

EAST AFR. PROT

410

4013

4013. *Send*

25 JAN 1915

Wardie

1915

25 Jan.

Last previous Paper.

W.O.

3698 S

German East Africa

Telegraphic correspondence

as to operations.

Mr. B. Stanley. Mr. G. Fiddes.
Mr. R. S.

General Wapshere seems very
anxious to push ahead.

Partly?

No W.O. telegraph as thought Jan 26/15
Message on outside of Capt. Duff's
Command. This is probably accidental

? There will be an *Ad. 20/15*
at *20/15* in *W.O.*
as *20/15* no. 27. *H. 20/15*

26/1/15

Jan 27/15

27.1.15

27.1.15

Next subsequent Paper

W.O.

4298 S

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

C.O. 533 160

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28.1.15



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The Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to

*the Under Secretary of State
Colonial Office*

and begs to forward for his information a copy of *telegram*

sent and
which have been received dealing with

operations in *East Africa*.

*hcg
for D76*
Jan 25th 1915

SECRET.

412

From War Office to General Wapshare

(No. 2842, cipher. M.O. 1A.)

24th January, 1915. 2.55 p.m.

The Secretary of State desires you to understand that with heavy calls all over the world it is not practicable to meet the full requirements of East Africa at present, and that you must therefore bide your time.

You were informed in my No. 2342, cipher, of 4th December that until reinforcements could be arranged, the offensive on any considerable scale was impracticable, and that meanwhile you should adopt a defensive attitude coupled with such minor offensive measures as you deemed practicable. You are now aware that sufficient reinforcements cannot be sent you to enable you to undertake serious offensive which is not considered necessary, as indicated in my No. 2810 of the 21st January.

After careful consideration of the circumstances, it is considered that for the present you should adopt a definitely defensive attitude along the Anglo-German frontier from Lake Natron to the sea, keeping your forces concentrated at suitable points to enable you to act as required. This might possibly enable you to spare some troops for co-operation with the Belgians in Northern Congo or to assist the Officer Commanding in Uganda to initiate some operations against the Germans in the Victoria Nyanza district, if undertakings in these directions seem to promise success. Please consider and report, and also inform us what is being done regarding the armament of vessels on Lake Victoria Nyanza.

From Major-General Wapshare, Zanzibar to War Office.

(No. S. 185.)

23rd January, 1915, 7.50 p.m.

I received your telegram of 19th January on 22nd January. Yesterday I visited the Umba Camp. I only referred in my No. S. 175 to the possibility of future offensive operations if they were sanctioned. The concentrated on Umba from Taveta and Moshi. Our advance to the Umba was evidently taken as a preliminary to an advance on Tanga.

The fight for the relief of the Jasin Post lasted 9 hours, great gallantry being shown in the face of heavy odds, especially of machine guns, by the King's African Rifles and Jhinda. A most gallant fight was made by some 40 Kashmir Rifles in a house near by, the majority eventually succeeding in breaking out and rejoining the Umba force. But for the want of British officers, with Imperial Service Troops to control the expenditure of ammunition, a longer resistance could have been made by the Jasin Post. Very heavy losses were sustained by the enemy.

To-day the Samanya Post is being withdrawn by a route north of Umba River into the main Umba Post. The latter, having been reinforced by two 15-prs. and seven machine-guns, is now an extremely strong post.

I have no intention of withdrawing from the Umba Post, and to withdraw the troops from it before the rains when the country becomes impassable to the enemy, or to us. To withdraw them now would have a very bad effect both from a military and from a political point of view, but I consider it essential that a warship should remain off Vanga in

When I have effected this, I intend that as large a force as possible shall be concentrated in a central position as a mobile reserve. I intend in the meantime that all preparatory measures, such as roads, water and transport, shall be pushed on partly in order that I may be enabled to relieve a threat on one point by pressure on another, but chiefly in order that I may resume the offensive without delay if it becomes possible to let me have additional reinforcements.