



1. Letter from Lord F. Scott 12 June
2. Sir G. Bottomley 13 June
3. Letter to Lord F. Scott 19 June
4. Memo. by Mr. Flood

Herewith a note on Lord Francis Scott's letter. I have taken some time to produce it because I had to do a little reading, and I am sorry that it has worked out to such an uncompromising negative. At the same time, after perusal of the Joint Select Committee's report, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that that Committee was of the opinion, which I share, that Kenya badly needs a rest from Commissions, Enquiries, and constitutional changes. There is no satisfying <sup>the</sup> unofficials and the time has come to say a definite No. We have got for the first time in the history of Kenya a really strong Governor, and the measure of his strength is the measure of the unpopularity with which he is favoured by Lord Francis Scott, Captain F. B. Guest and their friends. To give the unofficials more control in Kenya would also provoke all the "pro-native" elements which have been so vocal of late, and which would be only too happy to seize upon some new mud to throw at the Government of Kenya and the Colonial Office. In addition to that section, however, I think that any relaxation of control in favour of the unofficials would, at the present time, excite opposition from such more seriously minded people, and, with the finances of the Colony as they are, to abandon control would be a disastrous measure.

12.6.53

Sir G. Bottomley.

As you know, I have always been afraid of the slippery slope which has responsible Government at the

the end. The intermediate stages are likely to be thoroughly uncomfortable for everybody concerned. Kenya may find its model in the West Indies now but it would soon point to the example of Southern Rhodesia for something more.

You, of course, are best able to judge of the working of the Constitutions of Trinidad and Jamaica but, as Mr. Flood points out, the circumstances are not the same and, in addition, nobody has thought fit to mention the example of British Guiana and of the other (non-West Indian) Colonies where we have been forced gradually into the position of granting a very full measure of self government in places which are doubtfully ripe for it.

I am inclined to agree with Mr. Flood that we have in Sir Joseph Byrne a very strong Governor, but circumstances have been against him. You will remember the difficulty, finally the impossibility, of sending him a first-rate Financial Adviser for whom he asked soon after he took up office. He has always been hampered by the unavoidable delay in making a start. In any case he was something of a shock to the officials who, after the régimes of Sir E. Bentley, Sir R. Coryndon (who, I think, would have been successful if he had lived in combining co-operation with the settlers with the retention of real government in his own hands) and Sir E. Origny (who saw salvation in agreement by consent), were not likely to enjoy being pulled up on the sabbath.

I have shown you a letter which I had from Lord Francis Scott in which he, starting from a discussion on coffee growing by natives, made

around

the

the same point as in this letter that European opinion would not stand anything of the kind but that if they had <sup>financial</sup> ~~final~~ control everything would move smoothly. Does not this point to the possibility of a state of things in which we should be unable to get anything done except at the price of concessions?

All the same my greatest objection is that which Mr. Flood makes at the end of his minute above, namely, that we cannot relax <sup>financial</sup> ~~final~~ control at this moment. With a great part of the revenue earmarked for loan services and native betterment, it seems impossible to divide the responsibility for maintaining necessary services and tapping fresh revenue, and to make these things dependent on the goodwill of those who will consider themselves chiefly affected, in the hope which Lord Francis Scott holds out that we shall thereby create a sounder public opinion among the settlers in place of the present <sup>solid</sup> ~~stagnant~~ bloc. In any case we must surely wait and see whether we shall have to pass under complete Treasury control or not.

W.C.S.  
24.4.33

Sec of State  
(through Lord Rijnart)

This is a question which I think we might discuss on your return. Even though nothing can be done, I should like in any case to be able to tell Lord Francis Scott that it has been gone into with ~~the~~ the Department by you.

When I saw Lord Francis Scott  
he mentioned the Trinidad  
"Finance Committee" & also the  
Jamaica system. I thought  
I had made it clear to him  
that the Trinidad Finance  
Committee ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> purely advisory  
and a very similar body  
to the Select Committee on  
Estimates in England.

What I gathered from our  
conversation was that he  
was suggesting giving the  
unofficials some power to  
prevent extravagant expenditure,  
or expenditure that they did  
not regard as justified,  
and not complete control

over the finances of the Colony  
including the initiation of measures  
involving expenditure, and the  
imposition of taxation.

The veto power which the  
unofficials have in Jamaica  
is not a power which I would  
like to see given anywhere  
else, as it leads to endless  
trouble as regards voting of  
salaries etc. The Trinidad  
system works well, but as I  
have said above the "Finance  
Committee" have no powers  
beyond giving advice but the  
relations with the Government  
were always friendly, and I  
can't recollect any occasion on  
which I had to use the  
official majority in the

Council to overrule them.

J.H.L.

26.4.33

Asst Francis Scott came to see me & spoke to me ~~much~~ <sup>in the same</sup> way as he wrote to Sir I. Wilson. I fully appreciate the objection to the difficulties in the way of accepting Lt. J. Scott's proposals, but I cannot help feeling somewhat Greek sympathy for the White Letters' point of view than is exhibited in some of the other minutes. I do not know whether it is true that the measure of a Governor's "strength" is the measure of his unpopularity with the White Unofficials, but if it is so, it seems to me that he is deflated.

However, I agree that the matter cannot be carried further on this file, & that it should be discussed on the J. of State's return.

P.

26.4.33.

5. From Lord Francis Scott 27.4.33

6. To ———— 28.4.33

Pls. J.S. send (1) - (6) return file  
Friday.

Ed Lloyd  
2/5/33



got advance copies thereof and Mr. Juxon Barton informs us that a great many of the recommendations have already been carried into effect. The Government is considering the others and will no doubt submit proposals in the course of time. They are not easy and some of the proposals are definitely unwise, and I think unworlible.

Draft letter herewith.

[J.E.W. 7. 6. 33]

*The second para. of Major Gordon's  
draft letter of 10<sup>th</sup> April is interesting  
he anticipates local criticism of the  
"alternatives" if they are not  
worked through.*

*We must not let the way that I said  
in my letter will kill custom revenues have  
to make slight - custom revenue will  
fall in any case & it must not be so  
it.*

*Land Bank etc. be done with for the  
Government's view. I am the president of  
£700,000*

*W.E.S. 8-5*

*5.16  
85*

Sir S. Wilson.

Subject to anything that the Secretary of State <sup>may</sup> ~~might~~ have said to you, I do not see how you can take this further until Lord Francis Scott, when he gets about again, re-opens the matter of financial control, as he no doubt will.

I have been trying to find a press item which, as I recollect, represented Captain Schwartz as referring to Lord F. Scott's negotiations with the Colonial Office on this matter. Some of the press cuttings in 30EE/33 got rather near it but are not quite what I remember. If my recollection is right the news must have taken the Governor by surprise. But even if there has been premature publicity, I do not see how you can mention the point to Lord F. Scott till he gives you an opening.

In my view the next stage is discussion with Sir J. Eyre when he gets home. There is no need to assume his hostility if a practical scheme can be worked. If it cannot (even as a revocable experiment), it is for him to say so. If there is to be any discussion with Lord F. Scott before the Governor arrives, I think it may be relevant to keep in mind the subjects on which the Governor's powers of certification and veto might have to be freely used. I annex a list of points that occur to me. They are of course of varying degrees of prickliness.

*W.E.S.  
7.6.33*

Colonial Service Unification.

Defence.

Services common to Kenya and Uganda  
and/or Tanganyika.

Native taxation and expenditure on Native  
Services (outside the Native Betterment  
Fund).

Matters arising out of Government contracts.

Matters involving treaty questions  
(e.g. St. Germain or the Labour Conventions).

TELE. WHITEHALL 4900.

5/5/33

79

10, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
S.W.1.

My dear General

I enclose herewith 3 letters  
from Duddy Ward, 2 from Archer,  
as I promised you.

One other matter, can you tell me  
what has happened about our Sepulture  
Advisory committee's report? Has the  
Kenya Govt. acted on it?

Yrs sincerely

Dennis Scott

TEL. WHITEHALL 4600.

5/5/33 79

18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
S.W. 1.

My dear General  
I enclose herewith 3 letters  
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Kenya Govt. acted on it?

Yrs sincerely

James Scott

HFW/W

P. O. Box 181,  
Nairobi.

BY AIR MAIL.

10th April, 1933.

My dear Francis,

I have missed writing you over the last air mail or so because I knew that you were in very full touch with Eric Schwartz, and my last attempt to send you news by cable crossed one from you to Eric Schwartz giving practically the same information.

As regards Income Tax, the whole matter rests as a sort of race against time, whether the alternatives can be passed smoothly by the Committee sitting to consider them, and whether they can pass smoothly through the Legislative Council and reach the Secretary of State before there is any considerable reflex action against them in the country, and without any considerable criticism of them in Legislative Council.

I think one point that you might urge almost above all else with the Secretary of State is the urgent necessity, when considering the new revenue measures for 1933 and future years, of ensuring that these touch as lightly as possible on the community, and are well spread and well distributed. The great danger of Income Tax is that it takes really large lumps off the individuals affected; and that can only have a very drastic and most dangerous effect upon the national income. People will save, and will not spend, and the only result that I can see of Income Tax is that general revenue will suffer terribly, and I doubt very much whether at the end we should be any better off from the proceeds of Income Tax, as these will be largely set off by considerable falls in other revenue. The alternative proposals at any rate touch the individuals very lightly and are well distributed. I think that these can be faced with equanimity, and that they will not disturb the present sources of revenue.

My own feeling is that the question of national income, as I would call the financial resources of the community as a whole, is one that must receive as soon as

possible /

possible very serious consideration. I expect you will have heard that the banks have closed more or less on farmers, and I understand that Holm estimates that as a result of this action at least 60% of the cereal farmers will be forced out of business. That will be a frightful blow at our national income. On the other hand I believe the idea is, more or less, to obtain further funds for the Land Bank from the Treasury. Now, whilst we would have to use the Land Bank organisation for handling any advances by the Secretary of State, I doubt whether the ordinary methods of working of the bank are sufficient to meet the crisis with which we are faced. If we get £750,000 increased capital for the bank, that will benefit truly a certain number of individuals and of course, indirectly, all of us, but it will not do all that is required to keep up our national income as high as possible.

I believe the right way to handle things is for the Government to get in touch with the banks, and use any funds that the Secretary of State is prepared to place at our disposal for the Land Bank as cover for a guarantee by Government to the banks in consideration of banks continuing to help farmers on reasonable lines. In other words, by using the capital indicated as a cover for a guarantee by Government the banks, whose assets are in any case completely frozen, would be prepared, I think, to turn their advances into some form of long term accommodation, with a lower rate of interest, Government guaranteeing them against loss. Of course Government, and the banks, would have to deal only with approved farmers, and not with everybody indiscriminately. As soon as times began to improve this long term accommodation guaranteed by Government, as I have described, could be taken over by the Land Bank, and the funds required to pay off the banks could be met by an issue of bonds or by further borrowing on the part of the Land Bank. Something indeed will have to be done, and I believe you have got a really good opening to arrange something on these lines with the Secretary of State.

With every good wish,

Yours ever,

*Indley*

Lt. Col. Lord Francis Scott,  
White's,  
St. James,  
LONDON. S. W. 1.

TELEPHONE NO. 2742.  
TELEGRAMS: "COUNTRY."  
CODE: BENTLEY'S.

12  
Box 181,  
MUTHAIGA,  
NAIROBI,  
KENYA COLONY

April 11<sup>th</sup> 1933

My dear Francis,

A brief discussion with Haden last night whose point of view is that all the position demands in an addition to the Land Bank capital of £750,000. With that sum it would be possible to bargain with the Banks whom he claims would be prepared to forego a substantial portion of their individual advances in return for obtaining cash for the balance.

Whilst he may be quite right, the snag is whether that relief to the individual farmer would be sufficient to enable him to keep up to date with his interest, etc, on the mortgage that is still left, and with prices as they are today.

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I think that my proposal is the  
better for any we avoid all deficiencies  
where the careful farmer's expenditures  
and income would be met by the guaranteed  
fund. My scheme does not eliminate  
buying.

Anyway, all are agreed that something  
must be done legislatively or national revenue  
will be stretched sideways. \$750,000 seems  
to be the minimum figure required.

Yours ever

Freddy

TELEPHONE, 2877.  
TELEGRAMS, COUNTRY.

MUTHAICA,  
BOX 104.  
NAIROBI,  
KENYA.

April 14<sup>th</sup> 1933

My dear Francis,

As we examine the financial picture here, and get an ever clearer idea of how we stand, it becomes more and more evident that if further revenue is to be raised, it must be done with the lightest hand possible. Income tax takes large amounts from the individual and this can only be done at the expense of general revenue, and must have a disastrous effect upon revenue and trade generally. The alternative proposals touch with the lightest possible hand and are so well distributed that

No very large sum is taken from any one individual.

Has it ever struck you that a number of within deals, Government accounts and others, place their deposits on deposit with the Banks. These accounts form the resources with which the Banks give accommodation to persons and commercial people. These also make their deposits, do not want the income from and usually see that as well. They receive  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  for a year's deposit. Under Income Tax this rate will be reduced to approximately  $2\%$  or under, and as they do not

TELEPHONE, 2777.  
TELEGRAMS, COUNTRY.

(2)

MUTHAIGA,  
BOX 181,  
NAIROBI,  
KENYA.

Want the Income, it will pay them to buy British stocks not hold to Income Tax if the owner there of lives abroad. If this becomes generally recognized, as undoubtedly it will, it must mean heavy with demands with a consequential drain upon the colony's financial resources and upon the already overtaxed business Board. I suggest that this is a very important point with very possible good work

Yours ever  
frudly

P.S. Eric Schweitzer is doing too splendidly for words. I am left in admiration.

year. Now another factor has made its entry  
into the situation. With everything set fair  
for a good year agriculturally - certainly  
so far as coffee is concerned we appear to be in  
for a bumper crop - we have struck an  
unprecedented drought, and ~~for the time~~ I don't  
doubt are suffering; when I say that the  
long coffee trade is 5000 or 6000 tons that  
it will be another 3000 or 4000 tons in 10 days  
time unless the drought breaks. I believe cattle &  
creeds are in an equally parlous state, but of

Cause a set back to them is not so serious from  
 the coloring point of view as in the case of  
 coffee. I have no doubt that at the budget this  
 month all agents will cease to make advances,  
 & 80 to 90% of planters will be left high &  
 dry. The <sup>most serious</sup> thing <sup>is</sup> the <sup>pro</sup> government  
 and the <sup>Bank</sup> Bank with short term <sup>and</sup> <sup>from</sup>  
 borrowing, & to keep things going until  
 the 1931 crop. Otherwise a large number of  
 planters will go out of business, plantations out  
 of cultivation & apart from the loss of income,  
 there will be a colossal depreciation in capital  
 values. I have ascertained that we should  
 have the backing of the Bank & the Chamber  
 of Commerce in any case we put up to  
 fight on these lines, as indeed must be the  
 case in their own interests.

By the way, Hubert has from previous  
 indebted is in a light, as Pepper Regard is  
 the only party the country which has had rain.  
 My trust in you is not. Both here & at  
 side as well in for these crops & for making  
 the whole of it has been lost at side & another

ten days will see the end of it here, though we have struck it out well so far. Many farms have already lost their whole crop, both the mid-year one, which was exceptionally heavy, & the one for the end of the year.

It is a sad business to find a silver lining, I can't help thinking that if this set back has the result of forcing government to adopt agricultural credits, it may in the long run prove a blessing, however unpleasant it may be for the individual in the immediate future -

I haven't been in to Harist for some time so don't know the most recent news of it from you, but I trust things prosper well.

Be all most sincere best wishes that your operation will be completely successful & that you'll return in the course very much fitter than when you went home.

Yours sincerely  
A. D.

Eric has done awfully well as you depict, under very difficult circumstances.

28th April, 1933.

My dear Scott.

Your letter of the 27th instant received this morning reminds me that I have never acknowledged your previous letter, in which you raised the question of giving the Unofficial side in Kenya more control of the Colony's finances. The reason I have not done so is that, as you know, the Secretary of State is away and will not be back in the Office until Monday, when I shall naturally put your letter before him. It is, as I know you realise, a question which bristles with difficulties; but that is no reason why we should not discuss it.

Anyhow, many thanks for the two letters. I will show the one received this morning to the Secretary of State as soon as he gets back, because I know he has every intencion of going into the alternative proposals

Very

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  
LORD FRANCIS SCOTT, D.S.O.

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very closely before he comes to a decision as regards Income tax.

I would like very much to have a talk with you and I will arrange any time suitable to you after the 3rd of May. I am afraid I cannot manage to-morrow.

I am very sorry to hear about your having to go into hospital; it is awful bad luck.

Yours v. sincerely  
(L.S.) S. Harker

27/4/33 54

TELEPHONE  
KETERING 208

BOUGHTON HOUSE.

KETERING.

My dear General I have now received the report of the committee on the alternative proposals instead of income tax, and as their proposals are so infinitely superior to the income tax proposals, I do hope the Sec<sup>y</sup> of State will adopt them immediately. The income tax proposals cannot find the money necessary as I understand they put it at about £90,000 including our £30,000 for the doubled poll tax. I now hear that certain Govt. Officials have had the opportunity to suggest that income tax should be proceeded with and our proposals adopted as well! I am quite certain that neither you or Cudiffe Hester or any other honest man would ever

to such a dirty trick, but I thought I  
would warn you that such a proposal  
had been put up. If worse it just did  
try to do this, it would be the end of  
any possibility of the people in Kenya  
having any trust in Govt. at all. If  
Cauliffe is back on his return, will insist  
the Kenya Govt. to get on at once with  
the alternatives as proposed, & to drop the  
income tax bill, we shall have demounted  
the first big fence, & an atmosphere of  
good will will have been established. I  
hope then that he will consider the  
proposals for giving us some financial  
control, & I can guarantee he will never  
regret it, as he could then count on some  
real cooperation, which will never be

12

TALKING  
MATTERS 200.

BOUGHTON HOUSE,  
KETTERING.

2

For the coming under present circumstances.  
As I believe you understand this point  
of view better than any one else at  
the Colonial Office, I do hope you will  
support me in this. If we achieved  
agreement over this (as we are not asking  
for a great deal) it would be a great  
triumph for the policy of sound argument  
& reasonableness, which I have tried to  
stand for, as opposed to the "direct  
actionists" who would triumph if my  
efforts all prove abortive.  
I shall be at 18 Carlton Terrace on the 3<sup>rd</sup> May,  
& could come to the Colonial Office any time

that week, or on the morning of Sat. 29<sup>th</sup>  
if you wanted to have a talk.

Yours sincerely

James Scott

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P.S. I probably go into Hospital on May 9<sup>th</sup>  
for my operation to amputate my right leg.

JCS

It is somewhat difficult to know where to begin with this letter from Lord Francis Scott. I have had a typed copy made for ease of reading, and I have been considering it for some time. The burden of this letter is not anything to do with income tax but the idea that the unofficial members of Kenya should have full control over finance. The argument is that in Trinidad and Jamaica there are unofficial members who can veto the Government's financial proposals and that in those places the unofficial members are black, so that it is a gross injustice for Government to refuse the white unofficial element in Kenya a similar power.

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This, of course, <sup>begs</sup> the entire question. In Jamaica, and in Trinidad also, there is a homogeneous community (more or less) and a pretty wide franchise. In Kenya there is nothing of the sort because the unofficial white population of Kenya is not the whole people though from the way they talk they think they are. In Kenya, according to the figures given in Lord Moyne's Report, the total European population, men, women and children, is 12,285, with just under 57,000 Asiatics and just under 3,000,000 natives. Any argument about unofficial control must envisage further extension of such control to include Indians who are British subjects who have just as much right as the European, and also to include the natives.

X  
which includes the  
officials & their  
families.

Lord Moyne in his Report gives various figures of the contributions made by the different racial groups towards the revenue. Taken to the nearest

nearest thousand the figures are as follows:-

Europeans	666	or 36%
Indians	366	or 21%
Natives	791	or 43%

If the Native Betterment Fund has taken away from this, amounting to 260,000, the result is

Europeans contributed	666	= 43%
Indians	366	= 24%
Natives	511	= 35%

To argue that a community which only contributes 43 per cent of the income should control the whole lot is not one which can really be expected to carry much weight.

Further, quite apart from that, is this the time to give the unofficials in Kenya further control? Would Parliament agree to it? Could the S. of S. attempt to justify it by any reasoned arguments? I am afraid that the answer to all these questions can only be in the negative.

Another point is this. Kenya's finances are in a very precarious condition and it is quite possible that there might have to be an application for a Treasury grant-in-aid. Would the Treasury come to the rescue of a place like Kenya with the unofficials in control of finance? I think not. Then there is the fact that Kenya has got a debt of something near 117,000,000, and it would appear to be a risky step to give any measure of control to an irresponsible unofficial element when the interest on

on the debt will have to be found.

As regards Jamaica, I have always been given to understand that the peculiar system whereby nine of the unofficials can veto Government proposals on finance grounds is not one which should be encouraged elsewhere.

With regard to the second point that the Select Committee on Estimates should be made a Statutory Committee and that anything recommended by a majority of this Committee must be considered and acted upon by the Governor, unless he certifies the question as of paramount importance, <sup>(exception)</sup> is not one that commends itself to me. The reason for it, I suspect, is where Lord Francis Scott says "Anyhow under Byrne we spend weeks of our time on this Committee and then get completely ignored". I suspect that the real meaning of this is that the Committee puts up at the instance of the unofficials some perfectly ridiculous proposals which cannot possibly be accepted by the Governor; in other words, that the Governor tries to govern and not pay attention to the unofficials.

What the exact implications of this proposal are is not easy to find out, nor do I think that Lord Francis Scott can have considered it. Does he want to give his Committee power to initiate expenditure? If so, that is a power which is not possessed by the unofficials in Trinidad, Jamaica, or anywhere else, and it would be very difficult to justify giving it to a very small minority such as the Kenya European unofficials. The suggestion to try an experiment like this for three years is not a good one because once anything like

like this is introduced it is very difficult to suppress it if it doesn't work.

Of course a step like this would have a marvellous effect on unofficial opinion in Kenya because it would simply mean the abdication of Government into their hands, and I have no doubt that it would greatly please the Kenya settlers for the time being until they found something else. To say that the only people affected will be the Governor and the bureaucrats only shows the real trouble which, as I have already said, is that the Governor is trying to do his job and govern the Colony. As regards the right to some constitutional advance, I should like to know what that right is. In the speeches and articles about Kenya there is much talk about the inherent right of the white community to govern itself, but so far as I am aware that right only exists in their own imagination, though I have no doubt that they believe it. To put it briefly, the claims of the settlers are neither just nor wise and in my opinion should not be allowed.

I would further point out that if they are going to make suggestions for changes in their constitution, the proper method of doing it is to approach the Governor and

put

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put the case to him and not come round to the Colonial Office behind the back of the responsible man, namely, the Governor.

I have left to the last what is probably the most important factor in the consideration of the whole question, that is, the conclusions reached by the Joint Committee and by the Secretary of State. The Joint Committee's utterances are somewhat guarded, but in paragraph 73 they say that the responsibility of the Government towards European settlers should not be disregarded. "On the contrary the fullest security must be given to their legitimate interests. They should have a right to effective representation and to protection against legislative and administrative policy which would fundamentally change the economic conditions on the basis of which they settled in the country." But in paragraph 75 the Committee went on to say that the primary obligations to the native races involved certain corollaries. "The control of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must remain unimpaired. The conditions in East Africa ..... demand the maintenance of an effective power of intervention by the Crown in all matters of both legislation and administration. This power will be exercised by H.M.G. acting through the Secretary of State. It is clear that under existing conditions the principles outlined above can only be effectively operative if the authority of H.M.G. remains unimpaired." Later on in paragraph 96 the Committee point out that the functions of the

Unofficial

Unofficial Members of Council is advisory and that the ultimate responsibility rests with the Secretary of State.

In his last despatch on the report to the East African Governments, the Secretary of State said that he did not propose that any change should be made in the present arrangement that secures an Official majority in the Legislative Council (see the middle of page 55 of Cmd.4141).

It may be argued that these opinions and pronouncements are not sufficiently definite, but reading the Joint Select Committee's report as a whole I think it must be admitted that they are decisive against any extension of Unofficial control. Lord Francis Scott would, no doubt, try to argue that he does not want control in the full sense, but only in the power of upsetting finance, and that with the creation of the Native Settlement Fund envisaged by Lord Moyne, the settlers will be controlling their own money and not interfering or having power to control the general government machine. That I am afraid won't do because the control of finance is the pivot of the whole government machine and to surrender that to the European Unofficials would give away the whole of government. The figures I have given above show that the contribution to revenue produced by the European community is not up to half the total, and the Native Settlement Fund only involves a small amount of the total expenditure which should be devoted to native needs.

Shaw & Sons Ltd  
before sending

3

COLONIAL OFFICE,  
DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1.

19 April, 1953.

Dear Mr. Shaw

Your letter of the 13th of April has been waiting for my return from a short Easter holiday.

As regards the possibility of native coffee growing in Kikuyu, Kyambu naturally came up in our talk as being the most obvious locality owing to its similarity to neighbouring European coffee areas. Quite possibly some other Kikuyu area could be selected, but I can assure you that nothing will be done in a hurry.

On the other point mentioned in your letter, I rather hesitate to express any personal view on the question of unofficial financial control. But please do not think that we do not realise the present feeling in Kenya. I think that everyone admires

the

LIEUTENANT COLONEL  
LORD FRANCIS SCOTT, D.S.O.

the way in which the settlers have faced the bad  
times and it is only natural that they should feel  
that they should have the greater scope in dealing  
with the position in which they find themselves.

*Yours sincerely*

*W. S. H. H. H.*

*Send back to your attention*

TELL WHITEHALL 4800

13/4/33  
19, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
S.W. 1.

2  
18

Dear Sir Cecil I am so glad I saw  
you yesterday. I was very upset at the  
idea that you were thinking of  
bringing up the question of native  
coffee growing in Lygonia at this  
moment. I do implore you not to  
do so. I dread it is inevitable  
that this experiment will have to be  
done sooner or later, & I trust the  
fears of the coffee growers may be exagger-  
ated, but to open this question at this  
moment would be a calamity. I am

persuade the Leg<sup>y</sup> of State to give the  
 unofficals some control over our own  
 finance, & to do this in a generous  
 way, it will alter the whole atmosphere  
 & such a proposal as you make would  
 not meet with the 100% opposition  
 which it would today. You cannot  
 continue indefinitely keeping your  
 100% bureaucratic control, we are only  
 asking that every other civilized country  
 asks, & if the Home Govt will come  
 out boldly, everything would be easier.  
 If however everything we ask for is  
 turned down, & on the top of it our office  
 plants are threatened, then those who  
 say the Colonial Office are against the

2

TELE. WHITFALL 4800.

18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
 N.W.1.

Settlement, will have it all their  
 own way. I believe this is the crucial  
 moment in Kenya's history, & a  
 bold & generous policy adopted by the  
 Colonial Office towards the Settlers would  
 be repaid 1000 fold. Do please use  
 your influence in this direction, as  
 it is so important, & will change  
 the difficulties of your own work  
 into one of co-operation. I have written  
 fully to Sir S. Wilson about this.  
 Do help us. I am sure it is the right  
 policy.

Yours sincerely  
 Denis Austin

COPY.

18, Carlton House Terrace,  
S.W.1.

12/4/33.

My dear General,

You always hearten me when I talk to you as you are so sane and sensible in your views, and I only hope I may convince you sufficiently to use your influence with the Secretary of State to give us some constitutional control of finance. Following on our talk the other afternoon, I went and saw Sir Algernon Aspinall to hear his attitude about West Indian constitutions. I understand that in Trinidad they have an official majority but a finance committee with an unofficial majority to deal with all finance measures of revenue and expenditure, and that this works well. Then in Jamaica there is an official majority of 2, but any 9 Elected Members out of 14, by voting together unanimously can stop any new measure of finance. You can tell me if this is correct, and how it works in practice from a Governor's point of view. Aspinall says it works well from the unofficial side.

Now in both these countries I gather the Elected Members are practically all black, whilst in Kenya Elected Members as to 11 out of 17 are pure white. Surely it is hard, and in fact almost impossible for the National Government to refuse to trust us, as far as they trust these coloured men! It seems to me quite inconceivable, and I am quite sure that until the Home Government does come forward, and trust us, and put

responsibility

*I don't object  
his seeing  
Sir A. Aspinall.*

*\* The finance committee  
nearly advised  
J.H.*

responsibility on us, we shall always go on having these continuous political fights which are so tiring both for you here, and for us out there. I know there is the question of Native interests being safeguarded, and we are quite prepared to accept such safeguards, as we do not want to arouse either the Native or the Indian question. My proposals are therefore as follows. That we be given the same power as the Jamaican people have, i.e. that if 11 out of our 17 Elected Members vote together, they can stop any measure (of finance) being forced through by the official vote. I have taken 11 out of 17, as the nearest equivalent to 9 out of 14. In this way we do not disturb the present number of seats held by Europeans, Indians, or Arabs, and make no definite racial distinction but in fact if the whole of the European Elected Members acted together, they could act effectively.

Next, I ask that our Select Committee on Estimates should be made a statutory committee comprised as at present, i.e. Colonial Secretary, Treasurer, C.N.C., all European, Indian, and Arab Elected Members, and the nominated member (or members) to represent Native interests. At present, anyhow under Byrne, we spend weeks of our time on this committee, and then get completely ignored, and rolled out. I failed to find out exactly how the Trinidad Finance Committee was constituted, but I recommend the whole of the Elected Members so as not to raise a new question of proportions. My idea is that anything recommended by a majority of this Committee must be considered definitely by the Governor, and acted on, unless he

certifies

*of involving expenditure of public funds*

*This is going much further than in Trinidad, where they only advise &c.*

certifies the question is of "paramount importance", or whatever the expression is. Now I suggest as safeguards that the Governor must retain his power of veto and certification. That the "Native Betterment Fund" shall not be referred to this Finance Committee, and that matters of direct native taxation shall be reserved to Government, and shall not be interfered with by either of these methods. I will guarantee that the European Elected Members will respond to this power and responsibility and will not abuse it but if the Secretary of State is still doubtful, let him try it for a limited period, say 3 years, or in fact during the life of the next Legislative Council which is due to be elected again next February or March. If Government would come forward and take a bold step like this, without being pushed into it, it would have a marvellous effect, and would completely change the outlook in Kenya vis à vis the Colonial Office, and would induce better men to come forward and stand for Legislative Council. If however Government turn us down altogether, there is no question that the people are in such a mood that there will definitely be trouble out there. I have by my personal influence kept them back for months, but if all my efforts over here prove abortive, I shall have to give way to the left wingers, my policy having proved a failure. Please don't treat this as a threat as it is not meant so, but merely as an expression of fact. The great advantage of giving us this financial control is that the Governor will have to take the unofficials into his confidence and get their cooperation, whilst on the other hand, the Elected Members will have real responsibility placed on them, and unless the Governor uses his "extraordinary" powers,

will

will have to share with Government the responsibility for the soundness or otherwise of the Colony's finances. I think you know me well enough to know that I am not a "political stunt merger". I believe my views on politics are not unlike yours, in that I wish there weren't any! But as we have them, and as I do know the feelings of the vast majority of the British community in Kenya, I am quite convinced that the wise and right thing for the Home Government to do is to come forward and offer us this form of responsibility and show their trust in us. Neither the pro Indians or the pro natives can suggest this hands over either race to the mercy of the "exploiting settlers". The only people affected will be the Governor and the bureaucrats, and I believe it is generally accepted today that pure bureaucracy cannot be justified indefinitely. We have had so many expressions of belief in our right to some constitutional advance during the last 11 years, but in fact have never had any advance, and our position vis a vis the Governor is today much weaker than it has ever been before, during my time in Kenya. I am not putting this forward merely at the behest of the Convention of Associations, though they feel very strongly on the subject, but because after giving endless thought to these matters during the last 2 years, I have definitely come to the conclusion that it is the right thing, and the wise thing.

If you want any confirmation of the feelings of the people in Kenya, do see Freddie Guest who has just returned from Kenya and was very impressed with the strong feeling but also the sound arguments etc. of the delegates to Convention. I believe if we can convince the present Secretary of State that our

34  
claims are just and wise, he is just the man to put  
the thing through. To convince him, I do want your  
help, and do hope you will be ready to give it.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) Francis Scott.

12/4/33

18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
S.W. 1.

My dear General You always listen me when I talk to you as you are so sane & sensible in your views, & I only hope they convince you sufficiently to use your influence with the Sec<sup>y</sup> of State to give us some constitutional control of finance.

Following on our talk the other afternoon, I went & saw Sir Algernon Aspinall to hear his attitude about West Indian constitutions. I understood that in Trinidad they have an official majority but a finance committee with an unofficial majority to deal with all financial measures of revenue & expenditure, & that this works well. Then in Jamaica there is an official majority of 2, but any 9 Shirts

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51

THE WHITEHALL ROAD

18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE.

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Batterment Fund" shall not be referred to  
this Finance Committee, & that matters  
of direct Native taxation shall be  
reserved for Govt. & shall not be interfered  
with by either of these methods.

I will guarantee that the Empire State  
members will respond to this power &  
responsibility, I will not abuse it but  
if the Sec<sup>y</sup> of State is still doubtful,  
let him try it for a limited period,  
say 3 yrs, or in fact during the life  
of the next Leg. Co. which is due to be  
elected again next Feb or March. If  
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4  
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TELE. WESTWALL 4800

18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
N.W.1.

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TELL WHITFIELD ROAD

15, EARLTON HOUSE TERRACE,  
S.M.I.

39  
END

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