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Recd
MAR 25 1912

EAST AFR. PROT.
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G. 151
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Date
1912
March
previous Paper.
8198

NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT

Trs reports by Mr Archer, I.G., F.A.R. and Lt Col. Breaching.

Vertical handwritten notes on the left margin, including dates like '25th April 1912' and '25th April 1912'.

Mr. G. Fiddes

See also Mr 8798, from which it appears that steps are being taken to deal with the more immediately pressing matters.
The transport question ~~remains~~ lies at the root of the whole scheme for the control of the Northern & North Eastern frontier of one of the first things to be done is to decide how to keep the transport canal clear. Some suggestions are made as to the nature of the disease which has wiped out the canal transport in 3 successive years, but be want something more definite than this unless Mr. Stanley the Chief Veterinary Officer, who has recently travelled through the country on his way to

Vertical handwritten notes at the bottom left, including '109' and '2004'.

... I think that we should send out a veterinary expert with a knowledge of animal disease to investigate. Send the extract from Mr. Archer's report which I have marked by blue pencil brackets to Mr. Sturdy & ask him if he has arrived at any definite conclusion as to the nature of the disease & if so, what measures he recommends for coping with it - & telegraph to the S.S. asking whether the veterinary reports have reported on the blood studies & pathological specimens ^{which were taken} by Capt. Neave & if so what - then

Report from the question of disease it is necessary to ensure that the camels will be properly looked after. In the last issue Col. Sherrin says that at the present time, most officers engage their camels with a total disregard of the well being of the camels & give instances. It might be fairly easy to correct this & it might be considered whether officers who are likely to be employed in the future should not be required to undergo instruction for a short period in a Camel Corps in the Sudan.

...
H. J. ...

Northern

The ^{proper} line of communication for the Abyssinian frontier is clearly the Mecca - Mass - Kipit - Marsabit - Moyale route & I think that we should ask the firm to state what steps he proposes to take to improve the road on this route & to employ mechanical transport. It appears ^{that} Mr. Horne has done a good deal in the way of improving one section of the road for £100 & it might be possible to do a good deal more for a moderate expenditure. I am in cordial agreement with what Mr. Archer says as to the desirability of developing trade with Southern Abyssinia by means of ~~the~~ improved transport.

The proper line of communication for the North Eastern frontier is clearly the Juba River & it appears from what Col. Sherrin says at p. 4 of the last issue that it ought to be possible to make satisfactory arrangements for the transport of supplies on it. We might ask the firm whether the post steamers can tow barges & if not, whether their towing capacity could be increased at

a moderate cost.

The question of having Indian Salaries
or some other form of veterinary assistance
for the camels (see p. 8 of last one)
should certainly be considered.

We might let Sir P. G. + Col.
Thengra see Capt. Gordon's report
on camel + other transport in
Nigeria (p. 113 - 115 of Misc. No.
229).

H. J. R.

4/14

Mr. Archer's Report is very good. His pro-
posal to make a road to Marsabit deserves
early consideration. The Gov. does not refer to it,
and I would ask whether he proposes to
take it up. The whole question must be
gone into with Col. Thengra + Sir P. Gordon.

14. 6. 14

Agree. E. 6. 14 Also we must deal with
the camel disease.

H. J. R.

... that the upper Juba River
... a series of terraces which would
... navigation

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Nigeria (p. 113 - 115 of Miss. N^o.
229).

H. J. R.

4/IV

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Ok. 6.4

I agree. Also we must deal with
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H. J. R.

... that the upper Juba River
... a series of terraces, which would
... navigation

C.O.
8898
25 MAR 12

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI
BRITISH EAST AFRICA

March 2nd, 1912.

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
Sir,

With reference to Sir Percy Stewart's
despatch No. 136 of the 21st ultimo I have the
honour to forward herewith the enclosures referred
to therein.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,



ACTING GOVERNOR.

THE KING'S SECRETARY
LONDON, ENGLAND, W. 1, S.W.
COMMUNICATED BY THE GOVERNOR,
NAIROBI, EAST AFRICA
LONDON, E.W.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

COPY FORWARDED TO THE
SECRETARY TO THE AD-
MINISTRATION.

ENCLOSURE No. 1
In Dispatch No. 1902/3/12

C/O
0303
23 MAR 12

NAIROBI.

January 29th 1912

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9

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith my handing-over report, which will acquaint you, while still in Nairobi, with the existing state of affairs in the Northern Frontier District. I venture to put forward also, perhaps at the risk of exceeding my province, some suggestions for the future, in the hope that they will serve a useful purpose as a basis for discussion of the situation at Headquarters.


Report

I have &c., &c.,

Sd/- G. F. Archer
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT.

J. O. W. HOPE ESQ.,
OFFICER IN CHARGE,
NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT.

C.O. 533
103
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HANDING OVER REPORT

NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT

10

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

This is the pressing question of the moment. The situation is as follows:-

In June and July of last year I collected the tax of 160 camels from the Rendile to re-establish our transport, which was then at a low ebb; and arrangements were also made for a further number of 40 camels to be brought in to complete the year's taxation of the tribe, when camel sickness broke out in the Rendile villages. The collection was stopped, and Capt. Neave, Chief Stock Inspector, went out to investigate the matter. He reported the prevalence of a disease, which from former experience he was unable to diagnose. The symptoms were those of "mumps" i.e. swelling of the neck glands. In some cases the disease appeared to yield to treatment but when I left for my tour of the Frontier at the end of August we had lost four of the new camels from this cause, and I was anxious about it. Sickness then appears to have spread rapidly with the result that in four months (September to December) we have practically lost the whole of our Camel Transport.

The present position is that there are only about ten survivors fit for work, but I have bought 30 more camels from the Garre and have instructed Mr. Deck to endeavour to buy at Waiheir, and send to Marsabit.

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Recd
Ref 25 MAR 12

HANDING OVER REPORT

NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT

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Marsabit at once 50 more. We have also 50 donkeys working on the road between Merille, our Transport Base, and Marsabit, so that, though our transport position is far from satisfactory, it should be possible to tide over pressing difficulties this year provided that no further losses are sustained. Meru porters and a Dutch transport rider with two waggons are keeping us supplied as far as Merille.

The disease is reported to have more or less exhausted itself now in the Rendile country, but in Boran the camels are still dying. Gallarass, Chief of the Gubbra, estimated to me his personal loss at nearly 25%. "Beef"-camels always out at graze and in apparently perfect condition are reported to have succumbed to the disease as readily as "baggage". A symptom that has recently appeared with us is swelling of the knees, and camels thus affected succumb very quickly.

Now it must be borne in mind that this is the third year that we have lost, owing to an epidemic, lack of grazing, or "fly" on the road, practically the whole of our camel transport at this time of the year, viz: at the end of the drought and at the beginning of the rains. The first year I think I am right in saying the loss was attributed to Coccidiosis, which at the time was killing the Samburu cattle and the game. This year apparently the cause may be the same, or the result of "fly". Capt. Neave, I believe, inclines to the latter theory but it is understood that he took with him to Nairobi blood-slides and specimens of the affected parts so that it is hoped that the Veterinary authorities may have by now been able to arrive at

a decision on this point.

The road, however, between Marsabit and the Uaso Nyiro is known to be infested with tsetse fly (longipennis) and if it is found now that these "fly" are infected, then this road for animal transport becomes closed to us. In this case we are faced with a serious problem to which there would appear to me to be but three possible solutions:-

- (i) Mechanical transport from Meru to Marsabit.
- (ii) Meru porterage from Meru to Marsabit.
- (iii) Alteration in the line to supply for the Frontier, using the Juba River with Serenli as base.

I wish to make myself quite clear in this matter: these proposals are only put forward to meet the situation which will arise if the Veterinary authorities express an opinion, based on expert knowledge, that the Marsabit to Uaso Nyiro road is impossible for animal transport. Such an opinion I am informed unofficially was expressed by Mr. Stordy Chief Veterinary Officer, after traversing this stage recently.] *End*

Taking these propositions in detail then:-

(i) The form of mechanical transport to be adopted would be a matter for the decision of experts:- A cross-country tractor might be serviceable: otherwise the construction of a road and the employment of a motor lorry might be necessary. As regards the road there would appear to be no serious engineering difficulty about it, except in the matter of the crossing of the Uaso Nyiro, and in the ascent of Marsabit itself. The distance from the Uaso Nyiro Post to Marsabit is approximately 125 miles, of which about 115 miles is flat country.

Maximum

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Maximum differences of level on this tract would scarcely exceed 500 feet, a steady fall in the country to the N.E. being maintained from a point about 16 miles North of the Usao Nyiro Post. The going is hard sand, which bears a Dutch transport waggon carrying 2½ tons. Soft sand in the dry water-courses, and patches of lava strewn ground would present the main difficulties. Rain in the desert area is confined to about one month in the year. The difficulty of water and supplies for the labour gangs employed on the road might be overcome by the attendance of the tractor. The work has a beginning in that Mr. Horne has constructed this year, with small funds set aside for the purpose (£100) a cart road from Meru to the Usao Nyiro Post, and it might be possible for him to arrange to carry through this work to Marsabit. That he would do so successfully and also very economically there is ⁱⁿ my mind no question of doubt, if he once undertook the work.

Provision was inserted by me in next year's estimates for £500 from Public Works Funds for the improvement of communications in the Northern Frontier District.

Sufficient justification for the necessary expenditure might be found in the following:-

- A. The certainty and rapidity of supply for Frontier Posts and Detachments by this method of transport, which has now become a matter of administrative necessity.
- B. The rapidity of movement of troops, if ever required, to Marsabit which is a point within striking distance of the Frontier.
- C.

C. The development of trade with Southern Abyssinia.

On the first two points no comment is necessary, while as regards the latter I venture to quote extracts from a letter written by Mr. Zaphiro from Adis Ababa, dated February 16th 1911:-

"Our great interest for the present with Abyssinia is to encourage trade as much as possible, especially facilitating Abyssinian traders from the North of the countries of Konso, Bako, Sangama, Arusi and Liban to go to Nairobi"..... "The killing of elephants and raids in our country would be lessened if trade is encouraged"..... "Such an act (permission to trading firms to establish themselves near Moyali) will encourage the Abyssinian traders to come down from Bako, Sangama and Sidamo: these countries are very rich in rubber, coffee, beeswax, hides, mules and horses"..... "The Jibouti railway cannot compete with us, as transport of a mule load of goods from Bako or Sangama to Adis Ababa is between 25 and 35 dollars, and from Adis Ababa to Dire Dawa is from 12 to 16 dollars, and from Dire Dawa to Jibouti the French railway takes about 62 francs per ton of merchandise". That is to say, working from means of the charges quoted, the cost of transport alone on produce or merchandise from the southern provinces of Abyssinia to Jibouti is about 45^{fr.} per ton, or 34 shillings per 60 load.

Mr. Zaphiro continues: "The Abyssinians would avoid Adis Ababa for two reasons. Firstly it would be cheaper, say 60%, to bring their goods from Bako, Sangama or Sidamo down to the market of Moyali than to take them through customs stations to Adis Ababa. Secondly, it is most essential for the Abyssinians

to avoid shewing what they possess to their superior officers, for fear that their belongings will be seized by the latter, so they will prefer to send their goods to the Frontier and sell them cheaper, sooner than send them to the market of Adis Ababa provided they find a ready market at Moyali or Nairobi".

Again, in the Abyssinian Consular Report for 1910 Major Doughty Wylie expresses confidence in a potential trade with British East Africa thus:-

"Trade between Abyssinia and East Africa hardly exists yet, but there is every prospect of development after a few years of settled administration of the Border countries by the Protectorate". He refers to "the valuable trade of S. Abyssinia, more particularly the rich trade Sidamo Province" which he says "has its natural outlet in British East Africa" and he concludes by estimating "an import trade of 8 million yards of maradouf alone" which is equal in value to some £150,000 per annum.

A Mr. Foot of Adis Ababa, late Manager of the Ethiopian Rubber Company, is expected to arrive at Moyali shortly with a view to initiating this trade between the Southern Provinces of Abyssinia and the Protectorate, but present difficulties and uncertainties of transport are bound to seriously handicap, if not throttle, any enterprise of the sort. In fact, success, in my opinion, will be dependent upon whether or no the Government will be prepared to grant transport facilities for the development of this trade.

The institution of mechanical transport as far as Marsabit in the coming year would be a very big step

step in this direction, thus bringing Moyali within ten days (by camel transport) of easy communication with the Uganda Railway and the markets of the Protectorate, while the political value of good trade relations with Abyssinian is a point that should not be overlooked in a consideration of the question.

Dismissing this project, however, on the grounds of expense, we come to the second alternative:-

(ii) Meru Portterage

Assuming that porters in sufficient numbers would be forthcoming to meet our constant requirements as far as Marsabit, the drawback to this scheme is the consumption of food on the road by the porters themselves carrying the Government loads; thus, in the case of the despatch of 200 loads of food to Marsabit, exactly one half, 100 loads, would be consumed by the porters, who would take 20 days over the journey to and from Marsabit.

Furthermore a considerable wastage in the remaining loads would have to be reckoned on, through careless or mischievous handling when large bodies of wild porters are travelling without close supervision, and probably unaccompanied by a European Officer or by Police.

To enable porters to make the through-journey it would be necessary to sink, and keep supplied with water, at least two tanks on the road, one between the Uaso Nyiro and Kaurō, and one between Lasamis and Marsabit.

11 Personally I look upon the whole scheme as an extravagant and bad one.

Finally

Finally we have:-

(iii) An alteration in the line of supply using the Juba River with Serenli as base

The serious drawback to this route appears to me to be that for some seven months in the year Serenli is cut off from communication with the coast by river, while ^{direct} land communication is impossible because of "fly". This is presuming that the Afmadu route is so circuitous and so uncertain as to preclude it from being regarded as a serviceable line of communication between Kismayu and Serenli. The necessary escort of 25 soldiers for this journey also creates difficulties. In addition to this the Emperor Navigation Company's steamer freights are high, so that economy is not indicated by this route in the absence of a Government steamer plying on the river. After landing stores and supplies at Serenli there is still the question of 21 days transport by Camel Convoy to Moyali to be considered and it is found that the desire of camel owners here hire out their beasts against cash payment is not so keen as was originally hoped and expected.

Camel convoys from Serenli to Moyali would normally be 21 days on the road: from Marsabit to Moyali ten days.

The distances I should give as follows:-

Serenli to Moyali	280-300 miles
Marsabit to Moyali	150 do.
Meru to Marsabit	180 do.

The foregoing remarks, as I have said before, presume the infection of the tsetse fly on the Uaso Marsabit stage, and on this point it is for the Veterinary Officers to speak. I might mention that

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that Mr. Hamman, the owner of the transport waggons employed on this road, now claims for the loss from tsetse-fly bite of three of his draught bullocks, in support of which statement he quotes Mr. Sturdy, Chief Veterinary Officer.

On the other hand if it is decided that the loss of our camels is attributable again to the camel sickness in the District (which is my own view), endemic or epidemic in form whichever it may be, then it is a matter for consideration whether we persevere in our endeavours to maintain our camel transport service on this stage of the road, or whether we rely in future on transport waggons and draught-oxen.

Lack of grazing in the times of drought, and long waterless stretches certainly present great difficulties in the matter.

In the event of the latter alternative being accepted, however, I strongly advocate the temporary employment in Government service of the young Dutchman Bothma as transport driver or conductor: the hire or purchase of waggons, and the use for draught purposes of our Samburu bullocks of which we have a large number.

The present arrangement with the Dutchmen is unsatisfactory in that they are uncertain and unreliable in running their transport: we have no hold over them, and under present conditions they would not contract or bind themselves; and their waggons are liable to be taken off this service at any moment if it so suits them.

My personal recommendation in the matter, then, is:-

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1. That we persevere with animal transport in the absence of proof that the road is fly-infected.
2. That the whole of the £500 requisitioned from the Public Works next year for the improvement of communications in the Northern Frontier District be devoted to the Uaso-Nyiro-Marsabit stage of the road, and that the sum be expended entirely on pay and ration of labour staff.
3. That the staging system be adhered to, and that from Meru to Merille all supplies are transported by bullock waggons, while from Merille to Marsabit baggage camels, or better still, funds permitting, camel carts be used.

Our monthly requirement as far as Merille will be about 300 loads per month. To give some idea of carrying capacity:

1. A bullock waggon conveys some 80 loads and may cost £80.
2. A camel cart conveys about 10 loads and may cost £15.

Under the present system of porters to the Uaso Nyiro Post and cartage thence to Merille, the expenditure on Carriage of Goods works at about £30 per mensem exclusive of the cost of food for the Meru porters over the first stage.

In concluding this subject I venture to submit that the time has now come when a most careful consideration of the whole question at Headquarters is necessary.

Distribution of Officers

Political Officers are posted thus at present:-

Mr. Barrett at Marsabit

Mr. Chamier in the Rudolph District

Mr. Aylmer at Moyali

Mr. Deck on special duty at Wajhir.

Mr. Aylmer and Mr. Deck are due to exchange posts at the end of February unless you wish to arrange otherwise.

There has been, as you will doubtless have seen from papers on the subject, rather a serious disturbance at Wajhir which has necessitated the presence of an administrative officer there throughout the present dry season (January to March) and Mr. Deck had to be despatched thither at short notice. Lieut. Saunders accompanied him with 30 rank and file of the King's African Rifles from Moyali.

Mr. Chamier had applied for leave in April but he has just been transferred to Naivasha, so that an officer is required to replace him if possible.

Stations

Loyangelani (Kulal) I have had no opportunity to visit.

Moyali, I consider, has recently been allowed to fall into a bad state of repair, though no blame in this matter attaches to Mr. Deck as his resources were nil - the ten porters attached to the station being constantly required for the upkeep of the corn-shamba. Under instructions from the Officer Commanding Troops however the military at Moyali have now assumed definite responsibility for the upkeep of the station, and new lines, stores, guard-room, &c. are to be erected immediately.

Later I suggest that the Marsabit Station artizan should

should be sent to Moyali to erect officers quarters on the lines of the Marsabit house.

Marsabit Station is practically completed and in my opinion it is well-found and in good order.

General Administration

I have just completed a long tour of the Frontier districts, having travelled from Moyali to Serehli via Gaddaduma, Takabba and Eil Wak, and back through the Marrehan and Northern Garre countries. In company with the Inspector General, K.A.Rifles, and the Officer Commanding Troops. Both Dolo and Banisaa were visited on the tour. In the light of present information I am strongly of opinion that the projected establishment of Frontier Posts at these two places would answer no serviceable purpose, and that the wiser scheme to pursue is to post Political Officers to districts or tribal divisions, leaving to the discretion of these officers the question of movements about the area under their control. I am inclined to think that the Marrehan country should be included in the territory of the Northern Frontier District, though communication with Nairobi via Moyali and Marsabit would be a slow process.

All information gathered on the tour about these people, their sub-divisions and sections, their leaders, their numbers and so forth, has been embodied in a paper by Capt. French, Staff Officer, K.A.Rifles, while the Inspector General, K.A.Rifles, has written a Memorandum on the political situation here.

To accompany these I have compiled a map showing

all

all existing (reliable) topographical detail of this part of the country. Major Gwynn's work is outlined on the North, and his fixed points plotted. The positions on the map of Lugh and Bardera are those assigned to them by officers of the Italian Royal Navy, who determined their latitudes by sextant observations, and their longitudes by telegraph from Guimbo and Meadisho; while Lieut. Pardo is responsible for the traverse of the Canale from Bardera to Lugh. My own work comprises the sketch of the caravan route from Eil Wak to Serenli, and a traverse of our route from Serenli to Dolo, checked by astronomical observations with a 5-inch theodolite. An approximate geographical distribution of the sections of the Marrehan is also shown for administrative purposes, and it is thought that a provisional issue of this sheet, very incomplete though it is, by the Survey Department, may serve a useful purpose in providing a fairly reliable groundwork, to which can be attached all further topographical detail as it is forthcoming.

It is sufficient for me to say in this report that the recommendation put forward for the control of the Marrehan country is that a Political Officer of some seniority be appointed forthwith to this area, to be supported by a company of Infantry and a Section of Camel Corps.

Arms Traffic

The disarming of the tribe can scarcely be attempted at present without incurring a very serious risk of hostilities. Indeed, the rifle question in these Frontier Districts, presents what appears to be an almost insuperable difficulty. If it is decided that the rifles

rifles already in the hands of the tribesmen should be left in their possession so long as they behave themselves, though it is desirable, in view of our better control of the situation, to prohibit all further importation of arms into the country, then how can this be done except by the registration of those rifles already in their possession? Registration on the other hand must inevitably cause serious suspicion and doubt in the minds of quick-witted Somali peoples, and it is unlikely that any order in this respect would be complied with voluntarily.

The wisest course in my opinion, therefore, is to leave the whole question in abeyance till the Political Officers of the various districts have got into close touch with their people, when a reliable expression of opinion on the subject can be obtained.

As far as the Northern Frontier tribes are concerned everything depends upon the subsequent actions of the Marrehan.

Appointment of Political Officers

Simultaneous with the extension of Government control to the Marrehan country I advocate the posting of a Political Officer to the Garga country. His chief centres would be Eil Wak, Barissa and the Webbi Dana district.

Another Political Officer will be necessary during the dry season, in my opinion, to keep things quiet at Wajhir, from which he can also patrol the Lorian District which is now an important Ogasen and Boran centre. The presence of an officer here might

might put a stop to further aggression by the Mahomed Zubeir against our Boran and Sakuye peoples thus disposing of the necessity of an order of evacuation (from Wajhir) against these Ogaden tribesmen.

It is doubtful whether this work could be undertaken, however, by the Officer posted to Moyali, as it would entail his presence there during some seven months in the year, and it would thus seem that for the effective control of this part of the country - Wajhir, Garre and Moyali - three officers would be necessary, in which case the two low-lying country posts - Garre and Wajhir - might be interchangeable with Moyali. Station duty in the comparatively healthy climate of Moyali would afford a desirable change for the officers concerned, and I would go so far as to say that six months continuous residence by an officer in such places as Wajhir and Eil Wak should never, if possible, be exceeded. All this low country is hot and enervating, the forced marches on account of lack of water are trying, recreations are nil, and loss of energy is a sure result of too long residence.

Military and Police Distribution

The question that now arises is as to how it would be possible to find personal escorts for the Political Officers concerned. The present position is that we have half company of K.A. Rifles at Moyali, and another half company at Loyangelani on Rudolph; in addition there is the Civil Armed

Transport

Transport Corps with a sanctioned establishment of 52 men. The work of these men is primarily to escort the camel convoys, load the camels, and be generally responsible for transport work in the District. In addition, however, they perform the duties of Frontier Police, finding the station guards at Marsabit and doing all the out district work. They are recruited entirely from the best material for hard Frontier work, viz: Sudanese and Northern Somalis, and most have had either previous K.A. Rifles or Police service in the Protectorates. Under arrangement many of these men possess their own mules and so they can be sent mounted to do district work when circumstances so necessitate. It is recognized on all hands that they are most serviceable body of men, well suited to our needs on the Frontier. These are the available force at present in the Northern Frontier District.

The Political Officer, Garre country, in my opinion, should have at his disposal a detachment of some 30 men in view of the frequent presence in this country at certain seasons of the year of Abyssinian or Tigre marauding parties. It is absolutely essential - if for no other reason than to save our face with the natives, who, as the outcome of the Maud and Gwynn Boundary Commissions have a right to look upon themselves as British subjects, and who now assist us with meat rations and transport - it is essential, I think, that action should be taken against small bodies of these people found on our side of the Line, and the authorities at Mita Ababa have now stated very emphatically that strong action by us against raiding parties so far from complicating the political situation with Abyssinia

Abyssinia would very materially strengthen their hands in negotiating. It may be taken that ten to twenty men would be the average strength of these raiding and hunting parties, though on occasions these numbers are said to be exceeded. Thirty really reliable men with the Political Officer, equipped for rapid movement and well armed, together with the local natives, should, then, be able to cope with any normal situation likely to arise here, while the Political Officer must be relied upon to exercise a proper discretion in dealing with these cases. In the event of large bands crossing the border we have our instructions, namely to report immediately to the Minister at Adis Ababa.

The Political Officer at Wajhir would require an escort of some 25 men, while the officer in charge, for his constant journeys, would require not less than ten: when in the Somali areas he would be accompanied by the Political Officer's party.

That is to say, for work in the outlying Frontier districts alone 65 soldiers, or military police, would be, under this scheme, in constant requisition. There is in addition the garrison of Moyali Station to be found. I do not think that for the sake of appearances - moral effect that is - that this should be reduced much below 50 men.

There appear to me to be but two alternatives then: Either a full company of King's African

Rifles

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Rifles should be maintained at Moyali, from which these escorts can be found, or provision should be made for the employment of Military Police or Constabulary on the Frontier.

The Inspector General, King's African Rifles

I know strongly opposes the employment of King's African Rifles for this escort and military

police work in the districts which he considers affects the efficiency of the men as regular

troops. While from the civil point of view there are certain grave objections to the employment

of troops for out-district work. In the first place the men are not, and cannot be, under the

absolute orders of the Political Officers, and

when an escort of more than twenty men is required

it is laid down that a military officer must accompany it. Thus when there are only 2 officers at

Moyali, one civil and one military, and the

Political Officer has to travel to some unsettled

part of the district, it lies with the discretion of

the military officer, by virtue of responsibility

(in theory) for

For the safety of the Political Officer, to decide that an escort of 50 men or more is required, and that he will therefore command the escort himself. Under this ruling Moyali Station is left with 30 men under the Colour Sergeant, K.A.Rifles, with no British Officer in the place; an obviously unsound arrangement from our point of view.

There are, furthermore, difficulties as to the relative positions of the Political Officer and the Officer Commanding his escort when out on duty together.

The military officers hold the view that the Officer Commanding Detachment is responsible for everything. The Political Officer, having once expressed his intention of proceeding from one place to another, let us say from Moyali to Wajhir, puts himself entirely in the hands of the military officer, whose duty it is to conduct him there. It then rests with the military officer to determine the time of starting the marches, their length and duration, when and where halts shall be made, when and where the party camps and so forth, and it is intended to insert, under approval, a clause to this effect in the K.A.Rifles Ordinance governing "Employment of Military in aid of Civil Power".

This view I venture to oppose most strongly on the grounds that this means the complete subordination of the Civil Power. And though absolute responsibility for everything rests on the Civil Authority, all management is thus taken out of the hands of the Political Officer; in other words he becomes a cypher.

The fact that responsibility for all Transport arrangements in the Northern Frontier District rests with the Civil Authorities, under express instructions from His Excellency, nullifies, in my opinion, this ruling.

It is asserted that the marching powers of black troops under arms is a matter of technical knowledge; still more so is the management of Camel Transport, and all movements cannot be governed by out and dried regulation.

On personal grounds, also, I venture to raise my protest. With nearly eleven years East African and Uganda experience, mostly gained in the outlying districts of the Protectorates, I submit, with all humility, that I am the more competent authority to decide these points than the recently joined subalterns of K.A.Rifles. With your seniority still more so is this the case, while with our other Political Officers the same may generally be said to apply.

Fortunately personal differences on this subject as between military and civil officers are not very likely to arise, but as a question of principle this is a point requiring decision, and the Inspector General, K.A.Rifles, I understand, has asked for one.

NORTHERN FRONTIER CONSTABULARY

On account of these difficulties, and in fact on the grounds of general expediency from both the military and civil standpoint I now advocate the immediate formation of a Northern Frontier Constabulary, under the precedent of Zanzibar.

As long as just the half company, K.A.Rifles, for garrison duty at Moyali is retained, a Constabulary capable of future expansion can be formed to meet all normal requirements in the District (as at present constituted, that is, excluding Ngongoni) at an additional grant of some £8,400 in excess of the Civil estimate originally submitted. This is by a re-arrangement. Were my proposals adopted, the military garrison on Rudolph would be done away with, and the
 necessity

necessity of an increase of troops at Moyali avoided. In other words there would be set free one Company of King's African Rifles which is maintained at an upkeep cost (at Headquarters) of about £4,200, and our transport difficulties would be immensely reduced. The six monthly relief of detachments, and the constant changes of military officers is a source of unending difficulty.

In Capt. W. E. H. Barrett we have an officer of our own with every qualification and very eligible for the command of such a force. He would carry out the internal organisation and would be responsible for the necessary training, while the general control of the Force, to ensure the best administrative results, should be vested in yourself in your capacity as Officer in Charge of the Frontier.

The acceptance of this last provision will, I know, meet with opposition. I can only say that the conditions in the Northern Frontier District of to-day are those of the early days of Uganda, and our administrative machinery must be set accordingly.

In the Irregular Corps now at Marsabit we have the nucleus. I should say that enlistment in this Corps should be confined to Sudanese and Northern Somalis who have had former military or police training and who have proved themselves men of good character. That we can get the stamp of man we require, were these proposals sanctioned, I have no doubt, and only to-day, my first day here, I have been approached by eleven Sudanese ex-soldiers and three Somalis recently of the 6th K.A. Rifles who are anxious to engage for Police work with us on the Frontier. The work is popular, nobody will contest the statement that for this sort of work the Sudanese and Northern Somali is seen at his

best

best, and recruiting would go apace.

To outline the organisation of this Force, I should say that the sections would come into the Headquarters station one by one to do three months military training in the year; they would fire their annual musketry course and so forth; and they would be specially trained in the work expected of them; and they would go through a course of instruction in the handling and management of camels and mules under the superintendence of the Veterinary authorities; for the remaining nine months of the year they would be out on detachment duty with the Political Officers, and would soon gain a thorough knowledge of the country, the various peoples and the languages.

In this recommendation I have behind me the undivided opinion of the other Political Officers, Capt. Aylmer, Capt. Barrett and Mr. Deck, with their experience of local conditions, and I have now provisionally refrained my estimates so as to meet, next year, administrative requirements on the lines suggested in this report, and to cover the expense of the formation of the Constabulary.

The proposed distribution is set forth on a separate sheet attached to the estimate of expenditure.

CONCLUSION

For the length of this report I feel I owe an apology. My excuse must be that the limbo comes when a thorough appreciation of the position of affairs in the Northern Frontier District is necessary, with a view to reorganisation and better control of the territory. My personal views in the matter therefore are given for what they may be worth and they are the outcome at all events of careful consideration on the spot.

S/- G.F. Archer.
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER.

I.G.No.738.

To despatch No. 117 of 1912

No 2

1912

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23 MAR 12

Nairobi,

British East Africa.

Jan. 29th. 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir,

With reference to Your Excellency's letter N.P.No.1729/11 dated September 27th 1911 enclosing a Memorandum on the Northern Frontier and Jubaland, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum on the subject written by me after my recent tour through the country.

It will be realised that since the military problems are, in their broader aspect, entirely dependent on the Civil Policy which is to be adopted, it has been impossible for me to confine myself solely to the military side of the question. In considering the general policy to be adopted, I have received considerable help from Mr. Archery, Acting Officer i/c Northern Frontier District, to whose loyal co-operation much of the information contained in the report is due.

I have, etc., etc.,

Sd/- G. Theisiger, Colonel,

Inspector General, K.A.A.

His Excellency

The Governor and Commander-in-Chief,

British East Africa.

THE MARREHAN.

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1. The Marrehan Somalis inhabit an area of which the Eastern side is the Juba ^{from} (its junction with the Dar stream (Hele Rapids) to about Lugh. The N.W. and S.W. sides are roughly from Lugh towards Eil Wak and from the Dar towards Eil Wak. They do not however appear to come nearer than about two days from Eil Wak.

The country seems to be better watered than most of the Somali country to the south.

2. The Marrehan are divided into two main sections the Hassan and the Isak; in addition to which are the Ben who correspond to the Midgan of Northern Somaliland and the Derebe of East Africa.
3. The Hassan could probably put 2,000 men into the field. No estimate can be given of the rifles, though their Chief Ahmed Abden Roble guaranteed to furnish 100 if required. The Hassan both to Major Gwynn and to ourselves professed a strong desire for peace and settled Government, and as mentioned above actually offered to help us with men and rifles. On the other hand the Garre who should know what they are talking about ^{state} that their pro-statements are worth nothing and that they are little better than the Galti.
4. The Isak are divided into four Sub-sections they are:-
- (a) Her Farah Ugas
 - (b) Her Ahmed Wat
 - (c) Her Ali Dere
 - (d) Her Talhe

The first three of these form the Galti who are not original Marrehan but have come into the country during

the

the last six years mainly from Northern Somaliland. There is no doubt that the Galti sections are the crux of, the whole problem. They are as far as can be gathered essentially fighting Somalis, and in intelligence and brains are entirely different from so-called Somali tribes like the Garre and Gubahin. They occupy the best portion of the country and have rifles and ~~g~~ ponies. They are the chief if not the only cause of the raids against the Garre, Gubahin, and Aulihan.

(a) The Rer Farah Ugas. The paramount chief is Farah Got, the two sub-chiefs being Guhad Fillul and Haili. All these chiefs came in to see us and professed that they would welcome the Government, they put all the raiding down to their young men whom they said they could not control. Their line of argument was that there had never been any Government control in the country and they are only doing what had been done to them. They said that if Government came they must start with a clean sheet and not be asked to restore looted stock. Under Farah Got's son, they had just carried out a successful raid on a small scale against the Garre, but the chiefs stated they had cancelled one against the Aulihan out of respect for us. Their opinion was that if a patrol of sufficient strength was put into the country it would be quite safe against attack and would probably bring the whole Marrehan people into line.

Their numbers, as well as those of their rifles and ponies, are of course impossible to ascertain; a rough estimate based on the opinions of different chiefs would be 400 men, 200 rifles, 250 ponies.

Farah Got. I would put down as an elderly man but thoroughly fit and active; of strong character and considerable intelligence. I would not believe a word he said,

but

3.

but consider he has quite brains enough fully to realize when the game is up.

Sahad Filial. I should describe as a young man with a quick brain and of active habits and a good type of a fighting man.

Heili. Appears to be a somewhat weak old man with probably little influence.

(b) The Rer Ahmed Wet. This sub-section of the Galti is undoubtedly the most averse to any Government control. Their chief Shirre is the most dangerous and aggressive man in the country, and has always refused to meet any Government official. Major Gwynn reported that he was originally one of the Mullah's men and was trying to obtain a position somewhat similar to that occupied by the Mullah in Northern Somaliland. As far as can be judged he has, fortunately for us, at present failed to do this, but every month he is left without being dealt with, adds to the danger of his increasing his prestige and gaining new adherents either through interest or fear.

The approximate numbers of this sub-section are 400 men, the majority of whom probably have rifles and ponies.

(c) Rer Ali Dera. Approximate numbers 300-400 men with fewer rifles and ponies than the other two sections.

The Chief is Sheik Ismail who was too ill to come and see us. From what the other Chiefs told us he is all for peace but seems to have little control over his people.

(d) The Rer Tallhe. Do not seem to count much and are, as far as can be gathered, not likely to ^{cause} ~~bring~~ much trouble.

5. The Ben. The Chief of this tribe Abdi Mahmud seemed to desire peace and state he could help us with 400 Camels and 100 rifles. As fighting men they are probably met of

the

4.

the same class as the Somalis proper. They could probably put about 1,000 men into the field.

6. After careful consideration of the whole question I am of opinion that it will be impossible for us to continue our present policy of non-intervention and still keep our hold over our other tribes on the Northern Frontier, and also over the Aulihan. Putting aside for the moment the question of the justice of levying taxes or tribute from tribes whom we cannot protect, our whole position on the Northern Frontier will be come insecure if no steps are taken to stop general intertribal fighting, and importation of Arms and Ammunition. At the present time the Garre who have Armed themselves with rifles in self defence are anxious to avenge themselves on the Marrehan and recover their stock. The Government can and have stopped the Garre raiding; but if they do so they must in fairness protect them and recover their stock. As a matter of fact Major Gwynn told them over two years ago that their stock which had then been raided would be recovered.

If on the other hand the Government allow the Garre to counter-raid, as I understand the present policy in Jubaland to be, we shall be faced with a force of 2,000-4,000 men of whom about 400 will be armed with rifles, sweeping over the country with Government sanction, and plundering and probably murdering wherever they see the easiest opportunity. This must inevitably lead to further raids and would probably have the effect of welding the Marrehan together in self defence. It would also have a

very

very unsteady effect on our ^{other} tribes, and might cause difficulties with the Italians and Abyssinians if raids were made across the borders. Hitherto the raiding having been as a rule in the nature of highway robbery has resulted in small loss of life, but once reprisals set in on a large scale our experience in Northern Somaliland points to an increase of cruelty and the killing of women and children.

The only other policy that I can see open to us is to adopt a firm and consistent attitude towards the Marrehan and insist that raids on our friendly tribes must cease, as well as the importation of Arms and Ammunition; I do not think the time is yet ripe to demand the handing in of rifles already in their possession.

I consider that if a Political Officer specially selected were to tour the country for a year or so, get into touch with the Marrehan and ~~may~~ adopt a firm policy without interfering with the ordinary tribal customs, and work, as far as possible through the Chiefs, the matter might be settled without an expedition. This Officer would necessarily have to be given a very free hand.

He must be backed by a moderate show of strength, (on this point the Somalis themselves are thoroughly agreed) and it must be realised that should he fail he will be backed up by a regular expedition.

7. If this scheme were adopted the following military arrangements would be necessary:-

(a) One company to be moved from Nairobi to Juaaland, since there would have to be three infantry companies at Serenli.

(b)

(b) Two sections of the Camel Corps to be moved from Gubwa to Sereali.

(c) The Officer Commanding to send a Senior Officer to Sereali, to accompany the first patrol.

It will clearly be necessary to form a permanent transport for the troops patrolling the Hararaha country, but as some form of organized transport will be necessary in any case, the additional cost will not be great.

After practical experience of depending on hired Somali transport I am convinced that it is not safe to rely on it, nor it is possible to use it for troops who may find themselves in a hostile country. In the first place whatever they are paid, the Somalis dislike supplying camels and men; and when they are obtained all the animals are untrained to carry loads such as we have to put on them, and are liable to stampede. The attendant Somalis are not only useless to load camels, but are even unaccustomed to handle them, this being the work of the women; at any time they may desert, as happened recently and consequently a large number of soldiers have to be used in superintending and guarding the transport.

Sd/- G. THESIGER, Colonel

Inspector General,

King's African Rifles.

Nairobi, January 29th, 1912.

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Sd/- G. THESIGER, Colonel

Inspector General,

King's African Rifles.

Nairobi, January 29th, 1912.

**NOTES ON TRANSPORT IN NORTH-
ERN SOMALILAND.**

In considering the question of Transport the following extracts taken from the Official History of the Operations in Somaliland in 1901 to 1904 may be of use. Allowance must of course be made for the fact that these notes apply to active service. Although some of the points are obviously open to argument they give a fair idea of what should be considered in organizing a transport system in this Protectorate.

1. The exigencies of the water supply made impracticable such devices as the mono-rail system or traction engines, or motor lorries all of which come under consideration (page 216).

2. The transport service in Somaliland, as well as the water supply was the governing factor in the operations. It was however the fact that though the country contained immense herds of camels, the proportion of burden animals to milch and eating camels was small (page 212).

3. Price of camels Rs.40 Price of Harios Rs.5 (page 354).

4. Scale of baggage allowed:-

British Officers	150 lbs.
S.O. and N.O. Officers	100 lbs.
British Troops	15 lbs.
Native Troops and Followers			12½ (p. 346)

5. The supply situation would appear to be impossible in Somaliland unless administered by one officer with the interests of supply and transport equally at heart.

To illustrate the difficulty of supplying long lines of communication it may be mentioned that it takes a

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

REVENUE

The Commission has to report that the revenue from the land tax has been increased by 10 per cent. The Commission has also reported that the revenue from the land tax has been increased by 10 per cent.

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a camel to maintain a male or pony with grain 105 miles from the base.

Another difficulty which transport officers in Somalia encountered was that of keeping their animals fit for work. The grazing during the dry season is very poor indeed. This affects the Somali camel more than other transport animals for he is grass fed not grain fed.

It is surprising with the aridness after a short spell of rain - during which because the importance of good grazing is never lost sight of - to find animals out of work to such an extent and to recover their strength. Continuous and hard work the Somali camel cannot stand. The Somali camel will quickly take to eating grain and a ration of 6 lbs a day is enough. But it takes a long time to get him into really good condition for continuous hard work and it was considered that he should be fed on grain for a month before being put into hard work on a campaign in Somalia. When this cannot be done the Somali camel wears out in a very short time. It must also be borne in mind that even when a liberal grain ration is issued a plentiful supply of grass cannot be dispensed with.

Under Colonel Swayne and General Manning the transport on the lines of communication was worked on the convey system. In the fourth expedition the system was partly convey and partly staging. It was found that the losses in stores and supplies were considerably less with the convey system.

During the expeditions previous to 1905 the transport on the lines of communication was all hired. When General Manning took over the command, camels were turned into corps of 200 animals each with drivers

at the rate of one to every three camels plus 12 1/2
 spare. There were drivers per corps. These drivers were
 found to be very good and being under a British
 The number of the camels was about in a British
 Officer of the Transport Company with one Indian
 Transport Assistant (a sergeant of the Transport
 Officer) and two small transport attendants to assist
 him.

The camel cart train consisted of 100 carts each
 of which carried 400 lbs in addition to the rations
 of the camel and driver. With two camels a cart 8 to
 10 mounds (50 lbs a mound) could be carried on a hard
 track.

Building camels were preferred for cart work owing
 to their extra size and weight.

The camels received grain and grass and worked
 best when watered every third day.

The Natal buck wagon was not considered suitable
 for the country being found heavy and not broad enough
 in the tyre. Generally speaking wheeled transport
 was not found suitable for work in Southland.

15,245 camels were purchased during the fourth
 expedition from July 1893 to the end of March 1894 of
 which Rs.12,000 were purchased in Southland - price
 Rs.105 to 122.

The loss in camels was principally caused by
 exhaustion and by the absence of sufficient grazing.
 the necessity of working camels when the gun was up,
 the impossibility of feeding them with grain at
 great distances from the base, the impossibility of
 allowing them sufficient rest, and carelessness of
 attendants unless incessantly supervised.

The following points represent the result of the
 experience of the campaign:-

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Grooming is unnecessary but backs may be rubbed when saddles are taken off.

Animals should be unloaded at the first and loaded at the last possible moment and should be kept at graze as long as possible. The best hours for camels to graze are between 8 and 11 a.m. and 4 to 7 p.m. The camels should have 5 or 6 hours grazing a day if possible.

On cold nights saddles are best left on unless blankets are provided.

Grass should be given at night. This can be cut by day or on the march.

Grazing grounds should be visited by a British Officer or Non Commissioned Officer otherwise drivers are apt to tie camels up or herd them together, thus preventing them grazing.

All camels should be inspected sitting down once a day so that their backs can be seen.

When double marches are made the best hours to march are from 4 a.m. to 9 a.m. and from 3 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. If the march is under 15 miles it is better to start earlier in the morning and complete the distance in one march. Not more than three camels should be tied together in one string.

Opinions differed as to the personal qualities of the Somali but it seemed to be generally agreed that for work in Somaliland he was the best camel attendant. He is a natural camel man and does not ill treat his animals. Both he and the Arab require much supervision. The latter is more dawdler and quicker than the Somali, but he often ill treats his animals and overdrives them and ties them up when grazing.

There is much useful information on pages 514-515 on the despatch and receipt of stores.

Receipts of rations for African and Somali troops

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.no 2 ... colt

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Colt, 1 - 1st

Colt, 1 - 1st

Colt

Colt, 1 - 1st

DETAILS OF A PROPOSED TRANSPORT CORPS WITH HEAD

QUARTERS AT SERENLI.

1. The Corps is primarily intended for the transport of a Flying Column (strength one Company) based at Serenli carrying 30 days rations and 4 days water.

The whole or any part of the Corps could also be available for patrols and the employment of some between Serenli and Moyale when necessary in conjunction with the Flying Column.

Establishment

(a) Armed Syces

1 Colour Sergeant (Squad)

4 Sergeants (Squad)

15 Privates (Squad)

(b) Auxiliary Syces

20 (Load carriers) (Drivers)

(c) Animals

100 (Donkeys)

1 Mule (For headman)

From experience gained in Northern Somaliland and elsewhere, it has been proved that a minimum of one transport attendant to every three pack animals with which efficiency can be maintained. In Northern Somaliland this allowance was slightly exceeded. The 20 headquarters the number of pack animals can be largely reduced and the armed syces probably would be sufficient to handle the pack animals after the pack animals generally.

The 20 auxiliary syces would be required to move out. It is in these circumstances

1st

(8)

DETAILS OF A PROPOSED TRANSPORT CORPS WITH HEAD
QUARTERS AT SERENLI.

REC-23 MAR 12

1. The Corps is primarily intended for the transport of a Flying Column (strength one Company) based on Serenli carrying 30 days rations and 4 days water.

The whole or any part of the Corps would also be available for patrols and the transport of reliefs between Serenli and Moyale when not actually employed with the Flying Column.

2. (a) Armed Syces.

- 1 Colour Sergeant (Headman)
- 4 Sergeants (Section Commanders)
- 12 Privates (Drivers).

(b) Auxiliary Syces.

20 Local Somali (Drivers).

(c) Animals.

100 Camels

1 Mule (For Headman).

From experience gained in Northern Somaliland, Egypt and elsewhere, it has been proved that when on the march one transport attendant to every three camels is the minimum with which efficiency can be maintained. In Northern Somaliland this allowance was slightly exceeded. When at headquarters the number of attendants can be largely reduced and the armed syces given above would be sufficient to find grazing grounds and to look after the camels generally.

The 20 auxiliary syces would be taken on when the Corps is required to move out. It is proposed (assuming

that

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Establishment.

CHARACTER OF SERVICI.

.....

1. The Corps is primarily intended for the transport of supplies and stores (including the transport of the transport animals) and for the transport of personnel. It is not intended to be a permanent establishment but a mobile force which can be moved to any part of the area where it is required for service. It is not intended to be a permanent establishment but a mobile force which can be moved to any part of the area where it is required for service.

PERSONNEL

2. The personnel of the Corps will be drawn from the following sources: (a) Local Somalis (b) Discharged Sudanese Soldiers and Police (c) Berbers (d) Other available personnel.

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PERSONNEL

1000 Somalis

(b) Discharged Sudanese Soldiers and Police

3. The personnel of the Corps will be drawn from the following sources: (a) Local Somalis (b) Discharged Sudanese Soldiers and Police (c) Berbers (d) Other available personnel. It is not intended to be a permanent establishment but a mobile force which can be moved to any part of the area where it is required for service.

4. The Transport Corps would be under the orders of the Officer Commanding Troops Serenli who would detail an Officer to generally supervise its conduct. The

Personnel.

that they prove satisfactory after a trial) that they should be paid a small retaining wages (say Rs.2/- per person) when not actually employed so as to avoid the difficulty of training a fresh batch of drivers every time the transport moves away from its base.

5. This is a question of the utmost importance. It would be impracticable to employ local Somalis as permanent attendants for not only are they poor camelmen but their unreliability in the event of hostilities is sufficient to rule them out.

Gobwen and Kimayu Arabs are good Camelmen but it is very doubtful if they would take on work of this nature seeing that they are now doing so well as local carriers and traders near their own homes.

The best solution appears to be the employment of Berbers Somalis and discharged Sudanese Soldiers and Police. In the Northern Frontier District this combination is working successfully. Really good knowledgeable camelmen (discharged 8th Battalion soldiers) can be obtained in Berbers without difficulty. These men would probably be willing to sign on for three years if their passages were paid to Kimayu.

When employing Somalis away from their own country it is always advisable to lesson them with some other tribe. Sudanese are not such good camelmen as Somalis but they make excellent drivers when working with them.

The advantages of employing trained soldiers as armed axes are obvious.

Organisation.

6. The Transport Corps would be under the orders of the Officer Commanding Troops Serenli who would detail an Officer to generally supervise its conduct. The

most (The ...)

The ...

to ...

to ...

to ...

to ...

The ...

Equipment

Equipment

Colour Sergeant (headman) would be responsible for the condition of the Corps to this Officer.

The Corps would be divided into four Sections each with an establishment as under:-

- 1 Section Commander } Armed axes
- 3 Privates }
- 5 Auxiliary axes (when away from Serenli)
- 25 Camels.

This organization allows of one or more of the four Sections being used independently without in any way destroying the efficiency of the Corps as a whole. It allows also for expansion. For instance, should occasion arise, Sections can be increased to 50 or 75 camels and the organization remains without change.

5. (a) ARMED AXES.

- 1 Rifle
 - 1 Handkerchief
 - 1 Waterbottle
 - 1 Hatchette & Scabbard
 - 1 Oil bottle
 - 1 Sawersack
 - 2 pairs shorts
 - 2 pairs puttees
 - 2 Jerseys
 - 1 Turbush
 - 1 Turbush Cover
 - 1 Blanket
 - 4 Chaguis
- } Can probably be supplied from Northern Somaliland or existing Ordnance stores.
- } Yearly at a cost of Rs. 25/- per ~~man~~ man.

(b) Auxiliary Axes.

- 1 Water bottle
- Chaguis as required

(c) Animals.

- 1 Set of Saddlery per camel
- (The "Merio" consisting of 25 5 wats is the best)
- 1 Saddle rope 50 ft. by 1 1/2 inches
 - 1 Leading rope 55 ft. by 1 1/2 "
 - 1 Leading rope 15 ft. by 1 "
- 25% spare of all the ropes given above in uncut lengths.

4 Waterproof

4 Waterproof sheets (12 x 18 feet) for watering purposes.

4 Three gallon buckets.	Rs.
6. Purchase of 100 camels @ Rs.40	4,000
100 sets of saddlery @ Rs.10	1,000
Rope (including 20% spare)	500
Camel medicines	150
Miscellaneous stores	150
Contingencies (Basketry stores etc.)	250
Passages of 12 Somalis from Berbera to Kiisayu at Rs.50 each (Or the proposed 17 armed ayees if 5 are from Berbera and 5 are locally enlisted Somalians).	600
1 year's clothing for 17 armed ayees at Rs.25 each (vide para 5.)	425

Armament

17 Armed ayees 50 rounds recruits course	150
Do. Do. trained men's	
Purchase of wale for headmen	90
Rations for ditto	45

Pay.

(a) Armed Ayees.

1 Cr. Sergeant @ Rs.40	480
4 Sergeants @ " 30	1,440
12 Privates @ " 20	2,880 = 4800

(b) Auxiliary Ayees

20 men for 3 months @ Rs.12	1,920
Do. Do. @ " 2 (retaining wages) 100 = 2,000 =	6,880

Expenses.

17 armed Ayees @ Rs.5 per mensem	= 1,020
20 auxiliary " " " for 3 months 800	= 1,820

Total initial & first year's expenditure Rs.18556

= Rs. 1,066

notwithstanding of him (number) assigned to be
 received into of equal and to maintain the
 assigned post and duties of him upon the
 - under as furnished as 1880
 ayee name { referred to in
the report }
 (if there are any other) ayee available

and to care to one to avoid maintenance
 was at suitable intervals been paid and that
 before a as equal of the capacity and physical
 health. account of the maintenance for the
 of the of maintenance of the assigned ayees
 should be sufficient to maintain and his

APPENDIX (a)

Belgium and Germany and	1
France and Italy and	1
Spain and Portugal and	1
Sweden and Denmark and	1
Norway and Finland and	1
Denmark and Norway and	1
Sweden and Finland and	1
Spain and Portugal and	1
France and Italy and	1
Belgium and Germany and	1

APPENDIX (b)

listed under I
 herewith as a legend

APPENDIX (c)

same as referred to in I

APPENDIX (d)

1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1
1	1

6.

	Rs.
7. Purchase of 12 ransports @ Rs.40	600
Stock of saddlery, ropes, etc.	350
General medicines	150
Miscellaneous stores	150
Contingencies	250
Clothing for 17 armed cycles	425
Amunition for manual courses	68
Rations for headman's wife	45
Pay of armed and auxiliary cycles	6,880
Rations for ditto	1,280
	<hr/>

Total for recurring expenditure Rs.10,728

= 2 728

8. The Corps would be in working order in about four months time from the date of the sanction for its formation.

Sd/- G.N.Breeding Lieut-Colonel

Commanding 3rd Bn: King's African Rifles.
Noyale,

14th December, 1911.

ation, Kit & water
 allowance to Officers,
 Followers and
 animals moving with
 transport.

	Ration per diem lbs.	Kits lbs.	Water per diem galls.
British Officers	4	100	2
Assistant Surgeon	2 1/2	60	1
Native Officers & Inter- preters	1	40	1
African Troops, armed Syces & Followers	1	10	1
Auxiliary Syces, guides etc.	1	5	1
Riding Camels	5	-	-
Mules	2	-	2

camel loads etc.

2. The normal camel load is 240 lbs. in addition to the weight of the saddle. This is exceeded when water tins are carried.

Each water tin contains 12 gallons.

Four boxes of ammunition each of 240 rounds are carried by one camel.

Two hundred rounds per soldier and 2500 rounds per machine gun are carried on camels.

3. A Flying Column with strength as per margin and carrying 30 days rations and 4 days water would

	Camels
British officers	
Asst. Surgeon	
Native officer	
Rank and File	
Cooks and ser- vants (a)	
Guide	36
Interpreter	31
Armed Syces	
Auxiliary Syces	10
Riding camels (b)	
Mule (c)	
Rations and Kits	
Water	
Ammunition	
Medical and Veterinary Stores	1
Ambulance	2
Office and Stationery	1
Line and watering gear	1
Cooking pots	1
Barbed wire & sapper stores	1
Officers Mess	1
Machine Gun	1
Spare	
Total	12
	100

- (a) 2 per officer and 1 for the Asst. Surgeon
- (b) 1 per officer and 1 for the Asst. Surgeon
- (c) For Colour Sergeant headman

NOTE - The water carried (62 tins) includes one tin for medical purpose.

84/- G.R. Brading Lieut-Colonel

Commanding 2nd Bn: King's African Rifles.

Koyale.

14th December, 1921.

TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY

1. At the present time there is no military transport maintained in the Protectorate, the troops being dependent on transport supplied by the Civil authorities. This method when applied to porter transport has always been adopted and has worked satisfactorily but when applied to animal transport on a large scale or even moderately large scale, it is a method which in theory has many disadvantages and in practice has broken down badly during the last two years since we have been occupying posts on the Northern Frontier and in Northern Jubaland. Fortunately the troops have not been called upon to undertake any active military operations, requiring camel transport, and we have merely had peace conditions to deal with.

The following instances may be cited as examples of breakdowns seriously affecting the efficiency of the troops:-

The detachment at Moyale was on half and sometimes quarter rations practically all through 1910. During this period the milking camels refused to give milk and all or nearly all of them died, want of food being one of the main causes.

For six months the Serenli detachment was subsisting on what it could purchase at Bardera, through the good will of the Italian authorities; the men had little clothing and were using sacking. If the Commanding Officer on his own initiative had not purchased camels at considerable cost, which he had not estimated for, and sent them up through Jubaland there was actual risk of starvation.

At the present time there are several officers waiting for transport in various parts of the Protectorate, either to join their units or return home, and one officer with 20 Non Commissioned Officers and men had to be left at Dolo during my recent safari owing to the desertion of the hired Somali camelmen.

I am informed by the Officer in charge, Northern Frontier District at Marsabit, that it is out of the question to consider the relief of the detachment at Kulal, which was arranged to take place in January 1912, and that it will even tax all his resources to get food to Kulal and Moyale.

3. In this report I shall of necessity have to deal with matters which may justifiably be considered outside my province, my excuse for doing so is:-

(a) I have now seen for myself the actual conditions and have experienced the workings of unorganised and untrained camel transport.

(b) Since the supply and relief of troops has been guaranteed by the Civil authorities, anything affecting these most important points, necessarily becomes a military question. It must be remembered that two of the main causes of the difficulty of the Uganda Sudanese are the lack of proper training arrangements and the fact that the men are sent without their women. Although the idea of such a concession as actual insubordination is, I am glad to say extremely rare etc. it is unwise both in the interests of efficiency and regarding to ignore any legitimate causes of complaint.

4. It would be no exaggeration to say that the whole of military problem of Jubaland and the Northern Frontier hinges on transport and I venture to think this also applies largely to the Civil problems. The difficulties I have no hesitation in saying are very

great

great and require expert knowledge in the following points:-

- Finance
- Shipping
- Camel, Bullock and Mule Management
- Veterinary
- Motor Transport
- Civil and Military Requirements.

Until organized system has been worked out which is capable of expansion in time of need, we must always be in danger of breakdown, and should any crisis arise such as serious trouble with our own tribes, or irregular Abyssinian marauders, the situation would be very serious.

Even in the sphere of expense it is questionable whether the present system has been an economical one. For instance that at Serenli since July 1st 1941 to November 1941, Rs.7,272 were expended in transport for stores and stores going to Juba in the end in the way of camel and mule transport and the stores sent up with food for Serenli and Hiale cost approximately Rs.15,000. A large of course in the form of a transport unit in the Northern Frontier.

4. There are at the present time several military posts requiring animal transport for the purpose of relief and supply.

(a) Serenli. This place is at present garrisoned by a Company and a half. The normal way of sending troops and stores is by river. This takes on an average 12 to 17 days from the Coast, the river can however only be used from June to October, varying of course with the rains. At other times of the year the route is via Almadu, Sugar Loaf Hills (Juba.2nd N) and Serenli, a journey of approximately 15 days

during

great and require expert knowledge in the following points:-

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Camel, Bullock and Mule Management
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Motor Transport
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Until organized system has been worked out which is capable of expansion in time of need, we must always be in danger of breakdown, and should any crisis arise such as serious trouble with our own tribes, or irregular Abyssinian marauders, the situation would be very serious.

Even on the score of expense it is questionable whether the present system has been an economical one, for I find that at Serenli since July 1st 1911 to November 1911, Rs.7,272 were expended in transport for which we have nothing to show in the end in the way of camels or equipment; and the safari sent up with food for Serenli and Movale cost approximately Rs.16,000. I have of course no information as to the cost in the Northern Frontier.

• There are at the present time four military posts requiring animal transport both for the purpose of relief and supply.

(a) Serenli. This place is at present garrisoned by a Company and a half. The normal way of sending troops and stores is by river. This takes on an average 16 to 17 days from the Coast, the river can however only be used from June to October, varying of course with the rains. At other times of the year the route is via Afmadu, Sugar Loaf Hills (Juba.2° N) and Serenli, a journey of approximately 15 days

during

- 4 -

during 5 of which water has to be carried, and an escort of 25 men has to be taken. An alternative route from Nairobi is via the Uaso Nyiro, Marsabit, Moyale, Eil Wak to Serenli, a distance roughly of 800 miles and taking about two months. With adequate arrangements there should be no difficulty about arranging for supplying Serenli by river, but owing to the breakdown of the Government steamer, the Emperor Navigation Company have had to be employed, and the rates are high, viz: £6 a ton, £1 a man or woman. I am informed that the Government steamer is not in any case powerful enough to tow barges, but on this point I have no definite official information. For individual officers rejoining their companies or proceeding on leave when the river is not navigable, the land route is the only alternative. It should of course be possible by arrangement to minimize the necessity for such a course but even then instances are bound to occur.

At present time for instance Beri-Beri has broken out at Serenli, there is no doctor there and the only route one can go by is the land route from Kismayu; it may be weeks before he can collect transport to take him there.

(b) Moyale. This post is garrisoned by half a company found from Serenli, and which should be relieved every six months. It is supplied from Meru via Marsabit.

The road from Serenli to Moyale is via Eil Wak, it takes 21 days and water has to be carried for 4 days. An escort of 10 men has to be taken.

The normal requirements for each six months relief is 40 camels loads.

The road from Meru to Marsabit takes 13 to 14 days and from Marsabit to Moyale 10 days; during which four

days water has to be carried throughout the year, and possibly six in the dry weather.

The road is a very trying one for camels and it is now a moot point whether it is not fly infected. The first three days from Meru to the Uaso Nyiro Post are done by porters.

The normal requirements are 57 camels every six months, exclusive of those required for water and rations during the journey.

(c) Kulal is relieved from Nairobi and supplied from Meru via Merille. The garrison consists of half a company.

The time from Meru to Kulal may be taken as about 20 days.

Normal requirements for rations are 57 camels every six months exclusive of those required for water and transport during the journey.

(d) Ngabotok is garrisoned by half a company. It is supplied by donkey transport via Baringo Post. It takes about 14 days from the Post.

There are three methods of obtaining camels in the Protectorate.

1. By hiring and paying for them through the chiefs for a certain specified journey.

This is the method employed at Serenli, and largely along the Northern Frontier. The advantages of this system are:-

It is fairly reliable method, given time and assuming that the chiefs have their people well in hand, in certain cases it is cheap, as for instance in the Northern Frontier where a very small price is paid. In Jubaland on the other hand it is very expensive as worked up to date; 30 dollars a camel from Serenli to Moyale and the hirer is responsible for all losses. By this method the loss of a large number is not likely

likely as once the job is finished the men and camels return to their own villages.

The disadvantages are:-

It is useless to rely on in case of sudden emergency or for active operations. The camels may take days or even weeks to collect and you are entirely in the hands of the Chiefs. When the rates of pay vary considerably in the same safari ^{as} was the case recently amongst the Garre and Aulihan, it gives rise to grumbling and discontent. You are constantly getting fresh and untrained camels who are most difficult to load and manage. The men who act as syces are quite unable to load the camels, and since camel work is generally done by the women, they are even unused to handling them. The natives do not care for hiring their camels out and only do so under compulsion of their Chiefs.

In some cases the camels are not paid for being requisitioned as a form of taxation. Except that it is of course cheaper the advantages and disadvantages are the same.

(2. By buying them outright. The advantages of this system are:-

Camels can be selected. They become to a certain extent trained.

The disadvantages are:-

They require careful supervision, rest and grazing. These cannot be ensured, without having some officer with a thorough knowledge of the subject at the head of things who can give definite orders as to hours and rates of marching, halts, &c. Some veterinary skill is also most desirable. Trained syces are also required who can look after the loading when on the march and after the general management of the camels when not

working

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

C.O. 533

103

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working. The natives of East Africa as well as the Soudanese are notoriously bad with camels and require much teaching, and supervision.

At the present time most officers on safari arrange their marches with a total disregard to the well being of the camels. Continuous marches of 8 to 10 hours, often in the middle of the day, are quite a normal affair. As an instance I find one march of 17 days with one day's rest, some of the marches being of 10 hours and even more. It seldom happens that good grazing is obtainable close to the station. In the case of Moyale which was garrisoned by the camel corps for about a year, the camels had actually to be kept over 30 miles away. If an epidemic breaks out, all or a very large proportion of the camels are likely to die, as has happened on three occasions in the Northern Frontier District.

The natives are undoubtedly averse to selling. At some places, such as Kismayu, absurd prices are demanded and if there is an emergency these have to be paid.

3. Obtaining them by means of tribute or taxation as is done in the case of the Rendile. The advantages and disadvantages of are the same as those given under 2.

4. If the troops stationed in Jubaland and the Northern Frontier are to have any value as regular military force available in case of emergency, it is essential that they should have at least a nucleus of organized transport. At the present time the most suitable place to keep the transport would seem to be Serenli. This place is not only suitable from the strategical point of view, but as far as our experience goes seems suitable for camels, for we have so far left

no large proportion of those that have been there.

The Officer Commanding Troops has at my request drawn up a scheme for an organised transport showing what would be required for a flying column of one company available to take the field for a month, carrying four days water: this has been based largely on our experience in Northern Somaliland where most carefully drawn up rules regarding camel transport were in force and consequently very useful during the recent expedition.

The question of some other form of veterinary might well be considered.

During the expedition veterinary material was used in a very limited way but it is thought that it would be of great value to those who are engaged in the work.

for
1898-99

April 1912

Sir

DRAFT.

I am etc to transmit

R. L. Purdy Esq
26 Hudson Street
Edinburg

to you, for any orders that
you may have to give,

the accompanying balance
from a report on the
Northern Frontier District

1912-13
to Road 13
Chaffin

Recd. 25/3

relation to the difficulties
transport difficulties
~~of transport arrangements~~

Cashier's report (Personnel)

caused by the prevalence
of camel disease

from the report
on the report, see
the report.

I am to enquire
whether you have arranged
at any definite commission

as to the nature of the
business, kind of
that business you
recommend in coming
into it

✓

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and specimens (and if
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So / What is the result

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