

EAST AFR PROT

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Last previous Paper
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German East Africa
Telegraphic correspondence as to
operations

Mr. Bottomley & Mr. J. Anderson
Mr. Reed

They then to proceed from
misunderstanding to misunderstanding
The War Office management of these
operations is not impressive

Partly
with 9/15 Equ 9/15

1-2 R
9/15
L.A. 9.15

It looks as if the last W. O. cable will contain
an indefinite postponement of attack.

J. H. 1.15

This is all hopeless

11.1.15

Next subsequent Page

1493 S



337

8/1/15

The Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies

and begs to forward for his information a copy of *telegrams* which have been received dealing with operations in *East Africa & replies sent.*

*Under Secretary of State
Colonial Office*

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From War Office to Brigadier-General Wapshare.

(No. 2615, cipher. M.O. 137.)

31st December, 1914. 11.45 a.m.

Please repeat your telegram of 26th December with reference to General Malleon and Stewart, as it arrived much mutilated. Reference your No. 126 S of the 28th. It might be possible to organize and send out in the course of a few weeks an irregular corps (presumably dismounted) from the Legion of Frontiersmen, armed with mausers and under their own officers, if you think they would prove of service, but please understand clearly that it is impossible to give a definite undertaking that any reinforcements will be available even by July or August next beyond those laid down in No. 2463, cipher, of the 15th instant. The plan you propose in paragraph 3 of your No. 87 S. of the 14th appears objectionable as it necessitates operations from three different directions and a consequent dissemination of force. Can you not suggest a modified plan more in accord with forces likely to be available? With reference to your No. 113 S. of the 24th, please let us know force proposed for attack on Mafia Island when settled.

From Brigadier-General Wapshare, Nairobi, to War Office.

(No. M.O. 137.)

1st January, 1915. 8.15 a.m.

Reference last sentence of your telegram No. 2615, cipher. In view of the unlikelihood of general offensive operations in the near future, General Stewart asks that his services may be utilized in active operations elsewhere. I shall be sorry to lose him, but I recommend that his request be granted. He would be succeeded here by General Malleon, who would carry on his own special duties in addition.

From Brigadier-General Wapshare to War Office.

(No. 126 S.)

2nd January, 1915. 3.45 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2615 of 31st December, I misunderstood your telegram No. 2551, as I took it to mean that no offensive was probable in the near future, as there were no British infantry at all available, and my telegram No. 118 S, which please cancel, was based on this assumption. In the active operations now proposed General Stewart's local knowledge will be of great assistance to me. I understand that you can give the Northamptonshire Regiment (1), 36th Sikhs, Canadian Mounted Infantry, and a dismounted corps of the Legion of Frontiersmen. Please inform me of the numbers and organization of the two latter. In the circumstances I propose to attack Moshi area via Voi—Tsavo and Longido, demonstrating at Tanga with warships and transports. This appears preferable to attacking Tanga and from Longido, demonstrating from Voi; for with the Moshi area in our power the Usambara railway will probably fall into our hands without further severe fighting. I propose to give the command at Longido to General Stewart, and the command at Voi—Tsavo line to General Tighe.

I have just inspected the Voi—Tsavo line, and shall proceed soon to Longido. Water and transport difficulties are even greater than I anticipated, but meantime work progresses, and they can be overcome by careful preparation. This will take till at least the end of February. I cannot state definitely till the end of January when the advance can commence.

Regarding the transport required from India. If possible, 200 baggage camels, one mule corps for first line transport troops, already in British East Africa, and ammunition columns, 500 Army Transport bullock carts fitted with hooks with Indian establishment, and about 3,000 ft. worth of iron piping. On receipt of your approval, arrangements will be made with India.

2

from England at least 50 motors, preferably (a) 50 Hupmobiles, (b) Overland 35-h.p. or cars similar to description, (c) Fords. Chassis only, as lorry bodies would be fitted here. Cars should be sent as soon as possible.

I assume that the reinforcements in paragraph above may be taken for granted, and that I may now take measures for the resumption of the offensive on the plan (1) detailed above, as soon as possible.

From Brigadier-General Wapshare to War Office.

(No. 127 S.)

2nd January, 1915, 3.5 p.m.

We are now firmly established in four posts along the Umba river. We have taken and are holding Jassin, which is in German territory, and we have re-occupied Vanga which has been in the possession of the Germans since the beginning of the war. Some opposition was met with during the advance, but the enemy fell back; they tried to destroy the bridge over the Umba but failed owing to their rapid retreat. The enemy suffered more heavily and our loss was only slight. The natives who had sought our protection and whom we were feeding had previously deserted the district, but they have now returned to their villages in large numbers. The advance was rendered very difficult by want of water and the impossibility of rapid transport through dense bush. The enemy were known to be in strength at Duga and Kilulu. Commander Healam made a demonstration of effecting a landing with transports in Mowa Bay and so rendered great assistance by drawing off the enemy.

From Admiralty to Navy Board, Melbourne.

(No. 162.)

3rd January, 1915, 10.30 p.m.

Admiralty desire to employ "Protector" in East Africa to attack "Königsberg" now sheltering in Rufugi River, whose banks are entrenched and well defended with troops and light artillery.

Details of "Protector's" armament and condition are not known, but guns of 6-inch or above would be necessary and her vitals and coaming position would require protection against "Königsberg's" 4.1-inch guns. Extra protection added should be removable for sea passage and replaceable without ship having to dock.

Report if ship is efficient and available and when she could be ready to leave Australia. It is suggested she be towed to Mombasa.

From Brigadier-General Wapshare to War Office.

(No. 134 S.)

4th January, 1915, 9.30 p.m.

The Germans are showing some activity on the frontier south of Kisi, and on the Kagera River south of Uganda. I am sending reinforcements to Kisi to clear the situation. I consider that the force in Uganda is strong enough to prevent serious incursion there. On 8th January the Mafia expedition, about 500 rifles strong under Lieut.-Colonel Ward, leaves Mombasa in the "Kinfauns Castle," and from combined naval and military reconnaissance it is anticipated that the resistance will not be

From Commander-in-Chief, India, to War Office.

(No. 252 S.)

5th January, 1915, 11.15 a.m.

From Wapshare's telegram, No. 126 S., of 2nd January, which was repeated here, we gather that you may be thinking of employing the 36th Sikhs in East Africa. If this be so, we should like to send in their place the 130th Baluchis, whom we would prefer not to employ in Mesopotamia or Arabia, and, instead, to reserve the 36th Sikhs.

From Brigadier-General Wapshare to War Office.

(No. S. 139.)

6th January, 1915, 11 p.m.

Continuing my telegram of 2nd instant, No. S. 126. If the 36th Sikhs and the Northamptonshire Regiment can arrive here within a month from now I propose to attack Tanga, and I feel confident that I can capture it. This will have a very great political effect on the coast natives, and I think that this attack, together with the effect of the force in the Umba Valley, will contain many of the enemy and thus materially assist the decisive advance from Voi and Longido when I am in a position to carry this out. Having securely fortified Tanga, I propose to withdraw secretly most of the first line troops for the advance and to garrison Tanga chiefly with second line troops.

To effect the above it is essential that the attack should be supported by the "Goliath" and another warship, and that, until the decisive advance has taken place, the former should remain permanently in attachment at Tanga after the capture of the town.

From War Office to Brigadier-General Wapshare, Nairobi.

(No. M.O. 138.)

7th January, 1915.

Your No. S. 126 of 2nd January and No. S. 139 of 6th January. The formation of a corps of Legion of Frontiersmen is not feasible, and it is doubtful now whether the Canadian Mounted Rifles will be sent to you, so that the only reinforcements on which you can count is an Indian battalion, probably 130th Baluchis, instead of 36th Sikhs. Date of arrival cannot yet be settled. It is not understood how you come to mention Northamptonshire Regiment: there must have been some error as we have never stated it was available. Does this modify your views? You can apply to India for camels, mule corps, bullock carts, and iron piping. Question of motors under consideration here.