

EAST AFR. PROT

18741
REC^d
REG^d 22 MAY 14

SECRET

Office
1914
May
previous Paper.
110731/14
Secret

Abyssinia - Situation

to Stanley

On 707 10731/14 we asked East
for beam on his Rennell Rodd's Dis.
7.0. Ultra so far as northern
portion of East is concerned.

This is an interesting scheme sub-
mitted by Lord Kitchener, but I fear
that it will need a deal of negotiation
before we should get quite all
that he suggests for Great Britain.
However, the Italian East and
connection is provided for "some time"
will be contact with "right party"
from the Sudan to Adis Abeba &
from East to Somaliland. The

10731/14

Subsequent Paper.
110731/14
Secret

scheme has from an point of
view, the great merits of giving
the Nile basin to the Sudan &
part of the Italian province
to Somaliland. If we had
to 'give away' my part of the
country reserved to Gt Britain
in Adhikhan's map, I think
it wd be best to let the
Italians have more of the
"Somaliland of B. E. A."

The P.O. would ask for some
& in any case we can avoid
the reply from Col. ~~Adhikhan~~ to Sir.
on 70/10731.

? wait

acct

23/5/14

This looks excellent in
paper, but I doubt whether the Abyssinians
are going to allow themselves to be
chopped up in the easy way for some
time to come.

Put by?

H. J. D.

23/5/14

Pr 25.5.14

Ch. 16.5.14

626.5.14

626.5.14

P 22.11

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 19342/14

Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

Very Confidential

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

May 21, 1914.

Reference to previous letter:

Colonial Office, March 31

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
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Agent and Consul-General

Cairo, No 77, April 26

Abyssinian Tripartite Agreement

ABYSSINIA.

May 2.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[19342]

No. 1

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edmund Greig (Received May 2.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

Cairo, April 28, 1914.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No 76, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following observations with regard to the most advantageous boundary for the Soudan hinterland south of Adis Ababa, subject to the proviso that a territorial connection must be left for the Italian Government.

It does not appear to be necessary to alter the boundary line of the Soudan hinterland north of Adis Ababa proposed in my despatch No 12 of the 29th May, 1913, in order to obtain such connection, and I do not think that it would be possible to draw the frontier further to the west without giving away complete control of the head waters of the Blue Nile.

The territorial connection required should therefore be given immediately to the west and south-west of Adis Ababa, and, in order to maintain our right of railway access to the capital, a right of way through Italian territory would have to be secured.

I enclose a revised map on which the readjustment of frontiers which I consider could be made are marked, and which secures territorial connection between Erythraea and Italian Somaliland, and substitutes a British right of way between the Soudan and the capital, as well as one between British East Africa and British Somaliland, for the Italian right of way between the north-east portion of Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland proposed in my despatch No. 12.

If Italy requires further territorial connection beyond that shown on the map, it would have to be taken from the territory allotted to France, and a dotted line across that territory shows what might perhaps be enclosed in the French sphere. I would point out, however, that this concession would cause the French railway to Adis Ababa to pass through Italian territory, and France would doubtless have grave objection on any such interference with her access to the capital.

As regards the boundary to the west and south of Adis Ababa, I have given the frontier line on the map a somewhat more generous curve towards the west, but any considerable alteration in this direction would encroach on the valley of the River Omo, which should be in the British sphere.

Further to the east I have left a liberal hinterland to Italian Somaliland, showing a British right of way for a possible railway connection between the Soudan and Berbera.

I may add that I have had the advantage of consulting Mr. Thesiger on the subject during his recent visit to Cairo, and he is in agreement with me regarding the proposals contained in this despatch.

I have, &c.
KITCHENER.

ABYSSINIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

C. O.
22441

[May 19.]

Rec^d
REG^d 22 JUN 14

SECTION 1.

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[22457]

No. 1.

Mr. Thesiger to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

Sir, 4, Cranley Place, London, May 15, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum on my journey from Adis Ababa to Nairobi through Moyale, from whence I visited the frontier east to the Gaddaduma wells and west as far as Mount Turbi.

My journey through Abyssinia was unattended by any incident. Lij Yasu's orders that I should receive every attention were obeyed, and he himself sent one of his officers to accompany me as far as Sidamo with orders to Dejaz Baltha's representative to take me on from that point until we met Fitaurari Waldi. The Minister for War, Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis, also sent Fitaurari Gashi to accompany me as far as Moyale.

M. Zaphiro went with me to Nairobi and returned through Mombasa and Jibuti to Adis Ababa.

I would wish to place on record my very sincere appreciation of his services on the road, and of his wonderful knowledge of the country and the inhabitants, without which I am convinced my journey would have been of very little use.

From Sidamo onwards I found that M. Zaphiro was acquainted with nearly all the officers we met, and in the Boran country and along the frontier he can be said to have an intimate knowledge not only of all the chiefs but of nearly every man of any importance among the various tribes, and their friendship and respect for him were most valuable in illiciting information which might otherwise have been impossible to obtain.

As I had heard of the Merihan expedition just before leaving Adis Ababa I seized the chance of taking down forty mules on my own account which were sold in Nairobi at good prices, and the sum realised will be credited to the expenses of my journey after deducting the cost of their transport down, and knowing the shortage of mules in East Africa I also gave permission to M. Zaphiro and to several of my men to take down other mules to the number covered by my permit from the Abyssinian Government.

The account of the expenses of my journey will be sent in as soon as I receive from M. Zaphiro his accounts for himself and 1 servants from Jibuti to Adis Ababa.

I have, &c.

WILFRED G. THESIGER.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum on Mr. Thesiger's Journey to the Southern Frontier of Abyssinia and Nairobi.

I PROPOSE in this memorandum to deal with questions touching the internal conditions of Abyssinia only so far as they concern the situation on the southern frontier and recent incidents arising therefrom, these two subjects forming the main purpose of my journey.

I found that the chaotic disorder, into which the central Government has been steadily sinking for the past three years, was generally reflected throughout the provinces. The Abyssinian chiefs who escorted me talked freely on the political situation, the seriousness of which appears to be generally recognised, and were most outspoken in their criticisms. They attributed the existing disorder very rightly to the corruption of the Administration, which allows any offence to pass unpunished so long as the offender is rich enough to bribe his judges, and to the clacking off of all control from Adis Ababa. Lij Yasu is regarded neither with affection or respect, and even his own officers declared that he was disliked by the Shoans, who suspect

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him of having poisoned the late Emperor and are beginning to talk of Dejaz Tafari, the son of the late Ras Makonnen, as his possible successor.

The general attitude was that of people waiting for a crisis which they know to be inevitable but regard as something outside the sphere of any possible intervention on their own part. Accustomed for centuries to their system of feudal government, they leave the decision in all matters of higher politics to their own chief and, when the time comes, will probably obey his orders blindly.

The chiefs, however, are obviously in a state of uncertainty and, while they detest the present form of Government and, so far as they dare, refuse to recognise the authority of the Council of Ministers, their own personal jealousies and intrigues, united with their rooted mistrust of their colleagues, prevents any combination for the purpose of joint action.

So long, therefore, as the Ministers do not attempt to enforce their authority on the provincial chiefs and limit the exercise of their power to Adis Ababa and its surroundings, matters may drift on for a considerable time in much the same way as they are doing at present, since the burden of their corruption and abuse of justice falls mainly on the people and influential officers who have no one to appeal to and no means of getting their grievances heard.

The recognition, however, by the Government of their own weakness and of their impotence to make their will felt outside the capital, which conducts temporarily to the internal stability of the kingdom, makes it absolutely impossible for the provincial chiefs to become practically independent, and allows the central Government to treat with Abyssinia as a whole, or to obtain through the central Government the solution of questions which affect the provincial administrations. Herein lies the explanation of the difficulties we have experienced in obtaining any reparations for the serious frontier raids of the past two years or any satisfactory assurances that matters will be amended in the future, and it is becoming every day more obvious that we can look for no help from the side of the Abyssinian Government, but must in future depend entirely on our own powers of prevention to check the continuation of gun-running and raiding from the Abyssinian side of the border.

It was one of the purposes of my journey to obtain some information with regard to the authors of the various raids of the past two years and, if possible, evidence which would enable the legation to bring the responsibility home to some particular chief, whereby we would have further grounds for again endeavouring to force the Government to take action.

In order to concentrate our efforts to this end I decided to limit my enquiries to the four principal incidents of the past twenty-four months: namely, the joint attack by Abyssinians and Ali Abdy's section of the Garre on the Yabeh; the raid on Moyale, in which twenty-eight of our subjects were killed and a large amount of stock driven off; the raid which ended with the death of Captain Aylmer; and the simultaneous raids of Kulal and Marsabit.

It was known some time ago that the author of the attack on the Yabeh was a certain Abyssinian named Alemayyu, and at my request the Government had arrested him and one of his companions and had brought them to Adis Ababa in chains. As, however, the former had been allowed to escape and the latter had died in prison, all hope of obtaining information from this source had been destroyed. The Government had furthermore accused Ali Abdy, a chief of one of our sections of Garre, of having deliberately invited the Abyssinians over for the purpose of attacking the Yabeh and of having shared the plunder with them, and had asked me to investigate the matter at Moyale.

On the road down it was impossible to obtain any news with regard to the whereabouts of Alemayyu, who had apparently not returned to the frontier districts, and none of the Bar or Abyssinians questioned could tell me the names of his companions, as, with few exceptions, these raiders invariably adopt fictitious names when on these expeditions, which are also, as an additional precaution, in all probability frequently changed.

With regard to the accusation against Ali Abdy, Fitaurari Waldi maintained that not only had he invited the hunters over, but that he had also gone through the ceremony of blood-brotherhood with their leaders. I consequently sent on a message to Mr. Hope, asking that Ali Abdy should be sent to Moyale to answer the accusations, and on my arrival the matter was investigated by Mr. Hope and myself in the presence of Fitaurari Waldi and Gashi.

Ali Abdy denied that he had gone through the ceremony of blood-brotherhood,

but it was proved that the hunters had stayed for a week in his village before the raid during which time he had provided them with food and lodging; that they had started from his house with the Garre tribesmen, and that they had returned there to divide the looted stock equally between Abyssinians and Garre; and had, as Elin Shabba, another Garre chief testified, acted throughout as one people.

Ali Abdy himself could not deny the main facts, but pleaded justification, saying that, shortly before, the Yabeh had killed some of his men, and that being unable to obtain from us either reparation or protection he had taken matters into his own hands and had joined the Abyssinians in a joint raid against the Yabeh.

Elin Shabba and other Garre chiefs, however, gave evidence that no Garre had been killed for some time past, and that in the last instance the matter had been settled by the payment of blood money according to tribal custom. It was also shown by Mr. Hope that no complaint had been made to him by Ali Abdy of any men of his tribe having been killed, neither had he brought any such case to the notice of Colonel Thesiger or Mr. Archer when they passed through his village some five months before on a tour of inspection.

I therefore strongly recommended to Mr. Hope that Ali Abdy should be taken to Nairobi, and deported for some years as the offence with which he was charged of deliberate complicity with Abyssinian raiders was not an uncommon one, and must be checked by a severe example.

At the same time I would point out that, although in this case Ali Abdy appears to have been prompted merely by a desire of gain, our frontier chiefs are frequently placed in a position of extreme difficulty, and have no other choice but to shelter and aid the raiders or to submit to being raided themselves, as, with the small force at his disposal, the officer in charge of Moyale is unable to afford them the protection which we have promised them for so many years, or to obtain compensation in cases where they have not made their own terms with the hunters.

In this case, although I must maintain the necessity of making an example of Ali Abdy, I hold that considerable blame must attach to the Government of the protectorate, who have failed to give effect to the promises given and many times repeated to our tribes.

This investigation further proved beyond doubt that Alemayyu was the originator of this raid, that he had his residence in Sudama, the province of Dejaz Balela, and that the latter, by failing to take proper precautions for his safe custody after his arrest, can by Abyssinian law be called upon either to produce him or to take responsibility for his acts, and, as at the time of his arrest Dejaz Balela confiscated all his property, he can also be called upon to hand it over to us as part compensation for the damages inflicted by this raid.

I consequently wrote to the legation advising that this case should be reopened at Adis Ababa, and pointed out to Fitaurari Waldi that, as we had now dealt with their accusation against Ali Abdy, so we should look for an equal measure of justice on their side.

With regard to the Maikona raid on British and Abyssinian subjects grazing to the south of the line, I found that Fitaurari Waldi had already taken action against Dejaz Marid for this raid, and had recovered a certain proportion of the stock lost on this occasion from the Abyssinian tribes who belonged to his district.

We have, therefore, Abyssinian evidence as to the author of this raid, and should, with the assistance of Fitaurari Waldi, have now a fair chance of pushing home our claims for compensation.

Fitaurari Waldi stated to me that a certain number of the recovered sheep and goats were at Horro-luki, and agreed to allow certain of our Gabbra to go over for the purpose of trying to identify them.

As our Gabbra had, since the raid, deserted Maikona and emigrated to Marsabit, further investigation had to be postponed. Before leaving Moyale it was decided that, as soon as the rains broke, Fitaurari Waldi should bring the stock to Mege, and that Mr. Desk should seize the first opportunity of going there accompanied by some of the Gabbra for the purposes of identification of the animals. When we reached Marsabit, however, and called in the Gabbra headmen, great difficulty was experienced in inducing any of them to consent to go, one and all making excuses and endeavouring to shun their duty on his neighbours. This is an example of one of the many difficulties experienced by our officers in dealing with these questions, as although our tribes are usually ready enough to bring forward their grievances, it is almost impossible to induce them to take any trouble to do so, and the emergency necessary to substantiate their complaints.

ceases, and as regards raids made from other provinces than his own we must not look to him for aid in preventing them or for assistance in bringing our accusations home to the offending parties. His attitude is best described as one of benevolent neutrality.

It must, however, be remembered that his position in Adis Ababa is at best insecure, and we must always reckon with the possibility of his province being taken away from him, or of his attitude towards us changing. Of the first possibility I will not speak further, as it depends entirely upon the course of palace intrigues, the chances of which no European has ever yet fathomed; but I must dwell for a moment on the chance of the second eventually turning to fact.

In his efforts to maintain order on the frontier, Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis has been obliged to increase his garrisons very considerably, and in order to maintain them in the country he has been forced to change the whole system of taxation in the Boran. In former days the natives were only lightly taxed in cattle, and the collection of the tax was left in the hands of their own chief and they were free to move at will through the whole country wherever good grazing and water were to be found. They were in certain instances ill-treated by the Government troops in the district, and the fact that we steadily refused to return such oppressed families as took refuge on our side of the line has always been looked upon as a grievance by the Abyssinians and has been the reason of several raids into our territory. On the whole, however, these cases were comparatively few, and consequently of no great importance. Now, however, that the necessity of supporting a much greater number of soldiers in the district has forced the Government to divide all the Boran as serfs or bondsmen among the soldiers, giving to each officer and man so many families to support him, the question has become a very burning one. The native is obliged to pay a definite amount yearly in cash, kind, and labour to his master, he is forbidden to leave his village and consequently considers that from being a free man he has sunk to the slave of the Abyssinians. The desire, therefore, to escape to our side of the line where there is no taxation is now no longer confined to a few individuals but extends to whole sections of tribes. The Abyssinians are using every effort to prevent this emigration, but in instances of families and even villages which escape their vigilance are on the increase. The situation thus tends to become very difficult.

Without the Boran the Abyssinians cannot subsist in the country, and the view of Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis and his officers undoubtedly is that, since the extra soldiers were sent down to check raids at our request, we on our side should help the Abyssinians to prevent their crossing the border and force them to return when they succeeded in doing so. Our refusal to do so is looked upon as a grievance and may ultimately, if large numbers of Boran cross over in the future, as they well may, bring about a great change in the present friendly attitude of the Fitaurari, even if it does not lead to organised raids for the purpose of recapturing the fugitives. Taking these facts into consideration, and remembering that the internal disorders of Abyssinia must almost certainly increase as time goes on, the outlook on the frontier is full of uncertainty.

When I passed through Moyale I found that the total force which the District Commissioner had, actually on the frontier, to meet all contingencies was a garrison of forty King's African Rifles under Lieutenant Rose and thirty irregular police for patrolling and police work.

These men were excellent in their way but as regards numbers, equipment, and training utterly inadequate to the task they have in hand, and it seemed to me that the short of marvellous how Mr. Hope and the officers under him have accomplished all they have done.

These men were armed with worn out Martini's and a miscellaneous lot of old rifles which had been captured from the enemy. In one or two cases the back sights were missing, in all the barrels were loose, and the breeches jammed at a few shots. To show that I am not exaggerating I might mention that at Marsabit the Assistant District Commissioner had collected sixteen Martini rifles which were altogether unserviceable and by taking them to pieces and interchanging parts Mr. Castle Smith, who is a mechanical expert as well as Assistant District Commissioner at Moyale, was able to turn out eight rifles which would fire, and these were issued to the men.

When one considers that the police may at any moment be called upon to fight for their lives against a superior force, armed in most cases with modern magazine rifles, one cannot too strongly condemn the system which makes such a condition of affairs possible. It is unjust to the men, it is unfair to the officers who have to lead

them, and it is lowering to our prestige in the eyes of the Abyssinians who know the facts and comment on them in amazement.

As I have already said above, we can no longer hope by means of protests at Adis Ababa to force the central Government to maintain order on their borders or to restrain their soldiers and hunters from raiding into our territory: under the present conditions they could not do it if they would. It is equally vain to hope that any change in the Administration will bring about a better state of things, the whole Government is so disorganised that matters must inevitably go from bad to worse.

In these circumstances the only possible solution of a very difficult question is to be found in a reorganisation of the administration of the whole Northern Frontier district, which will allow all the various questions to be dealt with and provided for as a whole, instead of each one being inadequately treated when a pressing necessity arises, accompanied by an increase in the military and police forces which will allow for proper administration to be extended over the whole district and suffice to maintain order internally while preventing raids from outside.

At present the Jubaland Somalis and the Meriban are under different local administrations, and the fact that they wander from one district to another complicates matters and renders it difficult to deal with them. I hesitate to go into this subject at any length as it stretches beyond my personal knowledge and out of the scope of a memorandum dealing with frontier affairs, but refer to it briefly because a reorganisation of the Northern Frontier district must, to be effective, deal with the question of the Somalis, Meriban, Bann, and Garre tribes as a whole, and bring them all under one Administration.

To go back, however, to the frontier proper in its connection with Abyssinia, it must be remembered that the frontier administration extends from the post at Kufal and the south end of Lake Rudolf past Moyale and Gaddaduma to the junction of the Dawa and Gande Rivers, and that the whole length of this line is subject to incursions from the north. To deal with these raids, to maintain order and to carry on local police work among our own tribes, we had at the beginning of the year only 110 police which were distributed as follows: at Moyale 20 men, at Wajir 45 and at Kufal 35, supported by a half company of King's African Rifles at Kufal and another half company at Moyale. Owing to the great distances and the difficulties of communication any co-operation in a sudden emergency is impossible and the weakness of each individual post is thus accentuated.

If our frontier officers are to deal effectively with the situation and to be in a position to protect and administer our tribes; to check gun-running which is assuming serious proportions; and to deal with any ordinary hunting raid the police force on the frontier must be raised to 400 men, trained to a reasonable extent, armed with modern rifles and mounted, to the extent of 75 per cent., on mules.

The distribution of this force would be as follows:—

1. Moyale	40 men	3 administrative and
Banaha	20 "	police officers.
Brakau	20 "	
Muddo	20 "	
	100 "	
2. Dolo	100 "	2 administrative and
"	20 "	2 police officers.
	120 "	
3. Kufal	20 "	1 administrative and
Marsabit	10 "	1 police officer.
Makoon	10 "	
	50 "	
4. Garso Nyero	20 "	1 administrative
Wajir	40 "	officer.
El Wak	50 "	2 administrative and
	110 "	2 police officers.
Total	400 "	7 administrative and
		6 police officers.

1. The Moyale force would be responsible for the patrolling of the frontier from Turbi to Muddo, and their presence and continued patrolling would do most to

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prevent incursions of small bodies of hunters along this line and prevent them from settling for any length of time among our tribes.

The establishment of these four posts would, I think, prevent the entry of any large caravan-running caravans, and would enable our police to search the majority of the trade caravans which come over land for Wujeir and El Wak.

I do not imagine that they can entirely stop the traffic in arms, but they would largely increase the risks of the contraband trade and the discovery of any smuggled arms and cartridges should entail the forfeiture of the whole caravan.

Two administrative and one police officer would be necessary at Moyale one of whom would be continually engaged in patrolling the line and visiting the three small posts dependent on this station.

2. The police force at Dolo would patrol the frontier from Lugh to Muddo with the same ends as the Moyale post. It would be their duty also to prevent as far as possible the entry of armed Somalis from the north and to police the Merihan country to the south.

I consider the establishment of a strong post at Dolo to be most important in view of the expedition which is at this moment engaged in disarming the Merihan tribes. If this condition is successful and the Merihan are to a large extent disarmed we are bound to afford them protection in future as they are surrounded on all four sides by armed tribes with whom they are at feud. On the north they have the Yoben, on the east the Italian Somali tribes, on the south the Jubaland and the Garre. To leave them at the mercy of these enemies would be bad policy and would for ever destroy all hope of winning their loyalty. If the expedition is not successful the presence of a strong police force within their borders will be even more necessary to prevent them believing that they have successfully resisted the power of the Government and can henceforth disobey our orders with impunity.

One administrative and two police officers would be necessary for this section.

3. The third section would be based at Kulal and would serve to protect the Rendille tribes from the Turkhana and Abyssinians. Patrols would be necessary towards Maikona and Marsabit where small police posts should be stationed with a definite line to patrol.

When possible the main post should be pushed forward to Khor, which, as I have said in the early part of this memorandum, is the base from which the Abyssinians raid and probably the only water on the road between Rudolf and Maikona by which raiders can drive away looted stock.

In connection with the Kulal post, I would urge most strongly the necessity of placing two steel whale-boats with motor attachments on Lake Rudolf, these boats to be capable of carrying twenty men with their kit. By means of these boats the lake shore could be patrolled right up to the frontier, and it would enable us to throw in a force behind any body of raiders coming down either shore of the lake, thus cutting them off from their own country. As there is no other road, except the lake road, by which raiders from Dejaz Maredis and Fitaurari Mahommens districts can penetrate our country, we could, by this means, afford the Rendille absolute protection from the north, and in the event of further trouble from the Turkhana, a small force could be easily transported across the lake to co-operate with any column moving round the south end from Kulal or from Uganda.

At Kulal one administrative and one police officer would be required.

4. The Guaso Nyero post would be stationed in the present position at Archer's post, and would serve for local police duty and for the protection of the new caravan route to the Lorian and Wujeir. One administrative officer would be sufficient here.

5. The purpose of the two stronger posts at Wujeir and El Wak would be local police duties among the very mixed population which use these wells, patrol work on the roads leading to the frontiers, and they would serve as a reserve for the northern posts in the event of any raiders invading or pressing too strongly for the border. They would form a second line on the main caravan roads for the purpose of checking caravan-running and would be in touch with the police posts to the north.

An administrative and a police officer would be necessary at each of these posts, and the officer in charge at El Wak would administer the Garre tribes.

This is a brief statement of the minimum police force with which I believe the northern frontier district can be properly policed and administered. It would need to be supported by a military force based on Wujeir and Serenli, for use in any emergency which might be beyond the scope of police work. I will give later on a brief summary of the military scheme drawn up by the Inspector-General in connection

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with the above proposals, which I laid before the Governor and the authorities interested during my stay at Nairobi, who, I believe, fully concur in the views I have expressed subject to the consent of the Colonial Office and to the possibility of providing for the cost and maintenance of the increased force.

That the expenditure on the northern frontier district will be considerably increased is certain, but the present situation is very serious, and the forces at our disposal are insufficient to meet the actual requirements of the country at the present moment, and utterly inadequate to deal with any grave trouble which may possibly arise at any moment in the future.

As regards the proposed increase of expenditure on the police force, it must be remembered that it will also be possible thereby to increase the revenue of the frontier district in several ways. For instance, I would suggest levying a tax of a rupee per head on all cattle passing through Moyale; in the present year such a tax should bring in 10,000 rupees. I would also propose an import duty of 8 per cent. *ad valorem* on coffee. At the present moment there is a considerable trade in unskinned coffee from Sidamo with Jubaland, which could be very greatly increased once the caravan roads are made safe and facilities given to the Abyssinian merchants. With the increase of the police force a but or poll tax could be systematically collected to contribute to the cost of the increased administration. It would, I believe, be well to collect, where possible, the tax in cattle and sheep, and, after deducting the quantity sufficient for rationing the various caravans, to send the remainder at stated periods to Nairobi for sale by auction, where they would fetch about four times their local value.

The camel-owning tribes could be taxed in transport, that is, each tribal section could be called upon to supply a certain number of camels yearly for Government transport service when required, the hire value of which should be the equivalent of the total sum at which that section would otherwise be taxed.

At present, the taxation, owing to the inadequacy of the Administration, falls irregularly on the various tribes, and, to our shame, it must be added, is collected only from the peaceful tribes who are incapable of any resistance, while the more warlike Garre and the truculent Somalis escape it altogether because we are afraid of them, and the fact that they are beginning to appreciate this is one of the dangers of the present situation.

I might add here that one of the principal inducements to Abyssinian subjects to come and settle on our side, where their presence is a constant cause of friction with the Abyssinians, is the fact that there is no regular system of taxation.

It may be urged that the introduction of taxation among our tribes would not affect the immigrating Boran, who, by treaty, are free to graze and water on our side of the line. This treaty right, however, was undoubtedly only meant to apply to certain seasons, and to cover the old-established usage under which the Boran come down to the plains in the rains and our tribes go to the highlands in the dry season, and was never intended to sanction permanent residence free of taxation by our respective tribes on either side of the border. I would recommend strongly that, by agreement with Abyssinia, tribes who definitely take up their residence in the country of the other contracting Power should, after one year, become liable to taxation by the authorities of the district in which they have chosen to reside. This would at once discourage to a certain extent the influx of natives from the north, and break our Garre subjects of the habit of keeping a large proportion of their flocks in Abyssinian territory, where they are of no profit to our Administration.

I think I have said enough to show that the extra cost of this increase in the police force could in part be met by the additional revenue which it would then be possible to raise from the northern district, and will now turn to the question of the maintenance of the larger force. As I have said, the necessary meat rations could be provided locally, but the grain and other supplies would have to be sent up from the south. The opening of the new transport road, which is already under construction, will greatly facilitate this problem. Under this scheme stores would be transported from the border to Archer's Post, on the Guaso Nyero, from there by ox waggons or, better still, mechanical transport) to the Lorian, from whence camels are available for the carriage to Wujeir and El Wak, which would be the distributing centre for the posts on the border line. Considerable economy, both in cost and labour, could be effected by having the grain supplies from the Abyssinian post at Mera, where the collections are increasing the emigration enormously, with the sole idea of furnishing grain and flour for the Moyale markets, and although it would be out of the question to be entirely dependent on a source of supply which would be cut off in the event of

hostilities, as an additional means of obtaining grain. Meqa can be of great value to us.

From the two points of view, therefore, of the cost and the maintenance of the additional force, there would appear to be no insuperable difficulties in the way.

I think I am right in saying that Mr. Hope has recently been authorised to increase the present police force from 110 to 140 men, but this increase would do nothing to meet the actual needs of the situation, and I firmly believe that nothing short of the numbers suggested in the above scheme would really safeguard the frontier and enable us to introduce a proper Administration into these districts. The change would necessitate the additional appointment of 1 administrative and 6 police officers and the raising of 260 extra men. At present the district and assistant district commissioners combine the duties of administrative and police officers, but if the police are to be properly trained and our tribes taken in hand as they should be, this would no longer be possible.

The establishment of a proper police force would also have the additional advantage that it would relieve the military authorities from the necessity of providing small posts in outlying districts for what is really police work, and would enable them to concentrate their forces, thus facilitating uninterrupted training for the King's African Rifles recruits, and ensuring the concentration of a striking force at headquarters for use in any sudden emergency.

I have already mentioned the necessity of the police administration being supported by a military force, and will now add a brief outline of the increase in reorganisation which the Inspector-General considers to be absolutely necessary from the military point of view:—

One battalion King's African Rifles concentrated on Juba (four companies)
One battalion King's African Rifles concentrated on Nairobi, finding one company at Marich, one company at Moyale (five companies).

One flying column King's African Rifles based on Serenli:—

125 Somali Light Infantry.
50 Camel Corps (Soudanese).
50 Mule Mounted Infantry (Somali).
25 Pony "Hilaloes" (Somali).

One flying column based on Wujeir:—

125 Abyssinian Light Infantry.
50 Camel Corps (Soudanese).
50 Mule Mounted Infantry (Abyssinians).
25 Pony "Hilaloes" (Abyssinians).

Military transport of 150 camels near Serenli.

Military transport of 150 camels near Wujeir.

A commandant of the protectorate forces with headquarters at Nairobi, who will be responsible for the training, administration, and general distribution of the troops under His Excellency's orders.

The movements of the flying columns to be under the general direction of the officer responsible for the administration of the northern provinces.

The Zanzibar garrison of two companies to be found by the Nyasaland battalions which will necessitate (if Nyasaland military requirements consist of 300 men) this battalion consisting of five companies of 100 men each.

Sufficient in brief the requirements of the northern districts from the administrative, military and police standpoints.

With a strong force I believe that the frontier will be efficiently protected against attack from the north. It will be possible to minimise, if not to check altogether, the influx of arms and ammunition, and to bring our own tribes under proper control. Any lesser measures must, I am convinced, lead to disaster, and any delay in carrying out this very necessary reorganisation may lead us into serious trouble. By neglecting to fulfil our premier object of protection to our frontier tribes, we are fast losing their respect and respect. We are destroying the prestige which we have hitherto enjoyed in Abyssinia by our inability to deal with border raids with a strong hand, and we are arousing in the minds of our Somali tribes the suspicion that we are afraid of them.

Even now the situation will need very careful handling; in a few years we

shall be able to assert our supremacy only by means of a very costly expedition, for which our local forces will be altogether insufficient, and I cannot help feeling that, in the present state of affairs, incidents which appear insignificant in the commencement, may at any moment draw us into serious complications.

With regard to the commercial possibilities on the frontier we are handicapped at the outset by the fact that the products of Abyssinia are much the same as those of East Africa, and that the distances are too great to allow the product of Southern Abyssinia to be exported via Kismayu or Nairobi.

It has been the aim of the legation for some years past to induce the Abyssinian Government to consent to free trade in cattle, mules, and horses. As regards the first, we have been practically successful, and in 1913 some 7,000 head of cattle were imported via Moyale, but the Abyssinians have steadily refused, except in very exceptional cases, to sanction the export of either mules or horses.

I believe that the cattle trade is now firmly established, and that the numbers imported into East Africa will increase steadily. The recent changes in the system of taxation imposed upon the Boran, although it may lead to complications politically, is from the commercial point of view favourable to us. As I have mentioned above the Boran are now divided out as bondsmen among the Abyssinian officers and soldiers, and for every hundred head of cattle the owner has to pay to his master a yearly sum of 18 dollars, provide him with a bullock on certain feast days, look after his mules, and generally be of service. They are also called upon to provide camels and men for transport work, for which they receive neither pay nor rations and have further to pay to the Central Government a yearly tax of 1 dollar for every 100 head of cattle.

This is very much resented by the Boran, who are in consequence debating among themselves the possibility of emigrating *en masse* to our side of the line, and are only prevented by the difficulty of escaping with their cattle and the knowledge that if they fail in their attempt they would be shot without mercy.

In the meantime, however, they must have money with which to pay their taxes, and they can only obtain it by selling their cattle, for which they have no other market than Moyale. I have discussed the question fully with Fitaurai Waldi, and he will place no difficulties in the way of buyers from the south, but he was obviously uncertain how the matter would be regarded at Adis Ababa.

I consequently advised Mr. Hope to arrange all the details locally, and not to apply in any way to the Central Government, as I feel sure that in this way we shall get all the cattle we require.

It was further arranged that Somali traders from Nairobi should only be allowed to purchase cattle at Moyale, in the Abyssinian market, and at Meqa, the new headquarters of the local Government, and that we should open a weekly market on our side of the frontier.

The grounds for these two decisions were that it was very desirable, in the first case, to limit the Somalis to certain roads and markets in order, if possible, to check them from wandering all over the country and mixing themselves up in gun-running and other objectionable forms of traffic; in the second case, it is hoped by opening a market on our side to regulate the prices of cattle, grain, and coffee which are, on the Abyssinian side, sometimes run up to absurd heights by the officer in charge of the market, hoping thereby to tire out the merchants, who are naturally anxious to get away as possible, and oblige them to pay any price asked in order to avoid the further consequences of an enforced delay.

Although the Central Government have forbidden the export of mules I found that the officers in charge of the frontier were most anxious to sell as they receive no pay and find it hard to get money.

Many mules have been sold in this way to our police at Moyale; this being the only way in which Mr. Hope could obtain the necessary mounts for his men, who must, in return for the permission to buy and keep mules in the fort, use the animals for Government service while on duty but are free to sell them at Nairobi when they go on leave.

As a temporary expedient this system was ingenious and has worked well, but it is not economical for the Government who are very frequently obliged to buy these mules at Nairobi at three times the local price on the frontier.

I therefore recommend that the officer in charge at Moyale should be provided with money and authority to purchase all the sound mules that are offered for sale by the Abyssinians, as I believe he would in this way be able to buy 50 or three hundred yearly at an average cost of from 5/ to 6/ a head, whereas if these same mules are taken by traders or private persons to Nairobi the price is from 18/ to 22/.

In purchasing on the frontier the seller must always be called upon to give some known man as guarantee that the mule is his and that he has right to sell, as otherwise the buyer, if the mule is a stolen one, can by Abyssinian law be obliged to give it up to its rightful owner without compensation, whereas if a guarantee has been given the plaintiff can seize him until he produces the man who sold it wrongfully or refunds the value of the mule himself.

A careful observance of this precaution will hinder Abyssinians from making a practice of bringing stolen mules for sale on our side of the line, and will be the means of preventing a fruitful source of disputes with our neighbours.

Here again matters must be arranged locally, and we must abandon all hope of persuading the Central Government to give permits to export mules or horses either to the Protectorate Government or to private traders.

A great deal might be done to encourage the trade in coffee between Sidamo and Jubaland, where unhusked coffee finds a ready market among the Somalis, who pound up the grain with the husk as an article of food and do not use it as a drink.

I know that the import of coffee into the protectorate proper is forbidden for fear of introducing leaf disease, but no harm could be done by importing the unhusked coffee among the Meriban and Somali tribes, where there are no coffee plantations, the more especially as this coffee, as an article of commerce, would be unsaleable in the settled parts of the protectorate.

The Italians have, by means of their commercial agent in the Ginnir district, already established a large and valuable trade in unhusked coffee between the Arussi and Ben Adir, and we ought easily be able to do likewise especially if we have a consul, on the Gambela lines, in southern Abyssinia.

The merchants in Sidamo would be only too willing to open a trade southwards, as at present their only market is in Adis Ababa, and to reach the capital they have to submit to the exactions of various chiefs and sub-chiefs on the road, paying duty at about eight different custom houses.

Their only complaint at present is that if they send their coffee to Moyale they are not sure of finding a buyer at once on their arrival. This, however, is a matter which could easily be arranged if the country on our side were once administered and trade encouraged. So far Mr. Hope has been rather inclined to discourage the trade, as it affords an easy method of smuggling in cartridges. Once, however, the police force is increased, caravans could be thoroughly searched on passing the frontier and again by the patrols who would be watching the roads from Wujeir to El Wak, and if a severe example were made by confiscating the whole caravan if arms or cartridges were discovered to be concealed in the bales, the merchants would soon learn to appreciate the danger of gun-running and trade dishonestly.

No statistics are available as regards the amount of coffee which has passed the frontier of late years, but it is a trade which might be very valuable as a means of raising revenue, as even with an import duty of 8 per cent, *ad valorem* the merchants would pay far less in duties than would be the case on the northern road.

I believe that on enquiry it would be found that considerable amounts of wax and even hides are sent down from Abyssinian territory via Lugh to be exported at Italian Somaliland ports, and there is no doubt that a considerable portion of this trade would, if a regular administration and an efficient police control were established on our side, pass through Dolo and other points on the frontier to find their exit at Kismayu.

A certain trade is carried on with Jubaland in a kind of Epsom salts, which is found in Abyssinian territory and is very largely used by the natives for medicinal purposes. A certain quantity was obtained while I was at Moyale, and will, I hope, be sent home for analysis in case it may have a commercial value.