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THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM AS FACTORS AMONG KENYAN

INTELLIGENTSIA IN KENYA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS,

1957-1966

A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

By

Jason Nyariki Orwenyo

Washington, D.C.

August 1973

Thesis 4299

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL



The dissertation of Jason Nyariki Orwenyo entitled

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submitted to the department of History in partial

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AN ABSTRACT

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM AS FACTORS AMONG KENYAN
INTELLIGENTSIA IN KENYA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS,
1957-1966

By

Jason Nyariki Orwenyo

This is a case study of Kenyan intelligentsia and its relations with the Soviet Union in the decade between 1957 and 1966, when Kenyans found themselves involved with the issues of the Soviet Union and Communism and the West's challenge to them.

The British Colonial Government in Kenya had been expressing its concern over possible Communist influence in Kenya for some time. In 1958, a year after the first fourteen Africans were elected to the Legislative Council, they were asked to collaborate with the British Government and the West in keeping Communism out of Kenya. The majority of those Africans, most of whom became cabinet and high Government officials in the 1960's pledged to use all their powers to block Communism. Others were cautious and skeptical. The climax came in 1966 when the Kenya Government decided to purge from the party and the Government those politicians who advocated

strengthening relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

During the struggle for political independence, the leftist intelligentsia blamed the West for Kenya's and Africa's problems. They pointed out the shameful and disappointing role of the West in Africa: in the days of slavery it depopulated and disrupted Africa and depicted Africans as inferiors before the world. During the colonial period it deprived Africa of its wealth. The Kenyan intelligentsia argued that if Africa was to achieve any level of meaningful interdependence with the rest of the world it must first of all establish strong relations with the Communists. Of course, this intention was declared publicly before and after independence. Accordingly, Soviet Africanists were convinced that under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga, the president and vice-president of the ruling Kenya African National Union, Kenya would follow a noncapitalist path of development.

After independence, the leftist intelligentsia began to intensify Kenya's relations with the Soviet Union by reaching several agreements on technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation. These included sending three hundred Kenyans annually to study in the Soviet

Union, constructing various projects to help industrialize Kenya, providing weapons and training to strengthen Kenya's army, and training political cadres in Kenya. But under Tom Mboya's leadership, Kenya's right wing and its Western collaborators undertook calculated measures that disrupted the Kenyan socialists' and the Soviets' plans.

Western countries used their opportunities well and thereby became the major influence on Kenya politically, ideologically, economically, socially, militarily, and culturally. In the meantime, as the Kenyan progressive intelligentsia was purged from the ruling party and the Government, their Soviet contacts were expelled from Kenya.

The overall strategy of the Soviet Union aimed at neutralizing Kenya (and ultimately Eastern and Central Africa) from Western influence. But, whatever good intentions it might have had toward Kenya, the Soviet Union was dealt a strong blow by the West, which had anticipated its move and was well prepared to meet its challenge. Thus, the Soviets suffered a severe setback in Kenya in 1966, not because they were ill-advised or their activities ineffectual, but largely because their defeat was directed from the West, with coordinated execution in Kenya.

This investigation comes to the conclusion that regardless of how efficient Soviet diplomacy might have been, the West was bound to win, at least temporarily. Moreover, beginning with the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's, the right wing in the country projected and advanced the feeling that to Africa colonialism was an evil but, by the same token, Communism was the worst of the "imperialist" evils. In that effort the Soviet Union and Communism were viewed as sides of the same coin, and hence they were to suffer the same fate. On the other hand, "socialism" was agreed upon by all segments in the country as their goal. What the Kenyan leftists did not succeed in doing was to convince the public at large of the necessary relationship between any Kenyan socialism and the "scientific socialism" that they advocated. The masses, not understanding the nature of the ideological division in the country, naturally sided with the Government under the leadership of the national hero, Jomo Kenyatta. Had the masses clearly understood the path of development which the government was following, some of them may not have supported President Kenyatta.

PREFACE

When colonialism seemed on its way out in Africa, the Soviet Union, as other countries previously denied access to Africa, saw an opportunity to establish relations with the emerging nations. How the West and its friends in Kenya handled the Soviet Union's overtures to Kenya is the central investigation of this study. The lessons drawn from the task could have considerable application in the Third World countries.

The bulk of this research was done through facilities provided by the Library of Congress, for which I am most grateful. I would like to acknowledge the counsel and guidance of my adviser, Professor Joseph Schiebel, and the other two members of the board: Professor Joseph S. Sebes and Dr. T. Stephen Cheston, Assistant Dean of the Graduate School. I am also very grateful to Dr. Samir M. Soghby and Mrs. Mildred Balima of the Library of Congress for their criticisms, suggestions and encouragement; and Mrs. Mary Dyer, of our Graduate School Office, whose initial valuable editing and typing was the source of my initial encouragement in the preparation of this dissertation. However, although the above might

have influenced me, none of them bears any responsibility for errors or misinterpretations that might appear in the text.

Finally, I am extremely grateful for the continuous inspiration from my beloved parents, Jusuf and Sibiah N. Orwenyo, back home in Kenya.

Washington, D.C.

August 1973

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the Kenyan intelligentsia and its preoccupation with the Soviet Union and Communism in the period between 1957 and 1966. Political, economic, cultural, social, and military factors will be considered. Central is the debate on choosing a form of development for Kenya: would it be capitalist or socialist?

In the study of the term "intelligentsia" includes those Kenyans, members of the elite, who aspired to independent thinking. Thus, it included politicians, trade unionists, civil servants, independent professional people, students, and other non-manual employees above the clerical level. In this period the Kenyan intelligentsia developed an awareness that transcended ideological and political, and usually even tribal, differences. The first of the major groups was composed of left-wing nationalist militants who were often referred to as "socialists" or "progressives" and were Eastern-oriented. The other group was composed of right-wing nationalist conservatives who were Western-oriented.

It should be no surprise that in this study such

terms as "imperialists," "capitalists," "neocolonialists," "stooges," "Communists," "socialists," "progressives," "rightists," "leftists," "exploitation," "economic independence," and the like occur over and over again. Those who used them knew well what they meant. What East and West stood for was understood by Kenyans; those who took sides understood the issues at stake.

In order to understand the way in which Moscow dealt with the Kenyan intelligentsia, the reader must understand the assumptions by which the Soviet Union has conducted its foreign affairs. Soviet foreign policy, as Joseph Schiebel and other experts on the Soviet Union agree, is dynamic, aggressive, complex, and flexible. In Kenya this approach, as in other areas of the world, "crucially affected the dynamics of international relations because the Soviets [took] initiatives and created realities which . . . necessitated responses by the other powers."¹

The Kenyan intelligentsia came from diverse backgrounds, but they cooperated in the fight against colonialism. As it is shown in this study the left-wing of

¹Joseph Schiebel, "Convergence or Confrontation?" The Intercollegiate Review, V, No. 2 (Winter, 1968-69), p. 101.

this intelligentsia saw its task as continuing the fight against colonialism, as well as against capitalism. Thus they saw in the Soviet Union a pragmatic group of problem-solvers to whom they should turn for aid.² But the right-wing Kenyans, having been brought up in the Western value system, maintained that the Soviet Union was still primarily a revolutionary state, and was thus to be feared. This study tries to demonstrate the magnitude and the uniqueness of this split in the Kenyan intelligentsia.

Chapter I deals with those theoretical materials on the national-liberation movement that bear on our case study, primarily those of Marx and Engels on the path from colonialism to socialism. Background material on Russia's path to socialism is provided where it relates directly or indirectly to Kenya's problem. The debate on the noncapitalist path of development are also meaningful to our case study.

Chapter II deals with the growth of ideology in Kenya before the 1960's. It shows how the Soviet Union came to be regarded as a friend of Kenya in the struggle against colonialism, and how African leaders found themselves taking sides in the Cold War.

²Ibid., p. 102.

Chapter III begins with Kenyatta as the center of the struggle for independence. The Kenya African Nation Union (KANU), which represented this Eastward movement, had among its members the strongest supporters of the West in people such as Tom Mboya. But it was the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which was accused of collaborating with the Western "imperialists," as KANU was accused of "Communism."

Chapter IV begins with the independence-era enthusiasm regarding the East. The socialist-minded Kenyans concluded agreements with the Soviet Union. But the Western-oriented Kenyans in turn created problems for the Soviet Union in implementing its agreements.

Chapter V shows how one of the earliest and most promising areas of contact, that of educating Kenyans in the Soviet Union, plunged Kenya into the Cold War. Equally bad, upsetting to Soviet-Kenyan relations, was the situation in Nairobi, where Moscow's Lumumba Institute in Nairobi was violently attacked as a source of subversion.

Chapter VI describes how the Western-oriented Kenyans collaborated with their Western supporters to limit Moscow's involvement and influence in Kenya. Three events stand out: the merger of KANU and KADU into a

strongly Western-oriented party; the adoption of an "African socialist" development plan that contained many capitalistic elements; and the failure of the leftists' ideas on land reform to win acceptance. Despite much opposition it was adopted by the Kenya Parliament. As a result, the socialist Kenya People's Union was founded.

One question that the reader might ask himself is the role of the masses in all these events. The answer is to be found in African social, political, economic, and intellectual history, which closely resembles that of "Asiatic" society. Both societies have been referred to, in certain scholarly circles, as "Oriental"; that is, an autocratic state dominating a "weak" society lacking secure political and property rights and thus unable to force social and political change.³ Indeed, Soviet Africanists agree with this description although they refrain from using the term.

The author approaches this topic with a full awareness of the dangers involved. Some of the events are linked to certain personalities who, because their

³ Joseph Schiebel, "Aziatchina: The Controversy Concerning the Nature of Russian Society and the Organization of the Bolshevik Party," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History: University of Washington, Seattle, 1972), p. IV.

activities and political decisions effected fundamental changes that determined Kenya's direction. Accordingly, this author is duty bound to consider such personalities with forbearance and charity. Because of the general unavailability of some of the material, more frequent use of quotations is made than would otherwise be necessary.

Concerning the Russian transliteration, an attempt has been made to follow the Library of Congress system, but the task becomes trying when it is found that some Soviet-English journals have the same names of the same authors in different transliteration. In such a case the latter holds.

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE SOVIET POLICY

It is constantly asserted that the foreign policy stance of the Soviet Union to the Third World countries is that of a socialist country. This policy, it is claimed, is founded on Marxism-Leninism. Since our case is that of Kenya, we deal with Africa in particular; but there is considerable emphasis on the Afro-Asian countries. The problems discussed in this chapter are universal in the countries generally referred to as Oriental, or Asiatic, society.

Marx-Engels' Views on the Nature of the Oriental Society

Marx and Engels did not deal specifically with Africa in their principal writings or in their numerous newspaper articles and correspondence. Their writings on India and China, as well as references to the "barbarians," "semi-barbarians," "nations of peasants," and "the East," could be broadly applied to Africa's case. Marx and Engels, like other European scholars of their time, had some difficulty in using such undifferentiated

characteristic classification. As Hegel saw, in these countries of the East "we see duration, stability--Empires belonging to mere space as it were [as distinguished from time]--unhistorical history."¹ In his view, these countries were not undergoing any changes in themselves, but were engaging themselves in ceaseless destructive conflicts with one another.² In the same way Marx held that this Oriental society "has no history at all, at least no known history" and that what we refer to as history "is but the history of successive invaders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society."³ Considering such a situation, Marx welcomed the mission of British colonialism for "re-generating--the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia" despite its "destructive" aspects.⁴ Marx was convinced that "Oriental empires always show an un-

¹G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, with Prefaces by Charles Hegel, transl. by J. Sibree (Rev. ed.; New York: Willey Book Company, 1944), p. 105.

²Ibid., p. 106.

³Shlomo Avineri (ed. with an Introduction), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Despatches and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 125.

⁴Ibid.

changing social infrastructure coupled with unceasing change in persons who manage to ascribe to themselves the political superstructure."⁵ Thus, in his view, like that of other European intellectuals of his time, history meant man's changing his environment. Accordingly, if there was no change, there was no history and in such a setting man simply remained a pure natural being.⁶

From Marx's analysis of the general features of the East, the Oriental society was, in the first place, unchanging and stagnant, and, in the second place, stationary because of its unique mode of production based on common ownership of property.⁷ Indeed, the following characteristics have been generally accepted from the views of Marx and Engels, and other scholars in this field, as pertaining to Oriental society:

1. The absence of private property in land.
2. The necessity for artificial irrigation and concomitant need for large-scale public works.
3. The village commune as a basic social structure.
4. Despotism as a form of government.⁸

⁵ Ibid., p. 418.

⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

⁸ Joseph Schiebél, "Aziatchina: The Controversy

Along with China and India, Marx and Engels included Russia as a prime example of Oriental despotism. In the case of Russia, for a long time there has been controversy as to the nature--political, economic, and social conditions--of its society, specifically as regards the effects of the Mongol invasion on Russian development, the nature of Russian "feudalism," and the character of the "Russian autocracy."⁹ Both Plekhanov and Lenin essentially accepted the notion of Oriental--or Asiatic--society in Russia, as did Trotsky and a host of others.¹⁰ Later the leaders of the Soviet Union would have preferred discussion on this subject, particularly as it concerned Russia, to gradually disappear, but this did not happen. Since then there have been follow-ups on the subject. For example, in 1931 a discussion was held in Leningrad which, among other things, attempted to answer the question of how Communists should understand the social relations of those countries that had been designated by Marx and others as having an Asiatic mode of production.¹¹ Be-

Concerning the Nature of Russian Society and the Organization of the Bolshevik Party," (Unpublished dissertation: Seattle: University of Washington, 1972), p. 7.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 2-5.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 3-5. Also, M. Godes (ed.), Diskussia

ginning in 1965, along with the discussions on precapitalist social systems of the East, a discussion on "Oriental despotism" was supplemented in the periodical Narody Azii i Afriki, and it continued throughout the 1960's.¹² Beginning in 1970, a new discussion, on the role of geographical factors in the history of the East, was also started.¹³

Ironically, it should be pointed out here that E. Iolk (a minor participant) criticized Karl A. Wittfogel at the 1931 Leningrad discussion because of his "obsequiousness toward geographic factors"; Iolk then claimed that "Wittfogel has particularly sinned."¹⁴ The Chairman of the discussion, M. Godes, also criticized Wittfogel for concentrating on the mode of production and the powers of production and for excluding the relations of production and the class structure and the class question.¹⁵ But what Wittfogel was suggesting was that bureaucracy in China up to 1930's was in fact a ruling class. Similarly,

ob Aziatskom Sposobi Proizvodstva (Moscow-Leningrad: 1931), p. 27.

¹²V. N. Nikiforov, "Istoricheskaia problematika v zhurnale Narody Azii i Afriki (1968-1970gg), "Voprosy Istorii, No. 10 (October, 1970), p. 160.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Quoted by Schiebel, "Aziatchina," op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁵Ibid.

he was indicating that by implication in fact, from its "Asiatic heritage," the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were some sort of a ruling managerial bureaucracy.¹⁶ Later, even some Soviet citizens saw Stalinism as a system of "personal despotism."¹⁷

In his research, Karl A. Wittfogel arrived at the conclusion that Africa did belong to the camp of Oriental despotism.¹⁸ According to the Marxist description Africa met two major characteristics of Oriental society: "leaving. . . to the central government the care of the great public works, the prime condition of. . . agriculture and commerce" and the population "dispersed. . . over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in small centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits."¹⁹ Further, according to Marx's findings, the village communities had "always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism."²⁰ Of course,

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 27-34.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁸He did this in his scholarly research in the book: Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

¹⁹Quoted by Schiebel, "Aziatchina," op. cit., p. 25.

²⁰Ibid. Also, Avineri, op. cit., p. 88.

village communities have always been a prevailing feature in Africa, and the land there was of communal ownership. With this understanding it is not surprising that the leadership of the Soviet regime referred to the Asia and Africa as "the East."

Since Oriental society was composed of weak and stagnant masses that were unable to resist the unlimited powers of the state--largely because of an absence of political and property rights--Marx and Engels began to see European colonialism, undesirable as it might have been, as a rescue from the system.

Marx and Engels on Colonialism

The basics of Marx's and Engels' views on colonialism pertain to the problems of the national-liberation movement. In this case the progressive faction of the colonizers is the bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels saw the role of the bourgeoisie in the Oriental society in this light, as they wrote in the Communist Manifesto:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie. . . draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery--

with which. . . it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production. . . to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world of its own image. . . .²¹

The above quotation's essence would fit the situation in Africa from the end of the last century to the 1960's. Of course, Kenya would be one of the best examples.

Thus, through either dependence or interdependence, the bourgeoisie begins to revolutionize the masses. Marx and Engels were convinced that because Oriental society does not develop internally, it cannot evolve toward capitalism through the dialectics of internal change. Since the ultimate victory of socialism depends upon the prior universalization of capitalism, it naturally follows that despite the unfortunate aspects of European colonial expansionism, it was nevertheless a necessary step toward socialism. The horrors of European colonialism are dialectically necessary for the world revolution of the proletariat because Oriental society might not be able to emancipate itself.²²

Marx and Engels strongly felt that the non-European society was a drag on the progress of history

²¹Avineri, op. cit., pp. 31-33.

²²Ibid., p. 12.

and a serious threat to the realization of socialism. In this context there seemed to prevail a notion that the European proletariat might have to take over some colonies to prepare them quickly for independence so that they would begin to lay the foundation on which to build socialism. In an 1882 letter to Karl Kautsky, Engels emphasized the point that in colonial policy both English workers and bourgeoisie thought alike; he then added: "The countries occupied by a European population--Canada, the Cape, Australia--will all become independent; on the other hand, countries inhabited by a native population. . . are simply subjected. . . ." ²³ But while he was hopeful that the non-European countries would be taken over "by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence" he added that "how this process will develop is difficult to see." ²⁴

Along with colonization the question of modernization was given attention by both Marx and Engels. In 1851, Engels, at Marx' request, wrote an article entitled "Persia-China" in which he showed that defensive moderni-

²³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 423.

²⁴ Ibid.

zation introduced by the rulers of the East did not succeed because modernization of a few uncoordinated sectors of society was not enough. He stressed that the whole of the Oriental society had to be overhauled if modernization of the East was to succeed. Purely political or administrative reforms alone would be insufficient; a total change in socioeconomic relations was necessary. The social revolutions Marx and Engels saw as necessary for non-European societies were essentially European and bourgeois. Moreover, since their socialism had descended dialectically from European bourgeois civilization, they saw no need to look for origins of that socialism in the Oriental "nations of peasants." By this reasoning, "Chinese Communism," "Indian socialism," "Arab socialism," "African socialism," or any other types of national socialism have no place in Marxist theory and hence make little sense in its history.²⁵ Despite all their understanding of non-European society, Marx and Engels remained European-oriented thinkers, and their insights into Oriental society were never reconciled and incorporated into their general philosophy of history, which remained--

²⁵Ibid., pp. 25, 26.

like Hegel's--determined by the European experience and the Western historical consciousness.²⁶ Neither Marx nor Engels romanticized the Oriental society despite the obvious brutality, cruelty, and inhumanity of the European masters. They saw little worth in preserving Oriental society, which to them represented a barbarian stage of human development, and one that had become stagnant for a long time.²⁷

What Marx and Engels would have advocated in Kenya would have been modernization, and, as we have described above, it would have to be along Western lines. Such was the policy that the colonial-settler government pledged to force the Kenyan Africans to.

Marx and Engels on Russia's Path to Socialism

The controversy surrounding the national-liberation movements of the developing countries in the post-World War II era was in large measure attributable to Marx and Engels. They set the pattern, repeated so often even a century later, for a peculiar alteration of inflexibility and then ambivalence regarding a choice of

²⁶Ibid., p. 28.

²⁷Ibid., p. 22.

methodology for the achievement of a socialist state. As far as the socialist revolution in Russia was concerned, Marx and Engels knew that they were faced with a two-part problem: first, that Russia was semi-Asiatic in her geographic situation, manners, traditions, and institutions, and second, the divisiveness of the Russian intelligentsia, particularly the Populists.

The Russian Populists had for a long time worked closely with Marx and Engels before the Russian Marxists came into being. The Populists had virtually accepted Marxism in principle, but partly because of competitiveness and partly from nationalistic feelings, they did not adopt a Marxist label. This created problems as to which group Marx and Engels would support when those who claimed to be real "Marxists" sought recognition. When Marx and Engels proved to be ambivalent about choosing sides or reluctant to settle the controversy, they had good reason for so behaving.

This same evasiveness and ambivalence was evident in the late 1950's and in the 1960's when the Soviet leaders found themselves faced with the dilemma of whom to support: whether to commit themselves to certain of

the "progressive"²⁸ parties or to give total support to the weak Communist parties.

As early as 1853, Marx and Engels had been convinced that all the countries of Western Europe would follow the same path of development toward socialism, but they were not so certain about Russia, largely because of the constraints on her development resulting from her semi-Asiatic society. Although Marx and Engels tried to be ambivalent about which path Russia should follow to socialism, sometimes they were pressed to comment on the possibility of a socialist revolution in Russia. At one point Engels was asked to comment on the conviction that "at the present time a social revolution could be made in Russia with the greatest of ease, much more easily than in Western Europe."²⁹ Engels responded with ridicule and asked whether it were "permissible for one over twelve years of age to imagine the course of a revolution in such an utterly childish manner."³⁰ Thus Engels seemed

²⁸Throughout this study, the word "progressive" will be used to mean and imply men, ideas, movements, and events that aid Communism. This is based on the argument constantly raised by the Communists that, since the proletariat represents the future, whatever aids the realization of its dictatorship is "progressive," and whatever hinders it is "reactionary."

²⁹Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Three Volumes (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 387.

³⁰Ibid.

to shun completely any possibility of revolutions in states beleaguered by "Oriental despotism. . . from India to Russia."³¹

However, this did not stop the Russian intelligentsia from repeatedly demanding Marx and Engels to determine the better of the alternatives to socialism for Russia. Although the most outspoken were the Populists, other Russian intelligentsia shared their view that Russia should skip the capitalist stage of historical development. Marx guardedly agreed that different roads could lead to socialism under good leadership; but he also warned that strikingly analogous events "in different historical surroundings" have been known to have "led to different results."³² This ambiguity was the basis for the stands taken by Soviet theoreticians, party leaders, and journalists, who, when confronted with the heterogeneous realities of the African situation--different states and individual national leaders--were reluctant to let their rigid ideas undergo some modifications here and there.

³¹ Ibid., p. 394.

³² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 377.

It was not only the Populists who were troubled by the question of Russia's direct leap to socialism; it also occupied some of the early Russian Marxists. In 1881 Vera Zasulich went so far as to implore Marx to settle authoritatively, once and for all, the debate over the commune. While Marx seemed rather evasive, in his reply he nevertheless left no doubt that the peasant commune could serve as a base for Russian socialism:

. . . I hope a few lines will suffice to remove all doubt in your mind about the misunderstanding concerning my so-called theory.

[From my writings] the "historical inevitability" of this movement [capitalist production] is expressly limited to the countries of Western Europe.

. . . Thus the analysis given in 'Capital' assigns no reason for or against the vitality of the rural community, but the special research into this subject which I have conducted, the material for which I obtained from original sources, has convinced me that this community is the mainspring of Russia's social regeneration, . . .³³

While these views were being debated, Russia was in the throes of a revolution. The new Soviet leaders under Lenin began to expound the theory that backward countries, such as those of Asia and Africa, could "go over to the Soviet system through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through

³³Ibid., pp. 411-412.

the capitalist stage."³⁴ Commenting specifically on Africa, the leading Soviet Africanist, Professor Ivan I. Potekhin, suggested that "in certain circumstances the preservation of communal land ownership may facilitate the cooperation of peasant households and in that way the transition to socialism."³⁵

Marx and Engels had intentionally decided to remain vague as to whom they really supported in Russia because of the determined terrorism of the Populists, which they agreed was needed in a country like Russia. Professor Richard Pipes has written that Marx and Engels backed the Populists because of the two cardinal tenets of their doctrine, that is, "the possibility of Russia's bypassing the capitalist stage, and the feasibility of a revolutionary seizure of power."³⁶ However, they did not forget the dangers of the "unexampled despotism"³⁷

³⁴V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Vol. XXX (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 153-154. [Hereafter, all Lenin's Collected Works in this edition will be simply referred to by volume and page numbers.]

³⁵I. I. Potekhin, African Problems: Analysis of Eminent Soviet Scientist (Moscow: "Nauka" Publishing House, 1968), p. 66.

³⁶Richard Pipes, "Russian Marxism and Its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century," The Russian Review, IXX, No. 4 (October, 1960), p. 325.

³⁷Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, op. cit., p. 460.

in Russia. On this point Professor Joseph Schiebel declared that because of such "unexampled despotism," any efforts to change her could not be totally successful because it is like an attempt to "change the unchangeable."³⁸

The interesting question to raise at this point is: If Marx and Engels were not impressed with the arguments regarding Russia's separate path to socialism, would they have encouraged separate paths for other less developed countries? From our discussion above, there are some hints that they did not discourage such development, and that they even occasionally gave it their token support. This provides the basis for the activities of the Soviet Union in the developing countries.

The evasiveness and ambivalence of Marx and Engels on this question came to trouble Russian Marxists more seriously in the first decade of the twentieth century. Plekhanov, who is widely regarded as the father of Russian Marxism, conceived of a plan that involved a two-stage transition to socialism. During the first stage, socialists had to cooperate with other social groups in a

³⁸Joseph Schiebel, "Changing the Unchangeable: Historical Materialism and Six Versions of Eternal Laws of Historical Development," Studies in Soviet Thought, VII, No. 4 (December, 1967), pp. 318, 331.

united front against the autocracy. The aim would be to win general political and civil liberties, while at the same time organizing a large and powerful labor party. Second, having transformed Russia into a Western-style democracy, the socialists with the help of the labor movement would wrestle power from the possessing classes and thus establish socialism.³⁹

Lenin and His Followers: Their Views

On the other hand, in the Populist tradition, Lev Davidovich Trotsky, while in the process of developing his famous theory of "permanent revolution"--in cooperation with the Russo-German socialist Alexander Helphand Parvus--argued that Russia could very well skip a phase in the Marxist scheme of development. In his view, because of the peculiarities of Russian historical development, a dynamic revolution would destroy the autocracy and at the same time sweep away Russia's weak capitalistic and incipient bourgeois order. Because of Russia's socioeconomic backwardness, the bourgeois revolution would end as a socialist revolution, thus making the two revolutions more or less coincide--and making what

³⁹Pipes, op. cit., pp. 327, 328.

had started as a bourgeois revolution, end as a socialist one.⁴⁰ Lenin remained his ideological opponent until 1917, when he at last explicitly expressed the same views and carried them out.

As far back as 1905, Lenin had come close to the suggestion that reliance on the Russian bourgeois to develop an advanced capitalist order was doomed to failure because its background had not prepared it for the capitalist role. Lenin proposed to accomplish the coup for power by advocating the nationalization of land, but with the slogan "land to the tillers"; he created the impression that the land would in fact be distributed freely to the peasants. In accepting this strategy of seeking an alliance between the weak proletariat and the potentially powerful Russian peasantry, Plekhanov pointed out in 1906 that the resulting dictatorship of a minority over the majority resembled the old Oriental despotism. Lenin stressed that a reappearance of the old Asiatic despotism would be avoided by making sure that the newly established dictatorship would not have a standing army, secret police,

⁴⁰Rolf H. W. Theen, "The Idea of the Revolutionary States: Tkachev, Trotsky, and Lenin," The Russian Review, XXXI, No. 4 (October, 1972), p. 392.

or bureaucracy.⁴¹ As time elapsed Lenin found out that neither the bourgeoisie nor the workers would respond to Marxism, and so he reverted to the tight, secret, and professional revolutionary organization. This shift meant the abandonment of the basic tenets of Russian Marxism as outlined by Plekhanov. In so doing, Lenin had gone back to the old Populist approach.⁴²

In 1917, when things took a different turn, Lenin and Trotsky found themselves making major revisions, and even compromises, in their theory of revolution. In 1917, they implemented the ideas that had been suggested by Herzen and developed in considerable detail by Tkachev in the 1860's and 1870's--the possibility that Russia could skip the capitalist stage of historic development en route to socialism.⁴³

Inspired by the confidence experienced in the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin was convinced that, "weak as they [the peoples of the East] may be, and invincible as may seem the power of the European oppres-

⁴¹Joseph Schiebel, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴²Pipes, Op. cit., p. 336.

⁴³Ibid.

sors, who in the struggle employ all marvels of technology and the military art--nevertheless a revolutionary war waged by the oppressed peoples, if it really succeeds in arousing the millions of working and exploited people, harbours such potentialities, such miracles, that the emancipation of the peoples of the East is now practicable. . . ." ⁴⁴

The Soviet leaders realized the contribution the African people could make toward the world Communist movement against imperialism. Gregory Zinoviev, the President of the Third International, made this clear when he addressed the Congress of Baku:

The real revolution will blaze up only when the 800,000,000 people who live in Asia unite with us, when the African continent unites, when we see that hundreds of millions of people are in movement. ⁴⁵

But, in their approach to the developing countries, the Soviet leaders posited very strongly that they did not intend to export revolution. Indeed, Lenin himself bitterly spoke against those who promoted such views.

⁴⁴Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXX, pp. 153-154.

⁴⁵William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, 11 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1935), pp. 392-393.

Like Marx and Engels before them, Lenin and his followers did not believe that they could order or make arrangement for a revolution to be carried out in some foreign country if the people in that country were unprepared for such a revolution. To them, revolutions could only succeed when a clear majority of the people, including those in strategic positions, concluded that they could no longer live the old way. The concern they raised was that any attempt on the part of the socialist countries to force their kind of life upon others would simply undermine their own victories. In real life this is not as simple as it sounds. The kind of disagreement that evolved out of such reasoning led the People's Republic of China to brand the Soviet Union as "revisionist" in the 1960's.

The Second Comintern Congress and the Beginning of
the National-Liberation Movement

At the Second Comintern Congress, held in July 1920, Lenin presented a special report that put forth a set of definitions on the national and colonial question in the countries of the East, including those of Africa. It laid down the basic policy for the Communist parties to adopt in their national revolutionary movements. Since that time the Soviet leaders have always claimed that this document charters the fundamental revolutionary course for all oppressed nations as well as for the peoples of the colonial and semicolonial countries.

When Lenin submitted his "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" to the Congress, he asked for concrete information on some of the complex problems in various countries. The lessons of World War I made it plain that the masses of the non-European subject countries were integrally connected with the proletarian movement in Europe. The French and the British had used a few million colonial forces in the battlefields, as well as in domestic and factory jobs--seriously affecting the revolutionary movements. As Lenin put it: "The imperialist war drew the dependent peoples into world history; it is one of the most im-

portant tasks to find out how we should set about organizing the Soviet movement in the non-capitalist countries."⁴⁶ Accordingly, he urged the Congress to work out instructions for the revolutionary work of the people throughout the "East."

The relevant parts of Lenin's twelve points, as drawn up in his original draft with the commission's revision, follow:⁴⁷

--The anti-Bolsheviks of the world bourgeoisie have necessitated that the Communist movement of the advanced countries and the national liberation movement of the dependent countries rally around Soviet Russia.

--In each case the form of alliance has to be determined by the stages of development reached by the Communist or the revolutionary liberation movement in each country.

--In feudal-patriarchal countries, the Communists must support the native revolutionary liberation movement, but "The form which this support should

⁴⁶ Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XXXI, p. 150.

⁴⁷ Lenin, Volume XXXI, pp. 144-151; Jane Degras, The Communist International Documents, 1919-1943, 2 Volumes (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1971), I: pp. 138-142.

take should be discussed with the Communist party of the Country in question, if there is one." Both must fight against clerical and other reactionary elements and must render special assistance to the anti-feudal peasant movement by "organizing the peasants and all the exploited wherever possible into Soviets." The Communists should support but not be merged with the revolutionary liberation movement and with the support of the privileged class in the country must explain to the toiling masses the deception of the imperialists.

--The Communists should treat any surviving national sentiments with great prudence and thus avoid attracting the enmity of the peasants and petty-bourgeoisie.

When the Congress undertook discussion of Lenin's document, Maring (pseudonym of H. Sneevliet), a Dutchman representing Indonesia, expressed the idea that all dependent countries were essentially alike. He declared that continued attempts to define the differences between the nationalists and socialists were unproductive. Not making use of national revolutionary movements, he maintained, would leave half of the work undone by playing

dogmatic Marxism.⁴⁸

At the Congress considerable interest was centered around M. N. Roy, a newly converted Communist representing India. Roy presented his Supplementary Theses after Lenin had invited delegates to supply their own additional documentation and opinions regarding his draft theses. In his Supplementary Theses Roy shared Lenin's view that, for the time being, it was wise for the Communists to emphasize the exploitation of the colonial peoples rather than of the European proletariat. According to Roy's argument, if European capitalism got its resources from colonial and semicolonial peoples, then those resources should be denied it.⁴⁹ Also, since European overproduction was disposed of by selling to the dependent countries, these markets had to be closed; this would bring an end to the capitalist exploitation of hundreds of millions of dependent people. With the total loss of markets in and resources from the dependent countries, Roy believed, chaos would face the imperial-

⁴⁸Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 41.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 40, 46.

ists and hence would open the way for the proletarian revolution in Europe.⁴⁹

Although Lenin agreed with Roy that exploitation of nationalism should be used as a major tactical weapon, he did not agree with all of Roy's arguments. For example, in Lenin's view it would take a long time before a revolutionary situation could materialize in colonial areas, and even then the resulting Communist movement would not be very powerful. Furthermore, although both emphasized the importance of the colonial struggle, Lenin was not willing to tell his European comrades that their efforts were useless unless the "backward" masses of the East had achieved their revolution first. Lenin was convinced that revolution in the East was a subsidiary action.⁵⁰

Although in the final analysis Lenin's views prevailed, he nevertheless accepted some minor corrections, mainly in terminology, suggested by Roy. Lenin revised his wording, changing "bourgeois-democratic movements" to "national-revolutionary movements."⁵¹ He explained:

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 40.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 41.

We have arrived at the unanimous decision to speak of the national-revolutionary movement rather than of the "bourgeois-democratic movement." . . . objections have been raised that, if we speak of the bourgeois-democratic movement, we shall be obliterating all distinctions between the reformist and the revolutionary movements. Yet that distinction has been very clearly revealed of late in the backward and colonial countries, since the imperialist bourgeoisie is doing everything in its power to implant a reformist movement among the oppressed nations too. . . . [From the commission's findings,] we decided that the only correct attitude was to take this distinction into account and, in nearly all cases, substitute the term "national-revolutionary" for the term "bourgeois-democratic." The significance of this change is that we, as Communists, should and will support bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when their exponents do not hinder our work of educating and organising in a revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the masses of the exploited. If these conditions do not exist, the Communists in these countries must combat the reformist bourgeoisie. . . .⁵²

When we turn our attention to the national-revolutionary movement in Kenya, we shall be on the lookout for the points raised above.

The final draft of the theses made it clear that there were two distinct movements in the dependent countries, with different goals. The first movement was identified as the bourgeois democratic nationalist movement, and since its program of political independence was in the bourgeois phase, it would only be given judi-

⁵²Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, p. 242.

cious support in the initial stages. The second was that of the mass struggle of peasants and workers; the organization of this revolutionary movement "from below" was essential to establish "Soviet republics."⁵³

The general concern at the Congress was with such fundamental question as to what degree the Communist party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, had to ally itself with the anti-imperialist and non-Communist national and petty bourgeois--the so-called "from above" force-- and how much energy was to be devoted to increasing the power of the proletariat and the peasantry--the so-called "from below" force. Even though the Congress was aware of the fact that it was the masses who formed the revolutionary force of the people of the East, it nevertheless thought it wise to let the bourgeois assume leadership. But more important still was the fact that if the revolution was to succeed, it had to include in its initial stages a careful balance of tactics of both "from above" and "from below" forces.

Lenin's ideas and concepts, as enunciated at the Second Comintern Congress, as well as those of M. N.

⁵³Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 66.

Roy,⁵⁴ remained a strong force in guiding revolutionary movements in what later came to be known as the Third World. In our Kenyan case study various changing modes of the national-revolutionary movement are given treatment and the reader may determine for himself how genuinely revolutionary it is and how it fits into the Soviet program.

Old and New Discussions on the
National-Liberation Movement

Lenin and his comrades could not foresee that by the mid-1960's their ideas on the national-liberation movement were to spread to some forty states in Africa alone and still another thirty in Asia--all in varying stages of development. Or that Western European and North American capitalism would have added Japan to its

⁵⁴Reevaluation of the program and the concepts of the Second Comintern Congress by Soviet scholars was continuing even in the 1960's; in 1969 one of these scholars of the national-liberation movement noted that "even after rather fundamental amendments by the Congress commission, Roy's theses contained an erroneous idea that even at the first stage the revolution in the colonies should not be led by bourgeois democrats. Roy's ninth thesis says: "At the initial stage the revolution in the colonies should be carried out under a programme of purely petty-bourgeois reformist measures, such as the division of land, etc. But this does not mean that the revolution should be headed by bourgeois democrats.'" A. Iskenderov, "The Theory of Marxism and National-Liberation Movement," The National-Liberation Movement (Vital Problems), 111 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1969), p. 78.

camp. Furthermore, that because of its vast military, political, and economic might, capitalism would continue to influence the development of the underdeveloped countries. To achieve their aims, the capitalist elements either allied themselves with those local bourgeoisie who were engaged in building the superstructure of a bureaucracy, police, and army, or contracted with local feudalists in exploiting the masses of the country in an effort to preserve the precapitalist institutions for further development of capitalism. The major task of the national-liberation movements in these countries was and is to abolish or gradually phase out the precapitalist system and all it stood for.

Soviet foreign policy, being that of a Communist state, had to be presented in militant terms. It constantly asserted that capitalism as a system was doomed to obsolescence. Moreover, it stressed that "it is practically impossible for any African country to catch up economically with advanced capitalist powers" or to "solve its economic problems. . . as long as it remains within the world capitalist system."⁵⁵

⁵⁵ T. Popov, Political Economy and African Reality (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d.), p. 113.

However, the Soviet leadership made it clear that while its military policy emphatically supported revolutions everywhere, it considered such revolutions to be basically nationalistic and hence to be carried out without Moscow's intervention, but consistent with Marxism-Leninism. This position was clarified in 1961 in the resolution of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as follows:

The proletarian revolution in any country, being part of the socialist revolution, is accomplished by the working class of that country and the masses of its people. The revolution is not made to order. It cannot be imposed on the people from without. It results from the profound internal contradictions of capitalism. The victorious proletariat cannot impose any "felicity" on another people without thereby undermining its own victory.⁵⁶

In the 1960's Soviet theoreticians made it clear that the two types of revolutions for the countries of the Third World that desired to advance to socialism--national-liberation revolutions and socialist revolutions--were gradually drawing closer to each other. The term "national-liberation revolutions" is used interchangeably with the term "national-liberation movements."

⁵⁶The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17-31, 1961 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 484.

What national-liberation revolutions aim for is the eradication of imperialism and the feudal system, as well as of capitalism--the same enemy socialist revolutions struggle against.⁵⁷

A national-liberation movement in general was explained as a transitional revolution whose numerous activities included protests, meetings, and various types of rebellions--of which the national-liberation revolution is only one act aiding the revolutionary movement. The revolutionary national-liberation movement in any country generally retains some features of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions but gradually develops qualities of the advanced stage of the revolution, namely, socialist revolution. Thus, in Marxist terminology, the revolutionary national-liberation revolutions are bourgeois revolutions, while a socialist revolution is a proletarian revolution.⁵⁸

Soviet Africanists maintained that revolutions in African countries were of a generally democratic nature

⁵⁷A. Iskenderov, "The National-Liberation Movement in Our Time," and "Choice of a Road," The Third World; Problems and Prospects: Current Stage of the National-Liberation Struggle (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 22; 23.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 180, 181.

and hence included some of the tasks that are normally carried out by socialist revolutions. Of course, these Africanists knew that the African countries, like the rest of the Third World countries, were in various stages of development and that their potentialities varied considerably; they had to be realistic in viewing the specific situation in each country--the relationships among that country's own political forces, and its particular brand of political expediency.⁵⁹

However, the Soviets stressed the fact that socialist reforms should not be the immediate aim of national-liberation revolutions, but should be taken up only after the lapse of sufficient time for the development of necessary socioeconomic and political maturity. They further stressed that between the national revolutions and the actual initiation of socialist reconstruction by any liberated country, a certain historic period intervenes that probably differs from country to country. During this period socioeconomic and political reforms are carried out by national bourgeois and revolutionary democrats, who gradually yield leadership to a proletariat class. For the newly liberated countries seeking

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

to move from capitalism to socialism, the period of transition should be identified with national-liberation revolutions and not with socialist revolutions. A transitional period is said to include two stages. The first stage is that of growth--the development of socioeconomic and political factors needed to undertake the second stage, which is the actual construction of a socialist society. The two stages are as distinct as their concepts: The "non-capitalist road" and "socialist development."⁶⁰

The leading theoreticians of Marxism have repeatedly warned against any oversimplification of this process or the hasty inference that the socioeconomic development of the new national states and their transition to socialism can be achieved with ease. At the same time they have made it clear that such an effort had to be exerted by those states themselves. But in the 1960's the Soviet theoreticians were warning against the irreparable damage done to this concept by violent revolution, which the ultra-leftists, such as the Maoists, were seeking to impose upon the national-liberation movement. The Soviet ideologists were quick to point out that Lenin himself had warned against such false but

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 32.

seemingly correct Marxism-Leninism when he wrote: "Marxism is an extremely profound and many-sided doctrine. It is, therefore, no wonder that scraps of quotations from Marx-- especially when the quotations are made 'inappropriately'-- can usually be found among the 'arguments' of those who break with Marxism."⁶¹

The National-Liberation Movement and the
Noncapitalist Path

During that stage of the national-liberation movement in the Third World where local capitalism has not become a serious force, Soviet theoreticians have suggested a noncapitalist development. They claim that Lenin propounded such a theory of development to be followed by the former colonies and semicolonies in their anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The term "noncapitalist road" was coined and used for the first time by the Sixth Comintern Congress on September 1, 1928, as follows:

Alliance with the USSR and the revolutionary proletariat opens for the masses of. . . colonial and semicolonial countries the prospect of independent economic and cultural development, avoiding the stage of capitalist domination, perhaps even the development of capitalist relations in general. . . .

⁶¹Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVI, p. 212.

There is thus an objective possibility of [a] non-capitalist path of development for the backward colonies, the possibility that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the more advanced colonies will be transformed, with the aid of the victorious proletarian dictatorship in other countries, into the proletarian socialist revolution.⁶²

Lenin and his followers did not see the non-capitalist path of development as necessarily involving the setting up of a government under the leadership of a working-class party, that is, a virtual dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin suggested the idea of a non-capitalist path for the "backward" countries because of their virtual absence of capitalist relationships. Since they had practically no working class, he suggested that it was necessary to introduce a formula whose development would bypass Western-type capitalism.

In time, Moscow came to see the problem of non-capitalist development as embracing three important factors: first, the economic backwardness of the Third World countries and the inadequate development of the social relations therein; second, the possibility that the current national-liberation revolutions might develop into socialist revolutions; and last, the existence of a

⁶²Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, II (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1971), p. 533.

world socialist system that could exert a growing influence on world events.⁶³ Thus, for the national-liberation revolutions to be truly transitional, non-capitalist development must include the political, ideological, social, and economic spheres. In this way, Soviet theorists came to expand Lenin's ideas into a doctrine of economic colonialism or neocolonialism, according to which political independence without economic independence would prove to be illusory in the long run.

In the Ideological-Political Sphere

The sphere of development for the Third World includes the eradication of illiteracy and the beginning of a socialist-oriented culture. Such a culture, the Marxists contend, must struggle against bourgeois ideology while stepping up propaganda for scientific socialism and gradually begin to convert the ideology of scientific socialism into an effective force of social progress. Along with these tasks, all progressive forces of the country must gradually consolidate and continue to isolate the reactionary elements. A strong

⁶³A. Iskenderov, "The Choice of a Road," op. cit., p. 178.

revolutionary and progressive party guided by Marxist-Leninist theory must be established. And last, development in this area will witness the use of political power for specific social and economic reforms.⁶⁴

Soviet theoreticians since Lenin have maintained that, in a world deeply influenced by imperialism, the winning of independence by a country does not automatically deliver it from exploitation. Consequently, a major precondition for noncapitalist development is the consolidation of economic and political association with the socialist countries. Moscow emphasized that the "struggle for complete political independence remains a most important task confronting the countries that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression"⁶⁵ while at the same time emphatically cautioning that "there can be no full and stable political independence unless there is economic independence as well."⁶⁶

In daily life, political independence is made possible through a political party; therefore in Soviet

⁶⁴National-Liberation Movement (Vital Problems), op. cit., p. 55.

⁶⁵L. Minayev and L. Fyodorov, The Struggle for Socialism in the Third World (Moscow: Progress Publishers [1965]), p. 65.

⁶⁶Ibid.

theory and practice the party is held in the highest esteem since its members are entrusted with providing the leadership for the working class. Thus the party must direct its energies to include all the best elements of the working class, who in turn will bring in their experience, their revolutionary spirit, and their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But, in order for the party members to be the vanguard, they must be armed with the revolutionary theory, and with a knowledge of the laws of the movement.⁶⁷ Without such members the party is incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat. The party cannot limit itself simply to reacting to the feelings and thoughts of the masses. Nor can it afford to follow in the trail of the spontaneous movement. If it is incapable of overcoming the inertia and political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to arise above the monetary interests of the proletariat, and if it is unable to elevate the masses to the level of the class of the proletariat, then it does not deserve to lead.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, A New Translation (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1941), p. 96.

⁶⁸Ibid.

In the 1960's the Soviets were saying that they would support any parties in the developing countries that showed signs of growth. Lenin had strongly recommended that such parties he supported, but "only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when their exponents do not hinder the work of educating and instilling a revolutionary spirit in the peasantry and the masses of the exploited."⁶⁹ By about the mid-1960's, the Soviets were beginning to withdraw some of their support from the earlier, seemingly progressive, parties.

~~Part of this re-evaluation read:~~

The mere proclamation of the one-party system does not necessarily promote stability of power. This system can be effective and strong only if it expresses the vital interests of the overwhelming majority of the nation--the working people--and at the same time constantly strengthens its ties with the masses and works tirelessly to promote their class-consciousness and organisation.⁷⁰

As we have seen, the Soviets held that for the working-class movement there could be no talk of a "third" ideology, "an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement; the 'only' choices are either bourgeois or socialist

⁶⁹ Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, p. 244.

⁷⁰ E. Teosyan, "Readers Questions Answered: One-Party System in Africa," International Affairs, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 126.

ideology."⁷¹

Followers of Lenin, including Khrushchev, repeatedly preached the same message, "that all peoples and countries [will] come to socialism, but not all in the same way, for each country [will] lend its own distinctive features to this or that variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁷² In this same vein, Professor Potekhin said:

. . . I interpret African socialism as the African way to socialism. Africa will come to socialism as all other countries in the world. All mankind will come to socialism. Africa will come in its way.⁷³

For other Soviet theoreticians, the basis for their discussion was laid by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which dismissed those theories of "national socialism" as advanced by African, Asian, and Latin American countries as doctrines having a petty-bourgeois illusion of socialism whose aims were to mislead people as well as to hamper the development of the

⁷¹ Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. V, p. 384.

⁷² N. S. Khrushchev, 40th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Report to the Joint Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., November 6, 1957 (London: Soviet News, 1957), p. 31.

⁷³ I. Potekhin, "Remarks Distorted?" Africa Today, X, No. 3 (March, 1963), p. 13.

national liberation movement in those areas.⁷⁴

Following the guidelines provided by the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, some of the leading Soviet theoretical scholars and experts on the national-liberation movement, such as G. Mirsky and V. Tyagunenko, described the nationalistic type of socialism as one of "demagogic ideas."⁷⁵ Others, like V. Kudryavtsev, an Izvestia commentator, were more understanding about the humiliations Africans had gone through and supported a wait-and-see philosophy.⁷⁶

~~Since "for many years the colonialist concept of the world was indeed dinned into the heads of the Africans,"~~ it was psychologically understandable why many Africans talked about an independent ideology--African socialism.⁷⁷ However, to the bewilderment of the Soviet scholars, those

⁷⁴Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., October 31, 1961 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 46.

⁷⁵G. Mirsky and V. Tyagunenko, "Tendentsii i perspektivy national'nosvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenii, No. 11 (November, 1961), pp. 30-31.

⁷⁶V. Kudryavtsev, "Fighting Africa's Daily Round," International Affairs, No. 10 (October, 1962), p. 53.

⁷⁷V. Kudryavtsev, "Problems of Afro-Asian Solidarity: Thoughts at the Foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro," International Affairs, No. 5 (May, 1963), p. 55.

"socialist concepts are advanced in Africa not only by progressives who are sincerely searching for new ways leading to a better future, but also by reactionary ideologists who represent the bureaucratic top crust and who are associated with colonial interests."⁷⁸ "Reactionary ideologists" in Africa were identified as Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Tom Mboya of Kenya; and in Moscow's view their roles might thwart Africa's development, as had happened in Latin America for the last 150 years or so.⁷⁹

In the opinion of Professor Potekhin, those Africans and their foreign advisers who had introduced certain adjectives before the term "socialism" (such as "Pan-African") had done so "in belief that this theory will not lead to socialism," and were enemies of African unity and independent development.⁸⁰ Of course, Kenya was one of the leading African countries with those "demagogic ideas" on African socialism. In early 1965 Victor Petrov, an Izvestiia commentator, raised the following cogent argument against Mboya's socialism to the

⁷⁸Mikhail Kremnev, "Afrika ishchet novye puti," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 8 [60] (August, 1963), p. 69.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Potekhin, African Problems, op. cit., p. 118.

Kenyans:

Explaining how Kenya would turn into a socialist country, Kenyatta said: political liberty and right of equality are not enough. Our people have a right also to be free from economic exploitation. . . . if individual capitalists are allowed to build their own firms and factories as Mboya wants, then this would make the work of building socialism a 'difficult one.'⁸¹

Moscow's message was that continued stable development of a country depended enormously on the interdependence of ideological and political growth within this country.

In the Socioeconomic Sphere

~~The Communists set forth the following progres-~~sion of tasks in the social sphere. First, drawing the working people, especially women, into various aspects of social and political life. Second, to promote the overall growth and education of the working class, to prepare it for its leadership of the nation. Third, to steadily improve the living standards and social position of working people.

In the economic sphere the national-liberation movement needs to strive first of all toward eliminating the domination of foreign capital in the country's economy, and introducing agrarian reforms, especially

⁸¹Moscow Radio, April 2, 1965.

those that would serve the peasantry by implementation of the "land to the tillers" principle. Next, different forms of cooperation in trade and production must be developed and the state sector of the economy expanded. And last, industrial development must be accelerated and the activity of private capital restricted.⁸²

When the former colonial countries attained political independence, Moscow sought to win them to its side.

Throughout the 1950's and 1960's Soviet theoreticians strongly advocated agrarian reforms, which, while geared toward production, placed greater emphasis on social aspects of the land. In this regard they saw an especially important role for the pragmatic but progressive forces. Indeed, in the Soviet view, there can be no question of eliminating the age-old economic backwardness and shackling dependence on the Western powers without an effective solution to agrarian problems.⁸³

⁸² National-Liberation Movement (Vital Problems), op. cit., p. 55; also, Y. Potemkin, "The Emergent Countries: Certain Aspects of Socio-Economic Development," Internationalism National-Liberation Movement and Our Epoch, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1968), pp. 118-124.

⁸³ L. Stepanov, "Why Social Reforms Are Inevitable," The Third World: Problems, and Prospects; Current Stage of the National-Liberation Struggle, op. cit., p. 136. Also,

Accordingly, in Moscow's view, radical agrarian reform was undoubtedly a vital necessity for all the emerging nations. Such a solution called for resolute measures to abolish large landowners and implement the "land to the tillers" principle.⁸⁴ This was particularly relevant to the Kenyan situation.

In Moscow's view, the most effective means by which the young states could overcome their economic backwardness and unemployment was through industrialization. The Soviets based their argument on Lenin's teaching as implemented in the Soviet Union, as well as in other socialist countries. Lenin emphasized:

The salvation. . . lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms--that is not enough; and not only in [a] good condition of light industry, which provide[s] the peasant with consumer goods--this, too, is not enough; we also need heavy industry. And to put this in good condition will require several years of work.

Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we are not able to provide them, we shall be doomed as a civilized state, let alone as a socialist state.⁸⁵

Y. Potemkin, "The Emergent Countries: Certain Aspects of Socio-Economic Development," op. cit., p. 118.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 121.

⁸⁵ Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, p. 426.

After Lenin's death, the Soviet leadership continued to emphasize the importance of industrialization. In 1957 a leader of the Soviet delegation to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, A. A. Arzumanyan, discussed the main principles that guided the Soviet Union in aiding the nonaligned developing countries:

We can build for you an industrial plant or transport facilities, a research or educational establishment, a hospital or cultural institution, whichever you need. We can send our specialists to you or you may send yours to us to see our enterprises and research institutions. We can send our professors to your educational establishments or you may send your students to our educational institutes. ~~Do what is better for you. State~~ what you need and we can help you by rendering assistance in the form of loans or technical aid, within our economic possibilities.

We do not seek to get any advantages. We do not need profits, privileges, controlling interests, concessions or raw material sources. We do not ask you to participate in any blocs, reshuffle your governments or change your home or foreign policy. We are ready to help you as a brother helps his brother, without any interests whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need. Our only condition is to aid without conditions at all.⁸⁶

However, as Lenin had stressed, "without a long-term plan that envisages important achievements," whereby plans of various branches are soundly "co-ordinated,

⁸⁶A. A. Arzumanyan, "Report 'On Promotion of Economic Cooperation,'" Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, Cairo, December 26, 1957 - January 1, 1958 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), pp. 185-186.

and linked up so as to constitute [a] single economic plan," real industrialization is not forthcoming.⁸⁷ In any planning Soviet experts put a lot of emphasis on the public sector:

. . . We believe that accelerated construction of a national independent economy is only possible when the government sector actively influences the entire process of development in a given direction. Within this sector, the government has a reliable knowledge of its own resources and can completely subordinate its development to the implementation of the government's goals. . . . the private sector can only be regarded as a "black box" because the particular features of its structure and its relative independence of the government decisions do not provide the government with the information of its economic parameters and, all [the] more so, with the possibility of planning it.⁸⁸

Moscow's opposition to capitalistic private planning is based on the charge that "the policy of economic 'planning' in the capitalist countries consists in the mobilization of enormous resources for financial support of the leading monopolies through reduced consumption by the masses"--and that this claim makes planners

⁸⁷ Lenin, Collected Works, XXXI, pp. 510, 511.

⁸⁸ I. Aleshina, "Modeli ekonomicheskogo razvitiia," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 8 (August, 1969), pp. 81-82, reprinted in translation in Problems of Economics, XII, No. 1 (May, 1970), p. 31.

associated with the Establishment stress the private sector.⁸⁹ As might be expected, the Soviet leaders urged African countries to take advantage of Soviet experience.

According to the Soviet argument, the surest way for the African countries to attain independence was to establish and develop their own industries, above all manufacturing industries. Professor Potekhin suggested that African countries must stop basing their national economies on raw materials.⁹⁰ He emphasized that while it was very important to work constantly for the advancement of agriculture in the African countries, no country could afford to do that at the expense of industrialization since "the average level of the productivity of the social labour in an industrially developed country is higher than in a country where the bulk of social labour is expended on agriculture."⁹¹ Here the Soviets posed the question as to whether it was realistic for African countries with such a low per capita national income--as is the case for Sudan and Nigeria (\$75); Kenya (\$66), Uganda (\$60), Tanzania (\$55), or Malawi (\$26) to expect

⁸⁹B. Miroshnichenko, "Internal Significance of the Soviet Experience in Planning," The National-Liberation Movement (Vital Problems), op. cit., p. 175.

⁹⁰Potekhin, African Problems, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 12, 13.

to do business on an equal basis with Britain (\$950) or other Western countries with even higher per capita national income.⁹²

While expressing its desire to help African countries start laying the foundation of their industrialization toward economic independence, Moscow specifically cautioned African states not to align themselves with the West, because the Western countries did not wish to see the African countries develop to a balanced position. On this point, Potekhin quoted two American economists (H. Olden and P. Phillips) who wrote on the specific United States views and policy on the subject:

Development leading toward economic independence based on a balanced industrialization is not a part of the American definition. Such a development would conflict with American exports of manufactured goods and American control of underdeveloped areas.⁹³

With industrialization and its concomitant technoscientific collaboration, throughout the 1950's and 1960's Moscow valued foreign trade as one of the most important and promising forms of economic collaboration be-

⁹²V. Golsov, "National Income of Developing African Countries," International Affairs, No. 12 (December, 1964), p. 108. These were 1964 figures calculated by the methods used in the Soviet Union.

⁹³Ibid. The same argument is also raised in Woodrow Wilson Foundation, The Political Economy of the American Foreign Policy; Its Concepts, Strategy and Limits

tween the developing countries and the socialist countries.⁹⁴ Moscow claimed that credits granted by the Soviet Union under the terms of its trade-and-aid agreements with developing countries served as a potent stimulus for Soviet exports to these countries without their losing their independence. It further pointed out that the United States World Economy Survey of 1958 supported the findings that the Soviet credits created conditions favorable for the continuous exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods supplied by countries operating under a centrally planned economy.⁹⁵ Soviet Africanists see the economic collaboration with African states as serving two interconnected processes, namely, that of nation-building and the breaking-up of imperialism. Moscow continued to caution the leaders of the

(New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 158-159: "Despite the valid reasons for industrialization, the primary need of most underdeveloped countries is substantial increases in diversification, production and productivity of agricultural sectors of their economies. In these countries. . . the sacrifice of potential, economically feasible, agricultural development to ambitious industrialization projects can be self-defeating. . . ."

⁹⁴A. Kodachenko, "Vazhnaia forma ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva," Mezhdunarodnaia zhin, No. 2 (February, 1962), p. 50.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 55.

African states that they must keep intact the various fronts that had joined in the struggle for political independence; otherwise, they would disintegrate and begin to work for different goals as the struggle for socio-economic development started.

From time to time, as we have seen above, Marxist-Leninist theoreticians in the national-liberation movement try to be as practical and reasonable as they can be in assessing capitalism without altering their notions about skipping the capitalist phase. They do not deny the fact, for example, that capitalism can lead mankind to advanced development. They argue that it takes too long to reach that stage and that when that stage is reached, the system favors a few while allowing the masses to suffer. During the transitional period, "the character and trends of social and economic development of a country depend on many factors, and above all, on the distribution of internal political forces, on ideological and political maturity, degree of organization and authority of the progressive forces that are capable of drawing the working people into the construction of a new society."⁹⁶ But this is only possible when such forces have matured and begin to rely on the working

⁹⁶v. Tyagunencko, "World Socialism and the

class, the peasantry, and the progressive sections of the intelligentsia and when a people has the support of the socialist countries and of the international Communist movement to channel the nation's socioeconomic development along the lines of bourgeois-democratic revolution.⁹⁷

Since Marxism-Leninism opposes automatic transition from capitalism to socialism, it follows that non-capitalist development does not mean that capitalism is immediately removed from all aspects of social structure, nor does it mean indiscriminate nationalization or other hasty steps.⁹⁸ On the other hand, the revolutionary-democratic governments constructively use the economic positions they have won to gradually create requisites for a consistent development of socialism. Soviet theoreticians emphasize that any country that wants to undertake this kind of development must be constantly aware that "the political line of imperialism with respect to the national liberation is based on a combination of

Character of the Liberation Struggle," The National-Liberation Movement (Vital Problems), lll, op. cit., p. 54.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 54, 55.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

armed intervention and neocolonialist methods."⁹⁹ Thus Moscow's insistence that during the period of the national-liberation movement the national democratic leaders must continue "to fight imperialism" but not to cooperate with "imperialist monopolies" in the hope that such cooperation would help them to solve the economic problems facing their countries.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, Soviet Africanists suggest that a fairly long pause might be justified in the noncapitalist path before the next stage is undertaken.

The above narrative provides the broad outlines of the path that, in the view of Soviet scholars, a country like Kenya would have to follow to build a new society. Within this framework of progressive steps, the Soviet Union and Communism became preoccupying factors to the Kenyan intelligentsia as regards the problems of bringing their country into a modern world. Kenyan responses to Communism were wide in scope, yet they essentially pertained to internal development. The Soviets expressed

⁹⁹L. Vidyasova, "Imperialism: Enemy of the People, Enemy of Social Progress," International Affairs, No. 1 (January, 1972), p. 59.

¹⁰⁰Loc. cit., p. 55.

the view that any struggle of contending ideas would force development to occur in a zig-zag manner.

CHAPTER II

TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE IN KENYA BEFORE 1960

During the first half of the twentieth century, the people of Kenya developed their political consciousness from local and tribal level to national level. In that struggle for independence and national self-determination, colonialism and imperialism were the enemies. Thus the people of Kenya came to oppose not only the colonialists but also their economic system, namely, capitalism. Against that background, the Eastern world increasingly moved into the picture as the self-appointed apostle against colonialism and imperialism; and, hence it appeared the natural ally of the Kenyans. The contacts that Kenyans made with the Communist world were exaggerated and overplayed by the West to the effect that by the end of the 1950's, Kenyans were divided as to the best way to achieve their independence--some wanted to work with Western circles while others sought help from the East.

From Tribal to National Politics

At the close of the last century, European colonizers found Kenya organized mainly on the tribal level. The African elite in western and central Kenya-- among the Luo, Kikuyu and Kamba--became Christian "mission boys"¹ who accepted Western values and thus served as the chief agents of Westernism in Kenya. Yet after World War I, as they began to question the validity of Christian teachings, they became critical of political, economic, and social domination by the British colonial masters.

The influence of the war on the political interests of Africans is undeniable. Leaders of the yearling political parties had served with the 165,000 Kenyans enrolled in regular military units or employed as porters in the carrier corps. With military service came the opportunity to study the white man firsthand, while of necessity learning techniques of organized resistance.²

Two political groups sprung up after the war. The Young Kavirondo Association, founded in 1918, emphasized welfare politics. The Kikuyu Central Association, founded

¹B. A. Ogot, "Kenya Under the British, 1895 to 1963," Zamani: A Survey of East African History, ed. by B. A. Ogot and I. A. Kieran (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 266.

²Ibid., p. 268.

in 1924, was primarily a party of the Kikuyu tribe.

During this period of growing African political awareness, the settler colonial government of Kenya vowed that "we want neither Czar nor Lenin in Kenya. This territory demands British rule and essentially European rule."³ This declaration reflects perhaps a paranoia generated by the just-concluded Second Comintern Congress, for not a single Kenyan African had yet made contact with the new leaders of the Soviet Russian regime.

Indeed, the earliest contact occurred in 1929, undertaken by Jomo Kenyatta (then known as Johnston Kamau) during his visit to the Soviet Union. On this and other visits between 1932 and 1934, Kenyatta made good use of the opportunity for observation. While Kenyan African political organizations remained tribal in character, chiefly concerned with obtaining redress for specific grievances, Kenyatta "might have seen in Soviet Russia an alternative world system to the British Empire."⁴

³ Quoted by Markhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), p. 12.

⁴ Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 268.

Paul Robeson, African-American dramatic actor and baritone soloist, was Kenyatta's roommate in London, and visited the Soviet Union with Kenyatta's encouragement in 1934. He writes that both he and Kenyatta were moved by the progress brought by the Communist regime to the people of the Central Asian Republics, whose way of life had once resembled that of the East African people. In a period of less than twenty years, "The Yakuts and Uzbeks and all other formerly oppressed nations were leaping ahead from tribalism to modern industrial economy, from illiteracy to the heights of knowledge," and now "their young men and women [were] mastering the sciences and arts" as "their ancient cultures [were] blooming in new and greater richness."⁵

Regarding the two years at Moscow State University and his travels in the Soviet Union, Kenyatta himself vividly remembered:

... I was learning all the time. The first time I spent most of the time seeing the country as part of my education. I was not confined. I was my own master.⁶

⁵Paul Robeson, Here I Stand (New York: Othello Associates, 1958), pp. 43-44.

⁶Jeremy Murray-Brown, op. cit., p. 268.

Kenyatta's visit to Moscow was made possible by George Padmore of Trinidad, a professional Comintern agent. In the opinion of one of Kenyatta's biographers, Jeremy Murray-Brown: "Clearly there was more to Kenyatta's trip than straightforward tour,"⁷ yet in 1931, when he first returned to London, he was "anxious to appear moderate Kenyatta was at pains to remove the 'bolshevik' label attached to him."⁸ For instance, Kenyatta publicly repudiated the violent overtones given to his articles in the Daily Worker of January 1930. Still, it was claimed time and again that "Kenyatta was being trained as a professional revolutionary."⁹

Movement Toward National Politics

After World War II the African intelligentsia began to question the legitimacy of colonialism with renewed intensity. Some of this elite were veterans with fresh ideas. They no longer had interest in ad hoc measures, designed to win isolated successes within the colonial framework then characterizing African politics.

⁷Ibid., p. 164.

⁸Ibid., p. 165.

⁹Ibid., p. 167.

These men were interested in national or continental action rather than tribal politics.¹⁰

In 1944, when Eliud Mathu was nominated by the British colonial government to represent Kenyan Africans in the Legislative Assembly, the African elite immediately questioned how they would work with him. On his suggestion, they organized the Kenya African Study Union to serve as a "supporting body."¹¹ Three months later, on October 1, 1944, thirty-three Kenyans--representing most of the country's tribes--changed the name to Kenya African Union (KAU).¹² KAU sought as its membership "people drawn from all tribes" of Kenya, thereby promoting a national politics.¹³

Thus, largely because of economic, social, and political repression of African society by European society in Kenya, African nationalism evolved. Particularly

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 282.

¹¹ Harry Thuku, with assistance from Kenneth King, An Autobiography (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 65. Also, Jesse Kimani, "Harry Thuku: Pioneer Nationalist," Inside Kenya Today, No. 9 (September, 1970), pp. 28, 30.

¹² Harry Thuku, op. cit., p. 66. Also, Wilfred Kirumba, "The Rise of Political Parties in Kenya," Inside Kenya Today, No. 9 (September, 1970), p. 29.

¹³ Ogot, op. cit., p. 282.

flagrant examples of repression were the failure of the government to compensate ex-servicemen or their widows, the introduction of the Kipande system (identification passes), wage laws that amounted to forced labor, and the raising of the "Poll Tax" and the "Hut Tax." Meanwhile, European ex-servicemen were given land and reservoirs of African labor were put at their disposal. In addition, European-Indian political wrangling aroused Africans to political solidarity to ensure their own security.¹⁴

African militants and radicals challenged the colonial government's idea that Africans had to advance through local institutions before they could expect to share political control of their country. These radicals began to challenge colonial reasoning; they demanded political control first so that they could remodel their government as they saw fit.¹⁵ The colonial government and its white settler community came to interpret Kenyan nationalism as a pledge to drive Europeans from Kenya--by violent means if necessary.¹⁶ Further, when Kenyatta returned to Kenya

¹⁴ Kirumba, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁵ Murray-Brown, op. cit., p. 251.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 270.

from Britain in 1947 and offered to lead the KAU, European fear of African nationalism redoubled in intensity.

From its beginning, then especially under Kenyatta's direction, the objectives and demands of KAU included the following points:¹⁷

1. Abolition of all "racial discrimination" by law;
2. Cessation of European settler immigration, and restriction of European and Asian immigration on temporary basis to provide personnel for essential services and industries; satisfy need of the Africans for land;
3. Extension of "educational facilities," including establishment of university education in East Africa; loans for more Africans to receive higher education abroad, and more primary and secondary schools to provide compulsory primary education for all African children;
4. Constitutional reform to provide equal representation on all levels of government on the principle of "one man, one vote";
5. Permission for trade unions to function freely (registration optional); and prohibition of combination of trade unions; establishment of equal pay for equal skills and work; increase of minimum wage in accordance with standard of living;
6. Recognition of the freedom of assembly and speech without police interference in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the urgency for implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

¹⁷ Desmond Buckle, "Imperialist Terror in Kenya," World News and Views, XXXII, No. 46 (November 22, 1952), p. 542.

7. Organization of a "conciliation group" by the Governor, to include representatives of KAU, the Kenya Indian Congress, and elected members of each racial group, to help solve problems facing all races in Kenya.

Along with KAU emerged a strong progressive element in the labor movement, the African Workers' Federation. Both showed an uncompromising "solidarity and militancy" against colonial injustices.¹⁸ For example, during the annual conference of KAU in Nairobi on June 1, 1947, at which Jomo Kenyatta was elected president, the party gave a clarion call for "United African Front to win the Freedom Fight."¹⁹ The speeches of the KAU leaders projected the impression that in the Soviet Union "there existed no colour bar and that as Russia was in conflict with 'imperialists and colonizers' it was ipso facto the friend of the Africans struggling to gain freedom."²⁰

As the president of KAU, Kenyatta emphasized that since Kenya was an African country, it was bound to be ruled by Africans who, in their turn, would certainly

¹⁸Buckle, op. cit., pp. 541, 542.

¹⁹Singh, op. cit., p. 151.

²⁰F. D. Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1960), p. 219. Otherwise known as: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council, Session Paper No. 5 of 1959/60: The Origin and Growth of Mau Mau, 1960 to which it will hereafter be referred.

safeguard the rights of minorities. Referring to European settlers in Kenya, Kenyatta said: "I always like co-operation, but I do not like co-operation of the cat and the mouse."²¹ The determination of KAU during this period was variously expressed in strong language such as "If we want freedom we must hit back" through a "United African Front to win the Freedom Fight."²² The African majority gathered momentum from the confidence inspired by Kenyatta's forceful utterances. For instance, "What we Africans want is complete freedom so that we can do what we please. Kenya belongs to the Africans and anyone who disputes this view is guilty of blasphemy."²³

Of course, the European settlers in Kenya represented the positions of Kenyatta and other African political and labor leaders. Fearing the potential reorganization and redirection of the country, they urged the government to take action to "neutralise" or silence Kenyatta and others, but the government refrained from such action, wishing not to create martyrs.²⁴ By 1948,

²¹Singh, op. cit., p. 206.

²²Achieng Oneko, member of KAU executive committee and close comrade of Kenyatta, quoted in The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 306 and Singh, op. cit., p. 151.

²³Singh, op. cit., p. 295. ²⁴Ibid., p. 171.

Europeans were clearly worried that the African movement and its growing demands might be Communist-inspired:

There is an increasing demand on the part of the Africans for a share in the colonial government as partners, and none can tell with certainty how far a clamour for political rights is original, or apes the phrases and concepts of others. It seems certain that equalitarian principles of Russian Communism are being taught. These run counter to such elements of democracy as we now enjoy.²⁵

By this time anti-Communist hysteria was gaining momentum in Kenya among members of the European settler community, and they began to consider accepting a limited number of Africans as partners in their privileged economic and political circles.

However, in spite of stirrings of nationalist feeling among Africans, the white settler community in Kenya remained as determined and resolved as ever that "the European community, mainly in Kenya, seeks to secure local European dominance. . . so that development and progress will be along the lines of their culture and civilization, or at any rate not a menace to it."²⁶ Thus, despite the fact that the European community was

²⁵ Clarence Buxton, The Kenyan Question (Nairobi: East African Standard, Ltd., 1949), p. 6.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

and would continue to be a tiny minority in Kenya, and despite the fact that many Europeans were resigned to eventual African control of the government, they were determined that "African [leaders] must accept that Kenya is to be developed along the lines of Western civilization."²⁷ The Europeans' immediate concern was whether they could maintain this direction of development in the midst of a strong wave of African nationalism.

To comprehend the complexity of the problem and to appreciate the determination of the European community, it is important to understand the settler group in Kenya. It was made up of the younger sons and relatives of British peers and retired government and military personalities. That they had influence in high government circles in Great Britain led them to expect support from the British government in maintaining their influence in Kenya.²⁸ According to Margery Perham, the Kenyan whites were "a highly organized, ceaselessly alert group of shock troops, ready at any moment, when the defenses are weak, by assault or by stratagem to seize the last inner

²⁷Ibid., p. 14.

²⁸Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya (2nd ed. rev.; London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1966), p. 277.

stronghold of the constitutional citadel."²⁹ The character of this settler community was one of the major factors leading the British Government to consider Kenya the "test-case for British policy in Africa."³⁰

In search for support for its demands, KAU sent a two-man deputation--Mbiyu Koinange and Achieng Oneko--to lobby the United Nations and to appeal to the Colonial Office in London on behalf of the hard-pressed Kenyan Africans. The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, refused to see the deputation either in London or when he came to Kenya.³¹ While KAU officials were still being ignored by the Colonial Office, Governor Sir Philip Mitchell maintained in 1950 that "the people whom it is customary to describe in this country as the educated Africans are people with the sort of education that our children have by the time they are twelve years of age."³² Such arrogance in the attitudes of colonial officials

²⁹Elspeth Huxley, Race and Politics in Kenya; A Correspondence Between Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham with an Introduction by Lord Lugard (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1944), p. 24.

³⁰"Opportunity in Kenya: A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau," Fabian Research Series, No. 162 (December, 1953), p. 7.

³¹Buckle, op. cit., p. 542.

³²Ibid.

prompted African radicals to conclude that non-violent methods could not succeed in Kenya. If, they argued, the colonial government was determined to keep Africans "in their place," violence was justified. The masses seemed ready to use violence to regain the land taken by European farmers and to organize themselves, as they had done many times before. For that they did not need lectures.

However, some members of the KAU elite were well-disciplined, popular, progressive, and able men, willing to make some reconciliation with the government. But they were fully determined not to let the British suppress African nationalism by force in order to retain political power and economic interests. The new African nationalism would build a new society, but not on the injustices of the past. Accordingly, the leaders demanded that the government not hinder them as they sought a decent life for all through land distribution and educational and employment opportunities based on "non-racial" rather than "multi-racial" policies.³³ When their demands for such freedom were ignored, the Africans turned to violence as a last resort. This was the Mau Mau³⁴ uprising--a desperate

³³Ibid., p. 285.

³⁴Although "Mau Mau" came to mean different things to different people, in this study it should be understood

attempt by a desperate people to change a system of economic, political, and social injustice imposed by the British colonial government upon the Africans of Kenya.³⁵

In October 1952 Jomo Kenyatta and other KAU leaders were arrested and charged with organizing and leading the Mau Mau underground terrorist organization. When the African uprising began, the British declared martial law in the country. In the meantime all political activities were banned. During the suppression of the rebellion more than 11,500 Africans were killed, while another 100,000 were thrown into concentration camps and prisons.

The British government showed the extent of their interest in Kenya by their campaign to stamp out every

as, literally, the "freedom-oath organization," which was chiefly organized around the goals of freedom and its subordinate, property rights. It was also referred to as the "Land and Freedom Army." It erupted into violent struggles after it had become evident to its leadership that there was no alternative as the colonial government stood fast. The majority of those that had taken the freedom-oath were from the area surrounding Nairobi, the Central Province, for as the oath-taking began to spread to the whole country, the Kenya government declared a state of emergency. Both trade union and political leaders in the country played an important part in the activities of the freedom-oath organization.

³⁵ Ibid.

trace of Mau Mau, which was said to be "patterned after the Communist party organization" and "clouded with issues of Communism"³⁶ as well as those of race. Further, the British government, in conjunction with the settler colonial Kenya government, expressed its fears that "sinister foreign forces possibly Oriental [were] at work helping Mau Mau forces" and that this growing menace threatened not only Kenya but much of the rest of Africa.³⁷ The question that preoccupied the British, as well as other Western countries, was whether the ideas behind Mau Mau would be wiped out with the physical destruction of the uprising and the Africans who took part in it.³⁸

Years of National Emergency

In October 1952, the colonial authorities introduced martial law and arrested almost all KAU leaders. Many Westerners, official and non-official, evaluated the subsequent events of 1952-56 as a clash between "reactionary tribal fanaticism" and "modern civilization,"

³⁶Mau Mau, Library of Congress Motion Picture Collection, FDA 50 (Rock-Price Production, 1954).

³⁷Loc. cit.

³⁸Ibid.

emphasizing the existence of a direct connection between the KAU and Mau Mau.³⁹ Only after independence --with all of the participants of the uprising "rehabilitated" and its dead leaders called national heroes--did works providing a more objective picture appear.

Beginning in 1955, colonial authorities permitted the creation of political organizations limited to the district level. This action led to the fragmentation and dispersion of anti-colonial forces, clearing the road for active political work by moderate leaders ready to cooperate with colonial authorities. Thus, during the years of martial law, a considerable number of African political organizations retreated to moderate positions.⁴⁰

However, not all political parties were reconciled to moderation. In a challenge to the colonial policy, C. M. B. Argwings-Kodhek, the first African lawyer in Kenya, formed the Kenya African National Congress in Nairobi, in December 1955. Consistent with the anti-colonial position of KAU, his organization declared that the government's policy of limiting associations to the

³⁹V. G. Solodovnikov, A. B. Letnev, P. I. Manchkha (ed.), Politicheskie partii afriki (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Nauk" glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1970), p. 271.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 272.

district level would encourage tribal feeling and hinder the development of any national sense. He was forced to be content with the Nairobi District African Congress, whose splinter group, the Nairobi People's Convention Party, went across the country under the umbrella of Tom Mboya's Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL). Facing national organization, the government threatened to proscribe the KFL if it did not stop its political activities. Intervention by the British Trade Union Congress on the Federation's behalf saved it. The Nairobi People's Convention Party continued to demand the abolition of martial law, the implementation of land reform, the expansion of African representation in the Legislative Council, and the introduction of universal voting rights.⁴¹

Development of Opposing Camps

Largely because of the rapidly changing international situation, British powers in Kenya greatly desired that the country develop along Western lines, thus forestalling a Communist threat. In 1955 a former Governor of Kenya, Lord Altrincham, blamed the West for Communist infiltration into Kenya.⁴² He called for a major program

⁴¹Ogot, op. cit., p. 287.

⁴²Edward William Macleay Grigg Altrincham, baron

to "inspire the wisdom and the leadership necessary to save Africa from Communism." To combat Communism effectively, he asked the West to know well its strategy and tactics. These views were supported by an American scholar, Max Yergan, quoted by Bruce McKenzie in the Kenya Legislative Council in 1958 during a debate on precautions to be taken to stave off Communism in Kenya.⁴³

Actually, while fears about Communism and the search for ways of combating it were being brought into the open, there were only two people in Kenya who had been publicly labeled as Communists by the Kenya Government: Jomo Kenyatta and Markhan Singh (an Indian-Kenyan trade union leader). There were others--less than thirty--who had at one time or another been regarded as Communist sympathizers.⁴⁴ In Kenya, as in practically all

(Lord Altrincham), Kenya's Opportunity: Memories, Hopes and Ideas (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1955), pp. 145-147.

⁴³Max Yergan, "The Communist Threat in Africa," Africa Today, ed. by C. Grove Haine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 262. Also, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, Official Report, 11th Council Inaugurated October 1956, LXXVI, pt. 11, 2d sess. (July 24, 1958), cols. 2701-02. Hereafter referred to as Official Report, Kenya Legislative Council, 11th Council, etc. After June 7, 1963, the title changed to: Official Report, House of Representatives (or The Senate), First Parliament, etc. Similarly after the dissolution of the Senate in March, 1966, reference is to Official Report, The National Assembly, First Parliament, etc.

⁴⁴The Origin and the Growth of Mau Mau, op. cit.,

colonial African countries, there was no Communist party in the 1950's, due to the country's economic backwardness and its very small labor force, who lacked the experience to organize without outside help. Regardless, there were some who persistently warned against the growing specter of Communism in Kenya.

The first clear indication of the growth of differences among the African politicians in Kenya became public in May 1958 when Tom Mboya told the Kenya Legislative Council: "Most people will expect me to have no mercy for capitalists or big firms or employers. On the contrary, . . . I have a lot of sympathy for them because I realize one thing, that what this country needs most is the stimulation of more industrial development and greater investment.⁴⁵ He then pledged to do everything in his power to guarantee security for public and private ventures in Kenya. In July 1958, when a motion entitled "Precautions Against Communism" was introduced in the Kenya Legislature, the majority of the fourteen African elected representatives to that body committed

p. 220.

⁴⁵Official Report, Kenya Legislative Council, 11th Council, LXXVI, pt. 11, 2d sess. (May 20, 1958), col. 667.

themselves to the West. These representatives played a very important role in the ideological struggle of the 1960's.

The "Precautions" motion was introduced by a European member of the chamber, but an African member, Masinde Muliro, amended it to read: "That having regard to the increasing threat of communism in Africa and to Kenya's vulnerability and bearing in mind any political, economic and social frustrations which might provide a breeding ground for Communistic propaganda and activity, this Council requests Government to maintain the utmost vigilance and all possible precautions against any development of Communism in Kenya."⁴⁶ According to the motion, a Communist was identified as a person who accepted the doctrine and discipline of Marxism-Leninism and who was willing to subordinate his own ideas to those of the Communist party and to Marxist-Leninist theory.⁴⁷

On behalf of the Kenya Government, the Minister for Internal Security and Defense, J. W. Cussack, expressed the concern of the British Government about Communist inroads in colonial Africa and Kenya in particular:

⁴⁶Ibid., pt. 11 (July 24, 1958), cols. 2656-57.

⁴⁷Ibid., col. 2651.

The object of Communist support for the so-called national liberation movements in the colonies and elsewhere is not what a good number of people think it is. It is to deprive the metropolitan powers of supplies and raw materials, thereby creating unemployment in industrialized countries and the climate for a revolutionary situation where such a climate can only, in Communist dogma, exist. There is also a Russian imperialist background. . . . The object of communism has nothing whatsoever to do with liberty and freedom for the colonies.⁴⁸

He also revealed the policy of the Government not to allow people identified with Communism into the country and to restrict Kenyans identified with Communism, such as Kenyatta. Also, it was announced that the Government would no longer let Communist literature into the country and would prosecute those found with banned publications.⁴⁹

Muliro, who had amended the motion, referred to Communism as an "evil" and "godless propaganda," and emphatically pointed out that Kenya had to find a way to ward off the weaknesses--economic, political, and social inequities--that overtook Russia in 1917.⁵⁰ Tom Mboya left no doubt that he aligned himself and sought to align Kenya and the whole of East Africa with the West:

⁴⁸Ibid., col. 2652.

⁴⁹Ibid., col. 2653.

⁵⁰Ibid., cols. 2657, 2658.

... We should expose the communist lie by living the democratic truth and practising the democratic faith. It is not going to be enough merely to tell the people that Communists are liars, that they give you false hopes, they are this or that, if people cannot see an alternative that is better in real life and in practice than Communism. That is the challenge that the West must face--that is the challenge that those of us who believe that Communism must be defeated must face in East Africa today.⁵¹

Other African members of the Legislative Council concurred with Muliro and Mboya. Daniel Arap Moi said that as a Christian democrat, he wanted to see that Communism was defeated.⁵² Dr. J. G. Kiano noted that from extensive study of Communist literature--on Marxism--

Leninism and on Stalinism--he had concluded that in addition to being the worst type of imperialism, Communism is filled with the doctrine of violent revolution and hence is an unacceptable evil.⁵³

Other representatives exhorted the Government to shut off the possibilities of future collaboration between independent Kenya and the socialist world system. In registering his opposition to Communism, J. N. Muimi warned that Kenya must guard itself against Communist

⁵¹Ibid., cols. 2661-62.

⁵²Ibid., cols. 2668, 2669.

⁵³Ibid., cols. 2687, 2688.

"social and economic tactics," and then suggested: "We in Kenya can stand on our own without any aid from any Communist country."⁵⁴ Moreover, in his view, Kenya should stop "inviting communism" into the country by "preventing . . . young boys and girls being offered overseas bursaries by Communist countries" and going to be educated there--because he had no doubt that they would return to Kenya with ideas of Communism and then convey "these ideas to their counterpart young men in this country."⁵⁵ Still another member, Jeremiah Nyagah, who spent three weeks in socialist Yugoslavia as an official of the Kenya Government on a study tour, strongly warned against any "vehicle of bringing in this country the Soviet type of Communism" with the counsel that "what I saw could not fool anybody to become a Communist."⁵⁶ He particularly spoke out against the "acts of atrocity committed in East European countries," and then referred to the "common farms" with bitterness: "I would hate to see any of those kind established here."⁵⁷

⁵⁴Ibid., col. 2669.

⁵⁵Ibid., cols. 2669, 2670.

⁵⁶Ibid., col. 2692.

⁵⁷Ibid., cols. 2691, 2692.

Yet at least one member, Taita Towett, was skeptical about the real intentions of the colonial government in raising an alarm that was more imaginary than real. To him it looked like a ploy by the colonial government to commit Kenya firmly to the Western camp in the Cold War and by so doing divide the solidarity of African leadership. He made the following speculations:

. . . the Mover of the Motion should have said, as it was said in the Irish Parliament in 1780, that, "Mr. Speaker, I smell a rat. I see him forming in the air and darkening the sky; but I'll nip him in the bud." That is what the Mover of the Motion should have said. That would have been the end.

Now coming to the idea of what the Mover of the Motion had in mind, there is another thing which says, "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him." It is the same with Communism. It does not exist in Kenya and now it has been moved and it exists in our minds. I think it is very regrettable that this Motion should have been brought to this House.⁵⁸

Towett reminded his fellow legislators that they were embarking on a very dangerous road since "no legislation will stop anyone taking any ideas, any concept, any ideology that happens to be in the air"; his alternative was to concentrate on positive actions of fairness and equality to all.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Ibid., cols. 2663-64.

⁵⁹Ibid., col. 2664.

Oginga Odinga charged the colonial government with using so-called "communist methods" and "tactics" against the Africans in Kenya and using those methods to throw the African leadership into disarray. He pointed out discriminatory practices that enabled Europeans and Asians to "be rich permanently" while the African masses were intended to "be poor permanently." He stated that if the Government wanted Communism kept out of Kenya, it first had to alleviate those conditions that might stimulate grievances. At the same time he asked those who were worried about Communism to behave in such a manner that they did not by their actions or lack of them help the development of those "Communistic ideas" in Kenya.⁶⁰

In the meantime, the United States, where interest in Africa had been generated by Vice-President Richard Nixon's visit to Accra for the celebration of Ghana's independence in March 1957, began to compete with Communist interests in Africa. In mid-1958 the United States Under Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, leveled charges against what he called "the divisive effort of the Soviet imperialism to destroy co-operative

⁶⁰Ibid., cols. 2683-85.

ventures of the free world and to subvert the area to its own design."⁶¹ Still, in his view, the efforts of the Soviet Union were not likely to succeed in Africa because there were hardly any Communists or Communist parties worth the name. Even African trade union movements were affiliated with the Western-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. He appealed to the West to seek close, friendly, and equal relations to encourage Africa's "evolution into constructive, responsible channels" and repulse Soviet Communist challenges.⁶²

By the end of 1958 it was evident that the Kenya intelligentsia was divided as to which path the country was to take in its future development. The first group aligned itself with the West. The second group at first sought to work with various independent African groups but, since there was not much that other African countries could offer, it gradually turned to the East.

Kenyan Intelligentsia Begins to Divide

With Jomo Kenyatta in jail between 1953 and 1961 and his fate unknown, people's attention was drawn to the

⁶¹"United States Attitude to Problems of Africa: Mr. Joseph Palmer on African Nationalism," East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXIV, No. 1766 (August 14, 1958), p. 1572.

⁶²Ibid., p. 1573:

astute, ambitious young trade unionist and politician, Tom Mboya. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, then prime minister of Ghana, quickly detected Mboya's potential and sought to recruit him in the struggle for African liberation and unity, as he had tried with little success to involve Jomo Kenyatta in the mid-1940's. Accordingly, Nkrumah saw to it that Mboya was elected Chairman of the first All-African Peoples' Conference, which met in Accra from December 5 to 13, 1958. The stated aim of the Conference was a consolidated fight against colonialism, imperialism, racialism, tribalism, and other tactics which hitherto had been used to divide and rule Africa. Mboya presided over the conference, whose slogan in paraphrase by Nkrumah went as follows: "People of Africa unite! We have nothing to lose but our chains. We have a continent to regain. We have freedom and human dignity to attain!"⁶³ But some of the delegates, like Bhoke Munaka of Tanganyika, were even more militant: "We do not want to get rid of our chains. We want them to chain up the colonialists."⁶⁴ Mboya

⁶³Kwame Nkrumah, All-African Peoples' Conference: Speeches By the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening and Closing Sessions on December 8th and 13th, 1958 (Accra: Government Printer, 1958), pp. 2-3.

⁶⁴"Accra Conference Incites African Nationalist Activity: Mr. Mboya-Wants 'Weapons With Which To Fight' and 'Militant Mass Organizations,'" East Africa and

called for the "militant mass organizations" to liberate Africa and work for "undiluted democracy" on the continent.⁶⁵ However, at the conference he refused to allow his Kenya Federation Of Labour (already committed to affiliation with the American-dominated International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) to seek closer working relations with the All-African Trade Union Federation, which was considered Communist-oriented.⁶⁶

Africans attending this conference were charged with the task of curtailing the "inroads made by Western influence" and planning "a more modern socialistic pattern of society" based on that which had long existed in Africa. The conference emphasized the importance of preventing Africa from becoming "an extension of Europe or other continents."⁶⁷ Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, celebrated African-American scholar and writer, told the conference that since capitalism was doomed to failure Africa had no

Rhodesia, XXXV, No. 1783 (December 18, 1958), p. 447. Also, "Accra Conference Acclaims Kenyatta and Mau Mau: Secretariat to Liberate Africa from Colonialism," East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXV, No. 1784 (December 25, 1958), p. 480.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru; The Autobiography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 166.

⁶⁷ Nkrumah, op. cit., pp. 5, 6.

choice but to follow socialism, as "the whole world, including capitalist countries, is moving toward socialism, inevitably, inexorably."⁶⁸ Kenyans like Oginga Odinga were listening and pondering Du Bois' advice that it would be a grave mistake if African leaders were persuaded to adopt the dying capitalist system because of temporary advantages and comforts. Du Bois reminded Africans that their role was not to find a world of comfort for themselves but to educate their children, develop strong industry that would serve the great mass of the people, and to make Africa strong in ability, self-support, and self-defense.⁶⁹

Thus, the new wave of socialist-minded Kenyans headed by Oginga Odinga received its impetus from Du Bois. As an African traditionalist, Odinga found Du Bois' views strikingly similar to his own analyses on the methods of African development. He began to see parallels with traditional African socialism. For instance, historically, African land was held in common ownership, a fact true in Kenya even in 1958, when Odinga as well as other African

⁶⁸Andrew G. Paschal (ed.), A. W. E. B. Du Bois Reader (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 254.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 255.

leaders in Kenya were fighting the Government decision to do away with common ownership of the land in Kenya. Another parallel was that, as in the past, labor was organized for social ends and not for private profit. Furthermore, education was conducted by the family, the clan, and the tribe for the progress of the community and not mainly for the development of profitable industry.⁷⁰

Cultivating Alliances: A Search for Leadership

The Americans, recognizing the political talent of Tom Mboya, invited him to visit the United States under the sponsorship of the American Committee on Africa.⁷¹

For some five weeks in April and May 1959, Mboya traveled throughout the U.S., making over one hundred speeches.

He appeared on nationwide television and radio programs and was interviewed by Time and Life magazines, The New York Times, Jet, and other news media. At the same time he met such political leaders as Vice-President Nixon, Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John F. Kennedy, labor leaders George Meany, Walter Reuther, and John L. Lewis, and African-American

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 254, 257.

⁷¹Tom Mboya, Kenya Faces the Future (New York: The American Committee on Africa, Inc., 1959), p. 1.

leaders such as Martin L. King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and other civil rights activists. Even David Rockefeller, Chairman of New York Chase Manhattan Bank, arranged a dinner in his honor.⁷²

Mboya's message, which captured the attention of his hosts, was: "We prefer to govern or misgovern ourselves," and in Africa "Western democracy must match the internationalism of Communism, item by item, with the internationalism of democracy."⁷³ On the question of a Communist takeover of Africa, he assured his American hosts that "African leaders are committed to the ideas of democracy" and that the "Communist movement has very little base in Africa at the present time"; and added that what Africa wanted was "performance" and not "promises," in order to implement democracy.⁷⁴ On the question of African non-alignment and positive neutrality, he categorically stated: "This does not mean neutrality on the question of ideology. African people have much in common with the West."⁷⁵

⁷² George M. Houser, "Whirlwind Tour: Mboya Visits the U.S.," Africa Today, VI, No. 3 (May-June, 1959), pp. 9-11.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

By mid-1958 there was evidence that Odinga suspected and even feared Mboya's political ambition. Mboya was receiving wide publicity in Western circles, who, in Odinga's thinking wanted to use Mboya for implementing their plans in Kenya and Africa at large. Accordingly, Odinga set out to find ways of reducing Mboya's growing influence. One practical solution was to revive the popularity of Jomo Kenyatta and other leaders of the banned KAU--who were then still serving their seven-year sentences; but in this process Odinga was staking, as well as cultivating, his own political image.

Because of the hostile political atmosphere in Kenya, Colonial authorities did not want to hear the name of Jomo Kenyatta mentioned in public. For breaking that rule, Odinga's speech was gavelled into silence. None of the other African politicians in the Legislature wanted to associate himself with Odinga's remarks; and, indeed, speaking on behalf of some other members, Bernard Mate took strong exception to Odinga's statement. He emphasized that he and other two politicians, Dr. Kiano and J. J. Nyagah, were the political leaders in the Central Province, Kenyatta's home province. He likened Kenyatta with those politicians whose political careers

floundered like ships at sea, and further contended that Kenyatta's political activity was undistinguishable from criminal activity. Other African representatives felt that Odinga should have withdrawn his remarks; however, Odinga stood by what he had said.

The Colonial Government viewed Kenyatta as a Communist and wanted to see him replaced as a national leader in a future independent Kenya by some other leader of "moderate" views. Until after the first All-African People's Conference in Accra in December 1958, only Odinga among the elected African leaders advocated Kenyatta's leadership both in the Kenya Legislative Council and outside. However, after the Accra conference other elected African leaders also began to advocate Kenyatta's leadership. But by this time Odinga had come to suspect that some African leaders might be used to serve the interests of the colonialists and neo-colonialists in Kenya.

In November 1959, when the newly appointed Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick Renison, announced that although the seven-year-old state of emergency in Kenya was now at an end, but that Jomo Kenyatta and his imprisoned colleagues were still to remain in restriction, there followed a period of ferment, marked by debate for

and against Kenyatta. One of the bitterest attacks on him came from a fellow Kikuyu tribesman, N. G. Ng'ombe, who was a specially elected member of the Kenya Legislative Council. Ng'ombe took the view of the colonial government on the matter. His reasoning was that since Kenyatta had been convicted by a court of law, he had lost his leadership of the good Africans of Kenya. His return would once again bring the country "into. . . violence, robbery and murder"; hence "he must remain there [in detention] forever."⁷⁶

Kenya's Minister for African Affairs, O. M.

Johnston, strongly supported the above view as he himself denounced Kenyatta. He further rejected the claim that Kenyatta was the acknowledged leader of the Africans in Kenya by arguing that he was in "close touch with the opinion of responsible and mature Africans" in Kenya. In his opinion, the real leaders in the country were those with a full share of patriotism, who realized that the chances of evolving a stabilized and "civilized" African community lay in "co-operating with the Government."⁷⁷

⁷⁶Ibid., Vol. LXXIII, Fourth Session, (November 12, 1959), cols. 75-78.

⁷⁷Ibid., cols. 161, 162.

While various leaders were exchanging their views on the subject, they were surprised to discover that they had started to co-opt the colonialist language. Precisely, they found themselves using the phrase "responsible leaders"--which the colonialists had been using to mean "modern" in the Western sense--and also "co-operative"--which referred to those Africans willing to work "constructively" with the colonial government for the eventual evolution of a Western-oriented democracy in Kenya. The "responsible leaders" were alternatively known as "moderates"; African leaders responded negatively to the particular Western-oriented connotation of both these terms, which to them, simply referred to "conservative or "reactionary" leaders who did not serve the interests of their country. Inquisitively but sincerely, Mboya asked what the colonial government's intentions were in its attempts to cultivate "moderates" in the African leadership.

According to the leading Soviet Africanist Ivan Potekhin, those seven years of emergency had changed the whole life of the Kenyan African people to "one of deep sorrow, frustration and gloom."⁷⁸ Other Soviet Africanists

⁷⁸Quoted by I. Potekhin, "Colonialism vs. the Facts; a Review of The Roots of Revolt by Jack Woodis (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1960), International Affairs, No. 2 (February, 1961), p. 102.

shared the same view, they also agreed with the African leadership that the political racism that had been extended to the economic and social spheres, made it almost inevitable that the Kenyan liberation movement was bound to embrace more far-reaching socioeconomic reforms.⁷⁹

This view was further supported by the fact that the grand old man of the national-liberation movement, Jomo Kenyatta, was highly regarded as a "political leader of ability and energy."⁸⁰ But while Kenyatta was temporarily removed from the scene, the Soviet leaders were impressed with the new leadership that was surfacing. Among these the most promising was Oginga Odinga, who had shown an uncompromising determination to fight colonialism and imperialism.⁸¹

⁷⁹L. Stepanov, "Africa: The White Barrier," New Times, No. 49 (December, 1959), p. 15.

⁸⁰Ivan Potekhin, "Africa 'Rediscovered,'" News: A Soviet Review of Events, No. 19 (126), October 1, 1956, p. 17. Also, V. Sidenko, "A Hero of Kenya--A Review of Jomo Kenyatta. Towards the Truth about 'The Light of Kenya' by George Delf, London, 1961," New Times, No. 31 (August 2, 1961), p. 29.

⁸¹Official Report, Legislative Council, 11th Council, LXXXIII, 4th sess. (November 12, 1959), col. 125.

According to some of the critics of the left-wing politicians in Africa, Oginga Odinga's name was at the center of the focus of events in Kenya which related to the East-West conflict, "but no one seemed to have a precise idea what his true role in these affairs, and to what extent he [was] committed or influenced by the Communists." Indeed, to the best of anybody's knowledge "Odinga has not had any Marxist training. There is no evidence that he understands Marxists economics or would approve of them if he did. Most of his comments on business, even today [1965], would pass muster before any chamber of commerce anywhere in the world." In this puzzle of Odinga, his critics maintained that "there can, however, be little doubt that he aspires to a big role in East African affairs."⁸²

Land Politics in Kenya: Traditional
Views and Modernization

For Kenyans, land had always been one of the most burning problems, and it was the major issue of dispute during the struggle for independence. All of the fighting, which in the colonial period climaxed in the Mau Mau uprising between colonial authorities and the people of Kenya, occurred largely because of land. The Africans demanded that the land taken away from them by the Europeans be returned. This "land robbery" in Kenya, according to Idris Cox, a member of the British Communist Party, ranks as "one of the most shameful and sordid

⁸²"Ajuma Oginga Odinga," Africa Institute Bulletin (Pretoria, Republic of South Africa), III, No. 3 (March, 1965), pp. 68, 69.

aspects of British colonial history."⁸³

Before European values and attitudes regarding exclusive individual ownership of land were forced upon Africans, ownership was communal. Although there were deliberate attempts to confuse the issues of communalism and ownership of land among the African people by certain elements of its intelligentsia during the 1960's, traditional views could not be eliminated overnight. After careful study of land relations in Africa, former governor of the French colonies in Africa Maurice Delafosse wrote in 1921:

. . . The ground, according to the native conception, does not belong to anybody; neither does it belong to all. . . .

No individual or collectivity has the actual property to the soil, and no one can transfer rights to the land of which he is not the proprietor.⁸⁴

The same subject was further studied and commented on by world-renowned anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who cautiously wrote about "African Land Problems":

⁸³ Idris Cox, "Land Robbery in Kenya," The African Communist, 11, No. 1 (October/December, 1962), p. 59.

⁸⁴ Maurice Delafossé, The Negroes of Africa: History and Cultures, translated from French by F. Fligelman (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers, Inc., 1931), pp. 162-163.

Land is unique among human possessions as the gift of God or nature which affects and benefits and is available to the community as a whole. Human beings live on it, live by it, and sometimes for it. It is an object which in Africa determines fundamental policies. . . .⁸⁵

In Kenya, traditional views and practices followed the philosophies articulated in the above two quotations. For example, it had always been known that "the Kikuyu system of land tenure was not a tribal ownership. No chief or group of chiefs was allowed to sell any land."⁸⁶

From the 1920's to the early 1960's, Jomo Kenyatta was widely recognized by Kenyan Africans as the leading expert on questions pertaining to traditional views on land. In 1938 and 1944, he commented on the subject. He pointed out that "economically, socially, religiously and politically, land has much more significance to the African peasant than to any peasantry in Europe," and for this reason "the Kenyan Africans are ready to sacrifice their lives in defence of ancestral

⁸⁵ Bronislaw Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa, ed. by Phyllis M. Kaberry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 113.

⁸⁶ Jule Archer, African Firebrand: Kenyatta of Kenya (New York: Julian Messner, 1969), p. 117.

land."⁸⁷ He emphasized the importance of the land: "It supplies them with material needs of life, through which spiritual and mental contentment is achieved. Communication with ancestral spirits is perpetuated through contact with the soil in which ancestors of the tribe are buried."⁸⁸

Obviously, there were divergent views regarding the question of land among the African leaders. This was shown clearly on August 26, 1952, when Jomo Kenyatta, Bildad Kaggia, and Achieng Oneko addressed 20,000 Africans. Members of the audience shouted at Kenyatta when he was addressing them, demanding "to hear about the land and not beer," as Kenyatta sought to evade the land issue.⁸⁹ However, the other speakers were precise in their statements. Kaggia told the audience that the issue of land robbery by Europeans would be easily settled by the Africans when the proper time came:

⁸⁷Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya: The Land of Conflict (New Delhi: T. K. Menon, Secretary, India Africa Council, 1953), p. 10.

⁸⁸Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu, with intro. by B. Malinowski (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962), p. 22.

⁸⁹The Origin and Growth of Mau Mau, op. cit. p. 305.

It was because they [the Europeans] had complete control in Legislative Council that they got the land. They introduced laws like the Crown Lands Ordinance when we had no say in the Legislature. It was through Legislative Council that they took our lands away. That being so, Legislative [Council] could return the land to us today. . . . Our first essential is to get the elective system in operation and then we shall elect people who speak properly for us.⁹⁰

Achieng Oneko, who had just returned from London on a mission petitioning land return, told the audience that political freedom would come before the return of the land. He reminded them that only after freedom was won could the campaign for land return be launched; but he pointedly warned the audience that African leadership had to watch closely for false friendship from their European guests.⁹¹ Nevertheless, he pledged that independent Kenya would deal out justice to all, and he unconditionally assured his audience that "we want co-operation and friendship between races but we do not want the friendship that resembles the friendship of the crocodile and the fish."⁹²

In the late 1950's the Kenya Government embarked

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

on a program to enforce land consolidation, and at that time most of the African members of the Legislative Council rejected it. Yet some--like Dr. Gikonyo Kiano-- favored it "because it can prove to be a most revolutionary and useful reform as far as the land is concerned when this country. . . is being transformed from subsistence and communal economy to cash and profit seeking economy."⁹³ However, most African leaders opposed this reasoning, and Bernard Mate gave their views:

The idea of consolidation. . . means interfering with the tradition and the native law and custom

. . . The African had the land before the order to consolidate was made and still has it. He has had it for all time. The titles are secondary and not primary to establish ownership.⁹⁴

The central concern here was that land consolidation would drastically change "the very roots from which the African's ideas on land spring."⁹⁵ About a year and a half later, in November, 1959, the colonial authorities were reminded that African people were "not able to understand the individual ownership; they are more used to

⁹³Official Report, Legislative Council Debates, 11th Council, LXXVI, Part 1, 2d Sess. (May 29, 1958), col. 1130.

⁹⁴Ibid., cols. 1141-42..

⁹⁵Ibid., col. 1142.

clan ownership, the common ownership of land."⁹⁶ Indeed, despite the Government's all-out efforts to consolidate all lands in independent Kenya, there was resistance by certain tribes such that even by the mid-1960's some communities still held fast to the traditional practice of communal ownership.⁹⁷

The Kenyans who wanted to eradicate Western land values and attitudes by taking a traditionalist approach became increasingly Eastern-oriented. Since the African communal ownership bore some resemblance to collectives in the Communist world, the militant Kenyan intellectuals became increasingly branded as Communist representatives.

Concern over the future of land policy was also felt by Kenya's neighbor, Tanganyika. On the request of the governments of Tanganyika and the United Kingdom, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development undertook field research and reported its recommendations. These tended to support the traditionalist view:

⁹⁶ Ibid., LXXXIII, 4th Sess. (November 11, 1959), col. 65.

⁹⁷ "Communal Ownership 'Thing of the Past,'" Daily Nation, March 15, 1966, p. 5.

All questions of land tenure policy are of extreme delicacy because of the fears and anxieties of Africans, who see the land as the foundation of their existence. . . . Acquisition of individual title will bring a financial benefit to the title holder, but this desire of progressive farmers may be regarded by their neighbors with scorn and envy, and may be considered, rightly or wrongly as "land-grabbing."

.....
 The establishment of negotiable property rights enables the land to be used as security for borrowing and thus encourages and facilitates the provisions of credit to farmers. But this raises the risk of excessive indebtedness, eventual consolidation of ownership of land in the hands of those who have money to lend, and the creation of a destitute landless class.⁹⁸

The Kenya Government could have used Tanganyika's report, but it felt compelled to have its own study made. So the governments of Kenya and the United Kingdom asked the same body to undertake the same type of research project in Kenya. Although the mission reached the same conclusion as it had in Tanganyika, it noted changes in customary attitudes, some of which had been reinforced by the settler colonial government in Kenya:

Land tenure in the nonscheduled area. . . is much more complex because of the variety of tribal attitudes to it. At one extreme are tribes which control large areas of land which they regard, under their customary laws, as common property, exclusive

⁹⁸The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 94-95.

to the tribe as a whole; no tribal member having individual rights in it. A tribal member has the temporary use of such areas as the tribal chief assigns to him and ceases to have any claim to it once he discontinues its cultivation or, as in shifting cultivation moves to another assigned area.

On the other, for many years some tribes have recognized individual rights to land and outright sales have been permitted, though no registered title of ownership exists.⁹⁹

Aware that the Kenya Government was sponsoring research groups, a militant newspaper of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) published in Cairo attacked these developments as neocolonialist maneuvers. The editor of the paper saw changing tactics and strategy of British neocolonialism in Kenya, and came to two inescapable conclusions:

- (a) That. . . much capital would be forthcoming for Kenya's development under a steady and responsible government of the people, by the people and for the people, then under reactionary government by clique of self-seeking, opportunities [sic].
- (b) That the proposed land reform in Kenya whereby a group of Africans--selected by foreigners--will own farms of 50 acres in the highlands, is a colonial conspiracy, aimed at creating a feudal class amongst the Africans who would join the settlers in reinforcing and maintaining the colonial strata whose practices would continue to oppress the African masses.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 66.

¹⁰⁰Wera Ambitho, "Laying the Foundation of Neo-

Pertaining to land, the KANU newspaper further expressed the hope that Kenyan leaders would reject the intrusion of neocolonialism and follow the slogans of such leaders as Kwame Nkrumah: "I prefer independence in danger to servitude in tranquility"; or of Sokou Toure: "I prefer independence with poverty to servitude in plenty."¹⁰¹ And in the same vein of thought, Jomo Kenyatta himself declared: "We are unwilling to starve any longer. . . in order to support. . . a false aristocracy and discredited imperialism."¹⁰²

Colonialism in Kenya Through Spateful Propaganda,"
Supplement of the "New Kenya" (July-August, 1960), pp.
29-30.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁰²Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE SEARCH FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KENYAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, 1960-63

Since 1920, the Soviet Government has from time to time expressed its desire to render moral and material aid to the countries and the people of the East struggling for liberation from colonialism and imperialism. Overt gestures had been made to the people of Kenya over the years, but beginning with 1960, such offers became more persistent and persuasive. Increased Soviet attention was largely inspired by the improved political conditions in Kenya itself--the seven-year emergency period ended in November 1959--and by the wind of political change that was blowing all over colonial Africa. The Soviet Government began to back the Kenya African nationalist cause with ever-increasing intensity.

Struggle for Independence and the Freedom of Kenyatta

When in mid-January, 1960, a delegation of the Kenya Legislative Council went to London for a conference regarding an amendment in the Kenya constitution, the British Government barred the adviser to the African

delegation, Peter Mbiyu, from the conference on the ground that he was a member of the outlawed Mau Mau organization. The Soviet Government supported the African delegation, which decided to boycott the conference, protesting that there was "little hope the British will be more cooperative in dealing with the future of our people" if they showed such a stubborn attitude on a rather insignificant question.¹

The Soviets used this opportunity to remind the Kenyans to be on guard against "the old tactics of the neocolonialists." Also, they cautioned them to work relentlessly toward an undiluted "self-governing democratic state" and prepare to take their place within the world-socialist commonwealth.²

Since Soviet literature was not publicly available to the Africans in Kenya at that time, the Soviet leaders decided to seek more contact with the Kenyans in all walks of life by introducing Swahili broadcasts in addition to those in English, beginning February 1, 1960.

¹Moscow Radio, January 22, 1960. (The source of the radio reference are credited to the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service. Daily Reports: USSR and East Europe. The same is true of some references to Tass.)

²Ibid.

In its first Swahili broadcast Moscow Radio rhetoricized to the Kenyans that the days of the foreign rulers who had stolen the African continent and brought in "poverty, disease, starvation and ruin" were numbered, and that the Soviet Government and the Soviet people were wholeheartedly pledged to "support the African people in their struggle against foreign rule in its various aspects."³

In 1960 one of the greatest political developments in Kenya--closely related to the struggle for independence--was the demand for the freedom of Kenyatta and his colleagues. An excerpt from the commentary written by Aleksandr Vitmanovich, member of the board of the Soviet-African Friendship Society, a professor at Moscow State University and an acquaintance of Jomo Kenyatta during the latter's student days in Moscow, is representative of most Soviet broadcasts to African during this period:

The imperialists and neocolonialists are dealing out brutal treatment and reprisals against participants in the national liberation movement. They are killing and throwing into prisons and concentration camps fighters for freedom and independence, glorious leaders of the struggle against colonialism.

³Tass, February 1, 1960.

Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of the African Union in Kenya and the national liberation movement, was imprisoned for seven years.

Despite his complete innocence, Kenyatta spent seven years in prison. Last April the British colonial authorities transferred him from prison to an outlying . . . district for the rest of his life. There he will live under police surveillance in conditions very similar to regular imprisonment. This decision by the colonial administration has caused resentment and protests from all peace-loving people of the world. Soviet people cannot be indifferent to the fate of that outstanding fighter for African freedom, and have joined in the demand of the African peoples and all people of the world for the release of Jomo Kenyatta. We demand the freedom of Jomo Kenyatta.⁴

Vitmanovich was trying to identify the Soviet Union with the aspirations of the Kenyan Africans by emphasizing that the colonial policy of repression with regard to the African population at large was not justified. According to his reasoning it was ironic that even when the entire African continent was rising against colonial order, the British Government was trying all possible tactics to retain its power. He contended that the case of Kenyatta and all his associates, held incommunicado even after serving their terms of imprisonment, should be an example to the already indignant African public of colonial "justice" toward those who express the aspirations

⁴Ibid., February 3, 1960.

of the masses.⁵

A short time later, Ivan I. Potekhin, the leading Soviet Africanist (under whom Kenyatta had studied social sciences at Moscow State University), praised Kenyatta as a scholar who had devoted his life to defend the African people's rights of self-determination against colonialism. Lauding him as an authoritative leader of Kenya's people, he suggested that his name should serve as a national symbol against colonialism.

At the same time, the colonial government continued its campaign to discredit Kenyatta's leadership. In a major 1960 address to the people of Kenya, Governor Sir Patrick Renison followed traditional colonial thinking and derogated Kenyatta in most pejorative terms, calling him "the leader of the non-co-operative movement which organized Mau Mau," "the African leader to darkness and death," and one who "threatened return to savagery. . . to the fears and intimidation of dictatorship."⁶

⁵ Ibid., February 25, 1960.

⁶ "Release of Jomo Kenyatta Would Be Disaster, Says Governor; But He Nevertheless Refers to Circumstances in Which the Mau Mau Leader Might Be Liberated," East Africa and Rhodesia, XXXVI, No. 1857 (May 12, 1960), pp. 860, 861.

Notwithstanding this type of appeal, the campaign for the release of Kenyatta and his colleagues gained momentum. In June, 1960 the chairman of the Kenya Office in Cairo, Odhiambo Okelo, and the head of the information and radio section of the Kenya Office, Abdulla Karungo, visited Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. During a news conference for Soviet newsmen, Odhiambo Okello praised the support given by the Soviet Union to the African peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence. Among his suggestions for practical aid to Kenya was Soviet help in obtaining the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta.⁷

About two months later Oginga Odinga, then a member of the Kenya Legislative Council, went to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Odinga was enthusiastic about what he saw and heard of life in the Soviet Union. His impressions were corroborated by Ahmed Said Karusi, secretary of the twenty-five man delegation of the National Party of Zanzibar, whose visit to the Soviet Union approximately coincided with Odinga's. In part, Karusi

⁷ Moscow Radio, June 14, 1960.

summarized their impressions with the contention that they were accorded brotherly treatment without any type of discrimination. They were further enlightened to the Soviet Union's claim that it supports all those exploited, suppressed, and repressed.⁸

Pravda subsequently published excerpts from the speeches and writings of several African statesmen and other public figures under the headline, "Africa Seething Like a Volcano"; among the most passionate statements was that of Oginga Odinga, KANU's deputy chairman. The importance of Odinga's statement was that he tried to view the struggle of the African peoples from an international perspective, involving the Soviet Union and the United States. Odinga wrote:

The Kenyans will never agree to remain in colonial slavery. Both the past and the present of our country are noted for the increasing struggle for freedom and only by shedding our blood could the colonialists retain their power in our country. The people of Africa know very well that colonialism could have been wiped out a long time ago if the United States, the world's biggest [capitalist] country, did not stand behind the European colonialists. . . . Imperialism is the worst enemy of the African peoples. . . . The Soviet Union uses its prestige to help oppressed nations to rid themselves of all forms of neocolonialism. The Soviet Union is always with us in the most crucial moments of our struggle. We will never forget this.⁹

⁸ Moscow Radio, August 25, 1960.

⁹ Ibid., October 16, 1960. Also, A. Oginga Odinga,

Toward the Formation of KANU in 1960: Its Program

When one examines the political developments in Kenya in the post World War II period from the Soviets point of view, it is evident that the uncompromising "solidarity and militancy" of the progressive elements in the labor and political movements gave much hope for future socialist development. It was encouraging to the Soviet leadership that despite the "open attack" on the "organized Labour Movement" and the political party (KAU), the people of Kenya showed determination to continue fighting for their rights.¹⁰ It had been plain to the Soviets and to the rest of the world that KAU, in conjunction with the labor movement, had led to and intensified sharply the "Kenyan peoples liberation struggle in the early 1950's" as the Africans "demanded the land seized from them and political rights."¹¹ To the Soviets, the encouraging aspect was that though the British retaliated "by proclaiming a state of emergency, dissolving all political, trade union and other African organizations in 1952 by jailing their leaders or sending

"Kenii: Pobeda ne za goromi," Pravda, October 16, 1960, p. 3.

¹⁰"Kenya," Soviet News and Views, XXXII, No. 48 (December 6, 1952), p. 566.

¹¹Ibid., No. 50 (December 20, 1952), p. 590.

them to the concentrated camps," by 1960 it had become evident that "those seven years of emergency had changed the whole life of the African people to one of deep sorrow, frustrations and gloom" with an ever greater determination to fight colonialism and imperialism.¹²

In Moscow's view, Kenya was blessed to have a "political leader of ability and energy" in Kenyatta, with the masses of Kenya solidly behind him, motivated by the "deep sense of indignation at being denied their national freedom, and their unbending resolve to be the masters of their own destiny."¹³ But despite this hopeful sign, the Soviet Africanists were cautious because the two opponents of national-liberation in Kenya, the imperialists and the European settlers, showed determination for a long, hard fight. But again, political racialism in Kenya made it inevitable that the Kenyan national-liberation movement was bound to embrace far reaching reforms in order to be successful.¹⁴

¹²Y. Potekhin, "Colonialism vs. the Facts"; a Review of The Roots of Revolt by Jack Woodis (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1960), International Affairs, No. 2 (February, 1961), p. 102.

¹³L. Stepanov, "Africa: The White Barrier," New Times, No. 49 (December, 1959), p. 15.

¹⁴The K.A.N.U. Manifesto (Cairo: Dar El-hana Press, 1960), p. 2.

The first manifesto issued by KANU (approved by some 100,000 Kenyans in a mass meeting in Nairobi on November 24, 1960) warned against imperialism and colonialism. It vowed to be "always dynamic" and cautioned that after independence Kenya's development must not be "mere reformation of the existing imperialist system."¹⁵ The manifesto further reminded the Kenyan people that "Mau Mau was a child of social and political frustration arising from the rule of the white settler domination" and then appealed for the continuation of the militant tradition after independence to insure that neocolonialism and its agents were defeated. It called for "the speedy economic reconstruction of Kenya" and stressed that in any future planning "the interest of the community has to be placed before anything else."¹⁶ It also stated "priorities cannot be rationally decided by the capitalists in search for profit."¹⁷ The manifesto also called for nationalization in a mild tone: "KANU wants to ensure that the means of production, distribution and exchange are under the best obtainable system and administration consistent with all real interests of the country."¹⁸

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 10.

It further stressed that its aim was to labor for the achievement of social democracy whereby democracy was defined as "something which must grow and in growth be endemic to the soil in which it develops; it is not something defined, cut and dried, in vacuo; it is of the people and therefore for that must be stamped and characterized by the people's way and thought of life."¹⁹ The same view was sounded by the leading Soviet scholar on the national-liberation movement, V. Tyagunenکو, who told a discussion panel of Soviet economists, historians, journalists, and developing countries experts:

A firm and viable united front cannot be created only through agreements at the top level. It must be supported by united action--that is to say in the course of mass action from below, through the joint action of different social and class groups.²⁰

African Leadership Is Divided As Cold War Is
Brought to Kenya With Charges
Regarding Communism

The division among African politicians reached its height by the end of 1960, largely as a result of Odinga's tour of the Eastern world, during which he visited the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union,

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁰ Quoted in The Mizan Newsletter, VI, No. 8 (September, 1964), p. 9.

Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, as well as attending meetings of the World Peace Council in Stockholm and Tokyo. Odinga made speeches which were criticized even by some of his colleagues in KANU. Some praised the "Mau Mau revolution" as "a glorious and heroic struggle" which had saved the people of Kenya "from a planned policy by the British imperialists to exterminate and annihilate" them.²¹ On his return to Kenya in late October, his passport was immediately seized and he himself detained and searched at the airport for nearly two hours, while some of his fellow members of the Kenya Legislative Council, who happened to arrive with him on the same flight, were allowed to leave. When released, he bitterly protested that it had never been his intention to betray his people "by using soft words and church manners" in order to enjoy the respect of the "colonial and settler inspired Government."²² He further expressed his contempt for what he described as "sort of imperialist evil" where officials treated him "like a child" by asking

²¹"Solidarity with the African Peoples," Peking Review, III, No. 33 (August 15, 1960), p. 16.

²²"Odinga's Passport Seized at the Airport," East African Standard, October 27, 1960, p. 1.

him "insolent questions."²³

Later, when the Government's withdrawal of Odinga's passport was brought up in the Legislative Council by Tom Mboya, the matter evolved into a debate on Communism in Kenya and Odinga's role in it. The Government's view regarding Odinga was articulated by Kenya's Temporary Minister for Internal Security and Defence, G. J. Ellerton, who attacked the Communist jargon Odinga displayed in his speeches, writings and press statements.' In part, he charged:

. . . his action in the recent months, has done, and is still doing, a great deal to bring the threat of Communist infiltration and subversion, which has always been a potential threat, very much nearer to this country. Indeed eventually if not at once, his acts are calculated to bring this menace into our very midst.²⁴

In reply, Odinga began to correct some of the prevailing Western propaganda, particularly that which portrayed the Communist countries as having no respect for family life and personal property. He boldly told his fellow members of the Kenya Legislative Council that the Communist countries had actually "reverted to a way

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Official Report, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, 11th Council, LXXXVI, 4th Sess. (December 9, 1960), col. 873.

of life which was more or less similar to our old ways, the ways of the African people," and that he preferred "socialist democracy" because it emphasized "the development and improvement of the standard of life of masses of the country."²⁵ Then, responding to the accusation that his activities were geared to bringing Communism to Kenya, he commented as follows:

. . . I am being charged with the idea of infiltration of Communism into this country, but I wonder . . . whether I am the man who founded the Communist Party in Great Britain. Am I the founder of Communist parties all over the world, even in Australia? If anybody wanted to start a Communist party in this country would it be objectionable? Could he not do it if he wanted to do so? . . . After touring most countries and seeing what happens, I know that the whole world is just heading towards social democracy. Even in Great Britain it is the forces of capitalism which are delaying its progress, but socialism or socialist parties in Great Britain are slowly but surely gaining ground. . . it is only because that the forces of capitalism are still powerful, which is why people are not moving more quickly towards socialism. . . . But it is a new ideology which is actually prevailing all over the world and which is going on. I do not think that you can actually stop it. The time is coming and we are moving towards it when people, the world over, will accept this ideology.²⁶

This dramatic revelation, and particularly its conviction concerning the wisdom of publicly announcing acceptance of Communism, took many people by surprise.

²⁵ Ibid., cols. 881, 882.

²⁶ Ibid., cols. 881-882.

Yet Odinga continued to emphasize that he did not want Kenya to become involved in the cold war between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in their fight for world leadership; however, he maintained that Kenya had to learn and gain from both camps. In this respect, he said that he had received £10,000 from some friends in Great Britain to help Kenya students to go to the Soviet Union, the United States, or anywhere else for the purpose of acquiring an education. He stressed that he would always welcome money from anywhere in the world if it came from sincere people with no strings attached; but he stressed that he would never be bought.²⁷

Further, as the chairman of the African elected members in the Legislative Council, and hence the leader of the Opposition, he compared himself with other leaders having the same responsibilities, particularly so with Great Britain's Ernest Bevin and Hugh Gaitskell, who used to visit Communist countries. As "a future head of state," he made the following claim to the colonial government:

²⁷Ibid., col. 883.

I have a perfect right to tour the world and discuss things with people and see what is right for me, and nobody is going to tell me this is right and that wrong. It is up to me to judge what is right for me and what is wrong. Therefore, I do not think that someone is going to keep me in for ever in this country and stop me from seeing what is happening in other countries. All you are doing today, tomorrow you will not be able to do. It is like trying to stop the River Nile from flowing. In order to stop water from flowing into Egypt, you would need all the forces of the world. Therefore when we begin to develop, the best thing is not to try to block us, but to assist us to develop quickly--not stand in the way of development or stop us from learning what we wanted to learn.²⁸

To the political enemies of Odinga, who had always been suspicious of his political and ideological motives, the remarks showed how badly Odinga was playing his cards: he viewed the road to progress simplistically, unaware that he was living in a very complicated and sophisticated world. On December 22, 1960, Sir Charles Markham asked Odinga to tell the Legislative Council whether he seriously meant all he had said, and particularly whether as the "Leader of the Opposition" he seriously viewed himself as "a future head of State in Kenya," "or whether it was a slip of the course of his speech?"²⁹ To this query, Odinga positively replied, "It is true, Sir!"³⁰

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., December 22, 1960, col. 1432.

³⁰Ibid., cols. 1435-1436.

The strongest challenge to Odinga concerning the above views came from Tom Mboya, who ironically had started the affair with his defense of Odinga upon the withdrawal of the latter's passport. However, when it became plain that what was really at issue was both Odinga and his so-called "social democracy," Mboya did not hesitate to express his opposition to Communism. With no reservation whatever, Mboya stated that in the East-West struggle, Kenya's future development lay in the West. He told the Kenyans that fears of totalitarianism and dictatorship were tied up with Communism. He asked that Kenyans who believed in democracy face its challenge; he considered it not only the challenge for Africa but also "the challenge before the Western nations," whereby "our [Western] ideas should be stronger than any other ideas."

It seemed by the end of 1960 that both the Acting President and the General Secretary of KANU, James Gichuru and Tom Mboya, respectively, were collaborating with the colonial government, and were thus vulnerable to criticism regarding the detention of Jomo Kenyatta. Accordingly, a militant KANU Cairo Office criticized the two while backing Odinga Odinga, who had engineered and maintained the fight for Kenyatta's re-

lease.³¹ Later, Odinga publicly attacked both Gichuru and Mboya for their failure to use the opportunities they had to press for Kenyatta's freedom: "I can only draw the conclusion that Mr. Gichuru knows for certain that Kenyatta will not be released soon, and so both Gichuru and Mboya are making a bid for power."³² With four members of the KANU executive committee supporting Odinga, a statement was issued in the name of KANU rejecting the Mboya's suggestion that Gichuru or some person other "than Jomo Kenyatta should become our first Chief Minister pending Jomo Kenyatta's release."³³ As a result of this, Gichuru suspended Odinga, claiming that his activities were creating disunity in the party. Shortly thereafter, the party's Governing Council nullified Gichuru's decision, but only after twelve hours of tense debate. Throughout the 1960's, the controversy gained momentum:

Odinga was characterized as an agent of the interests of the Sino-Soviet bloc and Mboya a stooge of American influence and a child of British imperialism.³⁴

³¹George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London, New York and Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 131.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 132.

³⁴Ibid., p. 132.

To Western-oriented politicians, the division of the Kenya political parties into two major divisions (KANU and KADU) and a further division of KANU into two factions guaranteed that Kenya would not go Communist. The potential influence of Kenyatta upon such a political situation was of great concern to the West, the British in particular. In early 1961, with Kenyatta's release imminent, British high official circles wondered: "Would Kenyatta, who is known to be anti-white, anti-Western and anti-Christian, do more danger if he were released sooner or later?"³⁵ The West considered Kenyatta an ally of the uncompromising militant nationalists headed by Odinga, in whom they saw little chance of peaceful, evolutionary development in Kenya. Their hopes of such development centered on obtaining Kenyatta's agreement to work with fellow Kikuyu tribemen Dr. Gikonyo Kiano and James Gichuru, both of whom had the backing of Tom Mboya. It was argued that Kiano and Gichuru had responsibly realized that the "expropriation of Europeans would irretrievably ruin Kenya's agriculture."³⁶

³⁵"Kenya, Kenyatta, Kikuyu and Khrushchev," Africa Confidential, No. 5 (March 3, 1961), p. 2.

³⁶Ibid.

Up to this time Kenyatta was known for his militant nationalism, and, therefore, it was difficult to conceive of him reconciled to any such compromise. Upon his release on August 14, 1961, he told the people of Kenya: "I feel that this is the beginning of the road, so far as progress and prosperity is concerned."³⁷

Though both KANU and KADU looked for leadership from Kenyatta, he was reluctant to make a decision. When he was officially invited to lead KANU, it was expected that he would accept, but Odinga at that moment suggested that Kenyatta join KANU and dissolve it. With KANU dissolved, Odinga argued, Kenyatta would then begin to gather his supporters from both parties and form a "new liberal movement."³⁸

Yet when Kenyatta at last decided to join KANU in the latter part of September, 1961, and resumed his political role by referring to the KADU leadership as the "boys of the imperialists," he was no longer considered the leader of all Kenyans. The KADU deputy leader,

³⁷Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., p. 141.

³⁸"Dissolve KANU' Call," East African Standard, October 6, 1961, p. 1.

Masinde Muliro, issued a statement in which he declared that KADU had "refused Kenyatta's leadership because it is the leadership of the blind people. We believe in unity based on democratic ideas and we are satisfied that he has no such type of unity in mind. So we reject his leadership."³⁹ Similarly, the chairman of KADU, Daniel arap Moi, stated that he completely opposed Kenyatta's leadership in Kenya, accusing him of not respecting human dignity.⁴⁰

As the politicians were sorting out their differences, Soviet leadership re-entered the struggle, to wit: to woo members of the Kenya labor intelligentsia. In the latter part of September, 1961, the general secretary of Kenya's Oil Workers Union, Ochola Makanyengo, traveled in the Soviet Union for two weeks, stating afterward that the workers of Kenya hoped that the "time will come when we will follow the example of the Soviet workers in improving the living standard of the people."⁴¹

³⁹"Kadu Rejects Mr. Kenyatta's Leadership: 10,000 Supporters Cheer," East African Standard, October 2, 1961, p. 5.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Moscow Radio, April 25, 1962.

Though Makanyengo's statement was an encouraging sign of possible Soviet-Kenyan collaboration, Soviet leadership cautioned the Kenyan intelligentsia that there remained a great deal to be done. Most important was the achievement of unity among Kenyans:

The African people's struggle for freedom clearly has proven that the colonialists criminally exploit every little dispute between the African nationalists. Therefore, it is to their advantage that there should be between the major African parties of Kenya disputes which are encouraged by the colonialists. If such disputes are resolved the nationalists of Kenya will be able to fight united and will have a greater chance of victory in their fight to bury colonialism forever and achieve their freedom.⁴²

This coincided with the release of the Draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party, which defined the official attitude toward the political situation in Africa as well as the rest of the "Third World." The Program was published three months before the meeting of the Twenty-Second Party Congress in order to allow reactions from various Afro-Asian countries. KANU and other socialist-oriented parties of the African continent responded with interest to the Draft Program. Wera Ambitho, a representative of KANU in Cairo, viewed the

⁴²Moscow Radio, October 10, 1961.

national-liberation movement and the CPSU-KANU relationship in the following terms:

We are in full solidarity with the Draft Program of the CPSU. The program's section about the national liberation struggle movement directly answers our aims and problems. We are one hundred per cent in agreement with the conclusion of this section.⁴³

However, even while Soviet-Kenyan relations seemed to be growing toward deeper ties, the Soviets perceived a British threat to this relationship. According to them, the British were promoting the idea of maintaining two parties, thus encouraging conflict in Kenya. Moscow Radio appealed for African unity:

In 1960 the people of Kenya were able to form African political parties. Members from various races agreed to form a united African party to fight for freedom in Kenya. The colonialists, perceiving in this a threat to their overlordship, then introduced a policy of divide and rule, with the result that the two parties were formed: The Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba tribes formed KANU; the Masai, Nandi--and others formed KADU.

Why do colonialists continue their attempts to prove to the Africans who joined KADU that the bigger tribes, the Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba, are a danger to the members of KADU? The two parties are fighting for freedom, and the Kikuyu, Masai, and Nandi, tribes all want freedom for Kenya.

The colonialists want the conflict to continue while the people of Kenya are engaged in the final part of their struggle. It is essential to struggle for independence unitedly, and as the African saying goes: "If there is unity there is victory."⁴⁴

⁴³"Novaia stranitsa istorii," Pravda, October 31, 1961, p. 9.

⁴⁴Moscow Radio, November 28, 1961.

Regardless of Western maneuvers, Soviet leaders shared the optimism of Odinga and other Kenyans that "after achieving independence Kenya will establish friendly relations and cooperate with the socialist countries."⁴⁵

By the end of 1961 the British Government and the European community in Kenya were beginning to have confidence that Kenyatta would prove to be a reformed national leader, or, better yet that "he cannot grasp the political scene of 1961, so that his will-power no longer molds events."⁴⁶ Yet when Kenyatta, who had been expected to be "the unifying all-African leader," failed to unite KANU and KADU, the Western press commented that that "did not mean that he was of no use in Kenyan politics."⁴⁷ The most noteworthy indication of change that surfaced toward the end of 1961 was the use of the phrase "Kenyatta and his fellow moderates," suggesting that Kenyatta's militancy was a thing of the past and that British efforts toward Kenyatta's rehabilitation might indeed have produced the desired result.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Ibid., February 9, 1962.

⁴⁶"Kenyatta Flops," Africa Confidential, No. 22 (November 3, 1961), p. 1.

⁴⁷"Kanu's Own Kenyatta," Africa Confidential, No. 23 (November 17, 1961), p. 5.

⁴⁸Ibid.

It was not until December 1961 during an interview with British journalist and diplomat John Freeman that Kenyatta shed some light on his political views. Freeman asked Kenyatta whether he was a Communist, how his attitudes had changed toward Communism since the 1920's, and whether the general line of Communist policies toward Africa was good. In part, Kenyatta's answers were as follows:

. . . . I have visited Moscow; I have been there twice, like everybody else, as I know some of the Conservatives in England have done, just for education purpose. But some people who want to destroy my career naturally take the view that Kenyatta has been to Moscow and therefore he is a Communist. That is nonsense. . . . I never was close to the Communist Party. What I was close to was a Labour Party; I was very close to the International Labour Party but I was never closely associated to the Communist Party. The I.L.P. and the Labour Party--those were my parties. . . . I have no contact with any Communists or any Communist country. . . .

What we are looking forward to do and what we are trying to do is not to make Kenya follow somebody else's policy or ideology. We intend to make our own ideology and we are free to take good things from all quarters. And if we find that the British system of democratic government is good for us, we can adopt it, with modifications to suit our own ends. I think a parliamentary system does suit Kenya, with, of course, with modifications to suit the African way of thinking or way of life.⁴⁹

The Western world, which had long believed

⁴⁹"Jomo Kenyatta 'Face to Face': An Interview with John Freeman," *The Listener* (London), LXVI, No. 1706 (December 7, 1961), p. 958.

Kenyatta a Communist (therefore its greatest enemy in Kenya) was taken by surprise and was suspicious of Kenyatta's sincerity, particularly regarding his comments that he had contacts with neither individual Communists nor Communist countries. That he was willing to adopt the British democratic form of government was received in the West with great enthusiasm. But, if Kenyatta was being "reformed," there was still fear that Odinga, who had opened and led the struggle for Kenyatta's release and then had rebuilt his name as the unchallenged leader of Kenya, might still be able to influence him in the opposite direction. Indeed, the hostility of the British Colonial Government and the European community in Kenya was shifting from Kenyatta to Odinga. This development was described by Minister of Agriculture in Kenya, Sir Michael Blundell, who wrote about the struggle and the class ideas among the African leaders:

That struggle is centered around what sort of Kenya is to be fashioned from independence--a modern country with a modern administration and an expanding economy, in which all men of all races can play a part, or an obscure African country based on ignorance and poverty. Kadu under the leadership of Mr. Ngala and Mr. Muliro, and many in Kanu, such as Mr. Mboya and Mr. Gichuru, are pledged to the former but the struggle to return to the African past is carried on by Mr. Oginga Odinga and his associates. It is a clash of ideas based on free institutions

and the ideas of the West and those supported and sustained by the ideology and financial resources of communism.⁵⁰

As Blundell expressed, KADU and the right wing faction of KANU headed by Mboya were equally Western-oriented. In ideas regarding Kenya's future development there was hardly any difference between Ngala, Muliro, Mboya and Gichuru: they were all members of a responsible group of "moderates." On the other hand, Oginga Odinga and his associates were Eastern-oriented, and, hence, in Western eyes, irresponsible. In the early part of 1962, when there were problems in forming a fairly representative government, the British press cast Kenyatta as an "obstacle to a national government" largely because of his political reputation and his indecisiveness about taking a stand with the moderates.⁵¹

In March 1962, during the Kenya constitutional development talks in London, Kenyatta took the British by surprise when he outrightly rejected the attempt to

⁵⁰Sir Michael Blundell, "Building Kenya in the Right Image," The Times (London), February 12, 1962, p. 11.

⁵¹"Kenyatta as Obstacle to National Government: Seeking a Way Out in Kenya," The Times (London), March 30, 1962, p. 11.

name Mboya as Finance Minister, declaring that it would split the party. Yet he was perfectly willing to have Odinga placed in that position.⁵² Rumors were then abundant that, with help from Communist countries, "Odinga was training an army to usurp power when Kenya becomes independent."⁵³ However, despite constant allegations against Odinga, Kenyatta promised the Kenyan people that "Odinga Odinga [will] be 'the first man' to be given a post in purely KANU Government"⁵⁴--and this promise was kept.

Even though the British finally accepted Kenyatta's leadership in 1962, they strongly opposed Odinga's participation in Kenya Government and had the power to prevent it. This opposition to Odinga's participation as a Minister served clear warning that the West did not wish to see the development of cordiality between Kenya and the USSR.

Meanwhile, in the effort to improve Soviet-Kenyan relations, Kenyans paid two important visits to the

⁵²"Inter-Party Cooperation' in Kenya Government," The Times, April 15, 1962, p. 10.

⁵³"Mr. Odinga Replies," The Times, March 30, 1962, p. 11.

⁵⁴"Post Promised to Mr. Odinga," The Times, August 7, 1962, p. 1.

Soviet Union. Dixon Makasembo, a spokesman for the Kenya Progressive Party, travelled with an invitation from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.⁵⁵ The more important visit was that by a parliamentary delegation of members of the Kenya Legislative Council, led by John Keen, the organizing secretary of KANU. Upon arrival in Moscow, Keen made it clear that he and his colleagues considered the Soviet Union a friend who supported the Africans in their fight for freedom.⁵⁶

As to the rumored Kenya terrorist army, the members of the delegation were actually disappointed to learn that there were only thirty-two Kenyan students in the Soviet Union, in comparison with some two thousand from Ghana. In fact, because of the delegation's interest in education, the Soviet Government promised scholarships for three hundred students in the following academic year. And, speaking for the whole group after they had left the Soviet Union, one member emphasized that "more students should be sent to Russia for scientific and technical training. There is no reason

⁵⁵ Moscow Radio, April 6, 1962.

⁵⁶ Tass, April 20, 1962.

to fear indoctrination."⁵⁷

The delegation also noted that the general academic level in the Soviet Union was lower than that in England. They were most impressed by the effectiveness of the education on economic planning, since all citizens knew exactly what the government was aiming at. When the delegation visited the Supreme Soviet, they were given a standing ovation which impressed many as a clear indication that the Soviet Government desired something more than good relations between the two countries.⁵⁸

While the members of the delegation were delighted with their visit, the Kenya Government was discomforted by it. For one, the pronouncements made by John Keen were very disturbing. He gave a strong impression that Kenya could not forever swim in the Western orbit, and that it had to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain needed aid:

Kenya and other parts of Africa cannot always rely for all forms of aid on America, Europe, etc. There may come a time when that aid will stop, when it will be useful for us to be friendly with the people of other countries, so that we may

⁵⁷"Delegates Get Lavish Offers of the Soviet Aid for Kenya," East African Standard, May 4, 1962, p. 13.

⁵⁸Ibid.

continue to receive aid. . . if the United States showed signs of disinclination to continue aid, the Soviet Union's aid will be available to come to our rescue.⁵⁹

However, other members of KANU felt that improvement of Kenya-Communist relations could only be achieved at the expense of Western aid.

Those who were critical of Keen's Soviet leanings called him a Communist and drew a strong denial: "I am not indoctrinated, and I am not a Communist. . . . Africans are too firm in what they believe in and it would be too difficult for anyone to try and change these beliefs."⁶⁰ In defending what he thought was a genuine relationship developing between Kenya and the Soviet Union, Keen accused the United States of trying to bring cold war to Kenya. He further protested the mistreatment and discrimination against Kenya students, and African-Americans in the United States. On consideration of these things, Keen was not surprised in the least that the American Assistant Secretary had been "slapped" in Salisbury on an earlier visit; indeed, he said, "I am sure that the slap was justified."⁶¹ The

⁵⁹ Moscow Radio, May 1, 1962. Also, "Mr. Keen Hints at Aid from Russia for Kenya," East African Standard, May 2, 1962, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "U.S. Envoy a Threat to Kenya," East African

importance of John Keen's remarks lies in the fact that like Odinga he had come to conclusion that improved relations between Kenya and the Soviet Union were absolutely necessary if Kenya was to take its rightful independent place in the world community; otherwise it would continue to be the backyard of Western imperialism.

According to G. Usov, the "left wing of the national bourgeoisie" in Kenya, whose interests were represented by Kenyatta, seemed to have gained strength; but he criticized what he identified as the "right wing" of KANU. In his analysis, the most dangerous elements of that right wing of KANU included Kiano, Mboya, and Gichuru. He was particularly critical of Kiano, who he claimed revealed his true sentiments when he addressed a meeting of European settlers and called on them to cooperate: "Why should we conduct a fierce struggle against each other, if at the bottom of our hearts, we share the common aims?"⁶² Usov argued that the manner in

Standard, May 12, 1962, p. 5.

⁶²G. Usov, "Natsional'naiia burzhuagziia i osvoboditel'noe dvizheniie v vostochnoi Afrike," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 4 (1962), p. 86.

which Kiano defined. KANU's policy towards foreign capital implied that Kenya did not want to establish closer contacts with the USSR.⁶³ The Soviets seemed happy that at least "KANU youth organizations had launched a vigorous campaign for the removal of Gichuru and Mboya from the leadership position of the party," so that Kenyatta would have an opportunity to reorganize the party with the help from his close colleagues, especially the former Kenya African Union officials with whom he had been in prison.⁶⁴

As Kenya's independence neared, representatives began to attend world conferences. At the Moscow World Conference (July 1962), Kenya sent a delegation headed by Odinga which included Bildad Kaggia and James Nyamweya. Addressing the conference, Odinga spoke resolutely against a "base and foul" colonial system as well as about the problems of neocolonialism which again faced the peoples

⁶³ Ibid. Kiano's policy was one in which no expropriation of private property would be made except in undertakings of social importance for which compensation would have to be paid; that KANU would guarantee the security of foreign investments and work to attract foreign capital; and that in all internal political and social questions "KANU stands for slow evolution."

⁶⁴ Ibid.

of Africa. He told the delegates about the tremendous damage that colonialism had caused the people of Kenya. He denounced colonial capitalism and the private enterprise system. Further, he stated that the system had outlived its usefulness and he welcomed winds of change, bringing not only a just ideology but also an equitable distribution of material benefits. Odinga told the conference that the people of Kenya were for peace and disarmament, and that they supported Khrushchev's program of economic competition under peaceful coexistence.⁶⁵

It should be noted that while Odinga's speech to the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace had a Kenyan flavor, it struck precisely on the Soviet note; his remarks about the needs of Kenya were calculated to make Soviet leaders continue to rank Kenya high among their favored African countries. There is no reason to doubt Odinga's sincerity in these matters. Even his efforts to make it seem as if the goal of the two countries was the same is not hard to understand, especially in the context of the struggle against colonial capitalism. Before the delegation departed from Moscow, Odinga remarked

⁶⁵ Tass, July 12, 1962.

that the delegation accepted the suggestion of the Kenya students at Lumumba University that Kenya should send about 500 Kenyans annually to study in the Soviet Union to learn the skills that their country would need after independence.⁶⁶

A Move Toward Consolidating Kenyan Intelligentsia
with the Soviet Union

Toward the end of 1962 it was clear to all that relations between the Kenya intelligentsia and the leaders of the Soviet Government were growing increasingly cordial. However, the West was determined not to let that development continue unchallenged and was prepared for the inevitable struggle. Of course, the Soviets did not expect their courtship of the Kenyans to be an easy affair; they were willing to struggle.

According to Soviet analysts, the British were determined to maintain their influence over Kenya's development. In November 1962, the British replaced the anti-Kenyatta Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick Renison with Malcolm MacDonald. Of course, the main reason for the change was that Renison had earned low esteem among the Kenyans, so the British wanted a new, innocent but shrewd

⁶⁶Moscow Radio, July 17, 1962.

personality to improve and build new relations with the indignant Kenyans. The Tass correspondent, F. Katler, interpreted the replacement of Sir Patrick Renison as a challenge to Kenya's apparent Eastward movement:

. . . It is thought impossible to delay the granting of independence. . . In this situation the British Government has decided to replace the former governor with a new figure who is considered more capable of defending the interests of the British Crown.

. . . Evidently, certain nuances of the British policy in Kenya will change too. But the main aim remains as before, to keep Kenya under the British imperialism.⁶⁷

Understanding how Western countries operate to safeguard their interests, Soviet Africanists were not surprised by the appointment. MacDonald was widely considered one of the most respected British diplomats. He had become a Labour member of Parliament in 1929, had been a junior minister in 1931, and had entered the Cabinet as a Colonial Secretary at age 34 in 1935. For over thirty-five years he had held many high political posts and diplomatic appointments. MacDonald's job in Kenya, as we have noted above, was to curb her Eastward movement and gradually turn it Westward.⁶⁸ A contemporary of MacDonald,

⁶⁷Tass, November 22, 1962.

⁶⁸Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), pp. 310, 313.

the American Ambassador to Kenya, wrote in his political memoirs that "Malcolm. . . had been especially happy in Kenya where there were so many birds to watch--including the wisest old bird in Africa, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta."⁶⁹

The Soviet leaders sought to use every opportunity to make contacts and cultivate relations with Kenyans. In their efforts to influence all sections of the country, the next in line were the Moslems of Kenya. Accordingly, in November 1962, Mufti Ziyautdin Babakhanov, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, invited Seneda Ali, chairman of the Moslem Association in Kenya, to see the life of Moslems in the USSR. Seneda Ali observed that "mosques in those towns are full of worshippers," and before he left Moscow he remarked that he would always remember the Soviet Union.⁷⁰

As independence appeared imminent in 1962, many Kenyan leaders were occupied by questions as to Kenya's future development. Most seemed cautious, aware of the dangers that would befall them if they were not watchful. J. M. Kariuki, contributed "Kenya: Two Paths Ahead," to the Voice of Africa, warning his countrymen that they

⁶⁹Attwood, op. cit., p. 244.

⁷⁰Tass, November 17, 1962.

should never forget that independence was merely a first step towards regeneration of any country, and then cogently advocating a socialist advance:

Political power is essentially a means; an instrument in the hands of people which entitles them to make decisions regarding their future development. If we are to inherit a government unable to make the vital decisions necessary for our economic development. . . it will be a shallow victory indeed; a victory of a man who, spotting a great feast ahead, is satisfied with a dry bone thrown by the wayside. . . . Those who have thrown us this bone will chuckle to themselves, knowing that the real victory was theirs, while our people will face another decade of poverty and deprivation.⁷¹

This warning about neocolonialism was not new; it had been frequently repeated by KANU since its conception. In early 1963, when KANU issued the manifesto that was to take Kenya to independence, it pledged to continue the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in the still "enslaved" African colonies: "No Kenyan can fully rejoice in his own freedom, nor can he feel secure in it, while our brothers [in the Portuguese territories, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa] continue to suffer under such barbaric oppression."⁷²

⁷¹ Quoted by A. Lerumo, "Africa and the World Peace," The African Communist, No. 10 (July/August, 1962), p. 51.

⁷² The Kenya African National Union, What a KANU Government Offers You (Nairobi: The Press Publicity Department of KANU, 1963), p. 28.

As the last parliamentary elections before independence were being held in May, 1963, KANU, under the leadership of Kenyatta and Odinga, promised to do everything possible to set up an independent and "progressive" Kenya. It appeared that Kenya under KANU would follow the plans it had outlined in its manifesto, and would utilize them in a proposed federation with Tanganyika and Uganda.⁷³ However, in the case of Kenya, according to Yurii Fonorev, "Britain wants to have cooperative persons in such a new government, persons who are unlikely to place any obstacles in the face of Britain introducing its plans for enslaving Kenya through neocolonialism."⁷⁴ All arguments tended to show that the Soviets were well aware of the fact that their continued progress in strengthening relations with Kenya depended on the corresponding decline of Western influence in Kenya. According to the Soviet authorities this meant "cleansing the filth left by colonialism, struggling against neocolonialism and cementing the freedom of the country, which means adopting a policy of neutrality and nonalignment in military blocs."⁷⁵ Recommending the concept of

⁷³ Moscow Radio, May 7, 1963.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., May 30, 1963.

"neutrality" to Kenya leaders, Viktor Petrov stressed the idea in a commentary broadcast:

. . . neutrality is the most suitable policy for the underdeveloped African countries. Africa will be helping itself from intervention by the imperialist powers, which are trying to influence the African countries to join their military blocs and economic organizations to bring them under their control. A policy of neutrality would enable the consolidation of beneficial relations with all countries, including the socialist countries, to the advantage of nations adopting such a policy and in the interests of world peace.⁷⁶

The Soviets were heartened when they heard that even Tom Mboya, one of Kenya's staunchest supporters of Western views, had shown support for the idea of neutrality as he started demanding that Kenya formulate its own policy without seeking advice from Great Britain, and that it should borrow money from countries outside the West.⁷⁷

Naturally, the Soviet Government was delighted when KANU scored a big victory over KADU in the election. To the Soviets, the results confirmed that the majority of the people in Kenya wanted a "democratic African socialist" government as the KANU election manifesto had promised. They had rejected KADU since that party de-

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

sired to place Kenya under the wing of the British and other Western nations. Joyous over the news of KANU's victory, Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a congratulatory message to the newly elected Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta.⁷⁸

Soon after the election, attention shifted to the revision of the constitution, which had been drafted under British influence. In the Soviet view, since the constitution was based on regionalism, it hindered the progress and unity of the country and even made it vulnerable to continued interference from the British. In the opinion of Yurii Fonorev, KANU's views on the national question offered "great hopes for settling Kenya's problem"; and since KANU's views on the questions of peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, colonialism and neocolonialism were in accord with those of the Soviet Union, there were hopes that relations between the two countries would be greatly strengthened.⁷⁹

Another development which clearly indicated the warming of Soviet-Kenyan relations included an address by Nyangina Odinga, head of the delegation of the Kenyan

⁷⁸ Ibid., June 6, 1963.

⁷⁹ Ibid., June 25, 1963.

women which attended the Women's Congress in Moscow on June 24. She spoke about the prospects opening up for women and their future roles in an independent Kenya.⁸⁰

The Soviets were pleased to note that the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika met in Nairobi and on June 5, 1963, drafted a declaration on the establishment of the East Africa Federation, and that Jomo Kenyatta was leader to implement it. On June 30th Kenyatta addressed a mass meeting in Kampala, in an effort to win support for his program. Kenyatta called for "unity, struggle against separatism and tribal strife, and for the achievement of economic independence."⁸¹ The Soviets emphasized to Kenyans that strengthening relations with the Soviet Union was an important aspect of positive growth. To the Soviets this seemed perfectly natural, since "KANU leaders Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga have stressed that Kenya will follow the noncapitalist path and build socialism";⁸² and that as Odinga told Pravda correspondent I. Beliaev, since the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had

⁸⁰Tass, June 26, 1963.

⁸¹Tass, July 1, 1963.

⁸²Moscow Radio, September 18, 1963. Also, I. Beliaev, "Kenia zhdem peremen," Pravda, September 18, 1963, p. 3.

set the best example for Kenya, "Kenyan leaders were committed to cultivating relations with the USSR."⁸³

Essentially, what these developments showed was that there was considerable eagerness on the part of a segment of the Kenyan intelligentsia and leaders of the Soviet Government to cooperate in seeking answers to Kenya's impending problems, to view the independence of Kenya as the major starting point in the development of that relationship. At a meeting in the Kremlin on July 25, 1963, Nganga Vangubu, the secretary-general of the National Union of Journalists of Kenya, asked Khrushchev for his opinion on the issue of Kenya's independence. The Soviet premier stated his Government's views as follows:

The sympathy of the Soviet people has always been with the courageous people of Kenya, who made many sacrifices in upholding their right to an independent existence and development.

The proclamation of Kenya's independence spells a further extension of the family of independent African continent from colonial domination. . . . the Soviet people, true to their international duty, have always sided with the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, have always sided with those who, having gained independence, creating better living conditions for the working people.⁸⁴

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴"Nikita Khrushchev's Statement and Answer to Questions at Kremlin Meeting with Journalists," Soviet News, No. 4909 (October 28, 1963), p. 52.

As on most occasions, the Soviet Union presented itself and, indeed, behaved as an advocate of peace and as the principal friend of oppressed peoples everywhere. In this connection, the role played by the Soviet Union in concluding the international agreement on the banning of nuclear weapon tests (to which Kenyans had earlier voiced their support) gave the Soviet Union an image of respectability as a country in search of peace in the eyes of the Kenyan intelligentsia.

In this era of fast-moving events, the Soviet Union was in agreement with Kenya's governing party, KANU, that the constitution of Kenya would have considerable bearing on the future relations of Kenya with socialist countries. The opposition party, KADU, insisted on the principles of federalism or regionalism and bitterly opposed centralism. In Moscow's view, regionalization was unpopular with the people of Kenya because it divided the country and weakened its prospects for future economic and social development.⁸⁵ In an article entitled "Maneuvers of the Colonialists in Kenya," I. Konstantinov, Pravda commentator, described the fourth constitutional talks in the three-year period as a clear but sophisticated

⁸⁵Moscow Radio, August 20, 1963.

political game in which the Kenyan intelligentsia were hopelessly divided.⁸⁶ He criticized the proposed constitution because it took all the power from the central government and gave it to the seven provincial assemblies. He pointed out that the British agreed with Kenyatta that such a constitution was no good, but at the same time they encouraged the leader of the Opposition, Ronald Ngala, to refuse to negotiate. So for the sake of the Opposition, Ngala and some of his supporters refused to take into account what the majority of Kenyans wanted--unity and not disintegration.

KADU supporters claimed that they feared dictatorial potentialities within KANU, and they believed this especially since they felt that KANU was backed by ideas propagated in Moscow. KADU elements and their British supporters could not be convinced that the regionally-oriented constitution was an application of the famous old colonial principle of "divide and rule." It was sufficient for them to dismiss the whole matter simply as communist-inspired.⁸⁷

⁸⁶Moscow Radio, October 18, 1963. Also, I. Konstantinov, "Na mezhdunarodnye temy: Manevry kolonizatorov v Kenii," Pravda, October 18, 1963, p. 5.

⁸⁷Tass, October 10, 1963.

Intensification of Contacts Before the Establishment
of Diplomatic Relations

Following KANU's victory in May 1963, Kenya's Minister of Agriculture, Bruce McKenzie, told the National Assembly that before long the Kenya Government would take steps to establish trade relations with the Soviet Union.⁸⁸

Moscow itself was constantly looking for ways of making contacts with African intellectuals. In September 1963, the World Peace Council--a Communist front organization with headquarters in Vienna--sent a delegation to Kenya. The delegation was headed by Carlton Goodlet, editor of San Francisco's biggest Afro-American newspaper, The Sun Reporter. Its main purpose was to present a peace medal to the Kenya's Minister of Home Affairs and the Vice-President of KANU, Oginga Odinga.⁸⁹ It praised Odinga as a fighter for world peace, national liberation, and African unity.⁹⁰ The presentation publicly identified Odinga with the Soviet Union's and the world socialist system's interests in Kenya. For those who understood

⁸⁸ Moscow Radio, June 25, 1963.

⁸⁹ "Peace Medal for Mr. Odinga," East African Standard, September 3, 1963, p. 5.

⁹⁰ "Nagrada Uruchena," Pravda, September 8, 1963, p. 5.

the West's determination in Kenya, the wisdom of such a tactic was questionable.

One group of prominent KANU members bound for Peking complained of the indifferent treatment accorded them by Soviet officials during two brief stopovers in the Soviet Union. They did not understand why they were so roughly handled until while in Peking they were given facts on the Sino-Soviet rift which shed new light on their opinion of the Soviet Union.⁹¹

At more or less the same time another Kenya parliamentarian delegation was visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations. During its travels through the country, the members of this delegation spoke of their confirmation of the "falsity and non-objectivity of the Western bourgeois press," which, they claimed, had in the past and still continued to spread "fables and slander about Soviet reality" in the African countries.⁹² A Kenyan trade delegation arrived in Moscow and conferred with the

⁹¹"Group Tells of Russian Ill-treatment: Kenyans Abused on the Way to China," East African Standard, September 11, 1963, p. 4.

⁹²Komsomol'skaia Pravda, September 14, 1963, p. 3. From the caption under the delegation's photograph by I. Gričera. Also, see "Gosti stolitsy," Kazakhstaskaia Pravda (Alma-Ata), September 15, 1963, p. 1.

Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade regarding the establishment of trade contacts between the two countries.⁹³ The delegation was impressed by the volume of untouched markets in the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of East Europe--markets which would give Kenya a balanced, if not a favorable, trade, with the sale of her agricultural products. The socialist countries agreed to send study missions to Kenya.⁹⁴ Kenya wanted to sell surplus coffee, sisal, tea and other products to the Soviet Union and develop certain specific sections of agriculture, such as oil, hides, and skins to supply them.

Soon after the departure of the Kenyan trade delegation, the Soviets welcomed another Kenyan group on November 2: a high-ranking KANU delegation led by the party's Acting Secretary, Burudi Nabwera. They had been invited by the USSR Parliamentary Group, and the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The Parliamentary Secretary for Local Government, John L. N. ole Konchellah, blamed Western propaganda for the wrong notions Africans

⁹³Moscow Radio, October 15, 1963. Also, "Trade Talks with Kenya," Soviet News, No. 4908 (October 25, 1963), p. 45.

⁹⁴"3m. Communist Trade Hopes: Kenya Team's 'Astounding Success,'" East African Standard, (November 5, 1963), p. 1.

held about the Soviet Union:

Now we have seen with our own eyes that the USSR is a new world where people work for themselves, for the benefit of the nation and not in order to enrich a handful of exploiters as is the case everywhere where capitalism dominates. Our stay in the USSR has convinced us that the struggle waged by the Africans against imperialism and colonialism is part of the general struggle of peoples and all Soviet people, in the first place, against this monstrous evil.⁹⁵

Another member of that delegation was Senator John Kebaso, Deputy Speaker of the Kenya Senate, who contended in 1957 that "any attempt to give Kenya self-government will bring only mistrust, discontent, misgiving and fear among the African population and eventually give a chance to the Communist dominants to poison the African minds."⁹⁶ At this time he seemed, at least temporarily, to have changed his views with the changed circumstances. Like the other members of the delegation, he also expressed admiration for the remarkable achievements of the Soviet Union, as he saw them, he departed with the impression that the Soviet Union was "the happiest country in the world."⁹⁷

⁹⁵Tass, November 17, 1963.

⁹⁶"Six Contest S. Nyanza: Warning on Communist Dangers--Mr. Kebaso," East African Standard, February 26, 1957, p. 4.

⁹⁷Loc. cit.

Visiting Moscow and Tashkent as the guest of the Centrosoyuz at almost the same time as the KANU delegation, the president of the Trade Cooperative Alliance of Kenya, Wilson Okondo Onyango, told a Tass interviewer that Kenya cooperators wished to establish closer contacts with Centrosoyuz, "and trade to mutual advantage with it," and that he had made arrangements for a group of Kenyans to be trained at the Centrosoyuz.⁹⁸

As the date of Kenya's independence neared, it was the Soviets' turn to visit Kenya, since no Soviet citizen had been allowed into Kenya prior to this time. At KANU's invitation, two Soviet delegations arrived in Nairobi on December 7, 1963, in order to participate in the festivities in celebration of Kenya's independence, slated for December 12. The groups were led by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR and the First Deputy Foreign Minister for Higher and Secondary Education.⁹⁹ On independence eve, Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta met with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and his delegation and said that the establishment of friendly relations with the USSR had long been a dream of the people of Kenya, hitherto prevented by

⁹⁸Tass, November 22, 1963.

⁹⁹Ibid., December 8, 1963.

colonialism.¹⁰⁰ The members of the Soviet delegations had ample opportunities to meet and confer with individual Ministers of the Kenya Government and other Kenyans.

In a telegram to Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta on independence day, Chairman Khrushchev expressed high hopes for Kenya, particularly in embarking on the road of independent development with emphasis on strengthening its political and economic independence. He also expressed the hope that the two countries would at once establish full diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level and within a short time would develop a plan of comprehensive cooperation.¹⁰¹ As a result of the negotiations between the Soviet Government delegation and the Kenya Government, an agreement was reached on December 14, 1963, on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of diplomatic missions at Moscow and Nairobi.¹⁰²

On the other front, along with the other United Nations members, the Soviet Union's Permanent Mission at

¹⁰⁰"Soviet Government Delegation Received By Mr. Kenyatta," Soviet News, No. 4927 (December 11, 1963), p. 127.

¹⁰¹"Uhuru Messages," East African Standard, December 12, 1963, p. 4. Also, Tass, December 11, 1963; and "Nikita Khrushchev Sends Greetings to Kenya," Soviet News, No. 4928 (December 12, 1963), p. 129.

¹⁰²"Diplomatic Relations With Kenya," Soviet News,

the United Nations welcomed Kenya into UN membership with particular enthusiasm.¹⁰³ This was especially so because the first independent Kenyan delegation to the United Nations was led by Oginga Odinga, the Vice-President of KANU and the Minister for Home Affairs. In his debut address Odinga attacked the United States for blocking the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, and for being a deterrent to world peace. At the same time he accused the Western countries of aiding the racist and colonial regimes which oppressed African populations and threatened world peace by their actions; he beseeched the big powers, which spent colossal amounts of money for the dangerous and wasteful armament race, to continue to strive toward total disarmament for the well-being of all mankind.¹⁰⁴ In that speech he also raised these points:

No. 4932 (December 19, 1963), p. 145.

¹⁰³"Kenya and Zanzibar in United Nations," Soviet News, No. 4931 (December 17, 1963), p. 144.

¹⁰⁴Jaramogi A. Oginga Odinga, "Documents: Kenya at the United Nations," The African Communist, No. 16 (January-March, 1964), pp. 96-99.

As we look back into the history of our country we cannot escape the fact that Kenya has long been the victim of foreign domination. For too long we had no say in planning our lives or in deciding our destiny. For too long we have suffered the inequalities imposed on us by foreign rulers whose interest was to exploit us for their own benefit. Now in consequence of great political revolution by the people of Kenya under the bold leadership of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, we have become masters of our own destiny.

.....
 We wish to reiterate that Kenya shall pursue a policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality. By this we mean that while steering clear of all power blocs and judging each issue on its merits, we do not intend to remain neutral or passive on issues which are manifestly wrong or unjust. For instance, Kenya shall never be neutral on colonialism and imperialism. Kenya firmly believes that some of the major causes of international conflicts are the existence of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism. Our neutrality should not be construed as indifference and passivity to world problems, nor shall we adopt the role of seeking points of compromises to the basic principles of justice.

To annihilate this entrenched enemy of humanity, we need every ounce of our united strength in Africa and all the help of the anti-imperialist ally.¹⁰⁵

There was no question that the general tone of this speech was anti-West and, consequently, Western hostility to Odinga was anticipated. Indeed, in the words of the first American Ambassador to Kenya, the United States Consul General to Nairobi was reported to have "violently criticized Mr. Odinga's UN speech. . . and had suggested that they weren't welcome in America."¹⁰⁶ The Ambassador

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 94-95.

¹⁰⁶Attwood, op. cit., p. 150.

further claimed that the same "man had previously also threatened to cut off U.S. aid [to Kenya] if they invited the Communist Chinese to their independence celebrations"; he contended that such threats, or pressures, whether or not they were sincere, only presented him with "a few additional public relations problems" in his assignment as the first ambassador.¹⁰⁷

The next day Odinga was forced to hold a news conference at U.N. headquarters in New York to clear up some misinterpretations which had arisen from his speech.

He had this to say:

I would like to comment briefly on the reports of certain circles to the effect that Kenya is moving in the direction of the Eastern bloc. I certainly declared at the General Assembly on 16th of December that Kenya would firmly follow a policy of nonalignment and positive neutrality. . . . We shall not permit us being labelled "the lackey of United States" or "puppets of the Soviet Union." . . . We do not belong to either camp. We belong to Africa.

Before gaining independence, we, contrary to our will, were fettered to the West with chains of colonialism. Now we are free we shall establish new contacts. In some cases [we shall] compensate for the lack of equilibrium that existed in the past and take steps to leave the Western orbit.¹⁰⁸

In the Soviet view, Odinga's "neutrality and nonalignment" was acceptable as he seemed determined to open avenues to

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Tass, December 18, 1963.

the East. A Soviet correspondent who was present at this news conference got the impression that some American correspondent went too far in asking Odinga provocative questions, particularly those relating to his "personal contacts" with the Soviet bloc. Odinga bitterly denied the rumors which he claimed originated from the British and American press that he was leading Kenya to the Soviet bloc, and he added with regret that such "fabrications" were also supported and encouraged by certain individuals in Kenya who, he charged, hoped to make monetary profit from the United States.¹⁰⁹

The importance of the first Kenyan delegation to the United Nations lay in its expressed determination to maintain the fight against colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism. The delegation made it appear that Kenya was moving close to the Eastern bloc countries and away from the West. However, it is important to remember that this was a period when African political thinking had elevated socialism, and that in that wide currency and acceptance Kenya was no exception. Indeed, that mood is detected in Kenyatta's reply to Khrushchev's congratulatory message on Kenya's Independence:

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

On embarking on the solution of the majestic task of building a nation, we shall feel the inspiring support, friendship, sympathy and enthusiasm of the people of the Soviet Union and all-peace loving nations of the world.¹¹⁰

On the eve of her independence, when Kenya announced her ambassadors to various diplomatic posts around the world, Otuko was named Kenyan Ambassador to Moscow.¹¹¹ The first diplomatic contact was established when on December 24 the first Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vasil Kuznetsov, received the Kenyan chargé d'affaires ad interim, P.M. Acharia.¹¹² Ambassador Otuko himself arrived in Moscow on January 2, 1964, and presented his credentials two weeks later.¹¹³ In the meantime the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, on January 27, announced the appointment of Vladimir Lavrov as the first Soviet Ambassador to Kenya.¹¹⁴ As far as the Kenyan intelligentsia and

¹¹⁰ Ibid., January 8, 1964.

¹¹¹ "Russia Gives Recognition to Kenya," East African Standard, December 11, 1963, p. 1.

¹¹² Tass, December 24, 1963.

¹¹³ Ibid., January 2, 1964.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., January 27, 1964. Vladimir Lavrov had a degree in technology and arts and was a candidate in historical sciences. He had been in diplomatic services since 1947; he had previously held the post of counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and chargé d'affaires ad interim in Yemen. Prior to his appointment he headed

the Soviet Government were concerned, things were proceeding very well, and seemed to lend hope to the future well-being of the two countries and their relationship.

the second European section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs which dealt with Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGES IN RELATIONS AND IN PROMISES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE KENYAN AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS, 1964-66

Kenya was one of the few African countries that expressed a strong desire to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries following independence. However, after the uniqueness of her national character began to be observable, the time arrived for implementing that image projected in 1963/64. It was increasingly apparent that the ruling Kenyan intelligentsia lacked strong bonds with the Soviet Government. The group within the Kenyan intelligentsia that had been so enthusiastically engaged in strengthening those ties lost its power position to another group whose uppermost concerns were the pragmatic needs of Kenya. The new group was opposed to allowing the expansion of Soviet influence in Kenya and wanted to keep any relations between the Soviet Union and Kenya on a low level, perhaps even to strictly control any such relations.

The Promising Beginning

The Soviet Government had been very enthusiastic about the prospects of Kenya's developing into a socialist

state. Indeed, to the Soviet Africanists, if there were any countries in Africa whose leaders, party, and people appeared progressive and possessed with the determination to build a strong socialist state, Kenya was certainly one of them. In the last general election just before independence, KANU leaders made it very clear that it was their intention to establish a democratic African socialist regime in Kenya, and to that end they were given an overwhelming mandate by the voters. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and his deputy Oginga Odinga, Kenya appeared to have as good a chance of building a socialist state as the Soviet republics of Central Asia or the People's Republic of Mongolia. Socialism seemed to be the system destined to change Kenya's image as "the country of the white man" and to eliminate economic exploitation and social inequalities.¹

During this election, as we have seen above, Soviet Africanists described KANU leaders as the legitimate and "progressive" representatives of the Kenyan masses, while they considered KADU leaders as "dupes" of colonial interests. They also claimed that the British colonialists were concealing their "plan for enslaving

¹ Moscow Radio, August 15, 1963.

Kenya through neocolonialism"--and thus were an "obstacle" to Kenya's future development.² The Soviets claimed they could support this change by the fact the "white business circles," according to the British press, had contributed £ 25,000 toward KADU election funds.³ (The same sources reported that "scores of thousands of pounds were also received from Communist sources without which finances the Kenya African National Union could not have attained its position of paramouncy" in Kenya.⁴)

Although KANU had announced in mid-1963 that it wanted to adopt an African socialism in Kenya, there were even then some differences of opinion within the party concerning what should be its nature and implementation. There were those, for example, who considered "African socialism" to be synonymous with "scientific socialism," while others viewed it as a Western type of socialism. Still others thought that KANU ought to formulate an original form of African socialism adapted to Kenya's needs.

²Ibid., May 7, 1963.

³Y. Tomilin, "East Africa Chooses the Way," International Affairs, No. 1 (January, 1964), p. 43.

⁴"Mzee and Jaramogi," East Africa and Rhodesia, XII, No. 2122 (June 10, 1965), p. 538.

Kenyans, and particularly those who called themselves "progressives," expected that, since Kenya had set for itself the task of building a socialist society, it would increasingly move to cooperate with other socialist countries. The Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Adala Otuko, expressed the view that the government under KANU sought to maintain the "exceptionally friendly relations" which had developed between the Soviet Union and Kenya.⁵ But the "progressives" had started to hedge their optimism from the moment, when, during the independence celebration festivities, Jomo Kenyatta told the Duke of Edinburgh, "Our friendship with the Queen and the Government of the United Kingdom will now be of greater value. Before this was not of our choice; it was being forced upon us. But now although we have broken all chains, this friendship can be . . . of great value."⁶ In essence, this was an invitation to the British not to leave Kenya. When the same invitation was extended to the Eastern countries, it seemed to include the provision that the British would somehow have to make accommodation to the Communist countries.

⁵Tass, January 23, 1964.

⁶Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches, 1963-1964 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 17.

On January 12, 1964, a month after independence had been proclaimed, an armed uprising supported by the masses overthrew Sultan Seyyid Jamshid Bin Abdullah and the Nationalist Government in Zanzibar and proclaimed a Republic. The impact that this revolution came to have in East Africa was of incalculable dimensions. It set off a large cold war scare in East Africa. It forced Tanyanyika (and later Tanzania) to move more boldly into socialism while Kenya took a sharp turn to the right, while the prospects of East African Federation faded away. In Kenya, immediate reaction to the revolution was vocally favorable. Although some Kenyan politicians and labor leaders withheld their remarks, those who spoke openly solidly supported the revolution. Senator J. P. Mathenge, the leader of Government Business in the Kenya Senate, and J. K. Gatuguta, the secretary of the backbenchers in the Kenya House of Representatives, issued a supporting statement on behalf of their colleagues. The labor leaders showed their radical determination from the representative statement below issued by Walter Ottenyo, the deputy general secretary of the KFL:

The Kenya Federation of Labour hails the newly formed government in Zanzibar under the banner of the workers' revolution. Kenya workers are fully behind this popular and revolutionary government, which we are sure will work for the benefit of the common man

and woman.

"Scientific Socialism is the aim of all workers in the world and whoever opposes it automatically becomes an enemy of the workers." Any action taken to get such people must be hailed as a progressive move to eradicate imperialism if it is to achieve the long-awaited African Socialism. Mere words are not going to get us very far. . . .⁷

Shortly after the revolution in Zanzibar, army mutinies occurred in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya as a result of army discontent over pay and promotion. Noting the obvious enthusiasm for these developments from the Eastern world, the Western press began to question the wisdom of the British in allowing Jomo Kenyatta, whom the colonial government had on several occasions described as a "Communist," to lead independent Kenya.⁸ Just as the Western press tended to view the East African disturbances as Communist-inspired, Great Britain's Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in an interview for American television, said "[the Zanzibar and mainland uprisings] are actually being stirred up by the Communists . . . it looks very much as if they were inspired from the outside."⁹

⁷"East Africa Hails Coup in Zanzibar," East African Standard, January 14, 1964, p. 5.

⁸"Fruits of Folly and Fritless," East Africa and Rhodesia, XL, No. 2050 (January 23, 1964), p. 423.

⁹"'Closest' Communist Contacts: Insurrections

Odinga issued a statement blaming British policies, which had encouraged "undemocratic practices" and which had led to the violent revolution in Zanzibar; he then accused the British of using "divide and rule" tactics by trying "to find scapegoats in the form of Communists and people like myself."¹⁰ Upon hearing this, the British High Commissioner in Nairobi, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, contacted Kenyatta and issued a statement in which he challenged Odinga while trying to isolate him from the rest of the Cabinet, as he emphatically stressed that Kenyatta had told him that "the Minister's [Odinga] allegations do not represent his [Kenyatta's] views nor those of the Kenya Government."¹¹ If Sir Geoffrey's aim was also to test the unity of African leaders in Kenya, he found it vulnerable.

The Soviets had viewed the disturbances in East Africa with some concern. In their opinion, the West was afraid of the "displayed courage and lofty political maturity" of the African leaders, and especially of their

Inspired from Outside," East Africa and Rhodesia, XL, No. 2051 (January 30, 1964), p. 441.

¹⁰"Odinga Suggests Inquiry: 'Communists Not To Blame,'" Daily Nation, February 1, 1964, pp. 1, 16. Also, "Mr. Odinga Denies All Knowledge of Zanzibar Rebellion," East African Standard, February 1, 1964, p. 5.

¹¹"Sir Geoffrey Replies," East African Standard,

efforts to unify themselves and establish closer ties with the Soviet Union.¹² To the Soviets the British involvement in the pacification and settling of mutinies posed a serious threat to the development and strengthening of Soviet-Kenyan relations. Worse still, they believed, the British aimed at putting themselves in a position of major influence over Kenya's future development. In the Soviets' view the British were actively seeking an excuse to make a comeback with the aim of weakening the growing Soviet influence in East Africa.

Despite all the confusion resulting from the unrest, a Soviet delegation headed by the Secretary of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, P. T. Pimenov, made what appeared to be an untimely visit to Kenya, after having visited the United Arab Republic (UAR), Yemen, Somalia, Tanyanyika, Zanzibar, and Uganda. The delegation held talks with the leaders of Kenya's national trade union associations with the purpose of furthering closer friendly contacts. In Kenya, as in the other countries visited, a joint statement was issued expressing unity on the basic question of an international trade

February 1, 1964, p. 5.

¹²Tass, February 13, 1964.

movement.¹³

Shortly thereafter, in mid-March of 1964, Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga received the Soviet Ambassador to Kenya, Vladimir S. Lavrov, to discuss ways to combat feelings of distrust that had arisen at the time of the mutiny in East Africa.¹⁴ In the days that followed, considerable improvement was noticed.

As trouble erupted in East Africa, Soviet Africanists were making known some of their views on the future development of the area as a whole; but they had come to recognize that the East African countries could not be realistically examined in isolation because of the political, economical, historical, and ethnic ties between them.

What Kenya Seemed to Mean to Moscow in 1963/64

In about mid-1963 Jomo Kenyatta told Kenyans that "Our achievement of independence, for which we have struggled for so long, will not be an end in itself. It will give us an opportunity to work unfettered for the creation of a democratic African socialist Kenya."¹⁵ And

¹³Tass, February 8, 1964.

¹⁴Ibid., March 17, 1964.

¹⁵Ambu H. Patel (comp.), N. S. Thakur and Vanshi

to many Kenyans, Kenyatta was actually advocating a socialist development.

Kenyatta was highly regarded in the Soviet circles as a "prominent scholar and eminent political leader."¹⁶ Oginga Odinga had already won the gold peace medal as an ardent fighter against colonialism and imperialism. By the end of 1963 it was evident that the two leaders of Kenya were determined to see Kenya follow a noncapitalist path of development. KANU had made pledges to the people of Kenya and the masses naturally expected their fulfillment. On these promises, Odinga told a Soviet correspondent: "This can be done by building socialism. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are the best examples for us."¹⁷

Kenya's independence, on December 12, 1963, was enthusiastically greeted in the Soviet Union. To the Soviet Africanists, the Kenyan leaders were decided to take a noncapitalist road. On this, Y. Tomilin wrote:

Dhar (ed.), Forward by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Struggle for "Release of Jomo and His Colleagues" (Nairobi: New Kenya Publishers, 1963), p. 136.

¹⁶V. Sidenko, "Pyslaiushche kop'e," Aziia i Afrika Segodnia, No. 3 (March, 1963), p. 24.

¹⁷I. Beliaiev, "Kenia zhdet peremen," Pravda, September 18, 1963, p. 3.

... one very important result of the [Mau Mau] war was that the Kenyans gained greater political awareness, forged militant traditions and produced the cadres of determined men who have now brought the country to independence.

The social structure of East African countries, notably Kenya, favours the non-capitalist way of development.¹⁸

Tomilin further argued that since "Kenya is more akin to Algeria in socio-economic conditions," it was expected that Kenya would follow the footsteps of Algeria--the noncapitalist road.¹⁹ This view was also shared by Vladimir Kudryavtsev, the leading Soviet commentator for East African affairs. To Kudryavtsev, Kenya's independence was significant to the African continent. He wrote:

... For Kenya's independence will undoubtedly have an impact on the situation in whole of the liberated east Africa, the course of events in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and also on the pace at which racialism is rooted out in South Africa.²⁰

But these Soviet Africanists who had warned of the dangers of imperialism and European settlers to Kenya's independence suggested that the Kenyan leaders establish

¹⁸Y. Tomilin, "East Africa Chooses the Way," International Affairs, No. 1 (January, 1964), p. 42.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 44.

²⁰V. Kudryavtsev, "Kenya: African Problems in Sharp Focus," International Affairs, No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 65.

temporary cooperation with the European colonial settlers as a tactical step, arguing that direct expropriation of the settlers' land would put the country's economy on the brink of catastrophe.²¹ This tactic was later looked upon with dismay.

When Kudryavtsev returned to Kenya in late 1964 to see whether he could notice any differences from earlier that year, he was elevated. He and other Soviet Africanists were greatly impressed by the political sophistication they noticed among the African leaders and masses.²² In the meetings they attended around the country, the Soviet visitors were overjoyed to see some Kenyan leaders explain Communism to their fellow countrymen in simple terms. In addition, Odinga was reported as explaining the role of the Soviet Union in the struggle for African liberation and its assistance in building a new life. On the labelling of Kenyan leaders "Communists," Odinga told his audience in the presence of the Soviet delegation:

²¹S. Kulik, "Zemel'nyi vopros v Kenii," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 11 (November, 1964), pp. 111-113.

²²V. Kudryavtsev, "Front Line of Independent Africa," International Affairs, No. 12 (December, 1964), p. 59.

If Communists are the men who are doing everything for the people and are raising their living standards, we are glad to be called that.²³

The Soviet delegation witnessed the general approval of the masses in their act of extending friendship to their country. They also witnessed warm responses extended to the few Soviet specialists who had come to begin survey work on the various economic and cultural projects contained in the Soviet-Kenyan agreement. This warm reception was the case in the whole of East Africa. By the end of 1964, Kudyavtsev and other Soviet Africanists were sincerely convinced that East Africa, and particularly Kenya, was an area of key political importance--the "front line of independent Africa."²⁴

As we have seen, this impression was arrived at from the activities of the Kenyan leadership. For example, Jomo Kenyatta had for some time been stressing that political independence was only the first step toward real independence. Toward that end he asked Kenyans "never to forget the history of the struggle for freedom."²⁵

²³Ibid., p. 60.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵"Kenyatta Orders 'No Revenge,'" East African Standard, September 7, 1964, p. 1.

In that struggle he told a visiting Soviet delegation that "the Russians are our best friends."²⁶ "We condemn the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and industry for the private profit alone. We welcome economic democracy as the only real democracy."²⁷

Thus, while a significant element of the Kenyan intelligentsia was desirous of maintaining the trend toward sociopolitical development, they also had the foresight to understand that the type of Soviet-Kenyan relations they hoped for could not be assured unless grounded on economic collaboration between the two countries. These Kenyans had come to agree with what the Soviet theoreticians had been saying--namely, that political independence was meaningless without a firm economic foundation. And so they planned to approach the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, for this help.

Agreements Reached on Moscow's Aid to Kenya and the Subsequent Brief Period of Optimism

The first and only Kenyan high-level delegation to the Soviet Union in the 1960's was the one led by KANU

²⁶"Russki--nashi kharoshie druz'ia," Pravda, September 8, 1964, p. 4.

²⁷Kenyatta, "African Socialism and African Unity," op. cit., p. 23.

Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs Oginga Odinga in mid-April of 1964. The delegation was significant in that it was headed by the second-highest official of the Kenya Government and the man who had for a long time advocated the development of closer ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Equally important was the fact that the delegation's arrival in the Soviet Union coincided with Khrushchev's seventieth birthday and ended with the celebration of the May Day in Moscow.

Despite the importance of the other commemoration, when the delegation arrived in Moscow on April 18th, it made clear that its main purpose was to discuss economic and technical cooperation between Kenya and the Soviet Union. On its arrival in Moscow, Soviet Deputy Premier Alexei Kosygin assured the delegation that the Soviet Government was prepared to see that the discussions were fruitful.

While they were in the Soviet Union, the Kenyans were very busy with meetings, conferences, luncheons, and so on. For example, on the morning of April 20th, they were received at the Kremlin by Kosygin and officials. That afternoon, at a luncheon in their honor, they met with Mikoyan, Ponomarev, Kosygin and other party members.

In the evening Khrushchev received them, and since it was

his birthday, the delegation presented him with a gift from Jomo Kenyatta.²⁸ The very same day they also exchanged views with Foreign Minister Gromyko, with specific reference to Soviet-Kenyan relations.

After the May Day celebrations in Moscow, the Kenyan delegation left for a week's visit to Peking, following what was described as "an official friendly visit."²⁹ On May 10, 1964 the Kenyan delegation signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement with the People's Republic of China. According to the agreement Kenya received an interest-free loan (\$16.8 million), and a donation of \$3.1 million. The loan would be repaid over a 10-year period beginning in 1975, and the payment could be made by Kenyan exports to China, Swiss francs, or any other convertible currency agreed to by the two governments. There were no strings attached to the loan. It would take the form of complete equipment--either single items or complete sets--and technical assistance provided by the Chinese between July 1, 1966 and June 20, 1969.³⁰ On May 11th, when the delegation re-

²⁸Tass, April 18, 1964. Also, "Delegation from Kenya," Soviet News, No. 4952 (April 20, 1964), p. 64.

²⁹George T. Yu, "Sino-African Relations: A Survey," Asian Survey, V, No. 7 (July, 1966), p. 327.

³⁰"Kenya Gets 5 Million Pounds from China; Loan

turned from Peking to Moscow, at a dinner given by Kosiġin and attended by Soviet statesmen and party leaders, Kosiġin and Odinga exchanged speeches of friendship and cooperation.³¹

While the Kenyan delegation was in Moscow discussing economic and technical cooperation, a Soviet delegation led by K. K. Bakhatov, the head of the legal and treaty department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, was in Nairobi for talks concluding the first trade agreement between the two countries,³² signed on April 29, 1964.

The Kenyan delegation eventually negotiated an agreement with the Soviets.³³ The Soviet Union expressed its understanding of the intentions of the Kenya Government to develop its national economy, agreeing to the construction of a number of agricultural projects, a textile mill, a fish cannery, a fruit processing factory, and a sugar refinery. The Kenya Government considered these to be of primary importance to the economic develop-

to Boost Economy," The Nationalist, May 21, 1964, p. 3.

³¹Tass, May 11, 1964.

³²"Delegation from Kenya," op. cit.

³³"Sovetsko-Keniiskoe Kommuniġe," op. cit.

ment of the country. Also included in this category was the construction of a radio station. According to the agreement, the actual projects and the degree of cooperation were to be specified after a joint on-the-spot study by the Soviet and Kenyan experts on these matters and their preparation of corresponding recommendations. These experts were also to examine jointly the expediency of constructing a sawmill and paper mill in Kenya.

The Soviet Union agreed to grant Kenya credits to pay the expenses of the Soviet organizations, which were to render technical cooperation (for the fulfillment of research and development, the deliveries of plants and materials, and the despatching of experts). When the actual projects and the degree of economic cooperation were specified, the sum of these credits would be determined.³⁴

Besides these, the Soviet Government sought to help the KANU Government fulfill its pledge to the country to improve and diversify health and educational facilities; it promised to give Kenya a hospital that would accommodate two hundred in-patients and a polyclinic that would treat one hundred out-patients daily. The Soviet Govern-

³⁴ Ibid.

ment agreed that, for the first two years of the hospital's operation, it would send trained personnel to work in the hospital and provide it with all the necessary medicine. The Soviet Government also agreed to build a technical college that would accommodate one thousand students and provide it with all necessary equipment and educational materials, as well as send a group of Soviet teachers to the college to teach technical subjects. The Soviets agreed to cover all expenses involved for the first two years of the college's operation.³⁵

In his letter of thanks to Nikita Khrushchev in June, Jomo Kenyatta expressed gratitude for the generous Soviet aid. Regarding the domestic front, Kenyatta's message read: "I have no doubt that the building of industrial facilities and other objectives envisaged in the agreement will be a powerful factor in promoting the development of socialism in Kenya."³⁶ He also noted with pleasure that the Soviet Government had allotted two hundred scholarships--and perhaps would award up to one hundred more--to the Kenya Government to have its youth educated in the Soviet Union.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Tass, July 9, 1964.

Jomo Kenyatta further expressed his satisfaction with the common approach of the two governments to important international problems, including the prevention of new world wars and the elimination of colonialism in all its forms. Kenyatta concluded his letter by commenting on the details of the agreements with some emphasis: "The general response by our government to our present needs will be a powerful factor in the transformation of the brotherly relations that exist between our peoples into everlasting ties of friendship."³⁷

Visiting the Soviet Union almost concurrently with the official government delegation was another Kenyan group led by the Minister for Public Health and Housing Construction, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, at the invitation of the USSR Ministry of Public Health. At the USSR Ministry of Health, Dr. Mungai was quoted as having said that he wished he had taken his medical education in the Soviet Union instead of in the United States, since an African could learn more from the social system than simply how to provide medical services for the population.³⁸

³⁷ Loc. cit.

³⁸ Tass, May 12, 1964. From Copenhagen he described the Tass report as "malicious fabrication": "I

This spirit of enthusiasm was also shown by Kenyatta on African Liberation Day, May 25, as his message and that of President Nkrumah to the freedom fighters in the countries still under colonial rule were published in Pravda. From the message it was clear that Kenyatta was tending to use terminology characteristic of the Communist lexicon. As he tried to view the role his government would play in the eventual liberation of Southern Africa from European rule, he had come to appreciate the fact that the Soviet Union had contributions to make toward that same end.

As the relations between the Soviet and Kenya Governments were showing signs of growth, Kenyan youth showed determination to play their part in it also. On May 25 it was announced that when invitations were sent out to more than one thousand world-wide youth organizations to come to Moscow in September to take part in the World Solidarity Forum of Youth and Students, representatives of Kenya and South Africa were among the very first

merely said I was pleased to see the Russian system of education and medical training. I am proud to have studied in the USA, and the training I received there in science and medicine lived up to my highest expectations. The view that Africans can only benefit by studying in Russia, which Tass is so anxious to propagate, is an affront to the African personality. . . ." Nairobi Radio, May 14, 1964.

to arrive for the preparations.³⁹

In the meantime Kenyatta seemed to be pursuing his militant policy directed toward freeing the whole of the African continent from what he termed "colonialist and racist regimes." On July 18, when addressing the second Pan-African Summit Conference in Cairo, he thanked all African states that had helped Kenya win its independence and then repledged Kenya's support to all African countries fighting for their freedom. He reminded other African heads of states that "our duty is the liquidation of all remaining beachheads of imperialism in Africa"⁴⁰ and urged them to create an economic organization aimed at promoting a joint policy against "Western blackmail."⁴¹

As the Kenya Government continued to express an anti-Western policy, in about mid-July of 1964 a group of Soviet experts arrived in Nairobi to confer on the objectives and the volume of Soviet aid.⁴² A spokesman

³⁹Moscow Radio, May 25, 1964.

⁴⁰Tass, July 18, 1964.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., July 12, 1964.

of the Soviet delegation told some of the leaders of the Kenya Government in Nairobi on July 20 that the Soviet Government was "anxious to help the new Kenya--not just with words but with deeds."⁴³ About a month later, the Soviet team of experts, led by D. G. Cherkov, presented their investigative findings on the suitable sites for fish, fruit, and vegetable canneries; textile and sugar factories; and a sawmill.⁴⁴

At the end of October I. V. Arkhipov (first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee for Economic Relations with the Foreign Countries) led a Soviet Government delegation consisting of fifteen members to Nairobi to conclude negotiations on the economic and technical and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The Kenya Government expected that the Soviet Union would help Kenya "to develop its economy and to raise the standards of its population."⁴⁵

⁴³"200 Scholarships for Kenyans in Russia," Daily Nation, July 22, 1964, p. 16.

⁴⁴"Russian Experts End Survey for Industry Sites," East African Standard, August 15, 1964, p. 2. Also, "Russians Report on Factory Sites," Daily Nation, August 15, 1964, p. 3.

⁴⁵"Soviet Union and Kenya Discuss Economic and Technical Cooperation," Soviet News, No. 5054 (November 2, 1964), p. 60.

Arkhipov made it clear that the hospital and technical college were to be only a beginning of cooperation between the two countries. The Soviet Government wanted to discuss the whole question of large-scale economic cooperation in the near future.⁴⁶ He stressed that the Soviet Government sincerely desired to help Kenya increase its agriculture and industry so as to bring about desired socioeconomic development.

On November 20 the two countries reached two broad agreements, which were signed by James Gichuru for Kenya and A. V. Arkhipov for the Soviet Union, and a communique was issued. The first agreement concerned the two gift projects. The second agreement provided for cooperation in the construction of a number of industrial projects. First, Soviet organizations in conjunction with Kenyans would carry out irrigation works, build hydro-technical installations in the Kano Plains Valley, and clear scrub from areas near Lake Victoria. Second, they would construct a textile mill capable of producing fifteen to sixteen million yards of cloth fabric annually.

⁴⁶"Russians Seek Economic Links: Hospital and College Gift to Kenya," East African Standard, October 28, 1964, p. 5.

Third, they would construct a sugar refinery producing thirty thousand tons of sugar annually. Fourth, they would construct a shortwave radio station. Fifth, after determining a source of raw materials, they would construct a fish cannery and fruit and vegetable processing factory.⁴⁷

It was further agreed that the Soviet Union would supply Kenya with equipment for these projects, send experts to assemble and prepare the equipment, and help to train local experts and workers in their operation. For this the Soviet Union was to grant Kenya a credit of 40 million rubles at 2.5 per cent annual interest. The credit was to be repaid over a period of twelve years after the completion of deliveries of equipment for the projects--with the provision that the start of repayment be postponed until assembly of the equipment was completed.⁴⁸

⁴⁷"Russians Sign Agreement to Aid Kenya," East African Standard, November 21, 1964, p. 1.

⁴⁸Ibid.

Problems Arise in the Implementation of the
Soviet-Kenyan Agreement

While these promising avenues of economic, technical, and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and Kenya were being negotiated, the whole question of foreign aid was also being discussed by the East African countries. In a conference at the University College, Dar es Salaam, on "Problems of Foreign Aid," at the end of September 1964, Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, then Kenya's Minister of Commerce and Industry, told the delegates that there was no such thing as foreign aid without strings attached. He then added:

Nobody would give aid to any country without some obligation. What the recipient country must consider is whether the balance is in her favour or in the favour of the donor.

If the former is true then such aid must be accepted. We must have foreign aid, but we must not be too generous with such aid.⁴⁹

Dr. Kiano's main concern was that the donor countries had to be made fully aware that if they gave aid, then that aid should not be the source of embarrassment to the recipient. Although the statement was applicable to all countries donating aid, it seemed more relevant to the situation vis-a-vis the socialist countries, and par-

⁴⁹"Gift Horses Examined; They Must Be, Kiano Tells the Conference," The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), September 24, 1964, p. 8.

ticularly the Soviet Union, which were the major prospective donors to the East African countries, and to Kenya in particular.⁵⁰

Within a week of the conference at Dar es Salaam, on September 29, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta delivered a major speech to an assembly of businessmen in Nairobi City Hall in which he spelled out the new thinking on the future path of Kenyan economic development. He stressed that Kenya was to adopt a mixed economy, which meant that the roles of private enterprise and government would be complementary. He emphasized the view that while he favored some sort of state-controlled agency to help run certain sections of the economy, it was "not the intention of the Government to swamp the distributive trades by a monolithic organization, and there must remain a very large section of the economy under private enterprise."⁵¹ This new economic thinking was associated with Tom Mboya, and articles had appeared in the African Communist that at-

⁵⁰The delegation that Odinga led to the Soviet Union and to the People's Republic of China in April-May, 1964, during which time aid was promised to Kenya from both countries, was the first of such delegations from East Africa to seek aid from the Communist countries. Odinga's success in Moscow and Peking encouraged Tanzania and Uganda.

⁵¹Jomo Kenyatta, "Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches, 1963-1964" (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 78, 79.

tacked Mboya's "illusions":

The . . . point is in connection with the so-called "Mixed-Economy." There are quite a number of people of Mboya's thinking (especially a lot of Ministers in East Africa) who sometimes interpret African Socialism as another type of "Mixed Economy." I suppose that is what he implied in his ambivalent policy of having "state control" on the one hand, and the training of the local entrepreneurs (of which he himself is one, possessing bars, stores, etc.) on the other hand. Hence, his illusions. . . . This bogus and ambiguous idea of mixed economy must be fought to the very end.

Another feature of mixed economy has been the repeated cries by our Ministers begging the foreign merchants to stay in Africa. I wonder what positive contribution they can play in our developing economy.⁵²

At this time Kenyan leaders were deciding what to do with the large estates that European settlers were shortly to return to the Africans. The government had been studying the collective farm systems in the Soviet Union, other East European Communist countries, and the People's Republic of China. It was necessary to do so because KANU had promised the Kenyan people that it wanted to build socialism in the country and collective farming had been hinted at as the beginning. However, the idea began to spread that collective farming, despite its merits, was not actually as productive as privately owned

⁵²"What Our Readers Write: More on African Socialism," The African Communist, No. 16 (January-March, 1964), p. 89.

farms. Arguments that Soviet and Chinese collective farming were uninducive and unmotivating to the farmers and thus inefficient were supported with historic facts. As reports indicated that in carrying out such reforms many human lives and much property had been sacrificed, Kenyans were faced with the question of whether or not they wanted to pay the price.⁵³

The Dar es Salaam conference on the problems of foreign aid was attended by civil servants and academicians from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, among other countries. There is reason to believe that the West, which had been the sole supplier of aid to East Africa, had been studying the intentions of the Communists. Of course, African leaders, particularly in Kenya and to a lesser extent in Tanganyika, had long ago warned against imperialism from the East. Under that clouded political atmosphere, the United States Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood, embraced the spirit of the Dar es Salaam Conference. Mindful of impending Soviet activities in Kenya, he sought to undermine Moscow's socio-

⁵³Brian Crozier, "Private Farms Raise Output in China and Russia: Not Incompatible with Socialism," East African Standard, October 7, 1964.

economic plans⁵⁴ by issuing a statement in which he pointed out the United States' accomplishments in Kenya up to the end of July 1964 (by that time America's assistance to Kenya totaled some \$12,500,000 and was increasing--while the projected Soviet aid was about \$6 million). Challenging the Soviets, he made it clear that "American aid is certainly not 'disinterested,'" and that "Our aid does have strings." The United States expected countries receiving its foreign aid to support its foreign policy, at least act in such a manner that it would not prevent implementation of that policy.⁵⁵

Essentially, Attwood's statement was consistent with the objectives of United States foreign policy, which recognized that independent African countries which received U.S. aid might not necessarily cooperate fully with the United States. Realizing the political climate that prevailed in Africa in the 1960's, there was little doubt that U.S. aid to Kenya was guided by the principle that: "Our ability to assist other nations facilitated our efforts to gain their cooperation in dealing with

⁵⁴"Foreign Aid: The Channel System," Reporter, 111, No. 117 (October 9, 1964), p. 20.

⁵⁵Ibid.

foreign affairs problems." Further, such "economic assistance has been made available to countries with inadequate resources. . . and to countries which might otherwise find it advantageous to pursue courses of action which would be detrimental to us."⁵⁶

Some of the above points were also mentioned during the hearings on a foreign aid bill of the U.S. House of Representatives, on February 9, 1965, when the administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, David E. Bell, told the committee that although Jomo Kenyatta was a "middle-road man," he was constantly under pressure from "pro-communists like Mr. Odinga," urging him to move "to the East and away from the West."⁵⁷ The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, told the same committee that although at that time the Chinese were "the greater evil" in Africa, in the long run the Soviets were a considerable threat and a great danger."⁵⁸

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 78. Also, "Middle-Roader: Comment on Mzee," Reporter, IV, No. 3 (March 26, 1965), p. 12.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 117.

The British strategists had not themselves taken the growing Soviet influence lightly. This was revealed by the British Foreign Minister, Michael Stewart, who, on April 1, 1965, told the House of Commons of the Communist challenges in Kenya:

In so far as the aid they get from the Communist countries helps their economic development we welcome it. Our own aid is considerable. Forty-two per cent of all our overseas aid goes to Africa; and it is for the African countries themselves to judge from what quarters they should receive aid, and under what conditions.

When we look at any African group or leader or a party, the first question we ought to ask is not "Is he pro-East or pro-West?" but rather, "Has he the confidence of his people? Does he bring them to liberty and social progress?" If the answer to the question is "Yes," we should seek to be his friend.

The demand for economic progress and justice rises in Africa. We want to see it combined with democratic institutions. If we see that, it is important for us to show in our own country that we do not regard the democratic machine merely as a machine to be worshipped for its own sake, but to show that it can be used to solve economic problems and produce social justice. Further, if we want to have any status at all in Africa we must make quite clear at home and abroad that we reject in any form any doctrine that is based on race or racial superiority.⁵⁹

While these ideas, and similar ones mixed with threats, were being expressed in Western circles, Kenyan leaders were reevaluating their views as to what they

⁵⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DCLX, No. 90 (April 1, 1965), col. 1872.

really wanted for their country. With the Soviet threat imminent, the Western experts came out to show that the Western way of socioeconomic development was much more efficient than that of the socialist world.

The fact that the implementation of the Soviet-Kenyan agreements was slow in getting off the ground--the first project, that of building the gift-hospital, did not get started until July 28, 1965, when President Jomo Kenyatta laid the foundation stone⁶⁰--gave the critics of the Soviet Union an opportunity. Among those critics was Kenya's Finance Minister, James Gichuru, who told a mass meeting on March 1, 1965, that, despite what some people may decide to do, "Kenya will never go Communist"⁶¹; he assured his audience that his forthcoming trip to New York would enable him to borrow money from the World Bank to build schools. In the meantime he advised his audience not to listen to "disgruntled individuals" who wanted to put the country in trouble with their "communism." When he and Bruce McKenzie returned to Kenya at the end of March with pledges of about £ 41

⁶⁰Nairobi Radio, July 28, 1965.

⁶¹"Kenya Will Not Go Communist, Says Minister," East Africa Standard, March 1, 1965, p. 5.

million of economic aid from Western Europe and the United States, Gichuru commented: "We have achieved that which we thought was impossible. This is our most successful finance-raising trip."⁶² He added that several companies in the United States and West Germany wanted to invest in joint ventures with the Kenya Government.⁶³ He pointed out that money was available to Kenya because its government had won itself a reputation for political stability. Referring to the promised Soviet aid of some \$42 million, he said that "what we want is people who promise us some money and deliver the goods--not people who offer empty slogans."⁶⁴

⁶²"Millions in Aid for Kenya: Travelling Ministers Back in Triumph," East African Standard, March 31, 1965, p. 1.

⁶³In February 1966 when the West German President, Dr. Luebke, the first European head of state to visit independent Kenya, led his 30-strong party for discussions on his country's assistance to Kenya, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation, Dr. W. Scheel, renewed the assurance that West Germany would continue to support Kenya within practical bounds; and presumably in "a consortium of Germany, America and British interests" to carry out certain projects. See, "West German Aid," East African Standard, March 1, 1966, p. 4; also, "Visit of the West German President," Reporter, V, No. 153 (February 25, 1966), pp. 29, 31-33. On this type of "economic partnership," the Soviets' feelings have for a long time been that "today the African peoples actually deal with collective colonialism of the imperialist states." See, A. Kiva, "Africa: the National Liberation Movement Today," International Affairs, No. 8 (August, 1972), p. 39.

⁶⁴"Kenya Has a Good Image Abroad: Millions for

The continued delay on the implementation of the promised Soviet economic aid to Kenya gave Mboya an opportunity to launch an attack on the socialist countries' aid to Kenya when he addressed a KANU delegates' conference:

Much lip service has been paid in some Communist quarters to the idea of giving economic assistance to Kenya, but in fact most of our present developments are being greatly assisted by... the West... It would be a repudiation of our independence for which we fought so hard, if we are to give the impression that Kenya is available to any of the Communist countries for experimentation with their ideology and doctrines.⁶⁵

Mboya's opposition to Soviet-Kenyan cooperation was also shared by a number of distinguished senior ministers in the Kenya Government, among whom were Dr. Gikonyo Kiano and James Gichuru. President Kenyatta himself was reported to be sharing similar views, according to editorials carried in the East African Standard and the London Sun:

Development," Daily Nation, March 31, 1965, pp. 1, 2; also, "Kenya," The African Communist, No. 22 (Third Quarter, 1965), p. 59.

⁶⁵Tom Mboya, "Restoring Unity Through the KANU Manifesto," East African Standard, April 12, 1965, p. 4. Also, "Not Everything from the East Is Beneficial," Daily Nation, April 12, 1965, p. 6; "The Cold War Hint," The Times (London), April 12, 1965, p. 8.

President Kenyatta and his Ministerial colleagues have been patient in allowing expressions of all shades of opinion in the party in the interest of free speech. In the last few days, however, they have shown that their patience is fast running out

. . . it is West Germany which is buying a third of Kenya's coffee and Britain which is buying a half of Kenya's tea. On the other hand, some Eastern countries want Kenya to import from them goods which she already exports.⁶⁶

Rebuking Africans who talked as if Communism would give them everything for nothing. Mr. Kenyatta said he has been to Moscow University and would assure them that nobody gets anything for nothing from Communist countries.⁶⁷

It was understood that although the terms of the cooperative agreement between the Soviet Union and Kenya had been reached in principle, that the results of the investigation had been presented, and that after more discussions and negotiations agreement had been reached and signed, somehow the two parties had not actually reached final decisions in their presentations.⁶⁸ With such a situation, Mboya pointed to the fate of Soviet-Kenyan agreements signed some four months earlier:

⁶⁶"Trouble-Makers Warned," East African Standard, April 12, 1965, p. 4.

⁶⁷The Sun (London), April 13, 1965, quoted in "Sound Advice from Mzee," Daily Nation, April 11, 1965.

⁶⁸Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, Second Session, March 30, 1965, col. 926.

In accordance with the policy of interpreting non-alignment on the merits of each case, the Government has continued to maintain good relations with the U.K., with West Germany and the U.S.A.

.....
 The West has also been, and will continue to be, an important source of technical assistance. . . . Are we to stop. . . simply because they come from the West?

. . . financial and economic agreements are concerned with practical problems affecting the direct economic interests of our people. . . . This is not a matter of mere friendship or cold war politics.⁶⁹

With this type of economic pragmatism, as well as some political considerations in the background, it was obvious that the West could prevail in Kenya. Indeed, the little chance the Soviet Union had had diminished further when Mboya commented, in order to show that Kenya was non-aligned, "Whether or not we increase our trade and technical assistance programmes with the Eastern countries will be dependent on terms and opportunities offered and not on predetermined percentages" of "50-50 between East and West."⁷⁰

The period April-May 1965 witnessed numerous events that were detrimental to Soviet-Kenyan collaboration. Among these were the return of twenty-nine Kenyans

⁶⁹"Kenya's Way: Ministers Clash," Reporter, IV, No. 131 (April 23, 1965), p. 12.

⁷⁰Ibid.

from the Soviet Union. They arrived complaining of hunger, cold, racial discrimination, and other miseries that made them cancel their five-year programs after only six months. A few days later the Kenya Government rejected a Soviet gift of arms, which had been negotiated a year earlier, on the ground that the arms were second-hand, old-fashioned, and unsuited for a modern Kenyan army. Two days later, the Kenya National Assembly ordered immediate takeover of the Nairobi Lumumba Institute, the technical school that had been built and supported largely by funds from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with the accusation that it had become an object of cold war and ideological wrangling.⁷¹ And on May 7, the Kenya National Assembly approved Kenyan African Socialism as the ideological guide to Kenya's development, but whose real essence was a constitutional challenge to scientific socialism and hence to Moscow. These events did much to reduce the earlier enthusiasm for the Soviet Union in Kenya. The new spirit was that of economic pragmatism.

⁷¹This material is discussed fully in Chapter V, pp. 206-231.

In January 1966 Tom Mboya led a Kenya Government delegation to Moscow to discuss the implementation of the agreements of 1964.⁷² After a one-week stay in the Soviet Union, the delegation returned to Kenya. In Nairobi, Mboya revealed that certain changes had been made in the earlier agreements. He revealed that he had asked that two five-hundred-student technical secondary schools would be built instead of a one-thousand-student technical college, and that the Soviet Union would provide an increased number of teachers for the two schools. Second, there was to be more aid from the Soviet Union to provide staff housing for the two-hundred-bed hospital already under construction; also, local costs for the two gifts would be covered by the purchase of sugar from the USSR to generate local currency. Third, a bush-clearing project near Lake Victoria would not be carried out by the Soviet Union.⁷³

On March 1, 1966, more facts became available regarding the fate of the other projects during a question session in the Kenya National Assembly. On the Soviet-

⁷²"Kenya Government Delegation," Soviet News, No. 5229 (January 11, 1966), p. 22.

⁷³Nairobi Radio, February 18, 1966.

sponsored textile industry, Mboya made the following remarks:

. . . . The establishment of the cotton textile factory at Homa Bay with Russian aid which was originally proposed for 1965/1966 has now been deferred indefinitely by agreements between the Kenya Government and the U.S.S.R. Government. It is one of the loan credit projects in respect of which dates for establishment were left open and at the pleasure of our Government.

. . . . The Russian Government technicians did not, and I must make it quite clear, carry out a feasibility survey to be able to determine the potential or otherwise of such a mill, and it was after these considerations that the project was deferred.⁷⁴

There were a number of people in Kenya who had placed much hope in the project because of the employment opportunities it promised; such people could not understand why the government came to such a conclusion, particularly after having gone to great lengths to arrange for construction. For this group, Z. M. Anyieni, a member of the Kenya National Assembly, voiced their concern that the last group of Ministers (Tom Mboya, Bruce McKenzie, and Ngala Ndewa) might have disposed of the matter because they were not "supplied with sufficient data in order to negotiate meaningfully and that they were merely discussing something which it was never intended should

⁷⁴Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House of Representatives, First Parliament, VIII, Third Session (March 1, 1966), col. 1535.

materialize at all."⁷⁵

When another member of the Assembly, O. Bala, asked for explanations of the cancellation of the Kano Plain irrigation project, and particularly why the Soviet trade experts were not allowed discussions with Kenyan experts in order to solve the only remaining problem-- that is, selling goods from the Soviet Union in Kenyan markets in order to meet local costs--before deciding to abandon the whole project, Mboya's reaction to the question revealed the reasoning that had contributed to the Government's decision to cancel or defer practically all Soviet projects in Kenya:

The Kano Plains project was one of the most important schemes in which the Russians declared their willingness to assist Kenya. The project was discussed at length both in Moscow and in Nairobi with a number of visiting missions. During 1965, however, it became apparent that for a number of reasons it would be difficult to utilize Russian assistance on the terms and conditions upon which it was offered. The main problem was, of course, the meeting of the local expenditure on the project. This was estimated at a total cost of £ 6 million over [a] four-year implementation period. The Russians proposed to assist us in meeting the local cost of the scheme by credit under which the Government would sell on open market sufficient commodity[ies] from Russia.

For a number of reasons, these proposals were unsatisfactory to the Government. In the first place, there was the time factor. The Government could never be sure that it would be able to sell all the

⁷⁵Ibid.

produce from Russia. . . . nor was there any guarantee that the Russian products could be competitive on open market with similar commodities from other sources. In short, the Government could not accept the uncertainty which accompanied the implementation of the proposals for meeting local costs. . . . the Government has decided against the financing of the scheme through a credit commodity scheme. Such arrangement would take too long. . . .

If the hon. Member is a spokesman for the Communists, I am not a spokesman for anything! . . . The Government has approached other countries and groups to finance this scheme. . . . The Government now wishes to cover a total of 134,000 acres against the previous 35,000 acres.

. . . regardless of some heckling by some Members that we might be against some people for ideological reasons, in fact we wish to continue friendship with the Soviet Union and the people of that country on the terms already defined in our Sessional Paper.

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When it was revealed that a team of West German officials and experts--President Luebke with a party of thirty--had been seen flying over the site of the proposed project, Mboya told the House: "I can assure the House that the West German Government are very keen supporters of Kenya and her development plans and it is quite possible that they will be interested in this one."⁷⁷

Regarding the Soviet Government's problems in meeting local costs in order to implement the agreements, Mboya revealed that the Soviets wanted to sell to Kenya

⁷⁶Ibid., cols. 1537-1539.

⁷⁷Ibid., col. 1541.

"normal personal goods," as well as "cement, nails, timber, and a few other things."⁷⁸ The critics of the Government's decision and of the manner in which it had been handled, pointed out that the Kenyan delegation to the Soviet Union had prepared a list of commodities to figure in future trade between the two countries. According to that list, Kenya was to receive machinery and equipment of various kinds, including motor vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, watches, machine tools, tractors, iron, and steel. The Kenyan delegation was reported to have been "very satisfied."⁷⁹ Mboya's critics were surprised to hear that Soviet products could not successfully compete with other products in Kenya's open market, and even more so that the Soviet Government had wanted to import into Kenya the same products that Kenya herself exported.

The Kenyans who wanted to see Soviet-Kenyan economic, technical, and cultural cooperation improved and promoted wanted to know whether the Soviets deliberately refused to finance the Kano Plains irrigation by insisting that they sell their products in Kenya, or whether

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹"Trade Body from Kenya in Moscow Talks," East African Standard, October 12, 1964, p. 2. Also, "Kenya

the policymakers in the Kenya Government had curtailed the project. In asking this, Z. M. Anyieni raised the following comparative point:

. . . in view of the fact that, for example, the United States and Britain were defeated or were unable to finance the Aswan Dam in the United Arab Republic, and in view of the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics offered the United Arab Republic to the tune of more than £ 200 million to complete the Aswan Dam, would the Minister tell us why it became completely impossible for the Russians to finance a scheme which was going to cost so much less, £ 6 million as compared with £ 200 million?⁸⁰

Of course, Tom Mboya made it clear that the answer was simply due to political-ideological differences: "The conditions which governed [the Egyptians] in accepting a certain relationship with the Soviet Union are not necessarily applicable in Kenya, and we have decided on this occasion that we do not intend to apply the same formula."⁸¹

By 1966 it had become clear that the Soviets' attempt to implement economic, technical, and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and Kenya, which in

Trade Delegation for Moscow Discussions," Soviet News, No. 5044 (October 9, 1964), p. 19.

⁸⁰Official Report, Kenya National Assembly House of Representatives, First Parliament, VIII, Third Session (March 1, 1966), col. 1542.

⁸¹ibid., col. 1543.

1964 appeared very promising, was no longer so. Naturally, the Eastern-oriented Kenyans, and hence the Soviets, blamed Tom Mboya for this Soviet setback in Kenya. Indeed, the fate of the nine Soviet projects was obvious when Mboya said that "two or three schemes [were] removed" and "about four or five schemes were varied" and that in so doing the Soviet Government complied with the Kenya Government;⁸² only the hospital was built by the end of the 1960's, but not without its share of problems --especially in meeting the local currencies.

⁸²Ibid.

CHAPTER V

KENYANS STUDYING IN THE USSR AND UNDER SOVIETS IN NAIROBI CAUSE PROBLEMS

Educating and Training Kenya Cadres in the USSR Plunge Kenya in Cold War

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, when Kenyans, along with an ever-increasing number of other Africans, went to study in the Soviet Union, the European community in Kenya, as in the Western world, expressed concern that these students would return as Communists, or at least would come back with "dangerous" ideas, if they did not return as agents of Moscow. This fear was articulated in Kenya by the European Minister for Internal Security and Defense, J. W. Cusack, who reminded the members of the Kenya Legislative Assembly in 1958 that, even though there was no Communist Party and no "Communist front organizations," "the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council has its headquarters not far from here."¹ He cautioned the Kenyans "who might be tempted by seemingly innocuous offers of free travel"² not to accept such

¹Official Report, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, 11th Council, LXXVI, Part II, Second Session (July 24, 1958), col. 2652.

²Ibid.

offers. Also seeking to discourage Kenyans who might be looking for educational opportunities in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, an Arab member of the same Council, Shariff M. A. Shatry, stressed that "the Government of Kenya, or for that matter all East African Governments, should keep their eyes wide open for any signs of development of communism in East Africa. There can be no doubt that the eyes of the Kremlin are turned this way."³

The possibility of Communist influence being effected through the Kenya students became much more plausible toward the end of 1960, following Odinga Odinga's travels to London, Stockholm, Tokyo, Peking, Moscow, and East Berlin, among other places. Upon his return to Kenya, the Minister for Internal Security and Defense, G. J. Ellerton, accused Odinga of sowing Communist seeds in Kenya by helping Kenyan students go to Communist countries. Ellerton accused: "his [Odinga's] acts are calculated to bring this menace into our very midst," gradually if not at once. He contended that in less than three months following Odinga's return from the Soviet bloc, the number of Kenya students there had increased from about ten to fifty, and that the majority of

³Ibid., col. 2655.

those had been inspired by, actively encouraged by, and, in many cases, financed by Odinga. Ellerton argued that some of those students would return as agents of Communism working "ruthlessly and remorselessly for the achievement of the Soviet bloc aim."⁴

If Ellerton's statement was representative of Western sentiment, it was certainly not in line with the nationalist or "progressive" point of view. The latter believed that Kenya desperately needed specialists in all fields of knowledge--medicine, engineering, education, law, agriculture, technology, and many more--were willing to have them trained anywhere. Odinga's reply to Ellerton's accusation was representative of the nationalists' view during this period. He stated that he had always been against colonialism and imperialism, and that he would welcome any "force" to carry out that commitment.⁵ Others saw that force as being the students in the Soviet bloc countries. Odinga spoke most favorably of the education in those countries. The question of education in Communist countries became increasingly significant after independence. The potential for trouble was

⁴Official Report, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, 11th Council, LXXXVI, Fourth Session (December 9, 1960), cols. 473-476.

⁵Ibid., December 22, 1960, col. 882.

viewed particularly seriously by Western investors in Kenya, who saw Soviet-educated and-trained Kenyans as the "force" that Odinga talked about to route Western predominance in Kenya.

The controversy over the Kenyan students in the USSR began to gain momentum in 1962. In that year rumors originating from an article in the London Observer, which had printed a report that two Kenyans at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University had been arrested and that another fifteen were under restriction, began to spread in Kenya. The Rector of the university, V. S. Romyantsev, commented on the rumors by saying that he was surprised by those reports and numbers since the only twelve Kenyans registered at the university were continuing with their studies as usual.⁶ The president of the Kenya Student Union in the Soviet Union, Benjamin Omburo, issued a statement saying that he and his fellow students from Kenya were "profoundly indignant at the libelous attacks."⁷ Speaking both for himself and on behalf of the Kenya university students in the Soviet Union, Omburo commented on the larger implications of the rumors. He made it

⁶Tass, April 17, 1962.

⁷Ibid.

clear that Kenyan students, as all other foreign students, take up studies and subjects of their choice without being subjected to coercion. Also, contrary to cold war propaganda, Kenyans in the Soviet Union were enjoying their stay in the USSR.⁸

A profound Communist influence is readily apparent both in Omburo's phraseology and in his general line of argument. His statement also evidences a calculated effort to show that the Soviet Government and its people stand with the Kenyans.

At the height of this controversy, a KANU delegation, led by its Organizing Secretary, John Keen, happened to be visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Parliamentary Group. While there the delegation thoroughly investigated the conditions of the Kenyans studying in the Soviet Union and announced that they were satisfied that the rumors regarding the students were "complete fabrications."⁹ They further stated that other students from Kenya should go to the Soviet Union to study scientific and technical subjects.

⁸ Moscow Radio, April 18, 1962.

⁹ "Delegates Get Lavish Offers of Soviet Aid for Kenya," East African Standard, May 4, 1962.

without fear of indoctrination, and accepted an offer of three hundred scholarships from the Soviet Government.¹⁰

In late 1962 the thirty-two Kenyan students studying in the USSR told the Kenya Government delegation to Moscow, led by Oginga Odinga, that Kenya should send five hundred or more students yearly to the USSR for academic and technical training.¹¹

As the number of the Kenyan students in the Soviet Union increased, the controversy regarding the possible effects of their studying in the Soviet Union likewise increased. To the usual allegations of ideological indoctrination were added new charges that students were learning tactics of subversion, being mistreated, and were victims of racial discrimination. In mid-September 1963, a Kenyan parliamentary delegation headed by K. N. Gichoya spent about a fortnight in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations. The members of the delegations were particularly interested in the conditions of Kenyans in the Soviet Union because unfavorable reports about their treatment were once again reaching Kenya. But once

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Moscow Radio, July 17, 1962.

again, the report of the delegation was enthusiastic. The delegates were impressed with the study facilities and wished more Kenyans would go to study in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in their informal discussions with students, they found no justification of the mistreatment and discrimination allegations; all students were happy and satisfied.¹²

To the Eastern-oriented Kenyans it seemed as if a new chapter of Soviet-Kenyan interaction was in the offing, and they were thus disappointed to learn that only about one hundred Kenyans had left for the Soviet Union that year. In fact the number of Kenyans in the Soviet Union barely reached three hundred by the end of 1963. Yet it should be noted that the first time any students were able to leave Kenya publicly was in August 1963 when a group of thirty-eight Kenyans did so. This was the first time that the British had to admit that Kenya was no longer officially closed to Soviet and socialist influence.¹³

In the meantime, in the summer of 1963 the Kenyans

¹²N. Glagolev, "Kenyans M.P.s: 'We've Learned a Lot of New Things,'" Moscow News, No. 40 (667), October 5, 1963, p. 6.

¹³Beliaev, "Kenia zhdet peremen," Pravda, September 18, 1963, p. 3.

studying in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe began to make public political statements. At their second congress, the delegates declared that the struggle for the consolidation of Kenya's independence would be less effective if there were no cooperation between Kenyan students and the "progressive youth organizations" in other countries.¹⁴

Both within and outside the Kenya Government, procedures for selecting students appeared to be causing discontent toward the end of 1963. This became evident after forty-nine students who were scheduled to leave for Bulgaria were left stranded at the airport as KANU party youth members simply took their places and flew to Sofia for studies. The Education Minister, Joseph Otiende, issued a statement about this episode in which he challenged his fellow cabinet and party members: "It is a matter for regret that certain members who are government themselves should have sabotaged a carefully planned scheme."¹⁵

¹⁴"Zadacha: Krenit' sotrudnichestvo," Komsomol'skaia Pravda, August 28, 1963, p. 3.

¹⁵"Kanu Youths 'Take Over' Student Trip," East African Standard, November 7, 1963, p. 1. Also, "Sabotage" on Airlift, Says Minister," East African Standard, November 8, 1963, pp. 1, 11; "Students: Reply by Minister," Daily Nation, November 8, 1963, p. 1.

A new dimension of Soviet involvement in Kenyan affairs was made public on August 7, 1964, when Professor A. M. Sivolobov of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education held a press conference in Nairobi, where he had addressed about three hundred students, some of whom were expecting to leave for higher studies in the Soviet Union by the end of that month. He revealed that a total of three hundred scholarships had been offered to Kenyans to study at Soviet institutions of higher learning and technical schools. The majority of these were to study engineering in industry, agriculture, transport, communications, and electricity.¹⁶ He added that, while the Soviet Government was willing to offer additional scholarships every year, the decision to accept them rested with the Kenya Government. He indicated that scholarships at universities and colleges would last from four to five years while others, in special categories, would cover shorter periods. Students would stay at free hotels and would be provided with suitable winter clothing. During vacations they could return home, visit factories and collective farms, or attend sports camps--

¹⁶"Moscow Bound: 2,000 Kenyan Students in Russia By 1968," Daily Nation, August 8, 1964, p. 1.

all at Soviet expense. If the students chose, they would be able to earn money by working. Sivolobov stressed repeatedly that the students should be prepared to study hard and reiterated Lenin's words: "Learn, learn, learn." He advised them not to marry until their studies were completed. Last, he suggested that they join African and multinational study groups for discussions.¹⁷

In the weeks that followed, Professor Sivolobov helped the Kenya Ministry of Education select the first group of students. On October 8, when the last of the two hundred students--not three hundred as had been projected originally--left for the Soviet Union in a Soviet-chartered aircraft, it was revealed that the Kenya Government and KANU had cooperated in sponsoring some of the students. A cloud of suspicion had arisen when the departure date was delayed from August to October. There was considerable wonder also over the fact that while there were places for three hundred students, only two hundred were chosen, and that the Central Selection Board decided that some did not have to meet the standard academic requirements, since they were going to undertake technical courses. Before the students left, it was made

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 1, 16.

clear that they were expected to "spend the first year learning Russian before they could embark on their studies in various universities."¹⁸

After the fall of 1964 there were about five hundred Kenyans¹⁹ in the USSR, and at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University; Kenya's two hundred and fifty nationals composed the largest contingent of African students--followed by Ghana and the UAR.²⁰ The two hundred Kenyans who arrived in the Soviet Union that fall were well received. Unfortunately, that enthusiastic reception did not last long, and particularly for the group that went to study at Baku University.

According to a report in the Daily Nation written by a Kenyan student then at Baku, the students at Baku University had gone on strike less than two months after

¹⁸"89 Leave for Higher Education in Russia," East African Standard, October 9, 1964, p. 17; also, "Studies in Russia," Daily Nation, October 10, 1964, p. 4. It was with this group of students that, in a period of less than six months in the Soviet Union, problems arose that contributed to the drastic change in Soviet-Kenyan relations --which up to that time had appeared to be promising and enthusiastic.

¹⁹"Novy v zhizni afriki" kontinent raspravliaet pechi--obrazovanie dlia naroda," Pravda, November 16, 1964, p. 3.

²⁰"First Lumumba University Graduate Soon," Uganda Argus, February 13, 1965, p. 2.

their arrival in the Soviet Union. They had been complaining of inhospitable social conditions; but the strike ended one week later when Dr. Indire of the Kenya Embassy intervened and promised for their transfer to other educational institutions as soon as they had completed their preparatory training. A second strike was prompted by the death of a Ghanaian student on March 17, 1965. This time a group of ninety Kenyan students at Baku University boycotted classes for two weeks; they unanimously stated: "We must be transferred from here to other Russian States or else send us back home."²¹

On March 27 the students gathered their luggage and headed for the railway station at Baku, hoping to board the train for Moscow. They did not succeed because they had no travel passes and no tickets. Later that same day, the Kenya Ambassador, Adala Otuko, flew to Baku from Moscow and appealed to the students to return to the university and continue with their preliminary studies. But the students insisted that they had to leave Baku. Ambassador Otuko's discussions with the university officials and the authorities of Azerbaidzhan were abortive. The following day he reluctantly announced that those

²¹"Kenya Students in Baku," Daily Nation, April 10, 1965, p. 6.

students who did not want to study in Baku would be sent back to Kenya because there was no other place to send them, especially until they had finished their preparatory training.²²

About sixty students were in attendance at that last confrontation. In the opinion of the student reporter, had all those students left, relations between Kenya and the Soviet Union might have been affected. According to him, the only major complaint he had heard in Baku was that the Soviet men considered it "extremely bad for their girls to go about with foreigners, particularly Africans," and that to the best of his knowledge "there [was] no other discrimination."²³

On April 5, twenty-nine of the students who had disregarded the Soviet Government's ultimatum to return to their studies or else be returned to their country, arrived back in Nairobi in a chartered aircraft. After interviewing the students for most of the following day, Kenya Assistant Minister for Education, John Konchellah, told a press conference that the recent death of a Ghanaian under mysterious circumstances had alarmed the Kenyans and had made them feel insecure. Other reasons

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

for their dissatisfaction concerned alleged discrimination and a shortage of pocket money.²⁴ Strangely enough, they seemed almost unanimous in agreeing that they might have been happier if they had been allowed to transfer to a different college.²⁵

In Nairobi, the returning students alleged that the fifty-three Kenyans who remained at Baku University did so because they had received "bribes of money and women."²⁶ Speaking on behalf of the returnees, Nicholas Nyangira said that they had found it very difficult for "a brother to contact a brother." Furthermore, he said that he had wanted to study social studies but refrained when he found that "social studies" there consisted of the study of "communism," and that one of his friends who wanted to study law found that also to be the study of "communism."²⁷ Later he wrote in the American press that what they detested most was the intensified Communist "indoctrination," "brainwashing" and pressure on them to

²⁴"Striking Students Back From USSR," Daily Nation, April 7, 1965, p. 20.

²⁵"Six-Months Misery': Students Come Home," Reporter, IV, No. 131 (April 23, 1965), p. 30.

²⁶"Students Return Home After Russian Ultimatum," East African Standard, April 7, 1965, p. 1.

²⁷Loc. cit.

join political movements.²⁸

The fear of Communism that had been felt and expressed so often in Kenya since the 1950's and that had greatly intensified in the 1960's at last became inflammatory in April 1965. As conflict mounted on the issue of students, Kenya Parliamentarians voiced their anger.

C. B. Ngala-Abok declared:

. . . we will not have an incident where a great number of students come from Russia back to this country, poor and needy as they are, to engage the attention of the Government, a government that is receiving aid from overseas, and then claim they were being discriminated against, that they were indoctrinated, and that the ladies of those countries where they were refused to dance with them. It is absolutely stupid.²⁹

(The last charge sounded rather ironic, if not nonsensical, to most Kenyans who were accustomed to seeing men dance by themselves and women to do likewise in most Kenyan schools and institutions.)

The charge raised regarding indoctrination was commented on by the Assistant Minister for Finance, T. Okello-Odongo, in the following remarks during the debate in the National Assembly:

²⁸Nicholas Nyangira, "Africans Don't Go To Russia To Be Brainwashed," The New York Times Magazine, May 16, 1965, p. 64.

²⁹Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, Second Session (April 23, 1965), col. 1491.

. . . it would be quite relevant to mention what happened to the students who returned to this country from the Soviet Union. These students complained that they were being indoctrinated with Marxism, but I cannot see how a student can go to Soviet Union and come back here without learning about Karl Marx. . . .³⁰

In the Senate the reaction was the same. When the subject was introduced for discussion, there were cheers as the Senators declared that "we feel strongly about this [as a] serious matter of national importance" and demanded a full Government report.³¹ There seemed to be suspicion on the part of some that the Western-oriented Kenyans may have been behind the student repatriation as an attempt to discredit the East.

Three days after the Kenyans left the Soviet Union, Agin Oguang, a chemistry student still at Baku, said that he deemed it his duty to make a clarifying statement about his countrymen who had returned home. In an interview with a Tass correspondent, he said that "Kenyans students, as all other youths and girls from foreign countries are provided with every condition for

³⁰ Ibid., April 30, 1965, cols. 1710-1711.

³¹ Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, The Senate, First Parliament, IV, First Session, Part I (April 7, 1965), col. 583; also, "Senators Walk Out: Protest at Postponement of Debate on Students," Daily Nation, April 8, 1965, p. 4.

formal study" and that there were no differences in the treatment of foreign and Soviet students in Baku.³² Commenting on the charges of brainwashing, Oguang said: "I have never noticed attempts to impose the Communist doctrine upon us during lectures at the institute."³³

In Kenya, Nyangira accused Oguang of being "one of the students being used by both Communist and youth authorities at Baku University to read prepared statements over radio and television to confuse other Kenyan students."³⁴

Ongonga Achieng, the son of Kenya's Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, a second-year student at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, denounced the twenty-nine students. In his opinion the statement of the twenty-nine disillusioned Kenyans "will benefit only those reactionary circles which are interested in aggravating relations between the African states and the Soviet Union."³⁵

³² Tass, April 9, 1965. Also, "Student Refutes Stories," East African Standard, April 12, 1965, p. 3.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ "Six-Months' Misery': Students Come Home," op. cit., p. 31.

³⁵ Tass, April 13, 1965.

It was revealed on May 7 that the Kenya Student Union in the USSR had sent a letter to the Kenya Ministry of Education in connection with the departure of the disgruntled Kenyans from the Soviet Union. In the words of the President of the Union, Enok Opili: "We sharply condemn this act of the twenty-nine Kenyans; which has served as pretext for an anti-Soviet campaign."³⁶ He explained that the premature departure of these students evidenced their "immaturity, and lack of patriotism."³⁷

In Kenya the reaction to the return of the students was mixed; but partisans on both sides increased in number and in hostility with the rumor that "the Kenya Government had made arrangements before the flight of the returning students to attend universities in East Africa."³⁸ The President of the Kenya Young Christian Workers in Nairobi, J. S. P. Abwajo, was very critical of the returning students. He noted:

Kenya is badly in need of technicians and was delighted to see that our Russian friends offered scholarships to enable our brothers to specialize in these fields. It is regrettable, however, that instead of pursuing their course, they decided to embark on romance. Such people must be considered enemies of this country. As taxpayers, we shall not tolerate to see our money

³⁶Tass, May 7, 1965.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸"Help Likely to Be Stopped To Group," Daily Na-

spent by Kenya Government in trying to get schools for this type of people.³⁹

He further complained that, because Kenya's foreign-owned press was giving a great deal of publicity to the matter, the whole affair was serving the interests of "Western propoganda calculated to discredit the Eastern world." Therefore, he suggested that the press be warned that Kenya was nonaligned and would not tolerate newspapers that tried "to involve it in the Cold War between East and West."⁴⁰

On a closer examination of all the conflicting views, one is forced to the conclusion that--wittingly or unwittingly--the student affair had involved Kenya in the cold war.

A Soviet journalist, Vyacheslav Rostovtsev, commenting on the Kenyans' charges of racial discrimination, insults, moral coercion, and Communist indoctrination, concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated. He offered an alternate interpretation of the probable

tion, April 8, 1965, p. 16.

³⁹"Students Not Welcomed Back," Daily Nation, April 10, 1965, p. 6.

⁴⁰Ibid.

causes leading to the students' departure:

. . . I do not intend. . . to condemn them. Possibly in time, when they calm down, they will themselves be able to consider the whole matter objectively and review their behavior. I realize young men are inclined to be impetuous and categorical in their judgment, and sometimes rash in their decisions. Admittedly, not everyone can quickly adapt to another country far away from familiar places, the customary way of life, climate and food and [to] someone who considers himself above everything else, a strange environment may seem alien and unfriendly. He begins to regard everything with mistrust and suspicion.⁴¹

In the midst of the controversy surrounding the returnees, rumors were circulated that the US Department of State was considering enlarging its allocations of over thirty thousand dollars set aside for the 1965 education and cultural exchange program with Kenya to accommodate the twenty-nine Kenya students.⁴² Kenya Assistant Minister for Education Konchellah protested against press reports that the International Institute of Education, an agency under contract with the US Government, had started a "careful screening" of the returned students in Nairobi with a view to offer them scholarships to study in the US. He accused the American agencies of interfering in the affairs of the Kenya

⁴¹Moscow Radio, April 9, 1965.

⁴²"Baku: U.S. May Step In," Uganda Argus, April 19, 1965, p. 1.

Government, and charged that such actions were calculated to encourage "Cold War in Kenya."⁴³ Konchellah speculated with some concern over discrimination against African-Americans, which had already affected Kenyan students.⁴⁴ But even as Konchellah was raising this point, reports were circulating in Nairobi that several of the returnees had reconsidered their decision to leave the Soviet Union and desired to return.⁴⁵ It seemed as if some of the returnees, especially those who might have acted for the sake of unity, had come to the conclusion that they might have left too hastily.

A day after Konchellah's protest, the US Embassy in Nairobi issued a statement denying that the US had offered scholarships to the twenty-nine students. But

⁴³"U.S. Charged with Meddling in Baku Affairs," Daily Nation, April 21, 1965, p. 32.

⁴⁴Ibid. It was recalled that three Kenya students had been beaten in New York City in June 1964, and that when the Kenya Embassy asked the policy officials for explanations as to why the Kenyans had been arbitrarily beaten, the police officials' excuse was the apology that the patrolmen had confused the Kenyans for African-Americans, that is, Negroes. Burudi Nabwera, "This Brutality Is a Tragedy," Daily Nation, July 9, 1964, p. 7. (Burudi Nabwera, who personally issued the statement of protest over the incident, was Kenya's Permanent Representative to the U.N. and also Ambassador to the United States, 1963-1969.)

⁴⁵Loc. cit.

it admitted that several of them had been interviewed.⁴⁶

Two days later, Kenya's Education Minister, Mbiyu Koinange, denied rumors that the US was interfering with the students who had returned from Baku. He revealed that he had the assurance of US Ambassador William Attwood that any reports that had appeared in the newspapers were groundless.⁴⁷ Notwithstanding such denials, it became increasingly clear that the US had become involved in the affairs of some of the returned students.

Since one of the reasons for the return of the Kenyans from the USSR was "the death of a Ghanaian colleague [George Korjo Darko] who was found dead with head injuries in a Baku park,"⁴⁸ Soviet authorities undertook an intensive investigation into the cause of his death. Nine volumes of evidence were gathered and over 150 people were interviewed.⁴⁹ Four months later, the Azerbaidzhan Republic Prosecutor's Office announced that a twenty-

⁴⁶"U.S. Denies Offer of Scholarships," Daily Nation, April 22, 1965, p. 20.

⁴⁷"Minister Says Embassy Did Not Interfere," East African Standard, April 24, 1965, p. 5. Also, "U.S. Didn't Meddle--Minister," Daily Nation, April 24, 1965, p. 3.

⁴⁸"Six-Months' Misery": Students Come Home, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴⁹Tass, July 7, 1965.

seven year old Iraqi medical student, Abdul Hani, would be charged with killing Darko. The two students had been roommates at the student hostel in Baku.⁵⁰

The seriousness of the crime and its political consequences demanded that a special investigating team be assembled for the case. The trial began on August 17, and it was held in open session. The Iraqi youth failed to convince his listeners that he had killed in self-defense and while in a state of great emotional excitement.⁵¹ He was found guilty of murder and given a seven-year sentence.⁵² The trial and its conclusion relieved international political tensions and absolved Soviet citizens of any foul play involving the African student.⁵³ However, for Kenya and the Soviet Union the murder of the Ghanaian student had occurred at a most unfortunate time. The Soviet Union had stated in August 1964 that it was making preparations for some three thousand students to be accommodated in Soviet institu-

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., August 23, 1965.

⁵² Ibid., August 31, 1965.

⁵³ Ibid., August 25, 1965.

tions of higher learning by the end of the 1960's. By early 1965 there were pressures from some quarters within Kenya to limit, if not altogether eliminate, the number of Kenyans studying in the Soviet Union. By the end of the first half of 1965 it seemed evident that those against allowing Soviet involvement in the education of Kenyans were getting the upper hand. Consequently, in the early part of the second half of that year Moscow mounted a campaign designed to win African friends. The Soviets' intention was to make Africans aware that Western "neocolonialists" were attempting to deprive their young nations of an opportunity to have their own specialists.⁵⁴

At this time the Soviet Chief of the Higher Education Section in the Ministry of Education, S. I. Sokhin, was touring East Africa to interview students for scholarships in the Soviet Union. During his stay in Nairobi he seized the opportunity to attempt to break down some of the prejudices that existed against Soviet-trained students.⁵⁵ The prejudices were, essentially,

⁵⁴ Ibid., August 27, 1965.

⁵⁵ "Prejudice: Minister on Soviet Studies," Reporter, IV, No. 141 (September 10, 1965), p. 27.

that the quality of Soviet education was low and that ideological indoctrination eroded the rest of it.

During a luncheon in honor of Sokhin, Kenya's Assistant Minister for Education John Konchellah declared that he did not look down upon Soviet education. He cited five cases of Kenyans who, after studying in Soviet universities, had been placed in government jobs where they proved to have been well-trained. For Kenya, their education in the USSR was thus a good investment.⁵⁶ At that time it was also revealed that, for the school year beginning September 1965, the Soviet Government had offered Kenya two hundred and thirty scholarships, and that by the end of August there were over six thousand applicants from which only one hundred and two candidates had been selected.⁵⁷

By the end of 1965 there were about six hundred Kenyans studying in the Soviet Union, about one hundred more than at the beginning of the year. Most of them were studying engineering, medicine, or agriculture.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Compared to the Soviet projections and according to their friends in Kenya, this number was far too small. This became evident when it was announced in mid-1969 by Kenya's Assistant Education Minister, G. M. Mutiso, that only four hundred and forty-four Kenyans were studying in the USSR.⁵⁹

For the Soviets, who had expected that number to be at least two thousand by the end of 1966, it was certainly a great setback. But for the Western-oriented Kenyans and the West in general, this was a great victory in overcoming Soviet involvement in the training and upbringing of Kenya's youth. However, about mid-1972 it became obvious that once again the Kenya Government was attempting to follow up the 1964 agreement. At this time it was "envisaged that more than forty Kenyans will study in the Soviet Union for five to six years."⁶⁰ This was an interesting comparison--tens instead of the thousands sought in the early 1960's. Indeed, this demonstrated how far to the right the Kenya Government had moved.

⁵⁹ Nairobi Radio, July 30, 1969.

⁶⁰ Nairobi Radio, July 29, 1972.

Moscow's Lumumba Institute in Nairobi Divides
Kenyans and Contributes to the Worsening of
Soviet-Kenyan Relations

In addition to its program for training Kenyan students in the Soviet Union, Moscow established, with the help of other socialist countries, the Lumumba Institute in Kenya, specifically designed for ideological and political training of Kenyans already in positions of leadership. With the co-operation of militant and socialist-oriented Kenyan nationalists, the institute had a spectacular but brief period of operation before it was closed down by the Kenya Government. At the institute's level of training, there was such a noticeable influence (positive, from Moscow's standpoint) that the Kenya Government, in anti-Communist hysteria, took steps to control it. But, for the Soviets, it was a bold step to win over Kenyan leadership.

In the spring of 1964, Oginga Odinga made arrangements for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to finance the Lumumba Institute through the "Lumumba Trust Fund." The institute was built on a twenty-acre lot seven miles from Nairobi. Its plans were disclosed at its official opening by President Kenyatta on Republic Day, December 12, 1964. Its opening was one of the most significant events of Kenya's Republic

Day celebration.⁶¹

The Soviets and Kenyan nationalists chose Lumumba Institute as the school's name because "Lumumba" had come to symbolize Africa's liberation struggle. In the minds of many Africans, while Patrice Lumumba had taught and fought for the interests of the Congo and for national unity, he did not forget that Africa as whole was the "Mother-land" of all African peoples.⁶²

From the beginning the institute seemed unique in comparison to other schools and institutions in Kenya. To begin with, it was to be run by an eight-man board, of which President Kenyatta and Vice President Odinga were joint trustees. The board included the five men who had been imprisoned with Kenyatta after the Kapenguria trial on charges of managing and being members of Mau Mau.⁶³ With all these important names on

⁶¹"Jamhuri: Kenya Becomes a Republic," Reporter, III, No. 122 (December 18, 1964), p. 9.

⁶²"Lumumba: A Symbol of Africa's Liberation," Moscow News, No. 3 (578), January 20, 1962, p. 7.

⁶³These were Bildad Kaggia, chosen Chairman of the Board; Paul Ngei (the Minister for Co-operatives and Marketing); Achieng Oneko (the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism); Fred Kubai (M.P.); and Kungu Karumba. The others were Joseph Murumbi (the Minister for External Affairs); and Oluande Kaduol, who served as the board's Secretary and Registrar. Loc. cit., p. 11.

its board, many people in Kenya and around the world were asking what the real purpose of the institute was. At its opening ceremony, President Kenyatta said that the objectives of the institute included: "To act as the Party School of KANU; to define, teach and popularise African socialism"; and "to instil the spirit of harambee, nationalism and patriotism."⁶⁴ But while Kenyatta was saying these things, he was well aware of his Party's schism over what "African socialism" really meant: Odinga maintained that it meant "building a classless society," while Mboya maintained that it meant "neither nationalisation of all means of production nor the dispossession of people of their private property" and "it did not mean that everybody must be on the same level of poverty, and did not mean lowering down of standards."⁶⁵ Kenyatta expected that the institute would contribute to solving the controversy.

At the same ceremony Bildad Kaggia expressed his long-undiluted revolutionary attitudes, outlining his conception of the future work of the institute. He

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁵"Settling Down: Kenya's First Year of Independence," Reporter, ETI, No. 121 (December 4, 1964), p. 17.

stressed that it had to play its part in the search "to achieve our goal of a liberated, democratic and socialist African society," and he added:

Commercialism and individualism were unleashed upon us by the foreign invader to eat away at the basis of our closely knit social organisation of kinship and community. We appreciate that traditional institutions cannot survive in their entirety in the face of new and radical changes, but we must strive in every way to preserve the feeling and consciousness of close and mutual inter-dependence of our community. Instruction to students at this Institute will be based on this fundamental principle.⁶⁶

Among other provisions, the Charter of the Lumumba Trust empowered the institute to participate in any trade in East Africa or elsewhere; to print and publish newspapers, periodicals, books, and leaflets; to erect and establish centers for the social, moral, physical, and religious well-being of East Africans; and to promote the exchange of students between East Africa and other countries.⁶⁷

Once classes began, it became increasingly evident that the Institute was indeed unique, as it embarked on teaching courses on socialism, African socialism, and such subjects as party organization and political economy--subjects that were not taught at any other insti-

⁶⁶ Loc. cit., p. 10.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

tution in Kenya. Thus, as soon as it was opened, it became known as "an African ideological seat of learning."⁶⁸ Among the courses scheduled for the second session were: commerce, trade unionism, and co-operatives.

For the 1965 academic year the courses were divided into three main categories. In the first category was a course on party education, which was also supposed to provide suitable training for the National Youth Service (a program to enlist young men for two-year periods on public projects to help alleviate urban unemployment; both the Soviets and the Chinese were reportedly prepared to finance it for the Kenya Government), and journalism. In the second category was a course on theories of socialism, elements of state, and law. In the last category was an applied course consisting of a biography of Jomo Kenyatta, the history of political organization in Kenya, the African road to socialism, elements of organization and national economy, economics of co-operatives, Kenya's foreign policy, East African Federation, Pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity, Afro-Asianism, the Commonwealth concept, the United Nations, and the World Peace Movement.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Hezekiah Wepukhulu, "Aims of the Lumumba Institute," EAS, March 31, 1965, p. 6.

⁶⁹Ibid.

There was considerable interest among Kenyans as to how and by whom these courses would be taught. Although it had been earlier stated, following Kenya's policy of non-alignment, that the institute would recruit its teachers from anywhere in the world, by the end of March 1965 among its faculty of eight, were two Soviet lecturers--Andrei Bogdanov and Alexei Zdravomyslov, both of whom were said to have been professors at Leningrad University. The presence of the two Soviet lecturers was strongly detested by conservative circles, particularly since there was no Western influence on the faculty.

The same forces were further frustrated by the elegance of the institute--classrooms, hostels, dining hall, the administration office, and the decorated Kenyatta Assembly Hall with a seating capacity for one thousand students, which was so well equipped that it would be the site of plays, concerts, films, and lectures.⁷⁰

During the last week of March 1965 a three-month course covering most of the above three categories was commenced for 115 students, most of whom were chairmen, secretaries, and treasurers of district KANU branches throughout Kenya. Shortly after their registration, they

⁷⁰ ibid.

formed the Lumumba Institute Students' Union, with fourteen elected members--two from each of the seven Regions of Kenya. The Executive Committee of the Union thereafter elected its chairman and secretary.⁷¹

From the beginning the right wing of KANU feared that the Institute--with two Soviet lecturers--might be a breeding ground for Communism. Accordingly, on March 25, J. K. ole Tipis, a member of the anti-Communist "Corner Bar," otherwise known as the "Kenya Group," introduced a motion in the Kenya National Assembly urging the following steps: first, that the government take over the Lumumba Institute immediately and place it in the hands of the Minister of Education along with other educational institutions; secondly, that the government dissolve the Board of Governors of the Institute and give the Minister of Education the mandate to appoint a new, nonpolitical board.⁷²

The 115 registered at the institute were taken by surprise by this move. Addressing the students on April 7, Kenya's Assistant Minister for Economic Planning and Development, S. Okelo-Odong, accused the government of having ignored the interests of the African majority.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House

He then demanded that the economic power held by "foreigners" be transferred to Africans and warned of the danger of any government's reliance on revenues based on a foreign-dominated economy. Building his argument, he questioned the wisdom of having the country's Civil Service sustained by British and American citizens, and asked why Kenya's Six-year Development Plan had been compiled by an American professor. With these and other arguments, buttressed his point that, if Kenya sincerely wished to achieve non-alignment in its economic policy, "we must bend a little more to the Eastern bloc at this moment." Okelo-Odongo then told the students that "for reasons known only to themselves some Members of Parliament of Kenya have recently raised a hue and cry on the 'invasion of Kenya by Communists.'"⁷³

Two days later the Lumumba Institute Students' Union responded with the charge that "deliberate irregularities have rendered KANU party machinery completely ineffective" and that "this has been due to the manipula-

of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, Second Session (March 25, 1965), col. 777.

⁷³"Bend More to East--O. Odongó," Daily Nation, April 9, 1965, p. 20.

tion of powers and authorities."⁷⁴ Three days later KANU answered the students with the warning that "these types of hostilities merely tend to create bad relations between party leaders and the students at the Institute."⁷⁵ Since the students were party branch officials, this was basically a family quarrel--specifically, about what the Party should be and how it should be run. Even at this stage of the controversy, it seemed evident to higher party officials that the students were showing the influence of Moscow. Indeed, President Kenyatta gave fatherly advice to the students, when speaking of his own experience in the early 1930's at Moscow State University. He "stated that he had come to the conviction that Kenya should not expect anything for nothing from Communist countries."⁷⁶ But events which followed showed that the Lumumba Institute Students' Union members had not been much moved by his advice.

⁷⁴"KANU Being Manipulated," Daily Nation, April 10, 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁵"KANU Replies," Daily Nation, April 13, 1965, p. 4.

⁷⁶"Mzee--Nothing Free From Communist Countries--I was in Moscow State University," East African Standard, April 13, 1965, p. 1; also "Sound Advice From Mzee," Daily Nation, April 13, 1965, p. 1.

In the meantime the Chairman of the Board, Bildad Kaggia, seemed to be replying to President Kenyatta with his suggestion that, ideologically, Kenya must define its own socialism: "Kenya socialism must not be a copy of that in Russia, China, or any other country. Our socialism must be African. . . but it must mean socialism, not capitalism, in theory and practice." Such socialism, he claimed, had to spring and evolve from the party, but at the lowest level--through the participation of the people.⁷⁷

Following the same reasoning, Oginga Odinga warned his fellow Kenyans to be wary of the inevitable Western cry of the "danger of Communism."⁷⁸ Arguing that Kenya must remain non-aligned, Odinga defended the two Soviet lecturers at the Lumumba Institute, saying:

Where else do we find a place to introduce African Socialism in a much more enlightened form but in the Lumumba Institute? It is dedicated to offer training in specific terms in the field of African Socialism.

I want to show we are non-aligned.

In our national youth movement we have only American teachers. Does that mean anything? Does

⁷⁷"Kaggia Explains His Brand of Socialism," Daily Nation, April 16, 1965, p. 19.

⁷⁸"Warning by Jaramogi," Daily Nation, April 16, 1965, p. 1.

only the Soviet Union matter a great deal? We have over 5,000 American teachers in Kenya, does that mean anything?

At the moment we do feel the people who can teach more, who have tried and practised Socialism, are the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

However, when a heated exchange with pressmen about "Communist money" became personal, Odinga said that the propriety of his receiving "money from any friends for any purpose" was justified. And in Kenya and the West, this was a frequently explosive issue.⁸⁰

In the meantime, students at Lumumba Institute were demonstrating in rage due to the introduction on April 27 in the House of Representatives of the "Sessional Paper No. 10 1963-1965: African Socialism and Application to Planning in Kenya."⁸¹ On the same day, at a press conference in Nairobi, President Kenyatta introduced it as the "Kenya Bible." He claimed it had unanimous Cabinet support and expressed the hope that it would bring all the conflicts to an end--including the theoretical and academic arguments.⁸² But, two days

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 24.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, Second Session, April 27, 1965, col. 1497; also, Tony Hall, "Kenya Defines African Socialism," Daily Nation, April 28, 1965, p. 1.

⁸²Ibid.

later, about fifty members of the Lumumba Institute Students' Union issued a statement criticizing the Sessional Paper. They warned that unless African Socialism meant public ownership of land, factories, banks, heavy industry, communications, and commerce, it would be nothing but a disguised perpetuation of capitalist exploitation.⁸³ The Union's secretary, David Munyendo, read a statement critical of the Sessional Paper, the "neo-colonialists" and the collaborating agents in Kenya.

Later the United States Ambassador to Kenya expressed his opinion that the Sessional Paper actually stood "about midway between Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and the conservative wing of British Socialism," thus basically agreeing with the students' statement. However, like the Kenyan officials, he complained that "one could easily detect the heavy Russian hand of the faculty's two Leningrad professors in the phrasing of the manifesto."⁸⁴ The only member of the Kenya Parliament who happened to be a student at the Institute, W.

⁸³"Institute Students Urge Public Ownership," East African Standard, April 30, 1965, p. 9.

⁸⁴Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, op. cit., p. 247.

Kamau, agreed with Ambassador Attwood as to the authorship of the students' statement. However, the conservative forces in Kenya had suspected the motives of the Institute from the beginning and had therefore arranged to plant such people as Kamau as secret agents to "find information" to verify their conclusion.⁸⁵ To these student imposters, "Russian-sponsored Institute" was engaged in radicalizing students. This accusation was denied by the secretary of the Students' Union at the Institute with the assertion that the two Soviet professors only "teach principles." At the same time, however, he provided fuel for his antagonists' arguments when he said, "In my short time here I have learned that socialism must include public ownership of means of production."⁸⁶

Such ill-timed criticism left no doubt as to what would be the Government's next move regarding the Institute. An increasing number of conservatives in Kenya had come to regard the Institute as the official headquarters of scientific socialism in Kenya. A day after the Lumumba Institute Students' Union issued its

⁸⁵Official Report, Kenya National Assembly, House of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, 2nd Session (April 30, 1965), col. 1756.

⁸⁶"Nationalise Everything--Lumumba Students,"
 [op. cit.]

statement criticizing the Government Sessional Paper, the Kenya House of Representatives passed a bill titled "Government Take-Over of Lumumba Institute."

J. K. Ole Tipis, who introduced the motion for the Government take-over of the Institute, made the charge during debate in Parliament that the Institute was teaching "subversion" as well as importing "foreign ideologies" into the country.⁸⁷

There was no denying that the controversy had international ramifications. The evidence of this came when Tom Mboya rose to second the motion in Parliament and another Member of the Assembly, Z. M. Anyieni, immediately engaged him in what had become routine harassment in the legislative chambers and shouted to him: "The American Ambassador."⁸⁸ Given the bitterness each side's representatives felt for the others, it was understandable that interruptions and interjections became commonplace during national Assembly debates. In fact, the Speaker soon ruled that heckling of the members was acceptable in the chamber. Thus, members were shouted at as "capitalists" or "stooges" if they agreed with the

⁸⁷Loc. cit., cols. 1727-1729.

⁸⁸Ibid., col: 1739.

Western influence or as "communists" if they favored Eastern influence.⁸⁹

Mboya accused the two Soviet lecturers of teaching their own foreign ideology and hence corrupting Kenyan minds. He warned of the foreign funds pouring into the country and questioned the ability of those students who had become "specialists" in political science in three weeks and who had branded those in government as "useless nitwits."

Among the supporters of the motion was the "Kenya Group" ("Corner Bar Group"). In one of its meetings, the group termed the Lumumba Institute as "the hotbed of communism."⁹⁰ The hard-core critics who were then being referred to as "communists" throughout Kenya, expressed annoyance at the conservative nationalists' claim that they had the confidence of President Kenyatta and were using his name to promulgate their programs.

Bildad Kaggia, one of the oldest revolutionaries in Kenya and a former associate of Kenyatta, who had since independence bitterly disagreed with him over land policy, and who then was the Chairman of the Board of the

⁸⁹ Ibid., col. 1761.

⁹⁰ Ibid., col. 1732.

Lumumba Institute, tried unsuccessfully to win the support of his colleagues in the House. He told them that it was not fair to compare the Lumumba Institute students with those of other colleges and institutions in Kenya since the Institute students were party leaders--chairmen, secretaries, and treasurers of KANU district branches. He stressed the fact that they were politicians, many of whom were much older than many of the members of the House and that they were men of certain well-determined political views. Further, he pointed out, it was not as simple as some members claimed that the Institute would in no time convert them to Communism. He added that to discredit the Institute actually meant to discredit the Trustees and the Board of Management, all of whom had fought very hard for independence. He denied the accusation that Lumumba was run by foreigners--namely Soviets.⁹¹

However, to the majority of the members who were unmoved by Kaggia's plea, the presence of the two Soviet lecturers was clear evidence of a communist menace, and the statement issued by the Lumumba Institute Students' Union criticizing the Government's Sessional

⁹¹Ibid., cols. 1748, 1749.

Paper was another evidence of that communist threat. Mboya had made it clear that the issue in question did not derive from the students themselves, many of whom he claimed he knew and had worked with for a long time. Rather, the central problem was "to remove that impression. . . that [the Lumumba Institute] is an ideological institute, because it is not," and to make sure that the two Soviet lecturers "do not reach their own ideology."⁹² The argument that education did not necessarily convert people to communism did not succeed.

The motion was adopted with only one dissenting vote⁹³--Bildad Kaggia. There was no doubt by that time about the potential impact of Soviet political and ideological thought in Kenya, and that the Soviet presence was a force to be reckoned with, regardless of its magnitude.

By the time the Kenya Government decided to close the Lumumba Institute, it was estimated by Western sources that it had cost the Soviet Government about two million dollars.⁹⁴ The graduation ceremonies of the

⁹²Ibid., cols. 1743, 1747.

⁹³"Lumumba Institute Taken Over--President's Intentions 'Distorted,'" East African Standard, May 1, 1965, p. 1.

⁹⁴Attwood, op. cit., p. 249.

Institute's first and last class were held on June 19, 1965, with neither the Soviet Union's Ambassador to Kenya, Vladimir Lavrov, nor Ambassador Wang of the People's Republic of China in attendance. At the ceremonies Vice-President Odinga appealed for funds from both the East and the West to keep the school open; and, responding to the House of Representatives resolution, he proposed that the institute needed only to be registered under the Education Act "just as any other private institution in Kenya."⁹⁵

Bildad Kaggia alleged that the people who contended that African Socialism should be studied in isolation were "lop-sided" and claimed that it was absurd to "encourage isolationism in a planet moving towards unity."⁹⁶ The only genuinely outstanding incident during the ceremonies occurred when, after the wife of the Vice-President handed a certificate to one of the eighty-five graduating students, he responded by yelling: "Uhuru na Kommunisti" ("Freedom and Communism"), which drew the applause of others.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ "Lumumba Institute--What Now? Letter From Editor," Reporter, IV, No. 136 (July 2, 1965), p. 1.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

There were some Kenyans who were determined to keep the Lumumba Institute functioning. When Odinga decided to appeal for funds, Britain gave a cool answer:

"What exactly the Lumumba Institute is teaching in Kenya is unknown to the British public."⁹⁸ But by this time

Odinga had been replaced by Joseph Murumbi as the leader of the Kenyan delegation to the Prime Ministers'

Conference in London on the ground that his actions

"were calculated to further the cause of Communism" in

Kenya.⁹⁹ This charge was supported when he was quoted

out of context from a previous speech delivered in

Swahili in which, translated literally, he said "Com-

munism is like food to me."¹⁰⁰ The attack on Odinga was

⁹⁸"Lumumba Institute Asks for Money," East Africa and Rhodesia, IXL, No. 2124 (January 24, 1965), p. 686.

⁹⁹"Mr. Odinga Replaced As Leader; Continued Criticism of Vice-President," East Africa and Rhodesia, IXL, No. 2122 (June 10, 1965), p. 643.

¹⁰⁰"Ukominist ni kama chakula kwangu [Communism is like food to me]--Jaramogi," Taifa Leo, May 3, 1965, p. 1. On the grounds of Odinga's political enemies in Kenya attacked him following the way in which the foreign-owned English newspapers had reported Odinga's speech. Other Kenyans, like the Kenya's High Commissioner in London, tried to correct the image already created but with no success. The following is an excerpt from the report of the news conference he held on the subject: "Asked if Vice-President Odinga was non-aligned, the High Commissioner replied: 'He is a nationalist like all of us and non-aligned. He is a Kenyan committed to the cause of

actually an attack on the left-wing intelligentsia, among whom the next victim was the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Achleng Oneko, whose activities President Kenyatta appointed a commission to investigate. Even without waiting for the results of the investigation, however, the right-wing members of Parliament demanded a motion of non-confidence in Oneko.¹⁰¹

The campaign against the leftist political intelligentsia moved to include those in the labor union leaders, and thus completed full-circle relationship between the Lumumba Institute, the left wing of KANU, and some of the labor union leaders. President Kenyatta reminded these leaders of the Government policy and then warned them:

The Marxist theory of class warfare has no relevance to Kenya's situation. Attitudes which were appropriate when we were fighting for independence have to be revised. An all-out war by the unions could be waged against their own Government and fellow-citizens.

.....
This external influence and interference cannot permit a healthy trade union movement committed un-

Kenyan independence and African Socialism.' He dismissed as 'a rhetorical remark' Mr. Odinga's comment that 'Communism is like food to me.' See, "Dr. Karanja Says Mr. Odinga Is Non-Aligned," East Africa and Rhodesia, IXL, No. 2119 (May 20, 1965), p. 596.

101 "Mr. Odinga Replaced as the Leader; Continued Criticism of Vice-President," op. cit.

reservedly to our own national policies.¹⁰²

To facilitate the unification of the two major trade unions--the Kenya Federation of Labour and the Kenya African Workers Congress--Kenyatta named some Western-oriented members of his cabinet to help create that unity. In the meantime the President ordered an end to the "public bickering" and "quasi-political activities and statements by the leaders of these organizations."¹⁰³

These activities must be seen from the wider view of Cold War politics in Kenya. The American Ambassador in Nairobi saw this Cold War as being essentially between Kenyatta's and Odinga's forces:

With Parliament taken care of, the Kenyatta team directed its attention in July [1965] to the labor movement. Several unions led by Odinga sympathizers had recently broken with the Kenyan Federation of Labor and formed a rival federation covertly subsidized by Communist funds. One of the breakaway unions was the Dockworkers, which in an emergency could tie up the port of Mombasa. Rather than try to crush the insurgent group, Kenyatta suddenly announced the dissolution of both federations and appointed a hand-picked commission to set up a new central organization that would include everybody. Odinga's people grumbled--they knew their subsidy would be cut off once they were absorbed--but they could not openly oppose what appeared to be an admirably impartial compromise.

¹⁰²"Kenya Bans Trade Union Meetings: Government Warns Union Leaders," East Africa and Rhodesia, IXL, No. 2125 (July 1, 1965), p. 702.

¹⁰³Ibid.

A few months later, when the new combined federation was unveiled, one of two most important pro-Odinga union leaders got a title without any power, while the other eventually landed in jail.¹⁰⁴

The above-quoted problem was not an isolated incidence but an event related to the Cold War in Kenya. Another such event came about a month after the graduation of the Lumumba Institute students when some of them were arrested with a group of some twenty-six men and one woman on charges of attempting "an abortive coup d'etat."¹⁰⁵ Among those arrested were the general secretary of KANU Central Nyanza Branch, a lecturer at Lumumba Institute, and the former secretary of the student union at the Institute. Their "crime" was described as "gangsterism." It was asserted that most of the twenty-seven Kenyans were the chairmen and secretaries of district branches of KANU and that according to their national party elections all KANU officers except President Kenyatta and Vice-President Odinga had been voted out of office. Since it was the intent of the twenty-seven to continue to claim their offices and to implement their policies, Kenya's Attorney General asserted that, by arresting them, "a serious incident had

¹⁰⁴ Attwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256.

¹⁰⁵ "Deportations. . . and an Inquiry," Reporter, IV, No. 138 (July 30, 1965), p. 10.

been narrowly averted."¹⁰⁶

The Kenya Government accused two men, Wang Te-Ming and Hosea Jafee, of being the "master minds" behind "the KANU take-over case."¹⁰⁷ The two foreigners were deported upon very short notice. Wang Te-Ming was a former ex-Chinese major who had fought on the North Korean side in the Korean War and had been working in Kenya for two years as a journalist with the Peking Government News Agency. The Kenya Government, with characteristic lack of specificity, claimed that he knew too much and had too many connections within the government and the country at large, and hence was too dangerous to the unity and stability of Kenya. The former chairman of KADU, Masinde Muliro, proposed that, along with Wang's deportation, the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi should be closed down.¹⁰⁸ Hosea Jafee was a British citizen born in South Africa. He was a mathematics teacher at Prince of Wales High School and had the reputation of being a fighter of apartheid.¹⁰⁹ He had been

¹⁰⁶"Raids on K.A.N.U. Headquarters," East Africa and Rhodesia, IXL, No. 2127 (July 15, 1965), p. 735.

¹⁰⁷Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

very critical of the Prince of Wales School, which he accused of having a colonial mentality, of being too slow in integrating its student body, and of maintaining a racist staff. On departing, he said that he would "be back when Kenya is no longer semi-independent and semi-colonial."¹¹⁰

Not long after, another in the chain of related events occurred. Back-benchers defeated the government in Parliament after refusing to toe the party line. Almost immediately President Kenyatta retaliated by calling a meeting of the back-benchers at which he asked for and got their unanimous support to cease functioning immediately. To replace them he pushed the adoption of a KANU parliamentary group of which he was elected chairman and Ronald Ngala vice-chairman--outvoting Odinga by seventy-five to six. Odinga was truly a victim of the political atmosphere, which at that time was described in these words: "All current talk about attempting a communist coup in Kenya has given rise to very real fears among Kenyans and expatriate investors about what will happen when the nation's President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, now seventy-five, is forced by age to relinquish his firm

¹¹⁰Ibid.

hold both on the Government and on potentially subversive elements."¹¹¹

These worries within Kenya were not all that occupied the minds of the left-wing KANU leadership. They constantly thought about Kenyans studying abroad--both East and West. This concern that had developed among some right-wing Kenyan politicians regarding students studying in the Eastern countries exploded again in early 1966 following the KANU reorganization, when practically all left-wing members of the party were voted out of the party executive and when eleven members of Communist embassies were expelled from Kenya. They attacked the whole concept of letting Kenya youth be taught by Communist teachers. During exchanges in the Kenya Senate, the Deputy Speaker, John Kebaso, suggested to the Kenya Government that, since those students who had studied in the East could potentially overthrow the Government, they should be quickly rounded up so that the Government could question them one by one, "What have you been learning, what have they taught you," and you will find out that they are taught in terrorism, and nothing else. . . .¹¹² This proposal was supported by some

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Official Report, Kenya Senate, VII, 2d Sess.

Senators, who expressed the idea that since "Lumumba is no longer the communist-teaching centre, it is vacant now. . . [the] time has come when we should use this institute for proper teaching."¹¹³ But the Senators could not decide what to do with the senior government officials who were "already aligned to one side--some of them aligned to the West, some of them aligned to the East, and nobody who has some knowledge. . .of our status today can deny that fact."¹¹⁴ Thus, Kenyans found themselves being agonizingly divided between East and West.

As time went by, and particularly after the KPU had surfaced, the Kenya Government found itself being faced with dissident students at University College, Nairobi. According to the general secretary of the Nairobi University College Students' Union, M. Albino Odoch, the Government was operating with a "stern attitude" and the student leaders found themselves being "trailed" by men of the Kenya Police Special Branch. The student leaders most watched by the secret police were those that frequently invited ambassadors from Eastern

(March 17, 1966), col. 1001.

¹¹³Ibid., col. 1105.

¹¹⁴Ibid., col. 1107.

countries to address their meetings.¹¹⁵ The students complained that the Government wanted to turn the University College into a "kind of KANU ideological school."¹¹⁶

President Kenyatta himself warned the students during his speech on May Day. He cautioned them not to interfere in politics: "Remember, the Government is spending money on you to learn, but if you want to become politicians while still at the University, the Government will not tolerate this."¹¹⁷ He also reminded the teaching faculty of the college that the Government was paying them for a specific job of educating, not to train the students in ideologies.¹¹⁸ Almost a year later, on April 26, 1966, he made a speech on dissident activities, in which he said that "the younger men were the pitiful victims of flattery allied to purchase."¹¹⁹ He further claimed that "the older men in this dissident group, in their bitter vanity, and the younger men in their tiny

¹¹⁵"Students Followed': College and Kanu," Reporter, V, No. 158 (May 6, 1966), p. 25.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 26.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., p. 303.

arrogance, have isolated themselves from the national stream of political and social advance."¹²⁰

The Kenya Government, which had been from the beginning mainly critical of the University College students, began to be equally critical of the professors. These members of the intelligentsia were classified along with the radical political intelligentsia, who were known as Progressives or, alternatively, as Socialists. The Government's attitude toward these members of the elite intelligentsia was expressed clearly and forcefully by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting:

The majority of Kenya's university lecturers obtained their degrees at overseas seats of learning. Having been away from their homeland for years, they have returned to find a completely new order established, an African Government revolutionizing the life of the people in a manner beyond anyone's dreams before independence, and a rate of progress and achievement that is a record. Graduates returning from countries like Russia, the United States of America and Britain, where circumstances have made them sceptical of their country, found themselves bewildered and lost.

. . . They appear to be completely out-of-step with the realities of the present-day trends in Africa generally and Kenya in particular. In dealing with the problem of economic development and social evolution, they appear lamentably obsessed with theories learned overseas, which, while they may be useful in cold war politics and international "isms," are irrelevant in a country like Kenya.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ "A Case Against the 'Intellectuals,'"

From the above discussion it is evident that there were certain numbers of young Kenyan intellectuals who never stopped thinking and preparing themselves for a coming revolution. Unlike the others, who broke down under heavy pressures from some quarters of the government or by their own conclusions that their methods and tactics were wrong, there were others who possessed the stamina and conviction to follow a militant course. These hardened and broadened their views with time as they pondered the sense and aspirations of Kenya's independence among the masses.

CHAPTER VI

THE KENYA BOURGEOISIE, IN COLLABORATION WITH THE WEST, DISCIPLINE THE RADICALS AND REBUFF MOSCOW'S INVOLVEMENT IN KENYA

As we have seen, the British colonial masters in Kenya and their Western friends had been cultivating support among Kenyans since the late 1940's. Western involvement was beginning to pay off by the early 1960's. Toward the end of 1962 the only doubts about getting the hoped-for support and cooperation centered around Oginga Odinga and Jomo Kenyatta. It was not surprising, therefore, that they became the targets when the British press spread rumors of a "Mau Mau revival," simultaneous with an anti-Communist hysteria and tales of "secret Communist funds" allegedly at the disposal of KANU leaders.¹ The strategy was to win Kenyatta over to the "moderates" and isolate Odinga. With independence, as Eastern and Western countries fought over control of the future development of Kenya, the seemingly unified African leadership was in fact divided as to what position to take. The most pressing

¹Jack Woodis, "Kenya--The Hour of Decision," New Times, No. 36 (September 5, 1962), p. 18.

problem concerned what to do with the expatriates and the white settlers, who had the sympathy of the Western powers.

A Campaign to Isolate Radicals and
Eastern-Leaning Kenyans

Although there had been repeated assurances that an independent Kenya would treat European settlers in Kenya with consideration and would protect their property, it was not uncommon to hear such warnings as:

Respectable people in England and America have been drenched in what they believe to be humanitarian solutions to African problems. Profoundly ignorant of the realities of Africa, of the danger of resurgent primitivism, they urge "winds of change" that bring disaster. White settlers of Kenya may have to suffer a terrible fate before the West finally comprehends its folly in listening to false moralists.²

As the African leaders hastened to react, they fell victim to "divide and rule" tactics. The British press, which had since 1961 tried to isolate Odinga from the "moderates" with whom Kenyatta had begun to be identified, seemed to have achieved its objective in the second half of 1964. On observing and acknowledging these developments, Odinga himself issued the following statement:

²Anthony Harrigan, The Red Star Over Africa
(Beperk: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1964), p. 40.

The current attacks against me, ostensibly in defence of the man whom I owe the deepest loyalty, serves only to disclose the insidious intentions of such British organs towards the people of Kenya, and ultimately the people of Africa.

. . . a commentary published in the London Times. . . suggests that 'one effect of the change to republican status in Kenya could be to strengthen the hand of Mr. Kenyatta as President against Mr. Odinga, who is becoming a serious rival for power.'

A rival to whom? . . . I was the first to advocate his [undisputed] leadership.

We are continually intrigued and perplexed by the sources of reports and 'reliable top-level sources' or 'intelligence reports' or even 'Government officials' contribute to this fund of expert information, now being amassed in London and other capitals, and so freely disseminated to the Press. But whenever we press for further details of 'these sources' we are met with a blank wall of ignorance.³

These remarks reveal that political independence was diluted to the extent that the second most important official in Kenya was for all practical purposes powerless.

On writing the Republican Constitution--to become effective on December 12, 1964--the right wing of KANU, headed by Tom Mboya, then Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, succeeded in depriving Odinga of his powers as elected vice-president of the ruling party (hence of the Republic). The Amendment to the new Constitution, dated November 23, 1964, made the office of vice-

³"Kenya Minister Praises Mau Mau: Mr. Odinga and the British Press," East Africa and Rhodesia, XLI, No. 2082 (September 3, 1964), p. 25.

president an appointment by the president and not the result of election. The new Constitution did not have to be approved by the people at large; but the one-party (KANU) National Assembly did procedurally approve it. It was further specified that the vice-president could hold no other public office and would not succeed to the Presidency if the president died in office. Accordingly, Odinga had to give up his highly-valued Ministry of Home Affairs. It was a difficult decision, but ultimately he had no choice except to follow the new Constitution and the wishes of the president. This was the first battle that the Western-oriented Kenyans won over those of the Eastern-oriented faction.

The above development was of major concern to the British, whose influence was still strongly felt. This was particularly obvious during the occasion of the second reading of the Kenya Republic Bill in the British House of Commons. There Kenya was criticized for allowing the growth of Communist influence despite praise for Kenyatta's "strong paternal leadership" and "his possession of exceptional understanding of human feelings of all peoples of all races."⁴

⁴Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, DCCV, No. 47 (February 1, 1965), cols. 827-828.

Almost at the same time, a member of the British Government, Aiden Crawley, told a joint meeting in London of the Royal African and Royal Commonwealth societies about the "Communist menace in Africa." He described the menace of "Moscow's plans and Soviet policy in Africa," particularly in Kenya where the influence of "Russian money" was felt and where some of the people "thus financed were now Ministers in the African Governments" and with all "evidences that they were still being paid."⁵ He described the situation in Kenya as being gravely dismaying because of the activities of the returning African students from the Eastern countries, and because of fears over possible continuance of "nationalization."⁶

A dedicated core of young Africans sent to Iron Curtain countries had their whole outlook changed and now shared none of the opinions of the African leaders. They had become dedicated Communists, and were no longer African nationalists, among [them] being a number of doctors and lawyers. Such men intended to promote world Communism as taught by Lenin.⁷

⁵"Communists Are All Over Africa: Says Mr. A. Crawley, M.P.; Pan-Africanism No Obstacle to Russian and Chinese Activities," East Africa and Rhodesia, XLI, No. 2105 (February 11, 1965), p. 389.

⁶Up to the end of the 1960's, the only thing that was nationalized in Kenya was the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (later renamed Voice of Kenya). This was achieved by one man, the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Achieng Oneko. He did this amidst strong opposition from some of the Ministers.

⁷Ibid.

This concern about the radical views of Odinga and Bildad Kaggia, as the leaders of dissident militant nationalists with Communist inclinations, and about the Lumumba Institute as a center of indoctrination, was gravely felt not only in Western Europe, but in the United States.

Several such events compelled Vice-President Odinga to issue a statement. His concern was to prevent Kenyan leaders from being dictated to by Western countries as had been customary in colonial days. Odinga's attack on the Western countries was one of the most pungent he ever made; he spelt out how the West was interfering in Kenya's internal affairs:

We are made to understand through the Press that a detailed survey of Communist activities in Africa has been carried out by Britain.

During the colonial days the imperialist powers enjoyed unrestrained exercise to fight and defend their ideological interests on Africa's soil. They still appear to retain that colonial mentality and continue to assume that their activities cannot be checked. They are not ashamed even to declare their determination to continue this vile practice in Africa.

We are not blind to the carefully planned neo-capitalist manoeuvres operating underground. Here the plans are now designed to dupe the world with the idea that the Western European Union are concerned with Communist activities in Africa. This is the appearance they want the world to perceive. The reality is that they are determined to defend and maintain the selfish capitalist system which they had established. I say selfish in this particular case because their system cannot allow them to share friendship with those who prefer a different system.

Our particular concern in Africa is the Western arrogant colonial attitude. It is an insult to our

friendly feeling to the world that a foreign bloc should pledge determination to fight its ideological differences in Africa. . . . Foreign countries have no right whatsoever to declare their determination to make Africa a battlefield for their ideological differences. When African states invite their friends they do not do so because the friends are of a particular ideological brand. Besides, Africa is free to choose her friends and will also be alert in detecting those activities by foreigners which are considered to be evils.⁸

The militant nationalists, with Odinga as their leading spokesman, decided that they could not stand by disinterestedly. Despite Kenyan and Western hostility to their views, they thought they had a chance of changing the mood in the country. They pointed out that with the attainment of independence, various political leaders, tribes, religious groups, and other groups developed different goals for their own selfish ends rather than putting their energies into nation-building. They also pointed out that the West had replaced the "Mau Mau" with "Communism" as the enemy in Kenya.

A considerable shakeup of the Eastern-oriented Kenyan intelligentsia occurred on February 24, 1965, when Pio Pinto, a devoted Kenyan nationalist of KANU's left wing, a member of Kenya Parliament, and the chief of the

⁸"Odinga's Warning," Reporter, IV, No. 129 (March 26, 1965), pp. 13-14.

progressive publishing house "Pan-African"⁹ was assassinated in broad daylight outside his house in Nairobi. To people everywhere his assassination seemed a warning to those Kenyans who encouraged strengthening Kenya's relations with the socialist countries. T. Kolesnichenko expressed the Soviet views on the murder:

The manner in which the crime was committed leaves no doubt that this was a political assassination organized by the imperialists, another link in the chain of crimes they continue to commit in Africa.

.10

The American Ambassador to Kenya, who considered Pinto "Odinga's chief braintruster," saw the assassinations in the following light:

Pinto had been Odinga's personal liason man with Communist embassies as well as his chief political advisor; Pinto's wife was also Odinga's secretary. Some said Pinto was killed because he was going to tell Kenyatta about a plot to overthrow him; others suspected that some activist Kikuyus--with or without Kenyatta's tacit approval--decided to deprive Odinga of his services. . . .¹¹

The assassination of Pinto had a negative effect on Soviet-Kenyan relations. On April 1, a specially elected member of the Kenya House of Representatives--Malinda--introduced a motion asking the government to make sure that arms were

⁹ Moscow Radio, February 23, 1965.

¹⁰ Tass, March 1, 1965. Also, T. Kolesnichenko, "Kto ubil Pinto," Pravda, March 1, 1965, p. 3.

¹¹ Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, op. cit., p. 245.

not smuggled from Communist countries into Kenya.

Malinda was a founder of the "Kenya Group" (an informal coalition of the right-wing Kenya MP's who were strongly anti-Communists and anti-Odinga but for Kenyatta, also known as the Corner "Bar Group") which wished to restrict those who favored improving relations with the socialist countries.

Although the motion itself was not formally debated, it led to a lengthy discussion of the pros and cons of Kenya's relations with the socialist countries. Ronald Ngala, a member of the "Kenya Group" but a former leader of KADU where he had been the greatest critic of KANU policies, reminded the members that "we have just finished fighting against imperialism. . . but there are others who shout very loudly and yet want another form of imperialism in the form of Communism to come into this country."¹² A member of the left wing of the party, Dr. Waiyaki, stated that an "African nationalist" should not be labeled a "Communist" as had been true in colonial days; furthermore, if certain individuals did not like the African Socialism called for by the KANU Manifesto, they should not term it "Communism."¹³ But another right-

¹²Official Report, House of Representatives, First Parliament, IV, 2d Sess. (April 2, 1965), cols. 1183, 1185.

¹³Ibid., col. 1204.

wing KANU member, Khasakhala, formerly one of the leading KADU spokesman, retaliated by charging that "Kenya has been involved in [the] cold war because of . . . the awarding of scholarships from various countries" and since "some scholarships have been channelled through certain individuals, . . . as a result these individuals have been looked upon as agents of those countries."¹⁴ As the accusation was understood to be directed at Odinga in connection with his notions regarding Soviet-Kenyan relations, Odinga made the following remarks:

Kenya has developed a kind of emotionalism which comes on every now and then, and all this is normally subject to outside influence. At one time we had emotionalism of something called "Mau Mau," and everybody was frightened of a trouble called "Mau Mau." . . . There is a lot of trouble today which is being carefully formed, and that is the trouble of Communism, which is not new. I have known it, I have been charged with it, I have accepted that charge for a long time. Today, all these people who want to divide the Africans and create disunity are trying to bring it about with vigour and force. People ask me whether we are in danger of Communism and so on. . . . I say that we in Kenya are free to make friends with anybody. . . .¹⁵

Two days after this exchange, a debate occurred that threw the Kenya Parliament into an uproar after Soviet Africanists tried to tell the Kenyans that maneuvers were underway within and outside Kenya to spoil

¹⁴ Ibid., col. 1212.

¹⁵ Ibid., cols. 1215-1216.

Soviet-Kenyan relations. They tried to assure the Kenyans that all the Soviet people wanted was to assist Kenya "to be economically independent." Special-emphasis was given to the agreement signed by the two countries in which the Soviet Union had indeed "pledged to help [Kenya] in the technological and economic fields without laying down any conditions for this."¹⁶ An excerpt from that appeal from Moscow Radio follows:

. . . , the Western papers speak about the smuggling of Soviet arms into Kenya. This is sheer nonsense. Unfortunately, however, certain people in Kenya believe this. The Western powers have made several attempts to fabricate lies about the Soviet Union. . . .

We are confident that the Kenya Government authorities will also be able this time to restrain strongly these false statements in the Western press.¹⁷

The British Government was closely observing events in Africa and constantly received fresh analyses of the situation. The British maintained, as did other Westerners, that Kenya must be developed along Western lines, and that if it chose another path of development, that path must not be opposed to, or be a menace to, the West. Therefore, the West was pleased to see that within

¹⁶Moscow Radio, April 4, 1965.

¹⁷Ibid.

one month the Kenya Government closed down the Lumumba Institute and rejected the Soviet gift of arms, and that the Kenyan students returned from the Soviet Union. With the enactment of Kenya's African Socialism, the West felt confident that Communist influence was being overcome in Kenya. In this unexpected "new turnabout" the West found itself forced to change its views about Kenyatta, who was no longer seen as a "cunning, evil-eyed leader of Mau Mau" but praised as ". . . the West's only hope in the great struggle out there in Kenya."¹⁸ The change was dramatic for a white Kenyan farmer, who in 1960 was quoted as having said that, "if they let that scoundrel Kenyatta out, I am leaving Kenya for good"; in April 1965 the same farmer said: "If the old man Kenyatta goes, I go too."¹⁹ Regarding the U.S. attitude toward Kenya, the London Economist wrote: "Mr. Kenyatta must be seen in Washington as an equivalent of an entire regiment of marines"—by his simple act of rejecting the shipload of Soviet arms.²⁰ However, the West was still worried about the possible ascendancy of the militant

¹⁸"Our Man in Kenya," The Economist, CCXV (May 8, 1965), p. 633.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 634.

nationalists--Odinga, Okelo-Odongo, and Kaggia, among others--who demanded that Kenya bend a little more to the East.²¹

Mboya's major motive was to destroy all possible influences of scientific socialism in Kenya's African Socialism. According to the arguments of Soviet Africanists, the Kenya government should never have entrusted such a monumental task to a man who, despite his occasional seemingly constructive activities, was recognized fairly widely in Africa as serving "American and British interests."²² Of course, Mboya wrote and spoke bitterly against the "Marxian brand of socialism" while admiring Western socialism.²³

Moscow Criticizes Kenya's African Socialism

When it became unmistakably clear that Mboya was the architect of Kenya's forthcoming definitive ideological statement, Soviet Africanists started a campaign against his ideas a month before the official

²¹Ibid.

²²S. Kondrashov, "What the African States Discussed at Cairo," New Times, No. 15 (April, 1961), p. 3.

²³T. Mboya, "African Socialism," Transition, III, No. 8 (March, 1963), p. 17.

publication of the document, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. As Mboya made his intentions clear on March 30, 1965, on April 2 Victor Petrov, an Izvestiia commentator, began to criticize him. Petrov pointed out that there were two views of socialism: "scientific socialism" and "so-called African Socialism."²⁴ He stressed that scientific socialism as was practiced in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries meant that power is in the hands of the people and that all people have equal rights. But most important was that the means of production must be controlled by the people. Petrov asked his listeners if Mboya were sincere about socialism, considering the remarks he had earlier made to a Rotary Club in Nairobi: "We consider African Socialism an economic system in which private and public capital work together to promote the economy and bring about prosperity and human respect. African Socialism does not mean competing with others by establishing our own factories, but cooperating with others."²⁵ Petrov argued against this kind of socialism, which allowed private capital control over some vital means of production.

²⁴Moscow Radio, April 2, 1965.

²⁵Ibid.

In Kenya the Soviet Africanists pointed out that under "African Socialism" foreign investments from the West were flowing into the country. If Kenya's African Socialism had actually inadvertently encouraged capitalist investment rather than discouraged it, as is normally hoped for in socialist countries, in Moscow's eyes Kenya's socialism was nothing more than a "dishonest smokescreen" for capitalism.²⁶

About a year after the adoption of Mboya's document, Kudryavtsev wrote that the people of Kenya should have realized even from their brief experience that the neocolonialists had tried in "broad daylight" to make an entry for capitalist development. He expressed surprise that the Kenyan nationalists who had loyally championed the people's cause in the colonial period were being persecuted as Communist sympathizers when they refused to accept "African Socialism" as valid.²⁷

Kudryavtsev accused the alleged writers of the now notorious document of being Western "experts" working in Mboya's Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.²⁸

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ V. Kudryavtsev, "Problemy i suzdemia: ukhishchennia neokolonializma," Izvestiia, April 30, 1966, p. 2.

²⁸ V. Oplushtil, "Nekatorye tolkovaniia sotsializma

He added that the criticisms of the Communist system contained in the document were unwarranted since its writers showed no understanding of Marxism-Leninism. He further asked why some Kenyans were so fervently opposed to the nationalization of large foreign monopolies, such as banks, businesses, communications, media, plantations, and ranches--which could have been administered for the benefit of the whole country.²⁹ He expressed dismay as to whether a true socialist could have written: "We are not robbers. We abide with the constitution, which calls for the respect of property rights and just compensation in event of expropriation."³⁰ According to Kudryaytsev all socialists must be interested in the question of who owns the means of production. However, under the leadership of the Kenyan bourgeoisie, that question had either become of secondary importance or had been ignored altogether; hence the economic development of Kenya had turned towards capitalism.³¹

v. Tropicheskoi Afrike," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 74.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ V. Kudryaytsev, "Zametki obozrevatelja: Trevozhnye Signaly," Izvestia, March 16, 1966, p. 2.

³¹ Ibid.

Finally, in 1967, Moscow decided to tell the people of Kenya, and of Africa as a whole, exactly what it thought about Kenya's African Socialism, as Moscow Radio emphasized that without public ownership of means of production equal opportunities, equality, and democracy meant very little:

Tom Mboya's new kind of socialism was confirmed by the program of the Kenya Government's African socialism. . . . On many points, this document departs from socialism and takes a capitalist road. The program says it is the duty of the government to insure equal opportunities for all citizens. . . . let us see, opportunities in practice. . . . start with agriculture, on which the entire Kenya economy hinges. The so-called land consolidation is the main trend in the Kenya Government's agrarian policy. It actually means that the peasants are allowed to unite their separate crop areas and form communities. However, we see here that far from all peasants consolidate their land. Only [those] are allowed to do so who have no less than three acres. The well-to-do farmers receive government loans, but the peasants, who have very little land, are deprived of that little and are moved to specially established villages. So, on one hand, land consolidation leads to the establishment of an African country bourgeoisie. On the other it takes land from the masses of the African peasants and increases the huge army of unemployed.

Do you see equal opportunities in this? There can be no comparison between a well-to-do African farmer growing increasingly richer by producing crops for export and a peasant, who has lost his last piece of land and is becoming unemployed. The policy of equal opportunities is also aimed at creating a class of African bourgeoisie in the towns. African businessmen are given financial aid from the budget. . . . for the working class the policies of equal opportunities becomes even greater exploitation and lower living standards. One can see, by the example of Kenya, that the theory of equal opportunities actually signifies absolute freedom for the de-

velopment of capitalist relations, the other side of which is exploitation of man by man.³²

The Soviets did not say that the Kenyan leaders were alone in their opinion that their brand of socialism meant equal opportunities; there were leaders from other African countries who thought likewise. They charged those leaders with using the pseudosocialist theory of equal opportunity as a smoke screen for their movement towards capitalism.³³

In the Soviet view the concept of equal opportunities sounded very much like the Great Society in the United States, the Welfare State in Great Britain, and the Formed Society in West Germany. In these countries, "Equality was understood less [as] a social equality based on liquidation of exploitation of man by man, rather as an opportunity of the strong to suppress the weak and the rich to rob the poor."³⁴ The point that Moscow frequently made to Kenyans was that the foundation for their path of development towards socialism had to be laid properly.

³² Moscow Radio, February 2, 1967.

³³

Ibid.

³⁴

Ibid.

Kenyans and Their African Socialism

In Kenya the debate on African Socialism became intense beginning in 1963, when Tom Mboya declared that to him and to those Kenyans who were brought up under the Western umbrella, "socialism of the Western type" and definitely not "a Marxian brand of socialism" was to be preferred.³⁵ Other Kenyans disagreed and cautioned that "One is either a socialist or one is not. . . to talk of [a] Marxian brand of, or Christian or African, socialism is to beguile oneself."³⁶ Mboya was reminded that whereas features of socialism were probably practiced in Africa before the advent of democracy, "socialism as such is a modern political motivation."³⁷ Then Mboya's ideas were ridiculed:

In Mr. Mboya's article we are required to think that African socialists must be in a different compartment from the rest of the world's socialists. A clever way of saying Africans must be socialists even if they have another foot in the capitalist camp. It is like advocating that the workers of the world must not unite, something Mr. Mboya would not have agreed with during his trade union days.³⁸

³⁵Mboya, "African Socialism," op. cit., p. 17.

³⁶C. N. Omondi, "African Socialism," Transition, III (November, 1963), p. 6.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

As we have seen, Odinga saw African socialism as gradually leading to the "classless society," while Mboya saw it as a Western type of socialism. Reflecting this apparent confusion, one member of the Kenya National Assembly, Arap Too, inquired as to when Vice-President Odinga "was going to explain to the House the principles of African socialism and make arrangement for the widest publicity through radio and pamphlets to educate the citizens of this country on these principles."³⁹ This set the stage for confrontation as Mboya made it perfectly clear that "these matters... are my concern and do not concern the Vice-President's office."⁴⁰ With these few words Mboya was on the way to winning what amounted to a monumental political victory for the Western-oriented Kenyans. By 1965 the stage was set for a showdown.

The rightist intelligentsia viewed African socialism in an entirely different light from that of the leftists. In the same way that Das Kapital was referred to as "the Bible of the working class"⁴¹ in the late

³⁹Official Report, Kenya House of Representatives, IV, Second Session (March 30, 1965), col. 926.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹F. Engels, "Editor's Preface to the First English Translation," Capital: A Critique of Political

nineteenth century, Kenya African Socialism was introduced by President Kenyatta as "Our Bible."⁴² But to Kenyatta, African Socialism was "a vague concept"; and he never seemed to have given it serious thought, for his main concerns were to promote economic progress and political stability.

Essentials of Kenya's African Socialism

The main objectives of African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, were⁴³:

- (i) political equality
- (ii) social justice
- (iii) human dignity, including freedom of conscience
- (iv) freedom from want, disease, and exploitation
- (v) equal opportunity
- (vi) high and growing per capita incomes, equitably distributed.

It further stated that it was "an African political and economic system that is positively African, not being imported from any country or being a blueprint of any

Economy by Karl Marx (New York: The Modern Library, 1936), p. 30.

⁴²"Definition of African Socialism Unifying Voices of Our People"--President, "East African Standard, April 28, 1965, p. 1.

⁴³African Socialism and its Application to

foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source."⁴⁴ Among the conditions that it had to satisfy were: it must draw on the best of African traditions; it must be adaptable to new and rapidly changing circumstances; and it must not rest on a satellite relationship with any other country or group of countries.⁴⁵

The document emphasized that the two African traditions that form an essential basis for African Socialism were political democracy and mutual social responsibility. Traditionally, political democracy allowed all mature members to participate fully in political affairs while mutual social responsibility was simply the extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole. The document further argued that traditional African political democracy and hence African Socialism would not countenance any discriminatory criteria for party membership: "Thus African Socialism

Planning in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 3.

differs politically from Communism because it ensures every mature citizen equal political rights "and from capitalism because it prevents the exercise of disproportionate political influence by economic power groups."⁴⁶ The document praised religion as "a prominent feature of African Socialism" "which provided a strict moral code for the community."⁴⁷

The document stated that "the historical setting that inspired Marx has no counterpart in independent Kenya"; moreover Marx's predictions never came true. On this point the document argued: that "No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans. The class problem in Africa, therefore, is largely one of prevention."⁴⁸

On the crucial question of nationalization, the document advocated "sensitive control" that reflected some of the basic tenets of social democracy of the West as distinguished from the Marxist jargon, which at all time equates expropriation with the interests of the people. While it accepted the fact "that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the use of all productive

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 12.

resources," it warned that "a rigid system, however appropriate to present circumstances, will quickly become obsolete."⁴⁹ In fact, the document ruled out nationalization as it stated its conviction that "nationalization would discourage additional private investment, thus reducing further the rate of growth of the economy."⁵⁰

Kenyans' Reactions to Their Socialism

The challenge aimed at Marxism-Leninism became evident when the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs, Jeremiah Nyagah, told parliament:

. . . I think it is a golden opportunity for this country to show the world that we in Kenya can at least initiate something that the world will learn from us. . . .⁵¹

On the idea of selling it to the rest of Africa and the world, Tanzanians told Kenyans that their so-called African Socialism was a product neither of an African nor a socialist. They then reminded Kenyans that they might have "to re-learn lessons of Latin America all over again"; they further reminded Kenyans that African

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 6, 11.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 26.

⁵¹Official Report, The House of Representatives, IV, 2d Sess. (May 7, 1965), col. 1962.

socialism meant not "to trade or to receive aid from the capitalist countries like the United States, Britain, etc., whose currencies are convertible."⁵² But in Kenya alone, just as there were those who were its staunch supporters, there were others who strongly opposed it. For example, a member of KANU's left wing, Zephaniah Mogunde Anyieni, criticized the use of the term "African Socialism" as he argued that "it would be proper, if we refuse to call it scientific socialism, to call it Kenyan socialism."⁵³ However, some of the rightist leaders, like Masinde Muliro, expressed regret over the fact that "some . . . big money powers have succeeded and succeeded very well [in] getting to some of our own good Ministers in their own sort of way of life."⁵⁴

Commenting on his views regarding African Socialism, the Finance Minister, James Gichuru, emphasized that in introducing the document "our objective is to try to

⁵²"Kenya's 'African Socialism,'" The Nationalist, June 28, 1965, p. 6.

⁵³Official Report, The House of Representatives, IV, 2d Sess. (May 7, 1965), col. 1917.

⁵⁴Ibid., col. 1846.

secure as much money as possible, to enable the Government to run. . . .⁵⁵

Regarding Mboya's claim that there was no class problem in Kenya, some parliamentarians told him to stop his wishful thinking: "When some people say there is no class struggle in Kenya, I would say there is a class struggle in Kenya. . . . Let us not say it is racial."⁵⁶ Other Kenyans expressed the same concern. They emphasized that there was a dangerous "nucleus of a new class among Africans," and, furthermore, "the very success of policies enunciated in the paper will help to strengthen this class."⁵⁷ Here they raised an argument that the document "commits the government against a revolutionary break with the past in its attempt to transform society."⁵⁸ They warned that the document "may create in Kenya a healthy atmosphere for private investment, "which then would run counter to socialism."⁵⁹ On this point, an American journalist in Nairobi wrote the following evalu-

⁵⁵Ibid., col. 1915.

⁵⁶Official Report, The House of Representatives, IV, 2d Sess. (May 7, 1965), col. 1919.

⁵⁷Dharam Ghai, "African Socialism for Kenyans," East Africa Journal (June, 1965), p. 18.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 15.

⁵⁹Yash Ghai, "Kenya's Socialism," Transition, V

ation:

. . . It shows no taint of communism. It accepts wide areas of private enterprise. It shuns nationalization of industry as a panacea of economic ills. I would say that it stands about midway between Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and the conservative wing of British socialism.⁶⁰

Tom Mboya had claimed that the development of classes could be prevented by establishing goals for African Socialism. But his critics pointed out that his proclaimed goals were those of all societies--Communist and capitalist alike; they stated that what they were interested in were the policies to be pursued to achieve those ultimate objectives and not simply in hearing them repeated with fancy words and no action.⁶¹

Although the document did criticize both capitalism and Communism, it went to greater lengths in criticizing the latter. This prompted a reaction from the Assistant Minister for Finance, Okello-Odongo. He disagreed with the argument that African Socialism did not have anything to do with scientific socialism. He chal-

(i) (3-1965), p. 23.

⁶⁰Roscoe Drummond, "Staying Non-Aligned: 3 East African States Rejecting Communism," New York Herald Tribune, May 12, 1965, p. 27.

⁶¹Dharam Ghai, op. cit., p. 16.

lenged Mboya, saying that it was unwise to deny obvious facts that could be easily explained, and he used simple logic to illustrate his point:

. . . I would like to admit. . . that those principles which guide the economic, social and political life of the Africans bear close relationship to those principles which are expounded in scientific socialism. It would be, therefore, important that we make the relationship clear. I feel in a way that to say that African socialism has nothing to do with scientific socialism would be really deluding ourselves. . . .⁶²

In addition, he stated that the colonial economy that independent Kenya had inherited from the British was, relatively speaking, much like the one Karl Marx lived under in Britain. Other Kenyans argued strongly on this point in favor of Marxism. They pointed out the shortcomings of the document--and expressed dismay that the acknowledged tradition of common ownership was being discouraged. Class differentiation and individualistic social consciousness had been greatly encouraged--which would irrevocably change African destiny and the course of Kenya's history. In advocating that Marxism was applicable to Kenya, Bildad Kaggia declared:

. . . It is not enough to say that the conditions that existed in Europe, and which made Marx write his

⁶²Official Report, The House of Representatives, IV, 2d Sess. (May 7, 1965), cols. 1850-1851.

theories on socialism, do not exist in this country, unless one is going to say that Kenya is still in [pre-]1900's. . . . The conditions of masters and servants were imported here. . . . We have in this country settlers who came and grabbed the whole of the land that was available in this country and made the owners of land as squatters or servants on their land. These people were made propertyless, and they were servants of the settlers. This is the same today. The coming of independence has not changed anything. The Africans, the owners of the soil, the majority of the people in this country are still slaves of Europeans in their big estates and settlements. This shows exactly that we can borrow from Marx because we have this particular condition that is very, very much the same.⁶³

Other Kenyans who did not favor scientific socialism, as in the case of the Assistant Minister for Labor and Social Services, Odero-Ojowi, went as far as denigrating Karl Marx.⁶⁴ However, other strong critics of Marx, such as Assistant Minister for Economic Planning and Development Mwai Kibaki, could not agree with the above description; to him Karl Marx was "a great scholar who believed in the truth."⁶⁵ What he disagreed strongly with was the Communist invention of slogans and jargons that were diametrically opposed to their conduct. He claimed that the Communists always sought to install "dictatorship" and "tyranny," whereas their slogans were

⁶³Ibid., cols. 1986-1987.

⁶⁴Ibid., col. 1959.

⁶⁵Ibid., col. 1968.

"self-determination" and "peace."⁶⁶ He also castigated the Communist emphasis on "revolution" instead of a gradual social "transformation without a revolution."⁶⁷

Some conservative leaders in Kenya, such as former KADU leader Ronald Ngala, basically agreed with Mboya but still refused to accept the idea that those who had accepted Marxism-Leninism had become the major enemies of Kenya. He cautioned his Western-oriented countrymen that it was "idle thinking for any politicians to try to make us believe that the Western bloc is not out to infiltrate their Western ideology."⁶⁸

In rejecting Kenya's African Socialism, Oginga Odinga raised the following argument:

. . . when we achieved independence we had still to struggle for economic independence. We have inherited a system. . . in this country which is not of our own making. . . . our outlook in life was channelled in such a way that it only suited the Government which was in existence. . . . At the present moment, we have found ourselves economically in the capitalist camp.

We rise to this challenge. We are certain that we are right while we are changing the capitalist structure. . . . the system that we have pursued in the economic field for some time has been capitalist and that is what we have here. . . . We are still swimming in the capitalist world. . . .⁶⁹

⁶⁶Ibid., cols. 1969, 1972.

⁶⁷Ibid., col. 1969.

⁶⁸Ibid., col. 1933. ⁶⁹Ibid., cols. 1973-1974.

And thus, even though Odinga was the leader of Government Business in the House of Representatives, he in effect asked its members that the document be rejected. Of course, it was because of this document that clear differences between groups arose regarding Kenya's path of development, as well as the consequent quarrels between Kenyatta and Odinga. Essentially, theirs was an ideological difference, even though their arguments tended to show differences in tribal background--an inevitable factor because of the personalities involved.

Others who were critical and curious about what they saw as misconceptions of things in the document included Bildad Kaggia:

. . . Our Father of the Nation made a speech on the Kanu Manifesto before we attained internal self-government and in one place he said that Kenya will be a socialist state. He said this in no uncertain terms, social-wise, because political freedom and equality before the law are not enough. Our people have the right to be free from economic exploitation and social inequality. . . . Now we look at the document as it is, there is so much trying to avoid commitment. . . . -70

I do not mind calling our socialism African socialism, Kenya socialism, Kikuyu socialism, or even Luo socialism, but I believe that whatever prefixes we use [we] must be socialism and not capitalism, and I believe that the Government is really intending to implement socialism as applied to our own conditions and environment, but not to bring capitalism under the cover of socialism.⁷¹

⁷⁰Ibid., cols. 1875-1876. ⁷¹Ibid., col. 1985.

Both left and right felt very strongly about the issues. It seemed at the time, however, that the radical wing was more concerned with the welfare of the masses in Kenya, whose interests and destiny they claimed they represented. They demanded that there be a clause binding African socialism with the Federation of East African countries and ultimately that of all Africa.⁷² However, Mboya ignored other ramifications of the document and insisted that the Government sought to prevent its being converted to scientific socialism; its task was "to seek to see where Karl Marx made those mistakes and avoid them."⁷³ He further insisted emphatically that under African Socialism, the Kenya Government "permits a much wider role for private ownership."⁷⁴ He dismissed the idea of nationalization of "productive resources, including farming, land, business enterprises, and shops."⁷⁵ He made it clear that the Kenya Government would not follow the examples of other militant African states and denounced those militant elements in Kenya who wanted a "public revolution."⁷⁶ Thus, by implication, Mboya was

⁷²Ibid., col. 1857.

⁷³Ibid., col. 2000.

⁷⁴Ibid., col. 1999.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., col. 2006.

telling the Soviet Union and other Communist countries the conditions under which they could approach Kenya-- through African Socialism. When the cards were placed on the table and the points counted, Mboya and his group of conservative intellectuals had won a major political, ideological, and economic battle.

It should be noted that, after 1964, leaders in the Kenya Government had come up with a number of slogans, such as: "The Marxist theory of class warfare has no relevance to Kenya's situation";⁷⁷ "What we reject is the idea that he [Karl Marx] said more than 100 years ago should become a blueprint for Kenya";⁷⁸ "We are not scientific socialists or Marxists, we are African socialists."⁷⁹ The only statement that seemed eminently reasonable was the prediction by a member of the leftist parliamentarians: "This document is going to make it very difficult for anybody to effect the unity of Africa."⁸⁰ But Mboya's concern was to unify all Kenyans, while isolating his political enemies. "I see no reason why anyone should be nervous or jumpy when we tell the public that

⁷⁷Ibid., col. 1791.

⁷⁸Ibid., col. 2000.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., col. 1928.

Kenya has rejected communism. . . . We do not have a Communist Party unless it is underground. . . . If it is true that anyone in Kenya is a Communist, then he cannot be a true KANU member."⁸¹

An Appeal for Land Reform Fails

On the eve of independence, it was expected that a socialist revolution in agriculture was almost inevitable. This seemed particularly likely following a KANU delegation's visit to Moscow in November 1963. At the end of the visit, its leader--the KANU acting general-secretary, Burudi Nabwera--categorically stated that "the members of the Kenyan delegation have found that collectivized agriculture is an economically effective method of development of agriculture," which "Kenya would be able to utilize, especially on the big farms which have in the past belonged to Europeans."⁸² And having in mind that particular end, he expressed the hope that Kenya "would be grateful to the Soviet people if they would help us solve this problem," and reminded them that Kenya was

⁸¹"Mr. Mboya Restates His Position; Positive Non-Alignment Clearly Expressed," East African Standard, June 1, 1965, p. 7.

⁸²"My porazheny vsem uvidennym," Pravda, November 19, 1963, p. 4.

in particular need of "qualified specialists."⁸³

For a while this interest in collective farming was retained by the KANU Government. In the early part of 1964, Moscow responded to the Kenya Government's request and sent its first agricultural delegation to Kenya. For some two months the delegation negotiated an arrangement for agricultural cooperation.⁸⁴ But not long after this, some research articles appeared in the press on comparative agriculture in the East and in the West. These studies praised farming in the West and on the private farms in the Soviet Union and in the Chinese People's Republic.⁸⁵ They pointed out that collective farming was inefficient because it lacked incentives. The Kenya Government began to lose its earlier enthusiasm for collective farming.

After independence, a few Europeans sold their farms, and Africans with money bought them. In many cases these were members of the "elite" class who had substantial and constant sources of income. Regarding this move, Bildad Kaggia reminded Kenyans that "we are

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴"V neskol'ko strok," Izvestiia, April 29, 1964,

⁸⁵Brian Crozier, "Private Farms Raise Output in

struggling to regain our own lands, which were stolen by the British colonial government. We are not fighting for the right to buy our own land."⁸⁶ He urged the Kenya Government to take over the land to ensure both fair distribution and fair employment. He further argued that politicians and civil servants should not use the influence of their offices and positions to acquire huge land.⁸⁷

Seeking support from the student community, Kaggia told a meeting of the Kenya Students' Union of Nairobi University College that the government should adopt public ownership of the means of production. This would gradually give real power to the workers and peasants. He argued that if the land were left to individual ownership, even if that ownership were African, it would develop into capitalism.⁸⁸

Kaggia acknowledged that he had been a constant critic of government policy on land settlement.⁸⁹ He ad-

China and Russia," East African Standard, October 7, 1964, p. 4.

⁸⁶"Mr. Kaggia Attacks Dr. Kiano's Status," East African Standard, April 22, 1965, p. 5.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸"Take-Over Land Urged By Mr. Kaggia," East African Standard, April 15, 1965, p. 1.

⁸⁹"Mr. Kaggia Explains His Brand of Socialism,"

vanced the idea that a system be evolved whereby poor people could be given land without paying anything for it. He insisted, however, that he did not expect Kenyan socialism to be a copy of the Soviet Union's or of any other socialist country.⁹⁰ But Kaggia and those agreeing with him expressed concern whether the people to whom the masses had given power were socialist or capitalist at heart.

Government spokesmen answered Kaggia by telling Kenyans not to listen to disgruntled individuals. Finance Minister James Gichuru warned that any internal or external attempt to introduce Communism into Kenya could be defeated by the Government: "I want to make it quite clear. . . that Communism is not and will not be our policy. The tradition of our people cannot accommodate Communism as interpreted in Russia and China."⁹¹ He then declared: "I am a Kenyan citizen by right and I own my own small plot, but I cannot allow somebody else to take it away from me."⁹²

Daily Nation, April 16, 1965, p. 19.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ "Kenya Will Not Go Communist, Says Minister," East African Standard, March 1, 1965, p. 5.

⁹² Ibid.

Jomo Kenyatta, who Kenyans expected would restore land titles to them, was drawn into this controversy. He disagreed with Kaggia, with whom he had seemed to agree during their political career in the late 1940's and early 1950's, as well as during their long imprisonment and detention that ended in 1961. When Kaggia asked that Kenyatta's Government implement what they had together advocated for so long, and Kenyatta asked for more time, Kaggia continued to criticize. Kenyatta retaliated by dismissing him from his position as assistant minister, and when Kaggia showed no sign of stopping his criticism, Kenyatta publicly warned him:

I fought the colonialists with all my strength, and if any African wants to fight me let him try.

.....
 . . . there are those with poisonous mouths whose duty is to go around the villages challenging the Government and opposing all efforts being made to settle landless people, by saying that they will give you free land.

. . . there is no free land in Kenya and the Government will not rob anybody of his property. . . we do not promise land for all people of Kenya.⁹³

After this, Kenyatta traveled around the country emphasizing the same message and making promises: "there are no such free things in Kenya. . . . If you work hard you

⁹³"Revolutionaries Warned, Kenyatta Says 'I'll Fight Again,'" East African Standard, April 12, 1965, p.

will be rich."⁹⁴

Kenyan African Socialism Ends Hopes For Land Reform

With the desire to be on a better position to argue, Kenyatta asked Mboya, on very short notice, to prepare a document--African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya--to give ideological guidance to the country. His hope was that it "should bring to an end all conflicting theoretical and academic arguments."⁹⁵

In an attempt to fulfill basic tenets of socialism, the document declared that "almost every form of organization will be utilized. . . including national farms, cooperatives, companies, partnership and individual farms" in agriculture and land tenure.⁹⁶

When the document was debated in Parliament, Bildad Kaggia raised his concern about land reform in these terms:

⁹⁴"President Again Denounced 'Free Land' Lies," East African Standard, April 22, 1965, p. 5.

⁹⁵African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, op. cit., p. ii.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 41.

When we have been complaining that some people--those with money--are allowed to own big stretches of land, while many ordinary people cannot get a piece. . . . [we must] do something to ensure that the few people with money are not going to take over the whole land and leave the poor African without anything. . . . if we have 20,000 rich Africans taking over all the land that was formerly owned by Europeans, then we have achieved nothing, we shall have only exchanged white settler exploiters for African settler exploiters. . . .⁹⁷

. . . the other thing I would like to correct is this. Some people are going around saying I advocate free things. We have promised our people free education, free medical services and also promised our people land. I think it is wrong for the Government to try to ridicule me saying it is Kaggia's policy. It is not Kaggia's policy. It should be our policy. . . .⁹⁸

There were others who questioned the wisdom of Kenyans' buying back land for which nobody had paid them when taking it away from them. Still others asked why the Government proudly referred to the loans--of scores of millions of sterling pounds--from Great Britain for the purpose of buying the land, and criticism grew still more strident with such comments as:

The money coming from England to buy out the European settlers goes back in the pocket of the brother settlement officer, back to the same bank, straight to London; from London it goes back to London. Unless something is done to prevent this outflow of money from the country, we are bound to find ourselves living in a fool's paradise. . . .⁹⁹

⁹⁷Official Report, House of Representatives, IV, 2d Sess. (May 7, 1965), cols. 1987-1988.

⁹⁸Ibid., col. 1991. ⁹⁹Ibid.

Many experts on developments in Kenya seemed convinced that with the approval and consequent official "publication of African Socialism it seems that the land of remaining European farmers will not be appropriated in the near future."¹⁰⁰ And by and large, this was the situation throughout the 1960's. For example, officials such as Joe Dan Owina, an African District Officer, went around the country with a message of assurance from the Government to the worried European farmers. ¹⁰¹ Owina said that if Kaggia and his Land Freedom Army broke any laws that endangered the farmers, he had special instructions from Kenyatta to arrest Kaggia. However, he asked the European community to tactfully ignore African masses and instead continue with their work: "I wished [you] had not stated publicly that European farmers should not stay here for a long time. I know that economically we need them, but it is difficult to make land-hungry peasants understand that."¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Judith Listowell, "Land Settlement in Kenya," The Listener, LXXIV, No. 1896 (July 29, 1965), p. 151.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

It is obvious that the Kenyan leaders seemed to have developed a partnership with the European farmers, but sought not to let the Kenyan masses know of the collaboration. Indeed, all this had been made possible by government approval of the doctrine of Kenyan African Socialism. Ironically, articles in the Western press began to claim that "an agricultural revolution" had occurred in Kenya; however, it was also made clear that "the genesis of this revolution lay in the transfer of political power to the Kikuyu tribe from 1960 onwards."¹⁰³ But this so-called "revolution" did witness some 30,000 African families settled on farms bought from Europeans. In the meantime, the settlements experienced two major problems: first, there was an appalling shortage of administrative and technical staff; second, "some of the settlements are also handicapped by absentee owners, since holdings have been taken by a number of men in employment, including civil servants and other notables."¹⁰⁴

The Kenyan leftist intelligentsia continued to point out that land reform had presented so many problems to the Third World as a whole that Kenya must look for a

¹⁰³"Taking Over the White Men's Land," The Economist, CCXXII (January 21, 1967), p. 213.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 214.

proper solution while it had the opportunity. They pointed out that Kenya was lucky to have inherited some of the best agriculture in Africa. Hence what should be done was to retain the big farms under a system of African cooperative management; and, if possible, those Africans who had been working there should be retained to ensure a smooth transfer.¹⁰⁵ The rest of the country's farming could then be modernized and reorganized on the same basis to ensure a proper contribution to the economy as a whole. They stressed that there was nothing technically wrong with the formerly European-owned farms; what was wrong was that they were the basis of an exclusive self-contained society that kept itself apart from the masses--except as a source of cheap labor.¹⁰⁶

After they had left KANU and had formed their own socialist party, KPU, the leftist intelligentsia charged:

We are. . . informed by the Government that many large farms formerly owned by Europeans are now in African hands, as if the substitution of black settlers for white is all that is necessary!

The Government and KANU are unable to take drastic action over land for many obvious reasons. Its ideological commitment to capitalism is reinforced by the ownership by many individual members of the Government of hundreds and thousands of acres

¹⁰⁵Douglas Rogers, "Kenya--It's Time To Call A Halt," Africa and the World, II, No. 24 (September-October, 1966), pp. 9, 10.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

of land. Most of the Ministers and assistant ministers own big estates, some of them more than one.¹⁰⁷

If what the government was striving for was a socialist system, then it was indeed a strange type of African Socialism. Kenyatta and his closest advisers claimed that they were borrowing ideas and practices from both East and West and adapting them to the Kenyan way of life. But, regardless of how they might have described their land policy, there was no doubt that it was capitalistic and that it created more problems for the young country. Even Western observers criticized Kenyatta's land policy: "Kenyatta's plan. . . makes the granting of small-holder farms his essential tool for reform."¹⁰⁸

This criticism was based on the fact that the biggest and best farms had been grabbed by "some African politicians and civil servants in the Establishment" who were known as "the Black Colonialists" by their critics.¹⁰⁹ During such developments those critics pointed out that "Mau Mau remains an unfinished revolution that the white Western world has captured. . . for its own ends", with the help

¹⁰⁷Kenya People's Union, K.P.U. Manifesto (Nairobi: Pan African Press, [1966]), pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

of the African leadership.¹¹⁰ However, the Western-oriented Kenyans emphasized that Kenyatta's were policies of pragmatism and moderation. They charged, moreover, that to defend these unpopular developments, not a Kenyan power but a "Kikuyu power is being deliberately built up in the army, the civil service and other institutions, while other tribes seem powerless to curb it"--all this under the cover of "socialism."¹¹¹

Regardless of the accusations from the progressive intelligentsia on land policy, the government was convinced that the population shift from rural to urban living had necessitated adjustments. In short, a new economic policy had to be pursued, even if that meant capitalism. In a speech to the East African Academy Symposium, Tom Mboya left no doubt that the government was determined to pursue capitalist development even in the countryside:

The traditional view of property and land tenure is simply unsuited to a modern economy. The identification and registration of land are mandatory if farm production is to be economic and financial credits for improvement are to be secured.¹¹²

However, Mboya and those who shared his thinking were

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹²

T. J. Mboya, "The Impact of Modern Institu-

aware that the settlement schemes could not solve the problems of landless Africans in Kenya--whose landlessness and unemployment constituted a major economic, social, and political danger to the state. These critics argued cogently that this land should have been nationalized so that the landless could work in cooperative farms; selling it to individuals sowed seeds of destruction. The unending controversy about land in Kenya had many sides, but the apostle of free land, Bildad Kaggia, who had been imprisoned, detained, and later deposed from the government, made this point:

It is very important for this House and the country as a whole and the world to know the policy on which KANU and other previous parties in this country had struggled for so many years and on which they have fought and won election. Our policy . . . has been that the land in Kenya belonged to the African people and this land was stolen from us. . . . 113

Seeing no hope of establishing cooperative, collective, or state farms, Kaggia and his group moved to oppose uncontrolled individual purchases of land formerly held by the European settlers. They hoped at least to secure land for those who were too poor to buy land themselves. They also hoped to make it difficult for a new

itions on the East African Countries," Africa and the World, III, No. 26 (December, 1966), p. 27.

113 Official Report, House of Representatives, IV,

emerging class of African landowners to replace Europeans as a nucleus of capitalism in Kenya. In their efforts they claimed that they were representing the Kenyan masses.

Western-Oriented Kenyans Move to Isolate and Remove
Eastern-Oriented Kenyans from
Leadership and Power

From the beginning of 1965, when KADU dissolved itself and joined KANU, the right wing of KANU was so strengthened that it began to disregard the left wing. By mid-1965 it felt secure enough to replace Vice-President Odinga with the former leader of KADU, Ronald Ngala. Thus, in less than six months after joining KANU, the former KADU leadership was running KANU and had begun to discipline the radical wing of the party. Even the Western press was taken by surprise. A British editorial commented:

. . . His [Odinga's] isolation was starkly revealed. Now he has been contemptuously rejected by a party which owes him a great debt by the finance which he obtained personally from the Communist sources and made available to KANU for the crucial general election which it might not otherwise have won.

President Kenyatta and other senior members of the inner councils of KANU cannot have been taken by surprise by what is tantamount to a vote of no confidence. Indeed, without their approval Mr. Ngala's candidature would have stood no chance. Equally

evidently, Mr. Odinga would not have been displaced if Mzee Kenyatta had willed otherwise. He must have indicated that he had no objection to another rebuff for the Vice President of the State, and that he was content to see him deprived of the second office in the party. . . .¹¹⁴

This statement seemed to pose many more questions than it answered. For one thing, it pointed out that KANU consisted more of a group of individuals with a similar outlook than a well-disciplined party with specific objectives. The only fact that seemed more evident was that there were certain politicians in Kenya who were influenced by "Communism" while the majority of the politicians were opposed. Naturally, the West worked with those who opposed Communism. William Attwood wrote:

Kenyatta's associates were alert to Odinga's challenge from the beginning, as I discovered soon after my arrival in Kenya. Some were already urging him to break with Odinga and drive him out of the party and government before he could build his own subversive apparatus.

But Kenyatta's inclination was to sit back and give Odinga more rope. He opposed a showdown now that might split the party while KADU was still in opposition.

¹¹⁴"Mr. Odinga Repulsed, Isolated By the Party He Financed; Decision Is That of Mzee Kenyatta," East Africa and Rhodesia, No. 2130 (August 5, 1965), pp. 765-766.

There was an underground movement in the West directed against Odinga in particular. The gist of this was expressed in Ogden Nash's poem: "I hope that Kenyatta, the lion of Kenya, will settle the hash of this mirthless hyenya." Ogden Nash, "The Vice-President of Kenya," The New Republic, CLIII (November 6, 1965), p. 23.

... November 9 [1964]... Kenya became officially one-party state but in fact KANU was still divided between its pro-Kenyatta and pro-Odinga. By absorbing KADU, most of whose members were anti-Odinga, Kenyatta substantially increased his parliamentary strength. This was... in developing strategy.

In the government reshuffle that followed, Odinga became Vice-President, but found himself stripped of most of his powers. . . the Constitution decreed that Parliament would choose the new President in event of Kenyatta's death. Moi got the Ministry of Home Affairs, Odinga's old job. Ngala remained in Parliament where there was work to do, since Odinga men still held some key committee posts. Kikuyus were assigned as junior ministers--and watchdogs--in Odinga's and Oneko's offices.

. . . in Nairobi, Kenyatta's lieutenants pursued their quiet but carefully synchronized campaign to isolate and neutralize Odinga in Parliament. On July 25 [1965] Odinga was removed as a chairman of a powerful backbenchers group. . . and replaced by Ronald Ngala. . . Odinga's men were ousted as chiefs and assistant whips. . . . Thanks to the KANU-KADU merger and the formation of the Kenya Group, the moderates now had the organization, the confidence and leadership to assert themselves. . . .

Kenyatta himself remained aloof from the parliamentary maneuvers, but when I called on him at Gatundu on June 26 with a visiting American television crew, he was clearly elated. . . . With the Parliament taken care of, the Kenyatta team directed its attention in July to the labor movement.

Kenyatta's chief tacticians were Njonjo, McKenzie, Gichuru, Mungai, Mboya, Moi and Ngala. Of these, the first three, and sometimes Mungai and Mboya, comprised an inner circle of advisers who stayed close to Kenyatta. . . to map strategy. . . . what they had in common were brains, energy and an aversion to Odinga and what he stood for.¹¹⁵

Essentially, the above statement made it clear that

it was the U.S. and British influence that Kenyan politi-

¹¹⁵Attwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 243, 255, 256.

cians in control tended to follow, even though this might have been coincidental.

The KADU-KANU merger did not escape the Soviets, who remembered that in the past KADU had collaborated with the "imperialists", and that it had continually accused KANU leaders of associating with Communist regimes. In the Soviet view, it was largely because KADU had failed to rally enough support that it thought it tactically wise to disband itself.¹¹⁶ Later, in his memoirs, Oginga Odinga disappointedly reevaluated the effect of the merger:

I worked hard to have KADU absorbed into KANU; I hoped that an augmentation of strength would giner up the party, and, most important, would end disunity and tension among the people. . . .

I must admit that I calculated falsely; that the merger of KADU and KANU, far from strengthening the party, introduced dangerous divisive policies and forces into KANU and made possible the dilution of KANU's policy from within. . . .¹¹⁷

An immediate effect of the merger was that the attacks on the socialist countries, which used to be the

¹¹⁶M. Domogatskikh, "Krepnet politicheskoe ediistvo Kenii," Pravda, November 24, 1964, p. 13.

¹¹⁷Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 283-284. The same argument was made concurrently by the former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood in his political memoirs: The Reds and the Blacks, op. cit., pp. 240-244.

specialty of KADU, began to issue from KANU headquarters.

The Soviets, who had been taken by surprise by the events in Kenya earlier in 1965, sent a member of the African Studies Center of the African Institute in Moscow to Nairobi to spend two months at the East African Academy of Sciences to study the national-liberation movement in East African countries. Among his tasks was to collect data for a book which Soviet scholars expected to write on the anti-imperialist revolutions in Africa.¹¹⁸ When the book was published in 1967, it reported unequivocally that by June 1965--mainly because of Mboya's activities--the Kenya Government had favored capitalism, to socialism and Soviet-Kenyan relations had been struck a blow.¹¹⁹ Indeed, from the second half of 1965, Soviet-Kenyan relations on practically all fronts began to cool rapidly.

Looking forward to the second anniversary of Kenyan independence, and remarking upon how Soviet-Kenyan relations had progressed so far, Ambassador Otuko

¹¹⁸Tass, July 7, 1965.

¹¹⁹V. G. Solodovnikov (ed.), Antiimperialisticheskaia revoliutsiia v Afrike (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Nauk," 1967), p. 205.

told a Moscow News correspondent that progress would be evident once the agreements that had been reached on economic and technical cooperation were fully implemented. The presence of Kenyan students in the USSR was a promise of the growth of good relations between the two countries.¹²⁰ Soviet Government and the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University joined with some two hundred Kenyan students in the Soviet Union to celebrate the second anniversary of the Republic of Kenya.

In January 1966, a delegation headed by Mboya arrived in Moscow for a week of fruitless discussions on economic cooperation.¹²¹ On February 15, Mboya surprised a wide range of people when he introduced a motion that he claimed was directed by Kenyatta, but without the knowledge of Vice-President Odinga. Mboya's motion sought to isolate those members of the Government and the KANU Party who favored closer ties with the socialist countries. He identified them as the so-called "Socialist Group and Progressive Group"; he asked the House that "such people should declare publicly their intentions" or

¹²⁰"Kenya Since Independence," Moscow News, No. 50 (781) December 11, 1965, p. 6.

¹²¹Tass, January 6, 1966.

"express full confidence in the President and his Government," and in either case the House should condemn them.¹²² His argument was that, according to the Constitution, the President was the head of the government and that his position was indivisible from that of his government and ministers. He pointed out that ". . . you cannot like the President and not like his Government, unless you underestimate his intelligence. This is cheap, and this is illogical. . . ."123

Mboya told those dissident elements that since Kenya's "ideology had been stated" in the official document on African socialism, that ideology had to continue to guide all and that the government would "not accept any efforts or attempts to confuse the public regarding this ideology," particularly by those who favored strengthening relations with the East.¹²⁵

There was some concern raised as to where that type "non-acceptance" would end. Accordingly, some members appealed for an open forum of views--at least in the parliament:

¹²²Official Report, House of Representatives, VI, 2d Sess. (March 15, 1966), cols. 863, 864.

¹²³Ibid., col. 920.

¹²⁴Ibid., col. 940. ¹²⁵Ibid., col. 950.

It is important . . . that no attempt should be made to suppress openly the views of Members of Parliament, left wing, right wing, pro-East, pro-West. . . . If the country feels that pro-West views are prevailing, let pro-West views prevail. If pro-East views are prevailing, let those views prevail.¹²⁶

Accepting their label, the "progressives" and "socialists" in the Kenya Parliament defended their stand. Zephaniah M. Anyieni emphasized the necessity for "progressive, continuous changes."¹²⁷ Another Member of Parliament, A. S. Khalif, stressed that Kenya had to make room for its "socialist-minded" and "progressive-minded" citizens and ought not create antagonism toward them by demanding that all people think alike.¹²⁸ In a compromising manner, Mboya asked these "progressives" and "socialists" not to attempt to reduce the "problems of this country. . . to an Mboya/Odinga struggle"; but he also reminded them: "I have definite views and convictions. They do not have to be mine because I am against Mr. Odinga."¹²⁹ At the end of this exchange of views, it was more evident than ever before that there were two main groups in Kenya: the first one included Kenyatta and the "moderates," and the second one included

¹²⁶Ibid., col. 1003.

¹²⁷Ibid., cols. 980-981.

¹²⁸Ibid., col. 985.

the "socialists" and "progressives."

Mboya did not succeed with his motion to condemn the progressives and socialists, so he settled for an expression of confidence in Kenyatta. But Mboya also came to fully understand that, since independence, KANU had had "problems of organization." He saw the need for party reorganization and a new constitution to overcome certain weaknesses that had developed over the years.¹³⁰ Accordingly, upon very short notice, he called for a reorganization conference to be held from March 10 to 12. The socialists and the progressives, who were the intended victims of the conference, asked for more time to prepare for it--without success. Even before the conference was held an editor of a conservative white settler's paper, the Kenya Weekly News, placed the seeming failure of the party on the activities of the "moderates," writing:

. . . The current problem is not so much one of reorganising KANU but virtually creating a new political party which is more in keeping with modern conditions in Kenya. The fact is, perhaps that in its golden years Kanu never really existed as a political party in the really accepted sense. It was a mass movement for freedom and only employed party

¹³⁰Ibid., col. 943.

political techniques in the higher echelons when countering the Kadu electoral challenge and that of other political parties. Now, Kanu has to be turned from a mass movement into a viable political party. [But] because of the personality cult which has developed within Kenya politics and animosities within the party itself, this will not be of easy achievement.¹³¹

Odinga issued a special plea from Kenyatta for the postponement of the conference, and another forty-nine Members of Parliament and Senators made the same plea; but a group of ninety-nine MP's headed by Ronald Ngala insisted that the conference be held as planned. Odinga and his group alleged that there was a conspiracy backed by foreign imperialists to distract Kenya from her policy of non-alignment and force her into the imperialist camp.¹³² Odinga then raised his argument that the real danger to Africa stemmed from neocolonialism and imperialism and that the threat of Communism to Africa was imaginary. He was told that all he had to do was make up his mind about attending the conference.¹³³

Upon the announcement that the reorganization

¹³¹Jack Ensoll, "Kanu Showdown," Kenya Weekly News, No. 2091 (March 11, 1966), p. 7.

¹³²"Stormy Prelude to Kanu Conference," East African Standard, April 11, 1966, p. 18.

¹³³"Vice-President Told 'Make Up Your Mind,'" East African Standard, March 11, 1966, p. 1.

conference of KANU was to be held at Limuru, Odinga issued a statement in which he tried to seek support in an ideologically divided country by reminding Kenyans of the various tactics used by the West to align Kenya in its camp.¹³⁴ But the Kenya Government answered the following day--one day before the opening of the conference--by deporting two First Secretaries of the Soviet Embassy, a correspondent of the Soviet Novosti Press Agency, the Second Secretary of the Czechoslovak Embassy, a correspondent of the Czechoslovak News Agency, and a clerk of the Embassy of PRC, on the charge that they were advising the dissident elements in KANU.¹³⁵ Even though the Government did not give a reason for the expulsions, the Daily Nation provided one from what it termed its "usual reliable source." It warned that people might seem harmless as "newsmen," "cameramen," "news agents," "clerks," or even tourists, had to be taken as spies of their respective governments. Hence the Kenya Government would not tolerate them.¹³⁶

¹³⁴"I accuse--By Odinga," Daily Nation, March 10, 1966, p. 1.

¹³⁵"Communist Embassies Hit by Kenya Government Orders: Envoys Expelled--Two Journalists in Group," Daily Nation (March 11, 1966), p. 1.

¹³⁶"Diplomats and Spying," Daily Nation, March 11, 1966, p. 6.

It was plain that the reorganization conference was directed at the "socialists" and the "progressives," and particularly their leader, Oginga Odinga. The amendment to the new draft party constitution stated: "Having rejected the concept of automatic succession for the Republican Constitution and desiring greater unity, under one undisputed leader without a shadow, it is felt necessary to have a Deputy President over and above Provincial Vice-Presidents"; hence the elimination of the duties of the Deputy President of the party.¹³⁷ This action led to the complete surrender of power to Kenyatta, which was later regretted. Furthermore, under its "Aims and Objectives," the new draft constitution introduced "Communism" in addition to "capitalism" and "neo-colonialism" as a foreign influence to be opposed.¹³⁸

Accordingly, the reorganization conference, which was overwhelmingly composed of "moderates," voted out of the party practically all dissidents. Rejected, they founded their own party--the Kenya People's Union (KPU)--as everyone had expected. Odinga claimed that the conference arrangements had been made behind his back and

¹³⁷"Kanu Blueprint for the Future Is Unveiled," Daily Nation, March 10, 1966, p. 3.

¹³⁸Ibid.

that the proposals aimed at getting rid of him had been made without his knowledge. He then told the delegates: "I was one of the founders of KANU and the people of Kenya put me in my present position but "now I am being removed at the instigation of a few individuals without being told what my mistakes are." He then directly addressed Kenyatta: "We fought for your return from detention and now you are leading this great nation. But the present unconstitutional conference can only divide the country into two."¹³⁹ In his address to the delegates, Kenyatta stressed the need for pragmatic action and cautioned the socialists and progressives to change their tactics.¹⁴⁰ And, aware that those socialists and progressives who had been thrown out of the party were headed toward founding a party of their own, he declared to the delegates that they should regard them as "puppets without brain"; he then told the conference: "Let them go and form a new party. They should be told that we know their paymasters and we are picking them one by

¹³⁹"Kenya May Be Divided, Warns Mr. Odinga," East African Standard, March 14, 1966, p. 1.

¹⁴⁰"Need to Protect Independence: Unity the Way to Defeat Foreign Meddling," East African Standard, March 14, 1966, p. 1.

one.¹⁴¹

On this subject the Daily Nation carried the following editorial:

For the first time since independence, KANU now has national and executive officials who agree on all vital matters of policy. It seems reasonable to expect less schism, less maneuvering; and more open, positive and constructive approach to the problem of development.

Of even greater significance from the outcome of yesterday's conference is the fact that the so-called socialist and progressive group has been properly identified and isolated. Some of those who have been preaching Communist ideology to our people, some of those who have communist elements among them have got an effective answer from the country. . . .¹⁴²

Following the conference more expulsions occurred. On March 16th the Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy, the Soviet representative of the Soviet Tass news agency (Leonid Soliaköv), and a Soviet businessman were expelled; on March 17, the Third Secretary of the Hungarian Embassy and the Third Secretary of the Chinese Embassy were asked to leave.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹Sammy Githegi, "President Slams 'Puppets,'" Daily Nation, March 14, 1966, p. 1.

¹⁴²"Significance of KANU Changes," Daily Nation, March 14, 1966, p. 6.

¹⁴³"The KANU Party Conference: Reports of Communist Infiltration and Subversion in Kenya," African World, May 1966, p. 13.

Although some eleven diplomats and correspondents from socialist countries had been asked to leave Kenya, some politicians--like the former KADU leader Ngala, who had by this time become a powerful man in KANU--complained that "deporting a few members of the staffs of certain embassies is not enough. The Government must actually close the embassies that are busy infiltrating their ideologies into Kenya."¹⁴⁴

The East African Standard editorial told those Kenyan readers who might have thought that the expulsions were unjustified not to "be stupid to crow over Eastern discomfort" and that if a person's "activities were inimical to Kenya's interests, he will have to go. Kenya cannot afford enemies within the gates." It further reminded the readers that if the Government failed to do its job people would proclaim: "What did we tell you?"¹⁴⁵

The KANU purge came to be identified with the Communists; shortly after the conference the Defense Minister, Njoroge Mungai, warned that a Communist coup in

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵"Undesirable Aliens Expelled," East African Standard, March 18, 1966, p. 10.

Kenya, it would not succeed.¹⁴⁶ Mboya also rejected the Communists and added: "Anybody who accepts the work of a foreign power or tries to bring their influence in Kenya is not with us."¹⁴⁷

What really happened at the KANU reorganization did not take Kenyan political observers with any surprise, except probably the position that Kenyatta took.

With the loss of hope in KANU, Odinga resigned from his offices on April 14, and was soon followed by two Assistant Ministers, M. Waiyaki and T. Okelo-Odongo, as well as thirteen trade union leaders, including the deputy-general secretary of the Central Organization of Trade Unions, Denis M. Akum. On April 25 the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Achieng Oneko, resigned --and soon there were 28 Members of Parliament who had left KANU and joined the new party, KPU. The President's office described these as "a collection of frustrated individuals" who had been brought together by "some mysterious underground force."¹⁴⁸ But unlike the former

¹⁴⁶"Any Communist Coup Would Fail--Mungai," Daily Nation, March 14, 1966, p. 16.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸"Kenya Again a Two-Party State; Mr. Odinga Breaks with KANU, Dissident Group's Plan," African World, June, 1966, pp. 14, 15.

members of KADU who simply joined KANU without a new mandate from their electors, President Kenyatta called for a special session of Parliament on April 28, which passed a law requiring members who had resigned from KANU to stand for a new re-election.

From the Soviet point of view, it was the very forces KANU eliminated from the Party that really made KANU what it was. Soon after their elimination, Vladimir Kudryavtsev commented on the conference; he explained that long before the conference certain influential circles in the party had been waging a campaign to discredit those who favored ties between Kenya and the socialist countries. He then identified the two leaders of the "reactionary" circle: Ronald Ngala, "the former leader of the self-disbanded KADU. . . who has always played a role of champion of ideas of the British ruling circles," and Tom Mboya, "who considered himself a supporter of the African socialism" but who acted like a capitalist.¹⁴⁹ In his analysis, under the leadership of these two men, KANU leaders were "in fact doing everything they can to encourage the penetration of foreign capital into the country."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ V. Kudryavtsev, "Zametki obozrevatelii: trevozhye signal," Izvestiia, March 16, 1966, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

While Kudryavtsev was expressing Moscow's view of the political struggle in Kenya, a similar analysis was being expressed in a commentary by Karol Jezdinsky broadcast on Prague Radio. Jezdinsky suggested that KANU had been turned into a wealthy Kenyans' party, and continued:

The disturbed continent of African is today a battlefield of revolutionary and progressive forces and apparently Kenya is not exempt from the upheaval. Political independence celebrated with jubilant crowds and drums is only the first stage in the history of African countries, and it may mean a great deal of almost nothing. . . . KANU has met a tense situation previously unknown in independent Kenya. KANU is seriously split into what may be called a rightwing and a leftwing. Both denounces the so-called danger of communism. . . . I cannot help thinking that most of these rightwing critics must be wealthy men in a poor nation, who fear agrarian reform more than they do an improbable communist revolution. . . .

151

Under such circumstances, where the Western powers were alleged to be collaborating with the conservative forces in Kenya, KANU did not deserve support from progressive forces, particularly when it became increasingly clear that its official ideology--"African Socialism"--was "a slightly done-up programme for a capitalist development." 152

151 Prague Radio, March 16, 1966:

152 Gavrilov, "Africa: Classes, Parties and Politics," op. cit., p. 42.

The Challenge of KPU

Even before the Limuru conference was over, it was known that the progressive elements rejected by KANU had founded their own party. As we have seen, Kenyatta was one of the first to know of such plans. For the first time in Kenya's political history, there were two parties split along ideological rather than tribal or regional lines. When Odinga resigned from KANU and the vice-presidency to lead the new party, the political pattern of Kenya changed significantly. Shortly thereafter, when KPU issued a manifesto about its commitment to socialism, Moscow gave the new party its blessing without officially denouncing KANU.

Odinga resigned from KANU only after several stages of systematic humiliation and calculated isolation by his KANU colleagues.¹⁵³ In his April 14, 1966 resignation statement, Odinga tried to depict the new rulers of Kenya:

. . . The underground enemy has temporarily succeeded in creating an invincible Government in the country at the hands of whom many senior people both politicians and civil servants are now helpless prisoners. . . . It. . . represents first international forces purely concerned with ideological colonisation of the country and has no genuine concern for the development of the people. . . . it also

¹⁵³Attwood, op. cit., p. 265.

represents commercial interests, largely foreign, whose primary concern is for big profits for their shareholders.

My main concern in the last year or so has been how the people of Kenya can retrieve the situation before it is too late. . . . However, wanainchi, my honest opinion is that the present government has reached a point of no return. It can only do for the people the little that the underground master allows it to do. Its guiding star has become personal gain.¹⁵⁴

Later, when Achieng Oneko, Minister for Information and Broadcasting, resigned from the Government and KANU, he portrayed the Western-oriented Kenyans as "a small clique of individuals who have been the cause of regrettable but avoidable disunity in the Cabinet," and the country at large.¹⁵⁵ As evidence he recalled "the uncalled-for Motion of Confidence in the President and the Republic of Kenya debated in Parliament" on February 15, 1966, and the organizing of the "phoney meeting of the recent Limuru Conference" a month later.¹⁵⁶ He identified Mboya as the head of that clique. While emphasizing his "deep and personal regard for Mzee Kenyatta as an old comrade," he nevertheless criticized his leader-

¹⁵⁴"Mr. Odinga's Resignation Announcement," Reporter, V, No. 157 (April 22, 1966), pp. 10-11.

¹⁵⁵Achieng Oneko, "The Parting of the Ways," Africa and the World, II, No. 21 (June, 1966), p. 21.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

ship:

In the 1963 KANU Manifesto it was stated, among other things, that the party aimed at creating a democratic society based on African socialism. Emphasis was placed on the word socialism "because political freedom and equality are not enough. Our people have the right to be free from economic exploitation and social inequality. We aim to build a country where men and women are motivated by a sense of service and not driven by greedy desire for personal gain."

.....
 Who in the present KANU Government has the courage--let alone the intention--to bring about social equality? What if inequality must be perpetuated at the price of foreign aid?¹⁵⁷

Oneko also revealed: "I personally suffered and have not yet recovered from the campaign organised by my own colleagues in 1964 at Thika, when I first considered to nationalise the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation."¹⁵⁸ He claimed to have done so because nationalization was a Government policy. He made it clear that among his foremost aims were "a full realisation of our socialist objectives"; maintenance of the dignity of Kenyans; "deliberate and effective steps to liberate them from the present economic exploitation by foreigners"; and the "adoption of such social, economic and foreign policies which will reflect the desire and aspirations" of Kenyans

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁵⁸Ibid.

and their East African neighbors.¹⁵⁹

He disagreed with Kenyatta's Government on foreign affairs, land policy, agriculture, and the East African Federation, and hence he felt that his stay in the Government was an embarrassment to himself and to Kenyatta.¹⁶⁰

As might be expected, some KANU members were pleased by Odinga's and Onęka's departure from the party. Minister for Commerce and Industry Mwai Kibaki remarked that it was "much better for the economy. . . for those people to be out in the open, rather than inside the party attempting to scare off potential investors with statements made in the name of KANU."¹⁶¹ Opening the campaign, Kenyatta declared the tone of the Little Election (as the election held for the KPU members came to be called):

The Government is determined to uphold the rule of law in Kenya and it will ensure that the country's progress is not interrupted by the dissident group which has set itself up in the opposition to KANU and the Government.

I have done my part in removing these false prophets from parliament. They are to return to the electors for a fresh mandate. It is up to you to ensure that they are not returned to public life.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁶¹"KANU and KPU: Who's Taking Foreign Cash?"
Reporter, V, No. 158 (May 6, 1966), p. 11.

¹⁶²Ibid.

KPU's Declared Program

With the founding of KPU, it was publicly stated, for the first time in Kenya, that the "African Socialism" of Mboya and his Western advisors was a "meaningless phrase."¹⁶³ Indeed, the KPU manifesto claimed that to describe the policies of the KANU Government as "African Socialism" would be "an insult to the intelligence of the people."¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, KPU vowed to introduce "socialism as commonly understood," that is, control over the means of production, distribution, and exchange and the minimization of foreign control over the economy. Further, if the interests of the country demanded, KPU would not hesitate to nationalize public utilities.¹⁶⁵

On the land issue, KPU reiterated that to the Kenyans the end of colonialism meant the return of "stolen" land, but that "African Socialism" had betrayed the cause. Instead the country was becoming indebted for about a hundred million dollars borrowed to pay for land being taken by Ministers, civil servants, and other rich Kenyans. In this most crucial issue the KPU policy was:¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³K.P.U., K.P.U. Manifesto (Nairobi: Pan African Press Ltd., 1967), p. 10.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 10, 23.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 15-16.

1. Free land will be distributed to the neediest, including squatters and those who lost their lands in the struggle for independence;
2. Non-citizens will not be allowed to continue in ownership of vast areas of high-potential land;
3. Cooperative farming on land taken over from European settlers will be encouraged;
4. The KPU will fight for a reduction in the size of farms held by individuals;
5. Once all farms are reduced to a size consistent with democracy and socialism, all individual owners will be given maximum assistance to develop their holdings;
6. Land consolidation will be promoted, but only in a democratic manner according to the wishes of the people.

KPU committed itself to rapid industrialization, pledging to strengthen the industrial and commercial development corporation. It promised to press for the construction of heavy industry on an East Africa-wide basis.¹⁶⁷ KPU planned to institute technical education for those leaving primary and secondary schools. A pro-

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 21.

gram of technical secondary schools was proposed for every district, and technical colleges were also planned. Training in science and technology was to be emphasized in university education.¹⁶⁸

In condemning KANU's "wholesale importation of European and American ideas and values," KPU pledged to revitalize the best of traditional culture.¹⁶⁹

In foreign policy, KPU promised to work with countries and international organizations that opposed colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism. It also promised to implement the East African Federation, about which KANU leadership had shown little enthusiasm.¹⁷⁰

The KPU official policy was aggressively anti-KANU and ardently pro-socialist. KPU took its program to the polls in June 1966.

KANU and KPU Measure Each Other's Strength in the Little Election

The law requiring that any M.P. who decided to join the new party had to go to his constituency and seek a new mandate limited the number of those who might have

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 41, 42.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 11, 12; also, K.P.U., Wananchi Declaration: The Programme of the Kenya People's Union (1965), p. 13.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

otherwise switched parties because of the possibility of losing a seat and a livelihood.

Election meetings in the constituencies were held in a tense atmosphere; the meetings of KPU were disrupted in most cases, with the justification that KPU wanted to make Kenya Communist and was receiving money from socialist countries. In Moscow's view, the sharp struggle was a reflection of "the deep desire of the people to start important economic and social transformation of the country."¹⁷¹

That Moscow and Prague gave pro-KPU commentaries, and that the KPU candidates were known to be pro-Eastern, encouraged the focus on ideology in the campaign. The most obvious and spectacular aspect of the campaign was that "in his intervention in the campaign. . . President Kenyatta particularly stressed the threat of Communism, both from elements within the country and from outside forces which were alleged to be supporting the KPU candidates."¹⁷² He assured voters that he had geared the country for rapid advance by modernizing agriculture,

¹⁷¹ Moscow Radio, June 11, 1966.

¹⁷² "Political Development in Kenya," Commonwealth Survey, XII, No. 18 (September 2, 1966), p. 918.

spurring industrialization, promoting tourism, and carrying out reforms in economy, education, social services, housing, and health. Emphasizing that such was the only road to stable progress, Kenyatta stated:

. . . I will not insult your intelligence, as the KPU set out to do, by promising to provide you tomorrow with imaginary things that are not available or that cannot be financed.

There are some people who suggest that our African Socialism is of no account. They would have Kenya surrender to external interests, and put what they call "Scientific Socialism" in its place. Such people are traitors to the cause of Kenyan nationalism. And as they parade themselves in all their vanities, let it be remembered that their leaders were purchased with money. These leaders then bought lesser men with lesser sums of money. All the members of this sorry group have simply been bribed to try to betray our people into slavery of a new colonialism, more grasping and implacable than anything from which we fought free.¹⁷³

During the height of the campaign Kenyatta attempted to persuade the voters by producing photographs of what he claimed to be the new twelve-room house of Bildad Kaggia, the vice-president of KPU.¹⁷⁴ He frequently hit upon the fact that Kaggia was building such a house, which hardly fitted with his avowed role of

¹⁷³Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., p. 313.

¹⁷⁴"Little Election: Apathy in Kenya," Reporter, V., No. 161 (June 17, 1966), p. 11.

champion of the poor. The contention was that money came from foreign Communist sources. In addition, there were inferences of Kaggia's association with "uncircumcised" individuals--an attempt to arouse one of the worst Kikuyu tribal prejudices.¹⁷⁵ Mboya described Odinga as a confused individual with no policy or program, "who a few months ago was praising Mzee Kenyatta as a second God whom he would always follow and whom he had now deserted."¹⁷⁶ He ridiculed Odinga and KPU's "Kaggia-ism" and their socialist program; he pledged that KANU and Kenya "will move towards our declared aim of a socialist welfare state, according to our plans" and not those of the Communists.¹⁷⁷

In the Little General Election there were twenty-nine seats in contest--nineteen in the House of Representatives and ten in the Senate. In the House, KANU won twelve with but 72,584 votes while KPU won seven with 86,334 votes. In the Senate, KANU won eight seats with 61,698 votes, while KPU won two constituencies with 78,288 votes.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵Douglas Rogers, "Majority of Voters Were Against KANU: Election Rebuff for Kenya Government," Africa and the World, II, No. 23 (August, 1966), p. 5.

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁷⁸David Koff, "Kenya's Little Election," Africa

Soviet Reaction to KANU-KPU Split

By the end of 1966 Moscow had revised its opinion about the universal applicability of the Communist dictum that the one-party state is a means of combating the reactionary opposition which, relying on the support of foreign capital, seeks to hamper national progress, for such development was not taking place in Kenya. To the Soviet Africanists, there was doubt that in countries striving for a non-capitalist path of development, a one-party system helped them consolidate all "patriotic" forces and facilitate progress; progress was only possible when such a country was headed by a revolutionary democratic leader. However, they still firmly held that the one-party system was the only efficient system to provide the unity of the purpose and dedicated leadership necessary to guide African countries to prosperity. Poor countries could not afford to lose their few educated and gifted members because of political skirmishes. Soviet Africanists were further convinced that it was only through the one-party system, under dynamic, progressive leadership, that unification of various ethnic groups could be encouraged, particularly in such countries as

Report, XI, No. 7 (October, 1966); p. 60.

Kenya where experience had shown that stirring tribal animosities was an easy game.¹⁷⁹ Their disappointment with KANU's development, as well as that of others in Africa (particularly Ghana's Convention People's Party), led Moscow to announce that in the future it would withhold support until assured that the nation seeking it had thoroughly scrutinized the importance and proper machinery of a one-party system.¹⁸⁰

By the end of 1966, Soviet Africanists who once held Jomo Kenyatta's name in the highest esteem as one of the most outstanding African leaders in the national liberation struggle were beginning to level criticism at him:

. . . Jomo Kenyatta was considered one of the most revolutionary leaders in Africa. The imperialist press that once abused him is now singing his praises.

In 1953 a British court sentenced Kenyatta and five of his fellow fighters, including Oneko and Kaggia, to hard labour. After proclamation of independence, Oneko became a Minister of Kenyatta's government and Kaggia parliamentary Vice-Minister. These men had much in common--a joint struggle for independence of their country, grim years of hard labour and exile. Now their ways have parted and they have become practically class enemies. Kaggia and Oneko have retired and stand for Kenya's non-capitalist development, Kenyatta is leading the

¹⁷⁹E. Teosyan, "One-Party System in Africa," International Affairs, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 126.

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

country along the capitalist road.¹⁸¹

Moscow's changing attitude towards KANU and its consequent endorsement of KPU also resulted from the fact that KANU did not follow the policy it had outlined in its 1963 election program. The KANU Government did not keep its promise to dismantle the large farms of the Europeans and resettle African farmers on that land, so the problem of unemployment, closely connected with agriculture, became more and more acute with no solution in sight. Despite many economic danger signals, the KANU Government abandoned its long-promised "socialism" and embarked on the road to capitalism as a means of developing the cities and the countryside. Moreover, KANU paid only lip service rather than rendering active support to the freedom fighters on the continent who were struggling for their countries' liberation, contrary to its 1963 vow. It looked as if KANU, after absorbing KADU had swung to the right and had opened the door to foreign capital, thus making Kenya more dependent on the West than ever before. Some KANU leaders formed partnerships to acquire property in the capitalist fashion, whereupon they began to contradict their earlier radical

¹⁸¹Tomilin, "The Intelligentsia of Tropical Africa," op. cit., p. 39.

postures. The general political atmosphere that prevailed from independence through 1967 had given rise to several colonialist, imperialist, and neocolonialist plots against the progressive wing of KANU.¹⁸² Under these circumstances, the formation of KPU to carry on the fight that had been initiated by KANU was welcomed by Moscow.

Moscow's continued support of KPU worried KANU and the Kenya Government, and from time to time they even resolved to use violent means to destroy its influence. An example of this was carried in an editorial of the Reporter, the largest East African magazine:

According to newspaper reports, which have not been denied, Kenya's Minister for Labour, Dr. J. G. Kiano, was recently involved in a disgraceful incident in his own constituency, Murang'a.

. . . a gang of thugs led by the Minister went to the local offices of the Kenya People's Union, forced the door open, entered, and proceeded to ransack the office, destroying files and papers.

We are amazed that a Minister in the Government could have given his support to such acts of hooliganism. We are also surprised that the police in the vicinity who witnessed the incidents made no attempt to stop it, and that no arrests were made.

The issue here is whether Kenya is going to be ruled according to the rule of law, or whether the branches of the ruling party are going to be encouraged by the Minister's example to plunge the country into an era of political savagery, reminiscent of the rule of the Nazis in Germany or the Fascists in

¹⁸²V. Baryshnikov, "East Africa and the Development Paths," International Affairs, No. 2 (February, 1968), pp. 78, 79. Also, A. V. Kiva, "Natsional'nyi soiuz afrikatsev kenii," Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 3 (1968), pp. 41-43.

Italy or the antics of the Red Guards in Communist China.¹⁸³

This incident was one of several in which Government Ministers participated, reportedly carried out in different districts. Considering such developments, it was evident that the two-party system in Kenya had a long way to go to achieve stability.

From Purge and Expulsions to Propaganda

Official Kenyan anti-Communist sentiments reached such a proportion that in March 1965, the Kenya Government declared eleven pro-Communist foreigners persona non grata. The Soviet Union, home of five of the eleven diplomatic and journalistic expulsions, had not been given any reason for Kenya Government action, and its Embassy in Nairobi announced that these actions "could not be considered otherwise than unfriendly towards the Soviet Union."¹⁸⁴ L. Soliakov of the Tass news agency, who had been in Kenya for two years, said that on being asked to leave, he was told that he was considered a danger to Kenya's national security; but he himself considered the decision to be based on "the campaign of

¹⁸³Reporter, VI, No. 189 (July 14, 1967), p. 1.

¹⁸⁴"KANU Purge. . . and Deportations," Reporter, V, No. 155 (March 25, 1966), p. 9.

slander launched in the press against socialist countries" and as "clear evidence of the existence of forces here which are against friendship and cooperation between Kenya and the Soviet Union."¹⁸⁵ He claimed that the expulsions were without foundation. The Tass general director--Dmitrii Goriunov¹⁸⁶--sent a telegram to Kenya's Minister of Home Affairs, Daniel Arap Moi, strongly protesting that Soliakov's expulsion from Kenya could not be justified by facts.¹⁸⁷

The Western press continued to publish items to the effect that the Soviets and the Chinese had channeled funds through left-wing KANU members in order to erode Kenyatta's leadership. On March 23, Arap Moi said that a total sum of £ 400,000 had been distributed between 1964 and the end of 1965 by foreign elements (mainly by the Soviets and the Chinese) to some politicians in Kenya in efforts to subvert the Kenya Government. He accused them of "misusing their diplomatic privileges" to subvert the

¹⁸⁵"The KANU Party Conference," op. cit.

¹⁸⁶One year later he succeeded Lavrov as Soviet Ambassador to Kenya.

¹⁸⁷Tass, March 19, 1966; also, "Tass Protest," Soviet News, No. 5256 (March 25, 1966), p. 156. Leonid Soliakov and Zdenek Kubec of Czechoslovak News Agency played a big role in helping to found the Kenya News Agency in its early days.

Government." 188

The Soviet leaders who had placed much hope in Kenya and Ghana, among other countries in Africa, realized by early 1966 that "the imperialists direct their blows especially against the advanced countries of Africa" and that what had actually happened in Kenya "may serve as another example of the scheming of imperialists in Africa." 189 Since the Soviet Union demanded explanations and the Kenya Government gave none--except that it was "suspicious" of the persons expelled--some people wondered if Western powers had anything to do with the expulsions. The American Ambassador in Kenya wrote in his memoirs:

. . . to the people who ask me if we'd had anything to do with the expulsions, I pointed out that obviously we wanted to win the return match. The truth is that the Kenyan police had asked us to verify their suspicions that certain people were not what they pretended to be, and we had obligingly checked their names against our files. 190

As Soviet journalist Iu. Kharlamov noted, relations between Kenya and Somalia had sharply deteriorated during June due to border disputes dating back to colonial days. However, he was surprised to see some of

188 "Kenya Home Minister's Warning to Foreign Envoys: 400,000 for Subversion--Govt. will take Action," Daily Nation, March 24, 1966, p. 1.

189 Moscow Radio, April 25, 1966.

190 Attwood, op. cit., p. 268.

the Kenyan press and political leaders trying to ascribe the involvement of the Soviet Union in these conflicts. He asserted that the Soviet policy with respect to African countries that had just freed themselves from the colonialist yoke was one of friendly relations and economic and political assistance to help them overcome the consequences of colonial rule. After stating that Soviet policy towards both Kenya and Somalia was based on the same principles, he wrote:

Who is interested in the anti-Soviet propaganda being waged in Kenya? Who stands to gain by an aggravation of relations between Kenya and its neighbors? There is only one answer to this--the former masters of Eastern Africa and American imperialism, the leaders of neocolonialists, who are virtually interested in dividing countries of the African continent in order to be able to continue to impose their will on them.¹⁹¹

The concern of the Soviets in the controversy was to educate Kenyans about the principles upon which the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based. The most important of these principles was claimed to be that of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. Soviet spokesmen asked the people of Kenya not to allow the foreign newspaper publishers in their country

¹⁹¹Ita. Kharlanov, "S chuzhogo golosa," Pravda, June 29, 1966, p. 5. Also, Tass, June 29, 1966; and "Attacks on USSR in Kenya Newspapers," Soviet News, No. 5292 (July 1, 1966), p. 8.

to create disagreements between their country and the Soviet Union by playing on their emotions. On that issue Viktor Petrov raised the following argument to African listeners on his Moscow Radio broadcast:

In recent days my attention has been attracted by several articles published in Kenyan papers. To tell the truth, reading these articles has not pleased me in the least because they contain comments which are not in line with facts--indeed some of them are quite laughable. Some of these comments which deal with my homeland say that the presence of the Soviet Embassy near the Kenyan Armed Forces headquarters endangers the security of the country. Following this line of logic, Soviet newspapers should have been entitled for the past forty years to write that the British Embassy endangers the safety of the Soviet Government because out of the windows of the British Embassy one has a nice view of the Kremlin in Moscow, the headquarters of the Soviet Government Considering these articles you will discover that Kenyan newspapers have, in my opinion, embarked on a vast campaign with an obvious purpose, to [undermine] the principles upon which relations between the Soviet Union and other countries are based the Soviet Union has always [espoused] the principles of observance of noninterference in internal affairs of other countries.¹⁹²

According to V. Popov, the charges about an alleged Soviet menace to East Africa were inventions of colonialists and neocolonialists, headed by the United

¹⁹² Moscow Radio, June 27, 1966. This Red scare was intensified by the Daily Nation of May 5, 1966 whose front page was entitled "Russians, Chinese will have to move: Government Embassy Probe." This was accompanied by a map showing Kenya Army headquarters and its proximity to both Chinese and Soviet embassies. The paper further alleged that Kenya Army headquarters could be easily scrutinized from the windows of these embassies.

States, who were striving at all costs to divert attention from their own intrigues in Africa. He pointed out that the July 25, 1966 issue of the American weekly Newsweek had published data on Somalia's armed forces. He claimed that the Newsweek data about Soviet arms and specialists in the Somalian army, as well as the strength of the army, which was allegedly spearheaded against Kenya, was obviously invented.¹⁹³ Popov's main concern was that the figures in the Newsweek article were suspiciously similar to those published in the Kenyan papers Daily Nation and Sunday Nation. He argued that, since they nearly coincided, they must have been taken from the same source, "a very dirty and murky one--a source stirred up by the dirty hands of neocolonialists."¹⁹⁴ The controversy, from the Soviet viewpoint, did not really concern or even reach the people of Kenya; however, during the time of hostilities in which soldiers and innocent Kenyans were injured and killed, the newspaper reports made a difference. At such a moment Soviet

¹⁹³v. Popov, "Iz odnogo mutnogo istochnika," Krasnaia Zvezda, August 10, 1966, p. 3; Tass (International Service in English), August 9, 1966, in DR: USSR & EE, No. 155 (August 11, 1966), bb 13, 14 and "Neocolonialist Lies About Kenya-Somali Differences," Soviet News, No. 5306 (August 17, 1966), p. 76.

¹⁹⁴ibid.

arms to Somalia were pointed at as a major factor inspiring the Somalis.

When at last, in November 1967, the two neighbors signed an agreement on the border dispute, the exchanges between President Podgorny and Kenyatta showed a feeling of relief:

The agreement between the Governments of the republic of Kenya and the Republic of Somalia achieved in Arusha with the participation of the President of the Republic of Zambia, is an important contribution to the cause of strengthening the unity and consolidating of African states and to the cause of consolidating peace throughout the world.¹⁹⁵

The End of Activism

As 1966 ended, the Soviet authorities concluded that "in . . . Kenya, domestic reaction, with the support of the imperialists, has hit out at . . . the left-wing forces,"¹⁹⁶ and that any attempt to identify the Soviet Union with those left-wing forces did not improve Soviet-Kenyan relations. The Soviets had come to accept that when they came to Kenya in the early 1960's they did so under considerable disadvantage but nevertheless had made

¹⁹⁵Nairobi Radio, November 24, 1967.

¹⁹⁶K. Brutents, "African Revolution: Gains and Problems," International Affairs, No. 1 (1967), p. 20.

notable advances despite the massive, pervasive, and long-established Western presence. After being forced to limit their activities, the Soviets thought it wise not to force their way into what they perceived as a determination to end the Soviet-Kenyan relations. Rather than be forced into a humiliating situation by antagonistic elements in Kenyan ruling circles, they changed their strategy from that of positive activism to a policy of limited commitment and "wait and see."

Under the changed circumstances, communications and contact between the two countries became rare. The length of visits became shorter. The visit of members of a Soviet parliamentary delegation led by Iu. I. Paletskis, chairman of the Nationalities of the Supreme Soviets, arrived in Kenya on April 28, 1967, held brief talks with the speaker of the Kenya National Assembly, and on the following day left for Lusaka, Zambia.¹⁹⁷ But a new low ebb of Soviet-Kenyan relations was about to be reached.

In May the Soviet Government announced that its first Ambassador to Kenya--V. S. Lavrov--was being re-

¹⁹⁷"Znakomstvo s parlamentom," Izvestia, April 30, 1967, p. 3.

placed by Dmitrii Goriunov.¹⁹⁸ When the new Soviet Ambassador was received by Kenyatta, he handed the President a bank check of five thousand shillings for a hospital being built at Gatundu--Kenyatta's home village.¹⁹⁹

In the meantime the Soviet Government's overtures for friendship and cooperation with the Kenya Government in limited areas such as scientific research, medical technology, and occasional participation in the National Youth Organization were continuing, but on a very limited basis. Those activities were intended, wherever diplomacy made it possible, to keep alive otherwise weakening Soviet-Kenyan relations.

It was to be expected, under these circumstances, that Kenyatta did not speak positively of Soviet-Kenyan relations. For example, when he addressed a mass rally in Nairobi on Kenyatta Day, in October 1967, he attacked KPU and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, saying:

¹⁹⁸ Pravda, May 23, 1967, p. 7; also, Izvestiia, May 24, 1967, p. 6. In 1949 Goriunov was the chief editor of Komsomol'skaia Pravda, then assistant editor of Pravda, and from 1960 to 1967 he was the General Director of Tass.

¹⁹⁹ Izvestiia, May 28, 1967, p. 1.

"We have already discovered their plans. We know their associates, with whom they have been consulting."²⁰⁰

Nevertheless, Kenyatta did send a message of congratulations to Podgorny on the occasion of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution:

I look forward to the continuation of the friendly relations which exist between our two countries, and express the hope that our people will work hand in hand in the promotion of good will and peace in the world.²⁰¹

While things looked comparatively peaceful on the surface, it was later made known why Kenyatta had referred to the KPU and "their associates" who "wanted to bring a revolution to the whole of East Africa," had he not "discovered their secrets."²⁰² Responding to a question about a Soviet spy, Loginov, the Kenyan vice-president and Minister of Home Affairs, arap Moi, told members of the Kenya National Assembly that Loginov was "an active member of the Russian intelligence service. . . probably in charge of their operations in East Africa."²⁰³ Bekhteyev, a colleague of Loginov, arap Moi told the Chamber, had hurriedly

²⁰⁰ Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, op. cit., p. 344.

²⁰¹ Nairobi Radio, November 7, 1967.

²⁰² Loc. cit.

²⁰³ Ibid.

left for Moscow when the arrest of Loginov became known, before the Kenya security organization "had had an opportunity of identifying his wide range of contacts in this country."²⁰⁴ There were some people in Kenya who felt, as one member put it, that Soviet diplomats were abusing their privileged positions to interfere in the internal affairs of Kenya. These people asked: "Why did the Government not take action to arrest even those who made contact with him [Loginov] or, if possible, close down the Russian Embassy in Nairobi?" At this time many Kenyan leaders saw little if any good to be said for the Soviet side. They were satisfied with Western aid. The economic report of mid-1966 had been very encouraging. W. W. Rostow on Kenya's development struck a responsive chord: "Kenya's development is on the launching pad. In the past two years [since mid-1964] the nation has been geared for accelerated development and is now ready to take-off into self-sustained growth."²⁰⁵ While the Western-oriented Kenyans praised the report, the Eastern-oriented ones saw nothing to be happy about, since the

²⁰⁴ Official Report, National Assembly, XII, Part 2, 5th Sess. (December 22, 1967), col. 3695. Also, "Home Minister Moi's Disclosure in National Assembly: Russian was in Kenya to Spy," Daily Nation (March 23, 1966), p. 1.

²⁰⁵ "Boom Time: Kenya About to Take-Off," Reporter, V, No. 159 (May 20, 1966), pp. 22-23.

country's economy, it seemed, was again run by foreigners.

Moscow's Reflection on Kenya: Changes of
Attitude But No Loss of Hope

By early 1966 Soviet Africanists had come to the conclusion that forces of reaction were taking control in Kenya. However, they were also aware of progressive forces that were active even though outnumbered. A commentary by Moscow Radio made the following analysis of Kenya's socioeconomic and political scene:

KANU. . . has never been united. It has within its ranks very conservative politicians who see in the maintenance of close relations with imperialist powers the guarantee of their own prosperity. But it also contains people who are convinced of the need for social and economic reform and who are indignant that foreign capital controls the economy of the country as it did in the past and who are displeased with the extremely slow rate of agrarian reform.²⁰⁶

In the opinion of Soviet Africanists, the reactionaries in Kenya were determined to go to any lengths to make Kenya a capitalist country. They claimed that Mboya was using the term "African Socialism" to encourage capitalist development while his fellow party members were joining him in using anti-Communism as a weapon to discredit those who advocated the inclusion of socialist countries in Kenya's foreign policy.

²⁰⁶ Moscow Radio, March 11, 21, and 25, 1966.

The developments in Kenya, whereby some members of the intelligentsia began to share economic benefits of the country with the European and Asian community, was hardly a social revolution, in the Communist terminology. Soviets insisted that "no social revolution can be truly assessed only from the point of view of revolution in economy, without considering revolution in politics and ideology."²⁰⁷ In the views of Soviet Africanists, the problems that the Kenyans were experiencing in mid-1966 were mainly those in the political and ideological aspects:

The internal political struggle within Kenya African National Union (KANU) has risen to a high pitch. Because it is so diverse socially, its official ideology--a national variant of "African Socialism"--does not have the unanimous support. The "Kenya Socialism" programme is, in fact, a slightly done-up programme for capitalist development. . . .

. . . Party secretaries were often appointed from the top on the strength of the personal trust. In some places the party leaders selected their subordinates from among their friends and relatives. Such men could not, of course, hope to enjoy prestige and authority among rank-and-file members of the party and the people at large.

Furthermore, the mass organizations, which sometimes united nearly the whole of the adult population of the country, were highly unwieldy. Even on the assumption that that all members of the party hold

²⁰⁷N. K. Vaintsvaig, L. M. Gataullina, F. G. Kim, and F. I. Kulikova, "Teoriia i praktikka nekapilisticheskogo puti razvitiia," Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 4 (1966), p. 52.

the same political views, it is extremely difficult in practice to carry on serious party educational work among the whole population.

It is not only a matter of class differences. It should be borne in mind that the broad masses of the African population have inherited a cultural backwardness from colonial days. Most people in young African countries have not yet been freed from prejudice and superstition, and are still under strong influence of tribal chiefs, missionaries, etc.

Here is a picture which is typical of most African countries. . . on one hand, there [is] a passive mass of population which was the foundation of the ruling party, but which in fact exercised no influence in the course of state affairs and took no part in political life; and on the other, a relatively narrow section of the party cadres and activists who had no close ties with the masses, but who decided the country's future and determined the party's political life. The situation was aggravated by the differences both social and ethnic in this section. Its members often held opposite political views (although open statements against official programmes were rare.²⁰⁸

Under these conditions, it was not difficult for neocolonialism to impose itself; in fact, it was invited from some quarters. As a danger to the national-liberation movement, it was much more complex because, unlike in the struggle against colonialism, a rifle alone was not sufficient to counter it.²⁰⁹ Soviet theoreticians claimed that neocolonialism was a very well thought out

²⁰⁸N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Classes, Parties and Politics," International Affairs, No. 7 (July, 1966), pp. 42-43.

²⁰⁹V. Fetov, "The Strategy of Neo-Colonialism," Neo-Colonialism--The Bitterest Enemy of the Young Countries (Moscow: Novosti News Agency Publishing House, 1965), p. 22.

strategy for saving capitalism, and that among "its chief aims are to establish the unlimited power of the monopolies and to transform the economically less developed countries once more into a rare zone of imperialism."²¹⁰

In the view of Soviet Africanists, Kenya was making great progress economically, but the future still looked grim because of the capitalist path of development. This subject was also of great concern among the Kenyans themselves. According to a report of a Working Party in Kenya under the auspices of the Department of Christian Education and Training of the National Christian Council of Kenya, there were many areas where foreign control was felt to be to Kenya's disadvantage. One frustration of the Kenyan nationalists was revealed by John Nottingham, publishing director of the East Africa Publishing House, Nairobi. His concern was "the continued control of their economies and even of their ideologies by either the former colonial power or one of the super-powers," and that "this is . . . more frightening in that books are perhaps the most powerful political, cultural, ideological and educational weapons that the

²¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

world has yet seen."²¹¹

There were other Kenyans who felt that economic blessings had also sown seeds of inequalities that resulted in the emergence of classes in Kenyan society--a clear danger to African Socialism:

There is a clear class division in Kenya's society which is based largely on the share of economic wealth of the nation. Kenya's society provides a very good example of the haves and the have-nots. . . . There is clear evidence of a few African political and bureaucratic elite who are slowly merging with the commercial elite to form an apex at the top of the socio-political and economic elite, while the majority of Africans linger helplessly below. . . . This trend may defeat the very tenet of African Socialism which in effect may lead to another revolution of an unanticipated nature and which may end up in the disintegration of the whole Kenya society.²¹²

Like Soviet Africanists, the Working Party disapproved the path of development the Kenya Government was pursuing by the end of 1966; it recommended that the Government had to change that course, predicting that otherwise:

A purely economic logic of national growth would probably lead, in a decade or so, to the consolidation of a professional, managerial and political elite. Land-owning, business ownership, and political power would increasingly converge, and the tax structure will be neither stringent enough in its application, nor sufficiently progressive in principle, to dislodge these accumulations of wealth and power. Meanwhile, all around Nairobi, Kisumu

²¹¹Who Controls Industry In Kenya? Report of A Working Party (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), pp. 215, 216.

²¹²Id., p. 259.

and Mombasa, slum areas of endemic poverty will be rapidly growing, and settling into a self-perpetuating misery. Measures against the urban unemployed will become increasingly punitive, as unrest and crime make the streets unsafe, and illegal squatting upsets city planning, and ruffles civic pride. Elsewhere in the country, there will be prosperous provinces, where the progress of coffee and tea farmers conceals the impoverishment of a growing number of marginal landless labourers, dependent upon casual work at the barest subsistence wage. But there will also be less fertile regions, where a traditional way of life sinks in gradual degradation and neglect, as the more ambitious young people seek their future elsewhere. On the settlement schemes, the smallholder will have disappeared. Industrial development will have become frankly dependent upon an alliance of government capital with foreign technical skill, against which the enterprising Kenya craftsman will not be able to compete. The national economy will be making encouraging progress; but the nation will be falling apart.²¹³

²¹³Ibid., pp. 261-262.

CONCLUSION

After examining the Kenyan intelligentsia and its relations with the Soviet Union, it is evident that the active leftists approached the Soviet Union as an ally in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Since in the late 1950's and even in the early 1960's the British colonial masters in Kenya opposed the Soviet overtures to Kenya, it was up to the Kenyans to maneuver their way illegally to the USSR.

In the beginning, relations received a big boost, as colonialism was associated with the West and was viewed as an evil, while socialism was a popular sign of hope. Also, the West's attempt to close relations between Africa and the East increased the Kenyans' curiosity. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership, headed by the jubilant Nikita Khrushchev, remarkably revitalized its foreign policy and approached Kenyans with confidence and decisiveness. From periodic contacts, the Soviet leaders were impressed that the leftist intelligentsia showed encouraging evidence of assimilating socialist ideas. Even in colonial days Soviet-Kenyan relations seemed to grow stronger. To the British, this was a direct challenge and they resolved that such relations

must not come about at the expense of their influence in Kenya. Yet as Kenya's independence neared, in an enthusiastic spirit of independence and a desire to establish relations with all countries, Kenyan leaders aspired to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

After relations reached their highest point in 1963/64, the delay of the promised Soviet assistance to Kenya gave the critics of the Soviet Union an opportunity to intensify their attacks. Unfortunately, Kenya was no longer a two-party state, and the criticism that once came from the Western-oriented opposition party, KADU, began to come from the Government itself--KANU. By 1966 the Kenya Government strongly stressed the threat of Communism--both inside and outside Kenya--and, of course, this was basically an attack on the Soviet Union.

Tom Mboya, a strong advocate of a Western brand of socialism, used his magnetic organizing ability to attract the majority of Kenyans to his side. He eventually succeeded in making his socialism official, but not without bitter opposition from those Kenyans who saw their goal as scientific socialism.

Largely because of the growth KANU had shown from 1960, it seemed to have embraced elements ranking it among the most progressive parties in Africa. Its first

manifesto included the essentials of socialist doctrines. It was the expectation of the Soviet Union and the left-wing Kenyans that KANU would become even more radical after independence, but this did not happen. Despite advice from the Soviets the party did not evolve from the mass organization that led the country to independence; it was most effective in 1963 and 1964, but after that lost its progressive aspects. The major reason for the loss of its earlier vitality was that after KADU dissolved itself voluntarily and joined KANU, the conservative elements from both parties formed a powerful group within KANU that forced it to follow a Western-oriented policy. The socialist elements kept pressuring to make changes within the party; when no such trend seemed to have any chances of success a few of these militants founded the Marxist-Leninist Kenya Socialist Party in 1965, but this short-lived organization did not gather momentum because most of its ideological comrades were still in KANU hoping to institute changes. In early 1966, when the socialist-minded radicals in KANU were forced out of the party, they founded the Kenya People's Union, a socialist party. Soon thereafter KANU began to accuse the KPU of bringing Communism from Moscow to Kenya.

Soviet influence did penetrate a wide range of

Kenyan leadership, particularly as regards education, rapid industrialization, reorganization of land ownership and other social transformations. The Soviet Union temporarily succeeded in offering itself as a model in overcoming the problems of development blamed on the British and the West in general. This changed drastically when the Soviet Union did not respond swiftly to fulfill the agreements reached with Kenyan authorities a short time earlier. The West trumped the Soviet Union by offering its services on better terms. This experience made the reputation of the Soviet Union suffer greatly among Government officials; it suffered even more when similar experiences in Guinea and Ghana were brought into the picture. But while Soviet-Kenyan collaboration was not totally eliminated, the enthusiastic talk of comprehensive collaboration constantly mentioned in 1963 and 1964 had declined a great deal by the end of 1966. Kenya had come to reject Moscow altogether and was looking more and more to the West.

The Soviet setback in Kenya was largely due to Kenya's economic depletion, which Soviet aid was incapable of correcting on such short notice. This was made much more difficult because of Kenya's large European population of some sixty thousand and another two hundred

thousand Asians, as well as many Africans who looked to the West for their supplies of certain consumer goods that they could not be denied. The Soviet Union was not in the position to assume this task, in addition to helping Kenya in its industrial development. What the Soviet Union was prepared for at first was limited to politics and ideology --the things Kenya wanted to handle itself. When the West embarked on a program of aid for comprehensive economic development, it immediately moved into the areas of politics and ideology, ensuring its stability and leading to an all around loss for the Soviet Union, at least for the 1960's.

From the radical nationalists' point of view, this Western domination was regrettable. They protested that the Western countries continued to treat them as childlike creatures, claiming that they had enough sense to realize that the destiny of Africa was at stake--not simply the fortunes of Kenya. However, they knew that Kenyans were divided--first on racial lines and then on tribal and semitribal lines--and this made cooperation extremely difficult. In the meantime, tribal antagonism was growing, wittingly or unwittingly supported by some selfish politicians. Along this line, all sorts of fears --such as the fear of being attacked by political enemies

from within and without--were increasing by bounds. Out of this suspicion and distrust, and particularly with the threats of Communist coup d'etat, Kenyans became confused about their national goals. In the meantime, greedy leaders began to rely more and more on their Western collaborators, while expressing fear on imperialism from the East.

The Kenyan socialists were determined to broaden their ideological offensive and pointed out that the ruling intelligentsia had divorced itself from the masses and had decided to maintain its own orbit. In this case they referred to Mboya's "African Socialism," particularly what it had tried to hide and distort. The best example was land communalism, which was expected to pave the way to socialism. Instead, African leadership gave land consolidation new emphasis; part of the result was that the national consciousness, which was in its embryonic stages among the peasantry, reverted to individualism. In the meantime, the intelligentsia, expected to guide the African peasantry to socialism, began to take over parts of formerly European farms. These members of the intelligentsia not only betrayed their socialist objectives, but also deprived the peasantry of leadership. Some of the peasantry were given a share of the prize by the rightist

intelligentsia and promised more if collaboration was provided. As the Government began a movement to land registration, it seemed evident that the once-idolized African commune had been discarded. There was no question that the land values adopted were those of the West.

By the end of 1966 it was evident that Western influence had taken command of Kenya's development. Economic aid to Kenya was given by Western governments and private companies. The Eastern aid that had been carefully negotiated was either rejected or reduced to the minimum. In the same way Soviet military aid was rejected in favor of a military alliance with Great Britain. The earlier trend of Kenyans attending Western universities, colleges, and other seats of learning and the presence of thousands of Western teachers at Kenya's schools was maintained and in many cases increased. On the other hand, the Government cancelled the three hundred annual scholarships that the Soviet Government awarded Kenyans to study in the higher institutions of the Soviet Union.

To the leftist intelligentsia, Kenya's independence did not erase the colonial system of privileges and favors but instead extended it to another form--neo-colonialism in which the national bourgeoisie with its

tribalistic divisivenesses added more dangerous elements to the picture. But as the national bourgeoisie assumed some figurehead positions in the machinery of the Government, the former colonial masters took charge of the details of running the country. They took over education and science, administration and law, and the military, in addition to economic control. This meant perpetuation of the colonial culture while the remnants of the African culture that had persisted throughout the colonial days were ignored and left to die off. Modernization and progress seemed to be going hand in hand with the assimilation of European culture. Socialist elements maintained that the colonial structure had to be demolished, but they were willing to use its pieces in building a new structure.

Kenya's right-wing intelligentsia's attributes of modesty and simplicity baffled the leftists who over and over raised the question of why the Kenyan people had fought to liberate themselves from colonialism. They raised this concern in the same spirit they had fought colonialism; and they pointed out that their government policy at home and abroad must be based on the needs of the masses. But the bourgeoisie in control of the government were convinced that the ultimate purpose of their foreign and domestic policy was to ensure stability

and progress, and to them this meant little or no experimentation with the East. They thus decided to maintain their Western allies, whom they knew well, rather than risk their new gains and positions with new friends --the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The political situation in Kenya was reminiscent of the philosophic prediction of Frantz Fanon, in view of "Marxist formula":

Colonialism and its derivatives do not as a matter of fact, constitute the present enemies of Africa. In a short time this continent will be liberated. For my part, the deeper I enter into the cultures and political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.

. . . After a few hesitant steps in the international arena, the national middle classes, no longer feeling the threat of the traditional colonial power, suddenly develop great appetites. And as they do not yet have great political experience they think they can conduct political affairs like their business. Prerequisites, threats, even despoiling of the victims. All of which is of course regrettable, for small states have no choice but to beg the former metropolis to remain just a little longer The discontented workers undergo a repression as pitiless as that of the colonial period. . . . The people, the people who had given everything in the difficult moments of the struggle for national liberation wonder with their empty hands and bellies, as to the reality of their victory.¹

¹Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution (Political Essays), trans. by Haakon Chevalier (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 186-187.

Further, the correct conception of an ideology is as an instrument of modernization based on the theory of social change. Such an ideology is an explicit framework of means and ends capable of stimulating policy-oriented analysis, inspiring action, and constituting the normative and practical touchstone of accomplishments.² Any astute analyst of Kenya's situation has to come to the conclusion that Kenyatta's government in the 1960's was committed to "protecting the status quo," whereby, if the former colonialists were "useful to him and help make some Africans prosperous, they will stay."³ But during that time, it was not unusual to find some arrogant former colonial officials explain their continued domination in independent Kenya as follows:

It has to be remembered that we won. We defeated Mau Mau. Independence was negotiated, not seized, and most of the top people in the civil service and other key jobs were originally trained, and in many cases, picked by us for those jobs.⁴

Essentially, the Western policy was to promote an independent Kenya, but inclined to the West and not to

²Manfred Halpern, "The Rate and Costs of Political Development," The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCLIII (March, 1965), p. 25.

³Jim Hoagland, "Kenya Whites Survive Prosper Under Black Government," The Washington Post, January 8, 1973, p. 4.

⁴Ibid.

the East. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union actively sought to gain complete control over Kenya in this period; but it sought to neutralize Western influence. This Soviet approach received loud sympathy from militant radical nationalists in Kenya. Yet, though the Soviets left no strong influence in Kenya, they did succeed in implanting their ideas--that tenacious ideas of the Marxism-Leninism which both the colonial and independent Kenya governments had preoccupied themselves to keep out of the country.

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