

para: 5 of despatch . . . Say that the Sg
has suggested £30. ask whether
the Govt agrees & ask for an estimate
of cost.

para: 6 & 8 ~~referred to the report~~
~~was the report referred to~~
~~the case was referred to~~

I think that the Govt ought
to be told to send home a
proper "despatch relating to
Field Operations", in accordance
with section 170 of the R.A.R. Reg.

This wd. then be submitted to
the Interspart^l Rewards C^o to consider
whether a medal sh^d. be
granted, & to make recommend^{ns} as
to rewards for Officers.

para: 7 This can wait for the new
desp: ?

There are a few points in the
desp. to which ~~attention~~ I might call
attention.

p. 6 of Lt. Pakenham's report } The troops
of 23rd of June. } did some 400 miles of road
cutting.

p. 8 The Indian camel seems to
be well ^{in Ireland} & the horses in good.

p. 9. Suggested use of aeroplanes.

p. 10. + p. p. 4+5
of app: 7. A bad account

219

of Serenli as a
station.

p. 6. of app. 7. Special suitability

of Somalis for service in north
Iceland.

H. J. R.

13/5/14

Alou

Ms. 19. 10. 14

Mr. Read.

220

with regard to the Genl's despatch of July 5
para 3 I see no reason to doubt that we may
look forward to a peaceful administration of
the Karehan tribe, as the result of the
operations which tho' long deferred seem to
have had quite a successful result.

We must remember that the troops employed
must be concentrated as far as possible,
rested and then trained gradually in
bodies larger than companies and if
possible as a battalion: otherwise
their "morale" will suffer.

para 5. It is only just that some
compensation should be granted to
Officers for the wear & tear of kit. The
operations have caused damage in this
respect which would not have been
caused in a year under ordinary
circumstances. I suggest that
some compensation be made
accordingly. Perhaps \$30 per
Officer would be suitable. Though
this amount is insufficient to
make good all the damage done
Officers will undoubtedly that the
circumstances were exceptional
and will be satisfied.

I think that the operations have been
 exceptionally difficult and that some
 commendation - called for. I
 think that Colonel Graham should be
 especially recognized for his handling
 of a dangerous situation
 para. While agreeing with the Gov. as to
 the bestowal of the medal for distinguished
 conduct in the instance recommended
 by Colonel Graham, I have no hesitation
 in recommending the issue of the
 African General Service medal for
 the operations. Its bestowal is
 one of the few ways in which
 some recognition can be made
 to the rank and file for the very
 months of waiting under active
 service conditions in an ^{un}unhealthy ^{of the} ^{country}
 and most inhospitable country,
 and for the difficult operations
 which the ^{troops} had to undergo serious
 fighting were such as to try very
 highly their training as soldiers.
 In the interests of humanity & the
 contentment of the troops it is
 very necessary to do something

to reward them. The alternatives
 are (1.) to give them a monetary
 bonus (2.) to give them another
 wife each (3.) to award a medal.
 (3.) would probably give them a much
 greater pleasure as (2.) - seeing that their
 sense of proportion in these matters
 is somewhat different to ours -
 and also more than (1.) if we were
 to maintain a proper sense of
 economy -

Para 7. I have already put my views
 in this matter before the Sec. of State
 and I understand that he will take
 this opportunity of rectifying the
 incidence of his censure -

With reference to para. 6 of
 Colonel Graham's despatch of
 23rd April I would draw attention
 to the necessity for the careful
 handling of the Tibrahil Antihah.
 We must uphold the authority
 of Abdurrahman Kureel who now
 is in a much firmer position
 than formerly as Sheikh of the
 Antihah recognized by Govt. - Tactful

Method of the civil operations and a
 judicious juggling of troops shall
 effect our purpose. but we must
 remember that as yet we have not a
 force adequate to embark on any
 drastic measures against this
 section as others may be invited.

Though the reports in the
 Appendix ~~of~~ to this despatch
 are in some cases long-winded, they
 contain much valuable information
 which should be kept above ground
 for future guidance.

I would draw especial attention
 to App. 2. "The Serenti Defort" in which
 an expert Indian Supply Officer
 shows his surprise, amounting
 almost to ~~horror~~ horror, at the
 system, forced on the K.A.R. by the
 dictates of a false economy, which
 necessitated Lieut. Longproe,
 untrained to the work, performing
 the whole duties which in India
 would have been carried out by
 several highly specialised

officers and an elaborate
subordinate staff. Perhaps
India has found it gay in the
long run -

Although the answer has been
given to the general recommendation
of the C. L. J. C. and others, that
E. A. P. cannot afford to carry
them out - we must not lose
sight of these but should
prepare to make the necessary
improvements as soon as
money can be found.

Ad. Horner Colonel
J. J. K. A. P.

Oct. 11.
14.

2 Oct 1914

Dear Colonel Foran.

This is the
 merchant Bundle for
 you to minute!

I think it contains
 all the papers which
 you will want - perhaps
 more. I have but
 in the Salfield report
 also (31382/14) &
 also his other

2 Oct 1914

Dear Colonel Foran -

This is the
 present Bundle for
 you to minute!

I think it contains
 all the papers which
 you will want - perhaps
 more. I have but
 in the Salchid report
 also (31382/14) &
 also his other

piece 37/10

report of the journey
through the London
Region in case that
is the one you were

interested and appear in
Press Bureau in a day
or two - so far all
successful.

Duala was good
(+ unexpected) new

not many hard
troubles - only details
such as Hawthorne's
position - + horrible
questions of pay for
it (of course, one of the

scrapping at
different points along the
border - a part

Andrain follows last
the merchant.

Yours many
A.C.P. Parkin

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NAIROBI,
BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

No. 631.

July 3rd, 1914.

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 536 of the 20th of May and in confirmation of my telegram No. 218 of the 29th ultimo announcing the conclusion of the operations against the Marehan, I have the honour to transmit for your information the following communications which have been received since the date of my despatch above mentioned:-

- (1) Report from Officer Commanding Troops with enclosures dated April 28th.
- (2) Report by Officer Commanding Troops with enclosures dated May 21st.
- (3) Letter from Officer Commanding Troops with enclosures dated May 26th.
- (4) Final report by Officer Commanding Troops with Appendices dated June 23rd.
- (5) Statement showing the position and distribution of troops on the conclusion of operations.
- (6) Letter from Officer Commanding Troops dated June 25th making favourable mention of certain officers and men.
- (7) Letter from Officer Commanding Troops dated June 24th offering further explanation regarding the issue by him of an ultimatum to the Marehan in June 1913.

Yours,

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LEWIS HARCOURT, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

- 2 -

2. When the military operations were concluded Captain Salkeld, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Jubaland, and Mr. Elliott, Intelligence Officer, were left in charge of the situation, Major Seames being in command of the troops remaining in Serenhi.

3. In the course of an interview with Colonel Graham upon his arrival at Nairobi I found him satisfied that the result of the operations had been successful, and sanguine that the Provincial authority will have no difficulty in gradually establishing civil control over that portion of the Province. All troops except those which are to remain upon the Juba River are being returned to their respective detachments.

4. With the exception of a small balance the fine imposed on the various sections of the tribe has been collected. Colonel Graham has explained to me the reasons for considering it preferable that the whole of the fine should be collected at once rather than leaving it to be taken by instalments in the future. In thus acting upon the discretion which I left to him I am satisfied that he did what was right and on further consideration I think it better that the penalty should be exacted promptly and the whole matter closed.

I propose to await a report from Captain Salkeld before taking into consideration the steps to be taken for ensuring the future administration of the tribe.

5. With reference to paragraph 14 of the final report of June 23rd I desire to support the recommendation of the Officer Commanding that some compensation should be granted to officers who took part in the operations in respect of the wear and tear of uniform and camp equipment. I am not however in a position to offer recommendation as to the amount of this compensation but should be glad to know if you are prepared to acquiesce in this proposal and if so what amount you would be disposed to approve.

6. You will notice with satisfaction, I trust, the favourable observations made by the Officer Commanding, in his letter of June 25th, upon the work and conduct of the officers and men under his command and I would enquire whether it is your wish that an intimation of your commendation should be communicated to them.

It gives me pleasure to support the strong recommendation of Colonel Graham that the medal for Distinguished Conduct in the field be bestowed

- 4 -

bestowed upon the Native Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer of the Camel Company mentioned, and I trust that it will receive favourable consideration.

I have some hesitation however in endorsing the general recommendation that the African General Service Medal be given to all troops and followers employed in the operations. Being personally unaware of your views as to the circumstances under which this medal should be bestowed, I prefer to leave the matter for your decision without further observations than to say that although it is a fact that the troops incurred considerable hardship in the course of the operations there appears to have been but little active conflict with the enemy.

7. At his personal request I am forwarding Colonel Graham's letter of the 24th ultimo, but I do not think it necessary to trouble you with further comments upon the action referred to additional to those which were made in my Confidential despatch No. 181 of November 14th, 1913.

I do not wish to press my view that Colonel Graham's action in issuing an ultimatum was injudicious or precipitate and perhaps the further explanation now tendered by him may serve to satisfy you that the course which he proposed was the one which he considered to be the best

in

in the interests of Government.

8. I desire, in conclusion, to commend most highly the work which Colonel Graham has carried out whilst in command of these operations. I consider that, having performed his duty with the utmost intelligence, energy and discretion, the thanks of Government are due to him for the efforts which have enabled him to bring matters to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. I recommend therefore that if you see fit, a communication to that effect be made to him personally by yourself and that a copy be also forwarded to the War Office.

9. I may add that Colonel Graham will have arrived in England before this despatch is received and will, I trust, be able to explain and expand any points of detail on which further information may be required and which may not be sufficiently made clear by the enclosures hereto.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

Alonzo Beecher

GOVERNOR.

No. 11. 769

INCLOSURE *no. 6*

In Despatch No. 631 of July 22 1914

From

The Officer Commanding Troops

East Africa Protectorate.

2860

REC'D
Regd. 4 AUG 14

The Honourable

The Chief Secretary.

NAIROBI,

25th June 1914.

Sir,

On the conclusion of the operations in the Harrohan country I have the honour to bring especially to the favourable notice of His Excellency The Governor and Commander-in-Chief the services of the following Officers:-

Lieut. Colonel L. E. S. Ward, 4th King's African Rifles,

Commanded the Lines of Communication with ability and relieved me of a vast amount of responsibility.

Major L. H. Scames, 1st King's African Rifles, has proved

himself an able leader in the field. His previous knowledge of the country was of great assistance to me.

Captain J. F. Edwards, 3rd King's African Rifles, per-

formed the duties of Staff Officer to the Force in an efficient and satisfactory manner.

Lieut. C. G. Phillips, 1st King's African Rifles, Transport

Officer, an indefatigable Officer to whose able management of the Berail Military Transport Corps the success of the operations is in no small measure due.

Lieut. S. J. Lovegrove, 3rd King's African Rifles, Base
Supply & Transport Officer Serenli.

Lieut. E. Elliott, Reserve of Officers, Intelligence
Officer to whose knowledge and experience
of the Somalis the success of the final
negotiations must be attributed.

Dr. T. H. Massey, East Africa Protectorate Medical Service,
proved himself an ideal Medical Officer
for the Force. There can only be a very
few amongst the Officers and men who are
not grateful to him for his professional
skill and cheery optimism.

2. I have the honour to also very strongly recommend
the bestowal of the medal for Distinguished Conduct in
the Field on the following African Officer and Non-
Commissioned-Officer:-

(i) Effendi Abdi Sheriff Ahmed F. (Camel Company)
3rd King's African Rifles.

(ii) No 4008 Sergeant Jama Adur F. (Camel Company)
3rd King's African Rifles.

The necessary documents are attached.

3. In conclusion I hope His Excellency may be
pleased to recommend the grant of the African General
Service Medal and clasp "Marches 1913-1914" to all
troops and followers employed in and North of Serenli
between the 15th December 1913 and 31st May 1914.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient servant

Sd. B. E. Graham Lieut. Colonel
Commanding Marches Force & Troops
East Africa Protectorate.

Effendi Abdi Sheriff Ahmed, 'F' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles

Extract from Report of operations between 19th & 24th January 1914, by Captain W.G. Stonor.

17. "In conclusion I would bring to notice the very gallant conduct of Effendi Abdi Sheriff Ahmed, 'F' Company (Camel Corps) 3rd King's African Rifles. This Native Officer, when the heavy firing was opened upon the rear guard, immediately rushed back and joined Lieut Tilly and the Infantry section detailed for the rear guard. He was then hit through the shoulder with a heavy gas bullet his shoulder being smashed. He still however assisted Lieut Tilly getting back men from the Camel Corps to close up the rear face of the square, and only ceased from loss of blood.

When his wound had been dressed and he was able to sit up again he continued, despite the pain he was suffering, giving advice and encouragement to the men during each successive phase of the fight, and on one occasion I was personally glad to act upon a suggestion he made".

B.R. Raham

Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Garrison Force & Troops

East Africa Protectorate.

Nairobi,

25th June 1914.

(No. Army Form B. 200 in the Protectorate)

RECORD OF SERVICE

Native Officer Abdi Sheriff Ahmed (Soudanese)

| | |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Enlisted | 1st July 1899 |
| Appointed Lance Corporal | ? 1901 |
| Promoted Corporal | 1-10-1902 |
| Promoted Sergeant | 3-6-1903 |
| Promoted Colour Sergeant | 1-3-1911 |
| Promoted Native Officer | 1-4-1913 |

Previous War Service:

Gaden Expedition 1900-1901
Medal with clasp Subaland.

Embu Patrol-1906- Clasp

Maruka Patrol 1902- Clasp

Somaliland Expedition
1908-1910- Clasp

Character

Very Good.

Sd. D. F. Graham Lieut Colonel

Commanding Marrehan Force & Troops

East Africa Protectorate.

Nairobi,

26th June 1914.

DESCRIPTIVE ROLL

Native Officer Abdi Sheriff Ahmed

Date of enlistment

1st July 1900

Age

33 years

Height

5 ft. 5 1/2 inches

Tribe

Soudanese

District

Aboawa

Chief

Mausori

Sd. E. R. Graham Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Barrack Force & Troops
East Africa Protectorate

Nairobi,

25th June 1914

RECORD OF SERVICE IN THE FIELDNo 4008 Sergeant, James Adur, 17th Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles

Sergeant James Adur commanded the Small section on whom the brunt of the scouting and illalo work fell. He was ^{frequently} ~~constantly~~ engaged with the enemy and invariably commanded his section with ability and success.

B. R. Graham, Lieut Colonel

Commanding Murchison Force of Troops
East Africa Protectorate.

Nairobi, 25th June 1914.

RECORD OF SERVICE

No. 4008 Sergeant JAMA ADUR (Somali)

Enlisted 19th March 1912.

Enlisted as Sergeant on 19th March 1912
(late Sergeant 6th K.A.R.)

Previous War Service Somaliland Expedition
1908-1910. Medal 5 class

Character *Very Good*

Sd. E. R. Graham Lieut Colonel

Commanding Garrison Force & Troops
East Africa Protectorate.

Nairobi,

25th June 1914.

DESCRIPTIVE ROLL

No 4008 Sergeant Jama Adur

Date of enlistment 19th March 1912.

Age 28 years

Height 5 ft. 6 inches.

Tribe Somalis

District Somaliland Prot.

Chief Her Weyd

Sd. E. R. Graham Lieut Colonel

Commanding Barrack Force & Troops
East Africa Protectorate.

Nairobi,

25th June 1914.


INCLOSURE No 2

In Despatch No. 447 of July 3rd 1914

No.M.8.

Serenli.

21st. May, 1914.



To The Honourable
the Chief Secretary,
Nairobi.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I returned to Serenli yesterday and to submit my report for the intervening period.

2. I omitted to mention in my last report that on 18th April I had sent Mr. Filleul with a suitable escort to interview the Rer Ali Aulihan at Farnwen, where I myself arrived on the 25th. I interviewed the headman of the Rer Ali and found them perfectly amenable and ready to comply with any orders of the Government. They have now voluntarily surrendered 62 rifles. The Rer Ali also complained strongly of having themselves been looted by the Merchan generally, and I am of opinion that the rumour referred to in para 6 of my report of the 23rd April must be taken with a grain of salt. Probably both parties are equally to blame and I am inclined to think the best plan is to inform both sides that no claims and counter-claims will be considered. However Captain Salkeld is due to arrive this evening and far better qualified to give a decision on such a point than I am.

3. I arrived Garrebahare on the 28th. April and found that the Ahmed Wet, Ali Dera and Bon were all desirous of peace and were prepared to comply with my 'sabein'.

A 'sabein' amongst Somalis is an offering as a guarantee that peace is really asked for. This normally consists of one or two camels, or sheep and goats. I have insisted that the 'sabein' shall include a large number of rifles and in the case of the Ahmed Wet of ponies also and have no reason to complain of the result. In assessing the total fine I have naturally taken into consideration the size of the 'sabein'.

On the 30th instant I held a large baraza at which practically all the Merehan with the exception of the Rer Tulha and the Rer Hassan were represented. The former had already come in and the latter were reported on their way. I explained to them the reasons for the original order for disarmament, that they had taken no notice of this order or of invitations issued to them by the various Officers in charge to come in and state their side of the question, and that these various acts of disobedience had culminated in their unprovoked attack on our posts. I pointed out that the British Government only desired that its subjects should live in peace, and that there would be no interference with tribal customs but that Government was determined to stop (1) Raiding into Italian territory and (2) Inter-tribal raiding. and that Civil Administration would very shortly be re-established.

(5)

4. It was with very great regret that I came to the conclusion that it was inadvisable to defer the collection of the fines. I fully understood and appreciated His Excellency's ideas as cabled to me, but I considered that it would very considerably facilitate matters for the Officer who was to take charge if such a proportion of fine was collected as would render refusal by any sub-section to pay the outstanding balance at any time an act of folly, and further the gradual collection of fines for the support of the troops would I fear be rather in the nature of keeping a wound open.

As I anticipated the looking after the fine is a great difficulty and an early decision as to its disposal is necessary, I cabled to you again on this point yesterday.

5. To expedite the collection of the fines I detached a force under Major Soames to proceed to Dabli and thence to the Dilhara and decided myself to proceed to Makalla.

A copy of Major Soames' report is attached herewith.

6. I arrived at Makalla on 3rd. It had been my intention to hold all the watering places en route but very heavy rain fell on the 2nd/3rd, so I concentrated at Makalla to await the arrival of the Ber Hassan. Signalling communication was maintained between Garrebahare, Dabli and Makalla.

7. On the 5th. May I received information that a raiding party consisting almost entirely of Farah Ogas had looted a large number of Dagodia stock on the Dilhara.

(4)

I immediately despatched the Camel Corps with 11 Somalis mounted on mules under Lieut. Hughes to try and recover the stock and helio to Major Soames to co-operate. Lieut. Hughes succeeded in recovering 66 camels and captured two rifles, but the raiders had divided up into small parties and heavy rain obliterated all tracks.

This raid was against the orders of the Farah Ogas chiefs who are now doing their utmost to recover the looted stock, but it is only another proof of how necessary the presence of mounted troops is in this country.

8. As there were no signs of the Rer Hassan I decided to move towards where their kurias were said to be grazing and moved out on the 8th. I however came across a large herd of Ahmed Wet stock and collected some 600 camels and returned to Lakalla. The result of this was that the Ahmed Wet completed their fine and I further gave them back camels at the rate of seven camels to a rifle over and above the fine. Any stock in excess of the fine was promptly returned.

9. On the 10th May the Rer Hassan chiefs brought in their 'sabin' of 30 rifles and I announced their fine. I told them I was prepared to assist in its collection if their "Boote" proved recalcitrant and at their request I detailed half a company for this purpose. The latest information I have received is that the fine is being slowly collected.

(5)

10. I returned to Garrebahare via Binigar on the 13th. Of the principal sections the Rer Ahmed Wet and the Rer Ali Dera have now completed their fines, the Rer Hassan are collecting theirs and as the time I gave to the Rer Tulha for the collection of their fine has expired I have directed Major Soames to forcibly collect it.

11. Captain Salkeld arrived yesterday evening.

12. The health of the troops, I regret to say can not be said to be good. The majority of them have been in this part of the world too long and they badly need a rest.

As stated in my message of the May 1st, I have instructed Colonel Ward to take the 4th Battalion Companies back to Uganda. By the first returning steamer and barges I will send one Company of the 1st Battalion to Yonti and before leaving will leave instructions for the gradual demobilization of the troops here.

13. I attached herewith

- (1) Major Soames' report.
- (2) Schedule of fines inflicted and paid
- (3) Staff Diary.

Later I will submit my final report on the operations.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Sd/- B. R. Graham, Lieut-Colonel

Commanding Lerehan Force.

Garrebahare,

May, 14th. 1914.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF NO. 2 COLUMN
BETWEEN MAY 3RD. AND MAY 12TH 1914.

To The Officer Commanding,
Merhan Force,

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your orders to hold watering places and deny water to the Merhan Somalis' stock until they had paid their fine.

1. I moved from Garrebahare to Dabli 12 miles on May 3rd. On my arrival I found the river in flood and no Somalis watering there, as there was a sufficiency of rain pools everywhere for their immediate needs. I accordingly determined to move to Gerba Dina as I was told all the Ali Dera were living in that District.

2. On May 5th I arrived at Jabnana and was met on the road by Hadji Mohamet, the head of the Ali Dera, who confirmed the presence of the Ali Dera. I sent the column on to camp and visited some of the kurias, sending the illaloes to reconnoitre other kurias in the neighbourhood.

Instructions were issued to Hadji Mohamet to bring in the rifles still owing to Government and his fine of stock. On receipt of your letter on the evening of the 5th May, I made preparations to leave

(2)

leave Captain Giffard and Lieut. Rusbridger with one Company at Jabnana and to move out to the Dilhara with 100 men and illaloes, leaving all spare baggage behind. There are two good pools of water in the stream bed at Jabnana and Gerba Dima respectively which will probably last for about two months.

3. On May 6th I arrived at Werburray roughly 13 miles from Gerba Dima. On my way through Gerba Dima I passed the tracks of the Camel Corps and judged from the direction they had taken that they had either lost their way or were going by another road to Dadabli. Werburray is a small ballah containing water during the rains. That evening I received news by runner from Captain Giffard of Lieut. Hughes' movements, and that the raiders had divided up the loot and that rain had washed out all sign of their spoor. One Degodi camel was found by my illaloes who had been sent out scouting, they also found one Ali Dera village and captured 1 rifle.

4. On May 7th I arrived at Dadabli $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles, being considerably nearer than expected.

The Dilhara appears from here to consist of an enormous plateau at a considerably higher altitude than any other part of the country, the difference in climate being most marked. The country consist of patches of thick bush and fair sized open spaces of Park like country, some of the biggest seen being $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile in length.

(3)

The Dilhara is said to extend roughly from Sid-dama to El Wak and Moyali, the Northern side sloping to the Dava River, the Eastern side running North and South at a distance of roughly 20 miles from the Western line of wells in the Merehan country. This plateau is used by the Merehan, Aulihan, Garreh and Degodi as grazing grounds during the rains. At Dadabli there is a small lake or pan measuring roughly 350 yards by 250 yards, with a water surface (May 7th 1914) 200 yards in diameter and a depth of 1 foot 9 inches in the middle. There is said to be water here for five months. There is another lake called Yagala 5 miles N.W. of Dadabli, slightly bigger and much deeper (4 ft. at 20 yds from the edge), this is reported not to dry for 8 - 9 months.

Judging from general appearances one would consider there are other lakes or ballehs of a similar kind though possibly smaller on the Dilhara. The whole country has the appearance of a much heavier rainfall than the low lying Merehan country proper to the East of it. Dadabli and Yagala appear to be within easy distance of other important tribal centres on the plateau.

The raiders boma was pointed out to me close to our camp and from appearances the raiding party must have consisted of at least 100 men.

5. With a view to possibly getting in touch with the raiders I determined to return to Dadabli via Degogan and Gurgurra, but was prevented from doing so by my guide, who I suspected at the time of wishing to conceal this road from us. This was afterwards more or less borne out by some Degodi at Garrebahare who informed me that some of the stolen camels were hidden in that District.

(4)

6. On my return to Gerba Dima I sent for Captain Giffard and his party and then again interviewed Hadji Mohamet, who expressed his inability to collect either rifles or fine and asked me to collect it with soldiers.

I accordingly detailed 4 raiding parties to proceed to various Ali Dera villages to bring back a portion of the fine from each village. These parties started at 4 a.m. and the whole fine was collected and brought in our boma by 9.30 a.m.

13 Ali Dera villages and 1 Harb Yakub Bon village were raided, yielding

275 camels.

225 cattle.

1150 sheep & goats.

1650

Rifles brought in, captured and bought for stock.

12 Ali Dera.

6 Harb Yakub Bon.

18

Hadji Mohamet behaved very well, and, guided one of the raiding parties. I returned his own personal stock to him as a mark of Government appreciation of his conduct.

From the numbers of men seen, number of kurias raided etc, allowing for absentees and kurias not raided but known of, I would estimate the Ali Dera strength at 200 (250 maximum) able bodied fighting men.

7. The patrol returned to Garrebahare via Abumediarti on May 12th.

I have etc., etc.
 Sd/- L. H. Soames, Major.
 1st. K. A. Rifles.
 Commanding No. 2 Column.

TABLE OF FINES.

247

| Section. | Description. | SABEIN. | | | FINE. | | |
|---------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------------|
| | | Amount of Sabein | Amount Paid. | Amount Still due. | Amount of Fine | Amount Paid | Amount still due. |
| MER TULHA. | Camels. | - | - | - | 500 | 87 | 413 |
| | Cattle | - | - | - | 600 | 304 | 296 |
| | Sheep goats | - | - | - | 1000 | - | 1000 |
| MER ALI DERA. | Camels | 50 | 50 | - | 250 | 250 | - |
| | Cattle | 50 | 50 | - | 200 | 200 | - |
| | Sheep & goats | - | - | - | 1000 | 1000 | - |
| | Horses. | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| | Rifles. | 11 | 11 | - | 9 | 9 | - |
| SAHEED WET. | Camels | - | - | - | 150 | 150 | - |
| | Cattle | - | - | - | 150 | 150 | - |
| | Sheep & goats | - | - | - | 300 | 300 | - |
| | Horses. | 30 | 30 | - | 10 | 10 | - |
| | Rifles. | 40 | 40 | - | 20 | 20 | - |
| SARFAD. | Camels. | - | - | - | 9 | 9 | - |
| | Cattle. | - | - | - | 15 | 15 | - |
| | Rifles. | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | - |
| MER YUSSUF. | Cattle. | - | - | - | 0 | 29 | 11 |
| | Camels. | - | - | - | 80 | 60 | 20 |
| | Sheep & goats. | - | - | - | 400 | - | 400 |
| MER HASSAN. | Camels | - | - | - | 600 | 144 | 456 |
| | Cattle | - | - | - | 500 | 221 | 279 |
| | Sheep & goats | - | - | - | 1500 | 332 | 1268 |
| | Horses | - | - | - | 3 | - | 3 |
| | Rifles. | 30 | 30 | - | 10 | 2 | 8 |
| MER YAKUB. | Camels. | - | - | - | 100 | 40 | 60 |
| | Cattle | - | - | - | 100 | 100 | - |
| | Sheep & goats. | - | - | - | 300 | 216 | 84 |
| | Rifles. | 5 | 5 | - | 5 | 5 | - |
| SEYIKH AOUL | Camels | - | - | - | 30 | 30 | - |
| SEYIKH AOUL | Camels | - | - | - | 30 | 30 | - |

STAFF DIARY.

Extracts from April 23rd to May 21st.

April 23rd.

'D' Coy 3/K.A.R. 63/No.1 Column strength as per margin under the
 'E' Coy -do-103
 Details -do-10 Officer Commanding, Mershan Force left Serenli
 1 Sec. 'A' Coy at 2.30 p.m. for Garrebahare. Galalio was reached
 1/K.A.R. 30 at 6.45 p.m. and a camp made for the night.
 Followers 18
 1 B. Camels 282

April 24th.

Arrived at Dar where Mr. Filleul, A.D.C. with an escort of 'F' Coy 4/K.A.R. under Captain Carew were in camp.

The Rer Ali are reported to be at Farwen Dur, so Mr. Filleul is to accompany the force there to-morrow.

April 25th.

Arrived at Farwen Dur after a long and tiring march of 23 miles. Indian camels which are heavily loaded doing very well.

April 26th.

The Officer Commanding held a baraza of the Rer Ali chiefs during the day, and they brought in 25 rifles promising to bring in a further 20 qda to-morrow to Mr. Filleul who is to stay behind with an escort of 30 men 'A' Coy 1/K.A.R. and then return Serenli. 'F' COY 4/K.A.R. will accompany the Column to-morrow.

April 27th.

Arrived Gubbut. No water.

April 28th.

Arrived Garrebahare and went into camp near the boat. Water supply very short.

All sections except Rer Hassan and Rer Mahbub Yakub Bon have brought in 'sabein' demanded by Government, the Ahmed Wet completing theirs hurriedly on the arrival of the Column.

(2)

April 30th. A baraza of all sections held at 2 a.m. the only absentees being the Rer Tulha and Hassan. The Rer Habr Yakub Bon have now completed their 'sabein'. The reasons for disarmament and conditions of peace explained to chiefs and they were informed Civil Administration would shortly be re-established. Amounts of fines still owing also explained.

Major Soames arrived with No. 2 Column strength as per margin at 5.30 p.m.

The water supply very low indeed and it has been found necessary to put all ranks on a ration of 2 chaguls a day.

May 1st. It has been decided to send out 2 columns as under:- No. 1 Column under O.C. Merenan Force.

'E' Company 3rd. K.A.R.

½ 'D' Company 3rd. K.A.R.

½ 'F' Company 3rd. K.A.R. (Camelry).

No. 2 Column under Major Soames:

'B' Company 1st. K.A.R.

'F' Company 4th K.A.R.

Somali Illaloes.

All troops rationed up to 16th May.

Captain Stoner staying with 'C' Coy 1st K.A.

Rifles at Garrebahure.

No. 1 Column left at 4.10 a.m. for Abumadirt.

Water supply here at present plentiful.

Arrived Makalla. The Humbali river flowing thus making it impossible to hold water supply as at present stock can be watered anywhere. Rer Hassan brought in 24 rifles as part of their 'sabein'.

(3)

May 4th.

Signalling party and escort went up to Humbali Hill distance 14 hours from camp and communication opened with No. 2 Column at Dabli and with Garrebahare. A message from Major Soames that there were very few herhan at Dabli and he was leaving Captain Giffard and one company there and proceeding himself to Gerba Dima.

May 5th.

An impertinent letter received from Hassan Deba about his fine; a letter sent to Major Soames and enclosing an answer for Hassan Deba to the effect that the time for the payment of the Her Tulha fine was over and that troops would shortly collect it forcibly.

Three Dapdia arrived 10 a.m. and reported herhan had raised 1000 camels from them, sections implicated are said to be Her Farah Ogas, Garred, Ahmed Wet, and Ali Dera. They say raiders are at Dadabli 6 hours from here. Camel Corps ordered to move out with Dapdia as guide to recover this stock, left at 10.40 a.m.

Signalling communication established with Major Soames at Gerba Dima.

Her Ahmed Wet brought in small portion of their fine.

May 6th.

Signalling communication opened with Jabnam to where Captain Giffard has moved with his Company. A message received saying Major Soames left at 1.15 p.m. to-day for Dadabli to support Camel Corps. Very heavy rain in afternoon. Humbali river in flood. Fear this will hinder Camel Corps and wash out tracks of raiders.

May 7th.

Message received from Garrebahure to say Captain Stonor had proceeded to Fafes with Farah Ogas chiefs to try and catch some of the raiders.

In the afternoon a message received from Lieut. Hughes saying he had recovered 66 camels and 2 rifles but that the rain had washed out tracks of raiders who had split up.

May 8th.

No. 1 Column less 1 'E' Company 3rd K.A.R. left for Gerba Abdi.

On arrival at Lolli Tuli there were signs of a camp of what may be the raiding party of the Far Farah Ogas.

Captain Gregg with 1 'B' Coy sent after them to investigate returned at 3 p.m. with 697 camels mostly property of Ahmed Wet. Officer Commanding decided to return with these to Makalla and hold them till fine brought in.

May 9th.

Returned Makalla and found Camel Corps had arrived back.

Message from Captain Stonor his raid to Fafes had been unsuccessful as none of the men implicated could be found.

Lieut Hardingham left for Binigar with 1 'E' Coy to help and collect Ahmed Wet fine.

May 10th.

Message from Major Soames saying he had forcibly collected the whole of the Ali Dera fine.

Officer Commanding held a baraza of Rer Hassan at 11 a.m. and explained terms of peace and fine. The chiefs asked for troops to help collect it and so Lieut Hughes and Camel Corps left for Dilhara at 3 p.m. with Yero Ali.

Signalling message from Binigar reporting no Ahmed wet there.

(5)

In evening 400 Ahmed Wet camels out of those captured picked out and remainder returned. These 400 represents balance of fine, rifles etc., still due.

- May 11th. Left in evening for Humbali Camp. Signalling Station withdrawn.
- May 12th. Arrived at Binigar. During the day Ahmed Wet turned up in large numbers with part of the fine and to redeem their camels with rifles and horses; 12 rifles and five horses brought in.
- May 13th. Left Binigar and arrived Gerbahare with some 500 camels, 300 cattle and 300 sheep and goats.
No. 2 Column had arrived yesterday. A further 20 rifles brought in by Ahmed Wet in exchange for their camels.
- May 14th. Major Soames, No. 2 Column to proceed with stock to Dar, send stock in and then proceed to Dealu and collect Tulha fine.
'B' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles under Capt. Stonor, to proceed Makalla to support Lieut. Hughes and Camel Corps and collect Ber Hassan fine.
Officer Commanding with 'D' Coy 3rd K.A.R. as escort will return to Serenli, taking Medical Officer, all sick, surplus stores and ammunition, 'E' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles to remain and garrison Garrebahare.
- May 15th. No. 2 Column left at 4 a.m.
- May 16th. Officer Commanding left for Serenli.
- May 20th. Arrived Serenli.
- May 21st. Capt. Salkeld & Lieut. Richmond arrived at Serenli.

SE/- J.F. Edwards. Captain.
Staff Officer to the Kerehan Force.

Serenli,
21-6-14.

INCLOSURE

In Despatch No. 531 of July 3rd 1914

The King's African Rifles.

S E R E N G I .

26th May 1914.

To

The Honourable,
the Chief Secretary,
Nairobi.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for the
information of His Excellency the Governor
the following:-

- (i) My Memorandum to the Provincial
Commissioner Jubaland.
- (ii) Reply to (i) from Provincial Commissioner
- (iii) My handing over instructions to Major
L.H. SOAMES.

I have, etc.,

Sgd/- B.R. Graham. Lieut-Colonel
Commanding Troops E.A. Protectorate.

MEMORANDUM.

To

The Provincial Commissioner,
Jubaland Province.

With reference to the instructions to you by His Excellency the Governor dated April 18th 1914 (No: S.5266) I offer the following remarks.

2. His Excellency's orders are based on the premise that you would arrive at Serenli before the actual cessation of hostilities, but the sudden collapse of all opposition and the submission of the tribes forced my hand and I had to offer such terms as I considered suitable.

3. I have tried to base my fine at approximately 10% of a section's possessions. This I considered a severe but by no means excessive fine and has I hope and believe complied with the spirit as well as the letter of para 4 His Excellency's instructions to you.

4. I have also told all the tribal elders that I was prepared to purchase any rifles over and above the amount laid down in the fines at the rate of seven camels for a rifles. This I hope will comply with His Excellency's instructions as conveyed in his telegram to me dated 5th April 1914.

5. At any "baraza" I may have held, I have informed the elders that His Excellency had decided to re-establish Civil Administration on

cessation of hostilities and that you were arriving shortly. I was extremely careful to avoid anything definite and told them I had no idea of your views, that any orders you gave would have to be obeyed.

6. There is only one point in which I have not complied with His Excellency's instructions and this one particularly stated was a suggestion and could be varied at my discretion viz. the time for the completion of Pines- While fully appreciating the advantages from our point of view that the Pine should be extended over a period of months or years, I am of opinion that such a procedure would have made Administration far more difficult for the Officer taking over. In this view, I think, you concur.

7. In my opinion the Merahan have received a lesson and I do not anticipate any further trouble, but as you are well aware, in dealing with Somalis only a lunatic would guarantee anything.

8. There are some points however which, with all diffidence, I bring forward for your consideration.

(i) The Sheikh adl and the Shiremoge. These sections have not been in open hostility against the Government, but they unquestionably have been the middlemen in the arms traffic. Living as they do, close to Lugh, they are not easy to control and the advisability of their being moved nearer Serenli is to be considered.

(ii) Merahan - Aulihan areas require final adjustment so as to avoid probable causes of future friction.

(iii) Inter-sectional raids. These, I fear, it is well nigh impossible to stop. The 'Bobto' or young bloods are not in my opinion under the control of their chiefs and the only reprisal I can suggest is the prompt seizure of stock of the offenders. Unfortunately the stock in such cases is very limited and its total confiscation does not remove the desire to possess more. I would suggest that chiefs should be called on to surrender raiding 'Bobto' and they be made to do real hard manual labour in a Government Loma.

(iv) I have by cable informed His Excellency that I consider Shire Jama. (Ahmed Wet) should be deported. Major Soames who knows the chiefs far better than I do still holds this opinion. Mr. Elliott holds the contrary view. I personally am not so decided as I was. Deportation is perhaps an admission of weakness and if the chiefs have really realized the game is up, they may become powerful assets to Government in future administration.

So far as I have been able to gather, Shire Jama (Ahmed Wet), Yarrow Ali (Mer Hassan), and Sheikh Issac (Ali Dera) have been the principal factors in the recent trouble.

I know of no single chief whom I could recommend as a paramount chief for the whole of the Merhan. The most educated seems to be Haji Mahomed (Ali Dera) but he is a boy- He may however be very useful to Government in a few years.

(v) I think the Officer in Administration charge should have some secret service money at his disposal.

(vi) I enclose a copy of my handing over instructions to Major L.H. Soames who will take over from me. There is only one point which I have not touched viz the immigration of Somalis from the North. I have received no orders from His Excellency on this subject. My own opinion is it should be checked, but once tribes have crossed, it is practically impossible to turn them back. I do not anticipate any help from the Italian Government as I rather gather they are glad to be rid of would be emigrants, and the best way to check such is to have our own spies well to the North in Italian territory to give us timely notice of any intended movement and stop the actual crossing of the River Juba (vide v). The troops at my disposal cannot patrol the river and from Salugli to Onsi.

(vii) I am still of opinion that a visit to the Aboukr Jibrahil kurias is advisable. I do not mean any use of force whatsoever but I think they should be made to understand that Government's orders must be obeyed.

(viii) I have considerably modified my opinion of Haji Abdul Kenman Mursal. He has been of great assistance to me, without this I should never have procured the Aulihan illalces and the committing of the Aulihan to our side, combined with the Mohamed Zubier and Abd Fak fight in the

vicinity of the Lorian unquestionably cleared the Political atmosphere last February.

9. I would like to express my appreciation of the way Mr. Filieul has worked while he has been under my orders. I consider he has done very well under strange circumstances and new conditions.

10. I propose forwarding a copy of this Memorandum and any reply you may give me to the honourable the Chief Secretary for the information of his Excellency the Governor.

(Sd) E.R.Graham Lieut-Colonel
Commanding Merchant Force.

MEMORANDUM.

To

The Officer Commanding Troops,
East Africa Protectorate.

With reference to my instructions No. 5266 which you have seen and your remarks I have the following observations to make.

2. Opposition on the part of the Merahan having ceased I take it your presence is no longer needed and that your second-in-command has full knowledge of your ideas.

3. I have no intention of altering any orders you have given and consider the fines inflicted are sufficient but not too heavy. I propose that none should be remitted or spread over a long term as His Excellency suggests. With due deference I consider that a fine collected on the spot has more effect and leaves less rankle than any collected over a period which method allows the more influential men to despoil their poorer neighbours, for the purpose of payment.

4. I observe your remarks as to rifles. I assume however that His Excellency's instructions to me in his para 4 are to the effect that he wishes arms to be collected as opportunity offers. I shall therefore inform all chiefs that the carrying of arms will be looked on with disfavour and the owners will be liable to have

them confiscated. But I wish the owners to have time to receive this information and to have opportunity of selling to the Government before that order is enforced.

5. Your para 6 is dealt with in my para 3 and I understand the matter is practically over.

6. Re. your para 8 -

Sections (i) & (ii). This matter of nomads is a difficult one and though I agree in principle I should not care to give a definite opinion at present.

Section (iii). Raids in my opinion should be dealt with by the nearest British Officer Civil or Military. As a rough rule I consider the punishment should be the return of the looted stock plus 10% as a tribal fine. Those guilty persons that are captured should be detained until the fine is paid.

Section (iv). I doubt if I agree to deportation. A bad chief is better than no chief; he is at least a known quantity whereas a tribe without a chief is a totally unknown proposition.

Section (v). Is most essential.

Section (vi). We cannot with our resources without the co-operation of the Italians stop this immigration. There is no reason to suppose the Italians intend to help. Further the line of the river north of Lugh where the majority of the immigration occurs is I understand at least doubtful territory possibly Abyssinian.

Section (vii). I have already given orders

for a 'Baraza' with the Abuk Jibrani on my return to Serenli and another with the Aurihan proper.

Section (viii). I am of opinion that my own arrival at Wajneir and the visit of the Inspector General, King's Africa, to that place had more effect than we thought. I am however sure that the determining factor in the collapse of the Merehan opposition and the alteration of the attitude of the Serenli Auliban may be directly traced to menace of a strong reinforcement backed by ample transport from India.

7. I note your para 9 and 10.

8. As regards our conversation as to Cadis I consider they should be used but should not be Somalis. There is no such thing as a genuine Cadi amongst Somalis. Somali custom in many cases are different to the Sheria but that point presents no difficulty as they use either as suits them best. It were better that we had our own Cadis who should be Arab Sheriffs well paid and with no local prejudices.

9. I propose that the area now occupied by the inhabitants of Serenli should be properly laid out in reserves, watering places defined, sanitation arranged for, and so on.

The broad basis of the plan being

(A) A Government Reserve.

(B) A Military Reserve.

(C) A Native Reserve.

I do not suggest that this scheme should

-4-

be carried out at once but it gives us a definite plan on which to work, a portion this year, a portion next year and so on.

10. As is obvious this is only a very tentative expression of opinion. A copy is being handed to you and of course a copy will be forwarded to the Honourable the Chief Secretary there may be other points I have omitted but in general I can say that we are in complete accord.

11. A general scheme of Administration together with its reserve of force cannot be gone into by myself until I return. I propose a tour of about a month.

(Sd) H.L.Salkeld.

Ag. Provincial Commissioner.

Serenli.
26-5-14.

To

Major L. H. Soames.

1. On my departure you will assume command of the troops in Jubaland. The following notes and instructions are for your future guidance, but I have no desire to tie your hands in any way and you are at liberty to use your own discretion. Should however you feel compelled to act against the spirit of these instructions you will at once report to Head Quarters.

Political 2. It is hoped that the next 10 days will see the practical completion of the fines. This really means that Political considerations must again take precedence so long as no Military risks are involved. The K.A.R. Regulations paras 92 to 98 must be your guide. You will do your utmost to help the Officer in Administration charge.

It is very far from my wish that troops should be anchored at Serenli and Garrebahare, and the more patrolling that is done the better not only from a Political but also a Military point of view Officers will thereby get to know the country and the local Somalis will realise that Government although able to proceed anywhere, does not wish to interfere in any way with their tribal customs and habits.

3. These should be promptly dealt with. The Somalis of 'F' Company will all be mounted on mules and based for the present in Garrebahare, but you will of course send them to Serenli for a rest when the situation permits. I wish these Somalis to form the nucleus of

the new Mule Company and I intend approaching His Excellency for sanction to enlist more Northern Somalis.

The Sudanese and the Riding Camels will return to Gobwen. I am most anxious that the Camel Corps should be thoroughly rested and re-organized.

4. I am very averse to the opening of new stations and the frittering of troops who should be kept as concentrated and mobile as possible. Serenli will be your base and Garrebahare or Lolloshid or any other place should form an advanced camp and must never be left without transport to move say 30 (mule) Somalis and 50 Infantry with 10 days rations and 100 pounds reserve ammunition and water for one day.

One station other than Serenli should suffice.

5. will be kept as far as possible in Serenli. Cr. Sergt. She^o P^o Ahmed is in-charge. I have cabled to His Excellency for sanction to pay the Somali illaloes with cattle, they should be paid before they start at rates obtaining for ~~the~~ cattle here. I have also recommended these illaloes should drive the stock to Nairobi for public auction. If this is approved, the stock must be branded immediately and the illaloes will have to cut out the brand mark as proof of casualties on route.

A sufficient number of good milch cows will be retained in Serenli and Garrebahare for the benefit of officers. 100 milch camels may be placed aside and branded for the use of the Somalis of the new Mule company and the

S.M.T.C. If possible they will be served by Indian camels

You may purchase good baggagers, herios, ropes etc.. with milch camels and I will obtain H. A' sordiers regarding the balance.

Bullocks, sheep and goats should be kept for rations for troops. You will procure herdsmen locally with a due regard to economy. They should pending H. P.'s further orders be paid in stock.

6. Captain Salkeld is averse to the carrying of rifles and ammunition by any Merhan and is not prepared to give leave to anybody to do so. There may however be some exceptional cases e.g. Deria, Unakool who was given this permission by Mr. Hope.

7. Whenever a Political Officer has to proceed to any places which necessitates his being furnished with an escort, he will be supplied with transport from the S.M.T. Corps. If no escort is necessary he will utilise his own transport. You will keep to supply really good baggagers for the A.D.Cs. Merhan and Serenli who will be entirely responsible for their up-keep when once taken over.

The purchase of camels, whether for the S.M.T. Corps or for Civil Officers will be in the hands of the transport officer.

8. Whenever it is contemplated making a patrol, you will inform the A.D.C. of your proposed itinerary. Any meat or milk etc supplied by Somalis will be paid for by a 'chit' on Serenli.

9. Any raids by bands of Tigre or Abyssinians will be dealt with by the nearest officer.

10. I show on a separate paper the movements of troops. You will see therefore that I am practically concentrating the Nyassaland Companies in Subaland, but they will have to find the half company detachment at Moyale & 'C' Company under Lieut Faulkner will proceed as soon as possible to effect this.

You will use your own discretion as to accompanying this half company with more troops for a part of the journey - I am advising the Officer i/c N.F.D. of the contemplated move and the Lt. Col. Coy 3rd Battalion will proceed thence to Nairobi as expeditiously as possible.

I wish to return to the old establishment for the Northern Jubaland garrison as soon as possible.

11. Lieut. Phillips will remain temporarily i/c of the S.M.F. Corps, you will arrange for his relief under Battalion arrangements.

Captain Giffard will have to perform the duties of Staff Officer in Cobwen or Yonli.

12. All the temporary enlisted Maxim Gun Porters, stretcher Bearers, will be despatched to Nairobi for discharge as soon as possible after the collection of fines has been completed.

13. The greatest care must be taken of the ponies and they must as far as possible be groomed. I will arrange for the supply of brushes and curry combs.

14. I wish you to carry out the duties of an Officer Commanding Battalion as regards the 1st Battalion Companies. I think it will be simpler for all concerned if any returns etc. asked for Officer Commanding 1st Battalion are submitted through head quarters at Nairobi.

15. Your normal expenditure will strictly be limited by the approved estimates for 1914-15. If you are compelled to incur any extraordinary expenditure in connection with e.g. the care of the looted stock or the care of ponies, you may do so but you must immediately report this to head quarters for approval by His Excellency.

Sgd/- B.R. Graham: Lieut-Colonel

Commanding Troops I.A. Protectorate.

16. It is in my opinion the duty of Civil or Political Officer to decide whether he should be accompanied by a Military escort. Should he proceed anywhere without such escort he does so entirely at his own risk.

B.R.G.

Gov 26001/1914/E.A.P.

Downing Street

30 October, 1914

DRAFT

FINA PROVINCIAL No 977

Sir H. C. Belfield; K.C.M.G.
MINUTE.

Mrs. G. M. 29/10/14

Sir,

Mr. Bottomley 29.10.14

Mr. Read 29/10/14

I have the honour to acknowledge

Mr. G. Fiddes 29/10/14

the receipt of your despatch No. 631 of July

Sir H. Just

and with regard to the operations of inst

Mr. J. Anderson

the Mares n.

Lord Emmott, Irlington

Mr. Harcourt

In the fifth paragraph of your

despatch you recommend that some compensa-

tion in respect of wear and tear of uniform

and camp equipment should be granted to the

officers who took part in the operations.

I have consulted the Inspector General, King's

African Rifles, on this point and he has

suggested that £20 for each officer would be

a suitable sum. I shall be glad to learn

whether

whether you refer to this, and, if so, what
the estimate cost will be.

3. With regard to paragraphs 6 and 8
of your despatch, I would point out that in
accordance with paragraph 170 of the King's
African Rifles Regulations, a separate "Des-
patch relating to Field Operations" should
be addressed to me on this matter. *Your* ~~shall~~ *if this is done, you*
recommendations for rewards ~~will then receive~~
shall

* careful consideration.

4. I would add that the enclosures to
your despatch are extremely full and contain
matter
much which need hardly have been transmitted
to me. Certain papers are also included which
had already been forwarded to me. In this con-
nexion I have to call your attention to para-
graphs 169 to 173 of the King's African Rifles
Regulations and to request that the procedure
there prescribed should be followed in future.

I have, etc.,

(SIGNED) BARBOUR.

INCLOSURE No. 1

In Despatch No. 631 of July 3rd 1914

The King's African Rifles,

Serenli, 269


23rd April, 1914.

To

The Honourable,

The Chief Secretary,

Nairobi.



Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.M.6. dated 7th April, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of Major Soames' report on his patrol.

2. There is no doubt the continuance of pressure has had an excellent effect and I am advised by Lieut Elliott from Carrebahare that the Her Hassan are also making overtures for peace.

3. With reference to para 2 of the report it is impossible to treat with portions of a section. The inevitable result of such a course is that the portions, who do not contemplate surrender, hand over their stock to those that do and roam the country at will. There are no distinct tribal marks on stock and it is impossible to distinguish the owners. Even the Far Ogas have been found harbouring the stock of tribes who have not yet tendered their submission.

4. My orders to Major Soames modifying my original instructions regarding the infliction of fines did not reach him till he had dictated terms to the Ali Dera and I left it to Major Soames' discretion to alter his terms or not.

While I fully appreciate His Excellency's suggestions that the fine inflicted should be for
the

2.

the maintenance of the garrison, I am afraid unless, I exact some portion immediately, there will be considerable difficulty in its collection later on. I will do the best I can.

5. The rains seem to be falling this year and unless there is some more in the near future a drought may be expected. This hinders the movement and health of the troops and Major Soames party experienced considerable hardships.

This drought naturally is also affecting the Merehan whom Lieut Elliott describes as being very dispirited.

6. The Ber Ali Aulihan whom I allowed to cross near Lugh are reported to have been looting indiscriminately. I have sent Mr. Filleul with an escort out to interview them at Dar where I shall arrive to-morrow.

I am inclined to the opinion that a patrol amongst the Aboukr Jibrahil is very necessary to show them that Government intends supporting Haji Abdurrahman Mursal. By patrol I do not mean active operations and I hope the mere presence of troops will have the desired effect.

7. The Serepli Military Transport Camels have had very hard work and are badly in need of rest. I am therefore utilising the Indian Camels for my next move. It is very necessary that for some time after the operations cease here, we should have sufficient transport absolutely ready to supply a small column which may possibly be necessary to enforce the prompt execution of the Administration Officers orders.

8.

3.

Br. Officers
 Vety. Assistant
 Vety. Dresser
 R. & F. 'D' Coy 3rd
 K. A.R.
 R. & F. 'E' Coy 3/K.A.R.
 R. & F. 'F' Coy 4/K.A.R.
 R. & F. Details 3/K.A.R.
 Followers
 Indian Camel Atttds.
 Indian Camels.

8. I am moving out to-day with troops and camels as per margin and Major Soames follows on the 26th instant. I shall probably have to stop a day at Farnwen Dur to water the Indian camels and I may possibly be delayed at Lar with the Rer

MR SOAMES' COLUMN. Ali - Aulihan.

Br. Officers
 Indian Officer
 Medical Officer
 N. Officer
 R. & F. 'B' Coy 1/K.A.R.
 R. & F. 'F' Coy 3/K.A.R.
 Mllaloes
 Hospl. Stretcher bearers
 Hospl. Dresser
 Armed Syces
 Camel drivers
 Riding camels
 Riding mules
 Indian Camels
 Indian Camel Attendants.
 Ponies and Mules (officers)
 Followers.

I have, etc.

Sd/- B. R. Graham,

Lieut-Colonel.

Commanding Merein Force.

St.

REPORT ON MEREHAN PATROL WHICH LEFT
SERENLI MARCH 31st AND RETURNED APRIL 20th.

From

Major L.H. Soames

1st K.A. Rifles.

To

The Officer Commanding,

Merehan Force.

Serenli, 23rd April, 1914.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that (in accordance with your orders copy attached) on arrival at Garrebahare, finding that there was no trustworthy intelligence available, I decided to try and move by the central line of wells against the Ahmed Wed section of the Merehan, who I believed to be in the neighbourhood of Tagabie. My intention was to move via Binigar, Jin Fras Ful and Bashali, as I considered sufficient rain had fallen to make this route practicable. On arrival at Binigar there was no water, and the camp had to be moved back $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to a small rain pool which had been found by the Illaloes. News was then brought to me that there were 5 gurrias of Rer Ahmed Wed living between Jin Fras Ful and Bashali; I advanced upon the place where the gurrias were supposed to be to find that they were Aulihan Rer Ali who were moving down country to Garrebahare. On questioning the Rer Ali they denied the presence of any Ahmed Wed, but acknowledge that they knew where one of the Eli D gurrias was, this they pointed out, with the result that

2.

that of the Eli Dera 4 were killed 2 wounded 1 rifle was taken and the following stock captured 117 camels, 97 cattle and 632 goats and sheep. The stock was all killed. Among the killed was a headman of the Ber Sheikh section of the Eli Dera by name Wais. On arrival at Bashali the water was found to be so bad and of such limited supply, that, with the knowledge that there was no water at Tagable, and that the Ahmed Wed were supposed to be in the vicinity of Iekdima, I considered it impossible to advance any further by that route; I accordingly returned, the men having to march for 11½ consecutive hours before reaching water. On return to Garrebahare Mohamed Haji and Sheikh Ismaili's son came into camp at Garrebahare to make peace for the whole section of Eli Dera with Government. Terms were granted to them as in enclosure.

2. The patrol then moved out to Abumadirti where a Ber Garard village was captured, 1 of the enemy was killed, and 1 captured together with 30 camels and 70 cows; two rifles were seen. As this party came in and surrendered their two rifles the next day a proportion of their stock was returned to them.

On return to Garrebahare the Ber Balleh section of the Ahmed Wed came in to try and make peace for themselves only, but were not allowed to do so in accordance with orders, and a demand for a sabbein of 40 rifles and 30 ponies was made upon the whole of the Ahmed Wed.

3.

3. 'A' and 'C' Companies, 1st K. A. Rifles were then changed over as garrison to Garrebahare, and the patrol moved down to Farnwen Dur. Numerous Rer Ali and Rer Aigab were seen between Jehadin and Dar. The Ogas of the Aulihan was sent for and warned that his followers were not to go beyond Dar, and that those ~~of~~ in the neighbourhood of Farnwen were to stay where they were for the present, also that the Civil Officer would be at Dar in a few days time where he would hold a baraza.

Hassan Debir, chief of the Rer Tulha, was sent for and told that the Government expected more rifles to be given up by his section, and that his time for paying the Government fine was fast drawing to a close. He stated that a large proportion of the fine had been collected at Dehagine but that all his men were in constant fear of being raided by the Aulihan.

Six rifles which were seen being carried by the Rer Ali were taken from them on the journey back. The patrol then moved into Serenli.

4. I regret to report that the state of health of the troops on this patrol was bad, the men suffering from Dysentery, the effect of hard work and the paucity of very indifferent water. One M.G. Porter Manemba and one askari number 135 Bug Miesha died on the patrol from dysentery.

I have, etc.

Sd/- I. H. Soames Major.
1st Bn. King's African Rifles.

Serenli,

31st March, 1914.

Major L. H. Soames,

You will proceed in command of "C" and 'B' Companies, 1st K.A.Rifles and Somali details to relieve 'A' Company at Garrebahare. 'C' Company will remain at Garrebahare.

2. From Garrebahare you will proceed on patrol for as many days as your rations permit in such direction as your intelligence renders advisable.

3. The Intelligence Officer will give you full information regarding sections who have submitted and partially submitted to Government, these sections will not be interfered with unless you are absolutely convinced they have broken the truce.

4. Her Tulha have been given to April 21st to complete their fine. As you are aware Somalis are notoriously dilatory, but you will do what you can without resorting to force to collect such amount of the fine as would render it folly on the part of the Tulha to secede from Government.

5. You may meet the Aulihan Rer Ali who have received orders not to proceed south of Dar without my leave. You will take no action against them.

6. You will not make terms with any sub-sections of any Merehan tribe, i.e. Ahmed Wed, Ali Dera, Rer Hassan etc.

7. Should a complete section desire peace, you

2.

you will inflict fines on a scale similar to that
already inflicted on the Tulha.

Sd/- B.R.Graham,

Lt.-Colonel.

Commanding Merchant Force.

April 11th, 1914.

Conditions of peace with Ali Dera.

1. Within 10 days a total of 11 rifles and 2 horses to be brought in as sabben, 50 camels and 50 cattle. A man stops at end of 10 days if this is not brought in and war continues.

2. Within one month a further 9 rifles and a fine of 250 she camels, 200 cattle, 1000 sheep and goats.

Non-compliance with this means a further continuance of hostilities.

3. Other conditions of peace same as Tulha.

4. Any Ali Dera found with a rifle from now onward to be shot at sight.

5. Grazing area Dabli and anywhere south.

Sd/- I. H. Soames, Major.

Position at end of May

Serenli

- 'A' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 'B' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 1/2 'D' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles
- 1/2 'C' Coy 4th K.A. Rifles.

C. C.
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4 1/2 1/4

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Gerbe Harre

- 'C' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 'E' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles.
- 1/2 'F' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles (Camel Corps)

Moyale

- 1/2 'D' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles.

Moves in June

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles to Yonti
- 'F' Coy 4th K.A. Rifles to Uganda
- 1/2 'F' Coy 3rd K.A.R. (less Somali M.I.) to Gobwan.

Moves during river season.

From Nyassaland

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Serenli
- 'F' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Serenli
- 'A' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Nyassaland
- 1/2 'D' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi from Serenli
- 1/2 'D' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi from Moyale.
- 1/2 'C' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Moyale
- 'E' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi

Position in Jubaland of troops on completion of moves.

Serenli & Gerbe Harre

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- 'F' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- 1/2 'C' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- Somali M.I.

Moyale

- 1/2 'C' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles.

Yonti

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles

Gobwan

- 'F' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles (less Somali M.I.)

B. P. Graham

Lieut Colonel

Commanding Troops, E. A. P.

Nairobi,

29th June 1914

CONFIDENTIAL.

INCLOSURE 206

In Despatch No. 631 of July 3 1914

MALIBO.

24th June 1914.

279

The Honourable
The Chief Secretary.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No 151 dated 20 April 1914 I have the honour to offer the following remarks and to request that a copy may be forwarded to the Honourable The Secretary of State.

2. To explain my action I fear I must refer to past history.

In March 1913 Mr Ware the Assistant District Commissioner, Marrehan, reported to the War Office section were openly defiant and recommended that immediate action be taken. This was approved by His Excellency and the results were eminently satisfactory.

3. On the 2nd May, Mr Ware telegraphed asking for sanction to disarm "all the Marrehan sections as he considered it necessary and the opportunity most favourable." A copy of this telegram was passed to me for my comments on the 5th May and on the 6th I wrote as follows:-

(a) Mr Ware, in his report on the spot, he will have naturally discussed the project with Captain [unclear] and has doubtless caused the feeling amongst the Marrehas as to what effect such action would have. I think the proposal is sound and disarmament will have to be carried out sooner

or later, I therefore recommend Mr. Hure's suggestion be adopted.

(b) There are two points however which should not be lost sight of.

(i) That once we disarm the Harrehan we assume a moral guarantee to a cessation of raids by other tribes and the only way to effect this is by a general disarmament, and I think the next tribes to be dealt with will probably be the Garre and the Gerrelli Ashkan.

(ii) Disarmament loses its value unless its execution can be checked, and this will necessitate very careful watching of arms.

4. On the 24th June I received a memo from Mr. Monson that His Excellency had approved of the disarming of all sections of the Harrehan, provided that the local officers were satisfied they could ensure the protection of the people after disarmament and that Mr. Hure had been informed accordingly.

5. On the 4th June I left Nairobi to carry out my inspection of the troops in detention and called from Mombasa on the 5th inst.

On the 6th June after my departure the following telegram from Captain Soames addressed to me was received by the Adjutant:

"All sections of the Harrehan with exception of Far Ugan and Bon whose attitude is doubtful have combined to resist Government order of disarmament issued to Ahmed Wet-Sheikh as all is responsible for combination, will be necessary to be prepared to deal with Harrehan. At present do not anticipate Harrehan taking initiative. Suggest increase of mounted troops."

A copy of this was forwarded to the Chief Secretary and His Excellency intimated as follows:-

"They must be made to comply with our orders."

2. Question of reinforcements to be settled by C.O. Troops*.

6. A paraphrase of a very definite decision by His Excellency was received by us by wire at least on 7th June en route for Subaland, and I received a copy of it on my arrival at Serenli about the 20th June. These were the last and final instructions I received and its terms were so brief and so definite that I, I submit, was not unnaturally prone to the conclusion that His Excellency had decided at all costs to enforce the disarmament of the Karrehan.

7. I carried out the instructions of the troops and proceeded to Lollaid. At Lollaid after consideration of all available information and in view of His Excellency's definite instructions I directed Major Hickson to inform the tribes that they must bring in their arms by August 15th. It is to be noted on my part which was, also, in accordance with the Secretary of State's dispatch dated 10th October 1916, earned for me His Excellency's severe displeasure although my action was fully reported by Letter (No 990/40/13 dated 25th August). I went to justice to verify briefly report the situation as a Court of. In reply to Mr Mure's recommendation His Excellency, vide para 4 sanctioned the disarmament of all the Karrehan, further after Captain Seames had specifically said we must be prepared to fight. His Excellency wrote his minute the Karrehan must be made to comply with our orders. The Ahmed Wet had been told in May by Mr Mure they were to be disarmed. To avoid this order they and all sections except the Far Goss had moved away and were completely out of touch. Two months had already elapsed since the order for disarmament had been given and it came to the conclusion the fairest and kindest way to deal with the question was to let the tribesmen know that Government

MOVES

INCLOSURE

SERENLI GARRISON

Despatch No. 631 of July 3rd 1914

Position at end of May

Serenli

- 'A' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 'B' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 'D' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles
- 'F' Coy 4th K.A. Rifles.

C. C.
2860
4-1

Carbe Harre

- 'C' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles
- 'E' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles.
- 'F' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles (Camel Corps)

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Moyale

- 'D' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles.

Moves in June

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles to Yonti
- 'F' Coy 4th K.A. Rifles to Uganda
- 'F' Coy 3rd K.A.R. (less Somali M.I.) to Gobwen.

Moves during river season.

From Nyasaland.

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Serenli
- 'F' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Serenli
- 'A' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Nyasaland
- 'B' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi from Serenli
- 'D' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi from Moyale.
- 'C' Coy 1st K.A.R. to Moyale
- 'E' Coy 3rd K.A.R. to Nairobi

Position in Jubaland of troops on completion of march.

Serenli & Carbe Harre

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- 'F' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- 'C' Coy 1st K.A.R.
- Somali M.I.

Moyale

- 'C' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles.

Yonti

- 'E' Coy 1st K.A. Rifles

Gobwen

- 'F' Coy 3rd K.A. Rifles (less Somali M.I.)

B. R. Abraham

Lieut Colonel

Nairobi.

29th June 1914

Commanding Troops, E. A. P.

CONFIDENTIAL.

INCLOSURE *109*

In Despatch No. *63* of July 3rd 1914

MALDEN,

24th June 1914,

279

The Honourable
The Chief Secretary.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No 151 dated 7th April 1914 I have the honour to offer the following remarks and to request that a copy may be forwarded to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State.

2. To explain my action I fear I must repeat some past history.

In March 1911 Mr Mure the Assistant District Commissioner, Marnehan, reported to me that the Car Gras section were openly defiant and recommended that immediate action be taken. This was approved by His Excellency and the results were eminently satisfactory.

3. On the 2nd May, Mr Mure telegraphed asking for sanction to disarm "all the Marnehan sections as he considered it necessary and the opportunity most favourable." A copy of this telegram was passed to me for my comments on the 5th May and on the 6th I wrote as follows:-

(a) Mr Mure, if on the spot, he will have naturally discussed the project with Captain Gordon and has doubtless caused the feeling against the Marnehan etc. and effect such action would have. I think the proposal is sound and disarmament will have to be carried out sooner

er later, I therefore recommend Mr. Mure's suggestion be adopted.

(b) There are two points however which should not be lost sight of.

(i) That once we liberate the Harrehan we assume a moral guarantee to a certain degree from raids by other tribes and the only way to effect this is by a general disarmament, and I think the next tribes to be dealt with will probably be the Garre and the Herendi Aulthan.

(ii) Disarmament loses its value unless gun running can be checked, this will necessitate very careful watching of Fiere.

4. On the 31st May I received a memo from Mr. Monson that His Excellency had approved of the disarming of all sections of the Harrehan provided that the local officers were satisfied they could ensure the protection of the people after disarmament and that Mr. Mure had been informed accordingly.

5. On the 4th June I left Nairobi to carry out my inspection of the troops in Kisumu and sailed from Mombasa on the 5th idem.

On the 8th June - after my departure - the following telegram from Captain Soames addressed to me was received by the Adjutant:

"All sections of the Harrehan with exception of Far Vana and Bon whose attitude is doubtful have combined to resist Government order of disarmament issued to Ahmed Wet- Sheikh Ismail is responsible for co-operation, will be necessary to be prepared to deal with Harrehan. At present do not anticipate Harrehan taking initiative. Suggest increase of mounted troops."

A copy of this was forwarded to the Chief Secretary and His Excellency directed as follows:-

"They must be made to comply with our orders.

5. question of reinforcements to be settled by C.O. Troops*.

6. A paraphrase of it is very definite decision by His Excellency was received by me by wire at Lamu on 7th June en route for Subisaki, and I received a copy of it on my arrival at Serenli about the 16th June. These were the last and final instructions I received and its terms were so brief and so definite that I, I submit, not unnaturally came to the conclusion that His Excellency had decided at all costs to enforce the disarmament of the Warrehan.

7. I carried out my inspection of the troops and proceeded to Lolleshid. At Lolleshid after consideration of all available information and in view of His Excellency's definite instructions I directed Major Hickson to inform the tribes that they must bring in their arms by August 15th. As to this action on my part which has, subsequent to receipt of the Secretary of State's despatch dated 20th September 1915, earned for me His Excellency's severe censure although my action was fully reported in my letter (No 890/40/15 dated 25th August). I must in justice to myself briefly report the situation as I found it. In reply to Mr Mure's recommendation His Excellency, vide para 4 sanctioned the disarmament of all the Warrehan, further after Captain Seames had specifically said we must be prepared to fight, His Excellency wrote his minute the Warrehan must be made to comply with our orders. The Ahmed Wet had been told in May by Mr Mure they were to be disarmed. To avoid this order they had all sections except the Far Gas had moved away and were completely out of touch. Two months had already elapsed since the order for disarmament had been given and I came to the conclusion the fairest and kindest way to deal with the question was to let the tribesmen know that Government

was in earnest, and I decided that August 15th was a suitable date by which the tribes if they were coming in, should disarm. Had any section shown any inclination to treat, the time could easily have been extended. I did not think then and I do not think now that the fixing of a date in any way bound me to take action immediately on the expiration of the time limit. From a military point of view, it would have been foolish to do so - the tribes would be expecting it and having driven off their stock would be prepared to resist, therefore on military grounds and in this Major Dickson who was to carry out the operations, thoroughly concurred, I decided that September 15th was quite early enough to commence operations.

After seeing the very slow nature of the Marchan country I felt that it would be wise to re-inforce the Libala troops by one company and, having no troops of the Protectorate available, I on the 24th July sent by cable a message for a company from Uganda but asked that any such orders for their move should be deferred until my return to Nairobi about August 15th. My reason for this was the little one that I know what the company would require and I could save Government the cost of transportation of unnecessary stores etc. and I was not sure of difficulties, I did not desire them to arrive a day before they were actually required. In view of His Excellency's attitude that the question of reinforcements was to be settled by cable had no reason to suppose that the smallest unit of the King's African Rifles I could ask for as reinforcements would be the cause of any delay or trouble.

E. On my arrival at Nairobi on the 15th August I found that no steps had been taken to obtain the Uganda Company.

9. On the following day His Excellency asked me various questions as to whether I considered any action we could take would be final, would we check our running and in short, gave me the impression he did not any longer desire to enforce the disarmament of the Marzban, although his definite orders had been issued after his arrival on the 6th of the 8th May (vide para 3).

This attitude seemed to me to be at such total variance with the last orders of His Excellency which I had received and as I had already given instructions for the loyal fulfilment of these orders I asked His Excellency if I might have a day to think over it and to see if it was possible to withdraw from our position. I mention the above facts as His Excellency in his despatch said I seemed disinclined to fall in with his views which, with the utmost respect, I can not think fairly represents the difficulties with which I was confronted.

10. I then wrote my memorandum headed "Subuland Province" which contained a brief appreciation of the situation. Unfortunately Sir Henry Belfield contracted his illness and further action was taken by Mr Bowring. On the 27th August I saw Mr Bowring and told him of the impression I had formed that the Governor no longer desired to enforce the disarmament. Mr Bowring informed me he was very awkwardly situated as the Medical authorities hoped His Excellency would only be incapacitated for a fortnight and that to him if considered the matter should be seen through, a view which, to the best of my knowledge, Mr Bowring has consistently held and still holds. It was I who suggested to Mr Bowring that the matter be referred to the Secretary of State.

11. I would here emphasize the fact that had I, when

In Seranli, considered the number of troops in the Marrehan sufficient and the opportunity suitable I would have directed Major Hickson to take action and, I submit, would have been perfectly justified in so doing in view of Sir Henry Belfield's orders.

12. Some considerable time elapsed in telegraphic communication with the Secretary of State, but if, on receipt by my telegram asking for a company from Uganda, prompt action had been taken and the necessary sanction of the Secretary of State obtained, the reinforcing Company would have been in Seranli by the 15th September, only one month after the expiry of the time limit given by me and approximately on the date which, as I have already stated from a military point of view, I considered it was advisable to commence operations.

13. The Inspector General arrived at Mombasa on the 18th October and at the conference at Government House on the 18th October which was attended by the Inspector General, Mr Bowring, Major Turner and myself, His Excellency so far from expressing even the slightest disapproval of any action I had taken, said to the Inspector General that I at any rate had been consistent throughout in the views I had held and the opinion I had expressed. Moreover at this interview the Inspector General put the direct question to His Excellency as to what action the latter desired and the reply was that the Marrehan must be made to obey the order.

14. Simultaneously with the Inspector General's arrival, the Secretary of State's despatch dated 26th September was received. I had not the slightest reason to suppose that His Excellency took any exception whatever to any action of mine and on my remarks being asked

For, I gave a mere statement of fact and made no attempt to give reasons in justification of my actions.

15. It is with the most profound regret that I have written this letter and I must tender my apologies for introducing the names of other Officers in what is a purely personal explanation but as I feel I have incurred the severe censure both of His Excellency the Governor and the Secretary of State without my position having been thoroughly realised I have felt myself compelled in self justification to describe the situation as I found it as also to show the interpretation I placed on the orders I had received.

I have the honor to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant

B. R. Graham. Lieut Colonel

cas 7200 CAP

No.

NAIROBI,

25th June 1914.

The Honourable

The Chief Secretary to Government

East Africa Protectorate.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith my final report on the recent operations in the Marrehan country. I have from time to time submitted reports describing the progress of events and purpose now confining myself to a general survey.

I attach various appendices as per list which describe fully the subjects with which they deal and which embody the recommendations of the Officers who had to deal first hand with the difficulties with which they were confronted.

Brief History. Serenli Station was originally occupied by the orders of the late Governor Sir Percy Ciropari "as a post of observation" in 1910.

The garrison then consisted of *30 men of the Camel Corps*

In November 1911 Colonel Mesiger the late Inspector General the King's African Rifles accompanied by Mr G. Archer toured through the Marrehan country proceeding via Dolo to Moyale.

The first active move on the part of the Government of the Protectorate was made in 1912 when Mr Hope was detailed as Political Officer to get in touch with

the Marrehan and a strong patrol under Captain W. H. Soames accompanied him as escort. Valuable data were collected in the course of this patrol as regards water, numbers and strength of the tribes and the results were generally considered to be satisfactory since a majority of the tribesmen expressed themselves as pleased with the advent of Government and declared their willingness to desist from inter tribal raiding and to forget old feuds. A post was established in the Marrehan country first at Melemerara and subsequently 6 miles further North at Lolleshid, both being recognized tribal watering places on the Juba River. On Mr Hope's departure Mr Muir was appointed Assistant District Commissioner Marrehan.

A proof however that the Marrehan desire for peaceful administration was mere talk, was very shortly forthcoming. In March 1918 some Fer Ali crossed from the Italian side and were seized by the Fer Jar Ogas who disobeyed the Government order to surrender their prisoners. His Excellency's sanction to deal with the Jar Ogas was asked for and obtained.

Captain Soames very effectually surprised them in their 'karias' or villages with the result that all the leading Chiefs were captured or surrendered and 81 rifles and 14 ponies were handed over to Government.

In May 1918 the Assistant District Commissioner in charge recommended the general disarmament of all sections of the Marrehan but on the order being issued, all the tribes disappeared into the interior and all administrative touch was lost. On this being reported His Excellency decided that the tribes were to be made to obey our orders and the question of reinforcements was to be settled.

by the Officer Commanding Troops.

Unfortunately there was a little delay in the arrival of the one Company reinforcements with the result that the extra rations only reached Mfude on the Juba River which by road is only some 70 miles from Kenti. The non-arrival of these extra rations was subsequently the cause of considerable anxiety.

The Secretary of State's approval to disarm the Marrehan was eventually received at Nairobi on 25th December but in the meantime skirmishes between the tribesmen and our troops had already taken place.

Lines of Communications.

There are two ways of reaching Serenli

(i) River Juba

(ii) Roads.

(i) By river Serenli is some 140 miles from Gobwen but the river itself is a very uncertain quantity being dependent on the rainfall in Abyssinia. Its period of utility is uncertain and there are not yet sufficient reliable data to say for how long one may reckon on its being navigable. Roughly speaking this period may be taken to be from the 1st June to the 15th November but at the time of writing (23rd June) this year I have not yet heard that the river has risen.

On the river is the small Government steamer Rose which is said to be incapable of towing barges or carrying more than a very limited amount of cargo.

The English Navigation Company have two similar steamers capable of towing two barges, but the maximum loads on these two barges in the case of the better of the two steamers should not exceed 70 tons and in the case of the smaller

steamer 50 tons. The time taken by these steamers with barges to do the journey from Gobwen to Serenli varies from 18 to 25 days for the up journey and five to seven days for the down journey. So it may be accepted that with barges these steamers cannot do more than five trips in the navigable season and that their total carrying capacity is 400 tons. The English Navigation Company however say they are prepared to arrange for search lights and run their steamers by night. I am personally sceptical as to the feasibility of the proposal but if a success the amounts that could be transported can be greatly increased.

- (ii) There are 3 roads from Gobwen to Serenli.
- (a) The Gosha road.
 - (b) The cut military road.
 - (c) The Somali caravan route via Afmadu.
- (a) Is infested with tsetse fly and is impossible for animals and it will be some years before any reliance can be placed on Gosha porters.
- (b) This was cut in the hope it would meet the twofold demand of being clear of tsetse fly and of supplying water from the lakes on the fringe of the Gosha forest. Even during the driest seasons of the year tsetse have been found in places and south of Selagli camels must be watered by hand, a tedious and lengthy process.

The distance is roughly 250 miles and one day's water must be carried..

- (c) The Afmadu route is the main Somali caravan route which owing to the scarcity of water can only be used by troops after the rains have broken i.e. 15th April to 15th June and from 15th October to 15th November, these dates are very approximate. The road is said

to be clear of fly but this is a most point during the heavy rains.

Distance about 200 miles.

Description of Country. From Yonti to Mfudo the country is open with excellent grazing for cattle. From Mfudo to the Aruwen River some 40 miles North of Serenli it is bush in parts extremely dense and almost impenetrable. During the dry seasons there is not a leaf nor a vestige of green to be seen and for miles and miles one journeys through thorn scrub which only varies in denseness and its degree of ~~rod~~ hardness. During and immediately after the rains or for some 3 or 4 months in the year the country affords excellent camel grazing, is pleasing to the eye but not to pass through.

Marrehan Country. The Marrehan country lies in the extreme N.E. of the Protectorate, it is bounded on the North by the Gana & Juba rivers which join at Dolo, on the East by the Juba River on the West by the Bilhara plateau. Its southern border is the Bar, euphemistically called a river but during a bad 'jela' or dry season cannot be counted on.

Serenli itself is 20 miles South of the Bar and is in Aulihan country. It was found impossible to administer the Marrehan from Serenli and this was the reason of the formation of temporary posts at Helemerara, Lolleshid and finally Carrebahare 22 miles inland from and West of Lolleshid. The Marrehan, for Somali country, is well watered and North of Aruwen parts of it are comparatively speaking open. The Somalis themselves utilise the inland watering places as much as possible to avoid the risk of fly, when they are compelled to use the river, the stock is driven down two to six

miles, watered and immediately driven back to the grazing areas.

Except on the out roads and on the better defined tracks it is impossible to move at all rapidly and the immobility of the force was on several occasions a severe handicap.

In the Official History of the operations in Northern Somaliland the utility of camelry acting alone is doubted, the conditions are the same here. It is impossible to scout through bush with camelry when extreme vulnerability is a source of so little anxiety. Owing to the paucity of fit riding camels, I took the extreme step of dismounting the Camel Corps. It is impossible for one who has not seen it, to realise the rate at which Somalis drive their stock and I am convinced that to fight Somalis in their own country one must employ other Somalis who should if possible be mounted on mules or ponies. I do not think it will be advisable to enlist Marrehan for some time and so for the immediate future the Protectorate must rely on Northern Somaliland.

Roads.

In addition to the big road from Yonti to Serenli, roads have been cut mostly on compass bearings from Serenli to Lollehid, from Metawaris to Garrebahare, from Garrebahare to Lollehid and Abumadirte. The total distance of road cutting by the troops cannot fall far short of 400 miles, there are in addition to these out roads a few main tracks.

Organization.

It was originally hoped that the disarmament of the Marrehan could be effected with the ordinary Marrehan garrison with the aid of the extra Company borrowed from Uganda. Serenli to all intents and purposes is cut off under normal circumstances

7.

from November till June when the Juba River is not in flood, consequently there were in existence no military organisation for Lines of Communication, nor extra facilities for landing of animals and stores at Kiama or their transportation up country.

On the arrival of the 8 Companies 4th King's African Rifles I directed Lieut Colonel L. E. S. Ward Commanding the 4th Battalion to inaugurate the Lines of Communication. These Companies had a vast amount of fatigue with none of the compensations of active service since, though their arrival had an extraordinary moral effect and helped considerably to ease the situation, they were not called on to move up country. I wish to record my sincere appreciation of Colonel Ward's services as of all ranks of the 4th King's African Rifles.

Equally in Serenli the troops there formed part of a permanent detached force and had no special staff; some Company Officers were performing extra regimental duties e. g. Transport Officer, Base Supply Officer.

When I arrived in Serenli with the Adjutant Captain Edwards, this Officer performed the duties of Staff Officer and Lieut B. Elliott, Reserve of Officers, services were placed at my disposal as Intelligence Officer. It was necessary for one Officer at least to remain in Serenli and he combined the duties of O. C. Serenli and Base Supply Officer, Lieut Elliott was Intelligence and Political Officer, while all Staff work was performed by Captain Edwards. The latter I minimised as much as possible as, for instance, on account of the smallness of the number of troops employed, no effort was made to maintain the division between Routine & Operation Orders.

On the arrival of the three Indian Supply and Transport Officers, the senior, Captain C.M. Hozz was appointed Director of Supplies & Transport and the entire question of rations for the force were in his hands. The actual tendering and final contract for rations was done by Captain H.S. Hissell at Nairobi and I can not speak too highly of the manner in which this Officer carried out his multifarious duties.

Transport.

The Serenli Military Transport Corps was invaluable so far as it went but the camels had not prior to the commencement of operations had sufficient rest to enable them to be steadily employed over a period of months and so as to avoid a risk of their total breakdown I utilised the Indian Silladar Camels on the third patrol from Serenli.

Owing to the danger to small detached parties the 'through convoy' system was employed entirely between Serenli and Garrebahare and the fittest camels ^{on} arrival at Garrebahare were employed in the actual operations.

It was feared that the Indian camels would not be able to stand the strain of continuous work without a grain ration. So long as the grazing is good I am satisfied these camels can not only subsist without grain food but actually gain in condition.

The discipline of the Corps was exemplary and reflects great credit on Lieut Pirthi Singh and on all ranks under his Command.

Signalling.

This was extremely difficult, not from the technical point of view as the country contains some high hills running up to 1800' above sea level which afford ideal stations, but as regards escorts and food and above all water supply.

Small isolated bodies of men would have been in great danger of being overpowered and it is practically impossible to arrange for more than a week's water supply. In Appendix is a plan showing the lines actually employed. I think the Protectorate should procure some of the wireless apparatus such as is used to Cavalry Brigades.

Intimately associated with the sending of information is the obtaining of it and it is well worth serious consideration as to whether the time has not arrived for the trial of aeroplanes on the Northern and North Eastern frontiers of the Protectorate. The difficulties are great, but they would be no greater than those under which troops at present labour in trying to obtain timely information as to the exact position of raiders or of raided stock.

Tactics.

These are so fully and ably dealt with in the Official History of the operations in Northern Somaliland that I will only mention two points which I think are new. At Borotiti the Somalis waited till the troops reached open glades and then fired from the edge of the bush. The following procedure was evolved to meet this

On the advanced scouts reporting a clearing, the Column was halted and Maxims brought into position to cover the ~~front~~^{flank} of the Column and Command the glade. Portiers of the passage guard then circled round each side of the glade and reported all clear and held the edge of the bush till the convoy had passed.

- (ii) The Marehan were entirely armed with the Fusil Gras with a very high trajectory and as the tribesmen naturally shoot high, high ground in the vicinity of a camp did not have the same suc-

inspiring effect as it would on the N.W. frontier of India.

II. Health.

The health of the troops can only be described as fair. There is no doubt that the climate in the North East corner of the Protectorate is enervating and Serenli itself is one of the most debilitating places I have ever been stationed in. The majority of the Troops had been two years in the District and this no doubt affected their stamina. Latterly dysentery was very prevalent.

III. Conduct.

I can not speak too highly of the conduct generally of the troops. There were no serious cases of insubordination, a fact which I attribute almost entirely to the loyal way all Officers carried out their duties.

IV. General Results.

I think I may say that His Excellency's intention that Government prestige be re-established has been amply fulfilled and I hope the Marrehan realise that they can not with impunity disobey the orders of Government.

A table showing the number of rifles surrendered, cattle fined and collected is given in the Appendices.

V. Officers Kit.

I would especially draw His Excellency's attention to the wear and tear of Officers Camp equipment and uniform. After several months constant use in Somali bush this will need entire replacement and I hope he will favourably consider the question of a grant of compensation as is the custom after active service in India. I am not asking this for the Fank & file of the King's African Rifles who are supplied with uniform at Government expense.

Recommendations.

In a separate letter I am mentioning the names of those Officers and men whose good work I desire to bring particularly to His Excellency's notice.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant

B. R. Kanau Lieut Colonel

Commanding Merchant Force & Troops
East Africa Protectorate.

Subject.

Letters.

| | |
|--|----|
| Table of Fines | A. |
| Captured Stock, Rifles & Horses | B. |
| Rifles & Ammunition Surrendered | C. |
| Casualties | D. |
| Report by Officer Commanding Lines of Communication .. | E. |
| .. Medical Officer | F. |
| .. Officer i/c S.M.T. Corps | G. |
| .. Officer Commanding 55 Camel Corps | H. |
| .. Director of Supply & Transport | I. |
| .. Deputy Director of Supply & Transport | J. |
| .. Base Supply Officer, Gobwen | K. |
| .. Captain Hogg on Supplies | L. |
| Intelligence. Captain Elliot | M. |
| --do-- Gerba Harra Captain Gregg | N. |

TABLE OF FINES.

| Location | Amount of Fine | | | | | Brought in to date. | | | | | Remarks. |
|----------------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|---------------------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|--|
| | Camels. | Cattle. | Sheep & Goats. | Horses. | Rifles. | Camels. | Cattle. | Sheep & Goats. | Horses. | Rifles. | |
| Alba | 500 | 800 | 1000 | - | - | 759 | 394 | 459 | - | - | Excess camels accepted in lieu of cattle & sheep. |
| Ali Dera | 250 | 200 | 1000 | - | 9 | 250 | 200 | 1000 | - | 9 | |
| Mohamed Wed | 150 | 150 | 300 | 10 | 20 | 102 | 150 | 300 | 5 | 32 | 48 camels returned for the excess rifles. |
| Marrad | 9 | 15 | - | 2 | - | 9 | 15 | - | 2 | - | |
| Mussuf (Assan) | 80 | 40 | 400 | - | - | 60 | 29 | - | - | - | 20 camels, 31 cattle & 400 sheep & goat still due |
| Sheik Aol | 30 | - | - | - | - | 30 | - | - | - | - | |
| Assan | 600 | 500 | 1500 | - | 10 | 330 | 422 | 582 | - | 2 | 270 camels, 78 cattle & 918 sheep & goats still due. |
| Abu (Bon) | 100 | 100 | 300 | - | 5 | 28 | 124 | 216 | - | 8 | Excess cattle & rifles in lieu of camels. |
| Chiremoga | 30 | - | - | - | - | 30 | - | - | - | - | |
| Total | 1749 | 1605 | 4500 | 12 | 44 | 1598 | 1634 | 2557 | 7 | 51 | |

In addition to the above the following "Zabein" was imposed on certain section and brought in.

| Location | Zabein | | | | Brought in | | | | | Remarks. | |
|-------------|---------|---------|----------------|---------|------------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|----------|--|
| | Camels. | Cattle. | Sheep & Goats. | Horses. | Camels. | Cattle. | Sheep & Goats. | Horses. | Rifles. | | |
| Ali Dera | 50 | 50 | - | 2 | 11 | 50 | 50 | - | 1 | 11 | |
| Mohamed Wed | - | - | - | 30 | 40 | - | - | 30 | - | 40 | |
| Assan | - | - | - | - | 30 | - | - | - | - | 30 | |
| Abu Yakub | - | - | - | 1 | 5 | - | - | - | - | 5 | |
| Total | 50 | 50 | - | 32 | 86 | 50 | 50 | 31 | - | 86 | |

APPENDIX.

Captured Stock, Rifles, and Horses.

| | | | | |
|---------------|---|---|---|--------|
| Camels | - | - | - | 517. |
| Cattle | - | - | - | 586. |
| Sheep & Goats | - | - | - | 3,188. |
| Horses | - | - | - | 4. |
| Rifles | - | - | - | 7. |

Note,

This does not include amount brought in as Fines or Zabein.

+++++

APPENDIX.

Rifles, Revolvers, Ammunition, Horses.

| Section. | Rifles | Revolvers | Ammunition | Horses. | Remarks |
|-----------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------|---|
| r Tulha | 28 | 3 | 70 | - | |
| r Hassan | 42 | 4 | 12 | - | <u>Note.</u> |
| r Ahmed Wed | 73 | 3 | - | 38 | These numbers include fuses, |
| r Ali Dera | 30 | 1 | - | 1 | Zabein, and rifles etc. |
| r Habr Yakub (Bon) | 16 | - | - | 1 | captured. |
| r Garrad | 3 | 1 | - | - | |
| known | 2 | - | - | - | Captured in "Kerias" owners not found. |
| Total | 194 | 12 | 82 | 40 | |

C A S U A L T I E S.

(1) Enemies, (approximate)

| Place | Date. | Killed. | Wounded. | |
|------------|---------------|---------|----------|---|
| | 1913. | | | |
| Selele | December 15th | 4 | 5 | |
| Harre | " 25th | 1 | 1 | |
| | 1914 | | | |
| galti | January 31st | 15 | 10 | Bar balls owned to 13 killed. |
| ai | February 8th | 4 | - | |
| Broken Hos | " 20th | 5 | 3 | |
| Harre | " 13th | 3 | - | Note. |
| alla | " 27th & 28th | 7 | 4 | Numbers of killed are fairly accurate as in nearly every case bodies were seen. |
| oli | March 4th | 1 | - | The wounded numbers are probably rather more as the number quoted are those actually seen and reported afterwards |
| aille | " 6th | 5 | 2 | |
| h (near) | " 7th | 3 | - | |
| asso | " 9th | - | 1 | |
| kali | April 9th | 4 | 2 | |
| aderte | " 12th | 1 | - | |
| | Total | 51 | 28 | |

(2) Our Casualties.

Killed.
 No. 1880 Pte Juma Mursal "F" Coy 3/K.A.R.
 No. 125 Pte Wasidi "B" Coy 1/K.A.R.
 2 Aulihan Illaloes
 Total 4.

Died of Disease.
 No. 1294 Pte Alman Marjan "F" Coy 3/K.A.R.
 No. 5097 " Elmi Hirsi "F" Coy 3/K.A.R.
 No. 135 Bug. Ndasa "B" Coy 1/K.A.R.
 No. 3706 Pte Selim Riegalla "F" Coy 4/K.A.R.
 No. 123 Pte Mayari "B" Coy 1/K.A.R.
 No. 1 Porter Menembi "B" Coy 1/K.A.R.
 Syce Omar Madar S.M.T.C.
 " Issa Mohamed "F" Coy 3/K.A.R.
 " Ali Noor S.M.T.C.
 " Yusuf Haji S.M.T.C.
 Total 10.

Wounded.
 Lieut. Bentinck 3rd K.A.R. (dangerously)
 No O. Abdi Sherif Ahmed "F" Coy 3/K.A.R. (severely)
 No. 4005 Pte Ismail Ibrahim -do- (severely)
 No. Pte Kachafa "B" Coy 1/K.A.R. (slightly)
 No. Pte Maremu "A" Coy 1/K.A.R. (slightly)
 1 Aulihan Illaloes (slightly)

Y O N T I,

JUBALAND.

C. O.
28601Rec^d
Rec^d 4. APR 14

6th. May, 1914.

To,

The Officer Commanding Troops,
East Africa Protectorate.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith a Report on the Lines of Communication-Marehan Patrol- as requested in your telegram dated 22nd April 1914.

2. The report comprises a general account of the organization of the Lines of Communication with a precis of the more important happenings since the 3rd. March 1914 and the following appendices:-

- Appendix 1. Recommendations.
 " 2. Report on disembarkation of Indian Transport Corps.
 " 3. Details of Convoy despatched April 4th.
 " 4. Report on disembarkation, of Sudan Riding Camels.
 " 5. General Supply Consideration

Further information on this subject can be obtained from

The Staff Diary
 Lines of Communication Order Book
 Register of Letters & Telegrams
 Files of correspondence.

2.

filled SA 304

3. I desire to bring to your favourable notice the name of Captain E. G. M. Thornycroft- 4th. Battalion, The King's African Rifles who has performed the duties of Staff Officer to the Lines of Communication with conspicuous ability and energy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Sd/- L. E. S. Ward Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Lines of Communication,

Marehan Patrol.

REPORT ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

GENERAL SITUATION AT THE TIME OF OPERATIONS.

On March 3rd, the day after my arrival in Jubaland I received telegraphic instructions from Colonel Graham- Commanding the Marehan Patrol to take command of the Lines of Communication.

At this time there were no existing Lines of Communication nor had any organization been formed.

Lieut. Porcelli-3rd. K.A.R. acting as Staff Officer on the Jubaland was carrying ordinary routine work in connection with the Jubaland Garrison and Captain Filsell was arranging future supplies in Nairobi.

COMMUNICATIONS. Communication with the Headquarters of the Marehan Patrol at Serenli was obtainable through the Italian Govt. Wireless Telegraphic Installation via Giumbo and Bardera and Nairobi was also in communication with Jubaland by the connection of Giumbo with Aden.

L.M.S. "PEGASUS", stationed at Lamu, to some extent facilitated our communications with the Headquarters of the East African Government but owing to atmospheric influences it was often impossible to keep up the connection by this means.

AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

On taking over the duties of Officer Commanding Lines of Communication- I found the following resources at my disposal:-

1. Company (Nandi) 3rd. K.A.R. under Capt. Malin, distributed between Gobwen and Yonti.

A Detachment of 30 men of the Camel Corps-3rd K.A.R. with 15 sick camels at Gobwen.

Lieut. Porcelli-3rd. K.A.R. acting as Staff Officer Jubaland and D.C. Detachment Gobwen.

2.

3 Companies 3rd K.A.R. which had just arrived from Uganda under Major Clothier and had proceeded to Yonti.

Six Mules with 16 mules at Gobwan.

There was no existing Govt. Transport in Jubaland at this time and it was impossible to obtain camels in any number. Moreover the price of camels had been raised to the most alarming extent by the local camel owners.

The following supplies were available at Gobwan:-

16½ cases Ghee.

18½ bags Rice.

21 bundles of Dates.

At Yonti. Two months supplies on the Serenli Scale for 450 men brought by the Uganda Troops.

At Mfudu.

25,200 lbs. Rice.

45,750 " Flour.

240 " Dates.

and 151 sacks of cotton seed.

The supplies at Mfudu were under the charge of Clerk Fasal Ellahi and a small Detachment of the 3rd K.A.R. and had been left behind by Lieut. Tilley the previous September owing to the falling of the River Juba.

AVAILABLE ROUTES.

Serenli is connected with the coast at Kismayu by three routes which will be referred to in future as A, B, & C.

A. route A native track via YONTI-AFMADU and SALAGLI or DEGATCH.

B. A beached track via YONTI-MFUDU and SALAGLI

C. The River Juba.

On my arrival in Jubaland route A. was reported to be quite impracticable at that season owing to lack of water after leaving AFMADU.

Route C. was also impracticable until the annual rise of the JUHA RIVER.

Route B. at first the only available one, has the advantage of being well known and possesses satisfactory water conditions but its proximity to tsetse and bal fly areas places all camel transport used along it under grave risk.

Route B. was divided into the following three sections:-

ORGANIZATION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

No. I Section

KISMAYU-GOBWEN - YONVI inclusive.

No. II Section

MFUDU - SALAGLI inclusive.

No. III Section

SALAGLI - SERENLI.

Commandants were appointed to Nos. I and II sections.

A receiving Depot was formed at KISMAYU and GOBWEN was decided upon as the Base Supply Depot.

The Garrison of MFUDU was raised to 40 rifles found from "E" Company 3rd. K.A. Rifles and a post of 12 rifles was arranged for at Salagli but was not sent there eventually.

Available information as to existing stores, supplies and equipment was collected and scheduled and a further two months supplies for the Uganda Troops were ordered from East Africa by telegraph.

All possible arrangements were made to facilitate the forwarding of re-inforcements and supplies to SERENLI upon the formation of a suitable transport. Before my departure from Nairobi- telegraphic request had been made to India for complete Camel Transport Corps.

Arrangements were made with the Civil Authorities to convey some of the MFUDU stores to SALAGLI by porter

Transport with a ^{view} to its being carried through No. III Section - route B. by Camel Convoys sent from SERENLI. This arrangement was, however subsequently found impracticable owing to the impossibility of getting an adequate supply of porters from the Goshu District. From the Telegraphic information at my disposal it appeared to me that re-inforcements would be the first requirement of the Officer Commanding Marehan Patrol - so three companies 4th. K.A.R. - some Somali Illaloes and Medical details were held in readiness to proceed to SERENLI with two month's supplies.

Nothing further could be done until the arrival of the Camel Transport Corps from India.

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

7th. March telegraphic information was received that that the Camel Transport Corps from India would arrive at KISMAYU on 16th. March.

10th. March Telegraphic communication was established between KISMAYU - GOWEN and YONTI and was worked by the signallers 4th. King's African Rifles.

This greatly facilitated the work on No. I Section Lines of Communication.

10th. March Telegram from Officer Commanding Marehan Patrol saying he had not much food and until arrival of rations there was no immediate need for re-inforcements. On the same day another telegram was reached stating that operations were to be suspended for two months and that Officer Commanding Marehan Patrol was coming down to GOWEN.

18th. March S. S. "ISMAILIA" arrived at KISMAYU from KARAGHEE B bringing the following details :-

B. British Officers - Indian Supply & Transport Corp

- 1 Indian Officer.
- 1 Native Officer
- 2 Salaries
- 1. Sub-Assistant Surgeon
- 5. Duffadars.
- 6. Naiks.
- 1. Clerk
- 2 Artificers
- 2. Dressers
- 2 Syces
- 1 Hospital cook
- 121 Milledars
- 9 Followers
- 265 Camels
- 8 Ponies
- 200 Tons Stores.

Disembarkation commenced at once and was completed by 10 a.m. 20th. March (Appendix I, Report on Disembarkation)

20th. March - Telegram received from Officer Commanding BARENLI to the effect that rations were not urgently needed and suggesting waiting until the AFMADU route was practicable. Previous to this telegram arrangements had been made to despatch a convoy of supplies by route B. as soon as the Indian Camels could march.

20th. March - Telegram received from Officer Commanding Marchan Patrol asking for a convoy of three months supplies with Escort of "G" Company - 5rd. K.A. Rifles on permanent move to proceed by route A.

As route A. was absolutely impracticable for Indian camels which require more water than African Camels, instructions

were issued for convoy to proceed by route B. and Officer Commanding Merchant Patrol was informed by telegram that this route must be used.

The carrying capacity of the 58th Camel Transport Corps only admitted of two months supplies for the whole strength of Colonel Graham's Force at SERENLI - being carried in addition to the two months supplies necessary for the personnel of the Corps itself.

The start of the convoy was delayed owing to the necessity of waiting for the arrival at Kismayu of S.S. "KILWA" bringing the two months supplies for the Uganda Troops ordered on my arrival.

As soon as these supplies had been disembarked it became possible to make the convoy with following amounts from the "KILWA" - the 4th Battalion supplies at YONFI and the food Depot. at MFOBU :-

| | | |
|-------|-----|-------|
| Dates | 170 | ounds |
| Rice | 575 | -do- |
| Flour | 170 | -do- |

5. Camels miscellaneous Medical Stores also accompanied the convoy.

The convoy started from KISMAYU April 4th. and arrived at SERENLI April 19th.

For details of convoy see Appendix II.

April 22nd. S.S. "KILWA" arrived in KISMAYU with the first consignment of supplies for the coming year.

This consisted of

| | | |
|-------|-----|------------------|
| Ghee | 226 | cases |
| Salt. | 47 | loads and 9 bags |
| Dates | 485 | bundles. |

7.

This consignment was sent round to GOBWEIN by the Italian steamer S.S. "VITTORIO EMMANUELE" and one lighter and was unloaded and stored at the Base Supply Depot.

Cost of Transport from KISMAYU to GOBWEIN by the Italian Company was Rs.6/- per ton.

April 29th. "S.S. WISSEMAN" arrived with consignment of 1521 sacks of rice. 821 sacks were loaded into the Empire Navigation Company's "S.S. BAJURE" for conveyance to GOBWEIN at the rate of Rs.8/- per ton.

The remainder was stored at KISMAYU pending further arrangements.

April 30th.- "S.S. GOLONDA" arrived at Kismayu bringing 100 riding camels from Port Sudan. These were disembarked on 1st. May (Report on disembarkation Appendix III)

Sd/- L.E.S. Ward Lieut. Colonel
Commanding Lines of Communication

Marchant Patrol.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

As the result of my experiences in Command of Lines of Communication I submit the following recommendation for consideration :-

1. Kismayu harbour be re-surveyed, up to date charts made and more distinguishable leading marks erected.
2. More powerful cranes should be available at the Government Pier.
3. Ships of the size and tonnage of the Golconda (7,000 tons) should not be chartered for the conveyance of animals or stores to Kismayu. Such vessels draw too much water for the inner anchorage and in consequence lie so far out that there is great delay in reaching them from shore.
4. No vessels carrying animals or supplies except small coasting steamers should attempt to disembark their freight during the S.W. monsoon. The landing facilities at Kismayu are at present of such a nature that disembarkation can only be undertaken in good weather conditions.
5. The general political attitude of the Ogaden Somalis renders another situation such as has obtained during the last few months in Jubaland by no means improbable.

The landing of troops - animals and stores at Kismayu would be enormously facilitated by a powerful steam-tug and two sea-going lighters, all capable of crossing the bar at the mouth of the Juba River and proceeding to Gobwen.

The provision of this equipment in conjunction with an efficient Govt. river service would free the Administration of East Africa from the risk and

expenses caused by the incompetence and avariciousness of the local contractors.

All supplies for troops based on Kismayu should arrive well before the breaking of the S.W. monsoon and consequently all contracts made for this purpose in Nairobi and else where should be arranged earlier in the year. For the situation under consideration the discussion of contracts was still proceeding when I left Nairobi in February. I strongly recommend that future contracts be completed by the end of December.

Consignment of supplies should on no account arrive in Kismayu after the 15th. April.

7. The establishment in the past of an efficient river service under Government control would in all probability have saved much of the expenditure incurred during the last few years on the conveyance of stores and supplies to Serenli. The equipment for this service I estimate at two good river steamers and four lighters.

The expenditure justification for the expenditure necessary for the provision and upkeep of this equipment must depend upon the view taken of the general attitude of the Gaden tribes on the Juba River.

In my opinion the political situation in this part of the East Africa Protectorate warrants at least a serious consideration of the advisability of establishing a Govt River Transport Service in place of dependence upon the

Magre Navigation Company whose charges are exorbitant and whose steamers and lighters are old and untrustworthy

8. Kismayu - Gobzen and Yenti should be connected by a good road capable of bearing motor traffic.

Two motor lorries on such a road would save expenditure on camel and boat hire and greatly facilitate the rapid and safe transport of Military and Civil

stores to Gobwen and Yonti.

9. Kisumu should be connected with Mombasa by wireless telegraphy.

The use of the Italian wireless installation at Giumbo although invaluable during the recent crisis had grave drawbacks.

Many telegrams were received in such a mutilated condition as to be almost undecipherable and such delay was caused in communication with Nairobi owing to the round about route by which the connection is obtained.

10. An Officer versed in making contracts and arranging supplies should always be employed in Jubaland when occupied by troops.

11. Indian camels are not suitable for Military requirements in this Province.

The water conditions obtaining in the territory occupied by the Ogaden tribes of East Africa do not admit of these camels, which in India water twice a day, being kept in the state of fitness necessary for operations of war.

12. Until a motor lorry service is established between Kisumu - Gobwen and Yonti a Military Transport Corps of 60 local camels should be maintained for the conveyance of supplies and baggage between these places.

13. The enormous amount of fatigue work which has fallen upon the Lines of Communication troops during the last two months induces me to believe that unless there is a minimum of two Companies available for this purpose the formation of Corps of porters would be absolutely necessary in any future Military operations based on Kisumu.

14. The almost complete absence of all the necessary equipment for the handling and protection of supplies and stores has been greatly felt.

4.

I recommend that the Supply and Transport Officers now in Jubaland be instructed to make out a scale of such articles as tarpaulins, spring balances, stored tents and grain crushers which should be purchased and stored for further emergency.

In considering this recommendation it must be born in mind that the Lines of Communication in the present instance were hastily improvised on an emergency and no time was available for preparation.

15. In ² singling camels from freight ships to dhows or lighters the animals should be secured by haltering fore and hind legs in such manner that no movement of the legs is possible.

In taking camels off the "S.S. ISMAILIA" the animals were put into the slings with their legs free. This method not only caused delay in the lighters by the trouble experienced in many cases of getting them to lie down after the sling had been removed but also gave a larger margin of risk of damage to the animals from their attempts to kick.

The camels disembarked from the "Golconda" were secured in such a way that they were unable to kick or move their legs and thus were easily and safely handled.

Sd/- L.E.S. Ward. Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Lines of Communication

Marshan Patrol

Jubaland.

Youti, 5th. May, 1914

Appendix II.

REPORT ON THE DISEMBARKATION OF INDIAN
TRANSPORT CAMEL CORPS.

Telegraphic information was received on 7th March that the Transport S.S. "ISMAILIA" would arrive at Kisumu on March 17th bringing the Indian Transport Corps. Accompanied by the Staff Officer Lines of Communication I arrived in Kisumu 14th March to superintend the arrangements for the disembarkation.

The S.S. "BAJUNE" and one lighter belonging to the Empire Navigation Coy. was engaged- and six dhows were also chartered.

On the morning of 15th "C" Coy. 4th. K.A.R. arrived in Kisumu for fatigue duty in connection with the disembarkation. About 12 noon the S.S. "ISMAILIA" arrived in the harbour three days before she was expected.

I at once proceeded on board and gave instructions for the unloading of camels to commence.

Forty one camels were unloaded that night.

H.M.S. "PEGASUS" arrived on the evening of 15th March.

16th. March- I boarded H.M.S. "PEGASUS" early in the morning and held a consultation with Capt. Ingles, R.N. Commanding.

It was then decided that the Naval Authorities should

take charge of all vessels and the Italian steamer "VITTORIO EMANUELE" and one barge was chartered to assist in the disembarkation.

The two steamers and barges were used to unload camels and a start was made on the 200 tons of cargo by using dhows.

Signalling Communication was established connecting all units of the disembarkation.

2.

Work proceeded rapidly but unfortunately the "S.S. BAJUNE" went aground about 4 p.m. There was a spring tide running at the time and as she grounded very shortly after the tide had begun to ebb her position the next morning rendered salvage operations difficult.

"Coy. 4th. K.A.R. arrived in Kisumu for fatigue duties in connection with the disembarkation.

17th. As the Italian steamer "VITTORIO EMMANUELE" was required for tender to the Italian "S.S. FIERENZE" which arrived in Kisumu on that day very little could be done in the way of landing camels but the dhows continued to take off cargo and good progress was made in this respect. The winches of the Transport were manned by men from H.M.S. "PEGASUS", large fatigue parties were supplied from the Troops to handle the baggage on board and the Provincial Commissioner - Jubaland placed the convict labour at my disposal to assist the troops in unloading the dhows as they came ashore.

It was decided to make ^{an} attempt to refloat the "BAJUNE" at high tide between 7 and 8 p.m. and a large fatigue party was employed in digging a channel for her, removing the sand and shoring her up with timber baulks.

The "VITTORIO EMMANUELE" commenced to tow about 7.30 p.m. but the hawser parted almost immediately and the "Vittorio Emanuele" getting out of control also ran ashore.

18th. March. The unloading of baggage was proceeded with and all cargo was clear of the ship by 5 p.m.

The position of the "BAJUNE" at low water was found to be very serious as her stern had sunk into the sand and her propellers were almost buried. It was decided that every effort must be made to re-float both vessels at high water. The Provincial Commissioner placed all convict labour, Police fatigue parties and all Civil resources at

by disposal and as soon as the state of the tide permitted digging operations were commenced round both vessels. The propellers of the "BAJUNE" were cleared from the sand and deep trenches dug round her and similarly with the "VITTORIO EMANUELE" whose position however did not give much cause for anxiety.

Anchors and cables were laid out by the Naval Authorities and tackles were rigged up to allow of the troops pushing and pulling out the stranded vessels.

A few camels were landed from dhows.

At 7 p.m. the re-floating of the "VITTORIO EMANUELE" was commenced and after some 15 minutes was successful. All resources were then concentrated on the "BAJUNE" and after an hour's strenuous work she was at last got off into deep water.

19th March. The unloading of the camels proceeded quickly both steamers and dhows being used with success and by 6 p.m. the transport was reported to be clear except for 15 camels and 3 ponies. These were got off on the following morning and as far as the disembarkation authorities were concerned the "S.S. ISMAILI" could have left by 10 a.m. 20th. March.

S.M.S. "PAGASUS" left at 11 a.m. 20th March.

I was informed by the Master of S.S. "ISMAILI" that he was unable to leave until dawn 21st. March, owing to the necessity of trimming ship.

No losses of animals were sustained during disembarkation. All animals landed in good condition and the arrangements made for them on board the Transport were excellent.

I have the following points to bring to notice in connection with this disembarkation :-

4.

A. Owing to the lack of suitable jetty accommodation at Kismayu the process of landing a large number of animals and stores is relatively very slow, and under the circumstances unavoidable risks had to be taken. Several camels were nearly drowned.

B. More animal slings should be brought by Transports. The "ISMAILIA" only had five slings for this purpose. At least ten are necessary and should be brought by Transport in future.

Sd/- L.E.B.Ward Lieut.Colonel

Commanding Lines of Communication,

Marehan Patrol

DETAILS OF CONVOY.

Captain G.E.M. Hogg - Indian Army Director of
Supply and Transport
Lieut. K. Prithi Singh - Indian Army Commanding 53rd
Camel Transport Corps.
Lieut. E.G.M. Forcelli - Brd. S.A.R. Commanding Escort
A.P. Leese - Veterinary Officer.

Escort.

1. Rank & File 1st. King's African Rifles
1 Native Officer and
86 Rank & File Brd. King's African Rifles
6 Rank & File Somali Illaloes.

Non-Combatants.

17 Stretcher bearers
11 Maxim Gun Porters
8 Hospital Dressers
1 Interpreter
5 Officers' servants
4 Herdsmen
1 Shoemaker (Asiatic)

53rd Transport Camel Corps.

1 Native Officer
1 Sub-Assistant Surgeon
3 Veterinary Assistants
4 Duffadars
5 Naiks.
181 Billadars Camel drivers
1 Clerk.

Animals.

861 Transport camels
6 Ponies
10 Mules

Supplies and Stores.

3 months complete rations for personnel
 of 58rd. Transport Camel Corps.
 175 maunds of dates
 375 -do- rice
 170 -do- flour
 10 Whitman pattern saddles complete
 5 Camels miscellaneous Medical stores
 Water equipment 58rd. Transport Camel
 Corps. Officers baggage
 5 Camels baggage of "E" Company 8rd. K.A.R.
 10 Stretchers.

Sd/- L. E. S. Ward Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Lines of Communication

Marehan Patrol.

Yanti, 5th. May, 1914.

IV

Appendix VI.

REPORT ON THE DISEMBARKATION OF RIDING CAMELS.

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The first date given for the arrival of the riding camels from the SUDAN was April 26th.

Subsequently a letter was received from the Director of Govt. Transport, Mombasa giving the date of arrival of the S.S. "Golconda" carrying these animals, as 28th of April and requesting that all arrangements should be made for their landing, as the Master of the Golconda had instructions to proceed to Mombasa if there was any delay at Kismayu. On receipt of this letter the EMPIRE NAVIGATION COY'S, S.S. "BAJUNE" was chartered, and 8 dhows were engaged to carry out the disembarkation.

On April 26th. a telegram was received from Aden saying the Golconda would not arrive until April 30th.

S.S. "Golconda" was sighted off Kismayu about 8 a.m. April 30th. and anchored inside the inner reef by 9.30 a.m., but at considerable distance from the shore. The S.W. monsoon had broken three days previously, and a strong wind was blowing, and a heavy sea running. The owners of S.S. "BAJUNE" refused to go out to the Golconda, and the dhow owners also refused to sail out.

Communication by Commercial Flag Code was established with the Golconda, and Capt. Saunders went off to her in the Government whale boat.

At first Master of the Golconda stated his intention of sailing immediately, but on receipt of a written guarantee of indemnity for loss of time given to him by Major L.H. Hickson who was on board, he agreed to wait until the next day.

I accept full responsibility for Major Hickson's action, on the grounds that the camels had already been a long time at sea, and a transhipment at Mombasa, and the subsequent voyage to Kismayu in Messrs. Cowasjee Dinshaw's small coasting vessel.

would have incurred a serious risk of mortality amongst the animals. Every possible arrangement was made to commence disembarkation at dawn on 1st. May.

During the night April 30th & May 1st the weather moderated considerably, and S.S. "BAJUNE", towing dhows, got off by 5.30 a.m.

By 7 a.m. the disembarkation commenced, and proceeded rapidly. The "BAJUNE" was employed towing the dhows out, and as they were filled at the "Golconda" they proceeded under their own sail to the Government pier, where the camels were taken off by crane, the Golconda was clear of camels by 8.30 p.m. and sailed immediately. The last camel was ashore by 5 p.m. No casualties were sustained amongst the animals, which were all landed in good condition.

Dhows were prepared for the camels by lining their interior with brushwood.

It is most regrettable that in endeavouring to get off a stranded lighter one man of the 4th. K.A.R. was killed and another seriously injured.

COST OF LANDING

Hire of Dhows Rs. 170/- S. 11-6-8

Compensation for
Damage to one Dhow 30/- S. 1-6-8

Two days hire of S.S. Bajune
@ 2.55/- per day dms S. 50-0-0

Demurrage for five days @
30/- (on contract rate (or 25/-
per dms) S. 25-0-0

Total Cost = S. 92-12-8

Sd/- L. E. S. Ward Lieut. Colonel
Commanding Lines of Communication
Marchant Patrol.

Appendix. V.

General Supply Consideration

On my departure from Nairobi the question of the future supply for the Marchan Patrol was being dealt with by Capt. H. E. Filsell Cdr. K.A.R. who was negotiating the necessary contracts but at that time the Military situation was very obscure and it was impossible to decide upon definite amounts.

On arrival from India Capt. G. E. M. Hogg - Indian Supply and Transport Corps took over the duties of Director of Supplies and Transport. Capt. R. C. L. Sweeney was appointed Deputy Director of Supply and Lieut. A. S. C. Coffin was Supply Officer.

After consultation with me the Director of Supplies decided to order one year's supplies based on a force of 1,400 men and followers at Berani.

The Military situation was still very vague and although there were clear indications that the opposition of the Marchan was weakening the question of the general attitude of the Ogaden tribes had to be taken into account in the supply calculation so the basis was fixed upon the largest number of troops in this part of the Protectorate available for Military operation. On March 26th, Capt. Sweeney left Jubaland for East Africa to go into the question of contracts and complete orders for the supplies necessary on the Director's of supplies calculations.

Captain Sweeney returned to Kisumu on April 24th and reported that all necessary arrangements for the future supply situation were in hand.

By this date, however, the Military situation had cleared and except for some very unexpected development it was obvious that a large excess of supplies was under arrangement

due chiefly to the fact that there was now very little probability of the troops from Uganda being used to augment the force at Serenli.

At my instigation therefore Captain Sweeney telegraphed to Nairobi to accept 25 per cent less on all contracts and to dispose of surplus ghee locally.

In spite of this reduction there will in all probability be a large excess of supplies for the coming year.

This, I submit, was unavoidable under the circumstances existing at the time when the contracts were made.

Ed/- L.R.S. Ward Lieut. Colonel

Commanding Lines of Communication

Marchant Patrol

Yandi, 6th. May, 1914.

Report on Merchan Field Force and on Serenli &
Garrebahare Garrisons 1913 - 1914.

To

Lieut-Col. E. R. Graham
Officer Commanding Troops

Copy to

The Principal Medical Officer

The Provincial Commissioner

Kisumu.

1. At the time hostilities commenced with the Merchan
I was in Medical Charge at Serenli and Assistant Surgeon
Cody was in Charge at Garrebahare. Mr. Cody being due for
leave his relief Assistant Surgeon Nyss arrived in Serenli
on the 12th February 1914 and Mr. Cody proceeded to the
Coast on the 29th March in charge of Lieut. Tilly who
was invalided to Nairobi.

Dr. Mackinnon arrived in Serenli on the 18th March
having been appointed as Medical Officer to the Merchan
Field Force by the Principal Medical Officer Nairobi.

Captain Lane, B.A.M.C. S.B. was appointed Senior
Medical Officer to the Force he remained at Yonti with
the Troops of the 4th Battalion K. A. Rifles.

Three Hospital dressers were employed by the Senior
Medical Officer at Yonti and sent to Serenli for the
Field Force.

Ten stretchers, 18 folding camp beds, 6 tents, filters
Medical comforts for Officers and men, also drugs Field
Panniers and Surgical appliances etc.

54 Mashilae and bamboo poles for fitting them on to
were sent from Nairobi they were extremely useful and were
used instead of stretchers as when a man had to be carried

it was generally for a long distance the mashilas were easier for the bearers and more comfortable for the patients.

Stretchers and mashilas are very difficult to carry in this country owing to the bad state of the bush roads and paths.

Some tents, stretchers, mashilas, surgical appliances, drugs Medical Comforts etc. were taken to Garrebaharre the advanced base of Operations. A small grass house was used there as Dispensary and Medical store, sick men were accommodated in tents.

A Medical Officer accompanied each column of the Field Force and when small parties of troops left the column the Officer in Charge was given a Medical Companion and Surgical Haversack with all the appliances and drugs necessary for 1st aid in case of wounds or sudden illness.

Assistant Surgeon Nyss was left in Charge at Serenli and the O.C. Garrebaharre with the assistance of a Hospital Dresser looked after the sick during the absence of the Medical Officer from the advanced base.

Each Officer soldier and follower was issued with a first field dressing & new one was issued from time to time when the others became damaged or lost.

On patrol the sick were seen each day about 1 hour after arrival in camp when all men requiring medical attention were treated. Wounds etc dressed. On the march sick men as a rule unless too ill to do so rode on baggage camels.

Each column was allowed one baggage camel for Hospital Equipment and special arrangements were made for carrying water for Hospital purposes.

A party of stretcher bearers with mashilas accompanied each column of the Field Force.

Report on Mercha Field Force and on Serenli &
Garrebarre Garrisons 1913 - 1914.

To

Lieut-Col. E. R. Graham
Officer Commanding Troops

Copy to

The Principal Medical Officer

The Provincial Commissioner

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Each column was allowed one baggage camel for Hospital Equipment and special arrangements were made for carrying water for Hospital purposes.

A party of stretcher bearers with mashilas accompanied each column of the Field Force.

A Medical Companion and Haversack was carried by one of the stretcher bearers with the advance guard and another Companion and Haversack with the rear guard. This was done in order not to stop the movement of the column in case of wounds, sudden illness or men falling out from exhaustion.

B. The Mercha Field Force consisted of

18 British Officers
 1 British Warrant Officer
 1 Indian Officer
 3 Political Officers
 4 African Native Officers
 2 Medical Officers
 2 Medical Subordinates
 1 Veterinary Officer
 6 Clerks and Artizans
 769 African Troops
 192 African Followers
 1 Indian Native Officer
 3 Indian Kôr Dafadars
 1 Sub Asstt: Surgeon
 2 Veterinary Assistants
 1 Clerk
 128 Indian Followers

C. Killed in action

African Troops 3

Wounded

British Officer 1

African N. Officer 1

African Troops 4

Died of epidemic disease on active service (Dysentery)

African Troops 4

" Followers 1

Died on active service (Pl. thysis & Cerebral

African Troops 2

Haemorrhage)

Partially disabled on Active Service

African Troops 1 (Traumatic injury to

eye causing total loss of sight.)

4. Two British Officers were invalided. One for a wound received in action and one for an abscess with general debility. One British Warrant Officer for chronic dysentery.

It is fairly well known now that Northern Jubaland is not exactly a health resort and not the sort of place that a British Officer wants to stay for any length of time.

The housing accommodation in Serenli isbad, bungalows are made of makuti and are neither rain or sun proof, they are infested with scorpions white ants and sometime snakes. The question of food is serious as it is quite impossible to live on the country and all stores have to be brought from Kismayu or Mombasa. Very often an officer starts for Serenli at short notice and in the non shipping season the only means of transport is by camels those are difficult to get at Kismayu and therefore the officer has to bring the minimum amount of stores, clothing etc. this means that for some months until his kits and the rest of his stores arrive by steamer he is indeed very uncomfortable.

The average temperature in Serenli from November to April is about 97 and very often it registers 100 or over in the shade.

The country about Serenli and the Merehan would be difficult to describe and no one who has not visited it can form any idea of which it is really like, it seems strange that the Somalis who as a rule is intelligent should want to live in such a country.

Safari in this country under the best circumstances is not pleasant, but when an officer goes on active service and lives for 6 weeks without a tent the average daily

daily temperature over 100 in the shade and for all his food, bed, clothing etc. is allowed one camel for transport it is not exactly a pleasure trip. On this safari food ran short and there was no tea, coffee, sugar flour for days before the column returned to Serenli.

Living under conditions like these bad and insufficient food, bad housing accommodation, bad water, long & hot marches in a monotonous and uninteresting country one would be surprised if the European Officer kept in a good state of health.

During the time spent on active service in the Marehan country 3 officers and 1 warrant officer suffered from dysentery one officer from abscess and general debility. All these officers carried on their duties during this time until they arrived at Serenli when one Officer and one warrant officer were invalided to Nairobi.

Knowing the conditions under which officers live in Northern Jubaland I am strongly of opinion that no European officer should stay more than 1 year in Serenli or Marehan country and that no officer should be sent to Serenli unless he is in a fit state of health.

I would respectfully suggest that Officers detailed for duty at Serenli should be carefully examined at Nairobi before leaving and any officer who is in a weak state of health from Malaria or other cause should not be sent for duty here. Officers should be warned before coming to Northern Jubaland to have any defective teeth seen to by the Dentist before leaving Nairobi.

5. The Force here at present is composed of men from the following places :-

Nyasaland, Abyssinia, Highlands of East Africa, Zanzibar, Moshas, Abyssinia, Northern Somaliland, India, Soudan, Uganda, Arabia, and Egypt.

Indians. The 53rd Indian Transport Corps having only arrived a short time in this country I am unable to state what effect the climate and general conditions of Jubaland has on the health so far it has been ~~found~~ ^{found}. Those men get better rations than the African troops it includes potatoes and onions.

Swahilis. The Swahili Company have kept the best health and always have had the smallest percentage sick. This Company is about ^{1/4} Swahili from Mombasa and Zanzibar and the others from the Highlands of East Africa.

Somalis. The Northern Somalis arrived here in July 1913. On arrival they nearly all suffered from malarial fever which I have no doubt was contracted in the Goshia ~~country~~ country on the way to Serenli.

I have noticed that the Northern Somali gets malaria very severely no doubt this is due to his want of immunity as I understand there is no malaria in his own country. In other respects the Somali has kept excellent health and I am of opinion that no other African troops are so well suited for permanent residence in north Jubaland.

Uganda
Sudanese. The Uganda Sudanese do not seem to do well in this country they are not nearly so good on the march as the Nyasaland troops and feel fatigue much more after a long day, this may be due to the number of boys in the Company. They suffer more from intestinal disease than any of the other troops stationed here. Their general physique and powers of endurance are not so good as the Nyasaland troops.

Abyssinians. There are only a few Abyssinians troops here and they have been ~~in~~ a short time, they seem liable to contract *Catarrhal* diseases of the chest and suffer a good deal from Malarial fever.

... This Company has just arrived, coming from a cold

could part of the Highlands of East Africa it will be interesting to know how they get on in Northern Jubaland.

Some of these men have been in north Jubaland almost two years and nearly all the hard work house building, road cutting etc has been done by them; they have also had a lot of safari and for the last 6 months have been continuously on the march with only a few days of rest now and then.

During the last few weeks a number of these troops have been complaining about pains in the bones and joints ^{rendering} sending them unable to march. Some contracted dysentery - 3 contracted scurvy and several others are generally run down in health and want a rest and change of climate. I understand they leave this shipping season one Company for the coast and one for Nyasaland.

During the patrol one case of small pox occurred in B Coy 1st K.A.Rifles on the way between Serenli and Garrebaharre, the patient was isolated and all the precautions possible under the circumstances taken. I am glad to say no further case occurred. It is quite impossible to say where the infection came from, probably from some of the Somali prisoners, coming into the boma on patrol. This case was a mild one as the patient had been vaccinated in Nyasaland in 1912.

9 cases of amoebic dysentery occurred on patrol also in garrison at Serenli and Garrebaharre, 5 deaths took place. The disease was as a rule fairly mild and the patients quickly recovered under proper diet and treatment, but some of the cases were obstinate and developed into chronic dysentery with loss of flesh and general debility. Some men had to be left at the Italian hospital Lugh on our march north they were able to rejoin the column on the march back except one follower, this man died two days afterwards at Lugh.

This epidemic started about the same time amongst the troops on patrol and the troops in garrison at Serenli although there were nearly 100 miles apart. I am of opinion that the troops on patrol got infected at Garrebaharre where the column stayed for two days on the way to Lugh from Serenli

A number of cases occurred at Bardera on the Italian side ^{about} ~~at~~ the same time as the epidemic started in Serenli; no doubt these cases are ~~attributed~~ to the Juba water infected by natives washing cloth etc. . At one time this epidemic of dysentery looked extremely serious. Special precautions were taken about sanitation and all the cases of dysentery were isolated their ~~stools~~ ^{stools} disinfected and buried, from this time the number of cases decreased.

A herd of 20 milk camels were set aside by the O. C. troops for the hospital patients and I believe this saved the situation

Ipecacuanha ~~powdered~~ ⁱⁿ powder was given in all cases and it was most satisfactory. Some of the more serious cases were injected with Emetine gr. ^{1/2} hypodermically it acted quickly and with good result.

Influenza. An epidemic of influenza started at Serenli about the 20 ^{the} April and several of men had to be left in Garrison as they were unfit to go on patrol, the garrison at Garrebaharre contracted the disease and several more men left behind ~~these~~ unfit for active service. About the 12th May the epidemic ~~abated~~ ^{was} . There 37 cases, ^{save}, no deaths took place.

Scurvy. There e cases of scurvy were diagnosed amongst the Nyasa-land troops the symptoms were mainly in the ~~some~~ ^{gums} principally the ~~gums~~ ^{gums}. Anaemia, Dyspepsia, and spongy and ulcerated condition of gums. These patients improved rapidly with a more liberal diet, lime juice and camel milk, no fresh vegetables were available but a double ration of fresh meat was issued to the affected patients.

ations. 6. The present ration issued to the troops is weekly

| | |
|-------------------------|---------|
| Rice | 5½ lbs. |
| Flour Matama or Mahindi | 2½ lbs. |
| Fresh meat | 4 " |
| Ghee | 14 oz. |
| Dates | 2 lbs. |
| Salt | 3 oz. |

I consider this is an excellent ration but would recommend the addition of onions or beans to be given once or twice a week.

Perhaps when things are more settled in this country a shamba might be worked by the troops stationed in Serenli in this way they would be able to supply themselves with fresh vegetables.

I understand the soil near Serenli is good and all that is necessary would be a suitable pump to get the water from the Juba for the irrigation of the shamba.

Sanitation. 7. The question of Sanitation in Serenli under present circumstances is difficult, ^{day} one the garrison may be one Officer and 50 men and next day 20 Officers and 700 men with followers and a native bazar.

If Serenli is going to be permanently occupied by troops I consider that the first and most important step towards the organisation of proper Sanitary arrangements is to move the native bazar from its present position. This bazar is now almost a continuation of the houses in the Military boma which from a point of view of the health of troops is unsound.

If this bazar was moved down the river towards Bardera it would prevent the pollution of drinking water in the dry season by the natives, and in case of epidemic diseases breaking out in the bazar the troops could be well isolated. At present any epidemic in the bazar would be sure to spread to the Military Lines.

The hill south of Serenli towards Bardera at present covered with bush would in my opinion be a suitable site for the new bazar.

When most of the troops here now leave and the garrison is reduced to its normal size (about 200 men including military followers) the question of proper latrines should be considered.

At the present time the trench system is used at Serenli these trenches are situated 100 yards to ~~west~~ of the boma and are dug each evening and the trench used that day filled up with earth. This system for a temporary camp is good.

In my opinion the best arrangement would be to have a latrine built the floor and seats and about 5 feet of the wall along which the seats are arranged made of cement, the remainder of walls roof etc might be made of wood or galvanized iron; at the back of each seat is a small door in the cement wall to allow the bucket to be removed and emptied and another one put back in its place for use. The seats should be made of concrete as they can be kept much cleaner than those made of wood.

Two or three latrines with one bucket each should also be built for officers in a convenient place. (see attached sketch)

The excreta should be removed in a "night soil cart" to some place a mile or more from the boma inland and buried in deep trenches, for this work a reliable headman and proper staff of sweepers would be necessary.

A urinal might be made with a cement trough and a pipe coming out at the bottom about 1 inch in diameter the contents of this urinal runs from the pipe into a cement tank filled with ~~small~~ stones, at the bottom of this tank is a small hole or pipe which opens into a kerosine oil tin filled with ashes and sand or ~~very~~ small stones. At the bottom of this kerosine oil tin are several holes any urine which escapes through these goes into the ground - from the top of the cement tank to the

to the bottom of the kerosine oil tin is about 6 feet.

The top of the cement tank is flush with the ground and open to the air. The trough is washed out daily with disinfectant and water and the stones from the cement tank removed about once a fortnight, and put in the sun for a few hours or new stones substituted. I am informed by Assistant Surgeon Nyss that this urinal is largely used for troops in India and gives satisfaction.

Refuse and rubbish should be burned in the incinerator, another one might be built at the other side of the Boma.

The water supply of Serenli when the river is in flood is fairly good, but in the dry season there is very little water in the river and this is more or less stagnant as the current is slow. The pools of water in the river becomes polluted by natives washing clothes etc. and in this way cause dysentery and diarrhoea amongst the troops. I am informed by the Italian Medical Officer at Bardera that dysentery is epidemic there in the dry season owing to the pollution of water by the natives. At Serenli arrangements are made that troops take water from a point higher up the river where no clothes are allowed to be washed or natives to bathe, this is unsatisfactory.

Troops stationed at Garrebaharre water from some wells in the bed of a dry river, in the rainy season the surface soil is washed into the wells in this way the water becomes polluted, I have no doubt most of the cases of dysentery have been caused in this way. Latrine trenches are now so placed that in the rainy season surface soil is not washed from these trenches into the wells used for drinking purposes.

If Garrebaharre is going to be permanently occupied a stone coping should be erected round the mouth of each well to prevent entrance of surface washings during rain.

The water from the Garrebaharre wells has an unpleasant

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The drinking water for the troops at Serenli should be filtered. Allowing each man 3 gallons daily for drinking and cooking purposes. A tank of filtered water containing 900 gallons would supply the officers and garrison with drinking water for one day, assuming the strength of the garrison was about 700 including followers.

For filtration on a large scale like this a proper pump, two tanks a settling tank, receiving tank and at least 3 filtering tanks would be necessary. The component parts of such a filter beginning at the bottom would be a layer of from 1 to 2½ feet of rough stones getting smaller towards the top 2 to 6 inches of gravel ½ to ¾ inch of shells 3 to 6 inches of sea gravel, 1½ to 4½ feet of sand.

The top layer should of fine sand and can be removed and washed when it becomes impervious.

If filter of this kind act efficiently it is said that organisms may be removed to the extent of 99% of total number in water.

8. A Hospital to accomodate about 16 patients is urgently required for the troops at Serenli.

If the native town is removed to the proposed site a hospital and dispensary would be necessary. *apart from the building itself*, this hospital should be able to accomodate about 8 patients.


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I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant

S. J. H. M. 23-11
Medical Officer Marshah Patrol.



338

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6. The present ration issued to the troops is weekly

| | |
|-------------------------|--------|
| Rice | 5 lbs. |
| Flour Matama or Mahindi | 5 lbs. |
| Fresh meat | 4 " |
| Ghee | 14 oz. |
| Dates | 2 lbs. |
| Salt | 5 oz. |

I consider this is an excellent ration but would recommend the addition of onions or beans to be given once or twice a week.

Perhaps when things are more settled in this country a shamba might be worked by the troops stationed in Serenli in this way they would be able to supply themselves with fresh vegetables.

I understand the soil near Serenli is good and all that is necessary would be a suitable pump to get the water from the Juba for the irrigation of the shamba.

7. The question of Sanitation in Serenli under present circumstances is difficult, one ^{day} the garrison may be one Officer and 50 men and next day 20 Officers and 700 men with followers and a native bazar.

If Serenli is going to be permanently occupied by troops I consider that the first and most important step towards the organization of proper Sanitary arrangements is to move the native bazar from its present position. This bazar is now almost a continuation of the houses in the military boma which from a point of view of the health of troops is unsound.

If this bazar was moved down the river towards Bardera it would prevent the pollution of drinking water in the dry season by the natives, and in case of epidemic diseases breaking out in the bazar the troops could be well isolated. At present any epidemic in the bazar would be sure to spread to the Military Lines.

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| | |
|-------------------------|------------|
| Rice | 5 lbs. |
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| Dates | 2 lbs. |
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The hill south of Serenli towards Bardera at present covered with bush would in my opinion be a suitable site for the new bazar.

When most of the troops here now leave and the garrison is reduced to its normal size (about 200 men including military followers) the question of proper latrines should be considered.

At the present time the trench system is used at Serenli these trenches are situated 100 yards to ~~the rear~~ of the bazar and are dug each evening and the trench used that day filled up with earth. This system for a temporary camp is good.

In my opinion the best arrangement would be to have a latrine built the floor and seats and about 5 feet of the wall along which the seats are arranged made of cement, the remainder of walls roof etc might be made of wood or galvanized iron; at the back of each seat is a small door in the cement wall to allow the bucket to be removed and emptied and another one put back in its place for use. The seats should be made of concrete as they can be kept much cleaner than those made of wood.

Two or three latrines with one bucket each should also be built for Officers in a convenient place. (see attached sketch)

The excreta should be removed in a night soil cart to some place a mile or more from the bazar inland and buried in deep trenches, for this work a reliable headman and proper staff of sweepers would be necessary.

A urinal might be made with a cement trough and a pipe coming out at the bottom about 1 inch in diameter the contents of this urinal runs from the pipe into a cement tank filled with sponges. At the bottom of this tank is a small hole of pipe which opens into a kerosine oil tin filled with ashes and sand or ~~big~~ small stones. At the bottom of this kerosine oil tin are several holes any urine which escapes through these goes into the ground - from the top of the cement tank to the

to the bottom of the kerosine oil tin is about 6 feet.

The top of the cement tank is flush with the ground and open to the air. The trough is washed out daily with disinfectant and water and the stones from the cement tank removed about once a fortnight, and put in the sun for a few hours or new stones substituted. I am informed by Assistant Surgeon Nyss that this urinal is largely used for troops in India and gives satisfaction.

Refuse and rubbish should be burned in the incinerator, another one might be built at the other side of the Boma.

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
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Sir,

Your obedient servant

50 H. M. 23.04
Medical Officer Merneh Patrol.



Plan in Bottom of 117

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to flow into the bin and not outside it. The bin is now filled with porous stones and sand or ashes, and above this is a layer of small porous stones 4 ft in height, filling up the pit. The urine passes from the trough, through the pipe into the pit, passing through the 1st layer of porous stones it enters the bin containing the sand or ashes and tiny porous stones and passing through the hole in the bottom of the bin it enters the earth. By the time the urine reaches the bottom of the bin it is quite clean, having gone through a process of filtration in its passage through the pit.

The diagram shows two Latrines divided by a centre wall joining A & B. This is done so that while one pit is being cleaned the 2nd one is in use. The cleaning of the pit is very simple. Once a week the top layer of stones are removed and washed or flushed with some lyeal or cresol lotion and left exposed to the sun and air for that week. This does not take much trouble if some clean lyeal lotion be thrown on the stones daily which will keep them sweet smelling. The initial cost of building one of these latrines is not much and will last for years, with little danger of getting out of order. If only one urine pit is constructed, the stones must be removed once a week and flushed with lyeal or cresol lotion and exposed to the sun and air for 3 or 4 hours after which they may be put back. But I think the Double Latrine system is by far the best, and should be constructed when possible.

Dentl 25-5-14.

"Report on the work done by the Serenli Military Transport Corps during the recent Military Operations."

To show the state of the camels at the beginning of the Military Operations which began on 12.5.14, it is necessary to give a short account of the work done for a few months previously.

During the months of July-August-September every available camel, including those infected with 'fly' was working to transport three months stores for 400 men and followers and riding camels from Serenli to Lollehid; the only rest intervals being ten days between each convoy.

The number of camels working on this line, on signalling stations and other small safaris varied from 150-180 fit camels with an average number of 80 sick from sore-backs, fly and overwork.

During this period camels were brought in Serenli and at El-Wak but it was barely possible to buy camels fast enough to replace casualties by deaths.

At the beginning of October 62 new camels were obtained from the Bartiri near Selgid.

In October 1913 a large safari of all available camels went to Lollehid with Major Hickson and three to Gerba Harrah and were used in transporting stores from Lollehid to Gerba Harrah. All these camels had returned to Serenli by the end of October.

During October about 40 new camels were obtained from the Aulihan.

On November 2nd, 60 camels went to Gerba Harrah with the Inspector General, and on November 2nd all other available camels went up to Gerba Harrah with stores and 1st Company 4th K.A. Coy.

One section of 45 camels was left in Gerba Harrah to continue the transportation of stores from Lollehid to Gerba Harrah, whereas all others returned to Serenli

arriving in Serenli on the 10th or 11th.

On November 13th 20 camels went down the river to fetch stores left by the steamer at Anala; these camels were all 'fly infested' before starting.

On November 13th the Inspector General took 55 camels to Mia-ayu via Mfudu through a fly stricken area, and by the end of January all these camels were dead.

At the end of November a further section of 45 with a convoy went up to Gerba Harreh and remained there to help in the work between Lolla-hid and Gerba Harreh. Other small convoys such as 10 camels to 'F' Coy 4th F.A. Rifles cutting the road at Farnwan Dur kept nearly all the remaining fit camels busy.

On December 14th The S.M.T.C. were distributed as follows:-

90 at Gerba Harreh

55 at Mia-ayu

16 'Fly' camels at Mfudu to fetch Lt. J. C. Tilly.

20 at Dar with the Camel Corps.

2 at Russel Signal Station.

2 at Adilale Signal Station

5 in Aulihan country with syces buying ropes & harness.

4 near Brava Italian Somaliland with syces and an Arab trader buying camels.

4 in Farah Ogas Harreh country buying camels.

10 at Luch 'Fly' camels with syces buying harness

50 (fit camels)

50 sick " } In Serenli.

10 'Fly' " }

At this time some of the camels at Mia-ayu had died (10) leaving some 288 camels alive for the 21 Coy plus of Infantry and 1 Company of mounted men which were based on Serenli and there were only thirty camels available in Serenli.

The state of all the camels at this time was bad they all wanted a rest and some grazing even the 50 in Serenli had only 14 days rest.

Resume of work done during the subsequent military operations.

On December 16th. 18 camels left Serenli and went to Adilla.

On the same date 65 camels left Gerba Harrah and arrived after a forced march at Adilla; all 83 camels left for Gerba Harrah on the 17th. arrived on the 20th.

Ten new camels were obtained at Gerba Harrah from the Sheikh Al but they were all very young camels; these however gave a total of 118 at Gerba Harrah.

From 22nd-26th two trips were made to Lollahid up back to close the later station.

All the camels left at Gerba Harrah again on the 28th arriving in Serenli on the 2nd January, i.e. in 18 days inclusive of three days rest the camels covered 280 miles or a daily average of 14 per day.

From the beginning of January onwards safaris began to arrive from Wismaya.

On the 4th Captain Stonor arrived with 38 remaining camels taken down by the Inspector General and 22 Arab camels.

On the 10th all the Arab camels and 50 'fly' camels were sent down to Mfudu to bring up operations; these 50 camels included the 20 brought up by Captain Stonor. The Gerba camels (i.e. the 118 camels) had a rest Feb. 1-15.

On the 18th of February all available fit camels numbering 170 camels left Serenli with a convoy for Gerba Harrah, reaching Farnwen Dur on the 21st returning to Serenli.

On the 24th after the action at Durruti, the distance covered was about 88 miles.

On 27th safaris then arrived from Wismaya including Mr Elliott (23 camels) Colonel Graham 25 camels besides S.M.T.C. Camels picked up near Mfudu; Major Soames (5 camels)

And later on C Company 1st F.A.B. with 40 camels in march.

All these camels came up through the fly area and not less than 90 % have died of 'fly'.

Those that showed trypanosomes in their blood were put on to work in the section transporting stores from Mfudu to Serenli. The remainder were drafted to the other sections until they showed signs of trypanosomiasis and were then transferred to the Mfudu section.

All camels except those working on the Mfudu road had a rest from January 24th-Feb. 15th.

On Feb 15th the Corps stood as follows in Serenli 250 camels fit for work if needed though all wanting rest; this number is inclusive of camels from Kivaya not showing trypanosomiasis in their blood.

50 camels sick in Serenli and 30 odd on the Mfudu road a total of 80.

On the 16th Feb. Colonel Graham's force left Serenli with 120 camels which worked throughout the Lushian country returning to Serenli on March 16th.

Before starting out these camels had had three weeks rest and picked up a little in Serenli, though the grazing was very poor.

All these camels were carefully picked out as the best in the corps, care being taken that as early as possible were bred and about 7-10 years of age. These camels did very well during the long period of drought considering the state of the grazing.

The casualties were:-

14 dead

35 sick

The 14, 1 killed in action, 2 developed fly & collapsed and 11 died of exhaustion.

Of the 35 others

10 were bad sore backs & 25 weak from exhaustion due to overwork; these were transferred to the Italian bank of the river by the courtesy of the Italian officers

and were sent back to Serenli; their places being taken by captured camels.

During these five weeks operations about 400 miles were covered or a daily average of 13 1/2 miles per day.

When the camels returned to Serenli they needed a rest badly all were very thin/ owing to very scarce grazing and the dried-up state of the country. Feed was on two occasions out and provided for the camels at night time. During these operations 70 good baggers were captured, but on returning to Serenli it was found that 70 camels had died either in Serenli or on the Mfudu road including a number of camels which had come up from Kisumu and had not shown fly infection before Feb. 15th.

On March 30th Major Soames moved out again with 100 camels; these were made up by taking 60 camels which had remained in Serenli during the last five weeks and the remaining 40 were taken from the camels captured three weeks previously.

On the same date 10 camels proceeded to Selugli to exchange milch camels for baggage camels but the Barbard who had gone a long way inland did not respond well and only 22 were obtained.

Major Soames Column returned to Serenli on April 30th having covered in 21 days a distance of 350 miles or a daily average of 12 miles. The camels on arrival back were in a exhausted condition and only 30 could have gone out again within the week. The camels in Serenli were no better because the country was so dry at this time of year that there was no grazing. It must be remembered that these camels were worked during the good season in October-November so that they did not get an opportunity to put on their humps on which they have to exist during the dry season.

The camels during these operations whilst actually out working did extremely well but by the 30th of April they could not have done much more.

On April 30th the 53rd Bhilladar Camel Corps arrived in

Beroni and took over the transport duties so as to give the S.M.T.C. camels six weeks badly needed rest.

From March 30th to May 26th about 50 more camels died from fly infection chiefly including camels which were sent to India with Lt. Tilly on March 30th.

There are only 15 fly infected camels at present in the S.M.T.C. but there may be others amongst the captured or foraged fine camels which there has been no time to diagnose yet.

All fly infected camels worked hard on the Hrudu road to bring up the stores, this is the reason why they all died, so rapidly; if fly infected camels were not worked at all they would not die so fast and a few would cure themselves but, this would take two years.

From the above details it will be seen that there has been a very high mortality amongst the camels, briefly the causes are as follows:-

(a) Shortage of camels.

Ever since the corps was formed in 1918 the numbers of camels available for the work to be performed has always been quite inadequate with the results that

1. Every available fit camel was continually working until it got sick, a sore back or died of exhaustion.

2. Camels always had to be bought in a hurry for immediate use; that any camel which could carry a load had to be bought including 4 year old camels which were too young and feeble.

The former got exhausted and were unable to stand the long strains and in no case did they do well as for the most part they contracted pneumonia only a few recovering under treatment.

The latter have not the staying power of entire as has been amply proved. If there are a number of camels to choose from neither of the above should be chosen.

(b) 'Fly' The necessity of having to send camels down the river road to Mfudu and Lonti during the non-river season.

The area between Mfudu and Selasli is infested with both large and small hal fly and near the water with gadids (tsetse). Nearly 100 camels were lost on this road alone during the months of November 1913-April 1914. The only remedy for this is to use the road as little as possible and move the necessary convoys via Mfudu. From the above it will be seen that it is absolutely necessary to have at least double the number of camels required for actual work so that one half can rest whilst the other half is working.

(sd) C. C. Phillips Lieut
Officer I/c Saramli Military
Transport Corps.

From,

The Commandant,

Detachment 53rd Silladar Camel
Corps,

To,

The Director Supply and Transport,
Marehan Force,
Serenli.

Sir,

I beg to submit my report on the detachment
53rd Silladar Camel Corps, under my command.

2. The detachment 53rd Silladar Camel Corps left
Lilla (India) en route for Kismayu by three special
trains, on the 2nd March 1914 arriving at Karachi on
the evening of the 4th. The camels embarked on the 6th
It took 6 hours to embark 363 camels.

The ship arrived at Kismayu on the 15th of March and
dis-embarkation was finished by the morning of 20th.

3. At Kismayu the camel had to drink briny water to which
they took easily, though they were not used to it in
India. After the first week, they were watered once a
day and were ~~generally~~ gradually trained to water every
second day. On one occasion, beyond Serenli, 65 camels
were not watered until the 3rd day, and did not seem
any the worse. This was, no doubt, due to the greenness
of the grazing and, in my opinion is no argument in
favour of watering on 3rd day.

4. Grazing was very poor round about Kismayu and it was
strange to the camels. There is one poisonous shrub in
this country and if camels eat much of it, they get
throat trouble but they generally get over it. If camels
are again sent to Jubaland, leaving India in March, it
would be better if they were clipped while on board.
All camels were clipped at Kismayu and I found that

the clippers supplied to the Camel Corps were not of much use, as it is impossible to keep the sand out of the teeth and the clipper becomes clogged in consequence. It is very hard to keep a camels thick winter coat free of sand in a sandy place, and more over a heavy ^{coat} is out of place in this climate. It would be better if ordinary scissors, two pairs per section, were allowed instead of clippers.

5. Between the date of departure of camels from India and that of leaving Kismayu, there was only one casualty among camels, which shows that the camels stood the railway journey and sea voyage well. Great care should be taken in cleaning camel standings on board. Sand should be changed every day and the whole place thoroughly dis-infected.

6. On the evening of 3rd April, the detachment left Kismayu under my command for Serenli as through convoy to the front. Every camel was loaded, as it was necessary to carry as much rations as possible for the Marehan Force. No fodder ration for the camels for the journey was allowed in the convoy, but grain was supplied.

All African rations were done up in 120 lbs bags (loads not suitable for Indian camels, as they carry 400 lbs), and some of the camels which were over loaded got sore-backs under these loads, to which they were not accustomed.

The convoy arrived at Serenli on the morning of 14th; having covered 185 miles in 11 days, or an average of between 16,17 miles a day. On the top of these long marches all camels with the exception of 15, which had to be sacrificed to the tsetse fly so as to bring water from "Dais" into safe areas, had to be watered by hand and the camps were never less than 3/4 mile from water. In one place water had to be brought from over a mile and a half. The convoy arrived at Serenli on the morning of the 20th, having marched 253 miles. Throughout this long march all men kept wonderfully fit and

there were only two casualties among camels enroute. I do not think that there can be a better test than this as to what Silladar Camel Corps can do in a strange country.

It must be borne in mind that when the camels had left India it was about the end of "Mash" season, during which camels always fall of in condition. (Lieutenant Phillips of the M.A.F. who has had great experience of Somali camels, where most of the camels are gelt says that whenever a convoy of 100 camels half entire and half gelding, has been sent from Kismayu to Serenli or vice versa, about 25 gelding have generally died on the march, while the casualties among entires have been very few indeed. I am strongly of the opinion that an entire camel can stand severe strains better than a gelding, and this information may be of some interest in India where experiments are being tried in gelding baggage camels. I believe Mr Leese, Civil Veterinary Officer is also of my opinion. These long marches between Kismayu and Serenli were undertaken in order to get out of the fly area as quickly as possible.

7. On 23rd April 282 camels were sent with the first column to Garbahari, and 634 followed on the 26th with the second column, total 345. After the 20th camels were practically deprived of their grain rations, the only rations being available being uncrushed maize which had been much deteriorated from weavels. Indian camels are not accustomed to this diet. As there was only about 32,000 lbs available in Serenli, it only lasted camels for ten working days. Out of the 345 camels which were out with the two columns 150 returned to Serenli on the 11th May.

153 camels were sent down to Kismayu on the 14th May to bring up another convoy. 92 are still working with the columns.

8. There have been only 17 casualties among camels up to

date, which I think is a very small number, considering the amount of work the camels have done and most of it without grain. The grazing at this time of year is at its best in this country, but I am strongly of opinion that the camels once accustomed to grain cannot thrive on browsing alone, particularly in an area like Jubaland where every thing dries up soon after the rains.

9. I must thank Mr Leese, Civil Veterinary Officer, who treated all the sick camels during their stay at Kismayu and who also accompanied the convoy as far as Serenli. I am under a great obligation to him for all he has done.

10. Since their departure from India the following have done splendid work throughout and I strongly recommend them:-1.

1. Veterinary Assistant Rahmatali Beg
2. -----"-----Sultan Mohamed
3. Kot Dafedar Fateh Khan
4. " Ali Mohamed
5. Naik Din Mohamed
6. Nasik Ganda Mal
7. Naik Topen Ram
8. Naik Sher Mohamed

Sillaadars.

- 9 No:458 Larpe Naik Ghulam Mohamed
10. No. 859 " " Punnoo
11. " 854 " " Ranjha
12. " 401 " " Gulab
13. " 775 " " Mohamed
14. " 545 " " Punnoo Ram
15. " 397 " " Jaham Khan
16. " 567 Sarwan Moraffar
17. " 834 " Lakam
18. " 577 Dost Ali
19. " 600 Sarwan Abbas

20. No 684 Sarwan Habib Ullah

21. " 722 Sarwan Ghulam Ali

22. " 54 " Amir

23. " 827 " Sultan

11. Baboo Rai Sheja Lao has also done very good work often under trying conditions, and has been of great assistance to me.

12. I would reserve specially for mention Rissaldar Khuda Bakhsh, who has been my right hand man in connect with the duties of this detachment. I consider he has performed his duties excellently.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Pirthi Singh Lieutenant

Commanding Detachment 53rd

Silladar Camel Corps.

(11)

Officer Commanding

Marehan Force.

Serenli,

27th May 1914.

Forwarded,

I beg to endorse the recommendations made by the O.C. detachment 53rd Camel Corps.

(SD) G.E.M. Lobb Captain

D.S. & T.

From, The Director Supply and Transport
Marehan Force,

To
The Officer Commanding
Marehan Force.

Sir,

I have the honour to report on the work done by the Indian Supply and Transport Corps contingent from the date of embarkation on the ISMAILA at Karachi to the date of submission of this report.

1. Embarkation took place on the 6th March within 6 hours during which time 363 camels were slung into the holds of the vessel without mishap. The passage to Kismayu occupied 9 days and was made under favourable sea conditions. The health of troops and camels was excellent and there were no casualties amongst either. Disembarkation at Kismayu commenced on the 15th March and was delayed by the beaching of the two only available harbour steamers. Disembarkation was completed on the 20th March.

2. On arrival at Kismayu, the following appointments, subsequently confirmed (vide Marehan Force Order No 260 dated 21st April) were made under the orders of the Officer Commanding, Line of Communication:-

Director of Supply and Transport..... Captain G.E.H. Ross
Deputy Director of Supply and Officer incharge Advance Supply Depot..... Captain R.C.L. Sweeney.
Officer incharge Base supply Depot..... Lieut A.B. Coffin.
was

3. An Officer/ opened at Kismayu on the 15th March, and the scheme for controlling and distributing the Supply and Transport services was taken in hand. The objects in view were the massing close to point of contact with the enemy a sufficient reserve of supplies and complement of Transport to enable the commander to pursue his plans unhampered by restrictions relating to these services, and the relief of combatant officers from non-combatant duties

formerly delegated to them.

5. The port of discharge is Kismayu. The point of close contact with the enemy is Serenli. Serenli is approached from KISMAYU by 3 routes:-

- Communications. (A) A water way the river Juba, which is the Eastern boundary of Jubaland-distance 400 miles. (Gobwen the Base is 9 miles from Kismayu).
- (B) A direct path via Gobwen, Yenti, Mrudu Salagli-distance 240 miles.
- (C) An indirect path via Afmadu and Dekatch-distance about 500 miles, varying slightly according to the path taken after Afmadu.

Communications are governed by local conditions as under the river Juba is normally navigable from June to October. Fall Light draught steamers can proceed all the way to Serenli from Gobwen.

The banks of the river Juba are infested with the tsetse fly from Yentias far as Salagli (165 miles) all the year and the fly area extends on both sides during the rains, when the direct path (B) must be abandoned. Water is scarce on both routes, especially on route (C) which is impracticable for Indian camels except in the rains.

The communications are therefore not only long and difficult but uncertain. The accessibility or isolation of SERENLI depends on conditions of rain-fall which is very local in its incidence, impossible to foresee and for information concerning which we only have unreliable sources. In the event of no rain in Abyssinia or at Afmadu camel convoys must go by path (B) and risk decimation from tsetse fly.

6. Details of requirements at the front could only be worked out precisely after learning your intentions, and you were cut off from communication with the base. The situation was obscure in the extreme. It was believed that there was to be a cessation of active operations for two months, during which you would visit the base, and that

the ultimate development of the supply situation would synchronize with the completion, at Serenli, of sufficient reserves, calculated on three months in the enemy's country to enable resumption. Account had to be taken of the necessity for maintaining a garrison permanently at Serenli irrespective of the operations then in progress. The seasonal limitations of the river as a water way for despatch of supplies had to be borne in mind. It was impossible to foretell what the strength of the permanent garrison would be.

It was decided to estimate requirements on a basis of a force of 1400 men, including followers, in Jubaland for twelve months from the date of the river becoming navigable, to use the river exclusively for the despatch of supplies and to keep the Indian camels segregated in fly free areas pending their employment at the front as transport with fighting columns.

7. Estimates were framed accordingly. The weekly scale of rations for fighting men at and beyond Serenli is, - Rice 5 lbs, flour 2 lbs, dates 2 lbs, ghi 14 ozs, salt 3 oz and meat $3\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. Modified scales are authorised for certain classes of followers.

The stocks in Jubaland at the time, exclusive of those North of Yonti concerning which no precise information was available, were approximately Rice 6 $\frac{9}{10}$ tons, flour 4 $\frac{7}{10}$ tons, dates 4 $\frac{7}{10}$ tons, ghi 1 $\frac{8}{10}$ tons and salt $\frac{4}{10}$ of a ton.

The requirements calculated to last until the opening of the river season 1915, with ten per cent added, were - Rice 22 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons, flour 90 tons, dates 90 tons, ghi 40 tons and salt 10 tons.

The staff Officer at Nairobi had already ordered under contract 122 tons of flour, obtainable in Jubaland, and 70 tons of dates $31\frac{1}{2}$ of ghi and 7 of salt deliverable at Mombassa. Negotiations were in progress from the same quarter for the supply of 122 tons of rice (The Staff Officers estimate was based on the assumption of an even rice and flour.

issue at Serenli, but the scale was altered subsequently to five pounds of the former and two of the latter.) Allowing that the force at and beyond Serenli was provisioned up to June, this still left a deficiency to be provided for of 80 tons of rice, 23 tons of dates, and 4 tons of ghi, while flour stood 58 tons in excess. Application was made to Nairobi for the further supply of 80 tons of rice, and for the cancellation, if not already sanctioned, of a contract for 80 tons of flour. The question of dates and ghi was allowed to stand over, temporarily, as the former is an article of supply which deteriorates very rapidly in stock, and the deficiency in the latter was so small as to be easily made good ~~letter~~ later if required. The Indian camel transport personnel stood rationed up to the 20th of June. Three months further reserve on the Indian Field Service scale was asked for, together with some articles of supply depot equipment and six lift and force pumps of registered Indian pattern. Two supply sergeants and three supply clerks, whose appointment was considered indispensable, were asked for at the same time.

8. No regulations were placed at my disposal. Corps orders were issued to my Officers providing for the organisation and laying out of depots on the principles enunciated in Supply and Transport Manual, War, as modified by local conditions; for the issue of rations on authorised scales; for the maintenance and rendering of accounts on forms which had to be drafted "proforma" for the purpose; and for the submission of weekly transport states and supply progress reports. Arrangements were made for a permanent advance of Rs:5000/- on the local treasury at Kismayu, and orders regarding procedure were issued after consultation with the ~~the~~ treasury Officer. Captain Salkeld Provincial Commissioner of the province, was kind enough to place at my disposal a note drafted by himself on "Roads and Transport in Jubaland", as well as to assist me in drawing up rules for the guidance of supply Officers when making purchases and contracts. A local price list furnished

by the Civil authorities. These were all embodied in Corps orders. A scale was framed providing for issue and renewals of clothing to Indian Silledar camel men and sufficient stock of the same was asked for from India. (The demand for clothing to India Establishments was subsequently cancelled and the question of this supply held in abeyance by your order.) On the 25th March Captain Sweeny proceeded to Nairobi in connection with contracts and the passing in of supplies destined for the troops in Jubaland.

9. On the 29th March while I was at Yonti, your telegram was received summoning to Serenli, by the Afmadu route (C) two Supply and transport Officers, together with as much rations as possible up to three months consumption, and conveying your intention of forming an Advance base at GARBALARI.

A conference was held on the 1st April at Kismayu at the Provincial Commissioner's residence, attended by the Provincial Commissioner, the Officer Commanding Line of Communications, Mr. Leese, camel Veterinary Officer, the Officer Commanding Detachment 53rd Camel Corps, and myself at which it was unanimously decided that in view of reports of water scarcity at Afmadu, the route intended was impracticable for Indian camels, and that the convoy must proceed by Mfudu (A). You were ~~isn~~ informed accordingly.

As Captain Sweeny was at Nairobi, and it was undesirable to relieve Lieut. Coffin of his duties at the base depot, you confirmed my proposal to proceed alone as supply officer with the column, recalling Captain Sweeny to follow as rapidly as possible.

The supply column (240 camels) depended on the arrival of the S.S. Kilwa for the bulk of the rations to be carried to Serenli. The vessel arrived on the 2nd April, was unloaded by 11 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd and the supply column left Kismayu at 4 p.m. the same afternoon for the front under a load of 15,600 lbs rice, 15,680 lbs flour and 8880 lbs dates, leaving the following quantities to be

picked up on the march, viz at Gobwen (9 miles) 1600 lbs rice, at Yonti (18 miles) 8040 lbs rice and 4836 lbs dates and at Mfudu (98 miles) 14,800 lbs rice. These quantities represented two months supplies for the Marehan Force, except ghi and salt which were available at Serenli, and flour of which only six weeks requirements were available on board the Kilwa. Extra rice was carried to supplement deficiency of flour. Rations for issue to India personnel up to and including the 20th June were also carried on the supply column. The remainder of the camels were detailed for the carriage of water and equipment of Officers, escort and camel Corps. Grain for consumption by camels on the march amounted to ninety camel loads decreasing at a daily consumption rate of five camel loads. This was distributed throughout the convoy.

The convoy of 360 camels was under the command of Lieut Prithi Singh, Commanding the Detachment, 53rd camel Corps.

March
from
1971. The distance from Kiamayu to Salagli (181 miles) was traversed by forced marches in order to get through the tsetse fly area as rapidly as possible, and occupied 10 days and 15 hours. A day's halt had to be made at Mfudu to enable me to make stock of the stores lying there and to fill up the supply column, so that the rate of marching was between 18 and 19 miles a day. The convoy was loaded to straining point. The exigencies of the situation at Serenli did not seem to admit of an allowance being made either for sick or spare camels. It had been resolved to jettison supplies rather than to start short. The convoy marched in single file and almost entirely by night, and its length under these conditions was seldom less than two miles. I kept a record of the hours of marching. There were six whole night marches when the men did not bed down at all, and the total number of hours in bed between "lights out" and "reveille" was thirty-one for the eleven night, including the halt at Mfudu. Watering of camels every second day occupied from night to ten hours. Mr. Leese Camel Veterinary Officer, accompanied and convoy. He was in charge of fly reconnaissance. Watering and hours of

marching were ordered under his advice. Lieut. Porcelli was in command of the escort. After Salaghi marching was still by night but was proceeded with in a more leisurely fashion. Serenli (240 miles) was reached at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 20th:-

Stores were handed over into the supply depot at Serenli. There had been no loss from loads on the march and of the only two camels which died one was not fit to start.

10. The state of affairs at Serenli on the arrival of the convoy was precarious in the extreme. There was ample evidence that the decision which had led to camels being obtained from India was a wise one and had not been taken a moment too soon. Setting aside ghi and salt of which there was a sufficient reserve, supplies were exhausted. A board was held on the day following that of the arrival of the convoy and found that 2297 lbs rice 1965 lbs flour and 1975 lbs dates was the stock in hand fit for issue. In other words the force had subsistence for four days on the Serenli scale together with date rations for a fortnight. In addition to these quantities there were 365 lbs rice and 7474 lbs flour which were condemned by the board as unfit for human consumption. The issue of the condemned stock, which was in a very advanced state of deterioration, as a last resort, could only have been attended with grave risk of danger to the health of troops, and would have carried the garrison on for another nine days. The arrival of the convoy had relieved an impossible situation.

11. It had not been intended at first to employ the Indian camels north of Serenli after arrival. But you decided, in view of the condition of the Serenli Military Transport Corps, whose camels having borne the whole brunt of operations prior to our arrival, were now in urgent need of rest, to equip with Indian camels

the two columns which were in readiness to move out from Serenli. The first column marched out on the 23rd: April i.e. three days after completion of the march from Kismayu, and took with it 282 camels. These included a supply column of 121 camels and 65 camels under loads of grain. I accompanied the column as convoy officer. The second column, which took 63 camels, left Serenli on the 26th: April, with Lieutenant Prithi Singh as convoy Officer. Both column halted at Garbahari (78 miles) and the force was redistributed for further operations

12. On the 7th May after distributing supplies and arranging for the provisioning of the Garbahari post up to the 9th July, I left Garbahari to return to Serenli where the river was causing anxiety. I took half the Indian camels with me arriving at Serenli on the 12th May Lieutenant Prithi Singh and the remainder of his detachment stayed with the force for further operations.

13. On the 14th May I despatched 155 Indian camels, and Risaldar Khuda Baksh, back to the base at Gobwen, so as to be at the disposal of the Officer in charge base Supply Depot in the event of the river falling. Mr. Leese kindly volunteered to accompany these camels, he has been forced to proceed by the Mfudu path, and consequently to incur risk of heavy loss of camel from tsetse fly, as reports were received at Bekach that there has been no rain on the Afmadu path.

14. On the 30th May you returned to Serenli and ordered me to render my report on the work done by the Indian Contingent. Owing to your approaching departure and the fact that I am out of postal communication with the base, I have telegraphed to Captain Sweeny to submit direct to you at Gobwen a supplementary report on his work at Nairobi and the arrangements at the base since my departure from Kismayu. A report has also been called for

from the Officer Commanding Detachment 23rd camel Corps and this will be forwarded to you at Nairobi on receipt after his return to Serenli.

15. A perusal of this report shows that the scheme of for organizing the Supply and Transport Services which was in the process of preparation during the early days immediately following on the arrival of the contingent was destined never to be applied to the needs of the Marchan force. None the less the contingent has borne some share in the closing operations. It has been shown that the timely arrival of the convoy from Kismayu relieved a situation which was nothing if not precarious. The detachment 53rd Camel Corps has been employed continuously since its arrival at Serenli. At the time of writing this report half the detachment is on the road to the base, and having covered 400 miles in 6 weeks, is marching a further 240. Should the river fail these will have to return under loads, and the survivors will have marched 380 in 5 months and twice administered relief as an isolated force.

16. This report would not be complete without some reference to the thoughtful arrangements made at Nairobi by Captain Filsell for the provision of supplies to the troops in Jubaland. It has been shown that very little in the way of contract work was left to be done. Lieutenant Colonel Ward at Yonti had also made extensive purchases of maize for the Indian camels.

I am indebted to Lieutenant Lovegrove for his co-operation with me on several occasions.

I am under an obligation to Mr. Banerjee, clerk at Gobwen, for help in checking and handing stores at the base and to Mr. Fernandes, clerk at Serenli assistance willingly rendered.

17. I would bring to your notice the assistance rendered by Mr. A.S. Leese, Camel Veterinary Officer, to the detachment of the 53rd Camel Corps. His exceptional knowledge of the camel added to his personal popularity with Punjabi

camel man, to whom he was known in Indian, was of the greatest use on the march of the convoy. The value of his services to the detachment cannot be exaggerated.

18. I take the opportunity afforded me before closing the report to anticipate the recommendation, which the Officer Commanding detachment, 53rd Camel Corps has already informed me that he intends to make with regards to Rissal-darKhuda Bakhsh of the detachment. An immense amount of responsibility has attached to his position during the past few weeks. He has worthily upheld the best traditions of Silladar Camel Corps, handed down from operations in Somaliland and on the Indian Frontier. I strongly recommend him to your favourable notice.

19. In conclusion I desire to draw attention to the services of the undermentioned officers who have served with the Indian contingent:-

Captain R.C.L. Sweeny has had most of the responsibility of the work of collection of supplies at the base. He would have urged me to let him accompany the convoy to Serenli, but was absent in Nairobi at the time of our departure. His presence at Nairobi and later at Gobwen, has relieved me of any anxiety I might have felt as to the arrangements that were being made.

Lieutenant Prithi Singh has had the responsibility relating to the command of the Camel Corps detachment. Only 15 camels have succumbed under severe work, including a march through fly country and following the upsetting circumstances of a transfer by rail and sea to change conditions of climate, grazing and environment, each of which affects a camel. This is evidence of remarkable good handling. A great deal of hard work has fallen to this officers share.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant.

(SD) G.E.M. Logg Captain

Director of Supplies and Transport
Marehan Force.

March Patrol Operations, Jubaland, British East Africa 1914

(a) HISTORY

Brief summary of preliminary arrangements.

The Indian contingent arrived in Kismayu on the 15th March 1914. Landing of rations and camels commenced that day and was completed on 30th March 1914. Disembarkation was very slow, there being few facilities and a great deal of delay occurred, due to both tugs being stranded for some time.

At the time of our arrival the preliminary arrangements for the feeding of the force had already been taken in hand. Contracts for food stuffs had, for the most part, been concluded at Nairobi.

A temporary Base Supply Depot was formed at Kismayu pending settlement of the question, as to whether the Base should be at Gobwen or Yonti.

Issues from A.B.C. and D. Sections commenced on 31st March 1914.

Gobwen was eventually made the Base, this obviously had to be so, as Yonti is in the dry area for at least part of the year, and local camel men eventually refused to take their camels there, also the stores are a long way from the landing stage, and the river steamers are berthed at Gobwen. Should the question ever be raised again, I consider that there could be ^{no} doubt that Gobwen is the only suitable place for the Base Supply Depot.

The problem which had to be solved was to open up a line or lines of communication with the Force already in the Field, this, in itself, is, of course, an abnormal situation.

The river is only feasible as such for about 6 months in the year, when in flood; the road which follows the river is always more or less affected by it, the remaining route is via Aimulu, a round about way, which great water difficulties.

In addition, there is a wireless ^{station} of communication

between Lugh, Bardera and Giumbo in Italian Somaliland. The river route will eventually be very fully used to take up the bulk of the year's supply. The road following the river was used by a convoy of the whole of the Indian camels sent up on 4th April 1914, with food supplies, to relieve the situation at Serenli, where supplies were in a precarious state. The Afmudu route is now being used by a convoy of 152 Indian camels sent down from Serenli, to bring up a month's supplies, as the situation there is again becoming acute, owing to the lateness of the river in rising. The wireless installation between Bardera and Giumbo, and Giumbo and Nairobi via Aden, Zanzibar and Mombasa has been largely used, but telegrams were in most cases, badly mutilated and took a long time in transit, frequently, ~~from~~ ^{from} days from Giumbo to Nairobi. The necessity for some better communication between Serenli and Kismayu, and Kismayu and Lamu is obvious, Lamu being already telegraphically connected with Mombasa.

Initial difficulties and methods of overcoming them

The want of an efficient Storekeeper and clerk for the Base Supply Depot was greatly felt. Clerk Banerji was handed over for the purpose, and although a very willing, hard working man, he has no real knowledge of storekeeping and is not a highly trained clerk. However, the best had to be made of him and the work, just at the first, was not great. The lack of any supply equipment, whatever, also, was felt such as paulins, scales etc. Fortunately, it did not rain then, however, later on, stores were damaged by rain due to lack of paulins. Paulins were borrowed from the 4th King's African Rifles, Customs at Kismayu and Gobwen and they saved much loss. Tarrred matting was also used to cover lighters, but is not very effective, the steamer Company's paulins were kept at Miudu, last year to cover stores which had to be left there.

A few articles such as spring balances, stencils etc.

were purchased locally and at Nairobi, others being ordered by cable from India.

The want of clerks with the Head Office was also much felt, this was overcome by officers doing this work, but had the work at first been as heavy as might have been ^{expected} ~~expected~~, this would have been very difficult, if not impossible.

To overcome these difficulties, two Sergeants and three clerks were ordered by cable from India; from further experience, I am of opinion that 1st or 2nd. class Agents would have answered instead of staff Sergeants. Storekeepers were required as it appeared evident that several intermediate supply Depots would have to be opened.

We were certainly not hampered by regulations, as we had none, this, undoubtedly, has its advantages, but when it comes to organizing all arrangements from first principles, a few books of Regulations such as S. & T. Manual (War) and War Establishments (India) are very useful, as was proved by the demand made on the few private copies available.

Arrangements made for obtaining and storing local supplies prices paid, and method of packing.

At first the only local supplies obtained were rations for "A" Section, which were bought from S.S. "Tumala" but later this section was abolished and stores issued on payment at cost price.

Later on, purchases of maize, Matama grain, Manihiti and Matama flour were arranged for locally, prices paid, method of packing and names of suppliers are given in Appendix "A".

These supplies were stored in various buildings in the Gobwen Barracks in a Custom godown at Gobwen.

Ghee and dates which were imported, had for a long time to remain in the open, for lack of accommodation.

Recruiting organization, and payment of local labour; numbers employed.

Each officer was given an interpreter on Rs. 40/- a month with free rations, one of these was discharged and had to be replaced.

Local labour should be obtained through the Civil Authorities, but it was found in practice more satisfactory for the Officer incharge Base Supply Depot to engage the labour himself. Very little organization was necessary as only small numbers were engaged. In fact local labour only become a question of importance after the 4th King's African Rifles left Jubaland, as, previously, most of the work was done by fatigue parties provided by that Regiment.

Appendix "B" shows the number employed, rates of pay etc.

RATIONS

Three month's rations for India Troops and one month's for animals were brought from India, a further three months Indian rations were asked for to arrive before the 15th. May 1914, they actually arrived in Kisumu on 17th May 1914 together with the personnel, supply Depot equipment etc. asked for. African rations were calculated for one year's supply with 1400 Troops at Serenli; owing to the reduction of this number later, there resulted a large surplus in the country. The present requirements and surpluses are shown in Appendix "C". Commanding Troops Nairobi, was asked by wire to reduce, according to contract, Ghee, Rice and Dates by 25 per cent, but except in the case of Dates, it is doubtful if he was able to give the contractors notice of this reduction in time, should such be the case, these surpluses, which have not been sent to Jubaland, will have to be disposed of in Mombasa, possibly at a loss, but this is quite unavoidable.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION

This is as follows:-

Director of Supplies and Transport and Officer incharge Advance Supply Depot Captain G.E.M. Hogg at Garrabhari,

Deputy Director of Supplies and Officer in charge Intermediate Supply Depot Captain R. I. G. Sweeney at Serenli, Officer in charge Base Supply Depot / Lieut. A. S. Corrin at Gobwen Assistant Director of Transport and Officer Commanding Detachment 53rd Silladar Camel Corps Lieut. K. Pritti Singh at Serenli. Captain Sweeney has been delayed in proceeding to his charge owing to his absence at Nairobi and Mombasa on contract work and to the lateness of the river in rising during his absence Lieut. Pritti Singh has had charge of the Intermediate Supply Depot at Serenli.

CONTRACTS

A separate report on contract arrangement is attached.

ACCOUNTS AND OFFICE WORK

There is not much office work ordinarily.

A simple system of accounts was instituted. As far as I am told, the audit system is very brief. Although a complex system would neither be necessary nor desirable, yet, some simple system of checking demands and supplies issued below the Advance Supply Depot appear to be indicated.

SUPPLY EQUIPMENT ETC.

So far, I have had no experience of the water gear.

The Office equipment brought from India was insufficient, the want of a table, chairs, lamps and a better class of stationery was felt.

Supply equipment was received from India on 17th. May 1914, there was none, when we took over.

The equipment considered necessary for the Base Supply Depot is shown in Appendix "D".

(b) SUPPLIES(i) Food stuffs

Wheat:-Amount available at various seasons.
Harvesting. Route by which it is despatched to markets
method of working local miles.

There is no wheat.

Cattle:-Numbers of cattle sheep and goats available
on lines of communication. Average cost and output of
meat per animal. If animals migrate, when and where do
they go?

Cattle sheep and goats:-

Appendix "E" shows the resources average cost and output of these.

Other articles of food classed as such by the
inhabitants. Their suitability for consumption by
British and Indian Troops. quantities obtainable at
various seasons Prices:-

These are shown in Appendix "F".

There are no vegetables obtainable locally except imported potatoes and onions at Kismayu, Gobwen and Yonti. Tinned stores, rice groceries etc. are obtainable in small quantities in the shops at Kismayu, Gobwen Yonti.

(ii) Fuel:-quantity and descriptions obtainable on
lines of communication average cost. Fuel and firewood
is obtained. Political consideration governing
deforestation.

The supply is not limited, it has to be cut, and there is no cost, except wood which is cut and stacked for steamers along the river, when a charge of Rs 3/- per ton is made by the civil Authorities.

The wood is of good enough quality. There are no considerations governing deforestation.

(iii) Grain and fodder:-List of grains obtainable
quantities, prices and harvest season.

For list of grain etc see Appendix "G".
 There is a sufficient of grass for grazing of average food value.

No or fodder is stacked nor sold.

The grazing during the rains is quite good. Plenty of grazing for camels throughout the year. Fodder could be cut and stacked if necessary, but necessity not having arisen, it has not been made.

It is suggested that the description of local names of poisonous grasses, shrubs and trees should be obtained from Mr. Leese.

(iv) Markets and contractors:- Markets and articles obtainable there in. Food reserve in the country. How stored. Names of influential men who may come forward as contractors and the supplies they can tender for.

The principle markets are Kismayu and Gobwen at the coast and Alexandra in the Goshu country, the articles obtainable therein and food reserve in the country are already mentioned in supplies (b) (i) and (iii) and appendices thereto.

Supplies are ordinarily stored in mud and wattle huts, but I am told grain, if to be kept for some time, is stored in pits, in some parts of the country, though I have not seen this method of storing here.

Influential men who might come forward as contractors and supplies they can tender for are as follows:-

| Names of contractor | Supplies | Address |
|--|---|--------------|
| Juba River Syndicate | Mahindi & Matama | Balmerera |
| East Africa cotton growers association | Mahindi & Matama grain & flour & cotton seed. | Halwalood |
| The Powy's land Plantation Co. Ltd. | -----do----- | Mashdarmasha |

(v) Corps:- List of Corps grown. What corps can be used for grass storage and during what months.

Cotton seed is obtainable from Italian Somaliland, but there are certain difficulties in the way of importing it.

No corps are used for green storage.

Corps grown are maize matama (redJowari) small quantity of sugar-cane and beans cotton and I am told ground nuts will be tried shortly.

(c) TRANSPORT

(i) Forms of transport employed in the country.

Camels are mainly used, they only carry a load of 340 to 300 pounds and can go 5 days without water. There are not many available for hire or purchase.

Donkeys are also used, they are of a good type and I think might be used for Military purpose in draught as well as pack, they are not so susceptible to draught as fly.

There is an inconsiderable number of mules used mostly for riding.

Bullocks are seldom used and when used are generally used as pack.

Porters are generally obtainable in sufficient numbers from the Civil Authorities when required.

(ii) Local transport available for bringing in supplies to Base and posts on lines of communication.

Camels were used for bringing in supplies from Kismayu to Gobwen. I consider camel or bullock carts could be economically used along this route.

(iii) Names of influential men who would take up carrying contracts.

The principle contractor for camels for this purpose is Zeid Bazier at Kismayu.

(iv) Zoonotic and epizootic diseases prevalent in the country.

Camel Mange is supposed to be very rife about Gobwen. The fly is almost universal where there is water, the fly zone being, of course much greater during the rains. The river littoral from Yonti north being the most dangerous area.

The Haal fly is also found over a large area extending

into the Aimadu route.

(d) Roads and Railways

Roads:-

There is a very poor partly metalled road between Kismayu and Gohwen, it is capable of wheeled traffic, the metalling is a coral, the surface is very heavy and sandy in parts in the dry weather, it is somewhat firmer in wet weather.

It could not sustain heavy or continuous wheeled traffic, but is alright for pack transport.

I have had no experience of the other roads namely (a) route "A", the road via Aimadu and (b) the river road to Sarenli, route "B", but I am told in wet weather it is practically impassable through the Goshu country on account of the heavy cotton soil.

These routes are mere tracks, suitable for pack transport

(e) Harbours and water ways.

Harbours

Kismayu is the only harbour. Ships lie about one mile from shore, there is only a small jetty with half ton hand crane.

Two privately owned lighters were used in landing animals and stores.

There is no system to permit of working after dark, search lights on H.M.S. "Pegasus" were used, when the Indian camels were landed.

Local labour is obtainable from local civil authorities but not in great numbers, troops were mainly used for such purposes.

Sentries with gangs of labourers would be necessary.

The privately owned sea going tugs "Bajuna" belonging to the English Navigation and Trading Co., the "Vittorio Emanuele" belonging to the Italian Co. and a Motor tug the "Sisilana" belonging to Mr. Powis Cobb were used in disembarkation. There are also plenty of good seagoing dhows in the harbour which were also used.

Water ways

I am unable to report on the river, as I have not yet been beyond Yonti.

It is only navigable as far as Serenli for about 6 months and then with considerable difficulties, with a heavy current, shifting shoals, snags etc.

The approximate dates of rise and fall of the river for last 8 years are shown in appendix. "H"

There is an Italian river steamer of fair power, not used by us. The "Swahili" and "Somali" are the two rivet steamers belonging to the English Navigation and Trading Co. I am told they are very indifferent now and badly require replacing or, at least, overhauling. They are not powerful enough. They are twin screw (protected) Their draught is two feet six inches as also the draught of the lighters they tow. The loads of these lighters is from 30 to 40 tons with two feet six inches draught and there are four of them, two large and two small.

Wood is collected on banks and used on the steamers.

River is navigable in flood up to Serenli about 400 mile. Navigation at night is considerable dangerous.

Stores are loaded at Gobwen and unloaded at Serenli, no transshipment being necessary. There are no jetties, being alluvial and also shifting.

I consider escorts with each steamer are necessary.

The contractors are the "English Navigation and Trading Co." Ltd. and Mr. C.S.M. Gabriel is the managing director.

Mr. Rayne of Halevalood owns a small motor launch, draught about three feet. The Italian Government steamer owns a Motor launch of shallow draught at present out of order.

There is also the Government steamer "Rose" which I have not seen.

The native craft on the river are of the "Dug-out" variety in varying sizes, they are capacious but leak considerably.

The small temporary depot in Kismayu consisted of a mud and wattle shed about 6 yards by 12 yards roofed with palm thatch, with a yard about 10 yards by 12 yards.

There are plenty of sites in Kismayu but lack of godown accommodation.

The soil is all sandy.

Water obtained from wells in sufficient quantities but very brackish. Water for Europeans is brought in from the Juba river at Gobwen in pakhals on camels. Four large tanks were taken off the S.S. "Ismaila" as it was considered they would be very useful storing water.

This depot fulfilled practically none of the conditions laid down in S.Y. and T. Manual (War) para 16, but answered well enough, being only a temporary one.

Supplies locally obtainable at various seasons, the distances they have to be brought in, and the local transport available for the purpose.

Supplies locally obtainable have been shewn in (b) high rates being obtainable locally.

Local supplies, maize, maize flour, matama flour and matama come from the banks of the river Jube and are brought down in boats to Gobwen and across to Kismayu by camels.

Wood is obtainable for the cutting.

The amount of local labour obtainable.

The local labour is limited and has to be supplied by the Civil Authorities, for a large expedition either the troops would have to be used or possibly imported.

Building and the purposes to which they can be applied i.e. hospitals, Offices, godown etc.

Buildings in Kismayu would have to be hired or requisitioned, but there should be sufficient of them for hospitals and Offices, but not for godown without making the local owners evacuate their premises.

Gobwen The Base Supply depot consists of 4 godowns at present. The accommodation is poor and cramped, badly lighted and ventilated, even for this small expedition.

Here again practically none of the points laid down in S. & T. Manual (War) para 18 can be carried out. There are not many good sites for a depot here, as the high ground is very sandy and the low ground liable to flood.

Water arrangements here are better as the river is nearer but even here it is often very brackish.

The same remarks apply as regards supplies etc, as in the case of Kismayu, except, that practically all local supplies come down the river in dhows and Europe and imported supplies come from Kismayu on camels.

Labour There have been no labour difficulties so far, as most of the work was done by fatigue parties supplied by the 4th King's African Rifles, but for handling larger amount of stores than the present amount military or imported labour would be necessary.

There are no buildings, except those at present in use which are suitable as hospitals, offices

The present telecommunication between Subaland and Nairobi is expensive, & slow. I understand a wireless station is shortly to be installed at Mombasa which should improve matters. 14

At Gobwen the following improvements are required:-

A good sized shed is necessary near the customs house Gobwen, as a godown for all stores of the Base Supply Depot. An adequate supply of paulins should always be on hand in Depot, the lack of these has led to considerable losses, the extent of which is not yet known.

A large platform scale weighing up to about 2000 to 3000 lbs inside the godown is a necessity.

4 The wireless is now working
- H. J. R.

A short trolly hire from the godown on to the pier would be a great convenience and labour saving, this should cost practically nothing as there are plenty of rails, sleepers and several trollies lying about, and being allowed to rot with rust.

The jetty requires repair, otherwise it will shortly cease to exist.

A small hand crane capable of lifting half ton would be a great asset.

(Sd) R.L.C. Sweeny Captain

Deputy Director of supplies

24-5-1914.

Marshall Force. Patrol

Additional Notes.

Page 5:-

Under orders the Director of Supplies and Transport, Captain, R.L.C.Sweeny, commenced taking over charge of the Base Supply Depot, from 25th May 1914, to relieve Lieut. A.S.Coiffin who will proceed to India at once.

Page 2:-

The 152 Indian camels coming to Gobwen from Serenli, travelled by route "B" (River route) instead of route "A" (Ainsdu rout).

(sd) R.L.C.Sweeny Captain

D.D.S.

Appendix "C"

Statement showing the supplies of food stuff contracted for, for one year, for King's African Rifles at Seronli and the surplus that will result from the reduction of strength there.

| | Rice Tons | Dates Tons | Ghee Tons | Salt Tons | Remarks. |
|----------------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---|
| Amount Contracted for | 192 | 70 | 30 1/2 | 6-2160 | N.E. Approximate quantities available at Seronli Yonli Tons |
| Reduction by 25% | 30 1/2 | 17 1/2 | 7-1400 | | Rice " 1- 7 2170 |
| Amount left to be sold in Bombay | | | 7-1324 | | Dates " 1-299 2 1780 |
| Balance | 161 1/2 | 52 1/2 | 15-686 | 6-2160 | Ghee " 1-106 5 2187 |
| Actual requirements | a) 129-1040 | 61-1760 | 22-1470 | 3-1980 | Salt " 0-635 1- 469 |
| Balance Surplus | 38-80 | 0-1600 | Nil | 3-180 | (a) For 68 weeks plus 25%. |

Gobwin,

31.5.1914.

(sd) R.L.C. Sweeney Captain

Deputy Director of Supplies

Marehan Patrol.

APPENDIX "D"

The following articles of equipment are considered necessary for the Base Supply Depot:-

- Platform scale weighing up 2000 to 3000 lbs.
- Spring balances No 2 weighing up to 300 lbs.
- Large copper scale with beam and weights No 2
- Paulina 12 feet x 12 feet No 6
- Coopers tools set 1
- Water proof sheets No 50
- Lamps or lanterns No 2
- Stencils sets x 1
- Knives large No 2
- Parabues No 1
- Needles packing No 24

Edgewood

5- 1914.

(Sd) E.L.C. Sweeny Captain

Deputy Director of Supplies

"APPENDIX "H"

Approximate dates of rises and falls in the Juba River during last 8 years:-

| | Rises | | Falls | |
|------|-------|-------|--------------|----------|
| 1906 | 10th | June | 15th | November |
| 1907 | 20th | May | 20th | " |
| 1908 | 5th | June | -----do----- | |
| 1909 | 15th | May | 15th | " |
| 1910 | 7th | June | 20th | " |
| 1911 | 18th | May | 26th | " |
| 1912 | 26th | April | 20th | " |
| 1913 | 2nd | May | 28th | October. |

Gobwen

28th May 1914.

(SD) R.L.C. Swery Captain

Deputy Director of Supplies

No. 48.

Between
 10th, June, 1914.

28601

From: The Deputy Director of Supplies

Marehan Patrol.

To,

The Officer Commanding Troops,

Marehan Patrol,

I beg to forward the report on the working of the Base Supply Depot by Lieut. A. E. Coffin and Transport Corps.

Sd/- R. C. Sweeney Captain,

Deputy Director of Supplies

Marehan Patrol.

Report on the working of the Base Supply Depot.

H I S T O R Y.

The Base Supply Depot was originally formed at Kismayu on the 19th March, 1914. Here the three months' Indian rations and one month's grain and fodder for Indian Camels were stored. At first, only one Makuti hut was available, in which were placed all the perishable rations, but the fodder had to be left outside. On the approach of the rains, makuti roof were built over the fodder.

During the period that the Base was at Kismayu two consignments of African rations were received as follows:-

| Date | Flour | Rice | Dates | Ghee | Salt | Remarks |
|---------|--------|---------|--------|-------|-------|---------|
| - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8-4-14 | 15,600 | 15,600 | 9,000 | 5,960 | 840 | - |
| 18-4-14 | - | 154,480 | 86,880 | 9,880 | 7,800 | - |

Out of the first consignment every thing except the Ghee and the salt and 1,920 lbs. flour and 120 lbs dates was despatched the same day to Serenli by a convoy of Indian camels, which also took two months' rations for their own personnel in addition to the amount required for the journey.

On the 15th of April 1914 the movement of the Depot to Gubwan (the river base) was began in preparation for the opening of the river season. Large consignment of African rations now began to come in as follows:-

| Date | Flour | Rice | Dates | Ghee | Salt | Remarks |
|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|-------|--------------|
| - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 25-4-14 | - | - | 58,800 | 24,408 | 7,800 | - |
| 25-4-14 | 21,960 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 29-4-14 | - | 153,580 | - | - | - | Local supply |

| Date | Flour | Rice | Dates | Ghee | Salt | Remarks |
|---------|--------|--------|--------|------|------|--------------|
| 11-5-14 | 56,580 | - | - | - | - | Local Supply |
| 17-5-14 | - | 70,560 | 58,400 | - | - | - |

The first difficulty was to get them brought round from Kisumu to Gobwen. There are two methods of doing this

- (I) by small steamers the "Sajuna" and "Victor Emmanuel" which can cross the bar and come right up to Gobwen
 (II) by hired camels, which is very slow, as only 40 to 50 are available daily.

The first method is quick, but unreliable as the steamers can only cross the bar at certain times, which generally do not correspond with the times at which stores are required to be brought round.

The second difficulty experienced was in the storage of the rations. This difficulty arose from there being a much larger quantity of rations than usual, owing to preparations having been made for a much larger force at and beyond Serenli.

The storage accommodation was as follows:-

- (1) The Customs Godown on the river bank.
- (2) The Serenli store, a makuti building in the lines.
- (3) The corn store, an excellent stone building but too far away from the river to be used for stores required to be sent up to Serenli by boat.
- (4) A portion of the camel Corps store.

The question of storage accommodation close to the place of loading the barges is an important one. In a normal year, I have no doubt, that the Customs godown would accommodate all or nearly all the stores, but this is open to objection for the following:-

- (1) The Customs authorities might at any time object and require the godown for their own use.
- (2) The key remains in the possession of the customs authorities, although the Officer in charge Base Supply Depot is res-

possible for any deficiencies.

I would suggest either that a Military godown be erected on a suitable site on the river bank, or that a trolley line be laid down from the lines to the Customs yard or failing this that two or three strong but light carts suitable for man handling be kept at present only some cumbersome country made bullock carts (borrowed from the Civil authorities) are available, and the difficulties of moving stores with these through the heavy sand have been enormous, although fatigue parties of the 4th M.A.S. were available up to the 14th of May 1914.

The question of local labour is a very difficult one. The work requiring coolie labour comes in rushes e.g. when large quantities of stores come in by the small steamers from Siemayu or when the barges have to be landed. The ideal system to cope with this is a few permanent coolies which are necessary for the many odd jobs to be done in a supply Depot, and a large number of temporary coolies taken on when the rushes come. This system cannot be adopted owing to the practical impossibility of obtaining temporary labour. The only form of temporary labour is the employment of customs hamalis, who work for a certain price per bag shifted. This rate is a high one (1/8 cents per bag) and then only includes either removing bags etc. from the customs and carrying them to the side of the lighter or taking them from the side of the lighter and stacking in the customs. Any thing outside that the hamalis fix their own price for, which they make prohibitive. As regards stacking in the lighters or unloading from the lighters the few permanent coolies are sufficient, but when the necessity of moving stores from the lines, arises the hamali system at once breaks down, hence my suggestion for some means

of road transport. A scheme for a trolley system, I believe, was started this year, but came to nothing. It might be possible, however, to obtain rails and trolleys from the civil authorities, as these appear to be unused.

A statement of local labour employ up to 31st May 1914 is attached as appendix "B".

Great difficulties have been experienced owing to there being no tarpaulins for the protection of stores from rain. This made some losses unavoidable, as during the loading or unloading of large quantities of stores it was impossible to avoid being caught some times. On one occasion 85 tons of crushed maize arrived from Malwaled in a lighter and had to be left in a pouring rain with no other protection than the hatches which allowed the water to leak in with the result that over a ton was completely spoiled and had to be written off.

In loading the barges for Serenli great difficulty was experienced also, as the tarpaulins belonging to the Navigation Coy. had apparently been left at Serenli and make shifts had to be utilised such as straw mats freely coated with tar. Twenty tarpaulins had been asked for from India, but these only arrived during the third week in May. They have now been employed for covering the lighters.

The establishment asked for from India (two Staff Sergeants and three Clerks) also arrived in the third week in May. Until their arrival, it was impossible to carry out the work really systematically on Indian lines, especially as regards Office work, since some times for a week or 10 days or more both myself and the one Clerk left to me were employed from dawn till after dark superintending work outside. Since the arrival of the Non-Commissioned Officers and Clerks it has been possible to straighten every thing up and

get the Depot working systematically as far as the want of proper and sufficient storage room will allow. In my opinion, it is absolutely essential that a permanent European Non-Commissioned Officer should be allotted to Gobwen as a Storekeeper.

(b) Local Supplies and Contractors

The following supplies were contracted for locally:-

| | | | |
|--------------|---|---|--|
| Mahindi | 50 tons | } | from the Juba River Syndicate Ltd. |
| <u>Flour</u> | | | |
| Matama | 35 tons | } | since reduced to 30 tons Mahindi and 17½ ton Matama. |
| <u>Mais</u> | Quantity unknown, but 89 tons were taken on my books after crushing. See appendix "A" | | |

In addition to this, as Nairobi has so far only supplied 5 tons of Matama grain out of the total quantity asked for, it became necessary on the arrival of the Soudanese riding camels, to try and arrange for some locally. This was done on the order of the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication as he did not consider Mahindi grain suitable food. It is difficult to obtain any Matama grain ~~available~~ at this time of year, but arrangements have been made with Mr. A. Rayne to procure as much as possible and he has already delivered 3 tons 1847 pounds.

A list of local contractors and supplies likely to be made by them is appended as appendix "C".

(c) The forms of local transport have already been mentioned under (a).

The following is the detail of the prices paid from Kisumu to Gobwen:-

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---------|-----------|
| S.S. "Victor Emmanuel"..... | Rs. 7/- | per ton |
| Launch "Sisalima"..... | Rs. 7/- | do- |
| Camels..... | Rs. 1/- | per Camel |

This ~~did~~ not include loading, but included haulage out to the boat which could not come close to the shore.

In addition I ~~had~~ arranged with the "Victor Emmanuel" to take stores straight from the ships and bring them round to Gobwen at Rs.6/- per ton, but in the meanwhile an agreement was made by the then Officer Commanding Lines of Communication with the English Navigation & Trading Co., Ltd. to bring stores round at Rs.6/- per ton.

(d) ROADS.

The only road which concerns the Base Supply Depot is that from Aizway to Gobwen, a distance of nine miles. The whole of it except the last mile and a half being heavy sand the road at present is suitable only for transport.

(e) HARBOUR AND WATERWAYS.

Aizway Harbour is somewhat difficult of approach but good once when entered. During the present Monsoon however, stores cannot be landed at the customs house, but only at the pier about half a mile away. In order to meet the difficulty of storage during ^{this} monsoon a new customs godown had been erected opposite the pier, but the first time that this was used the floor fell in and a large quantity of Military stores had to be left outside, fortunately without any damage occurring.

The carriage of stores from Gobwen to Sereali is carried ~~out~~ ordinarily by river, during the flood season (which varies, but may be said to extend from the middle of May to the middle of October) as this is the only time that the river is navigable by the river steamers and lighters.

This year owing to the increased garrison at Sereali and the late arrival of the flood it has been found

necessary to send up two camel convoys of Indian camels, the first one taking two month's rations and the second one month's rations for African troops and its own personnel.

One steamer with two lighters left on 3rd. June 1914 carrying about 60 tons of rations and miscellaneous articles, but as the flood has not yet come down it is doubtful when it will reach Serenli. The second steamer with two lighters carrying about 70 tons left on 6th June 1914.

Sd/- A.S. Coffin Lieut.

Officer-in-Charge Base Supply Depot.

Appendix "A"

Statement showing stores purchased locally, method of packing prices paid and names of Supplies.

| Articles Purchased | Quantity purchased | Price paid | Method of packing stores | Names of Supplies | Remarks. |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|---------------------------|---|
| Maize | Not known | Not known | Gunny bags 160 lbs nett | Not known | 27,360 lbs. crushed Maize taken over by me in bags of 160 lb nett |
| Mahindi flour | 67,580 lbs. | Rs. 100/08 per ton | Flour packed in drill bags, 120 lbs. nett and these put into canvas bags, bags supplied by Government. | Juba River Syndicate Ltd. | |
| Mutama flour | 11,160 lbs. | Rs. 122/02 per ton | | | |

Sd/- A. S. Coffin Lieut.
Officer-in-Charge Base Supply Depot.

Appendix "B"

Statement of local labour employed in the Base Supply Depot,
up to and for 31st May 1914.

| Number | Nature of work | Rate of pay Per cts. | Per | Remarks |
|--------------|---|----------------------------|--------------|--|
| 6 | March, April and May, 1914 Miscellaneous loading & unloading | N11 N11 Rs. 14-00 | month | 5 engaged on 14th May 1914 17th -40- |
| 5 for 2 days | Miscellaneous | 1-00 | per day | 1 -40- 10th -40- |
| | Loading & unloading bags | Rs. 0-05 | for 5 Bag | The hamalis were paid 90 cents extra for restacking some bags which had fallen down. |
| | Loading 610 bags | 0-08 | | Bags were carried for loading on camels, those from inside the customs at 5 cents & those outside at 8 cents |
| | Loading 389 bags | | | |

By A. S. Coffin Lieut.

Officer-in-Charge Base Supply Depot.

Oil four-in-one same rubber Dabog.
 2014 A.P. 2014 in 1914.

| | | | | | |
|---|--|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| <p>transmission handles rollers</p> | <p>..... 2000 2000</p> | <p>loading 888 parts loading 810 parts</p> | <p>" 0-08 " 0-08</p> | <p>" "</p> | <p>those outside of 2 cents since from inside the containers up 2 cents & parts were carried for loading on carriers transporting some parts after the 1914 the handles were held 30 cents extra for</p> |
| <p>transmission rollers</p> | <p>2 for 800/8</p> | <p>miscellaneous loading & unloading miscellaneous</p> | <p>" 1-00 " 1-00</p> | <p>per day per day</p> | <p>1 -do- 1914 -do- 2 -do- 1914 -do- 2 -do- 1914 -do-</p> |
| <p>transmission rollers</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>loading 888 parts loading 810 parts</p> | <p>" 0-08 " 0-08</p> | <p>" "</p> | <p>those outside of 2 cents since from inside the containers up 2 cents & parts were carried for loading on carriers transporting some parts after the 1914 the handles were held 30 cents extra for</p> |

Statement of forest labor employed in the same rubber Dabog.

to be sent for 1914

Appendix 27

The Supply arrangements existing in Northern Jubaland.

ADMINISTRATION.

Supply control, in the broad meaning of the term, is vested in the Adjutant, C.M. Battalion, R.A.S. at Nairobi, who, under the orders of the Officer Commanding Troops, East Africa Protectorate, determines the amount of the reserves of supplies, clothing and equipment to be maintained at the base which is at Serenli, and arranges annually to complete these reserves. He deals with questions affecting permanent variations in scales of rations and other issues, and keeps the Officer Commanding Troops, East Africa Protectorate, advised on all matters concerning supplies in the Province. In his capacity as Staff Officer he moves the O.C. Troops, E.A.P. to approach Government on occasions when the intervention of the latter is necessary. He is generally answerable for the adequacy of the supply arrangements, but not for the efficiency of the service, the responsibility for which rests with the Officer Commanding Troops, Jubaland.

The Adjutant at Nairobi is associated in these duties with the Staff Officer at Sobwen to whom may be delegated the responsibility of arranging for such supplies as can be procured by local purchase in Southern Jubaland. The Staff Officer at Sobwen is also agent for Government and private consignment coming into the Province, and has to arrange for their receipt after clearance through customs, and for the custody and distribution. All arrangements relating to the

service of the chartered river steamer are in the
officer's hands. He may also issue subsidiary instruc-
tions to the Base Supply Officer at Serenli.

Supplies for the province are acquired mainly
through three channels, and estimates are sanctioned
annually in May.

(I) That the Crown Agent Clothing and Equipment
and certain petty supplies are obtained under a system
of annual Home Dept. contracts. The basis of
the submission of all orders is the estimate of Serenli.

(II) By contract at Nairobi. The Director forwards
his estimate for food-stuffs to the Secretary, Central
Tender Board at Nairobi. This latter invites tenders
for the same. The approval of samples is usually
rests with the Board, and urban orders are made
between the President of the Board, for and behalf of
Government, and contractor. The Board since 1938 has
been to have invited all tenders and to accept or reject
tenders work has been the duty of the Board of the
Director, who has invited tenders and
to give of samples and of those which are
of acceptance or rejection of orders.

Casual and supplementary purchases may be made
through the Director of Government Transport at Mombasa.

(III) By local purchase in Jubaland. The Staff
Officer, Jobern, is empowered from time to time to
arrange for supplies locally procurable either by
requisition or by direct purchase or by contract
with settlers.

The Serenli Depot.

The Base Supply Officer at Serenli is, in theory
responsible for the receipt, inspection, custody and
distribution of all consignments arriving at his Depot.

for the arrangement of his depot so as to facilitate rapid intake and stock-taking; for rationing troops, followers and animals at Seranli; for issuing rations in bulk to columns on patrol, to out-posts, and to signalling stations; for obtaining meat and such other supplies - as fuel for river steamers - as can be procured at or in the vicinity of Seranli; for all issues of clothing, equipment and petty supplies; and, for the preparation of the several records, registers and returns, the up-keep of day-books and ledgers, the checking and filing of vouchers, and the general clerical duties imposed on him by his office.

But in practise the duties of the Base Supply Officer have not been limited to those enumerated above. For instance he has charge of arms and ammunition, and deals with all correspondence and documents pertaining thereto (re-arming has taken place during his tenure of appointment). He maintains an inventory of Govt. furniture for which he is responsible, and he looks after all house-building materials. For not more than a year the postal arrangements for Northern Sabahland were under his management, and he still maintains the stock of postage stamps. For ten months he was in charge of a canteen. The tailor's, bootmaker's and carpenter's shop, and the armourer Sergeant's department though administered by the B.C. troops, Sabahland, exist mainly for services which are under the control of the Base Supply Officer, and the Base Supply Officer, as chief customer, has a large voice in their management. He is agent at Seranli for all private consignments, and acts as Storkespar for Officers on patrol. He is in charge of the river gauge.

The Officer who has borne the whole burden of this work on his shoulders during the past 12 months, without any kind of assistance - without even the services of a single trained subordinate or menial - is Lieut. S.J. Lovegrove. This Officer, himself untaught in work which is highly technical, has none the less contrived to unite and exert in his own person functions so widely divergent as those of an Executive Supply Officer and weighman and embracing those of a Quartermaster, vic-chilling sergeant, storekeeper, purchasing agent, Clerk, tallyman and, for the ten months during which he had the canteen, retailvender and barman. During the past year 180 tons of rations alone have passed through his hands. The strength of the troops, which in May 1918 stood at four hundred, has been steadily increasing until it has reached a thousand. It is not easy to convey an accurate impression of the mass of work that has been done with by Lt. Lovegrove, labouring often under the disadvantages of a trying climate and indifferant nourishment, and under circumstances of speed and crowding, which might well have paralysed the faculties of a trained expert. Yet the work seems to have been admirably performed, and Lt. Lovegrove's books, which have been placed at my disposal, are models of neatness, method and precision. I trust I shall not be wandering from the scope of this report if I venture to say that the manner in which these very arduous duties have been performed calls for high praise.

The Annual Requisition.

This has to be submitted by the Base Supply Officer at Sereni in time to reach the Adjutant at Nairobi on the 1st. October. Company Commanders requisition, in the first place, on the Base Supply Officer for articles of clothing

and equipment required for their men. The Base Supply Officer then compiles a garrison requisition, and allows a percentage as spare to cover payment issues in excess of authorized scale. The year's requirements of stationery, repairing materials and all manner of petty supplies are embodied in this requisition, which includes a variety of items, dealt with in other countries by the Ordnance and Public or Military departments, together with such as purchase to the music stock in trade of a carpenter, armorer, bootmaker and tailor. The latter portions of the requisition are based on those of the past year.

This requisition is counterchecked by the Officer Commanding troops, Jubaland, and submitted through the Staff Officer at Soboway, who authorizes it.

The Serenli records show what delay sometimes occurs in the preparation and submission of the annual requisition making it impossible for the Adjutant at Nairobi to be in time with his issue of the Form 100 Agent.

No articles of ration supply are included in the annual requisition, and the Base Supply Officer has no voice in the arrangements for the replenishment of his stocks of ration articles, the whole responsibility for which rests with the Adjutant at Nairobi. The latter keeps in touch with the Serenli Supply Depot through the medium of a monthly ration account. This return is rendered monthly by the Base Supply Officer, and enables the Adjutant to watch the Serenli reserves.

This procedure differs from that laid down for the provision of grain rations for camels of the Jubaland Camel Corps Coy. In this case the Company Commander requisitions direct on the Staff Officer, Soboway, for his requirements, and is held responsible

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that the cost of camel subsistence does not exceed a sum sanctioned annually in the Colonial Estimates.

Despatch of Stores to Serenli.

The water-way provided by the River Juba, which is generally navigable from June to October, is almost exclusively used for the despatch of stores to Serenli. For this purpose a contract is made annually by the Staff Officer, H.M.S., with the English Navigation & T. Coy., Ltd. whereby the Company agrees to charter to the Military authorities one steamer and two barges. Under the terms of the agreement the duration of the charter is for six months, and payment of a fixed sum is made in monthly instalments, the contract being terminable before the expiry in the event of the river becoming unnavigable, in which case rebate by the Coy. is provided for at a fixed daily rate for each day short of the whole period; this payment is inclusive of all working expenses of craft except fuel which has to be supplied by the military authorities; the storage capacity of the barges is guaranteed; cargo is carried at Govt. risk; the military authorities undertake all clerical labour in connection with the loading and unloading of cargo. Some other points are covered by the terms of the agreement which concludes by providing for arbitration by Captain Salvat in case of dispute. Capt. Salvat arbitrates in his private capacity, and not as Provincial Commissioner, Jubaland. No undertaking apparently is given by the company either as to the duration of a voyage or as to the number of voyages which can be guaranteed in a season on the basis of a given period of navigability. Repeated delays and break-downs seem to be the rule, and the question as to

whether stores consigned to Serenli will reach their destination before the river falls again annually and is always a cause of anxiety. It follows that any extra expense incurred by providing transport in supplement of the chartered river steamer is borne by the military authorities although the necessity of the provision of such supplementary transport may have had its origin in causes outside military control, such as the inefficient working of the chartered river steamer service or the unservicability of the craft. The conditions of the agreement do, it is true, cover total disablement of craft but these remarks apply to delays consequent on temporary disablement, which in their accumulation may make the difference of a voyage.

This year's contract has been concluded at Nairobi, and has not been seen up to the time of making this report. It is understood that special provisions have been concluded in view of the late situation in northern Uganda.

All stores required for Serenli are shipped usually from Mombasa by the Director of Govt. Transport, E. S. A., so as to reach Kisumu before the end of June, and they are consigned to the Base Supply Officer, Serenli, care of the Staff Officer, Gobwen, Bills of lading, Way-bills and pass notes are sent to the Staff Officer, Gobwen. Ships discharge into dhows at Kisumu and in agent is responsible for the landing of stores and for their conveyance to the customs house, the Staff Officer (or Transport Officer), Gobwen, hands the bill of lading to this agent, and receives a delivery order in exchange. He then proceeds to the customs where he takes over his stores on presentation of the delivery order and pass note. Numbers and description of packages are checked against items enumerated on the Way-bill, deficiencies being noted by him on the Way-bill and by the customs Officer on the pass note. The Agent's

charges for landing the stores are checked with the Way-bill.

Any subsequent handling of the stores at Kisumu is by African soldiers, supplemented by convicts if necessary, to save cost of hire of customs house porters.

The onward transmission by road of the stores to Gobwen is by camel transport, which always has to be hired for the purpose. Fresh

Way-bill is made out by the despatch officer in duplicate, which is sent with the consignment and affords check at Gobwen. Payment to the camel company is made on the "chit" system.

All consignments are accounted for at Gobwen in a store ledger, each entry corresponding with the checked Mombasa way bill. Drawn requisites to the Base Supply Officer Serenli, are also accounted for at Gobwen in this ledger.

The Station Officer, Gobwen, who is responsible, subject to the terms of the contract, for the date of sailing of the river steamer and the cargo to be carried, is kept informed by the Base Supply Officer, Serenli, of the order of priority in which stores are to be sent up. But this order of despatch does not tally with the order of receipt of consignments from Mombasa. He therefore has to prepare another Way-bill for each river steamer. This Way-bill is sent to Serenli, together with a shipping note, the Mombasa way bill and, for such articles as have their source of issue in a Quartermaster's Store, an issue Voucher. A list of stores awaiting shipment at Gobwen is also forwarded with each river steamer. The Base Supply Officer

Serenli, checks consignments on their arrival with the Gobwen way-bill. The completion of Mombasa way-bills and Nairobi issue Vouchers is held back indefinitely

The river steamer discharges her cargo at Serenli as rapidly as possible, as every delay tends to the curtailment of her programme. A Board, of which the Base Supply Officer is a member, assembles to take over packages, but in practice the Base Supply Officer, as Officer ultimately responsible for store accounting, does all the weighing in, checking and inspection himself, working from sun-rise to sun-set and during hours of darkness. Stones are brought on to the Serenli Letters by actual weights. Receipts for numbers of packages are endorsed on the shipping note and Gobwen way-bill. As has already been noted the completion of the Mombasa way-bill and Nairobi issue voucher is postponed indefinitely.

The system under which the Mombasa way-bill is sent for completion to Serenli is obviously unwieldy under the circumstances, and it is understood that this procedure has recently been revised, and that the Mombasa way-bill is now receipted at Gobwen. On the other hand a way-bill can only be completed by the consignee who, under existing arrangements is the Base Supply Officer, Serenli. The proper procedure is for the Staff Officer, Gobwen, to return to the consignor at Mombasa the Mombasa way-bill duly receipted by the consignor at Serenli. The Alternative is for stores to be consigned from Mombasa to the Staff Officer, Gobwen as consignee, the onward despatches to Serenli being treated as separate transactions

When stores are shipped by a river steamer, other than that chartered for Government, the civil regulations require the signature, by the A.B.C. or Customs Officer/Gobwen of the forwarding way-bill.

Storage Accommodation.

The following godowns have been erected at Serenli during the past eighteen months, by P. Lovegrove with such labour as could be made available in the shape of fatigue parties provided by troops.

1. A Tin store with earthen floor (storage capacity 35 x 15 x 8 ft.) used as a wholesale godown for intact bales and packages.
2. A godown (12 x 12 x 8 ft.) built of stone throughout with stone roof and floor, used as a retail store for clothing, equipment and petty supplies.
3. A godown of similar construction and dimensions to the preceding, which it adjoins, and used as an Officer's store.
4. A godown (40 x 20 x 10 ft.) with stone walls and floor, and with roof of corrugated iron, used as a ration store.

All the above with the exception of 1, are on raised floor.

There is also an armoury and magazine.

Issues of Rations.

The normal Serenli weekly scale for fighting men is:-

| | | | |
|-------|--------|------|---------|
| Rice | 8 lbs. | Case | 12 lbs. |
| Flour | 9 " | Salt | 3 " |
| Dates | 3 " | Meat | 4 lbs. |

The scales for followers vary considerably and are complicated and difficult to follow. Certain authorised followers draw rations on the above scale. Others such as Donkey boys and the Hospital sweepers, do not receive dates and meat. Camel transport personnel receive the Serenli scale of rice, flour and salt with one pound of meat daily but only draw their week's rations of dates and meat once in a month.

Three and half pounds beans was authorised weekly for

fighting men during part of 1918 in addition to the Serenli goals.

Extra meat is given when dates are not available. Game is not taken on patrol.

The scale of rations is laid down by the Officer Commanding Troops, E.A.F. in the first instance but is liable to change and reduction, as issues must depend on sufficiency of stocks which are not usually replenished if running short. It follows that the soldier does not always get what is considered best for his diet. The stocks will not be replenished.

Rations are not a free issue. A fixed amount of Rs. 5/85 a month is out from the pay of the soldier enlisted under the existing Ordinance. The reduction of the amount retrenched to correspond with a reduction of the ration does not seem to have been legislated for and is not intended.

Issues of grain to cavalry and camel Corps are made by special arrangements. The Pass Supply Officer has a special account for these issues.

The Pass Supply Officer ordinarily issues rations once a week. Special issues are made as required to details arriving at or leaving Serenli. All issues are made on the attached form of "Ration Certificate", which has to be prepared by the indenting Officer. These issues are then entered up in the Day Book. The number of days for which rations are issued is entered against each transaction in the column of Remarks of the Day Book, and affords check for future demands. Variations in strength of troops can be verified by reference to Garrison Orders. Both these forms are the design of Lt. Lovegrove.

Day Book entries are totalled weekly and transferred to the ration Ledger. Bulk issues to out-posts and columns are made direct from the Ledger.

In the case of all bulk issues for consumption outside Bareilly, rice and flour is re-bagged in 100 lb. sacks, and dates are re-packed in baskets, of which a stock of 100 mms is supplied annually for the purpose to the depot. These baskets are also purchasable locally.

Meat Supply.

The Base Supply Officer purchases from time to time as necessary. Suezka A.M.S. takes up contracts.

The price of goats is Rs. 2/50 each, rising in April and May only, to Rs. 4/- and Rs. 5/50.

Reserves vary from 10 to 100 goats and sheep, cattle being purchased as opportunities offers.

Recently herdsmen have been sanctioned for the care of captured stock.

Clothing & Equipment.

This is Quartermaster's work. Renewals are authorized on the basis of a minimum "life" provided for under the N.A.S. Regulations and Battalion Standing Orders. Issues over and above scale may only be made on payment.

Such issues are made by the Base Supply Officer on supply orders signed by Coy. Commanders, who are answerable for the correctness of their demands, and who account for transactions in their own ledgers. It needs must the responsibility for the Base Supply Officer in respect to articles of clothing and equipment really exists and goes with their sale outlets and preservation during storage, until purchase or consumption demands are exhausted the state of his resources.

Replacements for issue by troops are made locally by the Base Supply Officer, their "life" is two months.

Losses and Condemnations.

These are dealt with by a quarterly report for all articles in store whether of ration supply or of clothing and equipment. The Board's recommendations are endorsed.

by the Officer Commanding Troops, Jubaland, and a copy of the proceedings is forwarded to headquarters at Nairobi for disposal.

Losses and food supplies are chiefly dryage on dates and wastage on flour. Deterioration is almost wholly attributable to weevils. Mould, rain and flour seem chiefly liable to the attack of this pest which is found on all grain and flour stocks.

When surveying food supplies the board often has to consider the difficulty of replacement, and restriction thus imposed on their decision may result in the retention, for issue to the African soldier, of inferior stocks not really good for human consumption.

An allowance one per cent was formerly allowed on all ration supplies to cover losses. This allowance was increased to fifteen per cent 1 1918.

Account.

In the absence of information concerning finance procedure at Nairobi no attempt is made to deal with this branch of the subject.

Sd/- G.M. Hogg Captain

Officer Commanding Maresan Force.

Slh. No. 2/1/14

Date 1. 2. 14.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

Aden Shaba head chief of the Rer Libin Gureh has made an agreement with the Merehan that they should enter his country with their cattle if attacked by Government.

The Merehan have obtained a considerable amount of ammunition from the Tigre lately

Owing to recent raids by the Merehan on the Bahanwein it is not likely that the former will obtain any help from tribes on the Italian side of the river.

The Merehan intend to drive their stock across the river Daba if not pressed by Government

The Mohamed Zubeir will not join the Merehan as they are afraid of Talamga raids on their Kerias.

The Rer Afgab Aulihan will refuse to join the Merehan on any terms. They recently offered to help Government at Wajheir when the Mohamed Zubeir refused to obey orders issued by the political officer there.

Sheik Abdur-er-Rahman Mureah keeps the Merehan informed of Govt. movements through the medium of the Rer Aliwa Aulihan.

The Merehan do not possess more than an average of 15 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Many men have only 5 or 10 rounds each.

The Abokr Jibrahil Aulihan chiefs (Rers Ali, Arwa and Karsim) are trying to keep the Bal Ghog (young warriors) under control. They will probably be successful as all their herds must water at the river for the next two months.

The Merehan have decided to hide their stock around Goglo to the N of Bahanwein and near the river Daba.

The Abokr Jibrahil Aulihan (Rers Ali, Arwa and Karsim) will not join the Merehan. A few of their young men may do so when the rains start

Date 1. 3. 14

Intelligence

Precis of Information

The Farah Ogas and the Bone Merhan have definitely decided not to fight against Govt. but they are helping the hostile Sections with information. Some of their young men have joined the Fer Tulha.

The Fer Tulha and Fer Hassan are sitting on the Garrebaharre road. They number not less than 150 riflemen and 450 spearsmen. They are full of confidence and have quite decided to dispute any attempt by troops to reach Garrebaharre. Deinleh is still the head-quarters.

The supposed E03 rifles in the possession of the Merhan are, in reality, by the name Russian rifles of 275 bore. They are known to the Somali of Shermut. They do not possess many of these rifles.

Serenleh

Jubaland.

1 . 2 . 14.

To

The Officer Commanding
King's African Rifles
Jubaland.

Intelligence Report.

Tribe Bahalla Ogaden
Sub-tribe Mohamed Zubeir

Sir,

I have the honour to address you on the subject of the political situation in Jubaland as far as the Mohamed Zubeir Ogaden are concerned.

2. As you are aware, in dealing with my question relating to the Somali, it is necessary to go into details which, though tedious in themselves, yet must contribute largely to the making of the various political crises which arise from time to time in all parts of Somaliland. I refer especially to the tribal division and customs of the Somali for these are two great factors which make for the peace or otherwise of any country inhabited by a nomadic, fanatical and conservative people such as the Somali undoubtedly are.
3. I propose to confine this report to the present state of conditions appertaining to the Mohamed Zubeir Bahalla Ogaden.
4. For political reasons, it is necessary to understand clearly that the Ogaden Somali tribe is split up in Jubaland into two great sub-tribes namely- the Bahalla and Talamuga, for the past history of these two sub-tribes is one of constant inter-tribal warfare and this has created, owing to the many blood feuds, a situation which makes it highly improbable that these two sub-tribes could ever overcome the obstacles at present standing in the way of a combination between them for the purpose

purpose of fighting against the Government.

5. The Bahalla Ogaden consist of the Mohamed Zubeir, Aulihan and Rer Habr Suliman while the Talamuga is composed of the Rer Abdullah, Abud Wak and Rer Mohamed. Roughly defined the former inhabit that part of Jubaland to the right of the line drawn from Yonti to the Lorian Swamp while the Talamuga occupy the country to the left of this line as far as the Tana River.

It is true that the Talamuga helped the Bahalla in their rebellion to the extent of sending 500 warriors (mostly Abud Wak) to join the Bahalla force. These men bore the brunt of the fighting which occurred at Samasa and their casualties were severe. This caused friction between the tribes and this friction has gradually spread and intensified until they are now in a state of constant intertribe warfare.

Such warfare increases enormously the difficulties in the way of an agreement between them in the future for it raises up scores of blood-feuds which can only be settled by long and tedious litigious conversations between the chiefs of the tribes.

6. From a military point of view therefore the situation is somewhat simplified for it is certain that no action on the part of one of these two sub-tribes against the Government would have the support of the other.

7. It will now be understood that in dealing with any section of the Bahalla, it is quite necessary to take into account the probability of any co-operation between them and the Talamuga Sections.

8. The Mohamed Zubeir (paramount chief Ahmed Magan) are at present in the Deshek Wama, Afmadu (in small numbers only) Wajheir and Lorian Districts (large numbers). To understand clearly the prevailing political state of this Section it is necessary to refer to its history for the past two years.

The prevailing warfare between the Mohamed Zubeir and the Abud Wak was primarily caused by the murder of a Wurdeh attached to the Mohamed Zubeir and the stealing of his rifle.

The Abud Wak refused to pay "dia" (blood money) or to return the rifle. In consequence the Mohamed Zubeir Bobto (young warriors) raided a keria of Abud Wak and killed 25 men, women and children. After this the Abud Wak retired to the Tana river. The Mohamed Zubeir again raided down to the Lorian in January 1918 but were unsuccessful in finding any Abud Wak. In December 1918 the Mohamed Zubeir Bobto to the reported strength of 400 riflemen raided down to the Lorian and were successful in killing 100 of the Abud Wak (Somali reports only).

9. In ordinary circumstances there is no doubt that the combine at present in existence between the Bahalla Sections would come into operation at once if Government attacked the Aulihan but, at present, there is little likelihood of its materialisation for the Mohamed Zubeir reported to have already informed the Aulihan that they were not prepared to join with them against the Government owing to the extreme probability of an attack on their kerias by Talamuga directly the latter become aware of any serious friction between their present enemies and Government. There is, in my opinion, no doubt that the Talamuga would raid the Mohamed Zubeir Sections at Afmadu and Deshek Wama immediately they received information of a state of war in existence between Government and the Bahalla.
10. I am unable, at present, to estimate the total number of fighting men the Mohamed Zubeir could place in the field or the number of rifles they possess but there is no doubt that it would exceed 300 riflemen and the same number of spearsmen. During 1910 the strength of the tribe was much increased by the addition of large numbers of the Rer Mahamud Istas and War Dama (both Masayih tribes). Both these sections crossed the river in that year and I met several of their men during a safari to Sangal in 1912 when they all called themselves Mohamed Zubeir.
11. During my recent safari to this District I was informed that 200 riflemen and 300 spearsmen of the Mohamed Zubeir had passed west of Afmadu with the intention of attacking the Abdullah Talamuga.

Talamuga living at the Wama Kidu Lakes in Biskaya.

- 12. It is therefore, certain that the Mohamed Zubeir will refuse to entertain the application of the Merchan for assistance and it is very unlikely that any Aulihan action against Government would be supported by them.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Ed. F. Elliot.

Intelligence Officer.

Table to illustrate the descent
of the Mohamed Zubeir
Bahalla Ogaden

Ogaden

Magharbul Ogaden

Miyra Ogaden

Mohamed Zubeir

Mohamed Sultan

Mohamed Zubeir (Sultan's brother Ahmed Maghar)

1. 5. 14.

The O.C. Troops

Serenleh.

With reference to my recent safari through the Mohamed Zubeir and Aulihan country I have to report as follows :-

2. The secret treaty made between the Aulihan and Mohamed Zubeir tribes of the Ogaden in September of 1913 to combine against the Government if any attempt is made to disarm them is still in existence but it is highly improbable that any application from the Aulihan for assistance at the present time would meet with any success owing to the fact that the Mohamed Zubeir are engaged in fighting the Talamuga Ogaden near the Lorian.
3. The result of my inquiries in the Mohamed Zubeir country all combine to show that there is no likelihood of this Tribe acceding to the Merohan request for assistance against the Government.
4. As a result of my safari through the Aulihan country I find that half this Tribe show obvious signs of disloyalty and that this feeling may spread to open rebellion on the advent of the rains unless something is done to check it. This opinion is corroborated by the various reports on the attitude of the Aulihan towards Government issued by the Military Authorities at Serenli during 1915.
5. My investigations into the political state of the Aulihan show that the undercurrent of feeling against the Government on the part of a few chiefs and many of the Bobto (young fighting men) is sufficiently serious to justify my submitting to you my apprehension of opinion that another set-back such as the one received by the ~~Colonel~~ Captain Stonor will certainly cause some of the Aulihan Bobto to join the Merohan and may lead to some interference of the lines of communication by the Ker Ali and Ker Arwa Aulihan after the commencement of the heavy rains.

(sd) P. Elliot,
Intelligence Officer.

Serenleh

2. 2. 14.

To

The Officer Commanding
The K.A. Rifles
Serenleh.

Sir,

I have the honour to address you on the subject of the A Aulihan and their present relations with the other Ogaden sub-tribes and the Merehan Somali.

2. In order that the present state of affairs may be understood it is necessary to refer back to the past history of this sub-tribe.

The Aulihan, unlike the Mohamed Zubeir, have never had an opportunity of judging the benefits to be derived from English Administration nor have they, with the exception of a few of the chiefs, any idea of the amount of pressure which could be brought to bear on them by Government.

This is caused by the fact that they have inhabited the Districts remote from Kismayu such as Bhoji and Serenleh and, until lately, no real attempt has been made to bring them under any system of Administration.

3. During the rebellions of 1897, 1899 and 1901 the Aulihan joined with the other Bahalla sub-tribes but the disadvantages attached to such rebellions i.e. the raiding of their cattle and the burning of their villages by troops, were not felt by them. This was owing to the fact that all the fighting took place in Mohamed Zubeir country. The responsible chiefs there therefore find it difficult to persuade their young Boko (fighting men) that there are any great disadvantages attached to the somewhat defiant attitude which they sometimes adopt towards Govt.

4. The relations between the Aulihan and the other Bahalia Ogaden sub-tribes are very friendly.

As I have already shown in my report No. 1/1/14 dated the 1.2.14 on the Mohamed Zubeir a defensive alliance has been contracted between them but this alliance would not become effective against Government at present owing to the state of war existing between the Mohamed Zubeir and the Talamuga.

5. The Aulihan and Talamuga Ogaden are, on the whole, friendly towards each other. This is due to the fact that the Aulihan, Talamuga and the Abdullah Talamuga have few opportunities of raiding Aulihan stock owing to the distance which separates them from each other.

6. The existing relations between the Aulihan and the Merehan requires some careful consideration for, though they appear to amount to open hostility, they are in reality somewhat friendly during the fighting between the Aulihan and the Merehan the Merehan gave great offence to the Aulihan. The Merehan helped the Mohamed Zubeir, in addition to the Merehan sheltered and helped Ahmed Mogan, the chief of the Mohamed Zubeir, on the occasion of his visit to solicit aid against the Aulihan.

8. Another and greater cause of offence was the murder by the Merehan of Hassan Warfur, a strong and popular Aulihan chief. This man was one of Mr. Jenner's murderers and he was murdered by young Merehan Bobto during a visit to the latter tribe's country. Sheik Abdur-el-Rathman Mursal took strong action in the matter and persuaded a prominent Sheik on the Italian side to declare the murderers excommunicate from Islam. After such delay the Merehan paid "diya" to the extent of 200 camels.
9. Since the above murder the Merehan have, on several occasions, raided Aulihan stock and have refused the various applications of Sheik Abdur-el-Rathman to make any compensation.

10. Towards the end of last year the Abokr Jibrahil ceased from Abdul-el-Rathman Mursal and made secret arrangement with the ~~Mur~~ Merehan to live in peace and forego all claims for past raids. As this Section is, by far, the strongest of all Aulihan Sections living around Serenish it will be seen that the supposed friction between the Aulihan and Merehan is confined to the Rer Afgab and the Rer Wafata who remain faithful to Sheik Abdur-el-Rathman while the Abokr Jibrahil (Rers, Ali, Karsim and Afwa) are disposed to denounce him and establish friendly relations with the Merehan.
11. Fortunately the Rers Ali and Karsim have lately decided that their arrangement with the Merehan does not include the taking of any action against Government in aid of the latter but the Rer Afwa have decided to help them with information and men.
12. At your request an offer has been made to the Aulihan as a whole to supply a certain number of fighting men to assist Government in the capture of stock. At a Baraza held at Melka Adi the chiefs of Rers Ali, Karsim and Afgab decided to accept the offer but the Rer Afwa refused.
13. It will be understood that the use of Aulihan by Government will entail, not only the systematic capture of Merehan stock, but will also force them to definitely join with Government instead of "sitting on the fence" and awaiting the result of the fighting.
14. It is my opinion that the Rer Afgab and Rer Wafata can be relied upon to remain faithful to Government while the Abokr Jibrahil will take no aggressive action against Government until the rains begin or unless the force meets with some reverse.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(sd) P. Elliot.

Intelligence Officer.

Ogaden

Bahalla

Talamuga

Mohamed Zubeir

Aulhan

Habr Sulman

Rex Mohamed

Turadi

Jibrahil

Harwaisa Son Chart

Abokr Adi

Abokr Jibrahil

Mumin

ArwaBer AliKharsinWafataAfgabAden Kheir

x Disloyal

Date 3.2.14.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

There are a series of Ilaloos posted at intervals along the Garrebaharre road. Any movements of Troops is reported from one to the other. By this means news reaches the Horoun at Fahanwein very quickly.

Any Convoy or small body of Troops is to be attacked on the road. Large bodies of Troops not to be attacked except to save or recover Stock.

The Marches sitting at Fahanwein consist of Rer Ful'a and Rer Hassan in large numbers and the Rer Mill Dere in small numbers.

The Rer Ahmed Wedare sitting at Harboila. They have many rifles and some horses. They have arranged to join the Sections at Fahanwein directly a movement of Troops is reported in that direction.

The actual number of fighting men at Fahanwein is about 600 but the Ahmed Wed and the Mill Dere will increase this number to over 1000. Troops begin to move.

Serenli

To 5.3.14.

The Staff Officer
Marehan Force

Intelligence.

3. Through Cpl. Hassan Moosa E.M.T.C. from a chief of ABAB AFB (Isaak) now in Bardera just arrived from Lugh.

4. This chief is chief of the Section from which the Italian Authorities at Lugh draw their Ilaloes and his information is got from men acting as Italian Ilaloes or spies. He is of the same tribe as Hassan Moosa.

5. Sheik Awl and Shir Mogeh from British territory (last year these Somalis were living round ELAGAMBO & GUEBAT) have been to Lugh and collected ammunition which they took up river to SHEETLEH (about one hour south of HAMARRE). They were then seen selling it in quantities to men of Rer Tulha Marehan the rate being

10 rounds for a 2 years old camel

15 rounds for a grown camels

15 rounds for a cow with calf

I could not find out the date of this but the information is "a few days ago".

6. That lately many Marehan of all Sections have been coming down from HOBBA district in N. Italian Somaliland and have been crossing to our side of the Juba; numbers unknown.

7. I am trying to get this man over here to get more information from him but Cr. Sgt. Abdull. Alabi E.M.T.C. states that he will not come because he belongs to the Italian secret service, and only told Cr. Hassan Moosa because he is in the same tribe as himself.

sd. C. G. Phillips Lieut.

1st K. A. Rifles.

Serenli

6.2.14. 1954

Intelligence

Source. A Dobbahanta who went up to Gerba Harre about December 28th with some syces S.M.F.C. as runners. Has returned with four Farah Ogas runners this evening.

Information more reliable than any local Somali.

1. Deria Chacul the original runner sent by G.E. got sick and these four Farah Ogas went to Serenli in his place.

~~Serenli is a very important place for the Farah Ogas to operate.~~

2. Rers Tulha and Hassan disprictions scouts at Galales BOGALTI nobody

Farnwen DUR a party of 25 men only. All the rest of the men with their stock and families are grazing on the following lines

GOLGOLAMANI

TULLEH - HILL - WARSHAKABAR

watering at Farnwen Hors and the Juba river.

There is nobody to the WEST of the Farnwen DUR - Gerba Harre road.

3. Any Farah Ogas runners who come in saying that they have been molested by Rer Tulha on the way are telling lies and only state they have been molested in the hope of getting better pay. The Tullah allow runners to come in to Serenli so that they can bring news out.

This news was told direct to Cr. Sgt. Abdulla Alma S.M.F.C. Then

two more M.C.Gs of the Transport were sent to talk with the

Boibahanta in each case he told the same story.

ad. C. G. Phillips Incom

1st K. A. Rifles.

Precis of Information

The Rer Arva Aulihan are entirely disaffected. They are helping the Marehan with information. Some of their Hobto have joined the Rer Hassan and others are acting as Ilaloos.

Hassan Doba is in charge of the Marehan at Fahanwein. He is well versed in Dervish tactics.

Yero Ali Gabawain chief of the Rer Hassan has completed his negotiations with the Rer Libin Gurreh. The two Libin chiefs Aden Shaba and Ali Abdi have agreed to help the Marehan with men, rifles and ammunition. English troops approach from the west.

The Marehan are watering their stock as follows.

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------|
| Fahanwein | Rer Yusef | Emil Dera | Rer Hassan |
| Hagwalli | Rer Hassan | Ahmed Wed | |
| Makali | Very little water | | |
| Bussal | Ahmed Wed | | |
| Dableh | Very little water | | |
| Araba | | | |

Cl. of Thera (Rer Ahmed Wed) visited the Tula at Fahanwein with horsemen and some spearmen after the recent battle.

The Tigre on the river Daus are doing their utmost to encourage the Marehan to fight. They are selling considerable quantities of ammunition to the Marehan. They have received an application from Yero Ali (Rer Hassan) for assistance in the shape of riflemen.

Hadji Mohamed has offered large bribes to the Farah Ogas to join in with the disaffected Sections.

The enemy will attack the Force this side of Fahanwein as they fear that Government will establish a Zareba at Fahanwein for the purpose of capturing stock.

to 7.2.14.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

The whole of the Rer Tulha together with certain of the Rer Hassan have left Fahanwein Dur owing to scarcity of water.

They have gone to Gorarr and are watering at the river.

Hassan Deba is in charge of the fighting men (Tulha) with Abdi Ili under him

The Farah Ogas with all their chiefs are at Gurrebaharre and Gurreh Dabelleh which is not far from Helimarara.

The Rer Tulha at Gorarr number about 600 fighting men all very keen to fight.

The main body of the Rer Hassan together with the Ahmed Wed and the Eili Dera are at Hamballa and Makalla.

Numbers estimated as follows

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Rer Hassan | 600 |
| Ahmed Wed | 400 |
| Eili Dera | 100 |

The present plans of Rer Tulha are as follows:-

To move out from Gorarr with every available man directly information is received that the troops are on the road to Gurrebaharre. They are to be joined by the other Marehan tribes and a general attack is to be made on the Force. In case of a ~~xxx~~ reverse they are to retreat to the river Daua.

There are two Ilaloes permanently stationed at an old K.A.P. boma about 7 miles from Serenleh. Their duty is to intercept all passers along the road and to warn the Tulha when the Force moves out.

The Tulha admit a loss of 4 killed and 7 wounded in the Fahanwein Dur fight.

Chief Shera (Rer Hassan) with his 30 horsemen only stayed a few days at Fahanwein Dur. He then returned to Hamballi.

The Farah Ogas and the Tulha are reported to be holding a big baraza today to decide whether the Farah Ogas shall join the other Marehan Sections or continue to sit on the fence.

Date 7.2.14.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

11. Gorarr is about 6 miles SOUTH of Helemarera. It consists of very thick bush and the Kerias are close to the river. Fahanwein Hors is 6 hours hard march from Gorarr. Stock are not watering at Fahanwein Hors at present but there is plenty of water there.
12. There is ample water at Fahanwein Dur to supply men and baggage camels with water but not sufficient to water stock.

Appreciation of the situation in Merehan as shown in the
Intelligence Reports for the week ending

7 . 2 . 14.

1. The situation appears to be somewhat serious.
2. Garba Hare is isolated and the Troops there are unable to move out owing to lack of Transport.
3. Capt. Stanor reports that the Merehan showed great determination in their attacks on his convoys.
4. The book Jibrail Ambar has distributed and it is probable that the Fer Afwa and Fer Ali will join the Merehan if Govt. receives another check such as the one at ...

Para 1 Report No. 2/1/14.

The Merehan are reported to be very confident and intend to attack any Force moving to relieve Garba Hare. They are capable of placing over 1000 warriors in the field, if the sections combine.

Para 2 and 3 Report No. 2/2/14.

The Fer Afwa and Fer Ali are reported to have adopted a favourable attitude towards the Merehan. They may help them with men and guns at a later date.

Para 1 Report No. 2/3/14 and Para 3 Report No. 2/3/14.

The Mohamed Zubeir Ogaden will not help the Merehan owing to the state of war existing between them and the Talamuga Ogaden.

Para 5 Report No 2/1/14.

The attitude of the Fer Farah Ugas and Bone Merehan is very doubtful indeed.

Para 10 Report No 2/4/14.

(sd) F. Elliot,
Intelligence Officer.

Appreciation of the Situation in Merehan as shewn in the
Intelligence Reports for the week ending

7 . 2 . 14.

1. The situation appears to be somewhat serious.
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- Capt. Stenor reports that the Merehan shewed great determination in their attacks on his convoys.
- The Boko Jibrail Auilar are disaffected and it is probable that the Fer Arwa and Fer Ali will join the Merehan if Govt. receives another check such as the one at ...
- Para 1 Report No. 2/1/14.
3. The Merehan are reported to be very confident and intend to attack any Force moving to relieve Garba Hare. They are capable of placing over 1000 warriors in the field, if the sections combine.
- Para 2 and 5 Report No. 2/2/14.
4. The Ferret are reported to have adopted a favourable attitude towards the Merehan. They may help them with men and guns at a later date.
- Para 1 Report No. 2/3/14 and Para 5 Report No. 2/3/14.
5. The Mohamed Zubair Ogaden will not help the Merehan owing to the state of war existing between them and the Talamuga Ogaden.
- Para 5 Report No 2/1/14.
6. The attitude of the Fer Farah Ugas and Bone Merehan is very doubtful indeed.
- Para 10 Report No 2/4/14.

(sd) F. Elliot,
Intelligence Officer.

Date 9.2.4.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

1. The men of the Rer Tulha together with a few of the Rer Hassan are altogether at Eil Suk which is about 5 miles from the river Juba (inland) and EAST of Fahanwein Hora.
2. The Tulha women and children are attending to the herds. They take the herds to the Jubal daily to water and return to Eil Suk at night.
3. The Rer Ahmed Wad are at Dableh but water is scarce and they ~~propose~~ propose to go to the Juba shortly to some watering place NORTH of Lolishid.
4. The Rer Hassan are at Hamballa and Makalla with the Rer Eili Der. There is not much water at Makalla.
5. Farah Got and a few of the Farah Ogas want peace. The remainder are keen on joining the other Marehan Sections and will probably do so.
6. Hadji Mohamed is at Dabley. He is the prime mover in the insurrection and a dangerous man.
7. The principal Mullah, Sheik Abdullahi, has been influenced by Hadji Mohamed (Ali Dera) and has declared in favour of war. He is at Deinleh with a few Bone Marehan and other priests.
8. The Ilaloes of the Rer Tulha are now in the bush close to Far. Others are at Fahanwein Dur.
9. Eight of the Farah Ogas were at the recent fight with the Rer Tulha. On that occasion there were about 300 men of the Rer Tulha with a few Rer Hassan engaged in the principal skirmish.
10. After the recent fight Chief Shera Jama (Rer Ahmed Wad) joined the Rer Tulha with 30 horsemen and a large number of spearsmen. Finding that the Force had retreated he returned with his men to Hamballa. About 300 extra warriors of the Rer Tulha joined the army five ~~hour~~ hours after the retreat of the Force.

Date 9.2.14.

Intelligence

 Precis of Information

11. The Enemy's plans are as follows

Gurrebaharre Force.

- (a) The enemy believe that this Force must move shortly owing to shortage of food.
- (b) They are being watched by Ilalloes of the Per Ahmed Wed and Per Hassan.
- (c) If the Force attempts to leave for Serenleh they are to be followed by Per Hassan and Per Ahmed Wed warriors. News is to be sent on to the Per Iulba and the Force to be attacked by the combined Force of the Enemy at Fahanwein.
- (d) If the Force tries to make for Huh it is to be attacked by the Per Ahmed Wed and Per Hassan and a favorable opportunity occurs.

Serenleh Force.

- (a) The enemy confidently believe that this Force will not move out again after the recent check.
- (b) Ilalloes at Dar are to warn the enemy if the Force does not move and other Ilalloes are to watch the Force at the junction of the Fahanwein Dur and Fahanwein Hons roads.
- (c) If the Force takes the Fahanwein Hons road it is to be attacked on this side of the water.
- (d) If the Force takes the Fahanwein Dur road the enemy will proceed to that place by a Somali track.
- (e) They will choose a place in thick bush with boulders and stones behind which to take cover.
- (f) The riflemen to begin the battle. Spearsmen to wait until the enemy are in confusion and then charge. All riflemen to carry spears in addition to guns.
- (g) The enemy are confident of a successful ending to the fight.

Date 9.2.14.

Intelligence

Precis of Information

12. Yero Ali (Per Hassan) has brought many cartridges from the Gurreh and Tigre on the Dawa. He has been trading ivory for cloth at Lugh and exchanging the cloth for ammunition.
13. The water at Fahanwein Dur is ample for the force and baggage camels. A further supply can be obtained from the river bed by digging in the sand. Plenty of water at Fahanwein Hora and Dar.
14. The Talamuga Ogaden have retired to the Tana river. This free the Mohamed Zubair from fear of any immediate attack on their kerias by the former tribe and may encourage some of their Bopto to join the march when the rains begin.
15. The attitude of the Abokir Jibrahil Aulihan is unsatisfactory. It would appear that they are inclined to follow the lead of the Afa and favour the Marehan. It is advisable to commit this Section definitely to Government by using them to raid stock. At present they are unwilling to do so.
16. Mr Filieul reports that the Bartiri Somali shewed signs of unfriendliness towards his safari.

Slh No 1/2/14

Intelligence Office

Serenleh

10. 2. 14.

To

The Officer Commanding

K. A. Rifles

Serenleh.

Sir,

With regard to my letter No.1/1/14 dated the 1.2.14 on the subject of Mohamed Zubeir I have to report the following additional information :-

Para 11 This raiding party has returned arriving in Bhoji on the 22.1.14 They were unsuccessful in finding the Fer Abdullah as this tribe has retired to the Tana.

Para 12. The removal of the Talamuga to the Tana frees the Mohamed Zubeir from the fear of raids on their kerias by the Talamuga Bobto.

Para 10 Mr Filleul informs me that a Government Interpreter saw the raiding party start. It consisted of about 500 Bobto all armed with rifles. Many of them also carried revolvers. They had two camels carrying boxes of ammunition.

The rifles were for the most part obtained from the Aulihan while the revolvers are obtained from Ishak traders who buy them freely in Nairobi and bring them through Kismayu when proceeding north to trade in cattle.

Mr Filleul reports that the attitude of more powerful Mohamed Zubeir chiefs towards Governemnt is not satisfactory though he does not anticipate trouble from the tribe during the coming rainy season.

(sd) F. Elliot.

Intelligence Officer.

10. 2. 14.

The O. C. Troops

Serenleh

Sir,

I have to report that, at your request, I again proceeded to
Aulihan country to attempt to commit the Aulihan to Government,
by enrolling some of their
country and to get them to

of the

have

and promised to send about seven or eight
soon as possible proceed to Aulihan with the Force
greatly ease the political situation as it is certain that
disloyal Sections will make no advance unless they see
as their fellow tribesmen are assisting.

4. I found it necessary to offer the somewhat heavy wage of 35% of
all stock driven by the Bobto and a further 10% to the chiefs.
As, however, it will be impossible to drive any stock at all
without the services of these men I do not consider the amount to
be excessive.

(sd) F. Elliot.

Intelligence Officer.

Precis of Information.

The Marahan are watering their stock at the following places

- (a) Rer Tulha, Eil Buk, Tima Adi, Garra Dabeil, Teisp.
- (b) Rer Hassan Humballi, Matalla, Pablah.
- (c) Rer Ahmed Wed do do do
- (d) Rer Eili Dera do do do
- (e) Rer Farah Ogas Melimerera, Muraub, Bissul, Lolishid.
- (f) Rer Bone Sussul, Lugh, Wara.

The strength of the enemy is as follows

| <u>Section</u> | <u>Riflemen</u> | <u>Subarmen.</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Rer Tulha | 150 | 300 |
| Rer Hassan | 80 | 500 |
| Rer Ahmed Wed | 100 | 300 |
| Rer Eili Dera | 40 | 100 |
| Rer Farah Ogas | 110 | 500 |
| Rer Bone | 20 | 600 |
| | <u>370</u> | <u>2300</u> |

The Rer Tulha are still watering their stock daily at the Tulha. Their herds are said to consist of 5000 camels and about 1000 cattle.

The Farah Ogas chiefs state that they have an arrangement with the Tulha that the latter stock shall not be taken anywhere near the herds of the former.

The Chiefs of Farah Ogas express an earnest desire to remain at peace with Government. They offer to obey any orders regarding their stock which the Government may issue.

The Ilaloes at Rer are still there but are hiding in the bush. The Ilaloes are in the bush close to the river. They watch for movements of Troops from the Italian side.

The country at present inhabited by the Tulha consists of thick bush and has a very stony surface.

Date 12.8.14

Intelligence

Precis of Information

8. Somali reports regarding recent movement of troops at Garrehaba are as follows
Force moved 4 days ago. Left at 8 a.m. and returned same day.
Killed 4 men of the Rer Bone and captured some cattle and camels.
9. The furthest watering places of the Rer Tulha (Garre Dabell) is three hours hard march from Helimerera.

Precis of Information

Large numbers of the Rer Ahmed Wed have left Hamballa and gone to Yabasso with quantities of stock.

The Rer Tulha wish to leave their present watering places and join the Ahmed at Yabasso. They propose to make an arrangement with the Farah Ogas to pass through their Kerias.

Ialoes are at Dg. and Fahnwein. Their war marks are strong.

The Tulha strike downed the other obstruct on the road near the Sahar.

It is hoped that the Asfaris will clear the obstruction and enable the enemy to advance.

200 of the Rers Hassan are near Fahnwein Hors.

Water at Fahnwein Hors is very brackish.

This is the

The Rer Hassan spend the day together in the bush above this place.

Hassan Beba has sent in a letter asking for news.

Appreciation of the Situation in Marehan
for the week ending 14. 2. 14.

The situation appears to be less acute than last week.

The enrolling of Aulhan Bobto has had an excellent effect on the disaffected Sections of that Tribe. It is now unlikely that they will attempt any overt act of hostility against Government while members of their own Tribe are serving with the Force in Marehan.

Report No 1/4/14

There is no likelihood of the Mohamed Zubeir helping the Marehan

Report No.1/2/14

The total strength of the enemy is reported to be about 400 riflemen and 2500 Spearmen. This includes the Rer Farah Ogas and Bone Marehan.

Para 2 Report No 2/6/14.

The attitude of the Rer Farah Ogas is still very doubtful. There appears to be no doubt that half the Rer Bone will join the enemy.

Paras 5 and 9 Report No 2/5/14

If the enemy adhere to their reported plans they will attack the Force at Fahanwein. It is probable that only the Rer Tulha and Rer Hassan will attempt any attack at that place unless the other Sections hear of the move of the Force in sufficient time to enable them to leave their present watering places.

Para 11 Report No 2/5/14

(S) F. Elliot
Intelligence Officer.

Carbahare

24-8-14.

Precis of Intelligence

from whom obtained

I. The positions of the Marchan are as follows:-

| | | |
|-----------------|---|-----------------------------|
| <u>Dubleh</u> | Per Hassan & Bill Dera were there, 8 days ago. | Abdullahi Ali Per Hassan |
| <u>Humballi</u> | No one there. | |
| <u>Makalla</u> | Per Hassan and Per Bill Dera were there 2 days ago. | |
| <u>Kilebas</u> | Per Ahmed Wed. Saw Per Hassan | do |
| <u>Duroleh</u> | Some Marchan, Per Marim Iss | |
| <u>Yafusa</u> | Per Ahmed Wed | |

The whole of the Marchan at Dubleh collected together 10 days ago. The watering places at Makalla are Gol & Jibel. At the latter place fresh water, rest salty.

| | |
|---|-------------------------|
| Plenty of water at Humballi & Makalla. Little bad water at Ara-asi. | Ahmed Aden Per Aden. |
| The Per Hassan will go to Daus if they move from Makalla. | do |

| | |
|---|----|
| No I. confirmed with following exceptions. Dubleh people moved to Kargare near Makalla. | do |
|---|----|

Carbahare

24-2-14.

Precis of information

from whom obtained.

1. Below information as follows

Marshi Elme

(a) Dabieh plenty and good in wells

Marah Oyas

(b) Bushalli

(c) (SUNSHINE)

(d) Arad

very, salt / Yusuf Mohamed
shanta

only

Marshi Elme have left Dabieh and have

gone to Marshi Elme. Bushalli has also been

evacuated. Much stock is being

evacuated. Much stock is being

evacuated. Much stock is being

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evacuated. Much stock is being

Yusuf Mohamed

Tulbahanta.

There is a good road from Dabieh to
Makalla. Plains and thin bush.
Water is to be obtained half way
to Makalla at a place called
Kergurr digging in the sand
but it is salty.

Cartahere 23-2-14.

Precis of information

from whom obtained.

5. The brother of Hassan Daba Chief of the Fer Tullah was killed in the skirmish with the Govt. Illaloes. (?)
arah Manshi
Fer arah Ogas
6. The arah Ogas did not expect the force to arrive here. It was generally believed that the Loleshid road would be taken.
Mohamed Dir.
Fer arah Ogas
7. The Fer Hassan sent 50 men down to help the Tullah the day after the Illalo skirmish. They have not yet returned.
Mohamed Dir
Fer arah Ogas
8. The Fer Hassan & Hil Dera have left Dableh to-day and gone to Makalla. They intend to make for the Daus or Juba Rivers.
arah Manshi
Fer arah Ogas.
9. There is a road to Duroleh which shortens the journey to that place to 4 hours only.

Sd. . . Elliott

Precis of events which occurred between the
15-2-14 and 3-3-14.

on the occasion of the first patrol through Marehan
country.

Signalling party ambushed at Garba Hara. One man killed
and one wounded. 15-2-14.

A skirmish took place at Eil Bok between the Aulihan
and the Fer Tullah. The Aulihan lost one killed and
one wounded. The Tullah 8 killed & 4 wounded. 16-2-14

A keria of the Fer Tullah surprised and looted by the
Aulihan levies. Two Tullah killed. 21-2-14.

Fers Hill Dera and Hassan surprised at Humballi and
Makalla by the force. Two night attacks made on the
Govt. hareba, at Makalla but repulsed. Enemy lost 3
killed and 3 wounded. 27-2-14

Attempted ambush by the Fer Ahmed VBC. Repulsed. Fer way's
loss 2 killed and 2 wounded. 7-3-14

About 1000 of the Fer Ali and Fer Afzal Aulihan crossed
the Juba River into English territory at Talatona
10-3-14.

The Fer Tullah surrendered. 20-3-14

The force returned to Serenli. 26-3-14.

Sd. F. Elliott.
Intelligence Officer.

Intelligence Report

1-4-14.

1. On the 31st of March at Fahanwein Dur 48 rifles of the Rer Tulha were seen.
2. On the morning after the Farah Ugas chiefs visited the C.C. troops at Fahanwein they proceeded to the Tulha kerias and seized 1000 rifles back to their own rifles.
3. The Tulha own three horses. They are at Jabben.
4. Sheik Abdullah is in the keria of the Farah Ugas. He is the son of Sheik Ismail Rer Eili Dera.
5. The Ahmed Wed are at Eil Gumbo. They are watering there and at Sanajif and Eil Wedja.
6. Rain has fallen at Eil Gumbo and Ara-asi.
7. The Farah Ugas still have about 40 rifles. On the day that the Farah arrived at Berba Mare a considerable number of this section arrived at Lohished from Italian Somaliland.
8. The Rers Ali and Afgat are still Jarleh and Salebas. They have protected kerias.
9. The Kerias at Dablen are moving to the Dikhara.
10. Sheva Jassa of the Rer Ahmed Wed intends to return to the Italian side with 5000 rifles.
11. Position of the Rers reported as follows.

| | | |
|----------|---------------|------------------------------|
| Farah | Rer Gerard | Few Rer Hassan |
| Farah | Rer Hassan | Rer Eili Dera |
| Humballi | do | do |
| Ara-asi | Rer Ahmed Wed | Rer Eili Dera Rer Habr Yakub |

Bone. Rain reported at all these places

Intelligence Report.

8-4-14.

1. The Her Samantar Ahmed Wed under Shera Jama are preparing to go to Yahasse with the intention of crossing to the Italian side.
2. The Her Balich Ahmed Wed intend to remain on this side and apply for peace.
3. The Hill Dara are at the Dawa. They are reported to be collecting rifles with the intention of bringing them to Govt.
4. The Ahmed are living near Selbai and are watering at that place until the advent of rains.
5. Eight men of the Her Ali Aulihan have been sent to the Ahmed Wed as "erige" to ask for a return of looted stock.
6. Hostile Sections of the Marchan are at Makalla, Ara-ssi, Dablah Humballi. All may now be moving to the rains.

Garba Hare.

(SD) F. Elliott.

Intelligence Officer.

Intelligence Report

7-4-44.

1. The Rer Ali Hussein are still in Farah Ugas country though they have not yet paid their fine.
2. The Rer Samantar Ahmed Wed and the Rer Samantar are together at Lamedleh. They are waiting at the Rer Samantar and Yahaso. These sections were targeted and seen there on the 5th. Shera Jama is with them.
3. Tamas Barrah and Harshi Isamun have been killed by the Dargah at the Daus. Both these men are chiefs of the Rer Samantar.
4. The Rer Dargah have sent in another letter asking for arms. It purports to come from Hajji Mohamed and says that they are waiting on the road with 2 rifles and 100 rounds. A letter sent to them giving them six hours to return before troops follow. They admit the receipt of the letter asking for 50 rifles and 100 rounds as Subain.
5. Three Dargahs from Daus report that there are large numbers of Ahmed Wed stock entering near Yahaso.

Garth Hale.

(SD) P. Elliott

Intelligence Officer.

Serenli,

11th April 1914.

Lieut. F. Elliott,

Please note in event of any complete sections or their headmen coming in you will give them the following general terms for peace.

- (i) Submission of all rifles and ammun.
- (ii) A stock fine which will be inflicted at the close of the present operations and extent of which will be dependent on the behaviour of the section during the period intervening between its own submission and the close of operations.
- (iii) Returns of any stock looted from the Italian side and payment of usual "diaz"
- 2. You may also inform them that in all probability civil administration will be resumed on completion of present operations.
- 3. Your report by 6th April received.
- 4. You will make every endeavour to procure a few really good intelligence illaloes and tell them they will be paid well for good information. Payment will probably consist of camels and cattle and a reward for any really good specific piece of information may occasionally be promised. Payment at close of operations.

(sd) S.R. Graham, Lieut Colonel.

Gerba Harre,

14th April 1914.

Intelligence Officer,

Warehan Patrol.

Pending further instructions from Colonel Graham.

- (1) The conditions of peace given to the Eli Dera will remain unaltered.
- (2) If the Ber Hassan desire peace they must produce the Govt. rifle (Ammunition taken by them) and 50 rifles as Sabben. Ponies at the discretion of the Intelligence Officer.
- (3) If the (Habi Yakub) Ben desire peace they must produce 10 rifles as Sabben.
- (4) If the Ahmed Wed desire peace they must produce 40 rifles 50 ponies as Sabben.
- (5) The Eli Dera stock fine is to be passed and branded at Gerba Harre and then driven by them to Serenli.
- (6) The Ber Hassan (Yussuf) stock fine to be passed at Gerba Harre and sent on to Serenli.
- (7) Orders to be given to the Eli Dera that they are to move out of the Dilhara by the 1st May.

(Sd) J. J. Jones, Major.

1st K.A. Rifles.

I-4-14.

I. Rain reports as follows:

Dur Considerable quantity.
 (Shanwein Hars) practically none in the stream but plenty from the rain pools between the two places.
 Dur

Jenida (Govs. Boma) Considerable quantity

nilbara rain falling daily

Bogalla large number of rain pools

Bumali & Kabbala large quantity

Bedien & Banih

Wala to Wala

Wala to Wala

Leames' report

2. Position of Dur

Dur Duran

around Bogalla

Per Farah

South East of Dur

Per Farah

Per Farah

Per Farah

Per Farah

Gerba Hare

Per Farah

miles from Dabien

Per Farah

Per Farah

Reported to be at the West end of

3. Aulihan rifles

I seen at Jenida

I5-5-14

I seen by Major Leames

7-4-14

12 seen at Gerba Hare

8-3-14

20 seen loaded on camels by

Doga Shebel

I2-4-14

8 seen by a spy being carried

by men

I2-4-14

11 seen loaded singly on camels

I2-4-14.

58

Total number in Aulihan possession probably exceeds one hundred.

Two Aulihan kerias living between Gerba Hare and Shanwein Dur have refused the orders of the Uras (Yusuf Mahan) to move to Shanwein. Orders in writing given to the Per

Farah Ogas to direct them to move from their country and permission given to loot if they fail to do so within 24 hours.

5. The Aulihan are encamped at a place half way between Jehalin and Shanwein Tur. There is rain there but little at the Shanwein.

6. The Aulihan have had charges of looting laid against them by the

1. Haurasama Bon 3. Gurr Gur 5. Farah Ogas

2. Sheizal 4. Cabarwein 6. Turu Shabel

Govt. orders for restitution have been given in cases Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5.

Farah Gost reported on IS-4-14 by letter that he had been beaten by some Bolti of the Aulihan and blood drawn Govt. instructions given verbally to the Aulihan Uras to proceed himself to Farah Gost and offer blood money.

7. The Aulihan have failed to carry out the following orders issued to them by the O.C. troops.

- (a) Follow the troops to Loleshid at a distance of one day's march.
- (b) Take the river road only. Not to go far inland
- (c) Give up all their rifles to Govt. at Loleshid.
- (d) Failed to come to Shanwein Tur when ordered (14-8-14)

8. Yusuf Maghan, Ugas of the Aulihan reports that tidings have reached him of a big fight between the British and Dervishes near Durac last month. The Dervishes lost many men ? ? ?

(9) Shera Jama has interviewed a prominent follower (name doubtful) of the Mallah at a Belo near Dolo. The latter is wanted by the Italian Govt. for constant raiding of Italian friendly tribes. An arrangement was made whereby Shera Jama is to change his camels for cattle and proceed with the Mallah's followers to the Webbi Shebelle. He has gained leave to pass through Harlimwein country by returning to them stock lately looted by the Ahmed Fed.

Sd. S. Elliott

Intelligence Officer

Table

1. CERBA HARE No rain since 18-4-14. Water from wells only grazing fair.
- WUFLEH Small rain pools still exist. Grazing good. Sliders moving there.
- UMRALLI Very little rain fallen this year. Water from wells. Grazing bad.
- MAKALLA few small rain pools. Unoccupied. Grazing poor. Aru-asi-Bes
- ARU-ASI-BES.. Practically no rain. Country very dry.
- LUCH Dist. do do
- DOLO Dist do do
- DELHARA No rains for last 7 days. few pools only, grazing good.

Positions of sections.

2. Tulha Borolti, Deinleh and surrounding districts
- Farah Uzah Around and close to Cerba Hare but not in Government Reserve.
- Haurasama do do
- Marlin Iss do do
- Ali Hussein do do
- Fer Guard do do
- Habi Yakub Bon Do North of but close to Dakti III
- Fer Ahmed Ved Slightly to N.W. of Jerba Waraga (water & grazing scarce)
- Fer Hassan Delhara (large numbers) Dakti III (small numbers)
- Fer Sliders Dakti III & Delhara but all moving to Dubieh

(Note: Dakti III is near Guma Ad)

3. The sections on the Delhara must move this month towards permanent watering places if the present drought continues. Reports as to the lengths of time the present rain pools there will last varies from 5 days to 10 days. Cerba Hare has had more rain than any other district but the grazing is already beginning to wither up.
4. The chief of the Marlin Iss reports the death of one of his sections by gunshot at the hands of the Aulihan 15-4-14
5. Shabel Burreh, Fer Samrutah Ahmed Ved has brought into Cerba Hare 2 rifles and 1 pony as subein. He has been given leave

to live in friendly country pending further orders from G.
C. troops 16-4-14.

6. The Fer Gerard have brought in two rifles to Carba Dare 16-4-14.
7. A deputation from the Fer Hassan was reported to be on the way to Carba Dare with 5 rifles to ask for peace. Letter sent out to them stating that peace could not be discussed until thirty rifles were brought to Carba Dare. Deputation left with 5 rifles in arah Uta. (18-4-14)
8. Some of the Fer Gerard who escaped from Major Soames' camp near Bakti Illi and informed the Elders and Hassan of the British approach. This caused great consternation and report to the Delhara at once. 18-4-14
9. The Fer Illi of the Marchan by Aulihan have been discriminated. The latter have shown willingness in all cases to supply food and stock. The Marchan have themselves, looked after considerable quantities of Aulihan stock which they have failed to supply. 20-4-14.
10. The 46 head of cattle killed by Major Soames' camp at Bakti Illi belonged to the Lubi Yamb Bon Marchan. 20-4-14
11. The Fer Illi have brought in 30 Carba (are three) and one remainder as surplus. For cattle and camels are brought in. Govt. refused these until the whole surplus is brought in. Elders warned to be available before 15th. This has been done. A place to be considered as N. 18-14. This has been fully explained.
12. Fer Ahmed had wanted to be collecting rifles to bring to Govt. share and appear to be giving way.
13. Two Illi were sent to Fer Hassan on Delhara on 15-4-14. One returned and reported that Fer Hassan Bolti attempted to murder them in thick bush. The remaining Illi also is still missing. Probably killed as both men were chased and missing. Illi also not a good runner. 19-4-14.
14. Very large amount of stock is on the Delhara already. Mostly camels. All the kerias at Bakti Illi intend to go there when further rain is reported. Water at Bakti Illi can only last few more days without further rain. (Bakti Illi is 2 marches beyond MIKALLA towards DAUA)

15. Letter from the Bar Hassan states that 50 guns have been collected and that they are looking for the rest. This is untrue. Five guns only have been collected. The letter was written in Arabi's name after the receipt of my warning letter in order to gain time and stop Govt. from moving against them.
16. Riots sections bitterly complaining against Govt. order prohibiting them from moving to fresh grazing around and towards Humballi and Maralia. State grazing around Carba has nearly finished owing to absence of rain.

Intelligence Report for the week ending 27-4-14.

1. Four of the principal Ahmed Vet. officers arrived at Gamba-bahare boma 23-4-14 despite orders refusing them permission to do so without the proper orders issued by the O.C. Troop. They brought in 16 rifles and 18 ponies. All refused and officers ordered to leave at 11 hour. Shera, was detained for disobedience.
2. Head Ahmed reports that the Ber Hassan are attempting to collect rifles to bring to Government 26-4-14.
3. Two kurias of the Ber Hassan are on the Dilhara near Yakub at Garba Gaidi 26-4-14.
4. The Dam now contains water but grazing is bad. Some kurias of the Ber Hassan had damaged are reported to be there. 27-4-14.
5. Some of the Ahmed Vet. are watering cattle at Medialak Lakgi (8 hours march from Garba Gaidi). They cannot be watering at Makalla. 25th Det. of Ahmed Vet. at Military near Ara-ase. 27-4-14.
6. Sub-section Behanien Bahalla (Det. Subantar Ahmed Vet.) have gone to Dawad Dale for grazing. 27-4-14.
7. The Government Liaison (Det. Farah Oge) 243 went to the Ber Hassan at the Dilhara and reported to be murdered by Hassan Bobto has not returned. Report confirmed by Eli Dara 26-4-14.
8. A few kurias of Ber Hassan are on the Dilhara near Dabier. Intend to water from latter place. 26-4-14.
9. The Head chief of the Ber Hassan (Yero Ali) is at Garba Gaidi. Those of the Hassan kurias have been seen at Mado Ali but there is no water there. This is obtained from Makalla 27-4-14.

- 10. Large numbers of the Hassan camels are at Daus Dado near Garrah country and above the Dilhara (West)
- 11. All kurias on the Dilhara are returning towards Makalla and west of that place .
- 12. The Eli Dera camels are watering at Makalla, Cows at Garba Gano but the Water there is nearly finished.
- 13. The main body of the Eli Dera were at Garba Gano and Bakti Ali on the 26-4-14, but they are reported to have decided to move. Others are at Mado Ali (Garba Gairo is near Garba /bdi). 27-4-14.
- 14. A raiding party of the Dagedia from Abyssinia are reported to have crossed the river Eili Dera. A party of Eili Dera followed them on their return and, on entering Dagedia territory, raided a herd of cattle. Most of this herd was abandoned on the return march owing to the raiders running short of water. 27-4-14.

- 15. The water at Bakti Ali is reported to be sufficient for five more days from the 24-4-14. There a few rain pools at Makalla but much fouled by stock. Plenty of water at Husballi. Wells in good order. 27-4-14.
- 16. No grass at Husballi. Very little grazing for camels
 - do Makalla Fair camel grazing
 - do Juba Dist Bad camel grazing

In none of the above places are Marehan living at present Throughout all Marehan there is very little grazing with the exception of Garba Hara District. No rain since 14th

- 17. The Habr Yakub Bane are mixed with the Her Eili Dera and Her Hassan. Their chief watering place is Makalla wells

Position of Sections
 Her Tuha and Her Hassan Yusufat.
 Ali Hagaga, Dak Hagin, Deinich, They water at Dablich
 Hers Farah Egan, Ali Hassan Gerard, Hamudama Bane, Marlin is at.

Garba Hara District and Bassei. Watering at the Deshek
Rer Hill Dara and Rer Rahr Yakul come at,
Rahel Ill, Mado Ali, Daus Dida, Garba Gaira, Garba Abdi.
The Ill and the Dilhara. They water at Makalla and rain pools.
The Rer Ahmed Wed are at Hedidaka, Dawad, Wilhassar,
They are watering at Humballi and Makalla.

(SD) F. Elliott.

Intelligence Officer.

Daily Intelligence Report

28-4-14.

I.

1. The Raza and his force were seen yesterday in large numbers near
Karkala and Garba Abdi. They are also reported at Fimo
Mortan Arba and Buzalebut none of those places contain water.
Principal watering place is at Makalla.

2. The Raza Hassan have collected the captured Gvvt. rifle and 30
rounds. They are attempting to collect the remainder but the
Razas are unwilling to give them up.

3. The Raza Hassan camps are on the Dilhara in large numbers.

4. The Raza Hassan are at Karki Ill Makalla and Buzale. They
are now moving towards Dablich. Sev. al Karim are reported
to be at Garba half way between Makalla and Dablich.

5. The Raza Yakub and his force are in the Raza Hassan
Ill Daba. They are also at Banier and at Karki Ill.
Considerable ill feeling exists between the two sub-sections.
They are reported to be split. Some are travelling to Garba
while others remain with the Hassan. No attempts appear
to have been made to collect rifles but they are desirous of
getting more.

The road between Makalla and Dablich is nearly complete. The chiefs express
a desire to see the Gvvt. troops but they are desirous of
water.

Abundant. Plenty of rain water. Karkala little
rain water but plenty in wells. Makalla. Plenty of rain
water. Dablich. Little rain water but plenty in wells
Dilhara. heavy rain storm reported in Southern Dilhara.

Intelligence Officer.

Daily Information Report.

29-4-14.

1. The following chiefs of the Rer Hassan arrived at Garrebahare to-day. Abdillel Barso, Abdullai Hersi, Ahmed Aden. They brought in one Government rifle and 10 gras rifles. Deformed subein was insufficient. Ordered to leave Garrebahare at once, collect the total of 30 rifles and bring them to Government at Makalla on arrival of the force there.
2. Chief Samantar Gorel Habr Yakub Bon brought in 4 rifles and asked for peace. Instructed to await reply at Baraza to-morrow (30th instant).
3. Ali Omar, chief of the Rer Yusuf Hassan reports that he is bringing in 27 camels to Government to-morrow as part of the fine imposed on that sub-section.
4. The Aulhan are reported to be returning towards Garrebahare. There are now a few of their kurias between Dunleh and Dableh. They intend to water at the latter place.
5. The Rer Ahmed Wet have moved owing to lack of water. They are now watering at Habbai.
6. Constant inter-raiding is going on between the Rer Tuibe and Aulhan.
7. The chiefs of the following sections visited Garrebahare to-day:-
Rer Hassan, Rer Hassan (Yusuf), Rer Habr Yakub Bon, Rer Farah Dgas.
8. Considerable rain fell yesterday at Dableh.

Sd/- F. Elliott
Intelligence Officer.

The Officer Commanding Troops

Marchan Patrol.

Sir,

With reference to the attacks made by the Marchan on the force at Makalla on the night of the 25th February I am now in a position to furnish you with further details of the Marchan movements and intentions on that day.

2. On the arrival of the force in the early morning runners were sent out by the Per Bill Dera to all the Marchan Urisah within a radius of about 25 miles to summon all the available fighting men to Makalla.

The Per Hassan arrived in considerable numbers but very few of the Ahmed Wed and Habr Yakub Bona came in.

3. The Marchan were totally unprepared for the arrival of the force at Makalla. This surprise was effected by the spreading of false information regarding the movements of the force by one of their own spies.

4. The Marchan decided to make a demonstration directly darkness fell. To do this about forty riflemen were told off to advance under cover to within a short distance of the Govt. Zareba, fire off their rifles and retire at once.

This was done and a spokesman, acting under instructions, threatened the force with an attack at dawn.

A council of war was then held at the shallow wells to the east of the Govt. Zareba. It was decided to attack the Bona in the middle of the night. The riflemen who numbered about 50 were ordered to creep up close to the Zareba, stampede the camels by rapid fire, and rush in under cover of the expected confusion. The spearmen numbered about 150 to 170. They were instructed to follow close behind the riflemen and join in the rush.

Most of the riflemen carried out the advance but the spearmen failed to come within 500 yards of the Zareba. Directly

the troops opened fire the spearsmen bolted into the
Donga.

All the men killed and wounded were riflemen. The
losses of the enemy were 5 killed and 6 wounded.

7. Hadji Mohamed took no part in the fight. It was
alleged that he was not in the Donga only.

8. It is reported that several of the various Dongas who
took part in the fight. They all expressed great sur-
prise at the failure of the spears to stampede. They
were confident of their ability to enter the Dongas if
this had happened.

Sd. J. Elliott

Intelligence Officer

Appreciation of the situation in
Marehan

as shown in the Intelligence Report for the
month ending. 30-4-14.

1. The Rebellion has completely collapsed. The Rer Ali Dara Habi Yakub Bone, Rer Gerard and the Rer Ahmed Ned have surrendered and paid a ransom while the Rer Hassan a are suing for peace.
2. The recent attitude of the Rer Farah Ugas towards Govt. has been most satisfactory and the Rers Ali Hussein and Haurasama Bone continue to show every desire to carry out Govt orders.
3. The Rer Ali Aulihan have handed in a large percentage of their rifles and they have shown themselves amenable to Govt. orders.
4. It is probable that the coming move of the Forces to Dabieh and Makalla will bring all hostilities to a close.

(Sd) P. Elliott.

Intelligence Officer.

After the skirmish at Hill Bok a report that the Aulihan Levies had met with disaster and that I, together with the son of Sheik Abdurathman Mursal and most of the Bobto, had been killed caused great jubilation among the Rer Amin Jibrahil.

The safe return of the Bobto and the prompt distribution of a percentage of loot among them ended all further suggestions of a rising against Govt.

My informants of these details are Bob of the Rer Hassan and Tulha and Sheik Abdurathman Mursal of the Aulihan.

(sd) F. Elliot.

Intelligence Officer.

Conditions of Peace
Rer Tullah.

- (1) Bring in 20 more rifles as a minimum.
- (2) Obey all orders of any Government Officer.
- (3) Allow no other Marehan tribes to mix with Rer Tullah until there is peace with all Marehan Hassen Debs must drive away any other tribes and if unable be must report to Government.
- (4) For any rifles found in possession of a Rer Tullah a fine of 100 she-camels
- (5) To stop the Rer Tullah harbouring other stock he will keep his stock within limits ordered by any Govern - ment Official until peace is declared.
- (6) Rer Tullah to be held responsible for the Adelile signalling station, and if other Marehan come there he is to inform Government at once.
- (7) The whole Rer Tullah will be fined:-
 - 500 Camels (200 Passengers)
 - 500 Cattle
 - 1000 Sheep & Goats
 To be delivered at Farnwan Nos :-
 - 100 Cattle
 - 200 Sheep & Goats
 To be delivered by 6 p.m. 21st. March 1914 at Gordubele:-
 - 15 bullocks.

Conditions of peace with Eli Dera.

(1) Within 10 days a force of 12 rifles and 2 horses to be brought in at Jajbh.

50 Camels and 50 Cattle.

Man stops at end of 10 days if this is not brought in and war continues.

(2) Within 1 month a further 9 rifles and a fine of

350 she Camels

300 Cattle

1000 sheep and goats.

Non compliance with this means a further continuance of hostilities.

(3) Other conditions of peace same as Jajbh.

(4) For all the time being with a ... now on ward to be ... at ...

(5) For all the time being with a ...

(Sd) L.H.Scames, Major.

1st K.A.Rifles.

Correspondence between the Govt. and

The Rer Hassan

To the Officer of Govt. at Garba Hare

After salaams

We are sending to you the news of the Rer Hassan. All the big men and all the other men have sat and made a shaurri. They say "Now have the Govt. entered the country of the Marehan and sits at Lolishid. We hear that Govt. has called all the big men of the Marehan and has told them saying "the Govt. has arrived in your country to make straight the country". Govt intend to throw out all these bad men who have made fitna in the country. To make all Marehan at peace. To make it a country of traders. A country of shambas.

When we heard this we were glad. We obey Govt. orders we do not refuse them. The Govt. flag is raised at Lolishid. That time was the time of Mr Hope. When he went to Serenleh he left another officer. This officer made rotten the whole country and looted the stock of subjects.

Now when we subjects got the news of this looting we ran away. The subjects speke to Sheik Ismail, saying. Why has Govt. done this in stealing the stock of subjects? Before this Mr Hope made straight the country and brought peace in his train. We did not refuse Govt. orders. Afterwards entered fitna and the country became rotten. Now we wish for peace from Govt. We will bring all the guns and horses such as we have. All Orders are better than war. If peace comes to Govt. subjects all that Govt. wants it will get.

This talk is true. By God true. Written by Ahmed Aden

Received at Garba Hare

11-4-14.

Priest

Correspondence between the Government
and the Rer Tulha Marshan

Received at Garba Hare 10-2-14.

To
The English Government

After many salaams

Letter is written to the Govt. through the Rer Farah Ugas
the Rer Farah Ugas are Hassan Deba and Ali Ila have come to the
land of the Rer Farah Ugas.

They beg for peace on behalf of the men women and children
of the Rer Tulha.

These words are very true. We beg for peace

This is all

of the Rer Tulha

After salaams

Letter has arrived and with it two guns.

to you were to bring all your guns and horses if in
through you require peace. Why have you failed in this?

You have heard it said that any one coming here will be faw tene

It is not so. To any who come there is a free pass.

You have heard that Govt. is coming to loot you. This is true

if you fail to bring guns. True it is that Govt. will make war
Fail not to come tomorrow.

Listen to my words. Bring your guns and horses and obey order.
Lelishid.

10-2-14.

(Sd) F. Elliott

Int. Officer

To
The Rer Tulha

After salaams

You were given one month to bring in your fine. The month is
finished but the fine is not paid. This is a bad affair and

(contd)

Govt. is displeasd. A Force is now going to Dablah. Afterwards
this a Force will visit you. If you fine has not then been
paid the Govt. will take it by force.

These words by Govt. Orders.

Garta Hare

1-5-14.

(Sd) Elliott