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HELGOLAND, ZANZIBAR, EAST AFRICA: COLONIALISM  
IN GERMAN POLITICS, 1884-1890

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THESIS

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY  
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I alone assume full responsibility for any mistakes of a textual or interpretive nature which may appear in this paper.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ACP German Foreign Ministry Archives, Library of Congress Microfilms.
- BFO British Foreign Office Archives.
- DDF Documents Diplomatique Français.
- GP Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914.
- HP Holstein Papers.
- PD Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.
- RD Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags.
- RKA Reichskolonialamt.
- UCI German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of California Microfilms.
- UM German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of Michigan Microfilms.



CHAPTER I  
THE ORIGINS OF GERMAN COLONIALISM

A. The Historical Controversy

The origins, motives, and objectives of German colonial expansion are highly complex subjects. This is so largely because Bismarck's attitude toward colonialism was contradictory and ambiguous. Although any aspect of Bismarck's career is likely to attract attention, none has been any more perplexing or controversial than his adventure into colonialism. This confusion has all been reflected in the views of various historians who have dealt with the problem.

Mary E. Townsend has maintained that Bismarck held colonial ambitions from his earliest days in office and that he did not involve Germany at an earlier date only because she was not prepared for such an experiment. Townsend argues further that a German colonial policy did not necessarily contradict the necessities of German continental security.<sup>1</sup> Erich Eyck and William O. Aydelotte have emphasized the primacy of German domestic policies in motivating Bismarck's Kolonialpolitik, although neither would accept the view that Bismarck was actually a Kolonialmensch.<sup>2</sup> W. O. Henderson has maintained that prestige was a principal factor in Bismarck's colonial calculations. If German citizens abroad were not supported in their disputes with foreign nationals, they would lose confidence in their government. If a nation's citizens had no confidence in their own

government's ability or willingness to defend their interests, how could the international community be expected to go beyond the feelings of the Germans themselves? Prestige, influence, and great power status were all interrelated.<sup>3</sup> In a more recent article, Henderson has argued that Bismarck was simply undergoing a change in attitude regarding the value of colonies during the 1880's. By 1884 and 1885 he was less sure that they were worthless.<sup>4</sup> A. J. P. Taylor has asserted that Bismarck desired colonies strictly for diplomatic and security purposes. By acquiring colonies, Germany would be antagonizing Britain, which, in light of France's attitude toward the occupation of Egypt, would undoubtedly please France and perhaps minimize the humiliation of 1871.<sup>5</sup> Taylor's assumption is that the more recent Egyptian fiasco antagonized France as much or more than the loss of Alsace-Lorraine several years earlier. John Flint combines the arguments of Eyck, Aydelotte, and Taylor without making a judgment as to which interpretation is most important.<sup>6</sup> William L. Langer maintains that Bismarck was provoked into colonialism in order to show the Gladstone Government that German interests could not be abused.<sup>7</sup> Fritz Müller, an East German historian, sees Bismarck as being encouraged and even pressured into colonialism by German financial and industrial interests. Müller suggests further that Bismarck's failure to respond fully to the demands of the colonialists contributed partially to the Chancellor's political demise.<sup>8</sup>

Bismarck's motives regarding colonies will probably remain a source of historical controversy, for indeed there is no conclusive evidence one way or the other. The Chancellor's public and private comments on the subject were usually suited to the occasion; over the long range, they were highly contradictory.

In 1873 Bismarck told Lord Russell, the British Ambassador in Berlin, that Germany had no desire for colonies or fleets. Colonies depended on powerful fleets for protection and provision, and Germany's geographical position necessitated a powerful army but not a sizable navy.<sup>9</sup> In 1881 the Chancellor dogmatically proclaimed, "As long as I am the Chancellor, we will carry no colonial policies."<sup>10</sup> He told the Reichstag Commerce Commission, when it recommended the annexation of Formosa in 1883, that Germany was financially unable to afford colonies. It was difficult enough to convince the Reichstag to provide money for necessities such as national defense.<sup>11</sup> The explorer Eugen Wolf was astonished by Bismarck's remark in December, 1888. "Your map of Africa is very fine, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here lies Russia, and here lies France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa."<sup>12</sup> Hermann von Eckhardstein, a prominent German Anglophile, often recalled Bismarck's statement that Salisbury's friendship was worth more to Germany than twenty marshy colonies in Africa.<sup>13</sup> As late as 1889, Bismarck declared before the Reichstag that he had never

been a Kolonialmensch.<sup>14</sup>

The Chancellor's actions seemed to reflect these statements accurately. During the preliminary negotiations of the Treaty of Frankfurt, he refused the offer of French colonies in Cochin, China. Later he denied the request of German commercial agents that Imperial protection be extended to the Fiji Islands.<sup>15</sup> In 1874 an overture from the Sultan of Zanzibar asking for protection was rejected.<sup>16</sup> A proposal for the establishment of a South African colony by a group of German merchants was denied in 1876.<sup>17</sup> Within the next few years he ignored a plan for the colonization of New Guinea and announced that the political situation in Germany was such that the government was prevented from aiding the work of the Kolonialverein.<sup>18</sup> Petitions for protection from the Bremen Mission in Southwest Africa and from a colonial project of the Denhardt brothers on the Tana River in East Africa were also denied. This anti-colonial view was reflected in several of Bismarck's governmental appointments. One such example was Leo von Caprivi, appointed head of the Admiralty in 1883. Caprivi was vigorously opposed to colonial acquisitions and the means by which a colonial empire should be maintained, that is, a large navy of capital ships.<sup>19</sup>

On the other side of the coin, Bismarck gave indications at a very early date that he did have interests in German colonial expansion. The Constitution of the North German Confederation provided for the incorporation of non-contiguous

areas; this provision was also written into the Constitution of 1871.<sup>20</sup> In 1874 Bismarck appointed Heinrich von Küsserow to the position of Vortragender Rat in the Foreign Ministry. Küsserow was well known as a colonial enthusiast and was to be entrusted with overseas commercial matters.<sup>21</sup> Two years later Bismarck told F. A. Lüderitz, a noted Bremen merchant, that he had studied the question of colonization and concluded that "...a great nation like Germany could not, in the end, dispense with colonies...."<sup>22</sup> Bismarck even introduced a bill before the Reichstag in 1880 providing subsidies for the Godeffroy Company which was involved in the South Seas trade, specifically in Samoa. The whole question of colonies was raised during the course of debate over the bill and it became obvious that the government was not averse at least to certain colonial projects. After the bill had failed, Bismarck expressed the view that:

The Samoan Subsidy was a prelude to German colonial policy and the first practical expression of it. Neither the enemies of our greatness nor the doctrinaires of the Manchester School will succeed in preventing Germany from embarking upon a course which other nations have followed to advantage.<sup>23</sup>

Bismarck also created the Economic Council of Prussia to help stimulate commercial activity. The Council appropriated 100,000,000M to purchase colonies, but the Reichstag refused to approve such an expensive proposition.<sup>24</sup> Finally in April, 1884, Bismarck promised protection to F. A. Lüderitz for his Southwest Africa project, thereby committing the German Government to

limited involvement in the colonial race.<sup>25</sup>

From such a maze of contradiction, one can readily comprehend why Bismarck's motives have been variously interpreted. The only real certainty was that Bismarck did finally engage Germany in the colonial race. This does not necessarily indicate however that Bismarck was a Kolonialmensch from the beginning or that he was ever fully converted to the value of colonies. What appears to be more likely is that circumstances seemed favorable for the acquisition of colonies for Germany in 1883 and 1884, and the Chancellor believed that the possession of colonies might eventually prove to be of some advantage.

#### B. Background to Germany's First Colonial Involvement

The activities of France, Britain, and Belgium in Africa were of unquestioned importance in affecting Bismarck's decision to enter the colonial race. Leopold II of Belgium was the "venturesome sort" who traveled widely throughout the world, particularly in Africa, during his lifetime. During the eighteen sixties and seventies, he wrote frequently of the necessity for European technology to harness the vast underdeveloped areas of the world. Leopold's motives for expansion were not simply that he was a technocrat and that Belgium was a highly industrialized country capable of exploiting virgin natural resources; nor was it entirely the fact that Europe was becoming increasingly protectionist and therefore encouraging expansionist attitudes. Given the character and ambitions of the Belgian King,

there is little doubt that his primary incentive for expansion was prestige. Leopold's appetite for power and prestige was uncomfortably confined by the size and constitutional restrictions of his state. Britain was geographically small, yet she had become the world's foremost power by imposing herself in non-contiguous areas. The Netherlands and Portugal had made themselves great powers in earlier years by means of the same practice. In 1876 Leopold began the process of implementing an African policy; a conference was held with the expressed purpose of promoting exploration of the Dark Continent so as to open it to civilization. Ostensibly this endeavor would be undertaken as an international enterprise for all interested parties under the auspices of a new organization called the International Association for Exploration and Civilization of Central Africa. Located in Brussels, the executive committee of the organization was almost completely dominated by Leopold. The association was only a guise for Leopold's personal schemes.<sup>26</sup>

Leopold had little initial success in stimulating colonial interest in a major way, but in 1878 Henry Morton Stanley was engaged by the association to explore the Upper Congo. Between 1879 and 1884 he supplied information and data that would greatly facilitate commerce on the river. (In 1882 the International Association changed its name to the International Association of the Congo.)

The French suspected Leopold's motives almost from the

beginning. To counter possible Belgian domination of the western Congo River, the explorer Savorgnan de Brazza was dispatched in 1880 to secure the north bank against foreign domination. France and Belgium, however, were not the only parties interested in the western Congo River. Portugal, which had been satisfied to remain quiet as long as no one seriously threatened her ill-defined northern frontier of Angola, now issued her claim to the area. The groundwork for west African partition was laid. When the British chose to support Portugal's position, the movement toward partition was accelerated.<sup>27</sup> Europe now looked at Africa with a new interest.

Another incident contributing to the "African scramble" was the British occupation of Egypt. The origins of the British intervention is another story. Once the city of Alexandria had been bombarded, the British found themselves in a difficult position to maintain European interests in Egypt. The bombardment only provoked anti-European demonstrations. It was therefore deemed necessary to land troops to "restore proper order and respect." During the course of "proper restoration," the native Egyptian political order was destroyed. A situation evolved in which indigenous, Egyptian political institutions were so damaged or discredited that they were incapable of maintaining a stability satisfactory to European interests. If stability were to be upheld, it would have to be through the use of British bayonets.<sup>28</sup> Europe's attention was again focussed



on African affairs.

The gravest problem for the British in Egypt was the cost of occupation. It was necessary for the Egyptians to help finance the project of "restoring order." Money for this project would be drawn from both foreign loans and the proceeds from the internationally owned Suez Canal Company. This meant that interference in Egyptian affairs on the part of other nations was possible. The Egyptian situation so preoccupied Britain that she was weakened at other strategic points, particularly in India. More significantly, the occupation stimulated the desire from France and Italy for compensations.

Bismarck's attitude toward the initial phases of the "scramble" had been one of benevolent indifference. He paid almost no attention to the competition on the Congo River. His position on Egypt was that Germany would accept any solution Britain and France could find; he even had no objection to annexation.<sup>29</sup> German support in Egypt came to be one of the factors on which Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, depended. The importance of this German service was recognized and acknowledged by British statesmen.<sup>30</sup> In 1883 Sir William Harcourt, an influential Liberal member of Parliament, told Herbert Bismarck that Bismarck could easily have upset Britain's position in Egypt, "that we were left alone was due to Germany's good will."<sup>31</sup> The German Crown Prince Friedrich even received the impression that Britain's gratitude might have been carried to the point of welcoming an alliance with Germany and Austria.<sup>32</sup> By anyone's

judgment Britain certainly owed Germany a debt of gratitude; this was a credit on which Bismarck might legitimately expect to draw at a later date should he become interested in a colonial quid pro quo for Germany.

Factors other than Europe's new interest in Africa and a debt owed Germany by Britain affected Bismarck's attitude toward colonization. One of the most significant political events to occur in Europe during the early eighties was the perfecting of the German diplomatic security system. The Three Emperors' League had just been resurrected in June, 1881, thereby securing Germany's eastern frontier. In May, 1882, Italy joined the Dual Alliance, thus creating the Triple Alliance. Moreover, in 1883, even Franco-German relations were amiable. Jules Ferry and Charles Freycinet, successors to the revenge-minded Gambetta, both favored French colonial development. They were among the few Frenchmen who appreciated Germany's cooperation at the Madrid Conference on Morocco in 1880, and they were most gratified by Bismarck's support in the French annexation of Tunis in 1883.<sup>33</sup> Germany's security probably reached its zenith in 1883.<sup>34</sup> The international situation was propitious should Bismarck decide to enter the colonial business in a moderate fashion.

There were other factors that probably influenced Bismarck's ultimate decision to embark Germany on a program of colonial expansion. The general tendency in European economic

relations was toward protection.<sup>35</sup> Since Germany's entire industrial base was expanding, she would naturally be concerned that her access to markets and raw materials should remain open. Population was also on the increase. During the period from 1875 to 1885 the German population increased by more than three million.<sup>36</sup> Even living space might become a problem in the future.

The Anglo-French Treaty of 1882 undoubtedly had a sobering effect on Bismarck and may have encouraged his colonial tendencies. According to Heinrich Küsserow, the Wilhelmstrasse's colonial "expert," the treaty provided for the establishment of high tariffs on the imports and exports of all non-French or non-British goods in areas of west Africa under French and British control. Küsserow argued that German interests in the respective areas would suffer to the point of extinction. He went on to surmise that the tariff increase was a means by which the imperialist powers were safeguarding themselves against the growing effect of protectionism. He was convinced that this action was merely a preparation by the two powers to partition the remainder of west Africa. Bismarck was so informed.<sup>37</sup> The Chancellor received similar information from other sources. Adolph Woermann, a Hamburg merchant in African trade, bombarded the Chancellor with warnings that the total partitioning of Africa was at hand and that German trade in Africa would be crippled. In response to this emergency, Bismarck requested the

advice of the Chambers of Commerce in Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. All three groups encouraged greater government participation in support of African commercial activities. Hamburg recommended annexation of parts of the African coast to insure continued participation for Germany in African markets.<sup>38</sup> The west African example was not the first case in which German commercial interests had been abused in areas where other nationalities had taken political control. Prior instances had occurred in the Fiji Islands and New Guinea.<sup>39</sup>

These factors made it seem very possible that the door to the underdeveloped world might soon be slammed in Germany's face. If the underdeveloped areas could be held open, all would be well for the German economy. But if Germany allowed the other powers to partition the "uncivilized" world, then German citizens in Africa would have no lever to obtain reciprocal economic privileges in those colonial areas. Bismarck was not unconcerned about this problem and the effects it might have on his historical image with future Germans. He once admitted that he had seriously questioned himself as to whether or not in the future Germans might criticize "...that faint-hearted Chancellor back then with not having the courage to ensure for...[Germany] a portion of what later became valuable property."<sup>40</sup>

Bismarck's posture on colonization may also have been influenced by the expansion and consolidation of the colonial lobby in Germany. Previous to 1882 there had been several colonial

groups which had argued for the expansionist cause. The two most notable examples were the Central Verein für Handels-Geographie und Deutscher Interesse in Ausland, founded in 1868, and the West Deutsch Verein für Kolonisation und Export, established by Friedrich Fabri in 1880. Fabri was connected with the Rhine Mission which had several Protestant outposts scattered throughout Africa. There were many other such groups throughout Germany, but their influence was negligible since they lacked coordination and common purpose. Some such organizations were interested in missionary work, others in trade expansion, and still others in the gathering of geographical and geological data.

In August, 1882, however, a movement arose with the objective of coordinating the efforts of the various colonial groups. These interested parties met in Frankfurt and established a committee to look further into the matter. The objectives of the committee were to

...extend to a larger circle the realization of the necessity of applying national energy to the field of colonization for all the hitherto scattered efforts for expansion. To create some method for the practical solution of the question.<sup>41</sup>

The efforts of the committee resulted in the formation of the Kolonialverein in December, 1882. By December, 1883, despite only a year's passage of time, the organization numbered 3,260 and was scattered throughout ninety-two different towns and cities in Germany. The movement had the support of large

industry in the person of R. Stumm, the Saar industrialist; L. Baare of the west German heavy industry (Bochumer Verein); and H. A. Bueck, the General Secretary of the Zentralverband deutscher Industrieller. Other prominent figures important in the early stages of the movement were Count von Frankenberg-Tillowitz, the Silesian iron industrialist and leader of the Reichspartei; Rudolf von Bennigsen, chairman of the National Liberal Party; Theodor Stern, a prominent Frankfurt banker; Johann Georg von Siemens and Otto Wallich, directors of the Deutsche Bank; Adolf von Hanseemann, Chief of the Discontogesellschaft; Carl Fürstenberg, chairman of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft; and many other similarly important people.<sup>42</sup>

Nor was it that there had been no previous support in the Reichstag for a colonial policy. Undoubtedly some of the 112 Reichstag members that voted for the Samoan Subsidy bill were firm colonialists. Bismarck had always maintained that Kolonialpolitik was particularly unthinkable for Germany because she lacked the necessary desire.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps the situation was changing.

Bismarck could see some advantage in the cultivation of a colonial policy; by 1884 the question was how much of an advantage and how much effort was worthwhile. The Chancellor felt that colonialism might be a means of strengthening his position domestically for it gave him a device for attacking his opposition in the Reichstag elections of 1884. In 1879 the National

Liberals had split over Bismarck's tariff policy. The English orientation of the left-wing National Liberals led them to identify economic freedom with political freedom; this position caused disharmony with the more conservative National Liberals headed by Rudolf von Bennigsen. In 1880 the left wing of the party, guided by Eduard Lasker and Ludwig Bamberger, broke away and declared themselves in sympathy with the Progressive Party. These two groups now formed the Freisinnige or Radical party. The implementation of a colonial policy would perhaps nourish the split in the National Liberal group. Bennigsen and most of his followers viewed colonialism in a favorable light and perhaps could be persuaded to return as Bismarck's supporters. Bamberger and the Freisinnige group were anti-colonial. Perhaps in the colonial issue lay the seeds of a National Liberal-Conservative coalition.<sup>44</sup> Those who opposed colonialism could be assaulted as anti-national and not sufficiently concerned with Germany's prestige.<sup>45</sup>

Expense would be a definite obstacle to instituting any government colonial policy. The Reichstag was not the easiest organization from which to extract funds. More important than this was the fact that if the Reichstag initially granted the necessary funds, its own power would be increased because the fund would have to be renewed year after year, thus necessitating considerable bargaining.<sup>46</sup> But the expense of a colonial policy could apparently be overcome. Bismarck had before him the

working example of the British system of colonialism, that is of letting the flag follow the merchant. Private companies could be chartered to bear the expense of administration and development of the area in which they were involved. This example obviously had a significant influence on Bismarck's outlook, for sometime later when actively promoting colonialism he stated:

I [Bismarck] would follow the example of the English in granting merchants something like royal charters.... I don't wish to establish territorial spheres but only to protect commercial development of these merchants. We hope that growth will flourish in proportion to the vigor of the gardner. If matters do not work out, however, the responsibility rests with the gardner and not the Empire, which will lose nothing.<sup>47</sup>

By this method, not only would little cost be incurred by the Reich, but also the colonial tariffs and tolls might actually increase Imperial revenues. This would give the Reich a source of income beyond the "donations" of individual states to the Imperial Treasury.<sup>48</sup>

All of this evidence still does not entirely clarify Bismarck's motives for engaging in Kolonialpolitik, but it does show that the environment was favorable should he so desire.

### C. The Angra Pequena Affair

Whatever might have made colonialism appear attractive to Bismarck, it was the course of events in Africa that actually precipitated German colonial involvement. The British had taken Walfish Bay in 1878, and German missionaries in the area



therefore appealed to the British for protection from hostile natives. An official request to aid German nationals in Southwest Africa was made of the British Government by Count Hatzefeldt, the German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, replied negatively in November, 1880. At this time, the British also carefully defined the geographical limits of their interest in Southwest Africa.<sup>49</sup> They soon came to regret their decision.

In November, 1882, F. A. Lüderitz, who had previously been successful in the African trade, requested German protection for a series of factories he was building on the coast of Southwest Africa. Bismarck was not enthusiastic about this request, but from earlier communications it certainly did not appear that the British were interested in any area other than Walfish Bay. Lüderitz was not asking for protection in the traditional sense of the word. He merely wished to have himself placed under the jurisdiction of the nearest German consul and to depend on an occasional visit from a German warship. This would guarantee some regularity of communication and supply in an otherwise isolated area. On June 20, 1883, Lüderitz was provisionally notified that the Wilhelmstrasse had approved his request pending consultation with Great Britain.<sup>50</sup>

Bismarck made several efforts to communicate with the British concerning Lüderitz's request. He made it clear that if Britain would provide the minimal benefits of protection for

German citizens in Southwest Africa, Germany would not get involved. Otherwise, Lüderitz, at least, would be offered protection on the terms already discussed.<sup>51</sup>

The reply from London displayed a marked change from the indifference expressed in 1880. Whitehall now maintained that due to "certain establishments" along the coast, the Cape Government was now interested in Angra Pequena as an area for expansion. Protection could not be offered Lüderitz, however, because the exact location of his factories was unknown.<sup>52</sup>

Further inquiries from Berlin regarding Angra Pequena were ignored or answered with even more ambiguous language. Bismarck was quite agitated and as a result did nothing to discourage Lüderitz from solidifying his claims in Southwest Africa. Which one of the previously mentioned motives instigated this action is difficult to ascertain. One fact is certain: in light of Bismarck's earlier assistance in Egypt, the British response was highly undiplomatic. One Whitehall communication in November, 1883, maintained that

...although Her Majesty's Government have not proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty along the whole country, but only at certain points, such as Walfish Bay and the Angra Pequena Islands, they consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights.<sup>53</sup>

The position of the Gladstone Government seemed to be one of complete contempt for the interests of German merchants abroad. The Angra Pequena imbroglio seemed to be a repeat performance of

similar German grievances in New Guinea, Samoa, and the Fiji Islands. In April, 1884, Lüderitz was placed under German protection, an action probably as much the result of disgust with British diplomacy as of anything else. Perhaps Bismarck even hoped the declaration would seriously undermine Gladstone's political position in Britain.

The British response to German colonial expansion had been the consequence of several factors. To begin with, Whitehall had miscalculated Bismarck's determination to look after the interests of German nationals abroad and his possible interest in the acquisition of colonies. Lord Amthill, the Ambassador in Berlin, sincerely believed that the old Chancellor, despite his inquiries regarding Angra Pequena, would never involve Germany in serious colonial activity.<sup>54</sup> Undoubtedly, this view affected the way in which London handled German requests. Not until the damage had been done in the Spring of 1884 did Amthill admit to a more serious attitude on Bismarck's part toward the colonial issue. But even this attitude was attributed to the upcoming elections, in which it was anticipated that Bismarck's opposition might raise the cry of "colonies for Germany."<sup>55</sup> Finally in the Summer of 1884, the British Ambassador depicted German colonialism as a real force with which to be dealt.

The agitation is becoming a very serious one, and will have great influence on the coming Elections next Autumn, so that Bismarck must adopt a popular national attitude to secure

a majority in the new Parliament. If he cannot show that he has protected German interests everywhere,--the most popular thing he can do will be to throw the blame on England, and leave the Press to do the rest.... He has discovered an explored mine of popularity in starting a Colonial policy, which Public Opinion persuades itself to be Anti-English, and the slumbering, theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth and our Freedom has awakened and taken the form of abuse of everything English in the Press.<sup>56</sup>

Not only had Ampthill been dilatory in impressing Whitehall with Bismarck's desire to attain satisfaction for German nationals in Southwest Africa, but he completely failed to comprehend that the Chancellor's proclamation of April 24, 1884, was in fact the inauguration of the German Colonial Empire. Therefore no recognition of the German proclamation was forthcoming. This was not entirely as much the Ambassador's fault as it was that of his subordinates, for between May and August, Ampthill was bedridden with a fatal illness.<sup>57</sup> The misunderstanding led to strained relations between the two powers.

A second circumstance that snarled Britain's early reaction to colonial questions was her relation to her colonies. Most Britons did not regard early German colonial expansion as a threat. Germany was generally regarded as a "free trader" in colonial areas, and the areas in which she chose to expand were of no strategic value to the British Empire.<sup>58</sup> The Daily Telegraph wrote in 1884 that if the Germans were foolish enough to embark on colonial ventures in such "sterile sand holes" as Southwest Africa, then Englishmen would welcome the Teutons

aboard.<sup>59</sup> Lord Derby, the British Colonial Secretary, reflected the classic view when he stated, "...there is something absurd in the scramble for colonies...."<sup>60</sup> Gladstone wrote Derby concerning Angra Pequena: "...is it dignified or required by any real interest, to make extensions of British authority without any view of occupying, but simply to keep them [the Germans] out?"<sup>61</sup>

Not all subjects of the British Empire viewed German expansion in such an indifferent light. Opposition in the British colonies took on an almost paranoid characteristic. Naturally the Home Government was caught in the middle. In December, 1884, Derby wrote Gladstone that Australian settlers "...cannot bear the notion of a German settlement on the north coast of New Guinea."<sup>62</sup> The Cape Town correspondent for the Standard reported in December, 1884, that South African opinion was such that only one flag would be tolerated over all South African territory.<sup>63</sup> Sentiment in the colonies may well have been reflected in a remark addressed to Lord Salisbury by an inhabitant of Cape Town. "My Lord, we are told that the Germans are good neighbors, but we prefer no neighbors at all."<sup>64</sup> Mr. Scanlen, the Cape Prime Minister, came to London in 1884 specifically to lobby for rejection of the German claim to Angra Pequena. From this combination of circumstances the British position on Angra Pequena evolved.

Whatever the virtue or injustice of the German colonial

demands or the British resistance to them, Bismarck held the upper hand. Just as Germany's international position at the time was unassailable, Britain's position was almost exactly the reverse. Not only did she have no allies, but at this time she had no friends. An Anglo-French controversy over the French ambitions in Madagascar had just been revived. The dispute over possession of the mouth of the Congo River still raged.<sup>65</sup> (The British officially supported the Portuguese claims against the French by the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of April, 1884.) There was the ubiquitous Egyptian crisis, which would continue to cause tense Anglo-French relations for almost three decades. The conflict between Britain and Russia in Afghanistan threatened to break into open warfare at any moment. For Britain to begrudge Germany such a small, relatively insignificant piece of real estate as Angra Pequena was the same as issuing engraved invitations to the European powers to form an anti-British continental league. Granville had obviously failed to do what is commonly necessary of a good statesman, that is to form a list of priorities necessary for Britain's security. Had such a list been compiled, it would have been obvious that Angra Pequena was not a security interest, but that the maintenance of favorable Anglo-German relations might be.

Bismarck, on the other hand, was not unwilling temporarily to concert with other powers to show Britain the irrationality of her policy. He could certainly much better

afford to make an issue of a minor situation than could Whitehall. Because of the European alliance system, sympathy from Italy, Russia, and Austria for the British dilemma would not be forthcoming. The only factor which blocked Franco-German cooperation was French revanchisme, and, unfortunately for Britain, this feeling toward Germany had temporarily abated. Although there existed little likelihood of an alliance between the two powers, one of the major reminders of the humiliation of 1871 was removed from the scene in 1882. The death of Leon Gambetta, the symbol of French resistance to Prussia, eliminated a momentous obstacle to reconciliation.

Even though a native of Lorraine, Jules Ferry, the French Premier since February, 1883, took a moderate view of Franco-German relations. He felt that the return of Alsace-Lorraine was at best a remote possibility, and that a constant state of agitation with Germany would accomplish nothing. On the other hand, cooperation with Germany on certain specialized problems should be undertaken if French national interest so dictated. As earlier stated, Ferry was a proponent of the "new imperialism," and he plainly saw that Britain stood squarely in the path of French imperial aspirations. Here was one case in which collaboration with Germany would be justified.<sup>66</sup>

A German feeler for rapprochement was soon forthcoming. On April 24, 1884, the day that Bismarck had assured

Lüderitz of protection and only a day after Britain had proposed a conference on Egyptian problems, Bismarck summoned the French Ambassador, M. de Courcel. The Chancellor explained that Germany had too slight an interest in Egypt to assume leadership in opposition to Britain's policies there. He implied in strong terms, however, that British obstreperousness in Southwest Africa and Fiji would make possible German support of France's position.<sup>67</sup> The groundwork was being laid for a "jolly good" twist of the lion's tail.

Still the Chancellor was unwilling to forge a completely new relationship with France too swiftly, for he was obviously aware of the difficulties of any meaningful long-range cooperation with the Quai d'Orsay. Cooperation with England still would be preferable. Britain could have anything in Egypt she wished if only some accommodation toward German colonial interests would be demonstrated.<sup>68</sup> If such cooperation was not forthcoming, however, Germany would intentionally create embarrassment for England in diplomatic questions.<sup>69</sup> Whitehall would have one more opportunity.

On May 5, 1884, Münster, the German Ambassador, was instructed to convey the following observations to the British Government. Britain's security position vis-à-vis France and Russia was vulnerable; therefore, Germany's position regarding these powers was of utmost importance to Britain. Germany would



be willing to restrain these powers if Britain would give some evidence of cordiality toward German colonial interests in the South Seas and Southwest Africa. Should Britain prove cooperative, it would also mean German diplomatic support of Britain in Egypt and a sympathetic view of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Bismarck also added a new proposition: the concession of Helgoland to Germany as a test of England's intention to maintain friendly Anglo-German relations. On this point, Bismarck had probably been influenced by Chief of the Admiralty Leo von Caprivi. Caprivi was particularly anxious to secure the island in view of Germany's projected construction of a canal nearby connecting the North and Baltic Seas.<sup>70</sup>

Bismarck's logic on this latter point ran as follows. The island was a jumping-off point for attack on the Elbe River and the west coast of Holstein. Possession of the island would immensely improve the German coastal defense. Since the island lacked a satisfactory harbor, its naval value for Britain was highly questionable; in its existing state, the island was valuable only as a defensive device, but Britain had nothing in the area to defend. Since Parliament was unwilling to allocate revenue for the necessary construction of an adequate port, why not permit Germany to undertake the task? If Helgoland were ceded to Germany, Germany would be willing to erect harbor facilities which would provide new security for all navigators in the dangerous North Sea-waters. The absence of a harbor there had long caused considerable losses in property and lives to all

the various merchant navies. The cession of Helgoland would be favorably viewed by German public opinion, which at this time was not favorably disposed toward friendly Anglo-German relations. This would greatly facilitate a pro-British policy on the part of the Wilhelmstrasse.

A word-for-word reading of Bismarck's proposal would suggest that the price for German friendship had just escalated. The Chancellor seemed to be demanding recognition of Lüderitz's new position as well as Helgoland. A more careful reading of the dispatch, however, with its heavy emphasis on the cession of Helgoland, would seem to indicate that if the island became German property, the other matters in question were negotiable or even expendable. One thing, however, was beyond doubt: Germany would have satisfaction on one or the other of her demands or Britain would suffer.

Unfortunately for Anglo-German relations, complications developed. The German Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Count Georg zu Münster, was a firmly-committed Anglophile and highly dubious about German colonial involvement. The acquisition of Helgoland was the only part of Bismarck's instructions to which Münster was sympathetic. As a consequence, the Chancellor's instructions were not immediately conveyed to the British Government. In the meantime and without previous information concerning Bismarck's new proposal, Derby initiated an amazing conversation with Münster regarding Helgoland:

This perfectly useless piece of rock in the North Sea, the smallest of our colonies, gives me the most trouble of any. First of all, I can find no Governor for it, and now he writes regularly, like his predecessor, and begs to be transferred elsewhere.

Münster's response was appropriate:

If the rocks seem so useless to you, you should either make it useful by building a harbor or else hand it over to us Germans.

Derby replied:

A harbor of course would be very important, if it could be made, but we have so much to do at Dover and elsewhere on our coasts that it is out of the question. Germany would be more able and have more interest in doing it.

Münster responded casually, trying not to appear overly enthusiastic:

Yes, but then Germany would have to own Helgoland, and there is no prospect of that; moreover I am not sure if sufficient importance would be attached to it in Germany.

The Colonial Secretary did not discard the issue, but continued:

If Germany would undertake to build a harbor of refuge within three years, which would cost at least £250,000, there might be some use in talking about it.<sup>71</sup>

Unfortunately Münster made no mention of the undesirable aspects of Bismarck's dispatch, that is, the instructions regarding Southwest Africa, probably because he felt the possibilities for the acquisition of Helgoland appeared so favorable. Still nothing materialized regarding Helgoland or Africa. Bismarck repeated his instructions to Münster on May 11.<sup>72</sup> Almost a week

later Münster broached the subject of Helgoland with Granville. Bismarck's arguments as to why the British should part with the island were utilized, but again no mention was made of Germany's overseas claims.<sup>73</sup> This failure undoubtedly helped reinforce the British view that the Germans were not really serious about Southwest Africa. For whatever reason, Granville refused to make a commitment on Helgoland.

Despite Germany's proclamation on April 24, 1884, of limited protection for the Lüderitz settlement, Lord Derby declared before the House of Lords on May 19, 1884, that although Britain had not directly claimed Southwest Africa, she reserved the right to exclude other foreign powers because of the territory's general propinquity to the Cape Colony which would probably want the region for herself.<sup>74</sup> A statement of this nature without further mention of Helgoland was bound to be interpreted by the Wilhelmstrasse as a decision on the part of the British to continue their obnoxious behavior.

Bismarck, unaware of the possibility that Münster had not fully informed Britain of his desires or that Amptill's subordinates did not accurately picture the German atmosphere, was enraged. On May 24, 1884, Bismarck expressed his aversion to the British position:

I pressed Count Münster strongly today to say no more about Heligoland, for a desire of this kind can only be presented to a nation when it is in a friendly mood toward us. This description does not apply to the English

of today as is proved by their unrestrained claims against us in colonial matters. A Monroe Doctrine in Africa! Our wishes regarding Heligoland rest on no legal basis and would drag down our justified demands regarding overseas affairs to the same level, if they were lumped together for public discussion. If we fail to obtain justice from England across the ocean, we must at any rate try to gain closer touch with the other sea-faring Powers, France included. Public opinion in Germany would not endure the arrogance and selfishness of the English forever.<sup>75</sup>

Bismarck later told Münster that the acquisition of Helgoland was of secondary importance in his view. The real purpose of the proposal was

...to ascertain whether England was inclined, at the time, to satisfy our overseas grievances by ceasing to lay hindrances in the way of legitimate German enterprises, this in return for our firm offer of greater support for Britain.

The Chancellor went on to ask the perfectly logical question of "...why the right to colonize, which Britain used to the fullest extent, should be denied us [Germany]."<sup>76</sup> Since the British never offered Helgoland to the Germans, unfortunately it cannot be proved that Bismarck would have accepted the island in lieu of Southwest Africa. The Chancellor registered his disgust with the British by temporarily removing the colonial issue from the Ambassador's hands. Still he was reluctant to immediately go over to the French. Just at this time another opportunity was afforded the British to come to terms. Herbert Bismarck was dispatched to London on June 14, 1884, to again impress on the Gladstone Government the possible consequences of its action;

apparently Herbert's mission was a success. Granville quickly withdrew his government's objections to having Germans in Southwest Africa and told Herbert that British possessions were already too extensive. A few days later Herbert was told that the British Cabinet had unanimously decided to acquiesce to German desires regarding Angra Pequena. Granville also admitted that the entire unfortunate situation was Britain's fault; communication between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office had broken down and Derby had taken unwarranted liberties.<sup>77</sup> In addition to the apologetic tone of the conversation, Britain abandoned her treaty of February, 1884, with Portugal, although originally she had hoped to establish the legitimacy of Portugal's claims to the mouth of the Congo River. Support of the Portuguese claims would exclude other powers from the area, and Whitehall had been confident that a weak Portugal would be unable to exploit the Congo's interior. France and Belgium had been at odds with the British over their support of the Portuguese, and Germany had actively supported the Franco-Belgian position.<sup>78</sup>

Bismarck now appeared completely satisfied, and Amptill wrote Granville expressing his approval of the new British position:

The press is all praise at the fairness, justice, and friendliness of your decision, and I hear from all sides that it has done immense good to our international relations; for the Germans had set their hearts on the protection of Herr Lüderitz's enterprise at Angra-Pequena.<sup>79</sup>

This communiqué was sent the same day that the London Conference

on Egyptian finances opened in London (June 28). Unfortunately, Ampthill's optimism was unjustified.

In the meantime, Derby was being pressured by South African influences to reject German demands concerning Southwest Africa.<sup>80</sup> The Colonial Secretary, realizing that Granville would never completely consent to the wishes of the Cape Colony, attempted a compromise: he encouraged the Cape Colony to seize all territory in Southwest Africa not yet fully under German protection.<sup>81</sup> Technically the British held the right to secure this territory, but at the very least this was an ungracious attempt to restrict Germany's first colonial venture. To implement his policy, it was necessary for Derby to offer only a highly qualified recognition of German sovereignty and geographical rights.<sup>82</sup> This directly contradicted what Granville had assured Herbert earlier. The whole wound was reopened. The contradiction of recognizing the sovereignty of a nation in a given area and then qualifying it probably never occurred to Derby or Granville.

The controversy continued through the summer. Misunderstanding and lack of clear communication prevented settlement until late September, 1884. During the interlude, the Franco-German rapprochement was consummated. Concrete evidence of this new alignment came into full view at the London Conference where the British had fervently hoped for German aid. It is striking that the Conference began to experience serious difficulties at

the same time that Bismarck concluded that Britain was hedging on her stated recognition of German sovereignty in Southwest Africa.<sup>83</sup> France began strenuous resistance to the British solution for the Egyptian financial question. She was obviously being encouraged by German assurances of support.<sup>84</sup> It was not long before the Conference was a shambles, and no solution to the Egyptian problem had been found. Gladstone saw clearly that German encouragement had caused the French intransigence and thus the failure to solve the problem.<sup>85</sup>

Bismarck, however, was not yet finished with the British. On August 7, 1884, he wrote Hatzfeldt that the breakdown of the London Conference was a propitious time for expanding Franco-German cooperation to include an agreement on partitioning the unannexed parts of Africa. Germany and France should first reach an agreement and then propose an international conference. England would probably refuse the invitation because of her ambition to monopolize the non-Western world. This would facilitate the formation of an anti-British League of armed neutrality based on the Eighteenth Century model.<sup>86</sup> During August, 1884, State Secretary Hatzfeldt and Ambassador Courcel discussed the possibility on several different occasions. During the talks Hatzfeldt made no secret of the fact that the whole project was directed specifically against the recalcitrant British colonial policy. France could rest assured that she would have support on Egyptian matters.<sup>87</sup> In early October, Herbert Bismarck visited





THE VERY "OLD SOLDIER."

The Ever-busy B. (considering). "Why not another conference? Good! Conducted this time in our own beautiful tongue. Better!! And as John Bull is too interested in his domestic affairs to think of anything else--hem!--we shall have to meet without him! Best!!!" (Punch, September 13, 1884, p. 123)

Paris and confirmed assurances of mutual cooperation regarding Egypt.<sup>88</sup>

#### D. Germany and East Africa

The Franco-German rapprochement began to have concrete effects. In the first place, it was causing a crisis for the economy-minded Liberal Government. The increasingly evident isolation of Britain's international position had resulted in a determined agitation among the British public for increased naval expenditures. By December, 1884, a mild panic had emerged, causing Parliament to vote the extraordinary peacetime sum of five and a half million pounds for increased construction over the ensuing five years.<sup>89</sup> This development was particularly galling to Gladstone, who had always considered expenditures for armaments wasteful extravagance.

Mutual hostility between Britain on the one hand and Germany and France on the other was quite evident as the Berlin Conference on Africa opened in November, 1884.<sup>90</sup> The Congress had been arranged by the French and Germans ostensibly to deal with Congo problems, but as has already been shown, it was hoped that the meeting could be used as a means of isolating Britain. As it turned out, the British did not resist the idea of a conference. Moreover the decisions of the Congress proved to be reasonably acceptable to all. The provisions of the General Act of February 26, 1885, defined the Congo Basin, prohibited slave trade in the Congo territories, provided for free navigation of

the Congo and Niger Rivers, authorized the levy of tolls only for maintenance, and finally laid down the procedure for future annexations.<sup>91</sup>

Even while the diplomats were busy in Berlin, the explorers and soldiers of fortune, stimulated by the new interest in Africa, were busy staking out spheres of influence. In the process German and French nationals were able to secure large areas of West Africa for themselves. By this time the British had finally decided to moderate their resistance to the advances of other powers in West Africa. A Foreign Office memorandum of December, 1884, had argued that it was best to concede West Africa to others and concentrate on maintaining British interests in East Africa, since this area was strategic for the security of the route to India. Although this attitude might have done a great deal to ease tension in West Africa, there still remained the problem of East Africa.<sup>92</sup>

In this light the activities of Karl Peters, the founder of the Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation, were of some significance. Peters, who had just been discouraged by the German Foreign Office from undertaking a colonization project inland from Mossamedes on the Angola coast, redirected his energies toward East Africa.<sup>93</sup> This time the Kolonial Gesellschaft had decided anew on a settlement in the district directly adjacent to the island of Zanzibar. Apparently the primary incentive for activity in this particular area was the reading by one of

Peters' cohorts, Count Pheil, of H. M. Stanley's How I Found Livingston. Stanley had suggested that the region was healthful, rich in natural resources and agriculturally productive. The agency that was to facilitate the adventure, which was in reality far beyond the means of the Kolonial Gesellschaft, was the Deutsche Ostafrika Gesellschaft. The company had been founded in March of 1884 to provide Peters with sufficient funds for exploration of East Africa. For the next two years the relationship between the Colonial Society and the company would be very close because the respective boards of directors were the same men.

It is possible that Peters was unjustifiably encouraged as to Bismarck's colonial interests through the private comments of Foreign Office officials as well as by Bismarck's own comment before the Reichstag, in which he offered to grant charters to those who could demonstrate ability to engage in African commerce.<sup>94</sup> What Peters failed to comprehend was that charters would be granted only for unoccupied areas, that is, areas which other powers did not already claim as spheres of influence.<sup>95</sup>

Again Peters made known his intentions to the German Foreign Office and then left for Zanzibar. On arrival he found a response from the Foreign Office warning him that his efforts would receive no support from the German Government since the area he proposed to colonize belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>96</sup> This time Peters was not deterred. He and a group of

about thirty-five others, including bearers, landed on the East African coast just south of Zanzibar and proceeded about one hundred and fifty miles inland. During November and December, 1884, Peters concluded treaties with twelve chieftains in the districts of Useguha, Hguru, Usagara, and Ukami. The treaties surrendered almost sole control of the area to the German East Africa Company: administration, collection of taxes, enforcement of law, exploitation of natural resources. In return the company was obligated to recognize the independent authority of the chieftains.<sup>97</sup>

Because of illness, Peters returned to the coast, leaving behind Count Pheil to continue the treaty negotiations. A battery of telegrams was now dispatched to the German Foreign Office recounting the provisions of the treaties and emphasizing that they had been concluded only with individuals or tribes that claimed to be independent of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Peters projected a potential "German India" extending further south to Lake Nyasa. All that was needed of the Imperial Government was recognition of what had already been claimed by the treaties. Later Peters added that the help of the Wilhelmstrasse would be appreciated in obtaining coastal access for the company. This might require negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>98</sup>

Though as yet he had received no official response from the Foreign Office regarding his earlier communications, Peters dispatched what was probably his most effective memorandum to the

Wilhelmstrasse. The Chancellor was again reassured that the area in which the Company was engaged was independent of the Sultan's authority. Peters went on to suggest that if the German Government would grant a protectorate, the Company would cover all the expenses through land sales, trading stations, monopolies on weapons and alcohol, and charges levied on forest and mining concessions. The promise of economic self-sufficiency would mean a great deal to the German Government. Peters again requested that Imperial diplomacy be used to acquire a coastal facility for the company.<sup>99</sup>

Peters' project was not the only German colonial adventure in East Africa. Clemens and Gustav Denhardt had already been active in the Witu region just to the north of the island of Zanzibar. They had explored and mapped the Tana and Juba Rivers and in 1882 had requested Imperial protection for the establishment of a German colony. Although protection was refused, the brothers were able to form a private consortium in Berlin which allowed the purchase of a strip of land between the Tana and Juba Rivers.<sup>100</sup>

A problem now arose as to the validity of the purchase, for there were two individuals who claimed sovereignty over Witu. The Sultan of Witu, Achmed, had been the active ruler of the area since the 1870's but the Sultan of Zanzibar also claimed sovereignty over Witu, but had never been able to gain effective control even through force of arms.

The British position regarding the Denhardt brothers and Peters was naturally negative. British interests in Zanzibar were fairly substantial. Zanzibar was of importance for security reasons, as was mentioned earlier in the Foreign Office memo of December, 1884; there were also significant commercial interests. The island was one of the major trade centers for the Indian Ocean.<sup>101</sup> Zanzibar was particularly important since France was already established in Madagascar. The Island Kingdom was also one of the best examples of the "unofficial" British presence in Africa; the native governments were utilized to maintain British interests at no serious expense to Britain. In hopes of perpetuating this situation indefinitely, Britain had signed a treaty with the French in 1862 in which both powers promised to respect the independence of the Sultan, that is, not to alter the status quo.<sup>102</sup>

The General Act of the Berlin Conference seriously undercut the Sultan of Zanzibar's claims to continental authority for it prescribed that effective control over an area had to be established and maintained before valid title could be recognized.<sup>103</sup> It was on this basis that Peters and the Denhardts could assert their claims. The area which Peters and the Denhardts now claimed had presumably been recognized by the British and French in 1862 as belonging to Zanzibar. On the basis of its initial reply to Peters' East African project, the Wilhelmstrasse concurred with this view. The fact was, however, that the Sultan did not

exercise effective control over his continental possessions in the interior. His position beyond Zanzibar itself and the immediate coastal regions depended upon the inconsistent loyalty of his Arab vassals. In the interior, these men proved to be little more than provincial bandits, who not only terrorized the caravan routes, but also vigorously engaged in the slave trade. The fact that the Sultan could not suppress the slave trade, despite his obligation to do so as stipulated by the General Act of the Berlin Conference, was only a further indication that his "subjects" in the interior recognized Zanzibari authority only when it was advantageous to do so.<sup>104</sup> John Kirk, the British Consul in Zanzibar, encouraged the Sultan to assert his rights against the Germans. Any diminution of the Sultan's territory reduced his prestige and authority and hence the position of Britain. A favorable solution seemed unlikely. One Zanzibari expedition was sent to Kilimanjaro where the flag was hoisted, but the party withdrew immediately, posing no complications for Peters.<sup>105</sup>

Gladstone himself had never recognized the need for maintaining British hegemony in East Africa. Unfortunately, he was so involved with domestic issues such as Irish Home Rule and extension of the franchise that he left foreign affairs to others who, as it turned out, were more aggressive than he. Lord Kimberly, Secretary of State for India, feared German involvement in East Africa as endangering the "India route."<sup>106</sup> Percy



Anderson, head of the African Department of the Foreign Office, feared German expansion into Portuguese East Africa and hence South Africa.<sup>107</sup> Both Derby and Granville objected to German expansion at one time or another. Joseph Chamberlain, President of the Board of Trade, was a committed imperialist.<sup>108</sup> All this, combined with occasional ill service on the part of some British diplomats (as in the case of Angra Pequena) and the confused communication with the Wilhelmstrasse, made the British colonial appetite appear ravenous.

If Bismarck had hoped to profit from the colonial issue in the election of 1884, he was mistaken. By January, 1885, Münster had been notified that:

...the colonial question is...a matter of life and death for reasons of domestic politics. Public opinion lays so great a stress on our Colonial policy that the Government's position in the country actually depends on its success.<sup>109</sup>

Bismarck's insinuation that he was in the position of a parliamentary minister should have fooled no one. The Chancellor was probably trying to stir Münster into taking a harder line with the English since the Ambassador was considered by many people at the Wilhelmstrasse to be more English than German.<sup>110</sup>

The election results proved the colonial gimmick unsatisfactory as a great issue and the old statesman's interest seemed to wane. Holstein's view of the situation in 1885 was:

The Chancellor's behavior during the Conference [Berlin Conference on Africa] is peculiar. The whole thing bores him; to him it is scarcely

more than an election stunt. He has in fact no interest in the colonial question.<sup>111</sup>

The Wilhelmstrasse's response to Peters' proposal up to this point had also been quite phlegmatic, apparently substantiating Holstein's view.

Bismarck was not, in fact, finished with the colonial issue. Although the Conservatives and the government supporters had not carried the day by any means in the elections of June-July, 1884, the position of the Radicals had been somewhat reduced to the benefit of the Conservatives. Bismarck undoubtedly recognized that some support could be gleaned from the colonial question despite the fact one might not consider it to be a "great issue." Even among the Freisinnige and Center parties there were people who were sympathetic to the colonial cause, even though their respective parties were officially opposed.<sup>112</sup>

There may yet have been another reason in Bismarck's view for refusing to turn his back on colonialism. The health of Wilhelm I was not good, and it appeared that the succession of the liberal, British-oriented Crown Prince Friedrich was imminent. Herbert Bismarck told General von Schweinitz some years later that:

When we entered upon a colonial policy, we had to reckon with a long reign of the Crown Prince. During his reign English influence would have been dominant. To prevent this, we had to embark on a colonial policy, because it was popular and conveniently adapted to bring us into conflict with England at any given moment.<sup>113</sup>

Even if Herbert's statement was exaggerated, Bismarck certainly recognized that some domestic advantage could always be gained by twisting the lion's tail. If Britain persisted in her niggardly attitude toward German colonization, then the provocation of an artificial crisis could always be utilized to attain a greater following for the government. Necessary Reichstag legislation could be "railroaded" on the coattails of a temporary deviation into Anglophobism. A crisis with Britain would undoubtedly make the position of the future Friedrich III and his English wife more difficult, and therefore correspondingly more dependent on Bismarck.<sup>114</sup>

For these reasons and other economic and political factors already mentioned, the old Chancellor was unwilling to completely turn his back on colonialism. Still nothing has been proved as to whether or not Bismarck was really committed to the necessity of a colonial empire for its own sake. This problem has arisen because colonialism became involved in a much more important question as far as Germany was concerned, that is the security of the Reich. It was important for Britain to recognize that Germany and Britain vitally needed one another's friendship. If Whitehall failed to recognize this factor, there might be serious repercussions for the future of Germany's security system. Britain's intransigence over the colonial issue was evidence that she did not recognize the need for cooperation with Germany. Bismarck, therefore, took it upon

himself to remind her. The fact that Bismarck intensely despised Gladstone made the "disciplining process" easier.<sup>115</sup>

After showing no initial interest in Karl Peters' colonial project in East Africa, Bismarck granted an Imperial Protectorate the day before the conclusion of the Berlin African Conference.<sup>116</sup> (The Conference concluded February 27, 1885, but publicly March 3, 1885.)

Gladstone's popularity plunged to a new low. Faced with domestic scorn and the Franco-German entente abroad, the Prime Minister attempted a coup more characteristic of Bismarck than of himself. In a speech before the House of Lords on February 28, Granville attempted to clarify and defend the government's foreign policy; it was explained that Germany's negative attitude toward Britain resulted from the Prime Minister's refusal to annex Egypt, as was claimed to have been advised by Bismarck.<sup>117</sup> At least one eminent student of Anglo-German relations, William L. Langer, has suggested that Gladstone hoped to split the French and Germans by this revelation.<sup>118</sup>

Bismarck replied in a sharply worded repudiation on March 2 before the Reichstag. The Gladstone-Granville assertion was scornfully denied, although certainly there was some truth to the proposition. There is no denying however, that Gladstone's actions were contrary to accepted diplomatic protocol, and that contributed toward a continuing Anglo-German friction.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire 1884-1918 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 61-63, 72-75.

<sup>2</sup>Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), pp. 274-280; William O. Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), pp. 21-29.

<sup>3</sup>William O. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>William O. Henderson, "German East Africa 1884-1918," History of East Africa, (eds.) Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963-65), II, p. 125.

<sup>5</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies 1884-1885 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967), p. 6.

<sup>6</sup>John Flint, "The Wider Background to Partition and Colonial Occupation," History of East Africa, (eds.) Roland Oliver and Grevasse Mathew, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963-65), I, pp. 365-67.

<sup>7</sup>William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 291-318.

<sup>8</sup>Fritz F. Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-Ostafrika (Berlin: Rütten und Loering, 1959), pp. 51-52, 466-70. See Henry A. Turner for the most convincing argument utilizing economic factors.

<sup>9</sup>Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1905), II, p. 337.

<sup>10</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 60.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>12</sup>Otto von Bismarck, Die Gesammelten Werke, 15 vols. (Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1926), III, Dec. 5, 1888, no. 456, p. 646. Henceforth referred to as GW.

<sup>13</sup>Hermann von Eckhardtstein, Lebens-Erinnerungen, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Paul List, 1920), I, p. 307.

<sup>14</sup>Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstag, 460 vols. (Berlin: Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei, 1867-1930), VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. I, 27 Sitting, Jan. 26, 1889, p. 621. Henceforth referred to as RD.

<sup>15</sup>William H. Dawson, The German Empire 1867-1914, 2 vols. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919), II, p. 175.

<sup>16</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, p. 19.

<sup>17</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 61.

<sup>18</sup>Alfred Zimmermann, Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1914), pp. 21, 42.

<sup>19</sup>Eckhort Kehr, Schachtflottenbau und Partei-Politik, 1894-1901 (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1930), p. 4.

<sup>20</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 66.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>23</sup>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 15, 1880; quoted in Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 74.

<sup>24</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 77.

<sup>25</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, pp. 28-37.

<sup>26</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 291.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 291-92.

<sup>28</sup>Robert O. Collins, "Origins of the Nile Struggle," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 119.

<sup>29</sup>J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27), IV, Busch to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, Berlin, Sept. 7, 1882, no. 728, pp. 34-36; Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Sept. 13, 1882, no. 730, pp. 38-41. Henceforth referred to as GP.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Sept. 13, 1882, no. 730, pp. 38-41; Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, Bicester, Jan. 14, 1883, no. 735, pp. 47-48.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., II, Bismarck memo, Varzin, Sept. 16, 1876, no. 235, pp. 48-51.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., IV, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Bismarck, Potsdam, Sept. 4, 1882, no. 726, p. 31.

<sup>33</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, pp. 84-85.

<sup>34</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 291.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 288.

<sup>36</sup>Henderson, "German East Africa," p. 125; Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, p. 21.

<sup>37</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 87; Henry A. Turner, "Bismarck's Imperialist Venture," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 53-55. Turner points out that Küsserow did misinterpret the agreement.

<sup>38</sup>Turner, "Bismarck," pp. 53-55.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 56-57; Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 288.

<sup>40</sup>GW, XIII, Jan. 26, 1889, no. 27, p. 386.

<sup>41</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 82.

<sup>42</sup>Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar, pp. 51-52. Müller does not clarify precisely what he means by "support." There is a great difference between vocal moral support and extensive monetary support.

<sup>43</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, pp. 64-65, 68, 77.

<sup>44</sup>Allen C. Greenberg, "Bismarck and German Colonial Policy 1884-1885" (unpublished MA thesis at the University of Illinois, 1964), pp. 48-56; James H. Gore, Political Parties and Party Politics in Germany (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1903), pp. 13-14; Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme, 1861-1954 (Gottingen: F. Bruckmann, 1950), pp. 18-21.

<sup>45</sup>Norman Rich and M. S. Fisher (eds.), The Holstein Papers, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955-63), II, pp. 161-64. Henceforth referred to as HP.

<sup>46</sup>Zimmermann, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik, p. 46.

<sup>47</sup>Horst Kohl (ed.), Die politische Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: C. Bech, 1892-1905), X, p. 196.

<sup>48</sup>Greenberg, "Bismarck," pp. 53-54.

<sup>49</sup>Louis L. Snyder, "The Role of Herbert Bismarck in the Angra-Pequena Negotiations between Germany and Britain," Journal of Negro History, vol. 35 (October, 1950), p. 438.

<sup>50</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, p. 28.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Snyder, "Herbert Bismarck," p. 440.

<sup>53</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, p. 36.

<sup>54</sup>William R. Louis, "Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa 1884-1919," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 6.

<sup>55</sup>Paul Knaplund (ed.), Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 3 vols. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), II, p. 319; Louis, "Britain and Germany," p. 6.

<sup>56</sup>Knaplund, Letters, pp. 331-340.

<sup>57</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, p. 43; Amptill died in August, 1884.

<sup>58</sup>The Times (London), June 25, 1884, p. 5.

<sup>59</sup>The Daily Telegraph, Oct. 22, 1884 as quoted in Louis, "Britain and Germany," p. 4.

<sup>60</sup>Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), p. 208.

<sup>61</sup>Louis, "Britain and Germany," p. 4.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 296.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 300, 306.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>67</sup>Documents Diplomatiques Français, series I, 10 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929-38), V, Courcel to Ferry, Berlin, April 24, 1884, no. 246, pp. 264-65; Courcel to Ferry, Berlin, April 25, 1884, no. 247, pp. 265-66; Courcel to Ferry,



Berlin, April 25, 1884, no. 249, pp. 267-71. Henceforth referred to as DDF.

<sup>68</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Jan. 24, 1885, no. 757, p. 94.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., IV, memo by Wilhelm Bismarck, Varzin, Aug. 23, 1884, no. 750, pp. 78-79.

<sup>70</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 293; GP, IV, Bismarck to Münster, Berlin, May 5, 1884, no. 738, pp. 50-52.

<sup>71</sup>GP, IV, Münster to Bismarck, London, May 8, 1884, no. 739, pp. 53-55.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., IV, Bismarck to Münster, Berlin, May 11, 1884, no. 740, pp. 55-56.

<sup>73</sup>Fitzmaurice, Granville, II, p. 351.

<sup>74</sup>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Lords, series 3, 356 vols. (London: Cornelius Buck, 1830-1891), CCLXXXIII, May 19, 1884, p. 646. Henceforth referred to as PD.

<sup>75</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck's marginal comments, p. 58.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., IV, Bismarck to Münster, Friedrichsruh, June 1, 1884, no. 743, pp. 59-62.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., IV, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, June 17, 1884, no. 746, pp. 68-71; Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, June 22, 1884, no. 747, pp. 71-74; Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of Sir Charles Dilke, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1917), II, p. 81.

<sup>78</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 300.

<sup>79</sup>Fitzmaurice, Granville, II, p. 335.

<sup>80</sup>Aydelotte, Bismarck and Britain, pp. 103-04.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 101; London Conference, June 28-Aug. 2, 1884.

<sup>84</sup>DDF, ser. 1, V, Ferry to Waddington, Paris, July 27, 1884, no. 345, p. 354.

<sup>85</sup>Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa, p. 143.

<sup>86</sup>GP, III, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Varzin, Aug. 7, 1884, no. 680, pp. 413-14.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., III, Wilhelm Bismarck to Foreign Office, Varzin, Aug. 15, 1884, no. 683, pp. 418-19; Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, Berlin, Aug. 17, 1884, no. 385, p. 420. DDF, ser. 1, V, Courcel to Ferry, Berlin, Aug. 17, 1884, no. 372, pp. 373-75; Taylor, Germany's First Bid, pp. 47-8.

<sup>88</sup>GP, III, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, Paris, Oct. 6, 1884, no. 694, pp. 431-37; Herbert Bismarck, Paris, Oct. 7, 1884, no. 695, pp. 438-39.

<sup>89</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 303.

<sup>90</sup>The Conference lasted from Nov. 15, 1884 to Feb. 26, 1885.

<sup>91</sup>Edward Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), II, no. 128, pp. 468-86.

<sup>92</sup>Gladstone, for his part, objected to increasing British commitments in East Africa, but he was just as set against intrusion into East Africa by other powers. Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa, p. 191.

<sup>93</sup>Henry Bair, "Karl Peters and German Colonialism," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University, 1968), pp. 58-59.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp. 49, 61.

<sup>95</sup>RD, V Legislature period, IV Session, vol. II, 42 Sitting, June 26, 1884, p. 1061.

<sup>96</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 61.

<sup>97</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, no. 210, pp. 682-83; Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 72.

<sup>98</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," pp. 74-75.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>100</sup>Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 131.

<sup>101</sup>Paul E. Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the University of Michigan, 1937), p. 74.

- <sup>102</sup>Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, no. 222, p. 718.
- <sup>103</sup>Ibid., II, no. 128, pp. 484-85.
- <sup>104</sup>Hubbell, "Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty," pp. 72, 82.
- <sup>105</sup>Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa, p. 190.
- <sup>106</sup>Louis, "Britain and Germany," p. 4.
- <sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 5.
- <sup>108</sup>Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa, p. 179.
- <sup>109</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to Münster, Berlin, Jan. 25, 1885, no. 758, p. 96.
- <sup>110</sup>Moritz Busch, Bismarck, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1898), II, p. 372.
- <sup>111</sup>HP, II, Dec. 13, 1884, p. 169.
- <sup>112</sup>Hans Spellmeyer, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik im Reichstag (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1939), pp. 14-16.
- <sup>113</sup>Eyck, Bismarck, p. 275.
- <sup>114</sup>Knaplund, Letters, p. 339.
- <sup>115</sup>HP, III, Herbert Bismarck to Holstein, Königsten, Sept. 3, 1884, no. 122, pp. 131-32; Herbert Bismarck to Holstein, Königsten, Sept. 5, 1884, no. 124, pp. 132-33; Herbert Bismarck to Holstein, Friedrichsruh, Oct. 11, 1884, no. 132, pp. 137-38.
- <sup>116</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 68; Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), p. 405, for copy of the proclamation. Flint, "Partition," p. 369.
- <sup>117</sup>PD, Lords, ser. 3, vol. 287, Feb. 28, 1885, p. 464. Herbert Bismarck had once told Granville that British annexation of Egypt would be incompatible with German interests. Herbert went on, however, to argue that such a course was not in Britain's interest; GP, IV, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Sept. 13, 1882, no. 730, pp. 38-41.
- <sup>118</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 307.

## CHAPTER II

## THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND EAST AFRICA, 1886-1887

A. The End of the Franco-German Entente

Bismarck knew well that the favorable international situation had given him the opportunity to make moderate colonial demands on the British, and he had not failed to do so. The results had been gratifying as far as amassing a colonial empire was concerned, but Anglo-German relations had suffered in the process.<sup>1</sup> A permanent antagonism with Britain would certainly not serve German interests, particularly if it yielded no stabilizing force for the German security system. No one was more aware than Bismarck that his new relation with France could be only of a limited character.<sup>2</sup> Evidence of this awareness can be seen in the dispatch of Herbert Bismarck to London following the Chancellor's heated exchange with Gladstone in late February and early March of 1885. Bismarck was obviously reluctant to let things disintegrate to the point that Germany would have to depend excessively on French goodwill.<sup>3</sup>

Friedrich von Holstein, one of Bismarck's chief advisors, was convinced that France was only biding her time to avenge the decision of 1871; Franco-German cooperation in colonial matters was temporarily expedient as a means of intimidating the British. But Holstein was concerned that the relation might be carried to extremes. Such a policy might result in Germany's falling between two stools.<sup>4</sup>

There were a great many reasons why Bismarck might question the long-term feasibility of a rapprochement with France. During Herbert Bismarck's visit to Paris in October, 1884, to discuss Franco-German strategy in the forthcoming Berlin Conference, the press had been so critical that the French Government was forced to publish a yellow book showing that the discussions were limited to temporary colonial cooperation.<sup>5</sup> Freycinet's organ, the Télégraphe stated:

It is generally believed that any intimacy with Germany would be a jeu de dupe ou un feu de paille unless it should start with the healing of our real wounds...we do not mean the loss of money or of prestige but the separation from our Alsatian brothers.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps the best indication to Bismarck that he should begin to reevaluate his policy was the fall of the Ferry ministry in late March, 1885. Ferry's demise apparently came as the result of an unsuccessful campaign of expansion in Asia. While the Chamber of Deputies had been immersed in a debate on the virtues and evils of Ferry's colonial policy, new information arrived that French forces had been defeated by the Chinese and forced to evacuate Lang-Son. Paris panicked. Clemenceau declared the ministry guilty of treason; the mobs demanded a new government. Not the least notable of the cries from the mob was: "Down with the Prussian!"<sup>7</sup> The repudiation of Ferry's colonial policy was a rejection of French colonial schemes in general; it would mean that temporarily France would be more concerned with European affairs than with colonialism.<sup>8</sup>

The implications of Ferry's demise were not lost on Bismarck. Even though the new French Foreign Minister, Freycinet, seemed willing to endure the Franco-German relation for a time, by May, 1885, Bismarck viewed the "special" relation with France dimly. He was not convinced that he could depend on France, for she lacked the real backbone necessary to oppose Britain for any sustained period of time, and the same was true concerning cooperation with Germany.<sup>9</sup> A few days later while addressing the Cabinet, Bismarck stated: "For us [Germany] the French will never become even dependable defensive allies. The enmity is too old and will continue to exist."<sup>10</sup>

Another factor Bismarck had to consider in formulating a future policy toward Britain and France was the view of the Anglophile Crown Prince Friedrich. William I had just undergone his first serious illness. At almost ninety, the Emperor could not be expected to live much longer. The Chancellor had discussed the succession question with Baron Courcel, the French Ambassador, in a very frank fashion. The Ambassador's view of the meeting was that Germany intended to abandon Egypt to Britain in the near future and that France would have to make what terms she could with England.<sup>11</sup> On June 1, 1885, the French Ambassador was officially notified that the Quai d'Orsay could expect a change in Germany's attitude toward colonial cooperation with Britain.<sup>12</sup> This did not mean that Bismarck would immediately

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retreat from close Franco-German relations to renewed antagonism with France and a more intimate relation with another power such as Britain. On the contrary, it simply meant that Bismarck had decided to neutralize his position regarding France and Britain so as to leave greater maneuverability for German foreign policy.

A more neutral relation with Britain did not prove immediately possible for Bismarck. The complicating factor was the Anglo-Russian crisis in Afghanistan. Because of Russian expansion in Central Asia, Anglo-Russian relations had seriously deteriorated by the Spring of 1885. By late April and early May, war seemed inevitable.<sup>13</sup> Although Bismarck would have been gratified to have the Russian army preoccupied in Asia and Britain bogged down in what would undoubtedly be an unpopular and expensive war, the possibilities of German diplomatic exploitation of such a situation were not worth the potential hazards. Such a war posed two serious perils for Germany. Britain might decide her position was sufficiently vulnerable that differences with France should be composed, thus ending French isolation. That same undesirable circumstance could also occur in another manner. In the case of an Anglo-Russian War, Germany would doubtless be called upon to fulfill her commitments under the Three Emperors' League to support the Russian position.<sup>14</sup> There was yet another consideration which could also prove dangerous for Austria and Germany: if Russia should be too successful in the Middle East, her arrogance might interfere with

Austrian Balkan interests. Maintenance of the status quo was the most ardent desire of both Germany and Austria.<sup>15</sup>

Even though his sympathies and treaty obligations lay with Russia, Bismarck encouraged neither Russian expansion nor Russian obstruction to an equitable settlement over the issue. Because of the recent Anglo-German friction, Russia no doubt felt she could drive a hard bargain with Britain, but this was a different matter from Bismarck's actually encouraging the Russians. During the course of the crisis, when Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, began to question Germany about her treaty obligations under the Three Emperors' League, Bismarck undoubtedly became quite nervous.<sup>16</sup> Peace was Germany's best ally, and no one was better aware of that than Bismarck.

Unfortunately for Bismarck, the plans to ease Germany's relations with Britain could not be implemented because the British were convinced of Germany's complicity in encouraging Russia. The Times was full of recriminations toward Germany for encouraging Russian aggression. Granville himself was convinced that Bismarck was at least encouraging Russian procrastination in settling the problem.<sup>17</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe, writing many years later, suggested that the Penjdeh incident "...was the outcome of his [Bismarck's] direct suggestion that the moment was favorable for Russia to act."<sup>18</sup>

The Penjdeh incident did eventually involve Germany in more than an indirect fashion. Realizing that she was at a





"HIGH JINKS!"

John Bull, A 1. "Oughtn't we to muzzle him?"  
Inspector Bismarck. "Muzzle him! Why I rather like it!" (Punch,  
September 4, 1886, p. 115)

disadvantage against Russia in Afghanistan, Britain demanded that the Straits be opened to her warships, thus exposing Russia's more vulnerable area. The atmosphere was charged to a high point when the British argued that failure of the Ottoman Empire to allow passage through the Straits would be an un-neutral act.<sup>19</sup>

Bismarck fully recognized the danger of concurring with British wishes. Passage of British warships into the Black Sea might result in a repetition of the Crimean War. Russia would most likely consider opening the Straits an act of war; therefore Turkey would be directly involved. All of this would bring war dangerously close to the borders of Europe. Austro-Russian relations might be endangered, thereby threatening the Three Emperors' League, the main element of the German security system. If there were to be a war, the farther away from Europe proper, the better. It is not surprising that Bismarck instructed the German Ambassador in Constantinople to demand Turkish resistance to the British request.<sup>20</sup>

An additional problem complicating neutralization of Anglo-German relations was the Zanzibar-German question, an issue which remained an open sore. The Sultan of Zanzibar refused to recognize the position of the East African protectorate. The German Consul in Zanzibar, Gerhard Rholfs, was convinced that the British Consul, Sir John Kirk, was encouraging the Sultan to reject the claims of German expansion.<sup>21</sup> Without recognition

from the Sultan, there was little likelihood that Peters' company would acquire access to necessary coastal facilities. Still under pressure from the Afghanistan crisis, Bismarck warned Peters and his associates that restraint was necessary in dealing with the matter.<sup>22</sup> But in April, 1885, the Sultan himself addressed an appeal directly to the German Emperor in which he vigorously protested German claims to territory that he asserted to be his own.<sup>23</sup> Bismarck was enraged at the Sultan's presumption in appealing directly to William I. Assuming that Kirk was responsible for the act, Bismarck sent a sharply worded note to Whitehall warning that future indiscretions might result in German military reprisals against Zanzibar, and the Sultan should be so informed.<sup>24</sup> To emphasize to the Sultan the precariousness of his position, Bismarck let it be known on May 27 that a German naval squadron would "visit" Zanzibar to bring the Sultan to a more correct bearing.<sup>25</sup>

The Straits and Afghan crises as well as the Sultan's letter to the Kaiser should, perhaps could, have led to a worsening of Anglo-German relations, but this did not actually occur. For one reason, Bismarck was even more determined than ever to neutralize Germany's position vis-à-vis Britain because of the increasingly unstable European atmosphere. From Britain's point of view, it seemed easier and more important to compose her differences with Germany than with France. In late May, 1885, Whitehall's attitude underwent a dramatic transition regarding

Germany's part in the Afghan and Straits crises. The British Government apparently became so convinced of Bismarck's desire for peace that he was asked to mediate the British and Russian differences.<sup>26</sup>

As far as East Africa and Zanzibar were concerned, Sir Edward Malet expressed the British dilemma well.

...If we cannot or will not work with Germany, we shall be in a very awkward position because the German protectorate will be made effective despite us and our influence with the Sultan must collapse, to say nothing of the chances of Zanzibar being bombarded.<sup>27</sup>

Malet's advice was heeded, and in the last days of the second Gladstone Government there was evidence of a willingness to come to terms with Germany in East Africa as well as in West Africa. The concrete affirmation of this inclination was the pressure Britain exerted on the Sultan of Zanzibar to settle with Germany. Additional evidence that Gladstone wanted reconciliation was that Lord Rosebery, a close friend of Herbert Bismarck, was sent to Berlin to unofficially sound out the Wilhelmstrasse regarding a general colonial settlement.<sup>28</sup> During the conversations Rosebery suggested that a mixed commission be appointed to determine the legitimate limits of the Sultan's domain. Once this was accomplished, the way would be cleared for Anglo-German partition of the remaining portion of East Africa. On June 3, 1885, Bismarck provisionally accepted the idea of a boundary commission.<sup>29</sup> Taking Rosebery's approaches as indicative of a serious British intention of conciliation, Bismarck next

announced a German protectorate over the coastal area of the Sultanate of Witu on June 4, 1885.<sup>30</sup> With the Anglo-Russian crisis well on the way toward settlement, Bismarck could afford to test the sincerity of Britain's apparent resolution not to oppose limited German expansion. Witu was not an area in which Britain had previously expressed an interest, and therefore no Briton could raise an objection for reason of interest. If the territory eventually proved to be of some value so much the better, but primarily Bismarck was testing Britain's commitment to a principle. But before any of the projected details of the African settlement could be implemented, Gladstone's Government fell. Although the African question was temporarily set aside, this political event in itself would serve to improve Anglo-German relations, for Bismarck had never liked Gladstone.<sup>31</sup> Bismarck held Salisbury, on the other hand, in high regard, and considered the principles of the Conservative Party much more palatable than those of the Liberals. For his part, Salisbury made it clear from the beginning that he wanted German friendship. Münster recorded that Salisbury "...begged me to inform Your Highness [Bismarck] that he hoped...to do his utmost to reestablish and maintain a relationship such as existed during the time of Lord Beaconsfield."<sup>32</sup>

Salisbury was undoubtedly motivated in his own attitude toward Bismarck and Germany by a memorandum he had received from Sir William White, the British Ambassador in Constantinople.

White was convinced that Germany was the key to Britain's solution to the Egyptian problem.<sup>33</sup> Salisbury also saw the matter in this light, and in a private letter to the German Chancellor (July 2, 1885) asked his support in securing a loan of nine million pounds for the administration of Egypt.<sup>34</sup> Bismarck's reply was courteous but somewhat ambiguous; he promised to do what he could.<sup>35</sup> The German Chancellor was determined, however, that Britain should provide some solid evidence of an attitude different from that of the past two years.

Anxious for German aid, Salisbury was able to find concrete means of substantiating Britain's goodwill toward Germany. He offered to mediate a Spanish-German dispute over protectorate rights in the Caroline Islands.<sup>36</sup> The Prime Minister also used his influence with the Sultan of Zanzibar to obtain a favorable solution for Germany regarding East Africa. As was pointed out earlier, the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Sultan of Witu had come into conflict over the land that the Sultan of Witu had leased to the Denhardt brothers. The Sultan of Zanzibar refused to recognize the Sultan of Witu as anything more than an outlaw. In extending protection to Witu in June, Germany had recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Witu. Salisbury instructed Sir John Kirk, the British Consul, to restrain the Sultan of Zanzibar. Given the volatile Arab temperament, this was no small task. The Sultan was eventually persuaded to accept an international commission which would define the actual limits

of his suzerainty.<sup>37</sup> Germany recognized the British behavior as a friendly gesture.<sup>38</sup>

Whether Germany did actually return the British service in kind is open to question. What is important is that Lord Salisbury thought Germany had returned the favor by encouraging Russia to come to terms over the Afghanistan frontier and on the matter of the Egyptian loan. He wrote Lord Iddelsleigh, his Foreign Secretary:

I have been using the credit I have got with  
 —Bismarck in the Caroline Islands and Zanzibar  
 to get help in Russia and Turkey and Egypt.  
 He is rather a Jew, but on the whole I have  
 as yet got my money's worth.<sup>39</sup>

Apparently then, African cooperation between Britain and Germany was the key at this point to the amelioration of Anglo-German relations. The improvement came just in time, for no sooner had the Penjdeh crisis and the accompanying dispute over the Straits been assuaged than a new international disturbance arose.

#### B. Bulgaria, Boulanger, and Africa

The Bulgarian settlement at Berlin in 1878 had not been entirely satisfactory, for the separation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia had placated neither Bulgarian nationalists nor Russian Pan-Slavs. One of the prime moving forces behind that unfortunate solution was the position of the British. Whitehall had maintained that Russian domination over a greater Bulgaria would weaken the British position at the Straits.<sup>40</sup> As time passed,

however, Bulgaria proved herself more independent of Russian influence than anyone had previously expected. Now Russia and Britain exchanged positions; Russia objected to unification and Britain was in favor.<sup>41</sup> Both Britain and Russia saw a greater Bulgaria as a means of undercutting Russian influence in the Balkans. In September, 1885, the status quo in Eastern Europe was shattered by Bulgarian nationalists. Philipopolis, the capital of Eastern Rumelia, fell to revolutionaries who demanded union with Bulgaria. If Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the ruler of Bulgaria, accepted leadership in the movement, he was in serious danger of Russian reprisals. On the other hand, if he failed to espouse the nationalist cause, he had no hope of retaining his popularity in Bulgaria. Alexander chose the latter course.<sup>42</sup>

Russian retaliation was swift. Alexander III ordered the recall of all Russian officers serving in the Bulgarian army. This move seriously weakened the Bulgarian military position since Russian "advisors" contributed appreciably, not only to the training of the Bulgarian army, but also to its leadership; all officers above the rank of lieutenant were Russian.<sup>43</sup> The weakened position of Bulgaria's military forces, as well as the desires of King Milan of Serbia for compensation to bolster his prestige, led to a serious crisis. Since Serbia was the "protégé" of Austria-Hungary (as the result of a secret treaty in June, 1881) and because Russia considered Bulgaria





THE CHEEKY CHICK.

Alexander, the Little. "My! What a row I'm making!:" (Punch, October 3, 1885, p. 162)

her sphere of influence, the possibility of a clash between Germany's two primary allies arose. Bismarck's fears were realized when war between the two small powers actually broke out in November, 1885. Bulgaria did not prove to be as weakened by the loss of her Russian officer corps as Serbia had anticipated. Serb armies were not only thrown out of Bulgarian territory, but they were also so utterly defeated that it appeared Serbia might be invaded. Perhaps Austria would have to aid Serbia. This would have meant Russian occupation of Bulgaria.<sup>44</sup> A partition of Bulgaria and Serbia would seem to have been the simple alternative, but the Hungarians did not want Serbs in the Empire nor would the Russian Pan-Slavs have agreed anyway. On the other hand, Austria could not allow Russia to have Bulgaria outright without some compensation. Since Britain would object to any alteration of the Balkan situation by the great powers, Austria's safest policy was the promotion of the status quo. Bismarck's diplomatic skills were put to a severe test for he was well aware that France watched from the sidelines, waiting to emerge from her isolation to take advantage of an irreparable split among the three Emperors. Both Russia and Austria-Hungary reproached Germany for failure to take one side or the other. Giers wanted Bismarck to restrain Austria from interfering in Bulgarian affairs.<sup>45</sup> Andrassy, the Austrian Foreign Minister, on the other hand, was making statements to the effect that the Triple Alliance was worthless because of the

Three Emperors' League.<sup>46</sup>

Even in the early part of December, during the initial stage of the Serbo-Bulgarian war, the German Chancellor was beginning to consider a realignment of his overall foreign policy, something more than a mere neutralization of Anglo-German relations. On December 1, 1885, Holstein recorded in his diary that Bismarck had told his banker, Gerson Bleichröder, that Germany should draw closer to Britain.<sup>47</sup> The improvement in Anglo-German colonial relations undoubtedly contributed to this view. Bismarck was unwilling to act too quickly, however, for the Three Emperors' League was still intact, and a temporary solution regarding Bulgaria had been reached. In April, 1886, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire agreed to invest Prince Alexander with the Governor-generalship of Rumelia every five years.<sup>48</sup>

Unfortunately the Bulgarian settlement was short-lived. Events in August and September moved swiftly. Alexander was first forced from office and then returned, but on his return he was presented with a Russian ultimatum to leave Bulgaria or face a military occupation of the country.<sup>49</sup> Bismarck's whole security system was again endangered. There was no more room for unnecessary friction with Britain, for the Three Emperors' League was in danger of collapse. Bismarck felt that standing between Russia and Austria was not unlike trying to hold two vicious dogs apart.<sup>50</sup> Both antagonists were unhappy that

Germany would not wholly support their respective positions. The disgust with Bismarck's seemingly Olympian detachment resulted in a particularly sinister development in Russia.

Michael Katkov, the editor of the most influential Russian newspaper, the Moskovskya Vedomosti, began to agitate for disbanding the Three Emperors' League. Katkov was an ultra-nationalist, firmly committed to the principle of autocracy. He had originally favored the league for reasons of autocratic solidarity. But the apparent German indifference to Russia's plight in Bulgaria exposed Katkov's nationalistic sentiment as even stronger. Seething with bitter sarcasm, he compared the visits of Foreign Minister Giers to Berlin with the pilgrimages of the old Russian princes to the Golden Horde. Katkov went on to argue that only Germany benefited from the alliance: "If Germany stands so high, it is because Germany stands on Russia."<sup>51</sup>

In December, 1886, Edmond Toutain, Secretary to the French Embassy in St. Petersburg, maintained that Katkov addressed a memorandum to the Tsar in which he recommended that Russia completely reevaluate her position regarding France. Katkov argued that to bind Russia to neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war was illogical. Such a posture would allow Germany to concentrate greater numbers of troops against France, thereby more easily destroying her. Katkov went on to suggest that France's preservation was necessary for Russia's security.

Since this was the case, it was not advantageous for Russia to remain committed to an alliance that might not facilitate such a situation.<sup>52</sup>

Bismarck was cognizant of the atmosphere of the court at St. Petersburg. Although he recognized that Giers apparently was not a party to the anti-German movement in Russia, the Chancellor could not be so certain that Katkov's view would not eventually prevail at court.<sup>53</sup> Another disturbing aspect of Germany's position was that France's Bulgarian policy seemed to coincide increasingly with Russia's. Closer Franco-Russian relations were even more distressing to the Wilhelmstrasse at this particular time because French revanchisme was reviving.<sup>54</sup> Evidence of this phenomenon was the rise of General Boulanger, the French Minister of War, whose popularity was attained through his chauvinistic attitude toward Germany.

Neither Bismarck nor the Prussian General Staff actually believed that France was preparing for an attack on Germany at any specific time. On the contrary, the French troop concentrations and fortification structure seemed to indicate a defensive orientation.<sup>55</sup> There can be little doubt, however, that many Frenchmen came to regard Boulanger as the leader of the Jacobin faction which would eventually lead France to war. One royalist writer, Philippe de Grandlieu, reflected this view when he wrote in Le Figaro: "Boulanger, c'est la guerre."<sup>56</sup> The activities and popularity of the ultra-nationalist Ligue des

patriotes was greatly expanding in France. Maurice Barrès, one of the foremost contributors to this organization, freely and publicly admitted that the Ligue des patriotes was intended to be for France what the Tugendbund had been for Germany in 1813.<sup>57</sup> By July, 1886, the Ligue was said to have 130,000 members. Paul Déroulède, the founder of the organization, wrote with brutal frankness: "France and the French have but one object, to defeat Prussia and the Prussians."<sup>58</sup> A force such as this could not be ignored by Bismarck, especially since the French Government was weak and would therefore be excessively subject to the type of emotional issue that the Ligue des patriotes might arouse.

One could argue that Count Münster's reports from Paris gave Bismarck every indication that France wanted peace.<sup>59</sup> But Münster had not served Bismarck well on previous occasions. Herbette, the French Ambassador, seemed to bear out what Münster maintained.<sup>60</sup> But Herbette was a Frenchman. The reports of the German military attaché in Paris seemed to contradict the reports of Münster and Herbette.<sup>61</sup> There were also rumors of a Franco-Russian reconciliation, even the possibility of an alliance.<sup>62</sup> In the light of French support for the Russian position in Bulgaria, Bismarck must have been extremely disturbed.

Most statesmen would have been appalled at the thought of facing such a challenge; Bismarck, however, rose to the occasion. After scrutinizing the circumstances that faced Germany,

Bismarck felt the situation might be stabilized if the two unknowns in the European equation, Russia and Britain, could be persuaded to adopt a more pro-German orientation. This would keep France isolated and thus assure her peacefulness. The Chancellor moved to improve Germany's position with Russia by consenting to her seizure of the Straits if she so desired. He also agreed that the idea of a Serbo-Bulgarian partition between Russia and Austria would be dropped because of Russian objections to Austria receiving Serbia.<sup>63</sup> Despite German popular sympathy for Alexander of Battenberg, Bismarck refused to give any support to those who favored his restoration.<sup>64</sup>

The Chancellor now moved to also improve Germany's position with Britain. He hoped to accomplish two objectives: to insure against British interference in any Franco-German confrontation; and to strengthen Germany's position against interference from Russia in case of a Franco-German war. Bismarck's activities should not be interpreted as preparation for a preventive war against France because he still recognized that potentially Germany had the most to lose from a major revision of the status quo. His actions were merely precautionary, to prevent any possible altercation.

The outstanding and potentially most troublesome issue between Britain and Germany remained the East African question. It was not that Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse were so much at odds, but that British and German nationals in East Africa were

threatening to coerce their respective governments into unfriendly positions. This fear was not without foundation for no sooner was an official decision made to appoint a commission to study the boundaries of the Sultanate of Zanzibar than there was a dash by the German East Africa Company to extend its claims.<sup>65</sup>

Although Salisbury saw no particular value in resisting the German expansion in East Africa, complications at lower levels in the British Foreign Office caused difficulties. Sir John Kirk, British Consul in Zanzibar, objected vigorously to German penetration. His view was that the

...question to be decided is...whether we [the British] are prepared to see Germany paramount over all the Zanzibar coast...or whether some compromise cannot be come to whereby our influence is upheld....<sup>66</sup>

Kirk should have noted in the margin "whereby my influence too could be upheld." The British Consul undoubtedly saw that reduction of the Sultan's position would not only decrease British influence in East Africa, but would comparably undercut his own importance. Kirk followed his own foreign policy of encouraging unnecessary and hopeless resistance by the Sultan to German expansion. Kirk was finally removed from office because of intransigence.<sup>67</sup>

Kirk's removal did not alter the general picture. The conduct of policy at lower levels on both sides remained so troublesome that Hatzfeldt told Rosebery:



The entire situation demands a solution or the collaboration between two governments, which is the only method of guaranteeing a favorable remedy and preventing unpleasant developments, will be permanently destroyed. In that case it is bound to be replaced by dissension which, though it might be ascribed merely to subordinate officials, could nevertheless exercise an undesirable effect on general relations between the two countries.<sup>68</sup>

When the matter was eventually broached with Salisbury some time later, the Prime Minister vigorously asserted:

...that it would be thoroughly undesirable to allow any irritation over such questions to arise between friendly nations because of the rivalry of two subordinate agents.<sup>69</sup>

Salisbury's stance was that the Sultan's integrity could best be preserved by appeasing Germany rather than allowing provocation and perhaps bringing another squadron to Zanzibar.<sup>70</sup> In October, 1886, the British Prime Minister demonstrated his commitment to that policy. The governor on the island of Lamu, a territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar, imprisoned a German subject (the servant of Gustav Denhardt), and Bismarck demanded the man's release, compensation, and the dismissal of the governor. Britain encouraged the Sultan to comply.<sup>71</sup> In recognition of this good faith on the part of Britain, Germany took no further action.

Salisbury had good reason to wish cordial relations with Germany for Lord Cromer, the British Commissioner in Egypt, had warned Whitehall early in 1886 that "Berlin, and not Cairo, is the real centre of gravity of Egyptian affairs."<sup>72</sup> Cromer was

referring to Bismarck's position in the Caisse de la Dette, which controlled Egyptian financial matters. The powers sitting on the Commission besides Britain and Germany were Russia, Austria-Hungary, France and Italy. Russia and France were not on good terms with Britain, and Bismarck usually exercised influence over Italian and Austro-Hungarian votes. In October, 1886, Cromer acknowledged that no stable pro-British Egyptian Government was possible for the near future without the support of British troops.<sup>73</sup> This meant Britain would be in Egypt for some time to come, and a premium was now placed on relations with Germany. It also meant that Bismarck's desire to move closer to Britain would be more easily facilitated.

Although the need for cooperation with Germany may have appeared obvious to Salisbury, this "need" may not have been so clear to Bismarck. The pressures in East Africa were building up. In late September, 1886, an expedition of Britons led by George Buchanan and financed by Sir William Mackinnon, Chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company, was moving into an area claimed by the German East Africa Company. Both Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse were fearful of a clash.<sup>74</sup>

Under the circumstances, it was decided to take matters out of the hands of the Boundary Commission and settle the matter directly between London and Berlin. Bismarck wrote in the margin of one of Herbert Bismarck's memos that a quick decision was necessary, for if settlement were prolonged and Germany

forced for some reason to act against the Sultan, Britain might get the erroneous impression that Germany was acting against Britain.<sup>75</sup>

Richard Krauel, a Foreign Ministry specialist on colonial affairs, was sent to conclude an agreement on British and German spheres of influence.<sup>76</sup> Hatzfeldt reported optimistically from London that the British seemed anxious for a settlement "...if only we do not make too great demands." Bismarck's marginal comment was that this "...fault [too great demands] of our colonial jingos, whose appetite goes far beyond what we need or are capable of absorbing, must be carefully avoided."<sup>77</sup> Here was the issue which Bismarck hoped he might use to improve his relations with Britain.

Krauel's instructions included three basic priorities: (1) a delineation of the German sphere of influence in the Kilimanjaro territory; (2) a delineation of the borders of the Witu Sultanate, particularly the Sultan's southern border; and (3) an access to the sea for the German East Africa Company.<sup>78</sup> For their part, the British were interested in two basic points: (1) the exclusion of Germans from the northern part of the Kilimanjaro district where Mackinnon was establishing a British interest; and (2) the securing of a recognized domain for the Sultan of Zanzibar on the best possible terms.<sup>79</sup> The objectives of the two powers were somewhat contradictory and compromise would be necessary.

On November 1, 1886, the negotiations were conducted in an amiable manner and the two powers concluded an agreement with the following terms. The Sultan received territorial sovereignty over the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, Mafia, and other small islands within a radius of twelve miles of these islands. On the Continent his jurisdiction was recognized as existing between the Minengani River in the north and the right bank of the Rovuma River in the south at a depth of ten miles from the sea-coast. This latter decision actually was based on the findings of the mixed boundary commission.<sup>80</sup>

The vast hinterland behind the Sultan's recognized possessions was divided into British and German spheres of influence. The territory bounded on the south by the Rovuma River and on the north by a line starting from the mouth of the Tana River and following that river or its affluents to the point of intersection with the equator and the 38th degree of east longitude, and thence to the intersection of the first degree north latitude with the 37th of east longitude was divided between the two powers. The line of demarcation between the two spheres began at the mouth of the Uмба River (or Wanga) and ran directly to Lake Jipe and around its northern side passing to the north base of Mount Kilimanjaro and proceeding directly to a point on the east bank of Lake Victoria where the shoreline intersects the first degree south latitude. This delineation represented a compromise, since both Peters and Mackinnon

claimed areas respectively north and south of the line.<sup>81</sup>

Both powers recognized the coastline to the north of Kipini to Manda Bay as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar. This was important for the Germans since the Denhardt brothers were dealing primarily with the Sultan of Witu. The British also promised to use their influence with the Sultan of Zanzibar to obtain a long-term lease for Germany of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani. In return, the Germans agreed to accept and adhere to the Anglo-French Treaty of 1862 respecting the Sultan of Zanzibar's independence.<sup>82</sup> The Sultan resisted, but after a month of combined British and German pressure, adhered to the agreement.<sup>83</sup>

Despite the efforts of Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse, the Agreement of 1886 proved to be only a short-term solution to the conflict between British and German imperialists. By looking at the map, one can see that the territory behind the respective British and German spheres west to the Belgian Congo was a vacuum. The unanswered question was: who had the legitimate right to take the area? How would the hinterland be delineated? The East African question was as yet far from settled. However short-term the provisions of the treaty would prove to be, it represented a conscious effort on the part of Bismarck and Salisbury to prevent colonial difficulties from complicating the relations between their respective countries. The treaty was also the first concrete evidence of the movement of Anglo-German relations to a higher degree of cooperation.

### C. The Anglo-German Rapprochement

The temporary alleviation of potential Anglo-German colonial problems in East Africa was particularly important for Salisbury at this time, for now while he had been negotiating with the Germans concerning East Africa (primarily to assure himself of support in Egypt from the Wilhelmstrasse), the Prime Minister was also attempting to come to terms with the Quai d'Orsay.<sup>84</sup> The Germans were disquieted about this possibility. Bismarck fully realized that continuation of the Egyptian crisis was an excellent method of keeping France isolated and at the same time using cordial relations with Britain to restrain Russia. On this basis, he refused to cooperate with France in pressuring Britain to leave Egypt. On the other hand, the international balance was fragile, and Germany could not give ostentatious evidence that she was exploiting the situation. Hatzfeldt was warned accordingly:

If...he [Hatzfeldt] observed signs of an understanding between France and England regarding Egypt, [he should] refrain from opposing it or from awakening any suspicion that we [Germany] take pleasure in driving the English and the French at each other's throats.<sup>85</sup>

No positive result came of the negotiations. The French attitude, if anything, became more inflexible in its demands in the next few months. The very disturbing factor regarding the Egyptian question, to Germany as well as to Britain, was that it was a Franco-Russian cooperative effort that was hindering a reasonable solution, that is, a reasonable solution from the

British point of view.<sup>86</sup>

Bismarck's policy to mollify Russia had achieved only the most limited success. Although France and Russia still remained apart, Russo-Austrian-German relations had not improved. Russia's intentions with respect to France and the Central Powers remained an open question. In December, 1886, Katkov's influence with the Tsar was at its height. Alexander was thoroughly disgusted with the Three Emperors' League, and Schweinitz, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, noted that a great majority of Russians were increasingly raising their voices against Germany.<sup>87</sup> Although Bismarck was convinced that renewal of the League would not be forthcoming, all evidence indicated that Russia might be willing to sign a bilateral alliance with Germany. By January 20, 1887, however, the Tsar himself had rejected the Russo-German alliance proposal.<sup>88</sup> Bismarck would now have to make adjustments in his policy toward France and Britain.

Just as Germanophobia was reaching a peak in Russia, Boulangism was attaining new heights of popularity and chauvinism in France. Not all Russian and French animosities were directed toward Germany alone. Anglo-Russian relations were still poor, and Boulangism proved to be almost as anti-British as anti-German.<sup>89</sup> Commenting on Boulangism in February, 1887, Salisbury wrote:

The French are inexplicable. One would have thought that under existing circumstances it

was not necessary to make enemies,-- that there were enough provided for France by nature just now; but she seems bent upon aggravating the patient beast of burden that lives here by every insult and worry ingenuity can devise.

It is very difficult to prevent oneself from wishing for another Franco-German war to put a stop to this incessant vexation.<sup>90</sup>

When Russia responded to the prospective Russo-German arrangement in such a negative fashion, it was only natural that Britain and Germany should draw closer together, for both were objects of Franco-Russian enmity. Two other factors are important in explaining this tendency. The emergence of Herbert Bismarck as the "number two" man in the Imperial Government was of particular significance. The Chancellor had often used Herbert as a diplomatic "trouble-shooter," but in May, 1886, he became State Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Herbert was strongly Anglophile in his views and was quite sensitive to friction between Britain and Germany.<sup>91</sup> It was Herbert who wrote Hatzfeldt at one time that "Salisbury's friendship is worth more to us than the whole of East Africa...."<sup>92</sup>

A second factor of significance in the improvement of Anglo-German relations was the evolution of the colonial movement in Germany. The colonial question had been a frequent source of distress to Anglo-German relations since 1883, but by 1887 Bismarck's enthusiasm toward colonial ventures and their proponents was severely dulled, that is, if he ever had any real enthusiasm. Originally the Chancellor had hoped the colonialists would look after themselves and create no economic strain for the



Reich. Early in 1886 Bismarck voiced concern to the Kaiser that the German East Africa Company was in financial trouble.<sup>93</sup> Peters had shortcomings not only as a businessman, but his egotism caused frequent personality conflicts with business contacts necessary for the survival of the East Africa Company. Other deterrents to investment in the company existed. For instance, the company's board of directors consisted of Peters and four of his cohorts (Count Behr-Bandelin, Dr. Lange, Herr Jühlke, Herr Roghé). These men had actual control of the company, and the shareholders exercised no direct authority over them. Here was a primary reason for the sponsoring firms' reluctance to invest too much in the company.<sup>94</sup> Peters was a soldier of fortune, not a businessman, and too many people, including Bismarck, recognized that fact.

Nor was there anything encouraging about the operation of the Witu Company, owned by the Denhardt brothers. In April, 1886, Clemens Denhardt wrote Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg of the Kolonialverein, inviting him to buy out the Witu Company. He threatened to sell to foreigners if the request was denied. The following month the association did assume responsibility for the Denhardts' obligations, but this was only to be a temporary situation until a stable Witu Company could be created. The deal proved to be a swindle as far as the association was concerned.<sup>95</sup> Although they were not much as colonialists or administrators, the Denhardt brothers apparently were first-rate

"con men." These facts undoubtedly influenced Bismarck to let the Sultan of Zanzibar keep the island of Lamu off the Witu coast, where the best harbor north of Zanzibar was situated. The harbor would have been necessary if the Denhardtts were to fully exploit Witu economically, but Bismarck obviously did not take their Company seriously.<sup>96</sup>

These factors alone were sufficient cause for Bismarck to see that neither company caused trouble for Germany with Britain, but the troubles of the African companies only reflected a similar degeneration of the colonial movement as a whole in Germany. This decline made imposition of the Chancellor's will much easier. The travail within the colonial movement was the result of a dispute as to what the nature of the movement should be. Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, leader of the Kolonialverein, represented a fairly conservative viewpoint; he visualized the Verein as a body that encouraged colonialism by lobbying and propaganda, with actual implementation of a program being left to the government or private groups.<sup>97</sup> Karl Peters and his followers, on the other hand, favored a more activist role; Peters felt the colonial group should go beyond encouraging colonialism to actually raising capital to finance specific projects and then administering them.<sup>98</sup> Once Peters actually got involved in attempting to raise money for the maintenance of his East African project, it was obvious that his society needed a greater revenue source than its own collections. Peters hoped to overcome this obstacle by converting the

more "respectable" Kolonialverein to his way of thinking. This would clear the way for combining the two groups and hopefully broadening the financial potential of the new group.<sup>99</sup>

Peters' desired amalgamation did not evolve smoothly. Voices within the Kolonialverein attacked the idea of a merger. Many members felt that the society was trying to move too quickly; in many cases Peters' activities seemed like hazardous speculation. After all, the motto of the Kolonialverein was "erst wäg's, dann wag's" (look before you leap).


Rather than trying to smooth things over with the use of diplomacy and tact, Peters added fuel to the fire. At a large public meeting in March, 1886, Peters and Otto Arendt disparaged the association in what the Kolonialzeitung called "the grossest possible manner."<sup>100</sup> A short time later Peters accused the organization of being "...the greatest impediment to German colonization...."<sup>101</sup>

Naturally the Kolonialzeitung returned Peters' accusation in kind. Peters was attacked as being irresponsible and primarily to blame for the splintering of the German colonial movement.<sup>102</sup> The feud continued. Peters and others tried to circumvent the conservatives by calling for a congress on German colonial matters. The grass-roots approval he hoped for failed to materialize, and when the congress did convene, it was boycotted by the association.<sup>103</sup> The only positive work the Congress engaged in was to lay the foundation for the Pan-German League.<sup>104</sup>

Membership in the colonial organizations even dropped off in 1886 and 1887. The Kolonialverein membership peaked in September, 1886, and by December of that year had begun to decline.<sup>105</sup> By February, 1887, the Kolonial Gesellschaft had expanded its membership to no more than 4,050. For the ambitious plans that Peters envisaged, the Colonial Society had a budget of only 13,587M (about \$4,000).<sup>106</sup> It was inevitable that the society would eventually become more oriented toward the type of work which the association advocated, if for no other reason than a lack of funds. With Peters in Africa most of the time, the organization easily digressed from his original principles. When the merger finally came in 1887 forming the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, it was dominated by the conservative non-aggressive attitude.

The pliability of the colonial movement in Germany made closer relations with Britain easier. In light of the continuing and potentially explosive atmosphere on the Continent, Bismarck resolved to move closer to Britain in hopes of stabilizing the situation. His method was indirect, therefore avoiding the type of collaboration that could totally alienate Russia. In February, March, and May of 1887, Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Spain concluded treaties whereby they each agreed to support the status quo in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas.<sup>107</sup> Bismarck had done his best to lay the foundation and encourage such an agreement.<sup>108</sup> Britain was connected

to Germany through Italy and Austria, the other members of the Triple Alliance. In this fashion, Russia could certainly not accuse Germany of blocking her ambitions in the Balkans or the Straits. On the other hand, Russia would be forced to act with restraint since she was faced with this new coalition. Another advantage of the Mediterranean Alliance for Germany was that the indirect association of Britain and the Triple Alliance made the alliance more attractive to Italy. As a result the renewal of the Triple Alliance materialized without difficulty on February 20, 1887.<sup>109</sup> It would be a gross exaggeration to maintain that the whole Mediterranean League was the creation of the "master puppeteer of Berlin" who manipulated events and people at will. Certainly Bismarck did contribute a great deal to the formation of the Mediterranean League, but it would never have been possible had not each of the signatories seen some concrete advantage in participation. The Chancellor merely emphasized these advantages, which in most cases were already self-evident.<sup>110</sup>



THE THREE EMPERORS:  
or, the ventriloquist of Varzin!  
(Punch, September 20, 1884, p. 138)

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Southwest Africa, the Cameroons, Togoland, East Africa, and several holdings in the South Seas had been accumulated.

<sup>2</sup>G. N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882-1899 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), p. 23.

<sup>3</sup>William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), p. 307.

<sup>4</sup>Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), I, p. 148.

<sup>5</sup>E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York: Century Co., 1931), pp. 98-99.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>7</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, pp. 308, 315.

<sup>8</sup>Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 104. Frederic H. Seager maintains that the colonial issue was merely a pretext for Ferry's overthrow; domestic issues were the great cause of dissatisfaction; The Boulanger Affair (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 12.

<sup>9</sup>J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27), III, Bismarck to Hohenlohe, Berlin, May 25, 1885, no. 702, pp. 445-47. Henceforth referred to as GP.

<sup>10</sup>Robert Lucius von Ballhausen, Bismarck-Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche, 1920), p. 316.

<sup>11</sup>Emile Bourgeois and Georges Pagès, Les Origines et les responsabilités de la Grande Guerre (Paris: Hachette, 1921), pp. 395-97.

<sup>12</sup>Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds.), Holstein Papers, 4 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955-63), II, June 1, 1885, p. 201. Henceforth referred to as HP.

<sup>13</sup>GP, IV, Radowitz to Foreign Office, Pera, Apr. 23, 1885, no. 770, pp. 117-18; Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters General von Schweinitz, 2 vols. (Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1927), II, pp. 300-01; Aleksandr Meyendorff (ed.), Correspondence diplomatique de M. de Staal,

1884-1900, 2 vols. (Paris: A. Meyendorff, 1929), I, p. 185; George E. Buckle (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, ser. 2, 3 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926-28), III, p. 634.

<sup>14</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to William I, Berlin, May 27, 1885, no. 777, pp. 124-26.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., IV, Henry of Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, May 6, 1885, no. 775, pp. 122-23.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., IV, Henry of Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, May 6, 1885, no. 775, pp. 122-23.

<sup>17</sup>Edmund Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), II, p. 422.

<sup>18</sup>George P. Gooch and Harold Temperly (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 11 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1926-36), III, Crowe memo, Jan. 1, 1907, no. 445, Appendix A, pp. 397-420.

<sup>19</sup>GP, IV, Henry of Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, Apr. 15, 1885, no. 769, pp. 116-17.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., IV, Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, Apr. 9, 1885, no. 764, p. 113; Henry of Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, Apr. 15, 1885, no. 769, pp. 116-17.

<sup>21</sup>Henry Bair, "Karl Peters and German Colonization" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University, 1968), pp. 86, 88.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>23</sup>German Foreign Ministry Archives, Library of Congress Microfilms (ACP), reel 264, Sultan to William I, Zanzibar, Apr. 27, 1885, frames 538-39. Henceforth referred to as ACP.

<sup>24</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 88; there is no actual proof that Kirk did encourage the Sultan to address the letter to William I.

<sup>25</sup>Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890 (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), p. 423; John Flint, "The Wider Background to the Partition and Colonial Occupation," History of East Africa, (eds.) Roland Oliver and Grevase Mathew, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963-1965), I, p. 371.



<sup>26</sup>GP, IV, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, May 7, 1885, no. 776, pp. 123-24.

<sup>27</sup>Coupland, East Africa, p. 424.

<sup>28</sup>Flint, "Partition," p. 371; Coupland, East Africa, pp. 424-25.

<sup>29</sup>Coupland, East Africa, p. 425.

<sup>30</sup>Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), p. 195.

<sup>31</sup>Bismarck once described Gladstone as an "...excitable person who is perfectly capable of saying something infuriating, so that we might fly at each others' throats without knowing how it happened." HP, II, Aug. 27, 1884, p. 156.

<sup>32</sup>GP, IV, Münster to Foreign Office, London, June 26, 1885, no. 779, p. 131.

<sup>33</sup>Colin L. Smith, The Embassy of Sir William White 1886-1891 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 158-59.

<sup>34</sup>GP, IV, Salisbury to Bismarck, London, July 2, 1885, no. 782, p. 133.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., IV, Bismarck to Salisbury, Berlin, July 8, 1885, no. 783, p. 133.

<sup>36</sup>Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 vols. (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 1929-32), III, p. 227.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., III, p. 229.

<sup>38</sup>GP, IV, Wilhelm Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Aug. 19, 1885, no. 784, pp. 134-36.

<sup>39</sup>Cecil, Salisbury, III, p. 230.

<sup>40</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 2, III, Sept. 21, 1885, pp. 690-93.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., ser. 2, III, Sept. 21, 23, 24, 25, 1885, pp. 690-93; Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 348.

<sup>42</sup>M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 231.

<sup>43</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 348.

<sup>44</sup>GP, V, Henry of Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, Nov. 29, 1885, no. 996, pp. 24-25; Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 355.

<sup>45</sup>GP, V, Giers to Shuvalov, St. Petersburg, Dec. 9, 1886 [new style] no. 996, pp. 90-91. This letter was shown to Herbert Bismarck by Shuvalov December 13, 1886.

<sup>46</sup>GP, V, Herbert Bismarck to Henry of Reuss, Berlin, December 3, 1886, no. 1022, pp. 145-47.

<sup>47</sup>HP, II, Dec. 1, 1885, p. 269.

<sup>48</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 357.

<sup>49</sup>Valentine Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928), pp. 123-24.

<sup>50</sup>Lucius von Ballhausen, Bismarck, p. 359.

<sup>51</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 377.

<sup>52</sup>Edmund Toutain, Alexander III et la Republic francaise (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques & Sociales, 1929); pp. 140-41, 154-56, 165-66.

<sup>53</sup>GP, V, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, Oct. 17, 1886, no. 989, pp. 65-68; Bülow to Holstein, St. Petersburg, Nov. 15, 1886, no. 990, pp. 68-73.

<sup>54</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 378.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>56</sup>Seager, Boulangier, p. 49.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>58</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 373.

<sup>59</sup>GP, VI, Münster to Bismarck, Paris, Oct. 14, 1886, no. 1230, p. 144.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., VI, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, Oct. 18, 1886, no. 1231, pp. 144-45.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., VI, Villaume memo, Paris, Oct. 22, 1886, no. 1232, pp. 146-51; Waldersee to Bismarck, Berlin, Nov. 16, 1886, no. 1234, pp. 152-54.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., VI, Münster to Bismarck, Paris, Oct. 9, 1886, no. 1201, p. 95.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., V, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, Nov. 22, 1886, no. 992, p. 75; VI, Schweinitz to Bismarck, St. Petersburg, Nov. 9, 1886, no. 1206, p. 101 [see Bismarck's marginal comment]; Herbert Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, Nov. 16, 1886, no. 1207, pp. 102-03.

<sup>64</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 416.

<sup>65</sup>Reichskolonialamt (Bair Collection), Travers to Berlin, folder 394, Nov. 17, 1885. Henceforth referred to as RKA. The respective commissioners were Dr. Schmidt, the German Consul in Cairo; Colonel H. H. Kitchener for Britain; the French Consul in Zanzibar, Raffray; General Mathews, Commander of the Zanzibari Army and representative of the Sultan. France did not participate in any significant fashion. She was satisfied to accept German promises of adherence to the independence of the Sultan. This should indicate that France did not intend to cause serious trouble for Germany in 1886. Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), III, no. 264, p. 886, including note.

<sup>66</sup>Coupland, East Africa, pp. 471-72.

<sup>67</sup>Emile DeGroot, "Great Britain and Germany in Zanzibar," Journal of Modern History, vol. 25 (June, 1953), p. 120.

<sup>68</sup>GP, IV, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Apr. 22, 1886, no. 793, pp. 147-48.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., IV, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Aug. 13, 1886, no. 795, p. 149.

<sup>70</sup>DeGroot, "Britain and Germany in Zanzibar," p. 122.

<sup>71</sup>ACP, 264: Iddesleigh to Plessen, London, Oct. 9, 1886, f. 683.

<sup>72</sup>Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 21.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>74</sup>ACP, 264: Iddesleigh to Hatzfeldt, London, Sept. 24, 1886, frs. 734-36.

<sup>75</sup>GP, IV, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, Oct. 2, 1886, no. 798, p. 152; [see Bismarck's marginal comments].

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., IV, Herbert Bismarck memo, Berlin, Oct. 2, 1886, no. 798, pp. 151-52.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., IV, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Oct. 19, 1886, no. 801, p. 154.

<sup>78</sup>E. T. S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, 4 vols. (London: Methuen, 1928), I, p. 226 [see note].

<sup>79</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Varzin, Oct. 14, 1886, no. 800, pp. 153-54.

<sup>80</sup>L. W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office 1890-1913 (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 20.

<sup>81</sup>P. L. McDermott, British East Africa or IBEA (London: Chapman and Hall, 1893), p. 6.

<sup>82</sup>Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), III, no. 264, pp. 882-86.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., III, no. 265, p. 887.

<sup>84</sup>M. P. Hornik, "The Mission of Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff to Constantinople, 1885-1887," English Historical Review, vol. 55 (Oct., 1940), pp. 610-11.

<sup>85</sup>GP, IV, Rantzau memo, Varzin, Oct. 22, 1886, no. 803, p. 156.

<sup>86</sup>Hornick, "The Drummond-Wolff Mission," p. 622.

<sup>87</sup>Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, p. 332.

<sup>88</sup>Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 387.

<sup>89</sup>Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 41.

<sup>90</sup>Cecil, Salisbury, IV, pp. 29-30.

<sup>91</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 101.

<sup>92</sup>Helmut Rogge, "Bismarck's Kolonialpolitik," Historische Vierteljahrschrift, vol. 21 (Part I, 1922-23), p. 433.

<sup>93</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 111.

<sup>94</sup>William O. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 17.

<sup>95</sup>Fritz Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-Ostafrika (Berlin: Rütter & Loering, 1959), pp. 311-13.

<sup>96</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, no. 264, p. 882.

<sup>97</sup>Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, I, Oct. 19, 1884, pp. 395-396. Henceforth referred to as DKZ. Hermann Oncken, Rudolf von Bennigsen, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1910), II, p. 521.

<sup>98</sup>Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 83-84.

<sup>99</sup>Richard Pierard, "The German Colonial Society 1882-1914" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the State University of Iowa, 1964), pp. 62-63.

<sup>100</sup>DKZ, III, March 15, 1886, p. 195.

<sup>101</sup>Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar, p. 180.

<sup>102</sup>DKZ, III, June 1, 1886, pp. 358-60.

<sup>103</sup>Pierard, "The German Colonial Society," pp. 87-88.

<sup>104</sup>Mildred Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914 (New York: Mildred Wertheimer, 1924), p. 25.

<sup>105</sup>Pierard, "The German Colonial Society," p. 48. Membership declined from 12,500 to 12,100.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 90. This would seem to refute the view of Fritz Müller that big business was solidly behind German expansion.

<sup>107</sup>Alfred Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920-21), I, pp. 94-104, 116-23.

<sup>108</sup>GP, IV, Herbert Bismarck memo, Friedrichsruhe, Dec. 27, 1886, no. 841, pp. 223-25; Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Feb. 3, 1887, no. 883, pp. 300-03; Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Feb. 10, 1887, no. 889, pp. 309-11.

<sup>109</sup>Pribram, Secret Treaties, I, pp. 105-115; II, p. 80.

<sup>110</sup>Cedric J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886-1896 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 8.

## CHAPTER III

## THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND EAST AFRICA, 1887-1890

A. Emin Pasha and the Upper Nile

With tensions in East Africa rebuilding, Bismarck was determined not to allow colonial matters to interfere with the delicate continental balance. The Anglo-German East African Treaty of November, 1886, was evidence of this determination for it imposed fairly extensive restrictions on German expansion. The treaty, however, was not sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all the hinterland problems. Even before the year had passed by, the Chancellor was again attempting to avoid future conflicts in Africa by more closely defining spheres of influence. In December, 1886, Germany signed an agreement with Portugal by which reciprocal recognition was given to the hinterland behind their respective possessions.<sup>1</sup> The treaty was an obvious attempt by Bismarck to prevent British penetration into the German sphere of influence from the South, that is from behind Mozambique. Control of this hinterland area by a weak power was much more preferable than domination by a vigorous nation like Britain. The Chancellor did not fail to realize that a sudden abdication of German East Africa to the British would have serious domestic political consequences. Such an event might have been just what the German colonial movement needed to revive its sagging popularity. Furthermore, if German East Africa were to have any commercial value at all, access to

the three great lakes and the Congo in the west was required. Without this the property would not be valuable, even as a trading item. The treaty should not be regarded as an attempt to expand Germany's colonial empire; quite the contrary, it indicated Bismarck's willingness to prevent potential German expansion to the south. By this agreement Germany was foregoing the possibility of connecting East Africa to Southwest Africa. Bismarck hoped that British concurrence would assure the security of the southern and western borders for East Africa. In considering such a proposition, Bismarck apparently assumed that his own relation with Karl Peters was similar to Salisbury's relation with Cecil Rhodes. But Salisbury could not simply ignore Rhodes or his interest, and Whitehall therefore declined adherence to the Portuguese-German agreements.<sup>2</sup>

While Salisbury was unwilling or unable to sacrifice Rhodes' interests in the hinterland of Mozambique, he was willing to limit British penetration northward into the German sphere. This, of course, had been Bismarck's primary aim. Both men realized that a clarification and extension of the treaty of 1886 was necessary. On March 19, 1887, the two powers agreed that neither would approve the activities of foreign nations in the hinterland of the other.<sup>3</sup> By July, 1887, the necessity for additional clarification of boundaries to the north had arisen.

The complicating factor which necessitated a redefinition of boundaries was a fanatical religious cult known as the

Mahdists which successfully overthrew Egyptian political authority in the Sudan. During the course of the struggle the Mahdists were successful in "liberating" most of the Sudan. One of their more famous victims in the process was the celebrated Charles "Chinese" Gordon, who was massacred with his garrison at Khartum in 1885. At this point the only representative of the Khedive of Egypt left in the Sudan was Edward Schnitzer, a German physician who went by his Moslem name, Emin Pasha. Emin was located in the southern Sudan, with his headquarters at Wadelai on the Nile. Although his defensive position was relatively secure and his troops loyal, his logistical problem seemed insurmountable. To the outside world, Emin's situation seemed perilous.<sup>4</sup>

Salisbury was on the horns of a dilemma. The Prime Minister would have been content to have Emin take care of himself by simply withdrawing from the territory--a task neither easy nor safe, for most of Emin's troops were natives of the southern Sudan and there was evidence to indicate that they might mutiny rather than evacuate.<sup>5</sup> Reoccupation of the Sudan by Egypt or even the dispatch of a relief expedition would extend the Egyptian debt beyond reasonable limits.<sup>6</sup> Salisbury objected to a purely British involvement for fear of provoking a war with the Kingdom of Uganda. Mahdist elements were strong in Uganda, and they might force the King of Uganda to attack any foreign force. Since Emin was a German, the Prime Minister



would have been happy to let Germany or Austria worry about rescue operations.<sup>7</sup> But there was yet another matter to consider. Could the Salisbury Government afford a "Khartum" any more than the Gladstone Government? Certainly there were humanitarian organizations such as the Church that would view leaving Emin to his fate as barbaric. The various church groups were also interested in Uganda for another reason. Numerous Christian missionaries were scattered along the Upper Nile and were the objects of special concern because of a rash of atrocities committed against foreigners. There was church agitation for intervention to protect the missions.<sup>8</sup> Whatever Salisbury decided, the Liberals would obviously use the issue as the Conservatives had earlier used Khartum. Emin himself created another problem for Salisbury by offering to aid the British in annexing Equatoria if they would aid him.<sup>9</sup> This offer encouraged the "forward groups" within the British Government as well as British commercial interests.

These factors combined with two other elements to force Salisbury's hand. English missionaries were not the only foreign Christians in Uganda; there were Frenchmen as well. In December, 1886, the Quai d'Orsay began sounding the British about protective action.<sup>10</sup> Were the French interested in Uganda as a link in a transcontinental empire? If they were permitted to execute a unilateral "rescue," they might decide to remain. If a foreign power were permitted to move into Uganda, from the British point of view the French were the least desirable because of their

utilization of high tariffs in colonial areas.

Still another party was interested in Uganda: King Leopold of Belgium also had aspirations for the Upper Nile. The Bahr al-Ghazel and Western Equatoria would fit nicely onto the Congo State, and Emin could be utilized as governor of the area.<sup>11</sup>

Salisbury's solution to the problem was to encourage a privately financed expedition into Equatoria to rescue Emin. This would save the Egyptian and British Governments additional financial strain and divert some of the onus if the mission failed. William Mackinnon provided funds for the mission and the man he selected to lead the expedition was H. M. Stanley, the well-known African explorer. Stanley was in the employ of King Leopold of Belgium at the time, and Leopold was therefore able to use this as a lever to impose his choice of routes on the mission. He insisted that the expedition originate from the Congo, as this would open a new line of communication between the Congo and Uganda or, more importantly, the Congo and Lake Victoria and the Nile.<sup>12</sup>

In light of the earlier agreements, Stanley's movement into the hinterland areas naturally evoked protest from the Germans, but Salisbury was quick to reassure the Wilhelmstrasse. The Prime Minister instructed his Ambassador in Berlin that:

Her Majesty's Government...are prepared to discourage British annexations in the rear of the German sphere of influence on the understanding

that the German Government will equally discourage German annexations in the rear of the British sphere.<sup>13</sup>

Salisbury also clarified his view of an extended line of demarcation between the German and British spheres. He stated that

...the question was the arrangement of a line of demarkation, on the north of which the English were free to operate, while the Germans were to operate on the south of it. England expressly engaged not to acquire possessions, accept Protectorates, or oppose the extension of German influence to the south of the line of demarkation; and although it was true that no special geographical line had been expressly fixed by agreement for the delimitation to the west, Baron von Plessen [First Secretary of the German Embassy in London, 1884-88] said the Imperial Government had started from the idea that England would leave Germany a free hand for the future in the territories south of the Victoria-Nyanza Lake, and, without interfering with the territories lying to the east of the Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa at the back of the German Protectorate, would confine herself to opening up territories lying north of the agreed line.<sup>14</sup>

The Wilhelmstrasse was satisfied.<sup>15</sup> The Agreement of July, 1887, reaffirmed the two previous treaties of 1886 and 1887 and extended the borders of the respective spheres on the pattern devised in 1886. Again, however, the agreement did not include all the areas in which Germany and Britain might conflict, particularly areas north of the British sphere in Witu. No hinterland agreement had yet been formulated here.

The probable reason that no Witu hinterland solution was included was that Salisbury's view concerning the importance of the Upper Nile and Uganda was undergoing a transition. As

previously mentioned, it had been decided that an early withdrawal from Egypt was impossible. The Drummond-Wolff mission, which hopefully was to have attained at least a degree of cooperation with the Turks in the occupation, failed because of Franco-Russian influence with the Sultan. The failure occurred despite German support of the British position.<sup>16</sup> This could indicate but one thing: the British status in Constantinople had receded to a new low. Was British power sufficient to defend its interest in Turkey against Russia or France or a combination?

The answer to the question was "no." The Admiralty had already begun to feel this way in 1887; when, in early 1888, the French strengthened their Mediterranean contingent, definitely altering the balance against Britain, near-panic possessed the Admiralty. The British Naval Commander in the Mediterranean wrote that "...the normal strength of the Squadron in the Mediterranean is insufficient in case of a sudden attack or outbreak of war...."<sup>17</sup> It would be some time before Britain could adequately redress the balance. It became obvious that Egypt could be defended more easily than could the Straits. Not only was Egypt isolated from any easy overland attack, but Britain already had an army there. Britain also controlled the southern access to Suez by way of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Finally, Russo-French military and naval cooperation would be more difficult here than at the Straits.

If Britain were eventually going to depend on the India route through Egypt rather than through the Straits, then Egypt had to be more firmly secured. In this light Uganda came to have a new importance for Britain. Ancient legend had long maintained that he who controlled the Upper Nile controlled Egypt. Ariosto quotes the story in his Orlando:

The Soldan, King of the Egyptian Land,  
Pays tribute to this sovereign, as his head,  
They say, since having Nile at his command  
He may divert the stream to other bed.  
Hence, with its district upon either hand,  
Forthwith might Cairo lack its daily bread.<sup>18</sup>

More recent sources had maintained the same thing. It was felt that if an industrialized power gained control of the Upper Nile, the waters could be diverted, destroying the possibility of life for northern Egypt.<sup>19</sup> Sir Samuel Baker, the greatest Victorian authority on the Nile, was convinced that its waters could be diverted. The Nile flood of 1888, the lowest on record, dramatized the possibilities of such a catastrophe.<sup>20</sup> That Salisbury took a new interest in Equatoria and East Africa in general was not at all surprising.

#### B. Karl Peters in Zanzibar and East Africa

At the same time that Salisbury was becoming more concerned with Britain's position in East Africa, Karl Peters was attempting to improve the fortunes of the German East Africa Company. Peters' primary objective in 1887 was a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar which would acquire control

of the customs collections at Pangani and Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>21</sup> Peters had requested that the German Foreign Office cooperate closely with the company in securing the treaty. He already had the sympathy and support of the temporary German Consul in Zanzibar, Otto Arendt. But Bismarck refused to aid Peters in his bid to conclude an agreement with the Sultan, thereby forcing Peters to win the concession from the Sultan himself and to rely on Arendt for no more than introductions and advice on protocol.<sup>22</sup>

This attitude on Bismarck's part might appear somewhat ironic since during 1886 and 1887 the German East Africa Company had had its basic financial and administrative structure revised. Control of the board of directors had passed from the hands of adventurers like Peters to more cautious businessmen. Not only that, but William I invested 500,000M of his personal fortune and the Prussian State Bank also made a sizeable contribution.<sup>23</sup> Bismarck had therefore made the decision that the company could not be allowed to collapse. It was obvious from the Chancellor's actions that his motives for permitting such involvement were simply a means of restraining the company from causing trouble with the British while at the same time protecting the government from the charge of following an anti-colonial policy.

Peters' sense as to the importance of his mission was not modest. He wrote his sister, Elli:

At stake here is whether the German or Arabian world is to rule the western side of the Indian Ocean. The decision depends almost entirely on my actions. I simply cannot express my eagerness to begin the struggle.<sup>24</sup>

Peters' objective was not incongruous with the desires of the Sultan. Because of corruption and mismanagement, the coastal regions had ceased to yield adequate returns from customs collections. Perhaps German administrators could correct the situation. In the meantime, Mackinnon's company received complete administrative control of the whole of the Sultan's territory in the British sphere.<sup>25</sup> Mackinnon's success undoubtedly encouraged Peters to go beyond his original instructions and seek similar, more extensive powers for the German company in its sphere.

Sometime later (July, 1887) Peters successfully negotiated a preliminary settlement giving the German company widespread political and administrative powers as well as commercial benefits over the whole coastal area between the Uмба and Rovuma Rivers. He considered this moment the high point of his career. So impressed with his own achievements was Peters that he requested his appointment to the position of Imperial Commissioner for the territory so as to simplify his dealings with the Sultan in the future.

Not only was there no indication that the Peters' request was given any serious consideration at the Wilhelmstrasse, but contrary to what might be expected, the directors of the German

East Africa Company and its prime financial supporters had serious reservations about Peters' treaty.<sup>26</sup> As stated earlier, the board of directors of the Company had been reconstituted, giving more business-oriented individuals control, and they were not interested in expanding political authority because it would mean great additional expense at a rather substantial risk. No sooner had Peters reached the zenith of his influence than his political position in Zanzibar was destroyed. Gustav Michahelles, the new German Consul who replaced Arendt in July, 1887, had not gotten on well with Peters. He even suggested to Krauel that Peters was incompetent to run the African end of the company.<sup>27</sup> Almost at this same time, Peters lost what influence he previously enjoyed with the Sultan. He had been misleading Seyyid Barghash as to his own influence and importance in Berlin and when the truth revealed the contrary, the Sultan was quite angry. Given his particular view of Peters, it was probably Michahelles who so enlightened the Sultan. Peters was recalled to Berlin in December, 1887, ostensibly for consultation, but he exercised no further influence on the final treaty, which was concluded in April and June, 1888. Not only had the Imperial Government shown a great reluctance to engage in expansion of German political power in East Africa, but the East Africa Company itself was not enthusiastic about Peters' proposed extension of the company's authority beyond the realm of commercial matters. One item that was particularly repugnant to



the directors was the fact that Peters had decided to pay the Sultan a flat sum for the concessions; they preferred to have the Sultan receive a percentage of the revenues collected after expenses.<sup>28</sup> Being astute businessmen they realized that by this method, they would keep the Sultan interested in the welfare of the company. Had it been necessary for the German East Africa Company to ratify the treaty in July, 1887, when Peters concluded the preliminary draft, refusal would probably have been forthcoming.

As it was, the treaty that was finally concluded with the Sultan in April and June of 1888 still gave the East Africa Company extensive powers in the coastal strip. The most important commitment undertaken by the company proved to be the administration of customs and banking duties not just of Paganí and Dar-es-Salaam, but of the entire coastal strip between the Umba and Rovuma Rivers.<sup>29</sup> Precisely what caused the company to change its mind on the question of undertaking large-scale administrative commitments is unclear. Probably two factors were of importance. In the first place, the company directors had had more time to digest the degree to which the British had strengthened their position by agreement with the Sultan. Secondly, Seyyid Barghash, Sultan of Zanzibar since 1870, died during the course of the negotiations with Peters' successors, and his regime was succeeded by a very unstable government headed by Sultan Khalifa. The directors probably felt they had better

get firm control of the coastal strip to guard against any disorder which might occur under such conditions.

The commitments the East Africa Company had undertaken by the Commercial Treaty of 1888 marked a major turning point in the German colonial experience in East Africa. The original intuition of the directors in refusing Peters' expanded treaty now proved to be justified, for the company soon found itself in serious difficulty. The main problem stemmed from the Germans' undermining the position of the traditional Arab ruling class. This group had always served as the representative of the Sultan in the administration of his domain. Most importantly, they had been in charge of the customs collections and naturally derived the benefits thereof, to such an extent in fact that very little was left for the Sultan. With the substitution of the Germans, these profits for the Arabs would now be diminished. The influx of German personnel naturally brought large numbers of missionaries who were anxious to convert the "heathen" from his repugnant ways, particularly his indulgence in the slave trade. Here was the issue on which the German Government could not avoid providing some moral support, since it was a signatory of the anti-slave trade provision of the Berlin Act of 1885.<sup>30</sup> These sources of friction were intensified by the usual sorts of confrontations that one might expect with the convergence on the area of foreigners who were ignorant of native customs, paternalistic in outlook, and superior in attitude toward their new

charges. Particularly explosive, whether true or not, was the belief among the natives that German officials frequently violated the sanctity of the Mosque.<sup>31</sup> There were also incidents in which the German flag unceremoniously and illegally replaced that of the Sultan.<sup>32</sup> Small incidents gradually escalated into full scale revolt.<sup>33</sup>

Neither the Sultan, whom the rebels at first claimed to represent, nor the East Africa Company had the power, resources, or influence to "pacify" the revolt. In August, 1888, disorders reached such proportions that Michahelles advised more extensive Imperial intervention. He was convinced that the Arabs were manipulated by thoroughly corrupt leaders who seemed only to understand concrete power. If a suitable force were present, the Arabs might be held in abeyance.<sup>34</sup> Bismarck continued to resist extensive intervention on the part of the Imperial Government.<sup>35</sup> A detachment of troops was sent to East Africa for the protection of German citizens, but this was hardly a number sufficient to quell an insurrection. The Arabs, for their part, by the Fall of 1888 were not just revolting against German administration of customs houses, but were now engaged in a full-scale revolt for independence. It was no longer just the East Africa Company that was endangered, but the lives and property of a substantial European community in East Africa. This was particularly true of the British Indian citizens who were residents of the area.<sup>36</sup> If Germany did not act, there was the

possibility that the British might intervene on their own.

Bismarck was in an embarrassing position: should he favor or deny intervention? Though it would be a mistake to carry the analogy too far, his position as a result of the East African rebellion was somewhat similar to that of Salisbury and the Emin Pasha dilemma. In both cases, the respective leaders were faced with the possible political repercussions of a Khartum. Being a man who always studied his alternatives with care, Bismarck must have realized that from the political standpoint, withdrawal would probably have satisfied very few people. The parties of the left would have been happy to see the old man's embarrassment and would undoubtedly have capitalized on the mistake the government made in getting involved rather than on the virtue it displayed in withdrawing. For others on the political spectrum, as Bismarck must have recognized, withdrawal in the face of pressure exerted by a semi-civilized, underdeveloped, non-European people would have been considered a totally unacceptable blow to the German ego. Withdrawal would also seem to condone revolt against "legitimate" authority.

Bismarck must have decided in favor of intervention sometime in late October, 1888, and in true Bismarckian fashion he developed a plan that would be the most advantageous domestically and the least expensive financially. Although there had been some talk earlier, on November 3, British aid and

cooperation in suppressing the revolt in East Africa was requested by the Wilhelmstrasse.<sup>37</sup> In making the request, Bismarck appealed to the principle embodied in the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which supported suppression of the slave trade. Salisbury had little choice but to cooperate; as the leader among those nations concerned with suppression of the slave trade, Britain had to register approval for Bismarck's position. Furthermore, if the Germans were allowed to act alone, they might destroy the whole Sultanate. As Salisbury wrote one of his intimates: "...our ships by the side of the German ship during the whole of the operation...enforces upon them [the Germans] such moderation as suits our ideas."<sup>38</sup> British cooperation would reduce the cost of the operation for Germany and give her the aid of the strongest naval force in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the potential frictions inherent in a unilateral action would be avoided.

On the home front Bismarck had chosen his ground well. While some might question the Chancellor's ultimate motives for intervention, none of the political parties could object to suppression of the slave trade. The influence of the Church and the Center Party proved to be of significant value. Shortly after Bismarck called for action, Ludwig Windthorst, leader of the Center party, introduced a resolution before the Reichstag calling for the allocation of funds to support suppression of the slave trade.<sup>39</sup> Woermann of the National Liberals, and

Kardorff and Helldorff of the Reichspartei and Conservative party respectively, spoke before the Reichstag in favor of the resolution. Only the Freisinnige party and the Socialists remained unimpressed. Eugene Richter, the Freisinn leader, protested further government aid to the company for fear Germany would be preparing a Tonkin or a Massowah for herself. Singer, of the Social Democrats, denounced aid to the company as giving a carte blanche to colonial adventure.<sup>40</sup>

Speaking for the government in reply, Herbert Bismarck maintained that the honor of the German Empire necessitated the continuation of the work of colonization. The Chancellor himself declared that Germany was committed to the civilizing of Africa by her signature to the General Act of the Berlin Congress of 1885. East Africa was particularly important in this respect because it was the most likely part of the Continent from which to combat the slave trade.<sup>41</sup>

When it appeared that Bismarck's "new course" was going to carry the day, the opposition attempted a new tactic. Ludwig Bamberger of the Radicals now launched an eloquent attack on the German East Africa Company, hoping to show that it was so corrupt and incompetent that the expense of salvage was indefensible. Sabor, a Social Democrat, supported the Freisinn position by pointing out that the expense of perpetuating colonialism was an extravagance that benefitted very few Germans.<sup>42</sup>

Bismarck had cleverly undermined the opposition's

strategy by maintaining that suppression of the slave trade would have been essential even if the East African Company had never existed. The Chancellor refused to identify the government with the company and even went so far as to publicly condemn it for its failures. He also pointed out that an Imperial Commissioner was being sent to East Africa explicitly to expedite the elimination of the slave trade; the implication, of course, was that the government did not intend to renovate the company.<sup>43</sup> This statement marked another crucial turn on Bismarck's path to committing the Reich to colonialism. The Chancellor was successful in his propaganda campaign, and the Reichstag appropriated 2,000,000M in February and 1,950,000M in November, 1889. By using the anti-slavery issue, the Chancellor also obtained the support and cooperation of the famous Belgian anti-slavery crusader, Cardinal Lavigérie, the Archbishop of Algiers and Primate of Africa. Lavigérie had good connections with the French Government and apparently was influential in persuading France to permit Anglo-German action.<sup>44</sup> This was the man who was probably more responsible than any other for the temporary rapprochement between the Third Republic and the Catholic Church; France responded to Lavigérie's plea by dispatching a warship to participate in the coastal blockade.<sup>45</sup>

Parenthetically it should be noted that the whole issue of suppression of the slave trade was merely a political gimmick conjured up by Bismarckian opportunism. The Chancellor's conscience had caused him no undue pain in 1885 when he prevented

"teeth" from being put into the anti-slavery provision of the Berlin Act. The Chancellor had then agreed only to a moral declaration against the slave trade, fearing that too stringent a position would give Britain excessive power and influence in Africa, since she would be the nation most capable of enforcing whatever measures were agreed upon.<sup>46</sup>

The expansion of German Imperial activities necessitated the appointment of a Commissioner for East Africa. The man Bismarck selected, Hermann Wissmann, proved to be an excellent choice. Because close cooperation with the British and the Sultan was necessary, more than an ordinary soldier or adventurer was required. The British Consuls, Kirk and Homewood, and a German Consul, Arendt, had previously been replaced specifically because they could not maintain a reasonably compatible relationship with their counterparts. Wissmann showed himself to possess all the qualities necessary to quell the rebellion. Militarily the rebels were subdued or destroyed within fourteen months. In the subdued areas, Wissmann was careful to provide the natives who had suffered from the war with new seed and food for their short-term needs.<sup>47</sup> It is interesting to note that the East Africa Company received no such aid for their inland plantations.<sup>48</sup> Wissmann was also discreet in acknowledging native custom.<sup>49</sup> During the course of the naval blockade and military occupation, he also got on very well with the British. The smoothness of this aspect of Anglo-German relations may have



encouraged Bismarck's decision in January, 1889, to offer an alliance to Britain.

No sooner had the Imperial Government begun to achieve satisfactory results against the Arab rebels than a new danger loomed on the horizon. The Commercial Treaty and the succeeding revolt destroyed Bismarck's colonial policy as it had originally been visualized, for now the government was committed to a considerable extent in East Africa, although the commitment was relatively well defined at this time so as to avoid conflict with Britain. The renewed activities of Karl Peters, however, threatened to alter the compatible relation between Germany and Britain. Just as Emin Pasha's predicament had aroused interest in Britain, so it had created a similar effect in Germany. After his recall in December, 1887, Karl Peters became interested in the rescue of Emin Pasha. Naturally, there was humanitarian justification for such an undertaking and Peters liked to utilize this argument in seeking support.<sup>50</sup> But Peters himself, with his grandiose schemes of empire in East Africa, had more concrete reasons. Not only was Emin's stronghold in Equatoria the last outpost against the expansion of the Moslem hordes and therefore the protector of Christendom in Central and East Africa, but there were also commercial and political advantages to joining forces with Emin. Those who wished a stake in the future of Central Africa had to establish a strong tie between the coastal area and Lakes Victoria and

Albert on an east-west axis and the Lakes and Wadelai on the Nile on a north-south axis.<sup>51</sup> Presumably the complete north-south axis would include not only Wadelai in the north and Lake Victoria in the center but also Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa in the south.

Bismarck viewed Peters' projected mission as dangerous adventurism.<sup>52</sup> With Stanley already in the area as a representative of the Imperial British East Africa Company, the Chancellor wanted no incidents between British and German nationals that might complicate the international situation.

On the succession of William II to the throne, the Rescue Committee felt that the possibilities of government aid would be improved. The new Emperor had generally been sympathetic to colonial causes and specifically to the rescue mission. But when financial aid was requested, Bismarck intervened.<sup>53</sup> On September 24, the British Ambassador, Malet, wrote that Bismarck had told him that the German Government "...refused absolutely to have anything to do with the projected expedition of Herr Peters, for the relief of Emin Pasha."<sup>54</sup>

The Chancellor had also undermined the mission in yet another way at an earlier stage. He had appointed Hermann Wissmann as the Imperial Commissioner of East Africa charged with suppression of the Arab revolt. Wissmann was the only other German explorer with popularity equal to Peters'.

Wissmann also had a much larger following of "respectable"

Germans than Peters. Though Peters may have been happy to have such competition for influence removed, the Committee did lose some of its former respectability with Wissmann's departure.

After much delay and confusion resulting from the East African revolt and the loss of Wissmann, Peters was commissioned by the German Emin Pasha Rescue Committee to find Emin, rescue him, and set up trade relations with the interior, hopefully with Emin's help.<sup>55</sup> Peters' background gave little indication that he would be satisfied to limit his goals to the relatively pacific instructions of the Relief Committee. This lack of restraint might lead to a Stanley-Peters confrontation, which was just what Bismarck and Salisbury feared.

In December, 1888, Salisbury had asked Bismarck to officially define his attitude toward the German Emin Pasha relief mission. For the first time Salisbury was, in effect, giving notice that Great Britain had a special interest in the Basin of the Nile.<sup>56</sup> The Chancellor's reply to the Prime Minister's question was reassuring; the Peters' mission had no official approval or sanction. Bismarck refused to risk a breach with the British for the sake of a claim that was of no vital interest to Germany and which could not be effectively supported or developed.<sup>57</sup> One could point out, however, that the Chancellor had taken more or less the same stance regarding Peters' first adventure into East Africa; but now the international situation was quite different. The German Consulate in Zanzibar was

notified that Peters was to be given no assistance in matters concerning his expedition. German naval units were ordered to cooperate with the British in preventing Peters from landing on the East African Continent. Unable to believe that his own government would actively restrain him, Peters requested the committee to seek clarification. Karl Hoffmann, head of the committee, appealed to the Wilhelmstrasse for aid, but was met with blunt refusal.<sup>58</sup> With no sympathy forthcoming from the Wilhelmstrasse, Peters attempted to "negotiate" his way ashore with Admiral Freemantle, commander of the blockading British fleet. When Freemantle refused, Peters, apparently resigned to the circumstances, loaded his contingent aboard the steamer, Neera, sailed to the northernmost area of the blockade near Kismayu Bay, and landed. Some days later the Neera was seized by the British and brought before a prize court on the charge that Peters willfully allowed arms to be taken ashore.

The seizure of Peters' ship produced precisely the reaction Salisbury and Bismarck were trying to avoid. In Germany public outcry against the act reached significant proportions. The Emin committee was quick to protest, demanding that Berlin protect German citizens against arbitrary British actions. Protest meetings were planned. Bismarck was enough concerned to inquire into the matter in London. Whitehall, recognizing the possible repercussions, replied that the prize court had ruled in favor of releasing the ship.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, Bismarck

reassured the British concerning the Imperial Government's position on Peters. On June 25, 1889, explicit assurances were given the British that "Uganda, Wadelai, and other places to the east and north of Lake Victoria" were outside the sphere of German colonization.<sup>60</sup>

C. From Rapprochement to Alliance: Bismarck's Offer of January 11, 1889

The assurances given the British on June 25 probably marked the zenith of Bismarckian Anglo-German colonial cooperation. From the beginning of Salisbury's administration, the Chancellor had gradually moved toward a more intimate relationship with Britain. It was no coincidence that this phenomenon occurred in direct proportion to the degeneration of Russo-German relations. The Germans had been seriously worried about Russian intentions toward Austria and hence toward Germany for sometime. Moltke and Waldersee were convinced that Russia was gradually concentrating more men and supplies on the Austrian border. Waldersee's solution was a preventive war against Russia, concluded so quickly that France would have no opportunity to take advantage of the events.<sup>61</sup> Bismarck saw this solution as being similar to the man who committed suicide because of his fear of death.<sup>62</sup> In the west, Boulanger, now having exchanged the baton for the stump, seemed more of a danger than ever to Germany.<sup>63</sup>

As far as Russo-German relations were concerned, events were taking a rather ironic twist. At the same time the

Prussian military establishment was becoming increasingly alarmist regarding Russia, Giers was winning the battle against Katkovite influences in St. Petersburg. Had Giers had his own way, the Three Emperors' League would have been renewed. The Tsar, however, still refused to entertain continuation of the treaty, but he was now willing to accept a bilateral relation with Germany. In May and June, 1887, a Russo-German agreement was negotiated and concluded.

During the course of the negotiations the provisions of the Dual Alliance were revealed, and the Chancellor made it clear to Russia that Germany was bound to uphold Austria as a great power. Personally Bismarck did not feel that the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was at all in conflict with the Austro-German treaty since both were defensive agreements. Bismarck conceded, however, that Franz Joseph probably would have taken offense had he known of any Russo-German treaty.<sup>64</sup>

Perhaps more difficult to reconcile was the Second Mediterranean Agreement of December 12, 1887, which provided for defense of the status quo in the Straits. By the Reinsurance Treaty, Bismarck had promised to support Russia's position in Bulgaria and the Straits. Although Germany was not a signatory of the Mediterranean Alliance, Bismarck was certainly banking on it to restrain Russia in the Balkans and the Straits. Naturally the latter provision of the Reinsurance Treaty made Germany more attractive for Russia, but one could also argue that Russia was

thereby being encouraged to do exactly what was most dangerous for Germany, that is, to seek revision of the status quo.

As brilliant a diplomatic stroke as the Reinsurance Treaty may have been, the fact remained that Russo-German relations were still unhealthy. Russian discrimination against German nationals in Poland and the consequent German retaliatory action of prohibiting Russian securities on the Berlin exchange, caused harsh feelings.<sup>65</sup> Nor did the Pan-Slav agitation die with Katkov. Although the Russian nationalists were temporarily leaderless, feelings still ran high, and there existed much anti-German sentiment. Assuredly there were still grounds for the pessimism expressed by the Empress Frederick to her mother Victoria: "I only think that all this obliging is no use and of no avail and that Russians...will ally themselves with the French whenever they think it convenient."<sup>66</sup>

This all indicated to Bismarck that Germany still needed a favorable relation with Britain. The cooperation with Salisbury in Africa was one manifestation of that desire. As time passed, however, Germany seemed willing to go even further. In June, 1888, Herbert Bismarck had suggested to his good friend, Lord Rosebery, that Britain should join the Triple Alliance. This alignment would act as a guaranty for the future peace of Europe, for neither Russia nor France would ever dare wage war against such a coalition. ~~The motto of such a defensive coalition would simply be "attack nobody, but knock down anybody who~~

breaks peace."<sup>67</sup> Dating from April, 1888, the Chancellor himself had begun to take an unusual interest in the welfare of the British. Late in the month, Queen Victoria had spent two days in Berlin and had a very cordial chat with the Chancellor. Bismarck later told Prince Henry of Reuss, the Austrian Ambassador, "The Queen expressed her agreement with our foreign policy, and I am confident that we can count on her for favorable support even in serious difficulties..."<sup>68</sup> Bismarck was also encouraging the British Government to strengthen its naval position in the Mediterranean. Only in this way could Britain act as a deterrent to French aggression against Italy. (The French and the Italians were involved in a serious tariff conflict in 1888; Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister, claimed to expect a French attack at any moment and used this excuse to increase Italian armaments.) The Chancellor maintained that Britain could exercise significant influence only if she took action before the dam burst; "...prevention was better than cure."<sup>69</sup> Bismarck was undoubtedly worried about a Franco-Italian conflict and hoped that a British show of strength might cause France to think twice before causing Italy too much tribulation. After all, it was not completely inconceivable that France could coerce Italy out of the Triple Alliance. One cannot help but feel, however, that as Bismarck was talking about France and Britain's need to act as a deterrent, he was thinking not only of France, but also of Russia.



In August, 1888, Germany seemed to be moving closer to a more substantial agreement with Britain. At the direction of Bismarck, Count Berchem, the Undersecretary in the German Foreign Office, wrote Hatzfeldt analyzing Anglo-German-French-Russian relations:

France can do nothing against England unless we allow it. If we attack her on the East, she must renounce all thoughts of war or even of any military demonstration against England at the same time.

If, however, we do this, France would probably find support in Russia. The resulting situation could contain nothing desperate for us, but it would be too serious to burden the German Empire with such without absolute necessity. If, on the other hand, England were our dependable ally and also as strong potentially as she ought to be, and unless she does make the effort she cannot remain among the Great Powers, then, we might safely assume that the Powers working for peace--Germany, Austria, Italy and England,--would be strong enough to nullify any attempts on the part of the bellicose Powers--France and Russia.<sup>70</sup>

It would seem that Salisbury agreed substantially with the German view. Though he was not worried about Britain being isolated, he told the Queen that:

France is, and must always remain, England's greatest danger. But that danger is dormant, so long as the present strained relation exists between France and her two Eastern neighbors. If ever France should be on friendly terms with them, the Army and Navy estimates would rise very rapidly.<sup>71</sup>

In November, however, Baron de Staal, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, reported that Salisbury was publicly acknowledging his concern over French bellicosity; de Staal himself felt that Salisbury was justified.<sup>72</sup>

On January 11, 1889, Bismarck went the full distance with Britain. He instructed Count Hatzfeldt:

...to express...my [Bismarck's] conviction that the surest way to obtain peace, which England and Germany equally desire,...will be the conclusion of a Treaty between England and Germany, binding both powers for a limited time to combine resistance against a French attack. If a secret Treaty of this kind were possible, both parties would obtain a considerable promise of security against such a war while the war itself might be avoided by the timely publication of the Treaty.<sup>73</sup>

Bismarck went on to further analyze the European balance of power. He pointed out that security against France for Britain would also mean that the Americans would have to behave in a more restrained fashion. Returning to Russia and France, the Chancellor surmised that neither power would break the peace if it was told officially that to do so would definitely find Britain against them.

Once it is clearly understood that England would be protected against a French attack by a German alliance and Germany against a French attack by an English alliance, I consider the peace of Europe assured for the duration of such a published Treaty.<sup>74</sup>

This private approach to Britain was accompanied by a public statement before the Reichstag of German affection for Great Britain.

I consider England as the old and traditional ally and partner, with whom we have no contending interests--if I say ally I do not mean in the diplomatic sense: We have no alliance with England--but I wish to maintain the affection that we have had for 150 years, including colonial questions: And if it should come to my attention that we were beginning to lose that affection, then I should seek to prevent such a loss.<sup>75</sup>

What would move Bismarck to this extreme? Encouraging Britain to strengthen her naval position was one thing, but actual alliance with her was another. New naval legislation was before Parliament, and it should have been apparent that British rearmament was on its way, regardless of German encouragement. An arrangement such as the Chancellor proposed would take Germany beyond the pale of the Mediterranean agreements and certainly contradict the letter of the Reinsurance Treaty. The great advantage of the more limited Mediterranean agreement, which had been that Germany could avoid antagonism from either side, would clearly be lost.

Again, as is so often the case with Bismarck, nothing is entirely clear. One writer maintains that the old Chancellor could not have been serious about the pact for at the same time he offered the alliance to Britain (based substantially on a fear of France), he was telling Herbette, the French Ambassador, in January, 1889, that his faith in the Republic was restored as the result of the collapse of Boulanger.<sup>76</sup> This explanation is not completely satisfactory, however, for the defeat and exile of Boulanger did not mean that Boulangism was dead. Boulangism had become a political philosophy, and its adherents were not all unhappy to see the "man on horseback" leave the country. His name could still be used to advantage, and no one would have to endure those insufferable speeches which so frequently caused embarrassment for his colleagues.<sup>77</sup>

Perhaps another motive induced Bismarck to suggest an Anglo-German alliance. It may be that he felt the Mediterranean Agreement-Reinsurance Treaty arrangement was in danger of failing in the purpose for which it had been conceived, at least from Bismarck's point of view. Ideally the Mediterranean League would restrain Russia in the Balkans while the Reinsurance Treaty would assure good Russo-German relations. According to two of Bismarck's most trusted Ambassadors, however, such did not appear to be the case. Both Joseph Maria von Radowitz in Constantinople and General Hans Lothar von Schweinitz in St. Petersburg were highly pessimistic about Russia's attitude toward Germany and the ability of anyone to restrain her from pursuit of territorial ambitions. Radowitz felt that the position of Germany vis-à-vis Russia had degenerated during the previous year, and all indications were that the trend would continue. He maintained that this Russian feeling of impending conflict with Germany was only serving to bring it to reality sooner. To make matters worse, France and Russia were finding an increasingly greater community of interests.<sup>78</sup> Schweinitz, too, felt that relations with Russia had deteriorated, and he was deeply concerned over the improving Franco-Russian relations.<sup>79</sup>

In addition to the views of these key Ambassadors, there was a steady flow of information reaching Berlin about the increased westward movements of Russian troops and armaments. Waldersee, the Chief of the General Staff, constantly reiterated

his conviction that Russia would eventually attack Austria or Germany, or both, and a preventive war was the only way to gain an advantage.<sup>80</sup> Holstein's diary entry for November, 1888, was also pessimistic.

Things are looking serious again. The French Minister and Generals are starting to make warmongering speeches; I have never known the Ministers in particular [to] do such a thing since 1871. The Russians just go on moving their troops closer to their western frontier. Secret reports to this effect have kept coming in during the last few weeks.<sup>81</sup>

Bismarck may have been motivated to improve his relations with Britain because he could foresee the eventual triumph of anti-Russian influences over the Kaiser. This would have made a "special relation" with Russia difficult or impossible. Another possible motive for the German alliance proposal might have been that alliances and alliance systems had been Bismarck's prime means of dominating European politics since the early years of the creation of the Reich. He may simply have hoped to circumvent the contradictions an Anglo-German alliance would have raised for the Reinsurance Treaty. Had he been successful in reconciling such differences through diplomatic skill, chicanery, or secrecy, he would have accomplished the ultimate in security for the Empire. All of Europe would have been his stage, the respective European leaders the puppets, and Bismarck the master puppeteer. It would be inconceivable to consider that any European statesman would be so presumptuous as to attempt such a coup. But Bismarck was not "any European statesman."

Still further incentive for an Anglo-German alliance might have resulted from the existing situation in East Africa. As Salisbury told General Portal, his agent in Cairo and occasional Ambassador to the Sultan of Zanzibar, in November, 1889, "The whole question of Zanzibar is both difficult and dangerous...."<sup>82</sup> The Sultan, highly unstable in character and almost totally unpredictable in behavior, created a predicament.

Seyyid Khalifa, the Sultan, had spent a substantial portion of his life imprisoned by his late brother, the Sultan Seyyid Barghash, who suspected him of intrigue. This "retiring" life had not brought him into contact with the inhabitants of the Zanzibari Empire. When he did finally become Sultan, it was under the embarrassing circumstances of increasing foreign pressures and influences. These humiliations, coupled with the conviction that his subjects disliked him, seemed to have affected Khalifa's mind. On December 18, 1888, he announced that in the future his rule would be solely guided by the precepts of the holy Koran. To uphold such a plan he stated his determination "to utilize the power of life and death as exercised by his illustrious predecessors."<sup>83</sup> A barbarous public massacre of slaves and prisoners followed which caused vigorous Anglo-German protests.<sup>84</sup> If such actions continued, public pressures might force the powers to end the Sultanate. In fact, Bismarck and Salisbury had agreed to intervene "in a permanent way" should the executions reoccur.<sup>85</sup> The Sultan's outrageous behavior led

to the formulation of a plot among some Arab leaders to depose the Sultan in favor of his brother, Seyyid Ali. The plotters even requested aid from Euan Smith, the British Consul. Though Smith favored the idea, he resisted the temptation to lend aid for fear civil war might result, thus increasing the necessity for intervention on the part of the powers.<sup>86</sup>

Another potentially troublesome factor in Africa was Karl Peters. Bismarck could not help but be uneasy with this character loose in an area in which Britain had indicated interest. There was always the possibility of an outright clash between British and German subjects in the interior. Such a fear was by no means unjustified. Later in the year, as he moved inland, Peters would destroy several British trading stations along the way.<sup>87</sup> He even opened the mail of two Englishmen, one a representative of the Church Missionary Society, and the other a trader for the IBEA Company.<sup>88</sup> Whatever happened in Africa would be cushioned if Britain and Germany were allies.

Whatever his motives for proposing an Anglo-German alliance, it was not to materialize. While in London on March 22, 1889, Herbert Bismarck was told by Salisbury that an alliance would be inopportune politically. Though he seemed sympathetic to the idea, the Prime Minister feared that too obvious an anti-French policy would hurt his narrow Parliamentary majority. The Cabinet agreed. As he told Herbert:

We live no longer, alas, in Pitt's time; the aristocracy governed then and we were able to



SLOW--BUT NOT SURE.

"Germany marching slowly and cautiously in the colonial path." (Punch,  
January 26, 1889, p. 43)



form an active policy, which made England after the Congress of Vienna the richest and most respected Power in Europe. Now democracy is on top, and with it the personal and party system, which reduces every British Government to complete dependence on the aura popularis. This generation can only be taught by events. Meanwhile, we leave it on the table, without saying yes or no; that is unfortunately all I can do for the present.<sup>89</sup>

D. Helgoland and the Kaiser's Visit to Britain:  
Colonial Agreement as Alternative to Alliance

Herbert, though disappointed, agreed with Salisbury's assessment of the situation. The possibility of alliance was not dead, however; it might be revived at any time, particularly should the British public become endeared to the Germans. If alliance were to be a possibility, continuation of good relations had to be paramount. The situation still looked encouraging to the younger Bismarck.

Judging from my conversations so far with Ministers and influential people, there is a consistent genuine and increasing desire, even greater than at earlier times, not only to keep on the best terms with us, but to emphasize as much as possible our community of interests everywhere.<sup>90</sup>

It was during this same visit in London that Herbert had a lengthy conversation with Joseph Chamberlain, a well-known Germanophile and key Parliamentary figure. Chamberlain was interested in a colonial deal, perhaps in lieu of or as a prelude to an alliance: Helgoland for Southwest Africa. This was the second time Helgoland had been raised as a potential trading pawn. Chamberlain suggested that Southwest Africa would be

valuable to the British because they needed to build a railroad east from Walfish Bay to Bechuanaland. The Cape Colony had advocated the acquisition of Southwest Africa from the time the Germans had first shown an interest. Herbert honestly admitted that Southwest Africa had provided no positive return since it came to Germany. On the other hand, it had a certain prestige value as Germany's first colony. Chamberlain suggested that Helgoland was of far greater value to Germany since in the case of a Franco-German war, French ships would be prevented from seeking shelter or from coaling in the protection of the island. Chamberlain also went on to point out that the exchange would certainly be popular in Parliament and would go a long way toward alleviating African disputes. Mr. Gorst, another influential member of Parliament and a Conservative, had been speaking in favor of British retirement from Helgoland for some time. Herbert suggested that Chamberlain lay the issue before Lord Hartington, the leader of his party, or Lord Salisbury.<sup>91</sup>

The possibility of a colonial deal at this time was particularly favorable because William was scheduled to visit England during the summer (August 1 to 7). A colonial treaty concluded at the time of the Emperor's visit in all the pomp of the occasion would be highly favorable for Anglo-German relations.

In a conversation with Lord Salisbury less than a month later, the question of Helgoland and Southwest Africa was raised

by Count Hatzfeldt.<sup>92</sup> The Ambassador stated his belief that the political value of the island itself was nil, but that it might be of some defensive value to Germany. In the case of a Franco-German war, Anglo-German relations would doubtless suffer if the French were able to use the island in any way to blockade the German coastline.

Salisbury replied that such a situation would never be permitted to materialize. The Prime Minister remarked that realistically he could see no value in the island for Germany; tremendous sums of money would have to be expended to make the island of any substantial value. He then turned to the African aspect of the proposal and pointed out that Southwest Africa was really of no value at all to England; it was only of interest to the Cape. He added that he held no great enthusiasm for granting additional territorial advantages to colonies which were more or less independent and which would be unlikely to show Britain any gratitude.

Hatzfeldt's view of the conversation was that Salisbury had not definitely rejected the idea though he had no great enthusiasm for it. The Ambassador suggested temporarily deferring further mention of a deal; Bismarck concurred. Nothing transpired to lend any encouragement to the project. Herbert therefore advised that the prospect of a treaty being worked out for signature at Osborneduring the Kaiser's visit in August should be disregarded. It would take too long at this point to get the

matter through Parliament without showing excessive eagerness on the part of the Wilhelmstrasse. Such enthusiasm might raise the price of a future arrangement and destroy the possibility of a bargain altogether. Herbert asked that the Kaiser be so informed.<sup>93</sup>

But the question of Helgoland was not to be so easily shelved. The Kaiser's view on Helgoland proved to be somewhat different from that of the Wilhelmstrasse. In the first place, he believed that there was substance to Chamberlain's proposal and that a show of enthusiasm on Germany's part was the necessary ingredient in bringing about a bargain. Britain was particularly friendly toward Germany at this time and advantage should be taken of the situation. [Victoria was about to appoint William an Admiral in the British Navy, and both Houses of Parliament were going to be present at the British naval review in honor of William's visit.] The Kaiser considered the acquisition of Helgoland of the utmost military importance, particularly in the case of war with France. If Germany had possession of the island, the mouth of the Elbe River and Jade Bay (Wilhelmshaven) could be more adequately protected.<sup>94</sup>

The two Bismarcks at once reiterated their respective positions. Herbert pointed out that he had spoken to Chamberlain only once regarding the matter of a colonial exchange. Although Chamberlain may have been enthusiastic, neither his party leader, Lord Hartington, nor Lord Salisbury had shown eagerness. Too

much enthusiasm on Germany's part might cause Salisbury to feel he was being pushed against the wall and therefore feel obligated to refuse. This might endanger Germany's good relations with Britain, which were, after all, based on the fact that the Wilhelmstrasse had refrained from excessive demands. Bismarck's marginal comments showed concurrence.

I do not feel that considering all things we should take the initiative. It would jeopardize the affairs and weaken impressions, even our present good relations toward the Queen. We should appear greedy.<sup>95</sup>

Herbert went on to point out that relations between the Cape Colony and Britain were not good. The Colony had not been considerate in following British advice and in fact had a strong desire for complete independence. There was no sufficient reason to believe Britain would relinquish Helgoland for the benefit of such an ungrateful and disrespectful colony. A struggle over a colonial acquisition might also hurt Salisbury's Parliamentary position for Gladstone and the Liberals would obviously make unscrupulous use of the trade. Herbert implied that it might be better to wait until after the Kaiser's visit, on the assumption that Anglo-German relations would then be even more favorable. Herbert agreed that Helgoland would be a fine acquisition and that Southwest Africa was expendable, but a satisfactory trade was all a matter of timing. The Chancellor wrote in the margin: "We must wait for British initiative, and the moment when England needs us. At present we need England, if peace is still to be maintained."<sup>96</sup> The Chancellor repeated Herbert's fear that the

British opposition would be able to take unfavorable advantage of the Conservative Government. The Kaiser accepted the Bismarckian logic.<sup>97</sup>

William's visit to Britain was an overwhelming success. He eagerly anticipated his initiation into the British Navy.

He wrote the British Ambassador:

Fancy wearing the same uniform as St. Vincent and Nelson; it is enough to make one quite giddy. I feel something like Macbeth must have felt when he was suddenly received by the witches with the cry of "All hail, who art Thane of Glamis and of Cawdor too."<sup>98</sup>

The Anglophile attitude of the Kaiser had reached a new peak. His eloquent thanks to his grandmother was an emotional testament.

...I now am able to feel and take an interest in your fleet as if it were my own; and with keenest sympathy shall I watch every phase of its further development, knowing that the British ironclads, coupled with mine and my army, are the strongest guarantees of peace; which Heaven may help us preserve! Should, however, the Will of Providence lay the heavy burden on us of fighting for our homes and destinies, then may the British fleet be seen forging ahead side by side with the German, and the "Red Coat" marching to victory with the "Pomeranian Grenadier!"<sup>99</sup>

#### E. Return to the "Old Course": Bismarck's Move Toward Neutralization

If the Bismarcks had actually hoped that Salisbury might join the Triple Alliance, they were mistaken. Although official relations between the two countries were good, the German security system was no more improved than the day the Anglo-German alliance

was proposed. As a matter of fact, the system had deteriorated. In October, 1889, Alexander III visited Berlin (October 11 to 13) and made it quite clear that he was unhappy about the Kaiser's visit to Britain and its possible implications. Nor could the Tsar have been pleased that William's trip to Britain was followed closely by a visit to Berlin from Franz Joseph (August 12 to 16). Alexander was also quite suspicious of a trip which William II was planning to Constantinople in November, 1889.<sup>100</sup> It was felt by the Russians that at the least, this latter maneuver was an effort to prop up the Turks against the creeping expansion of Russian influence.<sup>101</sup> This action would be contrary to the provisions of the Reinsurance Treaty and indicated to St. Petersburg that German policy was undergoing a transition. At the worst the transition might mean an Anglo-Austrian-German-Turk quadruple alliance directed against Russian interests in the Balkans and the Straits. Alexander also voiced concern over the influence of chauvinistic anti-Russian elements in high positions of responsibility in Germany.<sup>102</sup>

Bismarck was never one to limit himself to one alternative; if Britain would not reciprocate Germany's desire for closer relations, then a change of course might be necessary. With no concrete prospect of alliance with Britain, the Chancellor recognized the need to modify his attitude toward Russia, keeping her confidence through a more neutral policy toward Britain. Unfortunately, by this time the old Chancellor was up against serious opposition which no longer made possible his complete

direction of German foreign affairs. Three times during the Summer of 1889, he unsuccessfully attempted pro-Russian gestures. In each case, he stumbled headlong into the opposition of an increasingly Anglophilé Kaiser.

When a German police inspector by the name of Wohlgemuth was lured across the Swiss border in April, 1889, and then arrested for illegal activities against Social Democrats, Bismarck saw the issue as an opportunity to strike against the activities of German revolutionaries on Swiss soil, as well as a chance to underline Germany's conservative sympathies with Russia. Accordingly, Russia was asked to cooperate with Germany in calling upon Switzerland to take proper precautions. As a Russo-German cooperative project, the venture was successful. But unfortunately the action roused the ire of the Kaiser's uncle, the Grand Duke of Baden, because Baden's Swiss tourist trade had been damaged by Bismarck's tightening of customs regulations at the Swiss frontiers.<sup>103</sup> The issue soon became an open sore in the relations between William and the Grand Duke on the one hand and Bismarck on the other.

A second problem emerged when, that same summer, the Russian Government requested permission to convert a number of railroad securities on the German stock exchange. Bismarck favored the project, but when it became known to the Kaiser, a clash of opinion materialized. The Kaiser demanded that the conversion operation cease since the German people would only be



supplying their enemy with money for a more effective military system which would eventually be used against the Central Powers.<sup>104</sup> Although Bismarck managed to push the project through, as a concession to William he was forced to warn German citizens against purchase of Russian securities.<sup>105</sup>

The third conflict had arisen when the Chancellor anticipated possible negative repercussions in Russia from a visit to Constantinople being planned by the German Kaiser. Although Bismarck did his utmost to prevent the trip, William persisted.<sup>106</sup>

To be both pro-British and pro-Russian would seem antithetical to ordinary men, but Bismarck felt that under the circumstances it was the only course open for Germany. There is little doubt that the conflict over Germany's position vis-à-vis Russia had a great deal to do with the personal problems between Bismarck and the Kaiser, and hence the acceleration of the Chancellor's downfall. As the Kaiser had told Radowitz earlier: "If Bismarck is unwilling to act against the Russians then we must part ways. I have conveyed this view through Herbert...."<sup>107</sup>

Bismarck was anxious to neutralize Germany's position vis-à-vis Britain because it was apparent by early Fall, 1889, that Britain was unwilling to ally herself or at least conclude a colonial deal with Germany which would give the appearance that Britain and Germany were so close that provocation of one would probably bring support from the other. Another factor was that the international situation had eased somewhat. Boulangism

had not been able to maintain itself once the "man on the white horse" had departed. The elections of September, 1889, reduced the Boulangist number in the Chamber to seventeen; the movement was nearing extinction.<sup>108</sup> This did not indicate that France would cease to be a danger to Germany, but at least one source of friction between the countries was in the process of decay.

Germany's relations with Russia had improved somewhat during late 1889 despite William's activities. To understand this phenomenon one must appreciate the position of the Tsar, for not all the pressure was on Germany. Aside from the Reinsurance Treaty, Russia was isolated, faced by two alliance systems which in both cases could be interpreted as directed against her. Russia's only alternative as an ally was a republican government for which she had absolutely no political affinity. In December the Tsar decided that Russia would seek to renew the Reinsurance Treaty.<sup>109</sup>

Events in Africa were another reason that Bismarck wanted to neutralize his policy toward Britain at this time. Although in June, 1889, the Chancellor had assured Britain that Germany would not go beyond her legitimate spheres of influence (as decided by the Agreements of 1886 and 1887), Salisbury had not exercised a similar restraint. During the Summer of 1889 the British exploratory parties had moved into the area between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, which the Germans considered their sphere of influence. The British Government granted Cecil Rhodes a

charter for his South Africa Company to operate north of the Zambesi River; in August, 1889, the company's charter was altered so as to leave the northern boundary of its field of operation open and indefinite.<sup>110</sup> (Rhodes was not one to let such an opportunity elude him. His plans were facilitated by the fact that after the rebellion in East Africa, few Germans had moved into the Lake Nyasa area from the coastal area. Rhodes could move north from well-developed supply bases in southern Rhodesia through peaceful or already pacified areas behind Portuguese Mozambique.

As Rhodes' company was threatening the German sphere west of Lake Nyasa and east of Lake Tanganyika, there was evidence that a British expedition led by the explorer Sir Harry Johnston had also penetrated the German sphere west of Lake Nyasa out of Portuguese Mozambique. Johnston, who was the British Consul in Mozambique, had reportedly concluded several treaties with provincial chieftains, thus giving Britain extensive claims in the region. Even though Whitehall claimed Johnston acted without instructions, it was quite evident that Salisbury was not fully restraining his government personnel, let alone private individuals like Rhodes and Mackinnon.<sup>111</sup>

Zanzibar too was rapidly reviving as a source of friction between Germany and Britain. The Sultan's position continued to decline; Bismarck had certainly done a great deal to contribute to this process. On the pretext of ending the East African

blockade "with a flourish," the Chancellor extorted from the Sultan the right to search for slaves in all Arab dhows in Zanzibari waters. This, of course, further undermined the Sultan's credit with his subjects.<sup>112</sup> Such demands did nothing to endear the German inhabitants of the island to the Sultan. Therefore, when German nationals were victimized, as all Europeans were on occasion, by the corrupt administration of the island, the Sultan had a tendency to "wink" at their problems. This practice in turn led to increased German agitation for the Sultan's removal or at least dislodging from actual power. Naturally the British resisted such encroachments on the Sultan's authority, thereby placing themselves in the unenviable position of upholding what was recognized by all as a corrupt, degenerate regime.<sup>113</sup>

A third area of dispute centered around the island of Lamu off the coast of Witu. The island had the best port in the area and therefore was important to the economy of the Witu protectorate. By the agreement of 1886 the island had been assigned to the Sultan of Zanzibar. This technicality did not prevent Achmed, the Sultan of Witu, who had not adhered to the Anglo-German-Zanzibar Treaty of 1886, from leasing the customs collection of the island to the German Witu Company.<sup>114</sup> The Imperial British East Africa Company finally protested the lease since Achmed had no title to the island, and the British Government supported the company rather than appease the Germans.

The matter was forced into arbitration, which was presided over by the King of Belgium, and in August, 1889, the German Witu Company lost its position on the island.<sup>115</sup> The importance of the loss to the Witu Company should not be underestimated, for whoever controlled Lamu was in a strong position to control Witu economically. In July, 1889, Herbert Bismarck had even talked of encouraging the sale of the Witu Company to Mackinnon if the Lamu award went unfavorably.<sup>116</sup> Although the Wilhelmstrasse had not pursued acquisition of the island diligently, it was clear that the British Government was not willing to have the German colonial empire die a natural death, but was actively working to hasten the process. To rub salt into the wound, the Sultan of Zanzibar now leased Lamu to Mackinnon's British company. Mackinnon was obviously planning on eventually acquiring the mainland since Lamu was of questionable value without the coastal area. In August, 1889, the British concern even tried to buy out the German Witu Company.<sup>117</sup>

Germany had willingly surrendered Uganda, had her interests abused by a corrupt Sultan in Zanzibar, her borders penetrated by a British adventurer, and was now threatened with the loss of Witu. Bismarck probably would have been happy to wash his hands of the whole mess could he have gotten a quid pro quo. None appeared forthcoming in any form from the British. This did not mean that the Chancellor was willing to return completely to the practices he had employed against Gladstone; too many

things had occurred since then to strengthen the British position and weaken the German, but some cold water on the Anglo-German relationship did seem appropriate.

A noticeable change of course might yield several advantages. In the first place, a happier Russo-German relation might result. The Tsar's mind would rest much more easily if he saw some evidence, however slight, of Anglo-German conflict. A minor disagreement with Britain would serve to cool the Kaiser's enthusiasm for all things British. In some instances not much was needed to induce a complete turnabout on William's part. Before his recent Anglophile departure, William had exhibited equally anti-British sentiment on occasion.<sup>118</sup> A certain method of cooling relations with Britain would be a more aggressive colonial policy, a policy to which the Kaiser would never object. If the slave-trade issue was properly utilized, the basis might be created for the government to attain the support of the large Catholic Center party. Bismarck took steps in this direction in November, 1889, when Germany sent representatives to the Anti-Slave Trade Conference in Brussels.<sup>119</sup> Certainly all was not well between Bismarck and the Kartell coalition (the coalition of parties by which Bismarck had ruled since 1887). At least one historian maintains that this conflict was so serious that the Chancellor actually did what he could to undermine the National Liberals and moderate Conservatives in the elections of 1890. There is substantial evidence to indicate that Bismarck

hoped to replace the Kartell with a Center-Conservative coalition.<sup>120</sup> Holstein and Eulenburg both thought Bismarck was "cozying up" to the Center.<sup>121</sup>

Evidence of Bismarck's determination to alter his policy toward Britain can be seen in his decision to support the acquisition of the Islands of Manda and Pata for the Witu Company, despite the fact that these islands, like Lamu, had been assigned to Zanzibar by earlier treaty. Potentially these islands could be developed into favorable harbor areas. In addition, Germany declared a protectorate over the region north of Witu on October 22, 1889.<sup>122</sup> Neither the British Government nor the Imperial British East Africa Company could have been happy to see this action. Salisbury must have felt some concern because the hinterland of the enlarged Witu included not only part of Uganda, but also the Upper Nile.

Even more serious from the British point of view was that Karl Peters was actually in Uganda. During the course of his journey inland, Peters was shocked to discover that Stanley had already "rescued" Emin. At the same time, however, Peters intercepted a message bound for British sources stating that Mwanga, the King of Uganda, had been unseated by his brother and that a civil war was in progress. Kiuewa, the brother, had undertaken an anti-Christian policy, and this served as Peters' excuse for intervention on behalf of Mwanga. The intervention was successful, and when he was restored, Mwanga showed his

appreciation by signing a treaty which allowed Germans to settle and trade in Uganda.<sup>123</sup> Peters obviously hoped to use this concession as the basis for an eventual German protectorate. With Peters on the way home with this as well as other treaties signed in the Uganda area, the British position in the Upper Nile could be seriously threatened, especially if Bismarck chose to ignore his earlier position regarding Peters' mission.

Whatever his attitude toward Peters might have been, Bismarck decided that German interests in Zanzibar could be more vigorously prosecuted; the German presence in Zanzibar was too valuable a diplomatic tool to be hastily discarded.<sup>124</sup> Since the British had strengthened their position in Egypt, that area was no longer available as a lever by which concessions could be extracted from Britain; perhaps Zanzibar could be used as a substitute.

Hatzfeldt was also instructed to protest vigorously the intrusion of the British South Africa Company into the Lakes region and also the open-ended nature of the Company's charter:

...the vagueness of the limits assigned in the charter to the operations of the Company which was so especially alarming to the German Government. It seemed as if it was the intention of the British Government to build up a wall right in front of German enterprise in Central Africa, so that it could go neither hither nor thither.

In December, 1889, Hatzfeldt suggested that:

Both Governments had to lay their account with a great mass of chauvinistic opinion. The only way they [the governments] could do this successfully was by coming to a complete understanding



one with the other. Minor difficulties... should be settled by commissioners appointed for that purpose. Graver questions would, of course, have to be the subject of negotiations between the two Governments.<sup>125</sup>

Hatzfeldt's impression of the cause for the revised British intransigence was that Britain had returned to the idea that Germany was not serious about colonies and could therefore be exploited on colonial issues. There was also the egotistic belief among many Britons that all East Africa was theirs by right of manifest destiny. Since the German presence imposed limitations, Anglo-German colonial ambitions were considered to be incompatible. The Ambassador went on to express the view that Salisbury was caught in the middle of the controversy, and caution should therefore be used to prevent excessive embarrassment.<sup>126</sup> Salisbury did not express similar concern about Bismarck's Government. Even though the Prime Minister was slow to respond to Hatzfeldt's suggestion for a colonial settlement, he did finally agree that some East African problems should be dealt with through arbitration. Hatzfeldt hoped that a more comprehensive settlement might result, but Salisbury was not anxious to proceed with undue haste; he favored arbitration of some disputes followed later, perhaps, by a general agreement. By January 19, 1890, the Germans had agreed to the principle of arbitration. Percy Anderson of the Colonial Department of the British Foreign Office would come to Berlin, and the decision would be made as to what subjects were suitable for arbitration.<sup>127</sup> It was at this point that Bismarck was forced to make

his exit.

There is no significant direct evidence to indicate that colonial policies had anything at all to do with the Great Man's political demise. It would appear that the Chancellor's personal relation with the Kaiser was the issue. Indirectly one can speculate that Bismarck's attempt to return to a more neutral Russian policy as the result of Britain's refusal to join the Triple Alliance or come to a colonial agreement may have antagonized the Kaiser sufficiently to accelerate the break. Given their respective personalities, however, it would seem that the break was inevitable.

From the time Bismarck became involved in the colonial race, Germany's position of security had declined. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute this descent to the Chancellor's colonial policy. A survey of his record from 1884 to 1890 would seem to indicate that Bismarck was moderate enough in his colonial demands to prevent any serious complications from arising without obtaining a comparable advantage elsewhere. For Germany to have maintained the herculean international position she held in 1884 and 1885 would have been inconceivable. The point is that although Germany's position declined, her borders were still as secure as could be expected and in the attainment of that situation, Bismarck had used his colonial policy to advantage. The Chancellor's statement that he was not a Kolonialmench was probably true; he was merely an opportunist.

## FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), II, no. 216, pp. 703-05.
- <sup>2</sup>D. S. Gillard, "Salisbury's African Policy and the Helgoland Offer of 1890," English Historical Review, vol. 75 (Oct., 1960), p. 633.
- <sup>3</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, no. 266, p. 887.
- <sup>4</sup>British Foreign Office, folder 403/109, Baring to Salisbury, Cairo, April 6, 1888, no. 4 (see enclosures). Henceforth referred to as BFO. G. N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882-1899 (Edinburgh: University Press, 1965), p. 27; Paul E. Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at University of Michigan, 1937), pp. 155-56; Georg zu Schweitzer, Emin Pasha (Berlin: Verlag von Hermann Walther, 1898), pp. 312-30.
- <sup>5</sup>Schweitzer, Emin Pasha, pp. 312-30.
- <sup>6</sup>Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1908), II, p. 307; Sanderson, Upper Nile, pp. 26-27, 44-45.
- <sup>7</sup>Sanderson, Upper Nile, p. 30.
- <sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 35.
- <sup>9</sup>Roland A. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), p. 37.
- <sup>10</sup>Sanderson, Upper Nile, p. 35.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-36.
- <sup>12</sup>Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty," p. 157; Sanderson, Upper Nile, pp. 34-35.
- <sup>13</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, p. 889.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., III, no. 267, pp. 888-89.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., III, no. 267, pp. 889-90.
- <sup>16</sup>Sanderson, Upper Nile, p. 41.
- <sup>17</sup>George Buckle (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, ser. 3, 3 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930-1932), I, Apr. 22, 1888, p. 399.

<sup>18</sup>William L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), p. 105.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-107.

<sup>20</sup>Robert O. Collins, "Origins of the Nile Struggle," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 122.

<sup>21</sup>Reichskolonialamt (Bair Collection), Folder 360, Peters instructions from the East Africa Company, April 2, 1887. Henceforth referred to as RKA.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 1130, Arendt to Berlin, March 13, 1887; see Bismarck's marginal comment.

<sup>23</sup>Henry Bair, "Karl Peters and German Colonization" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University, 1968), pp. 143-44. The new Board of Directors included men like Adalbert Delbrück of the Delbrück Bank and Wilhelm Oechelhäuser, Director of the Continental Gas Compound of Germany. Carl Bötticher of the Prussian Ministry of Interior and Paul Kayser of the Imperial Foreign Office were also represented.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 157-58.

<sup>25</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, I, no. 63, pp. 339-345.

<sup>26</sup>Bair, "Karl Peters," pp. 163-66, 167-68.

<sup>27</sup>RKA, 386, Michahelles to Krauel, Sept. 26, 1887; 398, Michahelles to Berlin, Nov. 18, 1887.

<sup>28</sup>BFO, 403/104, Scott to Salisbury, Dec. 10, 1887, no. 104.

<sup>29</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, II, no. 213, pp. 695-700; no. 214, pp. 700-01.

<sup>30</sup>Suzanne Miers, "The Brussels Conference of 1889," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 89; Oliver, Harry Johnston, pp. 52-87.

<sup>31</sup>J. W. Gregory, Germans in Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1901), pp. 129-38.

<sup>32</sup>Evans, Lewis, The Germans and Africa (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1915), p. 186.

<sup>33</sup>Das Staatsarchiv 1861-1919, 86 vols. (Leipzig: Duncker und Humboldt, 1872-1919), 50, Michahelles to Bismarck, Zanzibar, Aug. 25, 1888, no. 9666, pp. 8-9; Michahelles to Bismarck, Zanzibar, Aug. 26, 1888, no. 9667, pp. 9-12; Michahelles to Bismarck, Zanzibar, Aug. 27, 1888, no. 9668, pp. 12-13; Bismarck to Michahelles, Friedrichsruh, Oct. 6, 1888, no. 9669, pp. 13-14. See BFO, 403/106, 107 and 108 for British view of the disorders.

<sup>34</sup>Staatsarchiv, 50, Michahelles to Bismarck, Zanzibar, Aug. 25, 1888, no. 9666, pp. 8-9.

<sup>35</sup>BFO, 403/107, Euan Smith to Salisbury, Zanzibar, Oct. 2, 1888, no. 7; Kennedy to Salisbury, Rome, Oct. 7, 1888, no. 20.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 403/107, Sewaji and Topan [Indians] to Salisbury, Zanzibar, Oct. 12, 1888, no. 37.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 403/107, Hatzfeldt to Salisbury, London, Nov. 3, 1888, no. 194.

<sup>38</sup>Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Marquis of Salisbury, 4 vols. (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 1921-32), IV, p. 236.

<sup>39</sup>Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 460 vols. (Berlin: Nordeutschen Buchdrücherei, 1867-1939), VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. IV, Anlagen, no. 27, Nov. 27, 1888, p. 182. Henceforth referred to as RD.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. I, 15 Sitting, Dec. 14, 1888, pp. 303-305, 305-312, 316-319.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. I, 27 Sitting, Jan. 26, 1889, pp. 603-604.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. II, 30 Sitting, Jan. 30, 1889, p. 683.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., VII Legislature period, IV Session, vol. IV, Anlagen, no. 71, Jan. 22, 1889, pp. 492-93.

<sup>44</sup>Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty," p. 229.

<sup>45</sup>Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 12-13.

<sup>46</sup>Meirs, "Brussels Conference," pp. 87-89.

<sup>47</sup>Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty," p. 236.

<sup>48</sup>Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire 1884-1918 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 140.

- <sup>49</sup> Cecil, Salisbury, IV, p. 238.
- <sup>50</sup> Karl Peters, New Light on Dark Africa (London: Ward and Lock, 1891), p. 4.
- <sup>51</sup> RKA, 249/3, Appeal of the Emin Pasha Rescue Committee, July 18, 1888.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 249/3, Bismarck memo, Sept. 14, 1888.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 249/3, Bismarck to Emin Committee, Aug. 15, 1888; BFO, 403/109, Scott to Salisbury, Berlin, Sept. 5, 1888, no. 39.
- <sup>54</sup> BFO, 403/109, Malet to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1888, Berlin, no. 45.
- <sup>55</sup> Bair, "Karl Peters," p. 187.
- <sup>56</sup> Sanderson, The Upper Nile, pp. 44-45.
- <sup>57</sup> Fritz Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-Ostafrika (Berlin: Rutter & Loering, 1959), pp. 465-67.
- <sup>58</sup> Bair, "Karl Peters," pp. 190-91.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 194.
- <sup>60</sup> Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 45.
- <sup>61</sup> William L. Langer, Alliances and Alignments (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 444-45.
- <sup>62</sup> Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 268.
- <sup>63</sup> Frederic H. Seager, The Boulanger Affair (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 203-218.
- <sup>64</sup> J. Lepsius, A. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27), V, Bismarck memo, Varzin, July 28, 1887, no. 1099, pp. 265-66. Henceforth referred to as GP. Langer, Alliances and Alignments, p. 416-19.
- <sup>65</sup> Malcolm E. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1938), pp. 258-59.

<sup>66</sup>Frederick Ponsonby (ed.), Letters of the Empress Frederick (London: Harper Bros., 1928), p. 217.

<sup>67</sup>Walter Bussmann (ed.), Staatssekretär Graf Herbert von Bismarck (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), p. 499.

<sup>68</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to Henry of Reuss, Berlin, Apr. 28, 1888, no. 819, pp. 177-78.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., VI, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Apr. 28, 1888, no. 1281, p. 210.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., IV, Berchem to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Aug. 21, 1888, no. 942, pp. 399-400.

<sup>71</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, I, Aug. 25, 1888, pp. 436-38.

<sup>72</sup>Aleksandr Meyendorff, Correspondance diplomatique de M. de Staal, 1884-1900, 2 vols. (Paris: Baron A. Meyendorff, 1929), pp. 442-43.

<sup>73</sup>GP, IV, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Jan. 11, 1889, no. 943, p. 400.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., IV, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Jan. 11, 1889, no. 943, p. 400.

<sup>75</sup>Horst Kohl (ed.), Die Politische Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: C. Bech, 1892-1905), XII, p. 375.

<sup>76</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 326; Documents Diplomatiques Français, ser. 1, 10 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929-1938), VII, Herbette to Goblet, Berlin, Jan. 25, 1889, no. 304, pp. 318-17; Herbette to Goblet, Berlin, Jan. 26, 1889, no. 305, pp. 318-20. Henceforth referred to as DDF.

<sup>77</sup>Seager, Boulangier, p. 222.

<sup>78</sup>Joseph Maria von Radowitz, Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1925), II, p. 290; a good example of which Radowitz was only too well aware was the Franco-Russian cooperation regarding the British policy in Egypt.

<sup>79</sup>Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, 2 vols. (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1927), II, pp. 372-73; Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Briefwechsel (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928), pp. 256-57.

<sup>80</sup> Alfred von Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1923), II, pp. 17-20; William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance 1890-1894 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 32.

<sup>81</sup> Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds.), Holstein Papers, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955-1963), II, Nov. 1, 1888, p. 381. Henceforth referred to as HP.

<sup>82</sup> Cecil, Salisbury, IV, p. 247.

<sup>83</sup> L. W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office, 1890-1913 (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 29; BFO, 403/107, Salisbury to Malet, London, Dec. 20, 1888, no. 589.

<sup>84</sup> German Foreign Ministry Archives, Library of Congress Microfilms, (ACP) reel 266, Berchem to Layden, Berlin, Dec. 29, 1888, frames 150-52; Malet to Bismarck, Berlin, Dec. 21, 1888, frs. 153-54; Malet to Berchem, Berlin, Dec. 27, 1888, frs. 155-56. Henceforth referred to as ACP. For British view, see BFO 403/107.

<sup>85</sup> BFO, 403/107, Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, Dec. 23, 1888, no. 290.

<sup>86</sup> Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," pp. 640-41.

<sup>87</sup> Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty," pp. 174-75.

<sup>88</sup> Peters, New Light, p. 313.

<sup>89</sup> German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of California Microfilms (UCI), Reel 73, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Mar. 22, 1889, frame 618. Henceforth referred to as UCI.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 73, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, March 27, 1889, frs. 622-23.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 73, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck, London, Mar. 27, 1889, f. 627.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 73, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Apr. 13, 1889, frs. 632-37.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 73, Herbert Bismarck to Berchem, Königstein, June 21, 1888, frs. 638-39.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 73, Berchem to Bismarck, Berlin, June 21, 1889, frs. 642-43; Berchem, the medium through whom the Kaiser was



communicating to the Chancellor, added that the Kaiser had really felt the matter warranted sufficient importance for him to write Bismarck himself, but he declined because the Chancellor would feel the necessity for replying himself, thus causing unnecessary fatigue for the Chancellor. It is interesting to note that the Kaiser did not mention the protection the island might afford the Weser River or the Kiel Canal.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 73, Herbert Bismarck to Berchem, Königsten, June 21, 1889, f. 644.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 73, Herbert Bismarck to Berchem, Königsten, June 21, 1889, f. 648.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 73, Berchem to Bismarck, Berlin, June 24, 1889, f. 658.

<sup>98</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, I, June 14, 1889, p. 504.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., ser. 3, I, Aug. 17, 1889, pp. 526-27.

<sup>100</sup>GP, VI, Bismarck to Solms-Sonnenwalde, Berlin, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 1358, pp. 359-61.

<sup>101</sup>Colin L. Smith, The Embassy of Sir William White 1886-1891 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 123.

<sup>102</sup>Robert Lucius von Ballhausen, Bismarck-Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche, 1920), p. 504.

<sup>103</sup>Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), I, pp. 250-51.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., I, p. 251; Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 35.

<sup>105</sup>Rich, Holstein, I, p. 253.

<sup>106</sup>Ernest Jäckh, Kiderlen-Wächter, der Staatsmann und Mensch, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, 1924), I, p. 88.

<sup>107</sup>Radowitz, Aufzeichnungen, III, p. 297.

<sup>108</sup>Seager, Boulanger, pp. 229-38.

<sup>109</sup>Sergi Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Three Emperors," American Historical Review, vol. 23 (Apr., 1918), pp. 240-41.

- 110 Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (New York: St. Martins, 1961), p. 245.
- 111 ACP, 266, Malet to Bismarck, Berlin, Dec. 18, 1889, f. 463.
- 112 Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 51.
- 113 Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 643; Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 51.
- 114 Alfred Zimmermann, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1914), pp. 158-60.
- 115 Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, no. 269, pp. 891-99.
- 116 Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 642.
- 117 ACP, 266, Salisbury to Hatzfeldt, London, Aug. 27, 1889, frs. 516-17.
- 118 Krasnyi Arkhiv, 106 vols. (Moscow: Soviet State Printer, 1922-41), II, pp. 120, 128.
- 119 Miers, "The Brussels Conference," pp. 101-03.
- 120 J. C. G. Rohl, "The Disintegration of the Kartell," Historical Journal, vol. 9 (Part 1, 1966), pp. 88-89.
- 121 Rich, Holstein, I, pp. 256-57.
- 122 Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 642.
- 123 Peters, New Light, pp. 312-14; Bair, "Karl Peters," pp. 199-200.
- 124 Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 643; Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 164.
- 125 Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 643.
- 126 GP, VIII, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Dec. 7, 1889, no. 1672, pp. 3-4.
- 127 Ibid., VIII, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, Dec. 22, 1889, no. 1674, pp. 6-8.

CHAPTER IV  
ANGLO-GERMAN COLONIAL AGREEMENT OF 1890

A. End of the Reinsurance Treaty

The first change of government for Germany in more than a quarter of a century inevitably produced a great deal of confusion. It was precisely this instability, so uncharacteristic of the Prussian stereotype, that the new German Government hoped to avoid. The Kaiser did his utmost to give the impression that Bismarck had resigned voluntarily and that full efforts had been exerted to retain him. To maintain the facade of continuity, a vigorous effort was made to keep Herbert Bismarck in the government; after all, Herbert had been his father's only consistent confidant in matters of foreign affairs.<sup>1</sup> Should the European powers surmise that the new government lacked dependability or stability, Germany's security system could collapse overnight. The Kaiser obviously had this in mind when he made the statement for public consumption that "The course remains the same. Full steam ahead!" Unfortunately for the Kaiser and the Wilhelmstrasse, except for Bismarck, no one really was sure about the direction of Germany's past course; hence the Kaiser's statement might prove to be highly contradictory and misleading.

The most pressing foreign policy matter facing Caprivi and his new government was the status of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. The treaty was due to expire on June 18, 1890, and negotiations for renewal had begun in February of that year. To

make himself look better and to cause trouble for the Kaiser, Bismarck created the impression that his resignation was the result of a dispute over his pro-Russian attitude. In fact he did tell Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador, exactly that.<sup>2</sup> On March 20, Herbert Bismarck, who was still in office at this date, addressed a memo to the Foreign Ministry stating that Russia was no longer interested in renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty under the altered circumstances of a new German Chancellor.<sup>3</sup> The following day the Kaiser met with the Russian Ambassador to determine why St. Petersburg wished to break off talks on renewing the treaty. Shuvalov assured the Kaiser that under the circumstances he was merely requesting a delay so as to receive new instructions from St. Petersburg. The Kaiser then went on to tell the Russian Ambassador:

I wish to tell your Sovereign, who is my friend and has always been very kind to me, that nothing has changed our relations. The policies that the Chancellor [Bismarck] has made are not his, but those of my grandfather and of mine.

Count Herbert Bismarck tells me that you are reluctant to continue the negotiations for the renewal of our secret treaty due to the changes which have occurred....<sup>4</sup>

The Tsar's marginal comments on Shuvalov's report of what had transpired were: "I could not have asked for anymore."

Almost at the same time the Kaiser was seeking reassurance and simultaneously reassuring Shuvalov, a series of meetings was beginning at the German Foreign Ministry that would have caused more restraint on William's part had he but known. On

March 22 Caprivi visited the Foreign Ministry and was shown the Reinsurance Treaty by Holstein. At that time Caprivi told Holstein that the Kaiser favored renewal. Holstein, who had seriously questioned the validity of Bismarck's pro-Russian orientation, prepared to work for a new policy vis-à-vis Russia. He told the Kaiser's bosom friend, Eulenburg:

The confusion here is frightful. I have the feeling that something disastrous can easily happen because the Kaiser has people in his entourage who are making him afraid of Russia...by threatening him with a Franco-Russian alliance if the Bismarck programme you know about [renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty] is not carried through. Tomorrow at 10 Berchem, Raschdau and I, at my instigation, will make a joint report to Caprivi. Then we will see what Caprivi will do.<sup>5</sup>

The following day these three men argued the necessity of non-renewal of the treaty. It was contended that Germany would be committing political bigamy and that renewal of the treaty would be placing Germany at Russia's mercy, for its revelation would destroy the Triple Alliance. The Reinsurance Treaty by itself did not provide sufficient security to warrant the risk of losing the Triple Alliance. Instead of indulging in dangerous diplomatic gambles as in Bismarck's time, Germany should pursue a more lucid and honorable policy.<sup>6</sup> Caprivi was undoubtedly leaning toward Holstein's view when he left, but no final decision had been made. In the meantime Herbert Bismarck resigned; an important restraint on a change in policy had been withdrawn. Apparently Schweinitz, the German Ambassador to

Russia who was in Berlin at the time, precipitated Caprivi's ultimate decision to end the treaty. Upon seeing the texts of the treaties on March 27, the Ambassador was particularly impressed with the contradiction between the treaty and Germany's obligation to Rumania by the alliance of 1883. Schweinitz wrote in his diary:

I generally maintained that it was dangerous under the changed circumstances to follow so delicately balanced a policy through which Bismarck had avoided all the Russian hazards. I had always been of the view that the Treaty was of more value to Russia than to us. The special protocol gave Russia a valuable concession without any compensation for Germany at all.<sup>7</sup>

The Kaiser and Caprivi were convinced that an alteration in policy was necessary. Schweinitz was left with the undesirable task of informing Shuvalov of the decision. Ironically, the day that Schweinitz went to see the Russian Ambassador, news had just arrived from St. Petersburg that the Tsar had approved continuation of the negotiations.<sup>8</sup> Shuvalov was crushed by the decision. As consolation to the depressed Shuvalov, the best Schweinitz could do was to point out that although the treaty was not being renewed, there would be no change in Germany's policy with respect to Russia's relation to Bulgaria.<sup>9</sup> The clear implication was that Germany would no longer support an aggressive Russian policy in the Straits.

Giers unsuccessfully tried to secure some form of written guarantee during April and May. For his part, Schweinitz

had begun to have serious reservations about dropping Russia. On May 15, Giers offered to renew the treaty without the secret protocol (that is, German support in the Straits) and even without German recognition of the Russian preponderance of influence in Bulgaria. Schweinitz recommended acceptance.<sup>10</sup>

The whole matter of the treaty renewal was then reintroduced in Berlin. Lengthy memoranda were submitted on the question by Holstein, Raschdau, Caprivi, Marschall (the new State Secretary), and Kiderlen, a Vortragender Rat.<sup>11</sup> The tenor of the arguments gave a good indication of the direction the Caprivi regime would follow. Germany would no longer support Russia in the Straits. The Caprivi Government did not want to put itself in the position of opposing British entrance through the Straits as it had in 1885 during the Afghan crisis. This fear of again alienating the British in addition to contradicting the spirit of Germany's other treaty obligations led to German rejection of a second attempt by Russia to secure renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty.<sup>12</sup> Giers was offended by what he considered duplicity on the part of the Germans; he said he would never forgive the Kaiser.<sup>13</sup> On June 18, 1890, the Reinsurance Treaty expired. The table on which the German security system now rested was supported by two legs rather than three. This event in the Spring of 1890 is the most important single factor in explaining German colonial policy for the next few years.

B. The New Course: Caprivi, Salisbury, and Colonialism

When the Anglo-German negotiations on African problems resumed, the German position had mellowed. The first and most obvious reason for this alteration was the new attitude the Wilhelmstrasse was formulating toward Russia. Relations with Russia were obviously going to suffer from Germany's refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. Though this action was supposedly to neutralize Germany's position vis-à-vis Russia, the Wilhelmstrasse recognized that Russia's response might be unfriendly. At the least, this necessitated a secure relation with Britain if the scales of the European power structure were to remain balanced. Now more than ever before, the situation on the German side dictated that the outstanding cause of friction between Britain and Germany, that is East Africa, had to be settled amicably.

Another factor that may have softened Germany's view toward colonial settlement with Britain was the new Chancellor's attitude toward Russia. Caprivi was trained and educated as a soldier, and as a soldier he was constantly confronted with the problem of a two-front war for Germany. He eventually came to believe that such a disaster was inevitable. In 1882 when he had been unexpectedly appointed head of the Imperial Navy, the two-front war expectation was the basis on which Germany's naval posture was structured. When war came, the task of Caprivi's navy would be to defend Germany's coastal areas. No more.



ambitious program than this was considered since Caprivi felt that war might come at any moment and Germany would not have time to construct a large fleet of capital ships. Torpedo boats could adequately satisfy the necessities of coastal defense at a minimal cost. In this manner funds would not be seriously diverted from the military necessity of maintaining Germany's continental defensive position.<sup>14</sup>

Possessed by these beliefs, Caprivi emerged not only highly dubious regarding long-term Russo-German friendship, but also critical of overseas German expansion. Involvement in African expansion meant Imperial involvement in colonial administration and the movement away from a coastal fleet to a high-seas fleet of capital ships. Both these ventures would detract from the emphasis on Germany's continental military position. Although the new German Government could not give the appearance of subordinating her own interests to those of Britain, Caprivi's outlook was particularly disposed to amiable relations with Britain. The unfortunate German experience (native revolt of 1888-1889) in East Africa undoubtedly reinforced the Chancellor's inclination not to allow Anglo-German relations to be unnecessarily complicated by colonial affairs.

Caprivi's true outlook, however, was not so obvious to Salisbury at the moment when Dr. Friedrich Krauel, the Director of the Wilhelmstrasse's colonial division, and Sir Percy Anderson of the British Colonial Office met in Berlin on May 5,

1890. The British Prime Minister had been shaken by Bismarck's sudden departure and characterized the event as an "...enormous calamity of which the effects will be felt in every part of Europe!"<sup>15</sup> Though he said nothing further to clarify the meaning of his statement, Salisbury was undoubtedly fearful that the Kaiser, whose stability he questioned, was planning to become his own first minister. Serious friction for Anglo-German colonial relations could easily evolve, for William was recognized as an advocate of expansion.<sup>16</sup> Nor could Salisbury overlook the frequently strained relations between the Kaiser and the Prince of Wales, which if they recurred could mean trouble for Britain and Germany.<sup>17</sup>

Could the Caprivi Government really be trusted to prevent Anglo-German African problems from getting out of hand? What would be the new government's attitude toward the treaties that Peters was known to have signed in Uganda? On April 26 Emin Pasha had shown his gratitude to his British "liberators" by entering the German service and organizing an expedition to return to the interior. A rumor circulated that Emin was returning to Uganda with the objective of raising the German flag.<sup>18</sup> Had Salisbury known of the instructions conveyed to Emin by the Imperial Commissioner, Wissmann, he would have been quite disturbed. Emin was given a free hand to extend German influence into the region of the Upper Nile, a direct contradiction of Bismarck's earlier assurances to Salisbury's Government. It



A LITTLE PARTY IN EAST AFRICA ONLY GOING TO COLLECT A FEW BUTTERFLIES AND FLOWERS FOR THE DEAR KAISER, THAT IS ALL!!

"We came very near to having Kilima-Njaro attached to the British Empire, only the German Emperor said he would very much like it, because he was so fond of the *flora* and *fauna* of the place . . . Would the English have expected to get any territory on account of their great interest in the *flora* and *fauna* here."—Stanley speaking at Chamber of Commerce, May 21.

(Punch, May 31, 1890, p. 263)

should be noted, however, that Wissmann probably altered the instructions he had received from the Wilhelmstrasse on February 10, 1890, which authorized Emin to secure only the legitimately recognized areas of German East Africa.<sup>19</sup>

On May 12 Caprivi addressed the Reichstag for the first time. His objective was to secure allocation of 4,500,000M to strengthen Germany's position against the East African slave trade. An additional 350,000M was requested to provide subsidies for a regular steamship connection between Germany and East Africa. Both Marschall and Caprivi went to great lengths to assure Reichstag members that the money was not to be spent for extension of German colonies beyond the legitimate limits which had already been attained. Furthermore, the new government desired to cooperate fully with Britain in the solution of East African problems.<sup>20</sup>

Caprivi had received a generally favorable press in Britain and his maiden speech before the Reichstag appeared not to have aroused outward concern. The fact remained, however, that his first speech was devoted to colonial affairs. This might indicate to outsiders that the Chancellor's first priority concerned colonialism. One point The Times did make was that Caprivi gave no comprehensive account of how the money he requested would be spent nor did he precisely identify what his colonial policy would be.<sup>21</sup> Some rather disquieting questions could have been raised as a result of the Chancellor's speech.

What exactly was meant by his phrase that Germany would not expand beyond the limits of her legitimate territories? Did the British and German definitions of Germany's legitimate territories coincide? Or (did) Caprivi mean that Germany would not expand beyond the limits of what he thought Germany should legitimately have?

There was concrete evidence that the Anglo-German colonial issue could be potentially explosive. In one of his first conversations with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Malet, Marschall von Bieberstein, the new German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, bitterly complained of Whitehall's failure to restrain the intrusions of British nations into areas "recognized" as Germany's preserve. If Britain would show restraint, she could rest assured that Peters' activities would continue to be repudiated. The implication of Marschall's statement was that if Britain did not adhere to Germany's wishes, Peters' activities might be legitimized by the Wilhelmstrasse. During the same conversation Malet stated that Britain considered Uganda to already be within her sphere of influence. Marschall, however, insisted that all territory west of Lake Victoria was subject to negotiation.<sup>22</sup> Two days later Hatzfeldt relieved Salisbury's anxiety somewhat by agreeing that Uganda could be assigned to Britain during the negotiations, but it would have to be done in such a manner that the new German Government would not lose face. Salisbury now had to

discern what the Wilhelmstrasse considered "too much loss of face."

From the beginning of the conversations in early May, 1890, the only matter that assumed significance was the East African question. It was the task of Krauel and Anderson, the respective German and British representatives, to define the nature of the problem and then decide whether it could be settled through negotiation or whether arbitration would be necessary.<sup>23</sup> Anderson, for his part, had no preconceived ideas about the ease of the project he was to undertake. He recognized the Germans would be no "pushover." As he wrote Whitehall regarding his antagonist, Krauel, after their first meeting on May 3: "He knows his subjects very much better than he did when I last saw him, and a cat-like smile, which he used to have, has degenerated into a wolfish grin. I shall have uphill work."<sup>24</sup> The initial conversations immediately revealed a divergence of opinion between Britain and Germany as to what were and were not the legitimate boundaries separating the respective spheres of influence.

The first east African problem that Krauel and Anderson attempted to resolve was control of the territory west of Lake Victoria. The Treaty of November, 1886, had provided that the northern boundary of the German sphere should extend northwest from the mouth of the Wanga River to a point where the first degree of south latitude intersected the western shore of Lake Victoria. The more informal agreement of July 2, 1887, implied

only that Germany should have a free hand to the south of Lake Victoria and to the east of Lake Tanganyika. Nothing had been specifically said regarding the assignment of the region directly behind Lake Victoria to either Britain or Germany.

The value of this territory was predicated on its strategic position. When Mackinnon first became aware that Germany was interested in expansion west of Victoria, he was quite distressed:

This would altogether exclude us from the territory we think essential to the future development of British territorial influence in Central Africa, as it would absolutely prevent us from getting access to Lake Tanganyika and there joining with the new South Africa Company which is now being formed in London [Rhode's Company] and for which a royal charter on the same lines as ours will be obtained. I cannot urge too strongly the importance to British commerce and to our Company of the line drawn from the south end of Victoria Nyanza-Msalala [or Mwanza] or other point--to another point on Lake Tanganyika about 30 miles from the north of the lake.<sup>25</sup>

If the Germans controlled the area between Lake Victoria and the Belgian Congo, the Cape-to-Cairo route was ostensibly extinguished. Mackinnon would do his utmost to pressure the British Government into securing the region for his company.

The Germans were interested in the hinterland behind the lake primarily for commercial reasons, for possession would provide land access to the Belgian Congo, thereby connecting the rich inland trade with the coastal area and Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>26</sup> The German East Africa Company considered the region necessary

if commercial success were to be attained.<sup>27</sup> The German Government was therefore under some pressure to secure access to the Congo. Would the failure of Britain to recognize this German wish serve as a "loss of face" for the new German Government?

The only actual line that had been drawn was the boundary east of Lake Victoria, that is to the point of one degree south latitude on Lake Victoria. The Germans had tried to establish legitimacy based on the principle that the unoccupied hinterland belonged to whoever controlled the coastal area. The borders of the coastal protectorates, in other words, would simply be extended due west from the last established point of recognition. The German view of an equitable settlement behind Lake Victoria, therefore, would be an extension due west of the one-degree south latitude boundary to the Congo.

The British had already once refused to accept the German hinterland doctrine when they refused to adhere to the German-Portuguese Treaty of December, 1886.<sup>28</sup> Adherence to such a principle would have denied Rhodes access to the southern end of the Lakes region, particularly Nyasaland. In 1890 the British had even less reason to support the Hinterland Doctrine since if it were applied uniformly, the German Tana-Juba protectorate would cut across the region of the Upper Nile. The value of controlling Uganda would then be lost for Britain.

Despite the fact that Britain had not recognized legal claims to the area west of Lake Victoria, Anderson was




instructed by Salisbury to demand the whole region, leaving the Germans only the area south of Lake Victoria and east of Lake Tanganyika. Anderson himself would have been happy to settle for division at the one-degree line, for he was reasonably certain the Germans could be persuaded to grant Britain an access to Lake Tanganyika, thus maintaining the Cape-to-Cairo corridor. As far as Anderson was concerned, securing Uganda and the Upper Nile was of foremost importance. But Salisbury, after hasty examination of the treaties Stanley had negotiated west of Lake Victoria, was convinced that Britain could legally press claims here.<sup>29</sup> Anderson too had seen Stanley's treaties but was not convinced that they legalized Britain's demands behind Lake Victoria. Salisbury's behavior can probably be explained by the pressures exerted by Mackinnon and Stanley.

In a speech at Albert Hall on May 5, Stanley had publicly revealed the existence of his treaties and strongly implied that they gave Britain rights to the areas in question. A few days later the Pall Mall Gazette commented that the Foreign Office was informed of the treaties and it

...will hardly venture to render futile the efforts of Mr. Stanley and of the British Company by raising any difficulties as to their ratification. British subservience to Germany in East Africa, has, it is hoped, reached its limits.<sup>30</sup>

In response to the British claims, Anderson told Malet that Krauel was "both startled and alarmed." Deadlock ensued. On May 9 Anderson was forced to report that Berlin would yield

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.—MAY 24, 1890.



“NOT SUCH A FOOL AS HE LOOKS!”

H. M. STANLEY. “NOW THEN, STOOPID! KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN!”

(Punch, May 24, 1890, p. 246)

nothing south of the first-degree south latitude line. Under these circumstances Anderson was told to drop efforts at negotiating the issue and try to establish procedures for arbitration of the question.<sup>31</sup> Salisbury and Caprivi, however, were both probably reluctant to have the issue brought to arbitration because of the public ill will that had been aroused by the last British-German arbitration award.<sup>32</sup>

Another issue proving to be as tangled as the Victoria hinterland was the precise jurisdiction of Germany between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. The Germans could have taken the position that their border with Portuguese Mozambique should simply have extended due west; this was essentially the view they had taken in the region west of Lake Victoria. The Treaty of November, 1886, did not extend far enough to the west to deal with the Nyasa-Tanganyika boundary and the Agreement of 1887 only vaguely implied that the Germans should have the area east of Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa.<sup>33</sup> Although this was not sufficiently specific, it did seem to imply that Germany's borders should extend from the north end of Lake Nyasa to the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. The Wilhelmstrasse adhered to this view. Salisbury even supported this position in August, 1889.<sup>34</sup> Certainly the British could make no proper legal claim to the region as a result of the treaty with Germany. But Salisbury was increasingly subjected to "pressures advocating British possession of all the area between

the two lakes. Not only were Rhodes and Mackinnon demanding greater penetration north for the South Africa Company, but the Scottish Church also held a vested interest in the territory. Some years earlier Mr. James Stevenson spent £150,000 from his own pocket to build a road between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa to interconnect the more isolated missions in the region. The Scottish Church demanded that the British Government maintain control of the territory, for the missionaries had no desire to have their communications route fall under German control. The British Prime Minister feared the political consequences of opposing the Scottish Church.<sup>35</sup>

Salisbury was obviously succumbing to pressure because in May, 1890, he instructed Anderson to demand all the territory between the two lakes for Britain.<sup>36</sup> These extreme British demands would have deprived the Germans of the easiest communication route between the two lakes and a large segment of territory north of Lake Nyasa and east of Lake Tanganyika. They were also very fearful that the British, should they get a foothold on the east bank of Lake Tanganyika, would then eventually use this as a lever to link up with the hinterland west of Victoria, thus surrounding German East Africa.<sup>37</sup>

The third east African problem concerned the hinterland of the German Tana-Juba protectorate. The issue here was a very serious matter for the British. Although the Germans had apparently acknowledged British suzerainty over Uganda, the

purpose in acquiring this region would be defeated if the Germans expanded the northern segment of their hinterland of the Tana-Juba protectorate.<sup>38</sup> By no one's definition did Uganda stretch far enough north to encompass all the Tana-Juba hinterland.<sup>39</sup> If the Germans chose to expand west they could most certainly intersect the Nile, thereby frustrating the logic of British occupation of Uganda. On Salisbury's instruction, Anderson told Hatzfeldt that German possession of Witu (Tana-Juba protectorate) was the chief stumbling block to a negotiated settlement, for it acted as a great source of mistrust between the two countries. The hinterland of this protectorate had strategic importance for Britain, given the commonly accepted belief concerning the source of the Nile and its relation to Egypt. Mackinnon was relentless in applying whatever pressure he could muster to keep the Nile and its source free from the Germans. Anderson frequently complained of the excessive influence of the British colonial companies, which so often placed Whitehall in awkward positions.<sup>40</sup> Salisbury told Lord Goschen, his Chancellor of the Exchequer:

The great difficulty here [in East Africa] is the character of Mackinnon.... He has none of the qualities for pushing an enterprise which depends on decision and smartness. He has got the finest harbor on the coast [Mombassa?]-has had it for five years--yet there is not a jetty there. His hopes of trade depend on his enabling the caravans to get over a waterless belt of fifty miles which separate him from the profitable country. Yet, though he has had a

mass of railway material there for a very long time, he has not yet laid a yard of it. He has no energy for anything except quarreling with Germans.<sup>41</sup>

The Germans for their part were not inclined to give away cheaply what was recognized as a valuable pawn in negotiating with the British. Though Hatzfeldt himself was undoubtedly aware of the problems and status of the Witu Company, he told Anderson that Germany looked on the territory "...as a great possession full of future promise, which could scarcely be either relinquished or diminished."<sup>42</sup>

The fourth subject of dispute between Britain and Germany in east Africa was Zanzibar. As has been shown earlier, the island kingdom had been a frequent source of Anglo-German disagreement. More than once during Bismarck's time, Salisbury had been suspicious that the old Chancellor wanted to end the Sultan's authority over the island of Zanzibar. Britain, however, held a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo and the continued rule of the Sultan. Although the atmosphere on Zanzibar was quiet at this time, according to Euan Smith in February, 1890, the British position was being gradually undermined. German economic influence was becoming an increasingly significant fact on the island. The Germans paid the highest wages on the island and this was just one indication of the huge amount of German capital that was being infused into Zanzibar. There were six times as many Germans in Zanzibar as any other group of Europeans. Smith maintained

that the German increase in influence was at the expense of the Sultan and Britain. He even hinted that the Germans might be debating the feasibility of asserting their own authority over the island through a coup d'état. Although Salisbury might feel this latter idea was "childish," he could not miss the obvious implication that the cost for continued British hegemony was likely to increase as time passed.<sup>43</sup> There was no mistaking that German economic influence had increased and that some effort would doubtless be made to acquire matching political influence.

Salisbury had hoped that African matters could be dealt with in a rather dilatory manner without endangering Anglo-German relations. He originally felt that the passage of time favored Britain in most instances because of her greater colonial commitment and her superior capacity to undertake colonial ventures. Certainly no individual power could hope to compete with Britain's maritime position over an extended period of time. But by the second week in May, 1890, the atmosphere in Britain and Germany had been aroused by the exploits and propaganda of Peters, Emin, and Stanley. This excitement was such that neither government could ignore it without risking serious domestic embarrassment.<sup>44</sup>

Already, however, in Germany the press was coining phrases like "the encirclement of German colonies." The influential Kölnische Zeitung wrote that it was high time the

government took whatever action was necessary "...to prevent the full isolation [or restriction] of the German protectorates."<sup>45</sup>

Regardless of what may have seemed to be the attitude of the Caprivi Government toward expansion in east Africa, the inescapable fact was that it was primarily interested in good relations with Britain. If that relation was endangered by colonial expansion, then Germany would consider eliminating colonial expansion. Germany was in no position to compete with Britain on the African Continent for her security in Europe would be endangered by such competition. Caprivi's speech on May 12 before the Reichstag did not represent a conversion to colonialism, as some of his critics have maintained; he was merely asking for money to prop up the African territories he had inherited. Investors would never put substantial amounts of money into German African companies with conditions in East Africa so unstable. Caprivi hoped to provide stability for East Africa with Reichstag funds so that the private companies would be able to take over the burden from the government completely. Caprivi was not interested in expanding but only in making what Germany already possessed pay its own way, thereby decreasing the losses of the government in the long run.<sup>46</sup> As he told his friend, Major Keim, "...the less Africa the better for us."<sup>47</sup>

In May, 1890, there were two factors in addition to



those already mentioned that were reinforcing Caprivi's view that colonial problems could not be allowed to complicate Anglo-German relations. In April and May the question of British evacuation from Egypt was revived.<sup>48</sup> In order to help ease the financial problem for Egypt, Britain sought acceptance to convert interest on the Egyptian debt from five to four per cent. When the French refused to support the plan, the responsibility for its failure was placed on the Quai d'Orsay. This was relatively easy to do for, unlike earlier attempts at the same scheme, Britain now had general European support. Salisbury was not entirely unhappy with the French action because many British members of Parliament who held Egyptian stock would have taken a dim view of the procedure. The French action could also be used by the British to erode whatever influence France retained with the Sultan of Turkey and the Khedive of Egypt. By early April the French recognized their error and were willing to reopen negotiations. A commission of Anglo-Egyptian representatives was to meet in Paris with the French and consider the question. Baron Marschall, the German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was concerned that this might be the beginning of a British turn toward France.<sup>49</sup> Although Salisbury gave Hatzfeldt assurances that Britain was not contemplating a general rapprochement with France, the Wilhelmstrasse could not help being anxious so long as negotiations were in progress.<sup>50</sup> It was well known that French Foreign Minister Ribot was an

Anglophile. Salisbury was not willing to eradicate all possibilities of friendly relations with France or he would probably have been more receptive to Bismarck's alliance offer. A Franco-British rapprochement, however, would have disastrous effects on the Triple Alliance. France already was engaged in a strenuous effort to force Italy out of the Triple Alliance, but as long as Italy believed Britain to be favorable toward this alliance, such an occurrence was unlikely. If Britain appeared to be leaning toward France, the alliance would be threatened. Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister, was disgusted with the Triple Alliance anyway for being of so little aid in the struggle with France.<sup>51</sup>

An even more ominous threat to German security in May, 1890, was the apparent revival of a vigorous Russian effort to extend her influence in the Balkans. There was a definite feeling that Russia was preparing to move into Bulgaria and perhaps to take Constantinople and the Straits. In early May Salisbury considered the circumstances so serious that the British Mediterranean fleet had been doubled and was placed within forty-eight hours sailing time of the Straits.<sup>52</sup> On May 14 Hatzfeldt reported that he had received information through reliable sources that the Tsar's Government had placed an order through Russian firms for 40,000 cavalry saddles--a number far beyond peacetime necessities.<sup>53</sup> Although one might view this Straits crisis primarily as an Anglo-Russian problem, one must remember that Germany's allies were bound to the maintenance of the status quo

in the Mediterranean. Certainly, if Russia decided to take Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary would be forced to take retaliatory action, and Germany might easily become involved in such a conflict, should one occur. Such a situation would be made to order for French exploitation. Even more now than before, peace was Germany's best ally, but the fact remained that domestic necessities placed limits on the degree Germany could concede controversial issues to Britain. Caprivi could and was willing to give up much for British friendship, but not so much as to take his government's popularity beyond the point of diminishing returns.

C. The Anglo-German Colonial Settlement of July 1, 1890

The pressures of the renewed Straits crisis were probably the reason for Salisbury's introduction of a new ingredient into the Anglo-German colonial negotiations. In hopes of breaking the deadlock, the Prime Minister presented Hatzfeldt with a comprehensive six-point solution on May 13.

1. A partition of the territory northwest of Lake Nyasa, that is a compromise between the German demand for a straight line between the northwest corner of Lake Nyasa and the southeast corner of Lake Tanganyika (which would give Germany control of a good part of the Stevenson road) and the vague demands of the South Africa Company to territory north of Lake Nyasa and east of Lake Tanganyika, would be made.

2. The area west of Lake Victoria would be partitioned by a boundary drawn from the north end of Lake Tanganyika to the northeast corner of the disputed area, that is to the one-degree south latitude line on Lake Victoria's west bank.

3. Germany would cede her Tana-Juba protectorate and her accompanying claims to the islands of Manda and Patta to Britain.

4. Britain would be allowed to assume a protectorate over Zanzibar.

5. Germany would receive the island of Helgoland from Britain.

6. Germany would receive permanent possession of the coastal areas she was presently leasing from the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>54</sup>

Salisbury's proposal indicated that the pressures of the Scottish Church and the colonial lobby in Britain were forces that he could not ignore. His proposal for boundaries between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika would naturally include the Stevenson road for Britain. His solution also revealed the extent of Mackinnon's and Rhodes' opposition to accepting the proposition that Germany should be allowed to bisect a Cape-to-Cairo route. Salisbury even insisted that Hatzfeldt should keep these two segments of the plan secret until he had gained acceptance from the British companies. The Prime Minister's suggestion that Germany should part with her Tana-Juba protectorate shows that

he was concerned that Germany might eventually exert claims to the hinterland of that region and thereby cut the Nile north of Uganda.<sup>55</sup>

From this point on the talks, which had begun in Berlin between Krauel and Anderson, were now supplemented by a more important dialogue in London between Hatzfeldt and Salisbury. State Secretary Marschall did not grasp Salisbury's proposal at once. With the exception of Helgoland, Germany was conceding to British wishes in all matters. The proposition that Germany would receive permanent ownership of the area leased from the Sultan was actually no significant concession at all, for no one really expected that the land would ever be returned to the Sultan anyway. Germany was also being asked to forego land access to the Congo, which would emasculate the economic potential of the East Africa protectorate and also leave German territories almost completely surrounded by the British. Since Germany was being asked to relinquish the Tana-Juba protectorate as well as Manda and Patta, Britain should at least be willing to agree to the one-degree south latitude boundary west of Victoria.<sup>56</sup> Marschall knew that an agreement with Britain which relinquished too much could do more to endanger Anglo-German relations than no settlement at all.

The State Secretary obviously hoped that a nonchalant attitude toward the proposals would cut Salisbury's price just enough to make the settlement feasible. The British Prime

Minister, however, called Marschall's bluff. He had good reason for doing this because Marschall and Hatzfeldt had gotten their signals crossed. In a conversation with Salisbury the day before, Hatzfeldt had revealed his (anxieties at the delays in the negotiations.<sup>57</sup> On May 22 after telling Hatzfeldt that Britain might be willing to concede to Germany a small area of land access to the Congo north of Lake Tanganyika and that in the south the German border would extend to the southeast bank of Lake Tanganyika, Salisbury then complained that the colonial agitation being caused by Stanley's public statements would make temporary postponement of further negotiations desirable.<sup>58</sup>

If indeed Salisbury's behavior was designed to encourage a prompt settlement, he was highly successful. He knew that the Germans favored a general settlement rather than the slow process of arbitrating each African problem individually. The major concession he offered the Germans was well selected, for each time that the Helgoland issue had been raised previously, the Germans had been interested. The island in the North Sea would be even more important now with the Kiel Canal under construction. By adding the possibility of land access for Germany to the Congo, Salisbury was offering the minimum demands which the Germans felt they could accept.

Marschall's response was immediate. He told Hatzfeldt:

Postponement of the negotiation would be most undesirable because of the [negative] impression on public opinion and of the risk of

further differences that might arise owing to expeditions into the interior of East Africa.<sup>59</sup>

Marschall was obviously conscious that time and resources were on Britain's side in any Anglo-German contest over possession on the African Continent. Besides, it was not the Caprivi Government's intention to accumulate a large colonial empire. The Germans had long been interested in the acquisition of Helgoland; too much delay in coming to terms with Britain might cost Germany another opportunity. Marschall also realized that he had but a short time to conclude a treaty which would cede any large segments of African territory because Karl Peters was scheduled to return to Germany sometime in June. Peters' return with the treaties he had concluded in Uganda would undoubtedly stir German colonial sentiment just as Stanley's return had done in Britain.

At the same time he was intimidating the Germans by suggesting that the colonial talks be discontinued, Salisbury was laying the groundwork that would eventually assure settlement. By May 21 the Prime Minister had become convinced that Stanley's treaties in the territory west of Lake Victoria extended no farther south than the one-degree south latitude line the Germans demanded. If the Germans would promise to permit free trade between Lake Tanganyika and the British sphere to the north, Salisbury informed Hatzfeldt that Britain would accept the one-degree south latitude line.<sup>60</sup>

The Prime Minister's generosity should not be too highly

extolled for it had actually resulted from a special arrangement devised by Leopold of Belgium and Mackinnon. On May 20 Salisbury was shown the draft of an agreement whereby Leopold would lease Mackinnon a corridor of territory between Lake Albert Edward and Lake Tanganyika. The Prime Minister could now give the Germans the one-degree south latitude boundary.<sup>61</sup>

This concession to which Salisbury now appeared agreeable should have settled matters because shortly afterwards Marschall instructed Hatzfeldt that Berlin would allow all that the British asked if Germany received Helgoland, title to the coastal area of East Africa, and either a settlement favorable to Germany between Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika or the one-degree south latitude boundary west of Lake Victoria.<sup>62</sup>

On May 29, 1890 the Kaiser added his views. Marschall wrote Hatzfeldt that:

His Majesty shares the Chancellor's opinion that without Helgoland the Kiel Canal is without value to our Navy. Therefore, we consider the acquisition of Helgoland a valuable gain despite the [African] concessions mentioned in my [earlier] telegram....

You may point out to Lord Salisbury that you are convinced that so good an opportunity will scarcely occur twice settling two questions that have been so threatening to Anglo-German relations--East Africa and Helgoland--in a way which will give so little cause of complaint to the Jingos either in England or in Germany.... No German Government can avoid forever public discussion of the question of why England attaches such disproportionate value to the possession of this island, which has no importance in peace time, but which makes defense of the German coast difficult, facilitating hostile observation and attack.<sup>63</sup>



Now that the negotiations appeared to be going someplace, Count Hatzfeldt, being the good diplomat that he was, warned against pushing the Helgoland issue too hard. The Ambassador maintained that in reality Salisbury did not believe the island was worth much to Germany and therefore the wisest course would be not to enlighten him further unless it were absolutely necessary. Otherwise Germany might be forced into making all the concessions in Africa. Hatzfeldt added that Salisbury wished to discuss matters with his Cabinet before going on with the negotiations.<sup>64</sup>

To this point the following factors had been provisionally agreed to by Salisbury and Hatzfeldt regarding east Africa: Britain would receive a protectorate over Zanzibar, Uganda, Witu, the Somali coast, and the islands of Manda and Patta; Germany also forfeited any claims she had to the hinterland behind these regions; in return Germany was to receive Helgoland, title to the coastal region of East Africa and land access to the Belgian Congo as far north as one-degree south latitude. No firm decision had as yet been made on the southern border of the German sphere.

Salisbury's consultation with the Cabinet and other interested parties on the projected colonial treaty almost derailed the whole process of negotiations. Shortly after the Prime Minister had approved the Mackinnon-Leopold Treaty, Percy Anderson returned to London and learned what had transpired.

He was alarmed that the Prime Minister had assented to the arrangement, for on April 23, 1884, the Congo Free State had promised not to cede territory to any other power without French permission. If she did have to sell part of her territory, France would be granted first preference.<sup>65</sup> Both Salisbury and Leopold had apparently forgotten the agreement.

Mackinnon was warned on May 31 that his treaty was now unacceptable and new arrangements would have to be worked out with Leopold. Mackinnon refused any alteration, and Leopold was not apprehensive about French reprisals. Salisbury now brought to the Cabinet what he considered the two unresolved issues, that is, the division of the region west of Lake Victoria and the area between the two lakes in the south. The Prime Minister was willing to fight because he felt that Mackinnon "... has got all he really has a right to, which is Uganda."<sup>66</sup> Mackinnon, of course, did not agree and on June 2 put forward a new interpretation of the Hinterland Agreement of July, 1887, which maintained that the arrangement implied access from Uganda to Lake Tanganyika for Britain. Mackinnon asserted that the shareholders of his company had subscribed on this assumption and that the directors would be acting ultra vires if they now accepted new conditions.<sup>67</sup> Salisbury viewed Mackinnon's claim as simply fallacious. He told the Cabinet that the Germans would not allow themselves to be shut off from the Congo and surrounded by the British. The only alternative, if Sir William

Mackinnon's objectives were upheld, was that no arrangement at all would be arrived at, "...to throw up these negotiations now, and come to no result, is a step into the unknown."<sup>68</sup>

Despite Salisbury's appeal, the sentiment in favor of the Cape-to-Cairo route was too strong. Not only did the Cabinet favor "retention" of the territory behind Lake Victoria but it also insisted that the Stevenson road be prevented from falling into foreign hands. Salisbury, shocked by the opposition he encountered, did not even mention the necessity of ceding Helgoland in return for Witu, Uganda, and Zanzibar. The Cabinet seemed willing to grant Germany permanent possession only of the coastal strip on the East African coast. Even later, while sounding the Cabinet members individually and informally, little enthusiasm was evidenced for the cession of Helgoland to Germany.<sup>69</sup>

Salisbury was now faced with three alternatives. He could attempt to persuade the Germans to concede both the territory west of Lake Victoria and the Stevenson road in the south. If this could be accomplished, it was more likely that the Cabinet and Parliament could be induced to part with Helgoland. A second alternative was to force his will on the Cabinet, thereby risking a ministerial crisis. A third possibility was that the Mackinnon-Leopold Treaty could be approved, making possible the concession of the one-degree south latitude line to the Germans, yet still not destroying completely the Cape-to-Cairo dream.

Salisbury's first effort was an attempt to induce the Germans to grant all the necessary concessions. His method was again to emphasize to the Germans the difficulty of his position with the Cabinet and British expansionists generally. He suggested that perhaps agreement should be more limited. There was the implicit hint that perhaps negotiations should be postponed. The Prime Minister went so far as to employ Victoria's influence with William to assure British possession of the Stevenson road. He wrote her:

If Your Majesty thought good to do so, it would be very useful to point out to the Emperor that a great deal of sentiment gathered in Scotland round the Stevenson road from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika, and that any attempt to sacrifice it to Germany might produce serious feeling that would certainly help Mr. Gladstone very much.<sup>70</sup>

The German response this time, however, was negative; the British could have the Stevenson road but not the territory west of Lake Victoria. The Wilhelmstrasse was firmly convinced that if its minimal demands were not met, a colonial deal would not be worthwhile. Strong domestic opposition was anticipated even if the minimum demands were achieved. To Salisbury's suggestion of a partial settlement, the Kaiser wrote in the margin: "Nein! Zusammen oder Nichts!"<sup>71</sup>

The second alternative was probably the least appealing to Salisbury. The Home Rule question, discontented workers, and Conservative reliance on the Liberal Unionists were all problems and issues that necessitated as much government stability

as possible. Salisbury wrote in mid-June, as some of his tribulations had reached the boiling point:

My week has been a singularly hard one.... We have two very important foreign negotiations in hand [African negotiations with Germany and Behring Sea seal-fisheries issues with United States]--a revolt of the party at home,--a threatened mutiny in the police,--three colleagues talking of resigning [Mathews, Home Secretary; Ritchie, President of the Local Government Board; Goschen, Chancellor of the Exchequer],--in short, a pack of troubles....<sup>72</sup>

Salisbury's inclination was obviously to smooth over cracks, not open new ones.

The third alternative was the Mackinnon treaty. If Mackinnon could be persuaded to accept the provision that the land he was receiving was not a cession of territory on Leopold's part or would it ever be ceded outright to the British company, then technically the French would have no legal basis for complaint. On June 3 Salisbury and Mackinnon met. Mackinnon was sufficiently grateful to have the Prime Minister's assent to the treaty that not only was agreement on the text of the treaty satisfactorily concluded, but a few days later, on June 7, Mackinnon was also persuaded to withdraw his company's objections to the proposed colonial settlement with Germany.<sup>73</sup>

There was another danger that Salisbury faced in agreeing to the Mackinnon treaty, that was the view the Germans might take of the arrangement. Throughout the Anglo-German colonial negotiations, the Wilhelmstrasse repeatedly expressed an objection to having German East Africa surrounded by the British.

If the Mackinnon treaty was fulfilled, the British would not only increase their African possessions, but the original German objection would remain unaltered; East Africa would still be surrounded by the British. Salisbury's solution was simple. After leading Mackinnon and Leopold to believe that the treaty would actually be ratified, he changed his mind (although perhaps he had never really determined to allow ratification). Once the agreement with the Germans had been concluded and enthusiasm for Mackinnon and his prospects was subordinated to more important domestic issues by the Cabinet, obstacles and objections to the Mackinnon treaty began to reappear. For several months it appeared that the treaty might be approved, but in the end Mackinnon lost out.<sup>74</sup>

Salisbury's temporary pacification of Mackinnon proved to successfully bring his Cabinet into line. On June 8 the general principles agreed to between Hatzfeldt and the Prime Minister were approved.<sup>75</sup> That left only the Queen, who had not been completely informed on the projected treaty, particularly on the necessity of having to part with one of her possessions.

Understood from Lord Cross [Secretary for India] that nothing was to be done in a hurry about Heligoland, and now hear it is to be decided to-morrow. It is a very serious question which I do not like.

1st The people [of Heligoland] have been always very loyal, having received my heir with enthusiasm; and it is a shame to hand them over to an unscrupulous despotic Government like the German without first consulting them.

2nd It is a very bad precedent. The next thing will be to propose to give up Gibraltar; and soon nothing will be secure, and all our Colonies will wish to be free.

I very much deprecate it and [am] anxious not [to] give my consent unless I hear that the people's feelings are consulted and their rights are respected. I think it a very dangerous proceeding.<sup>76</sup>

Salisbury was not unaware that some of the Queen's arguments would have to be taken into consideration. The matter of applying German conscription to the inhabitants of the island had been brought up previously with the Germans.<sup>77</sup>

Salisbury had also apparently broached the matter of the constitutional rights of the islanders with Hatzfeldt, for he was able to assure the Queen that the rights had been dutifully taken into consideration.

No actual subject of your Majesty living now will be subject to naval military conscription. The existing customs tariff will be maintained for a period of years, and every person wishing to retain his British nationality will have the right to do so. The Cabinet thought it was impractical to obtain the formal consent of the 2,000 people who live there; anything like a plebiscite would be very dangerous as admitting the right of the inhabitants of an imperial post to decide for themselves as to the political disposal of that post. It might be used by discontented persons in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and even India.<sup>78</sup>

Salisbury, after arguing that their rights had been properly considered, pointed out that in reality the islanders had a closer racial affinity to the Germans than to the British. He also carefully emphasized the huge territorial gains Britain

would be receiving in return for the island, the advantages of a closer Anglo-German relation, and the fact that the Cabinet was unanimous in advising adoption of the proposed treaty.<sup>79</sup>

The Prime Minister was apparently convinced that he had persuaded the Queen to accept his point of view for he told Hatzfeldt that matters were now in order with only a few minor reservations.<sup>80</sup> Salisbury was correct; the following day the Queen accepted his arguments.<sup>81</sup>

In the next two weeks the exact details of the treaty were concluded by Krauel and Anderson in Berlin. On July 1, 1890, the treaty was signed. There was almost no alteration in what had previously been agreed to. West of Lake Victoria the boundary was drawn in such a way as to place Mount Mfumbiro in the British sphere, but otherwise the one-degree south latitude line was adhered to. Boundaries were established for German territories in Southwest Africa and Togoland. The treaty was comprehensive enough that both signatories derived two large advantages: all of the significant and outstanding African disputes between Britain and Germany were temporarily settled in an amicable manner and the treaty was so broad that both powers could claim considerable gain. It would seem that the groundwork had been laid for a new and more meaningful Anglo-German relation.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>J. Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, the Caprivi Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 4-6.

<sup>2</sup>Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, 2 vols. (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1927), II, p. 339.

<sup>3</sup>J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27), VII, Herbert Bismarck to William II, Berlin, March 20, 1890, no. 1366, p. 3. Henceforth referred to as GP.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., VIII, draft of memo by Shuvalov given to Schweinitz, St. Petersburg, May 14, 1890, no. 1373, pp. 20-21; here is strong evidence that the Kaiser himself really had no Russian policy that could have driven him apart from Bismarck.

<sup>5</sup>Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), I, p. 311; Berchem was Undersecretary of State and Raschdau was a Vortragender Rat.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., I, p. 312.

<sup>7</sup>Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, p. 404.

<sup>8</sup>Nichols, Caprivi, p. 56.

<sup>9</sup>GP, VII, Schweinitz to Caprivi, St. Petersburg, Apr. 3, 1890, no. 1370, pp. 11-15.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., VIII, Schweinitz to Caprivi, St. Petersburg, May 5, 1890, no. 1372, pp. 17-19; Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, p. 412.

<sup>11</sup>GP, VII, Holstein memo, Berlin, May 20, 1890, no. 1374, pp. 22-23; Marschall memo, Berlin, May 20, 1890, no. 1375, pp. 23-24; Kiderlen memo, Berlin, May 20, 1890, no. 1376, pp. 24-27; Raschdau memo, Berlin, May 20, 1890, no. 1377, pp. 27-29; Caprivi memo, Berlin, May 23, 1890, no. 1378, pp. 29-30; Caprivi memo, Berlin, May 22, 1890, no. 1379, pp. 30-33.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., VII, Caprivi to Schweinitz, Berlin, May 29, 1890, no. 1380, pp. 33-36; Sergei Goriainov, "The End of Alliance of the Three Emperors," American Historical Review, vol. 23 (Apr., 1918), p. 344.

<sup>13</sup>Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, pp. 405-06, 413.

<sup>14</sup>Nichols, Caprivi, pp. 30-31, 39-40; E. M. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914 (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938), pp. 288-89; Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire 1884-1918 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 160-61.

<sup>15</sup>Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 vols. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921-32), IV, p. 364.

<sup>16</sup>Robert O. Collins, "Origins of the Nile Struggle," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 133; Townsend, Rise and Fall, p. 115; G. N. Sanderson, "The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 and the Upper Nile," English Historical Review, vol. 78 (Jan., 1963), p. 53; J. C. G. Rohl, "The Disintegration of the Kartell and the Politics of Bismarck's Fall from Power, 1887-1890," Historical Journal, vol. 9 (no. 1, 1966), p. 57.

<sup>17</sup>George Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria, ser. 3, 4 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1930-32), IV, Apr. 21, 1888, pp. 397-99; Oct. 15, 1888, pp. 440-41; Feb. 24, 1890, pp. 573-74.

<sup>18</sup>The Times (London), May 1, 1890, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup>Fritz E. Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar-Ostafrika (Berlin: Rütten & Loering, 1959), pp. 476-78.

<sup>20</sup>Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstag, 460 vols. (Berlin: Norddeutschen Buckdrückerei, 1867-1939), VIII Legislature period, -I Session, vol. I, 4th sitting, pp. 31-33, 39-42. Henceforth referred to as RD.

<sup>21</sup>The Times (London), May 13, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>D. S. Gillard, "Salisbury's African Policy and the Helgoland Offer of 1890," English Historical Review, vol. 75 (Oct., 1960), pp. 647-48.

<sup>23</sup>The other questions being considered were: the legality of the Sultan of Witu's customs duties; the precise coastal boundary at Wanga; the Anglo-German boundary at Walfish Bay; German complaints about the activities of the Royal Niger Company; and the claim of the German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition Committee for compensation for the British seizure of the Neera. Sanderson, "The Anglo-German Agreement," p. 57.

<sup>24</sup>British Foreign Office, folder 403/142, Anderson to Currie, Berlin, May 3, 1890, no. 4. Henceforth referred to as BFO.

<sup>25</sup>William R. Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 12.

<sup>26</sup>Since the region was tropical rain forest, access to Lake Tanganyika for water transportation was not easy at all points.

<sup>27</sup>Sanderson, "Anglo-German Agreement," p. 58.

<sup>28</sup>See Chapter III, p. 94.

<sup>29</sup>BFO, 403/142, Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, May 8, 1888, no. 10; Salisbury to Malet, London, May 9, 1888, no. 12; Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, pp. 17-20.

<sup>30</sup>Sanderson, "Anglo-German Agreement," p. 58.

<sup>31</sup>BFO, 403/142, Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, May 8, 1890, no. 10; Salisbury to Malet, May 9, 1890, London, no. 12; Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, May 10, 1890, no. 13.

<sup>32</sup>Island of Lamu, see Chapter III, pp. 42-43.

<sup>33</sup>Edward Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), III, no. 267, p. 888.

<sup>34</sup>Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," p. 636.

<sup>35</sup>Buckle, Letters, ser. 3, I, June 1, 1890, p. 609.

<sup>36</sup>BFO, 403/142, Salisbury to Malet, London, May 9, 1890, no. 13; Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, May 10, 1890, no. 13.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 403/142, Anderson to Malet, Berlin, May 9, 1890, no. 4 (enclosure 4).

<sup>38</sup>See Chapter IV, p. 165.

<sup>39</sup>G. N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882-1899 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), p. 55.

<sup>40</sup>GP, VIII, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, Apr. 30, 1890, no. 1675, pp. 8-11.

<sup>41</sup>Cecil, Salisbury, IV, p. 281.

<sup>42</sup>GP, VIII, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, Apr. 30, 1890, no. 1675, pp. 8-11; Gillard surmises that both the Tana-Juba protectorate and the German claims to Manda and Patta were

simply actions taken by Bismarck to strengthen his bargaining position with the British and that Hatzfeldt was aware of this; Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," pp. 642-43; D. R. Gillard, "Salisbury's Helgoland Offer: Case Against the Witu Thesis," English Historical Review, vol. 80 (July, 1965), pp. 17-18.

<sup>43</sup>Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," pp. 651-52.

<sup>44</sup>Müller, Deutschland-Zanzibar, pp. 492-93.

<sup>45</sup>Kölnische Zeitung, Feb. 18, 1890, morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>Gillard, "Witu," p. 541.

<sup>47</sup>Nichols, Caprivi, p. 102.

<sup>48</sup>Documents Diplomatiques Français, ser. 1, 10 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie National, 1929-38), VIII, Montebello to Ribot, Péra, Apr. 1, 1890, no. 19, pp. 22-23; Ribot to Montebello, Paris, Apr. 1, 1890, no. 20, pp. 23-24; Montebello to Ribot, Péra, Apr. 6, 1890, no. 27, pp. 33-34; Montebello to Ribot, Péra, Apr. 25, 1890, no. 45, p. 62; Montebello to Ribot, Péra, May 1, 1890, no. 51, p. 72. Henceforth referred to as DDF.

<sup>49</sup>GP, VIII, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, Apr. 5, 1890, no. 1777, pp. 148-49.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., VIII, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, Apr. 29, 1890, no. 1779, pp. 151-52.

<sup>51</sup>Gillard, "Witu," p. 539.

<sup>52</sup>GP, IX, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, May 8, 1890, no. 2086, pp. 26-28.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., IX, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, May 8, 1890, no. 2089, p. 34.

<sup>54</sup>German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of California Microfilms, (UCI), reel 206, Hatzfeldt to Marschall, London, May 14, 1890, frames 616-620. Henceforth referred to as UCI. Salisbury's proposal represents the epitome of great power arrogance. For years Britain had recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, but now Salisbury was willing to end it all with the stroke of a pen.

<sup>55</sup>This contradicts the view of Professor Gillard that Salisbury was unconcerned about the future of the Tana-Juba protectorate. On the other hand, the fact that Britain would demand a protectorate over Zanzibar shows that Salisbury was also worried about the expansion of German influence on the

island. Sanderson does not feel that Salisbury was particularly worried over the fate of Zanzibar. Gillard, "Salisbury and Helgoland," pp. 631-53; "Witu," pp. 538-52; Sanderson, "The Anglo-German Agreement," pp. 49-72.

<sup>56</sup>GP, VIII, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, May 17, 1890, no. 1677, pp. 14-15.

<sup>57</sup>BFO, 403/142, Salisbury to Malet, London, May 21, 1890, no. 31.

<sup>58</sup>UCI, 206, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, May 22, 1890, f. 621.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 206, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, May 23, 1890, f. 623.

<sup>60</sup>Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, p. 22.

<sup>61</sup>Collins, "Nile Struggle," p. 142.

<sup>62</sup>UCI, 206, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, May 25, 1890, frs. 625-27.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 206, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, May 29, 1890, frs. 633-36.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 206, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, May 30, 1890, frs. 637-39.

<sup>65</sup>Collins, "Nile Struggle," p. 14; Hertslet, Map of Africa, II, no. 151, p. 562.

<sup>66</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, III, June 1, 1890, p. 609.

<sup>67</sup>Sanderson, The Upper Nile, p. 60.

<sup>68</sup>Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), p. 293.

<sup>69</sup>Collins, "Nile Struggle," pp. 142-43; Sanderson, The Upper Nile, pp. 56-57.

<sup>70</sup>Buckle, Letters, ser. 3, I, June 1, 1890, pp. 608-09.

<sup>71</sup>UCI, 206, Marschall to Kaiser, Berlin, June 4, 1890, frs. 650-52; BFO, 403/142, Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, June 5, 1890, no. 37.

<sup>72</sup>Cecil, Salisbury, IV, pp. 154-55.

<sup>73</sup>BFO, 403/142, Mackinnon to Salisbury, London, June 7, 1890, no. 39.

<sup>74</sup>Sanderson, The Upper Nile, pp. 93-94; Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, pp. 26-29.

<sup>75</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, I, June 9, 1890, p. 611.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., ser. 3, I, June 9, 1890, pp. 612-13.

<sup>77</sup>UCI, 206, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, June 6, 1890, frs. 661-62.

<sup>78</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, I, June 10, 1890, p. 613.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., ser. 3, I, June 10, 1890, pp. 613-14.

<sup>80</sup>GP, VIII, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, June 11, 1890, no. 1688, p. 24.

<sup>81</sup>Buckle, Victoria, ser. 3, I, June 12, 1890, p. 615.

## CHAPTER V

## RECEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE TREATY IN GERMANY

A. The German Government and the Initial Response to the Treaty in the Press

Although the Treaty had been signed, several critical steps as yet remained. The respective parliamentary bodies had to be convinced of the Treaty's justification, value, and necessity. As important as official ratification was the necessity of convincing the respective publics that the Treaty represented achievements consistent with its country's national interests. One of the most important rationales for concluding the Treaty was the improvement of Anglo-German relations; if the public could not be convinced of the validity of the agreement, the rapprochement might prove artificial.

The German Government, receiving the least real estate in the transaction, was particularly anxious concerning domestic response and therefore took appropriate measures to cushion any possible criticism of the Treaty. The German people had probably been aware since early June that negotiations between Britain and Germany on colonial matters were in progress. Marschall and Caprivi had both spoken of the need for agreement with Britain before the Reichstag; both men had also given assurances that in the case of agreement with Britain, Germany's colonial interests would not be sacrificed. As Marschall stated publicly on June 9:

From the German point of view...let it be emphatically declared that an agreement is only conceivable on the basis of complete equality of rights. It is not only the German Emperor, as The Times phrases it, who believes in the colonial future of the Empire but the German people also.<sup>1</sup>

Marschall seemed to be giving the strongest possible assurances that German interests would be fully protected and the new government would not be subjugated to Britain. A few days later the National Zeitung, a prominent National Liberal paper, exhibited a remarkable "intelligence-gathering facility" in declaring that colonial agreement with Britain was unlikely because her territorial appetite was insatiable. Britain wanted all of Witu in return for merely granting Germany land access to the Congo for East Africa. This hardly constituted a fair trade. The paper did believe that the Stevenson road was expendable, however, for not only was it incomplete, but it had been so little used that large sections were choked with vegetation and undergrowth.<sup>2</sup> The implication that could be drawn from the latter part of the statement was not so much that the Stevenson road would be conceded to the British, but that the British were using the incompleting road as a basis for pressing their claims as far north as possible into the region between the two lakes.

Although the items under negotiation seemed to be at least partially known, neither the full range of issues nor the full extent of the concessions that the Wilhelmstrasse was willing to make to the British was readily apparent. After



Marschall had made assurances that the negotiations would be conducted only "on the basis of complete equality," the official organ of the Wilhelmstrasse, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, suddenly seemed to be preparing (the) German people for a disillusionment:

We cannot help remarking that it would be a definite error on our part to attach so little value to our good relations with Britain that we would not be willing to secure them at the risk of certain concessions in Africa. One can expect that the pending negotiations with England will not satisfy everyone either in Germany or England because such an agreement can only evolve from mutual concessions. But it is desirable that public opinion in Germany, as well as in England, should be shown that such concessions, [whatever was agreed to] even though they leave certain far-reaching aspirations unsatisfied, are necessary in the general interest for the attainment of an object the importance of which will be underrated by no politician--namely the definitive settlement of disputed points which were or might have been calculated to produce a deeper feeling of estrangement between the governments of England and Germany.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time rumors were being circulated as to the terms of the Treaty. By June 16 the general outline of the Treaty appeared as follows:

1. Britain would have protectorates over Witu, Uganda, and Zanzibar.
2. Britain would have complete control of the Stevenson road and the territory to the west and south of the road.
3. The boundary dividing the territories west of Lake Victoria was a line due west of Kavirondo (that is, approximately the one-degree south latitude line). Britain would have

free access through this area from Uganda to Lake Tanganyika.

4. Germany would receive some compensation elsewhere in Africa.<sup>4</sup>

This representation of the projected Treaty caused a great many disappointments in Germany. Bismarck's favorite mouthpiece, the Hamburger Nachrichten, considered details of the Treaty, if the rumor proved accurate, to be "...one of the most fatal mistakes ever made with our colonial policy,... seeing that it has conceded everything to the English...."<sup>5</sup> Another generally pro-government, and highly reputable paper, the Kölnische Zeitung, questioned whether Karl Peters' Uganda treaties should be completely ignored or whether they were not just as valid as those of Stanley.<sup>6</sup>

All this indignant disappointment was exactly what the Wilhelmstrasse wanted. One might even go so far as to speculate that the article in the Kölnische Zeitung was a government "plant." After being promised a relation of equality with Britain by their government, the German people were now being conditioned to expect the worst. Then on June 17, after things appeared so dismal, the Reichsanzeiger, the Wilhelmstrasse's official press, released a preliminary draft of the Treaty.

1. The boundary west of Lake Victoria would be the one-degree south latitude.

2. There would be no Anglo-German tariff barriers west of Lake Victoria or west of Lake Nyasa to the border of the

Congo.

3. There would be freedom of religion in the areas covered by the Treaty.

4. England would use her influence to persuade the Sultan to sell the coastal strip previously leased to Germany to that country.

5. German Southwest Africa would have access to the Zambesi River.

6. The boundary between Togoland and the Gold Coast would be settled in accordance with the German proposal.

7. Germany would turn over her claims to Witu, Somaliland, and their respective hinterlands to Britain.

8. Britain would be allowed a protectorate over Zanzibar.

9. Germany would receive Helgoland from Britain.

10. No future agreement conflicting with this Treaty would be signed without consulting the other party.<sup>7</sup>

This Treaty must have appeared as an act of divine intervention to the colonialists after previously rumored press speculation. The strategy of the Wilhelmstrasse seemed to have yielded dividends. Enthusiastic approval of the Treaty in the press was the rule. Only from more conservative quarters, in some cases, was the reaction even moderate or restrained, but almost everyone found some virtue in the Treaty. Perhaps the greatest initial sigh of relief came from the Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft a few days after the report in the Reichsanzeiger.

The Deutsche Kolonialzeitung stated:

The settlement is much more favorable to Germany than one could have been led to expect from accounts in English papers. The acquisition of Helgoland will be a great boost to German national feeling and also provide protection for the mouths of the Elbe and Weser Rivers.<sup>8</sup>

The government view, reflected in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, was naturally optimistic:

The agreement...is a peace treaty...of the most gratifying kind because it was preceded by no [physical] struggle, and because it assures a continuance of friendly relations between the German Empire and Great Britain for an incalculable length of time... Despite [the sacrifices] an ideal result has been achieved which cannot fail to arouse a joyful echo throughout all Germany--we mean [the acquisition] of Helgoland.<sup>9</sup>

The National Liberal papers concurred that the Treaty was a great success. The National Zeitung wrote that:

Emperor William II has begun his reign by proving himself a true "Mehrer of the Reich" [Augmenter of the Empire]. The cession of the island is a new proof of the intimate relations which have evolved between Germany and England.  
...<sup>10</sup>

The Börsen Zeitung maintained that not only was the acquisition of Helgoland a valuable addition to the German Empire, but the resulting improvement in relations with Britain was just as significant.<sup>11</sup> The Hamburger Nachrichten still questioned the validity of the Treaty from the colonial viewpoint, but recognized the political value of entente with Britain.<sup>12</sup> The most important of the National Liberal organs, the Kölnische

Zeitung, took a professional and more restrained view of the Treaty in order to first study all sides of the question. At first glance, however, the closer relation with Britain appeared to be desirable. But the paper had long been a friend of German colonialism and therefore the losses in Africa were viewed as unfortunate.<sup>13</sup>

The radical-liberal oriented press was generally enthusiastic over the Treaty and especially the closer relation with Britain. The Freisinnige Zeitung expressed the opinion that the Treaty

...contained nothing that was opposed to the views of the Freisinnige Party. The agreement is characterized by the fact that Germany has recognized England's supremacy in Africa. The main point to which we attach importance, however, is that generally the two have come to a comprehensive agreement on all points on which their interests conflict.<sup>14</sup>

The Vossische Zeitung felt that Helgoland more than compensated Germany for any losses in Africa. William II had become "Mehrer of the Reich" sooner than expected.<sup>15</sup> The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had not been sympathetic to the colonial movement specifically because of the differences that had evolved with Britain and because of its expense. On this basis, the paper looked at the Treaty with satisfaction. "Previously our colonial policy was expansive; now it moves not so much in an expansive direction as it does toward consolidation."<sup>16</sup> The Berliner Tageblatt argued that the boundary settlement which would prevent further Anglo-German friction in Africa made the Treaty worthwhile.

"The situation has now been clarified and a new Epoch in the development of our colonial policy can begin."<sup>17</sup>

The Center party organ, Germania, was favorable toward the Treaty primarily because of the opportunity afforded Catholic missionaries in East Africa. Since the Center party generally opposed German colonialism, the limitations placed on expansion in East Africa were looked on favorably.<sup>18</sup>

The Social Democratic press had little comment on the value of the Treaty but was quick to point out that the objections of the colonial enthusiasts would be loud and strong. By supporting colonialism previously, the government had already done irreparable damage. It was too late to reverse the process of imperialism.<sup>19</sup>

It was in the Conservative press that a more reserved attitude toward the Treaty was taken. The generally conservative Post wrote that the first official act of the new German Government was important for improving German national feeling. The acquisition of Helgoland had been desirable for a long period of time. On the other hand, the price that was paid in Africa was exorbitant.<sup>20</sup> The Neue Preussische Zeitung (Kreuzzeitung) expressed satisfaction that the causes of potential Anglo-German friction were eliminated but, as was usually the case when making transactions with the British, they inevitably got the Löwenanteil. Under the circumstances the government had done the best it could, and Germany should be grateful to have

Helgoland.<sup>21</sup> The usually chauvinistic Christian Socialist Anglophobe organ, the Reichsbote, pointed out that although Britain received the "lion's share," the Treaty might prove to be of advantage to Germany in the future, either because of the improved Anglo-German relation or the acquisition of Helgoland. Germany's African possessions had caused her a great deal of tribulation and they would not be greatly missed.<sup>22</sup>

The most critical stance toward the Treaty at this early date came from the Bavarian Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung:

It will be a long time before the German spirit of exploration will recover from this blow, which we all hope future history will not point to as the Olmütz of the German colonial movement.<sup>23</sup>

Part of the reason for the paper's hostility toward the Treaty may have been the influence of Kuno zu Rantzau, Bismarck's son-in-law who was Prussian Minister in Munich from 1888 to 1891. The Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung was frequently the recipient of "enlightened" information from government sources. In this case the source may have been the government's representative, not the government itself. Although he had not come out openly against the Treaty, Bismarck may have been preparing for that eventuality through his influence in Munich and through his well-known organ, the Hamburger Nachrichten. Another reason for the paper's hostility may have been the general suspicion with which many Bavarians viewed a Prussian and Protestant Kaiser.

Generally speaking then, the initial press reception of the Treaty was better than might have been expected. Almost all

the papers had something favorable to say about the Treaty. The Wilhelmstrasse's strategy had undoubtedly contributed immensely to this favorable reception. Ambassador Malet reported to Whitehall that reception of the proposed Treaty was quite satisfying from the British point of view.<sup>24</sup>

B. The German Government and the Second Phase of Response to the Treaty

Although the Wilhelmstrasse had initially been able to keep criticism of the Treaty to a minimum, the passage of time allowed for closer inspection and evaluation of the terms of the agreement; this led to a more extensive censure of the Treaty a few days after the original proclamation in the Reichsanzeiger. The Times' correspondent in Berlin declared that many Germans were beginning to feel that Helgoland "...was the bit of sugar which was meant to sweeten Germany's bitter portion, but which had not wholly done so."<sup>25</sup> The Reichsbote reflected increasing sentiment in this direction when it declared:

The cession of Heligoland by Lord Salisbury is by no means a special proof of friendship for Germany; rather the contrary. In lieu of this island, England has received a new Heligoland of immense value in the shape of Zanzibar, which forms the chief emporium of the African trade. It is a bitter reflection that England only talks to us of mutual friendship when she wishes to extract sacrifices from us.<sup>26</sup>

The Kolonialzeitung, after further assessment of the Treaty, became more critical, as might have been expected. The East African clauses of the Treaty were the most difficult to



accept. Attached to the June 28 issue of the paper was a special edition quoting in full a long letter from Karl Peters dated April 13, 1890.<sup>27</sup> The letter recounted his journies in Uganda and his success in securing treaties from native chieftains giving Germany control of the region, an area which would be of great economic value to the Reich.<sup>28</sup>

The sacrifice of Zanzibar and Uganda was also being publicly deplored by Baron von Gravenreuth, second in command to Hermann von Wissmann in East Africa, who was home on leave. Gravenreuth maintained that Uganda was the key to Central Africa and Zanzibar was the key to East-Africa; that left Germany with nothing, or at best a position completely dependent on British goodwill.<sup>29</sup> The German Government was undoubtedly anticipating that Wissmann himself, who enjoyed great public prestige, would turn against the Treaty. Though he had said nothing to this point, Wissmann was rumored to be in complete agreement with his subordinate.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps Wissmann had even encouraged Gravenreuth's public statements.

Wissmann's attitude toward the Treaty was very important. If too many respected German notables came out against the Treaty, the government could anticipate tremendous obstacles in obtaining ratification. Most prominent in this vein, of course, was Bismarck. Although the former Chancellor had not publicly disowned the Treaty, his newspapers had not been friendly toward the Agreement. Bismarck himself, when questioned about the

Treaty, claimed that he would not be a party to criticism because everything he did and said was in the interest of peace and of the dynasty. This was not a very reassuring statement for, at the same time, the Hamburger Nachrichten was declaring that if England really wanted to demonstrate her goodwill, Walfish Bay should be ceded to Germany.<sup>31</sup> Bismarck had still left himself full room to maneuver; either a favorable or unfavorable alternative was possible regarding the Treaty. Karl Peters was also yet to be heard from. The Wilhelmstrasse could almost be assured that he would see no virtue in the Treaty.

On June 24, 1890, an editorial appeared in the Kölnische Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, making a strong appeal to all colonialists to decry the efforts of the grasping British, who were depriving Germany of her rightful possessions overseas:

The diplomacy of the English works swiftly and secretly. What they created burst in the face of the astonished world on June 18 like a bomb --the German-English African Treaty. With one stroke of the pen, the hope of a great German colonial empire was ruined.... Shall this Treaty really be? No, no, and again no. The German people must arise as one and declare that this Treaty is unacceptable! ...men of all parties who in this situation think of themselves only as Germans wish to take the matter into their hands. The Reichstag will, we hope, go to the government with an overpowering majority and say: The Treaty with England harms our interest and wounds our honor; this time it dares not become a reality! We are ready at the call of our Kaiser to step

into the ranks and allow ourselves dumbly and obediently to be led against the enemy's shots, but we may also demand in exchange that the reward come to us which is worth the sacrifice, and this reward is: that we shall be a conquering people which takes its portion of the world itself, and does not seek to receive it by the grace and benevolence of another people.  
 Deutschland wach auf!<sup>32</sup>

Fearing that the original strategy was not sufficient to rally support for the Treaty, the Wilhelmstrasse took additional measures to neutralize criticism. On June 24, while the Reichstag was in session, Baron von Marschall asked that the members refrain from discussing the projected Treaty as he was not yet at liberty to answer all questions since the matter had not been completely settled. Until that time, no one could really make a full evaluation or intelligent judgment on the Treaty.<sup>33</sup> Marschall's request was timely if his purpose was to stifle parliamentary criticism, for the Reichstag adjourned the day the Treaty was signed and did not reassemble until December, 1890. The government would now have time to take additional measures to encourage support without the hindrance of parliamentary debate. It would also mean that by the time debate on the Treaty had reached the Reichstag, the British Parliament would already have accepted or rejected the Treaty. If it was accepted by the British, the Kaiser could provisionally accept incorporation of the island into the Empire and the Reichstag would therefore be presented with a fait accompli. This would assure ratification of the Treaty, but still there

was the need to stimulate favorable popular response.

To make the Treaty more appealing to the German public, Gerhard Rohlfs, a former consul at Zanzibar, was enlisted by the Wilhelmstrasse to argue the (virtues) of the new African situation. In a carefully reasoned article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Rohlfs maintained that the loss of Zanzibar would benefit Germany in the long run. Germans had long been exploited by Zanzibari and British middlemen who were operating clearing houses on the island. By developing the facilities at Dar-es-Salaam, the Germans could deal directly with the African coast rather than working through the Zanzibar clearing house at great additional expense. There was immense opportunity for German business to develop the potential of Dar-es-Salaam without hindrance from the British.<sup>34</sup> Rohlfs's argument was obviously calculated to appeal to German business interests whose support or lack of support could make or break the aggressive faction of the colonial movement in Germany.

In the meantime the Treaty itself was signed at Berlin — on the evening of July 1, 1890. For the occasion The Times quoted a seemingly appropriate statement composed nineteen years earlier by Helgolanders when they were sought by the French to act as pilots for the blockading fleet in 1871:

We, the inhabitants of Heligoland, feel compelled to remind you that we still continue to have German blood in our veins. German is at present, as it ever will be, the language of

our schools and of our Church. We have no sympathies other than our own German sympathies, and we think it is about time to remind Germany that here in the middle of the North Sea there are Germans who are still awaiting their liberation.<sup>35</sup>

At the same time the paper also ran an article which declared that British public opinion was so fully committed to the Treaty that opposition would be political suicide.<sup>36</sup>

By some quirk of fate, it so happened that the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft was scheduled to convene a general meeting on July 1 at Cologne. On the basis of the article in the Kolonialzeitung of June 28 in which criticism of the Treaty abounded, one might have expected the society to vigorously condemn the Treaty.<sup>37</sup> The Society directors met on June 30 and hastily sought to frame a resolution on the Treaty. At this meeting, despite the fact that nearly all were dissatisfied with the Treaty, the recurring split between the activists and passivists was revived over the issue of a proper response. The result was a victory for the passivists, whose view maintained that openly attacking the government was a useless and unproductive tactic.<sup>38</sup>

The resulting resolution proved to be fairly innocuous. The Society expressed regret that the Treaty had been concluded because the colonial movement would suffer as a result. The government was also urged to prevent any further injury to colonization and to embark on a program consolidating and developing Germany's remaining colonies. On the other hand, the

resolution praised the government's work in suppressing the slave trade and went on to admit that the society was not really competent to criticize the Treaty from the standpoint of Germany's overall official policy.<sup>39</sup>

The resolution did not prevent prominent members from publicly criticizing the Treaty before the General Assembly of the society. Friedrich Fabri claimed that Germany had been swindled by Britain; at least Walfish Bay should have been ceded to Germany. He went on, however, to suggest that little could be done at this point other than to continue to work with what remained. Ernst Vohser argued that although the Treaty was distasteful in many ways, there was some cause for optimism since time might prove that the control of the East African coast might eventually lead to domination over Zanzibar itself.<sup>40</sup> Eugen Wolf, commercial attaché to Zanzibar, and Major von Liebut of the Prussian General Staff were also highly critical of the treaty in public speeches.<sup>41</sup> One member of the society, Oskar Hamm, took a realistic view when he declared: "As long as the German people and their parliamentary representatives are not forthrightly pursuing a colonial policy, the government cannot be condemned for failing to get better terms."<sup>42</sup> The influence and recognition received by the conference were somewhat undermined by the fact that Hermann Wissmann was too ill to address the members of the society.<sup>43</sup>

The dissention and difficulties within the society

apparently did not reveal themselves immediately to the public. The Times, for instance, felt the criticism of the Treaty coming from the Conference might constitute a danger to ratification.<sup>44</sup> Certainly it would only be human nature to be more observant of the critical rather than the pacific propaganda emanating from Cologne. The fact remained, however, that the government had benefited significantly from the split within the colonial movement.

Since the Reichstag had adjourned July 1, 1890, the British Parliament was the first representative body to act on ratification. The British had completed ratification in less than a month, with debate over the Treaty being overwhelmingly in favor. Several negative letters to the editor in The Times and a few articles in the Pall Mall Gazette hardly constituted serious opposition.<sup>45</sup> The strongest and most notable opposition to the Treaty came from Gladstone, who objected to the Treaty, of all reasons, for its infringement on the royal prerogative. Gladstone maintained that although a cession or exchange of territory needed ministerial sanction, parliamentary ratification was unnecessary. The Crown still retained this prerogative. Gladstone was supported in his ironic view by Prince Edward.<sup>46</sup> Gladstone's actions apparently caught many of his followers by surprise, according to The Times. After all, he had spent the better part of his life attempting to achieve full treaty-making power for Parliament as well as striving to cut away the

royal prerogative.<sup>47</sup>

Salisbury's presentation of the Treaty to the British public had been carried out in a skillful manner. On June 18 (in Minden and Brunswick) the British participated in extensive celebrations of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Blücher's arrival at Waterloo. At Waterloo itself, Germans and British alike toasted La Belle Alliance of the past and the present.<sup>48</sup>

Admiral P. H. Colomb was only one of several navy men who assured the British public of Helgoland's military uselessness to Great Britain. He maintained that the island could only be a source of weakness to Britain being the superior naval power. The expense involved in making the island potentially useful by building fortifications and harbor facilities was not worth the effort because in any case Helgoland's very proximity to Germany made it vulnerable. Control of the High Seas by the British Navy made the dependence on such "isolated coastal rocks" unnecessary.<sup>49</sup> One Commander Cameron wrote:

The opposition, while asking about the wishes of the people of Heligoland, propose to hand over to a government, intensely distasteful to them, the population of Ulster, consisting of upwards of one million and that in defiance of their ascertained wishes.<sup>50</sup>

Most important to getting the bill successfully through Parliament was the fact that Salisbury made absolutely sure that all concerned understood that no treaty was possible without the cession of Helgoland. Not only were the huge acquisitions in Africa motivation for approving the Treaty, but good relations



with Germany at this particular time seemed appropriate since another mild naval scare was materializing as the result of some research by reporters from The Times, research which revealed significant increases in the size of the Russian fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.<sup>51</sup> On July 28, 1890, Parliament completed ratification of the Treaty.<sup>52</sup>

During the course of the proceedings in the British Parliament, two important conversions were made to the cause of the Wilhelmstrasse. Apparently seeing the passage of the Treaty as inevitable and fearing possible reprisals for criticizing the Treaty, Gravensreuth admitted that he did not really believe the Treaty would end the German colonial movement. He stated that Wissmann felt the same way as himself, and as proof of their convictions, they both intended to return to their posts in East Africa.<sup>53</sup>

Another government spokesman, Admiral von Werner of the Imperial Navy, came to the aid of the Treaty in a statement on the value of Helgoland to Germany. In an article that received sufficient notoriety to attract the attention of The Times' Berlin correspondent, Werner maintained that German control of the island would render blockade of the Elbe and Weser Rivers impossible. Any blockading fleet had to have an anchorage protected from the turbulent North Sea weather where it could renew coal supplies. The only other substitute for Helgoland lay so close to Germany's coastline that heavy ordnance firing from



“GIVEN AWAY WITH A POUND OF TEA!!!”

(Punch, June 28, 1890, p. 306)

the mainland would prevent shelter. Werner estimated that possession of the island would release a squadron of ten to fifteen ships-of-the-line for service elsewhere.<sup>54</sup>

Caprivi sensed opinion toward the Treaty improving and now moved to consolidate his position. He issued an official statement justifying the Treaty from the standpoint of the German Government. Caprivi's arguments surprised no one. He reasoned that the most important benefit Germany derived from the Treaty was improved relations with Britain. No colonial dispute was worth the cost of Anglo-German friendship. Germany was a European power first, and colonial politics could not be allowed to interfere with the continental balance. In obtaining Helgoland the Reich strengthened its European position. The primary sacrifice made in order to obtain Helgoland, that is, the "cession" of Zanzibar to Great Britain, was inevitable. Conditions in Zanzibar were unstable; great power intervention was unavoidable. Since Britain had the longer traditional interest in Zanzibar, it was only reasonable that she should have preference if a quid pro quo could be found for Germany. Germany should not be unhappy to relinquish something she never really had in return for something of concrete value.<sup>55</sup>

Caprivi's statement seemed to mollify criticism of the Treaty in at least two conservative organs. The Kreutzzeitung now wrote that the acquisition of the island was of great value since it strengthened Germany's continental position. Good

relations with Britain would doubtless help maintain the European peace. In the case of a great war, colonies would be difficult to maintain anyway. The paper still questioned whether a truly healthful relation with Britain could be maintained if Germany always had to assume the subordinate position.<sup>56</sup> The Konservative Monatschrift declared that only time would tell whether the actions of the Wilhelmstrasse were justified. It was possible that the sacrifice of colonial areas would contribute to the European peace.<sup>57</sup>

On the other hand, the Post and the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung remained highly critical. They saw no value in Helgoland and therefore continued to oppose the African sacrifices.<sup>58</sup>

Bismarck's position on the Treaty had undergone a substantial transition in the period of two months. To begin with, he promised to remain silent on government issues. Then shortly after the signing of the Treaty, he praised it before a group of British shipbuilders as proof of the cordiality of Anglo-German relations. Little more than a week later, however, in an interview with the editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, he stated:

...I should not have concluded such an Anglo-German bargain. If it was the will of the Emperor that Helgoland should be procured at all hazards, I think it might at least have been gotten more cheaply. In the event of a war Helgoland might even become a danger to Germany if it was not strongly fortified. In 1870 the island was neutral, but if during the next war it is German, the French might be able to attack against the German coast.<sup>59</sup>

Bismarck continued to sit on the slightly negative side of the fence, unimpressed by Caprivi's logic and chiding the government for the high price paid for the small island. Still, he had not strongly committed himself to opposition to the Treaty.

In a final effort to overwhelm domestic opposition to the Treaty before the reopening of debate in the Reichstag, an elaborate ceremony was planned for August 10 in which the Kaiser would receive transfer of Helgoland from the British. The proceedings were made as ostentatious as possible, with a large complement of British and German warships, 2,000 German marines, and a huge retinue of dignitaries. The island was decorated from one end to the other with banners and slogans signifying Anglo-German friendship, and numerous salutes were fired by the warships in the harbor. The Kaiser, dressed in his British Admiral's uniform, was the first of the dignitaries to speak after the German flag was hoisted beside the Union Jack. He characteristically addressed his comments toward Admiral Hollman and the other naval officers present in a typically Wilhelmitan manner:

Comrades of the Navy, four days ago I celebrated the battle of Wörth at which my revered grandfather and my father provided the hammer blow that resulted in the formation of the new German Empire. Twenty years have now passed and I, William II, German Emperor and King of Prussia, reincorporate [?] this island, the last piece of German earth, into the Fatherland without war and without bloodshed. The island is a bulwark against the sea, a protection to

### 'LEBE WOHL! HELGOLAND!'

(An Incident of the Cession—hitherto unreported.)

THE Representative of BRITANNIA'S Might had departed in appropriate state, and the German Emperor had reached his destination.



The new landlord was most anxious to take possession. He was all impatience to appear before his recently-acquired subjects, to show to them the Military Uniform he had assumed after discarding that garb he loved so well—the *grande tenue* of an Honorary Admiral of the Fleet in the service of VICTORIA, Queen, Empress, and Grandmother. There was a consultation on board the *Hohenzollern*, and then a subdued German cheer.

The Chief Naval Officer approached His Majesty, cocked-hat in hand.

"Sire," he said, falling on one knee; "all is now ready."

"But why has there been this delay?" asked WILLIAM THE SECOND, in a tone of imperial command.

"Sire, we could not find the island. Unhappily we had mislaid—" and then the naval officer paused—

"Your charts and field-glasses?" queried His Majesty.

"No, Sire," was the reply. Then, after some hesitation, the chief of the German sailors continued, "The fact is, Your Majesty, I had lost my microscope, and—" But further explanation was drowned in the sound of saluting artillery. And the remainder of the day was devoted (by those who could find room on the island) in equal proportions to smoke and enthusiasm.

(Punch, August 16, 1890, p. 8)

German fisheries, a central point for my warships, a resting place and harbor of safety in the German Ocean against all enemies who may dare to show themselves upon it. I hereby take possession of this land, whose inhabitants I greet, and in token thereof I command that my standard be hoisted and by its side that of my navy.<sup>60</sup>

Herr von Bötticher, the Reich Secretary of the Interior, formally took over the island from Governor Barkly, the British representative. The dignitaries and guests then converged on the Casino, where toasts were followed by a gala dinner party. The Union Jack was allowed to fly beside the German flag until evening, when both were taken down to the accompaniment of elaborate pomp and ceremony. The next morning only the German flag was raised.<sup>61</sup> The Times wrote: "Seldom before in its existence has the small island of Heligoland been the scene of such excitement and enthusiasm as it has to-day."<sup>62</sup>

In August, 1890, Karl Peters finally returned to Germany from his exploits in East Africa. He was given a hero's welcome and while in Nuremberg was given a replica of Charlemagne's sword by the citizens of the city. The expected outburst of indignation at the Colonial Treaty did not occur. Peters' attitude seemed to be one of resignation. In Nuremberg, The Times quoted Peters as publicly stating that:

...after all, the Emperor and his Government must be left to determine what was best for the nation. It was the duty of leaders like himself to appropriate as much land as possible

out in Africa, but it was the prerogative of the Emperor to decide whether these annexations should be retained or treated as objects of barter and compensation for other acquisitions. From this point of view he was content to believe that by his expedition he had done something to advance the national cause.<sup>63</sup>

The German news media was strangely quiet regarding Peters' return. The Norddeutsche made no mention at all of Peters' arrival. Certainly the Kaiser's visit to St. Petersburg rightfully occupied a great deal of space, but it would seem to be the case in the semi-official press that Peters' attitude first had to be approved before he received publicity.

By the time of his arrival in Berlin, Peters was sufficiently cleansed to be received at the Kaiserhof, though it should be pointed out that the most significant individual present at the gathering who was connected with the government and who publicly acknowledged Peters' exploits was Karl von Hofmann, the former governor of Alsace-Lorraine. Peters, in replying to Hofmann's praise, must have caused immense relief in the Wilhelmstrasse for he again declared that

...the Emperor was, after all, the best judge of what was profitable to the nation, and that the surrender to the English of Uganda, which he had endeavored to secure for Germany, must be looked at in the light of a far-seeing policy of international "give and take."<sup>64</sup>

On his return from Russia, the Kaiser received Peters and personally decorated the explorer. Peters was under the impression, however, that he would be rewarded with an African governorship, and when no such reward was immediately



forthcoming, his despair turned him toward a small group of recalcitrants who were unalterably opposed to the Treaty. This faction of colonial activists within the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft was for the most part composed of Peters' old cronies from the original Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation and the ill-fated Allgemeiner deutscher Kongress of the Fall of 1886. These dissidents turned to a now receptive Peters to lead them in the formation of a new, more militant, nationalistic colonial organization, the Allgemeine Deutsche Verband. Peters eventually allowed himself to be elected president of the organization in January, 1891. Proof that he was not fully committed to the ideals of the new Allgemeine Deutsche Verband can be shown by the speed with which he resigned the position when the German Government did finally offer him the position of Imperial Commissioner in East Africa.<sup>65</sup>

Two points should be made clear about the Allgemeine Deutsche Verband; it did not originate from opposition to the Anglo-German Colonial Treaty and it did not have any significant support during its early years of existence. The group that finally precipitated the formation of the league was merely looking for a pretext to create a new organization. They thought public reaction against the Treaty might provide the necessary impetus for a more aggressive organization than the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft. Anyone who compared the tenets of the Allgemeine deutscher Kongress of 1886 and those of the

Allgemeine Deutsche Verband could clearly see that the league originated in September, 1886, not in July or August of 1890. The difficulties experienced by the league between 1891 and 1894 indicate that the activists not only misinterpreted public sentiment against the Treaty but also the overall enthusiasm for colonial expansion.<sup>66</sup>

### C. Government Policy and Reichstag Ratification

The final tactical steps used by the German Government to assure passage of the Colonial Treaty involved the form in which the Agreement was presented to the Reichstag. This procedure showed parliamentary savvy reminiscent of Bismarck's dealings with earlier Reichstags. The key to presentation was the almost universal acclaim for the acquisition of Helgoland. The government recognized that this aspect of the Treaty could easily be approved; therefore, the Treaty was not presented as a whole but was broken into parts--European and African. On December 2, 1890, the first day of the new Reichstag session, a bill was proposed for the incorporation of Helgoland into the Reich, specifically into Prussia. The strategy was obviously to ratify the satisfactory part of the Treaty, which could be done easily, and then to argue that since this section of the original Treaty had been accepted, the African provisions also had to be accepted. Caprivi could also limit effective Reichstag opposition to the African section of the Treaty because that body could not exercise jurisdiction over the government's

actions. The Reichstag's authority in territorial matters extended only to areas that were to be ceded by or acquired by the Reich. Only Helgoland was to actually become part of the Reich. East Africa was merely to be recognized as a German sphere of influence. While the Chancellor could not muzzle verbal criticism, no one could deny the legality of the government's procedure. Germany was merely relinquishing claims to territories she had not actually possessed and which, of course, had never been part of the Reich.

The presentation of the bill to the Reichstag was made by Karl von Bötticher, the Reich Secretary of the Interior, on December 2, 1890. In the space of seven days, the bill swiftly passed through three readings before the Reichstag. Generally speaking, there was little opposition that could not be easily explained away or justified by Bötticher. The two primary questions that were raised during the week of debate were: why should the Helgolandians have special privileges (freedom from military service) and why should Helgoland be incorporated into Prussia rather than be left as an independent state or joined with a non-Prussian state?

Bötticher argued that when dealing with the transfer of citizens from one nationality to another, the rights held by citizens under former sovereigns had to be respected. Furthermore, the British Parliament might not have approved the transfer had Germany not been willing to look after the special

interests of the Helgolanders. To the second question, the Minister of the Interior pointed out that incorporation of the island into Prussia was simply a matter of saving money. It would be less expensive for Prussia, with her more extensive bureaucracy, to expand a bit more to include Helgoland rather than to allow a smaller state to incorporate the island or to initiate a completely new state of Helgoland. Judging from the fact that the questions were not repeated and Bötticher's answers received enthusiastic applause, the questioners appeared reasonably satisfied. In addition, representatives of the National Liberals as well as the leaders of the Radicals and the huge Center party spoke in favor of the bill. Since it was known that Kardorff, leader of the Free Conservatives, was friendly toward the Treaty, the government was confident that the all-important third reading would pass with votes to spare. When Reichstag President Albert von Levetzow called for those in favor of the bill to rise, the great majority of the members present did so.<sup>67</sup> The most crucial stage of the Treaty's ratification was completed. The intelligence and tact with which the issue had been presented undoubtedly aided in acceptance.

The second stage of ratification was much more complicated and difficult. By far the most militant criticism of the Treaty had evolved from the African aspects of the Colonial Agreement. Fortunately for the government, there was no need

to submit a bill officially approving the African provisions. Helgoland was actually to be incorporated into the Reich; East Africa, on the other hand, was merely a protectorate which had been established some years previously and was now being expanded and stabilized. The Reichstag would be permitted to vote only on the positive territorial aspects of the Treaty, never on the Treaty as a whole. Caprivi never allowed the negative features of the colonial deal--that is, what Germany had allowed Britain to take--to come before the Reichstag during the course of ratification. This was all perfectly legitimate, for the Reichstag had no jurisdiction over territories which were not officially part of the Reich.

The types of legislation that the Reichstag was left to consider concerned only the acceptance of the expanded German position in East Africa. Voting on this matter was only indirect, for the government did not ask for approval but merely the allocation of funds for the particular needs of the protectorate. Caprivi was again quite careful in presenting his requests for funds. They were always connected to some particularly appealing political issue such as the suppression of the slave trade or protection of missionaries or German nationals. This made resistance to the government colonial activity as difficult as possible from a political standpoint.

Despite Caprivi's efforts, however, some criticism of negative features of the Colonial Treaty was interjected during

the course of debate on the issues mentioned above.<sup>68</sup> There was never any question that the government would fail to get the necessary votes on its carefully selected issues, but in his enthusiasm for popularizing and justifying his policy to the Reichstag, which really was unnecessary, Caprivi made a costly error. He made a personal appearance to defend his position during the first reading of a law to provide funds for the stationing of additional German troops in East Africa which would provide "minimum protection" for Germans living in the area. Caprivi's attempt at a tour de force was a logically reasoned argument justifying the "cession" of Zanzibar and Witu to Britain.

The Chancellor began by pointing out the difficulties Germany had had in maintaining her position in Zanzibar. He especially recounted the expense of sending ships to discipline the Sultan. He also reiterated that the lack of a clear central authority for the island had caused numerous disputes between Britain and Germany. It was obvious that the Anglo-German Zanzibari relation had to be clarified. The easiest method was the declaration of a protectorate by one or the other of the great powers. Given her traditional position in Zanzibar, it was logical that Britain be that power--if Germany could be adequately compensated; and Helgoland was considered adequate compensation. This aspect of the colonial bargain was advantageous to Germany because it not only provided an excellent

fortress for her coastal regions and the North Sea Canal, but it promised to bring stability to Zanzibar at British rather than German expense.

The Chancellor then went on to point out the logic behind the Witu settlement. He stated that Witu could never be developed in a prosperous fashion without adequate harbor facilities. The Germans had lost the possibility of attaining the best harbor for Witu when the island of Lamu was acknowledged as the property of the Sultan of Zanzibar in the arbitration award of 1889. The only other favorable harbors that could be developed were on the islands of Manda and Patta. Development of facilities here would be expensive and time consuming. More hazardous, however, would be the danger that those islands would also be awarded to the Sultan of Zanzibar since the claims of the Sultan of Witu to those islands were the same as the claims made to Lamu. Finally, there was the case of the German Witu Company, whose records showed it to be almost bankrupt financially. To reinforce and add legitimacy to his arguments, Caprivi then quoted from several past statements originating from Bismarck showing that his policy was merely a continuation of what Bismarck would eventually have done. One of the former Chancellor's remarks that was quoted was: "England is more important to us than Zanzibar and Witu to boot."<sup>69</sup>

Although Caprivi's speech was enthusiastically received at the time, he left himself completely open to criticism from



## CORIOLANUS

"Such a nature,  
 Tickled with good success, disdains the shador  
 Which he treads on at noon." Coriolanus, Act. I., Sc. 1.  
 (Punch, February 28, 1891, p. 103)



Bismarck should the old Chancellor choose to deny Caprivi's statement. Given Bismarck's earlier statements on the Treaty, it should have been obvious that such a denial would be a definite possibility, for he probably would not wish to be labeled anti-Russian should he return to power. Bismarck did indeed now officially launch his attack against Caprivi and the Treaty. In the Hamburger Nachrichten he denied that he would have approved such a colonial treaty with Britain. Good relations with Great Britain were essential, but the cost could have been much less. Britain needed German friendship as much as Germany needed Britain's; therefore Germany should have been able to expect an equal trade. The Colonial Agreement of July 1, 1890, did not constitute equal advantage for both parties.<sup>70</sup>

In all honesty, Bismarck probably could have negotiated a better deal for Germany. He would have been in a much better position to do so. The Caprivi Government was in a delicate position because the decision had been made to end the Reinsurance Treaty. Bismarck probably would not have permitted such an occurrence, thereby keeping a strong position vis-a-vis Britain. Secondly, The Caprivi Government was willing to make sacrifices simply to be able to conclude a treaty with Britain to show the world that all was well between Berlin and London and that the change of leadership had not damaged Germany's ability to deal successfully with foreign powers. Again, the need to signify his government's prestige or stability was not a problem that would have faced Bismarck. There can be little doubt that Bismarck was interested in discrediting the Caprivi

Government for his own political ends and was using the Treaty as a means to do so; but based on his previous record and policies, there is little reason to doubt the former Chancellor's basic disagreement with the Treaty. Bismarck's own best account, though a bit too extreme in places to be completely believable, comes from his memoirs:

That the Heligoland Treaty was a very great disappointment to us, is now the judgment of people other than those whose major interests are in overseas possessions. In the official justification of this affair the compensation, which is invisible to the naked eye, must be sought in the realm of things imponderable, in the fostering of our relations with England. Reference had been made in the affair to the fact that I, while I was in office, had set a high value upon these relations. That is undoubtedly correct; but I never believed in the possibility of a lasting guarantee of these relations and never intended to sacrifice a German possession[?] in order to gain a goodwill whose duration would have no [?] prospect of surviving an English ministry.... The renunciation of equal privileges in the commercial city of Zanzibar was a lasting sacrifice for which Heligoland offered no equivalent. Free trade with that single market on the East African coast was the bridge that joined our commerce with the mainland which today we can neither dispense with nor replace.

The tendency of Caprivi to make me responsible for doubtful political measures which he undoubtedly advocated at the command of a superior, was not exactly a proof of political honesty.... [Bismarck then quoted Caprivi's statement of February 15, 1891, before the Reichstag in which Caprivi maintained that his colonial policy was merely a continuation of Bismarck's.]

How he could have informed himself I do not know. If it was by reading the reports of the transactions, he could not have interpreted those reports to mean that I had advised the Zanzibar treaty. The proposition that England is of greater importance to us than Africa, which I have occasionally advanced in connection with over-hasty

and exaggerated colonial projects, may be just as pertinent under certain circumstances as the statement that Germany is of greater importance than East Africa to England; but this was not the case at the time that the Heligoland Treaty was concluded. It had not occurred to the English to expect us to renounce Zanzibar; on the contrary people in England were becoming accustomed to the idea that German trade and influence there was increasing and would finally secure the upper hand. The English in Zanzibar itself were convinced at the first news of the treaty that it was a mistake, for they could not comprehend why we should have made such a concession.<sup>71</sup>

The effect of giving Bismarck this opening made life more miserable for Caprivi and subjected him and the Treaty to more criticism than he had expected. The fact was, however, that the colonial issue was not one that held great appeal to Germans at this particular time. Proof of this fact was that even Bismarck's opposition, in addition to the activities of the Pan-Germans, was not enough to prevent the necessary allocation of funds for the operation and maintenance of the East African protectorate. The measures taken by the Caprivi Government were wholly successful in securing ratification of the Treaty. But the original objective of the Wilhelmstrasse had also been to create enthusiasm for the Treaty and the new relation with Britain; in this respect it must be said that Caprivi was less successful, and Bismarck was in no small part responsible for this latter development. The Chancellor's approach to the Treaty had been successful in enlisting a significant degree of friendly feeling for the Treaty, but Bismarck's opposition neutralized a good deal of the original attitude of the German people. Evidence of this

can be seen in the disappearance of discussion of the Treaty from the pages of the official press. Nor was the Treaty or any of its provisions again raised in any significant manner by government officials before the Reichstag. It was obvious that the government was attempting to dampen public discussion of the Treaty because it was unsure of its popularity. If the Treaty lacked popularity with the German people, however, it had not elicited any great disapproval either. Bismarck and the Pan-German League agitators had misjudged the climate of German pro-colonial sentiment on this count. The Treaty simply ceased to be a great issue by the end of 1891, for even reference to the "obnoxious" segments of the Treaty failed to appear in such concerned media as the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung. It was only after Britain and Germany had again become antagonists a few years later that the Pan-Germans and other ultra-nationalists again took up criticism of the Treaty and were successful in obtaining "grass-roots-oriented" criticism.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The Times (London), June 10, 1890, p. 5; of all the news media, The Times was the most careful and consistent observer of the events surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty.

<sup>2</sup>National Zeitung, June 13, 1890, as quoted from The Times (London), June 14, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, June 16, 1890, p. 1. The fact that the article also stated that agreement was to be concluded within ten or twelve days shows that the Wilhelmstrasse provided the inspiration for the statement. No one could have so accurately guessed the concluding dates unless he knew the real status of the negotiations.

<sup>4</sup>The Times (London), June 17, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup>Hamburger Nachrichten, June 16, 1890, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Kölnische Zeitung, June 16, 1890, morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>Reichsanzeiger, June 17, 1890, quoted from the German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of California Microfilms (UCI), reel 206, frame 727. Henceforth referred to as UCI.

<sup>8</sup>Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, June 21, 1890, p. 155.

<sup>9</sup>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, June 18, 1890, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>National Zeitung, June 18, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5; Manfred Sell, Die deutsche öffentliche Meinung und das Helgolandabkommen im Jahr 1890 (Berlin: Dümmler Verlag, 1926), p. 85.

<sup>11</sup>Bösen Zeitung as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup>Hamburger Nachrichten, June 18, 1890, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup>Kölnische Zeitung, June 18, 1890, second morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>Freisinnige Zeitung, June 18, 1890 as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, p. 94.

<sup>15</sup>Vossische Zeitung, June 18, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 18, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 18, 1890, first morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>Berliner Tageblatt, June 18, 1890, as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, pp. 90-91.

<sup>18</sup>Germania, June 19, 1890, first edition, p. 1. See article no. 3, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>Berliner Volksblatt, June 20, 1890, as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, pp. 95-96.

<sup>20</sup>Post, June 18, 1890, as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, p. 76, and The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>21</sup>Neue Preussische Zeitung, June 18, 1890, evening edition, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup>Reichsbote, June 18, 1890, as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, p. 73.

<sup>23</sup>Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, June 18, 1890, as quoted in Sell, Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, pp. 65-66.

<sup>24</sup>British Foreign Office, Folder 403/142, Malet to Salisbury, Berlin, June 20, 1890, no. 82. Henceforth referred to as BFO.

<sup>25</sup>The Times (London), June 23, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup>Reichsbote, June 19, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 20, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>27</sup>Peters was still slowly making his way back from his exploits in Uganda--the Emin Pasha Rescue Mission.

<sup>28</sup>Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, June 28, 1890, pp. 166-71; Peters was still unaware of the Colonial Treaty.

<sup>29</sup>The Times (London), June 20, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., June 24, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>31</sup>Hamburger Nachrichten, June 21, 1890, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup>Kölnische Zeitung, June 24, 1890 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 24, 1890, as quoted in Mildred S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League 1890-1914 (New York: Mildred S. Wertheimer, 1924), pp. 31-32; the last sentence of the quote is remarkably similar to the "Deutschland Erwach" of a later age.

<sup>33</sup>Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 460 vols. (Berlin: Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei, 1867-1939), VIII Legislature period, Session I, vol. I, 25th sitting, June 24, 1890, p. 529. Henceforth referred to as RD.

<sup>34</sup>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 1890, p. 2.

<sup>35</sup>The Times (London), July 2, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., July 2, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup>Deutsch Kolonialzeitung, June 28, 1890, pp. 166-71.

<sup>38</sup>Richard Pierard, "The German Colonial Society 1882-1914," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at State University of Iowa, 1964), p. 136.

<sup>39</sup>Deutsch Kolonialzeitung, July 12, 1890, p. 180.

<sup>40</sup>Pierard, "German Colonial Society," pp. 136-37.

<sup>41</sup>The Times (London), July 3, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>42</sup>Deutsch Kolonialzeitung, July 12, 1890, p. 180.

<sup>43</sup>The Times (London), July 3, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., July 3, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., June 27, 1890, p. 9; Paul Hubbell, "The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the University of Michigan, 1937), pp. 431-32. Hubbell has maintained that there was strong opposition to the Treaty in Britain. Evidence to the contrary would be the five to one ratio in Parliament favoring the bill at the time of the second reading of the bill. No count was taken of the final vote.

<sup>46</sup>Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1925), I, p. 666.

<sup>47</sup>The Times (London), July 25, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., June 19, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., June 24, 1890, p. 9. This belief was substantiated by Sir George Hamilton, Salisbury's First Lord of the Admiralty. George Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1868-1906, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1917-1922), II, pp. 140-143.

<sup>50</sup>The Times (London), July 12, 1890, p. 9.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., June 6, 1890, p. 4.

<sup>52</sup>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, series 3, vol. 347, July 28, 1890, p. 1108.

<sup>53</sup>The Times (London), July 19, 1890, p. 7. There is no evidence that Caprivi made any effort at all to intimidate or muzzle government officials who opposed the Treaty. As far as Wissmann was concerned, he was too loyal and conscientious to have done so in any case.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., July 16, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>55</sup>Reichsanzeiger, July 29, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), July 30, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>56</sup>Kreuzzeitung, July 30, 1890, morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup>Konservative Monatschrift, July, 1890, as quoted in Deutsche öffentliche Meinung, p. 75.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., pp. 70-71, 77.

<sup>59</sup>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 11, 1890, second morning edition, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 11, 1890, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., Aug. 11, 1890, p. 1; The Times (London), Aug. 11, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>62</sup>The Times (London), Aug. 11, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., Aug. 25, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., Aug. 26, 1890, p. 3.

<sup>65</sup>Henry Bair, "Karl Peters and German Colonialism," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University, 1968), pp. 203, 240; Wertheimer, Pan-German League, pp. 25-26.

<sup>66</sup>Wertheimer, Pan-German League, pp. 24-25, 34-35, 38-40. These points in whole or in part are obscure in works by Townsend, Langer, Henderson and Taylor.

<sup>67</sup>RD, VIII Legislature period, Session I, vol. II, Sittings 33, 35, 37, 38, Dec. 2, 4, 9, 10, 1890, pp. 751-57, 777-81, 812-16, 837.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., VIII Legislature period, Session I, vol. II, Sittings 58, 59, Feb. 5, 6, 1891, pp. 1322-45, 1347-64.



<sup>69</sup>Ibid., VIII Legislature period, Session I, vol. II, 58th sitting, Feb. 5, 1891, pp. 1229-1335; Uganda was not specifically mentioned in the speech, but it was inferred by Caprivi that the cession of Witu was so insignificant that territorial settlement west of Lake Victoria was adequate compensation for both Witu and Uganda.

<sup>70</sup>Hamburger Nachrichten, Feb. 8, 1891, p. 1; Feb. 9, 1891, p. 1; Feb. 11, 1891, p. 1; Feb. 15, 1891, p. 1.

<sup>71</sup>Otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, 3 vols. (Berlin: J. G. Cottasche, 1922), III, pp. 147-49, as quoted in Wertheimer, Pan-German League, pp. 27-29.

CHAPTER VI  
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE TREATY

A. Germany's Allies and the Treaty

Although the Anglo-German Colonial Agreement turned out to mean little for Anglo-German relations or for German domestic affairs, another important aspect of the Treaty was its influence and effect on the other members of the European community, for there was a great variety of response throughout Europe.

Perhaps the most unique and uninformed heralding of the Treaty appeared in the Spanish paper, Diario Mercantil. The paper declared that Britain had ceded Helgoland, an island which belonged to no one and was located on the African coast between the territories of Nyanza, Victoria, and the Congo, to Germany. The paper went on to maintain that this transaction would cause a disruption of the European balance of power.<sup>1</sup>

The most enthusiastic response to the Treaty naturally came from Germany's two allies, Austria and Italy. The Treaty would be viewed favorably in Italy as a means of reinforcing the Mediterranean agreements and binding Britain more closely to the Triple Alliance. Italy could depend on a greater degree of support from Britain in case of conflict with France. The French Ambassador in Rome, M. Billot, reported that in high government circles in Italy the Treaty was considered to be a great reinforcement to European peace in that it drew Britain even closer to the Triple Alliance.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister, had been attempting to use his influence with Germany to obtain aid in wringing colonial concessions from Britain in the hinterland of the Somali coast. By the (Anglo)-German Agreement, Germany was strengthening Britain's position on the Nile; Italy could expect no further help here.<sup>3</sup> Initially Crispi was fearful that the Agreement might possibly be at the expense of previously established Italian colonial interests, but he was assured otherwise by the respective foreign offices. Despite this potential disadvantage, the newspaper Riforma spoke for most Italians in welcoming the Treaty and considering it as an advantage to all concerned.<sup>4</sup>

Austria had greater reason to be enthusiastic about the Treaty than Italy for she had no conflict of interest. There were no colonial territories over which she was concerned, and any action that would draw Britain closer to the Triple Alliance enhanced Austria's security vis-à-vis Russia. The Vienna Fremdenblatt, the organ closest to the Austrian Foreign Office, reported that:

All the differences with England arising from the colonial policy of Germany, which constantly caused apprehensions of a disturbance of intimate relations existing between the two countries, appear to have been thus finally removed, and the closest rapprochement between England and Germany to have been sealed.<sup>5</sup>

As far as the provisions of the Treaty were concerned, the Austrians did not feel that the Germans did poorly in the

exchange of territory. This view was undoubtedly influenced by Austria's lack of a substantial colonial tradition and her single-minded concern with continental affairs. The liberal Neue Freie Presse maintained, somewhat over-optimistically, that:

The acquisition of Heligoland... is in the eyes of the German people a sufficient equivalent for a few sacrifices in Africa. The cession of Heligoland is a guarantee for a long period of peace between Germany and England.<sup>6</sup>

The Presse felt that both sides had made favorable gains, but that Germany especially profited from the exchange.<sup>7</sup> On June 22 the Fremdenblatt carried the official congratulations of Franz Joseph to Britain and Germany on the proposed Agreement. The paper then editorialized further that:

Although it is certain that Great Britain derives the greater apparent and material advantage from the bargain, Germany has been placed in no such position as can justify the lamentations of some of the Berlin papers. Germany is now in secure possession of a territory several times larger than the home country, which will be ample for the development of the grandest amount of commercial expansion.<sup>8</sup>

On the same subject of Germany's gain, the Presse wrote:

It is natural that the French should feel disappointed, for they have been hoping to see the relations between the Germans and the English grow gradually cooler over African disputes. The cession of Heligoland also disconcerts some of France's strategical plans, for it was proposed that in case of another war, the French should make a descent on the German coasts. Thus the possession of Heligoland, although of no use to England, is of some strategical importance to Germany.<sup>9</sup>

As far as Austria was concerned, by far the most important issue involved in the Treaty was the non-territorial

implication. Kalnoky's organ wrote:

...the Anglo-German compact has its importance outside Africa for Germany and England have not only become colonial neighbors but friends in Europe, and this, from the international point of view, is a very great gain.<sup>10</sup>

Several weeks later the same paper was giving a great deal of attention to the possibility of a meeting sometime in August among Crispi, Caprivi, and Kalnoky to discuss the adherence of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance.<sup>11</sup>

#### B. France and the Treaty

The French, of course, did object to the Treaty. Their greatest fear was undoubtedly just what the Austrian press was hinting, that England would join the Triple Alliance. Should such an event transpire, France would not only be frustrated in any Mediterranean or African ambitions she might entertain, but in case of a European conflagration, she would be faced by a formidable coalition. Militarily she would have lost the one advantage in which she was superior to the Triple Alliance: naval predominance. The fear of a quadruple alliance was a primary issue raised in the French press. Le Temps, the leading daily and semi-official mouthpiece of the Quai d'Orsay, wrote:

Lord Salisbury has carried his desire to oblige Germany to the utmost limits. When we think of all the glorious memories connecting Equatorial Africa with the history of English explorers, when we consider of how recent date are Germany's

territorial claims in that region, and when we dwell upon the danger of solutions which cut in two the British possessions in Africa, we come to the conclusion that it must have been for very powerful reasons that Lord Salisbury decided to make such a large allowance to Germany.<sup>12</sup>

The Moniteur Universel also felt that the Treaty had a secret provision, which was perhaps some new political arrangement. Britain would never have relinquished Helgoland without some political or territorial concession in Europe. The paper also protested against the right of Germany and Britain to divide east Africa between themselves.<sup>13</sup>

The clerical Univers and the liberal republican Le Journal des Débats both acknowledged that Germany had greatly improved her defensive stature vis-à-vis France. The Univers suggested that Salisbury was happy to do this so as to further constrict France. The Débats pointed out that the island was highly valuable for Germany, given the use France had made of it in 1870. The statement of German Admiral von Henk was quoted:

In the possession of Germany, covered with batteries, provided with a formidable armament, Heligoland will become the maritime defense of the Empire, and, thanks to it, the German fleet will be in a position to assume almost alone the important task of defending the coasts, which will supply the means of reducing to a minimum the number of troops of the land army which it is necessary to reserve for this purpose.<sup>14</sup>

The Revue Militaire de l'Étranger was fearful that Germany's increased security would make her more aggressive and militant.<sup>15</sup>

The Boulangist organ, Le Pays, attempted to make the

Treaty appear as a great humiliation for France, a disgrace which other men of "stronger stuff" would never have permitted. The two victors of Waterloo had again been permitted to combine against France. It was hoped that France still would have the last word, however, for the Treaty was a blatant violation of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1862, in which both powers agreed to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>16</sup>

On June 22 it was reported from Paris that the whole matter of the Anglo-German Treaty and its implications was to be raised before the Chamber of Deputies. Ribot himself (the French Foreign Minister), in the meantime, publicly asserted that Britain and Germany had violated not only the treaty of 1862, but also article thirty-four of the Berlin Act, which obliged all signatory nations to consult and give notice before establishing protectorates.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, however, Le Temps held out the olive branch:

It should be known in London that there is the most conciliatory disposition in Paris, that the affair will be treated with all possible courtesy and good will, but that it will be treated as a business affair, that is to say, never forgetting the great principle of quid pro quo, or as Prince Bismarck liked to say, the principle of do ut des.<sup>18</sup>

If France was to obtain some advantage from this unfavorable situation, Ribot recognized that some Parliamentary agitation for the benefit of the foreign press and officials could be

of some value. Even if Britain had joined the Triple Alliance, and nothing could be done on this account, agitation against the Treaty would be necessary for domestic reasons. The government would never be able to withstand (the) acknowledgment of the exchange without a quid pro quo. On June 18, Ribot met with Count Münster on the subject of the Treaty and angrily denounced its provisions. Had he been extremely concerned with the possibilities of an altered Anglo-German-French relationship, Ribot would probably have behaved in a less emotional fashion so as to conceal his real trepidation. Evidence supporting this contention regarding Ribot's indignation and surprise is Münster's assertion that many French politicians had foreseen an Anglo-German east African settlement for some time.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, the French Government appeared to be disturbed. Münster reported that Ribot had told Lord Lytton, the British Ambassador, that he was sure there were secret clauses to the Treaty.<sup>20</sup> The possibility had been suggested to him by Herbette, the French Ambassador in Berlin.<sup>21</sup> Whether this was playacting or whether Ribot actually believed his own accusations is open to question. Whatever the case, Ribot knew that his government would be subjected to untenable pressures if compensations were not secured.

On July 4, Le Temps announced that the British Government had accepted the principle of compensation for France in return for recognition of the Zanzibar protectorate.<sup>22</sup> The



problem now was finding suitable compensation. Fear of the domestic political situation drove Ribot to hint in very strong terms before the Chamber of Deputies that France might be allowed to annex Tunis. The Radicals, led by Floquet, Lacroix, and Clemenceau, were demanding annexation of the territory without the consultation of the other great powers. Münster believed it unlikely that Ribot would risk such a rash action, a measure bound to encounter the adamant opposition of Britain and the Triple Alliance. Eventually the French Minister would probably be satisfied with much less, but for political reasons the demand had to be made.<sup>23</sup>

Münster's prediction was soon born out, for Ribot declared himself willing to accept merely the abrogation of the British Commercial Treaty with Tunis as compensation. The British, however, would not agree to this for fear of antagonizing Italy.<sup>24</sup>

With the prospects for compensation appearing more remote, the French now appealed to the Germans. The French Ambassador, departing somewhat from regular procedures, approached Holstein, one of Caprivi's chief advisors, with a note reminding Germany that France had adhered to the Anglo-French Agreement on Zanzibar by a declaration on March 10, 1886. Herbette tried to influence Holstein to accept "some sort" of alteration of the status of Tunis in France's favor. The argument used by the Ambassador was that Bismarck had once encouraged France to take

Tunis. Holstein was unimpressed.<sup>25</sup>

The Germans recognized that the whole matter was not really their problem; after all, they had received no territory by the Treaty to which the French could legally object. The matter was primarily an Anglo-French problem, and all concerned recognized this fact. Münster had pointed out on July 12 that Franco-German relations reflected this recognition; as Anglo-French relations seemed to be degenerating, French opinion toward Germany was decidedly improving.<sup>26</sup> Germany had taken nothing to which France objected; the British, on the other hand, had taken much. Of the two signatories, therefore, France felt Germany to have least violated international law. The fact that France was now turning to Germany for aid in obtaining compensations from Britain indicated not only the unproductive status of the Franco-British negotiations, but also that the Quai d'Orsay's attitude was that the Treaty had not sufficiently damaged Franco-German relations to completely rule out the possibility of German aid in satisfying French needs. Paul Kayser of the colonial section of the Wilhelmstrasse felt that Germany should not interfere and thereby cause problems for the British; Whitehall undoubtedly preferred to handle the matter itself.<sup>27</sup> Holstein concurred. He also believed that the treaty of 1862 had not been violated.<sup>28</sup> Caprivi in turn concurred with Holstein's view and instructed Münster accordingly.<sup>29</sup>

Meanwhile the French, anticipating rejection of German aid after Holstein's negative response to Herbette, revived their

attempts to pressure the British. These efforts were particularly annoying to Salisbury for they came at the very time the Treaty was being debated in Parliament. Even though the Prime Minister had unequivocally refused any concession in Tunis, Ribot continued to agitate. Hatzfeldt recounted that Salisbury told him "...France's policy was stupid. It was as if she was intentionally trying to drive Britain into Germany's arms."<sup>30</sup> Hatzfeldt did his best to assure Salisbury that the French Government did not intend any serious antagonism and that a strong response from Whitehall would only complicate matters.<sup>31</sup> Hatzfeldt obviously concurred with Münster that much of the French aggressiveness regarding concessions in Tunis was necessary for domestic politics and that eventually France could be satisfied with a different quid pro quo.

Salisbury was much too astute a politician and diplomat not to perceive the necessity of Ribot's actions in the Chamber. He recognized that unnecessary provocation of France would be a weapon in the hands of his Francophile opposition in Parliament and perhaps could endanger the acceptance of the Helgoland bills.<sup>32</sup>

Fortunately, matters eventually evolved to the reasonable satisfaction of all concerned. Recognizing that nothing was to be gained in Tunis, Ribot asked the British for recognition of French protection over Madagascar. Although French influence on this island had been supreme for some time, no actual protectorate

had been proclaimed despite the fact that the French had made it clear that the island was definitely within their sphere of influence. Ribot additionally asked that Britain recognize the right of France to the southern hinterland of Algeria. Both these desires were reasonably compatible with British and German interests. Whitehall considered the Algerian hinterland worthless and there was little that could be done to unseat the French from their position in Madagascar. Settlement was hastened because the British were becoming more anxious over rumors that a Russo-Turkish conflict was near and that the Tsar planned to move on Constantinople. The eventuality seemed so probable that the Mediterranean fleet had received secret orders to concentrate in the Aegean Sea.<sup>33</sup> On August 5, 1890, agreement with France was reached.

The total settlement that evolved came in two parts. The first agreement, signed on August 5, provided for recognition of protectorates in Zanzibar and Madagascar respectively for Britain and France. In addition, the hinterland of French Algeria was recognized to extend as far south as a line from Saye on the Niger to Barruwa on Lake Chad.<sup>34</sup> The second part of the agreement consisted of an exchange of notes between the Germans and the French in which France recognized Germany's revised position in East Africa and Germany accorded recognition to France's Madagascar protectorate.<sup>35</sup>

During the course of negotiations in July, Germany had

departed somewhat from her position of aloofness and encouraged and aided the British and French in reaching the agreement. This service was recognized by many Frenchmen and contributed a great deal to alleviating some of the suspicions surrounding the Anglo-German Colonial Treaty. Münster was aware of the improved relations and accordingly reported to the Wilhelmstrasse an event in Paris which reinforced his view. While he was passing a crowd during a ride through Paris in an open carriage, one citizen called out: "C'est l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne!" The crowd gave a rousing cheer.<sup>36</sup>

The British, however, had not been particularly graceful in concluding the negotiations with the French. A good example of Whitehall's handling of the affair was Salisbury's celebrated remark about the consistency and color of the West African soil ceded to the "Gallic cock." Naturally neither the Quai d'Orsay nor the French people appreciated such behavior, and this worked to the advantage of Franco-German relations.

### C. Russia and the Treaty

If the seemingly increasing political isolation was difficult for the French as a result of the Anglo-German Treaty, it must have been even more difficult for the Russians, for they, unlike the French, were unaccustomed to its cold realities. In this respect the Anglo-German Colonial Agreement, concluded so recently after the cancellation of the Reinsurance Treaty, must

have been especially disquieting for the Tsar's Government. There is ample evidence that the Russians suspected the worst from the beginning. Baron de Staal, the Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, wrote St. Petersburg:

The principal importance of the transaction resides in the fact, it seems to me, of the rapprochement effected between the Germans and the British; a rapprochement to which the present arrangement offers a palpable witness. When one is united by numerous interests and positive engagements on one point of the globe, one is almost certain to proceed in concert in all the great questions that may arise in the international field. It is therefore idle to speculate, as many journals, on the question of whether a secret clause exists. For all practical purposes an entente with Germany has been accomplished. It cannot help but effect Britain's relations with the other powers of the Triple Alliance. This accord does not need a special clause or signatures. It stands on its own.<sup>37</sup>

All de Staal had to do was read Britain's most knowledgeable paper to become pessimistic. The Times wrote:

In this agreement politicians here discern not only an incident of great international importance, but also a triumph of German foreign policy and an undertaking with England that far exceeds the character of a mere entente cordiale.<sup>38</sup>

Another Times writer expressed the view that England and Germany should always be allies. The Morning Post, generally regarded as a government organ, announced that England's period of isolation was over. The Daily Telegraph declared that "...everywhere in Europe the [Colonial] Treaty is regarded as the prelude of a not formal, but nevertheless sound, Anglo-German Alliance."

The Saturday Review saw the Treaty as the conclusion of a firm Anglo-German alliance.<sup>39</sup>

Many other foreign newspapers, as has already been pointed out, implied or stated outright similar feelings. The frequent visits of William II to Britain and particularly the projected ministers' conference between the Triple Alliance ministers and Lord Salisbury all seemed to signify that Russia's arch rival and chief competitor in the Middle East was now combining forces with Europe's strongest military power. The Russian press certainly had no favorable comment on the Treaty. One complaint was that Helgoland in the hands of Germany would weaken Russia's naval position in the Baltic; but the most common fear expressed was that Britain had secretly joined the Triple Alliance and the new quadruple alliance planned to deprive Russia of her legitimate interests in the Balkans and the Middle East. One paper maintained that Russia would have to reinforce her garrisons, particularly on the borders of Afghanistan, for Britain was likely to be more aggressive as a result of her newfound security in the Anglo-German Treaty.<sup>40</sup>

At the same time that the Tsar's Government was being faced with the agony of an exaggerated feeling of isolation, France was doing her utmost to improve her relations with Russia. At almost the exact moment that news of the Anglo-German Treaty broke, the French Government began to prosecute Russian Nihilists in exile in Paris. The trials and convictions that took place in

June and July of 1890 were ostentatiously approved in the Russian press.<sup>41</sup>

Although the Tsar himself and Giers preferred close relations with a more conservative-oriented German Government, the Kaiser's actions and remarks provided little reassurance. Since William had changed his mind on renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, one thing after another had occurred to make it appear that Germany was moving in an anti-Russian direction. At the time the Reinsurance Treaty was being rejected, Prince Edward was receiving an enthusiastic reception in Berlin.<sup>42</sup> Then in May, 1890, a bill calling for army increases was introduced before the Reichstag. Part of the government's public rationale for this increase was the need of defending Germany against the Russian menace.<sup>43</sup> Germany did not appear to be very trusting of her neighbor. This was followed by several indiscrete, inflammatory, anti-Russian statements by the Kaiser while he was visiting East Prussia. The Tsar was deeply offended. One of the speeches on the anniversary of Waterloo seemed to be a warning to Alexander that he should not attempt to emulate Napoleon or he would suffer a similar fate.<sup>44</sup> This statement was made without any apparent reason but then came the Colonial Treaty with all its implications. Following the incorporation of Helgoland into the Reich, the Kaiser paid a state visit to Britain and was received with wild enthusiasm. The Russian Ambassador to Britain was painfully aware of the festivities





A TRIPLE ALLIANCE

"The Prince of Wales doth join with all the world  
 In praise of--Kaiser Wilhelm; by my hopes,  
 I do not think a braver gentleman,  
 More active-valiant, or more valiant-young,  
 More daring, or more bold, is now alive  
 To grace this latter age with noble deeds." (Punch,  
 July 11, 1891, p. 15)

and was pessimistic regarding their meaning.<sup>45</sup>

Between August 17 and 22, 1890, William II was to pay a state visit to Russia. It was anticipated that Russo-German relations would be markedly improved (as a) result. The immediate situation appeared most promising. What may have been a tremendous gesture of goodwill on Russia's part was an announcement that all soldiers recruited in 1885, 1886, and 1887 would soon be discharged into the reserves and that the period of regular military service was to be reduced from five years to four.<sup>46</sup> Given the statements made in the Reichstag at the time of the debate on the German Army bill, this should have been considered an important gesture on Russia's part. But during the visit, neither the Kaiser nor Caprivi chose to satisfy Giers' desperate yearning for positive assurances regarding Germany's position on Bulgaria or the Straits. Caprivi, even though admitting the correctness of Russia's stance on Ferdinand of Coburg's position in Bulgaria and her interpretation of the Straits Convention, rejected the Russian Minister's suggestion that written assurances be given the Russians regarding what had been said.<sup>47</sup> This was all too much for the Germanophile Giers to cope with. Just as during Katkov's time, anti-German influences at St. Petersburg, which were strong to begin with, now were rapidly gaining ascendancy. Undoubtedly the thing that made Giers' position most difficult was the Colonial Treaty. Had it not existed, the other grievances might more easily have

been ignored. But a large-scale treaty at this particular time and under these special circumstances indicated the need for an alteration of Russian policy. What is perhaps most ironic is that France was successful in leading Russia into an entente and then an alliance, which despite its original anti-British orientation was inevitably anti-German. This was done at the very time that France enjoyed what would legitimately be considered satisfactory relations with Germany for, as has been shown, the aftermath of the Colonial Treaty left no serious Franco-German repercussions. Had the Wilhelmstrasse been as successful in assuaging the Russians during the period following the Colonial Treaty as they had the French, there is little likelihood that the Tsar would have accepted the extended hand of the French Republic.

D. The Treaty as the Basis for an Entente Cordiale

If the Colonial Treaty of 1890 did not produce a great popularity for things English with the average German, at least the German Government did hope originally to maintain a special relation with Britain, possibly as a prelude to eventual British membership in the Triple Alliance.<sup>48</sup> The British, for their part, also wished to carry the Agreement further, specifically to use it as a means of enlisting German aid to prevent French access to the Nile from the west.<sup>49</sup> And indeed what might really have turned the Anglo-German Treaty into something more significant would have been a continuation of agreements on specific questions. In the colonial field, there was, in fact, a series

of minor agreements, evidencing the continuing special relation between the two powers in 1892 and 1893.<sup>50</sup> The last agreement, of November 15, 1893, delineated German and British spheres of influence in the hinterland of the Cameroons and Nigeria east as far as the Nile basin. The spoils thus were divided before the French had forced their way inside the territory. The agreement did not prove to be of lasting duration, however, because the Germans were suspicious of Britain's overall attitude despite this series of treaties.

This German suspicion evolved from the return of Gladstone and the Liberals to power in the Summer of 1892. Count Hatzfeldt's assessment of the effect that the change of government would have for Germany was "...that Gladstone will show a greater friendliness toward France." The German Ambassador also felt that Britain would be less willing to support Italy in case of trouble with France.<sup>51</sup> Count Solms-Sonnenwalde, the German Ambassador in Rome, confirmed this latter fear several months later. Solms recounted a conversation between the British Ambassador, Lord Vivian, and Benedetto Brin, the Italian Foreign Minister:

Lord Vivian asked him [Brin] whether Italy would move against France in case of a Franco-German war. Brin replied that if France attacked Germany, Italy would naturally go to Germany's aid. He [Brin] then asked Lord Vivian whether Italy could count on England's assistance if she [Italy] were involved in a similar way in a war with France. Vivian.

replied that in that eventuality it was very questionable whether public opinion in Britain would allow it. "It is of first importance for me [Lord Vivian] to be clear on this point."<sup>52</sup>

In December, 1892, the most serious Anglo-German difficulty since the signing of the Colonial Agreement of 1890 occurred; the British tried to prevent a German syndicate from obtaining railroad concessions in Turkey. The Kaiser was sympathetic to the railroad project, which was eventually to be the Berlin-Baghdad railroad, and the British interference was strongly resented. The British were finally told that if they did not desist, the Wilhelmstrasse would oppose proposed increases in the Egyptian army. Whitehall immediately capitulated.<sup>53</sup> Here was evidence that the relation forged by the Colonial Agreement of 1890 was not invulnerable.

A second disturbing event from the German viewpoint followed closely on the heels of the railroad problem. In July, 1893, France and Britain appeared on the verge of war over French territorial demands imposed on the Siamese. At the time when news of the crisis broke, William II was visiting his English relatives at Cowes. William was unnerved by the episode and reacted in a characteristic fashion by declaring that the French had deliberately chosen this particular moment to provoke a war because the British fleet was in poor condition and the German army had not yet reaped the advantages provided by recent military legislation. The Emperor nonetheless seemed ready to combat the French at once, despite the fact that Germany was not

really involved in the dispute.<sup>54</sup>

As events transpired, cooler heads prevailed and it was determined that the whole incident was a mistake; unfortunately, however, the Germans were never fully convinced that such was the case. The conclusion reached in Berlin was that the British were so apprehensive about the French that they had backed down completely.<sup>55</sup>

Gladstone's questionable behavior motivated Caprivi to take a more neutral attitude toward Britain. If Britain would not stand up for her own rights vis-à-vis the French, she certainly could not be relied on to help Germany. In late 1893 the Chancellor was presented with an opportunity to improve relations with France and he took it. The Quai d'Orsay was interested in nullifying the Anglo-German agreement of 1893 regarding the hinterland of the Cameroons. The Wilhelmstrasse let it be known that it was not averse to an alteration of the recent Anglo-German Treaty. Negotiators were soon working diligently in Berlin and on February 4, 1894, a solution was concluded that not only gave the French the opportunity to advance north from the French Congo to Lake Chad, but also made possible an eastern advance toward the Nile.<sup>56</sup> Naturally the British were enraged by the German action.

Unfortunately, the difficulty did not end here, for in May, 1894, in order to block any projected French advance into the region of the Upper Nile from a westward direction, the

British agreed to the extension of Belgian authority north from the northeastern edge of the Congo. It was hoped by Whitehall that this would create a buffer zone against French penetration. As a quid pro quo Leopold agreed to lease the British a corridor connecting Lake Albert Edward and Lake Tanganyika.<sup>57</sup> Not only did this reconstitute the Cape-to-Cairo route from the stillborn Mackinnon Treaty of 1890, but cut off the Germans from free land access to the Congo. This latter issue, it will be remembered, was a major issue as far as the Germans were concerned in 1890 during the colonial negotiation. Marschall had been quite clear that the Germans should not be cut off from access to the Congo by a corridor connecting Uganda and Nyasaland. Naturally the Germans were enraged when news of the Congo Treaty was released and they were forced to expend a great deal of effort to secure the abrogation of the objectionable part of the British-Congo Treaty.<sup>58</sup> From this point on, Anglo-German relations deteriorated into the monumental circumstances surrounding the Jameson raid. The Colonial Agreement of 1890 was not sufficiently cohesive to hold the two powers together in time of serious stress.

Perhaps the most significant difference between this agreement and the Franco-British Entente of 1904 was that neither Britain nor Germany was faced with any sufficiently serious crisis immediately after July 1, 1890, that could cement the groundwork that had been laid. Had Fashoda occurred in 1891 or

1892 rather than in 1898, or the Siamese Crisis proved more serious, perhaps Britain would actually have joined the Triple Alliance. As it turned out, Caprivi's foreign policy, which was based on the proposition that a neutralization of Russo-German relations could be compensated for with a comparable improvement in Anglo-German relations, proved to be unattainable. One of the most important reasons for this failure was the inability of the British and Germans to carry on in co-operating in African affairs as had been done in 1890.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Dairio Mercantil, July 1, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), July 2, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Documents Diplomatiques Français, series I, 10 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Française, 1929-1938), VIII, Billot to Ribot, Rome, June 20, 1890, no. 87, pp. 118-119. Henceforth referred to as DDF.

<sup>3</sup>C. J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886-1896 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 6-8.

<sup>4</sup>Riforma, June 18, 1890 as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>Fremdenblatt, June 18, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Neue Freie Presse, June 18, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Fremdenblatt, June 22, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 23, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>Neue Freie Presse, June 22, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 23, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup>Fremdenblatt, June 22, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 22, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., July 9, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), July 10, 1890, p. 5. I have found no evidence that such a meeting took place.

<sup>12</sup>Le Temps, June 18, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 19, 1890, p. 5. It is interesting to note that this paper felt Germany was getting the more favorable territorial deal.

<sup>13</sup>Moniteur Universel, June 20, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 21, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>14</sup>Univers, June 20, 1890 and Le Journal des Débats, June 20, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 21, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>15</sup>Revue Militaire de l'Étranger, June 20, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 21, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>Le Pays, June 19, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 20, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup>The Times (London), June 23, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup>Le Temps, June 22, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), June 23, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-1927), VIII, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, June 19, 1890, no. 1690, p. 26. Henceforth referred to as GP. Ribot also asserted that Germany had acquired very great advantages at little sacrifice to herself.

<sup>20</sup>German Foreign Ministry Archives, University of California Microfilms (UCI), reel 207, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, June 19, 1890, frames 61-63. Henceforth referred to as UCI.

<sup>21</sup>DDF, series 1, vol. VIII, Herbette to Ribot, Berlin, June 19, 1890, no. 85, pp. 116-118.

<sup>22</sup>Le Temps, July 4, 1890, as quoted in The Times (London), July 5, 1890, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup>GP, VIII, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, July 12, 1890, no. 1691, pp. 27-28.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., VIII, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, July 12, 1890, no. 1691, pp. 27-28. The Italians also had a commercial agreement with Tunis which the French wished ended.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., VIII, Holstein memo, Berlin, July 18, 1890, no. 1693, p. 29.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., VIII, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, July 12, 1890, no. 1691, pp. 27-28; the Kaiser could not resist gloating over Münster's report. Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds.), Holstein Papers, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), III, no. 321, p. 344.

<sup>27</sup>UCI, 207, Kayser memo, Berlin, July 18, 1890, f. 167.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 207, Holstein to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, July 18, 1890, f. 169; an examination of the vaguely worded document would seem to confirm Holstein's view. The problem, however, was how one defined the phrase stating that Britain and France "so engaged reciprocally to respect the independence..." of the Sultan. Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols., (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909), no. 222, p. 718.

<sup>29</sup> UCI, 207, Caprivi to Münster, Berlin, July 23, 1890, f. 174.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 207, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, London, July 22, 1890, frs. 178-80. Salisbury refused to consider allowing France to further fortify her position in Tunis, not only because of his concern over the possible repercussions for Anglo-Italian relations, but also because of Tunis' proximity to Egypt.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 207, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, July 24, 1890, frs. 182-83.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 207, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, July 24, 1890, frs. 185-86.

<sup>33</sup> William L. Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance 1890-1894 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 124-25.

<sup>34</sup> Hertslet, Map of Africa, II, no. 229, pp. 738-39.

<sup>35</sup> GP, VIII, Herbette to Marschall, Berlin, Nov. 17, 1890, no. 1704, p. 38; Marschall to Herbette, Berlin, Nov. 17, 1890, no. 1705, p. 39.

<sup>36</sup> UCI, 207, Münster to Caprivi, Paris, July 25, 1890, frs. 194-97.

<sup>37</sup> A. Meyendorf (ed.), Correspondence Diplomatique de M. de Staal, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie des Science politique et social, 1929), II, pp. 88-89.

<sup>38</sup> The Times (London), June 20, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, pp. 80-81.

<sup>40</sup> The Times (London), June 26, 1890, p. 5; June 30, 1890, p. 5; Aug. 4, 1890, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., July 9, 1890, p. 5.

<sup>42</sup> Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 79; Serge Goriainov, "End of the Alliance of the Emperors," American Historical Review, vol. 23 (Apr., 1918), pp. 344-46, 349.

<sup>43</sup> Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 79.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>45</sup> Meyendorf, de Staal, II, p. 97.

<sup>46</sup>The Times (London), Aug. 13, 1890, p. 3; Aug. 19, 1890, p. 3; Aug. 29, 1890, p. 3.

<sup>47</sup>William L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 8-9; the Russians seemed to hold signed agreements in particular awe.

<sup>48</sup>Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), I, pp. 327-28.

<sup>49</sup>William R. Louis, "Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919," Britain and Germany in Africa, (eds.) Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 19.

<sup>50</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, no. 272, pp. 909-10; no. 273, pp. 910-11; no. 274, pp. 911-12; no. 275, pp. 913-15.

<sup>51</sup>GP, VIII, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, July 19, 1892, no. 1732, pp. 75-76.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., VIII, Solms to Caprivi, Rome, Sept. 26, 1892, no. 1742, pp. 90-91.

<sup>53</sup>Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 40.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 44; J. Alden Nichols, Germany after Bismarck: the Caprivi Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 281. Nichols shows that in fact the Kaiser was in near hysteria at the prospect of having to face both the French and Russian armies. He seemed to feel, however, that unless Germany took part in whatever transpired, her prestige as a world power would be lost.

<sup>55</sup>Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 44-45.

<sup>56</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, II, no. 198, pp. 657-60.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., II, no. 163, pp. 578-583; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 132-141.

<sup>58</sup>Hertslet, Map of Africa, II, no. 164, p. 584; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 136-141.

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## APPENDIX I

Agreement between the British and German Governments, respecting the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the opposite East African Mainland, and their Spheres of Influence. 29th October-1st November, 1886.\*

(1.) Count Hatzfeldt to the Earl of Iddesleigh.

(Translation)

My Lord, German Embassy, London, 29th Oct., 1886  
 The Government of His Majesty the Emperor and that of Her Britannic Majesty having agreed to regulate various questions connected with the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the opposite East African mainland by means of a friendly understanding, verbal communications have with this object taken place, at which the following articles have been agreed upon:--

Recognition of Sovereignty of Sultan of Zanzibar over Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, Mafia, &c.

1. Germany and Great Britain recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and over the smaller islands which lie in the neighbourhood of the above within a radius of 12 sea miles, as well as over the Islands of Lamu and Mafia.

Recognition of Sultan of Zanzibar's Sovereignty over certain Territories on the mainland.

On the mainland they likewise recognize as possessions of the Sultan a line of coast which stretches without interruption from the Minengani River at the head of Tunghi Bay to Kipini. This line commences on the south of the Minengani River, follows the course of that river for 5 sea miles, and continues thence on the line of latitude to the point where it strikes the right bank of the Rovuma River, crosses the Rovuma, and runs down its left bank.

The coast-line has an internal depth of 10 sea miles measured from the coast direct into the interior from high-water mark.

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\*Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Store, 1909) III, pp. 882-886.

Kau

The northern limit includes Kau.

Kismayu, Brawa, Meurka, Magadisho and Warsheik

To the north of Kipini the said Governments recognize as belonging to the Sultan the stations of Kismayu, Brawa, Meurka, and Magadisho, with radii landwards of 10 sea miles, and of Warsheik with a radius of 5 sea miles.

Leasing to German African Company of Customs Duties at Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani

2. Great Britain engages to support negotiations of Germany with the Sultan for the leasing to the German African Company of the customs duties at the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani, in return for an annual payment to the Sultan by the Company.

Respective Spheres of Influence to be Defined

3. Both Powers agree to establish a delimitation of their respective spheres of influence on this portion of the East African Continent of the same character as that to which they have agreed as regards the territories on the Gulf of Guinea.

Territory Referred to in Arrangement

The territory to which this arrangement applies is bounded on the south by the Rovuma River, and on the north by a line which, starting from the mouth of the Tana River, follows the course of that river or its affluents to the point of intersection of the Equator and the 38th degree of east longitude, thence strikes direct to the point of intersection of the 1st degree of north latitude with the 37th degree of east longitude, where the line terminates.

Line of Demarcation

The line of demarcation starts from the mouth of the River Wanga or Umbe, runs direct to Lake Jipé, passes thence along the eastern side and round the northern side of the lake and crosses the Lumi River;

Taveita and Chagga (Kilimanjaro District)

After which it passes midway between the territories of Taveita and Chagga, skirts the northern base of the Kilimanjaro range,

and thence is drawn direct to the point on the eastern side of Lake Victoria Nyanza which is intersected by the 1st degree of south latitude.

Mutual Engagements to Respect Spheres of Influence

Germany engages not to make acquisitions of territory, accept Protectorates, or interfere with the extension of British influence to the north of this line; and Great Britain makes the same engagement as regards the territories lying to the south of this line.

Kilimanjaro Districts

4. Great Britain will use her good offices to promote a friendly arrangement of the rival claims of the Sultan and the German East African Company to the Kilimanjaro districts.

Witu

5. Both Powers recognize as belonging to Witu the coast-line which commences to the north of Kipini and continues to the northern extremity of Manda Bay.

Invitation to Sultan of Zanzibar to accede to Berlin Act

6. Great Britain and Germany will jointly invite the Sultan to accede to the Act of Berlin, 26th February, 1885, with reservation of His Highness' existing rights under the 1st Article of the Act.

Adhesion of Germany to Declaration between Great Britain and France of 10th March, 1862

7. Germany engages to adhere to the Declaration signed by Great Britain and France on the 10th March, 1862, with regard to the recognition of the independence of Zanzibar.

Having brought the foregoing articles to the knowledge of my Government, I am now authorized to declare their acceptance in the name of the Imperial Government, provided that Her Majesty's Government also make a similar declaration of their acceptance.

I have, &c.,  
HATZFELDT

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(2.) The Earl of Iddesleigh to Count Hatzfeldt.

M. l'Ambassadeur, Foreign Office, 1st November, 1886

I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of the 29th ultimo, in which you inform me that you are authorized to accept, on behalf of the Imperial Government, the following Articles of Agreement respecting Zanzibar and the adjoining territories, provided that they are accepted by Her Majesty's Government:--

Recognition of Sovereignty of Sultan of Zanzibar over Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, Lamu, Mafia, &c.

1. Great Britain and Germany recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and over the smaller islands which lie in the neighbourhood of the above within a radius of 12 sea miles, as well as over the Islands of Lamu and Mafia.

Recognition of Sultan of Zanzibar's Sovereignty over certain Territories on the mainland

On the mainland they likewise recognize as the possession of the Sultan a line of coast which stretches without interruption from the Minengani River at the head of Tunghi Bay to Kipini. This line commences on the south of the Minengani River, follows the course of that river for 5 sea miles, continues thence on the line of latitude to the point where it strikes the right bank of the Rovuma River, crosses the Rovuma, and runs down its left bank.

The coast-line has thence an internal depth of 10 sea miles measured from the coast direct into the interior from high-water mark.

Kau

The northern limit includes Kau.

Kismayu, Brawa, Meurka, Magadisho and Warsheikh

To the north of Kipini the said Governments recognize as belonging to the Sultan the stations of Kismayu, Brawa, Meurka, and Magadisho with radii landwards of 10 sea miles, and of Warsheikh with a radius of 5 sea miles.

Leasing to German African Company of Customs Duties at Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani

2. Great Britain engages to support negotiations of Germany with the Sultan for the leasing to the German African Company of the customs duties at the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and

Pangani, in return for an annual payment to the Sultan by the Company.

Respective Spheres of Influence to be defined

3. Both Powers agree to establish a delimitation of their respective spheres of influence on this portion of the East African Continent of the same character as that to which they have agreed as regards the territories on the Gulf of Guinea.

Territory referred to in the Arrangement

The territory to which the arrangement applies is bounded on the south by the Rovuma River, and on the north by a line which, starting from the mouth of the Tana River, follows the course of that river or its affluents to the point of intersection of the Equator and the 38th degree of east longitude, thence strikes direct to the point of intersection of the 1st degree of north latitude with the 37th degree of east longitude, where the line terminates.

Line of Demarcation

The line of demarcation starts from the mouth of the River Wanga or Umbe, runs direct to Lake Jipé, passes along the eastern side and round the northern side of the lake and crosses the Lumi River.

Taveita and Chagga (Kilimanjaro District)

After which it passes midway between the territories of Taveita and Chagga, skirts the northern base of the Kilimanjaro range, and thence is drawn direct to the point on the eastern side of Lake Victoria Nyanza which is intersected by the 1st degree of south latitude.

Mutual Engagement to respect Spheres of Influence

Great Britain engages not to make acquisitions of territory, accept Protectorates, or interfere with the extension of German influence to the south of this line; and Germany makes the same engagement as regards the territories to the north of this line.

Kilimanjaro Districts

4. Great Britain will use her good offices to promote a friendly arrangement of the rival claims of the Sultan and the German East African Company to the Kilimanjaro districts.

Witu

5. Both Powers recognize as belonging to Witu the coast-line which commences to the north of Kipini, and continues to the northern extremity of Manda Bay.

Invitation to Sultan of Zanzibar to accede to the Berlin Act

6. Great Britain and Germany will jointly invite the Sultan to accede to the Act of Berlin with reservation of His Highness' existing rights under the 1st Article of the Act.

Adhesion of Germany to Declaration between Great Britain and France of 10th March, 1862

7. Germany engages to adhere to the Declaration signed by Great Britain and France on the 10th March, 1862, with regard to the recognition of the independence of Zanzibar.

I have to declare on behalf of Her Majesty's Government their Acceptance of the above Articles of Agreement.

I have, &c.,  
IDDESLEIGH.

## APPENDIX II

--AGREEMENT between Great Britain and Germany, respecting the Discouragement of Annexations in Rear of their Spheres of Influence in East Africa. July, 1887.\*

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet.

Foreign Office, 2nd July, 1887

Sir,

BARON VON PLESSEN called at this Office on the 22nd ultimo and stated that the German East African Association had addressed a Petition to the Imperial Government, in which they expressed their apprehensions lest the expedition undertaken by Mr. Stanley for the relief of Emin Pasha should, after effecting its purpose, be utilized for the establishment, or paving the way for the establishment, of English Protectorates at the back of the German sphere of action in East Africa.

The German Government, Baron von Plessen explained, did not share the apprehension of the Company, inasmuch as in the negotiations of last October respecting the delimitation of the English and German spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, the main question was the arrangement of a line of demarcation, on the north of which the English were free to operate, while the Germans were to operate on the south of it. England expressly engaged not to acquire Possessions, accept Protectorates, or oppose the extension of German influence to the south of the line of demarcation; and although it was true that no special geographical line had been expressly fixed by agreement for the delimitation to the west, Baron von Plessen said that the Imperial Government had started from the idea that England would leave Germany a free hand for the future in the territories south of the Victoria-Nyanza Lake, and, without interfering with the territories lying to the east of the Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa at the back of the German Protectorate, would confine herself to opening up the territories lying to the north of the agreed line. As, however, rumours had reached the Imperial Government that Mr. Mackinnon, who had largely contributed to the Emin Pasha Expedition, was not alone actuated by purely philanthropic aims, but also entertained views of a commercial and political character, which rumours harmonized with the telegraphic report received from Zanzibar, that he was treating with the Sultan for the collection of customs at Mombasa, Baron von Plessen stated that his Government had deemed it expedient to lay an early explanation of their views on this question before Her Majesty's Government.

I have to instruct your Excellency with regard to this communication to at once inform the German Government that Her

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\*Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, pp. 888-90.



Majesty's Government take the same view of the question as is entertained at Berlin, and are prepared to discourage British annexations in the rear of the German sphere of influence, on the understanding that the German Government will equally discourage German annexations in the rear of the British sphere.

I have further to request your Excellency to assure the Imperial Government that there is no cause to apprehend that Mr. Stanley's expedition will be used as a means of interference with the territory under German influence, or in the rear of it; and to explain that Mr. Mackinnon's negotiations are merely connected with the scheme of English capitalists for opening up the interior in what is now the British sphere, which was frequently referred to in the discussion between the two Governments respecting the Delimitation Commission.

I am, &c.,  
SALISBURY

Sir E. Malet.

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(2.)--Mr. Scott to the Marquis of Salisbury

Berlin, 8th July, 1887

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to state that, in compliance with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, I informed Count Bismarck to-day that, in reply to a verbal communication made at the Foreign Office by Baron Plessen in regard to certain apprehensions of the German East African Company in connection with Mr. Stanley's expedition for the relief of Emin Pasha, I had been instructed by your Lordship to lose no time in stating to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government took the same view as the German Government of the intention of the Agreement for delimiting the two spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, and that they were prepared to discourage British annexations in the rear of the German sphere, on the understanding that the German Government would equally discourage German annexations in the rear of the British sphere.

I said I had also been instructed to reassure him in regard to Mr. Stanley's expedition.

That there might be no misunderstanding on this point, I ventured to read the whole of your Lordship's despatch to his Excellency.

Count Bismarck replied that your Lordship's explanation was clear and most satisfactory, and he begged me to convey his sincere thanks for the communication.

Baron Plessen, his Excellency added, had been quite correct in stating that the German Government had not shared the apprehensions of the Company, but he had thought it more advisable and comfortable with the good understanding between the two

Governments to have no concealments on these questions, but to invite a frank exchange of views on this subject, in order to be able authoritatively to set all such apprehensions at rest.

At Count Bismarck's desire I have repeated my communication to him in writing, and for that purpose I have employed, mutatis mutandis, the exact text of your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES S. SCOTT

The Marquis of Salisbury.

## APPENDIX III

--AGREEMENT between the British and German Governments, respecting Africa and Heligoland. Berlin, 1st July, 1890.\*

THE Undersigned,--

Sir Edward Baldwin Malet, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;

Sir Henry Percy Anderson, Chief of the African Department of Her Majesty's Foreign Office;

The Chancellor of the German Empire, General von Caprivi; The Privy Councillor in the Foreign Office, Dr. Krauel,--

Have, after discussion of various questions affecting the Colonial interests of Germany and Great Britain, come to the following Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments:--

East Africa. German Sphere of Influence.

Art. I.--In East Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Germany is bounded--

German Sphere. To the North. River Umba to Victoria Nyanza.

1. To the north by a line which, commencing on the coast at the north bank of the mouth of the River Umba [or Wanga], runs direct to Lake Jipé; passes thence along the eastern side and round the northern side of the lake, and crosses the River Lumé; after which it passes midway between the territories of Taveita and Chagga, skirts the northern base of the Kilimanjaro range, and thence is drawn direct to the point on the eastern side of Lake Victoria Nyanza which is intersected by the 1st parallel of south latitude; thence, crossing the lake on that parallel, it follows the parallel to the frontier of the Congo Free State, where it terminates.

Mount Mfumbiro

It is, however, understood that, on the west side of the lake, the sphere does not comprise Mount Mfumbiro; if that mountain shall prove to lie to the south of the selected parallel, the line shall be deflected so as to exclude it, but shall, nevertheless, return so as to terminate at the above-named point.

German Sphere. To the South. Rovuma River to Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika (Stevenson's Road)

2. To the south by a line which, starting on coast at

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\* Hertslet, Map of Africa, III, pp. 899-906.

the northern limit of the Province of Mozambique, follows the course of the River Rovuma to the point of confluence of the Msinje; thence it runs westward along the parallel of that point til it reaches Lake Nyassa; thence striking northward, it follows the eastern, northern, and western shores of the lake to the northern bank of the mouth of the River Songwe; it ascends that river to the point of its intersection by the 33rd degree of east longitude; thence it follows the river to the point where it approaches most nearly the boundary of the geographical Congo Basin defined in the 1st Article of the Act of Berlin, as marked in the map attached to the 9th Protocol of the Conference.

From that point it strikes direct to the above-named boundary; and follows it to the point of its intersection by the 32nd degree of east longitude; from which point it strikes direct to the point of confluence of the northern and southern branches of the River Kilambo, and thence follows that river til it enters Lake Tanganyika.

Map. Nyassa-Tanganyika Plateau.

The course of the above boundary is traced in general accordance with a map of the Nyassa-Tanganyika Plateau, officially prepared for the British Government in 1889.

German Sphere. To the West. River Kilambo to Congo Free State.

3. To the west by a line which, from the mouth of the River Kilambo to the 1st parallel of south latitude, is common with the Congo Free State.

East Africa. British Sphere of Influence.

The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Great Britain is bounded--

British Sphere. To the South. River Umba to Congo Free State.

1. To the south by the above-mentioned line running from the mouth of the River Umba (or Wanga) to the point where the 1st parallel of south latitude reaches the Congo Free State.

Mount Mfumbiro

Mount Mfumbiro is included in the sphere.

British Sphere. To the North. River Juba to confines of Egypt (Uganda, &c.).

2. To the north by a line commencing on the coast at the north bank of the mouth of the River Juba; thence it ascends that

bank of the river and is conterminous with the territory reserved to the influence of Italy in Gallaland and Abyssinia, as far as the confines of Egypt.

British Sphere. To the West. Basin of Upper Nile to Congo Free State (Uganda, &c.).

3. To the west by the Congo Free State, and by the western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile.

Withdrawal by Germany in favour of Great Britain of Protectorate over Witu.

Art. II.--In order to render effective the delimitation recorded in the preceding Article, Germany withdraws in favour of Great Britain her Protectorate over Witu.

Recognition by Great Britain of Sultan of Witu's Sovereignty.

Great Britain engages to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan of Witu over the territory extending from Kipini to the point opposite the Island of Kwyhoo, fixed as the boundary in 1887.

Withdrawal of German Protectorate over adjoining Coast up to Kismayu, to all other Territories North of Tana, and to Islands of Patta and Manda.

Germany also withdraws her Protectorate over the adjoining coast up to Kismayu, as well as her claims to all other territories on the mainland, to the north of the River Tana, and to the Islands of Patta and Manda.

South West Africa. German Sphere of Influence.

Art. III.--In Southwest Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Germany is bounded.

Namaqualand. Damaraland, &c.

1. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange River, and ascending the north bank of that river to the point of its intersection by the 20th degree of east longitude.

2. To the east by a line commencing at the above-named point, and following the 20th degree of east longitude to the point of its intersection by the 22nd parallel of south latitude, it runs eastward along that parallel to the point of its intersection by the 21st degree of east longitude; thence it follows that degree northward to the point of its intersection by the 18th parallel of south latitude; it runs eastward along that parallel

til it reaches the River Chobe; and descends the centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi, where it terminates.

German Access to the Zambesi

It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall have free access from her Protectorate to the Zambesi by a strip of territory which shall at no point be less than 20 English miles in width.

Southwest Africa. British Sphere of Influence. Bechuanaland, Kalahari, &c.

The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Great Britain is bounded to the west and north-west by the above-mentioned line.

Lake Ngami

It includes Lake Ngami.

Map

The course of the above boundary is traced in general accordance with a map officially prepared for the British Government in 1889.

Walfisch Bay

The delimitation of the southern boundary of the British territory of Walfisch Bay is reserved for arbitration, unless it shall be settled by the consent of the two Powers within two years from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement. The two Powers agree that, pending such settlement, the passage of the subjects and transit of goods of both Powers through the territory now in dispute shall be free; and the treatment of their subjects in that territory shall be in all respects equal. No dues shall be levied on goods in transit. Until a settlement shall be effected the territory shall be considered neutral.

Line of Boundary between the British Gold Coast Colony and the German Protectorate of Togo.  
Volta Districts.

Art. IV.--In West Africa--

1. The boundary between the German Protectorate of Togo and the British Gold Coast Colony commences on the coast at the marks set up after the negotiations between the Commissioners of

the two countries of the 14th and 28th of July, 1886; and proceeds direct northwards to the 6 10' parallel of north latitude; thence it runs along that parallel westward till it reaches the left bank of the River Aka; ascends the mid-channel of that river to the 6 20' parallel of north latitude; runs along that parallel westwards to the right bank of the River Dchawe or Shavoe; follows that bank of the river till it reaches the parallel corresponding with the point of confluence of the River Deine with the Volta; it runs along that parallel westward till it reaches the Volta; from that point it ascends the left bank of the Volta till it arrives at the neutral zone established by the Agreement of 1888, which commences at the confluence of the River Dakka with the Volta.

Each Power engages to withdraw immediately after the conclusion of this Agreement all its officials and employes from territory which is assigned to the other Power by the above delimitation.

Gulf of Guinea. Rio del Rey Creek.

2. It having been proved to the satisfaction of the two Powers that no river exists on the Gulf of Guinea corresponding with that marked on maps as the Rio del Rey, to which reference was made in the Agreement of 1885, a provisional line of demarcation is adopted between the German sphere in the Cameroons and the adjoining British sphere, which, starting from the head of the Rio del Rey Creek, goes direct to the point, about 9 8' of east longitude, marked "Rapids" in the British Admiralty Chart.

Freedom of Goods from Transit Dues between River Benué and Lake Chad.

Art. V.--It is agreed that no Treaty or Agreement, made by or on behalf of either Power to the north of the River Benué, shall interfere with the free passage of goods of the other Power, without payment of transit dues, to and from the shores of Lake Chad.

Treaties in Territories between the Benué and Lake Chad.

All Treaties made in territories intervening between the Benué and Lake Chad shall be notified by one Power to the other.

Lines of Demarcation subject to Modification.

Art. VI.--All the lines of demarcation traced in Articles I to IV shall be subject to rectification by agreement between the two Powers, in accordance with local requirements.

Boundary Commissioners to be Appointed.

It is specially understood that, as regards the boundaries traced in Article IV, Commissioners shall meet with the least possible delay for the object of such rectification.

Non-interference of either Power in Sphere of Influence of the other.

Art. VII.--The two Powers engage that neither will interfere with any sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I to IV. One Power will not in the sphere of the other make acquisitions, conclude Treaties, accept sovereign rights or Protectorates, nor hinder the extension of influence of the other.

No Companies or Individuals of either Power to exercise Sovereign Rights in Sphere of Influence of the other.

It is understood that no Companies nor individuals subject to one Power can exercise sovereign rights in a sphere assigned to the other, except with the assent of the latter.

Application of Berlin Act in Spheres of Influence within Limits of Free Trade Zone.

Art. VIII.--The two Powers engage to apply in all the portions of their respective spheres, within the limits of the free zone defined by the Act of Berlin of 1885, to which the first five articles of that Act are applicable at the date of the present Agreement;

Freedom of Trade.

The provisions of those articles according to which trade enjoys complete freedom;

Navigation of Lakes, Rivers, &c.

The navigation of the lakes, rivers, and canals, and of the ports on those waters, is free to both flags;

Differential Duties. Transport or Coasting Trade.

And no differential treatment is permitted as regards transport or coasting trade;

Duties on Goods.

Goods, of whatever origin, are subject to no dues except those, not differential in their incidence, which may be levied to meet expenditure in the interest of trade;



Transit Dues.

No transit dues are permitted;

Trade Monopolies.

And no monopoly or favour in matters of trade can be granted.

Settlements in Free Trade Zone.

The subjects of either Power will be at liberty to settle freely in their respective territories situated within the free trade zone.

Freedom of Goods from Transit Dues, &c.

It is specially understood that, in accordance with these provisions, the passage of goods of both Powers will be free from all hindrances and from all transit dues between Lake Nyassa and the Congo State, between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, on Lake Tanganyika, and between that lake and the northern boundary of the two spheres.

Trading and Mineral Concessions. Real Property Rights.

Art. IX.--Trading and mineral concessions, and rights to real property, held by Companies of individuals, subjects of one Power, shall, if their validity is duly established, be recognized in the sphere of the other Power. It is understood that concessions must be worked in accordance with local laws and regulations.

Protection of Missionaries.

Art. X.--In all territories in Africa belonging to, or under the influence of either Power, missionaries of both countries shall have full protection.

Religious Toleration and Freedom.

Religious toleration and freedom for all forms of divine worship and religious teaching are guaranteed.

Cession to be made by Sultan of Zanzibar to Germany of Possessions on the Mainland and of Island of Mafia.

Art. XI.--Great Britain engages to use all her influence to facilitate a friendly arrangement, by which the Sultan of Zanzibar shall cede absolutely to Germany his Possessions on the mainland comprised in existing Concessions to the German East African Company, and their Dependencies, as well as the Island of Mafia.

It is understood that His Highness will, at the same time, receive an equitable indemnity for the loss of revenue resulting from such cession.

German Recognition of British Protectorate over remaining Dominions of Sultan of Zanzibar, including Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and Witu.

Germany engages to recognize a Protectorate of Great Britain over the remaining dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, including the Islands of Zanzibar, and Pemba, as well as over the dominions of the Sultan of Witu.

Withdrawal of German Protectorate up to Kismayu.

And the adjacent territory up to Kismayu, from which her Protectorate is withdrawn. It is understood that if the cession of the German Coast has not taken place before the assumption by Great Britain of the Protectorate of Zanzibar, Her Majesty's Government will, in assuming the Protectorate, accept the obligation to use all their influence with the Sultan to induce him to make that cession at the earliest possible period in consideration of an equitable indemnity.

Art. XII.--Cession of Heligoland by Great Britain to Germany.


EDWARD B. MALET  
H. PERCY ANDERSON  
v. CAPRIVI  
K. KRAUEL

Berlin, 1st July, 1890.

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
# EAST AFRICA

## APPENDIX IV



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English Miles

Boundaries of:  
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 . . . . . 1887  
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## VITA

Jack Richard Dukes was born at Indianapolis, Indiana, on January 21, 1941. In 1946 he moved with his family to Champaign, Illinois, where he attended the public schools from 1947 to 1959, graduating from Champaign Senior High School in 1959. From 1959 to 1963 he attended Beloit College, majoring in history and minoring in political science. In the Fall of 1963 he began graduate work at Northern Illinois University in Modern European History. During his two years in residence at Northern Illinois University, Mr. Dukes served as a teaching assistant in the Department of History. After completing his Master's thesis entitled "The Influence of Friedrich von Holstein on the Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations, 1897-1901," Mr. Dukes graduated in 1966. While still completing his Master's thesis Mr. Dukes entered the University of Illinois as a Ph.D. candidate in 1965. At Illinois he worked as a research assistant for Professor Raymond P. Stearns in 1966 and 1967 and for the Department of History as a teaching assistant from 1967 to 1969. In the summer of 1969, Mr. Dukes was the recipient of a University of Illinois fellowship. He completed his dissertation, entitled "Helgoland, Zanzibar, East Africa: Colonialism in German Politics, 1884-1890," in January, 1970.

Presently Mr. Dukes is an instructor of history at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota.

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