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CULTURAL DUALITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

IN INDEPENDENT KENYA

1963-1965

by

Peter Linnekin-French

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate  
School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy.

1968

Abstract: Cultural Duality and Political Stability in Independent Kenya, 1963-1965

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The political stability of Kenya during the first two years after the granting of internal self-rule owed a substantial debt to both the indigenous and alien influences which formed the national culture. The resolution of the issues and problems which confronted the government of President Kenyatta depended on the choice of policy alternatives conditioned by sensitivity to the traditional tribal culture and the cultural orientations introduced from the outside during the colonial period. This study delineates the nature of each society and describes how each culture was important in providing a resource for policy making in the post-independence period.

To describe the national culture, a single standard of reference was desired. The framework chosen was one which broke the broad concept of culture down into constituent parts of skills, goals, and sentiments. This framework was used in the configuration analysis of both the African and European cultures. The growth of African political consciousness gave indication of how the norms of traditional African society were changed as increasing numbers of Africans accepted new behavioral cues from the Europeans until the Africans became politically competitive with their rulers. The learning of new skills, sentiments and goals, however, did not dissipate the importance of indigenous orientations. The utility of both sets of norms is seen in the examination of policy choices of the Kenyatta government as it dealt with a series of economic development issues, constitutional questions and security problems.

The methods employed for collecting data to substantiate the thesis included an ethnographic survey of the tribes in Kenya, a historical survey of colonial rule and the European community, a reading of the complete parliamentary record for 1963-1965, the use of the subject file of the East African Standard offices in Nairobi, and a series of field interviews with members of the Kenya House of Representatives.

Dedicated to the Memories

of

DAYTON ALLEN CARLISLE

Who Set Out the Guideposts

and

DONALD FAIRFAX TAYLOR

Of Whom Africa Required Everything

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have been most helpful in the researching of this study, some knowingly and many inadvertently. There are dozens of people whose names were never known such as the Masai moran who extended an invitation to visit his manyatta or the wizened old man picked up along a dusty road who told tales in broken English and Swahili of his days as a regimental sargeant-major in the old King's African Rifles. Most notably, there is the Honorable James Nyamweya, Minister of State to the Kenya Government, whose home in Kisii became a second home for me. Secondly, there is John C. Kamau, General Secretary of the Christian Council of Kenya, who in numerous conversations at Karura Falls Farm patiently answered my queries on traditional life and the way those old life styles continue to influence the present. Special thanks must go to the Honorable John O'Washika, C.L.A., Assistant Executive Officer of KANU, who in the early stages of the field work was so instrumental in arranging interviews with ministers and assistant ministers. Finally, there are the members of the House of Representatives who in the lounges of Parliament or in their constituencies proved most cordial and cooperatiye in giving of their time and knowledge.

In the writing of the study, I have benefitted greatly from the counsel and advice of Associate Professor William J. Foltz of the Department of Political Science at Yale. An invaluable supplement to that counsel has been the critical commentary of my colleagues at Syracuse University's Program of Eastern African Studies. Particular thanks is given to Professor Aidan Southall, of the Department of Anthropology, Associate Professor Julian Friedman of the Department of Political Science, Associate Professor Robert Gregory of the Department of History and Associate Professor Manfred Stanley of the Department of Sociology. All these people read the text of the thesis in its various draft stages and offered useful criticism based on their own disciplinary specialization and their field experiences in East Africa.

The writing of the study has taken longer than anticipated. During that period, I have been sustained through the support provided by Dean Stephen K. Bailey of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and by Professor Fred G. Burke, Director of the Program of Eastern African Studies. Also, the opportunity to teach at both the graduate and undergraduate levels has contributed significantly to the clarifying of theoretical perspectives leading to an improvement in the overall coherence of the study.

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## PREFACE

The distance between the conception of an idea and its realization in written form is traversed amidst everbroadening recognition of how confined was the initial insight. This confinement is clearly revealed when seeking an understanding of the peoples and cultures in the non-Western world. In the spring of 1963 as Kenya prepared for the last elections prior to independence, this study was planned to discover what elements in the national culture of that state had the greatest relevance to the operation of political life. Now, five years have passed, and Kenya again prepares for a general parliamentary election. During that time, the country has maintained its democratic institutions intact. Some restraints on individuals have been imposed, but the individual freedoms set down in the independence constitution have been preserved. Because stability and democracy have now been maintained for half a decade, the value of this study may be enhanced. Its primary purpose was to describe how and why the Kenyatta government was able to keep Kenya stable and democratic during the first two years in office. In so doing, perhaps the basis of present day stability is more clearly understood. If Kenya continues as a peaceful democratic republic in East Africa, future research may find a great debt is owed to the

men who assumed the responsibility for governing on June 1, 1963. This is their story; an account of forces shaping their lives, creating their problems, and influencing their policy choices during a crucial two year period in the history of a new nation.

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## CHAPTER ONE:

### INTRODUCTION: DIMENSIONS AND PROCEDURES

The years since the "winds of change" first swept African states from colonial rule to independence have been difficult ones for both the peoples and governments of those new nations. The attempts to maintain the forms of constitutional democracy installed in the last stages of colonial rule have not succeeded, and Africa has experienced a "crisis of confidence" for the leaders and followers alike, raising doubt as to whether democratic practice and political stability can be practised simultaneously in the new states south of the Sahara. This study represents an attempt to discover some of the strengths which Africa does possess. It is a study of a single African state, the Republic of Kenya, which, during the first two years after the granting of self-government, so managed its resources as to (1) preserve its stability while confronted with a series of potentially disruptive issues, and (2) maintain both constitutional democracy and an "open" style of political pluralism.

This can be considered a remarkable achievement when one surveys the threats that did confront the Kenya government during that period. Within two months of independence



one-third of the Kenya army mutinied. Throughout the first year of independence, former Mau Mau Freedom Fighters turned outlaws were a threat to the peace of Central Province.

The Northeastern Province and parts of the Eastern and Coastal Provinces were in turmoil from the guerrilla irredentism caused by the Somali shifita (outlaws). Thousands of Africans took to "squatting" on European farms after independence, proving economically disruptive to those key sectors of revenue production. In urban areas, massed labor protest over unemployment required government action. The opposition political party criticized the government severely. And always in the background was the force of tribalism, exacerbating the severity of nearly every political issue. In concert, those issues could have overthrown the government, yet with skillful use of its resources, the government survived. The fashion in which those issues were processed bespoke a maturity of problem analysis, a pragmatism and flexibility of response, and a political sophistication representative of more politically developed states.

It is the thesis of this study that Kenya's political stability resulted from the cultural pluralism existent in the national society and the leadership's awareness of the power of the value of such pluralism as a resource in the making of policy decisions.

Because of the sensitivity to cultural norms manifested by the political leadership and the distinctive content of both the traditional African culture and European colonial culture, constitutional democracy was maintained. The emotional sensitivities, life styles, and beliefs of the Kenya African were combined with the economic, social, and political contributions of the colonial period to form an observably mature level of political discourse characterized by government responsiveness in policy-making, dependence on popular sanction for legitimization of policy choices, and the utilization of democratic procedures for political action.

Thus stated, the thesis suggests that there is an observable causal relationship between the plurality of culture norms and the maintenance of political stability in Kenya. Since the crucial consideration is normative, the suggested relationship is not a tightly structured research question. Therefore, both the subject and the methodology may be open to criticism. To resolve the critical issue raised by the normative content of the thesis, two key research considerations had to be satisfied. First, it had to be shown that normative orientations descriptive of both the African and the European cultures do exist and that these normative orientations influenced the behavior of the politicians. Secondly, evidence

had to be compiled to indicate that the decision-makers in the Kenya government chose to utilize those normative orientations in making policy choices.

To provide support for the first of the research considerations, an ethnographic survey of Kenya tribes was made.<sup>1</sup> This survey was indexed along two basic lines. One, it showed how Kenya's cultures, despite differing ethnic origins, had a high degree of similarity in terms of actions, beliefs and ritual behavior. Formerly, this was an unsubstantiated characteristic found in more general texts. The compilation of survey materials resulted in the selection of twenty characteristics descriptive of the comparative nature of tribal life in terms of social organization, political practice, religious beliefs and judicial procedure. The second and more general characteristic revealed by the survey was the interrelatedness of tribal life through adherence to powerful communal norms that opposed individualism and supported social integration. The evidence on these communal ties was vital to the analysis of ways in which the traditional norms continued to influence life in post-independence Kenya.

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The survey included fifteen of the major tribes or tribal groupings in the country representing eighty percent of the population. The groups investigated were drawn from three of the four ethnic stocks in the country: the Bantu, the Nilo-Hamitic, and the Nilotic. No investigation was made of the Hamitic groups who live in the Northeastern Province of the country and constitute less than five percent of the total population. The tribes surveyed included: BANTU - Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Meru, Embu, Nyika, Polomo, Taita; NILO-HAMITIC - Kipsigis, Turkana, Masai, Nandi, Elgeyo, Suk; and NILOTIC - Luo.

Paralleling the ethnographic survey of tribal life was a configurative analysis of the European enclave in the former British colony. This analysis indicated how the influence of European culture on African life came from three groups: the settlers, the Colonial Office personnel, and the missionaries. Each of those archetypes for change made demands, imposed conditions, contradicted the traditional norms of tribal life, or introduced alternative role structures and new sets of activities different from the activities practiced in the tribal environment. The examination of the European community revealed the skills, goals, and sentiments of the alien intruders into Kenya and provided the basis for studying the process by which the cultural norms of African life were modified.

Supporting these cultural surveys and reinforcing the contention that norms from both cultural traditions had an impact on post-independence politics are two bodies of information: (1) the historical summary of the growth of African political activity in the former colony, and (2) the data gathered from an interview survey of nearly one-third of the membership of the Kenya House of Representatives. The selection of the House members as the interview sample was based on the following considerations:

- A. There was a high degree of overlapping between the House membership and the top officials in the hierarchies of the major political parties.
- B. The House of Representatives held the legal power for the making and legitimating of rules under the provisions of the Kenya Constitution.
- C. The House membership was elected on single-member constituency basis in order to reflect the demographic makeup of the society as divided among various tribal groups.
- D. The House membership was a primary communication link between the government and the local levels, permitting research access to the constituency level for purposes of observing how national decisions influenced local political life.<sup>2</sup>

The conclusions on the legislative and constituency behavior of the House membership provided ample evidence of the influence of cultural pluralism on post-independence politics.

The second major research consideration was dealt with through the analysis of a series of policy decisions taken by the Kenya government during its first two years in office.

This approach was based on the belief that though the minutiae of individual decisions may never be known, the analysis of a series of decisions can lead to a conclusion about a particular style or pattern of leadership. The process by which

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This final reason for selecting the House membership was considered particularly important as a means for resolving one of the crucial considerations in social science methodology, the narrowing of the macro-micro gap. See Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) chapter one.

an alternative is selected may never be known, but the choice is an empirical fact that may reveal much about the decision-maker himself or about the system in which his choices must be made. And when the consequences of a decision are observed along with the decision itself, conclusions can be drawn about the efficacy of a particular choice as it relates to the goals of the decision-maker and the environment in which the decision must be implemented.

Utilizing parliamentary debates and newspaper accounts along with supplementary comments offered by the politicians, these issues are described to show the following considerations: (a) how was the issue articulated, (b) how did the government move to resolve or mitigate the impact of the issue, and (c) how did the government's policy reflect sensitivity to and use of Kenya's two cultural traditions? All issues arose after the grant of self-government and touched on constitutionalism, domestic order, economic growth, public welfare, inter-national diplomacy, and governmental, police powers. The conclusions validated the original thesis that the manipulation of diverse cultural orientations within a reasonably open society is significant in preserving stability amidst the lack of adequate physical resources. This observance of "strategies of cultural management" was not considered a

new facet of social science inquiry.<sup>3</sup> However, the study does go beyond the description of basic strategies to seek an understanding of why leadership practices are viable.

By the selection of such a broad subject for investigation, it became necessary to depart from a rigid dependence on a single discipline or form of inquiry. This was intentional since it was never anticipated that the inquiry should compromise its scope by confining research to a narrow vein. It was intended that there should be no reliance on a rigid "scientism" that might restrict the effort to realize valuable insight concerning the basis of political stability in Kenya. The behavioral persuasion was used as a basis for designing the method of inquiry, however, it was not considered imperative to make that persuasion so complete as to exclude areas of investigation that were relevant to the topic though not precisely researchable in a rigorous manner. In choosing between political relevance and scientific exactitude, the preference was for relevance.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> McKim Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 27-56. Marriott uses the term in quoting Lloyd Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," American Anthropologist, pp. 677-678, 1963. Marriott describes such strategies in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of this question of relevance versus exactitude see Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," in Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism, (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1967), pp. 12-38 and McCoy's introduction, pp. 1-10.

The result is a balancing of disciplines to produce a series of conclusions about political stability in one African state that have not found similar treatment in other studies of Africa's new nations.

The organization of the study is based on a simple framework constructed out of a reading of the general literature on social change, cultural reorientation and political development. This study states that culture does play and must play a significant rôle in the actions of political life. The crucial point in the study of culture is to accept that the term itself is diffuse in definition. Accordingly, using a division acceptable to the social science community, culture is defined as consisting of: (1) skills, (2) motivations, and (3) affective sentiments.<sup>5</sup> This division permits recognition of change of one type, such as adoption of new skills, while accounting for lack of corresponding change in affective sentiments or motivations. Having accepted such a simple framework, I analyzed the skills, motivations and sentiments of the African and European communities. Both communities were internally homogeneous and thus available to generalizations. The analysis of the culture orientations of the two communities resulted in a list of supportive orientations,

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5. Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nationbuilding: Burma's Search for Identity, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), chapter one.



that the government of Kenya could employ to help maintain its authority and preserve national stability.

The constant reference to two cultures was considered vital since the research revealed that the Kenya government had relied on both cultures in seeking solutions to national problems. Indeed, it had no choice. The continuing strength of traditional ways demanded that the government be responsive to the tribal environment. At the same time there was an apparent realization on the part of the government that the use of new norms was necessary to build a strong modern nation. If there was to be a real sense of nationhood, there could be no return to the old ways; however, the old ways could not be disavowed for such action would have created a dangerous situation for the government.

There is no guarantee that the Kenya nation will always know the freedom from chaos and public disorder which marked the first two years after the granting of internal self-rule. Changes in attitudes, skills, beliefs, and motivations as well as the emergence of new elites, may dissipate the abilities of the government. The fact remains, however, that during the first years of sovereignty, cultural traditions - indigenous and alien - provided useful support for stability and democracy in the Kenya Republic.

## CHAPTER TWO:

### THE KENYA SYSTEM - A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The development of a methodology for investigating Kenya politics is based on the prior construction of an acceptable framework for integrating the diverse empirical data and materials drawn from a variety of scholarly disciplines. The problems encountered in constructing such a framework for analysis center around the reconciliation of two culture traditions and the definition of criteria for concluding that both culture traditions did effect policy decisions taken by the Kenya government. The task of resolving those problems is particularly fascinating in the study of Kenya because the past and the present are so closely linked. Long standing tribal ritual and belief continue to have an influence on the quest for modernity. New ideas are forced to defer to old ways that still command the respect of so many of Kenya's rural population. During the lifetime of President Kenyatta, Kenya, under the impact of colonial rule, moved from total underdevelopment to the fringes of modernity, and within the rich nexus of cultural influences determining contemporary events, the national leadership was able to harmonize diverse cultural elements and rule in peaceful fashion after the

grant of self government.

A decade ago, the belief that Kenya would emerge as one of Africa's more stable polities would have been criticized as a naive judgment on the future of lands south of the Sahara. At that time the most violent period of the country's Mau Mau rebellion had been brought to an end, but fear, mistrust and suspicion were the core of interracial relations in the colony. To the world at large, the Kenya conflict was distorted by sensationalist journalism and florid prose which firmly imprinted an image of the chaos and violence perpetrated by "savage" Africans.<sup>1</sup>

It is unfortunate that Kenya suffered from such misinterpretation of the Mau Mau Emergency, but this country in East Africa where so much history had been compressed into seventy odd years has always been a focal point of controversy. Since the beginning of the century, travelers, missionaries, naturalists, settlers, and officials have been

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<sup>1</sup> Perhaps no volume on Kenya is more widely read than Robert Ruark's Something of Value, a novel dealing with Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion. The empirical basis for this statement is derived from questionnaires administered to 306 Peace Corps trainees at Syracuse University. The results of those questionnaires showed the Ruark novel, Moorehead's The White Nile, and Paton's Cry the Beloved Country to be the most widely read books on Africa. See P.L. French, What a Peace Corpsman Believes (Syracuse University: unpublished monograph) and P.L. French, "The Nature of Cross Cultural Studies," A Special Report on the Tanzania XII Training Program prepared for the Peace Corps.

overpowered by their African experiences and have felt compelled to commit their adventures and observations to the page. They have done this often and with an abandon that provides a voluminous commentary on the years of colonial rule. A good portion of that commentary is inexpert, misinformed, pervaded with personal or ideological bias, stated in polemics and written out of anger or frustration. Nonetheless, the results of such efforts have produced two sound conclusions. First, impressions of Kenya are multiple and contradictory, and, two, few observers have remained emotionally detached from the Kenya scene once they spent any appreciable amount of time there.

Multiple images, cultural complexity and the compression of change into a relatively short span of time are three of the most apparent characteristics of the East African nation. In introducing the framework for analysis these are considerations which have instructed the collection of empirical data. Basically, Kenya has a political system founded on and guided by influence from both the traditional African culture and the cultural contribution of the European intrusion. The roles which make up the structure of the system and the functions carried on within the system reflect

that cultural ambivalence and heterogeneity. The exact nature and significance of each of the cultural traditions requires more specific definition. The framework constructed here performs that task.

#### THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN KENYA POLITICS

Nearly every author writing about Kenya has a cultural bias that colors his perspective of the country. To African writers, the colonial period was a composite of exploitation, forced subservience, victimization, and discrimination. To the European chroniclers, colonialism was a struggle to build something permanent amidst squalor, paganism, primitivism, stupidity and the lassitude of untrustworthy Africans. Yet out of the depths of that mistrust and hatred has emerged a polity that gives evidence of becoming a viable national system. This phenomenon cannot be attributed to the "stochastic" element in political analysis or the idea of chance convergence of circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Many variables affecting stability are identifiable. The state of physical resources, the amount of trained manpower, the efficiency and comprehensiveness of government institutions and the demands of

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<sup>2</sup> Benjamin Rivlin, "The Concept of Political System in the Study of the Developing Areas," Orbis, Vol. X, No. 2, pp. 548-563 for a discussion of stochasism in politics.

the masses are all important conditioning factors shared in common with the other new states of Africa.<sup>3</sup> The primary independent variables in the Kenya case are the nature of the traditional African life, the colonial experience under the characteristically distinct European community that came to Kenya, and the manner in which the leadership of the independence government used its distinct cultural heritage.

The tribal communities in Kenya were different from those found in many parts of Africa. In Kenya there were no great hierarchical patterns of tribal relations linking clan and sub-clan in an intricate set of relationships that had control over wide areas of the countryside. Neither were there rigid pyramids of authority that controlled community action through the issuing of commands by some paramount chief at the apex of the structure. Rather, the systems of tribal organization in Kenya were collections of relatively independent clan lineages which were segmentary or cut off from one another though they might exist in close geographical proximity. These small scale segmentary societies had not the institutional or bureaucratic organization one

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<sup>3</sup> Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 205-207 for a discussion of the factors that effect the capabilities of government operations.

associates with hierarchical or pyramidal systems. Kenya society consisted of a great number of relatively autonomous tribal units linked tenuously by certain forms of prescribed behavior.<sup>4</sup>

Colonial rule, like tribal societies in Kenya, was different though it established a state structure and economic framework similar to that set up in other colonies. Europeans and European political behavior in Kenya left a special legacy in the style of political activities practiced. The absorption of this European style by Kenya Africans combined with the strength of African traditions to form the two culture strains that continued to influence both the institutions and activities of the country's political life after independence.

The observance of cultural duality in Kenya, recognizable in numerous isolated instances would have been of limited use in political analysis if the empirical data could not have been integrated into some general frame of reference. Witnessing an African's continuing adherence to traditional habits or eager acceptance of social innovation would have meant little if that behavior could not be fitted into some general cultural pattern where it could be classified as

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<sup>4</sup> David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 83-100 for an analysis of tradition using this form of typology.

either congruent with traditional norms or representative of new cultural orientations. That is to say, what was required was an analysis of the two cultures that would account for the dynamics of cultural change and provide a single frame of reference descriptive of both sets of cultural orientations. The definition of political culture as symbols, beliefs, values and skills was considered to be too broad to provide an adequate basis for analysis. To achieve greater precision, three classes of culture characteristics were chosen. These are: (1) technical skill, (2) motivational goals, and (3) associational sentiments.<sup>5</sup> The first of these refers to the skills, knowledge, and ideas taught to members of society. The second refers to the types of goals and behavior which the socialization process reaches are legitimate. The third refers to beliefs and attitudes regarding the capacity of people to relate themselves to each other so as to facilitate collective action. Utilizing such divisions, more clearly defined cultural norms are more analytically apparent.

The a priori understanding that generalizations about cultures can be made on the basis of the three-fold classification of skills, motivations, and sentiments would have

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<sup>5</sup> Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nationbuilding: Burma's Search for Identity, (New Haven: Yale, 1961), chapter one for the division of culture into analytic categories.



been of little use in the study of Kenya if the behavior patterns of the various tribal groups had been very diverse. Correspondingly, if the European immigrants to Kenya had come from all across Europe, general statements about colonial rule would have been of equally little value. Empirical findings, summarized in Chapter Three, however, revealed a high degree of congruence in the behavior patterns of Kenya Africans. The impact of "cultural borrowing" amongst the several ethnic stocks resulted in a uniformity of outlook which made tribal society comparable.<sup>6</sup> Also, the European culture in Kenya represented a distinct social, political and economic unity of norms that permitted equally valid generalizations about the impact of colonial attitudes on the

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<sup>6</sup> On the concept of cultural borrowing, see Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, (New York: Mentor Book, 1934), Chapter: Integration of Culture. Also see, Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change, (New Haven: Yale University, 1961), passim. Malinowski uses a five-column approach to describe cultural borrowing and change. The cultural ambivalence of the new nations presents problems for the investigator with regard to the development of a conceptual framework that harmonizes cultural differences. Riggs defines transitional societies as "prismatic," see his contribution in Joseph LaPalombara, ed. Bureaucracy and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Fred Burke relies on a diffuse concept of "sociation" to describe the process of culture and social change, see Fred G. Burke, Africa's Quest for Order, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), chapter one. Karl Deutsch has used "configurative analysis" to account for the meshing of radically different social phenomena through the measurement of objective social criteria, but that approach does not account for subjective change, see Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953), passim.

values of African life. Thirdly, each of the two culture patterns was distinct enough to permit conclusions concerning how each set of orientations contradicted or reinforced its counterpart in the political environment.

#### THE TRIBAL PATTERN

The primary loyalties of Kenya Africans were to the family, clan and tribe. They were loyalties so strong that they created an inability or conscious refusal to evaluate issues in terms of a level of interest broader than that of the tribal unit. This intense loyalty was fostered by the other two analytical indices of culture: goals and skills. Within each tribe there was a body of custom which was comprehensively structured and which continues to influence the behavior of individual Kenyans. The basic goal was to maintain the harmony and unity of the tribal unit. The skills associated with the practice of ceremony, taboo, ritual or belief were woven together to create an intense level of communalism permitting the survival of non-scientific or non-technological societies in unpredictable environmental conditions. Each societal unit was forced by its environment to cooperate as fully as possible in order to survive. The individual was recruited into a series of dependent relationships that incurred obligatory behavior toward the society.

Security and survival depended on individual fulfillment of obligations to the group. Rigorous maintenance of custom and corresponding intolerance of deviant behavior were fundamental to the security of the whole tribal structure. In such fashion did Kenya society increase the active role of each individual within the society while strengthening parochial sentiments that alienated tribal members from other tribal groups.

These societies were most dependent on three key features which preserved cohesion of individual societal units and guaranteed survival beyond the lifetime of any single generation.<sup>7</sup> These three features were the basis for (1) the legitimization of authority, (2) the sanctioning of social action, and (3) the ordering of the individual's expectations of the future.<sup>8</sup> The basic feature of all Kenya tribes was the lineage tie of clan and kinship involving the requisite customary behavior of the extended family and

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<sup>7</sup> For a definition of society, I have relied on Levy, The Structure of Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 116. This is a system of action involving a plurality of interacting individuals whose actions are primarily oriented to the system which is in theory self-sufficient and which is capable of existing longer than the life span of the individual or individuals involved.

<sup>8</sup> Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 24 and 49 in which they discuss the obligations of the system to the needs of the individual.

all those descended from a common agnate or other ancestor. Such ties can be described as vertical for purposes of graphic representation, reflecting links between succeeding generations. The second feature which was nearly universal was the horizontal tie that linked individual segmentary clans through the use of age-grades in which ritual initiation of all people of approximately the same age tied an individual to a peer group for life.<sup>9</sup> The association of lineage groups with defined land areas was to insure that individuals remained close to those toward whom they had ritual obligations. Thus, lineage obligations, age-grade responsibilities, and association with defined land areas were the basis for the bulk of ritual and procedural customs in the society. Those phenomena of life which could not be explained by the body of custom related to family, clan, tribe, and peer group relations were thought to be the spiritual or supernatural nature and were accepted with resignation.

To minimize conflict within those societies that depended so heavily on cooperation, a currency was needed to pay compensatory judgments as well as to conform to the ritual

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<sup>9</sup> Of all Kenya tribes, only the Luo do not conduct practices that could be interpreted as age grade initiations. However, Luo youth do go through a ritual initiation that is accompanied by the extraction of the lower incisor teeth.

prescriptions of society. The use of such a currency or unit of exchange could avoid violent retributive action when a family, clan, or individual felt rights had been violated. Since the currency used was cattle, the whole of Kenya has been defined as being inhabited by "cattle cultures."<sup>10</sup> Cattle as currency were a transferable unit for nearly all required societal interchanges. To pay bride-wealth, initiation fees, compensations, and ritual penalties, cattle were the capital and the currency of the society. In non-technical systems, cattle were a self-reproducing unit permitting growth of exchange capital to meet any consequent growth in population. By tying wealth to such a unit and strictly defining the obligations regarding the use of the currency, the tribal society possessed a procedural mechanism that could work with tribal values and reduce the possibility of intra-community violence.

The integration of social behavior within the "cattle cultures" was aimed at the realization of the primary goals of the society - security and survival. Each tribal unit was a small scale community. The great weakness of those stateless societies (and the reason for the European's easy dominance) was the fact that those communities had limited

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<sup>10</sup> Peter Mudrock, Africa, (Chicago: McGraw Hill, 1959), pp. 340-345. Also see Melville Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), for a discussion of East African societies as "cattle cultures." The definition of currency is taken to mean other types of livestock as well, such as goats.

resources because of their segmentary nature. Being small and with few resources except communal cooperation they maintained a rigidity of custom and an intolerance of deviancy. They were not suited to the rapid assimilation of dynamic influences from the outside. Strict maintenance of custom with penalties for any transgressions were the basis for enforcing individual social obligations, and insuring survival when threatened by the physical environment. In essence, a delicate "equilibrium" was established which caused tribal society in pre-colonial times to be a series of scattered "small-scale equilibrial security communities" oriented to the goal of self-preservation through the socialization of the individual into complete harmony with his communal environment.<sup>11</sup>

#### THE EUROPEAN INTRUSION

Kenya tribal society could not absorb colonial rule without transformation. The Kenya African social systems so dependent on voluntary compliance to customary belief were not prepared to rebuff European intruders who so brazenly disdained both the structure and culture of indigenous society.

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<sup>11</sup> Max Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 279-280, 296-299 discusses the idea of tribal society as equilibrial communities, but prefers to describe tribal society as passing through a series of "repetitive equilibria" that permit the absorption of limited amounts of change.

The colonialists were more oriented to the rational, empirical, and analytical in their decision-making than to dependence on the spirituality of magico-religious incantation. With an attitude that mixed self-aggrandizement with moralism, the Europeans were inspired to political, economic, and religious enterprise under the rationale that such efforts were communicating to backward peoples the bounty of Western culture. Technically advanced, innovative, and specialized, colonialism introduced into Kenya whole new ways of thinking.

The basic sources for change in Africa have generally been recognized as the missionary, the administrator, the settler, and the entrepreneur. In Kenya, the entrepreneurial element consisted primarily of Asians who for historical and sociological reasons remained a closed enclave. Though the Asians extensively colonized all regions of the country, they did not accept the African into their culture. They taught Africans no languages and did not attempt to inculcate the norms and values of historic Indian culture.<sup>12</sup> Attention is thereby focused on the other three influences which were European. The most important of those was the settler influence. The colonial administrator, playing largely a

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<sup>12</sup> For a short study of the Asian community see George Delf, The Asians in Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

supporting role in culture change, was responsible for establishing a national governmental framework in which African political consciousness could mature and social change occur. The missionary efforts can be viewed as having been primarily catalytic in shortening the time required for the transfer of new social and cultural norms through the educative function performed by the mission schools. Both those archetypes, the missionary and the administrator, are also recognized as having provided the basis for alternative behavior. This threatened the high levels of voluntary compliance that existed in tribal society, thereby contributing to a weakening of the sources of cohesion in tribal environments. The major force for change, however, was the settler community which was the chief antagonist of the African community in the colonial period. It was from that group of immigrants that the Africans learned new political skills, and it was that community with which the Africans eventually competed.

Collectively and in isolation, these major forces constituting the alien intrusion set about weakening the close unity of tribal life. The missionaries brought traditional belief systems into question and condemned certain ritual practices of family life that had previously been integral to



family cohesiveness. The settlers with their need for cheap labor designed schemes to draw Africans away from traditional lands to work on European farms. The colonial administration established tasks which the traditional councils of elders were not capable of implementing. This latter practice lowered the prestige of the age-grade system as younger men rejected the legitimacy of the traditional authorities. Generally, the colonial intrusion constituted an attack on all three of the supportive features of tribal cohesion and thus initiated a process which transformed skills, goals, and sentiments of Kenya Africans. The direction of that transformation was toward a perspective more congruent and more competitive with the cultural norms of the European community itself.

#### THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL CHANGE

These two distinct sets of culture norms are the sources of the more parochial and the more modernist orientation which influenced the process of post-independence Kenya politics. The colonial period saw the gradual absorption by Africans of new cultural cues drawn from the European culture. Beyond the acceptance or rejection of new concepts of political behavior, the process of culture change involved a

reinterpretation of the whole range of social norms of the African. This process resulted in the abandonment of old "preferences" for more suitable goal objects of a different culture. The empirical verification of the fact of cultural change is the number of new institutions and modes of action which the Africans adopted.<sup>13</sup>

It is difficult to establish a precise equation by which perception of attachment to new culture norms can be measured, for as has been recognized, values and preferences,

change more by the unconscious redefinition of meaning than by rational analysis. Every contact and every procedure which discloses new facts has its repercussions upon the matrix of partially verbalized experience which is the seeding ground of conscious ideas!<sup>4</sup>

What is apparent is that cultural change in Kenya came about largely within the lifespan of the country's leader. In the space of sixty-odd years, depending on when colonial rule made its initial impact on a particular area of the country,

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<sup>13</sup> Referring back to footnote six, Malinowski, op. cit., Malinowski makes the most structured efforts to analyze culture change using five columns, the most important of which are labelled: (A) European impact, (B) Processes of culture change and contact, and (C) Surviving forms of tradition. Such a schemata clearly recognized the cultural determinism in both alien and indigenous cultures and emphasized the fact that the aims and intents of each were not necessarily congruent.

<sup>14</sup> Harold Lasswell, psychopathology and Politics, (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 184.

Kenya's "stateless" societies became involved in a process encouraging the repudiation of parochial loyalties and the adoption of attitudes of support for the larger national community. To bring about such change, given the parochialism of tribal life, required either intense communication between the cultures or an extended period of association to compensate for fragmentary contact. In Kenya, the timespan of colonial intrusion was insufficient to erase indigenous cultural orientations. Even under the best of conditions, the practices and beliefs of those tribal societies could not have been eroded away so quickly, and the conditions were never ideal. The contacts between Europeans and Africans were uneven in their intensity and extremely fragmentary in remote areas. As towns grew and spread the ideas and instruments of Western society, beyond the bright lights and paved streets, the "bush" swallowed up many such ideas and Kenya Africans preserved old ways. In the semi-arid wastes of the northern part of the Rift Valley Province, Turkana and Samburu tribesmen continue to live in much the same fashion that they did half a century ago. What has occurred in a single lifetime is a confrontation in which both cultural strains remained strong and distinct.

The change occurring where cross-cultural contacts were intense has demonstrated the capacity of Africans for absorbing technical innovation. In workshops in Nairobi, Africans display great skill at repairing electric typewriters and small desk computers or in operating keypunch machines and counter-sorters.<sup>15</sup> But a capacity to ably operate and repair complex machinery is not indicative of a rejection of traditional culture norms. Rather, there has been a selectivity of acceptance of Western innovation, a selectivity that produces cultural pluralism in habit and action. Africans cross thresholds to modernity but with the door behind them always ajar, in readiness for their retreat back into the "bush" with its comfortable familiarity. The movement to a modern environment typified by expanding urban complexes cannot be construed as a total separation from that narrow world of the tribe. A more accurate description of the change occurring would be an image of a broad zone of transition through which individuals pass back and forth or in which they spend lengthy periods of time.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> During field work, visits to the Olivetti office and East African Standard office supplies repair workshops found Africans repairing complex typewriters and computers. At Marco Surveys, Africans perform all tasks related to running of counter sorters and keypunch machines.

<sup>16</sup> Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 31-33 for a discussion of thresholds of integration.

Recognition that change in traditional beliefs can lag behind acceptance of technical innovation is basic to an interpretation of modern Kenya, for there has not been a synchronization between the adoption of new values and the more willing acceptance of new technical devices. Africans make full use of the telephone in Nairobi, but often use it only as a novelty.<sup>17</sup> The change from subsistence to cash-crop farming may be charted as an indicator of modernity, but the consequent shift from barter to exchange and the introduction of credit systems has created difficulties since the credit obligation under mortgages and loans is greatly misunderstood.<sup>18</sup> A Kikuyu woman may exchange shirts of hides and skins for bright colored cotton cloth, but she still labors along the roads bent under the heavy loads that can cause a tilted pelvis, difficulty in childbirth, and high

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According to an official of the East African Posts and Telegraphs Administration, the African really learned to use the phone in 1964, a year of intensive Africanization of the civil service, when the average length of a telephone conversation in Nairobi jumped from 3 to 9 minutes, an increase unprecedented throughout the globe for a single year.

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The widespread failure of Africans to repay loans was a political issue in Kenya during early 1965 because the loans given by the Government to farmers worked on a revolving basis with new loans being paid out of the revenues under repayment schedule. See Government of Kenya, Official Report, The National Assembly House of Representatives, Vol. IV, Part I. passim.

infant mortality.<sup>19</sup> A pastoralist who "sells" his cattle to "buy" shillings in order to pay taxes is statistically a part of the economic-technical change introduced in Kenya, but to interpret his tax receipt as indicative of cultural reorientation is a distortion of reality.<sup>20</sup>

Unevenness of contact, selectivity of acceptance, and limited time for cultural integration were, in the post-independence period, joined by a fourth factor which was integral to understanding the cultural balance of modern Kenya. This is the fact that cultural choices and preferences were now determined by the Africans themselves. With the emigration of many of the Europeans, the choice of new norms has been left to the Africans who themselves possess strong ties to their traditional environments. This continued link with traditional culture is recognized by one of the most sophisticated of Kenya's politicians when he states,

To a large extent, even African leaders and heads of state have not succeeded in transforming themselves completely into individual personalities; they are still to some degree communal because of their background and their relatives remain tribal, so they themselves cannot afford to change at the risk of offending their family.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> This fact was confirmed by the staffs of hospitals at Limuru, Thika Tumu Tumu and Kilimambogo.

<sup>20</sup> I. Q. Orchardson, "Some Traits Among the Kipsigis in Relation to Their Contact with Europeans," Africa, Vol. IV, 1931, p. 468.

<sup>21</sup> Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 64.

An awareness of continued obligation to the traditional culture still so strong among a politician's constituents can act as a brake on innovative policy and slow the pace of change, emphasizing the selective nature of adoption and illuminating the role of culture pluralism in the political life of a new country.

#### CULTURAL DUALITY AND SOCIAL EPIGENESIS

The addition of a second culture to the indigenous one leaves the norms of neither unchanged and results in a combining, fusing and meshing of orientations within individuals and within the whole society.<sup>22</sup> Such a combining of culture norms can be termed "social epigenesis" in which, as its biological referent implies, a new social system is introduced from the outside, the colonial system which overlaid the tribal subcultures.<sup>23</sup> Kenya's political culture can be described in this manner, using the concept of epigenetical development to emphasize the fact that Kenya's present political culture does not represent an organic growth whereby tribal norms were merely expanded to apply to a national context. Rather, a separate and complete

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<sup>22</sup> Pye and Verba, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>23</sup> Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48, January 1963, for a discussion of the concept of epigenetical development of a social system.

socio-political system was grafted on to the indigenous system with the subsequent integration of the two. This emphasis on the interacting growth of new culture norms is used because it offers a richer descriptive framework than is provided by trying to characterize transition in Kenya as a process of unilinear social, economic and political change. The epigenetical description preserves cognizance of the thresholds to be crossed and recrossed before traditional norms of tribal life are overcome in favor of more modern values. In addition the concept suggests that the persistence of such traditionalism ought not be classified as an aberrant form of behavior which only inhibits political change.

#### THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN

The epigenetical union of African and European communities was created and maintained by British colonial rule. A union that was often resented by African and Englishmen alike, the colonial administration stood between the two antagonists. It steadfastly refused to abandon its trusteeship of the African community, but often willingly supported the lesser demands of the settlers short of granting the ultimate settler goal - self-government. The nature of the



confrontation was clear, and the boundaries for action fixed. The Africans could not and would not withdraw for they were fighting for their own land. The Europeans were prepared to endure as long as any likelihood remained that their ultimate goal might be realized. Only when all hope was lost did the European community capitulate to the policies of the Colonial Office.

This dynamic, tension-filled balance of political antagonism was eventually destroyed when Africans developed new political skills that permitted them to effectively compete with their European overlords. In the early stages, the Africans, though far superior numerically to the enclave culture, were unable to control their physical and social environment. By contrast, the Europeans had the skills and the motivation to entirely dominate the whole of Kenya society, but they were restricted since final authority for African interests rested in London. The post-independence period has revealed that peaceful pluralist politics among the several ethnic and racial communities is possible; yet for six decades through a rising tide of African protest, those interests were viewed as irreconcilable.<sup>24</sup>

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On the question of European acceptance of African rule, only 356 Europeans left Kenya during the first six months of 1965 compared with 2326 in the same period of 1964. Africa Report, October 1965.

The recognition of the ways in which colonialism affected the traditional culture and broke open the integrated relationships of lineage, age-grade and land tenure established the fact that tribal society could become susceptible to new patterns of socialization. Also, the fact that culture change has taken place is as undeniable as recognition that such change has been uneven, unsynchronized, and generally unconsciously achieved. The penetration of colonialism established the lines of communication by which European ideas might pass into the tribal environment. The configurative analysis of European culture shows what types of ideas flowed into those disrupted African communities. The review of Kenya's political history will show what new ideas were accepted by the Africans. The deep impression made by the Europeans is revealed in the historical monographs that show the increasingly effective and imitative responses developed within the African community. These responses bespoke the emergence of Africans into national political life through the demonstration of new political skills. Possessed of those new skills, the African community engaged in an increasing number of political confrontations with the Europeans in a process commonly referred to as the "rise of African nationalism."

A key factor helping to determine the success of African nationalism was the self-destroying nature of colonialism in Kenya. The European community was distinctive for its class orientation. The settlers were not men escaping to a new country to be free from oppression in the mother land. They were men drawn from the upper classes or conditioned to upper class sentiments who could see no reason why they shouldn't control the environment which they had come to dominate physically. In Kenya, all around them was a representation of the Hobbesian world, and they sought to overcome it by bringing order and peace. For themselves, they demanded the "rights of Englishmen" and for the African there was to have been the benevolent protection of the "white man's burden." According to present political leaders in Kenya it was this inconsistency between egalitarian norms on the one hand and authoritarian practices on the other that eventually proved intolerable to Kenya's indigenous people.<sup>25</sup>

In recognizing the political characteristics of the European community it is not difficult to understand why the community should have envisioned a course of constitutional development in Kenya that would have paralleled Rhodesia. In 1902, with barely a handful of Europeans in the country,

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<sup>25</sup>This was repeatedly pointed out during the interviews when African politicians sought to describe how they had suffered under colonialism.

the first political group, the Colonists Association, was formed and for sixty years thereafter the Europeans sought to control the country. They fought for official representation, for executive authority, for fiscal control, for restrictions on non-Europeans, for special privilege, and for cabinet government under their own dominance. And always their victories were partial ones.

Former Governor, the late Sir Philip Mitchell, adequately summarized settler politics when he stated,

European politics in Kenya, ever since I can remember have been dominated - indeed bedevilled - is perhaps the word - by the pursuit of an unattainable objective, sometimes avowed, sometimes implicit, sometimes maybe even subconscious; the attainment of a form of self-government based on a legislature in which the European as such is to be entrenched in power by the terms of the Constitution and has a majority over all races combined.<sup>26</sup>

Under the restraint of the enforced balance imposed by Colonial Office control, the Europeans practiced a style of politics which developed into a, "habit, almost a tradition, of defiance and abuse of the Government," where angry settlers,

plotted against the Government in club and hotel bars, mostly at the top of their voices; passed resolutions affirming undying loyalty to the King and unshakable determination to resist the orders of his Government.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1954), pp. 216-217.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 97 and 101.

When the British Colonial Office would not grant settler demands or responded to demands slowly, the Europeans in the colony characterized their environment as a "miniature of an absolute dictatorship" where decisions were enforced by, "a separate caste of rulers, the officials, appointed by and answerable to a distant inaccessible authority."<sup>28</sup>

The settlers' response to arbitrary Colonial Office policy was to protest, boycott, resign, march on State House, bully Governors, and, in extremity, threaten revolution. Mitchell called such tactics a pity and wrote,

there is a large, silent, wondering, watching audience taking a good deal to heart and already beginning to put some of the conclusions it has drawn to dangerous uses, especially the conclusion that governments can be defied with impunity.<sup>29</sup>

What the African audience saw was the game of politics, power, and influence played by European standards, though the period during which the Africans only watched was short indeed. By 1920 the first stirrings of African political discontent had been revealed, and throughout the twenties and

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<sup>28</sup> Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1954), Vol. I., pp. 180-182.

<sup>29</sup> Mitchell, op. cit., p. 218. Also see MacGregor Ross, Kenya from Within, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927), Chapter XII, and Huxley, op. cit. p. 58, and Norman Leys, Kenya, (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), pp. 324-325, and Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham, Race and Politics in Kenya, (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 130 for references to what the Africans learned by observing European politics.

thirties it became increasingly apparent that Africans had adopted a host of new political ideas. The proscribing of tribal associations in 1940 demonstrated that in less than four decades, the "primitive" Africans had absorbed enough of Western culture to constitute a threat to the European community. By such absorption, the balance created by European political superiority (as opposed to the African physical majority) was destroyed. The Africans developed new skills while the Europeans were still tethered to the pronouncements of the Colonial Office. The post-war period thus became the denouement in the political conflict between European and African interests. What occurred was a resolution of issues which helped shape the political culture of the post-independence period. In those seventeen post-war years of maneuvering the Africans sharpened and broadened their political skills, and the Europeans fought a rear guard action in defense of their own interests.

#### CULTURAL DUALITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

Stimulated by the realization that traditional society had not the inner strength to guarantee the security of tribal life, young Africans emulated the political skills of their European overlords and were drawn into the modern sphere

of the country's political life. Evidence of such change is revealed in the actions taken, organizations created, individualism exerted, oral and journalistic opinions expressed, legal submissions drawn up, and protests to London made. All such activity constituted evidence that a new African elite had accepted new cultural cues and translated their new understanding into effective political action. Furthermore, the European values were not only accepted, but the skills of boycott, debate, threatened resignation, and demonstration were honed to a fine edge so that the Africans could be truly competitive with their European antagonists.

The determination of the European community to maintain its position caused the dispersion of new political understanding to a wider and wider sector of the African population. As African representation in the Legislative Council increased from one to four to six to an elected eight to fourteen, thirty-three and then one hundred and seventeen, more and more Africans learned at least rudimentary ideas about representative government and modern national politics. The extension of the franchise and the granting of permission to form African political parties meant that even in the remote areas of the country, Africans were exposed to the basics of a modern political belief

system with some understanding of the fact that elected members of Parliament were obligated to be responsive to the needs, expectations and demands of the electorate. Because of this development of political sophistication, after independence African politicians were forced to turn their attention more to the traditional tribal environment, for they realized that their continued leadership depended on how new political skills and old tribal appeals could be welded together to carry out successful social and political action.

The survival or maintenance of political systems is intimately bound up with the strength of support enjoyed by the rulers of the system. If the political system has relatively strong supports from the people and if the authorities controlling the system are reasonably capable of meeting the demands placed on the system, then the system should survive. In Kenya, the existent cultural dualism meant that demands on or supports for the system could come out of either of the two cultural traditions. And for the Kenyatta government, the conversion of demands into policy depended heavily on the support provided by the interrelated cultural traditions of both sets of norms. Briefly stated and expanded on in a later chapter, tribal



culture contributed to post-independence stability through its emphasis on the following norms of behavior:

- A. Traditional decision-making emphasized the importance of consensus and equity.
- B. Segmentary lineage systems resulted in direct decision-making rather than in an indirect process found in more stratified tribal societies.
- C. Peer and lineage ties strongly bound individuals to their respective tribes and clans.
- D. Consistently-legitimated decisions were accepted in order to prevent instability resulting from conflict-laden situations.

The supports for the national political system<sup>16</sup> introduced by the colonial experience were as follows:

- A. A consistent African perspective on European paramountcy.
- B. A form of political activity characterized as secular, pragmatic and rational and employing skills usually associated with Western political practice.
- C. A "national" set of institutions for the procedural conversion of demands and supports into policy.

For Africans in post-independence Kenya, political activities involved the use of both sets of supports since both the demands of the system and the processes of decision-making were cast into the two cultural traditions.

The government's skill in manipulating those supports was shown during the first two years in office as it moved to resolve issues and meet its goals of strengthening the sense of nationality of each Kenyan, maintaining the democratic procedures of government, and securing the legitimacy of its own authority.

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This systematic framework for analysis, as it is summarized here and elaborated in subsequent chapters, provides the scaffolding for evaluating governmental performance in the resolution of issues. In the discussion of individual cases, this framework is implicit at all times though specific references have largely been eliminated. The collected evidence presented confirms that cultural duality is a fact. The use of that pluralism to design policy alternatives is also supported by evidence. The form of Kenya's cultural pluralism is considered as an individual case. However, the insight derived from observing this case is seen to have useful implications for all of independent Africa because the case involves the co-joining of Western philosophical beliefs with an unfamiliar environment with consequent insight into the acceptance or rejection of those beliefs.

## CHAPTER THREE:

### THE NATURE OF TRIBAL SOCIETY

The cultural pluralism in modern Kenya is apparent at all levels of the society. Among the ninety percent of the population living in rural settings, the cultural balance weighs more heavily, at times almost to the point of exclusivity, in favor of behavior patterns developed before the arrival of the European. By contrast, in those sectors of the national society where exposure to the alien culture has been more extended and comprehensive, a new cosmopolitan manner often masks traditional behavior, though the indigenous norms are not forgotten.

Kenya lies halfway down the east coast of Africa. Its 225,000 square miles which border on the Indian Ocean have the rough shape of a pentagon in which forty percent of the area starting from the center and spreading westward is rich and green with the remaining sixty percent being dry and uncompromising to the farmer. Scattered across that land are more than nine million Africans collected in patterns which range in density from less than one per square mile in the vastness of the Northeastern Province to over seven hundred per square mile in Kisii District of Nyanza

# KENYA

## PHYSICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

**A** COASTAL PLAIN


**B** ARID LOW PLATEAUS

**C** KENYA HIGHLANDS

**D** L. VICTORIA BORDERLANDS

MAJOR ESCARPMENTS

LAND OVER 5000 FEET



Province.<sup>1</sup> They are people composed of four ethnic types: the Bantu, the Nilotic, the Nilo-Hamitic and the Hamitic.<sup>2</sup>

#### THE BASIS FOR CULTURAL FUSION AND SHARED PERSPECTIVES:

The present residents of Kenya were themselves intruders, displacing a much earlier culture. It is believed those earlier inhabitants were a Caucasoid group speaking a Cushitic language which as early as the first millenium B.C. had pushed southward from Ethiopia as far as Lakes Manyara and Natron in Tanzania.<sup>3</sup> This culture which spread throughout Kenya was characterized by the domestication of animals and intensive agriculture with terraced fields, irrigation, and the use of animal manure for fertilizer. To conduct such an

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<sup>1</sup> Kenya Government, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kenya: Population Census, 1962: Advance Report of Volumes I and II, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), p. 5. The 1962 census listed 8,636,000 inhabitants. The estimate for 1968 was 9,650,000+. Early population estimates must be considered educated guesses. Until 1949 population was estimated on the basis of tax receipts. Thus, in 1945 it was believed there were 3.9 million Africans, yet in 1949 the first census revealed 5,240,000. Also see Hailey, An African Survey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 129-30.

<sup>2</sup> Population Census, 1962, Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> George P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture, (Chicago: McGraw Hill, 1959), pp. 200-203. Murdock states that the Konso cluster in southern Ethiopia appears to represent the remains of the Cushitic incursion. On the pre-history of Kenya, also see G. Huntington, "The Peopling of East Africa by Its Modern Inhabitants," and Sonia Cole, "The Stone Age of East Africa," in Oliver and Mathew, History of East Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), Vol. I. Also J. H. Greenberg, "The Languages of Africa," International Journal of American Linguistics, 29 (January 1963) for a criticism of the term Nilo-Hamitic.

economy, those peoples clustered in the higher, heavy rainfall areas leaving the low-lying dry areas to Bushmanoid hunters. The domestic sites of the culture have yielded up stone pestles, grindstones, and pottery in stone-walled dwellings approached by graded roads, indicating a degree of economic and social specialization that makes their total disappearance surprising.<sup>4</sup>

It is believed that Nilotic invaders pushing into Kenya from the Sudan isolated the earlier inhabitants by assuming control over the low elevations and subsequently engulfed the indigenous culture through inter-marriage and fusion. The Nilo-Hamitic languages as well as the agricultural practices still used by tribes in the central Rift Valley indicate such integration.<sup>5</sup> The Bantu moved into the country from the south, one group pushing along the coast as far as the Shabelle River in Somalia and another arm extending into the central highlands around Mount Kenya and westward. Those Bantu, like the Nilotics, displaced and fused with the earlier culture, resulting in the disappearance of the latter.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Murdock, ibid., pp. 193-211.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 342-347.

Although the early Caucasoid people appear to have vanished, they were important in terms of the amount of culture transmitted to their Nilotic and Bantu successors. Certain features of the life of Kenya's earlier inhabitants were widely adopted, thus creating a cultural uniformity among the ethnic stocks and buttressing the conclusion that beneath imagined heterogeneity there existed and still exists a body of culture norms and customary practice which made the diverse tribes of Kenya into a relatively homogeneous group. Murdock supports the idea of cultural borrowing by noting in particular six traits, seemingly derived from the vanished culture, which have been widely disseminated among Kenya's peoples. These and other traits as well as a whole body of normative orientations combined four ethnic groups

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TABLE 3:1 TRAITS FOUND WIDELY AMONG THE TRIBAL GROUPS OF KENYA<sup>7</sup>

1. Systems of cyclical and hierarchical age grades.
  2. The drinking of blood from the necks of animals.
  3. Taboos on the eating of fish.
  4. The circumcision of both sexes.
  5. The presence of a despised and endogamous caste of smiths.
  6. A relatively egalitarian social system.
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who are possessed of a great deal of cultural and societal uniformity in terms of goals, sentiments and skills.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 199-202, 343.

Much of that uniformity persists into the present since basic demographic patterns have not been destroyed, and Kenya remains pre-dominately a rural country. More than nine-tenths of the population still lives outside the urban areas and with the exception of such centers as Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu, there are few towns over 10,000 in population. The basic organization of society remains the homestead or farm though urbanization and land settlement schemes are beginning to transform those links to the past. Traditionally, the societies of Kenya have followed two basic economic patterns: subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. All were cattle keepers.

Within their communities, the tribes interrelated social, political, economic and religious functions to insure the cohesiveness of the tribal order and the maintenance of stability. For the individual, the social organization was so constructed as to surround him with comprehensive societal responsibilities which were burdensome yet still acceptable since within those established limitations there was as complete a sense of security as that style of existence could provide. The man in the tribe receded into the group, constantly conscious of his obligations and place within the social context. An individual's whole existence from birth



to death became organically bound up in a series of family, clan and lineage associations that gave meaning to his existence. So complete was that sort of communality that it was once estimated that the women of the central Bantu could pass out their lives in the high probability of never in their existence spending more than half an hour alone at one time.<sup>8</sup> Growth from birth onwards was a gradual initiation into the various strata of the society, an intertwining of bonds of kinship, age, and sex and the establishment of patterns of standardized behavior so that each person was aware of how to act toward every other member of his society.

The goal of those actions and rituals was the maintenance of social cohesiveness in the tribal unit. Elaborate patterns of procedure, belief systems and mental and emotional attitudes supported the organization of the society. Those societies depended on a broad-gauged consensus of the members, a consensus strengthened by adherence to prescribed ritual. The generational continuity of the society was insured by imparting law, belief, and tradition with intensive thoroughness during initiatory rites. But more than any other characteristic of tribal life, the pre-eminent trait was the demand for

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<sup>8</sup> G. St. J. Orde-Browne, The Vanishing Tribes of Kenya, (London: Seeley Service and Co., 1925), p. 259.

the submergence of individuality to communal norms, since individuality might threaten the delicate balance created by voluntary compliance in essentially fragile social structures.<sup>9</sup>

Initiatory rites were carried out in groups to build a strong sense of unity and group cohesion.<sup>10</sup> Among the Kisii there were elaborate sets of "joking" relationships in which age-mates or those circumcised together might call each other the foulest of names. It is suggested that this allowed the individual to more thoroughly lose himself in the group through the permission of personal insult.<sup>11</sup> The Kikuyu did not alienate land from other tribes. Rather, a ceremony surrounded the

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<sup>9</sup>This concept of the individual within tribal society forms a theme discussed in much of the general literature. For an excellent treatment of this idea, see Diedrich Westermann, The African: Today and Tomorrow, (London: International African Institute, 1949), pp. 65-70. For a more general statement on personal identification with the society in pre-technical cultures, see Section IV of Chapter IV in Eric Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, (New York: Norton and Co., 1958), and David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), *passim*. In the latter work, there is recognition that overlapping can occur between the "Tradition-directed" and "Other-directed" characterological types (p.xxvii), thus the traditional Kenyan society where an individual was so heavily socialized to groups norms had some characteristics of "other-directedness."

<sup>10</sup>J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society, (Kampala: Makerere, 1958), p. 94.

<sup>11</sup>Philip Mayer, "The Joking of Pals in Gusii Age-sets," African Studies, Vol. X, No. 1, March 1951, p. 27.

purchase in which the seller of the land was ritually taken into the tribe to preserve the buyer against future litigation over title. Since members of the tribe were bound to certain set behavior toward each other, and protest by former owners could not be condoned this protected the community from strife.<sup>12</sup> Both the Kikuyu and the Kamba ceremonies following homicides brought the families of the slayer and the victim together to remove the threat of continued violence.<sup>13</sup> The Kipsigis would put the habitual criminal to death not for his crimes but because he constituted an "unnatural thing," a violation of the established pattern of intense cooperative communalism.<sup>14</sup> The removal of all threats to the social order through the use of ceremony or, in extreme cases, ritual killing could be interpreted as consolidating experiences designed to maintain the communal nature of tribal life.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and Kikuyu, (London: Methuen and Co., 1952), p. 21.

<sup>13</sup>Charles Dundas, "The Organization and Laws of Some Bantu Tribes," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, (hereafter JRAI) Vol. XLV, p. 267.

<sup>14</sup>I. Q. Orchardson, "Some Traits of the Kipsigis in Relations to Their Contact with Europeans," Africa, No. 4, p. 469.

<sup>15</sup>For a theoretical discussion of "viable" and "self-enhancing" systems, see Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), p. 249. By the definitions given, tribal society before the colonial era would be defined as "viable" but not "self-enhancing."

## THE ETHIC OF TRIBAL SOCIETY: THE PRESERVATION OF HARMONY

It was fundamental to Kenyan societies that they have a comprehensive body of ritual, taboos, and customary belief with which to control individual behavior. Tribal existence in unpredictable climatic conditions forced each societal unit to make itself as secure as possible against an environment unresponsive to their physical capacities and unresponsive to their intellect. Ability to survive depended on cooperation, and the communalism of tribal life was the basis for insuring such cooperation.

### The Individual Obligation to Consent

Life in family, clan, or age group surrounded the individual with dependent relationships which imposed obligations as well as granted security. Since successful survival depended on the willingness of individuals to respond to those obligations, failure to carry out defined responsibilities posed a threat to the security of the whole community. Deviant behavior from the prescribed norms was therefore not to be tolerated. The individual who adhered closely to the behavior patterns taught from infancy never was in danger of coming into conflict with his society. The individual was not achievement-oriented and could not derive personal satisfaction from the exercise of initiative. The individual as

an individual was afforded little opportunity to gain any form of dominance over his fellows. As one Kenya ethnographer has stated, "Africans never experienced the tyranny of the despot, but neither did they enjoy the power a despot might have given them."<sup>16</sup> The respected and honored personage in the society was the man who assiduously conformed to all the ritual prescriptions of the tribe. In a culture emphasizing obedience to communal norms and concern for community security as opposed to change or individualism, the esteem of the society focused on those most faithful in carrying out the full body of the tribal custom.

This rigorous maintenance of custom preserved the social order but severely compromised individual expression. From the perspective of hindsight, the enforced limitations on creativity, individuality, and innovative behavior can be seen as having forestalled the African's ability to resist the incursions of the alien European culture. However, in the period before the coming of the European, such a restraint on change was necessary. It guaranteed that new ideas would be introduced largely by accident or at an extremely slow pace, but it was necessary. Overruling creative impulses was the willingness to consign unexplained events to the realm of

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<sup>16</sup>Dundas, "Organization and Laws," op. cit., p. 259.

magic. Rolling stones might be inhabited by spirits but never provided the principle of the wheel. It has been commented that to the African,

the whole material world is moved by unseen forces. Their whole world is alive. A pebble is the child of the rock as clearly as a kid is the child of the goat. In their view of life we never see the whole of a man...and life moves along and collides with a vast number of what we can only call unseen forces in action.<sup>17</sup>

This willingness to ascribe isolated events to the supernatural reflected the difference between a reasoning and a revelatory culture. A dependence on spiritual guidance or cues restricted the Africans in their capacity to solve problems of a technical nature. The search for the cause of things was often condemned, and innovative behavior was something to be avoided as a threat to the society.

#### The Judicial Imperative of Avoiding Conflict

The judicial imperative of tribal life was that conflict-laden situations should be avoided if at all possible. Therefore, when an individual failed to meet the proscribed norms of the tribe, procedures were instituted to reinforce the norms of harmony, to avoid conflict. Except in rare cases requiring ritual execution, legal norms demanded appropriate payment of restitutive compensation rather than physical

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Norman Leys, Kenya, (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), pp. 43-45.

retributive punishment. That is to say, judgments were rendered in terms of compensation to be paid the aggrieved party by the defendant. In considering disputes, the bulk of the deliberation centered on the size of the compensation to be paid rather than on the crime itself. Perjury in the giving of testimony at a trial was not of great concern to the judges. When contradictions between plaintiff and defendant became too extraordinary, trials by ordeal were performed in which the person suffering most severely was adjudged to have given false witness. This latter procedure for determining truth was important because it helped remove the chance of potentially conflicting decisions being handed down by the elders. Through reliance on the non-rational mechanism of testing human endurance as an indicator of goodness, the man embittered over a decision might blame the ritual of ordeal, but he could not blame his adversities on the court. Truth having been magically ascertained, the court with clear conscience could go about the task of setting the compensation without having to depend on controversial information as the critical variable in arriving at a decision.

The compensation determined had the force of consensus opinion behind it, and the defendant was obligated to pay or experience severe social ostracism. In tribal society, to be

cast into such isolation would have produced emotional frustration bordering on the intolerable for the individual whose very existence was bound up in the tribe. This fact accounts for the use of banishment in place of execution as one of the more severe forms of punishment by some tribal groups. Crimes or transgressions of the social order which were so severe as to demand execution of the offender were potentially conflict-laden actions. Therefore, to insure against conflict it was the practice to secure the agreement of the lineage members of the condemned who would then help carry out the sentence of death in order to protect the society from subsequent recrimination on the part of the executed's surviving relatives.<sup>18</sup>

As with more developed systems, the ethic of tribal societies is clearly seen as survival, but in the case of Kenya's tribes, ritual obedience to custom was the primary device for emphasizing the community over the individual and guaranteeing the security of the group. As witnessed specifically in the blocking off of new information, the restraints

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<sup>18</sup> This interpretation of social custom implicitly states the thesis that differing levels of performance between cultures is environmental and not biological. In a modern context, Africans have been confronted with widespread opportunities to learn and have demonstrated the extent of uncommitted learning resources. See Bascom and Herskovits, Continuity and Change in African Cultures, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 10. On the role of magic in pre-technical cultures, see R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, as quoted in Erikson, op. cit., pp. 55-56.



on innovative behavior, the dependence on magic, and the procedures for achieving consensus in all potentially conflict-laden situations, tribal life sought to preserve a "societal equilibrium" delicately balanced on the weak foundation of uncompromising ritual and unquestioned individual obedience. It was a foundation that required only the appearance of some powerful outside force like colonialism to weaken the social order. Nonetheless, prior to the arrival of the European, tribal society was an integrated system that had the capacity of preserving itself for succeeding generations.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF TRIBAL SOCIETY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONFORMITY

The structure of society has been defined as, "the observable activities which make up the system."<sup>19</sup> Where those activities are performed with sufficient regularity they may be classified as defined roles. For those roles, individuals are recruited who then carry out the requisite activity associated with the particular role. In traditional Kenya society, the "roles" and "activities" composing the "structure" were oriented towards insuring "societal equilibrium." The system did not sharply differentiate its various

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Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 21.

activities. Religious activities, economic patterns, political acts, and social behavior were highly interrelated.<sup>20</sup> There was no purely political system apart from the overall tribal environment. Life itself was the politics of survival and political connotations invested almost every act within the society, down to the minutiae of taboos. From birth until death, life was organized or structured in patterns of activity displaying intensely strong and highly integrated communalism.

The organization of these stateless societies was accomplished by reliance on three basic features: (1) the association of the individual with particular land areas which reduced personal mobility, (2) the obligations of the individual to his family and clan lineage, and (3) the obligations of the individual to his peer group or age-grade. Those phenomena of traditional life which could not be encompassed in that structure were consigned to the spiritual or supernatural. Because there were so many unexplained aspects of life in magico-religious societies, Africans lived in constant communion with spirits and unseen forces

Ibid., p. 42. for a discussion of this type of political system which is characterized by the authors as an "intermittent" political system.

which had to be placated to make the burdens of life tolerable.<sup>21</sup>

### The Religious Requirement

Among many of Kenya's tribes, the individual could enter into a state of ritual impurity or ceremonial uncleanness through the violation of either customary belief or the transcendent spirit world, or from curses invoked by living individuals. This condition was cured through a process of

TABLE 3:2 RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AMONG SELECTED KENYA TRIBES<sup>22</sup>

	BANTU							NILO HAMITIC			NILOTIC				
	Kikuyu	Luhya	Kamba	Kisii	Embu/ Meru	Nyika	Taita	Pokomo	Kipsigis	Turkana	Nandi	Masai	Elgeyo	Suk	Luo
Ancestor Worship	D	D	D	D	A	D	D	D	D	D	D	N	D	D	D
Ceremonial Uncleanness	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	A	*	*	D	D	D	D	D
Animist Worship and Taboos	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Single Dietary	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	A	A	D	D	D	D	D	D

D - Present

N - Absent

A - Assumed on the basis of related data

\* - No data available

<sup>21</sup>Relative to Kenya see C. W. Hobley, Bantu Beliefs and Magic, (London: Witherby, 1922), pp. 7-8, 281, also Leys, op. cit., p. 51 and Leakey, Mau Mau and Kikuyu, op. cit., p. 85. For a general discussion on the role of magic for sustaining the individual in society, see Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 48-49.

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Footnotes 11, 24, 28 and 29 denote sources for supporting the characteristics referred to in the tables. This evidence is found in a number of sources, only a selection of which have been used for the purposes of documenting the existence of such characteristics. One religious practice: P. G. Bostock, Peoples of Kenya: The Taita, (London: MacMillan, 1950), pp. 15, 28-31, A.H.J. Prins, The Coastal Tribes of the Northeastern Bantu, (London: International African Institute, 1952), pp. 21, 29, 87-88, 128, Gerhard Lindblom, The Akamba of British East Africa, (Uppsala: K. W. Appelbergs, 1916), p. 177, Leakey, Mau Mau and Kikuyu, op. cit., pp. 39-43, Sidney and Hildegard Hinde, The Last of the Masai, (London: Heinemann, 1901), pp. 48, 99-101. G.W.B. Huntingford, "Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Nandi and Kony," JRAI, Vol. LX, 1930, pp. 418-419. A. C. Hollis, The Nandi, Their Language and Folklore, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), Eliot's introduction. G.W.B. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, (London: International African Institute, 1953), pp. 127-131, 136-138. C. W. Hobley, "Further Researches into Kikuyu and Kamba Religious Beliefs and Customs," JRAI, Vol. XL, 1910, p. 427. Hobley, Bantu Beliefs, op. cit., p. 127. Juxon Barton, "Notes on the Suk of Kenya Colony," JRAI, Vol. LI, 1931, pp. 88-91. Orde-Browne, op. cit., pp. 181-182. Gunter Wagner, The Bantu of North Kavirondo, (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 77, 93. J. A. Massam, The Cliff Dwellers of Kenya, (London: Seeley Service and Co., 1927), p. 187. J. Middleton, The Central Tribes of the Northeastern Bantu, (London: International African Institute, 1953), p. 80. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Political Structure of the Nandi-speaking Peoples," Africa, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1940, p. 258. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Luo Tribes and Clans," Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, No. 7, 1949, p. 31. John Roscoe, The Northern Bantu: An Account of Some General African Tribes of the Uganda Protectorate, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915), p. 291. Barton, "The Turkana of the Northern Kolosia District," JRAI, Vol. LVII, 1927, p. 193, and W.E.H. Barrett, "Notes on the Customs and Beliefs of the Wa-Giriama," JRAI, Vol. XLI, 1911, pp. 21-25.



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Leakey, Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 108, once estimated that the man leading the most exemplary life among the Kikuyu would inadvertently fall into a state of ceremonial uncleanness or thahu, during his lifetime so that he would not pass out his years without the sacrifice of more than one hundred goats. This estimate would include the goats used for initiation fees and the fees obligatory for partaking of the rites de passage of elderhood.

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Bostock, op. cit., pp. 4, 14, 16. Prins, op. cit., pp. 19, 65, 78, 61. Prins, "The Bantu Tribes of the East African Protectorate," JRAI, Vol. XLV, 1915, pp. 335-336. H. E. Lambert, The Use of Indigenous Authorities in Tribal Administration, (Capetown: University of Capetown, 1947), p. 37. Fr. Gagnolo, The Kikuyu, (Nyeri: Kenya Mission Printing School, 1933), p. 21. Hopley, Ethnology of the Akamba and Other East African Tribes, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1910), p. 124. Huntingford, Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 126-131. Goldthorpe, op. cit., pp. 93-94. Hollis, Nandi, op. cit., p. 6. Orde-Browne, op. cit., pp. 39-70. Evans-Pritchard, "Luo," op. cit., p. 27. Roscoe, op. cit., p. 281. Emley, "Turkana," op. cit., pp. 161, 190. Leakey, Mau Mau, op. cit., pp. 34-37. Evans-Pritchard, Nandi-speakers, op. cit., pp. 254-265. Wagner, op. cit., p. 53. Lindblom, op. cit., p. 140. Middleton, op. cit., pp. 31, 81. Huntingford, Nandi and Kony, op. cit., p. 426. Hartmann, "Local Customs of the Luwo Tribe in South Kavirondo," Anthropos, 1928, p. 263. K. R. Dundas, "Notes on the Tribes Inhabiting the Baringo District," JRAI, Vol. XL, 1910, p. 59. Philip Mayer, "Gusii Bridewealth and Custom," Rhodes-Livingstone, No. 18, pp. 2, 3.

primogeniture was not practiced in inheritance patterns. Regarding the latter, after death of the head of the household, the wealth and effects of a polygynous family group were divided among the mature sons of the various wives or if the sons were too young, an individual wife might be forced to take a "leviratic" husband, usually an age-mate of the deceased, who would oversee the household. Life within the family was communal and governed by ritual. Children, born amidst ritual (and often killed if unfortunate enough to be born twins), were linked to alternative generations through names given, and at an early age became participants in the economic life of the family as either herd boys or assistants in the duties of the household. Communal labor was a pervasive feature of tribal life, often extending beyond the nuclear family and involving such projects as agricultural work, tending irrigation networks, or building new homes. Even in the domestic sphere, the imprint of ceremony governed such things as the placing in the family compound of a hut for a new wife and the selection of the cooking stones for her hearth. In the making of decisions affecting family welfare, such as the permission for a youth to undergo initiation or the setting of a bride price, joint consultation was required. Lengthy discussion between the families of the

proposed bridal partners bound groups together prior to the actual marriage. Even in death, the deceased was not separated from the family for the spirit of a departed relative remained in the family circle, being propitiated and sought after for advice. The whole family was thus a unity centered in communal activities and adhering to order-preserving ritual.

The expansion of social organization beyond the family unit was represented in clan lineages composed of all people who traced their existence to a common agnate or other ancestor. Clan groupings in Kenya were segmentary, meaning relative equality was observed between lineages. Large or extensive lineages often divided to form separate or sub-clans, establishing their own totems and taboos but still claiming the common agnate. Members of the clan were under obligation to support and aid their kinsmen. How extensively such obligations were observed cannot be sharply defined, but a convenient if not always accurate indicator was the limit to which the responsibility for payment of compensation would be accepted, that is how distant a relationship could be exercised to get a law-breaker's kinsmen to help meet the terms of a compensatory award after a crime had been committed.



The framework of family and clan ties was strengthened by the second method of organizing tribal life - the association of social groups with distinct land areas resulting in the restriction on mobility. This geographic limitation combined with obeisance to totem and taboo to bind segmentary units into small "security communities," That is to say, depending on population density and the degree of inter-clan association, individual clans or even individual extended families with their ritual perspective and integrated social, economic, and political activity could form one of the series of "equilibrium security communities" of tribal society.

#### Political Decisions and Consensus

The binding together of the segmented lineages was accomplished through an age class system. Symbolized in initiation and circumcision rites performed at agreed on calendar intervals, age-classes provided each African with a peer group that could be as broad as the tribe itself. Adolescents were catechized in the lore of the tribe during their recovery in seclusion from the physically and psychologically demanding ordeal of ritual initiatory ceremonies.<sup>25</sup> Such procedures insured the generational continuity of tribal ritual in those

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For a more general discussion, see Westermann, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

non-literate societies while developing a life long unity among young men initiated together. The subsequent combining of age-classes into age-grades established the basis for the generational succession to the decision-making roles within the structure of tribal society. Bound into peer groups,

TABLE 3:4 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AMONG SELECTED KENYA TRIBES<sup>26</sup>

## BANTU

## NILO HAMITICS NILOTICS

	Kikuyu	Luhya	Kamba	Kisii	Embu/ Meru	Nyika	Taita	Pokomo	Kipsigis	Turkana	Nandi	Masai	Elgeyo	Suk	
Male															
Circumcision	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	N	D	D	D	D	N
Initiatory	D	D	A	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D
Age Grades	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	N
Successive & Cyclical ages	D	N	D	D	D	D	N	D	D	D	D	D	D	N	N
Handing over Ceremony	D	D	D	N	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	N	D
Chief	N	N	N	N	N	D	N	D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
War Leader	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D

<sup>26</sup> Bostock, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 14, 15, 21, 35. Prins, *Coastal Bantu*, pp. 65, 75-76, 21-23. Werner, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-373. Dundas, "Organization and Laws," *op. cit.*, pp. 237-241. Orde-Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-72, 77, 84-86, 93, 100, 114. K. R. Dundas, "Turkana," *op. cit.*, pp. 61-66. Massam, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-69, 55. Wagner, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 340. Leakey, *Mau Mau*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26. LSB Leakey, "Some Notes on the Masai of Kenya Colony," *JRAI*, Vol. LX, 1930, p. 190. Hollis, Nandi,

procedural and patterned advance to the level of ruling elder was nearly guaranteed as a matter of course. At designated time intervals agreed on by the incumbent ruling elders, ceremonies were convened in which older men retired and a new group took their place. This procedure signaled the advance in status of succeeding peer groups. Thus, a young man could foresee his future as one of regular advance from adolescence to warriorhood to elderhood and then to retirement. And at some point he would assume responsibility for judgment and decision in a system where policy-making resided in the elderhood of the community.

Despite the structured nature of this advance, however, the tribes of Kenya were basically egalitarian. In decision-making, opportunity to present individual views was extended to many members of the group, often including women, provided all proper ritual was observed. The actual rendering of a

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fn. 26 contd. op. cit., pp. 12-13, 56. Barton, op. cit., p. 87. Emley, op. cit., p. 164. Mayer, "Bridewealth," op. cit., p. 29. Huntingford, Southern Nilo Hamites, op. cit., pp. 127-131. Goldthorpe, op. cit., pp. 93-96. Evans-Pritchard, Nandi-speakers, op. cit., pp. 251-254. Evans-Pritchard, "Luo," op. cit., p. 28. Middleton, op. cit., p. 39. C. Dundas, "Native Laws of Some Bantu Tribes," JRAI, XLII, 1913, p. 510. D. S. Fox, "Further Notes on the Masai," JRAI, LX, 1930, p. 450. H. A. Fosbrooke, "The Masai Age-group Systems, a Guide to Tribal Chronology," African Studies, Vol. 15, 1956, p. 189. Hopley, Bantu Beliefs, op. cit., pp. 225, 92.

decision was the domain of the senior elders meeting in council, or on more important issues, in groups extending to a wider segment of the tribe. Legitimation of decisions depended on public support. The important policy issues of tribal life included the decision to undertake extensive military effort, the determination that initiatory ceremonies should be held, and the decision of the senior elders to retire and "hand-over" responsibility to the junior elderhood. The latter, done with ceremony, insured the orderly transfer of the controls of decision-making. Consensual decision-making itself was attended by the maximum possible debate to prevent disaffection which could arise if individuals felt they were disenfranchised by the lack of opportunity to present their views.

Individual decision-making or individuals exercising sole authority in decisions was the exception. Only one tribal group, the Wanga, a sub-group of the Bantu Abaluhya, were known to have had hereditary chiefs. Among other tribes there were some strong leaders as the Masai laibon or the Nandi orkoiyot who were more than magicians or divines but they were not hereditary leaders. During crisis periods, war leaders often were chosen, and they exercised a mandate for the duration of the crisis but were liable to removal from office if judged to have exceeded their authority. Thirdly, there were the



## THE PROCESS OF TRIBAL LIFE

The description of the values and structure of tribal life has referred to many of the recognizable functions which constitute the day-to-day processes of tribal society. Those functions were based on previously discussed cultural determinants of goals, skills and sentiments. Briefly summarized this discussion of tribal life shows that tribal norms and activities constituted an integrated cultural perspective.

TABLE 3:6. BASIC CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS OF KENYA TRIBES.

Goals	- To enforce intensive communal norms to insure societal survival.
Skills	- To use ritual, taboos and magico-religious practices to guarantee societal harmony.
Sentiment	- An intense level of parochialism strengthened by ritual obligation and restricted mobility limiting sentiments primarily to positive concern for the tribe and more specifically the lineage.

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Bostock, op. cit., pp. 31-32. Dundas, "History of Kitui," JRAI, Vol. LI, 1921, pp. 219-221, 234. Prins, Northeastern Bantu, op. cit., pp. 28-29. Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 141-146. Orde-Browne, op. cit., pp. 50-56. Routledge, With a Pre-historic People, (London: E. Arnold, 1910), p. 218. Dundas, "Some Organization and Laws, op. cit., pp. 260-262. Hinde, op. cit., pp. 34, 108. Fosbrooke, op. cit., p. 189. Evans-Pritchard, Nandi-speakers, op. cit., p. 256. Orchardson, op. cit., p. 469. Hollic, Nandi, op. cit., pp. 73-74, K. R. Dundas, "Baringo District," op. cit., pp. 60, 70. Emley, op. cit., pp. 188-190. Mervyn Beech, "Sketch of Elgeyo Law and Custom," Journal of the Africa Soc., Vol. XX, p. 198. Massam, op. cit., pp. 79-83. Mayer, "Bridewealth," op. cit., pp. 28, 36. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 202, 215.

All the functions were carried out which made tribal society comparable with other systems of greater complexity and sophistication. The individual was socialized toward and recruited into an environment of family, clan, and age-grade. Within that social matrix his interests were articulated and the legislative, executive and judicial functions carried out. The survey of tribal life revealed that most of Kenya societies were alike in that custom, ritual, taboo, totem, law, consensual decision-making, belief in the supernatural and dependence on oracles all supported the same goal - the preservation of a society free from conflict to insure the survival of the society.<sup>28</sup>

#### THE TRIBAL HERITAGE IN MODERN KENYA POLITICS

The tribes of modern Kenya have been significantly changed by colonial rule and now bear less resemblance to the composite form of life described above. Nevertheless, many of the cultural norms of that life remain very much in evidence though time has attenuated their influence. This continued existence of such orientations has a significant impact on the practices and procedures of post-independence political activity. The structural matrix of parochialism, lineage

ties, and age grades is still evident in the distribution of population and the strength of parochial loyalties of Kenya's peoples. This "parochialism" or "tribalism" can

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TABLE 3:7 TRADITIONAL CULTURE NORMS GIVING POSITIVE SUPPORT TO THE KENYATTA GOVERNMENT, 1963-1965

- A. Support for decisions rendered on the basis of consensus and equity.
  - B. Segmentary lineages support direct decision-making rather than indirect decision-making found in more stratified societies.
  - C. Peer and lineage ties strongly bind individuals to their respective clans and tribes.
  - D. Consistently legitimated decisions were acceptable in order to prevent instability resultant from conflict-laden situations.
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have severe inhibitory effects on economic and social change. The non-innovative orientation of tribal life works to reduce the speed of economic development. The unwillingness to restructure sentiments to permit the creation of a homogeneous national community is another negative factor. Contrasted with the negative aspects of tribal life, however, are the supports which the tribal heritage provided for the modern national system.



### Consensus and Equity in Decision-making

As stated above, Kenya society was essentially egalitarian. The intense communalism, the elders councils derived from the cyclical age-grade system, the consensus nature of decisions, and the requirement of popular support for decisions were factors that aided in the acceptance of Western legal beliefs. For Kenya Africans there was no tradition of harsh authoritarian rule. A decision was the outcome of discussion in which all people eligible to deliberate were given opportunity to express their opinions. Simply, there was acceptance of a belief that an individual's opinion counted. In establishing a new political system, Kenya's traditional culture supported the acceptance of debate, bargaining, consensus, and agreement among all parties as the basis for making rules.

### Direct Decision-making in the Absence of Heavily Stratified Society

The social organization of Kenya tribal society also makes a meaningful contribution to present day politics. As a series of segmented lineages bound loosely together through the age-grade systems, Kenya's clans were relatively autonomous systems not bound to higher authorities. Decisions were made within each unit. Within clans a premium was placed on the

face-to-face deliberation of issues. This highly personalized form of interest articulation has continued in the present. Individual constituents demand to see their representatives in order to personally articulate their interests. The representatives, in turn, demand that their role as rule makers be a real one. The result has been an unusually strong link between the parochial constituency and the more sophisticated sphere of national politics, establishing a close association from the top leadership down to the individual citizen.

#### The Obligations of Age-Grade and Lineage Ties

A third feature of traditional life which plays a significant role in the operation of post-independence political action is the continuing association of the elected representative to his tribal area. The old familial links and age-grade associations are weaker than in generations past, but the ties are still of sufficient strength to insure that the modern politician remains explicitly aware of where his loyalties must be centered. It is not an issue of choice. When a politician speaks of representing his people's interests, he speaks literally - they are his people.

Acceptance of Consistently Legitimated Decisions to Prevent Conflict

Finally, the tribal system developed highly intricate procedures for resolving conflict-laden situations. The dependence on massive bodies of ritual finds parallel in modern constitutionalism or coded law. The ambivalent nature of modern man is supposedly restrained by subjecting his passions to the rational restraints of a normative and unseen contract made evident in constitutions and in a dependence on legalism and the rule of law. By Western standards, the ritual procedures of tribal life may have seemed irrational, yet they performed a function similar to constitutionalism. As in the West, this ritual remained an acceptable instrument of control as long as it was consistently and uniformly applied.

\* \* \*

The great mass of the Kenya population has been socialized into a tribal environment in which there were strong and valuable supports for the development of modern egalitarian procedures. The people believe in consensus egalitarianism in the making of decisions with a maximum of public debate. The introduction of representative democracy is characterized by a style of operation in which the

constituent requires close contact with his legislator.

The decisions themselves receive popular sanction if they are consistently legitimated and applied through a structured process. This is the legacy of tribal culture in modern politics.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### THE COLONIAL RULERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AFRICAN LIFE

In 1963, at the time of its official termination, British control of Kenya was only slightly less than seventy years old, having been instituted when the Foreign Office assumed a responsibility that the Imperial British East African Company could no longer maintain. It was the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, however, before an actual imperial presence stretched from Mombasa at the coast to Mount Elgon in the west and from Victoria Nyanza to Wajir.<sup>1</sup> The colony itself was different from other European governed territories south of the Sahara because the settler community that came to reside there sought a goal which was unobtainable. Kenya was not like Ghana or Nigeria, neither of which

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<sup>1</sup> For discussions of the earliest contacts between Europeans and Africans in various parts of the country, see John Middleton, The Central Tribes of the Northeastern Bantu, (London: International African Institute, 1953), p. 16; A. C. Hollis, The Nandi, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 3; Phillip Gulliver, A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana, (Capetown: University of Capetown, 1951), pp. 3-4, E. D. Emley, "The Turkana of the Northern Kolosia District," JRAI, Vol. LVII, 1927, p. 58, John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 35-37, R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1905, (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), passim., Gunter Wagner, The Bantu of the North Kavirondo, (London: Oxford University Press, 1949) Vol. I, pp. 30-33, G. St. J. Orde-Browne, The Vanishing Tribes of Kenya, (London: Seeley and Service, 1925), passim., and Harold K. Schneider, "Pakot Resistance to Change," pp. 144-167 in Bascom and Herskovits, Continuity and Change in African Cultures, (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1959).

had a significant European enclave culture. Nor was the east African colony given the chance of becoming like Rhodesia or South Africa where European minorities held absolute dominance, though the first Protectorate Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, envisioned a "white man's country" where Britain was presented with a tabula rasa to be inscribed as the European should see fit.<sup>2</sup> Together, the factors of shortness of colonial rule and style of political domination are crucial considerations in understanding post-independence politics.

The attitude of the Europeans was a mixture of self-aggrandizement and moralism inspiring political, economic, and religious enterprise under the rationale that they were bestowing on backward peoples the benefits of Western culture. To the Europeans, the African was anything from a savage, "lacking in all the social graces which distinguish civilized homo sapiens from the brutes,"<sup>3</sup> to a "curiously likeable child," "never reliable, but in the grand manner sincere."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Sir Charles Eliot, The East African Protectorate, (London: Edward Arnold, 1905), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Isak Dinesen, Out of Africa, (New York: The Modern Library, 1952), p. 20 and Charles Townley Stoneham, Out of Barbarism, (London: Museum Press, 1955), p. 76, and Nora K. Strange, Kenya Today, (London: Stanley Paul and Co., 1933), p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> Dinesen, Out of Africa, op. cit., p. 23.

Only a redeeming conscience forced the translation of European sentiments into a pervasive paternalism. The colonial presence was considered a "yeast leavening the inert dough of Africa's indigenous peoples," building with "firmness and tact" a civilization "where formerly barbarism and nothing but barbarism had ever existed."<sup>5</sup>

Regarding the tenability of their political position, the settlers in Kenya seemed unaware that the imperial age was nearing an end when they initiated their efforts to become the last white-ruled dominion of empire. Blind to that reality, they carried out half a century of furious, even violent, political activity designed to institutionalize political inequality as a natural and just condition for all the foreseeable future. In the process, however, the Europeans did build the foundations of a rational secular, technical society with institutions necessary for the operation of a national government. As a result, the indigenous Africans became far better prepared to live in a world they did not make. The seven decades of European control established the outlines of the nation-state framework.

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Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country, Lord Delemere and the Making of Kenya, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1935), Vol. I, p. 34 and J. F. Lipscomb, White Africans, (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), p. 20, and Great Britain, East Africa Commission Report of the East Africa Commission, (London: HMSO, 1927), pp. 170-171.

New values, skills, beliefs and cognitions - a new culture - were introduced, and a massive structure of roles was established where it previously had not existed. The process sequences recognized in "rule under law" and implemented through legislative, executive, and judicial bodies constituted a major element of that colonial legacy. The establishment of these processes and their acceptance by the Africans meant Africans were given a capacity to deal with issues in a manner that was procedurally exempt from emotionally charged tribal animosities. The introduction of new legal codes, police forces, communications media and administrative hierarchies enhanced the capacities of the Kenyatta government to capably respond to the demands created by national independence and nationhood. Finally, the style of modern political activity, first practiced within the European community and then between Europeans and Africans established patterns of socialization and recruitment into a national political system that helped maintain and adapt Kenya to the responsibilities of sovereignty. Thus, without the colonial encounter, Kenya would have been much less prepared to operate as a nation in the world community.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> This paragraph contains a full range of references to the substantive ideas in Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), including reference to typologies for



The significance of the attitudinal, procedural and structural dimensions of the European legacy is recognized in the change that occurred within the African community as more and more Africans were drawn into the colonial sphere. First, the forms and institutions of colonial rule forced many young Kenyans to realize that only through the adoption of some aspects of the alien culture could there be any hope of reclaiming the Africans' political, social, and economic dignity from the demeaned state into which it was cast by intruding Europeans. This the Africans proceeded to do, and the effectiveness of their efforts produced a grant of independence sooner than either they or their European antagonists had assumed possible.<sup>7</sup> To understand how this change occurred in African society, however, there must first be awareness of the beliefs, attitudes, and values of the colonial rulers who brought about change. Africans reacted to colonialism by adopting behavior patterns different from the norms of traditional society. This chapter describes the ethic and activity of European society as they induced change in the African community.

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fn. 6 contd. structural-functional analysis and levels of functional analysis: maintenance and adaptation, conversion and capability. This summary indicates the comprehensiveness of the structure and the culture as well as the functional capacities introduced by the colonial regime.

<sup>7</sup>This opinion was recorded in numerous conversations in East Africa from Africans in all stations of society to the effect that independence had come sooner than any would have

## THE ETHIC OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY

The European disdain for the Africans attested to their elitist interpretation of the white man's role in East Africa. At the same time, an evident but philosophically phlegmatic European paternalism was testimony of a humanitarian impulse that assumed a distinguishable degree of responsibility for the "less fortunate races." There was a willing acceptance of a tutelary role over Kenya's indigenous peoples; however, the Europeans demanded for themselves the guarantees of freedom presumed under the heading of "rights of Englishmen." It was the firm belief of resident Europeans that those rights could be most effectively secured if control of the colony were placed in their own hands. The settlers, and, to a lesser degree, the administrators and missionaries stated their belief that the colony needed control by those most capable of governing the European residents. Precarious logic overlooked the normative contradiction contained in the belief that the security of the Europeans was best guaranteed by a demand of democracy for the rulers and dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise, over the indigenous masses.

The pattern of European settlement was such that for several decades it was possible for the white enclave to persist in a belief that such a political dichotomy could be indefinitely maintained. They did not understand that when Europeans first began settling in substantial numbers at the turn of the century, they were already destined to be a twentieth century anachronism. By 1920 when the East African Protectorate became Kenya Colony, the forces were in motion that eventually brought imperial possessions throughout Africa to independence. This ability to preserve outmoded social and political beliefs was strengthened by the immigration policies that turned Kenya into a refuge for the well-born or appropriately educated sons of England who believed "empire" and "imperial responsibility" to be obligations, not choices.

#### White Man's Country

The key figures in Kenya's European society were the settlers. They were a group of men and women, predominately English, who went out to Kenya to live in permanence. In actual numbers, the true Kenya "settlers" were a minority of the Europeans, but as landowners with the greatest personal stake in the country, they dominated opinion and exercised

power disproportionate to their actual numbers.<sup>8</sup> In personality, they were aggressive and individualistic, the archetype of the upper class leader desirous of establishing control over the environment and the societies of East Africa.

They sought insurance that Europeans would rule and that Kenya would not develop a "poor white class," inexperienced at giving commands. Individuals who lacked substantial finance were discouraged from even considering going out to the colony.<sup>9</sup> In 1903, a minimum of £300 above passage was necessary to settle.<sup>10</sup> The required capital soon rose to between £1500 and £4000 and persons without such affluence were advised, "on no account go to Kenya."<sup>11</sup> Promotional literature directed at aristocratic English heads-of-household encouraged the development of a society made up of a large

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<sup>8</sup> The size of the settler community was small. In 1921 only 1346 of 9651 Europeans were landholders. Twenty-seven years later, the number of landholders owning farms, not including farm managers, had risen to only 2087 while the European population had trebled to 29,660. See J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society, (Kampala: Makerere, 1959), pp. 129-133.

<sup>9</sup> Great Britain, Overseas Settlement Office, General Information as to Kenya Colony, (London: HMSO, 1924), passim., also H. O. Weller, Kenya Without Prejudice: A Balanced Perspective, (London: East Africa, 1931), pp. 73-75, Great Britain, East Africa Commission, op. cit., pp. 172-173, Goldthorpe, op. cit., pp. 130-131, and Huxley, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>10</sup> Huxley, ibid., p. 121.

<sup>11</sup> Overseas Settlement Office, op. cit., passim.

number of public school and university graduates.<sup>12</sup> Lord Cranworth chronicled his delight over the people met in Kenya in the early days: Lord Delemere, Lord Cardross, and "that genial old Etonian" James Elkington, "first Master of the Hounds in the Colony."<sup>13</sup> The settlers were described as being in some respects, "a caste of landed proprietors - a privileged class,"<sup>14</sup> or, in less kindly fashion characterized as gentlemen adventurers, "more kinsman of Hawkins and Clive...than of Wilburforce and Sharpe," that is ex-officer and public school types, "who controlled the politics and had independent incomes outside the colony."<sup>15</sup> Even the settlers' friendly biographer, Elspeth Huxley, confirmed the image when writing of settler belief in a doctrine of "benevolent feudalism" which was in its best aspects "a rough and ready pre-socialist system for the protection of the weaker members of society, an acceptance of responsibility for their (the Africans) welfare by the baron instead of the state."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> MacGregor Ross, Kenya from Within, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927), p. 65.

<sup>13</sup> Lord Cranworth, Kenya Chronicles, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1939), pp. 7, 15.

<sup>14</sup> Ross, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>15</sup> Norman Leys, Kenya, (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), p. 155.

<sup>16</sup> Huxley, op. cit., p. 188.

In the twenties and thirties when new settlers arrived under retired soldier and ex-Colonial Service settlement schemes, the spirit was preserved through either a complementarity of military and elitist attitudes or the fusion of imperial mentalities developed in various parts of the empire.<sup>17</sup> For those entering Kenya as ex-military or retired civil servants who did not represent England's upper classes, the temptation to adopt the colony's prevailing attitudes was an easy choice. Association with Kenya's more established elite created an upward psychic mobility for many of the late arrivals who were given opportunity to enjoy a manifestly higher standard of living in Kenya than in England and who could be absorbed into a social class that would have been denied them at home. From the descriptions of Kenya written before World War II, there is little or nothing to suggest that the settlers conceived of themselves as anything but a ruling class disposed to have patience with the African but never consider him an equal. Arriving in East Africa with a superior attitude, the Europeans were confronted with what seemed an apparently natural division of society along racial lines that reinforced their beliefs. The

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Kenya: White Man's Country?: Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau, (London: Fabian Publications, 1944), passim.

Africans were allotted the role of serfs, and it had become apparent by the early twenties that the middle class was to be filled by the Asians who set about meeting the bulk of the commercial needs of the society despite the antagonism incurred from the settlers. At the top were the Europeans who controlled the country.

Isolated from changing currents of Western intellectual opinion philosophies of cultural and racial superiority were discussed as "a natural fact made daily and hourly obvious," and amplified through constant debate and agreement.<sup>18</sup> The community became so narrow in its outlook that the settler was described as suffering from a "pervasive vitiation of faculties, a beclouding of his intellectual range."<sup>19</sup> Even commentators sympathetic to the Europeans recognized that the closely knit society possessed an "unquestioning adherence to a rigid code of behavior governing every action great and small," a conformity that "led to a stagnation of social development where no individual cared to diverge from the ancestral pattern."<sup>20</sup> Cut off from the maincurrents of changing English thought and set down in a wild land, "they

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<sup>18</sup> Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 145 and Huxley, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>19</sup> Ross, op. cit., p. 122.

<sup>20</sup> Colin Wills, Who Killed Kenya?, (New York: Roy Publishers, 1953), p. 31.

drew themselves together and merely worked out to their full extent the ideas of their time and class which they took to Africa with them."<sup>21</sup>

### In Support of White Dominion

The position of the settlers was supported strongly by the colonial administration and the missionaries in Kenya, neither of the latter groups being so different in their social perspectives as to establish in the minds of the Africans a distinctly contradictory image of Europeans. Colonial officials formed a complementary elite for the settler community, albeit the administration had different functions to fulfill and was not motivated by as blatant a self-interest as was the settler community. The missionaries paternal regard for Africans was genuine enough, but with rare exception they were men no less convinced that traditional African ways were barbarism incarnate.

The obligation of colonial administrators was to implement a policy of expressed concern for African interests that encouraged gradual development of the indigenous people. From as early as 1912, it was intended that the African should develop a sense of political maturity through working

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Leys, op. cit., p. 363.



in basic administrative units in the colony administration. However, the degree to which African interests were supported or ignored and settler claims acceded to or dismissed often depended on the personalities who filled the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies or the governorship of the colony. Until 1929 and the advent of the second McDonald government, the balance of sympathy often weighed heavily in favor of the settlers.<sup>22</sup> After World War II with growing support for self-determination of peoples, the Colonial Office backed African demands more firmly and the balance swung against the settlers and their supporters.

The rapport which developed between the settlers and the colonial administration stemmed largely from the public school/university profile of the settler community that was complemented by the background of Colonial Service personnel.<sup>23</sup> The Service was distinctly elitist with cadets drawn from a designated strata of society and developed in a certain mold. From 1910 until 1948 their selection was dominated by a confessed unreconstructed Victorian gentleman, Sir Ralph Doligan

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Robert Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), Ch. III.

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Ibid., pp. 6 and 16, Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, (New York: Nolsen and Co., 1937), p. 37, Edward Grigg, Kenya's Opportunity: Memories, Hopes and Ideas, (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), p. 74.

Furse,<sup>24</sup> He sought certain qualities in candidates; men who combined,

a high, though not necessarily the highest, intellectual standard with the desire and the stamina to face adventurous life in strange, distant, and sometimes dangerous conditions. An unusual combination of qualities was needed - courage with adaptability, firmness with sympathy, enterprise with reliability, obedience with authority.<sup>25</sup>

When trained they were sent out with a spirit of aloofness from the people ruled. They were inbred with the attitude that the masses were inscrutable and the only sensible course was to follow intuition in the making of policy. This failure to understand the African "point of view" drew criticism from those sensitive to African interests.<sup>26</sup> In summary, the Colonial Service administrators were often sympathetic toward Europeans, disdainful of African intellectual capacities, convinced of the superiority of the culture England imparted, and reluctant to recognize the complexity of the indigenous environment over which they governed.

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<sup>24</sup>The exclusivity of the service is revealed in the success of university graduates in dominating the yearly appointments. In 1926, "Oxbridge" alone supplied 54 of 107 cadets. The following year 79 of 83 were from universities, and in 1928, 84 of 88. For 1937, "Oxbridge" provided a phenomenal 123 of 157 cadets. Heussler, *op. cit.*, pp. 14 and 50.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, From Margery Perham's introduction.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 43, 97 and 101 and Sir Philip Mitchell, *African Afterthoughts*, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1954), p. 45. Also, L.S.B. Leakey, *Kenya: Contrasts and Problems*,

Colonial Service disdain, however, was not necessarily malicious in intent. It merely represented the logical outcome of the socialization patterns to which those Englishmen had been exposed from youth onwards. In translating attitudes into policy, the Colonial Officer did not seek the destruction of the societies over which he had come to rule. His mandate was specific and limited. He was to maintain order and peace, permit no practices that contravened his Western sense of justice, and collect enough revenue to finance his endeavors. If in the process African life suffered, then it must be considered an unfortunate casualty of the march of civilization.

By contrast, the missionaries consciously sought to remold African belief systems into acceptance of a highly stylized version of the Christian message. The sincerity of mission efforts cannot be questioned. The fortitude and strength of character required to penetrate the isolated areas of Kenya indicated the willingness to endure adversity for a belief that cannot but inspire admiration from even the most vehement critic of mission doctrines. At the same time, however, the theological "fundamentalism" and the Anglicized biblical interpretations seriously impaired the impact of

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fn. 26 contd. (London: Methuen and Co., 1936), pp. 63 ff. and appendix. Leakey was especially critical of the practice of impermanence of postings whereby officers had little opportunity to contact or understand the people they ruled. A random sample of careers of 15 officers (1925-1935) showed accumulated service of 89 yrs. with 104 shifts of post, representing an average of ten months in one place.

missionary efforts. Basically, the missionaries were not disposed to engage in syncretistic exercises that would have made their message more relevant to the African context. Because of that inflexibility, there was little inclination to attempt hermeneutical interpretations of local belief systems. A desire to preach a "fundamentalism" that condemned both Western social ills and African belief systems predetermined the form of missionary teaching. Also, the various denominations were jealously contemptuous of other missionary efforts, resulting in a form of "sacred parochialism" that reinforced the antipathies of indigenous tribalism. In their earnest efforts to preach a stylized religion that condemned other denominations, discounted traditional belief systems, and denigrated Western social practices which oversensitive religious conscience arbitrarily condemned as evil, the missionaries forced themselves to mistranslate the Bible in order to support their own beliefs.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>L. S. B. Leakey, Kenya Contrasts, op. cit., p. 86 heavily criticizes the churches for their lack of sensitivity in looking at African belief systems, while Leys, op. cit., pp. 238-241, recognized that had any missionary dared to preach as unreservedly as Paul regarding the inequities visited upon Africans, he would have been forced out of the colony by the settlers. As it was, there was little attempt on the part of missionaries to discover the nature of the Bantu ngai, the Nilo-Hamito asista or the Nilotic nyasaye, all indicative of a kind of monotheism suitable to syncretistic and hermeneutical interpretations. For an excellent general interpretation of the problem see John V. Taylor, The Primal Vision:

This combination of rigid biblical interpretation, denominational parochialism, and espousal of a faith so encrusted with Western social custom as to constitute Anglo-Imperial Christianity allowed missionary preaching to support attitudes of white dominion endorsed by settlers and colonial civil servants. The condemnation of African beliefs carried the concomitant belief that the European way was better. The determination to impart only the "considered best" of European culture attested to the sincere humanism of the missionaries as well as the paternalism that sought to "save Africa's peoples." By failing to seek an understanding of African belief systems, missionaries demonstrated they felt there was little in such systems to excite their intellectual curiosity.

In summarizing on the nature of European culture, it is apparent that the intruders into East Africa were as intent as the Africans on making themselves secure as possible, and they introduced a set of symbols, cognitions, beliefs, and

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fn. 27 contd. The Christian Presence Amidst African Religion, (London: SCM Press, 1964). As to the parochialism of the various missions, only the Catholic Church is ubiquitous in Kenya. Mission distribution for major mission groups is as follows: South Nyanza - Seventh Day Adventist; Central - Scottish Mission; Central Nyanza - Anglican; Meru - Methodist; Western - Quaker; Embu - Anglican; Rift Valley - African Inland Mission and Church of God; Ukambani - African Inland Mission and Anglican; Coast - Anglican and Baptist.

skills designed to support the concepts of religion, economics, law, politics, and social status taken from England. To that end, the aliens said to the Africans, believe in my gods, obey my laws, labor at the tasks I designate as useful to earn the currency that I say is of value, and pay the taxes that I say are necessary to strengthen my dominion over you.

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TABLE 4:1 BASIC CULTURE ORIENTATIONS OF THE KENYA EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Goals	- To secure the European position of dominion and control.
Skills	- To employ the rational, legal, technological, scientific, and economic processes of the West to realize its goals.
Sentiments	- To maintain ethnic and social exclusivity to the point of restricting immigration and proscribing racial equality in the colony.

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For half a century this cultural perspective dominated the operation of a society that may have differed on policy choices, but which was homogeneous in its interpretation of the superiority of its own culture, its view of the African and the techniques for guaranteeing its own survival.

#### COLONIAL PENETRATION OF AFRICAN LIFE

The analysis of tribal society emphasized how stability was achieved by dependence on limited mobility, lineage obligations, and peer group associations. The ritual

surrounding that interrelated set of factors provided a cohesiveness to that life while the unexplained was consigned to the supernatural, and, thereby, all life's contingencies might be resolved and community security preserved. However, the static condition of tribal life could not encompass the pressures placed upon it by colonial rule. Traditional society was not conditioned to absorb such vast change nor offer adequate defense against the power of the colonial intruders. The result was a pervasive penetration of tribal life that seriously effected the procedures, beliefs, and organization previously utilized to preserve tribal harmony. The society was opened up to new alternatives of behavior. However, to benefit from such alternatives first required the development of new and previously unknown concepts of self-interest and a consequent alienation from the attitudes of communal obligation.

As these ideas of individualism developed, old reference points were brought into question for the value of ritual conformity was increasingly difficult to sustain. More importantly for political study, rudimentary Western education when combined with even the most tenuous understanding of Western democracy caused the African to question why an

individual should be subjected to a subordinate place in society.

Politics is said to begin only when a people who are emotionally bound together, "achieve a symbolic definition of themselves in relation to the demands of the world."<sup>28</sup> Thus, when Kenya Africans became aware of their subjugation, they had the basis for forming a symbolic definition of themselves which was broader than the tribe and could justify collective action against the colonial rulers. Colonialism forced two basic changes in the African community. First, the development of new self-concepts by which an individual could question his relation to his traditional group and his subservient position to the European. And secondly, the growing awareness of assigned subservience based on race which could bring together all those similarly bound, enlarging loyalties beyond the parochial groups and creating the basis for political action through inter-tribal cooperation. The remainder of this chapter discusses those two basic outcomes of colonial rule.

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Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), pp. 185-186.



## The Administration of African Affairs

The basic concern of the colonial administration did not extend much beyond maintenance of peace and order and the implementation of British standards of justice. In return for the service, the administration sought sufficient revenue to cover its costs. Welfare endeavors were the almost exclusive province of the missions and remained so until after World War II. Operating at minimal expenditure, the administration controlled vast land areas by recruiting indigenous Africans to maintain order, collect taxes and sit as judges.<sup>29</sup> In establishing local tribunals, chiefs, headmen, and local councils, the Colonial Administration overlaid Western governmental norms on the norms of tribal society.

Africans were first involved under the Village Headmen Ordinance of 1902. In 1907 the Native Courts Ordinance first defined the role of traditional courts as judicial bodies, a role that was expanded under the Native Tribunal Rules of 1912 and 1913. The Native Authorities Ordinance of 1912

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The number of colonial personnel serving in Kenya varied during the first five decades of settlement:

1909 - 82

1939 - 121

1919 - 118

1949 - 170

1929 - 125

Source: Heussler, op. cit., p. 13.

superseded the 1902 Ordinance and remained in force until further revised in 1937. It was the second Native Authorities Ordinance of 1924 that gave real structure to administration of the Native areas.<sup>30</sup> Organized under a Chief Native Commissioner, first appointed in 1918, the ordinance created Local Native Councils (LNC's) to "provide an avenue to check disloyal organizations and a means for instilling responsibility in financial matters."<sup>31</sup> The European District Commissioners presiding over these councils directed the African's power to raise money, levy taxes, and pass laws on certain local matters. An expansion of the council functions came after World War II. The 1945 amended Native Authorities Ordinance created a Standing Advisory Committee for Local African Councils, seating five Africans among its membership.<sup>32</sup> Five years later, twenty-six African District Councils (ADC's) were created to replace the LNC's "with powers and responsibilities similar to those possessed in European Local Authorities in Kenya."<sup>33</sup> The bodies were corporate in powers, could

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<sup>30</sup> Kenya Colony, African Affairs Department, Report on Native Affairs, 1927, (London: HMS), 1928), p. 3.

<sup>31</sup> S. H. Fontaine, Local Government in Kenya: Its Origins and Development, (Nairobi: Eagle Press, 1955), pp. 15-18.

<sup>32</sup> Kenya Colony, African Affairs Department, Report on Native Affairs, 1939-1945, (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 4.

<sup>33</sup> Kenya Government, Some Aspects of the Development of Kenya Government Services for the Benefit of Africans from 1946 Onwards, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1953), p. 8.

sue and be sued, raise loans, and exercise wide functions including those formerly held by the chiefs and headmen.<sup>34</sup> Subsequent amendments to the ADC's Ordinance gave power to levy general and specific taxes, required submission of written minutes of meetings, defined communal labor laws, and permitted the ADC's to recruit labor. In the nineteen-fifties colonial authorities were of the opinion that the system had served its purpose of developing political maturity among Africans.<sup>35</sup>

While not pre-meditated, colonial administration helped weaken traditional society. The creation of administration which appointed "headmen" and "chiefs" were the executive arm of colonial rule at the lowest levels constituted a threat to traditional tribal councils. Chiefs symbolized an alternative in decision-making. In the early years, the choice of chiefs was made without reference to the deference due the elders of the tribe. This insensitive procedure was a social irritant to Africans.<sup>36</sup> The discovery that the

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>35</sup> Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 134-135, Also, Dilley, op. cit., p. 28, and for an excellent summary see John Middleton, "Kenya: Administrative Changes in African Life, 1912-1945," in Harlow and Cliver, op. cit., pp. 333-392.

<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of the work of the chief, see Kasina Ndoo, Life Story of a Kenya Chief, (London: Evans Brothers, 1958), passim. Also, H. E. Lambert, The Use of Indigenous Authorities in Tribal Administration, (Capetown: Capetown University, 1947), passim.

indiscriminately appointed official was outside the opinion matrix of the tribe led to more careful selection of the respected members of tribal society.<sup>37</sup> A second factor indicating colonial administration's impact on traditional life was the policy of appointing younger men to sit on the Local Native Councils and the African District Councils.<sup>38</sup> Thirdly, colonial authorities gave the local councils tasks which the traditional elderhood would have been hardpressed to carry out, since,

one of the more effective ways of breaking down self-contained parochialism when it persists as a barrier to nation-building is to overwhelm the capacity of local political systems to procure or to redistribute the resources required to cope with the altered situation.<sup>39</sup>

The combination of individual decision-making, rejection of traditional deference patterns and the creation of technical tasks beyond tribal capabilities made traditional decision-making procedures non-competitive with the colonial system and removed much of the inner logic for maintaining the

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<sup>37</sup> Dilley, op. cit., pp. 28-31, and A. St. J. J. Hannigan, What is Local Government? A Study of Local Government in Kenya and England, (Nairobi: Eagle Press, 1948), p. 29.

<sup>38</sup> Of the 103 members of the Kenya House of Representatives, 1963, for whom biographical data was available, 39 had served with their local ADC, meaning 30% of the House had experience at an age when traditionally they would have been too young for such service, the average of the House in 1963 was 35.2 years.

<sup>39</sup> Fred G. Burke, "Local Governance in East Africa: A Functional Analysis," Occasional Paper, Eastern African Studies Program, Syracuse University, 1964, p. 5.

customary ritual surrounding that system. It was not surprising that before many years had passed, young Africans realized their elders were unable to guarantee the security of the tribe. Though ritual age-classes continued, the cohesion of patterned orderly transfer of political power was greatly weakened.

It is important to recognize, however, that the deference patterns did not pass out of existence when procedures changed. Local government was a social institution. Deference patterns have strong normative connotations, and respect for age still is basic in Kenya. Elders are still the repositories of the lore of various tribes, still guide the ceremonies that remain in use and still are entitled to respect. Basically, the "cultural" preferences of the Africans have been detached from the social institutions of the tribe, and sufficient time has not elapsed for the old preferences to pass out of existence. The persistence of the age-deference pattern is most notable in the person of Kenyatta himself who is a link to the world of traditional African norms. His title of "Mzee," the old one, is descriptive of such deference and means more than old man. Rather, it has the connotation of "he whose wisdom comes from broad experience gathered over many years."<sup>40</sup>

## The Force of the Christian Presence

Missionary efforts in Kenya were often frustrated by the refusal of the missionaries to attempt a reconciliation of Christian doctrine with tribal custom and belief. While seeking converts, the missions condemned local practice, such as multiple marriages, ritual initiation of girls, the drinking of alcohol and dancing. Church opposition to polygynous marriage struck at a basic feature of the extended family system. Opposition to female circumcision condemned ritual required of young women before they could be considered marriageable. Criticism of drinking and dancing opposed primary forms of recreation and relaxation for the tribal community. And accompanying these indictments of African communal practices was the propagation of a faith designed to cast into doubt the belief in ancestral spirits, totems, and taboos. In combination, the missionary undermined many of the basic beliefs and practices which bound the extended family unit together, and he failed to replace it with forms of worship that showed human charity for the non-believer. The African was confronted with intense denominationalism and a confusing array of doctrinal imperatives, many of which were either destructive to the African sense of security, irrelevant, misunderstood, or contradictory to the African way of life.

The eventual response of the African, as he became increasingly educated, was to search for his own synthesis in the creation of separatist and independent churches.<sup>41</sup> The formation of such churches is first recorded in reports of African Affairs in 1930, a year after the question of ending female circumcision was politicized by mission protests to the colonial government. In 1929 pressure was put on the local Native Councils in Central Province to prohibit cliteridectomy, and the following year, five churches disassociated

themselves from the major mission groups and organized in Kiambu district under such names as the African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu Independent Pentecostal Church.<sup>42</sup>

The outcome of the controversy was the crystallization of a number of sects with their own code of ethics and ritual.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> For a study of the independent churches in East Africa, see F. B. Welbourn, East African Rebels, (London: SCM Press, 1961), part III, passim, and Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, (London: Longmans and Green, 1952), passim. During the course of fieldwork, a close relationship was established with the African Brotherhood Church, (ABC) an offshoot of the Anglicans in Ukambani. As indication of the magnitude of new church organization, the ABC has established its own bishopric, sisterhood, elderhood, and program for the training of clergy. Its operations were highly solvent and widely spread among the Kamba people.

<sup>42</sup> Louis B. Leakey, Mau Mau and Kikuyu, (London: Methuen, 1952), pp. 89-90. and the Native Affairs department, Annual Report, 1930, (London: HMSO, 1931), p. 9. The text of the protest ran, "First land was taken from us and now they take our most sacred customs; what will they take next?"

<sup>43</sup> John Middleton, op. cit., pp. 362-383.

Accompanying the growth of independent churches was the African demand that the government provide schools to overlap mission schools since it was nearly impossible to obtain secular education. Colonial authorities voiced fear that independent schools would be built, and their fears were realized when Mbiyu Koinange returned from studying in the United States and assumed leadership of the Kikuyu Independent Schools centered in the educational complex established at Githunguri.<sup>44</sup>

The political significance of such actions is summarized in the remark of early nationalist, Bildad Kaggia, "I realized while in England that we could never found a successful nationalist movement until the educated people were weaned away from the churches."<sup>45</sup> Thus, the Christian presence played the dual role of weakening the cohesiveness of the family and invited criticisms from the Africans leading incipient political movements.<sup>46</sup> More positively, the churches

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<sup>44</sup> Mbiyu Koinange, The People of Kenya Speak for Themselves, (Detroit: Kenya Publication Fund, 1955), passim., for a discussion of the problems of collecting funds to run the schools. Also, John C. Kamau, loc. cit., who was born at Githunguri and was circumcised there as a member of the 1935 age group.

<sup>45</sup> Bildad Kaggia, personal interview with the author.

<sup>46</sup> On the impact of Christianity, see J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society, op. cit., pp. 210-211, the Christian Council of Kenya, Annual Report, 1964 (Nairobi: The Christian Council, 1964), p. 24. and Kenya Government, Statistical Abstract, 1964, (Nairobi: Government Printer,



did provide education, both primary and secondary, until after World War II when the government took a more active role.<sup>47</sup> Interviews with members of the House of Representatives showed that thirty-eight of forty had received their education at mission schools where they reluctantly accepted the imposed missionary teachings.<sup>48</sup> In the latter role, the missionary contribution was an uncritical plus in terms of the colonial legacy for without missionary education, Kenya at independence would have suffered from shortages of personnel so necessary for the operation of an efficient and effective

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fn. 46 contd. 1965), p. 11. The 1962 listed 55% of the African population as Protestant or Catholic, but the sample was based on total enumeration of urban areas and a 10% sample of rural areas "rated" up to the whole population. The Christian Council estimated that the true figure was no more than 10% down from the 15% estimated by Goldthorpe in 1948.

<sup>47</sup> In 1912 there were 40 mission schools in the country. By 1930 there were 90 mission schools and 2000 out-schools, the latter meaning bush schools with some tie to a main center. At that time there were 85,000 children attending those schools, but the figure would have been much higher if the government had not in that year closed a number of the independent schools in Kikuyu areas. See Middleton, *op. cit.*, p. 385. Before 1911 there were no records of African education. In 1911 the Government gave grants of land to the missions wishing to set up schools. In 1924 the Education Ordinance laid down the rules governing grants in aid to mission schools. Even in 1954, despite post-war changes, 87% of African children received education in mission schools. See Kenya Colony, Education Department, Triennial Survey of Education, 1958-1960, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1960), p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> C. W. Hobley, Bantu Beliefs and Magic, (London: H. F. and G. Witherby, 1922), p. 35 and L.S.B. Leakey, Kenya: Contrasts and Problems, (London: Methuen and Co., 1935), p. 60. The two non-missionary educated interviewees were J. Tipis and A. K. Soi who were picked for Government school education because they, "appeared the right age," and the Government was interested in upgrading the Masai and Kipsigis.

civil service. Furthermore, the early educational opportunities meant that when overseas scholarships did become available in the forties and fifties, there were qualified persons to accept them. As a result, twenty-one of the thirty-nine members of the House serving as ministers and assistant ministers in June of 1965 had formal education beyond the secondary level.<sup>49</sup> The missionary influence is considered as one of initiation of socio-political change and a catalyst for the development of mature leadership needed to help stabilize independent Kenya.

#### The Pattern of European Settlement

The third feature of tribal life, limited mobility, was weakened by the economic changes wrought by the settlers. These changes were precipitated by the desire of the British government that its colonies be self-sufficient. In East Africa there was a commitment to maintain control of the Uganda Protectorate guarding the headwaters of the Nile. At great and unanticipated cost, a railway was constructed across Kenya from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. This route was designed to guarantee supplies for the administrators of Uganda. The

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Based on interviews, Marco Survey Ltd. (Nairobi, Who's Who in East Africa, (Nairobi: East Africans Printers, 1964), and the newsfile of the East African Standard, Nairobi.

cost of the railway was deemed so great as to make necessary the promotion of settlement along the line-of-rail to provide revenue producing farms. With this policy rationalizing the alienation of lands, settlers with the support of the British government obtained control over vast tracts and gave small regard to the people they displaced from traditional if ill-defined holdings.<sup>50</sup> Not until 1926 did the tribes of Kenya have a legal right to their land. Prior to that time, "encroachment might be effected by any Governor who could advance sufficiently plausible excuses for it to elicit concurrence from a Secretary of State for the Colonies in London."<sup>51</sup> When the Foreign Office took over the Protectorate, leases of as much as 20,000 acres were renewed if given under the old British East African Company charter. Forcible alienation of land was authorized under the 1901 Order in Council and a 1902 Amendment eliminated the earlier proviso against the alienation of land where the interests of Africans might be adversely affected, stating only that land could not be taken where Africans were actually

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Ross, op. cit., p. 51. Leys, op. cit., p. 282, Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 17. A summary of British land policy in Kenya is found in Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 673-689.

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Ross, op. cit., p. 48. Also see R. K. Pankhurst, Kenya: The History of Two Nations, (London: Independent Publishing Co., 1954), p. 30.

resident. Under such regulations, the Elgeyo were forced off the Mau Escarpment in 1904-05 to make way for the Grogan Forest Concession. The Kamba were moved out of the Lukenia Hills in 1907. A 1904 agreement with the Masai was abrogated and they were moved from the Laikipia. Between 1905 and 1915, nearly 4.4 million acres of land were alienated.<sup>52</sup> Self-criticism by the British was voiced in 1925 but that did not prevent the Closer Settlement Schemes of 1926 or the Indian Civil Servants Scheme of 1933-36, though admittedly the size of the holdings was much reduced from earlier days.<sup>53</sup>

To make farming viable, a labor force was needed, and the African was the candidate. The rationale used by the settlers was utilitarian in nature while being justified in terms that would sooth Victorian conscience. Thus evolved the theory of "interpenetration" that stated how direct contact with the white race was good because it provided a more rapid advance in civilization than if the Africans remained in the reserves.<sup>54</sup> The means of bringing the African out of traditional lands were taxation, binding contracts and prohibitions against the growing by Africans of the valuable cash-crop, Arabica coffee, which would have freed them of the

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<sup>52</sup> Pankhurst, ibid., pp. 28-33.

<sup>53</sup> Fabian Burea, op. cit., pp. 7-10.

<sup>54</sup> Dilley, op. cit., p. 214.

need to work on European farms.<sup>55</sup> The British government acquiesced in the settlers' assessment of the labor needs of the community, and public reports evidenced "resentment at tribal self-sufficiency. For a tribe to be content with its own produce was referred to almost as if it was wicked."<sup>56</sup> There was criticism of the system of enforced labor but the system was not discontinued until 1926 when it was discovered that the practice contravened the Geneva Convention.<sup>57</sup>

The importance of the system of getting cheap labor lay in the numbers of Africans who were introduced to new ways of acting and thinking. How many Africans were affected is difficult to estimate. The Ormsby-Gore Report of 1925 stated there were approximately 400,000 able-bodied African men between the ages of fifteen and forty. In 1924, seventeen hundred farmers had employed 87,000 Africans on their farms, or about 50 Africans per farm.<sup>58</sup> Knowing that in 1905 there were 600 settlers and cognizant of all the farming ventures that failed in the intervening nineteen years, it is still

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<sup>55</sup>

The taxation rate for 1912-1920 was 12 to 16 shillings a year which represented a month's wages, see Middleton, op. cit., p. 356.

<sup>56</sup>

Leys, op. cit., p. 185. Also, Margery Perham and Elspeth Huxley, Race and Politics in Kenya, (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 77.

<sup>57</sup>

Gregory, op. cit., p. 29 and Muga Gicharu, Land and Sunshine: Scenes of Kenya Before Mau Mau, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p. 58. For a review of labor laws, see C. R. Buxton, The Exploitation of the Coloured Man, (London: The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1925), pp. 77ff.

<sup>58</sup>

Ross, op. cit., Chapter VI.

reasonable to project an increase of fifty new farms a year over the period. Assuming a base labor force of 30,000 in 1905 and annual increases of 2500 per year, there was in the period considered an aggregate of over a million Africans employed on the farms. With even only a 25% yearly turnover rate, some 265,000 Africans or 10% of the total estimated African population who had worked on the farms in the first two decades of settlement.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, in order to establish the new alien economy, the Europeans acquainted thousands of Africans with the rudiments of the technical/innovative culture of the West while contributing to personal African mobility that weakened unquestioning adherence to traditional ritual and increased the practice of behavior not tolerated in the traditional environment.

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Leys criticizes the idea that there were available 400,000 men for work in the farms. He felt that the figure was closer to half of that since men over 30 were not useful. In addition to men on the farms, the 1927 African Affairs Report listed 20,000 African men in Nairobi. Assuming the Nairobi figure was only 13,000 three years earlier in 1924, it means that the combined total of men outside their traditional areas for some part of the year totalled 100,000 or 25% of all those that could conceivably have been available even discounting Leys' beliefs. As to the yearly turnover in such a labor force, in 1948 in Nairobi there was 52% annual turnover. Assuming a rate of permanency of 75% which is generously high, one achieves an understanding of the tremendous number of Africans who had worked outside the reserves by 1924.

## THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN

The penetration of colonialist influences into tribal society served to make that society more amenable to new patterns of social learning and behavior.<sup>60</sup> Lines of communication were established along which new cultural orientations could flow. To the African was communicated awareness of the threat to the old social order of the tribe. The African could see how alien belief systems, condemnation of traditional customs, alienation of lands, imposition of taxes, forced labor, and replacement of traditional authorities with colonial appointees were destroying societal harmony and security. To combat that attack on all that was meaningful in traditional life, small groups of Africans challenged alien control and demanded a redress of grievances.

To do this the Africans learned from the Europeans skills different from ones previously used to maintain the tribal society; and the environment for the learning of those skills was the European dominated political system. The style of political discourse developed within the European community was important for two reasons. First, it envisioned Kenya in a country-wide perspective, giving the colony a political focus as a nation-state. Secondly, the European institutions

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Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953), Chapter II for a discussion of the concept of social mobilization.

were an integrated whole for converting demands into policy. Unlike the Native Affairs administration, European institutions consisted of both input and output mechanisms. Whereas Africans were dependent on a Native Affairs Commissioner, Europeans employed a variety of agencies to insure that their interests were heard by British authorities. The model for rule-making was Westminster. Politics was played by English rules with reliance on parliamentary procedure, established law, and a pragmatic-bargaining style in articulation of issues.

The basic organ of settler opinion was the Convention of Association, a federation of a number of district associations formed in 1910 as a successor to the old Colonists Association. The policy of the Convention was the refusal to accept on any grounds that the government had a right to decide colonial issues in a way prejudicial to settler interests. When disagreement between settlers and the Colonial Office did arise, the settlers were convinced that their knowledge of the "native problem" granted them a higher capacity for judgment. Isolated as they were in the colony, their views were tightly reasoned and firmly held. The degree to which their opinions influenced the Colonial Office at any given point in time was a barometric reading of the settler community's attitude toward the "home" government. Pronouncements favorable to



the settlers heartened the community into believing that its ultimate goal of self-government was to be realized. Unfavorable judgments from London lowered enthusiasm and brought forth streams of vituperative condemnation.

Throughout the first two decades of political association, the Europeans gained a reputation for protest and remonstrance. Influence on Commissioner Charles Eliot resulted in the granting of land concessions without Foreign Office concurrence. Settler outrage was in part responsible for the denial of parts of the colony as a homeland for the Zionists.<sup>61</sup> Europeans, angered in 1908 over government restrictions on the practices to be used in the recruitment of African labor, bullied Governor James Haues Sadler unmercifully, saw the removal of Masai tribesmen from the Laikipia which the settlers coveted for themselves, and resigned from the Legislative Council in 1913 when elected representation was not granted on request.<sup>62</sup>

By 1920, the Africans had been exposed to more than a decade and a half of European politics. In the years that followed, the Africans developed their own political organizations while continuing to learn from the European community.

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<sup>61</sup> Robert G. Weisbrod, African Zion: An Attempt to Establish a Jewish Colony in the East African Protectorate, 1903-1905, (New York: New York University, 1965), unpublished doctoral dissertation. passim.

<sup>62</sup> This summary draws heavily on the political history of Kenya by George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, The Colonial Period, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), passim.

In the 1920's there was the settler protest over whether African interests should be paramount, a protest that was so vehement that it reached a point where armed rebellion was actively considered by the Convention of Associations. In the 1930's there was demand for greater control of the financial structure of the colony. And in the 1940's there was a demand for ministerial government. In the latter demand, the settlers were successful, but not before the first African was already sitting in the Legislative Council.

#### The Politics of Subservience, 1920-1940

The earliest recorded evidence that penetration of African culture by European political norms had established communication links strong enough to permit African participation in colonial political life appeared in the early 1920's. In 1920, the "moderate" Kikuyu Association, composed largely of chiefs and headmen, sought redress of issues surrounding expropriation of land.<sup>63</sup> A year later, the Young Kikuyu Association was formed to demand consideration of labor grievances. The significance of such change was not lost on observers even at that early date, as is seen in a description of a Young Kikuyu Association meeting at Dagoretti near Nairobi in 1921 where young men in Western dress took precedence over their elders and demanded higher wages, guarantees

<sup>63</sup> Middleton, op. cit., p. 357.

of African land titles, and more educational facilities.

There was in that meeting,

the genesis of revolution. Subjects putting questions to the Government; questions which ought to have remained unframeable. Government slightly resenting the challenge; unwilling to concede remedies too rapidly. Assurances of early consideration and ultimate improvement. Just a tinge of excuse by the Government; even a counter charge.<sup>64</sup>

The "unfathomable ill-feeling" sewn with the passage of the 1913 Labor Circulars, nourished with the Masters and Servants Ordinance and the "criminal" Kipandi (registration and identity card) system, and matured by Africans having to "pay rents and taxes for remaining in a state of captivity on a fraction of what was at one time their own land," resulted in the new political associations in the colony.<sup>65</sup>

The Young Kikuyu Association, led and inspired by a government telephone operator, Harry Thuku, expanded its protests into a general condemnation of European imposed "slavery" with the result that Thuku and two others were arrested and exiled to Kismayu. The African response was a series of disturbances eventuating in police fire on crowds, which killed more than twenty Africans.<sup>66</sup> The organization

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<sup>64</sup>Ross, op. cit., p. 226.

<sup>65</sup>Parmenas Mockerie, An African Speaks for His People, (London: Hogarth Press 1934), pp. 44-47, and 81. Also, Gicaru, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 57-59, 60, 76.

<sup>66</sup>Mockerie, ibid., p. 37 states that though officially only 25 were killed, "leaders of the demonstration collected 200 names of persons who received bullets and died in their homes, in addition there were many who although wounded, suffered permanent injury because they were afraid to go to hospitals to have bullets extracted."

itself, however, did not die and reformed under the banner of the Kikuyu Central Association. With early nationalists Joseph Kangethe and Jesse Kariuki at the helm, it demanded (1) Thuku's release, (2) African representation in the Legislative Council, (3) permission for Africans to grow Arabica coffee, (4) publication of laws in Kikuyu, and (5) return of African land. By 1925, these aims were supported in a vernacular newspaper under the editorship of Jomo Kenyatta.

Elsewhere in the colony, the twenties saw the birth of a Young Kavirondo Association in Nyanza which in 1923 became the Kavirondo Taxpayers and Welfare Association under the guiding hand of Archdeacon Owen.<sup>67</sup> This association, like its Kikuyu counterpart, submitted testimony to the Ormsby-Gore Commission of 1925 and the Hilton-Young Commission of 1927, and it also offered written submissions to the Joint Select Committee of 1931.<sup>68</sup> Outside the Bantu and Nilotic areas, agitation among the Nilo-Hamitics centered primarily around demands that colonial rule permit the preservation of traditional magico-religious authority figures and was only nominally concerned about issues of modernization.<sup>69</sup>

In the 1930's, the political development of Africans was largely over-looked in official reports on African affairs.

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<sup>67</sup>Wagner, op. cit., pp. 34-39.

<sup>68</sup>Colonial Office, African Affairs Department, Annual Report of Native Affairs 1927, (London: HMSO, 1928), p. 4.

<sup>69</sup>Middleton, op. cit., pp. 377ff.

African protest was dismissed as "semi-articulate agitation" among the Kikuyu; "probably inevitable among half-awakened peoples."<sup>70</sup> The fledgling nationalist movements were rather prosaically described as representative of "sturdy independence," illustrating the "cumulative process of exposure to civilization."<sup>71</sup> To prevent such "comtose agitation" from erupting into anything serious, the chiefs were told to be more diligent in their duties of countering "ill-informed political and anti-government propaganda in the reserves."<sup>72</sup> The government based its judgment of the comparative quiet in the thirties by contrasting the decade to the turbulence of the twenties. It also believed there was a steady decline of the KCA due to a quarrel within the leadership, such as the split between Kangethe and Thuku who had returned from exile.<sup>73</sup>

The quiet was misleading, however, and the warnings were unheeded in those early days while around the European community, "the raw material of sedition (was) present in abundance, grievances about labour and wages, and taxes and

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<sup>70</sup> Native Affairs, 1927, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>71</sup> Colonial Office, African Affairs Department, Annual Report on Native Affairs 1930, (London: HMSO, 1931), p. 4.

<sup>72</sup> Koinage, op. cit., passim, and Leakey, op. cit., pp. 91-93.

<sup>73</sup> Colonial Office, African Affairs Department, Annual Report on Native Affairs 1933, (London: HMSO, 1935), p. 6.

insecurity of land tenure, and tribal police and quarantine regulations and so forth."<sup>74</sup> Bitterly described by Parmenas-Mockerie, "naked tyranny (was) covered from the world with the figleaf; development and creation of a Christian democracy based on the English way of life."<sup>75</sup> Africans were forced to witness the continued alienation of land for settlement schemes, legalized in legislation like the Native Lands Trust Ordinance and its subsequent amendments for which there was little redress. Even when the Africans appealed to the Carter Land Commission, government authorities failed to read meaning into the changing African attitudes.<sup>76</sup> The Kavirondo Taxpayers and Welfare Association split along Bantu and Nilotic lines resulting in the establishment of the North Kavirondo Taxpayers and Welfare Association.<sup>77</sup> In Ukambani and the Taita Hills, associations allied to the KCA were formed, and all three groups were proscribed as subversive in 1940 on a justification by the government that the imminent entry of Italian Somaliland into the second World War justified the action.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Koinage, op. cit., pp. 25ff.

<sup>75</sup> Mockerie, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>76</sup> Perham and Huxley, op. cit., pp. 42-51.

<sup>77</sup> Wagner, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

<sup>78</sup> Gicaru, op. cit., p. 92.

The nature of this early political activity demonstrated how rapidly the Africans became aware that the Europeans were not the final arbiters of policy. The basic control rested in London, and it was to London that the Africans made representation. In the submission of testimony to the various commissions and the sending of advocates of African interests to London, the acceptance of Western legal and procedural practices was evident. In the formation of newspapers for the presentation of particular opinions was manifested nontraditional skills in the manipulation of symbols and attitudes. The formation of associations to articulate interests through delegated representatives was yet another departure from the consensualism and conservative ritual of the parochial tribal culture.

#### The Politics of Defiance, 1944-1956

The post-war years were an era when the European farmer was shaken in all his preconceived notions and forced to concede demands which only a few years before he would have entertained as nonsense. It was an era when the effectiveness of settler control over politics was weakened by a Colonial Office that was less susceptible to the blandishments of the settler. The years after the war witnessed unprecedented social upheaval in the African community as the impact of

Western culture brought tremendous social change among thousands of Kenya Africans. That mobilization of social attitudes helped create a population more attentive to the appeals of nationalism and served to differentiate more sharply the desires of the African from the intransigent social attitudes of the European.

The Magnitude of Social Change: Most characteristic of the post-war period was the way in which structures for social transformation first laid down by those archetypes of change: the settler, the missionary, and the administrator, were enlarged in number to form a comprehensive and integrated framework for the growth of a national social structure.

TABLE 4:2 OBJECTIVE GROWTH STATISTICS IN KENYA, 1947-1960

	Cement Consumption in tons	Electricity Usage in Kilowatt hours	Posts in Millions of Letters	Motor Vehicles Licensed
1947	-	34,458,000	31.2	20,215
1950	116,412	75,833,000	42.0	35,408
1955	192,319	223,118,000	73.8	56,861
1958	174,112	301,145,000	66.7	73,358
1960	182,076	356,947,000	74.1	89,505

Source: Annual Reports and Kenya Statistical Abstracts



In particular, this change is reflected in the expansion of the wage-labor economy and trade union growth that gave evidence of an African minority community within the mass of African population that had absorbed the requisite skills to effectively champion the interests of the whole African community by becoming competitive with the Europeans. The importance of new skills is indicated by the fact that not until 1940 did the African protest become effective, suggesting that a critical stage or threshold had been reached - a threshold created by the population density in the reserves, the growth of mobility of individuals and the movement into the cities, the inflationary rises in living costs, the expansion of demand schedules; and, most importantly, the presence of the minority with the capacity to initiate social and economic protest.<sup>79</sup> By the same token that "critical mass" or population cluster within Kenya society had to remain

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Chalmers Johnson, On Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), Chapter V. Johnson develops a thesis that loss of authority by the ruler will not occur in society until the deviants in that society can influence the non-deviants or law abiding citizens. When the non-deviants or law abiders begin to question the incongruence between reality and the stated values of the system, the authority of the rulers is brought into question. This is the essential role of stimulation to a new realization of reality brought about by the political activists in Kenya.

strongly tied to the traditional culture in order that political protest would eventually be able to be widespread enough to be effective in the struggle against the colonial government and the settlers.

Contrasting to the acceptance of new skills and sentiments by Africans, the Europeans sought to preserve and enhance their position on the basis of a balance between their

TABLE 4:2 TRADE UNION ACTIVITY IN THE WAGE LABOR ECONOMY, 1946-1959

	Labor force in '000	Applications to the Labor Exchanges*	Registered Unions/ Membership	Disputes	Men Striking/ Man days lost
1946	248	50,000	2/-	60	15000/165,000
1947	281	9,000	9/-	80	-
1951	-	28,454	**12/-	57	- / 9,671
1952	438	33,109	***17/40,000	84	9,597/ 5,718
1955	-	85,205	25/25,960	35	17,852/ 81,870
1956	492	91,500	-	38	5,170/ 28,230
1958	-	93,300	42/30,000	96	21,395/ 59,096
1959	537	82,122	52/ ****	67	42,124/431,973

\*The labor exchanges were originally established for the purpose of finding employment for demobilized African soldiers. By 1948, the Demobilization and Re-absorption Board had been dissolved. On the average, 23 exchanges were active yearly throughout the period.

\*\*Represents 9 employees and 3 employer's unions.

\*\*\*The membership represents only that of 13 employees unions; African trade unions were affiliated to a Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions which was in turn affiliated to the ICFTU.

\*\*\*\*The Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) sponsored the formation of nine new unions and concentrated efforts on agricultural workers for the first time. Seventeen unions were for other races or multi-racial.

minority dominance and African subservience which has ceased to be operative. In the post-war period they sought, "to live a fantasy...obsessed by a memory which was of no further use to them."<sup>80</sup> Continuing to talk in terms of gradual development of the African for roles in government, they had a supremely false confidence in the future,

Why indeed should we have doubted? For one thing we were much too busy to have doubts. We were working twelve hours a day. . .at a minimum of six days a week, and probably five hours on Sundays as well, and if we had time to sit down and read on a Sunday afternoon, our literature was almost certainly agricultural. . . . Moreover, all this time our enthusiasm was being reinforced by new settlers whose enthusiasm was equal to our own.<sup>81</sup>

The Royal Commission investigated the colony in the fifties reiterated the obliviousness of such isolated viewpoints when it noted that Europeans had little time for the African and when pressed would claim that African protests were unjustified.<sup>82</sup> Thus, in the post-war years, the Europeans were

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<sup>80</sup> Sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, (London: Hutchinson and Co. 1954), p. 101. Also see, Colonial Office, Royal Commission Report, Report of the Royal Commission, 1953-1955, pp. 194 and 380, J. F. Lipscomb, We Built a Country, (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), p. 106., Elspeth Huxley, Kenya Today, (London: Butterworth Press, 1954), p. 126, C. T. Stoneham, Out of Barbarism, (London: Museum Press, 1955), pp. 187-190.

<sup>81</sup> Lipscomb, op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>82</sup> Royal Commission Report, op. cit., p. 380.

witnesses to change among the Africans, indeed, they had helped precipitate it, but they failed to interpret its meaning and accommodate themselves to it.

The Achievement of Political Recognition: The impact of social change in Kenya colony did not of itself constitute political change, but the result of social change provided a new environment in which the politics of African anti-colonialism could flourish. The prescription of tribal associations in 1940 indicated that the "primitive" Africans had absorbed enough of Western skill techniques to constitute a threat to the European community. By such absorption, the static dynamism of enforced equilibrium was destroyed. The African developed new skills while the European was still tethered to the pronouncements of the Colonial Office. Indeed, the settler position deteriorated in the post-war period as a series of influences strengthened the African claims for political recognition.

Many of the external forces influencing change in Kenya are well documented since they were the general pressures that had impact on all or much of Africa. The advent of the Labour government in 1945 resulted in greater concern being expressed toward the colonies.<sup>83</sup> While the granting of wide

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<sup>83</sup>See John Parker's. Labour Marches On, (New York: Penguin Books, 1947), passim, and Rita Hinden, Empire and After: A Study of British Imperial Attitudes, (London: Essential Books, 1949), passim.

ranging freedoms was not anticipated, Africans did have a fairer hearing. Forcing the pace of change were the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Internally, 75,000 Kenyans returned from military service with considerably changed views on what was obtainable in their society.<sup>84</sup> The forties saw the growth of vernacular press which the colonial administration continued to dismiss as "semi-sophisticated ignorance" while lamenting that Africans, suspicious of even the best-intentioned efforts of the government, manifested an "increased disinclination to accept advice that is bred of self-assurance induced by a lack of experience in world affairs."<sup>85</sup> Local associations

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Kenya Colony, Report on Native Affairs, 1939-1945, (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 59, Also, personal interviews with the Hon. Bildad Kaggia, loc. cit., J. K. Tipis, loc. cit., and the Hon. J. D. Kali. In all only 9 of 117 constituent Members of the Kenya Parliament elected in 1963 served in the Kings African Rifles.

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Report on Native Affairs, 1939-1945, Ibid., p. 72. and Annual reports for 1946 to 1960. The expansion of the vernacular press was accompanied by a general expansion of all communication media. A centralized service for information was created in 1946. Fourteen district newspapers later consolidated to eight regional papers were established. In 1957 four vernacular monthly magazines had a combined monthly circulation of 136,000. Between 1947 and 1959, wireless broadcast hours increased 700% and public listening posts were established to reach a wider sector of the African population.

proliferated as centers for aggregation of African opinion. The Kenya African Study Union (KASU) was formed to advise Eliud Mathu, who in 1944 was appointed the first sitting African member of the Legislative Council.<sup>86</sup>

It was not the intention of the settlers, however, to reclaim any of the legacy of mistrust extended to the Africans over the previous four and a half decades of colonial rule. The European community, or substantial portions of it, still continued to think its security could only be guaranteed in white-dominated self-rule. Some even envisioned an East African dominion under its leadership as the responsibility of "a democratic people with a highly developed sense of justice" which would assume the decisive role in creating a "contented prosperous and progressive African community by concentrating on the African's mental, moral, and material improvement."<sup>87</sup> But even as that plan was put forward, the unity of the community was beginning to crack under the pressure of new ideas and its great strength of cohesiveness was increasingly dissipated.

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The Hon. Anderson Wamuthenya, an original member of KASU and now Member of Parliament for Mathira, personal interview with the author.

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The Elector's Union, The Kenya Plan, (Nairobi: East African Standard, 1949), passim.

The settlers, however, were not disposed to give in easily. With pressures building up both within Kenya and from England for expanded recognition of African interests, the Europeans, a community that never equalled as much as one per cent of the total African population, employed a full range of political and legal skills to pursue a highly successful policy of minority politics, giving ground only grudgingly and exacting concessions from England with every abandoned hope. While this retreat was underway, the Africans were provided with opportunity to mature not only as nationalists but as responsible politicians who recognized that in order to win concessions from the competitive and inspired European minority, they as African leaders would have to be as proficient at the craft of politics as their antagonists.

To conclude the Africans would not have demanded their freedom so quickly had the European community been more flexible in its outlook would be only to infer a different time sequence to events. The granting of freedom to colonial dependencies in Africa has followed a basic pattern with regard to the implementation of various constitutional provisions. These have started with the introduction of unofficial representation, expansion of that representation, creation of an executive council, transformation of the

executive council into a cabinet responsible to the legislature, extension of the franchise, extension of more ministerial posts to unofficials, settling on final constitutional instruments, final elections, and the grant of independence. With flexibility dictated by particular national situations and a fistful of differing time tables, this is a summary of British rule in Africa from 1945 onwards. In Kenya, the inflexibility of settler opinion guaranteed that the time sequence would be stretched out as long as possible so that other nations such as Ghana, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda would precede the country to independence.

The presence of Eliud Mathu in the Legislative Council was the beginning. Two years later, in February of 1946, the Kenya African Union (KAU) was founded with James Gichuru as president until Kenyatta returned from England and took the post in September of that year. Seeking membership in the Legislative Council, Kenyatta was rebuffed, though Mathu warned the Europeans that Africans would develop their grievances separately if they were denied a hearing through official channels.<sup>88</sup> At the time of the European elections in 1948, nominated African membership in the Legislative Council was increased to four. After the Colonial Secretary Griffiths visited the colony in 1951, the number soon grew

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<sup>88</sup> George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 103-119.



to six, but the European community was hostile to such representation and remained antagonistic to both the external and internal pressures being brought to bear on the colony and themselves in particular. There was still no direct franchise for Africans and the Europeans continued to hold parity with all other racial communities combined.<sup>89</sup> The slow pace of change and the unremitting European determination to preserve its influence was intolerable to portions of an increasingly embittered African community. In 1952, there occurred a breakdown in security, and the ensuing violence forced Governor Evelyn Baring to declare a state of emergency in which Kenyatta and 97 others were immediately placed under arrest.

The inspiration for the Mau Mau rebellion has been attributed to many sources. It has been called a "tragic revulsion against the new and a reversion to the old" and Dr. J. C. Carothers has characterized the movement as the "development of an anxious conflictual situation in a people who, from contact with an alien culture, had lost the supportive and constraining influences of their culture, yet had not lost the magical modes of thinking."<sup>90</sup> L.S.B. Leakey saw the

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<sup>89</sup> G. F. Engholm, "African Elections in Kenya, March 1957," in W. J. M. McKenzie and Kenneth Robinson, Five Elections in Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 394-396.

<sup>90</sup> J. C. Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954), p. 15.

movement as a religion to which it owed its success.<sup>91</sup> For the Kikuyu Africans, the rebellion is recalled as a revolt sparked by a need for human dignity.

It is around this fundamental indignity, this degradation of human relations, this basic threat to security at the core of his personal (and therefore spiritual) being, that all the other grievances - whether real or imaginary - cling and foster til they issue in revolt.<sup>92</sup>

And to the non-Kikuyu African:

Mau Mau was the child of economic and social problems which accumulated over the years and which had not found solutions through constitutional channels. They were all problems of discrimination against Africans in different forms.<sup>93</sup>

A return to the old, a loss of cultural constraint, a religion, a revolt to achieve human dignity and a complex socio-economic political problem - the Mau Mau rebellion could have been all those things to different observers.<sup>94</sup>

What is most evident from the tragedy that was Mau Mau was the response resulting from the blunting of the synchronization of change that was occurring in much of British Africa. In 1945, when the Manchester Conference on Pan-Africanism had

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<sup>91</sup> L. S. B. Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, (London: Methuen and Co., 1954), p. 41.

<sup>92</sup> Around Mount Kenya: Comment on the Corfield Report, (Kampala: Makerere College Kikuyu Embu and Meru Students Association, 1960), p. 16.

<sup>93</sup> Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1963), p. 40.

<sup>94</sup> Carl G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, (New York: Praeger, 1966), passim.

gathered, Africans from all of English speaking Africa were on more or less the same footing. By 1952, however, Kwame Nkrumah was a "prison graduate" come forth to be the Chief Minister of the Gold Coast's Legislative Assembly while Kenyatta was still a teacher at Githunguri. Kenya, one of the few African territories with an entrenched European minority had interrupted the time sequence of development to the frustration of burgeoning African political consciousness. Settler politics represented a vehement "no" to the working out of the self-liquidating principles that inspired post-war imperial policy. In 1952 the frustration among Africans caused by such a negative European response resulted in the temporary collapse of the system and of security.

The violence was organized on traditional lines employing age-grade ties and ritual appeals similar to those found throughout Kikuyu custom. Its proclaimed goals were those that had agitated the Africans for years: reclaiming of lands and ending of government restrictions leading to the end of European control. In the integration of traditional and modern orientations both with respect to ends and means, the rebellion obtained an image of cultural duality reflecting norms found in both cultures.

Attacked by a force of technical superiority, the rebellion came apart under pressure so that by 1953 the situation was in the control of the colonial government. Contacts in the cities were cut off, supplies to the activists in the forests dwindled, British regiments shuttled back and forth to the colony, and the process of releasing those interned was begun.<sup>95</sup> The storm subsided and was declared over in 1959, but it left the political landscape much changed from the early fifties. Even before the violence ceased, investigations were calling for wider recruitment of Africans into the government, abolition of discriminatory legislation and wider dissemination of information looking to creation of a multi-racial society. A new constitution was promulgated in 1954 which created a council of ministers as "the principal instrument in the government of the Colony; with one African among the six unofficial ministers. Further, a study was instituted which resulted in the introduction of a limited franchise for some 360,000 Africans, becoming law in March of 1956.<sup>96</sup> Referring to the catalytic effect of the Mau Mau rebellion, Tom Mboya has written that anyone must

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<sup>95</sup> Kenya Colony, Annual Reports, 1954-1957, passim., and Great Britain, Colonial Office, Kenya: Proposals for a Reconstruction of the Government, (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 4-14.

<sup>96</sup> Proposals, ibid., passim., Kenya Colony, Report of the Commissioner Appointed to Inquire into Methods for the Selection of African Representatives to the Legislative Council, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955), pp. 34-38 and Engholm, op. cit., pp. 406-407.

be led to believe "that had it not been for Mau Mau, perhaps these changes would never have taken place, at any rate, they would never have come as quickly as they did."<sup>97</sup>

The Politics of Victory, 1957-1963

Political activity in the colony between 1957 and the granting of independence in 1963 constituted the ingredients of the African success story. The ultimate outcome was never in doubt since by the time of the first direct elections of Africans to the Legislature, Ghana had already been an independent nation for two months. The catalogue of events occurring during those seven years, however, provide a commentary on the increasing political sophistication of African politicians as they manipulated the same political instruments which the settlers had once used to badger the Colonial Office and the government in London. Twelve years of political tutelage, starting in 1944 had brought the Africans to a point where they could effectively compete with the Europeans. Then, from 1957 onwards, Africans increasingly dominated political issues as the Europeans fought what can best be described as a magnificent rear guard action in favor of a lost cause.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Mboya, op. cit., pp. 44.

<sup>98</sup> It should be noted that the Mboya book serves as a particularly valuable memoir of a crucial period in Kenya history. The requirement for field work stems from the fact that other memoirs similar to the Mboya book are not available and the only source of information is contact with the leaders themselves.

With regard to the Africans, they began to realize that they had made great gains toward their goal of national independence by demanding representation, franchise, ministerial posts and in the process had been forced to accept the political belief system of British culture as distinct from and in addition to the political beliefs of tribal culture. The time factor created by slowness of colonial withdrawal resulted in an ever-broadening penetration of this alien political belief system into the remote areas of the country.

The proposed franchise was a reality in May 1957 when 37 candidates stood for eight seats. Restrictions on political activity were eased in order to allow the candidates to make their case to the constituencies before electorates largely unversed in the procedural aspects of Western democracy.<sup>99</sup> Refusing to consider the granting of the franchise as a victory, however, newly elected African Members of the Legislative Council demanded seven more seats. Following a visit by the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd to the colony in 1957, six more seats were granted and filled in March of 1958. Following those elections, Oginga Odinga began preaching for the release of Kenyatta from detention where the KAU president had been since 1953. In December of 1958, African

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Engholm, op. cit., pp. 412-413, 423, 426-428.

members boycotted the Legislative Council until new constitutional talks should be called. These were finally convened after the 1959 Conservative victory in the British parliamentary elections. Called to order at Lancaster House under the chairmanship of Colonial Secretary Ian McLeod during January and February of 1960, the talks resulted in agreement on an elected African majority for the Legislative Council with half of eight unofficial ministerial posts reserved for Africans.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the future of Kenya was determined though it required nearly another four years to determine the dispensations to be made regarding Europeans who could not abide the prospect of living in an African ruled country.

The adoption of a political belief system along with the broader socio/cultural norms of Western society was evident in the political history of those final years of colonial rule; most notably it was revealed by the emergence of a competitive two-party system that shaped the political life until the granting of independence. Formed on a national basis and representing the amalgamation of a number of small district organizations, the two parties, the Kenya African National

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Mboya, op. cit., p. 121, also Carl G. Rosberg and George Bennett, The Kenyatta Election, Kenya 1960-1961, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), passim. and Colonial Office, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1960, (London: HMSO, 1960), passim.

Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) represented in their organizational strength and policy commitments the interrelation of both parts of Kenya's "mixed" political culture articulated through "democratic" norms.

The growth of the two parties resulted from an early dissolution of the cohesiveness that had won the victories of Lancaster House. In the spring of 1960 the ban on country-wide parties, imposed since the Mau Mau rebellion, was lifted and the Kiambu meetings were held which created KANU. James Gichuru became president, ready to step down when Kenyatta should be released from prison. Oginga Odinga was elected Vice President and Tom Mboya was Secretary General. To dissidents, the party represented a Kikuyu-Luo alliance of the country's two largest tribes bent on national domination, and in June these dissidents coalesced under the leadership of Ronald Ngala to form the Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU) composed primarily of coastal Bantu tribes, Nilo-Hamites and Luhya.

Thus divided, the country faced the general election of 1961 in which KANU won a majority of the seats but refused to form a government because of a campaign pledge of non-cooperation until Kenyatta should be freed. A minority KADU



government assumed responsibility for four months until Kenyatta was released in August of 1961, after which a coalition government was created. The uneasy alliance was maintained amidst bitter recrimination between KANU and KADU through twenty-one months until the election of May, 1963 which was the last appeal to the electorate before the granting of self-government and independence.<sup>101</sup>

At the constitutional conference in early 1962, KANU opted for a strong central government while KADU espoused the principle of majimbo, or decentralization of major governmental powers to the several provinces.<sup>102</sup> This issue of majimbo became the basic policy difference between the parties. KANU was the more modern of the two. Its program of fiscally sound concentration of government at the center, a program of national welfare, and an internationalist association all supported the image of a dynamic, progressive, nationalist party aware of the real obligations that must be accepted in service to the nation over more parochial interests.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> The best discussion of the election is to be found in Bennett and Rosberg, op. cit., passim.

<sup>102</sup> Colonial Office, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, (London: HMSO, 1962), passim.

<sup>103</sup> For a discussion of the election see Clyde Sanger and John Nottingham, "The Kenya General Election, 1963" in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. II, No. 1, March 1964, pp. 15-16 and the KANU manifesto, What a KANU Government Offers You, (Nairobi: KANU, 1963), passim.

By contrast, KADU presented an image of rural parochialism as it campaigned on a policy supporting fragmentation of government to allay tribal fears of Kikuyu-Luo domination. KADU lacked the financial resources of KANU, failed to produce a broad ranging party program, was unsure of what powers it wanted delegated to the regions, and was wary of extra-national associations.<sup>104</sup> Most aptly described, the 1963 election brought the confrontation between a more sophisticated KANU and a KADU which still had extremely strong parochial orientations and a lack of the requisite skills to successfully compete against a more politically adept antagonist.

Six months prior to the election there had been serious question as to whether KANU would be able to win a majority of the poll. Disputes within the party caused Paul Ngei to leave KANU and form the African People's Party (APP) which made efforts to establish a national base but in the end was confined almost exclusively to the Kamba tribe for support, winning eight of nine electoral seats from KANU in the Ukambani region. Ngei's APP formed an alliance with KADU and agreed not to contest seats where KADU candidates had filed. Realizing in December of 1962 that it confronted a

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<sup>104</sup>Sanger and Nottingham, op. cit., passim.

vigorous campaign which resulted in winning slightly less than 54% of the total vote of 1.8 million and 72 of 112 contested seats.<sup>105</sup>

#### THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN KENYA POLITICS

When internal self-rule was granted to Kenya after the 1963 elections, the country was far better prepared for African control than would have been the case if independence had been suddenly thrust upon the country when Ghana was granted its freedom in 1957. Much of the basis for such preparation lay in the legacy of colonialism bequeathed in its characteristic attitudes, styles of action and institutions. From a review of the forms and procedures of colonial rule, three distinct elements can be identified as having made a significant contribution to order and stability in the post-independence period. Although other colonies may have had the same features, the Kenya case is unique because of the thoroughness that marked the inculcation of those factors into the Kenya system. The three factors were not introduced as an afterthought in the last stages of colonial rule. A part of Kenya history for six decades, they thereby became a part of the national system, ingrained into the political environment. The result of such intensive inculcation of those

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<sup>105</sup>

ibid.

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TABLE 4:4 EUROPEAN CULTURE NORMS GIVING POSITIVE SUPPORT TO THE KENYATTA GOVERNMENT, 1963-1965

- A. A Consistent African Perspective on European Paramountcy.
  - B. A Form of Pragmatic Activity Characterized as Secular, Pragmatic and Rational and Employing Skills Usually Associated with Western Political Practice.
  - C. A "National" Set of Institutions for the Procedural Conversion of Demands into Policy.
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features was the contribution of a unified political system where culture and structure became identifiably congruent or "synchronized" under African control. The rigidity of the Europeans who forced Africans to contest for their freedom using skills of the European culture strengthened the operational viability of the national system and enhanced the means for holding structure and culture in harmonious relationship against the potentially fragmenting force of tribal parochialism.

A Consistent African Perspective on European Paramountcy

The homogeneity of European culture created an image of the colonial ruler that suffered a minimal amount of distortion. The colonial administrator and the settler were frankly elitist in their attitudes concerning themselves in relation to the

African population. The proclamations of European religious beliefs as a superior religious dogma supported those elite attitudes. The individual European might have been benign or malevolent, paternal or abusive, benevolent or persecutory, but he was not equalitarian. Whatever might have been felt for the African by the most sensitive spirits, there was in the European community little to intimate a belief in the need for equity among all the races of the colony. The European was the privileged member of the society and the African was the pawn of prevailing standard of social justice.

The consistency of European attitudes toward the African produced a unified image of the European and European paramountcy in the eyes of the African. A man might feel many emotions toward his master, but affection was not one of them. Respect, tolerance, or patience might be part of that relationship, but not love. The refusal of Europeans to change their attitudes even after World War II mean the African's image of his rulers remained intact down to the last days of colonialism. The values of such an image are shown in the fact that separation of the ruler and ruled prevented the African from ever deserting his own tradition. No matter how educated, how wise, how perceptive a man became, he was still an African. He was not going to be an evolve. He was not going to merge

into European society. No matter how brilliant his intellect, how keen his insight, or how sound his judgment, he was still separated from the alien culture by bars of prejudice and forced to recognize that he remained an African whether in the "bush" or in the city. When he learned new political skills, they became skills to be employed in the service of his people, and not techniques to gain entry to the alien environment. When anti-colonialism grew in intensity, those new skills became the instruments for prying out colonial rule rather than the tools to help colonial authorities continue political dominance. The sharpness of the negative image of those rulers helped sustain the anti-colonialist struggle. Thus, the object of African disfavor and representing a social perspective that resented Africans, the Europeans, forced a long drawn out anti-colonialist struggle, never admitting Africans to the precincts of equity and never accepting the belief that supposedly inferior races had learned rapidly and well the skills of political manipulation.

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Political Activity Characterized as Secular, Pragmatic and Rational, and Employing Skills Usually Associated with Western Political Practice.

While Africans were denied social integration, they were not excluded from learning the beliefs and values that governed

the activities of European society. In increasing numbers, Africans were exposed to a style of government in which decisions based on secular rationality were made by individuals rather than by councils that appealed to magico-religious criteria. These Africans had contact with a world that accepted little as absolute and inviolable. No belief was sacred to the degree that compromise was impossible. When the time arrived for Africans to play a role in political life at the national level, they too adopted the style of action used by their colonial rulers. The series of compromises hammered out with the Colonial Office from 1957 onwards showed a new style of political discourse, a more pragmatic and flexible approach that eventuated in the achievement of all desired goals - African rule and national independence. The country's leaders had achieved a secularity of orientation that outweighed more narrow emotions when making decisions. They had absorbed what the Europeans had offered over so many years and had agreed to operate on the basis of European standards of political life. The example was provided by the settler community in which that enclave used every conceivable form to articulate its interests.

The articulation of issues can be accomplished using a variety of channels of access. These include: demonstrations;

petitions, violence, personal contacts, or formal institutional channels like the mass media. As to styles of interest articulation, it may be manifest or latent, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective. The Europeans used every one of these in providing examples for the Africans to follow.

The demonstrative boisterousness of European politics is perhaps one of the most recognized characteristics. The marching on the governor's residence, humiliation of governors in public, the demand that governors meet biennially with the Convention of Associations, the protest over proposed Zionist settlement, and the resignation from the Legislative Council when demands were not met - all those actions showed the demonstrative quality of European politics. The threatened violence over the "native paramountcy" question showed how men used to living under law were willing to abandon it. As to elite or personal connections, no community ever made better use of personal ties to the Colonial Office or the British Parliament. The nature of British society as the upper levels constituted an interlocking elite bound by family, school and university associations. Finally, the settlers sought to use the East African Standard and the Convention of Associations as their forum for voicing demands.



Styles of interest articulation were equally varied. Manifest displeasure and outspokenness tended to prevail over latent discontent. Demands were both specific and diffuse, at times voicing only the general desire for greater control of the colony while at others designating specific goals such as elected representation, parity with other races, precise definition of land policy, and representation on the Executive Council. The threats that accompanied such demands were sometimes merely vituperative commentary on the colonial authorities or direct pressure through the designation of specific actions that would be taken if demands were not met.

The constant use of those skills for the manipulation of interests, the use of boycott, petition, protest, debate, condemnation, editorial critique, definition of specific grievance, threat of armed rebellion, and enlistment of parliamentary support in Britain - all those techniques were copied by the Africans and used before independence was granted.

#### National Institutions for the Procedural Conversion of Demands into Policy

Of all the elements of the colonial legacy, none is of greater importance than the national political role structure created by the Europeans. The establishment of interest

groups such as the Convention of Associations provided models for later African political organization. The development of new nations is hindered by the radical imbalance between lack of interest groups and expansive government bureaucracies. Colonial regimes throughout Africa built up administrative frameworks for implementing laws or policies but discouraged the establishment of political parties until the last stages of colonial rule. In Kenya, such was not the case. There, the input sector of the political system was more fully formed by European activities. Europeans articulated their interests in a most sophisticated fashion. The colonial government was obligated to be responsive to those groups who fully understood the rights of Englishmen as more than a remote concept.

The institutions created by colonial rule also included mechanisms for procedural resolution of demands once the specific demand had been brought to the attention of the government. The Legislative Council was not an after-thought tacked on to the colonial system after World War II; it was an operational fact for forty years before the end of the war. It was a center for debate and decision-making. Its procedures were well established, and during the eighteen years before independence when more and more Africans took

their places in the Legislative Council Chamber, they absorbed both the procedural skills and the understanding of Western parliaments as appropriate rule-making bodies.

The two parts of the colonial structure - interest groups and government institutions - were bound together by a consistent of values which accepted such institutions as legitimate. The values of European society were dominated by a belief in individual freedom and procedural legal guarantees to insure that freedom was preserved. Unlike other colonies, Kenya had the political structure to give operational viability to such sentiments. Rule of law, self-determination of peoples, universal manhood suffrage were not empty phrases. The struggle for self government, elected representation in the Legislative Council and demand for consistent policy all enlivened abstract principles to the point where their meaning could be understood by a new African elite anxious to present their own grievances to the controlling authority in the colony. This integration of values and structure gave the national political system a congruence, a harmony or a sense of synchronization of parts which has been denied other former colonies because their structures were incomplete.

## CHAPTER FIVE:

### THE KENYA POLITICIAN

The period of colonial rule has meaning in the post-independence period only if the experiences generated by European control had manifest impact on those responsible for governing Kenya after the grant of sovereignty. The available evidence shows that the European impact was significant. Each of the politicians elected to the Parliament in May of 1963 had passed through the period of intense socialization to new political perspectives that followed World War II. Their life histories were a voluminous commentary on the weakening of tribal ties, the development of new modes of individual behavior, and the acquisition of new political skills. These men, one-hundred and fifty-one in number, were successful in their appeal to the electorate and entered the House of Representatives and the Senate charged with governing the new state of Kenya.<sup>1</sup> Their success in politics depended on their abilities to associate themselves with the cultural perspectives of their constituents while exercising certain acquired political skills.

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<sup>1</sup>Five House seats and two Senate seats were unfilled in May of 1963 because the people of the Northeastern Province boycotted the elections. Elected were 112 Representatives and 39 Senators.

It is most apparent that they were men of two worlds. None of the elected parliamentarians were exclusively raised and nurtured in a European environment, and if the demands of the Europeanized society became embarrassing or uncomfortable, that alien world could be deserted for the more relaxing and familiar cosmos of the tribal environment. Every one of those politicians were men who had adopted the pattern of Western mores, norms, beliefs, habits and modes of action in order to compete successfully in a new environment that colonialism created. But no man was bound to that world. Each politician knew how to let go his Western styles of living by the uttering of a phrase or a small action that could be pregnant with every nuance traditional tribal culture could impart to it.

The conclusions about Kenya's politicians are based on a survey of forty members of the House of Representatives. Supplementary information was collected on sixty-three more members of the House, providing data on 101 of 112 constituency elected members and 2 of the 12 national members elected from the House membership. Three of the constituent seats were filled by Asians, meaning data was available on 101 of the 109 Africans elected to the House as constituent members.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Additional information on the members of the House of Representatives was collected from three sources: The East African Standard Newsfile, Ronald Segal's Political Africa (New York: Praeger, 1961) and Marco Surveys Ltd., Who's Who in East Africa, (Nairobi: East African Press, 1965).

The sample of House Members was random but resulted in an acceptable level of tribal, geographical and status (i.e. ministers, assistant ministers and backbenchers) distribution. Included in the sample were seven ministers, eleven assistant ministers and twenty-two backbenchers, representing every province except the Northeastern and ten of Kenya's fourteen largest tribes. Distortion of the sample did occur in the

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TABLE 5:1 PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE

Nyanza	10 of 20	Western	5 of 13	Coast	2 of 12
Eastern	6 of 21	Rift Valley	5 of 24	National	2 of 12
Central	6 of 15	Nairobi	4 of 7	Northeastern	0 of 5


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over-representation of the Nairobi constituencies and the imbalance between Bantu (31), Nilotic (5) and Nilo-Hamitic (4) interviewees.<sup>3</sup> This is partially the result of the intention to include as many ministers and assistant ministers as possible in order to satisfy another research aim of achieving a more complete understanding of how decisions were arrived at within the government.

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<sup>3</sup>The Bantu:Nilo Hamitic: Nilotic ratio in Kenya is approximately 4:1:1, based on the 1962 census, Kenya Government, Statistical Abstract, 1964 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 10.

LOCATION OF CONSTITUENCIES OF MEMBERS  
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED



PROVINCES

- 1 Coast
- 2 Northeastern
- 3 Eastern
- 4 Central
- 5 Nairobi Extra-Provincial
- 6 Rift Valley
- 7 Nyanza
- 8 Western

TABLE 5:2 DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEW SAMPLE WITH REGARD TO TRIBAL SIZE

Tribes Ranked According to Size*	Number of Interviewees
1. Kikuyu.....1,642,065.....	ten
2. Luo.....1,148,335.....	five
3. Luhya.....1,086,409.....	six
4. Kamba.....933,219.....	three
5. Kisii.....538,343.....	five
6. Meru.....439,921.....	three
7. Mijikenda.....414,887.....	-
8. Kipsigis.....341,771.....	one
9. Turkana.....181,381.....	-
10. Nandi.....170,085.....	one
11. Masai.....154,079.....	one
12. Ogaden.....121,645.....	-
13. Tugen.....109,691.....	one
14. Elgeyo.....100,871.....	-
15. All Others.....983,234.....	two Embu, one Taita, one Taveta.

\*Statistical Abstract, 1964, op. cit., p. 10.

The choice of the House of Representatives as the source of the interview sample was determined by four considerations. These were as follows:

Overlapping of Party and House of Representative Membership: Independence meant that men previously engaged in the politics of opposition to the colonial regime became responsible for the conduct of the affairs of state. Filling of the ministerial roles was accomplished by taking men from the top leadership positions in Kenyatta's Kenya African National



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Union (KANU). The interviewing of men intimately bound up with the duties of government and policy-making as well as performing the role of party leader provided data on the difficulties of making the transition from minority politician to government leader.

TABLE 5:3 GOVERNMENT POSITIONS FILLED BY KANU LEADERSHIP, MAY 1963

	KANU	Government
Jomo Kényatta	President	Prime Minister
Oginga Odinga	Vice-President	Minister of Home Affairs
Tom Mboya	General Secretary	Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs
Joseph Murumbi	Treasurer	Minister of State
Mwai Kibaki	Executive Officer	Assistant Minister of Finance
James Gichuru	Past President	Minister of Finance

The House of Representatives as a Rule Maker: The actual rule making (as well as rule legitimizing power) was to a considerable degree resident in the House of Representatives. Cabinet decisions were debated at length and resolved in the House while the Senate played a secondary role. All House members interviewed agreed that election as a Senator was considerably less prestigious than being a representative in the House, since the Senate had the duties usually associated with Parliamentary upper houses, primarily powers of legislative delay.

The House of Representatives as a Population Sample:

The House Membership was made up of representatives from all the major tribal groupings in the country since constituency seats were allocated on a population basis with electoral districts restricted from crossing tribal lines.

The House of Representatives Members Provided a Link Between Government and the Constituency:

The daily activities of the members linked the national and the local spheres of politics, the modern and the tribal. Born in small scale societies, raised in tribal environments and representing those environments in Parliament, the members were constantly crossing and recrossing the dividing line between the rural areas and the more modern capital. The members were intermediaries transmitting national aims to the local levels and channeling local interests to the top. In the latter role, the members were particularly important since they could attach cultural nuance to the information they were called upon to transmit. Both as an object for observation and a means for gaining access to the constituencies, the House members were unusually well-suited.

**EARLY YEARS: LEARNING AND LABORING**

The present generation of leaders was born into a world already being changed by colonial rule. They never experienced

a pre-colonial era, and their whole existence has been one of confrontation with Western culture. In listening to each man's history of his early years one sees the ways that tribal solidarity was weakened by the incursions of colonial rule. All representatives interviewed originally came from rural areas. Their biographies provided ample evidence of how individual mobility increased, of increasingly secular households where the father was a government employee rather than a traditional farmer and of increased association with customs divergent from those of the tribe and the lineage. Nevertheless, the future parliamentarians were instructed in the lore of the tribe, had been herd boys, and had been ritually initiated amidst all the proper ceremony. Every Kikuyu knew whether he was "Mwangi" or "Maina."<sup>4</sup> The Kalenjin could recount in detail the experiences of initiation. The mere absence of a man's incisor teeth was enough to show that as a Luo he had been properly initiated.<sup>5</sup> But even as they were exposed to those old ways, these men were beginning

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<sup>4</sup> This distinction refers to the right and left hand division of circumcision groups whereby Kikuyu age-grades were divided.

<sup>5</sup> As indicated in Chapter II, the Luo do not have group initiations, but the lower incisor teeth of a youth are removed, signifying the beginning of young adulthood.

to experience new cultural innovations that one day brought them to the floor of the House Chamber.

Adolescence was marked by opportunities for advance in the world. For nearly all, there was a mission school where the rudiments of education could be obtained. Those schools were often attended with great difficulty and the interviewees told incidents of walking ten and twelve miles to school or of being forced to withdraw when even the dozen shillings required for a year's schooling were not available.<sup>6</sup> The mere size of African families meant all the children could not be educated. Of those interviewees coming from monogamous households, the average number of brothers and sisters was six. In polygynous households, the number was greater, with three of the interviewees having more than thirty brothers and sisters. When money was available, parents were not always convinced that education of their young sons was the best investment. National member Thomas Malinda's father looked upon another wife as a better use of his money than his son's education.<sup>7</sup> If an interviewee's father had a position with the government, there seemed a better chance of getting an education because the value of schooling was more clearly

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<sup>6</sup> Interviews with Abraham Gacciatta, Makone Ombese, Samuel Omweri and Edward Khasakhala.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Thomas Malinda.

understood. Such government positions might include chief, headman, judge, court interpreter or policeman.<sup>8</sup> Those interviewees raised in families where the father was a peasant farmer were forced to labor much harder to get to a school.

The opportunity for schooling introduced a whole new element into the life of Kenya's future leaders. Value was placed on individual achievement. Schooling permitted exposure to the competitive life of the European. Diligent study was rewarded by the passing of the required examinations. Hard work and sacrifice could lead to a coveted place in one

TABLE 5:4 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF ONE HUNDRED THREE MEMBERS OF THE KENYA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1963

Primary Education	103
Primary Education through Standard VIII	90
Secondary Education	68
Special Vocational Courses in Kenya	23
Teacher Training College Certificate	34
University Degrees	34
Overseas Training, either Vocational or University	22

of the few secondary schools. Hard work, however, was no automatic guarantee. Occasionally, guile could promote one's chances. Elijah Omolo-Agar went to Uganda and told the headmaster of Kings College Budo (Secondary School) he, Omolo-Agar, was a prince of a tribe in Kenya and thereby won

<sup>8</sup> Interviewees provided these responses: Father's occupation - 2 tribal court judges, 1 chief, 1 sub-chief, 1 headman, 1 policeman, 1 hospital orderly, 2 clerks, 2 teachers, and 28 peasant farmers.

admission.<sup>9</sup> Admission could depend on little things such as what mission had provided the primary schooling. For example, missionary parochialism could prevent a bright student from a Seventh Day Adventist School from attending a high school run by the Anglicans.<sup>10</sup> For the fortunate few, a high school certificate offered opportunity to apply for university education overseas.

The more likely consequence of application to secondary school was rejection and a search for other alternatives. A year or two at a teacher training college produced certificates enabling a man to teach the lower grades as a "T-1" teacher. While teaching in the mud and wattle, tinroofed buildings that often served as primary schools, the desire for more education could be pursued through correspondence courses.

For those who chose not to be teachers there was the government service. Justus ole Tipis went into the Veterinary Department for four years before going off to serve in the Kings Africans Rifles where he achieved the rank of Sargeant Major.<sup>11</sup> Harry Onamu trained as a medical assistant for five years and Jesse Gachago spent three years studying as a health

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Elijah Omolo-Agar.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with the Assistant Minister of State, James Nyamweya.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Justus ole Tipis.

inspector after being unable to get a place in secondary school and being considered too short for the police.<sup>12</sup>

John Okwanyo finished high school and then trained as a radiographer for three years.<sup>13</sup> Others received their training while working for the East African Railways and Harbors Administration or the East African Posts and Telegraphs Administration, took courses at the Jeanes School of Social Welfare or were trained in the police.

TABLE 5:5 OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF ONE HUNDRED AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE KENYA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMPOSITE OF ALL JOBS LISTED.

EDUCATION:		CIVIL SERVICE:	
Teachers	55	E.A. Railways and Harbors	5
Headmasters	23	E.A. Posts and Telegraphs	4
Education Officers	8	Clerks	7
		Police	2
BUSINESS:		Chiefs	3
Traders	8	Administrative Officers	2
Co-operative Officers	22	SOCIAL SERVICES:	
Businessmen	7	Medical Assistants	5
Clerks	6	Veterinary Assistants	1
		Public Health Inspector	4
PROFESSIONS:		Social Service Director	4
Journalists	8		
Lawyers	5	MILITARY:	8
Doctors	2		
University Lecturers	4	TRADE UNIONS:	42
Authors	2		

<sup>12</sup> Interviews with Harry Onamu and Jesse Gachago.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with John Okwanyo.



As is shown, teaching was the most popular career for the Africans since it was one of the few occupations where an African could have professional status. The other most likely source of employment was with the government as a clerk or messenger, or, with some training, as a minor official such as a health inspector or policeman. The East African Railways and Harbors and Posts and Telegraphs Administrations employed large numbers of Africans. For the rest, there was employment on the farms, work in private firms, trading, or a return to their traditional areas to become farmers.

Government jobs were usually the place for those seeking a job when further schooling was prevented for a variety of reasons: a bad result on the Kenya Primary Examination, refusal of a place in a secondary school, lack of fees, requirement to work to earn fees for a younger brother, or general dislike for school discipline.<sup>14</sup> A man entering government service with few qualifications might expect to be a messenger. Good at his job, he could advance to "registry clerk" meaning he would file folios and direct files to messengers junior to himself. Before the days of rapid "Africanization" there was little chance of going beyond that

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<sup>14</sup> These reasons listed were all standard reasons revealed in the interviews. Especially prominent is the condition of having to leave school to earn money so that a younger brother could get some education.

level as the higher grades of the civil service were filled by Asians and Europeans. In the police there was a chance to be a constable and corporal. Work in the railways were line jobs, menial and at the bottom of the pay scale. The bulk of the active trade unionists were drawn from those latter areas of the work force. Of the forty interviewees, fourteen pursued active careers in the unions prior to "joining politics" on a full-time basis.

These influences in the lives of the politicians represented a complex set of conditions common to many and the routes into politics for these men was different in detail, but each route had a certain uniformity. The most common feature was that none of the successfully elected politicians had just stepped off of their shamba or farm in order to become a national leader. All had been doing something which linked them to the more sophisticated aspects of colonial life, and invariably those links produced the confrontations with the Europeans that were frustrating and demeaning. Drawn into a world theoretically based on achievement criteria, the Africans found progress inhibited by factors totally irrelevant to a man's capacity to achieve.

## THE AWAKENING OF POLITICAL INTEREST

The majority of the present members of the House of Representatives were adolescents in the 1940's. Based on the survey of one hundred and three members, the average age of the House membership in 1963 was 35.2 years. If the seventeen cabinet ministers are excluded from that number, the average age of the membership was lowered to 33.6 years. This means that when Kenyatta made his first trip to London to protest to the British Parliament over native policy in Kenya, the present assistant ministers and the backbenchers of the Kenya House of Representatives were only in their infancy. Using fifteen years as the normal age for initiation into manhood, many of Kenya's present parliamentarians were just coming to adult status when Kenyatta returned from England and political ferment was on the increase. They were adolescents susceptible to enlistment in inspirational causes at a time when the whole society was rapidly changing.<sup>15</sup>

From their personal histories, it is apparent that the events of the 1940's made a deep impression on the forty interviewees. The growing strength of African nationalism provided a source of identification at a time when new loci of identity were useful for a traditional society pressured

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See Appendix III

by educated younger men who had less and less sympathy for the old ways. For many young Kenyans, the new source of identity was post-war politics. By the forties there was a legacy of political development; a legacy of hut and poll taxes, of land alienation, of the kipandi or identity card. To that legacy was added the fresh inspiration of Africans actually sitting in the Legislative Council, of the returned Kenyatta assuming the leadership of KAU - a hero who had triumphed in the European's world on the European's terms - and of the growth of new political associations like KAU and the trade unions.

Each of the forty interviewees was asked to name the person who had the most significant influence on their personal careers. Of the sixteen who felt they had been specifically influenced by a single man, six named Kenyatta and five named Gichuru, the first two presidents of KAU. Joseph Gataguta recalled vividly how every schoolboy wanted to be like Kenyatta when the mzee returned to Kenya.<sup>16</sup> Mwai Kibaki was suspended from Mangu High School for running a political club that was carrying on clandestine correspondence with a similar group at Alliance High School.<sup>17</sup> In the high schools and

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with Joseph Gataguta and other interviews, loc. cit.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Mwai Kibaki.

teacher training colleges, the debate clubs became forums for the discussion of the political ferment increasing throughout Kenya.<sup>18</sup> Such youthful activity derived from the events around it. The young men influenced were not involved in the political turmoil, but they were emulators of that turmoil, indicating the strength of political socialization that existed in Kenya after the war.

Of particular significance is the fact that this strong identification with Kenyatta appears to have prevented the growth of a generational cleavage in the leadership in Kenya. Kenyatta who became the object of loyalty in the forties remained the revered "Mzee, baba ya taifa" - the old one, father of the nation. The leader in the establishment of the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association in the 1930's, Mbiyu Koinange, was Minister for Pan-African Affairs in 1963, and James Gichuru, first president of KAU, was the Minister of Finance. They had become wazee, people to whom deference was paid because they should be the objects of traditional respect. Younger politicians emulated the achievements of the older ones while continuing to defer to them because the latter combined both secular achievement and traditional

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Interviews with Samuel Omweri, Johnathan Masinde, Elijah Omolo-Agar, and Jeremiah Nyagah.

qualities worthy of respect.<sup>19</sup>

Formal education also played a role in stimulating youthful political sentiments. A reading of philosophy, history, sociology, and current affairs provided an understanding of the concepts of civil equality that contrasted with the Africans' subordinate role in Kenya. Private reading tastes of the interviewees focused heavily on biography. Asked to name a single biography that was most stimulating to personal career aims, twenty-one responses were given as follows: Lincoln-7, Churchill-5, Nehru-3, Ghandi-2, Nkruman-2, Stalin and Tom Paine. Lincoln's popularity stemmed from a sense of identification based on the humble origins of the sixteenth American president. The association of interest and emotional orientation to persons who often had humble origins yet accomplished great deeds and the desire to emulate the accomplishments of Kenyatta emphasized the development of strong personal achievement orientations among the future politicians.

Thus, the young men who were eventually to win election to the Kenya Parliament were socialized into an environment

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<sup>19</sup> To test the reasons for Kenyatta's current popularity, a survey was conducted among ten Kenyan students studying at Syracuse University in 1966: 3 Kikuyu (tribe of Kenyatta), 3 Luo, 2 Kisii, 1 Luhya and 1 Kamba. Asked individually, all supplied virtually the same answer, Kenyatta is popular because he knows the modern world while not having forgotten the old ways.

that made politics a worthwhile vocation. They grew up at a time when there was frustration with the artificial and legal barriers set up by the colonialists. They were subjected to hundreds of slights, prejudices and criticisms that made them hate and mistrust the old colonial system. And when the time came, nearly everyone of the interviewees could recall in detail the day that they "joined politics."

The joining of politics brought a reverse in the trend of life that had led to the decision to actively fight the colonial system. Until the present members of the House got into politics, their lives had been journeys that took them away from their traditional homes. They were drawn away to the scientific/technological environment of the Europeans. They observed the institutions of government set down by the British, and they learned the pragmatic-bargaining skills of Western political practice. In schools, in unions, in civil service, in the welfare services, as business men, and as cash crop farmers, they first were witness and then participants in a process that elaborated personal perspectives condemning colonialism and desiring change. Those perspectives eventuated in nationalist political sentiments and involvement in political life. Once fully involved in

political life, however, the politicians found there was the necessity to go back and re-establish ties with their traditional societies in order to win election to the Parliament.



## CHAPTER SIX

### CONSTITUENCY POLITICS

The style of political life conducted at the constituency level was based on the local government politics carried on prior to the 1963 elections. Municipal, county and African District Council political activity was a valuable teacher of new political skills and ideas, but it was in 1963 that such experiences and skills began to have a direct bearing on the national political system. In that last election before independence, constituencies were greatly reduced in size so that the candidates campaigned and were elected by voters who had some knowledge of the man they were selecting. In 1961 there had been only thirty-one African constituencies, giving a ratio of approximately 1:200,000 between elected and electors. Three years earlier there had been only fourteen African seats in the Legislative Council and the first direct election of eight Africans to the Legislative Council had come only in 1957. Constituency politics was therefore, a relatively new phenomenon in Kenya life.

Most of the present generation of House representatives "joined politics" during the latter stages of colonial rule.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The phrase "joining politics" is the term most widely used to denote that a man's primary occupation or interest is in politics.

TABLE 6.1 POLITICAL SERVICE RECORDS OF ONE HUNDRED AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 1963

PARTY EXPERIENCE			
	KANU		KADU
National Officer	7		7
Branch Officer	24		4
ELECTORAL EXPERIENCE (BOTH PARTIES)			
1961 ELECTION	Successful	25	Pre-1961 Service in
	Unsuccessful	6	the Legislative Council
			9
CABINET EXPERIENCE			
	Ministers	6	Assistant Ministers
			9

By 1963, many of the politicians who were successfully elected had already served in the Legislative Council or had the experience of contesting for a national seat and losing. Others had acquired a degree of political finesse while serving as officers in the local branches of the national parties. The pre-independence elections provided a test of those skills in the transformed political system where local constituencies had become truly local.

#### APPEALING TO THE VOTERS

The one hundred and seventeen single member electoral districts for the House of Representatives were set up as a

result of a directive issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1962. The terms of reference were:

To divide Kenya into not substantially more or fewer than 100 Parliamentary constituencies for the election of Members to the Lower House of the Kenya Legislature. In accordance with the Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962....<sup>5</sup>

The Commission gave consideration to such factors as population density, communication, community of interest, the boundaries of existing administrative areas, and the need to insure adequate representation of urban and sparsely populated rural sections. No constituency was to form part of more than one Province.<sup>6</sup> The Constituency Commission was thus charged at the outset to pay particular attention to clan and lineage links in the establishment of the boundaries.

#### Constituency Boundaries and the Electorate


Constituencies rarely cut across tribal boundaries. In heavily populated areas where district boundaries were used to delineate constituencies, the electoral units became compact and often included only several large clans. This resulted in the establishment of an even closer link between

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<sup>5</sup> Great Britain, Colonial Office, Kenya: Report of the Constituencies Delimitation Commission, (London: HMSO, 1963), Cmnd. 1921, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

ELECTORAL CONTESTS FOR THE KENYA HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1963



- KANU vs. KADU
- ▒ KANU vs. Independents
- ▣ KANU vs. APP
- ▤ KADU vs. Independents
- ▥ No Candidates

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the electorate and the candidates. Except for candidates running in racially or tribally mixed urban areas, a man did not consider running outside his own tribal area since association with one's own people was a key legitimator of a man's candidacy. This fact was recognized by both the candidates and the national parties. Contributing to the peace and order of the 1963 elections was the fact that KANU and KADU did not directly contest many of the constituency seats. Where one party was strong, the other saw little value of wasting financial resources. Except in the cities and in Western Province where no party had clear dominance, constituency elections were fought between the official candidates or one of the major parties and independents who may have been in the same party but had failed to get the official party endorsement. KADU contested only fifty-seven of the one hundred and twelve seats and KANU contested only 88 of the one hundred and twelve.<sup>7</sup>

Being nominated in the traditional home area was only the beginning of the campaign. Candidates then had to justify their personal belief or the party's endorsement as the man best qualified to represent the interests of the people in the constituency. For some candidates, that was not a difficult

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<sup>7</sup> Clyde Sanger and John Nottingham, "Kenya General Elections, 1963," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, March 1964, passim.

task for they had always been in the constituency as traders, teachers, farmers, or shopkeepers and had access to many of the voters.<sup>8</sup> Others who had been overseas for schooling found it necessary to reestablish themselves in the community and renew ties to family and clan that had become attenuated during long absences.<sup>9</sup>

### The Role of Tribal Structure

How successfully a candidate was able to associate himself with his prospective electors often depended on the strength of his memory. All the politicians appeared to have phenomenal memories. They could remember social relationships, events, and conversations with detailed accuracy. At any time, members of the House seemed capable of exploring a whole series of relationships involving hundreds of people with apparent information about nearly all of those individuals. This ability is common in non-literate society and is an exceptional asset in the conduct of a campaign or the handling of constituency affairs. To recall with facility all one's schoolmates and what they are doing, all the children of the constituency who are

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<sup>8</sup> Interviews, loc. cit., in particular A. K. Soi and John Okwanyo.

<sup>9</sup> Interviews with Joseph Gataguta and James Nyamweya.

studying overseas, and the lives and family condition of hundreds of the local electorate is a source of amazement to the Westerner. This art of seeming to know everyone is reminiscent of the ward-heeler in American politics, except in Africa the scale is larger, often involving thousands of people ranged over tens and hundreds of square miles.

Close observation of this phenomenon reveals that each politician's social relationships have a structure to them which permit rapid recall. As the politicians indicate, their languages are rich in terminology defining social relationships within the clan, family and tribe. A man need only give his full name and home location and already much has been said about his family, his peer group, the year of his initiation into manhood and such related data. For the politicians themselves, the association with their own peer group provided a structured community of acquaintances not difficult to recall. This community overlapped with contemporaries met in mission schools. Also, a great number of the candidates were teachers who formed contacts with many students and their parents. Within a politician's family, relatives of other age groups provided links to yet other members of the constituency electorate, and, in combination, all these associations were arranged so a man could easily keep track



of vast numbers of his friends and acquaintances.

The Importance of Literacy and Age Requirements for Candidacy

Two of the prerequisites for candidacy were facility with spoken and written English and being over twenty-five years of age, legal requirements that drew a sharp distinction between potential members of Parliament and the mass of the population. The composition of the Parliament was predetermined to be largely composed of people from that minority who had received mission school education and been born before 1938. Men born much earlier than the mid-1930's had few opportunities for education, and, therefore, the candidates did not include large numbers of wazee or old men. With the exception of such people as Kenyatta, Gichuru, Koinange, Odinga, and Arap Moi, the electoral law ordained that Kenya would have a "young man Parliament," and, thereby, criteria established for becoming a candidate for office changed the normal deference patterns existing in the tribal societies. Age was no longer the established benchmark. Young men who in an earlier time would have been only bachelor warriors were permitted to compete for the responsibility of representing their people in Parliament. The laws on candidacy insured that new and more secular criteria had to be applied in the

selection of candidates and the choice of Representatives. The young men eligible for candidacy had to provide their electors with tangible evidence that they were best qualified to be the representatives.

### The Candidate's Record of Public Service

The more secular criteria for judging a candidate's merits were developed by reference to service with the colonial administration. As indicated above, after World War II, there was increasing localization of administration.<sup>10</sup> Africans sat on African District Councils, Municipal and Urban Councils, and District Education Boards. A partial listing of public bodies on which successful candidates had served included:

Elgon District Agriculture Board	Muranga Education Society
Rift Valley Water Board	Kikuyu Welfare Association
Kalenjin Language Committee	Taita Land Board
Rural Wages Commission	Nakuru Liquor Licencing Board
Naivasha African Advisory Board	Lake Victoria Water Board
Eldama Ravine African Advisory Board	Coast Province Cotton Committee
National Forest Authority	Mijikenda Language Committee
Kenya Meat Commission	Machakos District Probation Committee
African Livestock and Marketing Organization	Machakos Joint Loan Board
Nairobi African Advisory Council	

This service to local government agencies was of particular value in those densely populated areas where district

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<sup>10</sup>

Cf. Chapter IV above, p. 99.

boundaries and constituency directly coincided. This overlapping meant that an African District Council member who was

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TABLE 6:2 PUBLIC SERVICE RECORDS OF ONE HUNDRED AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1963

African District Councils	39
Urban District Councils	3
County Councils	9
District Education Boards	18

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a candidate had a sound perspective on the needs of his area and could speak convincingly on what he felt should be done for the electorate. A member of a District Education Board knew exactly how many children were being educated in the constituency and the schools available or needed. The situation was not unlike the American electoral process where men who have worked at lower levels and know conditions intimately are put forward or put themselves forward as persons who best know local conditions and therefore can best represent the people. By contrast, the situation did not conform to the Westminster model where a candidate did not need to fulfill residency requirements and could be selected for the constituency by his party. Tribal loyalties guaranteed that the man had to come from the home area, and restrictions on candidacy imposed by language and age requirements meant secular criteria had a distinct significance in

shaping the composite profile of House membership.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that success in the elections was exclusively pre-determined by reference to new and more secular criteria for judging candidates. In reality, winning often depended on the chance element in politics. A. K. Soi was a well known teacher whose students had experienced great success on their Kenya Primary Examination during the year prior to the elections, and grateful parents were convinced that Soi would represent them well. Ombese Makone and Alexander Dingiria were successful because constituency lines were drawn in such a way that they did not have to contest against the older and more seasoned politicians, Dawson Mwanyumba and Lawrence Sagini. Justin Tuwei had the fortunate experience of stepping into a political vacuum in Uasin-Gishu created by the departure of most of the Europeans. Luke Obok won in Alego district by capitalizing on his father's reputation as the greatest wrestler in the area. Harry Onamu was an unusual winner because he ran outside his tribal area and won because of the high regard he had earned among the Tugen people by operating his own maternity clinic in Eldama Ravine. John Osogo used a following built up while in the Kenya National Union of Teachers in

order to be elected. Bildad Kaggia and Fred Kubai faced the less happy prospect of beating back challenges of younger men who resented the return to prominence of Kaggia and Kubai after eight years in jail with Kenyatta.

What was characteristic of the successfully elected politicians was their effectiveness in operating within the pluralistic cultural milieu. The skills of modern political discourse were combined with more traditional skills used to maintain one's position in the tribe. While acquiring facility in handling the procedures and practices of a Westernized state, men preserved loyalty to the tribe or clan where a man's position depended on his willingness to give obeisance to traditional norms and modes of behavior.

#### CONSTITUENCY POLITICS

For the individual representative, his association with his constituency meant sacrifice and the need to respond to voluminous electoral demands. Nearly every weekend was the time for each representative to personally be in his constituency. Fortunately, the site of the capital near the center of the country and the accessible routes to even the remote electoral areas meant that six to eight hours of hard driving could take nearly every elected member to his "home" area.

The emphasis is placed on "hard driving" since the roads were difficult and in the first eighteen months after the elections four members lost their lives in road accidents while traveling between Nairobi and their home areas.<sup>11</sup> From the economic standpoint, the weekend safaris between the constituencies and Nairobi should have been more prohibitive than the driving hazards. Those members who secured election without substantial private funds or a continuing source of income were, during the first year in office when monthly salaries were under \$140.00 per month, under such acute financial pressure that protest finally called for the halving of minister's salaries and the doubling of the salaries of the backbenchers.<sup>12</sup>

Cost and physical hazards notwithstanding, the members still went home nearly every weekend. Abraham Gacciatta, a quiet spoken arriviste of the 1963 elections, claimed with

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<sup>11</sup>

The importance of spatial location is recognized in the fact that Nairobi's central positioning in the country enabled every member to get home with relative ease. This is contrasted to neighboring Tanzania where the capital Dar es Salaam is on the eastern border and as a consequence some members of that parliament were prevented from visiting their home constituencies during the entire life of the parliamentary session, five years.

<sup>12</sup> Election to the House worked particular hardship on those men who had been in relatively low paying positions before the elections. The need to purchase a car and the cost of making a round trip of 1000 miles or more each weekend was nearly financially ruinous.

pride that during the first year in office he spent only two weekends in Nairobi.<sup>13</sup> The standard pattern for all members was to depart the capital after the Friday noontime recess of Parliament and return in time for the reconvening of Parliament on Tuesday afternoon. Those weekend journies were considered by the parliamentarians and the electorate to be of greatest necessity. The African population prefers the traditional face-to-face communication. For the bulk of the electorate, 1963 marked the first time they had participated in the procedures of representative democracy when the constituencies were compact enough so the person elected could be well-known to a large majority of the voters. The feeling of association with the representative meant that even though authority rested in Nairobi, individual citizens wanted their views heard by the man responsible for their interests. Under such an obligation, the locally elected member "mended his fences" on a week-to-week basis. Even for the ministers whose time was more heavily committed to the affairs of state that could only be dealt with in Nairobi, constituents still preferred personal confrontation and voters traveled long hours to the capital and sat daily in outer offices until permitted to see their high-ranking kinsmen.

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<sup>13</sup>

Interview with Gaciatta.

Because of the demands on their time, ministers and assistant ministers hired people to maintain formal administrative liaison with the constituency while the backbenchers depended more on continual presence and week-to-week ad hoc assessments of the home areas.<sup>14</sup>

The value of the weekend tours lay in the political substance they gave to the concepts of government contained in the constitution. Representative democracy was a new phenomenon and the centralization of authority in the capital meant traditional styles of discussion among the kiama or council had been superseded. The weekend baraza provided the alternative, permitting individuals to state their positions and emphasize the issues they thought should be brought to the attention of the government decision-makers. The performance in parliament by the backbenchers showed the weekend tours to be an important feature of the political system, well suited to the support of the principle of representative responsibility. The second function of the

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<sup>14</sup> Field work gave opportunity to visit in the constituency and observe the style of contacts used. Of the forty interviewees, only ten maintained a permanent liaison of any sort. Kenyatta sought to insure close contact with the population by requiring that even his cabinet ministers be in their home areas at least once every two weeks. Interview with C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek.




weekend baraza or meeting was it allowed dissemination of government policy to the masses. The constancy of week-to-week consultation provided opportunity for the continual reinforcement of messages on the aims and intents of the Kenyatta government.

#### TWO CONSTITUENCIES: CONTRASTING POLITICAL STYLES

The similarities in constituent behavior emphasized the continued strength of tribal ties and the activities supporting the form of representative democracy established under the constitution. However, each constituency had a character of its own, and the styles of constituency politics often differed significantly. To describe these differences, two constituencies were selected to show variations in performance by the two members of the House and the disparate forms of pressure placed on the representatives by their constituents. These constituencies are Taveta-Voi, represented by Alexander Dingiria, and Nyaribari, represented by James Nyamweya, Assistant Minister to the President in 1964 and 1965.

Dingiria's Taveta-Voi constituency was a vast expanse of ill-watered scrub bush country in the southeastern section of Kenya that included all of the western half of the extensive

LOCATION OF TAVETA-VOI AND NYARIBARI  
CONSTITUENCIES



 TAVETA-VOI

 NYARIBARI

Tsavo Game Park. By contrast, Nyaribari was a slender strip of land in the southern part of Nyanza Province, a well-watered highland area with rolling hills quilted by neat fields of maize, tea, pyrethrum, coffee and passion fruit. The representatives themselves were as contrasting as their home areas. Dingiria, a forty year old Taveta tribesman was one of the most reticent of backbenchers. Having done primary and intermediate schooling, he was prevented from completing secondary school for lack of school fees. Nyamweya, a thirty-seven year old Kisii tribesman, was rebuffed in efforts to get a place in secondary school but finally passed both school certificate and higher school examinations, the latter equivalent of two years of college, through correspondence courses. Dingiria returned to his home area from school to work as a bank clerk and later opened a provisions shop, trading across the border into Tanzania. Nyamweya became a teacher while doing correspondence study and, after completing high school work, commenced legal studies. Passing his intermediate law exam by correspondence and overcoming government resistance, Nyamweya finished legal study in London and was called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn. Returning to Kenya, he worked briefly in the Registrar General's office before going into private law practice.

An active political career for Dingiria began in 1952 when he joined the Taveta African Association, an unregistered and therefore illegal society. He became a member of the KAU and his house was searched after the declaration of the Mau Mau Emergency. He was not proscribed, however, and during the fifties served on the African District Council, the District Education Board and the Local Land Board. Dingiria did not attend the founding of KANU at Kiambu but joined soon afterwards, becoming Secretary of the Taveta-Voi Branch of KANU and, in 1964, was elected Secretary of KANU for the Coast Province. To Dingiria, participation in politics was a way of organizing against discrimination. In Parliament he continued as a loyal defender of the government and its policies and a diffident spokesman of his people's interests.

Nyamweya's entry into politics was a hesitant one. In 1958 only local parties were allowed. Nyamweya was reluctant to join either of two in his home area since one was exclusively composed of Kisii and he feared being labelled a "tribalist," while the other was a more inclusive South Nyanza party, membership in which would have cut him off from tribal support. Attending the Kiambu meeting, Nyamweya was on the Committee of Ten that drew up the party constitution.

Returning home he helped organize the South Nyanza Branch of KANU and served as Vice-Chairman. The official party candidate in the 1961 elections, Nyamweya was defeated by Lawrence Sagini, an independent. During 1962 and 1963 he continued to practice law and became Chairman of a newly formed Kisii Branch of KANU. Again in 1963 he was the official party candidate and won in a difficult campaign against three independents. Appointed as Assistant Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs he helped write the revised Constitution before becoming Assistant Minister to President Kenyatta. A firm supporter of Kenyatta and the Kenyatta Government, Nyamweya was one of the most articulate members of the Parliament, answering queries with a thoroughness that discouraged further questioning.

In terms of comparative demands from constituents, Dingiria was placed under much less pressure than Nyamweya. The constituency of Taveta-Voi contained only two areas that could be considered peri-urban - the small collections of buildings and stores at railroad junctions which lend their names to the title of the constituency. Excepting Taveta on the Tanzania border and Voi, one hundred miles up the railroad from Mombasa, the whole area is sparsely settled.

Major resources were sisal concessions formerly owned by a European and the few watered areas created by the run-off from the snows of Kilimanjaro. Touring by car along the dusty tracks that served as roads and across the dry stream beds, there was often the necessity of having the underside of the car sprayed to prevent the spread of hoof-and-mouth disease. When Dingiria stopped to talk to his constituents, he had to encourage them to accept new ways. The Taveta remained unconvinced that land consolidation might help them. Two Kikuyus ran a bar in the town of Taveta, grossly overcharging the local people, but Dingiria did not criticize the practice since he hoped such entrepreneurship would be an example for his people, perhaps inspiring them to be more self-sufficient themselves.

The reluctance of Dingiria's people to build their own future aggravated the Member's task of explaining why the promises made prior to independence had not materialized. His people failed to understand that there were not the resources so children could be educated for free or medical services increased greatly. Dingiria was worried about the KANU Youth wingers in his area who had worked hard for his election but became idle and troublesome after independence.

He appointed, as did many of his colleagues, numbers of the troublemakers to the National Youth Service. He regretted the inequitable distribution of wealth that left his constituency without formal land settlement schemes or real development plans. He was aware that the situation would not change rapidly with so few students getting secondary schooling and only three overseas doing university courses. But to change those conditions would have required more forceful exercise of his position in Nairobi, which he did not do. Nor did his people push strongly and thus little prospect for change seemed to permeate the dryness and aridity of Taveta-Voi.

For Nyamweya the pressure was great, and his people demanded much from him. When he was at home in Kisii town he could expect no holiday. People would begin to gather early if the word had spread that the assistant minister had come from Nairobi. Surrounded by constituents in the living room of the house, questions were asked and information given on the state of the constituency since the previous visit.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> In sitting in on such sessions during the course of some six weekends spent in Nyaribari, no distinguishable pattern emerged as to who was entitled to participate in such discussions. Tax collectors, storekeepers, traders, craftsmen and local magistrates were all involved, seeming to arrive by invitation or appearing indiscriminately.

TABLE 6:3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NYARIBARI AND TAVETA-VOI CONSTITUENCIES

	Nyaribari	Taveta-Voi
Location	Nyanza Province	Coast Province
Size	120+ sq. miles	3200+ sq. miles
Population	85,000 est.*	48,000 est.
Registered voters	26,790	9,759
Voting (1963)	Nyamweya (KANU) 7839** Mogaka (Ind.) 4694 Ogoti (Ind.) 2196 Nyabogo (Ind.) 1161***	Dingiria (KANU) 6962 Kilelu (KADU) 731

\* Based on population density for all of Kisii district

\*\* Failed absolute majority

\*\*\* 59.2% of those enrolled voting in Nyaribari and 79.6% of those enrolled voting in Taveta-Voi

Source: Constituencies Delimitation Commission, op. cit., passim., and Kenya Government, Statistical Abstract, 1964, p. 8, and Standard, May 28, 1963.

Even an early breakfast might include as many as ten people, early arrivals wanting to get the Minister's ear first. When a moment permitted, a phone call to the District Commissioner supplied more information.

"Has the new sub-chief been appointed?"

"How is the other working out?"

"Are the permits in order for the rallies to be held during the next ministerial tour?"

The pace of involvement at the residence, however, served as only a prelude to the constituency tour itself, the major



preoccupation of Saturday and Sunday.

In each place Nyamweya's car stopped, the constituents were soon placing their grievances.

"We have so many grade cattle now. When is the government going to build us a creamery?"

"What is the government doing to keep the Kipsigis from stealing our cattle?"

"I didn't receive fair payment from the government for my shamba (farm) when the land was bought up for consolidation."

"Why didn't Kisii boys get more places in the secondary schools?"

"Why was Chief Musa sacked by the Ministry of Home Affairs?"

"Why won't the government allow us to brew Nubian gin?"

"If the government is raising school fees and taxes, why must we sell our maize to government agents for thirty shillings a bag when elsewhere it would be worth forty-eight?"<sup>16</sup>

Nyamweya would either answer the question on the spot or write down the queries. The same questions were repeated over and over on each tour - at Kiamokama and Koroka, at Masimba and Inchuni, at Ibeno and in Kisii town - and always received with patience. Though he was an assistant minister with the power of constituted authority and broad education supporting him, Nyamweya had to submit to the questioning of his

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<sup>16</sup> These questions were recorded on tour and translated by Mr. Benson Sigombe, the Minister's permanent liaison in Kisii town during 1964-1965.

unlettered elders, leaning on their sticks, wrapped in blankets, arguing, remonstrating, jabbing the air to give emphasis to their points. He had to greet everyone he knew, thought he knew, or who seemed to know him. In the milieu of the constituency there was a broad-based equality which Western institutionalism had not dissipated.<sup>17</sup>

Because Nyamweya had status in top government circles, he could respond to the pressures from his people in a way that Dingiria could not. Nyamweya could obtain funds for the Kisii primary school, support cooperative development in Nyaguta, promise a secondary school at Gesusu, and recommend with a view to success the expansion of the Inchuni Girl's Secondary School. To inaugurate such plans and encourage the people to work for their own welfare, he could promise a ministerial tour that would bring cabinet ministers to look at the constituency and get their support for local projects.<sup>18</sup> When the tour took place, the constituents would appear before the visiting ministers and

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<sup>17</sup> These descriptions drew on material recorded during visits to Nyaribari during June and July of 1964 and February, March, April, May, and June of 1965. Visits were made to Taveta-Voi during July of 1964 and January, May, June, and July of 1965. Constituent activities are also described in: "How a Backbencher Sees Himself," East African Standard, October 28, 1964, by Luke Obok.

<sup>18</sup> See the description of a ministerial tour of Nyaribari, Appendix I.

present prepared mimeographed petitions telling the ministers what they had done to help themselves and what they would like the government to do. Dingiria could only lament the fact that in the first year after independence only one minister had been enticed to set foot in his constituency. The weekend ministerial tour through a whole province became a standard part of constituency politics during the first year of independence. A man like Nyamweya used such tours to respond to electorate demands, planning projects carefully over the whole constituency so that his image would remain strong among all the voters for the next elections.

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Constituency behavior attested to the strength of the tribal legacy in Kenya politics during the immediate post-independence period. The ties of clan, peer group and traditional land areas were a strong bond binding members of the Parliament to their electors. The observance of traditional norms of behavior when parliamentarians met with constituents showed the deference which is given to one's kinsmen. Such practices strengthened the procedural nature of representative democracy. The strength of local opinion provided the members with a sense of support in demanding that the government

respond to local conditions. The review of constituency behavior in two constituencies shows that the patterns were not stable and could be subject to future change.

## CHAPTER SEVEN:

### LEGISLATIVE POLITICS

The first two years of the Kenyatta regime were dynamic years that reshaped both the institutions and style of Kenya political life to more adequately reflect the colonial legacy and the continuing strength of traditional tribal norms. The only fixed points amidst that change were the existence of tribes as the primary focus of individual loyalty and the institutional grouping of those tribes into a sovereign nation state. Evidence of this dynamic quality of political life was revealed in the influence of Western procedures, institutions, and skills on the criteria for political efficacy used in the rural constituencies. The importance of the tribe remained undiminished, but the style of politics was transformed. Equally significant changes took place in the House of Representatives. As the legitimate rule-maker of the state, the House was a national institution providing a forum for diverse tribal groups to articulate political interests in peaceful fashion. Because of the openness of that forum, the changing nature of the House was indicative of larger changes taking place within the whole Kenya political system.

## THE KENYA INTERPRETATION OF THE WESTMINSTER MODEL

The Kenya constitution provided for responsible government within a parliamentary framework that included a bicameral legislature with lower house dominance and cabinet responsibility. The patterns and procedures of the House of Representatives were strictly based on the Westminster model. The arrangement of the House chamber, the decorum to be observed by the representatives, the rules governing debate, and the deference accorded the Speaker were all indicators of how closely the parliamentary institution was a copy of the British House of Commons. Like its English model, the Kenya system seemed ideal for the introduction of "cabinet government" in which the Kenyatta cabinet would make the decisions and the House membership would legitimate those decisions by huge majorities.

Indeed, both the cabinet and the House membership seemed ideally suited to such roles. At an average age of 44 years when appointed in 1963, the cabinet members had a broader experience with government procedures than their colleagues on the backbenches. Fourteen of the sixteen ministers had received education beyond the secondary school level. Included in the cabinet were Asians and Europeans.

who had no tribal bias. Seven of the Africans represented urban constituencies, and they, therefore, did not have the same tie to their electors as existed for the men representing rural areas.<sup>1</sup> Even less tied to the electorate were the five men who had been elected as national members in the House and therefore had no constituency.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, the backbenchers' credentials generally consisted of at least primary education and some procedural experience gained from service at the local levels of government or in the administrative agencies.

However, there were basic flaws in supposing the British system could be so easily and conveniently introduced. British parliamentary politics assumes: (1) tight party discipline, (2) weak attachment of the representative to his constituents, and (3) acquiescence by the government party to the dominant position of the cabinet. The activities of the House of Representatives evidenced the acceptance of none of those assumptions. Tight party discipline did not

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<sup>1</sup> Ministers and Assistant Ministers Oneko, Kibaki, Mungai, Murumbi, Waiyaki, and De Souza.

<sup>2</sup> Ministers and Assistant Ministers Marrian, Mohamed, McKenzie, Singh and Bomett.

exist. Representatives were closely tied to their constituents. House members did not accept that the government had an unimpeachable right or privilege of ruling without close and adequate consultation with the popularly elected representatives of the electorate.

### The Principle of Cabinet Government

The members of the House resented the implication that their role might be that of a rubber stamp for government policies.<sup>3</sup> They were incensed that the government should think of its huge KANU majority as a guarantee against parliamentary defeat and a release from any obligation to maintain close contact with the backbenchers. Generally, the individual was largely excluded from policy making. The flow of legislation bore little of the imprint of the House. Few members were selected to sit on the House Sessional or Finance Committees.<sup>4</sup> The backbenchers might question the government, seek action on specific grievances through private member's motions, but, initially, their exercise of authority was minimal.

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<sup>3</sup>This was a commonly expressed grievance articulated by the backbenchers interviewed.

<sup>4</sup>Kenya Government, The National Assembly, The House of Representatives, Official Report, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), Vol. I, Part I, corrigenda (hereafter referred to as the Hansard).



This parliamentary resentment over cabinet dominance was increased by the frustrations faced on the constituency tours and weekly barazas that the backbenchers conducted. During the first year in office, they continued to tour their home areas, collect grievances, and experience the difficulty of trying to reconcile the promises of pre-independence with the government actions of the post-independence period. Excluded from policy making but forced to confront their electors, the House members felt isolated from the national government and frustrated among "their people." As stated by one member,

There is a triangle here. There is the government at one point. The local party and the voters are at another. We are in the middle. We have no contact with Kenyatta and the government. Our people demand that we fulfill the KANU manifesto. We are caught. Our people reject us and the government will not listen.<sup>5</sup>

After enduring a year of such isolation, the KANU backbenchers were instrumental in bringing about the first defeat of the government. In discussing that defeat, a leading government critic summed up the basis of voting against his party's own leaders by saying,

We wanted to find out if we were a debating society or not and to make the old man (Kenyatta) listen to us.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Thomas Malinda.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Zephaniah Anyieni.

In response to backbencher unrest, the government gave increased status to a caucus group which more fully discussed policy aims prior to their introduction on the floor of the House. Theoretically, such a new group was not necessary, since every member of the House was entitled to sit in on the meetings of ministerial committees where proposed legislation was discussed. However, backbenchers did not avail themselves of that opportunity yet still criticized the government.<sup>7</sup> The failure of the backbenchers to attend ministerial committee meetings and their continued complaint about exclusion from the decision-making process forced the government to take its remedial step.

Enhanced status for the "parliamentary group" was the nature of the government's response to member demands. Originally for KANU members only, the "group" became a committee-of-the-whole after the dissolution of KADU and served as a forum for discussion and criticism of all government policy. After the first year in office, the "group" met on a weekly basis.<sup>8</sup> The government's action did not

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<sup>7</sup> From the interviews of twenty-two backbenchers, it was ascertained that only six took more than a casual interest in ministerial committee meetings, and all of the six indicated their greatest interest was in the agricultural committee.

<sup>8</sup> The importance of the "parliamentary group" meetings was impressed on me while touring Taveta-Voi constituency with Alexander Dingiria. A short wave radio message summoned Dingiria to Nairobi with all possible dispatch and he made immediate preparations to comply.

entirely mitigate the feelings of resentment within the House membership, but it did relieve much of the pressure. That the backbenchers continued to harbor antagonism toward the government was demonstrated in selective legislative defeats of the government both before and after the activation of the "parliamentary group."

#### Legislative Behavior and Party Control

Logically, it would have been unlikely for the Kenyatta government to lose on any issue that came before the House. The KANU majority was first large and then, after November of 1964, absolute. Yet three times during the first two years, the government was defeated. On another occasion, the government saved its five year development plan by a single vote.<sup>9</sup> More shrewdly, on the issue of increased pay for the House membership, the government capitulated to the pressure of the legislature and had the motion withdrawn while authorizing the pay raises by executive action.<sup>10</sup>

The first defeat of the government was on the issue of signing accords of federation with Tanzania by August 15, 1964. The original motion offered by KADU called only for the signing of accords at the earliest possible date.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Hansard, op. cit., Vol. III, Part III, Col. 3572-3602, vote col. 3602.

<sup>10</sup>Nation, June 27, 1964.

<sup>11</sup>Hansard, op. cit., Vol. III, Part I, Cols. 254 ff.

Once debate was opened, KANU backbenchers amended the motion by inserting the August 15th deadline, a date clearly unacceptable to the government as evidenced by the speeches of Kenyatta, Mobyia and Odinga. Then the dissidents demonstrated their pique with the government by a two to one majority vote against Kenyatta and his cabinet.<sup>12</sup>

The second and third defeats of the government came in February of 1965.<sup>13</sup> The first of these two issues involved a motion for legislative concurrence to supplementary estimates for the 1964/65 budget in order to permit the government to finish out the fiscal year. The question that defeated the motion, however, was backbencher resentment over ministerial tours of the constituencies in which ministers promised large sums of money that seemed to be private gifts. Backbenchers complained that the people were losing interest in their parliamentary representatives and awaiting the arrival of the more affluent cabinet ministers. After the defeat of the supplementary estimates, the government agreed to change its style in touring the constituencies and the motion was then passed. The other defeat came when the backbenchers thought there were too many of Vice-President Odinga's

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Cols. 326. The division was 59-28 against the government.

<sup>13</sup> Nation, February 2, 4, 1965.

political allies nominated to the 1965 Sessional Committee. The membership of the committee was not approved. The list of nominees was changed and the motion then carried.<sup>14</sup> During the first two years, the Kenyatta government was never threatened by the loss of a confidence motion.<sup>15</sup> This was because the defeats of the government were not administered by the backbenchers in order to change the ruling hierarchy. Rather, the Kenyatta regime was pushed by the House so that the government would have regard for the role of the legislature and consult the membership in a manner more congruent with the established pattern of African life.

The reason that no threat to the Kenyatta government was raised was the concern of the House membership that without Kenyatta, the country would be severely threatened by disruptive tribalism. The feeling among the interviewees was that Kenyatta provided the symbolic strength to hold the country together. As stated by one member, "without that old man we would be lost."<sup>16</sup> The result of such concern that the government be maintained was a form of procedure where the cabinet consulted more extensively with the legislature than would have been expected in a British-based model.

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<sup>14</sup> Hansard, Vol. IV, Part I, passim.

<sup>15</sup> Confidence motion called, October 1, 1964, defeated without a division vote, Hansard, col. 3018.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with James Nyamweya.

### Party Discipline and Representative Responsibility

The defeat of the government despite a huge KANU majority resulted from the ineffective discipline maintained in the House. On the first defeat of the government, even the party whip, J. D. Kali, voted against the government.<sup>17</sup> KADU had even less control over its parliamentarians as more and more of its backbenchers and shadow ministers "crossed the carpet" to join the government benches. Eighteen months after the election, opposition leader Ronald Ngala formally dissolved the opposition and, "KADU joined the Government under the leadership of Mzee Kenyatta."<sup>18</sup>

The dissolution of KADU was based on a realization that was also apparent to individual representatives in the House. There was no national party capable of dominating the political situation. That Ngala could dissolve his party with such equanimity was the result of his belief that he could derive greater benefits for his supporters by joining KANU than by continuing to resist it. He was willing to do so since the Kikuyu-Luo alliance of KANU leadership had lost control of the party at the local levels and could not command the kind of loyalty that it had at the time of the 1963 elections.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Hansard, Vol. III, Part I, col. 326.

<sup>18</sup> Hansard, Vol. III, Part II, Cols. 4415-4416.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Ronald Ngala.

In the same fashion, backbenchers also realized that there was less need to be apprehensive over the possibility of KANU dominance, and parliamentary representatives became virtually free agents, speaking their own minds on all issues.

In the legislature, the significance of becoming a state with no effective party organization was crystallized in the rapid appearance of tribal groups all collected under the KANU banner and professing varying degrees of loyalty to the leadership of Mzee Kenyatta. In the House chamber, a huge kiama or council had been created. No one could be condemned as an opponent of the government. All members could foster their own personal or tribal interests within the party and the government.

The decline of the party and the inability of party leadership in maintaining control over its elected representatives showed how clearly the Kenya House of Representatives had diverged from the Westminster model. The changes were developmental rather than institutional. KANU had been a mass-based party with strong local branch organization. After the election, the top leadership deserted the party hierarchy for their responsibilities in the cabinet, and the local branch organization was permitted to atrophy. Burgeoning resentment by the backbenchers toward the top party

leadership qua the cabinet contributed to the fragmentation process. As the controlling capacities of KANU declined, KADU no longer feared its antagonist and the latter abandoned its opposition. The country became a "no party" state in the sense that there was no effective party agency to guide and direct political energies inside or outside the House. The government response was to create a "caucus party" on the American model; highly decentralized in terms of local organization and dependent on the "parliamentary group" to provide cohesiveness for effective government leadership.<sup>20</sup> The procedures of the parliament remained intact; only the form of the party had been changed, but the consequences were far reaching in terms of the organizational framework of effective rule-making.

#### INTEREST AGGREGATION IN THE HOUSE: THE TRIBAL CAUCUS

Following the dissolution of KADU, a further change occurred in the House. Freed from tight party control and attached by strong loyalties to their tribal groups, the House

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<sup>20</sup> Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), passim. The reference above to mass based branch parties and caucus parties draws on a typology developed by Duverger. The intensity of tribalist feelings and the lack of effective party control were the basis for the convenient shift to a party model characteristic of Duverger's description of American parties. This suggests an interesting consideration of the efficacy of branch party organization for parochial societies of great size in Africa.



members sought to strengthen those latter ties. Three weeks after the end of KADU, all Western Province members gathered to elect Masinde Muliro, former KADU Vice-President, as their spokesman for all the Luhya tribesmen, KANU and KADU alike.<sup>21</sup> Three months after that, the Coast members elected Ngala as spokesman for all Mijikenda tribesmen.<sup>22</sup> With Daniel arap Moi as the leader of the Kalenjin tribes of the Rift Valley Province and former APP leader Paul Ngei leading the Kamba peoples of Eastern Province, four of Kenya's seven provinces had grouped on tribal bases and elected as their spokemen men formerly opposed to KANU. Acknowledging that Kenyatta could speak for Central Province, only Nyanza remained deeply split. South Nyanza was a Luo-Kisii alliance siding with Mboya and Central Nyanza was an Odinga stronghold.<sup>23</sup>

In the parliament building, daily notices indicated that certain rooms were reserved for the meeting of members from a particular province or an individual tribe. These sessions were used to discuss every conceivable issue of interest to the assembled group; discussion ranged over issues of overseas bursaries and scholarships for children of the tribal area, aid for development projects, the placing of the

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<sup>21</sup> Nation, November 24, 1964.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., March 4, 1965.

<sup>23</sup> The seventh province was the Northeastern, controlled by Somali tribesmen born in Kenya.

tribe's recent university graduates in the civil service, and the types of pressure that could be used to get money from the government hierarchy.<sup>24</sup>

INTEREST AGGREGATION IN THE HOUSE: "NEW NATIONALISTS VS. IDEOLOGUES"

The dissolution of the opposition also aggravated existing divisions within the ruling KANU party. The first anniversary of independence was used by Kenyatta to consolidate his own strength against the internal opposition in KANU. This was done by taking former opposition members Daniel arap Moi and Paul Ngei into the cabinet without dropping any of the incumbents.<sup>25</sup> Kenyatta's cabinet then combined

TABLE 7:1 COALITION SHIFTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1963-1965.

May 1963	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">KANU/Independents</td> <td>APP</td> <td>KADU</td> </tr> </table>			KANU/Independents		APP	KADU			
KANU/Independents		APP	KADU							
September 1963	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">KANU/Independents/APP</td> <td colspan="2">KADU</td> </tr> </table>			KANU/Independents/APP		KADU				
KANU/Independents/APP		KADU								
November 1964	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="4">KANU</td> </tr> </table>			KANU						
KANU										
March 1965	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Kalenjin</td> <td>Kamba</td> <td>Kikuyu</td> <td>M'kenda</td> <td>Luo</td> <td>Luhya</td> <td>Others</td> </tr> </table>			Kalenjin	Kamba	Kikuyu	M'kenda	Luo	Luhya	Others
Kalenjin	Kamba	Kikuyu	M'kenda	Luo	Luhya	Others				
May 1965	<table border="1"> <tr> <td colspan="2">"New Nationalists"</td> <td colspan="2">"Ideologues"</td> </tr> </table>		"New Nationalists"		"Ideologues"					
"New Nationalists"		"Ideologues"								

<sup>24</sup>During the field work I had opportunity to attend a number of meetings of the Kisii tribal caucus. These were often held in a private home or the office of Assistant Minister Nyamweya, ranking Kisii representative.

the acknowledged leaders of certain tribal areas with a few younger men to provide technical competence to certain areas of development planning.

The basis for the cabinet reorganization stemmed from disagreement within KANU over the most viable strategies for national development. By early 1965, the government had more than a year and a half of experience in the affairs of state. It had a clear understanding of what could be accomplished, but some of the key figures in KANU continued to advocate programs beyond the government's means. The refusal of the government to respond to such demands only drew further criticism from the disaffected, and displeasure over the conservative approach to fiscal matters was not concealed.<sup>26</sup>

This division within KANU I have categorized as a split between the "new nationalists" and the "ideologues." The former were led by Kenyatta and espoused the conservative view

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The appointment of arap Moi rather than Ngala had value in that it gave Kenyatta contact with the people of the Rift Valley. This was useful to counteract the possibility of chaos if there were an outbreak of trouble on the far side of the Rift among the Luo, tribe of Odinga. Moi's appointment gave Kenyatta an unbroken stretch of territory leading to Nyanza that could be used if necessary. Ngala was appointed to the lucrative post of chairman of the Maize Marketing Board.

<sup>26</sup>Some of these men were the ones who had engineered earlier government defeats. Most notably, they were the same ones who withdrew from KANU in early 1966 to form a new opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU). These men included Kali, Anyieni, Kaggia, and Obok, all of whom were interviewed in the field.

on development. This caution of the "new nationalists" was frustrating to the latter group, the "ideologues," who were spearheaded by Vice-President Odinga and sought the fulfillment of pre-independence promises contained in the KANU manifesto. The "ideologues" were unwilling to reconcile themselves to the disparity between a simplistic pre-independence ideology and a post-independence reality. Their demands for increased state control of the economy regardless of its effects on investment or the European dominated agriculture sector were directly opposed to Kenyatta's position that had guaranteed the stability of the economy to various communities who contributed to the growth of the nation.

The socialist nature of the "ideologue" demands created the impression that they were communist influenced. Their speeches did little to dispel the image. During the first five months of 1965, the "ideologues" stated their position in terms that drew massive counter criticism from the "new nationalists." This verbal battle culminated in Odinga Odinga's "Communism is food for me" speech and the counter demand that he resign both his national and party offices.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, the nationalists continued to promote nation-building by seeking to shift loyalties from the tribal to the

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<sup>27</sup> Nation, May 27, 1965.

national level, all in the spirit of "Harambee" or helping together. Thus at the end of two years time, the House membership was divided into tribal caucuses and contending camps espousing different views of development philosophies.

#### POLICY AND POLITICAL INTEREST

The re-emergence of the tribal caucus and the splits within KANU demonstrated that the KANU party solidarity of the pre-independence period was only a facade hiding the basic division within the political environment. In occasionally defeating the government programs but not the government and in the realignments of tribal interest groups or political coalitions, the members of the House may have appeared as shrewd Machiavellians exercising consummate political skill. However, to believe that was the case would be as basic a distortion of what happened as to believe that men with only eighth grade educations would be totally ineffective elected representatives. In reality, the members of the House were concerned about securing their political positions by the means they personally deemed most efficacious. In terms of parliamentary procedure, all that happened was that the House more clearly reflected the political realities of Kenya and thereby gave greater integrity to its operations.

Unlike their colleagues in the cabinet, few backbenchers could articulate a comprehensive philosophy of government. Their reasons for becoming politicians were inchoate except for a hatred of the discrimination they had experienced at the hands of the colonialists.<sup>28</sup> Their personal philosophies consisted of a primary concern for the interests of their electorate/kinsmen, a desire to see the elimination of the vestiges of colonialism, and a hope to have substantial economic development and social progress consistent with expectations held prior to independence. Of all the backbenchers interviewed, only the former KAU leader, Bildad Kaggia, appeared to have a clearly thought out political perspective.

Kaggia was also one of the few backbenchers who researched and formally prepared the remarks he intended to deliver in the House chamber.<sup>29</sup> Among the majority of the backbenchers, the lack of preparation in readying speeches and the failure to try and understand all the complexities of legislation saved the government even more criticism in debate because the backbenchers just did not have the information to analyze all the matters brought to the House. In lieu of detailed knowledge, the backbenchers held to the three benchmarks of

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<sup>28</sup> Interviews with twenty-two backbenchers, loc. cit.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Bildad Kaggia.

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TABLE 7:2 MEMBERS QUESTIONS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE - DECEMBER, 1964\*

- \*\*382 Additional Post-office, Kisumu
- 672 Government Improvement of Lake Victoria as a Tourist Attraction
- 502 Telephone Extension for Kabarnet
- 430 Tarmac Uasin/Gishu Road
- 501 Tarmac Nakuru/Mariegat Road
- 746 Improvement of Bridges: Isiolo/Marsabit Road
- 421 Electric Power for Eldama Ravine
- 511 Railway Line for Machakos/Kitui
- 519 Tea Planting for Kipsigis Farmers

\* Excerpted from Appendix II

\*\* Numbers refer to assignation made prior to the question's appearance on the daily order paper.

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TABLE 7:3 MEMBERS QUESTIONS ON TRIBALISM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE - DECEMBER, 1964.\*

- \*\*128 Nyanza Luos in the Forces: Police, Prisons, Military
- 246 Racial Breakdown of Police Force
- 313 Favoritism: Entry in National Secondary Schools
- 316 Composition of Military Appointment Board
- 441 Trustees of Land Bank: Racial and Tribal Breakdown

\* Excerpted from Appendix II.

\*\* Numbers refer to assignment made prior to the question's appearance on the daily order paper.

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political orthodoxy: condemn colonialism, demand more social development projects from the government, and protect the interests of the tribe.

Of the three concerns of the representatives, the greatest was tribal loyalty and the potentially disruptive effect of "tribalism." Each interviewee was asked to discuss Kenya's greatest problems, and fear of the divisiveness of tribal animosities was expressed by all members of the interview sample. The debates recorded in the House Official Report emphasized that concern over tribalism. Representatives constantly raised the point that Kenya must not be allowed to become another Congo.<sup>30</sup>

The basis for such fear was the realization that during the months after the grant of self-government, the unity within the community of African political leaders was becoming unglued. Evidence of this was both positive and negative. Demands by members of the House that government look after local issues such as compensation for cattle raids, the tarmacing of certain roads, building of schools, settlement schemes for certain tribes, and the allocation of development funds to certain constituencies was the working out of the

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<sup>30</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, passim. particularly during the budget debate.



representative process whereby tribally homogeneous electorates placed pressure on their spokesmen to better local conditions.<sup>31</sup>

The negative aspects of tribalism were apparent in criticism voiced that certain tribes were being favored in the allocation of jobs, scholarships, overseas bursaries, and the distribution of industries. Before independence, these claims had been made on a partisan basis as KADU charged KANU with operating a spoils system in the use of appointive powers. The post-independence period brought criticism of tribal favoritism from both KADU and the KANU backbenchers. The house members wanted tribal breakdowns on men taken into the military, the police, sent overseas or admitted to the secondary schools.<sup>32</sup>

Officially, the government took little notice of this type of criticism, stating only that prescribed procedures had been used in the selection of personnel.<sup>33</sup> Privately, this attitude was dismissed by the members as a joke. Whatever the government position, no one could refute the fact that nine of sixteen ministers, the attorney general, and

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<sup>31</sup> See questions listed in Appendix II.

<sup>32</sup> Hansard, Vol. II, Part I, cols. 213-246.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., cols. 875-879, 1003-1006, Also Nation, June 26, 1964, Sept. 28, 1964, October 7, 1964, January 27, 29, 1965.

seven of sixteen assistant ministers originally appointed to the Kenyatta cabinet were Luo or Kikuyu. Two tribes, representing 33% of the population held 51% of the top leadership posts.<sup>34</sup> The mitigating factor of such domination was the split within the top leadership. Had the leaders of KANU remained united, it is unlikely that KADU would have become ineffectual so rapidly. However, though KANU may have weakened and the threat of Kikuyu-Luo domination felt to be less immediate, the members still evaluated issues in tribal terms and criticized the manner of government operations in which the leadership seemed to serve its own ends through the appointment of a disproportionate number of people from the Kikuyu and Luo tribes.

This issue of tribalism had further ramifications when members commented on other problems facing the country. Jealousy of ownership of tribal lands prevented optimum utilization of the country's productive areas and encouraged the landless to go to the cities or become squatters on the European farms. In urban areas, the unemployed seemed convinced that jobs were given only on a tribal basis. Less public but nonetheless important because it was such a widely held opinion was the private fears of many politicians that:

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<sup>34</sup>Hansard, Vol. I, Par I, corrigenda, Abstract, 1964, op. cit., p. 10.

tribalism could be used by foreign powers to subvert the stability of the government. A single comment speaks for many as summed up by Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism, Lawrence Sagini,

I do not fear communism for I don't believe we could ever become communist. What I fear for is our democracy. I fear that outsiders may put such pressure on us that we will be forced to take action that would compromise our democracy.<sup>35</sup>

In articulating his concern, the Minister was questioning whether tribal divisiveness might become so great as to force the abandonment of the constitutional guarantees established before independence.

The balancing of concern between fear of what tribalism could do and a desire to secure benefits for one's own tribe demonstrated the humanity of the politicians. They were not idealists only concerned with strengthening the state and enhancing loyalty to the nation; nor were they unaware of the dangers the country faced. They were elected representatives who were assessing the best ways for remaining in power. As described by Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, "politics is heady stuff."<sup>36</sup> They liked being in office, and they were concerned about issues that might threaten their

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with Lawrence Sagini.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Munyua Waiyaki.

incumbency: tribal strife, social disruption over unemployment, and mass disaffection among growing numbers of rural landless. Issues dealing with development such as more schools and hospitals and the hiring of more technical staff for better developmental planning were of lesser concern during that first year in office.\* The sound political logic of first securing one's position and then worrying about development guided their actions and informed their comments on major issues facing the nation. At the time of independence, the best way of preserving personal political security seemed to be through a strong tie to the tribal community, and the volume of available data supports that view.

#### THE INEQUITIES IN LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION

The description of constituency politics emphasized general patterns while describing variations in political style. These variations were evident in the analysis of Nyaribari and Taveta-Voi. Within the House of Representatives, certain general patterns of behavior were also apparent. The consistency of backbencher opinion, the dominance of tribalism as a source of discussion, the determination of the members to have a more vital role in national affairs, the search for consensus through the

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\*See Appendix V.

"parliamentary group" caucus, and eventually the emergence of the split between the "new nationalists" and the "ideologues." But, as in constituency politics, there were differences in style and performance of the members. Some representatives were heavily involved, some attached great importance to tribal caucuses, some had experience born of service in the old Legislative Council, and some had neither experience nor apparent enthusiasm for the tasks of being effective parliamentarians.

The differences in the personalities, skills, and motivations of the House members contributed to qualitatively unequal representation. This inequity was closely tied to the style of constituency politics. In some areas, like Nyaribari, the representative was placed under great pressure by his constituents and therefore had greater incentive to push his political interests in the House. Constituencies like Taveta-Voi did not generate such pressure, and the representative was not so obligated to involve himself in the bargaining for meager resources that took place at the national level.

These differences do not suggest that one style of politics was better than another. Nyamweya, running in Nyaribari, used a style of political discourse that was

effective with his electorate, and Dingiria used a different but equally effective style. The qualitative difference in performance arose when both men went to Nairobi. At the capital, a single standard for effective performance applied. While traditional norms may have had some influence on the procedures of the House, the institution itself was basically Western. The man who had the greater skill in the manipulation of that institution thus had an advantage over less skillful colleagues. Because of those differences, the fears of some politicians concerning tribal dominance were not unfounded as the following discussion points out.

It has been proposed that a means for determining political change that moves toward a more Western model is the analysis of three factors: (1) cultural secularity, (2) an increase in role differentiation or the division of labor, and (3) an increase in individual or group autonomy.<sup>37</sup> Emile Durkheim developed a theory that division of labor increases in direct proportion to the density of population.<sup>38</sup> Applying this theory to Kenya, the greatest division of labor

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<sup>37</sup>

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), chapter ten.

<sup>38</sup>

Emile Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), passim.

should occur among the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya, Kenya's largest tribes. Population figures show that density in the traditional land areas of those three tribes ranged from five to eight times greater than in the country as a whole. This density was also evident in the urban migration patterns which showed more people from those overcrowded areas had moved to the city than was the case for the country as a whole.<sup>39</sup> The accompanying table clearly shows how the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya had moved more precipitously to the cities suggesting a higher degree of role differentiation than existed for those tribes from less densely populated areas.

TABLE 7:4 CONTRASTING PATTERNS OF POPULATION DENSITY AND URBAN MIGRATION

National Population Density = 38 persons per square mile

	KIKUYU:	LUO:	LUHYA:
	Central Prov.	Nyanza Prov.	Western Prov.
Traditional home area:			
Population density per square mile:	174	272	272
Total number (3 tribes):	-----3,877,000-----		
Percent. of population 3 tribes:	-----46%-----		
Number working in Mombasa	8,094	10,875	7,272
Number working in Nairobi	65,560	24,870	26,332
	ALL NILO-HAMITICS:	ALL MIJIKENDA:	
	Rift Valley Prov.	Coastal Province	
Traditional home area:			
Population density per sq. mile:	61	.. 28	
Total number (all tribes)	-----1,283,000-----		
Percent. of population (3 tribes):	-----22%-----		
Number working in Mombasa	668	66,360	
Number working in Nairobi	2,428	2,164	

Extending the significance of these disparities in density and urban migration to the other two criteria for political change, one would expect to find increased subsystem autonomy among the same tribes. To test for the existence of such autonomy, political competitiveness in contesting elections was used. This correlation was first suggested when contrasting results of the elections in Nyaribari and Taveta-Voi. Relating this to fifteen constituencies represented

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TABLE 7:5 ELECTION RESULTS FROM NYARIBARI AND TAVETA-VOI, 1963 ELECTIONS.

NYARIBARI: Nyamweya (KANU) 7839	TAVETA-VOI: Dingiria (KANU) 6962
Mogaka (Ind.) 4694	Kilelu (KADU) 731
Ogoti (Ind.) 2196	
Nyabogo (Ind.) 1161	
Registered voters: 26,790	9,795

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
by members included in the interview sample and picked for highest and lowest degrees of competitiveness, it was found that in four where candidates won by taking more than 97% of the poll, the average density of population was 112 per square mile while in the other eleven characterized by high competitiveness, the average density was 361 per square mile. In the

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<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that the 1962 census report of urban population contained a tribal breakdown of residents only for Mombasa and Nairobi. Also, the numbers of Kikuyu in Nairobi and Mijikenda in Mombasa were conditioned by the location of those respective towns within the tribal areas of those two tribes.



SURVEY OF FIFTEEN CONSTITUENCIES CONTRASTED  
FOR HIGH AND LOW POLITICAL COMPETITIVENESS



■ HIGH  
■ LOW

latter eleven, the winners took an average of only 54.2% of the poll. All of the latter eleven constituencies were in Nyanza, Western and Central Provinces.<sup>40</sup> Assessing the elections for the whole country, it was found that winning candidates took an average of 75.5% of the poll in their constituencies, yet in areas of greater population density - Nairobi, Nyanza Province and Western Province - winning candidates took 67%, 72.3% and 65.1% of the polls respectively. Only in Central Province, home of the Kikuyu was there a serious deviation with winning candidates taking 88.8% of the poll, but in that latter province, Kenyatta was the Kikuyu elder whose endorsement in either a "modernist" or traditional sense was sufficient to nearly guarantee election.

This concept of sub-system autonomy and political competitiveness has historical precedent when it is recalled that the earliest political activity approximating in organization and style that of the Europeans appeared in those areas which were supposed to entertain the greatest division of labor. Those early associations were the Kavirondo Taxpayer's and Welfare Association (Luo and Luhya) and the Kikuyu Central Association.

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<sup>40</sup> The analysis of election returns is based on the Standard, May 28-29, 1963 and the Statistical Abstract, 1964, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

The evidence of greater cultural secularity among Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya is established by surveying the educational attainments and experiences of the members of the House. Admittedly, much of the basis for high educational achievement can be attributed to the fact that the missionaries preferred to proselyte in densely populated areas and therefore established their mission and schools among the sedentary societies. Also, those people in densely populated areas had more contact with administration, since administration had to concentrate where the needs were the greatest. Nonetheless, the general validity of the thesis is preserved.

TABLE 7.6 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVELS ATTAINED AMONG ONE HUNDRED AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1963.

	KIKUYU, LUO, LUHYA	Other Bantu support- ing KANU	MIJIK- ENDA	NILO- HAMITES	TOTAL
Primary schooling	0	1	0	0	1
Standard VIII	1	4	1	2	8
Vocational Training	3	1	1	4	9
Teacher Training College	4	8	2	7	21
Secondary School	11	3	3	4	21
Foreign training	3	3	2	1	9
University degree	21	10	9	3	34
TOTAL:	43	30	9	21	103

The conclusion drawn from the data is Central Province, Nyanza Province, and Western Province contained more people living closer together with more education and a historic and

current level of political involvement that was greater than the peoples living in the Coast or Rift Valley provinces. Using the typology of cultural secularity, role specificity, and sub-system autonomy, the people of the Central, Western and Nyanza Provinces were considered most politically changed and more adept at the use of Western political skills. And, in terms of representative inequity, there was a very real aspect to the charge that the Kikuyu-Luo could dominate the rest of the society.

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As emphasized in the opening passage of this chapter, Kenya politics during the first two years of the Kenyatta regime were dynamic. The government confronted policy questions and institutional change at the same time. The actions of the House of Representatives seemed directed toward establishing a congruence between the norms of the society and the role of the legislature. After two years, the House membership had collected into incipient interest aggregating groups on a tribal basis while cutting across those groupings were the divisions created by "ideologues" and the "new nationalists." Both tribal and ideological differences were discussed within the legislative chamber, the kiama. Thus the integrity of that House and the strength

of the Kenyatta government were supported by men born of a tradition that sought to avoid conflict through the search for consensus and the popular legitimation of decisions by representatives responsible to their kinsmen. It was all there. The tribal legacy had been suffused into the life of the national rule-making body.

## CHAPTER EIGHT:

### TWO YEARS OF CHALLENGE

During its first two years in office, the Kenyatta government successfully responded to a series of critical political issues. The nature of the government's responses was conditioned by at least six distinguishable factors. The reality of those limitations and the severity of the issues confronted suggest that the government's success in maintaining stability while preserving democracy cannot be attributed entirely to coincidental convergence of circumstances or the "stochastic" element in politics. The available evidence suggests that success was significantly conditioned by government planning. This evidence comes from the analysis of issues confronted during that period. Most notable in that planning process was the manner in which problems were handled in consecutive fashion, emphasizing that the government directed its energies by choice rather than being forced to deal with problems that had already built up intolerable pressures and threatened disruption. Beginning in June of 1963, the government focused attention ad seriatum on KANU vs. KADU/APP, "majimboism," the shifta, military mutiny,

labor unrest, party disunity, parliamentary discontent, constitutional reform, increased intra-party strife, and economic development. Throughout that period, new alliances emerged as old ones dissolved, and in each case, the government was able to exhibit support for each action taken though the personnel in the coalitions kept shifting. First the APP "crossed the carpet" permitting in mid-1964 greater pressure to be brought on KADU by the KANU majority in the House. Bi-partisan support from both sides of the House was forthcoming in dealing with the mutiny and the shifita.

Governmental responsiveness reduced the threat of potential destabilization in KANU and unrest among the backbenchers.

The complete dissolution of KADU and its incorporation into KANU provided a powerful base for the "new nationalists" in repudiating the claims of the "ideologues." With the single exception of the use of British troops in quelling the mutiny, all issues handled were dealt with by relying on the resources available within the Kenya political community.

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TABLE 8:1 MAJOR FACTORS CONDITIONING GOVERNMENT POLICY  
RESPONSES IN KENYA, 1963-1965.

- A. Insufficiency of physical and monetary resources to meet popular demands.
- B. Constituency politics that strengthened incipient pluralist democracy among competing tribal interest groups.
- C. Independent legislative behavior that was increasingly reserved toward government entreaty for acceptance of policies.
- D. The decline of the capability of the national party to elicit strong support for national solidarity.
- E. The pledge by the national leadership to maintain the guarantees of democratic practice written into the constitution.
- F. The growth of the split within the national party leadership over the most viable strategies for development.

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The political pragmatism evident in all those situations emphasized the supremely human quality of the political game in Kenya, and the political skills of the politicians were exceedingly important since the task of maintaining national stability was beset by many of the same obstacles that have confronted other African states. In the four years preceding independence, the economic growth rate only modestly exceeded the growth in population.<sup>1</sup> In an economy where

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<sup>1</sup> Kenya Government, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Statistical Abstract, 1964, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 100.



export earnings from coffee, sisal, tea, and pyrethrum accounted for two-thirds of export revenues, there was in the year of independence an unfavorable balance of trade of nearly £25 million on a total trade of £124 million.<sup>2</sup> Urban population was expanding at a rate of six per cent per annum, outstripping the capacity of urban planners to provide adequate housing or urban services. During the first year of independence, lack of educational facilities forced nearly 100,000 children to discontinue their education at the eighth grade level. The rate of increase in the employed labor force had averaged less than one percent per year during the last decade of colonial rule, and during the independence year there was a drastic decrease in the total number of employed wage earners. Capital formation was consistently down after 1958.<sup>3</sup>

Coincident with the magnitude of social demands and the limitations on resources was the appearance of a style of politics different from the colonial period, a style that changed constantly within the first two years of

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-26.

<sup>3</sup> Kenya Government, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Six Year Plan, 1965-1970, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 11, 20, 103, 134-35.

Kenyatta rule. The Westminster parliamentary model underwent small but significant modifications in order to more closely reflect the style of African life found throughout the country. The increase in the number of constituencies brought an increase in the number of significant political personnel representing all the tribes in the new nation, men with widely disparate levels of education and experience who made up a new political elite. Electoral laws determined that new criteria be used in the composition of that new elite, and the infusion of the new political personnel disrupted any elite stratification that might have been coalescing among the African political leadership of the pre-independence period. The expansion of electoral districts to more adequately represent all tribes helped inspire the realignment of old political coalitions. Universal manhood suffrage and election manifestos seeking to enlist the support of those newly enfranchised helped to stimulate an increase in popular demands for social change. All these personal equations in the political process emphasized the dynamic nature of the political system as Kenya began to elaborate a new political style. That new style was born of the traditional culture and the impact of colonial rule, but was distinctly modified by the interaction of the two traditions.

Amidst that cultural pluralism, the Kenyatta government was charged with the responsibility of ruling, maintaining the peace, and holding to its pledge to preserve the democratic practices that accompanied independence.

FROM SELF-GOVERNMENT TO INDEPENDENCE: JUNE 1963 - DECEMBER 1963

The responsibility for those tasks was given to Kenyatta and his party on the night of May 27, 1963 when word was received that Kuria constituency in the remote southwest of the country had returned a KANU candidate, assuring Kenyatta's party of an absolute majority in the House of Representatives.<sup>4</sup> Responding to Governor Malcolm MacDonald's invitation to form a government, Mzee Kenyatta accepted the obligation of being the country's first prime minister, and on June 1, 1963 led the nation into the final stage of colonial rule.

Several distinct problems had to be resolved or mitigated before independence could be granted. On that June 1, 1963, "Madaraka Day," Kenya was something of an imprecise geographical expression operating interim constitutional

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<sup>4</sup> East African Standard, May 28, 1963, (hereafter Standard), and personal interview with Mwai Kibaki describing the elation felt by the party leaders who had gathered at the home of Joseph Murumbi in Nairobi.

instruments amidst political controversy aroused by the split between governing KANU and the opposition KADU/APP coalition. The Kenyatta government sought to enhance harmony, give firm substance to the constitutional base of its authority, and establish guarantees of territorial integrity of the state. Less than five weeks after the inception of self-government, it was announced that solutions would have to be found in less than six months because the date of independence had been set for December 12, 1963.<sup>5</sup>

#### Building Public Confidence

The government was faced with a population which harbored much mistrust and some outright fear about the future. For his alleged complicity in the Mau Mau rebellion, Kenyatta had once been condemned by Europeans as the leader of darkness and death. Businessmen were apprehensive over the KANU manifesto and its indictments of capitalism.<sup>6</sup> The election campaign had produced an image of KANU as the more militantly anti-colonialist of the contending parties. The Asian

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<sup>5</sup> Kenya Government, The National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963), Vol. I, Part I, Col. 526, (hereafter referred to as Hansard).

<sup>6</sup> Kenya African National Union, What a KANU Government Offers You, (Nairobi: Printing and Packaging Corporation, 1963), pp. 8, 22ff.

community which controlled so many of the civil service jobs feared for their tenure.<sup>7</sup> The tribes of the KADU-APP coalition feared domination by the Kikuyu-Luo alliance that was the keystone of KANU party strength'. Unless those fears were relieved, the Kenyatta government stood a less likely chance of securing the cooperation from all groups in society to work to Kenya's advantage in the task of development. Recognizing that fact, the public image of the government embodied the spirit of moderation and inter-racial harmony during the months before independence. Following his installation as prime minister, Kenyatta addressed the nation in terms that clearly indicated no threats to public order would be tolerated.

I must point out that the Government now in power is the Government of the whole of Kenya. It is not just for those who elected us. We shall care equally for those people who gave us their votes, and those who did not. All those who did not agree with us have proper ways for making their views known. The Opposition is formally recognized in our national Constitution, and can play a constructive role in nation-building. On the other hand, we shall be as firm as any other Government in dealing with anyone who turns to subversive action. ...We shall not permit our plans to be sabotaged by those self-seekers who encourage strife and division. The hopes and aspirations which the people of Kenya have for their independence will not be dashed by anyone who seeks cheap notoriety by playing upon negative tribalism. We have the task of leading Kenya to prosperity and to do

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

this, we must foster the spirit of national unity, transcending divisions of party, tribe, community or region.<sup>8</sup>

Implicit in those statements was a balancing of two appeals. There was a call for voluntary cooperation and support of the government. At the same time, it was made clear that coercion would be applied should it be required.

Meaningful assurances of the government's good will were given to the European community. These were Parliamentary representation, Cabinet representation, guaranteed individual rights, adherence to the rule of law, the maintenance of the existing economic structures, and avoidance of adventurism in new economic policies. Three Europeans were elected among the twelve national members of the House of Representatives. One, Bruce McKenzie, was given the agriculture portfolio in the Cabinet, and Peter Marrian was Assistant Minister (Parliamentary Secretary) for Lands and Settlement. Former Nairobi mayor, R. S. Alexander was surprisingly elected to the Opposition benches, thereby defeating a KANU candidate.<sup>9</sup> The fourth European was Humphrey

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<sup>8</sup>Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee: The Prime Minister's Speeches 1963-1964, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 8 and Kenya Digest, No. 308, June 14, 1963, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup>Alexander's election was significant since he was a KADU candidate. Normally, all of KANU's candidates for national members would have been elected because of KANU's huge majority, but KANU members elected instead a European who it knew would sit on the opposition benches and criticize the government.

Slade who was elected unanimously and unopposed as the Speaker. Within the House chamber, speeches constantly emphasized the need for unity and cooperation. In announcing the date of independence, Kenyatta stated,

...I call upon the whole nation to cooperate and work vigorously with the Government for smooth and peaceful fulfillment of our objective. The future lies in that cooperation and acceptance of responsibility. We in the Government fully accept our responsibilities, but that is not enough unless the spirit in the Government is supported by a similar spirit and resolution on the part of all Members of this House and the public at large...we have recognized the right of the Opposition...we must agree that negative and destructive opposition can only do harm...We will accept fair and constructive criticism in any quarter...Let us move forward in the spirit of unity, cooperation and hard work.<sup>10</sup>

The debate on the shared responsibilities of the central government and the regional governments under the "majimbo" Constitution emphasized the parallel themes of the need for constitutionality in procedure and dependence on constitutionalism as a guide for action.<sup>11</sup> By pointing to the fact that cooperation and unity must be supported by the belief in the equity of the individual, the government helped reassure various members of the minority communities. Further assurance was given to them in the economic sphere with the government's promise that its prime concern was efficiency and

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<sup>10</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, Col. 529.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., Cols. 584-612.

"Kenyanization" rather than "Africanization."<sup>12</sup> As independence neared, the final constitutional instruments provided personal guarantees, entrenched rights, and explicit provisions regarding citizenship.<sup>13</sup> To reinforce his public statements and parliamentary assurances, Kenyatta met personally with members of the European community to support his policy and help relieve doubt.<sup>14</sup>

Apprehension in the business community abated when Minister of Finance Gichuru presented a new budget that was a model of conservative economic fiscal responsibility. The fear of a restructuring of the economy to encompass a more socialist outlook was not realized as the government introduced the budget for 1963-64. Speaking on the document, Gichuru emphasized that the picture was somewhat harsh but not bleak.<sup>15</sup> At about the same time the Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced that there were bright prospects for secondary industry in the second half of 1963.<sup>16</sup> The trade index which had fallen consistently before the elections

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Cols. 837-840, 1003-1012, 1144-1145.

<sup>13</sup> Great Britain, Colonial Office, The Kenya Independence Order in Council, 1963, (London: HMSO, 1963), No. 1968. Sections 1-30.

<sup>14</sup> Standard, Nov. 15, 1963.

<sup>15</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, Cols. 18-46.

<sup>16</sup> Kenya Digest, No. 309, May 31, 1963, p. 7.



recovered vigorously until six weeks after Kenya became self-governing it achieved a level not obtained since before the Lancaster House conference of 1960.<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps the most comforting feature of government performance was the continuity that surrounded the change-over to independence. The government functioned at a brisk pace. The budget was fully and openly debated; major fiscal legislation was passed. A new criminal procedure bill received the considered attention of the African lawyers in the House. In all, twenty-six pieces of major legislation were passed in the first five months.<sup>18</sup> As the last days of colonial rule ran out, very favorable press comment attended the birth of the new nation.<sup>19</sup>

#### Establishing the Constitution

The assurances offered to Kenya's minority groups through the government's moderate economic policies, the constitutional guarantees, and the personal statements of support for all of Kenya's peoples only partially offset the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., and Kenya Digest, No. 313, August 30, 1964.

<sup>18</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part II, cols. 2181-2182.

<sup>19</sup> Kenya Digest, Nos. 316 and 317, These issues contained summary comment from the London Times, the New Statesman, Manchester Guardian, Financial Times and the Tribune.

uneasiness experienced because of continuing political controversy between governing KANU and the opposition KADU-APP alliance. The central issue was the distribution of powers under the internal self-government constitution and the final constitutional forms to be agreed on before independence. Prior to the 1963 elections, when KANU and KADU were bound together in the precarious coalition government, a conference in London established the constitutional instruments for internal self-rule. Those instruments represented a triumph for KADU since they divided the country into six regions and called for the election of regional assemblies with devolution of certain powers from the central government to the exclusive control of the regional governments.<sup>20</sup> Since the KANU position was never to accept a "majimboist" or modified federal constitution, Kenya had a government bound by a constitution it was determined to repudiate. Kenyatta and KANU were not anxious to implement the regional arrangements, condemning them as technologically and administratively unworkable and prohibitively expensive. The exorbitant costs of federation for Kenya's limited resources were spelled out

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Hansard, Vol. I, Part II, col. 1866. Duties included land administration, local government, education, police, health, agriculture, probation, and fisheries. For a list of duties under the independence act, see Order in Council, No. 1968, op. cit., Schedule I, Article 66.

in the budget debate.<sup>21</sup> Finance Minister Gichuru stated that regionalism would force tax rises, result in uneven economic development, and have significantly disadvantageous effects on the Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, KADU strongholds. Calling on the opposition KADU-APP to join the Government in the spirit of "harambee," the "majimboists" were condemned for engaging in "cheap, negative, tribalist politics."<sup>22</sup>

Answering the government, KADU and APP spokesmen emphasized that "majimboism" was a fact and not debatable. After a month of self-government, KADU brought a motion in the House condemning the government for not informing the country as to the provisions of the constitution.<sup>23</sup> Defeated in that effort, KADU tried again in September by introducing a motion calling on the government to fully implement the constitution.<sup>24</sup> The force of KADU's argument, however, was weakened by the desertion of its ally. On September 13, Paul Ngei, leader of the APP, declaring it the desire of the party to support the national government, crossed the floor with his six Kamba followers, thereby reducing KADU opposition to twenty-three.<sup>25</sup> Defeated by parliamentary tactics and

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<sup>21</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, col. 33.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., cols. 350-351, 354.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., cols. 584-612.

<sup>24</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part II, cols. 1866-1896.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., cols. 1919-1920.

the overwhelming KANU majority, opposition leader Ngala went to the London conference determined to make one more effort to secure "majimbo" conditions in independent Kenya. His effort, emphasizing the tribal divisions, was a proposal for the splitting of the country into two separate republics.<sup>26</sup> Though it aroused considerable press commentary, it was a weak proposal. When the London conferees returned to Nairobi, they came with a document that detailed a form of federal structure, though the central government had almost unlimited power to overrule the regions. Furthermore, the KANU majority was sufficiently large to provide the three-quarters majority needed for constitutional amendment.<sup>27</sup> The KANU dominance having been firmly established, KADU stalwarts Murgor, Seroney, Towett, and Khasakhala left the opposition benches. KADU was reduced to the role of public conscience while Kenyatta continued his attempts to fashion a broad based consensus so useful in the new nation.<sup>28</sup>

#### Insuring Territorial Integrity

The boundary question involved two issues that required resolution in order to develop Kenya from an imprecise geographical expression to a demarcated national area.

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<sup>26</sup>Standard, October, 1963, passim.

<sup>27</sup>Independence Order in Council, op. cit., passim.

<sup>28</sup>Hansard, Vol. I, Part II, corrigenda.

Since 1895, the coastal strip on the Indian Ocean had been administered by Kenya though remaining technically part of the Zanzibar protectorate. The decision on the coastal area was, in the end, a procedural one. It was agreed that the area would be ceded to Kenya by Zanzibar at the time of Zanzibar's independence. That occurred several days in advance of Kenya's independence which avoided any major problem. The issue of separate existence for the strip was raised but never seriously considered.<sup>29</sup> The second boundary question was much more complex, and though Kenya had an internationally recognized boundary at the time of independence, the area encompassed by that northeastern border became the scene of continuing and increasingly bloody guerrilla warfare.

Kenya's Northeastern Province or the Northern Frontier District, as it was previously called, is populated by Somalis and Hamitic tribes who had inter-married with and been Islamized by the Somalis. Most of this process of inter-penetration has occurred in this century, and throughout the period the Somalis and Somali sympathizers have resented the even tenuous control exercised by the Kenya authorities. In the late 1940's, the politically emergent Somali Youth League extended its activities into the area

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<sup>29</sup>Standard, August, 1963, passim.

and created a quasi-government until the Youth League was proscribed by the British.<sup>30</sup> When the British and the Italian Trustee areas were united to create independent Somalia in 1960, a base was established to promote irredentism in the Province with a view toward causing secession in order to join the Somali Republic. Rival political factions in the area supported union with either Kenya or Somalia.<sup>31</sup> Anti-secessionist groups warned that unless drastic development measures were taken, the situation would become increasingly dangerous. In December of 1962, a special commission investigated opinion in the area and concluded there was abundant opinion on both sides, but the secessionists were better organized.<sup>32</sup>

In 1963, the issue was internationalized as Somalia said she was prepared to take the issue to the World Court. Despite British guarantees that the Somali point of view would be heard before a final settlement was made, Somali criticism of Britain continued to mount. When Britain

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<sup>30</sup> Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Reports, 1947-1950, passim. (London: HMSO, 1948-1950).

<sup>31</sup> SECESSIONIST PARTIES: Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party, Northern Frontier Democratic Party, Peoples National League, National Political Movement. ANTI-SECESSIONIST PARTIES: United Ogaden Somali Association, Borana Muslim Welfare Association, Northern Province United Association, Galla Political Union, and Northern Peoples National Union.

rejected turning the issue over to international inquiry, Somalia broke diplomatic relations. Within the Northeastern Province, Somali secessionists agreed to boycott the elections that brought KANU to power.<sup>33</sup> As a result the Province was unrepresented in the Parliament at the time of independence.

The declaration of self-government in Kenya found Somalia seeking international support in the Arab world and military support from socialist countries; while in the province itself there was non-cooperation, violence and numerous arrests.<sup>34</sup> Early in August, with Kenyatta's government adamantly opposed to surrendering an inch of territory, Somalia agreed to talks that resulted in the three day Rome Conference at the end of the month. No communique was issued since agreement was impossible. With Somalia continuing to threaten reprisals, Kenyatta and Governor MacDonald personally met with the Somali chiefs of the region to assure them of the Government's good will and to initiate a program to inform the people of both their constitutional rights and government plans for development.<sup>35</sup> As the date of independence approached, when the province as a sovereign part of Kenya would become a reality, border raids and violence increased resulting in

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<sup>33</sup> Standard, January 4, 10, 17, 18, 20, Feb. 7, 23, 25, 26, March 7-26.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., April 5, 12, 16, May 3, 9, 16, 23, June 11, 14, 17, 18, July 9, 10, 13.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., August 3, 6, 17, 19, 22, 26, 29, -Sept. 2, 4, 17, 24.

the murder of the District Commissioner of Wajir. Two weeks before independence, a motion was introduced in the Parliament calling for stronger security measures on the border. At that time Kenyatta noted the Somali government refused any responsibility for border incidents, and Kenya did not want to damage Kenya-Somali relations. He did emphasize that security would be maintained.<sup>36</sup> Within a month it was necessary to declare a state of emergency. Nonetheless, with one boundary issue settled and another legally established but emotionally unresolved, the territorial shape of Kenya was defined.

KENYA'S UHURU: DECEMBER 1963 - JUNE 1964

Impressive ceremony attended the proceedings at Nairobi's Langata Stadium on the night of December 12, 1963 when at midnight there was the lowering of the British ensign and the unfurling of the red, green, black, and white flag of the new East African nation. At the joint session of Parliament, Senate Speaker Chokwe read the Letters of Patent from Queen Elizabeth and heard the address from the throne delivered by the Duke of Edinburgh.<sup>37</sup> The change in Kenya's status, not marred by any unpleasantness, was a tribute to the efforts

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<sup>36</sup>Hansard, Vol. I, Part II, cols. 2400ff.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., Vol. II, Part I, cols. 1-6.



of the government during the previous six months. The European community had begun to express increased confidence in Kenyatta and his Cabinet. The divisive power of tribalism was at least momentarily masked by the swelling of the KANU ranks. The economy had recovered its balance as the government did nothing to irritate private finance. The rule of law was the established guideline for action. The message of the government that all must cooperate had been at least momentarily accepted by a significant majority throughout the land. Henceforth, any person or persons seeking to disrupt the fragile existing consensus stood in danger of having his actions condemned as a violation of the "spirit of Harambee," Kenya's national motto meaning "pull together."

The value of the government's policy emphasizing social and racial harmony was quickly realized in the first three months of independence. During that period the government was severely challenged by three issues that demanded hard decisions which would have been difficult if the Kenyatta leadership had not felt confident of at least the tacit support of all racial communities. Almost immediately after independence, the Somali-Northeastern Province dispute became acute. Within six weeks of "Uhuru" one of the three battalions of the Kenya army had mutinied. Thirdly, the public

pressure exerted by the unemployed built to a fever pitch in the streets of Nairobi. Each of those issues was handled in turn, all in different fashion, and in each case resulted in a solution or acceptable holding action.

### State of Emergency

On the 25th of December, thirteen days after independence, Kenyatta proclaimed a "state of emergency" in the Northeastern Province and six days later sought Parliamentary approval of his action. Stating that his hopes and expectations were exhausted, the prime minister revealed that in the previous six weeks there had been thirty-three incidents by "shifita gangsters" who were, "well organized, demonstrating great ruthlessness, good tactics and strategy." The shifita were believed to number 2700, of which 700 were operating in the Northeast Province and the remainder were based in Somalia. In moving the motion Kenyatta declared his dislike for emergencies and said it would be ended as soon as normal conditions were restored.<sup>38</sup> It was not realized then that the emergency would continue for years to come, being periodically extended by parliamentary provision.<sup>39</sup> With minor criticism from the opposition, the

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., cols. 8-11.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. cols. 142-184, Division vote 101-0.

original emergency motion was approved.<sup>40</sup>

The Northeastern Province became a restricted area and the Kenya army took increasing punitive measures against the shifita outlaws. Despite this violence, elections were conducted in the province and representatives selected to the Parliament.<sup>41</sup> After two months of the emergency, it was extended in a bipartisan action of the Parliament. During the debate on extension, the Somali government was openly condemned for its role in inciting irredentism, and the Kenya government noted Somalia's behavior was in violation of the charter of the Organization of African Unity. The government, while listening to commentary calling for increased security measures, cautioned those in the House who would have declared war on Somalia. Also, the government noted that it was attempting to win the confidence of the people in the province.<sup>42</sup> The state of emergency continued throughout 1964 and 1965 with increasingly bitter relations between Kenya and a Somali government which made little attempt to hide its involvement.<sup>43</sup> Only the isolation of

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., col.s 8-47, Division vote 87-13.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., cols. 93 and 601, 603-604, 750.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., cols. 142-183, 807, 812.

<sup>43</sup> Daily Nation, May 7, 1964. (hereafter Nation)

the disputed area and other more pressing issues restrained demands for war against Somalia while the Kenyatta government continued to fight a holding action.

### Army Mutiny

One month after the declaration of the state of emergency, on January 24, 1964, part of Kenya's army mutinied. To call for assistance from British troops of the so recently departed colonial ruler was a blow to national pride, but the decision was made in the interest of stability. In the space of a few hours, the 3rd Horse Artillery of Royal Engineers was brought to Lanet Camp, a hundred miles west of Nairobi. In seeking to calm public fears and allay the impression that Kenya could not handle its internal problems, Kenyatta publicly stated that the action by the British troops was not a blemish on the nation's prestige since the troops were already in the country at Kahawa Camp, twelve miles north of Nairobi. With the mutiny quelled, the 11th Battalion was disbanded and reformed as the 1st Battalion of the Kenya Rifles. One hundred and seventy men were cashiered, and a court martial sent fourteen men to prison.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Standard, January 27-30, 1964, February 8, 11, 13-16, 21-22, March 7-12, April 30, and May 1. Also, Hansard, Vol. II, Part I, cols. 666, 672 for a tribal breakdown of men serving in the army.

Land and Labor

A more critical problem overshadowing the issues of both the shifta and the mutiny was the interrelated complex of questions regarding land and labor. The problem was a blend of the traditional and modern in Kenya life, and did not provide an easy solution. Overcrowding in traditional tribal land areas encouraged young people to leave the land for the rapidly expanding urban centers. With only 31% of Kenya's 225,000 square miles receiving rainfall consistently above thirty inches annually and being otherwise suitable for intensive livestock and crop production, good land had always been at a premium.<sup>45</sup> A projection on population growth in crowded Nyanza and Central Province indicated that by 1975 there would be an average density of 275 people per square mile.<sup>46</sup> To the landless African who had anticipated "Uhuru," freedom had implied a new day when land would be abundantly available. Many sought to realize this new era by indiscriminately "squatting" on the land of European farmers. To the urban African, deprived of returning to the rural areas by lack of land, "Uhuru" was anticipated as an end to unemployment and the beginning of a better life.

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<sup>45</sup>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1963), pp. 64-65.

<sup>46</sup>Statistical Abstract, op. cit., pp. 8-9, and Six Year Plan, op. cit., p. 68.

In February, 1964, complaints from Europeans forced the government to make a choice on land policy, and the result was forceable removal of "squatters" from the European farms in order to prevent disruption of a key sector of the economy. It was difficult to make such a decision, since land and its possession was a fixed point in the Africans' constellation of values. Responding to criticism of its policy from the backbenchers in the Parliament, a government spokesman stated that there was no intention of being "soft" on illegal "squatting," and the government was not interested in "short term popularity" if it would result in disruption of the national economy. The members were told to stop blaming the government and go to their constituencies as spokesmen for the government policy, warning the people that difficult decisions were necessary. The people were to understand that the government meant business after many warnings about illegal squatting had been ignored.<sup>47</sup>

The difficulty of solving the long run problems of land settlement lay in the strength of tribalism and the refusal of Africans to support settlement of their traditional lands by others not of their tribe. The Masai did not want other tribes encroaching on their land reserve. The Kikuyu were

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<sup>47</sup>

Hansard, Vol. III, Part II, cols. 1006, 1015.

resented for their efforts to expand into the Rift Valley.<sup>48</sup> Since 1954, comprehensive plans for development and consolidation of African land holdings had been carried out under the Swynnerton Plan, but by the end of 1963, only 2.75 million acres had been consolidated and three million acres remained to be done. The capacity of the Six Year Plan was only 150,000 acres a year meaning 2 million acres would remain unconsolidated in 1970.<sup>49</sup> Outside the African reserves which were the foci for consolidation projects, the Government Central Land Board had purchased 115,000 acres and resold 74,000 of that to Africans. An additional 685,000 acres remained to be settled by Africans, and 100,000 acres had been sold to Africans in private transactions, all since 1961.<sup>50</sup> The continuing obstacles to land consolidation and settlement, however, were the time required, the number of people desiring land, and the prohibitively expensive costs of land purchase on settlement schemes. Finally, with those obstacles forcing poor people into the

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<sup>48</sup> Information from a series of interviews with G. Michael Low, founder and secretary of the Narrosurra Farm Co-operative Settlement Scheme, Sabatia, Kenya, European who used part of his farm in an inter-tribal experiment.

<sup>49</sup> Statistical Abstract, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

<sup>50</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, cols. 497-500.

cities, the growth in the "cash-wage" economy was not rapid enough to allow for absorption of the population "spill-over" from the rural to the urban areas.

In the cities, urban unemployment was an outgrowth of change in the whole social system of traditional life. Expanding rural population and the weakening of the social structure of African life released individuals from their rustic environment and encouraged their movement to the cities and towns. There they entered a milieu even less secure than the one they had left behind. There were just not enough jobs to absorb all the new arrivals from the rural areas.<sup>51</sup> Before independence, the social combustibility of the urban idle was a source of restless activity that was channelled into support for nationalist demands. After independence, the same unemployed became a liability, squeezed into the teeming quarters of Pumwani, Ziwani, Ofafa Jericho, Kariakor, and Bahati, the urban districts of Nairobi. From those overcrowded centers the message was clear: "Tell the Old Man (Kenyatta) we do not want to hurt his government, but tell him we are hungry."<sup>52</sup> The recognition that, "Those people would be susceptible to any

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<sup>51</sup> Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Reports on Community Development, 1951-1959, (London: HMSO), passim.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with the Hon. Munyua Waiyaki quoted directly.



foreign influence that put food in their bellies," emphasized the seriousness of the land/labor problem.<sup>53</sup> Any promises of free land and food would have been enough to enlist the support of thousands upon thousands of Africans. A relatively little amount of money carefully distributed could have filled the streets of Nairobi with people demanding things that the government was not capable of supplying. A series of continuing demonstrations by the hungry of the city could have shaken the confidence of the Kenyatta government. While less overt or clearly defined than either the mutiny or the shifta-outlawry, the demands of the landless and the unemployed were infinitely more critical to the stability of the country and the survival of the government.

The unemployment problem did not develop with the grant of self-government. In January of 1964 when hundreds of demonstrators marched on the Ministry of Labor demanding official action for Kenya's "forgotten thousands" there ended a long period when no remedial action was taken against a continually worsening condition. From 1954 to 1962, the employed labor force grew at the rate of only .8% a year, and in 1963 there was an 8% drop in the total number of wage earners.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Interview with the Hon. Fred Kubai, then Assistant Minister for Labor.

<sup>54</sup> Statistical Abstract, op. cit., pp. 23-26, and Kenya Weekly News, January 22, 1965, p. 31.

Over the years there had been minor attempts to deal with the problem, but it was only after the marches on the Ministry that the Minister of Labor Eliud Mwendwa, as Chairman of a Cabinet Committee on Unemployment, initiated a series of meetings between the Kenya Federation of Employers and the Kenya Federation of Labor.<sup>55</sup> During the first week of February, the Kenya National Unemployment Plan of 1964 (Tripartite Agreement) was worked out. It called for the expansion of the private sector work force by 10% and the government sector by 15%. Labor, as its contribution, agreed to refrain from strikes and making wage demands throughout the year.<sup>56</sup> Labor recruitment centers were set up with the chronically unemployed given job priority. In succeeding months, employers held to their part of the bargain, though lack of centralized control of the labor movement prevented the Kenya Federation of Labor from stopping all strikes. At

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<sup>55</sup> Kenya Colony and Protectorate, A. G. Dalgleish, Survey of Unemployment, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1960), passim. and the Standard, passim. from the Standard offices news files, 1958-1964. For information on the creation of the Cabinet committee, January 24 and Feb. 5, 8-10, 1964.

<sup>56</sup> During the year major strikes were called or threatened by the National Union of Teachers, the Agricultural Workers Union, the Commercial Workers Union in Kisumu, the Local Government Workers in Nairobi, the East African Posts and Telegraphs Union, the Electrical Trade Workers Union, and the East African Railway Workers Union. For further information on the Tripartite Agreement and the Labor Disputes Court, see Hansard, Vol. II, Parts I, cols. 881, 939.

the end of a year's time, the pact was extended for an additional two months.<sup>57</sup>

A second major action was the formation in June of 1964 of the National Youth Service. Selection was entirely political in that recruits from each province were chosen by the local members of the House of Representatives and the Senate for two years of service, first at a field training camp and then at work on development projects. Members of Parliament interviewed did not hide the fact that in making their choices, they sought to rid their constituencies of politically troublesome former Youth Winger types and defuse the socially unstable conditions that existed in the country where the image and reality of "Uhuru" had diverged.<sup>58</sup>

Both the unemployment plans and the Youth Service program were security measures taken to alleviate immediate pressure. The first was never designed to solve the bulk unemployment problem, and the latter was openly a political maneuver to

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<sup>57</sup> On April 7, 1965, amidst protest from the Kenya Federation of Labor, the government announced new legislation would be introduced to effectively control strikes. On April 6, 1965 the Tripartite Agreement was ended. Nation, April 7-8, 1965.

<sup>58</sup> This information was confided in a number of interviews and confirmed by the Hon. J. M. Kariuki, Director of the National Youth Service. Also, see Hansard, Vol. II, Part I, Cols. 826-827 on assignments of the National Youth Service.

resolve local threats to public order. They combined to represent astute moves by shrewd politicians who sought to remain in power in order to carry out their programs for the country.

### Anniversary of Self-Government

The first anniversary of internal self-government found Kenya a much changed nation. Racial and tribal divisions which seemed so prominent in mid-1963 had not developed into major problems. Splits within the ruling party were more apparent. The issue of "majimbo" had receded from political view as the KADU opposition dwindled to a few critical voices. It was known that the government was working on a revised constitution, and that republic status was probably to be the climax of the "Uhuru" anniversary celebrations in December.<sup>59</sup> The shifita problem remained a constant but localized concern, and confidence in the Kenyatta government had risen among the minority communities despite increasing demands from members of Parliament that the airways, public service commission, engineering posts, the police, and immigration posts be Africanized rather than Kenyanized.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with Simon Kamunde, then Assistant Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs.

<sup>60</sup> Hansard, Vol. II, Part I, Cols. 740-743, 818-820, 879-888, 962-966. Also see questions on Africanization in Appendix II.

During consideration of the amended deportation and immigration bill, however, the government sought to give assurance that the measures would only be invoked in the interest of national security, and, in debate, the bill was supported by members of the Asian and European communities.<sup>61</sup> Constitutionality of government operations remained a guide to action, and the rights of the individual were not infringed. The army mutiny was only a memory, and pressures from the unemployed had been at least temporarily relieved though by no means resolved by the Tripartite Agreement and the National Youth Service.

PREPARING FOR REPUBLIC STATUS: JUNE 1964 - DECEMBER 1964

As the anniversary of self-government passed, the government was more concerned with divisions in its own ranks and in the country at large. During the last six months of 1964, effort was made to overcome those divisions through two programs. First, the party was given attention it had not received since the May 1963 elections. Secondly, a greater sense of national unity was established through the enactment of constitutional amendments replacing the "majimboist" articles of the independence constitution. The latter was

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<sup>61</sup> Hansard, Vol. I, Part I, cols. 283-301.

completed after the uniting of the government and the opposition into a single national front. Of the two issues confronted, the antagonisms within KANU were the least amenable to solution while the changing of the constitution was handled in an open manner that seemed to satisfy the elected representatives.

### The Role of the Party After the Grant of Self-Government

The decline of KANU had two causes. First, after self-government was granted, the role of the party was drastically changed. KANU had developed as an instrument of mass protest to support claims for independence. Strong and sometimes uncontrollable commitment from Youth Wingers and party members had a basic utility. After the granting of self-government and the establishment of the "peace and hard work" policy, this extra-governmental structure designed for destabilizing outburst rather than reasoned control of emotion became a liability. Also, self-government resulted in the abandonment by top party leadership of the local machinery in order to fill top government positions. In abandoning the party structure, however, the top leadership neglected a mobilized, politically aroused cadre of Youth Wingers and party loyalists who on the local levels did not reap the

rewards of "Uhuru" commensurate with their expectations.

The second factor in party decline was the lack of cohesiveness in the national leadership. The Kikuyu-Luo alliance was, at best, an uneasy union, and the political contention between the Luo tribesmen KANU Vice-President Odinga and KANU General Secretary Mboya was a matter of record.<sup>62</sup> The party constitution had not been adhered to since its promulgation as leaders refused to hold the annual elections of national officers for fear of not being returned.<sup>63</sup> This "tempering of democracy" in party affairs continued throughout the first year of self-government and independence. So great was the deterioration that twelve months after the elections, the Assistant Executive Officer of KANU could say in more than jest, "Without being organized, an election could be held tomorrow and we would be out."<sup>64</sup>

To meet the tide of increasing criticism, a series of provincial party meetings were held. Meeting in Machakos, Mombasa, Nyeri, Nakuru, Kakamega, and Kisumu, the meetings

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<sup>62</sup> George Bennett and Carl Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election, Kenya 1960-1961, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), passim., for a discussion of the Mboya-Odinga split.

<sup>63</sup> This was a widely voiced complaint among the back-benchers interviewed.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with John O'Washika.

proposed that new provincial committees be elected as a middle level in the party hierarchy responsible for channeling information between the top leadership and the local party branches. It was promised that once such committees were in operation a national convention would be held.<sup>65</sup> The effort was ineffectual. The committees remained unformed. Seven months later, in January 1965, KANU Organizing Secretary John Keen announced a drive to enroll three million new KANU members, Mboya again promised to overhaul and strengthen the party, and the KANU House representatives affirmed the supremacy of the party.<sup>66</sup> The determination to repudiate factionalism was reiterated throughout March and April of

TABLE 8:2 INTERVIEW RESPONSES BY THIRTY ONE KANU M.P.'s TO THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING KANU?", MAY-JUNE, 1964.

1. Need for reorganization	6
2. Party factionalism	5
3. Need for closer party/government co-ordination	2
4. Need to educate party officials working at the local levels	2
5. Failure to adhere to the constitution	1
6. No problem facing KANU	2
7. No opinion	14*

\*Ministers and assistant ministers were extremely reluctant to answer the above question.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with O'Washika and I attended the provincial meeting held in Kisumu on June 13, 1964..

<sup>66</sup> Daily Nation, January 7-9, 1965.



The Kenya Constitution (Amendment) Bill which was presented sought to insure three primary aims: (1) that national leadership be visible to all the people, (2) that there be guaranteed collective responsibility of the president and cabinet to the Parliament, and (3) that the Parliament be recognized as the source of law in the country. A presidential regime meant the head of state and government would be a single man rather than having a head of state who was a far-off queen represented in Kenya by a governor general. The continued association of the president with the elected members in the Parliament was an effort to avoid legislative and executive separation such as existed in the United States. Finally, the supremacy of Parliament was to be guaranteed by withdrawing the powers of the provinces granted under the earlier constitution. The civil service commissions were to be consolidated, the financial procedures streamlined, and clauses previously subject only to constitutional amendment, were withdrawn from the constitution become matters of administrative procedure. In essence, the amendments called for centralization of authority and consolidation of provisions to reduce an unwieldy, inflexible document to a more workable series of enactments.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., cols. 3879-3905 being a speech by Mboya that well summarized all of the new provisions.

The government strategy for passage was simple but effective - be as open and legal as possible. The introduction of the amendment bill could not have been considered a surprise move. It had been anticipated from mid-August until its actual appearance on the order paper of the House on October 27, 1964. In moving the bill, Constitutional Affairs Minister Mboya made every effort to detail the government's reasons for each provision. He emphasized that the KADU opposition, which was two weeks away from voluntary dissolution, was a divisive force, and he showed the need for greater centralization. The ensuing debate, as Mboya later noted, centered not so much on the new provisions as on impugning the motives of the government for carrying out the changes.<sup>70</sup> In thirteen hours of debate, speeches favoring the government bill were twice as numerous as opposition remarks.<sup>71</sup> By not restricting any speaker's remarks, the opposition was given full and fair opportunity to convince the members of the House and, hopefully, for KADU's purposes, force a referendum. Accompanying the debate, the government sought popular support by bringing traditional elders to

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., cols. 3380-3392, 4012-4054, 4084-4134, 4186-4232.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., cols. 3934, 4012. These refer to remarks by Speaker Slade about his unwillingness to close debate until all had a chance to speak.

meet Kenyatta in order to get their endorsement. These old men were brought from their rural areas to Nairobi to sit and talk with Kenyatta and give their blessing to the new constitution and the idea of becoming a republic. By such tactics, the government conducted its own informal referendum outside the Parliament.<sup>72</sup>

The strategy was successful, and when a division was called during the voting on November 3, the amendments carried by the necessary seventy-five per cent, 101-17.<sup>73</sup> With the end of "majimboism" confirmed, and confronted by the prospect of political ineffectuality, KADU presented its statement of dissolution. Final votes on procedural matters delayed complete passage of the new provisions for several weeks, but when passed they came without a dissenting vote and Kenya had the legal authority to become a republic on December 12, 1964.<sup>74</sup>

BEYOND REPUBLIC DAY: DECEMBER 1964 - JUNE 1965

"Jamhuri" - republic status - was celebrated amidst much pomp and not a little sadness. People gathered from across

<sup>72</sup>

Standard, and Nation, September and October, passim.

<sup>73</sup>

Hansard, Vol. III, Part III, cols. 4230, 4636, 4656, 4743.

<sup>74</sup>

Ibid., cols. 4769-4772.

the nation to dance and perform the old ceremonial chants for noting significant events. For Europeans there was the sadness of seeing the last British troops board the plane for Aden as the last visions of empire were exchanged for republic status within the Commonwealth. Officially, the change was accomplished on the most amicable of terms. The popular Governor General MacDonald remained in the country as the queen's commissioner. Kenyatta became the head of state as the president and former Home Affairs Minister Odinga was appointed vice-president. Reviewing the first year of independence, there was cause for some satisfaction. Officially, the opposition had ceased to exist. The country had a new and strong constitution. The army mutiny had been quickly resolved. The policy against the shifta constituted an effective holding action. Labor unrest still demanded more detailed consideration, and former Mau Mau freedom fighters had to be dealt with. Of all the problems confronting the government, intra-party strife was the most intractable.

#### Development and the Spirit of Harambee

The concentration of government attention on issues most threatening to its authority, the achievement of political consensus and the establishment of a viable and

fiscally sound governmental structure meant that the second year of independence could permit greater attention to be focused on economic issues neglected during the previous twelve months. In the first six months of 1965, it was evident that the government, strengthened by new constitutional powers and the abatement of other security issues, sought to give greater concern to development and economic progress.

The Kenyatta government came to power with a party platform that stated it was the intent of KANU to build a democratic African socialist state.<sup>75</sup> There were policy statements of intended free medical treatment, land development, a minimum of seven years of free education, and to the landless and unemployed, a promise of expansion of industry. It was soon apparent that certain welfare aims could not be implemented in a short time. Yet, despite the fiscal obstacles, demands increased. Less sophisticated Members of the House of Representatives toured their constituencies uninformed as to how to deal with the queries of their electorate and many joined with the voters in demanding the implementation of the manifesto. To meet this protest, a new and more restrained statement of government policy,

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<sup>75</sup> KANU Manifesto, op. cit., passim.

Sessional Paper No. 10, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya," was produced. Emphasizing the desire to coordinate African traditions of "political democracy and mutual social responsibility" with a pragmatic blending of capitalist and welfare principles, the paper criticized scientific socialism and established the closest expression to an official ideology that Kenya has had.<sup>76</sup>

In practical political terms, the statement was designed to relieve pressure on the government by emphasizing that the people must help themselves in the spirit of "Harambee" - the country's national motto. The statement gave every parliamentary representative a reference point for reacting to his electors. It was not a real ideology, but a symbol of practical elucidation of a political problem soundly met by a comprehensive statement of intent within the limitations imposed by the lack of resources. It was a club against excess, self-aggrandizement and the pursuit of narrow competitive goals. In that sense the statement conformed to the African heritage by calling for a communal commitment to national development and condemned transgression of communalism

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Kenya Government, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), passim.

as not in the spirit of "Harambee."<sup>77</sup>

Accompanying the government's statement of its policy aims on development were firm declarations that existing resources must be used wisely. The government wanted its promises matched by integrity in the use of local resources by local groups. Warnings were issued to local government bodies in Nyanza, Central, Western, and Rift Valley Provinces. When fiscal irresponsibility did not cease, the government finally was forced to dissolve a county council and assume interim responsibility.<sup>78</sup> The combination of promoting economic progress and maintaining firm civil control was also evident in the operation of the Development Finance Corporation to support new industry and expand the job market while passing tighter legislative controls over labor unions to replace the Tripartite Agreement of 1964.<sup>79</sup> Thus in both the rural areas and the cities, the theme was one of public responsibility and concern balanced by efficiency and good management, all under the banner of "Harambee."

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<sup>77</sup>Sessional Paper No. 10 was described by Assistant Minister of Economic Planning Mwai Kibaki as "a protestant bible written by African catholics in conjunction with American exploiters," meaning it was a statement of the protestant ethic written by Catholics Mboya and Kibaki with the help of an American named Edwards who was serving as an advisor to the ministry.

<sup>78</sup>Standard, October 24, 1964, January 1, 3, 13, 25, 29, February 24, March 4, April 4, May 24, 25, June 1, 1965 - warnings and action of the government.

<sup>79</sup>Hansard, Vol. IV, Part I., passim, and Standard April-June 1965, passim.

### The Dissident Freedom Fighters

The security threat posed by the former Mau Mau freedom fighters required the exercise of diplomacy not needed in determining how to deal with the shifta. The Somali outlaws were virtual strangers to many of the Africans and the initiation of strong punitive measures was an easy choice. The former freedom fighters were a different case. They were men who had aided in the struggle for independence but, failing to moderate anti-social behavior, had become a political and economic liability with the end of colonial rule. Concentrated among the Kikuyu in Central Province, those men had become outlaws whose depredations could not be tolerated. At independence, an amnesty was declared, encouraging many to come out of the forests and join in the celebration of "Uhuru." Those who did come out soon discovered that "Uhuru" would be hard work and the only reward might be a hoe for cultivation. Dismayed over such a prospect, many returned to the forests, and the government soon realized that it had a problem that was not so easy to resolve.

A month after independence, the amnesty was declared over and freedom fighters became fully liable to criminal punishment. Throughout 1964, however, the threat of punitive action was not carried out since the outlaws continued to



enjoy the respect of the local people. To act in a ruthless manner against tribesmen so recently called heroes would have made it difficult to keep the support of the law-abiding people. On the first anniversary of independence, a second one-month amnesty was declared. During that period, prominent leaders appealed to the outlaws to give up, and Defense Minister Mungai went into the forests to try and persuade the outlaws to come out peacefully.<sup>80</sup> With the end of the second amnesty and amidst clear statements of how the men were then enemies of the nation, a security action resulted in the killing of a number of the fugitives, including the "self-styled General Baimungi." Following those actions the forest outlaws ceased to be a security issue as the people supported the government policy.

#### Nationalists, Ideologues, and Foreign Influence

The action against the former freedom fighters, the warning of the county councils, the reinterpretation of the KANU manifesto, and the restrictions on the trade unions showed that the government had an appreciation of the limits on its resources. It also showed that there was determination to resist any threats to civil order that might threaten the position of the government. Consistent with this interest

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Standard, 1964, passim, and January 6, 9, 12 and 25, 1965.

in dealing with threats to its position, the government focused its attention on a problem that had been neglected during the first year of independence. This was the significance of foreign influence in the country. Realistically, the problem had to be ignored when other problems faced the country since to raise the issue meant that a deeper division would be made within the ranks of KANU. At independence it had been valuable to preserve KANU solidarity at all costs, including overlooking the fact that some of the party members may have been amenable to foreign associations designed to promote personal rather than national self-interest. After the declaration of the republic with a strong new constitution under the control of the central government, KANU solidarity seemed more a liability than an asset, and the issue of foreign influence was directly raised.

Foreign influence, covert foreign influence, is virtually impossible to research or discover, but the controversy aroused by suspected influence was widely reported and disrupted the political activity of the country. It should be emphasized that the source of such influence was thought to exist exclusively in the socialist countries. The United States had been widely condemned for its role in the Congo in November of 1964, but seven months after that incident

Kenyatta sent warm congratulations to President Johnson on the 4th of July.<sup>81</sup> Other countries such as West Germany, Japan, Italy, Scandinavia and Britain had extensive interests in Kenya, but were not accused of doing anything improper. Foreign influence was considered to be socialistic influence, and, as reported in the press, it was seen to center in the activities of Vice-President Oginga Odinga.

Within KANU, the "nationalists" condemned the "ideologues" as corrupters of the "Harambee" spirit and warned of the dangers of foreign influence.<sup>82</sup> The real controversy centered in the question of who was or was not in the pay of foreign powers. In May of 1965, there was complaint that Odinga was buying support in South Nyanza with money supplied by Socialist countries. As one member of the House of Representatives put it, "My constituency is being bought out from underneath me."<sup>83</sup> To strengthen his hold on South Nyanza, Kenyatta made a personal tour to the remote corners of the province, including in his entourage his loyal ministers.<sup>84</sup> Other suspicions were aroused that the labor

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<sup>81</sup> Standard, July 4, 1965.

<sup>82</sup> Nation and Standard, January - May, 1965, passim.

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Elijah Omolo-Agar.

<sup>84</sup> The impact of the tour was somewhat negated when Odinga invited himself along. This is a personal insight developed in talking to politicians while I attended a part of the three day tour.

unions had been subverted by foreign money. The unions it was recognized constituted one of the few cohesive forces in the country capable of pressuring the government. If the unions were to respond to the leadership of acknowledged Odinga supporter, Makanyango, nationalist stability and the position of the government could have been endangered.<sup>85</sup>

It was rumored that foreign influence had a role to play in the army mutiny and that the Ghanaian High Commissioner was a source for the distribution of funds from socialist countries. Members of Parliament agreed that Kenyatta adjourned Parliament and took a large delegation of ministers, including Odinga, to London for the Commonwealth Conference in 1964 because there was talk of a coup.<sup>86</sup> It was fact that Odinga was given a largely ceremonial role as Vice - President.<sup>87</sup> It was a fact that Odinga arranged for the building of the Lumumba Institute with socialist country funds. The Institute opened in December of 1964 to teach

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<sup>85</sup> A conclusion based on discussion with Minister of Defense Njoroge Mungai, and also with Mr. Russell Heater, Political Attache, Embassy of the United States in Kenya, 1965.

<sup>86</sup> This was a particularly widespread rumor in June of 1964, and the fact so many politicians were sent to the Malawi independence celebrations or were taken to London did little to dispel the idea, though the threat never materialized.

<sup>87</sup> The Office of the Vice-President had responsibility for arranging all ceremonies and drawing up a new report on the constituencies with the possible recommendation for expanding the number of seats.

party officials the principles of socialism and the life of Kenyatta.<sup>88</sup> It was admitted by the government that it had confiscated arms from the basement of the Vice-President's Office in Nairobi in April of 1965.<sup>89</sup> It was denied, with British Government support, that there had been any threat of an Easter Weekend coup in 1965 in which Kenyatta had asked the British to stand by in Aden should they be needed. It was a fact that Russian arms coming into the country in April of 1965 on short notice were refused by the government and accompanying Russian weapons experts were asked to leave the country.<sup>90</sup> It was a fact that seventy-five tons of Russian and Chinese arms coming from Tanzania were seized in South Nyanza in May of 1965, and only the most abject apologies of Prime Minister Obote of Uganda permitted them to pass on into Uganda.<sup>91</sup> It was a fact that Kenyatta felt compelled to remove Odinga from the leadership of the Commonwealth Conference delegation in 1965.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Nation, December 13-16, 1964. In March 1965, the Hon. J. Tipis gave notice of a motion asking that the government take over the Institute under the Ministry of Education. Nation, March 26, 1965. The government merely had the institute register as an educational facility and lack of finance eventually forced it to close, Nation, May-July, 1965.

<sup>89</sup> Nation, April 13, 1965.

<sup>90</sup> Interview with Njoroge Mungai, Minister of Defense.

<sup>91</sup> Nation, May 17, 1965.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with Mungai, loc. cit.

The role of Uganda and Tanzania in the seizure of arms in South Nyanza brought an angry outburst from Kenyatta over such a blatant violation of sovereignty by Kenya's East African neighbors. The vehemence with which the government condemned such unwarranted intrusion demonstrated the determination of the nationalists to preserve the integrity of the state and not tolerate any threat to its position. Less than two years before, in June of 1963, Kenyatta had amicably met with Nyerere of Tanzania and Obote of Uganda to affirm their joint desire for union of the three states by the end of that year. To achieve that ideal would have meant the sacrifices of sovereignty and personal position, for it was clear that not all the ministers in the Kenyatta Cabinet would find places in the federation Cabinet. The mixture of personal and national self-interest delayed the prospect of union and the next two years saw the deterioration of unity amidst recrimination as to who was to blame. A month after the arms seizure, Tanzania announced that it would have its own currency and introduce restrictions on goods coming into the country from Kenya and Uganda. In such fashion did "nationalism" weaken the proposed unity of East Africa.

The collapse of immediate hopes for union emphasized the commitment of the Kenyatta government to its own survival

and the maintenance of the integrity of the state. The men who had led the anti-colonialist struggle were not prepared to let authority be weakened by shifta guerrillas, former freedom fighters, socialist fellow travelers, army mutineers, rebellious backbenchers, unrealistic party ideologues, squatters, the unemployed or the rural landless. Using constitutional instruments, police power, economic inducement, and the call for national solidarity under the banner of "Harambee," the government leaders sought to insure greater loyalty to the nation and consolidate their hold on the legitimate instruments of authority. In so doing, they prepared to face the continuing problems of leadership despite the success in the confronting the problems of the first two years in power. Much still remained to be done. On the streets of Nairobi, the unemployed were surrounded by all the opulence of Western society while they lacked even the bare necessities of life. Throughout the country, eager adolescents faced the disappointment of not being able to continue their education due to lack of facilities. Behind every rural dispensary and hospital were huge common graves; bleak symbols of the high infant mortality rate. In the rural areas, men still complained because land settlement schemes did not move fast enough to satisfy the hopes of the

landless. And in the remote areas, many Kenyans went about the tasks of just getting enough to survive each day, unconcerned that Kenya was a nation in a continent of new nations.



## CHAPTER NINE:

### CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE MAINTENANCE AND ADAPTION OF THE KENYA SYSTEM

This study of Kenya politics has described a causal relationship between the culture norms adhered to in Kenya society and the maintenance of stability during the first two years of independence. In so doing, however, the study has been careful to point out that such a relationship was critically dependent on the conscious manipulation of those divergent culture orientations present in the populace at large. The verification of such a relationship was made difficult because of the multiplicity of factors influencing political performance, factors that can overwhelm attempts at rigorous empirical analysis. This was particularly the case since causality was predicated on normative variables that were difficult to isolate.

As an investigation of the role of political culture and "strategy of culture management," the research had to depend on a collection of methodological tools, primarily history, ethnology, survey research and field observations.<sup>1</sup> None of those techniques provided data that was contradictory

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<sup>1</sup> McKim Marriott, loc. cit., Chapter one above.

to the thesis of conflicting in an interdisciplinary sense. That is to say, ethnography, history, and survey data confirmed the thesis in a fashion which mutually reinforced evidence gathered from several scholarly disciplines. Based on the collected evidence, the interpretation of the research work touched a number of areas considered the province of political science: elite study, legislative and party behavior, structural/functional analysis, decision-making, and theory of law and democracy. As with the methodology, the different interpretations are internally consistent and supportive of the thesis. Based on such consistency, the causal relationship between culture norms, stability, and "strategies of culture management" is affirmed.

The following analysis of the data addresses itself to the several fields of political inquiry useful in validating the thesis. This is done in five sections. The first discusses the manner in which the two culture legacies supported the concept of representative democracy as the basis for state operations. A second section deals with the adaptive process undergone by both the institutions and the procedural forms of political life. The third section emphasizes the secular capacities of the Kenyatta government by reviewing

the manner in which crises of societal integration and legitimacy were "managed" by the leaders. A fourth section discusses some basic considerations regarding political demands, policy formation, and limits on government response. Finally, a fifth section reviews how culture played a part in the resolution of major problems.

Before turning to those individual areas, certain general comments should be offered. First, this study of political culture in a former colonial nation emphasizes the critical relevance of the two culture patterns involved. When Kenyatta assumed the responsibility of governing, the actions of his government were conditioned by the country's past; both the tribal heritage and the more recent colonial legacy. Through an understanding of that past comes the realization that the policy choices were not random, the character of the politicians not unfathomable, and the behavior of the electorate not unintelligible. Rather, there is coherence to Kenya's past and post-independence present. The habits, beliefs, behavior and institutions of the traditional tribal environment are bound up with the hopes, dreams, frustrations, and accomplishments of the European community to provide a basis for understanding why certain actions were taken.

TABLE 9:1 SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS CONSTITUTING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN LEGACIES IN MODERN KENYA POLITICS, 1963-1965

From African Society:

- A. Support for decisions rendered on the basis of consensus and equity.
- B. Segmentary lineages supporting direct decision-making rather than indirect decision-making found in more stratified societies.
- C. Peer and lineage ties that strongly bound individuals to their respective clans and tribes.
- D. Concern for consistent legitimation of decisions in order to prevent instability that could result from conflict-laden situations.

From European Society:

- A. A consistent African perspective on European paramountcy.
- B. A form of political activity characterized as secular, pragmatic and rational, and employing skills usually associated with Western political practice.
- C. A "national" set of institutions for the procedural conversion of demands into policy.

The second consideration is the general relationship between culture and stability. This relationship is not new to the discussion of political systems. Much consideration has been given to the importance of synchronization or congruence between culture and society as the key to system maintenance.<sup>2</sup> With reference to this study, Kenya's post-independence stability would appear to rest on a congruence between a normatively pluralist culture and an institutionally Western set of political structures. Those Western structures, democratic in character, were preserved throughout the period studied. Each subsequent section of the chapter, therefore, accounts for how culture and "culture management" preserved stability within a democratic framework. In the context of that analysis, two further considerations must be born in mind. One, neither culture tradition was of such strength to dominate the other. That is to say, traditional culture prevented political functions from centralizing into a secular national dictatorship while Western norms provided a means of resisting the centrifugal

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<sup>2</sup>See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), Chapter II for a discussion of congruence in political systems. Also, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), passim. for discussion thesis of importance of synchronization between values and division of labor in society.

force of tribal parochialism. The last consideration is preservation of democratic character and does not imply institutional rigidity. As shown in earlier chapters, post-independence politics was a dynamic experience notable for significant rôle redefinition within the political structure.

#### THE CULTURAL LEGACIES AND THE PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRATIC NORMS

The pre-independence pledge by the Kenyatta government to preserve democratic institutions and procedures was similar to pledges given by the leaders of many new nations. The difference between Kenya and other states was the successful maintenance of that pledge. In the previous chapters, it has been revealed that success was influenced by the support of the two cultural traditions in the country. When looking at those traditions, there are certain concepts emphasized: equity, consensus and procedural resolution of conflict, consistent legitimation of decisions, and representative responsibility. These terms also help constitute an operational definition of democracy, and, as observable features of Kenya's culture milieu, they provided support for the pledge by Kenya's leaders.

### Equity

Tribal society concerned itself with equity in the decisions taken and in insuring that appropriate restitution was made in considering legal disputes. The behavior of elected politicians revealed a desire to see equity prevail in the making of policy, though that concern for equity was often phrased in terms of tribal self-interest and condemnation of nepotism or tribal domination. Related to this African perspective were the legal procedures and secular norms that permitted a means for operationalizing the concern for equal treatment.

### Consensus and Procedural Resolution of Conflict

Tribal society also placed heavy emphasis on the achievement of consensus in the making of decisions. Elaborate procedures were followed for insuring that conflict would not break out. The institution of parliament also provided procedures for resolving conflict in peaceful fashion. Added to those parliamentary procedures were all the techniques of Western political practice that provided numerous strategies of negotiation to aid peaceful resolution of disputes. The value of Western institutions and procedures lay in their utility as mediatory tools between tribal groups.

since the traditional tribal procedures were generally used only within individual tribal societies. Thus, traditional culture provided the normative base, and Western culture added skills to operationalize norms in a nation-state system.

### Consistent Legitimation of Decisions

Tribal societies opposed the making of decisions in an arbitrary manner. The segmentary lineages of Kenya's stateless societies depended on direct decision-making procedures as a guarantee decisions would be made in a manner acceptable to those affected by the decision. Tribal society had no tradition of accepting decisions handed down by fiat from a higher authority. The basis for the parliament as the source of law was the belief that the people should be represented in the making of policy. The attitude of the members of the House of Representatives was that their role should be an active one, and they protested vigorously any attempt to weaken their mandate. In such fashion did the two traditions preserve the integrity of the legislative branch of government as part of Kenya's democratic system.

### Representative Responsibility

The inclusion of the popularly elected representatives in the decision-making process was tied to the obligations



of those representatives to actively consult with their constituents. The strength of peer-group and lineage ties forced the maintenance of liaison with the constituency. This tie remained strong because Africans had never been permitted to desert such associations. Africans never became evolues who disavowed their ties to the tribe. When political change occurred after the war, the European was contested against on European terms - representative democracy. To defeat the European, Africans used European skills, driven forward in their efforts by the consistent perspective of alien paramountcy maintained throughout the colonial period. In promoting the conditions of representative democracy among the mass of the people, the politicians insured that they could not take themselves away from the people without violating both the norms of traditional culture and European culture.

Taken together, the four concepts illustrate how Kenya's cultural heritage supported the pledge of maintenance of democratic institutions. To have exchanged democracy for authoritarian methods would have been a repudiation of the two cultural traditions and contributed to increased "dis-synchronization" of culture and structure. As a result of

the integration of the two sets of culture norms, the possibility of democracy was much enhanced whether it was the result of a legitimate choice of the leadership or a political response to the current realities of the national culture.

#### THE CULTURAL LEGACIES: EPIGENESIS IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

The synchronization between cultural norms and the institutions of the system was also aided by the changes in political structure and function. These changes worked to make the Western governmental institutions more acceptable to Kenya's tradition-bound masses while stimulating a degree of political sophistication that permitted parochial societies to more effectively work within a nation-state framework. The quality which distinguished these changes from the policy choices of the government was that these changes were developmental or "epigenetical" rather than anticipated by the leaders as the possible or probable outcomes of sovereignty. All these changes (summarized in Table 9:2) testify to the dynamic nature of the Kenya political system.

Earlier discussion has indicated how the parliament was transformed into a kiama-like council by the dissolution of the opposition and the importance given to the "parliamentary group" as a committee-of-the-whole for the discussion

TABLE 9:2 STRUCTURAL/FUNCTIONAL ADAPTATIONS OF THE KENYA POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1963-1965

	FUNCTIONAL	STRUCTURAL
TRIBAL INFLUENCE	1. Modification of Westminster model as representatives maintain close ties to constituencies.	1. Decline of KANU as the mass-based "branch" party and the emergence of the "caucus" party.
	2. <u>Kiama</u> -like quality of parliament after dissolution of the opposition.	2. Emergence of the tribal caucus as an incipient interest group.
	3. Importance of the "parliamentary group" over ministerial committees.	3. Modification of the Westminster model of "cabinet government."
WESTERN INFLUENCE	1. Secular sentiments that dominate the parochial when nationalist vs. ideology splits cut across tribal lines.	1. Expansion of the parliamentary membership breaks up elite stratification and coalescence of those politicians prominent before 1963.
	2. Government skill in "crises management."	2. Population exposed to the institutions of representative democracy encouraging the growth of popular demands articulated through the representative process.
	3. Requirements for candidacy introduce secular criteria to the constituency level for the elections.	

of policy. These changes came after the members of the House had demonstrated they wouldn't be satisfied with the legitimating role often given to lower houses in "cabinet government" systems. Outside the House chamber, the "epigenetical" process resulted in the atrophy of the mass-based KANU party and the appearance of a "caucus" party giving reference to incipient tribal interest groups built on close ties between elected representatives and constituents.

The changes brought by Western norms were evident in secular criteria that penetrated the traditional environment as well as in the continued use of procedures associated with the Western institutions introduced by colonial rule. At the local levels, qualifications for candidacy introduced new criteria of political efficacy for judging the respective merits of the candidates. The expansion of the parliamentary membership for the 1963 elections brought into public life a new generation of leaders to at least temporarily break up any potential coalescence of the pre-independence elite into a dominant political class. Also, the exposure of the masses to the procedures of representative democracy stimulated popular demands for increased government welfare programs. This level of popular demands encouraged the split

between the "new nationalists" and the "ideologues," demonstrated by the way secular considerations began to overrule prime loyalties to the tribal group. The result of those changes in the system was an increase in pressure on the government to use its resources carefully in managing crises.

The outcome of such structural and functional "epigenesis" in the form and style of government was a system that more adequately reflected the prevailing values of the society. The changes provided greater integrity to the institutions of the national system by transforming them into role structures that were predicated on the norms representative of the pluralist political culture.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CRISES

The developmental changes in the Kenya political system were valuable in bringing about a greater degree of synchronization between culture and structure, but they also contributed to new pressures on the government. Developmental change forced on an ideal model can bring strain on those in authority who are charged with maintaining the ideal nature of the model. In this case, the ideal was the nation-state system which the Europeans had laid over the traditional societies of Kenya. The Kenyatta government was empowered

to maintain constitutional order and the integrity of the state. For the people of Kenya, the nation-state concept was unfamiliar. In support of its right to act, the government had the constitutional instruments provided by the colonial rulers and the mandate signified by KANU's electoral victory. Countering that power was the reality of Kenyans in the Northeastern Province who totally disavowed the legitimacy of the government. Also, there was the fragmentation of the national party after election that weakened a major source of regime strength. Other evidence of social fragmentation within the country was provided by the emergence of the tribal caucus and the racial fears of Europeans and Asians just prior to independence. The critical nature of these weaknesses was recognized by the government in its responses to the lower party echelons, the backbenchers, and the mass of voters; responses designed to encourage participation, societal integration and mass involvement.

The need of the Kenya government to give critical concern to societal integration is not unique. A typology suggesting this as the task of all new nations has been referred to in other studies.<sup>3</sup> What is unique about Kenya

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<sup>3</sup>The typology of "crises" referred to is in Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 62-67. Pye lists six crises in political development: legitimacy of authority, identity by the people with

was the way government responded to questions of legitimacy and integration through the management of each issue or crisis with a variety of policies. It would be difficult to say that a separate policy-approach termed "crises management" was adopted within the cabinet, but the accompanying table shows that no attempt was made to solve all problems at once, and that certain priorities seemed evident.

Nearly all issues were apparent and awaiting government consideration when the Kenyatta regime took office. The response, however, was selective. During the first six months, attention concentrated on issues of racial harmony and constitutional legitimacy. The fears of ethnic minorities were calmed and emphasis placed on law as a necessary base for building stability. The Government refused to consider the surrender of any part of the Northeastern Province, saying its sovereignty would not be compromised. On tribal issues, KADU was encouraged to give up "negative tribalism" and join with the Government for the good of the country.

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fn. 3 contd. the government, penetration of the national government to all levels of society, encouragement of participation of the society in government, integration of all people under one government, and distribution of resources to the society. This "crises" approach is to be the basis for a forthcoming study in the Princeton Comparative Politics series and will be authored by Leonard Binder, James Coleman, J. LaPalombara, Myron Weiner and Lucien Pye.

TABLE 9:3 MANAGEMENT OF CRISES BY THE KENYATTA GOVERNMENT DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS IN OFFICE, JUNE 1, 1963 - JUNE 30, 1965




Crisis Category	1963			1964			1965									
	J	J	A	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
1. Race Relations																
2. Army Mutiny																
3. Former Freedom Fighters																
4. Demands for Welfare																
5. Fiscal Irresponsibility																
6. Squatters																
7. Constitutional Reform																
8. KADU/APP Opposition																
9. Labor Unrest																
10. KANU Intra-Party Conflict																
11. Foreign Influence																
12. Tribalism																
13. Parliamentary Unrest																
14. Shifts																

REPUBLIC DAY - December 12, 1964

ANNIVERSARY OF SELF GOVERNMENT - June 1, 1964

INDEPENDENCE - December 12, 1963

SELF GOVERNMENT - June 1, 1963

-  Issue Active and Requiring Government Attention
-  Issue Under Prime Consideration by the Government
-  Issue Resolved



In contrast to the six months before independence, the first six months after "Uhuru" were crucial because the government had less flexibility in deciding where to concentrate its attention. Its authority was threatened by the mutiny which required immediate and decisive action. The unemployed and the squatters also posed threats where response could not be delayed. While those issues were being handled, backbencher and KANU party unrest matured to a point where greater sensitivity to participation in government had to be considered. The pressing nature of those demands distracted attention from the more basic question of tribalism with the result that KANU party functionaries and the backbenchers turned more and more to their tribal caucuses.

The distraction may have been an unwitting oversight or a conscious choice. So pressured was the government that the distraction from issues of societal integration had to be tolerated. Nevertheless, during that six month period, a pattern began to emerge that showed the government concentrating its energies in certain areas rather than dissipating them by seeking to resolve all issues at once. The mutiny was dealt with quickly. The amnesty for freedom fighters was rescinded but no other action taken for at

least a year since the weakened military position would have made coercive action against the outlaws considerably more difficult. The move against the "squatters" was tokenism and abandoned when other issues arose. While dealing with those immediate security threats, nothing was done about constitutional reform or the KADU opposition. Issues of foreign influence and demands for more public welfare were permitted to exist without direct attention. However, when the questions of backbencher and party unrest arose, the government realized that its power base was directly threatened, and its responses were more rapid.

The first six months of independence seemingly interrupted the government's agenda for action. Certainly, the mutiny was not anticipated. The blossoming of unrest among the unemployed to intolerable proportions also represented a crisis that was not expected. The same can be said of the need to discipline the "squatters" who had moved on to European farms. During the last six months of 1964, the government appeared to return to the pursuit of goals of its own choice, the primary one being consolidation of its authority through constitutional reform. This was accompanied by the campaign to convince the opposition to join the government. Notably, the government pursued neither of those

goals until it had mitigated the question of backbencher unrest and effected a temporary rapprochement among the factions within KANU. Then after obtaining its goals of constitutional reform and reconciliation with the opposition, the issues of forest outlaws and party factionalism were taken up more vigorously.

After becoming a republic, the country's government turned attention to problems that had previously been neglected. Concern was focused on issues of welfare and the distribution of resources. Also, the government led by the "new nationalists" under Kenyatta strongly challenged the dissident factions of KANU without endangering the legitimacy and authority of the government; a situation far different from conditions that had existed only a year before.

The management of crises showed that the leaders were skillful politicians adept at meeting challenges and remaining in power. The pragmatic performance of the government demonstrated its astuteness in recognizing the fundamental "crises" in the politics of new states and in moving to confront and solve those challenges. During a two year period, attention was directed to the nation-building process through penetration of government personnel into the

society, the identification of loyalties with the Harambee spirit, the responsiveness shown to the backbenchers, and repudiation of threats to legitimacy.

#### THE CULTURAL LEGACIES: POLITICAL DEMANDS AND POLICY FORMATION

The norms of the two cultures also provided a framework (Table 9:4) in which the leaders of the government could select from numerous alternatives to solve the problems it confronted. Its actions, however, were bound by limitations on resources, by the need to deal with the fundamental "crises" of legitimacy and societal integration, and by the pledge to maintain democratic procedures. This section examines two questions. First, it analyzes law as the foundation of the state. Then, a framework is elaborated for the discussion of the limitations on policy alternatives in decision-making.

#### Cultural Pluralism and the Foundation of the State

The basis for the separation of government responses into appeals for voluntary compliance based on consensus as distinct from more institutionalized procedures including coercive force (Axis CD, Table 9:4) is illustrative of the normative differences in the two cultures regarding the role of

TABLE 9:4 DIAGRAMMATIC EXPRESSION SHOWING THE USE OF CULTURAL SUPPORTS AS AN AID IN ISSUES RESOLUTION BY THE KENYATTA GOVERNMENT, 1963-1965.

	Issues that Originate from modern orientation to politics & the nation	Issues that Originate from traditional/tribal orientations
<b>SUPPORTS:</b>		
Issues in which the use of modern orientations to political influence and power proved more effective in resolving the problem	<p><u>Demand:</u> Threat of intra-party conflict, Back-bencher restiveness, unemployed labor, army mutiny, race relations, and foreign influence.</p> <p><u>Response:</u> Broad use of police power, labor-management arbitration, political appointment, constitutionalism, and mass media support.</p>	<p><u>Demand:</u> Control of the freedom fighter outlaws, shifts, squatters, and administrative financial irregularities.</p> <p><u>Response:</u> Broad use of police powers and procedures to justify acts as constitutionally legitimate.</p>
Issues in which appeals to tradition or the tribe proved useful in resolving the problem	<p><u>Demand:</u> Need for efficient constitutional instruments, a reduction in opposition obstructionism, containment of the deviousness of tribalism</p> <p><u>Response:</u> Appeals to Consensus, involvement of all tribes in decision-making, consistent legitimation of issues.</p>	<p><u>Demand:</u> Implementation of the KANU manifesto, increase in both rural and urban welfare.</p> <p><u>Response:</u> Promotion of "Harambee" and the restatement of the manifesto in terms of African Socialism and application to planning.</p>

Axis AB: This vertical axis separates demands of a more local character from those that touched on the whole nation. Those demands listed to the left of the axis are of national significance and more serious in terms of national stability. Those listed to the right are considered serious but not likely to have had the power to bring down the government.

Axis CD: Whereas axis AB related to demands, Axis CD draws a distinction between responses. Those responses listed above the axis indicate the use of more formal institutional procedures, including coercive force as practices consistent with the norms of European society. Those responses listed below the axis emphasized voluntary compliance congruent with the consensual norms of tribal life.

law in the state and society. The purpose of the distinction lies in its analytical value for describing how the two cultural traditions were different and yet bound together to provide support for the Kenyatta government as the legitimate power within the state.

Previous discussion has emphasized the consensual form of tribal government where dependence on spirits, oracles, oaths, and ordeals were used to avoid inter-personal conflict. To reduce the need for such "instruments" of justice, codes of behavior defined how a man must act toward his kinsmen and peer group. In the post-independence period, those codes were still valid as evidenced by the obligations felt by the members of the House of Representatives. The modern era may have weakened the acceptance of every nuance of tribal custom, but the men still felt they were bound to general forms of behavior toward kinsmen and clan.

By contrast, the European culture emphasized individualism and respected ingenuity, inventiveness and entrepreneurial skills. The literature describing the European settler community is filled with descriptions of this type of relationship between man and his environment. The Europeans expended their fortunes and their energies in seeking to secure their place in East Africa, but they acted as individuals. They

were free agents and as such, made alliances with other Europeans to thwart the interests of the Africans and the Asians or the Colonial Office. Europeans might feel obligated to other members of the community because of old school ties and class loyalties, but they were not kinsmen to whom a man was ritually bound by a code of obligatory behavior. At the risk of employing an over-used illustration, this individuality of settlers was summed up by Churchill in 1907, "Every white man in Nairobi is a politician; and most of them are leaders of parties."<sup>4</sup> In a society that encouraged the practice of a man's self-interest, unbound from the social constraints found in the tribe, a more formal standard of legal behavior was required than the personal behavior patterns used in the African social setting.

Thus, the distinction between the two societies can be a legal one. All societies recognize the need to regulate behavior in order for the society to survive. The rigid behavior patterns with their intensive socialization practices provided tribal security through a code of obligatory human conduct, a law of men or a Ius gentium. European

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<sup>4</sup> George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 32, quoted from Churchill's My African Journey, p. 21.

society which had already passed through multiple philosophical revelations on the role of man in the state depended more heavily on institutions and codes of law within which the domain of individual action was broad, but the standards of justice were explicitly set for all men, a codified procedure, or a Ius civile. Taken together, the two socio/legal perspectives harmonized with each other and the institutions of the state to enhance the cultural and societal "congruence" so valuable to the maintenance of stability in the system.

The great majority of the population still felt obligated by the traditional modes of behavior, but they were norms that operated only within the tribe. Outside the individual tribe, the obligations did not apply and a more secular standard was needed for all the tribes and communities of Kenya. The government had a need for a legal standard that accepted the use of force as a valid legitimate prerogative of the state. Because of that need, the civil law of the former colonial rulers was a valuable support. The continued hold of traditional law also had a role to play. Legal standards legitimizing the use of coercive force gave the government the right to exercise great power. The fact that




so many of Kenya's peoples still clung to traditional norms of behavior meant they were more willing to accept an authority that gave reference to popular consensus. Because this attitude had a hold on a majority of the population, the performance of the Kenyatta government was supported by the right to exercise coercive power while being tempered by a need to be responsive to the humane tradition of tribal law and custom.

#### Cultural Pluralism and Policy Formulation

No issue faced by the leaders was exclusively modern or solely traditional. All were amalgams, though the origin and content of some issues stamped them as more modern or traditional, depending on the nature of the question addressed. In the same fashion, the policy responses of the government were not developed exclusively out of either modern or traditional understandings of the environment. It has already been made clear in discussing democracy and culture, "crises management," and socio/legal perspectives that the government could not be a free agent in making its policy choices. The content of each issue built in its own set of limitations. The accompanying table (9:5) suggests how limitations were placed on

TABLE 9:5 CULTURAL DUALITY AND THE LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO THE KENYATTA GOVERNMENT, 1963-1965



government as it designed its policies. At the outer limits are restraints imposed by the lack of physical power, the size of the population to be controlled, and the promise to maintain a democratic regime.

The table illustrates that a movement from the modern to the traditional in terms of the issue origin forced a change in the options available for consideration as policy. For example, race relations was dealt with by the use of constitutional guarantees, proclamation of government intent to maintain equality, options on becoming Kenya citizens, and guarantees of economic security. The same alternatives were not available when dealing with the forest outlaws who twice rejected the concept of amnesty and forced the government to use its limited coercive powers.

This continuum is maintained in looking at responses to other issues that more clearly originated in the traditional norms became dominant, but modern norms were not totally abandoned since complete dependence on tradition would not have been sufficient to resolve the questions raised. Constitutional reform had to be confronted with the use of Western legal and parliamentary procedures as well as traditional appeals. Only when there was a move into the predominately welfare and economic sector or

where demands were founded almost exclusively on traditional norms did tradition begin to dominate government policy responses.

#### THE CULTURAL LEGACIES AND ISSUES RESOLUTION

The recognition of limitations imposed on the government by its resources, the culture, the goal of democratic institutionalism, and the basic crises of legitimacy and integration provide the background for an analysis of the way the two cultural traditions were used in concert to respond to various issues that arose. This analysis has been broken down into sections based on Tables 9:4 and 9:5 and is organized on the basis of the cultural legacies listed in Table 9:1.

#### Nationbuilding and the Crises of Political Modernity

Political development and nationbuilding are not necessarily compatible processes. The former recognizes the growth in scope and complexity of political roles and secular orientations to political things. The latter attempts to weld parochial, ethnic, and regional diversity into singleness of purpose for the benefit of the nation. One is an empirically observable process and the other is a normative goal. Kenya's political history witnessed the growth of a

relatively modern political system encompassing competing parties, incipient but recognizable interest groups, many new and specific role positions within the administration, and the practice of political skills not indigenous to the traditional African environment. The multiplicity of such new roles and practices in a system underlain by tribalist sentiment could have presaged serious consequence for the government. In illustration of this point, the army mutiny, the demands of the unemployed, the disaffection of the backbenchers, race relations, and controversy between "ideologues" and the "new nationalists" in KANU were all serious questions formulated in a context characterized as modern. They were issues not to be solved by appeals to traditional sentiment. In seeking accommodation, the government had to be skillful in the most modern sense in planning its policies.

The Role of the Tribal Legacy: Despite the fact that these issues were not primarily tribal/traditional in origin, they still demanded reference to traditional orientations. From the public record there is evidence that this requisite sensitivity in response was taken. Government concern for Europeans and Asians was enunciated clearly on a legal,

equalitarian basis and was supported by maintenance of economic security for alien investment. Strict legal procedure was also followed in the summary courts martial of the mutiny leaders. The restraining orders on labor and arbitration of the unemployment grievances were first supported by the rule-makers in Parliament. All the acquiescence to backbencher demands was a tacit acknowledgment by the government that it had neglected its obligations to be responsive and involve elected representation in policy-making.

It would be unreasonable to expect, however, that the concern for legitimacy of decisions would take precedence over political efficacy. In the issues discussed in this section there was no attempt to involve all the people in decision-making. Certainly anti-European and anti-Asian sentiment among the population would have opted for the abrogation of the rights and privileges of those minorities if a popular referendum had been held. Suppression of the mutiny did not have to be justified by consensus. It necessitated immediate action. The courts martial required an impartial rendering of justice. The demands of the unemployed that jobs be found was not within the resources

of government or industry to grant and the expanding nature of public protest on the streets of Nairobi could not be tolerated indefinitely. Swift action was essential. Each of those issues was conflict-laden. How the potentially destabilizing forces might be neutralized was the crucial question. In each case, certain traditional norms had to be disregarded in favor of more modern values. The pressure of the moment took precedence over procedural consistency valued in the traditional order. And yet, the swiftness of action did not overrule obedience to all procedure. The result was government action that neglected popular participation in decision-making but retained constitutionalism as the key to the legitimacy of its acts.

Because the unrest among the backbenchers was within the House, the government was under a less precise mandate to obtain public support for its actions. The response was accommodationist. The conflict between "ideologues" and "new nationalists" required even less concern for legitimating consistency or popular sanction. In private, the cabinet was reshuffled, and the government position strengthened with the results announced as a fait accompli.

The Role of the European Legacy: In Kenya the absorption of modern political sophistication during the last years of colonial rule was particularly intensive as the Africans learned to maneuver as skillfully against their European counterparts, but the end of colonial rule brought the reversion to old loyalties and the reappearance of strong tribalist sentiment combined with those Western political skills. Concepts of innovative behavior, advocacy, political militancy and tactical analysis of situation supported pursuance of tribal and individual aims. National politics had incorporated those skills into the operation of the political system. Along with the adoption of new skills went the new affective orientations which permitted associations among a wide circle of contacts. Men of formerly hostile tribes found issues of common concern or unifying causes which produced new alliances. Also, motivation in politics took on new dimensions. Tribal sentiments and obligations still remained strong, but the new leaders began to formulate goals in terms of personal self-interest, ideologies, and differing views of what the future ought to bring to the nation.

The change in the game of politics testified to the increase in secularity of view among the leadership.



Appeals to divine forces no longer had a bearing on action, and decisions were governed by more rational, calculated criteria. No revolutionary supplications were addressed to unseen deities to halt the Lanet mutiny. To calm minority fears, the government made clear its intent to stick by the constitution. In dealing with labor unrest, confidence was not placed in empty appeals for calm. Management and industry were forced to increase their labor force 10% and the government hired an additional 15%, unions were enjoined from striking for a year and the National Youth Service was promoted as a popular symbol of government concern. The confrontation with the backbenchers brought conciliation, new procedures for communication and pay raises all around. To deal with weakness in the party structure conferences were held, new organizational arrangements proposed, and new lines of communication defined. When foreign influence threatened, the government condemned its East African neighbors, refused arms from socialist countries and stated its opposition to Communism no matter who spoke in favor of it.

Despite the fact that the government wasn't dependent on traditional appeals, however, it still was not arbitrary in adhering to a single style of response. It was flexible

and pragmatic. Labor was dealt with in stop-gap measures while the mutiny was crushed utterly - down to the cashiering of the ranks and the courts martial of the officers. The reaction to the backbenchers was encompassed in soft though effective responses, but Kenyatta still adjourned the Parliament and took a large retinue to the 1964 Commonwealth Conference to prevent any likelihood of a coup. No shuffle of high level KANU personnel took place until KADU was dissolved and the government felt new strength within its ranks provided by the fact that it no longer had to confront an opposition. The response to manifestations of foreign influence was hardline. Incursions on national sovereignty were not taken lightly and disloyalty was condemned. Yet even on such a crucial issue, Kenyatta showed a certain flexibility in not yielding to demands that Vice President Odinga be removed. Maintaining the guarantees of free speech, the government permitted the Vice President to move freely about the country condemning, in increasingly vituperative terms, the government in which he served. He was watched but no action was taken which would have turned the Luo leader into another Lumumba, dead or alive.

The skills exhibited by the government showed the level of maturity of the leaders and the distance they had traveled

from the traditional environment. In defense of the nation's interest and the country's stability the government was conciliatory when necessary and hard when required. It responded to public demands with stop-gap measures when it knew that a whole solution was too expensive. It espoused its belief in the rule of law and impressed on the people its determination to maintain the integrity of the law while not abandoning its right to use coercive measures where their need was dictated by circumstances. In summary, the analytic rationality of secular responses, the adherence to the rule of law and the flexibility of policy alternatives all gave ample evidence of the penetration of modernity into the political system of independent Kenya.

#### Nationbuilding and the Limits of Toleration

The choices of policy became more difficult when issues arose which were not so modernist in their origin but also were not amenable to traditional appeals. In such cases, the policy choices of the government were narrowed from both sides. On the one hand, legislative enactments, civil actions, or all the paraphernalia of the Western legal process were ineffective because the people at fault did not understand or realize the threat posed against them by the

government. On the other hand, use of traditional appeals emphasizing agreement and consensus were ineffective because the positions were too firmly held to be resolved by such appeals. The four issues considered under this heading were: the Shifta, the former Mau Mau freedom fighters who remained in the forests as outlaws, the illegal squatters on European farms and the financial irregularities within the county councils.

4. The Role of the Tribal Legacy: The need to rely on coercive measures, however, should not be construed as evidence that tribal norms had no role to play. There was a need for the government to show the entire population that all decisions taken were consistently legitimated, and that even though action was coercive, it had been given appropriate consideration according to the laws of the land. The declaration of the emergency in the Northeastern Province had parliamentary approval and successive mandates were sought each time it proved necessary to extend the emergency provisions. In dealing with the forest outlaws, the government took great pains to explain that the legal amnesty was over and that continued outlawry was criminal activity subject to criminal punishment. The squatters were also warned that the land was not theirs. The county

councils were warned on numerous occasions that violation of their fiscal responsibilities would lead to strong government action.

The contents of the four issues were such that it became difficult to avoid conflict-laden situations. The shifta problem was acute because it had failed all earlier attempts to bring reconciliation before independence. The forest outlaws were given two chances to come out of the forests. When the outlaws refused the second pardon, the mass of law-abiding citizens were clearly informed as to why former heroes had been branded criminals and why it was necessary to carry out reprisals against them. The county councils and the squatters were also warned, but the government was forced in all four cases to abandon the traditional ways of obtaining a decision and to use the broader police powers it possessed in order to bring the issues to a solution. In all cases, it became clear that explicit action was required and that consensus would not be achieved through discussion.

The Role of the European Legacy: A key consideration in examining the solutions to those issues was to note how the government did not permit parochial sentiments to dominate its formulation of policy. Despite its sympathy and

sensitivity, the government did use strong procedural civil and police actions to resolve the individual questions. Kenya's sovereignty was not surrendered to the shifta outlaws. Similarly, sentiment over the previous contributions of freedom fighters was not permitted to intervene in determining the necessity of police actions taken in the forests. The county councils presented an even more clear cut case where illegality for whatever reason was not to be condoned. In all the cases, the government took a rational, secular view of its responsibilities and based its responses on national need and national interest.

Throughout its consideration of the four issues, the goals were clear, but the means to be employed followed no single pattern. The style of response suitable to dealing with the county councils was not amenable to the solving of the problem of the outlaws. Arbitrary seizure of the councils could not be paralleled by arbitrary annihilation of the men in the forests. The extensive punitive actions against the shifta were not suitable as a policy for dealing with the squatters. The squatters actually were only a focus of government attention for about two months. A year was allowed to elapse between the amnesties for the forest outlaws. The county councils were allowed to pursue

their imprudent ways for nearly two years after self-government before the government took action. Contrasting such flexibility, the response to the shifta and the declaration of the emergency was much less sensitive. Harsh sanctions against the people of the Northeastern Province were less likely to produce mass alienation of the general population than similar actions against a tribe of the Rift Valley or Central Nyanza.

In all these issues, traditional beliefs and values were given prime consideration in determining policy, but ultimately the solution rested heavily on the willingness to use agencies of control alien to tribal life and more representative of modern nation states. The Parliament, the army, the police, the national civil service - were all state institutions that played a role. When procedures and practices of a consensual nature were exhausted, and the issues still had not been resolved, attention turned to the use of procedures and skills learned from the Europeans.

#### Nationbuilding and Traditional Attitudes

Tribalism in Kenya society was a major obstacle to national integration. I showed earlier that the leaders of Kenya considered tribalism as a most critical problem,

filling the parliamentary debates with constant references to the destructive nature of that force. In dealing with the issues of tribalism, of the role of the Opposition parties, and of constitutional reform, a series of incautious policy choices had to be avoided. The success of the government in using traditional behavior to combat the threat of tribalism can be readily observed in an examination of the policy employed. The primary goal of government was to convince Kenya's peoples that they could live without fear of tribal domination.

The Role of the Tribal Legacy: To build such confidence, the government took no actions which were not consistent with established legal standard. In refuting claims of favoritism in the civil service postings, scholarship grants, and resource distribution, the government was able to show that all appropriate procedures had been followed. The debate on reform of the constitution was procedurally correct in every detail. Constitutional reform was a difficult issue that could have involved an expensive referendum. By consulting with the elders of the Opposition tribes, a consensus was brought about. In the debate on the reforms, all views were heard. The same



theme of promotion of consensus was evident in the entreaties to KADU to forsake the opposition. The dwindling KADU opposition was told it lacked real power in the House even though it could still have its views heard. Through such a real search for consensus and legitimacy, valuable support was enlisted from all tribes on issues of crucial importance to the nation.

The Role of the European Legacy: The importance of getting a more efficient and workable set of constitutional instruments and the need to avoid tribal conflict indicated a secular viewpoint had triumphed over the narrow and parochial views that might have guided the government. The nation, rule of law, and the state were to be served over the parochial and the local. That secularity of opinion was matched by a pragmatism of approach. The APP was welcomed into KANU without reprisals. When it became possible former opposition leaders were brought into the cabinet, or were given places of significance in the quasi-public corporations. Constant concern for legitimacy and the procedures of the Parliament showed the government dependence on state institutions inherited from the colonial rulers. The confining of parliamentary dissidence to the chambers of the legislature showed skillful use of that institution. The speech, the

effective use of oratory, the statutory requirement, and the House rules of order became effective tools for permitting extended criticism while not suffering an unexpected reverse that might have occurred if malcontents were to take to the streets in more violent expressions of dissatisfaction. Along with such skills went the full use of the news media to inform the populace how the government was holding to its pledge of consensus, legitimacy, and popular representation in decision-making.

#### Nationbuilding and the Fulfillment of the Promises

Many of the controversies in Kenyan political life originated among specific groups in the population such as the army, the racial communities, the labor unions, or the backbenchers. This meant that responses could be tailored to fit the particular situation, or, in some cases, the nature of the controversy limited the number of viable policy responses. Distinct from those issues involving limited portions of Kenya's population was the issue of satisfying the demands of all the people. The mass of Kenya's peoples were sophisticated enough to vote and to demand that their representatives maintain liaison between constituency and capital. More importantly,

there was increased public realization that the government had obligations to fulfill toward its supporters. Needs formerly filled within the family unit became the responsibility of government agencies. The transformation of national demographic patterns and the consequent weakening of tribal and family ties forced new obligations on the national authorities. The magnitude of those responsibilities became more clearly apparent when the Kenyatta government took office. As summarized by some of the key personnel. "Ours is an almost frightening responsibility....If there is something wrong, now I am responsible...And every time I make a decision, I find I must back it up with another one."<sup>5</sup> Those demands differed from tribe to tribe, but nearly all groups in the society were desirous of some form of welfare or economic change.

The Role of the Tribal Legacy: The pressure brought by the public at large demanded that the response be pitched in an idiom that the public would understand. Since more than ninety per cent of the people still lived in an environment that was rural or peri-urban, the policy choices were limited to responses formulated primarily out of traditional orientations. The European culture norms had some role to play as is recognized in the scope and content

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<sup>5</sup>Quotes from interviews with Minister of Natural Resources Sagini, Minister of Defense Mungai and Minister for Economic Planning and Development Mboya.

of the people's demands - more schools, more clinics, more industry, and more hospitals, but the environment in which those demands were articulated was still very much the tight, closely-knit world of tribal society. Against these demands, the government had to show the people that there was not sufficient wealth to build and establish all the public facilities that the people desired, but that the government was doing what it could.

The only way to develop such understanding meant going to the people. A policy communicated in a written directive sent unceremoniously from Nairobi would have been useless. Thus, more and more ministerial tours went about the countryside, praising the people for their self-help schemes, and encouraging contributions to "Harambee" development projects. The tours were a succession of barazas or meetings where people gathered to listen and put their comments to the government spokesmen in a fashion similar to the old tribal councils. By explaining its position, the government sought to give greater support to its policies of restraint in spending. By emphasizing policies of uniform treatment for the whole country, the impression was conveyed that acts were equitable to all people. The policy of fiscal restraint was not decided by the people, but the strategy

of public involvement lent an image of "popular will" to the proceedings and strengthened the government's position while mitigating the threats that could have been posed by mass public discontent.

The Role of the European Legacy: The recognition of the valuable role of the traditional legacy, however, did not overshadow the importance of the more modern policy alternatives that could be employed by the government. The restraint in spending showed by the government was indicative of its realism concerning the state of its resources and the scope of activities it could reasonably consider. Operating with this understanding of its position, the government had to justify to the people its reasons for not implementing the KANU manifesto with its over-generous interpretations of "Uhuru."

It was fortunate that the people were willing to devote extensive voluntary school construction or the building of clinics. The people had observed what the Europeans had and wanted those things for themselves. Education was acknowledged as a key to a better life. Because of the perspective of European life held by the Africans, the government found support for its "Harambee" campaigns of cooperative enterprise and self-help.

To support its public appeals and flexible approach, the government had the administrative structure established by colonial rule. The ministries of labor and social services, works, power and communication, agriculture, lands and settlement and commerce and industry, as well as economic planning and development constituted a tremendous resource for insuring that the "Harambee" efforts preached so widely in the constituencies could be controlled and directed to the real benefit of the government and the nation rather than being a wasteful and frustrating enterprise or too much or too little built in the wrong places for the right reasons. As in other demands faced by the Kenyatta government, the origin of demands and the potential solutions were conditioned by the two cultural traditions in the country operating within a restricted framework set by the physical limitations on governmental resources.

#### PERSPECTIVE

The most hopeful conclusion that emerges from this study of Kenya is the realization that politics in the new nations is not a determinate process. The success of Kenya's political leaders in managing resources to insure stability shows that despite the existence of poverty, disease,

illiteracy, ignorance, and lack of physical and monetary resources, men still did have flexibility in the making of policy decisions. However, the recognition of the potential for independent action carries no guarantee of political success. For this study has also shown that independence of action had to be sensitive to the environmental situation. Lacking sufficient resources, the political leaders could have chosen to ignore their socio/cultural context only at their peril. Despite the "epigenetical" changes which gave greater congruence between structure and culture in a social system, the Kenya nation was so dynamic in terms of societal inputs that leaders were called upon to attempt a series of "repetitive resynchronizations" between hopes and realities. Adaptation and maintenance depended not only on the developmental nature of the political system, but also on the understanding, skill, and resourcefulness of the leadership in meeting problems.

When the political leaders chose to maintain stability and democracy, they tested their skills to an even greater degree than would be the case if stability alone had been the sole object of government. Political efficacy was tempered by philosophical commitment. In Africa, where democratic institutionalism in nation states is enfeebled

and tribalism is strong, the desertion of philosophical commitments might have been tempting. The personality study of the Kenya political elite showed how self-interest tempered idealism. The pre-occupation with the tribe and one's personal political future was characteristic of the elite. Nonetheless, Kenya's leaders chose to preserve democracy and democratic institutions even when confronted with a series of potentially disruptive domestic issues. And in implementing that choice, they drew on the two cultural legacies existent in the country. Perhaps, in future, such conditions may change, but by their choices during a two year period, the Kenya leadership showed that democracy is viable in the new states and that support for its existence lies in the culture norms that can give strength to alien institutional frameworks.



APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I:

A Description of a Ministerial Tour of Nyaribari Constituency, Kisii District, February 2, 1965 with Itinerary and Petitions.

The ministerial tours discussed in the body of this study were a common feature of post-independence politics. A cabinet minister or a small group of cabinet ministers would tour a district for several days, taking a day in each of the constituencies in the district.

The following documents were collected while accompanying a ministerial tour through Nyaribari constituency. The official delegation consisted of Tom Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Lawrence Sagini, Minister for Local Government, and James Nyamweya, Assistant Minister to the President and the representative from Nyaribari constituency.

The intent of this tour was to promote "Harambee" self-help efforts being undertaken by the local people. The procedure was for the entourage to stop at a place, have speeches given by the members of the delegation, and receive petitions from the local people concerning their needs.

The accompanying documents show the types of petitions presented to the ministerial delegation. Only two are included, the remainder being printed in Swahili. These documents are notable for the fact that they were mimeographed and widely available to all the local people and to every member of the delegation; an indication of just how sophisticated the local people had become in articulating their interests.

#### I. ITINERARY FOR THE TOUR

"The programme of the visit of various Ministers and Members of the National Assembly in Kisii District on the 2nd of February, 1965.

- 9:00 a.m. The party leaves Kisii Hotel for Kisii DEB School.
- 9:10 a.m. The party arrives at Kisii DEB School and tours the School.

- 9:30 a.m. The party leaves Kisii DEB School for Nyanchwa Mission.
- 10:40 a.m. The party arrives and tours Nyanchwa Mission.
- 11:25 a.m. The party leaves Nyanchwa Mission for Kereri Girl's School.
- 11:40 a.m. The party arrives at Kereri Girl's School and tours School.
- 12:00 The party leaves for Nyaguta.
- 12:30 p.m. The party arrives and tours school, nursery school, church, co-operative society, and any other self-help scheme.
- 12:45 p.m. Lunch at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Mogire.
- 1:30 p.m. The party leaves for Ibeno Mission
- 2:00 p.m. Party arrives at Ibeno Mission and tours school and the dispensary.
- 2:30 p.m. The party leaves for Gesusu Mission.
- 3:00 p.m. The party stops at Gesusu dispensary.
- 3:15 p.m. The party arrives at Gesusu - tours the co-operative society and the school; public meeting.
- 3:30 p.m. The party leaves for Ichuni Mission.
- 5:30 p.m. The party arrives at Ichuni Mission; tea.
- 6:30 p.m. The party leaves for Nairobi.

Note: Our next ministerial visit will cover Majoge-Bassi and Wanjara-South Mugirango constituencies. Date for the visit will be announced later. A similar visit will cover Kitutu East and North Mugirango constituencies.

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"MEMORANDUM TO BE PRESENTED TO THE MINISTERIAL PARTY VISITING GESUSU SCHOOL ON THE SECOND OF FEBRUARY, 1965.

We, the Members of the Gesusu School Committee, on behalf of the community have the pleasure of welcoming you here at Gesusu where you are now visiting. To your esteemed visit we most respectfully beg to put the following matters before you for your kind consideration.

1. GENERAL LIFE HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL

This school was started in 1928 under the management of Seventh Day Adventists (S.D.A.). Through Church cooperation, the progress of the school building, and the construction of

roads to the school was well carried ahead. In 1947 the community erected a second classroom of bricks. Since then, the population of the school children increased tremendously and resulted in beginning a new school Getacho which is a few yards below.

## 2. SECONDARY SCHOOL

We feel it is time for Gesusu to be made a Secondary School for the following reasons:-

- (a) There is enough land of 14.8 acres;
- (b) There are about 30 schools in Nyaribari Masaba;
- (c) Water is available;
- (d) There is a dispensary;
- (e) Roads to the school are quite good;
- (f) The people have started to collect money for the school.

## 3. DISPENSARY

In order to fight against disease, in 1961, the community established a dispensary, though not well equipped. This dispensary does not only serve the people from Bassi location and a few from Masai but also the people around Gesusu. This is due to the great distance from their homes to the district hospital in Kisii. As such, we appreciate the services of Gesusu Dispensary and we are looking forward to getting the Government's aid.

## 4. THE CHURCH

The people of Gesusu have realized that the church brings good understanding among the people. The church followers have proposed to erect a brick building for services. They are busy making bricks. They also wish to seek the aid from the Government.

## 5. SOCIETY

Our Pyrethrum Society was started in 1959. The farmers have been doing well but when the price of pyrethrum went down, the people were discouraged. We also ask for increase of price of our flowers. Can the Government lend money to the Society so that farmers can use it?

## 6. STOCK THEFT

The stealing of stock by our neighboring tribes; Kipsigis and Masai has been a bother to us. In many cases this has brought several civil fights, which results in death. We have often suffered big losses as the bordering tribe are not willing to compensate for our stolen properties as instructed by the order Committees. We ask the Government to strengthen the force of Tribal Police at the borders as they help in maintaining the peace.

We hope that our request will meet your favorable consideration in the spirit of Harambee.

With good wishes to you all,

Yours faithfully,

Legend. W. Maranga

CHAIRMAN

GESUSU SCHOOL COMMITTEE

ON BEHALF OF GESUSU COMMUNITY

Gesusu Kisii 2nd February 1965."

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"Memorandum of Visit to Ibeno Mission

We are very happy to welcome the Honorable members of Parliament and other distinguished guests to the Church of God Mission at Ibeno near Kisii. Thank you for coming to be with us.

A very brief history of the Mission will help you to understand our desire to aid the advance of the country of Kenya. Work began in this area in the year 1948. African church leaders from North Nyanza came to this area to bring the word of God. Following this Missionaries came from time to time. As a result of these interests, churches, schools, and a dispensary were developed. At the present time we have a missionary living at Ibeno. There is a full

Intermediate School being conducted. A new leadership training building is being constructed. Church services are held regularly. Each month leaders of the churches are brought in for training. From time to time conventions are held for youth, women and church groups. These things have been made possible because the people of Kisii have worked faithfully with the church leaders and missionaries. Many people deserve thanks for their interests and faithful work.

We are thankful for what has been accomplished in the past. We have a desire to press on and do more together for the people of this area and also for the nation of Kenya. There are two desires we are trying to fulfill at this time. They are to advance the medical and educational parts of the work as well as the church related work. A request has come from the Hon. James Nyamweya to have a maternity hospital here. The plan is for the people of this area to raise funds to build and equip the building. The mission will supply a graduate nurse from America for a period of at least five years. This means paying her salary and building the necessary residence. Qualified students can be trained in out hospital in North Nyanza and the people of the area have been raising funds for the building. Together we can accomplish this.

The second desire is for a secondary school to be started. Permission has been granted to use the existing building for a classroom of an unaided day school. This permission is given so that if enough funds are secured and the Government approves the school it can be opened this year. The school committee members of the area council have met and scheduled a meeting to be held next week with many members of the county council, area council and representatives of various societies to be present so that we have a clear picture of the financial possibilities. A united fund raising campaign is under way to assist the education and health needs of the area. Sufficient land is now available for the development of a secondary school.

Throughout Kenya the spirit of self-help and Harambee is developing. This spirit will develop a great nation. All working together by the help of God, will cause us to succeed. The central Government alone or the community alone or the church alone cannot do the thing needed. We

are doing what we can and ask that you will do what you can to aid our projects.

As you leave us we want you to know that we are praying for you. Your task is great and you will need the wisdom and strength that God alone can give to develop a strong righteous nation. We want you to come again and see what we have accomplished together.

Thank you,

Welcoming Committee

Francis Mogaka	-	Spokesman
Clair Schultz	-	Mission Secretary
Simon Robinson	-	Resident Missionary
Justo Oyunge	-	Chairman, School Committee
Timothy Motanya	-	H/M Ibeno Intermediate School
Elijah Nyang'era	-	Chairman, Gusii Minister's Assembly
Stephen Getuno	-	County Council Member
Momanyi Gitaya	-	Chairman Area Council
Musa Myandusi	-	Retired Chief

## APPENDIX II:

The Influence of Constituency Interests on Questions Put to the Government During Question Time in the House of Representatives: A Survey of the Third Session, First Parliament, June-December, 1964

The research of Kenya politics revealed a close relationship maintained between elected representatives to the House of Representatives and their constituents. It was an established fact that members of the House spent a significant portion of time in their constituencies, usually the period from Friday evening through Tuesday morning. Observation of the members meeting with their people showed the high degree of rapport between representative and electorate, with no reluctance on the part of individual voters to voice both specific and general demands. In turn the representatives would agree to carry the questions and demands of their people to the floor of the House of Representatives.

To demonstrate the strength of constituent pressure on the elected members, a survey of questions asked during the question time in the House of Representatives was compiled. The Official Record for the Third Session of the First Parliament was used, June 9, 1964 - December 1, 1964. During that period, the legislative body was in session 75 days, and a total of 624 questions were directed to the government. The great majority of the questions were concerned with inquiry as to when the government would alleviate or improve some condition existing in the constituency of the questioner.

The choice of member's questions as an indicator of how constituent interest was communicated to the government was dictated by several considerations:

- A. The use of questions permitted a simple mode of content analysis. More difficult types of content analysis would have been nearly impossible without using such sophisticated techniques as the "General Inquirer" method (Philip Stone, et. al., MIT Press, 1967).



- B. Questions provided a more useful index of interest than the analysis of speeches. This is the case because the speeches of the representatives have a random quality in which remarks may range over a wide range of subjects. By contrast, individual questions are confined to a single subject and, therefore can be counted easily in assembling an index of interest.
- C. Questions were posed on a non-partisan basis. The use of the members questions provided a means for indexing constituency pressure exclusive of the more political overtones of "majimboism" or the other divisions that split the membership of the House of Representatives.

It will be noted that the great majority of the questions raised specific issues related to specific places. Where the place was unspecified, I have added it after reading the content of the parliamentary exchange that followed presentation of the question. This is noted in parentheses after the title of the question. Some questions may seem misplaced in the index if sole reliance is placed on the title of the question. In such cases, designation for purposes of indexing was made on the basis of the content of questioning that occurred when the question was presented.

The results of the survey show clearly that in Kenya's parliamentary system, question time was not comparable to the British Parliament. Kenya's House members were closely tied to their constituencies, and parochial concerns took precedence over the national interest. By contrast, question time in the British House of Commons is used to pose questions of a more national or international concern. For purposes of comparison, a survey was made of the House of Commons debates for an eleven day period in June of 1964. The results, summarized below, reveal the contrast in the subjects of questions. In the British debates, national and international issues dominated local issues, 150 to 68. While in Kenya, national and international issues totalled only 264 out of 624 questions posed.

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS ASKED IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
FIFTH SESSION, FORTY SECOND PARLIAMENTARY, JUNE 8-19, 1964.

	National Focus	Local Focus
Industry	11	22
Administration	2	0
Employment	10	13
Foreign Affairs	77	0
Defense	23	0
Housing	18	15
Agriculture	1	2
Health	1	3
Roads	0	6
Electricity	12	1
Development	2	2
Crime	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	160	68

Source: House of Commons, Official Report, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), (London: HMSO, 1964), First Series, Volume 696, Fifth Session, 42nd Parliament, Session 1963-1964, June 8-19, 1964.

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS ASKED IN THE KENYA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THIRD SESSION, FIRST PARLIAMENT, JUNE 9-DECEMBER 1, 1964.

	National Focus	Local Focus
Administration	28	25
Shifta outlaws	1	21
Foreign Affairs	31	0
National Issues (undesig- nated)	34	0
Local (undesignated)	0	37
Crime	5	7
Labor	10	4
Africanization	23	16
Race Relations	20	1
Development (undesignated)	5	28
Tribalism	26	25
Personal	0	11

## DEVELOPMENT:

Local Industry	11	32
Telecommunications	0	8
Roads	1	26
Electricity	2	6
Railways	2	6
Agriculture	6	46
Water	0	17
Education	14	10
Agriculture Settlement	6	37
Health	<u>21</u>	<u>15</u>
	246	378

The criteria for dividing the questions into national or local focus was whether or not the question title or the subsequent parliamentary exchange mentioned any specific place by name. If no name was mentioned, then it was assumed the question was being posed in the national interest. The listing that is given below shows the types of questions asked and gives insight into the interests of the members and their electorates.

## ADMINISTRATION:

National Focus:

- 135 African Civil Servants; Stoppage of pensions.\*
- 151 Interterritorial transfers of prison officers.
- 163 Diplomatic posts for non-graduates.
- 166 Graduate personal tax; civil servants
- 178 Compensation; retiring officers.
- 220 Redesignation; laboratory assistants.
- 221 Denial of passenger service vehicle licence.
- 233 When will government announce results of Pratt Salaries Commission.
- 234 Withdrawal of authority from disloyal chiefs.
- 243 Assistant Commissioner of Police; powers.
- 261 District police; morale and efficiency.
- 265 Regional government agents; privileges and authority.
- 274 Government fire masters qualifications.
- 275 Powers of the chiefs.

\* The number which precedes each question title is the one assigned to the question when submitted by the House member. This number is printed with the question on the daily order paper on the day set for discussion in the House chamber.

- 276 Election of chiefs.
- 282 Government inspection of fire appliances.
- 331 Kenya civil servants; transfer from Uganda.
- 335 Exemption from settlement costs; poor people.
- 347 Africans to receive same salaries as predecessors.
- 350 Law graduates salary.
- 405 Monthly allowances; trainee nurses.
- 427 Civil servants; changes in designation.
- 450 Legislation to protect women students.
- 454 Transport of unlicensed goods.
- 470 Fire arms licences for Africans.
- 481 Price listing of goods.
- 496 Salaries and conditions of service; sweepers.
- 497 Legislation for drunkenness.

Local Focus:

- 148 Irregularities; Abaluhya taxpayers.
- 162 Post office; Bomet constituency.
- 167 Postal facilities for chief's centers: Malara/Navablolo/  
Lugari.
- 212 Terms and condition of service; Mathari.
- 255 Reopening of Ports Victoria and Sio.
- 326 Judicial proceedings: Wamba.
- 329 Nyali Police station.
- 353 Police posts: Kisii and Homo Bay.
- 364 Postal facilities: Majoge/Bassi.
- 398 Postal facilities: Ukwala.
- 435 Issuance of licences: Tana River and Lamu.
- 443 Strengthening Nyangori police post.
- 448 Police station; Arrochet farm.
- 459 Nyamira police station.
- 491 Dismissals of government employees (Kericho).
- 493 Shikusa Borstal Institution: housing.
- 500 Regional Government Agent Samburu traveling allowance.
- 576 Commission of Inquiry: Embu county council.
- 740 Land rover for Nyanguta-Kibos police station.
- 773 Machakos as an adjudication district.
- 778 Busia as a separate police division.
- 786 Replacing an old chief in Samburu.
- 795 Redesignation of community development officer (Nyanza)
- 802 Stationing of army unit at Del Del.

## SHIFTA OUTLAWS

National Focus:

567 Camel trade with United Arab Republic.

Local Focus:

129 Compensation for shifita victims.  
 165 Minister's visit to Tana River.  
 192 Kidnapped Kenya citizens.  
 248 Minister's visit to Northeastern Province.  
 314 Shifita contacts with forest fighters.  
 389 Emergency measures against shifita.  
 546 Pay for NFD tribal police.  
 548 Fencing for shifita affected towns.  
 549 NFD allowances.  
 561 Further education and training for NFD.  
 562 Teacher training college for NFD.  
 563 National Youth Service for Northeastern Province.  
 564 Confiscation of loyal somalis property.  
 566 Training of veterinary instructors (NFD).  
 639 Shifita raids on Meru people.  
 689 Movement to control Kenya somalis.  
 728 Ammunition for Tana home guards.  
 737 Intensified measures against shifita.  
 745 Help for shifita victims: Marsabit.  
 749 Police refusal to shoot shifita.  
 760 Minister of local government's visit to Wajir.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

125 Diplomatic relations with Somalia.  
 136 Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania joint defense talks.  
 153 Firearms confiscation at sea and airports.  
 154 East African treasury bills and East African and Aden Government securities.  
 175 Control of capital outflow from Kenya.  
 202 Government satisfaction with work of foreign ministers abroad.  
 247 Federation talks: government statement.  
 277 Student's death in Moscow.  
 296 Immigration office in Kisumu.  
 308 Trade agreements: copies to members.  
 338 Institute for foreign languages.  
 360 Students receiving military training in Russia.  
 381 Karasuk: administration by Kenya.

- 453 Voice of Kenya: external services.
- 455 Measures to prevent Ethiopian tribes from crossing into Kenya.
- 483 OAU policy and trade union affiliation.
- 495 Visa charges.
- 509 Meeting foreign ministers at airport.
- 515 Foreign embassies in Kenya.
- 525 Chairman of Samburu county council's trip to Russia.
- 590 Immigration office at Nakuru.
- 643 Contributions to the East African currency board.
- 673 Kenya Africans in Uganda and Tanzania.
- 681 Military college for Kenya.
- 734 Reduction of passport charges.
- 744 Statement by Kenya's ambassador in China.
- 752 People killed by Ethiopians since 1958.
- 763 Import of Betel leaves from India.
- 768 Making an atomic and hydrogen bomb.

NATIONAL ISSUES: (Undesignated)

- 127 Personal tax receipts: unemployed people.
- 146 Muslim holidays to be national holidays.
- 174 Fire losses in Kenya: 1962/63.
- 189 Cost of British forces: Lanet mutiny.
- 203 Students studying in communist countries.
- 208 Freedom fighters from other countries in Kenya.
- 224 Miss Uhuru's appointment to the Prime Minister's office.
- 239 Names of sponsors of students in Czechoslovakia.
- 260 Strengthening of Kenya army.
- 323 Women in Kenya National Youth Service.
- 328 Desert Locust Control: Kenya contribution.
- 375 Junior leader's company at Kahawa.
- 390 Fixing of maize prices.
- 456 Customs duty for fresh fish
- 528 Government newspaper.
- 600 VOK: corrections of misquotes.
- 615 Teaching of French and Russian in secondary schools.
- 620 Boundary between Tsavo park and Southern Kitui.
- 632 Introduction of educational T.V. programs.
- 633 Selection and appointment of chiefs.
- 636 Establishment of a Kenya navy.
- 638 Destruction of Ramisi dam.
- 653 Abolitions of African courts.
- 655 Legality of African customary marriages.

- 664 Self-styled "ministers": chairman of regional assembly committees.
- 665 Government officer as honorary counsel.
- 718 Renaming of Lake Victoria.
- 719 Rise of Lake Victoria waters.
- 730 Changing to the Swahili time system.
- 748 Army or General Service Unit for Marsabit.
- 753 Exemption from income tax: families more than five children.
- 766 Classification of minerals.
- 771 Un-expected landing on Kisii airstrip.
- 792 Kenya awards and decorations.

LOCAL ISSUES: (Undesignated)

- 116 Official news service for Embu.
- 143 Exposed mine shafts: Kakamega.
- 157 Agreement with forest fighters.
- 179 Bush surgery by certain tribes.
- 181 Settlement of flood victims: Kadani location.
- 190 Ministerial tour to Western countries.
- 204 Welfare and upkeep of beggars in cities.
- 206 "Legion of Mary": Nyanza province.
- 219 Eviction orders: alleviation of hardship: Central province.
- 222 Contamination of River Kuja.
- 226 Property damage by game: Yatta.
- 254 Rehabilitation of forest fighters.
- 283 Settlement of Nairobi landless.
- 287 Day nursery for Home Servants Center, Nairobi.
- 291 Killing of Kipsigis at Soyot.
- 294 Flood victims: Nyanza and Western Provinces.
- 298 Sugar shortage: Nyanza province.
- 303 Demolition of houses: Kisumu.
- 305 Casual Laborers pay: Northeastern province.
- 309 Repair flooded bays: south Nyanza.
- 321 Control of floods: south Nyanza.
- 332 Stock theft: Samburu and Dorobo tribes.
- 363 Geological survey: Elgeyo/Marakwet.
- 369 Unemployment relief project: Northeastern province.
- 400 KANU disturbance of peace: Bondo.
- 401 Attack on old woman by police: North Ugenya.
- 404 Preservation of customary marriage laws.
- 417 Nairobi domestic servants families.
- 420 Free education: children of Mr. Mbasu.
- 458 Housing of Prostitutes.

- 479 Tsetse fly in Tinga area.
- 492 Western province job-seekers.
- 517 Grass fires; Ukambani and Masai.
- 532 Compensation to dependents of people killed by wild animals.
- 761 People killed by game; Bomet.
- 781 Reports of prostitution in Nairobi.

CRIME:National Focus:

- 354 Drunken driving.
- 355 Registered letters; theft by postal employees.
- 386 Protection of public against careless drivers.
- 356 Capital punishment for felonious offences.
- 237 Steps to prevent reprisals; murder of prisoner.

Local Focus:

- 217 Arson cases: Nyanza.
- 286 High crime rate in Nairobi.
- 371 Unnecessary stay in custody, Malindi.
- 678 Crime increase in east Kano.
- 738 Police constable involved in shooting incident (Kuria).
- 757 Shooting incident (Wamba)
- 772 Kikuyu driver for Machakos land office.

LABOR:National Focus:

- 310 Registration of Kenya Federation of Trade Unions.
- 324 Government fulfillment of Tripartite agreement.
- 346 Wages and equal pay, equal work.
- 392 Teacher claims salary, leave, etc.
- 394 National employment bureau.
- 395 Kenya Federation of Labor split.
- 445 Unregistered job seekers.
- 555 Teacher's strike; avoidance of.
- 643 (a) Dismissal of employees since tripartite agreement.
- 644 Authorities and the Tripartite agreement.

Local Focus:

- 380 Strike: Kaimosi teacher training college.
- 641 Labor unrest in Mombasa.
- 645 Exploitation of workers: Mombasa.
- 703 Mombasa Dockworkers Union: annual election.



## AFRICANIZATION:

National Focus:

- 244 Africanization of Deputy Inspector General of Police.
- 267 Top posts for Africans in the East African Railways and Harbors Administration.
- 270 Number of Africans training as land valuers.
- 319 Africanization of post of Inspector General of police.
- 365 Tribal breakdown of Regional Government Agents.
- 376 Africanization; settlement board posts.
- 384 Africanization; director of Kenya National Parks.
- 385 Africanization; Conservators and Deputies of Forest Department.
- 414 Appointment of Kenya African judges and magistrates.
- 449 Africanization of State House offices.
- 457 Council members to be Kenya citizens.
- 488 European settlement officers.
- 541 Africanization: Commissioner of Prisons.
- 544 Africanization: Comptroller of Office Services
- 551 Africanization: Hostesses on Upper Class trains.
- 574 Africanization: Executive Officer; Transport Licencing Board.
- 618 Transfer of Indian businessmen to towns.
- 706 Africanization: Department of Mines and Geology.
- 715 Africanization; all town clerks.
- 716 Africanization: Posts and Probation Services.
- 729 Qualification of Registrar General and Deputy.
- 759 Africanization: Paymaster, Northeastern Province.

Local Focus:

- 159 Africanization: Maseno National School.
- 240 Africanization: Agricultural Officers, Kericho.
- 242 Africanization: Administrative posts - Kericho.
- 245 Africanization: Commissioner of police for Rift Valley.
- 264 Settlement officers: Nyandarua.
- 472 Africanization of clerical staff; Mombasa.
- 585 Local women as Community Development Officers; Embu.
- 594 Africanization of police; Machakos.
- 595 Settlement officers in Machakos.
- 597 African water inspector: yatta furrow.
- 646 Africanization: Mombasa city council administration.
- 692 Africanization: settlement officers; Muhoroni.
- 700 Africanization: Rift Valley regional sports officer.
- 707 Goan civil servants in Kilifi district.
- 789 Africanization: livestock officer, Samburu.

## RACE RELATIONS:

National Focus:

- 126 Europeans buying up farms.
- 133 East African Power and Light shareholders.
- 134 Magadi Soda Company.
- 141 Fencing private European farms.
- 149 Prices for compassionate farms.
- 180 Macalder Mines; royalties.
- 209 Mr. J.A.R. King's income tax.
- 210 Mr. Dickenson's income tax.
- 230 Citizens; Number of Europeans and Asians.
- 257 Expatriate civil servants.
- 288 Settlement schemes for non-Africans.
- 297 Number of Asian Kenya citizens.
- 406 Transfer of missionary school teacher.
- 416 White hunter's organization; membership.
- 489 Land purchases by Europeans and Asians.
- 521 Mr. Benbow as Hotel manager in Kenya.
- 556 Government investment in Industrial Promotion Services, Ltd.
- 598 Government employment on Mr. Angaine's farm.
- 647 Empire loyalists living in Kenya.
- 649 African ownership of urban properties.

Local Focus:

- 290 Allocation of a plot to Mr. W.M. Spencer.

## DEVELOPMENT: (Undesignated)

National Focus:

- 278 Improvement of housing in rural areas.
- 391 National marketing union.
- 617 Shop leases in African areas.
- 624 Imported corrugated iron sheets.

Local Focus:

- 193 Development of Eastern Province.
- 216 Central Housing Board; allocation of funds - central Nyanza.
- 231 Minineral wealth; Mamisi.
- 382 Additional post office; Kikumu.
- 424 Lake Hannington minerals; South Baringo.
- 543 Extension of T.V. services.
- 547 Financial aid for Marsabit.
- 571 Survey staff; Coast Province.

- 577 Services for Rujenyas township.
- 591 Post office for Homa Bay.
- 611 Administration office for Bokoli location.
- 613 Improvement of Kakamega as a Provincial headquarters.
- 621 Price controlled crops - reviewed; Ukambani.
- 627 Financial aid for self-help groups; Nyando.
- 628 Castor seed oil factory for Kibwezi.
- 672 Government improvement of Lake Victoria as a tourist attraction.
- 684 Industrial development for Nyeri.
- 696 Original price of land in Nandi hills.
- 699 Trade loans to Nandis.
- 702 Co-op societies for coast Province.
- 705 Tourist facilities; Kakamega forest.
- 711 Establishment of industry in Muranga.
- 712 Fishing at mouth of Nzoia river.
- 726 Housing; Mutito division.
- 736 Offices for clerks: Tana River district.
- 750 Postal facilities: Marsabit.
- 767 Search for Radium: Nyanza.

#### TRIBALISM:

##### National Focus:

- 128 Nyanza Luos in the forces; police, prisons, military.
- 139 Settlement of former highlands; tribal breakdown.
- 145 Loans to sawmillers and pitsawyers.
- 152 Kenya students overseas.
- 182 Employment relief schemes; officers - selection of.
- 184 Scholarships for academic and technical studies.
- 185 Overseas selection committee; composition of.
- 246 Racial breakdown of police.
- 299 Review and compositions of service commissions.
- 313 Favoritism; entry into national secondary school.
- 316 Composition of military appointments board.
- 317 Recruitment into army and General Service Unit.
- 320 Kenya airforce; tribal breakdown.
- 407 Accommodation at Siriba College.
- 438 Appointment of chairman to statutory boards.
- 441 Trustees of Land Bank; racial breakdown.
- 504 Scholarships for Coast Kenyans.
- 522 Scholarship grants to students; tribal breakdown.
- 540 Employment of women at VOK.
- 560 Overseas education at Somalis.
- 610 Promotions and dismissals of chiefs.
- 635 Tribal breakdown of administrative officers in North-eastern Province.

- 637 Uniform salaries; county council officers.
- 710 Discrimination against KADU in the army.
- 732 Racial breakdown in medical service.
- 754 Examination for the public service.

Local Focus:

- 155 Settlement for Kisii; West Sotik.
- 235 Boundary dispute; Rift Valley and Western Provinces.
- 236 Discrimination in settlement; Rift Valley.
- 259 Settlement of poor Turkana.
- 269 Settlement of Kalenjin in Central Province.
- 280 Training of Bajun students.
- 322 Coast police officers training at Kiganjo.
- 352 Return of freedom fighter's land.
- 379 Turkana students overseas.
- 524 High administrative posts for Pakot.
- 530 Rejection of people for police and army (Kibera)
- 582 Embu people serving overseas.
- 586 Embu people in administration.
- 593 Number of Kamba Regional Government Agents in Kitui.
- 602 Discrimination; Fort Hall Road Dispensary.
- 625 Lawlessness: Luo/Nandi border.
- 642 Senior labor officer Mombasa.
- 652 Embu people in settlement schemes.
- 666 Removal of Kamba settlers from Kyulu.
- 675 Stock thefts reported to police (Nyanza)
- 690 Transfer of Mr. Wahome to Kabarnet.
- 704 Removal of civil administration from Busia to Nyambare.
- 758 Assurance to Somalis on scholarship.
- 770 Livestock officer in Bomet.
- 781 Uniting the Abatura people.

PERSONAL QUESTIONS:

- 173 Inquest into death of eleven year old child; Kampi ya Moto.
- 253 Resignation of Dr. Otsyula.
- 419 Death of Moses Musau.
- 426 Reinstatement of Lt. Owino.
- 437 Treatment of Mr. Sagala's son at Kenyatta Hospital.
- 447 Local politicians on governing bodies of educational institutions.
- 592 Compensation to Kyale Nzau.
- 601 Licence for public meeting; Mr. Shikuku.
- 679 Arrest of murderers of Mr. Oriyo.
- 687 Employment of Mr. Wacumba in police.
- 751 Police guards for senators and members of the house.

DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONS DIVIDED BY TOPIC:

## LOCAL INDUSTRY:

National Focus:

- 147 Confidence restoring measures for businessmen.
- 186 Police protection for local products.
- 318 Benefit from government loans.
- 336 Distillation and licencing of nubian gin.
- 357 Bankruptcy for non-African traders.
- 425 Legislation for rent control of business premises.
- 603 National chamber of commerce and industry.
- 616 Fixed rents for market.
- 671 Fish industry revenue.
- 685 Construction of a paper factory.

Local Focus:

- 140 Refusal of hotel keepers licence (Samburu).
- 161 Home industries for Ugenya.
- 191 Courses for local traders (Meru).
- 215 Loans to African traders; Machakos district.
- 232 Loans to traders; Hamisi district.
- 252 Industrial development; Ukambani.
- 279 Central housing board loans; Coast Province.
- 293 New industries for Kericho.
- 301 Investment in Nyanza and Western Provinces.
- 337 Manufacture of tiles in Kakamega.
- 339 Animal leases to African traders (central Nyanza).
- 359 African plot holders; Ni robi.
- 396 Loans to businessmen; Thompson's Falls/Nanyuki.
- 436 Closing of Lamu fisheries.
- 485 Industries for Kakamega town.
- 486 Trader loans; Ikolomani.
- 535 Control of sales of molasses and jaggery (central Nyanza).
- 536 Business polts; title deeds (Kisumu).
- 537 Industries for Masai district.
- 550 Coast Province deep sea fishing industry.
- 568 Loans to Somali businessmen.
- 569 Leather tanning industry for Wajir.
- 578 Building loans for Embu.
- 579 Vegetable canning for Mbulori.
- 584 Embu Self-help groups.
- 599 Barber licences; Nairobi.
- 603 National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
- 607 Expansion of Kisii Coffee Research Institute.

- 650 Trading loans for Embu people.
- 733. Non-payment of Miraa Trading Company employees.
- 741 Leather tanning industry for Nyanza.
- 783 Cement factory at Sultan Hamud.
- 784 Lime factory at Makindu.

#### TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

- 170 Automatic telephone exchange for Western Province.
- 194 Extension to Kitale/Kapenguria telephone.
- 198 Radio call sets, Tana River.
- 361 Telephone extension: Chemobet/Tambach.
- 502 Telephone for Kabarnet.
- 514 Radio telephone: Makueni.
- 557. Telephones for Kaloleni.
- 640 Telephone line to Meru town.

#### ROADS:

##### National Focus:

- 747 Reduction of road fee licences.

##### Local Focus:

- 169 Tarmac roads: Leseru/Tororo; Kakamega/Broderick Falls/Kitale.
- 177 Improvement of roads: Isiolo/Mandera/Moyale.
- 207 Tarmac: Chororia/Meru Boma Road.
- 281 Lamu: all weather road.
- 295 Bridge damaged by floods near Maraboi.
- 387 Improvement of Maseno/Vihiga road.
- 418 Deterioration: Londiani/Kericho road.
- 430 Tarmac: Usain/Gishu road.
- 433 Tarmac: Kitale/Kakamega road.
- 452 Tarmac: Nakuru/Mariegat road.
- 505 All-weather road Kitale/Lodwar.
- 507 Tarmac: Coastal road.
- 510 Upgrading: Wamuyu/Kitui road.
- 604 Tarmac: Kisumu/Kisii road.
- 605 Bridge at Kirumi Ferry.
- 619 Permanent bridge at Athi river.
- 630 Tarmac: Kisii/Nyangusu road.
- 661 Bridge over Tyaa River.
- 662 Bridge over Tana River.
- 677 Access roads for sugar cane growers (Nyando).
- 694 Tarmac and widening of roads: Bomet.
- 680 Tarmac roads: Kiganjo/Nanyuki/Nyeri/Thompson's Falls.

- 722 Increased tarmacing for Nyanza Province.
- 739 Tarmac: Kibos/Songhor road.
- 746 Improvement of Bridges: Isiolo/Marsabit road.
- 762 Subsidy: road maintenance in south Nyanza.

#### ELECTRICITY:

##### National Focus:

- 201 Electricity from Lake Victoria.
- 334 Hydro-electric power: Kenya River.

##### Local Focus:

- 168 Establishment of Kenya Electricity Board.
- 171 Kakamega/Broderick Falls electricity supply.
- 358 Go Go hydroelectric power.
- 421 Electric power: Eldama Ravine.
- 460 Electricity plant for Kisii town.
- 469 Hydro-electric power for Nzoia River.

#### RAILWAYS:

##### National Focus:

- 527 Introduction of electric trains.
- 674 Train accidents, 1963-1964.

##### Local Focus:

- 223 Sara: increase in height of crossing.
- 250 Railway: Sagana/Embu/Meru.
- 434 Railway between Kitale and Mbala.
- 511 Railway line to Machakos and Kitui.
- 552 Extension of railway: Kedowa/Kericho/Kisii/Homa Bay.
- 612 Makadara crossing deaths.

#### AGRICULTURE:

##### National Focus:

- 272 Allowances: African and non-African farmers.
- 415 Formation of co-op farming societies.
- 490 Agricultural pool for new settlers.
- 494 Loans to farmers without land title.
- 606 TEA scheme.
- 634 Bulls for settlement scheme.

Local Focus:

- 114 Long terms to Embu farmers.
- 138 Development of Kerio Valley.
- 199 Livestock industry for NFD.
- 228 Encouragement of Agriculture development in Nyanza.
- 258 Land usage: Laikipia.
- 306 Stock sales: south Nyanza.
- 333 Transport of cattle to Athi River factory.
- 345 Maize planting by tea workers: Kericho.
- 366 Assistance for Kisii self-help schemes.
- 372 Sisal monopoly in central Nyanza.
- 374 Consent to sale of Kenami estate.
- 402 Tea growing: Mwinbi/Chuka.
- 423 Cash crop in Baringo area.
- 446 Self-help schemes in Hamisi.
- 461 Removal of restrictions on tea planting acreages (Kisii).
- 464 Financial assistance: African tea growers, Kericho.
- 466 Assistance to self-help schemes: Ugenya.
- 473 Development loans to African farmers (Uasin Gishu).
- 474 Farm development loans: WaPokomo and Orma.
- 477 Co-op farming: Mwea/Tebere.
- 480 Ranching schemes for Samburu.
- 484 Rice mill factory for Mwea Tebere.
- 519 Kipsigis cattle for Kenya meat commission.
- 520 Tea planting by Kipsigis farmers.
- 542 TEA scheme and Western Province.
- 565 Stock sales to Kenya Meat Commission (NFD).
- 580 Water schemes and milk marketing: Embu.
- 587 Cattle dips for Samburu.
- 588 Grazing in national forests: Samburu.
- 589 KMC Factory at Nakuru.
- 608 Tea nurseries in Gussi district.
- 633 Grazing of Lembus forest.
- 657 Farm loans; Embu North people.
- 658 Embu coffee cooperative.
- 669 Sugar industry in Shimba hills.
- 686 Branch of Kenya Co-operative Creameries for Kiganjo.
- 697 Confiscation of stock: Chemilil.
- 691 Mosquito control: Kano plains.
- 698 Loans to sugar cane growers: Nandi.
- 720 Increase pyrethrum quota for Gusii.
- 727 Cattle ranching cooperative for Mtito division.
- 735 Sale of Pakot cattle to KMC.
- 742 Uganda sugar estate: settlement of laborers (Muhoroni).
- 777 Maize buying market in Busia.



## WATER SUPPLIES

- 131 Monoculture: Tana irrigation scheme.
- 142 Irrigation schemes: Bomet.
- 214 Irrigation schemes: Ukamba.
- 225 Improvement of water supplies in Yatta.
- 251 Irrigation schemes: Tana river.
- 273 Free water for Mombasa African locations.
- 292 Development: Bomet waterfalls.
- 368 Water: Mbololo/Kasigau/Maktau.
- 378 Water shortage in Kericho.
- 412 Fresh water for coastal towns.
- 422 Water for irrigation: south Baringo.
- 463 Water supplies: Bomet.
- 478 Water supplies in Baragoi division.
- 513 Water: Makueni.
- 559 Water supply for eastern Kitui.
- 659 Water development in Kitui district.
- 713 Water supplies for Ugenya.

## EDUCATION:

National Focus:

- 195 Promote adult literacy.
- 200 Creation of philosophy faculty for the university college.
- 227 Maseno-Jeanes school to be a commercial college.
- 256 Factors determining transfer of secondary schools to national status.
- 266 Takeover of educational bodies.
- 340 Compulsory education in Kenya.
- 362 Government takeover of missionary schools.
- 373 Higher education loan funds - number of loans.
- 408 Fees demanded by new independent schools.
- 409 Withdrawal of missionaries responsibilities: education.
- 410 Revision of history textbooks.
- 471 Disqualified teachers.
- 545 Approved schools executive officer.
- 769 In-service training for unqualified teachers.
- 779 Inspector teams for schools.

Local Focus:

- 343 Educational facilities: Wanderobo tribe.
- 380 Teacher training courses: Siriba.
- 403 Women's teacher training: Kericho.

- 429 Sigalala technical and trade school to be a polytechnic.
- 462 Teacher training and technical trade school for Kisii.
- 538 Adult training college (Kisumu).
- 581 National secondary school: Embu.
- 682 Wamburu farm institute to be an agriculture college.
- 717 Approved school for Sangala.

#### AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT SCHEMES:

##### National Focus:

- 397 Purchased of mismanged farms.
- 432 Land on settlement schemes on death of farmer.
- 526 Nationalization of land.
- 531 Foreign money for land settlement.
- 609 Wool sheep rearing in Kenya.
- 688 Bank loans for co-operative societies.

##### Local Focus:

- 137 Kessup plot holders: certificates (Rift Valley).
- 160 Settlement: Muhoroni area.
- 172 Land consolidation Lurambi.
- 183 Money for settlement: south Nyanza.
- 196 Tana River settlement scheme.
- 205 Kericho settlement scheme.
- 262 Settlement of landless Abaluhya.
- 263 Settlement of European farms in Ol Kalou.
- 289 Kaptaget settlement scheme.
- 303 Title deeds for farmers in Gedi and Mijimboni.
- 304 Title deeds for Makueni settlers.
- 312 Settlement scheme for Meru/Theraka.
- 330 Number of Uasin/Gishu settlers.
- 342 Resettlement of Wanderobo.
- 367 Settlement of Mata people.
- 377 Land registration in Kericho.
- 399 Land adjudication areas: Central Nyanza.
- 428 Settlement of Kuria people: Muhoroni settlement scheme.
- 431 Land for people of Kamu Kuywa.
- 440 Land title deeds Hamisi farmers.
- 451 Resettlement for Western and Central Province people.
- 465 Settlement of Uasin/Gishu squatters.
- 475 Settlement for Salama location people.
- 482 Land title deeds: Sagana settlers.
- 487 Land consolidation Ikolomani.
- 499 Money for land consolidation and land registration:  
Machakos.

- 512 Cotton and sisal planters: Makueni.
- 523 Settlement scheme for Pakot in Tans Nzoia.
- 533 Land consolidation: North Mugirango.
- 558 Money spent on self-help schemes.
- 570 Financial aid for Roka settlement.
- 583 Mount Kenya forest for settlement.
- 622 Land settlement: Kitui.
- 623 Land consolidation: Central Nyanza.
- 654 Land consolidation in Embu south.
- 667 Settlement schemes Kamba.
- 675 Settlement schemes for Tindoret squatters.

#### HEALTH

##### National Focus:

- 150 Shortage of doctors.
- 158 Measures to encourage the birth-rate.
- 187 Mung cancer cases in Kenya.
- 188 Legislation to stop smoking.
- 211 Security for Mathari Mental Hospital staff.
- 213 Discharges from Mathari Mental Hospital.
- 229 Nairobi clinics; Nocites in vernaculars.
- 238 Kenya qualified doctors from Makerere.
- 268 Medical practitioners licence.
- 285 Princess Elizabeth Hospital: closure of buildings.
- 413 Number of nurses training overseas.
- 439 Free medical treatment; government policy.
- 442 Voluntary agencies hospitals.
- 498 Employment of nurses.
- 670 Insurance companies in Kenya.
- 693 Illegal practices in medical profession.
- 714 Preventive drugs for sleeping sickness.
- 721 Free medical treatment.
- 780 Charges by medical practitioners.
- 794 Legislation for compulsory medical diagnosis.

##### Local Focus:

- 218 Construction of Kisumu hospital.
- 249 Discharge of patients from coast regional hospitals.
- 300 Malarial mosquitoes in Nyanza.
- 370 Eradication of disease in Tana River.
- 506 Clinics in Tana River.
- 516 Hospitals in Turkana district.
- 555 Circumcision by force among the Abaluhya.
- 572 Karatina Medical Hospital.

- 573 Modernization of Karatina Mathera Hospital.
- 575 Mental illness: Taita-Taveta.
- 631 Financial aid: Sega Rangala Hospitals.
- 649 Kala-zar in Kitui district.
- 683 More beds for Nyeri Hospital.
- 709 Enlargement of Butere dispensary.
- 724 Patients uniforms: Kisii hospitals.
- 725 Extension of Ithero health center.

## APPENDIX III

A NOTE ON THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF ADOLESCENTS TO ENLISTMENT  
IN INSPIRED CASES

The significance of the nineteen forties for the youth of that era has a significant bearing on modern Kenya politics. In a sample of 103 of the 117 elected Members of the House of Representatives, the average age at the time of election was 35.2 years. Exclusive of the seventeen Cabinet Ministers, the average age was 33.6 years. If fifteen is accepted as the average for initiation into the manhood of traditional society, the majority of House Members came to maturity during the mid-forties. Even allowance for a six year distortion in age because many members were either unsure of their age or for traditional reasons wanted to appear older or younger, members came to maturity between the date of proscription of the old Kikuyu Central Association (1940) and the beginning of the emergency regulations (1952).

Erikson in Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Norton and Co. 1962) and in his Childhood and Society (New York: Norton and Co. 1950), makes constant reference to the major crisis of adolescence. He refers to this crisis as one of identity which, "occurs in that period in the life cycle when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes for his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him other judge and expect him to be." Erikson argues that during such transitional period young people are particularly susceptible to enlistment in inspired causes.

The evidence collected suggests that the 1940's was particularly crucial in that respect. For many young Kenyans, the "effective childhood remnants" were confused since change was occurring in their lives with regard to association to traditional norms that were not congruent with what they were learning in the mission schools. The

changing nature of the African community was not providing clear indication of what "others expected of him." There were not clear guidelines, but the return of Kenyatta provided a symbol, a man of both worlds. The interview responses as to the reasons for Kenyatta's popularity given by members of parliament and students interviewed at Syracuse University supported this hypothesis about the basis for Kenyatta's charisma.

As to the creation of political clubs on the campuses of the secondary schools and the political interest stimulated in debate societies, the political activity of the Kenya African Union (KAU) provided an object of emulation that could not be duplicated by reference to the traditional Kiama which had ceased to be an effective powerholder. Politics was exciting to the young men who became the political leaders of the 1960's. It provided a focus for their interests and energies which was not found elsewhere in society.

Pursuing this question further, an investigation was made of some of those people who did not seem able to forge "some working unity" out of their lives and either voluntarily or otherwise had been committed to Kenya's only mental hospital, Mathari. A sample of 100 male patients (13% of the national total) of all certified male patients was selected at random. In addition to recording their case histories, visits to the wards permitted opportunity to talk with some of the patients about their conception of the illnesses in terms of traditional understandings. In the wards, conversations were limited to Kikuyu since my personal knowledge of both Kikuyu language and culture was greatest.

It was discovered that most of the patients believed they were afflicted with thahu, ceremonial uncleanness in the traditional sense. Yet despite this association of illness with traditional custom, the patients studied had an overall level of education of nearly four years, 3.66. Of the 63 who had schooling, the average years of education rose to 5.57 or nearly through Standard VI. The average age of those 63 patients was 27.6 years, meaning they did their primary schooling during the late forties and early fifties. This represented an extremely high level of education for that period when one considers that as late as 1964 only

12.7% of the eligible children were receiving education to Standard V in Kenya. The random sample suggested that the patients confined at Mathari were more highly educated than the national average and the 63% who had any schooling had gone through their primary education concurrently with or slightly after the present Kenya leadership.

The type of behavior most often found among the patients studied was schizophrenia. This was the official diagnosis offered by Dr. B.K.A. Crawford, staff psychiatrist. He stated further that the form of pathological behavior differed from the symptoms found in Western mental illness by the suddenness of withdrawal from society. In talking with patients in the wards it was found that many preserved visions of going back to school, back to a job in Nairobi or to work for President Kenyatta. It was common for the patients to think they were big political figures and the common test for subjective orientation was, "Can you name men in the government?" Often while being oblivious to all else going on around them, patients would name not only Kenyatta but a number of other leading politicians.

The conclusion from this preliminary investigation and the data gathered from interviews with the present political leaders suggests the powerful influence of politics and things political on the socialization process of young Kenyans who were lucky enough to be in school. Beyond that general conclusion there are a series of implications for future inquiry about the management of intra-personal tensions in cultures undergoing rapid systemic change.

## APPENDIX IV:

Outline Form Used in Summarizing Interview Data  
on Members of the House of Representatives of  
the Kenya Parliament

## PERSONALITY ANALYSIS SHEET

NO.

NAME:

PARTY:

CONSTITUENCY:

TRIBE:

AGE:

DATE OF RITUAL INITIATION:

FATHER'S OCCUPATION:

FAMILY:

Monogamous

Number of brothers and sisters

CHURCH AFFILIATION:

SCHOOLING:

Primary

Secondary

Teacher Training

University

Overseas

Other

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SCHOOLING WAS OBTAINED:

MARRIED:

NUMBER OF CHILDREN:

LANDOWNER:

NUMBER OF ACRES HELD:

OCCUPATIONS:

DATE ENTERED POLITICS:

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ENTERED POLITICS:

INFLUENCES:

People

Reading

Specific events

REASONS FOR SUCCESS IN POLITICS:



PARTY OFFICES HELD:

MEANS OF MAINTAINING CONSTITUENCY CONTACT:

---

GREATEST PROBLEM FACING KENYA:

WHY IS THIS THE GREATEST PROBLEM FACING KENYA:

OTHER PROBLEMS: (ranked)

- 1.
  - 2.
  - 3.
  - 4.
- 

WHAT IS YOUR OUTLINE OF SOLUTIONS TO MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS:

---

## APPENDIX V

Interview Responses of Forty Members of the Kenya House of Representatives to the Questions: "What is the major problem facing Kenya today?" and "What are other major problems facing Kenya?", May-June, 1964.

This data collected in the field has been excluded from the body of the thesis, but it does offer some minor supporting evidence concerning the performance of representatives in the House. The reasons for placing little reliance on the statements of the interviewees are as follows:

- A. The sample is too small to constitute a dependable survey of elite attitudes.
- B. In interviewing the representatives, the impression was strong that few men had clearly thought out their political positions, and, therefore, their views on the important issues of the day were likely to change rather casually.
- C. The focus of this study is a two year period, and these responses were collected in two months. The dynamic quality of Kenya politics saw much change during the two year period that was studied. To use these responses as a valid basis for judging attitudes during the entire period would be a distortion of the responses themselves.

Therefore, the text of the study emphasizes only the concerns of the representatives which were most prominent from the public record of the parliament or the mass media: tribalism, anti-colonialism, and hope for development of the welfare and economic aspects of the society. As is indicated in the responses listed below, the interviews were helpful in identifying these three key areas, while more comprehensive data from other sources backed up the validity of the general concern felt by representatives for the three areas listed.

As the problems are listed, the representatives concern for ridding the country of the vestiges of colonialism is not apparent except in a tangential way as related to problems of land settlement schemes. The impact of tribalism is readily observable, however. With regard to the third point of political orthodoxy, the skewed interest of the backbenchers over "fulfillment of pre-independence promises" as well as the more direct references to need for development, need for employment opportunity, educational facilities, health facilities, and economic planning with adequate technical personnel is support for the point developed in the text.

DESIGNATION OF MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING KENYA AS SEEN BY  
MINISTERS, ASSISTANT MINISTERS, AND BACKBENCHERS

	Ministers	Assistant Ministers	Backbenchers
Tribalism	1	4	6
Unemployment	2	3	4
Land settlement schemes	0	0	3
Foreign influence	0	1	1
Education	1	0	1
Economic planning	2	3	2
Fulfilling the promises	0	0	7
Lack of technical personnel	1	0	0
	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>22</u>

MAJOR AND SUBSIDIARY PROBLEMS FACING KENYA AS SEEN BY FORTY  
MEMBERS OF THE KENYA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMPOSITE  
OF ALL RESPONSES GIVEN.

	Rank Order					Total
	I	II	III*	IV	V	
Tribalism	11	8	6	5	0	30
Unemployment	9	4	4	2	1	20
Land settlement	3	6	5	0	0	14
Foreign influence	2	4	3	1	2	12
Education	2	5	2	2	0	11
Economic planning	5	5	0	0	0	10
Fulfilling the promises	7	0	0	0	0	7
Lack of technical personnel	1	1	0	0	0	2
Health facilities	0	0	1	0	0	2
Crime/shifta	0	4	0	0	0	4
	<u>40</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>112</u>

\*many interviewees could not or did not care to list more than two problems.

Concluding, the responses were insightful and useful in providing guidelines to seek more comprehensive evidence, but the responses did not have the empirical strength to justify elaborate conclusions about the attitudes of political elites.

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- Gaciatta, Abraham L., Member of Parliament for Nyambene South, Nairobi, July 15, 1964.
- Gataguta, Joseph Kararaje, Member of Parliament for Kikuyu and Chairman of the Transport Licencing Board, Nairobi, July 17, 1964.
- Heater, Russell, Political Officer, United States Embassy, intermittent conversations, June 1964-June 1965.
- Kaggia, Bildad, Member of Parliament for Kandara, Nairobi, July 25, 1964.
- Kali, J. David, Member of Parliament for Doonholm, Nairobi, June 23, 1964.
- Kamau, John C., General Secretary of the Christian Council of Kenya, February 1964 - July 1965, intermittent conversations.

Kamunde, Simon, Member of Parliament for Meru Central and Assistant Minister for information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Nairobi, July 1, 1964.

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Kibaki, Mwai, Member of Parliament for Nairobi East, Assistant Minister for Economic Planning and Development, and Assistant Executive Officer of KANU Nairobi, July 16, 1964.

Kitule, Dennis, Deacon, African Brotherhood Church, conversations, February-June 1965.

Kubai, Frederick, Member of Parliament for Nakuru East and Assistant Minister for Labour and Social Services, Nairobi, June 22, 1964.

Low, G. Michael, intermittent conversations, Narrosurra Farm, February-July, 1965.

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