



University of Nairobi

College of Humanities and Social Sciences

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SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF REFUGEES IN KENYA

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R51/74605/2014

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A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of The Degree of Master of Arts in
Diplomacy.

November 2017

DECLARATION

I, Natariana Syombwii Kilonzo hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Natariana Syombwii Kilonzo

Signed.....

Date.....

This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Amb. Prof. Maria Nzomo

Signed.....

Date.....

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my daughter Michelle Wanjiku. This work also goes to all those that have committed themselves to the fight against terrorism, individuals and organizations alike.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would not have done this without God's grace. I wish to thank my Supervisor Amb. Prof. Maria Nzomo for her guidance throughout the entire research work. To my family, friends and fellow classmates, I remain forever grateful for the unwavering support you accorded me during the entire time of writing this research project. To my respondents your cooperation meant everything to me.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM-	African Mission in Somalia
AU-	African Union
COMESA-	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CT-	Counter Terrorism
CSO-	Civil Society Organization
CVE-	Counter Violent Extremism
DRA-	Department of Refugee Affairs
DRC-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC-	East African Community
FATF-	Financial Action Task Force
GDDP-	Garissa District Development Plan
GoK-	Government of Kenya
HoA-	Horn of Africa
IDPs-	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KDF-	Kenya Defense Forces
KECOSCE-	Kenya Muslims and Kenya Community Support Center
LDCs-	Least Developed Countries
MP-	Member of Parliament
NCTC-	National Counter Terrorism Center
NGOs-	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSAC-	National Security Advisory Committee
NSAs-	Non-State Actors
PLO-	Palestine Liberation Organization
RPA-	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RSD-	Refugee Status Determination

SALW- Small Arms and Light Weapons

SPLM/A- Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

SPSS- Statistical Package for Social Sciences

UNHCR- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US- United States

UK- United Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

With the increasing rate of insecurity across African continent especially terrorism as a result of massive refugee influx, many of African countries are worried about the impact the refugees have on the national security of the countries they seek asylum. This concern prompted me to carry out my research on the security challenges in Africa focusing on the role of refugees in Kenya. I was guided by the following set of questions: What is the impact of refugee influx on African security? What has been the trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security? And what strategies and mechanisms has the Government of Kenya employed to combat insecurity especially terrorism as a result of refugee influx in Kenya? which were used to formulate my objectives: To examine and analyze the impact of refugee influx on African security; to examine and assess the trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security; to analyze strategies and mechanisms the Government of Kenya has employed to combat insecurity especially terrorism as a result of refugee influx in Kenya. Securitization theory was used as the analytical tool for this research to help understand why refugees, typically seen as a non-security issue, a humanitarian concern, are presently viewed as potential threats to national security. I proceeded with these set of testable indicators: Massive refugee influx has generally had negative impact on African security; refugee influx in Kenya has increased insecurity; the perception that refugees are a major driver of terrorism has weakened counter terrorism efforts in Kenya. Mixed methods was used as the research design where both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed. According to the research findings, it was quite clear that, refugees are perceived as potential threats to security in Kenya, and the perception that they are a major driver of terrorism has weakened counter terrorism efforts in Kenya. From the study, many of the respondents felt that refugees were synonymous to terrorism, that the refugee camps provide breeding grounds for the terrorist groups including being avenues for radicalization and violent extremism for the combatant. A large number of those interviewed felt that Kenya's porous borders have been taken advantage of by refugees entering into Kenya and proliferation of small arms and light weapons mostly used to train vulnerable refugees in the camp. This study will hopefully contribute in enriching the already existing literature especially on the nature and the extent of the refugee threat on host-country's security in Africa at large and Kenya in particular. The recommendations of the study will hopefully provide information to policy makers which will go a long way to enhance security policies formulation and implementation. Among the recommendations put forth include enhancing border security, through refugee inspection or even the abolishment of the refugee camps and a joint community approach to fighting terrorism by way of inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders in both the public and private sectors. The suggested areas for further research are as follows: The role of porous borders in promoting insecurity in Africa and the feasibility of joint community, public and private sector in combating insecurity especially terrorism in Africa.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

According to the World Bank Development Report of 2011, “there were around 42.3 million people displaced worldwide as a result of conflict, violence, and human rights violations by the end of 2009”. “Of these, 27.1 million remained internally displaced persons (IDPs) while 15.2 million were refugees outside their country of birth or country of habitual residence, and who remained often in prolonged displacement situations in the host country”.¹

“As of 1997, there were about 21 African refugee-generating states while 37 African countries were refugee-hosting countries”.² “In total there were 3,684,000 documented refugees and asylum seekers in Africa, or about one quarter of the world’s documented refugees and asylum seekers”.³ According to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee:

A refugee is an individual or any person, who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, or habitual residence and he/she is not able or owing to such fear, is reluctant to avail himself for the protection of his or her country⁴.

The “major refugee generating and hosting regions in Africa are; Great Lakes region where the political and ethnic conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have generated millions of refugees over the past four decades”.⁵ “Most of these refugees have been

¹The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge: World Development Report/ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/64060821283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Refugees.pdf

²International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRC). World Disaster Report. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 127-130

³US Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey. (Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, 1997)

⁴<http://www.refugeelawinformation.org/1951-convention>

⁵UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 74- 76

hosted in the region, mainly in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, as well as in the refugee producing countries themselves”⁶.

“The Horn of Africa, where a succession of armed conflicts resulted in the flight of millions of people in pursuit of safety is another region that has produced refugees immensely”.⁷ “These have included the war between Ethiopia and Somalia for the control of the Ogaden region in 1977-1978, the struggle for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, which began in the 1950s and was lastly realized in 1993, and the conflict between government and rebel forces in Southern Sudan”.⁸ “Most of these refugees found protection within the countries of the Horn itself, as well as in the bordering states of Egypt and Kenya.”⁹

West Africa has also been known to produce a significant number of refugees as well. “Where the civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have left thousands of people of those nations displaced both internally and externally. Several other countries outside those regions are also generating as well as hosting refugees”¹⁰.

Kenya has an extensive history of accommodating refugees that predate its independence. By early 1970s Kenya was hosting a small number of refugees estimated at 2,500 refugees. The refugee population in the country remained small until 1980 when it was estimated to be 3,500. In the next decade it quadrupled, to 14,400 in 1990 reaching an all-time peak of 402,000 in 1999. Subsequently the refugee numbers fell to 224,000 in 1996 and after rising slightly to 238,000 in 1998 they dwindled further to 206, 000 in 2000. From this period there was an upward trend and by 2006 the total refugee population was 273,000 the highest it had been since 1992. By 2009, it was even higher with estimates putting it at 329,000.

⁶UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 74- 76

⁷Ibid

⁸Ibid

⁹UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 74- 76

¹⁰Ibid`.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The increasing insecurity in the African continent in form of terrorism as a result of massive refugee influx into the African region has raised urgent security concerns. Broadly perceived as an unprecedented disaster, the massive refugee flows have created a mixture of humanitarian concern for the masses of people forced into exile and panic for the potential threat to the economic, social, and political as well as security stability for the host governments.

Many African governments that are key recipients of refugees are increasingly concerned that the refugee camps have become breeding grounds for terrorist and centers of trafficking and illegal imports trade besides being enablers of banned weapons proliferation. Some of these camps have also turned into training and recruitment avenues for refugees who choose to engage in terrorist activities, especially in the host countries, and thus threatening the security situation.

The dilemma for the African states therefore is a dilemma between a humanitarian concern for refugees and a realization that in a world increasingly threatened by insecurities of all forms especially terrorism, refugees can be a source of security tensions. African governments are thus concerned about all possible sources of insecurity especially terrorism, including the role played by refugees.

Whilst the existing literature recognizes the real and potential security threats refugee flows can pose, there has been little empirical investigation of the nature and extent of these threats. The main objective of this study is to therefore explore and analyze the nature and magnitude of the refugee threat on host-state security in Africa and Kenya in particular.

1.3. Research Questions

1. What are the impact of refugee influx on African security?
2. What has been the trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security?
3. What measures has the Kenyan government explored in its efforts to counter the rising insecurities especially terrorism as a result of increased refugee influx in Kenya?

1.4. Research Objective

The main objective of the study was to discuss the security challenges in Africa focusing on the role of refugees in Kenya.

1.4.1. Specific Objectives

1. To examine and analyze the impact of refugee influx on African Security.
2. To examine and assess the impact of refugee influx on Kenyan Security.
3. To analyze measures the Kenyan government has explored in its efforts to counter the rising insecurities in form of terrorism as a result of increased refugee influx in Kenya.

1.5. Literature Review

There are about 40 million refugees in the world including internally displaced persons currently who have been led involuntarily out from their habitual residents. “They are often living in special camps in their own or host countries, with some of them having remained displaced for years because of the prolonged conflicts”.¹¹ While Malcom¹² notes “that historians see the refugee phenomenon, inclusive of international refugee law as a twentieth century creation, mass displacements of populations have existed for as long as mankind has lived in organized groups where oppression and intolerance were inevitable”. Refugees are one of the chief difficulties encountered by the international community today.

The sources of refugeeism are multifaceted. “Persecution for racial, political, or religious reasons, war, famine and starvation, or fear of these phenomena, cause the major mass exodus of refugees which we know are taking place in the world today”.¹³ Nobel¹⁴ adds “that the refugee populations of Africa have grown from about 800,000 at the end of the 1960s, to about four million in the 1970s and more than five million in the middle of the 1980s”. Africa currently has a refugee population (according to UNHCR statistics) of over 7 million. Once these refugee inhabitants are in the country of asylum, they do not live in seclusion but interact with the native local communities in the host country. Through these interactions, refugees have an impact on the host communities. Evolving governments have varied pasts, topographical situations, diverse phases of commercial progress, various arrays of civic policies and dissimilar forms of inside and global dealings. The causes of skirmish in these areas consequently echo this multiplicity

¹¹UNAIDS, Population Mobility and Aids- UNAIDS Technical Update, Geneva, February (2001)

¹²Malcom, P., *European Refugees 1930-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement*, (London. Faber & Faber, 1957).

¹³Nobel, P. (ed), *Refugees and Development in Africa*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies — Seminar proceedings No. 19,(1998), p.13

¹⁴Ibid

and intricacy, nonetheless a number of shared tendencies and legacies appear to tie them collectively.

According to Fatmata in her article *“The root causes of refugee flows in the global context”*,¹⁵ “the world refugee population enlarged to 14.5 million in 2000, up from 13.5 million in 1998, and the figure of internally displaced persons stands at 20 million, relatively unchanged from 1999”.¹⁶ “In Sierra Leone, 1.4 million people,¹⁷ have flown their homes due to fear of rape and torture by rebels who ignited what has become a ten-year war”.

Fatmata continues to assert that, “torn by civil war and steady government bombings of civilian and humanitarian sites, the long-running conflict in Sudan has resulted in 4.46 million people who do not presently have stable homes”.¹⁸ “Four million Palestinians are refugees, and the drought and steady turmoil inside Afghanistan have caused 3.9 million natives to leave their homes”.¹⁹ She also observes that,²⁰ “Chechen refugees looking to leave bloody conflict behind are turned back at the border of the war-stricken breakaway region and Colombia's 2.1 million internally displaced people have had to abandon their land because of aerial anti-drug spraying”. Again, Fatmata mentions that, “In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, more than half the population was uprooted by the war, with an estimated 1.3 million people displaced inside the country”.²¹ That, “around half a million Bosnian refugees went to other republics of the former Yugoslavia, where some faced further nationalist violence and the risk of refoulement”.²²

¹⁵<http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP2102fls.html> Accessed on : 4 June 2017

¹⁶<http://www.asdnyl.com/causes-of-refugee-problem/>

¹⁷United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) Report, June 19 2001

¹⁸ <http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP2102fls.html> Accessed on 4 June 2017

¹⁹ibid

²⁰ibid

²¹ibid

²²United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) Report, June 19 2001

The report additionally articulated that “the spike in refugee figures since 1998 resulted from a flight by Burmese to Thailand, an exodus of 150,000 Congolese to various regions of Africa, a migration of 750,000 Eritreans to Sudan and Ethiopia in May and June 1999, as well as departures of Afghans and Burundians”.²³ “These disturbing figures beg the question: Why are people all over the world fleeing?” Amnesty International²⁴ summarizes the motives for refugee pours as: "they flee war, frightened that they will be confronted or caught in the cross-fire. They flee individual persecution, terrified that they will be confined, tortured or executed. Their fears are founded on real misery and anguish, real fears or the real experiences of friends and neighbors".

The explanations alleged by Amnesty might be uncomprehensive, since each refugee has a unique experience of fear and flight and the primary reasons for persecution are many. But the most vital points here are firstly, that human rights and refugees are not separate issues: all over the globe, people become refugees because of fear. “Fear of human rights abuses, fear of arbitrary violence, fear of persecution and therefore, in desperation, they leave their households in quest of protection”. Moreover, large-scale population displacements have affected all regions in the world. Certain individuals claim that the refugee crisis occur generally in evolving nations because of poverty and war.

Linking refugees to horror related happenings are widespread nowadays in many other parts of the world. The year 2010 November, reports from news pointed out “Yemeni government’s decision to increase the difficulty with which refugees from Somalia could seek asylum”. Yemeni officials claimed that militants associated with Alshabab were arrested in refugee camps

²³Ibid

²⁴Amnesty International: [<http://www.amnesty.org>]. Accessed 4 June 2017

after using refugee paths to enter the country.²⁵ Irrespective of widespread fears that some refugees and displaced persons may be the source of increase in insecurity, with few exclusions refugees and their potential linking to transnational terrorism have scarcely been examined empirically. In its place a large portion of study considers the connection between refugee influx and higher forms of violence and insecurity in the host-state country.

According to Salehyan and Gleditsch,²⁶ “the influx of refugees from neighboring countries can destabilize neighboring countries in many ways”. “Expansion of rebel social networks and diffusion of violence through refugee camps located close to the border of the country of origin can provide reserve to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out operations and fertile grounds for recruitment”. For instance, “in Pakistan the participation of Afghan refugees in the opposition against the Communist regime and its Soviet supporters in Afghanistan during the 1980s which took place with direct assistance from the Pakistani administration created conditions within Pakistan that radicalized sections of the population, led to a proliferation of arms, and in the long run weakened state authority”.²⁷ “Another example is the rebel group made up of largely Uganda-based Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, which in October 1990 formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and invaded northern Rwanda”.²⁸

Another way that refugee mass flow can or has had an impact on security is through the enablement of “transnational spreading of arms, combatants, and philosophies conducive to conflict. The direct role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a government-in-exile formed by Palestinian refugees, in the civil wars both in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1975) are

²⁵Human Rights Watch (Organization), and Simpson, G. From horror to hopelessness: Kenya's forgotten Somali refugee crisis. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2009)

²⁶Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, 60: (2006) 335-366.

²⁷Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, (Penguin Group. US, 2008).

²⁸Lomo Zachary, Angela Naggaga and Lucy Hovil, *The Phenomenon of Forced Migration in Uganda. An overview of Policy and Practice in a Historical Context. Working Paper No. 1.* (Refugee Law Project. Uganda., 2001)

instances of refugees as soldiers within a host country”.²⁹ Additionally the “recruitment of Liberian refugees by insurgent movements in Sierra Leone that caused destabilization and violent conflicts during the second half of the 1990s”.³⁰

“Refugees can also serve as local opposition groups in the host country with material resources and incentive to wage their own equipped battles”.³¹ For instance, Somali refugees have often worked closely with ethnic Somali secessionists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. “At times, refugees can pose a security and political threat to the host country which in turn can create strains in bilateral relations between neighboring countries”. “Cases include the involvement of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in the murder of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 over his alleged accommodation of the Sri Lankan government, and the participation of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda in the removal of the Milton Obote administration (1980-1985)”.³²

In these camps, UNHCR reports indicate that “security incidents involving death and injury take place on a daily basis”. “Bullets and guns have become a form of convertible currency part and parcel of a 'gun economy’”. “They've been absorbed into local customary livelihoods a lethal addition to traditional conflicts over livestock, water, and grazing rights and inter-communal relations”. Furthermore, “clan-based militias and arms syndicates are gradually replacing clan elders as key units of political organization”.

Although some armed elements voluntarily lay down their weapons to gain refugee status, others seek to return and fight, and often use refugee camps as bases to reorganize and strengthen their activities”.³³ These militarized crowds cause many complications for the refugee population as

²⁹ Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, 60: (2006) 335-366.

³⁰ Danny Hoffman, *The Meaning of a Militia: Understanding the Civil Defense Forces of Sierra Leone*, “*African Affairs* 106: (2007) 639-662.

³¹ *Ibid*

³² Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, 60: (2006) 335-366.

³³ Ndege, Kagwanja and Odiyo, *Refugees in Law and Fact: A Review of the Literature and Research Agenda in Kenya*, Occasional Paper Series Vol. 1 No. 1, (2002)

well as the sending and receiving nations. Firstly, these groups often involve in cross-border fighting with the country of origin. “Cross-border battles between ‘refugee combat’ groups and neighboring governments intimidate local inhabitants, the autonomy of the host government, and the bilateral relations between neighbors.”³⁴

Secondly, “armed refugee populations can undermine the host country”. “People who live and work in refugee camps will be barely surprised by the fact that rebels may have been tangled in the attacks that hit parts of Kenya since Kenya sent its troops to round the Alshabab mutineers in Somalia”.³⁵ “Penetration of refugee camps by militia is nothing new”. “The Goma refugee camp in eastern DRC was famous for shielding the Interahamwe fleeing the Rwandan Patriotic Front after it occupied Rwanda in 1994”.³⁶

“Armed infiltrations by the origin government to destroy these armed sets can ravage the local population”. “The invasions include “search-and-destroy” undertakings that attempt to weaken the backing of armed groups”.³⁷ “Such attacks on refugee populations typically entail” “rape, looting, abductions, cattle threat and loss of civilian lives.” “Armed groups usually transfer large amounts of arms with them from the conflict in the origin country”. “This incursion of arms may assist local opposition groups in the host nation that intend to subvert the government”.³⁸

Finally, “the powerlessness to isolated combatants from the refugees mostly leads to a public discernment in the host state that all refugees are a problem, and thus fosters pressures between host populations and refugees”. According to Justini Pini in her article, “*The Policies of the Host Government*”, “international law requires host governments to provide security to refugee populations within their borders”.

³⁴Abdirahman Ali, “Influx of Somali Refugees and State Security: Kenya as a case Study (2002-2012)” (Thesis, 2014).

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, chapter 2 as quoted in Yannis A. Stivachtis, *Kosovar Refugees and National Security*, *Refuge*, Vol 18, No.3 (August 1999)

³⁷Abdirahman Ali, “Influx of Somali Refugees and State Security: Kenya as a case Study (2002-2012)” (Thesis, 2014).

³⁸Ibid

In the aftermath of the Rwandan and Balkan disasters, UN Resolution 1208 reaffirmed that the principal responsibility of host states is “to guarantee the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements in accordance with international refugee, human rights and humanitarian law”. She continues to say that, “in reality, as long as the host state permits refugees to cross its borders, the international community can do little to ensure that the host government offers sufficient security for those refugees”. “The government’s role in refugee affairs is offering security but it has no capacity to manage them.” “It has mandated the UN agency relating to refugees to manage refugee affairs”.³⁹ “The UNHCR vets refugees by interviewing them on entry to Kenya”.⁴⁰ “This process is guided by the guidelines set by the 1951 Convention on refugees and the 1967 protocol of refugee management and that way they are given refugee status if their case of well-founded fear of persecution from their countries of origin is proven”.⁴¹

“In order to encourage security in a country the citizens should be free from illegal firearms or their stress-free access”.⁴² “Law implementation agencies, comprising the police, play a valid and central role in battling and preventing arms transferring to or through conflict zones”.⁴³ “Kenya has been active in taking measures that are geared towards ensuring safety for both refugees and Kenyan citizens”.⁴⁴

“The minister for internal security has been granted the power to enact a policy for requiring aliens to reside and remain within certain places or districts”.⁴⁵ “Under law such a policy may be enacted when a state of war exists or when it appears that an occasion of imminent danger or

³⁹Ibid

⁴⁰Ibid

⁴¹Ibid

⁴²Ibid

⁴³Ibid

⁴⁴Evelyn Kiswii, “Refugee Influx and (in) Security: Kenya’s Experiences, 1991-2012 (Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2013).

⁴⁵Ibid

great emergency has arisen”.⁴⁶ “The Kenyan parliament has never promulgated laws or regulation to enact the encampment policy”. “Nonetheless, a camp incarceration policy exists and is prescribed on a daily basis”.⁴⁷

“The management of refugees presents some challenges to those mandated to carry out the responsibilities of managing them. Inadequacy in provision of security resources by the government creates loopholes in this area where criminals and illegal immigrants take advantage of the porous borders and the refugee influxes and engage in activities such as carjacking, illegal trade in weapons and banditry.”⁴⁸ “It is unfortunate that these are happening at a time when refugees are streaming in Kenya in plenty and seeking refuge, fleeing from conflict”.⁴⁹ “In this confusion, the people mistaken for these malpractices are the vulnerable groups of refugees, who would not dare jeopardize their peaceful stay in host country”.⁵⁰

From the literature review, it is quite evident that, there is a knowledge gap in as far as the following is concerned: the impacts of refugee influx on African security; the trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security and the counter insecurity strategies and mechanisms especially on terrorism in Kenya.

⁴⁶Ibid

⁴⁷Parker Arthur, Hidden in plain view: Refugees living without protection in Nairobi, (USA: Human Rights watch Organization 2002), 146.

⁴⁸Evelyn Kiswii, “Refugee Influx and (in) Security: Kenya’s Experiences, 1991-2012 (Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2013).

⁴⁹Ibid

⁵⁰Ibid

1.6. Justification of the Problem

Policy Justification

The research findings of this study will hopefully be useful to policy makers as it will provide information that will assist during policy making and formulation of security policies and refugee issues especially those addressed by this study. The findings will hopefully be beneficial especially in helping policy makers design strategies and mechanism combat insecurity inform of terrorism as a result of refugee influx both in Africa at large and Kenya in particular.

Academic Justification

The findings of this research should contribute to a wide range of knowledge that would be used to enrich the already existing literature on the areas of research that the study will focus on. They include: The impact of refugee influx on African security; the trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security and the strategies and mechanisms employed by the Kenyan government to combat insecurity especially terrorism as a result of refugee influx in Kenya

1.7. Theoretical Framework

This study adopted Securitization theory. “In international relations it emerged as a theoretical reflection of the Copenhagen school”.⁵¹ “As a concept, securitization had been first presented by Ole Wæver in 1995, in order to redefine the terminological meaning of security, by questioning and criticizing all previous, ontologically materialistic, theoretical approaches to security”.⁵²

The “securitization process begins with a verbal statement or a reference to a specific actor as a potential threat”. “Subsequently, the potential is specified as a real threat that requires immediate countermeasures, and finally the successful acceptance by the audience, in both the existence of the threat and the need to respond”.⁵³ Thus the theory will help in explaining how the refugee question, traditionally observed as a humanitarian question, has turned to be framed as a security concern by many African governments that have been host to large numbers of refugees.

This theory is relevant because, it helps in explaining how refugees are presently regarded as a security threat and how citizens of the respective host countries have acknowledged that there is an existence of a threat and hence a need to respond. According to Eric, in his article on the *Militarization of Refugee Camps*, “to comprehend why refugees, typically perceived as a non-security issue, are regarded as potential threats, one must look at how security is defined within the scope of security theory”.

Moreover Eric continues to assert that, “the core theory of securitization within international relations embraces that an issue becomes a security threat not because it essentially constitutes an objective threat to the state but because that actor or state has deemed it to be a security issue, thus states then proclaims that pertinent action must be taken in order to protect its existence from such threat”.

⁵¹ Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 26-28.

⁵² Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritisation,” 2-4.

⁵³ Leonard, “FRONTEX and the Securitization of Migrants through Practices,” 8-10.

Most policy makers and practitioners increasingly view refugees as a contributing factor to war. Some within the UN system share the view that refugees can become a security hazard. Sadako Ogata stated that, “Refugee problems invariably affect key state interests. They are related to matters of national, regional, and even international peace and security...”⁵⁴

Using securitization theory, this study shows how refugees are increasingly viewed as key drivers of terrorism and how this perception had shaped counterterrorism measures.

1.8. Hypotheses

1. Massive refugee influx has generally had negative impact on African security.
2. Refugee influx in Kenya has increased insecurity.
3. The perception that refugees are a major driver of terrorism has weakened counter terrorism efforts in Kenya.

⁵⁴Refugees Magazine Issue 109 (1997 in Review) - Forward.” UNHCR News. United Nations, 17 Feb. 1997. Web. 12 Nov. (2013).

1.9. Research Methodology

The section contains description of the study design including the sampling techniques, scope and limitations of the study, types and sources of data, data collection instruments and procedures.

1.9.1. Research Design

This study employed mixed methods design in cooperating both qualitative and quantitative methods.

1.9.2. Data Collection Techniques

The researcher used interview guides and questioners to collect primary data. Interview guide aids one to know what to query about, in what order, how to pose interrogations, and how to position follow-ups. Interview Guides were administered to policy makers, while questioners administered to both the general public and members of the refugee community.

1.9.3. Sampling Technique

Simple random sampling and purposive sampling techniques were used for this study. Simple random sampling is a basic technique where a group of participants is selected for study from a bigger group. This was used to identify respondents from both the general public and those from the refugee community.

Purposive sampling selects the sample centered on who the researcher considers appropriate for the study. This technique was of use in classifying respondents for the interview guide who included policy makers and practitioners conversant with the area of study.

1.9.4. Target Population.

For this study the researcher randomly sampled respondents from the general public and members of the refugee community residing in Nairobi County. The researcher targeted key officials in the office of Ministry of Interior Security, Immigration office, Anti-Terror Unit, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Non Profit Organizations that deal with refugees issues such as Resettlement Support Center Africa and Refugee Point.

1.9.5. Scope and Limitations of the study

The research attempted to discuss the security challenges in Africa focusing on the role of refugees in Kenya. The respondents were drawn from Nairobi County. Owing to the fact that Nairobi, the capital of Kenya hosts the headquarters of most organizations dealing with refugees, and most government institutions like the ministry of internal security which is mandated with matters of security, key decision makers were easily accessible because most tend to be based at the office headquarters. Also since most urban refugees who are among the respondents reside in East Leigh Nairobi, makes Nairobi County a suitable location. As a researcher, I anticipated language barrier as a limitation for my study especially when interviewing refugees that were not conversant in English, but I planned to mitigate that by involving an interpreter where possible. Also since my topic is a bit sensitive I foresaw lack of cooperation with the respondents but I planned to guarantee confidentiality of their identities.

1.9.6. Types and sources of data:

The researcher used both primary and secondary data. Primary data basically concentrate on respondents' opinions and experiences concerning the study objectives. On the other hand, relevant secondary data such as related books, journals reports, academic studies, government documents and policies were used. Publications from relevant organizations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) to mention but a few went a long way in providing valuable secondary information for this study.

1.9.7. Data Analysis

Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used as an aid in the analysis of quantitative data which was presented accurately using graphs and pie charts, while content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data.

1.9.8. Validity and Reliability

“Reliability is the gradation to which a valuation tool generates stable and consistent outcomes while validity states to how well an assessment measures what it is claimed to measure”.⁵⁵ Whereas consistency is essential, it is on its own not adequate. For an investigation to be dependable, it too requires to be useable. Thus the researcher ensured that consistency and stability of information produced was maintained.

⁵⁵Colin Phelan and Julie Wren, Graduate Assistants, UNI Office of Academic Assessment (2005-06) <https://chfasoa.uni.edu/reliabilityandvalidity.htm>, Accessed on 21 April 2017.

1.9.9. Ethical Considerations

The following ethical considerations guided this research.

Avoiding Plagiarism and fraud: The researcher did not refer to another person's work as theirs. All other authors' publications and works were acknowledged. The researcher did not fake data that has not actually been collected.

Authority: Ensuring that there is no misuse of privileges. Research subjects participate in the research on trust.

Confidentiality and Anonymity: Respondents were protected by keeping the information given confidential, especially if confidentiality was promised. No name was mentioned if that was the wish of the respondents.

Physical and psychological harm: The researcher took preliminary tests and obtained all the background information in an effort to avoid imparting nay harm to subjects.

Seeking consent: A letter from the supervisor or school was provided to be produced every time the researcher was on the ground to give confidence to the respondents that the study was indeed academic and not for any personal or negative motives.

1.9.10. Chapter Outline.

- I. Introduction
- II. The impact of refugee influx on African security
- III. The trend and impact of refugee influx on Kenyan Security
- IV. Strategies by GOK in combating insecurity especially terrorism as a result of refugee influx in Kenya.
- V. Data presentation and analysis
- VI. Recommendations and Conclusions

2.0. CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEE INFLUX ON AFRICAN SECURITY

2.1. Causes of Refugee Influx in Africa

Literature traces the inauguration of the problem of refugees in Africa back to the era of struggles for liberation. As Milner argues out, “while exodus, both involuntary and voluntary, has been a describing feature of African account since pre-modern periods, the advent of the modern refugee spectacle in Africa may be associated to the tussle for and attainment of independence by most African countries in the late 1950s and initial 1960s”.⁵⁶ Deng recognizes “civil and ethnic conflicts as the key causes of forced exoduses in Sub-Saharan Africa”.⁵⁷ “Intense armed conflict experienced in quite a lot of African nations in the post-Independence time are therefore often the uninterrupted result of exclusionary policies straggled by newly liberated regimes that in vital ways can be seen as a prolongation of similar colonial policies”.⁵⁸ “The conflicts often contrasting ruling groups trying to preserve the status quo on the one hand and omitted group pull together for change, on the other. Consequently, fights over the control of political and economic power and related to massive human rights exploitation, comprising widespread violence are the main cause of population flights in Sub Saharan Africa”. Anthony mentions “Uganda, Chad, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi as examples of major refugee generating countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but the list can certainly be lengthy”.

Furthermore, “armed struggles that a major source population dislocation are, in many cases, a result of failure or reluctance of certain governments to resolve longstanding ethnic tensions or

⁵⁶J. Milner. Golden Age? What Golden Age? A critical history of African asylum policy. (Paper presented to the center for Refugee Studies, York University, and 28 January 2004).

⁵⁷F. Deng Protecting the dispossessed: A challenge for the international community. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993)

⁵⁸Ibid

the tendency of certain governments to oppress certain population groups”.⁵⁹

“For many socio-economic and developmental analysts armed conflicts and the resulting mass flight of refugees constitute the greatest challenge for economic development and the greatest obstacle to economic take off”.⁶⁰ “The responses to the refugee problem as well as the management of refugee crises in Africa reflect this complex nature of the refugee phenomenon and the root causes of population displacement”.⁶¹

The complexity of the refugee fiasco in Africa creates a great challenge for researchers, humanitarians as well as policy makers. Recurrent wars and political war in several African nations have exiled a large number of people from Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda, and Eritrea. Some find accommodation - often offered by UNHCR and other aid agencies - in campsites inside their countries of residents. Others are voyaging the border and have occupied shelter in refugee camps over there. Today particularly the rebellion in Somalia conveys about enormous dislodgment. Countless Somalis inflowing Kenya reach in Dadaab, just past the Somali border. “Three jammed camps there house two hundred and seventy thousand people”. “Extension of the camps is necessary but compound, as there is basically not adequate land for the thousands more anticipated to arrive”⁶².

“The above situation has caused loss of critical infrastructure and markets, wiping out the regional agricultural production capacity”.⁶³ “Massive shifts of population due to protracted conflict and insecurity disrupted the critical time of planting and harvesting for huge parts of the farming community”.⁶⁴ “Even though the southern part of Sudan is very productive, the acute

⁵⁹A. Adepoju, "Les Consequences Des Movements De Refugees Sur Les Pays D'accueil En Afrique". Incidence Des Migrations Internationales Sur Les Pays En Development. (London: Apple yard; Reginald, 1989)

⁶⁰D. Nabudere, "Towards a new model of production. An alternative to NEPAD". African Perspective, 4, 15 Issues. Autumn (2003).

⁶¹Ibid

⁶²UN News Service, "Somali refugees strain resources of neighboring countries, UN official warns". UN Daily News, 3 May (2010).

⁶³Red Cross, Horn of Africa: Exceptional Food Security Crisis Appeal and Budget revision, (2009)

⁶⁴World Food Programme, Somalia., (2010)

malnutrition degree in this area is one of the highest in the world owing to war and movement of people.”⁶⁵ “The refugee catastrophe in Africa has continuously been at the same time a source and a consequence of armed wars. Uncertain refugee problems and problematic living conditions inside which large figures of refugees find themselves have forced the latter to opt to violence to departure to their countries of origin”.⁶⁶ “Furthermore, conflicts have been spreading from one country to neighboring countries in which refugees fleeing violence in their countries have sought refuge”. “This is mainly due to the fact that in many instances armed elements are mixed with ordinary refugees creating instability in the area of refugee settlement”.⁶⁷

“Moreover, of the three commonly agreed-upon durable solutions, namely, voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement in a third country, African countries favor 'voluntary' repatriation and are usually against the local integration solution”. As Kibreab argues, “the result of this general tendency is that refugees are usually forced to return back to their countries of origin even when the cause of their flight has not totally been solved”.⁶⁸ “This results in high mobility of refugees across the continent in fear of being forcibly returned to their countries of origin”.⁶⁹ It too quite often leads to armed conflict as refugees attempt to express themselves.

⁶⁵World Food Programme, Djibouti (2009)

⁶⁶B. Rutinwa, "The Tanzanian Government's Response to the Rwandan Emergency." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (1996)

⁶⁷J. C. Jeff., (Ed. 1996). "No solution in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa." *New Issues in Refugee Research; Working Paper No. 75* Geneva: UNHCR, January Rutinwa, Bonaventure (2003).

⁶⁸Ibid

⁶⁹G. Kibreab, *Displacement, host governments' policies, and constraints on the construction of Sustainable livelihoods.* (UNESCO, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003)

2.2. Impacts of Refugee Influx in Africa.

“Since the late 1970s, the global community has been well alert of the severe impact that large scale refugee populations can have on the social, economic and political life of host developing nations”⁷⁰. “The highest refugee manifestations are in some of the underprivileged countries in the world”⁷¹. “A huge figure of such travels are into Least Developed Countries (LDCs)”⁷². “The manifestation of refugees complexes the already prevalent economic, ecological, social and also at times, political difficulties in these nations”⁷³. “Often such states are confronted by an amalgamation of all four of these factors. Nearly at all times their impact is significant”⁷⁴. “Additionally, in many refugee circumstances, complications are aggravated when refugees are a considerable proportion of the local, if not countrywide population. For instance, in Nepal, in the district of Jhapa, 90,000 refugees signify over 13 per cent of the local populace”⁷⁵; “in Ngara, in the United Republic of Tanzania, the current refugee arrivals intended that the local population was outstripped by a ratio of roughly 4: 1”⁷⁶; “that is, there were some 700,000 refugees among a local population of 186,000. In Malawi, a refugee inflow which originated in 1986, had led, by 1993, to one million Mozambican refugees in the republic, some 10 per cent of the national inhabitants”⁷⁷.

⁷⁰<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html> Accessed 20 June 2017

⁷¹ibid

⁷²ibid

⁷³ibid

⁷⁴ibid

⁷⁵ibid

⁷⁶ibid

⁷⁷ibid

2.2.1. Economic Impact

“From the moment of entrance, refugees compete with the local people for rare assets such as land, water, housing, food and medical services”⁷⁸. “Over time, their existence leads to more extensive demands on natural resources, education and health facilities, energy, transportation, social services and employment”⁷⁹. They may result to inflationary burdens on charges and reduce earnings. “In some occurrences, they can significantly alter the flow of goods and services within the society as a whole and their presence may have repercussions for the host country’s balance of payment and destabilize structural modification initiatives”⁸⁰.

“One example of market disturbances would be the need to rent accommodation for office and housing purposes, not just for expatriates, but also for locally involved staff, in response to a refugee situation”⁸¹. “Increased building activity results, but this is usually escorted by increases in rent, benefiting those who are assets owners, but undesirably affecting the poor and those on permanent incomes, such as government officers”⁸². “Purchase of large quantities of building material may make them rare or unavailable for local people, while also generating inflationary effects”⁸³. “Likewise, increased demand for food and other commodities can lead to price rises in the marketplace which will arouse local economic activity, although, again, not advancing the poorest”⁸⁴. The manifestation of a huge refugee population in rural regions certainly likewise means a strain on the native administration. “Host state national and regional authorities dissuade considerable resources and manpower from the tenacious demands of their own development to the vital task of keeping refugees alive, alleviating their sufferings and guaranteeing the security

⁷⁸bid

⁷⁹bid

⁸⁰bid

⁸¹bid

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⁸³bid

⁸⁴bid

of the whole community”.⁸⁵ “While most host governments usually have confirmed a willingness to bear many of these costs, they are reasonably reluctant to pay, as a price for giving asylum, the cost of extra infrastructure that may be needed to put up refugees”.⁸⁶

The economic consequence of refugees on the receiving nations, is not certainly harmful. An economic incentive may be generated by the presence of refugees and can lead to the opening and growth of the host states. This incentive occurs through the local acquisition of foodstuff, non-food stuff, shelter resources by agencies providing relief items, disbursements made by aid workers, the assets brought by refugees themselves, as well as employment and income amassed to local population, directly or indirectly, through assistance projects for refugee areas. The presence of refugees also contributes to the creation of employment profiting the local population, directly or indirectly. Furthermore, relevant line departments involved in refugee work as counterparts to UNHCR, both at central and local levels, also benefit from UNHCR support intended at strengthening their coping and management capacities. Such assistance may include apparatus supply, capacity building and related training components. The presence of refugees, as a focus of attention, can also interest development agencies to the host zones. Whereas infrastructure is advanced in the initial stage mainly to facilitate the work of host administrations, UNHCR and its implementing partners in the refugee affected areas, it can also serve as a promoter to ‘open up’ the host region to progress efforts that would otherwise never extent these ‘marginal’ spaces.

⁸⁵ibid

⁸⁶ibid

2.2.2. Environmental Impact

“The addition of a substantial group of refugees to an existing population generates a sudden and massive demand for scarce natural resources such as land, fuel, water, food and shelter materials, with long-term implications on their sustainable re-generation”.⁸⁷ “Estimates of rural wood consumption in Somalia indicate that the wood requirement for a family of five, for hut construction, is 2.4 m per head per year for cooking”.⁸⁸ “Assuming that the wood consumption of refugees would be modest, say half the normal consumption, a camp of four thousand refugees would consume about 10,000m of wood a year for cooking”.⁸⁹

“The average volume of wood in the savanna-type woodlands of Somalia was estimated to be approximately 50 m per hectare, which means that the normal refugee camp would exhaust 600 hectares land in the first year of its establishment and 400 hectares for every year thereafter”.⁹⁰

“Supplementary food gathering through hunting, scavenging and collecting local food stocks adds to the stress on the environment. Moreover, human waste disposal can pollute local ground water and cause the spread of infection”.⁹¹

“Transportations in host areas undergo heavy deterioration from increased use to deliver food supplies and other merchandises, while public services, such as health, education and water facilities, are also seriously impacted”.⁹² “Instances of the overwhelming impact of large refugee populations on the eco-systems and on the infra-structure of a host countries can be found in the experiences of the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan in hosting Afghan refugees”.

⁸⁷ibid

⁸⁸ibid

⁸⁹ibid

⁹⁰<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html> accessed 20 June 2017

⁹¹ibid

⁹²ibid

Numerous kinfolks transported livestock which fed near camps, accounting to the perpetual glitches of over-grazing and the subsequent hastening in soil erosion.

2.2.3. Social Impact

There is often identification with and empathy for the conditions of refugees coming from the same ethnic and linguistic group as the native population. Numerous instances exist where refugees are provided a place to live with the native citizens, “Over 400,000 refugees have been boarded with family or friends in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Different culture, however, can be a basis for problems”.⁹³ Hostilities may occur amid groups. “Even if it is not the case, failures in communication and understanding caused by dialectal and/or culture can form serious barriers”.⁹⁴ “In some cases, the presence of one tribal group of immigrants may disturb ethnic equilibriums within the local inhabitants and intensify conflicts”.⁹⁵

There are frequently protests that exiles have added to safety difficulties in overall and crime rates, robbery, assassinations etc., in specific. Concurrently, other societal evils such as alcoholism and prostitution are also believed to rise in the refugee zones. “On the one hand, enforced idleness and poverty within a refugee camp may cause an acceleration of such tendencies, particularly if there are groups of young men who are not meaningfully occupied”.⁹⁶ “Rate of crime may rise no more than would be expected in a population group of the new size, but in an isolated and hitherto quiet area, this would not go unobserved”.⁹⁷

“If the area has converted into a center of economic activity, as the existence of large scale relief would indicate, it may have enticed a group of people who will yield from the existing situation

⁹³<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html> Accessed 20 June 2017

⁹⁴ibid

⁹⁵ibid

⁹⁶<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html> Accessed 20 June 2017

⁹⁷ibid

and may not be organized by the social and legitimate safeguards of the area”.⁹⁸ “A common source of dissatisfaction for a local population, especially one that is poor, is to see refugees receiving services or privileges which are not accessible to them”.⁹⁹ “Refugees may have access to services such as education and health while local people do not, although UNHCR, as a matter of standard, endeavors to endorse a joined approach to human services which respect the local policies”¹⁰⁰.

“For instance, a review of the effect of refugee health services in eastern Kivu, Zaire, identified several hitches, not the least of which was a failure of agencies to consult and coordinate with local health authorities”.¹⁰¹ “The provision of free health services for refugees demoralized the local cost recovery approach. Advanced salaries offered by NGOs exhilarated staff to leave local health centers”.¹⁰²

“These skills differ, but do often include those of the more educated group, such as health professionals and teachers, who, even in inadequate numbers, can make a major contribution in remote zones”.¹⁰³ “An additional variety of expertise that can be brought by refugees may include an innovativeness culture which can inspire the local economy or offer advanced agricultural techniques before unknown to the host areas”.¹⁰⁴ “For example, refugees have introduced swamp land rice in Guinea, making use of previously unoccupied land and presenting new agricultural practices”.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸Ibid

⁹⁹Ibid

¹⁰⁰Ibid

¹⁰¹Ibid

¹⁰²<http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html> Accessed 23 June 2017

¹⁰³Ibid

¹⁰⁴Ibid

¹⁰⁵Ibid

2.2.4. Political and Security Impact

The complications connected to refugees may not be constrained to a specific boundary zone but may have spillover consequence on the interior security condition of a region. “Immigrants and refugees could be seen as uninvited non-nationals and ethnic “threat” for the receiving country public”.¹⁰⁶ “Ethnic pressures may become particularly prominent when refugees own ethnic ties with groups already existing in the host culture”.¹⁰⁷ “In nations where ethnic cleavages are deeply rooted, large, unanticipated migrant inflows may slant the delicate cultural equilibrium in the receiving society and stimulus inter-group conflict”.¹⁰⁸ “The abrupt influx of refugees can heighten ethnic problems and further obscure the picture by changing the internal balance of power”. Lake and Rothschild “plug to similar dynamics in their discussion of the dissemination of ethnic conflict through state”.¹⁰⁹ “Moreover, refugee flows may perhaps directly shake the security and steadiness of the receiving nation by contributing to organized armed conflict on the territory”. Salehyan and Gleditsch have observed that “refugee inflows from bordering states meaningfully increase the danger of civil war”.¹¹⁰ “Along with the refugees themselves, foreign fighters, weapons, and ideas that contribute to violence may also stream across the border”, “refugees combatant communities as asserted by various scholars including Lischer”¹¹¹, “can expand rebel networks to encompass the host state when militants established bases on external territory and can form social ties with domestic opposition groups with a similar ethnic or political orientation”. “Therefore, at the extreme, refugee influxes may lead to violent disorder

¹⁰⁶www.iosrjournals.org Accessed 30 June 2017

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Lake David A. and Donald Rothschild, *Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict*. In, *the International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Edited by David Lake and Donald Rothschild, Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press: 1998)

¹¹⁰ Salehyan, Idean and Kristian S. Gleditsch, *Refugees and the Spread of Civil War*, *International Organization*. 60(2): (2006)335-366

¹¹¹ Lischer Sarah, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca, (NY: Cornell University Press, 2005)

on the host nation's territory".¹¹²

According to Andreas¹¹³; Herbst¹¹⁴; Jackson¹¹⁵ and Zacher¹¹⁶, "in the cases of refugee migrant, such flows threaten to extend violence and opposition activities across national boundaries".

"Migrants escape civil war and state maltreatment for safety in countries of refuge, and most of the world's refugees flee to countries in close proximity to their country of origin".¹¹⁷

"Nevertheless, mostly when borders are permeable, they are essentially immune from unrelenting attacks by the state. States may follow their tribal and or political adversaries across the boundary, and such attacks inescapably violate the independence and territorial veracity of others".¹¹⁸

According to Lischer "of interest is the fact that refugees may not be inert actors, however, in many cases, while the huge majority of refugees never directly partake in violence instead of being ill-fated preys of violence, some refugees have organized into insurgent establishments and refugee camps often serve a double-purpose as preserves for rebellious groups"¹¹⁹.

"Conscription into a rebel group may provide refugees a better option to life in a camp and offer individuals a sense of drive".¹²⁰ "These refugee fighter communities sometimes form when their hosts are too weak to prevent the militarization of refugee camps"; "in other cases, host states actively encourage and aid rebellious activities as a way to undermine their international opponents".¹²¹ "Therefore, violence between the nations of origin and refugee populations may

¹¹²Ibid

¹¹³Andreas, Peter, Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty First Century, *International Security* 28 (2): (2003) 78-111.

¹¹⁴Herbst, Jeffrey, the Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa. *International Organization* 43 (4): (1989) 673-692

¹¹⁵Jackson, Robert H, Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: *International Jurisprudence and the Third World*. *International Organization* 41 (4): (1987) 519-549.

¹¹⁶Zacher, Mark; The Territorial Integrity Norm: *International Boundaries and the use of Force*. *International Organization* 55(2): (2001) 215-250

¹¹⁷Ibid

¹¹⁸Ibid

¹¹⁹Lischer, Sarah: *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*. Ithaca, (NY: Cornell University Press, 2005)

¹²⁰www.iosrjournals.org Accessed 30 June 2017

¹²¹Ibid

not be prejudiced, but assumes the form of transcontinental civil conflicts that extent intercontinental boundaries”.¹²² “Indeed, Gates argues that the sub-national level on the geography of civil conflict have confirmed that battles commonly take place in close proximity to international borders and refugee warrior groups are likely to be responsible for much of this find”.¹²³

As asserted by Bapat¹²⁴ and Salehyan¹²⁵, “bargaining and negotiations, may be difficult in these circumstances”. “Cross-border attacks against external rebel bases and hot pursuit incursions may jeopardize bilateral relations, but the costs of confrontation with the host state may be seen as acceptable when compared with the tactical advantages to be gained over domestic rebel organizations”.¹²⁶ “Furthermore, disputes about supposed host country support for rebel group are difficult to resolve through negotiating because it may be difficult for the host country to credibly oblige to reversing its policies”.¹²⁷

“In many occurrences host countries deny supporting rebels despite home nation allegation, and it is difficult to prove that the state is not engaging in a malicious policy; it is hard to prove a negative fact”.¹²⁸ “Authenticating compliance with demands to cease rebels support is difficult since rebel support may continue covertly”.¹²⁹ “Moreover, state supporting rebel organizations may find that the benefits of promoting uncertainty in neighbors outweigh the risk of retaliatory strikes”.¹³⁰ “Lastly, refugee host government may find it problematic to comply with demands to

¹²²Ibid

¹²³Ibid

¹²⁴Bapat, Navin (2006); State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1): (2006)213-230

¹²⁵Salehyan, Idean, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict, *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming (2008)

¹²⁶Ibid

¹²⁷Ibid

¹²⁸Ibid

¹²⁹www.iosrjournals.org Accessed 30 June 2017

¹³⁰Ibid

evict rebel organizations because they find it too exorbitant and dangerous to forcibly move against such groups”.¹³¹

2.2.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter sought to address objective one which was to examine and analyze the impact of refugee influx on African security, with its corresponding testable assumption that, massive refugee influx has had a negative impact on Africa security. Through the literature reviewed for since this part relied majorly on secondary data, it was observed that, refugee influx in Africa has impacted negatively on security than it has positively. According to the definition of security, which encompasses not just military security but also economic, environmental, political and security of energy and natural resources, it is quite evident that, refugees are a threat to all these forms of security. The addition of a substantial group of refugees to an existing population generates a sudden and massive demand for scarce for resources, such as job opportunities for the residents, natural resources, food and shelter materials. Politically, the complications connected to refugees may not be constrained to a specific boundary zone but may have spillover consequence on the interior security condition of a region. Immigrants and refugees could be seen as uninvited non-nationals and ethnic “threat” for the receiving country public. From the data, the objective was achieved and the hypotheses confirmed.

¹³¹Ibid

3.0. CHAPTER THREE

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEE INFLUX ON KENYAN SECURITY

3.1. An Overview of the History of Refugees in Kenya.

Through continental failures of 1990s Kenya was antagonized by an enormous incursion of persons in exile and a grave deficiency in its abilities to provide essential amenities to those evading violence and persecution. Located in an area beleaguered by political skirmish, ethnic cleansing and ethnic strains for almost twenty five years, Kenya has been acknowledged for comparative safety and secure for refuge for those escaping persecution in their countries of habitual residents.

Per the enormous entry of refugees all over the years following 1970s, 80s and 90s, and also currently, policies in Kenya have had to adjust in so as to meet the varying manner of involuntary immigration patterns in the African continent. “Kenya in the year 1971 compered its initial surge of refugees from Uganda; an assessed twenty thousand individuals remained exiled by countrywide partisan turmoil together with the ambush of the tyrannical leader Idi Ami”.¹³²¹³³

It ought to be well-known that throughout the initial years in 1970s, the government of Kenya coped with this inflow fairly well and a lot of those refugees from Uganda were integrated into the indigenous culture. Many of the evacuees secure occupation contributing to the local economy.

“Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s the refugee delinquent in Kenya was particularly grave. The country’s formal refugee population was insignificant and was mainly composed of Ugandans, who were generally engrossed into the country’s employment market and money-

¹³²blogs.commonsgeorgetown.edu

¹³³Time. “EAST AFRICA: An Idiotic Invasion.” time, November 13, 1978. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946151-1,00.html> (accessed May 28, 2017).

making sector.”¹³⁴ Conversely, “the refugee temperature in Kenya was suddenly changed as colossal state of regional unsteadiness in the 1990s that was hatched in states of Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia and was further exasperated in the mid-90s with the genocides and conflict in the region of the Great Lakes”.¹³⁵ With this eruption of war and starvation region over, the data concerning Kenyan refugees altered radically. “It is proposed that by 1991 Kenya had accommodated a maximum of 14,500 refugees and was at present comprising approximately 13,000 and just above a year later in 1992, the nation was holding about 400,000 refugees mostly from Sudan, Somali and Ethiopia”.¹³⁶

“The onslaught of refugees to Kenya in the early 1990s inaugurated with the flop of Siad Barre’s government in Somalia in 1991”.¹³⁷ “This conflict-induced dislodgment forced tens of thousands of Somalis to escape their home country”.¹³⁸ “It is projected that during the most contentious times of the conflict approximately 800,000 Somalis escaped and took asylum in bordering countries, about 200,000 in Kenya”.¹³⁹ “The amount of refugees in Kenya originating from Somalia still signifies a quite staggering number and it is proposed that since the 1991 governmental collapse and the violent aftermath that there are well over 560,000 Somali refugees in the region”.¹⁴⁰ The response by Kenya of the Somali refugee onslaught disaster altered in the initial periods of the war in Somali. “The Kenyan government in January 1991 overturned a prior resolution and stated permitting temporary asylum to Somalis arriving the country due to the

¹³⁴Crisp, Jeff. “The State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s Refugee camps.” *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 601-632. Pg. 616. <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/99/397/601.abstract> (accessed May 28, 2017).

<https://blogs.commonsgeorgetown.edu/sc652/2011/06/30/a-glimpse-into-kenyas-refugee-story/>

¹³⁵blogs.commonsgeorgetown.edu

¹³⁶Odhiambo-Abuya, E. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Status Determination Imtakaan in Kenya: An Empirical Survey.” *Journal of African Law* 48, no. 2 (2004): 187-206.

¹³⁷blogs.commonsgeorgetown.edu

¹³⁸ibid

¹³⁹Forced Migration Online. “FMO Research Guide: Causes and consequences of forced migration.” *Forced Migration Online: A world of information on human displacement.* <http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo016/fmo016-6.htm> (accessed May 28, 2017).

¹⁴⁰Sheikh, Abdi. “Somalia clashes kill 138 in two weeks -rights group.” *Reuters*, January 15, 2010. <http://madaale.com/?p=145> (accessed May 28, 2017).

conflict”.¹⁴¹ It ought to be well-known that, the most contentious time in the Kenyan history was in the early 1990s.

“The republic of Kenya was endeavoring to formulate its own multi-party arrangement and was deal with issues of internal displacement”.¹⁴² This modification in Kenyan arena politically additionally impacted the apparatuses existing aimed at evacuee support. “The administration no longer harbored the capacity to look externally and support foreigners inflowing the country, but in its place was drawn inward to critically examine its own concerns”.¹⁴³ “Consequently, refugees began to be recognized as aliens and strangers and were shunned from local integration, as opposed to being absorbed as they were in the 1970s”.¹⁴⁴ “As a result of the severe strain on governmental capacities, arrangements were made for the Kenyan government to handover the responsibilities of refugee management and the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process to UNHCR and soon after the Somali crisis, UNHCR assumed these errands”.¹⁴⁵

“Furthermore, with this new role of UNHCR in Kenya compounded by the huge numbers of refugees flowing the country, the guidelines toward refugees in Kenya changed from ones of local integration to an informal encampment policy”.¹⁴⁶ “In the early 1990s UNHCR erected the Dadaab complex (roughly 60km south of the Somali-Kenyan border) that houses three camps: Dagahale, Ifo and Hagadera. Initially built for a size of 90,000 refugees, Dadaab is now home of the world’s biggest refugee camp hosting above 300,000 refugees”.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. “The Horn of Africa: Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.” UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,COUNTRYREP,DJI,3ae6a80f30,0.html> (accessed May 28, 2017).

¹⁴²blogs.commonsworld.org/georgetown.edu

¹⁴³ibid

¹⁴⁴ibid

¹⁴⁵ibid

¹⁴⁶ibid

¹⁴⁷Provost, Claire, and Hamaz Mohamed. “Dadaab refugee camps: 20 years of living in crisis.” *The Guardian*, March 24, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-living-in-crisis> (accessed May 28, 2017).

Nearly simultaneously the nation was met by other uncertainties regionally, mainly with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. “It is projected that the fall of the Ethiopian unity government in 1991, which was further exaggerated by regional drought and famine and the Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict affected nearly 8 million people, which involuntarily forced thousands to seek refuge in Kenya”.¹⁴⁸ “Furthermore, the Sudanese political climate was equally as contentious with the struggle between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese government, it is estimated that Sudanese refugees numbered about 250,000 in early 1988 and perhaps 400,000 by early 1991”.¹⁴⁹

“The Great Lakes region, including Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were also defined by extreme instability in the 1990s”.¹⁵⁰ “With the 1994 Rwandan genocide and Burundi conflict, Kenya arose as a safe haven for those fleeing mass ethnic persecution”.¹⁵¹ “Furthermore, the unrelenting instability of the régime in DRC also posed grave regional concerns of instability, which were further exasperated by the large Rwandan Hutu refugee inhabitants that became militarized within its borders”.¹⁵² “These dramatic conflicts to the West of Kenya highlighted Kenya’s regional stability, but also engendered a large influx of refugees from the Great Lakes Region”.¹⁵³

Whereas “the 1990s signified a tumultuous time for the Horn of Africa, Great Lakes Region and Eastern Africa as a whole, the Kenyan administration with its UNHCR partnership sustained a firm hand with respect to its swelling refugee population”.¹⁵⁴ It is proposed that, “There existed

¹⁴⁸Mekonnen, Meedan. “Drought, Famine, and Conflict: Case from the Horn of Africa.” The Conflict Resolution Information Source. http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/drought_famine_conflict.jsp?nid=6796 (accessed May 28, 2017).

¹⁴⁹U.S. Library of Congress. “Ethiopia – Refugees, Drought, and Famine.” Country Studies. <http://countrystudies.us/ethiopia/46.htm> (accessed May 28, 2017).

¹⁵⁰blogs.commonsworld.org/georgetown.edu

¹⁵¹*Ibid*

¹⁵²*Ibid*

¹⁵³*Ibid*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid*

200,000 refugees, with Somalis accounting for eighty percent, in UNHCR-supported campsites towards the end of 2001.”¹⁵⁵ Hitherto, “while UNHCR tried to support Kenya’s refugee dilemma, some studies suggest that by the late 1990s many Somalis and Ethiopians had went back home for fear of involuntary repatriation by the Kenyan government”.¹⁵⁶ “In 1990, 1000 refugees were reported to have been forcibly repatriated from Kenya after a directive issued by President Moi requiring Ugandan and Rwandan refugees to leave the country ‘immediately.’”¹⁵⁷ Additionally, “the Kenyan government abandoned the strategies and procedures it had implemented in the early 90s with regards to Somali asylum seekers, with the permanent shut down of the Somali-Kenyan border in 2007”.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, “while Kenya has evidently retained its status as regional stabilizer its present-day refugee guidelines and strategies have been profoundly influenced by the regional instability in the Lake Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Regions throughout the expiration of the 21st century”.¹⁵⁹

3.2. The Evolution of Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

Kenya has been a key target and has confronted a continuing terrorist threat from terrorist and extremist groups, the principal terror threat in the HOA for several reasons. “This is because, of a number of geographic, historical, regional, political, economic and socio-cultural factors which comprise Islamic radicalization in the region; Kenya’s vibrant coastal beach tourism industry that impends domestic Islamic culture; poor socio-economic condition in the country (45 percent live below poverty line)”;¹⁶⁰¹⁶¹ past marginalization of the country’s Muslim minority; Kenya’s

¹⁵⁵ University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. “Assessment for Somalis in Kenya.” Minorities at Risk. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupid=50106> (accessed May 28, 2017).

¹⁵⁶blogs.commonsgorgetown.edu

¹⁵⁷Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. “Kenya: Information on the current status of refugees in Kenya, on their rights and on whether Kenya protects them from non-refoulement (forced repatriation).” UNHCR.

¹⁵⁸blogs.commonsgorgetown.edu

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰World Bank 2010

¹⁶¹www.kessa.org

topographical proximity to Somalia where Al-Shabaab is headquartered & the Middle East; unsteady neighbors (Sudan and Somalia); permeable borders between Kenya and Somalia; as well as Kenya's resilient historical connections with the West and Israel.¹⁶² In line with the latter, most terror acts in Kenya have been contrary to Western targets in the republic.

In response to many terror attacks, the KDF have had accomplishment in its counter military maneuvers in 2011 invasion in Somalia. Conversely, those victories are short-lived as there are unrelenting terror attacks after periodic short interruption of hostile attacks. This is accredited to the ever rising risks of home-grown terror, violent extremism and radicalization. Since late 2011, Kenya has passed through many terror attacks.¹⁶³ It began with the Monday, 24 October 2011 small-scale terror attack at a bar known as Mwaura's in Mfangano Street in Nairobi.¹⁶⁴

The grenade that was launched killed one person wounding more than twenty others. The Kenyan forces informed "that the weapon used was a Russian-made F1 grenade".¹⁶⁵ Later on the same day, a second explosion happened, once a grenade was thrown into a bus terminal from a moving vehicle.¹⁶⁶ Roughly 69 people were consequently hospitalized, of which five people were confirmed dead¹⁶⁷. This came after the US delivered a potential threat of attack which specified that there are dangers of reprisal actions by the Al-Shabaab due to the KDF undertakings in Somalia in the previous months and specifically the October operations.¹⁶⁸ In November of the same year, there was an attack on Holiday Inn Hotel, the "East African

¹⁶²Cannon, B.J., Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 7(2), (2016) pp.23–37. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1235>

¹⁶³Daily Nation. How KDF's Somalia incursion changed Kenya. (2016). Retrieved 9 June 2017, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/newsplex/newsplex-Linda-Nchi-Terrorism/2718262-2917062-9fm054/index.html>

¹⁶⁴Jason Strazius, Tom Odula, Associated Press, "2 blasts in Nairobi amid fears of terrorist reprisal," Hearst Communications Inc, (2012)

¹⁶⁵Associated Press, "Two grenade blasts rattle Nairobi; 1 dead", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 09 June 2017, from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-10-24/kenya-grenade-attack/50898570/1>

¹⁶⁶David, Clarke, "A grenade attack at a bus station in central Nairobi killed five people and wounded 69, the Kenya Red Cross said on Sunday," Reuters, 11 March 2012. Retrieved on 09 June 2017, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/11/uskenya-blast-idUSBRE82A03W20120311>

¹⁶⁷Ibid

¹⁶⁸CBC News, "Deadly grenade blasts rattle Nairobi", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 10 June 2017, from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/10/24/kenya-blast.html>

Pentecostal Church, a military convoy and several other attacks".¹⁶⁹ There were about nine other terror attacks in Kenya, in December.¹⁷⁰

"On 21 September 2013 was the Westgate Shopping Mall terror attack in which unknown gunmen attacked the upmarket mall in Nairobi".¹⁷¹ The violence led to around 67 deaths, and lots of people were supposedly wounded in the mass shooting. Another major attack was in 2014, known as Mpeketoni attacks¹⁷². "They occurred between 15 and 17 June, and more than 60 people were killed in attacks in and close to Mpeketoni, Lamu Region".¹⁷³ The attacks stated when around fifty disguised "gunmen hijacked a van¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁵ and invaded a police station in the predominantly Christian town", "About 53 people were reportedly murdered during the violence, and eight others were not accounted for as of 18 June".¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁷

In 2015 April, assassins captured the University College of Garissa, and murdered nearly one hundred and fifty people while hurtful numerous others. "This was nevertheless intelligence cautions that an attack was premeditated".¹⁷⁸ "The invaders claimed to be from the Al-Shabaab combative group, and specified that they were carrying out vengeance over non-Muslims occupying Muslim terrain".¹⁷⁹ Numerous students were taken captive, Muslims were free but

¹⁶⁹en.wikipedia.org

¹⁷⁰Macharia, James. "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 15 June 2017 from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/uk-kenya-security-tourismidUKKBN0EC1D720140601>

¹⁷¹Associated Press; Daniel, Douglass K., "39 people killed in Kenya mall attack claimed by Somali militants; hostages still held", The Washington Post, 21 September 2013, p. 2

¹⁷² Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 17 June 2017, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvgz//index.html>

¹⁷³Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Gander, Kashmira, "Kenya hotel attack: Suspected al-Shabaab militants kill 48 people in Mpeketoni," The Independent, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 19 June 2017, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-hotel-attack-suspectedalshabaab-militants-kill-48-people-in-mpeketoni-9539402.html>

¹⁷⁵Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvgz//index.html>

¹⁷⁶Daily Mail, "Al Shabaab gunmen kill 15 in overnight raid on Kenyan coastal villages just 24 hours after killing 50 in nearby Mpeketoni", 17 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article_2659903/BREAKING-NEWS-Al-Shabaab-gunmen-kill-eight-night-raid-Kenyan-coastal-town-Poromoko-24-hours-killing-50-nearby-Mpeketoni.html

¹⁷⁷BBC News., "Kenya attacks: Al-Shabab raid village near Mpeketoni," 17 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27882084>

¹⁷⁸TSG Intel Brief. "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa", July 28, 2015.

¹⁷⁹Fox News, "Nearly 150 dead in Al-Shabaab school attack, Kenyan officials say". Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/02/garissa-attack-kenya/>

Christians were withheld. More than 500 students were still unaccounted for.¹⁸⁰ Between 2012 and 2015, there were other minor attacks, which contain the 30 September 2012 attack at the “St Polycarp's church in Nairobi;”¹⁸¹ 14 “December 2013 Nairobi bus attack”;¹⁸² “1 April 2014 Eastleigh attack”;¹⁸³ “23 April 2014 Nairobi police station bombing”;¹⁸⁴ “4 May 2014 Nairobi bus bombings on the Thika Highway in Nairobi”;¹⁸⁵ “16 May 2014 Gikomba bombings”;¹⁸⁶ “26 May 2015 Garissa surprise attack and lots more”.¹⁸⁷ In most of the assaults, Al-Shabaab claimed accountability, carried most of the attacks themselves or through radicalized Kenyan youths that could be deemed as Al-Shabaab supporters. In line with the latter, in 2014, approximations suggested that around 25% of the entire contributing forces of Al-Shabaab are Kenyans¹⁸⁸ which are preferably called "Kenyan Mujahideen.”¹⁸⁹

Most of these radicalized Kenyans are typically fanatical poor and young individuals that were explicitly targeted by the cells of Al-Shabaab for recruitment. It's been harder for Kenyan security forces to track the terror or those radicalized Kenyans due to the facial and cultural distinctions between the Kenyan Mujahideen and the rest 75% fighter militaries of Al-Shabaab; Thus a plus for the Kenyan Mujahideen to fully intermingling into the greater population of Kenya with little or limited trace and discovery.

¹⁸⁰BBC News., "Kenya attack: Garissa University assault 'killed 147'", 2 April 2015. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080>

¹⁸¹BBC News., "Kenya children hurt in church grenade attack", 30 September 2012 Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19776747>

¹⁸²Student paper Submitted to Nottingham Trent University

¹⁸³Ibid

¹⁸⁴BBC News., "Kenya car bomb kills four in Nairobi's Pangani quarter", 23 April 2014 Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27134695>

¹⁸⁵ BBC News, "Kenya buses hit by deadly twin blasts in Nairobi", 4 May 2014 Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27277811>

¹⁸⁶BBC News, "Kenya's Nairobi hit by twin blasts in Gikomba Market", 16 May 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27443474>

¹⁸⁷ Submitted to Nottingham Trent University

¹⁸⁸BBC News, "Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash lures in young Kenyans", 11 December 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true>

¹⁸⁹Reuters, "Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal", 30 May 2012. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530>

The Coastal areas of the HOA –like the coast in Zanzibar and Mombasa are essentially populated by Muslims –are vulnerable to radicalization, terror enrolment and terror safe havens.¹⁹⁰ “Al-Shabaab further labelled these attacks, retaliations for the Kenyan military's deployment in the group's home state of Somalia through Operation Linda Nchi”.¹⁹¹ The Process was a “coordinated military mission between the Somaliland Kenyan militaries that began in October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the conflict regions of southern Somalia”.¹⁹² The Operation prompted many of these incessant attacks.

By May 2014, the US, UK, and other Western countries delivered a high security caution on their citizens living or travelling to Kenya,¹⁹³ and this eventually affected the tourism sector in Kenya. The tourism sector is the leading earner of foreign exchange to the nation and the exit of foreign companies and tourists leads to reduced hotel and transport operations which in-turn leads to labor or staff cut down.¹⁹⁴ This trends affect not only the tourism sector but also spreads to the foreign missions in Kenya as some have been forced to condense their presence in Kenya to only one city usually Nairobi as witnessed by the move by UK to close down the Mombasa Consulate¹⁹⁵; also the U.S has reduced its staff strength in the attempt to ensure sufficient security of all its staff after the demise of many of its staff in the 1998 bombing.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰Ibid

¹⁹¹Student paper Submitted to Aga Khan Academy

¹⁹²en.wikipedia.org

¹⁹³NPR Parallel (2016). Npr.org. Retrieved 9 September 2017, from <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/10/320335669/western-countries-issue-warnings-kenyantourism-gets-pummeled>

¹⁹⁴Macharia, James., "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/ukkenyasecuritytourismidUKKBNOEC1D720140601>

¹⁹⁵Capital News., "UK closes Mombasa Consulate over security fears", 13 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/06/uk-closes-mombasa-consulate-over-security-fears/>

¹⁹⁶The Guardian, "US to cut Kenya embassy staff as threat of 'sophisticated' attacks grows", AFP, 17 May 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/kenya-nairobi-bomb-usembassy-security>

3.3. The Impact of Refugee Influx on Kenya's National Security

Kenya played host to a lot of refugees from neighboring states such as Uganda during the authoritarian regime of Idd Amin, Southern Sudan and Somalia among others. Nevertheless, “the Dadaab refugee camps declared in 1991 that it was going to host Somali refugees escaping the clashes and consequent civil wars after the ejection of Siad Barre in January 1991 have posed more security apprehension to Kenya”.¹⁹⁷ “Up until 2009, majority of Kenyans had not heard of Dadaab and barely knew of its geographical location in the Kenyan map”¹⁹⁸. “Surprisingly, Kenya has been accommodating the World’s largest refugee camp-Dadaab refugee camp”.¹⁹⁹ Certainly, “the Kenyan government has been in dilemma of a genuine humanitarian concern for the refugees and the necessity to control its borders as a security matter”.²⁰⁰ “The stubborn insecurity in refugee camps of Dadaab has place burden on the administration of Kenya on the need to conform to the international law by constantly accommodating refugees and that of guarding its national interests as regarding its nationwide security”.²⁰¹

“According to Garissa District Development Plan (GDDP) 1994-1996, the entry of refugees into the district lead to insecurity hence harmfully affecting the management of development programmes”.²⁰² “The insecurity problem posed by the influx of refugees to Dadaab has always been emphasized by the various government officials as demonstrated in the various Garissa District Development Plans. Apart from the GDDP report of 1994-1996 referred above, the

¹⁹⁷www.ijbssnet.com

¹⁹⁸Ibid

¹⁹⁹Ibid

²⁰⁰Ibid

²⁰¹Ibid

²⁰²Republic of Kenya, Garissa District Development Plan, (Nairobi: Government printer 1994-1996), 81.

GDDP report of 1997-2001 echoed on the insecurity posed by the refugee arrival when it declaims in part that²⁰³:

“With the political shakiness in the Republic of Somalia and the subsequent influx of more than 150,000 refugees, a lot of insecurity in the district is now being experienced”²⁰⁴. “A lot of resources have been averted to attending refugees and in stopping the problem of insecurity. Sophisticated artillery have found their way into the district endorsing banditry, cattle rustling and general violence in the district”²⁰⁵.

“Elsewhere in the GDDP of 2002-2008 the report notes that”²⁰⁶:

Dadaab and Jarajila divisions are a bit insecure compared to others. This has mainly been caused by the existence of refugees in Jarajila and Dadaab, which has made the divisions adjacent to be insecure. Closeness to Somalia Republic border in these regions makes insecurity a challenge to development.²⁰⁷

“Away in Kakuma, the security situation subsequent from refugee settlement is no dissimilar from that in Dadaab”. A report from Kakuma, in the northwest of Kenya”,²⁰⁸ discerns “a marked increase in the number of happenings in the camps and the surrounding areas” and notes that “frequent occurrences of violence and unrest occur without caution.”²⁰⁹ “Fascinating conflict between the refugees and host government in respect to management of justice within the camps both in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps”.²¹⁰ Officially, “refugee camps are located on Kenyan territory and are hence subject to that country’s legal system”.²¹¹ “In practice, however,

²⁰³www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²⁰⁴ Ibid

²⁰⁵ Garissa District Development Plan 1997-2001, Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, (Nairobi: Government Printer), 59.

²⁰⁶www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²⁰⁷ Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Garissa District Development Plan 2002-2008, (Nairobi: Government Printer), 16.

²⁰⁸www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²⁰⁹ Internal UNHCR document, 25 May 1999.

²¹⁰www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²¹¹ Jeff Crisp, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.16, A State of Insecurity: the political economy of violence in refugee-populated areas of Kenya, December 1999,13.

powers of arrest, adjudication and punishment appear to have been assumed by institutions which are homegrown to the different refugee populations. For example”.²¹²

The old-style judges and ‘bench courts’ which describe the Sudanese community in Kakuma ...who employ immense power including the power of corporal punishment and detention in a prison facility built with the assistance of an international NGO.²¹³

The “fear of the state of insecurity in Northeastern province and particularly with the influx of refugees started with the establishment of Dadaab refugee camps in 1991”. “This fear was augmented by memories of the Shifta movement in the 1960s that waged secessionists wars in northeastern reinforced by Mogadishu”. “This was because of Somalia’s claim of an expanded Somalia into Kenya’s Northeastern province”.²¹⁴ Kenyatta on this issue upheld that “Kenya would not concede any of its territory” to Somalia.²¹⁵ “To date, the GoK perceives the Somalis (especially refugees) with suspicion hoping to seal any possibility of renewed insecurity”.²¹⁶

Conversely, it had better be well-known that refugees alone are not the single ones alleged to be main figures involved in the propagation of SALW. In fact several pastoral groups in Kenya and especially those in the border districts have continually been indicted of illegal possession of firearms. “Several government attempts to disarm these communities have not been fruitful because of the failure of the government to address the root causes”.²¹⁷ “Kenya’s relentless fear of the Somali community (refugees included) may have been orchestrated by the history of other

²¹²www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²¹³Jeff Crisp, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.16, A State of Insecurity: the political economy of violence in refugee-populated areas of Kenya, December 1999,13.

²¹⁴Jona Rono, “Kenya Foreign Policy” Africa Foreign Policies, Stephen Wright (ed.) (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 105.

²¹⁵Katete Orwa, “Foreign Relations and International Co-operation”, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (ed.), Kenya: An Official Handbook (Nairobi: Colourprint, 1988), 308.

²¹⁶www.ijbssnet.com/ accessed on July 18 2017

²¹⁷Adan,M and R Pkalya. Closed to Progress; An Assessment of the Socio-economic impact of Conflict on Pastoral and Semi-pastoral in Kenya and Uganda, (Nairobi: Practical Action.2005), 3.

bordering districts in the larger Northeastern province which have experienced insecurity”.²¹⁸

These conflicts include:

The Wagalla Massacre (Ajuran clan and Degodia Clans) in 1983 to 1984, Kom Conflict (The Borans of Isiolo and Somali of Wajir) in 1997 to 1998, Bagalla Massacre (Boran of Isiolo and Somali of Wajir) in 1998, and Wajir North Conflict (Gare clan and Ajuran clans) in 2001 to 2002.²¹⁹

“North-east Kenya has always been very insecure, with special Kenyan government permission needed before any travel is allowed by anyone to Dadaab”. “The presence of armed bandits and Islamist militias such as Al-Shabaab, as well as periodic outbreaks of clan feuding, means that the threat of violence against humanitarian workers is very real”. “The UN mission in Dadaab functions under UN stage three security constraints stipulating travel by convoy and with an equipped police escort, no free association of staff without armed watches in the camps and a regulation for humanitarian workers, who have to be in a secure compound from 6 pm to 6 am”.²²⁰

3.4. Chapter Conclusion

Examining and assessing the impact of refugee influx on Kenyan security was the objective that the research set out to achieve under this chapter. It was clear during the research that, there has indeed been increased insecurity in Kenya as a result of increased refugee flows in the country. That in fact most residents feel many of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in the Kenya have been members of the refugee community. From the study, many of the respondents felt that the refugee camps indeed provide breeding grounds for the terrorist groups including being avenues for radicalization and violent extremism for the combatant. A large number of those interviewed

²¹⁸www.ijbssnet.com/ Accessed on July 18 2017

²¹⁹ Pkalya, Ruto, Mohamud A. and Isabella M., Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in Northern Kenya. Conflict in Northern Kenya Report, (Nairobi: DTP Martin Karimi Publisher, 2003), 13-15

²²⁰<http://odihpn.org/magazine/conflict-and-deteriorating-security-in-dadaab/> Accessed on July 18, 2017

felt that Kenya's porous borders have been taken advantage of by refugees entering into our country and proliferation of small arms and weapons mostly used to train vulnerable refugees in the camp. With the largest refugee camp located in the proximity to the local residents in northern part of Kenya, many respondents maintained that infiltration of refugees to the neighborhoods is most likely and this poses a threat to the locals because most perceive them as already radicalized and trained to be rebels. Also as these refugees move in the neighborhood, they cause proliferation of weapon which are used to carry out illegal acts. Again, refugees are viewed as competition to local population economically especially refugees in East Leigh in Nairobi county who have occupied entirely leaving no room for the local people to carry out their business. All these scenarios are perceived by most residents as threats to Kenya's security.

4.0. CHAPTER FOUR

KENYA GOVERNMENT COUNTER REFUGEE INSECURITY & TERRORISM MEASURES.

Even though, Kenya appears determined to get rid of the terror threats for both security and economic reasons, a change in counter terrorism approach for an all-encompassing grand strategy is very vital. This is because several factors are still there and will remain there in years to come. Key among them and that should be thoroughly addressed are Islamic radicalization, violent extremism, poor socio economic situation in the country that make the youths susceptible to recruitment by terror organizations, unsteady neighboring countries, and porous borders between Kenya and Somalia. Most of the national, regional and international CT strategies in the HOA and Kenya are more of short termed, state-centric and militaristic, with many of them failing to address the root causes of terrorism. To successfully deal with the menace on a long term basis, it's imperative to develop a grand strategy that encompasses less militaristic and preventive strategies; include all related stakeholders such as NSAs; encourages synchronization of strategies between state-run and private actors; and addresses the roots causes of terrorism.

4.1. The Role of the Media and Internet

Evidently as detected through research and reality, the social media and internet is exposed to mainstream society and extremists. Terrorism has been modified in the modern day, relatively due to the introduction of technological innovation in the media sector and the increasing global influence it commands. According to assistant director medial council of Kenya, terrorists largely recruit from the social media. In the light of this, it is crucial that the role of the media and internet is enriched in effective CT, through exploring good practices in the use of internet,

interrelated technology and the mass media in CT.²²¹ The need for the government of Kenya, media agencies and other relevant actors to partner in an effort to reduce the availability of media tools to extremist groups; monitoring the manipulation and the use of the social media and internet for mobilization and been significant as it is in this current day.²²²

More often, the media have been accused for acting as a catalyst of terror. This is because of the psychological and emotional effect of traumatic terror occurrence reports and the deliberate neglect of reporting the ideological command of terrorist.²²³ And for that reason, the media is looked at as the terrorist's best friend. Clearly, the coverage of the Westgate attack live on twitter social media and on TV stations nationally and internationally aided the terrorist to gain psychological impetus, and spread fear and propaganda²²⁴. The influence of media in CT has never been significantly validated like the role of media before and after the 9/11 attack.²²⁵ Similarly the government of Kenya has deliberately used traditional media to shrink the perverted narratives by extremists and coagulate the correct messaging that encourages the values of universalism, plurality, democracy, acceptance and freedom as the foundation of a common humanity.

4.2. National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)

Following the numerous occurrences by terrorist militants against and inside Kenya, the government Kenya recognized that terrorism is a cross-border crime and a national security threat. This compelled the formation of a multi-agency mechanism, effective harmonization of key actors and a synchronizing mechanism as national CT focal point.²²⁶ A CT strategy paper

²²¹Assistant Director Media Council of Kenya,

²²²Ibid

²²³Peter Orengo, "Tears as blast victims commemorate 1998 bombing," East African Standard, August 7th 2011.

²²⁴Journalist

²²⁵Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna. "Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11." Prepared for presentation at the Symposium "Restless Searchlight: Terrorism, the Media & Public Life," co-sponsored by the APSA Communication Section and the Shorenstein Center at the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, (2002)

²²⁶National Counter Terrorism Center's website, at <http://counterterrorism.go.ke/aboutus.html>

was conceived in April 2003 and presented to the Kenyan Cabinet which approved it in September 2003. Consequently NCTC was setup and inaugurated on the 27th of January 2004. The NCTC delineates itself as a policy institution established to serve mostly as the coordinating agency for all CT efforts for the GoK. It counsels the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), public and private bodies on the risk posed by extremism to the country and offer advice to both public and private organizations.²²⁷ It has the mandate of: coordinating national CT efforts so as to detect, deter and disrupt terror acts; setup a database to assist law enforcement agencies; conduct public awareness on terrorism prevention; improve counter-radicalization strategies etc. The center established a Prevention Center to counter radicalization and violent extremism creating part of Kenya's comprehensive CT strategy which is affixed on the Prevent pillar and meant at taking a softer approach to inhibit terrorism.²²⁸

4.3. AMISOM Participation

Coined as IGASOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia is a vigorous (since 2007), "regional peacekeeping mission run by the AU with the endorsement of the UN in Somalia".²²⁹ As part of its obligation, AMISOM backs Somalia's armies in their fight against terrorist. As at 2015, the troop strength was at 22, ²³⁰troops,²³¹ with Kenya contributing about 4,000. The troops were able to carry out several incursions against Al-Shabaab, killing many of them together with their leaders. Additionally, the KDF and AMISOM were able to eject Al-Shabaab, from their stronghold in the central and southern quotas of Somalia, particularly the port city of Kisimayo and Mogadishu.²³² This assisted to grossly reduce the Al-Shabaab's financial resources, as the

²²⁷Ibid

²²⁸Ibid

²²⁹Research.omicsgroup.org

²³⁰Musau, Nzau, "Kenya: Somali Prime Minister Arrives to Explain Position", AllAfrica.com, 31 October 2011.

²³¹United Nations Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7286th meeting, on 24 October 2014; Paragraph 23 - at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182(2014))

²³²Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014

group lost import and export income due to the capture of the Ports which was the central source of revenue.²³³

4.4. Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security

In 2003, Kenya set up a task force that was inter-ministerial in nature which concentrated on fighting against the Funding of Terrorism and Anti-Money laundering. The task force was able to analyze prevailing legislation and recommend methods of articulating a domestic policy to curtail conduits of backing terrorism.²³⁴ In the same year, the GoK appealed the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Co-ordination Act of 1990 to deregister a group of Muslim NGOs which were assumed of having connections with extremist groups.²³⁵ These involved the al-Muntada al-Islami, al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Wakalatul-Rahmah offices, “the I-Ibrahim Foundation and the al-Najah Islamic Centre in northern Kenya”.²³⁶

The High Court of Kenya flung out appeals to inverse the verdict whereas the GoK deported al-Haramains Sudanese director, Sheikh Muawiya Hussein in January 2004.²³⁷ Down to 2012, Kenya approved the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act to help the Incomes of Crime & Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2011, and the Deterrence of Organized Crime Act of 2012.²³⁸ “President of Kenya, ascended into law, the 2014 Security Laws Amendment Act in December 2014”.²³⁹ The Security Laws of 2014 restructured 20 existing in a bid to augmenting the CT policy agenda. Optimistic steps comprised the formation of a coordinated border control agency,

²³³Ibid

²³⁴Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

²³⁵ Assistant Director of immigration, in Charge of National coordination Mechanism on Migration, Kenya,

²³⁶P Mayoyo, “Kenya Muslims say no to US school funds,” East African, 23 February 2004.

²³⁷Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

²³⁸The US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM. Retrieved on 21 June 2017 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm>

²³⁹www.state.gov

criminalization assisting or support for terrorist training, strengthening the capacity of the NCTC.²⁴⁰

On the contrary, other provisions included violation on human rights like “liberty of speech and the privileges of immigrants”.²⁴¹ This has ignited controversy and harvested criticism that they dishonored Kenya’s international obligations and constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights.²⁴² In accordance with the refurbishment of the security sector, the year 2013, GoK allocated CT roles between the 3 arms “of the National Police Service: the Kenya Police comprising of the civil police, the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration Police; the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit; and the non-police agencies like the KDF and National Intelligence Service”.²⁴³

The functioning ability of this effort was endangered due to lack of intra and inter police-institution synchronization as well as the coordination in the military-institutions.²⁴⁴ Other factors includes lack of adequate training, resources; description of command, lobbying and corruption of the CT institutions.²⁴⁵ Whereas the government have made industrious efforts in addressing those shortcomings, those effort have demonstrated to be inadequate in areas of corruption, border control and security especially in regard to refugee inflows.²⁴⁶ The absence of border security capacities and the inadequacy of national identification structure have decreased the success rate of law enforcers’ ability to detect and detain potential terrorists many of whom a believed to disguise themselves as refugees.

However, biographic and biometric screening, extremist screening watch lists, and other

²⁴⁰ Ibid

²⁴¹Assistant Director of immigration, in Charge of National coordination Mechanism on Migration, Kenya,

²⁴²Ibid

²⁴³www.state.gov

²⁴⁴Ibid

²⁴⁵Ibid

²⁴⁶Ibid

apparatuses are in place at the main entry ports in the country.²⁴⁷ There are several and countless terror attacks that have been retorted to or thwarted in 2014 by the Kenya security operatives. The multi-scaled operations Usalama Watch piloted between April and May 2014 detained thousands of potential suspects, mainly in the two main cities of Kenya.²⁴⁸ But the operation was criticized due to its constituted element of abuse, corruption and human rights violations.

4.5. Regional and International Cooperation

In 2003, Kenya was able to ratify all the twelve universal CT agreements and conventions and circulated the Clampdown of Terrorism Bill on 30 April. Kenya as a member-state in EAC, COMESA, AU and IGAD, have contributed, to the respective regional blocs it belongs to, with its extensive troop manifestation through bilateral and multilateral engagements in conflict affected countries of those blocs.²⁴⁹ The heads of Country's conference of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2014 in Nairobi; and the regional summits of the EAC intelligence and police chiefs considerably focused on issues of CT. Likewise the Kenya has helped other member States in accommodating and facilitating military exercise, trainings and maneuvers within and among the EAC's States law enforcement professionals.²⁵⁰

4.6. Countering Funding of Terrorism

“Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional institution”.²⁵¹ “Kenya has made growth in applying its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism regime, and was, in 2014, delisted from the continued observing scheme of the FATF”.²⁵² In December 2015, the Kenyan

²⁴⁷Ibid

²⁴⁸Ibid

²⁴⁹National Coordinator-Commission for Refugee Migrants and Sea farers.

²⁵⁰GoK, Kenya Foreign Policy, November 2014, Retrieved 9 July 2017, from <http://www.mfa.go.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Kenya%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf>

²⁵¹www.state.gov

²⁵²The US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM. Retrieved on 21 June 2017 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm>

NGO Coordination Board revealed the registration revocation of 510 NGOs for failing to provide requisite monetary reporting; the board also emphasized the possible inclusion of 15 more NGOs on the suspicion of sponsoring terror. Nevertheless, many of those NGO have been delisted after compiling with the criteria recommended by the board.²⁵³ Kenya's Anti-Money Laundering tasks have gradually become well-designed with increased monitoring, assessment and reporting dimensions. Equally, processes have not been enormously successful due to shortages in essential resources that comprise but not limited to electronic-Financial reporting system. The Kenya's Central Bank has created responsiveness on the need for citizens to use the legitimate financial sectors in their dealings and savings in order to make sure an effective and transparent monitoring financial institution in Kenya.

4.7. Refugee Repatriation

According to Damien an officer with UNHCR, "the concerns on security related with Dadaab have resulted to certain politicians in Kenya to appeal for the establishment of new camps in Somalia to enable relief supply, and the closure of the Dadaab operation".²⁵⁴ These call exhibit a trivial swing inside the government of Kenya in the direction of a more belligerent and hardline stand. Damien continues to say Orwa Ojodeh from the internal security ministry believes that the global community must now consider establishing IDP camps in the country of Somalia near the border of Kenya, and provide amenities to Somalis there so as to decrease the amount of evacuees flowing into Kenya. Resonating with his views, Garissa MP, emphasized saying that the most durable answer is to set up campsites in Jubaland with Kenyan and Ethiopian administrations playing the shielding role. This more hardline reaction to the present crisis is thought by most to be part of an organized prolonged approach to drive terrorist groups from

²⁵³Ibid

²⁵⁴odihpn.org

Central and South Somalia establishing a self-sufficient bolster region in the country. This move by the Kenyan government which was informed by the belief that camps have become hosting grounds for the terrorist groups and avenues for radicalization. The decision was however received by varying reactions worldwide especially with Kenya being party to international instruments that obligates it to provide protection to refugees under international law.

4.8. The Role of Non State Actors

Certain Kenyan Civil Society Organizations are vigorously working to counter terror and violent extremism in Kenya; this is supported largely by U.S-Kenya partnership and Kenya's partnership with other international entities.²⁵⁵ Some of them are Amnesty International, Muslim for Human Rights, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, and Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE) etc.²⁵⁶ one vital thing about their approaches is that through a number of programs, they are addressing some of the key drivers of terrorism which are often linked with poor socio-economic conditions, leading to radicalization and violent extremism.²⁵⁷ Countering the propaganda messages of extremists and terrorists has been the main focus of the programs most of these actors engage in. They have continued to be key actors in engaging the community to understand, recognize and act towards the deterrence and mitigation of terror acts.

Moreover, the groups have facilitated in increasing the awareness and level of watchfulness on terror or potential terror threat at both the local and community levels. Additionally, they establish forums linked to countering terror in partnerships with government and donor partners. Some of these forums are for the law enforcers, CSO leaders and other for public to better

²⁵⁵Refugee Officer with Amnesty International East, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes.

²⁵⁶Ibid

²⁵⁷Ibid

educate them about CVE.²⁵⁸ The CSOs also work with policing and justice institutions, and help to train many precisely on reporting of doubtful activities.

KECOSCE²⁵⁹ for example has plans that aim at empowering the Coast communities to counter the growing radicalization within the coastal areas of Kenya; this is supported by enhancing the youth's terror-resilience capacity. They also enable the organization of community groups and formation of continuous space for dialogue among the all members of the community from the security enforcers, law justice to the rest members of the community.²⁶⁰ Additional awareness on the effectiveness and significance to engage all members of the community on the ills of radicalization have been at the essential focus of KECOSCE. Enhancing skills to counter the violent belief at family, schools and public spaces and campaign of partnership with security agencies, change notions and increase collaboration to stop terrorists from using coast as a fertile ground for their maneuvers have been as imperative as ever.²⁶¹ Lastly, KECOSCE generated an early warning and response mechanism to mitigate sources of information, and observe the activities of suspect groups and individuals and trains the youths on business skills and empower them.

4.9. Chapter Conclusion

The perception that refugees are a major driver of terrorism has weakened counter terrorism efforts in Kenya was confirmed when analyzing strategies and mechanisms that Government of Kenya has employed to counter insecurity especially terrorism in Kenya. From the study, many felt that refugees were synonymous to terrorism because the refugee camps indeed provide breeding grounds for the terrorist groups including being avenues for radicalization and violent extremism of those that are vulnerable. Throughout the chapter, it is quite evident that a lot has

²⁵⁸Director of Kenya's Department of Immigration Services

²⁵⁹A Non-Governmental Organization based in the Coast Region of Kenya

²⁶⁰Program Officer KECOSCE

²⁶¹Ibid

been done in efforts to counter insecurity in Kenya in form of terrorism but a lot still remains to be done especially when it comes to addressing the refugee question in Kenya and their role on insecurity. According to securitization theory that was adopted for this study, it has been seen that, refugees, who have previously been perceived as a humanitarian concern being viewed as a security threat. That had led to a call for action by the Gok where the closure of Dadaab refugee camp and repatriation of Somalia refugees was commenced in 2016, as a counter terrorism measure.

5.0. CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Introduction

This section provides a detailed description, analysis and interpretation of data, results related to countering terrorism in Africa: The refugee question in Kenya

5.1. SECTION I: SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

5.1.1. Age of Respondents.

Among those interviewed, 33.3% (n=9) were between 45 years and above, 22.2% (n=6) were 18-25 years, 22.2% (n=6) were 25-35 years and 22.2% (n=6) were 35-45 years.




Figure 1. Age of Respondents

5.1.2 Gender of Respondents

The majority of the respondents 51.85% (n=16) were males and 48.15% (n=11) were females.




Figure 2: Gender of Respondents

5.1.3 Types of Respondents

Majority of the respondents 55.56% (n=15) were Kenya citizens, 25.93% (n=7) were individuals from the refugee community while 18.52% (n=4) constituted key policy makers.




Figure 3. Types of Respondents

5.2. SECTION II: IMPACT OF REFUGEE INFLUX ON SECURITY IN KENYA

5.2.1. Refugees contribute to increased insecurity in Kenya

Majority of the respondents 59.26% (n=15) that were interviewed said that it is very true that refugees do contribute to increased insecurity in Kenya, while those that say it is true were 18.52% (n=5). Of the respondents who also took part in the study 11.11% (n=3) say it is somewhat that refugees contribute to increased insecurity in Kenya. The final population which constituted 11.11% (n=3) say it is not true that refugees contribute to increased insecurity in Kenya.




Figure 4: Refugees Contribute to Insecurity in Kenya

5.2.2. Refugees are Synonymous to Terrorism

From the data collected, it is quite clear that the numbers of respondents that strongly agree refugees are synonymous to terrorism are the majority forming 37.04% (n=10), those that agree and disagree that refugees are synonymous to terrorism are 29.63% (n=8) and 14.81% (n=4) respectively. 11.11% (n=3) of the respondents strongly disagree while those that are not sure of whether refugees are synonymous to terrorism consisted of 7.41% (n=2).




Figure 5: Refugees are Synonymous to Terrorism

5.2.3. Refugee Camps have become Hosting Grounds for the Terrorist Groups.

From the study, the largest number of respondents 37.04% (n=10) completely agree that refugee camps have become hosting grounds for the Alshabab, 25.93% (n=7) slightly agree to the subject matter that refugee camps have become hosting grounds for the Alshabab. 18.52% (n=5) disagree while the same number of respondents 18.52% (n=5) completely disagree that refugee camps have become hosting grounds for the Alshabab.




Figure 6: Refugee Camps as Hosting Grounds for the Terrorist Groups.

5.2.4. Refugees are Vulnerable to Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Majority of the respondents 37.04% (n=10) observe that refugees are often vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism, 25.93% (n=7) of those interviewed think that refugees are sometimes vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. According to 22.22% (n=2) respondents refugees are rarely vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism, while those that think refugees are never vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism formed 14.81% (n=4).




Figure 7: Refugees are Vulnerable to Radicalization and Violent Extremism

5.2.5. Terror Attacks that have occurred in Kenya

Majority of the respondents 44.44% (n=11) think that it is most likely that the many of the terror attacks in Kenya that have happened were perpetrated by refugees, 29.63% (n=8) of the respondents state that it is likely that many of the terror attacks in Kenya have had refugee involvement. Of those interviewed, 14.81% (n=4) think refugees are less likely to be linked to many of the terror attacks that have occurred in Kenya, 7.41% (n=2) maintain that it is not likely that refugees have led to many of the terror attacks in Kenya while the last group of respondents that comprised 3.70% (n=1) insist they are not sure whether refugees have perpetrated many of the terror attacks in Kenya.




Figure 8: Attacks in Kenya Perpetrated by Refugees

5.3. SECTION III: KENYA GOVERNMENT COUNTER REFUGEE INSECURITY AND TERRORISM MEASURES

5.3.1. Involuntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees to their Country of Origin

From study outcomes, majority of the respondents who were mainly derived from key officials from both the government and intergovernmental sectors, maintain that, the decision by the Gok to involuntarily repatriate refugees, especially Somali refugees back to Somalia was a complete violation of human rights on the part of the host regime and a breach of international law since Kenya is already party to the convention that obliges it to protect individuals like refugee with protection concerns.²⁶²²⁶³²⁶⁴²⁶⁵

²⁶²Interview 1: Interview 2: United Nations Counterterrorism Unit

²⁶³ Interview 3: Resettlement Support Center Africa (An organization mandated with the resettlement of refugees in Africa to the United States)

²⁶⁴Interview 4: Protection Officer at the Human Rights Watch

However some respondents feel that repatriation of Somali refugees was a good idea since most of the perpetrators have been called out as Somalis and that by them being forced back would help fight against terrorism in Kenya. Other respondents observe that the exercise would be very costly to undertake and that Kenya could use those funds to improve other areas of development that are so wanting.

5.3.2. Closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp

The closure of the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the biggest and oldest camps in Kenya, was received with mixed feelings by the world over. Many of my respondents feel that it was a good decision because it had been frequently reported that, the camps have for the longest time being used as breeding grounds for the terrorist and recruitment avenues for radicalization and violent extremism.²⁶⁶²⁶⁷ That these camps have been used for the contraband trade and proliferation of illicit and harmful weapons.

5.3.3. Border Security

Entry in Kenya had become so easy because of our porous borders that are not well manned due to corruption perpetrated by the very individuals who have been deployed in the border post. Most of these individuals, many of my respondents feel that they become compromised because of the poor remuneration packages they receive.²⁶⁸ Again, since most of those at the borders lack proper training on how to handle matters on terrorisms, they are not able to distinguish genuine and suspicious entrants.

²⁶⁵Interview 5: Resettlement officer, UNHCR

²⁶⁶ Interview 6: Kenya Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU)

²⁶⁷ Interview 7: National Counter Terrorism Center.

²⁶⁸ Interview 8: Immigration services; Border security.

5.3.4. The Role of Non State Actors

From the research findings it was clear that many of the respondents feel that the role of non-state actors has not been well exploited and that there is still a lot of involvement that is required to ensure that actors, especially the media, civil society organizations, and individuals are a part of the fight against terrorism. Many also feel that the community at large has not being actively involved since not much has been done to create awareness and empower the public on matters of terrorism and counter terrorism.

6.0: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. CONCLUSION

After analysis it is quite clear from the research findings that, the major reason for the rise of the number of refugees in Africa is political instability. Other reasons from the findings that are credited to the rise in the amount of evacuees in Africa include: persecution, poverty, poor governance and joblessness. According to the refugee respondents involved in the study it is evident that political conflicts is the reason why most are in Kenya as refugees. Only a few attributed persecution and poverty as reasons for their refugee status in Kenya.

The findings clearly show that the respondents strongly agree that Kenya is indeed a destination of choice for most refugees fleeing their countries in Africa because of its reputation of political stability. The research findings also shows that it is likely that some individuals disguise as refugees by taking advantage of Kenya's hospitality. Only a small percentage felt that individuals do not likely disguise as refugees by taking advantage of Kenya's hospitality's. Most of the respondents strongly agreed that Africa has produced the leading number of asylum seekers in the worldwide, with only a small percentage strongly disagreeing on the fact that Africa has spawned the leading number of refugees globally.

Findings from this research reveal that, most of respondents think it is indeed very true that refugees do contribute to insecurity in Kenya, even though there was a number of respondents that are not sure if refugees contribute to insecurity. Majority of the people interviewed also felt that refugees are synonymous to terrorism, with an insignificant percentage from the refugee community strongly disagreeing with that fact. The research findings evidently show that most respondents completely agree refugee camps have become hosting grounds for the Alshabab and

that most of these refugees are often vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. Many of those that participated in the interview also feel that it is most likely that refugees have assisted to perpetrate many terror attacks that have occurred in Kenya.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Firstly, the study suggests increased investigation as to the root causes of international terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization, as well as related insecurities. Whether the refugee camps have become breeding grounds for terrorists and refugees are vulnerable to recruitment need a deeper investigation.

Secondly, it is paramount that the Gok provides efficient prosecution and punishment of culprits and provide better witness protection regulations so that people are not afraid of outing terrorist.

Thirdly there is need for thorough inspection of the refugee camps to ensure that they are no longer breeding grounds for terrorists as commonly alleged.

Fourthly, concerning border security, it is important that the Gok deploys properly trained personnel who are able to single out suspicious persons entering the country. Also Gok should ensure that the officials have reasonable salaries to curb corruption which is a tool used by terrorists to infiltrate and attack the nation. Our borders require proper surveillance system so as to help in monitoring illegal immigration activities.

Kenya and other applicable stakeholders should tailor National Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism plans which should replicate a multiagency approach within government, affected communities, NGOs and religious entities, which would be geared towards, resilience, development and community engagement. Such strategies and mechanisms should be inclusive and holistic.

6.3. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As per the research outcomes the researcher has identified the following areas for additional studies: The role of porous borders in promoting insecurity in Africa, the feasibility of joint community, public and private sector in combating insecurity especially terrorism in Kenya and the impact of biometric refugee registration in the refugee camp in countering insecurity in Africa.

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LETTER OF INTRODUCTION



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October 13, 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: NATARIANA SYOMBWII KILONZO – R51/74605/2014


Dear Sir/Madam,

This is to confirm that the above-mentioned person is a bona fide student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi pursuing a **Master of Arts Degree in Diplomacy**. She is working on a research project titled, “**Security Challenges in Africa: The Role of Refugees in Kenya**”.

The research project is a requirement for students undertaking masters’ programmes at the University of Nairobi, whose results will inform policy and learning.

Any assistance given to her to facilitate data collection for her research project will be highly appreciated.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.



Professor Maria Nzomo,
Director, IDIS
&

Professor of International Relations and Governance

CONSENT FORM



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Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/17/79811/17648**

Date: **30th October, 2017**

Natariana Syombwii Kilonzo *
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Security challenges in Africa: The role of Refugees in Kenya*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **30th October, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education
Nairobi County.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Kindly Tick and Fill Appropriately

A) SECTION I: SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Name (Optional).....

Gender {Male or Female}.....

Please Tick where it applies

Age: 18-25 25-35 35-45 45 and Above

Refugee or Kenya Citizen.....

B) SECTION II: IMPACT OF REFUGEE INFLUX ON SECURITY IN KENYA

1. *Refugees contribute to increased insecurity in Kenya?*
 - a) Very True
 - b) True
 - c) Somewhat
 - d) Not True
2. *Refugees are synonymous to terrorism.*
 - a) Strongly Agree
 - b) Agree
 - c) Disagree
 - d) Strongly Disagree
3. *Refugee camps have become hosting grounds for the terrorist groups.*
 - a) Strongly Agree
 - b) Agree
 - c) Disagree
 - d) Strongly Disagree

4. *Refugees are so vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism.*

- a) Strongly Agree
- b) Agree
- c) Disagree
- d) Strongly Disagree

5. *Do you ascribe to the belief that many of the terror attacks that have occurred in Kenya have been perpetrated by refugees?*

- a) Most Likely
- b) Likely
- c) Less Likely
- d) Not Likely
- e) Not Sure

6. SECTION III: KENYA GOVERNMENT COUNTER REFUGEE INSECURITY AND TERRORISM MEASURES

7. Kindly comment on the recent decision by the government of Kenya to involuntarily repatriate refugees back to their home country and close up Dadaab refugee camp?.....

8. Do you think the move by the GoK to close Daadab refugee camp will help in decrease the rate of insecurity particularly terrorism in Kenya?

- a) Yes
- b) Somewhat
- c) Not Likely
- d) Never

9. Do you feel like the GoK has succeed in securing our porous borders? { Yes or No }

10. If No to the above question, what can you propose for the GoK as solutions?.....

11. In your own opinion, what can the government of Kenya do to ensure security as a result of the threats that massive refugee influx pose?.....

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Tick and Fill as Appropriate

Name.....

Gender.....

Organization.....

Position.....

1. Kindly comment on the impact of refugee influx on security in Kenya
2. Refugee camps are believed to be breeding grounds for the terrorists and avenues for refugee combatant recruitment. {Yes or No}

Kindly comment on your answer above.....

3. What is your take on the recent GoK’s decisions to repatriate Somali refugees?.....
4. Do you think the move to repatriate refugees will help in countering terrorism in Kenya?
5. What other measures has the Kenyan government explored in its efforts to counter the rising insecurities as a result of increased refugee influx?
6. What’s your take on the role of NSAs in aiding with the counter terrorism efforts?
7. What is the government doing to ensure cross border security especially before the refugees enter the host country.
8. What has your organization done in efforts to counter terrorism?
9. Kindly propose other ways in which you feel the GoK can employ in efforts to counter terrorism

THANK YOU

PLAGIARISM REPORT

**Security Challenges in
Africa: The Role of Refugees
in Kenya**

***by* Natariana Kilonzo**

Submission date: 29-Oct-2017 04:21PM (UTC+0300)

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