

**SOCIO- ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF PERCEPTIONS ABOUT
SECURITY:**

A CASE STUDY OF EASTLEIGH AREA, NAIROBI COUNTY

MOSES.M. MURIIRA

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this is my own work submitted to University of Nairobi and has never been presented for award of any other degree or diploma.

Signature: Date:

Moses .M. Muriira

This project has been submitted for examination with approval of the university supervisor

Signature: Date:

Dr. Patrick .O. Asingo

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this research study to my wife, Irene, for always being there for me and being the pillar on which my success is built. Moreover, I wish to dedicate this research project to my two children, Austin and Grace, the source of my strength and pride.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I thank God for being with me throughout this journey to the end and for giving me strength to complete this research project despite the many challenges that I have encountered in the course of undertaking it. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my family (immediate and extended) for understanding shown during difficult times. My supervisor, Dr. Patrick Asingo, thank you for all the assistance, guidance and your commitment to my study.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

ATPU: Anti-Terror Police Unit

CID: Directorate of Criminal Investigation

GSU: General Service Unit

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

KADU: Kenya African Democratic Union

KAR: King African Rifles

KDF: Kenya Defence Forces

MP: Member of Parliament

NIS: National Intelligence Service

NPSC: National Police Service Commission

SLDF: Saboot Land Defence Forces

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

VIPs: Very Important Persons

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DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Perceptions: Perceptions refers to the way a person thinks or understands a situation, thing or another person. Perceptions composes both observing something or someone and the mental image that forms after the observation.

Factors: factors are things that affect event, decision or a situation either socially or economically.

Security: The safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage.

Social factors: These are facts and experiences that influence individual's personality, attitudes and lifestyle.

Economic factors: This comprises of the information that influences value of an investment or income.

Income: This is the sum of all the wages, salaries, profits, interest payments, rents and other forms of payments received.

Education: This is the process of facilitating learning, acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values, believes and habits.

ABSTRACT

This study sought to evaluate the influence of socio- economic factors on the perceptions of security among residents of Eastleigh area. The study adopted convenience sampling in selecting the respondents of the research study. 100 research respondents were selected from whom 81 fully filled questionnaires were collected, representing an 81% response rate. To analyse the collected data, the researcher adopted both inferential and descriptive statistics with the findings being presented in simple tables and charts. From the results of the study, it is determined that majority of the residents in the Eastleigh area profess the Islamic faith, derive their income from businesses and have low levels of education. However, from the findings of the study 79% of the research respondents stated that they feared attacks from terrorists with 61.7% stating that they feared harassment from the police. The study used gamma measure of association to evaluate the relationship between Socio-economic factors and the perceptions of security of Eastleigh residents. The study concluded that income level of the residents, had a positive and significant correlation with the perceptions of security of the Eastleigh residents. Similarly the relationship between education levels and perceptions of security was also found to be strong, and the same was found in the relationship between the religious affiliation of the residents and their perceptions about security. Overall, the study concludes that social economic factors have a direct, positive and significant effect on the perceptions of security of Eastleigh residents.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Study Background

In the last two decades, terrorism has emerged as one of the greatest problems facing the Kenyan nation ever since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi. The 1998 American embassy bombing claimed a total of 213 lives and wounded up to 4000 people (Aaronson, 2013). The attack on the embassy was masterminded by Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed, the leader of the AL Qaeda terrorist group on the East African coast. Ideally, the plan of the 1998 attack was based on both the Kenyan coast in Lamu Town and Eastleigh area in the outskirts of Nairobi in which the current study is focused. The bomb that was detonated in the embassy was to be delivered to the masterminds of the bombing using a Nissan truck in the Eastleigh area. The threat of terrorism has shifted from the Al Qaeda to the new age threat of the Al-Shabaab, a breakaway of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

Presthold (2011) explicates that the alignment of the Kenyan nation with Western powers and their position as a partner in the global war on terror exposes the country to the spite of the Islamic extremists. Additionally, the location of Kenya along the East African coast and on the Horn of Africa further exposes it geographically to threats against the security of its people (Vittori et al., 2009). Despite threats on its borders especially to the North (Sudan and Ethiopia) threatening the safety of the Kenyan people especially due to cattle rustling, the major threat lies on the Kenyan border with Somalia. Following the toppling of the SiadBarre government in the year 1991, Somalia remained a stateless nation with no formal government till the year 2006. Forest (2011) explains that the 1991-2006 period allowed the breeding of Islamic extremists who have wreaked havoc in the Somalia for over two decades. The threat of the militants is not

constrained to Somalia; it also affected neighbouring nations such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Aaronson (2012) documents that Kenya's bears the brunt of terrorism especially due to the porous nature of the Kenyan borders, corruption in the security forces and the influx of Somali refugees in refugee camps such as Dadaab. Some of the refugees later find their way into other parts of the nation especially Nairobi's Eastleigh area.

However, the threat of the Kenyan's security transcends over its geographical location to its political association with the West and Israel, religious composition, economic and social-cultural aspects (Botha, 2014). Additionally, the national tourism in the coastal region has also served as a threat to the dilution of the Islamic culture and traditions predominant in the Kenyan coast (Botha, 2014). The marginalisation of the coast region from equal development opportunities, lower education and income levels have also made youths at the coastal area susceptible to the lure of the terror organisations (Lind et al., 2015). The Kenya nation open door policy to refugees as well as its adoption of the UN policies on refugees has also made it easier for refugees to coexist among the native Kenyan population. According to Vittori et al. (2009) Kenya has a population of over 40 million people, the majority of whom are Christian while Muslims account for about 7.2% of the total population. Despite their small percentage, Muslims in Kenya are largely vocal and own more than 20% of the private institutions especially non-governmental firms.

However, it is the murder of 67 persons and wounding of 170 more in the West Gate Mall tragedy in September 2013 as well as the killing of the 147 students and injuring 76 more in the Garissa University incident that highlighted further the threat of Al-Shabab. Additionally, further investigation revealed radicalisation of the Kenyan youth especially of the Somali region notably Abdirahim Mohammed Abdullahi, a former law student at Kenya's oldest University, Nairobi

University (Steers, 2015). Mohamed Mohamud, the Mastermind of the Garissa attack is also alleged to mastermind the Mandera attack that claimed 36 lives.

In response to the terror threat in Kenya, the UK government issued a travel advisory to its citizens visiting Kenya. The travel advisory comprised of the some areas on the Kenyan coast and interestingly Eastleigh area of the capital city, Nairobi (Angote, 2015). The areas profiled were deemed to possess high threat of terrorism and therefore in the eyes of the UK government, the perceptions of the security of its citizens were not positive. The Kenyan nation responded to the increasing cries for security by mopping up the Eastleigh area of Nairobi and rounding off the ‘suspects’ in Kasarani stadium Nairobi. These actions were widely criticised by the national opposition leaders and human rights groups. Leftie (2014) elucidates that over 4000 persons of Somali origin were arrested as being suspected members of the Al-Shabaab. The high number of the suspected terrorists in the Eastleigh area, as well as the travel advisory issued by the UK government in the area, exposes the perceptions of people about their security in the area.

This research sought to evaluate the impact of Socio-economic factors of residents living in the area on their opinionof security. Also referred to as the ‘little Mogadishu’ Eastleigh area is mainly occupied by Somali residents majority of whom are immigrants from Somalia. Eastleigh boasts of a robust business sector that contributes more than 25% of the total levy revenue collected by the Nairobi County. Additionally, the residents of the Eastleigh whom the majority are Muslim have complained of exploitation and harassment from the Kenyan security forces. The Socio-economic factors and past terror attacks in the area makes Eastleigh an ideal area of interest for the study.

1.2 Statement of Problem & Research Questions

Based on previous events in Kenya and around the East African region, it is evident that insecurity is one of the major threats to the security of the East African nations. Aaranson (2013), Kenya has witnessed more than 150 cases of varying magnitudes since the first terror attack in Nairobi Mfangano Street in October 2011. Eastleigh area, in particular, has borne the brunt of the terror activities with more than 10 cases of grenade attacks that claimed dozens of lives and left many injured such as area member of parliament Abdi Yusuf Hassan. The targeting of the area MP highlights the audacity of the terrorists to target even the powerful and wealthy in the society. As a result of the terror threat, the government has reacted by establishing intensive patrols, Nyumba Kumi initiative as well as sharing intelligence among nations.

Despite considerable efforts, the perceptions of security especially in such hot points as the Eastleigh remain poor. Eastleigh presents an interesting and ideal location for conducting the study. Firstly, the area residents are majorly Somali Muslims, who operate successful businesses in Nairobi. Secondly, given that the residents come from the marginalized North Eastern region and Somalia, majority possesses very low levels of education. Thirdly, the area has for long been used by terrorists in preparation for terror attacks as well as a hide-out given the big population of Somali residents. The research question is: *How do the social-economic factors affect the perceptions about security?*

In view of the threat to security in Eastleigh area, the following three research questions guided this research study;

- i. What is the impact of income levels on perceptions about security?
- ii. What is the effect of educational levels on perceptions of security?

- iii. How does religion influence perceptions of security?

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 Main objective

The primary goal of this research study was to evaluate the impact of socio-economic determinants on perceptions about security among resident in Eastleigh Nairobi County.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

- i. To evaluate the impact of income levels on perceptions about security.
- ii. To evaluate the impact of educational levels on perceptions of security.
- iii. To assess the effect of religion on perceptions of security
- iv. To provide recommendations on how perceptions about security can be improved.

1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study was conducted in Eastleigh area in Nairobi County. This is because the researcher was not able to cover the whole country due to time factor, financial implications and other logistics. Additionally the area has a higher percentage of Muslims and is perceived to be the hub of terror groups in Nairobi Kenya which is believed to be a determinant of the socio-economic factors.

The researcher experienced several limitations in the course of undertaking this research study. Firstly, the research was constrained by the research budget as well as time for conducting the research. With regards to the research budget, the researcher was limited on the number of research assistants to hire. In this case, the researcher undertook to prepare, distribute and collect the research questionnaires. Additionally, the researcher was incapable of reaching every possible research respondents in the Eastleigh area. Despite coming up with a research sample of 100 target respondents, the respondents cannot be said to be representative of the total population

of Eastleigh areas. Micheni (2010) reports that based on the Kenyan 2010 Census, Nairobi Eastleigh, and its environs had a total population of 348,778 residents. Therefore, a sample of 100 selected through convenience sampling cannot be adjudged to be reliable, nor are its results.

Secondly, the researcher adopted close-ended questionnaires which align to the positivist philosophy of research. In this case, the study respondents were constrained to the Likert five scale answers. While the questionnaire results were easy to edit, sort and analyse, the Likert model denied the respondents the opportunity to reveal their true subjective feelings, opinions and perceptions about elements. In addition, the close-ended questionnaires adopted in the research also constrained the respondents towards giving short answers limiting them from providing additional details on the impacts of Socio-economic factors on their perceptions of security.

1.4.1 Rationale of the Study

The outcome of this research will help the government to come up with the best policies in curbing insecurity in Kenya. It will also help in understanding factors that lead to insecurity in Eastleigh and the country at large. The study will also help in putting effective strategy in place to reduce losses of lives and increase peace.

The recommendations of the current study will be useful to policymakers in the Kenyan security docket on how Socio-economic factors of the residents impact their perceptions of security. Additionally, it will serve as additional literature to researchers seeking to undertake studies on the perceptions of security in Kenya and around the world.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

In this section of the research study, the researcher reviews and evaluates past research findings of the perceptions of security as well as how socio - economic factors impact perceptions about security. First the researcher evaluates the correlations between income, religion and Education levels to perceptions about security. The literature review is also categorized into two sections; the first section evaluates perceptions about security. In the second part of the literature review, the researcher evaluations are based on past studies whether socio - economic aspects of people impact their perceptions of security. Aronson (2013) postulates there are a correlation that subsists between the global war on terror and the Kenya's politics as well as Kenya's focus on regional security.

1.5.2 Income level and Perceptions about security

According to Dal-Bo (2011) areas where people had low levels of income had higher propensities of crime than areas with where residents have higher income. This again is linked to many studies carried out in Kenya concerning the same. Many Kenyans according to the research believe that the higher the level of income the higher level of insecurity and the lower the level of income the more one feels secured. However, the study fails to link this perception to Kenyans in different areas within the country. The study only reveals to us this theory which is conducted in one area of residence i.e. Eastleigh. The researcher believes that there is a gap which needs to be filled by carrying out more research on the same.

1.5.3 Religion and Perceptions about security

According Lind et al. (2015) argues that income levels and religious affiliation of the Somali youth in the Kenya impacts them to radicalisation into the Al-Shabaab militia group. Though extensive in their research, the study falls short of explicating the effects of the Somali residents' religious affiliations on their perceptions of security. The researcher in this case puts more concentration in one area with a major bias on the Somali who are Muslims thereby failing to cover the other religious affiliations which could have brought more meaning to this theory. More researchers need to come in with different theories regarding the same by conducting more research on the same in different areas.

1.5.4 Level of education and Perceptions about security

According Brockoff et al. (2012) and Cohen and Soto (2007) studies concur that higher levels of education discourage individuals from participating in crime. Additionally, the studies conclude that more educated people usually have better perceptions of security as compared to the less educated counter parts. To some extent the theory agrees with the researcher's findings. Although the researcher explains and expound on the same, there still remain a gap that need to be filled by other researchers who should come up with their ideas on the same by carrying out research on the same but in different areas of the country.

1.5.5 Perceptions about Security

Barrett et al. (2015) explicate that perceptions is in itself a process that starts off by identifying information through the use of human senses, followed by the interpretation of information identified. Analysis of the information helps the individual to be able to understand the aspects and happenings in the environment. Lussier (2008) propounds that the perceptions process is twofold. Firstly, the person receives information through the use of their sensory organs which is

then processed from low-level information to information that is better understood by the individual. Secondly, the information processed is then linked up and compared to the individual's prior knowledge and expectations. In this way, the individual selects the information that will eventually impact their perceptions.

The psychology around security is based on both perceptions (feeling) and reality. In reality, the perceptions of an individual about their safety is partially mathematical or scientific and also based on the individual's belief (Kenyon and Sen, 2015). How secure a person is from burglary cases can be estimated by calculating the burglary cases over a period, let's say five years. The probability of a burglary attack can, therefore, be determined using prior collected data. Ideally, the statistical way of calculating risk is utilized by insurance firms when calculating premiums to be paid by the clientele. However, the perceptions of security are not only wrought in statistical data. Williams (2009) notes that the perceptions of security of an individual are influenced by the psychological reactions to the security risk of which they are exposed. Boersma and Hamann (2009) explicate that based on past experiences and countermeasures undertaken against security threats, individuals may choose to either feel safe or not. Ideally, if the individuals have been exposed to say terror attacks in the past and are not convinced on countermeasures undertaken, the perceptions about security may be negative given their expectations.

Gorur (2015) study in the Sudanese internally displaced camps documents that the perceptions of the communities living in the camps is influenced primarily by the wealth of information the people have. The information is gathered from past attacks perpetrated by their rivals based on which the persons choose to flee, submit or fight off their attackers. Rosand et al. (2007) study on the impact of terror in Sub-Saharan region reveals that population, especially in the Kenyan coast, have a poor perceptions of their security. Ibrahim (2010) focuses the blame on the poor

opinion of security on the ongoing radicalization of Kenyan youth, past terror events as well as the failure of the government to deal firmly with terror threats. Odhiambo et al. (2015) explicates that the recent high-profile terror attacks by the Al-Shabaab terrorists in The West gate Nairobi and Garissa University have only heightened the poor perceptions of security. Before the two high-profile attacks, Kenyans were merely accustomed to grenade attacks that did not amount to massive casualties in the West gate attack and subsequently in Garissa University attack.

Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) state that there is a dilemma in Kenya over the issue of hosting refugees. The great influx of Somali refugees in camps in the North Eastern region and many immigrants in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi highlight the greater risk for the Kenyan Nation. The influx of Somali immigrants into Nairobi impacts negatively on the residents of the capital city. This is based on the wealth of information that the residents possess about Al-Shaahab attacks in Nairobi and Eastleigh being an area profiled by a terrorist as a 'safe zone'. International Crisis Group (2012) report holds that both the poor and the rich in the Eastleigh area in Nairobi have a poor perceptions of their security. The poor in particular live in fear of the police and other security forces that round them up for registration and other legal papers. Additionally, they risk being profiled as members of the Al-Shabaab or their sympathisers (Odhiambo et al., 2013). The rich on the other hand, fear for the long term future of their investment and properties in the Eastleigh area. The perceptions of freeze or theft of their assets by individuals in the government makes the individuals conceal information on their properties and business associations (International Crisis Group, 2012).

1.5.6 Impact of Socio-economic factors on perceptions about security

Chen et al. (2014) define demographic factors as the social and economic aspects of a population relating to such aspects as age, income level, marital status, the level of education as well as gender. Differences in demographic characteristics are utilized to place individuals in groups that explicate their behavior. May et al. (2011) research on the predictors of fear and risk in terror identified income level and religious affiliation as major predictors of terror and security risk. The study is based in the Kentucky region and utilizes adult residents based on their perceptions about security after the 9/11 attack. DiMaggio (2008) asserts that the media highlights into the 9/11 attack left the American people perceiving the Arab and Muslim people as threats to national and personal security. Mursheed (2009) on the threat perceptions in Europe concurs with May et al. (2011) study findings. Mursheed (2009) recommends that for the perceptions on Muslims being terror threats to be reduced, European nations need to stop economically marginalizing the Muslim youth and offer them equal opportunities to their White colleagues. Additionally, the Muslim youth should be allowed to formulate their own identities to align with their new European homelands. Stewart (2008) study reveals that the perceptions of Muslim youth as threats against security due to their religion as Muslims impact both their perceptions of their own security as well as that of other people who perceive them as threats.

Wakinini (2014) on the perceptions of security among residents of Malindi area concluded that the education level of the residents impacts directly on their perceptions of security. The higher the educational level of residents the poorer their perceptions about security in the area largely due to their exposure to information on past attacks. Brockoff et al. (2012) on the impact of education on terror concludes on a positive correlation between lower levels of education and terrorism. On the other hand, the study finds that higher level of education reduces the tendency

of terror activities thus leads to good perceptions about security. Cohen and Soto (2007) opine that higher levels of education increase the opportunity costs of terrorism. Additionally, a higher level of education contributes to the higher level of employment and incomes thus discouraging individuals to join terror groups (Shafiq and Sinno, 2010). To this end, it is evident from past studies that demographic aspects of the population have a direct impact on perceptions about security.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

1.6.1 Bounded Rationality Theory

This study uses the bounded rationality theorem postulated by Hebert Simon. According to this theory people make the decisions in light of three aspects. Firstly, the rationality of the decisions they make is limited to the information that is available to them at the decision-making time (Fussey, 2011). Secondly, the individuals make decisions based on the ‘cognitive limitations’ existent in their minds (Bendor, 2010, 12). Finally, the decisions made by the individuals are based on the time available for them to make the decisions. However, the rationality of their decision will be bound to the resources that are available to them at the time being. Velupillai (2010) opines that given that resources are always limited, the individuals will seek to make optimal decisions based on the resources available. Individuals are rational upto the limit to which they have information collection, storing and dissemination abilities. Richter (2008) explicates that the size of the human brain is too small to be capable of evaluating information available to it compared to the problems faced by the individual at a time (Braun and Ortega, 2014).

In this case, the individual resorts to heuristics in making decisions due to the limitation of the brain, time as well as information processing abilities. In this case, the person resonates to

feelings rather than rationality. In the face of security threats and information about security threats, the individual may perceive to be safe or not. Fussey (2011) adds that especially in a time of political upheaval, war or attacks, human beings neither possess all the information needed to make rational decisions. Additionally, the time calls for reactionary measures due to lack of adequate time and resources to process the information. In this case, the individuals may have a negative perceptions about their security given the absence of all information regarding likely occurrences.

Tsang (2008) propounds that though heuristics offers perfect solutions in case of constrained time available for decision making, they push the individual further from the right perceptions. The individual make mistakes in assessments leading to the derivation of wrong perceptions about a situation in hand. Despite not directly explicating the relationship between Socio-economic factors and perceptions about security, bounded rationality explains on how information, time as well as cognitive limitations of the human brain impacts perceptions. Social heuristic as a tool of bounded rationality, in relation to the study in question, are there to guide behaviour and decisions in the social environments. Social environments are characterized by complexity, uncertainty and agents with limited information.

The bounded rationality in this case, through the imitate-the-majority heuristic, i.e follow-the-majority heuristic can be applied to imitate the majority of agents in a particular reference group. In relation to this study it can be deduced that many individuals have different perceptions about the level of security depending on their levels of education, their religion and level of their income. In the absence of these capabilities, the individuals are irrational and adopt the use of heuristics or shortcuts to make decisions. This has been demonstrated by different authors and researchers as discussed in this bounded rationality theory.

1.7 Research Hypothesis

1.7.1 Main Hypothesis

Socio-economic factors impact on perceptions of security

1.7.2 Specific Hypothesis

- i. The lower the income level the more one perceives to be secure .
- ii. The lower the education levels the more one perceives to be secures.
- iii. People who profess islam religion precieve to be more secure.

1.8 Research Methodology

1.8.1 Research Design

The researcher used simple random sample methods because of the targeted population which will be 100 people in number given questionnaires randomly. This study will be carried out in stages and will use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

1.8.2 Data collection

The primary method of data collection will be employed where the researcher will adopt the use of close-ended questionnaires which will be 100 copies in number distributed to residents of Eastleigh area in Nairobi to be filled and thereafter collected by the researcher.

1.8.2 Data analysis

For purposes of analyzing the data collected using questionnaires, the researcher adopted both descriptive and inferential statistics. Once data is obtained from the field, it will then be coded and analysed aided by computer using statistical software SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) and Microsoft Excel programme for windows. It will then be summarised using distribution tables and bar graphs for all items. In presenting data, central measures of tendency will be used to discuss the findings.

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND TO SECURITY IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter the research study sought to provide a historical and contextual background for the current study. The researcher sought to find out the perceptions of security among people living in the Eastleigh area. To do so, the researcher evaluates the Kenyan security agencies from their invention as well as the reforms undertaken by the agencies over time. Additionally, this chapter of the research study explores the Eastleigh area to bring the area into the context of the current study. The contextual evaluation covers the location of the Eastleigh area, its invention, as well as growth as well as its current residents among other aspects. With regards to the structure of the second chapter, the researcher commences with the historical framework followed by the contextual framework.

2.2 The Security Framework in Kenya

According to Chapter 14 Article 239 (1) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, there are three national security organs in Kenya. The three are; the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Police Service (NPS). The key role of the three organisations is to ensure that Kenya and its citizens are protected against all threats emanating from both internal and external sources. Besides protection of the Kenyan Territory against attacks from foreigners, the security organs are charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights, freedoms as well as the peace and stability of the Kenyan citizens. Schweitzer et al. (2012) assert that despite the wide description of the Kenyan constitution on the Kenyan security organs, the KDF, as well as the national police service, have several other

agencies serving under their banner. The section below provides the description of the various security organs ranging from their history, reforms as well as renowned security incidents handled by the agencies.

2.2.1 Kenya Defense Forces

According to Article 241 of the Kenyan constitution promulgated in the year 2010, the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) composes of three forces, the Kenya Navy, Kenya Army and the Kenya AIR Force. Like many other Defence forces across the world, the KDF are under the command of the Kenyan President, referred as the Commander in Chief (CGH) of the Kenya Defence Forces. Article 241(3) of the year 2012, stipulates that the KDF has three key functions. Firstly, the KDF are charged with the responsibility of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kenyan Republic. Secondly, the KDF may in the case of national emergencies in Kenya be deployed to assist. Thirdly, with the approval of the Kenyan National Assembly (Parliament), the KDF may be deployed to quell violence and restore peace in areas within the nation affected by unrest or lack of stability.

According to Act 241 of 2012, the pecking order in the KDF starts with the President, who is the CGH, followed by the Cabinet secretary in charge of Defence, and then the Chief of General Staff who is deputized by the Vice Chief of General Staff. Below the Vice Chief of General Staff serve the service commanders of the Kenya Army, Kenya Air Force and the Kenya Navy.

Davis (2007) offers that except the first duty of protecting Kenya and its border, the KDF has to report to Parliament on its two other functions through the Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Defence. Though, the KDF was officially founded after the Kenyan Independence in the year 1963, its history goes back to the year the late 1800's and early 1900's during the Kenya colonization to the British.

Bennett (2013) observes that evidence points to the involvement of Kenyans as part of the Uganda Rifles in the suppression of the Nandi rebellion in the late 1890's as well as suppression of the Sudanese troops in Uganda in the early 1900's. However, following the suppression of the Sudan rebellion, the Colonial Government reconstituted its forces in Central and East Africa into a unison command called the King African Rifles (KAR) (Page, 1998). By the year 1916, the KAR in Kenya were stationed in the Mount Kenya Region Town centre of Meru. However, the unit was disbanded in 1926 only to be reconstituted in the year 1930 and moved to Nairobi and was utilized by the British forces in the World War II. Bennett (2013) offers that during the emergency period in Kenya, the Kenya Regiment of the King African Rifles was utilised in the war against the African Mau Mau movement.

Following the declaration of Kenyan Independence in December 12th 1963, the Kenya Regiment of the KAR was transformed into the Kenya Military with three units 3 Kenya Rifles, 5 Kenya Rifles and 11 Kenya Rifles. Hornsby (2012) opines that the transition from the Kenya African Rifles to the Kenya Military was not smooth with a mutiny taking place in the year 1964 for whom result led to the disbandment of the 11 Kenya Rifles. The British government agreed to withdraw its forces who were later replaced with African soldiers. However, the Britons aided Kenya in establishing and training the Kenya Airforce and Navy. The training of the Kenya Army by the Royal British Army has continued to the year 2015 in such areas as Nanyuki (Parker, 2011).

Hornsby (2012) illustrates that compared to other armies in neighbouring nations such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, the Kenya Defence Forces has seen less active action in wars. However, as early as the 1960's the KDF was fighting against the so-called 'Shifta Menace' (Ringquist, 2011, 12). In the period 1964-1968, just after Kenya's independence from the British,

Kenya Defence Forces and the General Service Forces (GSU) engaged against the secessionist Somali in the North Eastern region who sought unison with their counterparts in Somalia. Shifta means bandit in Somali and the Kenyan used the word as propaganda against the Somali's quest for Independence from Kenya (Murunga, 2005).

The Somali in the North Eastern Region then referred as the Northern District Frontier cited their economic and political marginalisation largely supporting a Majimboism policy supported by Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) party led by Ronald Ngala. On the other hand, Kenyatta KANU government rejected Majimboism thus the action by the army to quell the unrest in the area. Khadiagala (1994) asserts that the Shifta were sponsored informally by the Somali government of the time.

Interestingly, a diplomatic deal between the Kenya and Somali government brought the menace to an end in 1969 which allowed the defence forces to mop up remaining guerrilla fighters. Despite the success of the Kenya defence forces in quelling the Shifta, it left a bad taste and perceptions of the Kenya Defence Forces and general security organs in eyes of the Kenyan-Somali. The Somali saw the Shifta war as criminalisation of the Somali, who were political, economically and culturally marginalised by the Kenyan government (Ringquist, 2011). On a positive note, the KDF have been involved in peacekeeping operations in such nations as Macedonia, Croatia, East Timor, South Sudan and Angola as part of a larger group of UN soldiers across the world. Bachmann (2012) postulates that the involvement of the KDF in these missions and their professionalism in the field improved the perceptions in the eyes of the Kenyan people as well as the International community.

In Kenya, a Kenya Army regiment the Rangers was dispatched to quell violence in Mount Elgon region following the overpowering of the Kenya police as well as the GSU in the year 2008.

Weisshaar (2008) explicates that Sabaot Land Defence Forces (SLDF) led by Wycliffe Matkwei reigned terror in Mount Elgon killing 600 and displacing close to 70,000 people raping and torturing many more. Despite, the military intervention bringing an end to the 18 month conflict, the military left fear in their wake with involvement in detention, rape and torture of residents in the area (Simiyu, 2008). The involvement of the military in internal operations despite achieving the desired result was again questioned by human right groups due to alleged commission of human rights abuses.

Overall, the greatest involvement of the KDF came with the operation Linda Nchi where they verged into Somalia October 2011 to fight the Alshabab and assists the Somali transitional Government to establish itself in Somalia. Gray (2012) reports that the mission has been largely successful in the Kenyan Forces capturing key towns such as BeresQoqani and Kismayu as well as the Capital Mogadishu, which is now under the control of AMISON. Despite the KDF efforts to contain the Al Shabab in Somalia, the Alshabab has engaged in several missions that have claimed scores of lives in Kenya. Notable events include West Gate, Mpeketoni, Garissa University and Mandera quarry attack that claimed 68, 52, 147 and 92 Kenyan lives respectively. Overall, among the four notable attacks, it is the handling of the west gate attack that brought the spotlight back on the KDF. The KDF were blamed for their lack of coordination during the attack along with other security forces, lack of immediate response as well as looting (Butime, 2014). The event saw an erosion in the perceptions of the Kenyan people on the KDF professionalism as well as the overall security of the Kenyan state.

Besides the attacks on the Kenyan soft targets, an attack on 15th January 2016 on a KDF camp in El-Adde Somalia caught the camp flat footed. The result was the complete destruction of the camp while the Kenyan soldiers suffered heavy casualties further underlining the ill-

preparedness of the KDF as well as the threat of the Alshabab. The attack is the deadliest of the AMISON Soldiers in Somalia to date as half of the battalion of 150 soldiers are still not accounted for (Williams, 2016).

2.2.2 National Intelligence Service (NIS)

Established by Act 242 of 2012, the NIS was formerly called the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). Based on Act 242(2), the primary duty of the NIS is collect domestic and foreign intelligence. Besides collection of both domestic and foreign intelligence, the NIS is an important cog of security in Kenya as it shares the same information with the police to facilitate both prevention of attacks as well as arrests of suspects. Based on Act 242 (5), the NIS is charged with the responsibility of the gathering, collection, analysis and transmission of intelligence information with other organs and agencies of the state. The NIS is also charged with the responsibility of advising the President as well as the National Security Council on policies regarding national security.

Bennett (2011) explicates that NIS traces its roots in Kenya to the Special Branch, which was established by the colonial government in the year 1926. However, the collection of intelligence by the African natives started way before when traders were crisscrossing the then native nation used to collect intelligence which facilitated raids for animals. The colonial government exploited these links especially during the war with the Mau Mau to collect information on the activities of the Mau Mau and their leaders. Additionally, the Special Branch was keen on collecting information regarding the actions and activities of trade unionists in Kenya in the pre-independence period.

Walton (2013) postulates that post-independence period led the Special Branch to be revered among the Kenyan people especially the dissidents of the Kenyatta Government. The special branch then led by James Kanyottu was utilized by politicians to detain and torture perceived dissidents and opposition members in Kenya. Notably, the greatest involvement of the Special Branch was in the period following the 1982 attempted coup of the Moi government. Dianga (2002) asserts that the special branch had by the time of the attempted Coup de tat infiltrated the KDF and had information on the impending coup. The result of the attempted Coup was more than 100 soldiers and 200 civilians dead as well as loss running into half a billion shillings.

Murunga and Nasongo (2007) report that the special branch had two days before the Coup informed President Moi of the impending Coup as well as named its masterminds including the eventual leader Senior Private Hezekiah Ochuka. However, the President deemed an arrest of KDF officers by the police as surmounting to insubordination and preferred an internal way of handling the unrest. Systematically after the attempted coup de tat, the Special Branch set out to torture suspected dissidents and organizers of the coup violating the constitutional rights of the suspects for a fair trial. Dianga (2012) explicates that the Special Branch then became a feared agency that operated above the law with complete disregard to the national constitution. Among the notable names that faced the wrath of the special branch include Former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Former Subukia MP KiogiwaWamwere, Shem Ochuodho, PhilipMurgor among others (Kiereini, 2014). Latter, the special branch was transformed into the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the predecessor of NIS in the year 1998.

Hornsby (2013) states that up until the year 1998, the Special Branch had operated as a unit of the national police service. However, in the year 1999, the National Government decided to separate the NSIS away from the Police making the earlier an independent agency charged with

the sole primary role of the collection, gathering, analysis and transmission of both domestic and foreign intelligence to relevant agencies. Similar to the Attorney General in Kenya, the Director General of the NIS has a security of tenure that helps to shield him/her from interference from the ruling class thus protecting national interests. The NIS has since been transferred from the Special Branch location in Nyati House to its current headquarters in Marurui in the outskirts of Nairobi city. (Alexander, 2005).

Intelligence services in Kenya have had several highlight moments of failure that have brought into question the professionalism of the force and its ability to preserve peace and security in Kenya. Firstly, the Special Branch and later the NSIS failed to provide intelligence regarding the impending post-election violence in areas of the Rift Valley in 1992, 1997 and 2007. Secondly, they failed to provide information on terror attacks in Nairobi American embassy attack as well as the West-gate attack in Westland's area of Nairobi (Njeru, 2008). However, the failures in the case of the intelligence services cannot be blamed entirely on their lack of competence.

Mureithi (2012) highlights that under the law, the NIS officers are not permitted to carry any firearms perhaps due to the notoriety of the special branch back in the 1980's and early 1990s. In this case, the intelligence officers may be exposed to situations where they could prevent crime or make arrests but cannot do so as it does fall under their jurisdiction. As a result of their barring from making arrests, NIS end up taking the intelligence information to the Police, who most of the times ignore it, such as the case of Garissa University attack. According to the Waki report of the year 2007, the NSIS state that they provided information regarding possible attacks in such areas as Molo, Eldoret as well as Burnt Forest. However, the police supposedly ignored the information till it was too late and many people lost their lives. The same blame game was replicated in the West Gate attack where the NSIS absolved itself of any blame citing that

information was provided on possible targets to the police beforehand. Nichols (2015) evidently, shows a clear lack of organisation among Kenyan security agencies which lead to a failure in the protection of the Kenyan civilians and their property from attacks by terrorists.

2.2.3 The National Police Service

According to Chapter 14 (4) of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, the Kenya Police Service is the national body charged with the responsibility of enforcing the law within the borders of Kenya. The Kenya police service as explicated by Act 11 of the year 2014 composes of three key divisions, the National Kenya Police, Administration Police and the Criminal Investigations Departments (CID). The Kenya Police Service is headed by an Inspector General and deputized by two Deputy Inspectors General one overseeing the administration police while the other being in charge of the National Kenya Police. The third deputy is the Director General of the CID. Under the National Kenya Police; there are various specialist units of police including; the General service Unit (GSU), Anti-Stock Theft Unit, Traffic Police, Kenya Police Airwing, Police Dog Unit, Maritime Police among other units. The GSU is the paramilitary wing of the Kenya Police service established back in the 1950's to deal with the scourge of the Mau Mau, who were at the time fighting for Kenyan Independence (Warah, 2013).

Ombatti (2013) offers that the GSU has since expanded to undertake the protection of VIPS, diplomats as well as the President. A popular segment of the GSU is the Recce squad which is revered and admired by the Kenyan Public. The Recce composes of 2000 specialist officers trained in Israel with expertise in kidnap, recovery and extraction missions as well as diplomatic and presidential protection (Okari, 2015). The Kenya police service initially called the Kenyan Police Force before the advent of the 2010 constitution, was formulated back in the year 1906, half a decade before Kenya acquired its independence from the British (Hope, 2015). The force

was established in the Sir William McKinnon, a British businessman with interests in the Coastline of Kenya with the purpose of protecting his stores from attacks by bandits. In this case, the majority of the police officers were located in the coastal region thus their Swahili name 'Askari' (Hewitt, 2008). With the development of the Uganda railway, police presence grew on the mainland in efforts to secure and safeguard property and workers who were building the railway (Osborne, 2014).

During the World War 1, the Kenyan police officers were lined up with Kenyan soldiers as they fought along the British and their Loyalists against the Nazis. After the war end, the police force grew as did the level of literacy among residents with the development of Schools.

Osborne (2014) offers that the Second world war saw the recruits of the Kenya police force line up again with the Kenya military against the Italian force in Somalia. Besides serving in the battle, the recruits acted to collect information as well as in interpretation, as well as recovery missions in Somalia. Following the development of the GSU in the year 1948, the police air wing was formulated in the year 1949 (Danopoulos, 1996). Later in 1958, the Kenya police headquarters were established under the defence ministry. However, the current headquarters of the Kenya Police service are in Vigilance House in Central Business District, Nairobi. The advent of the Kenyan independence from the British saw a replacement of the expatriate officers with Kenyan officers (Hornsby, 2013).

Based on Article 11 of the year 2012, the Kenya police role is to maintain law and peace in Kenya, protection of life and property, detection and prevention of crime as well as enforcement of all laws. However, the perceptions of the Kenyan Police in the eyes of the Kenyan Public has been largely negative given the high level of human rights violations and corruption. Gicobi (2015) offers that for the last six years, the Kenyan Police has topped the list of the most corrupt

institution in Kenya. As of December 2015, a Transparency International report shows that the average bribe paid to a Police officer per month was Ksh 4800. However, the figure could be higher given the location of deployment and the rank of the Police Officer. Odula (2014) postulates that the corruption level in the Kenyan Police service is so bad that the officers would be willing to take bribes to let terror suspects go scot free. The revelation of this information in the local dailies has done little to change the perceptions of the Kenyan people for their safety especially at a time when terror attacks have been rampant. Wagner (2014) asserts that based on a Transparency International report in 2010, 91% of the Kenyan people considered the police force to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt.

In addition to corruption, the Kenyan Police has also been blamed for alleged human rights violations over its history and also recently for its handling of terror suspects. Kenya has in the recent five-year period been marred by cases of terror attacks. Patterson (2015) asserts that the ongoing fight by the Kenyan security forces against the Alshabab has been accused of widespread human right abuses. The Kenyan government has meanwhile turned a blind eye on such accusations letting the officers on the wrong go scot free (Press, 2012). Notably, the Operation Usalama Watch launched in such areas as Nairobi, Coastal and North Eastern parts of Kenya were largely seen as discriminative against the Muslims especially those of Somali descent. Additionally, the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) has been blamed for more than 200 extra-judicial deaths with some committed in broad daylight or some of the victims being allegedly kidnapped and killed by the ATPU (Satter, 2014).

In the year 2010, following twin bomb attacks on buses in Eastleigh, the area witnessed looting of the Somali-owned shops in the area. In response, the Police arrested more than 300 suspected terror suspects, none of whom was eventually charged with the crime (AFP, 2010). A similar

operation was undertaken in the Eastleigh area in the aftermath of the Westgate terror attack that left 68 Kenyans dead. The operation mainly focused on the Eastleigh and Pangani areas saw more than 4000 Somalis arrested and detained at the Kasarani stadium, some for more than 24 hours required under the Kenyan law (Mohammed, 2014). Additionally, the Kenyan authorities also deported several Somalis bearing UNHCR registration forms while some were mentally challenged. In Eastleigh, the Somali were subjected to discrimination such as denial from boarding Matatus, harassment from Police on patrol as well as abuse from the general public. The message, in this case, was clear that the Somalis were not welcome in Kenya and that Terrorism was a Muslim and Somali aspect, and the two could not be differentiated. Doya (2013) offers that the Westgate attack only acted in strengthening the longstanding prejudice and discrimination against the Somalis and Muslims in Kenya.

2.2.3.1 Reforms in the Kenya Police Service

Following the 2007 General elections in the year 2007, the then incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was announced the winner in a tightly contested and controversial election against the opposition leader and future Prime Minister Raila Odinga. What followed was a spate of violence in the nation which claimed lives of 1300 Kenyans and displaced more than 600,000 (Corradetti, 2015). In an attempt to quell the violence, the Kenya Police resulted in the use of excessive force which led to more deaths, extrajudicial killings and in some cases sexual crimes especially in opposition areas (Okia, 2011). The Waki commission constituted to investigate the violence recommended wide-ranging reforms in the police force.

Some of the reforms included a new legislation in the name of the National Police Act that was enacted by Parliament in the year 2011. In line with the Act, the Kenyan Police and the Administration Police were to be merged into one force headed by an Inspector General of

Police (Kenya Act 242(2)). Fast forward to the year 2012, the appointment of David Kimaiyo as the Inspector General of Police to replace then Commissioner of Police Mathew Iteere, marked the implementation of reform on the command of the Police force. Additionally, the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) Act of 2011 established a body made up of civilians whose duty of recruitment of the police officers in Kenya. The body headed by Johnston Kavuludi is a first in Kenya (Ombati, 2012). The NPSC has been largely involved in the vetting of police officers in an attempt to reform the police force sending many senior officers home majorly on corruption and human rights abuses (Nguru, 2015). Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) Act of 2011 set pace for the establishment of IPOA whose key role is handling complaints about police officers as well as conducting disciplinary and criminal investigations on the Police and advising whether criminal actions should be preferred against officers.

The Kenyan Constitution promulgated in the year 2010, give more power and freedom to the Inspector General of Police from the control of the Cabinet Secretary of Internal Security (Nguru, 2015). The Cabinet Secretary can only advise in writing on policy matters. However, the IG has operational freedom over the actions of the Police. The Kenyan constitution additionally clearly outlines the powers of the Police to prevent them from undertaking actions that are not within their mandate. Based on Amnesty International (2013) the progress in the reforms have however been stunted as explicated by Table 1 below which shows the timeline between enactment of laws in parliament and their implementation.

Table 2.1 Timeline between enactment of laws in parliament and their implementation.

	NPS Act	NPSC Act	IPOA Act
Adopted by Parliament	25 August 2011	25 August 2011	25 August 2011
Commencement date	30 August 2011	4 October 2011	18 November 2011
	IGP	NPSC	IPOA
Appointed and sworn in	24 December 2012	9 October 2012	4 June 2012

Source: Amnesty International (2013)

The Kenya Police service has also made considerable efforts in implementing community policing anchored under Article 244 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010. Dubbed the NyumbaKumi initiative in Kenya, the initiative seeks to restore security in Kenya to ensure that individuals are living in a way a village knew each other well. In so doing, the NyumbaKumi initiative is expected to improve information exchange between the Police and other security organs with the public. Muraya (2014) offers that the initiative drawn from Tanzania is spearheaded by Joseph Kaguthi, a former Provincial Commissioner. The NyumbaKumi appreciates that security of the people in a nation is a shared responsibility between the public and the security forces.

However, the Kenya Police has only managed to set out the foundations for the reforms; many challenges lay ahead. Lack of compliance with the law is an endemic crime in Kenya perpetrated by even the high and mighty in Kenya. For example, the President and Prime Minister in the year

2013 attempted appointing three males to the Inspector General and two Deputy General positions in contravention of the two-thirds gender balance rule stipulated by the Constitution. The earlier then rescinded his decision and appointed Grace Kaindi as the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Corruption is still endemic in Kenya especially among the Kenyan police as evidenced during the vetting exercise of Police officers where the majority of them struggled to justify the sources of their wealth (Usalama Reform, 2012). The public confidence in the Police, especially in areas with bad security history like Tana River and the North Eastern region, is poor where citizens hate and despise the men and women in uniform.

Finally, as much as the blame can be placated on the police, the Kenyan police lack adequate resources and preparedness to fight off attacks (Kapchanga, 2015). The police, for example, lack equipment and logistical support which could have aided in proper response to such attacks as Garissa University, Mpeketoni as well as the massacre in Baragoi (Langat, 2015). Usalama Reform (2012) adds that the Kenyan Police lack adequate housing and meagre salaries, a reason that could explain the chronic levels of corruption in Kenya.

2.4 The Eastleigh Area: History and Growth

Doya (2013) asserts that Eastleigh area in Nairobi is the center in East Africa where the Alshabab sources its funding as well as terrorists who engage in terrors attacks on the Kenyan people. Eastleigh falls in the Pumwani Division of the Nairobi County and is divided into North and South Eastleigh. Known as the ‘Little Mogadishu’, Eastleigh are is a home to predominantly Somali immigrants who moved to the country following the toppling of the SiadBarre government in the early 1990’s in Somalia (Manson, 2013). However, the area founded in the year 1921 was not meant to be a home for the Somali nor the Africans. The area was set out to be home to the Indians as well as the African elites at the time. Nevertheless, the area is now

encroached with a majorly Somali population. Wesangula (2008) offers that the area is of immense importance to the Nairobi County contributing close to 30% of the levies and taxes contributed to the Nairobi County (Yusuf, 2012). The robust business in Eastleigh consists of imported commodities majorly from such market as Mogadishu, Turkey and Dubai.

Wanga (2014) asserts that the business sector in Eastleigh has seen a gradual decline following security forces operations in the area such as Operation Usalama Watch. Somali investors in the area have responded to the discrimination and harassment of the government forces by moving their billions to other nations in Africa. What has followed were vacated houses and business premises that the African Kenyans are struggling to fill given the high cost of rent paid by former Somali tenants.

CHAPTER THREE: STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

3.1 Introduction

The main aim of this study was to evaluate the effects of socio - economic factors on perceptions of security of residents among Eastleigh area in Nairobi. To accomplish this purpose, the researcher sought to collect data through the use of close-ended questionnaires from the residents of Eastleigh. This chapter presents the data collected from the respondents in simple graphs which are easily understandable. The chapter composes of four sections. In the first section, the researcher evaluates the socio - economic of the research respondents. Additionally, the first section also assesses the response rate of the questionnaires utilised in data collection. The second section consists of an evaluation of the perceptions of security among residents of Eastleigh area. The third section comprises of an appraisal of the relationship between socio - economic factors and the perceptions of security among Eastleigh residents. The final section provides a compendious summary of the main chapter findings.

3.2 Response Rate


For data collection, the researcher distributed questionnaires to 100 respondents. Of the 100 research questionnaires circulated to the respondents, the researcher collected 81 questionnaires which were fully completed. The 81 collected questionnaires represent an 81% response rate.

3.3 Respondents' demographics

3.3.1 Gender

In this case the researcher sought to find out the number and the percentage of respondents in socio-economic aspects. The chart below elaborates gender distribution for the respondents in the study.

Figure 3.1 Respondents Gender




Source: Author (2016) percentage

Among the Socio-economic aspects the research sought to understand the gender of the respondents. Majority of the respondents in Eastleigh area were male, the phenomena could be as a result of the area being a business hub and therefore most are doing business to earn a living to provide for their families.

3.3.2 Religion

Religion is a factor that is key in a demographic area. In this case the researcher analyses the types of religions that are found in the study area and thereafter represents it in a chart below in numbers.


Figure 3.2 Respondents' Religious Identity



Source: Author (2016)

According to Leftie (2014), a majority of the residents in Eastleigh are Somalis who profess Islam as their religion. The results of the study as shown in figure 3.3 below agree with the assertions of Leftie (2014). Of the total research respondents, 44.4% profess Islam, 30.9% profess Christianity, and 9.9% of the respondents profess Hinduism while 14.8% of the respondents asserted that they profess other religious faiths.

Figure 3.3 Respondent's Degree Of Religiosity




Source: Author (2016)

According to Lind et al. (2015), religious radicalisation of the youth in Kenya has a direct relationship with the terror threat facing the nation. In this case, the researcher sought to understand the staunchness of the respondents in their religious faith. Based on figure 3.4 below, it is evident that the majority of the respondents are staunchly religious with 38.3% of the total respondent asserting that they are very religious. Meanwhile, 29.6% of the research respondents state that they are religious. As explicated by figure 3. 4 below, only 18.5% of the total respondents conceded not being religious.

3.3.3 Employment status of residents

Employment status in this case simply is about the number of individuals who are actively in employment and those that are unemployed and goes further to find out the sectors of employment for those who are actively in employment. The researcher therefore after doing well his research expresses this in form of a bar chart s elaborated below.

Figure 3.4 Respondents employment status



Source: Author (2016)

Regarded as the Little Mogadishu, Eastleigh area in Nairobi is a hub for Somali Businessmen dealing with imported goods mainly from Mogadishu and Dubai. The researcher sought to confirm the employment status of the research respondents to evaluate whether the majority of the residents are indeed businesspeople. Based on figure 3.8 below, 55.56% of the total respondents are self-employed, 14.81% are employed by private firms while 8.64% ply their trade for the Kenyan Government.

3.4 Respondent Perceptions about Security


According to Kenyon (2015), the perceptions of an individual with regards to any issue are directly affected by two things. Firstly, the information they receive through their sensory organs which individuals process from the low levels status of the information to information that the individuals can then comprehend. Secondly, the perceptions of an individual are directly influenced by the information and expectation that the individual had before the receipt of the new information. Lussier (2008) explicates that individuals still have the capacity to choose what

to perceive and what to believe. Past empirical studies concur that the Eastleigh area has been a target of many terror attacks from terror suspects. Additionally, past research by AFP (2010) and Mohammed (2014) postulate that the residents of Eastleigh area especially those of the Somali descent have been facing harassment by the Kenyan Security Forces. Satter (2014) study concludes that the Kenyan Police especially the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) has been widely blamed for kidnapping, torture as well as extra-judicial killings of suspected terror suspects and radical Kadhis. Against this background, the researcher sought to evaluate the perceptions of the respondents on security in the Eastleigh area.

3.4.1 Target for Criminal elements

The chart below indicates perceptions about how one is likely to be targeted by criminals.

Figure 3.5 Target for Criminal elements




Source: Author (2016)

Firstly, the researcher sought to understand whether the respondents felt that they were likely targets for criminal elements in the Eastleigh area. Based on Figure 3.5; the majority of the respondents consented that they are likely targets for criminal elements in Eastleigh. 53.1% of

the total study respondent stated that they still fear attacks from criminal elements in their area while 27.2% stated that they did not feel to be likely targets of criminal elements.

Figure 3.6 Likelihood of a target of terrorists




Source: Author (2016)

Eastleigh area has in the past borne the brunt of terrorists with the suspects targeting even the high and mighty. Aaronson (2013) espouses that the area MP, Abdi Yusuf Hassan was targeted and severely injured in grenade attack in the area. On this basis, the researcher sought to understand whether the respondents perceived themselves likely targets for the terrorists. According to figure 3.6 above, 79.1% of the respondents considered themselves likely targets for terrorists. Meanwhile, 21% of the respondents were neutral on the query while 9.9% disagreed that they were likely targets for terrorists.

3.4.2 Fear of attacks by terrorists

In this case the researcher went a step further to question the respondents on whether they fear attacks from terrorists and put it in a chart as below.


Figure 3.7 Fear of Attacks by Terrorists



Source: Author (2016)

The researcher went a step further to question the respondents on whether they fear attacks from terrorists. Based on figure 3.7 above, 79.1% of the respondents stated that they fear attacks from terrorists while 13.6% stated that they did not. Meanwhile, 17.3% of the total respondents maintained a neutral position to the query.

Figure 3.8 Likelihood of Neighbours harbouring Terrorists




Source: Author (2016)

According to Mogire and Agade (2011) Eastleigh area has for a long time been perceived as an ideal hideout for terror suspects given that majority of the residents are Somali Muslims. In this case, some of the area residents are likely to be sympathizers of the terror suspects. The researcher sought to evaluate whether the respondents suspected their neighbours of harbouring terrorists. Based on figure 3.8, 66.7% of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 19.8% of the total respondents disagreed that their neighbours could be sympathizers of terror suspects.

3.4.3 Blame on neighbour's for past attacks

On this basis, the researcher questioned the respondents on whether they blamed their neighbours for the past attacks in the Eastleigh area and thereafter recorded it in a chart as below.

Figure 3.9 Blame on neighbours for past attacks




Source: Author (2016)

According to Mogire and Agade (2011) majority of attacks in the Nairobi city are planned in Eastleigh area. A good example being the 1998 bomb attack on the American Embassy Nairobi that claimed 213 lives. On this basis, the researcher questioned the respondents on whether they blamed their neighbours for the past attacks in the Eastleigh area. Based on figure 3.9, 22.2% of the total respondents maintained a neutral position of the question while 51.9% stated that they did not blame their neighbours for past attacks in their areas. Meanwhile, only 25.9% of the respondents stated that they blamed their neighbours for the past terror attacks in their area.

3.4.4 General Security

The researcher sought the opinions of the respondents regarding the general security of the Eastleigh area. After the response the researcher went ahead to put this in a chart.

Figure 4.10 General Security



Source: Author (2016)

With regards to perceptions of security, the researcher sought the opinions of the respondents regarding the general security of the Eastleigh area. Based on figure 4.0 above, the majority of the respondents were pessimistic about the state of security in Eastleigh area. 65.4% of the total respondents stated that the area was insecure. Meanwhile, 8.6% of the total research respondents stated that the area was not insecure.

Further, research on the perceptions of security shows that majority of the residents considered themselves likely targets of terror attacks. Additionally, 66.7% of the total respondents stated that they suspected their neighbours to be harbouring terrors suspects. The results on the perceptions of security also show that majority of the respondents consider their area to be insecure.

3.5 Correlation between socio - economic factors and Perceptions of Security

Kenyon and Sen (2015) postulate that the psychology on security is based on both the reality as well as the perceptions. In this case, individuals are influenced both by instinct as well as past


security events and the countermeasures undertaken to prevent their future occurrence. Chen et al. (2014) study espouses that past research studies have shown a direct correlation subsisting between the socio-economic and perceptions of security.

It is on this background that this research sought to evaluate the correlation between the socio-economic factors in this income level, education level, and religion on the perceptions of security for people living in Eastleigh area. To evaluate the correlation between the socio-economic factors and perceptions of security, the study utilized Gamma measure of association. Collins (2009) offers that gamma is a symmetrical measure of association used with either ordinal variable or dichotomous nominal variables. It ranges from -1 to +1 with -1 and +1 each indicate perfect relationships while no relationship is indicated by 0. Gamma below zero means a negative or inverse relationship; that is, as one thing goes up, the other goes down. Gamma above zero means a positive relationship; as one variable goes up, the other goes up

3.5.1 Correlation between Religion and Perceptions of security

With regards to religion, Mursheed (2009), DiMaggio (2008) and May et al. (2011) studies conclude that there exist a direct correlation between religion and the perceptions of security. The studies in particular leverage of research in Europe and USA where the Muslims were largely perceived to be threats to security in the post 9/11 era. As DiMaggio (2008) espouses, Arabs Muslims were deemed as threats to security in Europe on a personal and national level in the wake of the 9/11 attack on the world Trade Center and the Pentagon in the USA.

Figure 4.1 Correlation between Religion and Perceptions of Security



Source: Author (2016)

On this basis of the 81 research respondents for whom complete questionnaires were collected, 44.44% profess Islam while 30.9% profess Christianity.

Figure 4.1 shows that majority of the Muslims who returned their questionnaires felt secure while majority of people from other religions who returned their questionnaires felt Insecure. This could be as a result that majority of the residents in Eastleigh being Somalis (most Somalis are Muslims) whose origin is North Eastern, Kenya which is relatively insecure compared to Eastleigh in Nairobi.

The above comparative bar graph does not show the exact correlation in terms of the strength of the relationship between religion and the perception about security, with regards to the current research study, the researcher adopted the Gamma measure of association for both the perceptions of security and the religious affiliation of the respondents to test the strength of their

relationship. The table below shows the relationship between Religion and perception of security as was the response out of 81 questionnaires distributed.

Table 3.1 Relationship between Religion and Perceptions of Security

Security	Religion		Total
	Muslims	Others	
Secure	31	3	34
Insecure	5	42	47


Source: Author (2016)

From the gamma calculation there is a strong association ($\gamma = 0.977$) between religion and perception of security, meaning that a person's religion influences the perception about security since majority of Muslims in Eastleigh feel secure while majority of those of other religion feel insecure.

3.5.2 Correlation of Income and Perceptions about security

May et al. (2011) identified the income level of residents as one of the factors alongside the religion affecting people's perceptions of security. Dal-Bo (2011) research concludes that areas where people had low levels of income had higher propensities of crime than areas with where residents were high income earners. Botha (2014) study in Kenya cites that the economic marginalization in the Kenyan Coast as one of the propagators of formation of such terror groups as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Additionally, the study revealed low income levels of the residents in the Coastal Region as one reason why youths in the area are easily lured joining the Al-Shabab

Figure 4.2 Correlation between Income and Perceptions of Security



Source: Author (2016)

The researcher sought to understand whether the income levels of the residents had any effect on the resident's perceptions of the general security of their area.

Based on the assessment of the respondent's socio-economic factors earlier in the chapter, the income levels of the residents in the Eastleigh area are entirely different from those of the Coastal region as espoused by Botha (2014). Based on figure 4.2 above, 25.9% of the total research respondents stated that they earned Ksh 51,000- Ksh70, 000 per month while 44.4% of the total study respondents stated that they earned above Ksh 70,000 per month. In this case, a majority of the residents can be adjudged to be middle income earners.

Based on the empirical study postulations as well as demographic and descriptive study results, it was important to evaluate the correlation between the income levels of the residents with Eastleigh resident's perceptions of security. From the figure above majority of the high earners feel insecure while those who earn less feel secure, that is out of the 55.56% of the respondents

(whose income is high) 20% felt secure while 80% felt insecure, on the other hand 44.44% of the respondents (whose income is low) 58.33% felt secure while 41.67% felt insecure.

The above comparative bar graph does not give enough information about the strength of the relationship between income levels and the perception about security, with regards to the current research study, the researcher adopted the Gamma measure of association for both the perceptions of security and the income levels of the respondents to test the strength of their relationship. The table below shows the relationship between income levels and perception of security as was the response out of 81 questionnaires distributed.

Table 4.1 Correlation between Income and perceptions of Security

Income (kshs)	Likely target		Total
	Secure	Insecure	
Low (51,000-70,000)	21	15	36
High (70,000 and above)	9	36	45

Source: Author (2016)

From the gamma calculation, there is a strong association ($\gamma = 0.697$) between income and perception of security. Indicating that as once income level changes the perception about security also changes, the higher the income levels the poor perception about security and the lower the


income levels the better the perception about security. Overall, it can be concluded that an increase in income levels of the residents results in greater uncertainty as well as fear of the attacks among the Eastleigh area residents.

3.5.3 Correlation between Education and perceptions about Security

Based on past empirical studies, education levels of residents have been seen to have a direct effect on the resident's perceptions of security. Wakinini (2014) study results conclude that the higher the education levels of residents, the poor their perceptions of security since they are predisposed to information on past attacks. On the other hand, Shafiq and Sinno (2010), Brockoff et al. (2012) and Cohen and Soto (2007) studies concur that higher levels of education discourage individuals from participating in crime. Additionally, the studies conclude that more educated people usually have better perceptions of security as compared to the less educated counterparts.

The data on the Figure below shows the correlation between education levels and perception of security of different respondents as was carried out by the researcher.

Figure 4.3 Correlation between Education levels and Perceptions of Security



Source: Author (2016)

Based on figure 4.3 above, it is evident that the correlation between education level of the respondents with their likelihood of being targeted for attacks though positive is statistically significant. Additionally, the relationship between the education levels of the respondents and their likelihood of being targets of attacks mean that the relationship is significant. .

Further the research reveals that the perception of those who are educated to higher level is good on security, as evidenced the higher number i.e. 53.1% felt Insecure while the remaining 38 which represents 46.9% felt secured. In figure 3.3.1 it demonstrates that the perception of people of higher educational level (University/College) change as they have a higher percentage for those both of the respondents who felt secure and those who felt insecure.

Overall, the study results with regards to the relationship between education level and perceptions about security are found to be insignificant. In this case, the study results agrees with the postulations of earlier empirical studies by Shafiq and Sinno (2010), Brockoff et al. (2012) and Cohen and Soto (2007) who concluded that the education levels of residents have a significant and positive effect on their perceptions of security.

The above comparative bar graph does not give enough information about the strength of the relationship between education levels and the perception about security, With regards to the current research study, the researcher adopted the gamma measure of association for both the perceptions of security and Education level whereby the researcher distributed the 81 questionnaires to be filled with respondents based on their either Primary, Secondary or University/College Level of Education. A total of 81 questionnaires were filled out of which a total of 23 were from respondents who had attained primary level of education 22 secondary

level and the remaining 36 from University and college level. The table below shows the relationship between education levels and perception of security.

Table 4.2 Correlation between Education Levels and perceptions of Security

	Education level			Total
	Primary	Secondary	College/University	
Secure	20	14	4	38
Insecure	3	8	32	43

Source: Author (2016)

There is a strong association ($\gamma = 0.871$) between education levels and perception of security. Indicating that the perception of security varies with the education levels of an individual. i.e the higher the education level the more a person feels insecure and vice versa.

3.6 Conclusion

This third chapter of the research study sought to evaluate the data collected utilizing the research study questionnaires. With regards to the response to the study questionnaires, the researcher received 81 fully filled study questionnaires of the 100 issued. Demographically, 77.8% of the total respondents were male while 22.2% were female. From the study 44.44% of the respondents who returned their questionnaires were Muslims out of which 86.1% felt secure while 13.9% felt insecure. On the other hand from the other religions of the total 55.56% of the respondents who returned their questionnaires only 6.7% felt secure while the remaining 93.3% felt Insecure this shows that Muslims feel more secure compared to other Religions. Meanwhile,

majority of the respondents profess Islam, possess secondary school level of education and earn above Ksh 70,000 per month. With regards to the respondents' perceptions of security, the majority considered themselves likely targets of criminal elements and terror suspects in their area. 61.7% of the total respondents stated that reaffirmed past study postulations that the residents in the area feared harassment from the security forces. However, based on the research results, the majority of the respondents (51.9%) stated that they did not blame their neighbours because of the past attacks in their area. Nevertheless, 65.45 of the study respondents asserted that still viewed their area as being insecure.

Overall, the study results concluded that the correlation between the religion and the perceptions of the residents as being strongly positive and significant. The research study's results with regards to the effects of religion on perceptions of security align with Mursheed (2009), DiMaggio (2008) and May et al. (2011) past study results. On the other hand, the research results concurred with Botha (2014) and Dal-Bo (2011) study concludes that income and education levels of residents are positively and significantly related to their perceptions of security.

It emerges that all the social economic factors from the study have an influence on the perception about security.

CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary

Kenya has in the recent past borne the brunt of terror activities ever since the first terror attack in Nairobi on the American Embassy. Based on past empirical research studies, Eastleigh has been an epicenter for such attacks both witnessing terror attacks as well as the general perceptions that the area harbors terror suspects. The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether the socio-economic factors of the residents in the area impacted on their perceptions of security in their area. This fourth part of the research study presents the conclusions of the study based on the study findings in comparison with past empirical study results. Additionally, the study provides recommendations on how the government of Kenya can improve on the perceptions of the Eastleigh residents about their security. Moreover, this fourth chapter explicates the limitations encountered by the researcher in the course of undertaking the study. Finally, the fourth chapter provides recommendations to future researchers on the how to overcome the limitations encountered in the current research study.

4.2 Conclusion

4.2.1 Effects of Income on Perceptions of Security

The first hypothesis of the research study was that high-income earners in the Eastleigh area have a poorer perceptions of security compared to the low-income earners. With regards to the correlation, the relationship between the income levels of the respondents and their perceptions of security was found to be strongly positive and significant.

In this case, it can be adjudged that the study results align to Mursheed (2009) and DiMaggio (2008) studies in Europe where the residents besides having relatively high incomes had a bad perceptions of security after the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, the study results echo the postulations of Odhiambo (2013) that the rich have a poorer perceptions of security in Eastleigh due to the exposure of their investments to terror attacks. The direct and positive correlation between income levels and perceptions of security means that as the income levels of the residents in Eastleigh area rise, their perceptions of security worsens. Thus, the research study results have confirmed H1; that high income earners have a poor perceptions of security compared to the lower income earners.

4.2.2 Effects of Education Levels on perceptions of security

The second hypothesis of the research study espoused that residents with lower education level in the Eastleigh area have a better perceptions of security compared to those residents with higher levels of education. Further research on the perceptions of security shows that majority of the residents with higher education levels had a poor perceptions of security which could be as a result of their exposure about security through their studies and therefore they understand more of about the security threats in the area. Some of the security concerns could be fear of attacks from terrorist or fear of harassment from the Kenyan Security Forces.

4.2.3 Effects of Religion on perceptions of Security

Based on the third hypothesis, residents of Eastleigh of other religious groups area have a poorer perceptions of security compared to the Muslim embers in the area.

Overall, the suspicion among residents on harbouring of suspects and the threat that the differences in religion pose on the perceptions of security in Eastleigh align to past empirical study results. According to Stewart (2008), Christians perceived themselves to be targets of

attacks in Europe and USA following the 9/11 attacks. Interestingly, the majority Christians in Europe and the USA perceived the Muslims as threats to both national and personal security (Mursheed, 2009 and May et al., 2011).

The correlation between religion and perceptions of security found to be both strongly positive and significant. It can, therefore, be adjudged that the study confirms the research hypothesis that Muslims have better perceptions of security as compared to other residents in Eastleigh area.

Overall, the study concludes that social economic factors have a direct, positive and significant effect on the perceptions of security of Eastleigh residents.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the study results, the study provides two recommendations which the Government of Kenya needs to enact to improve on the Eastleigh area resident's perceptions of security.

Firstly, the Kenyan Government need to implement reforms in its security forces to ensure that they operate in a humane way, and they conduct their operations in adherence to the letter and spirit of the constitution as well as other local and international laws on Human rights. The majority of the respondents in the study state they still fear being rounded up and harassed by the Kenyan Security forces. This presents a huge hurdle for security and intelligence officers as the poor perceptions the residents' bear of them may constrain the residents from sharing vital information regarding suspected terror activities. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) needs to address the complaints brought to it by victims of harassment from the Police officers. Additionally, there is a need for better avenues of presenting the complaints to IPOA other than reporting the complaints to the same police stations where the suspects of harassment work.

Secondly, the government should implement and entrench community policing locally known as the Nyumba Kumi initiative. Based on the research study results, the majority of the research respondents stated that they suspected their neighbours of harbouring terror suspects. Drawn from Tanzania, Nyumba Kumi will ensure that people improve their interaction across ten households. In retrospect, increased interaction will improve the flow of information between residents as well as between the residents and the Police. In this case, the security forces will be capable of preventing crime in such areas as Eastleigh. Additionally, increased interaction among neighbours will greatly enhance the perceptions of neighbours about each other and thus enhance their trust.

Overall, implementation of these recommendations will greatly improve the perceptions of the residents in Eastleigh on the Security forces as well as enhance their trust as neighbours in the area. In retrospect, they are likely to feel safer in the area.

4.4 Directions for Further Research

A future researcher with interests in a similar topic of study should pay attention to the above-stated limitations and devise the following measures to overcome the limitations.

Firstly, to overcome the challenge of sample representativeness of the population, the future researcher should undertake to increase the size of the sample. Moreover, future researchers should utilise probability sampling in selecting a sample for study so as to ensure that every element in the population has a known say, n chance of being selected. Adoption of probabilistic sampling will result in the elimination of the sampling bias improving the reliability of the data collected as well as the recommendations provided by the research.

Secondly, to overcome the limitation of the close-ended questions that limit the provision of the information provided by the respondents, future researcher should adopt both open and close-ended questions. In adopting both close ended and open ended questions, future researchers will offer the research respondents the opportunity to subjective feelings, perceptions, and opinions.

Lastly, future researchers could complement the use of research questionnaires with interviews. Interviews offer the researcher intrinsic advantages such as opportunities to rephrase a question as well as the reading of the non-verbal cues of the respondents which are not available if the questionnaires are utilized.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Research Questionnaire

Hi, I am a student seeking to collect data in relation to the research on the relationship between socio-economic factors and perceptions of security among residents of Eastleigh area. The information collected from you as a respondent of the study will be utilised solely for the purposes of the study. Kindly tick the answers against the questions provided below. I thank you for your acceptance to participate in the current study; your contribution will be highly appreciated.

Questionnaire

Kindly tick in the box representing your answer to the general question

Part one: General Information

1. Are you a resident of Eastleigh area in Nairobi City?

Yes

No

2. Please indicate your gender?

Male

Female

3. Please indicate your age?

18-30 years old

31-40 years old

41-50 years old

50 years and above

4. Kindly indicate which religion you belong to?

- Christian
- Muslim
- Hindu
- Others

Other, Kindly specify

.....

5. How religious are you

- Very religious
- Religious
- Likely Religious
- Not Religious

6. Kindly indicate your education level

- No formal education
- Primary School
- High school
- University degree

7. What is your monthly income?

- Below 10,000 Ksh
- 10,000 -30,000 Ksh
- 31,000 -50,000 Ksh
- 51,000 Ksh and Above

8. For how long have you resided in Eastleigh?

- Less than 1 year
- 1- 5 years
- 6-10 years
- Above 10 years

9. What is your employment status?

- Unemployed
- Self employed
- Government employed
- Private sector employment
- Others

Other, Kindly specify

.....

10. What social media platform do you participate in?

- Facebook
- Twitter
- Whatsapp
- Others

Other, Kindly specify

.....

Part Two

Perceptions about security

With regards to questions 1 to question 7 below, kindly tick only once per question in the box that expresses the opinion you are in agreement with. 1 represents disagree, 2 represents Disagree, 3 represents Neutral, 4 represents Agree and 5 represents Strongly Agree.

Question		Strongly Disagree [1]	Disagree [2]	Neutral [3]	Agree [4]	Strongly agree [5]
1	You are a likely target of criminal elements in your area					
2	You are likely to be rounded up and harassed by Kenyan security forces?					
3	You are a likely target of terrorists					
4	You fear attacks by terrorists					
5	You suspect that your neighbors could be harboring terrorists					
6	You blame your neighbors for the past attacks in your area					
7	Your area is generally insecure					