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TO THE EMANCIPATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY,  
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INDEPENDENCE FOR TANGANYIKA: AN ANALYSIS  
OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH  
LED TO THE EMANCIPATION OF THE  
TRUST TERRITORY, 1946-1961

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by

DANIEL RICHARD SMITH

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Daniel Richard Smith

Fr. Gabriel Abdehayed, Ph.D.

To my father -

"Full many a gem...".

## PREFACE

### Overview

In the period 1946-61 the territory of Tanganyika rapidly made the transformation from a politically underdeveloped United Nations trusteeship to that of a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth. Once the independence drive began, it was able to achieve its ends in a speedy and relatively peaceful manner.

Because of the moderate nature of the Tanganyikan liberation movement, as compared with the more precarious and erratic developments taking place in neighboring Kenya and Uganda, the details of the course of political evolution in the trusteeship have been left largely unexamined. This has led to the formulation of several shallow generalizations concerning Tanganyikan political development. It is commonly maintained that there was no effective black party within the territory before the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, that no serious political power was wielded by the European

or Asian communities during the liberation drive, and that the nationalist movement avoided major incidents of civil disobedience and unlawful activity. Finally, most surveys claim that TANU's moderate position concerning both the pace of political development and the future of the minority communities was the product of the political philosophy of Julius K. Nyerere and his key lieutenants.<sup>1</sup>

Those scholarly works which have examined political developments have either been devoted to the pre-World War II period as in the case of Margaret Bates' doctoral dissertation "Tanganyika Under British Administration 1920-1955" or focus their attention on one particular aspect of territorial political evaluation. Thus for example, B. T. Chidzero's "Tanganyika: Influence of International Organisation on Political and Constitutional Development", examines only the activities of the Trusteeship Council.

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<sup>1</sup>These generalizations are reflected in the following standard histories of Tanganyika: Judith Hare Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (New York: London House and Maxwell, 1965); Alexander MacDonald, Tanzania: Young Nation in a Hurry (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1966); Hugh W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, 1920-1967 (New York: Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, 1968); J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

Similarly, the scope of Amon James Nsekela's "African Nationalism in Tanganyika" and Anthony H. Rweyemamu's "Preparation for Independence in Tanganyika" are both limited to African activities and ignore the role of the colonial administration, the home government, and the United Nations.

The purpose of this dissertation is to present a detailed analysis of the factors which led to the political emancipation of Tanganyika and by so doing, to expand upon and clarify these generalizations. There has been a tendency in African historiography to oversimplify the liberation movements of the 1950 period by speaking in general terms of "the winds of change" which swept the continent after the Second World War. However, the rise of political activity in Tanganyika was not merely the result of a growing desire among Africans in the trust territory for increased participation in government affairs. Nor was it simply the product of British willingness to abandon the colonial empire. Rather, it was the result of several major factors which Sir Andrew Cohen has aptly described as "interrelated pressures". Speaking of political development in the post-World War II British Empire, the renowned

Africanist stated that constitutional advancement in the colonies occurred:

...as a result of what I propose to call inter-related pressures - on the one hand the pressure exerted through the actions and policies of the British Government, the Governments in the territories, and public and parliamentary opinion in Britain, and other opinions and attitudes in the territories themselves.<sup>1</sup>

In the case of Tanganyika, the interrelated factors were more numerous and complex than in the rest of British East Africa. Political progress in most colonies can be examined in light of the activities of the African nationalist organizations and the corresponding official reaction on the part of the colonial power to such developments. However, the situation in Tanganyika was further complicated by the trusteeship status of the territory which made Great Britain accountable to the United Nations for her administrative decisions. Under the stipulations of the Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika, Great Britain, as the Administering Authority, was required to submit an annual report covering all phases of territorial development to the United Nations. The document was subject to

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<sup>1</sup>Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959), p. 37.

examination by the Trusteeship Council who in turn made recommendations to the Crown to help plot the course of future territorial ameliorations. In addition, the United Nations dispatched a "visiting mission" to Tanganyika every three years to gather firsthand information concerning events in the territory. Thus, the policies of the Colonial Office were subject to the scrutiny of an international agency to whom African activists could appeal for support in their campaign for independence. A study of the post-war political development of Tanganyika consequently necessitates an examination of the attitudes of three separate groups: the African nationalists, the colonial power, and the United Nations.

The most active of these three forces was unquestionably the African nationalist movement. As the majority community within the trusteeship (98 percent of the total population), it clearly manifested the greatest concern of all the major parties involved with the question of constitutional development towards self-government. Although the immigrant Asian and European settlers were also deeply affected by internal developments in Tanganyika, the fact that their interests were well represented by the Crown and that they formed such an insignificant part of the



total population in effect removed non-Africans from effective participation in post war territorial political activities. Thus, while preserving their role as influential pressure groups, Asians and Europeans never radically effected the course of Tanganyikan constitutional evolution.

Black nationalism in Tanganyika as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, arose in the period immediately following the Second World War. It was the product of both sudden exposure to the modern world afforded to Africans who participated in the war effort, and the opportunities provided for increased indigenous participation in administrative affairs during the period of neglect which extended from the outbreak of the war until the completion of European reconstruction in the late 1940's.

From 1945-54, black political activism in Tanganyika centered around local rather than territorial issues. This early political involvement was generated by African demands for increased representation in local government, a desire to limit the power of traditional native authorities, dissatisfaction with special privileges granted white settlers, and by a resentment of official agricultural policies which were often contrary to tribal customs. Political activity during these years was limited to the formation of clubs or

"associations", generally comprised of the educated African elite of a given region. The only form of protest utilized was petition. The associations continually denied that they were political parties and condemned the use of either violence or civil disobedience to achieve their aims. They called for the reform of the existing colonial system rather than for development towards self-government. By 1954, the most active and widespread African organization was the Tanganyika African Association (T.A.A.) which boasted of territory-wide support. In the early 50's, T.A.A. had become increasingly vocal in its activities and in several instances, especially in the Geita district of Lake Province, resorted to civil disobedience tactics in its attempts to force the government to meet its demands. Key among the reforms sought by the Association were: increased African political participation, an acceleration of constitutional development and an end to the forced agricultural methods.

However, because it lacked a broad base of popular support, the organization was unable to gain significant concessions from the administration. Consequently on July 7, 1954, Julius Nyerere, then President of T.A.A. converted the Association into the Tanganyika African National

Union thereby creating the territory's first African political party. Under the charismatic leadership of Nyerere, TANU was able to quickly gain a strong basis of popular support, and to use its influence to persistently pressure Great Britain into granting ever-increasing political and constitutional reforms.

The TANU platform for political development called for the immediate initiation of representative government based on universal adult suffrage without income, property or racial qualifications. Thus it opposed the multi-racial theory of British colonial administration and the official policy of indirect rule which called for a slow evolution of the political system through the transformation of the traditional native authorities.

In short order TANU learned to exploit the weak points of the colonial administration to further its own cause. Thus, the party severely criticized the agricultural methods and the poor performance of the native authorities to discredit British rule and gain popular support. When it became obvious that the anti-colonial forces in the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council of the United Nations were eager to assist Nyerere, the TANU leaders astutely utilized this basis of propaganda, making

four separate trips to the U.N. between 1955 and 1960 to speak for the cause of political advancement in Tanganyika. The nationalist leadership also cooperated closely with the Labour government and various liberal and socialist groups within the United Kingdom. These allies inside the home government, often members of Parliament or officials within the Colonial Office, did much to advance the cause of Tanganyikan emancipation within Britain.

Although TANU limited its membership to Africans, it allowed Asian and European settlers to cooperate with its efforts and in return gave its allies political support at election time.

A study of the development of self-government in Tanganyika must also include an examination of the position of the colonial regime. Throughout the independence movement, Great Britain maintained a fairly flexible and openminded attitude towards the question of political advancement. There were several reasons for this approach. As the Administering Authority of the trusteeship, Great Britain governed a territory which, unlike most of her colonies, she had never willfully carved out for any particular purpose. The Crown had administered the territory since 1919, first as a League of Nations mandate, and

after 1945 as a United Nations trusteeship. Since she did not have a personal claim on the territory, Britain never took an adamant position in favor of the preservation of colonial rule in Tanganyika. At the same time, because the duration of British administration under the trusteeship agreement was tentative, the territory attracted few white settlers and investors. The Crown therefore maintained a flexible and low-key attitude toward the administration and development of Tanganyika. Throughout the period of black political activism, the United Kingdom never objected to the demand that the territory become self-governing. The Administering Authority always recognized that Tanganyika would gain her independence. The conflict between TANU and the Crown therefore centered around the questions of how soon independence should be granted and the composition and framework of the government after emancipation.

Since Tanganyikan nationalism arose during the heyday of independence movements on the continent, the British were readily willing to grant concessions and thus avoid the development of problems and expenses in this "adopted"<sup>1</sup> territory. In addition, the Mau Mau

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<sup>1</sup>The term "adopted" was frequently used by the territorial administration and the Colonial Office in

emergency in Kenya and the conflict with the Kabaka in Uganda made the British eager to avoid development of a third trouble spot in their East African domain. Thus, they adopted a makeshift policy in which they were willing to concede to some TANU demands, but adamantly refused to be pressured into any settlement which would cause a loss of prestige for the Crown. At the same time, the British had to at least attempt to ensure that the white and Asian settler communities were afforded a secure position when independence was achieved. It was for these reasons that the Crown opposed African demands for immediate self-rule based on universal adult franchise. Instead the government fostered a policy of slow, gradual political development based on the evolution of the traditional authorities. At the same time, a system of parity was devised to guarantee effective representation for the minority communities. It was thus the questions of governmental structure and the pace of political evolution that brought TANU and the British administration into conflict.

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referring to the trusteeship status of Tanganyika. See for example, the Tanganyika Standard editorial of October 26, 1946. See also Crawford Young, "Decolonization in Africa", in Colonisation in Africa Vol. II, edited by L. G. Gann and Peter Duignan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 450-462.

The position of the Administering Authority was complicated by the political power struggle taking place within the home government. From 1946 to 1961, the Conservative Party continually maintained that a slow pace of political development, accompanied by substantial economic and social advances would be necessary if Tanganyika were to be granted any significant degree of self-government. The Labour Party by contrast, called for rapid advancement toward political self-rule in the territory. During the period 1946-50 when Labour was in power, the pace of political, economic, and social development accelerated rapidly. From the 1951 General Election in Britain until the day of Tanganyikan independence, Labour members of Parliament, as the minority opposition, continually harassed the Conservative regime and the Colonial Office with complaints concerning the goals and methods of British administration and with demands for speedy constitutional development. The Labour Party was enthusiastically supported by liberal and socialist activist groups and by the reform press. Key among these supporters was the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which served as the tutor and ally of Nyerere. The Bureau would supply liberal members of Parliament with information concerning territorial activities and waged a

continual propaganda campaign to gain popular support in Britain for the rapid political advancement of the trusteeship. Often, the Bureau would undertake extensive research projects to provide M.P.s with material critical of the slow pace of development advocated by the Conservative Party.

The development of Tanganyikan independence was complicated by the trusteeship status of the territory which made Great Britain accountable to the United Nations for its policy decisions. After the Second World War, the Trusteeship Council of the international body became the arena for an ideological battle which pitted the colonial powers, primarily Britain and France, against the anti-imperialist nations, led by the Soviet Union and including most of the Communist bloc and the recently emancipated nations of the Third World. The anti-imperialists continually used the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly to condemn the British activities in Tanganyika. As a result, they became the staunch allies of TANU. Most of these critics came from nations which had never had any experience in colonial experience. Consequently, their condemnations and their suggestions for political advancement were often based on ideological beliefs which in no



way took into account the actual problems facing Britain within the territory.

The Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika required that the United Kingdom submit an annual report of its activities to the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council also had the right to dispatch a Visiting Mission to the territory every three years. However, nowhere in the agreement between Britain and the United Nations was it stipulated that the international organization would require the colonial power to accept its recommendations. Only through the pressure of world opinion could the Trusteeship Council force the British to alter their official policy. Consequently, the battle in the U. N. took the form of an ideological contest. This only added to the heated and polemical nature of the debates over Tanganyika which unfolded in both the General Assembly and within the Trusteeship Council. The anti-imperialist powers and the African nationalists realized that the British, who were in the process of transforming their Empire into a Commonwealth, were most sensitive to public opinion concerning colonial issues and exploited this weakness to force concessions from the Administering Authority.

The history of Tanganyikan political development is therefore essentially the story of the relationship between these three separate groups, each of which possessed a different theory of how and at what speed constitutional development should take place. The extent to which they cooperated, compromised, and quarreled constituted the prime factor in determining the course of territorial advancement towards self-government.

Once the nationalist movement was firmly organized under the leadership of Nyerere, the pace of political development was most rapid. Despite the administration's insistence on gradualism, the combined pressures from TANU, the liberals in Britain, and the anti-colonial powers at the U. N. forced the Crown to make compromise after compromise. In 1957, four years after TANU was founded, the first territorial elections were held. In 1959, elected ministers replaced governor-appointed cabinet members. The following year, full internal self-government under the leadership of a Chief Minister was introduced. Finally, on December 9, 1961, Tanganyika was granted complete independence.

It is the goal of this dissertation to examine in detail the interrelationship between the British Government,

the African nationalists, and the United Nations to determine to what extent each of these organizations influenced the course of political development in Tanganyika territory in the period 1946-61.

### Research Methodology

In an attempt to historically analyze the various contributing influences which led to the granting of independence to Tanganyika, the author has concentrated on the sphere of politics with special emphasis on the role of political activist organizations and their impact upon the course of constitutional evolution. Consequently, the issues of social, economic, and educational developments within the trusteeship have been touched upon only in those instances when they directly relate to the question of territorial politics. This has been done to focus clearly upon the issue of constitutional advancement as viewed by the various interrelated groups concerned with the problem of political development within Tanganyika.

In order to shed more light upon the position of the key political pressure groups, the author has utilized a number of collections of primary source material previously ignored, or only partially utilized by earlier researchers.

Key among these are the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau located in the Rhodes House Africana Collection, Oxford, England. As the leading reform group within Britain concerned with the development of Tanganyika, the Fabians maintained a steady stream of correspondence with key figures in the nationalist movement, including Julius Nyerere, Oscar Kambona, Paul Bomani, Zuberi Mtemvu and S. M. Kandoro. Nyerere himself was an active correspondent with the Bureau from his student days at Edinburgh. In addition, the organization's papers contain records of correspondence with numerous white settlers, Asian community leaders, and civil administrators within the trusteeship. The records therefore offer informative insights, often revealing the attitude of both leading political figures and the common citizens of the various racial communities, or the numerous issues involved with the question of political advancement. The Fabian Bureau records also contain correspondence with other reform groups and Labour M.P.s. As such they serve as a vital source of information concerning the attitude of the liberal community within the home government as a whole.

In an attempt to shed further light on the attitudes of members of all the interest groups, the author has

employed the papers of numerous members of the Colonial Office, the territorial administrative staff, and the immigrant minorities, all of which are contained in the Rhodes House Africana Collection.

Since the individual papers and correspondence in the collection bear no special manuscript numbering, the author has in every instance possible identified the source by the general topic heading under which it appears in the collection.

The Tanzanian National Archives in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania have also been employed in this dissertation. Of particular use are the political files containing the activities of the numerous TANU branches throughout the territory, and their correspondence with both the Union's central headquarters and the colonial administration.

The archives of both the Conservative and Labour parties, both located in London, England contain a wealth of valuable information revealing the attitude of the major powers in the home government concerning political developments in Tanganyika. Especially useful are files of material containing the statements of key liberal and Tory leaders such as Creech-Jones, James Griffiths, and

Iain MacLeod. Files containing similar useful information are found in the holdings of the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

The author also employed the Africana collection of Boston, Northwestern, and Syracuse Universities, as well as the Tanganyika holdings of the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University and the Library of Congress. These sources provided a wealth of material in the form of official publications and material collected as the result of research projects undertaken by members of the various universities and institutions. Of special help were the papers of William Friedland concerning TANU-TFL relations, which were located in the Hoover Institute.

Finally, the Dag Hammerskjold Library of the United Nations was utilized to gather information concerning the role played by the international organization and particularly the Trusteeship Council in influencing the course of territorial political evolution. The papers of the Trusteeship Council pertaining to Visiting Mission reports and petitions from territorial inhabitants were particularly helpful.

By utilizing the information contained in these sources, the author will attempt to chronologically trace the history of Tanganyikan political development from 1946 to 1961, in an attempt to evaluate the impact of each of these interrelated factors on the course of territorial political development.

### Acknowledgments

The successful completion of any major research project is necessarily dependent upon the assistance and cooperation of numerous individuals.

For their most valuable and gracious assistance in the research phase of this project, I would like to thank Mr. J. D. Hall, Superintendent of the Rhodes House Africana Collection who, together with his staff, guided me in the acquisition of the papers of numerous colonial administrative personnel, territorial settlers and national leaders. Their many hours of assistance was of special aid in extracting pertinent materials from the Fabian Colonial Bureau papers. Especially valuable assistance was provided by the staff of the Tanzanian National Archives, the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, the archives of the Conservative and Labour parties, and the Hoover Institute. I would also like

to express my gratitude to the Dag Hammerskjold Library of the United Nations and to the Africana collection of Boston, Northwestern, and Syracuse universities for the privilege of utilizing their extensive resources.

A special thanks goes to Miss Beverly Gray of Boston University, and Mr. Hans Panofsky of Northwestern for their personal assistance and kind hospitality during my stay at their institutions. Miss Lilian Viacava of Ryan Library, Iona College, greatly aided my research through her location and acquisition of numerous doctoral dissertations on related topics.

For his enthusiastic encouragement, professional guidance, and many hours of patient editing and corrections I would like to express my thanks to my mentor, Fr. Gabriel Abdelsayed. The guidance of Dr. Charles Holmes and Dr. Thomas Curran both of whom provided valuable criticism of my research project is also greatly appreciated. For his many years of kind guidance, fatherly advice and personal concern I would like to add a note of personal appreciation to Dr. Hugh C. Brooks who has been a source of constant inspiration since the commencement of my graduate studies.



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For the aid in the typing, photocopying and revision of the numerous drafts of the dissertation I am indebted to Miss Susan Carter, Claudia McCormack and Susan Pechar. An especially warm thanks goes to Miss Christine Anderson, Anne Dumouchel and Donald Walsh for their kind assistance as typists, proofreaders and enthusiastic support in the final stages of manuscript preparation.

In a personal note, I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Richard Guidorizzi who first inspired me with a love of historical research and to my parents who have always served as a source of encouragement, assistance and loving understanding.

# MAP 1



RED  
SEA

Sudan

GULF OF  
ADEN

Ethiopia

Somalia

Uganda

Kenya

Rwanda  
Burundi

Tanganyika

Pemba  
Zanzibar  
Mafia

I  
N  
D  
I  
A  
N  
O  
C  
E  
A  
N

Malawi

Zambia

Mozambique

EASTERN AFRICA




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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION: THE TERRITORIAL BACKGROUND

#### General Characteristics

Tanganyika is a vast and geographically diversified nation. Comprising an area of 362,688 square miles, it was the largest and most populous of the eleven United Nations trust territories and over six times the size of its Administering Authority, the United Kingdom. The territory is located just south of the equator, between the three great lakes of Africa and the Indian Ocean. To the north, Tanganyika is bordered by Kenya and Uganda, to the west by Rwanda-Burundi and the Belgian Zaire. It shares a common border to the southwest with Zambia, and in the south with Portuguese Mozambique. The entire east coast is bordered by the Indian Ocean.

The physical features of Tanganyika display a great deal of variation. The coastal sector is a narrow strip of sandy terrain some ten to fifty miles wide. This is a region of low, flat lands with a tropical climate. The



central plateau which ranges in altitude between 3,500 to 4,500 feet above sea level, constitutes the greatest portion of the entire land mass. This area possesses a hot, dry climate and contains numerous rivers which drain either into the Indian Ocean or the Great Lakes. The interior plateau contains over 20,000 square miles of inland waterways. It is a hot, dusty land during the dry season and an area of flash floods and earth slides during the period of the long rains.<sup>1</sup> The final major geographical feature consists of the hilly regions of the southwest and southeast. Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest peak on the continent (19,565 feet) and Mount Meru, both located near the Kenya border, enjoy a semi-temperate climate along their slopes and are consequently the healthiest and most desirable regions in the territory.<sup>2</sup> During the period of colonial

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<sup>1</sup>C. Gillman, "A Synopsis of the Geography of Tanganyika Territory", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 1 (March, 1936), 7-12.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain Colonial Office, Col. No. 317, Report by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations on Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration for the year 1954 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), p. 2.

rule, European settlements were largely concentrated in this area.


Tanganyika is divided into three climatic zones. The coastal region and immediate interior reflect tropical conditions with an average temperature of 76° and an annual rainfall of 40 inches. The massive central plateau is a region of generally low humidity. Here, the annual rainfall varies between 20 to 40 inches and the average temperature is 70°. Both, however, are subject to radical daily changes. The highlands region enjoys the most favorable climatic condition, with a semi-temperate climate and a well-balanced annual rainfall of 30 to 40 inches.

At independence, the population of Tanganyika numbered 9,238,000<sup>1</sup> and was divided among three races: African, Asian and European. Of these, slightly over 9,000,000 were Africans who were separated into over 120 tribes. Lack of a dominant tribal group was to be a distinct advantage to the independence movement since the traditional rivalries so common in other territories were avoided.<sup>2</sup> The Asian

<sup>1</sup>United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Central Statistics Bureau, Recorded Population Changes, 1948-1967, Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1968), pp. 2-6.

<sup>2</sup>For a geographical breakdown of tribal groups, see Map 2, page 4 and Table 1, pp. 693-695.

# MAP 2



Reference  
 See table  
 page 693-695 for  
 tribal names.

## TRIBAL MAP OF TANGANYIKA TERRITORY

community, numbering approximately 107,400 was comprised of Indians, Pakistanis, Goans, and Arabs. Europeans who constituted less than one percent of the colonial population, numbered slightly more than 23,300 and represented over thirty different nationalities.

The great bulk of the Tanganyikan African population during the colonial period were subsistence agriculturalists, producing just enough for their immediate family needs. In 1955 there were fewer than 500,000 Africans, or less than 7 percent of the total black population who were regular wage-earners.<sup>1</sup> The only segment of indigenous agricultural society which regularly participated in the cash economy were those who belonged to the coffee and cotton growing cooperatives of the Southern Highlands and West Lake Provinces. Poorly developed educational institutions further served to prevent the bulk of the African population from making the transition from traditional to modern society. In 1960 less than 10 percent of the African inhabitants could be classified as

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<sup>1</sup>Ansu Kumar Datta, Tanganyika: A Government in a Plural Society (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), p. 23. A detailed breakdown of income and occupation for the three races is offered in Chapter 2.

literate.<sup>1</sup> Thus, even at the threshold of independence, most indigenous inhabitants had serious impediments to overcome before they could become reasonably efficient in the art of self-government.

The Asian communities occupied a middle position in Tanganyikan society. While the African population was primarily rural, the Asians were concentrated in the larger townships and in the municipality of Dar es Salaam.<sup>2</sup> Members of this community were primarily employed in the wholesale and retail trades, commercial banking, and the civil service. Asians acted as the middle men between European exporters and African producers and controlled many of the more prosperous import and export firms of colonial Tanganyika. Since many Asian families sent their most promising students to universities in Great Britain, Portugal, and India, there was a significant number of Asian doctors, lawyers, and upper level civil servants. The less prosperous members of the community were

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization, Basic Facts and Figures (E/CN.5/400), 1961, pp. 18-21.

<sup>2</sup>It was not until December 10, 1961 that Dar es Salaam became the first municipality to attain the status of "city".

employed as artisans, semi and unskilled laborers, and subsistence farmers. As a whole, they enjoyed a higher economic and social status than did the indigenous population. Since each Asian community organized its own private school system, the middle strata of Tanganyikan society was far more educated than was the African community.

Despite their relative prosperity, Asians were never successfully united as a political force within the territory. Cultural differences and the isolationist tendencies of many religious sects divided the race into dozens of tiny communities who generally refused to cooperate with one another. The Asians thus occupied the middle position on the Tanganyikan social pyramid, with the Africans below and the Europeans above them.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed statistical analysis of the position of the Asian community, see: M. A. Mullani, "Asians in Tanganyika" (a paper in political science for the Third Year Exam at the University of Dar es Salaam, September, 1967), *passim*; Indira Rothermund, Die Politische und Wirtschaftliche Rolle der Asiatischen Minderheit in Ostafrika (Berlin: Springer-Verlaag, 1965), chapters 2, 3, 5; Daniel R. Smith, "The Problems and Possibilities of Survival Facing the Asian Communities of Post-Uhuru Tanzania" (unpublished M.A. thesis, St. John's University, New York, 1971), chapters 1-3.

The European section of the population in colonial times was composed of government administrators, civil servants, missionaries, and businessmen engaged in industry and commerce. European planters maintained a strong hold on the production and exportation of sisal, cotton, tea, and coffee which were the territory's principle cash crops. The European community also monopolized the mining, transportation, and communication industries. The vast majority of all high level civil servants and colonial administrators were European.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Tanganyikan society was a mixture of three separate cultural groups, all operating at different economic, social, educational, and political levels. As each group began to develop a sense of political identity, it formulated its own plans for the political evolution of the territory. Africans, as the overwhelming majority of the territorial inhabitants, sought the creation of a black majority government without special privilege for the immigrant races. The European community, by contrast, sought to preserve rule by the Crown for the longest period possible. Their preferential treatment as British

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed examination of the position of the European community, see Datta, chapter 2.

citizens and their close affiliation with key personnel in both the Colonial Office and the Conservative Party made whites reluctant to concede to African demands for increased indigenous political control. Finally, the Asian community, because of its division into numerous isolated cultural and religious groups, generally avoided participation in territorial political activities. While the more liberal and educated elements of Asian society did support the African nationalist cause, the majority of the middle strata community remained aloof of political developments and preferred to maintain a neutral position. Thus, they avoided incurring the hostility of either the African or the European activists.<sup>1</sup> These conflicting solutions presented problems in administration and representation which were to plague the Administering Authority until its withdrawal from the territory in 1961.

Throughout the colonial period, most of Tanganyika was left underdeveloped by the British. The erratic climatic conditions of much of the plateau region, especially in the Southern Province, and a lack of adequate water supply in most areas resulted in large tracts of

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<sup>1</sup>Datta, passim; Taylor, pp. 26-37.



totally unoccupied land.<sup>1</sup> The presence of the tsetse fly in many sectors and the complete absence of modern transportation facilities caused the other regions to be sparsely populated. In 1960 there were only 3,770 miles of main road and 1,760 miles of railroad serving the entire territory.<sup>2</sup> As a result, two-thirds of the population resided in pockets of desirable terrain totalling less than ten percent of the entire land mass. Nearly 70 percent of all lands were uninhabited.<sup>3</sup> As late as the 1950's, there


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<sup>1</sup>Although Tanganyika has an abundant inland water supply, it tends to be concentrated in the western sector of the country. The central region therefore suffers from periodic droughts. Other areas which do receive adequate annual rainfall are plagued by the fact that it is concentrated into a comparatively short period, often causing soil erosion, land slides, and flash floods. When the water recedes, a long, dry spell ensues. Such conditions are clearly unfavorable to commercial and often even to subsistence agriculture. For a detailed study of these problems, see Carl G. Roseberg, Jr. and Robert L. West, British East Africa: Problems and Prospects, Report of a study prepared for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1957 (Boston University, 1957), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Territory, Statistical Abstract, 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), pp. 48-57.

<sup>3</sup>Great Britain, East Africa Royal Commission, Cmd. 9475, East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 475-476. See also Map 3, p. 11.

MAP 3



TANGANYIKA TERRITORY  
ALIENATED LAND & TSETSE COUNTRY  
1955

were entire districts where the only means of modern communication was radio.<sup>1</sup>

Although sparsely settled and underdeveloped, Tanganyika was not a poor dependency by African standards. The soil of the coastal region, the Lake Province and the Meru and Kilimanjaro highlands as well as certain sections of Southern Province was suitable for commercial exploitation for the production of sisal, cotton, coffee, oilseed, and groundnuts. In addition, diamonds, lead, coal, and kaolin, as well as smaller deposits of tin, wolfram, and mica are found in scattered quantities throughout the territory.

#### Historical Background

In 1926 when Sir Donald Cameron became Governor of the territory, a most decisive period of Tanganyikan political development began. It was Cameron who introduced the concept of "indirect rule" into the territorial administration. Under this system, the major internal and

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial No. 333, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration: Report by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the year 1954 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), para. 190.

external affairs of the territory were handled by the colonial regime and the British home government. On the local level administration was gradually placed in the hands of traditional indigenous rulers, referred to by the British as the "native authorities". Beside fulfilling their normal ceremonial, religious and social functions, the local leaders were required to perform certain administrative tasks for the colonial government. Included among these were the levying and collecting of taxes, maintenance of law and order, and the enforcement of social welfare and local development projects such as road construction, erosion prevention and boundary demarcation. Indirect rule was thus a complex affair whereby Great Britain attempted to preserve the traditional sources of authority of the indigenous peoples and at the same time to evolve these systems into modern governmental bodies and agencies. The British maintained that this method would ensure peaceful territorial development by making local leaders agents of the administration.<sup>1</sup> At the same

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<sup>1</sup>N. U. Akpan, "Have Traditional Authorities a Place in Modern Local Government Systems?", Journal of African Administration, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July, 1955), pp. 110-112. The system of indirect rule was first devised by Lord Lugard to satisfy the needs of British rule in Nigeria. For a detailed history of Lugard's activities and philosophy see: Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, 1st baron,

time it allowed Africans to gain training in self-government. Modern political participation could thus gradually be expanded, the pace depending on the ease of adaptation experienced by each tribe. Ultimately, the system would lead to significant African participation in the running of the central government. Cameron always recognized that British control of the African dependencies was temporary. Thus, he viewed self-government as the final goal of indirect rule.<sup>1</sup> In addition to its theoretical goals of political advancement, indirect rule also had several practical benefits. It was a far more economical system than was direct rule, since the great expense involved in the hiring of expatriate administrators was avoided. It also simplified the task of controlling the indigenous population since local administrators enjoyed a traditional source of authority and ruled through institutions which were familiar to the natives. Most significantly, indirect

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The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1965). The dual mandate was later further modified by Lord Hailey to suit the needs of the English holdings in East and Central Africa.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp. 53-55.

rule fostered a "caretaker" attitude by which the British attempted to interfere as little as possible with the indigenous societies which came under their control. As opposed to the initiation of ambitious programs aimed at westernization and modernization, the Crown sought only to maintain law and order in the African territories in which indirect rule was practiced. Britain viewed its mission primarily as the obligation to control foreign affairs, regulate trade and commerce, and protect Her Majesty's subjects within the dependencies. Thus, little money was expended on education, social services, or economic amelioration programs for the African population.

The system was also a major liability to African nationalists since it did little to overcome the parochial attitudes fostered by the traditional African way of life. This in effect severely limited the number of indigenous inhabitants who possessed the interest and degree of political awareness necessary to actively support a liberation drive. Indirect rule could therefore be utilized by the British to impede the growth of nationalist consciousness among a people by keeping the African population separated into traditional tribal groups. This division of the African community into scattered and

isolated groups, each possessing a strong tendency towards parochialism, offered formidable barriers to any elements of the African community who might wish to challenge colonial rule. In summary, it was a practical solution for the administration of an underdeveloped region in which the British, because of the tentative nature of the Trusteeship Agreement, sought to minimize expenses.<sup>1</sup>

The policy of indirect rule was maintained by the British until 1958 when internal and international pressures forced them to alter their system and initiate direct elections for members of the Legislative Council. Despite the long-standing support it received from the Crown, indirect rule never achieved its stated goals.

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<sup>1</sup>The theoretical and practical values of indirect rule are well analyzed in; Prosser Gifford, "Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for Colonial Policy", Yale University, 1965 (mimeographed); William Lord Malcolm Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), and "The Foundation of Self-Government in the African Colonies", United Empire, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (July-August, 1948), 176-179; F. A. Montague, "Some Difficulties in the Democratization of Native Authorities in Tanganyika", Journal of African Administration, Vol. III, No. 1 (January, 1951), 21-27; Tanganyika Territory, Native Administration Memoranda, No. I. Principles of Native Administration and Their Application (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1930):

Rather, it became a major impediment to the development of modern political systems. Once given official sanction by the colonial administration, traditional leaders tended to jealously guard their government supported authority and to resist any attempt aimed at evolving democratic systems of representation at the local or central government levels, since such reforms would result in a deterioration of their traditional base of power.<sup>1</sup> Thus, indigenous chiefs as a whole fiercely resisted efforts to accelerate the pace of political development.<sup>2</sup> It was this position which led them into a direct confrontation with the nationalist movement.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>A detailed study of the effects of indirect rule on the principle tribal groups of Tanganyika is found in: Edouard Bustin, La Decentralisation Administrative et L'Evolution des Structures Politiques en Afrique Oriental Britannique (Liège: Faculte de Droit, 1958), chapters 2-5.

<sup>2</sup>In Tanganyika, the great exception to this rule was the prosperous Chagga tribe of the Kilimanjaro region. The Chagga had begun to evolve their political system to include local direct elections long before an organized independence movement began. The highly successful cooperative movement also traces its origins to this tribe's efforts to organize the region's coffee industry.

<sup>3</sup>The attitude of the nationalist leadership towards resistance by local chiefs is clearly stated in E. B. M. Barongo, Mkiki Mkiki Wa Siasa Tanganyika (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1966), chapters 17-19.



The shortcomings of local rule through traditional authorities is well summarized by H. A. Wieschoff:

...indirect rule which normally grants far-reaching authority to the traditional tribal chief and which in some instances even endeavors to resurrect a centralized tribal authority, does not necessarily further the policy of responsible self-government.... The rulers thus favored by the system of indirect rule jealously guard their position which a democratization of the administration would be certain to jeopardize. Therefore, it is inherent in this system that those participating in the administration oppose progress and are not infrequently stout defenders of the status quo.<sup>1</sup>

Progressive development in most fields was severely limited in Tanganyiká during the inter-war period. The utilization of indirect rule produced minimal advances in political participation. Consequently, the bulk of the African population remained totally unaware of the function and purpose of modern political systems. The business recession of the 1930's and uncertainty concerning the duration of British tenure under the mandate system made both Parliament and private businessmen hesitant to invest in that territory. A disastrous famine during the early

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<sup>1</sup>H. A. Wieschoff, Colonial Policies in Africa, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), pp. 69-70.

1920's forced the administration to utilize most of its funds for emergency relief. As a result, little progress was made towards economic development or social amelioration.<sup>1</sup> Uncertainty over the territory's future was compounded in the late 1930 period, when Hitler began to make persistent demands for the return of the former German colonies.<sup>2</sup> The policy of appeasement pursued by the Western powers further discouraged development within the territory since potential investors feared that the mandate could at any time be returned to Germany.<sup>3</sup>

The inter-war period was therefore one of stagnation during which the system of indirect rule failed to advance the political system. It is significant that during this period, the African population did not have a single representative in the Legislative Council, nor did it have any high ranking official to represent its interests

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<sup>1</sup>Excellent and detailed studies of conditions in the inter-war period are found in: Walter Morris-Hale, "British Administration in Tanganyika From 1920 to 1945" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Genève, 1969), chapters 2-3; Kenneth Ingham, "Tanganyika in the Twenties: The Era of Byatt and Cameron", Tanganyika Notes and Records (March, 1959), 18-30.

<sup>2</sup>London Times, January 7, 1937.

<sup>3</sup>Hjalmar Schacht, "Germany's Colonial Demands", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 15 (January, 1957), 223-234.

in either the administration or the civil service. At the same time, uncertainty over the future status of the territory discouraged public and private investment, thus denying the territory the economic and social development needed to evolve towards competent self-rule.

During the Second World War the territory experienced another era of neglect as Great Britain minimized her colonial activities to concentrate on the war effort. It was during this period of staff and budget shortages that Africans for the first time were able to obtain responsible positions in the administration and civil service. Service in the armed forces also helped Africans to make the transition from traditional to modern society.

On December 13, 1946, following the activation of the newly created United Nations, Tanganyika was transformed from a mandate of the League of Nations to a United Nations trust territory. Great Britain, as the power responsible for the development of the territory, now received the designation of Administering Authority.

#### Administrative Framework

The head of the colonial administration in Tanganyika, as in the case of all British colonies, was the Governor who served as the official representative of the Crown in the

territory. He was appointed for a specific but variable number of years and was directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies to whom he reported all activities and from whom he received orders and administrative guidelines. The Governor had the power to issue ordinances, to appoint official and unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils,<sup>1</sup> and to approve legislation proposed by the legislature. He was also Commander-in-Chief of the territorial forces. In addition, he possessed the authority to deport or expel undesirable inhabitants. Although theoretically responsible to the Colonial Office, the complicated individual circumstances that surrounded the administering of each territory produced a situation whereby the activities of the Governor were seldom opposed by the home government.

The Tanganyika Executive Council was created in 1920 as a consultative body to advise the Governor in the

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<sup>1</sup>In speaking of members of either the Executive or Legislative Councils, the term "official" refers to members who were colonial service administrative personnel; "unofficial" members were not employed by the colonial administration; "nominated" members were either officials or unofficials and were appointed by the Governor to represent important groups or interests; "elected" members represented electoral constituencies in the legislature.

formulation of territorial policy. Although the membership of the Council varied in the course of Tanganyika's political development, it nonetheless always included among its members the Chief Secretary of the Government, the Attorney General, the Treasurer and the head of the Medical Services. Executive Council members were almost exclusively officials in the Colonial Services although after 1939 unofficials were legally permitted to join. Although the Governor as head of the Council was supposed to consult with its members on the formulation of all important policy, he could act without their advice in the case of minor considerations and in times of emergency. Under normal circumstances, although required to seek its advice, the Governor was not bound to follow the recommendations of the Council. It was therefore by no means an effective check on his power.<sup>1</sup> If he did ignore its advice, the Governor was merely required to make a written explanation of his decision to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Tanganyika Legislative Council was established in 1926 and at its inception was to consist of the

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<sup>1</sup>T. J. Lennard, ed., How Tanganyika is Governed (Dar es Salaam: The Eagle Press, 1957), pp. 14-16.

Governor, the members of the Executive Council as ex officio members, and a designated number of both official unofficial members, all appointed by the Governor. Thus, at the time of its creation, the Legislative Council was neither elective nor representative. The chief function of the council was the initiation of legislation "for the peace, order, and good government of the territory".<sup>1</sup> Its position was clearly subordinate to that of the executive branch. The Governor had the power of veto over legislation and could also refer bills to the home government for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. With the official side of the council possessing a majority, the legislative branch of government formed no real opposition or counterforce to the authority of the administration.

The various government departments worked in close cooperation with the executive. The heads of all the central government agencies formed a secretariat under the supervision of a Chief Secretary appointed by the Governor. The Chief Secretary was the immediate supervisor of all administrative officers and communications from various departments passed through him to the Governor.

<sup>1</sup> Tanganyika Territory, Legislative Council, Orders in Council, 1926, Article XIV.

The Chief Secretary also served as the Governor's deputy and was the Leader of Government in the Legislative Council. He was also an appointed member of the Council, as were the heads of most important administrative departments.<sup>1</sup> The territory of Tanganyika was partitioned for administrative purposes into eight provinces, and each province was subdivided into districts (see Map 4, p. 492). The head of each province was the Provincial Commissioner who was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, tax collection, internal improvements, control of the police force, and supervision of local courts in his domain. The District Commissioners were responsible for similar duties in their region and were answerable to the Provincial Commissioners for their activities. It was at this level that the real authority of the government was directly exercised, since it was the obligation of the District and Provincial Commissioners to supervise the everyday activities of the indigenous population, and to translate the general policies and regulations drawn up by the central government into terms applicable to the

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<sup>1</sup>B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 54-59.





particular tribal groups living within their spheres of influence.

Finally, at the lowest level of the administration were the native authorities, with the obligation of enforcing local government regulations through the guidelines of their traditional institutions. Thus, African participation in the administration was kept at a minimum. It was not until December 1945 that the first two Africans were appointed to the Legislative Council.

#### The Nature of the Trusteeship Agreement

Tanganyika's position as a trusteeship clearly separated it from the other British holdings in East Africa making the Crown accountable to the Trusteeship Council for her activities in the territory. The basic obligation of the British, as stated in the United Nations Charter, was "to promote the ... advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence".<sup>1</sup> With specific reference to the Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika, Great Britain pledged to develop free political

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<sup>1</sup>Charter of the United Nations, Article 76 (b). See Appendix A, pp. 675-680.

institutions and to foster participation in these on the part of the indigenous population who would ultimately gain control of the political system.<sup>1</sup> Although the goals of British trusteeship were clearly stated in the Agreement, no provision was made to control the methods employed by the Administering Authority in reaching these objectives. Britain alone was in a position to determine the rate at which the advance towards self-government would take place, and to decide the actual structure of the political system which was to evolve in Tanganyika. Although she had to report her activities to the U. N., there was no system established to allow the international agency to force its will upon the Administering Authority. No provision was made in either the U. N. Charter or the Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement to allow for the transfer of control from one administering authority to another.

Under the stipulation of Article 87 of the U. N. Charter, the supervising authority of the United Nations was placed in the hands of the Trusteeship Council. This special body was comprised of one representative of each member State. Each administering authority had its own

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<sup>1</sup>For the full text of the Trusteeship Agreement, see Appendix B, pp. 681-691.

delegate to the Trusteeship Council who was empowered to vote on Council resolutions. In addition, each administering authority was permitted to have a Special Representative who could not vote, but who was an expert on a given trust territory. This territorial expert accompanied the voting representative at council meetings whenever major issues were being discussed.

The duties of the Trusteeship Council were clearly enumerated in the U. N. Charter. It was their responsibility to examine all reports by the Administering Authority and all petitions received from residents of the trusteeship. These reports and petitions were debated by the Council, which then made written observations and recommendations in the form of resolutions, based on a majority vote by the Council members. Resolutions were forwarded to the General Assembly. The Fourth Committee of this body would then debate the issues involved and either formulate its own views or adopt those of the Trusteeship Council. The final conclusions of the Fourth Committee were then forwarded to the Administering Authority via the U. N. Secretariat.

The Trusteeship Council also had the obligation to formulate an annual questionnaire concerning political,

economic and social developments in the dependencies.

These questions were to provide the framework for the required annual report of each administering authority. The colonial power was required to make a clear and specific answer to each issue raised in the questionnaire.

Finally, the Trusteeship Council under Article 87 (c) of the U. N. Charter, was obligated to send periodic visiting missions to each of the trust territories. These visits, designed to provide the Trusteeship Council with first-hand information gathered by its own members, began in 1948 and toured Tanganyika every three years until 1960. Visiting mission teams were appointed by the Trusteeship Council from among its own members and consisted of delegates from both the administering authorities and the non-administering members of the Council. The purpose of each mission was to gain first-hand information concerning all aspects of territorial development. Visiting teams would interview colonial officials, local leaders, and private citizens and would accept delegations and petitions from the resident population. Each mission was required to draw up a detailed report of its observations and conclusions which was submitted to the Trusteeship Council. The Council would debate this report and issue

its own conclusions which would be forwarded to the Administering Authority. The Authority would then be free to issue its own statement thus making official its reaction to both the Mission Report and the Trusteeship Council's observations.

The Trusteeship Council therefore engaged in multi-fold activities which allowed it to examine conditions in each trust territory and to make suggestions to the Administering Authority. It was not however in possession of any clearly established method of forcing its will upon the colonial power. The nebulous position of the international body was well-expressed by Sir Edward Twining, the Governor of Tanganyika:

...under the Trusteeship Agreement the administering power, which is the United Kingdom, was ultimately responsible [to no one].... The Trusteeship Council could debate our affairs, could call for an annual report, could send a visiting mission every three years, and could receive petitions. But if we did not agree with their views and their resolutions, it was our responsibility to decide what was best for Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Edward Lord Twining, "The Last Nine Years in Tanganyika"; African Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 230 (January, 1959), 17.

The Crown's position as the ultimate decision maker in matters pertaining to territorial development was strengthened by the fact that the Trusteeship Agreement gave the British full legal, administrative, and jurisdictional powers over Tanganyika. This included the right to establish military bases and the right to join the territory into economic, administrative or customs unions with the other British holdings in East and Central Africa.<sup>1</sup> In summary, the British Government was given certain clear and well defined powers as the agency responsible for the control and development of Tanganyika. At the same time however, the guidelines of its obligation to advance the territory towards self-government and the right of the Trusteeship Council to supervise and evaluate the Crown's fulfillment of this requirement were formulated in the vaguest of terms. Thus, the British could readily define the extent of their authority while the international agency was in a much weaker position if it wished to oppose Crown policy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix B, p. 681.

<sup>2</sup>Chidzero, pp. 39-48.

As a result, the only possible source of pressure that could be applied to the Administering Authority was the impact of public debate and the use of polemical debate and propaganda in both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. As the U. N. became divided between the colonial and anti-imperial powers in the fifteen years preceding Tanganyikan independence, such tactics were employed with increased frequency to the harassment of the British and to the benefit of the African nationalists.

#### The Genesis of the Liberal Reform Movement

During the Second World War it became apparent to Great Britain that the changes produced in her dependencies as a result of the war effort, coupled with a major shift in world public opinion concerning the desirability and justification of maintaining an empire, were producing a trend away from imperialism and toward self-rule. As a result, the Crown began to accelerate the pace of development within its territories, recognizing that most dependent areas would ultimately attain at least internal self-government. In order to assist the increased pace of development, Great Britain abandoned her traditional policy of insisting that the colonies bear all expenses

involved in their administration and development.<sup>1</sup> Determined to assist the internal advancement, in 1940 Parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This bill allocated £5,000,000 for projects designed to help exploit the resources of the dependencies and for improvement of the general welfare services of colonial peoples.<sup>2</sup> In 1945, a second act was passed which provided an additional £120,000,000 to be granted over a ten year period.

The Crown therefore recognized that substantial aid would have to be allocated to the African dependencies and steps taken to advance the territorial political system which would ultimately be controlled by the indigenous population. However, the home government was divided into rival factions, each with a separate concept of both the pace at which the programs of advancement should be conducted, and the actual structure of the independent government once self rule was attained. The Tory faction maintained that the established system of indirect rule,

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<sup>1</sup>Stephens, pp. 73-74.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Public General Acts (1940), 3 and 4 George VI, chapter 46.



coupled with a maintenance of guaranteed protection for the minority communities, would have to be preserved if a moderate and well balanced form of political system was to emerge. The conservatives repeatedly stressed the necessity of preceding political advance with substantial social, economic, and educational reform programs which would naturally encompass a period of several generations. Liberal reformers by contrast (generally affiliated with the Labour Party), insisted on a rapid acceleration of Tanganyika's political system even if such advances exceeded the pace of social, economic, and educational development. Reformers argued that only immediate and direct exposure to modern political processes would truly prepare the indigenous population for viable self-rule.

Clearly, the most influential and prestigious of the liberal activist groups was the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Founded in October 1940 by Labour M.P. Arthur Creech-Jones and the British socialist reformers Rita Hinden, James Betts, and Marjorie Nicholson as an extension of the Fabian Society, the Bureau's purpose was to collect and coordinate information concerning activities in the dependencies and to foster popular demand for the dissolution of the Empire. As a branch of the British

Fabian Society, the Bureau operated as a progressive reform group dedicated to the gradual spread of world socialism. With particular reference to the British dependencies, Fabians sought to end the traditional concept of an Empire based on mercantilism and exploitation of underdeveloped regions by the European powers and in its place create a Commonwealth of freely participating states. Primary among the socialist aspirations was the plan to introduce a series of long range economic and social reforms which would distribute the goods and services of the British Commonwealth among its inhabitants on a more equitable basis. The Bureau believed that a rapid pace of political development, coupled with substantial economic aid, was needed to start the dependencies on the road to self-rule. Fabians maintained that political self-determination based on rule by the indigenous population of each territory was essential if racial tension, which could undermine the planned Commonwealth of freely participating states, was to be avoided. The Fabian Bureau therefore dedicated itself to cooperation with the emerging nationalist groups within the British Empire. Key among its cooperative efforts was the socialist campaign aimed at educating the British public in

territorial affairs to foster a spirit of popular support within the home government for the liberation movements.<sup>1</sup>

One of the major tasks of the Bureau was to coordinate the efforts of members of Parliament sympathetic to the cause of colonial emancipation. The Fabians extensively researched controversial colonial issues and forwarded their findings to their Parliamentary allies. One of the standard tactics employed by the Bureau was to prepare a list of questions for M.P.s to ask in the House of Commons in order to solicit information concerning government policy or to encourage public interest in colonial affairs.<sup>2</sup> As the Bureau expanded its operation, it began to tutor members of Parliament who had special interest in

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<sup>1</sup>P.A. Emerson, "Introduction to the File Listings of the Fabian Colonial Bureau Papers", Rhodes House Africana Collection, Oxford, England. Emerson's introduction offers a comprehensive study of the Fabian Bureau's philosophy and activities. The complete records of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (hereafter referred to as FCB), are held in the Rhodes House Africana Collection, Oxford, England. Rhodes House is the principal British archives dedicated to the collection of primary source material concerning all aspects of Great Britain's African dependencies.

<sup>2</sup>This tactic is outlined in a letter from Doctor Rita Hinden, Secretary of the FCB to James Johnson, M.P., July 20, 1950. See also Hinden to F. Skinnard, M.P., March 31, 1949, FCB papers.

a given territory, in an attempt to make them quasi-experts on some aspect of that territory's colonial situation. By 1955, the Fabians had no fewer than twelve members of Commons who concentrated on issues involving Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

The Fabians were by no means the only liberal organization concerned with the colonial question. During and immediately after the Second World War, scores of activist groups sprang to life in Great Britain. Key among these associations were: the Union of Democratic Control, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the London Race Relation Group, the Aborigines Protection Society, the Racial Unity Movement, the Women's Commonwealth League, The League of Colonial Peoples, St. Joan's Alliance, the African Bureau, the Anti-Slavery Society, and the Friends of Africa. All of

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<sup>1</sup>List of M.P.s, denoting their "fields of concentration", dated February, 1955, in the miscellaneous notes and paper files, FCB papers. The list is in the handwriting of Fabian Secretary Marjorie Nicholson. The M.P.s so noted were: Fenner Brockway, Harold Davies, Rt. Hon. Hilary Marquand, Sir Leslie Plummer, W. T. Proctor, Eirene White, W. Tom Williams, Lord Farington, and the Earl of Listowel. John Hynd was designated as an expert on Tanganyikan constitutional problems, and along with Eirene White shared the designation as an expert on race relations within the territory.

these organizations shared as a common goal the termination of colonial rule and the transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth of freely participating states. The liberal activists produced a continual stream of inexpensive pamphlets and newsletters aimed at making their views on colonial affairs well-known to the British public.<sup>1</sup>

During the war period, Labour Party members of Parliament, encouraged by the liberal activists, began to raise questions concerning British colonial policy in Tanganyika. Between 1940 and 1945, Dr. Rita Hinden, Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, corresponded

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<sup>1</sup>For a sampling of the policy positions of and polemical techniques employed by these groups see: The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, An International Colonial Convention (London: The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1943); James Frederick Green, The British Empire Under Fire (New York: The Foreign Policy Association Inc., 1940); Labour Party, The Labour Party's Post-War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies (London: Victoria House Printing Co., Ltd., 1943); Rita Hinden, Downing Street and the Colonies (London: Fabian Colonial Society, 1942); Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, "The British Colonial System and its Future" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, June 10, 1943); Michael Scott, Civilization in Africa (London: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1944).

continually with E. Harvey, a Labour M.P. At her encouragement Harvey initiated a policy of insistent questioning to gain information concerning government aid for the fledgling native coffee cooperatives in the territory. It was the Bureau's belief that such an organization could form the basis of a program of economic amelioration for the African inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, M.P. R. Sorensen plagued the Secretary of State for a guarantee that permanent white settlements in Tanganyika would not be permitted, at the expense of the African population, via the practice of land alienation.<sup>2</sup> In February 1944, Harvey protested against the use of forced labor and a lack of effort on the part of the government to improve economic and social conditions in the territory.<sup>3</sup> He later called for a Parliamentary examination of working conditions within the trusteeship,<sup>4</sup> and for a study to

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<sup>1</sup>Rita Hinden files, "Correspondence with MP's, 1940-45", FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Rita Hinden to R. Sorensen, January 25, February 15, 1943, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Hinden to E. T. Harvey, March 6, 7, 12, 16, 1944, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Harvey to Hinden, July 6, 1944, FCB papers.

determine what steps could be taken to raise the African standard of living.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Fabian Colonial Bureau conducted an investigation into the use of conscript labor on sisal and rubber plantations in Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, before the termination of the Second World War, the Fabian Bureau had established a well-organized and influential research and pressure group dedicated to the termination of colonial rule. Although the socialists recognized that Britain was ultimately prepared to free the colonies they were not satisfied with the Crown's nebulous plans for territorial advancement. Rather, they called for a concentrated effort to ameliorate conditions in the territories as soon as possible and the initiation of immediate programs of modern political development. Writing to Arthur Creech-Jones, later Secretary of State for the Colonies, Rita Hinden remarked:

The general limitation of colonial policy as we know it at the moment, that is to say, Trusteeship leading to self-government, is a vague undefined future, combined with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. It seems to me that neither this political

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<sup>1</sup> Hinden to Harvey, July 20, 1944, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup> FCB research notes, April 13-May 4, 1944, FCB papers.

concept nor this economic concept is sufficient to meet the needs of today....

The whole position in Eastern and Central Africa demands a much bolder treatment than the present policy, either economic and political, can offer.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, by the end of the Second World War, Great Britain stood prepared to make a gradual but major change in her colonial policy by slowly evolving her subject people towards self-government. At the same time there existed within Britain an active liberal socialist movement dedicated to accelerating the pace of development towards independence within the colonies. By 1945, the Fabian Colonial Bureau had already taken a keen interest in the territory of Tanganyika and had begun to defend African interests there via its allies in Parliament. With the termination of the war, the change from mandate to trusteeship status provided the anti-colonial forces in the United Nations and especially within the Trusteeship Council (led by the Soviet Union, and closely supported by both the Communist bloc nations and the recently liberated colonial territories), with the means of scrutinizing and protesting Britain's Tanganyikan policy.

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<sup>1</sup>Handen to Arthur Creech-Jones, June 22, 1942.



The stage was set for a confrontation that would accelerate the development of self-government in Tanganyika at an unprecedented pace. The one factor lacking was the existence of a viable African nationalist movement. The only significant political group within the territory was the Tanganyika African Association, which in 1940 had a membership of less than one hundred, and which limited its activities to petitioning.<sup>1</sup> Once a viable party was formed and the indigenous population given reason to participate, the Tanganyikan independence drive would be able to mount a serious program of political development. This would result in an alliance with the liberal forces in Britain, and close cooperation from the anti-imperialist elements in the U. N. The end result would be the rapid political evolution and emancipation of Tanganyika territory.

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<sup>1</sup>Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, p. 217.

## CHAPTER II

### THE GENESIS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM 1945-50

#### Introduction

Immediately following the Second World War, the seeds of nationalism were sown throughout the territories of sub-Saharan Africa. Africans returning from the military and other war-related occupations had been exposed to modern political and social systems and to participation in a cash economy for several years. This exposure, coupled with a change in international attitudes towards the entire question of colonialism was to produce a series of continent-spanning independence drives which were to emancipate most colonial holdings within two decades.<sup>1</sup>

In 1945 Tanganyika seemed to be one of the territories least capable of producing a viable nationalist

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1957), introduction.

movement. The bulk of the population continued to follow traditional tribal life styles, with little concern for their political futures. No African political party existed, nor was there any organized group within the territory which objected to government policy. In February 1945, G. A. Tomlinson, an Assistant District Officer, made the following comment in a letter to Rita Hinden:

Politically, we have no worries - the people here...are very backward and will have to be more or less spoon fed... [for] years. Their tribal organization, like so many stock people, is of a very loose kind; they value the European assistance little except to stock disease remedies.<sup>1</sup>

In March of the same year a member of the Tanganyikan medical department staff noted that:

The one fundamental reform in the territory should be political. There is, in spite of good will and hard work, no democracy whatsoever here. ...indirect rule is only functioning on minor points and is completely dependent on the sanction in personal and public affairs from the administration, is virtually and in practice dictatorial, benevolently so, but dictatorial. The majority, the vast majority of the people is [sic] without any political responsibility, it does not participate at all in the determination of its fate. The obvious result is a mental stagnation which condemns

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<sup>1</sup>G. A. Tomlinson to Rita Hinden, February 22, 1945, FCB papers. See also N. V. Rounce, Senior Agricultural Officer, Mwanza to Rita Hinden, February 3, 1945.

every project, even every move in the right direction to a, often responseless, effort of administrators or technical officers....<sup>1</sup>

In the early post-war years, lack of political concern was coupled with economic and social stagnation. The wartime budget had negated the possibility of economic advancement and internal improvements. Poor weather conditions during the period of hostilities added to Tanganyika's problems. By the end of the war most of the territory's more fertile lands had been seriously overworked. In addition, no plans existed to begin utilization of the vast unoccupied sections of the territory.<sup>2</sup> Food was seriously short, and the danger of widespread famine

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<sup>1</sup>R. Ollendorff to FCB, March 1, 1945, FCB files. Ollendorff served as Sleeping Sickness Surveyor in Tanganyika for twelve years. His letters, although often awkwardly phrased (Ollendorff was a German refugee) offer keen insights into post-war territorial conditions.

<sup>2</sup>Conditions described in the territory at the end of the war are well described in: Great Britain Colonial Office, Colonial No. 220, Report By His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika for the Year 1947 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 2-80; Sir William Platt, "Problems in East Africa from 1941-1944", United Empire, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1946), 3-7; Tanganyika Territory, An Outline of Post-War Development Proposals (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1944), pp. 1-16; Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1945 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1946), passim.

was imminent.<sup>1</sup> Little private development could be hoped for since the trusteeship status of the territory made Tanganyika an undesirable area for investment. The war-time budget of the home government made development via public funds impossible. As a result, few social service improvements occurred during the war years. For example, no significant advancement in African education had been made since the 1930's.<sup>2</sup> It is small wonder that when Sir Edward Twining assumed the Governorship of Tanganyika in 1949, he described the territory as having been "in moth-balls" since 1919.<sup>3</sup> Yet, in spite of this stagnant situation, within fifteen years Tanganyika was to make the transition from colonial rule to full independence.

It was the Administering Authority itself which took the first steps to transform Tanganyika from a passive,

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<sup>1</sup>On February 22, 1945, G. A. Tomlinson, Assistant District Officer of Mbulu, wrote to describe conditions in the territory. He stated that food supplies were so scarce that the government was finding it difficult to conscript laborers. Most natives no longer met the minimum weight requirement of 120 lbs. FCB files.

<sup>2</sup>N. Langford-Smith, "The Education of African Rural Communities: Fact, Theory and Action", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 22 (December, 1946), 3-13.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 27, 1949.

undereducated, subsistence level society to a modern state. The British realized that independence movements would arise in most territories shortly. In order for self-rule to succeed, these states would have to be politically, economically and socially advanced. In 1943 Oliver Frederick Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced Britain's plan to accelerate the pace of advancement in the Empire:

We are pledged to guide Colonial peoples along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire. We are pledged to build up their social and economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop their natural resources....<sup>1</sup>

It was with this end in mind that the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 were passed.<sup>2</sup> In addition to these actions, several specific programs for Tanganyika itself were established. In 1947 a Ten-Year Plan for the Development of African Education was initiated, aimed at increasing the total African enrollment

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 391, Col. 48 (1943).

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, British Information Services, Central Office of Information, Colonial Development and Welfare 1946-1955 (London: British Information Services, 1956), pp. 3-7.

in the territory's schools from 112,000 in 1946 to 282,000 by 1955.<sup>1</sup> In 1947 an all out effort was begun on the part of the government to encourage Africans to form co-operative unions. It was believed that cooperation would provide an effective means of allowing the indigenous population to make the transition from a subsistence to a cash economy. As a result, cooperative membership rose from 58,000 in 1947 to 157,000 by 1953.<sup>2</sup> It was the firm belief of the Administering Authority that an extensive program of economic and social development would have to precede any advancement in African political participation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Territory, A Ten Year Plan for the Development of African Education (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1947), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Annual Report to the Trusteeship Council, 1947, p. 252. Tanganyika Territory, Department of Labour, Report, 1953 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1954), p. 43.

<sup>3</sup>The official publications of the British Government, and both the conservative and moderate press basically shared the paternalistic belief that extensive economic advancement and social evolution would have to precede any attempt at increased African political participation. See, for example: K. B. A. Dobson, "Mens Sana", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 25 (June, 1948), 48-55; Great Britain, British Information Services, African Challenge (New York: British Information Service, 1945); Elisabeth Hoyt, "Economic Sense and the East African", Colonial Review, XXIII (January, 1947); L. P.

Unfortunately for the colonial regime, the plan of gradual development contained several major flaws. While the pace of economic and social development was accelerated, territorial political advancement remained stagnant under the system of indirect rule. The failure of the British to coordinate advances in other fields with substantial political development was to create a gap in constitutional development which was to be filled by Tanganyikan African nationalists working outside the governmental framework. At the same time, despite their good intentions, the economic and social development plans produced widespread discontentment. Attempts to advance agricultural and cattle production resulted in a series of government regulations which violated tribal customs and traditional values. Attempts to advance the economy via white settlement and land alienation were seen as a grave threat by the growing nationalist leadership. The ill-fated Groundnut Scheme produced serious doubts concerning the capabilities of the administration to initiate practical economic programs. The hiring of Asians

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Mair, Self-Government or Good Government? (London: The London Institute of World Affairs, 1958); Petro C. Mntambo, "The African and How to Promote His Welfare", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 18 (December, 1944).



and Europeans to fill positions in the expanded administrative staff was fiercely resented by the ever-growing number of literate Africans who sought positions in the government service.

Thus, the colonial administration's attempts to improve the educational, social, and economic situation of the territory provided a source of widespread resentment which was easily exploited by African nationalist leaders.

### Labour's Colonial Policy

In 1945 general elections in Great Britain brought the Labour Party into power for the first time since the inter-war period. The new regime, comprised of the more liberal elements of the British Political spectrum, quickly made plans to accelerate the pace of colonial development. Of key importance was their plan to immediately increase political participation within the dependencies. In 1946 Arthur Creech-Mones assumed the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies.<sup>1</sup> Following

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<sup>1</sup>Arthur Creech-Jones was born in Britain in 1891. Educated at Whitehall Boys School, he joined the War Office as a clerk on the clerical staff in January, 1907. His first exposure to liberal politics came in 1908 when he joined the Dulwich Branch of the League of Progressive

the liberal-socialist philosophy, he began to initiate a program of colonial development aimed at transforming the Empire into a commonwealth. From 1940 to 1945 Jones had served as Chairman of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Upon his assumption of the top post in the British Colonial Office, the liberal reform movement in Britain acquired a direct contact with Downing Street.

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Thought and Services. By 1910, he was Secretary of the branch and an active organizer in the Borough of Camberwell Trade and Labour Council. He served as Secretary of the latter from 1913-22. In 1914 he joined the London Egyptian Debating Society and gave frequent lectures on socialism and nationalism. It was here that he made lasting contact with key socialist leaders including Herbert Morrison, James Mylles and Fenner Brockway. During World War I, Creech-Jones was imprisoned for refusing to serve in the armed forces. Upon his release in 1919, he served as National Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union and in 1921-28 was an executive member of the London Labour Party. After an unsuccessful bid for public office in 1929, he was elected to the House of Commons as Labour Party candidate for Shipley Division, Yorkshire in 1935. He retained this seat until 1950 when realignment of the district led to his defeat. From 1935-40 he served on the Executive Committee of the Fabian Society and in 1940 became Chairman of the Colonial Bureau. He served as a member of the Labour Party Imperial Advisory Committee and during the Second World War played a key role in the formation of the party's colonial policies. He was the initiator of the plan to end colonial rule and to form a Commonwealth of freely participating states. It was he who planned and established the Colonial Development Corporation. Based on "Introduction to the Guide to the Papers of Arthur Creech-Jones", Rhodes House. The archives hold the entire collection of Creech-Jones' public papers.

The Labour Party was to remain in power for five years. In this period, encouraged and advised by the most liberal factions in Great Britain, the pace of development in the colonies was to accelerate rapidly, thus giving the fledgling nationalist movements ample opportunity to spread. The new Secretary of State's attitude concerning political development is clearly seen in his April 1946 address to the General Meeting of the Labour Party:

Recent years have seen remarkable political developments and constitutional changes in almost all our territories. We have entered into a phase of Colonial history in which there is a widespread demand from the colonial peoples, or at any rate from the more vocal elements, for more practical evidence of the sincerity of our oft proclaimed policy of conferring self-government on the colonial communities.

I am convinced that in this modern age with its forces of nationalism and freedom, with the spread of educational and economic changes and the political and social awakening going on, we must adjust ourselves to a much quicker tempo of constitutional development than would have seemed practicable a few years ago. We have to experiment boldly though not necessarily rashly and to recognize that while the transfer of power to people not fully trained or with adequate experience or tradition to exercise it will lead to mistakes being made, it is only through actual experience in the exercises of responsibility that people can acquire a sense of duty and service.

The process may be a painful one but the alternatives of increasing bitterness and tension in the relations of the people to the government would be disastrous.<sup>1</sup>

Although the ultimate goal of its colonial policy was clear, the Labour Party was faced with a dilemma. On one hand, it was committed to advance the pace of political development in the territories as rapidly as possible. At the same time however, it had to insure that the economic and social institutions of each territory were adequately advanced by independence to effectively meet the demands of a modern society. Maintenance of the delicate balance between these two aspects of development was to become a major problem for the Labour regime.<sup>2</sup> Speaking

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<sup>1</sup>"Draft of a Speech by Secretary of State Arthur Creech-Jones for the General Meeting of the Labour Party, April 1946", in "Labour Party Policies" file, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>The necessity of maintaining this balance and the problems encountered in doing so are reflected in the copious socialist writings of the period. Representative examples include: James Griffiths, Arthur Creech-Jones, and Rita Hinden, The Way Forward (London: Fabian Publication Ltd., 1950); Rita Hinden, Common Sense and Colonial Development (London: Fabian Publication Ltd., 1949) and Socialists and the Empire (London: Fabian Publication Ltd., 1947); Arthur Creech-Jones; "A Labour View of British Colonial Policy", United Empire, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (July-August, 1945), 127-131 and Labour Colonial Policy (London: Fabian Publication Ltd., 1947); L. Silberman, Crisis in Africa (London: Fabian Publication Ltd., 1947).

of the policy initiated by his party, Creech-Jones stated:

The central purpose of British Colonial Policy is simple. It is to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that insure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter. But though this policy is clear enough, the problems to be overcome in carrying it out are numerous and complex.<sup>1</sup>

By the late 1940's, it was clear that indirect rule was not producing the gradual advances in local political participation originally envisioned by the Crown. The British nevertheless insisted that despite its faults, the system of rule through traditional institutions was the only feasible method of political advancement for Tanganyika. In 1948 the Administering Authority condemned the belief that elections along the modern democratic lines could be held anywhere in the territory as "radical" and "premature", based on the argument that:

At the present state of development it is... quite impossible to disassociate the mass of the people from the tribal system of local government.

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<sup>1</sup>Draft of a policy statement by Creech-Jones, December, 1947, Creech-Jones papers.

To attempt to do so would result in antagonism on the part of the vast majority instead of their whole-hearted cooperation which is so essential if progress in social and political development is to be achieved. For the great majority of the indigenous inhabitants their social and political life is bound up with their strong attachment to their tribal structure and constitution. To destroy the latter would mean the disintegration and not the advancement of the former. The only sure basis on which political and social advancement can be achieved is the expansion and broadening of the existing system on sound democratic lines until it develops into an efficient instrument of local government.<sup>1</sup>

In the same year, the British defended indirect rule before the Trusteeship Council, stating:

If primitive African people are to play a part...in advancement towards the ideals of a free democracy, the first stage of advance must be erected on the foundation of their own political conceptions and tradition, which must be modified and adapted to the new order by a steady process of education and guidance.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial No. 242, Report By His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika for the Year 1948 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 52.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, Observations of the Administering Authority on the Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Tanganyika, 1948, T/333, p. 244.

Despite the confidence expressed by the British in the indirect rule system, the policy did little either to advance political institutions or to introduce Tanganyikan Africans to modern social conditions. Of the 415 native authorities functioning in 1950, 190 drew 80-100% of their membership from one tribe, while the remainder had 50-75% of their membership represented by a single tribal unit.<sup>1</sup> This system did little to break down the barriers which traditionally kept each tribal group separated and autonomous. The maintenance of such parochial attitudes in no way served to modernize the territory.<sup>2</sup> By the late 1940's, therefore, the indirect rule system in Tanganyika had clearly become a cause of political stagnation rather than a method of advancement. It served to perpetuate the authority of traditional rulers and all of their isolationist tendencies

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<sup>1</sup>Stephens, pp. 55-56.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed case study of the failures of indirect rule in a Tanganyika province, see the papers of the District Officer Charles Fitzwilliam C. V. Cadiz, especially "Some Difficulties in the Democratization of Native Authorities in Tanganyika" and "Development of Local Government", Rhodes House. The archives contain the personal papers and official reports of numerous Colonial Service personnel.

inherent in tribal society. The growing number of educated elite were eliminated from government participation and could only turn to activities which lay outside the framework for advancement provided by the administration.<sup>1</sup>

While indirect rule was practiced by the British in all of their East African holdings, Tanganyika was the territory in which the system produced the least favorable results. By 1950 many local government councils in Kenya

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<sup>1</sup>The shortcomings of indirect rule are well analyzed in: Hans Cory, "Reform of Tribal Political Institutions", Journal of African Administration, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (April, 1960), 77-84; H. A. Fosbrooke, "Tanganyika: The Application of Indirect Rule to Chiefless Society", (paper presented at the Thirteenth Conference Proceedings of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institution for Social Research, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, 1959), pp. 17-29; J. Gus Liebenow, "Legitimacy of Alien Relationship: The Nyaturu of Tanganyika", The Western Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Part 1 (March, 1961); A. J. Loveridge, "Chiefs and Politics", Journal of African Administration, Vol. XL, No. 4 (October, 1959), 201-207; Retired Official, "Some Notes on Native Administration in Tanganyika", African Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 192 (July, 1949), 240-242; Audrey Isabel Richards, East African Chiefs; A Study of Political Development in some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes (London: Faber & Faber, 1960), passim; A. G. Wallis, "Local Government and the Maintenance of Law and Order", Journal of African Administration, Vol. V, No. 1 (January, 1953), 11-14; I. Woodriffe, "The Relationship Between Central and Local Government in Africa", Journal of African Administration, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January, 1957), 3-15; R. W. Wraith, "Local Government in Tropical Africa", (paper presented at the Rome Congress of the International Political Science Association, September, 1958).



and Uganda had become inter-tribal and inter-racial in composition. In Tanganyika however, the traditional authorities successfully resisted any attempts to allow Asians or Europeans to join local councils. Admittance of members from other tribes was rare and usually was achieved only after insistant prodding on the part of local colonial administrators. Throughout the territory, traditional leaders showed little evidence of being willing to modernize local institutions. By 1945 the territory's local government program was far behind its counterparts in Kenya and Uganda.<sup>1</sup> Although some isolated reforms did begin to take place in the period immediately following the war,<sup>2</sup> the pace of development was far slower and less effective than the British had envisioned. By 1950 Lord Hailey warned that unless a method was found for admitting the educated elite and

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, African No. 1173, Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration: African Local Government (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), pp. 17-52.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial No. 261, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika for the Year 1949 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 27-36.

progressive young Africans into the local political process, the indirect rule system would end in total failure.<sup>1</sup>

### Political Developments Within the Territory

In the period 1945-50, it became apparent that the nationalist spirit sweeping the continent would soon become manifest in Tanganyika. Great Britain, realizing that the native authority system alone would not be an effective means of guiding the territory's political development, began to evolve a general plan for the changes that would inevitably take place in the structure of the territorial government. In their quest for an overall strategy of political evolution, the British formulated what was known as the "multi-racial" or "partnership" system of rule.

The multi-racial theory was an attempt to obviate the paradoxical imbalance between percentage of population and ability to contribute to internal development which existed in the East and Central African territories.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hailey, Native Administration, Vol. II, p. 352.

<sup>2</sup>Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the High Commission Territories.

The fact that Tanganyikan blacks comprised 98 per cent of the total population made it evident that any attempt at political reform aimed at establishing a democratic system would necessarily produce a black-controlled government. Yet, if political domination by the indigenous population were allowed, the territory would be totally unattractive to the Asians and Europeans whose technical skills and capital were sorely needed to further develop the territory. Great Britain, therefore, faced a serious dilemma in her East and Central African holdings. She recognized that the government of Tanganyika would ultimately be controlled by a black majority and that steps would have to be taken shortly to commence the transformation from colonial status to self-rule. Yet, if this were done too quickly, non-Africans would not be willing to invest or settle in the territory. In addition, the British citizenship enjoyed by many Asians and Europeans obliged the Crown to protect their interests within the territory. Multi-racialism was seen as at least a temporary solution to these problems.<sup>1</sup> According

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office Cmd. No. 7987, The British Territories in East and Central Africa (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1950), p. 8. See also, Cranford Pratt, "Multi-racialism and Local Government in Tanganyika", Race, Vol. 2 (November, 1960), 33-49.

to the partnership theory, administrative services and activities were evenly distributed among the three races. Thus, for example, educational funds were divided equally among the Asian, African, and European communities. Three separate school systems were established, with separate courses of instruction and separate salary scales for personnel. Similarly, when elected representation on the Legislative Council was initiated in 1957, unofficial seats were divided equally among the three races.

The ultimate purpose of "partnership" was to permit each community to develop its potential as fully as possible and to contribute to the development of the territory according to its ability. In theory, the system was designed to prevent unnecessary competition and thus to avoid racial hostility. Multi-racialism was seen, therefore, as a temporary means of fostering racial cooperation rather than competition by means of a program of separate development. Speaking of the goals of partnership in 1953, Oliver Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated:

Each section of the population must be enabled and encouraged to play its full part in the development of the territory and its institutions in complete confidence that the

rights and interests of all communities, both indigenous and immigrant, will be secured and preserved.<sup>1</sup>

The tri-racial system in reality offered the guarantee of a privileged position in Tanganyikan society to members of the Asian and European communities. Thus it served as an encouragement to those elements of the population who could best contribute to the development of the trusteeship through private investment in the economy. The minority groups also provided professional services and the trained, experienced civil servants needed to advance the trusteeship in a period when the Tanganyikan African community itself could not produce such talents. In summary, the tri-racial system offered a sense of political, economic, and social security to the immigrant races whose talents and private investment capital were sorely needed by the Crown.

Great Britain was to insist upon the preservation of the tri-racial system until the last days of colonial rule. When the concept of racial partnership on the territorial level was combined with the policy of indirect

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 502, Col. 2240.

rule on the local level, the end product was a program of gradual political evolution. In theory, the combined systems would allow Africans to gain experience in modern political activities at the local level, and to gradually assume an ever increasing role in the affairs of the central government. At the same time, the development process would be sufficiently slow to protect the interests of the minority communities, and to thus encourage investment within the territory.

Unfortunately for the British, racial partnership like indirect rule, never realized its theoretical goals. In the early post-war years it became apparent to the colonial administration that the new generation of educated Africans and the returning veterans were not willing to accept the slow, erratic pace of political development afforded by the traditional authorities.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, the British refused to abandon indirect rule. While administrators in Kenya and Uganda were forcing native authorities to permit African participation in

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Territory, Secretariat, Secretarial Minute Paper, 33136, Memorandum on the Problems of Relations Between Native Authorities and the Younger African Generation (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1945), passim.

local government, the colonial regime in Tanganyika took no such steps. In June 1948, civil servants attending a conference of provincial commissioners were ordered to advise chiefs that educated elite should be allowed to express their views in tribal councils. However, it was made clear that under no circumstances should the elite be permitted to run for local offices or to undermine the traditional authority.<sup>1</sup> In the few cases during the early post-war period where elite were able to become prominent on tribal councils, they were placed in positions which made their authority clearly subordinate to that of the chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

The policy of multi-racialism was especially unsatisfactory to educated Africans. Although the practice guaranteed political development to each community, it also created a situation in which the minority communities, numbering less than two percent of the total population, held two-thirds of the representative seats in the government and had two-thirds of the social services geared to their needs.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 48-51.

<sup>2</sup>G. Andrew MaGuire, Toward "Uhuru" in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation (London: Cambridge University, 1969), pp. 60-61.

Consequently, indirect rule and multi-racialism failed to achieve their goal of producing a peaceful atmosphere in which gradual political evolution could occur. Instead, they were a source of constant irritation to the westernized elements of the indigenous population. Protest against both policies was to become a rallying point for African nationalists in the early 1950's.

The political changes initiated by the British in the period 1945-50 were all the result of the Administering Authority's attempt to put the theories of indirect rule and multi-racialism into practice. In December 1945, the Africans gained their first significant representation at the central government level with the appointment of two Tanganyikan Africans to the Legislative Council. Both appointees, Kidaha Makwaia<sup>1</sup> and Abdiel Shanghai were chiefs. Their selection was a recognition of the right of traditional rulers to lead the political advance of the African

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<sup>1</sup>Makwaia became a member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 1945. Throughout his career, he remained in constant contact with the Bureau, informing them of political developments in the territory and seeking professional advice from their staff of experts. Thus, from the outset, the British socialists established close contact with the African political leadership within the territory. FCB files, Tanganyika correspondence.



population as opposed to leadership from the elite. In 1947 a third African was admitted to the Council, and the following year yet another indigenous representative was selected.<sup>1</sup>

In 1947 the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a memorandum to the Tanganyikan administrative staff in which he urged closer supervision of native authority activities by colonial personnel. The Secretary also called for the establishment of local government councils based on democratic representation and for closer cooperation towards political development between central and local government.<sup>2</sup> Clearly, the administration was attempting to coordinate political development activities between native authorities and administrative staff.

A major innovation in the administrative framework was announced in September 1947, when the Secretary of

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<sup>1</sup>The third seat was held by several individuals during its five year duration. Its first recipient was Chief Adam Sapi of Iringa. On April 19, 1948, the Governor appointed Juma Mwindadi for a term of five years. Mwindadi was headmaster of the private Islamic School in Dar es Salaam, and a member of the municipality's Township Authority. Tanganyika Standard, April 20, 1948:

<sup>2</sup>Territorial files, Tanganyika, Creech-Jones Papers.

State approved the appointment of a number of special members to the Legislative Council, each holding a specific title and having a prescribed set of duties. The newly established offices were: Member for Law and Order, Attorney General, Member for Finance, Trade and Economics, Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, Member for Lands and Mines, Secretary for African Affairs, Coordinating Secretary, and Member for Labour, Education and Social Welfare.<sup>1</sup> Each member was placed in charge of the administrative departments that corresponded to his spheres of responsibility. The establishment of the member system was a major advance for the central government. Under the plan of constitutional evolution followed by the British, the creation of member seats was the precursor to the establishment of ministerial posts and the formation of cabinet government.<sup>2</sup> In 1948 the Governor announced in the Legislative Council that one of the primary goals of the post-war government would be to increase contacts between the educated elite and the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, September 25-28, 1947.

<sup>2</sup>Lennard, pp. 18-19.

tribal authorities.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the élite would be allowed to participate in political activities but only through the channels established by the indirect rule system.

In 1949 Sir Edward Twining assumed the governorship of Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup> His administration marked the beginning of a period of rapid constitutional change and political advancement. On November 23, 1949, the new Governor addressed the Legislative Council and announced a series of local political reforms. The changes announced included a pledge to introduce elections for municipal offices in Dar es Salaam as soon as possible, the granting of municipal status to Tanga by 1951, and the drawing-up of a Township Bill which would provide a measure of local autonomy to the larger settlements.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 23rd Session, November 2, 1948, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Edward Twining, G.C.M.G., M.B.E. Born in 1899, Twining graduated from Sandhurst in 1918. From 1923-28, he served with the 4th King's African Rifles. Twining was a civil administrator in Uganda from 1919-39, served as Deputy Director of Labour on Mauritius in 1939 and as Director from 1940-43. From 1944-46, he was Administrator of St. Lucia, Windward Islands. Twining served as Governor of North Borneo from 1946-9, and as Governor of Tanganyika, 1949-58.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, November 24, 1949.

Most significant was his revelation of a plan to create a series of provincial councils, on inter-racial and inter-tribal lines, which would serve as a link between traditional authorities, local elite, and the administration. Each council would have a number of unofficial representatives and a limited amount of executive power and financial responsibility. These announcements were clearly in line with the standard policy of effecting political advancement through the evolution of local government bodies. The administration believed that Africans who were experienced with the operation of district level tribal councils could now be reasonably expected to successfully participate in representation on the provincial level. At some undesignated point in the future, the provincial councils would form the basis for expansion into territorial politics. Speaking of the proposed changes Twining announced:

I should like to state emphatically that I believe that this development which has as its two main features inter-racial cooperation and building from the bottom instead of from the top, is of greatest importance to Tanganyika.

If we can make the Provincial Councils efficient and responsible bodies, they may become the foundations on which to base the future political life of the Territory. It is important that, at an early date, we should ensure that the unofficial representatives of

the Councils should sit with some form of popular support. If these Councils can be properly established, then they may become the Electoral Colleges for unofficial representation on the Central Legislature.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the proposed provincial councils would enjoin the two principles upon which colonial rule in Tanganyika was based: multi-racialism and political development via local evolution.

The exact nature of the administration's plan for development through provincial councils became clear on December 12, 1949, when the Governor introduced the most important plan for political advancement of the 1945-50 period. Twining announced the establishment of a committee to study the question of constitutional development. Chaired by the Attorney General Sir Charles Mathew, the committee was composed of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council (seven Europeans, four Africans, and three Asians), the Attorney General, and the Member for Local Government. Its assignment was to study constitutional structure on both the local and territorial level and to make proposals for the future course of political development.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Committee on Constitutional Development, Administration of Tanganyika Territory: Legislative and

No sooner had the committee been formed, than it was sent a memorandum by the Governor entitled "Future Constitutional Development in Tanganyika", in which he outlined the administration's views concerning constitutional reform. The Governor suggested the creation of an unofficial majority in the legislature, selected through an electoral college system. Electors would be chosen by the recently instituted provincial councils, with one African and one non-African representative selected from each province. Additional members would be appointed to represent Tanga and Dar es Salaam. The Council would also contain three ex-officio members (the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, and Attorney General) and fifteen nominated members. Thus, it would be comprised of thirty-eight persons and would have an unofficial majority. In addition, there would be a Chief Speaker. Twining's proposal called for the creation of the Council by late 1951 or early 1952. He also suggested the

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Administrative System (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1950), p. 1. The fact that the minority communities dominated the committee was viewed by liberal reformers as an attempt by the administration to insure that the report would strongly support the preservation of parity and indirect rule. See Creech-Jones - Nicholson correspondence, January 6-23, 1950, FCB papers.

immediate initiation of local elections to make operative the electoral college system.

When the news of the memorandum was made public, widespread criticism resulted, based on the belief that the constitutional committee was being pressured into endorsing the administration's proposals. The white settler community was especially disturbed that equal representation between Africans and non-Africans had been suggested.<sup>1</sup>

On December 14, 1949 the Governor held a conference at the Government House in Dar es Salaam. He refuted the claim that the constitutional committee was a pawn of the administration. Twining stated:

You will see that the terms of reference for the Special Committee on constitutional reform have been framed very broadly. I should like to dispel any fears that anyone may have that Government is either trying to jockey the Committee into accepting its plan or to force the pace. Government has drawn up certain proposals which have been circulated to Members of the Committee. I wish to make it quite clear that Government is not wedded to these proposals and wishes to leave the widest discretion to the Committee to frame such proposals for constitutional reform as will appear necessary after a careful study of the existing constitution. If after their recommendations have been considered it is possible to provide some sort of local autonomy in

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<sup>1</sup>See Tanganyika Standard editorials and Letters to the Editor, December, 1949.

the principal townships and a certain measure of decentralization to Provincial Councils we shall have taken a great step forward.<sup>1</sup>

When the Committee released its report in April, 1951, it was clear that the Twining memorandum had by no means dominated the members' conclusion. The Mathew Report rejected the proposal for an unofficial majority, stating that more political experience in representative government would have to precede such a step.<sup>2</sup> The committee recommended an enlargement of the Legislative Council and the establishment of "parity" between representative members of the central legislature.<sup>3</sup> It also advocated the introduction of elections, urging that they be held as soon as possible after the establishment of the new Legislative Council. The committee refused however to make any recommendations concerning franchise requirements. Instead, it strongly urged the government to appoint a special commissioner to study the entire

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<sup>1</sup>An unpublished manuscript, December 14, 1919, Tanganyika Manuscript collection, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1951), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>The term "parity" refers to the establishment and maintenance of an equal number of representatives from each of the three racial communities.



question of voting qualifications and further constitutional development.<sup>1</sup> The report rejected the proposed provincial councils and the electoral college system as impractical and cumbersome. Finally, it suggested that at least one-third of the allotted African seats on the new Legislative Council be reserved for non-chiefs, to afford the educated elite more opportunity for political participation.

The proposals of the Committee exasperated the African political activists of the territory by calling for the preservation of the parity system. At the same time, they alienated large segments of the white settler community who were determined to resist any policy changes aimed at increasing African political participation. Once again, the colonial regime's attempts to initiate a moderate reform resulted in increased political tension.

Britain's long-range plan for Tanganyika called for gradual political evolution coupled with rapid economic growth and social development. In the 1945-50 period, it was necessary for the Administering Authority to initiate a rigorous program of internal improvement.

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<sup>1</sup>Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development, p. 9.

As in the case of the proposed political reform, the amelioration efforts were to become a source of intense controversy.

In 1946 the British initiated a Ten-Year Development and Welfare Program for the trusteeship. The original budget called for the expenditure of £17.8 million between 1947 and 1956, thus providing over fifty percent of Tanganyika's annual capital input.<sup>1</sup> The funds were concentrated on improving the transportation, communication, and educational facilities of the territory. Heavy stress was also placed on agricultural experimentation. Original estimates proved far from adequate and by 1950 the total budget had to be revised to exceed £24 million.<sup>2</sup>

The Tanganyika government and the Colonial Office believed that if the trusteeship were to be reasonably developed, large numbers of white settlers would have to

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Development Commission, A Ten-Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1946), pp. 16-19.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed study of the Welfare Plan's shortcomings see: Cyril Ehrlich, "Some aspects of Economic Policy in Tanganyika, 1945-60", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July, 1964), 265-277.

be attracted to the territory. It was felt that only this step could provide the influx of talents and finance needed to develop the private sector of the economy. The entire issue of European immigration presented a serious problem to the Labour government. Historically, white settlement resulted in land alienation and in the creation of a strong minority community with an exploitive hold over the indigenous population.<sup>1</sup> Thus, an influx of Europeans was looked upon unfavorably by both the Labour Government and the liberal activist groups. Yet in order for a territory as backward as Tanganyika to develop with any degree of rapidity, the presence of an enterprising white settler group was an absolute necessity.<sup>2</sup> The task before the liberal regime, therefore, was to encourage sufficient settlement to aid territorial advancement but at the same time to obviate the possibility of exploitation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The classical example is the case of the White Highlands in Kenya.

<sup>2</sup>Margery Perham, "White Minorities in Africa", Foreign Affairs (July, 1959), 637-648. This article provides a clear analysis of the positive and negative aspects of white settlement.

<sup>3</sup>Marjorie Nicholson to "interested M.P.s", January 24, 1946, FCB papers.

On February 21, 1946 Creech-Jones dispatched a memo to Governor Twining outlining exactly such a scheme. The message clearly stated that the needs of Africans were to be given priority in the allocation of all lands within the territory. This included the disposal of the former German estates seized during the war. Although non-African settlement would be permitted, whites would be eligible to no more than temporary aid from the government. In addition, no settlement scheme would be approved by the Colonial Office which sought to allocate the choicest lands to Europeans. Finally, Africans who were moved as a result of development schemes would have to be resettled and compensated for their losses.

Speaking of these guidelines for white settlement, the Secretary of State concluded:

...a limited amount of non-native settlements, by suitably selected persons of the right type and under conditions of proper Government control is likely to be conducive to the economic development of the Territory. If the political and social advancement of the African inhabitants is to proceed at any adequate pace, it is essential that we should press on with economic development by all suitable means. Provided, therefore, that the interests of the African inhabitants are not likely to be impaired by such schemes of non-native settlement may suitably be embarked upon.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>, Secretary of State Creech-Jones to the Governor of Tanganyika, February 21, 1946, Tanganyika Territorial Files, Rhodes House.

The Administering Authority soon discovered that the underdeveloped condition of the territory, coupled with the uncertainty of British tenure under the Trusteeship Agreement, did little to encourage prospective settlers. In an attempt to offer new incentive, in 1949 the government announced that leases on agricultural lands would be increased from a thirty-three to a ninety-nine year period.<sup>1</sup> This plan, like the majority of the Crown's post-war projects, was well-intentioned but politically ill-fated. The growing nationalist movement strongly resented any attempt to increase European settlement or to grant special privileges to an alien community. In addition, in the years to come, the land alienation policy was to become a weapon of ideological controversy at the United Nations and to cause Great Britain frequent embarrassment within the international community.

A major project of the 1945-50 development period was the Groundnut Scheme. Managed by the Overseas Food Corporation, the undertaking envisioned clearing over three million acres of land for large-scale, mechanized production

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<sup>1</sup>Statement by Governor Twining, December 14, 1949,  
p. 3.

of peanuts.<sup>1</sup> Centered in the districts of Kongwa, Nachingwea and Urambo, the actual land clearance began in 1947. The entire scheme never worked well, due to high transportation and communications costs, difficulties in recruiting native labor, poor weather conditions, and a topsoil that proved to be sub-standard even for groundnut production. As a result, the project collapsed in 1951 after some 90,000 acres had been cleared. The only returns from the 3.6 million invested were the creation of a deep water port at Mtwara and the construction of 150 miles of rail line from the coast to Nachingwea.<sup>2</sup>

The land alienated for the Groundnut Scheme had been acquired by means of ninety-nine year leases which ultimately reverted back to the indigenous residents. Most of the acreage claimed for the project had been tsetse infested, and therefore of little exploitive value to local residents. Nonetheless, the project was to be utilized by both Tanganyikan African nationalists and the anti-imperialist powers on the Trusteeship Council as a symbol of the

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Ministry of Food, East African Groundnut Scheme: Review of Progress to the End of November, 1947 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>Stephens, pp. 82-83.

excessive power enjoyed by the government and the incompetent manner in which it exercised this authority.

In 1946 an issue arose that was to become a rallying point for African nationalists during the remainder of the colonial period. In that year, the administration announced that 788,000 acres of land were to be alienated for white settlement and economic development projects.<sup>1</sup> This amounted to less than 1.6 percent of the total land area of the territory. Yet because of the dangers of white control of the private sector of the economy, the policy was to serve as a major source of tension between the administration and the growing independence movement. It was this policy which in 1951 was to result in the Meru land case, which proved to be one of the most bitter controversies of the colonial period.

The final major part of the Administering Authority's attempts to develop the territory consisted of the initiation of a number of compulsory programs aimed

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<sup>1</sup>The term "alienation" refers to reservations of designated plots of land for the use of the government or individuals granted right of domain by the government. Although land could be claimed which was previously held by residents of any race, in practice it was always African held land which was designated for reservation. The Government was responsible for the compensation and resettlement of persons removed from alienated lands.

at improving agricultural productivity. While each of these projects was based on sound economic and scientific principles, they also presented a challenge to the traditional agricultural and cattle raising customs of the indigenous peoples. The territory's Ten-Year Plan included over forty such schemes, aimed at preventing soil erosion, increasing crop yield, and improving livestock utilization. The plan initiated major agricultural supervision centers in Sukumaland, Mbulu, Usambara, Pare and Uluru.<sup>1</sup> In these regions, the government plan required the slaughter of excessive cattle,<sup>2</sup> the alteration of traditional cultivation techniques, the clearing of new land, and the increase of water supplies. The use of such modern agricultural methods as tie-ridging, cattle-culling, destocking, inoculation, cattle-dipping, as well as the concept of using chemicals for soil improvement were misunderstood by Africans and consequently viewed as threats to the traditional way of life. Often

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<sup>1</sup>Ten-Year Development and Welfare Plan, pp. 8-11.

<sup>2</sup>Cattle, the traditional form of bride-wealth payment, are highly valued in East Africa as a form of "psychic income", although the herds have little or no cash value.



indigenous social institutions and customs were challenged by these innovations.<sup>1</sup> The use of compulsory agricultural methods was to be a decisive factor in the independence drive. Dissatisfaction produced by challenges to the traditional way of life were to incite many non-westernized elements of the indigenous population to join the nationalist movement.

Thus, during the 1945-50 period, the Crown was to initiate a series of political reforms and a program of economic development both designed to provide the internal improvements necessary before Tanganyika could hope to be reasonable stable as a self-governing state. Although well-intentioned, each of these plans contained elements that were unsatisfactory to parts of the indigenous population. As a result, the projects would help divide the population into rival factions and to recruit supporters for the slowly growing nationalist movement.

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<sup>1</sup>A well-documented examination of the effects of enforced agricultural methods on individual tribes is found in: Lionel Cliff, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Improvement in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period", Taamuli, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July, 1970), 3-15.

Territorial Political Activities 1945-50

In the early post-war period, African political activity in Tanganyika was virtually non-existent. In 1946, M.P. Julian Snow requested that the Fabian Council Bureau provide him with names of Tanganyikan blacks who were knowledgeable of territorial politics and could, therefore, provide information on constitutional development. Snow was informed that the Bureau knew no Tanganyikan African who was qualified to provide such information.<sup>1</sup> Yet within a five year period the Fabians were to maintain steady correspondence with over two dozen Africans who were to become the leaders of the independence drive.

Independence movements in post-war Africa followed a general pattern of development. They began with the polite presentation of specific grievances to colonial authorities. Such activities, however, even if they produced the desired goals, generally failed to satisfy the ever-growing aspirations of the African leadership. When more elaborate and long range demands (such as universal suffrage or political control by the indigenous

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to Julian Snow, M.P., July 22, 1945, FCB papers.

population) were made, the nationalists would encounter their first serious resistance from the administration. This in turn usually led to more overt signs of African dissatisfaction such as civil disobedience tactics. Ultimately, the isolated petitioning groups and scattered grievances united to form the nucleus of a territory wide independence drive.<sup>1</sup>

During the period 1945-50, political activity in the trust territory centered around the use of petitions drawn up either by private individuals or the territory's growing number of quasi-political associations.<sup>2</sup> With the activation of the Trusteeship Agreement in 1946 the use of petitions spread rapidly, since discontented Africans could now appeal not only to the British government, but also to the generally more sympathetic Trusteeship Council.

British reaction to these early protest attempts took the form of harassment rather than compromise. As a

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<sup>1</sup>MaGuire, pp. vii-xix: Hodgkin, pp. 41-48.

<sup>2</sup>The term "association" was utilized by activist groups to indicate that their organizations were not political parties. The bulk of the early political organizers, as educated elite, were employed in civil service occupations. Since individuals so-employed were banned either de jure or de facto from political participation, the elite sought to avoid any association with political parties.

result, the Crown alienated the educated elite who headed such activities. Government resistance thus drove the African leadership to form nationalist groups with operations outside the framework for political participation provided by the administration.

Even before the rise of associations, many elite used their individual influence to protest against colonial policy. One of the key leaders of this early period was Chief David Kidaha Makwaia, of Usika.<sup>1</sup> One of the first Africans to be appointed to the Legislative Council, Makwaia used his position to oppose unpopular government policies and to actively campaign for increased African political participation. In March 1946, he called an open meeting of Africans in Dar es Salaam to protest the recent White Paper proposals for an inter-territorial organization.

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<sup>1</sup>Chief David Kidaha Makwaia, educated in Kampala and Oxford. Makwaia becomes chief of the Usika in 1945. The following year he became one of the first two Africans to serve on the Legislative Council. He served on the East African Executive Board and on the Central Assembly from 1948-51. Chief Makwaia was a member of the East African Post and Telegraph Advisory Board in 1952 and served on the East African Royal Commission on Land the following year. In 1954 he resigned his chiefship to devote full time to territorial issues. After 1955 his support of the multi-racial policy caused him to side with the government in opposition to TANU. With the rise of Nyerere, Chief Makwaia lost his position of prominence in territorial politics.

in East Africa. In opposition to the government plans, Makwaia called for strict limitations of the powers of the East Africa High Commission and strong African representation, via elections, on the Central Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Other African political activists emerged in the early post-war period. In 1948, the Sukuma Federation of Chiefs petitioned the U. N. Visiting Mission for increased African representation on the Legislative Council, more training programs for black administrators, an end to land alienation and for African participation in the formulation of food prices.<sup>2</sup> By 1950 the Fabian Colonial Bureau was engaged in steady correspondence with over one dozen African leaders in Tanganyika.<sup>3</sup> These Africans continually sought guidance concerning the best methods of organizing political activities. The socialists kept the Tanganyika elite advised concerning developments within the home

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<sup>1</sup>FCB papers, Tanganyika political files, Makwaia papers. Speaking of the Chief in a letter to M. P. Lydall Wilkes on March 21, 1946, Fabian Secretary Nicholson stated "I am told he is...not one of the usual run of reactionary chiefs".

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, Report of the Visiting Mission to East Africa, 1948 (CI/218), p. 51.

<sup>3</sup>Skeffington files, 1947-50, FCB papers.

government, and offered advice concerning the attainment of their political goals. At the same time, the African activists provided the liberal government in Great Britain with a wealth of first-hand information concerning activities within the trust territory.

The greatest single source of African complaints in the 1945-50 period centered around the use of compulsory agricultural and cattle raising methods. Discontent with this aspect of British policy caused continual unrest and led to a constant stream of petitions and complaints leveled against local administrators.<sup>1</sup> Although there were no serious outbreaks of violence or major violations of the peace, dissatisfaction was nonetheless formidable.<sup>2</sup> This unrest was to shortly become a valuable unifying factor for the nationalist movement. The reports of local administrators in the 1945-50 period abound with remarks concerning widespread "fitina" resulting from the enforcement of government policies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For an intuitive analysis of the practicality of trying to enforce alien agricultural practices within a traditional society, see; A. C. M. De Vere, Miscellaneous Papers relating to Tanganyika, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 2, pp. 696-700.

<sup>3</sup>"Fitina" is translated as "unrest", "disquiet" or "complaining".

The fact that the British used native authorities to enforce their policies led to further discontent. Tribesmen complained bitterly that the enforcement of government regulations led their chiefs and elders to violate tribal custom. As a result native authorities in many regions severely undermined their traditional sources of respect through their cooperation with the administration. Such conditions served the interests of the emerging nationalist leadership. The elite could now persuasively argue that the chiefs were little more than the hired lackeys of the colonial regime thereby strengthening the nationalist claim that they were the only true spokesmen of the African population.<sup>1</sup> When TANU emerged as a major political party in 1954, it was consequently able to gain widespread support quickly by capitalizing on the discontent fostered by almost a decade of enforced agricultural programs.

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<sup>1</sup>Detailed studies of unrest in specific districts produced by government policy are found in: Goran Hyden, "Political Penetration in a Rural Area" (Paper presented at the East African Institute for Social Research Conference, 1966); J. Gus Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971); G. Andrew McGuire, "The Emergence of the Tanganyika African National Union in the Lake Province", in Protest and Power in Black Africa, ed. by Robert I. Rothenberg and Ali A. Mazuri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 337-392.

In the period 1945-50, while individual Africans were protesting the methods and goals of colonial rule, the first significant indigenous elite associations were also beginning to emerge. Such organizations were to prove most valuable to the growth of a viable nationalist movement. It was through participation in local political and self-help groups that significant segments of the Tanganyikan African population opted to abandon traditional tribal society and to participate in territorial level deliberations.

Most of the early associations shared certain characteristics. All limited their activities to complaints and petitions through accepted channels. The vast majority operated on the local or tribal level and attracted little support from the non-African population. All possessed a limited following and restricted their aims to the solution of certain specific parochial issues.<sup>1</sup> Yet they were significant in that they represented a form of modern political activity which operated outside of administrative

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<sup>1</sup>J. Gus Liebenow, "Response to Planned Political Change in Tanganyika Tribal Groups", American Political Science Review, Vol. 1 (June, 1950), passim. In the late 1940's, Liebenow conducted extensive field research among the tribal groups of Tanganyika. The generalizations concerning associations above are based on his detailed observations.



control. Although each group concentrated on its own local problems, most associations were in accord in their demand for the reform of the native authority system, for increased African political participation, and for the termination of forced agricultural practices. Of the several dozen associations which flourished in post-war Tanganyika, the most notable were the Tanganyika African Association, Sukuma Union, Bahaya Association, Meru Citizens Union, Chagga Cultural Association, Chagga Cooperative Union, Kilimanjaro Citizens Union, Arusha Citizens Union, Mwanza African Traders Cooperative Society, and the Lake Province Growers Association.<sup>1</sup>

Each association was founded by and for a particular ethnic group and had as its goals the resolution of specific local problems. Thus, the Meru Citizens Union resisted local land alienation, while the Sukuma Union hired tribal lawyers to protect the rights of the educated elite in tribal courts. The Union also protested the enforcement of British agricultural and livestock policies

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<sup>1</sup>The names of these organizations appear repeatedly in the annual reports of the Colonial Office to the United Nations and the annual reports of the Provincial and District Commissioners.

and petitioned for the initiation of the elective principle in local government councils.<sup>1</sup> In the period 1949-50, both the Kilimanjaro Citizens Union and the Chagga Cultural Association called for the election of representatives to the newly formed Chagga federal council.<sup>2</sup>

One of the more sophisticated associations was the Sukuma Union, founded in Mwanza on December 12, 1954.<sup>3</sup> This was a most significant organizational attempt on the part of the Tanganyikan African population since it involved the largest of the territory's tribal groups.<sup>4</sup> The overall goal of the Union was to economically develop the Sukuma people whom it felt were kept from making significant progress towards modernization because of poor colonial administrative methods. As a result, the educated elite of the tribe sought to circumvent the power

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<sup>1</sup>B. J. Dudbridge and J. E. S. Griffiths, "The Development of Local Government in Sukumaland", Journal of African Administration, Vol. III, No. 3 (July, 1951), 141-146.

<sup>2</sup>P. H. Johnston, "Chagga Constitutional Development", Journal of African Administration, Vol. V, No. 2 (July, 1953), 134-140.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 13, 1945.

<sup>4</sup>The Sukuma numbering about one million, represent one-ninth of the territory's total population.

of the chiefs and to deal directly with the colonial administration.<sup>1</sup> The Union was especially opposed to the Sukumaland Development Scheme, which allowed chiefs and headmen to control the utilization of private agricultural and livestock lands. Consequently in the 1945-50 period Union representatives plagued local authorities with a steady stream of petitions calling for the termination of forced agricultural methods.

Unquestionably the most active of the early quasi-political organizations was the Tanganyika African Association (T.A.A.) which was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1927 with the help of colonial administrators who wished to create a legitimate and controllable forum for African political activity.<sup>2</sup> Because of its close association with the government, in its early years T.A.A. limited its political operation to the holding of public debates to shed light on controversial issues. The Association was nonetheless the most modern and best organized of all the

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<sup>1</sup>J. Gus Liebenow, "The Chief in Sukuma Local Government", Journal of African Administration, Vol. XI, No. 2 (April, 1959), 841-92.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph Austen, "Notes on the Pre-History of TANU", Makerere Journal, No. 9 (March, 1964), 3.

early political activist groups. Other organizations were restricted to members of a particular tribe, religion, or occupation, and operated on a local basis. T.A.A., by contrast, was open to all Africans and established several branch offices throughout the territory. Since such an association was attractive primarily to members of the educated elite, most of its early members were teachers or civil servants. In the early post-war period, T.A.A. stood alone as the only association capable of becoming a viable, territory-wide political organization with a basis of popular support.

In the late 1940's, T.A.A. gradually began to make the transformation from a discussion group into a black activist organization. In 1946 the Association held its first territorial meeting to discuss the impending transfer of Tanganyika to U. N. control and to determine how such a change would effect indigenous political development.<sup>1</sup> The following year representatives at a territory-wide meeting passed a series of resolutions condemning non-African control of trade and commerce, the practice of land alienation, civil service promotion policies, and

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<sup>1</sup>Minutes of a territorial meeting, 1946, T. A. A. files, FCB papers.

lack of Tanganyikan African political representation at the central government level.<sup>1</sup> By 1948, T.A.A. membership had risen to over 4,000 with thirty-nine branch offices scattered throughout the territory.<sup>2</sup> That same year, the Association held its second territorial-wide meeting to protest Tanganyika's inclusion in the East African High Commission and the Common Services Organization. Discontent was based on the argument that any move to unite Crown holdings in East Africa threatened to undermine Tanganyika's unique position as an international trusteeship.<sup>3</sup> When the United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in Tanganyika in 1948, the Lake Province branch presented a petition which demanded increased educational opportunities, more African positions in the civil service, improved living standards, better working conditions, and higher wages. Most significantly, the branch called for increased freedom of political participation and for an

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<sup>1</sup>Minutes of a territorial conference of T.A.A. held at Mwanza, May 17-18, 1947, Tanganyika territorial files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, April 22, 1948.

<sup>3</sup>Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika", in African One-Party States, ed. by Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962); p. 415.

end to racial discrimination which it felt was perpetuated by the partnership system. Part of its plan for increased political activity included the granting of more autonomy to local government bodies. This, the T.A.A. felt, would offer Africans experience in administrative and democratic processes.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, as the decade of the 40's drew to an end, the Tanganyika African Association found itself expanding rapidly in both activities and membership. It had begun to formalize a body of specific grievances and a definite set of plans for their rectification. Still, the Association lacked the credentials of a viable African nationalist movement. Its membership was comprised primarily of the urban elite and had little influence over the bulk of the African population. Its influence did not penetrate the rural areas. There was no permanent headquarters, no full time staff and no treasury.

The Association was in effect little more than a hyper-active petitioning agency whose survival depended upon official sanction. Because it limited its activities

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Report of Visiting Mission, 1948, pp. 153-155.

to legitimate petitioning via official channels, T.A.A. was able to remain in the good graces of the administration. It was common for the government to advise the Association in advance of upcoming political activities or policy changes. T.A.A. in return always sought official permission for its undertakings. By granting special favors to T.A.A., the government was attempting to illustrate to other African activists that cooperation with the administration was the most expedient policy to follow.<sup>1</sup> It was common for the government to allow T.A.A. to send observers or advisors to administrative meetings when timely topics were being discussed. Association members were often appointed to fact-finding commissions and special study groups. In the late 1940's as an increasing number of settlements were granted the status of towns, T.A.A. leaders were commonly appointed to the fledgling Township Authorities.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the cordiality which existed between the Association and the colonial regime, T.A.A. failed to gain

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<sup>1</sup>Sir Richard Turnbull, private interview with the former Governor of Tanganyika, Henley-on-Thames, Oxon, England, June 8, 1973.

<sup>2</sup>MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 70-72.

cooperation in its attempts to advance African political participation. While small concessions were made via the appointment of Africans to local advisory boards and councils, no definite program of political evolution was offered by the administration. The undesirable systems of indirect rule and tri-racialism were steadfastly adhered to in a period in which the Tanganyikan African elite called for increased indigenous participation in territorial-level politics. By the late 1940's it was clear to the less passive elements of T.A.A. that increased pressure would have to be applied to the Crown if any significant alterations were to be achieved. Such a move, however, necessitated a major change in the structure and function of the Association.

The leader of this reformation was Selemani Mahugi, the territorial vice-president of T.A.A. In 1946 Mahugi began to agitate for the unification of the T.A.A. cells which were loosely scattered throughout the territory and for the inclusion of the rural population into its membership. Mahugi felt that such alterations would allow the organization to present a unified front and a popularly-supported program of reform to the administration.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Speech delivered by Selemani Mahugi, June 5, 1948, cited in Mwanza District Annual Report, 1948, Rhodes House.



Thus by 1950, the Tanganyika African Association had begun a major renovation which was to transform it from a loosely organized quasi-political group, which enjoyed the favor of the government, to a more active association with territorial-wide support and a less cooperative spirit towards the administration. Although it by no means could claim to be representative of the bulk of the Tanganyikan African population, T.A.A. had definitely taken a radical turn away from the more passive activities which characterized its earlier history.

As African political involvement assumed a more unified and demanding role, the white settler community of Tanganyika began to take a much greater interest in both political participation and constitutional development. Any change aimed at democratic political advancement was naturally viewed as a grave threat by the tiny minority community. Throughout the independence drive therefore, the European settlers revealed themselves as a most conservative group, who strongly opposed the idea of increased African political activity. Even the imbalanced parity system was viewed by elements of the settler community as too great a concession to African political aspirations.

The total white population in 1948 numbered only 10,648. Settlement during the inter-war period had been impeded by wide-spread speculation that either Great Britain or the League of Nations would submit to German demands for the return of the former colony.<sup>1</sup> After the Second World War, repeated rumors concerning the possibility of transfer to another administering authority also discouraged European interest despite government attempts to attract white settlers.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the white community emerged as a comparatively small and politically conservative group who felt that political advancement would be disastrous to their already uncertain future. Part of this fear was their conviction that the enormous economic, social and educational gaps which existed between the immigrants and indigenous communities made Africans unfit for participation in modern political activities.<sup>3</sup> The writings of white

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<sup>1</sup>Dorothy F. Buxton, "German Settlers in Tanganyika", The Contemporary Review (December, 1950), 2.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Report of Visiting Mission, 1948, pp. 155-157.

<sup>3</sup>Margaret Bates, "European Politics in Tanganyika", (Draft of a paper prepared at Smith College, March, 1965), passim.

settlers clearly reflect their doubts concerning the abilities of Tanganyikan Africans to function effectively in a democratic system. For example, a white member of the administrative staff made the following observations concerning proposals to increase African political participation:

I am living for nine uninterrupted years in closest contact with the Africans here, and I know that the majority even of the most-advanced Europeans will declare those ideas as impossibilities, putting the cart before the horse, dreams, dangerous nonsense of all bundled in one. The most severe limitation of even the most progressive white man is the mental colour bar, whose basis is the enormous difference in wage or income, in privilege, in his, sometimes doubtless, superiority of mind and imagination, both of course products of civilised surroundings and upbringing. Nevertheless, I assure you it is not only possible, but politically and economical sic a necessity for which in the African there is a sound foundation.<sup>1</sup>

In 1949 when the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission recommended increased African representation in the territorial government, the white settler community strongly protested the suggestion.<sup>2</sup> The general

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<sup>1</sup>Ollendorf to Hinden, October 31, 1947, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Bates, "European Politics", p. 8.

sentiment reflected was that the African population was not prepared for such sophisticated activities. One settler remarked:

...where their Report was obviously wrong was where it talked of more Africans in government and in authority. There is just not enough of that kind of African here yet. I believe that if the truth were known, Government was extremely hard put to find three to serve [on the Legislative Council]. There just are not the educated Africans here that there are on the west side or in the West Indies....<sup>1</sup>

The white community felt that Africans were demanding increased control of the government and rapid development of the territory, yet were unable themselves to contribute to this advancement. Thus any suggestion by liberal reformers aimed at increasing Tanganyikan African control were condemned as radical and subversive. Noting this attitude, one educated African remarked:

...Socialists and people with socialist connections tend to be labelled "Communists" here. In fact, it would appear [that] the greater bulk of Europeans -- both officials and non-officials out here, to say the least, have no respect for liberal reformers.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Audrey Smith, wife of the Director of Medical Services, Dar es Salaam to Hilda Selwyn-Clarke, Assistant Secretary, FCB, June 3, 1949, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from H. K. B. Mwapachu, a black in the Social Welfare Department, Tanganyika, to Hinden, December 4, 1950, FCB papers. Because of the animosity of the

In the early post-war period the settler community in Tanganyika began to organize to protect their position of privilege within the territory. The general policy position of the Europeans, which they steadfastly adhered to until the end of the colonial period, called for major alterations in the territory's legal status, administrative structure and official policy. Key among the proposed changes were demands to initiate unlimited European settlement to be encouraged by land alienation and the use of long-term leases.<sup>1</sup> In addition, whites called for an end to the uncertainty of trusteeship status by annexing Tanganyika to another British colony. A popular plan often proposed during this period called for the union of all of British East and Central Africa into one single federation, ruled by an apartheid type government. At all times,

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white community, Mwapachu refused to contribute articles on territorial events to Venture, the Fabian journal. Similar reasons caused Thomas Marealle, Paramount Chief of the Wachagga, member of the Legislative Council and a dedicated Socialist, from publically expressing his views, Marealle file, FCB papers.

<sup>1</sup>R. E. S. Tanner, "Conflict Within Small European Communities in Tanganyika" (paper presented at the Conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, July, 1962), passim.

Europeans called for white dominance of the government. Even the imbalanced parity system was viewed as too generous. The general plans and attitudes of the European community were well summarized by Legislative Council member Thomas Marealle:<sup>1</sup>

...In parts like the Northern and Southern Highlands Provinces where numbers of European Settlers are increasing considerably, racial attitudes are developing from intolerable to bitter [sic]. Strong agitation going on for amalgamation with Kenya, abolishing status of trusteeship to make it safe for unlimited European settlement, under the guise of 'economic development', and then stepping on to the theory of 'European leadership', a much misused term meaning in essence the segregation of the races, the introduction of noxious colour bars in every form of social life in which almost everything and every place will be 'out of bounds for natives and dogs' as in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.<sup>2</sup>

Europeans in the early post-war years began to use their organizational capacity, finances, and personal contacts to influence the formulation of territorial policy. In December 1949, members of the Northern Province Council and the Southern Highlands Union, two white settler

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Marealle, an employee in the Social Welfare Office. He became President of the Tanganyika Civil Servants Association and later Paramount Chief of the Wachagga.

<sup>2</sup>Marealle to Hinden, May 25, 1949, FCB papers.

organizations, met to formulate plans aimed at protecting European interests within the territory. They agreed to try to create a territorial-wide European Union with the goal of placing elected white representatives on the Legislative Council. They also called upon the home government to commit itself to increased European settlement throughout East and Central Africa. Finally, the delegates made plans for the creation of an association which would join together white settlers in all the neighboring British territories including Rhodesia and South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

In January 1950, members of the Tanganyika European Council, another recently formed white settler group, met at Dodoma. In a much publicized manifesto, they called upon all Europeans in the territory to unite to:

...foster permanent white settlement, preserve the traditions of Western Civilisation, and... promote and maintain as paramount, European leadership while working for the advancement of all peoples in the territory.<sup>2</sup>

The desire of the white community to preserve an atmosphere of racial aloofness is reflected by the storm

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<sup>1</sup>East African Standard, December 18, 1949.

<sup>2</sup>Minutes of the Dodoma Conference of the Tanganyika European Council, January, 1950, Rhodes House.

of protest which followed an announcement by the United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations that schools in Tanganyika would soon be integrated.<sup>1</sup>

Since the majority of the permanent white settlers were engaged in agricultural pursuits, the most controversial issues in the eyes of the European community involved land alienation and length of tenure. It was the position of the settler community that, owing to the poor quality of the soil, a profitable farming venture could be carried out only if large tracts of land were utilized, preferably for cultivation of a single crop, over a long period of time.<sup>2</sup> Even then, government aid would sometimes be needed.

In 1945, a white settler clearly summarized the economic status of the agricultural sector when he informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

With the exception of Coffee, by reason of its climate and geographical position, Tanganyika cannot market any crop which cannot

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<sup>1</sup> See Tanganyika Standard, Letters to the Editor, March-April 1950, for example of the strong protest initiated by the white community.

<sup>2</sup> C. Y. J. Chiang, "British Policy in Tanganyika: A Study of Its Development in Relation to Changing Concepts and Needs, to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, and to the United Nations Trusteeship Council" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1958), pp. 492-560.



be produced better and cheaper in other parts of the world. It would therefore be foolish to attempt to attract white settlers to the territory in an effort to grow and sell produce which could not possibly stand up to healthy competition and which would be foredoomed to failure in any period of world wide economic crisis.<sup>1</sup>

Because of limited potential, Europeans felt that only long-term leasing of choice lands could make large scale agriculture a reasonable venture. Under the Cameron administration, land tenure leases had been limited to thirty-three year periods while customary tenure in other East and Central African territories was based on ninety-nine year contracts.<sup>2</sup> Settlers continually protested the Tanganyika policy and cited it as the main cause of the territory's failure to encourage substantial immigration. Nonetheless, the government in the early post-war years refused to alter its tenure system and so stated in a policy announcement issued by the Governor on December 18, 1948.<sup>3</sup> The discontent of the white community over this

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<sup>1</sup>C. Kirk, a clerk in the Railway Account Department, Dar es Salaam, to Creech-Jones, December 7, 1945, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration 1920-1955" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Hilda's College, Oxford, 1957), pp. 388-421.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 18, 1948.

decision is exemplified in the following letter from a struggling farmer to Secretary of State Creech-Jones:

The terms which have been published mean, in their present form, that after a farmer has developed his farm and has completed the term of 33 years, the farm can be taken over by the Government with statutory compensation. This strikes at the very root of permanent white settlement in Tanganyika and has given rise to a great deal of misgiving....

The feeling or insecurity on the part of the white population in Tanganyika today is worse than ever. On the other hand, the Africans are getting the impression that we are simply there to develop their lands for them so that they can take them over in their highest form of development when it suits them and the Government.

...these fears are certainly not without foundation and may prove a very severe stumbling block to the development of Tanganyika and to white settlement generally....<sup>1</sup>

The following year, when the government announced plans to turn ex-German lands in Arusha and Moshi over to Africans, the white settler community issued a loud but vain protest.<sup>2</sup>

The most volatile incident involving land policy during this period began in February 1950, when Member of Lands and Mines Donald MacDonald stated that the government was planning to alienate one hundred farms of 1,000

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred Vincent, white settler to Creech-Jones, March 26, 1946, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup> East African Standard, July 15, 1949.

acres apiece each year for white settlers for an indefinite period of time. He further proclaimed that plans were being drawn up to create a "homogeneous" European land block which could possibly require the removal of Africans from tribal holdings. Finally, the Member announced that the government was giving serious consideration to the renewal of ninety-nine year leases and the abolition of the unpopular Land Acquisitions Ordinance, which stipulated that Native Authorities had to be consulted before lands could be alienated.<sup>1</sup> Although MacDonald's announcements proved unfounded and he himself was soon removed from the membership, his statement produced a popular uproar which clearly revealed the unrest felt by the white settlers.<sup>2</sup> In June of that year however, the European community was granted a major concession when newly appointed Secretary of State James Griffiths announced that ninety-nine year leases would be approved in areas which were not suitable for African

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, February 18, 19, 21, 1950.

<sup>2</sup>See the pro-settler Tanganyika Standard and conservative East Africa and Rhodesia, February and March 1950. Both papers editorial columns reflect the feeling of uncertainty and discontent prevalent among European farmers.

exploitation and wherever poor soil made long term leases necessary to attract investors.<sup>1</sup>

Despite this major concession, Europeans continually agitated for more lands and longer periods of tenure. In June of 1950 white settlers in Kongwa district formed a Settlers Council and petitioned the government to divide the territory into three separate geographical zones, each reserved for members of one race.<sup>2</sup> Although such proposals seldom had a serious influence on territorial policy the fact that whites in neighboring Rhodesia had been able to dominate territorial affairs served as an incentive to Tanganyikan Europeans and as both a threat and rallying point for African nationalists. By 1950 a Labour Party visitor to Tanganyika noted that:

The European settler groups seem to have become increasingly intransigent in recent months. They are doing their best to unite all the European communities throughout that area on a common colour platform as one of their spokesmen put it. The African in return became increasingly suspicious and uncooperative.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>James Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Rita Hinden, June 29, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, June 22, 1950.

<sup>3</sup>Hinden to Griffiths, March 8, 1950, FCB papers.

In the early post-war period, Europeans began to form local quasi-political groups to protect their interests and to air grievances. Although quite similar in structure and function to the Tanganyikan African associations, the European groups enjoyed the advantages of better finances, more experienced leadership and better rapport with the administration than did their indigenous counterparts.

The first major white association was the Northern Province Council which was originally founded in Arusha in 1947, under the title of the Northern Province Secretarial Bureau. The Council was especially concerned with land tenure policies and with attempts at establishing a closer union with Kenya.<sup>1</sup> By 1948 the Council claimed to represent over two thirds of the local European settler community which then numbered about 700. The organization was run by an executive committee of ten settlers which included six British, two Greek, one American, and one African member.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Provincial and District Books of Tanganyika Territory, Arusha District Annual Report, 1947, p. 3, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Bates, "European Politics in Tanganyika", pp. 12-13.

By 1949 the Northern Province Council began a drive to establish a territorial base of support. Branches were opened in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, Moshi, Dodoma, Tanga, Lindi, and Kongwa and a territory-wide conference was held in Dodoma in October of that year.<sup>1</sup>

During the same period, white settlers of moderate political and social leanings joined together to form the Southern Highland Union. The association was unique in that although it was founded and dominated by whites, it admitted members of all three races.<sup>2</sup> However, it attracted few followers and served only to make the Northern Province Council even more popular among members of the European community.

In October 1950, the Tanganyika European Council, the most active of the early white settler groups, was founded. Its early membership was comprised primarily of break-away units from the Northern Province Council. The bulk of its following was found in the fertile, heavily

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<sup>1</sup>Northern Province Council Bulletin, November, 1949. This irregular publication served as the official newsletter for the organization. Tanganyika territorial papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Notes on Political Parties, 1945-55, Tanganyika territorial files, FCB papers.

settled Southern Highlands region. The Council centered its political program on the demand for the election of Asian and European representatives to the central Legislative Council based on common rolls.<sup>1</sup> It also called for the introduction of a highly qualitative franchise which clearly favored members of the European community. Africans would eventually be allowed to participate in territorial level political activities but only through the gradual evolution of their traditional local government organizations. At some distant point in the future, they would be allowed to form a central African representative body which would ultimately merge with the Asian-European controlled Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup>

When Governor Twining announced the formation of a constitutional committee in December 1949, the European Council protested that the members were all Legislative Council appointees and therefore could not truly represent public opinion. At the same time, they opposed the Governor's recommendation that seats be reserved for

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<sup>1</sup>Under the "communal roll" system, each racial group voted separately and only for members of the same ethnic community.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 4, 1950.

Africans on the Council as a dangerous and premature step.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the colonial period the settler community, concerned by both its relatively small size and the uncertain future of the territory as a trusteeship, sought to form an alliance with the other European communities in East and Central Africa. In November 1949, when the Visiting Mission report called for increased African political participation and further protective guarantees for native lands, the white settler community of Tanganyika loudly protested. In support, the neighboring Kenya Elections Union held an emergency meeting in which it called for a termination of the trusteeship agreement and the full incorporation of the territory into the Empire. At the same time the Union demanded passage of a Land Acquisition Ordinance which would allow the government to take over African lands "on the shortest notice". Finally, it suggested further land alienation, the active recruitment of white settlers by the Government, and the introduction of an electoral system

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<sup>1</sup>East Africa and Rhodesia, February 23, 1950; Tanganyika Standard, February 19, 20, 23, 1950.



for Europeans only.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, on March 3, 1950, Nairobi white settlers held a meeting to protest the Tanganyikan administration's recommendations to the Constitutional Committee, which they considered far too liberal. The Europeans passed a resolution in which they urged whites "to frustrate, by all means in their power, the proposed constitutional changes in Tanganyika which may mean the end of British rule in that territory."<sup>2</sup>

The greatest attempt at cooperation among the white settler groups was the creation of an inter-territorial political group known as the Capricorn Society. Founded in Salisbury in 1949 the Society was based on the belief that the future development of East and Central Africa could not be decided by diplomats and politicians in the home government. Rather, they maintained that "a policy for Africa must come from within Africa itself."<sup>3</sup> The aim of the society was to unite white settlers and a

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<sup>1</sup>Kenya Electors Union, Minutes of meeting held December 4, 1949, Kenya Electors Union records, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 5, 1950.

<sup>3</sup>Capricorn African Society, draft of "The Capricorn Contract", Capricorn papers, Rhodes House Africana Collection, Oxford.

few select indigenous elite in East and Central Africa through a series of interlocking territorial committees with advisory and support groups centered in both London and New York (U.N.). Capricornists planned to eliminate racial tension by formulating a plan which would gradually introduce the principle of universal adult suffrage to the region.<sup>1</sup> While the theoretical goals were in accord with the designs of both the liberals and Tanganyikan African nationalists, the stringent educational and economic qualifications for franchise set by the society meant in reality the perpetuation of white rule for many generations.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, a most attractive organization for Europeans who did not consider themselves racists but who had no intention of decreasing their existing hold over the territorial political structure. The fact that Society leaders had influential connections both at the U. N. and within the Colonial Office also

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<sup>1</sup>J. M. Oldham, New Hope for Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), passim. Oldham was the founder of the Capricorn Society. New Hope is considered the fundamental testament of the organization.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

enhanced the prestige and attractiveness of the Capricorn movement.<sup>1</sup>

While Europeans and Africans were founding their first significant associations, the Asian community tended to avoid controversial issues. The fact that the immigrant community could not exert as much pressure as the far more influential white settlers but at the same time was by no means in as dire need of change as was the African population, helped to perpetuate Asian inactivity. At the same time, strict cultural and religious differences divided the community, thus restricting the possibility of organized political cooperation. The characteristic aloofness of the Asian communities is reflected in their initial reaction to the proposed political changes. In June 1950, a majority of Dar es Salaam Asians interviewed by the Committee on Constitutional Development called for proportional representation by religious sect or culture group, rather than by race.<sup>2</sup> The one exception

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<sup>1</sup>The correspondence of Capricorn President David Sterling reveals that the Society maintained personal contact from 1940-54 with seven members of the United Kingdom delegation to the U.N.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from Kamrudin Jiva Daya to Hinden, June 13, 1950, FCB papers.

to this isolationist tendency in the early post-war years was the Central Moslem Association. In July 1950, the organization held a special meeting in Dar es Salaam to consider the question of future political developments.

There it passed a resolution stating:

...any racial or colour division...of the population such as European or Asian or African is repugnant to our faith and injurious to our interests...we recommend that a common roll<sup>1</sup> of franchise be adopted for all permanent residents of Tanganyika as 'Tanganyikans' without any distinctions whatsoever.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, even at this early date, serious conflicts of interest and differences in approach to political development separated the three communities. Activity initiated by one group would therefore almost invariably produce counter activities and proposals from the opposing associations. Thus, political awareness was expanded, but along clearly racial lines.

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<sup>1</sup>"Common roll" refers to the use of a single list of candidates in which no racial distinctions are made. Voters are not required to cast ballots only for members of their own race, nor are they required to vote for a specific number of candidates from each racial community.

<sup>2</sup>Central Muslim Association, minutes of meeting held July 29, 1950, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika Territorial files, "Political Activities, 1945-54", FCB papers.

Political Considerations in the Home Government

As the Second World War ended, both the liberal and conservative factions of the home government accepted the fact that the time was at hand for the initiation of the first steps of territorial political advancement which would ultimately bring self-rule to most of Great Britain's territorial holdings. This realization was the rationale behind her initiation of the massive Colonial and Welfare Corporation and its many subsidiary agencies.<sup>1</sup> However, within Britain there were those who were not satisfied with either the pace of colonial development or the methods employed by the home government. As a result, the liberal and socialist elements within Britain launched a campaign aimed at accelerating the pace of colonial advancement towards self-government.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Development Corporation, Colonial Development Corporation (London: The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Ltd., 1945), passim; Great Britain, British Information Services Reference Division, Towards Self-Government in the British Colonies (New York: British Information Services, 1947), pp. 45-47.

<sup>2</sup>The philosophy of the liberal community is well expressed in: Fabian Colonial Bureau, Domination or Cooperation: Report on a Conference on the Relationships Between the British and Colonial Peoples (London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1946); Rita Hinden, "Imperialism Today", Fabian Quarterly (April, 1945), 1-8.

Liberal concern over the future of Tanganyika dates back to the early post-war years. In 1945, the Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau remarked:

...the whole question of Tanganyika is very much in the forefront of our minds just at the moment. In one way or another, we have met a number of people coming from Tanganyika and all reports they bring lead us to feel very anxious about the future of this territory. Its status as a mandate will bring it to the fore when colonial questions are settled at the Peace Conference, following on the proposal for the formation of the new Trusteeship Council at San Francisco. We have therefore been considering preparing some documents for publication on the special question of Tanganyika, and in view of this I have been gathering up many valuable papers and letters which have come my way.

The Fabian Bureau immediately began to make an intense study of the territory and to enlist the aid of liberal members of Parliament who raised questions in the House of Commons concerning all aspects of the Trusteeship's development.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to Ollendorff, July 18, 1945, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See letter from Hinden to S. M. Mtengeti, August 18, 1948, FCB papers. Mtengeti, a black activist in Tanganyika, requested the names of M.P.s who were interested in helping to advance the pace of constitutional development in the territory. In reply, Hinden supplied the names of F. Skinnard, John Rankin, J. Hynd, and Reginald Sorinsen.

The liberal group concluded that the major controversies that would arise in the territory in the early post-war years would center upon the issues of land tenure and white settlement, (with a special problem arising concerning the disposal of ex-enemy estates) the methods and goals of the Overseas Food and Colonial Development corporations, and the debate within the Trusteeship Council over the pace and nature of political development.<sup>1</sup> The socialists were convinced that all of these troublesome questions were produced and further aggravated by the tri-racial policy of the Administering Authority.<sup>2</sup> Speaking of the racial composition of the territory, the Fabian Bureau noted:

This mixture naturally gives rise to a struggle for economic and social power between the different communities, which is exaggerated by the great cultural differences between them..

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<sup>1</sup>"Problems Arising in Connection with Tanganyika", notes on controversial issues drawn up by the FCB, 1945-50, Tanganyika files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>The defects of the partnership system were a constant theme of post-war liberal literature. As prime examples, see: Arthur Creech-Jones, "Our African Territories", African Affairs, Vol: 45, No. 180 (July, 1946); Julius Lewin, Britains Colour Bar in Africa (London: The Union of Democratic Control, 1948); Marjorie Nicholson, Self-Government and the Communal Problem: A Study of Colonial Constitutional Problems Arising in Plural Societies (London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1948).

This struggle, has not up to now been very bitter in Tanganyika itself, but events in surrounding territories have caused different groups in Tanganyika to adopt much stronger views than hitherto.<sup>1</sup>

Included among the "events in surrounding territories", the Bureau listed: South African nationalism, attempts at Central African federation, the creation of the East African High Commission and Central Legislative Assembly,<sup>2</sup> attempts by East African settlers to form political links with Central Africa, and the continuation of white immigration in all British territories.

The liberal reformers continually insisted that Britain had to formulate a definite, clearly-stated policy towards Tanganyika, based on a guarantee of self-government via the democratic process rather than through the "temporary" partnership system.<sup>3</sup> The basic complaint of

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<sup>1</sup>Notes on Tanganyika, Tanganyika files, 1945-55, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Both agencies were seen as a threat since they were a possible means of blurring the distinction made between colony and trusteeship. The international accountability of Britain was viewed as a major asset by liberal reformers.

<sup>3</sup>This demand is well articulated in: Josephine Kamm, Progress Toward Self-Government in the British Colonies (London: Fosh & Cross, Ltd., 1945), passim; Rt. Hon. The Earl of Listowel, "The Modern Conception of Government in British Africa", United Empire, Vol. XL, No. 4 (July-August, 1949), 172-177.



progressive reformers was that although Britain planned to emancipate her colonies, the process was retarded by the influence of interest groups who sought to preserve the Empire. Within Tanganyika, the white settler organizations were viewed as the chief source of such complications.

Fabian Secretary Hinden noted:

What is really lacking in Tanganyika is obvious -- a clear and determined policy. London has stuck to its fundamental ideas that the African should come first, that he should be encouraged towards self-government, that his standard of living should be raised. Once these principles reach Tanganyika they collided with the powerful claims of the minorities and special interests on the spot. In a hundred insidious ways Colonial Office policy is watered down by local pressures; and who is there, other than the harried official, to combat the subtle influence on his doorstep of employers, companies, planters and settlers? The Africans are unorganized, uneducated, politically untrained; the Indians are caught precariously between the upper Europeans and lower African millstones, and are aware of their own unpopularity. The whole psychology of Tanganyikan politics is wrong, and no amount of white self-righteousness or black resentment can set it right. Only an absolutely unequivocal policy can break through the confusion.<sup>1</sup>

The demand of the Fabian Colonial Bureau and other liberal groups for rapid territorial development led to

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden, "Notes on Tanganyika, 1948", Rita Hinden correspondence files, FCB papers.

open conflict in Parliament between the supporters of colonial emancipation and those who sought to preserve the Empire.

This pressure was manifested in many forms and involved multifold issues. In January 1945 Lord Ammon, at the urging of Rita Hinden, publicized a demand that Africans be trained for administrative positions in government. When the Colonial Office admitted that few steps had been taken in this direction, Ammon concluded that "...this is a side of the question of Colonial Government which requires attention and insistent pressuring on the Colonial Office."<sup>1</sup> In the same year, Labour M.P. John Dugdale demanded a Parliamentary inquiry to determine why the African wages in urban areas were so low that Africans were prevented from living within the townships and thus were denied exposure to modern influences.<sup>2</sup> A report by the Labour party advisor to the Colonial Office, Major Orde Browne analyzed the clearly substandard wages and working conditions afforded Africans in the territory.

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<sup>1</sup>Letter from Lord Ammon to Hinden, January 12, 1945, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Dugdale, March 14, 1945, Creech-Jones papers.

The report also revealed that the administration was not fulfilling its legal obligations to supply housing and adequate health facilities for African government workers.<sup>1</sup> The entire issue was subsequently raised in the House of Commons by Member A. G. Bottomly, at the urging of the Fabian Bureau.<sup>2</sup>

The debate soon extended to the House of Lords, where it was further revealed that Tanganyika blacks were still subject to penal sanctions for breaking contracts, that forced recruitment tactics were still employed by the native authorities and that mass corporal punishment was commonplace in many outlying regions.<sup>3</sup> The defense of the Colonial Office policy, led by Lord Hailey, was based on the argument that wages and working conditions should not be radically altered due to the lackadaisical attitude of Tanganyikan Africans towards salaried employment. According to Hailey, any reform would "only result

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Col. No. 193, Labour Conditions in East Africa (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), para. 170-194.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Bottomly, March 21, 1946, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), May 11, 1949, Col's 541-592.

in absenteeism, irregular working, and inefficiency."<sup>1</sup> When the debate was given prominence in the home press, editorials and letters from its public clearly reflected the wide gap which existed between the liberal and conservative communities on the question of African abilities to advance. This in turn led to opposing views concerning the pace at which territorial development should be allowed to proceed.<sup>2</sup>

The Overseas Food Corporation and the Groundnut Scheme were major sources of policy conflict within the home government. When the liberal community discovered that personnel working on the scheme often become permanent settlers upon the termination of their contracts

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., cols. 562-563.

<sup>2</sup>Compare for example, the editorials and letters to the editor of the London Times and East Africa and Rhodesia for May 12-14, 1949. The difference between the liberal and conservative thought on the issue of African development is also clearly stated in: Arthur Creech-Jones, "The Labour Party and Colonial Policy, 1945-51" in New Fabian Colonial Essays, ed. by Arthur Creech-Jones (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 19-37; Ian Henderson, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement: Two Views Considered (Lusaka: Historical Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1964); Lord Rennell, Arthur Creech-Jones M.P. and Col. C. E. Ponsonby, M.P., "Africa and the British Political Parties: (1) A Liberal View (2) A Labour View (3) A Conservative View", African Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 176 (July, 1945), 107-119.

and that even temporary resident employees were becoming involved in white settler politics, they demanded a full-scale investigation. This in turn led to a series of Parliamentary debates.<sup>1</sup>

There were also several major controversies concerning development policy in Tanganyika territory which continually divided the liberal and conservative elements of the home government. Key among these issues was the question of further white settlement. The Labour Party and the liberal reform groups maintained a constant stand in opposition to future white immigration. They insisted that increased European settlement inevitably resulted in special economic concessions for the minority groups via subsidies and price controlling, domination of the representative organs of government, and special land acquisition privileges. The history of white settlement throughout East and Central Africa indicated that the policy ultimately resulted in white domination and the demise of carefully planned schemes for African development. Thus, liberals

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to James Johnson, M.P., April 18, 1950, FCB papers. See also Olive Holmes, "Peoples, Politics and Peanuts in Eastern Africa", Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXVI, No. 14 (December, 1950), 154-163.

stood prepared to resist any proposals aimed at increasing European settlement within the territory.<sup>1</sup>

In March 1949 it became known that the Crown had given 126 Europeans and eleven companies land grants within the trust territory. The fact that Secretary of State Creech-Jones supported these grants despite his position of leadership in both the Labour Party and the socialist movement further confused and aggravated the situation.<sup>2</sup> The Fabian Bureau quickly organized a liberal protest in opposition to this policy. The Secretary of State made it clear that the granting of permission to settle had been based on the individual merits of each application and that the concessions were not indicative of a new policy. The liberal reformers however remained unsatisfied.<sup>3</sup> Fabian Secretary Nicholson remarked:

...we are very anxious that any new entrants should be people who can be of use in key

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<sup>1</sup>FCB notes on "Future of White Settlement in Tanganyika", dated 1945. Hinden to E. Harvey, M.P., March 15, 1945, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), March 11, 1949, cols. 527-529.

<sup>3</sup>Creech-Jones to Marjorie Nicholson, Bureau Secretary, March 16, 1949; Nicholson to Creech-Jones, March 18, 1949, FCB papers.

positions in plantations, co-operative schemes, etc.; but not small farmers, as they do not make any adequate income unless they underpay their labour.<sup>1</sup>

The conservative faction was quick to defend the increased settlement policy.<sup>2</sup> At a meeting of the Royal Africa Society, a political social organization comprised primarily of foreign service personnel, Conservative M.P. E. W. Bovill stated:

The critics of the Colonial Empire regard the white settler as the quintessence of everything that is evil. It is very difficult when you are discussing the British Colonial Empire with those who know nothing about it to persuade them that the white man is not out to batten on the black.

...I can assure you that the white settler in East Africa could not have a better champion than the Colonial Office, the representatives of which are constantly impressing upon their critics the

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to C. G. P. Smith, M.P., March 19, 1946  
FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>The pro-settler attitude of the conservative elements of British politics is reflected in the popular political literature of the period. See for example: Malcolm Lord Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1943); Major Lewis Hastings, M.C., "Democracy and the African", African Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 197 (September, 1950), 211-223; J. H. Huizinga, "Africa, the Continent of Tomorrow's Trouble" African Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 195 (April, 1950), 120-128; Elspeth Huxley, Africa's Dilemma (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1948), and "Some Impressions of East Africa", United Empire, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5 (September-October, 1947), 237-244.

immeasurable boon which the white settler has given to Africa. What East Africa owes to the white settler is to my mind incalculable but is fully appreciated by the Colonial Office.<sup>1</sup>

The general belief of the conservative community was that increased white settlement should be supported not only because it provided an economic opportunity for Europeans but also because it afforded Africans the experienced leadership they needed if the territories were to advance. This belief was clearly reflected by the Tory leadership in the post-war debates on Tanganyika. In May 1949 Lord Tweedsmuir summed up the conservative viewpoint on this issue:

...we would not encourage a flood of European settlement that would push the African population back and back and finding that balance is a challenge to us. This is a design for a great partnership, a partnership which a great African once described as 'the harmony of the black and white keys'. If European colonization is curtailed, I believe that it will also curtail that leadership and that technical assistance which the African so badly needs. If you allow Europeans only thirty-three year tenure of their land, they will be tempted to extract as much as they can from it in that short time, then lay it to waste and leave it....If you

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<sup>1</sup> E. W. Bovill, "East Africa Today", (An address given at a meeting of the Royal Africa Society, April 12, 1946), Rhodes House.



create a European climate of insecurity, you will discourage all further enterprise and investment, and destroy the good will upon which all development must rest.<sup>1</sup>

A major victory for the conservative forces was achieved in February 1949. The recently published report of the 1948 Visiting Mission had suggested a curtailment of European settlement. In response to demands for a refutation of these proposals made by Conservative M.P. Ivor Thomas and Colonel J. W. Ponsby, Secretary of State Creech-Jones announced:

His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to schemes for non-African settlement in Tanganyika, on the understanding that the land in question is not required for African occupation, and that the schemes are economically sound. I recognise the value of non-African enterprise and that it must be viewed as an integral part of the development of the Territory as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

This concession by the liberal Secretary of State was based on his recognition that the territory could not hope to make any significant economic progress without settler investment. As a result, some 100 Europeans were

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords). May 11, 1949, col. 569.

<sup>2</sup>Notes of a meeting with Conservative delegation, February 2, 1949, Creech-Jones papers.

given land grants in 1949. At no time however, did the Secretary plan to make open settlement a permanent or long range feature of Tanganyika's administrative policy.<sup>1</sup> The concession, nonetheless, represented a clear victory of Conservative policy.

In retaliation, liberal elements within Britain began to campaign to thwart future white settlement.<sup>2</sup> The Fabian Bureau, which led the liberal drive, petitioned its cause directly to the new Secretary of State:

A major source of trouble is that it is by no means clear what the policy of the Government is on the question of European land settlement in Tanganyika, and Africans are fearful that the history of Kenya is about to repeat itself....As you know, the land alienation policies have been criticised time without number in the Labour movement, and it has always been our hope that, with a Labour Government in office, the mistakes of the past would not be repeated in the Colonies neighboring on Kenya. This does not mean to say that we are not aware of the valuable contribution to the economic life of the country made by European capital, skill and enterprise, but we claim that the same contributions could be made without alienating land for settlement....Once

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<sup>1</sup>Creech-Jones to FCB, February 6, 8, 1949, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>The year 1950 found Creech-Jones out of office due to the reapportionment of his district. He was replaced by James Griffiths, another liberal with socialist leanings who nonetheless proved to be another unexpected thorn in the side of the liberal reform movement.

European settlement is permitted, the settlers naturally develop a political stake in the country; they put forward claims for privileged treatment and the political consequences, in terms of African resentment outweigh by far the benefits of an economic order that the settlers are able to bring.

There are now signs of this unfortunate sequence of events occurring in Tanganyika, and we are filled with disquiet by the reports coming from that country....It is obvious that immense pressure is being exerted by Europeans in Tanganyika to gain possession of more and more land. They have many more opportunities of voicing their claims loudly than have the Africans, who -- apart from the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations -- can look for protection only to you, Sir, and to your Officials in the Colonial Office and on the spot, and with all diffidence, express the hope that you give this problem, with all its manifold dangers and political implications, your earnest attention, and consider the possibility of an unambiguous statement of where, exactly, His Majesty's Government stands.<sup>1</sup>

Once again however, the liberal forces were to suffer a setback rendered by one of their own members. In reply to the Bureau's request, the Secretary of State commented:

I have carefully considered the arguments put forward in your letter, but I can see no reason for varying the policy regarding European settlement which has been followed by my predecessors. In a vast country with a comparatively sparse and scattered population, such as Tanganyika, the cost of administration is inevitably very high.

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<sup>1</sup>Rita Hinden to Secretary of State Griffiths, June 29, 1950, FCB papers.

At the same time, there is urgent need to increase educational and medical facilities for the African population of the territory. If this is to be done there must first be a considerable expansion of the Government's revenues and to secure that we must develop the economic resources of the territory to the utmost by all possible means and with the least possible delay.

...In these circumstances I think your Committee need not fear that the political disadvantage of the proposed policy of European settlement in Tanganyika will outweigh the economic and other advantages which the territory will derive from it.<sup>1</sup>

While the controversy over European immigration was in progress, a second major liberal-conservative confrontation was taking place. This involved the related question of land alienation and centered on the issue of what plots should be reserved for European use, under what circumstances and for how long a period of tenure.

The battle over land grants commenced in May 1946 when the Land Settlement Board of Tanganyika proposed that the Member for Lands and Mines be allowed to handle all petitions for grants, and that preferential treatment be given to veterans and experienced small scale white farmers. The Fabian Bureau launched a protest in the

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<sup>1</sup>Griffiths to Hinden, October 20, 1950, FCB papers.

House of Commons via the cooperation of Captain Charles Smith, M.P. As a result, the proposition was abandoned.<sup>1</sup> In 1946 the Post-War Planning Committee, established to draw up a blueprint for future territorial development, suggested that a Land Settlement Board and Office be established to study the possibility of ninety-nine year leases for new settlers. Again the socialists protested loudly to both the press and the Colonial Office, thus temporarily blocking the measure.<sup>2</sup>

A major crisis in the land grant controversy arose in 1949 when the House of Lords debated the Colonial Office's policy concerning land alienation for Tanganyika. This debate closely followed the release of the 1948 Visiting Mission report, which called for the turning over of confiscated ex-enemy estates to the indigenous population for development via cooperative farming. In defiance of this recommendation the government announced that only 155,000 acres on the lower slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro would be reserved for Africans and developed at the government's expense. The Crown clearly rejected the Visiting

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<sup>1</sup>Marjorie Nicholson to Captain Charles Smith, May 19, 1946, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 29, 1946, FCB papers.

Mission's overall recommendations. It was the belief of the Administering Authority that the African population did not yet possess the capacity to utilize these valuable lands properly. Lord Listowel, opening a debate on the issue in the House of Lords stated:

...although we agree that ownership and control should ultimately pass to African hands and that it may well be exercised on a cooperative basis, it seems likely that the transfer would be a gradual process, and there can be no question of handing over this undertaking at an early state....There must necessarily be a lengthy period of preparation and instruction before the indigenous inhabitants can hope to make a business success of such a vast and complex agricultural experiment.<sup>1</sup>

Listowel, a staunch supporter of the liberal reform drive,<sup>2</sup> did however, concede that aside from the ex-German estates, no other lands should be reserved for white settlement since over one-sixth of the most valuable real estate was already set aside for European utilization.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), May 11, 1949, cols. 581-582.

<sup>2</sup>See Lord Listowel, Commonwealth Future (London: The Fabian Society, 1957), for a detailed analysis of Listowel's thoughts on colonial issues.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report on the Visiting Mission, 1948, pp. 82-88.

Speaking of this issue, the Lord stated:

...I would suggest that Her Majesty's Government should be extremely cautious in their alienation of any further land in Tanganyika. Alienation of arid, unproductive land, like that which is being developed by the groundnut scheme, is clearly to the advantage of the territory....

However...no land that is required for African occupation or any land likely to be required for Africans in the foreseeable future should be alienated. We are all aware that there is in Tanganyika a serious shortage of land into which Africans can be moved. Such movement is necessary if erosion is to be stopped in the areas already occupied. It seems to me, on reading this Report, that it is very improbable that there is much land which is neither needed for African occupation nor likely to be needed in the foreseeable future.<sup>1</sup>

The conservative faction, however, refused to support any of the reforms suggested by the Visiting Mission report. They argued that no significant development could occur within the Territory without a drastic influx of white settlers. Since less than two percent of the total land area was reserved for white utilization and the total number of acres alienated had been decreased from 1,993,000 under German rule to 1,846,000 under British administration, conservatives maintained that the land policy was more than generous in its concern for native interests.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), May 11, 1949, cols. 552-553.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., cols. 560-561.

It was during this period of debate over land reservation that the most sensitive alienation problem, the Meru land case, had its inception. The issue involved the government plan to remove about 1,000 members of the Meru Tribe in Northern Province from the Sanya corridor, a plateau lying between Mts. Meru and Kilimanjaro. They were to be transferred to new lands some forty miles to the west, in the Kangori region. The decision was announced by the Government at a tribal baraza<sup>1</sup> on June 7, 1949.<sup>2</sup>

Although the full storm of controversy over the Meru land move did not break out until the 1951-54 period, dissatisfaction with the proposals was expressed by a local elite activist group, the Meru Citizens Union, and by T.A.A. Both organizations ultimately petitioned the United Nations to block the transfer. At the same time, the Meru chief who gave his consent to the government proposal was pressured into retiring in the wake of tribal unrest produced by the plan.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Baraza" is a tribal meeting. In the later part of the colonial period, such meetings included parliamentary procedure, participation by European administrators, and democratic voting on some issues.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, June 8, 9, 1949.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Eleventh Session, 426th Meeting (June 3-July 24, 1952), pp. 306; 431st Meeting (June 30, 1952), pp. 1-3.



The liberal forces within Great Britain quickly conducted an investigation of the situation. The Secretary of State was plagued with a constant stream of questions from anti-colonial groups concerned over the fate of the Meru people and the possible implications of the policy in relation to land alienation. In June 1950 Michael Parker, a Labour M.P., asked the Secretary of State to guarantee that Tanganyika would not be divided into specified areas for European and African settlement. The Secretary of State assured him that no such a plan was intended by Her Majesty's Government.<sup>1</sup> This promise was reinforced in a letter from the Secretary to Rita Hinden in October 1950:

...there is no intention of dividing Tanganyika into native reserves and areas for non-native occupation. Alienated areas are, and will continue to be, scattered among areas of African settlement throughout the Territory.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Colonial Office continually promised that it had no plan for massive European settlement or land alienation, lack of a clear policy statement produced

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), June 21, 1950.

<sup>2</sup>Griffiths to Hinden, October 20, 1950, FCB papers.

considerable unrest within the liberal ranks of the home government. It was feared that the policy of deciding land grants and settlement cases on an individual basis could ultimately result in the development of an overly powerful white settler group in Tanganyika. The recent statements by the Member for Lands and Mines only increased the growing apprehensions of the Labour party and its supporters. The liberals therefore sought a definite assurance from the Crown that this would not be allowed to happen.<sup>1</sup> Their protest was centered on the fear that the economic advances resulting from white settlement would not offset the negative political effects produced within the territory by such a powerful and conservative force:

All experience elsewhere seems to suggest that a settler community, once established in a country with an African majority, is likely to try to protect its interests by adopting a political attitude which is incompatible with harmonious race relations. There has been ample evidence in the past few months that some sections of opinion in Tanganyika already reflect such an attitude but there has been no evidence to suggest that there is any effective organized body of opinion amongst the settlers which does not regard the future of the Territory from the standpoint of its own community rights....My committee

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<sup>1</sup>Marjorie Nicholson, "Notes on Issues in Tanganyika Territory"; Rita Hinden, "Tanganyika" in personal correspondence files, FCB papers.

cannot believe that it is in the long run likely to be of benefit to the Territory to have its economic resources slightly improved by the admission of 100 settlers a year, at the expense of repeating there the difficulties which are so apparent in Kenya.

...We feel disquiet at the removal of Africans from land already in their occupation, since the removal of Africans from land immediately, and naturally, arouses the liveliest forebodings as to the security of tenure of Africans on other lands.

We are aware that in asking you to reconsider the whole policy of land settlement in Tanganyika we are asking you to depart from the policy which the Tanganyika Government has followed...We feel that is a case in which the value of continuity of policy is likely to be completely cancelled out by the political results. We would question also whether the policy is likely to meet with the approval of the trusteeship Council of the United Nations, whose Visiting Mission has already commented not wholly favourably on conditions in Tanganyika.

The situation was further aggravated by Member MacDonald's additional statements in an address to the Dar es Salaam Rotary Club concerning alleged government plans for the creation of a "non-native homogenous block" in the Sanya corridor region.<sup>2</sup> The press in both Britain and East Africa widely reported and editorialized the issue thus creating a great controversy in both the home government and the colonies. The question was temporarily

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to Griffiths, November 14, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 2, 1950.

resolved in December 1950, when a delegation from the Fabian Bureau met with representatives of the Colonial Office. The socialist delegates were shown detailed maps outlining the nature of the planned move. It was apparent that the 500 families involved had been isolated from the rest of their tribe located on the lower steps of Mt. Meru as a result of the German and earlier British policies of land alienation. The administration's plan would reunite them with their tribe. All expenses involved and all financial losses produced by the move would be compensated for by the government. Finally, the land from which the families were being moved was suitable only for grazing connected with large-scale commercial cattle ranching. It was therefore of little economic use to the Meru. A study of maps showed that about seventy-five European estates would be created in the corridor and that this was in no way an attempt to link with other alienated areas to create a "homogeneous" land block.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the socialists decided to support the Meru removal decision, based on the fact that it would be beneficial to both the Meru and to

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<sup>1</sup>"Notes on a discussion held December 5, 1950, between Bureau delegates and Colonial office representatives", Tanganyika Files, FCB papers.

territorial development and that, "...the necessity of this settlement arose from conditions which did not obtain anywhere else in the territory and would not recur in the future."<sup>1</sup> Thus, although the question of land tenure was of increasing importance, the vagueness of government policy and the moderation of the liberal position still prevented the issue from becoming a troublesome controversy. The flexibility of the liberal community is reflected by the fact that the Fabian Bureau in early 1950 conditionally accepted the concept of ninety-nine year leases, if necessary to encourage development of low quality lands.<sup>2</sup>

The 1945-50 period also saw the initiation of a rift between the liberal and conservative factions concerning the supervisory role of the United Nations in the administration of the territory. Labour interests in the international body's activities dated back to the drawing up of the Trusteeship Agreement. At that time the Fabian Bureau had unsuccessfully utilized its supporters in the House of Commons in an attempt to pressure the Secretary of State

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Venture, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February, 1950), 1.

to consult the indigenous population on their views concerning the nature of the trusteeship contract.<sup>1</sup> The first major conflict concerning the role of the U. N. came with the release in 1949 of the report of the Visiting Mission of the previous year. The observations of the delegates criticized the territory's land alienation policy, called for an end to white settlement, and noted the dire need for an accelerated pace of political advancement. Above all, the report noted that fulfillment of these needs did not seem probable under the existing systems of racial separation and indirect rule. The liberal reform groups as a whole supported the conclusion of the Visiting Mission and noted that many of the most serious problems were the product of a vague Colonial Office policy. Dr. Hinden commented:

With the publication of this Report, the fat will be in the fire. Britain critics at UNO will undoubtedly leap with joy at some of the disclosures, and an unmerciful bludgeoning - an [d] probably at the same time a quite unfair one - may well be in store for the Colonial Office. British spokesmen will feel their hackles rising and will discant on all that has already been achieved in the face of staggering obstacles. Britain has, in fact,

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<sup>1</sup>Correspondence between FCB and Kenneth Younger, M.P., April-June 1946, FCB papers.

done almost everything she could in a backward, difficult country with an uneducated population - everything that is, except have an unambiguous policy: And it is just this which the irate Europeans of East Africa are now asking her to formulate. We want, proclaimed a settlers meeting in Tanganyika last week, a 'categorical statement from the Government which will leave nobody, black or white, in any doubt as to what...the government intends to do'. Precisely.<sup>1</sup>

While the liberal community accepted the criticisms in the Visiting Mission report with some reservations, the conservative elements, and especially those involved in overseas administration, were irate. Fabian Secretary Hinden remarked:

...despite some factual weaknesses, the Report hit the nail on the head, and I...have said so pretty emphatically within the sacred precincts of Church House. But the C.O. seems to have had its back put up properly, and they are ranting about the inequalities of Trusteeship Council behavior.<sup>2</sup>

Conservative resentment of the report was clearly reflected in the House of Lords debate of May 11, 1949. The general attitude of the Tory faction was that the U.N. team was unaware of the problems inherent in administration of

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden, notes for an article entitled "Tanganyika Tangle", Hinden files 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Wilfred Benson of Great Britain's U. N. staff, May 13, 1949, FCB papers.

a developing territory. Noted Lord Farington:

...some of the Commission's remarks are due to a lack of appreciation...of the position of this country vis-a-vis not only Tanganyika but its other Colonies. Of course, the Commission's members will have regarded themselves in so far as they represented the Trusteeship Council, as the guardians of the people of Tanganyika. It is natural for them to try to obtain for their wards as much as possible; we cannot reproach them for that. But they should remember that this country has many Colonial responsibilities beyond its Trusteeship territories. Even if this country's resources were considerably less limited than in fact they are, we should still not be in a position to give all our Colonies the services on a scale which the Commission think desirable, and which we should think desirable in the case of Tanganyika. Not only do the Commission somehow show themselves a little too parochial-minded, but sometimes they do not seem to recognize the shortages of this post-war world.<sup>1</sup>

The report was also severely criticized by Lords Rennell and Hailey both of whom noted that such attacks discouraged potential settlers from investing in the territory by making British tenure seem to be in doubt. Thus, the report potentially impeded territorial development. In addition, the Lords discredited the report on the basis that the four man U. N. team spent only six weeks in the territory and completely failed to visit two provinces.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), May 11, 1949, cols. 548-548.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., cols. 525-572.



The fact that the Mission was comprised primarily of representatives of non-colonial powers with no ability to appreciate the complexities of colonial administration further challenged the value of the document. The disdain of the Tory faction for the U. N.'s right to criticize British colonial policy was well expressed by Lord Hailey:

...though we all accepted the fact of the former, Mandated Territories would have to become Trust Territories, we viewed with a great deal of apprehension the constitution of the Trusteeship Council. It is not a body of men appointed on account of their knowledge or interest or experience of the Colonial affairs; it consists of nation members. There was every reason to suppose...that the representative of these constituent nations would reproduce in the Trusteeship Council some of the national prejudices, dislikes and enmities which have found so large in the discussions of the U.N.O. itself.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Rennell described the missions as:

...well meaning people butting in on things they know very little about....That they should proffer advice, is not helpful either to the administration in Tanganyika or to His Majesty's Government who are trying to develop Tanganyika. Both the Government and the administration have my sympathies over the treatment they have received at the hands of an itinerant Commission of this sort, which is the direct product of the formation of a great and noble ideal which never ought to have been formalised.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., cols. 557-558.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., col. 576.

The final criticism of the Mission was issued by the Colonial Office itself, in a statement entitled "Innaccuracies and Misunderstandings in Trusteeship Council Report."<sup>1</sup> Thus, the Tory party which was firmly committed to the slow evolution of the territory over a period of several generations, and to the preservation of the systems of parity and indirect rule, clearly revealed that it had little use for the interference of the United Nations in trusteeship affairs.

The post-war period saw the development of yet another conflict between the liberal and conservative elements of the home government, which in the years to come would override all other issues. This was the question of the rate and nature of political development within the territory.

The pattern of political development in Tanganyika was a constant source of concern for the liberal forces in the post-war years. In the 1945-50 period Labour M.P.s repeatedly raised questions concerning the democratization of native authorities, the initiation and development of

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Information Department, "Innaccuracies and Misunderstandings in Trusteeship Council Report", newsbrief released by the Colonial Office, February 24, 1949.

democratic processes in local district and provincial councils and plans for the political education of the indigenous population. Above all, liberals were interested in the pace at which elective procedures would be introduced at the territorial level and in the structure of the territorial government as it underwent its gradual evolution towards self-rule.<sup>1</sup>

The reformers believed that the Colonial Office and the territorial administration were willing and capable of initiating a satisfactory plan of political advancement but that they were opposed by the small but influential European community. White settlers were therefore viewed as the greatest threat to peaceful political advancement.<sup>2</sup> Liberals were convinced that the tri-racial nature of the territory, with its two tiny minority communities, would present ever increasing problems to the Crown unless an early declaration of political development along democratic lines was announced.<sup>3</sup> When Governor Twining's memo to the

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<sup>1</sup>See the files of M.P.'s Kenneth Younger and J. Skinnard, for a listing of the numerous questions asked by each in the 1945-50 period, concerning territorial political developments, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to John Hynd, M.P., February 28, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Notes on "Political Advancement in the East African Territories", territorial files, 1948-49, Creech-Jones papers.

constitutional committee suggested parity between African and non-African inhabitants via an electoral college system, the loud protest raised by white settlers convinced liberals that their struggle would be not with the territorial government, but with the European community.

The Fabian Bureau remarked:

Tanganyika is at present the storm centre of a constitutional conflict which has arisen from the proposal that Europeans and non-Europeans should vote on a common electoral roll. This issue is fundamental to the whole future of East and Central Africa.

The problem facing Britain has its roots in the structure of the population of these territories, and we are aware that it is a problem which admits no easy solution....Europeans are overwhelmingly out-numbered by Africans and are also out-numbered by Asiatics, mainly Indians....Considering the great cultural differences between the communities, it is natural that the minority group should feel anxious lest their own cultural standards should be lost, and this would create political difficulties whichever community were in the minority. It happens, however, that the minority group is at present politically dominant, and that its members, in the light of their own tradition, expect political representation and responsibility of a kind which has been known only in highly advanced communities. If they wish to share democratic institutions with the majority, they face the difficulty that these institutions are very far removed from the traditions of the majority community; if they are unwilling to share power, they can only try to evade or silence African demands for equality. It appears that in the desire to maintain

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their own standards intact, the European minorities in the British territories are increasingly turning to the latter policy.<sup>1</sup>

Liberals argued that as a result of white settler pressure the Crown had developed the policy of racial separation and had also insured that, in practice, the European community dominated territorial politics. The recent division of the East and Central African territories along racial lines appeared to be ample proof that similar developments were underway in the Trusteeship.<sup>2</sup> The liberal community therefore viewed the proposed constitutional advances in Tanganyika as "...a test for the whole political future of the territories in East and Central Africa which are inhabited by multi-racial populations."<sup>3</sup> As the leading progressive organization, the Fabian Bureau led the battle for an end to racial separation. It argued that since the ultimate goal of British colonial policy was self-rule through democratic institutions,

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<sup>1</sup>FCB notes on "Constitutional Policy in Tanganyika", April, 1950. FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to John Hynd, February 26, 1950; Creech-Jones to Lady Hilda Selwyn-Clarke, May 3, 1950; James Betts, FCB Secretary to Michael Scott of the African Bureau, May 9, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Hinden, "Tanganyika notes", April, 1950, FCB papers.

it was pointless to create artificial barriers which would have to disappear with the emancipation of the territories. Unnecessary division also increased racial tensions and in the long run proved a disservice to the minority groups.

The Bureau reasoned:

...all possible efforts should be directed towards the development of Parliamentary institutions which reflect the true balance of interests in these territories. Separate representation does not assist in this development, since it institutionalises the existing division between the different communities and inhibits the growth of non-racial political parties. The aim should be for a common electoral roll for all communities, with the same qualifications for all electors.<sup>1</sup>

While advocating common roll elections, the socialists claimed that the quality of the electorate would be safeguarded by literacy tests, in either Swahili or English, minimum income requirements, and the use of appointed members for some seats on the Legislative Council to represent commercial interests.<sup>2</sup> At a meeting of Fabian Bureau leaders and sympathetic M.P.s, the liberal camp devised a temporary plan of African representation which would allow Tanganyikan Africans without necessary economic

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<sup>1</sup>Notes on "Constitutional Policy", FCB papers; Venture, Vol. 2, No. 5 (June, 1950), 1-3 and 11-12.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholson on East African policy, Spring 1950, FCB papers.

or educational qualifications to indirectly elect local representatives to the central legislature through local native councils. When individual tribal groups were sufficiently advanced, this alternative system could be phased out and replaced by direct participation in central government elections. The transformation would take place at different times in various sections of the territory depending upon the speed with which Africans were able to make the adjustment to modern political processes.<sup>1</sup> In order to guarantee minority community representation on the Legislative Council, the Governor would have the right to nominate members of the Asian and European race to fill an agreed number of reserved seats. Official majorities would also be retained on the Legislative and Executive Councils. Although unofficial appointees would be selected from all three communities, the liberals insisted that "...there should be no acceptance in theory or in practice of any principle of parity of representation or of any other rigid device."<sup>2</sup> Finally, the liberals agreed

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<sup>1</sup>"Notes on a meeting at Transport House", April 17, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholson, "Notes on Tanganyika Policy", April 23, 1950, FCB papers.

that any political parties which might develop should not be allowed to limit membership to one race, since this would only further aggravate the racial tensions already produced by "partnership".<sup>1</sup>

The socialists also rejected the proposals for constitutional development put forth by the Governor in his note to the Constitutional Committee. They argued that the suggested electoral college system provided a common electoral roll for the minority groups, but excluded educated Africans. In addition, the proposal made no plan for guaranteed reserved seats for Asians and Europeans, which would be necessary as political evolution occurred. Finally, there was no insurance that the native authority councils, the supposed training ground for political participation, would be forced to operate in a democratic manner.<sup>2</sup>

In order to explain both their own policy and their objections to the proposals for political development put forth by the Tanganyika Government, the Fabian Bureau arranged an interview with the Secretary of State and key

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<sup>1</sup>Correspondence between Nicholson and Dr. Kenneth Little of the London School of Economics, April 17-23, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>"Notes on Constitutional Policy", FCB papers.



personnel from the Colonial Office.<sup>1</sup> The socialists were generally satisfied with the reception given their proposals, but expressed skeptical concern of how their suggestions would be received by the colonial administrators who were closely allied with settler interests. The head of the Fabian Bureau offered the following evaluation of the meeting:

...[Secretary of State] told us that most of the Governors of Eastern and Central Africa would be coming to London within the next three months... in order to discuss constitutional problems for the whole of the area. He considered that the proposals which we placed before him as being very meritable, and showing signs of careful work, and that they could be considered as a possible basis for discussion with the Governors. He recognises very clearly that there has to be a change of heart in East and Central Africa with regard to many aspects of the life of the African and Indians if bloodshed is to be avoided in that area. We felt that the Secretary of State was very honest and sincere, and only too willing to listen to our point of view, but what the outcome will be when he is at his discussion with the Governors and the top permanent officials is another matter.<sup>2</sup>

The conservative faction by comparison was determined to maintain political control by the minority communities

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to Griffiths, April 21, 1950, FCB papers. The delegation included Nicholson, Francis Horrabin, Reginald Sorenson, M.P., and Dr. Kenneth Little.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Audrey Smith, May 23, 1950, FCB papers.

for as long as possible. Tory leaders repeatedly rejected any proposals calling for a time schedule of territorial political development. They also maintained that the development of representative government could effectively take place only through the evolution of the native authorities. The democratization of these local political units would be followed by the establishment of first district and then provincial councils. Ultimately Africans would participate in open elections at the central government level, but only after years of local political experience had been gained. At all times, however, the minority groups would have their political influence preserved by the reservation of seats in elective bodies and by the appointive power of the Governor.<sup>1</sup> The lack of confidence felt by the Tory faction was summed up by Lord Listowel who spoke of Conservative party apprehensions:

...about the pace at which advance towards a representative system of government in a tribal society can be made, and the time required before the indigenous population can provide for themselves an efficient and responsible administration.

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<sup>1</sup>The Conservative plan for political evolution is well expressed in Alan T. Lennox-Boyd, "Impressions of East Africa", *United Empire*, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (July-August 1952), 163-167. See also House of Lords debate of May 11, 1949, passim and the statements made by Tory leaders to the press in East Africa and Rhodesia, July 6, and August 3, 1950.

In our view, a too-rapid movement towards these objectives, by failing to take into account the political immaturity of the rural African population, would imperil the standard of living and the steady political progress of the territory as a whole....

It is...extremely difficult at the present stage of African political development to find Africans who are both able to play a useful part in the work of the Council and are recognized by the mass of the African population as speaking in a representative capacity for them. The danger of forcing African representation by Africans at a hot pace is that it will result in practice in the representation of sectional interests which often run counter to the interests of the rural communities which form the bulk of the population. Before the masses of the people can safeguard their own interests it will be necessary as I have already said in referring to the method of developing self-government in Tanganyika, to build up a system of representation by popular choice at the tribal or local government level.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the colonial period, the Tories continually argued that African representatives were not necessary to safeguard African interests, since Her Majesty's Government sought to protect the rights of all subjects and because government policy was clearly designed to favor indigenous interests. The liberals by contrast claimed that white settler demands unduly influenced the administration and weakened its policies.

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), May 11, 1949, col. 583.

The Liberal supporters in Parliament immediately began to apply direct pressure on the government to insure the proper and rapid political advancement of Tanganyika. In March 1950, M.P. Sorenson demanded that the Secretary of State give assurances that he would "...not be deflected from the path of granting just constitutional representation to Africans in Tanganyika because of the objections of European minorities."<sup>1</sup> The following month, another Labour member demanded that the government clearly outline its plan for increased African representation on the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup>

During this period, liberal activists continually offered advice and support to Tanganyikan African leaders within the territory. Chief Kidaha Makwaia, one of the four African members of the Legislative Council, was advised not to support any constitutional changes based on regionalism (as had occurred in Nigeria) since this would lead to sectionalism and would fail to provide African elite the territorial base of political support they needed to create a viable national leadership. At the same time,

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to Rev. R. Sorenson, M.P., March 8, 1950, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), April 26, 1950.

Makwaia was discouraged from accepting any proposal for the reservation of a set percentage of Legislative Council seats for each race since such a settlement would only produce racial unrest. In addition, any settlement which offered significant representation to the minority communities would clearly be out of proportion to their percentage of the total population and thus unfair to Africans.<sup>1</sup>

The Fabians offered similar advice to Legislative Appointee and T.A.A. leader Marealle and to various other members of the Association. In this early period the T.A.A., although actively involved in local issues, had not yet formulated a definite plan for territorial political evolution. The socialists continually urged the Association to decide upon a policy statement. The liberals advised that only a program ultimately based on open election through a non-racial franchise could guarantee the evolution of truly democratic institutions within the territory. For this reason parity should not be supported. The right of the minority groups to maintain a significant role within the government could be preserved temporarily by minimal

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to Makwaia, August 3-11, 1950, FCB papers.

franchise qualifications and by the appointive power of the Governor. However, the Association had to make it clear that the territory would eventually have a black-dominated government.<sup>1</sup>

The Fabians also advised leaders of the Asian communities. The Bureau, for example, severely criticized the Muslim community's<sup>2</sup> suggestion that Legislative Council representation be based on religion, as yet another means of dividing the population into rival groups.<sup>3</sup>

Thus by 1950 the stage was set for a major liberal-conservative confrontation over the question of political development within the trust territory.

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<sup>1</sup>"T.A.A. correspondence files", FCB papers. See especially Nicholson to Marealle, November 14, 1950; Hinden to Marealle, March 31, 1950 and Makwaia-Hinden correspondence, October 1949-April 1950.

<sup>2</sup>At the time of the correspondence, the Association served as the principle socio-cultural organization of the 30,000 member Muslim community. Division into numerous sects most of which reflected strong isolationist tendencies, prevented the Muslim community from playing a more active role in territorial developments.

<sup>3</sup>Hinden to K. J. Daya, September 27, 1950, FCB papers.

### The Influence of the United Nations

The controversial debates which arose between 1945 and 1950 concerning the development of Tanganyika were further complicated by the activities of the Trusteeship Council. In the early post-war period, this body became the stage for the ideological conflict which raged between the colonial powers and the anti-imperialist nations. While the Permanent Mandate Commission had been a decidedly pro-colonial body<sup>1</sup>, the Trusteeship Council was strongly opposed to any form of imperialism and continually agitated for the emancipation of the trust territory. Through the Visiting Mission reports, the annual examinations of the activities of the administering authority, and the handling of petitions from subjects within the territory, the Trusteeship Council maintained a constant stream of criticism which caused repeated complications and embarrassment for the Colonial Office and the territorial administration, both of which were already under attack from the liberal community.

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<sup>1</sup>Pierre Alexandre, L'Afrique Orientale Britannique (Paris: Armand Colin, Cahier 161 de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques: Decolonisation et Regimes Politique en Afrique Noire, 1961), pp. 95-105; Charlotte Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy Under Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 3-19.

The criticism leveled by the international organization was much more severe than that raised by dissident factions within the home government. While socialists realized that self-government was imminent and therefore limited their criticism to issues involving the pace and structure of political evolution, the Soviet Union and her anti-imperial allies openly and repeatedly charged that Britain had no intention of ever emancipating her global holdings. At the same time, the ideological convictions of the anti-imperialist faction caused them to ignore the positive improvements produced by British administration.<sup>1</sup>

The trusteeship confrontations did not begin with the creation of the United Nations. Although the Council was established in 1946, the Soviet Union did not take its seat until two years later due to other ideological conflicts it was engaged in within the international body. During the interim period, the Council functioned smoothly and was able

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<sup>1</sup>For an example of the difference in the nature of the criticism leveled by the two groups compare: Molly Mortimer, Trusteeship in Practice (London: Fabian Colonial Bureau, 1951) and N. V. Novikov, Statement by N. V. Novikov Member of the USSR Delegation to the Second Part of the United Nations, Ambassador of the USSR to the United States in Committee IV, Trusteeship and Non-Self Governing Territories of the General Assembly to the United Nations (Washington, D. C.: Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November, 1946).



to set up the machinery needed for its operations, including such important technicalities as rules of procedure, format for questionnaires, and means of examining petitions. It was therefore not until 1948 that the real confrontations began. The Soviet Union and her allies, drawn from the communist bloc and nations which had recently received their independence from Colonial powers, did their utmost to discredit the activities of the administering authorities. Every administrative reform and program for internal advancement was condemned as either too weak or as a veiled attempt at neo-colonialism.<sup>1</sup> Great Britain and the other administering authorities persistently refuted such renunciations claiming that the Council was "degenerating into a platform of political propaganda."<sup>2</sup> The colonial powers argued that most Trusteeship Council members had no experience in or detailed knowledge of territorial administration.

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<sup>1</sup>A personal account of the criticism leveled against Britain in the Trusteeship Council is offered in: Sir Alexander Cadogan, "Five Years of the United Nations", United Empire, Vol. XLI, No. 6 (November-December, 1950), 321-326.

<sup>2</sup>Statement made by the British representative to the U. N. before the opening meeting of the General Assembly in Paris, 1948. Reported in the Manchester Guardian, May 16, 1948.

Rather, as the ideological spokesmen for the anti-imperialist forces they dealt in a world of theory and doctrine while ignoring the down-to-earth problems involved with the governing of colonies and trusteeships.<sup>1</sup>

From the very beginning, the Trusteeship Council found itself engaged in a battle over the question of exactly what controls it could exert over the Administering Authority. Article 87 of the United Nations Charter gave the Council the right to examine reports submitted by the Crown, to review and examine petitions from inhabitants of the territory, and to conduct periodic visits. The British were also required to submit information concerning internal developments. The Trusteeship Council examined all reports and petitions and submitted their analysis of territorial conditions to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (Trusteeship Committee), on which all U.N.O. members had one representative. The Fourth Committee would then study the

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<sup>1</sup>John Fletcher-Cooke, "Tanganyika and the Trusteeship Council", International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (June, 1950), 40-48; Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, "The United Nations and the British Commonwealth", United Empire, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (March-April, 1953), 59-73 and "African Forum", Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (May-June, 1948), 109-114.

issues under question and draw up resolutions which were subsequently voted upon in the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Although this elaborate system was established in the U. N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for Tanganyika, neither document stipulated that the international agency had any power to force the Crown to accept its resolutions. The Trusteeship Council in reality could only apply the pressure of international opinion to gain acceptance of its suggestions. The questionable nature of U.N. authority only served to make the polemical battle between the colonial and anti-imperialist forces that much more bitter.

The first major controversy within the international organization was initiated by the tour of the first Visiting Mission in 1948. The four man team was made up of delegates from China, Costa Rica, Australia and France. Only the latter

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Cmd. 7081, Treaty Series No. 19 (1947), Tanganyika: Text of Trusteeship Agreement as Approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations New York 13th December, 1948 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947); Cmd. 6840, Trusteeship Territories in Africa Under United Kingdom Mandate (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946).

two members had any experience in colonial affairs.<sup>1</sup> The Mission toured the territory for forty-three days, visiting six of the eight provinces.<sup>2</sup> The team encouraged Tanganyikan Africans to openly articulate their opinions of British administration and to present their complaints in the form of written petitions.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the indigenous population was afforded a ready made means of by-passing the colonial administration with their problems. The two most significant petitions received were those presented by the Dar es Salaam and Shinyanga branches of the T.A.A. The Shinyanga document called for a major program of educational development to bring Africans into the cash economy and to prepare them for political participation. It also called for increased African representation on the Legislative Council and in

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<sup>1</sup>The French representative M. Laurenti had been a senior officer in the French African colonial service and the Australian, Bryan Chinnery, was an expert on native affairs among the primitive cultures of the Southern Hemisphere.

<sup>2</sup>The fact that the team took only six weeks to examine some 36,000 miles inhabited by over six million people made the Mission conclusions most questionable to the home government. See House of Lords debate of the Mission report, May 11, 1949.

<sup>3</sup>The Tanganyika Standard continually published notices announcing the schedule of the Mission teams and the sites designated for interviews with petitioners.

the territorial administration. Economic demands included better living conditions, more openings in trade and commerce, higher wages, and a greater indigenous share in the mineral wealth of the territory. Finally, the petition appealed for freedom of speech and press, and an end to racial discrimination.<sup>1</sup>

The Dar es Salaam petition dealt with the similar economic and social problems, but avoided any mention of increasing political participation.<sup>2</sup> Interviews with individual Africans throughout the territory revealed an almost universal desire among the elite for better educational opportunities and the initiation of both local government and territorial elections.<sup>3</sup>

The conclusions of the Visiting Mission were published in the official report released in 1949. Although the report remarked favorably on freedom of political expression within the territory,<sup>4</sup> it was nonetheless highly critical of administration activities in the area of

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Report of the Visiting Mission, 1948 Appendix 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Appendix 2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-35.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

political development. It especially condemned the lack of a clear plan for development of self-government. The Mission noted:

...there is a degree of definiteness about very immediate next steps, far less assurance concerning the steps to follow, and an apparent void beyond that to the ultimate goal.

The lack of political planning cannot but have an adverse effect on the rate of progress.<sup>1</sup>

The visiting team was highly impressed with the members of the African elite it interviewed and remarked most favorably on their comprehension of both local and territorial issues.<sup>2</sup> The report was therefore critical of the multi-racial system and of the policy of political evolution via indirect rule. The Visiting Mission report charged that since African members of the Legislative Council were appointed and not elected there were in reality no spokesman for indigenous opinion at the central government level. It also claimed that the recently created provincial councils were both ineffective and undemocratic. Finally, it criticized the administration for failing to appoint Tanganyikan Africans to significant posts in the government and on the special boards and committees created to examine

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 58-61.

particular proposals. Most significantly, the U.N. report supported demands made by the T.A.A. for increased African representation on the Legislative Council and for elections in the near future on a non-racial basis. While it called for the Crown to accelerate the pace of development towards self-government, it did recognize that at that moment Tanganyikan Africans were not yet ready for self-rule.<sup>1</sup>

The report was also critical of Britain's economic policies. It noted that the territory had made little progress in commercial and industrial development and that the system of inter-territorial cooperation had damaged Tanganyika by concentrating trade and commerce in Kenya. Finally, the land policy of the government was severely criticized by the Visiting Mission. They noted that of the 6,334,000 acres of "productive" land, 1,846,278 were held by non-Africans. In order to prevent further alienation, the U.N. report suggested that all missionary lands not immediately needed for religious and social services, and all former German estates be given to Africans for cooperative development. It also urged that European immigration be

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 32-37.

kept at the barest minimum consistent with the development of the territory and the immediate and long-range needs of the African inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> On February 20, 1950, the Trusteeship Council debated the Mission report and approved all of the proposals made by the visiting team.<sup>2</sup>

The United Kingdom delegation to the U. N. fiercely contested the Mission report. Especially strong resentment was felt for the proposals concerning political development and for the criticism leveled against the system of indirect rule. The British position on these matters was clearly stated in a confidential memo to the United Kingdom representative to the U. N.:

These measures indirect rule and local democratisation efforts represent, in the opinion of the Administering Authority, the maximum advance for which plans can usually be formulated at the present time. The method and direction of further advance must be largely determined by experience gained during this initial stage. The Administering Authority will, however, certainly work out plans for a further advance as soon as the full attainment of the present objectives is in sight.

The Administering Authority is convinced that had the Visiting Mission been able to see more of the territory and the astonishing variety of its peoples they would have appreciated more clearly the extreme difficulty of securing at this stage

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 51-52.

<sup>2</sup>London Times, February 21, 1950.



representation of the masses of the people, of a kind which would be at once effective and acceptable to them, and would have appreciated the inevitability of gradualness in the development of democratic institutions among the indigenous inhabitants if they are to rest on a solid and lasting foundation.<sup>1</sup>

The United Kingdom delegation also maintained that although the major advances in economic, social and educational services called for by the report were desirable, the limited resources of the territory and the Colonial Office simply did not allow for such an extensive undertaking.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, it is clear that the policies of the Administering Authority were far from satisfactory to the anti-imperialist faction of the Trusteeship Council. The conflict between the two was to be a source of constant frustration to the Crown and in the years to come was to provide the African liberation drive an ally even more radical in its reform demands than were the liberal groups within the home government.

By 1950, the various factions involved in the Tanganyika independence movement had begun to formulate

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<sup>1</sup>"Confidential Memorandum for the United Kingdom representative dealing with the 4th Committee", October 29, 1948, p. 2, Tanganyika Territorial files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-5.

their policies and to clarify their areas of disagreement. It was clear that the Colonial Office's policy of slow political development via indirect rule and multi-racialism was heartily supported by the white settler community and the conservative forces within the home government. In opposition stood the African activists within the territory and the liberal reformers of Great Britain. Allied with them was the anti-imperialist faction of the Trusteeship Council which presented, up to 1950, the most radical stance against official British policy. Finally, it should be noted that both the liberals and the international agency were much more forceful in their protest and had much clearer overall plans for future territorial development than did the fledgling African activists groups who due to poor organization, lack of funds and skilled personnel, limited their activities to mild forms of protest and petitioning and totally lacked any concrete long range plans for the political advancement of the territory.

## CHAPTER III

### POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM,

1951-54

#### Background

By 1950 the stage was set for a political controversy of major proportions in Tanganyika. The vital questions of the rate and structure of future constitutional development were being challenged by the liberal reform groups and the more radical anti-colonial forces of the United Nations. Although varying in both their motives and aspirations, these forces stood in clear opposition to the slower pace of political progress endorsed by the Colonial Office and supported by the Conservative party at home and the white settler groups within the trusteeship. By 1950 liberals and Conservatives were divided over a growing number of issues. Key among these were: land alienation, white settlement, the speed and structure of future political developments, and the extent of Trusteeship Council authority over territorial affairs. In the period

1951-54, these and new controversies were to result in further alienation of the opposing groups. In addition, the early 1950's were to see the rise of organized African protest on the territorial level, and the creation of the first viable Tanganyikan African political party.

The Colonial Office was well aware that its post World War II development plans, while well-intentioned, had produced considerable unrest within Tanganyika. To remedy the situation, the Office attempted to stress its plans to fully evolve the dependencies as rapidly as possible. In June 1951, upon assuming the post of Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttleton proclaimed that the goal of British colonial policy was:

... [to] aim at helping the Colonial Territories to attain self-government within the British Commonwealth. To that end we are seeking, as rapidly as possible, to build up in each Territory the institutions which its circumstances require. Second, we are all determined to pursue the economic and social development of the Colonial Territories so that it keeps pace with their political development.<sup>1</sup>

This generalization was clearly in accord with the demands of liberals, anti-imperialists, and Tanganyikan

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<sup>1</sup> "Statement issued by the Secretary of State Oliver Lyttleton at a Colonial Office briefing, June 11, 1951", British Colonial Office files, Rhodes House.

African activists. Britain, nonetheless, continued to irritate these groups by her strict insistence upon the policies of indirect rule and tri-racialism as the guidelines for further political development. Her determination to adhere to this system was manifested in the Tanganyika government's policy statement of 1954. Here the administration declared that the goal of future political developments was to establish "a working partnership of the three main races",<sup>1</sup> in which all shared equal representation in elective government bodies. This proclamation posed a grave threat to the liberal reform elements. As long as a system of equal racial representation endured, the two minority groups would dominate territorial policies at the expense of the overwhelming African majority.

The white settlers and Tory factions, anxious to retain European domination over the trust territory's affairs, eagerly rallied to the support of Britain's multi-racial policy. It was the battle over this issue, coupled with the ever-present debates concerning white settlement and U.N. supervision of trusteeship development, that was to produce the major confrontations in the 1951-54 period.

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Local Government Memorandum. No. 1, Part 1 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 7-9.

A primary cause of Britain's dilemma during this period was her refusal to abandon the ill-conceived plan of local political evolution via the native authorities. The Colonial Office (encouraged by white settlers who wished to slow down the process of development towards self-rule) persistently maintained that significant and stable political advancement could come only through the democratization of traditional tribal leadership.<sup>1</sup> In reality, the system of indirect rule in most instances failed to achieve its projected plans for political evolution. Chiefs and elders would generally skirt the task of introducing modern democratic processes since such reforms would reduce their traditional base of power. Those who did attempt to introduce modern techniques often did not have the knowledge or experience necessary to do so effectively. Finally, the bulk of the indigenous population, possessing little or

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<sup>1</sup>For official expressions of this view see: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Col. No. 277, Development of African Local Government in Tanganyika (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), passim; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Col. No. 1178, Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration. Fourth Session. African Local Government. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 31-53, 127-143; Tanganyika, Local Government Memorandum No. 2 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1953), pp. 1-22, 27-28.

no exposure to modern conditions, were apathetic to most attempts aimed at local political development.<sup>1</sup> A significant number of Africans were nonetheless resentful of the chief's role as tax collector and enforcer of government agricultural procedures under the system of indirect rule.<sup>2</sup> Consequently they were easily attracted to educated Tanganyikan Africans who pledged to do away with such

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<sup>1</sup>The failure of the indirect rule system was commented on by many colonial administrative personnel. For examples see: East African Institute of Social Research, "Notes on Native Administration" (Kampala, Uganda: July, 1952), *passim* and "The Present Day Position of Lower Chiefs" (June, 1952), *passim*; Robert Howman "African Leadership in Transition - An Outline," Journal of African Administration, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July, 1956), 117-126; Z. E. Kingdon, "The Initiation of a System of Local Government in the Rugwe District of Tanganyika," Journal of African Administration, Vol. III No. 4 (October, 1951), 186-191; J. Gus Liebenow, "Some Problems in Introducing Local Government Reform in Tanganyika," Journal of African Administration, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (July, 1956), 132-138; W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Changes in Local Government in Tanganyika," Journal of African Administration, Vol. VI, No. 3 (July, 1954), 123-128; J. P. Moffet, "Native Courts in Tanganyika," Journal of African Administration, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January, 1952), 17-21; P. Montague and R. Page-Jones, "Some Difficulties in the Democratization of Native Authorities in Tanganyika," Journal of African Administration, Vol. III, No. 1 (January, 1951), 21-28.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 6, pp. 707-714. It is clear that discontent with official policies was rapidly becoming widespread and that certain districts, notably Bukoba, were especially fertile ground for the initiation of more radical African political activity.

unpopular policies. The end result was a gradual, territory-wide, decline in respect for traditional authorities, and the genesis of a strong indigenous attraction for the anti-administrative rhetoric of the elite.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the ever-present complaints concerning native authorities and agricultural methods, several major administrative decisions contributed to the spread of popular unrest.

Key among these issues was the activation of the Meru land scheme. The tribe had continued to oppose the 1949 removal decision, and had petitioned both the 1951 Visiting Mission and the Colonial Office to delay implementation of the plan.<sup>2</sup> The British nonetheless decided to begin evacuation of the corridor before the U.N. was able to issue a statement on the matter. Between

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year [s] 1951-54 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1953-55), passim. For a detailed historical study of the transfer of support from traditional authorities to nationalist elite, see Roland Arnold Young and Henry Fosbrooke, Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960), pp. 143-183 and Smoke in the Hills; Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1960), pp. 78-167.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954, Report on Tanganyika, T/1169, pp. 51-52.



November 17 and December 12, approximately 325 Meru families were evicted by force. In the process, almost 500 dwellings and storage buildings were burned and 1,600 head of cattle were impounded. Although no lives were lost in the process, twelve Meru were arrested for using violence to resist evacuation. The Crown justified the move by pointing to the fact that the Meru had been transferred to new and fertile land at the government's expense.<sup>1</sup> The new tribal holdings had been equipped with a watering system, two cattle dips, and a veterinary station. In addition, the administration was ready to pay £14,000 in compensation for losses suffered during the move and to exempt the Meru from tax payment obligations for one year. The government countered accusations of racial prejudice by pointing out that some small European farmers had also been required to evacuate the area.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-54; Tanganyika Legislative Council, The Meru Land Problem (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1952), pp. 2-6; Ian Michael Wright, "The Meru Land Problem", Tanzania Notes and Records, No. 66 (December, 1966), 137-146.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Meru Land Problem, pp. 7-8; Tanganyika Legislative Council, The Sanya Corridor (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1953), pp. 1-2; United States, Department of State, Meru Land Case Study: Native Interests and Land Distribution in East Africa, Report No. 5940 (February 24, 1953), passim.

African dissidents, by contrast, claimed that the removal of indigenous residents to make way for the European dairying investors was indicative of the preferential treatment accorded to white settlers. Thus, the land move became another source of public discontent with British rule, and a rallying point for the growing nationalist movement.

During this period, the colonial administration also adopted an unofficial policy of refusing to recognize the growing associations as representatives of any group within the indigenous population. It soon became clear that this policy also applied to T.A.A., which was rapidly losing favor with the government as its activities became more radical. The administration made public its intention to support the native authorities and defend their right to enforce government policy. This attitude is reflected in a letter written to T.A.A. headquarters by Mwanza Provincial Commissioner Thomas Walden. In his note, the administrator admonished T.A.A.:

You have an excellent opportunity of helping your people by cooperating with the lawful authorities.

...I would remind you that Native Authorities are part and parcel of these. Before it is too late I would warn you to consider seriously the

error of your ways, as otherwise you are bound to find yourself in trouble.<sup>1</sup>

As T.A.A. became increasingly vocal and radical in its protests against colonial rule, an alliance developed between the native authorities and the administration, both of whom sought to thwart the rise of the elite-led nationalist movement before it became too advanced.<sup>2</sup> Official opposition to the T.A.A. accelerated when the organization transformed itself into the Tanganyika African National Union. When the 1954 Visiting Mission praised TANU as a viable African party with the potentialities for territorial leadership the Governor publicly condemned the report. He stated that the goals set forth

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<sup>1</sup>P. C. Walden to T.A.A., February 22, 1954, T.A.A. files FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Heuscher, British Tanganyika: An Essay and Documents on District Administration (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1971), pp. 55-68; MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 166-169; Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., "African Leadership and Political Developments in East Africa" (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkely, 1959), pp. 12-17; E. J. E. Sway, "The One Party and Democracy in Tanzania" (a paper in Political Science for the Third Year Exam at the University of Dar es Salaam, March 1, 1968), pp. 4-9. For a detailed study of the alliance of chiefs and administrators against the nationalist elite, see M. K. Itong, "The Political Development of Kahama District, 1950-65" (a paper in Political Science for the Third Year Exam at the University of Dar es Salaam, March, 1968), passim.

by the Union "...failed to inspire confidence either in the organization or in the supposedly well-meaning persons who encourage it."<sup>1</sup>

As the number of protests against official policy increased, the government took its first clear steps aimed at restricting African political activity. The initial action was taken in August 1953, when the Governor announced that no members of the administrative service of any race could belong to political associations. All civil servants were given ninety days to terminate their membership in such organizations. Specifically named as activist organizations were the T.A.A., the Tanganyika European Council, and the Asian Association.<sup>2</sup> The ruling was a major blow to the growingly militant T.A.A. Throughout the territory, branch officers reported the loss of their principal leaders. With virtually no opportunity for employment existing in the private sector Tanganyikan Africans had little choice but to accept the government decree. In Shinyanga district, the Association was forced

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 11, 1954.

<sup>2</sup>U.N. Report of the Visiting Mission, 1954, pp. 75-76; Tanganyika Standard, August 21, 26, 29, 1953.

to cease operations entirely.<sup>1</sup> Realizing the disastrous effects of the ruling, the T.A.A. petitioned the Governor to reconsider the decision, stating:

The vast majority of the educated Africans in the Territory are in the Civil Service and banning them from membership in political organizations is equivalent to banning the Territory. This, Your Excellency,<sup>2</sup> is a serious blow to our political development.

The government, however, took no steps to either rescind or modify its position. The ban on civil servant membership was the first example of a policy which the administration would maintain until 1957 when the first territorial elections were held. As long as political groups cooperated with territorial policy and limited their dissent to petitioning, they would be tolerated or even favored by the government. At the first sign of any serious protest however, the government would take immediate steps to oppose the organization involved and to undermine its basis of support.

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<sup>1</sup>T.A.A. Notes on Annual Activities, 1953, T.A.A. files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Letter by President of T.A.A. to Governor Twining, August 10, 1953.

Undoubtedly, the most suppressive government measure against non-sanctioned political activity during this period was the passage of the Registration of Societies Ordinance. Signed by the Governor on April 11, 1954, the regulation required all political organizations within the territory to receive government recognition. Any group which was refused registration was automatically banned from political activity. In addition, registration could be cancelled at any time for societies which "threatened" to disrupt law and order or the peaceful development of the territory.<sup>1</sup> The Ordinance was passed in the wake of a period of wholesale unrest and civil disturbance in the Lake Province. Resulting from dissatisfaction with the native authorities and their willingness to enforce unpopular government agricultural regulations, the outbreaks had been led primarily by local T.A.A. officers.<sup>2</sup>

Speaking in the Legislative Council, the Governor made it clear that he would neither tolerate acts of civil

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Territory, Legislative Council, Ordinance No. 11, 1954 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1954), pp. 1-2.

<sup>2</sup>Bukoba District, Annual Report, 1954, Tanganyika administrative papers, Rhodes House.

disobedience nor recognize the right of self-proclaimed Tanganyikan African leaders to represent the interests of the indigenous population:

My attention has been drawn to attempts which have been made in some parts of the territory by self-seeking individuals, usually men of straw, who, having appointed themselves as political leaders, have tried to stir up the people against the Native Authorities, and in some cases the Central Government, by exploiting local grievances real or imaginary. They do not hesitate to collect money; indeed, large sums of money, from many ignorant or unsuspecting people which they have little qualms of using or rather misusing for their own benefit and aggrandizement. This cannot be allowed to continue and Government will not tolerate such activities which are contrary to the best interests of the people and are designed to damage, if not destroy, good government. Respect for authority, which is an inherent trait in the African character, must be preserved.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the government was determined to undermine any attempts at unauthorized political activity within the territory. While involved in suppressing political dissent, the administration was also busily engaged in introducing its own plan for the evolution of the territory.

A major step in constitutional development was the January 1952 announcement that, in accordance with the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard), Twenty-Eighth Session, second volume (May 12, 1954), p. 321.

recommendations of the 1951 Mathew Commission,<sup>1</sup> a special committee would be formed to study the question of franchise expansion. Headed by Prof. W. M. M. Mackenzie<sup>2</sup> and comprised of all unofficial members of the Legislative Council, the Special Commission was assigned two basic tasks. It was required to recommend a program of political development which would ultimately result in the achievement of responsible government with an unofficial majority,<sup>3</sup> and to recommend measures to alleviate the "excessive concentration" of governmental responsibility in the municipality of Dar es Salaam.<sup>4</sup>

After nine months of research and interviews, the Mackenzie Commission issued its findings. The report,

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Report of Committee on Constitutional Development, pp. 24-25.

<sup>2</sup>Professor of Administration and Government, University of Manchester and member, FCB.

<sup>3</sup>The term "responsible" was used to designate a government of elected representatives, headed by a Prime Minister and a ministerial cabinet. Responsible government did not, however, necessitate independence, i.e., separation from the authority of the Crown.

<sup>4</sup>Tanganyika, Constitutional Development Commission, Report of the Special Commissioner Appointed to Examine Matters Arising Out of the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1953), pp. 1-4.



released in September 1952, called for the development of both local and territorial government on an elective, inter-racial basis. It was the firm belief of the Commission that local political advancement should be given priority over changes in the composition of the Legislative Council.<sup>1</sup> The report suggested the division of the territory into nine constituencies (the eight provinces and Dar es Salaam). In the provinces, elections would be based on a common roll from which one member of each race would be elected to represent the province in the Legislative Council. In order for a ballot to be validated, it would have to indicate the selection of one member from each race. Elections would be based on plurality. Dar es Salaam would have a common roll vote with a three member constituency. However, no racial proportion would be required. The result would be a representative side of the Legislative Council comprised of twenty-seven members. The Commissioner recommended that the number of seats on the official side be increased to preserve the official majority.<sup>2</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, British Information Services, Central Office of Information, Reference Division, "Constitutional Development in Tanganyika", Commonwealth Survey No. 121 (May 8, 1953), pp. 31-33.

<sup>2</sup>Report of the Special Commissioner, pp. 69-75.

Mackenzie team recognized the wide gap in political awareness and experience which separated the three racial communities. It therefore suggested that common roll elections be initiated for the European and Asian communities, but that for the present, African representatives be selected through indirect means or by nomination, the mode selected depending upon the extent of political development in each constituency. As the indigenous population in each voting district developed a reasonable sense of political awareness, the indirect process could be replaced by the use of common rolls.<sup>1</sup> The report failed to speculate on the length of time before a majority of Tanganyikan Africans would be able to participate in the direct election process. Voting qualifications were set at twenty-one years of age and residency in territory for three of the four years immediately preceding the election. No property qualifications were recommended nor was discrimination on the basis of sex to be allowed.<sup>2</sup> For common roll elections, the report recommended additional franchise qualifications of literacy in English, and three months of residency in the voting district prior to registration.

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<sup>1</sup>For a summary of the Mackenzie Commission proposals for each constituency, see Table 3, pp. 701-702.

<sup>2</sup>Report of the Special Commissioner, pp. 51-58.

To qualify as a candidate for an elected office, the Commission suggested the same qualifications as those required for common roll franchise. In addition, prospective candidates had to take an oath of allegiance to the territorial government and submit a deposit fee (₡25 for local and ₡50 for territorial elections). Civil servants who wished to become candidates for Legislative Council seats would be required to resign their positions.<sup>1</sup>

The Mackenzie Commission made a number of other specific suggestions for political development. Referring to the composition of the Legislative Council, it recommended that for the immediate future, an official majority be preserved but that unofficial members be elected to office rather than be appointed by the Governor. It was further suggested that the territory be redivided, for administrative purposes, into four "regions" each run by a Regional Council which included both official and locally elected members. Although responsible to the central government, the regional administrations would be autonomous in the handling of most local issues. In addition, Mackenzie recommended the division of each region into

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-87.

counties and the formation of a series of county and urban councils based on the election of unofficials from all races. The councils would serve as a training ground for modern local government participation, would foster a spirit of inter-racial cooperation, and at the same time would help decentralize governmental power by removing some administrative responsibility from territorial headquarters at Dar es Salaam. Each county council would be under the chairmanship of a Senior Administrative Officer. It would include official members, but would have an unofficial majority which represented the three racial groups in accordance with their percentage of the population in that county.<sup>1</sup> It was clearly stated, however, that the councils were designed to work in close cooperation with the native authorities and in no way would infringe upon the rights of traditional rulers.

Finally, the report called for the establishment of elected representative councils to help govern the townships and municipalities. Mackenzie felt that the territory was ready for immediate experimentation in township elections in both Dar es Salaam and Tanga.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 75-83.

In summary, the Commission's proposals offered a limited opportunity for increased political participation to all three races. At the same time, it called for the preservation of indirect rule and provided protection for the minority communities through its acceptance of the parity system.

On June 25, 1952, while the Mackenzie Commission was still conducting its investigation, the Secretary of State announced in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom had decided to adopt two of the recommendations made in the Mathew report. In specific, His Majesty's Government accepted the proposal to divide the number of seats on the unofficial side of the Legislative Council equally between the three races. The government side of the chamber would also be increased. At the same time, following the committee's advice, an official majority would be retained.

The Secretary of State also made it clear that the Crown was firmly opposed to the establishment of any timetable for political development. Finally, it was announced that the Colonial Office had approved a recommendation by Governor Twining which called for the creation of the post of Chief Speaker of the Legislative

Council.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a nominated member would replace the Governor as the head spokesman in the legislative body. This office was activated with the installation of the first speaker on November 1, 1953.<sup>2</sup>

The exact details of both the Legislative Council alteration and the initiation of the parity system were revealed in May 1954, when the Governor announced that within one year an enlarged tri-racial legislative body would be set up. It would consist of an unofficial side based on parity between thirty unofficials (ten of each race) and an official side which contained thirty-one members.<sup>3</sup> The new officials would all be nominated by the Governor. This policy would continue until the territory was ready for elections. Furthermore, organizations representing various communities and special interests within the territory would be encouraged to submit lists of

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 502 (June 25, 1952), cols. 2258-2267.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Statement by His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on 17th November, 1953, (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1953), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, May 18, 19, 24, 1954. See also Table 4, p. 703.

suggested representatives to the administration.<sup>1</sup> A short time later Twining issued an additional policy statement in which he announced that the reconstituted Legislative Council would begin functioning in March. Finally, the Governor announced for the first time there would be parity among the unofficial members of the Executive Council.<sup>2</sup>

The British government therefore intended to politically evolve Tanganyika via her long-established policy of indirect rule and her more recently devised parity scheme. The blueprint for territorial development was clearly articulated by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on June 25, 1952:

First, it is the intention to continue to administer the territory in accordance with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement until the ultimate goal of self-government has been reached. Her Majesty's Government confidently hopes that when the goal has been attained Tanganyika will be within the British Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government attaches importance, for the interests of the inhabitants of Tanganyika, to the maintenance and promotion of British traditions and the British connection with the territory. Secondly, her Majesty's Government interprets the

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<sup>1</sup>George Maclean, Abstracts from Tanganyika diary, 1926-61. The papers of this member of the administrative staff include notes on conversations and meetings with Governors Twining and Turnbull, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., "Memo on constitutional change", December, 1954. See also Table 5, pp. 704-706.

Trusteeship Agreement and Article 75 of the United Nations Charter as imposing on the Administering Party an obligation to provide for the full participation of all sections of the population, irrespective of racial origin, in the progressive development of political institutions and in the economic and social advancement of the territory. Each section of the population must be enabled and encouraged to play its full part in the development of the territory and its institutions, in complete confidence that the rights and interests of all communities, both indigenous and immigrant, will be secured and preserved.

The Government's commitment to indirect rule was made clear by Governor Twining in May 1954. In a speech before the Legislative Council, the Governor clearly emphasized that cooperation with the native authorities was the only reliable means of modern political development. He condemned attempts to produce political change which lay outside the channels provided by the government, and specifically discouraged chiefs from appointing members of the T.A.A. or other activist groups to tribal councils.<sup>2</sup>

The policy of discouraging non-sanctioned political activities was quickly enforced. When the fledgling Sukuma

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<sup>1</sup>London Times, June 26, 1952.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Statement by His Excellency the Governor to the Legislative Council, May 12, 1954 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, May 12, 1954), pp. 1-3.



Union, then a quasi-political tribal association, applied for official sanction under the Registration of Societies Ordinance, the Government delayed a final decision until March 1954. In the interim period, the organization collapsed due to a lack of funds and the severe official limitations placed on its activities by local administrators.<sup>1</sup>

A similar episode occurred in January 1951, when the Chagga Citizens Union petitioned the territorial government for the right to elect their paramount chief and to do away with the administrative division of the tribe into three separately governed units. The Chagga argued that British rule had made the traditional ruler too powerful and that a check should be placed on his authority via the electoral process. Especially repugnant to the Chagga was the fact that both the executive and judicial branches of local government were under chiefly control. In their petition, the Citizens Union pointed out that the tribe had twenty-five years of experience in democratic procedures

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<sup>1</sup>MaGuire, Towards Uhuru, pp. 165-166; J. V. Shaw, "The Development of African Local Government in Sukumaland", Journal of African Administration, Vol. VI, No. 4 (October, 1954), 171-178; R. E. S. Tanner, "Law Enforcement by Communal Action in Sukumaland, Tanganyika Territory", Journal of African Administration, Vol. VII, No. 4 (October, 1955), 159-165.

as a result of its participation in the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union. Although the issue was raised in Parliament by the Labour Party on January 29, 1951, at that time both the territorial government and the Colonial Office refused to take action on the question.<sup>1</sup> The widespread resentment produced among the comparably affluent Chagga was to be exploited shortly by the nationalist leadership.

By 1954 it was clear that the British system of indirect rule was making little progress towards the initiation of modern political participation. No franchise existed in the central legislature, where both officials and unoffi- cials were still appointed by the Governor. At the local level, despite challenges from the educated elite, the native authorities successfully impeded the development of democratic processes. In the few instances where local elections for tribal councils existed, participation was limited to adult male taxpayers and balloting was by show of hands. In several districts "advisory" councils

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<sup>1</sup>Petition to His Excellency the Governor from the Chagga Citizens Union September, 1951. Tanganyika Territorial files, Rhodes House; Nicholson to Marealle, October 5, 1951; Hinden to James Johnson, M.P., January 30, 1951, FCB papers.

consisting of local administrators and traditional rulers did meet to discuss administrative policy. These bodies were, however, devoid of any power to enforce their suggestions and seldom admitted local elite to their deliberations.<sup>1</sup> With an indigenous literacy rate of nine percent,<sup>2</sup> and only five Tanganyikan Africans holding senior civil service posts in the administration,<sup>3</sup> by 1954 it was apparent that the road to rapid political development lay outside the guidelines established by the administration.

The Administering Authority persistently refused to recognize the shortcomings of and the indigenous dissatisfaction with indirect rule and parity. Indeed, the Colonial Office made a continuous effort to stress the

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<sup>1</sup>Based on statements concerning political participation found in: Great Britain, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika under United Kingdom Trusteeship for the Year s 1950-54 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951-55); Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year s 1950-54 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1951-55); Tanganyika Provincial and District Books, 1950-54, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Economic and Social Council, World Communications (Paris: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1956), p. 87.

<sup>3</sup>Annual Report...to the United Nations, 1954, p. 19.

fact that the territory was undergoing a peaceful transformation.<sup>1</sup> His Majesty's Government insisted that any acceleration of political development was beyond the existing capabilities of the African population. Thus, in 1951 Governor Twining reported that most Africans within the territory were apathetic towards efforts aimed at modernization and had no real complaints concerning the system of indirect rule. At the same time, the Governor stated that the political reforms demanded by critics outside of the territory were not supported by the majority of African inhabitants.<sup>2</sup>

It is therefore clear that by 1954 the Colonial Office was determined to perpetuate the policies of indirect rule and parity and to suppress any attempts by the indigenous population to seek other paths of political evolution.

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<sup>1</sup>See for example, "Tanganyika Territory, Information Service, Press Release No. 3T/01C14 of May 6, 1953 which opens with the passage: "Tanganyika, the most cosmopolitan territory in East Africa, where over eight million Europeans, Asians, and Africans live together in an atmosphere of racial harmony...."

<sup>2</sup>The Development of African Local Government in Tanganyika, pp. 38-46.

The White Settler Community: Support  
for Gradualism

During the 1951-54 period the white settler community of Tanganyika revealed itself as the most reactionary group within the territory. As such, it was adamantly opposed not only to the demands for rapid political advancement made by Tanganyikan African nationalists and their liberal supporters, but also to the few cautious steps to increase African participation taken by the colonial regime. Thus, the increase in African participation on the Legislative Council, the formation of local government councils, and the introduction of parity among the unofficials were resented by the white settler community. The press within the territory was European dominated and continually condemned proposals for political advancement as radical and "communist inspired". A popular charge leveled by whites was that liberal forces within the home government and the communist bloc on the Trusteeship Council were cooperating to undermine the British Empire. One of their repeated demands therefore was for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and the granting of full colonial status to Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Mwapachu to Hinden, December 4, 1950, August 10, 1951. "Nicholson Notes on political development in

Although settlers as a whole resented attempts aimed at African political advancement, the minority community was for many years unable to present an organized opposition to reform measures. This was due primarily to the collapse of the Tanganyika European Council during this period.

From its inception, the organization had suffered from an inability to gain the support of the majority of the Europeans within the territory. The Council held little appeal to the non-British members of the white settler community. In addition many Englishmen who were potential members failed to join or to actively participate because of their isolation in the more backward areas of the trusteeship.<sup>1</sup>

By 1951 differences of political opinion were added to the TEC's logistical problems. In November of that year the organization's central committee passed a

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Tanganyika Territory, 1954", FCB papers; East Africa and Rhodesia, January 4, 1951; James F. Tierney, "Britain and the Commonwealth: Attitudes in Parliament and Press in the United Kingdom Since 1951", Political Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3 (October, 1958), 220-233.

<sup>1</sup>Anthony H. Rweyenanu, "Preparations for Independence in Tanganyika" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1962), pp. 20-21.

resolution in which it firmly denounced the parity proposals of the Mathew Report as dangerous, radical innovation. The Northern, Southern, and Southern Highlands provincial branches all approved of the protest and went so far as to suggest that if necessary, aid be sought from South Africa to help resist the planned reforms.<sup>1</sup> The Central and Eastern branches of the Council were only willing to criticize parity as a premature policy change while the Tanga branch actually accepted the planned alterations.<sup>2</sup>

It was this split which shattered the Council. The individual branches attempted to function autonomously and the organization never again presented a unified front. By 1953, when the central headquarters at Dar es Salaam decided to accept parity, the association was well beyond the point of being salvaged. The following year the central headquarters closed and in the months that followed most branch offices ceased operations.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United States, Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Dar es Salaam, Despatch No. 23, "Transmission of a Resume of Political Development in Tanganyika Territory During the Year 1951" (February 23, 1951), pp. 4-9; East Africa and Rhodesia, November 15, 1951.

<sup>2</sup>United States, Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Dar es Salaam, Despatch No. 354, "Meeting of the Tanganyika European Council at Tanga, May 31-June 1, 1951" (June 4, 1951), pp. 1-6.

<sup>3</sup>East Africa and Rhodesia, June 18 and 25, 1953.

While the European Council was in the process of demise, a new association with an inter-territorial base of support began to attract the attention of Europeans in Tanganyika. This new political-cultural organization was the Capricorn Africa Society. Founded in 1949 by a small group of Kenyan and Rhodesian whites, the Society expounded a theory of benevolent racism which called for the gradual evolution of a single democratic government for all of British East and Central Africa. Capricornists believed that the initiation of representative government should begin immediately and be based on high income and educational standards.<sup>1</sup> While members of all races would be free to participate in elections, it was clear from the rigid franchise qualifications that virtually all Africans would be eliminated from political activities for many years.

In 1952 the Society officially opened branch offices in Dar es Salaam and Tanga. That same year, David Sterling, a white settler who organized the movement in the trusteeship, became Capricorn Society President. The organization quickly condemned the proposed parity system. In addition,

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<sup>1</sup>Based on The Capricorn Declarations and Manifesto, both issued in 1952. Capricorn Society papers, Rhodes House.



the Tanganyika branches called for further land alienation and increased white immigration, both in the name of territorial development. Capricornists also demanded an end to trusteeship and the absorption of Tanganyika into the Empire. By 1954 over 500 Europeans were members of the Society.<sup>1</sup>

It is therefore clear that the white settler community was firmly opposed to any immediate attempts to increase African political participation. As a scattered and unorganized minority community however, they failed to create a unified front for the defense of their interests.

#### African Activism, 1951-54

The acceptance of the Mathew Report by the Secretary of State made it clear to politically concerned Africans that the Crown did not intend to initiate modern open electoral representation for some time to come. The concept of parity which offered Africans equal representation of unofficials with minority communities whom they

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<sup>1</sup>Rita Hinden and Creech-Jones, "Notes on Capricorn Activity", Tanganyika political files, FCB papers.

outnumbered four hundred to one was entirely unacceptable to Tanganyikan African political activists.

In addition, the increasing tendency towards white settler domination in neighboring regions gave concerned Africans ample reason to be apprehensive concerning future territorial development.<sup>1</sup> It became clear that the use of petitions and adherence to the principle of co-operation with the administration would not achieve the nationalist aspirations for increased political participation. As a result, the 1951-54 period was one of increased African agitation and a willingness for the first time to openly defy the administration on a territory-wide, long-term basis.

When the decade opened there appeared to be little chance of a well-organized political organization assuming the leadership of the Tanganyikan African population. Few qualified Africans were willing to actively challenge the administration. Those members of the elite who did attempt to defy the colonial regime soon found themselves unemployed. Yet there was a growing discontent among the

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<sup>1</sup>In addition to the growing strength of whites in the Kenya highlands, the creation of the Central African Federation in 1953 officially extended settler control over the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

bulk of the indigenous population who were increasingly resentful of official policy. The chief sources of complaint centered around dissatisfaction with agricultural and livestock regulations, taxation, and the activities of the native authorities.<sup>1</sup> As local resentment swelled, the time became ripe for the advent of effective elite leadership. The entire situation was well summarized by a black civil service employee who noted:

...the political climate throughout Tanganyika is one of apparent calm. How long it will remain so, I for one cannot predict. Closer investigations of African opinion reveals growing suspicion of the Government and a more alert political consciousness than one came across a decade ago. What is lacking is leadership. All potential leaders are in the civil service and the element of hazard is still too great for them to leave their secured positions to offer the people their leadership.<sup>2</sup>

The Administering Authority felt that there was little danger of organized resistance from the indigenous population. With T.A.A. still holding meetings in the homes of its members and limiting its activities to petitioning, the only significant source of African activity

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<sup>1</sup>For a summary of local unrest during this period, see Table 6, pp. 707-714.

<sup>2</sup>H. K. B. Mwapachu to Nicholson, June 19, 1954, FCB papers.

appeared harmless. Official expectations were that the Association would never evolve beyond the state of a docile, quasi-political institution.<sup>1</sup>

Despite all signs to the contrary, the period 1951-54 was to be marked by the advent of the first truly active nationalist leadership which quickly transformed the T.A.A. into the aggressive, more adamant Tanganyika African Union with the proclaimed goal of African dominated self-government for the territory. Most significantly, for the first time a group of elite emerged who were willing to abandon their former employment and devote all their energies to political organization and active protest.

The first such leader was Paul Bwani, who in the late 1940's founded the co-operative movement to unite the cotton producing element of the African population.<sup>2</sup> In 1950 Bwani established the Lake Province Growers

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<sup>1</sup>Annual Report on the Administration of Tanganyika, 1954, p. 32; Sir Edward Twining, "Tanganyika", United Empire, Vol. XLIII, No. 5 (September-October, 1951), 227-232 and "The Situation in Tanganyika", African Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 200 (July, 1951), 297-310.

<sup>2</sup>Based on biographical sketches in the Tanganyika Standard, December 9, 1961 and Who's Who in East Africa 1967-68 (Nairobi: Marco Publishers (Africa) Limited, 1968). After independence, Bwani was appointed Minister of Economic Development.

Association which later evolved into the formidable Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions. Bomani served as President of the Sukuma Union in 1951 and the following year was elected president of T.A.A.'s Mwanza branch. Earning the respect of the local administration, he was appointed to the Mwanza Township Authority in 1952 and also served for many years as a member of the Lake Province Council. By 1952, Bomani had penetrated most of the more prosperous black-controlled rural areas and had effectively recruited the local population into the co-operative movement. The foundation of Tanganyikan African participation was therefore laid immediately prior to the inception of TANU.<sup>1</sup>

A second leader to appear during this period was Issac Bhoke Munanka. A member of the Kuria tribe from Mara district, Munanka was employed as a government clerk in Mwanza. In 1948 he joined the local branch of T.A.A. and quickly became an active organizer. Munanka resigned his post in 1948 to devote full-time to political

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<sup>1</sup>Although Bomani insisted on a clear distinction between the activities of his cooperative movement and those of the African political party, he nonetheless gave strong support to Nyerere. Bomani and his chief lieutenants were present at most TANU rallies. Successful cooperatives were a major source of TANU campaign funds throughout the 1950 period.

recruitment. The same year he was elected vice-president of the Association, and assumed the presidency in October 1953 when Bomani departed to continue his education in Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> Munanka's plans called for the rapid development of a viable Tanganyikan African political party with a territorial base of support. In 1952 he suggested that the T.A.A. immediately begin to make such a transformation.<sup>2</sup> By 1954 he was the chief organizer of African protest in the prosperous Lake Province region. During this period he also engaged in repeated but unsuccessful attempts to form a territorial labor association, potentially entitled The Federation of All Workers and Trade Unions.<sup>3</sup>

Another active Tanganyikan African organizer was Saadani Abdu Kandoro, a one-time government employee who joined T.A.A. in 1944. A close friend of Bomani, he founded the Tabora branch of the Association in 1948 and by 1952 had risen to the rank of Secretary in Lake Province.

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<sup>1</sup>MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 135-137. In the independent government, Munanka rose to the position of Minister of State.

<sup>2</sup>Munanka to Nicholson, January 6, 14, 19, 1952, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Munanka to Nicholson, July 27, 1954.

Spurred on by a fierce resentment of the native authority system, Kandoro was a key organizer of resistance to government policy in the Mwanza region.<sup>1</sup>

The Association's transformation into a more radical activist group was also assisted by Ali Migeyo, a civil servant from Bukoba who founded and later headed the T.A.A. branch in that district. Migeyo was a staunch opponent of both indirect rule and the parity system. As such, he was a key figure in the organization of Tanganyikan African resistance to official policy.<sup>2</sup>

A significant addition to the T.A.A. forces of the 1950 period was Lomez Bogoke. A former member of the police force, he was an active member of the Sukuma Union by 1946. In the early 1950's Bogoke became President of the Tabora branch and initiated an extensive campaign aimed at rejuvenating and expanding the Union's operations.<sup>3</sup> He soon discovered that recruitment of new members was seriously hindered by the administration's policy of firing

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<sup>1</sup>G. R. Mutahaba, Portrait of a Nationalist: The Life of Ali Migeyo (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp. 18-23.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 9, 1961. McGuire, Towards Uhuru, pp. 144-146.

<sup>3</sup>Note on T.A.A. activities, Nicholson files, FCB papers.

elite who engaged in non-sanctioned political activities. In April 1954 Bogoke decided to join the T.A.A., realizing that it was the Tanganyikan African organization which possessed the gréatest potential for overcoming official obstacles. His conversion encouraged a large number of Sukuma Union members to emulate his example, thus swelling the ranks of T.A.A. in the Tabora region.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the early 1950's, Tanganyikan African political activity via the T.A.A. was aided by the vigorous recruitment campaign of Japhet Kirilo of Mwanza and Joseph Kimalando of Moshi. Both men toured the territory repeatedly to encourage Africans to join the Association. As capable speakers they were able to utilize the unpopular colonial agricultural policies to stir the public to protest and civil disobedience.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of the influx of full time personnel and skilled leadership, the T.A.A. was able to attract an

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<sup>1</sup>Kirilo's career is well summarized in McGuire's, Toward Uhuru, pp. 151-153. For a detailed history of Kimalando's activities see: S. W. Frederick, "The life of Joseph Kimalando", Tangania Notes and Records, No. 70 (July, 1969), 21-28.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, 1951 (T/946), p. 21.



ever increasing number of Africans. From 1948 to 1951 alone, membership swelled from 1,789 to over 5,000.<sup>1</sup> The growing strength of the Association was noted by the liberal reformers in Great Britain who in turn announced their eagerness to offer guidance and political support to the rapidly spreading organization.<sup>2</sup> By 1951 the Association boasted of an active national headquarters in Dar es Salaam, regional centers in four of the provinces, and over twenty district offices (cells).<sup>3</sup> The new T.A.A. was able to attract the support of most concerned members of the Tanganyikan African elite. As a result, when local elections were held for ward councils and township authorities for the first time in 1952, Association members secured most of the seats open to Tanganyikan Africans.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, by 1953 a major change had occurred in T.A.A. It was no longer satisfied with limiting its activities to petitioning. Rather, it stood prepared to bring its protests to the United Nations, the Colonial

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to A. M. Tobias, T.A.A. Secretary, July 14, 1954.

<sup>2</sup>Tobias to Nicholson, September 8, 1951.

<sup>3</sup>Tobias to Nicholson, October 6, 1951.

<sup>4</sup>Twining, "Notes on Political Affairs, 1952", Rhodes House.

Office, or the central administration in Dar es Salaam if its demands were not met. At the same time it was prepared to utilize mass rallies, protest meetings, and civil disobedience tactics to voice its dissatisfaction with official policies. However, the Association still concentrated on isolated local issues and had yet to formulate a plan for the political development of the territory. It was the failure to meet the challenge of these larger issues that prevented T.A.A. from claiming title of a nationalist movement.

Tanganyikan African opposition to official policy became increasingly widespread and vocal in the early 1950's. When the Mathew Commission proposals for constitutional development were debated in the Legislative Council, African representatives made it clear that they were firmly opposed to the parity system. They announced that they had no intention of allowing the African population to be kept in a minority position through imbalanced territorial representation.<sup>1</sup> In addition, they feared that a European-Asian coalition would block any

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, The Constitutional Debate 1951 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1951), pp. 24-31.

attempted political advancements if parity were instituted.<sup>1</sup> The Tanganyikan African elite used the press to clearly state their opposition to any form of constitutional advancement which would allow the white minority to dominate the representative branch of the government. Repeated references were made to similar developments in Kenya and the Rhodesias and to the fact that Tanganyikan Africans did not intend to allow such conditions to develop within the territory.<sup>2</sup>

A major rallying point for the T.A.A. was the controversial Meru case. When the eviction occurred in 1950, the Association launched the most widespread organized reaction against British rule experienced by the territory up to that date. Kirilo Japhet, Secretary of the Arusha

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Public Relations Department, "Tanganyika Legislative Council Debate on Constitutional Committee's Report" (An unreleased press statement with alterations attached dated November 16, 1951), Richard B. Brayne papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See for example the anonymous letter signed Pale-Pale (slow) printed in the Tanganyika Standard, March 24, 1951. Correspondence between Legislative Council member Marealle and FCB dated March 24, 1951, reveals that Marealle was the author of the controversial letter. See Standard, Letters to the Editor, March 25-April 8, 1954, for white reaction to the statement.

branch, founded the Meru Citizens Union to lead the movement.<sup>1</sup> The Union first brought its case before the 1951 Visiting Mission team in an attempt to block the proposed move. When this failed, Japhet and Earle Seaton, the Union's legal advisor, raised sufficient funds from among the indigenous inhabitants to present their case in person before the Trusteeship Council.<sup>2</sup> Thus the Meru case resulted in the further organization and activation of Tanganyikan African political awareness. Participation in the protest led many Africans to seek active membership in the T.A.A. The spectre of further land alienation and increased white settlement was successfully exploited by leaders to maintain the political momentum produced by the case.<sup>3</sup>

Realizing that the United Nations would be petitioned without the sanction of the Crown, African activists readily

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<sup>1</sup>Japhet used a separate organization to prevent T.A.A. from becoming liable to prosecution or official retaliation. Japhet to Nicholson, April 12, 1952, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 11th Session, 431st and 451st Meetings (1952), passim.

<sup>3</sup>Cliffe, p. 5. United Nations, Report of the Visiting Mission 1954, pp. 66-74.

utilized their unique relationship with the international organization. In 1951, the Shinyanga branch of T.A.A. petitioned the international organization for the right of Tanganyikan Africans to elect an African to attend Trusteeship Council meetings and represent indigenous affairs.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the Mwanza branch presented a petition in which it demanded increased African representation on the Legislative Council, non-racial elections for all representative bodies within the Trusteeship, and the opening of high level civil service positions to Africans. The organization also demanded an end to European settlement and land alienation, a program of educational instruction in Swahili, and overseas training for Africans in countries other than Great Britain. Finally, the Association requested United Nations funds to supplement British contributions towards territorial development and called for free trade between the trusteeship and all nations.<sup>2</sup> The petition also clearly indicated

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, "Petitions from Tanganyika", T/Pet. 2/118, August, 1951.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, "Petitions from Tanganyika", T/Pet. 2/103, October, 1951.

that the African population was determined to achieve rapid political advancement towards self-government:

The Africans must now have a big say over the rule and public funds of the Territory in order to enable them to acquire independence in the near future. In fact it is high time that Africans should be given an opportunity<sup>1</sup> to start shouldering the rule of the country.

The 1951 Visiting Mission received petitions containing basically the same demands from T.A.A. branches in Dar es Salaam, Ngudu, and Dodoma. However, it should be noted that only the Mwanza branch was bold enough to speak of independence in the immediate future. All branches complained of racial prejudice and were especially resentful of remarks concerning Tanganyikan African activists made in public statements by administrative officials. The pro-settler bias of the territorial press was also a common complaint.<sup>2</sup>

When the Visiting Mission returned to Tanganyika in 1954, it discovered that African demands had become much more concrete and radical in the interim three years. Undoubtedly, this was due in part to the influx of full-time

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission 1951, passim.

capable leadership in the T.A.A. In addition to the standard demands for increased economic and educational opportunities, Tanganyikan African petitions now boldly demanded that a U.N. office be established in Dar es Salaam, with branches in each province, and that the U.N. flag be flown alongside the British colors.<sup>1</sup> More significantly, T.A.A. called for the establishment of a timetable for development towards self-government which had the approval of the African population. In addition, the Association demanded a statement from the Crown affirming that Tanganyika would soon have a black dominated government. To begin this transformation, it called for the immediate creation of an African majority in the Legislative Council. The T.A.A. petition stated:

We are the owners of this country, there are more of us than any other race...therefore it is just and proper that there should be African majorities in such councils as the Legislative Council, county councils and town councils, and that the African representative of these councils should be selected by the people.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to petitioning the U.N., Tanganyikan Africans also increasingly made demands directly to the

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission 1954, pp. 12-15.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

territorial administration. In 1952 the T.A.A. sent the Mackenzie Commission its own set of proposals for the re-organization of the Legislative Council. The plan called for a council which consisted of the Governor, eighteen official members, nine non-official African members, and seven non-officials from the other two races. In addition, one representative each for Tanga and Dar es Salaam were to be selected in open elections conducted on a non-racial basis. Finally, the Association demanded that Swahili be used as a second official language in the Legislative Council.<sup>1</sup>

In 1952 the Shinyanga branch of the Association sent a petition to the Governor demanding that an equal number of African and non-African representatives, both officials and unofficials, be appointed to all district, provincial, and township authorities. In addition, the T.A.A. suggested that Africans, rather than the Governor, should have the right to select all such local representatives.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the early 1950's, the same branch

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<sup>1</sup>T.A.A. Memorandum to the Special Commissioners Investigating Constitutional Development, 1952, T.A.A. papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>T.A.A. handout dated December 17, 1952, in T.A.A. file, FCB papers.



repeatedly called for the use of Swahili as an official language in the central legislature.<sup>1</sup>

When the East African Royal Commission visited Tanganyika in 1953-54, it was deluged by complaints from various T.A.A. branches concerning white settlement, destocking, taxes, and the inefficiency of the native authorities. The fact that the petitions and policy statements issued by the Association were for the first time in Swahili was a further sign of a growing spirit of Tanganyikan African nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

In the period immediately preceding the founding of the Tanganyika African National Union, the African protest movement within the territory reached an unprecedented level. This was especially true of Lake Province where the effective T.A.A. leadership was concentrated in the persons of Bhoke, Munanka, and Kandora. There, resistance to British rule quickly abandoned the more passive methods of verbal complaining and petitioning. It now became a more radical and organized form of political activity which utilized mass political meetings,

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid. Notes on T.A.A., dated 1952.

<sup>2</sup>East African Royal Commission, Passis.

civil disobedience tactics, protest marches, and the practice of sending petitions and delegations to both the U.N. and Downing Street, thus bypassing local administrators and often even the central government in Dar es Salaam.

Tanganyikan African unrest was the product of dissatisfaction with a growing number of government activities and policies, including compulsory agricultural techniques, livestock control, an ambiguous white settler policy, inadequate educational facilities, poor health services, outdated or non-existent transportation and communication facilities, and biased government hiring practices. Africans were especially resentful of the Crown's insistence that the policies of indirect rule and tri-racialism be retained.<sup>1</sup>

A particularly troublesome issue centered around the question of education. Africans bitterly complained that the existing primary and secondary systems helped to perpetuate the barriers which existed between the indigenous population and the immigrant communities. They

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<sup>1</sup>For a summary of the major complaints in each district, see Table 6, pp. 707-714.

argued that the use of separate educational facilities for the three races indoctrinated students from their earliest days in the practice of racial isolation.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the fact that over ninety percent of the African population received no education at all<sup>2</sup> meant that most Africans were not receiving the training in civics, citizenship and other social sciences needed to make them aware of the functioning of their government. Finally, inadequate training in technical skills and modern agricultural techniques meant that most African graduates could not look forward to profitable employment as a reward for their academic pursuits. In view of these facts, indigenous activists demanded that all schools be integrated, that a major influx of funds be provided for African education, and that the territorial course of study be updated to provide adequate training in the skilled crafts and sufficient preparation for participation in modern political systems.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Munanka to Betts, September 26, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Stevens, p. 86. For a detailed study of the territorial political system see MacDonald, Chapter 3.

<sup>3</sup>T.A.A. to Twining, April 3, 1952, T.A.A. files, FCB papers.

By 1952 the Mwanza branch of T.A.A. had become an especially militant organization. African unrest in that district centered around dissatisfaction with compulsory destocking procedures and the cotton cess tax, both of which had been strictly enforced since 1951.<sup>1</sup> In addition, there was serious unrest produced by African resentment of both local native authorities and European administrators who enforced the unpopular regulations. Finally, there was deep-seated resentment of Asian control of local retail trade.<sup>2</sup> Because of widespread indigenous dissatisfaction, it was relatively easy for African activist leaders in Mwanza to establish a broad basis of popular support. The first sign of major unrest occurred in January 1953, when a local T.A.A. delegation met with the Provincial Commissioner and demanded that the practice of destocking and the livestock tax be suspended. They also insisted that in the future, the people and not the chief be consulted to determine the enforcement of government regulations.<sup>3</sup> The following spring, Kandoro, the

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<sup>1</sup>Letters of P. J. C. Marchant, a Mwanza administrator, 1953-54, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>District Books, Lake Province 1951-53 (microfilm), Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, January 18, 19, 23, 25, 1953.

President of the Mwanza branch, and Abbas Sykes, Territorial Secretary of T.A.A., toured the province to arouse popular support for the Association. They ably utilized the Meru land issue to enlist members and to organize local resentment of British rule.<sup>1</sup> A second major recruitment campaign was conducted in January 1954. After a one month tour which included visits to all district offices in the Lake Province, a general provincial meeting for T.A.A. supporters was held in Mwanza.<sup>2</sup> When it was learned that Twining was scheduled to visit the township in mid-February, the provincial headquarters of T.A.A. summoned together representatives of all local association branches and prepared a list of grievances to be submitted to the Governor. However, upon his arrival Twining refused to meet with the delegation, stating that they were not the official representatives of the African residents.<sup>3</sup> In protest, the Lake Province T.A.A. sent a

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro, pp. 26-29, McGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 151-152.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, February 1-4, 1954; T.A.A. memoranda to FCB, January-February, 1954, Tanganyika Political Parties files, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Munanka to Nicholson, February 14, 16, 1954, FCB papers; Tanganyika Standard, February 13, 1954.

telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which they strongly condemned the official snub and listed their complaints against both central government policy and the local administration.<sup>1</sup> In retaliation, the Governor called a public meeting with the local chiefs in which he stated that they as the native authorities were the only recognized representatives of the African population. As such, they had the power to control their people and to oppose the T.A.A. and the political opportunists who pleaded its cause.<sup>2</sup>

In 1953 the T.A.A. branch in neighboring Bukoba district underwent a similar phase of civil disobedience and open protest. Led by district president Ali Migeya, the unrest centered upon dissatisfaction with forced agricultural methods and the compulsory production of various cash crops.<sup>3</sup> Popular resentment was so strong that in October the provincial commissioner placed a ban on all public meetings. On November 25, 1953, Migeya held a

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro, pp. 39-40.

<sup>2</sup>Twining statement, recorded in the files of the Mwanza Police Service, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Mutahaba, pp. 18-22.

massive rally in defiance of this restriction. Tear gas and a baton charge were used to disperse the crowd. Nyerere, then territorial president of the T.A.A., flew to the scene but officials refused to negotiate with him. Association efforts to extract a promise that tear gas would not be used in the future also resulted in failure.<sup>1</sup> Migeya was arrested and received a one year prison term for his provocation of the incident.<sup>2</sup> Although T.A.A. petitioned the Governor to form a multi-racial panel to investigate the issue and to determine the cause of such widespread unrest, no official response was given to the repeated requests.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, by 1954 the African elite were aware of a growing spirit of indigenous unrest, generated by unpopular administrative policies in the rural areas, and a general refusal on the part of the government to take immediate steps to remedy such problems. African activists recognized that the existing widespread dissatisfaction could

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, November 26, 27, 29, 30, 1953. Nyerere to Nicholson, December 3, 1953, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Mutahaba, p. 122, Nyerere to Betts, December 18, 21, 1953.

<sup>3</sup>Kandoro, pp. 40-47; Munanka-Nicholson correspondence, May 10-June 5, 1954, FCB papers.

be successfully exploited to recruit new members into the ranks of a nationalist movement if a broad program of reform and political advancement could be formulated. This in turn could lead to the emergence of a viable, territory-wide African political organization with a strong basis of popular support.

In order for the African elite to achieve these ends, it was first necessary to greatly strengthen the T.A.A. In 1953 the Association acquired the leadership needed to initiate such a transformation when Julius Nyerere assumed the presidency.<sup>1</sup> To him fell the task of

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<sup>1</sup>Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Born in 1922 at Buliama, Julius was the eldest son of chief Nyerere Burito of the Wazanaki. At the age of twelve, Nyerere was sent to a mission school at Musoma, where he was baptized a Roman Catholic in 1934. After three years of elementary education he was sent to Tabora where he completed Standard X. Nyerere attended Makerere College from 1943-45 and he obtained a diploma in Education. Following graduation he was employed as an instructor in St. Mary's Catholic School near Tabora. In 1949 Nyerere departed for Edinburgh where he earned a doctorate in economics. Throughout his graduate years, Nyerere maintained constant contact with Fabian headquarters. He exchanged theories on African political development with Nicholson and Hinden and contributed several articles to Venture. Upon his return to Tanganyika in 1952, Nyerere became active in territorial politics and joined the T.A.A. in 1952. His education and travel, coupled with his charismatic speaking and leadership ability, led to his election as President of the Association in 1953. In 1953 he was the only black Tanganyikan who possessed an advanced degree. In 1954 Nyerere married a girl from a neighboring tribe to whom



inspiring a sense of nationalism in a people who enjoyed no traditional bonds of unity and of channeling this spirit into a united, territory-wide independence drive with the ultimate goal of instituting a viable, African controlled, representative government.

When Nyerere became President of T.A.A., he had already formulated definite opinions concerning various aspects of British rule and the steps necessary to change the established system. His early theories, formulated while he was a student at Edinburgh, clearly reflect Fabian influence. Nyerere maintained that social, economic, and educational equality for Africans, coupled with rapid and proportional distribution of political responsibility within the territory, would have to be initiated immediately if Tanganyika were to begin a successful,

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he had been engaged since his 1949 departure for Edinburgh. George Dunheved, Julius Nyerere, A Bibliography (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Information Service, 1961), pp. 1-4; Thomas Patrick Melady and Elliot W. Robbins, "Julius Nyerere: Architect of a New State", The Catholic World, Vol. 190, No. 1140 (March, 1960), 352-357; United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere: President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1965), pp. 1-3. An interesting source of information concerning Nyerere's early political activities coupled with intuitive observations concerning his personality is found in the papers of E. N. Brend, Rhodes House.

peaceful transition towards self-rule. Even before his return to the trusteeship, Nyerere was convinced that the systems of indirect rule and parity were unsatisfactory methods of territorial advancement. Speaking of the injustices of the tri-racial system, which divided public funds equally among the three communities, Nyerere stated:

We do not ask for privileges in East Africa, all that we ask is that our Government should give our children equal opportunities, with those it gives to the children of other races. The Europeans and the Indians are already richer than we are; already their children are born to greater opportunities than ours; that is only natural. No African desires that their wealth should be confiscated and given to us; I believe such a thing would be a grievous crime. But what we consider to be equally criminal is that the Government to which we all belong, the Government which in time of war demands our very lives to defend our way of life, should out of public funds, assure every European child of full primary education when it can not afford to educate any more than 8% of our children. That we will continue to fight as long as we live and as long as it lasts.

Nyerere's early writings also made clear his belief that as "protected subjects" in a territory under international control, the people of Tanganyika were not part of the British government. Their primary loyalty was therefore to Tanganyika and not to the Crown. Speaking of

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Nicholson, March 8, 1952, FCB papers.

this priority in allegiances of which each African had to become aware, Nyerere stated:

The Government that makes the laws is not his Government. He cannot hope to change it for he never made it. To him such a law, depending upon its seriousness, would justify disloyalty and if necessary and practicable, complete severance from the protective authority. For a protected person necessarily has two loyalties, one to his country and another to his protector. His loyalty to his country must always come first, for it is natural and if one may use the word, unconditional, as long as he remains a citizen of his country. But his loyalty to the protective authority is only secondary for it is conditional depending on a treaty, actual or implied.<sup>1</sup>

Above all, Nyerere's early writings reflect a dissatisfaction with the concept of parity which he clearly saw as a major impediment to African political control:<sup>2</sup>

However one may jeer at the idea of counting noses one cannot help feeling something rather unsatisfactory when a Party with a majority in a Legislature is returned by a minority in the Constituencies. Such a Party, in my opinion, would feel much stronger if it knew that the majority of the people (the noses) in the Constituencies support it, although the

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Fabian Secretary Hilda Selwyn-Clarke, June 1, 1952.

<sup>2</sup>While most of Nyerere's earlier writings were distributed only to fellow students and his Fabian mentors, he made a point of circulating his writings on the parity issue. For example, Nyerere forwarded copies of his unpublished 1951 pamphlet on racial representation to both African Legislative Council member Kidaha and to Governor Twining. Nyerere to Editor, Fabian Publications Ltd., July 25, 1951, FCB papers.

'communities' whatever they may stand for, may be against it. The same reasoning makes me feel that the Tanganyika Constitution will only be fair, as long as it insists on racial representation; when it gives more representatives to the Indians, for instance, than to the Europeans, whatever the Europeans as a community may stand for.<sup>1</sup>

With this goal in mind, Nyerere began an immediate campaign to stimulate Tanganyikan African political concern and awareness in the rural areas. He soon found that despite widespread common dissatisfaction with British administration, T.A.A. branches generally operated as isolated units. Coupled with this lack of coordination was the absence of a clearly stated blueprint for the political evolution of the territory. Based on these findings, Nyerere concluded that a major reconstruction of the Association was in order.<sup>2</sup> The recent unrest in the Lake Province and especially the confrontations with the government at Mwanza and Dodoma only made such steps seem all the more imperative. Twining's recent refusal to meet with T.A.A. delegates made it clear to Nyerere that the government did not consider the Association a serious force to be dealt with.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere - Nicholson, September 4, 1951, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere - Nicholson correspondence, April-June, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., June 8, 1954.

In April the President called T.A.A. leaders from throughout the territory to Dodoma, where he outlined plans for a major rejuvenation of the Association.<sup>1</sup> The result of this step was the creation of the first political party within the territory, one which not only worked outside the native authority structure, but which also challenged the very legitimacy of British rule. In addition, TANU was the first significant political organization which was not limited primarily to the elite. Rather, it accepted Tanganyikan Africans from all classes and offered them ample opportunity for participation and leadership in the drive towards self-government. Thus, political mobility regardless of wealth, education, or social status was afforded to the bulk of the African population for the first time.<sup>2</sup>

In July Nyerere met with T.A.A. leaders in Dar es Salaam for a four day constitutional conference. There, the various proposals made at Dodoma for the activation of

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<sup>1</sup>George Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU", Makerere Journal, No. 7 (1963), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Goran Hyden, TANU Yagenga Nichi: Political Development in Rural Tanganyika (Lund: Uniskol Bokforlaget Universitat och Skola, 1968), pp. 128-151.

the Association were debated. Present at the meeting were seventeen T.A.A. leaders gathered from across the territory. All were full-time political organizers and most had been in trouble with the administration for acts of civil disobedience or defiance of the native authorities.<sup>1</sup> The constitution ratified by the delegates on July 7, 1954 was consequently far more militant and radical than the charters of earlier activist groups. In addition to changing the name of the organization to the Tanganyika African National Union, membership in the party was now limited to persons of the African race. The decision was based on Nyerere's belief that a multi-racial organization would soon attract a large number of experienced non-Africans and thus limit the opportunities for Tanganyikan Africans to rise to significant positions of authority.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the constitution declared that the Union stood prepared to "...fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden notes of T.A.A.-TANU leadership dated September 1954, FCB papers. Most notable among the delegates was Oscar S. Kambona, who until 1956 was to serve as Nyerere's chief aid and confidant.

<sup>2</sup>Anil R. Popatia, "Major Policy Themes of President Nyerere" (unpublished research paper for the Third Year Exam in Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, March, 1967), pp. 6-11.

independent." Significantly, it spoke of "the Queen" in lieu of "Our Queen" as was customary format for political charters.<sup>1</sup> The document also clearly listed the goals towards which the Union would be oriented. Key among these was a pledge not to cease militant African activities until the territory achieved independence. The constitution further called for an effort to overcome all tendencies towards tribalism and isolationism, both of which impeded the growth of a nationalist movement. In a clear rejection of parity, partnership, and indirect rule, the constitution demanded the immediate initiation of open elections for local and territorial offices, the establishment of a black majority on all representative bodies, and the termination of all racial distinctions in the formulation of administrative policy.<sup>2</sup> It also called for administration aid in the development of African trade unions and cooperatives, and for an accelerated program aimed at increasing African economic and educational opportunities. TANU's constitution

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika African National Union, The Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union (Dar es Salaam: Thakars Ltd., 1954), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-5.

further pledged to oppose all schemes aimed at additional alienation of land or further European immigration.<sup>1</sup>

Although the goals promulgated by TANU at its constitutional convention represented a major escalation of African political activism, Nyerere made it clear that his organization sought to achieve its ends within the framework of the law and that only peaceful means of protest would be employed.<sup>2</sup> At the same time he stated that while TANU was restricted to Africans, in the independent government citizens of all races would enjoy equal rights.<sup>3</sup>

After the creation of the new party, TANU's first objective was to gain a territorial base of support. In 1954 its activities were still concentrated in the larger towns and the prosperous Lake Province. The transformation of the Association into the Union at first received little attention in most parts of the trusteeship. It was not until the arrival of the Visiting Mission team in August

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<sup>1</sup> These goals were designed to stir popular support at a time when the Meru controversy was still a most sensitive issue. Kandoro to Nicholson, August 3, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup> Tanganyika Standard, July 9-10, 1954; Memo to Hinden, July 28, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup> Tanganyika Standard, July 12, 1954.



that the party enjoyed any significant notoriety. When the Mission publicly commented that the organization appeared capable of leading an independence drive, TANU received widespread publicity for the first time.<sup>1</sup>

In 1955 Nyerere and Kambona began a territory wide tour to spread the nationalist movement to areas previously untouched by political activity. As a result of their concentrated efforts, membership rose to 175,000 in the period 1954-57.<sup>2</sup> It must be kept in mind, however, that the vast majority of TANU supporters attended rallies but did not actively participate in the political process. Since there was no franchise until 1957, it was difficult to transform popular support into practical assets<sup>3</sup> during the early years of the liberation drive.

Nyerere persistently used the general discontent produced by the native authority system and enforced

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission 1954, p. 61; Bennett, pp. 4-6.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika African National Union, "TANU Souvenir: Independence Day, 9th December, 1961" (a souvenir booklet containing statistical data on the history of TANU), Dar es Salaam, 1961.

<sup>3</sup>One scholar has estimated that only 25% of TANU members paid dues or participated in political activities on a regular basis. Martin Lowenkopf, "Political Parties in Uganda and Tanganyika" (unpublished M.A. thesis, London University, 1961), pp. 163-169.

agricultural methods as the basis for popular support for his organization. In order to appeal to Africans in the rural areas who virtually all maintained close ties with traditional tribal customs, TANU leaders employed ceremonial costumes and accessories which closely resembled the garb of local chieftains. Thus, the authority and dignity of TANU speakers was stressed in a manner that was meaningful to non-Westernized Africans. The Union also established an elders section, thereby creating a special position for the more revered members of the traditional societies.<sup>1</sup> However, neither the costumes nor the structure of the local TANU cells were typical of any particular tribal group. Nyerere and his chief lieutenants continually stressed that tribalism could be exploited by the British to keep the territory's African population weak and divided. Thus, the objective of TANU's frequent territorial recruitment tours was to stir up and mobilize dissatisfaction with the administration. In addition, by reminding the indigenous population of their African heritage, the Union drew attention to the undesirability of colonial rule.

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson notes on TANU, dated March, 1955, FCB papers.

TANU's main task was to channel this unrest into modern political activism which would operate on the territorial rather than on the local or tribal level. It was for this reason that the organization encouraged the use of Swahili as a unifying indigenous language. Swahili was especially advantageous since it was not associated with any one group within the territory.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout this early period of political organizing, TANU made it clear that the tri-racial policy, the practice of indirect rule, and the parity system were totally unsatisfactory means of political development. At the same time, the newly-formed Union firmly stated that the recent proposals of the Mackenzie Report, which the government had heralded as a significant political advancement, were also too limited. In October 1954, Nyerere made this clear in a letter of protest addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Governor:

TANU accepted the recommendation about the official majority but while welcoming the recommendations to elect the Dar es Salaam members on the Legislative Council, it felt that Professor Mackenzie could have gone further and recommended at least a form of election for the Provincial Representatives.

We are convinced that to continue nomination at this stage of the Territory's constitutional

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Hinden, August 12, 1955, FCB papers.

development would be unwise. We appreciate the difficulty of organizing elections in a large sparsely populated and illiterate country like Tanganyika. But we are certain that the difficulties involved are not insurmountable and that the experience that the people would gain in electing their own representatives while the Council still retains an official majority (and thus maintaining Legislative and administrative efficiency) would be invaluable. Indeed it was this hope of gaining experience IN ELECTIONS while retaining an official majority that made us willing to accept the official majority recommendations.<sup>1</sup>

Clearly, TANU was not prepared to accept a slow system of gradual political participation. Rather, it demanded a clear-cut program of constitutional development which would rapidly lead to the establishment of a black majority, representative government.

The fact that Nyerere was a figure to be dealt with was quickly recognized by the colonial government. From May until September of 1954, he was appointed by the Governor as a temporary member of the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup> The Government took this step to emphasize that expediency of cooperation with the administration. It was felt that

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to the Chief Secretary of the Governor, October 6, 1954, Tanganyika territorial files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>He temporarily replaced Chief Makwala who was on a four month leave of absence to serve with the East African Royal Commission.

by accepting a seat, Nyerere was acknowledging the necessity of producing political change through the channels established by the colonial regime.<sup>1</sup>

During his four months on the Council however, Nyerere utilized his position to publicize the goals of TANU and to criticize the existing government policy. Nonetheless, he made it clear that the Union sought to achieve its desired reforms through legal, constitutional means. In his first speech before the Council, Nyerere called for immediate direct elections on a non-racial basis for the Legislative Council representatives from Dar es Salaam. At the same time, he demanded that the other constituencies use a liberal franchise to select a panel of candidates from which the Governor could make appointments.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Colonial administrators who commented on Nyerere's appointment are in accord concerning the motives of the Government. See Papers of Francis Dudley Dowsett, June-September, 1954; C. Harris, May-September, 1954; Douglas Frank Heath, July, 1954; J. S. M. Vinter, tape recording of an interview concerning African political development, Rhodes House. The Fabians came to the same conclusions concerning Nyerere's appointment. Nicholson to John Hatch, M.P., September 11, 1954; Hinden to John Hynd, M.P., September 18, 1954, FCB papers; Hatch to Creech-Jones, May 31-June 6, 1954, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 28th Session, Vol. 3 (May 25, 1954), pp. 303-305.

Nyerere's moderation is reflected by the fact that he justified the creation of the Registration of Societies Ordinance, based on his acceptance of the administration's right to protect the population from exploitation by bogus organizations. At the same time however, he clearly expressed his anxiety lest the ordinance be used to suppress legitimate societies who happened to be critical of the government.<sup>1</sup> The TANU president made it clear that his organization stood prepared to oppose the administration and to pursue its goal of creating a self-governing Tanganyika based on non-racial representation. In one of his final speeches before the Council, Nyerere defended the Union against recent attacks by local administrators and white settler critics:

Most thinking people in Tanganyika believe that time is ripe for a real constitutional change...but Government, and the majority of Unofficial members of the Legislative Council are too obstinate to change their views. We have been accused of racial politics, of aiming at a policy which is contrary to the declared policy of the Government, of wanting independence in five years, of starting self-government campaigns...Our aim is certainly self-government; when to attain it the people of Tanganyika will decide. We are not racial, but I have emphasized that we must aim at a democratic Tanganyika, and those who fear democracy need not remain in the Territory.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 28th Session, Vol. 4 (September 2, 1954), p. 401.

In spite of its capable leadership and its ability to quickly gain public attention, the fledgling Union soon found itself in the midst of a major crisis centered around the widespread unrest in the Lake Province and especially in Sukumaland. The disorders which had arisen in that area as a result of general dissatisfaction with both the native authorities and official agricultural policies had never been settled. Furthermore, the causes behind the violent encounters with the government had neither been examined nor remedied. Realizing the potential of a major crisis developing in the area, Nyerere raised the Lake Province issue at the TANU constitutional conference in July 1954. The delegates sent a special committee to visit the Minister of Local Government to protest the recent Mwanza gassing and demand a full scale investigation of the causes of unrest in that area.<sup>1</sup> The government, however, took no action on the request.<sup>2</sup>

A week later, new outbreaks occurred in the region. In mid-August, the Maswa branch of TANU was given permission

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<sup>1</sup> Minutes of T.A.A. meeting, July 3-7, Dar es Salaam, T.A.A. files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup> Nyerere to Betts, August 6, 1954, FCB papers.

to hold a public rally. Accordingly, Kirito Kasiko, the president of the region's Union cell, informed Chief Ndaturu that a Union rally was scheduled and that the chief should be prepared to be present as the representative of the local native authority. The Chief protested to the Provincial Commissioner, stating that TANU was trying to issue orders to the local representatives of the administration. In support of the Chief, the Commissioner revoked permission to hold the rally. When the Union protested this decision and held several private meetings to plan a new course of action, the Commissioner revoked the branches' registration under the provisions of the Registration of Societies Ordinance.<sup>1</sup> Clearly, the administration stood prepared to defend the authority of local chiefs from attacks by the nationalist movement. Thus, the Government felt that it was necessary to take a strong stand against TANU in Sukumaland. On September 11, 1954, Governor Twining described the Lake Province as "the No. 1 security risk of the Territory."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 176-179.

<sup>2</sup>Twining to Chief Secretary Walden, September 11, 1954, Walden papers, Rhodes House.



The major confrontation occurred in October when a spontaneous series of demonstrations against the local chiefs occurred throughout the region. When several meetings with TANU leaders failed to quell the unrest, the Government took decisive action. On October 27, the Registrar of Societies sent notes to H. M. Bhoke Munanka, Provincial President, and S. S. Kandoro, Provincial Secretary, in which he announced that the Government would no longer recognize the registration of the Lake Province branch of TANU because "it appears to me that such a society is being or is likely to be used for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order, and good government."<sup>1</sup> On November 3, Kandoro received a notice from District Commissioner Scott of Mwanza Urban who notified him that all assets of the Union were being confiscated under the provisions of the Societies Ordinance. The notice made it clear that anyone found in possession of TANU records, accounts, publications, banners or insignias would

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<sup>1</sup>Registrar of Societies to Munanka and Kandoro, October 27, 1954, Tanganyika Territorial papers, political files, Rhodes House. The legal justification for this decision was based on Sections 8 and 9 of the Registration of Societies Ordinance.

be liable to prosecution.<sup>1</sup> After the surrender of all records to the district headquarters, the homes of both Kandoro and Munanka were searched. Both were subsequently deported from the Lake Province and prohibited from participation in political activities elsewhere in the territory.<sup>2</sup> A similar series of events occurred at the Malampaka branch of TANU, which had also engaged in organized protest against the enforcement by native authorities of official agricultural regulations. In November the TANU district cell was closed for violation of the Societies Ordinance.<sup>3</sup>

By November of 1954, TANU operations in the Sukumaland sector of Lake Province had been successfully halted. Although the Union was permitted to operate elsewhere in the Province, the closing of the Provincial Headquarters and the Malampaka and Maswa ended the nationalist drive in vital Sukumaland until the lifting of the

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<sup>1</sup>District Commissioner Scott to Kandoro and Munanka (in Kiswahili), November 4, 1954, Mwanza district files, Rhodes House, TANU files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro, pp. 91-93. This was done under the provisions of the Removal of Undesirable Persons Ordinance, 1952.

<sup>3</sup>District Commissioner, Maswa to A. R. R. Mgeni, Secretary of TANU's Malampaka branch, October 28-November 9, 1954, Tanganyika territory, political files, Rhodes House.

ban in 1958. Nyerere began an active publicity campaign in which he tried to force the British to substantiate their charges against the TANU branches and more specifically, to bring forth indictments against those individuals who were reputedly engaged in such lawless activities.<sup>1</sup> The Government, however, refused to prosecute the cases, thus leading nationalists to the claim that the Sukuma closings were acts of unjustifiable suppression.

Thus, by 1954 a major shift had occurred in the political activities of the African population. The T.A.A. evolved from a passive petitioning agency into a formidable activist movement with the potentiality for gaining a territory-wide base of support. TANU was eager to point out the flaws in British administration and to clearly state its goals of self-determination with a black majority representative government in the near future. Nor was the Union hesitant to utilize local unrest as a means of gaining popular support. The British in turn, by their willingness to register TANU branches outside of Sukumaland, and their temporary appointment of Nyerere to the Legislative Council, revealed their willingness to permit

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<sup>1</sup>See Nyerere statements to press, Tanganyika Standard, November-December, 1954.

increased African political development. However, their actions in Sukumaland were a clear sign that the Administering Authority would neither accept civil disobedience nor allow TANU to humiliate the Crown or its representatives. The British would negotiate with Nyerere, but were determined not to allow the Tanganyikan African nationalists to force them to accept a major change in policy.

#### The British Political Scene

In 1950 general elections in Britain resulted in the return to power of the Conservative Party. Although only in office for five years, the departing Labour Government felt confident that it had made substantial progress in its aims of developing the colonial territories. They believed that the historical progress of transforming the Empire into a Commonwealth, now well underway, was irreversible. Commenting on the substantial and permanent changes wrought by the liberal regime, Rita Hinden noted:

In principle our fight for political progress, economic development, social services, trade unions, etc. in the Colonies, has been won. The conservatives may try to make inroads in the achievements of the last years and there are further advances still to be made, but they cannot turn the clock back.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden, notes on the future policy of the FCB, April, 1951, FCB papers.

Looking to the years ahead, Hinden projected that the East and Central African territories would be "the major danger point in the Empire." This was based on the liberal belief that the unsatisfactory system of partnership perpetuated by the colonial administration and the conservative stance of white settlers who adamantly refused to give up their positions of privilege under the tri-racial system, would form a coalition in opposition to all serious advancement.<sup>1</sup> In order to protect the gains made since the war and to further advance the political development of the territories, the liberals were determined to use their question-time on the floor of Parliament to continually badger the Conservative regime into introducing reforms.<sup>2</sup> The stage was therefore set for further

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to Hatch, June 20, 1950, FCB papers. The problem existent in multi-racial societies was a frequent theme of the liberal writers of this period. See for example: Fabian Colonial Bureau, East African Future (London: Fabian Publications, Ltd., 1952); Arthur Gaitskell, What Have They To Defend? (London: The Africa Bureau, 1955); Adrian Hastings, White Domination or Racial Peace? (London: The Africa Bureau, 1954); Labour for Africa Group, Africa's Challenge: Britain's Great Chance (Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia: The Thanet Press, 1952); W. Arthur Lewis, Michael Scott, Martin Wright, Colin Legum, Attitude to Africa (London: William Chawes and Sons, Ltd., 1951); Patrick O'Donovan, Africa: Which Way Now? (London: The Africa Bureau, 1952).

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Labour M.P.s, June 8, 1951; Labour Party Political Education Service, Discussion Notes No. 25, British Africa (London: The Labour Party, April, 1960).

confrontations between the liberal and Tory factions over the evolution of Tanganyika territory.

Because they were eager to aid in the advancement of the trusteeship, the Fabian Bureau was never truly satisfied with the limited activities of the basically passive T.A.A. During the period of the Mathew Commission investigations, the Fabians complained bitterly that the Association failed to keep them informed concerning the latest developments in the territory. At the same time, they noted that the organization was hesitant to make public its own guidelines for constitutional advancement.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, when the Bureau tried to determine the true facts concerning the government opposition to the Chagga Union it was unable to obtain the required information from the T.A.A., which was hesitant to become openly involved in the controversy.<sup>2</sup> The socialists were soon led to the conclusion that the fear of job loss kept T.A.A. members from a more active role in territorial policies.<sup>3</sup> The inability

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to T.A.A. Secretary Sykes, April 2, 4, 5, 1952, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hynd-Nicholson correspondence, April 19-May 6, 1951, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Hynd to Hinden, July 13, 1951, FCB papers.

of T.A.A. to cooperate effectively with the liberal reformers is reflected in Colonial Bureau Secretary Nicholson's comment to a Society member in Dar es Salaam:

We do try to have our sources of information as wide as possible, but in Tanganyika at present we have not nearly sufficient contacts. The African organizations are not sufficiently well organized to send our regular material....<sup>1</sup>

It was this lack of cooperation which led the Fabians to openly criticize the T.A.A. as a "passive" group who were "far too conciliatory" to the colonial regime.<sup>2</sup> The Society was therefore quite pleased when Nyerere assumed the presidency of the Association. Because of the close working relationship that had developed between Nyerere and the socialists during the TANU leader's student days at Edinburgh, the Bureau was confident of his eagerness to cooperate closely with them in their efforts to stir public opinion in favor of rapid political development within the territory.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to D. M. Anjaria, August 14, 1952, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Venture, Vol. 13, No. 9 (October, 1951), 1.

<sup>3</sup>Betts-Nicholson correspondence concerning Nyerere, November 1953-August 1954, FCB papers. Members of the society had helped Nyerere by editing an early manuscript of his concerning race relations in East Africa. They also

The liberal attack on official policy included severe criticism of virtually all of the sensitive issues which arose in the trusteeship during the 1951-54 period.

The reformers, conscious of the need of fledgling political groups to have the cooperation and leadership of the African elite, were strongly opposed to the territorial policy of not allowing government employees to engage in political activities. Since most elite were employed by the administration, such a policy removed the educated, capable leadership from the political arena. The Fabians began an active protest campaign in opposition to this policy. M.P.s John Hynd and Frank Beswick both protested the policy in the House of Commons,<sup>1</sup> and the July 1954 issue of Venture was entirely devoted to an examination of the controversial issue.<sup>2</sup>

Writing to the TANU cell at Mwapachu, Fabian Secretary Nicholson summarized the Bureau's feelings:

I don't see why the gap between political activities of other citizens and those

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continually advised him of the legal complications involved in various plans he put forward for territorial development. Finally, the Fabians tutored him in the arts of research, debate and polemics.

<sup>1</sup>Hynden to Beswick and Hynd, September 22, 1953, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Venture, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July, 1954), 2-3.



permitted civil servants should be so enormous, and particularly why political restrictions should be applied to teachers. I have sent a copy to Mr. Nyerere and hope he will do something about it. As you say, the potential leaders are in the civil service, and if they are all paralysed it is inevitable that leadership will pass into the hands of possibly less educated people outside.<sup>1</sup>

The Fabians were also on the alert for information concerning the sensitive issues of white settlement and land alienation. In February 1951, Labour M. P. James Johnson asked the Secretary of State for an assurance that those whites employed by the faltering Groundnut Scheme would not be permitted to remain in Tanganyika as white settlers once the project totally collapsed.<sup>2</sup> Similarly in May 1952, and February 1954, when rumors concerning increased white settlement and the creation of 999 year leases began to circulate, the Fabian Bureau arranged to have liberal M.P.s raise a series of questions on the floor of Commons.<sup>3</sup> Although both incidents proved

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to Mwapachu, July 14, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Johnson to Hinden, February 6, 1951, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>The May debate was initiated by M.P. Hynd, and the February 1954 controversy was introduced by James Johnson. Rita Hinden papers, M.P. files, FCB papers.

to be the product of hearsay and misinterpreted policy statements, it was nonetheless clear that the Bureau intended to serve as the defender of Tanganyikan interests in the home government.

In June 1954, when the Tanganyikan government again raised the possibility of increased European immigration, the Bureau enlisted the aid of M.P. John Rankin to defend their position in the House.<sup>1</sup> The Fabians then initiated a major campaign to protect Africans in Tanganyika from the danger of increased white settlement. The socialists demanded seats for Tanganyikan Africans on the Immigration Committee which served as an advisory body to the Immigration Controller. In addition, they proposed that the committee be empowered to ensure the adoption of its suggestions.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Marjorie Nicholson was assigned to visit the territory for a first-hand analysis of the entire political situation. Based on her interviews with the representatives of the three racial communities, she concluded that no effective government machinery existed

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Rankin, May 6, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden to Nicholson, May 23-June 4, 1954, FCB papers.

to enforce the immigration quotas established by the Colonial Office.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, when Chief Makwaia of the Legislative Council visited Britain in June, the Bureau interviewed him extensively to gain insights concerning the European settler problem.<sup>2</sup> When the related issue of land alienation was raised by the Meru Citizens Union petition to the U.N., the Fabian Bureau quickly brought the question to the floor of the Commons to determine exactly what had occurred during the controversial move.<sup>3</sup> However, once it became clear that the move had been necessary and that it did not constitute part of an overall plan to create a white highlands sector, the Fabians issued a clear statement of support for the scheme.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Bureau revealed that its disagreements with the Colonial Office were based on concrete research and were not merely ideological attacks on colonial rule as a whole.

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to FCB, March 3, 8, 14, 1954. See also Venture, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May, 1954), 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>Hinden notes, June 6, 1954; Manchester Guardian, June 3, 1954.

<sup>3</sup>Hynd to Creech-Jones, March 24, 25, 28, 1954, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>4</sup>Nicholson to Hynd, April 20, 1954, FCB papers.

The socialists also began an active campaign to try to force the Colonial Office to insure that Africans in Tanganyika be made aware of the activities of the Trusteeship Council. Coupled with this was a demand that the indigenous population be advised of their rights to petition to the United Nations over the heads of both the territorial administration and the Colonial Office.<sup>1</sup>

The Fabians also firmly supported Tanganyikan African demands for rapid political advancement. When the Labour regime was removed from office in the 1950 election, the socialists began to formulate immediate plans for a campaign to endorse a rapid increase in African political participation in all the East African territories. In 1951, Selwyn-Clarke confided to J. H. Lodge, M.P., that the Bureau feared that in "the case of Tanganyika, the change of Government may have set the clock back,"<sup>2</sup> and that extensive plans were being devised to aid the cause of political evolution in the Trusteeship. Accordingly, outgoing Secretary of State Creech-Jones

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<sup>1</sup>Hinden to John Rankin, M.P., January 29, 1951. Hinden to Dr. Ralph Bunche, September 27, 1950, FCB papers. See also Margery Perham's article in The Listener, December 30, 1954.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to J. H. Lodge, May 27, 1951, FCB papers.

initiated a campaign aimed at making the British public aware of the reforms needed if peaceful development were to be preserved in the territory. His writings and public statements called for a pace of political development which would match the rapid advances being made in the fields of economics and education through the Colonial Development programs. At the same time, he stressed the failure of the tri-racial system and the inadequacies of indirect rule.<sup>1</sup> Thus, in 1951 when the Chagga began to agitate for local constitutional reform and the election of a Paramount Chief, the Fabian Bureau used its influence at the Colonial Office to support the proposals.<sup>2</sup>

While the liberal reformers were in favor of the rapid initiation of African majority rule, they were by no means insensitive to the plight of the European minority communities. While opposing partnership as an imbalanced form of representation, they also resisted any Tanganyikan

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<sup>1</sup>Arthur Creech-Jones, "What is Partnership?" (a mimeographed policy paper widely circulated by the liberal reform groups, 1951-52). "British Colonial Policy With Reference to Africa", International Affairs, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (August, 1951), 151-164; statement in London Times, July 11, 1951.

<sup>2</sup>Correspondence between Nicholson and Secretary of State Griffiths, March 20-August 13, 1951, FCB papers.

African proposals aimed at depriving Europeans of a voice in the independent government.<sup>1</sup> Speaking of this concern, Creech-Jones noted:

If 'partnership' arouses African fears, 'democracy' must arouse European fears. 'One man, one vote, and a Gold Coast constitution' have become the symbols of a fear that a small white community will ultimately be engulfed by a black flood. Some African spokesmen have confirmed their fears by talking of an 'African Nation' in which Europeans will remain as 'guests'. While we hold the view that immigrant communities should not be permanently privileged, we believe equally that immigrants who are already settled in East and Central Africa and who owe their first loyalty to the Crown and to the country in which they now live and bring up their children must be accepted by Africans as part of the local population, and that all should have their share in building a democratic society based on equality of individuals. This conception requires that Africans as well as the immigrants should be prepared for the compromise which democracy demands from all individuals and without which it cannot exist.<sup>2</sup>

In order to avoid racial oppression from any source, the Fabians advocated the initiation of an open franchise

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<sup>1</sup>Fabian Colonial Bureau, Advance to Democracy (London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1952); Tsehokedi Kahama, Political Change in African Society: A Study in the Development of Representative Government (London: The Africa Bureau, 1956).

<sup>2</sup>Creech-Jones to Labour M.P.s, February 6, 1952, Creech-Jones papers.

on a non-racial basis in Tanganyika. While realizing that African lack of training and experience made universal adult franchise immediately impractical, they insisted that the use of high voting qualifications and the reservation of seats for specific communities were acceptable only as temporary measures. The Fabians consistently maintained that political participation as well as economic and social development had to be pursued on a non-racial basis. Rather than stress the factors which separated the three communities, they felt that the goal of British policy should be the elimination of ethnic divisions.<sup>1</sup>

By its willingness to accept a temporary compromise on the questions of franchise and reserved seats, and its recognition of the problems facing the minority communities, the Bureau once again revealed that it was not merely a polemical, agitative, anti-imperialist organization. Its goal was not to undermine British rule but rather to

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<sup>1</sup>The above analysis of the Fabian Bureau's position is based on the proceedings of their Symposium on Partnership and Political Development, held in Manchester, March 23-29, 1952. FCB and Creech-Jones papers.

devise an equitable plan for the political evolution of the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

When the Mackenzie Report was released, Labour M.P.s, encouraged and assisted by the Fabian Bureau, utilized the House of Commons to demand that the suggestions concerning non-racial elections for Dar es Salaam and the election of unofficial members for the rest of the territory be initiated immediately. The Tory regime, however, refused to commit itself beyond the point of stating that it was seriously examining the report and had found several of the proposals favorable. At no time would the Colonial Office concede to liberal demands for a timetable of political advancement.<sup>2</sup> Noting the storm of controversy raised by the Labour M.P.s and the Fabian Bureau, the T.A.A. General Secretary wrote:

It is very gratifying to see how prompt our allies in Britain have been in pressing for a

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<sup>1</sup>It should be noted that the FCB evolved their plans for territorial development during the 1951-53 period when Nyerere was a student at Edinburgh. When he returned to Tanganyika to assume leadership of T.A.A., his early demands for political development, and especially the temporary compromises which he was willing to accept, closely adhered to the Fabian Society's suggestions.

<sup>2</sup>Between March 18-July 14, 1954, the Mackenzie proposals were raised on fourteen different occasions in the House of Commons.



discussion of the recommendations in the House of Commons. We here appreciate and well realize the value of your support.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring of 1954 Nyerere began to press for the incorporation of the MacKenzie Report suggestions into the new Legislative Council which would convene in March 1955.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, he sought the introduction of common roll elections with reserved seats for the municipality of Dar es Salaam.<sup>3</sup> However, when Labour M. P. James Johnson was persuaded by the Fabian Bureau to raise the issue in the House of Commons, Secretary of State Lyttleton made it clear that the Tory government would not consider the proposal. The Secretary stated:

The system of representation by geographical areas will not be introduced until the Legislative Council is reconstituted next year; and it is the intention of the Tanganyika Government that the new Council should become firmly established before the elective principle is introduced. This policy has been given unanimous approval by the present council and reflects responsible opinion generally throughout the territory.

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<sup>1</sup>A. M. Tobias to Hinden, April 30, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>The existing Council had been initiated in 1950 for a five year period. A new body was therefore due to be convened in March.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to Betts, June 3, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Session, Vol. 582 (July 16, 1954), col. 1964.

When Johnson pointed out that both the African and Asian organizations had petitioned for an experiment in common roll elections, Lyttleton reported that: "...the course which we are pursuing has the support of most moderate and informed opinions in Tanganyika."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the Tory government made it clear that it considered Nyerere's demands far too radical. At the same time, the battle lines between the Tory and Labour parties were drawn over the question of territorial political development. The Bureau made it clear that it intended to support the newly activated T.A.A. in its battle for the incorporation of the Mackenzie recommendations. In reporting to the T.A.A. on the adamant position taken by the Secretary of State against the formation of the new legislature, Fabian Secretary Nicholson commented:

This position still remains most unsatisfactory to us, and I presume that Mr. Nyerere will be raising the issue in the Legislative Council. We shall continue to do what we can at this end.<sup>2</sup>

During the period of political unrest which culminated with the banning of TANU in Sukymaland, the liberal

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Nicholson to Tobias, July 14, 1954, FCB papers.

community rallied to the support of the African nationalists. When the Lake Province confrontations began, T.A.A. leaders maintained a constant stream of correspondence with the Fabian Bureau and the Labour Party. The liberals in turn pressed Parliament for a full scale investigation of the situation and demanded the immediate reopening of all TANU branches if the government could not produce indictments which listed specific offenses and the individuals involved. In April 1954, Labour leader Fenner Brockway demanded that the Secretary of State explain why Governor Twining had refused to meet with a T.A.A. delegation upon his visit to Mwanza. At the same time he challenged the use of tear gas to disperse the Bukoba branch rally of December 2, 1953. The Secretary refused to discuss the issues at that time, claiming that the incidents were under investigation.<sup>1</sup>

In July 1954, when the protests against the native authorities and an increase in the cattle tax<sup>2</sup> produced

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), April 7, 1954, cols. 603-604.

<sup>2</sup>In an effort to limit the number of cattle, the Government increased the cess tax by 200% from 6d to s.1.6d, Mwanza district files, 1954 (microfilm), Rhodes House.

widespread unrest in the Mwanza region, Brockway raised the issue in Parliament, warning that government policy was causing unnecessary tension. This in turn produced Conservative accusations that the Labour Party was undermining the Crown's plans for territorial development.<sup>1</sup>

Speaking of the cooperation the nationalists were receiving from the liberals in Britain, Mwanza T.A.A. leader Munanka stated:

Again we have been filled with joy to read about our distinguished fighter Mr. Brockway on the question of Cattle and Cotton Cess and Stock limitation. We immediately informed our people about it. Although the answers from the Secretary of States [sic] were not fully satisfying, but we have left assured that something good might emerge from it. We sent full information to our Honourable Friend to pursue the matter further as our people are still not happy on this question. We wish him to continue until such time that we hear the Government stop Livestock Limitation Policies.<sup>2</sup>

In August the Fabian Bureau dispatched Marjorie Nicholson to the territory to personally examine the situation in Lake Province. Her subsequent report encouraged

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<sup>1</sup>See East Africa and Rhodesia editorials, June-July, 1954. The Labour Party, by contrast, supported African demands to end forced agricultural procedures at its policy-making convention at Scarborough, July 23-27, 1954. Labour Party Archives, Labour Headquarters, Transport House, London.

<sup>2</sup>Munanka to Nicholson, July 27, 1954, FCB papers.

the liberal elements to continue their criticism of the native authority system and their attack on the slow pace of political development. In summarizing her findings, Nicholson concluded:

I am very worried about the undercurrents in Tanganyika. The Government gets away with looking very liberal as it is when compared with its neighbors, but I think there is far too much complacency about. A little prodding from this end might be helpful.<sup>1</sup>

When the TANU branches in Sukumaland were finally closed, an active correspondence ensued between Munanka, Kambona, and James Betts of the Fabian Bureau. Working in close cooperation, the Africans supplied the liberal group with information concerning the latest developments in the troubled region. The Bureau in turn utilized this information to repeatedly raise the issue in Parliament.<sup>2</sup> On December 8, M.P. John Hynd initiated a debate in the House of Commons. Based on the fact that the outbreaks had been isolated and the possibility that the parties involved had not been properly informed of the nature of their offenses, he suggested that the banned TANU branches

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to FCB Advisory Committee, September 3, 1954, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See correspondence between Betts and Kambona-Munanka, July, 1954-February, 1955, FCB papers.

be reopened. This suggestion was rejected by the Secretary of State who stated:

I think that certainly the people who are sometimes called professional society organisers, some of whom have interests quite apart from the interests of their so-called constituents are fully informed as to the law. Over 200 applications for registration have been granted, and only four have been refused, and nothing could be worse for these societies than that the wrong society should be recognized.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary further refused to list specific charges against the closed branches, stating that "It is not always desirable in public to give all the reasons which lead a responsible official to come to a conclusion of that kind."<sup>2</sup>

Thus by 1954, the home government was clearly divided over the question of recent political developments within the trusteeship. The liberal faction, encouraged by the advent of capable Tanganyikan African leadership and a territorial-wide political organization, sought rapid political advancement along non-racial lines. The conservative element, by contrast, viewed the resurrected T.A.A.

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 582 (December 8, 1954), col. 1317.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

and later TANU, as a serious threat to the established policies of indirect rule and partnership.

### The U. N. and the Liberation Drive

In the period 1951-54 two visiting missions toured Tanganyika and produced reports which were highly critical of British administration of the trusteeship. When these reports were finally submitted to the Trusteeship Council, their findings were approved by a majority of the agency's members. The conclusions drawn by the international organization were a source of encouragement to both the African nationalist leaders and their liberal supporters in the home government. The conservative regime, by contrast, condemned the findings of the Trusteeship Council and its agencies as groundless polemical attacks perpetrated by the anti-colonial forces of the United Nations.

The greatest criticism of the Administering Authority was centered around the problem of political development. This was, however, certainly not the only complaint leveled by the international organization. The 1951 Mission report was highly critical of Britain's attempts to improve economic conditions within the African community. The report found that there were no mandatory

safety devices on jobs involving unskilled labor, no program of workmen's compensation, no minimum wages, and no government regulation of working hours or housing standards.<sup>1</sup>

The educational system was also severely criticized for its policy of racial separation and for its inability to reach the adult community, most of whom had to utilize fingerprints in order to "sign" contracts which often bound the uneducated worker for long periods of time and contained severe penalties for contract violation.<sup>2</sup> The communist bloc nations and the former colonies on the Trusteeship Council used their findings to accuse Britain of violating Article 5 of her Trusteeship Agreement which required her to protect the indigenous population from abuse and fraud in all labor relations within the territory.<sup>3</sup>

The Meru land case was also a source of polemical and ideological controversy within the international organization. The tribe had petitioned the Trusteeship

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission, 1951, pp. 34-37.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 9th Session, 423rd Meeting (1952), pp. 18-24.



Council to block the proposed move. However, while the matter was still being deliberated the Tanganyikan government undertook the transfer. This produced a stream of protest from the anti-imperialist nations and resulted in the adoption of a resolution in which the Council stated that it:

...regretted that the Administering Authority ...found it necessary to move any of the Meru people from land on which they had settled... by a process of forcible eviction...in the course of which damages and loss were suffered by members of the Meru people.<sup>1</sup>

Additionally, the U. N. document offered the British as a future guideline "the principle that African communities...should not be moved to other areas unless a clear expression of their collective consent has been obtained."<sup>2</sup> Finally, the 1954 Visiting Mission recommended a reopening of the Meru Case and the creation of a special U.N. committee to determine appropriate compensation for the families who suffered eviction.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Trusteeship Council Resolution 468 (XI), A/2150, pp. 49-50.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission 1954, pp. 97-99.

The Trusteeship Council also challenged the British systems of racial separation and parity representation. In March 1954, the organization noted that although race relations within the territory were still peaceful, the imbalanced development of the three communities was a source of serious future danger. The Council therefore resolved that the Administering Authority should be encouraged to "intensify efforts to bring about, in the shortest possible time, the development of a united Tanganyika, in which the indigenous inhabitants will play their full part."<sup>1</sup>

Speaking of parity, the Council expressed its hope that the system:

...would be regarded by the Administering Authority as a transitional phase, and that consideration will be given to the initiation as soon as possible of a common electoral roll, with appropriate qualifications, if considered desirable.<sup>2</sup>

The major controversy arising between the Administering Authority and the Trusteeship Council was produced

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 11th Session, 438th Meeting (1954), p. 26.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 11th Session, 441st Meeting (1954), p. 81.

by the conclusions of the 1954 Visiting Mission concerning the political development of the territory. In effect, the report coupled a condemnation of British plans for constitutional development with a recognition of TANU as the potential leader of an independence drive. Finally, it called for the emancipation of the territory within twenty-five years.

The 1951 visiting team had noted that there was a virtual absence of modern political activity among the African population and that the few existing associations limited their scope to local reform issues.<sup>1</sup> Three years later, the Mission reversed the observations of its predecessor after studying the activities of one-month old TANU. During its six-week visit, the team met with several Union delegations, all of whom made a favorable impression on Mission members. Especially impressive was the twenty man delegation from the troubled Mwanza region headed by Munanka and Kandoro. The report noted that the TANU leadership was composed of an educated, experienced elite who well articulated the Tanganyikan African population's

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission. 1951, pp. 42-44.

grievances with the administration and their aspiration for rapid political development at the territorial level.<sup>1</sup>

As a result, the Mission Report made the following observation concerning TANU:

...if put to the test its following would prove to be large, and its emergence as an important force must therefore be recognized...the Mission was impressed with the quality of the leaders ...their moderation and sense of realism.<sup>2</sup>

The report also supported the organization's objection to the parity system and its goal of establishing a government based on a black majority. The Mission concluded that "...no stability is possible unless it is made clear that the goal is the governing of the country mainly by Africans."<sup>3</sup> Because of this, the report was severely critical of Governor Twining's statement that members of the civil service would not be allowed to join political organizations, since the decision removed capable Africans from participation in the independence drive.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission. 1954, pp. 74-76.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 74-75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

The most significant statement contained in the Visiting Mission Report, however, was its conclusion that Tanganyika would be ready for independence within a twenty-five year period:<sup>1</sup>

The willingness of the Mission to suggest a timetable while even TANU had not yet projected a date for self-government clearly reflects the organization's eagerness to undermine British control as rapidly as possible.

Thus, by 1954 the seeds of a liberation movement were clearly sown within the trusteeship. The Tanganyika African National Union had emerged as a black political organization with a growing base of support, effective leadership, and clear-cut plans concerning the course of constitutional development. In addition, the Union had established a well coordinated working relationship with the liberal elements of the home government. Finally, it enjoyed the support and recognition of the anti-imperial forces on the Trusteeship Council.

In opposition to the nationalist movement stood the conservative forces of the home government and the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

white settler community, both of whom were willing to initiate political advances in the territory, but who insisted on the preservation of indirect rule, parity, and partnership.

By 1954 it was clear that one side would soon be forced to accept a major alteration in its plans for the future political development of Tanganyika. The existing stalemate was to be altered in the period 1955-57 by the Tanganyika African National Union's rise to territorial prominence. With the advent of a viable African political organization in possession of a well formulated plan for trusteeship advancement, the liberal elements of the home government and the anti-colonial powers of the Trusteeship Council were to find a champion to rally behind in their drive to emancipate Tanganyika. By 1960 the combined efforts of the African nationalists and these extra-territorial interest groups were to exert such a continued pressure that the Crown was to opt for the immediate emancipation of the trusteeship. As will be seen, this final decision was greatly aided by the major alterations in Colonial Office strategy and philosophy which were to occur by 1958. In the period

1955-57 nonetheless, a bitter struggle was to ensue until the British government opted for a substantial modification of its plans for Tanganyika.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE COURSE OF GOVERNMENTAL EVOLUTION:

OPPOSING VIEWS, 1955-1957

#### Background

By 1954 it was clear that a major confrontation concerning the course of future political development was soon to take place in Tanganyika. The recently emerged nationalist movement was committed to a program of rapid constitutional advancement, the granting of universal adult suffrage, and the initiation of responsible government controlled by the indigenous population. These goals were supported by the Labour Party and the liberal reform groups, both eager to transform the Empire into a commonwealth, and by the anti-colonial forces of the United Nations who sought to embarrass the Crown and undermine the basis of British rule throughout the globe.

Opposed to this alliance stood the Tory Party, the right-wing elements of the British home government, the Colonial Office, and the white settler community of



Tanganyika. The conservative alliance favored a slow pace of political development in which constitutional change did not outdistance the economic, social, and educational amelioration of the trusteeship. For this reason, the government and its supporters favored the perpetuation of indirect rule, a high qualitative franchise, the tri-racial system, and the use of reservation and parity to allocate seats in the territory's legislative bodies.

In the period 1954-57 the British began to introduce plans to blueprint the future course of political development. This was done to prevent the emergence of yet another crisis in an already seriously troubled corner of the Empire, to relieve pressure from the Trusteeship Council, and to placate critics within the home government. The alterations proposed by the British were clearly designed to both offer the promise of gradual, peaceful change and at the same time to keep intact the principles of parity, indirect rule, and partnership.

Each Crown proposal, however, was vehemently protested by the African nationalists and their allies as either an insufficient "token" reform, or more seriously, as a plot to placate the African population and to undermine the independence drive. Consequently, the actual

course of political development consisted of a series of grudging compromises between the British and their liberal adversaries. While neither side was totally satisfied with the compromise settlement for any of the major political policy decisions, the sum total of these alterations resulted in the holding of the first territorial elections. Despite the limited qualitative franchise and the maintenance of proportional representation, this event was clearly a milestone on the road to self-rule.

The Territorial Administration:  
Policy and Compromise

In 1955, the Crown appeared to be little concerned with the possibility of a serious political challenge originating from the indigenous population. When the Visiting Mission Report suggested a twenty-five year deadline for independence, the Colonial Office dismissed the suggestion as "wild, extremist and impractical".<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, in her annual report to the United Nations during these years, the British consistently refused to project a date for the initiation of self-government, stressing that the poor political awareness of the bulk of the

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<sup>1</sup>John Hatch, Africa Today and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1960), p. 91.

population would render such an estimate absurd.<sup>1</sup> The fact that the Crown did not recognize TANU as an organization capable of leading a liberation drive is reflected in the following statement released by the Colonial Office in 1955:

Among the indigenous people there are numerous local associations of a quasi-political nature, which are generally concerned with promoting political aims among a tribe or the immigrants of a district. No developments in the formation of political parties in the generally accepted sense have yet taken place. The recently formed Tanganyika African National Union...claims to represent all the indigenous people of the territory, but its activities are mainly confined to the towns, and there is little liaison between headquarters and provincial branches.<sup>2</sup>

In an attempt to gain the cooperation of the nationalist movement and thus avoid future conflicts, Nyerere was offered a post as a district commissioner.

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial No. 324, Report by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Trust Territory of Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration for the Year 1954 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 20-28; Colonial No. 333, 1956, pp. 12-17; Colonial No. 339, 1957, pp. 11-16.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, 'Central Office of Information, "Political Conditions in Tanganyika Territory", press release dated April 6, 1955, p. 2.

Had he accepted, the TANU leader would have been the first African in the territory to occupy such an elevated position in the local administration.<sup>1</sup>

Even when it became clear that the nationalist association was formulating a major challenge to British policy, relations between the Crown and TANU remained moderate and flexible. On his part, Nyerere continually condemned acts of violence and the use of civil disobedience tactics.<sup>2</sup> The government consequently took a moderate position in its disagreements with the Union. The Registration of Societies Ordinance, for example, was never employed against TANU as a whole. Rather, the administration used it to close only those branches whose actions made the danger of violent confrontation imminent.<sup>3</sup>

Peaceful relations were also aided by the moderate and diplomatic stance maintained by Governor Twining at all times. Although a firm believer in the system of

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Betts, August 11, 1954. The TANU president refused the position because of the government ban on civil servant political activity.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere memorandum to TANU branch offices, November 10, 1954, TANU files, Tanganian National Archives.

<sup>3</sup>See public statement by Governor Twining, East Africa and Rhodesia, March 10, 1955.

indirect rule and multi-racialism, he was nonetheless willing to take definite steps to initiate political advances if he believed they did not violate the principles of British colonial policy. Thus, on several occasions he called for changes in the territorial constitution which increased African political participation in the Legislative Council. Similarly, he successfully labored for the initiation of parity in 1953, two years before the deadline recommended by the Mackenzie Report. Twining was always willing to compromise and to retain a flexible attitude in his dealings with the nationalist opposition.

In March 1955 the new Legislative Council opened, based on the parity of unofficial members recommended in the Mathew Report. The reorganized body consisted of 61 members of whom 31 were officials. The remaining 30 unofficial seats were divided equally among the members of the three racial groups. Each community therefore had 8 seats representing the provinces, a member for the municipality of Dar es Salaam, and a representative for special interests.<sup>1</sup> Although unofficals represented constituencies, all seats were filled by nomination. Council

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 4, p. 703.

members were nonetheless supposed to be selected "after consultation with bodies representing the communities or interests they will serve."<sup>1</sup> The establishment of the constituencies was initiated as part of the gradual replacement of the nomination system by one based on election. In explaining the creation of the constituencies, the Colonial Office stated that:

Consideration will be given to introducing elections on a common roll in certain areas where there is a substantial demand and their introduction is practical.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, the new constitution provided for an enlarged Executive Council, which consisted of the Governor, three ex-officio members who represented key branches of the administration, five nominated officials, and six non-officials (two from each race).<sup>3</sup> The admission of six non-officials to the Executive Council meant that although the administration still enjoyed a majority in the Legislature, the Government side of the chamber

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Central Office of Information, "Constitutional Progress in Tanganyika", Release No. R 3041 (April, 1955), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 5, pp. 704-706.

for the first time contained unofficials. This was done to provide the six non-government members of the Executive Council an opportunity to become involved in the affairs of various government departments, and therefore to gain upper-level administrative experience.<sup>1</sup> Finally, in order to encourage African participation and cooperation, the use of Swahili in Council debates was permitted for the first time.

Although its system and structure of seating were altered, the introduction of the new Council did not radically change the legislative branch. The bulk of the official members were the same persons who had served on the preceding council and were simply transferred to the new body en masse. Most retained their same jobs and committee positions.<sup>2</sup> All of the Africans on the official side were chiefs and, in one case, the wife of a chief.<sup>3</sup> The ten unofficial African members consisted of three

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<sup>1</sup>Statement by Chief Speaker of the Legislative Council, Tanganyika Standard, April 20, 1955.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed analysis of this transfer, see Tables 7 and 8, pp. 715-716, 717-719.

<sup>3</sup>Mrs. E. M. Marealle, wife of the Paramount Chief of the Wachagga.

chiefs, three cooperative leaders, and four school teachers. The only member associated with the TANU leadership was Paul Bomani, who represented the Lake Province constituency.

Thus, the legislative branch of the government was still firmly in the hands of civil servants and professional administrators appointed by the Crown. Those few Africans who did receive nominations were, for the most part, conservatives who were also in the employment of the colonial administration. As a whole, there seemed little probability that the Legislative Council would serve as an instrument for the expression of nationalist aspirations.

In his opening speech before the newly constituted Legislative Council, Governor Twining made it clear that the parity system would be in effect for a long time and that future constitutional development would be based on the evolution of grass roots political awareness, fostered through the native authority system. Above all, Twining made it clear that there was no place in the scheme of territorial development for what he referred to as "the heady wine of nationalism."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Speech by His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on 20th April 1955 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1955), p. 6.



The Crown also made it clear to the United Nations that the parity system would be in operation for a considerable length of time. In February 1956, the United Kingdom Special Representative to the Trusteeship Council vigorously defended the concept of a lengthy period of parity arguing that special concessions and guarantees were needed to encourage Asians and Europeans to invest and settle in Tanganyika. Without these private sources of revenue, it would be impossible to adequately develop the territory's potentialities. At the same time the system did no injustices to the Tanganyikan African population, the vast majority of whom were far from prepared for modern political activities.<sup>1</sup>

Although parity was preserved, in July 1957 the Governor announced a change in the ex-officio membership of the Legislative Council which was increased to 15 and, for the first time, included six Assistant Ministers (four Africans, one Asian and one European).<sup>2</sup> In addition, in

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 17th Session, 672nd Meeting, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, British Information Services. Reference Division, I.D. 1306, The United Kingdom Dependencies 1957-58 (New York: British Information Services, 1958), p. 4.

December the Council was enlarged from 61 to 67 members with new seats divided evenly between the Government and Representative side of the House. This increase was the result of the division of the heavily populated Lake Province into two separate constituencies.<sup>1</sup>

During this period, the Government clearly stated that it intended to see a limited, high qualitative franchise introduced in the territory. It was obvious that Legislative Council elections were the next major step in political advancement. The administration was therefore anxious to insure that any voting qualifications adopted were compatible with the preservation of parity. Similarly, it sought to establish rigid candidate prerequisites to limit the number of residents qualified to run for public office. Thus, it felt that the inexperienced and unsophisticated elements of Tanganyikan society, who were seen as the greatest potential threat to orderly territorial development, could be kept off the ballot.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 33rd Session, Volume 2, (December 11, 1957), pp. 353-356.

<sup>2</sup>Speech by Sir Edward Twining at Corona Club dinner, Dar es Salaam, September 22, 1955. Tanganyika territorial files, political papers, Rhodes House.

The details of the Government's plan for a high qualitative franchise were made known to the nationalist leadership in May 1955, when Kambona acquired an official copy of a confidential memo from Governor Twining to all field officers outlining the rigid candidate and voter prerequisites the Government would demand as the basis of any future territorial election.<sup>1</sup> The requirements for voters included a twelve month territorial residency, with a six month residency in the given constituency, twenty-five years of age, a Standard XII education or two years service in a government position of authority or certification as a "recognized dignitary". The education requirements could be waived for residents who had an annual income of £200 or who owned property worth £500 or more.<sup>2</sup> Disqualified were the insane, convicted prisoners

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<sup>1</sup>The original document was forwarded to the FCB by Kambona on May 31, 1955. Kambona-Betts correspondence, May 31-June 18, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Twining memo, "Tanganyika Franchise, Government Proposals: Qualifications and Disqualifications of Voters and Candidates for Election to Leg Co." (May, 1955), p. 2, FCB papers. The term "recognized dignitary" was provided to extend the franchise to the chiefs as the leaders of the indigenous population under the system of indirect rule.

in custody, and those guilty of "electoral offenses".<sup>1</sup> Qualifications for candidates included: being a registered voter, four years residency in the territory within the six years prior to the election, a knowledge of English sufficient to read Legislative Council documents, and fluency in either English or Swahili for use in debate. In addition, candidates were required to take an oath of allegiance to the territorial government, had to be nominated by twenty-five registered voters of the same race, and were required to pay a £50 deposit which was forfeited unless the candidate received a specific percentage of the total votes cast in his constituency. Disqualifications included allegiances to a foreign power, a previous incident of bankruptcy, having served a prison term of more than six months, being the holder of a Crown office, or having a government contract and not publicly announcing the fact in either the Territorial Gazette or a newspaper in the respective constituency within one month of the election.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 4. The Fabians and the TANU leadership interpreted the "electoral offenses" clause as a means of curtailing anti-government agitation by nationalist candidates during the campaigns.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-8.

The relatively high economic and educational qualifications clearly eliminated the bulk of the African population from both the franchise and candidacy. The ban on civil servant participation and the required fees and nominations by members of one's constituency and race excluded many educated Tanganyikan African elite from contention. Finally, the required oath of allegiance and disqualification for "electoral offenses" in effect meant that African nationalists would be prevented from openly articulating their dissatisfaction with the colonial regime.

The official proclamation of the Tanganyikan government's position on the franchise and future political development in general came in April 1956, in an address by Governor Twining before the legislature. In his speech, the chief executive attacked the Trusteeship Council recommendation of a target date for the introduction of self-government. At the same time, he rejected "local demands" for the dissolution of the present Legislative Council and its replacement with one based on electoral representation. The Governor did, however, acknowledge that the use of elected representatives would be initiated in the near future. In light of this fact, Twining stated that he would soon submit a bill which would call for elections based on a

qualitative franchise in some constituencies by 1958, when the term of the existing legislature expired. Finally, the Governor announced that a committee would be appointed to study the forthcoming government bill which would call for a common roll election based on a qualitative franchise without sex discrimination, and the maintenance of parity representation in each constituency.<sup>1</sup> When the exact details of the voting and candidacy qualifications were announced, they corresponded exactly to those listed in the confidential memorandum of May, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

The rigid educational and economic standards suggested would clearly eliminate most Africans. In order to qualify as a Standard XII graduate, a student had to pass the exam for Standard XI and the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate test. In the 1950-55 period, an average of only sixty Africans per year completed this requirement.<sup>3</sup>

The income stipulation was equally restrictive. In 1955 only 2,300 Africans in the territory were earning

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 31st Session, Volume One, (April 25, 1956), pp. 4-17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., (May 17, 1956), pp. 291-297.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 9, p. 720.

annual incomes which would enable them to register as voters.<sup>1</sup> The proposed qualifications would therefore clearly preserve control of the legislature by the minority community, despite the introduction of the elective principle.

On May 26, the Governor appointed the members of the announced committee on franchise requirements. The nine man panel was composed of five Europeans, two Africans and two Asians. Six of its members were unofficials on the Legislative Council and members of the newly founded white settler political association, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP).<sup>2</sup> Only one member, Chief Thomas Marealle, was friendly to the nationalist movement. When the committee released its findings in October, the qualifications it proposed were exactly the same as those articulated by the Governor.<sup>3</sup> Speaking of the rigid franchise requirements,

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Labour Department, Annual Report, 1955 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, May 27, 28, 1956.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Government Paper No. 1-1957, Report of the Committee Appointed to Study Government's Proposals Regarding the Qualifications of Voters and Candidates for Election to Legislative Council, Together with Copies of Despatches Exchanged Between His Excellency the Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), passim.

Twining made it clear that the high standards had been adopted to insure that the government did not fall into the hands of incapable, inexperienced leadership. The Governor stated:

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is determined to go forward on the basis of qualitative democracy...and not on the prostituted meaning of democracy which glib-tongued politicians think of as an open sesame for fulfillment of their own ambitions.<sup>1</sup>

When the bill was submitted to the Legislative Council it was rapidly approved with slight modification. The annual income requirement was lowered to £150, educational qualifications were reduced to Standard VIII, and the minimum age was set at twenty-one.<sup>2</sup>

Members of the Legislative Council and administrative personnel who commented on the reduced franchise noted that the modifications were made to extend the franchise to virtually all members of minority communities.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 30, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Election of Members of the Legislative Council and for Matters Incidental Thereto and Connected Therewith (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), pp. 32-24.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, May 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 1957; papers of administrators Barton, Dowsett, Fletcher-Cooke, Harris, Vinter, and Young, Rhodes House.



Although African voters would constitute a majority in all constituencies, the inclusion of the parity system guaranteed that Legislative Council control remained in the hands of the minority communities. The modified Election Bill was approved by the Legislative Council and the Governor in May, and formally signed by the Secretary of State during his October tour of the territory. While visiting the Trusteeship, Secretary Lyttleton made it clear that no further changes in Legislative Council composition, racial representation or voting qualifications could be expected in the near future. Indeed, he remarked that the present pace of political development "...was in danger of being too rapid rather than too slow."<sup>1</sup>

Finally, in April 1957, Twining announced that a Post Elections Committee would be appointed to examine the results of the first territorial elections for Legislative Council seats. These were scheduled for late 1958 in a select number of constituencies. The committee would evaluate the results of the first electoral experience and then make recommendations concerning the methods, procedure, and time for the holding of further elections in the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 29, 1957.

Trusteeship.<sup>1</sup> The Governor made it clear, however, that under no circumstances would the possibility of universal adult franchise be considered:

As to universal suffrage, I can state bluntly that there is no intention whatever of introducing it, or even considering it, at an early date....Anyone who is familiar with constitutional practice will be aware that all electoral systems show a gradual development of the franchise, and during the discussion in the Franchise Committee members were advised that there was no recorded case of the first introduction of elections taking place on the basis of universal suffrage.... While we should not necessarily be discouraged from doing something which is unprecédented if it seems to fit the particular circumstances of our own country and our own time, it would be quite unrealistic to suggest that these conditions were satisfied for the introduction of universal adult franchise now in Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup>

In September, after consultation with the Minister for Local Government, Twining announced that five constituencies had been selected as suitable for the 1958 Legislative Council elections: Northern, Tanga, Eastern, Western, and Southern Highlands provinces.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Address By His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on the 30th April 1957 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), pp. 5-9.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika, Address By His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on 17th September, 1957 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), p. 1.

Thus, by late 1957 it was clear that the government was determined to maintain the parity system and hence preserve control by the minority communities. Although constitutional progress in the form of Legislative Council elections would occur, the high qualitative franchise and candidacy requirements would prevent the African nationalist movement and its supporters from gaining control of the elected seats in the legislature.

Throughout the early 1950's, the government also made it clear that the recently announced constitutional advances in no way altered Crown plans for political evolution through native authorities. On April 20, 1955, the Governor utilized his opening speech before the newly constituted Legislative Council to stress that the tribal system was the "bulwark" of African society and that nationalism was an "unstable" and "unreliable" force.<sup>1</sup>

As the decade progressed it became increasingly apparent that the native authorities were steadily losing control of the indigenous population. In 1956, the government assigned M. J. B. Molohan, a Senior Provincial Commissioner in the Tanganyika service, the task of

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Address by Governor 20th April 1955, pp. 2-5.

studying the problem of detribalization. His report, released the following year, clearly revealed a major tendency among the young Tanganyikan Africans to abandon tribal life and migrate to the larger settlements where they were no longer under the control of the traditional source of authority. Molohan stressed that as the trend accelerated, the effectiveness of the native authority system steadily declined.<sup>1</sup> Clearly implied was the conclusion that indirect rule was an outdated, unrealistic form of local government control. Similar convictions were expressed by senior civil service administrators in 1957 during a Colonial Office gathering of East African personnel.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the decreasing popularity of the chiefs, Tanganyikan administrators throughout the mid-1950's noted a growing tendency, especially among young males, to support local national organizations and

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Committee to Study Problems Arising from African Detribalization, A Study of the Areas of Tanganyika where Detribalized Persons are Living with Recommendations as to the Administrative and Other Measures Required to Meet Problems Arising Therein (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), pp. 72-75.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, African No. 1190, Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration. 8th Session: The Place of Chiefs in African Administration (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 25-37.

to transfer to the educated elite the support and respect once claimed by the chief.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the steadily widening gap between the chiefs and the younger generation, the British government refused to deviate from its long established policy of indirect rule. Inherent in the preservation of this system was the belief that modern political participation had to be firmly implanted on the local level before the indigenous population could hope to have a major voice in the formulation of territorial policy. This attitude was repeatedly reflected in the official policy positions promulgated by the Crown

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<sup>1</sup>For an analysis of this problem on a territorial-wide basis, see: Tanganyika, Ministry of Local Government, Halmashauri Ya Jimbo Doyo Katika Nehi Ya Tanganyika 1951-56 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956), pp. 16-23; Tanganyika, Précès of the Local Government Elections (Urban Areas) Ordinance No. 44 of 1956 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956), pp. 6-7; Tanganyika, the Secretariat, The Development of African Local Government in Tanganyika, 1955 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956), passim; Tanganyika, Ministry of Local Government and Administration, The Development of Local Government in Tanganyika, 1956 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), pp. 33-37. For detailed studies of particular tribal groups, see: L. P. Mair, "African Chiefs Today", Africa, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1958), 195-206; Keith G. Mather, "A Note on African Councils in the Rungwe District of Tanganyika and their Election", Journal of African Administration, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1957), 182-188; I. H. Norton, "An Inter-Racial Local Council in Tanganyika", Journal of African Administration, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January, 1956), 26-32.

in its dealings with the Trusteeship Council. A confidential memo sent by the Colonial Office to its United Nations representative clearly reveals Britain's attitude:

In considering measures to be adopted for the political education of the African population, the Administering Authority must be guided by the wishes and feelings of the mass of population and must not allow itself to be pressured into inappropriate and premature action through pressure from a small educated minority who are often largely detribalized and out of touch with the peasantry who constitute the mass of the population.

The Administering Authority agrees unreservedly with the views of the experienced African administrators stationed in Tanganyika that the political education of the African population must begin in the sphere of local government and that local government must in the first instance be organized on a tribal basis and on a foundation of tribal custom and tradition. The first step must be to secure popular representation in the tribal organization. The next stage...is to encourage tribal councils to federate into District Councils or Councils covering an ever wider area....

An increase of direct African representation on the Legislative Council is visualized as an inevitable constitutional development. At the present stage, however, it is extremely difficult to find Africans who are sufficiently educated to be able to participate usefully in the deliberations of the Council and who at the same time are truly representative of the masses of the African population, and responsive to their needs and wishes.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Confidential memorandum to the United Kingdom representative to the Trusteeship Council from the Secretary of State for the Colonies entitled "Confidential on Local Government (Native Councils) and Progress Towards Self-Government", April 4, 1957, Tanganyika Territorial files, Rhodes House.

The colonial administration also made it clear that it intended to foster respect for the traditional authorities. In his opening speech before the Legislative Council in May 1957, Governor Twining clearly stated that no matter what changes might occur in local government, the chiefs would remain the main source of African political power within the territory.<sup>1</sup>

This determination to support the native authorities and to preserve their political leadership in the face of increasing opposition from the growing nationalist movement was reiterated at the first territorial convention of chiefs at Mzumbe in May 1957. At that gathering, Twining stated:

...We have recently been experiencing a new phenomenon of a political party composed largely of people whose tribal links have been loosened, and who have not the proper respect of the Native Authorities and chiefs. Most of their ideas come from those outside the territory, put into their heads by the people who have not got the true interests of Tanganyika at heart and want to apply here methods which are not particularly suitable to our local conditions. They base their appeal on the emotional attractions of extreme nationalism, which in effect is

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 30th Session, 1st meeting, May 7, 1957, p. 6.

nothing more than racialism. As a result of a series of historical accidents Tanganyika cannot yet be said to be a nation, but it is for us to build the country up to nationhood.<sup>1</sup>

British determination to support the native authority system coincided with a steady increase in the number of incidents of indigenous dissatisfaction with local administrators, taxes, and official agricultural policies.<sup>2</sup> This discontent was both incited and exploited by local TANU leaders who sought to use it as a means of recruiting new members. Typical incidents of unrest were reported by the Masai District Commissioner who noted that:

The most disturbing feature of the year was the increase in hooliganism. Among adults this was without doubt associated with the local branch of TANU which, despite the deplorably low standard of leadership, acquired many followers in the later half of the year.

An increasing number of politically disaffected persons consider it fair game to 'frame' the Police on every possible occasion, and co-operation from the public leaves much to be desired. The public seems reluctant to intervene when bands of rowdies decide to beat up persons whose only offense appears to be that they are in the public service; recent victims have included a school teacher, an N.A. native authority driver and an N.A. messenger-- in the

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<sup>1</sup>Governor's opening address to the First Convention of Chiefs, Mgumbe, Morogoro, May 14, 1957, administrative files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 10, pp. 721-727.



later case TANU supporters were prominent among the assailants. A particularly mean attempt was made by a TANU member, with the aid of a forged document, to accuse the Inspector of the misappropriation of Shs. 800/....<sup>1</sup>

In order to curb widespread unrest, the Legislative Council in November 1955 approved the Incitement to Violence Act which made the passing of oral remarks critical of another race a crime of sedition. Furthermore, in the trying of such cases, the burden of proof was placed on the defendant who had to produce evidence that no hostile intent was existant in the remark.<sup>2</sup>

Coupled with this legislation was the even more stringent Penal Code Amendment Bill passed in November of the same year. Especially wide latitude in the prosecution of dissidents was given to the administration in Section 63B of the ordinance which stipulated:

Any person who without lawful excuse prints, publishes or to any assembly makes any statement likely to raise discontent amongst any of the inhabitants of the territory or to promote feelings of ill-will between different classes or communities or persons of the Territory is guilty of misdemeanor and is liable for imprisonment for twelve months.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Masai District Annual Report, 1957, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, Sept. 16, 1955.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Ordinance No. 49 of 1955: An Ordinance to Amend the Penal Code (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1955), p. 2.

In addition, the legislation empowered the Governor to ban the past and future works of any author considered seditious or dangerous. As in the case of the Incitement to Violence Act, the burden of proof was placed on the accused.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the administration made clear its belief that local TANU leaders were the initiators of many of the incidents of civil disobedience. In April 1957, the Public Relations Department released a pamphlet entitled "What's the Answer?", in which it openly accused TANU of inciting the indigenous population to commit unlawful acts and encouraging them to ignore the traditional sources of authority. The publication strongly discouraged Africans from joining TANU and ended with an appeal for indigenous cooperation with the native administrators.<sup>2</sup>

By 1957, therefore, a pattern of behavior was revealed in the Crown's reaction to the spreading nationalist movement. On one hand, the British were willing to

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> Tanganyika, Public Relations Department, What's The Answer? (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957), passim.

initiate constitutional advances which pointed the way towards eventual self-government. Thus, they were willing to increase the unofficial side of the Legislative Council, to investigate and establish franchise qualifications, and to prepare the way for the first territorial elections to be held in 1958-59. At the same time, however, the Crown insisted upon the preservation of the increasingly outdated system of indirect rule and the maintenance of parity representation. When the nationalist movement turned to civil disobedience tactics and scattered acts of violence to protest such policies, the administration adamantly stated that it had no intention of being pressured into granting further concessions. This position was reflected in the passage of the Incitement to Violence and the Penal Code Amendment Acts. Clearly, the time was ripe for either a major confrontation or compromise between the colonial regime and the nationalist movement.

#### Political Activities Within the Minority Communities

As the conflict between TANU and the government expanded in the 1954-57 period, the minority communities took steps to clearly express their views concerning the course of political development within the territory.

During these years, the white community for the first time developed a united front to oppose both the goals of the African nationalists and any efforts on the part of the administration to compromise with militant demands. The territorial press which was controlled by the European community continually criticized the United Nations and the liberal factions of the home government for attempting to accelerate the pace of territorial political development. White settlers adamantly favored the maintenance of parity and the preservation of the tri-racial system.<sup>1</sup> The press accordingly portrayed TANU as a radical and ambitious minority organization which sought to gain political power at the expense of the more realistic and reasonable traditional African leadership. Based on TANU's demand for a black controlled government and an end to European immigration, the press argued that the Union sought

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<sup>1</sup>See East Africa and Rhodesia editorials, February 7, 14, 1955. The conservative organization within the home government also helped to publicize these opinions. See for example: Sir Ashley-Clarke, Commonwealth or Colonialism? (London: Royal Africa Society, 1957), pp. 3-6; Vincent Harlow, "Colonialism and the Transfer of Power", United Empire, Vol. XLVIII, No. 5 (September-October, 1956), 221-229.

to drive all whites from the territory.<sup>1</sup> Although most Europeans recognized that Nyerere sought a peaceful and moderate course of political development, they feared that the more radical elements of TANU would eventually control the Union and encourage violent racial confrontations. The proximity of the Kenya Emergency only added to such apprehensions. The increasingly widespread incidents of unrest and civil disobedience further contributed to European fears of racial violence. Speaking of the mounting turmoil, one white settler commented:

The TANU chief-Nyerere is showing up pretty badly of late as he seems to have no control or grip on his staff all over the country. His Branches in Handini, Korogwe, and Pagani have been closed down by Government following prosecution and conviction of their officials on various charges, but all akin to sedition....

Now some local TANU officials have resorted to the trick of getting subscription to TANU funds from simple labourers, whom they tell that as long as their subscription to TANU is up to date, they will not have to pay any taxes to Government. A gang of local quarry labourers was run in for not paying their tax and all produced TANU subscription receipts as evidence that they had paid their tax. It is becoming evident that Nyerere is not capable of running

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<sup>1</sup>For a prime example of this type of propaganda see editorials in Tanganyika Standard, February 9, 1955, and East Africa and Rhodesia, March 7, 1955.

an organisation as big as he wants TANU to be. His capacities perhaps run in making speeches. But not in running an organisation.<sup>1</sup>

With the demise of the Tanganyika European Council, the settlers were left without a source of political organization. In February 1956, this vacuum was filled by the creation of the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), which, from its inception, was clearly an indirect agency of the colonial administration. The party was created on February 24 during a meeting between the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and Governor Twining, in the home of the latter.<sup>2</sup> In an attempt to create a political organization to oppose the radical goals of TANU, the UTP drew up a Manifesto in which it advocated multi-racialism, the maintenance of parity, and political evolution guided by traditional authorities.<sup>3</sup> The close cooperation between

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<sup>1</sup>H. Beer, a Tana white settler, to Nicholson, April 23, 1957, FCB papers. The widespread fear that local TANU leaders would not adhere to Nyerere's demands for peaceful development is also seen in the Tanganyika Standard, letters to editor, September 9, 10, 14, 17, 1956. See also the personal papers of white settlers Peter L. Birkett, John Frederick, R. Hill, Mrs. J. F. Lewis-Barned, George Maclean, Sir Philip Even Mitchell, Ronald William Neath, and Lady Mary Elizabeth Schrivener, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Observer, February 26, 1956; Kamona to Nicholson, February 27, 1956, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Manifesto of the United Tanganyika Party, February 24, 1956, Rhodes House.

UTP and the administration is reflected in the fact that of the thirty-two unofficials present at the meeting, the four who abstained from endorsing the Manifesto were all TANU members.<sup>1</sup>

Party leadership was assumed by two Europeans, Ivor Bayldon and T. W. Tyrrell, both of whom were Twining appointees to the Legislative Council. Upon hearing of the Party's creation, Nyerere complained bitterly that the unofficial side of the legislature was now in reality no more than a UTP delegation. He therefore called for the dissolution of the existing Legislative Council and the holding of territorial elections to fill the vacancies.<sup>2</sup>

At its founding meeting, the multi-racial Central Council was created to control the operations of the various party branches. This plan, however, never came to fruition. Policy making and activities remained under the

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<sup>1</sup>Venture, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1956), 18. During a meeting with the Fabian Bureau Executive Board on February 29, 1956, Oscar Kambona stated that the four abstainees were: Paul Bozani, Patrick Nambi, George Kundaeri and Joseph Mwansasu. The later two had joined TANU immediately prior to the meeting with Twining. FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, February 27, 1956.

control of the Dar es Salaam cell, which was closely supervised by Governor Twining.<sup>1</sup>

The Manifesto drawn up by the UTP rigidly adhered to the pattern of territorial political development formulated by the British government. Thus, while acknowledging the equality of all races, the organization justified the parity system because of the "advanced condition" of the European and Asian communities. Thus, it attempted to support government policy and at the same time to refute accusations that it was racist. In its treatment of the sensitive racial question the Manifesto stated:

All men are equal in dignity....However different, peoples have varying natural gifts and a wise people is one which seeks the development and full use of all those gifts....Therefore those people of Tanganyika who have had the advantages and benefits, moral and spiritual, social and cultural, economic and political, of an older civilization have an overriding obligation to spread those advantages through the length and breadth of Tanganyika and to enable those less fortunate to share in them.

The party accepts as an obvious fact that acceptance of this principle will entail sacrifices, not only on the part of the givers but also on the part of the receivers.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bates, European Politics, pp. 22-24; Anon James Nsekela, "African Nationalism in Tanganyika" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Pacific, 1960), pp. 62-63.

<sup>2</sup>UTP Manifesto, pp. 2-3.



That the "sacrifices" referred to included acceptance of the parity system despite the radical imbalance in the territory's racial population was made clear in Article 8 of the Manifesto:

...the present Constitution with such developments and innovations as are compatible with the principles of the Constitution, should be manifested and should continue until such time as the main races are more nearly formed into one whole as responsible citizens of Tanganyika and have advanced further on the road of Nationhood.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, the organization recognized that the "final responsibility" for Tanganyikan political development rested in Her Majesty's Government and would remain there until full self-government within the Commonwealth was achieved.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, coupled with the Manifesto was a UTP Pledge whereby the Party committed itself to respect the power of both the colonial administration and the native authorities, to promote change only through constitutional means, to resist the activities of all subversive groups, and to "evolve the most suitable form of franchise for the circumstances of Tanganyika and to resist all proposals

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

which would lead to the domination of one racial group over the other."<sup>1</sup>

In summary, the United Tanganyika Party, while avoiding specific reference to either the Twining administration or TANU, clearly articulated its intention to support the government blueprint for political evolution and to oppose the proposals of the African nationalist movement.

Once organized, UTP began an energetic program aimed at spreading its views throughout the Trusteeship. To facilitate this goal, the party began a weekly publication entitled News and Views, which consistently supported government policy. Key among the party's priorities was the defense of the administration's multi-racial policy. The organization clearly expressed its belief that the parity system did not constitute a form of racism, despite the territory's great imbalance in racial population. Rather, it argued that such a system was needed until a majority of the Tanganyikan African population was truly capable of sharing the responsibility involved in modern political

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<sup>1</sup>United Tanganyika Party Pledge, FCB papers.

participation.<sup>1</sup> It therefore supported parity as a temporary expedient until a majority of members of the three races attained the level of "responsible citizenship" which was measured in terms of economic success and educational training.<sup>2</sup> In April and May of 1957, the UTP conducted a number of extensive speaking tours in Tanganyika, Great Britain, and the United States (U.N.) to stir up popular support for their cause. The majority of the speeches made on these tours stressed the necessity of giving economic and educational development priority over political evolution. Only when Tanganyika had developed a more self-sufficient economy, and an effective modern educational system that reached the bulk of the population, could serious consideration be given to political advancement. Based on this line of reasoning, multi-racialism and parity were viewed as the only reasonable avenues of territorial development.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This philosophy is clearly reflected in an article by UTP Chairman Bayldon, appearing in News and Views, November 23, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>UTP handout "Development Towards Self-Government", April 1956, UTP files, Creech-Jones papers. See also Tanganyika Standard, February 27, 1956.

<sup>3</sup>UTP speech files, 1957, Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam.

UTP also used the fact that unlike TANU, its membership was open to all races to attempt to prove that it was the African political party and not itself that was guilty of discrimination.<sup>1</sup> The organization's attitude towards both TANU and the preservation of parity is well summed up in a 1956 speech by UTP organizer Brian Willis:

That Mr. Nyerere and this Tanganyika African National Union should strive so violently and so persistently to misrepresent the U.T.P. is a measure of the fear which they feel for the success of a multi-racial policy which is officially approved by the Government of the country. The U.T.P. does not 'believe' in the inferiority of this or the superiority of the other, but merely in facing facts, and it is the cardinal weakness of Mr. Nyerere's party that facts are the last thing they wish to face.

The most important among these facts is that the mass of Africans in Tanganyika are uneducated and that those who are educated have reached only a limited standard. It is vital that the standard of education of the mass of Africans should be improved as rapidly as possible, and until this is achieved it is demagogic nonsense for anyone to pretend that they can play their part as they should and as they must, in the full life of a modern, developing country.

If this fact is not recognized one must be forgiven for feeling that Mr. Nyerere's party wants power for power sake. They have certainly

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<sup>1</sup>See for example, Letters to the Editor, East Africa and Rhodesia, December 6, 1956; Speech by UTP President Bayldon at Tabora branch meeting, April 6, 1956, UTP files, Rhodes House.

never produced a policy, either economic or political, which would improve the standard of living of a single ordinary African.<sup>1</sup>

The UTP platform attracted those who stood to gain from the preservation of the parity system and a slow process of territorial political evolution. Thus, its membership was primarily comprised of European and Asian businessmen and prosperous white farmers. It also received substantial backing from Tanganyikan African civil servants who supported government policy, often for the sake of career advancement, and from the native authorities who sought to maintain their control of local government via the preservation of indirect rule.<sup>2</sup> In an open attempt to undermine the African nationalist movement, the UTP repeatedly offered Nyerere positions of prominence within the organization.<sup>3</sup> However, all efforts to sabotage TANU and its growing base of popular support ended in failure.

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<sup>1</sup>News and Views, December 6, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>Brian Willis notes on UTP recruitment, October-November, 1957, Tanganyika Territory, political files, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere-Betts correspondence, November 1956-September 1957, FCB papers; News and Views, April 6, July 21, 1957.

The UTP's speeches, occasional papers, handouts, and general political literature were all written in a scholarly, philosophical, and elevated style. All publications were in English. The party rigidly supported official policy on the vital issues of political representation, franchise qualifications, land tenure, and European immigration.<sup>1</sup> Thus, it had little appeal to either the nationalist leadership or the bulk of the indigenous population who were increasingly dissatisfied with local government policies and administrators.

Although it had only a small basis of support, the UTP nonetheless presented a serious threat to TANU in the 1954-57 period. The party claimed the loyalty of 28 of the 30 unofficial members of the Legislative Council. As such, it dominated the committee created by the Government to consider the questions of both elections and franchise for 1958. Hence, it was clearly in a position to officially endorse its personal preferences for common roll elections based on a high qualitative franchise and a mandatory parity vote.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>News and Views, March 1956-June 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Note that the UTP platform corresponded exactly to the final recommendation of the committee.

In addition, the fact that Governor Twining had been the power behind the creation of UTP was a strong indication that the organization enjoyed official sanction and therefore could expect preferential treatment from the administration. The party also received substantial support from the British Conservative Party, which openly endorsed the UTP and offered it tactical advice and moral support.<sup>1</sup> Brian Willis, who became the recruitment organizer for UTP, was assigned this task by the Conservative leadership.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the financial assets of party members made it possible for the organization to conduct a much more extensive publicity drive than TANU was capable of initiating during its early formative period. Clearly then, the UTP posed a serious threat to fledgling TANU.

The predominantly white Capricorn Society was also busily engaged in the formulation of a plan for territorial political development. In 1956, David Sterling, a Dodoma white settler, was elected President of the Society. He immediately launched a campaign to widen the base of

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<sup>1</sup>Notes on UTP, 1956, Conservative Party Headquarters, London.

<sup>3</sup>Willis papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

support for his organization.<sup>1</sup> In June 1956, the Society held an inter-territorial convention at Salima, in which it formulated a series of franchise qualifications for the British dependencies in East and Central Africa: Under the Capricorn proposals, in order to register as a voter, a Tanganyika resident would have to be twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the territory, and a resident for twenty-seven months in his constituency. In addition, he would have to take and understand an oath of allegiance to the colonial government.

The Capricorn Society's voting qualifications involved a complicated franchise system whereby a resident had to satisfy at least two of fifteen possible voting requirements. Those individuals who were able to meet more than the minimum two were granted an extra vote for each additional qualification for up to a total of six votes. The fifteen qualifying factors were: Form XI education or its equivalent; possession of a certificate of proficiency in certain skilled crafts; an annual income of £240 or possession of property worth £480; a taxable income of

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<sup>1</sup>Capricorn African Society papers, Sterling memorandum, April-May 1956, Rhodes House. See also, Kirilo Japhet, "The Capricorn Society", Africa Today, Vol. 4 (March-April, 1957), 8-9.



£1500 for two consecutive years; possession of civil or military decorations; possession of a commission in a recognized national voluntary organization; the holding of a past or present public office; be the mother of two children who have reached Form II; possess field rank in the armed forces or police; be a traditional ruler; be the possessor and maintainer of a recognized prosperous agricultural business; be an African warrant officer or sergeant in the territorial service; be an officer of a former association; be 42 years of age or older.<sup>1</sup>

Although the Society insisted that its policy was non-racial, the relatively high franchise qualifications and the use of the multiple vote was in effect a bid for the preservation of minority rule in British East and Central Africa.<sup>2</sup> For this reason, the Society failed to attract the support of most politically conscious African inhabitants. Capricornist literature of the 1955 period

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<sup>1</sup>Capricorn African Society, notes from the June 1956 Salima Convention, Capricorn papers. See also Henry Crookenden, "The Capricorn Contract," African Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 121 (October, 1956), 297-302.

<sup>2</sup>For a Capricorn refutation of racial charges see David Sterling, "The Capricorn Contract", United Empire, Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (May-June, 1957), 102-105.

did attempt to link Nyerere and other prominent TANU leaders with its activities but such propaganda tactics did little to gain support for the organization.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the official sanction enjoyed by the UTP and the fact that it concentrated exclusively on trusteeship issues made the other European party far more attractive to whites than the inter-territorial, non-sanctioned Capricorn Society.<sup>2</sup> Thus, while offering an additional alternative plan of development, Capricorn never became a serious threat to either TANU or UTP.

While the white settler population was developing a sense of political awareness and a policy of active participation in territorial affairs, the Asian communities entered the political arena for the first time. Up to this point, Asian participation had been limited to the occasional discussion of pressing issues by the cultural

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<sup>1</sup>Capricorn pamphlets of the October-December 1955 period claimed that Nyerere and three TANU organizers, Kidaha, Tsehekedi and Savanhu were all Capricorn members. These charges were publicly denied by the Africans so named and the January, 1956 issue of Venture featured a refutation of the claim. See also Nyerere-Winchester correspondence, December 13-22, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>David Sterling, notes entitled "Recruitment Difficulties", dated July, 1957, Capricorn papers.

associations active within most of their communities. The isolationist tendency of most sects and an unwillingness to jeopardize their position as the middle strata in Tanganyika society made most Asians quite reluctant to take a stand on the controversial issues which divided the white and African races.

By 1955, however, Asian community leaders began to recognize that participation in political affairs was a pressing necessity if their people were to play an influential role in territorial evolution. However, despite copious attempts to encourage modern political participation, most Asians refused to become involved in politics.

In 1951 the Asian Association, a cultural society open to all sects, was founded in Dar es Salaam. Although it never abandoned its multifold religious and cultural activities, by 1955 the organization had begun to take an active interest in territorial politics.<sup>1</sup> Under the leadership of its President, Amir H. Janal,<sup>2</sup> the Association

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association files, 1954-57, Rhodes House. See also Creech-Jones notes on Tanganyika minority politics, 1955-60, Tanganyika Territorial files, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Janal was a member of the FCB and later a close ally of Nyerere.

tried to persuade Asians to abandon their isolationist tendencies and to become involved in the pressing political issues of the day. This attempt is reflected in its May 1956 message to all Asians in the Trusteeship:

Blissful oblivion-- with far from blissful consequences to be-- is the only way to describe the state of the Asian Community in this country. How else to express this total self-centeredness, this absolute unawareness of the fast-changing scene around?

...what manner of lives do we live, and what contribution do we make to the stream of events and to the shaping of history? Let us be honest with ourselves...we have stagnated and indeed corroded almost beyond repair. Do we not find a fatal pre-occupation with narrow communal or sectional matters, an ostrich-like mental outlook, a pitifully servile and fatalistic acceptance of happenings in matters of vital concern, and most tragic of all a complete oblivion to the needs, aspirations, hopes and fears of the masses in whose midst we live?....<sup>1</sup>

When the parity system was introduced in 1957, the Association was totally negative in its opinion of the designated Asian representatives. Crossroads, the political broadsheet of the Association, remarked:

The Asian team...will be the weakest collection of fine gentlemen who do not know whether they are coming or going. There is not a single member of strong political conviction who can exert influence in the coming

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<sup>1</sup>The Tanganyikan, April, 1956, pp. 7-8. This publication was one of the official newsletters of the Asian Association.

struggle in the Leg Co between TANU and the UTP. The policy of the Asian members so far, of vacillation, of sitting on the fence of fear and of living in pious hope that the British Government will rule this country forever and look to them for the lead will not do any longer.<sup>1</sup>

While most Asians did not respond to the Association's plea for increased political participation, those who did constituted the more liberal elements of the community and showed great sympathy for the TANU cause.<sup>2</sup>

Many Association organizers were also active members of the Fabian Society. As such, they cooperated with both TANU and the socialists to promote the cause of self-government.<sup>3</sup> Sympathy for the TANU platform and dissatisfaction with British rule is clearly reflected in the

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<sup>1</sup>Crossroads, August 20, 1957, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere, in a letter to Nicholson noted that "The few truly active Asians tend to be sympathetic to Union designs", April 22, 1956, FCB papers. For a clear statement of the pro-TANU attitude of the more liberal elements of the Asian community, see: Saphia Mustafa, The Tanganyika Way (Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1961), passim. Both the author and her husband were ardent supporters of TANU and served on the Legislative Council and in the independent administration throughout the 1960's.

<sup>3</sup>Hinden noted that by 1956 the FCB was engaged in regular correspondence with nine prominent Asian community leaders. "Notes on Political Developments--Tanganyika", 1956, FCB papers.

following policy statement, issued by the Asian Association in 1956:

The British Colonial Administration has without justification and contrary to the facts of history worked out an assumption that constitutional reform and political advancement in a colonial territory must be deferred as long as it is possible to do so.

That any rapid political change resulting in power passing into the hands of the people is detrimental to its interest, and hence must be discouraged.

That a colony must go through the age old pattern of crawl, walk and run laid down arbitrarily....

...Such a policy based on the fear of the masses has invariably led to extreme politics, ultra nationalism, and crises.<sup>1</sup>

The Asian Association was also severely critical of both parity and tri-racialism which they viewed as sources of racial tension rather than as viable methods of territorial development. In condemning British policy, the organization stated:

It is futile to argue that the Asians and the Europeans are bigger taxpayers and that they are used to a more civilized way of life and that they can afford to spend more money for civilized amenities....

It is futile to argue that an equal sum of money is spent for the betterment of each of the three groups of people in Tanganyika because in

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association handout entitled "Tanganyika", November 13, 1956, Asian Association papers, Rhodes House.

a nation revenue is spent not on the basis of more to those who pay more but more to those who need it.

In a nation those in the higher rungs of society must sacrifice even if it means lowering in standards so there is a quick raising of the standards of those in the lower rungs of society.

In the political field again equality of races is only an expedient which if not converted into non-racialism, the accepted expediency will acquire the colour of injustice and do an irreparable harm.

...We believe that the Tanganyikan African has too long been maligned. He is not so backward and foolish as it is made out and he is not incapable of viewing the position of Tanganyika in its Tanganyikan perspective provided we really feel and behave like the nationalists of Tanganyika....

...Does it not follow that in Tanganyika the longer we try and maintain distinctions of races the result will be Africanism and does it not follow that if we insist on equality of a Tanganyikan irrespective of race Tanganyika nationhood will soon be within our reach?....<sup>1</sup>

The Asian Association therefore called upon members of its community to support the program of rapid political advancement based on democratic, non-racial representation advocated by the nationalist movement. The organization continually agitated for the termination of minority privileges and a closer political, economic and social balance among the three races:

If we tell ourselves that we belong here truly and earnestly, then we must...tell ourselves

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<sup>1</sup>The Tanganyikan, March, 1956, pp. 2-3

that this sense of belonging has to be shared by the vast number in whose midst we live. We must tell ourselves that to achieve this we must unlearn a lot of things, and learn many more. We must tell ourselves that for a long time now it is for us to give and to go on giving....We must tell ourselves that it is not enlightened self-interest, which is only a more dignified expression of opportunism, but positive values of emotion and common-sense which will redeem from within us the rich heritage which we have hitherto repudiated in our erstwhile sojourn in this country.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, Asian activists persistently strove for the creation of a non-racial program of territorial development. Their appeal was based on the argument that the Trusteeship could be effectively self-governing only when a true spirit of nationalism united the three communities. This line of reasoning is reflected in the 1956 policy statement issued by the Association:

All inhabitants of Tanganyika are interdependent for their peace, happiness and prosperity, and collectively constitute the nation....

Belief in non-racialism and nationhood is a matter of conviction with us and not that of expediency. We take this opportunity of reiterating these principles and are prepared to join hands with others in taking practical steps to achieve the nationhood

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association Policy Statement, April 8, 1956, Asian Association files, FCB political papers.



of Tanganyika, without presumptions, without reservations and without fear.<sup>1</sup>

Since the Asian community constituted such a small percentage of the total population, the Association reminded its members that failure to cooperate with other races for the good of the territory would be disastrous. As the middle group in Tanganyikan society, the Asians would be wise to advocate a form of territorial development which ignored ethnic distinctions. In 1957, Crossroads, the Association newsletter announced:

Our policy is to look at the problems in this country from a human angle and not from the advantage to ourselves. It is to create confidence in the masses of the people that we do not desire to adhere to any privileges, that this country will be governed on democratic principles without any reservation and with a view to that steps shall be taken forthwith to remove any social barriers in all walks of life now. With this end in mind we have advocated the introduction of universal adult franchise and non-racialism in schools, in administration and in social life now.

In this country where immigrant races have made their home the Asians have the greatest of both in number of lives and in investment. This is one of the reasons why the Asian must with boldness and political foresight and sagacity take initiative in his own hands...he is in the middle of the ladder of society and therefore can understand the view-point of the African better than the European....He can be

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

the bridge between the two provided he has the courage of conviction and fearlessly takes the lead. The days of sitting on the fence are gone. We have to make a decision and act.<sup>1</sup>

As early as 1954, the Asian Association began to campaign for the introduction of common roll elections. They argued that the parity system would only produce increased racial tensions which would ultimately be disastrous to the minority communities. Therefore, Association leaders maintained that elections to central government offices should be based on democratic principles without the reservation of special seats for the non-African segments of society.<sup>2</sup> The Association was especially opposed to the introduction of a high qualitative franchise which would exclude most Africans from the voting rolls, since this would lead to the rise of a form of Tanganyikan African nationalism which stressed racial distinctions and hostilities.<sup>3</sup> The organization clearly stated its opinion concerning voting qualifications for

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<sup>1</sup>Crossroads, August 20, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>The Tanganyikan, Vol. 1, No. 11-12.

<sup>3</sup>"Notes on the Tanganyika Asian Association", compiled by the FCB for the Bureau's Annual Conference, December 8-9, 1956, Tanganyika territorial files, political notes, FCB papers.

the 1958-59 elections at its 1956 territorial conference:

The guiding principle of any franchise committee in Tanganyika must be to include on the voter rolls the largest number of people. In the sure knowledge that there is the official majority and the Colonial office control, opportunity can and should be given to the largest number of people to educate themselves in the true principles of democracy.

We believe that if the vast numbers of people are excluded from having a voting right on grounds of education or prosperity, there will be created a reaction in those excluded and will lead to racialism. An irreparable harm will thus be done to the achievement of Tanganyikan nationhood....We believe that there must be progressive constitutional change in keeping with democratic principles leading to full self-government by the people of Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

When government plans for the 1958 elections were released, the Asian Association quickly denounced the proposed high qualitative franchise and the use of the parity voting system. Viewing the recommendations as far too restrictive, the Association pledged to "continue our efforts to see that a franchise is introduced which will be acceptable to the majority of the people."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association Conference papers, March, 1956, Rhodes House. See also The Tanganyikan, Vol. 1, No. 9-10 (April-May, 1956), pp. 5-6.

<sup>2</sup>Asian Association handout "The Voter Question", November, 1956.

Association Secretary Rattansey quickly informed the Fabian Bureau (of which he was a long standing member) that his organization not only opposed the government scheme but also firmly supported the counter-proposals made by the black nationalist movement:

The Government has published its own recommendations...based on what is termed qualitative democracy. Pursuing this carefully any student of politics will immediately realise that a vast majority of Africans will be excluded whilst practically all the male non-African voters will qualify....In fact it is more probable that the number of voters of Asian and European origin will each outnumber the Africans.

The Asian Association believes that in case these proposals or any others of similar character are accepted and recommended by the Committee on elections set up by the Government, the result will be a mockery of election.

If the vast numbers of people are excluded from having a voting right on grounds of education or property, there will be created a reaction in those excluded and will lead to racialism.

The Africans say that qualitative democracy is only a pretext to delay the march of democracy in the country and that it is not acceptable to them. They demand that the basis should be the Universal adult franchise. The Asian Association has also favoured Universal adult franchise, but the Government persists in its stand of restrictive right to vote whereby only a few thousand Africans would be entitled to vote. Such a policy is bound to defeat its own purpose.

In Tanganyika what is required is Nationalism from the immigrant races which means the shedding of the fear of the indigenous population.

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<sup>1</sup>Rattansey to FCB, November 13, 1950, FCB papers.

The liberal Asian leadership also condemned the UTP, which it viewed as the political incorporation of all of the governments unacceptable programs. The Asian Association newsletter of March 1956 rejected the white party Manifesto and stated that it was:

...unable to advise its members and other Tanganyikans to subscribe to them....

Although the United Tanganyika Party claims to be a non-racial party, its declarations if accepted and followed, will on the contrary give a blow to Tanganyika Nationhood, which is our avowed aim....UTP is basically objectionable because it entrenches racial differences and is a device to obstruct constitutional development on democratic lines. It is based on fear of the masses and therefore introduces reservations which will undermine the efforts<sup>1</sup> towards nationhood, by encouraging racialism.

When the names of those chosen to serve on the Elections Committee were released in April 1956, the Asian Association bitterly objected to the fact that most members were UTP leaders and that therefore, the Committee would be no more than a tool of the administration.<sup>2</sup>

The Asians also published a biting, critical denunciation of the UTP Manifesto which condemned the Party's

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association newsletter, March 7, 1956, pp. 3-4. See also Asian Association letter to Venture, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1956), 9.

<sup>2</sup>The Tanganyikan, Vol. 1, No. 9-10 (April-May, 1956), p. 6.

constitution as a "racist document disguised in insincere humanitarian ideals and false premises, aimed at preserving minority privileges at the expense of Nationhood."<sup>1</sup> Tension between the Asian Association and the UTP was further increased in August 1957, when Legislative Council member J. D. Shah of the Asian Association was replaced by S. M. Patel, Chairman of the Morogoro branch of UTP. The Asians viewed this action by Governor Twining as a clear sign that battle lines had been drawn between themselves and the Government because of the Association's criticism of administrative plans for political development.<sup>2</sup>

Thus by 1957, both minority communities had taken major steps to increase their role in territorial politics and to formulate plans for the future development of the trusteeship. The white community, represented by both the UTP and the Capricorn Society, was in favor of the slow development program formulated by the Crown, while the politically active members of the Asian community supported Tanganyikan African nationalist demands for rapid,

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<sup>1</sup>Asian Association pamphlet "The United Tanganyika Party", June, 1956, Tanganyika political files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Rattansey to Betts, August 12, 1957, FCB papers.

non-racial advancement. Clearly then, both the liberal and conservative elements gained new allies in their struggle to dominate the rate and structure of Tanganyika's evolution towards self-rule.

#### TANU's Rise to Territorial Prominence

In the period 1954-57, the Tanganyika African National Union transformed itself from a struggling African association into a well-coordinated political party which became in effect the organizational embodiment of the nationalist movement. This change was due in a large measure to the influx of full time political organizers and to the close support the Union enjoyed from both the liberal elements of the home government and the anti-imperialist forces within the United Nations.

Of the Africans who emerged to devote full time to political activities the most significant leaders were Nyerere and Kabona. In March 1955, the TANU president resigned from his teaching position at St. Francis School in Pugu. For several months Nyerere avoided public appearances and corresponded continually with liberal supporters in Britain. By September, he had formulated the future political goals and methods of TANU and was ready to begin to develop a territorial basis of support

for his independence drive.<sup>1</sup> In explaining his decision to become a full time political activist, Nyerere argued:

Recently the Government gave its Civil Servant [sic] a choice between TANU and their jobs. The reason given was the British tradition of the neutrality of the Civil Service in political matters. When we argued that under present circumstances in Tanganyika this ban would reduce almost dangerously the field from which we can recruit our leaders, the Government pointed out, with statistical proof, that more educated young men take jobs outside the government than within the Government and that we are free to recruit from all people outside Government Service. This was the strongest argument against our claim....But when resignation from TANU is given me as a condition of retaining my job the whole problem becomes one of principle. Who in Tanganyika is free to join and lead TANU? In theory all people outside Government Service. In practice I know that Native Authority employees are not free, or at least they are less free than Mission Teachers. But if the freedom of Mission Teachers is also to be doubted the position becomes gloomy for I cannot see any reason why every employer should not give the same condition to his employees: and that possibility would be tragic. I must, therefore, resign as a protest.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere-Selwyn-Clarke correspondence, March 26-September 2, 1955; Nyerere-Hynd correspondence, April 14-September 16, 1955; Selwyn-Clarke-Hatch correspondence, March 21-September 9, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere letter of resignation to the Headmaster, Father Lynch of St. Francis School, Pugu, March 22, 1955, Nyerere files, FCB papers.



During the same year, Oscar Kambona resigned his position in the civil service to devote full attention to his duties as Organizing General Secretary of TANU.<sup>1</sup> Following Nyerere's example, Kambona resigned to protest the administration's ban which prohibited civil servants from participating in political organizing activities. Both men especially resented the fact that many private employers were following the government's example. As a result, the educated elite were faced with the choice of either withdrawing from the political arena or damaging their professional careers.<sup>2</sup>

Nyerere and Kambona imitated the constitution of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party in formulating a set of operating principles for the Union. Indeed, the basic structures and much of the actual phraseology of the C.P.P. document were incorporated directly into TANU's constitution.<sup>3</sup> TANU pledged to "fight relentlessly until Tanganyika

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Betts, August 3, 1955, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Hinden, February 13, 1955. Nyerere himself was threatened with expulsion from the St. Francis faculty unless he ceased his political activities. Nyerere to Betts, April 3, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Kandora claims that Nyerere utilized George Padmore's The Gold Coast Revolution, pp. 254-266, which contained a reprint of the Nkrumah document. Kandora to

is self-governing and independent"; to foster a spirit of nationalism in opposition to the forces of tribalism and isolationism; to campaign relentlessly for election to all local and central government bodies; to work for the initiation of African majority rule; to resist all attempts at racialism; to help develop trade unions and cooperatives; to obtain aid for the establishment of price controls, the development of small scale industry and the training of indigenous technicians; to establish a minimum wage and a system of compulsory education; to resist further European or Asian immigration and land alienation, as well as any plans to federate the British territories in East and Central Africa.<sup>1</sup>

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Hinden, November 21, 1955. Both the C.P.P. text and the Padmore book were banned in Tanganyika at this time. It should be noted that Mkwana, like Nyerere, was trying to reorganize a weak, moribund, loosely organized political association (the United Gold Coast Convention) and transform it into a modern political party. The C.P.P. constitution, drawn up on July 12, 1949, served as the model for the following sections of the IANU constitution, which were adopted almost verbatim: Aims and Objects, Membership, Election of Delegates to the Party, Conference, National Executive Council, Central Committee of the National Executive and Inner Party Organization.

<sup>1</sup>IANU Constitution, pp. 1-3.

Once Nyerere and Kambona became full time politicians they began to establish rigid guidelines for both the recruitment of TANU members and the coordination of activities in their widely scattered branches. It was especially important to adjust the former T.A.A. units which were accustomed to operating independently, to the new system of central control by the Dar es Salaam headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

Membership in TANU was limited to Africans who were at least 18 years of age. Local political, social, and cultural associations such as trade unions or tribal organizations could be affiliated with the Union upon the payment of a political assessment tax.<sup>2</sup>

Both Nyerere and the members of the National Executive Committee were subject to reelection at the annual Delegates Conference which brought together the presidents and organizing secretaries of each TANU cell.<sup>3</sup> Although the national executive was officially scheduled to hold quarterly

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Betts, April 27, 1955, Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, June 6, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Bennett, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>Kambona interview with FCB East African "specialists", April 12, 1958, at FCB headquarters, Tanganyika political files, Creech-Jones papers.

conferences, lack of funds coupled with communication difficulties resulted in the continual violation of this regulation.<sup>1</sup> In reality, the Union's policies were the product of the Executive Central Committee, which was composed of the President and nine other members selected by him. All members resided in Dar es Salaam and met at least once a week. The committee was empowered to assume full responsibility for party decisions in the event of an emergency.<sup>2</sup>

Nyerere and his lieutenants maintained that their decision to initiate a full time independence drive was to a great extent necessitated by the return to power of the Conservative Party. The nationalists claimed that the Tory regime with its stress on indirect rule and parity could not be relied upon to produce the rapid changes demanded by TANU. Thus, it was necessary to operate outside of the channels of political participation afforded by the colonial regime and to do so on a full-time basis. Speaking of the Union's attitude towards the conservative home government, Nyerere noted:

...a Labour regime would have given us the necessary assurance about our future and

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Hinden, November 29, 1956, FCB papers. From 1956-59, only three quarterly meetings were held.

<sup>2</sup>TANU Constitution, p. 4.

released our energies into more constructive channels. As it is with a Tory, and a strong Tory government at that, we must employ a great deal of our energies into getting an assurance THAT TANGANYIKA SHALL BE TRULY DEMOCRATIC. Not in the sense in which the Rhodesias and South Africa are believed to be democratic but in the sense in which [sic] Britain or the Gold Coast is democratic.

Without that assurance our friends in Britain and elsewhere will be expecting too much from us if they think that we still support so-called parity or have faith in the good intentions of the [sic] British Government about our future. Already that faith is being put to the test and I feel sure that the onus of proof is on the British side. Already it is a question why, in spite of the Trusteeship status of the Territory, the British find undiplomatic [sic] or inexpedient to declare categorically that TANGANYIKA SHALL BE DEMOCRATIC.<sup>1</sup>

African dissatisfaction with government policy was most adamant in relation to the parity system. Indeed the bulk of the protest literature produced by TANU during the 1955-57 period was devoted to criticism of the tri-racial policy.<sup>2</sup> The creation of white dominated regimes in the British Central African territories and the favorable treatment given to European settlers in the Kenya highlands served to increase TANU's dissatisfaction with multi-racialism.

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarks, July 4, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro to Munanka, March 3, 1958, TANU political files, Tanzania National Archives.

Speaking of recent developments in the other African territories, Nyerere remarked:

...Britain has never proved that where there is a question of Black Versus White she will not prove that Blood is thicker than water. The case of India, the Gold Coast or Nigeria cannot be applied to Tanganyika, for we have been labelled 'multi-racial society', and that makes all the difference [sic].<sup>1</sup>

TANU repeatedly used the example of the territorial educational system to exhibit the inequalities of the tri-racial policy. The May 11, 1957 issue of Sauti ya TANU carried an especially stinging attack on the system:

Now non-racialism is a good thing; equal rights and opportunities are good things, rewards on merit and not on race is a good thing. Say that they are the good things on which policy in Tanganyika is based. The imagination of the good but ignorant will do the rest. They will never imagine good souls, that we have separate schools for the Asians, European, and African children. That these schools are not private schools but either Government or Government-aided schools; that His Excellency himself said only a year ago that it would be an act of cruelty to mix children of different races and backgrounds in the same schools; that all the Asian children receive a 9 year primary education; that all the European children receive an 11 year primary education; that only 40% of the African children receive any primary education at all and this lasts for only 4 years after which 80% of them are made to leave school. It

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Kambona, November 16, 1957, FCB papers.

would never occur to the imagination of those liberal souls that when the Government of Tanganyika had £3,200,000 to spend on education, it set aside £800,000 and divided the rest equally, the 25,000 Europeans, the 80,000 Asians, and the 8,000,000 Africans each receiving £800,000 to spend on the education of their children.

◊ This is what we in Tanganyika call non-racial policy based on equal rights and equal opportunities. We are evolving a vocabulary of our own! If this country did not have a single non-African and only 40% of our kids could go to school, it would have been more than absurd for a Government of Tanganyika to say that its policy was based on equal rights and equal opportunity. Yet our Government makes this proposterous claim in spite of the facts.<sup>1</sup>

Despite his adamant dissatisfaction with British policy, Nyerere consistently opposed the use of violence and racial hatred to gain support for his Union. After the 1954 Visiting Mission report endorsed TANU, Nyerere publicly stated that he was convinced that despite government persecution, the goals of his organization could be achieved without having to resort to violence. Although Tanganyikan Africans would not long endure minority rule, he insisted that with the aid of TANU allies in the home government and on the Trusteeship Council,

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU (The Voice of TANU), No. 11, May 11, 1957. Sauti was the official publication of the Tanganyika African National Union.

rapid peaceful advancement could be made towards the formation of a black majority government.<sup>1</sup>

An intuitive analysis of the TANU President's personality is afforded by E. N. Brend, Officer in Charge of Police in the Lake Province. From 1954 to 1959 he was personally assigned the task of following Nyerere and reporting his political activities to central administrative headquarters. Speaking of Nyerere's insistence upon peaceful political evolution, Brend reported:

He had made a study of Gandhi's movement in India and the whole basis of his programme was to be one of passive resistance to opposition. It was obvious that Julius was confident that TANU would quickly become Territory-wide. He seemed to be almost impersonal in his approach and I was convinced that at that time he had no personal ambition. I suggested that he might find himself making slow progress in his own district and he laughed saying that Musoma like the rest of Tanganyika would soon fall into line. Julius was unperturbed by the size of the task before him, he felt that tribalism might prove a bigger obstacle to his progress than the British Government. One thing that struck me forcibly at the time was

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, January 27, 1957. A comprehensive study of Nyerere's non-violent methods is found in Harvey Glickman, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere", in Transition in African Politics, ed. by Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno (New York: Praeger Publications, 1966), pp. 195-250.



that Julius was no fanatic, he was dedicated to organising his people for self-government but there was no bitterness or rancour towards the British Authorities. He was clearly a man of moderation.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's persistent adherence to a non-violent form of political advancement is attested to by the fact that he broke with the African newspaper Mwafrika, which enjoyed a circulation of over 20,000, when it advocated racial violence.<sup>2</sup> In addition, in 1958 Nyerere's moderate policies caused him to lose the support of the more radical leadership within his own party who broke away to form the racist African National Congress (A.N.C.).<sup>3</sup> In effect, Nyerere and TANU offered the Crown the opportunity to gradually release control of Tanganyika to African hands without having to undergo a violent confrontation. Thus, by accepting a policy of gradual concessions, the British were able to avoid a costly and prestige damaging struggle with the Tanganyikan African nationalist coalition.

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<sup>1</sup>Papers of E. N. Brend, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere correspondence with Mwafrika editor T. E. Mbitu, August-October, 1959, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>3</sup>Rweyemuzu, pp. 217-221.

In order for the TANU program of progressive gradualism to succeed, it was first necessary to prove that the Union enjoyed a territorial basis of popular support. Before this could be achieved, TANU had several major obstacles to overcome. The Union faced a hostile administration which stressed the native authority system and which was firmly opposed to any nationalist movement seeking to operate outside of the guidelines provided by the system of indirect rule. At the same time, TANU had to rely upon support from an illiterate and widely scattered population most of whom were apathetic to its goals. The one unifying factor shared by the many isolated tribal groups was their general dissatisfaction with official agricultural and cattle control policies. Finally, the Union was faced with a serious lack of both funds and trained personnel in the lower ranks.<sup>1</sup> When it became obvious that the Nyerere coalition was determined to proceed with its plan to evolve the nationalist drive despite these obstacles, the administration accelerated its program of harassment. In March 1955, the Governor's office distributed a list of associations which civil servants who earned over £150 per year were

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere reported that the T.A.A. had virtually no cash reserves at the time of its transformation into TANU. Nyerere to Hinden, September 29, 1955, FCB papers.

prohibited from joining. The banned organization included: the Tanganyika European Council, the Asian Association, the Tanganyika African National Union, and the Sukuma Union. Although membership in these groups had been forbidden for some time, the administration now, for the first time, insisted that local supervisors rigidly enforce the ban.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, a plainclothes officer was assigned to attend every public TANU rally or meeting to take note of the proceedings and to gather information concerning Tanganyikan African political activities.<sup>2</sup> Finally, a special memorandum was sent to the native authorities which discouraged both chiefs and their staffs from joining TANU. The notice also reminded the chiefs that their authority superseded that of any political organization and that they possessed the power to ban malcontents who disrupted or threatened to disrupt law and order in their districts.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Memo to all departmental supervisors from the Chief Secretary to the Governor, March 6, 1955, Tanganyika administrative papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Brend papers.

<sup>3</sup>Confidential memo distributed to all native authorities, district and provincial commissions, and officers in charge of police, May 23, 1955, Mwanza Police files, Rhodes House.

Clearly then, if Nyerere and his lieutenants hoped to achieve their political objectives, they would first have to raise sufficient funds and recruit enough experienced lower rank personnel to successfully inspire an isolated, apathetic population with the spirit of nationalism. In addition, these steps would have to be taken in the face of the stiff opposition of an increasingly hostile administration and its native authority allies.

Nyerere and Kambona soon discovered that the obstacles were indeed formidable. Kambona noted that the early meetings of TANU were often attended by as few as 25 people, and that funds for even basic operating costs, "were almost nil".<sup>1</sup> This condition persisted until the Spring of 1955. Despite ardent recruitment efforts by the party leadership, Kambona conceded that their success to a large extent came from the release of the Visiting Mission report:

The Mission report was an unexpected boon to TANU. ...TANU suddenly came into the limelight... Educated...Africans were reading, hearing and seeing what TANU had asked for and made their judgements upon it. The number of members swelled, its branches increased, its strength grew and it was able to employ a paid Secretary General.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Fabian Colonial Secretary, October 18, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Betts, November 2, 1955, FCB papers.

The sudden influx consisted primarily of recruits from the urban, westernized elements of the indigenous population. Because of a lack of funds, poor transportation, and poor communications facilities, Nyerere and Kambona concentrated on building a corps of well-organized, qualified, and dedicated supporters. The TANU leaders therefore naturally turned to the towns and municipalities where the more educated, modernized, and accessible elements of the African population were found.<sup>1</sup> Above all, Nyerere sought to avoid the evolution of an overextended, widespread movement which lacked strong central control. He repeatedly expressed the opinion that the bulk of the Tanganyikan African population who lacked both political experience and savoir-faire would have to be carefully guided and supervised if outbreaks of racial violence were to be avoided.<sup>2</sup>

TANU soon discovered that the desirable African elite were eager candidates for party recruitment. Educated Africans were frustrated with the tri-racial system which

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<sup>1</sup>Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), Chapter 2; Stephens, pp. 105-106.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere-Betts correspondence, June 3, 1955-October 19, 1957, FCB papers; Nyerere to Kambona, March 2, 1956, TANU files, Tanzania National Archives.

offered them lower pay scales than their counterparts in the minority communities. Ambitious Tanganyikan Africans often discovered that unofficial use of a color bar kept them at the lower rung of the socio-economic ladder despite their skills, education, and ambition. An ever growing number of these frustrated individuals saw political activity as the only possible vehicle for the rapid reform of colonial policies.<sup>1</sup> When the United Nations recognized the leadership potential of TANU, the elite flocked to the ranks of Nyerere's organization. In 1955, it was estimated that over 25,000 of the Union's 40,000 members resided in Dar es Salaam.<sup>2</sup> Significantly, in the period 1955-57, as TANU membership rose from 40,000 to 175,000,

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<sup>1</sup>See for example, Letters to Editor, Tanganyika Standard, February 14, 1955. See also Thomas Reginold Batten, Problems of African Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), passim; C. W. Walter Howe, "An Analysis of the East Africa Royal Commission 1953-55 Report" (an unpublished paper presented at a Boston University symposium on Economic Development in the Colonial World, August, 1956), pp. 26-31; the Harfield Foundation and the Colonial Office, African Education: A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 55-186; Gary Thomas, "Community Development and Nation-Building in Transitional Tanganyika" (Occasional Paper No. 11, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Program of Eastern African Studies, 1964), pp. 1-13.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, September 27, 1955.

the number of party cells only increasing from 26 to 38.<sup>1</sup> Clearly, the Union maintained a highly compact organization, centered within the larger towns and municipalities.

Despite Nyerere's intention to limit the size of TANU until the party was well coordinated and controllable, his organization was soon swelled with supporters from the rural areas. In April 1955 Kambona began a three month tour of the territory designed to bring the TANU message to the more backward areas. He soon discovered that dissatisfaction with agricultural policies and native authorities was so widespread that non-Westernized Tanganyikan Africans were eager to join the Union which they viewed as the only viable means of African resistance. In each district, Kambona encountered young members of the elite who were eager to found TANU cells in their community.<sup>2</sup> Noting with some dismay that the Union was growing well beyond the size envisioned in his original plans, Nyerere reported to the Fabian Bureau that "...in spite of our reluctance to let TANU swell out into a mass movement TANU is swelling out very rapidly".<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Lowenkopf, pp. 41-46.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona-Nyerere correspondence, June-August, 1955, Tanzania National Archives; Kambona-Betta correspondence, June-October, 1955, PCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, July 4, 1955, PCB papers.

When he returned from his 1955 appearance before the Trusteeship Council. Nyerere found that many branches had swelled "beyond the controllable state". As a result he ordered his lieutenants to "call off mass recruitment".<sup>1</sup> Nyerere initiated an immediate tour of the territory and discovered that in several districts that had previously revealed no interest whatsoever in political activities, Africans actually fought over copies of the TANU constitution which were constantly in short supply.<sup>2</sup> He nonetheless revealed his hesitancy to be encouraged by the blossoming of TANU popularity. In his correspondence to the Fabian Bureau, Nyerere remarked:

But in spite of official and other nonsense which is enough temptation to make us go out for numbers, we shall stick to our policy of steadily building a well-knit organization which will truly serve the interests of the country rather than satisfying our own vanity. If we had one million members our enemies could still call them 'noses' and not human beings and we may have done the Union more harm than good by trying to meet this sneering with numbers.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Creech-Jones, August 12, 1955, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, July 7, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to Betts, August 30, 1955, FCB papers.



Despite Nyerere's hesitancy, TANU's ranks continued to swell. This was due at least in part to the zealous campaigning of Kambona, Kandoro and Zuberi Mtemvu a recent recruit who later replaced Kambona as Secretary General when the former received a leave of absence to complete his studies in Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> Despite frequent admonitions from Nyerere, his key lieutenants persistently revealed their determination to expand party membership.<sup>2</sup> In addition, many rural branches were started by local leaders without a knowledge of the Dar es Salaam headquarters. Often the arrival of a notice or a delegation from a rural cell was the first notification the central committee had of a new unit's existence.<sup>3</sup>

The speed with which TANU recruited members was startling even to its most ardent supporters.<sup>4</sup> By 1956 the

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro, pp. 31-34; Nyerere to Kambona, August 21, 1955, TANU political files, Tanzania National Archives; Betts to Selwyn-Clarke, May 18, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere memo to TANU cell leaders, October 6, 1955, Mwanza Police files, Rhodes House. See also Kandoro to Mtemvu, April 23, 1955, African National Congress files, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Kambona interview at Labour Party Headquarters, December 2, 1957, Labour Party archives, Transport House; Stephens, pp. 131-132.

<sup>4</sup>Mtemvu to Kandoro, April 3, 1956, Mtemvu files, FCB papers.

Union had 30 branches and a total membership of 100,000. The following year, 18 additional branches were in operation and membership exceeded 175,000.<sup>1</sup> During this period, the staff at Dar es Salaam headquarters never exceeded eight full time workers, including Nyerere.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the 1957-58 period, TANU recruitment skyrocketed to an average total of more than 6,000 new members per month.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, Nyerere's plan to maintain a compact, urban-elite membership ended in failure. For the remainder of the independence drive the President's primary internal problem centered around the maintenance of a modern and unified stance in the face of increased government opposition and an ever mounting spirit of militancy in the more isolated sectors of the territory.<sup>4</sup>

The growth in membership did however eliminate the bulk of the Union's financial problems. Africans joined TANU by paying a two shilling initiation fee which provided

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona interview, Transport House: Tanganyika Standard, April 30, 1956; United Nations News, June 24, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, July 8, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>Lowenkopf, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup>Nyerere to Hatch, May 23, 1960, Hatch files, Transport House.

them with a membership card. So popular was the Union that numerous cases of rural Africans joining several times were cited by both party leaders and colonial administrators.<sup>1</sup>

Despite his reluctance to allow the Union to become too widespread, Nyerere nonetheless continually sought financial support from the African population. Indeed, he devoted an entire issue of Sauti ya TANU to stress the need of economic aid:

...independence, is not an easy thing. It requires determination, hardwork and above all self-sacrifice. TANU has started the ball rolling, and it is the duty of every individual to keep it rolling.

In fact, let every African support our organization. Those in position [sic] of membership cards should see that they pay their monthly subscription regularly, and those who merely support us without having membership cards is not enough. To-day the Governor may refuse to see us, but when you are all joining the Union and demonstratably behind TANU the Governor will invite TANU. It has been like that everywhere. It is not going to be different in Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup>

The funds collected during the early 1955-56 period were used to construct a modernized permanent headquarters at Dar es Salaam and permanent branch offices at Mwanza, Tabora, and Dodoma. In addition, English and Swahili

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro, p. 43. Papers of Brend, Townsend, and White, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 3, March 16, 1957.

versions of the TANU Constitution were printed and widely circulated. A pamphlet entitled "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights" was also drawn up and distributed to westernized members of the Union.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, by 1957 TANU had gathered together a following which crossed the territory's social, economic, religious, and tribal lines. The Union contained western-educated African elite, illiterate subsistence peasants, urban workers, rural farmers, Muslims, Christians, Anamists, and representatives of virtually every tribal group.<sup>2</sup>

The strength of the Union was its ability to exploit the widespread dissatisfaction with British rule and to present itself as the one party capable of remedying the situation. Clearly TANU had become the instrument for African political aspirations.

In order to coordinate the activities of their numerous new recruits, the TANU leadership created several divisions within the party. Key among these were the TANU Youth League, the Women's League, and the Elders Section.

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Fabian Colonial Secretary, November 13, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Lowenkopf, passim; Stephens, pp. 41-43.

In addition, the party formed close ties with other significant Tanganyikan African organizations. Primary among these was the highly influential Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL).

The Youth League, which in the late years of colonial rule was to become the most militant TANU organization, was designed for members between 18 and 35 years of age. Headed by Rashidi Kawawa,<sup>1</sup> it was responsible for maintaining order and discipline at meetings for the collection of membership dues. Members wore green shirts bearing the TANU insignia and in some areas were drilled as paramilitary units.<sup>2</sup>

The Women's League was an organization unique to the East African political scene. Led by Bibi Titi Mohamed,<sup>3</sup> by 1956 the sector boasted a total membership of

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<sup>1</sup>Kawawa also served as the General Secretary for the Tanganyika Federation of Labour. In 1957 he was chosen by Nyerere to fill a nominated seat on the Legislative Council offered to the party by the Governor. After independence, Kawawa served as Minister for Labour.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro, pp. 66-68; Tanganyika Standard, December 9, 1961.

<sup>3</sup>Bibi Titi was one of the earliest members of TANU. The daughter of a coastal trader, she was active in the political organizing of coastal Moslem women several years before the women's section was officially created.

over 5,000. Unlike other TANU organizations, the Women's League elected its own leaders rather than having them appointed by the National Executive.<sup>1</sup> Significantly, the organization was founded after Fabian Bureau representative John Hatch noted that TANU had few female members.<sup>2</sup> In addition to political indoctrination, the Women's League also educated its members in health, hygiene, cooking, reading, and writing.<sup>3</sup>

The Elders Section represented an attempt to gain the cooperation of the senior members of tribal society by providing them with a special form of representation. By recruiting the older element of traditional African society, TANU also hoped to refute the often voiced government accusation that the Union was merely an organization of inexperienced youths who refused to accept either the authority of their elders or the system of indirect rule. The party also hoped that by attracting elders it would be able to employ their traditional source of authority to maintain discipline in the more backward

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<sup>1</sup>Bennett, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Hatch to Hinden, June 10, 1955; John Hatch, New From Africa (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1956), pp. 51-57.

<sup>3</sup>Stephens, p. 131.

sectors of the territory.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the independence drive, the division served as the Union's key agency for criticism of land alienation policies. As the traditional source of authority in rural communities in matters concerning land tenure, the elders served as an effective means of inciting local resentment against government programs.<sup>2</sup> The head of the Elders Section was Sheikh Sulerani Takadir who gradually built division membership to over 5,000.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Betts, January 27, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>For detailed studies of the position of elders concerning land alienation and their role within the TANU hierarchy see: T. O. Beidelman, "Warfare in Court; Intertribal Tensions in a Local Government Court in Colonial Tanganyika" (an unpublished paper for a seminar in British colonial development, Boston University, 1960), pp. 17-26; Fred G. Burke, "Local Government and Nation Building in East Africa: A Functional Analysis" (a paper prepared for the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9-12, 1964), passim; Earle Edward Seaton, "The Political System of Tanganyika: Origin, Characteristics, and Evolutionary Development" (an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1966), pp. 142-163; Aaron Segal, "The Politics of Land in East Africa" (a paper prepared for a symposium on East African development, Northwestern University, 1965), pp. 2-17.

<sup>3</sup>Takadir, a Moslem from Dar es Salaam, headed the division until late 1958 when he attacked TANU for not including Moslems on its list of candidates for the Legislative Council. Nyerere immediately expelled Takadir, stating that he refused to recognize religious divisions within the Union.

Each section of TANU held its own meetings, elected its own local representatives, and had the power to admit or expel members. The divisions all maintained strong contacts with liberal supporters in both the United Kingdom and on the Trusteeship Council.<sup>1</sup> Significantly, all submitted individual petitions to the 1957 Visiting Mission.<sup>2</sup>

One of the key alliances developed by TANU during this period was its cooperation with the Tanganyika Federation of Labour. It was the trade unions which first provided TANU with an extensive base of popular support.<sup>3</sup> Since the unionists were virtually all at least partially westernized, they were eagerly sought by Nyerere as part of the elite corps of recruits he wished to develop during the early formative period. The fact that unionists were concentrated in the towns further increased their

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<sup>1</sup>Karibona "Notes on the evolution of TANU: 1954-58", FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1957, Report on Tanganyika (T/1345), pp. 24, 68-69.

<sup>3</sup>William H. Friedland, "The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System" (Occasional Paper No. 10, the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1962), pp. 27-28.



desirability. Nyerere maintained a steady stream of correspondence with the TFL leadership in an attempt to foster a strong spirit of cooperation between the two organizations.<sup>1</sup> From 1954-57, trade union membership expanded from 6 unions with a total of 300 members to 15 unions with over 3,400 card carrying supporters.<sup>2</sup> The bulk of these attended bi-weekly labor rallies which generally featured key TANU speakers. In addition, most of the higher echelon leadership of the TFL were also prominent members of the Union.<sup>3</sup>

In the early years of political activism, cooperation between the two organizations was formidable. In the spring of 1957, TANU supported a Dar es Salaam bus strike and a subsequent walk-out by workers in the beer industry by both refusing to utilize the public

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<sup>1</sup>TANU-TFL correspondence, 1954-57, papers of William H. Friedland, Hoover Institute for War, Revolution and Peace. The primary research material utilized by Friedland in his many studies of the labor movement in Tanganyika is found in the Institute's manuscript collection.

<sup>2</sup>R. Kawawa, "The T.F.L., T.A.N.U. and Unity", Spearhead (December, 1961), 15-16.

<sup>3</sup>Job N. Chali, "TANU and Trade Unions", Itanenge, No. 2 (December 1962), 28-29; S. N. Varna, A. K. Datta, O. P. Gael, R. Ramachandrar, Tanganyika; A Background Study (New Delhi: Crescent Works Private, Ltd., 1961), pp. 41-46.

transportation facilities and boycotting domestic beverages. Although neither strike produced the desired labor improvements, the TFL leadership was well aware of the close TANU support it had received.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, the Federation rallied behind TANU during the early years of the independence drive. Most significantly, it agreed with the Union's condemnation of the Government proposals for the 1958-59 elections. This support is reflected in the following statement by TFL organizer Mpangala:

Tanganyikans were encouraged by the government's announcement that it was proposing elections on a common voting list for 1958. However, their expectations were disappointed by the restrictive qualifications for voting. These restrictions are unacceptable to both the Federation of Labour and the Tanganyika African National Union.

...Apparently the government deliberately intends to deny the right to vote to the majority of Africans and most of the working population, who are economically and educationally poor in all respects.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>William H. Friedland, "Cooperation Conflict and Conscripton. TANU-TFL Relations 1955-64" (a paper printed by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1967), passim; Kivoni College, Dar es Salaam, "Darubini Yenu: Focus on Uhuru" (a special publication of Kivoni College for the Independence Day celebration, 1961), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>International Federation of Trade Unions, News, April, 1957, p. 3.

The trade unions also supported TANU demands for an end to the qualitative franchise, for a one person one vote system, and for the right of candidates to be nominated by members of other races.<sup>1</sup> The close cooperation between the two organizations is demonstrated by the fact that a Trade Union secretary was dismissed in late 1957 for endorsing a non-TANU candidate in his election district.<sup>2</sup> The Federation maintained its own close contacts with the United Nations and in 1957 submitted a documented analysis of the sub-standard working conditions within the territory to the Visiting Mission.<sup>3</sup>

In his attempt to unify the Africans and thus present a solid front of resistance to the colonial administration, Nyerere also courted the cooperation of the tribal chiefs. He sought to use chiefly authority as a means of further gaining esteem for the Union from the more backward elements among the indigenous population.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere-Mpangala correspondence, IFL files, Friedland papers.

<sup>2</sup>Mpangala to Kandoro, October 29, 1957, Friedland papers.

<sup>3</sup>Report of the Visiting Mission, 1957, p. 161.

<sup>4</sup>Kandoro, p. 12.

The Union was quick to recruit the aid of any chiefs who were willing to use their authority to maintain orderly TANU cells within their traditional sphere of influence. At the same time, however, on numerous instances TANU encountered traditional authorities who fiercely resisted the proposed changes advocated by the Union and resented the challenge the nationalist movement presented to their traditional way of life.<sup>1</sup> Nyerere continuously attempted to convince the chiefs that TANU did not wish to destroy their role in tribal society; that the nationalist movement

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<sup>1</sup>For case studies of the cooperation or resistance experienced by TANU in its dealings with chiefly authority, see: Joseph T. Gallagher, "Fusions and Fissions Among the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southwestern Tanzania" (an unpublished M.A. thesis, State University of New York, College at Fredonia, 1963), pp. 21-46; J. Gus Liebenow, "Tribalism, Traditionalism, and Modernism in Chagga Local Government, 1958", Journal of African Administration, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April, 1958), 71-82; Michael Saltman, The Social Structure of the Sukuma of Northern Tanganyika with Special References to the Indigenous Political System and Customary Land Tenure: A Preliminary Survey (Rehovot, Israel: National and University Institute for Agriculture, Center of Comparative Studies on Rural Development, 1963) pp. 21-23; Hugh W. Stephens, "Predicting Political Change: The Case of Tanganyika" [a paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 7-10, 1966], passim; G. K. Whitlamsmith, Recent Trends in Chagga Political Development (Moshi: KNCU Printing Press, 1955), pp. 29-35; G. E. T. Weyewardene, "Administration and Politics in Two Swahili Communities" (a paper prepared for the East African Institute of Social Research, Makerere College, Kampala, Annual Conference, January, 1959), passim.

was aimed at undermining British, and not African authority. He argued that the administration was deliberately misrepresenting TANU's intentions and thus was isolating the chiefs from the nationalist movement under the standard British strategy of "divide and rule".<sup>1</sup>

Finally, TANU made use of Kiswahili to introduce an African language into the independence drive which could inspire nationalism, but which at the same time transcended all tribal lines. In 1957, the first language census taken within the territory revealed that over four million residents (40 percent of the total population) spoke Swahili with sufficient competency to utilize it in political deliberations.<sup>2</sup> Clearly, the trade language was an effective vehicle to spread news and party propaganda, and a useful tool for political indoctrination. TANU speakers were not faced with a myriad of tribal dialects to master if their audience possessed a functional knowledge of Kiswahili. Consequently all of the Union's major publications and many issues of Sauti ya TANU were

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 26, March 27, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Central Statistical Bureau, African Census Report, 1957 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1953), p. 109.

translated into this language. The Youth League and Women's Section were encouraged to schedule educational sessions to train members in conversation, grammar, and composition.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, despite TANU's rapid expansion well beyond his initial expectations, Nyerere was determined to maintain a peaceful and well organized political organization. Violence and racial tension were to be avoided at all costs and a spirit of compromise was encouraged to ease the Crown into a series of peaceful, progressive compromises, each of which was to bring the territory one step closer to self-rule.

In this early period, the government made several attempts to persuade TANU to pursue a course of political development which would be within, rather than outside of, official channels. The administration recognized that the Union was rapidly transforming itself into a formidable spokesman for the African community. It therefore sought to persuade TANU to cooperate with the government to avoid unnecessary turmoil.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona notes on party activities, February 9, 1957, TANU files, Tanzanian National Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Twining notes to D. C. Mwanza, April 16, 1957, Rhodes House. The personal papers of administrators Brend,

It was in light of this policy that Governor Twining, on August 2, 1957, unexpectedly announced the appointment of both Nyerere and Chief Kawawa to the Legislative Council. Although Nyerere's appointment was only temporary, the Government offer was clearly a concession, since it amounted, in effect, to official recognition of TANU's significance as the voice of the indigenous population.<sup>1</sup> Nyerere also had to make a major concession in accepting a nominated seat since this would indicate a willingness of the nationalist movement to recognize, at least temporarily, the concept of non-elected Council members. The TANU President decided to accept the seat realizing that a position on the central legislature would provide a valuable platform for the expression of the Union's views on territorial development. At the same time, it would help convince the administration that

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Clarke, and Younghans, Rhodes House, also substantiate the fact that the government tried to persuade TANU to cooperate during the early years of the independence drive.

<sup>2</sup>TANU continually insisted that the Government appointed Nyerere only to disprove his recent charges before the Trusteeship Council that UTP was in effect a government party. See Sauti ya TANU, No. 14, August 9, 1957.

TANU intended to initiate reforms through a program of moderation, cooperation, and compromise.<sup>1</sup> In a letter to the Fabian Bureau, Nyerere analyzed his decision to accept the government offer:

It is true that my appointment to the Leg Co is a victory for TANU, but you do realize, I am sure, that it was not an easy decision for me to whether or not to accept [sic] this appointment. It was after a very thorough examination of the Pros and Cons that I decided to take what is in fact a political risk, because I felt that TANU should be heard in the Council.<sup>2</sup>

Nyerere's brief appointment, however, in no way represented Crown acceptance of TANU demands or a recognition that political control was beginning to shift into the hands of the indigenous population. Throughout the period of Nyerere's appointment TANU branches were banned, especially in the troublesome Lake Province, for defiance of government regulations and for attacks against native authorities. In addition, the administration repeatedly denounced TANU demands for an end to parity and the establishment of a timetable for political development.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere memo to all TANU cell leaders, August 30, 1957, TANU political files, Tanzanian National Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, September 2, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>See for example, Twining speech delivered at Provincial Chiefs Conference, Tabora, July 9, 1957, Tanganyika political files, Rhodes House. During the period July 1-September 30, 1957, the Tanganyika Standard carried over 125 articles in which it reported official criticisms of the Union.



The Nyerere appointment was short-lived and in the final analysis served only to increase tensions between the administration and the nationalists. Nyerere attended only two meetings of the Council during which he submitted proposals calling for the end of parity and indirect rule. He also introduced a special compromise proposal for future constitutional advancement in which half of the Council seats would be filled by parity nomination and half by open, non-racial elections in single member constituencies.<sup>1</sup> Finally, Nyerere fiercely attacked the Local Government (Amendment) Bill which was designed to force native authorities to make their councils open to members of all races. He argued that 36 out of 56 existing local councils had voluntarily become multi-racial. The Union leader reasoned that any changes in the remaining units would have to be the product of voluntary and natural steps towards inter-racial cooperation. Speaking of the proposed bill, Nyerere stated:

I must protect against this unwise and unnecessary irritation of the Chiefs and the people. It will make the chiefs and people naturally

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard) 32nd Session, 6th Volume (December 2-13, 1957), pp. 81-94.

suspicious of the pressure of non-Africans on their Councils. It will set back a development in race relations which was already taking place on the initiation of the Chiefs themselves and their people; it will create racial difficulties, which we shall have to try and remove when this country is no longer under British rule.<sup>1</sup>

All of Nyerere's proposals, however, were either ignored by the government or defeated in debate by the Council's UTP faction. As a result of the government's refusal to accept any of TANU's suggestions, Nyerere resigned his seat on December 13, protesting that the administration did not understand the art of compromise and that the UTP in effect controlled the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup> He argued that the preservation of parity and tri-racialism were insisted upon by the Government not primarily to aid the minority communities, but rather to suppress the liberation drive by preventing the emergence of African political control:

...The Government has consistently, and for the most unconvincing reasons rejected every

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 18, December 16, 1957. In his private correspondence, Nyerere expressed the fear that if the use of multi-racial representation became too widespread, additional pressure would be placed on TANU to accept members from all races. He feared that such a move would reduce inexperienced Africans to minor positions in the party hierarchy.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 14, 15, 1957.

proposal that I have made in the Leg-Co. Most of the proposals which I have made have been compromises on the proposals originally made by my Organization. If I could believe that my function on the Leg Co was always to give in and never to receive, I would still resign: I have given everything that it was in my power to give, and what I have given has been rejected. I came to the Council expecting a little of the spirit of give and take. That spirit is not there. I would feel that I am cheating the people and cheating my own Organization if I remained on the Council, receiving allowances and attending sundowners as an Honorable Member, giving the impression that I was still of some service on the Council, when in fact I know that I am useless. I had, therefore, no alternative, but to tender my resignation and ask that my resignation take effect from Friday 13th December, 1957, the day my last compromise was rejected by the Government.<sup>1</sup>

In a letter to the Fabian Bureau, Nyerere explained his resignation in much stronger terms, declaring that the government was trying to "pacify TANU through bribery" and that continued service on the Legislative Council would "amount to Hypocrisy". At the same time he noted that the Council's recent approval of the Government voting qualification proposals negated the possibility of winning a

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere note of resignation to Governor Twining, December 13, 1957, Tanganyika political files, Rhodes House.

reasonable compromise on the question of future political development.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's resignation came in the midst of an ever increasing number of confrontations between the nationalist movement and the administration. Seen as a whole, the sum of these incidents threatened to destroy the spirit of compromise and cooperation which had already been badly shaken by Nyerere's experiences as a nominated member.

The major source of disagreement centered around the question of constitutional development. In particular, TANU and the administration radically differed in their views on both franchise qualifications and constituency structure.

The Union centered its opposition to government policy around the condemnation of parity which it viewed as the operating principle behind all Government proposals concerning constitutional development. TANU argued that the division of territorial population by race was an insult to the democratic process designed to remove most Tanganyikan Africans from the franchise by concentrating wealth, valuable land, and educational facilities in Asian

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Creach-Jones, December 23, 1957, January 6, 1958, Creach-Jones papers.

and European hands. It was, in brief, a system devised by an "unscrupulous government" to offer protection and opportunities to those who least needed them, at the expense of "the honest poor and ignorant".<sup>1</sup>

The Union nonetheless tried to maintain a moderate position in suggesting methods of reforming the existing system. TANU's handling of this issue was typical of Nyerere's repeated efforts to clearly and openly condemn various aspects of British rule, but at the same time to appear to be reasonable and moderate in outlining the steps necessary to remedy the situation. Thus, in 1955 TANU conceded that parity would have to be gradually phased out for the benefit of the minority communities, and that European and Asian interests would have to be protected in the African majority government which would soon evolve. In return, Nyerere called for a government statement confirming that Tanganyika would ultimately become a "primarily African" state.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika African National Union, TANU and the Vote (Dar es Salaam: Thakars Ltd., 1955), pp. 2-4. This party publication contained the Union's clearest statement of opposition to parity.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, April 16, 1955; Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, June 18, 1955, FCB papers.

At the same time, the Union stressed its belief that the gradual breakdown of parity could be achieved without racial violence. This conciliatory attitude was revealed by Nyerere in his official statement outlining TANU's constitutional reform demands:

Tanganyika is happy in having the most reasonable minorities in all the plural [sic] societies in Africa. Even the leader of the United Tanganyika Party, a party otherwise so reactionary that its future in Tanganyika is a doubtful one, did state recently his belief that future governments of Tanganyika will be largely African....

It is this reasonable attitude on the part of the immigrant minorities which enables us to demand changes which are no more than a symbol of gradual development towards democracy. We believe that the majority of the immigrant communities in Tanganyika will accept this as proof of our good will.<sup>1</sup>

The Union's fear of the parity system was clearly expressed in a letter from Makwaia to the Fabian Society:

...there is a danger that immigrant minorities might be associated with more privileges than desirable. If a common roll is to be introduced, let it be a common roll. I have discussed this point with Mr. Nyerere and his views on the matter are the same as mine. There should be more Africans on both limbs and legs and the proportion of 'racial representation' should be altered in such a manner as to

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika African National Union, TANU and Tanganyika's March Towards Self-Government (Dar es Salaam: Trainers, Ltd., 1960), p. 3.

symbolize the goal we are aiming at is a primary African State. I am confident this would be supported by all responsible Africans and by non-Africans who intend to make Tanganyika their home and remain the equals of the Tanganyika African.

Those non-Africans who may be having dreams to impose a political Federation of East and Central Africa may oppose these suggestions. It is time now people realize that every sane person would like to be his own master in his own home. The Tanganyikan leaders of African political opinion are in favour of gradual constitutional development provided that the Tanganyika Government and the Administering Authority make a proclamation that Tanganyika is going to be developed as primarily an African State....

We realize we are not ready for self-government today but we want to see a clear pointer that the territory is going to develop primarily as an African state.<sup>1</sup>

It was TANU's firm conviction that the recommendations presented to the Constitutional Committee by the government were in effect a perpetuation of the parity system and thus were totally unacceptable. Therefore, the party released a clear statement of opposition to the administrators' plans:

Government is introducing a system of elections which forces an elector to vote for a political opponent or not to vote at all. Conscience is ignored, all democratic practices are ignored; sheer commonsense is ignored and if

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<sup>1</sup> Mwakata to Selwyn-Clarke, September 10, 1956, SOU papers.

next year we have elections we may have to vote for our opponents or otherwise our ballot papers will be declared invalid.

This trickery was invented by our Government; it has no...precedent. But, the Governor tells us, it suits the special circumstances of our country and our time. It does not suit any country anytime. A political trickery is always an evil everywhere. Our special brand is particularly evil.

The Government refuses to introduce universal suffrage because there is no recorded precedent anywhere. You can not have it both ways, friends! Those who are prepared to forgive this originality in political trickery however reactionary they may be should be prepared also to accept originality in the grant of what is a fundamental human right.<sup>1</sup>

TANU used its newsletter, the territorial newspapers, handouts, and pamphlets to stress the fact that under the proposals for representation suggested by the government there would be one representative for every 2,500 Europeans, one representative for every 9,440 Asians and one for every 820,500 Africans.<sup>2</sup> The nationalist demand for more rapid constitutional advances than those recommended by the government was based on their insistence that "the tempo of formulation of public opinion was a rapidly accelerating one", and that political awareness had increased drastically

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 10, May 4, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, Sauti ya TANU, No. 7, April 16, 1957.



since the time of the Mackenzie survey upon which the administration was basing most of its suggestions.<sup>1</sup>

During this period, the Fabian Bureau offered the following analysis of TANU demands:

They [TANU] argue that the only way in which ordered expression could be given to this awakening political consciousness would be the introduction of adult suffrage, and that their acceptance of a continuance of the official majority in the Legislature would be a safeguard that enables the population to gain experience of an electoral system without any danger of disturbing normal development.

They argue that there is an atmosphere of co-operation amongst the races at present, which would be lost, and racial differences exacerbated if a system of communal roles is introduced; and that therefore a common roll system should be adopted, with a universal adult suffrage and reserved seats.<sup>2</sup>

By October 1956, TANU was convinced that the administration had no intention of altering the systems of parity and indirect rule.<sup>3</sup> It therefore drew up and widely circulated its own proposals for constitutional development,

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<sup>1</sup>TANU leaflet entitled "The Vote 1958", TANU political materials files, Northwestern University Africana Collection.

<sup>2</sup>Minutes of FCB Buscot Conference on Constitutional Development and Franchise in East Africa, December 8, 9, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere memo to all TANU cells, September 2, 1956, TANU political papers, Rhodes House.

copies of which were sent to the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Trusteeship Council.<sup>1</sup> In presenting the counter-proposals, TANU offered the following argument:

If there is going to be a conflict in Tanganyika, a conflict resulting from a refusal to recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Africans, such a conflict is not likely to be between the Africans and the non-Africans, but between the Africans and the Government. It is the British Government and the Government of Tanganyika which have hitherto refused to take any steps to prove to the African that democracy is the ultimate aim in Tanganyika. The Tanganyika Government has stated repeatedly that the present constitution has been designed to last for a considerable length of time and that it does not propose to change it. The reason given for this obstinacy is not that this is the desire of the majority of the immigrant communities in Tanganyika but that such is the policy of the Administering Authority and the Government of Tanganyika. Thus an obstinate Government in Dar es Salaam, presumably supported by the British Government, is refusing to take the only steps which can ensure gradual and peaceful development in Tanganyika towards self-government. This obstinacy can only lead to the discrediting of moderate statesmanship and the encouragement of extreme African nationalism on one hand and non-African reactionism on the other. We in TANU are prepared to do anything in our power to ensure peaceful development. We are convinced the immigrant minorities will do the same. Everything now depends upon the British Government and the Government of Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Karbona to Betts, October 23, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup> "TANU Policy Statement on 1956 demands for 1958 Constitutional Changes", October 8, 1956, FCB papers.

The Union stressed its opposition to the government proposals for constitutional development in virtually all of the party's political literature of this period. The central argument utilized by TANU was that the proposals of the Constitutional Committee were based on the Mackenzie Report and that conditions within the trusteeship had changed radically since the time of that survey:

...TANU feels, that the Government proposals, based on the Mackenzie Report, are not adequate to meet the present political situation in Tanganyika. It has been argued that 'there is as yet no formed public opinion in Tanganyika except on a few very broad matters of principle'; and again that many of the people of Tanganyika are still at a tribal stage of development and unready for the use of the vote. Against this we contend first that the Mackenzie Report was written in 1952, that the tempo of formation of public opinion in these times is a rapidly accelerating one, and that the existence and rapid increase in membership of TANU is primary evidence of this.<sup>1</sup>

It was the Union's conviction that even the reductions in voter qualifications inserted into the Mackenzie proposals by the Legislative Council did not significantly advance the territory's political system. TANU argued

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere speech given at Bukoba, October 23, 1956, Bukoba district annual report Rhodes House. Copies of this speech were widely circulated throughout the territory.

that while the changes in income and education qualifications scarcely increased the number of Tanganyikan African voters, they extended the franchise to virtually all adult members of the minority communities. The Union condemned the amended law as "not worth the paper on which it is so imposingly printed".<sup>1</sup> Viewing the approved qualifications as a scheme to preserve parity, the Union argued:

But now our Government proposes to introduce a system of voting which will divide our citizens into citizens with the right and citizens without the right to vote. The criterion of deserving? Income, education and office. Will the voteless masses, the second rate citizens, continue to shoulder their responsibilities of citizenship? Or will Government devise a means of exempting them from shouldering those responsibilities? One of the functions of our Legislature is to discuss the raising and expenditure of Government revenue. Since we are deliberately depriving the masses of the right to have a say in the election of our Legislatures shall we continue to tax these irresponsible, second rate masses? Have the masses any right to say 'No Taxation without Representation', or is this the right only of the rich, the educated and the office-holders.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 7, April 16, 1957. The Union devoted this entire issue to a detailed refutation of the amended version of the constitutional reform bill.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro speech, April 2, 1957, Mwanza. A copy of his presentation is contained in the Mwanza District Police files, Rhodes House.

In presenting TANU's alternative demands to the Union's liberal allies in the home government, Nyerere announced:

The Tanganyika African National Union feels that if the present happy relations in Tanganyika are to continue it is essential that there be a definite statement of policy from the British Government about the future constitutional development of the territory. Cooperation from the African people is dependent on a statement that Tanganyika shall become a democratic state. This is always a feeling that all the peoples concerned are working towards a common goal. Such a declaration is therefore of utmost importance and urgency for the well being of all the peoples of this Trusteeship territory.

Such a statement of ultimate democracy must be accompanied by a change in the present composition of the Legislative and Executive Councils. In 1954 TANU accepted the equal representation of all three main racial groups for the life of one Legislative Council only. It never regarded it as more than a transitional stage towards ultimate democracy.<sup>1</sup>

The Union released its own set of proposals for constitutional development in October 1956. Although they contained major deviations from the guidelines offered by the administration, they nonetheless complied with the TANU philosophy of moderate, non-racial reform.

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<sup>1</sup>Statement issued by Nyerere during a Press Conference at Labour Party Headquarters, Transport House, September 27, 1956, Labour Party Archives, Transport House.

Foremost among TANU demands was the Union's insistence that the Government make "a clear declaration that our country will be developed as a democratic state". Based on the fact that ninety-eight percent of the population was black, this would "naturally" result in the creation of a "primary African state".<sup>1</sup> The fact that Uganda had recently been given such a guarantee only increased the fervor with which TANU insisted upon the issuance of such a statement.<sup>2</sup>

In order to advance towards a "primary African state", TANU offered several proposals for the reorganization of both the Executive and Legislative Councils.<sup>3</sup>

The Union accepted the continuance of an official majority on the Executive Council. However, it demanded the introduction of ministerial posts, with portfolios for both official and representative members. In addition, TANU called for the abolition of the existing form of

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere press statement outlining TANU demands for constitutional reform, October, 1956, TANU files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See Tanganyika Standard, letters to the editor, September 4, 13, 1956, for examples of this argument. See also East Africa and Rhodesia, "E. A. & R. marked", August-September, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 11, pp. 728-729.

parity and the introduction of a modified version based on an equal number of African and non-African members (i.e. four Africans, two Asians, and two European unof-  
ficials).<sup>1</sup> The Union stressed the necessity of this alteration if Tanganyikan Africans were to be afforded experience in the running of key administrative departments. Nonetheless, the preservation of an unofficial majority and the use of guaranteed reserved seats for the minority communities insured the preservation of government control and the maintenance of adequate non-African representation.<sup>2</sup>

TANU's most radical demands were contained in its plan for the transformation of the Legislative Council. The Union called for the preservation of an official majority on the government side of the floor. It nonetheless demanded that parity between Africans and non-Africans be introduced. This move was designed to both increase the number of African seats and to terminate the use of

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<sup>1</sup>"TANU Election Proposals, 1958", a leaflet distributed by the Union throughout the 1956-57 period, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Twining, October 23, 1957, Rhodes House.

parity.<sup>1</sup> The demands of the party for the unofficial side were, however, far more radical. In clear rejection of British plans for territorial political development, TANU called for the abolition of the triple vote and the introduction of a modified version of parity based on equality between African and non-African representatives. The Union called for the election of 16 African, 8 European, and 8 Asian unofficials via a common roll election, based on universal adult suffrage. The plan envisioned the division of the territory into 32 constituencies, 16 for African representation, and 8 each for the minority communities.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere explained his plan in detail in a letter to the Fabian Bureau:

The European and Asian constituencies will be geographically coincidental with nine or more of the African constituencies and members regardless of race, except in the Southern and Western Provinces, will be elected not on a communal roll but by universal adult franchise. It follows therefore that all voters in these constituencies will have three votes, one each for the African, the European and the Asian reserved seats in these constituencies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, November 6, 1958, FCB papers. See also Table 11, pp. 728-729.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 12, pp. 730-734.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere paper on TANU constitutional reform program, November 3, 1958, FCB papers.



There were, however, several areas in the territory in which special arrangements would have to be made. Key among these were sections of both Southern and Western province. Nyerere explained TANU plans for elections in these sectors to his liberal allies:

In the Southern Province the Masasi, Tunduru and Songea Districts and in the Western Province the Kigoma, Kasulu, Kiboida, Mpandu and Ufiye Districts...are so large in extent and the tribal disparities are such that direct elections would be exceptionally difficult in these areas. It is accordingly proposed that a Legislative Council Member should be drawn from each by indirect election until the time comes for subdivision into smaller constituencies. It follows that it would be most difficult to have direct elections for reserved seats for Europeans and Asians in these Provinces and it is therefore proposed that their representation here should be by Governor's nomination.<sup>1</sup>

The TANU proposals also made special provisions for direct elections in Dar es Salaam. Under party plans, the municipality was to be established as a separate constituency in which a triple racial ballot would not be required. However, the creation of the special Dar es Salaam constituency disfranchised several sections of the territory. To make up for this, Nyerere proposed the use of special

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. See also Table 12, pp. 730-734.

nominated seats. The TANU president elaborated on these plans in a letter to M.P. John Hynd:

We have...made a special case of the municipality of Dar es Salaam though this has meant, in order to keep within the proposed number of unofficial representatives, making one large constituency for the Africans of the Eastern Province and disfranchising the comparatively few Europeans in the Central Province and Asians in the Southern Highlands Province. These disparities in representation will have to be taken care of by nomination to the representative membership of the Legislative Council.

We have given special weighting to Dar es Salaam because we feel that with the closer approximation in numbers of the different races there will provide a point of observation for the operation of the system of the common roll with reserved seats in more realistic conditions.<sup>1</sup>

By demanding election of the unofficial side through a common roll and universal adult suffrage, the nationalist movement clearly revealed its determination to deviate from the official policy of parity representation. Nyerere was nonetheless anxious to maintain the moderate position for which TANU was becoming increasingly well-known. He therefore widely publicized the fact that under party proposals, the average constituency would contain 240,000 African, 10,000 Asian and 3,000 European voters. Although the Union would enjoy a clear majority if all seats

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Hynd, October 17, 1955, FCS papers.

were selected through universal adult suffrage and common roll elections, TANU nonetheless advocated the continued use of reserved seats, the maintenance of a modified version of parity, and the retention of an official majority. By its willingness to accept partial improvements, TANU hoped to reveal itself as a moderate organization which well understood the spirit of compromise and the concept of gradualism.<sup>1</sup> It therefore was bitterly resentful when it became apparent that the Government had no intention of endorsing what TANU considered to be compromise proposals. The following passage clearly reflects the Union's bitter disillusionment with the Government refusal to negotiate:

Our demand for election of all representative Members of Legislative Council could be objected to only on grounds of administrative difficulty. But most people would be willing to give Government more time to complete the electoral rolls, if they needed the time. Yet even this is rejected with religious fanaticism...we beseech them to ask for elections all over the country and not to accept the mockery of 'experimental elections' in three or four constituencies.

Another feature of the Government proposals which will make our elections a fraud and a

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<sup>1</sup>Hyeres paper on constitutional reform, November 3, 1950, FOS papers. The Labour Party used TANU's concessions on these points to support its contention that TANU was a reasonable organization which deserved the recognition of the Crown.

mockery is the racial provision. In order to be validly nominated a candidate must be nominated by 25 registered voters at least 15 of whom must be of the candidate's own race. Our Government expects us to stop thinking in terms of race. This is a good expectation. But we are waiting in vain for the Government to set us the example...there is no need at all for another racial requirement except to satisfy Government's racial obsession.

To make racial security trebly sure it is proposed to give each voter three votes, one for an African, one for a European and one for an Asian candidate. Thus, if because of the paucity of Europeans in any constituency, TANU failed to get 15 European voters to sponsor a candidate whom we could support, we would be bound to persuade all our supporters to vote for a U.T.P. candidate to make their vote for a TANU candidate valid....This out-moscows Moscow. NO elections anywhere in the world could be more fraudulent. We wait in trepidation for more such brilliant ideas from our inventive Government.<sup>1</sup>

Closely associated with the Union's insistence upon the termination of parity representation was its demand for the initiation of universal adult franchise based on the age of twenty-one. Nyerere maintained that a highly qualitative franchise would de facto disqualify most Africans as voters. In effect, it would serve to perpetuate political domination by the minority communities even if the official policies of parity and

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<sup>1</sup> Sauti ya TANU, No. 7, April 16, 1957.

tri-racialism were abandoned.<sup>1</sup> Thus, TANU called for elections along non-racial lines, with the enfranchisement of all adult Tanganyikans. Coupled with this was a rejection of the Government plan to limit the first election to five constituencies. The Union insisted that the growing voice of African nationalism in all parts of the territory should be given an opportunity to express itself. Nyerere argued that the willingness of TANU to preserve the official majorities on both the Executive and Legislative Councils, and its plan for parity between Africans and non-Africans, were more than generous safeguards which would adequately protect the interests of the minority communities:

The Government is proposing to have elections in some parts of the country in 1958, on a restricted franchise. TANU demands elections throughout the territory on a basis of universal franchise. The Government proposals are entirely unacceptable to us. We stand on the principle that every individual in the state has an equal right to determine the way he is governed. We consider that our proposals to reserve 50% of the seats in the Legislative and Executive Councils give adequate protection to the minority communities and we cannot accept this further limitation to the democratic rights of the people of Tanganyika.

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<sup>1</sup>"TANU Election Proposals-1956", Nyerere to Mtenvu, June 3, 1957; Kambona to FCB, April 27, 1957, FCB papers.

The present Government proposals would make an election a mockery and TANU is not prepared to participate on such a basis. Our devotion to the democratic ideal is too great to take part in a fraudulent election.<sup>1</sup>

The Union refused to accept the Government claim that most Africans were not sufficiently educated in modern political activities to participate in territorial elections:

We believe that the only way in which ordered expression can be given to this awakening political consciousness is the introduction of universal adult suffrage.

It may be argued that this would be a dangerous step in the present state of education in the country. In our view it would be more dangerous to delay the introduction of universal suffrage than it would be to introduce it now. In our proposals for amendments to the Constitution we have specifically included the maintenance of an official majority in both the Executive and Legislative Council. This will inevitably limit the scope of elected representatives. We hold that this safeguard enables the population to gain experience of an electoral system without any danger of disturbing the normal development of the country.<sup>2</sup>

Nyerere further argued that lack of political preparation was not a valid justification for the maintenance of

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<sup>1</sup> Nyerere speech before Labour Party allies at Transport House, September 27, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Nyerere speech at Dodoma, February 26, 1957, Tanganyika political files, FCB papers.

rigid voting qualifications because:

...it is unjust that Africans today should be disfranchised because of the past and present inadequacy of the Government's educational policy....We therefore hold firm to the principle of universal adult suffrage without other qualifications than that of residence.<sup>1</sup>

The Union realized that many Africans would not truly understand the significance of the first territorial elections and that a large percentage of the indigenous voters would have at best a vague comprehension of both the issues and procedures involved.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, TANU maintained that this immediate electoral experience was necessary to prepare Tanganyikan Africans for modern political participation and to allow the Union to measure its basis of popular support. Nyerere summarized these beliefs in an address before Fabian Bureau leaders:

It is expected that there will be a low poll in much [sic] districts in the early elections, but this occurred equally in the earlier elections of the West African territories....

Nonetheless, we believe that the use of the vote and the conduction of electoral

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere memorandum to FCB on TANU election demands, November 11, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Betts, January 6, 1958; Mtevu to Nyerere, December 6, 1957, FCB papers.

campaign on a territorial basis is the best means of awakening public opinion to national as opposed to parochial issues.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, TANU demanded that the African population be allowed to elect a member of the indigenous community to serve as observer at all Trusteeship Council meetings.<sup>2</sup>

Despite TANU's rather moderate demands, the administration adamantly refused to consider the Union's compromise proposals. From October 1956, when the nationalists first released their plans until May 1957, the Union employed formal petitions and open letters to the government, debate before the Legislative Council, and private correspondence to key administrative officers in an attempt to negotiate a compromise plan for the upcoming elections.<sup>3</sup> All such efforts ended in failure. The Government adamantly insisted that the terms it had proposed to the Constitution Committee marked the limits to

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere address to FCB Headquarters, February 25, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 8, April 26, 1957. This policy was at that time in practice in the British Cameroons.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere noted that over 35 attempts were made during this period to persuade the government to compromise its position. Nyerere to Betts, April 26, 1957, FCB papers.



which it was willing to accelerate the pace of political development.<sup>1</sup>

TANU bitterly resented the Government's refusal to negotiate. Speaking of the Union's moderate demands, Nyerere commented that "a club of Uncle Toms could not have asked for less than we have asked for."<sup>2</sup>

Seeing that its proposals were not being given serious consideration, Nyerere decided to increase pressure upon the administration. On April 4, 1957, after consultation with key TANU leaders,<sup>3</sup> he issued a policy statement declaring that the party would have nothing to do with elections until the Government agreed to accept both universal adult suffrage and parity between Africans and non-Africans on the unofficial side of the Legislature.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See for example, Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard), 32nd Session, 4th Volume (March 3-6, 1957), pp. 82-83.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 11, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere consulted with Munanka, Kambona, Marealle, Bomani and Mtemvu before deciding upon this official statement.

<sup>4</sup>Kambona to Betts, April 22, 1957, FCB papers. See also statements by TANU leaders, Tanganyika Standard, April 10-16, 1957.

The deadlock was partially broken in May when the proposed Election Bill was debated in the Council. The Chief Secretary, as the official administrative spokesman, proposed that elections be held in three or four of the nine constituencies. TANU, represented by Nyerere, demanded territory-wide elections. In the ensuing debate, all African members of the Council, both officials and unofficials, supported the Union demand. As a result the debate was postponed until the administration consulted with the Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup> TANU immediately sent a petition to the Secretary in which it demanded that an official statement be released agreeing to territory wide elections. Nyerere argued that the elections, already scheduled for March or April, could be postponed until August or September to facilitate the proposed alteration.<sup>2</sup> The fact that all African members of the Legislative Council supported the TANU proposals was used by the Union to argue that it was the nationalist

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard) 32nd Session, 5th Volume, (April 3-7, 1957), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 10, May 4, 1957.

movement and not the administration who truly understood the needs and aspirations of the African population:

Government confirmed typical ignorance of the mood of the people during the Election Bill debate. The Chief Secretary is reported to have said that it was a blow to Government to hear that Members wanted elections, throughout the country. Government ought to have known this a long time ago; but their ostrich policy makes them blind to what in their opinion are unpleasant facts--If this Government can so seriously mistake the mood even of its own nominees in Legislative Council can we seriously credit it with any knowledge of the mood of common people in this country?<sup>1</sup>

The decision of the Colonial Secretary, announced in June, was to hold elections in the five scheduled constituencies in September 1958. After this, a special Post-Elections Committee would decide the appropriate method for the holding of elections in further contests to be held within the territory. The tri-racial ballot and government plan for parity would be retained.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, by the mid-1950's, it was clear that the plans for political development articulated by TANU varied greatly from those proposed by the administration and that neither side intended to alter what they already considered

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 73-74.

to be compromise positions. Nyerere realized that a possible alternative route to independence lay in the trusteeship status of the territory. He therefore hoped to use the United Nations, and in specific the Trusteeship Council, to advance the course of political evolution despite the unwillingness of the Crown to compromise. It was his conviction that the international body could successfully be exploited to spread the TANU message. At the same time he hoped to utilize international pressure to force Britain into a series of further concessions.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, between 1954 and 1957, Nyerere himself made three separate trips to the United Nations to represent TANU demands to the Trusteeship Council. All of Nyerere's appearances were skillful and impressive appeals in which he offered a moderate and reasonable series of proposals. At the same time, however, he persisted in his demand for immediate reforms aimed at rapidly moving Tanganyika towards self-government. As a result, he did much to undermine official accusations which claimed that

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Batts, February 7, 1955, FCB papers. See also, Bates, "Tanganyika," pp. 420-421 and G. McKitterick, "The United Nations and Tanganyika", Mboni, Vol. II, No. X (March, 1960), 19-28.

Union leaders were irresponsible troublemakers who did not truly articulate the sentiments of the majority of Africans. In addition, Nyerere's appearances helped to spread TANU's popularity among the indigenous population. As it became clear that the international body recognized TANU as the spokesman of the African community, an ever increasing number of Tanganyikan Africans began to accept the Union as the most viable of the nationalist organizations. Consequently, before each scheduled Nyerere visit to the U. N., the Union was able to readily solicit funds from the indigenous community to defray the expenses involved.<sup>1</sup>

TANU's involvement with the Trusteeship Council began during the tour of the 1954 Visiting Mission. The U.N. representatives received over a dozen petitions from Union cells during their inspection of the trusteeship. The principle document, which articulated TANU's demands for the termination of parity, the rapid advancement of territorial political institutions, and a guarantee of an African controlled government was drawn up by the

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<sup>1</sup>D. W. Mwakawago, "The Growth of Nationalism in Tanganyika", Mboni, Vol. II, No. VI (November, 1965), 6-14.

Union central headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Other major branches were permitted to submit their own petitions, all of which closely imitated the paper prepared by TANU headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

When the Visiting Mission report endorsed TANU as a party capable of leading a viable nationalist drive, Nyerere's suspicion that the U.N. could be used to oppose British policy was confirmed. He and the other key TANU leaders praised the report as "fair, just and very balanced".<sup>2</sup> When the administration and the settler community began an active campaign to denounce the document, the central committee of TANU decided to send Nyerere to New York to present an oral petition to the Trusteeship Council. The conservative faction seemed determined to discredit the U.N. findings. Their attack became especially bitter when it was discovered that the report had led to a great increase in Union recruitment. It was felt that a personal visit by Nyerere might persuade the Council to endorse the Mission findings despite the adamant

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<sup>1</sup>Karibona to Secretary, FCB, July 16, 1953, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, February 16, 1955, FCB papers.

opposition of the Crown.<sup>1</sup> A territorial collection yielded shs. 12,000 from TANU supporters to cover the expense involved with the visit.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere first addressed the Trusteeship Council on March 7, 1955. In his presentation, the President explained that the Union had been organized to lead Tanganyika to independence via the creation of an elective government based on a black majority in all representative public bodies in conformity with the Trusteeship Agreement and Article 78 of the U.N. Charter.<sup>3</sup> Nyerere stressed that although the Union aimed at creating a black dominated government, Africans would not be the only race to hold office. Rather, he offered assurances that the government would be open to and represent all citizens regardless of their ethnic origins.<sup>4</sup> He therefore condemned the systems of parity and indirect rule, claiming that they contributed to the

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<sup>1</sup>London to News, April 19, 1955, Creatchfield papers.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Africa National Union, UJAMA KATIKA UMO (Dar es Salaam: Trainers, Ltd., 1955), pp. 21-22.

<sup>4</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, [T/52.553], pp. 11-12.

development of racial tensions. Parity was depicted by Nyerere as a means of preserving minority rule. Indirect rule, at the same time, tended to perpetuate the parochial attitudes associated with tribalism. The native authorities were thus utilized by the Crown to keep the African population divided. In this way, the administration hoped to impede the drive towards 'uhuru'.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's speech was highly critical of British attitudes towards the Tanganyikan African nationalists. He informed the Council that the Visiting Mission's recommendation of a twenty year deadline for self rule had increased African confidence in peaceful methods of advancement. Nyerere denounced Great Britain for its rejection of the deadline proposal and for its recent propaganda literature which claimed that most Tanganyikan Africans viewed the twenty year time limit as premature.<sup>2</sup> The TANU President stressed that Africans were quite

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records (A/C 4/SR.579), p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>Throughout the months of late 1954 and early 1955, the Department of Information, the white settler press, and key administrative officers including the Governor and the Chief Speaker all released statements indicating that most Africans did not support the initiation of self-rule in the near future.



confident of their ability to run a stable government in the near future and that the experiences of recently liberated states in West Africa proved that such rapid political evolution was indeed feasible.<sup>1</sup>

During his first appearance, Nyerere also outlined TANU's complaints concerning land alienation, European immigration, educational policies, and economic development. He argued that under the existing policies, the territory could hope for neither rapid nor peaceful evolution towards self-rule. He therefore demanded that both the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority issue statements affirming that the parity system would be abandoned in the near future and that steps would be taken to ensure that Tanganyika would soon emerge as a "primarily African" state.<sup>2</sup> In return, Nyerere offered his assurance that non-Africans who chose to become Tanganyikans would be welcome to make the territory their home and would be granted all the rights and privileges accorded to the African population.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>TANU Katika UNO, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>3</sup>Trusteeship Council, (T/SR, 592), p. 14.

The first U.N. visit was clearly a landmark in TANU history. Upon his return to Dar es Salaam, Nyerere found a crowd of over 10,000 supporters waiting to hear the results of his visit. This was to date the largest political rally ever convened within the trusteeship.<sup>1</sup> The Union leader offered a message of cautious hope to the awaiting audience:

I did not go to America to bring you self-government, but I went to ascertain whether the possibility is there. By hard work, either in our lifetime or that of our children, we shall achieve it.<sup>2</sup>

By the time of his return, Nyerere was clearly accepted by the indigenous population as the key leader of the independence drive. It was at this time that he resigned his teaching position to devote full time to TANU activities. It was also during these early weeks after his return that he was both offered the temporary seat in the Legislative Council by the Governor and wooed by representatives of the Capricorn Society and the UTP.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 22, 1955.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 21, 1955.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere himself remarked about his increased notoriety in his correspondences to FCB members. See Nyerere to Betts, March 28-April 6, 1955, FCB papers.

Once he established contact with the Trusteeship Council, Nyerere repeatedly utilized the international body to express his dissatisfaction with numerous British policies. In October 1955, the annual TANU territorial conference sent a petition to the Council seeking its support in the Union's campaign against the recently proposed Incitement to Violence Bill:

Because there is racial harmony in Tanganyika this Conference is greatly perturbed at Government's intention to pass the new Incitement to Violence Bill which very much curtails our freedom of speech and press. This Bill is bad and has no parallel in neighboring territories or any true democracy in the world. It denies citizens of their right to freedom of opinion and expression. This Conference resolves to use every constitutional means to prevent the passage of this bill. It resolves further to ask members of the Legislative Council to refrain from passing it until they have sought and received mandates from the people. It also resolves to send this resolution to the Colonial Secretary, the Secretary General of the United Nations and to see the Governor immediately.<sup>1</sup>

Several months later, acting Organizing Secretary Mtemvu forwarded a petition to the U.N. Secretary General protesting the proposed amendment of the Penal Code.

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, (T/Pet. 2/198), November 2, 1955, p. 2.

Copies of the protest were also forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Governor. In his letter Mtemvu argued:

When the bill was discussed in the Legislative Council, it became clear that the law was in fact worse than we thought it to be....

One of an accused person's safeguards which British Law recognizes and respects is the presumption of his innocence until his guilt has been proved [sic] by the prosecution; and in the law of sedition it is necessary to prove seditious intention. But this curious law separates criminal intention from the crime and makes it possible for the accused to be convicted of a crime for making a statement which he did not intend to raise discontent. All the prosecution is required to prove is that the statement is likely to cause discontent....

...Sir, we are greatly perturbed by this law and we know that the people are perturbed. We ask the Governor at least to postpone the debate on the Bill until members of the Legislative Council had sought the opinion of the public, but this was not done. The articulate public is known to be opposed to the law.

We ask you, Sir, to persuade the Tanganyika Government to repeal this law; or to at least do something to ascertain whether the public in Tanganyika is opposed to this law or not.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the United Nations was informed of all major TANU confrontations with the Administering Authority as the nationalists attempted to utilize the Trusteeship Council to force the Crown into further concession.

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, (T/Pet. 3/198/ADD.1), February 9, 1956, p. 3.

By August 1956, it was apparent to TANU that its recommendations for voter and candidate qualifications in the 1958 elections were not being seriously considered by the Crown and that there existed little hope for a compromise. It was at this time that TANU's central committee agreed to send Nyerere on an extended speaking tour of Britain and the United States to seek support in their efforts to obtain concessions from the Crown. During his five month tour, Nyerere hoped to increase the popularity the Union enjoyed with both the liberal elements of the home government and the anti-colonial block at the U.N.<sup>1</sup> His itinerary included two separate visits to United Nations headquarters in New York.

During his first visit in November 1956, Nyerere addressed the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. He requested their aid in obtaining from the Crown an official guarantee that Tanganyika would emerge as a black-dominated government. His speech included a condemnation of the parity system and a demand that the government accept TANU's compromise proposals for the upcoming territorial elections. He argued that the Union was the

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<sup>1</sup> Nyerere to Betts, August 17, 1956, FCB papers.

strongest and largest nationalist movement in all of British East and Central Africa and that the Crown simply had to accept the necessity of compromising with such a potent organization.<sup>1</sup>

In December Nyerere once again returned to address the Fourth Committee. His presentation amounted to a bitter condemnation of British administrative policy, the white settler community, and the person of the Governor. Speaking of the inadequacies of the tri-racial system, Nyerere commented:

The Government of Tanganyika...pursues a policy which must inevitably lead to racial bitterness. Let me say here what I have already said in London, that it is unfair to those Europeans and Asians in Tanganyika whose only desire is to live in peace and co-operation with the Africans, for the Government to pursue a policy which inevitably leads to antagonism between them and the Africans. We deserve a Government that has the imagination to pursue a policy that will lead our country to nationhood without bitterness.<sup>2</sup>

He also attacked the white community for its support of Britain's imbalanced colonial policy. Indeed, Nyerere charged that European settler pressure was one of the

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Fourth Committee, Official Records, 11th Session, 563rd Meeting, pp. 71-74.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Fourth Committee, Official Records, 11th Session, 579th Meeting, p. 150.

primary forces behind the Crown's decision to perpetuate the tri-racial system:

In the plural societies British policy has always been the preparation of the white minorities to govern the indigenous majorities.... This is the record of British rule in the plural societies. There has been no exception to this rule....

...of the two minority communities it is the European community which can and does influence British Colonial policy....

Our objective is democracy in Tanganyika under conditions in which the race of an individual is irrelevant to his participation in political activity. Our proposals are designed as a stepping stone to this objective....

...we do not see why Africans in other parts of Africa should be given the vote and we in Tanganyika deprived of it on the pretentious grounds of poverty and illiteracy. We know that the real reason behind the Government policy is the presence of white settlers in Tanganyika. Government's limited franchise proposal would give the vote to all European adults in the country, to about 20% of the Asian adults, and only to a tiny fraction of the Africans. This we cannot accept willingly.

During his speech Nyerere also lashed out at the territorial government's administrative staff and in particular at Governor Twining:

The fact that Africans have less members in the Executive and Legislative Councils than any of the other Communities is not statutory for racial composition of the non-officials... [but rather] depends on the Governor's discretion.

But it is a significant fact that in a Legislature which has been described as the most liberal in the plural societies the Governor saw it fit to use his discretion by giving the Africans a minority of members in that Council.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere claimed that Twining was blinded from seeing the true condition of the territory by his stubborn loyalty to the outdated principles of British colonial rule:

Ignorance about the mood of a people can be amusing in those who hold no positions of responsibility; but in the Head of a country such ignorance can be tragic.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, the TANU President cited several instances in which Twining had derided or slandered the Union and its officials. Nyerere used these events to substantiate his claim that the government had no respect for TANU and no intention of accepting the moderate compromise proposals drawn up by the African party. He argued that the Union's reasonable plans, if accepted, would afford Tanganyika the opportunity of developing peacefully and gradually towards self-rule:

A final observation which I would like to make about these proposals is that, they are extremely moderate and should enable the Government to demonstrate to our people something that is vitally important to our future of our country, that the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 150.



people can, through constitutional means, realize gradually their legitimate aspirations...the chief function of nationalist movements like mine is to articulate the natural aspirations of the people and to show them the technique of gradual reform through constitutional means. This has been our message of hope to our people and they have responded with overwhelming enthusiasm.... Visitors who have come to Tanganyika, including prominent members of the Labour Party, have been struck by the remarkable growth and peaceful character of our movement. When I go back to Tanganyika...I shall be addressing thousands of people eager to hear what I have to tell them. They know that I did not go to the United Kingdom or come here to ask for self-government. They will want to know whether there is hope of a gradual development to self-government. I plead with you,..to enable me to carry that message of hope...that one day our country shall be democratic....<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere asked the Trusteeship Council to guarantee British acquiescence to several TANU demands. Specifically, Nyerere called for a target date for the initiation of self-rule; a series of deadlines for the initiation of the various constitutional reforms leading to independence; a guarantee of universal adult suffrage in the 1958 elections; and an end to government harassment of TANU.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere stressed that the Union plan for political development provided the most facile means of instituting these

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 151-152.

<sup>2</sup> Julius K. Nyerere. That Notorious Speech (Dar-es-Salaam: Trakars, Ltd., 1956), pp. 15-16.

reforms. He refuted British claims that TANU demands were extremist by arguing that under the Union plan Africans would have fewer representatives on both the Executive and Legislative Councils than any other race. In addition, Government control would be preserved by the retention of an official majority. Finally, fifty percent of the unofficial seats would be reserved for minority groups who represented less than two percent of the total population.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Nyerere sought Trusteeship Council backing in his battle against the parity system. By obtaining international support for what it considered to be the most moderate compromise proposals possible, the Union hoped to break the deadlock which had been created by the Government's refusal to accept any of TANU's suggestions for the upcoming elections.

When Nyerere was forced to return to Dar es Salaam without the firm statement of support he hoped for,<sup>2</sup> he told an awaiting crowd of 20,000 supporters that the economic strength of the European and Asian communities had encouraged the Crown to reject TANU's proposals for a

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<sup>1</sup>Official Records, Fourth Committee, 579th Meeting, pp. 150-151.

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 393-404.

modified parity system. He made it clear that Tanganyikan Africans would not long endure the system of imbalanced representation, stating: "We are prepared to live with the members of other races but we are not prepared to be ruled by them."<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's final trip to the United Nations occurred in June 1957, at the height of the unrest produced throughout the territory by the enforcement of unpopular local government regulations. At this time, the administration was also engaged in a massive propaganda campaign, aimed at blaming TANU for the widespread fitina. Government criticism focused on the claim that the Union was attempting to undermine the power of the chiefs and thus to undo the cornerstone of indirect rule.

In order to challenge these accusations, Nyerere was accompanied to the United Nations by Thomas Mwaalla, the Paramount Chief of the Wachagga who was also a member of the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup>

In his address before the Trusteeship Council, Nyerere contended that an ever increasing number of Africans

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, January 27, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere explained this strategy in a letter to Kambona, June 6, 1957, FCS papers.

were expressing their apprehensions that the parity system might result in the African population being dominated by an immigrant minority in the representative branch of the government. Since 98 percent of the population was African, and since the Crown had articulated its plans to institute a democratic form of government, Nyerere felt it reasonable to demand that the Administering Authority issue a statement guaranteeing "that Tanganyika is to become primarily an African state."<sup>1</sup>

He also attacked the Government and its UTP supporters for their franchise proposals, which would prevent all but "a tiny fraction" of Africans from voting. At the same time, he bitterly noted that the Union's proposals for a modified parity system had come under severe attack, although the nationalists offered 50 percent of the unofficial seats to the representatives of the two tiny minority communities.<sup>2</sup> Finally, Nyerere refuted claims that his organization was revolutionary, and stated that it merely "believed in the gradual achievement of Tanganyika's independence in perhaps 10 to 12 years."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, T/SR, pp. 817-819.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, News, Release No. 25/57, June 24, 1957, pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup>Trusteeship Council, Official Records T/SR, 818.

Marealle, as Chairman of the Territorial Chief's Convention, served as a most influential witness for the nationalist organization. His very appearance challenged British claims that the chiefs resented TANU and felt threatened by the rapid spread of the independence movement. Marealle substantiated Nyerere's charges concerning the inadequacies of parity and indirect rule. He also criticized the administration and the white settler community for their reactionary outlook. Finally, the Wachagga chief expressed his belief that more cooperation with the nationalist movement would result in the evolution of a stable and moderate form of self-government within a period of ten to fifteen years.<sup>1</sup>

Although of primary concern to all parties involved, the issue of constitutional development was not the only source of confrontation between TANU and the Crown in the 1954-57 period. Another major source of unrest was the recently founded United Tanganyika Party. TANU resented both the policies of the white settler organization and the fact that it enjoyed close cooperation from the Administration. Nyerere's initial reaction to the party

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 817.

is revealed in his correspondence with Labour Party headquarters:

It came as a great shock to the majority of the inhabitants, especially Africans, when the representatives in the Legislative Council created their own political party within the Legislature, called the United Tanganyika Party.

It is this party, rather than any other organisation in the territory, that enjoys governmental authority, with the result that the majority of the inhabitants have been left without any sort of representation in the Legislature.<sup>1</sup>

A short time later, Nyerere wrote to the Fabian Bureau to express his serious apprehensions concerning the UTP. His remarks moved the Bureau to reprint the entire text of his letter in the May edition of Venture:

The influence the United Tanganyika Party ...will have on the masses of the peoples of all races will depend upon whether the U.T.P. will be a democratic organisation working towards a democratically self-governing Tanganyika or whether it will be a type of organisation which would suit the partnership advocates of Central Africa, or at best the philosophers of the Capricorn Society. Judging from its statements of beliefs and aims we believe that the partnership it advocates will be the latter type of partnership and not a democratic partnership which recognises the basic rights of the individual irrespective of his or her colour or creed....

The U.T.P. pledges itself to maintain the present constitution and to accept only such

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Labour Party Headquarters, April 2, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

developments and innovations as are compatible with the constitution....

What is so sacred about our present constitution...we don't believe that parity is so sacred that it should be maintained. Parity of representation was an expedient, and a very undemocratic expedient, and while we accept it for the moment, we do not accept it as a state of affairs to be maintained for a long time....<sup>1</sup>

So strong was Nyerere's fear of the UTP that he claimed its very existence necessitated the dissolution of the Legislative Council. He argued that since 26 to 30 unofficials were members of the party, it was impossible for the Council to function in an objective, non-partisan fashion. This conviction is reflected in a memorandum to all TANU officials:

The present Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council were nominated to represent all the people of Tanganyika on the parity principle....The Tanganyika Unofficial Members Organisation [TUMO] being non-religious and non-parity, that is representing no one religious or political group, could at least claim to be non-partisan.

But with the formation of the United Tanganyika Party by all or most of the members of TUMO that situation is changed. TUMO is no longer simply what its name states...TUMO is now the United Tanganyika Party in the Legislative Council. With this change TANU's policy must change with regard to the present Legislative Council....

...under the new circumstances the present TUMO is as much partisan as the National Executive

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to FCB, May 2, 1956; Venture, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1956), 8-9.

or Central Committee of TANU, with the difference that TANU's Committee is outside the Legislative Council while UTP's Committee is equivalent to TUMO. With a rival party occupying all or most of the Unofficial seats in the Legislative Council even the little faith we had in TUMO must naturally vanish. TUMO is now an anomaly and the Governor can remove that anomaly only by dissolving the present council immediately and preparing the country for territorial elections.<sup>1</sup>

Coupled with its denunciation of the UTP, the Union outlined its now modified plans for the conduction of territorial elections:

Originally our policy was to tackle the problem of elections step by step, starting with those constituencies which are organizationally and temperamentally readier for elections and moving gradually to others as we gained more experience....

But under the new circumstances it is difficult to continue nomination, even in a few constituencies, without involving the Governor in party politics...We are opposed to the continuation of nomination unmodified, and it is for that reason that our policy on elections must change. We must now demand elections immediately and in all constituencies.<sup>2</sup>

On February 23, Nyerere sent a letter to Governor Twining asking him to meet with a TANU delegation to discuss the alteration of official plans for the upcoming

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere memo to all TANU officials, February 22, 1956, Tanganyika political files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere note to members of the National Executive, March 2, 1956, Tanganyika files, Creech-Jones papers.



elections and territorial political advancement in general. TANU requested the meeting because of the recent formation of the UTP. Nyerere stressed the necessity of an immediate election for Legislative Council members, via universal adult franchise, since the existing unofficial members were "no longer representative of the people of Tanganyika."<sup>1</sup>

The request for an interview was rejected by Twining who had already refuted TANU's claims that the formation of the UTP necessitated the creation of a new Council. The Chief Secretary to the Governor, who responded to Nyerere's letter, made the Governor's position clear:

I am to say that, while His Excellency always regards with sympathetic interest political developments, they cannot by themselves justify departure from the path of orderly constitutional advance which, at the present stage of the development of this country, has necessarily been carefully planned in relation to the fundamental realities of economic and social progress. No useful purpose could therefore be served by discussions of the kind you appear to envisage.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Twining, February 23, 1956, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Chief Secretary to the Governor to Nyerere, March 10, 1956, FCB papers.

When Nyerere attempted to further pursue the matter, he was informed that future correspondence concerning his request should be directed to the Assistant Secretary, S. R. Tubbs, who was also head of the Dar es Salaam chapter of the UTP.<sup>1</sup>

It was therefore clear that the Government had no intention of complying with TANU demands for immediate territory-wide elections. In addition, the administration's actions strongly indicated that the Governor intended to cooperate with the UTP and to protect it from TANU attacks.<sup>2</sup> This fact was bitterly protested by Nyerere in a letter to all TANU cell leaders:

The Governor nominated thirty individuals to be our Representatives...according to the constitution. One can regard these individuals as the Governor's Best Thirty, and there is nothing wrong in that. You may call them the Governor's Favourites. It is still politically sound, there is nothing either absurd or unconstitutional about it.

But as soon as these thirty individuals decide to form and do form a party, which like any other party is bound to be controversial, two things must happen.

Their political colourlessness must vanish and one can no longer regard them as the Governor's

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<sup>1</sup>Chief Secretary to Nyerere, March 19, 1956, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Twining statements in the Tanganyika Standard, March 12, 16, 1956.

Favourites without also regarding them at the same time as the Governor's Favourite Party. We suggest in the name of orderly constitutional advance, that, that would be most unconstitutional. The Governor may have a favourite party but he should try never to show either by commission or omission of any act that he had any. With the introduction of party politics, the Governor's part, whether he likes it or not, must rapidly become of a constitutional monarch with rather more exercisable prerogative powers.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere insisted that UTP control of TUMD negated the possibility of having an objective set of plans formulated for the coming elections. The fact that the elections committee was composed of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council,<sup>2</sup> and that 26 of the 30 individuals were the founders of the UTP, made it apparent that the white settler party would in effect dictate the course of future political developments within the Trusteeship.

Thus, Nyerere felt that the constitutional committee should be disbanded and immediate elections held. This would measure the grass roots strength of both TANU

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere letter to TANU officials, March 18, 1956, Tanganyika political papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 280-286.

and the UTP and would indicate which party truly held the people's mandate to determine the course of political evolution. Speaking of these demands, Nyerere argued:

A political party with seats on both sides of the house is going to determine whether or when we are going to have elections, and what shall be the voters and candidates qualifications. And who gave this party the mandate in preference to the other Parties in the Country? The Governor. But the Governor has no such mandate either. Neither he nor the people he consulted while nominating our Representatives knew or even guessed that these Representatives would end up by legislating for us not as thirty individuals but as a Political Party.

That one Political Party should hold this unique position in the country and that without any mandate whatsoever from the people is not a matter to be treated lightly. Surely the Governor does not expect the people of Tanganyika, leave alone members of the Union, to sit back and let a political party legislate for them, when there is no sign of proof that the people have confidence in that Party. All we request is that the Governor should let his nominees of the UTP seek the confidence of the people thru elections. Without that confidence they have no right to sit as a Party in the Legislative Council and determine our fate.<sup>1</sup>

When it became obvious that the government had no intention of complying with TANU demands for the immediate initiation of elections, the Union began to escalate its attack upon the UTP. The African nationalists insisted

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere open letter to all TANU members, March, 1956, ICB papers.

that they were not opposed to the organization because it was a competing political party. Rather, they claimed that their criticism was based on the fact that the UTP de facto controlled both the unofficial side of the legislature and the elections committee. TANU argued that this was most dangerous, since UTP support of parity meant the preservation of an imbalanced system of representation which would ultimately lead to increased racial tensions, as the rapidly spreading sentiment of African nationalism found no effective means of expressing itself. The basis of TANU's resentment of the UTP was summarized by Organizing Secretary Mtesvu in a letter to the Fabian Society:

My Union is not opposed to the formation of the U.T.P. or any other body; but it is opposed to the policy of this particular organization. It is a reactionary organization which under the cloak of multi-racialism pledges itself to resist constitutional changes which point towards democracy. It is a racialistic organization which is blind to individual persons but sees colours only—three high colours. WHITE, BROWN and BLACK in that order of importance. It is a paternalistic organization which in the words of its chairman 'fears for' the Africans....

It is rather odd that these people who start from a position which casts the African in a place of perpetual inferiority in his own country should claim to be non-racial....TANU is not prepared to see our people in their country devalued like a rotten currency....

TANU refuses to see 8,000,000 Africans equated with 3,000 Europeans however clever the latter may

be. Nor is TANU prepared to see 8,000,000 Africans equated with 70,000 Asians however rich they may be.<sup>1</sup>

TANU consistently argued that its plan for universal suffrage along non-racial lines was the only viable alternative to the system of parity endorsed by the UTP and the government. By offering all inhabitants the right to equally participate in political affairs, the Union felt confident that it could avoid the outbreaks of racial violence which it predicted would be inevitable if the tri-racial system were continued for long. The Union also claimed that the UTP, despite its promise to recognize the equal rights of all citizens, was nonetheless a fundamentally racist organization. Nyerere made this contention clear in a letter to the Fabian Bureau:

In my view the U.T.P., in spite of its professions to the contrary, is the most racial party so far formed in Tanganyika...

What makes this racial approach necessary? In our view, it is fear; fear that in the advent of democracy the African masses would swamp the non-African minorities.

...would the franchise the U.T.P. advocate be based on the Rhodesian principle of 'equal rights for all civilised men'? Or would the U.T.P. be

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<sup>1</sup> Interview letter to Labour Party Headquarters, March 12, 1957, Labour Party Archives.

prepared to accept universal adult franchise as understood by our British Trustees?

...our U.T.P. friends are priding themselves on the multi-racial composition of their party, but perhaps we should judge a party or community not by its racial composition but by what it stands for...we believe that if their aims and beliefs were achieved they would entrench and perpetuate racialism.<sup>1</sup>

Although the Union failed to persuade the government to comply with its bid for immediate territorial elections, the reasonableness of TANU's position made the Union's proposals acceptable to many members of both the European and Asian communities. Many non-Africans publicly advocated the moderate propositions put forward by the nationalist party.<sup>2</sup>

Still other members of the immigrant community, while not endorsing TANU, were dissuaded from joining UTP. By July, 1957, the UTP claimed only 6,900 members (4,600 Africans, 1,800 Asians, 500 Europeans).<sup>3</sup>

Clearly then, by 1957 the UTP and TANU were engaged in a major conflict centered around their opposing

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to FCB, May 21, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, letters to the editor, Tanganyika Standard, January 5, 7, 8, 11, 1957, in which Asian and European residents expressed their satisfaction with Nyerere and TANU.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 8, 1957.

views concerning the best course of territorial political development. Although it attracted only a small following, the UTP presented a serious threat to the nationalist movement because of the favorable position the minority party enjoyed within the territorial government.

In addition to its conflict with both the UTP and the administration concerning the upcoming election, TANU also found itself involved in a series of lesser disagreements involving government policies.

Key among these issues was the Union's adamant opposition to the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill. In 1955, the TANU Annual Delegates Conference unanimously passed a resolution protesting the proposed measure. Copies of the resolution were forwarded to the Secretary of State, members of the Trusteeship Council, the Governor, and the Chief Secretary. Especially distasteful to the nationalists was section 63(b) of the ordinance which placed the burden of proof on the defendant. In a letter to Governor Twining, Nyerere reasoned:

This is a new crime in Tanganyika and as far as we know it has no parallel in any of the East African Territories or indeed any democratic country in the world. If one purpose of this section is to protect or promote good race relations, then one would have thought that Tanganyika would be the last so-called multi-racial country



in Africa to need such a law. For law reflects or at least should reflect the mood and the needs of the country concerned. But if this law is meant to reflect the mood or needs of the Territory, and while the leaders of all the communities are doing all they can to promote good race relationships, we must confess, your Excellency, that we do not know that mood or those needs of this Territory which this law is meant to reflect.

...Your Excellency, on behalf of my Union, I humbly beg you to see that this section of the Bill is deleted or at least that this bill is not passed until Representative M.L.C.'s have explained it to their constituencies and received the necessary mandate from the people.<sup>1</sup>

The Bill was also attacked in the Legislative Council by Paul Bomani, who argued that it would seriously impede, if not destroy, the growing political organizations since their leaders would fear to openly express their criticism of government policy.<sup>2</sup>

The Union also protested the Incitement to Violence Bill. Once again, its argument was based on the fact that the placing of the burden of proof on the accused was a violation of traditional British law and the belief that the peaceful condition of the trusteeship made such a piece

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Twining, November 1, 1955, Tanzania National Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard), 30th Session, 3rd Volume, p. 611.

of legislation unnecessary.<sup>1</sup> However, both TANU efforts ended in failure and the two bills were approved without modification by the Legislative Council.

The Union also protested the inadequate educational facilities afforded Tanganyikan Africans under the tri-racial system. It was TANU's contention that lack of formal training was a major cause of the disenfranchisement of the bulk of the African population. At the same time, inadequate education kept Africans isolated and uninformed and thus removed many indigenous inhabitants from the mainstream of territorial political developments.<sup>2</sup> The major battle over education policy came in June 1955, when the government allocated £3,200,000 raised by the sale of confiscated enemy property to the territorial school systems. £800,000 were set aside for the schools of each racial community and the remainder was placed in a higher education fund. TANU bitterly protested this action, pointing out that the Africans, who most needed financial assistance, received the smallest allocation per pupil. At the

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Labour M.P. M. Winchester, December 13, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>These complaints were voiced by Kambona in a speech before Labour Party M.P.s at Transport House, August 16, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

same time, since Asians and Europeans claimed most seats in the territory's secondary schools, the bulk of the higher education fund would be utilized for non-Africans. The indigenous inhabitants who claimed 98 percent of the territory's potential school enrollment were therefore granted only 25 percent of the available funds.<sup>1</sup> When it was discovered that one white school had already been granted a special gift of £ 600,000 by the Legislative Council, Union dissatisfaction reached a new pitch.<sup>2</sup>

TANU also opposed many of the government's agricultural policies. In 1957, the administration proposed to alienate some 70,000 acres of land in the Kilombero Valley. The plan called for the granting of a 99 year lease to a South African sugar company<sup>3</sup> and a guarantee that no new sugar concessions would be allowed to open within the territory for a period of 25 years. TANU condemned the proposal, claiming that although it would temporarily be an

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<sup>1</sup>See Nyerere speeches, Tanganyika Standard, July 1, 3, 1955. See also Kambona to Betts, August 11, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Kambona, July 8, 1955; Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, July 4, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Sir J. L. Huttett and Sons, Limited.

economic asset, in the final analysis it would place another sector of the cash economy under non-African control.<sup>1</sup> The Union petitioned the Labour Party and the Fabian Bureau for assistance in combating this scheme.<sup>2</sup> Although a confrontation was avoided by the company's decision not to make the investment, the incident only served to further increase tensions between TANU and the administration.

The Union's dissatisfaction with official agricultural policies is also reflected in TANU's resistance to the Crops (Unlawful Possession) Ordinance of 1955. This legislation, which was passed as the result of pressure from European settlers in Northern and Central provinces, which were then in the midst of a famine,<sup>3</sup> made it possible for citizens to be arrested for the possession of crops if they could not immediately prove ownership.<sup>4</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 3, March 16, 1957 and No. 6, April 13, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, February 23, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Papers of Richard B. Brayne, D.C. Rhodes House; Kambona to FCB, February 9, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Crops (Unlawful Possession) Ordinance, No. 48 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956), pp. 1-2.

its battle against the legislation, TANU sought the co-operation of both the Trusteeship Council and the Labour Party. Once again, however, the government refused to consider the Union's appeal.<sup>1</sup>

One of the major disagreements between TANU and the administration centered around the question of a target date for the initiation of self-rule. The Union argued that the announcement of such a date would do much to ease racial tensions by giving the nationalists a guarantee that independence was indeed coming in the foreseeable future.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere summarized TANU's demands in the party newsletter:

...the idea of a target date gives to the country the very thing that our opponents tell us they desire above everything else, and that is political stability. The fruitlessness and often bitter rangles about 'whether' or 'when' we are going to be a democratically self-governing state will be answered once and for all and all of us can set about preparing for the day through economic and social development. Of course, to the reactionaries this is a revolutionary idea, and so were such ideas as Christianity, Chartism or Five Year Plans.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Betts, October 30, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Mtevu speech at Dar es Salaam Municipal Auditorium, April 26, 1957, TANU political files, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>3</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 11, May 11, 1957.

In addition to complaints concerning specific government policies and legislation, the period of 1954-57 saw an ever increasing number of incidents in which indigenous inhabitants protested against local administrative procedures and personnel.<sup>1</sup> Although dissatisfaction with native authorities, taxes, agricultural, and livestock policies had been prevalent long before the emergence of TANU, the nationalist movement readily exploited indigenous unrest to undermine local government authority.<sup>2</sup> Local TANU cell leaders frequently attracted new members by raising the convincing argument that the Union alone possessed the potentiality to successfully oppose unpopular

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 10, pp. 721-727.

<sup>2</sup>For studies of local unrest during this period, see: Raymond Apthorpe, "A Survey of Land Settlement Schemes and Rural Development in East Africa" (paper presented at the Social Science Research Council Conference, East Africa Institute for Social Research, Makerere College, Kampala, January 3-8, 1966), pp. 20-25; Ralph Austen, "The Study of Indirect Rule in a Tanganyika Province", (paper prepared for the East Africa Institute of Social Research Conference, Kampala, January, 1963), passim; Clyde R. Ingle, "Compulsion and Rural Development in Tanzania" (paper presented at the 12th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Montreal, October 15-18, 1969), passim; Eugene C. Lee, Local Taxation in Tanzania (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 1-40; Issa K. S. Musoke, "Who Holds Power in Bukoba?" Taanuli, Vol. 1, No. 1, (July, 1970), pp. 24-32; E. V. Winans, "The Structure of Shambalai" (paper presented at the East African Institute of Social Research Conference, Kampala, June, 1957), passim.

administrative measures. Although Nyerere himself denounced the use of violence, the leaders of the isolated cells became increasingly involved in incidents of civil unrest.<sup>1</sup> This was especially true during the period of Nyerere's five month tour of Britain and the United States. By mid-1956 the TANU president was forced to call on members of the Union's Executive Council to devise plans to tighten central control of all party activities. He feared that acts of unrest would do more harm than good by destroying the Union's image as a moderate and compromising organization.<sup>2</sup>

It gradually became apparent that the administration and TANU were on the verge of a major confrontation. Both sides had proposed what they considered to be the maximum compromise possible of their plans for territorial development. Yet neither party was satisfied with the other suggestions. The increased frequency and bitterness with which TANU criticized the administration and

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners, 1955-57 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956-58). See also, the papers of Brayce, Cody, DeVere, Henton, Brandt and Maclean, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, July 16-September 3, 1957, FCB papers.

the sporadic outbreaks of unrest throughout the territory only served to further increase tension.

The first incident to indicate an escalation of hostilities occurred in February 1957, when the administration placed a six month ban on Nyerere which prohibited him from addressing public meetings. In justifying this decision, the Government claimed that the TANU president had been stirring up racial animosity and that he had publicly advocated resistance to both local administrators and official policies. In particular, they cited Nyerere's addresses before TANU supporters at Dar es Salaam and Moshi following his return from the U.N. The restriction was justified under the provision of the Incitement to Violence Act. The government claimed that his criticisms were of an "inflammatory" nature and "might lead to a breach of the peace".<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere denied that his speeches in any way encouraged his audience to violate the law. He bitterly demanded that the government produce evidence of his misdeeds and insisted that he was being persecuted by administrative officials who sought to undermine TANU's goal

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<sup>1</sup>Copy of Nyerere's official notification of the ban, February 29, 1957, TANU political papers, Rhodes House.



reputation. Nyerere claimed that he had been misquoted and forwarded a tape and a transcript of his speech to the administration. When the administration replied that the revised version was still seditious, Nyerere issued a public challenge:

If I, speaking in Dar es Salaam, before, presumably, Government's most reliable reporters, can be falsely accused of saying the most utter nonsense, how much credence can be attached to reports heard about TANU officers in the villages where Government relies for its reporters upon uneducated headmen who are often stooges to the Government?

...Government should tell the people what they know I said and which they still believe to be inflammatory; and what they accused me of having said. The Government Press has accused TANU of being embarrassed by what they call 'true facts'. We are not embarrassed by facts, but we certainly question some of their 'true facts' about TANU. I am now asking them to publish all the facts and 'true facts' which they relied upon when they issued the ban against me.<sup>1</sup>

The administration, however, refused to reply to the challenge. Nyerere then sought the aid of the liberal community in the home government hoping that the issue could be raised in the House of Commons.<sup>2</sup> Speaking of

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 5, March 30, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, March 14, 1957, FCA papers.

what he considered to be the Government's unjustifiable actions, Nyerere noted bitterly:

I do not challenge the right of the Government to take necessary action to preserve law and order. The preservation of law and order is certainly Government's first duty, for everything that it does depends on this.

But in the Colonial World any statement, particularly a statement of fact, that embarrasses Government is enough to conjure up the powers of Government to preserve law and order.<sup>1</sup>

Despite Nyerere's efforts, the administration adamantly refused to either lift the ban or to press formal charges against the TANU chief. The censure, however, did not seriously impede the progress of the nationalist movement. It was during this period of restriction that Nyerere began to publish Sauti ya TANU. This enabled him to circulate Union views in writing, rather than via public appearances. In addition, he frequently met in private with local TANU leaders, who in turn carried his messages to the people.<sup>2</sup> At the same time TANU's membership continued to swell. Several key recruiters reported that the ban on Nyerere actually aided the growth of the Union

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<sup>1</sup>Extract from "Freedom of Speech in Africa" a widely published Nyerere text circulated in Great Britain by the FCB, April, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona interview with FCB, May 22, 1957, FCB papers.

since many Tanganyikan Africans interpreted the restriction as administrative recognition that the party was powerful enough to be considered a serious threat.<sup>1</sup> Nyerere himself made his famous third visit to the United Nations while under censure. He used his appearance to protest against what he considered to be unjust persecution. So bitter was his condemnation of administrative tactics, that the government found it advisable to prepare and circulate a formal reply to his accusations.<sup>2</sup>

The Nyerere ban, coupled with his resignation from the Legislative Council, made it apparent that the spirit of cooperation and compromise which had marked the nationalist drive to date was seriously shaken.

The most serious confrontations, however, did not take place between the government and Nyerere, but rather between scattered TANU cells in the outlying section of the territory and the local administrators of these areas. Throughout the 1955-57 period isolated and repeated outbreaks of unrest occurred throughout the territory. Although dissatisfaction with local administrators and

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Some Comments on Mr. Nyerere's Speech at the Fourth Committee of the United Nations (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1957).

official policy had existed long before the formation of TANU, the Government attributed the sudden increase in confrontations to local Union cells. Nyerere maintained that the administration sought to use these frequent but unconnected occurrences to refute TANU's claim to non-violent means of political advancement:

...after Government had made up its mind to kill TANU there was one stumbling block-- TANU's moderate programme and non-violence. To get over this obvious difficulty Government had to invent a story of double-facedness about TANU. That we have one policy for the public, including the U.N., and a different policy which we preach secretly.<sup>1</sup>

As an example of the administration's attempt to portray the Union as an extremist organization, Nyerere frequently cited the government publication drawn up to criticize his June 1957 U.N. speech. Nyerere argued that the official publication only partially quoted him and that the selection of out of context remarks was clearly aimed at making TANU appear to be a radical, racist, organization. It was for this reason that the Union published the pamphlet entitled That Notorious Speech,

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<sup>1</sup> Sauti ya TANU, No. 12 (A), May 18, 1957.

in which it presented a detailed explanation of the government's misrepresentation of the U.N. delivery.<sup>1</sup>

Speaking of the ease with which the more conservative elements of both the territory and the home government accepted administrative propaganda, Nyerere complained:

If you want to dupe some people it is enough to conjure up the words 'revolution' or 'revolutionary'. Say TANU is asking for 'revolutionary changes'; take care that you do not mention what those changes are and the imagination will do the rest! Simple.<sup>2</sup>

Realizing that TANU success to a large measure depended upon support from the liberal home government, Nyerere hastened to refute the government propaganda. In an open letter to the Union's "liberal allies", he argued:

During the last 2½ years we built up a large and responsible organization. The orderliness with which our mammoth meetings are conducted and the absurdly trivial reasons which Government gives for taking severe action against TANU is evident proof of this; and this is a country which has a law under which any person can be locked up for making any statement 'likely to raise discontent'. We preach all over the country obedience to Government and respect for authority, but all this is ignored by those to whom TANU is an

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Kambona, May 6, 11, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 11, May 11, 1957.

embarrassment. I have a duty to my Organization to protest against Government's anti-TANU activities.<sup>1</sup>

Despite Nyerere's insistence upon peaceful protest, by the mid-1950's, the rural branches of TANU increasingly came under the leadership of individuals who advocated a more radical form of confrontation with the administration. It was consequently the cells farthest from the control of Dar es Salaam Headquarters that most often came into conflict with government officials.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere, who noted the increased unrest with considerable dismay, attributed it largely to the lack of political sophistication of rural TANU leaders. It was for this reason that he had earlier sought to limit the size of the Union and maintain tight central control.<sup>3</sup> Nyerere nonetheless realized that, with the introduction of TANU's 1956 demands for elections based on universal adult suffrage, his party did indeed need a broad base of popular support. Thus, his plan for an electoral confrontation with the UTP forced him to

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere letter forwarded to Labour Party Headquarters, March 27, 1957, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>MaGuire, Towards Uhuru, passim; Sway, pp. 17-26.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to John Hatch, M.P., August 12-28, 1957, Labour Party Archives.

accept the concept of a territory-wide organization with a substantial following from among the non-westernized, rural population.<sup>1</sup> Gradually, Nyerere accepted the fact that Dar es Salaam headquarters could not maintain tight control of isolated branch activities and that local leaders with tactics far more radical than his own were coming to power in these cells. One local administrator who maintained a friendship with the TANU president commented on Nyerere's attitude towards the introduction of less sophisticated leadership:

...he has been to my house for a drink in the evening and I had expressed to him some misgivings about some of the personalities in his organization; he said few of us can claim to be completely virtuous and he had to use the material that came his way.<sup>2</sup>

Nyerere nonetheless had no intention of allowing TANU to resort to violent confrontations to achieve its goals. While realizing that local cell leaders would employ unsophisticated approaches, he was determined to use his authority within the party hierarchy, and his popularity with the masses, to maintain an overall

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere expressed this change of tactics during an interview with FCB leaders in June, 1957, prior to his third appearance before the Trusteeship Council. FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Brend papers, Rhodes House.

strategy of peaceful protest and advancement towards self-government through a series of gradual compromises.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's insistence upon non-violence is evidenced both by his own actions and by the observations of local administrators who recognized his efforts to conduct a peaceful independence campaign. Between 1954 and 1957, he expelled seven local cell leaders for provoking their followers into confrontations with the government.<sup>2</sup>

Often, Nyerere's influence was sufficient to control the designs of more radical local leaders. One district police officer offered the following analysis of the relationship existing between Nyerere and Issac Munanka, the radical activist of Lake Province:

... Munanka was a fanatic, a true barricade sterner and yet at the same time he was a likeable person. Issac was a conformed and rabid nationalist. On one occasion he visited an African friend in the hospital and studying a meal provided for patients decided that it was substandard. He took the plate of food to the office of the Provincial Medical Officer and suggested the latter should try and eat it. Issac and I were friends, but he never made any secret of his views, it is fortunate that he

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere interview with FCB, June, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona interview with Selwyn-Clarke, November 3, 1957, FCB papers. See also Sauti ya TANU, No. 9, April 22, 1957.



was always under the more powerful influence of Julius otherwise he might well have diverted his energies into less pacific channels.<sup>1</sup>

Another administrative official spoke with praise of Nyerere's ability to control branches which deviated from the policies of central headquarters:

As TANU grew it attracted a number of unscrupulous people and nationalist fanatics. In public speeches threats were made to plain clothes policemen present as to what would be their fate after self-government. This reached such proportion that my own staff became jittery and I mentioned that matter to Nyerere. Almost immediately the tone of speeches changed and it was made clear that the Police were servants of the public and that after self government the country would require an efficient Police force. This illustrates how great a control Nyerere had over his organisation and how he was prepared, under certain conditions, to cooperate with the government.<sup>2</sup>

The increased incidents of civil unrest naturally resulted in official retaliations. The government was quick to utilize the Registration of Societies Ordinance, the Penal Code (Amendment) and the Incitement to Violence acts to suppress dissidents. Local officials were especially sensitive to criticism of native authorities, realizing that the nationalists sought to undermine this

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<sup>1</sup>Brend papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Papers of Ronald Neath, D. C. Dodoma, Rhodes House.

foundation of indirect rule. Virtually all of the annual reports of district commissioners and police chiefs for the period 1954-57 note incidents of defiance to native authorities which were attributed to TANU agitators.<sup>1</sup>

So tense was the situation that in March 1956 a magistrate in the Kondoia court officially proclaimed that he gave credence to local rumors which claimed that TANU leaders had ordered their followers to disobey all directives issued by native authorities. The Union petitioned the Chief Secretary, the members of the Legislative Council, and the U.N. Secretary General with their demand that a committee of inquiry, comprised of private citizens, be established to investigate the incident "for the good name of TANU, the impartiality of the Judiciary and the enlightenment of the public."<sup>2</sup>

The administration readily employed the Penal Code (Amendment) Act as a means of limiting the activities of TANU leaders. So many instances of government interference were reported, that by July 1956, Nyerere felt

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 10, pp. 721-727.

<sup>2</sup>Organizing Secretary-General of TANU to the Chief Secretary of the Fabian Society, March 26, 1956, FCB papers.

obliged to send a formal protest to the Trusteeship Council. He asked the international body to bring pressure to bear upon the colonial regime, to insure that the Union could successfully perform its role as the leading spokesman of the Tanganyikan African community.<sup>1</sup> The policy of official harassment was so extensive that in 1955 a district commissioner tried to stop Kambona and Nyerere from holding a meeting in the home of the former.<sup>2</sup> In January 1957, the Crown applied further pressure by closing several TANU schools which were used by the Youth League and Women's League, under the premise that they were centers of anti-government activity. At the same time, the Youth League was banned from wearing its green uniform because it "intimidated" other Tanganyikan Africans.<sup>3</sup>

Incidents of official harassment occurred with increased frequency. In April 1957, an official complaint was brought before the Legislative Council by member Paul Bonani who had seen an infuriated district commissioner

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Twelfth Session, T/DR. 592, para. 32.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, July 4, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Copies of official ban notices forwarded to FCB by Mrenvu, January 3-April 16, 1957, FCB papers.

in Geita threaten to shoot anyone who claimed to be a TANU member.<sup>1</sup> In May a sub-chief in Bukoba was removed from the native authority council because he refused to sign a statement denouncing the Union.<sup>2</sup> Frequent instances of administrators prohibiting the distribution of Sauti ya TANU and other Union publications were also brought to the attention of central headquarters.<sup>3</sup> Nyerere cited these occurrences in a letter of complaint to the Governor, but received no reply.<sup>4</sup>

By far, however, the most widespread form of unrest was produced by the enforcement of unpopular agricultural, livestock, and tax policies by the native authorities. Local TANU leaders persistently derided the chiefs and elders as lackeys of the colonial regime and traitors to the nationalist drive. Often native authorities were condemned for compliance with reasonable and necessary projects. By the same token, native administrators often

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 9 (b), April 28, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Bukoba District Annual Report, 1957, Tanganyika Provincial and District Books (microfilm), Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere memo to Executive Committee, August 12, 1957, Tanzanian National Archives.

<sup>4</sup>Nyerere to Twining, September 2, 1957, Nyerere files, FCB papers.

blamed local dissent on TANU agitators while in fact many of the unpopular measures had long been the cause of indigenous unrest.

The first signs of serious confrontation appeared in early 1955, when a convention of chiefs in Sukuzaland declared that TANU leaders were "indecent" and their speeches "seditious". As a result, they resolved to prohibit the further registration of Union branches in the Lake Province.<sup>1</sup> During the same year, Moshi and Bukoba districts reported frequent TANU inspired protests resulting from government orders to slaughter all surplus cattle. Administrators in both regions noted serious indigenous dissatisfaction with compulsory deforestation, the enforcement of the cattle and cotton cess, and the system of allocating land for plantation agriculture.<sup>2</sup> In addition, both the Lake and Southern Highland provinces reported TANU sponsored demonstrations against recent legislation which stipulated that all local government councils had to be multi-racial in composition.<sup>3</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup>"Resolution of the Convention of Native Authorities, Sukuzaland," February 16, 1955, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Annual reports of Moshi and Bukoba districts, 1955, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Annual reports of the District and Provincial Commissioners, Lake and Southern Highlands provinces, (microfilm), Eastern African Studies Program, Syracuse University.

summary, there was growing tendency by 1955 especially in the Lake Province, for TANU leaders and local authorities to clash over official policies and to conduct programs of mutual harassment. The situation was summarized by a Fabian Bureau delegate who interviewed Nyerere:

I had a talk last week with Julius Nyerere ....He told me that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction in Tanganyika at the imposition by the Government of the coffee cess, the cattle cess and I believe that the third was tobacco. He said that the Africans were not consulted, that they did not know whether the cess was to go to the Government or the Native Authorities...the Government has still not wakened up to the need of explaining its policy, even when it is constructive.<sup>1</sup>

In 1955 unrest also spread to Kondoa and Irangi districts. At the annual TANU conference, provincial delegates from these areas drew up a petition which formally condemned both compulsory destocking and forced communal labor.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere decided to visit the region for a personal examination of the issue. He concluded that the TANU leaders had acted prematurely and condemned their resolution. He further announced that he supported

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Frank Beswick, M.P., March 23, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro, pp. 81-84.

both policies as necessary conservation measures.

Finally, the president decreed that no new TANU branches would be opened until tensions had eased and government regulations had been complied with.<sup>1</sup>

The closing of isolated TANU cells, generally in the areas most distant from central headquarters, was a common tactic employed by the government in its battle with the Union during this period of increased hostilities. An analysis of the events leading up to the closing of individual branches reveals a general pattern of behavior. The units that were either banned or refused registration were those led by the more militant and unsophisticated elements of the Union hierarchy. Virtually all were closed for minor acts of insubordination to local authorities. Often, the broad interpretation possible under the Registration of Societies Ordinance or the revised Penal Code was utilized to limit TANU activities. Finally, although the administration acted swiftly and without compromise to suppress over-zealous nationalists, no attempt was made to ban the entire Union. The government, although anxious to curtail the activities of troublesome

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, April 12, 15, 1956.

agitators, was nonetheless willing to allow those branches which adhered to the moderate philosophy of Nyerere to continue their peaceful protest activities.<sup>1</sup>

Those branches which were either closed or refused initial registration received a standard citation claiming that the cell "...is, or is likely to be, used for purposes incompatible with law, order and good government."<sup>2</sup> Most of the incidents which provoked the official ban were minor confrontations, often with native authorities, and involved the issues of forced government agricultural or livestock policies. Between 1954 and 1957, such conflicts were to ban Union branches in ten of the territory's fifty-five districts.<sup>3</sup> Government censure, although curtailing the scope of the TANU activities, did not completely thwart the Union in the restricted areas. Indeed, most closed branches continued to hold secret meetings and to privately recruit new members.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Selwyn-Clarke, May 26, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, (T/SR.818), para. 217; Sauti ya TANU, September 3, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>Sway, pp. 11-12.

<sup>4</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 1, February, 1957.



The first major confrontation occurred in the Lake Province in November 1954, when the Mwanza and Mwalampaka branches were refused registration. When Nyerere questioned the government decision, he was merely informed that the leaders of both branches had been declared "not decent" by a district officer who attended several TANU rallies and overheard speeches which "were near seditious."<sup>1</sup> The Union strongly opposed the prohibition of two entire branches based on the alleged remarks of two individuals. Speaking for TANU, Kambona reasoned:

...if the Leaders were in the eyes of the Government not decent why was it necessary to ban the Union as a whole and confiscate all its property instead of banning the prospective leaders?

If the speeches were near seditious, why could the Government not have dealt with the Leaders concerned without going so extreme as [sic] banning the branches?<sup>2</sup>

Since Mwanza and Mwalampaka recruited members primarily from the Wasukuma and Bahaya, two of the territory's more politically conscious tribes, the closing

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<sup>1</sup>Annual reports of the District Commissioners, Mwanza and Mwalampaka districts, 1954, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to FCB, January 12, 1955, FCB papers.

produced a major crisis for the Union.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, ten months later, Kambona described the ban as "a blow from whose effects TANU had not fully recovered even now."<sup>2</sup> Although the Union made repeated demands that either the accused individuals be brought to trial or else government agree to drop the charges, no official response was ever made to the nationalist challenge.<sup>3</sup>

In late 1954 the government extended its ban to include all TANU branches in Sukumaland. The ban, which was to remain in effect until October 1958,<sup>4</sup> was the official reaction to the high concentration of radical activities in that part of the territory. The area was the base of operation for the extremist elements of the TANU hierarchy, notably Kandoro and Munanka. Throughout the early 1950's, the region had been the site of frequent and bitter confrontations between native authorities and local nationalist leaders over an increasing number

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro to Hinden, December 30, 1954, Hinden files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Secretary, FCB, October 18, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere interview with FCB leaders, February, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 12, 1958.

of unpopular administration policies.<sup>1</sup> The government, realizing that the potentiality for a violent confrontation was greatest in this section, decided to curb all TANU activities before the indigenous population became too well organized and politically oriented.<sup>2</sup> The official justification for the ban was the repeated incidents of TANU inspired resistance to livestock and soil conservation policies.

The closing came as a major shock to TANU, which was now blocked from political activity in the most prosperous of the African inhabited regions, which also contained one-twelfth of the territory's total potential voters.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, TANU made repeated efforts to reverse the government decision. In 1957, the Sukumaland representative of TANU asked the Visiting Mission to apply international pressure on Great Britain to reopen the

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<sup>1</sup>Liebenow, "Response to Planned Political Change", pp. 457-459; MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, passim.

<sup>2</sup>Turnbull interview.

<sup>3</sup>East African High Commission, East African Statistical Department, Tanganyika Population Census, 1957, (Nairobi: East Africa High Commission, 1958), pp. 17-18.

the region to nationalist activities.<sup>1</sup> Repeated attempts were also made to arrange an interview with the Governor to investigate the events leading up to the Sukumaland ban. At one point, the Governor claimed that he would not speak to TANU delegates because Dar es Salaam Union leaders had snubbed him by refusing to attend a social gathering he had sponsored.<sup>2</sup> The Union vehemently denied that any of its members had been invited to such an affair and charged that the Governor was avoiding a meeting with TANU because he had no legal grounds to support the Sukumaland closings.<sup>3</sup>

Pressure on nationalists in Sukumaland was increased in 1957, when the ban was further extended under the new power granted the administration via the amendment of the Registration of Societies Ordinance. The revised ordinance stipulated that any and all activities of a banned society were illegal. It now became a criminal offence for TANU

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<sup>1</sup>Visiting Mission Report, 1957, pp. 14-16. Although under ban at the time, the Shinyanga District Commissioner nonetheless gave cell president Maswanya permission to hold private meetings to prepare the petition. See McGuire, Toward Uhuru, pp. 192-193.

<sup>2</sup>Chief Secretary to the Government to TANU headquarters, Dar es Salaam, February 3, 1957, Tanganyika political files, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 1, February, 1957.

to sell or distribute party literature, emblems, or insignia within the banned zone. At the same time, leaders of Sukumaland cells were forbidden to recruit members for TANU branches outside of the prohibited area.<sup>1</sup>

The administration continued its attack on overly defiant TANU cells throughout this period of strained TANU-Government relations. In 1956 cells in Bukoba and Lushoto were closed, and their members banned from further political activities as a result of defiance to local administrators and native authorities.<sup>2</sup>

A major confrontation over the right of the government to close TANU units occurred in Korogwe district in January 1957. The ban was an official retaliation to a speech by Bakari Mohammed, a local cell leader who announced that TANU was now the government, and that the people no longer had to obey the orders of colonial administrators. He was subsequently tried and imprisoned under the provisions of the Penal Code (Amendment) Act.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Kambona, August 21, 1957, Kambona file, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona interview with FCB representatives, December 14, 1956. FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Annual Report of Korogwe District, 1957, Rhodes House.

Reacting to the ban Nyerere admitted that Mohammed had broken the law but challenged the justification of disbanding the entire cell of over 11,000 registered members because of the actions of one man. He argued that no British party would be banned because of the crimes of its leaders.<sup>1</sup> He persistently maintained that the members of his party were being denied their right to political participation because of the improprieties of a few rash individuals. In addition, Nyerere claimed that many of the misdeeds which closed Union cells were exaggerated by local administrators:

Bakari Mohammed was warned by the Provincial Secretary and District Chairman of the Korogwe Branch. Did after this Government continue to believe that Bakari Mohammed was speaking or acting on behalf of TANU? How is it in fact that these Government actions against TANU have always as their bases actions or words of an ordinary member of TANU or at best a junior office-bearer of a remote sub-branch in the village? Hundreds of meetings of TANU are held all over the country by senior officials of TANU and these meetings are almost invariably attended by members of the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department. How is it that in spite of all this, anti-TANU action always relies for its evidence upon the infallible local headman?<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere speech "Freedom of Speech in Africa", p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 9, April 27, 1957.

The government, however, refused to be swayed by Nyerere's arguments. When the Union continued to press the issue, TANU branches were banned in all of Tanga province and shortly thereafter Nyerere himself was placed under ban for his criticism of local administrators.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, for the duration of the censure, the TANU messages were carried to the Tanga population by both the TFL and the cooperative societies of Bomani.<sup>2</sup>

Further government repression came in September when the Iringa cell was closed because its leader encouraged local residents to oppose a government sponsored cattle dipping scheme.<sup>3</sup>

Nyerere protested these closings to both the Visiting Mission team and the Government. He claimed that the administration was not merely trying to preserve law and order, but rather was determined to crush the nationalist movement by intimidating potential African leaders.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bennett, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Kanbona, December 10, 1957, ECB papers.

<sup>3</sup>The Iringa branch had been a source of constant irritation to the colonial administration because of its successful efforts to exploit native dissatisfaction with livestock control policies. Annual Report of Iringa District, 1955-57, Rhodes House.

<sup>4</sup>Report of the Visiting Mission, 1957, p. 15; Nyerere to Betts, October 16, 1957.

Shortly thereafter, branches at Pangani and Handini were banned for insubordination to native authorities.<sup>1</sup>

Once he himself had been banned, Nyerere turned to political writings to bitterly denounce the administration. It was clear that his hopes for a moderate and reasonable settlement of disagreements with the government were badly shaken:

The Governor is reported to have declared that the Government policy is based on strength and when necessary this will be made apparent to everybody. What the Governor should be told is that this has been apparent to everybody except Government sycophants...to-day branches of TANU are closed and individuals are deprived of basic human rights on the simplest pretext. Read many of the threatening statements which from time to time are made by the Government of Tanganyika and if you know little about East Africa you would think Tanganyika is the Mau Mau country. All this shows beyond doubt that Government's policy is based on strength. And that is the real trouble. We ask Government to base its policy on JUSTICE and make this apparent to everybody....

We appeal to the conscience of all men of good will here and abroad. Here is an organization [TANU] whose policy and leadership even its worst enemies admit is moderate and reasonable; but it is nevertheless being slowly but surely suppressed by a stupid and outmoded Government in the name of law and order. Honest dictatorship is bad enough but this insidious

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<sup>1</sup>Annual reports of Pangani and Handini districts, 1957, Rhodes House.



form of dictatorship in Tanganyika is unworthy of the representatives of a Nation the enemies of which admire still its sense of fair play.<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere firmly pledged that his Union would not succumb to government pressure and abandon its campaign for rapid political advancement:

Recent events lead us to believe that it is the intention of certain elements in the Territory, not only to discourage African political aspirations, but to wipe out TANU completely.

Our Korogwe branch has been ordered out of action and our President ruzzled. One wonders what the future has for us in store. But let me say this, that anti-TANU activities or unhealthy press will not stop us from demanding our rights or achieving our objectives. Besides this will not solve our political problems here, it will only set the clock back. What we need and deserve is a Government that has the imagination to pursue a policy that will lead our country to nationhood without bitterness.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, by 1957 TANU had evolved from a fledgling political party supported by the more Westernized elements of the African population, to a territory-wide organization with a strong basis of traditional indigenous support. Although its official policies stressed moderation and compromise, the more radical leaders of isolated party cells increasingly turned to active resistance of both

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 10, May 4, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 3, March 16, 1957.

local authorities and government policies. The colonial administration adamantly refused to accept any of the Union's compromise proposals and established a firm policy of suppressing the more troublesome African dissidents. The end product of these encounters was the bitter disillusionment of Nyerere who had hoped for a more reasonable reaction from the government. Clearly, unless one side radically altered its position, the stage was set for a major confrontation between the nationalists and the Administering Authority.

The Home Government: Support and Condemnation

During the 1954-57 period, the liberal and conservative forces within the home government continued their ideological battle to either advance or retard the nationalist movement within the territory. Consequently, both factions took definite policy positions on most of the controversial issues being debated within the trusteeship.

In October 1956, the Labour Party clearly indicated that it intended to continue its campaign to terminate the British colonial system, and replace it with a union of freely participating, independent states. At its annual conference, Labour delegates issued a formal statement:

outlining party plans for the British overseas possessions:

The Labour Movement has a great opportunity to prove that socialism and equality are not for home consumption only. We began in 1947 to transform an Empire into a Commonwealth. We have given up the concept of political influence based on force. Now we need to grasp that a free economic association with the colonial people will stabilise the Commonwealth and meet the most important challenge of our time.<sup>1</sup>

The liberals maintained that this transformation would have to occur quickly, if violence were to be avoided, since restless nationalist groups were now active in virtually all of the colonies. At the same time, if a prosperous economic union of freely participating states were to be established, the transformation would have to occur while Britain still enjoyed a favorable image among the indigenous inhabitants of the dependencies.<sup>2</sup>

The conservative faction, by contrast, persisted in its insistence that the development of the colonial

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<sup>1</sup>Policy statement drawn up at the Labour Party Blackpool Conference, October, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>For a summary of liberal arguments in favor of rapid transformation, see: Michael Scott, Policy in Africa (London: The Africa Bureau, 1956).

territories would have to be a slow process which stressed economic and educational development rather than rapid political advancement.<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of the liberal community towards Tanganyika was summarized by Fabian Bureau chief Marjorie Nicholson in her 1955 report following a two month visit to the trusteeship:

There are very serious undercurrents at work in Tanganyika although the Tanganyika Government presently is presenting to the world a picture of a very happy country...the tone of the Government comments, and particularly the tone of its references to politically conscious Africans, is quite out of tune with the progressive policy the Government claims to be following....

...the Tanganyika Government has a progressive policy of multi-racial local government but evidence submitted to the Visiting Mission shows that some Africans fear this as an intrusion of immigrants into local as well as national government....

Members of the Parliament have raised a number of questions following my visit...and in all cases but one have received negative answers, some complacent, some frivolous. There is a blind spot on the whole question of political advance and political education, to the extent that even extra-mural work is ruled out....Our office correspondence shows that the Tanganyika Government's complacency would be inappropriate

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Bradley for British Information Services, Britain's Purpose in Africa (New York: British Information Services, 1955). See also editorials, East Africa and Rhodesia, June-July 1956.

even if Tanganyika were not surrounded with trouble in Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland, and in existing circumstances it may become disastrous.<sup>1</sup>

The key confrontations between the Labour and Tory regimes centered around the colonial administration's attitude towards TANU. Liberals claimed that the territorial government was adamantly opposed to the Union and deliberately persecuted it. The multifold restrictions placed on the organization were viewed as attempts to thwart the development of the nationalist movement. The official criticism of the 1954 Visiting Mission Report for its endorsement of TANU was cited by liberals as evidence of this. The Tories, however, denied such accusations and claimed that any action taken against the Union merely indicated the colonial regime's determination to preserve law and order in the trusteeship.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, when the Tanganyika Public Relations Department published an official criticism of TANU in its pamphlet, What's The Answer?, the Fabian Bureau sent a delegation to the Colonial Office to protest the incident.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson notes on "Conditions in Tanganyika", October 3, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>For a summary of both party's views see: Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser., Vol. 583, (July 4, 1955), cols. 779-87.

<sup>3</sup>Winchester to Hatch, July 4, 1957, FCB papers.

The Fabians continually stressed that TANU, and in particular Nyerere, offered a moderate, reasonable, and gradual solution to many of the potentially flammable issues within the territory. They argued that unless some recognition and concessions were granted to the Union, the more radical and violent elements of the African population would rise to power. At no time, however, did the liberals challenge the good intentions or ultimate goals of the Colonial Office plans. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Fabian Secretary Selwyn-Clarke conceded:

My committee does not wish to exaggerate the seriousness of current trends in Tanganyika. It is aware that the administration is generally acceptable to the people, that it is pursuing a sound policy of economic and social advancement, and that in the political field it is working on lines intended to alleviate racial antagonism.<sup>1</sup>

However, despite its good intentions, the Bureau insisted that British policy did "not take into account the rapid spread of the nationalist spirit" and that the Colonial Office was discouraged from making substantial alterations in its methods by "various interest groups", and specifically by the minority communities.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Lennox-Boyd, April 6, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Liberals argued that if Nyerere received more cooperation from the government, the danger of racial violence could be avoided:

The President of TANU is a very able young man, quiet in his methods, moderate in his opinions and generally anxious that racial antagonism should be avoided.

...we feel that the comments concerning Nyerere in the Observations<sup>1</sup> is entirely at variance with our impressions and bears a striking resemblance to earlier comments on other African politicians who are now Ministers in other territories.<sup>2</sup>

The Labour Party agreed with the Fabian Bureau's analysis and warned that within the trusteeship:

...a racist spirit is beginning to creep into African organizations and this racial tension will probably increase unless Government shows some willingness to recognize the moderate TANU organization.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke here refers to the Tanganyika Government's official rebuttal to the Visiting Mission proposals. The administration specifically denied that a viable nationalist organization existed within the trusteeship. See: Tanganyika: Report of the 1954 Visiting Mission: Observations of the Administering Authority (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1955), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Lennox-Boyd, April 22, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Hatch to Colonial Office, February 3, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

The Tory regime, however, adamantly refused to either recognize the Union or grant it special considerations. In his reply to Selwyn-Clarke's accusations, the Secretary of State argued:

Neither the Tanganyika Government nor myself have any objections to the Tanganyika African National Union as such, or to Nyerere...it has been made quite clear by myself, my predecessor and the Governor of Tanganyika that the ultimate objective of Tanganyika is self-government and I do not think it is necessary for any further statement to be made, as there is no doubt in the minds of the peoples of Tanganyika about what we are aiming at. With a spirit of cooperation and faith in our tested methods, serious problems can be satisfactorily resolved.<sup>1</sup>

The close bonds which united TANU and the liberal reformers grew even stronger during the period 1954-57. Correspondence between Bureau and Party leaders at this time was virtually all on a first name basis.<sup>2</sup> The Union strongly encouraged liberal support and made it repeatedly clear that "the spread of TANU's message in Britain by our liberal allies is essential to the achievement of our goals."<sup>3</sup> Speaking of the close cooperation and valuable strategic advice provided to his party by the Bureau,

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<sup>1</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Selwyn-Clarke, April 30, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See for example Nyerere and Kambona files, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to Nicholson, March 23, 1955, FCB papers.



Kambona remarked that "...this Union is very deeply indebted to you for all you are doing to further its interests and I cannot thank you enough for it."<sup>1</sup>

During the period when the Union was formulating its official demands for franchise requirements and Legislative Council structure, the Labour Party and the Fabian Bureau maintained especially close contacts with the TANU hierarchy. Prior to each of Nyerere's appearances before the United Nations, the Union leader visited London and held private meetings with friendly M.P.s, who offered tactical advice concerning the problem of political advancement. Often, TANU leaders would reside in the homes of prominent liberal allies during their visits.<sup>2</sup> In December 1955, TANU established a permanent personal contact within the home government when Oscar Kambona took up residence in London to complete his study of law. While in Britain, he constantly served as a liaison between the Union and its supporters. TANU would frequently instruct Kambona to deliver personal messages to cooperative M.P.s or to

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Secretary, FCB, January 3, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, Betts to Nyerere, September 3, 1955 and Selwyn-Clarke to Arthur Skeffington, M.P., September 17-18, 1956, FCB papers.

address liberal groups and explain Union policy. The reformers deluged Kambona with questions concerning TANU goals, situations within the trusteeship, and the personal motivations of numerous members of both the Union and the colonial administration.<sup>1</sup>

So close was the spirit of cooperation between the liberals and nationalists that official policy statements issued by the Labour Party were often formulated with the consultation of TANU representatives.<sup>2</sup>

The liberal community, by the same token, enjoyed great influence with TANU. When the date for the first half of territorial elections was announced, D. F. Heath, a liberal white settler and member of the Fabian Society, sought the Bureau's help in receiving an endorsement from Nyerere to run for the European seat in the Dar es Salaam constituency. Heath realized that TANU approval was necessary for any non-African candidate who hoped to capture a majority of the African votes under the tri-racial ballot system. Seeking the aid of James Betts, a long

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona files, PCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Kambona, October 25, 1955, PCB papers.

time friend of both Heath and Nyerere, the white farmer stated:

I wrote to Nyerere after his return from U.K., which must have been nearly a month ago, but have had no reply so far. I have also called on Rattansey, who is now vice-president of the Asian Society; and we had a long political chat. I think I am pretty certain of sufficient Asian support, but am still a bit doubtful of TANU, as it is difficult, but understandable, for an Englishman, no matter how sincere are his motives, to get an entry into the xenophobic and esoteric circle of educated Africans. As I told you, I know Nyerere slightly and have given him lunch, but he may well believe that that was just idle curiosity. I think a letter from you -- from a source he trusts -- would be a very great help to me....<sup>1</sup>

When Betts endorsed Heath in a letter to Nyerere, the TANU president agreed to support the white settler's candidacy.<sup>2</sup>

During this period of close cooperation, three liberal TANU supporters, Marjorie Nicholson of the Fabian Bureau, Arthur Skeffington, M.P., and John Hatch, M.P., visited the trusteeship to gain first-hand information concerning political developments.<sup>3</sup> Kanbona reported that

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<sup>1</sup>D. F. Heath to Betts, August 19, 1957, Betts files, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Betts to Nyerere, August 23, 1957; Nyerere to Betts, September 4, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nicholson visited the territory from December 1954-January 1955; Hatch in June, 1955; and Skeffington from October-November, 1957.

the visit of John Hatch, the Labour Party Commonwealth Officer, was a strong encouragement to Africans and that his public endorsement of TANU greatly aided the Union's recruitment drive during this critical formative period.<sup>1</sup> The Fabian Bureau performed an additional service to the Union by maintaining close correspondence with many of the more moderate to liberal members of the minority communities.<sup>2</sup> The socialists repeatedly urged these less reactionary elements of Asians and European society to cooperate with TANU for the well-being of all residents of the trusteeship.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, throughout the 1954-57 period of tense negotiations, liberal Members of Parliament raised repeated questions on the floor of Commons to challenge Tory policy and to advocate the course of territorial evolution suggested by the nationalists.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Karibona to Secretary, FCB, October 18, 1955, FCB papers. Karibona reported that "there followed a rush of membership in his wake".

<sup>2</sup>By July, 1957, the Bureau corresponded with over 80 members of the non-African communities. Selwyn-Clarke "Notes on Tanganyika", July, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>See for example, FCB to Kattassey, leader of the Asian Association, April, 1956-November, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Nyerere, August 24, 1957, FCB papers. The principal liberal M.P.s involved were Hatch, Nynd, Winchester and White.

The liberal allies of TANU used their positions as members of Parliament to challenge all of the government policies which the nationalist movement found objectionable. They were especially critical of the use of recent government legislation to curtail the activities of African political dissenters. In March 1955, M.P. John Hynd demanded an explanation of the Registration of Societies Ordinance which he viewed as an oppressive and unnecessary measure. The Secretary of State defended the legislation, arguing that:

It provides for a system of registration of societies, with certain defined exceptions, and examination of their constitution and objects. Its purpose is to protect Africans from exploitation by unscrupulous society organisers, and it gives the Government power to declare illegal a society which is used for any purpose prejudicial to law and order or at variance with its declared objects.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary further defended the Ordinance by pointing out that it had been widely praised by several non-official members of the Legislative Council and in particular by Chief Kidaha.<sup>2</sup> Liberals, however, refused

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser.; Vol. 503 (March 2, 1955), col. 506.

<sup>2</sup>Lennex-Boyd to Selwyn-Clarke, April 30, 1955, ICS papers.

to accept this reasoning and insisted that chiefs who stood to gain by the impediment of the nationalist drive were not suitable sources of information concerning indigenous attitudes.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of repeated requests from TANU leader Munanka, the liberals agreed to pursue the matter within the House of Commons.<sup>2</sup> Speaking of their dissatisfaction with the Colonial Office position regarding the ordinance, Fabian Secretary Nicholson remarked to Nyerere that "...the Ordinance seems to be quite abominable and should also be unnecessary if everything in Tanganyika is as rosy as the Government always claims."<sup>3</sup>

The Fabian Bureau, despite its ideological commitment to the Union's goals, nonetheless maintained a reasonable and balanced approach in its evaluation of territorial affairs. When the Union appealed to the socialists for aid in opposing the ban on civil servant participation in political organizations, the Bureau assigned

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<sup>1</sup>Hatch to Secretary of State, September 8, 1955, Lennox-Boyd files, Conservative Party Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>Eirene White to John Hynd, September 17, 1955, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>3</sup>Nicholson to Nyerere, September 23, 1955, FCB papers.

several staff members the task of investigating the issue.<sup>1</sup> When research revealed that such restrictions were generally recognized throughout the Empire, the Bureau concluded that TANU could not justly oppose the ban, despite Nyerere's contention that it would isolate his Union from most of the capable African leadership. In its final evaluation of the situation, the Fabian Bureau advised Hynd:

With regard to the banned organisations for the East African Civil Service, they are all political organisations according to our information so I do not think we can follow up your question on those lines. I expect that Nyerere told you, as he did us, that he wants the ban lifted as far as the Tanganyika African National Union is concerned for a few years as they need the educated and more senior African civil servants to help them build up a responsible Union. I can see his point but I do not think we can put down a question. There is no legal precedent for us to argue.<sup>2</sup>

The Fabians ultimately decided to send an informal deputation to Lennox-Boyd to see if special consideration could be given to TANU. However, when the Secretary of State refused to consider the suggestion, the liberals

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Selwyn-Clarke, February 18, 1953; Selwyn-Clarke to Hynd, February 22, 1955; Selwyn-Clarke to Karbona and Munanka, March 4, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Hynd, March 18, 1955, Labour Party Archives.

were forced to concede that they could not justifiably pursue the matter further.<sup>1</sup> Although they persistently suggested that special considerations be granted to the Union, the Bureau refused to challenge the legal grounds upon which the Colonial Office supported the law.

The liberals were also severely critical of the Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance which they condemned in the Commons for its deviation from the model British Penal Code which placed the burden of proof on the prosecution rather than on the accused.<sup>2</sup> When Hynd failed to receive a detailed explanation of the measure while in debate, the Fabian Bureau urged him to press the Secretary of State for an official justification of the legislation.<sup>3</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Kambona was called upon to explain the TANU viewpoint on the issue. The nationalist leader reported that the Governor had refused to discuss the Ordinance with a Union deputation before it was enacted. He also complained that since its passage "...it

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke correspondence with Hynd and Hatch, March 16-April 3, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See John Hynd's condemnation in Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 5th ser., Vol. 582 (December 7, 1955), cols 65-66.

<sup>3</sup>Winchester to Hynd, January 26, 1956.



is almost impossible to make any political statement that doesn't cause dissatisfaction to the members of other communities."<sup>1</sup> The issue was again raised by M.P.s White and Hynd on February 22. The liberals demanded a detailed explanation from the Secretary of State clarifying why this unique piece of legislation had been designed for Tanganyika and no other dependency. They also sought an explanation of why the burden of proof was placed on the accused and a clarification of how a law could authorize the banning of future works by seditious authors.<sup>2</sup> The aggressive action of the liberals was motivated by their belief that the ordinance was designed solely as an impediment to TANU, and that "conditions in Tanganyika provide [d] no justification whatsoever for such legislation."<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of State, however, refused to give a detailed response. He would only state that no

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona interview, February 9, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ses., Vol. 582 (February 22, 1956), col. 121. It should be noted that these very questions were suggested by Kambona in a meeting with Labour M.P.s at Transport House on February 16, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>3</sup>Winchester to Hynd and White, February 18, 1956, FCB papers.

particular incident had inspired the legislation, but rather, that it was the produce of "the general desirability of discouraging such acts".<sup>1</sup> Although the issue was raised again by Labour M.P.s on February 28 and March 1, Lennox-Boyd refused to further elaborate on the matter.<sup>2</sup>

By far the most controversial questions separating the liberal and conservative factions were their views on both the parity system and the closely related issue of territorial elections. The Tory faction persistently argued that parity had to be maintained until the economic and educational gap separating the African and non-African communities was substantially narrowed.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, they felt that the election proposals devised by the Tanganyikan government were more than generous<sup>4</sup> and that any attempt to further accelerate the pace of political evolution would lead to disaster.<sup>5</sup> The liberals, by

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 5th ses., Vol. 582 (February 28, March 1, 1956), cols. 1121 and 1206.

<sup>2</sup>Winchester to Hynd, March 8, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Betts, February 13, 1955, FCB papers. See also editorials, East Africa and Rhodesia, May, 1956.

<sup>4</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Selwyn-Clarke, April 30, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>5</sup>For an example of Britain's official position on political development, see: Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Reference Division, Constitutional

contrast, insisted that parity must be abandoned and replaced by a program of rapid political development in order to obviate the danger of racial violence resulting from the dissatisfaction of the increasingly restless majority community.<sup>1</sup>

The liberals maintained that the moderate philosophy of TANU had prevented any serious outbreaks of racial unrest, but that unless the administration set a deadline for the termination of parity, more radical elements might rise to the leadership of the independence drive. This argument was summarized by Selwyn-Clarke in an open letter to the Secretary of State:

Racial parity has been accepted by the present African leaders, but they definitely regard it as a state which will not last for a considerable period. My Committee suggests that it should be clearly stated immediately that the policy of the United Kingdom and the Tanganyika Government is that Tanganyika shall ultimately be a self-governing democratic state. In the absence of such a statement, Tanganyika is drawn into the discussion of what is meant by such terms as 'partnership' and 'multi-racial state', and many Africans have formed the impression that parity is a fraud, designed to

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Development in the Commonwealth, Part II United Kingdom Dependencies. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955).

The liberal viewpoint is well summarized in Tshekedi Kahama, Political Change in African Society, passim.

prevent them from ever having control of their own country. Demands for an 'African' state are already heard, and racialism is already raising its head.<sup>1</sup>

On June 28, 1956, the Working Committee of the Fabian Bureau met to discuss the problem of parity in the trusteeship. The socialists formulated a policy statement which demanded that the Crown publicly recognize that "the ultimate aim of all multi-racial societies is a common electoral roll with universal adult suffrage", and that if the temporary use of parity were absolutely necessary "it must be done on a basis of equal requirements for the franchise."<sup>2</sup> In October of the same year, the Labour Party Annual Conference at Blackpool produced a political pamphlet, entitled The Plural Society, outlining its official colonial policy.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the delegates passed the following resolution concerning parity:

Firstly the people in the colonies with mixed racial societies must ultimately have the right

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Lennox-Boyd, April 6, 1955, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Minutes of Working Committee Meeting, June 28, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>British Labour Party, The Plural Society (London: Faber and Faber, 1957).

to decide under which type of constitution they wish to live, the Westminster model is not necessarily the best for all societies of mixed races, and secondly, the best way to give them the opportunity to make their decision is through the election of representatives by universal adult suffrage on the basis of one man one vote....

...the hope of survival of the minorities, on a long-term basis, lies in the ability of Africans, Indians, and Europeans to exclude race and colour and the prejudices and resentments they arouse and to think of themselves as citizens of Kenya, Tanganyika or Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup>

Several weeks later former Secretary of State James Griffiths, who served as chief spokesman for the Labour Party on colonial affairs, issued a policy statement in which he criticized parity as an impractical and outdated policy which produced unnecessary racial tensions. Griffiths argued that peaceful cooperation along non-racial lines was the only real solution to the problem facing the plural societies:

...the rights of the Indian and European minorities will be secured by the leadership and service that they can give to the territory....

No member of the Labour Party should underestimate the long struggle ahead to achieve the policy approved by our annual conference.

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<sup>1</sup>Resolution adopted at the British Labour Party Annual Conference at Blackpool, October, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

When we agree on these policies we must mean it, when a Labour Government comes to power it means that if these people get it we must do without it. If we are not prepared to go without, do not let us pass resolutions that mean nothing. But we mean it, so let us be ready to stand up and meet the critics who say, 'We should get this, not the blacks.'<sup>1</sup>

In order to insure that the liberal view on parity always had a spokesman, Eirene White was assigned the task of representing the Labour position on race relations in Tanganyika in any Parliamentary debate which might arise.<sup>2</sup> Clearly then, both the Labour Party and the Fabian Bureau were closely aligned to TANU in their views concerning parity and the needs of the plural societies.

Liberals maintained that unless a system of franchise qualifications were devised which gave the vote to a majority of adult Africans, the moderate position of the nationalist drive in Tanganyika would be replaced by a far more radical and violent form of protest.<sup>3</sup> Thus,

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<sup>1</sup>Text of Griffiths message to Labour M.P.s November 11, 1956, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Griffiths assigned White this task on October 23, 1956. Labour Party Archives.

<sup>3</sup>Selwyn-Clarke summarized liberal concern in a widely distributed handout entitled "Tanganyika Future", released in September, 1955. FCB papers.

in April 1955 the Bureau called upon the Secretary of State to create a special committee with representatives of all races to consider the question of franchise qualifications for both local and central government elections.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in 1955 liberal M.P.s confronted Lennox-Boyd on no fewer than thirty instances with demands that the indigenous population in Tanganyika be educated in modern electoral procedures.<sup>2</sup>

The liberal activists, however, refrained from detailing their exact plans for both candidate and voter qualifications for the first territorial elections until late 1956. Although the Fabian Bureau and the Labour Party received repeated suggestions from their members concerning the issuance of an official franchise plan, both James Griffiths and Selwyn-Clarke felt that it would be more appropriate to wait for the release of TANU's own proposals. In this way, the nationalist movement and

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<sup>1</sup>Notes in Nicholson's handwriting on FCB delegation to Lennox-Boyd, April 6, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Labour Party list of petitions and delegations to the Colonial Office involving the East and Central African dependencies, December, 1955, Labour Party Archives.

the liberal reformers could best coordinate their objectives and avoid the possibility of issuing conflicting plans which would only weaken their basically united front.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that the liberal community helped TANU to formulate Union demands for the 1958 election franchise. In September 1956, Nyerere arrived in London to request that the Colonial Office intervene and alter the franchise proposals and the parity voting system recently endorsed by the Tanganyika government. On September 19, the TANU chief met with Labour Party and Colonial Bureau allies in a conference hall in the House of Commons which was customarily reserved by Creech-Jones for Labour Party policy meetings.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly thereafter James Betts, a long-time friend and mentor of Nyerere, left his Bureau desk to consult privately with the Union leader.<sup>3</sup> On October 4 Selwyn-Clarke

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<sup>1</sup>This strategy is detailed in the correspondence between Selwyn-Clarke and Griffiths, April 6-September 3, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Griffiths, September 20, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Betts to Hatch, September 23, 1956, Labour Party Archives.



revealed that Betts had been helping Nyerere formulate TANU demands for the 1958 elections:

Jimmy Betts has nearly finished the memorandum working out the policy of T.A.N.U. on franchise and elections. He and I feel that this is a service we should give to Nyerere.<sup>1</sup>

The Bureau did imply, however, that while it was offering advice to Nyerere, its views on the election qualifications had not yet been officially formulated.<sup>2</sup> In trying to establish its own policy, the Bureau sought the advice of Prof. W. J. M. Mackenzie who had headed the territory's first constitutional commission. Mackenzie informed the liberals that the trusteeship was indeed ready to make a major political advance:

...I was out in Tanganyika in July...and found that things had changed a good deal (largely in the right direction) since 1952. The result is that a good deal of what I said there is obsolete so far as Tanganyika is concerned, because it is no longer necessary to be so extremely cautious there.<sup>3</sup>

The Bureau forwarded a copy of the Mackenzie letter to the Secretary of State, pointing out that the "obsolete"

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Creech-Jones, October 8, 1956, Creech-Jones papers.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Creech-Jones, October 8, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>W. J. M. Mackenzie to Selwyn-Clarke, October 29, 1956.

recommendations of the 1952 committee were the basis of the Government's recent franchise proposals. In response, the Fabians were informed that the Legislative Council's reduction of income and education qualifications satisfied the need for a more liberal franchise than that originally envisioned by the Mackenzie committee.<sup>1</sup>

On November 7 the Bureau received a letter from Nyerere which indicated that the qualifications suggested by Betts had in fact been adopted by him as the official TANU suggestions for the coming elections. Nyerere stated:

Very many thanks for the help you have given me in my effort to present TANU's case here. I thank you in particular for your help in working out a detailed plan for putting our electoral and constitutional proposals into effect. The plan as it now stands is the best that we have been able to devise. I have sent a copy to TANU stating that the plan has my full support and my confidence that it will get the official support of the Union.<sup>2</sup>

On November 18, 1956, Rita Hinden received a letter from Makwaia informing her that the proposals recently forwarded to TANU's Executive Committee by Nyerere had been approved.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Bureau served as the chief

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson-Lennox-Boyd correspondence, October 30-November 5, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, November 7, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Makwaia to Hinden, November 18, 1956, FCB papers.

adviser for the formulation of TANU's plans for the 1958 election qualifications.

The Fabian Bureau held its own conference to devise a policy statement on both franchise and representation in the East and Central African territories in December 1956. The meeting, which was attended by most of the liberal reformers concerned with developments in Tanganyika,<sup>1</sup> adopted a set of demands, which although somewhat vague since they were not designed for any one particular territory, nonetheless complemented the TANU proposals. Indeed, the socialist plans were in many ways more radical than TANU's own designs.

The Fabian proposal advocated recognition of the fact that the British dependencies were primarily African in composition, and that accordingly, their political structures had to reflect this premise. The liberals, therefore, called for the introduction of common roll elections and the creation of "geographical

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<sup>1</sup>Present at the December 8-9 conference were Roland Brown, John Dugdale, M.P., W. J. M. Mackenzie, Marjorie Nicholson, Kenneth Robinson, Reginald Sorenson, M.P., Cecil Wibley, Mary Winchester, Hilda Selwyn-Clarke and James Betts.

constituencies" in which there was "no place for special racial or tribal or minority representation".<sup>1</sup>

The Bureau was willing to accept a temporary system of guaranteed seats for minority groups, but refused to support any program of parity:

The most acceptable modification...as a temporary measure, is the common roll multi-member constituency with reserved seats for minorities. Where these are not practicable (for reasons of disparity in the size of the different electorates etc.), the devices of cooption or nomination might well be used to give adequate representation to minorities. We do not favour any extension of the system of communal rolls, though its continuance in areas where it already exists may be inevitable as an interim measure.<sup>2</sup>

The socialists were also willing to compromise their demands for universal adult franchise, but only as a temporary "interim" compromise, "for reasons of difficulties of electoral administration, of political bargaining, or of allowing time for the growth of African political organisations".<sup>3</sup> In territories where this was

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<sup>1</sup>"Resolution of the December 8-9, 1956 Buscot Conference on Franchise and Representation in East and Central Africa", p. 2, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

necessary, the Bureau conceded that minimum educational and income qualifications could be utilized. However, the Fabians made it clear that at no time would they support the use of a multiple vote, nor would they endorse allowing voter qualifications to be left to the discretion of the territorial Executive.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Bureau supported the retention of official majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils of all British dependencies, and advocated the immediate adoption of a ministerial system.<sup>2</sup>

In early 1955 the Fabians made repeated attempts to arrange a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss their proposals. However, Lennox-Boyd persistently refused to meet with the Bureau, claiming that his schedule left room only for "the discussion of critical, factual matters."<sup>3</sup>

In summary, by 1956 the socialists had not only helped to formulate the Union's plans for territorial political development, but had also devised their own general guidelines for the British dependencies of East

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Eirene White, May 28, 1957, Labour Party Archives.

and Central Africa. The Fabian formula was, in effect, more radical than that of TANU because of the Bureau's refusal to accept even a temporary compromise version of parity.

During the 1955-57 period, the liberal and conservative factions also clashed over the banning of TANU cells. In February 1955, Marjorie Nicholson assigned John Hynd the task of raising questions in Parliament to discover the administration's rationale behind the recent closing of TANU units Mwanza and Mwalampaka. She did so as the result of a direct request from Nyerere who was concerned that the ban was the beginning of an administrative attempt to undermine the entire nationalist movement.<sup>1</sup>

Although Hynd attempted to initiate a debate on two separate occasions, the Secretary of State refused to discuss the matter.<sup>2</sup> In April, the M.P. tried to force a confrontation by demanding that the administration take steps to identify and prosecute those individuals who were involved in the allegedly subversive activities

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholson to Hynd, February 18-21, 1955; Nyerere to Nicholson February 12, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hynd to Nicholson, March 23, 1955, FCB papers. The M.P. raised the question on March 3 and again on March 23.

which closed the branches. Once again, however, Lennox-Boyd refused to be led into debate and would only state that the cells had been banned "for the sake of preserving law and order" in the territory.<sup>1</sup> When pressed to explain additional closings in Sukumaland and Bukoba the Secretary of State, in a written reply to the Fabian Bureau, noted that the government was convinced that there was no significant dissatisfaction in either region with official policies or administrators and that the Union had been totally banned in both areas for its attempts to create unrest where none existed.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the confrontation Kambona advised the Bureau concerning political conditions in the regions where cells were banned.<sup>3</sup>

In March 1956 M.P. Arthur Skeffington also raised the question of the Sukumaland ban. In particular, he wished an explanation of why numerous petitions seeking permission to re-open TANU cells in the area had been denied.

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<sup>1</sup>Hynd to Selwyn-Clarke, April 4, 1955, Hynd files, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Lennox-Boyd to Selwyn-Clarke, April 30, 1955, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Nicholson notes on Kambona interviews, February-June, 1955, FCB papers.

The Secretary of State once again refused to give specific details, but did state that the individuals who presented the petitions would "most likely" disrupt the peace, and hamper the effective running of the government if the branches were given permission to resume their normal functions. Lennox-Boyd added that local government reports indicated that the majority of Africans in Sukumaland favored the ban.<sup>1</sup> Similar attempts by other liberal M.P.s to press the issue also ended in failure. The government adamantly refused to discuss the reasons behind the decision to ban individual TANU branches. This refusal, in turn, led to angry and frustrated accusations by liberals who claimed that the Union was the victim of official persecution, primarily because it effectively articulated indigenous dissatisfaction with outdated methods of British rule.<sup>2</sup>

Liberal M.P.s also supported TANU in its opposition to the other political organizations which emerged during this period. In March 1956, Eirene White and

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<sup>1</sup>London Times, March 8, 1956.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Lennox-Boyd, March 6, 1956, FCB papers.



Selwyn-Clarke visited the Colonial Office and demanded an explanation of how UTP members could be allowed to serve as officials on the government side of the Legislative Council, considering the ban on civil servant political activities. In addition, they questioned the policy of selecting primarily chiefs as the unofficial representatives of the indigenous population.<sup>1</sup>

Several weeks later, John Hatch and Arthur Skeffington demanded that early elections be held for Legislative Council seats in view of the fact that the unofficial members were now, in effect, a political party. They also asked if it were true that official pressure was being placed on chiefs to join the UTP.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the Fabians used Venture to continually publish articles critical of the UTP, by depicting it as a racist organization, which if allowed to thrive, would undermine the moderate policies of TANU.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Notes on interview with Lennox-Boyd, March 6, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hatch-Skeffington correspondence, March 17-23, 1956, Hatch files, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>3</sup>See for example, Venture, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May, 1956), 8-9.

The Capricorn Society was also severely criticized by British reformers. Liberals feared that the organization's bid for equality of representation based on qualifications rather than race would appeal to the minority groups and to many of the African elite and thus would "divert and retard TANU's political movements."<sup>1</sup>

As a result of their apprehension, the Bureau assigned the Earl of Lucan the task of examining Society activities.<sup>2</sup> His report, which was printed in Venture, condemned the Capricornists and urged readers to avoid association with it. Lucan's investigation also refuted rumors that Nyerere and several other prominent TANU leaders were secret members of the society.<sup>3</sup>

Liberals and conservatives also clashed on the question of economic development in the trusteeship. The Tanganyikan administration, Colonial Office, and conservative members of the home government all maintained that the economic potential of the territory was being developed

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<sup>1</sup>Winchester to Nyerere, February 6, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to the Earl of Lucan, January 21, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Venture, Vol. 7, No. 9. (February, 1956), 6-7.

in as rapid and as equitable a manner as possible.<sup>1</sup> Labour party critics by contrast insisted that the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts had only made slight progress in remedying the economic maladies of the colonies.<sup>2</sup> With specific reference to Tanganyika, liberals maintained that economic control was firmly in the hands of the minority communities, and that the system of parity further served to perpetuate this imbalance. Reformers therefore opposed land alienation and future white settlement. In addition, they demanded that no other sectors of the economy be allowed to fall under minority control.<sup>3</sup> In order to

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<sup>1</sup>For examples of the conservative viewpoint, see: Great Britain; Central Office of Information, British Information Service, I.D. 892 (Revised), The United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (and supplements) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955); Philip Mason, A New Deal in East Africa (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955); Tanganyika, Summary of Observations by Tanganyika Government on the Major Recommendations and Conclusions of the Royal Commission Report. January, 1956 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1956); Tanganyika, Tanganyika, A Review of its Resources and Their Development (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1955).

<sup>2</sup>See, O. W. Duxplaton, Colonial Development Corporation (London: Fabian Colonial Publications, 1957); Venture Vol. 8, No. 9 (February, 1957).

<sup>3</sup>For example, the FCB and the Africa Bureau both opposed the Groundnut and the Sugar Schemes. Scott to Hinden, July 17, 1957, FCB papers.

partially remedy financial inequality, they called for a major reform of the civil service system, which would place Tanganyikan Africans in high level administrative posts.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, on June 8, 1956, Fabian Assistant Secretary Mary Winchester interviewed Lennox-Boyd and demanded an explanation concerning the inequitable distribution of funds from the sale of enemy property. She argued that a much more rapid expansion of the indigenous educational system was necessary if Africans were to gain significant employment in the territorial work force.<sup>2</sup>

In March 1956 Labour M.P. Margaret Slater asked the Secretary of State to explain why Africans in Tanganyika were forced to pay a cess tax on coffee while Europeans were not. Labour demands for an official response increased when it was discovered that revenue from the tax was allocated to the Tanganyika Coffee Board, which was of far more service to European than African growers.<sup>3</sup> When the Secretary refused to offer an

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to James Johnson, M.P., March 6, 1956, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Winchester to John Rankin, M.P., June 9, 1956, FCB papers. She noted that the issue was raised at the request of Karbona.

<sup>3</sup>Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 5th ses., Vol. 576 (March 7, 1956), col. 212.

explanation, liberals swamped the Colonial Office with telegrams and letters of protest.<sup>1</sup>

Liberal reformers, however, did not allow their ideological commitment to blind them either to the reality of conditions within the trusteeship, or to the needs and capabilities of the home government. Thus, they accepted the legal justifications behind the ban on civil servant political activity. Similarly, when M.P. Fenner Brockway announced in 1956 that Tanganyika was ready for self-government, the Fabian Bureau and the Labour Party both rejected his claim as "extremely premature".<sup>2</sup> In addition, the Bureau recognized that nationalist leaders in Tanganyika were often radical and naive in their approach to political problems. The liberals maintained, however, that the future leaders of the Tanganyikan African population had to be aided. This was not done because of ideological commitment, but rather:

...because although we realize that they sometimes make regrettably extremist statements, we are also well aware that the discredited leaders of today may be Ministers tomorrow.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Lennox-Boyd papers, Conservative Party headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>Brockway files, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Batts to Lennox-Boyd, July 6, 1956, FCB papers.

When Africans in Tanganyika raised the argument that participation in the East Africa High Commission would eventually lead to federation, the Fabians denounced such apprehensions as groundless and decided to take steps to end senseless rumors. Speaking of this problem, Selwyn-Clarke reasoned:

The safeguards against federation are many and adequate and the African fears are absolutely groundless....As to how African suspicions can be dissipated, I would suggest that I do a paragraph for 'Venture' and that you send it for copy to the whole East African press. It would be a pity if we appear as campaigning on the matter but most educated Africans would read a statement from a friendly and unofficial source. It is better that Africans should fill their heads with their major problems that matter rather than chase an illusory will of the wisp.<sup>1</sup>

In March 1957, the Labour Party and Fabian Bureau both received reports that Africans in the Mt. Matagere region were being removed to make way for a government erosion project. Upon examining the situation, the liberals concluded that the scheme represented a reasonable conservation attempt and that the families involved had no traditional claim to the area. As a result, reformers refused to raise the issue in the home government.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Winchester, June 25, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Correspondence between Selwyn-Clarke, Hynd, Hatch and Lennox-Boyd. Lennox-Boyd papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

Finally, liberals were aware that the decrees of the Trusteeship Council were often based on ideological commitment, which failed to take into account the actual territorial conditions. Speaking of the international body, Labour Party Colonial Affairs Advisor Creech-Jones stated:

The basic difficulty arises from the constitution of the Council. It permits representation of responsible as well as irresponsible powers, of knowledgeable as well as inexperienced members, and of the play of politics and deep prejudice.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, by 1957 the liberal elements of the home government were committed to the support of TANU demands for political advancement and to the defence of the Union from the attacks of both the colonial administration and the conservative elements within the home government. In addition, the liberals shared many of TANU's criticisms of territorial economic and educational policies. However, neither the Labour Party nor the reform groups operated solely on the basis of ideological conviction.

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<sup>1</sup>Creech-Jones memorandum to Labour M.P.s entitled "United Nations Machinery for Dealing With Colonial and Trust Territories", July 11, 1955, Creech-Jones papers. See also Fabian Colonial Bureau, British Interests in Africa (London: Fabian Publications Limited, 1956), pp. 11-13.

Their goal was to obtain self-government for Tanganyika, but to do so in a manner that took into account the realities of the territorial situation and not merely their own political preferences. In opposition to the liberal alliance stood the Tory Party, the Colonial Office, and the white settler community, all of whom persisted in their support of the traditional policies of parity, indirect rule, and gradualism.

The United Nations: International Criticism of British Policy

During the period 1954-57, the Trusteeship Council once again became the site of an ideological conflict between the colonial powers and the anti-imperial forces of the Third World and the communist bloc. As in the past, the anti-imperialist allies concentrated their efforts to disprove the merits of any of Britain's plans for territorial development. They persistently argued that government policies were aimed at the preservation of an Empire and that any introduction of representative government was designed to solidify rule by the white settler community, who would in turn be loyal allies of the Crown.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For an example of the ideological confrontations which occurred at the U.N., see "Storm Over Tanganyika", Africa Today, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March-April, 1955), 14-16.



The first major confrontation within the Trusteeship Council occurred in February 1955, during the debate of the recently released 1954 Visiting Mission Report. The United Kingdom representative, Sir Alan Burns, condemned the document as "impractical" and "shortsighted", because of its recommendation of a twenty year target date for independence, and a rigid timetable for the initiation of various steps in political development towards this goal.<sup>1</sup> Speaking of the unreasonableness of these suggestions, Sir Alan announced that:

The Administering Authority is unable to accept the recommendation by the Visiting Mission that a timetable should be fixed for the successive phases of constitutional development and that a date should be specific by which the Territory would be granted self-government. The declared policy of the Administering Authority is that the constitutional development of Tanganyika should be by stages, the ground being consolidated and the future reviewed in the light of the experience gained before each important stage is undertaken. The rigidity of a fixed timetable would be inimical to the harmonious development of political institutions corresponding to consecutive stages of economic and social evolution. This does not mean that political and constitutional progress will be slow.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations News, No. 10/55, February 28, 1955. For the text of the original Visiting Mission suggestion, see Report of the Visiting Mission, 1954, pp. 251-252.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records (25 January-28 March, 1955), p. 174.


The Administering Authority's position was strongly defended by Mr. John Stanhope Reid, the New Zealand representative to the Trusteeship Council who had also served as chairman of the 1954 Mission team. Reid testified that the setting of a target date was an unreasonable request which placed "undue pressure" on the Crown, especially considering that "the obligation to bring the people to self-government or independence as soon as possible is contained in the Trusteeship Agreement."<sup>1</sup>

The anti-colonial forces, by contrast, strongly supported the deadline. The representatives of the Soviet Union, El Salvador, and India were especially adamant in their demands for a target date. Mr. Rikhi Japhal, the representative of India (who had also been a member of the Mission team), argued that the concept of a timetable was in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter. The 1954 report, he reasoned, "expressed a point of view that might not be in conformity with the policy of the Administering Authority, but which nevertheless was based on certain arguments, facts, hopes and beliefs".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 176-178.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations News, No. 14/55, March 7, 1955.



Despite pressure from the anti-colonial powers, at the February 28 meeting the United Kingdom officially rejected the idea of a target date. This led to bitter accusations from the El Salvador representative (and former Mission member) Rafael Eguizabal, who claimed that the Colonial Office had rejected the idea of a timetable during a conference in London long before the Mission had even departed for Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup> In a general debate which followed, the anti-colonial forces, led by the U.S.S.R., utilized the 1954 report to condemn numerous aspects of British administration. Primary targets included the parity system, land alienation, job opportunities, official treatment of nationalist organizations, and the inadequacy of information concerning the U.N. provided to the Tanganyikan African community.<sup>2</sup>

British rule was defended by United Kingdom Special Representative Arthur J. Grattan-Bellow, who on February 28 presented a detailed explanation of the economic and educational problems existent in the territory.

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, February 28, 1955, pp. 178-183.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations Review, Vol. 1, No. 9 (March, 1955), passim.

He persuasively argued that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to try to estimate the degree of political development and to set any time limit for self-government because there are so many factors involved which are unpredictable".<sup>1</sup> He testified that he was aware that "one element" of the population was pressing for a timetable but that there was no way in which to estimate such developments "with any reasonable degree of accuracy".<sup>2</sup> He further argued that the "vast majority" of the population accepted parity and that the Visiting Mission Report represented the first serious recommendation that the system be abandoned. Finally, the U.K. representative emphatically denied that the minority groups enjoyed any special privileges, maintaining that the only unusual considerations consisted of certain "safeguards" for Africans.<sup>3</sup> His speech was vehemently denounced by the Soviet representative, Vasily F. Grubyakov, who claimed that parity rule was aimed at creating a settler-dominated society

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, February 28, 1955, pp. 176-181.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations News, March 7, 1955.

which would willingly remain part of the British Empire. He challenged the Crown to initiate a referendum on the question of parity, to discover the true sentiments of the population.<sup>1</sup>

The debates were interrupted on March 2, in order to entertain a petition from Sir Charles Phillips, spokesman for the Tanganyika Legislative Council Unofficial Membership Organization (TUMU). In his address, Sir Charles noted that Legislative Council members were disappointed with the undue stress placed on political development in the Mission Report. He argued that the establishment of a timetable would be confusing to most inhabitants, especially if such an alteration closely followed the recently announced constitutional changes. The Crown representative argued that "all of us out there can't see the setting of a time limit...Africans must learn to understand the full implication of self-government, both financial and administrative."<sup>2</sup> Finally, he claimed that the Mission had failed to adequately consider the economic and educational development of the trusteeship. In light

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, February 29, 1955, pp. 180-186.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 118-191.

of the necessarily slow pace of development in these sectors, the concept of a timetable was both "impractical" and "dangerous".<sup>1</sup>

Following the testimony of the TUMO representative the general debate on the report resumed and continued on until March 11. During this time it became clear that ideological commitments sharply divided the Council. Britain's repeated attempts to explain the factual dimensions surrounding any of her policy decisions were condemned by the anti-colonial powers as vain efforts to justify the maintenance of minority rule and the preservation of an Empire. At the same time, Britain refused to consider any proposals which deviated from her long established policies of parity and indirect rule.<sup>2</sup>

At the conclusion of the debate, Sir Alan Burns made it clear that the United Kingdom would not carry out any of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed summary of the ideological arguments presented by both sides, see: Roger Baldwin, "Report from the United Nations", Africa Today, Vol. 3, No. 3 (May-June 1956), 10-11 and the United Nations, Department of Public Information, Tanganyika, Land in Transition: The U. N. Visiting Mission's Report on Tanganyika, the Observations and Plans of the Administering Authority, and the Debate and Recommendations of the Trusteeship Council (New York: U. N. Department of Public Information, 1955), pp. 20-25.

the suggestions made in the report, even if they received the endorsement of the Legislative Council:

I must make it quite plain that the administering authority, with whom the responsibility rests, will under no circumstances accept or implement any recommendations which in their view are inimical to the real interests of the inhabitants of Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, Grattan-Bellow announced to a press conference that endorsement of the Mission Report would "impair the cooperation and good will" which existed between the government of Tanganyika and the Trusteeship Council. This in turn would produce unnecessary "hostility" and "antagonism" between the United Kingdom and the U.N.<sup>2</sup> The British representative explained that his country's primary objections centered around the recommendation of a deadline for independence, the demand for an end to land alienation, and the condemnation of the multi-racial policy. He maintained that no valid arguments had been raised in the debates "...to invalidate the opinion of

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, March 11, 1955, p. 223.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations News (No. 15/55) March 11, 1955.



the Administering Authority or to warrant it reconsidering the Mission's recommendations".<sup>1</sup>

The British position received support from the delegates of Australia, France, and Belgium. The Australian representative, W. D. Forsyth, defended multi-racialism as a necessary expedient, and denounced the bid for a target date as totally impractical. Both France and Belgium condemned the idea of a target date and praised the rapid economic, social, and educational progress which the Administering Authority had achieved in such a short time, especially in a territory with so few exploitable resources.<sup>2</sup> The Belgian representative, Pierre Ryckmans, added that "political evolution [is] contingent on economic and social evolution and prudence must be exercised."<sup>3</sup>

In opposition to Britain and her allies, the representative of El Salvador argued that a deadline date would "be an inspiration and an incentive to the people of the territory and serve as an incentive to nationalism."<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, March 11, 1955, pp. 231-233.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 234-237.

<sup>4</sup>U. N. News, March 14, 1955.

Soviet delegate claimed that the Mission Report depicted conditions in the territory as they really were, and was "bold enough to call a spade a spade". In addition, the U.S.S.R. condemned parity as a device aimed at insuring European domination, and multi-racialism as a "poorly disguised form of racist oppression".<sup>1</sup> India and China both supported the accusations of the Soviet Union and El Salvador.<sup>2</sup>

Upon the conclusion of the debate, the Council appointed a special committee comprised of representatives from Australia, Belgium, China, and Haiti to draw up a report making recommendations for the Trusteeship Council on the mission proposals.<sup>3</sup>

The report submitted on March 24 stated that although the Administering Authority had attempted to foster racial cooperation, it was nonetheless necessary to immediately grant Africans more participation on all levels of government. It stressed the necessity of

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, March 11, 1955, pp. 241-242.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 243.

<sup>3</sup>United Nations News, March 14, 1955.

fostering a sense of "territorial consciousness" and recommended the eventual establishment of a common roll vote. It further stated that parity had to be viewed as a "transitional phase" and expressed the hope that:

...the experience gained in the next constitutional stage will point the way towards an early and progressive increase in African nonofficial representation in the Legislative Council and towards the attainment as soon as possible of the Charter objective of self-government or independence.<sup>1</sup>

The report agreed with the Administering Authority on the value of introducing elections in local government bodies as soon as the population of a given area expressed a desire and capacity for them. However, the committee also urged that in the near future elections be introduced for members of the central government.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, the report called for increased opportunities for Africans primarily through civil service reform and increased government aid to the cooperative movement. Finally, the committee recommended the rapid integration of the educational system and an end to further land alienation.<sup>3</sup> While encouraging rapid advancement towards

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<sup>1</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, March 24, 1955, pp. 271-273.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>3</sup>Ranganyika, Land in Transition, pp. 30-34.

independence, they failed to comment upon the mission recommendation concerning a target date.

When the committee's recommendations were voted upon, they were approved by the Trusteeship Council in a three (United States, China, Haiti) to two (Great Britain, Belgium) decision with seven abstentions (Australia, El Salvador, France, India, New Zealand, Syria, U.S.S.R.).<sup>1</sup>

The following year, the Trusteeship Council again considered the question of political development in Tanganyika as a result of persistent urging from the U.S.S.R. and her allies. Although Great Britain tried to postpone further debate, arguing that it would only increase the growing hostilities between the Administering Authority and the international organization, the anti-colonial bloc was insistent upon forcing a confrontation. Nyerere's recent favorable appearances before the Council only served to further their demands for a debate on the question of territorial political development.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The abstentions were primarily based on the fact that the concept of a target date was omitted in the final report.

<sup>2</sup>Bernard T. G. Chidzero, "Tanganyika: Influence of International Trusteeship on Constitutional and Political Development (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1958), pp. 316-327.

When pressed to define the United Kingdom's position on the pace of political evolution, Sir Alan Burns firmly announced that:

It is unthinkable that those responsible for carrying on Her Majesty's Government could, in the discharge of their duties under the Trusteeship System, plot out a timed course of political development for a Trust territory based on nothing more than guesswork.<sup>1</sup>

Nonetheless, on April 9, 1956 the Council adopted a recommendation, sponsored by the Soviet Union, to establish a series of target dates for political, economic social, and educational development "to bring the British-administered U.N. trust territory of Tanganyika to the final goal of self-government or independence!"<sup>2</sup> Voting in favor of the recommendation were Burma, China, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Syria, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. The measure was rejected by the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and Australia.<sup>3</sup>

During this period of tense Trusteeship Council relations, two official publications of the United Nations,

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations Document T/PV. 820, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations News, (No. 16/56), April 12, 1956.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

while praising British economic and educational efforts, nonetheless called for rapid political development along non-racial lines. As such, they indirectly criticized the parity system and contributed to increased hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

In 1957 the ideological conflict reached new heights when the Council, despite the fierce opposition of Britain and her allies, passes a resolution in which it urged the Administering Authority to:

...consider making a statement on the policy it proposes to follow in Tanganyika and should, inter alia, include therein the principle that, in accordance with the principles of the International Trusteeship System, the Territory shall be guided towards self-government or independence and shall become a democratic State in which all inhabitants have equal rights....<sup>2</sup>

When the resolution was approved by the General Assembly on February 26, a storm of protest arose from the conservative faction of the British home government.<sup>3</sup> Sir

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<sup>1</sup>See: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Building for Tomorrow in Tanganyika (New York: U.N. Dept. of Information, 1956); United Nations, Trusteeship Council, "Survey of Political Events and Developments in Tanganyika", (TI/1956/2).

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Resolution Adopted By The General Assembly At Its 661st Plenary Meeting On 26 February 1957 (A/3554).

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Sir Alan Burns, "The Approach of the United Nations to Colonial Questions", United Empire, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (March-April, 1957), 50-54.

Andrew Cohen,<sup>1</sup> who had recently replaced Sir Alan Burns as United Kingdom representative to the Council, denounced the U.N. resolution, arguing that:

...there is much virtue in proceeding step by step, neither too quickly nor too slowly; judging the exact nature of each step in the light of experience of the last one; and consulting the representatives of the people on the Legislative Council at each stage.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the resolution had been inspired by Nyerere's controversial third appearance before the United Nations, and that the legislation made special provision for the 1957 Visiting Mission team to devote special attention to the territory's political development, served to further increase tensions between the British and their critics on the Council.<sup>3</sup>

Another major controversy arose in 1957 with the issuance of the report of that year's Visiting Mission. During its tour, the team conducted over a dozen interviews

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<sup>1</sup>The appointment of the far more moderate Cohen was viewed by many in the home government as the first sign that the Crown was about to make a major concession in its Tanganyika policy. See Hatch to Nicholson, February 3, 1957, FCB papers and Lennox-Boyd to Cohen, April 6, 1957, Lennox-Boyd papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations Document T/PV. 697, p.8.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen to Lennox-Boyd, April 20, 1957, Lennox-Boyd papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

with TANU leaders, and in particular with members of the Executive Committee. In its report the Mission concluded that the Union had formulated, and was capable of executing, a viable plan for the establishment of a moderate, African-controlled state in which the immigrant communities would enjoy equal rights as citizens.<sup>1</sup>

The team noted that members of the Tanganyikan African community expressed serious dissatisfaction with both the parity system and the use of a qualitative franchise in the upcoming territorial elections. Based on numerous interviews, the Mission concluded that the rapid pace of modernization within the trusteeship had "given rise to an upsurge of African nationalism affecting a large segment of the population which tends to become easily impatient and frustrated if political change appears to it to be unduly slow."<sup>2</sup> It therefore suggested that major changes be made in the territory's existing administrative policy to make provision for increased African awareness. The Mission made it clear that significant and stable political advancement would occur only

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<sup>1</sup> Report of the Visiting Mission, 1957, pp. 7-17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 13.



when Africans were granted a greater share of economic control and increased educational opportunities. This, they felt, could only be done if the parity system was terminated, and if the non-African communities were willing to abandon their monopoly of territorial resources.<sup>1</sup>

The Mission also called upon the administration to introduce a system of "broad universal adult franchise with a secret ballot."<sup>2</sup> When the 1957 report was examined by the Trusteeship Council, the anti-colonial forces further demanded that TANU's suggestions concerning the termination of parity and the introduction of universal adult franchise be complied with before the 1958-59 elections. When Sir Andrew Cohen pointed out that such a radical change would necessitate the postponement of elections for at least two years,<sup>3</sup> the Trusteeship Council agreed to accept the government system of franchise for the territory's first electoral experience, but to reserve final judgment until it had examined the findings of the Post Elections Committee.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-56.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 111.

<sup>3</sup>Trusteeship Council Official Records, 21st Session, November 5, 1957, p. 247.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 251.

The Trusteeship Council was also the site of controversy between Britain and her critics concerning the administration's treatment of TANU. In June 1957 the Crown was challenged by the delegates from the U.S.S.R., India, and Syria, all of whom claimed that the ban on Nyerere was an attempt to destroy the nationalist movement and thus keep the territory within the British Empire. In defending the administration, the British Special Representative argued that:

...both the context and tone of his [Nyerere's] speeches and the circumstances in which they were delivered, led the authorities to the conclusion that a perpetuation of his approach was likely to lead to a breach of the peace....<sup>1</sup>

Sir Andrew Cohen later remarked that TANU activities had "introduced an interracial tension which happily had not hitherto existed in Tanganyika's multi-racial society."<sup>2</sup>

In June 1957 the United Kingdom was severely criticized for its position on territorial voting qualifications. The debate began when the Jordanian representative, Mr. Najmuddine Rifai, called for a largely expanded franchise. He noted that the use of the qualitative voting system had

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations News, (No. 25/57), June 17, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Trusteeship Council Records, November 18, 1957, pp. 206-209.

produced great apprehension within the African community. He therefore demanded a clear statement of Britain's plan for qualifications in future elections. A much stronger form of criticism was leveled by U.S.S.R. representative, I. I. Lobanov, who called the parity vote "a ruthless device which radically suppresses 8,000,000 Africans" and "forces them to live behind artificially created barriers".<sup>1</sup>

In response, Sir Andrew Cohen stated that the parity vote was only a temporary measure designed to protect the interests of the immigrant communities who "after all, produce over fifty percent of the revenue on which the development of social and other services depends".<sup>2</sup> He assured the Council that the Crown's ultimate goal was to create a "non-racial rather than a multi-racial society, a society with each man as a man, and in fact a Tanganyikan".<sup>3</sup>

Thus, by 1957 a clear division of opinion had occurred concerning the future of political development in Tanganyika. The emerging nationalist movement, which now

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 211.

enjoyed a broad basis of popular indigenous support, was determined to end the parity system and create a self-governing African controlled state. The nationalists found strong allies among the liberal reformers of the home government and the more radical and polemical anti-colonial forces within the U.N. In opposition to the rapid attainment of independence stood the Colonial Office, the territorial administration and their allies among the territory's white settlers, and the colonial powers on the Trusteeship Council. These more conservative elements insisted upon the preservation of minority group control and advocated a cautious, gradual pace of political development. Clearly, the time was ripe for a major confrontation or a significant compromise of either side's plan for future territorial development.

## CHAPTER V

### THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISE, 1958-59.

#### Territorial Developments

The years 1954-57 had been marked by the development of increasingly strained tensions between the nationalist movement and the administration. The widely differing views offered by both factions concerning the pace and structure of territorial development had resulted in a political deadlock in which neither side was willing to further alter its policies for the sake of compromise and peaceful cooperation. The increased incidents of violence and civil disobedience throughout the territory offered further indication that a major confrontation was imminent. Finally, the situation was clouded by an escalation of tensions between the rival factions within the home government and the Trusteeship Council.

Despite the numerous disagreements and unresolved issues which existed by the end of 1957, within the brief

period of twenty-four months the situation in Tanganyika was to undergo a major transformation which not only removed the primary causes of friction, but also introduced a spirit of cooperation and compromise unique in the British East and Central African dependencies. As a result of this new spirit, within two years TANU was to find itself at the head of a black majority regime, and on the threshold of responsible government.<sup>1</sup> This era of peaceful cooperation was the result of a series of major compromises made by both the British administration and the Tanganyikan African nationalists. The breaking of the deadlock also produced a reduction of tensions in the home

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<sup>1</sup>Responsible government, in political terms, is the intermediate step between colonial administration and independence. A responsible government is one with a majority of elected ministers within a Council of Ministers (which replaces the Executive Council) and a majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. When the Council of Ministers, as the executive branch of government, introduces legislation, it is required to convince the elected majority in the Legislature to support its proposals. Repeated failure to receive such support would necessitate the resignation of the ministers. In other words, the executive branch is "responsible", i.e., answerable to the elected representatives of the people in the Legislative Council. For a detailed study of the various phases of political development which Colonies undergo, see: Robert Strauss-Hupe and Harry W. Hazard, eds., The Idea of Colonialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), passim.

government and the virtual removal of Tanganyika as a topic of debate in the still ideologically divided Trusteeship Council.

Indicative of the shift in British policy were the changes in key administrative personnel which occurred during this period. On July 7, 1958 Sir Richard Turnbull replaced Edward Twining as Governor of Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup> From the outset, the new chief executive reflected a much more liberal attitude toward TANU proposals.<sup>2</sup> While certainly not ideologically affiliated with the Union cause, Turnbull, unlike Twining, was not committed to the preservation of parity and indirect rule.<sup>3</sup> Rather, he recognized that British colonial policy was undergoing a major change and as a result sought only to maintain government supervision

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<sup>1</sup>For a personal summary of the highlights of the Twining administration, see his "The Last Nine Years in Tanganyika" African Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 230 (January, 1959), 15-24.

<sup>2</sup>Turnbull, who had spent all of his Colonial Service career in the Kenya administration, was at first viewed apprehensively by the nationalists. The conservative faction in both the colony and the home government, however, warmly welcomed his arrival. See Sauti ya TANU, No.'s 54 and 55, July 7 and 14, 1958 and East Africa and Rhodesia "E A & R Marked", July-August, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, p. 61. See also the character sketch of Turnbull in The New Commonwealth, January, 1960.

of territorial political evolution, no matter what the speed or structure of this transformation might be.<sup>1</sup> Turnbull neither condemned the nationalists nor allied himself with them. Rather, he dealt with TANU members as individuals and judged them in terms of his obligation to maintain peace, law and order in the trusteeship.<sup>2</sup> Thus, Turnbull on one hand would yield to African demands to accelerate the pace of political development, while at the same time he busily prosecuted and publicly condemned radical dissidents.

The new Governor greatly reduced tensions by publicly stating that he had faith in Nyerere's ability to maintain a moderate and cooperative course of action in his dealings with the administration. Turnbull described the TANU president as "an exceptional man of a type too infrequently produced in any society".<sup>3</sup> Unlike his predecessor, he was willing to meet with TANU delegations and to issue public and prompt responses to Union petitions.<sup>4</sup> Civil

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<sup>1</sup>Turnbull interview.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 9, 1958.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, pp. 61-62.



service personnel noted a marked change in the administration, which now instructed district officers to establish contacts with local Union leaders and to attempt to negotiate compromises on differences of opinion involving minor local issues.<sup>1</sup> One rather liberal administrator remarked that he had "suddenly become persona grata again after being in the wilderness for seven years".<sup>2</sup> Speaking of TANU's reaction to the Turnbull administration, a European member of the Legislative Council noted:

Julius Nyerere is delighted in the appointment and he [Turnbull] is an excellent Governor in every way. Julius Nyerere is a changed man since Turnbull has come and treats him charitably and with mutual respect. They are becoming friends. A great change again from Twining. 'That bloody little s.b. Nyerere' which was the way he always referred to Julius Nyerere.<sup>3</sup>

Another major change in colonial personnel occurred in the home government in October 1959 when General Elections in Great Britain resulted in the replacement of

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<sup>1</sup> This change was noted by administrators C. C. Harris, Eric A. W. Lewis, P. N. Mawhood, Eric George Rowe, J. S. M. Vinter, and R. W. Young, in their personal papers. Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup> Brend papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup> Douglas Heath to Betts, December 15, 1958, Heath papers, Rhodes House.

Lennox-Boyd with Iain Macleod as Secretary of State for the Colonies. Although a member of the Tory party, Macleod's colonial policy was much more liberal than any of his predecessors of that decade. He believed, based on economic reasoning, that Crown territories should be transformed into self-governing members of the Commonwealth as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup> In the case of Tanganyika, Macleod maintained that the moderate philosophy of Nyerere made it possible to initiate far-reaching changes in the political structure.<sup>2</sup> Thus, by 1959 both the Governor and the Secretary of State stood prepared to initiate rapid and far-reaching alterations in the constitution of the trusteeship.

The period 1958-59, however, was by far not devoid of confrontation between the administration and the nationalist movement. The sporadic incidents of civil disobedience and local unrest which had occurred throughout the post-war

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<sup>1</sup>See East Africa and Rhodesia and London Times editorials, October 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Macleod note on "Conditions in the East and Central Africa Dependancies", November, 1959, Macleod files, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford.

period increased in frequency and intensity during these years.<sup>1</sup> Much of the violence stemmed from the fact that radical cell leaders interpreted government concessions as a sign that the colonial regime could no longer maintain control of the territory in the wake of the liberation drive.<sup>2</sup> As a result, acts of disobedience to native authorities as well as violations of official policies increased drastically.<sup>3</sup> Such incidents resulted in the banning of TANU in the Geita district in May 1958, under the familiar claim that local Union leaders were a threat to orderly government.<sup>4</sup> When the disobedience continued, Nyerere used Sauti ya TANU to publicly accuse the local district officers of deliberately

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Colonial No. 342, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration: Report By Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Year 1958 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), para. 91-148; and Col. No. 326, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration. Report By Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Year 1959 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), para. 106-152; Tanganyika, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for the Years 1958 and 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959 and 1960), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Kanbona to Betts, August 28, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 13, pp. 735-740.

<sup>4</sup>Tanganyika Gazette, Order No. 298, 1958.

persecuting the Union.<sup>1</sup> As a result, he was tried for criminal libel and fined ₦150.

During this period the Government and TANU also clashed on the question of local government bodies. The administration felt that a series of regional councils, which operated on the tribal, district, and provincial levels, should be created to train the more isolated elements of the indigenous population in modern political participation. Ultimately, the councils were to serve as a training device to prepare Africans for participation in territorial decision making. In accordance with the recommendations of the Mackenzie Report, the administration attempted to make the local councils multi-racial in composition wherever the ethnic distribution of population made such a scheme feasible. The councils were supposed to be initiated by local residents. However, by 1958 with the first territorial elections pending, the government rapidly increased its efforts to encourage leaders to introduce such rural bodies.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 37, July, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Speech by His Excellency the Governor at the Opening of the Fourth Meeting of the Thirty-Third Session of the Tanganyika Legislative Council on 6th May, 1958 (Dar es Salaam: The Government House, 1958),

TANU adamantly opposed the government scheme, charging it was an administrative tactic aimed at diverting indigenous attention away from the nationalist drive. The Union further claimed that the stress on multi-racial councils was an attempt to indoctrinate the unsophisticated elements of the Tanganyikan African population with the system of parity which TANU so violently opposed.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the nationalists charged that the government was applying pressure on its administrators to speed the creation of local representative bodies.<sup>2</sup>

The issue came to a head in October 1958, when Governor Turnbull addressed the Legislative Council and defended administrative policy from recent Union accusations:

District Councils are a form of local government; they are not a projection of Central Government. If they are to be successful in training local people to accept important local responsibilities they must have the full confidence

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pp. 2-4; Tanganyika, Ministry of Local Government and Administration, The Development of Local Government in Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), passim.

<sup>1</sup>TANU opposition to multi-racial local councils dated back to the publication of the Union's election demands in 1956.

<sup>2</sup>TANU handout, "The Elections and Your Vote", 1958.

and support of the population in the district. If that confidence and support is lacking, then it would be better not to introduce any modern form of local government machinery. I am sure that it is desirable for local people to accustom themselves to the exercise of administrative and financial responsibility in local matters but there can be no question of compelling them to do so. So let me repeat that neither District Councils nor any other new local government bodies will be established in any areas unless it is the general wish of the local people that this should be done.<sup>1</sup>

The following day the Governor publicly stated that he deeply resented the widespread false accusations originating from TANU which charged that he encouraged the rapid introduction of local multi-racial councils to lure Africans away from the Union cause.<sup>2</sup>

When it became clear that local level TANU leaders were determined to gain seats on any councils that might be established and thus use the representative bodies as a means of spreading the Union message,<sup>3</sup> the government loudly protested. The administration argued that the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard), Thirty-Fourth Session, Second Volume (October 15, 1958), pp. 126-127.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 16, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>This plan was outlined by Mtemvu in his correspondence with Kandoro, May 6-November 23, 1958, Mtemvu files, Tanganyika political papers, Rhodes House.

purpose of the councils was to educate Africans in modern political activities by allowing them to participate in deliberation that involved local, familiar issues. As such, they were not designed as a platform for the airing of controversial territorial political issues. The Governor made this point clear in a speech to the Wanyakyuse of Southern Province upon the opening of their district council:

Take care...that the good name of your Council is not spoiled by too much participation in political affairs....The Council depends upon the help of each of you and upon cooperation with the Government. Political affairs do not concern the Native Authorities at the level of local government. The task of your local governments is to improve the lot of the people and increase the wealth of your country....

...Africans who wish to enter territorial politics should first widen their knowledge by playing a part in local government. They must show beyond doubt that they are worthy of the trust of their fellows and that they can put the needs of others before their own interests.<sup>1</sup>

Despite unrest resulting from the illegal activities of radical TANU cell leaders and Union suspicion concerning the creation of local councils, relations between the administration and the nationalists improved markedly in 1958

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<sup>1</sup>Turnbull speech (in Kiswahili), November 18, 1958, Rhodes House.

and 1959. This was primarily due to major alterations in official policy which both increased the pace of development towards self-rule and at the same time resolved many of the controversies which in the past had been sources of nationalist discontent.

The first major breakthrough occurred in June 1958 when the Legislative Council released the results of its recent investigation of territorial land tenure policies, inspired by the observations of the East African Royal Commission.<sup>1</sup> The report, endorsed by Governor Twining, strongly discouraged future land alienation. It also recognized the necessity of major reforms in the land tenure system, if large numbers of Tanganyikan Africans were to raise their standards of living through participation in the agricultural sector of the economy. While acknowledging that any changes in the system of tenure would have to be the result of tribal initiative, it nonetheless recommended the allocation of substantial funds to

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<sup>1</sup>The Royal Commission report noted the poor soil quality of Tanganyika and concluded that most of the territory's land could not readily support commercial agriculture. It also noted a tendency to concentrate the more valuable, exploitable lands in the hands of Europeans. See Royal Commission Report, Chapter 2.



achieve this goal wherever the indigenous desire for policy alteration existed.<sup>1</sup>

In order to encourage individual African farmers to enter the cash economy, the administration instructed the African Loan and Investment Division of the Department of Commerce and Industry to give priority to long-term, small capital investments.<sup>2</sup> Thus, small scale African farmers could more readily obtain government funds to invest in modern agricultural equipment. The new policy was praised by both TANU and the cooperative movement as a major step in the right direction.<sup>3</sup>

In June 1958, another major concession was made by the administration when Governor Twining ordered the restrictions on TANU activities in Lushoto and Korogwe districts eased. While retaining the ban on public rallies

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Government Paper No. 6-1958; Review of Land Tenure Policy-Part I (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958), passim.

<sup>2</sup>In the past, the bulk of the money loaned had been allocated to large scale African commercial efforts. See: Tanganyika Local Development and African Productivity Loan Funds: Report and Accounts for 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960), pp. 1-5.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere speech at Dar es Salaam Municipal Auditorium, August 28, 1959, TANU files, Rhodes House; Bomani to Nicholson, November 3, 1959, FCB papers.

and the operations of the militant Youth League, he did permit the Union to distribute literature and to conduct "moderate" campaigning for the upcoming elections. The government made it clear that the ease on restrictions was a test case and that future administrative decisions concerning TANU's activities in this region would very much depend on the manner in which the nationalists reacted to the official decision.<sup>1</sup>

During the period 1958-59, the government also initiated a series of far reaching changes in territorial policy, all of which resulted in a closer spirit of co-operation between the administration and the nationalists and, at the same time, brought the country to the threshold of responsible government.

Primary among these alterations was the conduction of the first territorial elections, which were divided into two phases, each involving five voting districts.<sup>2</sup> Registration of voters for all ten constituencies was officially

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<sup>1</sup>Twining memo to district commissioners, officers-in-charge-of-police, and administrative personnel, Lushoto and Korogwe districts, June 20, 1958, Rhodes House. See also Nyerere to Kandoro, July 9, 1958, Nyerere files, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

opened by the Governor on August 3, 1957.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the 1956 Government suggestions, the elections were based on the previously endorsed limited franchise and a common roll. One candidate of each race was to be elected, as an unofficial member of the Legislative Council, from each of the ten electoral districts. Constituencies consisted of a province, or part of a province, and every voter was required to indicate a preference for one and only one candidate from each racial group.<sup>2</sup>

During the first month of registration a total of only 665 voters were placed on the rolls within the entire territory.<sup>3</sup> This was due primarily to TANU's refusal, up to that point, to participate in the elections because of the use of the restrictive franchise and the tri-racial ballot.<sup>4</sup> On October 5, the Government officially announced that the first phase of the election would take place on

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Gazette, August 7, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

<sup>3</sup>G. W. Y. Hucks, "Legislative Council Elections - 1958" Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 54 (March 1960), 41. Hucks was the official clerk to the Legislative Council and served as 1958-59 Elections Officer.

<sup>4</sup>Governor to Hucks, September 8, 1957, Hucks papers, Rhodes House.

September 8, 1958. In addition, the deadline for voter registration in the first five constituencies was set for December 31, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

Since TANU continued to object to both voting qualifications and the electoral procedures, by October 31 a total of only 8,305 individuals had registered.<sup>2</sup> When the Union finally agreed, despite serious reservations, to participate in the contest voter recruitment improved substantially. By December 31, when registration closed for the first half of the elections, a total of 36,874 voters was tabulated, 28,526 of whom were from the first five constituencies.<sup>3</sup>

On August 20, 1958, the recently appointed Governor Turnbull announced that the date for the second phase of the elections would be advanced from September 1959 to February 9 of the same year.<sup>4</sup> Turnbull stated that the change was initiated to afford the Post Elections Committee

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 5, 1957.

<sup>2</sup>Hucks, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup>Hucks to Members of the Legislative Council, January 28, 1958, Hucks papers.

<sup>4</sup>Tanganyika, Governor's Speech to Legislative Council, April 30, 1957, passim.

the opportunity to more quickly release its proposals for the next phase of constitutional advancement.<sup>1</sup> By the closing date for the second phase elections a total of 30,791 voters had registered in the five remaining constituencies.<sup>2</sup>

With a franchise that was restricted by income, educational, and employment qualifications, less than one percent (50,317) of the territorial population registered for the trusteeship's first electoral experiment. Although voter rolls did not indicate race, an examination of names and occupations, coupled with an examination of population breakdown in each constituency, leads to the conclusion that African registration was larger than that of the two minority communities combined in every constituency except Dar es Salaam.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the rolls indicate that the vast majority of African voters belonged to the Westernized or semi-Westernized segment of indigenous society, where

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, August 21, 22, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Hucks, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup>This conclusion is substantiated by Lowenkopf, pp. 163-69 and in: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, "Tanganyika Election, 1958-59" (paper prepared for a symposium on Political Institutions in the Commonwealth; June, 1959), pp. 2-5.

they served as native authorities, minor civil servants, or professionals.<sup>1</sup>

Although the administration had instructed its district officers to encourage registration,<sup>2</sup> there were repeated complaints concerning the laxity of potential voters. Registration officers reported that many Asian and European residents considered participation pointless because of the numerical superiority of the Tanganyikan African population.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, many Africans failed to register, especially for the second phase elections, because of the lack of contested seats in their constituency.<sup>4</sup>

Once the registration period was terminated the government attempted to clarify the significance of, and mechanics involved in, the actual voting procedure to novice African constituents. The administration therefore ordered all district officers to demonstrate correct voting techniques

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 15, p. 746, which contains a statistical breakdown of the voter registration in one district.

<sup>2</sup>Twining memo to all Provincial and District Commissioners, October 23, 1957, Tanganyika Territorial administrative papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>District and Provincial Books, 1958-59 (microfilm) Rhodes House.

<sup>4</sup>Karbona to Creech-Jones, October 18, 1959, Creech-Jones papers.

in the weeks before each election day.<sup>1</sup> In addition, a number of official government publications were distributed which explained the entire electoral process to registrants.<sup>2</sup> Finally, sample ballots containing fictitious candidates, parties, and symbols were widely utilized as training techniques.<sup>3</sup> Despite government efforts to explain the electoral process, the official Elections Officer noted that reports from district administrators indicated widespread confusion concerning all aspects of the upcoming contests.<sup>4</sup>

The period of nomination was officially opened on July 8, 1958, with potential candidates required to meet the qualifications approved by the Legislative Council in 1956.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Legislative Council Elections: Notes for the Guidance of Returning Officers (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958).

<sup>2</sup>See for example, the widely distributed government leaflet, "How to Vote at the General Elections for the Legislative Council. Your Vote is Secret!", released in August, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Hucks to Turnbull, August 21, 1958, Hucks papers.

<sup>4</sup>Elections Officer Hucks listed the following questions as those most asked by potential voters: "What happens if we do not vote at all?", "Who will pay our fares to travel to Dar es Salaam?", "Why was not the name of the headman included on the ballot paper, if a new Government was to be selected?", "Was this to be a new Government for all time?". Hucks papers.

<sup>5</sup>See pp. 322-326.

For the first phase elections, a total of 44 candidates (22 Asian, 14 African, 8 European) were nominated to contest for 15 open seats.<sup>1</sup> Notably, a candidate did not have to be a resident of the constituency in which he appeared on the ballot. Contenders who wished to withdraw were free to do so, without forfeiture of their campaign deposit fee, up to twenty-four days before the election. By the first phase elections, 5 of the original 44 contenders had withdrawn and 3 stood unopposed. Thus, in reality, 36 individuals were left to compete for 12 vacancies.<sup>2</sup> The results of the first election, which took some three weeks to officially record, revealed that TANU candidates, and Asians and Europeans endorsed by TANU, had captured all 15 open seats.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of the sweeping Union victory, only three contenders came forward to challenge the nationalist party during the second phase of the elections. Thus, three of the five constituencies returned all of their

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 9, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Gazette, September 29, 1958.



candidates unopposed, and only in Dar es Salaam and Southern Province were elections held at all. Consequently, only 12,041 of the over 30,000 registered voters actually participated in these contests.<sup>1</sup> Once again, TANU and her approved non-African candidates captured all 15 seats.<sup>2</sup>

When it became clear that TANU and her supporters in the minority communities were soon to sweep the elections, the Governor, upon consultation with the new Secretary of State, decided to announce additional constitutional changes, all of which were significant concessions to nationalist demands. The gravity of these rapid concessions made it clear that the Crown was now aware of the strength of the nationalist movement and, in light of the recent modification in Colonial Office policy, was indeed prepared to comply with virtually all of TANU's political demands.<sup>3</sup>

The first major policy statement came in the week following the release of the first phase election results.

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<sup>1</sup>Hucks, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Gazette, February 27, 1959.

<sup>3</sup>Turnbull interview.

In an address before the legislature, Governor Turnbull made an announcement long awaited by TANU. The Chief Executive clearly acknowledged that the parity system was only a temporary measure, and that the Crown recognized and accepted the inevitability of an African controlled government:

In terms of population the Africans are, and always will be, an overwhelming majority in Tanganyika and as the country progresses it is right and proper, as indeed it is natural and inevitable, that African participation both in the Legislature and in the Executive should steadily increase. It is not intended, and never has been intended, that parity should be a permanent feature of the Tanganyika scene. On the other hand, it is intended, and always has been intended, that the fact that when self-government is eventually attained both the Legislature and the Government are likely to be predominantly African should in no way affect the security of the rights and interests of those minority communities who have made their homes in Tanganyika. I am glad to note that the responsible leaders of major political parties in the territory are in complete agreement on this important matter and that there is, therefore, a good prospect that in due course there will exist in Tanganyika a Government in which Her Majesty's Government will be able to devolve their trust as being a Government under which responsible people of all races would feel secure.

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<sup>1</sup> Tanganyika, Speech By His Excellency the Governor Before the Legislative Council, October 14, 1958 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 2.

The announcement once again affirmed the Administering Authority's intention to concede to the nationalist organization's insistence upon the creation of an African-dominated government. It was during this presentation that the Governor also announced the advancement of the date for the second phase of territorial elections, so that the Post Elections Committee could more quickly begin to discuss plans for the next phase of constitutional development.

On March 7, 1959, following the publication of the second phase election results, the Governor announced the administration's intention to allow unofficial members to serve as ministers for the first time. In order to facilitate this change, the total number of ministers would be increased from nine to twelve, of whom five were to be selected from among the elected representatives on the Council. Turnbull further announced that the new ministers would include three Africans, one Asian, and one European member. Finally, it was determined that the existing Executive Council, which was in effect rendered inoperative by the Council of Ministers, would continue to function for the life of the existing legislature. As such, it would serve as an advisory body to both the ministers

and the Governor. Any recommendations of the Executive Council, however, would have to be approved by the ministerial body.<sup>1</sup>

When the fiscal year began on July 1, 1959, the new Council of Ministers was sworn in. The twelve man body was composed of ten ministers with specially designated portfolios, the Attorney-General, and the Chief Secretary, who served as both the Chairman and the representative of the Governor.<sup>2</sup> The three African unofficials<sup>3</sup> filled the posts of Minister of Health, Minister of Social and Co-Operative Development, and Minister for Lands and Survey. The Asian representative, A. H. Jamal, was appointed Minister for Urban Local Government and Works, while the European,

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Address By His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on the 17th March, 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), pp. 2-4.

<sup>2</sup>The ten ministerial posts were: Finance, Security and Immigration, Education and Labour, Health, Lands and Surveys, Natural Resources, Mines and Commerce, Provincial Affairs, Social and Co-operative Development, Urban Local Government and Works. For a detailed study of the function of each of these posts, see: John Sidney Richard Cole and W. N. Denison, Tanganyika: the Development of its Laws and Constitution, Vol. 12: The British Commonwealth, the Development of its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens, Inc., 1964), pp. 42-54.

<sup>3</sup>S. N. Eliufoo, C. G. Kahama, and Chief Abdullah Fundikira.

D. N. M. Bryceson, assumed the post of Minister of Mines and Commerce.<sup>1</sup>

An unusual aspect of the ministerial appointments serves to illustrate the growing spirit of cooperation between the administration and the nationalists. As ministers, the five designated members served on the Government side of the floor. Yet, as elected members they had the right to oppose Government policy. In order to make allowance for such opposition, a special "gentleman's agreement" was devised which permitted the ministers to temporarily resign their positions upon issuance of a forty hour advance warning to the administration. They would then return to the unofficial side of the floor and temporary replacements would be nominated by the Government to fill the vacant posts. Once the issue at stake was voted upon, the elected ministers would once again resume their posts on the Government side.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Being the Addresses of His Excellency Sir Gordon Richard Turnbull K.C.M.C., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Tanganyika at the Swearing in of Ministers, on their Taking Office in 1959, 1960, and 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>Turnbull interview; Nyerere to Kambona, July 29, 1959, FCB papers.

During his March 17 address the Governor also announced that the Post Elections Committee, suggested by Governor Twining in 1957, would soon be activated. In May 1959 the members of the fifteen man body were announced. Headed by Sir Richard Ramage, the panel was composed entirely of Legislative Council members, eight of whom were elected representatives (four African, two Asian, two European).<sup>1</sup> Of key importance among the Ramage Committee's terms of reference were the following assignments:

Having regard to the fact that it is not intended that parity of representation in the Legislative Council should be a permanent feature of the Tanganyika constitution, and bearing in mind the need for adequate representation of the main minority communities and the desirability of keeping the total number of elected members to a figure not greatly in excess of the present total of representative members; to recommend what, if any changes should be made in the existing provisions for representation by elected members in the Legislative Council, what if any changes should be made in the present number of constituencies and in their boundaries, and what, if any, changes should be made in the present system of tripartite voting....

To recommend whether, within the general principle of a qualitative franchise any change in the present qualifications for candidates and voters would be desirable; and, if so, what those changes should be.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Report of the Post Elections Committee, 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 21.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

In addition to its task of finding a possible substitute for the parity system and formulating new voter and candidate qualifications, the committee was also instructed to make recommendations concerning the maintenance of nominated Legislative Council seats for members representing special interests. Finally, it was required to evaluate a government proposal to create a Territorial Council which would represent the chiefs and allow them to serve as an advisory group to study all proposed territorial legislation.<sup>1</sup>

The Ramage Committee traveled to each district in the territory, where it interviewed individual residents and representatives of various organizations to determine the population's views on future constitutional advancement. Notices explaining the purpose of the Committee and outlining its itinerary were placed in district administrative posts, local and territorial newspapers, and in the official Gazette. By mid-August, the group had traveled over 4,600 miles, held 28 committee meetings, and interviewed 82 individuals or delegations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

When the report of the Committee was released to the Legislative Council on September 18,<sup>1</sup> it contained plans for wide-sweeping alterations in the territorial political system, all of which were clearly complimentary to the goals of the nationalist movement.

Most significantly, the report called for the abolition of both parity representation and the tripartite vote. In their place, it suggested the creation of 29 constituencies, each of which contained one "open seat".<sup>2</sup> The report also called for the creation of 16 reserved seats to be equally shared by the Asian<sup>3</sup> and European communities. In constituencies with reserved seats, each voter was to have as many votes as there were seats, but could only give one vote to one candidate in each open or reserved seat.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Legislative Council, Government Paper No. 4-1959 Post Elections Committee: Exchange of Despatches (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>The term "open" was used in place of "African".

<sup>3</sup>The term "Asian" was now to include the Arab community for purposes of representation.

<sup>4</sup>Report of the Post Elections Committee, pp. 4-10.



In terms of voter requirements, the Committee called for the continuance of a twenty-one year minimum age qualification. While preserving the three out of five year territorial residency stipulation, the report recommended that citizens also be required to be residents of the constituency in which they wished to register. Special voting qualifications were also recommended for each sex. The Post Elections Committee suggested that males be required to hold a receipt for the payment of Personal Tax for the year preceding registration. Women would either have to prove ownership of a house or homestead, pay any form of direct tax, hold any business license for which a fee was required, be literate enough to apply for registration without assistance, or be the holders of a public office. Coupled with these qualifications was the recommendation that the existing income and educational requirements be repealed.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to candidate qualifications for the Legislative Council, the Report recommended that the territorial residency requirement be set at three out of five years preceding nomination. It further suggested

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-14.

that the literacy requirement be limited to the ability to follow a debate in English and that the Chief Speaker be designated as the sole judge of this ability. The number of signatures needed to be nominated was set at 35. In the case of reserved Asian or European seats, 25 of these would have to be from members of one's own race. Voters would be allowed to only sign one nomination paper for each seat in their constituency. Finally, the Committee suggested that the remainder of the existing candidate qualifications be preserved intact.<sup>1</sup>

The report completely rejected the concept of nominating members to represent special interest groups.<sup>2</sup> Finally, it disapproved of the administration's plan for a Territorial Council. In its place, the Post Elections Committee recommended preservation of the existing Convention of Chiefs which, it felt, should be granted statutory recognition through local legislation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-17. The other qualifications were: 25 years of age; be a registered voter; be willing to take an Oath of Allegiance; not be disqualified for legal or psychological reasons; be willing to provide a Shs.500 deposit; and satisfy one of the following qualifications: be a former member of the Legislative Council; have an annual income of Shs.4,000; or be a graduate of Standard XII.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-11.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-19.

Going beyond its terms of reference, the Committee suggested that when an elected majority was initiated in the legislature, 50 constituencies should be established to elect 71 members. Of these, 50 would be open, while 11 would be reserved for Asians and 10 for Europeans.<sup>1</sup>

The proposals of the Ramage team were formally endorsed by the Legislative Council on September 18, 1959. After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Governor addressed the territorial legislature on December 15 and announced the acceptance of virtually all of the Post Elections Committee's suggestions.<sup>2</sup> In order to speedily initiate the alterations, Turnbull revealed that a general election would be held in September 1960 to create an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council. The contest was to be based on the plan for racial composition suggested by the Ramage team.<sup>3</sup> Although the Council

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council Exchange of Despatches, pp. 2-6.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika, Address By His Excellency the Governor to the Legislative Council on the 15th December 1959 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1959), pp. 1-2. See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

would not automatically contain nominated seats, the Governor did reserve the right to appoint a small number of members to the body who possessed "specialized knowledge and experience" and could therefore be of service in the consideration of particular, highly specialized matters.<sup>1</sup> Most significantly, Turnbull announced that the recently established Council of Ministers would be re-organized to give numerical superiority to non-officials.<sup>2</sup> This alteration, in effect, promised TANU what it had so long fought for-- responsible government.

The Crown endorsed the alteration of the franchise qualifications suggested by the Ramage report to create an even larger electorate. While agreeing to the age and residency requirements, the administration decided that the only additional qualification would be satisfaction of one of the following: ability to read or write English or Kiswahili; possession of an annual income of £75 or more; being the holder of a past or present post in the government. The plan to distinguish between male and female

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Public Relations Department, "Tanganyika to Have Elected Majority in Council of Ministers and Legislature", Release E/80/59 ++ 5/48 (December 15, 1959), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Address by Governor 15th December 1959, p. 1.

voter qualifications was rejected. At the same time, it was announced that all persons who had been registered in the first territorial election would automatically be included on the new electoral rolls.<sup>1</sup> The Colonial Office completely accepted the Post Elections Committee's suggestions for candidate qualifications and agreed to abandon its plan for the creation of a Territorial Council.<sup>2</sup> By this last concession, the Crown even further reduced the role that the chiefs, who for so long had been proclaimed the representatives of indigenous interests, would play in the new government.

Thus, in eighteen months, the administration had produced radical alterations in territorial policy and had satisfied most of the major demands of the nationalists. The parity system and tripartite vote were terminated. Indirect rule would de facto collapse with the control of the government by an elected majority. Responsible government would commence with the introduction of an unofficial

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-6. The abandonment of the Council was viewed by liberals as an official recognition that the system of indirect rule was now inoperable. See Creech-Jones to Hatch, January 2, 1960, Creech-Jones papers.

majority in the Council of Ministers. Most significantly, government by civil servants was terminated and rule by the representatives of the African population was soon to begin. The colonial phase of Tanganyikan history was drawing to an end.

The Minority Communities: The Termination of Political Imbalance

As the first territorial elections approached, both the European and Asian communities found themselves without significant popular support among the electorate.

Most members of the immigrant communities chose to avoid political participation, reasoning that they could little effect the course of territorial development because of their small numbers. Many Europeans and Asians claimed that active campaigning would only further alienate them from the nationalists and thus produce unfavorable repercussions when Africans came to power.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of their unwillingness to actively engage in territorial politics, the bulk of the European community continued to express its distrust in the ability.

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<sup>1</sup> Election Officer Hucks reported this widespread attitude in a memo to the Governor on August 28, 1958, Hucks papers. See also letters to the editor in the Tanganyika Standard, August 1958 and January, 1959.

of Africans to lead a viable self-government. The ever increasing incidents of civil disobedience further contributed to the fear with which many whites anticipated a black-dominated administration.

Typical European apprehensions concerning TANU's leadership ability are reflected in the following commentary of a white farmer in Tanga:

Nyerere seems something of a bright lad, but he lacks the grip to run TANU properly; and his control is obviously very loose indeed, and his staff all over the country is involved in pinching the office cash etc.; stirring up people against the chiefs and local government authorities. Nyerere ought to go and get a minor job with the Chagga coffee growers in KNCC as there he would learn something about the practical work of running a large organisation.<sup>1</sup>

Another skeptical white offered the following analysis of African politicians and their liberal allies:

...both Nyerere and Mboya tend to a black policy especially at their own meetings; they are more moderate in Legco and public. Such activities are not surprising but they do show a lack of political flair; the first reaction of both Nyerere and Mboya seems to be 'go on strike' as soon as they don't get all their own way. The Asians of 20 years ago adopted such a policy, but have learned something more

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<sup>1</sup>H. Beer to Selwyn-Clarke, January 14, 1958, FCB papers.

since then. The brighter Africans ought to have noticed this and avoided making the same sort of mistake again...I fear that they learn all this going on strike business from UK leftists. The New Statesman and the Socialist Commentary are both quite unfair in their comments re black and white in East and Central Africa [sic]. They seem to take it as axiomatic the the [sic] white man is ALWAYS in the wrong, and the black man ALWAYS in the right....The African point of view should not be adopted...simply BECAUSE it is an expressed African opinion. Africans are just as liable to make mistakes as white men; though many leftists do not seem to think this....<sup>1</sup>

The only organized party representing white settler opinion, the UTP, was devastated in the territorial elections. Despite its claim to be multi racial, the party ran only European candidates in the 1958-59 contests.<sup>2</sup> So decisive was the defeat suffered by the party that by December 1958, it ceased to have any significant function within the territory.<sup>3</sup>

In the early phases of the campaign, before TANU agreed to participate, the UTP campaigned vigorously, hoping to take advantage of the Union's inactivity and

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<sup>1</sup>Unaddressed letter dated April 3, 1959, in the papers of Eric A. W. Lewis, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

<sup>3</sup>Great Britain Report to the United Nations on Tanganyika, 1958, p. 36..



thus capture all of the available seats in the absence of any effective competition.<sup>1</sup> At this point the party supported the voting arrangements and plans for territorial development which had been endorsed by the Twining administration. Thus, the UTP supported parity, the triple vote, reservation of Legislative Council seats, preservation of an official majority, and the concept of a Territorial Council of Chiefs.<sup>2</sup> However, with the termination of the TANU boycott, the UTP, realizing that its position was far too conservative to capture the vital African vote, radically altered its campaign platform.<sup>3</sup> Key among its position reversals was its condemnation of mandatory parity, and its suggestion that the tripartite vote "be made optional since it has little support among the public".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See "Experiment Misfired", The Economist, May 11, 1957, p. 486. See also Hatch to Betts, June 6, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>"UTP Election Manifesto", a leaflet circulated by the party from June to August, 1958, UTP files, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Fletcher-Cooke to UTP headquarters, Dar es Salaam, August 23, 1958. The papers to Sir John Fletcher-Cooke, M.L.C. and co-founder of the UTP are found in Rhodes House.

<sup>4</sup>Speech by Fletcher-Cooke, September 2, 1958, Fletcher-Cooke papers.

Despite the UTP's policy modifications it failed to gain wide popularity among even the European community. The one truly valuable source of UTP support, the person of Governor Twining, (who had inspired the founding of the party) terminated with the arrival of Sir Richard Turnbull in July 1958.<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, those members of the European community who received TANU approval rose to political prominence in the period 1958-59. Although TANU did seek European allies with liberal ideals, the Union placed its primary emphasis on selecting candidates who would decidedly defeat their UTP opponents as part of the nationalist plan to completely undermine the white party.<sup>2</sup> Notably, whites who were nominated to compete with UTP candidates came from a variety of national backgrounds while the UTP members were all of British origin.<sup>3</sup> European candidates designated as "TANU approved" all made great efforts to associate themselves, at least by inference, with the nationalist movement.

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<sup>1</sup>Bates, "European Politics", pp. 14-17.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Betts, August 28, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>TANU-supported white candidates included one Greek, one Swede, two Americans, and two Swiss.

The election manifesto of one such contender serves as an example of such tactics:

I am not a member of any existing political party as I believe in non-racial secular politics. I believe in the rightness and justness of the general policies of T.A.N.U. and the Asian community, but I preserve my integrity as an independent to differ on detail should occasion arise.

I believe the immediate step should be the establishment of responsible government, and I shall then, through the concept of a Tanganyika nationhood made up of all the people who live here, work for self-government.

We must set aside doubt. What this country needs is the confidence of certitude. The people are bedevilled by suspicion of Britain's sincerity. I know that sincerity is there, but it must be made apparent by a quickened tempo of political progress calming fear and bringing conditions of stability in which we can go forward together in mutual confidence.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of TANU's endorsement of white candidates in each constituency, UTP members soon found that their campaigns had little hope of succeeding. Several contenders consequently withdrew from the race shortly before election day, on the grounds of "personal or medical reasons".<sup>2</sup> When the election results were tabulated, independent whites who received TANU approval defeated their

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<sup>1</sup>Douglas Heath, "My Manifesto", a campaign leaflet distributed by the candidate in August 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Heath to Betts, December 15, 1958, FCB papers.

UTP opponents in every constituency in which the European seat was contested.<sup>1</sup>

The only other form of white political activity was that of the Capricorn Society. David Sterling, the president of the organization, made repeated attempts to persuade independent Europeans to endorse the Capricorn plan for a highly qualitative, non-racial franchise, which would obviate the necessity of parity. Capricornists argued that such a system would avoid racial tensions and yet ensure a stable government by being highly selective in the formation of an electorate.<sup>2</sup> The Society's position on future constitutional advances was summarized by Sterling prior to the first phase elections:

The present disturbances in Africa should not divert the British Government from its resolve to grant self-government to all territories there. Indeed it should reaffirm this intention, which politicians and officials are too apt to gloss over in silence, thereby adding grist to the mill of the African racialists. The British Government must also make plain that it is determined to create conditions in which the African territories will become not liberated ex-colonies but genuine nations. The crux of this is that the individual must be safe-guarded against

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

<sup>2</sup>David Sterling, "Nationalism is not Enough", a Capricorn election handout, September, 1958.

arbitrary rule. Here the British Government, as well as the Europeans in Africa, have failed to see the problem clearly. Hitherto Colonial Secretaries have usually spoken of the need to protect minority races after independence. We in the Capricorn Africa Society hold this to be quite impossible, for any constitutional device designed to protect minorities would then become an intolerable provocation. The European or Asian will become safe as an individual or not at all. If self-government comes to territories in which there is no basis of common citizenship, then there is no hope of unity, whether among Africans themselves or between the racial groups....

In establishing a common roll we would open the way to a common citizenship and therewith the stability needed to realise the other vital conditions of national independence; administrative and economic viability. Because of the educational backwardness of the African, the administration must continue to depend for some time partly on the recruitment of a Civil Service overseas. At the same time, the non-African civil servants must be willing to serve. Clearly a period of confident partnership between European subordinates and African Ministers, and vice versa, must precede independence if it is also to follow it.<sup>1</sup>

Because the Capricorn plan varied so radically with African aspirations, it was virtually impossible to find European candidates willing to endorse the Society's manifesto.<sup>2</sup> The one European contender who publicly acknowledged his affiliation with the Capricornists was decisively

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<sup>1</sup>David Sterling, "Self-Government in Africa: Common Citizenship the Way". A speech delivered by the Capricorn president in Dar es Salaam on September 5, 1958, Capricorn papers.

<sup>2</sup>Sterling to H. Beer, August 26, 1958, Capricorn papers.

defeated in his election attempt.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the second phase contests the organization, for all practical purposes, ceased to function within the trusteeship.<sup>2</sup>

As a whole, the Asian community of Tanganyika, because of its religious and cultural divisions, continued to avoid participation in territorial politics. However, the more progressive elements of the immigrant race did follow the leadership of the Asian Association which served as the chief spokesman for the middle strata community.

From the outset, the Association closely allied itself with TANU plans for constitutional development. Its three principal leaders, Amir H. Jamal, S. Mustafa, and M. N. Rattansey, all campaigned for the Union. In return, they received TANU endorsement and enjoyed a wide margin of victory in their constituencies. Of the ten Asians elected to office in the 1958-59 contests only two, who ran as independents, were not affiliated with the Asian Association.<sup>3</sup> During the campaign, the organization

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<sup>1</sup>Mr. W. D. Lead of Tanga Province.

<sup>2</sup>Heath to Betts, March 2, 1959, Heath papers.

<sup>3</sup>Jamal to Betts, March 11, 1959, FCB papers.

published an election manifesto with the sub-title "Shed the Fear of the Masses", which clearly reflected close adherence to TANU philosophy:

Although at present racial in membership, this Association believes in non-racial secular politics and will work hand in hand in the struggle for democracy with other organizations similarly minded and will strive to remove fear and suspicion from the mind of the African so that he feels strong, and happy to support non-racial secular politics....

...In a country where 98% of the population is indigenous the exclusion of large numbers of people from the voting right will create a reaction in them and lead to racialism, not to Tanganyika nationhood....

...We believe that the compulsion to cast three votes, one for the candidate of each race is an interference with the democratic right of a voter and should be removed....

...In trade, commerce, industry and agriculture, the non-African Tanganyikans have a special duty towards the Africans. Their higher education, experience and know-how must be available to the African so that the apparent disparity does not become an object of grievance with the Africans. All their efforts should be devoted to the benefit of the country as a whole and with it, the advancement of the African....<sup>1</sup>

The two Asians not affiliated with the Association who did succeed in capturing a Council seat both developed campaign platforms which reflected their adherence to TANU demands and hence received Union support.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Asian Association Election Manifesto", a leaflet distributed in 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Rattansey to Kambona, October 30, 1958, FCB papers.

Asian candidates who ran without TANU endorsement all assumed moderate positions in an attempt to develop a balance between the political beliefs of the Union and those of the UTP.<sup>1</sup> No such candidate, however, made a successful bid for election.

The ability of the nationalists to effect the campaigns of minority candidates is evidenced by events in the Western Province, where only the Asian seat was contested. When the six independent contenders originally nominated failed to meet Union approval, the Asian Association and TANU conferred and decided to nominate Rattansey for the seat. Although the Dar es Salaam lawyer was largely unknown in the region, he easily won election as a result of TANU's endorsement.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, by 1959 neither minority community was in a position of political prominence within the trusteeship. The existence of a limited, but nonetheless overwhelmingly larger African electorate reduced the immigrant races to positions of minor importance within the political structure.

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<sup>1</sup>See for example, S. M. Patel's "Manifesto" (in Kiswahili), which was widely distributed in 1958. Tanganyika political files, Northwestern University.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere-Rattansey correspondence, August 6-14, 1958, TANU political files, Tanzanian National Archives.



It was now clear that success as a minority candidate was primarily dependent upon the contender's ability to win the support of the nationalists. Political control by non-Africans was now an historical recollection.

The Nationalist Movement: Protest and Victory

The period 1958-59 was marked by the peaceful achievement of basically all of TANU's demands for territorial political reform. As a result of the numerous compromises initiated by the Crown, the Union stood prepared to assume control of a government based on African majority control of the legislature. The success of TANU in these years caused the Union's ranks to swell as an ever increasing number of Africans accepted its leaders as the official spokesmen for indigenous aspirations. The rising power of the Union was noted in November 1959 by a research team from the University of London who remarked that:

Nationalism in Tanganyika has a growing appeal. Many Africans identify themselves with the cause: they believe that it works for them, that its leaders are interested in their welfare, and that by and through the movement Africans will find equality and happiness. Even in this mass movement, the individual does not feel submerged by numbers but rather, more important and exalted. The devotion to their leaders seems to be wholehearted; the leaders are trusted by their

followers, implicitly and completely, although the leaders may in turn quarrel among themselves.<sup>1</sup>

The successful spread of TANU's popularity, and its general acceptance as the leader of and spokesman for the Tanganyikan African population served to further reduce the ever dwindling power of the traditional authorities. Throughout the territory, chiefs and elders discovered that their positions were increasingly being challenged by Africans who had abandoned the tribal way of life. The fact that traditional leaders served as local government representatives under the system of indirect rule further increased hostilities. The distrust with which the nationalist movement viewed the colonial administration was interpreted by many TANU cell leaders as a further justification for opposing the native authorities.<sup>2</sup> The fact that the chiefs and elders were obliged to enforce unpopular agricultural and livestock controls also contributed to the process of alienation. The result of

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<sup>1</sup>University of London, "Report of a Survey of Political Activities in British East and Central Africa", (unpublished field project, November, 1959), p. 26.

<sup>2</sup>For a scholarly study of this transition see L. P. Mair, "African Chiefs Today", Africa, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1958), 195-206.

these conflicts was the steady erosion of indirect rule, which for so long had served as the foundation of British colonial policy.

In the period 1958-59 the territory was once again plagued by repeated instances of local unrest resulting from the activities of nationalist leaders in isolated sectors who eagerly exploited local dissatisfaction with government policies. In these years, the most troublesome area was once again Sukumaland and in particular the district of Geita. So serious were the civil disorders in this region that they resulted in the virtual breakdown of local government control.<sup>1</sup> The unrest, which was to result in the most violent confrontations of the nationalist drive, focused on local dissatisfaction with government plans to establish multi-racial councils,<sup>2</sup> distrust of traditional rulers, and dissatisfaction with agricultural controls. Above all, however, the disorders reflected an increasing refusal on the part of the African population to recognize the authority of the colonial administration. Rather, for the first time during the independence drive, Tanganyikan

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed study of the crises in Sukumaland, see MaGuire, Toward Uhuru, passim.

<sup>2</sup>Note that the primary cause of unrest had long been opposed by TANU.

Africans were willing to violate government regulations and to ignore subsequent bans, claiming that the British regime no longer had the right to control African affairs. In brief, the unrest marked the dawn of massive nationalistic awareness.

The Geita crisis began in March 1958 when the government announced the creation of a multi-racial district council based on parity representation.<sup>1</sup> Local TANU leaders angrily protested the government action, complaining that only the chiefs and not the people had been consulted. They also widely publicized the Union's long-standing opposition to the concept of forced multi-racial councils.<sup>2</sup>

Several unauthorized massive demonstrations followed in the wake of the TANU protests.<sup>3</sup> Nyerere himself utilized Sauti ya TANU to condemn the planned multi-racial councils, arguing that the local population seriously disapproved of the government scheme.

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<sup>1</sup>Annual Report for Geita District, 1958, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Kandoro to Selwyn-Clarke, March 28, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Geita police files, 1958, Rhodes House. Over one dozen unauthorized demonstrations occurred in March alone.

<sup>4</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No.'s 22-27, March-April, 1958.

The following month, the administration arrested several TANU leaders who publicly condemned the council. When a visit by Nyerere produced a great rush of new membership for the Union, the government invoked the Incitement to Violence Act to ban all TANU and TANU connected activities in Geita for a six month period.<sup>1</sup> This, in effect, barred the Union from campaigning in the region until after the first phase of the territorial elections.

The result of this action was a series of continual demonstrations, all conducted without official sanctions, calling for the dissolution of the council, the lifting of the TANU ban, and the termination of rule by the native authorities. During this period, crowds of up to 1,000 persons would demonstrate before administrative headquarters. The repeated arrest of demonstration leaders, almost all of whom were TANU members, failed to quell the unrest.<sup>2</sup> Between May and August 1958, over twenty such illegal rallies were reported by local administrators.<sup>3</sup> Nyerere, who

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<sup>1</sup>MaGuire, Toward 'Uhuru', pp. 211-212.

<sup>2</sup>See Tanganyika Standard, May-August, 1958. For an example of a typical demonstration see issue of July 13, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Geita police files, 1958.

normally opposed civil disobedience tactics, failed to denounce the Geita demonstrations. Rather, he condemned the decision to ban TANU, claiming that local authorities had falsely accused the Union of misdeeds. The normally moderate Nyerere angrily reported:

We are not afraid of the law. If the Police could keep out of politics and act as impartial referees, between law abiding citizens and the rest, including bush governors who think they are above the law, then the Law would be our greatest friend. The reasons why lunatics have been trying to provoke our people into violence is the fact that they know we are virtually invincible if we remain a law-abiding organization. They have seen how embarrassing are the excuses which they have given in the past for closing down TANU branches. They want better excuses. If TANU refuses to oblige them they would stoop to vile provocation to satisfy their own evil desires.

I ask Government to wage its anti-TANU war as frankly and honestly as we are waging our anti-Imperialism war. Colonialism is an intolerable humiliation to us. We shall wage a relentlessly determined battle against it until we are free. We shall use no violence. We shall stoop to no dishonest methods. We shall be as clean in our methods as we are in our aims. We shall publicly declare our methods as we publicly declare our aims. We shall not submit to humiliation.

Nyerere believed that the Geita incident served as a clear indication to the British that the system of indirect

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 29, May 27, 1958.

rule through native authorities was no longer viable in Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup> He nonetheless refused to support violent protests, and admonished his followers to avoid such tactics:

Fellow Africans, be on your guard. The enemy is losing the cold war because he has no argument against our case. His only chance is to provoke violence so that he may use the gun.

Don't give him that chance. Don't be provoked into violence. Be as calm and as good humoured as you have always been. The Enemy is bound to lose.<sup>2</sup>

In late July the danger of violence in Geita increased radically. On the 29th of that month a crowd of district inhabitants, estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000, marched to the office of the Provincial Commissioner at Mwanza demanding that the multi-racial council be inactivated and the ban on TANU lifted. After camping in a nearby sports field for three days, the crowd was dispersed by the use of tear gas.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, a delegation of three Mwanza TANU leaders flew to Dar es Salaam and petitioned the newly appointed Governor to intervene in the situation by ordering an end to the persecution of the Union.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere to Betts, July 21, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 29, May 27, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 28-August 2, 1958.

<sup>4</sup>Nyerere to Kambona, August 18, 1959, FCB papers.

Although Turnbull flew to Geita to examine the situation, local unrest continued throughout August and September. On August 11 a crowd of over 3,000 were tear gassed when they demonstrated before the district headquarters. In retaliation, local Union leaders despatched an angry message to protest to both the Colonial Office and the Trusteeship Council.<sup>1</sup>

Following the second incident of gassing, civil unrest rapidly began to spread to the area surrounding Geita. By late August, administrators in Mwanza district reported that the native authority system was virtually ineffective, as Africans refused to comply with government policies and initiated a series of unauthorized, TANU-led, mass rallies.<sup>2</sup> The following month, neighboring Kwinba district reported an outbreak of unauthorized political demonstrations. Shortly thereafter similar disturbances were reported in Maswa.<sup>3</sup> The success of TANU in the first phase elections further aggravated the situation. Administrative reports

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, T/Pet.2/226, October 6, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Annual Report for Mwanza District, 1958, p. 26, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, August-September, 1958.



at all levels indicated that many Africans interpreted the Union victory as a sign that the government was not capable of controlling territorial activities.<sup>1</sup> Local discontent soon led to protests over destocking, tie-riding, cattle dipping, cess taxes, native authorities, veterinary practices, conservation schemes, and local public works projects.<sup>2</sup> In brief, effective local rule had collapsed in much of Sukumaland.

The crisis in Geita also produced a most critical personal confrontation between Nyerere and the administration. In July 1958, the TANU leader was formally charged with three counts of sedition, resulting from his denunciation in Sauti ya TANU of the Geita District Commissioner. Nyerere claimed that the administrator had lied on several occasions. The official reaction to the charges was the arrest of Nyerere (subsequently released on bail) and the banning of the Union newsletter. Nyerere pleaded innocent to the charges, but when convicted, agreed to pay a \$150 fine rather than accept a prison term which would disqualify him from candidacy in the impending elections.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This attitude was reflected in the Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioner (Lake Province), 1958, passim.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere explained his decision in a letter to the FCB, August 2, 1958, FCB papers. It should be noted that

Although local authorities never fully regained control of their districts, the crisis in Sukumaland was to a large degree eliminated by Governor Turnbull's decision to lift the TANU ban on October 12, 1958, following the Union's electoral victory.<sup>1</sup>

With the return of the banned TANU leaders a series of massive but peaceful rallies ensued and within six weeks five new TANU offices were constructed and opened.<sup>2</sup> In an attempt to avoid future crises, Nyerere ordered all cells to notify the TANU provincial headquarters at Mwanza in advance of all plans for rallies, public speeches or popular demonstrations.<sup>3</sup> In addition, he toured the troubled area in November and demanded that his followers comply with all local government regulations.<sup>4</sup>

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the government attitude during the trial, especially in light of the recent inauguration of Turnbull, suggests an effort to avoid creating a crisis. Nyerere's sentence could have involved a mandatory prison term, thus eliminating him from the elections. In addition, the TANU leader was released on the day before the last nomination day.

<sup>1</sup>Turnbull interview.

<sup>2</sup>Annual Report for the Mwanza district, 1958, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Nyerere to TANU cell leaders, Lake Province, October 28, 1958, Tanganian National Archives.

<sup>4</sup>See Bennett, p. 26.

Clearly then, by late 1958 both Nyerere and the administration were determined to avoid instances of unrest produced by conflicts between local nationalist leaders and government representatives. The size and duration of the Sukumaland uprisings clearly reflected the inability of the system of indirect rule to maintain control of the indigenous population. Finally, the disquiet was indicative of the extent to which the Africans were committed to the nationalist cause. As such, they were increasingly reluctant to accept rule by the British administrators and their representatives.

The image of the nationalist party was also enhanced by TANU's role at the formative meeting of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. The fledgling organization met in Mwanza in September 1958 to devise a means of coordinating the efforts of the nationalist movements of the British East and Central African dependencies.<sup>1</sup> TANU organizer Munanka was selected as Secretary of the inter-territorial African organization, while Nyerere was chosen as the representative of Tanganyika.<sup>2</sup> TANU leaders reported

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<sup>1</sup>See Sauti ya TANU, No. 56, April 9, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Gikonyo Kiano, "The Pan African Freedom Movement", Africa, Vol. VI, No. 9 (September, 1959), 11-14.

a marked increase in recruitment as a result of the publicity given to the Union by the Conference.<sup>1</sup>

It was during this period of increased nationalist success that TANU also experienced the first and only internal turmoil suffered by the Union during the independence drive. In February 1958 Zuberi M. M. Mtemvu, who served as both External Secretary of TANU and Provincial Secretary for the Eastern Province, broke away from the Union and established a separate political party, the African National Congress (A.N.C.). Mtemvu had long felt that Nyerere's organization was far too moderate, both in its attitude towards the minority communities, and in its timetable for political advancement. In justifying his decision to abandon TANU, Mtemvu cited Nyerere's speech before the annual Union conference at Tabora in which the President had assured the minority communities that they "would not be swamped" by a black majority at election time. Four days later, Mtemvu announced his decision to form a separate party, claiming that Nyerere was "far too moderate" and thus failed "to express the will of the

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Selwyn-Clarke, September 23, 1958, FCB papers.

people".<sup>1</sup> In a petition seeking Trusteeship Council support, Mtemvu called for self-government in Tanganyika by 1962, "without the cooperation of the two non-African races".<sup>2</sup>

In presenting his argument in favor of exclusive African control, Mtemvu reasoned:

...our party has not been founded to be a threat to permanent settlement of the non-Africans in this country, not even to scare away foreign investment. Europeans and Asians who have settled in Tanganyika are here to stay. This categorical assurance by me and our party in view of the prevailing harmony in Tanganyika is quite unnecessary...

However, my party views Tanganyika society as having two fears opposite each other. The majority fear minority domination and the manority [sic] fear democracy. Both these fears must be allayed, but not by throwing democracy overboard. The first fear that must be removed is the African fear, in view of what has already happened in Kenya and further South. This can only be done by granting self-government to the Africans now. After this stage has passed, the killing of the other fear will be entirely the responsibility of the African, and there is no evidence to show that the African will act against the interests of his fellow non-African who has helped him to attain his freedom....<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Mtemvu to Betts, March 3, 1958, FCB papers. Mtemvu wrote to the Bureau in the hope of gaining liberal support.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations Trusteeship Council. Doc. T/Pet. 2/L. 10/Add. 1, March 7, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>ANC circular, "Why Mtemvu Wants Your Vote", August 15, 1958.

In effect, Mtemvu called for the immediate creation of a government in which the only guarantee of protection for minority group interests was the good will of the African population. The A.N.C. leader further clarified his demands shortly thereafter by announcing that the only persons who had the right to claim to be Tanganyikans were the indigenous inhabitants.<sup>1</sup>

When the electoral contests began, the A.N.C. initiated an industrious campaign to lure African support away from TANU by campaigning under the motto "Africa for Africans". However, Mtemvu and the A.N.C. Treasurer were the only party members who succeeded in gaining nomination. When the anticipated indigenous support failed to materialize, the A.N.C. became more radical in its position and desperate in its tactics. The increasingly racist position developed by Mtemvu is reflected in his correspondence with the Fabian Bureau:

The underdog has much more reason for being unreasonable and feel that he is thus asserting himself [sic]. The weak find it very difficult to be magnanimous. The African is weak and has been humiliated. To ask him to accept the non-African as his equal is to ask too much. You must first give him that self-confidence without which he can never be magnanimous.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Doc. T/Pat. 2/L. 12, May 14, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Mtemvu to FCB, September 2, 1958, FCB papers.

In August 1958 the territorial press abounded with rumors concerning a possible merger between UTP and TANU.<sup>1</sup> Although several meetings between Union leaders and white party candidates failed to produce any concrete results, Mtemvu exploited the situation in an attempt to prove that Nyerere was in fact going to compromise his plans and share party leadership with the minority communities. The fact that the UTP modified its election proposals to closely imitate those of TANU was viewed by the A.N.C. as further evidence of this conspiracy.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Mtemvu used British land alienation policy and resurrected the Meru removal incident, in an attempt to prove the existence of an administrative plan to create a white highlands region within the trusteeship. In a letter of protest to the Colonial Office the A.N.C. leader charged that:

The Government seems to be carving a small Europe for the Europeans and the Asians out of Tanganyika. We would not like this to continue.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, August 21-30, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>A.N.C. election handout, "Africa for Africans", August, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Mtemvu to Secretary of State, September 27, 1958, FCB papers.

These alleged government plans were in turn used by the Congress to justify its demands for the immediate creation of an independent government without minority community representation. As election time approached, Mtemvu revealed the details of his plan for a political system controlled exclusively by Tanganyikan Africans:

...the African National Congress envisages... a state in which all the members of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council will be indigenous Africans. Should the phrase 'indigenous Africans' puzzle you, Sir in our language it means all the Africans who belong to any of the recognized tribes in Tanganyika....

...we want a purely indigenous state...because it is [sic] in the interest of the immigrant people themselves that we should have it.... The African fears and dislikes multi-racialism which is literally being forced upon him by an alien government. He cannot understand the motive behind this idea, which may very well be to his disadvantage in view of what is happening in Central Africa and Kenya under the name of multi-racialism. Britain may succeed to force this type of government upon the people as long as she rules this country but this may have a very disastrous consequence upon the immigrant races when she leaves. The reaction of the Africans against the non-African might be violent as a result. Now, neither the African National Congress nor the immigrant races themselves would like this to happen.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>A.N.C. to Secretary of State, August 30, 1958, A.N.C. papers, Rhodes House.



Thus, the A.N.C. rejected TANU proposals for an elected majority in both the legislative and ministerial councils as far too moderate. In justifying its demand for the immediate granting of independence, the A.N.C. claimed:

Our party and the people of Tanganyika want to govern ourselves now. This is partially because it is shameful to be ruled and partially because we believe that we have fulfilled the necessary conditions a subject people have to fulfill before they can be granted self-government. We dissociate [sic] ourselves with the view that the British social and economic developments should be the yardstick of our readiness for self-government. The only measure that has been in use everywhere, so far, is the people's desire for self-government....The people want self-government next year and no party we know of has specifically demanded for that [sic]. We also want to govern ourselves in a better way than the British government is governing us. A glance at how things are being run in the territory should reveal how true this statement is.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the break-away of A.N.C. offered a far more militant approach to the question of territorial political development than that proposed by the Union. The Mtenvu organization maintained that TANU had compromised itself to the government, by insisting upon a moderate political campaign whose immediate aims were limited to the

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<sup>1</sup>A.N.C., "Why Mtenvu Wants Your Vote".

initiation of majority rule and responsible government. By leveling these accusations Mtemvu hoped to win the support of more militant TANU followers, and in particular, of the radical leaders in the scattered rural cells.<sup>1</sup> His plans, however, decisively failed. In the first territorial elections Mtemvu himself placed a poor third among the Africans of the Tanga constituency, receiving only 53 of the 5,411 votes cast. His party Treasurer, F. Ugulumu, suffered a comparable defeat in the Southern Highlands voting district.<sup>2</sup>

During the elections, another political organization appeared within the territory to compete with TANU. This was the Tanganyika National Society, a politically moderate, elite discussion group which closely imitated the programs of the Capricorn Society. Founded in Dar es Salaam in July 1958<sup>3</sup>, by a multi-racial group of civil servants and teachers, the Society called for the gradual development of self-government within the British Commonwealth based on a common citizenship which ignored

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<sup>1</sup>Mtemvu to Kazbona, July 21, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

<sup>3</sup>Sway, p. 21.

racial distinctions. In its plans for constitutional advancement, the Tanganyika Society envisioned a high qualitative franchise and multiple vote.<sup>1</sup> Led by its African president, R. K. Mwanjisi, the organization sought to attract the support of the more educated segment of Tanganyikan African society, the vast majority of whom would qualify as both voters and candidates in the 1958-59 elections. By offering a version of the Capricorn plans designed specifically for Tanganyika, Mwanjisi hoped to lure a majority of the elite of all races away from TANU.<sup>2</sup> However, only the Society president himself was able to gain nomination and was decisively defeated in the Southern Highlands constituency, where he received fewer votes than any other candidate.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, African attempts to establish viable political organizations with platforms to both the left and the right of TANU ended in total failure.

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<sup>1</sup>"Manifesto of the Tanganyika National Society", a broadsheet widely distributed in August-September, 1958.

<sup>2</sup>Mwanjisi to Sterling, September 2, 1958, Capricorn papers.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

As the clearly recognized leader of the nationalist drive, and the key spokesman for the indigenous population, TANU faced none of the problems encountered by the A.N.C. and the Tanganyika Society during the 1958-59 elections. Rather, the major issue facing the Union was its decision whether or not to participate in the territorial elections. So strong were the nationalist objections to the parity system, the triple vote, and the qualitative franchise, that for two months following the official scheduling of the election date, TANU refused to begin campaigning. The party hierarchy were divided over the issue of participation, with the more militant wing represented by Kandoro, Mtemvu, and Munanka advocating a boycott.<sup>1</sup> However, at the October 1957 annual TANU conference, Nyerere and the more moderate members of the Executive Committee were able to persuade all of the key Union leaders to endorse participation. The moderates themselves, however, were far from satisfied with the electoral procedure. They therefore issued a policy statement in which they noted their discontent, and declared that the Union was willing to accept the existing electoral system only as an "interim"

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<sup>1</sup>Kanbona notes to FCB, September, 1958, FCB papers.

measure.<sup>1</sup> Nyerere himself publicly stated that TANU had agreed to participate primarily to manifest its willingness to compromise with the administration.<sup>2</sup>

Practical political considerations also undoubtedly influenced the Union decision. On October 28, 1957, the Secretary of State announced that the date for the first phase elections would not be altered, no matter what percentage of the territorial population chose to participate.<sup>3</sup> In addition, in the early months of registration and nomination, TANU was under the false impression that the UTP was capable of offering them a serious challenge in the Dar es Salaam constituency. They felt that the longer the elections were postponed, the greater would be the chance of the UTP victory in the voting district.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the repeated claim of the Union that it, and not the minority party, truly represented the indigenous population, necessitated an electoral confrontation with the

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<sup>1</sup>"Minutes of the Annual Territorial Meeting of the Tanganyika African National Union", Tabora, October 10-12, 1957, Tanzanian National Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 16, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>London Times, October 29, 1957.

<sup>4</sup>Nyerere to Betts, August 12, 1957, FCB papers.

UTP, even if voter and candidate qualifications were not to TANU's satisfaction.<sup>1</sup>

Once the Union agreed to participate, it zealously began to formulate and publicize its campaign platform. It should be noted that the Union's demands were the basis of not only her territorial level campaign, but also served as the platform for TANU candidates who sought election in local government bodies. In the 1958-59 period, virtually every municipality held its first Town Council elections in which TANU candidates were swept to victory.<sup>2</sup> The same development occurred in tribal and district councils throughout the territory.<sup>3</sup> In the case of multi-racial elections at any level, the Union adhered to its standard policy of "approving" particular European and Asian candidates, the vast majority of whom were also victorious.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to Selwyn-Clarke, September 2, 1957, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>The first municipal election was held in Arusha in January, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>For a detailed case study of TANU tactics in tribal council elections, see: K. E. Shadbolt, "Local Government Elections in a Tanganyika District", Journal of African Administration Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (April, 1961), 78-84.

<sup>4</sup>Lowenkopf, passim.

The TANU election platform for the 1958-59 contests was based on the Union's belief in certain basic political principles. Primary among these were: the right of all states to be self-governing and democratic; the right of all citizens to receive an education and to share in the economic prosperity of a country; equal rights and privileges for all citizens; and the initiation of constitutional change through non-violent means.<sup>1</sup>

In order to incorporate its philosophical ideals into the territorial government, the TANU campaign platform called for: a majority of elected ministers by 1959; an end to parity by the creation of an elected African majority in the Legislative Council; single member constituencies based on district boundaries; the abolition of the compulsory tripartite voting system; and the initiation of a territory-wide program of free and compulsory primary education.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the Union campaign demanded the termination of the qualitative franchise, which it viewed

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<sup>1</sup>The philosophical principles upon which TANU based its demands clearly reflect strong liberal, and in particular Fabian, influence. See for example, special issue of Sauti ya TANU, September 3, 1958 and Stephen Mhando, TANU and the Vote (Dar es Salaam: Thakers, Ltd., 1958), passim.

<sup>2</sup>Mhando, pp. 2-7.

as "an insult to everybody except to a negligible minority".<sup>1</sup> In its place, TANU called for the initiation of universal adult suffrage and a "free vote on the basis of one man, one vote, one value".<sup>2</sup>

Part of the TANU platform involved a concentrated effort to end tribalism within the territory. The Union maintained that the isolationist tendencies of many tribal groups kept a significant number of Africans out of the mainstream of nationalist activity. In an effort to overcome this handicap, Nyerere conducted an extensive tour of the territory, often going into sparsely populated areas with few potential voters, to stress the necessity of participation in territorial political activities. He continually refuted the long-standing government claim that the nationalists, as an elitest group, sought to destroy the power of the chiefs and elders. The TANU president argued that this was merely a tactic employed by Union enemies who wished to undermine the liberation drive:

African nationalism is the child of colonialism and is directed primarily and frankly against

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Africa National Union, Let us Govern Ourselves (Dar es Salaam: Thakers, Ltd., 1958), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Africa National Union, Uraia-Maelezo ya Kweli ya Waziri Mkuu (Dar es Salaam: Thakers, Ltd., 1959), p. 2.



the colonial power....The Chiefs of Tanganyika never governed Tanganyika as such because there was no such thing as Tanganyika (before the coming of the European powers). Tanganyika is here to stay but the colonial power, not Tanganyika, is being challenged by the nationalists, and the colonial power must go....The question then is, who replaces the Colonial power: Some silly people seem to think that the answer is either the chiefs or the nationalists. And, they say, if it is the nationalists then this is a challenge to the authority of the chiefs. But there is no inherent 'either' 'or' in this. There is no inherent challenge to the traditional authority of the Chiefs in this, because there is nothing traditional in the power that now forms the government at the centre. The chief's traditional place is the tribe....Since African nationalism is Tanganyika nationalism against British imperialism it cannot be regarded as a challenge to the chiefs unless the chiefs decided to side with the British and thus identify themselves with Imperialism. And that is the real question. Will the chiefs of Tanganyika identify themselves with Imperialism.<sup>1</sup>

The success of the nationalist campaign to overcome tribalism is measured by the fact that Nyerere himself was elected to office in Lake Province where he readily defeated Patrick Kunambi, a member of the Waluguru, who were the largest tribe in the constituency.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the October 1959 Annual Conference of the Territorial Convention of Chiefs passed a unanimous resolution endorsing the

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 37, January 13, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 14, pp. 741-745.

TANU platform.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the nationalist drive was never marked by the creation of tribal political parties, an event not uncommon within other African liberation movements of the same period.

In preparing its campaign tactics, the Union utilized great caution and avoided nominating TANU leaders who were known for their militant activities. This was done to prevent alienating the minority communities, especially in Dar es Salaam, which the Union feared losing because of the heavy concentration of non-African voters.<sup>2</sup> The nationalists also nominated two TANU candidates in each constituency. Thus, if one member were arrested for "endangering law and order", the second candidate could readily replace him. Since no such incident occurred, all of the "reserve" candidates withdrew from contention in the last days of the campaigns.<sup>3</sup>

In its endorsement of both Asian and European candidates, the Union used one primary method of evaluation: ability to deal a decisive defeat to UTP competitors.<sup>4</sup> It

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 3, 4, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, August 20, 1958.

<sup>3</sup>Elections Officer Hucks to Turnbull, March 2, 1959, Hucks papers.

<sup>4</sup>Kambona to Betts, September 21, 1958 FCB papers.

should also be noted that African voters sedulously rejected non-African candidates who at any time had served as nominated members of the Legislative Council on the basis that such individuals were lackeys of the colonial administration.<sup>1</sup> Significantly, no former member of the Council whose seat was contested gained re-election. So confident was Nyerere of African support that following the first phase elections he predicted that "next February's elections in the other five constituencies will be a purely mechanical routine".<sup>2</sup>

Thus, TANU's clean sweep of both electoral phases clearly indicated that it was the only political organization which could justly claim to be the voice of the territorial electorate. For the first time, Nyerere was able to serve in the Legislative Council, along with nine other Africans, as an elected member.

Once seated in the Council, Nyerere's first tactic was to consolidate the unity which had led to the Union victory. Accordingly, he organized the thirty elected members into a parliamentary group known as the Tanganyika

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<sup>1</sup>Kandoro to Karbona, January 16, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, September 10, 1958.

Elected Members Organization, (TEMO), with himself as Chairman, Dereck Bryceson as Deputy Chairman, and Amir Jamal as Treasurer. TEMO members pledged to use their newly won seats to fight for the termination of the systems of parity and indirect rule and to oppose the tripartite vote. In addition, they pledged to campaign for the initiation of responsible government in the immediate future.<sup>1</sup>

Speaking of the formation of TEMO, Amir Jamal described the close spirit of cooperation which bound together the newly elected members:

The most remarkable thing in Tanganyika today is the TANGANYIKA ELECTED MEMBERS ORGANISATION (TEMO). The unity of purpose which has been shown in the deliberation of T.E.M.O. has been as gratifying as it has been amazing. This has been highlighted by the spontaneous, un-premeditated election of its office bearers (Nyerere (African) Chairman, Bryceson (European) Vice-Chairman, and Jamal (Asian) Treasurer).

No lobbying took place, there was no hesitations; and the nominations were made on the spot. It fully demonstrated the spirit which moved the 10 Europeans, 10 Africans and 10 Asians who form TEMO. No one is thinking on racial terms, at least within T.E.M.O.'s four walls, and that is a great thing in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 42, March 17, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Jamal to FCB, April 2, 1959 FCB papers.

Thus, by March 1959, the nationalist drive had not only swept the territorial elections but had also formulated a united front on the unofficial side of the legislature, dedicated to the fulfillment of all of TANU's goals for future constitutional developments.

On March 17, when the government announced its plans to transform the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers, the Union was faced with another major decision. The TANU election platform had advocated an elected majority in the Council while the administration's proposal called only for the appointment of five unofficials out of a total of twelve posts. However, once Nyerere had conferred with both the TANU Executive Council and the members of TEMO, he announced that the nationalists would cooperate with the administration's plan because "there is strong conviction that the Governor is most sincere in his approach to the country's problems."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, they reasoned that the assumption of high level posts would give unofficial members an opportunity to prove their capabilities, and thus speed the progress towards self-government.<sup>2</sup> In spite of its willingness to compromise,

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 18, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, April 2, 1959, FCH papers.

the Union felt it necessary to publicly criticize the concept of designating unofficial members on a racial basis.

TANU protested that such a step:

...was considered extremely regrettable, in view of the efforts of all the elected members of whatever race to approach the problems of the country on a non-racial basis...however, here again the racist outlook betrayed was taken as a challenge to all that the elected members stood for and...was accepted in the same spirit as the tri-partite compulsory voting system was accepted at the time of the election.<sup>1</sup>

Similar protests were raised by both the Asian and European members of TEMO. Bryceson complained that the government continued to think in terms of race, while the unofficial members had abandoned such distinctions, and now viewed themselves as "a construction team to build a nation".<sup>2</sup>

The willingness of TANU to cooperate with a government plan about which it had serious reservations, and to do so while expressing confidence in the good intention of the administration is indicative of the new spirit of compromise and cooperation that had developed since 1958. At

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 23, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Bryceson to Turnbull, March 30, 1959, Tanganyika political files, Rhodes House.

the same time, the administration revealed its willingness to coordinate efforts with the nationalists, by asking TEMO to select five unofficials to fill the newly created ministerial posts. TEMO did so, agreeing that Nyerere should not be selected in order to allow him to continue to serve as leader of the opposition.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout 1959 TANU also engaged in an active campaign to publicize its views concerning the terms of reference of the Post Elections Committee. The Union, while recognizing that the overall plan envisioned by the administration would lead to responsible government, nonetheless had reservations concerning some of the terms of reference given to the Ramage Committee. It therefore formulated and widely circulated its own set of plans. Union demands included the establishment of an elected majority in the legislature and in the Council of Ministers. This would be done through elections based on universal adult suffrage and a common roll. Finally, the Union insisted upon the abolition of parity in any form.<sup>2</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup>Bryceson to Betts, April 4, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>TANU "Memorandum Submitted to the Government of Tanganyika and the Post Election Committee", June 13, 1959, Boston University Africana Collection.

specific, the nationalists called for a Legislative Council composed of 79 elected and no more than 3 non-elected members. Of the 79 elected seats, 13 would be reserved for Asians (including Arabs) and 8 for Europeans, with the remaining 58 designated as "open".<sup>1</sup> Union plans for the Council of Ministers envisioned a 12 man body in which three posts, (Defense, External Affairs, Attorney General), were reserved for official members of the legislature on a non-racial basis.<sup>2</sup>

For the purpose of elections, TANU suggested the division of the territory into 58 constituencies, 44 of which would elect one member each. Of the remaining districts, 7 would elect 2 members each, and 7 other 3 members each. The basis of designation for multiple representation constituencies was distribution of minority group population. This represented an effort to afford minority groups the opportunity to elect members of their own community in districts where they had a significant number of inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> Adults in the multiple districts would be granted one vote

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No: 55, July 14, 1959.

<sup>3</sup>See Table 16, pp. 747-749.



per seat, but the use of all of a constituent's votes was optional. Failure to use them all would therefore not result in the invalidation of one's ballot.<sup>1</sup>

The Union adamantly rejected any form of parity representation, arguing that such devices were undemocratic and ultimately resulted in racial unrest. Thus, it insisted upon "open" seats rather than ones designated for the candidate of a particular race. It should be noted that under the TANU proposals, a voter in a multiple seat constituency could cast his ballot for any candidate in the district. His choice was in no way restricted to members of a particular ethnic community.<sup>2</sup>

Nonetheless, the Union recognized the need for minority group representation. It was for this reason that TANU was willing to allow the Governor to nominate up to three members of the Asian and European communities for seats on the Council.<sup>3</sup> In explaining its plan for

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, (special issue) July 7, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>TANU "Memorandum to Post Elections Committee".

<sup>3</sup>In clarifying this somewhat vague stipulation, Kambona explained that the seats should be utilized only if a community failed to elect at least one representative. The third seat was an insurance for the Arab population. Kambona to FCB, July 13, 1959, FCB papers.

non-racial representation, the Union reasoned:

The proposals we are submitting are not designed to provide representation for Africans, Asians and Europeans as such. They are designed to pave the way for a truly democratic form of representation. In a truly democratic situation the majority need no special protection. Their interests are taken care of by the democratic process itself. We are not, therefore, suggesting representation for the African as such. We are suggesting that a majority of seats be free seats which can be contested by any Tanganyikan.

While the aim must be to get away from any form of racial representation we do not feel that we can at this stage dispense with some form of special representation. We must devise some temporary means which will make sure that our Legislature has people drawn from a cross section of the whole population. It is for this reason that we are suggesting reservation of seats for the minority communities.<sup>1</sup>

The nationalist memorandum emphatically rejected the voting qualifications proposed by the government and in its place demanded the initiation of universal adult suffrage. Finally, it condemned the idea of a Territorial Council of Chiefs as unnecessary, since the proposed function of the body was already fulfilled by the existing Convention of Chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

TANU conducted an extensive publicity campaign to foster popular support for its constitutional proposals.

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<sup>1</sup>TANU "Memorandum to Post Elections Committee".

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Union leaders toured the territory, encouraging the population to endorse the nationalist plan when interviewed by the Ramage team. The Union made a concentrated effort to visit all of the districts before the arrival of the Post Elections Committee.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the government representatives repeatedly heard demands for the incorporation of the TANU plan from the inhabitants they interviewed.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the Union published a number of widely distributed leaflets, all explaining its position on the restructuring of the territorial government. Repeatedly, the nationalists argued that the mandate given to TANU in the territorial elections indicated the population's support of the Union program. Thus, the nationalists maintained that the government's task was merely that of formulating a means of incorporating these policies:

We have repeatedly stated that at the last elections the electorate, 58,000 of them, endorsed TANU's demands for Responsible Government. The Government aimed at securing a responsible electorate. The electorate which endorsed TANU's manifesto was a responsible electorate—that is all the more reason for granting their demands. It is for the Post Elections Committee to deliberate on such matters as the number of constituencies, their boundaries, etc. But the people

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<sup>1</sup>Janal to FCB, August 14, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Report of the Post Elections Committee, pp. 18-21.

of Tanganyika have wholeheartedly endorsed TANU's demands for a majority of Elected Members in the Legislature, a majority of Elected Ministers in the Executive, the abolition of the Tripartite vote and Universal Adult Franchise. It is for the Constitutional Committee to work out the details of putting these demands into effect.<sup>1</sup>

When the final modified version of the Ramage Report was announced in the Legislative Council on December 15, Nyerere declared that the Union would accept all of the government proposals. He also recorded his objection to the maintenance of literacy and income qualifications for the franchise, noting that this would allow a maximum of only one million voters to participate in the 1960 General Elections. TANU nonetheless accepted the final government plan and expressed the Union's faith in the good intentions of the government.<sup>2</sup>

In his speech before the Legislative Council, Nyerere addressed several remarks to the non-African communities who were shortly to come under the authority of a black controlled government. In an attempt to assure

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 54, July 7, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 16, 1959.

Asians and Europeans that the nationalist movement would continue to oppose racial prejudice, Nyerere stressed:

...the trust of [the] immigrant minorities in the good will of the indigenous majority. That trust throws a great responsibility on us as a majority community. From now on the duty of protecting human rights--those human rights for which we have been struggling, those rights for which we were prepared even to die--that duty from now on is our duty.

Let it not be said by posterity that we were a bunch of hypocrites. Let not the world point a finger at us and say we gained our freedom on a moral argument -- the argument of the brotherhood of man -- and then threw that argument overboard and began ourselves to discriminate against our brothers on the ground of colour. Let God, who has helped us reach this day, save us from that sin against his justice.<sup>1</sup>

He also warned, however, that economic domination by the minority communities would not be allowed to continue. Nyerere reasoned that social and economic imbalance in African societies had historically led to racial strife and that the elected government would have to eliminate such dangerous inequities as soon as possible:

...The way to it is not going to be a smooth one. One of our difficulties is at present the distribution of the wealth of this country. The division of any society into 'haves' and 'have-nots' is always dynamite; here it is aggravated

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates, (Hansard) 35th Session (December 15, 1959), p. 39.

by its identification with race. 'Haves' here are generally immigrant minorities; 'have-nots' indigenous majorities. This is dangerous. We must remedy that situation as quickly as humanly possible.

The members of the minority communities here and in friendly countries abroad who sympathise with Tanganyika's efforts in human relations, have a great responsibility. They must do everything possible to help us to raise the general standard of living for the masses of our people.<sup>1</sup>

Despite Nyerere's admonition concerning future social and economic changes, the Union conducted an extensive publicity campaign to convince the minority communities of its good intentions.<sup>2</sup> In a public interview following the announced constitutional changes, the TANU leader assured the territory's inhabitants that when majority rule began:

The colour of a person's skin or the texture of his hair will be irrelevant to his political rights and his duties as a citizen as it is irrelevant in his values in the eyes of God.<sup>3</sup>

Part of the Union strategy included a series of speeches by non-African members of TEMO, all of whom

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona outlined this strategy in his correspondence with Hatch, December 6, 1959-January 21, 1960, Hatch papers, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>3</sup>London Times, December 17, 1959.

visited their constituencies in an attempt to remove Asian and European apprehensions concerning the advent of African controlled, responsible government.<sup>1</sup>

The announcement of the impending 1960 elections marked a major transformation in TANU strategy. The struggle for official recognition and for the initiation of a black majority government had ended in success. As a result, the official speeches, publications, and personal correspondences of the nationalists all assumed a far more optimistic tone, and reflected a conviction that their battle with the administration was over. Typical of this new feeling was Nyerere's remark to James Betts "We can now afford to be slow about something."<sup>2</sup> A jubilant Amir Janal reported to his Fabian allies "We are all fighting the same battle now. The race is run, and the help rendered by you and other friends in the U.K. cannot easily be measured in words."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kambona to FCB, February 3, 1960, FCB papers. See also articles in Tanganyika Standard, January-February, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, January 3, 1960, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Janal to Selwyn-Clarke, December 21, 1959, FCB papers. For other reflections of the jubilant nationalist sentiment, see Nyerere's article "We Cannot Afford to Fail", Africa Special Report Vol. IV, No. 12 (December, 1959), 4-6 and George W. Shepherd, Jr., "Bwana Julius: Tanganyika Today", Africa Today Vol. VI, No. 6 (November, 1959), 12-15.

Symbolic of the new spirit of cooperation between TANU and the administration was the fact that when the new Legislative Council convened in March 1959 the TANU Youth League, which had so often been condemned as the militant wing of the Union, assisted local authorities in controlling the crowds along the parade route in Dar es Salaam.<sup>1</sup>

With its major battles won, the Union turned to constructive planning for the future. In 1959, it boasted of 37 territorial cells, a registration of over 900,000, and a new central headquarters building in Dar es Salaam.<sup>2</sup> By November 1959, Nyerere was able to confidently assure his people that "self-government is certain next year".<sup>3</sup> The period of protracted hostilities was over.

#### The Home Government: Shifting the Focus

The period 1958-59 was marked by a radical decline of tensions within the home government concerning the question of Tanganyikan political development. The concessions granted by the Crown, coupled with the influx of more

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 16, 1959.

<sup>2</sup>Karibona to Betts, November 28, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, December 23, 1959.



moderate administrators in both the Colonial Office and the territorial government, resulted in the equitable solution of most of the major sources of conflict. Nonetheless, the liberal and conservative factions remained ideologically divided in their appraisal of events within the trusteeship and in their basic attitudes towards the concept of colonialism.

Between 1958 and 1959 a major transformation occurred in both the Colonial Office personnel and policy. The expenses involved in attempting to advance territorial social and economic systems at the same pace as the political sector had resulted in the bankruptcy of the Colonial Development Corporation and its multifold subsidiary agencies. Gradually, the home government became aware of the impossibility of continuing to bear the burden of such rapid internal expansion within the many colonies of a far flung empire. At the same time, the flowering of nationalist organizations with strong bases of popular support made it impossible to retard the pace of political evolution, without risking the dagger of violent confrontation.<sup>1</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>For historical analysis of this change in policy, see: L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1971), pp. 357-398; William Patrick Kirkman, Unscrambling an

end result, by the late 1950's, was a recognition by both the liberal and conservative factions of the home government that the pace of development toward independence would have to accelerate at a much more rapid pace than that envisioned by the earlier post-war governments. Labour and Tory M.P.s, however, remained divided in their reaction to the rapidly changing events on the African continent. The more right wing elements looked upon the increasingly successful Tanganyikan African political organizations with skepticism, and demanded certain safeguards to protect British subjects and investments. Thus, they supported such policies as the multiple-vote, the qualitative franchise, and the retention of official majorities. At the same time, they stressed the economic and social advances which came as a result of the colonial experience, arguing that British rule had indeed made great efforts to prepare the sub-Saharan territories for participation in the community of nations. Conservatives pointed with pride to the

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Empire: A Critique of British Colonial Policy, 1955-1966 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), passim; Kenneth Kirkwood, Britain and Africa (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 207-283; William Miller MacMillan, The Road to Self-Rule; a Study in Colonial Evolution (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1960), passim.

multifold institutions and agencies established within both the home government and the territories as a sign of the efforts being made to develop the more backward parts of the Empire. Given the time and the authority, they argued, the colonies would truly be ready for self-rule in one or two generations. Consequently, the private press and the information services of the Colonial Office abounded with publications describing the activities of the Crown within the African dependencies and the improvements resulting from such endeavors.<sup>1</sup>

Liberals, by contrast, argued that the pace of political development should continue to accelerate until all of the dependencies had attained self-rule, either

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<sup>1</sup>For example of such publications see: Sir Hugh Beaver, "Colonial Development Corporation", Progress, (Summer, 1958), 209-216; Kenneth Bradley, Britain's Purpose in Africa (New York: British Information Services, 1959); Great Britain, British Information Services, Reference Division, I.D. 1294, Community Development in The United Kingdom Dependencies (Swindon, U.K.: The Swindon Press, Limited, 1958); Great Britain, British Information Services, Reference Division, I.D. 1286 (Revised), Political Development in the United Kingdom Dependencies (New York: British Information Services, 1959); Great Britain, British Information Services, Reference Division, I.D. 1327, The United Kingdom Dependencies 1958-59 (New York: British Information Services, 1959); Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Progress in the Colonies (New York: British Information Service, 1958); Great Britain Colonial Office, Community Development; A Handbook (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).

within or outside of the Commonwealth. They maintained that while it was necessary for the Crown to help develop the economic and educational systems of the colonies, such aid should in no way impede the course of political evolution. Claiming that direct and immediate participation in modern political activities was the only viable means of developing stable regimes, the liberals called for rapid advance to self-rule and abundant long range economic assistance from the Crown after independence.<sup>1</sup>

With specific reference to Tanganyika, the more conservative factions of both the Tory Party and the Colonial Office complained that far too many concessions were being granted to Nyerere. Coupled with this complaint was the often repeated accusation that the home government had been pressured into speeding the pace of constitutional development by liberals within Great Britain and enemies on the Trusteeship Council, all of whom were dedicated to the goal of undermining the Empire. Consequently, conservatives preferred the maintenance of an

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<sup>1</sup>For examples of the liberal viewpoint see: Marjorie Nicholson, Political Objectives and Developments (London: Fabian Publications Ltd.; 1958) and Eirene White, What Hope for a Socialist Commonwealth? (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1959).

official majority, the administrative power of nomination, and the preservation of minority community guarantees in Tanganyika. At the same time they praised the rapid economic, educational, and social development of the territory, citing the success of the cooperative movement, the creation of multi-racial tribal and town councils, the introduction of the sisal crop, and the efforts of the Colonial Development Corporation as examples of Britain's contributions to indigenous advancement.<sup>1</sup>

Liberals countered with the argument that the Nyerere regime should be given immediate control of an independent, African majority government which recognized no special reservations for the immigrant communities. Reformers also called for the initiation of universal adult

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<sup>1</sup>The conservative viewpoint on Tanganyika is reflected in East Africa and Rhodesia, editorials, October 1 and 15, 1959; Great Britain, Central Office of Information, References Division, No. R 4172, Tanganyika (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959); Tanganyika, Department of Commerce and Industry, Commerce and Industry in Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam: The Tanganyika Standard, 1957); Tanganyika, Public Relations Department, Tanganyika Legislative Council 1926-58 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958).

suffrage and the termination of indirect rule at all administrative levels.<sup>1</sup>

Although the rival factions engaged in endless squabbling in the period 1958-59, the question of political development in Tanganyika steadily became an increasingly less controversial topic. The strict control maintained by Nyerere during the period of political campaigning, and the moderate policy statements released by TANU after the election, made the home government recognize that they were dealing with a reasonable nationalist organization which had no intention of seriously challenging their dwindling authority.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the rapid pace of political evolution produced few internal battles on the floor of Parliament. The advent of the moderate Macleod administration further served to foster an era of peaceful negotiations in matters involving the trusteeship.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See: Africa Bureau, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba (London: The Africa Bureau, 1958), and Venture, Vol. 9, No. 9 (February, 1958), and Vol. 10, No. 10 (March, 1959).

<sup>2</sup>Turnbull interview; Macleod memo on "Conditions in the East and Central African Dependencies, 1959", Conservative Party Headquarters.

<sup>3</sup>For an insight into the attitudes of political figures in the home government concerning developments in the trusteeship, see the "Quarterly Chronicle" and "African Affairs at Westminster" columns in African Affairs, Vol.'s 57 and 58 (1958-1959).

While the period was devoid of major confrontations, the liberal faction within Britain nonetheless maintained a keen interest in Tanganyikan affairs. As such, it stood prepared to offer TANU guidance, moral support, and publicity whenever the need arose. At the same time, liberals carefully scrutinized the many constitutional changes occurring within the trusteeship to ensure that they did indeed conform to the aspirations of the nationalists.

Thus, the period 1958-59 was marked by a continued spirit of close cooperation between TANU and her supporters in the home government. As the pace of political activity became progressively less frantic, liberals began to alter the scope of their political propaganda campaigns. Instead of stressing the inadequacies of British colonial rule and the necessity of constitutional advances, socialist speeches and literature now emphasized the stability and reasonableness of emerging African regimes, and the necessity of increased economic aid from Great Britain. While the aim of earlier publicity had been to defend struggling African political organizations from reactionary resistance, the literature and speeches of this period advertised the victory of African nationalism and the promise of a prosperous Commonwealth of freely participating independent states.

During these years, key leaders of the nationalist drive frequently appeared before liberal reform groups to outline their plans for territorial development. From 1958 to 1959 Nyerere, Kambona, and Bomani presented more than twenty well publicized speeches to members of the Fabian Society, the African Bureau, and the Labour Party.<sup>1</sup> Liberals also produced a substantial amount of literature concerning developments within the territory. The Fabian Society utilized Venture to carefully explain and endorse the TANU platform during the 1958-59 elections.<sup>2</sup> Realizing that there was considerable public concern within the home government over the future of minority groups in African dominated regimes, the socialists persuaded Nyerere to write a number of articles in which he stressed TANU's opposition to racism. At the same time, the Bureau convinced prominent members of the territory's minority groups to issue statements in which they affirmed their trust in

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<sup>1</sup>"List of TANU Engagements", a note in Selwyn-Clarke's handwriting, dated January 28, 1960, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Venture, Vol. 10, No. 4 (September, 1958), 4-5; Vol. 10, No. 9 (February, 1959), 8; Vol. 10, No. 10 (March, 1959), 2; Vol. 11, No. 4 (October, 1959), 1-2.



TANU's moderate policies.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, extensive publicity was given to the Union's electoral victory and its acceptance of the resulting constitutional changes. Liberal literature stressed the fact that TANU did indeed enjoy a mandate from the territorial population and that it represented a moderate, well-balanced approach to the goal of responsible government.<sup>2</sup> The reformers also gave wide-spread publicity to the political writings of the nationalists. For example, Nyerere's Barriers to Democracy was produced in capsule form by the African Bureau, Fabian Society, and Labour Party.<sup>3</sup> In addition, M. P. Arthur Skeffington wrote a widely distributed pamphlet, Tanganyika in Transition, in which he offered an historical survey and ideological defense of the nationalist movement.<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>See for example Janal article in Venture, Vol. 11, No. 1 (May, 1959), 4 and essay by Heath, Venture, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June, 1959), 9. See also M.P. Arthur Skeffington to Selwyn-Clarke, on liberal publicity campaign strategy, September 6, 1959, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>2</sup>Selwyn-Clarke -- Janal correspondence, October 1-23, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Venture, Vol. 10, No. 8 (January, 1959), 4; African Bureau leaflet "The Voice of Reason", 1960, Labour Party broadsheet summary of Barriers to Democracy, December, 1959, Labour Party Archives.

<sup>4</sup>Arthur Skeffington, Tanganyika in Transition (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960).

pamphlet was conceived by Selywn-Clarke, in close consultation with both Nyerere and Kambona, to enhance the image of TANU within Britain in the hope of gaining substantial economic aid for territorial development after independence.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the period of rapid political transformation the Fabian Bureau maintained a steady stream of correspondence with key personalities within the territory, constantly encouraging them to make public statements of support for TANU both within the territory and before the press in the home government.<sup>2</sup>

The liberal community, while realizing that TANU had successfully achieved most of her major goals, was eager to assist the Union in speeding the territory's advancement towards complete independence and in gaining economic aid for major internal development projects. This attitude was well expressed by Selwyn-Clarke in a letter to the Executive Committee of TANU:

We are of course delighted with the constitutional alterations and the promise of

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<sup>1</sup>Skeffington correspondence with Nyerere and Kambona, October 1959-March 1960, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, FCB to Chief Kidaba Makwaia, October 4, 1956; Betts to Heath, July 30, 1959; Betts to Janal, November 21, 1958, FCB papers.

self-government for the next year. I feel that all of you in Tanganyika should be warmly congratulated on the moderation and statesmanship with which you have steered your course and you have certainly been rewarded....

Any concrete information that you may have on further needs which should get support from this country, if you will let me know, our M.P.'s will certainly take up your points. We are in fact seeking an adjournment debate on economic conditions in Tanganyika.<sup>1</sup>

The liberal community carefully followed the rapid pace of political development between 1958 and 1959 in order to assist TANU in any way possible. In May 1957 the Labour Party sent a delegation headed by M.P. James Callahan to the Colonial Office to demand that the government issue a final policy statement concerning the date and structure of the proposed territorial elections.<sup>2</sup> In the months that followed, liberals made repeated attempts to effect a modification in the election plans which would complement TANU's demands for the termination of the parity system. The Colonial Secretary refused to consider the liberal proposals, explaining that any alteration

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to TANU Executive Committee, December 14, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Callahan -- Selwyn-Clarke correspondence, May 5-17, 1957.

would delay the first territorial elections for a period of up to two years.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, when rumors abounded that elections in the Dar es Salaam constituency were being delayed at the request of white settlers to allow the UTP to concentrate its efforts at undermining TANU strength in the municipality, Labour M.P.s demanded a full scale investigation.<sup>2</sup> When the date for the 1960 territorial elections was announced, M.P. James Johnson called upon the government to allocate special funds for adult education within the African community to better prepare Tanganyikan Africans for participation in the electoral process.<sup>3</sup> The Fabian Bureau also conducted an investigation and upon discovering the lack of political understanding which existed in the more backward regions of the territory, called for the creation of district level voter training programs.<sup>4</sup> They

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<sup>1</sup>Lennox-Boyd -- Skeffington correspondence, April 28-September 6, 1957, Conservative Party Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>Betts to Lennox-Boyd, August 6-28, 1957, FCB papers. No official response was ever given to the charge.

<sup>3</sup>Johnson-Winchester correspondence, April 16-June 21, 1959.

<sup>4</sup>Notes on FCB investigations in Winchester's handwriting, April 1960. The Bureau extensively interviewed Elections Officer Hucks to determine the degree of African comprehension reported by returning officers. FCB papers.

also sought the professional guidance of Prof. W.J.M. Mackenzie to determine the extent to which existing educational systems prepared Tanganyikan Africans for modern political participation.<sup>1</sup>

Liberals consistently rallied to the defense of TANU whenever Union cells came under administrative censure. On March 3, Arthur Skeffington raised the question of the Iringa closing in Parliament. The Secretary of State, however, refused to give details concerning the decision to ban TANU in that district.<sup>2</sup> When repeated attempts by M.P.s failed to produce a more elaborate explanation, the Labour Party sent a delegation to Lennox-Boyd, complaining that the territorial administration was attempting to undermine TANU. They utilized Nyerere's often repeated argument that all Union members in the banned districts were being denied their right of political participation because of the crimes of a few individuals.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Winchester to Mackenzie, December 30, 1959, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Skeffington to Winchester, March 5, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Lennox-Boyd notes on an interview with Labour Party delegation, April 1, 1958, Conservative Party Headquarters; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser. Vol. 609 (April 12, 1959), col. 32.

When continued complaints concerning African dissatisfaction with official agricultural policies came to the attention of liberals in the home government, the African Bureau despatched Arthur Gaitskell, an expert on soil conservation, to investigate conditions in the troubled areas.<sup>1</sup> During the same year, M.P. John Hynd demanded an explanation concerning the removal of Tanganyikan Africans in the Matagoro hills, who had been forced to abandon their traditional land holdings. When Lennox-Boyd justified the removals as a necessary part of a long-range government irrigation project, the Fabians assigned Majorie Nicholson to investigate the incident.<sup>2</sup> Although in both cases it was concluded that the government actions were justified, the keen interest manifested by the socialists is a reflection of liberal determination to continue to act as the ally and defender of the African nationalists, despite the fact that TANU was well on the road to victory. For all practical purposes, however, the battle between the liberal and conservative factions concerning the political future of Tanganyika was a dead issue.

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Hatch, October 26, 1958, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Hynd to Nicholson, March 8, 1959, FCB papers.

### The Role of the Trusteeship Council

The period 1958-59 was one of limited Trusteeship Council involvement with the territory of Tanganyika. Although the major political transformations of the post-war decade occurred during these years, the fact that no visiting mission team toured the area virtually removed Tanganyika from the Council's busy agenda.<sup>1</sup> Besides examination of visiting team reports, the only other means of generating debate over developments in the trusteeship was the receipt of petitions from territorial residents. However, the major concessions granted by the Crown greatly decreased the necessity of the nationalists employing this means of protest. Consequently, only two petitions were received by the Council during this period. Both involved the closing of TANU branches, but in neither case was there sufficient evidence for the Council to formulate any official conclusions.<sup>2</sup> Those debates which did occur, however, reflected the continuation of the ideological division

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<sup>1</sup>Chidzero dissertation, pp. 449-462. The next scheduled visit was slated for the year 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Andrew Cohen to Colonial Office, October 23, 1959, Rhodes House; see also United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 16th Session, Suppl. No. 4 (A/4818), p. 24.

of the international body. On March 25, 1958 the Council commenced a debate over the question of the preservation of the parity system. The representatives of China, Burma, and Guatemala all criticized the policy as an unsatisfactory means of representation because of the highly disproportionate nature of the territory's population. As a result of the recent and rapid growth of the nationalist movement, the anti-colonial powers argued that parity would ultimately result in serious racial conflict. In order to avoid such unnecessary violence, the representative of Burma called upon the Administering Authority to formulate a new policy which would "satisfy the aspirations of African nationalists while providing reassurance to the non-African minorities".<sup>1</sup> Australia, France, and the United States further called upon Great Britain to recognize that parity was merely a transitory policy, and to issue a clear statement of exactly what the next phase of constitutional development would involve. They also urged the Administering Authority to cooperate with emerging nationalist parties if it were determined that they

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 13th Session, Supplement No. 3(A/3821), p. 41.



represented the bulk of the territorial population.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the Soviet Union severely criticized parity as a system "designed to consolidate already existing racial barriers", and claimed that it was the African population and not the immigrant races who needed assurances concerning their future.<sup>2</sup>

The British representative, Sir Andrew Cohen, refused to accept these arguments, stating that parity was a presently necessary system which would be re-evaluated following the territory's first electoral experience.<sup>3</sup>

In July 1958 the Trusteeship Council also engaged in a heated debate concerning both the upcoming territorial elections and the planned Post Elections Committee. The representatives of China and India initiated the debate by calling for the advancement of the date for the second phase elections in order to speed the formation of the constitutional committee. At the same time, they demanded that the post election team be given the broadest terms of reference possible, and that it be comprised

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 46-47.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 51-52.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 46-53.

primarily of Africans.<sup>1</sup> The Guatemalan delegate called upon the Administering Authority to guarantee that the next step in constitutional advancement would include the creation of an elected African majority in the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup>

Turning to the question of franchise, the Soviet representative called for the initiation of universal adult suffrage and the democratisation of local administrative agencies. This view was supported by India, China, and Haiti, all of whom found the existing franchise qualifications far too restrictive.<sup>3</sup> The delegate from Guatemala saw fit to record his suspicion that Great Britain was not prepared "even in the distant future" to initiate African majority rule.<sup>4</sup>

During the debate, the Administering Authority's policies were defended by Australia, Belgium, France, and New Zealand. These powers viewed both the qualitative franchise and Britain's hesitancy to define the frame of

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 13th Session, Supplement No. 4(A/3822), pp. 16-17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-48.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

reference of the Post Elections Committee as necessary expedients until the results of the first phase elections could be properly analyzed.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the British delegate adamantly defended the use of parity and the qualitative franchise as the only workable systems for the territory's first electoral experience. He nonetheless assured the Council that all British policies and procedures were at best temporary and would be reviewed carefully following the release of the results of the 1958-59 contests.

At the conclusion of the debate, despite ardent protests from Great Britain and her allies, the Trusteeship Council passed a resolution in which it recognized the necessity of accepting parity and the qualitative franchise for the upcoming elections, but nonetheless demanded the introduction of universal suffrage at the earliest possible date. In its official statement the international body concluded:

The Council, mindful of the opposition encountered by the Visiting Mission among Africans with regard to the tripartite voting arrangements and to the qualitative franchise in the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Council, notes the explanation given by the Administering

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-28.

Authority, inter alia, that these elections are an experiment and any change in the existing electoral provisions would delay the elections. Recalling its earlier opinion that the tripartite voting system can only be tested by experience, the Council notes the statement of the Administering Authority that the system will be reviewed by the constitutional committee to be appointed in 1959. Recalling also its previous opinion concerning the desirability of progressively broadening the franchise, the Council hopes that the electoral qualifications will be reviewed taking into account the experience gained from the elections and the wishes of the African population with a view to promoting the introduction of universal suffrage with the least possible delay.<sup>1</sup>

At the conclusion of the meeting Sir Andrew Cohen announced that, despite the passage of the resolution, the Administering Authority would under no circumstances consider the initiation of universal adult suffrage as part of the next constitutional advancement. He further denounced the supporters of the resolution arguing that they had no knowledge of true conditions within the trusteeship.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to these two major debates, during the period 1958-59, the Administering Authority was continually deluged with questions concerning the treatment of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen to Lennox-Boyd, March 27, 1958, Lennox-Boyd papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

African nationalists. The anti-colonial powers repeatedly charged that the closing of isolated TANU branches was an attempt to destroy the nationalist drive before it successfully upset Britain's plan to establish a regime ruled by a white minority loyal to the Crown. On several occasions the Soviet Union went so far as to charge that the UTP was no more than an agency of the territorial administration. At the same time, the anti-imperialist powers denounced Britain's efforts to develop the trusteeship as deliberate attempts to perpetuate minority rule by allowing the immigrant races to gain a monopoly on the territorial economic and educational systems.<sup>1</sup> As in the case of all trusteeship deliberation during the 1958-59 period, no concrete alterations occurred as a result of the deliberation.

Thus, by 1959 the nationalist movement in Tanganyika had succeeded in achieving the greater part of its objectives for the political development of the territory. The rapid change which occurred in these years was the result of the willingness of both the

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen notes on Trusteeship Council affairs, January 1958-November 1959, Cohen files, Institute for Commonwealth Studies.

administration and TANU to compromise their policy positions. At the same time it was greatly influenced by the major alterations which occurred in Colonial Office policy. The advent of Turnbull and Macleod, coupled with Tory realization that the pace of political evolution would have to be accelerated, led to the successful incorporation of TANU's basic demands. The colonial government now viewed its function within the territory primarily as the obligation to maintain law and order until the rapidly approaching day of independence.

Finally, this alteration in official policy led to a marked reduction in ideological conflicts in both the home government and the United Nations concerning the political future of the territory. Serious differences of opinion remained, but the fact that Tanganyika would soon have an independent, African controlled government was accepted by all parties involved.

## CHAPTER VI

### FROM RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT TO INDEPENDENCE: .

#### FINAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1960-61

##### The Passing of Colonial Rule

The period 1960-61 was marked by the termination of British rule in Tanganyika. The announcement of the 1960 General Elections made it clear to all concerned factions that an African majority would soon control the government and that independence was soon to follow.

Britain's obligations now consisted primarily of maintaining law and order within the trusteeship while at the same time supervising the constitutional alterations necessary to institute first responsible government, and then independence. As the authority of the Crown steadily decreased in these years, the nationalist movement assumed an increasing number of responsibilities in the handling of the territory's internal affairs. As a result, during the period 1960-61 TANU, in effect, became the government.

Although it was clear that the colonial administration was soon to depart, the years 1960-61 were by no means devoid of conflict between the African population and the Administering Authority. Despite Nyerere's repeated insistence upon law and order and interracial cooperation,<sup>1</sup> the period was once again marked by continual incidents of unrest perpetuated by the militant leaders of scattered Union cells.<sup>2</sup>

Although none of the incidents were sufficiently serious to result in TANU branches being banned, the outbreaks nonetheless reflected the continuance of indigenous dissatisfaction with both administrative personnel and official agricultural and livestock control policies. In addition, they were indicative of an ever-growing tendency among Tanganyikan Africans to disobey local government regulations. This spirit of rebellious civil disobedience was fostered by the realization that Crown authority was on the wane.

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<sup>1</sup>For an example of Nyerere's pleas for moderation see his article "We Must Not Fail" in Lake Province News, No. 8 (March, 1960), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>See Table 17, pp. 750-753.



The widespread refusal by indigenous inhabitants to accept the authority of local administrators was noted in June 1960 by the Tanga Provincial Commissioner who advised his district officers:

The next twelve months is going to be a very difficult period -- not so much in terms of security as in terms of keeping government at district level and below moderately effective and avoiding long term disaster brought about by emotionalism and inexperience.

There will probably be a certain amount of 'uhuru happiness', causing indiscipline and racial irresponsibility -- and the inevitable and dangerous corollary of non-African disillusionment...

The main problem of the new government will be to create constructive rather than destructive activity and interest in the management and development of the country, and our political leaders have no previous experience of this. Most of the TANU politicians are little more conscious of handling the everyday affairs of a province than most top level civil servants have been during the last five years...

There will be a constant temptation for the new Ministers to look for scape-goats whenever anything goes wrong; the hang-over from the imperialist regime is the obvious target with the D.C.'s and P.C.'s the most prominent victims.<sup>2</sup>

The growing tendency of nationalist leaders to initiate conflicts with local administrators was also noted by the Handani District Commissioner who complained:

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<sup>1</sup>Speech delivered by the Provincial Commissioner, Tanga Province, June 16, 1960, in the papers of C. C. Harris, Rhodes House.

All Africans exalted by political and constitutional acceleration suffer from an enormous inferiority complex and are pathetically eager to be accepted as professional equals just because they know they are not...

The Provincial Administration is the most outward and visible sign of the 'Imperialist regime' and is therefore the politicians greatest enemy...<sup>1</sup>

Numerous district officers noted that even when local TANU leaders sought to comply with Nyerere's instructions to maintain law and order, they often did so through methods that were as illegal as the offenses from which they were trying to protect the public.<sup>2</sup> One district commissioner noted:

In the early part of the year there was evident on all sides a spirit of non-co-operation with Government and an automatic aversion to advice. This is changed and the reverse is now the case in most instances. A few of those who find it difficult to keep up with the trend of events remain as potential sources of discontent. This earlier spirit manifested itself in the increased unwillingness to pay tax and a tendency to hold the law lightly...

As a result of the earlier disregard of law was so to confuse people that the reverse movement of the pendulum now evident has brought forth a crop of fresh offenses committed by persons whose

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<sup>1</sup>Annual Report of Handini District, 1960, Tanganyika Provincial and District Books.

<sup>2</sup>Annual district reports for 1960 and 1961, Tanganyika Provincial District Books. See especially Handini and Arusha, 1960, Mwalampaka and Tanga, 1961.

intention it was to restore law and order in the belief that they have the power and authority necessary to do this.<sup>1</sup>

The widespread tendency towards civil disobedience was studied by Hans Cory, a prominent government sociologist, who had studied tribal developments in Tanganyika for over a decade. Speaking of the frequent outbreaks of unrest at the district level, Cory observed:

When the real trouble starts is when egotistic and self-seeking motives become driving forces of a movement and its leadership.

Mr. Julius Nyerere has recently approved those of his followers who are all out to obtain positions within the hierarchy of TANU. There arose another type of men who try to use the demand for national freedom in which every African joined with enthusiasm for their own purposes...The people still listen to their words but they are not the words they have heard from the leader. They usurp now a leadership in the discussion about the reform of Local Government, but in this case they should, like before, not be trusted with their own ideas, but should be disciplined to express the opinions of their leader and his helpers. In other words, TANU must work out together with the present Government the principles on which Local Government should be built up. Then when this is done the officers of TANU in the districts must be controlled by their seniors to follow those principles in the same way as the officers of the present Government do it.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Annual Report of Kilosa district, 1960, in the papers of G. R. P. Henton, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Speech by Hans Cory at a meeting with TANU leaders, Lake Province, January 28, 1960, Cory papers, Rhodes House.

The reports of local administrators in the period 1960-61 abound with complaints concerning TANU inspired unrest. In October 1960, the District Commissioner of Bukoba reported that local Union leaders were threatening to imprison individuals who did not vote for TANU candidates in local tribal council elections.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary to the Minister of Local Government noted that over fifty similar complaints were registered by district officers between October and November of 1960.<sup>2</sup> On October 22, four TANU Youth League members at Ngapa were convicted of holding their own court and for inflicting corporal punishment on local Africans whom they suspected of being disloyal to district cell leaders.<sup>3</sup> In November three prominent Union members in Shinyanga were imprisoned for leading unauthorized demonstrations to protest local destocking and soil conservation measures. In reviewing the case the local magistrate complained:

It is a matter of lasting shame that the major political party in the country is not

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<sup>1</sup>Letter dated October 8, 1960, papers of H. J. Cooke, D.C. Bukoba, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Memo in the papers of Ronald William Neath, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 22-24, 1960.

able to control its members and persuade them to follow lawful activities...it is as well that TANU members in the small towns and villages should understand that they have no right to trample upon and interfere with the liberty of innocent and peaceful Tanganyika citizens.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Hassami Kilugo, the Njombe District Secretary to the TANU Youth League, was found guilty of intimidation. After failing to extract a bribe from a local Asian shopkeeper, he initiated a month long boycott of the shop by Union members.<sup>2</sup> Another incident of non-African harassment occurred when the Secretary of the TANU Masasi branch entered the shop of an Asian merchant and searched it for illegally sold cashew nuts.<sup>3</sup> During the same month, fourteen members of the Union's Arusha branch were convicted of holding their own courts, persecuting Asian shopkeepers, and inciting local inhabitants to demonstrate against government tax measures.<sup>4</sup> On November 22, 1960, Masai cell leader Athumani Makanjila was convicted under the Incitement to Violence Act for his

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<sup>1</sup>Entry dated November 2, 1960, Shinyanga Police files, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, November 2, 1960.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, November 3, 1960.

<sup>4</sup>Annual Report for Arusha District, 1960, Rhodes House.

inflammatory remarks concerning local non-African residents.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the District Commissioner of Ukerewe reported a massive illegal demonstration led by local cell president Nicas Buhatwa who claimed that the ballots for a local council election had been tampered with. His evidence was based on the fact that the TANU candidate had not enjoyed a wide enough margin of victory.<sup>2</sup>

So extensive were the incidents of unrest that in November 1960 George Kahama, the Minister for Home Affairs, saw fit to warn a TANU Youth League meeting that Union members had no right to assume the role of law enforcement officials. He accused the TYL of "arresting" individuals for offenses against the liberation drive, of conducting illegal trials, and of drilling as paramilitary units.<sup>3</sup>

In an attempt to end the steadily increasing incidents of rural unrest, in October 1961 Prime Minister Nyerere announced the initiation of a new administrative

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, November 22, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Annual Report for Ukerewe District, 1960, Rhodes House.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, October 3,4, 1960.

system. Under the plan each Provincial Commissioner would work in close cooperation with a political representative of the area who would be designated by the Legislative Council. The Prime Minister defined the alteration as an attempt to eliminate problems resulting from competition between political and administrative authorities in the rural sections of the territory.<sup>1</sup> When the final details of the plan were released, Provincial Commissioners were ordered to supervise the formation of district teams in each region under their control. The teams were to be composed of: the district Chairman of TANU, all TANU District Secretaries, the District Officers, the Provincial Commissioner, and any members of the National Assembly from the area.<sup>2</sup> The measure is also a reflection of Nyerere's determination to incorporate the nationalist political party directly into the administration -- in other words, to make TANU and the government synonymous.

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, National Assembly, Assembly Debates (Hansard), Thirty-Sixth Session, Fifth Meeting, pp. 96-99. See also: Tanganyika, Office of the Chief Minister, Chief Minister's Circular Letter No. 1 of 1960: The Relationship Between the Civil Service, Political Parties and Members of Legislative Council (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960).

<sup>2</sup>Memos from the Permanent Secretary no. 's PM 110/03 and PM 110/03 (26), October, 1961, Tanganyika Administrative papers, Rhodes House.

The success of Nyerere's plan is measured by the subsequent reports of district and provincial commissioners. The 1961 survey of Ukerewe District noted that with the initiation of the district teams, local TANU organizations became the loyal allies of local law enforcement officers, and that Union efforts to maintain law and order "appear to have been beyond criticism."<sup>2</sup> A confidential memo from the Provincial Commissioner of Lake Province cited the efficiency of TANU in settling an intertribal dispute in that sector of the territory.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, the 1961 reports of over one dozen district officers noted that the TANU Youth League had ceased all illegal police and paramilitary activities and was now actively engaged in school construction and soil conservation programs.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the numerous incidents of local unrest during the period 1960-61, constitutional advancement at the territorial level nonetheless proceeded at an unprecedented

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<sup>1</sup>Annual Report for Ukerewe District, 1961, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Confidential memo from P.C., Lake Province to Prime Minister dated November 18, 1961, Tanzanian National Archives.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika District and Provincial Books, Rhodes House.



pace. On April 26, 1960, the Chief Secretary of the Legislative Council announced that the Secretary of State had authorized widespread changes in the executive branch of the territorial government, to take effect on October 1, 1960, following the tabulation of the upcoming election results. Primary among these alterations was the creation of the post of Chief Minister, who would serve as the Governor's key advisor and as the Leader of Government Business within the legislature. This post was to be filled by an elected member of the Legislative Council. In addition, the Crown announced that the existing position of Chief Secretary was to be replaced by the newly created office of Deputy Governor. The holder of this position would serve as a member of the Council of Ministers, but could not be a member of the Legislative Council. He would also assume the post of head of the Civil Service.

In addition, the executive alterations called for the formation of a new Council of Ministers, to be comprised of the Governor (who was to serve as Council president), the Deputy Governor, ten unofficial ministers, and two Civil Service ministers. The two designated official ministerial posts were to be those of Attorney General and Minister for Information. The ten unofficial posts would include the

new office of Minister for Home Affairs, which would command the portfolios of Police, Prisons, and Immigration. The new arrangements, however, included the stipulation that the use of the Police Force was to remain under the control of the Governor who maintained the right to issue orders to the Commissioner of Police in times of emergency. Finally, it was announced that the Executive Council would be permanently abolished.<sup>1</sup>

The new alterations amounted to a guarantee that responsible government would be initiated following the 1960 General Elections. The Council of Ministers would be comprised of a majority (ten out of twelve) of elected unofficials, and would be responsible to another elected representative, the Chief Minister. The fact that the Chief Minister would be the key spokesman for government business in effect placed executive initiative in the hands of an elected representative. The functions of the Governor were now reduced to those of Commander in Chief of the territorial militia, and chief representative of the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Council Debates (Hansard) Thirty-fifth Session, Second Meeting, pp. 52-59.

Crown. Clearly, the power of initiative was now in the hands of the unofficial members of government.<sup>1</sup>

In comparison to these far-reaching changes in the executive branch of government, the 1960 General Elections were of little political consequence. Registration was completed by the end of March with a total of only 899,055 of an estimated 1,500,000 potential voters registering.<sup>2</sup> On Nomination Day (July 18), only 86 candidates registered to compete for 71 legislative seats.<sup>3</sup> As a result, on July 29 the government announced that 58 candidates had been automatically elected since they faced no opponent on the ballot in their election district.<sup>4</sup> The unopposed contenders included 39 Africans, 8 Europeans, and all 11 Asian candidates.<sup>5</sup> Nyerere himself, as the only African contender in the Dar es Salaam constituency, was spared the time and effort involved in a personal political

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Public Relations Department, This Month in Tanganyika, (April, 1960), passim.

<sup>2</sup>The Colonial Territories 1959-60, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 19, 1960.

<sup>4</sup>Memo from the Elections Officer to the Governor, July 29, 1960, Tanganyika administrative papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

campaign. All of the automatically elected representatives were TANU members or non-Africans who had received Union endorsement. In light of the elimination of most constituents, the government announced that the election date would be advanced to August 30.<sup>1</sup>

In the actual contests, 11 TANU candidates were opposed by 9 independent Africans and 2 candidates endorsed by the A.N.C. In the remaining two European constituencies, two Union supported candidates were pitted against two whites, neither of whom were affiliated with any political organization. Both TANU supported whites were swept to victory, as were 10 of the 11 African candidates.<sup>2</sup> When the final totals were tabulated TANU received 80 percent of the 121,086 votes cast.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time that the government announced the advancement of the election date, it also revealed that

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 31, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, September 1, 1960. The one unsuccessful African candidate was A. Dodo of Mbulu who lost to an independent, H. B. Sarwatt by a vote of 7,860 to 7,620. The local TANU cell had refused to endorse Dodo who was the choice of Dar es Salaam headquarters. Kambona to Betts, September 27, 1960, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Election Officer to Governor, September 27, 1960, Tanganyika administrative papers, Rhodes House.

the timetable for the initiation of responsible government was to be accelerated. Originally scheduled for October 11, 1960, to correspond with the swearing-in of the newly elected Legislative Council, the date was forwarded to September 3. This was done to give the new ministerial staff an opportunity to work with the outgoing Executive Council and thus better prepare themselves for their new responsibilities.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it was announced that Julius Nyerere had been chosen to serve as Chief Minister. When the government announced its appointments to the remaining ministerial posts, the offices of Attorney General and Minister for Information Services were retained by white government officials.<sup>2</sup> The 9 unofficial ministers included 6 Africans, 1 Asian, and 2 Europeans.

Two of the minority community ministers, Dereck Bryceson (Minister for Health and Labour) and Amir Jamal (Minister for Communications, Power and Works) were long-standing allies of TANU. In addition, 4 of the 6 African appointees were active Union leaders. George Kahama was

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<sup>1</sup>Turnbull interview.

<sup>2</sup>I. S. R. Cole and M. J. Davies.

appointed Minister for Home Affairs, while Paul Bomani became Minister for Agriculture and Cooperative Development. Oscar Kambona was assigned the post of Minister for Education, while Chief Rashedi Kawawa became Minister for Local Government and Housing. The only nominated unofficial was the Minister for Finance, Sir Ernest Vasey. With the inclusion of the Governor and the Attorney General, the Council of Ministers was composed of 7 Africans, 6 Europeans, and 1 Asian. Of these, seven retained the positions they had held in the previous government.<sup>1</sup> All of the appointments were made by Turnbull during a series of private consultations with Nyerere in early August 1960.<sup>2</sup> At the swearing-in of the new ministers, the Governor made it clear that the period of responsible government had truly begun, and that the task of future development toward self-rule had passed from the colonial regime to the elected representatives of the people:

The purpose of our meeting here this morning is to administer the necessary oaths to the twelve Ministers who from today will form Her Majesty's Council of Ministers in Tanganyika, and who will

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, September 3-6, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Selwyn-Clarke, September 6, 1960.

become my constitutionally established advisers on all matters of policy and legislation.

Today's ceremony ushers in the last stage of our constitutional development before self-government. We have moved, in less than two years, from a Government of which the executive was composed wholly of officials to a Government in which all but two of the portfolios are held, not by virtue of experience in the Civil Service, but by virtue of membership of the Legislative Council and of the confidence imposed by the leader of the major political party in those to whom they have been allocated...

The tasks that lie before you are primarily these; to accustom yourselves to the acceptance of collective responsibility, even though such acceptance may involve the temporary subordination of some of your political aspirations; to acquire the skill to devise policies which are within the bounds of financial and social circumstances, which are administratively practicable, and which will not conflict with the aims being pursued by your colleagues; and to maintain a close and sympathetic relation between public opinion and the processes of Government.<sup>1</sup>

The September 3 ceremony marked the fulfillment of one of TANU's major goals. With a Council of Ministers comprised almost wholly of TANU members and close allies of the Union, the power of executive initiative was, in effect, in the hands of nationalists. The Union was now in a position to undertake the final steps necessary to attain full

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Speech by His Excellency the Governor Before the Legislative Council At the Swearing-in of Ministers, on 3 September, 1960 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960), p. 2.

independence. Finally, the actions of the Crown made it clear that the British government was no longer attempting to impede the nationalists in the attainment of their ultimate objective. This spirit of cooperation was reflected by the selection of Nyerere as Chief Minister, and by the decision to allow him to approve appointment of the remaining members of the ministerial council. The government also made a concentrated effort to explain the constitutional alterations involved in the initiation of responsible government to the indigenous population. Accordingly, district officers were ordered to hold political education lectures to clarify the details behind the transformation for local inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> In addition, a special pamphlet, written in both English and Kiswahili which explained the recent changes, was widely distributed.<sup>2</sup> Finally, October 11 was designated as "Madaraka Day" to dramatize the significance of the new regime.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Turnbull memo to all District Officers, August 28, 1960, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>"Responsible Government", a pamphlet distributed by the Department of Informational Services, August 1960.

<sup>3</sup>"Madaraka" is the Kiswahili equivalent of "responsible government".



When the new Legislative Council opened it was composed of 71 elected representatives and 10 nominated members who were seated in accordance with the Governor's power of appointment. The non-elected members included 2 officials and 8 unofficials (4 Africans, 4 Europeans, and 2 Asians). All such specially designated members were assigned on the basis of particular skills (as in the case of Sir Ernest Vasey, Minister for Finance) or to insure the representation of minority or special interest groups (as in the case of the appointed representatives of the Arab and Goan communities).<sup>1</sup> In all, the new Legislative Council was composed of 53 African, 16 European, and 13 Asian members.<sup>2</sup> Since the vast majority of these representatives were either TANU members or loyal supporters of the Union, it was clear that the nationalists now possessed the control of the legislative and executive branches necessary to speed the trusteeship to full independence.

The Administering Authority was clearly eager to accelerate the pace of territorial political evolution. Accordingly, when the Legislative Council convened on

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<sup>1</sup>Turnbull interview.

<sup>2</sup>The Colonial Territories, 1960-61, pp. 7-8.

October 11, the Governor announced that a Constitutional Conference would be held in March:

To advise the Secretary of State on the arrangements which need to be made for the attainment of self-government; and consider the steps that will have to be taken to prepare the way for independence and the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, Turnbull announced that the newly appointed ministers would be assigned the task of preparing a Three Year Development Plan aimed at further exploiting the territory's resources, and thus preparing the way for a more self-sufficient, independent government.<sup>2</sup>

The willingness of all sides to agree to a rapid program of political advancement is evidenced by the speed with which the Constitutional Conference despatched its obligation. The meeting, which opened in Dar es Salaam on March 27, 1961, was able in a period of only three days to resolve all of the legal technicalities necessary to grant full independence to Tanganyika. Present at the meetings were the Secretary of State, the Governor, the entire

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, Address by His Excellency the Governor to Legislative Council on 11th October, 1960 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Council of Ministers, three Colonial Office experts on constitutional affairs, and the members of TANU's executive committee.<sup>1</sup>

From the outset, Iain Macleod made it clear that the Colonial Office anticipated little problem in rapidly advancing the territory toward the point of full sovereignty. In his opening statement, the Secretary of State remarked:

I think that at this opening session of the conference I should make clear Her Majesty's Government's position in this matter. It is that we do not oppose the proposal of independence; we welcome it. We know the strength of feeling in your country that Tanganyika must soon take her place in the community of independent nations. There is, therefore, nothing between Her Majesty's Government and Tanganyikans on this great issue...The United Kingdom has no desire to put that date of independence later than absolutely necessary. What we have to do then is to look at the problem that will face this country at independence and see whether we can agree on the date and the work which must be completed beforehand. Let me say that I am sure we shall be successful in reaching agreement on these matters.

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<sup>1</sup>The Government had allowed Nyerere to invite "those of his colleagues who are most directly concerned" to attend the Conference. Tanganyika, National Assembly, Report of the Tanganyika Constitutional Conference, 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Press, 1961), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>London Times, March 28, 1961.

Within three days the conference members were able to formulate a series of stipulations agreeable to all parties involved. Key among these was the announcement that full internal self-government would be initiated in Tanganyika within a few weeks. In order to activate this transformation, the Governor, Deputy Governor, and the two official members would withdraw from the Council of Ministers. The Chief Minister, now known as the Prime Minister, was to assume the position formerly occupied by the Governor as head of the Cabinet. The function of the Governor was now solely to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, except in matters of defense and external affairs.<sup>1</sup> Thus, his role was limited to his position as Commander-in-Chief of the territorial defense forces and his function as the leading representative of the Crown. The running of the internal government was now in the hands of the Cabinet and the elected legislature. At the same time, the Legislative Council was to be renamed the National Assembly with its future composition determined by the Cabinet.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Report of the Constitutional Conference, pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

In addition, the Constitutional Conference delegates agreed to create a Public Service Commission, to begin operations two months after the introduction of self-government. The organization was to be run by a Civil Secretary who would replace the Deputy Governor. The Conference also formulated plans for the creation of both Police Service and Judicial Service Commissions which were to be controlled by the executive branch of government.<sup>1</sup> It was agreed that members of the Civil Service Commission would be appointed by the Governor in consultation with the Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup>

When the conference completed its work, the only technicalities remaining to be settled were the questions of compensation for Overseas Civil Service Personnel, the continuation of Tanganyika's participation in the East African High Commission, and the matter of financial aid for internal development.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>Macleod notes on "Tanganyika Constitutional Arrangements", dated April 21, 1961, Macleod papers, Conservative Party Headquarters.

On the final day of the meeting, the Secretary of State announced that full internal self-government would be initiated on May 1, and that independence day was scheduled for December 28, 1961, a period of less than nine months.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the conference a spirit of close cooperation characterized the relationship between TANU and the Crown. In speaking of the rapid pace of advancement which had occurred since 1958, Nyerere publicly remarked to Turnbull and Macleod:

In the two and one half years since one of you became our Governor and the eighteen months since the other became Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, my colleagues and I have seen enough of your good intentions towards us to leave us in little doubt that the Conference will have a happy outcome. We are fully convinced...that all of us in the conference room are seeking the same objective -- the early and complete independence of Tanganyika. It is idle to pretend that we do not face some problems about the Methods we will use in obtaining that objective, but we can hardly believe that the difficulties over methods or even over timing can be allowed to obstruct the way to what we all so greatly desire.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Cmd. 1360, Report of the Tanganyika Constitutional Conference, 1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), p. 18. This date was later advanced to December 9.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Standard, March 28, 1961.

Words of equal praise were expressed by the Secretary of State for the TANU president:

In the ordinary run of things, it would probably not be appropriate for me to mention individuals as having played a particular part in a country's affairs, but sir, this is no ordinary man. In Mr. Julius Nyerere, this country has a leader to whom not only the people of Tanganyika but many others in all parts of the world can look to with confidence to guide this emerging nation successfully through the very great tasks ahead.<sup>1</sup>

With the culmination of the conference, only a few technicalities stood between the nationalists and their goal of independence.

In May 1961, Julius Nyerere was sworn in as Prime Minister of Tanganyika. At the same time several changes, all approved by Nyerere in consultation with Turnbull,<sup>2</sup> took place within the Cabinet. Under the provision of self-government all ministerial posts ceased to be occupied by representatives of the Crown. Accordingly, the official members of the Cabinet were replaced by individuals selected from among the elected members of the Legislative

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Report of the Tanganyika Constitutional Conference, 1961, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Being the Address Delivered By His Excellency Sir Richard Gordon Turnbull, K.C.M.C., on the Swearing-in of Ministers 1st May, 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), p. 2.

Council. The alteration consisted of the appointing of two African ministers. Tewa Saidi became Minister for Lands and Surveys, while Job Lusinde was selected as Minister for Local Government.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it was decided that the portfolio of the Minister for Information Services was to be taken over by the Prime Minister and that Rashidi Kawawa was to be appointed Minister without portfolio, which in effect made him Deputy Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> Nyerere appointed Roland Brown, a London lawyer, as Attorney General. However, this post was no longer included as part of the Cabinet.<sup>3</sup> Finally, it was decided to retain the highly qualified Sir Edward Vasey as Minister of Finance although he was a nominated member.<sup>4</sup> The remainder of the Cabinet was left unchanged. Of the 12 ministers, 9 were

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<sup>1</sup>Both men were loyal TANU activists and had served as campaign recruiters during the 1960 elections. Jamal to Betts, June 3, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Nyerere to Betts, May 23, 1961. In his letter Nyerere indicated that Kawawa's selection was partially influenced by the Prime Minister's desire to maintain close contacts with the more radical elements of TANU, of whom Kawawa was one of the better known leaders.

<sup>3</sup>Brown, an active Fabian, was recommended to Nyerere by Eirene White. See Nyerere-White-Jamal correspondence, April 15-May 23, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>4</sup>Jamal to Heath, April 28, 1961, Heath papers.



Africans, 2 Europeans, and 1 Asian. All but one were elected members of the Legislative Council.

Thus, as of May 1961, the nationalist goal of full internal self-government had been achieved, and independence was slated for the near future. Africans, and in particular members of the TANU organization, now enjoyed control of both the executive and legislative branches of the territorial government, as well as a virtual monopoly on political influence within the multifold local government town and tribal councils throughout the trusteeship. Finally, British administrative personnel at the central, provincial, and district levels were busily engaged in the process of placing governmental operations in the hands of the Tanganyikan African regime, thus facilitating the nationalist goal of complete administrative control.

One of the few issues remaining to be settled before Tanganyika arrived at full independence was the question of the Civil Service. In 1960, of the 3,800 upper level civil service positions, 2,960 were held by non-Africans (2,418 by Europeans and 542 by Asians).<sup>1</sup> Of

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain, Colonial Office, Col. No. 349, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration. Report By Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Year 1960 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 24-29.

these, only 121 were residents of the territory. Finally, although non-Africans accounted for only 4 percent of the total Civil Service staff,<sup>1</sup> they earned 37 percent of the annual wages paid to government employees.<sup>2</sup> Clearly, positions in the Civil Service would have to be rapidly opened to Tanganyikan Africans if the government were to be truly run by the indigenous majority. At the same time, however, the interests of the non-African civil servants would have to be protected if Nyerere wished to adhere to his promise to avoid racial persecution of the immigrant communities.

In order to solve this dilemma, in December 1960 Nyerere introduced TANU's proposal for a Five Year Africanization Program, under which no one except Africans of tribes indigenous to Tanganyika were to be appointed to the civil service on "permanent and pensionable terms". In order to protect minority interests, however, the plan excluded existing members of the Civil Service and those

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council, United Nations Visiting Missions to Trust Territories in East Africa, Report on Tanganyika, 1960, pp. 35-36.

non-Africans who applied for and were granted Tanganyikan citizenship.<sup>1</sup> By July 1961, over 700 African middle-level officers had been recruited under the new program (16.5 percent of the total middle-level pay scale).<sup>2</sup>

In order to ensure the quality of the Civil Service until a substantial number of Tanganyikan Africans were prepared to assume high level positions, the Tanganyikan Government in 1961 entered into an Overseas Service Aid Scheme agreement with Great Britain through which the Secretary of State contracted to recruit British civil servants for the Tanganyikan Government as the need arose. Individuals recruited would be compensated by the Tanganyikan Government on the same pay scale as the African government's own employees and Britain would provide additional benefits and allowances for the expatriates.<sup>3</sup> In addition, in order to persuade existing employees to retain their positions, Mr. Nyerere wrote letters of appeal to all Civil Service officers requesting them to remain in the service of Tanganyikan government. He personally

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<sup>1</sup>Sauti ya TANU, No. 68, December 7, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika Informational Services, This Month in Tanganyika (July, 1961), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika Standard, February 26, 1961.

assured them that recent inflammatory remarks by TANU politicians concerning British administrators in no way reflected the attitude of the new government:

...I want to make it clear...that My Government, and therefore the great bulk of the people of Tanganyika whom we represent, are really in need of your help; and we will be for a long time to come.

...let it be clearly understood that such wild remarks as were recently reported...do not reflect my views or my Government's or those of the vast majority of the people of this country. You can account for them by the heady atmosphere in which they were delivered and so I hope you will ignore them... We need our experienced administrators, our corps d'elite as the Governor called you the other day, because it is they who keep the whole machinery of Government working...

So I am not suggesting that from now on no irresponsible statements are going to be made by junior politicians in this country. Such a suggestion would be silly. What I am seriously suggesting is that you should not be put off from your great task by such statements and such irresponsibility...

If you can stay indefinitely, that is what I would like best -- subject only to our Africanisation policies, and I have said before that we are so desperately short of trained Africans that these policies are unlikely to affect you adversely for a good time to come.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nyerere letter to all Civil Service Officers, May 1, 1961, Rhodes House. See also Tanganyika, Office of the Chief Minister, Circular Letter No. 1 of 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961).

At the local government level Nyerere introduced a plan in February 1961 which assigned an African trainee, bearing the title of District Commissioner Designate to each European District Commissioner. The African was trained by the British officer until prepared to assume control of the region himself. At that point, the white administrator was transferred to a post of equal rank and pay scale in another sector of the territory.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Nyerere's treatment of the Civil Service once again reflected his moderate position on the questions of race relations and Tanganyikan development. While refusing to allow the minority communities to maintain their monopoly on high level government positions, he was nonetheless unwilling to eliminate qualified immigrants solely for the purpose of providing jobs for Tanganyikan Africans. The program of Africanization would steadily eliminate the inequalities existent in the Civil Service, but not at the expense of the non-African employees already on the payroll.

The final issue to be resolved prior to independence was the question of citizenship. During the month of October,

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<sup>1</sup>Speech by Nyerere at the opening of the Administrative Training Centre, Mzumbe, February 25, 1961, Nyerere papers, Rhodes House,

the National Assembly engaged in an extended debate concerning the Government's White Paper on Citizenship. The document, which had been prepared under Nyerere's careful supervision during July and August,<sup>1</sup> proposed the granting of automatic citizenship to all African residents and recommended the creation of a system to permit non-Africans to become Tanganyikan citizens after independence, either by registration or naturalization.<sup>2</sup> Although the bill met with strong opposition from TANU radicals in the National Assembly (led by Kawawa and Kandoro) it was nonetheless passed into law as a result of Nyerere's direct intervention. Speaking as Prime Minister, he urged the Assembly to allow individuals of all races to elect to become Tanganyikans and thus to eliminate the possibility of racial antagonism in the country.<sup>3</sup> The final version of the approved bill allowed non-Africans who had lived in Tanganyika for a minimum of five uninterrupted years the

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<sup>1</sup>Jamal to Betts, August 16, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika, Tanganyika Citizenship-Government White Paper No. 1, 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup>Tanganyika, National Assembly, Assembly Debates (Hansard), Thirty-Sixth Session (October 17-19, 1961), pp. 307-373.

right to become citizens, providing they renounced citizenship in their country of origin.<sup>1</sup>

With the peaceful settlement of the Civil Service issue and the resolution of the citizenship problem, Tanganyika was prepared for full independence. On December 9, 1961 Nyerere was formally presented the instruments of sovereignty in the Dar es Salaam national stadium.<sup>2</sup> This act was culminated on December 14 when the Security Council unanimously approved the Tanganyikan petition calling for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. On that same day, the newly created nation was admitted as a member of the General Assembly.

In an address before the international body, Nyerere spoke of Tanganyika's goals as a sovereign state, which strongly reflected the philosophy of TANU throughout the independence drive:

The basis of our actions, internal and external, will be an attempt, an honest attempt, to honour the dignity of man. We believe that all mankind is one, that the physiological differences

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika, National Assembly, Government Paper No. 4-1961 Tanganyika Citizenship, 1961 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), pp. 1-4.

<sup>2</sup>Great Britain, Laws and Statutes, 10 Elizabeth, 2 Ch. 1, Tanganyika Independence Act, 1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961).

between us are unimportant in comparison with our common humanity. We believe that black skin or white, straight or curly hair, differences in the shape of our bodies, do not alter or even affect the fact that each one of us is part of the human species and has a part to play in the development of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

With this act, all of TANU's goals had been achieved.

Tanganyika was an independent member of the British Commonwealth with a black majority government.

#### The Transformation of TANU, 1960-61

In the period 1960-61, the Tanganyika African National Union not only emerged as the leading spokesman for the indigenous population, but was also able to fully incorporate itself into the administration of the independent government to the point where Tanganyika and TANU became virtually synonymous. In order to do this, several obstacles had to be overcome and several major alterations achieved within the party's structure.

One of TANU's primary goals during this period was to consolidate the support of the Tanganyikan population behind the nationalist organization. Part of this task included the elimination of all serious opposition within the

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<sup>1</sup>London Times, December 15, 1961.



territory. By 1960 the Union had little to fear from the indigenous population in the political sphere. The Asian Association had recently ceased its political operations, feeling that its support of TANU had given the minority community the maximum assurance possible in a African dominated government.<sup>1</sup> The UTP, by contrast, had been effectively annihilated by its defeat in the 1958-59 campaigns and consequently put forth no candidates in the General Elections.

The only significant form of African resistance came from the persistent, antagonistic activities of the A.N.C. Throughout the last years of the independence drive, Mtemvu continued to agitate TANU in an attempt to lure the more radical anti-immigrant factions of the Union into his organization. In March 1960, for example, the A.N.C. petitioned the Secretary of State for the right to be represented at the Constitutional Conference arguing that the Congress, and not TANU, represented the true aspirations of the Tanganyikan African community. The request was

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<sup>1</sup>Rattansey memo to Asian Association members, March 2, 1960, Asian Association papers, Tanganyika political papers, Rhodes House. See also The Tanganyikan, May 23, 1960.

formally denied.<sup>1</sup> Mtemvu also repeatedly complained that his organization was the victim of relentless persecution because of Nyerere's determination to avoid having an opposition party in the National Assembly. In a petition to the Fabian Bureau for liberal support Mtemvu reported:

I broke from TANU to see that people do not have perpetually the idea of ONE party regime [sic]. I also felt that Julius Nyerere would appreciate the desirability of emergence of true parliamentary Opposition Party [sic] which will help Tanganyika to form a truly democratic parliament when we become independent in the next five years. But this does not seem to be his plan at all. He has been preaching the fantastic idea of ONE party government in Tanganyika at least for 15 years after independence. His attitude has made even Tanganyika government [sic] become so partisan that sometime they do not know what they are doing....<sup>2</sup>

In the 1960 election campaigns it became clear that the territorial population did not agree with Mtemvu's views.<sup>3</sup> The Congress put forth three candidates all of whom did so poorly that they were forced to forfeit their election fees, totaling only 337 votes between them.<sup>3</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>Mtemvu-Macleod correspondence, March 23-April 16, 1960, Macleod files, Conservative Party Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>Mtemvu to Selwyn-Clarke, March 12, 1960, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Bennett, p. 27.

A.N.C. subsequently charged that Africans who had wished to support the Congress had been intimidated by TANU Youth League members.<sup>1</sup> During the 1960 campaign TANU made a marked effort to undermine A.N.C.'s platform by denouncing the Congress as a racist organization. The Union repeatedly stressed Nyerere's insistence upon cooperation with the minority communities and his vow to protect their interests once independence was achieved.<sup>2</sup>

Despite its decisive defeat, the A.N.C. continued its acts of racial antagonism. In November, the party called upon the Government to appoint Africans to the posts of Speaker and Clerk in the Legislative Council, arguing that it was not right for Asians and Europeans to occupy these high paying jobs while Africans were unemployed. In its complaint, the A.N.C. denounced TANU's moderate racial policy complaining that:

By accepting a multi-racial government they [TANU] have admitted to the world what they are incapable of running a country without the

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<sup>1</sup>See statement by A.N.C. Publicity Secretary Frederick E. Omido in Tanganyika Standard, September 8, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona to Nicholson, August 23, 1960. See also the Union's campaign literature: Stephen Mhando, TANU and the Vote (Dar es Salaam: The Dar es Salaam Printers, Limited, 1960), pp. 5-7 and Tanganyika African National Union, Election Manifesto, 1960 (Dar es Salaam: Thakers Ltd. 1960), p. 1.

assistance of foreigners. This is an insult to the African people and the sooner the TANU Government quits, the better.<sup>1</sup>

Despite its ardent campaign, the African National Congress was never able to gain a substantial following among the territory's African population. By early 1961 the government began to take decisive steps to prosecute the A.N.C. for its racist policy statements. On March 8, 1961 the party's Youth League was officially banned for being "incompatible with the maintenance of peace, order and good government", and in the weeks to follow several of its key leaders were officially censured.<sup>2</sup> Shortly thereafter, the A.N.C., the only organized African opposition to TANU, ceased to function.

By 1961 TANU stood as the only Tanganyikan African political organization with representation in the territorial government. The Union possessed 46 branch offices and a total membership of 1,250,000.<sup>3</sup> So prosperous was the party that in June 1961 it was able to donate its

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<sup>1</sup>A.N.C. Publicity Secretary to the Governor, November 5, 1960, Tanganyika political papers, Rhodes House.

<sup>2</sup>Mtemvu to Selwyn-Clarke, March 28, 1961, Ministry of Home Affairs to A.N.C., April 7, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>3</sup>Jamal to Betts, October 19, 1961, FCB papers.

five floor building in Dar es Salaam to the Tanganyika University College.<sup>1</sup>

It was at this point that Nyerere decided to re-write the TANU Constitution to redirect its aims from an organization dedicated to the rapid introduction of self-rule, to one committed to "consolidating the freedom of the country and its people".<sup>2</sup> Nyerere felt that a refocusing of Union goals was essential since the original objectives of the organization had been successfully fulfilled. With the release of the new TANU constitution in September 1960, Nyerere began an aggressive campaign aimed at obviating the possibility of political opposition arising within the territory. During this period he initiated the first in a series of steps which, by 1962, were to result in the creation of a one-party state. Nyerere argued that in a developing nation such as Tanganyika, there was no room for the luxury of political competition. Thus, only one political organization should be allowed to exist. He insisted that this restriction in no way impeded the

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<sup>1</sup>Tanganyika Standard, June 17, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>Tanganyika African National Union, Katiba ya TANU (Dar es Salaam: The Eagle Press, 1961), p. 1.

democratic process since the voice of dissent could always be openly expressed either through the use of petition or via the people's representatives in the National Assembly.<sup>1</sup> In 1961, in an attempt to make accommodations for minority community activities, Nyerere allowed the first non-African members to join TANU.<sup>2</sup> Although initial immigrant participation was limited to members who were "invited" to join on the basis of special qualifications, by 1963 party membership was open to all citizens.

Finally, as part of TANU's new insistence on the preservation of a one party system, by 1961 such organizations as the Meru Citizens Union and Sukumaland Federation were forced to cease all political activities, even on the local government level.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, by independence the Tanganyikan African National Union had not only achieved all of its objectives

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<sup>1</sup>For examples of Nyerere's defense of the one-party concept see: Julius K. Nyerere, "It's Up to Us", Africa Today, December 1961, pp. 4-5, and his Scramble for Africa (Dar es Salaam: Thakars, Ltd., 1961), passim.

<sup>2</sup>The first non-Africans to be admitted were two Asians, Dassa Aziz and Al Noor Kassam, and one European, Lady Chesam. All were made members of the Executive Committee and had been active fund raisers in the 1958-59 and 1960 elections.

<sup>3</sup>McGuire, pp. 278-286.

for territorial political development, but also stood as the only functioning party in the African dominated government. Tanganyika was in the process of becoming a one-party state.

The Home Government and the United Nations--  
Final Considerations

In the period 1960-61 developments in Tanganyika contributed little to the perpetuation of the ideological conflicts underway within both the British Government and the Trusteeship Council. With self-government attained and the date of independence already arranged, the trusteeship no longer served as an issue in the continuing debate concerning the political development of the British dependencies. The liberal and conservative factions, however, varied in their historical evaluations of events within the trusteeship. The Tory party and the Colonial Office viewed the emancipation of Tanganyika as the result of a carefully planned program of political training initiated by the Crown, part of which included a well formulated program of economic and educational advancement resulting from the concentrated efforts of the Colonial Development Corporation.<sup>1</sup> Liberals, by contrast, maintained that

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<sup>1</sup>For examples of the Conservative evaluation of territorial development, see: Great Britain, British

territorial independence came as the result of persistent efforts on the part of the nationalist movement which received little more than opposition from the Colonial Office and the right wing faction of Parliament. They historically evaluated the British systems of indirect rule and parity as totally inadequate failures which produced unnecessary impediments to the emerging sense of indigenous political awareness. Liberals consequently demanded substantial financial aid for post-independence development to partially compensate for the inadequacies of colonial rule.<sup>1</sup>

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Information Services, Tanganyika, A Story of Progress (New York: British Information Services, 1961); Great Britain, British Information Services, Tanganyika: The Making of a Nation (New York: British Information Services, 1961); Tanganyika, Information Services, Day of Triumph for Tanganyika; Happy Victory for a Good Cause (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961); Tanganyika, Information Services, Elected Majority in Legislature. Great Strides Towards Goal of Independence: Tanganyika Legislative Council 1926-60 (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1960); Tanganyika, Information Service, Nchi Yetu (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961).

<sup>1</sup>The liberal interpretation is well depicted by Fenner Brockway, M.P., 1960 Africa's Year of Destiny: A Political Guide to a Continent in Crisis (London: The Movement of Colonial Freedom, 1960); Labour Party, Labour Party Discussion Notes, No. 25; East African Future (London: Labour Party Political Education Series, 1960); Kenneth Younger, Britain's Role in a Changing World (London: The Fabian Society, 1960).



During these final years, correspondence between the liberal activist groups and TANU decreased markedly. With virtually all of the Union's aspirations achieved, there were few problems with which the socialist organizations could assist the nationalists. The Fabian Bureau and the Liberal Party did, however, continue to support TANU in every way possible. Thus, when the question of financial aid to the independent government arose, liberals sent a delegation to the Secretary of State to demand that funds originally allocated for long-range trusteeship development be released to the Tanganyikan government.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, when Nyerere decided to amend the TANU constitution to fit the needs of the independent government, he sought the advice of Fabian and African political experts and finally modeled the new constitution on the Labour Party Contract.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the liberal factions continued to function as the mentors and supporters of TANU.

The unusual spirit of cooperation which existed in the home government and which thus obviated the necessity of serious confrontation is summarized by Selwyn-Clarke's

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Macleod, August 9, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>Kambona correspondence with FCB Secretary Catherine Hoskyns, March 16-April 23, FCB papers.

evaluation of the Macleod administration. Speaking of the Secretary of State's Tanganyika policy the Fabian Secretary remarked:

We all appreciate his difficult position and the extraordinary competence he has shown in dealing with the problems in the trusteeship. We are confident in our anticipation of a happy conclusion to our involvement there. We are therefore focusing our attention on more troubled areas within the East Africa dependencies.<sup>1</sup>

During this period the question of territorial political evolution also ceased to be a source of major controversy within the Trusteeship Council. Although the anti-colonial nations continued to condemn British activities as part of an imperialist ploy to retain at least indirect control of the territory,<sup>2</sup> the general attitude within the international body was one of satisfaction with the rapid political changes initiated by the Administering Authority.<sup>3</sup> Speaking of recent alterations in the constitution of the territory, the 1960 Visiting Mission team reported:

All evidence which the mission has presented in this report clearly indicated that Tanganyika

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<sup>1</sup>Selwyn-Clarke to Jamal, July 25, 1961, FCB papers.

<sup>2</sup>See for example, the U.S.S.R. publication by M. Braguinaki and Y. Loukonine, Apercu D'Historie Du Movement De Liberation Nationale Dans Les Pays D'Afrique Orientale (Moscow: Editions du Progress, 1962).

<sup>3</sup>See for example, "Tanganyika's Progress Toward Independence Harmonious and Rapid", United Nations Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (July, 1960), pp. 36-39.

is progressing smoothly and rapidly towards the ultimate goal set by the international trusteeship system and the problems which remain are very largely of a technical and financial matter. The constitutional advances which have occurred since the visit of the visiting mission in 1957 have far exceeded expectations and, with the institution of responsible government towards the end of 1960, the territory will, in fact, have entered the final stages before independence.<sup>1</sup>

The report also commented favorably on British efforts to increase economic aid to the independent government and took special note of the favorable state of race relations within the territory which it viewed as "an encouraging example to other multiracial societies" in East Africa.<sup>2</sup>

On April 21, 1961, the General Assembly passed by acclamation a resolution calling for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement to take effect immediately after the granting of independence by the Crown.<sup>3</sup> This recommendation was officially activated by a unanimous vote of the Security Council on December 14, 1961. Tanganyika was now a fully sovereign state.

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<sup>1</sup>Report of the Visiting Mission, 1960, pp. 38-39.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>London Times, April 22, 1961.

Thus, the period 1960-61 was marked by the rapid and peaceful settlement of the few remaining political issues to be resolved before the granting of full independence. Notably, these final arrangements came not as the result of Crown-initiated programs, but from the incentive of the newly installed African regime now in full control of territorial development. It was also during this period that TANU and the government of Tanganyika became permanently intertwined. Nyerere and his lieutenants were clearly in control of the administration and had already initiated the first in a series of alterations aimed at the creation of a one-party state.

During the final months of the independence drive, the ideological factions within both the home government and the Trusteeship Council began to have increasingly less interest in territorial developments. With the successful emergence of TANU as the only political power within the independent government, the territory ceased to be a suitable subject for ideological concern either within Great Britain or the confines of the Trusteeship Council. Tanganyika's future was now in the hands of the TANU regime.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION -- THE TRIANGLE OF INTERRELATIONSHIP

An historical analysis of developments within Tanganyika in the years 1946-61 reveals that the political evolution of the trusteeship was the result of a number of interrelated forces, each operating within its own frame of reference towards its own specific political goals.

Key among these factors was the British administration which until 1960 enjoyed the power of initiative in matters involving territorial development. Although always recognizing the fact that Tanganyika would ultimately emerge as an independent member of the Commonwealth with a black majority government, the British Colonial Office nonetheless viewed this transformation as a slow, long-range process which would have to be coupled with substantial advances in the social, economic and educational sectors of the trusteeship.

Post-war British development plans were therefore based on the system of indirect rule with its emphasis on the role of the chiefs and other traditional sources of authority. At the same time, Crown policy stressed the protection of the European and Asian minority communities whom it viewed as the only potential sources of significant internal development. It was because of this view that the system of minority protection referred to as "parity" was introduced and soon became the second major principle of British colonial policy. Consequently, all of the major political alterations initiated by the Crown in the post-war years were based on these two principles of operation. It was for this reason that the administration insisted that representation in the Legislative Council include the preservation of an official majority and at best, racial parity among unofficial members. In accordance with the system of indirect rule, most African nominees appointed by the Governor were chiefs or elders. At the same time, indirect rule was perpetuated at the local level by the preservation of the system of rule by chiefs and headmen who served as the native authorities in the British administrative system. A local government version of parity was also enforced by the Crown's

insistence on the creation of multi-racial township and tribal councils. It was only in the very last years of colonial rule that Britain was willing to recognize the inevitability of a black controlled government in which the fate of the minority communities was dependent upon the policies of the indigenous majority.

The personal papers of numerous Colonial Office and territorial administrative personnel reveal that at no time did the Crown consider the maintenance of tenure over Tanganyika a priority issue in its overall plan for the African dependencies. The final decision, announced at the 1960 Constitutional Conference, to agree to the rapid emancipation of the trusteeship was therefore made with relative ease. The economic bankruptcy of the Colonial Development Corporation and the ever increasing militancy of the rural TANU cells served as further justification, in the eyes of the colonial personnel, for the speedy acceleration of constitutional advancement. Significantly, at no time did key administrators reveal plans to maintain control of Tanganyika for an extended length of time.

Within Tanganyika, Crown colonial policy was ardently supported by the white settler community who were well aware of their position of privilege under the existing system

and who therefore feared the substantial loss of political, economic, and social status which would come with self-rule. Thus, the principal white organizations, the UTP and the Capricorn Society, both centered their political platforms on the preservation of minority control through the use of a qualitative franchise based on high income, educational, and occupational standards.

Indeed, the writings of numerous white settlers as well as the publications and activities of their political organizations reveal that the immigrant European community throughout the post-war period constituted the most reactionary of all those interest groups involved with the question of territorial development. As a small minority group, who enjoyed a position of special privilege and who possessed numerous personal contacts with the colonial administration, the white settler desperately fought to resist the advent of an African-controlled government. However, numerical inferiority and a failure to agree to a clear plan of territorial evolution kept the European community without a viable political organization for the greater part of the independence years. The only reasonably well organized white party, the UTP, collapsed with the termination of the Twining administration.



The Asians, by contrast, as the middle strata community, avoided overt political activities. The religious and cultural divisions which severed the community also discouraged the formation of a unified political front. Thus, the bulk of the Asians avoided participation in the controversial battles of the post-war years. Those few individuals who did enter the political arena, however, became the ardent supporters of the nationalist movement. This decision came as the result of the strong ties which progressive Asians maintained with the liberal reform movement in Britain as well as Asian recognition of the fact that the will of the African majority would ultimately prevail.

The papers of the Asian Association and the personal writings of numerous members of this minority community clearly reflect the willingness of most politically active Asians to support the TANU program for territorial evolution. At the same time, they clearly manifest a feeling of frustration that most members of the community refused to take an active part in political issues.

Thus, lack of organization, interest, and potential combined in the period 1946-61 to minimize the impact of the immigrant races upon the course of territorial amelioration.

Undoubtedly, the most active of all groups concerned with the question of territorial political development was the African nationalist movement. By the early 1950's, Africans became aware that the milder forms of political activity (generally restricted to the use of petitions and public debates) employed by the early indigenous associations, contributed little to the acceleration of territorial political development. It was this realization that caused the T.A.A. to develop a more radical and activist protest strategy, and ultimately to transform itself into the Tanganyika African National Union. With the advent of Julius Nyerere to the presidency of TANU, the African population had the organizational means of successfully resisting British plans for territorial evolution. By his insistence upon an exclusively African community membership, Nyerere was able to insure that his party would be led by, and express the interests of, the African population. At the same time, by maintaining a moderate position on the highly controversial racial issue, he was able to offer a program of political transformation which was eagerly endorsed by both local reformers and anti-Imperialist agitators. By the same token, the moderate nature of Nyerere's long-range plans made them

acceptable to the Crown when it became clear that the growing voice of the African community was indeed a force with which to be dealt.

Once the Union had formulated a course of action, Nyerere refused to alter his basic plans for territorial evolution. Thus, he would concede to neither the racist demands of his militant followers nor the series of counter proposals suggested by the Crown. He was, however, willing to accept temporary compromises and to utilize interim measures in the course of political advancement. Thus, for example, TANU agreed to participate in the 1958-59 elections under the stipulation that the parity vote and qualitative franchise were temporary expediciencies.

By 1960 TANU had clearly emerged as the leading voice of the African population and the only viable political organization within the territory. It now stood ready to initiate the alterations which would result in its incorporation into the actual machinery of government as Tanganyika became a one-party state.

An examination of the internal and external correspondence of the Union clearly reveals the ability of the central headquarters to maintain a moderate and reasonable program of constitutional advancement. At the same time,

the very reasonableness of this program presented a formidable challenge to the Crown by attracting widespread support from liberal reformers in the home government and radical British detractors in the United Nations. In the final analysis even the widespread incidents of civil disobedience in the rural areas worked to the advantage of TANU. Because of their isolated nature they failed to discredit the nationalist drive as a whole. At the same time, Nyerere's ability to prevent major violent confrontations and his repeated condemnation of local Union leaders who violated the law, served to further Nyerere's image as a peaceful reformer. Thus, TANU's overall image was that of a reasonable political reform group which deserved recognition from the Crown.

The program of political evolution within the Trusteeship was also influenced by events within the home government. Throughout the period 1946-61, the liberal and conservative factions were continually divided in their view concerning the pace and structure of territorial development.

The conservatives, represented by the Tory Party and most key Colonial Office personnel, insisted that substantial economic and educational advancement would have

to precede any significant political change. Acceleration of the pace of development and attempts to deviate from the principles of indirect rule and parity were consequently viewed as a plot by either the socialist forces within the home government, or the anti-colonial powers who sought to undermine the British Empire. Conservatives realized that self-rule by African majorities would eventually come to all of the East and Central African dependencies, but firmly believed that a gradual process of overall development which extended for a period of several generations would have to precede the initiation of responsible government.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum liberal reformers, represented primarily by the Labour Party and such socialist-oriented groups as the Fabian Colonial Society and the Africa Bureau, demanded a rapid pace of political development for Tanganyika. They felt that the initiation of self-government would have to be given top priority, even if constitutional development far outdistanced changes in the territory's social, economic, and educational structure. By applying pressure on the Colonial Office through their representatives in Parliament, such zealots were able to bring the issue of Tanganyikan political evolution to the attention of the British public.

In their attempts to stir public interest the liberal faction employed the friendly press, public speeches, discussion groups, and an endless barrage of pamphlets, leaflets, broadsheets, and magazine articles to spread its message. All such forms of publicity were highly critical of British administrative policy and at the same time stressed the reasonableness and moderation of TANU plans. Thus, the reformers appealed for the support of not only the liberal, but also the more moderate elements within the home government. At the same time, they maintained close contacts with TANU leaders and with sympathetic members of the territory's non-African population.

The writings of home government politicians and activist reformers therefore reflect a clear ideological split over the question of Tanganyika's future. However, it should be noted that both sides continually reflected a basically open minded attitude and a willingness to at least consider compromise when major confrontations arose. Thus, the Colonial Office never banned TANU as a whole, offered Nyerere numerous opportunities to serve as a nominated member of the Legislative Council and regularly lifted restrictions on banned Union cells whenever the danger of

civil disorder appeared to have subsided. Liberals at the same time were aware of the tangible practical problems involved in the administration of a dependency, and supported those government plans which they felt were reasonable. Thus in the final analysis, for example, the Labour Party and the Fabian Colonial Bureau endorsed the Meru Land Scheme.

Finally, the papers of liberal reformers reveal the strong influence which the Fabian Bureau had within TANU. The early political training of Nyerere was supervised by Bureau mentors. Throughout the independence drive the Society served as both the advisor and defender of many of the leading Union spokesmen. Perhaps the key illustration of Fabian influence is the fact that James Betts served as consultant to Nyerere in the formulation of TANU's demands for constitutional reform during the 1958 territorial election campaigns. Clearly, the liberal elements of the home government were key participators in the drive for Tanganyikan independence.

While the battle within the home government raged, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations also joined the debate over territorial development. From its inception, the international body was sharply divided between

the former colonial powers and the anti-imperialist faction composed of the Communist nations and the liberated states of the Third World. In a period when the British Empire was engaged in a slow but determined process of liberating its dependencies, the anti-colonial forces embarked on a program of relentless harassment based on their claim that the Crown was determined to permanently maintain at least indirect control of Tanganyika by placing the pro-British minority communities firmly into power prior to emancipation. Thus, all Crown policies were viewed as acts of deception aimed at keeping the Empire intact. The fact that the Trusteeship Agreement and U. N. Charter failed to clearly define the extent to which the Trusteeship Council could supervise the British administration only increased the polemical intensity of the Council's debates. The annual reports of the Administering Authority, the findings of the visiting mission teams, and the petitions received from the territorial inhabitants, therefore became weapons in an ideological battle and not evidence upon which to formulate a realistic appraisal of the true territorial situation. The fact that most nations critical of British policy had no knowledge of the complexities of colonial administration further confused the



issues. The official documents of the Trusteeship Council reveal the existence of a continual ideological battle in which the theoretical question of the rights or wrongs of colonialism over-shadowed the objective examination of actual conditions within the territory.

Thus, it is impossible to point to a single factor as the catalyst of Tanganyikan liberation. The African nationalist drive offered the British a reasonable and balanced approach to the problem of rapid territorial development. Therefore, when the economic considerations, coupled with the rapid emergence of African political awareness, made it obvious that the Crown could not hope to effectively achieve her plans for long range political development, TANU offered a suitable alternative to the existing system. At the same time, relentless pressure from the liberal factions of the home government and British opponents on the Trusteeship Council, made the perpetuation of Crown rule (always tentative because of the territory's trusteeship status) seem increasingly less desirable. Thus, once the Crown abandoned its original plans, a viable alternative method had already been formulated by TANU and her allies. Tanganyikan independence is, therefore, the end result of the interaction of all these factors.

APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM<sup>1</sup>

ARTICLE 75. The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision as such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

ARTICLE 76. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present charter, shall be:

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economic, social, educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the

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<sup>1</sup>Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 25, 1945.

people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the people of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

#### ARTICLE 77.

1. Trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

(a) territories now held under mandate;

(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

(c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

ARTICLE 78. The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

ARTICLE 79. The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 95.

ARTICLE 80.

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81,

placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph I of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

ARTICLE 81. The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trusteeship territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

ARTICLE 82. There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the

agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

**ARTICLE 83.**

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice or security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social and educational matters in the strategic areas.

**ARTICLE 84.** It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and

security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the territory.

ARTICLE 85.

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

APPENDIX B

TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE TERRITORY  
OF TANGANYIKA<sup>1</sup>

Whereas the territory known as Tanganyika has been administered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations under a Mandate conferred on His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas Article 85 of the United Nations Charter, signed at San Francisco on 26 June, 1945, provides for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements; and

Whereas His Majesty has indicated his desire to place Tanganyika under the said international trusteeship system; and

Whereas in accordance with Articles 75 and 77 of the said Charter, the placing of a territory under the

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<sup>1</sup>Approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 13, 1946. United Nations, General Assembly, Tanganyika Trusteeship Agreement (CT/Agreement 12, 1946).



international trusteeship system is to be effective by means of a Trusteeship Agreement;

Now, therefore, the General Assembly of the United Nations hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for Tanganyika.

ARTICLE 1. The Territory to which this Agreement applies comprises that part of East Africa lying within the boundaries defined by Article 1 of the British Mandate for East Africa, and by the Anglo-Belgian Treaty of 22 November, 1934, regarding the boundary between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urandi.

ARTICLE 2. His Majesty is hereby designated as Administering Authority for Tanganyika, the responsibility for the administration of which will be undertaken by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

ARTICLE 3. The Administering Authority undertakes to administer Tanganyika in such a manner as to achieve the objectives of the international trusteeship system laid down in Article 76 of the United Nations Charter. The Administering Authority further undertakes to collaborate fully with the General Assembly of the United Nations and the

Trusteeship Council in the discharge of all their functions as defined in Article 87 of the United Nations Charter, and to facilitate any periodic visits to Tanganyika which they may deem necessary, at times to be agreed upon with the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 4. The Administering Authority shall be responsible (a) for the peace, order, good government and defence of Tanganyika, and (b) for ensuring that it shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 5. For the above-mentioned purposes and for all purposes of this Agreement, as may be necessary, the Administering Authority:

(a) shall have full powers of legislation, administration, and jurisdiction in Tanganyika, subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of this agreement;

(b) shall be entitled to constitute Tanganyika into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with adjacent territories under his sovereignty or control, and to establish common services between such territories and Tanganyika where such measures

are not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system and with the terms of this Agreement;

(c) and shall be entitled to establish naval, military and air bases, to erect fortifications, to station and employ his own forces in Tanganyika and to take all such other measures as are in his opinion necessary for the defence of Tanganyika and for ensuring that the territory plays its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the Administering Authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from Tanganyika in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the Administering Authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within Tanganyika.

ARTICLE 6. The Administering Authority shall promote the development of free political institutions suited to Tanganyika. To this end, the Administering Authority shall assure to the inhabitants of Tanganyika a progressively increasing share in the administrative and other services of the Territory; shall develop the participation of the inhabitants of Tanganyika in advisory and legislative bodies and

in the government of the Territory, both central and local, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Territory and its peoples; and shall take all other appropriate measures with a view to the political advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika in accordance with Article 76 (b) of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 7. The Administering Authority undertakes to apply in Tanganyika the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations already existing or hereafter drawn up by the United Nations or by the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter, which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Territory and which would conduce to the achievement of the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system.

ARTICLE 8. In framing laws relating to the holding or transfer of land and natural resources, the Administering Authority shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and shall respect the rights and safeguard the interest, both present and future, of the native population. No native land or natural resources may be transferred, except between natives, save with the

previous consent of the competent public authority. No real rights over native land or natural resources in favor of non-natives may be created except with the same consent.

ARTICLE 9. Subject to the provisions of Article 10 of this Agreement, the Administering Authority shall take all necessary steps to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, industrial and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals and to this end:

(a) shall ensure the same rights to all nationals of Members of the United Nations as to his own nationals in respect of entry into and residence in Tanganyika, freedom of transit and navigation, of property both movable and immovable, the protection of person and property, and the exercise of professions and trades;

(b) shall not discriminate on grounds of nationality against nationals of any Member of the United Nations in matters relating to the grant of concessions for the development of the natural resources of Tanganyika and shall not grant concessions having the character of a general monopoly;

(c) shall ensure equal treatment in the administration of justice to the nationals of all Members of the United Nations.

The rights conferred by this Article on nationals of Members of the United Nations apply equally to companies and associations controlled by such nationals and organized in accordance with the law of any Member of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 10. Measures taken to give effect to Article 9 of this Agreement shall be subject always to the overriding duty of the Administering Authority in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Charter to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika, to carry out the other basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, and to maintain peace, order and good government. The Administering Authority shall in particular be free:

- (a) to organize essential public services and works on such terms and conditions as he thinks just;
- (b) to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in order to provide Tanganyika with the fiscal resources

which seem best suited in local requirements, or otherwise to serve the interest of the inhabitants of Tanganyika;

(c) where the interests of the economic advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika may require it, to establish, or permit to be established, of specific purposes, other monopolies or undertakings having in them an element of monopoly, under conditions of proper control; provided that, in the selection of agencies to carry out the purpose of this paragraph, other than agencies controlled by Government of those in which the Government participates, the Administering Authority shall not discriminate on grounds of nationality against Members of the United Nations or their nationals.

ARTICLE 11. Nothing in this Agreement shall entitle any Member of the United Nations to claim for itself or for its nationals, companies and associations the benefits or Article 9 of this Agreement in any respect in which it does not give to the inhabitants, companies and associations of Tanganyika equality of treatment with the nationals, companies and associations of the state which it treats most favorably.

ARTICLE 12. The Administering Authority shall, as may be appropriate to the circumstances of Tanganyika, continue and extend a general system of elementary education designed to abolish illiteracy and to facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the populations, child and adult, and shall similarly provide such facilities as may prove desirable and practicable in the interests of the inhabitants for qualified students to receive secondary and higher education, including professional training.

ARTICLE 13. The Administering Authority shall ensure in Tanganyika complete freedom of conscience and, so far as is consistent with the requirements of public order and morality, freedom of religious teaching and the free exercise of all forms of worship. Subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the Agreement and the local law, missionaries who are nationals of Members of the United Nations shall be free to enter Tanganyika and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings and to open schools and hospitals in the territory. The provisions of this Article shall not, however, affect the right and duty of the Administering Authority to exercise such controls as he may consider necessary for the



maintenance of peace, order and good government and for the educational advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika, and to take all measures required for such control.

ARTICLE 14. Subject only to the requirement of public order, the Administering Authority shall guarantee to the inhabitants of Tanganyika freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of petition.

ARTICLE 15. The Administering Authority may arrange for the cooperation of Tanganyika in any regional advisory commission, regional technical organization or other voluntary association of states, any specialized international activity not inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 16. The Administering Authority shall make to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the basis of a questionnaire drawn up by the Trusteeship Council in accordance with Article 88 of the United Nations Charter. Such reports shall include information concerning the measures taken to give effect to suggestions and recommendations of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. The Administering Authority shall designate an accredited representative to be present at the

sessions of the Trusteeship Council at which the reports of the Administering Authority with regard to Tanganyika are considered.

ARTICLE 17. Nothing in this Agreement shall effect the rights of the Administering Authority to propose, at any future date, the amendment of this Agreement for the purpose of designating the whole or part of Tanganyika as a strategic area or for any other purpose not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system.

ARTICLE 18. The term of this Agreement shall not be altered or amended except as provided in Article 79 and Article 83 or 85, as the case may be, of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 19. If any dispute whatever should arise between the Administering Authority and another Member of the United Nations relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of this agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided for in Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter.

APPENDIX C

TABLES

THE TRIBAL GROUPS OF TANGANYIKA

TABLE 1 for Map 2

1. Luo	21. Sambia
2. Kuria	22. Mbugu
3. Suba (i)	23. Digo
4. Kwaya-(ii)	24. Segeju
5. Jita (ii)	25. Bonde
6. Kerewe (ii)	26. Zigua
7. Kara (iii)	27. Kwavi
8. Shashi	28. Ngulu (sometimes known as Nguu or Nguru)
9. Zanaki	29. Kaguru
10. Ikizu	30. Doe
11. Ikoma	31. Kwere
12. Nguruimi	32. Zaramo
13. Sonjo	33. Luguru
14. Masai	34. Sagara
15. Arusha	35. Ndengereko
16. Meru	36. Rufiji
17. Chagga	37. Kutu
18. Kahe	38. Vidunda
19. Arusha Chin	39. Matumbi
20. Pare	40. Mwera

- |                                      |                               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 41. Machinga                         | 63. Barabaig                  |
| 42. Ngindo                           | 64. Iraqw                     |
| 43. Makonde                          | 65. Gorowa                    |
| 43A. Mawai                           | 66. Mbugwe                    |
| 44. Matambwe                         | 67. Hadzapi                   |
| 45. Makau                            | 68. Isanzu                    |
| 46. Yao                              | 69. Iambi                     |
| 47. Ndendeuli                        | 70. Iramba                    |
| 48. Ngoni                            | 71. Sukuma                    |
| 49. Matengo                          | 72. Nyamwezi                  |
| 50. Nyasa                            | 73. Sumbwa                    |
| 51. Pangwa                           | 74. Zinza                     |
| 52. Bena                             | 75. Haya                      |
| 53. Ngoni of Mpepo                   | 75A. Nyambo                   |
| 54. Pogoro                           | 76. Ruanda                    |
| 55. Ndamba                           | 77. Hangaza                   |
| 56. Mbunga                           | 78. Subi                      |
| 57. Hehe                             | 79. Rundi                     |
| 58. Gogo                             | 80. Ha                        |
| 59. Turu                             | 81. Jiji, Rundi, Ha admixture |
| 60. Sandawe                          | 82. Vinza                     |
| 61. Burungi                          | 83. Tongwe                    |
| 62. Rangi, with admixture<br>of Wasi | 84. Holcholo                  |

- |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|
| 85. Bende     | 96. Nyiha     |
| 86. Konongo   | 97. Wungu     |
| 87. Pimbwe    | 98. Safwa     |
| 88. Rungwa    | 99. Sangu     |
| 89. Fipa      | 100. Wanji    |
| 90. Rungwa    | 101. Kinga    |
| 91. Kimbu     | 102. Nyakyusa |
| 92. Nyika     | 103. Kisi     |
| 93. Wanda     | 104. Ndali    |
| 94. Mtambwe   | 105. Malila   |
| 95. Nyamwanga | 106. Lambia   |

TABLE 2

Incidents of African Protest Against Government  
Policy, Representatives or Forced  
Agricultural Methods 1945-50

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Arusha 1945	tax, native authority, destocking
Arusha 1946	native authority, destocking
Arusha 1947	tax, agricultural controls
Arusha 1948	tax, native authority
Arusha 1949	native authority, agricultural controls
Arusha 1950	tax, destocking, agricultural controls
Bukoba 1945	native authority, cattle dipping
Bukoba 1946	tax, native authority, destocking
Bukoba 1947	tax, native authority
Bukoba 1948	tax, destocking, agricultural controls
Bukoba 1949	tax, native authority, cattle dipping
Bukoba 1950	tax, agricultural controls, cattle dipping
Dodoma 1945	native authority, destocking, agricultural controls
Dodoma 1946	tax, native authority, agricultural controls

Dodoma 1947	tax, native authority, destocking, agricultural controls
Dodoma 1948	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Dodoma 1949	native authority, cattle dipping
Dodoma 1950	tax, native authority, destocking
Iringa 1945	native authority, agricultural controls
Iringa 1946	native authority
Iringa 1947	tax, agricultural controls
Iringa 1948	native authority, destocking, agricultural control
Iringa 1949	native authority, agricultural control
Iringa 1950	tax, native authority, cattle dipping
Kilosi 1945	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Kilosi 1946	tax, native authority, destocking, agricultural control
Kilosi 1947	tax, native authority
Kilosi 1948	native authority, agricultural control
Kilosi 1949	native authority, destocking
Kilosi 1950	tax
Kesarawe 1945	native authority, destocking



Kesarawe 1946	native authority, agricultural control
Kesarawe 1947	tax, native authority, cattle dipping
Kesarawe 1948	native authority, destocking, agricultural control
Kesarawe 1949	native authority
Kesarawe 1950	native authority, destocking, agricultural control
Lushoto 1945	destocking, agricultural control
Lushoto 1946	native authority, cattle dipping
Lushoto 1947	tax, native authority, agricultural control
Lushoto 1948	native authority
Lushoto 1949	tax, destocking, agricultural control
Lushoto 1950	native authority
Mbeya 1945	tax, agricultural control
Mbeya 1946	destocking, cattle dipping
Mbeya 1947	tax, destocking
Mbeya 1948	destocking, agricultural control
Mbeya 1949	tax, destocking
Mbeya 1950	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Moshi 1945	agricultural control
Moshi 1946	native authority, destocking
Moshi 1947	tax, cattle dipping

Moshi 1948	tax, destocking
Moshi 1949	tax, agricultural control
Moshi 1950	destocking
Mtwara 1945	
Mtwara 1946	tax, native authority, cattle dipping
Mtwara 1947	native authority
Mtwara 1948	
Mtwara 1949	tax, destocking, agricultural control
Mtwara 1950	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Pangani 1945	
Pangani 1946	
Pangani 1947	tax, native authority, destocking, agricultural control
Pangani 1948	
Pangani 1949	tax, native authority, agricultural control
Pangani 1950	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Rungwa 1945	native authority, destocking, cattle dipping
Rungwa 1946	tax, native authority
Rungwa 1947	
Rungwa 1948	tax, destocking, agricultural control

Rungwa 1949

Rungwa 1950

tax, native authority, destocking, agricultural control

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Source: Tanganyika Provincial and District Books, 1945-50. Rhodes House African Collection, Oxford; Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners, 1945-50 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1946-51). The personal papers of administrative personnel substantiate the official reports. See papers of George Maclean, Sir Philip Euen Mitchell, B. J. J. Stuhkings and J. M. Sword, Rhodes House.

TABLE 3

Mackenzie Report Suggestions for Electoral Constituencies, 1952

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>European Vote</u>	<u>Asian Vote</u>	<u>African Vote</u>
Central Province	—	—	NAR
Eastern Province (excluding Dar es Salaam)	—	—	NAR
Lake Province	—	DE or NAR	NAR
Northern Province	DE	DE	NAR
Southern Province	—	—	NAR
Southern Highlands Province	DE or NAR	DE or CR	NAR or CR
Tanga Province	DE or CR	DE or CR	NAR or CR
Western Province	—	—	NAR

Mackenzie Report Suggestions for Electoral Constituencies, 1952

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>European Vote</u>	<u>Asian Vote</u>	<u>African Vote</u>
Dar es Salaam	5 NAL or IE	4 or 5 NAL or IE	—

Key: DE = Directly elected on a common roll  
IE = Indirectly elected on a common roll  
NAL = Nominated at large  
NAR = Nominated as representative  
CR = Reserved seat on a common roll  
— = Race not represented

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Source: Tanganyika, Constitutional Development Commission, Report of the Special Commissioner Appointed to Examine Matters Arising Out of the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1953), passim.

TABLE 4

The Development of the Tanganyika Legislative Council

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Membership</u>	<u>Officials</u>	<u>Unofficials</u>	<u>Europeans</u>	<u>Asians</u>	<u>Africans</u>
1945	27	15	12	7	3	2
1947	28	15	13	7	3	3
1954	29	15	14	7	3	4
1955	61	31	30	10	10	10
1957	67	33	34	11	11	11
1959	53	28	25		parity vote	
1960	80	71	9	10	11	50

Source: J. P. Moffett, ed., Handbook of Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958), and "Elections in Mainland Tanzania: A Historical Record," Mbioni, 1970, Vol. II, No. 5 (July, 1970), 17-21.

TABLE 5The Development of the Tanganyika Constitution:  
1920-1960

<u>Date</u>	<u>Legislative Council de jure</u>
1926	13 officials, 10 unofficials - any race
1945	15 officials, 14 unofficials - must include at least one African
1953	Speaker replaces Governor as Chairman
1955	31 officials, 30 unofficials - 10 each race 27 for 9 constituencies 3 for general interests
1957	34 officials and nominated unofficials (no fixed ratio or racial quota) 33 representative members, 11 per race (30 for 10 constituencies, 3 for general interests)
1958	first election, 1st part, September
1959	first election, 2nd part, February (composition of Council still as in 1957)
1960	Chief minister to head Government 71 elected members (50 for open seats) 11 seats reserved for Asians 10 seats reserved for Europeans Governor still empowered to nominate members for general interests.

Legislative Council de facto

1926	2 Asians included, no Africans
1945	2 Africans included

Date                      Legislative Council de facto

1948    4 Africans included

1959    Government side: 28 all non elected

    7 official ministers

    16 nominated members:

        7 Africans

        4 Asians

        5 Europeans (1, an official)

    5 elected ministers

Representative side: 25 elected members

1960    71 elected members

    (50 African, for open seats

    11 Asians

    10 Europeans)

    8 nominated members

    (4 Europeans

    2 Asians

    2 Africans)

Executive Council

1920    4 officials

1926    6 officials

1948    "Member system" introduced

1954    2 ex-officio members

    5 nominated members

    6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative Council members

1955    6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side of the Legislative Council

1957    8 officials (now called ministers)

    6 assistant ministers

    (4 Africans

    1 Asian

    1 European),

    ex-officio members of Legislative Council but not of Executive Council



Date                      Legislative Council de facto

1948    4 Africans included

1959    Government side: 28 all non elected

7 official ministers

16 nominated members:

7 Africans

4 Asians

5 Europeans (1, an official)

5 elected ministers

Representative side: 28 elected members

1960    71 elected members

(50 African, for open seats

11 Asians

10 Europeans)

8 nominated members

(4 Europeans

2 Asians

2 Africans)

Executive Council

1920    4 officials

1926    6 officials

1948    "Member system" introduced

1954    3 ex-officio members

5 nominated members

6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative Council members

1955    6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side of the Legislative Council

1957    8 officials (now called ministers)

6 assistant ministers

(4 Africans

1 Asian

1 European),

ex-officio members of Legislative Council but not of Executive Council

Date                      Legislative Council de facto

1948    4 Africans included

1959    Government side: 28 all non elected

7 official ministers

16 nominated members:

7 Africans

4 Asians

5 Europeans (1, an official)

5 elected ministers

Representative side: 28<sup>5</sup> elected members

1960    71 elected members

(50 African, for open seats

11 Asians

10 Europeans)

8 nominated members

(4 Europeans

2 Asians

2 Africans)

Executive Council

1920    4 officials

1926    6 officials

1948    "Member system" introduced

1954    3 ex-officio members

5 nominated members

6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative Council members

1955    6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side of the Legislative Council

1957    8 officials (now called ministers)

6 assistant ministers

(4 Africans

1 Asian

1 European),

ex-officio members of Legislative Council but not of Executive Council

Date                      Legislative Council de facto

- 1948    4 Africans included
- 1959    Government side: 28 all non elected  
           7 official ministers  
           16 nominated members:  
             7 Africans  
             4 Asians  
             5 Europeans (1, an official)  
           5 elected ministers

Representative side: 28 elected members

- 1960    71 elected members  
           (50 African, for open seats  
             11 Asians  
             10 Europeans)  
           8 nominated members  
           (4 Europeans  
             2 Asians  
             2 Africans)

Executive Council

- 1920    4 officials
- 1926    6 officials
- 1948    "Member system" introduced
- 1954    3 ex-officio members  
           5 nominated members  
           6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative  
           Council members
- 1955    6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side  
           of the Legislative Council
- 1957    8 officials (now called ministers)  
           6 assistant ministers  
           (4 Africans  
             1 Asian  
             1 European),  
           ex-officio members of Legislative Council but  
           not of Executive Council

<u>Date</u>	<u>Legislative Council de facto</u>
1948	4 Africans included
1959	<u>Government side:</u> 28 all non elected 7 official ministers 16 nominated members: 7 Africans 4 Asians 5 Europeans (1, an official) 5 elected ministers  <u>Representative side:</u> 25 elected members
1960	71 elected members (50 African, for open seats 11 Asians 10 Europeans) 8 nominated members (4 Europeans 2 Asians 2 Africans)
	<u>Executive Council</u>
1920	4 officials
1926	6 officials
1948	"Member system" introduced
1954	2 ex-officio members 5 nominated members 6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative Council members
1955	6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side of the Legislative Council
1957	8 officials (now called ministers) 6 assistant ministers (4 Africans 1 Asian 1 European), ex-officio members of Legislative Council but not of Executive Council

Date                      Legislative Council de facto

- 1948    4 Africans included
- 1959    Government side: 28 all non elected  
           7 official ministers  
           16 nominated members:  
             7 Africans  
             4 Asians  
             5 Europeans (1, an official)  
           5 elected ministers

Representative side: 25 elected members

- 1960    71 elected members  
           (50 African, for open seats  
             11 Asians  
             10 Europeans)  
           8 nominated members  
           (4 Europeans  
             2 Asians  
             2 Africans)

Executive Council

- 1920    4 officials
- 1926    6 officials
- 1948    "Member system" introduced
- 1954    3 ex-officio members  
           5 nominated members  
           6 unofficials, 2 of each race, all Legislative  
           Council members
- 1955    6 unofficials who now sit on the Government side  
           of the Legislative Council
- 1957    8 officials (now called ministers)  
           6 assistant ministers  
           (4 Africans  
             1 Asian  
             1 European),  
           ex-officio members of Legislative Council but  
           not of Executive Council



<u>Date</u>	<u>Executive Council</u>
1959	<p>Function of Executive Council taken over by <u>Council of Ministers</u></p> <p>4 official ministers</p> <p>5 unofficial ministers            (3 Africans            1 Asian            1 European),            all elected members of Legislative Council</p>
1960	<p>2 official Ministers</p> <p>10 unofficial Ministers (including Chief Minister)</p> <p>7 Africans</p> <p>2 Europeans</p> <p>1 Asian</p>
	<p><u>Franchise:</u> none before 1957</p>
1957	<p>qualifications: 2 years secondary education or            £150 annual income or specified            office</p>
1958	<p>voters registration - 60,000</p>
1959	
1960	<p>qualifications: literacy in English or Swahili or            £75 annual income or specified            office, past or present</p> <p>voters eligible: 1,500,000</p> <p>voters registered: 133,000</p>

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Source: This summary is based on an examination of the Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, 1926-1961, The Tanganyika Standard, 1945-61; Annual reports to League of Nations and United Nations, 1926-61.

DateExecutive Council

1959 Function of Executive Council taken over by Council of Ministers

4 official ministers

5 unofficial ministers

(3 Africans

1 Asian

1 European),

all elected members of Legislative Council.

1960 2 official Ministers

10 unofficial Ministers (including Chief Minister)

7 Africans

2 Europeans

1 Asian

Franchise: none before 1957

1957 qualifications: 2 years secondary education or  
£150 annual income or specified  
office

1958 voters registration - 60,000

1959

1960 qualifications: literacy in English or Swahili or  
£75 annual income or specified  
office, past or present

voters eligible: 1,500,000

voters registered: 133,000

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Source: This summary is based on an examination of the Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, 1926-1961, The Tanganyika Standard, 1945-61; Annual reports to League of Nations and United Nations, 1926-61.



TABLE 6

Incidents of African Protest Against Government  
Policy and Representatives, 1950-54

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Arusha 1951	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Arusha 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Arusha 1953	Tax, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Arusha 1954	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Bilharamulo 1951	Tax, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Bilharamulo 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Bilharamulo 1953	- - - - -
Bilharamulo 1954	Native authority, Destocking
Bukoĉa 1951	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Bukoba 1952	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Bukoba 1953	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Bukoba 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Buha 1951	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Buha 1952	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Buha 1953	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Buha 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Dodoma 1951	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Dodoma 1952	Native authority, Destocking
Dodoma 1953	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Dodoma 1954	Agricultural controls, Destocking
Handini 1951	- - - - -
Handini 1952	Tax, Agricultural controls
Handini 1953	Native authority, Destocking
Handini 1954	Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Iringa 1951	Tax, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Iringa 1952	Tax, Native authority, Cattle dipping
Iringa 1953	Native authority, Destocking
Iringa 1954	- - - - -
Kesarawe 1951	- - - - -
Kesarawe 1952	Tax, Native authority
Kesarawe 1953	- - - - -
Kesarawe 1954	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kilimanjaro 1951	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Kilimanjaro 1952	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Kilimanjaro 1953	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Kilimanjaro 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Kilosi 1951	- - - - -
Kilosi 1952	Tax, Native authority, Destocking
Kilosi 1953	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Kilosi 1954	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Konda 1951	Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Konda 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Konda 1953	- - - - -
Konda 1954	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kondoa 1951	Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Kondoa 1952	Tax
Kondoa 1953	- - - - -
Kondoa 1954	Native authority, Cattle dipping
Korogwe 1951	Tax, Native authority, Cattle dipping
Korogwe 1952	Tax, Agricultural controls
Korogwe 1953	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Korogwe 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Lushoto 1951	Native authority
Lushoto 1952	Tax, Native authority, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Lushoto 1953	- - - - -
Lushoto 1954	Native authority, Agricultural controls
Masai 1951	- - - - -
Masai 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls
Masai 1953	- - - - -
Masai 1954	- - - - -
Mbeya 1951	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mbeya 1952	- - - - -
Mbeya 1953	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mbeya 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Mbulu 1951	Native authority, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1952	- - - - -
Mbulu 1953	Agricultural controls, Destocking
Mbulu 1954	Tax, Native authority
Moshi 1951	Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Moshi 1953	Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1954	Tax, Native authority
Mwanza 1951	Tax, Native authority, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1952	Agricultural controls, Destocking
Mwanza 1953	Tax, Native authority, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1954	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Pangani 1951	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Pangani 1952	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Pangani 1953	- - - - -
Pangani 1954	Tax, Agricultural controls
Rungwa 1951	- - - - -
Rungwa 1952	Tax, Native authority, Agricul- tural controls, Cattle dipping
Rungwa 1953	Native authority, Destocking
Rungwa 1954	Tax, Agricultural controls
Same 1951	- - - - -
Same 1952	Native authority, Cattle dipping

District and YearComplaint

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Same 1953	- - - - -
Same 1954	Agricultural controls, Destocking
Shinyanga 1951	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Shinyanga 1952	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Shinyanga 1953	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Shinyanga 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Tanga 1951	Tax, Native authority, Destocking
Tanga 1952	Tax, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Tanga 1953	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Tanga 1954	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Uhehe 1951	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Uhehe 1952	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Uhehe 1953	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls

District and YearComplaint

Uhehe 1954

Tax, Agricultural controls,  
Destocking, Cattle dipping

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Source: Provincial and District Books, 1951-54; Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1951-54; Report to the United Nations 1951-54; personal papers of Richard B. Brayne, A. J. G. Brown, Charles Fitzwilliams, C. V. Cadiz, Hans Cory, N. O. Durdant-Hollamby, C. C. Harris, J. A. K. Leslie, B. J. J. Stubbings, and J. M. Sword, Rhodes House.



TABLE 7Tanganyika Legislative Council Membership - 1954

The Speaker, Brig. W. H. Scupham

Ex-Officio Members:

The Chief Secretary, Mr. R. de S. Stapledon, C.B.E.  
 The Member for Legal Affairs, Mr. A. T. Gratton-Bellew,  
 Q.C.  
 The Member for Finance and Economics, Mr. C. E. Tilney  
 The Member for Social Services, Mr. B. Leechman,  
 C.M.G., O.B.E.  
 The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources,  
 Mr. A. E. Trotman, C.M.G.  
 The Member for Communications, Works and Development  
 Planning, Mr. T. F. R. Hill  
 The Member for Local Government, Mr. F. H. Page-Jones  
 The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. A. H. Pike, O.B.E.

Nominated Official Members:

Mr. C. E. T. Biggs, Director of Agriculture  
 Dr. A. T. Howell, C.B.E., Director of Medical Services  
 Mr. A. A. Oldaker, C.B.E., Senior Provincial  
 Commissioner  
 Mr. E. C. S. Dawe, Director of Veterinary Services  
 Mr. K. L. Sanders, O.B.E., E.R.D., Acting Labour  
 Commissioner  
 Mr. R. E. Ellison, Acting Director of Education  
 Mr. R. C. Marc, Acting Director of Public Works

Nominated Unofficial Members:

Sir Charles Phillips, C.B.E., Dar es Salaam  
 Mr. V. M. Nazerali, O.B.E., Dar es Salaam  
 Mr. G. N. Houry, Q.C., Dar es Salaam  
 Mr. I. C. Chopra, O.B.E., Q.C., Mwanza  
 Chief Adam Sapi, M.B.E., Iringa

Nominated Unofficial Members:

Mr. I. C. W., Balydon, Mbeya  
Mr. A. Y. A., Karimjee, Dar es Salaam  
Liwali Yustino D. Egonda, Newala  
Mr. F. Hinds, Arusha  
Chief H. Msabile Lugusha, Tabora  
Mr. A. L. LeMaitre, O.B.E., Tanga  
Mr. J. H. Baker, Kahoma  
Mr. J. K. Nyerere, Kisarawe

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Based on: Tanganyika, Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 29th Session, Vol. I, May 12, 1954.

TABLE 8TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP - 1955

The Speaker (Brigadier W. E. C. Scupham, C.M.G., M.C.)

Ex-Officio Members:

The Chief Secretary, Mr. R. de S. Stapledon, E.B.E.  
 The Member for Legal Affairs, Mr. A. J. Gratton-Bellew,  
 Q.C.  
 The Member for Finance and Economics, Mr. C. E. Tilney  
 The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources,  
 Mr. A. E. Trotman, C.M.G.  
 The Member for Communications, Works and Development  
 Planning, Mr. J. F. R. Hill, C.M.G.  
 The Member for Local Government, Mr. F. H. Page-Jones  
 The Member for Lands and Mines, Mr. A. H. Pike, O.B.E.  
 The Member for Social Services, Mr. J. P. Attenborough,  
 C.B.E.

Official Members:

Sir Charles Phillips, C.B.E.  
 Mr. V. M. Nazerali, O.B.E.  
 Mr. D. P. K. Makwaia, O.B.E.  
 Mr. G. N. Houry, Q.C.  
 Chief Adam Sapi, M.B.E.  
 Mr. I. C. Chopra, O.B.E., Q.C.  
 Chief Amri Dodo  
 Mr. R. E. Ellison, E.D., Deputy Director of Education  
 Mr. H. S. C. Gill, Senior Provincial Commissioner, Tanga  
 Mr. R. J. Harvey, Secretary for Trade and Economics  
 Sir James Henry, M.C., Q.C., Solicitor-General  
 Mr. F. Hinds  
 Mr. A. M. A. Karimje, O.B.E.  
 Dr. J. M. Liston, M.B., Q.C., Director of Medical Services  
 Mr. C. Mace, O.B.E., Director of Lands and Surveys  
 Mrs. E. M. Marealle  
 Mr. N. M. Mehta  
 Liwali H. Saleh El Busaidy, M.B.E., Liwali of Dar es-  
 Salaam  
 Mr. K. L. Sanders, O.B.E., E.R.D., Labour Commissioner

**Official Members:**

Liwali Gulamrasul Sherdel, Liwali of Bagamoyo  
Mr. J. R. P. Siper, Director of Agriculture  
Mrs. K. F. Walker  
Mr. F. H. Woodrow, O.B.E., Director of Public Works

**Unofficial Members, Dar es Salaam:**

Mr. A. Y. A. Karimje, O.B.E.  
Hakimu S. J. Kiruka  
Mr. R. C. J. Maslin

**Unofficial Members, Central Province:**

Chief Abdarahamani Gwao  
Mrs. S. Keeka  
Lt.-Col. C. L. Towne, O.B.E.

**Unofficial Members, Eastern Province:**

Mr. G. P. Kunambi  
Mr. D. Parker  
Mr. J. D. Shah

**Unofficial Members, Lake Province:**

Captain J. Bennett  
Mr. P. Bomani  
Mr. S. R. Tanner

**Unofficial Members, Northern Province:**

Mr. S. K. George  
Mr. H. K. Virani  
Mr. B. J. Wallis

**Unofficial Members, Southern Highlands Province:**

Mr. I. C. W. Bayldon, O.B.E.  
Mr. R. K. Manji  
Mr. G. W. Mwansaau

**Unofficial Members, Southern Province:**

Liwali J. D. Mgonda  
Mr. J. A. G. Verai  
Mr. R. W. R. Miller, O.B.E.

**Unofficial Members, Tanga Province:**

Mr. M. S. Desai  
Mr. A. L. LeMaitre, O.B.E.  
Mr. P. C. Mntambo

**Unofficial Members, Western Province:**

Mr. J. H. Baker  
Chief H. M. Lugusha  
Mr. H. L. Sumar

**Unofficial Members, General Interests:**

Mr. Amur Omar  
Sir Eldred Hitchcock, C.B.E.  
Mr. E. D. Lushakuzi

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Based on: Tanganyika Legislative Council, Legislative Council Debates, 30th Session, Vol. I, April 14, 1955.

TABLE 9Africans Attaining Standard XII Status 1950-55

Africans Passing Standard XI Examination						
<u>Year</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
Boys	not available	295	not available	333	413	not available
Girls	not available	5	not available	7	25	not available
Total	not available	300	380	438		528

Africans Passing the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate Examination

<u>Year</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
Boys	not available	not available	not available	83	94	not available
Girls	not available	not available	available	3	4	not available
Total	34	57	64	86	98	118

Statistics based on: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report...to the United Nations 1950-55.

TABLE 10Incidents of African Protest Against Government  
Policy or Representatives 1955-57

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Arusha 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Arusha 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Arusha 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Beharamulo 1955	Tax, Agricultural Controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Beharamulo 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Beharamulo 1957	Native authority, Destocking
Bukoba 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Bukoba 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Bukoba 1957	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Buha 1955	Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Buha 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Buha 1957	Native authority, Cattle dipping
Dodoma 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking
Dodoma 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking
Dodoma 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking
Handini 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Handini 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Handini 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Iringa 1955	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Iringa 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Iringa 1957	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Kesarawe 1955	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle- dipping



<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Kesarawe 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kesarawe 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Kilimanjaro 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Kilimanjaro 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kilimanjaro 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Kilosi 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kilosi 1956	Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Kilosi 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Konda 1955	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Konda 1956	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Konda 1957	Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping

District and YearComplaints

Kondoa	1955	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kondoa	1956	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Kondoa	1957	Tax, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Korogwe	1955	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Korogwe	1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Korogwe	1957	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Lushoto	1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Lushoto	1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Lushoto	1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Masai	1955	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Masai	1956	Destocking, Cattle dipping
Masai	1957	Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbeya	1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Mbeya 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Mbeya 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Mbulu 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1957	Tax, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Mwanza 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Pangani 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking

District and YearComplaints

Mbeya, 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Mbeya 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls
Mbulu 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1957	Tax, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls
Mwanza 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls
Pangani 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agri- cultural controls, Destocking

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Mbeya 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Mbeya 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Mbulu 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1956	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Mbulu 1957	Tax, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Moshi 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Mwanza 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Mwanza 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Pangani 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Pangani 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Pangani 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Rungwa 1955	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Rungwa 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Rungwa 1957	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping.
Same 1955	Tax, Native authority, Destocking
Same 1956	Tax, Native authority, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Same 1957	Tax, Native authority, Destocking
Shinyanga 1955	Tax, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Shinyanga 1956	Tax, Native authority, Destocking
Shinyanga 1957	Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Tanga 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking
Tanga 1956	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaints</u>
Tanga 1957	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Uhehe 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls, Cattle dipping
Uhehe 1956	Native authority, Agricultural controls, Destocking, Cattle dipping
Uhehe 1957	Native authority, Agricultural controls
Ukerewe 1955	Tax, Native authority, Agricultural controls
Ukerewe 1956	Tax, Native authority
Ukerewe 1957	Agricultural controls, Destocking

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Source: Provincial and District Books, 1955-57; Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1955-57; Personal papers of Geoffrey P. Alsebrook, D. Barton, Richard B. Brayne, E. N. Brend, A. J. G. Brown, Charles Fitzwilliam, C. V. Cadiz, L. K. Dawson, Francis Dudley Dowsett, A. C. M. De Vere, Randall Erskine Ellison, Sir John Fletcher-Cooke, H. Lt. John Grant, C. C. Harris, Douglas Frank Heath, R. J. Hildesley, Rt. Rev. J. Holmes-Siedle, George Maclean, H. Mason, P. N. Mawhood, Donald William Neath, Eric George Rowe, B. J. J. Stubbings, J. S. M. Vinter, and R. W. Young.

TABLE 11TANU Proposals Made in 1956 for 1958 Constitutional Advancement1956 ConstitutionTANU Proposals for 1958The Legislative CouncilThe Legislative CouncilOfficial SideOfficial Side

Officials - 17

Officials - 17

Representative nominated  
members:Representative nominated  
members:

Africans: 4

Africans: 8

Asians: 6

Asians: 4

Europeans: 4

Europeans: 6

Total Official side: 31

Total official side: 33

Unofficial SideUnofficial Side

Nominated members:

Directly elected members:

Africans: 10

Africans: 14

Asians: 10

Asians: 6

Europeans: 10

Europeans: 6

Total unofficial side: 30

Indirectly elected members  
Southern & Western Provinces  
Africans: 2Nominated members  
Southern & Western Provinces  
Europeans: 2  
Asians: 2

Total unofficial side: 32



The Executive Council

Officials - 8

## Unofficials:

Africans:	2
Asians:	2
Europeans:	2

Total: 14

The Executive Council

Officials - 9

## Unofficials:

Africans:	4
Asians:	2
Europeans:	2

Total: 17

The introduction of the system of portfolios; some allocated to representative members of Legislative Council

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Based on TANU political files, 1954-58; FCB papers and TANU documents file, Northwestern University.

TABLE 12

## TANU Proposed Electoral Constituencies, for 1958 Territorial Election

Province	Admin. Districts	Mackenzie Reports Proposals in Appendix D	African Pop. 1948 Census Nearest 1,000	M.L.C.	Europ. Pop. 1952 Census	M.L.C.	Asian and Arab Pop. 1952 Census	M.L.C.
Central	Dodoma	Ugogo county						
Central	Manyomi	Development						
Central	Mwapwa	Area B (1)	370,000	1	1051		3,949	
Central	Kondoa	Singida						
Central	Singida	Kondoa, Mbulu						
North	Mbulu	county develop.						
	(most of)	Area B (2)	620,000	1	496		2,135	
TOTALS			990,000	2	1547		6,084	1
Eastern	Dar-es Salaam	municipal-ity	51,000	1	3603	1	23,207	1
Eastern	Kilosa	Urban						
Eastern	Mkojoro	Uluguru county	123,000		296		1,342	
Eastern	Ulanga	A1 & A2	230,000		546		2,024	
Eastern	Bagamoyo	Districts	121,000		132		256	
Eastern	Kisarawe	not allocated	79,000		85		625	
			188,000		329		438	

Eastern Rufigi	C	105,000	15	278
Eastern Mafia		11,000	20	651
TOTALS		857,000	1 1483	1 5,614

Lake Mwanza				
Lake Mwanza Urban	Sukamaland			
Lake Geita	County			
Lake Kwimba	A. (1)			
Lake Maswa				
Lake Shinyanga		1,022,000	2 927	6,699

Lake Bukuba	West Lake			
Lake Biharamula	County Dev.			
Lake Ngara	Area B. (1)	454,000	1 317	1,834
Lake North Maru	East Lake			
Lake Musoma	County dev.			
Lake Ukerewe	Area B. (2)	368,000	1 257	1,475
TOTALS		1,844,000	4 1501	1 10,008

Northern Arusha	Mt. Meru			
Northern Masai	County			
Northern Mbulu	A(1)			
Northern (small part)				
Northern Moshi				
Northern (small part)		108,000	1819	3,498

Northern Moshi (rest of)	Kilimanjaro County						
Tanga Pare	A(1)	350,000	1147			3,716	
<b>TOTALS</b>		458,000	1 2966	1		7,214	1
Southern Newala	Makonde						
Southern Mtwara	County A(1)	242,000	208			1,159	
Southern Lindi	Lindi-Kilwa						
Southern Kilwa	County Dev. Area B(2)	274,000	335			2,516	
		516,000		1			
Southern Masai	Masai-						
Southern Nanchingwea	Ruponda Cty. Dev. Area B(2)	162,000	620			301	
Southern Tunduru	Not allocated	66,000	21			105	
Southern Songea	With Njombe County Dev. Area B(2)	172,000	240			10	
	INDIRECT ELECTION	400,000		1			
<b>TOTALS</b>		916,000	2 1,424			4,091	IN

South. Highlands	Chunya Mbeya County A(1)	458,000	2	872	1,909
South. Highlands	Iringa County A(1)	181,000		800	1,273
South. Highlands	Njombe With Songea County Dev. Area B(2)	207,000		184	198
		388,000	1		
<b>TOTALS</b>		846,000	2	1,856	1 3,380
Tanga	Handeni				
Tanga	Lushoto				
Tanga	Pangani				
Tanga	Tanga County A(1)	462,000	1	2,012	1 11,256
Tanga	Tanga Urban				
Western	Tabora				
Western	Tabora Urban				
Western	Kahama				
Western	Nzega	440,000	1	1,007	4,675

South. Highlands	Chunya Mbeya County A(1)	458,000	2	872	1,909
South. Highlands	Iringa County A(1)	181,000		800	1,273
South. Highlands	Njombe County Dev. Area B(2)	207,000		184	198
		388,000	1		
<hr/>					
TOTALS		846,000	2	1,856	3,380
<hr/>					
Tanga	Handeni				
Tanga	Lushoto				
Tanga	Pangani				
Tanga	Tanga	462,000	1	2,012	11,256
Tanga	Tanga Urban				1
<hr/>					
Western	Tabora				
Western	Tabora Urban				
Western	Kahama				
Western	Nzega	440,000	1	1,007	4,675

South. Chunya Highlands	Mbeya County A(1)	458,000	2	872	1,909
South. Rungwe Highlands					
South. Iringa Highlands	Iringa County A(1)	181,000		800	1,273
South. Njombe Highlands	With Songea County Dev. Area B(2)	207,000		184	198
		388,000	1		
TOTALS		846,000	2	1,856	3,380
Tanga Handeni					
Tanga Lushoto	Tanga County A(1)				
Tanga Pangani					
Tanga Tanga					
Tanga Tanga Urban		462,000	1	2,012	11,256
Western Tabora	Unamwezi				
Western Tabora Urban	County Dev. Area B(1)	440,000	1	1,007	4,675
Western Kahama					
Western Nzega					

Western Kigoma	Buha				
Western Kasulu	County Dev.				
Western Kibondo	Area B(2)	358,000	200		1,145
Western Mpanda	Districts not allocated	108,000	232		553
Western Ufipa					
INDIRECT ELECTION		466,000	1		
<hr/>					
TOTAL		906,000	2	1,439	IN 6,373 IN
<hr/>					
GRAND TOTAL		7,408,000	16	17,885	8 77,609 8

M.L.C. = Member Legislative Council

N = Nominated

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TABLE 13

Incidents of African Protest Against Government  
Policy or Representatives 1958-59

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Arusha 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Arusha 1959	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Buharamulo 1958	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Buharamulo 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Bukoba 1958	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Bukoba 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Buha 1958	Tax, Native Authority
Buha 1959	Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Dodoma 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Dodoma 1959	Tax, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Geita 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Geita 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Handani 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Handani 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Iringa 1958	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Iringa 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kesarawe 1958	Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Kesarawe 1959	Tax, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kilimanjaro 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Kilimanjaro 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kilosi 1958	Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kilosi 1959	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Konda 1958	Tax, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Konda 1959	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kondoa 1958	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kondoa 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Korogwe 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking, Cattle Dipping
Korogwe 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking, Cattle Dipping
Lushoto 1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Lushoto 1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Masai 1958	Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Masai 1959	Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Mbeya 1958	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping

District and YearComplaint

Mbeya	1959	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Mbulu	1958	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Mbulu	1959	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Moshi	1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Moshi	1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Mwanza	1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Mwanza	1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Pangani	1958	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Pangani	1959	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Rungwa	1958	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Rungwa	1959	Tax, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Same	1958	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

District and YearComplaint

Same 1959

Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

Shinyanga 1958

Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

Shinyanga 1959

Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking

Tanga 1958

Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping

Tanga 1959

Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

Uhehe 1958

Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking

Uhehe 1959

Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking

Ukerewe 1958

Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping

District and YearComplaint

Ukerewe 1959

Native Authority, Cattle  
Dipping, Compulsory  
Destocking

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Source: Provincial and District Books, 1958-59; Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissions, 1958-59, personal papers of Geoffrey P. Alsebrook, D. Barton, R. Bosnell, Richard P. Brayne, E. N. Brend, A. J. G. Brown, Charles Fitzwilliam, C. V. Cadiz, L. K. Dawson, Francis Dudley Dowsett, A. C. M. DeVere, Randall Erskine Ellison, Sir John Fletcher Cooke, H. St. John Grant, C. C. Harris, Douglas Frank Heath, R. J. Hildesley, Rt. Rev. J. Holmes-Duddley, George Maclean, H. Mason, R. N. Mawhood, Ronald Williams Neath, A. Priestner, Eric George Rowe, B. J. J. Stubbings, J. M. Sword, J. S. M. Vinter, R. W. Young.

TABLE 14

Results of First Territorial Elections, 1958-59

First Phase, September 8, 1958

EASTERN PROVINCE

Population 955,828 (excluding Dar es Salaam)  
 Registration 4,629 (excluding Dar es Salaam)

African

TANU  
 Ind.

J.K. Myerere  
 G.P. Kunabi

2,628  
 802\*

Asian

TANU approved  
 Ind.  
 Ind.

A.H. Jamal  
 S.M. Patel  
 F.K. Issa

2,672  
 601\*  
 157

European

Ind.

G.K. Lewis

Unopposed

SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS

Population 1,023,805  
 Registration 5,283

African

TANU  
 UTP  
 Ind.  
 Ind.

J.B. Mwakangale  
 T. Samkey  
 F. Ugunumu  
 W.B.K. Mwanjisi

2,682  
 694  
 420  
 120

Asian

TANU approved

A.S. Bajaj  
 R.K. Manji

2,744  
 1,172\*

European

TANU approved

Lady M. Chesham  
I.V.W. Bayldon

2,962  
952

TANGA PROVINCE

Population 671,381  
Registration 7,044

African

TANU  
UTP  
A.N.C.  
Ind.

J. Keto  
P.C. Mntambo  
Z.M. Metmvu  
P. Nkanyemka

3,455  
1,854\*  
53  
49

Asian

TANU approved  
UTP  
Ind.  
Ind.

B. Krishna  
M. Husain  
F.S. Khambalia  
M.A. Ayaz

3,550  
1,435  
350  
76

European

TANU approved  
UTP

R.N. Donaldson  
W.D. Lead

3,439  
1,972

WESTERN PROVINCE

Population 1,052,795  
Registration 5,912

African

TANU

Chief Fundikira

Unopposed

Asian

TANU approved  
Ind.

M.N. Rattansey  
L.A. Bhatia  
N.A. Patel  
P.R. Patel

2,474  
1,056  
235  
213

European

J.H. Baker

Unopposed\*



NORTHERN PROVINCE

Population 758,960  
Registration 5,658

African

TANU  
Ind.

S.N. Eliufoo  
S.K. George

3,348  
1,275\*

Asian

TANU approved

Mrs. S. Mustafa  
H.K. Virani  
M. Sharif  
N.M. Mehta  
D. Behal

2,248  
864\*  
682  
660  
169

European

TANU approved

D.N.M. Bryceson  
J.M. Hunter

3,300  
1,323\*

Second Phase, February 9, 1959

DAR ES SALAAM

Population 128,742  
Registration 8,500

African

TANU

R.M. Kawawa  
(Gen. Sec. Tang. Fed. of Lab.)

Unopposed\*

Asian

TANU approved

K.L. Jhaveri  
G.M. Daya

4,281  
2,023

European

TANU approved

D.F. Heath  
T.W. Tyrell

4,869  
1,434\*

SOUTHERN PROVINCE

Population 1,088,046  
Registration 3,923

African

TANU L.N. Sijaona

Unopposed

Asian

TANU approved

S.T. Thanki  
M.H.B. Versi

2,243\*  
900

European

Dr. L. Sterling

Unopposed

SOUTH EAST LAKE PROVINCE

Population (of Lake Province) 2,228,485  
Registration South East Lake 7,759

African

TANU

Paul Bomani

Unopposed\*

Asian

C.K. Patel

Unopposed

European

J.S. Mann

Unopposed

WEST LAKE PROVINCE

Population listed above  
Registration 4,828

African

TANU

C.G. Kabana

Unopposed\*

Asian

N.K. Laxman

Unopposed

European

B.C. Johanson

Unopposed

CENTRAL PROVINCE

Population 642,730  
Registration 4,871

<u>African</u>	TANU	M.M. Kihere	Unopposed
<u>Asian</u>	TANU approved	A.N. Kassum	Unopposed
<u>European</u>	TANU approved	H.W. Hannah	Unopposed

\* Former M.L.C.

Based on J.S.R. Cole, "Progress to Independence: Tanganyika," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 59 (September, 1962), 179-186; G.W.Y. Hucks, "Legislative Council Elections--1958", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 54 (March 1960), 39-47; "Elections in Mainland Tanzania: A Historical Record", Mbioni, Vol. I, No. 5 (1970), 27-35; Tanganyika Gazette, September 13, 1958 and February 27, 1959; Tanganyika Information Service, Tanganyika's Parliament: 35 Years of Making History, (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1961), passim; Tanganyika, Legislative Council, First Electoral Roll of Voters for the Constituency of Eastern Province, Southern Highlands, Tanga Province, Western Province, Northern Province (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958); Tanganyika, Legislative Council, First Electoral Rolls for Voters of the Constituency of the Dar es Salaam District, Southern Province, South-East Lake, Central Province, West Lake (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1958).

TABLE 15Voter Registration Analysis: Utete District, 1959DISTRICT POPULATION 104,682VOTER REGISTRATION 253

<u>Number of Voters</u>	<u>Occupation</u>
121 Voters - 71% of Total	Local Government: 1 Chief 55 Headman 47 Native Authorities
	Primary Schools: 1 Headmaster 17 Teachers
23 Voters = 13% of Total	Civil Servants: 4 Officers 11 Clerks 4 Police 3 Hospital Attendants 1 Postal Clerk
7 Voters - 4% of Total	Agriculture: 7 Farmers
18 Voters = 11% of Total	Business: 17 Traders 1 Ginnery Manager
1 Voter - .8% of Total	Political: 1 TANU Secretary

Based on "First Electoral Rolls, Utete", in Utete District File, 1959, Tanganyika District and Provincial Books (microfilm), Rhodes House.

TABLE 16

## Tanganyika African National Union -- Proposed Electoral Constituencies, 1959

District	Population				Reservation	
	African	Asian	European	Unreserved	Asian	European
Kilwa	88,237	331	416	1		
Lindi	175,591	2,351	189	1	1	
Masasi	150,339	376	135	1		
Mtwara	94,715	1,008	209	1		
Nachingwea	56,003		146	1		
Nwala	176,915		71	1		
Songea	196,324	328	263	1		
Tunduru	69,922	154	33	1		
Chunya	37,954	136	79	1		
Iringa	245,985	1,603	928	1	1	
Mbeya	229,105	3,324	909	1	1	
Njombe	240,185	240	228	1		
Rungwa	270,586	472	133	1		
Handeni	92,492	250	30	1		
Korogwe	111,200	1,343	340	1		
Lushoto	152,387	154	552	1		
Pare	108,436	576	95	1		
Pangani & Tanga						
Rural	169,985	2,239	569	1	1	

District	African	Asian	European	Unreserved	Asian	European
Tanga Urban	36,581	8926	824	1	1	1
Kahama	111,736	673	58	1		
Kasulu	174,884	55	58	1		
Kibondo	120,104	138	47	1		
Kigoma	85,928	1118	104	1		
Mpanda	49,878	283	205	1		
Nzega	203,755	1336	115	1		
Tabora	161,998	3492	594	1		
Ufipa	144,512	560	129	1		
Arusha	142,391	3800	1905	1		1
Masai	64,276	91	108	1		
Mbulu	193,199	335	333	1		
Moshi	359,094	4174	1267	1		1
Dodoma	236,152	2859	406	1		1
Kenya	158,193	460	64	1		
Manyoni	58,829	369	35	1		
Mpwapwa	114,785	329	626	1		
Singida	161,531	866	79	1		
Iramba	149,931	498	115	1		
Bagamoyo	88,159	532	108	1		1
D'Salaam	93,373	29,986	4479	1		1
Kilosa	151,157	2688	313	1		
Kisarawe	186,905	923	494	1		
Mafia	11,307	829	31	1		
Morogoro	263,651	2698	596	1		1
Pufiji	118,865	385	14	1		
Uanga	126,791	274	149	1		



TABLE 17

Incidents of African Protest Against Government  
Policy or Representatives 1960-61

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Arusha 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Arusha 1961	Tax, Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Biharamulo 1960	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Biharamulo 1961	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping.
Bukoba 1960	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Bukoba 1961	Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Buha 1960	Tax, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Buha 1961	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Dodoma 1960	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Dodoma 1961	Tax, Native Authority
Geita 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Geita 1961	Native Authority



<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Handani 1960	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Handani 1961	Tax, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Iringa 1960	Tax, Cattle Dipping
Iringa 1961	Native Authority
Kesarawe 1960	Cattle Dipping
Kesarawe 1961	Tax, Native Authority
Kilimanjaro 1960	Native Authority
Kilimanjaro 1961	Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Kelosi 1960	Tax, Native Authority
Kelosi 1961	Agricultural Control
Konda 1960	Agricultural Control
Konda 1961	Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Kondoa 1960	Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Kondoa 1961	Tax, Native Authority
Korogwe 1960	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Korogwe 1961	Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Lushoto 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Agri- cultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Lushoto 1961	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Masai 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Masai 1961	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Mbeya 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Mbeya 1961	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Mbulu 1960	Tax, Native Authority
Mbulu 1961	Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Moshi 1960	Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Moshi 1961	Tax, Native Authority
Mwanza 1960	Tax, Cattle Dipping
Mwanza 1961	Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Pangani 1960	Tax, Native Authority
Pangani 1961	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Rungwa 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Rungwa 1961	Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Same 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Compulsory Destocking
Same 1961	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping

<u>District and Year</u>	<u>Complaint</u>
Shinyanga 1960	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping
Shinyanga 1961	Native Authority, Agricultural Control, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Tanga 1960	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping
Tanga 1961	Native Authority, Compulsory Destocking
Uhehe 1960	Tax, Native Authority
Uhehe 1961	Native Authority, Cattle Dipping, Compulsory Destocking
Ukerewe 1960	Native Authority, Agricultural Control
Ukerewe 1961	Tax, Native Authority, Cattle Dipping

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Source: Provincial and District Books, 1960-61; Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners 1960-61; personal papers of Geoffrey P. Alsebrook, D. Barton, Richard B. Brayne, E. N. Brend, L. K. Dawson, Francis Dudley Dowsett, H. St. John Grant, C. C. Harris, Douglas Frank Heath, George Maclean, H. Mason, R. N. Mawhood, Ronald William Neath, Eric George Rowe, J. S. M. Vinter and R. W. Young, Rhodes House.

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Rhodes House is the major depository for primary research material concerning the British African dependencies. The key collection utilized in this dissertation is the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (127 Boxes) covering all aspects of Socialist involvement in Tanganyika. The collection contains copious material devoted to all phases of territorial political development (Papers of the Asian Association and the United Tanganyika Parties). In addition, the African Collection contains the personal papers of numerous administrators in the Tanganyika Service, the writings of key Colonial Office personnel, the papers of the Capricorn Society, and the Provincial and District Books of Territorial officers.

Tanzanian National Archives, Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania.

The National Archives contain the personal writings of most of the African political activists. Especially helpful are the papers of T.A.N.U. Headquarters and the Executive Committee and intercell memoranda concerning all phases of the Union's plans for political development.

Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Party Headquarters, London, England.

The Party headquarters maintains a fine collection of political position papers on key territorial issues, files covering the writings of Tory M.P.s active in the debate concerning Tanganyikan development and newspaper clipping files involving party activities.

Labour Party Archives, Labour Party Headquarters, Transport House, London, England.

The archive is a source of abundant material covering the party's involvement with Tanganyika

in the post-war period. Especially helpful are the files of M.P.s who actively cooperated with the TANU hierarchy.

Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, England.

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