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ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL KENYA

BRUCE J. BERMAN

1973

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Yale University in
Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

Abstract

This study employs contemporary bureaucratic and organization theory in an analysis of the decision-making and communications processes and characteristic attitudes and values of the Administration in Colonial Kenya and the effect of these factors on its relationship to the larger political system and the processes of socio-economic development in the colony.

The Kenya Administration was an integrated prefectorial organization characterized by conservatism, resistance to change and innovation, and a preoccupation with the maintenance of law and order. The decision process was protracted, the policy focus fragmented and short-run, and critical decisions could be made only with extreme difficulty. The Central Secretariat was preoccupied with the affairs of the European and Asian immigrants and the Provincial Administration largely left on its own to deal with the Africans. Although largely of middle-class origin, administrators possessed the attitudes and values of aristocratic, organicist conservatism. They were ambivalent about both African society and the development of bourgeois industrial society in Britain.

Colonial Kenya had a dual political system. In the European arena the white settlers gained a dominant influence over important policy areas, but were blocked by the Administration and London authorities from achieving self-government. This led to a stalemate over the direction of the political and economic development of the colony. In the African arena the Provincial Administration acted as an authoritarian and paternalistic guardian. African political activity was dealt with through a combination of cooptation and coercion, and African politicians were viewed as corrupt and power-hungry exploiters from whom the unsophisticated tribesman had to be protected.

Rapid socio-economic development after 1939 led to a rising level of conflict between the Africans and the Administration, as well as an internal challenge to the Administration's dominant position in the government from emerging functional ministries. An escalating crisis culminated in the 'Mau Mau' Emergency of 1952 which appeared at first to restore the declining power of the Administration. The political initiative, however, moved towards the metropolitan authorities who, by 1960, sought an accommodation with the Africans and largely ignored both the Administration and the settlers.

In comparative perspective the processes of the Kenya Administration are more typical of British colonialism than the mythical image of 'indirect rule' and similar to those of French colonial rule. Colonial administration was an expression of traditional conservatism, not bourgeois capitalism and is different from imperialism. The decolonization process in Africa represented the end of colonialism, but not necessarily the end of imperialism.

FOR ELAINE

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This study began when I was unable to find in the existing body of scholarly research answers to some questions about the character of colonial rule in Kenya that arose out of an interest in the development of African political and labor organizations. A rather narrow concern with colonial administration gradually and necessarily expanded to embrace the analysis of the colonial political system in Kenya and its transformations under the impact of the forces of socio-economic change. Contrary to my initial expectations and intentions I found myself involved in 'doing a whole system'. While this was perhaps too large and ambitious a subject for a doctoral dissertation, the interest and importance of the subject impelled me to follow the study through in its varied dimensions.

Any scholar, no matter how much his work bears the imprint of his own ideas and style, benefits to an extent he may not be fully aware of himself from the assistance of many other hands. This is particularly true of a study such as this which covers so wide a field and draws upon so many different sources of theory and data. Numerous individuals and institutions have provided invaluable resources, assistance and advice throughout the process of research and writing. They are responsible for much that is of value in the study and I have the pleasure to acknowledge here my deepest thanks and gratitude for their help.

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Bruce J. Berman

Kingston, Ontario

August, 1973

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The primary source material used in this study is drawn from archives in London and Nairobi and from a series of interviews with former colonial administrators, technical officers, and politicians in Britain and Kenya. Archives are identified by the prefixes KNA (Kenya National Archives), KGL (Kenya Government Library) and PRO (Public Record Office, London). The interviews are identified by number and a lettered suffix. For administrators there is a three digit number, the first digit indicating the rank of the officer: 1 for junior officers, 2 for senior officers (Provincial Commissioners or Under Secretaries and over in the Secretariat). The suffix indicates the primary area of service in Kenya: field (F) or Secretariat (S), or both (FS). Technical officers are indicated by a two digit number and the suffix T. Political figures are indicated by a two digit number and the suffix P with either A (African), B (British) or S (Settler).

Over forms of Government, let fools contest.

What ere is best administered is best.

Alexander Pope, Essay on Man

Why do you stand there amazed?

I did not know this would come to be.

But you saw the signs?

No. I didn't.

You did.

I didn't!

But--

I tell you we didn't. We tried our best.

He walked away, stamping his feet angrily on the ground.

'And to think of all we did for them,' he said.

James Ngugi, Weep Not, Child

CHAPTER ONE

IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND BUREAUCRACY

For almost a century the European colonial occupation of Africa has been an inexhaustible source of scholarly debate and polemical attack. A substantial part of this intellectual interest has focused on the economic theories of imperialism provided by Hobson, writing out of the liberal tradition, and Lenin and, to a lesser extent, Luxemburg, working from the Marxist perspective. In the ongoing debate between Marxists and anti-Marxists over the origins and consequences of European expansion into Africa, scholarship and polemic have often been inextricably intertwined. In addition, a substantial body of research, frequently connected only peripherally to the theoretical issues of economic imperialism, has emerged with reference to the colonial history of Europeans in Africa. The end of formal political control by European powers has stimulated a surge of renewed interest in the colonial era as archives in the metropolises and in the former colonies have been opened to public inspection, and historians have investigated in impressive detail the motives, methods, and policies of the rulers, as well as the African reaction to them and their impact on African societies. Nevertheless, there is an intellectual narrowness, theoretically and empirically, in both of these bodies of research that has inhibited the fuller understanding of the colonial experience through a linkage of theoretical analysis and detailed historical description.

The principal limitation of Marxist theories of imperialism has been their unrelieved Eurocentric focus, as indicated by the

full title of Lenin's pamphlet, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.¹ Within this perspective imperialism has been understood as a consequence of the pattern of development of monopoly capitalism in the metropolitan countries, and thus research has tended to focus narrowly upon the analysis of economic factors relating to falling rates of profit and the accumulation of excess stocks of capital that led to a search for profitable investment possibilities abroad. The extension of colonial control over most of Africa has generally been seen as the result of competition among the imperialist powers for protected markets, fields of investment, and access to valuable raw materials. Although the critical thrust of both liberal and Marxist theories of economic imperialism has given rise to a body of muck-raking literature on the misdeeds and inequities of European rule in Africa,² internal processes within the colonies, especially the operation of the political infrastructure of colonial rule and the consequences of imperialism for subject peoples have been treated as of distinctly secondary importance. The primary objective of the attacks on the theories of economic imperialism has been to demonstrate the salience of non-economic motives behind European expansion, especially in the 1870-1914 era, and has emphasized the importance of socio-political factors, notably nationalism, the diplomatic rivalries among the metropolitan powers, and internal cleavages as explanatory variables.³ The greater portion of this debate has naturally been concerned with the 'scramble' for African colonies. Where attention has focused on the period of established colonial rule after World War One, the main issue in the debate has been whether or not the European power actually placed the anticipat-

ed volume of investment in and derived substantial profits from their African colonies.⁴ Recently, the process of decolonization has shifted contemporary theoretical concern to problems of neo-colonialism and dependency with an increasing interest in the impact of external linkages upon the internal patterns of development in African states. The primary concern, however, of Marxist and neo-Marxist theorists continues to be narrowly defined in terms of the economic causes and consequences of neo-colonial dependency.⁵

The large and rapidly growing corpus of historical research on the colonial experience within Africa has expanded beyond a concern with the period of imperial rivalry before 1914 to an increasing focus upon the detailed description and interpretation of the patterns and consequences of colonial rule itself.⁶ The groundwork for the development of the increasingly specialized field of colonial history was laid in the 1920's and 30's through the magisterial studies of European colonial rule by Buell and Hailey, as well as the pioneering research of British and French anthropologists on traditional African societies and the memoirs and other writings of colonial officials. An initial preoccupation of this research with the perspectives, policies, and methods of the colonial rulers has been recently moderated by growing attention to the realities of the African reaction to colonial control, and colonial history has become a sub-field within the developing discipline of African history. While this historical research has impressively documented the actions of colonial officials and has shown a fair amount of interest in comparing the similarities and differences between the patterns of colonial rule by the European powers, particularly Britain

and France, historians have failed to provide any rigorous analysis of the bureaucratic infrastructure of colonialism and consequently have neglected the possible extent to which the methods and policies of colonial administration have been shaped by the organizational characteristics of colonial administrative systems.⁷ Recent studies of the development of British and French colonial administrative services by Heussler and Cohen have provided valuable knowledge of the patterns of recruitment and training of colonial officials, as well as the general patterns of bureaucratic behavior, but have dealt broadly with British or French Africa as a whole and stopped short of analysing the performance of colonial officials within the socio-economic and political context of any particular colony.⁸

Neither the theorists of imperialism nor colonial historians have thus provided a rigorous, theoretically informed analysis of the bureaucratic dimension of European rule in Africa.⁹ The need for such an analysis is, however, very real, for colonial political systems in Africa present us with unusually pure examples of the administrative state. In the colonial setting political and administrative institutions were combined within the organizational framework of the colonial bureaucracy which provided both the fundamental means of control over the subject population and the critical connecting link between the colony and the metropole. As J.M. Lee has pointed out, "within the dependent territories of the British Crown the conception of the state meant little more than the body of Colonial Service officers who represented the sovereignty of the monarch."¹⁰ For subject peoples colonialism meant subjugation not only to an alien culture and capitalist economic system, but also to a form of

political organization and control unprecedented in their previous experience. Colonial administrations provided the institutional framework shaping the relations between ruler and ruled and the manner of the latter's incorporation into the economic system of the metropolitan power.

The policies and patterns of action of colonial administrative organizations cannot be explained simply by reference to 'structures of domination' or to the inherently repressive qualities of colonial rule. Weber pointed out long ago that bureaucracy has become the characteristic 'structure of domination' in the twentieth century,¹¹ and such phrases consequently define rather than resolve the problem. Furthermore, to treat the issue through the use of such a concept as 'the colonial situation' emphasizes the particularity of colonialism and tends to obscure the possibility that the variables shaping the character of colonial rule may be common to a wider variety of seemingly different political systems and, as such, of broader theoretical import. The focus on the idiosyncracies of colonial society thus makes it difficult to relate the character of colonialism to socio-economic and political aspects of the metropolitan societies and therefore inhibits dealing with the large-scale issues of the theory of imperialism. In short, the task is to get inside of 'structures of domination' and analyse more rigorously and precisely the bureaucratic inputs with regard to the extent that they explain the already extensively described outputs of colonial rule and illuminate the relationships between ruler and ruled within the colony and between the colony and the metropole.

I. Colonial Administration in Kenya: The Scope and Method of the Study

The fundamental motive for the study presented here is to provide a theoretically informed analysis of the operational reality of a colonial political system through an examination of the politics of colonial administration in Kenya, with special reference to the critical years between 1940 and 1960. The starting point for the study is the Kenya Administration, the organization of generalist administrators who staffed the field organization of the Provincial Administration and the central administration or Secretariat in Nairobi. This was a small and clearly defined organization within the total structure of the Kenya Government, rarely comprising more than 100 to 150 men, and, except for the earliest days of British rule, never constituting more than a small fraction of the number of British officials in the colony. However, in Kenya, as in all of the other territories under the control of the Colonial Office in London, the Administration was the primary agent of imperial control and is therefore the necessary subject of a study of the politics of colonialism.

The framework of the analysis is drawn from the body of bureaucratic theory developed in contemporary political science and sociology. I have attempted to make this study both analytic and historical in focus by using the framework of abstract and general propositions to explain particular and some instances unique configurations of historical events. This is thus basically a 'particularizing' study rather than the 'generalizing' study common in contemporary political science. As Lipsét, Trow, and Coleman point

out, particularizing analysis "uses general laws or regularities in order to carry out analysis of the particular case...it uses previously known generalizations in order to help make particular statements ...in [generalizing analysis] the particular statements are used to develop the law."¹² As with most methodological prescriptions, this distinction is not unambiguous. It does, however, illuminate one very important point: this research does not constitute an explicit test of the various propositions employed in the analysis. The study of a single case, especially of the sort that relies upon historical sources, does not permit the controlled comparisons necessary for testing the relationships between the major variables stipulated in the hypotheses. Moreover, since there is apparently no unambiguous way in which theoretical propositions can be linked to observable data, a single case cannot in any event stand as a critical test of probabilistic theory.

While particularizing analysis cannot test the theory employed as a set of guiding assumptions, it obviously must begin by establishing whether or not the relationships stipulated in the theory are actually present in the case at hand. From each of the abstract propositions employed in this study I derived a series of empirical generalizations and low-level hypotheses describing the Kenya Administration and its external environment and tested them against the data gathered in the field. This, however, was only a starting point. Particularizing analysis involves a primary concern with the subsequent problem of what specific form the theoretically defined relationships take and what difference did they make in the particular case under study, i.e., to what extent do those relationships explain

something else about empirical reality. For example, a basic proposition emerging out of many studies of bureaucracy is that the influence of individuals and groups on the decision-making process in bureaucratic organizations is correlated with the control of the information or expertise that form the premises of decision. My concern in this study is not only to see whether this relationship did in fact exist within the Kenya Administration, but also to analyse the specific consequences of that relationship for the image of external reality at different points within the organization, the actual decisions made by the Administration, and the patterns of action that resulted from these decisions.

The limitations of a particularizing case study in testing theoretical propositions does not mean, however, that it cannot make a substantive contribution to the development of theory. On the simplest level, a case study can reflect upon the degree of confidence we have in the viability of the hypotheses employed and thus constitute an implicit test by its effect upon the subjective probabilities attached to them. Particularizing analysis can also contribute to the critical analysis and refinement of existing theory. Thus, on the one hand, where the relationship predicted by a hypothesis exists in a particular case but is of only limited explanatory value, the case study suggests that the hypothesis may be valid but trivial; while, on the other hand, where the predicted relationship does not obtain in a particular case, this can suggest the operation of intervening variables that may define the limits within which the hypothesis holds. Even more important, analytically rigorous and theoretically sophisticated case studies using known regularities to explain other aspects

of political and social life can suggest new linkages between phenomena and thus directly contribute to the creation of new theories, as well as provide a systematic base for the elaboration of synthetic and comparative studies. In fact, many of the propositions employed in this study were initially generated by intensive case studies of particular organizations.¹³

The adoption of particularizing case study analysis as a research strategy also raises certain problems involved in doing the historian's traditional job with the tools of the social scientist. Philip Selznick has perceptively defined the problem in his classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority:

Theoretical inquiry, when it is centered upon a particular historical structure or event, is always hazardous. This is due to the continuous tension between concern for a full grasp and interpretation of the materials under investigation as history, and special concern for the induction of abstract and general relations. Abstractions deal harshly with 'the fact', choosing such emphases and highlighting such characteristics as may seem factitious, or at least distorted, to those who have a stake in an historically well-rounded apprehension of the events themselves.¹⁴

In other words, we confront another dimension of the familiar tension between methodological rigor and substantive significance, complicated by the varying perspectives of different disciplines. To what extent can we generalize about characteristic patterns within the innumerable individual events in a particular case before we lose sight of the complexity and richness of human experience and move the historian to complain, "How can you say colonial officials did such and such when Provincial Commissioner X and Chief Secretary Y did something quite different?" At the same time, with what detail and sense of

subtle variation can we treat the case before the social scientist complains that the regularities are smothered in a mass of detail as we have lost sight of the forest for the beauty of the trees. An attempt to provide a happy medium of generalization and detail is more likely to disappoint than satisfy both the historian and the social scientist. There is no easy resolution to this dilemma. I point it out here to indicate that this study has been pursued with an acute awareness of the pitfalls involved and the risks have been consciously accepted in the light of the potential interest and importance of the results.

On a more specific level, any case study is open to the objection that the case selected, while interesting in itself, is idiosyncratic and cannot therefore serve as a basis for generalization. The immediate answer to this objection is that social scientists place great emphasis on the idea that 'good' theory must be capable of explaining both the similarities and differences between examples of a particular phenomenon, and a particularizing study employing theoretical propositions to explain a specific case must necessarily discriminate between the effects of general and idiosyncratic factors, thereby more precisely defining its distinctive characteristics. Usually, however, the argument of idiosyncrasy involves the often implicit assertion that the idiosyncratic factors are not only present, but also more important, i.e. determine more about the actual course of events, than any abstract general factors. With regard to Kenya, the objection can be raised that the presence of a substantial white settler population made it atypical with regard to most of the British colonies of black Africa. This objection is frequently based on the

untested assumption, especially common among orthodox Marxist analysts,¹⁵ that the Kenya Administration was necessarily the willing and pliant servant of settler interests and was, for all intents and purposes, inseparable from the settler community. The adoption of this assumption, however, leaves us incapable of adequately accounting for the frequent and often bitter conflicts that marked the relationship between the Administration and the settler community prior to 1939. It is equally plausible to assume that such conflicts serve to reveal the social forces and implicit motives and interests that distinguish colonial officials from settlers, and it is a major theme of this study that the conflicts with the settler community served to intensify the basic characteristics of the Kenya Administration and thus highlighted some of the general characteristics of colonial administration that were less visible in colonies where the powerful challenge of a settler community did not force the local administration to more clearly articulate its interests and commitments.

A. The Three Major Questions of the Study

From the perspective of the general phenomenon of European colonialism in Africa this study involves a microanalysis of colonial rule within one colony. Taken from the perspective of Kenya, however, it involves both micro- and macroanalytic dimensions. As James Fesler has pointed out, studies of public administration have generally suffered from "failure to take account of the total political system (and, by extension, of the total social and economic system)."¹⁶ To focus exclusively on the analysis of the Kenya Administration as a bureaucratic organization would leave the most important questions about

colonialism unanswered. This is, therefore, not a study in public administration narrowly conceived. Rather, it begins with a micro-analysis of the Kenya Administration and then uses this as a basis for the larger macroanalysis of the wider political system of which the Administration was a critical, even dominant, part and the total socio-economic system of the colony in which that political system was imbeded. This can be visualized as involving three concentric circles, with the problems of analysis becoming more abstract and wider in scope as one moves out from the center. Each of the three areas of analysis, intimately interconnected in actual historical experience, can be analytically separated and conceptualized in terms of three major questions:

First, what internal structural and cognitive factors shaped the character of the Kenya Administration as a bureaucratic organization, and what consequences did these factors have upon its typical patterns of decision-making and action? In answering this question one can explain how and by whom colonial policy in Kenya was formulated and implemented. Two other important questions also arise in this context. How did the organizational characteristics of the Administration shape the way in which administrative personnel perceived the role of the organization and understood the nature of the external environment with which they had to deal? Specifically, this involves administrators' images of the subject African population and their conception of the role of the Administration in relation to it. Finally, what was the effect on the internal processes of the Administration of the external socio-economic and political environment, notably the powerful settler community and the fundamental duality of the colonial

society and economy produced by its presence?

Second, what was the role of the Kenya Administration in the larger political system of the colony, and how was this role shaped by both its internal organizational characteristics and the external environment? Here one confronts the critical issue of the position of the Administration in the colonial administrative state and the way in which it acted to define the boundaries of the legitimate political arena. This also involves the analysis of the patterns of interaction between the Administration and groups in the external environment, especially the settlers and the Africans; the socio-economic cleavages and conflicts that brought the settlers and the Africans into the political arena and shaped their demands and grievances; and the reaction of the Administration to conflicts with each of them. Furthermore, what constraints upon and commitments by the Administration emerged from these interactions with groups in the external environment.

Third, what factors shaped the relationship between the Kenya Administration and processes of socio-economic development in the colony? How did the Administration attempt to control or respond to these developmental processes, and, conversely, what was the impact of such development upon the operations of the Administration itself? In the wider socio-economic and political context, what was the impact of development on the patterns of cleavage and conflict within the colony and what relationship did these patterns have to the intensification of African political activity after 1945. Finally, what were the bases and consequences of the Administration's reaction to African politics?

These questions do not commit the analysis in advance to a

rigidly deterministic formula and permit one to give full weight to the potential contingency of historical experience. Political and socio-economic variables on both the micro and macro levels are treated as mutually interdependent within a process of reciprocal causality. Moreover, recognizing the possibility that important events may be the unforeseen and unintended consequences of purposive action, considerable attention has been paid to assessing the distance, if any, between the intentions and consequences of administrative action. This analysis requires the intersection of two streams of data. The first deals with the internal processes of the Kenya Administration and has been drawn from two primary sources: the internal papers of the Kenya Administration and the Colonial Office, consisting of correspondence, memoranda, and minutes; and a series of in-depth interviews with administrative and technical officers and European and African political figures in Britain and Kenya.¹⁷ The second relates to processes of socio-economic change and political conflict in the colony, with particular reference to European settler and African political activity, and is drawn from both the primary sources of documents and interviews and the extensive body of secondary sources on Kenyan economic and political history.

Each of the sections of this study is organized around one of the three major questions of the analysis and consists of a brief theoretical introduction followed by chapters containing the substantive analysis of the Kenyan experience. Section One, consisting of two chapters, deals with the Kenya Administration as a bureaucratic organization. Section Two, also containing two chapters, analyses the colonial political system in Kenya in terms of its European and African

components. Section Three, comprising three chapters, treats the processes of socio-economic development in Kenya, the attempts of the Administration to respond to and control these processes, and the ensuing political crisis which reached its violent peak in the 'Mau Mau' emergency and culminated in the commitment of the British government to a rapid process of decolonization. The sections also follow a general chronological order, the first two focusing on the period between the two world wars, while the third deals with the ensuing twenty years, particularly the 1945-1960 period. The concluding chapter attempts to assess the more general significance of colonial Kenya for broader comparative and theoretical issues.

NOTES - CHAPTER ONE

1. Roger Owen, "Introduction" in Owen and B. Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, Longman, London, 1972, pages 1 - 11.

2. Since notable examples include E.D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden, Leonard Parsons, London, 1920; L. S. Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, Allen and Unwin, London, 1920; and with specific reference to Kenya, Norman Leys, Kenya, Hogarth Press, London, 1924; W. MacGregor-Ross, Kenya From Within, (first ed. 1927) Cass, London, 1968; S. and K. Aaronovitch, Crisis in Kenya, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947.

3. Again, examples of an enormous literature: D.K. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism; an Historiographical Revision" Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 14, no. 2, 1961; J. Gallagher and R. Robinson "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1953; Gallagher and Robinson, Africa and the Victorious; MacMillan, London, 1961; D.S. Landes, "Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. XXI, no. 4, 1961; W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd ed., Knopf, New York, 1965; J. A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, Meridian Books, New York, 1955; C. W. Newbury and A.S. Kanya-Forstner "French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa," Journal of African History, Vol. 10, 1969.

4. S. H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1938; G. Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism, 2nd ed. Columbia University Press, New York, 1967; G.G. Leduc, "The Economic Balance Sheet of Colonialism" The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 4, no. 1, 1969.

5. Two recent examples are Harry Magdoff, "Imperialism Without Colonies" and Bob Sutcliffe, "Imperialism and Industrialization in the Third World", both in Owen and Sutcliffe, Op. cit., pages 144-170 and 171-192.

6. The scope of this research is demonstrated in two recent multi-volume collections; P. Gifford and W.R. Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968; and France and Britain in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971; L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Colonialism in Africa, 3 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969-72.

7. There have been some recent attempts by historians to focus on the decision-making processes of imperialism, but the analytic apparatus remains rudimentary. See for example; A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "French Expansion in Africa: the Mythical Theory." in Owen and Sutcliffe, Op. cit., pages 277-94.

8. Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service, Oxford University Press, London, 1963 and W.B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1971. Heussler's subsequent studies (The British in Northern Nigeria, Oxford University Press, London, 1969; and British Tanganyika, Duke University Press, Durham, 1971) provide much valuable data on administration in those two colonies, but are historical in focus and method and do not deal analytically with bureaucratic structures and processes.

9. For orthodox Marxists operating on a base-super structure model, political aspects of imperialism are dependent factors epiphenomenal to the major theoretical issues. Colonial historians, on the other hand, have been inhibited by distrust of social science theories and methods.

10. J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, page 72.

11. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, From Max Weber, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1948, page 196-244.

12. S.M. Lipset, J.S. Coleman, and M. Trow, Union Democracy, Anchor Books, Garden City, 1956; page 471.

13. Particularly M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964; and Philip Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grassroots (first publ. 1949) Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966.

14. Selznick, Op. cit., page 250.

15. S. and K. Aaronovitch, Op. Cit., passim.

16. James Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization" Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1965, page 553.

17. Forty-seven interviews were conducted in Britain and Kenya between August, 1968 and January, 1970. The interviews averaged 1 1/2 - 2 hours in length, the longest covered a total of 5 hours. Thirty of the interviewees were former officers of the Kenya Administration whose aggregate careers spanned the years 1911 to 1963. These men were not selected by random sample, but were chosen, as far as possible, because they held specific posts at particular times. Most of them held several positions in the Administration or Kenya Government during their careers, including Chief Secretary (3), Chief Native Commissioner or Minister for African Affairs (3), Minister of Labour, Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance, Permanent Secretary of various ministries (6), Secretary to the Cabinet, and Provincial Commissioner (9). Almost all of these men had also served as District Officers or District Commissioners in Kenya, Six of those interviewed had served only as District Officers or District Commissioners and held no senior posts. Five interviews were conduct-

ed with technical officers from the Legal Department and the Departments of Agriculture and Local Government. Ten interviews involved Kenyan political figures of the colonial era, six Europeans and four Africans, including seven who held seats on the Legislative or Executive Councils and men who served as Ministers of Agriculture, Finance and Community Development. Two British politicians, a former Secretary of State for the Colonies, and a Labour M.P. active in colonial affairs, were also interviewed.

SECTION ONE

THE KENYA ADMINISTRATION

INTRODUCTION

In analysing the Kenya Administration the concern of this study is with those characteristics of the organization that shaped its relationship with the external environment and can therefore provide a base for the examination of its role in the larger political system of the colony and in the process of socio-economic development. The most important of these characteristics are the decision-making processes in the organization, the attitudes and values of organizational personnel, and internal processes of communication and information collection.

In the simplest terms, we can immediately classify the Kenya Administration as a bureaucratic organization of the type known as prefectural field administration. As such it is similar in basic structure and purpose not only to the other colonies of British Africa and India, but also to a large number of historical and contemporary administrative organizations in both colonial and independent political systems. Thus, one is actually dealing with variables at four separate levels of abstractness and generality: (1) universal factors found in all bureaucratic organizations; (2) factors common to prefectural systems of field administration; (3) factors typical of colonial systems of prefectural administration; (4) factors unique to Kenya. The first three can be treated together when we analyse the internal characteristics of the Administration, while the fourth requires separate treatment.

I. Decision-Making Processes: Policy, Discretion, and Control

When one speaks of decision-making or the formulation of

policy one tends to lump together processes that deal with a variety of organizational problems of differing depth and scope. Anthony Downs has pointed out the existence of four organizational levels: "The shallowest consists of the specific actions taken by the bureau, the second of the decision-making rules it uses, the third of the institutional structure it uses to make those rules, and the deepest of its general purposes...change can occur at any depth without affecting layers of greater depth, though it will normally affect all shallower layers."¹ Shallower layers relate to deeper layers as means to ends, with the first three layers being instrumental means in relationship to the deepest level of basic organizational goals or purposes. As one moves from the shallowest level of specific actions to the deepest level of organizational purpose we move from specificity to increasing generality and diffuseness. The relationship between the levels is therefore not a rigid one-to-one linkage. Deeper levels define a range within which the shallower levels may vary and this makes for progressively greater flexibility as one moves from purposes to specific actions, i.e., organizational purpose may be pursued through more than one possible institutional structure, which in turn is compatible with a number of different decision rules or methods, while a very large number of actions can emerge from a set of decision-rules. As a result, "it is easier to adjust actions than rules, easier to shift rules than change structures, and easier to alter structures that adopt new purposes", and this leads to the characteristic inertia or resistance to change of bureaucratic organizations.²

On the basis of this typology of organizational levels one can discriminate between routine and critical decisions. Routine decisions involve changes in the action programs and decision rules of an organization and work out "the detailed applications of esta-

blished canons." Critical decisions, however, involve necessary changes in the purpose and institutional structure of the organization that define the framework of values and structure within which routine decisions can be made.³ Routine decisions are part of the everyday operations of an organization. Changes in structure and purpose, meanwhile, because of their profound implications for the organization and for vested interests within it tend to occur only in the most drastic circumstances. Thus, as Crozier points out, significant change in bureaucratic organizations tends to depend upon the existence of crisis conditions to overcome organizational inertia.⁴ Critical decisions cluster around these points of crisis in the history of an organization and shape its dynamic adjustment to changed internal and external conditions. The making of critical decisions is, according to Selznick, the defining task of organizational leadership.⁵

Critical decisions involve commitments that define the basic character of an organization. Such commitments are "ways of acting and responding that can be changed, if at all, only at the risk of severe internal crisis...the emergence of organizational character reflects the irreversible element in experience and choice."⁶ Defining commitments, however, are only partially the result of conscious choice. Critical decisions in themselves can generate implicit commitments that are the unforeseen and unintended consequences of purposive action. The most important of these unintended commitments emerge from the formation of individual and group vested interests within the organization tied to the maintenance of particular action programs, methods, and structures. This results in the transformation of means into ends, and "the tendency of established relations

and procedures to persist and extend themselves, will create the unintended consequence of committing the organization to greater involvement than provided for by the initial decision to act."⁷ The conversion of means into ends in themselves is a source of unexpected crisis and can inhibit, or even prevent, the making of explicit critical decisions adjusting the purposes and structures of the organization to changed circumstances.

This discussion of the levels and types of organizational decisions brings us to the consideration of the actual processes of action involved in making these decisions. One of the most important contributions of modern organizational research has been to reveal the importance of power and conflict for an understanding of decision-making processes in bureaucracies. This results, on the one hand, from the necessity in complex organizations for the higher authorities to delegate some degree of discretion in the implementation of policy to their subordinates, and, on the other hand, from the fact that all organizational personnel have personal values and interests that differ to some degree from the general purposes of the organizations and the intentions of the top leadership. The human components of the organization are thus not neutral instrumentalities rationally and predictably manipulated by the formal leaders, but active subjects attempting to manipulate the actions of the organization to serve their own needs and purposes. This results in what Downs calls the 'leakage of authority': the modification of policies and orders by subordinate personnel so that the action programs actually carried out involve a variety of purposes in addition, and in some cases, antithetic to the original intentions of the higher authorities.⁸ Bureaucratic organi-

zations thus always contain conflicting tendencies towards the decentralization of discretion and the centralization of control. In the most general terms this conflict is expressed in Crozier's proposition that incumbents of each role in a hierarchically structured organization fight to preserve and enlarge their area of discretion and autonomy, and limit their dependence upon and responsibility to other roles.⁹ This process operates vertically with superiors attempting to maximize their control over their subordinates and the subordinates struggling to minimize that control and their consequent responsibility to their superiors, while maximizing their autonomy and discretion in the performance of their duties. It also operates horizontally with personnel acting to minimize the degree to which their actions must be predicated upon and coordinated with the actions of other roles at the same organizational level.

The higher authorities in an organization almost always possess both formal and informal sanctions intended to assure the compliance and reliability of their subordinates and overcome the leakage of authority. To the extent that these sanctions do give the leaders effective control and enable them to hold their subordinates accountable for their actions, the latter will not exercise discretion, but, quite the contrary, will avoid acting on their own, shift the burden of decision on to their superiors, and assume the 'safe' position of acting only under orders or according to the established rules.¹⁰ The control that authorities can exercise over their subordinates is always subject to limits, however. This results from the fact that the sanctions that the authorities usually have at their disposal are commonly intended to deal with what are viewed as instances of individual de-

viance, while the most important conflicts within an organization are structurally defined cleavages between groups or categories of roles at different levels of authority in the formal organizational hierarchy.¹¹ Even if manifested through the actions of particular individuals, such structural conflicts will occur continually, regardless of the employment of sanctions. In these circumstances the constant invocation of powers of transfer, demotion, and dismissal by the higher authorities is likely to have serious effects on organizational morale and begin to interfere with its effective operation. Furthermore, structural cleavages contain a potential for collective action on the part of individuals occupying common role positions to oppose and neutralize the sanctions of the authorities.¹²

As a result of the fundamental conflict between superiors and subordinates over control or discretion and the limited effectiveness of sanctions, decision-making within an organization tends to take the form of a complex bargaining process. This bargaining is generally tacitly accepted by members of the organization as inevitable, although it is often overtly cloaked as a process of problem-solving or persuasion, with an emphasis on 'getting the facts' to solve indecision or differences of judgment, and with a display of public geniality and official harmony.¹³ The most important characteristic of this bargaining process is its scope, i.e., the degree to which it involves the four organizational levels discussed earlier. This is determined by the degree of discretion exercised by subordinate officials, which in turn depends upon the specificity or diffuseness of the basic goals of the organization. Where the goals of an organization can be narrowly and precisely defined and directly

linked to specific action programs in which the performance of personnel can be measured with some precision, the discretion of subordinates can be fairly effectively controlled and the bargaining over policy confined to the levels of routine decision. However, the broader and more diffuse the purposes of the organization, the vaguer and more imprecise the linkages between those purposes and any particular institutional structures, methods, or action programs, and the greater the opportunity for the exercise of discretion by subordinate officials. Where organizational authorities tacitly or explicitly accept the discretion of their subordinates in relation to methods and specific action programs, the policy bargaining process penetrates to the deepest levels of the organization and involves critical decisions. The discretionary control over the means of implementation by subordinates means that they can thwart the operation of any basic policy of which they disapprove, and they must consequently be consulted over the most important decisions. Thus the greater the delegation of discretion in an organization, the more complex and protracted will be the internal bargaining process, as even crucial issues have to be referred up and down the organizational hierarchy.

Furthermore, the wider the discretion of subordinate officials, the more they can fuse their own goals and purposes with those of the organization. The methods and specific programs they carry out become, because they have played a major role in their creation, infused with value in and for themselves, or, in Selznick's terms, 'institutionalized':

Whenever individuals become attached to an organization or a way of doing things as persons rather than as technicians, the result is a prizing of the device for its own sake. From the

standpoint of a committed person, the organization is changed from an expendible tool into a valued source of personal satisfaction.¹⁴

This is the dynamic behind the transformation of means into ends and the formation of vested interests within an organization. The delegation of discretion increases the commitment of personnel to the organization, but at the price of generating unintended commitments to the preservation of established methods. The exercise of wide discretion by subordinates may therefore increase resistance to change and restrict rather than expand the flexibility of the organization.

Decision-making, discretion, and commitments all take on distinctive coloration within prefectoral field administration because of the characteristic purpose and structure of the organization. In the European experience, both in the establishment of centralized states and in the extension of colonial rule, prefectoral systems have generally been established against a background of political instability where there were perceived threats to the survival of the established regime and the compliance of significant segments of the society with its directives was in doubt.¹⁵ The initial purpose and defining commitment of prefectoral administration has been the conservative one of maintaining the existing regime in power and ensuring compliance with central directives through the exercise of authoritarian control. The Prefect, Collector, or District Commissioner in the field is expected to be an impressive, even awesome, and omnipotent embodiment of the power of the central government and this promotes authoritarian values as well as methods in the organization.¹⁶ Prefectoral organizations are staffed by an elite cadre of generalist administrators who are expected to be skilled in the exercise of power,

backing up their orders with the use of force if necessary, and to literally 'hold the line' for the regime and maintain the status quo.

The issues of discretion and control arise in particularly acute form in prefectural systems. The wide dispersion of field agents to often distant posts makes considerable delegation of discretion imperative. This is reinforced where communications and transportation are primitive and the possibility of frequent direct contact with superior authorities at the center is correspondingly limited, and where the society is extremely heterogeneous and presents widely varying local circumstances to which policy must be adjusted. Both of these conditions are typical of the circumstances of colonial administration. Furthermore, the basic purpose of control and the maintenance of stability is in practice very broad and diffuse -- almost any social, economic or political phenomena can be seen as relevant to them --, and this is reflected in the traditional formula defining the responsibility of the Administration in British colonies as "law and order and good government". This is propelled by the general tendency for government activities to progressively expand into more and more areas of social life.¹⁷ The prefectural field officer thus tends to become responsible for anything and everything that occurs in his area. This is formalized in 'integrated prefectural systems' where the generalist field agent is given authority over all other activities being carried on in his area by other government departments, or exercises responsibility for them himself where the other departments are not present.¹⁸

One of the consequences of the broad responsibilities and high degree of discretion exercised by field officers in prefectural

systems is that in many instances they will encounter situations not dealt with by any existing organizational policies. Over wide areas of activity their discretion may thus be virtually total with regard to formulating appropriate responses, while the central authorities can at best make only a post-hoc evaluation of the adequacy of their performance. Ironically, prefectoral administration which is established to ensure centralized control of the political system, presents within its own organization extreme problems of central control in the face of powerful centrifugal tendencies. Historically the most serious of these control problems was to prevent the field officer from identifying with and becoming an agent of powerful local interests against the center, and a variety of methods were employed to prevent this from happening.¹⁹ In the modern colonial situation this problem took a slightly different form. In the light of the presumed primitiveness and lack of effective political organization of the subject peoples, the issue is not the 'capture' of the field officer by local interests, but the officer's development of his own interpretation of the interests of the local population, which usually contains a substantial self-serving element, and his defence of those 'interests' against outsiders, including the central authorities of his own organization. Many of the techniques of inspection and enforcement for dealing with this fundamental center-periphery cleavage did not operate in African colonies. As a result of the chronic shortages of personnel, the problem was not to regularly rotate field officers so that they would not become attached to local interests, but the contrary one of keeping officers in a particular post long enough to achieve continuity. In British colonial administration there were

also important cultural inhibitions against using means of checking up on the performance of field officers since the relations between field officers and central authorities were also those of gentlemen.

The wide discretion generally exercised by field officers has a number of important consequences for the internal processes of prefectural systems. First, the policy bargaining process is a long and complicated one in which the field officers must be consulted on the most basic and critical organizational decisions. At the same time, many issues are dealt with in the field, without being referred to the central authorities, and this process of local decision results in the fragmentation of policy and often significant variations from one local area to another. More important, field officers acting on their own cannot deal effectively with large scale issues common to many areas or even the whole society, with the result that "'decisionlessness' in the face of urgent problems may be an unanticipated consequence of the localizing of decision-making power."²⁰ Action may be delayed on these problems until the emergence of a major crisis brings them to the attention of the central authorities.

Furthermore, the discretion of field officers permits the exercise of a high degree of personalism in the performance of their roles and results in the formation of vested interests and the institutionalization of the established methods discussed earlier. Added to the essentially conservative initial commitment of prefectural administration, these vested interests create serious resistance to change. Critical decisions can be made, if at all, only after prolonged bargaining or in the face of a drastic crisis. Prefectural administration is thus an organization that can deal flexibly with

problems of static adjustment, but has great difficulty in making the critical decisions that permit dynamic adjustment of its basic purposes. This is reflected in Robert Heussler's summary analysis of British colonial administrations in Africa:

At the start of each colony's association with England policy was important, for there had to be a reason to move forward. At the end of the colonial time, similarly, there was a rationale of going away. In between, the landscape was dominated by a system, not a policy.²¹

Given the limitations on the effectiveness of direct means of control and supervision of field officers, the higher authorities in field administrative organizations frequently resort to indirect controls through either highly selective recruitment or intensive indoctrination of personnel after they have entered the organization, or both methods in combination.²² Thus the central authorities will search for men who are already strongly committed to the basic values and general goals of the regime they are expected to maintain.²³ Where the task of the organization can be defined with some specificity and precision, and the methods of implementation are highly specialized and professionalized, selective recruitment and intensive training can produce what Fesler has termed 'illusory decentralization' where decision-making is actually highly centralized as field agents can be relied upon to freely act in conformity with the doctrine of the higher authorities without direct supervision.²⁴ However, in prefectural systems, the diffuseness of the organization's goals and the difficulty in giving them precise operational definition limits the control obtained by recruitment and training to the negative level of restraining field agents from methods and actions embarrassing or

damaging to the regime, i.e., ensuring that they tend to use their wide discretion within a range generally acceptable to the central authorities.

In British colonial administration highly selective recruitment of administrators was combined with an emphasis not on indoctrination through training programs, but rather indoctrination through in-service experience. The reliance upon 'learning by doing' reinforces resistance to change. Where the situations dealt with by the organization have no precedent in the experience of new personnel, they are forced to rely upon the advice and direction of the more experienced staff who teach them the existing methods and action programs. Given a lack of alternative sources of ideas on methods or policy, such established routines, which constitute the core of the vested interests of the field agents, tend to be passed on from one generation of recruits to another and become part of an organizational tradition in which they cease to be seen as pragmatic ways of dealing with empirical situations and are reified into universal and unchanging operational principles. While the field agent may still possess substantial freedom of action, the folklore and conventional wisdom of the organization provides a general framework for his activities that he rarely strays beyond.²⁵

II. Administrative Attitudes and Values: The Consequences of Uniformity

The values and attitudes of organizational personnel are of general importance for understanding the internal processes of bureaucracy. If structural factors define the basic internal processes

and cleavages in bureaucracies, then it is the subjective orientations that officials bring to their roles that shape their particular understanding of and response to those problems of operation, and lends to an organization its characteristic and often unique style of action.²⁶ Where subordinate officials exercise wide discretion in shaping the mode of the organization's reactions to its external environment and exercise considerable influence on the formation of basic policy, their attitudes and values are of particular importance.

There is a general tendency in bureaucracy for the growth of common values and a homogeneous outlook among organizational personnel that is intensified in organizations where subordinates exercise substantial discretion. As was suggested above, the fundamental purpose of selective recruitment and indoctrination was to ensure that subordinates possessed a common set of values and attitudes similar to that of the central authorities. It was this homogeneity of outlook that provided the latter a general measure of control over subordinate field officers by promoting a distinctive ethos that intensified the commitment of the individual to the organization. As Lewis Coser has pointed out:

Part of what is meant by the concept of 'group consciousness' is the transformation of individuals with their own specific life situations into conscious representatives of the group. The individual will be more intransigent in his representative role because he sees himself as the bearer of a group mission.²⁷

In prefectorial organizations the generation of a common ethos and sense of distinctiveness generates a strong esprit de corps which generates a resistance to external interests and helps to ensure the loyalty of the field agent. However, homogeneity of attitudes and values has

several very serious consequences for an organization.

The homogeneity of outlook among organization personnel is antithetic to innovation and change in two distinct ways. First, it restricts the range of options considered in the organization. Second, homogeneity intensifies the tendencies towards institutionalization and the formation of vested organizational interests that resist change.

Even more important, when an organization relies upon selective recruitment to bring in personnel with common attitudes and values they already possess before entry, rather than providing specific indoctrination, there will be a tendency to those orientations to remain implicitly understood instead of being consciously articulated in an organizational doctrine or ideology. In British colonial administration organizational doctrine went little beyond a series of vague phrases that elliptically suggested to colonial officials their shared, but largely unstated, ethos. It is difficult to conceptualize middle range policies dealing with specific problems and relate them to such vague values and purposes. Furthermore, when an organization with vague, implicit goals also relies upon in-service training, officials move directly to involvement in the details of day-to-day operations without any contact with intervening levels of policy decision. This leads to a tendency to emphasize technique over objectives. In Kenya, as in other British colonies, this was reinforced by the perspective of British 'empiricism' which denigrated systematic policy in favor of serial, 'pragmatic' responses to immediate circumstances. As a result crucial issues tend not to be dealt with through explicit policy decisions, but by a series of ad

hoc, short-range adjustments that can be, at different locations in space and time, mutually contradictory. The result is that the organization drifts without direction, "exposed to vagrant pressures, readily influenced by short-run opportunistic trends."²⁸ This is the real meaning of Heussler's remark that British colonialism was dominated by a system, rather than a policy. It also points up what we shall see was one of the salient qualities of colonial administration: an extreme lack of leadership and general inability to make critical decisions except at points of major crisis.

III. Communication and Information Processes: Uncertainty Absorption and Bias

Organizational communications and information processes can be analytically separated into external and internal components. The former deal with those factors that determine what aspects of its environment an organization defines as important and systematically scans for information relevant to policy formulation and implementation. The latter deals with the factors that affect the flow of this information within the organization and determine what information is controlled by what roles. Both dimensions are empirically linked and are also interconnected with the structural and cognitive factors already discussed.

One of the most important contributions of modern organization theory has been the delineation of the relationship between knowledge and power in bureaucracies. As Crozier has put it, referring to intra-organizational power: "Its major means of action, finally, can only be the manipulation of information or at least the strict regulation of access to information."²⁹ The control of information,

or more generally, uncertainty allocates power in an organization, and this is in turn due to the character of information in organizational settings. March and Simon note that, "In organizational communication evidence is replaced with conclusions drawn from that evidence, and these conclusions become the 'facts' on which the rest of the organization acts."³⁰ They term this communication of conclusions rather than evidence 'uncertainty absorption', and go on to point out:

...a great deal of discretion and influence is exercised by those persons who are in direct contact with some part of the 'reality' that is of concern to the organization. Both the amount and locus of uncertainty absorption affect the influence structure of the organization.

Whatever may be the position in the organization holding the formal authority to legitimize the decision, to a considerable extent effective discretion is exercised at the points of uncertainty absorption.³¹

In prefectoral organizations where the field agents exercise general control over information about local conditions and their own actions, they can interpret this information in ways favorable to themselves and use it to defend their effective discretion. Furthermore, while the field agents may not exercise final influence over the policy choice of the higher authorities, their control over the informational premises of action tends to shape the perceived range of alternatives from which the decision is made.

The control of the image of external reality by any single category of officials can never be total however. Uncertainty absorption can be performed to some degree by officials at each level of the organizational hierarchy through which the information moves before it reaches the top. There is both an inevitable loss of detail

and a degree of distortion of the original message as it is subject to successive summarizations and interpretations at different levels of the organization. This results in important differences in the image of reality at the center and periphery of an organization. The central authorities receive a mass of highly summarized and interpreted information which they use to construct a general picture of organizational operations and external conditions. Their perspective is thus different from the more parochial focus of lower level officials directly surveying only a small portion of the environment. What appears as an urgent problem in the field, for example, can be lost or glossed over at the center. In prefectoral systems such differences reinforce the structural cleavage between the field agents and the central authorities. The field agents may establish the basic parameters of the image of the local environment, but subsequent summarization and distortion can provide abundant bases for conflict over the significance of what they see.³²

A variety of techniques are available to the central authorities in an organization for limiting the effects of the summarization and distortion of information. They can jump over the intermediate stages of the communications ladder and receive information directly from officials in the field, and they can check that information by developing independent sources of information, especially outside of the organization itself. What is important in the present context is that such techniques were generally either not used or ineffective in Kenya due, on the one hand, to the deep-seated cultural constraints against checking on the information provided by administrative officers, and, on the other hand, to the relative weakness

of independent sources of information among the African population of the colony.

Turning to the external dimension of communication and information processes, the attitudes and values of organizational personnel introduce systematic biases into the information collected from the environment and the specific way in which it is summarized and interpreted within the organization. The biases characteristic of a particular organization must be established by empirical investigation. Generally speaking, however, information biases result from such things as the sources of information relied upon by organizational personnel, the measuring tools they employ, as well as more diffuse factors relating to their basic, often stereotyped, images of the external environment and their orientations towards problems of intelligence and analysis. Thus we shall find that in Kenya the socio-cultural orientations of British 'empiricism' produced an anti-intellectualism expressed in an antipathy to systematic analysis and an emphasis on intuition and short-run, direct, and simple answers.

Another critical, often overlooked, source of information bias derives from the perceived power of the organization in relation to its external environment. As Wilensky points out, when an organization "has a monopoly of relevant resources, it has no need for information about rivals."³³ Organizations collect information about those aspects of the environment perceived as 'relevant' in the sense of being problematic and presenting some challenge to the formulation and execution of organizational policy. That which does not present a challenge to the organization sufficient to interfere with its operations does not have to be taken into account. Thus, the more

powerful an organization appears to be in relation to its environment, the less it will know about the environment. Crozier notes that "there will be a tendency to escape from reality at the two extremes, when reality is too difficult to cope with and when it no longer presents a challenge."³⁴ 'Knowledge is power' can be matched with a complementary aphorism, 'Power is ignorance'.

Individuals and groups in the external environment of an organization find it difficult to make their demands known or otherwise communicate with it unless they possess sufficient power to compel the organization to take account of them. According to Coser:

To make oneself understood and to get others to listen is contingent on the possession of power to give force to one's argument. A group that is not able to assert its interests will not gain consideration of its claims.³⁵

There is thus a barrier of power around an organization which must be surmounted if an organization is to 'hear' messages from its environment. Moreover, organizations will tend to be ignorant of changes in the environment unless or until these changes present a challenge to established routine operations.

The most common challenges to administrative organizations indicating problems in the external social environment are conflicts with outside individuals and groups.³⁶ Organizations such as prefectural systems which are committed to the authoritarian control of their environment are therefore prone to serious informational problems. Apter has noted an inverse correlation between coercion and information in political systems generally.³⁷ Organizations that suppress conflict tend to experience a deterioration in the scope and accuracy of its information about the outside world. Moreover, sup-

pressive organizations tend to judge information from the outside by the demonstrated loyalty of its source. Since these sources are those most likely to be dependent upon the organization for their own status and protection, the information they supply tends to be shaped by their own interests and their perceptions of what the organization wants to hear. The result is the creation and persistence of an image of order and stable routine where none exists, making suppressive organizations prone to unanticipated crises. The potential for violence directed against the organization is highest when officials can employ coercion, involving both the threat and actual application of force, against the activities of outside groups in a relatively routine fashion. The use of some degree of coercion in such cases is accepted as a normal part of organizational operations, and can force external individuals and groups to also resort to the threat or actual use of force before they can breach the communications barrier and be heard by the organization.

IV. External Factors: The Dual Society in Colonial Kenya

The most idiosyncratic aspects of the Kenya Administration derive from the socio-economic and political characteristics of its external setting. A consideration of this setting provides a useful sketch of the historical background of the organization.

Colonial Kenya had its origins in the intricacies of late nineteenth century imperial diplomacy. Control of the land lying along the route between the East African coast and Uganda was felt by British authorities to be important to the maintenance of a dominant influence around the headwaters of the Nile, which was in turn of

strategic importance to their position in Egypt and the Sudan and to the protection of linkages to India and the rest of the Empire in Asia. The area itself, with its scattered and apparently very primitive pastoral and agricultural tribes, was otherwise regarded as of no intrinsic importance.

In 1887 responsibility for establishing control of the route to Uganda was given to the Imperial British East Africa Company, in return for a concession to control commerce and exploit whatever sources of profit it could develop in the area. Failing to find the expected profits, the financially hard-pressed company turned over its operations to the Foreign Office in 1895 and the East African Protectorate was established. Over the next twenty years British control was gradually extended throughout the Protectorate, largely through small scale punitive expeditions initiated by the administrators and military officers on the spot. In 1905 control of the Protectorate passed to the Colonial Office and the administrative infrastructure of British rule was established on a regular and permanent basis. By the outbreak of war in 1914 the pioneer era of colonial rule had effectively come to an end. In 1920 the territory, including a ten mile strip along the coast that remained a protectorate under the formal rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar, was annexed to the Crown as the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya.

With its principal concerns elsewhere, the Foreign Office made only desultory efforts to develop internal administration during the decade it controlled the East African Protectorate. During this period, however, two critical decisions were made which were of deep significance for the future politics of the colony. First to secure

the link with Uganda, a railroad was built between 1895 and 1901 connecting Mombasa on the coast with the Kisumu at the eastern end of the Kavirondo Gulf of Lake Victoria. In 1902 the Eastern Province of Uganda, including Kisumu, was transferred to the Protectorate, bringing the entire rail line within a single administrative unit. The railroad, however, required freight and passenger revenues both to cover the cost of operations and to retire the expensive loans from the metropole required for its construction. This led to the second critical decision: the introduction of white settlement. Since the local African tribes looked unpromising as a source of economic activity and revenue, and the climate of the interior highlands appeared healthy for Europeans, in 1904 the Protectorate Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, initiated a policy of encouraging white settlement in the territory that was confirmed and extended by subsequent Governors and Secretaries of State for the Colonies. In addition, a second and larger flow of immigration came from India to take up subordinate positions in the developing Protectorate government and establish a commercial infrastructure serving both the settlers and the surrounding Africans.

The dual nature of colonial societies has often been noted.³⁸ In Kenya the presence of European and Asian immigrants enormously magnified the duality between the world of the rulers and the world of the ruled that ran through the society, economy, and polity of the colony. A vast expanse of the central highlands, including a large proportion of the best agricultural land in the colony, was reserved for European settlement. To facilitate the opening of this area, the pastoral Masai were moved between 1904 and 1912 from grazing lands in

the central portion of the Rift Valley to more arid lands to the south, and substantial amounts of land were alienated from other tribes, especially the Kikuyu in the environs of the administrative center of Nairobi. The 'settled' districts demarcated within this area, along with the major urban areas of Nairobi and Mombasa, were the foci of the immigrant communities and gave clear spatial referents to the dual society.

The character of colonial socio-economic relationships in Kenya was defined principally by the internal relations between the elements of the dual society rather than the external relationship with the metropole. With little in the way of exploitable natural resources and only a limited market for manufactured goods, Kenya was economically marginal from the metropolitan perspective and only began to attract substantial investment from major British corporate interests after 1945. Moreover, the fiscal position of the colony before 1939 was often shaky and required periodic assistance from the Treasury in London. The principal mode of investment in the colony was the personal, frequently slender, resources of the European settlers and Asian immigrants. Colonialism in Kenya was thus essentially an internal relationship between the Africans and the immigrant communities, within the over-arching administrative structure of British rule.

The most important characteristic of Kenya was that it was a colony of white settlement that remained under the control of the Colonial Office.³⁹ Unlike Southern Rhodesia, the white community of Kenya never achieved internal self-government with its own locally recruited and controlled civil service. During most of the colonial

era Kenya was ruled by a bureaucracy in which positions of authority were staffed by expatriate officials recruited and appointed from Britain who were formally interchangeable with their counterparts in the non-settler colonies of British Africa. The key expression of Colonial Office rule was the presence of the Administration as the dominant element of government, especially the field organization that was the primary agent of imperial control. There was thus a fundamental contradiction in the structure of colonial society in Kenya between an Administration whose basic structure and purpose were shaped to the authoritarian and paternalistic control of a dependent and unsophisticated native population, and a settler community that was neither dependent nor unsophisticated and possessed the resources to address its demands directly to the central authorities in Nairobi and London. This contradiction lay at the heart of political conflict in Kenya.

NOTES - INTRODUCTION #1

1. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1967, pages 167-68.
2. Ibid., pages 173-74.
3. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, 1957, page 60.
4. M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, pages 195-203.
5. Selznick, op. cit., pages 61-64.
6. Ibid., page 40.
7. Philip Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grassroots (first publ. 1949) Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966, page 257.
8. Downs, op. cit., pages 133-36.
9. Crozier, op. cit., page 156.
10. Ibid., pages 187-89. This retreat into irresponsibility behind the 'rules' is linked to the apathy and lack of involvement or commitment among workers in highly routinized and rigidly controlled organizations.
11. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, pages 157-205.
12. James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, John Wiley, New York, 1958, pages 121-29.
13. Ibid., page 131.
14. Selznick, Leadership, op. cit., page 17.
15. James Fesler, "The Political Role of Field Administration" in F. Heady and S.L. Stokes, eds., Papers in Comparative Public Administration, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1962, pages 120-23, 129; Brian C. Smith, Field Administration, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, pages 56-57.
16. James Fesler "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization", Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, no. 3, 1965, page 562.
17. However, in prefectorial organizations the aspects of the performance of a field agent most readily evaluated by the central authorities are such things as revenue collection and, in particular

the maintenance of law and order narrowly defined, i.e. the absence of overt conflicts and challenges to the established regime. This leads to a tendency, highly visible in Kenya, for field officers to react to all other government activities in their area from the perspective of their impact on the imperatives of control. In short, the prefect's responsibilities are broad, but his focus on them is narrow.

18. For an analysis of the different types of prefectural systems, see Robert C. Fried, The Italian Prefects, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963, pages 206-315 and Smith, op. cit., pages 44-124.

19. Fesler, "The Political Role..." loc. cit., pages 129-34; Smith, op. cit., pages 62-63.

20. Fesler, "Approaches..." loc. cit., page 562.

21. Robert Heussler, "British Rule in Africa" in P. Gifford and W.R. Lewis, France and Britain in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971, page 576.

22. Downs, op. cit., pages 228-36; Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Study of Complex Organizations, Free Press, New York, 1961, pages 156-60.

23. Downs points out that these values are formed early and heavily influenced by childhood socialization (op. cit., page 229). In Britain the selection of such personnel was facilitated by the existence of a relatively homogeneous elite culture and recognized institutions of elite socialization in the public schools and the two ancient universities.

24. Fesler, "Approaches..." loc. cit., page 556; Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study of Administrative Behavior, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960, especially pages 161-200.

25. This organizational 'wisdom' or tradition is an informal phenomenon created and orally transmitted by the field officers themselves, and is not to be confused with written standing orders coming down from the central authorities. The strength of this oral tradition in Kenya reflected the emphasis on method over substance in the Provincial Administration.

26. Thus Crozier in the second half of his study (Op. cit., chapters 8-11) accords cultural values and orientations an importance equal to, if not exceeding that of structure in the explanation of organizational behavior.

27. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956, page 115.

28. Selznick, Leadership, op. cit., page 25.

29. Crozier, op. cit., page 163.

30. March and Simon, op. cit., page 155.

31. Ibid.

32. Downs, op. cit., pages 118-122.

33. Harold-Willensky, Organizational Intelligence, Basic Books, New York, 1967, page 40.

34. Crozier, op. cit., page 186.

35. Lewis Coser, "Violence as a Method of Conflict Resolution" in Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, Free Press, New York, 1967, page 106.

36. Coser, "Some Social Functions of Violence" in Ibid., pages 82-92.

37. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965, pages 39-40.

38. Georges Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" in I. Wallerstein, Social Change: The Colonial Situation, John Wiley, New York, 1966, pages 54-55.

39. Kenya shared this characteristic with Northern Rhodesia, and, to a lesser extent, Tanganyika and Nyasaland. However, the settler communities in the latter two colonies were far smaller and much less influential than that in Kenya. Northern Rhodesia also differed from Kenya in that its economy was rapidly dominated by the copper industry, controlled by metropolitan corporations, rather than by local settler agricultural interests.

CHAPTER TWOCENTER AND PERIPHERY — PATTERNS OF DECISION-MAKING
AND DISCRETION IN THE KENYA ADMINISTRATION, 1919-1939

The twenty years between the two World Wars marked the 'golden age' of colonial administration in Kenya. This period saw the culmination of trends originating in the pioneer period of colonial rule before 1914 and the establishment of norms and patterns of action that would deeply affect the response of the Kenya Administration to accelerated processes of change after 1945. In this chapter the analysis will focus on the impact of the internal structural factors that shaped center-periphery relations in the Kenya Administration, as well as how the effect of these factors was muted or reinforced by the dual character of colonial society. Since the emphasis is upon general patterns of action, the data is presented in highly summary form and essentially for the purpose of illustrating the main points of the analysis. The objective of this and the following chapter is to provide both a necessary over-view of the colonial administrative organization, before analysing its role in the larger political system, and a useful base-line for gauging the impact of processes of development and conflict in the post-1939 era.

I. The Structure and Process of Decision-Making

The British system of colonial administration was marked by the exercise of a high degree of discretion in the formulation and implementation of policy by subordinate officials in the field. This pattern was visible in two distinct organizational dimensions. First, each of the individual territorial administrations of the colonial empire maintained considerable autonomy in relation to the Colonial Office in London. Second, within each territory the field administration exercised a high degree of

discretion in relation to the central administration in the colonial capital.

A. The Kenya Administration and the Colonial Office: The Limits of Autonomy

"Trust the man on the spot" was the phrase that denoted the conscious acceptance by British politicians and civil servants of the relative autonomy of a colony in relation to the metropolitan authorities. The phrase expressed a set of traditionally sanctioned pragmatic judgments based on long historical experience of the difficulty of controlling the actions of distant imperial agents. The acceptance of colonial autonomy was prompted by recognition of three structural and ecological factors shaping the relations between center and periphery in the Empire: 1) the physical difficulties of communication; 2) the enormous scale and diversity of the colonies; and 3) the lack of clear lines of authority linking the colonies and the Colonial Office in general, and the Secretary of State and the Governors in particular.

In the early twentieth century an exchange of dispatches between London and East Africa took approximately six to eight weeks and occasionally as long as three months. This had improved by the inter-war years, but still could rarely be accomplished in less than a month. Telegraphic communications had been established with London at the turn of the century, although, as a result of an incessant concern for economy, "the Colonial Office thought twice before using this costly means of communication."¹ In practice, the use of telegrams was limited to what were thought to be the most important issues of policy or urgent crises. Moreover, officials in London generally declined to act until a full explanatory dispatch had arrived by sea. Annoyed with the delays of lengthy correspondence with

Whitehall or faced with situations that required immediate action, officials in a colony frequently acted on their own discretion and informed the Colonial Office after the fact. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the metropolitan authorities to reverse such faites accomplis.

The global scale of the Empire and the incredible diversity of peoples and cultures within it appeared to British officials to make it virtually impossible, if not foolhardy, to attempt to impose any uniform pattern of policy. The Colonial Office generally only articulated vague 'principles' that would be flexibly adapted to fit the varied empirical circumstances of individual colonies.² Moreover, the small staff of Administrative Class Officials at the Colonial Office, (fewer than 35 in 1929 and still less than 50 ten years later) could not be expected to keep track of all policy developments in every colony. In practice, therefore, large areas of policy were left uncovered by even general policy statements from the metropolitan authorities. According to a senior Kenya administrator: "There were very few policy statements from the Colonial Office:... By and large the local government alone was able to get down to detail with regard to the problems."³ What is especially significant for this study is that, as Margery Perham has pointed out, "the Colonial Office rarely promulgated general principles about the form for the structure of that part of Government which chiefly affected the native population."⁴ The pattern of field administration was thus a matter of the individual discretion of the colonial governments.

The recognition by the metropolitan authorities of the limits to direct control imposed by the difficulties of communication and cognition resulted in no effort being made to erect intervening structures of authority

of any permanence or range of responsibility linking the individual colonies to the Colonial Office. In consequence of the lack of clearly articulated administrative linkages, "there was no machinery for enforcing a centrally agreed policy."⁵ Where the Colonial Office sought to ensure the acceptance of even general principles of policy it had to negotiate the issue separately with each local administration. The actual relationship between a colony and the Colonial Office generally came down to that between its Governor and the Secretary of State, but here too the lines of authority were not clearly drawn.⁶

The metropolitan authorities did have powers to control the internal administration of a colony. The Secretary of State could refuse assent to items of local legislation, disallow ordinances already passed, legislate directly through a Royal Order-in-Council, as well as issue direct orders to a Governor and dismiss him if he failed to comply. In constitutional terms this authority to intervene was technically unlimited.⁷ However, these controls were extreme and intended for use in exceptional circumstances rather than as part of the ordinary administrative process. They did not contradict the general autonomy of the local administrations, but served to indicate that this autonomy was bounded and there were limits to the extent that the man on the spot would be trusted. The implication was that the Colonial Office would intervene only when something went wrong in the administration of a colony.

A colony was considered well administered to the extent that its affairs were not a matter of public controversy in Britain. Where the actions of a colonial government or other events in a colony became or threatened to become a political issue embarrassing to either the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State, or the Government in power, the London

authorities were moved to vigorous action. The embarrassing incident or scandal brought attempts at outside influence on the Colonial Office itself and a rush to prepare urgent answers to parliamentary questions that disrupted the established routines of its officials.⁸ If they were of sufficient seriousness and magnitude such incidents could throw a pall over the subsequent political career of the Secretary of State or even besmirch the reputation of the Government as a whole.

With regard to fiscal matters, it was an unshakeable element of the British concept of empire that all colonies should meet the costs of their administration entirely from local revenues. The Secretary of State could not make grants of additional funds from the metropole without the explicit authorization of the Treasury. Where a colony found itself unable to meet its own expenses, control of its finances passed out of both its hands and those of the Colonial Office. The Treasury superintended the budgets of debtor colonies and mercilessly pruned expenditures until it was satisfied that all possible economies had been made. Only then would it authorize a grant-in-aid for uncovered expenses. Such supervision continued until a colony could pay its own way and was no longer a charge on the British exchequer.

The Colonial Office tended, therefore, to focus its attention on those aspects of a colony's affairs that were a potential source of domestic controversy. Since resort to the sanctions at their disposal would in itself often lead to the situations they sought to avoid, the metropolitan authorities found themselves in a position that "made powers of persuasion more important than powers of command."⁹ They would generally seek to exhaust every possibility of persuading the government of a colony to modify an undesirable course of action before confronting what one Secretary of

State termed the choice of having to "back or sack" the Governor.¹⁰

Given a corresponding interest on the part of local administrations in avoiding direct Colonial Office intervention, the result was a delicate, complex, and often protracted process of bargaining and negotiation. Under the circumstances, the governments of the colonies frequently exerted substantial influence on the vague 'principles' of policy articulated by the Colonial Office itself.

The success of the process depended upon the mutual understanding by the participants of the boundaries within which they could operate and their tacit acceptance of the rules of the game. The primary architects and defenders of the process of interaction between center and periphery in the Empire were the permanent officials in London and the colonial capitals. With the office changing hands 22 times between 1909 and 1945, few Secretaries of State had sufficient background in colonial affairs or held the office long enough to develop any real expertise in the detailed problems of individual colonies. They thus found it imperative to rely upon the advice of their officials who, especially with regard to the African colonies, had "developed settled ways of dealing with certain issues from which most Colonial Secretaries would find it hard to depart."¹¹

As the result of the presence of both the settlers and an Administration formally responsible to the Colonial Office, Kenya provoked more controversy in the British political arena than any other colony in Africa. It was not only a major focus of parliamentary interest in colonial affairs,¹² but also excited the interest of a small but important and articulate segment of the British public. The frequency and intensity of Kenya's intrusion into British politics worked to circumscribe the discretion exercised by its central administration within narrower limits

than those enjoyed by less controversial colonies. The Colonial Office subjected local policy to closer and more continuous scrutiny and the Secretary of State intervened more frequently and directly than in the affairs of other territories. This is reflected in the difficult position of the Governors of Kenya. Eliminating two men who died in office, we find that four of the remaining nine Commissioners or Governors between 1895 and 1939 did not serve full terms of office: one was summarily dismissed by the Secretary of State, two resigned after major conflicts with the metropolitan authorities, and the fourth was transferred and demoted. (See Table #1) Moreover, while by 1926 four out of five Governors in the Empire were drawn from the ranks of the career Colonial Service,¹³ only one of Kenya's Governors between 1919 and 1939 can be classified as a career colonial official, and he died in 1924 after less than two years in office. Of the other four, one, Sir Edward Grigg, was a politician and journalist, while the other three were professional soldiers, two of whom had no previous experience in colonial administration.

The autonomy of the Kenya Government was further circumscribed by the fact that no colony was a greater charge on the British exchequer. This began with a loan of 5.5 million pounds for the construction of the Uganda Railway in 1895 and continued with annual budgetary grants that ceased in 1912, only to have to be resumed again during the depression years of 1921-22 and 1932-36. Sir George Fiddes, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office during the early 1920's, noted in 1926 that "East Africa is only kept solvent, under present conditions, by the exercise of a severe economy which involves the starving of necessary services."¹⁴

TABLE I
GOVERNORS OF KENYA 1895-1963

	Date of Birth & Age at Appointment	Education	Previous Career	Previous African Experience	Term of Office	Manner of Leaving
Sir Arthur Harding*	1859 36	Eton Oxford	Diplomat	Zanzibar	1895-1900	Regular Trans. Promoted
Sir Charles Eliot*	1862 38	Cheltenham Oxford	Diplomat	None	1900-1904	Resigned in Protest
Sir Donald Stewart*	1860 44	Clifton Sandhurst	Soldier Captain	S.Af. Sudan Gold Coast	1904-1905	Died in Office
Sir James Hayes-Sadler*	1851 56		Soldier Lt. Col.	Somalia Uganda	1905-1909	Transferred Demoted
Sir Percy Girouard	1867 42	R.M.C., Kingston	Soldier Colonel	Sudan S.Af. N. Nigeria (Gov.)	1909-1912	Resigned (conflict with S of S re-tired)
Sir Henry Bellfield	1855- 57	Rugby Oxford	Barrister Civil Ser-vice (Malaya)	Nigeria	1912-1918	Regular Trans-fer, retired
Sir Edward Northey	1868 50		Soldier (Maj. Gen.)	S. Africa Nyasaland (Military)	1918-1922	Dismissed by S of S (retired)
Sir Robert Coryndon	1870 52		Colonial Service	Bechuana-land N. Rhodesia Uganda Gov.	1922-1924	Died in Office

TABLE #1 (continued)

GOVERNORS OF KENYA 1895-1963

	Date of Birth & Age at Appointment	Education	Previous Career	Previous African Experience	Term of Office	Manner of Leaving
Sir Edward Gries	1879 46	Winchester Oxford	Journalist and Politician	None	1925-1931	Regular Trans- fer
Sir Joseph Byrne	1874 57	Barrister- Lincolns Inn	Soldier (Brig. Gen) Col. Service	S. Africa Sierra Leone (Governor)	1931-1936	Regular Trans- fer
Sir Robt. Brooke-Popham	1878 58	Haileybury Sandhurst	Soldier (Air Chief Marshal- all of R.A.F.)	None	1936-1939	Returned to Active Service
Sir Henry Moore	1887 52	Cambridge	Colonial Service	Nigeria Kenya (C.S.) Sierra Leone (Gov.) Colonial Office	1940-1944	Regular Trans- fer (Gov. Ceylon)
Sir Phillip Mitchell	1890 54	St. Paul's Oxford	Colonial Service	Nyasaland Tanganyika Uganda (Gov.)	1944-1952	Regular Trans- fer, retired
Sir Evelyn Baring		Winchester Oxford	Colonial Service		1952-1959	Regular Trans- fer
Sir Patrick Renison	1911 48	Uppingham Cambridge	Colonial Service	None	1959-1962	Dismissed by S of S

B. The Provincial Administration and the Nairobi Secretariat: Duality and Discretion

The Provincial Administration of Kenya enjoyed an unusually high degree of autonomy in relation to the central government in Nairobi. In part this autonomy was based upon problems of control common to systems of field administration, but it was powerfully reinforced by the duality of colonial society in Kenya that was reflected in the Administration and turned the focus of the central administration in a very different direction from that of the field branch of the organization.

In contrast to the vague links between the colonies and the metropole, the Kenya Administration was a unified organization with clearly specified lines of formal authority. In general structure it conformed to the common pattern of the Crown Colony system.¹⁵ The Administration as a whole was a relatively small organization, numbering only 145 officers at its peak in 1921, and was periodically reduced by depression economies and the demands of war to a low of 114 in 1939 (see Table #2). The formal hierarchy of authority established a clear chain of command from the Governor to the Colonial Secretary and thence to the Provincial and District Commissioners giving the central authorities direct control over the field officers. In practice, however, the relationship between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat was also governed by the concept of "trust the man on the spot". The isolation of field administrators from immediate contact with their superiors; the slowness of communications, exacerbated by financial restrictions on the use of such telephone and telegraph links as existed; and the diversity of conditions in the various districts were felt to make detailed control of administration from the center undesirable and unworkable. Under the circumstances, field officers

TABLE #2

STAFF OF THE KENYA ADMINISTRATION 1919-1939

	1919	1921	1928	1931	1933	1935	1939
Provincial Administration	123	143	121	133	123	113	106
Central Government (Secretariat)	4	2	6	7	7	5	8
Total	127	145	127	140	130	118	114

were given a wide brief and expected to work out the implementation of any policy in the light of local conditions. The communications from the Secretariat "were guidelines and suggestions, more than definite instructions".¹⁶

The discretion accorded field officers in the implementation of policy also gave them considerable influence over its formulation. The opportunities administrators in the field had to modify, delay, ignore, and generally thwart the implementation of a policy they disliked made the position of the central administration, as that of the Colonial Office, one of persuasion rather than command. Moreover, the sanctions possessed by the central authorities were intended to deal with cases of individual recalcitrance rather than structural cleavages. In consequence, the Governor and his senior officials would seek to gain the general agreement of the Provincial Administration before issuing a statement of policy on a particular subject: "The District Commissioner or the Provincial Commissioner was perfectly entitled to object to any particular policy being adopted. His views were sought as a rule..."¹⁷ The concerted opposition of the field administration, expressed by the Provincial Commissioners at their periodic meetings in Nairobi, was sufficient to kill a policy proposed by the central

authorities. Conversely, the concurrence of the central authorities was required for policy proposals emanating from the field, especially where they involved additional expenditure.

With both field and the center able to exercise some veto power over policy proposals, the decision-making process in the Kenya Administration tended to take the form of a protracted process of bargaining and negotiation. Even without determined opposition at any level, the process was enormously time consuming and major issues could circulate between Nairobi and the field for years before any decision was made. The process went on until general consensus was achieved, and the responsibility of any particular official group of officials for the final policy is often difficult to determine. Matters were frequently dropped without any decision being taken because of a lack of consensus or because discussions had gone on for so long that the issue had lost its salience in the light of later developments. Moreover, while discussions wore on, field officers often lost patience and acted on their own without waiting for any agreement on the central framework of policy.¹⁸

Once a policy decision was finally made it was still subject to the discretion of the field officers as to what form it would take and how vigorously it would be implemented in their areas. There were significant differences in the patterns of administrative action from district to district and within a specific district from the tenure of one D.C. to another. Such variations were visible in such important areas of administration as the methods of recruiting local African officials and headmen and the composition, methods of selecting members, and procedures of the Local Native Councils in the districts.¹⁹ The system permitted the exercise of

a high degree of personalism, especially by the District Commissioners, who worked with a considerable degree of independence from their immediate superior, the Provincial Commissioner, and were able to administer their districts in ways that reflected the idiosyncracies of personal style.

This discretion was jealously guarded:

Each District Commissioner had his own way of running [his district] and the Provincial Commissioner did not order or direct them. He came to visit and support them ...you got District Commissioners...of considerable calibre and age and they all had their own ways of running things and I don't think anyone really bent them in any way. 20

The Provincial Commissioner, even though he had wide formal authority as the executive head of the province, would set policy for the province only after close consultation with his District Commissioners and with considerable deference to their views. Even more important, the Provincial Commissioner viewed himself primarily as a field officer, identifying with his District Commissioners and acting as a spokesman for the views of the field administration in his province to the Secretariat. Instead of being a connecting link between the center and the field, the actual role of the P.C. was "to cope with headquarters, with the Secretariat or whoever ... if there was a query or complaint."²¹

The cleavage between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat, more than being simply a structurally defined organizational conflict between center and periphery, also expressed very real differences of perspective and experience. From a district station in the bush, Nairobi and its concerns seemed distant and alien from the 'real' work of administration. Secretariat officials appeared to spend their time writing minutes and memoranda remote from the real world in the districts. "Pushing the

"bump around" was the contemptuous phrase used to describe the work of the Secretariat by field officers who felt that only they really understood the grassroots conditions and problems of the colony.²² The Secretariat official, however, "felt that he could take a wider view of the whole colony-wide situation and felt he was probably better informed about why there was the need for this, that, or the other change or decision."²³

Even more important than the issue of a parochial or cosmopolitan perspective was the fact that the content of the policy issues and the arenas of action that engrossed the attention of the Secretariat were essentially different from the concerns of the field administration dealing directly with the African population of the colony. The world of the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, and other officials of the central administration was oriented around the active political arena in Nairobi created by the presence of politically articulate European and Asian communities aggressively pressing their respective interests against each other and against the government. The attention of the central authorities was monopolized by heated controversies in which they were alternately arbiters and participants. Moreover, it was the linkages of the immigrant communities, especially the European settlers, with important political and financial interests in the metropole that made it difficult to contain conflicts within the colony and caused them to spill over so frequently into the British political arena; and the task of dealing with the London authorities fell exclusively on the shoulders of the central administration. The double burden of contending with Nairobi politics and the Colonial Office pulled the Governor and the Secretariat far away from the world of the Provincial Administration and gave them a larger area of common concern with

officials in London than with a D.C. and his staff less than fifty miles away. The minutes of the Executive Council, officially the chief advisory body on public policy, during the two decades between the World Wars are notable for their paucity of reference to African affairs and their pre-occupation with matters of concern to the immigrant communities.²⁴

The divergence of focus between the field and central administration resulting from the duality of colonial society in Kenya was recognized by many administrators and for ten years, 1919 to 1929, an attempt was made to officially segregate the affairs of the immigrant communities from those of the Africans through a system of 'Dual Administration'. Nairobi and the so-called 'settled districts' of the Highlands, seven in number, were established as extra-provincial districts under the control of District Commissioners-cum-Resident Magistrates directly responsible to the Colonial Secretary. The Provincial Administration proper was confined to operating in the mainly African districts which remained grouped into provinces and was placed under the executive control of a newly created office of Chief Native Commissioner who headed a new Native Affairs Department.²⁵ The system of separate administration of European and African areas foundered on both internal organizational conflicts and the opposition of the settlers who were attempting to gain control of the government of the entire colony, and the unitary system of Provincial Administration was restored. At the same time, however, the settled districts were given considerable powers of local self-government which reduced the scope of the Provincial Administration's authority and responsibilities in these areas to a fraction of what it was in the African districts.²⁶

The creation of the post of Chief Native Commissioner brought the

cleavage between the center and the field right into the structure of the Secretariat, and the history of this position is a significant indicator of the depths of the split between the two worlds of the Kenya Administration. The appointment of the C.N.C. was originally contemplated by officials in Nairobi and London as a means of muting a rising tide of criticism from humanitarian circles in Britain over the neglect of African interests by bringing into the central government an officer speaking with the voice of the field administration and dedicated to the protection of African interests. With the introduction of the system of dual administration the C.N.C. acquired executive authority over the Provincial Administration. This authority overlapped, however, with that of the Colonial Secretary and created an ambiguous situation in which the administrative pyramid had two peaks. Furthermore, settler politicians opposed the presence of a powerful spokesman for the Africans with a seat on the Executive Council and direct access to the Governor. On two occasions, 1922 and 1928, Governors sympathetic to settler interests attempted, with the concurrence of their Colonial Secretaries, to abolish the post on the ostensible grounds of administrative convenience. The Colonial Office, however, refused to agree to the elimination of the position out of concern for the adverse reaction such a move would cause in Britain.²⁷ When the system of dual administration came to an end, the continued division of authority between the Colonial Secretary and the Chief Native Commissioner was completely untenable. In the early 1930's unitary control of the Provincial Administration under the Colonial Secretary was restored and the C.N.C. was reduced to the relatively powerless role of chief adviser on native affairs. Although he retained his seat on the Executive Council,

the C.N.C. had become, in the popular local epithets, 'the fifth wheel of the coach' and 'the friend at court' of the Provincial Administration. The status of the Chief Native Commissioner continued to decline during the 30's and by 1940 Lord Hailey judged that "his effective prestige is probably inferior to the Heads of the principal government departments."²⁸

The preoccupation of the central administration with dealing with the immigrant communities and the Colonial Office circumscribed the degree of control it could exercise over the Provincial Administration. This is a crucial and unique paradox of the Kenyan situation: the same factors that acted in one direction to decrease the freedom of action of the central authorities, also worked in another direction to reinforce the discretion of the field administration. The Secretariat lacked the resources of both time and personnel to carefully keep track of the activities of the Provincial Administration in African areas. Furthermore, the points at which settler and African interests intersected tended to generate the types of conflicts that brought intense pressures from the settlers on the Secretariat and spilled over into the London arena to stimulate the intervention of the metropolitan authorities. Reluctant to confront these situations, Secretariat officials made no attempt to formulate any basic native policy to guide the Provincial Administration since such a policy would implicitly have to deal with the patterns of development and the relations between the two worlds of colonial society in Kenya.²⁹ There was thus a hiatus between the vague principles of policy announced by the Colonial Office and the concrete action programs carried out by field officers. Over wide areas of native administration field officers were left free to decide both the goals of policy as well as the means of implementation.

Lord Hailey noted that in Kenya:

No manual has been provided for the guidance of administrative officers, who are left to deal with the native authorities in the light of their own knowledge and experience, with no assistance save that afforded by occasional circulars. The result has been a diversity in practice which militates against the orderly development of the system as a whole. 30

The reluctance of the central administration to articulate the goals of native policy restricted the scope of the policy bargaining process within narrower limits than in other colonies. The issues that formed the content of discussions between the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration tended to be treated serially with little effort to coordinate them in relation to a general framework of policy objectives. The field officer "had to be ready to use his own initiative and ... his own judgment in the vast majority of cases."³¹ The narrow scope of the policy process in the Administration limited the degree of interaction between the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration, and thus tended to obscure the basic unwieldiness of decision-making and the degree of cleavage between the perspectives of the two branches of the organization.

Field officers in Kenya were given in practice extremely broad and ill-defined responsibilities for all government activities and for the general welfare and advancement of the population of the African districts. Except for occasional professional advice from officers of the various technical departments, the District Commissioner was largely on his own with regard to the socio-economic development of his area. One administrator noted:

There was no development policy, except that was initiated by the District Commissioner, because it was virtually non-existent in Nairobi Schemes were initiated at district level and you fought for money to do this or that, or else you just did it and took no notice of what went on higher up. 32

Lacking any guidance from the center, the Provincial Administration was left to its own resources in a manner that emphasized its essentially conservative rationale. In common with other prefectural systems, the field organization of colonial administration was established to maintain political control in areas where compliance with central authority was frequently in doubt. The only definite responsibilities of the field administration that drew the careful surveillance of the Secretariat in Nairobi were the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes. It was on these activities that the higher authorities judged the success or failure of an administrative officer; all other activities were of secondary importance. Given the lack of any civil institutions in the African areas outside of the colonial bureaucracy, the Provincial Administration was committed to the maintenance of a status quo in which the continuity and survival of its own power were central elements. This commitment, combined with the wide discretion of field administrators to control their districts in their own way and their ability to defend their established routines of action, made it exceptionally difficult for the Provincial Administration to deal with internal or external change except through marginal incremental modifications of existing policy that did not threaten the essential requirement of control. The position of the Provincial Administration was thus one that made criteria of short-run expedience more important than consideration of long-term consequences.

C. The Administration and the Technical Departments: Generalists vs. Specialists

The Kenya Administration, including both the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration, comprised only a fraction of the British civil

servants in the colony, more than ninety percent of whom were employed by various technical and specialist departments. (See Table #3) The relations between the Administration and these departments displayed the classical bureaucratic confrontation between the administrative generalist and technical specialist, but was shaped and given specific content by the characteristics of British colonial administration in general and the Kenya Government in particular.

In the British concept of colonial government the Administration was viewed as providing the necessary framework of organization and policy to which the activities of all other departments of government were subordinated. The paramount authority of the Administration in a colony derived from the belief that:

Administration is a synthesis of all knowledge designed for practical application. Its concern is with the co-ordination of the activities of all the specialist departments and, above all, in Africa, with feeling the pulse of African thought and sentiment to ensure the utmost possible good will and understanding. It follows that ... any subordination of Administration, either in the direction of subduing it to the prestige or outlook of a Department which by its very nature is a specialism, or in the direction of imposing a specialist outlook or training on its personnel, is equally dangerous. 33

Administrators in London and the colonies saw the role of the technical specialist as advising the Administration on the technical feasibility of various projects and then carrying out the alternative they themselves selected. The administrator's perception of what could be done took precedence over the technician's judgment of what should be done, i.e., the generalist decided "whether proposed specialist activities would fit the social framework."³⁴ In theory then, the Administration was an integrated prefectorial structure that directed the activity of other departments at all levels.

TABLE #3
 (EUROPEAN) STAFF OF THE KENYA GOVERNMENT,
 1919-1939

Department	1919	1921	1928	1931	1933	1935	1939
Administration	127	145	127	140	130	118	114
Education	37	47	94	161	138	140	138
Police	54	82	113	138	102	104	125
Medical	65	89	158	200	159	154	160
Agriculture	17	28	50	79	73	63	90
Veterinary	54	56	61	69	67	61	67
Forestry	23	27	26	29	25	24	25
Public Works	49	61	116	207	97	86	87
Railroad	58	59	99	117	80	83	92
Posts & Telegraph	80	104	104	120	145	141	177
Other	139	211	231	271	249	278	323
Total	703	909	1179	1531	1265	1252	1398

The position of the Administration represented in part the replication of certain aspects of British class structure within the bureaucracy. Administrators occupied a status similar to that of the traditional ruling class and considered themselves above the technicians who occupied a middle rank in the hierarchy. This was reflected, as we shall see in the next chapter, in differential patterns of recruitment for administrative and technical officers, as well as in relatively higher salaries for administrators, and in the preference they received in the distribution of the perks of office, especially housing. The Administration also took precedence

in the elaborate ceremonial that cloaked the operations of government. The aloofness and privileges of the Administration were resented by the other departments and this discontent over status differences reinforced the basic structural cleavage between specialist and generalist.

At the central level in Nairobi the Heads of the various specialist departments were directly responsible to the Colonial Secretary and, through him, to the Governor. The system was thus strongly centralized at the top, with all departments being funnelled to a single peak. Furthermore, the technical departments could communicate with the Governor or with each other only through the Colonial Secretary and the Secretariat. Beneath the center the departments extended down into the field as separate water-tight compartments. There were no formal horizontal linkages between the Administration and the other government departments that would facilitate regular contact and the integration of the activities on intermediate and lower levels. Articulation of the relationship between administrators and technicians was confined to verbal statements reaffirming the general authority of the Administration over the activity of all government departments that were issued when a conflict came to the attention of the central authorities.³⁵ Given the lack of institutional linkages through which to bring this relationship into effect, field officers were essentially left on their own to work out a modus vivendi on virtually a one-to-one basis with the technicians.

Relations between administrators and technicians in the field, however, were ambiguous as a result of the lack of an explicit development policy. There were simply no clear goals towards which the Provincial Administration could coordinate the activities of the departments and no focus

around which their interrelations could be ordered. Since development activities were at the discretion of the District Commissioner, field officers of the technical departments had to deal with each D.C. separately in terms of what the latter thought should be done in his district. The discretion of the D.C.s in this area was "guarded ... very jealously"; officers of other departments could not work in African districts without the permission of the D.C. and if they failed to inform him of their activities and receive his approval "there was a tremendous row".³⁶ Tensions were most acute with departments whose responsibilities either overlapped with the Provincial Administration, as with the Kenya Police, or dealt with subjects of particular interest to administrators, as with the Agriculture Department. In fact, for some twenty years after the restoration of the unitary administrative system in 1929, the Kenya Police confined their routine operations to the towns and settled districts, while normal policing of the African areas was handled by local Tribal Police controlled by the District Commissioners.

The task of sorting out conflicts between administrators and technicians in the field fell principally on the shoulders of the Provincial Commissioners. They dealt with the relations between their subordinates and the departmental officers in a similar manner to the way in which they protected the discretion of the Provincial Administration in dealing with the Secretariat. The task was facilitated by the junior rank of the departmental officers posted in the field which made them clearly inferior in rank and status to the P.C.

On the whole, however, relations between administrators and technicians do not appear to have been a major problem in the Kenya Government

before 1939. The cleavage was muted by the same duality of focus that separated the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration. As Sorrenson points out:

For many years there had been what amounted to two administrations in Kenya - one, composed of the Chief Native Commissioner and his assistants, and the provincial administration working in the African Reserves, catering largely for Africans; the other, consisting largely of technical departments ... catering largely for the European settlers. 37

The major impetus for the development of the technical departments was the social and technical services demanded by the settlers in the towns and settled districts of the White Highlands. The activities of the technical departments were thus concentrated in the areas in which the authority of the Provincial Administration was most limited. The number of specialist officers posted to the African districts remained extremely small; the combined total of the field staffs of the five most important departments only equalled the number of field administrators in 1935 after the latter had been reduced in numbers by depression cut-backs, and did not reach 100 until 1943. (See Table #4) An agricultural or veterinary officer often found himself responsible for two entire districts. They were so over-burdened that they could give little detailed attention to any particular problem and often could do little more than advise the D.C. and leave both the selection and implementation of policy entirely in his hands. In many outlying districts technical officers appeared infrequently, if at all. Conflict between specialist and generalist was muted by sheer lack of contact:

II. Communications Processes, Decision-Making, and Discretion

The discretion exercised in the formulation and implementation of

TABLE #4
FIELD STAFF IN AFRICAN DISTRICTS,
1919-1939

Department	1919	1921	1928	1931	1933	1935	1939
1. Provincial Administration (Total Field Officers approx. 20 in settled districts)	89	109	92	109	99	82	70
2. Police	0	13	18	24	22	19	23
3. Medical	4	9	19	33	26	29	20
4. Education	0	0	0	12	18	15	12
5. Agriculture	0	0	5	8	7	15	19
6. Veterinary Svs.	9	7	8	12	14	17	15
Total: 2 through 6	13	16	50	89	87	95	89

policy by the Provincial Administration in relation to the Secretariat and by the latter in relation to the Colonial Office was correlated with the degree to which they controlled the flow of information which shaped the perception of external reality by the higher authorities and defined the range of policy options open to choice. Where this control of information by field agents at the periphery was relatively unchallenged, these agents performed the function of uncertainty absorption and shaped the organizational premises of decision to a degree that permitted them to exercise a dominant influence over policy. However, where this control was challenged either by structural factors within the organization or by the existence of

alternative sources of information, the influence of the field agents was correspondingly diminished and supplanted by that of the higher authorities or external individuals and groups.

The discretion exercised by subordinate officials in the colonial administrative structure in Kenya was defended by a claim to unique knowledge of local conditions. This claim was generally accepted by higher authorities and was built into the formal lines of communication within the Kenya Administration and between it and the Colonial Office. This acceptance of the control of basic information by subordinates in the field was based on a corollary of the concept of 'trust the man on the spot' which indicated he was to be trusted because he alone really knew the local circumstances to which policy had to be adjusted. This belief was particularly marked with regard to the field administrator's supposed knowledge of the African. A former Secretary of State remarked that "on the whole, the District Officer was very popular with the African and they knew in those days what was going on, which no one else did".³⁸

Although all of the various departments of the Kenya Government collected information relating to their activities, the information upon which policy relating to the African population was based came essentially from the Provincial Administration. This position was occasionally challenged by the assertion of field officers from the technical departments that they were in closer and more friendly contact with Africans and thus better able to provide detailed and accurate information than administrators. Although a few senior administrators were inclined to accept this criticism³⁹, several factors supported the strong tendency of the Secretariat to give priority to information emanating from the Provincial Administration.

First, the limited field services of the technical departments before the Second World War left the Provincial Administration as the only branch of government with a continuously operating field organization in all of the districts of the colony. In many instances the administrator was simply the only man on the spot. Second, the formal lines of communication linked the Secretariat directly to the field administration in all of the provinces, but only indirectly, through the Heads of departments, to the technical officers in the field. Information from the Provincial Administration dominated in sheer quantity and detail. Third, the organizational and social cleavages between administrators and technicians led the former to accord priority to information emanating from their own ranks and reduced the contacts between departments to a level that inhibited the flow of detailed information. Fourth, the fact that before 1939 almost all Secretariat posts were filled by administrators with previous field service who were linked to the Provincial Administration by numerous ties of personal contact and friendship, meant that the formal lines of communication were reinforced by informal communications channels within the organization.

On the level of colony - metropole relations, the single line of formal communications led from the Governor and the Secretariat to the Colonial Office. The Administration of a colony was officially the Colonial Office's sole source of information about conditions in the territory, and all communications with the metropole was supposed to flow through this channel. This applied even to individuals and groups in the colony outside of the government, who could only officially address information to the Colonial Office through the Governor. The Administration therefore had

ample opportunity to ensure that the information reaching the Colonial Office depicted its actions in the most favorable light and filtered out information that was potentially damaging or might have metropolitan political implications. Furthermore, informal lines of communication between officials served to reinforce the reliance of the London authorities on information from the central administration of the colony. The Governor and senior administrators took regular leave in Britain which permitted them to consult personally with the Secretary of State and the officials of the Colonial Office.

The deference in official channels of communication to the purported expertise of the men on the spot was also reinforced by a widely accepted and strongly held norm that one could not and did not question the word of a fellow officer and gentleman. In the Kenya Administration this resulted in the lack of any regular efforts to check the accuracy of information supplied by the Provincial Administration through the establishment of alternative channels of communication within the organization. There were thus strong inhibitions against a Provincial Commissioner, for example, touring one of the districts of his province without the D.C. and collecting information about local conditions on his own.⁴⁰ If the Secretariat wished to verify some of the information it received from a district, the only official action they could take would be to refer the matter back to the District Commissioner.⁴¹ This norm also prevented the Colonial Office from establishing any continuous and open alternative source of information comparable to the Corps of Colonial Inspectors in the French African colonies: Sir Cosmo Parkinson, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office between 1937 and 1942, bluntly summed up the British

perspective:

The whole idea of such an inspectorate is alien to our whole tradition and thought. It smacks of bureaucratic control; and worse still the element of espionage at once comes in to poison the atmosphere, and if in fact it were not there, I do not know how Governors and their colonies could be persuaded to believe that it was not. 42

As was suggested above, the control over information possessed by subordinate officials in the field through the formal channels of communications, while very strong, was by no means absolute. In certain key policy areas the principal sources of information rested in other hands than those of the Provincial Administration or the Secretariat. The factors counteracting administrative control of information were both organizational, deriving from the internal dynamics of the Administration; and political, emerging from the activities of unofficial individuals and groups in Britain and Kenya.

As information from the field flowed upward through the successive levels of the administrative hierarchy it was subject to a process of increasing summarization and interpretation at each level. Reports from the District Commissioners went to the Provincial Commissioners and through him to the Secretariat and the Colonial Secretary, from the latter to the Governor, and from the Governor to the Colonial Office. By the time it reached the top levels in Nairobi the information had suffered a significant loss of detail and intensity. A settler politician with long political experience both inside and outside of the Kenya Government noted that:

... in the general process of movement up from a small district 300 miles away from Nairobi the whole picture got tremendously dimmed and its vivacity, the vivacity of the problem diminished The whole process of the transmission of news, which probably took three months from the initiation up to Nairobi, tended to take off the highlights and present a fairly flat surface. 43

While the central authorities did derive their basic image of reality in the African areas from the Provincial Administration, this image tended to reach them in a highly simplified and, to a degree, caricatured form. The transformation of information as it worked its way upward through the organization was another important factor behind the difference of perspective between the field and the central administration and made conflicts over the interpretation of information an intrinsic element of the policy bargaining process.

The Administration as a whole dealt primarily with information about people rather than things, and wherever individuals and groups in the external environment were sufficiently articulate and organized to speak for themselves, they constituted alternative, unofficial sources of information that challenged control of communications by the organization. In Kenya there could be no pretense of the Administration speaking for the immigrant communities. Both the Europeans and the Asians formed numerous associations that pressed their views directly on the Secretariat, by-passing the Provincial Administration, and kept up a constant barrage of comment and criticism. The settlers also often possessed personal ties with various officials, and such 'old-boy networks' could be used for private communications away from the public arena. Moreover, both the Europeans and the Asians had personal and organizational links with individuals and groups in Britain who pressed their respective views directly to Parliament and the Colonial Office and served as alternative, unofficial sources of information for the metropolitan authorities.⁴⁴

Control of information by the Provincial Administration was most complete with regard to the African population. It was assumed at all

levels of the administrative system that the field administrators spoke for the Africans, and in fact, in the majority of African districts during the inter-war period, the local populations possessed neither the organizational resources nor sufficient understanding of the colonial system to press their views at a higher level than the District or Provincial Commissioner. It was up to the Provincial Administration whether and in what form such information would be passed on to the higher authorities at the center. Even here, however, the administrative monopoly of information was sporadically broken by informal sources. These tended to be European missionaries in African areas who were critical of government actions, or, on occasion, even field administrators disgruntled with official policy, who would communicate their views privately outside of official channels. In most cases such information would be addressed either directly to the Colonial Office or to individuals and groups active in the 'native rights lobby' in Britain. Such informal sources tended to focus on specific abuses of power and on such contentious issues as the exploitation of African labor and the alienation of African land to European settlers.⁴⁵

The instances in which the metropolitan authorities were moved to active intervention into Kenyan affairs were strongly related to the existence of these informal, non-official sources of information which brought to their attention situations of potential domestic political import. The political salience of Kenya led to the tacit establishment of contacts between the Colonial Office and individuals and groups with private lines of communication with the colony.⁴⁶ The Colonial Office thus possessed some alternative, although hardly comprehensive, sources of information about

Kenya. Even more important, it was generally only where such unofficial sources of information indicated the existence of an 'embarrassing incident' or brought a local conflict into the metropolitan political arena that the London authorities would be moved to establish official sources of information independent of the normal administrative line. These usually took the form of investigating commissions composed of Members of Parliament and other British public figures, or, occasionally, a single noted expert in a particular field.⁴⁷

These commissions were specifically intended to take the control of information about important and controversial issues out of the hands of the local governments and interested private parties and place it in those of an ostensibly impartial panel. Brett has asserted that these commissions were sufficiently frequent during the inter-war period to be considered a permanent part of the administrative machine,⁴⁸ thus constituting precisely the sort of inspectorate that the Colonial Office otherwise refused to contemplate. On closer examination, however, we find that these commissions did not counteract the Kenya Administration's control of the official channels of communication in any continuous fashion. The commissions operated periodically and then only in what were generally recognized as exceptional situations, and were limited by their terms of reference to the investigation of specific and often narrowly defined problems. Furthermore, in carrying out their investigations the members of a commission were largely dependent on the aid and cooperation of the Kenya Administration.⁴⁹ Finally, there are also reasonable doubts that can be entertained about the complete objectivity of the commissioners themselves. According to one Kenya official:

Normally the commissioner goes and sees the relevant chap in the Colonial Office and says, 'well, you appointed me to go into this, what sort of answer are you seeking'. And there is a vague policy line given him and he finds in accordance with this, otherwise he doesn't get put on any more commissions. 50

The extent to which administrators recognized that their effective discretion depended on their control of communications was expressed in their attempts to defend themselves against the informal sources of information discussed above. This showed generally in a hostility to outside criticism. More specifically, the Secretariat dealt swiftly and severely with administrators who communicated with outside individuals and groups or directly with the Colonial Office outside of formal channels and committed the cardinal sin of washing dirty organizational linen in public. 51

They also acted to prevent outsiders, especially those critical of the government, from seeking information directly from administrators. In 1930, for example, Governor Grigg wrote to the Secretary of State complaining of attempts by interested parties in Britain to obtain unauthorized information from administrative officers. 52

The Administration attempted to limit the impact of information emanating from unofficial individuals and groups in the colony, usually by attempting to discredit the source by ascribing to it a flagrantly self-interested bias. This was not particularly effective when, as was the case with the settlers, the outside groups had potent connections in Britain willing to take up their case. It was effective, however, in dealing with the African population, especially the political associations that emerged in the 1920's and began to attempt to articulate African demands and grievances. As we shall see in Chapter Four, field administrators were able to

generalize a negative image of African political organizations throughout the colonial authority structure in a way that effectively destroyed their credibility as genuine expressions of African opinion. Furthermore, the coercive powers of administrators to maintain law and order permitted them to directly suppress information from Africans at the source where it was felt to be a potential threat to the position of the Provincial Administration.

Notes

1. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, 1909-1945, Faber and Faber, London, page 31.

In 1909-10 the Colonial Office budget provided only £7,000 for telegraph communication with the entire Empire. By 1939-40 this had increased to only a scant £10,000. (Ibid., page 53.)

2. Ibid., page 55.

3. Interview 2215.

4. Margery Perham, "Introduction" to V. Harlow, et.al., eds., History of East Africa, vol. II, Oxford University Press, London 1965, page xxxii.

5. J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, page 12.

6. The lack of clarity in the relationship between the Secretary of State and the Governor is evident in the confused efforts to define their respective spheres of formal authority in Parkinson, op.cit., pages 62-3 and 137; and Sir George Fiddes, The Dominion and the Colonial Office, G.P. Putnam, London and New York, 1926, pages 45 and 49.

7. "...it is well understood that the Secretary of State is entitled to intervene in any matter of administration within a Governor's authority, whether legal powers are involved or not."
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, Praeger, New York, 1966, page 339.

8. Fiddes, op.cit., page 19.

9. Lee, op.cit., page 54.

10. Oliver Lyttleton (Viscount Chandos), The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, The Bodley Head, London, 1962, page 419.

11. Perham, "Introduction", loc.cit.; page xxvii.

12. Kenya was the subject of no less than 325 questions in the House of Commons between 1925 and 1929 alone. (Figures from E.A. Brett, "Development Policy in East Africa Between the Wars", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1966, page 10, note 1.)

13. Fiddes, op.cit., page 61.

14. Ibid., pages 121-122.

15. Beneath the Governor there was a Chief Secretary (known before 1938 as the Colonial Secretary -- to avoid confusion the later

title will be used in this context) who was the executive head of the Administration as well as head of the entire civil service in the colony. The Chief Secretary was assisted by a small Secretariat, staffed by a few administrative officers, and he and this small office comprised the central organization of the Administration. Beneath the central administration the field organization of the Provincial Administration was organized into 4-6 provinces and approximately 35 districts headed by Provincial and District Commissioners respectively, with the latter usually assisted by one or more junior District Officers. The numbers of provinces and districts varied due to periodic reorganization. The four main provinces were Coast, Central, Rift Valley and Nyanza. In the north the Northern Frontier District and Turkana Districts were administered separately from the rest of the Provincial Administration and were eventually combined into the Northern Province. The two Masai districts were also separately administered as, in effect, another Province under an Officer-in-Charge, Masai, who had similar salary and status to the P.C.'s.

16. Interview 201FS.

17. Interview 201FS.

18. A Classic example was the issue of establishing Provincial Native Councils which was discussed and debated for almost a decade, 1938-47, before being dropped. During that period the field administration in Central and Nyanza Provinces went ahead and experimented with informal versions of the councils on their own initiative, while the administration in other areas rejected them as premature. (Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, (Hereafter KNA); various papers in Ministry of African Affairs 7/575 and also "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners" Meeting of October 24-26, 1946, DC/MKS15/3.)

19. Kenya Government Library (hereafter KGL), "Kenya: Report by Lord Hailey following his Inquiries in April, 1940", pages 9-15.

20. Interview 219F.

21. Interview 214F.

22. As one administrator put it: "In those happy days nobody wanted to go into the Secretariat. It was a marvellous life outside. You felt you were working with the people, bettering their lot.... This you didn't find in the Secretariat where you were churning papers. Interview 116F.

23. Interview 217F.

24. Public Record Office, London (Hereafter PRO) CO/544 Kenya Executive Council Minutes, various volumes, passim.

25. The vast majority of the population of a 'settled' district was also African. The differences were that a significant proportion of

the African population lived and worked as laborers on the European farms which occupied a large part of the area of the district and that the district contained at least one town with a sizeable (often no more than a few hundred) European and Asian population. In 'African' districts the Africans lived and worked on their own tribal lands and within the context of their own tribal institutions. A few districts like Kiambu and Nyeri combined both sets of characteristics.

26. The recommendations for the restoration of the unitary system of Administration and the development of local government in the settled districts emerged from the work of the Feetham Commission on Local Government. See Report of the Local Government Commission, vol. I, Crown Agents, London, 1927.

27. For example, in 1922 an official of the East African Department of the Colonial Office commented:

"We have taken credit to ourselves for the creation of the post of C.N.C. as likely to ensure that native interests are carefully looked after, and we may find ourselves exposed to criticism in Parliament and elsewhere if we agree hurriedly to a change of policy which may be represented (and correctly) as lowering the status of the officer charged with responsibility for the welfare of the natives."

PRO/CO 533/281, H.F. Batterbee to W.C. Bottomley, Minutes of 16 October, 1922. Other papers on the attempts to abolish the C.N.C. are found in that volume and also in PRO/CO 533/382/15406.

28. KGL, "Kenya: Report by Lord Hailey...", page 31.

29. Ibid., page 40.

30. KGL, Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and African Political Development", (Confidential Report to the Secretary of State, 1941), page 65.

31. Interview 201FS.

32. Interview 227FS.

33. Roger Howman, African Local Government in British East and Central Africa, Part I, page 4 (Reprint Series of the University of South Africa, no.4, Pretoria, 1963). Howman was the Native Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia who visited Kenya and the other East African colonies in 1951-52 to collect information on African local Government and prepare a series of reports which were originally published in 1952-53. He was sufficiently struck by the dominant position of the Administration in Kenya and the other colonies, in sharp distinction to its position in Southern Rhodesia, to go to considerable pains to explain the rationale behind it.

34. Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, page 54.

35. For example a 1926 circular on the "Position and Responsibilities of Administrative Officers in Native Areas and their Relationship with Departmental Officers" stated:

"In order to avoid division of authority in the control of native populations and action by Departmental Officers not in conformity with the general policy of the district, it is essential that Departmental Officers should act not only in close consultation with, but under the general direction of, the District Commissioner."

"The Senior Commissioner [Provincial Commissioner under the dual administration system] is, within the limits of his province, the principal executive officer of Government, and is personally and directly responsible to the Governor for the peace and good order of his province and for the efficient conduct of all public business therein. It is his duty to supervise not only the work of his administrative staff, but that which is done in his province by all Departmental Officers."

"Any matters which are susceptible of settlement by direct communication between the Senior Commissioner and local Departmental Officers should be so adjusted without prior reference to headquarters...."

KNA/PC/NZA 2/555, Secretariat Circular No.66, 11 October, 1926.

The circular left open the question of how the relation between a departmental officer and his department head in Nairobi and how he was to deal with the divided authority over him between the P.C. and the former. Similar circulars were issued in 1927 and 1935.

36. Interview 219F.

37. M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, E.A.I.S.R.--Oxford University Press, Nairobi and London, 1967, page 69.

38. Viscount Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton), Interview, December 11, 1969.

39. KNA/MAA 10/64, C.N.C., E.B. Hosking, "Memorandum" to Chief Secretary, Gilbert Rennie, July, 1940.

40. Interview 201FS.

41. KNA/MAA 10/64, Hosking to Rennie, July, 1940.

42. Parkinson, op.cit., pages 101-102.

43. Interview OIPs.

44. The pattern of these linkages and their effect on metropolitan politics is clearly illustrated in the 1922-23 conflict between the European and Asian communities of Kenya that led to the "Devonshire Declaration" of 1923. See Robert G. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, pages 5-45.

45. For example, in 1929, Archdeacon W.E. Owen, an Anglican missionary in Nyanza Province and a prominent critic of the Administration, complained to the Colonial Office and the British press about the use of forced labor, especially of women, by local administrators. (PRO/CO 533/368/15612). In 1921-22 a District Officer, S.V. Cooke, wrote directly to the Colonial Office in an attempt to thwart clandestine settler efforts to acquire the land of the Samburu tribe near Maralal. (S.V. Cooke, Interview, May 13, 1969.)

46. Prominent among these contacts were Dr. J.H. Oldham, Secretary of the International Missionary Society, and W. MacGregor-Ross, former Director of Public Works in Kenya and an ascerbic critic of the Government and the settlers, who had been forced to retire by settler pressures.

47. The major commissions investigating problems in Kenya or East Africa as a whole between 1919 and 1939 were:

- 1925--The East Africa Commission (Ormsby-Gore)
- 1929--The Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa (Hilton-Young)
- 1930-31--Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union in East Africa
- 1932--Investigation by the Financial Commissioner (Lord Moyne) on Certain Questions in Kenya
- 1932-34--The Kenya Land Commission (Carter)
- 1934--Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika Territory. (Bushe)
- 1936--Commission on the Financial Position and System of Taxation in Kenya (Sir Alan Pim)

(The names in parentheses are those of the chairman or sole member of the commission.)

48. E.A. Brett, "Development Policy in East Africa Between the Wars", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1966, page 16.

49. The secretary of the Kenya Land Commission, S.H. Fazan, was an experienced administrative officer who had co-authored an earlier

government report on Kikuyu land tenure, and he exercised considerable influence on the agenda and timetable of the testimony taken in Kenya by the Commissioners. He also intervened on a number of occasions to cross-examine witnesses and supplied the Commissioners with lengthy memoranda on economic and social conditions among the Kikuyu. See Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1934, passim, especially vol. I.

50. Interview 230T.

51. In 1917 Mervyn Beech, an experienced D.C. with a flair for ethnography, wrote an article on Kikuyu land tenure ("Kikuyu System of Land Tenure", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. 7, 1917, pages 46-59) that contradicted the official position of the Kenya Government by claiming that the Kikuyu possessed a form of individual rights in land. To compound the transgression, Beech circulated reprints of the article among his fellow officers. The Executive Council responded by ordering the issue of an official circular denouncing Beech's views and requested that the Secretary of State consider issuing an official disclaimer to the Royal African Society. It recommended that Beech also be severely censured. A short time later he was forced to retire (PRO/CO 544/14, Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting of 22 October, 1918). Cooke (see above) was rewarded for his letter to the Colonial Office with a severe rebuke from the Chief Native Commissioner for going outside of proper channels of communication. Further indiscretions resulted in his transfer to the Tanganyika Administration at the request of the Kenya Government. (S.V. Cooke, Interview, May 13, 1969.) Cooke, in many ways a classic organizational maverick, continued to cause trouble in Tanganyika and was forced to retire in 1937. He then returned to Kenya and entered politics, being elected to the Legislative Council in 1938 and serving until 1961.

52. PRO/CO 628/IND 26340. The original dispatch was destroyed under statute, but a description of its contents survives in this index at the Public Records Office.

CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOCRATIC CONSERVATISM -- ADMINISTRATIVE ATTITUDES,RECRUITMENT AND INFORMATION PROCESSES, 1919 to 1939

In an organization where subordinate officials in the field exercised great discretion, the personal attitudes and values of individual officers played a major role in determining the behaviour of the organization in relation to its external environment. The necessary corollary of the concept of 'trust the man on the spot' was that he must be a 'good man' worthy of the trust placed in him, i.e., he must act in ways acceptable to the higher authorities where they could not effectively exercise direct control over him. To ensure that the actions of field officers conformed to their expectations, the higher authorities in the British system of colonial administration relied upon internalized normative restraints based upon shared premises of action:

...the members of this increasing corps must share the same standards of conduct and manners sufficiently to allow them to understand one another. They must act when dispersed over wide and testing regions upon similar principles and in pursuit of the same almost unspoken purposes.¹

As a matter of deliberate policy, the Colonial Office maintained firm control over the recruitment of administrative officers to ensure that they possessed a common background of belief and experience permitting them to communicate easily with each other and with the metropolitan authorities, and to act with an acceptable degree of consistency and predictability.

1. From 'Cowpunchers' to Gentlemen: Recruitment and Training in the Kenya Administration

The pattern of attitudes and values sought in colonial administrators was that of the traditional aristocratic ethos of the British ruling class, especially the easy 'habit of authority' and sense of public service and obligation to the ruled. The code of the colonial administrator demanded "that in every circumstance and under all conditions he shall act in accordance with the traditions of an English gentleman."² The attributes sought by the metropolitan authorities were clearly spelled out in the confidential Colonial Office

Appointments Handbook:

A man's natural qualities ... derive partly from inheritance and home environment, and partly from school or academical training. If he comes from stock that has proved its worth, generation by generation, in the professions or in public service, if he has been reared in the faith that duty and chivalry are of more account than ambition and self-seeking, if his education has broadened his mind in that faith and taught him the meaning of that responsibility...then he has ... many of the qualities for which you are looking. The truth of this is incontestable...³

These qualities corresponded to such widely and deeply held beliefs in British civil service and political circles that their elitist and aristocratic bias was largely taken for granted. Thus, in 1929 the methods of recruiting colonial administrators was warmly endorsed both by a committee investigating the organization, recruitment, and terms of service of the various branches of the Colonial Service, headed by Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Treasury, and by the then Secretary of State, Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), the noted theorist of Fabian socialism.⁴

The primary qualifications for appointment as a colonial administrator were family background and education. The Colonial Office looked principally, although not exclusively, for the sons of the 'old'

middle class whose families had been active in the Church, the armed forces, the civil service, or the learned professions where the ethos of public service was supposed to prevail. Even more important, however, was attendance at a public school and, to a lesser extent, Oxford or Cambridge. The public schools had become through the course of the nineteenth century the principal route through which the sons of the middle class were prepared for entry into the ruling circles of Great Britain. It was there that the sons of both the old professional class and the 'new' middle class of commercial and industrial entrepreneurs were indoctrinated in the aristocratic tradition of service. As Rupert Wilkinson points out, the public schools "perpetuated the political supremacy of the landed classes by 'capturing' talent from the rising bourgeoisie and moulding that talent into 'synthetic' gentlemen."⁵

From 1919 to 1948 the recruitment of colonial administrators was largely controlled by one man at the Colonial Office, Sir Ralph Furse. As a graduate of Eton and Balliol and a former cavalry officer during the First World War, Furse was himself a perfect example of the type of man sought for colonial administration and an open and unashamed advocate of the aristocratic tradition.⁶ Applicants were selected by personal references and interviews rather than competitive examination. This permitted Furse and his staff to place primary emphasis on the factors of background, breeding, and manner they considered indicative of the qualities necessary for colonial administration. While specialist boards screened the candidates for the technical services, Furse and his staff personally interviewed the candidates for administrative posts. The system was informal and largely intuitive; Furse himself

admits that "trial and error was the basis of our system in all its aspects."⁷ What they were looking for, beyond the proper social and educational background, was the relaxed air of command and the sense of noblesse oblige cherished by the British ruling class.

To encourage the steady flow of the proper sort of applicants for the Administrative Service, Furse maintained personal contacts at the leading public schools and at Oxford and Cambridge. The brilliant or markedly intellectual student, the introspective man who might tend to question received values, was consciously avoided. The Colonial Office looked for modest intellectual distinction, demonstrated athletic prowess, a taste for outdoor life, and, implicitly, an unquestioning acceptance of the aristocratic ethos and the ideals of imperialism. As Cashmore noted of the pattern of recruitment for the Kenya Administration, "the emphasis was on the extrovert, the healthy outdoor type with more common sense than brain."⁸ Recruitment was facilitated by the social and economic conditions of the inter-war years, which saw many middle class families in straitened circumstances and eager for secure and relatively prestigious careers for their sons, and the growing competition for posts in the Home Civil Service, which increasingly closed them to those of only moderate academic achievement.

The control of recruitment by the Colonial Office resulted in a significant change in the social and educational background of the Kenya Administration from a relatively broad base of recruitment before 1914 to an increasingly narrow and homogeneous base in the inter-war decades.

Recruitment to the Kenya Administration during the early years

of British rule was a haphazard and largely ad hoc affair, drawing men from a variety of sources and diverse social backgrounds. Initially, most officers were recruited locally in East Africa and the core of the Provincial Administration, numbering only 22 in 1897, came from the staff of the Imperial British East Africa Company. Subsequently, several officers drifted up from South Africa after the end of the Boer War and a few transferred from other colonies, mostly from Uganda when that territory's Eastern Province was transferred to the East African Protectorate in 1902. The Englishmen who were wandering about the edges of the Empire at the turn of the century and found employment in the Administration of what was to become Kenya were a curiously mixed group. They had responded both to the push of limited prospects at home and the pull of visions of fortune and adventure abroad, pursuing a wide variety of occupations before ending up in East Africa.⁹ Most came from the middle or lower-middle class and few, if any officials appear to have come from clearly working class backgrounds. According to Cashmore, of the approximately 200 men who joined the Administration between 1895 and 1914, no less than 41 were the sons of parsons. He notes that "parsons were notorious for their small stipends and large families; their sons, however well-educated, must win their way in the world."¹⁰ A further twelve were the sons of regular army or navy officers, five were the sons of doctors, five were the sons of lawyers, and four the sons of civil servants. Only nine were the sons of businessmen. Eleven had family backgrounds indicating membership in the traditional upper class: seven were the sons of 'gentlemen', three were sons of peers, and one the son of a Secretary of State for the Colonies.¹¹

Education was the aspect of the background of the early administrators that showed the greatest diversity. While all had some formal schooling, few had attended either a public school or one of the two ancient universities. Information on 40 officers serving in 1903 indicates that only 15 had attended public schools, while five had been at Oxford and four at Cambridge. Three had been to other British universities and six had been educated on the Continent.¹² The lack of 'proper' educational credentials was noticed early by members of the upper class present in East Africa. Richard Meinertzhagen, then a young lieutenant in the Kings African Rifles, noted in his diary in January, 1904:

...the low class of man who is appointed to administrative appointments. Few of them have had any education and many of them do not pretend to be members of the educated class.... Sir Clement Hill, who recently visited the Colony on behalf of the Foreign Office, remarked that 'so long as Civil Servants were enlisted from the gutter' we could not expect a high standard of administration.¹³

Meinertzhagen's judgment was harsh, but it serves to indicate the strength of the perceived relationship between the proper sort of education and fitness to rule.

Soon after they assumed responsibility for the territory, Colonial Office officials moved to end the local recruitment of administrators and replace them with their own appointees. By 1907 the qualifications for an administrative post had been raised to either a university degree, a regular commission in the armed forces, professional qualifications in law, or at least 1500 marks on the Civil Service examination. By 1910 Governor Sir Percy Girouard wrote to the Colonial Office that "the time is past when we should recruit our staff from so-called pioneers"

and cowpunchers."¹⁴

The criticism levelled against the less educated members of the Administration by their superiors make it clear that it was precisely their unreliability in dealing with both Africans and European settlers that prompted the change in recruitment patterns. In a secret dispatch in May, 1910, Girouard complained that, "with one exception, his Provincial Commissioners "all lack the social qualifications necessary for the handling of a white community ... and [this] has been a very potent factor in accentuating the situation", and he insisted that the P.C.s "must be men not only of ability but of social position and good education."¹⁵ The less-educated officers were also thought to be often unnecessarily arrogant, high-handed, and brutal in their dealings with Africans. Meinertzhagen acidly noted:

When such men are given unlimited power over uneducated and simple-minded natives it is not extraordinary that they should abuse their powers, suffer from megalomania and regard themselves as little tin gods.¹⁶

Unsure of themselves and untrained in the art of ruling, such officers were felt to be more concerned with asserting their own power than looking after the Africans under their control and to be more prone to the uncontrolled outbursts of rage, what Cashmore calls the furor africanus, which occasionally led field officers to acts of vicious brutality.

The change in recruiting patterns imposed by the Colonial Office was visible by the years just prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Six of the eight administrative cadets sent out to the East African Protectorate in 1911-12 and all five of those sent out in 1913-17 had been to Oxford or Cambridge. The war led to a suspension of regular recruitment for five years; it was resumed in

1919-20. The Colonial Office's method of recruiting reached its full flowering in the two decades between the wars. The men entering the Kenya Administration between 1919 and 1939 showed a high degree of uniformity of social and educational background. The major change was in the educational credentials of administrative appointees: the limited data available on the family background of officers entering during this period indicates that they remained essentially of middle class origin.¹⁸ Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the particular social and political circumstances of the colony led to special efforts to recruit what one Secretary of State called "the type of public school man who can handle our Kenya politicians without any social or other inferiority complex..."¹⁹

Furse's success in getting the type of man desired for the Kenya Administration is reflected in the statistics on the educational background of the administrative cadets of the inter-war years. (See Table #5 and #6.) Data on 75 of the 183 entrants during this period indicates that 61 or some 81% attended English public schools. Another 7, or 9%, attended Scottish or Irish schools similar in ethos and organization to the public schools, while 3 (4%) were educated in the dominions. Only 4 men, representing a scant 5.3% of the total, attended grammar schools or other forms of state-aided secondary education. The data on 105 of the entrants who attended university indicates 79 or some 75% had been to Oxford or Cambridge and 16 or 15% to Scottish or Irish universities, while only 3 or 2.9% had been to either the University of London or one of the provincial 'redbrick' universities. Of the 78 officers who either did not attend university or about whom educational information was not available, more than 60 were ex-officers

TABLE #5

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF KENYA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

	Entered Service						Totals
	1890-1909	1910-1918	1919-1929	1930-1939	1940-1949	1950-1959	
Secondary Education							
Public Schools Total	12	18	28	33	57	17	164
Scottish or Irish	1	1	2	5	6	1	16
Grammar School	1	3	2	2	13	2	23
Tutored Privately	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other or etc.	0	0	1	2	8 (3 Kenya)	0	11
Sub-total	15	22	33	42	84	20	216
None	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	15	22	33	42	84	20	216
No Info	39	40	94	14	40	180	407
Total N	54	62	127	56	124	200	623

TABLE #6

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF KENYA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

	Entered Service						Totals
	1890-1909	1910-1918	1919-1929	1930-1939	1940-1949	1950-1959	
<u>University Education</u>							
Oxford	10	28	21	16	37	44	156
Cambridge	3	11	18	24	31	50	137
Oxbridge Total	13	39	39	40	68	94	293
London & Redbrick	0	0	1	2	4	15	22
Scottish and Irish	2	3	8	8	5	13	39
S. African and Other Commonwealth	0	0	0	1	1	5	7
Foreign	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
Military, technical and other non-university	4	0	6	0	6	1	17
Subtotal	22	42	54	51	84	129	382
None or no information	32	20	73	5	40	71	241
Total N	54	62	127	56	124	200	623

who were permitted to enter the service without university degrees to meet the pressing shortage of staff when recruitment was resumed immediately after the war. After a brief period of diversity the Kenya Administration became a body of men of highly uniform background and experience. Viewed in comparison with the British Home Civil Service during the same period, the Kenya Administration shows a markedly higher proportion of men who attended public schools, approximately the same proportion of graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, and noticeably lower proportions of graduates of state-aided secondary schools and of London or provincial universities.²⁰

The emphasis on recruiting men for the Kenya Administration with the proper public school and Oxbridge backgrounds widened the gap between the administration and technical departments. The latter showed a much greater diversity in the educational and, by reasonable inference, social class backgrounds of their British personnel. Beneath the Administration, the other departments arranged themselves along a ladder of social status and prestige. The highest rungs of this ladder were occupied by those departments whose officials had social and educational backgrounds similar to the Administration such as the Legal Department, the Audit Service, the Department of Agriculture, and the Medical Department. The Education Department contained numerous university graduates, but of very diverse origins. The status of the Police was ambiguous; while a large segment of European officers were drawn from the public schools, few if any had the final cachet of an Oxbridge degree. The bottom rungs of the ladder were occupied by departments such as Public Works, Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, and

the railroads, in which few officials had university degrees or had attended public schools, and some even lacked secondary education.²¹

A. "Dropped in at the Deep End": Training and Career Experience

The Colonial Office relied upon careful and selective recruitment to find the type of men it wanted for colonial administration, rather than upon socialization and training programs of its own creation. Few of the administrative cadets selected for Kenya and the other African colonies had any real knowledge of the Empire and its peoples. Their previous education, in line with the views that continued to dominate the public schools and the two ancient universities, concentrated heavily on the Classics, with scant reference to any subjects of practical or contemporary relevance.²²

The training provided by the Colonial Office for administrative cadets during the inter-war decades in year long courses at Oxford, Cambridge, and, later, the University of London bore little relationship to the reality of administration as it was practiced in the field. Administrative skills were not regarded as a subject that could be taught, but rather as innate capabilities developed by the public schools and universities and brought out through actual experience. Consequently, the Colonial Office authorities made little effort to promote the academic study of colonial administration and the training given to cadets focused on the basic nuts and bolts tools of the job. The program included instruction in law, keeping official accounts, surveying, and tropical medicine; as well as lectures on imperial history, a smattering of anthropology, and introductory language study. No systematic effort was made to indoctrinate the cadets in an official ideology or doctrine, for in fact there was none and, given the success

in recruiting men already committed to the vague ideals of imperialism, no felt need for it: At most, the cadets learned the current principles and phrases of official policy. The course appears to have had little impact on those who took it: when asked how they learned administration, none of the former members of the Kenya Administration interviewed felt it was an important factor in their experience.²³

The administrator learned his skills on the job without any real prior preparation. The phrase that recurs repeatedly in the accounts given of their experiences by former administrators is "thrown in at the deep end". Soon after a young cadet arrived in Kenya he was sent to his first field post at a district station in the bush. After a short period spent learning the office routine and reading the files, he was usually sent on safari with an interpreter and a few Tribal Police to collect tax and settle minor shauris (disputes) in some corner of the district. Within a few months of arriving, the cadet was expected to pass qualifying exams in law and Swahili and begin hearing cases as a lower-level magistrate. Both junior and senior officers agreed that this was the best, if not the only, way to turn a raw cadet into a seasoned District Officer:

I was in Embu and pushed out... after I was there for about a month - simply sent out to a sub-station and told to run it... I could still really understand very little of the language... I knew very little law, and frankly, didn't know much about the taxation system or accounting. But one simply learned because one had to you know.²⁴

Dropped into an utterly alien environment and expected from the start to work on their own, cadets depended heavily on the advice and criticisms of the more experienced officers in a district, espe-

cially the District Commissioner. They "received unobtrusive tuition from a wise D.C."²⁵ who assigned them tasks and then evaluated their performance. The effect of this dependence of junior officers upon the knowledge and experience of their immediate superiors was the creation of a series of unwritten principles of administration passed on from one administrative generation to another. Successful methods and patterns of action for dealing with various situations acquired the force of precedent and were generalized into a series of axioms that became the conventional wisdom of the Provincial Administration and guided field officers in the implementation of policy. Both policy and axioms became woven into the fabric of an organizational tradition that was rarely questioned. However much they varied in detail and personal style, the actions of administrators in the field possessed a basic stability and consistency derived not so much from explicit direction from above as from orally transmitted principles formulated out of the interaction of the values and experiences of the officers themselves.

The discretion of field officers was thus tempered by general adherence to established methods. This reliance upon an oral tradition subservient to the tried and true methods of the past led to a resistance to change and innovation in administrative practice, especially in dealing with Africans, that reinforced the conservative tendencies of the prefectural structure. "The major drawback of in-service training", Heussler notes, "was the static nature of government: it supported."²⁶ Furthermore, the essentially sui generis development of an organizational tradition by the serving officers permitted the Kenya Administration and the other Administrations of

the various colonies of British Africa to each acquire a distinctive style and flavor despite basic similarities of structure and personnel.

The career of administrator was marked by modest pay, limited chances for advancement, and, especially in the early days, difficult and often dangerous working conditions. Between 1895 and 1920 37 officers died in service, most from blackwater fever, although five were murdered and several were suspected suicides. The primitive conditions and loneliness of the remote bush stations were the causes to which the high attrition rate was attributed.²⁷ By the 1920's conditions had greatly improved, although junior officers were advised not to marry during their first two tours of duty. Older officers, however, were permitted to bring their families with them to all but the wildest and most remote stations in the Northern Frontier District.

Administrators were shifted frequently from district to district. This was especially true of junior District Officers who generally changed posts annually, if not more often. The higher authorities in the Administration attempted with only mixed success to keep D.C.'s in a district for a two to five year period. A chronic shortage of personnel resulting from the straitened fiscal position of the colony, combined with the ordinary provision that had to be made for sickness and regular home leave, made it difficult to achieve continuity in field postings. Some of the smaller and less important districts suffered chronically from frequent changes in administrative staff. The situation tended to discourage field officers from learning local vernaculars, and even provoked complaints from the Colonial Office that Kenya administrators could not stay in as close touch with the Africans as their counterparts in Tanganyika, Uganda,

and Nigeria.²⁸

Advancement through the ranks was slow and the number of senior positions available was small. (See Table #7) Most administrators rose no further than District Commissioner and served out their career in that rank. Those who failed to reach this position generally resigned or been discharged during their first five or eight years of service.²⁹ Only a few were promoted to Provincial Commissioner, the highest rank in the field administration, with a considerably higher salary and status, although no more real power, than the most senior D.C. If a man achieved this rank by his early activities, it was a possible stepping stone to greater things. For District P.C.s, however, it was a terminal appointment and they retired after an average term of four to six years.

For the man of ambition the path to high achievement lay not in the Provincial Administration but in the Secretariat. Almost all of the men who occupied senior Secretariat posts in the 1919-39 period entered the central administration early or mid-way through their careers and stayed on without returning to the field.³⁰ The higher echelons of the Secretariat served as spring boards for appointments to Chief Secretary or Governorships, the pinnacles of Colonial Service. These distinctions were relatively rare: less than thirty of the men who served in the Kenya Administration achieved these positions (and Kenya produced more Governors than any other British colony). The distinction between the ambitious climber and the man content to serve out his career in a district was another factor in the cleavage of outlook between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat.

TABLE #7

CAREER EXPERIENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

	1890-1909	1910-1918	1919-1929	1930-1939	1940-1949	1950-1959
No. entered service	454	62	127	56	124	200
Previous Service in other colony	13	4	6	5	22	20
Previous Service in other Dept.	14	6	6	0	8	16
Promoted to D.C.	53*	39	66	39	50	7
Promoted to P.C.	21	12	10	14	2	0
Secretariat Svs. (Jnr. post)	7	18	38	22	39 only	18 only
Secretariat Svs. (snr. post)	13 total	20 total	41 total	36 total	74 total	30 total
Secretariat Svs. (No field exp.)	8	7	15	22	9 only	3 only
Secretariat Svs. (No field exp.)	1	3	2	4	26 both	9 both
Svs. in Colonial Office	0	0	4	2	6	2
Subsequent Svs. in other colony	8	17	19	15	11	
Promoted to Governor or Chief Secretary	2	6	6	9	5	1

*Incomplete

As members of a common organization, field and Secretariat officers were formally interchangeable, and the field-center cleavage was sufficiently recognized for an effort to be made to rotate junior positions in Nairobi among as many administrators as possible in order to bridge the gap. This policy was only partially successful: information on 245 officers who served in the Administration between 1919 and 1939 indicates that only 78, or 32%, had experience in the central administration.³¹ Many field officers refused to go to the Secretariat and actively tried to avoid such appointments.

Finally, officers were also transferable from one colony to another, especially after the creation of a unified Colonial Administrative Service in 1932. However, such transfers were relatively infrequent and usually confined to senior positions. By the late 1930's they had begun to generate the hostility of local officials who felt that most if not all of the senior posts below the Chief Secretary should be reserved for them.³² This problem was any early indication of the pattern of development and the internal conflicts that would come to full flower after 1945.

II. Administrative Attitudes and Values: Patonism, the Organic Society and the Ruling Class.

Whatever the linkages in the metropole between capitalism and imperialism, the single most striking fact about the Kenya Administration is that the social and political values of largely middle class administrators were not those of bourgeois liberalism but of an aristocratic conservatism. The central core of their attitudes and values represented a notable example of what Barrington Moore has described as 'Patonism': an anti-rationalist, anti-urban, anti-materialist, and

anti-bourgeois response of the traditional landed ruling class to the development of modern industrial society.³³ Patonism found a remarkably congenial institutional setting in the prefectorial system of colonial administration. The structural and attitudinal characteristics of the Kenya Administration were thus mutually reinforcing, and the ideas characteristic of the British ruling class between roughly 1870 and 1914 were consequently preserved within the organization long after their influence had begun to wane in Britain. Indeed, colonial officials were increasingly dismayed and disheartened by the course of development of British society in the twentieth century.

A. The Lack of a Doctrine and the Rejection of Theory

The social and political beliefs of administrative officers in Kenya as well as the rest of the Empire were never contained within any explicit doctrine of colonialism or theory of colonial administration. They comprised instead a set of implicit, rarely articulated assumptions. This lack of a colonial doctrine was the result of two factors. The first was the consciously achieved uniformity of the attitudes and values of colonial officials both in the colony and the metropole. So widely held were these beliefs, they were rarely mentioned or argued over by administrators in the course of their work. As Philip Curtain has pointed out, in his study of European images of Africa, "the more cohesive the society, the less the need to bring these unstated assumptions into the open."³⁴ It was only after 1945, due to the greatly intensified attack on colonialism both in Britain and the international arena and to the declining influence of the Administration within the Kenya Government, that administrators felt

a need to express and defend their premises.

The second factor was an anti-rationalist suspicion of abstract thought; an extreme cultural nominalism that eschewed theories, doctrines, ideologies, and the products of abstract thought in general as having little value in the practical world of affairs. This attitude was vividly expressed in a book entitled The Public Schools and the Empire, published in 1913:

The fact is... we are as a people incapable of deductive reasoning, and impatient of general principles. We therefore lack, alike in our external and internal relations, the power of forecast... We abhor abstractions as pedantic; we pin our faith to the isolated facts immediately before our eyes; we disdain ideas; we thank God that, if we are a nation of shopkeepers, at least we are not, as other men are, 'a nation of ---- professors'.³⁵

This valuing of immediate experience involved a determination to treat problems individually as they arose, with a concentration on the 'hard facts' of the case and a tendency to neglect the possible relations between events treated in isolation. Colonial administrators regarded themselves as practical men of affairs and had little time and patience for abstract speculation. Thus one Provincial Commissioner asserted that "we should not allow ... the results of our work to be undermined by infiltration of the Political Theorists."³⁶

Along with the rejection of theory went a reluctance to look ahead or anticipate future developments beyond the problem at hand. Implicit in this lack of foresight was a sanguine acceptance of periodic crisis as almost a part of the normal course of events. Problems were dealt with only when they had assumed such magnitude that they could no longer be ignored and demanded immediate attention. This tendency toward a crisis orientation not only was consciously recognized, but also

was a matter of some pride as indicative of their ability to cope with any situation that might arise; to 'muddle through' as the proud phrase had it.³⁷ This attitude was tempered, and then with regard to short term rather than long term events, only in areas where a crisis might spill over the local arena and bring the intervention of higher authorities. Administrators acted to avoid 'embarrassing incidents' rather than anticipate distant long range developments. Structural and attitudinal factors thus combined to create an administrative style that was an almost classically pure example of disjointed incrementalism.³⁸

Nowhere was the suspicion of theory were strongly rooted than in the area of its application to administrative methods and organization. There was no theory of colonial administration and, as we have seen, the subject was conspicuously absent from the training course for colonial administrators. This hostility to the application of theory to their own bailiwick was typical not only of colonial administrators, but also of British civil servants in general. Wilkinson notes that the administrator "being brought up to lead ... found it difficult to view leadership as a science" and he "tended to shy away from academic studies of administrative technique."³⁹ Colonial officials rejected the use of analytic tools for anticipating necessary changes in administrative methods in response to changing internal or external circumstances. They vigorously resisted any suggestion that administration was a technical specialty subject to analysis and criticism in the same sense as engineering or agricultural science. This attitude promoted resistance to change and innovation and reinforced the tendency to rely upon traditionally established and sanctioned methods.

B. The Organic Society and the Ruling Class

The political development of Britain since the industrial revolution represents in a significant sense not so much the modernization of tradition as the traditionalization of the modern. The traditional ruling class of aristocracy and gentry inducted the sons of the rising bourgeoisie into their own vision of society and polity. The attitudes and values of the ruling class did not remain unchanged, but were shaped by the new conditions of society without losing the roots that went deep into Britain's pre-industrial past.

The primary element of the ruling class image of society was the concept of 'organic community'.⁴⁰ This involved the view that society was, or ideally should be, an organically integrated whole, each of whose constituent parts had a specific role to play in the total community. The various segments of society were hierarchically ordered according to differentials of wealth, status, and authority that corresponded to their proper role in society. Each individual had a particular role to play which imposed certain obligations on him, and if he failed to meet these obligations he "[rent] the social fabric and fail[ed] other people, who count[ed] on his performing his job."⁴¹ Implicit in this image was a rejection of any concept of society as a collection of competing or antagonistic individuals and groups. Harmony and order were the basic characteristics of the organic community.

In the public schools this image of society found expression in a constant emphasis on the value of the historic community, on the necessity of deference to hierarchy, and on the importance of the individual's identification with and loyalty to the community. The

schools:

posed tradition and historic institutions as time-tested oracles of wisdom. Against these the individual cut a puny figure. Only insofar as he contributed to the community and deferred to tradition did his actions carry meaning.⁴²

They thus worked to counter the individuality of middle class society and replace it with a sense of obligation to the traditions and needs of the collectivity, be it the school, an organization like the Kenya Administration, or the nation.

The harmony of the organic community was guarded and preserved by strong and stable institutions and by the activities of the ruling class. The class and the institutions were viewed as inseparable; one implied the necessary existence of the other.⁴³ The role of the ruling or 'political' class was to rule in behalf of all of the other elements of society and ensure the realization of the common interest. This was its unique function for which its members were prepared from birth. It was the task of the public schools to mould boys for their place in the ruling class and they engendered in their students not only a relaxed habit of authority, but also a firm belief in their fitness to rule.⁴⁴ This ability to rule was viewed as a supremely British quality: as late as 1950 the Chief Native Commissioner in Kenya could refer with pride to the British "genius for government."⁴⁵

If membership in the ruling class conferred great power, it was also felt to involve great obligations. The belief in the reciprocity of rights and duties and in the reciprocal obligations of ruler and ruled represented the essential elements of the traditional aristocratic concept of authority that survived through the social transformations of the modern era.⁴⁶ In return for the deferential loyalty

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and obedience of the ruled, the ruler was expected to protect and promote their physical and spiritual well-being. Paternalism, the tradition of noblesse oblige, was thus an intrinsic element of the concept of the ruling class and one that carried with it the force of a moral duty to the community. This element of obligation lay behind the ethos of 'public service' held by administrators, i.e. the belief that political participation should take the form of voluntary and essentially disinterested service on behalf of the common good.

These beliefs about the nature of the organic community and the role of the ruling class exercised a profound influence on the self-image of the colonial administrator. They firmly believed that the existence of an integrated community depended upon their performance of their duty to govern. The administrator's job, according to one former official, was to look after the 'have nots' and ensure that they received a fair deal; while another, reflecting on the imperial experience, asserted that "without bureaucracy there can be no social justice."⁴⁷ Administrators were strongly committed to the achievement and preservation of 'equity' and 'justice' in society, but as interpreted by the ruling class rather than according to the selfish and conflicting claims of various individuals and groups. They sought distinction in public service rather than in the pursuit of individual achievement through business or the professions. The desire to do one's duty through public service was a pervasive motive attracting young men to a career in colonial administration.⁴⁸

Another crucial influence on the Administration, both in terms of its internal esprit de corps and its behavior toward those it ruled, was the cult of 'games' found in the public schools and the ancient

universities. The valuing of athletics as much or even more than intellectual training derived from a belief in its efficacy in building desirable traits of character. The team image had a powerful influence on administrators' conception of their organization. The Warren Fisher Committee on the Colonial Service listed the qualities desired in an administrative officer as "vision, high ideals of service, fearless devotion to duty born of a sense of responsibility and, above all, the team spirit."⁴⁹

This feeling of being a team found expression, particularly in the Provincial Administration, in an intense feeling of fellowship and sense of solidarity born of the sharing of common experiences, beliefs and problems. One administrator noted that "the D.C.s... thought of themselves as a brotherhood,"⁵⁰ As a result of this sense of brotherhood, the Administration made strong demands upon the loyalty of individual officers. Those who could not or would not meet the standards of the organization were denigrated as having 'let the side down'. The values of administrators, especially those of team solidarity and the subordination of the individual to the group and its traditions, thus permitted superior officers a degree of normative control over their subordinates that made up to some degree for the lack of institutional controls. However, the face of organizational authority was softened and a degree of deference to the administrative hierarchy was made easier by the common background and beliefs of administrators, which gave to their relations the relaxed ease characteristic of interaction among social equals, as the use of the team image suggests.

The strong sense of solidarity in the Administration also led to a great concern for its public image and prestige. The Administra-

tion was both hostile to outside criticism and sensitive about the sort of 'embarrassing incidents' that would provoke such criticism and the possible intervention of the metropolitan authorities. The desire to save face led to efforts to publicly protect both the organization and individual officers, even while those involved might privately be subject to disciplinary measures.

These basic administrative attitudes were also attached to an elaborate code of etiquette and ritual. The members of the ruling class were gentlemen, and in the gentlemanly ideal a self-assured air of command was combined with social poise and good manners. Such was the force of these beliefs that a Provincial Commissioner could write that "good manners are really the basis of good race relations."⁵¹ The unwritten code of manners prescribed the proper relations with superiors, equals and subordinates. In addition, all of the major events of social and political life were surrounded by elaborate ceremonial. What Bagehot described as the 'dignified' aspect of government played a large and conspicuous role in the life of the Administration. The Kenya Archives contain more than five hundred separate files under the general heading of ceremonial that prescribe everything from the proper form and occasion for dress uniforms, to the ceremonial order of precedence of various ranks of officials, and to the lists of those entitled to official Christmas cards.

C: Evolutionary Change and the Rejection of Conflict and Politics

Correlated with the image of society as an organic community was a "belief in the natural organic growth of human institutions, including the institutions appropriate to government."⁵² The institu-

tions of society were not consciously or quickly created, but emerged through a long and gradual process of evolution. Historic institutions expressed in an almost mystical way, beyond any rational explanation, the essential genius of a people. This essentially Burkean image of change provided an explanation of the British 'genius' in the supposedly slow, stable, and peaceful evolution of the nation's historic institutions.

All human societies were believed to be involved in a process of evolution from savagery to 'civilization', although this process proceeded at different rates in different societies and at different periods in time. At any moment in history one society stood out as the standard bearer of civilization and its institutions represented the highest stage of human development then achieved. It was the confident assumption of the British ruling class that Britain held this position in the modern world, in the same way as the Romans had in their era, and it was on the basis of this preeminence that they assumed the duty of ruling over people lower down on the evolutionary ladder and guiding their ascent. The process of evolution was necessarily a long and gradual one; a 'natural' growth process suited to the maintenance of an organic community over time. Where change was too rapid it served as a source of conflict that disrupted or even destroyed the fabric of society. It was the role of the ruling class to guide society through the process of change in a way that preserved its vital harmony and stability.

The concept of government that emerged from the attitudes and values of administrative officers was a limited and passive one. Wilkinson describes it as "an outlook which saw the ruler as guardian

rather than innovator."⁵³ The primary role of the ruling class was to provide the conditions for the harmony and stability of the organic community. The fundamental means for the achievement of these ends was the maintenance of law and order. For the colonial administrator this was the indispensable condition of efficient administration: "A cardinal point about the whole of the colonial administrative concept was that you could do nothing unless you had law and order."⁵⁴ This guardian mentality was therefore congruent with and reinforced the structural factors that emphasized the Provincial Administration's primary prefectorial commitment of control. The concept of government was ameliorative in the sense that where the ruler intervened it was to right wrongs or eliminate possible sources of disruption rather than to directly introduce change. There was no preconceived theory or plan for shaping of the process of social evolution, but rather a determination to maintain social unity and continuity through piecemeal adjustments to social change deriving from other sources. Government acted to eliminate aberrations and ensure that change was a 'natural and organic' process.

Such concepts of change and government left little room, for social conflict and generated an abiding dislike of openly expressed conflict and hostility that was an intrinsic part of the values of the British ruling class. Conflict was viewed as inherently disruptive of the harmony of the organic community and it was therefore the duty of the ruling class to remove such sources of divisiveness. This was reflected in the emphasis upon good manners and courtesy which served to blunt public expressions of hostility and disagreement. Conflict within the ruling class was also muted by ties of friendship and

family and common experiences of public school and university that cut across divergences over issues of public principle and policy.⁵⁵ The effect of this antipathy to conflict by the Administration was to strongly reinforce the tendencies to deny the existence of conflict that are inherent in formal organizations. This was associated with an emphasis on public consensus in order to conceal "conflict from the public eye by wrapping it in the mists of official harmony"⁵⁶ and with a tendency to view conflict as the result of the clash of personalities. This veiling of conflict also reinforced the tendencies toward secretiveness and hostility to criticism.

Where open conflict erupted either within or outside the organization the Administration desired it to take the highly-stylized and not-quite-serious form of a game. If a conflict could be ritualized and surrounded by ceremonial that symbolized underlying unity, its most threatening aspects would be eliminated. Thus, one senior administrator, when asked about the clashes between the Administration and the European settlers during the 1920' and 30's, responded with the following account:

Just at the end of the twenties, when relations were very bad between officials and settlers, the then Governor as a deliberate act of policy started a series of cricket matches which became the Settlers vs. Officials Cricket Matches, the great event of the year.... It was always fought with great bitterness... On the last night both teams invariably dined at the favorite club, where we had this tremendous party.⁵⁷

The dislike of conflict also found expression in an aversion to politics. To the officers of the Administration 'politics' meant the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest through noisy partisan conflict that ignored the general interest of the community. 'Politics'

was something to be avoided because it set men against each other and rent the fabric of society. This attitude was vividly reflected in the remarks of Kenya's Chief Native Commissioner during the tense days in 1952 immediately preceding the Emergency:

...we are all inclined...to catch the typical Kenya disease of politics and repeatedly get ourselves completely lost in the forest of politics to the extent of not being able to see or at least recognize the nature of the trees that make up much of the forest.⁵⁸

For administrators the function of the ruling class lay in the realm of 'government' rather than 'politics', and the essence of 'government' was administration. A number of officers summed up the spirit of the Administration by referring to the couplet from Pope's Essay on Man quoted at the beginning of this study. Administrative officers tended to regard themselves as above 'politics' and untainted by partisan interests. The ruling class governed in the interests of society as a whole, and not in the interests of its members or any other individual or group. This attitude was intrinsic to the idea of public service, and, as Chapman points out, is characteristic of countries with a tradition of paternalistic government by a stable ruling class.⁵⁹ In describing their work administrators tend to emphasize that they were "completely neutral" and worked in "an entirely disinterested fashion".⁶⁰ The position taken by the administration was assumed to be non-partisan and in the best interests of all. This image of disinterested benevolence was also expressed in formal prohibitions on the participation of civil servants in politics and in the concepts of 'fairplay' and 'sportsmanship' which were supposed to guide the administrator. As a potential source of disruption, politics

was something to be controlled and limited.

If little has been said thus far about the more widely acknowledged British values of democracy and representative government, it is because there is little evidence to suggest that they occupied any significant place in the minds of most colonial administrators. The authoritarian values dominant in the Administration were fundamentally antithetic to concepts of democracy as either the right of all members of society to some form of participation in the formulation of public policy, or the provision of an arena in which conflicts could be resolved between competing and mutually antagonistic interests. As Michael Lee points out, "colonial government... encouraged its main participants to describe political responsibility in terms which emphasized the approval of the governors rather than the consent of the governed."⁶¹ To the colonial administrator democracy meant, if anything, the tacit acceptance of a degree of debate, negotiation, and bargaining over public policy within the ruling class. They were, as a result, markedly hostile to any criticism of their actions emanating from their subjects: "I think anyone who stood up and opposed Government policy was naturally suspect by the usual run of administrators."⁶² The goal of eventual self-government for colonial peoples so often announced by the statesman in London also appears to have had little impact on the thinking of the men on the spot. Either they felt that the presence of white settlers rendered the goal inoperative in Kenya, or they regarded it as referring to so distant a future that it was of no moment for their day-to-day administrative concerns.⁶³

D. The Distrust of Individualism

In the early days of British rule in Kenya the Administra-

tion viewed the process of social evolution through lenses colored by the self-confident Victorian mystique of progress. Britain stood at the zenith of her power and it was easy to equate the ultimate development of civilization with the emergence of an industrial society based on individualistic striving. For the early administrators, untutored in the aristocratic world view, individualism represented the driving force of progress and the highest stage of social development. In 1917 John Ainsworth, one of the most noted of the early generation of administrators, told the members of the Economic Commission meeting in Nairobi that the progress of the African must come from the growth of individualism and "the old tenets, superstitions and traditions will have to disappear and in place thereof there must evolve a black with individualistic ideals."⁶⁴

Ainsworth and his colleagues were, however, replaced by men for whom economic and social individualism was tainted with socially irresponsible selfishness. As the bearers of an essentially aristocratic tradition and culture they were ambivalent about the purported virtues of modern industrial society whose development was marked by much of the kind of disruptive conflict they believed should be avoided or eliminated. As men of basically 'country interests' whose ideal community was a romanticized vision of the English country town or village,⁶⁵ they disliked the process of urbanization that accompanied the growth of industrial society and saw in the city the sources of social decay and disruption. Moreover, the social and political character of modern society appeared increasingly anti-thetic to the type of traditional authority and social elitism that they represented. As Western society was shaken by the turbulent

convulsions of the twentieth century, the easy self-confident belief in the intrinsic superiority of Western 'civilization' was replaced with growing doubt and uncertainty. The greater the evident collapse of social harmony and the loss of community in Britain itself, the greater was the desire of colonial administrators to preserve the supposed organic unity of African traditional society. By 1945, in a memorandum on native land tenure policy, two administrative officers, H.E. Lambert and P. Wyn-Harris, bemoaned the "unrestricted growth of non-co-operative irresponsible individualism among African farmers" and suggested ways of combating it.⁶⁶

The attitudes and values of colonial administrators thus led them to an increasing ambivalence about the character assumed by their own society in the course of the first half of this century. This was reflected in a corresponding ambivalence about the character and worth of the African societies over whom they ruled.

III. The Images of the African and His Society

The attitudes of colonial administrators towards Africans and towards traditional African tribal society were in large part derived from the paternalistic authoritarianism and assumptions about social evolution intrinsic to the general socio-political attitudes we have already discussed. It is from these attitudes that administrative officers derived the sense of social, cultural, intellectual and technological superiority that was the fundamental justification for imperial rule. This sense of racial superiority did not necessarily imply a belief in racially defined differences in intelligence or capability, although such beliefs were probably common among the

European settlers in Kenya. Administrators tended to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude toward such theories. Charles Hobley wrote in 1929 that "the wish may be father to the thought, and we must beware of hasty deductions from observation over a limited period."⁶⁷ The success of the African in achieving a higher level of civilization under the guidance of the Administration was viewed as an empirical test of the African's capabilities. In a very real sense, then, colonialism was seen revealing the African's fitness to survive on his own in the modern world.

Administrators assumed that this process of transformation would take a very long time. Before the Second World War administrators measured the necessary duration of colonial rule in centuries rather than years or even decades. It was common to compare the African's position on the ladder of evolution to that of the ancient Britons before their colonization by the Romans and to reason that if it took Britain almost 1,700 years to reach its current level of civilization, Africans could not be expected to achieve civilization in less than several centuries, even with the most careful guidance.⁶⁸ Before 1939 the whole colonial enterprise was buttressed by the assumption that time was a virtually unlimited resource. The resulting lack of felt time pressure relieved the Administration of any sense of urgency in working out the future path of development of traditional tribal society and its relationship with the immigrant communities. With so much time thought to be available, it was felt that pragmatic solutions could be found piecemeal as particular issues arose. Moreover, the sense of unlimited time permitted administrators to defer difficult policy decisions and push them forward in time to where

they could be the concerns of future generations of officials.

One of the fundamental issues of colonial policy for both metropolitan officials, politicians, and scholars and the administrators in the field was whether African customs and the basic fabric of tribal society should be preserved, and the African permitted to 'develop on his own lines'; or whether African life should be totally transformed by the introduction of Western values and institutions in the place of traditional society and culture. This debate reflected the deeply rooted dichotomy in European images of non-Western tribal peoples between the noble savage and the depraved, ignorant, and superstition-ridden savage.⁶⁹ The issue was never clearly resolved. The direction in which Kenya officials tended to turn at any moment depended in part on the corresponding image they held of their own society. The more favorable that image, the more they contemplated the demise of tribal society; while the more unfavorable it was, the more readily they tended to see aspects of tribal society as worthy of preservation and protection.

Consonant with the buoyant optimism of the high tide of imperialism, the early administrators in Kenya tended to deny to African culture any achievements of value or worthy of preservation. The tribes of Kenya, most of whom lacked centralized political institutions or even clearly differentiated political roles, were regarded as occupying one of the lowest rungs of the ladder of social evolution and were subject to particularly harsh judgment. Sir Charles Eliot, Commissioner of the East African Protectorate from 1900 to 1904, wrote that "we are not destroying any old or interesting system, but simply introducing order into blank, uninteresting, brutal barbarism."⁷⁰ This low estimation of traditional tribal society was charac-

teristic of an important strain of opinion in both Kenya and the metropole and persisted to some degree throughout the history of British rule. Some fifty years later Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya from 1944 to 1952, wrote of the history of East Africa:

... the startling thing is that when you go into the matter a little more deeply, 30,000 years ago turns out to be not the beginning but the end; for between the stone implements and Doctor Livingston there is nothing, except a little gradual change. Nothing at all of African Africa; not a ruin, nor a tomb, nor an inscription; indeed, not even a legend supporting anything resembling tribal history for more than a few generations.⁷¹

This attitude was accompanied by a complacent assumption of the inevitable collapse of tribal society in the face of a vastly superior European civilization. Colonial rule meant the destruction of traditional African society in the course of guiding the African on the path to social advancement. In 1904, in the midst of a series of delicate negotiations to move the Masai from their traditional grazing lands in order to make room for European settlers, Eliot wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Lansdowne, that:

... we should face the undoubted issue - viz., that white mates black in very few moves... there can be no doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go under. It is a prospect that I view with equanimity and a clear conscience.⁷²

The contrary tradition of the noble savage, uncorrupted by the development of civilization, found expression in the marked preference of British administrators for the fierce warriors of the pastoral nomadic tribes, who arrogantly resisted the introduction of European ways, over the less aggressive agricultural tribes, who were more receptive to European methods and values. In Kenya this meant a prefer-

ence for the conservative Masai, Samburu, or Somali over the Kikuyu. The Masai, more than any other tribe, were the subject of this process of romanticization. In fact, particular care was taken not to let field officers stay too long in the Masai districts lest they contract what was popularly known as 'masai-itis' and turn into representatives of the tribe rather than agents of the Administration.⁷³

Even more important was an increasing tendency for the Administration to view traditional society as worthy of preservation, at least in part, and regard with unease the inevitable destruction that earlier officials like Eliot accepted so calmly. This sentiment was correlated with administrator's growing disenchantment with the development of Western civilization and what they viewed as the loss of community and the divergence from the organic ideal in British society in particular. Sir Philip Mitchell, despite his dismal judgment of African society, could write in the preface to a book by one of his administrative officers:

And what agreeable people these simple folk are, how like a breath of fresh clean air, in contrast to the fetid wickedness of western civilization gone putrid in the hands of wicked men.⁷⁴

Administrators increasingly tended to see traditional society as the organic community they wished to preserve. Ainsworth observed in 1917 that the African's "social existence is practically governed entirely by communalistic ideas and sanctions."⁷⁵ While he assumed that these would eventually be replaced, for his successors in the Administration, less convinced of the value of social individualism, they represented the very essence of the organic community and their preservation became an end in itself. Tribal society became the

necessary focal point of the desired 'natural' process of social evolution and the African had to be protected against social change that would result in its destruction.

This desire to preserve tribal society was also founded on more pragmatic motives. While the pioneer administrators had been involved in a process of conquest in which the resistance to British dominance had to be crushed, their successors in the inter-war era were faced with the very different task of maintaining stable administration within the established Pax Britannica. The more that the Provincial Administration became concerned about the destructive consequences of social change, the more the desire to preserve tribal society as an end in itself was combined with a belief that its preservation was instrumental to the maintenance of political control. Lacking both the policy and resources for developing new socio-economic and political institutions, the thinly spread administrative staff in the districts could not hope to maintain effective control if tribal institutions failed to provide the basic framework of social order.

The disenchantment with modern industrial society and concern with the maintenance of control found frequent expression in the Western-educated African, or, as he was more commonly referred to, the 'detrribalized native'. For the Administration the real African was the man still living an essentially traditional life within the context of tribal institutions, 'the man in the blanket', who comprised the overwhelming majority of his charges. The educated African who lived outside of tribal institutions and detached from the restraints of traditional controls was to the colonial administrator an

unnatural being, no longer really African but certainly not European, who challenged their whole conception of an orderly social universe in which each individual had his proper place. The 'detrribalized native' with his few years of mission education, his rejection of tribal institutions, his dislike of heavy manual labor and desire for European-style employment (often enough as a Government clerk), his often misperceived and caricatured efforts to imitate European life-styles and values, and his willingness to challenge the cardinal assumption of European superiority represented a potential source of social disruption and a challenge to the 'natural' process of gradual evolution sought by the Administration. Moreover, as Lonsdale points out, detribalization raised the spectre of the "headless multitude" and the "concern to preserve the tribe turned into something near alarm when it later appeared that the alternative might be a xenophobic pan-Africanism rather than the leaderless mob."⁷⁶

Through all of this the individual African emerged as the artless innocent, the victim of both the negative aspects of his own culture and the destructive changes brought by contact with the modern world. In the mid-1950's Mitchell could write:

...it was, and is to this day, a picture of simple, ignorant, witch- and magic-ridden people at the mercy of many enemies... beginning to grope at long last towards escape from behind the Iron Curtain of the black ages of ignorance and terror. A people helpless by themselves, spiritually hungry, hungry perhaps for hope more than anything; technically and educationally almost wholly incompetent for the world into which they were brought with such a sudden, even violent, manner; economically, totally dependent on new enterprises begun for the first time under the colonial Governments...⁷⁷

If African culture and society represented in a sense the childhood of human evolution, then the African himself had many of the qualities of a child. In this image of grown up childishness, irresponsibility, and unpredictability the paternalism of the administrator found concrete expression.⁷⁸

The colonial administrator's self-image rested upon the assumption of the utter incompetence of the African in dealing with both the evils of his own society and with the disruptive influences of Western civilization, and his consequent dependence upon the strength and benevolence of the Administration. The administrator firmly believed in his ability to identify and act in the 'best interests' of the Africans far better than they could themselves and, hence, protect them against the weaknesses of their own natures. This notion of protecting the African against himself was widely diffused throughout the whole apparatus of colonial government in Kenya. For example, African representation on the Legislative Council during the inter-war decades was based on the premise that:

two Europeans were nominated to represent native interests; not native desires, but native interests which by interpretation were very different from native wishes.⁷⁹

Those nominated to hold the 'African' seats on the Legislative Councils were usually retired administrative officers or missionaries.

Although they had a general abhorrence of conflict, administrators showed a much more sanguine acceptance of the utility and occasional necessity of official force. It was widely accepted that the savage-child African would occasionally misbehave and have to be punished. The belief that harsh discipline, physical punishment, and a degree of suffering were essential for education was a part of the

public school experience shared by most administrative officers, and they carried with them a belief in the value of discipline and the efficacy of compulsion. On an individual level, corporal punishment in the form of flogging was an integral part of the penal code for Africans. Moreover, the almost casual slap, shove, or kick for the sluggish or insubordinate was a not uncommon, if never officially condoned, aspect of the behavior of administrators in the field. One D.C. even toured his district with a bundle of bamboo canes for meting out immediate punishment to minor offenders.⁸⁰

On the more significant level of the use of collective force, administrators accepted that Africans would both resist the imposition of and, occasionally, the continuance of colonial rule and that force would be necessary to subdue them. Hobley viewed such conflicts as inevitable "before the lower race fully accepts the dictum of the ruling power", while Meinertzhagen, who participated in several of the punitive expeditions during the initial conquest of Kenya, saw force as justified because "it will teach a lesson and result in a more enduring peace than less violent measures."⁸¹ Moreover, since the Administration's view of the Africans' best interests did not always correspond with their desires, it was felt that compulsion would occasionally be necessary to get them to accept what was good for them. Even an administrator of the post-1945 period reported that sporadic violence was "regarded as part and parcel of life in Africa."⁸² Furthermore, given the limited physical force actually at their disposal,⁸³ administrators tended to react harshly to the first sign of disobedience.

IV. Information Processes: Sources of a Biased Perception of Reality

The attitudes and values of administrative officers, the sources of information on which they relied, the coercive power at their disposal and their ability to employ it in relatively routine fashion, and the linguistic medium of communication all introduced systematic biases into the information about African societies they sought and employed.

The attitudes and values of administrators were of greatest importance in shaping the collection and interpretation of information about the basic characteristics of traditional institutions and contemporary processes of change within tribal society. The belief that tribal society was the natural arena of African life and the necessary locus of processes of change, led to a preoccupation with information on conditions in the tribal reserves. This interest in the 'real' African of the rural areas, as opposed to the detribalized African of the towns, was correlated with the concentration of the vast majority of field postings in the African districts rather than in the towns or settled areas. The handful of administrative officers posted in the towns and settled districts were preoccupied with matters relating to the immigrant communities and had little contact with the Africans working in the towns or on European farms. There was a Municipal African Affairs Officer in Nairobi, but he was officially on secondment to the settler-dominated Nairobi City Council and held only an advisory position. One incumbent of this position emphasized how different the job was from the ordinary work of the Administration:

... it was a foretaste of things to come
which most administrative officers never

came up against. I was in contact with Africans who were remote from tribal control, remote from the values which the Administration had worked on, remote from the methods which the Administration customarily used.⁸⁴

The fact that the Administration's power and responsibility were significantly circumscribed in the towns and settled districts by the increasing scope of local government accorded to the immigrant communities resulted in low priority being ascribed to the posting of officers to these areas and the positions often suffered heavily from a rapid turnover of personnel. For example, in a period of 18 months in 1938-39 Mombasa had no less than 13 different District Officers, seven of them in the first six months of 1939 alone. This extreme lack of continuity not only hampered administrative efficiency, but also prevented any systematic compilation of information by locally knowledgeable and experienced officers. As a result, the investigating commission appointed to examine the circumstances of the first major strike of African workers in Kenya among the Mombasa dock workers in 1939 complained that it had "no facts, figures or statistics" to guide its inquiries, and went on to identify the Administration's lack of contact with the Africans in Mombasa as a precipitating factor in the strike.⁸⁵ A few months later a member of the Legislative Council, who had served on the strike commission, noted in a memorandum to the Governor:

I was impressed by the fact that it was quite impossible to obtain accurate data concerning social conditions in towns, and our deliberations were much handicapped by this. It seemed to be no one's business, apart from the amateur efforts of one or two enthusiastic missionaries, to study these vital problems.⁸⁶

The information collected by the Provincial Administration thus had an overwhelmingly rural bias toward conditions in the African reserves, and the Administration as a whole tended to be ignorant of the social conditions among Africans living in the towns and settled districts outside of the tribal areas and to underestimate the extent of social change in urban areas.

With regard to the African districts on which they focused most of their attention, the information collected by field administrators suffered from a lack of systematic and detailed knowledge of the traditional cultures and social institutions. While several administrators were talented amateur anthropologists, the Administration never promoted or sponsored the systematic study of the various peoples over whom it ruled. Knowledge about traditional tribal society depended upon the scattered and generally untrained efforts of interested field officers, missionaries, and even local settlers. Moreover, no attempt was made to disseminate the available published sources to the field officers. What a District Commissioner knew about the people in his district depended on his own efforts and what he could extract from material scattered through district records. The knowledge of administrators varied widely and this permitted the emergence of a few local experts on the affairs of particular tribes who exerted a heavy influence on policy relating to 'their' people. The frequent shifting of administrators from one district to another also inhibited learning about the traditional societies, since officers would be unwilling to invest the time in acquiring information that might not be of any use in another tribal area. In 1949 Professor Isaac Schapera of the London School of Economics conducted a survey on behalf of the Colonial Office

and the Kenya Government on the extent and quality of the anthropological research on the tribes of the colony and concluded that "the information available even about the peoples that have been most fully described cannot be considered adequate by modern standards, and the need for further research is great."⁸⁷

Even with regard to subjects in which official efforts were made to collect information, the results were colored by the beliefs and values of administrators. Two examples, both of which had crucial consequences for the course of Kenyan politics, were the question of traditional land tenure patterns among the Kikuyu and the problem of the size and rate of growth of the African population.

Few issues in the history of Kenya aroused as much controversy as the question of whether the Kikuyu tribe possessed a system of communal land tenure or one that recognized some degree of individual tenure. In the face of Kikuyu grievances over the loss of land to European settlers, the question was of critical importance for the determination of whether land owned in some sense by Kikuyu had been given deliberately or mistakenly to Europeans during the early days of settlement, what sort of rights were exercised over this land by individuals and families, and whether compensation should be given directly to those who claimed the loss of their holdings or to the tribe as a whole. Sorrenson has shown that the attitudes of administrators, especially their view of the evolutionary development of land tenure systems from tribal communalism to modern individualism and their desire to restrict the development of the latter and thereby protect the African from further loss of land to Europeans by the sale of individual titles, led them to reject and misinterpret informa-

tion collected about the Kikuyu githaka system of individual or family farms. Furthermore, their perception of the political difficulties of reversing earlier grants of land to European settlers led them to favor collective compensation for the tribe, which left the individual grievances unresolved to fester as a source of continuing conflict.⁸⁸

The Administration did not possess any reasonably accurate idea of the total number of Africans living in Kenya or of the growth rate of this population until the first post-war census of 1948. Before that date, the Administration relied upon impressionistic estimates by the District Commissioners, using crude and haphazard methods, and made little use of the meager professional statistical services available in the colony.⁸⁹ Relying on its own efforts and eschewing the aid of technical specialists, the Administration grievously underestimated both the total African population and its growth rate. Backward projections from the relatively accurate censuses of 1948 and 1962 indicate that official estimates of the 1921-1939 period were in error by as much as 35 percent.⁹⁰ The growth rate of the African population was largely a matter of conjecture, although the prevailing impression among administrators seems to have been that the population was basically static or growing at a very slow rate. This too was a gross underestimate and it was not until shortly before the Second World War that government officials became conscious of rapid population growth among several of the agricultural tribes.⁹¹ The political implications of these figures resulted from the fact that they were used as the basis for administrative estimates of the current and future land requirements of the various tribes and establishment of the bound-

aries of the tribal reserves within the African districts.

The one category of information carefully and continuously surveyed by field administrators was that of political conditions in the districts. This material was collected not so much to ascertain local African opinion and reactions to government policy or to be correlated with information about traditional society and patterns of social change, as to identify possible sources of unrest or subversion that should be dealt with by administrative action.⁹² Information on current socio-economic conditions tended to be forced into a category of secondary importance, especially since there was no general development policy that made the possession of such information a matter of importance to field officers or to the higher authorities in Nairobi.

Where field administrators attempted to keep track of local opinion and gauge African reaction to government policies, the information was biased by the nature of the sources on which they tended to rely. The manner of collecting such material was essentially ad hoc and the principle sources were the African employees of the Administration itself. In 1940 the C.N.C. told the new Chief Secretary:

You asked me what system the Administration had of intelligence in their districts. The answer of course must be 'no system' ... The Chief, the tribal police, and above all, the interpreter are the chief sources of information.⁹³

This basic reliance on the official chiefs, headmen, interpreters, and tribal police was confirmed repeatedly in interviews with former District Commissioners.⁹⁴ The difficulty was that in almost all the tribes in Kenya these roles were filled by appointment by the Administration and the incumbents lacked traditional sanction for their posi-

tions. They were thus the creatures of the colonial government and were utterly dependent upon the good will and favorable judgment of the Provincial Administration for their authority and continuity in office. As a result, these African agents of the Administration tended to supply information in a form that they thought administrators wanted to hear and that would create a favorable image of their own loyalty and efficiency. The distortion involved took two basic forms. First, the chiefs, headmen, and interpreters tended to exaggerate the extent of local approval of and enthusiasm for government policies; and second, they tended to ascribe any expressions of disapproval or discontent to the work of a tiny minority of agitators or malcontents. Many chiefs and interpreters were also not above pinning the label of agitator on their political opponents and using their relationship with the D.C. in the pursuit of their own personal vendettas or in one of the myriad of disputes and factional conflicts that marked local tribal politics.

If they were posted in a district for a period of a year or more, most field administrators were able to develop informal local contacts. These were usually with European missionaries working in the area, an obvious and frequently exploited source of information, and, in accordance with the elitist bias of administrators, with the local African 'notables' whom they assumed were the leaders of local 'public opinion'. The latter generally included those traditional elders who continued to exercise some influence, successful and wealthy farmers, the mission school teacher, and the rare African shopkeeper.⁹⁵ These sources too were biased as the individuals involved were unrepresentative of the great mass of subsistence cultivators or herdsmen

and their positions depended at least indirectly on the existence of the colonial regime.

Administrative officers tended to judge the value of information by the demonstrated loyalty of its source. They sought a positive reflection of themselves which they found among those Africans willing to provide such a favorable image in exchange for the opportunities for the satisfaction of personal ambition the Administration provided. The fact is that administrators did not want to listen to the opinions of Africans they believed to be ignorant and incompetent, especially when such opinions conflicted with their own views and official policy. Least of all was the Administration willing to listen to African complaints about the behavior of individual officers. As one former D.C. noted, "if the officer had the confidence of the Provincial Commissioner, was working in line with the political policy of the area...the Provincial Commissioner would not worry very much what the Africans said."⁹⁶

The coercive powers possessed by the field administrators permitted them to deal with such expressions of dissent in a routine manner without having to call them to the attention of the central Administration in Nairobi. The D.C. in his combined role of local policeman, judge, and jury had the power to levy fines and issue short prison sentences for refusal to comply with official policy instructions or local orders issued by himself or the appointed chiefs. He also had the power to control all public meetings in the district and to regulate the activities of local associations. He could deal with more persistent opposition by arranging for the deportation of recalcitrant individuals to remote parts of the colony and for the banning

of 'subversive' associations, and could back these sanctions with the threat and actual use of armed force through his own Tribal Police, the regular Kenya Police, or, ultimately, the units of the King's African Rifles stationed in Kenya. Insofar as these sanctions were effective in suppressing expressions of discontent and compelling compliance with government policy, the Administration was relieved of any necessity to take account of African reactions and could frame policy on the basis of its own perceptions of African interests. This point was clearly made by a former Secretary of State who noted that "when you are so dominant you don't have to worry."⁹⁷ The actual application, as opposed to the threat of force was not considered a normal part of routine administration. However, while it required investigation, every resort to force was not regarded as a crisis, and the Administration elaborated a series of explicit action programs for field officers to render its use more controllable and predictable in its consequences.⁹⁸ The hallmark of the skilled District Commissioner was knowing how far he could use compulsion on the local populace without arousing active resistance. This is what was meant in practice by 'feeling the pulse of the local community'.

A fourth source of bias in the information collected by the Administration were the linguistic difficulties occasioned by the use of Swahili as the medium of communication between the government and Africans. This was supported by policy decisions which specified Swahili rather than English as the language of African primary education.⁹⁹ At first glance this use of a single lingua franca throughout the colony would seem to have been a convenience that facilitated communication. In fact, it severely limited communication between the

Administration and their African subjects. Except for a small number of native speakers on the coast, Swahili was just as much a second language for the vast majority of Africans as it was for British officials. One official stated emphatically that "Swahili was no means of communication, not really, because both sides learned it and neither of them spoke it really well."¹⁰⁰ In such circumstances the possibilities for misinterpretation and confusion on both sides were considerable. It proved so difficult to translate the laws of the colony into an unambiguous Swahili version that they were only printed in English and it was left up to the field officers to explain them as best they could to the people of their districts.¹⁰¹

Most Africans in the reserves did not speak Swahili and administrators relied upon Swahili-speaking interpreters to translate their remarks into the local vernaculars. There was thus a two-step translation process between the orders and instructions composed by the D.C. in English and what finally reached the local populace. The interpreters on whom the Provincial Administration was forced to rely were, moreover, notorious for their dishonesty and venality, particularly in the manner in which they often distorted the remarks of the D.O. or D.C. for their own purposes and extorted bribes from ordinary Africans who wanted to communicate with the administrative officers.¹⁰² This reliance on Swahili and interpreters was reinforced by the frequent shifting of administrators from one district to another that inhibited the learning of the local vernaculars. Officers were officially encouraged to learn tribal languages and salary bonuses were offered for those who did, but few men availed themselves of the opportunity.

Finally, another important difficulty affecting communication between Africans and the Administration emerged from deeply rooted cultural differences in the use of language. For Africans the issues of local affairs were traditionally approached in speech through indirection rather than explicit statement, and the language of politics was highly allusive, metaphorical, and elliptical with frequent resort to complicated parables. Administrators, however, regarded themselves as men of action rather than words and prized directness, brevity, and simplicity in the use of language. One official noted that:

If you were to really sense things you had to listen and listen and it took a lot of patience for one thing, and generally the European was not very patient.103

In consequence of these differences, Africans tended to find Europeans abrupt, arbitrary, and insensitive; while Europeans found Africans to be obscure, tedious, and casuistical. This fostered an image of the opaqueness of African motives expressed in one of the most enduring of colonial stereotypes: "You never really know what they are thinking". A degree of mutual incomprehension was built into the colonial situation, whatever other biases affected the communications process.

NOTES

1. Margery Perham, "Introduction" to Heussler, op. cit., page xx.
2. Duke of Devonshire, "Speech to the Corona Club", 1922, quoted in Ibid., page 72.
3. Francis Newbolt, Appointments Handbook, page 13, quoted in Ibid., page 72.
4. Ibid., pages 59-66.
5. Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, page 4.
6. Sir Ralph Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, passim.
7. Ibid., page 229. Furse describes his methods of selection and defends it against 'scientific' criteria on pages 216-232.
8. T.H.R. Cashmore, "Studies in District Administration in the East African Protectorate, 1895-1918"; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1965, page 27. Cashmore is a former District Officer of the Kenya Administration.
9. Their previous occupations indicate the extent of their wanderlust. John Ainsworth was the son of a Manchester tradesman and had spent five years as a trader in West Africa and the Congo before entering the employ of the Imperial British East Africa Company. H.L. Hinde was a doctor in the Congo. Charles Hobley had been a geologist and then an administrator in Uganda. Three had tried ranching or farming in the American West and another had been a tea planter in Ceylon. One was a former clerk of the Bank of England and another a barrister. More than a dozen were former army officers and four were former officers of the Royal Navy. Several had served in the Civil Services of the South African Colonies while others had worked in the Governments of Nigeria, Cyprus, Egypt, and North Borneo. There was even a Norwegian engineer, a Eurasian clerk from India, and an illiterate Maltese sailor. (See Cashmore, op. cit., pages 15-18 and 21-23.)
10. Ibid., page 30.
11. Ibid.; Cashmore notes however, that "the Peers were poor (and Scottish)." Page 30.
12. Ibid., pages 24-25.
13. Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1906, Oliver and Boyd, London, 1957, page 132, entry of 1/12/04.

14. PRO/CO 533/74/22078; Dispatch of 14/6/10, Girouard to Seely, quoted in Cashmore, op. cit., page 24.

15. PRO/CO 533/74, Secret dispatch of 26/5/10, Girouard to Crewe, quoted in G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, page 216.

16. Meinertzhagen, op. cit., page 132.

17. Cashmore, op. cit., page 25.

18. Information on the father's occupation of 22 officers who entered the administration between 1919 and 1939 gives the following distribution: 6 businessmen, 6 farmers, 4 regular army or navy officers, 2 civil servants, 1 clergyman, 1 lawyer, 1 doctors, 1 schoolmaster, 1 pub keeper. This cannot be taken as an adequate sample and various categories are probably over- or under-represented, especially that of clergyman. The category of farmer is deceptive since it can mean anything from a small farmer to a wealthy country squire. (Two of the six farmed in Kenya.) Pub keeper and schoolmaster are marginal occupations probably best classified as lower middle class. The middle class status of 14 of the 22 is, however, clear.

19. PRO/CO 533/485/38297/1, W.Ormsby-Gore, Minute of 8 October, 1937. The issue being discussed was a suggestion to appoint a new Chief Native Commissioner for Kenya from the Sudan Political Service.

20. According to the data compiled by Kelsall, open competition entrants to junior administrative class posts in the Home Civil Service in 1919-20 had the following secondary school backgrounds: 40.6% public boarding schools, 29.4% secondary day schools with membership in the Headmasters' Conference, and 14.2% secondary schools operated by local education authorities. For the period 1925-32 the figures were, respectively, 35.1%, 33.1% and 20%. For 1933-39 they were 38.1%, 31.2% and 18.9%. With regards to the University background of open competition entrants in 1919-20, 72.2% attended Oxford or Cambridge and 13.7% London or provincial English universities. In 1925-32 the figures were 83.8% and 5.6% and in 1933-39, 88.8% and 7.8%. R.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Great Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955, Tables 17 and 23 and pages 118-145.

21. Information on the educational background of technical officers is scattered through the listings in the Kenya Staff Lists and the brief biographical entries in the Colonel Office List, both published annually. Although too incomplete to permit statistical summaries, this information clearly shows the general patterns noted in the text.

22. In a survey of the undergraduate fields of study of administrative cadets appointed in six selected years between 1927 and 1940, Heussler found that all 134 men had read classics, usually

in conjunction with another subject. The most popular combination was classics and modern history, in which 54 took their degree; followed by 19 in classics and law, and 17 in classics, philosophy, and economics. (Op. cit., page 240). Furthermore, the dominant role of classics was so great that it was widely believed that a first class honors degree in 'Greats' (Classical philosophy and literature) fitted a man for high achievement in almost any career. Furse reported that while on a tour of Kenya in 1936 he spoke to Sir Vincent Glenday, "the masterful ruler of the Northern Province" who:

"held that 'Greats' was the best training for African Administration. 'A man who has read 'Greats' can tackle anything. I can say that, for I did not read them myself.'" (Op. cit., page 259).

23. As one administrator put it: "This was a very pleasant experience for me, but it really wasn't very necessary. It enabled me to learn the grammar of Swahili, but apart from that it really made very little difference to my qualifications." (Interview 214F)

24. Interview 227FS.

25. Interview 225FS.

26. Heussler, op. cit. page 207.

27. Cashmore, op. cit., pages 36-39.

28. In 1937 two of the leading unofficial experts on colonial affairs, Margery Perham and Lord Hailey, expressed their concern to the Secretary of State that field administrators in Kenya relied too much on interpreters and were "not sufficiently in touch with their natives", as compared with the Administrations of Tanganyika, Uganda, or Nigeria. The Secretary of State, Ormsby-Gore, and his senior officials concurred, blaming the situation on the frequent shifting of field officers, and a dispatch was sent to the Governor asking him to try to get more officers to learn the major vernaculars. He replied that the shortage of administrative staff and the necessity for home and sick leave rotations made it impossible to really improve the continuity of postings and the problem remained unresolved. (PRO/CO 533/485/3829/1)

29. This early attrition is particularly striking among those officers appointed in the three years 1919-21. This was the group that contained a large number of ex-officers from the World War. Of a total of 71 cadets, 19 dropped out within their first two years, 11 more within five years and 7 more within 8 years. Only 34 remained for relatively full careers and all were eventually appointed District Commissioners. (Information extracted from Kenya Government Staff List for the years 1919-1939).

30. Information from Ibid.

31. Ibid. A similar policy to rotate officers between the colonies and the Colonial Office had little impact in Kenya, with only six administrators seeing service in London in the 20 years between the wars.

32. PRO/CO 533/485/38297/1, Personal letter, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham to Sir W.C. Bottomley, 2 November, 1937.

33. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, pages 491-496. See also Cynthia F. Behrman, "The Mythology of British Imperialism", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1965.

34. Philip Curtain, The Image of Africa, MacMillan, London, 1965, page vii. Robert Heussler, one of the most knowledgeable American students of British colonial administration noted that it was "often difficult, it not impossible" to get administrators to speak philosophically about their work. (Yesterday's Rulers, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pages 213-214.)

35. H.B. Gray, The Public Schools and the Empire, Williams and Norgate, London, 1913, page 6.

36. KNA/MAA 7/126. E.H. Windley, P.C. Central Province to C.H. Thornley, Deputy Chief Secretary, letter of 6 December 1948.

37. No less a figure than Stanley Baldwin stated:

"The Englishman is made for a time of crisis, and for a time of emergency. He is serene in difficulties but may seem to be indifferent when times are easy. He may not look ahead, he may not heed warnings, he may not prepare, but once he starts he is persistent to the death and he is ruthless in action. It is these gifts that have made the Englishman what he is, and have enabled the Englishman to make England what it is. It is in staying power that he is supreme and... to some extent impervious to criticism."

(Quoted in Wilkinson, op. cit., page 86)

38. The principal theorist of incrementalism, Charles Lindblom, incorporated the phrase commonly used by the British to describe their approach into the title of one of his major papers: "The Science of 'Muddling Through'", Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX, no. 2, Spring, 1959.

39. Wilkinson, Op. cit., page 72.

40. Michael Lee has noted the influence on colonial policy of the idealist tradition in British political thought and the concept

of the organic community, in Colonial Development and Good Government, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pages 19-20. See also E.W. Evans, "Principles and Methods of Administration in the British Colonial Empire" in Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration, the Colston Papers -- Butterworth's Scientific Publications, London, 1950, page 11; and Kenneth Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of British Colonial Policy Between the Wars, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, pages 89-91.

41. Cynthia F. Behrmann, "The Mythology of British Imperialism, 1880-1914", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1965, page 155.

42. Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pages 42-43. Ironically, many of the 'traditions' of the late Victorian and Edwardian public school were in fact the relatively recent creations of mid-nineteenth century public school reforms.

43. As one former Secretary of State put it:

"You can have the institutions without a political class and you can't have a political class without the institutions." Interview 04PB.

44. W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1965, page 154.

45. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 1/1195. Chief Native Commissioner, E.R. St. A. Davies, "Address to the St. George's Society at Kisumu", 22 April 1950.

46. The concept of traditional authority used here is from Reinhard Bendix, Nationbuilding and Citizenship, Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, 1969, pages 47-73.

47. Interview 218F. R. Tatton-Brown, "How Was Colonialism Justified: A Personal View", unpublished seminar paper, St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, 1968, page 8.

48. For some, service was a family tradition:

"I was the younger son of a very much regular army family and my elder brother went into the army and my second brother went into the army...so it had to be a service of some sort. There was no possibility of business or anything like that."

(Interview 219F)

What is even more striking, however, is how the sons of businessmen and professionals found the idea of their father's career unacceptable and turned to administrative service to find a 'worthwhile' job with real 'responsibility' and the opportunity to 'create' or 'really achieve something'.

49. Quoted in Leonard Barnes, "The Colonial Service" in W.A. Robson, ed., The British Civil Servant, Allen and Unwin, London, 1937, page 245. See also Behrmann, *op. cit.*, page 48 and Sir Cosmo

Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, 1909-1945, Faber and Faber, London, 1947; page 134.

50. Interview 103F.

51. KNA/MAA 7/126. E.R. Windley to C.H. Thornley, letter of 8 December, 1948.

52. Evans, "Principles...", loc. cit., page 11.

53. Wilkinson, op. cit., page 62.

54. Interview 208FS.

55. Guttsman, op. cit., pages 148-149.

56. Wilkinson, op. cit., page 36.

57. Interview 210S.

58. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 1/1195. Chief Native Commissioner, "Speech to the United Kenya Club", June 1952.

59. Brian Chapman, The Profession of Government, Unwin University Books, London, 1959, page 274.

60. Interview 219F, Interview 221S.

61. Leg, op. cit., page 2.

62. Interview 201FS.

63. One former P.C. recalled his surprise upon hearing the remarks in 1938 by the Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald, that the self-government of local peoples was the ultimate goal of British rule. (Interview 213F) MacDonald's remarks are quoted in Robinson, op. cit. page 91. See also A.P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism, John Wiley, New York, 1965, page 179.

64. John Ainsworth, "Memorandum on the Question of Segregation as Between Black and White in the East African Protectorate" in East African Protectorate, Economic Commission: Evidence, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1917, page 35.

65. Sir Philip Mitchell (Governor of Kenya, 1944-52) described himself in his memoirs as "a young office of almost wholly country interests" (African Afterthoughts, Hutchinson, London, 1954, page 43.) Heussler wrote of Sir Ralph Furse that "country life, country virtues, and country people are his ultimate reality" (op. cit., page 68). The dominance of country interests among administrators was also emphasized in several interviews.

66. H.E. Lambert and P.Wyn-Harris, "Memorandum on Policy in Regard to Land Tenure in the Native Lands of Kenya", in Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, The Kikuyu Lands, Government Printer, Nairobi, page 64.

67. C.W. Hobley, Kenya From Chartered Company to Crown Colony, H.F. and G. Witherby, London, 1929, page 194.

68. After making such a comparison, Ainsworth and Hobley concluded in an important 1909 memorandum on native policy that:

"In dealing with African savage tribes we are dealing with a people who are practically at the genesis of things...and we cannot expect to lift them in a few years from this present state to that of a highly civilized European people.... The evolution of races must necessarily take centuries to accomplish satisfactorily.

(Quoted in M.P.K. Sorrenson, "The Official Mind and Kikuyu Land Tenure, 1895-1939", East African Institute of Social Research, Conference Papers, 1963, page 2 [mimeo]). See also G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912, Oxford University Press, 1966, pages 278-279.

69. It also constituted a British version of the debate between assimilation and association that was a fundamental element in French colonial policy and practice. However, while the values of French liberal republicanism lent support to the egalitarian dimensions of assimilation, the organicist values of British cationism reinforced the argument for the preservation of the tribal community within a process of very gradual change.

70. Sir Charles Eliot, The East African Protectorate, London, 1905.

71. Mitchell, op. cit., pages 18-19.

72. Sir Charles Eliot to Lord Lansdowne, Dispatch of 9 April 1904. Quoted in Mungeam, op. cit., page 113.

73. Interview 207ES.

74. Sir Philip Mitchell, "Foreword", to R.O. Hennings, African Morning, Chatto and Windus, London, 1951, page 9.

75. Aisworth, "Memorandum...", loc. cit., page 35. Hobley stated that the impairment of the traditional native system of government was "the most unfortunate result of the impact of European culture" and welcomed efforts to check its disintegration. (op. cit., page 183.)

76. John Lonsdale, "European Attitudes and African Pressures: Missions and Government in Kenya Between the Wars", Race, vol. x, no. 2, October 1968, page 142.

77. Mitchell, op. cit., page 26. (Italics are mine.)

78. See, for example, Hobley's description of the African character, (op.cit., pages 180-187) and Heussler's remarks (op. cit., page 122). The character of a paternalistic system of race relations is analyzed in detail in Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism: a Comparative Perspective, John Wiley, New York, 1969, Chapter 1.

79. Interview 231T.

80. K.L. Hunter, Interview, July 20, 1969. Efforts to decrease the use of corporal punishment met with resistance from some administrators. In 1929, the District Commissioner of Laikipia in Rift Valley Province complained that the lack of use of the cane and the easy conditions in detention camps for minor offenders resulted in "poor manners, occasional impertinence, and a growing slackness, unpunctuality and carelessness" among Africans. (KNA/DC/LKA 1/1, Annual Report of Laikipia District, 1929.)

81. Hobley, op. cit., page 155; Col. R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1906, Oliver and Boyd, London, 1957, page vi.

82. Interview 120F.

83. The coercive force immediately available to the D.C. consisted of only a handful of Tribal Police attached to the Official Chiefs who were usually armed with nothing more than a rifle or shot-gun and a few rounds of ammunition.

84. Interview 206FS.

85. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to Examine the Labour Conditions in Mombasa, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1939, paragraphs 4 and 54.

86. KNA/MAA 7/575. S.V. Cooke, "Memorandum on Native Policy", April, 1940.

87. I. Schapera, Some Problems of Anthropological Research in Kenya Colony, International African Institute - Oxford University Press, London, 1949, page 14.

88. Sorrenson, "The Official Mind...", loc. cit., passim.

89. See, for example, the comments on the inadequacies of the methods used to estimate population in H.E. Lambert, D.C. Embu, "Notes on the Population of Embu Native Reserve" in Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, vol. I, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1934, pages 556-558; and the remarks of the Statistician to the East African Governor's Conference in Ibid., page 1099.

90. D.A. Lury, "African Population Estimates: Back Projections of Recent Census Results", Economic and Statistical Review, East African Statistical Department, September, 1965, pages x-xi. Lury presents the following comparison of official population figures and his revised estimates of the actual African population.

1921		1931		1939	
Official*	Revised*	Official*	Revised*	Official*	Revised*
2,483	3,786	2,967	4,109	2.9-3.7	4,790

* Figures in millions

91. PRO/CO 544/58, "Minutes of the Executive Council Meetings of 16 February, 1939 and 12 April, 1939". The Council insisted that with proper farming methods the land in the Kikuyu reserves would be adequate for 25 years.

92. Interview 201FS.

93. KNA/MAA 10/64, Hosking to Rennie, July, 1940.

94. Interview 201FS, Interview 105F, Interview 214F, Interview 217FS.

95. Interview 214F.

96. Interview 201FS.

97. Interview 04PB.

98. A secret pamphlet of "Instructions on the Use of Armed Force in Civil Disturbances" was issued in 1930 with revisions in 1934, 1940, and 1946. A covering circular emphasized the need to keep the pamphlet strictly secret. (KNA/MAA 10/127). A secret circular of January, 1945 added instructions on the use of troops for demonstration purposes, i.e., 'Showing the flag', and on the requisitioning of troops for actual use in quelling civil disturbances. (KNA/PC/NZA 2/665; E.R.E. Surrige, Ag. Chief Secretary, Circular of 20 January, 1945.)

99. PRO/CO 544/30; "Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting of 6 September 1929". The members of the Council understood the political implications of what they were doing and recommended that Administration and Education Department Officers "should take every opportunity of explaining fully the influences underlying this recommendation to native tribes such as the Kikuyu, whose susceptibilities it may be expected to offend, and who may be in danger of misunderstanding the change." (Ibid.) As a result of such decisions Swahili and English became aspects of the racial stratifications of Kenya. Swahili was the language between European and African and symbolized the latter's subordinate position. English was considered the exclusive property of Europeans and an African who spoke English to a European was considered 'cheeky' and needed to be put in his place.

100. Interview 230T.

101. Interview 207FS.

102. Interview 128FA. This man, a Kamba, served under the British as a District Assistant and in 1961 was one of the first Africans appointed a regular D.O. in the Administration. I am also indebted to Dr. Timothy Riungu of Kenyatta National Hospital, Nairobi; Dr. Kivutu Ndeti of the Department of Sociology, National University of Nairobi; and Dr. John Lonsdale of Trinity College, Cambridge, for additional information on the role of interpreters.

103. Interview 230T.

SECTION TWO

THE DUAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

IN KENYA

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between a bureaucratic organization and its external social environment is basically a two-way power situation in which the organization both attempts to exert its own power over that environment and is subject to the efforts of centers of power in the environment to control it and use its resources for their own purposes. This pattern of power interaction results from the fact "that any bureaucracy, not only implements different political and social goals and provides different services, but also necessarily performs regulatory and mediating functions in the society" which "affects the distribution of power and allocation of resources to different groups in society" and thereby generates competition among outside groups to control it.¹

In Kenya, as in other colonies, the state was coterminous with the colonial bureaucracy. Even the ostensibly 'political' institutions, the Legislative Council and the Governor's Executive Council, contained until 1948 official majorities composed of civil servants generally required to vote according to the official line of policy, and were thus firmly a part of the structure of the bureaucracy without effective independent legislative or executive authority. As the sole source of legitimate authority within the colony, the bureaucracy was the necessary subject of the actions of individuals and groups in the external environment seeking to influence public policy. As the central and most powerful element in the bureaucracy the Administration was both the principal focus of external pressures and the primary determinant of the basic response to these pressures by all of

the other departments of government. The general power situation of the bureaucracy consequently took on increased importance in the colonial situation since a critical decision for the Administration was also a critical decision for the entire political system.

However, as we have seen, the Kenya Administration was an organization with considerable internal resistance to change that made critical decisions very difficult. While the field agents of the Provincial Administration exercised substantial discretion, their actions involved largely fragmented and piecemeal reactions to short-run situations that constituted static rather than dynamic adjustment to change, and the Administration as a whole was a rigid organization. Even without the intrusion of outside interests, the process of making basic decisions on policy involved a complicated and ponderous bargaining process and still left implementation in the hands of field officers. Furthermore, the attitudes and values that shaped the characteristic outlook and ethos of administrative officers were those of Morstein Marx's 'Guardian Bureaucracy' in which "civil servants were as ready to determine the needs of the public, independent of what the public might say, as they were unyielding in the face of special interests."² The basic predisposition of the Administration in relation to the external environment was towards deflecting or neutralizing the activities of individuals or groups in society that sought to influence organizational policy, and thereby eliminating both actual and potential challenges to the orderly and predictable course of administrative operations.

While this predisposition towards controlling the environment derived in the first instance from the characteristic tendency of

bureaucratic organizations to render all operations rationally predictable, it was powerfully reinforced in the Kenya Administration by the antipathy of administrative officers to expressed social conflict and 'politics'. This attitude is characteristic of guardian bureaucracies, especially prefectural organizations with wide powers and a strong sense of distinctiveness and internal solidarity, in which officials tend to see themselves as having a higher vision and motivation than individuals and groups in the external environment who operate on the basis of partisan self-interest. They feel that they alone can formulate and implement public policy according to the cool clarity of practiced expertise and selfless commitment to the public interest, rather than according to the heat of partisan passions. Each issue removed from the arena of partisan conflict and subjected to expert bureaucratic decision is a victory of episteme over doxa, of true knowledge over mere opinion.³ For the Kenya Administration the desired, if unattainable, ideal was a world in which a tractable population responded without question to its policies and directives. Given its dominant position in an administrative state, for the Administration the exercise of such control over its environment meant that its 'mediating and regulatory functions' involved the determination of the boundaries of the legitimate political arena and a specification of the issues and participants involved in the formulation of public policy. As Schattschneider put it:

The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country because the definition of alternatives is the choice of conflicts and the choice of conflicts allocates power.⁴

Selznick has posited two basic strategic reactions of a bureaucratic organization to challenges from the external environment. First, formal cooptation through the open and official incorporation of outside individuals and groups into the structure of the organization without intending to accord them actual power over policy decisions.⁵ Second, informal cooptation through the covert cession of substantive influence over the determination of organizational policy to outside centers of power without formally giving them positions within the organization.⁶ One can, however, add another alternative, the suppression of external challenges and demands through the direct application of the power of the organization backed by the ultimate sanction of force. Suppression was not a viable choice either in the organization or social context Selznick analysed. It is, however, clearly an option of basic importance to prefectorial administration in general, and to colonial administration in particular. When we examine the three strategies of bureaucratic reaction together it becomes apparent that formal cooptation is an ambiguous category that does not resolve an external challenge to the organization by either eliminating it or surrendering it significant power. Selznick himself points out:

Formal cooptation ostensibly shares authority, but in doing so is involved in a dilemma. The real point is the sharing of the public symbols or administrative burdens of authority, and consequently public responsibility, without the transfer of substantive power; it therefore becomes necessary to ensure that the coopted elements do not get out of hand, do not take advantage of their formal position to encroach upon the actual arena of decision. Consequently, formal cooptation requires informal control over the coopted elements lest the unity of command and decision be imperiled.⁷

One can thus hypothesize that formal cooptation is an unstable policy choice for an organization which would find itself forced to move towards either of the two more definitive courses of action. Formal cooptation tends not to be used as a means in itself for dealing with challenges from the environment, but as a validating mechanism to legitimate either suppression or informal cooptation. It is seldom found alone, but usually appears in combination with one of the other options.⁸

The actual combination of formal cooptation and suppression or informal cooptation selected by an organization, and their success or failure in enabling it to deal with challenges from its environment, depends not only on the strength of the organization in relation to external centers of power, but also the basic attitudes of organizational functionaries towards the individuals and groups involved. In Kenya the Administration reacted to the European settlers through a combination of formal and informal cooptation by which the settlers were accorded certain official positions and status to legitimate what otherwise would have been an embarrassing and illegal cession of substantial power to the European community. Conversely, in dealing with the Africans, the Administration combined suppression with formal cooptation to such powerless bodies as the Local Native Councils or official appointments to government posts where individuals could be subject to bureaucratic discipline.

According to Eisenstadt, there are three possible outcomes of the interaction between a bureaucratic organization and its social environment: 1) the organization maintains its autonomy and distinctiveness; 2) bureaucratization involving "the extension of the bureau-

cracy's spheres of activities and power either in its own interest or those of some of its elite", and a tendency "toward growing regimentation of different areas of social life and some extent of displacement of its service goals in favor of various power interests and orientations"; 3) debureaucratization where "there is subversion of the goals and activities of the bureaucracy in the interests of different groups with which it is in close interaction."⁹ Autonomy, however, appears to be dependent upon the rare occurrence of a balance of power between an organization and its external environment and most organizations will thus tend to break towards one of the extremes, especially when they exist in a changing environment. Bureaucratization can be understood as the outcome of successful efforts to suppress outside challenges where the organization comes to dominate its environment, while debureaucratization is the consequence of informal cooptation permitting the penetration of external interests into the organization and their shaping of its policies for their own purposes. Furthermore, Eisenstadt also notes that tendencies towards bureaucratization and debureaucratization can occur simultaneously in different spheres of operation of the same organization.¹⁰ Thus in Kenya, debureaucratization occurred at the center as settler interests penetrated the central administration, while at the same time a process of bureaucratization occurred in the field as the Provincial Administration extended its control over the African population.

I. The Dual Political System and the Kenya Stalemate

The result of debureaucratization in the central administration and bureaucratization in the field was the emergence of a dual

political system that paralleled the duality of society and economy in Kenya. One sector of the system, which can be called the 'modern' or European political arena, embraced the central government and the immigrant communities and operated primarily in Nairobi and the settled districts. The other sector, the African or 'colonial' arena proper, consisted of the Provincial Administration and the various African societies in the colony and was spatially focused on the African districts, although it also increasingly came to include the activities of individuals and groups in the towns and urban areas.

This dual political system had developed by the early 1920's and dominated the political life of Kenya until the major constitutional reforms of the mid-1950's. It was characterized by a dominant settler influence on a wide range of policy issues in the central government in Nairobi, while the metropolitan authorities maintained ultimate control over the constitutional structure and status of the colony and the Provincial Administration controlled native administration in the field. The crucial consequence of this distribution of power was a stalemate over the basic socio-economic and political objectives of colonial rule. Critical decisions regarding the development of the colony could simply not be made. While the settler community could shape policy to meet its immediate needs, it could not achieve the formal control of the government it desired. The Colonial Office and Kenya Administration on their part could block settler efforts to gain self-rule, and field officers could rule the great majority of the black population without direct settler interference, but they could neither put forth alternative proposals for the path of political development nor define an explicit policy for

African development without risking a prolonged and bitter conflict with the settlers. 'Native policy', which was of critical importance not only for the colony as a whole, but also for the internal processes and goals of the Administration, was particularly sensitive because any statement of objectives with regard to the African population ipso facto had implications for the role of the settlers in the colony and the pattern of black-white relations. The stalemate meant that the gap between the vague ideals announced in the metropole and the action programs actually carried out in the field could not be filled. In 1930 Governor Sir Edward Grigg wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Passfield, that: "The difficulty in native policy is not in stating principles. Agreement as to principles is very wide. But the interpretation and application of principles is another matter."¹¹ Ten years later, Lord Hailey noted that the Administration demurred from general policy statements out of a reluctance to clash with the settlers.¹²

With no party in the policy system being able to define or impose even provisional goals for the colony, Kenya drifted without direction until the post-1945 political crisis which culminated in the Emergency shook the system to its roots. Each arena tended to operate as a watertight compartment, with policy-making confined to ad hoc incremental modifications of the status quo. Focusing on the Administration itself, the stalemate that emerged in the political system served to reinforce the tendencies towards aimless drifting already present in the structure of the organization and the 'muddling through' attitudes of administrators. The central administration found its hands tied by a web of commitments emerging out of

the accommodations it made to the reality of settler power, and these commitments eliminated the consideration of a wide range of policy alternatives on the grounds of political expedience. The central administration could thus not exercise effective leadership for the Provincial Administration in its relations with the African population. The organization operated well enough during the inter-war years when the field officers in the African districts faced few serious challenges, used their discretion, and acted on minimal policy directions with a sense of strength and self-confidence. After 1945, however, when field officers were increasingly confused and uncertain as to their role and power and were pressed by a rising tide of African discontent, a heavy price would be paid for the opportunism and lack of leadership resulting from the split between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat.

What is most striking about the Kenya stalemate is the extent to which the participants in the political system were acutely aware of the lack of basic policy and yet found themselves unable to do anything about it. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Governor Coryndon exclaimed: "Upon my word, it seems though none of my predecessors had ever thought of the future."¹³ Similar complaints came from the settlers and missionaries as well, and each group blamed the other for the lack of direction of the colony's future development.¹⁴ The numerous investigating commissions of the 1921-31 period can be seen as attempts to overcome the sense of aimless drifting by taking the issue out of the stalemate of the Kenya political system and placing it in the hands of 'independent' authorities. The various vague formulas that emerged, such as 'native paramountcy' or 'association', were

vitiated by the continued reliance upon local interpretation and implementation which simply handed the matter back to the contending parties and resulted in reaffirmations of the status quo. During the 1930's the focus of investigating commissions shifted to more specific policy issues, e.g. land, criminal law, and taxation, and the efforts to define the future goals of the colony were abandoned. A 'final' solution of the land question emerged from the Kenya Land Commission in 1934 only because the most important party to the conflict, the Africans, were essentially excluded from the policy process. In the end, the sense of malaise was insufficient to overcome both the political stalemate and the strongly institutionalized pattern of fragmented, short-run decision-making in the Administration. The settlers and the Administration quickly became preoccupied with the immediate problems of dealing with the economic and fiscal consequences of the depression. As Marjorie Dilley noted in 1937:

The attempt to write the outlines of future development in East African was dropped, and the situation was left to be settled and adjusted as circumstances arise... This is the usual British policy, the attempt to outline development for the future being the unusual and disharmonious element.¹⁵

NOTES - INTRODUCTION - SECTION #2

1. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization" Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, December 1959, page 306.

2. Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, page 60.

3. A guardian bureaucracy, combines both Heglian notions of a 'universal class' above the partisan conflicts of civil society and the Platonic ideals of the guardian class. The Platonic elements are clearly spelled out in Philip Woodruff's (pseud for Philip Mason) study of the Indian Civil Service which is entitled The Guardians (The Men Who Ruled India, Vol. II, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, esp. pages 75-77.)

4. E.E. Schattschneider, "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope" American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, no. 4, December, 1957, page 494.

5. Philip Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grassroots (first publ. 1949) Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966, pages 13-14.

6. Ibid., pages 14-16.

7. Ibid., page 261.

8. Suppression and informal cooptation will generally not occur together, but in sequence; informal cooptation following unsuccessful efforts at suppression.

9. Eisenstadt, loc. cit., page 311.

10. Ibid., page 312.

11. Grigg to Passfield (Sidney Webb), 27 May and 11 June, 1930 (Grigg Paper, Queen's University Archives).

12. KGL, "Kenya: Report by Lord Hailey Following his Inquiries in April, 1940" page 40.

13. PRO/C0533/280; Sir Robert Coryndon to Secretary of State, the Duke of Devonshire, 17 September, 1922.

14. On the lack of general policy and complaints by some officials in the pre 1918 period see T.H.R. Cashmore, "Studies in District Administration in the East African Protectorate" unpublished PH.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1965; pages 77, 92, 112, 117-120. In 1930 during discussions of native policy in Kenya, W.C. Bottomley, Under Secretary at the Colonial Office noted that, "It is I think in

the possible absence of what I call a definite direction of policy in Kenya, that the Colonial Government is most open to criticism. (PRO/C0533/396/16040/1930, 'Minute' of 12 March 1930) A settler politician noted, "Basically, I think the settlers' criticism of the British administration was it never made up its mind where Kenya was going." (Interview O1PS) On missionary criticisms of the lack of direction see Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, Longmans, London, 1954, page 254.

15. Marjorie R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony (first ed. 1937) 2nd ed. Cass, London, 1966, pages 84-85.

CHAPTER FOURTHE ADMINISTRATION AND THE SETTLERS: THE SCOPEAND LIMITS OF SETTLER POWER

Settler efforts to influence the Administration and gain a dominant position in the policy-making process began almost immediately after the encouragement of white settlement became official policy during the tenure of Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot (1900-1904). Over the next twenty years the settler community gradually gained increasing access to the political arena as the East African Protectorate acquired the formal institutions of Crown Colony government. The process of institutional development reached its culmination in 1920 when, with active settler encouragement, the East African Protectorate was formally annexed as the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. By the early 1920's the settlers were firmly entrenched in the formal political institutions of the colony with eleven elected members on the Legislative Council and two appointed representatives on the Executive Council (usually the leaders of the settler members of LegCo). The informal power wielded by the settlers was even greater, and by 1929 the Hilton Young Commission could report that their influence had gone far beyond "the strictly constitutional position".¹

The influence over public policy exercised by the settler community was, however, achieved only after a series of often bitter and acrimonious conflicts with the Administration and they ultimately failed to achieve their most important objectives. The settler community acquired a dominant political position not because the Administration was an un-faithfully pliant servant of its interests, but because it possessed

political resources that made it necessary for the Administration to seek an accommodation.

I. The Bases of Settler Power

The legitimate participants in Kenya politics outside of the official bureaucracy were the settlers, the European missionaries, and the Indian immigrants. The presence of these groups in the political arena was a function of the resources of power they possessed to compel the Administration to take account of their position. Given the vast differential of resources between the three groups, the settlers exercised an influence far exceeding that of the other two groups, who occupied a marginal albeit recognized position in the political system. Settler power derived from the socio-economic characteristics of the European community, which determined the pattern of settler interests and attitudes, and the power resources available to them.

The most striking social characteristic of the settler community was its strong aristocratic flavour. Among the most prominent Kenya settlers were Lords Delamere (the acknowledged settler leader until his death in 1931), Cranworth, Portsmouth and Hindlip, as well as numerous younger sons of titled families including those of Lords Southesk, Enniskillen, and Nottingham. In addition, several peers had extensive interests and investments in Kenya, notably the Duke of Westminster, the Earl of Warwick, and Lords Armstrong, Cobham, Howard de Walden, and Waleran.² The aristocrats and gentry never comprised more than a fraction of the settler population which contained many middle class Britons and a large South African element, both Boer and British. Nevertheless, they set the tone of white settlement in Kenya. The Colony was viewed as an

area of settlement for 'gentlemen' only; European settlement on small-holdings on the Southern Rhodesian pattern was consciously rejected, and determined efforts were made to prevent the growth of a class of 'poor whites'.³ Thus the Soldier Settlement Scheme started immediately after World War One was restricted to former commissioned officers and the winners of the lottery for the assignment of farms included 24 men and women from "the top ranks of English society", as well as 36 colonels, 46 majors, and 60 captains.⁴

The aristocratic element also established a dominant upper class life-style to which all members of the European community attempted to conform. They were attempting to recapture the life of the landed squire that their declining socioeconomic position made it increasingly difficult for them to maintain in Britain. For the minority of settlers with sufficient private means the Colony became a playground that made the name of Kenya synonymous in fashionable British social circles with aristocratic high living, extravagance, and promiscuity, even during the Depression.⁵ For the vast majority of settlers, however, the expenditures necessary to 'keep up appearances' according to the exaggerated local standard was a heavy drain on their already slender capital resources.

Given their desire not only to make their fortune, but also to attain or maintain a style of life fast disappearing at home, settler social and political attitudes were essentially reactionary in character. One post-World War Two settler politician noted of the earlier generation of settlers that "they pioneered with ox wagons when the rest of the world was just about to get into aeroplanes, and this, of course,

meant that much of the thinking was very much behind thinking in other countries ... (they were) really living in another century."⁶ The settlers were firm believers in aristocratic government and had a high view of themselves as a uniquely able 'ruling race'. They were politically conscious, articulate, and autocratic, as Winston Churchill's famous remark after his 1908 visit to East Africa indicated: "All Europeans in East Africa are politicians and most are leaders of parties."⁷ The settler community was thus quick to demand their individual and collective 'natural rights' of Englishmen to participate in politics and govern their own affairs.

An important element of the settlers, including such leading politicians as Lord Delamere and Colonel Ewart Grogan, were willing to resort to any means at hand to advance their interests, including land speculation, shady financial deals, and the use of their entrée to government through the Legislative and Executive Councils to influence government actions in ways that resulted in large personal profits. Any efforts to expose such questionable practices was generally met with protestations of shocked outrage. The prevailing attitude seems to have been: "because I am a gentlemen and therefore honorable, everything that I do, no matter how crooked, is in fact honorable."⁸ A number of individuals with powerful personal connections that made them virtually unchallengeable were thus able to lie, connive, and cheat their way into vast financial and land holdings with virtual impunity.

With regard to the other communities in Kenya, the settlers displayed a racism much more extreme and open than that of the Administration. Like the latter, the settlers viewed the African as a savage, ignorant,

and incompetent child. Unlike the Administration, however, many if not most settlers tended to regard the African's inferiority as a genetic and thus unchangeable condition. The tone of the community on racial matters was set by the South African element. As early as 1905 the acting Commissioner of the Protectorate, Frederic Jackson, complained to the Colonial Office that the settler leadership's "strong prejudice against all black men is obvious to an unbiased person."⁹ The settler view of the African was also heavily infused with their attitudes toward the working class in Britain. Of the lower orders of society, whether in Britain or in Africa, "there was thought to be nothing to understand, only something to control. This was the pattern chiefly of the countryside, particularly in the south of England, and it was largely from the countryside that the early immigrants came."¹⁰ For the settler farmer the African was little more than a feature of the environment that was more or less useful in the attainment of his goals. Although the settler politicians protested loudly and often of their sincere concern for African welfare, they defined it in a way that was synonymous with their own interests: what was good for the European community was ipso facto good for the African because the settlers brought civilization and economic development. However, the settlers reserved their richest contempt and most virulent hatred for the Indian immigrants who were regarded through most of the 1919-1939 period as the greatest threat to the settler position. While almost all settlers would protest their genuine liking and concern for Africans, few would admit to anything more than dislike for the Indian and they often complained that the latter were a corrupting influence on the natives.¹¹ In the early 1920's

the settlers' bitterest battles were with the Indians and they successfully exerted pressure to segregate the latter in the towns and entirely exclude them from agricultural settlement in the White Highlands.

The settler community was thus a mixture of the aristocratic reactionary and the thrusting capitalist entrepreneur, with the two qualities often enough combined in the same individuals. However, behind the arrogant truculence of the settler's public attitudes and behavior lay the stark realities of their economic position. The fact was that, with the exception of brief and deceptive boom periods in 1919-1921 and 1923-1929, the settler economy based on commercial agriculture was largely a failure until the outbreak of war in 1939 brought the beginning of a sustained period of high prices and expansion of output. Settler agriculture, supposedly the backbone of the colony's economy, suffered from a chronic lack of capital, unscrupulous land speculation, and inept and uneconomic farming practices.

Aside from a few individuals with large private fortunes and small number of plantation developments by well-financed British and foreign corporations, the vast majority of the average of 2,000 European farmers in Kenya possessed only modest capital resources. The upper class character of white settlement in the Colony was a factor of social background and status aspirations rather than wealth. The settlers were also faced with a lack of cheap credit facilities that could supply the development capital they sorely needed and they were forced to rely upon high interest loans from commercial banks and mortgage companies. The problem was compounded by the speculative concentration of land in a few hands. By 1912 some 20 percent of the land alienated for white settlement was in

the hands of five individuals or syndicates, while in 1934 14 percent of the farmers owned 39 percent of the alienated land in the Highlands.¹²

According to van Zwanenberg:

It must be taken as a fact that the wealthy landowners were buying up more land than they required as farmers, holding it until the price had risen, and then selling out. The effect of holding land off the market was to raise its price above its productive level. The effect was of course felt greatest by the small farmers with limited capital resources, whose prospects were made less sanguine. With less capital to fall back on, or with great outgoings in paying interest on a bank loan, their whole farming potential was severely limited. 13

To add to their problems, most of the settlers had little skill or previous experience at farming and they depended almost exclusively upon unskilled African labor. V. Liversage, an agricultural economist employed by the Kenya Government during the 1930's, thought that the majority of settler farms were grossly inefficient and that "the important factor was undoubtedly the low level of knowledge, skill and industry on the part of the majority of the farmers and the high standard of living expected."¹⁴ Many of the aristocratic farmers attempted to replicate the wheat farming and cattle and sheep raising typical of the English landed estates they were trying to emulate. The Highlands, however, did not prove particularly suitable for this type of agriculture and the costs per unit of production were so high that the Colony enjoyed no competitive advantage in international markets. These nostalgic ventures were only economically viable when the internal market was heavily protected against outside competition.¹⁵ More than half of the settler farms relied upon the monocultivation of maize. The only really profitable crops were sisal, tea, and especially coffee. However, only a small portion of the Highlands were suitable for coffee cultivation and all of these essentially

plantation crops required capital resources beyond the means of most settlers. Furthermore, given the shortage of capital and skill, as well as the withdrawal of large areas from production for speculative purposes, the European farming community as a whole was never able to bring more than 10 to 12 percent of occupied alienated land under actual cultivation. On farms that averaged over 2,600 acres, the average area brought under cultivation was only 269 acres.¹⁶ The Highlands were therefore never farmed to anything like their actual productive capacity.

With its glaring financial and structural weaknesses, settler agriculture was extremely hard-hit by the fall in commodity prices during the depression of the 1930's. The maize farmers in particular found themselves in dire straits and their number dropped from just over 1,000 in 1929 to 816 in 1934.¹⁷ In 1936 Liversage estimated that some 42 percent of the general farms in the Colony were 'sub-economic' in terms of their capacity to support a minimal European style of life.¹⁸ The settler economy was kept afloat only by the 400 farms growing plantation crops, although even the coffee farmers ran into serious trouble in 1934-1936, and by the small gold rush in western Kenya which provided income for many virtually bankrupt farmers.

The social origins and attitudes of the settler community and their economic travails shaped their attitude toward government officials in general and the Administration in particular. As Colin Cross had pointed out, the social structure of colonial Kenya was unique in the British Empire in that the Administration was not at the top of the local social ladder, being outranked by many settlers of higher social status.¹⁹ As a result the settlers tended to resent and belittle the pretensions of the Administration and their efforts to establish what one

settler politician termed a "celestial caste system". As we noted in Chapter Two, it was this problem that prompted the Colonial Office to carefully select administrators with the type of public school and Oxbridge background that would enable them to deal with the settlers on a basis of social equality.

Even more important, the settlers believed that since the Government had invited white settlement in the first place it should be responsive to their every need. Kenya's capitalist entrepreneurs were prepared from the beginning to call upon the most extensive state action in support of their private interests. Any reluctance on the part of officials to accede to settler demands brought forth a storm of abuse. The role of the various technical departments in aiding the European community was obvious and the settlers provided a steadily increasing demand for government services in education, transportation, communications, medicine, agriculture, and veterinary science. For the settler, however, the role of the Administration was both a paradox and a threat. Lord Cranworth noted that "the Englishman to his credit instinctively dislikes an official."²⁰ The function of the Administration was to rule, but it could not pretend to rule over the settlers in the same manner in which it ruled over the Africans. In settler eyes the only legitimate function for the Administration was to control the African in ways beneficial to European interests. Anything else was a threat to the settlers' strongly asserted right to control their own affairs. Since the Administration did not always automatically or willingly accede to their demands, the settlers persistently viewed the Administration as 'pro-native' and altogether too lenient in dealing with the Africans.²¹

The majority of the settlers, including the aristocratic element,

shared a similar socio-cultural background to administrative officers, especially after the pioneer officials began to be replaced with officers of public school and Oxbridge background. Aside from a basic congruence of attitudes, this meant that there were no cultural barriers blocking communication between the settlers and the Administration. While African demands were often difficult for British officials to understand, for both linguistic and cultural reasons, the settlers literally and figuratively spoke the same language. The settlers had a clear understanding of the structure of the government, the nature of its relationship with the metropolitan authorities, and the accepted norms of action. They knew both where and how to address themselves to the bureaucracy and, equally important, how to phrase their policy preferences in the same idiom employed by the officials. As one Chief Secretary put it: "you had highly educated, highly efficient Europeans ... who were capable of really taking a great interest in the running of the affairs of the country."²² Moreover, the settlers were able to criticise government policy on economic, financial, and agricultural matters in the minute detail which meant that officials had to spend a great deal of time and effort in dealing with their requests, suggestions, and demands. Thus, on this most basic level of communication settler interests acquired a priority over those of other groups simply because they were easier for officials to understand and, hence, usually appeared more reasonable and rational than the demands of the Africans or even the articulate and well-educated Indians.

Given that most settlers came from politically and socially active strata of British society, they quickly organized themselves into a large number of local and colony-wide associations that applied direct

pressures on the government machine at all levels. The organizational density of the small settler society was remarkably high and European organization for political purposes began almost as soon as the first settlers arrived. The Colonists Association which addressed demands to the Colonial Office in 1905 had a mere 32 members. From shortly before the First World War until the outbreak of the Second, settler political activity was mainly carried out under the aegis of the Convention of Associations, which federated the numerous local organizations, and various colony-wide associations formed around the major areas of economic activity (Chambers of Commerce, Growers Associations for particular crops, etc.). The organized strength of the settler community was enhanced by an unwritten but strictly enforced rule of racial solidarity and unanimity; the settlers always presented a united front to all outsiders, especially the government. The effect of this was to give a dominant influence to the extreme element among the white community who were most rabid in pressing their views. In Kenya, as in other colonies with European settlers, the extremist tail wagged the moderate dog and intense social pressures were applied to mute the public expression of more moderate opinions and socialize newcomers into the proper attitudes and opinions on various issues.²³

The organizational strength of the European community enabled them to apply intense and continuous pressures on both the government and specific officials through their representatives in the Legislative and Executive Councils, deputations and individual visits to government offices, petitions, mass meetings, and letters and editorials in the local press. Where the government balked at settler demands and conflict emerged, the settlers could swiftly mount an acrimonious and vociferous public agi-

tation against the government, including mass marches on Government House. Even more important, the settlers both actually and symbolically challenged the Administration's control over the legitimate use of force in the colony. In 1907, in a "deliberate affront to the Administration", Grogan and a few cronies publicly flogged three Africans in Nairobi accused of 'insulting' two European women.²⁴ In 1923 during the delicate London negotiations that led to the "Devonshire Declaration", the settlers organized a Vigilance Committee and made little effort to hide their preparations for an armed rebellion to take over the colony if the resulting settlement was not to their liking.²⁵ Through most of the inter-war years the settlers forced the government to pay for the maintenance of the Kenya Defence Force, a para-military organization of settlers intended for use in case of a native uprising, that directly challenged the government's control of armed force.

In addition to collective pressures, individual settlers kept up a constant stream of complaints and requests to local level administrative and departmental officers. According to one field administrator; "anything they wanted that they thought they could get away with or pressure you with they would ask for ... you often had a flaming row and ended up on splendid terms ... and they ceased trying to pull fast ones."²⁶

The success of the settlers' use of both organized and individual pressures stemmed from the impact of these tactics on officials' intense dislike of openly expressed conflict and their fear of the effect a clash with the settlers might have on their personal career prospects. The noisy agitation the settlers raised on important policy issues disrupted organizational routine, gave undesired publicity to official actions, and generally made life miserable for officials. Involvement in the

sordidness of political conflict was the last thing government officials wanted. The impact of the 'disease of politics' on administrators was pointedly indicated in a letter from Sir Armigel Wade, the Colonial Secretary in the mid-1930's, to Sir George Tomlinson of the Colonial Office:

... I feel that I have had about enough of Kenya, I am tired of the everlasting political dissensions and I doubt if I could give my best if I were faced with another three years tour with three more budgets to wrangle over ... I have had a pretty wearing time as Chief Native Commissioner and Colonial Secretary and at the end of this last budget session I admit that I was beginning to feel the strain. 27

Since the success and efficiency of an administrator tended to be judged by how quiet he kept his area, i.e., his ability to keep local conflicts from intruding into higher organizational levels, and he was selected in part for his presumed ability to deal with the settlers, involvement in an open conflict with them tended to reflect badly on his chances for advancement. One official noted that the settlers:

Created misgivings and doubts and fears in peoples' minds about their careers and what could be the effect on it if they didn't handle the situation with tact and skill so that certain people were not too upset on the other side ... if they said 'look, so and so is causing an awful lot of trouble to us out there' this would be a bad mark against him and it would be noted probably and he would not find his career as prosperous as he had expected. 28

Such pressure was felt most acutely by ambitious officers with their eye on the senior Secretariat posts for which an ability to 'handle' the settlers was a crucial qualification. Although settler influence on the careers of administrators largely took this form of creating fears among officials of what might happen if they incurred the ire of the settlers, there is also clear evidence that at a few crucial junctures the European

community was able to force the transfer or early retirement of particular senior officials that they regarded as particularly inept or hostile to their interests, and that any D.C. or D.O. in a settled district who had difficulty getting along with the local Europeans would be quickly transferred to a less sensitive post.²⁹

Settler agitation and demands gained even greater potency as a result of their influential connections in London. The implied threat behind all settler political activity was that if they did not receive satisfaction from the Kenya Government they would raise the issue in the metropolitan arena and bring the sort of outside interference by the London authorities that the Administration sought to avoid. Many of the leading settlers were well connected by ties of family and friendship with influential elements of the ruling class and were able to generate support for their interests in Kenya through quiet behind-the-scenes manipulation of these informal linkages. It was hardly by accident that the two leaders of the settler community between the wars were Lord Delamere and Lord Francis Scott. Delamere, as a peer and a member of the Legislative and Executive Councils, was in the unique position of having access to official public forums in both Britain and Kenya. Scott, the younger son of a Duke, was reported in 1936 to be an 'old personal friend' of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office and to have access to six Cabinet ministers as well as the King himself.³⁰ The settlers also received important support from the 'Kenya Lobby' of largely Conservative peers and M.P.'s. The Tory Party in general remained sympathetic to a community drawn from the social stratum that was the traditional backbone of its support. Finally, a number of economic pressure groups representing business and financial circles with interests

in Kenya, the Joint East African Board and the Associated Producers of East Africa chief among them, also served as a vehicle for the metropolitan representation of the settler position.³¹

The manner in which these contacts were employed depended upon the degree of influence the settlers exercised over the Administration at any particular time. Each time an issue in Kenya spilled over the local arena into metropolitan politics leading settler politicians rushed to Britain to speak to their London connections and carry on an active lobbying campaign at home. During the 1920's, when the settler influence over the Administration was maximized by a series of sympathetic Governors, the major threat to European interests came from the activities of British missionary and humanitarian groups attempting to persuade the Colonial Office to intervene on various policy issues. The settlers consequently emerged as staunch defenders of the notion of 'trust the man on the spot' and used their London ties to attempt to short circuit the humanitarian influence. When the Administration under Governor Sir Joseph Byrne (1932-37) offered stiffer resistance and attempted to impose several policies the settlers found unpalatable, European leaders were quick to pressure the Colonial Office to intervene and overrule local policy.

The final garnish on settler power was provided by their ability to apply intense informal social pressures on officials, especially local administrators in the settled districts. Settler social preeminence in the colony was symbolized by the exclusion of officials from the most exclusive European club, Muthaiga, while officials joined the Nairobi Club across town.³² In the districts, however, the social stratification of the government restrained the administrators from socializing freely.

with departmental officers and they consequently found their primary social contacts among the local settlers. Playing on the importance attached to social relations in upper class culture, the settlers in the small and tightly knit social circle centering on the local club could make life miserable for an administrator and his family if they found reason to dislike him. As one officer noted:

The European administrator was under pressure to try and be nice to his own people. You know, try and oblige them and it took a very strong minded chap not to. You met them socially, and met them playing golf, bridge, and elsewhere as you didn't meet your Africans in quite the same social way. 33

The permeability of the Administration to the various aspects of settler power was increased by the attitudes of both the Kenya and London authorities and certain structural characteristics of the administrative organization. As a result of the long and difficult British experience of attempting to rule colonies of white settlers in North America and South Africa, which led to a tradition of gradually granting increasing self-government, Colonial officials were extremely reluctant to attempt to force issues on the settlers unless demanded by domestic political considerations. Thus in 1925 the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Ormsby-Gore, replied to Opposition critics that:

I do not want Lord Delamere or his successors in the future to appear in the role of George Washington, or the successors of the Honorable Members opposite to appear as Lord North, but I say in all sincerity, it is not possible in the twentieth century to govern people by the use of an official majority 6,000 miles away as it was in the old days. 34

The Kenya settlers were manifestly members of the political class and therefore their claim to a right to participate in public affairs was something that the Administration found it impossible to deny.

The issue was thus not whether the settlers should play a role in the formulation of public policy, but how much influence should they exercise in playing that role. Furthermore, administrators firmly believed that only settler enterprise could provide the necessary basis for the economic development of the colony and therefore that "it was just plain common sense for the Government to take account of their wishes in a great many matters with which the Government were dealing".³⁵ The Administration thus recognized the settlers as having a 'legitimate interest' in certain policy areas, especially labor, taxation, and finance that deserved to be taken account of in the policy-making process.

The sympathy of administrators for settler interests was also undoubtedly increased by the government policy of encouraging officers to build homes in Kenya and to stay on after they had retired from service and permitting officials to make private investments of certain types. While the great majority of administrators continued to return to Britain after retirement, the above policy did enjoy a certain degree of success, although probably among those officers who were most sympathetic to the settlers in the first place. Several of these retired administrators played a prominent role in settler politics; at one period during the 1940's four of the elected European seats on the Legislative Council were held by former administrative officers. Investments by government officials raised the difficult question of possible conflicts of interest. While the government was aware of the problem and, for example, the Executive Council prohibited officials from investing in local mining operations,³⁶ in the light of the correlation between Kenya's racial castes and the possession of such forms of property, any investment by officials in European enterprises compromised their ostensibly

neutral position. The record of the Executive Council, which had to approve all such investments, show that most purchases of land or of stock in local companies were made by departmental rather than administrative officers. There were, however, some glaring exceptions, the most notable of which were Sir Edward Northey's investment of £6,000 in a sisal estate while he was Governor and the purchase of a farm in his province by the Provincial Commissioner of Rift Valley.³⁷

In the structure of the government the extensive formal powers of the Governor, his pivotal role in the Executive and Legislative Councils, and his relative isolation from direct contact with the bureaucracy, (with the significant exception of the Secretariat) made him vulnerable to the central thrust of settler pressures. Julian Huxley, in a 1931 memorandum to the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, noted that:

The Governor is subject to great political and social pressure from the white community of Kenya. His position is one of exceeding difficulty.... Few, if any, Governors have been able to withstand organized white pressure, and native rights have been violated, and native interest neglected. 38

Since the Governor above all had to be able to deal effectively with the settlers, i.e., keep them relatively satisfied and mute their combativeness, most of the men selected for the post tended to be sympathetic to the settler position. Moreover, a number of the Governors, such as Northey, Grigg, and Brooke-Popham, had no prior experience of colonial administration and no knowledge of African society or its problems.

Their preoccupation with dealing with the settlers and matters of high policy meant that the world of the African remained alien and unknown to them, and they showed little sympathy for or understanding of it.

Finally, the exalted position of the colonial Governor and the elaborate

formal ceremonial and deference that surrounded his actions tended to bring out the megalomania in many Governors³⁹ and the settlers were able to effectively use their social position to flatter the conceits and vanities of these men.

The two other recognized legitimate participants in the political arena, the European missionaries and the Indian community, possessed an independent influence on the policy process only insofar as they could use their overseas connections to bring their interests or views on a particular issue to the attention of the metropolitan authorities. Their influence was otherwise largely a negative one exercised against the settlers, and in cases of conflict between the settlers and the Administration they almost always used their positions on the Legislative and Executive Councils to support the latter. However, with the existence of official majorities on both bodies their votes were not of crucial importance and could not, hence, be used to bargain with the Administration.

The missionary political role was not defined in terms of the representation of their own interests, but as moral gadfly and self-appointed defender of African rights and interests. The politically active segment of the missionary population in Kenya was almost wholly drawn from the representatives of the two established British churches, the Church Mission Society (Anglican) and the Church of Scotland Mission (Presbyterian). The majority of missionaries were either from America or other countries in Europe and, conscious of their position as aliens in a British colony, carefully avoided involving themselves in local politics. The political influence of British missionaries rested on their connections with missionary and church circles in Britain, notably the

International Missionary Council and its secretary J.H. Oldham, and their ability to use these connections to bring 'embarrassing incidents' to the attention of the metropolitan political arena and organize direct pressures on the Colonial Office. They achieved their greatest success in helping to force a reversal of government policy in the 1919-21 crisis over the so-called 'Northey Circulars' on the recruitment of African labor and in promoting the adoption of the doctrine of native paramountcy in 1923 Devonshire Declaration.⁴⁰ Subsequently, missionary influence increasingly declined, despite the fact that from 1924 to 1948 a series of missionaries occupied a seat on the Legislative and Executive Councils to represent African interests. First, the missionaries' claim to represent African interests challenged the Administration, which saw itself in the same role, and the embarrassing incidents that they brought to light often involved the actions of administrators or other government officials, to the intense annoyance of the bureaucracy.⁴¹ Second, a bitter conflict between the Church of Scotland Mission and the Kikuyu over female circumcision in the late 20's caused many of the tribe to turn away from the missions and compromised the missionaries' claim to be spokesmen for the largest tribe in the colony. Third, even in the area of policy in which they exercised most direct control, African education, the missions were forced by declining interest and contributions from the metropole to increasingly rely upon government subsidies which discredited them as independent spokesmen for the Africans. By the end of World War Two the missions, in Oliver's words, "were but a partly pensioned company of the European regiment"⁴² and they played little part in the bitter conflicts of post-1945 politics.

The political position of the Indians, despite their economic importance in the commerce of the colony, suffered heavily from the racism of the British, both settlers and officials. Well organized and articulate and often brilliant critics of the government and the settlers, they were despised by the latter and regarded by the former as a noisy annoyance. Under the communal system of representation adopted they gained formal access to the Legislative and Executive Councils, but with only five representatives on the first body and one on the second, even though they outnumbered the settlers by more than two to one. They were subjected to various forms of discrimination and segregation, both official and unofficial, and were prevented from holding land in the Highlands. Indian conflict with the settlers reached its peak in the early 1920's. However, when the Colonial Office sought to side-step the issue by declaring for the unenforceable doctrine of native paramountcy in its White Paper on the Indian question (the Devonshire Declaration), the Indians refused to accept the outcome and for eight years, 1923-31, withdrew from participation in the Legislative and Executive Councils. Such influence as they were able to wield depended primarily on their connections in India and Britain, and the willingness of the Government of India to press the Indian Office in London to intercede with the Colonial Office on behalf of their interests. Even here, however, their success was limited and mainly consisted in delaying policies and legislation they opposed.⁴³ The Political effectiveness of the community was also increasingly hampered by its internal religious and ethnic divisions which robbed it of unity and enabled the government to play upon its internal conflicts.

II. The Scope of Settler Power

Since the Kenya Administration could not operate effectively against concerted settler opposition and open agitation, and since the formal cooptation of the settlers into the Legislative and Executive Councils did not accord the settlers the power over public policy they demanded, the settlers were rapidly and informally coopted into the policy-making process. By the early 1920's this process was so obvious that it was openly recognized and given the name 'Government by Agreement'. This represented, in effect, an effort on the part of the Governor and the Administration to avoid embarrassing and damaging open clashes with the European community by consulting with the settler leaders on major issues of policy before they were formally brought to the attention of the Legislative and Executive Councils for official enactment. One settler politician of the era stated that "the idea was that you had a talk at Government House and then supported each other."⁴⁴ The settlers thus acquired a veto power over policy before it reached the Executive and Legislative Councils which remained under the control of official majorities. Moreover, while the Government remained the formal source of all legislative and policy proposals, the settlers were able to bring their interests to the attention of the Governor and his senior officials and have them embodied in concrete policy statements.

Once a mutually acceptable position had been hammered out in informal consultations, the settler leaders were then expected to support the resulting government proposals on the issue. The settlers were in the potent position of having power without responsibility in the political process. European politicians continued to sit on the opposition benches in the Legislative Council and they could, and occasion-

ally did, oppose in public measures that they had earlier agreed to in private. Furthermore, 'government by agreement' was essentially an administrative effort to mute political conflict and settler politicians appear to have been dubious about its efficacy.⁴⁵ The process of policy-making by prior mutual agreement often broke down, as the contentious political history of the inter-war decades attests, because of the limits of the flexibility of the two sides. The limits of the settler politicians' ability to negotiate and compromise with the Administration was defined by the dominant influence of the extremist element in the European community. 'Government by agreement' often led to conflict between the settlers and their leaders over concessions on particular issues and the contemporary documents indicate that the settler leaders were much more reasonable in their private as opposed to their public dealings with the government.⁴⁶

Another primary vehicle for settler influence over the details of official policy was through the control of public finance. With the entry of their elected members into the Legislative Council, the settlers also gained recognition of the council's right to sanction all public expenditure. During the 20's this was achieved through a committee of the Council composed of the Colonial Secretary, the Treasurer, and the C.N.C., and all of the unofficial members, which considered the government's draft budget and then referred it with comments back to the entire Council sitting as a Committee of Supply. The settlers disliked the system since the government retained its official majority on the Council and, in the words of Governor Grigg, "it never meant that Government in any way divested itself of the final responsibility for

policy in regard to the Estimates and expenditure."⁴⁷ In 1933, as the result of a bitter and successful fight to prevent the introduction of an income tax by the government, the settlers gained increased control through a statutory Standing Finance Committee of the Legislative Council with an unofficial majority which shaped the government's proposed expenditures into the draft Estimates presented to the Council. From 1933 to 1952 the Standing Finance Committee was, according to a Secretariat official of the period:

In many ways the real seat of power.... Only three officials sat on the SFC. It patterned the Budget, authorized expenditure, made special allocations and generally controlled fiscal and financial policy. It was through SFC that the European members of LegCo really wielded power and applied influence. But their proceedings were not of course public like LegCo or formally reported. 48

From this position of power the settler community exercised a dominating influence over four major issues of public policy: 1) land, 2) labor, 3) immigration and settlement, and 4) taxation and public expenditure.

The alienation of land for European settlement, much of it claimed by various tribes in the colony, was the fundamental foundation of the settler community. The evidence makes clear that once the decision was made to open the colony to white settlers, the land actually given to Europeans was determined by a number of important factors: the depopulation by disease and famine of large areas formerly actively occupied and cultivated by African farmers (notably in the southern Kikuyu areas); the general ignorance of both European officials and settlers of African systems of land tenure and their refusal to recognize any other

pattern than that of beneficial occupation; the incessant settler demands on a small and overburdened Land Department and local administrative officers, resulting in the granting of many farms without their being properly surveyed or even viewed by government officials; the simple dishonesty of a number of settlers in laying claim to land actually occupied by Africans and taking advantage of government disorganization and ignorance; the use of metropolitan political connections by prominent settlers to promote the award of vast land grants to several individuals and syndicates; and the use of intense local pressures to secure the removal of African tribes from land desired for white settlement, notably, the removal of the Masai from the Laikipia plateau between 1904 and 1912, and the grant of some 32,000 acres of land from the territory of the Nandi to participants in the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme after the First World War.⁴⁹ Eventually some seven million acres representing about a third of the agriculturally productive land in the colony, was reserved for white settlement, of which just over five million was actually occupied by European farmers.⁵⁰

Having gotten the land, the principle settler task was to defend it against all possible threats. Through the use of their political position they were able to gain statements which the settlers regarded as sacrosanct, about the permanent and exclusive nature of white settlement in the highlands from a series of Secretaries of State; block the entry of Indian agricultural settlement in the alienated areas; and, eventually, through the Highlands Order-in Council of 1938, the legal stipulation of the highlands as an exclusive European enclave.⁵¹ Such

was the power position of the settlers, that, even where errors were recognized in the grant of African lands to European farmers, the alienation was regarded by government officials, missionaries, and settlers alike as an irreversible fait accompli; whatever the errors or dishonesty involved, the position of the settlers on the land was politically unassailable.⁵²

Once the settlers had staked out their farms it was necessary to recruit African labor, since it was regarded as both physically dangerous and socially degrading for white men to do hard physical labor in the tropics. Settler enterprise was built upon African sweat and this was justified by the assertion that such labor was not only necessary for the development of the economy, but also 'good' for the African by bringing him into contact with a higher civilization and teaching him habits of hard work and perseverance that would combat the indolence and lack of industry that supposedly characterized traditional society. All of these themes were echoed in the words of Governor Grigg in 1926:

The base on which the whole pyramid of our civilization in this Colony is reared is native labour. If the native thrives, we thrive. If we thrive, the native should thrive too. The interests of the natives ... and of the settlers ... are inseparable. But the future of the natives is in our hands, and our future depends upon the use which we make of our power. 53

On the basis of this comfortable assumption of what was good for the settler and good for the African, labor on European farms became to the settlers something that was 'in the best interests' of the African and which he could therefore be compelled to do, even if it was against his wishes. The various explanations of why the African must work for

Europeans reflected the fact that from the beginning of white settlement at the turn of the century until the late 1920's the supply of African laborers was chronically short, particularly in the period before 1914 and between 1924 and 1926. The settler view was that since the government had invited them into the country it should bear the responsibility of seeing that sufficient supply of native labor was available and use whatever means necessary, including coercion, to do so. Lord Delamere spoke of the necessity "to legalize methods and force the native to work."⁵⁴ While the Administration resisted the use of the more extreme forms of coercion, it recognized the settlers' need for labor, as well as its own for various public works. The means resorted to was taxation, which not only provided much needed revenue, but also "was a potent administrative weapon: as a form of discipline, as a test of obedience, or as a means of forcing labor from the Reserves."⁵⁵ Thus, while the Administration refused to act directly as recruiters of labor for settler farms, it imposed a Native Hut Tax (later transformed into a Hut and Poll Tax) which forced Africans to leave the reserves to find the cash income necessary to pay their taxes. The general theory was that one month's wages should be equivalent to the annual rate of tax. In 1913 the D.C. of Machakos noted:

To increase taxation in order to drive natives out to work is forced labour under a subterfuge and it is impossible to get away from the fact. 56

The indirect coercion of the tax system was supplemented by a series of labor laws -- the Registration of Natives Ordinance, Masters and Servants Ordinance, Resident Native Labour Ordinance, etc. -- de-

signed to facilitate the control of the African labor force and insure that they remained at their jobs. The most important of these was the registration ordinance, passed in 1915 and brought into force in 1919, which required all male Africans above the age of 15 to be registered and fingerprinted by the government and to carry at all times a registration certificate, or kipande, which contained a record of their employment outside the reserves. The corpus of labor legislation rigidly controlled African movement outside the reserves, limiting it to that necessary to seek employment. At the same time, reflecting the fear of both the Administration and settlers of the growth of a mass of 'de-tribalized natives' in the towns, the by-laws of the settler-controlled Nairobi Municipal Council placed severe restrictions on African access to urban areas by prohibiting Africans from staying in the city for more than 36 hours without employment and confining them to either the native locations or, in the case of domestic servants, to the place of employment from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. The police were given wide discretion in the enforcement of this legislation and the penalties for unauthorized movement, loss of the kipande, refusal to follow an employer's orders, leaving a job without permission, etc. were severe: "The infringement of labour laws is rated as a crime and the heaviest penalties can be imposed for minor acts of disobedience."⁵⁷ It is not surprising that the spatial locus of the operation of these laws was in the towns and settled districts where the Provincial Administration exercised the least influence and could provide little in the way of protection from exploitation for the local African laborers. The labor laws also prescribed conditions of employment, food, and housing

intended to ensure the worker fair treatment by employers, but neither the Administration nor the small Labour Department had sufficient personnel to inspect all employers, both European and Indian, and evasion of their obligations by employers, especially when economic conditions were bad, was fairly common.⁵⁸

During the Depression the character of the labor problem reversed itself: the problem of the European farm was no longer too little native labor, but too much. This was particularly true with regard to the squatters who worked in return for a small cash income and the right to cultivate crops and graze their stock on a few acres of their employer's unused land. Settler farmers increasingly wanted to eliminate this highly inefficient system, so redolent of European feudalism in its long-term commitments and mutual obligations, with more economic and commercially oriented plain wage labor. They thus pressed for the enactment of the Resident Native Laborers Ordinance, passed in 1937, which gave virtually total control over the conditions of the squatter system to the European dominated district Councils in the settled areas. The Councils used these powers to progressively restrict the conditions of the squatters' existence and force them to either leave or dispose of their crops and stock and become wage laborers.⁵⁹

The settler interest in immigration and settlement policy was obvious and they used their influence to see that Kenya Government and its agents in London made continuous efforts to encourage an increasing flow of European immigrants into the colony and provide the help and services necessary to enable them to stay. The question of settlement was, of course, inseparable in practice from the land and

labour issues which were intimately related to the conditions of the settlers' existence in Kenya. The organized settlement schemes for ex-officers after both World Wars were the most elaborate manifestations of the settlers' demand for the active encouragement of white immigration. Conversely, the European community attempted, with much less success, to restrict the flow of Indian immigrants and arrest the growth of the group that in the inter-war years appeared to be the greatest threat to the predominant white position. It is interesting to note that additional settlers were apparently wanted as much for their contribution to the sheer numbers of white community as for their aid in the economic development of the colony: the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919-22, an ill-conceived economic disaster for most of the participants, was judged a success because it resulted in the permanent addition of 500 settlers and their families to the European community; and the efforts to aid impoverished settler farmers during the Depression were intended as much to keep them in the colony as to get them back on their feet economically.⁶⁰

The most striking settler influence on policy was in the area of taxation and public expenditure. From 1921 to 1936 the Europeans and Indians in Kenya paid only 30 shillings a year direct taxation through a poll tax on adult males. In 1927 a special education tax of 30 shillings per annum was introduced for use in meeting the costs of the separate educational systems maintained for the two immigrant communities. Total direct taxation for the settlers was thus 3 pounds a year. Most of the revenue the Kenya Government derived from the immigrant communities came from indirect taxes, especially customs duties

on imports, although these indirect levies were also paid by Africans. On two occasions, 1920-22 and 1932-33, the settlers bitterly and successfully fought government efforts to introduce a light income tax. The resulting imbalance in the tax system is revealed in the fact that the settlers, with a per capita income estimated at 200 times that of the average African, paid a direct tax rate only five times higher than the basic native hut and poll tax rate of 12 shillings a year.⁶¹ In 1929, Drummond Shiels, the Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Colonial Office, reported the yield of direct taxes in Kenya between 1900 and 1925 to be 5.8 million pounds for Africans and 330,000 pounds for non-natives.⁶² In 1936 the settlers finally accepted the imposition of income tax at a rate, however, only one-third that levied on comparable incomes in the United Kingdom.⁶³ The settlers also benefited from discriminatory customs duties that permitted many items necessary to their economic success to enter duty free, while low-cost items used primarily by Africans were subject to duty.⁶⁴ For a European, Kenya between the wars was a place where large incomes, if they could be made, could be kept intact and where the general cost of living remained considerably below that of Britain.

As reluctant as they were to pay taxes, the settlers were positively eager for the government to provide the services and capital investments they demanded. The resulting impact on the Kenya Government was severe; between 1921 and 1936 it incurred a public debt of 17.8 million pounds, of which some 13 million pounds represented loans for the Uganda Railroad for the construction of branch lines into the settled districts, and in the depression year of 1932 the fixed interest

charges alone reached the staggering total of 1.01 million pounds, or no less than 33.6 percent of total government revenue for the year.⁶⁵ In addition, most of the personnel and budgets of the various technical departments went for the provision of services to the settler community. Settler politicians consistently opposed government efforts to expand services provided to Africans and during the depression demanded reductions in government expenditure that fell most heavily on these services. Also during the depression, the settlers lobbied for and got a statutory Land Bank that eventually provided one million pounds in credits to settler farmers, of which 328,000 pounds went to discharge mortgage obligations.⁶⁶ Finally, the settler controlled District Councils refused to use their powers to levy local taxes and were entirely funded by grants from the central government. Dilley noted that the Councils were not particularly careful about how they spent the money, which was mostly intended for the construction of rural roads.⁶⁷ The settler position is all the more striking in light of the fact that Africans during this period had already shown themselves willing to pay local rates of one or two shillings a head, thus taxing themselves twice, to pay for services through the Local Native Councils that the settlers received at the expense of the government.

The settlers were able to use both their local influence in Kenya and their London connections to thwart any efforts to limit the dominant position they had achieved in Kenyan politics. Their success is particularly indicative of the difficulties of the imperial authorities exercising any real degree of control over what went on in

the colony. The most striking example of the settler ability to defend their position was the history of the doctrine of native paramountcy which ostensibly defined the direction and content of British trusteeship in Kenya after 1923. The settlers had achieved their position through the tacit acceptance of their influence by officials in the Administration and the Colonial Office after a long series of open conflicts and private negotiations. The existing status quo during the inter-war years was an informal one, unrecognized by any official public statement of policy by either the Nairobi or London authorities. Procuring such a statement from the imperial authorities thus became a vital goal both for the settlers, in order to legitimize their informal position, and for their critics in the Labour Party and humanitarian circles, as a means of limiting settler power and protecting native rights. In both instances the pressure was for something anti-thetic to the British approach to administration: a statement of the specific role of black and white in the development of Kenya and specification of the ultimate political goal of colonial rule. Since active African participation in the government was at that time inconceivable for even the most radical advocates of native rights, the latter generally sought an assertion of the formal supremacy and ultimate responsibility of the imperial authorities, i.e., that control over policy should remain in the hands of the Administration and the Colonial Office alone.

At first sight the 1923 White Paper (The 'Devonshire Declaration') appeared to have achieved the purpose of the critics of the settlers in its assertion of the paramountcy of native interests and

the indivisibility of imperial control.⁶⁸ Historians agree, however, that the declaration was simply a measure of expediency to blunt the conflict between the European and Indian immigrant communities and deny the latter equality in the political and economic systems, and the British government neither intended nor made any effort to see that it was actually implemented by the Kenya Administration.⁶⁹ The settlers simply ignored it, and a sympathetic Governor Grigg replaced it with a 'Dual Policy' of the 'complementary development' of the African and settler communities that represented little more than a rationalization of the status quo. In 1927 the existing situation was recognized in another White Paper, issued by the Tory Secretary of State Leopold Amery, that sought to 'associate' the settlers in the exercise of the imperial trusteeship and recognized the 'Dual Policy'. The only serious effort to enforce the doctrine of native paramountcy came with the Labour government of 1929-31. The Secretary of State, Lord Passfield, issued a White Paper and a "memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa" in 1930 that reaffirmed native paramountcy and the sole authority and responsibility of the colonial authorities. However, Governor Grigg made no effort to implement the policy and it was ignored by the new Conservative government that took power after the Labour collapse in 1931.⁷⁰

III. The Limits of Settler Power

The settler community suffered, nonetheless, a number of serious defeats. First, and most important, they utterly failed to achieve their ultimate goal of self-government on the Southern Rhodesian model. Through the 1920's and early 30's they constantly pressed for

constitutional 'advances' that would accord them formal control of the Kenya Government. These included demands for an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council, which they attempted to make a condition of their acceptance of the schemes for closer union of the East African colonies, and for a Statutory Finance Committee of the Legislative Council with a settler majority, which they sought as a condition for their acceptance of Government's income tax proposals in 1932-33. These efforts failed for the simple reason neither Labour nor Conservative Governments in Britain ever considered settler self-government an acceptable future for the colony. In August, 1933, during the height of the income tax controversy, the Secretary of State, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, bluntly told Lord Francis Scott that "no Government in this country would ever agree to the claim on the part of the white settlers to govern on their own."⁷¹

Second, not only was ultimate Imperial control maintained, but the settlers also failed to convert the Administration into an organization totally oriented toward serving their needs. The crisis over the 'Northey Circulars' in 1919-21 and the refusal of the Administration to directly serve as labor recruiters for the settlers indicated the outside limits of official collaboration with the settlers on issues intimately involving Africans in the reserves. Furthermore, the senior staff of the Administration and the technical departments remained expatriates whose fundamental loyalties went to the Colonial Service and to Britain. They were appointed by the Colonial Office and the vast majority either returned to Britain after retirement or were transferred to other colonies. Only a handful of Kenya settlers

or settlers' sons entered the Administration in the inter-war years and then only if they possessed the requisite public school and Oxbridge background and passed through Furse's selection process. Local settlers were largely confined to the Kenya European Civil Service, which provided the higher level clerical and office staff and the lower level technicians in the various departments. During the Depression in particular, considerable conflict and ill-feeling existed between the European 'locals' and the 'expatriates' who comprised the elite of the bureaucracy.⁷²

Third, after settler influence reached a peak during the term of Governor Grigg, the formal and symbolic expressions of Imperial administrative control were reasserted under Governor Byrne. This involved such acts as the dismissal of the settler head of the Board of Agriculture and his replacement by the Director of Agriculture; and the transformation of the Kenya Defence Force, the settler territorial militia, into the Kenya Regiment, an organization designed not to fight as a unit but to provide reserve officers for the rapid expansion of the King's African Rifles in the event of an emergency. Both changes were carried out by administrative fiat over the protests of the settler community. The change of the K.D.F. into the Kenya Regiment was pushed through by Governor Byrne in 1936 and reduced the emotionally charged symbol of the settlers' challenge to the government's monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The action provoked a futile walk-out from the Executive Council by the settler representatives Lord Francis Scott and Major Cavendish-Bentinck, who returned thirteen months later, in April 1937, after Byrne had been succeeded

by the more conciliatory Governor Brooke-Popham.⁷³

A variety of factors worked in place limits on settler political influence and deny them their ultimate goal of self rule. First, Colonial Office officials, including several Secretaries of State, neither trusted the motives of the settlers with regard to the Africans, nor were convinced of the economic viability of white settlement in Kenya. Second, an active London lobby of missionary and humanitarian groups and a variety of informed individuals kept up a steady and often intense drum fire of criticism directed at the British press, Parliament, and the Colonial Office that emphasized the venal self-seeking of settler political demands. Third, the parochialism of the settler perspective led them to ignore aspects of colonial administration and policy that did not touch directly on their economic and political needs. Fourth, and perhaps most important, within the Kenya Administration organizational self-interest ultimately proved more powerful than loyalty to social class so that administrators both remained hostile to settler political goals and struggled to preserve a degree of freedom of action.

The dismal performance of the settler economy prior to the Second World War created grave doubts in the Colonial Office as to whether Kenya was in fact a 'white man's country' that robbed the settler argument for self-government of much of its potency. Thus, in 1937 a Colonial Office official could write that, while it was the policy that white settlement in the Highlands should be encouraged:

So far as the Colonial Office is concerned, this policy is subject to the qualification that it is not yet regarded as absolutely proved that the European community

will be able to prosper in the highlands of Kenya.... These doubts have been accentuated by the experience of the farming community in Kenya during the recent trade depression. 74

Furthermore, however vague they remained about their application in practice, the ideals of trusteeship exerted a powerful grip on Colonial Office officials who deeply distrusted the motives of the settlers in relation to Africans. No matter what the public rhetoric might be about the congruence of the interests of the two races, the Kenya settlers, as an economically troubled, politically powerful, and openly biased community, could not be trusted to deal fairly or humanely with the African or put the public interest before their own. Thus, when Scott wrote to the Times to complain that officials made the settlers, "feel that we are unwanted interlopers who cannot be trusted by the powers that be to have a share in the government, as it is taken for granted that we shall use any powers we may be given to further our own interests rather than to work for the good of the country as a whole"; Cunliffe-Lister wrote one sarcastic word on the Colonial Office clipping of the letter: "exactly". 75

The recognition by metropolitan officials that the settlers were members of the political class and thus legitimate participants in the political arena did not, therefore, involve any further acceptance on their part of a necessary identity of interests or binding obligations to the settlers on the basis of the uncritical acceptance of class or personal loyalties. As legitimate participants in the political process, the settlers had the right to fight for their interests according to the accepted rules of the game. However, the settlers were an

obviously partisan group and colonial officials refused to give any credence to settler claims to speak for the public interest, this being a role they believed that only they themselves were qualified to fill. The settlers were thus 'in the system', but did not, in the end, control that system.

Arranged against the economic and political connections of the settlers in the 'Kenya Lobby' was the 'Native Rights Lobby', consisting of a wide assortment of church and missionary societies, humanitarian and philanthropic groups, and a number of individuals in British intellectual and political circles. Both 'lobbies' sought to exert pressure on the Colonial Office; either directly, through correspondence or personal meetings with Colonial Office officials, or indirectly, through connections in Parliament. Both included a number of M.P.s and could expect a sympathetic hearing from several others. The Kenya Lobby was primarily linked with the right-wing of the Conservative Party, while the Native Rights Lobby was principally connected with the Labour Party. Despite the general unimportance of colonial issues in British electoral politics, these lobbies comprised an important and highly articulate segment of the British public and it was their activities that made Kenyan affairs into the domestic political issues that moved the Colonial Office to action. The Kenya Lobby preferred mostly to work in private, exerting its pressures through the traditional socio-political networks of the British upper-class. The Native Rights Lobby was much more publicly active and sought to supplement private pressures with efforts through the press and petitions mobilizing public opinion.

In the inter-war years the central concerns of the missionary and humanitarian groups were the preservation of native lands against the encroachments of the settlers and the protection of native labor from exploitation and coercion. When aroused they could mount an impressive public campaign.⁷⁶ Their actual influence on policy was, however, limited, and even their greatest success during the Northey crisis and the subsequent negotiations on the 'Indian question' leading to the doctrine of native paramountcy was, as we have seen, negated on the ground by a combination of settler pressures and the interpretation and variation of policy by the Kenya Government. Their chief impact was as the watchdogs of Imperial trusteeship and paternalism, reminding colonial officials of their responsibilities, and, through their contacts in Kenya, as an alternative channel of communication that provided information reinforcing the image of the settlers as irresponsible, self-seeking exploiters. However, the defenders of native rights attacked administrative abuses as often as they criticised the settlers, and in such instances their influence reached its limit as Colonial Office officials leaped to the defence of their fellow civil servants in Kenya.⁷⁷

What must be pointed out about the activities of the humanitarian groups is that at no point did they ever challenge or even openly question the basic premises of British imperialism or the system through which it was administered. Their object was to see that the Empire lived up to its expressed ideals and they sought the amelioration of specific abuses rather than any systematic reforms. They dealt more with what were regarded as 'unfortunate incidents' resulting

from failures of individual judgment and character than with patterns of action rooted in basic structural arrangements. Metropolitan political controversy thus took place within a basic public consensus on the ideals of imperialism that all of the contending parties used to justify their positions.

~~The third factor that tended to limit the extent of the settler~~ influence was their general lack of interest in any matters that did not appear to directly touch their perceived economic and political needs. Despite their protestations of concern for the African, settlers took little interest in native policy outside of ensuring themselves of the conditions for an adequate supply of labor and blocking efforts during the depression to extend the government services available to Africans. The settlers in general and their political leaders in particular rarely, if ever, toured the African districts or spoke to the field administrators in those areas.⁷⁸ Settler ignorance of conditions in the reserves served to reinforce the dual politico-economic structure of Kenya and freed the field administrators in African areas of direct contact with the political pressures directed at the central government and the administration in the settled districts. Settler influence on administrative policy and practice in the reserves tended to be indirect in taking the form of a limit on the degree of economic and social development that could be embodied in official policy on African affairs and the lack of an explicit native policy. On certain crucial administrative concerns, notably the development of the Local Native Councils, the settlers took virtually no interest in official actions.

The fourth factor countering settler influence in Kenya was the dislike of settler politics and the rejection of settler political goals by the great majority of administrators, especially in the Provincial Administration. Few of them accepted any more than their counterparts in the Colonial Office the settler goal of self-government as a desirable future for the colony. Indeed, the achievement of that goal implied the effective destruction of the Administration in its existing form, a prospect which few officers accepted with equanimity. Field officers in particular felt considerable distaste for the politics of Nairobi and the settled districts and were largely powerless in those areas of policy subject to a dominant settler influence. As one administrator put it:

... one felt helpless really. Politics were handled at a higher level - one really couldn't deal with them; they were a matter ... straight between the settlers' leaders and the Governor or senior people in the Government. The D.C. just had to pass it by. 79

Common social and cultural background and the ties of friendship, school, and family were ultimately overridden by the organizationally-defined interest of administrators in preserving their discretion and ruling without outside interference.

The officers of the Provincial Administration struggled to maintain an arena of action free of the settler influence that bound the hands of officials in the central government and isolated from the rancorous political conflicts of Nairobi. This found expression not only in a dislike of Secretariat postings, but also in a strong distaste for administrative posts in the settled districts, despite the more comfortable living conditions and social facilities they offered to officials

and their families. Field officers preferred the physical discomfort and isolation of the African districts where 'real administration' remained possible.⁸⁰ Their relative autonomy in these districts was enhanced by the narrowness of settler interests. These reactions on the part of administrative officers in the field to the settler presence thus added significant centripetal pressures to the basic duality and decentralization in the structure of the Administration. Even more important, the threat of settler interference with administrative control had a deep impact on the relationship between field administrators and the Africans over whom they ruled.

1. Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa (Hilton Young Report), Cmd. 3234, London, 1929, page 89. See also Dilley, op.cit., page 129.

2. T.H.R. Cashmore, Studies in District Administration in the East African Protectorate 1895-1918, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1965, page 69, n. 2.

3. Indigent Europeans were unceremoniously deported from Kenya. The minutes of the Executive Council of the 1919-1939 period now in the Public Record Office in London include numerous such deportation orders. See also Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, Coward-McCann, New York, 1969, page 83; Marjorie R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, first edition, 1937, second edition, Cass, London, 1966, page 12.

4. Roger van Zwanenberg "The European Economy in Kenya, 1919-1939: An Example of Primitive Capital Formation" Staff Paper no. 46, Institute for Development Studies, University College, Nairobi, September 1969, mimeo, page 7.

5. Thus the famous society joke of the 1930's: "Are you married, or do you live in Kenya?"; and the legends of the hi-jinks of the notorious 'Happy Valley' near Nakuru. On the aristocratic life-style of the settlers see C.C. Wrigley "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-1945" in Harlow, et.al., op.cit., page 220.

6. Interview OIPS.

7. Winston S. Churchill, My African Journey, London, M.P., 1908.

8. N.S. Carey-Jones, The Anatomy of Uhuru, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1966, page 66.

9. PRO/CO 533/5/53423, Sir Frederick Jackson, Despatch of November 11, 1905.

10. Carey-Jones, op.cit., page 63.

11. For settler attitudes towards the Indians in Kenya see Dilley, op.cit., pages 38, 152-157. The limits of missionary humanitarianism in Kenya and their bias against the 'vices of Oriental civilization' are described in Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, Longmans Green, London, second edition, 1965, pages 259-260.

12. 1912 figures from van Zwanenberg "The European Economy" loc.cit., page 3; 1934 figures from S. and K. Aaronovitch, Crisis in Kenya, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947, page 75.

13. Van Zwanenberg, loc.cit., page 8.

14. Cited in Ibid., page 13.
15. Wrigley, loc.cit., pages 216-217, 236-237; Aaronovitch, op.cit., pages 77-82.
16. The average area cultivated varied between 149 acres in 1920 and 316 acres in 1940. (Aaronovitch, op.cit., page 74.) At the time of the report of the Kenya Land Commission in 1934 "the actual area alienated to Europeans was 10,345 square miles, of which 11.8 per cent was cultivated, 40.7 per cent used for stock, 20 per cent occupied by native squatters, and 27.5 per cent not in use. The margin between the 16,700 square miles which were eventually defined by the commission as reserved for European occupation and that already held by settlers was therefore considerable; there was an 'even greater disproportion between the area reserved and in beneficial use' (Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Oxford University Press, London, 1936, page 750.) The settlers, amounting to about 1/4 of 1 per cent of the population of Kenya controlled what amounted to about a third of the agriculturally usable land in Kenya.
17. Van Zwanenberg, loc.cit., page 11.
18. Cited in Ibid., page 12.
19. Cross, op.cit., page 84. Settlers sarcastically referred to new administrative officers as the 'esquires'. (Cashmore, op.cit., page 60.)
20. Lord Cranworth, A Colony in the Making: Or Sport and Profit in East Africa, London, n.p., 1912. The title of the book is indicative of the two poles of settler aspiration.
21. Interview O1PS and Interview O3PS.
22. Sir Gilbert Rennie, Interview, September 30, 1968.
23. Administrators often speak with considerable bitterness of the influence of the 'lunatic fringe' or 'shocking minority' among the settlers (Interview 227FS, Interview 209FS, Interview 235FS). Even settler politicians occasionally admitted to difficulties in controlling the extremist element among the European population. See the letter from Lord Francis Scott to the Secretary of State, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 25 June, 1933. (PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33.)
24. G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912, Oxford University Press, London, 1966.
25. R.G. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, page 22; Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, Praeger, New York and Washington, 1966, pages 65-68.

26. Interview 103F.
27. PRO/CO 533/485/38297/1937, Sir Armigel Wade to Sir George Tomlinson, personal letter of 27 January 1937.
28. Interview 230T.
29. There was apparently heavy settler pressure behind the forced retirement of W. Macgregor Ross as Director of Public Works in 1923. Always a caustic critic of the settlers and of the toadying of some government officials to settler interests, MacGregor Ross finally clashed with both the settlers and Governor Northey and Chief Secretary Bowring over his charge of a conflict of interest in the routing of Uasin-Gishu branch of the Railway through properties held by Lord Delamere and Major Grogan. (See the papers in PRO/CO 533/280, especially the Despatches nos. 177 and 178 of 22 July 1922.) In 1952-53, settler pressures were apparently behind the replacement of the Chief Native Commissioner and Chief Secretary as a quid pro quo for settler acceptance of the Lyttleton constitutional reforms. (Confidential information.)
30. George Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya, up to 1945" in V. Harlow, et.al., History of East Africa, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, page 318. An illustration of Scott's connections can be found in his personal letters to Cunliffe-Lister contained in PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33.
31. Gregory, op.cit., pages 120-122.
32. Interview 223S.
33. Interview 217FS.
34. House of Commons, Hansard, 5g, V. 219, C 2712.
35. Interview 221S.
36. PRO/CO 544/42, Minutes of the Executive Council of 1 April, 1933.
37. On Northey's investment, see the enclosures to Despatch no. 283 of 9 March, 1922 and Colonial Office comments relating to it in PRO/CO 533/276. On the farms of the P.C., Rift Valley, see Minutes of the Executive Council of 10 July, 1936 in PRO/CO 544/47. A survey of the Executive Council minutes between 1931 and 1939 revealed approval by the council of 18 investments by Administrative officers (10 in land, 8 in business or commercial ventures) and 27 by departmental officers (24 in land and 3 in business or commercial ventures).
38. "Memorandum from Professor Julian S. Huxley, King's College, University of London" Joint Select Committee: Appendices, quoted in Gregory, op.cit., page 141.

39. Sir Edward Gregg, for example, was an admirer of Mussolini and occasionally affected his own version of a black-shirt uniform in public. "On one occasion, he admonished the Church for neglecting to offer prayers for the health of the Governor." Ibid., page 55.

40. Ibid., pages 25-45.

41. George Bennett, "Imperial Paternalism: The Representation of African Interests in the Kenya Legislative Council" in K. Robinson and F. Madden, Essays in Imperial Government, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, pages 150-152. A particular thorn in the side of the Administration was W.E. Owen, Archdeacon of Kavirondo who frequently criticized government policy and wrote to newspapers in the U.K. to expose 'abuses' by settlers and officials. See, for example, his complaints in 1929 over the use of forced labor by the government and the official reactions in PRO/CO 533/386/5612.

42. Oliver, op.cit., page 290.

43. The response of the British government to Indian interests in East Africa was a function of its sensitivity to nationalism in India itself. The East Africa Indian National Congress maintained contact with both political circles in India and sympathetic individuals and groups in London. The willingness of the India Office to defend Indian interests in Kenya is another example of the tendency of British civil servants to identify with 'their' people even if it set them against their peers in the Colonial Office. The primary occasions for the expansion of Indian-settler communal clashes into imperial scale conflicts were during the "Indian Question" controversy of 1921-23, the fights over taxation and financial control in 1933 and 1936, and the attempts to implement the Kenya Land Commission recommendations between 1934-1938. In 1922, the Colonial and Indian Offices hammered out the Wood-Winterton proposals for a Kenya settlement on the basis of a common Indian-European electoral roll, but these foundered in the face of bitter settler opposition (Gregory, op.cit., pages 20-21). The promulgation of the Highlands Order in Council restricting settlement in the Highlands to Europeans was apparently delayed for four years since "this was a matter of considerable embarrassment to an Imperial Government conscious of Indian Nationalist feeling". (Bennett, "Settlers and Politics..." loc.cit., page 327). In the end, however, the Indian community failed to achieve the basic goals of a common roll, unrestricted immigration and access to land in the Highlands.

44. Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, Interview, August 12, 1969.

45. Ibid. Another settler politician comments that "Under government by agreement, the settler leaders often got into hot water with their followers, but the alternative was a long period of opposition which did much harm both to the settlers and the government". (Interview OIPS)

46. In a letter to Winston Churchill, Scott remarked:

"Personally I am quite sure we are not yet ready for self-government on any terms, but I am anxious we should devote ourselves to building up the position of white settlement ... so that in due course we may be in a position to demand self-government on the lines of Southern Rhodesia...."

(PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33, Lord Francis Scott to Winston Churchill, letter of 7 November, 1933.) A few months earlier Scott had admitted to Cunliffe-Lister that, "In existing circumstances ... it was all 'bunkum' that anyone should talk about self-government". (PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33, extract from note by Sir Samuel Wilson on an Interview with Lord Francis Scott, N.D.)

47. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council, Debates, 19 December, 1929, page 763.

48. Interview 206FS.

49. On the Movement of the Masai and the subsequent controversy which led to the resignation of Governor Girouard, see Mungeam, op.cit., pages 260-273. On the Nandi land issue, see MacGregor Ross, op.cit., page 81.

50. Aaronovitch, op.cit., pages 72-77; Hailey, op.cit., page 750.

51. For the history of the "White Highlands", see Mungeam, op.cit., passim, Dilley, op.cit., passim, and M.F.K. Sorrenson, The Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1968.

52. Thus the Kenya Land Commission, while recognizing a loss by the Kikuyu estimated at 109.5 sq. miles, refused to return the alienated land, (by then under cultivation by settlers) and offered other, often inferior land, in its place, Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556, London 1934, pages 106-144.

53. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council, Debates, 28 October, 1925, pages 782-783.

54. Lord Delamere at a 1908 public meeting with Governor Sir James Hayes-Sadler on the labor situation. Quoted in Dilley, op.cit., page 217.

55. Cashmore, op.cit., page 101. It should also be noted that Administrative officers were legally empowered to conscript able-bodied African men and women for unpaid compulsory labor as porters or, under the direction of official headmen, to work on local public works in the

district. Africans were initially liable for this 'communal' labor for up to 15 days a quarter (later reduced to 6 days a quarter). The Administration regarded this as an obligation for 'community service' rather than forced labor, and as an aspect of traditional society that they were simply making use of for the betterment of the Africans. See also the Shiels-Parkinson exchange discussed below (Note 62).

56. Ibid., page 104.

57. Aaronovitch, op.cit., page 113. On labor legislation in general, see also pages 112-123.

58. In 1939, the Mombasa Labor Commission noted that with regard to the employer's obligation to supply housing for his workers, "We were astonished to find that both government and private employers have been ignorant of this provision in the law or have disregarded it..." (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to Examine Labour Conditions in Mombasa, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1939, paragraph 20.)

59. Wrigley, loc.cit., page 257; Rosberg and Nottingham, op.cit., pages 249-252.

60. Van Zwanenberg, loc.cit., pages 20-26.

61. The Aaronovitch's provided a rough estimate of per capita cash income in Kenya as £208.2 for Europeans and £1.1 for Africans (op.cit., page 151). The inequities of the Kenya tax system were gross. In 1931 the European community paid £42,596 in direct taxes, while the Africans paid £530,877. Customs levies and other indirect and miscellaneous taxes brought the European contribution to £665,781 and the African to £791,100 (Ibid., page 161). During the depression, however, the returns on customs duties, the principal source of revenue from Europeans, fell precipitously and the natives were squeezed to make up for the losses. S. Herbert Frankel noted that "Had it not been for more stringent collection of native hut and poll taxes, which brought in no less than £558,000 in 1933 (only £16,000 less than in 1928), the budget deficits would have been very much greater than they were". (Capital Investment in Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1938, p. 266.)

An even more critical issue was the question of whether the Africans received a fair return in government services for the taxes they paid or if, as critics of the settlers contended, they subsidized the services provided to Europeans. The problem was compounded by the proposition of revenue taken in indirect taxes which made the relative contributions of the various communities difficult to determine. However, during the financial crisis precipitated by the depression, two official commissions investigating the finances of the Colony concluded that the tax burden on the African was too heavy and that the settlers were lightly taxed for the quantity and quality of services they received in return. Both proposed the imposition of income taxes on the settlers, thus precipitating the controversy of 1932-33 and 1936 (Report by the

Financial Commissioner (Lord Moyne) on Certain Questions in Kenya, Cmd. 4093, London 1932; Report by Sir Alan Pim on the Financial Position and System of Taxation of Kenya, Col. 116, London 1936).

There is little doubt, however, that the settlers resisted government efforts to extend services to Africans while at the same time constantly demanding the increase of those provided for their own needs. As noted earlier (Chapter Two) the technical departments were primarily oriented towards serving the needs of the settlers. Moreover, as Dilley notes, "too often grants to native services benefit non-natives equally, if not more than natives, although they are charges against the natives". (Op.cit., page 243.) The Labour Government insisted in its White Paper of 1930 that the "natives should receive, directly and visibly, a fair return for the direct taxation which they are called upon to pay" (Cmd. 3573, London 1930, page 14) and Lord Moyne recommended the establishment of a Native Betterment Fund specifically earmarked for African development. However, in the face of settler resistance, neither the general policy nor the specific proposal were ever implemented.

62. PRO/CO533/391/15906/1929. T. Drummond Shiels, "Memorandum on Alleged Injustices to the Native Peoples in Kenya, with Special Reference to the Lumbwa" 11 February, 1930, page 3. This memo precipitated what was perhaps the most significant debate within the Colonial Office on policy in Kenya during the 1919-1939 period. Shiels' chief antagonist was A.C.C. Parkinson, then an assistant secretary in the East African Department, who replied with a 49-page memorandum that attempted to refute in detail each of Shiels' critical marginal notes on the first document. ("Memorandum" 5 March, 1930, and "Comments on Dr. Shiels' Marginal Notes" 10 March, 1930.) Parkinson was supported by W.C. Bottomley; ("Memorandum" 12 March, 1930) one of the Under Secretaries in the Office, and the debate continued, on and off, until July 1930, without any definite conclusions resulting. The debate covered almost all of the salient issues relating to Kenya: taxation, labor, settler influence, education, and development. What is especially revealing, however, from an organizational standpoint, is that Parkinson, whose previous remarks in the files indicate he was far from an uncritical supporter for either the settlers or the Kenya government, felt constrained to defend them both against the outside politician in the Office (Shiels). So vigorously did he do so that Shiels protested that:

"... he mistook my object and did not meet my queries as I had intended. He regarded my memo as an attack on the Kenya government and himself as its champion, and set himself to put the very best force on all the aspects of my enquiry.... Mr. Parkinson has regarded himself as a special pleader...." (Minutes of 15 March, 1930.)

63. Aaronovitch, Op.cit., page 162.

64. PRO/CO 533/391/5906/1926, Shiels "Memorandum..." The settler also benefitted from special freight rates on the Railroad which subsidized cereal production even though it led to heavy deficits for the railroad during the depression. (Aaronovitch, Op.cit., pages 78-79.)

65. Van Zwanenberg, Loc.cit., pages 19-20. The ratio of debt charges to domestic exports was even more striking, rising from 17.9% in 1928 to the extremely high level of 53.7% in 1934. (Frankel, op.cit., pages 182-183.)

66. Ibid., page 25.

67. Dilley, op.cit., page 246. Lord Moyne recommended an investigation of the 'notorious' use of funds by the European councils (op.cit., Cmd. 4093, pages 31-32).

68. The equivocation and ambiguity of the White Paper can be seen in the following excerpts (emphasis added):

"Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it definitely necessary to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the municipal races should conflict, the former should prevail. Obviously, the interests of the other communities, European, Indian, and Arab, must severally be safeguarded. Whatever the circumstances in which members of these communities have entered Kenya, there will be no drastic action or reversal of measures already introduced, such as may have been contemplated in some quarters, the result of which might be to destroy or impair the existing interests of those already settled in Kenya. But in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races. It is not necessary to attempt to elaborate this position; the lines of development are as yet in certain directions undetermined.... This paramount duty of trusteeship will continue, as in the past, to be carried out under the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the agents of the Imperial Government, and by them alone." (Indians in Kenya, Cmd. 1922, London, 1923.)

69. Dilley, op.cit., pages 140, 167-168, 179-187, 206-208; Gregory, op.cit., pages 42-45, 50-55; Rosberg and Nottingham, op.cit., pages 69-70.

70. Gregory points out that Governor Grigg was not only antithetic to the policy of paramountcy but sought to conceal the terms of the 1930 White Paper from the African population. In the face of such intransigence, the Secretary of State, Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) certainly had good grounds and clear precedent in Kenyan history for dismissing Grigg. However, for reasons that remain obscure, he vacillated over insisting on implementation of his stated policy and the question of the proper relationship between settlers and Africans remained confused and unresolved. (Op.cit., pages 122, 140-145.)

71. PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33. "Note by Sir Samuel Wilson on Discussion between the Secretary of State and Lord Francis Scott, at which Lord Plymouth and Sir S. Wilson were present", 2 August, 1933 (Wilson was the then Permanent Secretary of the Colonial Office).

72. In 1939, 750 of the total of 1,250 positions in the Kenya Government were filled by the European Local Civil Service. The discontents of this section of the bureaucracy, particularly in relation to the expatriate 'career' service officers standing over them, are documented in the Report of the Kenya European Local Civil Service Committee, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1939, passim.

73. PRO/CO 544/47, "Minutes of the Executive Council" of 6 March, 1936; 20 March, 1936; and 16 April, 1937.

74. J. Flood, quoted in van Zwanenberg, loc.cit., page 30.

75. PRO/CO 533/436/3198/33. Letter to the Times of 13 August, 1933. Another C.O. official noted tartly "Me thinks the writer doth protest too much".

76. For example, in December 1932, a controversy broke out over the alienation of African lands in the newly discovered gold fields of Western Kenya. Over the next eleven months, some 174 articles on the subject appeared in the British press, mostly in the Times and the Manchester Guardian, but also in other major London and provincial dailies and in such important journals of opinion as the Economist, the Spectator, and the New Statesman. In February, and March, 1933 no less than 32 questions were asked in the House of Commons, mostly by Labour M.P.'s, who attempted to get the Secretary of State to reveal the financial interests involved in the mining operation, the number of European prospectors admitted, the provision made for the protection and compensation of native rights in the area, and the operation in the situation of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930. The Colonial Office itself received letters and petitions from almost 300 individuals and groups, the vast majority protesting the violation of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance and the breach of promises to the natives on the security of their land. A sample of the individuals and groups who protested gives some idea of the range of opinion that could be mobilized in support of 'native rights': Sir Herbert Samuel, W.G. Ormsby-Gore, M.P. (later Secretary of

State for the Colonies, 1936-38), the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Church Mission Society, The Church of Scotland, the Society of Friends, the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, the Negro Welfare Association, the Llandodno District Women's Institute, the London Group on African Affairs, the Leeds Temperance and Social Welfare Union, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the Cardiff Trades and Labour Council, the Federation of University Conservative and Unionist Associations, the Leeds Labour Party, and the Hendon Division Liberal Association.
(PRO/IND 29998/Files 3006/1-5 A)

77. The most notable example is the Shiels-Parkinson exchange in PRO/CO 533/391/15906/1929. (See note 66 above.)

78. Interview 209FS.

79. Interview 201FS.

80. According to one D.C.:

"I swore I would never serve in a settled area again ... it nearly sent me up the wall, a sense of frustration. It wasn't my idea of administration and it was to my mind phony..." (Interview 103F.)

THE AFRICAN ARENA: THE PROVINCIAL
ADMINISTRATION AND AFRICAN POLITICS

The African districts were the 'real' world of colonial administration where the officers of the Provincial Administration operated the Kenya system of direct rule with its high degree of discretion in relation to the central authorities and unusual capacity for direct intervention into African society, unmediated by intervening traditional political institutions. Free of direct contact with powerful immigrant groups, field officers constructed a system predicated on the preservation of unchallenged administrative control in which overt conflict and political activity was defined as illegitimate, while a degree of covert politics was tacitly accepted as part of the 'game' of administration. The D.C., in the phrase popular in Kenya between the wars, was 'the King in his castle'. At the same time, however, the settler presence and the parameters of the European political arena indirectly exercised a significant impact on the patterns of administrative behavior by both intensifying imperial paternalism and placing additional constraints on the ability of the Provincial Administration to respond to the consequences of socio-economic change among the African population.

I. Paternalism and Self-Interest in the Provincial Administration

The settler presence in Kenya added an external dimension to and substantially intensified the paternalism of administrative officers in the field. One administrator stated emphatically, "I think anybody who was really serious in the Administration regarded our jobs as being

sort of a protective screen for the African because there was no one else to look after their interests."¹ For most administrators the settlers were the principal source of the exploitation from which they wanted to protect the African. During the first fifty years of British rule the claim of the Provincial Administration to be the proper guardian of African interests was widely accepted among individuals and groups in the metropole who distrusted to one degree or another the intentions of the settlers, including the Native Rights Lobby, colonial scholars, and officials at the Colonial Office. Without the protective screen of the field administration, it was felt that the Africans would be subject to the worst abuses of unbridled capitalist exploitation. During the inter-war years the efforts of the settlers to gain control of the colony were countered by the insistence of the metropolitan authorities on the maintenance of undivided imperial control, i.e., the exclusion of the settlers from any direct involvement in native administration.²

It is of crucial importance to note the extent to which this view of the Provincial Administration as the protector of the African coincided with the organizationally-defined interest of field officers in guarding their freedom of action. The field administrators came to regard the preservation and protection of their own discretion as identical to the protection of the welfare of the African. The claim to be the sole legitimate protector of the African was used not only to fend off threats of settler interference, but also intervention in the districts by the technical departments of the government. In some instances there was even feuding between administrators in neighboring districts each

intent on protecting his people. By the same token, settler infringement on African interests tended to be seen as a threat to the independence of the Provincial Administration. In the end the intertwining of paternalism and self-interest led administrators to attempt to protect the populations of the African districts from anyone who was not a member of the Provincial Administration. As one field officer perceptively noted in describing his feelings towards the settlers:

... it was a baneful influence and I resented it. But I think the truth of the matter was that I resented it like I resented the Supreme Court and the Police. I didn't like chaps to get between me and my people ... you must be in charge, there must be no interference, and the settlers were rivals. What's so funny about it in a way is it was exactly the same attitude we had toward the African politicians. 3

II. The Basic Patterns of Provincial Administration

The internal structural and cognitive factors discussed in the first section of this study that made the maintenance of control the dominant objective of the Provincial Administration in Kenya were thus strongly reinforced by external characteristics of the settler influence in the European political arena. The development of the basic patterns of administrative action in the field focused around the achievement of the critical goal of unchallenged control. Aside from a brief and quickly forgotten memorandum issued by Governor Girouard in 1910,⁴ the Provincial Administration possessed no handbook or set of standing orders containing an explicit statement of the principles and methods of native administration. These emerged, rather, from the largely ad hoc responses of field officers to specific situations and

were incorporated into the accumulated conventional wisdom of the Provincial Administration that was handed down from one generation of officers to another.

A. Methods of Administration

The objective of control actually involved two distinct dimensions. One involved the maintenance of maximum local control over the African population within a district, while the other consisted in the maintenance of maximum discretion in relation to the higher authorities of the central administration in Nairobi and the settler-dominated political arena. These two dimensions of 'good' administration were linked: local control was a necessary precondition for the maintenance of discretion. Where control was lacking the situation invited the intervention of the Secretariat and political attacks by the settlers and could cloud the career of the officer involved. The goals of local control and discretion were articulated through the principles of 'prestige' and 'efficiency' that formed the foundation stones of administrative action in the field. These two principles stipulated no specific patterns of action, but rather the two key images that such action should project; the former was directed at the Africans and the latter at the central administration and the settlers. 'Prestige' facilitated control, while the image of 'efficiency' protected discretion.

'Prestige' was a complex, multi-faceted concept. The word recurs again and again in the papers of the Provincial Administration; virtually any policy issue or major event in the colony or a particular district would provoke discussion of the actual or potential effect of

various courses of action on the 'prestige' of the organization. The core of the prestige of the Administration was the achievement of authority, i.e., the acceptance by the indigenous population of the legitimacy of imperial power and their compliance with its directives. More than simply a recognition of a need for subjective legitimacy, prestige indicated the kind of image on which such authority was thought to be based. Administrators believed that prestige rested on "moral ascendancy; their word must be believed and obeyed".⁵ In actual practice it tended to mean the projection, from the background of presumed European moral and intellectual superiority, of an image of administrative infallibility and omnipotence. The administration must always and everywhere appear to be in complete and unchallenged control of any situation. Neither the Administration nor any individual officer could ever admit to miscalculation or failure, even in reversing previous policy. No action could be taken that might appear to be a concession to African demands; all policy had to appear to be the result of the unconstrained will and benevolent concern of the Administration.

Thus prestige meant that the African had to always stand in awe of the Administration. It was on this basis that a handful of administrative officers could command and expect obedience from millions of Africans, for the individual officers isolated in rural districts had little else with which to back up their orders. In the end prestige came down to a symbolic power capability that made it possible for the Administration to rule an alien population with only the most slender resources of coercive power: a few battalions of the King's African Rifles scattered through the colony, a few tribal police (often unarmed),

and, occasionally, a small detachment of the regular police in the districts.⁶

However, to establish the symbolic power capability intrinsic to administrative prestige, real power had to be periodically demonstrated. The African had to be aware that non-compliance with the directives of the Administration would be punished. It was thus in relation to the establishment and maintenance of prestige that the use of force became a valuable instrument of a colonial administration. The first Commissioner of the East African Protectorate, Sir Arthur Hardinge noted:

Our prestige by which we alone keep them in check, depends on their believing that our orders once given cannot be disregarded with impunity.⁷

This sense of administrative necessity combined with administrators' image of the African and their belief in the efficacy of physical punishment made the skillful use of the limited physical force available a matter of critical importance.

Once effective control was obtained, the Administration could then afford to exercise its paternal care over the African. Continual vigilance, however, remained necessary in later years to insure that the original lessons were not forgotten. As Cashmore points out:

... administrators were sensitive to any sign of disobedience. It was always necessary to act swiftly and severely, lest little troubles left unchecked led to terrible endings... All subscribed to that second of the Punjab principles that a shot in time saves nine.⁸

Prestige having been established by deadly force, administrators maintained it by resort to lesser levels of coercion. In addition to their ability to arrest, fine, imprison, or arrange for the deportation to a

remote area of Africans who refused to comply with official directives, administrators also had the ability to levy 'collective punishments' on whole tribes or sections of tribes. These collective punishments usually took the form of large fines and were primarily imposed for such illegal activities as cattle theft (an endemic practice among many of the pastoral tribes), inter-tribal raiding, or refusal to hand over to the Administration those guilty of serious crimes. Where instances of overt unrest occurred, the population of the area was forced to pay a levy to cover the costs of the additional police or armed forces brought in to restore order.

By maintaining unchallenged control, i.e., 'law, order, and good government', administrators achieved the basis for projecting an image of 'efficiency' to the higher authorities in Nairobi. For the latter, the primary criteria for judging the field officers was, in the words of Governor Girouard, "in the ability they have displayed in procuring the contentment and satisfaction in their Districts".⁹ In practice the central administration measured 'contentment and satisfaction' by a steady flow of tax revenue from a district and the absence of any overt conflict or disorder that might divert their attention from the affairs of the immigrant communities in the main political arena. The best run districts were those that Nairobi heard the least about. The factors that prompted central intervention into the local affairs of a district were thus essentially the same as those that would bring Colonial Office intervention into the affairs of a particular colony.

The crucial methodological problems of the 'art' of native administration related to exactly how field officers could achieve and

maintain prestige and efficiency. Given the latitude each officer had in working out his own modus vivendi with the local African population, these methods were approached in highly personalistic terms. Prestige and authority were also personal characteristics of each officer that he had continuously to create and maintain by the force of his own personality in every district in which he served. This was tacitly recognized by administrators as involving a complex and subtle game in which Africans would constantly test their authority and probe for personal weaknesses.¹⁰ A critical showdown would often come early in an officer's tour of duty in a new district. As Cashmore describes it:

Administration was a game of wits. Honours went to the side with the soundest wind. Simulated anger was one thing, but genuine rage spelt defeat. Each officer had to evolve his own methods: bluff, anger, pretended idiocy (Allah showed mercy to the witless), humour, familiarity, aloofness, or goodnatured enthusiasm. There was no single technique; the aim was to be en rapport.¹¹

Where he failed to establish his personal authority, an administrator not only damaged the prestige of the Administration as a whole, but also he suffered a deep personal humiliation that could ruin his career.

It was on the techniques of playing this game that the traditional wisdom of the Administration provided a series of proverbs to guide the field officer in the various situation he was likely to encounter. Cashmore goes on to list several of the most important:

When in doubt create a crisis.

In each new district one has to have a showdown. Choose your battlefield and win. After that, bluff will last to the end of the tour.

No officer is any use till he served at least six months in a district.

Remember, one only finds the true reason for any African action months afterwards.¹²

To these were added a variety of pointers on judging the reactions of different tribes. Thus, the Kikuyu were regarded as intelligent and industrious, but unstable and untrustworthy, the Luo as straightforward and stolid, the Kamba as loyal and good-natured, the Masai as the aloof 'noble savage', the Giriama (in the Coast Province) as backward and apathetic, etc. Each tribe acquired its own stereotype and was the subject of a considerable amount of administrative folklore.

Perhaps the most critical technique for the field administrator was knowing the uses of bluff. It was here that the cool, unflappable air of command became the administrator's most valuable resource. At an extreme it meant the ability to single-handedly confront an angry crowd of several hundred Africans as if he were backed by a full company of troops. It also meant knowing the limits of bluff and when to avoid confrontation which could not be won. One of the pioneer administrators wrote of the Kamba "nothing makes one more helpless ... than his discovery that your threat was an empty one", while one of his successors of forty years later noted:

The first rule was never give an order unless you could enforce it.... The second rule was never give an order that was likely to be disobeyed. 13

The maintenance of both organizational and personal prestige required the continual demonstration of the Administration's presence in every part of a district, and for the individual field officer this meant regular personal tours of his area, usually on foot (until the introduction of four-wheel drive vehicles after 1945). The belief in 'safari' as the only effective method for maintaining the Administra-

tion's position and for learning local sentiments and conditions was an enduring, almost sacred, principle of the Provincial Administration. In his 1910 memorandum Governor Girouard ordered all district level field officers to spend a total of at least three months a year on safari in order to "show himself to both settlers and natives and hear their complaints at first hand".¹⁴ The cardinal sin was to become desk-bound with bureaucratic office work and never get to 'know' the district on a personal basis. More than forty years later, an officer sought to defend the Provincial Administration against charges that it was 'out of touch' with the Africans by demonstrating that modern administrators spent just as much time on tour as their predecessors.¹⁵

Administrators resorted to a variety of methods for, in their phrases, 'getting the feel of ...' or 'feeling the pulse of a district'. Given the difficulties of communication with Africans, stemming from the general failure of administrators to learn the local vernaculars and the reliance on Swahili and interpreters which made misunderstanding or wilful distortion an ever-present possibility, officers often relied upon solely behavioral indicators for judging the effectiveness of control and the contentment of the local population in an area. The most popular measure was the flow of tax payments which was read as an indicator of both the acceptance of the Administration's authority and the general economic conditions in a district. A sudden downturn in revenue through either difficulties in meeting the tax payments or evidence of deliberate evasion was immediate evidence of trouble brewing. Another measure was simply judgment of African facial expressions and responses when an officer toured an area; e.g. were the

faces smiling and responses friendly, or were they sullen and cold.¹⁶

Direct communication with the African population was generally through barazas, open public meetings held in various parts of a district when administrators were on tour. However, the communication at these meetings tended to be unidirectional in the form of orders or announcements by the Administration to the Africans. Consultation of local 'opinion' tended to be confined to the Administration's conventional sources of information: the African employees of the Administration itself and selected local 'notables'. Moreover, some transcripts of barazas from the early 1930's indicate that aside from the D.C. or D.O. present, most of the talking was done by the official chiefs or headmen of the area.¹⁷ The comments by ordinary Africans tended to be confined to minor complaints about inequities in the implementation of established policies or requests for more services. The individual African could not publicly complain about or challenge policy itself or criticise the performance of European or African officials without provoking a negative response. For example, one D.C. told a group of Africans protesting a government decision that:

The decision was a matter for Government and not for them and that opposition on their part would not only injure their own people but would bring upon [them] the displeasure of Government and if carried to any excess undoubtedly would result in their own punishment. 18

The methods of native administration implied a role for the Africans quite unlike the conventional relationship between a public agency and its clientele. In a very real sense the Africans were treated as members rather than clients of the organization. The character of the Administration as an elite corps is more fully understood when we

see that, in practice, administrators extended the boundaries of the organization to include the Africans they ruled as the missing rank and file. The role of the African was to give a disciplined and obedient response to the directives of the Administration. Where he complied with administrative demands, the African was promised benevolent care and guidance on the long road to higher civilization.¹⁹

Where he challenged or resisted authority, he risked swift, even severe, punishment. Administrators dealt with Africans through a blend of moral exhortation, didactic tutelage, threat, bluff, and coercion.

The role the African was expected to play left no room for any political action. The open expression of conflict was frowned upon and administrators considered the organized pursuit of political goals by Africans to be both premature and unnecessary.²⁰ Administrators would listen to grievances and complaints that did not directly touch upon their own position or actions, but any overt resistance to official policy was subject to punishment and complaints about individual officers or the Administration as a whole were generally ignored. Since the actions of the Provincial Administration were, by definition, benevolent and 'in the best interests' of the African, its policies and structure were not regarded as the subject of legitimate complaint. Africans thus faced an overtly rigid and authoritarian organization that expected immediate compliance with its directives, denied them any legitimate role in the formulation of policy, and regarded their preferences with a patronizing scepticism.

The system was not monolithic, however, and Africans did acquire some, if very limited, influence over the Provincial Administra-

tion. This was felt in the first instance through the covert and informal politics tacitly accepted by administrators as part of the 'game' of administration. Many of the feuds and conflicts of traditional politics continued to operate in the districts and were complicated by new sources of power and opportunities for personal aggrandizement created by the imperial presence. A friendly D.C. was an invaluable resource in these conflicts, while an unsympathetic one was a threat to be guarded against and neutralized if possible. It was in this context that the personal authority of an administrative officer was constantly challenged and his strength and shrewdness tested in a political game of wits. Administrative officers were generally aware of the active political process going on beneath the surface of daily life to a greater or lesser degree that depended on their sensitivity to the nuances of social and political relationships, their general knowledge of the society and culture of the people in a district, and their ability to develop widespread sources of information. They generally categorized the intricate intrigues and maneuverings of local politics as fitina (plotting, malicious rumours, skullduggery, etc.) and came to see African politics in the districts as usually involving lying, conspiratorial chicanery, and unvarnished self-seeking.

On a more general level field officers were responsive to African opinions or preferences as a matter of political prudence. Africans could humiliate and harass administrators they did not like, sometimes to a point where he was rendered obviously ineffective and would be transferred. There was no guarantee, however, that his successor

would be any better. Unpopular policies were occasionally modified or dropped when administrators sensed that widespread resistance might lead to a significant breakdown of control. Even this residual African influence was, nevertheless, thwarted when administrators were convinced of the importance of a particular measure and were willing to employ threats and compulsion to force its acceptance.

III. The Instruments of Control: Chiefs, Tribunals and the African Colonial Elite

Administrative officers tended to carry a stereotype of traditional African political systems oriented around the existence of a 'chief' heading a hierarchic structure of authority. The chief could deal directly with the British in the name of the whole tribe and his effective authority could be incorporated into the structure of colonial administration, thereby preserving some of the aura of traditional legitimacy for the colonial system. By controlling the chief the administrator could control the whole tribe effectively and cheaply (given the small number of British officials available). This was the essential assumption behind the systems of 'indirect rule' developed in the West African colonies, especially Nigeria. Without chiefs as intermediaries between the Provincial Administration and the masses, it was feared that the fabric of tribal society would rapidly disintegrate and leave the handful of field officers to face an uncontrollable rabble.²²

However, with the exception of the small Wanga 'kingdom' among a section of the Luhya in Nyanza, the African peoples of Kenya lived in small-scale dispersed societies based upon segmentary systems of

corporate kin groups. Authority over a limited range of political and legal issues was commonly handled by councils of clan or lineage elders, along with a system of age-grades or age sets, as among the Kikuyu, or a few differentiated political offices, such as the Ruoth of the Luo and the Laibon of the Masai and Kipsigis. Authority within these societies was circumscribed and fragmented, councils and leaders generally dealing with only certain delimited subjects (land, warfare, civil disputes, etc.), and seldom exercising effective power over more than a small geographic area. There were no individuals or councils who either controlled or could act in behalf of all of what the British considered to be a single 'tribe'. Fighting between sections of a single tribe was not uncommon, and serious internal conflicts were frequently dealt with through fission and session, with segments of clans or lineages splitting off and moving to other, often uninhabited, areas. Several of the agricultural tribes thus had moving frontiers of settlement extending from a core area. The various tribes possessed little corporate self-consciousness as distinctive peoples, but rather were conglomerates of sections sharing a basically similar language and culture. Relations between the various African societies were fluid and unstable, the fortunes of particular groups waxing and waning over time. At the moment the British entered the area to establish control, the power of the Masai was rapidly declining, while that of societies such as the Kikuyu and Nandi was vigorously expanding.

In the light of their stereotype and lack of accurate ethnographic information, British administrators tended to find the traditional

political systems of Kenya confusing and difficult to understand. Errors were common, and in a few instances important indigenous institutions were undetected for many years. There often appeared to be no political authority at all -- as late as 1935 an administrative memorandum noted that "the political organization of government before the British occupation was of a very nebulous character"²³ -- and this contributed to the generally low opinion of the Kenya tribes, especially in comparison with the interlucastine kingdoms of Uganda which fit the prevailing stereotype so closely.

Nevertheless, administrators felt a compelling need for African subordinates who could provide a continuous administrative presence in local areas and ensure that the commands of tiny European staff were carried out. From the beginning administrators began to appoint African subordinates, often with little effort to find out about the existing authority structures. These men had no traditional sanction for their positions; many were marginal individuals of low status in their own societies who made themselves useful to the new conquerors and were rewarded with positions of power.²⁴ By 1902 the ad hoc practice crystallized into a system in which each district was divided into locations headed by an appointed headman responsible to the District Commissioner, thus creating a native administrative cadre appointed, paid, and controlled by the Provincial Administration.

There was, however, considerable confusion among administrators about the status of the system they had created. Although the system was one of direct rule, Governor Girouard, coming from Northern Nigeria, introduced some of the concepts of indirect rule. He insisted on using

indigenous authorities as instruments of local control, but defined them as "the Chiefs and Elders".²⁵ The chiefs thus came to be considered as established facts of tribal life rather than the Administration's own creations, and were increasingly relied upon as an instrument for the preservation of tribal society. Despite the caveats of outside observers such as Lord Hailey, who noted that "though the term is frequently employed in Kenya, there are no native authorities in the sense in which the term is used in the ordinances of other territories",²⁶ administrators tended to treat the chiefs in many contexts as if they were in fact indigenous roles. The contradiction in administrative policy was pointedly described by the anthropologist, W.E.H. Stanner, in a study of the Kamba of Kitui District, and his remarks are applicable to the general situation in the colony:

... an arbitrary administrative system was set up under which, as each district was brought under control, a native was singled out and was placed in authority over it with powers conferred by the Village Headman Ordinance of 1902. There is no evidence that such districts (now termed 'locations') were, as they have been officially said to be, 'roughly coincident with the area over which some native chief or council of elders exercised a precarious jurisdiction'.... Nor can it be said that the appointment to positions of great authority of individuals who possessed no traditional right whatever to exercise such powers was in keeping with the still defended principle that 'progressive changes in the social, material, and moral condition of native life must be effected not by abrupt or violent departure from established custom or tradition but by fostering or elaborating whatever there may be of an indigenous system of local government. 27

A. The Role of the Kenya Chief

The contradictions in administrative policy made the role of the official chief extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, the chief was expected to be the direct administrative subordinate of the District

Commissioner who judged his performance primarily on the grounds of his "ability to stimulate a satisfactory flow of taxation and ability to maintain disciplinary control of a location."²⁸ On the other hand, however, the chief was also expected to be the 'representative' or 'spokesman' for his people, and the Provincial Administration depended upon them as the primary source of information about local conditions and opinion. As official appointees they had little or no traditional sanction for this role. Moreover, if they were to fulfill the role of tribal leaders, they would have to express the grievances of the local population and challenge the Provincial Administration over unpopular policies. The strain of the chief's position was manifest in situations in which they were ordered by the D.C. to implement unpopular measures. If they complied, and satisfied their official role, they risked losing all authority among the local population and being identified as tools of the colonial power. If they resisted, they might acquire some independent authority as tribal leaders, but risked dismissal from their posts on the grounds of 'inefficiency' or 'corruption'. As one D.C. noted of Koinange Mbiu, one of the most famous and powerful of the official Kikuyu chiefs:

He poses (to the D.C.) as an exemplary adviser and then (to the tribe) as the saviour of his race, even if this means a prompt reversal of the policy avowed. 29

Only a minority of shrewd and skilful men, such as Koinange, who held his post from 1905-1950, were able to successfully juggle the conflicting dimensions of the chief's role. Administrative records contain constant complaints by field officers about the inefficiency, incompetence, and dishonesty of the chiefs or of the degeneration of

seemingly able and honest men into apathetic inactivity and corruption. In many districts chiefs were frequently deposed and replaced by the Provincial Administration.³⁰ However, despite complaints and high turnover, the British officials, as Stanner points out, never questioned the "ultimate wisdom and efficacy of the headman system itself".³¹

The ambiguity of the chiefs' position also showed in the varied and often inconsistent methods by which D.C.s attempted to combine some degree of traditional sanction, popular choice, and ultimate administrative control in the selection process. Among the Luo in Central Nyanza District administrators tried to identify the 'leading' or 'chiefly' clan of a location and appoint the clan head as chief. In North Nyanza administrators attempted at first to use Wanga agents as chiefs in other Luhya locations, but these men were often placed over traditional enemies of the Wanga and the resulting discontent led to a gradual phasing out of this policy. Among the Kikuyu and Kamba chiefs were chosen without any systematic regard to traditional roles or institutions. Yet the chiefs of the Meru and Embu, closely related to the Kikuyu in language and culture, were generally selected from the ranks of the traditional elders. There was a tendency, reflecting the tendency of administrators to treat the chiefs as if they were indigenous positions, for the office to become hereditary within certain families and lineages. However, where the hereditary principle conflicted with the demands of efficiency and competence, administrators generally opted for the latter. To introduce a degree of popular participation in the selection process, they often held open barazas at which nominations were invited for the position and the support for

various candidates measured through informal election procedure, e.g., a show of hands or a line-up behind preferred candidates, or extended discussions to gauge the 'sense' of the baraza. In the face of the priorities of control, the Provincial Administration ultimately appointed the man it wanted when traditional connection or popular choice produced unacceptable candidates.³²

The recruitment of chiefs was complicated by their very low salaries and the fact that they could be neither transferred or promoted. In 1940 the highest paid chief in Kiambu received only 100 pounds a year, while a few years later the salary range in various districts was between 40 and approximately 300 shillings a month.³³ In some of the larger and more populous districts a few chiefs were designated Senior Chiefs, which mainly meant a higher salary scale, while in the 1940's a very few Divisional Chiefs in charge of three or four locations were appointed. These career limitations made it difficult to recruit able and more educated younger men, and the Kenya chiefs were generally considered to be less educated and efficient than their better paid counterparts in Uganda and Tanganyika.³⁴

As difficult as the role of chief was, it nevertheless created opportunities for ambitious men to acquire a concentration of economic, social, and political power unprecedented in tribal traditions. They were able to use their connection with the Provincial Administration to the advantage of themselves, their kin, and their allies in the local area. Koinange, for example, was described as "loyal to government and only treads consciously on its corns for his own advantage or that of some other Kikuyu or group of Kikuyu (which may come to the same thing)".³⁵

The earliest chiefs, mostly illiterate pagans, used their positions for the pursuit of largely traditional goals of wealth and status. Their successors, increasingly mission-educated Christians, tended to pursue new opportunities for wealth and status brought by British rule and often became rich and 'progressive' farmers.³⁶ They also benefited from a preferred access to Western education for their families and friends that conferred the increasingly necessary prerequisite for official appointments. This new African administrative elite was already visible before the First World War and during the inter-war period they steadily increased their wealth in land and capital, especially in the Kikuyu districts.

Much of the wealth and power acquired by chiefs was not officially sanctioned by the Provincial Administration. Their positions created the opportunities and their low salaries the incentives for the acquisition of extra-legal income, and there were frequent charges against the chiefs of extortion, bribery, and general corruption and abuse of power.³⁷

The power accumulated by many chiefs upset the often delicate power balances achieved in traditional political processes and made them a central focus of political competition and conflict.³⁸ The concentrated resources available to them enabled many chiefs to dispense patronage and acquire large personal followings. Much of this political activity went on below the view of administrative officers. The chiefs' authority to issue orders for the maintenance of law and order in their locations permitted them to harass and restrict the activities of their opponents in tribal politics with the tacit support of local

administrators, thus turning the latter into their unwitting allies. While the actual extent of the chiefs' influence on field administrators cannot be accurately documented, and probably varied widely according to the individuals involved on both sides, there is little doubt that the chiefs were the principal players of the 'game of administration' recognized by administrators and some, such as Koinange, were performers of consummate skill.

B. The Native Tribunals

In the African districts the authority of the Provincial Administration included responsibility for the administration of justice as an intrinsic part of its control function. Since British law was regarded as too 'advanced' for the level of evolution reached by the African societies of Kenya and its introduction would disrupt tribal life, administrators sought some means of using African customary law and jural institutions. Here too, however, the results were confused and contradictory.

At first chiefs were permitted to try civil and minor criminal disputes in their own courts, but the opportunities this provided for manipulation and corruption were all too apparent. In 1911 Governor Girouard directed the Provincial Administration to attempt to use the councils of elders that traditionally administered tribal law and a policy of developing native tribunals began. However, as Lord Hailey pointed out in 1940, the tribunals that were created had "little in common with the courts recognised by native custom", but were, as he added later, "largely the result of experiments made by administrative

officers on their personal initiative and responsibility."³⁹ The Native Tribunals Ordinance of 1930 gave the Provincial Administration wide discretion in establishing the form and functions of African courts. While the traditional councils of elders had exercised authority over very restricted areas, the tribunals created by the Provincial Administration generally served three or four locations together. The chiefs were excluded from the tribunals, whose members were appointed by the P.C., with some effort at informal consultation, ostensibly from the ranks of the traditional elders and other locally influential persons. As the system developed, however, the traditional elders were increasingly pushed aside into a minor role.

There was considerable confusion about what law the tribunals actually administered. In the areas of Central and Nyanza Provinces most affected by social change, customary law was itself in a state of flux that led to conflicts over the traditional rule to be applied in particular cases. The administration made no provision for legislating changes in customary law to deal with changing social practice in such critical areas as land tenure and transfer. Moreover, responsibility for trying offences under a variety of Kenya Government ordinances was increasingly delegated to the tribunals. By 1945 some 27 ordinances were triable in whole or in part of the native tribunals, with even more added to the tribunals in Nyanza and Central Provinces.⁴⁰

The tribunals were also troubled by problems of corruption. The tribunal elders received only meager salaries from the government which they supplemented by the traditional method of collecting fees from the parties in a case. This practice led to a suspicion among

many administrators of widespread corruption in the tribunals, although it was difficult for them to prove their allegations.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the system, especially in the Kikuyu districts, was open to manipulation by the new African colonial elite, including chiefs, other government employees, school teachers, and a few wealthy farmers and traders, who had the money to pay off the court elders and pursue lengthy and expensive appeals. This was particularly true in an increasing number of land disputes. In 1945 an official investigation of the native tribunals reported:

There were signs that in some areas powerful and influential Africans were abusing their position in order to acquire for themselves large 'estates' at the expense of the more helpless, improvident, or simpleminded members of the community; and there is a strong suspicion that tribunal members have often backed the interests of the new privileged class and have even joined in the 'racket' themselves. 42

The chiefs and tribunals created by the Provincial Administration for the maintenance of tribal controls, and often treated as if they were indigenous institutions, thus actually promoted changes in tribal society leading to the development of a new socio-economic and political elite dependent upon the colonial regime. The emergence of this new elite, in conjunction with other forces of change resulting from the introduction of a capitalist market economy by the immigrant communities, constituted the background for the growth of new patterns of conflict within African society and between Africans and the colonial authorities.

IV. The Emergence of Modern African Politics

In late 1921 and early 1922, at a time of mounting political

conflict between the settlers, the Indian community, and the Administration, a new form of African political activity appeared simultaneously among the Luo and Kikuyu peoples. In Nyanza a Young Kavirondo Association emerged under the leadership of several young, mission-educated Luo and, with the support of several official chiefs, held a series of mass meetings in which grievances were presented to the local Administration in the name of 'Piny Qwacho' ('the Country says' or 'We, the People, say').⁴³ In the Kikuyu areas an East African Association appeared in 1921 under the leadership of Harry Thuku, a clerk in the Treasury in Nairobi. Both associations expressed grievances over increased taxes, unpaid compulsory labor on public works, the use of compulsion by officials to force Africans to work on settler farms, the enforcement of the 'kipande' registration system, and the insecurity of tribal lands in the face of alienations to the settlers. The situation in the Kikuyu areas had a violent conclusion: in March Thuku was arrested and subsequently a confrontation in Nairobi between the police and his followers left 21 Africans dead and 28 wounded.⁴⁴ In the aftermath of both the Thuku affair and the reversal of government labor policy following humanitarian agitation in Britain, the Administration followed a more conciliatory line in Nyanza, and at a baraza in July, 1922 Governor Northey announced a reduction in hut tax, the disbanding of government labor camps, and an end to active labor recruitment by the chiefs and the administrative officers.

While the pre-1914 conflicts between Africans and the colonial authorities essentially represented 'primary resistance' by segments of independent tribal societies against an alien invader whose power and

Intentions were only dimly perceived,⁴⁵ the main thrust of African political activity after 1918 took place within the over-arching institutional framework established by the imperial power and drew upon new organizational techniques to express new issues derived from the forces of socio-economic and political changes introduced by the colonial government and the immigrant communities.

The African political associations that emerged in the inter-war years represented a basically modern and secular response to new patterns of cleavage and conflict and an effort to find a mode of political expression within the colonial system. They articulated demands for the modification and repeal of unpopular administrative policies and, increasingly, for access to the political arena and some influence on the policy process. During the 1920's and 1930's the associations acquired an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the structure of the colonial system, especially the linkages between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat and between Nairobi and London. In addition, they established links with sympathetic individuals and groups in Britain, experimented with a variety of organizational techniques, attempted to use several methods of pressure on the colonial authorities, and began to establish regular links among themselves.

The issues dealt with by the political associations were the direct consequence of the processes of change brought by the colonial presence. The most crucial source of change was the capitalist market economy created by the immigrant communities which involved not only the alienation of African land for settler farms but also the

mobilization of increasing numbers of Africans as either producers of cash crops or laborers in immigrant enterprises. Other factors of change, such as the missions and the Western education they introduced and the colonial administrative system, only acquired their full political significance in relation to the impact of the monetary economy.

The grievances behind the 1921-22 troubles emerged against a backdrop of economic depression that saw a disastrous drop in prices to both European and African producers, a one-third cut in African wages by agreement among European employers, a one-third increase in African taxes to offset falling government revenues, the use of administrators and chiefs to force Africans to work on settler farms, and a "horribly mismanaged" conversion of the currency from the Indian rupee to the Sterling-based East African shilling that led to widespread inflation.⁴⁶

The political associations did not reject Western society and culture, but accepted the value of change and attempted to achieve a selective process of development on their own terms rather than one imposed by fiat by settlers, missionaries, and administrators. Unlike the nationalist movements of West Africa, they were led not by a university-educated elite, but by young men with seldom more than a primary education. These men were not concerned with abstract rights, but focused on specific socio-economic issues in the rural areas and found their base of support among the farmers in the reserves and the laborers on settler farms.⁴⁷ The degree to which rural populations could be mobilized in support of the associations was directly correlated with the extent of social change and the the conflict it generated.

These conflicts were shaped by the settler occupation of vast areas of land and the colonial administrative structure which placed rigid social and spatial boundaries around the tribes, rendering traditional modes of conflict resolution by secession and movement impossible and forcing Africans to fight out their disputes among themselves and with the authorities within a fixed, hierarchically ordered framework. Among the Kikuyu, where change and conflict were most intense, there was the greatest degree of political organization and protest. Less extensive and disruptive change among the Luo and Luhya was reflected in a lower level of political conflict. The new forms of political activity and organization did not appear at all in those tribes that remained untouched by the market economy and continued to live their lives in the traditional manner, notably the coastal peoples and the various pastoral groups. The principle challenge they presented to the Provincial Administration was their persistence in pursuing such traditional activities as inter-tribal raiding and organized cattle rustling.

A. The Kikuyu and the Politics of Land

For the largest tribe in the colony, occupying an area in the center of Kenya between Nairobi in the south and Mount Kenya in the north, the most important result of British rule was the alienation of large tracts of their land to Europeans: some 60,000 acres, mostly in southern Kiambu, were given to settler farmers who transformed much of the area into coffee plantations that were among the richest enterprises in the territory.⁴⁸ In addition, the Kikuyu found

themselves bordered on the south, east, and north by other settler farms, on the southeast by the growing urban center of Nairobi, and on the west by the closed, government-controlled forest preserves of the Aberdare Mountains. This spelled an end to Kikuyu colonization and expansion along their borders, and their sense of loss over the 'stolen lands' was thus compounded by an inability to occupy what might have been theirs if not for the British conquest. The emotional intensity of the land issue was poignantly expressed by Chief Koinange, who told Fenner Brockway in 1950:

When someone steals your ox, it is killed and roasted and eaten. One can forget. When someone steals your land, especially if nearby, one can never forget. It is always there, its trees which were dear friends, its little streams. It is a bitter presence. 49

The alienation of their land generated a deep and abiding distrust of the Administration among the Kikuyu. In 1929 a Colonial Office official noted that "the Kikuyu do not trust the Kenya Government and do not believe in their assurances of a desire to advance the progress and welfare of the natives".⁵⁰ Kikuyu grievances were further inflamed by constant anxiety over the security of their remaining territory, created not only by periodic settler demands for more land, but also by the continual expropriation of small segments of Kikuyu farmland by the Administration for public works, mission schools, hospitals, trading centers, and a power station. To the Administration these projects served the beneficial development of the tribe. However, in Kikuyu eyes these measures, which almost always involved the dispossession of farmers with nowhere else to go, seemed to betoken a European intention to eventually get hold of all of their

land.⁵¹ Such events led to constant Kikuyu demands for both the return of alienated land and the issuance of legal titles to ensure the security of that which remained in tribal hands.⁵²

A series of official measures designed to prevent further alienation of African land actually increased insecurity. For example, the Kikuyu were gravely disturbed by the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 and a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of East Africa which vested all African lands in the Crown and turned them into 'tenants at will' of the Crown authorities.⁵³ In 1932-34 the Kenya Land Commission was convened to find a 'final solution' to the land issue, but the result satisfied only the Administration and the settlers. Biased by instructions from the Colonial Office that the land held by the settlers was inviolable, the Commission rejected the claims of individual tenure advanced by the holders of githaka rights in the alienated areas and treated the issue as a communal one in relation to the total land held by the tribe. Judging that an additional 40,000 acres had been already added to the Kikuyu reserves by the Administration, the Commission awarded only 21,000 acres to the tribe as a whole in compensation for land lost to the settlers and added 350 square miles of poor, arid land on the distant North Yatta plateau for future expansion.⁵⁴ The Kikuyu were united in their rejection of the Commission's findings and in 1940 Lord Hailey found that:

Subsequent events have not disabused them of the feelings that the Government is still largely under the influence of settlers, or convinced them that there will be no further appropriation of native land to settler interests.⁵⁵

Socio-economic change also added further overtones to the land

issue. After decimating epidemics of small pox in the 1890's and influenza in 1918-19, the Kikuyu population began to increase rapidly within the fixed boundaries of their reserves. By the 1930's the reserves were becoming seriously congested: in 1932 it was estimated that the average Kikuyu household possessed only 11 acres of land, 4 acres in the most densely populated areas near Nairobi.⁵⁶ Moreover, these holdings were in scattered plots that were increasingly fragmented as the population grew. The result was serious soil deterioration and erosion as the human and animal population forced the abandonment of traditional fallowing methods and the cultivation of marginal land.⁵⁷ Efforts by administrators to stimulate the growth of cash crops, principally maize and other foodstuffs, produced only pitifully small returns for individual families. In the depression year of 1932 average household income amounted to an estimated 107 shillings in Kiambu, 52 shillings in Fort Hall, and 28 shillings in Nyeri.⁵⁸ Furthermore, as a result of settler pressures, Kikuyu were prohibited from growing coffee, the most lucrative cash crop; a restriction that was particularly galling to those Kikuyu who lived near rich European coffee plantations on land that was formerly their own.

The loss of land, the increasingly crowded conditions in the reserves, and the need for cash income for taxes and new material wants generated a steady flow of Kikuyu out of the reserves. By the 1930's, some 110,000 Kikuyu, or approximately a fifth of the tribe, were living outside the reserves, the greatest number as squatter labor on settler farms. Others drifted into districts inhabited by tribes with more ample resources of land. Wherever they settled out-

side of the reserves they "tended to regard themselves as colonists, not squatters, who had acquired land in their own right ... continuing the colonizing tradition that had led to the settlement of Kiambu and Nyeri by their forebearers from Fort Hall".⁵⁹ Still others found their way into urban employment, forming more than half of the African population of Nairobi, or into an indeterminate pool of under- and unemployed floating between the reserves, the towns, and the settled areas. This movement was subject to frequent official harassment under the restrictive laws controlling African travel and employment outside of their reserves.

The Kikuyu were also subject to early and intensive missionary activity, principally by four Protestant groups that, after early competition, came together into a cooperative alliance. This provided the Kikuyu with more widespread opportunities for Western education than was available to other tribes, including access to the Mission Alliance High School, the most important African secondary school in the colony. This promoted the emergence by the early 20's of a new social element in a growing group of educated men who found employment as clerks and semi-skilled workers in the government, missions, and private companies both inside and outside the reserves. However, between 1928 and 1931 the Kikuyu and the missionaries clashed bitterly over an attempt led by the Church of Scotland Mission to abolish the hallowed tribal custom of female circumcision.⁶⁰ Although the Administration tactfully avoided taking sides in the conflict and the missions eventually conceded defeat after losing much of their previous membership and influence, many Kikuyu were profoundly disturbed by what

appeared to be a frontal assault by Europeans that threatened the very survival of their culture.

The Kikuyu found themselves in conflict at various times with the Administration and the settlers over land, labor, taxation, crops, education and the power of the chiefs; and with the missionaries over their right to retain valued tribal customs. Kikuyu society itself was increasingly divided by bitter land disputes, as available resources disappeared, and by conflicts between the colonial elite and the mass of the tribe, between pro- and anti-mission groups, and between generations divided by differing experience and education.

The internal conflicts in Kikuyu society found their most significant political expression in a clash between the chiefs and the educated young men. The chiefs and the other elements of the tribe's colonial elite espoused a policy of moderation, cooperation, and reform from within. "They adopted many of the elitist, paternalist, and authoritarian attitudes that permeated the actions of their District Officers and some missionaries ... they accepted in practice their subordinate role in the colonial state."⁶¹ The younger men took a more militant and egalitarian position, first in Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association, and from 1924 in the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) which emerged as the major African political association of the inter-war era. The two groups clashed frequently, especially in Kiambu. In 1922 the chiefs vigorously opposed Thuku and demanded his deportation, while in the late 20's and 30's they used their official powers to harass individual members and restrict the public activities of the KCA.

In 1928 Jomo (then Johnstone) Kenyatta became the General Secretary of the Association, and over the next three years it achieved the peak of its pre-war influence and support through its leadership of the Kikuyu struggle against the missionaries during the crisis over female circumcision. The KCA became the primary political expression of a growing desire among many Kikuyu to exercise some degree of control over the forces of change unleashed in their society.

As Rosberg and Nottingham point out, the KCA:

Represented those elements of the tribe that psychologically did not fully accept European dominance.... Membership in the KCA by itself became a personal symbol of dissent. The KCA leaders felt that they had a right to reject those aspects of the new cultural patterns which did not suit them. They were groping for an ideology that would bring the Kikuyu into the modern world without abandoning their dignity and independence, both politically and also in social and cultural terms. 62

This stance led the KCA to present a variety of demands to the colonial authorities, including the settlement of the claims of the dispossessed Kikuyu, security of title to the remaining Kikuyu land, and an end to piecemeal appropriation of land in the reserves, especially for private commercial undertakings of little direct benefit to the Kikuyu themselves. They also asked for expanded educational facilities equal to that provided for the immigrant communities, improved health and sanitary facilities, and the more active promotion of socio-economic development in Kikuyu areas.⁶³ The KCA was also strongly sensitive to the linguistic dimensions of colonial domination, requesting translation of the laws of the colony and official reports into Swahili or the vernacular, and asking the government to "educate us purely and properly in the English language because it is

the political language."⁶⁴ Furthermore, the Association played an active role in several Kikuyu efforts to establish new institutional structures independent of the colonial system, notably the founding of a monthly Kikuyu-language journal in 1928 that was the first vernacular publication by Kenya Africans, the organization of the land claims of various Kikuyu families for presentation to the Kenya Land Commission, and the foundation in 1938 of the Kenya African Teachers College at Githunguri in Kiambu. This era also saw the emergence, in the aftermath of the circumcision crisis, of two independent Kikuyu school systems linked to independent Kikuyu churches which attempted to define a mode of Western education and Christian belief in accord with both new aspirations and valued tribal traditions.⁶⁵

The KCA made extensive use of the limited channels of 'constitutional' action available to Africans, maintaining a barrage of letters, telegrams, and petitions directed at first to the Chief Native Commissioner, and then, increasingly, to the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State himself. The association also attempted to present memoranda or testimony before the various investigating commissions that visited the colony between 1924 and 1934, and ran candidates for the elected seats on the Local Native Councils in the districts, in 1928 electing two members in Nyeri, nine in Fort Hall, and six in Kiambu on a platform of preserving tribal customs against missionary interference. All of these efforts at using legal modes of action and protest failed to gain the KCA any influence on government policy. As the leadership of the Association came to more clearly understand the structure of the colonial system, they began to protest

against the constraints on African political activity and seek ways to gain access to the central political arena in Nairobi. By the early 30's the KCA was asking for directly elected African representatives on the Legislative Council to replace the missionaries and retired administrators appointed to the "African" seats and who "expressly claimed that they are not on the council to represent the Africans, but to voice their own views of what is best in the Africans' interest".⁶⁶

The Association demonstrated an increasing willingness to question the basic colonial premise of the inability of Africans to articulate and act in their own interests, and to challenge the Provincial Administration's jealously guarded prerogative of speaking for the native. On this basis the KCA attempted to bypass the Kenya Government and bring their case directly to the attention of the metropolitan authorities through letters to the British press, the establishment of contact with sympathetic individuals and groups in the 'native rights lobby', and two trips to London by Kenyatta who presented Kikuyu grievances to the Colonial Office and complained about the authoritarian methods of administrative officers, especially their refusal to explain or discuss matters of policy.⁶⁷

The activities of the KCA did not involve any fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the colonial system, but rather a demand for access to that system and a legitimately recognized place in it. Nevertheless, during the 1930's the inability of the KCA to achieve any significant results through the narrow legitimate channels open to it and the frequent harassment of its activities by the chiefs and local administrators, led the Association into a semi-clandestine ex-

istence and an increasingly militant tone. Even more important, by the end of the decade the KCA leaders were becoming increasingly aware of their grievances as part of large-scale issues involving to some degree all of the major tribes in the colony, and they moved overtly and covertly to establish and expand contact with similar associations and politically aware Africans in other parts of Kenya.

B. The Luo and Luhya: Parochialism and Cooptation

The forces of social change among the Luo and Luhya, the largest tribes in western Kenya, were neither as extensive nor as destructive in their impact as those operating upon the Kikuyu. Neither tribe lost any significant amount of land by alienation to the European settlers. Nyanza Province served primarily as a vast labor pool for European enterprises, ranging from the immediately adjacent farms in the Rift Valley and the highlands around Eldoret and Kitale to the docks of Mombasa more than 500 miles away, with the Luo providing workers in numbers second only to the Kikuyu. The promotion of cash crops by administrators such as John Ainsworth before 1914 provided opportunities for acquiring cash incomes within the reserves, especially through the sale of maize (corn) which rapidly became a staple of the African diet throughout the colony. At the same time, however, the Luo and Luhya lacked the intensity of exposure to the European market and settler society of the Kikuyu areas and the conflicts over restrictions on the growth of cash crops such as coffee experienced by the Kikuyu in the 30's. Furthermore, the dominant mission presence in Nyanza was the Anglican Church Mission Society,

the most liberal and least authoritarian of the Protestant groups in Kenya. Under the leadership of W.E. Owen, Archdeacon of Nyanza from 1918 to 1944, the CMS promoted the development of an indigenous church leadership exercising considerable responsibility for pastoral affairs and "not noticeably under the direction of an alien missionary society".⁶⁸

The peoples of Nyanza thus lacked the burning, bitter, and continuous grievances that could serve as the basis for political mobilization and did not experience a direct frontal assault on hallowed tribal tradition by the agents of European culture. As a result, Nyanza politics in the inter-war period was dominated primarily by parochial tribal issues, clan conflicts among the Luo and disputes between the Wanga and other Luhya sections. Where political activity was directed against the colonial system it was moderate in tone and focused on the piecemeal reform of specific grievances. The most important African political association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, was "active whenever there were genuine grievances, and tended to disintegrate during prosperous years".⁶⁹ Political activity was largely dominated by a new colonial elite that emerged from the opportunities for achievement and status provided by the presence of the Administration and the missionaries. This elite adopted an essentially cooperative position in relation to the colonial authorities and was heavily oriented towards the fulfilment of individual aspirations. Lonsdale notes that:

The leaders of the early political associations ... sought personal acceptance and recognition from the rulers of a colonial society from which they had

gained much. The early politicians' indignation was fired not by corporate memories of resistance but by the frustration of their individual great expectations. 70

They thus sought and eagerly accepted cooptation into the colonial system. By the early 30's the leaders of the Young Kavirondo Association from the 1921-22 protests and, later, of the KTWA had for the most part been absorbed into colonial institutions, some as locational chiefs and others as Anglican priests.

In the aftermath of the 1921-22 protests, the Nyanza Provincial Administration sought the assistance of local missionaries in turning their adherents away from political activities. Since the leadership of the YKA was heavily drawn from the African leaders of the CMS, Archdeacon Owen requested and received permission from the Administration to attempt to turn the YKA away from politics and towards more constructive activities and cooperation with the government. In 1923 he formed the KTWA and became its first President. The leaders of the Young Kavirondo Association retained their posts in the new organization, while the chiefs and European administrators served as ex-officio vice-presidents. Under Owen's aegis the KTWA was effectively coopted into 'responsible' channels, concentrating heavily on welfare measures and the stimulation of economic growth, and cooperating with the Provincial Administration to ensure 'good government'.⁷¹ KTWA members formed a majority on the Central Nyanza Local Native Council and pressed the Administration for a greater return in services for African taxes and for increased educational, health, and economic facilities.

The lack of any intense conflict and the elite character of the KTWA leadership was reflected in a political consciousness and an

understanding of the colonial system that were far more constricted and much less sophisticated than that among the more militant Kikuyu. The institutional universe of Nyanza politics before 1945 was confined to district and provincial levels, with the specifically political objectives of the African elite being greater power and autonomy for the local roles and institutions in which they already participated. While the KTWA sent petitions and representatives, to give testimony before the various investigating commissions of the 20's and early 30's, it never demanded, as the KCA did, access to the arenas of power controlled by the Administration or the settlers. Nyanza political leaders, according to Lonsdale, could not imagine themselves manipulating the colonial system, and their principal political demand among both the Luo and Luhya, never granted by the Administration, was for a paramount chief for the tribe which "would have opened up the higher reaches of the administrative hierarchy to Africans, placing them on a level with, perhaps even ousting, the British District Commissioner".⁷² There was a basic acceptance of their limited political role and an effort to maneuver for more advantageous positions within the existing rules of the game.

Tribal parochialism and religious denominational differences also left their mark on the KTWA. Within a year of its formation Owen found he had to form a separate North Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association for the Luhya, while Catholic missionaries started a Native Catholic Union that scrupulously avoided involvement in politics. The KTWA thus ended up as an almost exclusively Luo and Anglican organization. Moreover, it suffered after 1925 from increasing internal conflict

between the chiefs and the Christian elite stemming from the ambivalence of the chiefs' roles in the association and the colonial administration. Owen himself was a tireless crusader against abuses of official power, especially irregularities in tax collection and the use of compulsory labor for their private ends by the chiefs, and he often found himself in the invidious position of attacking some of the officers of his own association.⁷³ To the Provincial Administration the actions of Owen and the KIWA in exposing grievances against authority were often annoying and occasionally infuriating, especially where official chiefs were associated with the protest.⁷⁴ By the early 30's, however, most of the KIWA leadership had found their desired status in the colonial system and the organization became increasingly inactive, Owen ending his association with it in 1936. The NKIWA meanwhile had been preoccupied with pressing the interests of local elites of various Luhya sections against the Wanga agents originally appointed as chiefs by the Administration. As the Wanga chiefs were gradually replaced, the NKIWA, just as its Luo counterpart, came to be a vehicle of local vested interests.

After 1935 the KIWA came under the control of a new and more militant leadership drawn from the Kisumu Native Chamber of Commerce, an organization representing the Luo petty traders operating in and around the major urban center of Nyanza. Mostly men from minor clans with some Western education, the traders chafed at the economic advantages open to the official and mission elements of the new elite, especially the comfortable arrangements between the chiefs and the Asian traders who dominated commerce in the reserves, and came to identify

"the pillars of local society with the props of colonial rule".⁷⁵ In the late 30's they led the KTWA into increasingly sharp conflict with both the Luo elite and the Provincial Administration, addressing so many memoranda and petitions to the Administration that the association became known to the Luo as 'Jo-Memorandum'.⁷⁶ More militant politics also emerged among the Luhya in the North Kavirondo Central Association formed after the discovery of gold in Kakamega location of North Nyanza District in 1931 brought a flood of European miners and prospectors, many of them destitute farmers, into the Luhya heartland. The Kenya Government rushed through legislation 'temporarily' alienating several thousand acres of densely populated farmland without consulting the Local Native Council and abrogating the 'inviolable' guarantees of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930. This led to strong protests in Britain from the native rights lobby, and created among the Luhya fears for the security of their land and distrust of European motives expressed by the NKCA in a series of urgent petitions to the Secretary of State. However, the leaders of the NKCA, mostly young school teachers, allied themselves with the Wanga in a search for tribal unity, thus bringing themselves into conflict with powerful local elites, while their support, never very strong, began to wane when the gold deposits proved meagre and European mining operations began to contract.⁷⁷

The NKCA and the post-1935 KTWA were both ineffective organizations commanding little popular support and incapable of mounting any serious challenge to the local African elites who had found a mutually beneficial accommodation with the colonial authorities. They

had to reach outside of Nyanza for support. As its name suggests, the NKCA was in touch with members of the Kikuyu Central Association virtually from its inception and by 1934 had direct contact with KCA headquarters in Nairobi. Both the KTWA and the NKCA began to pick up support after 1938 as a result of African opposition to legislative measures permanently fixing the boundaries of the White Highlands and anxiety over the future of their lands and property stimulated by soil conservation and compulsory destocking measures introduced by the government to halt the deterioration of land in the reserves. This led to expanded contacts between the KCA and the Nyanza political associations resulting in a joint protest to the Secretary of State in November, 1938 against the destocking measures and a KCA-KTWA memorandum to the Secretary of State the following year protesting the Highlands Order-in-Council and culminating in a meeting of representatives of the three organizations in Nairobi in March, 1940.⁷⁸

Despite the importance of Nairobi as a center for organizational activity and contact between African political groups, specifically urban issues played little if any role in their activities during the inter-war period. The associations, including the more sophisticated KCA, remained rooted in the issues arising from the impact of change on rural tribal society. For the largely Kikuyu population of Nairobi, recruited mostly from the nearby districts of Kiambu and Fort Hall, urban life remained largely a temporary sojourn and they maintained strong ties with rural society and its problems. African urban protest when it appeared came not in Nairobi but in the port city of Mombasa where a far more heterogeneous population lived in isolation

from their distant tribal homelands.

During the 1920's and, in particular, during the depression years of the 30's there were sporadic strikes and efforts to organize among the Asian workers in Nairobi which culminated in 1935 in the formation of the Labour Trade Union of East Africa under the leadership of Makhan Singh, a self-professed Communist. In 1937, in response to pressures from the metropolitan authorities to comply with standards set by the International Labour Organization, the Kenya Government introduced legislation legitimizing trade union activities, despite the open reluctance of both settlers and officials.⁷⁹ African workers in the urban areas were, however, untouched by these developments. African urban protest emerged spontaneously and to the surprise of the Administration in a general strike of workers in Mombasa in July, 1939. At that time the city contained a diverse African population of some 5,000 Luo, 5,000 Kikuyu, and 2,000 Kamba, as well as 2,000 Africans from various coastal tribes and 3,000 from Tanganyika, most of whom were employed as unskilled labor in various municipal and government agencies, European and Asian firms, or as casual laborers on the docks. The strike reached its peak on August 2nd with widespread picketing, some looting, police baton charges, and the arrest of about 150 persons; and ended two days later due to "the effective work of the police" and "hunger, especially among the casual labour".⁸⁰ A commission of inquiry appointed by the Administration identified the sources of the strike as the miserably low wages, insecurity of employment, and appalling conditions of diet and housing of the workers in the city, compounded by administrative ignorance and neglect which saw so rapid a

turnover of personnel in the office of D.C., Mombasa, that administrators were incapable of learning about the city and its problems, let alone taking steps to ameliorate them.⁸¹ The commission's report led to administrative reforms that resulted in the formation of a separate Labour Department, but the war intervened to prevent the implementation of any concrete measures to deal with the socio-economic roots of the disturbance. The 1939 strike ended as a preview of the role that urban protest and organization would play in post-1945 African politics.

5) 'Dini' and the Varieties of Religious Protest

The political associations discussed above constituted, despite their occasional use of traditional symbols and defence of indigenous culture, essentially secular and modernist responses to the changes brought by the colonial presence. Resistance to European political and cultural domination was, however, also expressed through a variety of specifically religious bodies or movements. This reaction took a variety of forms, ranging from messianic and nativistic sects totally rejecting European culture to African separatist Christian churches emerging out of organizational and doctrinal disputes with European missionary groups. One of the earliest of the former was the Cult of Mumbo which appeared in Alego location of Central Nyanza District in 1913 and whose leaders advocated a "return to the African way of life" and "promised a new 'golden age' that was to be attained as a result of a complete transformation of the society".⁸² Kikuyu religion had a long tradition of arathi (prophets), and in 1930-31, in the aftermath

of the circumcision crisis, a new group of arathi appeared who were known as Watu wa Mungu (God's People). They roamed through Kiambu and Fort Hall preaching the rejection of Western medicine, education, and missions. Later, however, they also came to reject various aspects of traditional Kikuyu culture and their ritual was heavily influenced by certain aspects of fundamentalist Protestantism.⁸³ There were several messianic movements among the Kamba prior to World War One, and in 1922 a prophet named Ndonye wa Kauti appeared in Machokos promising to bring about the deliverance of the Kamba from the Europeans.⁸⁴ The separatist churches were far more formal in structure and basically Western in practice. They sought to create a specifically African expression of Christian belief congruent with valued traditions, and they split off from the European missions after conflicts over church discipline and the acceptance of doctrines that were thought to be aspects of European cultural dogmatism rather than intrinsic elements of true biblical Christianity.⁸⁵

These religious groups were, on the whole, far more ambiguous about their relationship to both traditional society and the changes introduced by the colonial presence than the secular associations. They tended to mobilize those elements of African society who did not accept European dominance, yet who at the same time were not certain what they wanted in its place.⁹⁰ They did not specifically attempt to enter the political arena to pursue particular socio-economic or political goals, or to right any burning grievances, although they often clashed with colonial authority where religious doctrine led them to reject certain official policies. The nativistic and more messianic

groups were especially distrusted by administrators as a potential threat to control, even where no specific conflicts had occurred. The Watu wa Mungu, for example, were hunted by police who eventually killed three of them in a clash in 1934. Administrative repression was notably severe where the groups promised to get rid of the European presence. The Cult of Mumbo was suppressed between 1919 and 1929 and its leaders were exiled to Lamu. The following year the Kamba prophet, Kauti, met a similar fate.

The primary significance of the sects and independent churches lay not so much in their importance as means of political mobilization and action, but rather in their impact on European perceptions of African religious behaviour. All African religious phenomena tended to be indiscriminately categorized in Kenya under the Swahili term 'Dini' (Church). The beliefs, rituals, and behavior of these religious groups were often bizarre and repellent to European eyes, and promoted an image of African irrationality and instability. The Watu wa Mungu, for example, were described in a police report as having "a peculiar and wild facial expression and appear to be slightly deranged".⁸⁷

V. The Response of the Provincial Administration to African Politics

The ability of the Provincial Administration to respond to the demands and grievances of the African political associations was severely constrained by the stalemate over basic policy and the settler dominance of intermediate policy issues in the European political arena.

The reluctance of officials to face a confrontation with the settlers over a 'native policy' for Kenya left the Provincial Administration adrift without any specific goals towards which to guide the

development of the various African societies in the colony and around which to orient its own activities in the African districts. While many individual field officers were active 'developers' constantly seeking new projects for their districts, their activities were diverse, uncoordinated, and often inconsistent, varying not only from district to district, but also within a particular district during the tenure of different D.C.s. Lacking a coherent policy specifying developmental priorities, as well as both technical advice and expertise, the D.C.s dealt essentially with amateur efforts at specific 'improvements' in the physical and socio-economic conditions in a district, selected according to their own individual perceptions and enthusiasms, and only occasionally at the suggestion of one of the technical departments. These projects were incredibly diverse, ranging from the construction of roads, small dams, and other public works to improvements in public health and sanitation, the introduction of cash crops from cotton and maize to wattle and cabbages, the improvement of agricultural methods, the establishment of women's clubs and boy scout troops, and even the stimulation of team sports. Many projects were ill-conceived failures, others were neglected by new D.C.s who did not share the enthusiasm of their predecessor, and all were constantly hampered by a lack of funds for development.⁸⁸ The results, however, were not completely negligible: a rudimentary road network was gradually extended through all but the more remote districts, significant improvements were made in both human and animal health, and the introduction of various cash crops drew a steadily growing number of Africans into involvement in the monetary economy.

None of these various activities dealt directly with the forces of social change to which the African political associations responded. Some, such as the improvements in health which led to overpopulation in areas in Nyanza and Central Provinces, directly contributed to the problems of change. The cost of D.C. discretion, however, was not only the fragmentation of administrative action, but also a preoccupation with local issues and an emphasis on the idiosyncratic characteristics of each district which made it difficult for administrators in the field to perceive, let alone act, on the larger social structural issues in the colony.

Given the reactive and ameliorative posture implicit in their 'guardian' image of administration, field officers were oriented more towards dealing with specific local grievances and they attempted to respond to them, as one D.C. put it, "insofar as they are in accord with general policy ... without recourse to the agitation (sic) themselves".⁸⁹ The problem, however, was that organizations such as the KCA increasingly touched upon matters that were not in accord with existing policy or dealt with basic socio-economic cleavages involving the relations of the various racial communities on a colony-wide basis. In some instances administrators sympathetic to African complaints could use their discretion to discretely evade or ignore settler-influenced policy, and in a few cases where they felt serious injustice and exploitation to be involved some officers stimulated controversy in Britain by going outside of official channels and leaking information to missionary and humanitarian groups or communicating directly with the Colonial Office.⁹⁰ In most instances the problems were too large,

too complex, and too public to be discretely dealt with in the bush. Open advocacy of African interests on controversial issues not only involved considerable personal risk for the individual officers involved, but also dragged the whole Provincial Administration into the acrimonious conflict of the central political arena.

The African political associations thus placed the Provincial Administration in a position that clearly reveals the underlying contradiction between paternalism and organizational interests. Where the protection of African interests involved controversy that threatened to compromise the discretion of the Provincial Administration, with the exception of a few mavericks who paid a price for their non-conformity, administrators preferred to be team players and protect themselves and their organization. This left them uncomfortably interposed between the settlers and the Africans and unable to deal with the issues generated by the internal colonial relationship between them. Moreover, while socio-economic aspects of this relationship lay at the root of the conflicts in the colony, the most immediate clash involved the confrontations between the Provincial Administration and the local African populations in the districts. Caught in a position that made it virtually impossible for them to respond to the larger issues involved, individual administrators were left to deal with these confrontations at the level of actual or potential threats to the maintenance of law and order.

These political constraints on the range of responses open to the Provincial administration do not, however, explain the specific manner in which administrators understood and interpreted the activity

of the African political associations. Within the bounds of these constraints they reacted to African political activity on the basis of their Gatonist socio-political values, their conception of the proper role of administration, and their personal and organizationally-defined interests. These factors led to an intense hostility towards and suspicion of any manifestations of organized and independent African political action and to the emergence of a rigid stereotype of African politicians and political organizations that became an integral part of the conventional wisdom of the Provincial Administration and largely dominated administrative action until the late 1950's. This image was intimately linked to the Kikuyu, through both the activities of the Kikuyu Central Association and the prevalent colonial stereotype of the tribe as ambitious and intelligent, but also secretive, deceptive, and conspiratorial. Through their control of the flow of political intelligence, field officers were able to impress their image of African politics upon both the central administration in Nairobi and the Colonial Office in London where the interpretations coming from the field were accepted as the basis for formulating responses to the relatively infrequent contacts with African politics at those levels.

Thus, on the one hand, administrators could view the socio-economic goals of African political groups as unobjectionable and, in more reflective moments, note that an organization such as the KCA "includes in its ranks a vast proportion of the more enlightened and progressive youth";⁹¹ while, on the other hand, their conception of the role of the Administration pushed them, just as the political constraints on their position, to respond not to the socio-economic issues involved,

but to the mere fact of opposition itself. The mere existence of an association claiming to defend African interests implied that the Provincial Administration had failed in its role of benevolent protector and was thus seen as a grave threat to the unchallenged authority and prestige that was the basis of effective control. On the same grounds, the political associations posed a grave challenge to the personal authority of individual officers. The KCA or the KIWA constituted rivals for the loyalty of the African masses and the educated politicians, the men in pants, interposed themselves between the administrator and 'his people', the men in blankets.⁹² What is especially striking is that this reaction was largely independent of the occurrence of any overt resistance or defiance of authority on the part of the associations. Thus during the crisis over female circumcision, Governor Grigg, echoing the views of the field administrators, wrote in a despatch to the Secretary of State about the KCA that:

There is no evidence of any acts or even any propaganda on the part of the association or of individual agitators that could be called definitely seditious....

What I have to report to you Lordship therefore, is not a series of overt acts of opposition to Government or of omission to comply with Government's requirements, but the creation and, I fear, the spread of an atmosphere of criticism and mistrust which may have unfortunate effects upon those of the native population who become involved in it. 93

Administrators repeatedly told each other that no actions could be taken by Government which could be construed as concessions to outside demands or political agitation without compromising their prestige and, hence, their control over the African. Even where Africans were considered to have legitimate grievances, any change in policy had to protect

the necessary image of the Provincial Administration's benevolence and omnipotence.⁹⁴ This conviction reinforced the existing barriers of the communications process and made it virtually impossible for the African associations to get the Provincial Administration to listen to their demands until they mounted precisely the sort of agitation that threatened to end in disorder and an 'embarrassing incident'. As early as 1926 this was clear to the leaders of the KCA when they wrote:

There is no (sic) anyone to represent our grievances, there is no faithful person who can speak on our behalf. So if we keep quiet the Government will think we are quite satisfied. 95

Furthermore, since their values and interests led them to view the associations as unnecessary threats to the administrative process, field officers came to view the issues raised by the groups as either phoney or fantastically exaggerated. Thus in 1929 the D.C., Kiambu saw the KCA as composed of "adept liars and past masters at sewing (sic) the seed of false rumours", while Governor Grigg repeated the judgments of his field officers in asserting that: "It is not apparent that the association has any real grievances. It makes all the capital it can out of the apprehensions, genuine or fictitious, of the Kikuyu as to the security of their land."⁹⁶ It was impossible, moreover, for administrators to accept that their own actions, so benevolent in intent, could be a source of grievance to Africans and they consequently refused to countenance any complaints about the behavior of individual officers or demands for changes in administrative structure and practice. The associations tended to be seen as sources of social disruption creating conflicts that would not otherwise exist or exasperating griev-

ances that would be dealt with by the Administration as a matter of course. Administrators generally came to believe that there was no necessary linkage between African socio-economic problems and the activities of the political associations which were felt to engage in political agitation for their own purposes and did not necessarily express the underlying discontents of the African masses. This understanding of the associations provided the necessary rationale for treating them as simply threats to law and order and good administration.

The reaction to the KCA and the other African associations also reflected the hostility of administrators to the emerging generation of educated Africans. These organizations confirmed their fears that education would create a class of Africans desiring to rapidly assume responsibilities for which they were blatantly ill-equipped and which only the Provincial Administration could properly handle. Governor Grigg noted that the KCA consisted of "the members of a younger generation who knew just enough to be discontented with the conditions of barbarism in which they were born, but not enough to appreciate the difficulties of emerging in a moment of time from that state of barbarism to the assumption of all the concomitants of a highly developed Western civilization".⁹⁷ This view of the 'semi-educated' or 'detrimentalized' native made it even more difficult for administrators to take the associations seriously as expressions of deep-seated African sentiments. Grigg's private secretary used a telling metaphor of the colonial relationship in describing KCA activity as "groups of young men acting in the same sort of way as first-form boys at school, who make bombs to

blow up their form master, and one is disinclined to take them seriously ... the Kikuyu, still like the first form boy, loves secret societies"; and he added his belief that "if the situation is handled with good humour and restraint ... these sillies would give up their conspiracies and ... be content to go back and work their shambas (farms)".⁹⁸

However, behind the 'juvenile' activities of the associations administrators detected the disturbing motives of a lust for power and a greed for money. The associations had to be taken seriously as dangerous efforts at personal aggrandizement. Administrators' belief that politics was a pursuit of partisan self-interest that was necessarily segmental and usually opposed to the interests of the community as a whole led them to view the associations as representing only the tiny minority of 'detrribalized' natives detached from and unrepresentative of the interests of the rural masses in the reserves. The activities of the KCA were viewed as irresponsible agitation intended to dupe the ignorant rural African through lies, imaginary grievances, and fantastic promises into believing that the association represented their true interests. Visible popular support for the associations tended to be dismissed as manipulated and essentially spurious.⁹⁹ By the late 30's administrators showed a growing tendency to see the associations behind any expressions of opposition or unrest in the major tribes. While the Mombasa Labour Commission could find no evidence of the involvement of African political associations or the Labour Trade Union of East Africa in the 1939 strike,¹⁰⁰ government officials and the settler press both insisted that it was the direct

result of the activities of African 'agitators'.¹⁰⁰ Administrators' judgment of the associations was confirmed by the fact that the KCA spent a considerable portion of its time collecting money through membership subscriptions or special fund-raising drives. Although this money was vital to the association both for carrying on its advocacy activities and maintaining the leaders who had no other resources to fall back on, to colonial officials it smacked of corruption. The money collected by the KCA was denounced as being "for the personal comforts of the members of its committee", and as collected "in all probability, by threats and coercion".¹⁰¹

Finally, as a result of its vigorous support of traditional custom during the circumcision crisis, the KCA also came to be seen by the Provincial Administration as a reactionary force supporting an atavistic rejection of Western civilization. This belief was supported by two other events. First, although they never found any direct evidence, field officers felt that the various 'dini', notably the Watu wa Mungu, were covertly manipulated by politicians in the KCA.¹⁰² Second, in 1938 Jomo Kenyatta published his book Facing Mount Kenya which asserted both the value of many aspects of Kikuyu traditional culture and the ability of the African to articulate his interests without the aid of his professional protectors in the Provincial Administration.¹⁰³ However ambivalent they might have been about the value of modern industrial society, administrators could not accept any direct challenge to one of the fundamental tenets of colonial rule: the absolute superiority of European culture in all its aspects. Moreover, the perceived connection between the religious cults and political protest also touched

upon the fear of irrational fanaticism and savage frenzy that was the most unsettling dimension of their image of the African. The defence of tradition by religious or secular means came to be interpreted as a total rejection of modernism and civilization. When this view was combined with the tendency to judge a native people's ability and moral worth by their success in developing on the lines defined by colonial authority, it led to the additional understanding of Kikuyu protest as an indication of their incapacity to adjust to the strains of modernization.¹⁰⁴ This concept was to become a dominant theme in official interpretations of the post-1945 political crisis.

In the end the African politician became another unscrupulous exploiter from whom the administrator had to protect the unsophisticated tribesman. Once again the interests of the Provincial Administration and the 'best interests' of the African were interpreted by officials as one and the same. Administrators rationalized the situation by viewing their actions not as the suppression of legitimate African political aspirations, but as a therapeutic response to the poor quality of the 'self-appointed' leaders of the associations. There would always be a place in the colonial system for the 'natural' leaders of the community. In concrete terms, they moved to deal with the political groups first by coopting them into 'safe' channels, such as the Local Native Councils, and then, when cooptation proved only partially successful, by harassment, stringent restrictions on organizational activities, and, ultimately, outright suppression.

A. The Uses of Cooptation

The initial reaction of field administrators to the political

associations in the 20's was to attempt to coopt them into 'responsible' channels of action by turning them away from contentious political issues towards safer welfare goals through which they could be enlisted into friendly and essentially passive cooperation with the colonial authorities. We have already seen how this was accomplished in the KWA through the offices of Archdeacon Owen. During the 1926-29 period attempts at cooptation also characterized the initial reaction of Central Province administrators to the KCA.¹⁰⁵ This brief era of good feelings rapidly deteriorated, however, in the face of the KCA's refusal to accept the passive role assigned to it and its increasingly militant stance during the female circumcision crisis. Although as late as September, 1929 the D.C., Kiambu felt that "the thoughts and activities of ill-affected young men" could be diverted to such "progressive and profitable" groups as an agricultural improvement society or the Boy Scouts,¹⁰⁶ the Provincial Administration increasingly judged the KCA a dangerous and subversive organization.

The primary institutional vehicle for the cooptation of African political activity was the Local Native Councils, which were first discussed after the 1921-22 troubles and effectively brought into operation in 1924-25. The explicit political objective of the councils was to counteract "any mischievous tendencies which might develop in native political societies" by providing a forum for the expression of public opinion in which Africans could harmlessly let off steam and a local government body which would exercise limited local legislative and executive functions and provide Africans with tutelary experience in the responsible running of their own affairs.¹⁰⁷ The Administration

considered the councils established in each district as the sole legitimate mode of African political participation. If there had previously been any need for independent associations, administrators felt that it was eliminated by the councils and expected that all grievances and expressions of opinion would be brought to their attention through the council members.¹⁰⁸

There were wide variations from district to district in the degree to which the Local Native Councils were brought into operation. They operated most effectively in the populous districts of Central and Nyanza Provinces where local rates gave them substantial budgets and the local populations possessed a degree of political consciousness, while they languished in somnolent apathy in the more remote districts inhabited by conservative pastoral peoples. Nevertheless, even in the advanced districts the LNC's were not effective units of local government. They were not permitted to exercise any real authority and allowed to make appropriations for only a limited range of local services (even here the Provincial Administration often intervened to curtail what were felt to be excessive expenditures on education). Most of the legislation passed by the councils came down in standardized form from the Administration, which used the councils to enact local measures that could not be taken up by the Legislative Council in Nairobi. The D.C.s prepared the council budgets since Africans were regarded as unready to exercise fiscal responsibility and incapable of understanding the finances of councils which overlapped confusingly with the expenditures of the various government departments operating in a district.

The LNC's also failed to provide an arena for African political

expression because the District Commissioners exercised firm control over both composition and deliberations of the councils and refused to permit 'politics' to intrude in their operations. Prior to 1939 the majority of each LNC consisted of members appointed by the local administration and composed almost entirely of official chiefs, government employees, and other members of the African colonial elite who could generally be counted upon to be quiet and cooperative. The remainder of the council members were selected through a variety of informal electoral techniques at barazas, and a significant proportion of them were also usually chiefs. Administrators regarded the councils constituted in this fashion as representative bodies, even when they occasionally admitted that the 'representatives' made little effort to learn or articulate the feelings of their 'constituents'.¹⁰⁹ The D.C.s also served as Presidents of the councils, preparing the agenda and presiding over the meetings. Whatever the hopes of senior officials in the Secretariat that the LNCs would allow Africans to safely ventilate their grievances, field officers consistently declined to consult the councils for their views on major issues of native policy and refused to permit the consideration of resolutions or subjects critical of the government and its policies. One missionary observer of the councils later noted that the degree of freedom of speech exercised by the councillors depended on how well the D.C. understood either Swahili or the local vernaculars.¹¹⁰ Council members openly critical of government policy would be ruled out of order and occasionally, if they persisted in their opposition, ejected from the chamber and deprived of their seat.

B. Harassment and Repression

Administrative efforts to coopt the associations were coupled with measures designed to exert some control over their activities, including the requirements that they receive permission from either the D.C. or the chief of a location for any public meetings and that they submit the agenda of the meeting in advance to the D.C. In the 1930's, with the administrators increasingly convinced that the KCA and the other groups they believed were associated with it (the NKCA, the Wakamba Members Association, and the Teita Hills Association) were corrupt, reactionary, and subversive; official efforts to harass and restrict the ability of the associations to organize and operate significantly increased the tempo.

In 1930, after the circumcision crisis had brought the situation to the attention of the central authorities in Nairobi, Governor Grigg sponsored an amendment to the Native Authorities Ordinance that prohibited the collection of money by African associations without the express permission of the local Administration. Efforts were also made to force the KCA to publicly account for the expenditure of its funds, on the theory that this would discredit the leaders in the eyes of their followers. Administrators also made common cause with the Kikuyu chiefs, vigorously supporting them against attacks from the KCA and encouraging their efforts to prohibit the meetings of the association in the locations.

Administrators also used their control over official channels of communication to prevent the KCA and other groups from effectively employing the legitimate 'constitutional' channel of protest by petition.

They insisted that all communications with higher authorities either in Nairobi or London be submitted in the first instance to the field administration for conveyance through 'proper channels'. Any attempts by the associations to leap over the local administration and present petitions directly to the Governor or the Secretary of State resulted either in complete silence on the part of the authorities or a return of the document with curt instructions to resubmit it through the proper officials. Where they complied with these regulations, associations found, however, that petitions tended to be briefly acknowledged and then forgotten. In some instances letters and petitions were apparently not sent on to the higher officials to whom they were addressed. More commonly, field officers would pass them on with a memorandum refuting African grievances and demands point by point and adding vivid denunciation of the association's leaders and objectives. The higher authorities could do little but accept the field officials judgments and either replied with a brief acknowledgement or incorporated the latter's rebuttals into a longer reply. The constant resort to constitutional channels thus gained the associations little but stony and hostile silence or insulting and patronizing replies from the colonial authorities. The Central Province Administration even refused to mention the name of the KCA in correspondence with it, and instead addressed all replies to individuals. ¹¹¹

Administrators also resorted to more individual forms of harassment. Joseph Kang'ethe, the President of the KCA, was ejected from his seat on the Fort Hall LNC in 1926 and in 1930 was sentenced to prison for holding an illegal meeting against the orders of the local chief. Other

members of the KCA and of other militant associations were subject to a variety of petty fines and charges, found it difficult to hold on to government jobs, and, occasionally, were even dismissed from posts with private employers at the request of the Administration.¹¹² After direct clashes with the colonial authorities, African politicians such as Thuku or Muindi Mbingu were arrested and deported to remote parts of the colony without formal charges or trials.

Outright suppression of the associations was, however, avoided apparently because of the lack of concrete evidence of seditious activities and the consequent furor that such action would arouse in the native rights lobby in Britain. The onset of the war changed the situation and enabled the Administration to move more directly against the very existence of these organizations. By this time administrators in Central Province were convinced that the activities of the KCA were "probably treasonable", and the Defence Regulations of 1939 had equipped the Administration with enhanced coercive powers to deal with matters of internal security. During 1939-40 the Administration was also gravely concerned about Italy entering the war and mounting an invasion of Kenya from Ethiopia. Although the KCA, the UMA, and the THA had sent a joint declaration of loyalty to the Governor at the beginning of the war, the Administration suspected, without any conclusive evidence, that the KCA had been in secret contact with the staff of the Italian consulate in Nairobi. This suspicion, combined with the actual evidence of increased contact and cooperation among the militant associations, was sufficient to move the Administration to finally suppress the groups that had been annoying it for more than a decade.¹¹³ On May 27 and 28, 1940 the KCA,

UMA, and THA were proscribed and 22 of their leaders arrested and sent to Kapenguria in the Northern Frontier area, where they were detained for the duration of the war. Administrators throughout the colony greeted the action with relief and pleasure, and for almost five years overt African political activity disappeared from the Kenya scene.

Notes

1. Interview 210S.

2. This is expressed clearly in the 1930 Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa (Cmd. 3573), issued by the Colonial Office during Lord Passfield's term as Secretary of State, which reversed the proposed association of the settlers in native policy and administration made by Leopold Amery while he was Secretary of State in 1926 in the White paper Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa (Cmd. 2904).

3. Interview 103F.

4. KNA/DC/KSI, Sir Percy Girouard, "Confidential Memoranda for Provincial and District Commissioners", May 1910.

5. T.H.R. Cashmore, Studies in District Administration in The East African Protectorate, 1895-1918, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1965, pages 57-58.

6. Just how slender these resources of coercion were is indicated by the fact that in 1927 Kenya had one policeman for every 1,148 persons in the colony as compared to one policeman for every 367 persons in Metropolitan London. (L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 213, n. 6.)

7. Hardinge to Foreign Office, 19 August 1898, quoted in Cashmore, op.cit., page 58.

8. Ibid., page 58.

9. KNA/DC/KSI, Girouard, "Confidential Memoranda", page 13.

10. Interviews 103F, 208FS, 214F.

11. Cashmore, op.cit., page 48.

12. Ibid., page 55, n. 3.

13. Charles Dundas, "History of Kitui", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 43, 1913, page 491; and Interview 103F.

14. KNA/DC/KSI, Girouard, "Confidential Memoranda", Cashmore, op.cit., page 49.

15. D.J. Penwill, "Paper - The Other Side", Journal of African Administration, Vol. 6, July 1954, pages 121-122.

16. Interview 214F.

17. KNA/PC/CP8/2/1, S.H. LaFontaine to all Provincial and District Commissioners, 11 August, 1930 and replies from Central Province D.C.s especially M.R.R. Vidal; D.C., Fort Hall to P.C., 11 September, 1930 with transcript of a baraza held on August 26, 1930.

18. KNA/PC/CP 8/5/2, J.M. Sylvester, Acting D.C. Fort Hall to S.C., Nyeri, 2 December, 1926.

19. See the remarks of John Ainsworth on discipline, obedience and the development of the African in Cashmore, op.cit., pages 110, 112-113.

20. Interviews 105F, 207FS, 07PS.

21. Interview 103F.

22. KNA/DC/KSI, Girouard, Confidential Memoranda, page 5.

23. Quoted in Audrey I. Richards, East African Chiefs, Faber, London, 1960, page 18. See also Cashmore, op.cit., pages 73-74, and Bethwell A. Ogot, "British Administration in the Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 1900-60", Journal of African History, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1963, pages 251-53.

24. Karl Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, Praeger, 1966, pages 80-82. John Ainsworth told the Kenya Land Commission:

"During Wilson's occupation of Dagoretti a youth of Kikuyu-Dorob mixed blood became friendly with some of the askari at the station and when the station was evacuated he accompanied Wilson to the coast. He returned to Kikuyu with Capt. Smith and as he had a little knowledge of Swahili he became most useful as an intermediary between Capt. Smith and the Kikuyu. For some time, however, he had no particular status until Wayaki was deported when he was constituted local headman. This youth was Kinyanjui who some years later became the Government recognized paramount chief of Southern Kikuyu. He had no hereditary right to this position and in all probability would never have attained it but for his association with the European authorities."

(Col. John Ainsworth, Memoranda "Kenya Land Commission: Evidence, Vol. I, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1934, page 495.)

25. KNA/DC/KSI, Girouard "Memoranda..." page 1. Although their legal title was 'headman', appointed African subordinates in the districts were commonly referred to as 'chiefs' and that convention is followed in this text.

26. KGL, "Kenya: Report by Lord Hailey Following his Inquiries in April, 1940", pages 8-9.

27. W.E.H. Stanner, "The Kitui Kampa: A Study of British Colonial Administration in East Africa", 1939, page 4, unpublished manuscript in

H.E. Lambert Papers, Library of the University of Nairobi.

28. Ibid., page 13.
29. KNA/DC/KBU/11/1, Chief's Character Book, entry by H.E. Lambert, October, 1943, page 54.
30. Administrators in each district generally kept a political record book or Chief's character book and these are filled with frequent complaints about the incompetence and dishonesty of the chiefs. See, for example, KNA/DC/MKS4/8, Machakos Political Record Book, Vol. IV, 1925-30; also Stanner, Loc.cit., pages 5-11.
31. Stanner, Loc.cit., page 12.
32. KGL, "Report by Lord Hailey ..." pages 9-10, 36.
33. Ibid., pages 10-11; Lord Hailey, Native Administration in British African Territories, Part I: East Africa, HMSO, London, 1950, pages 124-25, 151-52.
34. KGL, S.H. Fazan, "A Report on Some Aspects of the Relations Between Government and Local Native Councils in Kenya", unpublished official report, 1938, page 107.
35. KNA/DC/KBU 11/1, Chief's Character Book, entry by H.E. Lambert, October, 1943, page 54.
36. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 82-83, and M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, pages 44-45.
37. See Note 30, also Ogot, Loc.cit., page 253; Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 47, 78-80, and the testimony of W. McGregor Ross to the Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1934, page 3382.
38. Stanner, Loc.cit., *passim*; Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 78-80; and J.M. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya" in A. Mazrui and R. Rotberg, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, pages 589-91.
39. KGL, "Report by Lord Hailey ..." page 24 and Hailey, Native Administration, Op.cit., page 104.
40. Hailey, Native Administration, Op.cit., page 101.
41. KGL, "Report by Lord Hailey ..." pages 27-28.
42. Arthur Phillips, A Report on Native Tribunals, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1945, page 285.

43. On the 1921-22 events in Nyanza see Ogot, Loc.cit., pages 261-63; and Lonsdale, Loc.cit., pages 599-603.

44. The official description and explanation of Thuku's activities, arrest, and the ensuing disturbances is found in PRO/CO533/276, Confidential Despatch 67 of 13 March, 1922, Gov. Northey to Secretary of State, W.S. Churchill, and Confidential Despatch 79 of 11 April 1922, Northey to Churchill, both with extensive enclosures. The African perspective is recorded in Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 47-55.

45. It took quite some time for Africans in various parts of Kenya to understand that the Europeans were not just passing through but had come to establish permanent rule over them. In 1907, for example, a young administrator at a new district post in Kisii recorded that the Africans "do not seem to be able to understand that we are going to stay" (quoted in Cashmore, Op.cit., page 54). It has been argued that 'primary resistance movements' exercised a significant impact on the later appearance of nationalist movements in East Africa (T.O. Ranger, "Connections Between 'Primary Resistance Movements' and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa", Journal of African History, Vol. 9, Nos. 3 & 4, 1968, pages 437-453 and 631-641). For Kenya, at least, this emphasis on continuity tends to obscure the very real changes in organization, goals and methods represented by the African political associations that emerged after World War I.

46. Lonsdale, Loc.cit., pages 596, 600-603; PRO/CO533/282 "Native Affairs Report of the Chief Native Commissioner" 1921; and, on the mismanagement of the currency, W. MacGregor Ross, Kenya From Within, (First Edition 1927) Cass, London, 1968, page 199-216.

47. Martin Kilson, "Land and Politics in Kenya: An Analysis of African Politics in a Plural Society", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 10, September 1957, pages 561-63; and J.M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa", Journal of African History, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1968, pages 119-146.

48. Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 18-19.

49. Fenner Brockway, African Journeys, Gollancz, London, 1955.

50. PRO/CO533/384/15540, Sub File A, Minute, T. Drummond Shiels, Parliamentary Undersecretary of State to Lord Passfield, 31 December, 1930.

51. PRO/CO533/422/18073/1932, "Memorandum of the Kikuyu Central Association to the Secretary of State for the Colonies", February 1932, pages 2-6.

52. Ibid.; and KNA/PC/CP8/5/1, Kikuyu Association (a moderate group composed mainly of official chiefs), Pétition addressed to Governor

Grigg, 25 November, 1925, and memoranda to Hilton Young Commission, January, 1928.

53. Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 28-29.

54. Report of the Kenya Land Commission (Cmd. 4556) HMSO, London, 1934, pages 71-77 and 129-144. On the Secretary of State's instructions to the Commission, first publicly revealed in 1936, see Kilson, Loc.cit., page 567.

55. KGL, "Report by Lord Hailey ..." page 6.

56. S.H. Fazan, "An Economic Survey of the Kikuyu Reserves", Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Vol. I, pages 974-75.

57. Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 40-45, and I.B. Pole-Evans, Report of a Visit to Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1939.

58. Sorrenson, Op.cit., page 41.

59. Ibid., page 38.

60. In January, 1930, Kenyatta presented the Kikuyu view to Drummond Shiels at the Colonial Office, but the metropolitan authorities declined to intervene in the matter, other than to informally urge the Kenya Government to provide 'safety valves' for African political expression. (PRO/CO533/384/15540 - Sub File A, "Dr. Shiels interview with Mr. Kenyatta", 23 January, 1930, and, T.D. Shiels to Sir Edward Grigg, Personal letter, 6 February, 1930.) For a full account of the circumcision crisis see Rosbert and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 105-125.

61. Ibid., page 86.

62. Ibid., pages 86-87.

63. KNA/PC/CP8/5/2, "Memorandum from the Committee of the KCA to Sir Edward Grigg", 31 December, 1925; and KNA/PC/CP8/5/3, "Petition to the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Wilson from the KCA", 30 May, 1929. [Wilson was the Permanent Undersecretary of the Colonial Office and was on a visit to the Colony.]

64. KNA/PC/CP8/5/3, "Petition to R. Hon. Sir Samuel Wilson ..."

65. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 125-31; and John Anderson, The Struggle for the School, Longman, London, 1970, pages 112-131.

66. PRO/CO533/422/18073/1932, "Memorandum of the Kikuyu Central Association to the Secretary of State for the Colonies", February, 1932, page 14.

67. PRO/CO533/384/15540 - Sub File A, "Dr. Shiels Interview with Mr. Kenyatta".

68. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", Loc.cit., page 595.

69. Ogot, Loc.cit., page 266.

70. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", Loc.cit., page 589.

71. Ibid., pages 607-613, and J.M. Lonsdale, "Archdeacon Owen and the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association", paper presented at the Conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, 1963; Ogot, Loc.cit., pages 262-64.

72. J.M. Lonsdale, "Politics in Western Kenya", unpublished manuscript, page 43.

73. PRO/CO533/386/15612 (1929) esp. Despatch no.143 of 9 March, 1929, Darth to Amery; also Owen's articles in Manchester Guardian, Dec.6, 1928 & May 1929.

74. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", Loc.cit., pages 614-615.

75. Ibid., page 629.

76. Oginga Odinga, Not yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1967, page 67. Numerous KTWA petitions from the late 1930's, containing complaints about taxes, chiefs, official interpreters, the Local Native Councils and the attitudes and methods of the Provincial Administration are found in KNA/PC/NZA2/471, and PC/NZA2/554.

77. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", Loc.cit., pages 620-27 and 634-35; Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 161-63, 177, and 218.

78. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 163-64; Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", pages 626, 636. Record of the March, 1940 meeting is found in KNA/DC/NN10/1/2 "The Conversations of the KCA, KTWA and ANKCA" of 4 March, 1940. The following month the KTWA and the NKCA sent a joint petition to 'Lord "Abe" (sic) Hailey' (KNA/PC/NZA2/545). Information from government informers a few months earlier indicated that the KCA was interested in extending its activities to the Nandi, Teita, and Masai peoples as well (KNA/PC/NZA2/544, B.W.D. Cochrane, Superintendent of Criminal Investigations Department to P.C., Central, 22 December, 1939). The only other Kenya peoples in which political associations were formed before 1940 were the Kamba (Akamba Members Association) and the Teita (Teita Hills Association). In both instances the associations emerged in the course of conflicts generated by the socio-economic impact of the European presence. For the Kamba the conflict was over government attempts at forced destocking after the rapid growth of the cattle population led to serious erosion in the Kamba reserve which cut the tribe off from some of its traditional grazing area.

Among the Teita the issue was the more straightforward one of occupation of a block of land claimed by the tribe by a European land company.

79. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council, Debates, Second Series, Vol. II, 1937, columns 48-64 and 321-331.

80. East African Standard, August 4, 1939; and Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to Examine the Labour Conditions in Mombasa, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1939, paragraphs 46-47.

81. Ibid., paragraphs 7-20, 53-54. See also Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 181-85; and Makhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1969, pages 83-94.

82. Ogot, Loc.cit., page 257.

83. KNA/DC/FH1/4, H.E. Lambert, D.C., Kiambu, to C. Tomkinson, P.C., Central, 15 June 1942.

84. PRO/CO533/284, Confidential Despatch 331; Governor Sir Robert Coryndon, to Secretary of State, The Duke of Devonshire, 12 December, 1922. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 325.

85. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., 129-130, 326; see also David Barrett, "Two Hundred Independent Church Movements in East Africa", unpublished paper, University of East Africa Social Science Conference, December, 1966.

86. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya", Loc.cit., page 638.

87. KNA/PC/CP8/7/3, Superintendent of Police, Nakuru to Commissioner of Police, Nairobi, 21 May, 1934.

88. Interviews 207FS and 103F. This pattern of individual fads and enthusiasms, and the consequent discontinuity of action, was also characteristic of the field officers of the Indian Civil Service during much of its history. (Philip Woodruff (pseud. for Philip Mason) The Men Who Ruled India, Vol. II: The Guardians, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, page 96.)

89. KNA/PC/CP8/5/5, E.B. Horne, P.C., Central to E.H. Emley, D.C. Embu, 12 January, 1934.

90. This was, for example, the origin of the 1921 crisis over the so-called 'Northey Circulars' ordering administrators to actively recruit labor for settler farms (Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, 2nd edition, Longmans, London, 1965, pages 250-52). In the late 1930's field administrators also covertly began to permit Africans in more remote areas of Central Province to evade what they considered

to be unfair restrictions on the growth of some of the more lucrative cash crops. (Interviews 208FS and 227FS.) Nevertheless, field officers found the KCA difficult to deal with because, as one D.C. put it, the problems they raised were "tribal rather than local" (KNA/DC/CP8/5/5, D.C. Fort Hall to P.C. Nyeri, 29 June, 1932).

91. (KNA/PC/CP4/1/2; Kikuyu [later 'Central'] Province, Annual Reports, 1928.

92. Thus in 1941 the D.C., Central Nyanza wrote to Archdeacon Owen concerning the Secretary of the KTWA, "I feel he is using his position to act as an intermediary between the people and myself, a position I cannot accept". (KNA/PC/NZA2/554, J.D. McKean to W.E. Owen, 11 November, 1941.)

93. PRO/CO533/392/15921, Confidential Despatch 130, Grigg to Passfield, 12 October, 1929.

94. Thus in 1942 the D.C., Voi wrote to the P.C., Coast that the land grievances expressed by the Teita Hills Association had to be dealt with before the leaders of the association were released from detention "so that if adjustments are made they cannot in any way be attributed to their return" (D.C., Voi to P.C., Coast, 23 May, 1942 — quoted in Lonsdale, "Politics in Western Kenya" unpublished manuscript, page 516).

95. KNA/PC/CP8/5/2, Kikuyu Central Association to Senior Commissioner, Nyeri, 10 July, 1926.

96. KNA/DC/KBU1/22, Handing over Report, M.R.R. Vidal to S.H. Fazan, 21 September, 1929, page 23; PRO/CO533/392/15921, Confidential Despatch 130, Grigg to Passfield, 12 October, 1929.

97. Ibid.

98. PRO/CO533/384/15540, Sub-File A, Personal letter, Major E.A.T. Dutton to W.C. Bottomley, Under Secretary, Colonial Office, 25 November, 1929.

99. KNA/DC/KBU1/22, Handing over Report, M.R.R. Vidal...

100. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Op.cit., paragraph 49; East African Standard, "Editorial" August 3, 1939.

101. PRO/CO533/392/15921, Grigg to Passfield, 12 October, 1929.

102. This belief is mentioned repeatedly in the papers, including police and informers reports, included in KNA/DC/FH1/4. In 1938 a chief in Fort Hall arrested and convicted several members of the KCA of being members of the Watu wa Mungu, a conviction upheld by the D.C. (George K. Ndegwa for KCA to D.C. Fort Hall; 4 July, 1939 and reply dated 6 July, 1938).

103. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, Vintage Books, New York, N.D., page xviii. For a description of Kenya European reactions to the book, see Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 131-134.

104. In 1942, H.E. Lambert, a distinguished amateur anthropologist and one of the Administration's most astute experts on African society, wrote of the Watu wa Mungu:

"Perhaps the psychological background is simply a release reaction to the increasing complexity of life in the new Kikuyu conditions.... We should not find it surprising that some such attempt at release should manifest itself from time to time when we consider how very rapidly a new and much more complex economic system requiring a more exacting struggle for existence and an individual effort no longer capable of merger in a communal responsibility has overwhelmed a primitive African tribe." (KNA/DC/FH1/4, Lambert to P.C., Central, 15 June, 1942.)

105. KNA/PC/CP8/5/2, Minutes of meetings between officers of the Provincial Administration and members of the KCA on 25 July and 30 August, 1927, and 16 March, 1928.

106. KNA/DC/KBU1/22, Handing over Report, M.R.R. Vidal.

107. Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1924, Government Printer, Nairobi, page 20.

108. KNA/PC/CP8/5/1, S.W. Hemsted, S.C., Kikuyu, to CNC, 30 January, 1928; PC/NZA2/554, Ag. P.C. Nyanza to Secretary, KTWA, 3 August, 1938.

109. KNA/PC/NZA2/554, V.M. McKeag, D.C., Central Kavirondo to Archdeacon Owen, 4 December, 1931.

110. Interview 08PM. W. MacGregor Ross told the Kenya Land Commission:

"At present the District Commissioner is Chairman: he draws up the agenda, limits free speech, suppresses what and whom he likes, and compiles the only report of the proceedings so conducted." (KLC, Testimony, Vol. III, Op.cit., page 3382.)

111. KNA/PC/CP8/5/5, P.C. Central to D.C. Embu, 12 January, 1934.

112. KNA/PC/CP8/5/3, Letter from UNGA [milling company] 'To Whom It May Concern', 19 April, 1930, stating of one Robinson Tetu:

"We are now regretfully dispensing with his services at the request of the Administration, as he is stated to be connected with the Kikuyu Central Association."

113. The CNC minuted the Chief Secretary shortly afterward that: "There is very little doubt (and very little actual proof) that they were in communication with the Italian Consulate and were indulging in fifth column activities." (KNA/MAA10/64, E.B. Hosking to G.S. Rennie, 6 July, 1940.)

SECTION THREE

DEVELOPMENT AND THE CRISIS
OF COLONIAL RULE

INTRODUCTION

The dimensions of colonialism are most vividly revealed in its characteristic crises. According to Balandier, such crises "constitute the only points of reference from which one can grasp, in a global sense, the transformations occurring among a colonial people under the influence and actions of the colonial power."¹ By the same token, such crises also reveal the reciprocal transformations of the colonial power itself. The crisis of colonialism in Kenya was a crisis of both the rulers and the ruled which found its roots in the economic, political, and administrative institutions that had emerged over a half a century, and was precipitated by two crucial changes that began during the Second World War.

Arnold Feldman had pointed out that "societies are in stasis only when the different rates of change -- political, economic, and social -- enjoy some kind of equivalence at a moderate level."² This relatively rare situation did exist in Kenya during the inter-war period when the scope of government activity was narrow and the settler-dominated monetary economy grew slowly, if at all, and when, with the exception of the Kikuyu, the impact of social change on the African societies of the colony was relatively modest. This began to change during the war. First, the monetary economy began a process of very rapid and sustained growth that lasted for almost two decades. Available evidence suggests that for a brief period between 1947 and 1954 this growth reached the staggering level of more than 13 percent per year.³ The monetary economy of the colony thus lurched forward unexpectedly; senior administrative officials in the Secretariat, ex-

pecting a post-war depression similar to that following World War One, do not appear to have become fully aware of the sustained rapidity of growth until the late 1940's. Unaware of the onset of this rapid growth, the colonial authorities in the metropole, after more than a decade of discussions with the authorities in the colonies and various interested individuals and groups in Britain, made a commitment to the active promotion of the social and economic development of the colonies in preparation for eventual self-government. The new over-all goal of colonial policy was expressed in a series of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, beginning with that of 1940, which provided after the end of the war unprecedented metropolitan resources for development programs. This led to the rapid growth of colonial governments and the expansion of the scope and depth of their intervention into the society and economy of the colonies. The impact of these two changes, rapid growth and the commitment of government to development, upon the existing socio-economic and political system in Kenya generated both political and administrative crises, the interaction of which culminated in the Emergency.

The political crisis of socio-economic development emerged from the processes of social mobilization and differentiation attendant upon the growth of a capitalist monetary economy. Deutsch had defined social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."⁴ The major historical result of mobilization had been that people have been drawn away from the relatively homogeneous and self-sufficient local community that provided the primary context of

their lives and increasingly incorporated into a much larger, complex, and interdependent framework of institutions. The effective community of those dependent upon reciprocal processes of production and exchange is enormously increased, and this expansion in scale is matched by an increasing social differentiation rooted in the functional specialization of socio-economic activity. Not only are more and more people dependent upon each other, but also there are more and more kinds of people, as the variety of social roles rapidly expands. These new roles are incorporated into a myriad of formal organizations, each of which tends to generate its own relatively distinctive values and interests. The number and variety of competing and potentially conflicting interests in a society thus also expands. Deutsch goes on to point out that the process of mobilization involves two separate stages:

- 1) the stage of uprooting or breaking away from the old settings, habits, and commitments; and
- 2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively stable new patterns of group membership, organization, and commitment.¹⁵

Colonial officials in Britain and Kenya, just as many others in their position in different parts of the world, assumed that socio-economic development would almost automatically generate social peace and stability, increase prosperity and ameliorate existing grievances. However, the fact that, in aggregate, development increases the level of production of goods and services and the average per-capita income in a society tends to obscure the equally important facts that the costs and benefits of development tend in a capitalist market framework to be differentially distributed among the population and, especially where growth is very rapid, result in massive social disruption and widespread individual deprivation. As Mancur Olson points

out:

...contrary to what is usually assumed, economic growth can significantly increase the number of losers...there is in the short run no necessary, or even likely, connection between economic growth and the amelioration of hunger and the other deprivations of poverty.. There may, instead, very well be a general decrease in living standards with rapid economic growth.⁶

For many people the development process is thus an experience of institutional collapse and personal hardship.⁶ This is especially true of peasant and tribal people in colonial societies where development was not an internally-generated indigenous process, but one brought and imposed through the culture and institutions of the ruler from the capitalist metropole. The vast disparities of wealth, status, and power between the rulers and ruled in the dual society of colonialism were perpetuated and, indeed, widened by the development process. The indigenous society tends to be treated by the dominant sector of the colonial rulers as a pool of resources to be used in development. The capitalist market penetrates into indigenous society and its members are increasingly mobilized into the widening economic system as producers of primary products, consumers of manufactured goods, and, especially, as laborers in the enterprises of the alien ruling stratum. The consequences have been the commoditization of resources of land, labor, and capital whose use has traditionally been governed not by the market but by complex networks of social and cultural ties. Eric Wolf notes that "capitalism cut through the integument of custom, severing people from their accustomed social matrix in order to transform them into economic actors, independent of prior social commitments to kin and neighbors."⁷ Furthermore, the mobilization of the

indigenous population has often been carried out through the direct coercion of forced labor and the indirect coercion of imposed taxation. In addition to the disruption of traditional society, development also produced such concrete deprivations for the rural population as growing internal differentiation expressed in widening disparities of wealth, increasing landlessness as a result of losses to wealthier members of the community or white settlers, intensified by rapid population growth straining available resources.⁸ In the urban areas, a growing number of the indigenous workers in modern enterprises experience a lag of wages behind an inflationary rise in prices, while another element pushed off the land encounters the new social phenomenon of unemployment.⁹ Each of these efforts of development had been present to a limited extent in Kenya prior to the Second World War, but their scope and intensity was enormously magnified by the sudden onset of rapid and sustained economic growth.

The mobilization process not only produces social disruption and deprivations leading to the emergence of new cleavages and conflicts, but also transforms the institutional scope of conflict in a society. In traditional societies most social conflicts could be dealt with at the level of the local community which provided the primary matrix of the individual's social involvement. The political arena at a higher institutional level, if one existed at all, was the exclusive concern of a narrow elite and dealt with a restricted range of policy issues that impinged only intermittently on the local communities, and then usually for taxation and levies for the armed forces. The process of mobilization makes it impossible for conflicts to be resolved within the context of local institutions as individuals

are increasingly involved in wider and wider socio-economic networks in which they are bound to thousands if not millions of other people by complex ties of not only mutual dependence and cooperation, but also competition and conflict. Direct interaction with more than a handful of people with whom the individual is linked in the social structure becomes impossible. The issues increasingly become societal in scale and conflicts must be fought out in the most inclusive arenas. As Deutsch points out:

In practice the results of social mobilization often have tended to increase the size of the state, well beyond the old tribal areas, petty principalities, or similar districts of the traditional era, while increasing the direct contact between government and governed far beyond the levels of the sociologically superficial and often half-shadowy empire of the past.¹⁰

Furthermore, the incorporation of previously disparate and relatively autonomous groups into a single socio-economic system creates pressures for the expansion of the political system as well. Deutsch again notes:

...social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. Those politically relevant strata are a broader group than the elite: they include all persons who must be taken into account in politics.¹¹

/ The political system is thus subjected to unprecedented demands for decisions on new policy issues and for the expansion of participation to include new participants. At this point the second stage of the mobilization process is involved, for what is at issue is precisely the conditions under which the mobilized population will be integrated into "some relatively stable new patterns of group membership, organization, and commitment." This is the source of the political crisis

of development which in Kenya made the maintenance of the separate arenas of the dual political system increasingly untenable in the face of African demands. As early as 1945 Jomo Kenyatta clearly spelled out the issues involved:

What we do demand is a fundamental change in the present political, economic, and social relationship between Europeans and Africans...the Africans make their claim for justice now, in order that a bloodier and more destructive justice may not be inevitable in time to come.¹²

The intensity of these demands is substantially increased when the state itself is actively involved in the development process and its actions have a significant impact on the resulting distribution of values and the particular institutional arrangements in the rest of the society that result from it.

The expanding scope and intensity of demands on the political system creates a potential for revolution in the society. Whether the political crisis develops into large scale collective violence or the new issues and participants are more peacefully accommodated into the political system depends upon the responses, as well as the unforeseen and unintended consequences of those responses, of the established political authorities. According to Charles Tilly, "collective violence is a contingent outcome of interactions among contenders and governments, in which the agents of government commonly have the greater discretion and do most of the injury and damage."¹³ The responses involve, in effect, a series of critical decisions either reaffirming the status quo or reorienting the basic objectives and institutional framework of the political system. In a colonial administrative state such as Kenya the burden of these decisions fell

most heavily upon the Administration, especially the Provincial Administration which provided the established linkages mediating between the indigenous population involved in the mobilization process and the central political authorities. In such circumstances the conflict between bureaucratic inertia and dynamic adjustment to change comes to a head. Administrators face a choice between "the operations of a bureaucracy which merely administers rules, and operations which answer to the strategic issues of social coordination and conflict", and they tend to "retreat from participation in the existential problems of the population into the protective carapace provided by the administrative machinery."¹⁴

In Kenya the central administration in the Secretariat was caught in the web of commitments of the political stalemate with the settlers and was incapable of making critical decisions for the colony. The Provincial Administration for its part was an organization whose orientation and established patterns of response involved the control or suppression of demands from the African population and the formulation and implementation of policy on an extremely fragmented and short-run basis. Moreover, at the same time as it faced the political consequences of mobilization, the Administration was involved in a crisis within the government resulting from the general commitment to the active promotion of development. While administrators both at the center and in the field were increasingly aware that something was wrong, the limited vision imposed by organizational positions and commitments apparently prevented any general understanding of the full scope and implications of the administrative crisis. This crisis had its origin in the basic tension, noted by

resler, between the requirements of the goal of development and those of the prefectoral system's existing commitment to the status quo and the maintenance of law and order. In addition, the growth of functional departments to implement development programs challenges the dominant position of the Administration within the government and generates increasing conflict between specialists and generalists.¹⁵

The emergence of these clashes in the Kenya Government created a need for internal critical decisions to reorient the basic objectives and methods of the Provincial Administration and sort out the relations between administrators and technical specialists.

These critical decisions were never made. In the metropole the process of defining the new doctrine of development was not carried very far. No real attempt was made to reshape the existing institutions and methods of colonial administration in light of anticipated requirements of development: post-1945 'development and welfare' colonialism was simply superimposed on the framework of the earlier 'law and order' colonialism. As in the past, it was left up to the Administration of each colony to translate the vague principles emanating from the Colonial Office into a general policy applicable to local conditions and implement this policy through specific operational programs. However, any chances that the critical decisions might have been made in Kenya, despite the Administration's problems in dealing with innovation and change, were largely eliminated by a series of 'reforms' made in 1945 to facilitate the implementation of development programs. The direct formal line of command from the Provincial Administration to the Chief Secretary was ruptured and executive responsibility for the Provincial Administration shifted confusingly between senior officials

preoccupied with the financial, technical and organizational problems occasioned by the expansion of government activities and the emergence of functional ministries. The Provincial Administration was left adrift to both maintain law and order and lead in the formulation and execution of local development programs. The cleavage between center and periphery in the Administration widened into a chasm of mutual incomprehension and hostility.

Chapter Six describes how the Secretariat failed to find an effective general development policy, while the Provincial Administration developed a series of specific programs intended to halt social disintegration in African society which actually intensified the political conflicts in the colony. Chapter Seven examines the interaction between the external political and internal administrative crises and how this led to the Emergency. Chapter Eight attempts to show how the Emergency finally generated a series of critical decisions, the first of which appeared to restore the power and status of the Provincial Administration, while the subsequent ones, shaped by the growing power and initiative of the metropolitan authorities, broke the political stalemate and culminated in the end of direct colonial rule.

NOTES - INTRODUCTION - SECTION #3

1. Georges Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" (first publ. 1951) in I. Wallerstein, ed. Social Change: The Colonial Situation, John Wiley, New York, 1966, page 56.
2. Arnold Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution" in H. Eckstein, Internal War, Free Press, New York, 1964, page 114.
3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963, pages 20-21.
4. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 3, September, 1961, page 494.
5. Ibid.
6. Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force" (first publ. 1963) in J. L. Finkle and R.W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change, 2nd ed., John Wiley, New York, 1971, pages 562, 564-65.
7. Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Harper and Row, New York, 1970, page 279.
8. Ibid., pages 280-81.
9. Olson, loc. cit., pages 562-63.
10. Deutsch, loc. cit., page 502.
11. Ibid., pages 497-98.
12. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya: The Land of Conflict, International African Service Bureau 3, Manchester, 1945, page 22.
13. Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1973, page 439. The approach adopted in this study is also similar to that of Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968) in focusing on rapid change and mobilization as the sources of critical challenges to existing political institutions. It departs from Huntington, however, to share Tilly's emphasis on the character of existing political institutions and especially the responses of the incumbent authorities as the crucial determinant of whether the tensions and deprivations of development will lead to large-scale collective violence.

14. Wolf, op. cit., page 287.

15. James Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of De-
centralization", Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1965, pages 559-
64.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY, 1945 to 1952

The Kenya Administration approached the new colonial ideals of development and welfare ostensibly guided by the concept of 'multi-racialism' introduced by Governor Sir Philip Mitchell soon after he assumed office in December, 1944. A career administrator of distinguished achievements, Mitchell had thirty years of experience behind him beginning as a District Officer in Nyasaland in 1914 and including terms as the Chief Secretary of Tanganyika and as Governor of Uganda and Fiji. He came to his post as "the most experienced and trusted East African-ist the Colonial Office had" and "was convinced that he had a logical and integrated policy that would mould together all the various conflicting interests of the country into a new multi-racial nation, a light to Africa and the world."¹

Mitchell's vision of the multi-racial society was a recasting of the notion of the organic community in the light of the colonial context:

...what we have already achieved here is a living, growing, dynamic society pursuing as its objective the creation of a polity in which all of the human groups of which it is composed have a share, and a vital interest according to their several needs and capacities, a society which places no insurmountable obstacle in front of anybody or any race.²

His approach was based on the doctrine announced by such imperialists as Rhodes and Churchill of 'equal rights for all civilized men', and he saw the major role of colonial government as creating the "conditions in which [its] wards can advance in civilization, knowledge, and capacity ...to the farthest point they can reach."³ Steady economic growth guided

and encouraged by the Administration would create the conditions under which Africans could rise to a level of civilization permitting them to increasingly participate as equals in a multi-racial state. What was envisioned for the African was a very gradual political and economic evolution, the various stages of which were unspecified, in which he would have to prove his capabilities in his current position before further advances could be contemplated.

Multi-racialism was also a plea for patience and moderation addressed primarily to the European settler. Mitchell and his senior Secretariat officials saw the Europeans as the primary danger to the political peace of the colony. He found the fundamental cleavage in Kenya to be that between those who believed "that all human beings are capable of civilization" and those who did not, i.e. most administrators and most settlers, respectively. Multi-racialism was a means to educate the settler community in the changed conditions of the post-war world, quell their fears of African domination, and bring them into harmonious collaboration with the government and the other racial communities. On this basis Mitchell took the lead in carrying out a modification of the Legislative Council in 1948 to include an unofficial majority in which an increased number of European, Asian, and African members collectively outnumbered the government benches, and which he hoped would "stimulate the development of party as opposed to racial groupings."⁴ Furthermore, multi-racialism assured the settler that only Africans who met appropriate standards (i.e., British) of civilization and behavior would be accorded full social and political rights, and that the European community as the most politically advanced element in Kenya would for an indefinitely long time have a "predominantly powerful and influential

part to play."⁵

I. The Lack of a General Development Policy

Multi-racialism, however, was never effectively translated from a vague statement of ideals into a specific general policy of development for the colony. The structural and political constraints on the Administration continued to make it both unwilling and unable to make general policy, and the stalemate of the inter-war years persisted with the Governor and the Secretariat incapable of filling the hiatus between the vague ideals of multi-racialism and the programs implemented in the field. For Mitchell himself, multi-racialism was not so much a guide to policy as a declaration of faith by a deeply religious and idealistic man. For officials in the Secretariat it provided a concept that assured them they were on the right course and that the socio-economic problems of Kenya would in the long run be wiped out. The actual development programs, however, were formulated on a serial and largely ad hoc basis by government officials outside of the Secretariat and private interests in the monetary economy.

Two further factors also hampered the ability of the Administration to handle development problems. First, there was a simple lack of both the technical expertise and information necessary for conceptualizing the development process. Few if any government officials were trained in economics and the first professional economists were only reluctantly hired in the late 1940's. Nor was much aid in this area forthcoming from the metropolitan authorities. Until the mid-1950's professional economists in Britain showed little interest in the field of development economics or in studying colonial economic problems.

The Colonial Economic Development Council was a signal failure among the specialist advisory bodies formed by the Colonial Office after the war.⁶ Furthermore, the Administration was sorely deficient in basic information about the parameters of economic activity in the colony, especially the African subsistence economy, as well as in scientific data about such crucial matters as soil structure, and fertility and the distribution and availability of natural resources. Without a clear understanding of the existing economic and resource base, the establishment of developmental priorities or even the organization of specific programs became inordinately difficult. A senior official of the Kenya Treasury noted that they operated "without statistics, without research, and it was very much a blind hit or miss."⁷ As late as 1949 W. Arthur Lewis, one of the few economists interested in colonial problems, reported that:

most colonial administrations have not yet even begun to recognize the nature of their most important economic problems, let alone make provision for dealing with them.⁸

Second, the formulation of policy was also hampered by the lack of felt time pressure in the Administration. In 1945 administrators could not conceive of an end to colonial rule in the foreseeable future. Governor Mitchell spoke of the Africans requiring strong colonial control for generations to come, while other administrators mentioned time spans for the development process of fifty to two hundred and fifty years.⁹ In any event, the ultimate goal of development was comfortably beyond the career span of any serving officer. The future, it was felt, would take care of itself; there was more than enough time to deal with individual problems as they arose. Thus the specification of long-term goals and time tables was thought to be not only undesirable, since it deprived colonial authorities of the flexibility to respond to local conditions,

but also quite unnecessary.

The organizational characteristics of the Administration combined with the lack of expertise and time pressure to abort efforts at development planning. The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts stipulated that each colony should prepare a ten-year plan to cover the first period of post-war development. In 1945 a Development Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to prepare a plan for the period 1946-55. In the same year a Development and Reconstruction Authority (DARA) was established, also under the direction of the Chief Secretary, to coordinate developmental activity and expenditure. The Development Committee, however, made no effort to articulate goals or priorities, but rather aggregated into a more comprehensive report a wide variety of individual projects suggested by District and Provincial Commissioners and a series of settler-dominated sub-committees reporting on various functional areas.¹⁰ Moreover, the lack of reliable socio-economic data limited the Committee's report to nothing more than statements of intended public expenditure in various areas.

The resulting 'plan' was never taken very seriously by administrators. Their attitude was perhaps best summed up by Percy Wyn-Harris, the Chief Native Commissioner from 1947-1949:

...any plan must be stated in very wide terms and
...any detail that is filled in is purely to give
body to an otherwise nebulous picture; the detail
itself and even large pieces of the whole picture
are subject to the most drastic altering and re-
planning.¹¹

As a result of this attitude, the Administration readily departed from the plan to meet specific contingencies through ad hoc additions of new programs and modifications of existing ones.¹²

A. Administrative Ambivalence Toward the Development Process

Even more important than the lack of a general policy or the failure of planning was the fact that administrators were profoundly ambivalent about the whole notion of development itself. They tended to fear change as a source of social disintegration and looked upon processes of development primarily with regard to their impact upon the existing institutions of African society, rather than in terms of their efficacy in creating new institutional patterns in the future. As administrative officers increasingly came to fear the consequences of the changes in African society produced by contact with European culture, the preservation of the organic community they saw in traditional tribal life became a goal of paramount importance. They thus approached the post-war commitment to development with grave reservations and great emphasis on the need to maintain social cohesion by introducing change slowly, carefully, and with firm control to avoid its undesirable consequences. One D.C., for example, cautioned his fellow officers that "patience is needed, a true sense of proportion and a firm hand on the brake", and he added:

Tradition is what the African needs (just as much as we do) to help him along the right road. We smashed some of his traditions and it is necessary to give him a basis on which to build new traditions.¹³

There was a corresponding emphasis that development must be a process of 'natural evolution' in which social order and unity was maintained. The Administration wanted to extend this principle to embrace all sectors of Kenyan society, immigrant as well as African.

For Governor Mitchell the objective of development in Kenya was the evolution "~~from components at present heterogeneous a harmo-~~

nious and organic society."¹⁴ The problem was how to reconcile the desire to maintain the integrity of tribal society with the presence of a settler community for whom development meant the expansion of outputs and profits of agriculture, commerce, and industry based upon individual and corporate private capital. The only pattern of development for the colony as a whole acceptable to the settler community was toward European socio-economic and political institutions, values, and lifestyles. At the same time, moreover, Mitchell and the senior officials in the Secretariat continued to operate on the assumption that African cultures and societies had little of value worth preserving. Multi-racialism did not mean multi-culturalism, but rather the creation of a Christian and essentially British civilization among Kenya's varied population. While insisting that multi-racialism presupposed no particular set of institutions, Mitchell also stated that his goal "was the establishment of a civilized state in which the values and standards are to be the values and standards of Britain."¹⁵ Selective change was rejected. As one D.C. put it, "the African must learn that there is no short cut to civilization and he must accept it indivisible or leave it."¹⁶ The conflicting elements in administrative attitudes of assimilation as opposed to protection of traditional society reappeared in the new and more compelling context of post-war development.

On the rare occasions when administrators attempted to articulate a concept of the society they wanted to create the divergent strains showed clearly. For example, the District Commissioner of Machakos stated that the goal of development was:

to try to help the transition from the Iron Age... to standards of life and social behavior which are set by the immigrant European community, and to

effect this - which can only be most painful and difficult - without imposing intolerable strains on the social fabric of the Kamba tribe with resulting violence and sorrow.¹⁷

Another fundamental element of administrators' understanding of development was the assumption that socio-economic growth necessarily preceded and was an essential precondition for the political advance to self-rule. Development, moreover was also a matter of moral and spiritual growth: the ascent to 'civilization' was also a climb to a higher moral plane. Political development became a prize achieved at the end of the process of socio-economic change, and administrators, in a real sense, tended to view development as a test of the African's worthiness of the political prize. Mitchell saw the African as being "at present in a very primitive moral, cultural, and social state", and he told his Provincial Commissioners in 1949 that "the key to the advancement of the African lay in his own character."¹⁸ The burden for the ultimate success or failure of the development process was shifted onto the shoulders of the African himself, while the Administration established the criteria of advancement and judged his progress. However, without a general policy specifying the goals of socio-economic development, it was extremely difficult if not impossible for the Administration to clearly specify the criteria by which the African's readiness for political advancement would be judged. Furthermore, in this area as well, the only path of political development acceptable to the settlers led to parliamentary institutions on the Westminster model according to the pattern established in white dominions of the old Commonwealth.

A commitment to a general pattern of development on anything but Western lines would have opened an irreparable breach with the

settlers. If a Western pattern were adopted, administrators feared it would result in a massive breakdown of tribal society, and they, rather than the settlers, would be responsible for dealing with the resulting anarchy. Even if the latter outcome could be avoided, the Administration would still be faced with the problem of defining the respective roles in the resulting Western-style institutions of Africans, Europeans, and Asians. Whatever balance the Administration proposed would be likely to be rejected by at least one of the ethnic communities.

Faced with all of these constraints, it is not surprising that the Administration, the central Secretariat in particular, dealt with the most comprehensive level of policy decision by doing nothing. In so doing, the Administration tacitly accepted the continuance of the existing division of society, economy, and polity in Kenya between the world of the Africans and the world of the immigrants. It also persisted in its established patterns of dealing with the problems of the various ethnic communities separately and essentially in isolation from each other and of framing policy on low levels of generality involving incremental adjustments to deal with immediate issues.

II. Development Policy in the Monetary Economy: Settler Control and Rapid Expansion

That real economic growth could only come from the efforts of the immigrant communities, especially from settler commercial agriculture, was a dogma of the Kenya Administration from the time Europeans were first invited to settle in the colony. The post-war commitment to development reinforced the settler position. Governor Mitchell and his senior officials saw little economic potential in the development of African agriculture and regarded the more intensive develop-

ment of the White Highlands as one of the government's most important tasks.¹⁹ Whatever its doubts about the desirability of Western economic institutions for the African, the Administration firmly believed that the prosperity of Kenya rested on the growth of immigrant enterprise.

After tottering near virtual collapse during the depression, the settler-dominated monetary economy entered a period of sustained growth with the coming of the war in 1939. This war-born prosperity continued after 1945, spurred by a buoyant international market for agricultural products and an increasing rate of capital investment.

Kenya's Gross Domestic Product is estimated to have risen from £53 million in 1947 to £127 million in 1954 and the real growth of the monetary economy has been estimated at 6 percent per annum between 1945 and 1958.²⁰ The economy experienced not only expansion, but also in-

creasing internal diversification and complexity. This was most apparent in the establishment of an increasing number and variety of industrial enterprises. In 1951 the Kenya Government noted the presence of 84 different types of manufacturing, processing, and extractive industries in the colony, and by 1954 it could state that "since 1945 the development of secondary industries in the Colony has been spectacular."²¹

Between 1945 and 1958 some 3,283 new companies were incorporated in Kenya and the colony also began to attract investment from large foreign and metropolitan corporations.²² In the process, Nairobi was transformed into a major regional center for trade, manufacturing, and finance.

Commercial agriculture continued, however, to be the primary base of the economy and the principal earner of foreign exchange, accounting for almost 82 percent of export sales in 1957.²³

The Kenya Government played only a secondary role in this

vigorous growth. By its acceptance of a dominant settler role in the economy and related areas of policy the Administration ceded effective control over the patterns of development in the monetary economy to private interests. The stance of the government was "one of encouragement rather than of forcing or even guiding in the blue print sense."²⁴ Given the lack of expertise and information, the government did not provide much more sophisticated direction than to urge the increase of production in all areas. Moreover, for the Administration to have attempted a more active role would have prompted the type of conflict with the settlers it wanted to avoid. The government concentrated its activities and expenditures on the development of natural resources, improvements in transport and communications, and the expansion of services that would facilitate private sector growth.

The administrative machinery for the growth of settler agriculture was a complex series of marketing and production boards developed out of the war-time mobilization of the economy. The system was designed to stabilize and maximize the price to producers and it provided organizational arenas in which settler farmers could exercise direct influence over policy and protect their private interests, including the restriction of the entry of new licenced producers, i.e., Africans, into the market for lucrative cash crops.²⁵ The expanded extension services provided to settler farmers were also designed for the maximization of profit rather than production.²⁶ This meant that the level of production was not extended beyond the point where marginal returns on additional production began to decrease. As a result, despite the great increase of output, European farms in the White Highlands were not farmed to anything near their productive capacity and

large portions continued to lie undeveloped. Settler agriculture was, above all, a money making proposition for the individual farmer and not a vehicle for promoting the most rapid expansion of the economy as a whole.

The political dimension of the agricultural board system was also crucial. The boards brought the settlers into semi-official collaboration with the government and served to mute some of the bitter conflict that marked settler-government relations during the 1919-1939 period. A senior official of the Ministry of Agriculture noted that without the board system "the relations of the settlers with the government would have been intolerable."²⁷

The government was even more inactive with regard to the development of commerce and industry, leaving the initiative almost entirely in the hands of private interests.²⁸ The anti-industrial and anti-urban biases of administrators, their belief that the development of the country lay essentially in commercial agriculture, and the political dominance in the European community of the farming interests impeded serious consideration of industrial development policy. Both official and settler thinking in this area "was notably vague and confused."²⁹

III. Development Policy in the Subsistence Economy: Administrative Control and the Preservation of Social Cohesion

African tribal society, in which the vast majority of the population of Kenya still pursued traditional modes of subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry, was the principal arena for active intervention in the development process by the Administration. The participation of Africans in their own development was actively encouraged, but only in so far as they worked under the direction of the Provincial

Administration. The requirements of 'good government' ultimately "meant that the official classes accepted full responsibility for development schemes, neither more nor less."³⁰

Administrators focused their attention on three major problem areas: 1) soil conservation, the reconditioning of eroded and over-grazed lands, and the development of water resources; 2) land tenure patterns, the determination of the optimum size of farm units, and the introduction of improved agricultural methods; 3) social development and welfare and the prevention of social disintegration. In each area the thrust of administrative action was reactionary, i.e., it was intended to reverse processes of change already in evidence that the Administration regarded as destructive. The 'guardian' self-image of administrators inclined them to an ameliorative approach that emphasized 'welfare' objectives much more than development. The resulting 'development' programs were primarily concerned with the larger agricultural farming-herding tribes, particularly the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba, in which the Administration believed deteriorating change had gone farthest. Significantly, these tribes were also those in which increasing political activity posed the greatest potential threat to administrative control. The smaller and more conservative tribes, the pastoral peoples in particular, tended to be neglected.³¹

A. Soil Conservation and the Rejection of Cash Crop Agriculture

The destruction of land in the African reserves, especially in Central and Nyanza Provinces, presented the Administration with an urgent and compelling problem. In 1945 the Director of Agriculture reported that the average productive capacity per acre in native areas

had fallen by not less than fifty percent.³² The decline in food production in the more eroded districts like Machakos placed an increasing strain upon the land in the most fertile African farming areas in Nyanza which were called upon to grow increasing surpluses of food to supply the most deteriorated areas.³³

To a considerable extent this destruction of the land was an unanticipated consequence of the Administration's own policies. Having grossly underestimated the size and rate of increase of the population of various tribes, the Administration proceeded to confine them within delimited reserves incapable of absorbing the expansion of both human and animal populations. Rapid growth of people and livestock, notably in the Kamba districts of Kitui and Machakos and in the already densely populated Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Nyeri, placed intense and increasing pressure on the land. African farmers were forced to cultivate or graze every available piece of land and abandon traditional methods of fallowing through shifting cultivation. Furthermore in light of the fact that large areas of land in settled districts remained unused and in face of Kikuyu claims that land alienated to the settlers had been stolen from them, the Administration was aware of the potentially explosive political implications of land deterioration and population pressure. Thus, in 1946 the Provincial Commissioners emphasized the "necessity to avoid any suggestion that the provision of more land could permanently solve the inherent difficulties of the present land congestion problems."²⁴ The issue had to be resolved within the existing distribution of land, or the Administration would be forced to confront the issue of finding a new basis for the relationship between white and black.

Administrative officers preferred to view the deterioration of land in the reserves as evidence of the destructive incompetence and backwardness of the African farmers or herdsman. The country values and interests of administrators were challenged by the situation and for many of them saving the land from the depredations of its human occupants became a virtual obsession during the late 1940's.³⁵ The central thrust of development activities in the reserves for the first five years after the war was directed at the reconditioning of the land and the prevention of further deterioration. This involved extensive programs of contour terracing, the planting of grassy lees to hold the soil, and efforts to introduce crop rotation and the use of animal and chemical fertilizers. The sense of urgency felt by officials on this specific issue stimulated an uncommon scope and intensity of action marked, ironically, by an unusual willingness to ride roughshod over traditional practices that interfered with conservation efforts and an unwillingness to brook any opposition from African farmers. Field administrators readily resorted to 'compulsory communal labour' to aid the technical officers and the whole tone of government action was unequivocal and heavy-handed.³⁶

The belief in the destructiveness of native agriculture led to a rejection of development through cash crop farming and an insistence on the improvement of subsistence cultivation.³⁷ To promote the growing of cash crops in lieu of food crops among African farmers, thought to be ignorant of good farming methods and careless of their land, would invite total destruction of the soil through the reckless pursuit of profit. Only after the efficient production of food crops had been established could the introduction of suitable cash crops in carefully

selected areas be contemplated. As a result, the Administration continued restrictions on African production of the most profitable crops, particularly coffee, tea, and pyrethrum, that had originally been imposed through settler pressures during the 1919-1939 period.³⁸

By rejecting agricultural development on the basis of commercial farming the Administration not only set itself against existing patterns of change, but also against the expressed preferences of an increasing number of African farmers. In Nyanza Province African farmers had for some time been deriving considerable income from the sale of cotton and increasing surpluses of corn. The Kiambu Kikuyu had been growing fruits and vegetables for the Nairobi market for decades, and a considerable number of farmers there and in Fort Hall District had been profitably growing wattle for many years.³⁹ In the decade following the war African farmers in these and other areas showed an increasing desire to grow the cash crops reserved for European farmers and were angered and frustrated by the continuance of official restrictions. Administrative policy thus denied Africans access to the money economy as independent producers at a time when the visible prosperity of European agriculture was rapidly increasing.

B./ Land Tenure: The Issue of Individual Tenure and Title

To improve the conditions of subsistence agriculture the Administration had to confront the vexing issue of the proper pattern of land tenure to be enforced in the reserves. To administrators the basic choice lay between the gradual introduction of some form of individual holdings or the maintenance of traditional systems of communal tenure. The issue was connected to the problem of the minimal size of an econ-

omic holding in the reserves. Growing population pressure led to increasing fragmentation of holdings though inheritance and Africans in Nyanza and Central Provinces were farming even smaller and more scattered plots. Land tenure was also linked to the question of agricultural credit. If progressive farming techniques were to be developed, Africans would at some point require access to loans, and a clear title to land which could be used as security was a necessity for a credit system.

Individual tenure and the sale and transfer of land was increasingly in evidence in Kikuyu areas.⁴⁰ Moreover, Kikuyu appeals to the government for the issue of titles giving security of tenure under law had been going on since the early 1920's. These demands for secure title reflected not only a fear of further alienation of land to Europeans, but also profound changes in the role and value of land in tribal life in the face of growing population pressure and an increasing desire for cash income.

Administrators, however, were profoundly ambivalent about the question of individual tenure. On the one hand, their distrust of individualism reached a peak of intensity in the aftermath of the war. Many officers "having lost faith in economic individualism ... doubted the moral right of Europeans to impose such a system on Africans, thus destroying the supposed communal spirit of tribal tradition."⁴¹ The spread of individualism was seen as linked to the destructive 'mining' of the land with cash crops, and the Administration feared "the tendency of the African to an individualism which was more pronounced than that of the European he tried to imitate."⁴² On the other hand, administrators' image of social evolution led them to believe that 'natural' processes of change would gradually produce, as they had in Britain, some form

of individual land tenure.

For the first three years after the war the rejection of individualism dominated policy discussions and the Administration decided to attempt the "resuscitation and encouragement of indigenous controls and the setting up of land authorities based on the indigenous system."⁴³ Unfortunately, among the Kikuyu, where traditional land controls were rapidly disappearing and tradition had in any case included a form of individual tenure, it proved impossible to identify any sufficiently cohesive group that could serve as the institutional means of communal control.⁴⁴ Consequently, this policy did not go beyond a series of inconclusive discussions among administrative officials.

By 1948 opinion shifted and the Administration was prepared to contemplate the official introduction of some form of individual tenure, provided firm controls could be maintained to eliminate its undesirable aspects. The process of formulating and implementing a coherent policy on individual tenure was thwarted, however, by the slowness of the normal decision-making process, the lack of felt time pressure, and the lack of coordination and communication both within the Administration and between it and other government departments.

Officials of the central administration discussed the issue for almost three years before bringing the Central Province administration, the field officers most directly concerned with the issue, back into the discussions. The matter was further delayed when the P.C. had to consult his District Commissioners. The latter raised objections over the details and timing of the proposals that dragged the decision process out for another eighteen months. These discussions were held serially and no attempt was made to bring all of the officials

involved together in a single meeting to thrash out the proposals. Finally, the P.C. acted on his own initiative and had his Native Courts Officer draw up a set of occupancy rules specifying the conditions for the granting of titles. In mid-1952, after more than four years of discussions, the Legal Department was finally consulted and the Administration was shocked to find that it judged the draft rules to be inapplicable under the existing provisions of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance. Characteristically, while the Chief Native Commissioner's staff sought a compromise solution that would not require amendment of the sacrosanct ordinance, the Central Province D.C.s decided to accept the rules as the basis for policy and begin a pilot scheme.⁴⁵

The approach that finally emerged was typically tentative and limited with a primary emphasis on retention of control over tenure patterns by the Administration. The rules of occupancy were a combination of traditional and English land law, and security of title was made conditional on the principle of beneficial occupation, i.e., the use of good farming practices. Due to limitations of staff and finance, the program was restricted to issuing titles to only the 'progressive' farmers in a district.⁴⁶ The Administration thus attempted to tie the issue of individual titles to the adoption of improved methods of agriculture by holding them out as a reward for cooperation with the government.

C. Social Welfare and the Reversal of Social Disintegration

Administrators felt considerably more comfortable dealing with welfare programs than in dealing with the complexities of agricultural development or land tenure systems. Welfare permitted full scope for

the expression imperial paternalism, without requiring any rethinking of established methods of administration. As one administrator put it, welfare "is really a synonym for good administration ... there is a danger in considering welfare as another specialist activity requiring a large number of specialists to tackle it."⁴⁷

Social welfare schemes were the specific means through which the Administration attempted to halt the perceived trend of social disintegration and restore the organic unity of the community. Administrative efforts in this area included not only a variety of concrete programs, but also the earnest moral exhortation of the African. A 1949 Youth Conference in Nyeri:

put to these leaders the perilous decline in the social integrity and unity and [trend] to enlist their support in a 'Social Uplift' movement based on respect and care for the land, as in the 4-H organization in the U.S.⁴⁸

A large proportion of the welfare work in the districts was carried out under the rubric of 'community development' (cooperative communal self-help projects). This was to be a means of stimulating local interest and participation and had the added attraction of supposedly being inexpensive, since it relied on unpaid voluntary labor.⁴⁹ Community development in Kenya was tempered, however, by the Provincial Administration's insistence on maintaining control of all activities in the reserves: "the secret of success in any native reserve is constant supervision of every activity. If any activity is not supervised it dies."⁵⁰ This placed clear limits on the extent to which local initiative could be tolerated. Governor Mitchell warned the Provincial Commissioners "against the danger of allowing the enthusiasm for 'Community Development' to get out of hand."⁵¹ Administrators continued to

believe that only they knew the best interests of the African, while the African himself, in his ignorance and inexperience, had nothing to contribute to the development process except his labor. On this basis administrators could ignore mounting African pressures for individual tenure, the expansion of cash crops, the provision of agricultural credits, and increased access to education.

Fear of social disintegration also colored the Administration's perception of the role of education in the development process. The African with a Western 'literary' education was feared as a threat to both traditional institutions and administrative control, and education beyond the primary level was mistrusted as the source of a class of Africans alienated from and incapable of being reintegrated into the fabric of tribal life. Too much education too soon disrupted the necessary process of gradual organic evolution. Therefore, education policy for both primary schools and adult education programs emphasized the teaching of agricultural and vocational subjects that would not detach the student from life in the reserves and permit him to fit the tribal focus of official development policies. Here again the Administration's policy ran counter to growing African demands for increased access to all levels of education, including secondary schools and universities.⁵²

D. The Gaps and Contradictions in Administrative Policy

In framing development policies for the African areas administrators sanguinely accepted the fact that the success of these policies depended upon forcing 'excess' population off the land in the reserves. In 1948 the Chief Native Commissioner noted that in order

to issue titles to farms of economic size:

The excess of population would be forced off the land, which would thereby be saved from ruin. He was aware that in adopting such a course Government would be creating a landless class, and that hardship was inevitable.⁵³

The creation of this landless class of Africans was accepted as an inevitable part of the evolution of society and it was assumed that it would eventually be absorbed by increased employment opportunities created by the growth of the money economy. Administrators believed that in the long run Kenya would follow a pattern of evolution similar to that of Britain or other Western industrial societies.⁵⁴

This calm acceptance of the transformation of an increasing number of Africans into agricultural and industrial proletarians flatly contradicted the Provincial Administration's vigorous efforts to maintain the integrity of tribal society in the reserves. The process of Westernization that administrators rejected with one hand, they accepted with the other for the bizarre reason that it would facilitate the preservation of traditional society by relieving over-crowding. There is no evidence that the incompatibility of the two courses of development pursued in the immigrant communities on the one hand, and in the African reserves on the other was ever consciously recognized. Having ceded direct control over development of the monetary economy to private interests, the Provincial Administration relied, in effect, on the labor absorptive capacities of settler enterprise as a deus ex machina for some of the most pressing problems in the reserves. Unfortunately, the capacity of European agriculture, the largest sector of the money economy, to absorb African labor had reached a limit and farmers were actually attempting to reduce the number of laborers

through increased mechanization.⁵⁵

With regard to the urban African worker the contradictions in administrative policy went even deeper. The existing low wage structure did not free the worker from the land, but bound him to it since it was impossible for him to support his family in the city on what he earned. Thus he was forced to maintain a base in the reserves. This imposed upon most urban workers a pattern of periodic migration between job and farm that inhibited the emergence of a permanently committed urban labor force with a rising level of skill and productivity.

The Administration's failure to deal with the problem of urban wages was symptomatic of its continuing neglect of the problems of change in urban areas. Despite the rapid growth of non-farm employment and of the African population of Nairobi and smaller towns, few administrators were posted to urban areas and their influence on settler dominated urban governments was limited.⁵⁶ For most administrators the city continued to be regarded as an alien and hostile environment: the breeding ground of crime, political unrest, and social disintegration. While they were willing to accept industrialization as a means of dealing with 'excess' rural population, they were not willing or able to deal with the consequences.

Finally, the Administration had no conception of and made no provision for an African economic rôle other than that of subsistence farmer in the reserves or laborer in immigrant enterprises. The possible African contribution to development in terms of small-scale commercial, industrial, and service enterprises, as well as cash-crop farming, was given scant attention aside from a few adult vocational training programs. Indeed, for some administrators the idea of the

African as trader, contractor, or transport operator was not only grossly premature, but also something of a joke. Once again, the Administration's policy, or lack of policy, ran counter to both patterns of change in the reserves and the expressed desires of an increasing number of Africans.⁵⁷

E. Implementation and the Problem of Local Discretion

The actual programs carried out in a district were expected to come from those who best knew local conditions and needs. District and Provincial 'teams', composed of departmental officers under the direction of the local administrator, decided what particular projects best served the objectives of various development policies as well as their scope and timing. This discretion was jealously guarded and field officers tended to resent specific instructions or suggestions emanating from the central authorities.⁵⁸

The lack of technical criteria to judge the efficacy of many social and economic development projects resulted in the choice of particular schemes being determined by the enthusiasm and persuasiveness of the field officers who proposed them. The fact that the central authorities in the DARA and the various departments controlled the allocation of funds resulted in a complex bargaining process over the budgeting of development projects. Competition between not only the various government departments, but also different districts encouraged the exaggeration of both the potential costs and results of projects for the purpose of bargaining for what was actually thought to be needed: "...a lot of it was how can we screw money out of this bloody government...and you got the most crazy schemes blown up which were sort of by guess or by God... you tended to do a complete shot in

the dark."⁵⁹

Local discretion, compounded by the lack of general policy and a consequent inability to clearly link any particular project to developmental goals, continued to result in wide variations in projects between districts and within single districts over time. Programs proceeded by fits and starts according to the ideas and biases of the particular administrative and technical officers present. One field administrator noted:

A lot depended on your person and your initiative...within this general idea of sort of progress and development. A chap was mad keen on schools, schools it was, every school under the sun you saw being developed in his district. Then someone would come along who didn't like schools, but he liked dispensaries -- this is a bit of an exaggeration, but this was the principle of it -- so dispensaries was the thing, or women's clubs, or what have you. If you look at reports of years gone by [you see] a whole series of drives to do this, that, or the other, and usually the drives in eighteen months to two years fell flat on their faces... enthusiasm followed time after time by collapse.⁶⁰

IV. Administrative Control and the Failure of Political Development Policy

During the first post-war decade the foundation of British policy for African political development was the use of local government as a school for education in democracy, political responsibility, and social service. This was expected to provide the necessary basis for the advancement of the African to self-government. The metropolitan authorities in particular placed their hopes for the slow 'organic' evolution of African society upon the effective development of local government. It was therefore also viewed as a means of

stimulating local participation in development and as a channel for the expression of political opinion and dissent. Moreover, local government was considered a more significant arena for African political participation than central government institutions because it was closer to the people, and it was projected as the base of a multi-tiered pyramid of local, provincial, regional, and central councils that would gradually provide Africans access to more inclusive institutional arenas and greater political responsibilities.⁶¹ Kenya, where indirect rule had never been implemented and the Administration ruled through institutions of its own creation, was regarded as a progressive example of the direction in which other colonies were to move. The Local Native Councils, unencumbered with the burden of traditional indigenous institutions, were expected to be more easily adaptable to the general pattern of British local government that was accepted as the model for development.⁶²

This preoccupation with local government rested upon the distinctive understanding of political development. To colonial authorities in London and Nairobi 'political development' meant the development of administrative capacity, i.e., the ability to effectively operate institutions for the maintenance of order and the provision of social services, rather than the growth of institutions and the acceptance of norms relating to the regular and orderly resolution of conflicts among competing interests. This concept was consistent with their image of government and belief that the exercise of political rights entailed reciprocal obligations of public service to the community. Arthur Creech Jones, the Labour government's Secretary of State from 1946 to 1950, emphasized that progress depended "on developing in

African communities a sense of community obligation and social responsibility and handling his own affairs ... essential to his effective work in the central political institutions of his territory."⁶³

Political development also meant the creation of a responsible ruling elite capable of operating the institutions of government and to whom alone power could be safely and legitimately transferred. Consonant with their belief that stable institutions could not work without a 'political' class, administrators sought to replace themselves with an African elite created in their own image. This elite would guard the general interest and promote orderly change, while standing aloof from partisan controversy and the advancement of personal interests. The operational measure of African political advancement became the Administration's judgment of the performance of African civil servants and public officials.⁶⁴ The British approach to local government as a means for the provision of local services rather than an arena for partisan conflict made local institutions an obvious choice for schooling the new elite. Local government became a test of the African's fitness for access to higher institutions. Even so shrewd an observer as Lord Hailey felt that if local government systems failed it was not due to any defects in colonial policies, but to "deficiencies inherent in the constitution of local African society."⁶⁵

The objectives of formal cooptation of African political activity that engendered the Local Native Councils in Kenya in the 1920's was also present in post-1945 policy. The conscious political intention behind the development of local government was to divert African attention away from participation in central government and undercut the position of the urban-based African politicians increas-

ingly in evidence after 1945. In his despatch on local government development Creech Jones warned of the danger of creating a "class of professional African politicians absorbed in the activities of the centre and out of direct touch with the people themselves"; while Governor Mitchell in his reply emphatically asserted the right of the Administration to protect the ignorant rural African from the wiles of the sophisticated demagogue "usually inspired by self-interest and... a marked lack of concern for truth, honesty, justice, or good government."⁶⁶

The Colonial Office characteristically demurred from any attempt to define the actual means of implementing the development of local government, and Creech Jones emphasized that field administrators should be given "the widest possible latitude within the general framework of policy...and that full scope should be given for the exercise of individual energy and initiative."⁶⁷ Thus the control of local government institutions remained in the hands of the Provincial Administration.

The maintenance of control over the Local Native Councils in the hands of the D.C.s meant that the patterns established in the inter-war years continued to characterize the operation of the councils and effectively prevented them from serving as either a forum for political expression and participation or as a vehicle for political education and training. Administrators continued to refuse to permit 'politics' in the LNCs.⁶⁸ Moreover, Mitchell insisted that the councils were not institutions created with the consent of the governed, but emanations of the government exercising only delegated power, and specifically warned against the use of the phrase "Serkali ya Wenyeji" (Government

of the People) in reference to them.⁶⁹ The formal adoption of a general goal of political development thus had little or no impact on the Provincial Administration's insistence on controlling the terms of legitimate political activity in the African districts. The responsibilities of the councils and the range of issues permitted expression in their debates remained severely restricted. The District and Provincial Commissioners retained veto power over any measure passed by the councils and the vast majority of the legislation enacted continued to be enacted at the behest of the D.C. and in a standard form written by the Provincial Administration. Oginga Odinga, a member of the Central Nyanza LNC in the late 1940's asserts that in many instances these were unpopular measures that administrators pushed through the councils to give them a veneer of acceptance by the 'representatives of the people'.⁷⁰ Administrators also continued to prevent the discussion of issues that they considered beyond the competence of the members and, although they were supposed to use the councils as a means to consult African opinion on issues before the central Legislative Council in Nairobi, they generally declined to do so whenever there had been any significant opposition to government policy. Council members who consistently opposed government policy and criticized the Administration continued to be ruled out of order in debates and occasionally ejected from the councils to be replaced by more 'responsible' and pliant men.⁷¹

The first post-war election to the Local Native Councils in 1945-46 presented an immediate challenge to the Provincial Administration's determination to keep politics out of local government when several members of the new Kenya African Union were elected to the

councils in the three Kikuyu districts. The Provincial Administration promptly moved to restrict the access of 'undesirable' individuals to the councils, the Provincial Commissioners agreeing "that it was most necessary to prevent political hot-heads, who had no real backing from the majority of the people, from pushing their way into membership of the Local Native Councils by conducting intensive electioneering campaigns."⁷² They did so by manipulating the franchise and method of election to the councils. The usual system of election by lining up behind candidates in an open baraza was replaced with an electoral college based on new Locational Councils composed of official chiefs and traditional elders. To be eligible for election candidates also had to demonstrate reasonable support from a traditional territorial or kinship group. The Provincial Administration thus turned to the traditional authorities it had hitherto largely ignored and tried to revive their power as a means of undercutting the influence of younger politicians and blocking their access to the councils. Furthermore, although most of the councils in the larger districts had an elected majority by the late 1940's, a sizeable minority of LNC members continued to be appointed by the Provincial Administration which used these seats to 'balance' the councils against members who tended to oppose official policy.⁷³

The didactic functions of the local councils was progressively thwarted by the increasing scale of many of their budgets and the extent of their involvement in the funding of projects carried out by various government departments. If the councils were to have educated the African in running his own affairs, the pupil would have to have been permitted to make some mistakes while learning to exercise his

responsibilities. However, with LNC revenues from voluntary local rates in Central and Nyanza Provinces running as high as £80 - 100,000, many of the councils were "far too big and elaborate for the African to be given much to do with and in practice, as distinct from official descriptions of what the councils have or are doing, they are the 'toys' of the District Commissioners."⁷⁴ Given the potential high cost of errors, administrators opted for efficiency rather than encouraging African participation. They continued to exercise firm control over the council treasuries and prepared the budgets, even where the council had a finance committee. Moreover, the increasing use of council funds to supplement the development activities of the technical departments led to such confusion between local and central financing, that even the D.C.s found it difficult to deal with the complexities of budgeting.

African participation in local government was further hampered by efforts to develop the councils on British lines. In 1950 the INCs were transformed into African District Councils with expanded authority and responsibility for local affairs. For the first time African local government came under the formal supervision of the Local Government Department in Nairobi, although the D.C.s retained immediate control. The African District Councils represented a system of such scale and complexity that professional local government officers from Britain had to be brought in to advise the officer of the Provincial Administration on their operation. The educative function of local government faded and, in fact, special programs had to be established to recruit and train ADC personnel.

A further consequence of the emphasis on local government was a complication of the already deeply ambivalent position of the official

chiefs. Since many of the chiefs were appointed members of the local councils they found themselves "in an invidious position as, on the one hand, employees of Government, and on the other, as representing the interests of the people of their locations."⁷⁵ When the D.C., acting as council President, had them implement local government programs, the chiefs also became members of the council's executive staff. The chief, therefore, was at once an official of both local and central government, as well as both a member of the council and its employee. The development the Administration envisioned for the ADC was the gradual withdrawal of the D.C. from direct participation and the transformation of the chief into an executive officer of the independent council. The development of the chiefs into a genuine local administrative cadre was, however, contradicted by the Administration's own policy of creating African Assistant Administrative Officers. Appointed in small numbers in the first years after the war, mostly in Nyanza and Central Provinces, the AAAs were younger and better educated than the chiefs and treated by field officers as their potential successors. Their existence indicated an intention to maintain the continuity of the Provincial Administration whatever the pattern of local government. Here too, there is no evidence that administrators ever sensed the contradiction between the two courses of action.

Finally, the development of local government did not provide a mode of access for Africans to the central political institutions in Nairobi. The intervening tiers of councils leading to the Legislative Councils were never created, despite almost a decade of discussions in the Administration. Moreover, not only was there a lack of defined institutional linkages between local councils and LegCo, but also, as

local government became more complex and specialized on the British model, officials felt a growing need to clearly separate local and central government organizations and functions. By 1952 Governor Mitchell was "so impressed with the need to divorce local government bodies entirely from Legislative Council, that instructions are to evolve some method of selection [of African members of LegCo] that does not make use of District Councils."⁷⁶ This separation ended any idea that the councils would be a training ground for a new elite that would gradually gain access to higher institutions.

Without any clear criteria for both the path of access to central institutions and the method of selection of suitable African representatives, African membership in the Legislative Council came about primarily as the result of an ad hoc administrative response to outside pressures from missionary and political circles in Kenya and Britain.⁷⁷ After initially refusing, the Administration reversed its position and in 1944 appointed Eliud Mathu, a Kikuyu school teacher, to the Legislative Council. In 1947, B.A. Ohanga, a Luo civil servant, was appointed to a seat following the retirement of the last missionary representative of African interests, and two more African representatives were added the following year when the Legislative Council was expanded to include an unofficial majority.

In selecting African members of Legislative Council the Administration demonstrated the tendency to equate readiness for political participation with administrative capacity and moral rectitude. African representatives were appointed not the basis of demonstrated leadership or evidence of a widespread following, but with regard to their possession of the proper education and administrative ability; in short,

they had to show both a patina of Western learning and the ethos of public service so highly prized by administrators.⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, those selected tended to be officials of either the central or local government. However, the application of administrative criteria for filling ostensibly political positions compromised the effectiveness of the African representatives by transforming them into creatures of the Administration lacking an independent constituency and power base in the African community. They thus did not, as the Administration had hoped, serve to divert growing African support from political organizations such as the Kenya African Union.

These criteria were also extended to judge the readiness of Africans generally for access to the central political institutions. Nothing lowered administrators' estimation of African capabilities more than instances of peculation of public funds and bribery among African officials. As long as these were fairly common occurrences they remained convinced that the African was unready for political advancement.⁷⁹

These criteria were also linked to the issue of the maintenance of 'standards' that served to restrict African access to the higher levels of the civil service, especially in the Administration. As one P.C. pointed out, "our policy was always that you could never have anyone unless he was absolutely perfect and absolutely loyal."⁸⁰

With these attitudes, and in spite of their strenuous efforts to improve conditions in the African reserves, administrators found themselves facing a rising tide of African opposition and embroiled in an unforeseen and seemingly inescapable political crisis. The roots of this crisis lay in the consequences of the development process itself.

1. Carl G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, Praeger, New York, 1966, page 198.
2. Sir Philip Mitchell, "Speech to the Nairobi Rotary Club". Reprinted in Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, Hutchinson, London, 1954, page 273 (emphasis added).
3. Ibid., page 220.
4. Ibid., page 227.
5. Ibid., page 273.
6. Lee, op. cit., pages 93-94, 112-114.
7. Interview 07PS.
8. W. Arthur Lewis, Colonial Development, Manchester Statistical Society, 1949 (quoted in Lee, op. cit., page 112).
9. KGL, Sir Philip Mitchell to Arthur Creech-Jones, Despatch of 30 May, 1947, and KNA/PC/NZA3/1576, various memoranda on native policy by Nyanza Province administrators.
10. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Development Committee, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1946.
11. KNA/PC/NZA3/1576, P. Wyn-Harris, "Preliminary Note on Post-War Policy Within the Native Land Units of Kenya", 13 September, 1944.
12. Barbu Niculescu, Colonial Planning, Allen and Unwin, London, 1958, page 129.
13. KNA/PC/NZA3/1576, H.H. Low, D.C., Central Kavirondo, "Memorandum on Native Policy", 8 December 1943.
14. Sir Philip Mitchell, The Agrarian Problem in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1948, page 33.
15. Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, op. cit., page 275.
16. KNA/Ministry of African Affairs, 7/126, J.B. Carson, D.C., Elgeyo-Marakwet, to P.C., Rift Valley, 25 October, 1948.
17. D.J. Penwill, "Paper -- The Other Side", Journal of African Administration, vol. 6, July 1954, pages 118-119.
18. KNA/DC/MKS 15/3, "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 7-9 February, 1949".
19. Sir Philip Mitchell, "General Aspects of the Agrarian Situation in Kenya" Despatch no. 44 of 17 April 1946, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1946.

20. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya, IBRD-John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963, pages 20-21 and 341. See also East African Statistical Department, Kenya Unit, Domestic Income and Product in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1959.

21. Colonial Office, Report on Kenya for the Year 1951, H.M.S.O., London, 1952, pages 49-51; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Notes on Commerce and Industry in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954, page 13.

22. H. Wilson Ord, "East African Companies", East African Economic Review, vol. 7, no. 1, June 1960, page 47.

23. Marion W. Forrester, Kenya Today: Social Prerequisites for Economic Development, Mouton, The Hague, 1962, pages 96, 99.

24. K.W.S. MacKenzie, "The Development of the Kenya Treasury Since 1936" East African Economics Review, vol. 8, no. 2, December 1961, page 70.

25. N.S. Carey-Jones, The Anatomy of Uhuru, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1966, page 39.

26. Ibid., page 43.

27. Ibid., page 70.

28. During the war the government had provided an important incentive in this area through the establishment of the East African Industrial Management Board which provided £200,000 for setting up needed secondary industry. However, "the experience did not generate any enthusiasm for the possibilities of direct government participation in, or stimulation of, industrial development" (Michael McWilliam, "Economic Policy and the Kenya Settlers, 1945-48" in K. Robinson and R. Madden, eds. Essays in Imperial Government Presented to Margery Perham, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, page 189). Government efforts to aid industry and commerce consisted primarily of the zoning of sites in the main towns and the provision of improved transport and communications facilities. The government's labor policy, which maintained the minimum wage of urban workers at an extremely low level until the mid-50's, provided what was in effect an indirect subsidy to industry. Although an economist was appointed Secretary for Commerce and Industry in 1948, government activity in this area did not really take shape until 1954 when a Ministry of Commerce and Industry and an Industrial Development Corporation were started to aid the establishment of new industry.

29. McWilliam, loc. cit., page 188.

30. Lee, Op. cit., page 13.

31. It was felt that the pastoral tribes like the Turkana, Mukogodo, Samburu, Galla, etc., were located in areas that made it unlikely they would develop beyond pastoralism. The backward and conservative agricultural or mixed economy tribes like the Pokomo, Giriama, Suk, Kamasia, Njemps and Elgeyo-Marakwet were considered so far behind the more advanced tribes as not to be a problem of immediate concern for development policy. Only agricultural or mixed economy tribes showing considerable evidence of change (Meru, Embu, Kisii and Kipsigis) received much attention beside the preoccupation with the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya. Thus the Administration made no effort to start the development process, but only attempted to control it where it already was in evidence. (See KNA/PC/PZA3/1576, P. Wyn-Harris, "Memorandum", 13 September 1944.)

32. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report on Native Affairs, 1939-1945, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1947, page 37.

33. Ibid., page 40.

34. KNA/DC/MKS15/3, "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 29-31 January, 1946".

35. See, for example, the attitudes expressed in the Interim Report on Development, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1945, Paragraph 14.

36. Interview 133T; and M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1967, page 75.

37. Mitchell, Despatch no. 44, op. cit., page 6.

38. It is important to emphasize that Administrators accepted restrictions on cash crops where they felt the results would be destructive and not simply because the settlers wanted to restrict competition from African farmers. Where Administrators felt Africans could safely grow cash crops, they chafed at settler-imposed restrictions. This was particularly true of the ban on coffee growing by Kikuyu farmers (KNA/MAA8/65, P.C. Central to Provincial Agricultural Officer, letter of 26 May 1951). There is also some evidence to suggest that administrators ignored evasions of restrictions where they thought the bans unfair (Interview 208FS and 227FS).

39. In 1945 African farmers in Nyanza Province marketed produce with a total value of £445,495 (Report on Native Affairs 1939-1945, op. cit., page 41). By 1949 this had grown to £722,710. In the same year, the farmers of Central Province marketed some £1,189,145 of produce. (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, African Affairs Department, Annual Report 1949, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1951, pages 48-49).

40. Sorrenson, Op. cit., page 78; John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life, 1912-1945" in V. Harlow, et. al., eds., History of East Africa, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, page 341.

41. Sorrenson, Op.cit., page 58.
42. KNA/DC/MKS15/3 "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 10-15 April, 1945".
43. KNA/DC/MKS15/3 "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 29-31 January, 1946."
44. Sorrenson, Op. cit., pages 60-61.
45. Ibid., pages 61-64, 66-68.
46. Ibid., pages 70-71.
47. KNA/PC/NZA3/1576, Wyn-Harris, "Memorandum" of 13 September, 1944.
48. KNA/MAA8/65 "Some Notes on a 'Youth Conference' held at the LNC Hall and Showground, Nyeri on 1-2 September, 1949" dated 6 October, 1949.
49. Community development was one area in which the Colonial Office provided active advice and encouragement for local administrations. This emphasis reflects the poverty of expertise available on economic matters and the predominance of anthropologists, missionaries and education specialists among the specialist advisers to the Colonial Office (see Lee, op.cit., pages 86-87, 94-98). The anthropologists of the functional school, in particular, shared with administrators an organic image of society and an overwhelming concern with the preservation of social cohesion.
50. KNA/PC/NZA3/1576, Wyn-Harris, "Memorandum".
51. KNA/DC/MKS15/e, "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 7 - 9 February, 1949".
52. The D.C.s in the more populous districts in Central and Nyanza Provinces constantly restrained the Local Native Councils from making what they felt were excessive appropriations for elementary education. For a detailed analysis of the role of the Administration in educational policy, see John Anderson, The Struggle for the School, Longman, London and Nairobi, 1970 especially pages 32-50.
53. KNA/DC/MKS15/3, "Recommendations made at an Informal Meeting of Provincial Commissioners, April 28, 1948".
54. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 1/1195; Chief Native Commissioner, "A talk to the Christian Forum on Some Present Day African Problems", 3 July, 1950.
55. The settlers exercised control over the African laborers on their farms through the District Councils of the settled areas, which had been given authority to control the terms of African employment by the Resident Native Labourers...

Ordinance of 1937. Despite the opposition of a number of administrators and officials of the Local Government and Labour Departments, there was little the Government could do to prevent the settlers from throwing increasing numbers of squatters off the European farms. (Interview 206FS)

56. The Municipal African Affairs Officer in Nairobi served in an advisory role to the European dominated City Council and had no executive powers. The programs to which the Council tended to be sympathetic dealt with welfare, housing, education, etc. rather than the controversial issues of the urban workers' economic position (Interviews 201FS and 206FS).

57. The desire to enter independent non-agricultural occupations was particularly strong among the 60,000 Kenya Africans who served in the British Army in World War II. Returning to Kenya they used their wartime pay and bonuses to set themselves up in a wide variety of businesses. They received no encouragement or support from the Administration and the Annual Report of Native Affairs for 1946-47 complacently noted that few of the aspiring African entrepreneurs "had resources in experience and capital commensurate with their ambitions, and gradually the disappointed, who were many, settled down to their former way of life" (page 3). Oginga Odinga asserts that the Administration actively harrassed African efforts, including his own, to establish businesses; that it was impossible for Africans to get loans from banks; and that official trade regulations seemed to exclude Africans. He notes that "our economic effort was frowned upon not only because it was competition against established trading preserves, but also because it was a demonstration of African initiative and independence." (Not yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1968, page 89).

58. As one P.C. tartly noted:

"If you worked well together, they really left it to you entirely... it came from the bottom level normally. Anything that came from on top was generally a mess and I think they knew that. (Interview 227FS)

59. Interview 103F.

60. Ibid.

61. KGL, "Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governors of the African Territories", 25 February 1947 (Bound into the minutes of the African Affairs Committee for 1948). This was the principal Colonial Office statement of political development policy in the immediate post-war period.

62. KGL, Lord Hailey, Native Administration and African Political Development, Confidential Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1941, pages 25 and 27.

63. Arthur Creech-Jones, "The Place of African Local Administration in Colonial Policy", Journal of African Administration, vol.1. no. 1, January 1949, page 3.

64. In 1948 and 1950 the Administration turned down African petitions for a seat on the Executive Council:

"...until Africans have had time to take advantage of the widely increased opportunities for public service made available to them in the last few years and have demonstrated by their capacity for responsibility and by their integrity in public matters that they are worthy of the great trusts which have already been entrusted to them." (KNA/MAA7/575, M.N. Evans, "Reply to Memo of African Unofficial Members Organization on African Participation in Government," 11 August 1950)

65. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in British African Territories, Part I: East Africa, H.M.S.O., London, 1950, page 206.

66. KGL, "Despatch from the Secretary of State...", of 25 February, 1947; and Sir Philip Mitchell to Arthur Creech-Jones, Confidential Despatch no. 16 of 30 May, 1947.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview 116F.

69. KNA/DC/NN3/6/1, Sir Philip Mitchell to K.L. Hunter, P.C. Nyanza, 10 March 1948.

70. Odinga, op. cit., page 92.

71. For a vivid account of clashes with the D.C. over the issues of debates see Ibid., pages 90-93.

72. KNA/DC/MKS/15/3, "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 24-26 October 1946" and also "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 26-28 May 1947".

73. In the three Kikuyu districts 21 of 24 nominated members were official chiefs. In the three most politically active districts of Nyanza, 36 of 42 nominated councillors were chiefs. By way of contrast, in the much quieter district of Kericho in Nyanza, only 5 of 13 nominated members were chiefs. (Hailey, Native Administration, op.cit., pages 127, 154.)

74. Howman, African Local Government..., op. cit., Part II, page 32.

75. Hailey, Native Administration, op. cit., page 204.

76. Howman, op. cit., part II, page 33.

77. KNA/MAA7/575, exchange of letters between Arthur Creech-Jones and the Secretary of State, Col. Oliver Stanley, dated April 22 and April 30, 1943; also George Bennett, "Imperial Paternalism: The Representation of African Interests in the Kenya Legislative Council", in Robinson and Madden, Essays in Imperial Government, op. cit., pages 162-165.

78. Mathu was a perfect example of the type of man sought: a graduate of the Alliance High School, the elite African school in Kenya, he attended Fort Hare University College in South Africa and Balliol College, Oxford. His maiden speech was praised for its quotations from Addison and Shaw. (Ibid., page 165).

79. KNA/Ministry of African Affairs 8/141, P. Wyn-Harris, C.N.C. to E.W. Mathu, 23 August, 1948.

80. Interview 219F. Settler opposition to African participation was also frequently expressed through arguments about the maintenance of standards. For an analysis of the impact of the maintenance of standards argument on both educational policy and African access to the civil service see Richard Symonds, The British and Their Successors, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, pages 181-82, 203, 234-44, 258-61.

CHAPTER SEVENDEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CRISIS, 1945 to 1952

At the same time as they struggled to formulate development programs, field administrators found themselves confronting serious internal and external challenges to their position in the colonial political system. Two distinct but intimately related processes of change, the increasing scope and complexity of the structure of government and the deterioration of African society under the impact of socio-economic development, converged on the Provincial Administration in the form of a challenge to its position within the Kenya Government from the technical departments and a challenge to its control over the African population from the Kenya African Union. Contrary to their most fervent beliefs and expectations, administrators found development led to a dramatic expansion in the scope and intensity of conflict in the colony. Their response to these challenges and the resultant African counterreaction set in train an escalating political crisis that moved with a terrible and inexorable logic to the declaration of a state of emergency in the colony in October, 1952.

I. Bureaucratic Development and the Challenge to Administrative Dominance

Within the first decade after the war the Kenya Government was transformed from a small-scale colonial administration into an increasingly bureaucratized modern state with the attendant proliferation and functional specialization of departments and personnel. Between 1945 and 1955 the total number of government employees of all races increased from 14,000 to more than 60,000.¹ The number

of European officials grew from 1,659 to 5,590 during the same period.² Government expenditures increased from £7.8 million in 1945 to £16.4 million in 1951 and to £38.3 million in 1955/56. A separate development budget grew from £.984 million in 1946 to £4.09 million in 1951 and to £8.51 million in 1955/56.³

This transformation was facilitated by rapid improvements in transport and communications. The road network was greatly extended, the major roads began to be paved, and four-wheel drive vehicles were introduced cutting travel time to a fraction of what it was before 1939 and leaving few areas of the colony inaccessible to the regular activity of the various government departments. The telephone system was expanded to bring all of the major districts into direct linkage with Provincial headquarters and the central government in Nairobi. The advent of direct air service between Nairobi and London and the introduction of radio telegrams cut the usual time for and exchange of correspondence with the Colonial Office from weeks to two or three days. The physical isolation of the district boma (headquarters) from Nairobi and of Nairobi from London was ended and the volume of communications between all levels of government reached proportions undreamt of in 1939.

The rapid growth of the immigrant communities and the monetary economy they controlled stimulated an increasing demand upon the government for social and economic services and for public investment in improving transportation, communications, and water resources. While the government did not plan or actively direct the development of private enterprise, this development spurred the creation of new departments, such as the Department of Commerce and Industry establish-

ed in 1948 under the leadership of a professional economist, to offer advice and assistance to private investment. The demand for social services was particularly felt in the areas of health and education: the Medical Department's European staff increased from 185 in 1947 to 358 ten years later, while the European section of the Education department grew from 178 to 373 in the same period.⁴

The expansion of government activity and personnel was most marked in relation to the enormous expansion of the technical departments in the African districts, including some, such as the Education Department, whose previous involvement with Africans had been negligible.⁵ By the early 1950's the normal complement of European officials in a district had expanded to include, in addition to the officers of the Provincial Administration, staff from the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Public Works, Medicine, Veterinary Service, and the Kenya Police. In addition, the regular departmental staff was supplemented by specialized personnel for specific development projects funded by the Development and Reconstruction Authority. By 1951 this specialized development staff alone employed some 474 European officials.⁶

The impact of economic growth and related development programs on the size and complexity of the government can be seen most clearly in the experience of the key departments of Agriculture and Labour. Before the Second World War the Agriculture Department was a relatively small organization, mainly oriented toward serving the needs of settler farmers. In 1939 it consisted of eight sections with a total European staff of 90. By 1947 the department had grown to include 183 European personnel organized into 13 sections. Eight

years later the department had a European staff of 347 in six major divisions, each containing two or more sections, and four separate units of specialized development staff.⁷ In addition, a number of quite separate organizations concerned with African agriculture were started in the immediate post-war period, notably the Maize and Produce Control Board and the African Land Development Board (ALDEV). The Agriculture Department also founded and operated the Edgerton College of Agriculture to train European farmers and was deeply involved in the working of the complex system of production and marketing boards that guided the development of settler commercial agriculture.

The development of the Labour Department is even more striking since the department originated as a small section of the Administration consisting of an administrator serving as Principal Labour Officer and a handful of seconded District Officers to deal with the problems of African laborers in Nairobi, Mombasa, and on the settler farms. It was reorganized as an independent department in 1940 after the Mombasa strike revealed glaring deficiencies in the Administration's handling of labor problems. After the war the rapid development of the monetary economy and the consequent increase in the scale and diversity of labor issues prompted the rapid growth and increasing internal differentiation and functional specialization of the department. By 1948 it contained five sections and employed such specialized personnel as a medical officer, factory inspector, statistician, trade union officer, and registrar of native labor, in addition to a greatly increased staff of regular labour officers.⁸ In 1945 the Labour Department employed only 17 Europeans in a total

staff of 172, while three years later it contained 51 European officials in a total staff of 425. The department reached its peak strength of 539, including 87 European personnel, in 1957 when it was the largest Labour Department in any of the British colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.⁹

A. The 'Member System' and the Genesis of Functional Ministries

The expansion and differentiation of the various government departments was matched by an equally important transformation of the central administration in the direction of functional ministries and cabinet government. This began early in 1946 with the introduction, on the initiative of Governor Mitchell, of the so-called 'Member System'.¹⁰ The traditional colonial structure in which all government business was centralized under the Chief Secretary and the Secretariat was replaced with a decentralized system in which the Executive Council was enlarged from nine to eleven and members of the Council were assigned responsibility for particular subjects of government business and assumed general control of the relevant departments. The Governor was permitted to appoint, where he thought it appropriate, members of the settler community as well as civil servants to hold the portfolios on the Executive Council.

Initially, only three of the new 'Members' were appointed. Two were government officials: Sir Gilbert Rennie, the Chief Secretary, became the Member for Development and Chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Authority, with his regular administrative duties being assumed by the Deputy Chief Secretary, who was also elevated to the Executive Council; and Charles Mortimer, the Commissioner for Lands

and a long-time official member of the Legislative Council, was named the Member for Health and Local Government. The third position of Member for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Natural Resources went to Maj. Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, an experienced settler politician who was an elected member of the Legislative Council and had served during the war as Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board. Two other official members of the Executive Council who already exercised responsibility for particular subjects or departments, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General, were simply given the additional titles of Member for Finance and Member for Law and Order, respectively. The position of the remaining official member of the council, the Chief Native Commissioner, was left unspecified, a reflection of the continuing ambiguity of the position of the office in the central government. Finally, four Assistant Directors of Agriculture were appointed to work under the Member and coordinate agricultural, veterinary, and resource development in the major provinces.

Mitchell's objectives in this reorganization were both administrative and political. With regard to administrative matters, he attempted to change two of basic characteristics of the pre-war Kenya Government: the centralization of all business under the Administration and the isolation and lack of coordination of the activities of the technical departments. He noted that the increasing volume and complexity of government activities required more and more expert knowledge and attention and made the continued centralization of affairs in the hands of the Chief Secretary and Secretariat impracticable. The creation of the Assistant Directors of Agriculture

was intended both to "remove the dissatisfaction among professional officers, whose opportunities for promotion...are not good", and deal with "the lack of authority, continuity, and co-ordination which results from the insistence on water-tight bureaucratic departmental organizations which bear no relation whatever to farming practice or the actual needs of the situation in the field."¹¹

Politically, the objective of the reorganization was to end the acrimonious conflict between the settlers and the government that punctuated the inter-war years and abolish the practice of 'government by agreement' whereby settlers participated in the formulation of official policies without having any responsibility for supporting them. Mitchell wrote to the Secretary of State that "the Executive Council (Unofficial) Members ought to support the Government or resign, anyhow on major subjects; and should take charge of groups of subjects."¹² Outwardly Mitchell's reorganization appears to be a concession to the persistent settler demands for executive power, and so it was in fact interpreted by elements of the European and, in particular, Asian communities.¹³ In reality what he attempted to do was replace the informal cooptation of the inter-war years, which gave the settlers power without responsibility, with formal cooptation to office that would give the appearance of participation, but permit the government to restore and extend its effective control over policy. These objectives are evident in the restrictions imposed on the position of unofficial Members. First, the crucial power to appoint, promote, and dismiss colonial officials remained in the hands of the Colonial Office and the Establishment Branch of the Secretariat, thus denying the Member direct controls over his

staff. Second, and even more important, Mitchell noted that the most likely source of unofficial Members would be the European Elected Members of the Legislative Council and felt that "to make such an appointment would be to unbalance the constitutional position and might even give an impetus out of time to political developments for which it is clear the country is not ready."¹⁴ Unofficial Members were therefore required to resign from elective office and accept appointment by the Governor to both the Executive and Legislative Councils. This arrangement effectively separated a settler politician from his constituency and made him dependent on the government for his appointment and continuity in office. He either supported government policy or had to resign. One of the early unofficial Members noted:

...contrary to what a lot of people thought, you did not become a civil servant; you were liable to dismissal at a moment's notice, the same as you could resign at a moment's notice, but you did not have your electoral responsibility to what could be pressure group bodies.¹⁵

At first only some 35 percent of the European staff of the Kenya Government were in departments assigned to the control of one of the newly created members. Over the next few years more and more departments were assigned to existing Members and several new Members were created from among the other officials holding ordinary seats on the Executive Council. By 1949 more than 90 percent of the European officials in the colony worked in departments that were the responsibility of one or another Member,¹⁶ and by the early 1950's the Member System had developed, in all but name, into a ministerial system. Until the outbreak of the Emergency, however, only one other

unofficial European was appointed a Member. E.A. Vasey, a businessman and former Mayor of Nairobi, was named the Member for Health and Local Government in 1950 and became Member for Finance in 1952. The majority of the Members continued to be civil servants (five of seven Members in 1951) and most of them were senior officers of the Administration. During its first six years of operation Mitchell's system managed to retain formal control of the machinery of government in the hands of the bureaucracy itself.

Impetus for the growth of the ministerial system also emerged within the Administration from a new group of central government officials created by the Member System. The assignment of the responsibility for various departments to Members of the Executive Council necessitated the corresponding decentralization of secretariat work, and by the late 1940's each Member had a small secretariat of administrative officers that comprised the core of future ministerial organizations. In 1945 the Secretariat had still been a relatively small operation and the number of posts in the central administration totalled only 18, eleven Assistant Secretaries and seven senior administrators. Under the impact of the Member System the number of central administrative posts grew to 34 in 1951 and the field of opportunity for the ambitious man with a taste for secretariat work began to appear: administrative officers with little or no field experience in Kenya who spent their entire term in the colony in one or another central administrative post in Nairobi. Between 1940 and 1960 some 47 officers entered the Administration and were posted directly to secretariat positions without prior service in the field. Most of them had previous service in other

colonies in Africa, but a few came from the Indian Civil Service or the Colonial Office and other branches of the Home Civil Service. By contrast, in the twenty years prior to 1939, only six administrators from outside of the ranks of the Kenya Administration had been appointed directly to posts in the Secretariat. In 1945 15 of the 18 positions in the Secretariat were held by career officers of the Kenya Administration, while by 1957, 33 of the 59 central administrative positions were filled by men who began their careers in other colonies. This situation and the increasing specialization of secretariat work under the Member system made it increasingly difficult to maintain the pre-war policy of regularly rotating officers between the field and the center. The Provincial Administration and the central administration effectively became two distinct organizations staffed by different personnel.¹⁷

B. The Stagnation of the Provincial Administration

Despite the rapid development of the scale and complexity of the departments of the Kenya Government and the movement towards ministerial organization, the Provincial Administration remained essentially unchanged in size and structure from the years of its greatest flowering between the wars. The number of administrative officers grew slowly, largely to make up for officers lost to the armed forces during the war, and actually decreased slightly between 1949 and 1951. In the latter year the number of officers serving in the Provincial Administration was 127, slightly under the peak of 129 reached in 1931 before the impact of depression and war.¹⁸ No serious attempt was made to reshape its structure or rethink its role in the

light of the commitment to development and the transformation of the other elements of the Kenya Government. The gap between the burgeoning departments in Nairobi and the district stations in the bush widened. Tied closer together by improvements in transportation and communications, they grew farther apart in both outlook and method.

II. Increasing Conflict and Cleavage in the Kenya Government

The process of bureaucratic and ministerial development in the Kenya Government redefined the structural framework within which the actual processes of policy formulation and implementation took place. Formal aspects of ministerial and departmental organization, budgeting, communications channels and the chain of command allocated resources that various individuals and groups could bring to bear on the processes of bargaining and negotiation that shaped policy decisions, and either imposed constraints that they sought to avoid, or opened areas of discretion they sought to defend. Changes in formal structure thus modified the balance of power within and between organizations in the government, threatening established vested interests in the Provincial Administration and creating new ones in the technical departments and central government with an interest in pressing for even further change. For this reason even seemingly minor aspects of formal structure and practice, including the wording of documents bringing them into being, became the subject of often heated controversy.

The incompatibility of prefectural field administration and functional ministries has already been noted. The internal transformation of the Kenya Government resulted in this incompati-

bility being expressed in a dramatic increase in the level of internal conflict and a marked diminution of the traditional position of the Administration both in the field and in the central government. These consequences of bureaucratic development were apparent in the relations of administrative and technical officers in the districts, in the relations of field administrators with the central government, and in the relations among the departments and developing ministries in Nairobi.

A. Generalist vs. Specialist: Administrators and Technicians in the Field

Before 1939 the District Commissioner had little government activity to supervise and coordinate beyond that performed by himself and his District Officers. During and after the war, however, the tasks of internal administration became an increasingly important and time-consuming part of his job, and the D.C. "tended to become a fairly senior sort of business executive in his area...more and more a chairman of committees, a man operating behind a desk."¹⁹ He was responsible for keeping track of and coordinating all of the rapidly proliferating government activities and serve upon the numerous boards and committees organized in each district. The D.C. was increasingly called upon to administer the action of others rather than be a direct operational agent himself. In 1954 the D.C. of a large and important district (Machakos) reported that he supervised an office staff of 18 and was expected to preside over or attend no less than 131 committee, board, and council meetings in the course of the year.²⁰

As men contemptuous of paper-work and desk jobs, field administrators regarded the pressures towards bureaucratization with

suspicion and some hostility. One officer later noted that:

Unless the District Commissioner was very energetic or virile or extremely efficient he tended to be bogged down. And of course there was the underlying feeling that people were judged on the letters they wrote instead of what they were doing in the field.²¹

Moreover, accustomed as they were to a small organizational universe in which they knew almost everyone with whom they dealt and had personal contacts with their superiors, field administrators also reacted strongly to the increasing impersonality of government business. The officer quoted above added ruefully that "the whole thing got a bit turgid and complicated and civil service, instead of having the good old human relationships."²²

Even more important, administrators felt that the increasing burden of office work interfered with their ability to carry out their fundamental responsibilities according to the hallowed traditional methods. This was especially true with regard to their belief that good administration rested upon close personal contact between the administrator and his people through regular tours through the district. After 1945 many, if not most, field officers felt that "paper, correspondence, telephones, and all that sort of thing tended to root a D.C. more firmly in his office... he had less time to go around on safari."²³

The increasing field staffs and activities of the technical departments also limited the scope of the administrators' effective discretion by putting an end to their roles as amateur, part-time veterinarians, civil engineers, doctors, sanitary officers, and agriculturists. These tasks were increasingly assumed by trained

specialists and the administrator was thrown back upon his primary control function. Even here his authority was narrowed by the re-introduction of the Kenya Police into the African districts in the late 1940's. The issue that emerged was the classical one of how far the diffuse responsibility of the administrative generalist for order and 'good government' gave him the authority to control, even over-ride, the professional judgment of the specialist. During the inter-war years this conflict, as we have seen, was muted by the limited scale of the activities of the technical departments in the African districts. After 1945 it arose with increasing urgency around the serious differences in the orientations of the Provincial Administration and the technical departments towards the development process.

In the analysis of the development politics of the Administration we noted that field officers were preoccupied with the disruptive consequences of social change and sought policies that would preserve the fabric of traditional African society and ameliorate existing grievances and conflicts. They attempted to shape the activities of the technical departments to fit these conservative policies, believing that their general responsibility for all government activities required them to exercise firm control over the technical departments in the field and gave them a right to intervene and modify or veto programs that they felt would have disruptive consequences. According to one P.C., "the Administration was... the senior service... and had the final say when there was a conflict of view."²⁴ The technical officers resented the control over their activities by untrained generalists with a low regard for specialized knowledge. Largely indifferent to the political implications

of their work, they felt their primary responsibility was to implement programs to conserve the soil, thin out over-crowded cattle populations, introduce new crops and farming methods, or improve public health or communications as rapidly and completely as possible. In their view the role of the Provincial Administration was to provide them with the necessary support for their programs and deal with any resistance or unrest such programs might provoke from ignorant natives unable to understand the benefits involved.²⁵

Attempts to limit the clash by more precisely defining the responsibilities and spheres of discretion of the parties foundered on the resistance of administrators to any formal diminution of their control over all activities in the field. The attitudes and conventional practices of senior field administrators towards the technical departments had been formed during the pre-war era when departmental activities in the African areas were minimal and they rarely, if ever, encountered a situation in which they were asked to defer to the professional judgment of a technical officer. When in 1945 the Secretariat prepared a draft circular on the relationship between administrators and technical officers in preparation for the administration of development programs, the Provincial Commissioners took vehement exception to a statement that they and the District Commissioners "as laymen, are not competent to issue orders or intervene in matters of technical knowledge, organization, or routine."²⁶ It was precisely in the area of technical knowledge and routine that administrators wanted to intervene to control the development process in the African districts. The Secretariat temporized: the offending phrase was removed from the published

circular which asked all officials to remember their common commitment to the public interest and rely on consultation and mutual cooperation to work out basic policies in the provinces and districts, but considered it "impractical to issue any more precise instructions as to the formal relations" between administrators and departmental officers.

The circular concluded with the appeal that:

The good sense of officers and their common devotion to the interests of the public and of the Service may be trusted to evolve from this general direction a satisfactory and efficient modus vivendi.²⁷

The Secretariat thus avoided the basic issue and threw it back to the 'man on the spot' to work out necessary adjustments to local circumstances according to organizational conventions that were assumed to be understood by all. The implication was that departmental specialists were expected to know their place and keep to it, and the circular was interpreted in this fashion by the Provincial Administration. One D.C. wrote his departmental officers that the circular "puts into black and white the unwritten law pertaining ever since there were any East African colonies and before that the understanding in India."²⁸ The basic cleavage was therefore unresolved and administrators were left to sort out their relationships on their own with the predictable wide local variations of conflict and cooperation.

One innovation that emerged from the 1945 circular was the establishment of the Provincial and District Teams. These were joint consultative bodies, composed of officers of the various technical departments and chaired by the P.C. or D.C., which were supposed to work out development policies and programs in the provinces and

districts and determine the priorities among the competing and occasionally conflicting proposals of the various specialist departments. In effect the teams were vehicles for the Provincial Administration to keep track of and exert control over the activities of the technical departments. The effectiveness of the teams was limited by several factors. First, the implementation of the policy was subject to wide variations introduced by the exercise of local discretion. As late as 1950 a new P.C. in Nyanza reported that he found no provision had been made for regular discussion and contact with senior technical officers in the province.²⁹ Second, the teams did not resolve conflicts between administrators and technicians, but simply became the site of clashes. Administrators and technicians agree that the relative effectiveness of the teams at different times and in different districts was enormously variable.³⁰ Third, the technical officers often found the teams boring and irrelevant because they were not interested in the affairs of most of the other departments and they resented officers of other departments, as well as the Provincial Administration, having a say in their own programs.³¹

By the late 1940's relations between the Provincial Administration and the technical departments, especially the ability of field administrators to control the activities of technical officers, was increasingly tied to the development towards functional ministerial organization under the Member System. Bureaucratic relations in the field were influenced by two crucial aspects of the linkages between the field and the central government in Nairobi: 1) the growing estrangement between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat, and 2) the increasing by-passing of the

Provincial Administration by the developing proto-ministries.

B. The Provincial Administration vs. the Secretariat: The 'Blind Spot'

In November, 1948 the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province, E.H. Windley, wrote to the Chief Secretary to express the collective opinion of the administrators in the province on the deterioration of relations between the field and the central administration:

It was felt that it is becoming more important than ever to make a concerted effort to overcome the 'blind spot' that tends to exist between officers at Headquarters and officers working in the field. It was fully realized that it is difficult for you all to get out with the growing complexity of work in Nairobi and pressures of political considerations. It is none the less true that the work confronting officers in the field is growing in difficulty and importance year by year, and there is a danger to the whole machinery of action if the 'blind spot' should spread.³²

The Chief Secretary, Sir John Rankine, agreed that something was wrong, even if it was vague and hard to define. His only action, however, was to urge senior Secretariat officers to visit provincial and district headquarters at every opportunity and "make a special effort to try at least to give officers in the field the impression that we are trying to overcome what Mr. Windley calls the 'blind spot'.³³

During the next four years the field officers' sense of a lack of understanding of their problems by central administration officials and their mingled feelings of resentment, contempt and hostility toward the Secretariat persisted and periodic complaints continued. The cleavage between the Provincial Administra-

tion and the Secretariat was exacerbated by the post-war patterns of bureaucratic development, particularly the increasing differentiation of field and central administration personnel and the growing pre-occupation of the latter with complex policy issues of colony-wide import. Indeed, so strong were the essentially structural constraints on the position of Secretariat officials, that one officer noted:

Even when you'd been in the field say for ten years, you go into the Secretariat and you suddenly, as it were, forget, or appear to forget, what the situation in the field is like. This is because you're now talking about policies on quite a different level...and you're seeing things at this level.³⁴

Secretariat officials tended to accept the increasingly abstract or 'academic' nature of their work and the resulting loss of touch with the small world of the field officer as a natural, and thus basically irremedial, result of administrative growth and development; while the Provincial Administration, largely by-passed by such developments, continued to be rooted in the personal immediacy and parochial concerns of the field administration.³⁵

The Member System also drove a wedge between the field and the central administration. The Chief Secretary, the formal head of the entire Administration, was totally involved in matters of development policy and the workings of DARA. Rankine remarked in a memo that he had "not felt the same responsibility and personal interest in the affairs of the Administration as I should have liked."³⁶

Executive responsibility for the Provincial Administration was given to the Deputy Chief Secretary, who was also burdened with several other important subjects. To make matters worse, the Chief Native

Commissioner, the field officers' 'friend at court', remained without executive power until 1954 and in his advisory role was effectively inferior to the other Members in both status and influence.

Finally, Governor Mitchell played a personal role in increasing the estrangement of the Provincial Administration from the Secretariat by being less and less responsive to the views of his field officers during the three or four years preceding his retirement in 1952. One of his principal lieutenants commented:

I think that he, quite subconsciously... felt that the young provincial commissioners had nothing to tell him, that he knew everything. And it wasn't that he was arrogant... he was too bored to read what they said.³⁷

As long as the Administration retained control over the formal channels of communication between the field and the central government, with correspondence from the departments in Nairobi going to the Secretariat and from there to the Provincial Administration which channeled it to the departmental field organizations, it could defend its dominant position in the government. By the later stages of the Member System, from about 1950, communications were increasingly broken up into independent channels emanating from the emerging secretariat organizations under each Member and linking them directly with their field staff. The Provincial Administration found itself increasingly by-passed and its influence over departmental policy consequently diminished as administrators found they knew less and less about the details of technical department operations. Furthermore, the form and content of information flowing along these channels was different. The modern bureaucratic state is the great producer and consumer of statistical information, and Kenya was no

exception to this phenomenon. Virtually all of the relatively reliable statistical data on economy and society in Kenya dates from the post-war period. Governmental growth and specialization was correlated with the rapid increase in the variety of statistical information collected by the specialist departments for their own use and the incorporation of professional statisticians into their staffs.³⁸ The involvement in development was a powerful incentive for the collection of statistical data with which to measure the impact of various policies and programs. If this statistical data was more extensive and accurate, it was also much more specialized and involved a tendency to survey increasingly narrow segments of the environment and to ignore categories of information that did not lend themselves to quantitative measurement. Such data was radically different from the very impressionistic information supplied and utilized by the generalists of the Provincial Administration in assessing the diffuse concept of 'good government' or making even more subjective judgments about the 'mood' of a district. As central government officials, both administrators and specialists, became absorbed in the abstract and technical aspects of policy, the information supplied by the Provincial Administration declined in importance in relation to the 'hard facts' collected by the specialist departments.

The burden of this loss of control over the communications network fell most heavily on the shoulders of the Provincial Commissioners. As the principal intermediaries between the field administration and the central government they bore the brunt of the incompatibility of the prefectoral and functional systems. The P.C. was formally the supreme authority in his province, occupying

there a position analogous to that occupied by the Governor in the colony as a whole. Under the Member system, however, the P.C.s were given the status of Heads of Departments and the Members could communicate with them directly in the same manner as they communicated with the other Heads of Department under their control.³⁹ The P.C.s were thus supreme in the field, but clearly treated as subordinates in the central hierarchy of the functional system. It remained uncertain as to who had the last word in a conflict between a Member and a P.C. over the policy to be followed in a province. As early as 1948 the Chief Secretary noted that the rift between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat was caused, in part, by the "inferiority complex" of the P.C.s, who were "a little apt to resent what they regard as a lowering of their status" under the Member system.⁴⁰ In any event, the P.C.s found that were increasingly by-passed by the Members rather than treated as subordinates. In 1950 the Chief Native Commissioner complained on behalf of several of the P.C.s "that there was a growing tendency for important decisions on matters affecting their provinces to be taken in Nairobi without their being consulted."⁴¹

C. Decline and Weakness in the Central Administration: The Chief Secretary and the Chief Native Commissioner

The Member System also introduced new cleavages into the central government and had a significant impact on the position of the Chief Secretary and the Chief Native Commissioner.

The Member System experienced internal difficulties as a result of internal conflicts among various members over ambiguous or over-lapping assignments of subjects and departments. After

considerable debate a revised schedule of assignments was issued in August, 1948. The problem soon arose again in a clash between the Chief Secretary and the Deputy Chief Secretary over whether the latter exercised independent authority over various departments, especially the Provincial Administration, or delegated authority as a subordinate of the Chief Secretary. A further revision of subject assignments in April, 1950 returned the Provincial Administration to the control of the Chief Secretary and affirmed the subordinate status of the Deputy Chief Secretary.⁴² However, the very fact of an open clash between the Chief Secretary and his principal assistant was indicative of the decline of the Chief Secretary's position in the central government. He no longer stood at the apex of a single pyramid directly below the Governor and the Secretariat was no longer the central administration for the whole colony. The single apex was divided up into a number of independent authorities with their own direct access to the Governor. Although superior to the other Members in official precedence and protocol, the Chief Secretary was increasingly in the position of primus inter pares. When the P.C.s complained to the Chief Secretary in February, 1950 about the decline of their authority, he replied by noting that his own position "no longer carried an all-pervading responsibility", and that this was to be expected with the growth of the government.⁴³

The Chief Native Commissioner, meanwhile, continued in the ambiguous role of the 'fifth wheel of the coach' and the weakness of his position contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Provincial Administration and the central government by depriving the former of a spokesman in Nairobi who could deal with the other

Members of a basis of equality. As a member of the Executive Council who had exercised a subject responsibility for years before the actual introduction of the functional system, the CNC had a logical claim to a Member's portfolio, but his lack of executive responsibility for any department made his status problematic. It was not until the August, 1948 assignment of Member's responsibilities that the CNC was listed as the Member for African Affairs. His authority and functions, however were not stipulated until the second revision of assignments in April, 1950, and then in a manner which simply restated the contradictions in his position. On the one hand, he was designated as simply the "chief adviser" to the Governor and Official Members on native policy and administration and could not issue orders on any subject that was the concern of another member without the latter's concurrence; while, on the other hand, he was described as "the active operative agent of the trust which Government exercises on behalf of the African people", and was given authority to "take steps to ensure that all advice tendered by him, unless modified by himself or rejected by the Governor, is in fact carried out."⁴⁴ This confused formulation committed the CNC to a difficult bargaining process with other senior officials in which, since he lacked an organizational base, his influence rested largely on his own strength of personality and ability to maintain close and amicable relations with these officials, especially the Governor.

III. African Deprivation and Political Conflict

The six years of the Second World War resulted in the rapid growth of both the degree of African involvement in the monetary economy and the level of African economic aspirations. In the

reserves the demand for food crops and cattle to feed Allied forces widened opportunities for cash incomes, while in the towns and settled areas economic expansion led to an increasing demand for African workers that raised the number of African wage earners in Kenya from 213,743 in 1936 to 379,286 in 1945.⁴⁵ Even more important, 75,000 young Africans served in the East African forces where they received a basic education and many were given technical training for the wide variety of specialized roles and services in a modern army. A 1943 Kenya Government report on the post-war employment of the African soldier noted that "his capacity for taking responsibility and his skilled work have surprised those who knew him only as a manual labourer."⁴⁶ These veterans returned to Kenya at the end of the war with an enhanced social and political awareness, new skills, and greatly increased material aspirations. It was these men, armed with unprecedented amounts of money from back pay and bonuses, who rushed to establish an independent economic position for themselves as artisans, contractors, transport operators, and retail traders.

After 1945, however, African economic aspirations were bitterly disappointed. While settler agriculture, industry and commerce expanded impressively and the prosperity of the immigrant communities visibly increased, Africans found their economic position deteriorating in both relative and absolute terms. Thus, even though the African wage bill in the colony increased from £8.3 million in 1947 to £13.2 million in 1951, the African population of total wages declined from 45.6 to 40.7 percent as non-African wage totals doubled from £9.9 to £19.2 million during the same period.⁴⁷ Furthermore, government labour policy held wages to low levels and responded only sluggishly to cost of living increases with the result that African

wages constantly lagged behind a steady inflationary spiral that pushed the African retail price index from a base of 100 in 1939 to 198 in 1947 and 325 in 1952.⁴⁸

Such relative or aggregate measures do not reveal the absolute deterioration in the conditions of social and economic life experienced by Africans in the reserves, on settler farms, and in the rapidly growing urban areas of Nairobi and Mombasa. In each of these areas the deteriorating conditions weighed most heavily upon the Kikuyu, whose reserves were the most densely populated and who comprised the great majority of the African labor force both in the towns and on the settler farms.

In the reserves themselves rapid population growth and soil erosion continued to bring intense and increasing pressure on land resources. Wartime demands for increased production led to further neglect of fallowing procedures and accelerated the destruction of the land. Despite an increase in the area under cultivation, yields per acre decreased and the growing population left less and less of a surplus for cash sale. In 1945 the average annual income per family in Nyeri from the sale of cash crops was a mere 57 shillings.⁴⁹ Population density reached 542 per square mile in that district, leaving an average of only 3.34 acres of cultivable land per family, while Fort Hall and Kiambu districts had densities of 411 and 420 persons per square mile, respectively.⁵⁰ As land became an increasingly scarce resource, the buying and selling of plots became more and more common, especially in Kiambu. These transactions worked largely to the advantage of the Kikuyu colonial elite and accelerated the process of social differentiation that had begun

during the inter-war years.⁵¹ Poorer Kikuyu, especially those who lived as tenants (ahoi) on the land of other families, found themselves in an increasingly tenuous position. The resulting insecurity and anxiety was expressed in a rising level of conflict over land, especially in the form of law suits, that turned "family against family, brother against brother in an individualistic race for more acres of eroded soil."⁵² The most serious consequence of the struggle was the emergence of a class of landless Kikuyu scratching out a meagre existence in the reserves, often as laborers on the farms of their more prosperous neighbours, or drifting into the towns and settled areas looking for work.

However, just as the reserves were becoming packed with what the Provincial Administration regarded as 'excess' rural population, the numbers of landless Kikuyu were swelled by the return of squatters being forced off European farms. By 1948 some 294,000 Kikuyu, comprising more than 28 percent of the total population of the tribe, were living and working outside of the reserves. Four-fifths of this number were laborers and their families living and working on settler farms as either squatters or contract labor.⁵³ Many had lived there for decades and an increasing number of children had been born and raised on settler farms in isolation from the tribal society in the reserves. The rapidly growing prosperity of European farmers intensified the pressures to evict the squatters that had emerged during the depression. After 1945 settlers were attempting to expand their production and introduce more efficient modern methods, and they wanted to push the squatters off the valuable land they occupied and replace this inefficient latifundia labor system

with more productive full-time contract labor. The European-controlled District Councils in the settled areas progressively restricted the amount of land the squatters were permitted to cultivate and forced them to dispose of their stock, without any corresponding increase in the squatters' meagre monthly wages to offset either the loss of their principal sources of livelihood or the rapid inflation of consumer prices.⁵⁴ By the late 1940's the squatters were in a precarious and rapidly deteriorating position. Those who would not accept or were not offered straight wage contracts began to drift back to the Kikuyu reserves, where they found their kin groups had no vacant land to give them, or into the towns and urban centers where they swelled the ranks of an unknown number of floating unemployed.

The situation of Africans in the urban areas was little better than that in the reserves or on settler farms. The African population of Nairobi jumped from an estimated 40,000 in 1938 to 77,000 in 1947 and 95,000 in 1952, more than 51,000 of whom were Kikuyu.⁵⁵ In response to the employment opportunities offered by the growth of government and the development of commerce and industry, Africans flocked to Nairobi and Mombasa to find work. As early as 1945 the Labour Department reported that Africans showed a strong preference and considerable aptitude for industrial work, and by the late 1940's the majority of African workers were employed outside of the agricultural sector.⁵⁶ Whether they were employed or not, however, the conditions faced by urban Africans were appalling. Since wages were too low to permit workers to support their families in town, the majority of the urban African population was composed of men living alone. Combined with the growing population of unemployed,

this created the conditions for flourishing crime and prostitution in the African slums. Furthermore, the African areas of Mombasa and, especially, Nairobi suffered from a severe lack of housing, educational, medical, sanitary, and recreational facilities. In 1947 the African population of Nairobi exceeded the capacity of available housing by 26,000 persons, and the following year the Municipal African Affairs Officer reported:

It was disheartening to see legitimately employed Africans sleeping under the verandahs in River Road, in noisome and dangerous shacks in the swamp, in buses parked by the roadside and fourteen to the room in Pumwani, two to a bed and the rest on the floor.⁵⁷

Evasion by European and Asian employers of the legal requirements to provide their African staff with adequate food and housing was still widespread and the settler-dominated town councils, despite government prodding, dragged their heels over investing in improved conditions and services for Africans. It was not until 1950 that a government committee was formed to investigate and plan improvements in African housing, and the impact of its recommendations would not be felt until several years after the start of the Emergency.

A. The Expanding Scope and Intensity of Conflict

Administrators who began the process of post-war development with high hopes of creating a prosperous and peaceful colony soon noticed a marked deterioration in the tone of their relations with Africans, particularly in the Kikuyu reserves, and found themselves faced with an increasingly sullen and uncooperative population that resisted almost every government policy intended to

improve their condition. The growing hardships experienced by Kikuyu in the reserves, in Nairobi, and on the settler farms exasperated old grievances and created new ones. Administration development programs intended to arrest social disintegration and ameliorate conditions in the reserves appeared to the Kikuyu and an increasing number of other Africans to actually thwart their efforts to improve their lives and to spur the deterioration of tribal life.

Continued restrictions on the growth of the most lucrative cash crops, the reluctance of the Provincial Administration to introduce a secure system of land titles, and the lack of agricultural credit facilities hampered the efforts of all but the wealthiest Africans to establish themselves as independent farmers. For those already crammed into tiny and increasingly fragmented plots of land, soil conservation programs pursued with such single-minded devotion by government officials, especially bench terracing and the planting of grassy lees, further constricted the area available for cultivation. Moreover, terracing was carried on through unpaid compulsory labor, with stiff fines for those who failed to appear for work or who failed to terrace their land. This compulsory labor not only upset the normal rhythm of agricultural work, but also, since so many men were working outside of the reserves, fell heavily upon the women. Discontent surfaced in Fort Hall in 1947 when Kikuyu women, with the encouragement of local political leaders, refused to work and, in a massive demonstration that turned into a near riot, forced the government to temporarily abandon its terracing program.⁵⁸

Development programs also intensified Kikuyu fears for the security of their land. The practice of expropriating small plots of

land for public purposes already in evidence between the wars accelerated and each expropriation by the government for a new market, sports ground, dispensary, community center, or road involved dispossessing one or more farmers of all or part of their land. . These pin-pricks, along with the continued encouragement of an increasing flow of white immigration and establishment of more settler farms by the government, lent credence to rumours that continued to run through the Kikuyu reserves that the government intended to alienate all of their land to the settlers.

Africans struggling to establish themselves in business suffered not only from their own lack of capital and experience, but also from the indifference of the Provincial Administration, an almost total absence of credit facilities, and the hostility of the Asian traders who already dominated commerce in the African areas.⁵⁹ The failure rate among these ventures was exceptionally high and intensified African grievances over being excluded from the economic benefits of the development of the colony.

The increasing African desire for Western education, especially the secondary and higher education that would open up more secure and highly paid skilled and white-collar jobs, also brought them into conflict with the colonial authorities. The Local Native Councils in Central and Nyanza Provinces frequently clashed with administrative officers who refused to allow what they regarded as excessive council appropriations for education. African opposition to government education policy crystallized after the adoption of the ten year development program proposed in the 1949 Beecher Report on African education. To Africans this plan was too slow and too restricted in its objec-

tives, providing for only four years of education for the mass of African children and only sixteen African secondary schools for the whole colony by 1957. Karari Njama, a Kikuyu school teacher and later one of the leaders of the guerilla forces in the Aberdare mountains, noted that "most Africans thought the intention of the plan was to get these African children to go to work on the settlers' coffee or pyrethrum plantations after four or so years of education"; and that Archbishop Beecher, "being the leader of the East African Churches, was felt to be once again trying to bring the independent schools under his control", thus destroying the most valued and enduring institutional legacy of the Kikuyu clash with the missions.⁶⁰

A small, but growing number of Africans with secondary and higher education found their opportunities for upward mobility blocked by the racial stratification that governed both public and private employment in Kenya. The few who found their way into technical and white collar positions, mostly in government service, were frustrated by the wide salary differentials between themselves and Europeans or Asians doing similar work, by the animosity of lower grade European civil servants who saw them as a threat to their own positions, and by the patronizing attitudes of the European public.⁶¹ This emerging educated elite also directly confronted the racism of colonial society in the color bar which virtually ruled out all social contact between the races; as well as in such infuriating practices as the refusal of Europeans to speak English with Africans, the constant reference to African men as 'boys', and, as Elspeth Huxley put it, the "continual outcrops through the crust of behaviour of a code of racial superiority ... that enter into the soul and fester."⁶²

Finally, increasing numbers of Africans were caught in a vicious circle in which they bore the full brunt of the contradictions in government policies. For example, while the Central Province Administration was considering the problem of what to do about the 'excess' population of the Kikuyu reserves, the Secretariat responded to the growing population of unemployed in Nairobi with the Voluntarily Unemployed Persons Ordinance of 1949, the so-called 'spiv' law, under which unemployed Africans were picked up and dumped, landless and destitute, back into the reserves.⁶³ Furthermore, the ability of Africans to move between the reserves, the towns, and the settled areas in search of a viable economic position was seriously hampered by the Kipande system and other restrictive labor legislation which left them at the mercy of employers and the police.

As a result of the experiences described in the past few pages, suspicion of the intentions of the colonial authorities intensified and Africans increasingly tended to see nefarious designs behind government policies and programs, especially those government officials insisted were for their benefit. Moreover, the bitter conflicts that marked the relations between the Administration and the settlers before the war were no longer in evidence and Africans saw the increasing participation and apparent power of the settlers at all levels of government. It was difficult for Africans to see any significant difference between the settlers and the Administration and they appeared to be elements of a single structure of political, social, and economic domination intent on keeping Africans in a permanently subordinate position. These sentiments were revealingly reported in 1947 when the Trade Union Adviser to the Labour Depart-

ment, James Patrick, recorded the opinions of African workers in Mombasa after the first major post-war strike. They told him:

The European wants the Africans to be poor and come down like dogs...The European comes and takes everything belonging to them and then asks for brotherhood...When they want to go up Government pushes them down...They like Government, but Government doesn't like them. Why cannot Government assist us so that everyone can be equal...They had arrived at the stage when they felt they could not sit down together with Europeans. Their complaints in the past had always been put to one side...the lion and the goat cannot lie down together. Why is Government, they asked, not good to the Africans? Everybody in the world is out to put the African down.⁶⁴

The growing conflicts of the post-1945 era were thus increasingly politicized as over each of the various issues Africans found themselves confronting the agencies of colonial authority, including the Administration, the technical departments, and numerous settler-controlled public bodies. The numerous individual conflicts touched with increasing urgency upon fundamental cleavages in the colonial system -- the distribution of land between Africans and Europeans, the goals of development and the role of the African in the economic system, the participation of the various racial communities in the governance of Kenya -- that involved precisely those 'great issues' of policy that the Administration continued to be unwilling and unable to confront. Such issues could not be dealt with within the limited institutional arenas, such as the Local Native Councils, that the Administration insisted were the legitimate sphere of African political participation. While African political associations before 1939 had tacitly accepted the legitimacy of colonial authority and sought redress within its bounds, after the war they increasingly challenged the system itself, including the authoritarian methods of

the Administration and its right to unilaterally establish the criteria for African political advancement, and raised the level of political conflict to a new and more critical plane.⁶⁵ In contrast to administrators who saw socio-economic development as the necessary precondition for African political advance, African politicians came to perceive the acquisition of political power as essential to the achievement of the socio-economic welfare of their people.

B. African Political Organizations: The Kenya African Union and the Trade Unions

The Kenya African Union was formed in October, 1944 by 33 prominent Africans from various tribes in order to provide an organizational base to promote African interests and provide support for Eliud Mathu, the first African member of the Legislative Council. Harry Thuku was the first Chairman. A month later, under pressure from the Administration, the name was changed to the less overtly political Kenya African Study Union. KAU or KASU was itself part of a surge of African organizational activity that began towards the end of the war and saw the emergence of both an active vernacular press and numerous welfare, occupational, commercial, and recreational associations organized both on tribal and trans-tribal lines, which spurred the growth of political consciousness and awareness of shared deprivations and grievances.⁶⁶

For the first few months of its existence KASU actually enjoyed considerable support and encouragement from the Administration which considered it a potential vehicle for responsible participation and training in public affairs for the growing number of educated Africans.⁶⁷ In early 1945 Thuku resigned and James Gichuru,

a teacher at the Alliance High School was elected President. A year later the organization reverted to its original name and relations with the Administration soured as it increasingly abandoned its stance as a study group for more overtly political goals. The status of KAU as a political organization was confirmed in June, 1947 when Gichuru voluntarily stepped down and the Presidency was assumed by Jomo Kenyatta.

Kenyatta returned to Kenya in September, 1946 after a sixteen year exile and shortly after he had acted as co-sponsor, with Kwame Nkrumah, of the Pan-African Congress in Manchester. Long removed from involvement in factional or tribal policies, he had emerged as a dominating, almost legendary figure who had come to mean "all things to all men". Kenyatta was the only African political figure in the colony of sufficient stature to serve as the leader of a unified trans-tribal political organization, and as President of KAU he moved immediately to turn it into a mass movement in pursuit of "universal African objectives."⁶⁹

Beneath Kenyatta a diverse group of leaders and militants came together in the organization. One element came from the new generation of younger educated Africans, many of them graduates of Makerere College in Uganda, represented by such men as Gichuru (Kikuyu), J.D. Otiende (Luhya), and F.W. Odede (Luo), who found in the KAU "outlets not found in the local associations: the company of their fellow elite and a national political focus."⁷⁰ A second element was a less educated but more militant group of young men emerging from the demobilized veterans and urban workers. The trade unions were the principal avenue of mobility for this group, which

included such men as Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Dedan Kimathi (all Kikuyu), and Paul Ngei (Kamba). The third element in the KAU leadership was composed of Kenyatta's old colleagues in the Kikuyu Central Association, principally Jesse Kariuki, James Beauttah, Joseph Kang'ethe, and George Ndegwa. The KCA had gone underground after its proscription in 1940 and its activities revived after the release of its arrested leaders towards the end of the war. On his return from Britain, Kenyatta established himself as the director of the Kenya African Teachers College at Githunguri, which was also the center for the KCA General Council. He attempted to bring his former associates into the KAU and persuade them "that what was at stake was no longer a Kikuyu battle, with limited objectives, but a national struggle for the independence of the country, involving the people of Kenya as a whole."⁷¹ Nevertheless, the KCA retained its identity as a clandestine organization within the KAU and came to dominate the Union's organizational infrastructure in the Kikuyu districts and among the Kikuyu squatters on the settler farms.

Despite KAU's nationalist goals and the presence of members of other tribes among its leadership, the overwhelming majority of its support lay among the Kikuyu and they exercised a predominant influence on it. As a result of the continuing differential impact of social change on the various tribes, efforts to establish KAU as a mass movement with active branches throughout the colony were only partially successful. Only among the Kikuyu, where the impact of social change was most extreme and destructive, was there a mobilizable base of mass support, much of it already stimulated by contact with the KCA. Some degree of success was achieved among the

Kamba and Gusii, and among the Luhya in some of the more over-crowded locations in North Nyanza; but the conservative pastoral tribes and the peoples of the coastal area continued to remain outside of the orbit of significant socio-economic change and political consciousness. Even more important, however, the KAU was unable to establish an effective base among the Luo, the second largest tribe in Kenya. Until the mid-50's Luo politics continued to be dominated by parochial tribal issues and clan conflicts, and the national issues and goals of the KAU evoked little popular response. There was also considerable Luo jealousy of the Kikuyu and suspicion of the latter's domination of the KAU. Moreover, the younger generation of Luo leaders involved in the KAU, such as Odede, Oginga Odinga, and Achieng Oneko, could make little headway against the continuing influence of the first generation of Luo political leaders who had been coopted into the administrative and missionary hierarchies.⁷² The Luo approach to the colonial authorities continued to be one of collaboration and cooperation, and a considerable amount of energy was absorbed in the pursuit of social welfare and economic improvement goals through such tribal associations as the Luo Union. Although it could eventually claim a paid membership of over 100,000, the KAU remained at best a "coalition of Bantu-speakers,"⁷³ and by the Emergency had yet to effectively unify the disparate elements of the African population in Kenya.

In spite of its organizational failures, KAU was still a force of unprecedented strength in Kenya African politics, and for some eight years until its proscription in 1953 it attempted to act as an open and legitimate nationalist organization pursuing socio-economic and political reform through constitutional means. The pattern of

action of the inter-war years was resumed, but with a noticeably greater degree of sophistication and articulateness. Both the KAU central organization and many of its more important branches peppered the Kenya Government with petitions, memoranda, and resolutions. Externally, KAU made representations directly to the United Nations, as well as to the metropolitan authorities in London, and attempted to establish and maintain contacts with sympathetic British politicians and organizations and with fellow nationalists in other colonies, notably Uganda and Tanganyika.

The political goals of the Union were based on the clearly articulated assumption that "the political objective of the African in Kenya must be self-government by Africans", and in pursuit of this objective it demanded equal representation of all races on the Central Legislative Assembly of the inter-territorial East African High Commission established in the late 1940's, an African seat on the Executive Council, increased African representation on the Kenya Legislative Council, and more elected members on the Local Native Councils.⁷⁴ Increasingly aware of the effect of the Administration's control over information reaching the Colonial Office, the KAU leadership asked for both an African assistant CNC and a permanent African liaison officer in the Colonial Office "to advise the Colonial Secretary on the proper shades of opinion in the colony, as distinct from official reports as submitted by the Government."⁷⁵

The Union's position on socio-economic issues reflected the predominant influence of the Kikuyu in the special emphasis placed on various aspects of the land issue. A major petition entitled "A Prayer for the Restoration of Our Land" was presented to the Secret-

ary of State, James Griffiths, when he visited Kenya in May, 1951, and in November of that year the petition, with 67,000 signatures, was presented by Mbiu Koinange and Achieng Oneko to British MPs in London and to UNESCO in Paris.⁷⁶ KAU also demanded the repeal of the Kipande system and the 'spiv' law; guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly and movement for Africans; and higher wages and living conditions for African workers. It also requested universal primary education for African children and increased opportunities for higher education abroad.

The greatest achievement of the KAU, however, was not on these particular issues, where it failed to achieve almost any meaningful reforms, but recasting African politics into a national framework.⁷⁷ Henceforth unified political action on the basis of common African interests, however imperfectly achieved by the KAU, was recognized by African politicians as the essential strategic objective. Ironically, for the KAU itself:

...the political moderation which was urged by Kenyatta in order to win over to KAU communities less impatient than the Kikuyu, only served to deny the constitutionalist wing a chance to win the political victories which might vest this trans-tribal elite group with more widespread support.⁷⁸

As the failures of constitutional action mounted, the KAU leadership divided into moderate and militant wings, the latter composed of KCA elements and the new urban leaders and the former containing primarily the non-Kikuyu politicians, with Kenyatta attempting with increasing difficulty to bridge the widening gap between them.

While the KCA represented an essentially agrarian militance centered in the reserves and the settler farming districts of the

Rift Valley, the extreme edge of African frustration and anger in the urban areas was expressed by the leaders of a growing African trade union movement. In January, 1947 an African Workers Federation appeared to lead a successful general strike in Mombasa, only to collapse nine months later when the government arrested its leader, Chege Libachia, and several of its officers.⁷⁹ The government would recognize and grant legal registration only to individual unions organized on industrial or craft lines, and the suppression of the African Workers Federation stimulated an intense period of organizing new unions and strengthening the few that already existed, such as the Transport and Allied Workers Union, and the Domestic and Hotel Workers Union. The union leaders and militants, however, saw union and political activity as synonymous and showed a strong syndicalist streak in a preference for an omnibus union and the general strike: "they didn't want to break into unions...They wanted everything to go -- all workers to be united together and then when they strike everything goes on strike."⁸⁰ They felt that individual unions divided Africans into smaller groups that could be easily dealt with serially by government and employers through a policy of divide and rule, and in 1949 another try at central organization was made with the East African Trade Union Congress started by Makhan Singh, the leader of the Asian unions of the 1930's, Fred Kubai of the Transport and Allied Workers Union, and Bidad Kaggia of the Clerks and Commercial Workers. After the government refused the EATUC legal registration, an attempted general strike in Nairobi in 1950 was suppressed by a massive show of force. At the same time, however, the union militants fought a bitter battle with moderate elements for control of the KAU organization in

the city. In 1951 they gained control of the Nairobi Branch of the KAU and began to exercise increasing power within the national organization.

IV. The Administrative Response

The reactions of the Kenya Administration to the conflicts created by bureaucratic and economic development were rooted in the widening gap between the Provincial Administration and the Secretariat. Increasingly detached from day to day developments in the field and preoccupied with the specifics of development and the increasing complexity of internal management of the bureaucratic machine, the Secretariat responded with vague projections of long-term development that was assumed would eventually eliminate the bases of current conflicts and with earnest moral exhortations for the improvement of race relations. Responsibility for dealing with the immediate problems of political conflict was left in the hands of the Provincial Administration, whose officers were possessed with a mounting confusion and uncertainty over their role and tended to react with intensified efforts to control the African population.

A. The Central Administration: Multi-Racialism and Detachment

The shifting of executive responsibility for the Provincial Administration back and forth between the Chief Secretary and the Deputy Chief Secretary, and the preoccupation of these officers with the other subjects assigned to them under the Member System, increasingly isolated the top ranks of the central administration from events in the field. Only the Chief Native Commissioner, the weakest of the senior administrative positions, remained in regular contact with the Provincial Administration. Furthermore, as senior administrators

became increasingly involved in the detailed specific problems of development programs and financing, as well as in the complex problems of internal administration attendant upon the rapid expansion of the technical departments, the prestige and importance accorded to the Provincial Administration declined:

There was an apparent tendency in high quarters to assume that the affairs of Government could be conducted through departments and that the devolution of authority to District Councils which was then taking place would, and possibly should, lessen the authority of the District Commissioner.⁸¹

The isolation of senior administrators also ruptured the traditional lines of communication between the field and central administration. The political intelligence reports that were the Provincial Administration's key source of influence on the Secretariat were sent to the office of the Attorney General/Member for Law and Order who had assumed under the Member System the responsibility for internal security previously held by the Chief Secretary. The Attorney General and his staff, however, had no executive power to guide the Provincial Administration, and, as legal officers of the government, were concerned primarily with information relating to specific breaches of the criminal code rather than the more sensitive and ambiguous political intelligence flowing in from administrators in the field. Efforts to analyze and circulate intelligence reports among the senior officers of the Secretariat were sporadic and uncoordinated. F.D. Corfield, the author of the official report on the origins of the Emergency, noted that "after an exhaustive reading of many volumes of these reports I have been left with the inescapable conclusion that they just 'disappeared' into the Central Secretariat."⁸²

Senior officers in the Secretariat thus had little sense of the scope and intensity of the conflict developing between the KAU and the Provincial Administration. Their contact with African politics was sporadic, centering on demands and petitions addressed directly to the Governor or sent to the metropolitan authorities and sent back to them for comment. They tended to regard these demands as naive and intemperate efforts to speed up the necessarily lengthy and gradual process through which the African would rise to a level of civilization permitting him full participation in the economy and polity.

In accordance with the multi-racial concept, Mitchell and his senior Secretariat officials firmly believed that socio-economic reforms were the primary mode of dealing with the unrest and social disintegration brought on by rapid social change.⁸³ They also agreed with the conclusion of the Cambridge Summer School on Race Relations that there must be opportunities for educated, politically conscious Africans to participate in development and in the tasks of government. However, what they understood as reforms were the development and welfare policies being carried out in African areas by the Provincial Administration and technical departments. The benevolent motives behind these programs were assumed to ensure their beneficial results. They assumed that adequate opportunities existed for African participation on the Local Native Councils and the successor African District Councils, in various public boards and committees to which African representative had been appointed, and in the Legislative Council where African representation had been increased to four in 1948. On this basis the Secretariat turned down a KAU demand for an

African member of the Executive Council:

...until Africans have had sufficient time to take advantage of the widely increased opportunities for public service which have been opened to them in the last few years and have demonstrated by their capacity for responsibility and by their integrity in public matters that they are worthy of the great trusts which have already been entrusted to them.⁸⁴

In practice, however, Secretariat officials were unwilling to grant Africans effective participation in government decisions. The educated African was welcome to collaborate in the implementation of development policy under the direction of the government, but he could not be involved in its formulation. While a few senior field officers complained that it was illogical to demand African collaboration in economic and political development when the basic goals of development remained unspecified, Secretariat officials accepted such participation only in so far as the Africans uncritically accepted the government's policies and programs.⁸⁵ This very narrow understanding of participation provided Secretariat officials with the grounds for consistently ignoring or rejecting the representations, appeals, and demands addressed to them by the KAU in the years before the Emergency. As one Secretariat officer minuted on a 1948 KAU petition to the Secretary of State, "it is really a waste of time for the Kenya African Union to put forward petitions and memoranda every few months."⁸⁶

Africans were thus offered nothing more than formal cooptation into the government apparatus. Secretariat officials were unprepared to accept any active criticism of government methods or policies. B.A. Ohanga, a Luo member of the Legislative Council noted:

Whenever we had an opportunity to criticize Government policies... these were nearly always dismissed as uninformed opinions arising from the background of

ignorance of Government machinery and administrative objectives... Any really harsh criticism by an African that could be substantiated by facts was often followed by individual intimidation through administrative channels.⁸⁷

For the same reasons, Jomo Kenyatta, who was appointed to the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board in 1947, resigned from the Board two years later, along with Eliud Mathu and S.V. Cooke, because he "was never given a fair hearing when he made his protests about agriculture."⁸⁸

Secretariat officers found it impossible to conceive that development and welfare policies, about whose beneficial results they received frequent statistical evidence from the technical departments, could serve as a source of African deprivation and discontent. Furthermore, their adherence to the concept of multi-racialism made them tend to see African opposition and dissent as expressions of racial animosity. To Secretariat officials the nascent nationalism of the KAU represented an unreasoning opposition to progress and a rejection of multi-racial ideals in favor of a doctrine of racial domination they found no more acceptable than that of the settler extremists. The KAU came to be viewed as representing a form of reverse racism led by a small minority of semi-educated 'misfits', 'malcontents', and 'irreconcilables' with whom there could be no cooperation or reasoned interaction.⁸⁹

Between 1948 and 1950, as the political crisis in the colony began to achieve its full dimensions, the Secretariat made a more direct effort to deal with the rising levels of conflict through a specific policy of race relations. A Secretariat circular warned that "if we seriously mishandle this problem of race relations in the next

decade we will effectively brand our administration of this colony a failure."⁹⁰ The unfortunate impact of this approach was that it reinforced the tendency of administrators to view conflict as detached from underlying socio-economic deprivations. The report of the Cambridge Summer School on Race Relations had emphasized that "economic conflict will override personal friendships when the test comes."⁹¹ Nevertheless, both the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration neglected political and economic factors almost entirely and viewed race relations as essentially a problem of personal relationships to be resolved through attention to good manners and courtesy in government offices, increased social contacts between educated Africans and European officials and settlers, inter-racial sporting events, and mass education promoting 'sane' racial attitudes and the values of 'good citizenship'.⁹²

A viable policy failed to emerge from these deliberations, however. Administrators in the field and in the Secretariat blamed both African racial animosity and the existence of the color bar on the ignorance, fear, and arrogance of the settlers and the European subordinate staff in other departments. The fear of provoking a bitter clash with the settlers effectively emasculated efforts to articulate a clear policy. Administrators agreed that settler racism was a 'spiritual and emotional' problem that could not be dealt with through deliberate anti-discrimination legislation, but rather required a slow process of persuasion guided by the "old empiric British method of going step by step in the light of experience."⁹³ The primary means of dealing with African racism was felt to be the close personal relationship between the field officer and his people, and the Secretariat thereby handed

the problem back to the Provincial Administration.

B. The Provincial Administration: Closer Administration and Repression

Faced with serious internal and external challenges to their authority, field administrators suffered a serious loss of direction and self-confidence. With the Secretariat offering no coherent leadership, their shared assumptions and methods, the conventional wisdom of more than fifty years of organizational tradition, appeared increasingly out of step with the growing concentration of government resources and activities in the technical departments and the increasingly strident demands of the Africans. As one Provincial Commissioner put it, "we felt we were pioneers and there were no textbooks to tell us what would happen", and he noted of his colleagues that "if they complained about the central administration, it was because they did not know what to do themselves."⁹⁴ Field officers has a sense of being subjected to circumstances largely beyond their control and of being adrift on currents whose origin they only dimly perceived and whose course and destination seemed both capricious and intractable: "things were always forced on us...those problems we had to deal with we didn't go out to meet half way, we had them thrust upon us."⁹⁵ In stark contrast to the aloof calm that prevailed in the Secretariat, the Provincial Administration in the epicenters of Kikuyu unrest worked under an intensifying sense of pressure and crisis.

The malaise of the Provincial Administration was also linked to the neglect of the organization's needs as it was left behind in the surge of bureaucratic growth in other parts of the government. In November, 1950 the Chief Native Commissioner reported to the

Legislative Council that the Provincial Administration was eleven officers short of its established strength of 139, another six were expected to leave in the following year, and only 13 new cadets were in training. Moreover, 72 of the District Officers had only arrived since the war, and 26 of them had less than two years of service.⁹⁶ Even more important, administrative personnel were spread especially thin in the areas of greatest political conflict and unrest, with a normal complement of 17-19 in Central Province, 5-7 in the settled districts of Rift Valley Province, and 2 in Nairobi.⁹⁷ Thus a total of 25-29 administrative officers were expected to deal with the major areas of African unrest.

What was particularly difficult for administrators to understand was why policies intended to ameliorate the condition of the Kikuyu served to intensify conflict. They came to blame this unrest on a 'loss of contact' resulting from the bureaucratization of government business that kept them tied to their offices and prevented them from pursuing the traditional method of administration based on direct personal contact with the African. This meant that the 'human problems' of social disruption due to rapid change were left to fester. Since administrators continued to believe that Africans trusted the Administration and looked to it for protection and guidance, the solution they turned to was 'closer administration', i.e., the intensification of administrative control through "a welcome return to older methods of administration."⁹⁸ With this approach the various values and assumptions of administrative officers came together -- the equation of African welfare with the preservation of the discretion and power of the Provincial Adminis-

tration, the emphasis of personalism, the distrust of change and conflict, and the conviction that conflict could be done away with and harmony restored where the will and 'good sense' of the ruling class prevailed.

As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, the development of self-conscious ideologies tends to begin where tacitly accepted and traditionally established modes of thought and action are challenged and found to be increasingly inadequate for dealing with the changed circumstances of the external world. The ideology articulated in such circumstances is not necessarily new or 'progressive', but may just as readily be conservative or 'reactionary' in import and involve the conscious reassertion of previously implicit conventions.⁹⁹ Such was the origin of the Catoist beliefs that formed the core values of administrators, and it was also the pattern of their reaction to their new situation. Field officers had a felt need for an explanation of the causes of the internal and external deterioration of the position of the Provincial Administration and a reformulation of their distinctive role that would permit them to deal with a threatening situation. The element of nostalgic yearning for the golden past when control was unchallenged and Africans submissive and trusting is unmistakable in their response. The 'loss of contact' was a rationalization rooted in their inability to understand the growing hostility and resistance they met from Africans.¹⁰⁰ In assuming that this could be overcome by 'closer administration', again an evocation of past traditions, officers of the Provincial Administration chose to reassert authoritarian controls in a manner that had the effect of intensifying rather than resolving the political conflicts in the colony. In their

eyes, however, if 'closer administration' failed, it could only be the fault of the agitators and demagogues in the KAU.

The field administrators' response to the Kenya African Union was thus rooted in both their stereotype of African politics and their desire to reassert control. This reaction was pushed to particular virulence by the Union's involvement in opposition to government development policies. The developmental effort brought out the passionate commitment of the administrators to the land and the people and they felt that Africans should be duly grateful for their efforts.¹⁰¹ When resistance led by local and national leaders of the KAU brought many of the development programs in the Kikuyu districts to a virtual standstill, administrators reacted with frustrated fury. In their eyes resistance to policies intended to benefit the Kikuyu was utterly irrational. The only possible motive for opposition was simply a grab for political power by spreading malicious lies about government intentions: "it was generally anti-government stupidity...opposition to anything so as to get kudos from the people."¹⁰² The KAU leaders were out to dupe the unsophisticated rural population into supporting them, and by halting development programs they maintained conditions of poverty and misery that could be exploited by irresponsible agitation. The fact that KAU and other African associations collected ever larger sums of money to finance various activities and pay the salaries of their officials reinforced administrators' belief that African politics was essentially duplicitous -- a confidence racket battenning on the fears and ignorance of the rural masses. Moreover, the fact that Nairobi served as the organizational center for African opposition confirmed their view of

the city as a source of subversion and corruption from which flowed a stream of 'detrIALIZED' agitators to disrupt what would otherwise be an essentially peaceful rural society.

The administrative reaction to African politics was expressed to a large degree in attacks on the personal ability and integrity of the African politicians. While respected for his intelligence and articulate command of English, Kenyatta was also feared for his evident charismatic power over the Kikuyu as well as his emergence as a dominant leader of national proportions. Administrative correspondence during the 1945-52 period is filled with increasingly bitter epithets and denunciations of the leading African political figures, the Kikuyu leaders in particular. Through such epithets as 'bad hats', 'the same old stiff's', 'malcontents', and 'incorrigables' administrators expressed their conclusion that the politicians were inherently anti-European and anti-government.¹⁰³ Thus they could not be dealt with reasonably, only limited in the influence they exerted on the gullible masses. There was no point in trying to deal with them to reach agreement on contentious issues since they would only attack the government later over something else. Even where the African leaders attempted, as Kenyatta did in several instances, to cooperate with the government and resolve conflicts, administrators reacted negatively and saw in these efforts examples of Kikuyu guile in appearing to cooperate while actually engaging in clandestine subversion.¹⁰⁴

The actual strategies adopted by administrative officers to effect 'closer administration' reflected their belief that the Kikuyu politicians were an unrepresentative minority motivated solely

by political ambitions unconnected with socio-economic factors. They insisted that "agitation is often the cause of unrest" rather than a symptom of it,¹⁰⁵ and believed that by restricting the activities of the agitator social harmony could be restored. They thus sought to isolate the Kikuyu politicians from tribes not yet deeply affected by the 'disease of politics', as well as limit the contact between these agitators and the rural Kikuyu. On the first objective, the Provincial Administration deliberately attempted to prevent the KAU from becoming a national organization by a policy of divide and rule through the stimulation of inter-ethnic hostility. For example, in response to a 1948 KAU petition to the United Nations, administrators found two Nyanza chiefs who "objected to the way in which this memorandum was presented by a few Kikuyu politicians purporting to represent the peoples of Kenya" and instructed them to publicly "stress the implications of the memorandum which was the claim of the Kikuyu to speak for and, therefore, to dominate, the native peoples of Kenya."¹⁰⁶ With regard to the second objective, field officers in Central Province harrassed the officials of KAU and various local Kikuyu associations and attempted to limit their activities through control over public meetings. As early as 1946 the D.C.'s required that the KAU had to have their permission before holding any public meetings and these meetings could only be held near the district headquarters. Even private meetings of KAU members in the reserves required the permission of the chief of the location. The following year further restrictions were placed on public meetings in the aftermath of widespread resistance to development programs, especially in Fort Hall District, generated by a series of KAU rallies.¹⁰⁷ In 1948 additional

restrictions were placed on the collection of money by African associations in order to facilitate the exposure of the expected frauds, and periodic attempts were made in ensuing years to control the activities of the vernacular press and prosecute editors and writers for what were considered to be the most scurrilous articles. In addition, administrators constantly vilified individual Kikuyu politicians at official barazas and other meetings with Africans in the Kikuyu districts. The P.C., Central wrote that "with some care, but considerable directness, the D.C.s Fort Hall, Nyeri and self have been plastering these boys in public utterances as a counter attack and also to drive a wedge to draw off waverers if possible."¹⁰⁸

This administrative action against the KAU stopped short of outright suppression. As a British colony, the formal rights of freedom of speech, association and public assembly were recognized in Kenya and the Administration could proscribe the KAU only at the risk of public outcry in Britain and the possibility of active intervention of the Labour government. For its part, the KAU never deviated from its public posture of being an open and legally recognized political association pursuing its goals through constitutional means. It could only be suppressed and its leaders arrested if the Administration could gather documented proof of seditious intent and the actual fomenting of violent unrest. Administrators chaffed at these restrictions. As their predecessors during the 1920's and 30's, what they were reacting to was really the spirit of opposition and independence represented by the KAU and the Kikuyu politicians. Virtually any statement of protest or act of opposition to government policy tended to be attributed to the influence or direction of the politi-

clans and the inability of the Provincial Administration or the Kenya Police to find conclusive evidence of their leadership of actual subversion was interpreted as an indication of their cleverness in covering their tracks.¹⁰⁹ Administrators had a growing predisposition to look for violent intentions and covert conspiracies underlying African political protest as a justification for their own actions. What is especially notable is the extent to which the less evidence they had of conspiracy, the more administrators believed that it was actually taking place.

V. Escalation, Polarization, and Violence: The Coming of the Emergency, 1950-52

The reactions of the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration to African unrest and the activities of the KAU confirmed the increasing African distrust of government intentions. Secretariat officials appeared both contrary and unresponsive: they advocated racial equality, but caved in to settler intransigence and declined to act against the color bar or repeal discriminatory legislation: they advocated development and socio-economic reform, while officials in the field carried out programs that appeared to prevent Africans from improving their position or sharing in the increasing wealth of the colony; and they called for African participation, but disregarded any criticism of official policy and vilified the critics. The hostility of the Provincial Administration to African political aspirations and the bitter harassment of African political leaders and organizations made the government's vague pronouncements about African political advance and the formal guarantee of freedom of action into crude shams. What the government promised in theory, it

effectively denied in practice. The most crucial effect of the administrative response to African politics was to progressively discredit constitutional modes of action. Each rejected petition and new restriction on its activities widened the gap between the moderates and militants in the KAU and increased the influence of the latter. The inability of the Union to effect meaningful changes in government policy or resolve specific grievances led to the shift in the focus of conflict from dealing with particular issues within the existing framework of the colonial system to a direct challenge to the system itself, and a shift in political initiative to those groups willing to take direct action to force a change.

The secret movement among the Kikuyu to achieve total unity and prepare for direct action was a response to the apparent hypocrisy and rigidity of the central Secretariat and the overt hostility and harrassment of the Provincial Administration. The conviction in the Administration that an anti-European and potentially violent conspiracy lay behind the facade of the KAU and other Kikuyu associations became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The most critical stage of the political crisis began in February, 1950 when Kikuyu political leaders from the KAU, the Nairobi trade unions, and elements of the proscribed KCA that had continued to operate in secret within the KAU in Central Province decided to embark on a campaign of mass oathing to unify the Kikuyu and generate a sustained and intense commitment to the political struggle. In Kiambu and among the Kikuyu squatters in the Rift Valley the mass oathing was largely under the control of the older elements of the KCA, while in Fort Hall, Nyeri, and Nairobi the oathing was led by a younger and more

extreme group of leaders emerging out of the trade unions. By early 1952 preparations had begun for armed resistance. The objective of this violence, however, was not insurrection. The Kikuyu leaders recognized their inability to overthrow the full might of the imperial power, and they sought rather to create a crisis of sufficient magnitude to compel the direct intervention of the metropolitan authorities.¹¹⁰

Information about mass oathing that reached field administrators in 1950 convinced them of the duplicity of the KAU and led to further repressive measures. They believed the oathing was carried out by a 'Mau Mau' association dedicated to murder or drive out all of the Europeans in Kenya. Although the origins of the name are obscure, there is little doubt that 'Mau Mau' was intensely real to both government officials and settlers.¹¹¹ A series of clashes with adherents of African religious sects — the Kikuyu 'Dini ya Jesu Kristo' in Kiambu in 1947, and the 'Dini ya Msambwa' in North Nyanza in 1948 and at Kolloa in Baringo District in 1950 -- in which four European police and administrative officers, as well as several African police and civilians, had been killed roused again administrators' fears of African fanaticism and hysteria and their suspicions that these groups were secretly manipulated by African politicians to further their own ends. To many administrators, including Governor Sir Philip Mitchell and several senior Secretariat officials, 'Mau Mau' was apparently a 'dini' controlled by the KCA behind the facade of the KAU. Arrests of Kikuyu for administering an illegal oath began in April, 1950 and by the end of the year 120 had been convicted and imprisoned.¹¹² On August 4, 1950 the Executive Council acting on

the advice of a memorandum by the CNC proscribed the 'Mau Mau' association.

In May, 1951 the Secretary of State, James Griffiths visited Kenya and the KAU, under the leadership of Kenyatta, made one last desperate effort to head off the developing confrontation and work through constitutional channels. The Union asked for 12 elected African members on the Legislative Council. Griffiths, also facing demands from the settlers and the Asian community, temporized by giving Africans a seat on the Executive Council and two more appointed members in the LegCo. The impassioned petition seeking redress of Kikuyu socio-economic grievances was ignored, and, soon after, Kikuyu extremists turned their backs completely on the politics of petitions and resolutions.¹¹³

Early in 1952 several prominent local leaders of the KAU in Fort Hall District were sentenced to prison for two years for conspiracy. At the same time a wave of arson broke out in Nyeri directed against official chiefs and other Kikuyu loyal to the colonial regime. By the middle of the year the violence had spread to Nairobi and its environs in the form of sporadic acts of terrorism and assassination against Kikuyu who opposed the secret movement.¹¹⁴ By July the Provincial Administration and a thoroughly alarmed settler community were placing heavy pressure on the Secretariat to go to the Colonial Office for permission to declare a state of emergency. Up to this point the Secretariat had been rather passive with regard to the developing crisis. Governor Mitchell and his senior officials consistently underplayed the seriousness of Kikuyu unrest.¹¹⁵ From the Secretariat's perspective it was an isolated element in a

colony that appeared otherwise to be peaceful and prosperous. However, with Mitchell's retirement in June and the escalation of the conflict to a new level, the Central administration became actively involved.

At this point, the decision to declare a state of emergency depended as much upon bureaucratic politics and self-interest as it did upon the external political situation faced by the Administration. For the field officers in the centers of unrest the situation had become extremely threatening and they felt the time had come for definitive action against the politicians who were in their eyes the source of the emerging insurrection. To take such extreme action on their own discretion, without documented proof of the conspiracy, would have exposed them to possible charges of exceeding their authority and using excessive force. However, a declaration of a state of emergency, which could only occur with the permission of the metropolitan authorities, would relieve them of this burden of responsibility and place them in the position of simply carrying out a policy established by their superiors.

Secretariat officials resisted these pressures from the Provincial Administration and the settlers for a state of emergency. They continued to feel "that Mau Mau was an administrative affair and that it was the business of the Administration to ensure that it did not interfere with the general smooth running of the governmental machine which was engaged on more serious matters." ¹¹⁶ Furthermore, for the central government to approach the Colonial Office with a request to declare a state of emergency would have been an admission both of its failure to govern effectively and of the inaccuracy of the reports of the peace and prosperity of the colony sent as late as

June to the Colonial Office. This would not only invite the active intervention of the metropolitan authorities, but also would blight the careers of the officials who had to take responsibility for the decision. The situation was complicated by the fact that Mitchell's successor, Sir Evelyn Baring, injured himself in an accident and did not arrive to take up his appointment until the end of September. Instead of the usual three or four weeks, the interregnum between governors stretched to more than three months. During this critical period the central government was headed by the Chief Secretary, assisted by the Chief Native Commissioner and the Attorney General, and these officials were understandably reluctant to make a drastic decision that would commit the new governor to an emergency situation even before he arrived. During July and August, therefore, they stoutly maintained that the situation had been greatly exaggerated and there were no grounds for invoking a state of emergency. They attempted to deal with the situation through less drastic measures, notably new legislation increasing the coercive powers of the Provincial Administration and the Police. The Colonial Office was not informed officially of a serious deterioration of law and order in the colony until the 17th of August.¹¹⁷ In September the CNC and the Attorney General visited London and received Colonial Office approval for new repressive legislation, but the measures were never implemented. Baring arrived soon after and immediately embarked on a tour of the centers of unrest. He faced two basic choices. He could decline to ask for a state of emergency and attempt to deal with the situation by other means. If he subsequently had to turn to emergency measures, it would be an admission that he could not halt the deterioration of

the situation and would have to accept responsibility for it. He could, however, immediately opt for an emergency, which would throw responsibility for the crisis onto his predecessors and, by bringing the situation down to rock bottom, leave him no place to go but up. He chose the second course of action, his decision being prompted by the assassination on October 7th of Senior Chief Waruhiu, one of the government's staunchest supporters in Kiambu. After assent from London and some time to arrange for the arrival of British troops to bolster the local forces and plan 'Operation Jock Scott' for the arrest of Kenyatta and some 145 other African political figures, the state of emergency was declared on October 20, 1952 and the crisis moved to a new level of large-scale organized violence.

CHAPTER SEVEN - NOTES

1. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 8/177, "Circular No. 12 of 24 December, 1955."

2. Collated from Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Staff Lists, Government Printer, Nairobi, for the years 1945-55. The 1955 total represents the peak strength of the government at the height of the Emergency and a proportion of the increase represents personnel recruited solely for Emergency-related purposes.

3. Figures on recurrent and development expenditure from Colonial Office, Report on Kenya, for the years 1945, 1946, 1951, and 1955, HMSO, London.

4. Collated from Staff Lists, op. cit., for the relevant years.

5. In 1939 the African Section of the Education Department had a staff of 37, which only grew to 42 by 1947. Eight years later, however, it had expanded to 123 Europeans and 48 Africans. (Source, Staff Lists).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Labour Department, Annual Report for 1948, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1949.

9. Labour Department, Annual Reports, 1945-1960. The next largest Labour Department was that of Nigeria which had a staff of 400 serving a population approximately six times larger than that of Kenya. (International Labour Office, African Labour Survey, Geneva, 1958, page 689).

10. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 2/2275, Confidential Despatch, Governor P.E. Mitchell to Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, 9 March 1945; and Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council, Sessional Paper no. 3 of 1945, "Proposals for the Reorganization of the Administration of Kenya" Government Printer, Nairobi, 1945.

11. Ibid., and KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 2/2275, Secret Telegram no. 375, Mitchell to Stanley, 26 May 1945.

12. Quoted by Mitchell in an excerpt from his diary in his memoirs, African Afterthoughts, Hutchinson, London, 1954, page 214.

13. On the Asian reaction see KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 2/2275, Secret Telegram no. 555, Mitchell to Stanley, 21 July 1945. European reaction was described in Interview 03PS.

14. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 2/2275, Mitchell to Stanley, 9 March, 1945.

15. Interview 07PS.

16. Collated from Staff Lists, op. cit.

17. Ibid. Information on the careers of individual officers indicates that 64% (36 of 56) of the officers who entered the Kenya Administration between 1930 and 39 served in the Secretariat at some time in their service, while the proportion dropped to 58% (74 of 124) of those officers entering in the 1940-49 period and fell dramatically to only 15% (30 of 200) for those entering during the 1950's. To some extent this variation is accounted for by the fact that Kenya became independent before most of the younger officers entered the second decade of their careers, the period during which most senior Secretariat appointments were first made. However, if we focus on those officers who served only in junior Secretariat posts, the level at which most temporary secondments of field officers were usually made, we found a similar decrease from 31% of the 1940-49 entrants (39 of 124) to 9% (18 of 200) among 1950-59 entrants. This decrease occurred despite the rapid growth in the number of administrative posts in the central government.

18. Ibid.

19. Interview 217FS.

20. D.J. Penwill, "Paper - The Other Side" The Journal of African Administration, vol. 6, July 1954, pages 120-21.

21. Interview 219F.

22. Ibid.

23. Interview 214F.

24. Ibid.

25. A senior official of the Agriculture Department summed up the argument between his department and the Administration during the 1946-52 period:

"Agriculture wanted to push on, to get a framework on which to develop agriculture, [but] the Administration were extremely sensitive as to the repercussions of this both on the political attitudes of the people and the social attitudes.... I think that Agriculture felt that it was better to create some upset in doing this in order to demonstrate that the people could have a better living (sic). The Administration

said they were happy to go along with that but they weren't prepared to have the upset developed to the extent where there was very open opposition to it."
(Interview 232T)

26. KNA/PC/NZA2/555, "Relations Between Administrative and Departmental Officers" Draft Circular presented to the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting of 10 April, 1945.

27. KNA/PC/NZA2/555, Secretariat Circular no. 19 of 25 June, 1945.

28. KNA/PC/NZA2/555, D.C., South Kavirondo, "Circular to all Departmental Officers" 16 July 1945.

29. KNA/PC/NZA2/555, Acting P.C., Nyanza to Provincial Agriculture, Education, Medical and Veterinary Officers, 14 November, 1950.

30. Interviews 208FS, 103F, 116F, 219F.

31. Interview, 133T.

32. KNA/Ministry of African Affairs 9/929, E.H. Windley, P.C., Central to J.D. Rankine, Chief Secretary, 23 November 1948.

33. KNA/Ministry of African Affairs 9/929, Memorandum, Rankine to Deputy Chief Secretary, Chief Native Commissioner and Financial Secretary, 30 November, 1948 (emphasis added). Rankine specifically exempted the CNC from his remarks because he already toured the districts regularly.

34. Interview 230T. The Secretariat official was also constrained by self interest to adopt the prevailing style and current policies:

"...when you come into the Secretariat you were now on [to] the possible governorship and other lines of promotion if you made a success of whatever you were doing there. This produced a great conformity among chaps who come in because they now tried to play it very carefully in a Secretariat manner so that they could show they were the right kind of chaps." (Ibid.)

35. KNA/MAA9/929, Rankine to DCS et. al., 30 November 1948. The perspectives of the field officers is clearly indicated in the remarks of a young D.O. who entered service in the early 1950's:

"... on the whole, Headquarters was highly disliked as a bloody nuisance...provincial headquarters often roused the same feeling, because your loyalty was to the district

and that was the only damned thing that mattered." (Interview 103F)

36. KNA/MAA9/929, Rankine to DCS et. al., 30 November, 1948.

37. Interview 210S. This point was echoed by one of Mitchell's P.C.s during this period: "He had a curious down on the Administration. I think he had a chip on his shoulder about a lot of things... A curious man to deal with, ability undoubted, but he never would listen." (Interview 227FS)

38. This is evident in the increasing amount of statistical data published in annual departmental reports between 1945 and 1963. See, for example, the Labour Department Annual Reports for those years. The department first appointed a professional statistician to its staff in 1947.

39. KNA/Secretariat Circular no. 16 of 13 September 1946.

40. KNA/MAA9/929, Rankine to DCS et. al., 30 November, 1948. A year later, during the LegCo debate on the budget estimates for 1950, an elected European member, Derek Erskine, launched a slashing attack on the Provincial Commissioners, referring to them as "that gauleiter intermediary", and suggesting that the P.C.s and their staffs be eliminated from the machinery of government. (East African Standard, December 17, 1949). This attack had little chance of success, but it would have been unthinkable before 1939 and illustrates the serious decline in the status of the Provincial Administration in general and the P.C.s in particular.

41. KNA/MAA9/929 "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' meeting at Government House on 6-9 February, 1950." Several P.C.s also directly expressed their grievances at this meeting. The only action taken in response was a note by Mitchell to the Executive Council emphasizing the key role of the P.C.s.

42. KNA/Secretariat Circular no. 19 of 18 April, 1950.

43. KNA/MAA9/929, "Minutes of the Provincial Commissioners' Meeting at Government House on the 6-9th February, 1950."

44. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 8/1406. "Appendix A to Draft Schedule of Subjects and Departments Assigned to the Members of the Executive Council," April, 1950. At this time, however, the CNC did succeed in separating his office from the Secretariat after twenty years of integration. This tiny African Affairs Branch was the CNC's sole formal executive responsibility until 1954. It is significant to note that, in the face of the growing specialization of central government administrative posts and their staffing with men from outside of Kenya, the staff of the African Affairs Branch was drawn exclusively from career officers of the Kenya Administration with extensive field experience. (Staff Lists, op. cit.)

45. Labour Department, Annual Report, 1950, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1951.

46. Report of the Sub-Committee on Post-War Employment of Africans, Nairobi, 1943. Quoted in C.G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, Praeger, New York, 1966, page 194.

47. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Committee on African Wages, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954, page 42.

48. Labour Department, Annual Reports, 1947-52, Government Printer, Nairobi.

49. N. Humphrey, et. al., The Kikuyu Lands, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1945, page 7.

50. Ibid., and M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1967, page 77.

51. In 1946 the D.C. Kiambu noted that "these influential people are increasing their holdings and doing as they please... the rule of 'might is right' prevails particularly when the might is backed up by Chiefs and other influential men." (KNA/MAA7/456, A.C.M. Mullins to C. Tompkinson, P.C., Central, 5 June, 1946)

52. Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1949, quoted in Sorrenson, op. cit., page 79. By 1950 the volume of litigation over land was reaching proportions that were seriously over-burdening the Provincial Administration, and the P.C. Central appealed to the CNC for additional staff just to handle to appeals. (KNA/MAA8/65, E.H. Windley to E.R. Davies, 2 February, 1950).

53. Sorrenson, op. cit., page 80; and Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau from Within, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1966, page 34.

54. Sorrenson, op. cit., pages 81-82.

55. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., page 208; Barnett and Njama, op. cit., page 34.

56. "The African, generally speaking, prefers industrial work and shows an aptitude for it. It is uncommon to hear complaints of low output by natives operating machines or working in factories. (Labour Department, Annual Report, 1945, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1946, page 13). In 1950 only 48% of Africans employed for wages in Kenya worked in the Agricultural Sector. This rose to 49.26 in 1951, but dropped again to 46.6 in 1952. The proportion employed in the public services and in manufacturing rose, during the same period from 22.6 to 23.5% and from 8.25 to 9.6% respectively (Labour Department, Annual Reports, op. cit., 1950-52).

57. Quoted in East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-55, Report, HMSO, London, 1955, page 207.

58. Sorrenson, op. cit., page 75; Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pages 237-38.

59. For an account of the problems of the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, one of the most important African businesses established after 1945 see Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1967, pages 79-89.

60. Barnett and Njama, op. cit., page 77. The Committee, headed by Archbishop L.J. Beecher, the head of the Anglican Church in East Africa, had recommended that government subsidies be given only to those Kikuyu independent schools that accepted inspection by the Department of Education. (African Education in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1949, pages 55-62.)

61. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, Deutsch, London, 1963, pages 29-30.

62. Elspeth Huxley, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: A Journey Through East Africa, Chatto and Windus, London, 1949, page 57.

63. The Chief Native Commissioner explained the intent of the 'spiv' law:

"If a man has no regular lawful means of livelihood it means either he is going to starve in the town or he is going to commit crime. We say that such a man must either report to the Labour Exchange to show that he is genuinely looking for work or if he is merely a potential rogue, we should have the power to return him to his place of domicile." (KNA/MAA8/70, P. Wyn-Harris to Margery Perham, 17 April, 1948).

64. KNA/Ministry of Labour 9/372, James Patrick, "Report on a Visit to Mombasa" November, 1947.

65. According to one of the most important Kikuyu politicians, they rejected the process by which administrators, having decided on a policy without consulting the Africans, "imposed it, dictated it, and threatened people if they refused to follow it, even if it turned out to be wrong." (Interview 09PA).

66. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pages 210-12 and John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life, 1912-45" in V. Harlow, et. al., History of East Africa, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, pages 388-91.

67. Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, op. cit. page 258. In December, 1944 the General Secretary of KASU, Francis Khamisi sent a letter to all D.C.s requesting that the Union be brought to the attention of the LNC's and be provided facilities for branch meetings. This request was accompanied by a covering letter from the Secretariat encouraging administrators to assist KASU and followed a month later by another letter indicating that African civil servants could join the Union (KNA/DC/UG5/1, letters of 15 December, 1944 and 17 January, 1945.)

68. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., page 216.

69. Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968, page 43.

70. J.M. Lonsdale, "Politics in Western Kenya" unpublished manuscript, Cambridge University, 1970, page 529.

71. Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., page 43.

72. Lonsdale, op. cit., page 531a.

73. Ibid., page 530; Rosberg and Nottingham, op.cit., pages 217-20.

74. KNA/PC/CP8/5/4, "Resolutions of the Kenya African Union" 20 April, 1947; MAA2/5/146, "Resolutions of the General Meeting of the Kenya African Union" 23 May 1948.

75. KNA/MAA2/5/146, "Memorandum from the Kenya African Union to the Secretary of State During his Visit to Kenya, May 1-3, 1949". As might be expected, the reaction in the Secretariat to this proposal was particularly chilly. (Mitchell to Secretary of State, Arthur Creech-Jones, 29 July, 1949).

76. KNA/MAA2/5/146, J. Kenyatta, "A Prayer for the Restoration of Our Lands," 14 May, 1951; Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pages 223-24.

77. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pages 220-233.

78. Lonsdale, op. cit., pages 529-530.

79. Makhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1969, pages 141-160.

80. Interview.09PA.

81. F.D. Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Cmd 1030) HMSO, London, 1960, page 237.

82. Ibid., page 35.

83. Ibid., pages 118-19.
84. KNA/MAA2/5/146, M.N. Evans, for Chief Secretary, to Acting Executive Officer, KAU, 14 October, 1948.
85. KNA/MAA7/126, K.L. Hunter, P.C. Nyanza to C.S. Thornley, Acting Chief Secretary, 19 October, 1948, and Officer-in-Charge, MASAI to Chief Secretary, 15 December, 1948; and Mitchell, op. cit., page 221.
86. KNA/MAA2/5/146, M.N. Evans, "Minute" of 14 June, 1949 on KAU 1949 petition.
87. B.A. Ohanga, personal communication to author, September, 1969.
88. Comments of S.V. Cooke, quoted in Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., page 107.
89. Corfield, op. cit., pages 18, 23, 122, 192.
90. KNA/MAA7/126, "Race Relations" Secretariat Circular, June, 1948.
91. Ibid., "Extracts from Report on Race Relations", page 3.
92. The replies and suggestions received from more than a dozen D.O.s, D.C.s and P.C.s are found in KNA/MAA7/126 and collected in M.N. Evans "Summary of Suggestions Put Forward by Administrative Officers" 22 March, 1949.
93. KNA/MAA7/126, J.D. Rankine Chief Secretary Minute to, CNC, E.R. St. A. Davies, 2 September, 1950.
94. Interview 218F.
95. Interview 219F.
96. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 1/1195, CNC, E.R. Davies, "Notes for Speech to LegCo Budget Session" November 1950.
97. Corfield, op. cit., page 236.
98. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 1/1195, CNC, E.R. Davies, "Notes on a Speech to Legislative Council" February, 1952.
99. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in D. Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent, Free Press, New York, 1964, pages 63-64.
100. The element of rationalization is highlighted by the fact that one D.C. studied the records in his district (Machakos) and found that in the post-1945 period administrators spent just as much, if not

more, time on personal Safaris in the district than their predecessors. (D.J. Penwill, loc. cit., pages 118-19).

101. For example, in response to a petition from the Akamba Union, a Secretariat official wrote to the P.C., Central that "it is deplorable that a body purporting to represent the Akamba people should have no word of gratitude for the immense assistance the tribe has had from Government" (KNA/PC/CP8/5/4, R.G. Brayne-Nicholls to E.H. Windley, P.C. Central, 15 June, 1951).

102. Interview 227FS.

103. Notable examples of uncertainty absorption with regard to the image of African politicians is found in the letters of September 1 and September 14, 1951 from the P.C., Central to the CNC and Chief Secretary respectively, commenting on the activities of the Central Province Branch of the KAU. (KNA/MAA2/5/146).

104. Corfield, op. cit., pages 52-53, 72, 102-103.

105. Ibid., pages 74-75.

106. KNA/MAA8/25 Secret "Minutes of a Meeting of the Official Members of the African Affairs Committee" 3 November, 1948 (emphasis added).

107. KNA/PC/CP8/5/4, D.C. Nyeri to General Secretary, KAU, March, 1946, "Rules for KAU Meetings in Nyeri;" and MAA8/65, Secret "Notes on a Meeting Held in the Office of the CNC on 19 December, 1950;" "Minutes of a Meeting of the D.C.s, Central Province at Nyeri, 8-9 February, 1951."

108. KNA/MAA8/65, P.C. Central to CNC, 13 September, 1951.

109. Corfield, op. cit., pages 81, 98, 117, 169-170, 221.

110. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pages 264-65, 269-70.

111. Ibid., pages 331-34, and Barnett and Njama, op. cit., pages 53-54.

112. Corfield, op. cit., pages 100-101.

113. KNA/MAA2/5/146, "A Prayer for the Restoration of Our Lord". On June 6 the D.C., Nyeri prepared a secret report on a KAU mass meeting in Nyeri on May 27 and noted that, "There seems every likelihood of trouble in the near future, if as seems certain, the KAU memorandum on the Kikuyu lands is rejected. The district is hot with rumours of 'deeds not words.'" (Quoted in Corfield, op. cit., page 107).

114. Corfield, op. cit., page 136; Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., page 276.

115. The first over-all summary analysis in the Secretariat of 'Mau Mau' was made by the Director of Intelligence and Security (not an administrative officer and attached to the Attorney General) in February, 1952. He submitted a comprehensive report in April of that year, but it did not reach the Acting Governor until August or the P.C., Central until the end of September. (Corfield, op. cit., pages 129, 133-34). In June Mitchell visited the Colonial Office and told the Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttleton, (later, Lord Chandos) that Kenya was "lapped in peace" (The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, The Bodley Head, London, 1962, page 393.) The issue of whether Mitchell and his senior officials in the Secretariat simply misjudged the seriousness of the situation or actively suppressed the information about rising Kikuyu unrest is the subject of much speculation and mutual recrimination among the secretariat officials and field administrators I have interviewed.

116. Corfield, op. cit., page 238.

117. Ibid., page 151.

THE EMERGENCY AND THE DECLINE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, 1952 to 1960

The declaration of the Emergency began the most intense and ultimately decisive period of political conflict in Kenya culminating in the Lancaster House Conference of early 1960, which spelled the effective end of colonial rule and initiated a brief period of transition to independence under an African government. In Britain the colony became a major focus of domestic political debate as the process of imperial withdrawal from black Africa began and then rapidly accelerated. The lurid tales of 'Mau Mau' excesses spread by sensational press coverage also brought intense international attention and notoriety that earned Kenya a permanent place in the racial folklore of the Western world. Militarily, however, the Kikuyu groups that emerged to fight the British forces were, after an initial period of confusion and indecision, relatively easily contained and broken-up and by early 1956 the fighting was essentially over. At the same time, the 'Myth of Mau Mau' took coherent shape both as a justification for the British reaction to Kikuyu unrest and as a guide to policy for a program of civil pacification and rehabilitation of the tribe that was carried out with uncompromising severity and intensity.

The impact of the Emergency on the Kenya Administration was profound and yet initially deceptive in its implications. During the violent stages of the crisis the declining power and prestige of the organization, especially the Provincial Administration, was apparently dramatically reversed. Field officers acquired extraordinary coercive

powers backed by massive force that permitted the virtually total suppression of African political activity and the assumption of a degree of direct control over the African population unprecedented in the history of the colony. By 1956 the Administration was seemingly at the zenith of its power. Within three years, however, the ability of the Administration as an organization to control the bureaucratic machinery of government and its position as the dominant focus of the political process had largely disappeared. The sense of crisis engendered by the Emergency brought increasing intervention of the metropolitan authorities in a series of constitutional reforms that finally broke the thirty-year long stalemate over the basic direction of political development. The introduction of full-fledged ministerial government in 1954 rapidly brought to culmination the decline of the Administration as the dominant department of government. The entry of African elected members into the Legislative Council fundamentally shifted the balance of power in the political arena and increasingly reduced the Administration to the role of spectator to a sequence of crises and compromises involving, on the one hand, the political representatives of Kenya's racial communities and, on the other, the metropolitan authorities. These developments prepared the way for a dramatic change in the direction and timing of British policy made at the highest levels of metropolitan politics without any apparent prior consultation or negotiation with the Kenya Government.

I. The Conduct of the War Against 'Mau Mau'

The declaration of the Emergency was not immediately followed

by the outbreak of large-scale combat between organized Kikuyu guerillas and British security forces. For more than five months there ensued what one Central Province D.C. referred to as 'the phony war'.¹ It was a period of disorganized confusion for both sides in the conflict. The colonial authorities, assuming that a 'Mau Mau' rebellion was already underway, rushed to head it off. The regular Kenya Police, the Provincial Administration, and the local units of the King's African Rifles, along with elements of British army battalions and uniformed and armed units of settlers in the Kenya Police Reserve, swarmed into the Kikuyu reserves "charging over the hills looking for a battle",² but did not encounter any large-scale organized resistance. Despite the movement of a small number of young Kikuyu into the forests on the fringes of the reserves as early as August 1952, the underground movement had neither coherent plans for the organization and training of guerrilla combat forces nor possessed a significant stockpile of modern arms. Operation Jock Scott and subsequent arrests of other political figures had effectively decapitated the Kikuyu underground movement, depriving it of virtually all of the educated and experienced top leadership and leaving the situation in the hands of uneducated and largely illiterate local leaders and rank and file.

Fearing the spread of 'Mau Mau' to other tribes and other parts of the country and attempting to allay the pervasive fear and insecurity that gripped the settler population, the Kenya Government moved to repatriate Kikuyu to the reserves. Hundreds of young men, many of them militants in the movement, were rounded up by police sweeps

in Nairobi, Mombasa and other towns and sent back to the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru districts of Central Province. Tens of thousands of other Kikuyu, including women and children, mostly squatter families from the settler areas of the Rift Valley, but also including groups of Kikuyu from as far afield as Nyanza and parts of Tanganyika, were repatriated to the reserves. This pathetic flow of refugees, numbering almost 100,000 by the end of 1953, crowded into the already strained and over-populated Kikuyu reserves and almost a third were reduced to dependence on government hand-outs for survival.³ Swiftly passed emergency legislation gave the Administration and the security forces wide powers of arrest and detention without warrant or trial, as well as legal sanction to shoot on sight anyone found in prohibited areas. By the end of 1954 18,069 Kikuyu were in prison after conviction of various 'Mau Mau' offences, while 49,289 others were detained in detention camps without trial.⁴ Capital punishment was extended to cover a wide variety of offences for which an eventual total of almost 1,000 Africans were eventually executed after conviction in special Emergency Assizes.⁵

It was against this background of chaos and enormously intensified official repression that Kikuyu resistance began to take shape during the first months of the Emergency. According to Barnett:

Forced confessions, beatings, robbery of stock, food, and clothing, brutalities of various sorts, and outright killings were frequent enough occurrences to rouse a fear in the hearts of most Kikuyu that the intent of the white man was to eliminate the whole Kikuyu tribe. Combined with the general confusion, the partial disintegration of the Movement, and the will of some to fight back, this fear inaugurated a slow but steady drift of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru peasants, particularly the youth,

into the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares.⁶

Eventually some 15,000 Africans, mostly Kikuyu, but also including numbers of the closely related Meru and Embu peoples whom the Government considered to be equally infested with the 'disease of Mau Mau', found their way into the forests where resistance groups and a command structure began to take shape in early 1953. The forest fighters eventually were organized into the Land Freedom Army under the principal leadership of Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Mathenge in the Aberdares and Waruhiu Itote ('General China') around Mount Kenya. The leaders of the resistance were an almost totally new group of men with little if any linkage with the pre-Emergency leadership of the underground movement. Only Kimathi, who had been Secretary of the Thomson's Falls branch of KAU, held any significant political position prior to the Emergency, and only Karari Njamá, the secretary of Land Freedom Army organization, possessed even a few years of secondary education. As the most thorough analysts of the Emergency stress, armed resistance emerged not as a result of a coherent plan of rebellion, but rather "derived from the conditions of the Emergency itself".⁷

Significant Kikuyu resistance began on the night of March 26, 1953 with a well-planned and executed raid on the Naivasha Police Station in the Rift Valley in which the attackers captured a small supply of arms and ammunition. For almost a year after, small-scale hit and run raids on police posts and fortified camps set up in the reserves to protect the small minority of Kikuyu who remained actively loyal to the colonial regime were a nightly occurrence, in addition to ambushes of government patrols and occasional attacks on settler farms.

The heaviest fighting centered in the locations adjacent to the forests in Fort Hall and, to a lesser extent, Nyeri. A second center of resistance emerged in Nairobi where a second tier of militant leaders took over the Central Committee and transformed it into a "War Council" that attempted to provide a central organization for the whole resistance movement and maintained sporadic contacts with and sent a slender trickle of recruits and supplies to the forest fighters.⁸ For some eighteen months the War Council controlled the African locations of the city by night, while the security forces exercised tenuous control during the day.

The Land Freedom Army, however, proved incapable of organizing or mounting an effective guerilla war. Led mostly by veterans of the World War ignorant of guerilla methods and tactics, the Land Freedom Army replicated the organizational and command structure of the British army, with platoons, companies, and battalions led by captains, colonels, generals, etc. Kimathi assumed the rank of Field Marshall. Aside from a few raids on settler farms and some terrorist activity in the African locations of Nairobi, fighting was almost entirely confined to the reserves. No attempt was made to harass and isolate Nairobi itself, a city with an exposed water supply and slender electrical power, communications, and transport linkages with the rest of the colony and the outside world. The forest fighters were also constrained by their meagre supplies of arms and ammunition. According to government estimates, they possessed no more than 1,030 precision weapons, the most potent of which were a few Bren guns, and probably had many fewer than this number available for use at any one time.⁹ These modern

weapons were supplemented by home-made guns and grenades, as well as traditional Kikuyu spears and simi (swords), and the panga, the ubiquitous broad-bladed agricultural knife of East Africa.

Organizational difficulties further hampered the operations of the Land Freedom Army. A significant number of small bands, known as Komereras, operated on the margins of the forest outside of the control of the central command structure and without reference to its military and political objectives.¹⁰ Operation of the Mount Kenya forces was disrupted when General China was wounded and captured in early 1954. Furthermore, as pressure from the government forces increased, the structure of the Land Freedom Army began to disintegrate. Conflicts emerged between the literate and less-educated segments of the leadership, particularly between Kimathi and Mathenge, and communication and coordination between units declined. Leaders and their men placed a growing reliance on magical divination and prophesy for making decisions and upon more and more extreme oaths to maintain morale and commitment in conditions of increasing privation and isolation.¹¹

Arrayed against the Kikuyu were security forces that eventually totalled almost a division of African and British troops, including armor and artillery units and RAF bomber formations, some 20,000 police, including both regulars and the Kenya Police Reserve, and enormously increased administrative cadres in the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru districts of Central Province, in the Rift Valley, and in Nairobi.¹²

At first, after declaring the state of emergency and rounding up the leading Kikuyu politicians, neither the Kenya Government nor the Colonial Office had any clear idea of how to quell the emerging insurrection or

eliminate its active or passive support by the great majority of the tribe. Both the methods and goals of policy remained undefined. In addition, the government was unprepared to deal with a situation in which three organizations, the Administration, the Police, and the British Army, all claimed primary responsibility for directing operations. Actions were initiated by each organization without coordination and frequently at cross purposes with the others. In Nairobi the situation resulted, as a Parliamentary delegation that visited Kenya in January, 1954 discreetly put it, in "severe strains and stresses in the higher direction of the Government".¹³

Emergency policy began to take coherent shape after the arrival of General Sir George Erskine as commander of the armed forces in June, 1953. The organizational situation improved with the formation in March, 1954 of a small, top-level War Council composed of Governor Baring, General Erskine, Sir Frederick Crawford, the Deputy Governor appointed to relieve some of the administrative burden on Baring, and Michael Blundell, a prominent settler politician; and with the formation of District Emergency Committees comprising the District Commissioner and local Police and army commanders to coordinate operations at ground level. Working under a general plan, the security forces invested the affected districts location by location, forcing the resistance groups further and further into the forests and breaking their links with their mass of supporters in the 'passive wing' in the reserves. The civilian population was rounded up from their scattered homesteads on the ridges and confined to guarded and stockaded villages, frequently under 23 hour curfew. To break the hold of the Nairobi War Council over the African

locations of the city and destroy its linkages with the forest fighters, the government carried out Operation Anvil. On April 24, 1954 the entire African population of the city was rounded up by soldiers and police and systematically interrogated, with some 27,000 Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru detained for 'Mau Mau' sympathies or activities and 20,000 more deported to the reserves.¹⁴ By mid-1954 large scale raids by the forest fighters ceased. A mile-wide strip along the edge of the forest was cleared of cultivation and declared a prohibited zone in which anyone found could be shot on sight. In 1955 the troops were withdrawn from the reserves and confined their operations to tracking down the dwindling units of the Land Freedom Army in the forests.

By 1956 the military phase of the Emergency had essentially come to an end and operations of the security forces revolved around a massive man-hunt for Dedan Kimathi, who was eventually captured in October and subsequently tried and executed. The inequality of the conflict is starkly reflected in the official casualty figures: 11,503 'terrorists' killed, 1035 captured wounded, 1,550 captured unwounded, 26,625 arrested, and 2,714 surrendered; to 95 Europeans killed (35 civilians) and 127 wounded, 29 Asians killed (26 civilians) and 48 wounded, and 1,920 loyal Africans killed (1,819 civilians) and 2,385 wounded.¹⁵ Emergency regulations remained in force, however, until 1959 and, as a result of British government decisions after the Suez debacle in 1956 to develop Kenya as a major base, a substantial military presence was maintained.

II. The Emergence of the Myth of Mau Mau and its Consequences

The declaration of the state of emergency and the massive

escalation of official violence created a critical need on the part of both the Kenya Government and the metropolitan authorities for an explanation and justification of its actions against a largely unarmed civilian population. Through a virtual monopoly of information and access to the mass media, the Kenya Government and its supporters in the colony and in Britain succeeded in carrying out the most widespread and significant instance of the absorption of uncertainty in the Kenyan experience. Through the British and international press the 'Myth of Mau Mau' received wide circulation and created an enduring stereotype that has entered the folklore of Western society.¹⁶ The basic components of this myth, which emerged piecemeal during the years of the Emergency, can be summarized as follows: Mau Mau was a form of mass psychosis involving an atavistic rejection of modern civilization and an attempt to revert to a degraded savagery. It found its roots in the secretive and suspicious 'forest psychology' of the Kikuyu people, and its immediate causes in a breakdown of self-control and the constraints of tribal tradition, as well as the inability of the Kikuyu to adjust to the strains of modernization resulting from the clash of primitive and modern cultures. The Mau Mau organization itself was a fanatic religious cult created and cynically manipulated by a group of unscrupulous politicians, the most important of whom was Jomo Kenyatta, who were motivated by a lust for power. Through the use of bestial oaths and magic these leaders sought to turn their followers into murderous automatons, complete pariahs from all decent human relations and values, for use as instruments in pursuing their nefarious design of driving all Europeans and Asians out of Kenya and establishing Kikuyu

dominion over all of the Africans in the colony.

To a significant degree the motivation behind the creation and propagation of this image of Mau Mau was clearly political and founded in the need of the governments in both Nairobi and London to defend themselves before not only British society, but also an international arena increasingly dominated by the varying but nonetheless collectively disconcerting anti-colonialism of the United States and the Soviet Union. As Lucien Pye has pointed out, in order to maintain its claim to legitimacy, a government faced with an insurrection "cannot admit that [its] policies prior to the outbreak of violence were incorrect or unjust; even less can [it] suggest that [it] has changed policies in the face of violence and illegal actions", and "no matter what changes may occur in practice, the formal positions of a government cannot change perceptibly during the course of the conflict".¹⁷

The necessity for maintaining these strategic positions was intensified in the case of Kenya because it was a colonial government involving the alien rule of a racial and cultural minority. Furthermore, the metropolitan authorities also faced substantial opposition within the British political arena over colonial affairs that made any concession of error politically dangerous. The bi-partisan approach that had previously characterized colonial policy in Britain was in the process of breaking down and the Emergency in Kenya was precisely the sort of scandalous incident that the Labour opposition could use to attack the Government. Already under attack by the Opposition for its handling of the emergency in Malaya, the Conservative government found itself subject to an increasingly intense parliamentary assault over Kenya. The Labour

attack, the brunt of which fell upon the Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, focussed on the need for immediate socio-economic reforms to deal with the causes of Mau Mau and culminated in a motion of censure and parliamentary division in December, 1952.¹⁸

After returning from a hurried visit to Kenya at the end of October, to confer with Kenya Government officials and representatives of the three racial communities, Lyttelton took the position, which he stoutly maintained throughout his tenure as Secretary of State, that Mau Mau had no relationship to Kikuyu socio-economic grievances, but was simply a savage cult led by a few power-hungry leaders. This position was consistently supported by both the Kenya Government and the settlers. Behind the scenes, however, officials in London and Nairobi began to formulate fundamental changes in social, economic, and political policy in the colony. The image of Mau Mau as a form of mass mental illness and as an attempt to return to the savage past facilitated both the public and private maneuvers of the London and Nairobi authorities. If Mau Mau represented an atavistic rejection of modernity, then socio-economic reforms could not be expected to eliminate it. On the contrary, Mau Mau could be depicted as emerging from the existence of rapid socio-economic development rather than the lack of it. It was a state of tragic mal-adjustment rooted in the peculiar character of the Kikuyu themselves. Given the universal acceptance of European superiority and African backwardness, no critic had the temerity to suggest that the Kenya Government should aid the Kikuyu in regaining their state of pre-colonial savagery. The myth of Mau Mau effectively countered the contrary image of the Emergency as a rebellion against

colonial oppression led by progressive nationalist leaders put forth by anti-colonial politicians and groups, and made it increasingly difficult for the latter to maintain and gain public support for their attack on the government.¹⁹ Mau Mau could then be dealt with as a disease that must be eradicated as quickly and completely as possible. Even more important, the myth of Mau Mau made it appear that if the policies of the Kenya Government were a cause of the Emergency, it was because they were progressive and attempting to promote the modernization of Kikuyu society. Important changes in policy could then be depicted as continuations and expansions of the Kenya Government's already existing programs for African development, rather than as reversals of direction and implicit admissions of past errors.

The myth of Mau Mau cannot, however, be seen simply as an effective propaganda ploy consciously created and cynically manipulated for political purposes. Useful as it was, the myth was also sincerely believed by administrative officials and settlers, as well as Colonial Office officials, many British politicians, numerous journalists and scholars who helped publicize it, and a substantial portion of the British public. It was and continues to be believed because it provided a coherent and apparently rational explanation of seemingly irrational events that should not have happened. The fundamental European assumption that "the colonial system was perfectly capable of responding to the legitimate social and political grievances of Africans" and that acceptance of the system "was in the enlightened self-interest of the individual African"²⁰ was challenged by several aspects of the Emergency. Why did unrest and hostility to Europeans grow during a period of increasing

prosperity in the colony, why was the central focus of this unrest the most advanced and progressive tribe in the country, and why did they turn to a secret organization bound by what to European eyes were savage and bestial oaths? Furthermore, how could the Kikuyu, who were supposed to be cowardly and afraid to fight according to the prevailing colonial stereotype, sustain such intense and widespread resistance?

The various components of the myth that answered such questions were not created de novo, but rather drew upon several elements of official attitudes in Kenya that had developed over the previous half-century. The stereotyped image of the Kikuyu as ambitious and intelligent, but secretive, devious, and cowardly, has already been mentioned. The myth of Mau Mau also drew upon the ambivalent images of traditional African society held by officials who increasingly turned from the favorable image of the traditional organic community, which they had attempted to maintain, towards the darker image of magic and witchcraft-ridden savagery. Traditional Africa was increasingly viewed as valueless and totally unworthy of preservation. Modernization could only involve total embrace of Western Christian civilization in all its aspects and any effort to maintain tradition was not only irrational but immoral. Missionary observers in particular tended to see the Emergency as a clash between the forces of darkness and light, but others were affected by this image as well. Lyttelton wrote in his memoirs: "I can recall no instance when I have felt the forces of evil to be so near or so strong. As I wrote memoranda or instructions, I would suddenly see a shadow fall across the page -- the horned shadow of the devil himself."²¹ The belief in the atavistic goals of Mau Mau

drew upon the conviction of officials since the circumcision crisis of 1929-31 and Kenyatta's defence of Kikuyu tradition in his 1938 book that militant Kikuyu politics was essentially anti-progressive and anti-European. The experience of the Administration in dealing with various 'dini' as the apparent outward expressions of atavistic fanaticism provided the framework for the construction of the model of the Mau Mau organization as a religious cult. All of these elements combined with the prevailing image of Kikuyu politicians as unscrupulous and power-hungry confidence men motivated solely by personal gain to create the conviction that Mau Mau was manipulated behind the scenes by a small number of irresponsible leaders. Although the Administration was well aware of the increasing conflict among the KAU leadership before the Emergency and Kenyatta's efforts to bridge the gap between moderates and militants, Kenyatta was increasingly singled out as the evil genius behind Mau Mau and depicted as a Machiavel of satanic proportions.²² Finally, the belief that unrest and conflict were created by agitation and could be dealt with by eliminating the source of agitation sustained the assertion that the whole Mau Mau phenomenon had no real link with socio-economic factors save for the psychological incapacity of the Kikuyu to adjust to the strains of modern life.

The various elements of the myth were first articulated by the government during the trial of Kenyatta and five associates between November, 1952 and March, 1953 at Kapenguria, a remote administrative post on the western escarpment of the Rift Valley. Although Kapenguria is generally considered one of the great political trials of the twentieth century, the Kenya Government insisted it was a trial on simple criminal

charges and used it as a forum for establishing a legal justification for the Emergency. The evidence against the accused was slender and that against Kenyatta came down to the testimony of one witness who later admitted having perjured himself in return for Government promises of a university scholarship in Britain.²³ The trial, however, expressed the official conviction that Kenyatta and his associates were guilty no matter how little direct evidence could be gathered. In the course of the proceedings the Judge, Ransley Thacker, dismissed Kenyatta's recitation of Kikuyu land grievances with the comment "I gather grievances have nothing to do with Mau Mau, and Mau Mau has nothing to do with grievances". The Prosecution charged Kenyatta with having "elevated Mau Mau into the position of a religious cult". The trial ended with the six defendants being convicted and sentenced to the maximum penalty of seven years hard labor. In his judgment Thacker concluded that Mau Mau did exist, Kenyatta had begun to organize it in 1946 with the object of driving all Europeans out of Kenya, the six accused formed the Executive committee of Mau Mau, and "they have taken advantage of the uneducated or primitive African in order to further their own ambitious purposes and lust for power".²⁴

European belief that Mau Mau was "an advanced form of group insanity" capable of the most obscene atrocities²⁵ was confirmed by the "Lari Massacre" of March 26, 1953, the same night as the raid on the Naivasha Police Station, in which some 97 loyal Kikuyu, including many women and children, were brutally murdered. Subsequent research has revealed that the incident was rooted in a local conflict, in which the Kikuyu population of the area was bitterly divided following the acceptance

by one group of a government-imposed settlement of a land dispute over an area of Kikuyu farms known as Tigoni that had inadvertently been left as an island amidst the settler farms of southern Kiambu, and that the attack was organized and carried out by local people who attempted to make it look as if it was the work of the forest fighters.²⁶ The Administration, however, chose to interpret Lari as "the most extensive Mau Mau attack of the Emergency" and saw the motive behind it as an attempt "to murder all loyalists in the area and so to frighten everybody throughout the Kikuyu country into joining Mau Mau".²⁷ Lari crystallized the image of Mau Mau both inside and outside of Kenya, intensified the level of official violence in reprisal, and widened the conflict among the Kikuyu between the supporters of the resistance and the small minority of loyalists. The massacre was heavily exploited by the government for propaganda purposes, accounts and photographs of it receiving world-wide publicity, and it significantly dampened external support for the sympathetic view of the Kikuyu as nationalist freedom fighters.

Important support for the official explanation of Mau Mau subsequently came from a multi-party parliamentary delegation that visited Kenya in January, 1954 and was escorted through a carefully planned itinerary of visits to various parts of the colony and interviews with selected Europeans and Africans by Granville Roberts, the Kenya Government's public relations officer in London. The delegation agreed that Mau Mau was a conspiracy using magic and terror to psychologically manipulate the Kikuyu into a return to savagery.²⁸ The psychological dimension of the myth of Mau Mau received its most im-

portant corroboration from the British psychiatrist J.C. Carothers, who produced after two months research in the colony a semi-official report that was widely circulated and quoted.²⁹ In addition, versions of the myth of varying degrees of comprehensiveness and emphasis were spread by a flood of articles, pamphlets, and books by scholars, missionaries, settlers, journalists, and official propagandists.³⁰

The impact of the myth of Mau Mau on European officials and settlers in Kenya is visible in two critical areas. First, it lies behind the unofficial but nevertheless pervasive atmosphere of self-righteous moral outrage that attended the often brutal operations of the security forces. Second, and more important, it provided the ideological basis for the construction of the official policy of 'rehabilitation' to root out and destroy the sources of Kikuyu militance.

A. A Dirty Little War

The myth not only explained Mau Mau to Europeans, but also served to sanction the patterns of behavior that came to characterize European actions toward Africans in general, and the Kikuyu in particular, during the Emergency. The Lari massacre and the murder of several settlers on isolated farms spread fear and distrust among Europeans throughout Kenya and served to convince them, in the words of the Corfield report, that they "were faced with a terrorist organization not of ordinary humans fighting for a cause, but of primitive beasts who had been made to forsake all moral codes in order to achieve the subjugation of the Kikuyu tribe and the ultimate massacre of the European population."³¹ The great majority of Europeans, both settlers and officials firmly be-

lieved that Mau Mau committed 'unspeakable atrocities' indiscriminately against men, women and children, despite that fact that these assumptions were challenged by contemporary medical analysis of post-mortems on Mau Mau victims.³²

By thoroughly de-humanizing the Kikuyu forest fighters and their supporters, the myth permitted Europeans to pursue the conflict with a clear conscience and a complete conviction in the moral righteousness of their cause. The result was a loosening of normative restraints on the use of force and, according to an important missionary, a significant 'brutalization' of European sensibilities.³³ In the early months of the Emergency settler extremists demanded the execution of 50,000 Kikuyu "until they were literally killed into submission" and a hysterical mob of Europeans demonstrated at Government House where they beat up the African police guard detachment and were only narrowly dissuaded from storming the building.³⁴ The atmosphere of unrestrained brutality emerges more concretely in the fragmentary but compelling evidence of atrocities and generally heavy-handed treatment of Africans by the various elements of the security forces. There were incidents of indiscriminate killing by the regular army and police units, as well as the loyalist Africans of the Kikuyu Guard and the settlers of the Kenya Police Reserve: Kikuyu rounded up in sweeps would be reported as having been "shot attempting to escape" or taken into the forests never to return again or be counted in official casualty figures. Those taken into custody were frequently beaten and otherwise physically maltreated by their European and African captors. Loyalist Africans were particularly involved in these activities, often engaging

in harsh reprisals against the passive wing of 'Mau Mau' supporters in the reserves, as well as using their position to settle personal vendettas and extort cash payments from civilians. The prevalent attitude was perhaps best summed up by the words of a British officer later convicted of ordering the mutilation of prisoners, who told his Sergeant-Major that "he could shoot anyone he liked provided they were black".³⁶

There actions were at no time a matter of official policy. Senior officials of the Administration and the security forces repeatedly condemned abuses by their subordinates in the field and moved to punish those responsible where illegal acts were exposed. The Kenya Police bore the brunt of official condemnation. At the beginning of 1954 there had been a total of 130 prosecutions for brutality among the Police ending in 73 convictions, and the Parliamentary commission concluded that "brutality and malpractices by the Police have occurred on a scale which constitutes a threat to public confidence in the forces of law and order".³⁶ The onus for Police misconduct fell directly on the Commissioner of Police and in the course of 1954 that office was filled by three men, two of whom resigned over either criticism of their handling of the situation or as the result of conflicts with the Administration.³⁷ In addition, the vastly expanded list of capital crimes under the Emergency regulations were motivated not only by a desire to maintain the policy that 'Mau Mau' was simply criminal terrorism rather than a political insurrection, but also, according to a senior official of the Legal Department, to head off settler demands for 'drumhead court martials' and the implicit threat of summary executions by security

forces in the field.³⁸

A number of factors, however, combined to limit the efficacy of these measures. First, the sheer pace of events during the most intense fighting overwhelmed the limited investigative capacity of the government. The Attorney General and his tiny staff in the Legal department, who were responsible for dealing with abuses by the security forces, had no independent intelligence resources and were forced to rely upon the Administration and the Police for information. The internal investigative unit of the Police meanwhile consisted of a small section headed by one Superintendent. Second, even where they either witnessed or learned about illegal actions by the various elements of the security forces, government officials, especially in the Administration, were torn between their desire to punish and their equally strong sense of loyalty to colleagues and subordinates. As one high-ranking administrator put it:

If I knew there was a weak link I would condemn that sort of thing. You had to have him out. [But] I didn't ever wish to look as if I were in league with the politicians in England who were screaming about atrocities and saying all white men were rotten.... You couldn't possibly appear to give countenance to them. I kept having to defend [my subordinates], but I was always worried lest something might go wrong and I was defending something that was indefensible. This didn't happen very often, but it did happen to me. 39

Third, most administrators tacitly believed that abuses could ultimately be neither totally avoided nor suppressed in the emotion-charged circumstances of the Emergency where, in the heat of combat, 'mistakes' were inevitable. Fourth, official actions could not totally counter widespread public attitudes in both settler and official circles that found

expression both in the press and in a fund to pay the legal expenses of European officers accused of illegal brutality.⁴⁰

Finally, while excessive force was officially condemned in the operations of the security forces in the field, the use of coercion, counter-terror and mental anguish became an accepted part of the rehabilitation program for tens of thousands of Kikuyu held in prisons and detention camps.

2. Rehabilitation and 'The Pipeline'

The increasingly large numbers of Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, and Kamba taken into custody during the first two years of the Emergency confronted the Kenya government with the critical problem of what was to be done with these prisoners and detainees held in prisons and camps scattered throughout the colony. Only some 18,000 were being held in prisons under sentence for specific offences and these were primarily 'hard-core' activists and captured forest fighters. A more serious problem was posed by the thousands of 'passive' supporters of 'Mau Mau' rounded up in the mass sweeps of 1954 who were neither chargeable nor convictable of particular offences and were being held under either Governor's Detention Orders or Delegated Detention Orders signed by local administrative officers. Beginning in 1953 a series of ad hoc measures initiated both in the camps and in Nairobi led to the emergence by the end of 1954 of a policy of rehabilitation and an elaborate system of implementation. The theory and practice of 'rehabilitation' bore the imprint both of the myth of 'Mau Mau' and more general official attitudes and values, and it represented perhaps the last and most intense flowering

of the ideals of imperial trusteeship and the fervent belief in the Christian civilizing mission of Britain. Rehabilitation in essence was an attempt to psychologically and socially cure the Kikuyu of the 'disease' of 'Mau Mau' and make them fit to return to the 'normal' life of colonial society.

The organization and administration of the rehabilitation program came largely under the control of T.G. Askwith, an experienced administrative officer appointed Commissioner of Community Development and known for his liberal racial views, working with a 'Sociological Committee' appointed to analyse the causes of 'Mau Mau' and formulate policy for ending it. The Committee counted Harry Thuku and the anthropologist Louis Leakey among its members, and was advised by the psychiatrist J.C. Carothers. The psychological interpretation of 'Mau Mau' was the unquestioned point of departure for Askwith and the Committee:

Mau Mau is a dangerous obsession based not on intellect, but on feeling and emotion which has been worked up over many years by certain leaders exploiting grievances in which, whether real or imagined, they themselves genuinely believed. To overcome this obsession mere argument and persuasion is not enough, and an attack must be made on feelings and emotions. 41

The basic premise of rehabilitation policy was that the detainee must be induced to willingly confess his 'Mau Mau' oath. "Confession was the first and most vital step in getting rid of the 'poison of Mau Mau'. Without it rehabilitation could not start."⁴² The process began with 'Screening Teams', composed of Kikuyu loyalists with a large component of official chiefs and headmen, that interrogated each detainee and assigned him to one of three categories: 1) unrepentant

'hard-core' Mau Mau; 2) passive or active Mau Mau supporters who were willing to confess their oath and cooperate with the authorities; and 3) those innocent of any connection with Mau Mau. These groups were given the revealing names of black, gray, and white respectively. Those classified as 'white' were immediately released. The gray detainees, once they had confessed their oaths, entered upon the actual process of rehabilitation through a system known as 'the pipeline'. Starting in detention camps scattered through the colony, they moved, as they showed the proper changes in attitude and behavior, to other camps increasingly close to their homes, first in their district of origin and then to 'open' works camps in their home locations. They were then reviewed by committees of loyalists and, if pronounced cured and fit to rejoin society, were released under probation. Black detainees were considered unreformable and the Administration originally planned that they would be kept in some form of permanent custody in camps located in remote and isolated parts of Kenya.⁴³ Beginning in 1956, however, the Kenya Government was subject to growing pressure from the British authorities to rapidly release the detainees, and increasing efforts were made to make as many of the hard-core confess their oaths so that they could be reclassified as 'gray' and begin to move up the pipeline to eventual release.

Confessions were induced by methods of psychological and physical pressure intended to create mental anguish that would counter the hold of Mau Mau on the detainee. Askwith spoke approvingly of methods adopted in settler-run programs in the Rift Valley which sought to create fear "similar to that engendered in a schoolboy who has been called for

an interview with the Headmaster"; while one of the most successful detention camp Commandants noted that since "Mau Mau was built on fear we had to create a greater fear of our camp than that of Mau Mau".⁴⁴ Once he had confessed his oath and saw that it had no power to kill him, the detainee was a 'hollow shell' who could be refilled with acceptable attitudes and patterns of behavior. He was then subject to an intense regiment of activity in the camps that stressed the "hard work, washing, discipline, and games"⁴⁵ that were an intrinsic part of the public school experiences and values of administrative officers.

The programs in the camps had their counterpart in similar activities carried out among the population remaining in the reserves and urban locations by the Community Development Department and a variety of voluntary associations. These earnest and intense efforts included welfare programs, boy scout troops, vocational training, sports, community groups, women's associations and adult education designed to reconstruct Kikuyu society and bring it back to the high road of progress towards modern civilization. Community Development Officers were also responsible for carrying out propaganda activities to bring the Kikuyu to a new acceptance of the legitimacy and beneficence of the colonial system. The intellectual foundation of the rehabilitation effort was expressed in a little book by Askwith entitled The Story of Kenya's Progress, widely circulated by the government in English and Swahili versions. The book emphasized the backwardness of Africans before colonial rule, the need for economic development, the necessarily long and gradual process of development to political maturity and democratic institutions, the proper standards of deferential behavior, and

closed with the injunction that "Freedom is a great privilege. It cannot be given but can only be earned. It is only safe in the hands of those who know how to use it."⁴⁶

Another major emphasis of rehabilitation programs both in the camps and the reserves was the reindulcation of Christian belief in Kikuyu who had reverted to savage darkness. In May, 1954 a meeting of administrative officers and official chiefs in Central Province concluded that "No nation can progress without Christianity" and then added ingenuously, "for some reason Christianity is losing its popularity among the Kikuyu".⁴⁷ The Administration placed high hopes on the success of a Christian 'revival' in the reserves in bringing back the mass of Kikuyu. Protestant and Catholic missionary groups organized chaplaincies for evangelical action among the detainees in the camps and teams from the Moral Rearmament Movement directed several detainee rehabilitation programs.

Although the Sociological Committee had advised against the use of force to obtain confessions, massive and compelling evidence points to pervasive resort to brutality and violence against the detainees. The staff of the 'rehabilitation' program had been hurriedly assembled, without the usual careful recruiting procedures for European officers, and most of the subordinate staff lacked anything resembling prior training or experience for their work. Some of their superiors "described them as 'sub-human', 'the bottom of the barrel', and 'in need of rehabilitation themselves'".⁴⁸ In the prevailing atmosphere of license and Afrophobia, the thin line between the psychological inducement of fear and active counter-terror was frequently

crossed and the administration of savage beatings was not uncommon. In addition, there was wide-spread corruption among the African loyalists on the screening teams who used their positions to punish their opponents or personal enemies and frequently ran active extortion rackets taking money in return for 'white' classifications.⁴⁹

After 1956, as attention turned toward rehabilitating the hard-core detainees, there was an increasingly open reliance on the use of force to obtain confessions and make inmates participate in camp programs. Elaborate distinctions were drawn between legal 'compelling' force and illegal 'overwhelming' force. Forced confessions were often combined with another method called the 'dilution technique' which divided hard-core detainees into small groups which were placed among a much larger number of cooperative detainees who attempted to persuade the recalcitrant to confess and participate in rehabilitation. The hard-core detainees who prompted these methods regarded themselves as political prisoners and refused any form of cooperation with the authorities on the grounds that it implied acceptance of the Government's characterization of them as criminals. The nadir of the policy of official force was reached in March, 1959 at a remote camp at Hola on the Tana River, established as a permanent exile colony for the most recalcitrant remaining detainees. Eleven prisoners were beaten to death following their refusal of a work order. The Hola Camp incident led to an official enquiry into conditions in the detention camps and caused a political uproar in Britain, culminating in full-scale Parliamentary debates in June and July, 1959.⁵⁰ In the aftermath of the scandal, the Kenya Government abandoned 'rehabilitation' and

quickly released the remaining detainees; whether or not they had confessed. Subsequent detention of Kenyatta and other major political figures was justified on the grounds of security, rather than on the basis of efforts to cure the 'disease of Mau Mau'.

The Administration was nevertheless convinced that 'rehabilitation' had been a complete success and could point to the processing of some 77,000 detainees through the 'pipeline' system by the beginning of 1959. There remains, however, considerable doubt as to the actual impact on the attitudes of the Kikuyu and members of other tribes subjected to the programs in the camps. It appears that, especially for the militant detainees, 'rehabilitation' was put up with "as a necessary impediment in the struggle for freedom".⁵¹

III. False Renaissance: Administrative Power and the Reconstruction of Kikuyu Society

The revelation during the early stages of the Emergency of widespread support among the vast majority of Kikuyu for the militant underground movement was a telling blow to the self-image administrators had of their relationship to the African masses: "administrative officers who had thought that the population was with them when faced with atrocities, killings ... and this collapse of loyalty or allegiance, naturally suffered a bit of a traumatic shock and many of them moved to the right in their inclinations and race relations in a way I don't think they would otherwise have moved".⁵² This evidence of African rejection of the Administration's paternal care and benevolent intentions spurred administrators in the field to a passionate commitment to a complete reconstruction of Kikuyu society on more 'civilized' lines.

and a restoration of the supposed former relationship of deferential respect and affection on the part of the African.

The implementation of this transformation of Kikuyu society was facilitated by a dramatic increase of the apparent powers of the Provincial Administration under the conditions of the Emergency. The deterioration in the status and power of field officers markedly visible in the years before October, 1952 was seemingly reversed and the status of administrators restored and even expanded beyond what it had been in the golden era before the Second World War. The contentious Kikuyu politicians and their organizations were removed from the scene and Emergency Regulations gave administrators the punitive powers to quickly eliminate any opposition. Even as the fighting raged, money began to pour into the affected districts in unprecedented amounts for reconstruction and development programs. The discretion and freedom of action of field officers in the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru Districts effectively increased and administrators could and consciously did act beyond the law in their efforts to wipe out Mau Mau in the reserves. A Minister of African Affairs during the Emergency attests to the difficulty of the central administration keeping track of what was going on in the field and described it as a return to the style of administration during the pacification of Kenya a half century before, while a District Officer noted bluntly: "Emergency regulations you said ... and you did what you damned well liked".⁵³ Furthermore, Governor Baring and senior administrators in Nairobi defended the position of the Provincial Administration and fended off the efforts of European politicians to gain greater settler influence over administrative action in the field.⁵⁴

The renaissance of administrative power had a tonic effect on the field officers, and, in spite of the violence and danger, the Emergency became for them a period of high hopes and intense excitement. The dispirited uncertainty and confusion, and the anxious sense of being the passive victims of explosive forces beyond their control of the pre-Emergency years disappeared, to be replaced by the mid-1950's by a bouyant, optimistic, and commanding activism. A Provincial Commissioner of Central Province remarked that:

We were really beating the Mau Mau. The esprit de corps and general feeling among everyone working in the districts was enormously high. People really felt they were getting somewhere and they were achieving something and they were doing some good in every way ... and they were. 55

The policy of closer administration reached its ultimate level of development as the administrative infrastructure in the affected districts was reorganized and substantially expanded. The peak strength of the Provincial Administration was reached in 1955 when there were 206 officers in the field in Central Province, 35 in the settled areas of the Rift Valley, and 15 in Nairobi.⁵⁶ Most of the increase was accounted for by temporary appointments of what were known as District Officers -- Kikuyu Guard (DO/KG) recruited primarily from the young men of the Kenya Regiment, the settler territorial defence unit. Even before the Emergency, the Provincial Administration had begun the process of decentralization from District headquarters for the purposes of closer control by establishing three or four divisions in a district, each staffed by a regular District Officer, and this was rapidly carried down to the locational level. In April, 1953, at the onset of large-

scale fighting, the Administration decided to organize the African loyalists into local defence units called the Kikuyu, Embu or Meru Guard. A fortified post was built in each location and staffed by fifty men, ten of whom were eventually armed with rifles or shot guns, commanded by a DO/KG. By the beginning of 1955 the average European administrative cadre in each of the three Kikuyu districts was around 40 with several thousand Kikuyu Guard under their command. This force was in addition to other security units in the district, including approximately eight to ten stations of the regular Kenya Police, staffed by about 500 men, and an Army battalion. This increase in staff, coupled with the enormous expansion of administrative powers and the virtual sealing off of the Central Province from the outside world "brought a degree of direct administration of the Kikuyu unparalleled in the history of British colonial Africa".⁵⁷

In one very critical sense, however, the restoration of the power of the Provincial Administration was deceptive. The removal of the Kikuyu politicians and the imposition of Emergency regulations served only to remove the external threat that the Administration had faced before October, 1952. The internal challenge to the Administration's dominance posed by changes in the structure and composition of the Kenya Government remained untouched and, indeed, increased. In the field this was experienced in conflict between the Administration and the other organizations in the security forces, the locus often being the District Operations Committee chaired by the D.C. with the District Superintendent of Police and the local Army commander as members. Official papers and interviews attest that relations with the police in

particular were generally tense, frequently hostile, and occasionally bitter.⁵⁸ Much more important than inter-departmental wrangling in the field were the series of constitutional changes discussed below. Pre-occupied with problems of reconstruction and development, administrators exercised little influence on such matters of high policy, which they regarded with some amusement as a game of politicians. The impact of these changes did not begin to be felt until the late 1950's with the Emergency was drawing to a close.

A. Loyalists, Villagization, and Land Consolidation

The focus of reconstruction was the minority of Kikuyu, estimated by administrators to be 10 to 20 percent of the total, who had remained loyal to the colonial regime. These 'Loyalists', the active core of whom consisted of "a few of the tougher chiefs and other Government servants, some business men and teachers, and others, together with a large number of Christians" were seen as the new basis of Kikuyu society and the source of civilized elite.⁵⁹ The Provincial Administration thus placed its support behind the colonial elite among the Kikuyu whose emergence had been encouraged by its own policies of the previous half century. The internal conflicts visible in Kikuyu society before the Emergency were crystallized by administrative action, and the Kikuyu Guard, recruited from among the Loyalists, consisted disproportionately of older and richer men.⁶⁰ During the first two years of the Emergency the development programs and funds that poured into the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru districts were used to provide material rewards and inducements for the loyalists and attempted to win over the

mass of tribesmen who passively supported the guerrillas in the forests: "it was definitely Government's policy to make agricultural assistance to Kikuyu fully discriminatory -- so that such assistance and extension work was only afforded to known loyalists in good areas ... those areas where bad incidents had taken place ... should be denied the benefit of Government services; and that a tough line should be taken in these areas until they had shown they were prepared to cooperate with and be fully loyal to Government."⁶¹ The members of Kikuyu Guard units were also given issues of food and clothing, payments of school fees for up to three children, and most were also exempted from the payment of the special Emergency tax levied on the tribe. In addition, direct punitive action was taken against the land and property of known 'Mau Mau' militants and their activist supporters. Between March, 1954 and the end of 1956, the Provincial Administration issued confiscation orders against a total of 3,533 persons, of whom between one quarter and one half were found to be landless.⁶²

The two pillars of the Provincial Administration's policy for the transformation of Kikuyu society were the programs of villagization programs were both punitive and strategic, being carried out, as one Central Province D.C. put it, "in the shadow of the sten gun".⁶³ The mass of Kikuyu and Embu suspected of passively supporting 'Mau Mau' were removed from their traditional scattered homesteads and concentrated into stockaded villages, often under 23 hour a day curfews, that were built on land confiscated from guerilla fighters. Villagization emerged in 1953 largely as the result of ad hoc measures taken

by administrators in the field seeking a means of reasserting administrative control and breaking the links between the guerrillas in the forests and their supporters in the reserves, as well as punishing the disloyal population. In mid-1954 it was adopted by the War Council in Nairobi as a central policy for defeating Mau Mau, and carried out on a more coordinated and thorough basis. By October, 1955 more than a million persons had been concentrated into some 854 villages, and the program had proved a strategic success in bringing the mass of the population under firm control of the Provincial Administration and isolating the forest fighters from their base of support and supplies. However, as the fighting in the reserves began to subside, administrators increasingly came to see the villages as a valuable resource for the reconstruction of Kikuyu society. Emphasis shifted from punishment to the positive function of the villages as the foci of a new three class rural society consisting of a wealthy elite, middle class of solid and stable farmers, and a lower class of landless artisans and laborers. The villages would provide a means for absorbing the excess population in the reserves who would find work both in the farms of the prosperous and in cottage industries that administrators hoped would emerge in the villages.⁶⁴ At this point the objectives of the villagization program became inseparable from the program of land consolidation that was expected to be the basis of an agricultural revolution in the reserves.

Land consolidation emerged from the very tentative steps taken by the Provincial Administration before the Emergency to begin the issue of legal individual titles to land. Administrators saw this

as being linked to the consolidation of the scattered fragments that characterized Kikuyu land holdings into more compact units that would also facilitate the efficient introduction of modern agricultural methods. During the first part of the Emergency consolidation was employed on a limited basis as part of the general policy of rewards and punishments, with consolidation generally beginning in a 'loyal' area controlled by a strong chief. Here again the initiative in the policy came from the field, consolidation being started by the D.C. of the Nyeri in mid-1953, and being taken up by the D.C. of Fort Hall in 1954 and the D.C. of Kiambu in early 1955. These local efforts, varying in scale, organization, and method, were finally pulled together in November, 1955 when consolidation was adopted as policy for the entire province to be carried out and completed within five years. A month later, with the encouragement of Governor Baring, consolidation was adopted by the central government as official policy for Central Province, and in March, 1956 an experienced field officer, F.D. Homans, was appointed Land Tenure Officer to coordinate its implementation. 65

From the beginning of 1956 increasingly intense efforts were made to demarcate and consolidate all of the African land in Central Province, whether of loyalists or not, into compact, economic holdings. From the beginning land consolidation was very much a policy that 'belonged' to the Provincial Administration; administrators vigorously pressed forward for the completion of consolidation and the registration of titles despite lengthy conflicts with the Legal Department and the Colonial Office over enabling legislation and with the Lands and Survey

Departments over the accuracy of the survey and demarcation methods employed.⁶⁶ The motivations for the policy were, in part, economic. Consolidation was expected to facilitate farm planning and agricultural development under a new agricultural plan adopted for Africans in early 1954, as well as provide employment for the landless, since each holding of three acres was expected to require three hired laborers when fully developed. This was expected to be the basis for an agrarian revolution that would accomplish what the enclosures had done in British society, but without the attendant social disintegration and disruption.⁶⁷

The dominant motives behind consolidation, however, were political. The Emergency finally and unequivocally brought home to administrators the connection between political militance and the socio-economic discontents of rural society and they seized upon land consolidation as a means to create a stable and politically passive middle class of propertied farmers who would be immune to the appeals of political radicalism and nationalism. As early as 1954, C.M. Johnston, the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province, stated that the objective of the consolidation schemes then just beginning was "to build up the yeoman farmer, the middle class man in fact who has so much to lose that he would be unlikely to revive or rejoin a subversive movement".⁶⁸ Administrators frequently told each other that they had to 'strike while the iron is hot', i.e. complete the consolidation program while the Kikuyu politicians were in detention and Emergency powers gave them unchallenged control over the population in the reserves. This sense of urgency increased in the late 1950's as the number of detainees

released rapidly grew, and the consolidation of the three Kikuyu districts was essentially completed by 1959-60. At the same time, news of the consolidation program and awarding of titles reached the detention camps and stimulated thousands of detainees to cooperate with the authorities so that they could move down the 'pipe-line' and return home in time not to lose their rights to a holding in the reserves.

Villagization and consolidation provided field administrators with a new and compelling sense of purpose after seeing their authority and functions increasingly usurped by the technical departments and challenged by the African politicians. Their conservative values and country interests achieved their final and fullest expression in these efforts to shape Kikuyu society according to their nostalgic vision of the organic community of British rural society.⁶⁹ For many administrators the supposed transformation of Kikuyu society was the proudest and most enduring achievement of the Provincial Administration. However, both villagization and consolidation failed to achieve the hoped for political and economic goals. Except for parts of Kiambu, where they provided housing for workers commuting to Nairobi, the villages were largely abandoned and people returned to their land when Emergency restrictions were relaxed. Even more important, consolidation did not provide for economic holdings of sufficient size for the emergence of the mass of 'yeoman' farmers; the reserves were simply too crowded, and the returns in economic expansion beyond subsistence were modest. Furthermore, there turned out to be far more landless Kikuyu than originally anticipated and the small holdings in

the reserves did not have the capacity to absorb them as laborers.⁷⁰

Finally, while the majority of Kikuyu finally got title to a land holding, the political consequences that the Provincial Administration hoped for did not materialize. Farmers in the reserves, even many of the few wealthy ones, proved to be susceptible to the appeals of nationalist politicians when constitutional changes permitted the reappearance of African politics in the late 1950's and shifted the center of gravity of political conflict from the reserves to Nairobi.

IV. Constitutional Change: Ministerial Government and the Decline of the Administration

The Emergency created a crisis of sufficient magnitude to break the thirty year stalemate over basic policy for the political evolution of Kenya and commence a process of political change that gathered increasing momentum over the next decade. Within the colony there were immediate pressures from all racial groups for the reorganization of the central government and increased access of unofficial politicians to decision-making positions in return for the loyal support provided by the Europeans, Asians, and many non-Kikuyu Africans for the government's campaign against the 'Mau Mau'. These internal pressures were reinforced by political events in Britain, notably a fierce assault by the Labour opposition on the Government's policy in Kenya in 1952 and 1953 and recommendations of major reforms by the Joint Parliamentary Committee that visited Kenya in early 1954, as well as the sensitivity of the British Government to the impact of events in Kenya in the international arena, especially on anti-colonial sentiment in the United States.

The lead in negotiating constitutional changes was taken by the

Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, who visited Kenya in late October, 1952 to get a first hand look at the situation, and returned again in May, 1953 and February, 1954. In part, this attention reflected the fact that the Emergency was precisely the sort of crisis that stimulated controversy in Britain and traditionally brought metropolitan intervention. In addition, however, Lyttelton's actions were indicative of a more general process of a shift in policy initiative towards the metropole marked by the increasingly activist role of the Colonial Office and the increasing status and power of the position of the Secretary of State. The growing nationalist challenge to colonial authority, the increasing levels of political conflict in the colonies, and the commencement of the process of decolonization all presented critical issues of constitutional policy that could only be decided in the metropole, either by the Colonial Office or, in critical cases, by the British Cabinet itself. The role of the Secretary of State in negotiating constitutional changes became of importance for an orderly process of devolution. The extension of regular airline linkages throughout the empire made it possible for the Secretary of State to intervene directly in any colony within a matter of hours. The established conventions over the relations between individual colonial governments and the metropolitan authorities began to break down, and the Secretary of State acquired power from his capacity to thrust himself "into the colonial situation as a mediator between warring groups and as an inspector of his own administrative officers".⁷¹ In Kenya, while the various departments of the local government continued to exercise control over the formulation and im-

plementation of the more specific and specialized subjects of intermediate policy, the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State moved directly into the lacuna over basic constitutional and political development policy, as well as into the new area of policy concerned with the specific conduct of the Emergency, which now came to occupy center stage in the political arena.

Lyttelton picked up the multi-racial concept as the basis for constitutional change and told the settlers bluntly that they could only rely upon continued British support for their position if they accepted increased African participation in the government.⁷² After lengthy and difficult behind-the-scenes negotiations with representatives of the three racial communities, he finally secured European and Asian agreement to a new central government structure. These arrangements, known as the Lyttelton Constitution, came into force in March, 1954. The ministerial system was formally established, bringing with it the associated concepts of ministerial and cabinet responsibility. The Executive Council was transformed into the Council of Ministers and actual ministerial organizations were formed, linking the various departments together into individual units rather than the loose associations at the top level that come from responsibility to a common Member. Budgeting was placed on a ministerial rather than individual departmental basis. The existing civil service and unofficial Members became ministers in the new system, while multi-racial participation in the government at cabinet level was implemented through the addition of six new unofficial ministers, three European, two Asian, and one African. These new positions were created by the separation of

departments from existing portfolios and the establishment of two ministers without portfolio. Civil servants or the two earlier appointed unofficial Members continued to head the most important ministries, the new unofficial ministers being assigned less important portfolios or none at all. The two Asians were assigned the Ministry of Works and one of the posts without portfolio, while the African was given the Ministry of Community Development, a position almost wholly concerned with African affairs. Two crucial posts, Internal Security and Defence and African Affairs, went to senior administrative officers, and in the latter the Chief Native Commissioner was restored to the executive control over the Provincial Administration that had been lost more than twenty years before.

Multi-racial ministerial government thus finally came to Kenya, but not in the form anticipated by Mitchell's reorganization of 1945. He had attempted to mute the intensity of political conflict and isolate the central government from it. However, largely as the result of settler pressures, under the Lyttelton Constitution the principle that ministers or members had to resign elective officers was dropped and the European and Asian ministers retained their elected seats on the Legislative Council. The ministerial system therefore brought the cleavages of the external society into the top level of the government in an unstable ministerial stew of civil servants ultimately responsible to the Governor and the Colonial Office and local politicians responsible to their own racial communities. Within the legislature the principle of representation by racial communities was maintained, along with that of 'parity', i.e., the number of Euro-

pean elected members remained equal to the total of all of the other racial groups combined. Direct election of African members on the basis of restricted franchise was promised within a few years. Lyttelton's reforms were grudgingly accepted by the European and Asian communities. The African appointed members of the Legislative Council, the only surviving African political voice after the detention of the politicians and eventual banning of the KAU in June, 1953, refused to collectively approve the new constitution. However, rather than totally refuse the access to the Council of Ministers offered by Lyttelton, they permitted one of their number, B.A. Ohanga, to come forward as an individual to accept the portfolio for community development, and two others eventually became Parliamentary Under Secretaries in other ministries.⁸¹

The Lyttelton Constitution, despite the importance of the changes it introduced, did not represent the formulation by the metropolitan authorities of an explicit program for the political development of Kenya. It was another essentially backward-looking incremental response to problems and tensions emerging out of existing institutional arrangements, rather than an initiative taken to achieve any specific future goal. In accordance with what came to be accepted Colonial Office practice for dealing with the process of decolonization, the Lyttelton arrangements were a reactive response to the emergence of acute local pressures.⁷⁴ The incremental approach thus still dominated British methods during the 1950's. The Lyttelton Constitution was an interim measure intended to last until 1960 when the constitutional situation in Kenya would be reviewed again. While the implicit lines

of future development were clear, the metropolitan authorities were not prepared in 1954 to make any commitment with regard to the ultimate balance between the various racial communities either in the cabinet or the legislature and the possible date for the introduction of self-government for the colony.

Despite its evasiveness with regard to some of the most sensitive questions for the political evolution of Kenya, the 1954 constitution nevertheless had very serious political consequences.

First, Africans had finally breached the walls of the highest levels of the central government. Henceforth, the issue was not whether they were capable of participation, but the scope and timing of their access to the cabinet and the legislature. Second, the constitution led to the breakdown of the carefully maintained political unity of the settler community and opened a widening gulf between European moderates willing to work within and attempt to maintain their dominant position through a multi-racial government and die-hards opposed to any sharing of power with other races.⁷⁵ By 1955 there were even rumors that the most extreme settler elements were considering, as they had in 1923, an armed rebellion to seize control of the government and an appeal to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia for assistance.⁷⁶

Third, the introduction of ministerial government completed the progressive decline of the central and Provincial Administration from the dominant position they had held in the government until 1945.

Under the pre-war system the preeminent position of the Administration was expressed in the direct line of the hierarchy flowing from the Governor to the Chief Secretary and thence to the Provincial

Administration. The other departments of government stood, in a sense, to one side of this line of authority in clearly subsidiary and subordinate position. This pattern, as we have seen, began to change with the introduction of the Member system. The formal introduction of functional ministerial organization in 1954 finally broke up the old unitary organization into several ostensibly equal ministries, thereby up-grading the status of the specialist and technical departments through their ministerial organizations and reducing the Administration to the status of simply one department among many others in the complex structure of a modern state.

The development of powerful ministerial organizations after 1954 is most vividly illustrated by the growth of the critically important Ministry of Finance and Development. Fiscal policy and budgetary matters were originally handled within the Secretariat, where a Financial Secretary, in consultation with the Chief Secretary, exercised detailed control over the budgets of the individual departments and prepared the annual estimates for presentation to the Legislative Council. Once appropriations had been made, the departments were responsible to the Department of the Accountant General for their expenditures. This system proved increasingly difficult after 1949 when the Secretary of State devolved final powers of approval for the annual estimates of revenue and expenditure to the Legislative Council and the bureaucracy became technically responsible to the legislature on financial matters. After a disastrous debate on the 1952 budget, Mitchell shifted Ernest Vasey, the second unofficial member appointed, from Member for Health and Local Government to the finance portfolio, hoping to mute

the fires of political conflict by placing financial matters in the hands of a local European.⁷⁷ Vasey's position in the government was ambiguous: although not a civil servant, he was held in high esteem by officials he worked with for his administrative skill and financial astuteness, while his liberal views on racial and political issues deprived him of any real support among the settlers.⁷⁸ His position rested almost solely upon the status and power of the organization he headed and he had a vested interest in the fullest and fastest development of a ministerial system in which the Ministry of Finance would occupy a pivotal position.

Vasey moved on two levels to create a powerful organization. First, he physically removed the Financial Section from the Secretariat to the offices of the revenue and accounting departments placed under his control and consciously began to build a Treasury staffed with professional financial officers:

My first objective was to try and bring as far as one possibly could an atmosphere into the Treasury that people would go into the Treasury and would make Treasury a career. ... and stop the transfer into the Treasury of people who were not trained. Indeed, when I took over ... one of the things I said to the Colonial Office was to ask that no man should be transferred out of the Treasury for a period of time without my consent.⁷⁹

Vasey was largely successful in this area, attracting a cadre of able officials dedicated to specialization in financial affairs who shared his views on the role of the Treasury and were eager to join what they believed to be a progressive and increasingly powerful organization.⁸⁰

By 1957 17 of the 18 top officials of the Treasury were specialists appointed directly from outside of Kenya, while only one, a junior As-

Assistant Secretary was a member of the Kenya Administration on temporary secondment.⁸¹ In addition, Vasey moved to improve the technical expertise of the Treasury by placing the head of the East African Statistical Department in charge of a new economic research division.

His second goal was extension of the policy areas over which the Treasury had formal control to include economic development. Vasey pressed for the abolition of the Development and Reconstruction Agency on the grounds that as a civil service body its control of development funds cut across the responsibilities of the emerging ministries.

DARA was dissolved in 1952 and the Treasury assumed control of development financing. With the formal introduction of ministerial government in 1954, the Treasury became the Ministry of Finance and Development and Vasey became chairman of the Development Committee of the Council of Ministers, "thereby bringing the Treasury properly into the field of economic planning".⁸² When the large grants from the British exchequer required to fight the Emergency threatened to bring metropolitan control over Kenya's finances, Vasey began a series of regular personal visits to London where, because he was not a career civil servant and "was not afraid to be rude to people",⁸³ he was able to get metropolitan agreement to a separation of Emergency-related funds from the regular budget of the colony and safely retain control of the latter in the ministry.

At the same time, Vasey and his senior officials moved to divest themselves of responsibility for the detailed accounting of ministerial expenditures and superintendence of future estimates, leaving the ministry free to confine its attention to basic issues of economic

and fiscal policy. To effect this they pressed for the adoption in 1955 of the British exchequer and audit system under which the Permanent Secretary in each ministry became the accounting officer responsible for the expenditure of the ministry's appropriations.⁸⁴ The Treasury determined the amount available for the total budget and entered into cabinet-level discussions on the division of this amount among the various ministries, leaving it up to the latter to determine how its total appropriation would be divided among various departments. The Ministry of Finance and Development also became one of the most vigorous advocates of collective cabinet responsibility to the legislature in the preparation of budgetary estimates and of individual ministerial responsibility for expenditure to the legislature through a Public Accounts Committee. The former would insure the public support of politician ministers for a budgetary process in which the Treasury would play a dominating role, while the latter would shift an unwanted burden onto the shoulders of individual ministries.

The introduction of ministerial government completed the transformation of the role of the Chief Secretary. The abolition of the DARA and the vesting of responsibility for development policy in the Ministry for Finance and Development and the Development Committee of the Council of Ministers removed the Chief Secretary from his principal area of policy responsibility since the end of the war. Direct control of the development process was finally taken out of the hands of the Administration and divided up among various functional ministries. According to one Chief Secretary:

Although he was one of the Governor's advisers, more often than not the Governor ... would discuss matters

with his ministers over certain particular things and the Chief Secretary perhaps was not told about this ... he would not know what was going on in a particular sphere. 85

By 1955 the Chief Secretary retained direct executive control only over the Secretariat, by this point divided up in the Office of the Chief Secretary, the Cabinet Office, and the Establishments Division, and the Departments of Information and Immigration.

The principal role of the Chief Secretary came to revolve around the internal politics of ministerial government. He was given "those portfolios which were too hot, politically speaking, to go to unofficial ministers",⁸⁶ and served as Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Council where he expressed the Government's position on behalf of the increasingly heterogeneous Council of Ministers. Much of his time outside of LegCo was spent in arbitrating disputes between various ministries and between the field and the central government.⁸⁷ Given the widely varying interests and perspectives of the civil servant and politician ministers in the Kenya government, the Council of Ministers had its problems in achieving internal unity and collective action, especially with regard to "getting the ministers to have a cabinet approach to any problem".⁸⁸ The civil servants in the cabinet, particularly the administrators, expected the Council of Ministers to be a means of achieving at least a public front of political unity and inter-racial cooperation. There was a tendency, however, for the politician ministers to advertise their achievements and policies in terms of the goals and interests of their particular racial constituencies and publicly blame their problems on the other ministers.

This was particularly true with regard to the Ministry of Finance and Development when ministers would periodically announce new programs or policies entailing additional expenditures without having obtained Treasury approval. The Council of Ministers and the Treasury then found themselves in the embarrassing situation of either accepting the independent action of the minister, and thus compromising collective cabinet action, or disavowing his actions and running the risk of his resignation and a crisis in the delicately balanced cabinet structure. 89

While the functional system resulted in the decline of the Administration's influence as an organization within the government, it nevertheless permitted several individual administrators to rise to positions of substantial power and influence within the various ministries. The growing number of administrative officers specializing in secretariat work in Nairobi welcomed the introduction of ministerial government and the consequent increase in the number of high status and salary positions open to them. The number of administrative positions in the various ministry headquarters in Nairobi climbed to 87 (54 assistant secretaries and 33 senior posts) by 1957 as each ministry acquired its own central administration headed by a Permanent Under Secretary. Although the monopoly of senior posts by members of the Administration was broken, with departmental and technical officers filling 28 of the 87 administrative posts in the various ministries, the remainder were held by administrators, 26 of whom had risen from the ranks of the Kenya Administration while 33 had been directly appointed to the Secretariat from posts outside the colony. 90

High ranking administrators in the ministries often found that they could exert considerable influence over politician ministers who frequently had little knowledge and experience in the subjects under their control:

You know you felt you could probably 'con' him, that's not the right word, but you could probably get things done more readily through a political minister and get them on the move than you would under the old system.⁹¹

During the late 1950's and early 60's when the number of politician ministers increased, and especially when Africans replaced both European civil servants and settlers, administrators were dubious of both their abilities and intentions and tended to see their own role as 'taming' the ambitious politician and seeing that he "did not go off the rails" in his desire to change things.⁹²

In the field the ministerial system further narrowed the scope of the authority of the Provincial Administration as departmental officers found themselves primarily responsible to a line of command leading to one or another minister in Nairobi. The politician minister, in particular, resented District or Provincial Commissioners giving orders to 'their' field staff and they provided the latter with powerful support in any conflicts with the Provincial Administration. Much to the chagrin and annoyance of field administrators, conflicts with departmental officers were quickly referred up the line in various ministries to be settled at the top level in Nairobi. Furthermore, the establishment of independent lines of communication between the ministries and their field staffs begun under the member system was rapidly completed. While the Provincial and District Commissioners were formally supposed to be incorporated in the communications network

of each ministry so that they could be kept informed of the activities of the various agencies operating in their areas, the ministries in practice increasingly by-passed the Provincial Administration and dealt directly with their specialists in the field.⁹³

The most serious consequence of the increasingly independent operation of the ministries was the acceleration of the declining status of the Provincial Commissioners. During the late 1950's the Chief Secretary received several complaints from Provincial Commissioners that they could no longer keep track of government activities in their provinces, while a settler politician who held a number of ministerial posts found that the P.C.s "tended ... to regard one as an enemy in the camp" and reported that "on one or two occasions I have known Provincial Commissioners to quite openly state that they would not have the Minister for Agriculture interfering in their province".⁹⁴

The Provincial Commissioners found it increasingly difficult for them to play their traditional role of intermediaries between the field administration and the central government. They now found that they had to deal separately with almost a dozen different ministries, many of them headed by political ministers who neither knew nor cared very much about the 'understandings' that were supposed to govern the relations between administrators and other officials, or accorded much priority to the Provincial Administration's view on policy issues. The burden of fending off the interference of other ministries or sorting out their conflicts with the Provincial Administration fell primarily on the shoulders of the Chief Native Commissioner

in his executive capacity as Minister for African Affairs. In the field administrators attempted so far as possible to ignore the numerous and often conflicting directives of the various ministries and, in the traditional manner, "do what was required, without being pushed around too much from on high".⁹⁵ When other ministries were felt to be "making nonsense", of the P.C.s and the Minister for African Affairs would "get over it by devious means".⁹⁶ Such involvement in bureaucratic politics, however, indicated the distance the Provincial Administration had travelled since the days of 'the King in his castle'. The initiative in the formation of policy, particularly in the areas of political and economic development, had definitively shifted to other hands.

V. African Politics and Constitutional Crises: The Metropolitan Decision to Withdraw

The crisis generated by the Emergency also brought significant changes in the socio-economic policies of the Kenya government that led to a refocus of its approach to African development and the implementation of many of the changes demanded by the KAU before October, 1952. Early in 1954 the Government adopted a new plan for African agricultural development, the so-called Swynnerton Plan,⁹⁷ based on the rapid growth of commercial agriculture through land consolidation, the provision of secure individual titles, the establishment of agricultural credit facilities, the improvement of farming methods, and the introduction of a wide range of cash crops, including those previously restricted to European farmers. Despite administrative and technical difficulties, as well as falling commodity prices, this de-

velopment program is estimated to have led to a doubling of the average cash income of African farmers between 1955 and 1962.⁹⁸ In urban areas concerted efforts were finally made to stabilize the African labor force and encourage the permanent urban residence of African workers and their families through substantial increases in real wages, the encouragement of rising levels of skill and productivity, and the provision of increased social services and housing. A start was thus finally made in coordinating urban and rural development policies and ending the vicious circle that trapped many Africans. In addition, much of the outward manifestation of racial discrimination was done away with and formal racial barriers in the civil service were dropped. Increased facilities were also provided for African education, especially on the secondary and higher education levels, including the establishment in Nairobi of a Royal Technical College that rapidly advanced towards university college status.

In part these changes were involved in the government's effort to deal with the Emergency by gaining increased African support, especially from non-Kikuyu, and answering some of the metropolitan criticism that accused it was not doing enough for the African and was pursuing only a policy of repression. The new policies were not seen or depicted as reversals of previous positions, but rather as being in continuity with, and essentially accelerated extensions of the development programs that had been actively carried out since 1945. Nevertheless, they also reflect the declining influence of both the field and central Administration on the formulation and implementation of development policy and the progressive abandonment of the con-

servative caution and preoccupation with the protection of the integrity of tribal society characteristic of administrative officers. In a sense, the orientation of policy had moved in a full circle back to the confident liberalism of the beginnings of British rule fifty years before with an emphasis on economic individualism and competitive capitalism. This emerged clearly in the Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, published in 1955, which provided the intellectual underpinnings for subsequent development policy in Kenya and was often described as 'bathed in pure milk of Adam Smith'. The report advocated the abandonment of protective policies towards African societies and the rapid incorporation of the Africans into a free-market economy based on commercial agriculture and the development of secondary industry for the local market.⁹⁹ It was also symptomatic of the growing influence of a metropolitan-centered perspective on colonial affairs.

The impact of these policies was to accelerate the processes of social change and incorporation into the monetary economy of African societies hitherto not as deeply affected as the Kikuyu. The process was also promoted by Emergency measures, such as Operation Anvil, which removed much of the Kikuyu labor force from the towns and settled areas and led to their replacement by Africans from other tribes, particularly the Luo, Luhya and Kamba.¹⁰⁰ As in the experience of the Kikuyu, this widening involvement in the monetary economy and exposure to social change stimulated a growing political consciousness in other tribes and a base of support for the revival of African politics in the late 1950's. This political consciousness was also spurred once

again by some of the government's own development programs. In Nyanza, for example, efforts to enforce land consolidation through closer administration stimulated widespread rural unrest in the mid-50's among Luo who saw the policy as mainly working towards the advantage of the colonial elite of chiefs and their clans and eventually forced the Provincial Administration to abandon its efforts to impose it.¹⁰¹ Finally, while the government tried carefully to separate development programs from the Emergency and spread them through other tribes, so that Africans would not see them as the consequence of the crisis, many Africans nevertheless were increasingly aware of the improvement in their conditions that followed upon the Emergency and this stimulated them to make increasing demands. Thus in 1955 a police informer reported that a man told a crowd after a baraza with the Governor:

"He [Governor Baring] said that Mau Mau are bad people, and we know perfect well that Mau Mau brought something good to us, because before Mau Mau started people were getting low salary, and when Mau Mau started to fight with the Europeans the Africans are getting much more money than they used to get in early days.... We have to continue to cause more trouble with the Europeans until they would tire with us and to understand that this country is not belong to them at all and they are strangers in this country. 102

However, for almost three years after the start of the Emergency virtually all African political activity, with the exception of the effectively coopted appointed members of the Legislative Council, was suppressed by the Administration. The only independent African organizations to survive were the trade unions in the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions, later renamed the Kenya Federation of Labour,

which had been carefully set up to secure official recognition after the failure of the East African Trade Union Congress. The African unions were hard hit by the Emergency which saw a considerable portion of the Kikuyu leadership swept into detention and left some of the individual unions without any officers to carry on their affairs. The KFL survived, however, with the support of the British TUC and the ICFTU which provided not only resources and training for union officials, but also valuable metropolitan and international platforms for publicizing African views and lobbying support with the Kenya government and the Colonial Office.¹⁰³ The removal of the Kikuyu union officials made room for the rise of a new leadership headed by Tom Mboya, a young Luo sanitary inspector for the Nairobi City Council. While the KFL carefully cooperated with the government in the development of regular labor relations machinery and officially adopted a non-political stance, Mboya himself pointed out that the grievances brought to the unions in the absence of any African political organizations could only have been ignored at the price of "the death of trade unions", and under his leadership the KFL protested to the government over Emergency policies, including detention without trial, collective punishments, and screening practices and conditions in the detention camps, and indicated its disapproval of the Lyttelton Constitution.¹⁰⁴ In February, 1956 the government finally moved against the KFL and threatened it with suppression if it did not end its political activities. The organization was saved by the intervention of the British TUC which sent its head, Sir Vincent Tewson, to Nairobi to deal with the Kenya Government, but its subsequent activities were consider-

ably circumscribed.

In mid-1955 the Administration permitted the formation of African political associations on the district level. While the cautious policy sought to avoid the challenge of another national organization such as the KAU through a more sophisticated form of divide and rule, African political activity began nonetheless to revive and spread, especially in the areas outside of Central Province. In that year a formula was also worked out for the election of African representatives to the Legislative Council on the basis of a restricted franchise on the basis of qualifications of age, education, property and occupation, with up to three votes for more 'qualified' voters. Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru were also required to obtain a loyalty certificate from the local District Commissioner. After several delays voters were registered at the end of 1956 and the elections were finally held in 1957. Six of the eight appointed members of the Legislative Council lost their seats and were replaced by a new generation of non-Kikuyu politicians led by Mboya, who captured the Nairobi seat, and Oginga Odinga, who won the Nyanza seat on the wave of rural discontent over government land policy. The Luo now assumed leadership of both the urban and rural dimensions of African politics. As a result of variations in the issuance of registration certificates by the District Commissioners, the Kikuyu were unrepresented in the Legislative Council, the Central Province seat going to a Meru, Bernard Mate.¹⁰⁵ The entry of the elected members was a crucial watershed in Kenyan politics and shattered some of the illusions of both government officials and settlers about the limited African support for militant politics. As one settler

member of LegCo eloquently put it, "When the elected members came it was exactly like looking through a dark visor at a furnace and then lifting the visor and looking straight into the furnace where you saw the flames and thoughts and emotions of the Africans leaping up".¹⁰⁶

Under the leadership of Odinga and Mboya the African representatives took the initiative in defining the central issue of political conflict for the next three years, namely whether Kenya would come to independence under a multi-racial or an African government. They expected to gain little by working through the Legislative Council, which they regarded simply as a useful forum for attacking the government and the settlers and gaining publicity for their views, and moved instead to make the existing multi-racial arrangements inoperable.¹⁰⁷

They immediately rejected the Lyttelton Constitution, refused to accept the ministerial portfolio that would have symbolized their acceptance of official policy, and demanded fifteen more African representatives to give them a majority over the elected members of the other races, thereby creating a constitutional crisis that could only be resolved by the intervention of the metropolitan authorities.

The Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, arrived in Kenya in October, 1957 to gain the agreement of the three racial communities to new constitutional proposals worked out in consultation with the Governor and senior administrative officers. The Africans demanded a programmatic statement of the objectives of British policy: "If it is a bus ride we are invited to join, let us have in clear terms the destination, for unless we are agreed on this we shall certainly not agree as to the route."¹⁰⁸ They did not get it, however. The Lennox-Boyd

constitution provided for an increase in African representation in the Legislative Council to 14, giving them parity with the settlers, and a second ministerial portfolio. In addition, 12 special seats, four for each of the major racial groups, were to be elected by the other members of the LegCo. The new arrangements also called for a ten year halt in constitutional changes. The authorities in London and Kenya still sought to find a multi-racial formula that would hold off militant African nationalism and preserve the dominant position of the European in the colony.¹⁰⁹ The Africans, however, increasingly held the initiative, and realized their advantage in provoking yet another crisis. The six additional African representatives elected in March, 1958 joined the others in rejecting the new constitution and vilifying the moderate Africans who came forward to accept the special seats and one of the ministerial portfolios. Odinga also reinvoked Kenyatta's name and image as a national leader amid the shocked outrage of the officials and settlers in the council. At the end of 1958 the African members collectively walked out during the Governor's speech to the Legislative Council and shortly after began a complete boycott of the council's proceedings. Emergency regulations were still in force and some administrative harassment of African political activity ensued in early 1959, but the Kenya Administration was no longer in a position to exercise control over the pace of political change. In the spring the Africans formed a joint delegation with the Asian LegCo representatives and one dissident European member, S.V. Cooke, which travelled to London and secured Lennox-Boyd's agreement to a new constitutional conference. This was immediately followed

by the emergence of a new multi-racial party, the New Kenya Group, led by Michael Blundell and organized around the bulk of European elected members and all of the special members of the LegCo. The Africans suspected and accused the NKG of being promoted behind the scenes by the Colonial Office to provide a justification for the continuation of a multi-racial constitution.¹¹⁰

At the same time, however, important changes were taking place in the orientation of the British government toward colonial affairs in general and Kenya in particular that would have a critical impact on the pace of political change. As late as January, 1959 the metropolitan authorities still adhered to a policy of gradualism and believed that colonial rule would yet last for a considerable time; Lennox-Boyd agreed with the East African governors at a conference held that month at Chequers, that Tanganyika might achieve independence by 1970, with Uganda following soon after, while Kenya would likely not move to independence until after 1975.¹¹¹ Even while this was taking place, a serious reevaluation of colonial affairs was being made by Prime Minister MacMillan and elements of the left wing of the Conservative Party, notably Ian McLeod, in the light of the debacle of the Suez intervention of 1956, the obvious decline in Britain's position as a world power, and the increasing external pressures for decolonization from both the U.S. and the rapidly growing bloc of non-Western nations. The choice in the colonies, in the face of mounting internal challenges to the colonial authorities, increasingly appeared to be the unpalatable one of 'shoot or get out'.¹¹² The first alternative was both morally unacceptable and probably incapable of

being justified to metropolitan and international opinion, as well as beyond the resources of Britain to sustain on a prolonged and massive scale. These second thoughts were strongly reinforced by the revelation in Britain in mid-1959 of the Hola camp scandal in Kenya and shortly afterward the publication of the Devlin report on the Emergency in Nyasaland which spoke of the colony having become 'a police state'.¹¹³ These incidents revealed the type of measures that would likely be involved if Britain attempted to sustain colonial control by force and led to stormy debates in Parliament that deeply embarrassed the government. Metropolitan interests were not of paramount importance and the costs of sustaining control of the remaining colonies increasingly appeared to exceed any possible benefits. The turning point for British policy was the general election of October, 1959 which returned MacMillan with a clear mandate and strengthened the Tory left wing. McLeod asked for and received the colonial portfolio, and, with MacMillan's apparent approval, abandoned the gradualist approach to decolonization in favor of a policy of the quickest possible withdrawal from Africa.

The changes in policy were crystallized in the Kenya constitutional conference which opened at Lancaster House in London as MacMillan was touring Africa with his message of the 'winds of change'. The Lancaster House conference symbolized the shift in the initiative in Kenya policy with all of the members of the Legislative Council now travelling to London to meet the metropolitan authorities on their home ground. British policy had been formulated on the highest levels and the Secretary of State negotiated directly with the European, Asian,

and African leaders. The new Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, and senior officials of the Kenya government had not been previously consulted on the new policy,¹¹⁴ and were no longer main parties in the discussions, serving rather as couriers for the Secretary of State to the various racial groups. At the outset of the conference McLeod made the long-awaited statement of goals by unambiguously indicating that Kenya would advance to independence under African majority rule. The remainder of the conference focused on securing African and European agreement to a constitutional framework for the transition period that would continue to give the settlers some political role. The Europeans came away from the conference believing that the transition period would last ten years and give them enough time to institutionalize some degree of multi-racial participation.¹¹⁵

Lancaster House marked the effective end of colonial rule through direct political control in Kenya. What ensued over the next four years until the colony became an independent state in December, 1963 was a complex period of transition in which the various participants in the political process came to assume different roles and perspectives and new issues became salient. The chief concern of the metropolitan authorities was to find a means of transferring power to an African government, while blunting the more radical fires of nationalism, and widening African access to the economy without halting economic growth or destroying valuable metropolitan interests. Changes of government and constitutional conferences followed in rapid succession. African national organizations were again permitted, but the African political leaders themselves now split, with the Luo and Kikuyu forming

the Kenya African National Union and the politicians from smaller tribes fearing domination by the Luo and Kikuyu joining together in the Kenya African Democratic Union under Ronald Ngala. KANU won a resounding victory in the 1961 general election, the first fought on a common electoral roll, but refused to form a government until Kenyatta was released. A minority government formed by KADU in coalition with Blundell's New Kenya Group spurred a revival of hopes that a multi-racial government could bring the country to independence with the settlers and smaller tribes protected through a complicated federal arrangement of regions with significant powers outside of the scope of the central government. These efforts proved ultimately futile in the face of KANU's electoral strength and the insistence of the Luo and Kikuyu leadership on a strong centralized government. Kenyatta was released from prison in August, 1961, quickly assuming the leadership of KANU. By April, 1962 Kenyatta led KANU into a national coalition government with KADU, and fourteen months later, after another resounding KANU electoral victory, he was Prime Minister leading Kenya to internal self-government and then independence.¹¹⁶ During the same period socio-economic policy provided increasing access to land in the White Highlands for Africans from the densely packed reserves and began the cooptation of the African elite into collaboration with metropolitan economic interests, while providing for the basic preservation of the existing socio-economic structures.¹¹⁷

Lancaster House and the ensuing acceleration of the process of decolonization was a stunning and unexpected shock for Europeans in Kenya, both settlers and officials. When Michael Blundell returned

from the conference he had a bag with thirty pieces of silver thrown at his feet. The impact of the changes was especially severe on the Provincial Administration. Field officers saw the conference as "the end of everything" and felt that "the passes had been sold" behind their backs.¹¹⁸ During 1960 and 61 Provincial Commissioners and other senior administrators toured the districts encouraging their men and assuring them that most of them would be needed even after independence, but the morale of the organization collapsed nonetheless. The congruence of organizational and personal interests that had given the Provincial Administration much of its strength and cohesion disappeared. The organization clearly had no future and administrators were increasingly preoccupied with ensuring one for themselves. During the next few years a substantial and "perhaps disproportionate amount of time" in the Kenya Treasury was spent in working out arrangements for pensions and cash payments for loss of career for administrators and other government officials.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, after the unchallenged dictatorial powers of the Emergency, administrators found they had to spend the next few years dealing with African politicians, many of them previously hated antagonists, not only as equals, but also as superiors in the ministries or as their own prospective successors. It was a difficult transition for many of them to make. In mid-1960, almost defiantly, senior administrators, several of them veterans of the Emergency and earlier conflicts with the KAU, influenced Governor Renison to respond to African pressures for the release of Kenyatta with a speech denouncing him as "a leader to darkness and death", and issued the official report on Mau Mau, acts which intensified racial

tensions and inflamed the fears of the European community.

The last mission for the Administration was to maintain short-term order during the transition period and prepare what was seen as the essential structures of control for the new independent state.¹²⁰ With the Ministry of African Affairs having disappeared from the government in response to African resentment over the paternalism it implied, the Provincial Administration was once more restored to a unitary line of command through the Chief Secretary to the Governor and a new circular was issued restoring its control over the activities of other government departments in the field.¹²¹ At the same time, an independent, secret channel of communications was established between the permanent secretaries in the ministries, the Chief Secretary, the Governor and the Colonial Office to keep ultimate control of the transition process in British hands.¹²² A belated start was finally made in training Africans to assume posts in the Administration and the first regular African District Officers were appointed in mid-1960. In 1962-63 the pace of Africanization began to accelerate as increasing numbers of administrative posts in the field and in the central government were turned over to African officers. The process reached its peak in the months immediately before and after independence, and by the end of 1964 almost all of the British administrators had left the service. A few stayed on in Kenya to retire or accept jobs in business. The great majority left the country, a few of the most able being transferred to some of the few remaining administrative posts in the dwindling remains of the Empire, while most of the rest returned to Britain to either retire on pension or take up a variety of jobs in business and

government. The last collective expression of the organization, the Kenya Administration Club, meets periodically in London for dinner and evenings of nostalgic reminiscence.

Notes

1. Interview 214F.
2. Interview 219F.
3. Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, Praeger, New York, 1966, page 286.
4. Ministry of Community Development, "Minutes of the Community Development Conference, January 14-17, 1957: Talk by Mr. C.M. Johnston, Special Commissioner on 'Reabsorbtion of Detainees'". (Privately supplied.)
5. Capital crimes included the possession or manufacture of arms, ammunition, or explosives, engaging in or assisting terrorist operations, 'consorting with armed men', and administering or being present at and consenting to the administration of a Mau Mau oath. At the end of 1954 there had been 756 hangings of which 508 were for offences less than murder, including 290 for possession of arms and ammunition. (M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1967, page 102-103.)
6. Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau from Within, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1966, page 71.
7. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 277.
8. Ibid., page 302.
9. F.D. Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Cmd. 1030) HMSO, London, 1960, page 232.
10. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 301.
11. The most complete account of the experience of the Land Freedom Army is found in Barnett and Njama, Op.cit., passim; and Robert Buijtenhuijs, Le Mouvement Mau Mau, Mouton, Paris and The Hague, 1971, 225-364.
12. By 1954 there were 2,775 regular Kenya Police and 2,741 Kenya Police Reserve stationed in Central Province. (Corfield, Op.cit., page 240.)
13. Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya, January 1954 (Cmd. 9081) HMSO, London 1954, page 5.
14. F. Majdalany, State of Emergency: the Full Story of Mau Mau, Longmans, London, 1962, pages 203-08.
15. Corfield, Op.cit., page 316.

16. Buijtenhuijs, Op.cit., pages 151, 155-56.
17. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1967, page 140.
18. David Goldsworthy, Colonial-Issues in British Politics 1945-61, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pages 212-214; Oliver Lyttelton (Lord Chandos) The Memoires of Lord Chandos, The Bodley Head, London, 1962, pages 401-402.
19. Interview O2PB. For an example of the counter interpretation to the official view see Fenner Brockway, Why Mau Mau? An Analysis and a Remedy, Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, London, 1953 and Tom Mboya, The Kenya Question: An African Answer, Fabian Colonial Bureau, London, 1956.
20. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 321.
21. Lyttelton, Op.cit., page 395.
22. Corfield, Op.cit., pages 50-63 and 163-170. This report provides perhaps the fullest official expression of the myth.
23. The perjury was made public in December, 1958 in a signed affidavit by the witness, Rawson Macharia. See J. Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968, pages 79-86.
24. Kapenguria Trial, Verbatim Transcript, quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 282-84. The fullest accounts of the trial are contained in Montagu Slater, The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta, Mercury Books, London, 1965 (first published in 1955) and D.N. Pritt, (Chief Defence Council) Autobiography, Part 3, The Defence Accuses, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1966, pages 71-136.
25. Sir Philip Mitchell, "Mau Mau" in C. Grove Haines, ed., Africa Today, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1955, page 490.
26. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 287-291; Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 100-101.
27. KGL, History of the Loyalists (unpublished printed booklet) pages 31-32 quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 291.
28. Report ... of the Parliamentary Delegation, Op.cit.,
Page 4.
29. J.C. Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954.
30. The standard bibliography on Kenya (Eastern African Studies Program, Syracuse University, 1967) presents an incomplete list of more

than 150 books, pamphlets and articles on Mau Mau. Perhaps the most influential statements of the European image of Mau Mau are by Louis S.B. Leakey, the distinguished archaeologist and anthropologist regarded by many colonial officials as the leading expert on Kikuyu and culture, in his books Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (Methuen, London, 1952); and Defeating Mau Mau (Methuen, London, 1954). The Colonial Office also played a direct role in propagating the myth. In 1954, it first refused to publish an appendix to the Report of the Parliamentary Delegation containing texts of Mau Mau oaths and confessions from detainees obtained by 'screening teams' on the grounds that they were too lurid for the general public; and then confidentially circulated copies to the political parties, the TUC, and various missionary societies and organizations interested in colonial affairs so that "the present situation in Kenya may be seen in its proper perspective. (Confidential letter, O.G. Fry of Colonial Office to Secretary, Liberal Party Organization, with enclosures, 12 April, 1954 in Joseph Murumbi Papers, Nairobi. See also Goldsworthy, Op.cit., page 58.)

31. Corfield, Op.cit., page 169.

32. J. Wilkinson, "The Mau Mau Movement: Some General and Medical Aspects", East African Medical Journal, Vol. 31, No. 7, July 1954, pages 295-314.

33. Interview 08PM.

34. Sir Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964, pages 123-128 and 137.

35. Manchester Guardian, 26 November, 1953, quoted in Slater, Op.cit., page 246.

36. Report ... of the Parliamentary Delegation, Op.cit., page 7.

37. The Police Commissioner at the start of the Emergency had come from previous service in Ireland and Palestine and was widely criticized for not maintaining firm enough control. He was replaced by Sir Arthur Young, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London, who resigned after nine months in the wake of bitter clashes with the Administration over his attempts to reform Kenya Police procedure on domestic British lines (Interview 234T). His successor was R.G. Catling, a senior police official from Malaya where he had played an important role in quelling a slightly earlier emergency.

38. Interview 234T.

39. Interview 227FS.

40. Report ... of the Parliamentary Commission, Op.cit., page 8.

41. Commissioner for Community Development and Rehabilitation, "Rehabilitation", January 6, 1954, unpublished memorandum quoted in

Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 336.

42. Ibid., page 337.

43. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 8/177, "Confidential Directive by H.E. the Governor: Appendix A, Policy for Detainees" November 1, 1954.

44. Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 336, and Blundell, Op.cit., page 198. The methods used by the camp commandant included starting rumours of atrocities and faking executions to intimidate the detainees.

45. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 338.

46. T.G. Askwith, The Story of Kenya's Progress, Eagle Press, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, second edition, 1958, page 120.

47. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 9/841, "Confidential Minutes of a Meeting at Provincial H.G., Nyeri, 11-13 May, 1954, to discuss Policy and Reconstruction in the Kikuyu Land Unit".

48. Quoted in Sworn Deposition, dated July 24, 1956 by Muriel E. Fletcher, former rehabilitation officer in charge of the rehabilitation of women and girls in the Kenya Department of Community Development, December, 1954 to November, 1955. The deposition also documents numerous instances of maltreatment of detainees of both sexes and varying ages. (Joseph Murumbi papers, Nairobi.)

49. Interview 219F.

50. Report of the Committee on Emergency Detention Camps, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1959; Documents Relating to the Death of Eleven Mau Mau Detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya, (Cmnd. 778) HMSO, London, 1959; and also Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 342-46.

51. Sorrenson, Op.cit., page 103. The experience of the detainees is most fully recounted in J.M. Kariuki, Mau Mau Detainee, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964.

52. Interview 206FS.

53. Interview 227FS, Interview 103FS.

54. Blundell, Op.cit., page 141.

55. Interview 214F.

56. Corfield, Op.cit., page 240.

57. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., page 293.

58. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 9/841, A.C.C. Swann, acting P.C., to all D.C.s, Central Province, 12 April, 1955. Numerous other examples are scattered through other files, notably MAA8/65, 7/46, 2/5/209. Also, Interview 202S, Interview 103F, and Interview 207FS.

59. Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 294-95.

60. KNA/MAA 2/5/306, "Kikuyu Guard Reorganization in Dagoretti, Kiambu" unsigned memorandum, 29 March, 1954. Most of the Kikuyu Guard were over 45 years old, reflecting the generational conflicts in Kikuyu society. The administration realized that they represented only a "very small body of the community", (Ibid.). An analysis of the Guard units in Githunguri location in Kiambu revealed that 44 of them were described as 'very rich', 265 as 'rich', 77 as 'above average', 79 as 'below average' and only 144 as 'poor' (Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 108).

61. KNA/MAA8/65, Memorandum, Sir Frederick Crawford, Acting Governor, to M.A.W.R. (not otherwise identified), June, 1954.

62. Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 104-105.

63. Interview 219F.

64. See for example the articles written by administrative officers: O.E.B. Hughes, "Villages in the Kikuyu Country", Journal of African Administration, vol. VIII, no. 4, October, 1955; and J.M. Golds, "African Urbanization in Kenya", Journal of African Administration, vol. XIII, no. 1, January, 1961. Also, Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 110-112, 147-50 and 234-35, and Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., pages 304-305.

65. Sorrenson, Op.cit., pages 116-120.

66. Ibid., pages 121-132, 171, 209-210.

67. Ibid., pages 117-118.

68. KNA/MAA2/5/306, "Lecture by Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, C.M. Johnston, to District Officers - Kikuyu Guard", 14 January, 1954.

69. Sorrenson, Op.cit., page 235.

70. Ibid., pages 220-36.

71. M.J. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, page 66.

72. Lyttelton, Op.cit., page 398-99; Blundell, Op.cit., pages 155-159.

73. Interview 07PS, Interview 12PA.

74. Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, pages 37-38.

75. Blundell, Op.cit., pages 134-35, 145-49, 192-93.

76. Rumours of this consideration of rebellion by extremists were discussed in the correspondence of several settler politicians (confidentially supplied).

77. An unprecedented and never-repeated coalition of the unofficial LegCo members of all races launched a concerted attack on the Government's budgetary proposals, voting down numerous items of appropriation. This alliance was forged by the European elected members who were angered by a tax on exports proposed by the Financial Secretary. Among the items cut from the budget were funds for European confidential secretaries for the Provincial Commissioners. This opened a leak in the Provincial Administration's security apparatus in the tense months preceding the Emergency.

78. Interview 215S and Interview 206FS: Private papers of a settler politician indicate that Vasey was regarded with suspicion by other settler politicians and even suspected of 'Communist' leanings by some of the more reactionary elements of the European community. (Confidentially supplied.)

79. Sir Ernest Vasey, Interview, June, 1969.

80. Interview 202S, Interview 215S.

81. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Staff List, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1957. Vasey drew his staff from diverse sources, including men with previous service in Mauritius, Palestine and the Indian Civil Service.

82. Vasey, Interview, June, 1969. See also K.W.S. MacKenzie, "The Development of the Kenya Treasury Since 1936", East African Economics Review, vol. 8, no. 2, December 1961, pages 68-72.

83. Interview 202S.

84. MacKenzie, "The Development ... " loc.cit., pages 61-65.

85. Interview 208FS.

86. Interview 225FS.

87. Interview 208FS.

88. Interview 206FS.

- 89. Interview 07PS.
- 90. Staff Lists, Op.cit.
- 91. Interview 217FS.
- 92. Interview 212FS.

93. KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary 8/1406, "Procedures Attendant upon the Introduction of the Member System" Secretariat Circular 16 of 13 September, 1946. Office of the Chief Secretary 8/177 "Statement of Administrative Procedure Prescribed for the Transaction of Business with which Ministers are Concerned", Secretariat Circular no. 8, of 15 April, 1954. Despite these policy statements, a high official of the Ministry of Agriculture noted:

"The Agriculture Department had many programs which it was pushing and its field officers were pushing very enthusiastically, and they couldn't be bothered to deal with the District Commissioner very often. And I myself found from ministry headquarters that it was much more convenient to deal with one of [our] chaps on economic development programs, rather than have to bring in the local committee and District Commissioner." (Interview 230T)

94. Interview 208FS; Interview 01PS. To counteract this tendency to be by-passed by the Ministries the P.C.'s often attempted to build up informal communications channels of their own by cultivating the ministers personally (Interview 214F).

95. Interview 214F.

96. Interview 227FS.

97. R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1954.

98. E.S. Clayton, Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies: Some Lessons from Kenya, Pergamon Press, London, 1964, page 46.

99. East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955, Report, (Cmd. 9475) HMSO, London, 1955, pages 390-95.

100. In 1954 the Minister for Education, Labour and Lands told representatives of the Nairobi construction industry that the Government intended to keep the proportion of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru in Nairobi at around 30 percent, and the Labour Commissioner told them they would have to look to Nyanza to make up for their shortages of labor. (KNA/MAA7/756, "Note of a Meeting Held in the Ministry of Education, Labour and Lands on October 25, 1954".)

101. J.M. Lonsdale, "Rural Resistance and Mass Political Mobil-

ization Amongst the Luo of Western Kenya", unpublished paper, Cambridge University, 1966.

102. KNA/DC/TN3/1, "Secret Report of William Wanyoni, police informer," 28 November, 1955.

103. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, Andre Deutsch, London, 1963, pages 34-43, 56-60; Goldsworthy, Op.cit., page 57; and Lee, Op.cit., pages 169, 171-172.

104. KNA/Ministry of Labour 3/66, Tom Mboya, "Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions, Annual Report, 1955".

105. Of the 35,644 registered voters in Central Province some 21,145 were Meru, reflecting the differing zeal with which the local D.C.s promoted registration. (G.F. Engholm, "Kenya's First Direct Elections for Africans, March, 1957", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4, 1959-60, pages 432-33.)

106. Interview 01PS.

107. Mboya, Op.cit., pages 117-120; Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1967, pages 149-54.

108. Mboya, Op.cit., page 121.

109. Blundell, Op.cit., page 241; W.P. Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire: A Critique of British Colonial Policy 1956-66, Chatto and Windus, London, 1966, pages 45-49.

110. Odinga, Op.cit., pages 164-165. Blundell's own account of the party is in Op.cit., pages 247-299 *passim*.

111. Ibid., pages 261-62.

112. Kirkman, Op.cit., page 50.

113. Iain Macleod explained the factors behind his conviction that basic changes were necessary in 'Britain's Future Policy in Africa', Weekend Telegraph, 12 March 1965 and 'Trouble in Africa', Spectator, 31 January, 1964. See also Goldsworthy, Op.cit., pages 361-72.

114. Interview 208FS, Interview 212FS.

115. Blundell, Op.cit., page 277.

116. For detailed accounts of the politics of the 1960-63 period see George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pages 151-161 and George Bennett and Carl Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-61, Oxford University Press, London, 1961; as well as the personal accounts by such participants as Blundell, Mboya and Odinga in works cited above.

117. Gary Wasserman, "Continuity and Counter Insurgency: The Role of Land Reform in Decolonizing Kenya, 1962-70", unpublished paper presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, November, 1972.

118. Interview 103F, Interview 105F. As late as 1959 Administrative cadets had been recruited for Kenya with promises of a full career opportunity. After Lancaster House their appointments were changed to short-term contracts (Interview 124F).

119. Interview 202 S. These arrangements involved the payment of some £35.5 million to 3,020 expatriate civil servants between 1962-63 and 1968-69. The independent Kenya Government was responsible for £21.7 million of the total (Mboya, Op.cit., page 134).

120. "Report of the Working Party on the Future of the Provincial Administration", R.O. Hennings, Chairman; F.A. Loyd, and R. Tatton-Brown, 1 December, 1961. (Copy privately supplied.)

121 KNA/Office of the Chief Secretary, Secretariat Circular no.2, February, 1960 and Secretariat Circular 12, June 1960. These measures, taken in the aftermath of Lancaster House, were intended to maintain direct control over the colony during the transition period in a direct line of command running from London to the districts.

122. Interview 01PS.

COLONIAL KENYA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The central focus of this study has been upon the character of the Kenya Administration as the key to the explanation of the character of colonialism in Kenya -- not as a single factor explanation, but in terms of the complex interplay of internal organizational characteristics with external political pressures and wider forces of socio-economic change. As a result of its pivotal position in an administrative state, the Kenya Administration both reflected and shaped the nature of the colonial political and social system, and its reactions to patterns of conflict and change had critical implications for the entire colony.

The presence of the settler community led to the penetration of the central administration by settler interests and, at the same time, reinforced the basic characteristics of the prefectural administrative system in the field outside of settler-dominated areas. The Kenya Administration thus displayed with particular vividness a growing center-periphery cleavage between the Secretariat and the Provincial Administration; the effective concentration of wide discretionary powers relating to the African population in the hands of field administrators; an authoritarian and paternalistic protectiveness toward the African and hostility towards all outside interference, whether from the central government or the settlers; an identification of the interests of the African with the organizational interests of the Provincial Administration; a fragmented policy process marked by a short-run focus and emphasis on method over substance; and a strong resistance to change and extreme difficulty in dealing with critical decisions

within a static and rigid organizational system.

A pervasive duality ran throughout the social, economic, and political spheres of colonial Kenya and formed the foundation for the gradual emergence of a modus-vivendi during the inter-war years in which the worlds of the African and the immigrant communities were treated as separate watertight compartments. The settler-dominated political system at the center generated a stalemate in which the settlers acquired control over policy relating to their immediate socio-economic interests while the colonial authorities blocked their efforts to achieve formal self-rule. In the African districts, after the labor crisis and the declaration of the 'paramountcy of native interests' in the early 1920's effectively removed the Provincial Administration from the direct servicing of settler economic needs and formally excluded the settlers from involvement in native administration, field administrators pulled away from the fractious political conflicts at the center and jealously guarded their control over the indigenous population. The cost of this dual political system was high; the Kenya Administration was incapable of making critical decisions on major issues of policy, and it drifted into a short-run opportunism that reinforced its internal tendencies towards fragmented, ad hoc incrementalism.

The sudden onset of rapid economic growth during the Second World War and its continuity after 1945, as well as the active commitment of the metropolitan authorities and the Kenya Government to the promotion of development, made the dual political system increasingly untenable. Rapid economic growth led to the increasing mobilization of Africans, especially the Kikuyu, into the settler dominated monetary

economy and subjected them to both relative and absolute deprivations. These new grievances, overlaid on existing ones relating to the alienation of land to the settlers and population pressure in the reserves, reinforced by government efforts to enforce unpopular policies of agrarian and social 'development', generated a rising level of conflict over systemic issues and led to unprecedented demands upon the Administration for critical decisions reorienting the goals and institutional structures of the colony. The Administration found itself simultaneously facing external and internal crises from the political demands of the African population and a threat to its status and authority from the growth of the technical departments and the emergence of functional ministries within the government. The central administration continued to be tied by its web of commitments to the settlers and preoccupied with the management of the increasingly complex bureaucratic machine. The Provincial Administration was left on its own, without effective leadership from the central authorities, to confront the political crisis and responded by attempting to create the pre-1939 status quo of relatively unchallenged control over the African population through a policy of 'closer administration' and through the increasing harassment and repression of African political organizations, notably the Kenya African Union.

The declaration of the state of emergency in October, 1952 is best understood not as a response to a rebellion, but as a preemptive strike by the colonial authorities against a suspected conspiracy to rebel that in reality was neither as coherent nor as far advanced, and was much more limited in its objectives and resources,

than administrators believed. For this reason organized Kikuyu resistance did not emerge until some five months after the declaration of the emergency and the occupation of the Kikuyu homeland by security forces. What is especially striking is that the escalating course of repression emerged contrary to the initial intentions of administrative officers, and the Emergency itself involved far greater violence than they anticipated. For the Provincial Administration the Emergency was an effort to remove an intransigent, irresponsible, and corrupt political element that stood in the way of the realization of its progressive and benevolent policies for African development and welfare. What we confront in Kenya is thus not a melodrama, with a clash between the forces of good and evil, but a tragedy involving an intensely dedicated body of men for whom any compromise with Kikuyu politicians became a dereliction of their duty to the 'real' African. The crisis of the Emergency finally broke the stalemate of the political system and resulted in a series of critical decisions on political and socio-economic policy in the colony. At first these appeared to have restored the status and power of the Administration, especially in field, but subsequent decisions during the 1950's progressively undermined and then destroyed the colonial system in Kenya.

Decolonization began in Kenya with a series of political reforms between 1954 and 1958 that emerged more as a response to existing circumstances than as efforts to outline future development. Nevertheless, these reforms reflected an increasing willingness of the metropolitan authorities to ignore the traditional conventions guiding relationships with colonial governments and intervene directly that was

prompted by the growing metropolitan economic stake in Kenya and the expenditure of British funds, estimated at 35-50 £ million, for the Emergency. Metropolitan interests became of paramount importance, and the London authorities increasingly ignored the local vested colonial interests of both the Administration and the settlers. By the late 1950's the political initiative had shifted to the resurgent African politicians and the metropolitan authorities. At the Lancaster House Conference in early 1960 the British government negotiated directly with the Africans and finally made a programmatic commitment to the independence of Kenya under an African majority government. The Administration and the settlers were shunted aside to feel abandoned and 'stabbed in the back'.

To return to the issue posed at the beginning of this study, how unique is Kenya? Were the internal structures and processes of the Kenya Administration and the external socio-economic and political context atypical, and did they combine to create an idiosyncratic course of events, or did they express underlying continuities derived from the operation of more general variables. Specifically, what generalizations and relevant theoretical insights are suggested by this case study with regard to such important issues as the character of colonial administration, the general nature of imperialism, and the process of decolonization. In order to investigate possible answers to these questions, we can examine Kenya in comparison to administration in other colonies both of Britain and other European powers. Given the paucity of data on many colonial systems, as well as the general lack of strictly comparable studies of colonial administrative and political

processes, this attempt at synchronic analysis is, at best, partial and the conclusions necessarily tentative.

I. Colonialism, Imperialism and Decolonization

The comparative study of colonial administration in Africa has been preoccupied with showing the differences between the systems of the various European powers and mixed in the description of formal institutions and legal powers. Many of the perceived differences are based more upon national stereo-types than systematic empirical research. Much of this analysis also shows an apparent self-serving element, especially among British scholars who never tire of asserting that British colonial rule was more just and more humane, less authoritarian and brutal, and prepared Africans for independence better than any other colonial power. The result has been the generation and perpetuation of images of colonial administration divorced both from reality and from any sophisticated understanding of bureaucratic structures and processes.¹ Many of these images begin by taking at face value the debates over colonial policy objectives and methods in the metropole and at the highest levels of the colonial systems. As Kiwanuka points out:

Few scholars have addressed themselves to the difference between what was said and what actually happened. Fewer yet have recognized the fact that the British colonial system came to be associated with the philosophy not so much because the British applied more indirect rule but because they talked about it more than the others.... Similarly the French were associated more with the policy of assimilation because they talked about it more. 2

This has tended to obscure any underlying similarities which may have existed. A cursory glance shows that all of the colonial systems in

Africa were based on prefectorial field administration. If the theoretical analysis of bureaucratic organizations has any value, we should find basic similarities in the operation of these prefectorial systems.

The study of British colonial administration has been bedevilled by a 'myth of indirect rule', and it is in relation to this myth that Kenya, where indirect rule was never officially applied, appears at first to be atypical of British colonies in Africa. The myth is based upon the selection of one particular colony, Northern Nigeria, as a paradigm for the analysis of all British administration in Africa. This has been the result of not only the long shadow of Lord Lugard and his disciples, and the metropolitan authorities' general encouragement of the adoption of the principle of indirect rule in most colonies; but also of the British preoccupation and fascination with centralized African kingdoms and their confusion over and even hostility towards the decentralized systems that did not conform to Western stereotypes.³ The Northern Nigeria system, however, was not even fully replicated in the other regions of Nigeria,⁴ and was applied only partially and inconsistently in other colonies. Most analyses of British administration, after positing the mythical ideal, have to spend considerable time explaining the local deviations and variations and this inhibits focusing on what the local system actually was. Several facts stand out against the myth of indirect rule. First, as Apthorpe points out, centralized traditional political systems are probably "deviations from the norm ... more typical of the political conditions in tropical Africa at the time of European penetration are the non-centralized systems".⁵ These decentralized systems were the

ones in which indirect rule was applied with difficulty, if at all. Second, even where centralized indigenous systems were found, they were substantially changed by their incorporation as 'native authorities' into the colonial system. Few local administrations fully understood the indigenous systems and much of it was left out and ignored, while new roles were added and the authority and status of many existing roles were transformed.⁶ Third, if indirect rule is strictly interpreted as a situation in which the British administrator served essentially in an advisory role in relation to the native authorities, it was not consistently applied even in Northern Nigeria. As one of Lugard's lieutenants put it, after removing the emir of Katsina:

Whether we wish to be so or not we are the rulers. We must either be above or below the rank and file.... The Protectorate has its laws and ordinances, and our functions have long been far in excess of mere Residential Advisors ... a native can no more understand the idea of joint rule by Emirs and Residents than he can understand the doctrine of the trinity. 7

If, however, we define indirect rule more broadly as the use of indigenous institutions and authorities in colonial administrative systems with the official delegation to them of certain administrative and judicial functions, then the difference between indirect and direct rule is simply a matter of degree. As one anthropologist pointed out: "indirect rule is rarely in toto different from direct rule -- indeed it is very often true that any one system of government may be regarded as 'direct' or 'indirect' according to the point of view adopted."⁸ At this point, indirect rule becomes an assumption rather than a description of empirical reality. The central underlying fact appears to be that all

colonial administrations in Africa, given their chronic shortage of money and personnel, required and found African collaborators and subordinates to extend their effective control. Where these subordinates could not be identified in the indigenous society, they were created. Whatever the vague formulas or policies of the authorities in the metropole or the colonial capital, the administrative systems in the field were formulated by the administrative officers on the spot in relationship to local exigencies and the over-riding requirement of control. "Whether a chief was hereditary or appointed, whether he was under a British or French regime, he owed his position to the approval of the colonial power, and he retained that position only as long as the colonial regime believed he was playing the role assigned to him."⁹ However they may have depicted the local system to the central authorities, local administrators controlled African officials, treating them as spokesmen for local opinion or subordinate agents of the government according to the expediency of the situation at hand. In Tanganyika, for example, indirect rule was introduced by Sir Donald Cameron in 1925. His District Officers, however, were skeptical of the system, and behind an outward facade of 'native authorities' the reality was D.O. domination and control,¹⁰

In light of the realities of power in the colonial context and the internal processes of prefectorial systems, it is indirect rule on the model of Northern Nigeria that turns out to be idiosyncratic. The Kenya system is actually more typical of the basic character of British colonial administration, in India as well as Africa, which was government by District Commissioner, District Officer, Collector, or

whatever other title was given to the principal field agents of the administration. The internal processes of these prefectoral systems were essentially the same. All of them were characterized by the exercise of wide personal discretion by field officers and the cleavage between the field and the Secretariat.¹¹ There was a similar emphasis on in-service training and on techniques of administration over the substance of policy.¹² Policy was fragmented and showed wide variations from locality to locality as administrators concentrated on their pet projects and fads. The administrative systems as a whole shared a short-run focus, a vagueness of long-term objectives, and a basic rigidity and resistance to change.¹³ Field officers shared an intense paternalistic protectiveness towards the 'real' peasant or tribesman in the villages and were hostile to any outside interference, especially by educated natives or white settlers. In Tanganyika where the local settler community was far smaller and exercised much less political influence than in Kenya, administrators "had at best an ambivalent attitude" towards them, and "by instinct and profession administrators stood with the Africans".¹⁴

In the end, however, the basic similarities of British colonial administration are not very surprising, once we get past the tendency of most studies to exaggerate the idiosyncracies of each colony or, for that matter, each administrative officer. Men drawn from relatively homogeneous socio-economic and educational backgrounds and placed in essentially similar organizational structures will tend to act in generally similar ways. This after all was precisely the result the metropolitan authorities hoped would emerge from their careful

and highly selective recruitment process.

British and French colonial administration, meanwhile, are conventionally viewed as constituting two totally different political universes.¹⁵ Once again, however, the reality appears to be very different from the stereotype. Comparing the results of this study of Kenya with William Cohen's study of the French colonial service in West and Central Africa,¹⁶ we find that the experiences and internal processes of French and British colonial administration are not only similar, but also in many instances practically identical. This similarity is all the more striking because the systems were formed independently and largely in ignorance of each other, and suggests the existence of strong underlying continuities in the colonial administrative process.

In French Africa, as in Kenya, the higher authorities in the colonial capitals and the metropole had difficulties with casually recruited early administrators who were often uneducated, ignorant and incompetent, as well as brutal to the African population, negligent of their duties, and insubordinate to their superiors. In France colonial administrators had a very low popular image, which persisted well into the twentieth century, of being the dregs of metropolitan society.¹⁷ The metropolitan authorities responded with a variety of means of recruitment and training of administrators, finally settling in 1912 on selective recruitment combined with rigorous professional training at the *École Coloniale*, (which eventually gained the status of one of the *grande écoles* as the *École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer*). This emphasis on formal training stands in contrast with British practice, and

reflects both a less unified elite culture, which made selective recruitment more difficult, and the French belief in the value of intensive and highly legalistic training for administrators. Nevertheless, experienced administrators in the colonies often denigrated the 'impractical' and 'theoretical' education of the École and, just as their British counterparts, emphasized the importance of in-service training for new cadets.¹⁸ By the inter-war years the 'buccaneers' of the early days had been largely replaced by more educated, reliable, and competent officials. While the range of socio-economic backgrounds represented in the recruitment of these administrators was much wider than that of British colonial administration, including men from worker and peasant backgrounds rarely if ever represented in such organizations as the Kenya Administration, French colonial officials were nevertheless of preponderantly upper-middle class origin. Moreover, similar to the British, French administrators were largely drawn from the administrative and professional middle class rather than from among the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. According to Cohen, in 1929 the fathers of 72 percent of the cadets entering the École Coloniale were in the liberal professions or high administration in the civil service, while only 1.5 percent were business managers and 14 percent rentiers or small businessmen. In 1936, under the Popular Front government, 14 percent of the cadets came from worker backgrounds, but 51 percent still came from the high administration and liberal professions.¹⁹

While highly centralized in formal structure, French colonial administration was just as highly decentralized in practice as that of

the British, and this decentralization worked on the same two basic levels. Ministers and ministry officials in Paris had little influence on policy or direct control over what went on in the colonies. The colonial portfolio had little prestige and ministers changed so frequently that they had little time or motivation to learn much about colonial affairs and leave their mark on policy. The Corps of Colonial Inspectors, embodying that method of checking on officials so despised by the British, was far too small and thinly spread to provide the metropolitan authorities with detailed information about events in all of the various colonies or enhance their effective control. General policy was made by the Governor-Generals of the two colonial federations rather than Paris, but even they lacked knowledge of and control over events in the individual colonies. Furthermore, in each colony the Governor could exercise little direct control over most of the administrators in the field. As in British colonies, the internal logic of the prefectural system and external ecological conditions left effective discretion in the hands of the Commandants de Cercle in the bush.²⁰ The British D.C. as 'the King in his castle' found his counterpart in the French Commandant as 'le roi de la brousse'. French field administrators ruled autocratically, with little outside interference, and exercised their authority over a wide range of government functions with the assistance of few technical officers. Their perspective tended to be short-run with an emphasis on the techniques of control, and the concepts of bush administration appear to have been virtually identical to that of the British. For example, General Gallieni noted that "the higher administration must depend upon the good

sense and initiative of territorial commanders who are in direct contact with the local population", and Van Vollenhoven, the celebrated Governor General of West Africa, declared that "only one's presence, personal contact, counts. The circular is zero".²¹

Furthermore, contrary to the popular image, French colonial administration lacked a basic doctrine and long-term policy. The concepts of 'assimilation' or 'association' were not effectively translated into coherent doctrine or explicit policy. Charles Regismanset, the director of political affairs in the ministry of the colonies, declared in the 1920's:

It is abundantly clear that France has no colonial program, and in maintaining this negative attitude, she is faithful to a tradition. She has no program and has never had one. ²²

Despite the wide discretion of field officers, French colonial administration during the inter-war decades was rigid and stagnant. "The totality of powers that the administrators had arrogated to themselves meant that any change in the colonial system could occur only through their activities. The Corps in the interwar period, however, maintained a form of stability that easily led to stagnation."²³

These basic continuities in organizational processes are predicted by the theoretical analysis of prefectural administration. Nevertheless, the real contrasts between French and British colonial rule may have derived from cultural differences in the values, attitudes, and general ethos of administrators which resulted in essential differences in the orientations and outputs of structurally similar systems. Thus French administrators may very well have been more autocratic and brutal than their British counterparts, and this might reflect deep-

seated cultural differences in attitudes towards the use of force in government. However, the numerous often murderous punitive expeditions by which British rule was established in Kenya and the intense violence and atrocities of the Emergency indicate that the difference is no more than one of degree. Moreover, Kiwanuka notes that the land, labor, and educational policies of the colonial powers were essentially similar, particularly in their effects on the subject populations.²⁴

Finally, just as British administrators, whatever lip service they paid to the ideal of indirect rule and letting the African 'develop on his own lines', moved towards the exercise of direct control and judged African society by British values and standards; so did French administrators tend to reject 'assimilation' for the policy of 'association' with an increasing reliance on the chiefs, whether traditional or appointed, and an emphasis on the preservation of the integrity of tribal society.²⁵ All of this suggests important continuities in outlook, especially among field officers.

Analysis of the attitudes and values of field administrators suggests that colonial administration was in reality a European atavism; an attempt to create in the African context a modern idealized version of traditional aristocratic authority in a stable, hierarchically ordered society. Colonial rule can only be termed a middle class phenomenon if we focus exclusively on the social origins of administrators.²⁶ There is an unfortunate tendency to over-estimate the dominance of bourgeois values and culture in European society and neglect the continuing vitality of earlier, more traditional orientations, especially in the years of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century

that were the crucial formative period of colonial regimes. Furthermore, we also tend to see bureaucracy as largely a product of bourgeois liberal society and ignore, as Wolin reminds us, the substantial conservative contribution to bureaucratic thought and practice;²⁷ a contribution which finds its most concrete expression in prefectorial administration. When we look at the orientation of colonial administrators expressed in their attitudes, their motivations for a colonial career, and even their language of administration, we confront an essentially traditional and conservative world view and an aspiration to aristocratic power.

The values of aristocratic conservatism and an authoritarian paternalism were strongly evident in British colonial administration both in Asia and Africa. Heussler aptly depicts the situation of the British administrator when he notes that "year in and year out they lived the lives of little kings in an epoch when their home-based brothers had exchanged kingship for bourgeois democracy".²⁸ It is something of a surprise, however, to find that when we look closely we find similar attitudes among the ostensibly more egalitarian, republican and bourgeois French, especially the desire for an aristocratic, almost feudal, authority. Hubert Deschamps, a distinguished administrator and an active socialist wrote:

We leave France to become kings. And soon because there will be revolutions, we shall be the only kings on earth. And not do-nothing kings either, but artists at our job, enlightened despots organizing our kingdoms according to maturely reflected plans. ²⁹

Colonial administration also expressed a deep-seated European ambivalence towards non-Western cultures; a reaction of attraction and

repulsion that found its mirror image in a similar ambivalence towards European society and culture.³⁰ As Mannoni has pointed out, the European colonial was a man in flight "from a world in which others have to be respected .. because he cannot accept men as they are" and his rejection of the European world "was combined with an urge to dominate".³¹ In the early days, colonial administration tended to attract rootless, marginal men from European societies in the midst of a major socio-economic and political transformation. By the inter-war years, when administrative recruitment was more carefully controlled and administrative organizations firmly established, colonial administration attracted the discontented sons of the upper-middle class. Both French and British administrators tended to be men who fled from the limiting and repressive aspects of bourgeois industrial society, from the stultifying prospect of a career in an office in London or Paris, or worse, some provincial city. They were attracted to the colonies by the lure of the exotic and the promise of a free and heroic life of will and action in which they could exercise enormous power and reshape a part of the world.³²

Colonial rule thus created a white ruling caste in rural Africa. While the British tended to romanticize the supposed 'organic community' of traditional African society more than the French, field officers of both nations moved away in practice from the vague principles of 'indirect rule' or 'assimilation' to share a common ground that emphasized their own power and control and African dependence. When they acted to defend traditional society they were also defending the position they had established for themselves in it. The defence of

traditional society increased in proportion to the extent to which administrators found their power and status challenged either by white settlers or by African political associations led by educated, urban-based politicians. The stagnation and rigidity characteristic of colonial administrative organizations derived not only from organizational factors, but also from the fact that for the field officers administration was an end in itself. The emphasis on the methods and techniques of administration, carefully recorded and passed down in the conventional wisdom of the organization, indicates the extent to which the exercise of control and the domination of the African population were the principal satisfactions administrators derived from their job. From this came the intensity with which the administrator defended 'his district' and 'his people' against any outside interference. Change was something that was to come slowly, through small incremental improvements, with the ultimate goals of self-government or assimilation always projected into a distant future well beyond the career of serving officers. French and British officials alike tended to grossly underestimate the scope, rate, and consequences of social change in Africa and were taken by surprise by the pace of events after 1945. Heussler's comment on Tanganyika can be taken as a summary of events throughout French and British Africa:

... what was planned did not happen and what happened was not foreseen until it was too late for the planners to do much about it. 33

Colonial administrative systems were also particularly weak intellectually and analytically, and the level of understanding of external forces, of change and their relationship to organizational opera-

ations was low. Administrative officers were generally neither uneducated nor particularly stupid, but the constraints of their organizational situation and ethos largely deprived them of the motivation, skills, and information necessary for a more reflective understanding of their socio-economic and political environment. They tended to be confused and angered when post-1945 economic development, which they assumed must improve the lot of the Africans and make them contented, actually stimulated a rising level of conflict. The impact of administrators on development programs tended to be confused, inconsistent, and often contradictory; as when the Kenya Administration contemplated pushing 'excess' population out of the Kikuyu reserves without considering the absorptive capacity of alternative sources of employment or the existing deprivations of African conditions in the urban areas. The response of colonial administrations to African deprivations and grievances was also frequently marked by what Eric Wolf has described as "a particular kind of structurally induced stupidity, the kind of stupidity which ascribes to the people themselves responsibility for the evils to which they are subject".³⁴ This can be seen, on the one hand, in Kenya when administrators tended to blame 'Mau Mau' on the inability of the Kikuyu to adjust to the strains of modernization, and, on the other hand, in the more general tendency of colonial administrations to view conflict and unrest as something created by African politicians duping the ignorant masses.

If the foregoing analysis is valid, it suggests that imperialism and colonialism are quite different, albeit linked, phenomena. Imperialism is the relationship between a metropole and a dependency; a

series of asymmetrical linkages established and maintained for the perceived economic and political interests of the metropole. As long as the expected benefits of profits, resources, and strategic advantage are obtained, imperialism requires no necessary interest in or direct control over the internal affairs of the dependency. Colonialism, however, is a complex of ties created within a colony between European colonials, both administrators and settlers, and the indigenous population that ensures for the European an exalted political, social and economic status in a racially based system of stratification. While the relationships of imperialism are large scale, distant, and impersonal; the relationships of colonialism tend to be personal, immediate, and reaffirmed daily. The imperial interests of the metropole and the local colonial interests are not identical and may in fact be in conflict. Emmanuel has pointed out that "the most difficult struggles of the imperialist countries since the 18th century had not been with the natives in their colonies but with their own settlers".³⁵ It was the colonies of settlement in North America, Southern Africa, and the Pacific that were the most assertive of their own economic and political interests against the metropole and acted to end, forcefully or peacefully, the relationship of imperial dependence. White settler populations in Africa have frequently been in conflict not only with the local administration, but also the metropolitan authorities and the major metropolitan corporate interests active in the local economy.³⁶ We have seen also how administrators in Kenya distrusted economic individualism and feared the impact of modern industrial society on the African. Indeed, the presence of the administrator was generally

regarded by authorities in both the metropole and the colony, as well as by humanitarian groups and anti-imperialists, as a bulwark against the worst abuses and exploitation by both local settlers and metropolitan corporate interests.³⁷ The difference between colonialism and imperialism is revealed most clearly in the ironic situations where we find the local colonials, administrators and settlers, in an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist position against the metropole.

This view of colonialism and imperialism suggests a new interpretation of the process of decolonization. From the time control of the colonies was assured until the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain and France largely ignored their African possessions. Metropolitan investment in the colonies prior to 1945, with the exception of isolated pockets of valuable mineral resources, was miniscule.³⁸ Except when major crises or a juicy scandal erupted, metropolitan centers of economic and political power, as well as the general public, had little interest in colonial affairs. The domestic groups interested in the colonies were active and vocal, but were largely not of national political or economic importance. There was little reason for tight metropolitan control over the local colonial regimes and little felt need for explicit policy stating basic objectives and priorities. The Second World War, however, demonstrated the strategic value of colonial resources and stimulated economic growth that attracted an increasing flow of metropolitan investment after 1945. Thus metropolitan interest in the colonies began to increase just as the local colonial administrations faced their most serious challenge.

The escalating conflicts that emerged in African colonies in

the 1945-60 period pitted a mobilized and politically conscious segment of the African population against the local colonial regime. The metropolitan authorities were at first only indirectly involved in these conflicts, but as they were increasingly called upon to intervene and find solutions for the local combatants the political initiative increasingly moved into their hands. In French as in British colonies the rise of African nationalism was correlated with increasing metropolitan intervention and control over local colonial administrations.³⁹ During the 1950's the interests of the metropole and the vested interests of settlers and administrators in the colonies began to increasingly diverge. Galtung has pointed out that imperialism involves asymmetrical, but mutually beneficial, ties between centers of economic and political power in the metropole and similar centers in the dependency. Imperialism thus requires local collaborators.⁴⁰ For France and Britain the costs of using their own colonial agents in this role began to be increasingly high. Colonialism, however, primarily benefitted the colonials themselves and its continued support by the metropole in conditions of increasing political disorder and violence threatened the very existence of metropolitan interests. The process of decolonization thus began when the costs of maintaining direct colonial rule became unacceptable in the eyes of the metropolitan authorities,⁴¹ and involved a turning away from the administrators and settlers towards finding a modus vivendi with their African antagonists.

Accommodation with the African politicians was virtually impossible for administrators and settlers for whom colonialism was a way

of life. For metropolitan authorities, however, it made little difference who the local collaborators were as long as they provided the basic conditions of stability and order conducive to the expansion and increasing profit of metropolitan interests.⁴² We have seen that in Kenya, African politicians had contacts in Britain from the late 1920's, and they generally found the metropolitan authorities fairer and more receptive than the Kenya Administration.⁴³ The Emergency itself represented an attempt of the clandestine organization among the Kikuyu to generate a crisis that would force the intervention of the London authorities. They succeeded, but the British government initially decided to support the Kenya Government. The shift away from the administrators and settlers towards direct negotiations with the Africans for the relenquishing of formal political control appears to have occurred in both Britain and France approximately during the period 1955-60, with the Suez crisis of 1956, DeGaulle's accession to power in 1958, and the British general election of 1959 as important watersheds.

Decolonization was not a planned process of gradual withdrawal and preparation for self-government, unless we consider ad hoc improvisation under pressure and after-the-fact rationalization as evidence of planning. The political reforms of the first post-war decade were intended to deal immediately with the growing conflicts within the colonies, and if they looked forward to independence at all it was still in a distant and indeterminate future. Metropolitan policy on the colonies was initially uncertain. The administrators and settlers in the colonies and their metropolitan allies continued for some time to

have considerable emotional and political influence, and colonial affairs became a major issue of metropolitan political controversy during the 1950's.⁴⁴ By the end of the decade, however, the advantages of an expedient end to direct colonial control seem to have become increasingly apparent to policy-making circles in both France and Britain. During the previous decade and a half expanding metropolitan investments in the colonies and colonial development policies had shaped the tax structures, marketing arrangements, monetary systems, infrastructure investments, and industrial and extractive sectors of the colonies to the advantage of the metropole,⁴⁵ and tied them more closely to it than ever before. To continue to support the maintenance of colonial control involved the choice of the first of the two options of 'shoot or get out', and would certainly have jeopardized metropolitan interests. Withdrawal from formal political control, meanwhile, offered at least the possibility of maintaining valuable socio-economic ties.

Under metropolitan influence, policy towards the African nationalist politicians and their organizations began to shift from suppression to a combination of formal and informal cooptation. When the decision to withdraw was finally made explicit, the European powers left as soon as they could find and negotiate an agreement with an African leadership group that appeared to be strong enough and enjoy sufficient popular support to maintain stable government in the territory.⁴⁶ Local administrations had little choice but to obey or, as in Algeria, plot futile rebellion when the unequivocal directives finally came from the metropole. The settlers were ultimately politically and

economically expendible. Sir Michael Blundell, the Kenya settler leader, became aware of the prevailing winds in Britain when a young Tory M.P. told him "What do I care about the f...ing settlers, let them bloody well look after themselves", and he came away from a meeting with Iain Macleod suspecting that "perhaps after all our future was to be decided not so much for our own good, as I had imagined, but for that of Great Britain". A few months later at the Lancaster House Conference, he "came to the conclusion that the Africans knew from the Colonial Office that they were batting on a wicket specially prepared for them".⁴⁷

Rupert Emerson has expressed his concern over the fact that:

The sudden end of colonialism should indicate a striking change in the power relationships. Such a change there has undoubtedly been in various respects, and yet it is notorious that the gap between the advanced and the backward has continued to widen rather than contract.⁴⁸

This apparent paradox is resolved, however, when, in the light of the analysis of colonialism and imperialism presented here, we understand decolonization simply as the end of colonialism in Africa and not necessarily the end of imperialism. Decolonization represented the assertion of metropolitan over local colonial interests, in collaboration with an emergent indigenous elite, and involved the preservation rather than the withdrawal of metropolitan influence and investment. Available aggregate evidence indicates that the economic, cultural, military, and political dependence of African states on the metropolises has generally continued, if not increased, in the years after their ostensible independence.⁴⁹ This suggests that imperialism continues to be a matter of great consequence for African development, but that is a question that falls beyond the scope of the present study.

Notes

1. The conventional view of colonial administration is well exemplified by Michael Crowder, "Indirect Rule: British and French Style" Africa, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, 1964 and his West Africa Under Colonial Rule, London, 1968.
2. M. Semakula Kiwanuka, "Colonial Policies and Administrations in Africa: The Myths of the Contrasts", African Historical Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, 1970, page 300.
3. In Northern Rhodesia administrators tended to consider the Lozi, with a centralized political system, to be 'intelligent' people, while the Tonga, with a dispersed, decentralized system were regarded as 'an obstreperous, dissipated lot'. (Raymond Apthorpe, "The Introduction of the Bureaucracy into African Politics", (1960) in N. Raphaeli, Readings in Comparative Public Administration, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1967, pages 279-80.
4. Michael Crowder, "The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa" in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Colonialism in Africa, Vol. II: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pages 339-40.
5. Apthorpe, loc.cit., page 273.
6. A.I. Richards, "Tribal Government in Transition (The Bemba of Northern Rhodesia)" Supplement to the Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. XXXIV, no. CXXXVII, 1935, pages 3-26.
7. Sir Richmond Palmer, 9 November, 1908; quoted in Robert Heussler, "British Rule in Africa" in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis, France and Britain in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971, page 581. This point was also noted in KGL, Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and African Political Development", 1941, especially pages 34-35.
8. Apthorpe, loc.cit., page 272.
9. Kiwanuka, loc.cit., page 301.
10. Robert Heussler, British Tanganyika: An Essay and Documents on District Administration, Duke University Press, Durham, 1971, pages 51-54, 58.
11. Ibid., pages 6, 15, 26, 42-45, Philip Woodruff (pseud. for Philip Mason) The Men Who Ruled India, Vol. II: The Guardians (first published in 1954) Schocken Books, New York, 1964, pages 90, 94-95, 214-216.
12. Woodruff, Op.cit., pages 79-91. He goes on to point out that one of the difficulties during the transition period of the 1920's and 30's was the emphasis of officials in the field on the technique of control;

"Everyone was trained to this technique. It was the right technique for the local situation.... But tactical lessons could not be applied to strategy without modification and when the issues were much bigger, when the Secretary of State and the Viceroy took the place of District Officer or City Magistrate, the technique could not be applied in quite the same way...."

But many of the district officers, the superintendents of police and the battalion commanders expected their government to behave as they themselves would have behaved in a local situation." (page 246)

13. Thus Lord Hailey's judgment of Tanganyika in 1942: "the progress of the territory as far as native affairs are concerned seems to have come to a standstill. Improvements continue to be made in the machinery, but as a whole, the machine does not seem to move forward" (quoted in Ralph Austen, Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pages 214-215). See also Heussler, Op.cit., pages 37, 39, and Woodruff, Op.cit., pages 165, 208.

14. Heussler, Op.cit., pages 33-34.
15. Crowder, "Indirect Rule ..." loc.cit., pages 197-205.
16. Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1971.
17. Ibid., pages 13-15, 23-25.
18. Ibid., page 121.
19. Ibid., pages 90-92. By the 1930's colonial administrators were basically similar in education and social background to the higher civil service in metropolitan France (page 104).
20. Ibid., pages 59-65, 71, 79.
21. Ibid., pages 65,67 (emphasis added)
22. Quoted in Ibid., page 60.
23. Ibid., page 120.
24. Kiwanuka, loc.cit., pages 298-99, 301, 304-09.
25. Cohen, Op.cit., pages 71-72, 140-41, 179.
26. L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara, Praeger, New York, 1967, page 209.

27. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1960, especially the discussions of organization and community, pages 357-414.

28. Heussler, "British Rule ..." loc.cit., page 578.

29. Quoted in Cohen, Op.cit., page 106.

30. This ambivalence in European cultural history is brilliantly analysed in Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965.

31. O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (first published in 1950) Praeger, New York, 1964, page 108.

32. W.B. Cohen, "The Lure of Empire: Why Frenchman Entered the Colonial Service", Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 1, 1969, pages 103-116.

33. Heussler, Tanganyika, Op.cit., page 66.

34. Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Harper and Row, New York, 1970, page 286.

35. Arghiri Emmanuel, "White Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism", New Left Review, no. 73, May-June, 1972, page 40.

36. Ibid., pages 38-43.

37. J.A. Hobson, for example, noted:

"The contact with white races cannot be avoided, and it is more perilous and more injurious in proportion as it lacks governmental sanction and control. The most gigantic modern experiment in private adventure slowly yielded its full tale of horrors in the Congo Free State, while the handing over of large regions in Africa to the virtually unchecked government of Chartered Companies has exposed everywhere the dangers of contact based on private commercialism" (Imperialism (first published in 1902) University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1965, page 231).

38. Emmanuel, loc.cit., pages 50-51.

39. Cohen, Rulers, Op.cit., page 175.

40. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, 1971, no. 2, pages 81-117; and also Ronald Robinson,

"Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration" in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe, (eds.) Studies in The Theory of Imperialism, Longman, London, 1972, pages 117-142. Robinson, however, sees decolonization as the end of collaboration rather than a shift from one group of collaborators to another.

41. Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources", World Politics, vol. 20, no. 4, 1968.

42. For example, Emmanuel notes that when Patrice Lumumba was imprisoned by Belgian authorities in the Congo in 1958, it was major Belgian corporate and financial interests which came to his assistance. (loc.cit., page 41.) In Kenya, Kenyatta had become the devil incarnate to both settlers and administrators, but the metropolitan authorities had no such psychological constraints to prevent their ordering his release in 1961 and shortly after placing him in the cabinet, in order to meet the unyielding demands of the African politicians with whom they were negotiating.

43. Interview IOPA, and Interview IIPA.

44. For the impact on British politics see David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-61, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pages 205-372, passim.

45. T. Balogh, "The Mechanism of Neo-Imperialism: The Economic Impact of Monetary and Commercial Institutions in Africa", Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, vol. 24, no. 3, 1962, pages 331-46.

46. The identification of a ruling group and the erection of an institutional framework for them to operate in was, of course, a by no means easy task in the face of internal ethnic and ideological cleavages among the Africans themselves. The Congo provided an object lesson in the perils of too rapid withdrawal. Independence settlements required delicate balancing acts reflected in the exceedingly complex and often fragile constitutional arrangements with which African states were launched into the world. Emmanuel suggests that one reason for the rapidity of the withdrawal of the metropolitan powers was a desire to undercut the possibility of white settler communities rejecting the process and seceding to set up their own states. (loc.cit., page 43.) Such efforts failed in Algeria and the Congo, but succeeded in Southern Rhodesia, which in any case had been from the beginning a settler state over which the metropolitan authorities had little if any control.

47. Sir Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1964, pages 266, 271, 273.

48. Rupert Emerson, "Colonialism", Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 1, 1969, page 3.

49. See, for example, the statistics in Barbara Stallings, "Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America" Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, vol. 3, 1972.

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