

Duplicates

7

DESPATCH

East of Port
15165

60
15165
Rec:
Regt 30 Apr 00

No
1000
1002
1002

River Expedition

no way to do it but attacking covering
operations will be planned & efficiently
carried out; large area brought under admin
capture of stock will be returned gradually for work

W Reed

Inquiries received as to the despatches
relating to the River Expedition and the
grant of a medal for it. ² 2116 ^{W.O.} 2507
Below called attention to the fact that the
despatch describing the operations had
never been dealt with although it was received
some ten months ago and had in fact
completely disappeared. It is believed to
have been taken away by Mr. Lobb when
he left his office to go to Bermuda.

I have therefore had this duplicate
of the despatch registered.

For copy of 1200/2

Mr. Lobb
to be
to return
to the
any other

19995

It is not necessary to go into the

political issues and results of the expedition
in any detail. Briefly, it was necessitated
as an attempt to murder a Political
Officer of the actual murder of ^{two} ~~one~~
of the native porters & an Indian
trader & some 300 native troops with the British
officers & other men while others were sent
into the district on the 15th of Jan^y 1808 &
by the 1st of February my first completed
operations which are stated to have secured
all the posts in view including the surrender
of the man who attempted the Political
Officer's life the recalcitrant men are
estimated to have lost 200 killed. The
total number of wounds

of the native levies
is included account
appear that
only one soldier was wounded in the
course of actual fighting. None were killed.
A large amount of stock was taken. The
disposal of this was settled ^{about} ~~some~~ a
year ago. Some of it was sold, the rest
was returned to the natives in payment
of work done.

It is pretty evident that this dispatch
was intended to be a dispatch relating

to field operations and to be submitted to the Inter-Departmental Council on Military Rewards. The officer who commended evidently intended his communication to be of this nature, though they are not exactly the report briefly describing the operations which the Regulations prescribe. The Col. however, assumed that he did mean this despatch for the Rewards issue (if he didn't, he might not have sent the O.C.'s reports in it), has made nearly every mistake possible.

Reg. 170 of the R.A.R. Regulations says that the Col., in forwarding the report of the O.C., will write a covering despatch giving his opinion on the operations and his recommendations. Such despatches should be headed "Despatch relating to Field Operations". In the absence of this heading a despatch will be regarded as sent for information and not as a recommendation for rewards.

Reg. 171 says that such despatches should not contain reference to previous correspondence. This is very necessary, as such despatches are intended to be published.

to field operations and to be submitted to the Inter-Departmental Council on Military Rewards. The officer who commanded evidently intended his communications to be of this nature, though they are not exactly the report briefly describing the operations which the Regulations prescribe. The Colt, however, assuming that he did mean this despatch for the Rewards Council (or if he didn't, he ought not to have sent the O.C.'s reports in it), has made nearly every mistake possible.

¶ 170 of the R.G.R. Regulations says that the Colt, in forwarding the report of the O.C., will write a covering despatch giving his opinion on the operations and his recommendations. Such despatches should be headed "Despatch relating to Field Operations". In the absence of this heading a despatch will be regarded as sent for information and not as a recommendation for recognition.

Reg. 171 says that such despatches should not contain reference to previous correspondence. This is very necessary, as such despatches are intended to be published.

By the Islands in the South Pacific & the
importance of the operations, & with it
in the case the Govt has added to his
endeavour of carefully labelling his despatches
confidential.

Reg^o 73 says that the name of an
officer or soldier whom it is desired to mention
recommend for reward ~~in~~ ^{is mentioned}
with commendation in the covering despatch
of the Governor, as well as in the report
of the officer commanding the operations.
Colonel Mackay recommends for individual
reward the usual enormous percentage
of white men engaged. But the Govt does
not so much as refer to a single one of these
recommending. Nor does he state his
opinion, indispensable for the purposes of the
Rewards Council, whether the operations
were worthy of a medal.

As for the actual merit of the operations
they certainly attained their object in a
very short time and with no loss to
Govt either of life or money from a
political point of view they were a great
success. But in unforeseen and dangerous

they fell very far short of the standard
which the Rewards Council has set up
for the publication of despatches on the
part of a medal. This is not a reason
for refusing to refer the despatch to the
Council, but for damping down in advance
extravagant hopes conceived by those who
took part in the operations.

I think the best course would be
to tell the Govt that his despatch has
been overlooked, & that it is not understood
clearly whether it is intended to be
a despatch relating to said operations,
pointing out the respects in which it
violates the rules laid down for the
submission of such despatches. To say that
as the operations were not sufficiently
arduous or extensive to justify separate
treatment ~~in such~~ from his point of view, it
would be better that they should be included
in any general despatch which he may write
covering the such night fighting, ~~in 1903~~ ^{as in}
contemplated in Par. 73 of the
Regulations. ~~Govt~~ ^{Govt} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~included~~ ^{included}

See minute
of 1903
and
1904



My dear Reed

I have not but I would
the mantle of Reed
and George, here with
the S.A.P. Kiri expedition
papers, with more
contributions. They have
given me a lot of
work so I will
couple of papers to
have typed; nevertheless,
like the photographs,
which have not been
found. Sorry.

I do hope the CO

take drastic action - to write
 for present similar occurrence
 to be brought back - I
 am anxious to write - to the
 block - then to provide
 for what, to be of benefit
 is needed now not less
 than a raid on measures.

Someone wrote a book
 on the "Psychologie de la foule",
 a report of the French
 revolution, showing how
 individual citizens of
 unimpeachable morals
 habits became
 collectively a horde of
 savages, ripe for any
 outrage. I who have
 seen it can testify that
 something of the sort has
 taken place in some of our
 European situations - the

Thus by inaugurating
 our own nation of this
 country in wholesale
 slaughter & destruction
 of the land that our
 name took in the
 mortal of subject races,
 I think no punishment
 is too severe for men
 who adopt such methods
 without due cause.

It would be an
 excellent thing if
 you could meet a
 young Commission of
 nine men, myself as
 secretary & factotum
 to enquire & report on
 the system of practice

administration in force in
our tropical African
Colonies & protectorates
& then took steps to
standardize a bit &
in basic sound principles.

Downing Street is certainly
handicapped - dealing
with such matters -
detail very to the
absence of local staff here
& personally I think
it is worth a look at a
good thing to have a
native affairs branch
in the C.O. - one who
men to be off to study
~~and~~ who would
compare local practices
& legislation & enable
the staff to keep a
better control over
Governors' requests.

and all other tenderness
 must be well noted.

control

I wish you could get
 a letter to put in a good
 man to look after
 E.A.D. & I - Clifford
 for a while.

work on time the
 cream. I expect our
 young man's committee
 is very poor.

respectably
 face is the parish
 on the balance of the
 House of Assembly would
 draw tears from a man.

Do say a fly in
 me by, with my head
 of the infant, not least
 I delighted.

15165
Mr. Read

Mr. Ambrose

1. The main facts of the case are as follows
2. The Kisiil people, to the estimated number of between 10,000 and 20,000, occupy a tract of about some 200 square miles in extent in the Kisumu Province, surrounded on the four sides by Nilotu, Kavirondo, Masa, Lamu and a forest belt respectively.

The district lies at an elevation of about 5,000 feet, is densely cultivated, fertile and well watered, bare of forest and free from tsetse.

Like all other African tribes, the Kisiil had frequent feuds with their weaker neighbours, notably with the Kavirondo, whose country they frequently raided for cattle; being the stronger tribe, they were invariably successful and gained a high but cheaply won reputation for truculence and warlike spirit. The largest and strongest of the clans into which the tribe is divided is that of the Kitutu, who have always been the most persistent raiders.

In 1905 a small force under Capt. (now Major) Jenkins visited and punished certain Kisiil clans (other than the Kitutu) for raids on their neighbours.

There appears to have been no further communication between the Kisiil and the Administration until 1907 and the early part of 1908, when the Kisiil station was opened.

The actual selection of the site was left to a junior officer, Mr. Northcote, who fixed at the southern end of the territory of the Kitutu, the most truculent and powerful of the Kisiil clans, whom

moreover had not been one of those united by
Capt. Jenkins three years previously:

17

The new station was not inspected by any of
the senior officers of the Province, and Mr. North-
cote had with him a force of 62 civil Police but no
regular troops.

Beyond the statement by Mr. Ainsworth that "it
would appear that the Kitutu, either intentionally
or through some error of interpretation" on enquir-
ing the reason of Mr. Northcote's advent, were told
that inasmuch as there was a famine in Kavirondo,
"Mr. Northcote had come to Kisii for a time where
there was plenty of food", there is nothing to show
that Government took a single step to get into
touch with the Kisii or to acquaint them before-
hand with its intention to occupy their country
permanently, or with the object which it had in
view in so doing.

5. Mr. Ainsworth writes, "the Kitutu, from the
start, became suspicious of our intentions" and
"made no secret of their dislike to our locating
ourselves among them. . . . They were extremely
ignorant and isolated. . . . These people (the Kisii)
were not in a position to know of the Government,
its power and resources; in fact they appear to
have had no idea at all of the existence of any
authority apart from what they understood existed
at Kisii station itself."

"In a few words, it is evident that the Kitutu
did not want a station near them. They resented
the White man intruding amongst them. . . .
It was believed further," adds Mr. Ainsworth,
"that the occupation of Kisii was simply a personal
matter and would cease for ever with the death
of Mr. Northcote."

It is not surprising therefore, under the

Gov/15160
Appendix P
Page III
page 3 of
Mr. Ainsworth's
Report.

Appendix P
as above.

by the local witch-doctor, should have led eventually to the attack on Mr. Hornebeck and other intruders (Police and traders) which brought about the punitive expedition described in these despatches.

I will deal first with the events antecedent to the commencement of operations.

It is not stated whether the decision to establish a Government station in Kisi had been arrived at with the Government's approval after consultation with the senior administrative officer in charge of the province. This is a very important point and that Sir. J.S. Sadler should be asked for information for on it depends largely the degree of his responsibility for what followed.

The establishment of a new station in a totally unknown district such as that in question, inhabited by a large population of raiding savages who had no previous knowledge even of the existence of the Whiteman's Government and power was a matter requiring serious consideration. In Northern Nigeria, where until recently there were large pagan districts which had not been brought under effective administrative control, a District Officer might at best even tour, much less establish a Government station, in an unexplored district without the express sanction of the Government.

(Vide Memo: No. 7, para: 11 in Sir F. Lugard's Memoranda for Political Officers, 1907.)

In a new Protectorate where the extension of Government control over remote tribes is necessarily slow, the risks and responsibilities attaching to the process of effective occupation have to be estimated in advance as accurately as the information at the disposal of the Executive will allow.

Assuming that the Administration had decided to make a forward move, it is clear that unless a small staff sufficient to deal with the district to be absorbed was available, and that this staff had to find it and on the spot such military support as was deemed necessary after careful enquiry in view of local political conditions and of the emergencies which might be likely to arise during the early stages of occupation, the decision would be premature and therefore bad policy.

Continuity of Administration and of the effect produced upon savage tribes by Europeans with whom they have had no previous acquaintance is the first and most important essential.

For this reason it is never advisable that the task of making known and building up the authority of Government under such circumstances should be entrusted to a single European.

In the present instance, however, this elementary principle of African Administration was disregarded. A single officer was allowed to penetrate into the centre of an unexplored district, several days march from the nearest Government post, and established a station in the territory of the most powerful and truculent of the local tribes.

9. To give a true idea of what such a step means necessary to quote Mr. Ainsworth. "I consider it a great mistake to leave any of these outstations with only one officer in charge. It is not fair to the officer concerned. It is against the interests of the Administration, it is offering dangers that should not be offered, and such a system is responsible in a certain degree for many wrong impressions gained by the natives. It might be said that such a system is unfair to the European and native civil superintenders for in

(para 9, page 3 Part II of Mr. Ainsworth's report in Gov/15155.)

the event of the disablement or death of the solitary European, the chances of their offering a successful resistance to a general attack on the station would be very small.

10. As regards effective military support, Mr. Northcote had none. He had, on the contrary, 62 Civil Police; that is to say, men who have been (1906) reported as being useless for military purposes and inefficient as ~~auxiliary~~ ^{civil} Police. The opinion of the Officer Commanding the Kisumu expedition was, that the state of the Police (who included these 62) was "deplorable"; as instances of this it may be noted that one Police escort mutinied and shot one of the ~~two~~ Non-Commissioned Officers, and that one of their officers, Mr. Foran, D.S.P., wrote to the Officer Commanding Troops, "I do not trust the Police and I feel obliged to protest against being left with such an incompetent and untrustworthy body of men."

It is with such men as these to support him and enforce the authority of Government that the Administration allowed a solitary civilian to embark on the task of extending its control over a remote and unknown district populated by some 50,000 savages, and I look upon the proceeding as one of criminal folly.

It is noteworthy that the Governor makes no reference whatever to the portion of Mr. Northcote's report above quoted, which is, in effect, a severe condemnation of the policy of Government on that occasion.

11. I was under the impression that Mr. Ainsworth himself was ~~Provincial Commissioner~~ ^{Provincial Commissioner} of the Kisumu district; but if this were so, it is inconceivable that he would so readily condemn this way the administrative methods for which he himself was properly responsible.

In the Report of the Officer Commanding Troops, however, reference is made to the fact that the Provincial Commissioner had only been in the district for 2 months and knew nothing about the Kisii, and it may therefore have been another, and not Mr. Ainsworth, who was in immediate executive charge of the Province. This point should be cleared up.

12. It is nowhere stated in these papers who was primarily responsible for the forward movement in Kisii.

Mr. Northcote could hardly have taken such an important step without authority and the District Commissioner immediately above him must assuredly have been cognizant of it. Whether the Provincial Commissioner at the time had authorized it or not, it is impossible to say, and the Government should be asked for information on the point.

13. A more important question, as far as Sir. J. Sadler is concerned, is whether he was aware of and had approved the proposal to establishment of the station which was to be the first step towards occupation and effective control of the Kisii territory; and, secondly, if so, whether he approved of the task being assigned to one Assistant District Commissioner supported by 62 civil Police.

It looks to me very much as if the move was undertaken by the local executive either with the knowledge of the Governor and his advisers or else without their being made fully acquainted with local conditions. It is essential that this should be ascertained.

If the Governor was fully aware and authorized the move, he was guilty of carelessness and incompetence in that he failed to see that proper methods were adopted in order to safeguard Government

interests, for no Administrator worthy of the name would authorize such an important ~~extension~~ extension of Government responsibility as that involved by the occupation of a large tract of unknown and turbulent hill-country being entrusted to a solitary and comparatively inexperienced junior officer and a handful of civil police admittedly of no military value.

14. If, on the other hand, this step was taken by subordinate executive officers on their own initiative, the responsibility, though they share it with him, still falls upon the Governor inasmuch as he was content to put up with a system of administration under which the executive staff were so loosely controlled and so destitute of a sense of responsibility that it was possible for one or some of them to cast a few and heavy responsibility on the Government without its knowledge or authority, and by so doing to involve the Protectorate in military operations, resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives, which in my opinion need not necessarily have occurred.

Close and unremitting control by the Executive over its outlying staff is the first requisite for the successful administration of an African Protectorate, above all during the extension of its authority over unsubdued native tribes. How strict this control can be may be seen on reference to Sir F. Lugard's Memoranda for Political Officers, and I can personally vouch for the fact that in its absence the effective occupation of Northern Nigeria would have been infinitely more costly in lives and money.

The process of absorbing fresh territory demands tact, patience and foresight, and the

services of the most experienced district officers, for while Government through its Officers is slowly building up first impressions of its aim and power in the minds of savages, who are necessarily ignorant and distrustful, a very slight mistake due to hasty temper or ignorance of their language or customs may lead to disaster.

16. The value of first impressions in the minds of the native cannot be overestimated; if they are unfavourable, trouble is bound to ensue, and with it the necessity for military operations, and all that they imply.

A tropical Administration consequently needs its ablest servants in the work of getting into touch with savage races in the most effective and at the same time cheapest manner, and my experience has been that the lower and more savage the native the higher the type of European required to deal with him effectually on these lines. The remoter his standards and ideas are from ours, the greater the imagination and insight required to divine and amend them.

17. In the case under review, the most delicate of the tasks imposed on a tropical Administration was placed in the hands of a very junior officer, and it was rendered difficult at the very outset by an error either of judgement or knowledge, for as Mr. Ainsworth says, (vide para: 4, above) "Mr. Northcote was told either unintentionally or through some error of interpretation" that Mr. Northcote had come to their country for a time only.

[Note. The consequences of Mr. Northcote's lack of experience are stated by the Governor in para: 3 of his despatch in 1892, where he says that although Mr. Northcote was apparently aware of the considerable degree of unrest that had existed amongst the Kikuyu for some time past, "he does not appear to have attached the importance he should have done to the signs that should have been evident."

The result of Mr. Northcote's failure to read one situation aright was that the Governor was informed that there was no necessity for garrisoning Kisii station with a company of the King's African Rifles which was prepared to do so in consequence of a outbreak of the Kisii crisis. In 1907 had this step been taken, it is more than probable that this outbreak and visible sign of the Government's power would have prevented the rising which subsequently occurred.

18.

The exact opposite was the case, and having once entered their country, to remain there, Mr. Northcote should have made it clear to the Kisii, before doing anything else, that he, and through him the Government, had come to stay and meant to do so.

One result of this error was that the Kitatu took steps to hasten the end of what they believed to be in any case only a temporary and unwelcome visitation, by attempting Mr. Northcote's life. With an experienced officer such an error would not have been allowed to occur. The whole of the neighbouring chiefs and as many tribesmen as possible would have been invited to a friendly durbar at which the existence and intentions of Government would have been explained to them. That is the ordinary practice. *If this was impracticable the methods referred to in para 23 would have been adopted.*

19.

Mr. Northcote was evidently ignorant of their language and therefore unable to check his interpreter. If Government intended to effect a peaceable occupation of the Kisii district, it does not appear to me unreasonable to demand that it should have required the officer detailed for this duty to pass the Lower Standard in Kisii before settling permanently in the district. An elementary knowledge of a language sufficient to check simple translations or statements made by an interpreter, can usually be acquired in a few months. Considering how much depends under such circumstances upon accurate translation, and the avoidance of misunderstandings, it is not surprising that the establishment of a school of Kisii interpreters is a matter of some importance.

tion in a new district, where, as in this case, was not a question of immediate progress, might well be deferred until the officer posted to it had obtained an elementary knowledge of its dialect through friendly border natives.

20. I have already stated that Mr. Northcote was unsupported by any force, ^{or} ~~many~~ of the name (para 10) and this aspect of the question requires attention.

Among savage tribes such as the Kiall our authority at the outset is ^{unusually} based to a large extent upon our visible superior armed strength for they recognize ^{naturally} only the rule of the strongest. It is a matter of months and years before savages come to recognize the moral and intellectual superiority of the ruling race, but the sight of ^{armed} and superior resources in ^{the hands of a small number} disciplined men appeals to them at once. There has consequently been a tendency to go a step further and to use our strength unnecessarily. To quote Sir. P. Glouard, "officers" are often led to consider the subjects of His Majesty as ^{enemies} brought under civilizing agencies as common enemies and therefore to treat them as such.

Mr. C
29574307
Nigeria.

21. Our aim should rather be to obtain effective control with as little use of force as possible. I do not hesitate to say that a parade of strength, judiciously displayed in a banner salute, impress the native mind will in the majority of cases result in that object being obtained without its being necessary to use force.

Time and again in the early stages of Northern Nigerian administration I have known cases where the administrative staff at outlying stations would have been swept out of existence had it not been for the massive superior force ^{imposed} by the mere presence of the superior race.

MS. No. 100
1324/07

EXTRACT from the Annual Report on Kuri Province for the year 1907, by Captain and Resident F.H. Paxton.

Opening up of the Mushi country.

"2. About a third of the country occupied by the Mushi tribe has been opened up without having met with the necessity of using force and the probability thereby created that the remainder of the country can in the same way be brought under Administrative control, loose in many ways though that control may be.

The Occupation of the country may be divided into two stages: (1) for the first three months of the year a system of patrolling with half a Company under the guidance of a Political Officer. Base at Fukari from which the patrol, constantly on the move, radiated westward as far as the Katsena River. The method adopted was, shortly stated, to get into touch with each fraction of the tribe through the intermediary of other friendly Mushis related by marriage and then to induce them to come in and see the Political Officer before ever a move was made into their country. When the patrol arrived their objects were known, suspicions had been previously allayed by the exercise of tact, patience, and an interminable amount of talking: the force had been properly introduced, and

and was accompanied by the headman of the fraction. Every advantage was taken of the fact that each man, division, clan, fraction, group and cluster, pursues a system of endless vendetta with the next, the Administration therefore represented itself as the necessary force majeure willing and capable of giving decisions and seeing that they were enforced, exactly that sort of control that all primitive peoples desire and are thankful for. Incapable themselves of rendering justice outside their own cluster, without the power of co-operating to enforce a ruling, and burdened with an interminable series of retaliations that cannot be brushed aside, such peoples accept with what might almost be termed gratitude the directions of an apparently powerful stranger, especially if the latter combines with all those qualifications required by the nature of his duties those rarer ones of sympathy and insight into the minds of a natural people. At this stage, however, the Administration cannot commit itself to judicial decrees which must be enforced, for it either lacks the necessary force or it would be politically inexpedient to use it; consequently arbitration has in almost every instance been the method adopted and most of the time the necessity to hold that a considerable amount of bluff had at times been used.

(2) On April 1st the permanent occupation of a site

site ten miles below the rapids of the Katsena River, a site which was called Katsena Allah, after the old abakwa-ribe town of that name. Here the force was increased to a full Company, and N. V. B. with 2 officers, one British N. C. O. and the Political Officer in charge of the Division. A Medical Officer was later added to the staff.

From this centre in the very heart of the Mumbi country the same policy has been pursued, very gradually increasing our control over all these clans on the right bank of the river and preparing the way for an equally peaceful penetration next year of the larger portion of Mumbiland lying to the west and south of the Katsena River.

"Closely following on the occupation of Katsena Allah came a large number of native traders followed later by the Niger Company Limited, who have built a factory and asked for a Lease of land.

+ + + + +

H. of. for. Nig.
1911/12
Desp. No. 1364
of 15. 1. 07.

In a despatch relating to the occupation of the Munshi country Sir Percy Girouard wrote as follows:-

(paragraph 4)....."Captain Gordon who has been in immediate charge of the occupation, writes: "I think I have sufficiently shown that a peaceful development is dependent on an efficient political staff, its accessibility and ubiquity."

(paragraph 5)..... As regards taxation, the Resident is strongly of opinion that no direct tax should be imposed.....

(paragraph 6)..... I have issued instructions that the whole country should be retained for the present as an unsettled district (i.e. an area which cannot be entered by any Europeans other than administrative officers for any purpose without the Governor's special permission. R.P.L.) and that the Resident should proceed very slowly and cautiously with any taxation proposals.

I cannot speak too highly of the methods which have been adopted by the Resident in charge of the Province, by the Political Officer in immediate charge of the duty and the officer in charge of the patrol.

By careful co-operation (i.e. between the Political staff and the military officers in the Munshi country. R.P.L.) and slow but steady progress no punitive action whatever has been necessary. In view of the character of the people and the many former

reports as to their intractability, the results achieved are most satisfactory"

In a later despatch^x on the same subject the High Commissioner observed:-

(paragraph 10). "....." In conclusion I would like to say that no attempt has been or will be made to impose direct taxation on this people until they are receiving the full benefits of settled Government. when I have no doubt they will readily accept taxation by exchange for the great benefits which will undoubtedly accrue to them."

In acknowledging the former despatch, Lord Elgin observed that he had read "with pleasure and satisfaction, the High Commissioner's remarks on the methods pursued by the Resident with the object of bringing under control and opening up to trade without any resort to force the country of a people formerly deemed intractable"

advance into the Kisi country was made, and form an object lesson which the English ~~Union~~ ^{Union} ~~authorities~~ ^{authorities} would do well to study.

24. Sir J. Hayes Sadler observes that he is "convinced that without the severe lesson they (the Kisi) have received, their submission would not have been complete, nor would the pacification of the country have been so assured as it is now."

In the light of the results which can be achieved by the use of proper methods, I do not think that the Governor's opinion can be accepted, for ~~provisions~~ ^{provisions} were not employed in Kisi.

As to the killing of ~~some~~ ^{some} 250 Kisi, ~~and~~ ^{and} of some 80 women and children, the extermination of 12,000 cattle and sheep, and the wholesale destruction of villages, was in Sadler's opinion (Sadler courageously terms it a "severe lesson") which ensured complete submission and pacification at an earlier date than might have been possible without

Nevertheless I maintain that had due precautions and proper measures been adopted at the outset, there would have been no necessity for a lesson of this nature or it to have been administered.

The proudest moment in a District Officer's life in a new country is when he has the happy consciousness of having won control over natives by his superiority in brains and not in brute force.

When Administrators or their subordinates are careless or err in their judgment in the use of force, with severe trials the odds are that the consequences will nearly always be remedied by force.

As a result, the native's ~~unwilling~~ ^{unwilling} obedience to the new authority is prompted not by respect for the Administrator's superior intelligence and justice and humanity, but by fear of his soldiers, and of a

repetition of a lesson such as that in question, and in such cases it is years before the feeling of hatred for the intruder is ~~extinguished~~. It would be hard to find a more unsatisfactory foundation on which to build up a district administration.

15165
P. P.
11.

26. It is evident as the following extracts from his reports show that these considerations were not foreign to Mr. Kineworth at all. "I am of opinion that a Company of troops should be stationed there (Kisii station) for some time to come, not that they need always be in the country, but the natives should learn to know that they are available."

15165.

"Constant patrolling for some time will tend to get Kisii generally in perfect order." "and now all that is required is to leave the Company of Kings African Rifles in the country, which should, in consultation with the District Commissioner, be employed as much as possible on patrol work."

At Swor
the O.C.
1898.

"... This arrangement will, I consider, be ample for Mr. ~~Hemsted~~ to effect a policy of conciliation, and to get the various sections (of the Kisii) to 'come into line'."

10902
12.

These measures are precisely those which should have been adopted at the outset. Col. Sadler, it is true, states that he was prepared to station a Company of troops in Kisii in August 1907, and did not do so because he was informed that this step was unnecessary.

This circumstance, however, merely demonstrates the bad judgement of the man on the spot. It does not affect the correctness of the view stated above. If had Col. Sadler and his advisers known the business properly this Company would have been sent to Kisii with Mr. Northcote at the start as a matter of course.

28. The punitive expedition under Col. Mackay and the means of extending the reputation of the Kisii as fighters. They are described by the Chief Staff Officer as "a negro race" who have earned the reputation of "having a noble belief, which reputation from the experience gained from this expedition is an entirely false one. With the exception of one or two occasions when they assembled in some force on the flanks of detached columns, they offered no resistance to the advance, and a few shots were generally sufficient to cause them to rapidly disperse."

907/15165
Appendix K
Notes on the
Kisii
para: 3

15165
Report

Col. Mackay, commanding the force, states: "The Kisii do not use bows and arrows but fight with a shield and spear" (para: VII) . . . "I never could induce him to come to close quarters" . . . (para: VIII) . . . "I may justly say that their efforts throughout were weak" (para: VIII). Judging from para: VII, the tribesmen seem never to have come closer to the columns than 200 or 300 yards.

Mr. Ainsworth confirms this. "Personally," he says, "I believe that the first day's operations were responsible for the almost entire collapse of any fighting qualities which the Kisii fighting man may have had; certain it is, however, that on the first day they showed no inclination to engage any of the fighting columns."

The enemy's casualties were 435 killed and wounded, according to the Staff Diary; they lost 7,000 cattle and 5000 sheep and goats.

the estimated value of over \$14,000, and a large number of the villages were burned. In view of the statements noted in the preceding paragraph, this punishment appears to me to have been unnecessarily severe. If the resistance of the Kistis was broken down after the first two days fighting, when the returns show that they lost 20 men killed, 78 prisoners and 320 head of livestock of an estimated value of over \$1,000, and many villages burnt, was it necessary to continue the operations against them for as much as 14 days more, at a further cost of over 200 killed and wounded, over 8,000 head of cattle and sheep captured and many more villages burnt?

30. To how great an extent the loss of life that occurred was due to the methods employed in the expedition is evident from the following extracts from the Military Reports.

Major Kirkpatrick, C.S.O. says, "The only way of forcing them (Kisii) to fight is by seizing their cattle and burning their villages."

The O.C., Col. Mackay, says the same thing, (para: VIII of his Report, q.v.) and adds, "I therefore decided to make every effort to capture his stock with a view to bringing him to action or at least to attack the camp at night but I never could induce him to come to close quarters."

Col. Mackay and a soldier was of opinion correct according to his lights in doing so could to bring his enemy to action, but impossible to overlook the irony of such a situation, where the Kisii are stated to be in revolt.

Gov/15165
Appendix K.

the "East African Standard", one of the best places in which one would expect to find the native's side of the case fairly considered.

I agree unreservedly with the views of "Imperialist" and the "Standard", and they constitute an indictment of the Administration and its methods which calls for the serious consideration of the S. of S.

33. I do not think it is realized how severely the natives in the East African Provinces have suffered by these methods. In my minute on Gov. 13086/07

I summarized the results of the pirer punitive expeditions carried out between 1902 - 1906. Inclusive of the figures for the Kisii expedition above stated, the Administration between 1902 and February 1908 has captured from the Kikuyu, Nandi, Sotik, Kamille, and Kisii tribes 35,600 cattle, 70,000 sheep and goats, and inflicted on them a loss of 2500 killed and wounded.

Taking the cattle at Rs 30 and the sheep and goats at Rs 2 a head (the official figures on the present occasion, vide App. Q, Gov/15165/08), this represents a total value of over 290,000 in confiscated livestock.

34. It should be remembered also that with the sole exception, I think, of the present Kisii expedition, each of these expeditions was accompanied by a large number of Masai or other friendly, over whom little or no control was exercised, and who enjoyed unlimited opportunities of looting and was not surprised to hear from an officer of the King's African Rifles that on such occasions that Colonial's probably appropriated in

this way as many cattle and sheep as were captured by the regular troops for Government.

The severity of the "lesson" in such cases is accordingly far greater than would appear from the official returns.

38. On the present expedition there is the same want of moderation and definite policy with regard to the punitive measures.

The Government's terms were not formulated in advance or stated to the tribesmen through the medium of friendly, as far as can be seen, no figure was fixed beforehand for the fine on cattle, ^{with intention of} no halt was made after the first blow had been struck and the main body of the enemy had become utterly demoralized, to see if the lesson, as far as it went, would result in the surrender of the criminals and the submission of the tribes.

The operations did not cease until 38 natives had been killed or wounded, many villages burnt, and livestock to the estimated value of £2,400 seized, in respect of each one of the six murders, actual or attempted, of which members of the tribe had been guilty.

38. It may be said that this manner of stating the case is incorrect and unfair, inasmuch as a portion only of these losses is to be regarded as punishment inflicted in obedience to the Government's orders that fines should be imposed on those clans which had "revolted", the balance being the unavoidable and unnecessary outcome of the commanding officer's compliance with Col. Sadler's further instructions to him to "restore order" and "quell the revolt". That is probably true, from the Commanding Officer's

Gov 15185
Appendix M.

point of view, the natives could not possibly appreciate such distinctions, and it is with the effect produced upon their minds by these operations that I am immediately concerned.

To the Kafir the whole of these operations and their results can only have appeared as a punishment for the actual killing of the 5 portives and the wounding of Mr. Worthoof, and not in part for the "revel" against Government which these advances and the subsequent attack on the station were held to constitute.

Viewed from this standpoint, the Staff Officer Standard's reference to the "punishment" inflicted on a large number of human beings, and many of them in the nature of things were probably originally innocent of any "evil intent" has an added significance, and the ill-timed severity of these punitive measures may well leave in the native's mind an abiding sense of injury and injustice.

39. It is impossible to believe that all this bloodshed and destruction was either necessary or politic.

After the first two days, when the contemptible nature of the Kaffer fighting qualities had become evident, and they had suffered heavy loss in lives, prisoners and property (20 killed, 70 prisoners, 3,000 head of live stock seized and many villages burnt), these operations should have been stopped, and under your orders to go into with the friendly neutral clans and through the British still disarmed to consider.

The result of the day which by the Government's orders was to be killed on

Morning Post
9th April
1902

point of view, but the natives could not possibly appreciate such a distinction, and it is with the effect produced upon their minds by these operations that I am immediately concerned.

To the Kiar, the whole of these operations and their results can only have appeared as a punishment for the actual killing of the 5 natives and the wounding of Mr. Northcott, and not in particular the "revolt" against Government which these offences and the subsequent attack on the station were held to constitute.

Viewed from this standpoint, the *African Standard's* reference to the "punishment" inflicted on a large number of human beings, and many of them in the nature of things were probably originally innocent of any "evil intent" has an added significance, and the ill-timed severity of these punitive measures may well leave in the native's mind an abiding sense of injury and injustice.

38. It is impossible to believe that all this bloodshed and destruction was either necessary or politic.

After the first two days, when the formidable nature of the tribes fighting qualities had become evident, and they had suffered heavy loss in lives, prisoners and property, (20 killed, 70 prisoners, & 230 head of live stock seized) many villages had to evacuate operations shortly have been stopped, and under your orders to get into touch with the friendly or neutral clans surrounding the station, the still disintegrated force had

The meeting of the 14th which, by the

"Morning Post"
5th April
1908

41
... been decided on and
conceded to the clans concerned and a
... About a week or more, if necessary,
allow for payment. A clear statement of
the consequences of non-payment should have
been made at the same time, and these should
have taken the form of a refusal of police
operations for a stated period, one day in
this case would have been sufficient, and so on.
The natives would thus have had full opportunity
of understanding what was required of them.
The Government's object would have been
attained with the infliction of a minimum amount
of suffering on the people.

50. This is practically the procedure laid
down by Sir G. Lugard in No. 7, para. 6 of his
Memoranda already mentioned.

As soon as the full amount of the fine
had been paid or otherwise obtained, the troops
should have retired from the district, leaving
a strong garrison at the Kishi station.

One company and a half would have been
sufficient for the purpose. The system followed
so successfully in the Yungui country in Northern
Nigeria, which may be summed up as patience and
patrols, should then have been followed in order
to get into touch with the more remote tribes and
gradually obtain control over them.

If it is admitted that the extension of
British authority over native tribes should
be carried out with the least possible suffering
on their side, then patience and tact must be
given a fair trial first, and the employment of
force regulated to the backbone and not to the

As soon as military operations are once in progress, however, the temptation to take a short cut and to obtain immediate success by forces of arms is a strong one. Such a misuse of strength is costly and bad in principle, and the present is a case in point.

Had the steps recommended by Mr. Ainsworth after the cessation of hostilities (vide para. above) been taken at the outset, there is no doubt whatever in my mind that those hostilities would not have occurred.

The conquest of the district would in all probability have been a bloodless one. In the light of what we now know regarding the true value of the warlike reputation which the Fulani previously enjoyed, the success of a policy of gradual and peaceful penetration carried out by experienced officers on the lines adopted in the Munshi country in Northern Nigeria, can hardly be a matter for doubt.

There is of course always the possibility, where the relations between Government and savage tribes are still in embryo, that a very slight deviation from the right line of policy may arouse anger and suspicion culminating in isolated acts of violence or even a general outbreak.

Every day of peaceful communication between European and African, however, promotes mutual understanding, breaks down distrust and thereby renders the chances of trouble more and more remote.

When trouble comes vicissitudes are that it will then be local rather than general, and the task of repressing it proportionately lighter. This, I think, is the universal experience under such conditions.

For the above reasons, therefore, I hold that the loss of life and property inflicted on the Kikuyu was far greater than the circumstances warranted and that the Governor is responsible for this undeserved severity, in that he failed to lay down a proper course of procedure for the guidance of the Officer Commanding and the Political Officer with the Expedition.

41. The military authorities, however, are in no sense responsible for the errors of the Civil power, the result of which they were called upon to counteract, and as far as the reports show, the troops were well handled and did all that was required of them satisfactorily.

The Officer Commanding, however, recommends the award of the African General Service Medal and a clasp for rounding up livestock, and shooting down at six and seven hundred yards and without loss to themselves, savages armed only with spears who "except on one or two occasions, when they assembled in some force on the flanks of detached columns, offered no resistance to the advance." (C. S. O.'s report) is held to constitute a sufficient qualification for a medal, no doubt they deserve it. But if a medal is given for an exploit of this kind, it might be with greater justice be bestowed on every private who qualifies as a marksman on the range at Nairobi, for his achievement and his deserts are far greater.

There was no fighting in the real sense, and such opposition as there was can hardly be regarded as a serious test of military qualities.

42. Two "regrettable incidents" must be noted.

Thirty-two women and forty-six children were made prisoners, it is not stated why or for how long or what became of them. This makes the very worst impression on natives, and gives rise to reports that we have caught them in order to eat or enslave them, or some such rubbish which as a rule has the effect of making natives who would otherwise be friendly quite unapproachable.

Unless it is desired to take prisoners in order to use them as envoys, failing other means of opening communications with hostile natives, the practice should be strictly forbidden.

No explanation is given in this case and it should be asked for.

"Onuonwu himself was unfortunately shot by our men yesterday. I say unfortunately because it appears he was on his way into camp to see the S.P.O. when he was killed".

If this chief was on his way to camp to see Mr. Ainsworth, it must have been apparent to those who met and killed him that he was bent on a peaceful errand and not coming to attack them.

The only possible conclusion is that the troops regarded every native within range as an enemy and shot him at sight.

From my own experience I know that that is the natural tendency of native African troops in a hostile country and how difficult it is to restrain them.

This is the only incident of the expedition and I am afraid it explains to some extent the heavy casualties inflicted on the clans.

A full report should be called for from the officer actually in command of the men who shot Onuonwu as to the circumstances of the occurrence.

Intelligence
Diary, para.
09.

O.C.'s Report para. 11. Enclosure to Gov. 15165.

One circumstance calls for special mention. When Col. Sadler ordered the mobilization of the troops on the 15th of January, 1908, only 50 rifles were actually available at Nairobi, the Headquarters of the Kings African Rifles in the Protectorate.

The main reason for this was the fact that the 1st Batt. were relieving their Zanzibar Detachment.

Had really serious trouble broken out anywhere in the Protectorate, the situation would have been a grave one and Col. Gaugh should be asked for his views as to whether steps cannot be taken to make better provision against such a contingency.

47
political situation, marked by the claim of law and order, the recognition by the King of this allegiance due from them as subjects of the Crown and of the authority and prestige of the Government which in fact had never existed.

45. This phraseology is no doubt loosely employed, but it may nevertheless denote a radically unbound and equally loose habit of mind (analogous to that noted by Sir. P. Girouard), namely an unconscious tendency on the part of a certain type of European to regard any native in a new Protectorate as a law-abiding subject from the mere fact of his being placed by Providence within its borders and, by Proclamation, under its laws, irrespective of whether he has ever come into actual touch with the Administration or not.

Officials who take no pains to readjust their preconceived ideas in the face of new conditions run a great risk of remaining blind to the Native's side of the case, and therefore to the most efficacious ways of dealing with them.

47. In the same way individuals who without reflection apply the terms disobedience and revolt to the attempt of a tribe to repel the invasion of strangers and preserve its own freedom are naturally predisposed in favor of the adoption of the severe measure which civilized men are accustomed to associate with the commission of the open defiance of established authority implied by these terms.

The spirit of fair play and of generosity to an opponent, savage though he be, is apt under such circumstances to be obscured by the less chivalrous sentiments animating those who believe themselves to be inflicting punishment on a criminal, and when that punishment is not defined by law and the mandate is
*left left to the discretion of
the Executive*

given in general terms capable of wide interpretation. It will be realized how great is the danger of overstepping the bounds of justice.

Until those in authority are taught to "set the game above the prize," as Newbolt puts it, there will always be the danger of their being so ready to convince their opponents by force rather than persuasion.

The second factor is a financial one. The requirements of a new Protectorate are always in excess of its means, and a Governor's first concern is to increase the revenue by any possible means. That the East African Protectorate is no exception to the rule is evident from the particular stress which Col. Sadler has invariably laid upon the necessity of increasing the administrative staff in order to collect revenue from new districts which would otherwise contribute little or nothing.

It is undoubtedly the practice of the East Africa Protectorate authorities to impose but a tax on a district as soon as the organization of the district staff permits of its collection.

In the present instance Mr. Ainsworth mentions in his report the payment by two of the chiefs of the Kitutu clan of a portion of their hut tax on the 28th. of January, a few days after the active operations had begun, so that the tax must have been imposed in Kisii immediately after the opening of the station by Mr. Northcote.

In his despatch, Col. Sadler writes "the expedition, though the loss of life is to be regretted, has had the effect of opening up a rich country which will now be brought under effective administration, and should

Gov/10902
C.P.O.'s Report
Part II Page 3.

Gov/10902
Para 3.

... has become one of the best paying districts of the
"Protectorate."

49. In the expedition of 1905, the official returns
show that the Niamas suffered a loss of 394 killed and
wounded and of 5,000 head of cattle (or approximately
£10,000). Adding the figures for the present
expedition, it appears that the Government have
punished the tribe to the total extent of 30 casual-
ties and 47,000 head of cattle and sheep, valued at
over £24,000.

Notwithstanding this heavy punishment they
are regularly taxed, the moment Government is in a
position to demand payment.

Here again I must go to Northern Nigeria for an
example of the right policy.

In his despatch No. 344 of 15.7.07 relative to
the Munshi occupation, Sir E. Girouard wrote (para-
5) . . . "As regards taxation, the Resident"
"is strongly of opinion that no direct tax should be"
"imposed" on the Munshis. . . . "I have issued"
"instructions that the Resident should proceed very"
"slowly and cautiously with any taxation proposals."

In a further despatch, the F. O. states: -
"In conclusion I would like to say that no"
"attempt has been or will be made to impose direct"
"taxation on this people (the Munshis) until they are"
"receiving the full benefits of settled Government,"
"when I have no doubt they will readily accept tax"
"ation in exchange for the great benefits which will"
"undoubtedly accrue to them."

50. The conditions were the same in East Africa
Protectorate and Northern Nigeria though infinitely
more difficult in the latter - a savage tribe distin-
guished for its raiding on its weaker neighbours,
guilty of isolated acts of hostility towards Govern-
ment officers and others, and wholly opposed to

H. O. N. O.
Nigeria
29431/07.

H. O. N. O.
31.12.07
No. 199 of
3.10.07.
Part: 10.

any attempt on the part of the Government to acquire and exercise any control over them.

In Northern Nigeria, the country of the tribe was opened up to trade without any resort to force by the patience and tact of three or four officers, civil and military, and a carefully thought-out system of patrols, friendly overtures through native intermediaries, and arbitration in local disputes (vide attached extract from the President's Muri's Annual Report).

No taxation was or will be imposed until a sufficient quid pro quo exists in the shape of the benefits resulting from settled Government and freedom of trade.

51. 50.

In the East Africa Protectorate, on the other hand, disaster was courted from the outset by the establishment in the tribe of a weak post under a solitary and not very capable junior civilian. The intentions and very existence of the Government which he represented were not made properly known to the people, and hut-tax was imposed almost immediately. The visible weakness and unimpressive character of the post and its garrison invited a natural attempt on the part of the principal clan to get rid of it. This attempt was followed by the destruction at the hands of a military expedition of a large number of lives and villages and the seizure of £14,000 worth of livestock, and the bulk of the clans forced to fly from their country and seek refuge in neighbouring districts, whose inhabitants took the opportunity thus afforded them of relieving the demoralized refugees of a good deal more property.

The taxation was imposed on the tribe at the beginning is to be continued.

It would be difficult to find a sharper contrast of one that is sure to the discredit of the

East Africa Protectorate administration.

30.
32

The policy of taxing the inhabitants of a newly occupied district before they have come to understand the nature and the benefits of civilized Government, still less enjoyed them, is unjust and impolitic in degree.

No value is given in return for the money paid, and the native can hardly regard the tax otherwise than as a forced contribution arbitrarily exacted by the stronger power. He pays through fear alone and gains in the paying a constant and permanent reason for disliking the Government and its agents.

Possibly it might be advisable to require payment of a small tax from each Chief or Headman, not for Revenue purposes but in token of their recognition of Government as their rulers.

Whether this is so or not, ^{the} right policy is to abstain from imposing any general taxation for at least a year or two years after the occupation of the district, whether by conquest or otherwise.

By the time that period has elapsed, provided that the District Officers are up to their work, the native will in all probability readily accept it, as Sir. P. Girouard states. Even then, taxation should ^{only} be gradually imposed.

33

When, as is the case of Kisumu, the effective occupation of the district and the punishment of its inhabitants for outrages on Government Officials has been carried out concurrently, by means of military operations resulting in heavy loss of life, in the confiscation of some £24,000 worth of livestock in the last 3 years, and in suffering of other kinds, the argument against the immediate imposition of taxation becomes far stronger.

With the taste of such a lesson fresh in his mouth, it will be long before the native is inclined

to recognize the benevolent aims of Government or the benefits theoretically inseparable from administration by a civilized race.

54

The short view is to impose taxation at once, preferably, no doubt, by peaceful means, but if necessary by force, whether the native receives any equivalent in return or not.

The long view is to defer taxation until Government is in a position to give ^{and actually does give} good value in return, and thus to ensure, as far as such a thing can be ensured, the recognition by the native of the fact that his interests and those of the Government are identical.

55

It would be interesting to know what amount of Hut Tax Revenue is derived from the outlying districts of the East Africa Protectorate away from the Railway, and how much of the total is expended in ways which are of direct benefit to their inhabitants.

No doubt the development of one portion of the country has an indirect effect upon the prosperity of another, and the preservation of law and order and the consequent freedom of communications and trade are directly though not at once beneficial.

I should prefer to see Government go a step further and give the natives of a newly occupied and taxed district an immediate incentive to ^{as a result of Government protection} and an opportunity for self-improvement by establishing (or subsidizing) a technical school or class of handicrafts and a small model plantation at each Government station, where instruction would be given free. I do not think we are doing nearly as much as we ought in this direction. Too much of the revenue from native taxation, especially in East Africa Protectorate, goes to meet expenditure on objects which are only remotely beneficial to the native.

56. There is a wide-spread tendency among the small communities of European officials ruling each over several millions of natives in the various tropical African States and Protectorates to accept and to apply without discrimination the theory that the best way in which to obtain effective control over coloured races, in the interests of good Government and progress is to "smash them first and let them down gently afterwards" as I once overheard a Government officer express it.

Necessary and unavoidable as this drastic procedure may be and in under certain circumstances, its adoption is certainly utterly unjustifiable in the great majority of instances in which native races display reluctance to bow to our authority at the outset and fail to recognize the ability of Government to maintain authority in case of need by force.

57. If that ability is suitably brought home to them by a judicious and timely parade of force, it will rarely become necessary to use force. "Si vis pacem, para bellum" is a maxim which holds good to an even greater extent among savages than among civilized races, and if it were acted upon more consistently than it is by tropical administrations there would be fewer punitive expeditions and less bloodshed and demoralization.

It is no doubt recognized to a certain extent, and for that reason each African Protectorate maintains a military establishment and the police carry rifles instead of truncheons.

58. In the East African Protectorate and other Protectorates as well the material available for the purposes of affording an object lesson in the reserve force at the disposal of Government is in my opinion not distributed to the best advantage; its effect as a deterrent is consequently to a large extent wasted.

The policy of Government is surely to prevent disorder, and not merely to contain itself with providing the means of

suppressing it, after it has arisen; the armed strength of Government should therefore be dispersed accordingly.

In new Protectorates especially recognition of this principle is of vital importance during the initial stages of rendering the occupation of unknown areas effective because the risks of disorder are greatest at that period, growing less as civilizing agencies are brought to bear.

It is precisely in these Protectorates however that the policy of prevention is rendered difficult and often subordinated to the policy of cure by reason of the conflict between military and political considerations the existence and effects of which are I think not fully recognized.

The military policy is one of concentration;—the maintenance at one or possibly two central points of a body of troops which can be dispatched without delay to any part of the country where and when the situation calls for military action.

This policy is perfectly sound from a military point of view, and moreover has two great advantages; it makes for the efficiency which can only be obtained by combined training, and for the financial economy which results from the reduction in the number of troops rendered possible by the superior efficiency and mobility of a concentrated striking force.

The policy of the Civil Power on the other hand is, or should be, to maintain in the various districts a show of force sufficient to impress the natives with the fact that resistance to authority would be futile. The more unsettled the district, the greater the show of force required at the outset. This policy is naturally antagonistic to that of the military authorities, for it involves decentralization and the dispersal of military units; battalions are split up into companies, combined training becomes impossible, the spur of competition is absent, and the general efficiency and smartness of the troops undoubtedly suffers.

The contest between concentration and economy on the

35
one hand and decentralization and increased expenditure on the other has resulted too often in the victory of the former policy. In such countries as the East Africa Protectorate the fact is greatly to be deplored, for the outbreak of disorder with its resulting loss of prestige, is directly facilitated and its suppression attended by far greater difficulties, delays and bloodshed than would otherwise be the case.

When a new district in Northern Nigeria was brought under effective control, a company of troops was stationed at its headquarters as a matter of course, as an obvious means to ward off any possible agitation, and mainly due to that common-sense precaution that the civil staff had time to build up by peaceful methods an influence and authority over the originally hostile population, in process of time rendered it possible to reduce the garrison and in some cases to dispense with it altogether.

Eventually the political conditions will be ripe for the unreserved adoption of the concentration policy, but until the outlying districts of a large Protectorate have fallen into line with the settled central districts, that policy can only be gradually developed.

1. In the case of the Kisii outbreak, one civilian and 50 civil Police of no military value were allowed to enter and settle in the Lunenburg territory, of which account was one of the most unsettled and dangerous districts in the Protectorate. The news of the attempt on Mr. Northcote's life reached Kisumu by runner on the 12th. January, so that presumably it occurred a day or two previously, say the 10th. January.

Mr. Ainsworth telegraphed to Wm. Capt. Bois, O. C. Lumbwa, the nearest military post, who had one Company of the 3rd. Batt. King's African Rifles; and this officer with 50 men reached Kisii station on the 15th. January.

The news of the outbreak was received by telegraph at Nairobi on the 14th. January and the expedition under Col. Mackay

did not arrive at Kisii until the 23rd.

The regular troops reached the scene of the disturbance for 8 days after its outbreak, and then only one officer and 50 men (half of the garrison) of a neighbouring district some days march away. The main body of the troops did not arrive at Kisii headquarters until 8 days later, that is to say a fortnight after the attack on Mr. Northcote.

Note

I do not reckon the 50 Police under Mr. Teran who left Kisumu on the 1st, and presumably reached Kisii about the 15th, or 17th, as they were of no military value. (1913 para 10.)

Had the Kisii despised the warlike reputation which they actually enjoyed in official circles, Mr. Northcote and his Police would have been wiped out before the Lunwa detachment could have reached him.

The fact that the tribesmen subsequently belied it is no wise absolves the Administration from the blame which is incontestably due to it for failing to safeguard its authority and the lives of its servants.

2. The necessity of using force in order to prevent the occurrence of disorder is vitally important for another reason, namely because the actual application of force is a confession of weakness rather than an exhibition of strength, under such conditions as those in Kisii.

The resort to forcible measures in order to obtain authority under these conditions simply amounts to this, that the local Administration notwithstanding a highly trained political staff and the varied resources of civilization at its disposal has been unable, or as in this case too incompetent, to win the confidence and the ^{voluntary} military cooperation of a tribe of primitive savages without first terrorizing them by bloodshed, stock-raiding and house-burning.

The use of force on this occasion was due to the neglect on the part of the Government and its agents of the usual administrative procedure, one evil leading to another.

Having once adopted forcible means in order to inflict

punishment for outrage: the Government reluctantly postponed them in order to bring about the political unification of the Khasi, normal procedure being again neglected.

The extension of administrative control over the tribe might have been effected by peaceful methods at the cost of time and patience, and the loss to Government of a certain amount of New Tax revenues, but in all probability with little or no further bloodshed, if active operations had been stopped after the first blow had fallen on the tribe.

The Government however preferred to attain the desired result at once and did so in the space of 14 days.

The tribe lost 300 men killed and wounded and 12000 head of livestock; many villages were destroyed and the principal clans thoroughly demoralized and scattered.

On our side there was one casualty, a native levy slightly wounded, and the Administration reaped an estimated net profit of £12,000 after deducting the cost of operations, and

Sir J. Hayes Sadler, whose regret for the loss of life was quickened, if I recollect rightly, by a telegram from Lord Elgin, reports with satisfaction which he evidently expects the the Secretary of State to share, the acquisition of what "should soon become one of the best paying districts of the Protectorate."

With regard to the policy of fines, the O.C. Troops was instructed to exact payment of fines from the clan or clans responsible for the death of the Police and porters, and from the clans which "revolted."

No exception can be taken to the first order; the system of money payments for killing—death-money—prevails generally among African races and if met among the Khasi, would nevertheless be readily understood by them. It is essential however to announce the amount beforehand and to abide by it.

To fine a tribe or clan for "revolting" (vide paras 44-47) when it has first to be brought by force under an authority

19185
Annex C

which has neither been recognized by nor effectively exercised over it is to my thinking not only impolitic but wholly at variance with ordinary ideas of justice.

The administration of even-handed justice in a lawless society is the most potent of the instruments calculated to secure the respect and obedience of primitive races and to render them immune from the loss of their independence at the hands of strange Europeans.

Resistance to the first attempts of strangers to deprive them of their freedom of action and especially to exact payment of tribute, is not considered an offence among African tribes anywhere than it is among civilized peoples, and to fine a tribe for evading a natural instinct to preserve its freedom and its property is to revive the methods of the Dark Ages.

It is surely enough to have broken their spirit and conquered their territory without invoking the assistance of legal ~~technicalities~~ technicalities to turn their armed invasion into a treasonable revolt against a sovereign of whom they had never heard, and on that account to inflict punishment upon them.

A wholesale confiscation of property for such a reason deserves the Government's action of all appearance of an act of justice and degrades it to what is not only in the owners' eyes but in very truth a raiding expedition.

Our superiority to the native is in effect reduced to a superiority in brute force and ability to destroy and rob him, and he looks upon us solely as stronger savages than himself.

The proper course would have been to fix at the outset a definite fine to be paid by the clans responsible for the killing of the Police and porters, and not to have taken a penny more.

I totally disagree with the action of the expedition in subduing the Kisii country by force, for the reasons stated

which has neither been recognized by nor effectively exercised over it is to say that it is not only impolitic but wholly at variance with ordinary ideas of justice.

The administration of even-handed justice in a lawless society is the most potent of the instruments calculated to secure the respect and obedience of ^{the} native races and to shield them from the loss of their independence at the hands of strange Europeans.

Resistance to the first attempts of strangers to deprive them of their freedom of action and especially to exact payment of taxes is not considered an offence among African tribes anywhere, but it is among civilized peoples, and to fine a tribe for obeying a natural instinct to preserve its freedom and its property is to revive the methods of the Dark Ages.

It is surely enough to have broken their spirit and conquered their territory without invoking the assistance of legal ~~technicalities~~ technicalities to turn their armed invasion into a treasonable revolt against a sovereignty of whom they had never heard, and on that account to inflict punishment upon them.

A wholesale confiscation of property for such a reason deprives the Government's action of all appearance of an act of justice and degrades it to what is not only in the owners' eyes but in very truth a raiding expedition.

Our superiority to the natives is in effect reduced to a superiority in brute force and ability to destroy and rob, and he looks upon us solely as stronger savages than himself.

The proper course would have been to fix at the outset a definite fine to be paid by the clan responsible for the killing of the 4 Police and porters, and not to have taken a penny more.

I totally disagree with the action of the expedition in subduing the Kisii country by force, for the reason stated

in paras 30 - 30, but granting for the sake of argument that the O. C.'s policy of seizing livestock in order to bring the Kisii to order for that purpose (para: 30) was necessary, the cattle thus seized should have been unconditionally returned to the natives when that object had been attained.

Gov 15160
para: 3

The fasted stock are it is true to be gradually returned to the tribes in return for work done in the "development of their country."

This is certainly a step in the right direction and but for the action of the Secretary of State Col. Sadler would not have been taken. At the most however it only amounts to changing the character of the punishment by making it payable in labour instead of livestock.

The Governor makes no reference to any provision for the families or dependants of the 4 Police and porters killed in the Kisii. These men strictly speaking were killed no doubt in the course of their duty. Their death however, unless the Government can show to the contrary, is directly due to their being improperly employed in an unknown and unsettled district in which Government servants, with the exception of the police, should never have been permitted much less ordered to go without an escort until the establishment of the diplomatic relations which enabled them to do so without any risk.

A full report should be called for as to the circumstances of their employment under such conditions.

Notably it was due primarily to failure of Mr. Northcote's report (vide Mr. Ainsworth's and Col. Sadler's despatch 1902)

to gauge the temper of the tribe and to appreciate what was going on around him.

It seems to me from the information available to be distinctly a case in which compensation should be given from public funds.

The whole episode betrays a degree of administrative ineptitude and a vicious misuse of force on the part of the Administration which deserves the gravest censure, and a

Governor so lacking in a sense of his responsibilities
 with regard to native races under his care that he is able
 to see in the result of such methods only a "complete success"
 and the opening up of a "free" source of Hut Tax revenue. In
 my opinion utterly unfit to be entrusted with the task of
 administering an African Protectorate.

To summarize the order sequence the conclusions which these despatches do not appear to justify:-

(1) The incompetence of the Executive, as shown by the failure to control its agents and to ensure the prosecution of a definite administrative scheme of opening up new territory, is in the first place responsible for the following results:-

- a. Unsuitable location of Kisumu station.
- b. Inadequate and ill-organized civil staff.
- c. Inefficient precautions on the spot against possible disorder (i.e. a Police instead of a military garrison).
- d. Failure to acquaint the Kisumu with the character and aims of Government, and neglect to take proper steps to impress their attitude on the set with its resources and power to uphold its authority.
- e. Premature and unjustifiable imposition of taxation.
- f. The failure of Mr. Northcote to realize and react to the political situation.

which led to a riot caused:-

the attempt on the part of the Kisumu and other clans to free themselves from a strange and unwelcome administration by a simple boycott, supported by the unimpressive escort of ill-disciplined native subordinates who were employed to enforce it and also the presence of the Police, which could only appear to the tribesmen at that stage as an act of oppression.

The murder of 2 Police and 2 Europeans who were improperly exposed to risks which should not have been run except by patrols of regular troops.

(2)

DURING ACTIVE OPERATIONS

neglect to fix and to communicate to the clans, either before or, apparently, during hostilities, the exact amount of the fine which Government had decided to impose in respect of the murder of the Police and porters.

Undue prolongation of punitive measures and failure to cease active operations for more than a few hours at a time in order to give the clans a reasonable opportunity of learning

the Government's terms and making their submission.

Unjustifiable and impolitic infliction of a... on various clans because of their revolt against a power to which they had never submitted.

Uncalled-for severity towards the tribe as evidenced by the list of casualties and the amount of property confiscated or destroyed.

Continuance of direct taxation in spite of the heavy losses inflicted on the clans and of the fact that it will take some considerable time before they enjoy any direct benefit from our administration.

70. A more important point upon which the Secretary of State should ask for information is who was responsible for the decision to establish a station in Kisii and bring the district within the area of effective administration.

The assumption by Government of additional responsibilities of so wide a nature should clearly not have been decided upon except after full consideration by the Governor-in-Council, and Col. Sadler should be asked if this was so or not.

There is a direct chain of responsibility from the Assistant District Commissioner on the spot through the District and Provincial Commissioners to the Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor, and these officers are jointly and severally responsible for the administration, errors and omissions which occurred in the district and which brought about the necessity for military action.

The responsibility for the unquestionably harsh measures employed by the expedition to punish and conquer the Kisii rests with the Chief Political Officer and with the Governor and mainly with the latter, since he failed to lay down the proper procedure to be observed.

Gov. 15165
Appendix A.
Staff Diary
5th February.

under such circumstances, and did nothing to check the wholesale destruction of life until recalled to a sense of his responsibilities by a telegram from the Secretary of State.

The whole affair gives the impression that there is a serious failure on the part of the Governor and his headquarter staff to keep in proper touch with and control the executive affairs in the districts, both in matters of general policy and in the execution of particular duties; & that this want of system leads to slackness and neglect of responsibility on the part of the District and Provincial staff, who give their subordinates too free a hand and fail to exercise proper supervision over their actions.

Gohlradler might be sent a copy of Sir F. Lugard's Political Memoranda and asked whether similar standing orders have been compiled for the guidance of executive officers in the Protectorate, and, if so, to furnish the Secretary of State with a copy for consideration.

R. P. Hanley

6.3.09

(Beranda)

G.O.
Governor's Office, 15/65

Nairobi, 30 APR 08

April 1st 1908.



EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE.
CONFIDENTIAL (28)

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit copy of a letter dated 17th ultimo from Lieutenant-Colonel F.D. Mackay giving cover to his report on the late operations against the rebellious sections of the Kisi tribe.

2. The reasons which necessitated this punitive expedition have already been fully reported, and in my despatch No. 97 of the 3rd ultimo, I explained the delay which had occurred in the preparation of this report through the illness of the Officer Commanding Troops and the Chief Staff Officer after their return from the expedition.

3. There can be no question but that the situation in Kisi immediately after the attempt on the life of the District Commissioner was critical; the warlike Kitutu clans were in revolt, murdered two Policemen, an Indian trader and some Kavirondo porters and practically invested the Station. This was relieved by Mr. Foran and a party of Police hurriedly despatched from Kisumu, the Company of the King's African Rifles at Lumwa following, and the troops at Headquarters, who were at the time employed

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR THE COLONIES,

DOVING STREET,

LONDON, S.W.

C.C. Troops
March 17th

4/3
1908

65
employed in quarantine guard duty, mobilizing as quickly as could be managed.

4. The details of the operations are fully set forth in Colonel Mackay's report. They were well planned and efficiently carried out. The result has been that the rebellion has been completely quelled, the refractory clans have made complete submission, and a large area of thickly populated and very fertile country has been brought under administration. I consider that Colonel Mackay and the officers mentioned by him deserve all credit for the successful planning and carrying out of the expedition, and though the loss of life suffered by the refractory clans is to be regretted, I am convinced that without the severe lesson they have received their submission would not have been so complete nor would the pacification of the country have been so assured as it now is.

5. In accordance with Your Lordship's instructions the captured stock will be gradually returned to the tribes in return for work done in the development of their country.

6. The Inspector General, King's African Rifles, has not yet seen the reports I am submitting. Should he have any remarks to make on them I will address Your Lordship again by the first opportunity.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble servant,

Frederick

76/145
NAIROBI

March 1908.

From

The Officer Commanding

KISII Expeditionary Force.

To

The Secretary

to the Administration

East Africa Protectorate.



Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. 5/5 dated 13th February 1908 and in accordance with paras 168 to 173 King's African Rifles Regulations, I have the honour to submit for His Excellency's and the Governor's information the enclosed report on the operations in KISII from the date of my instructions to mobilize the Force to the close of the operations.

I enclose Appendices to my report which should be read in conjunction with the same.

In consequence of certain outrages and murders having been committed by the KISII tribe, it was decided by His Excellency the Governor to at once take punitive measures against them.

Offences committed by the KISII Tribe

- (a) Murder of 2 Policemen.
(b) " " 1 Indian Trader.
(c) " " 2 Kavirondo Porters.
(d) a personal attack made on Mr. HOSKINS, Assistant District Commissioner, who was severely wounded by a spear.

Reason for Expedition
offences.

Situation &
Distribution
of Troops on
Outbreak of
1 Coy. 3rd K.A.A.F.
150 Police
50 Mand Levies.

II. On 15th January 1908 when His Excellency the Governor ordered the mobilisation of the Force as per margin the troops were distributed as follows:

At Nairobi, the Headquarters of the Troops, where there were only some 50 Rifles available. This was owing to the fact that at the time the 1st Battalion King's African Rifles were in the act of relieving their Kampisi Detachment and were in consequence absent from NAIROBI.

The 2 Headquarters Companies of the 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles were employed on Gattle Quarantine duty from the ATHI River Station on the Uganda Railway to the TANA River covering a frontage of over 50 miles and some 50 to 50 miles from NAIROBI.

At the same time the Company at LUMBA which was required to join the Force was furnishing a patrol of 1 British Officer and 25 Rank & File in the KARRAS and KAKAMBOA country. I could therefore only take the Field with about 100 rifles whereas I had estimated that a force of 500 rifles was necessary for the successful carrying out of His Excellency's instructions.

Intelligence III.
communications

On the outbreak of hostilities practically nothing was known of the KISII Tribe or their country. The Provincial Commissioner of KISUMU Province (of which the KISII District forms part) had only been some two months in that part of the Protectorate and had never personally come in contact with the KISII nor could he produce any information in his Office that was of any use to me for the forthcoming operations.

Mr NORRINGTON, the Assistant District Commissioner, in KISII was lying wounded at the Government Station and was not in a condition to furnish me with such

Information

information as he possessed and the greatest difficulty was experienced by us in deciding from which point to take my advance.

After carefully considering the situation it appeared to me that the mouth of the BOWDO River, which point, on Lake VICTORIA NYANZA is nearest to the KISII country would be the most suitable spot on which to concentrate.

Soundings of the lake in that part were taken and it was discovered that KONGO BAY could be used for the small Steam Launch PERRY ANDERSON to enter and tow Berges with stores etc and that sufficient depth of water was available.

The troops were moved by rail to KISUMU and thence by water transport to KONGO BAY which is some 3 to 4 hours steaming from PORT FLORENCE.

This enabled me to concentrate the force within 19 miles of the KISII Boundary and 23 of KISII Station. At this place some 2 1/2 miles from the Lake I formed my Base Depot which was held by a small party of Police under a Civil Officer who acted as Base Commandant.

On the 23 KISII attacking Mr NORTHCOKE which may be considered as the first real move in the rebellion some 68 police only were in the KISII Government Station.

On receiving the news that Mr NORTHCOKE had been wounded, the Provincial Commissioner KISUMU Province, sent on a Medical Officer with a small escort which failed to get through to KISII owing to the hostile attitude of the tribes on the way.

A further party of police were hurried out forward to do their utmost to get through to Mr NORTHCOKE and at the same time I British Officer and 50 Rank & File 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles were despatched

Situation in IV.
KISII up to 20th
January 08.

from the Detachment at LUMENA as reinforcements. Both these parties made KISII Station their objective as reliable reports came to hand that the KISII were actively engaged in besieging and attacking the Government Station (KISII).

Both the reinforcements of King's African Rifles and Police who picked up the Medical Officer, got into the Station without suffering any loss, arriving on 30th January 1908. Captain BOIS 3rd King's African Rifles who commanded the Detachment from LUMENA now assumed Command of the Force in KISII and set to work to fortify the Station and make it secure from any attacks as he observed the tribe gathering in great numbers on the surrounding hills and assuming a very hostile attitude. Owing to the direct roads being closed he could not get any information through that either himself or police got safely through so that I had to make every endeavour to get a sufficient force concentrated at KONGO BAY in order to be in a position to save KISII Station if hard pressed and on the 30th January 1908 I had concentrated on the KONGO KISII line 230 men available to make a forced march if necessary and thus clear up the KISII Station difficulty, on this date I received information that the Station was safe.

Five
operations.

- V. On the 31st January 1908 I arrived with my main Column now made up to 280 rifles on the border of the affected territory and immediately commenced active operations, dividing my force up into small columns, covering a frontage of about 10 miles. I drove the enemy in front of me towards KISII Station; this movement came as a complete surprise

(8) 70
to the enemy as on all former occasions when any armed parties moved to the Government Station, they invariably followed what was considered the main road or rather track and never diverged across country.

The enemy suffered heavily and in this days operations my Columns captured many head of stock and burnt many dwellings and cattle stockades.

Our tactics on this day so demoralized the enemy that he did not make any combined effort to dispute our march on any future occasion.

During this days operations although the KIBII appeared in great force on the surrounding hills they did not make any combined attack and were easily driven off by a few well directed volleys and a few rounds fired from the maxims.

theatre of operations.

VI. As several of the KIBII Clans were not actually hostile to the Government and refrained from actual rebellion, the area of active operations only covered some 400 to 500 square miles and was very difficult to operate in owing to the long elephant grass which grew in the valleys and to a dense scrub and tall cultivation which covered the higher ground, all hill tops where the grass was short were the only positions from which a good view could be got, besides a long escarpment ran through the country, gave us an extended view and from which the friendly Clans could be located.

The aspect as mentioned above favoured in every way the enemy's tactics as it gave cover for his stock and very difficult and good hiding places for the warriors, but at the same time made it most difficult for the Troops to move and keep touch in.

ing the road to KONGO BAY and bring in the convoy not
strongly guarded, so that I may justly say that their
efforts throughout were great.

IX. From the date I commenced active operations to the
end of the expedition on 6th February 1900, the enemy
suffered heavily.

They lost over 7000 cattle captured and 3000 sheep &
goats were taken, many living and cattle bones were
burnt while over 500 casualties were inflicted on the
enemy who were completely demoralized fleeing with
their families into the KAVIRONDO country for personal
safety.

During the operations our loss was trifling, only one
HANDI Levy wounded.

I attribute our small casualty return to the fact
that very few native Levies were employed and that all
raiding parties sent out from the Main Column, were
of sufficient strength to cope with any hostile bodies
of the enemy they came in contact with by a few well
directed volleys or rifle fire and that the enemy
used no bows and arrows, also when encountered in our
force, they were so closely pressed by the troops
that they had no opportunity to concentrate.

X. I attribute the speedy and successful results of the
operations to the keenness displayed by all ranks
and to the loyal support I received from both Civil
and Military Officers which represented both the
1st and 2nd Battalions King's African Rifles and also
to the splendid marching powers of the native
soldier although burdened as he was, with 7 days
rations, blanket, equipment etc.

transport XI. Porter transport was used throughout; they were all recruited from the WAKAVIRONDO tribes around KISUMU and MARIAS and on the whole worked well but they could only carry a 40 lb load which necessitated a large force and in consequence longer columns to guard in the line of march.

medical XII. The medical arrangements were all that could be desired. The Medical Officer in his report states the health of the Force was excellent.

supply XIII. A ration of rice was carried for the Troops but this was often diverted from and a local flour ration substituted which was of excellent quality. Porters were rationed on flour collected in the areas from which they were recruited.

discipline XIV. The discipline of the Troops was excellent.

The discipline of the Police was not good (see Mr. [Name] Report attached). This, I consider, from years' experience of Africans is attributed to the fact that both women and men were not sufficiently trained or disciplined before they are placed in the ranks to act as a military element.

Difficulties XV. The District Engineer Uganda Railway blocked the line at FORT TERRAN and delayed a Troop Train and apparently the same train was delayed at LONDIAKI for some unknown reason, vide my Staff Diary of 20-1-1908.

Re Equipment: XVI. The present pouch supplied with the Equipment is not of a useful pattern; the cover is not sufficient to prevent cartridges falling out when men are operating in thick bush country or lying down with the pouches full of ammunition.

Conclusion. XVII. In conclusion I would most respectfully request you will be good enough to bring to His Excellency the Governor's notice that I am of opinion that African General Service Medal with a Clasp inscribed "KISII 1908" should be granted to all Officers, Commissioned-Officers and men under my Command who took part in the expedition from 16th January to February 1908.

Confidential XVIII. I have the honour to enclose in a letter a confidential letter giving the names of the Natives, Officers, Non-commissioned-Officers and men whose services, I consider, worthy to be brought to the notice of His Excellency the Governor.

I have the Honour
to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant

INDEX OF APPENDICES.

KISII EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

- A. Staff Diary
- B. Intelligence Diary
- C. Intelligence re the Kisii Tribe
- D. Kisii Operation Scheme
- E. Mobilization Orders
- F. Standing Orders
- G. Operation orders
- H. Routine orders
- I. Net result of the operations
- J. Notes on the Kisii
- K. Medical Report
- L. the Governor's despatch sanctioning the Expedition
- M. Chief Political Officer's despatch closing the operations
- N. Final remarks on the Kisii Expedition
- O. Provincial Commissioner (C.P.O's) Report on the Kisii Expedition.
- P. Financial Report on expenditure of Kisii E. Force.

Serv. Major Evans
Sergeant Taylor
Hospital Dispenser

- 1. The force halted at Kisumu on the 15th
- 2. The force proceeded by water transport to Konga
- 3. The force spent 3 hours steaming from Kisumu
- 4. The troops travelled in lighters towed by the
- 5. The troops disembarked for the day about 11 miles
- 6. From the landing place where the boats were
- 7. Mr. Stopper joined the force here and is
- 8. Inspector of Police Mbaraka also joined the
- 9. force and is detailed for duty at the base camp

10. The column moved on 21 miles to Marakanyo Camp

and halted for the day. Here the column was joined

by Major J. J. Kingdon C. S. D. R. G. to command

Major J. J. Kingdon's rifle company, C. S. D. R. G.

No. 7 Company and S. A. Hicks under Lieut de

Forest and Lieut Hoffmeister Det. ...

calling officer.

The troops in the convoys left that place at 3 p.m. on the 15th but

did not arrive at Kisumu until 6.30 a.m. on the

16th instead of the delays on the railway.

The first delay occurred at Londiani where the

whole train was out of order instead of the

overhaul of the train only. The train then

off to ... before the ...

the next delay occurred at Fort ... where we

were informed that the line had been cut.

to make a flanking movement to the right and then
swing round to the left to sweep along the
hills capturing all stock seen.

The column proceeded on its way marching in an
elastic square with the porters in the middle.
Falted about a mile further on to destroy some
huts on the right of the road and then resumed
the march halting for the day at ... Distance
of traversal 85 miles.

Captain ... and ... with 30 rank and
file of ... and ... and reached
... station from ... on the 15th January
... into camp ... by Assistant District
Superintendent ... They had come from
... station and reported it only about 3 miles
off. All ... and returned to their station.
On the ... were coming in large numbers from ...
... about ...

Captain ... with his men arrived ...
having captured much stock, killed 13 ... and
captured some women and children.

Information having been received
that ... party had lost some stock,
Lieut. ... was despatched with ...
down the valley to the ... of ... to track and
cover the ...

Lieut. ... with 30 rifles was detailed to
sweep along the ridge to the ... of ... in
all villages.

Both ... parties were ordered to return to camp
by sunset.

At about 4 P.M. Lieut. ... returned camp with
captured stock and some prisoners. Reported 1
... killed.

... was received that Lieut. ...
... that he had failed in ...

about 100 of the enemy, about 4 miles from camp and began retiring slowly along the river towards camp.

Captain Gordon with 50 rifles went out to take care of his and brief his men into camp.

At about 5.45 p.m. Lieut. Folsom returned to camp with his party.

He had not seen Gordon's party but he had to fire his rifle off the enemy and fired about a couple of volleys.

At 8 p.m. Captain Gordon returned to camp. Reported 1 Kisii killed.

Result of days operations.

Cattle captured	about	1700 head
hats & sheep	"	1000 "
smaller animals		20 killed
prisoners taken		48 children

Many villages burnt.

General order issued that on no account were grain stores to be destroyed.

The column marched into Kisii station today, distance from camp 32 miles.

A few Kisii seen on the tops of Muzman hills on arrival. Camp Lieut. Folsom with 50 rifles of the I Company was sent out to bring in some stock which had strayed from us the night before and was seen by the Kisii police in friendly villages about 2 hours from the station.

He returned about sunset with 155 head.

Captain Gordon with 4 No 6 Company was ordered to destroy the villages of the Hill about 10 miles

to the N. of camp.

The following officers and men joined the force to...

Dr. A. A. ... 1950

Mr. ... Dist. Com. A.P.O.

Mr. ... North ... Dist. Com. A.P.O.

Captain ... and ... and file of ...

A.D. ... and ... and file ... Police

Captured stock carefully counted.

Cattle, head of ... 1950

Sheep ... of ... 1950

Headquarters received ...

No. 8 Company under ...

on to the ... with ...

sweep round to ... of camp, ...

stock and burning villages.

He returned at sunset with ...

reported many head of cattle still in the ...

detached to ... and camp.

No. 1 Company under Captain ...

by ... swept round from ...

the bottom of the ... to the ...

as ... finished up in ...

Returned at sunset with ...

Reported had seen ... cattle on top of ...

... with ...

endeavored to get ...

by ... but failed.

... joined the force to ...

assist in ... cattle.

... and ... the cattle ...

result of days ...

Cattle captured 1679

sheep and goats approximately 800

many killed 38

Our casualties - one ...

A few trails were seen on the top of the escarpment and on the surrounding ridges but directly they were fixed on. One was killed and the N'gubi Indians accounted for another.

To V Company under Captain Grimshaw remained at their station to guard the cattle.

The section of the J.I. Company sent out to the N. returned at midnight with some captured cattle.

Reported that they had reached N'gubi's village was told them that he had seized a lot of the Kikuyu stock on their attempting to enter his territory and was holding the same for government.

One of the N'gubi men came in with this party to see the C.P.O.

Section that went out 3.30 brought in a number of cattle and reported the presence of large herds which they had not time to collect.

Captain Gordon found the Ngugi River (vide Intelligence report) He brought in a few head of cattle and reported the presence of more.

Result of days operations

Cattle captured	464
Sheep and goats captured	461
Human casualties	4 killed
Our casualties	1 wounded
	nil

Messengers from N'gubi came in to see the C.P.O.

Agreed to wait here.

The C.P.O. wishes to go down into the valley tomorrow to give them a chance to come in and see him and has requested the O.C. to suspend operations for the present to the N. of our camp.

The total numbers of cattle captured to date amount to

Cattle	5391
Sheep and goats	3224

Certain cautions have to be made from these totals on account of reductions to men and porters.

January Headquarters remained at Kogonko camp.

Lieut Stacey with 4 No III Coy was sent out the 25th with orders to capture all stock but refrain from burning villages.

The O.C.R.A. Force with 2 No P.O. escorted the remaining 1 of No III Company proceeded down into the valley to the 4. of camp and interviewed various chiefs of the Kitutu. At the conclusion of the interview, the O.P.O. informed the O.C. that he wished to hold a conference with the wree of the Kitutu to discuss the situation and requested the O.C. to suspend active operations until the conference was ended.

Captain Stigand 1st S.A. Rifles has arrived at Kisii station as Survey Officer and has been ordered to report himself here to-morrow.

Result of days operations

- Cattle captured 500
- Sheep and goats approximate 40
- Enemies casualties 7 killed.

January Lieut de Carteret with 20 rifles left camp at 5.30 a.m. to meet Capt Stigand and report him into camp. The 20 rifles returned to camp yesterday from the east. He reported his arrival at the headquarters camp today. He was accompanied by 20 rifles, 100 lbs of stores, and 10 rifles. From Kisii town the report returned to Kisii town in the afternoon. Capt Stigand had not yet the report, but to meet him under Lieut de Carteret, which returned here at sunset.

Captain Stigand reports an encounter with the Kitutu near the church between Kogonko Bay and Kisii town on 25th January.

Estimate of the enemies casualties at 10 killed.

Organ and his people and Ngekundi, Hainan headman with his people came in today to have an interview with the C.P.O. They want peace and state they have committed no hostile acts.

This so far as is known is true. They maintain that Kibetia is inclined to overextend and does not want to go any further. They confirm the report that the witch woman is at the bottom of the trouble.

Operations will be directed to capture and kill the witch woman and Kibetia.

The column marched today at 8:30 a.m. in a N.W. direction and after a two hours march reached Eduvia territory where it was met by Eduvia himself who handed over 60 head of cattle which he had seized from the Kibetia.

After another hours march along a good road led broad out by Eduvia people we camped at Mbaranga. Distance 22 miles.

We crossed three streams named Mbaranga, Nye onite and Ntulo which eventually join to gether and form the Kibetia river.

Eduvia villages are much larger than those met with in other parts of the colony and are surrounded with walls about 6' high and 12" wide built of mud and small stones. There were no gates and no strong. The outside of these walls is a ditch about 4' wide and 2' deep.

100 Kibetia men have been hired for the C.P.O. to assist in driving the cattle.

No company under Captain Lorde, accompanied by Mr. Rensted A.P.O. moved out to the N.W. and swept along the wall capturing Kibetia villages.

This company rejoined the column at sunset and brought in a large number of captured cattle and reported

and headquarters at Ndavi as early as possible. Orders to this effect were despatched to the O.C. No 1 Company at 8 p.m. today the 30th January and he should arrive here with the cattle on the evening of the 1st February.

2. One of the III Coy with 30 hand levies will proceed to Morro on the road to Kisi until they meet No 1 Company with the cattle. They will assist in escorting the cattle here.

3. The remaining half of No III Company will move along the road to Kericho building barabas at the following places:

- Kiyanderi on the 31st January
 - Kibera on the 1st February
- This company will then return to Ndavi's camp and should arrive here on the 2nd.

Mabruk, a head chief of the Nandi arrived at headquarters to take charge of the Nandi levies.

A convoy of 73 porters arrived today under escort of a section of No 1 Company from Kisi. Reported no incidents on the road.

Had also reports in one day. He was not in any communication with Kisi or Kungu Bay now.

Headquarters remain at Ndavi.

Telegram sent to his Agency the Governor asking that 50 police under a white Officer be sent to Kericho to guard the cattle or if that is impossible half a company of N. Coy. led by a British Officer.

No III Company under Kiyanderi with the cattle will march at 5.30 a.m. in the direction of Kisi to meet No 1 Company and assist in bringing the cattle into Ndavi.

110
Lieut. Storey with the III Company reached station 3.45 P.M. on 1st January. Mr. Moran A.D. was on this patrol with Captain Grimsby captured

95 head of cattle } approximately
300 sheep and goats }

Mr. Stocker A.P.O. at Kongo Bay reports that he has captured

500 head of cattle } approximately
300 sheep and goats } approximately
30 Kisi killed and wounded.

Further orders sent to Capt. Grimsby orders him to march to headquarters camp with all captured stock leaving Lieut. Storey with his half company at Kisi station.

This report from Captain Grimsby renders an alteration in our plans necessary and a postponement of the drive from the Kuni valley until JANUARY 10th. We have been taught a lesson and the safety of the KISI - KONGO BAY route assured.

Half a Company with the Landwehr Levies will proceed to Kericho with the captured stock.

Half a Company will remain at Kisi.

This will leave headquarters with two companies to move against Nohari and Omande.

Headquarters will move to Kericho camp as soon as Lieut. Storey returns from his patrol on the Kericho road.

From Kericho half a company will be dispatched to the K. of K. (Kisi village).

Half a company to Kericho Hill.

In conjunction with Lieut. Storey's half company at Kisi which will move out to the north, the whole of the force will then move out to the north and parties making a base at Omande camp their point of attack.

Headquarters will be at Kericho. Colonel will be at Kericho.

meanwhile march for Oweya camp along the top of the escarpment.

February

Headquarters remain at Ndavis.
Orders received from Principal Medical Officer that Sergeant Taylor R.A.M.C. is to return to Nairobi. Asst Surgeon, [unclear] taking his place as dispenser. Lieuts Sladen and Fitzgerald with 1 No 3 Company joined headquarters camp on completion the building of cattle pens at Keryenge and Kitero in preparation for [unclear].

February

The column retraced its steps from Ndavis camp to Kocoko camp arriving at the latter place at 7.00 P.M.

Captain Gordon with 1 No 3 Company remained at Ndavis camp village to await the arrival of the captured stock, when he is to drive it to Kericho, where he will hand it over to the detachment of police or Ist [unclear] which the C.O. R.A. force has requested. His Excellency the Governor may be posted there to guard the cattle, and return to head quarter camp as quickly as possible.

In the event of Captain Gordon not finding such a detachment at Kericho when he arrives there, he with his half Company will remain at that place and guard the cattle until such time as he may be relieved.

50 loads had to be left behind in charge of Ndavi [unclear] to lack of beasts for transportation.

At [unclear]'s village the main column met [unclear] under Captain [unclear] escorting the captured stock from Kisii to Ndavi's village.

From this place, Lieut Fitzgerald with 1 No III Coy and Mr. [unclear] R.A.M.C. was detached from the main column with orders to march to [unclear] village and

encamp there for the night and to be in readiness for to-morrow's operations.

Captain Bois with half No 1 Company was also detached with orders to march to Libetis hill and encamp there for the night for the same purpose as above. The captured stock having been handed over to the section of No 7 Coy. and the Lumber Levies with orders to drive it to Hrovis. The remaining half of No 1 Coy. joined the main column and marched with it to Hrovis.

At 3 a.m. orders were despatched to Lieut. Storey at Kisil to the effect that he and his half Coy. were to be in position on the hill to the N. of and 1 1/2 miles from Kisil station at 8 a.m. on the 11th, so as to co-operate with the columns from Hrovis and Libetis and also the headquarters column from Bogonko.

The disposition of the troops on the evening of the 10th was as follows:-

Headquarters: No 7 Coy. & No 1 Coy. at Bogonko
Lieut. Fitzgerald with No 3 Coy. at or adjacent to Hrovis.

Capt. Bois	"	1	"	1	"	Libetis
Lieut. Storey	"	1	"	1	"	Kisil station
Capt. Gordon	"	1	"	1	"	Hrovis

These columns with the exception of the last, which is under orders to proceed to Hrovis with the captured stock, will move simultaneously to-morrow at 8 a.m. in the direction of Hrovis, each carrying all stock and gun available during the night with the exception of the gun which will be left in order and their respective orders.

Lt. Fitzhugh and Surgeon joined the column today.
vice-Capt Taylor R.A.M.C.

February 11. At 8 a.m. the headquarters column moved out of the camp and advanced in the direction of Kisil station along the top of the escarpment.

At 8:30 a.m. a column of smoke was observed rising from Libetis hill to the north of Kisil station.

and about 7 miles away, this was doubtless Capt. Poin's Company but we failed to get into signalling communication with him.

At 9 A.M. the people in the valley immediately before us were observed to be driving out their cattle.

There were Artambo's people who before the commencement of operations against the Kisi had thrown a police squad over the escarpment.

Sections were at once sent out to the plain & left down into the valley to endeavour to capture this stock.

The headquarter column after waiting for about an hour descended into the valley and marched straight for Okey's camp, which it reached about 1.15 P.M.

Soon after resuming camp communication was obtained with Lieut. Fitzgerald's column which had operated from Mbe-tis. Nothing had been seen or heard of Lieut. Sorey's column, which was to have cooperated from Kisi station.

All the troops were concentrated in Okey's camp by 4.30 P.M. with the exception of the column from Kisi and a sergeant and few men of Capt. Poin's Column. These latter arrived in camp at about 8 P.M.

The result of the day's operations was as follows.

Cattle captured	537
Sheep & Goats	200
Animals casualties	38 killed & mangled
Our casualties	Nil.

Heavy rain & hail storm about 4 P.M.
Lieut. Widen, with one section as escort, was dispatched to Kongo Bay, with 300 unloaded porters, to bring up all stores from that place to Okey's camp.

Mr. Armitstead with 1/2 platoon and 20 N.C.B. was sent to Kisi station to remove all stores to this camp. He also took with him 300 sheep with which to pay off

February

off the various levies. A.D.S.P. Foran with an escort of police arrived from Kisumu station about 8 a.m. to see the C.F.O. He informed me that Lieut Storey had not received any orders of the 3rd instant, which accounts for his failing to cooperate with the other columns yesterday. It appears that the letter containing the orders was received in Kisumu at 8 p.m. on the 3rd by the A.D.C. but that the handwriting on the envelope had become indistinct and that he had read Capt Bois for Lieut Storey and had placed the letter in one aide's hands to await the former officer's return. The C.F.O. had been written on the subject.

Original, the friendly chief who captured and handed over to us the man who bore Mr. Northcote, arrived in camp and reported that in the course of yesterday's operations, his own village was burnt, some of his people killed and stock taken. Steps are being taken to verify this statement.

At 1.30 p.m. Capt Bois and Mr. Remsted returned from investigating this matter and reported that one man only was killed, who was armed with spear and shield that no cattle had been taken but that 18 mats were burnt. The C.F.O. has decided to recompense Onguen for the burnt mats.

This evening the C.F.O. received a despatch from the C.F.O. requesting the suspension of hostilities.

The force accordingly return to Nairobi and demobilize.

February Masud Mtendi with one section No V Coy. sent to Ndoo via to bring up the 50 loads left there.

Mr. Northcote A.P.O. and Dr. Rodden P.M.O. with an escort of police arrived in camp today from Kisumu and returned there at 11 p.m.

Lieut. de Carteret and Dr. Vays M.O. left by the down train the further to proceed to England on leave of absence, the latter to report himself to the P.M.O. at Nairobi on completion of his duties with the Kisumu Expeditionary Force.

In February Captain Bailey with 14 companies arrived in Kisumu from Mombasa Bay at 8.0 p.m. At 8.0 a.m. the troops train left for Nairobi with the U.C., S.O.A., Lieut. Sladen, P.O. and No 321 Company under Lieut. Stacey and Fitzgerald. Lieut. Sladen left the train at Lushwa, from whence he proceeds to Kericho to take over charge of the cattle ward.

At 6.30 p.m. the 2nd troop train left Kisumu for Nairobi with Captain Bailey, S.O.A.'s branch Lieut. Offmeister, 1st Officer, 1st Lieutenant P.O. Kinross, Sgt Major Boyce and No 10 V Company.

The remaining 2 of No 10 V Company was entrained at Lushwa.

Captain Gordon remains at that place to close the station.

In February The troops arrived at Nairobi and the force was demobilized.

J. Kirkpatrick Wilson
G. J. D. K. F. Love

Intelligence

1. Intelligence on Kisii tribe to be
at this of and previous to acclim-
ation of Kisii in this country
is as follows.

2. The Kisii country is bounded on the
N. by the Kavirato, on the south by
the Kavirato and the Kavirato, on
the E. by the Kavirato, on the West
by Kavirato and Kavirato south.

The tract of country inhabited by the
Kisii comprises between 18000 - 20000
square miles.

Anything between 20000 - 10000
18000 - 16000 (approximate) and
around

Mui (apparently called from previous
information Inubi) is, as far as we
know, the only chief of any importance.
He is not a paramount chief but merely
chief of his own particular section or
clan which forms by far the larger part
of the Kisii.

Plantain, millet, and yam is large
quantities, while potatoes, beans and
bananas are also grown.

Abunhee and other attacks

tribal Govt. The various clans each have their own chief, very little intercourse between different clans except by woman.

Constant intertribal raiding takes place. It would not appear probable that we should meet the Kisii tribe concentrated

5. Telegraphic information received that Kivuu attitude not satisfactory, his people being suspected of having attacked Louisa's caravan.

4. Attitude of Lamu people peaceful and little likelihood of the Kisii endeavouring to enter their country.

Enquiries as to the attitude of Harer being made.

6. Nearly all Kitutu, largest tribe of the Kisii reported in open revolt.

Nil

18th Jan

Nil

19th Jan

6. In the course of conversation with Mr. J. Ainsworth, C.S.O., he informed me that the Kisii were composed of 13 or 14 different clans, the majority of which were

7. they have killed four Kavirondo traders and two police sakaris.

news from Kisii

Jan 21.

8. The march to the lake through Kavirondo country, is fairly goodly populated and large cultivated tracts of land.

Jan: 22nd

9. Entered the enemy's country after about an hours march. Densely populated and well cultivated. Water plentiful.
10. Informed that the Kisii were seen the morning driving their cattle, in large numbers upon the escarpment to the East. Apparently had no idea we were coming.
11. The Kisii threw a police askari over the escarpment and killed him.
12. Information confirmed that the Kisii cattle with the majority of their fighting men are moving to the East.
13. It would seem that looking from Kisii station the whole of the Kisii country from the South westwards is friendly whilst from the S. Eastwards to North it is all unfriendly country.
14. Several friendly chiefs came in to pay their respects to the C.P.O.
15. Large number of cattle reported by friendly natives to have been driven into the valley due S. of camp.
16. Chiefs reported to be keeping quiet and not inclined to join in the trouble.
17. Three big chiefs of the Kisii came in to see the C.P.O. All appear friendly. Their names and tribes are as follows.

Names

Intelligences

Clan

District

1048

Okotoh

Mugarangu

Kanaganbo

Oolo
Lyugi

Mariim)
Wanjari

Wanjari

I have received information from Mr. Hemsted

Jan 25th

that the whole of the fighting men of the Kitutu clan with their cattle are on the escarpment and between that and the Kuja River. The Kuja River is surrounded with swamps and it is unlikely that the enemy will attempt to cross it.

Mr. Hemsted's information leads me to believe that the enemy will not move far from where they are now reported to be.

A list of the Kisiif clans with their headmen is attached in Appendix K. Ndube or Ndui (vide para 3) is a Mugarangu a subtribe of the Kitutu.

The information received today confirms that in para 13.

The Kitutu clan comprises about half of the whole of the Kisiif tribe and could put about 2,000 - 10,000 spears into the field.

We are encamped at Hoppa 5.

Jan 26th

Ndube's territory reported two hours march from here. He is friendly and has captured from the Kitutu who attempted to enter district. This stock he wishes to hand over to Government. The Kitutu are hiding with their cattle to the S.E.

Large herds of cattle are reported to have been seen in that direction by the station which was

sent out there this afternoon.

25. One of the Ndubi's men came in to see the C.F.O. this morning also bringing from Ndubi, either of the following men.

Notes on the Klai were taken down by me to-day on information received from the C.F.O. from Mr. Kestled, A.S.O. and various natives.

These notes will be found in appendix K.

26. The Raja River from where Captain Gordon and Mr. Kestled saw it yesterday on the far side of the escarpment would appear to be about 50' wide and 3' deep. A fast running stream. Its general direction South Westerly. The right bank is steep and the left bank gently rising. For a great part of its course it flows through swamps, but is not very difficult to cross. This escarpment is called the MUKA escarpment which terminates on the far side within sight of KERICIS.

The C.F.O. interviewed ANGEN, headman of the MUKA section of the NIGBU.

It appears that he himself was taken no active part in the outbreak and was afraid to come in as some of his people had joined the non-

27. He believes that a witch doctor is at the bottom of the trouble and made medicine by means of which Northcote was to die and the Government driven out of the country. ANGEN is anxious to obey Government orders.

28. The C.P.O. also interviewed 2 headmen of OMUOGA'S, where people had at the beginning of the disturbance thrown a police askari over the Mangi encampment.

29. They professed themselves anxious for peace & are ready to undergo such punishment as the C.P.O. may see fit to inflict for the arrest of the police askari.

30. OMUOGA'S himself was unfortunately shot by our men yesterday. I saw unfortunately because it appears he was on his way into camp to see the C.P.O. when he was shot.

It seems as if the KIRAU are getting rather despondent and wish for peace.

The C.P.O. is interviewing their chief to-morrow to discuss the situation and pending the result of the interview no active operations will take place.

31. Omugwa and Nyakundi headmen of Kalipi came in Jan 28th to see the C.P.O. to-day. Many of their people accompany them. They paid about Rs 1,000 in hut tax and brought in fuel for the expedition.

They confirm the information that the witch woman is responsible for the whole trouble.

That witch's people are the only ones who Nyakundi does not think they will come in.

Kibetis villages are situated about 3 miles to the N. from camp on a ridge running roughly East and West.

State the Kibizi's cattle have moved into Nduvis country whilst a certain amount are still within reach of this camp.

The witch woman is living with Nduvis people.

The man who steered Nduvis, is a slave of the witch woman and has fled and is living with the Kavirondo.

Received information that on the 26th Jani Capt. Stigand was on the march from Kibizi to Kisumu. Information was received that Kibizi were driving cattle from the direction of the Government towards Mbatia territory. On investigating this the cattle were observed. Kavirondo friendly were sent out to see what they were doing about 100 of the Kibizi extended order directed upon the hill but on being met by rifle fire from the police fled driving back the majority of their cattle with them. Estimated at 50 killed.

The situation seems to have narrowed down to the following:

That Kibizi people should not be our objective.

They may have done any of the following things.

1. Driven their cattle into Mbatia territory.
2. Driven the into the thick country to the S.
3. Are hiding their herds near at Kisumu.

Received information that a party of the Government is interested in the Government.

The names of Kibizi and his chiefs are exceedingly anxious to help Government and offer services of 2500 Shwara, 250 Kibizi regarding the incident.

Informed that Kavirondo are sheltering some of the Kibizi herds.

That Kibatis people are moving that way.

Received information that a convoy when on the road between Kungo Bay and Nini on the 23rd was attacked close to the Kibatis villages. The convoy opened fire and killed two of the Nisi who upon that remainder fled.

Many cattle were observed in this location.

The attack was probably delivered by.

1. Detachment of the 1st District in which the previous day's operations took place.
2. Kibatis people who may be living in the borders of Kavirondo.

Received information that Kibatis people and their cattle are hiding amongst the Kavirondo.

That the Majors (Major) have made two attacks on the hills where they have built a station, whether for the cattle or as a defensive measure is uncertain.

The Kibatis are not now grazing their herds on Kungo, only two parties which the Majors can recross the hills if they wish to break down into the valley.

Reports received from O. L. M. Coy. at Kungo Bay state that the following day the Nisi - Kungo Bay road was attacked about 200 Nisi close to the Kibatis became engaged and killed 21 of the Nisi. Many showed great determination and did not give way even when subjected to a heavy fire from Maxim.

Telegram received from Mr. Stocker A.S.C. at Kungo



Intelligence

1111

Kongo Bay at 3.30 p.m. saying he had captured about 500 head of cattle, 800 sheep & goats.

Reports numerous thousands of cattle crossing to the N.E. into Kavirondo country.

Another 100 Mandi levies have arrived at Kongo Bay.

Iberis and Omaniya people appear to have returned to their villages and are engaged in attacking convoys on the Kisii-Kongo Bay road.

Information received at S. M. today that Capt. Ongwen has brought in the man who appeared to Mr. Northcote and handed him over to the civil authorities at Kisii station.

That Mawnda has gone in to Kisii station and begged for peace.

Information re satisfactory attitude of Lumbwa, Kurel and Sotik people further confirmed.

The road to Kericho crosses the Sondo River about 9 miles from Ndavia. The crossing is good with a strong bottom. Water about knee deep stream fast about 30' wide. The ascent to the Kericho side is very hard for cattle in places almost precipitous.

From Ndavia to Kiryandaga is about 16 miles. Kericho reported about 5-6 hours march from Ndavia.

After crossing the Sondo River you get into Lumbwa territory.

A Lumbwa patrol is grading the crossing. Heavy rain and hail about 4 p.m.

5. Nil

Feb. 5th

6. Artambo, headman of the Mwaramba section of the Kitutu, the people whose valley we passed through today, has fled towards Munga. It was his people who threw the police askari over the escarpment.

Kibeti is believed to be hiding in the Nyabundia villages.

Can get no confirmation of the report that the majority of fighting men and cattle have crossed the Ruja river and are on Munga hill.

7. Very few people and cattle observed in Kibeti and Ogeya districts. Are believed to have fled into Kavirondo.

The C. I. O. has requested the O. O. K. F. to suspend hostilities as he is of opinion that the Kitutu have been sufficiently punished and are thoroughly demoralized.

H. F. Kirkpatrick Major
L. S. O. K. F. Force

Intelligence re the KISSI Tribe.

- I. The country inhabited by the KISSI tribe is roughly about 1,200 to 2,000 square miles. Bounded on the north by KAVIROBO tribes East by LUMWA and BUKET South by KOTLIK & LUMWA MASAI West by KAVIROBO.

population

3. The population of the country is from 50,000 to 40,000 souls; this number is liberal but as the country is densely inhabited, I consider the above a reasonable census.

clans

3. The tribe is divided up into several clans; these clans are not in any way united but act independently under the orders of their chieftains. The KISSI tribe is supposed to be the remnants of the ancient SERIWA people who at one time held the whole of MANDI and the GUASINRUISHO plateau until expelled by the MANDI and MASSAI tribes.

They are intermarried both with the LUMWA and KAVIROBO.

number of fighting men

- 4. I estimate that if the whole KISSI tribe united some 8,000 to 10,000 fighting men could be put into the field, but owing to the constant internal feuds this is not in the least probable. The warriors are generally armed with spears and shields only, they use their bow and arrows. The spear handle is a ~~very~~ shaft similar to the KAVIROBO. Their shields are made of a rather high order. This is a fact that they have seen as yet practically nothing of the effect of modern fire arms.

Local Govt. 5. There is very little authority held by the Chief-
tains and the inhabitants of villages only conside-
der their headman. There is one exception to this
A clan in the North West of KISSI country is go-
verned by a chief named NUVI who has consider-
able authority and this section is very important.

6. The KISSI clans are in no way similar in their
mode of living: the various clans have different
ways, according to the size of the clan but the
following may be taken as a guide.

- a. Some clans live in walled villages with a
ditch and thorn fence outside.
- b. Other villages are simply surrounded with
a thorn fence only.
- c. Scattered houses on the hill sides.
- d. The chief lives with his clan.

Deductions.

- a. The tribe, not knowing the effect of modern
arms, will keep their families and stock in
their villages while the warriors will attack
the columns while moving through their country
- b. Try and secure their families and stock in
LUMBA, BURST and KAVIRONDO (this is not to be
considered likely as BURST know the effect of
SOTIN Expedition, and LUMBA had a lesson in
seeing their friends the KANDI punished, the
KAVIRONDO are friendly to Government and send
their warriors to attack the columns.

Sd. J. H. Bailey Captain
for Chief Staff Officer

19108

Deliver the attack so as to get between the hostile and apparently friendly islands.

After the signs have been observed in the field from flying columns and sweep the country destroying all hostile houses and capturing their stock and kill their villages.

affiliation of
to carry
above

1. 200 miles
2. 100 miles
3. 50 miles

for Chief Staff Officer H. Jones

1. 200 miles
2. 100 miles
3. 50 miles

Appendix B

Mobilization orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Commanding Troops E.A. Protectorate

121

NAIROBI, 18th January 1908.

Composition of Force.

Coys 3/K.A.R.

Maxim Guns
Police.

1. The force as per margin will be mobilized to carry out His Excellency the Governor's instructions regarding the KISSI tribe. The force will be known as the KISSI Expeditionary Force. The force will be organized in one column until it arrives at KISSI Government Station.

2. The following appointments are made:-

(a) To Command K.E.F.

Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay 3rd K.A.R.

(b) Chief Staff Officer General Staff Duties

Major H.F. Kirkpatrick 3/K.A.R.

(c) Staff Officer A.G. & G.M.G. branches

Captain J.H. Bailey

(d) Special Service Survey Officer

Captain W.R. Sadler

(e) Staff Officer Transport Duties

Lieut. G.C. Sladen 1/K.A.R.

(f) Staff Officer Finance

Mr. C.A. Armitstead Paymaster 3/K.A.R.

(g) Signalling Officer

Lieut. A.R. Hoffmeister 1/K.A.R.

(h) Chief Staff Political Officer

Mr. J. Ainsworth C.M.S.

Prov. Commr. Kiunga Province

(i) Principal Medical Officer

Civil Surgeon H.A. Bodeker

Mr. Lays M.B., M.O.

Mr. G. Taylor Dispenser

3. The troops will assemble, with exception of one officer and 50 R. & F. 3/K.A.R. and 60

The civil authorities at KISUMU have been instructed to place at KONGO BAY one month's rations for 420 porters.

7. A base hospital will be formed at KONGO BAY

Serious cases will be forwarded to KISUMU or NAIROBI as occasion arises.

8. One British Officer and 25 rank & file
NAIROBI.

Major

Chief Staff Officer K. E. Force.

... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..

... ..

... .. orders ... of ...

- 2. All will invariably carry seven days supply
 - (a) on the march 3 days
 - (b) by porters 4 days.

3. The following order to column commanders. discretion to alter it if necessary

- (a) interval 50 paces
- (b) a quarter of the column with one in its centre.
- (c) the column escorting baggage
- (d) a quarter of the column.

Scouts to be to a distance of about 50 yards.

Company at the head of and one if in
... .. rounds of
... .. to carry
... .. will be

4. When possible the observed, but which to be with

- (a) The formation will be square
... .. will be taken by of the column
... .. right face second of the column.
... .. left face third of the column.
... .. of the column.

(a) The personnel to be kept in the rear of the formation shall be the personnel who are not directly involved in the fighting. The personnel who are directly involved in the fighting shall be in the front of the formation. The personnel who are in the rear of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move forward if necessary. The personnel who are in the front of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move backward if necessary.

The personnel who are in the rear of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move forward if necessary. The personnel who are in the front of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move backward if necessary.

(b) The personnel who are in the rear of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move forward if necessary. The personnel who are in the front of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move backward if necessary.

(c) No officer will leave his position without special permission of O.C. when

(d) single calls will be used for all phases of the drill.

(e) The "halt" command will be used to stop the formation according to the nature of the drill.

(f) The "halt" command will be used to stop the formation according to the nature of the drill.

(g) The personnel who are in the rear of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move forward if necessary. The personnel who are in the front of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move backward if necessary.

During the drill the personnel who are in the rear of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move forward if necessary. The personnel who are in the front of the formation shall be in a position to be able to move backward if necessary.

tion on the attack. A square should, if possible, be formed on the "alert" position, or on the "advance" position. In formation, the advanced guard forming the front face, with a main part in the centre, covering its flanks by direct sections or sub-sections at right angles to the front. On the flank being stopped by other troops the whole of the advanced guard will form the front face.

10. Every endeavour should be made to keep camps in a sanitary condition.

Latrines will be to the lee-side of the square which will be staked in at six feet.

A small latrine will be made at two opposite corners of the square and will be used as latrines at night.

11. The following books will be kept up in each column:

- Column standing orders
- Column drill orders
- Column operation orders
- Column staff diary
- Column intelligence diary

These will be handed in to the Adjutant-General at the close of operations with the column's contribution report.

The following reports will be compiled weekly and rendered as occasion offers direct from column staffs to that of headquarters.

- State of column
- State of ammunition
- State of supplies - (1) with column (2) at column base
- Return of ammunition expended since date of last return.
- Sick register

(b) Security details, showing nature of casualties are
not disclosed.

(c) Release of stock and prisoners captured since
date of last return and how disposed of.
Weekly progress report containing a précis of the
column, staff, and intelligence details will be pre-
pared and rendered to the Chief of Staff Officer as
convenient. Important intelligence will be com-
municated to him as soon after receipt as possible.

II. All British Officers will see that the lives of
women and children are spared and any of the enemy
warned, who may ask for quarters.

1. The following strength positions of I B.C.O. & A. and
will be detailed by No. 1 to strike a pitch
C.O.'s tent, the ... O's tent, the ... O's tent, the
Special Service Army tent, the ... O tent the ...
major tent the hospital tent, the clerks tent and
the officers mess kitchen tent.

2. The sick will parade every morning in front of the
hospital tent one hour before marching off.

W. J. T. Bailey Gordon

Chief Staff Officer I B.C.O. & A. Force.

1429

No I. o Operation orders by Lieut Colonel J. D. Bailey
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force
KISSI, 19th January 1908.

Base Depot. The Base Depot will be formed at KONGO WAY in which
13,000 porters rations will be placed in the hands of the
authorities, KISSI, by the 19th inst.

Lt. J. D. Bailey Captain
for Chief Staff Officer KISSI Force

No 8. Operation orders by Lieut Colonel J. D. Bailey
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force
KONGO WAY. 19th January 1908.

1. On completion of the disembarkation the column will
march to the first camp on the KISSI road and be-
vouac for the night, carrying 4 days rations by
transport and will await arrival there of Chief Po-
litical Officer and Chief Staff Officer. No active
operations will be undertaken unless the column or
camp is attacked.

11. No crops or food supplies of the enemy will be
destroyed without special permission from the G.C.
of the Force.

111. On arrival at KONGO WAY a signalling station will
be established there.

1v. The transport staff will carry all ammunition and
transport and stores and all of communication will
report to S. O.

v. The column will strike camp and be ready to move off
at 4.30 a.m. tomorrow morning. Officers will
make their own arrangements as to striking camp.
All Company Messes, Company Officers Messes, etc.
will move in rear of their companies.

Lt. J. D. Bailey Captain
for Chief Staff Officer KISSI Force

No 5. Operation orders by Lt Col. ...
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force
KARAKORUM Camp 30th January 1905.

i. The column will continue its march to-morrow morning in the direction of KISSI.

ii. The point of the advanced guard will leave camp at 6.30 a.m. No 5 Coy. will be the leading Coy, and will furnish the advanced guard, so that it will furnish the rear guard.

iii. The position of the HANZI Levies on the line of march will be as follows:-
80 in extended order about 200 yards in advance of the advanced guard,
10 about 200 yards to the right flank
10 about 200 yards to the left flank
10 about 200 yards in rear of the rear guard.
The Levies will furnish the rear guard in all circumstances.

iv. The Officer commanding the Column will be with the advanced guard.

v. The attention of all Officers is called to attending orders with reference to regulations governing the life of camp in case.

Operations Order by District Officer J. B. ...
Commissioner KISSI ...
... Camp ...

10. The ... will continue ...
11. The ... of the ... will ...
... will furnish the ... guard.

12. On the arrival of the ... at ... station the
whole of the police now there will march with an
empty convey with the greatest possible despatch to
... Stocker's Camp at ... The party will be
under the charge of Assistant District Superintendent
of Police ...

On arrival at ... Camp ... of
Police ... will proceed by boat to
Kisumu. Hence, on special duty to ... station
from whence he will march to ... and report
himself to District Commissioner at that post for
duty. He will then accompany the Dist. Commr. to
... Post. Of the police remaining at ...
post those which belong to ... station will return
to ... with a full convey. 2 porters will be al-
located to ... load.

Inspector ... will ... of ...
... will be sent out from ...
... will hand over charge of the ...
... Stocker's camp.

The remaining police will ...
for patrol duty.

13. The Transport Officer will send by A.D.S. ...
to ... Stocker a detail of loads required.
14. ... food will not be required.
... Officer ...

Operation orders by Lieut. Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding 1st Expeditionary Force
KINSE Station 23rd January 1908.

i. The column started at KINSE Station to-day from
KINSE Camp.

ii. The head column will remain at KINSE to-morrow.

iii. Light Bata will, half of No 1 Coy will be ordered
to turn the village to the N.W. of camp.

iv. To-morrow morning No 112 Coy of 100 rifles under
Lieut Storey will march to the South for about 3
hours when they will execute a turning movement to
the left and drive along the escarpment until they
reach the valley to the East of camp, when they will
descend into the valley and return to camp.

No 1 Coy under Captain Grimmett accompanied by a
Political Officer will return to-morrow to the
Ogava Camp from thence they will cross the stream
to the North of that Camp and then execute a turn-
ing movement to their right leading roughly for the
point at which the main column passed all obstruc-
tions of yesterday, when they will swing along the
bottom of the escarpment until they reach the
before-mentioned valley due East of camp and return
to KINSE Station.

Lieut Rodmeister Signalling Officer with an es-
cort of 20 rifles of No 1 Coy will proceed to such
a point to the North of camp as to be able to see
both villages and the escarpment.

Each of the above mentioned columns will be accompa-
nied by 20 signallers with their own equipment.

It is indicated that the 1st and 2nd BATTALIONS will
accompany each column to assist in driving the
main stock.

Each of these columns will burn all villages met with and capture all the stock they can. No grain stores to be burnt.

Two columns will be back in camp by sun set. The Chief Political Officer has made arrangements to detain police at the friendly villages close to camp to avoid any likelihood of the column's inflicting them for averted will be.

All these 3 parties will march off from camp at 6 a.m. Guides will be provided by the Chief Political Officer for No I & III Coys.

Col. F. F. ... Major Chief Staff Officer KISSI Force.

Operation orders by Lieut Colonel J.D. Mackay Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force KISSI Station, 24th January 1908.

- i. The column will march out from KISSI station tomorrow.
- ii. The column less Capt Grimshaw with 1 Coy No I Coy will depart at 6.00 a.m. tomorrow and will march along KISSI's valley to the North. No III Coy will sweep the top of the escarpment commencing from the point where they left off today. The ammunition on the soldier will be made up to two rounds per rifle, 50 rounds per rifle being in reserve.

3 days rations will be provided on the march.

The G.C.O. will remain at KISSI station. There the hospital has been established.

Police will accompany the column and will be under the orders of the G.C.O. The armourer sergeant will not accompany the column.

at iii. Capt. Grimshaw and the 1 Coy No I Coy will remain at KISSI station to guard the captured stock.

The remainder of Coy will march with the convoy:

of Coy, No 3 Coy under Capt Jordan will march at 4 a.m. to the camp with the object of capturing AIB-FIN cattle but not burning his villages.

This Coy will retain the mail covers at the last camp arriving there before sunset.

30 Nandi Levies will accompany this Coy to drive captured stock.

iv. Mr. Assistant L.F.O., will accompany No 1 Coy.

v. Guides will be provided by the U.S.A.

Wd. J. J. Fitzpatrick Major
Chief Staff Officer KISSI B. JARA.

Operation orders by Lieut-Colonel J. D. Mackay
forwarding Nandi Expeditionary Force
KISSI B. JARA, 27th January 1945.

i. The Column will move tomorrow at 6.30 a.m. to DEVIS Villages

ii. No 3 Coy will furnish

I section for an advanced guard

I section for rear guard

I section for cattle guard

The remaining sections of No 3 Coy and No 5 Coy will march with the convoy.

The point of the advanced guard will leave camp at 6.50 a.m.

The Nandi Levies will march with the cattle.

Wd. J. J. Fitzpatrick Major
Chief Staff Officer KISSI B. JARA.

The column arrived at NDUVIS village to-day and camped close by.

The left Coy. will proceed tomorrow at 6.30 a.m. to KIMANDU on the road to KISSI and afterwards to the village of KISSI. The right Coy. will remain at NDUVIS.

On the 1st of February the party will continue southwards on the road to a place named KISSI where they will build a similar scribe to the one mentioned above.

On completion of this latter scribe the party will return to headquarters at NDUVIS Camp with the same day's ration.

Lieut. Bladen will accompany this party and will be in charge of it.

4 days ration per man will be carried in haversacks.

A signalling unit will accompany this party.

As many spare porters as are available will also accompany this party to assist in building the scribes. Guides will be provided by the G.P.O.

iii. The right Coy of No 1 Coy will return on the road towards KISSI station tomorrow at 6.30 a.m. until it meets No 1 Coy with the captured stock now at KISSI which has been ordered to join headquarters here at NDUVIS Camp when it will return to NDUVIS Camp with No 1 Coy.

35 RANDI Levies will accompany this party also a signalling unit.

The right Coy of No 1 Coy will return with the left Coy.

5 days ration per man will be carried in haversacks.

Sd. S. B. Kirkpatrick Major
Chief Staff Officer KISSI S. B.

Commanding Tenth Expeditionary Force

14th Nov 1918

i. The march will start tomorrow at 6.00 a.m. in the direction of ...

ii. The ... section will advance ...

The point of advanced guard will be ...

iii. Captain Gordon will ... will remain here at ... to the whole of the captured stock ...

Of this ... section will accompany the main column up ... from ... when it will return with the ... to ...

Sgt ... will accompany this section to assist in driving the ...

The remaining ... will ...

iv. Captain Gordon will arrange with the Transport Officer for such transport as may require.

v. Sgt Taylor R.A.M.C. will remain here with Capt Gordon and will proceed to ... from whence he will return to ... reporting his arrival to the Principal Medical Officer.

Sd. ...

Chief Staff Officer Tenth Expeditionary Force.

Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

BOONKO Camp 3rd February 1908.

- i. The headquarters camp is now at BOONKO.
- ii. It is the intention of the Officer Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force to furnish the section of the KISSI concerning the attacks on covers at the 25th and 30th of last month.
- iii. The following dispositions have accordingly been made:-
 - Headquarters camp with one Coy at BOONKO on the 1st of the encampment.
 - 1 a Coy under Lieut Fitzgerald accompanied by Mr. Bennett at SEATI.
 - 1 a Coy under Capt Bois at the foot and on STRAWBERRY Hill.
 - 1 a Coy under Lieut Storer at SEATI station.
 Each of these columns has a half platoon and a rifle.
- iv. At 9 a.m. tomorrow Lt Storer with half a Coy from KISSI Station will be in position on the hills north of KISSI Station and about one and a half miles distant from it.
- v. At last hour 1.30 p.m. the 1st instant the various columns will converge from the above mentioned places converging on OKYAI Camp. Carrying all stock on backs and working parties will, the exception of a few cattle being in order to take their respective routes.
- vi. Every endeavour should be made to maintain contact between the various columns.
- vii. The place of concentration will be at OKYAI Camp.

Lt Col. H.B. Kirkpatrick Major

Chief Staff Officer K. Force

Commanding ISSI Expeditionary Force.

OKYGA Camp 4th February 1908.

i. Headquarters moved from ROKINGO Camp to OKYGA Camp today, where it was joined by Lieut Storey and Lt. Fitzsimons and so III Coy, also Capt Bois with 4 No I Coy.

ii. The column will remain here two days to enable the C.P.O. to interview the chiefs of the ISSI.

iii. To-morrow the 5th February the following movements will be made:-

Lieut Sladen Transport Officer with one section of No 5 Coy as an escort will proceed to Mr. Stecker's camp at ROKINGO BAY and bring up all stores there to headquarters camp at OKYGA.

Mr. and Mrs. H.C.O. of No I Coy under Mr. Amittah will proceed to ISSI Station and bring out to headquarters camp all stores now in that station.

These two parties will rejoin at 8.30 a.m.

The Amittah party will rejoin headquarters from ISSI with the latter party.

iv. These two parties will make no offensive movements against the ISSI except in case of self defence.

v. The transport Officer will take care of necessary arrangements for the transport of these two parties.

Sd. H.P. K. Patrick

Chief Staff Officer ISSI Force.

OKUYA Camp 6th February 1902.

- i. The Chief Political Officer having requested the Officer Commanding N. Force to suspend hostilities active operations will cease from this date and the force will return to HAIBONI and camp there.
- The O.C. R. M., The O.C. G., S.O., the Special Service Survey Officer and Dr. Loys M.C. will proceed to KONGO BAY to-morrow on route to Haiboni.
- Lieut. DeBarteneh & one section of No 4 Coy will accompany this party as escort.
- ii. Captain Bailey will assume command of the troops at OKUYA Camp and will proceed to KONGO BAY immediately on return of Masud Affendi and the section of No 5 Coy from MBUYA.
- iii. The troops will be rationed for 3 days to be carried in haversacks. All remaining rations should be handed over to O.C. No 1 Coy which day is remaining at OKUYA Camp.
- iv. Dr. Puffer P. O. will return to KONGO BAY with columns under Capt Bailey.
- A.D.S.P. Porer and the ISUMI police will proceed to KONGO BAY to-morrow in charge of the stock. The NISSI will accompany this party.
- On arrival at KONGO BAY A.D.S.P. Porer will hand over the stock to Mr Stecker A.P.O. taking receipt for the same.
- v. Captain Gordon with 1 No 4 Coy now guarding the cattle at KIBUMBE will proceed to KONGO BAY immediately after being relieved of the charge of the cattle and there await further instructions.
- vi. All signallers will return to HAIBONI.

vii. Captain [Name] and Survey Officer is stationed off the strength of the Expedition from this date and will report himself to the Director of Surveys for instructions.

viii. No 1 Coy, under the Command of Capt [Name] will remain at OKAYA Camp as garrison for the [Name] district until such time as the authorities may consider that sufficient order prevails to the District to allow of the withdrawal of the garrison. Special orders will be handed to the C.O. No 1 Coy defining his duties.

35 porters of the S. E. F. will remain with this Coy 200 sheep out of the number now at OKAYA Camp will be left with the No 1 Coy to be utilized in payment of labour in building the lines for this Coy Asst Surgeon [Name] will remain at OKAYA Camp in Medical charge of the troops.

Demobilisation will take place on the arrival of the troops at [Name].

Ed. F. [Name]
Chief [Name] Officer E. S. [Name]

144
Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISII Expeditionary Force 144

NAIROBI, 19th January 1968

1. With reference to mobilisation order No 1 of today's date, Captain G. G. G. with 50 rank and from LUMWA arrived at Kisumu on 18th day's date to cover the Lake Rudolf and to escort the Medical Officer to Kisumu Station.

2. The following instructions in connection for cash will be observed by all officers taking part in the Kisii operations: All cash drawn on account of the Kisii Expedition for pay of soldiers, transport, followers, intelligence purposes etc, etc, should be accounted for to the Paymaster and F.A.R. Nairobi. All railway warrants, vouchers & indents relating to the Kisii Expedition should be marked "KISII EXPEDITION", and copies of all indents should be sent to the Paymaster and F.A.R. Nairobi. Arrangements are being made whereby the Treasury Officer Kisumu will keep a supply of cash on hand which will be available for the purpose of the Kisii Expedition, and applications should be made to him for any money required. Accounting Officers should send their reports monthly to the Paymaster and F.A.R. Nairobi, every item of expenditure being duly supported by a voucher.

J. J. Riley Capt
S.O.A. 1st Branch K.S.F.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding Kisii Expeditionary Force

NAIROBI, 19th January 1968

With reference to mobilisation orders of the 15th inst.
3. 4 Officers and 118 rank of the 16th (No 3 Coy S/R.S.A.) will leave NAIROBI on 20th day's date for Kisumu. 17th inst. One day's social relations will be carried in the afternoon.

officer & I
men of No 1
S/R.S.A.
to Kisii
Special
Instructions

Troop
No.

All mules, ammunition, baggage, hospital stores, rations etc. will proceed by this train?

4. Headquarters Staff.

8 Officers, 1 warrant Officer, 178 men and file (No 1 Coy B Coy. Bnd R.A.M.) will proceed by the 2nd troop train leaving HAMBORI at 7.30 P.M.

This train will arrive at HERERA about 10 P.M. 18th inst. and 3 Officers and 40 men & file (No 1 Coy B Coy. Bnd R.A.M.) with all necessary stores and hospital stores will be disembarked there.

Mr. W. J. Mayer, Major, 2nd Boerline Regt. has been appointed special service survey Officer to the Expeditionary Force from this date.

6. All signallers employed with the Force will draw extra pay of Rs 5/- per month commencing on Saturday 18th inst. This will all be paid to the men recorded by the signalling Officer.

7. Officers will carry rifles on the Expedition.

Sd. J. J. Miller, Capt.

S. O. A. G's Branch R.A.F.

Nowline orders by Lieut. Colonel J. D. ...
Commanding HISSI Expeditionary Force
HERERA IS. I. OS.

8. The troops will parade to embark at 8.30 A.M. and will be marched to the lighters.

All equipment will be carried and not stowed on the lighters.

The Company will embark in the following order:

No III Coy to V Coy No I Coy

On arrival at HERERA No I Coy will be the first to disembark. No V Coy next and No III Coy last.

No I Coy on landing will stow the Post to cover the disembarkation.

Immediately all the men have disembarked and the lighters have been unmoored the S.S. PERCY ANDERSON

with the lighters will return to KISUMU. 14
Every man will be strictly warned that he has to sit
down while in the lighter and that he is not to move
about.

Captain Bailey, S.O. will superintend the disembarkation.

Sd. J. F. Bailey Capt

S.O.A.G. Branch E.A.S.

Headline Order by Lieut Colonel J. D. Mackay

Concerning the 1st B. Coy KISSI B. Force.

KISUMU BAY. 19. I. 1908.

Indents for 9. With reference to headline order No 2 of 18. I. 08

Mr. G. A. Arnitstead, Paymaster 3rd E.A.S. left KISUMU with the troops on the 17. I. 08.

All indents for cash will be made to him at Headquarters KISSI Boma.

Orders for 10. The following Officers will be on duty to-day at night

the times stated opposite their names:-

Captain J. F. Bailey	9 a.m. to 11 p.m.
Capt. J. D. Mackay	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Capt. J. F. Gordon	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Mr A. C. Arnitstead	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Sd. J. F. Bailey Capt

S. O. A. G. Branch E. A. S.

Headline order by Lieut Colonel J. D. Mackay

Concerning the 1st B. Coy KISSI B. Force

KISUMU BAY. 20th January 1908

10. The following Officers arrived at Headquarters to-day for duty with the 1st B. Coy.

Mr J. Gordon, Chief Political Officer

Major F. P. Kirkpatrick 3rd E.A.S. S.O.

Lieut H. J. de Carteret 3rd E.A.S.

Lieut E. A. R. Hoffmeister 1st E.A.S. Signalling Officer

Officers for II. The following officers will be on duty at the times stated opposite their names:

S. P. Lays	8 P.M. to 11 P.M.
Capt Grinch	11 P.M. to 1 A.M.
Lieut de Carteret	1 A.M. to 3 P.M.
Lieut Storey	3 P.M. to 5 P.M.

Routine orders by Major Colonel William H. ...
Concerning ... Expeditionary Force
... 1st January 1908.

Officers for II. The following officers will be on duty at the times stated opposite their names:

Lieut Fitzgerald	8 P.M. to 11 P.M.
Lieut Bladen	11 P.M. to 1 A.M.
Lieut Hoffmister	1 A.M. to 3 P.M.
Maj Major Boyce	3 P.M. to 5 P.M.

Officers for 16. The following changes will take place in the assignment of officers to Coy's and will take effect from to-day date.

Captain ... to Command No 1 Coy.
 Lieut Fitzgerald posted to No 11 Coy
 Captain ... to command No 5 Coy
 Lieut de Carteret posted to No 7 Coy.

... J. L. Bailey Captain
S.O.S. branch ... Force.

Routine orders by Major Colonel ...
Concerning ... Expeditionary Force
... 2nd January 1908.

Officers for 16. The following officers will be on duty at the times stated opposite their names:

Major ...	8 P.M. to 11 P.M.
Major Kirkpatrick	11 P.M. to 1 A.M.
Captain Bailey	1 A.M. to 3 P.M.
Capt Sadler	3 P.M. to 5 P.M.

... J. L. Bailey Capt
S.O.S. branch ... Force

Orders by Lieut-Colonel J. Dring
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

KISSI Station 2nd January 1903.

15. The police consisting of one officers and 50 men
and file will find the cattle guard to-morrow
leaving camp at 8.15 a.m. and returning at

16. All available porters will call in at night, to-
morrow morning and attend to the present cattle
herd and arrange its partition so as to hold a
further 200 head of cattle. Captain Gordon will
will be in charge of the Detachment.

17. The following officers will be on duty to-morrow
at the times stated opposite their names:-

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Captain Gordon | 6 P.M. to 11 P.M. |
| Captain Grimshaw | 11 P.M. to 1 A.M. |
| Lieut de Carteret | 1 A.M. to 3 A.M. |
| Lieut Storey | 3 A.M. to 5 A.M. |

8d. J. E. Miles, Secy
S. O. A. B's Station K. S. Force.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding FIRST Expeditionary Force

1st Div. 1st January 1942

15. The police consisting of four officers and
and five will find the cattle camp
leaving camp at 6.15 a.m. and returning

16. All available porters
morning and afternoon
have and increase the number so as to hold a
further 200 head of cattle. Captain Gordon will
will be in charge of the Kaitiaki.

17. The following officers will be on duty to-night
at the times stated opposite their names:-

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| Captain Gordon | 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. |
| Captain Grimshaw | 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. |
| Lieut. de Carteret | 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. |
| Lieut. Storey | 3 a.m. to 5 a.m. |

J.D. Mackay, Captain
S.O. 1st Branch N.S. Force

Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force

KISSI Station, 24th January 1908

Officers for IS. The following officers on duty to-night

at the times stated opposite their names:-	
Captain Bois	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Dr. Rodker	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Lieut Fitzgerald	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Lieut Bladen	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

on the 19. The following are taken on the strength of the

S. Force from the dates opposite their names:-
 Mr. Stocker A.D.C. appointed transport Officer
 Base Camp KONGO BAY 19.1.08
 Police Inspector Fitzgerald with 15 Rank & File
 S.A.P. Police 19.1.08
 Captain J. Bois with 50 Rank and File S/A.A.R. 23
 1.08

Dr. Rodker M.O. P.O. K.S.P. 23.1.08
 Mr. E Hamsted D.C. P.O. K.S.P. 23.1.08
 Mr. Northcote A.D.C. P.O. K.S.P. 23.1.08
 A.D.S.P. Force with 180 Rank & File S.A.P. Police
 23.1.08

of 20 A Board of Officers composed as under will assemble
 at the C.P.O.'s tent at 8.30 p.m. to-day for the
 purpose of selecting a building site for the occu-
 pation of a detachment consisting of one Coy of the
 S/A.A.R.

President

Lieut-Colonel V.D. Mackay S/A.A.R.

Members

Mr. E. Hamsted D.C.
 Dr. Rodker M.O.
 Lt. de Sartoret
 Mr. G. Cunningham P.W.D.

Sd. J.H. Bailey Capt

S. O. A.G.'s branch K.S. Force.

Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force

KISSI Station, 24th January 1908

Officers for IS. The following officers will be on duty to-morrow at the times stated opposite their names:-

Captain Bois	9 P.M. to 11 P.M.
Dr. Rodaker	11 P.M. to 1 P.M.
Lieut. Fitzgerald	1 P.M. to 3 P.M.
Lieut. Bladen	3 P.M. to 5 P.M.

IS. The following are taken on the strength of the S. Force from the dates opposite their names:-

Mr. Stocker A.D.C. appointed transport Officer Base Camp KISSI BAY 19.1.08

Police Inspector Fitzgerald with 15 Rank & File S.A.P. Police 19.1.08

Captain J. Bois with 50 Rank and File S/A.A.R. 23.1.08

Dr. Rodaker M.O. P.M.O. K.M.P. 23.1.08

Mr. E Hamsted D.S. P.O. K.M.P. 23.1.08

Mr. Northcote A.D.C. P.O. K.M.P. 23.1.08

A.D.S.P. Moran with 180 Rank & File S.A.P. Police 23.1.08

20 A Board of Officers composed as under will assemble at the C.P.O.'s tent at 4.30 P.M. to-day for the purpose of selecting a building site for the occupation of a detachment consisting of one Coy of the S/A.A.R.

President

Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay S/A.A.R.

Members

Mr. T. Ainsworth

Dr. Rodaker M.O.

Lt. de Sartaret S/A.A.R.

Mr. S. Cunningham P.V.D.

Sd. J.H. Bailey Capt

S. O. A.G.'s branch K.S. Force.

Commanding KIBSI Expeditionary Force.

KIBSI Station - 22nd January 1908.

81. A Field General Court Martial composed as under will assemble to-day on the return of No 7 Coy to camp for the trial of No 391 Sergeant of the East Africa Protectorate Police and also other prisoners as may be brought before the Court.

President

Captain W.A. Grimshaw S/A.A.R.

Members

Lieut F.B. Storey S/A.A.R.

Lieut G.C. Bladen I/A.A.R.

All witnesses are hereby warned to attend.

82. The following officers will be on duty to-night at the times stated opposite their names:

Lieut Hoffmeister	9 P.M. to 11 P.M.
Sgt Ned Royce	11 P.M. to 1 A.M.
Headiffendi	1 A.M. to 3 A.M.
Mr Armitstead	3 A.M. to 5 A.M.

83. When an issue of stock is made by any officer notification of the issue in writing should be given to the Staff Officer Finance.

Ed. J. Bailey Captain

Commanding Branch K.I.B.S.I.

Routing orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Concerning M.S.I. Expeditionary Force,

10th January 1900.

Parital 24. The following is an official certificate
 Field General Court Martial held at M.S.I. Station
 on the 10th January 1900
 Sergeant Francis E.A. Police
 Offence charged: Receiving, knowing it to be
 stolen, goods the property of
 comrades.
 Plea Guilty.
 Sentence To be reduced to the ranks.

Officers for 25. The following officers will be on duty to-night &
 at the times stated opposite their names:-
 Major Kirkpatrick 9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
 Captain Bailey 11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
 Captain Adler 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
 Captain Gordon 3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Officers for 26. Officers in charge of patrols will immediately on
 return to camp, render to the G.S.O. a return
 showing the number of the enemy killed and taken
 prisoners, casualties to the patrol and number
 of cattle sheep and goats captured.

Sd. J.E. Bailey Captain

G.S.O.'s branch K.L. force.

Routing orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Concerning M.S.I. Expeditionary Force

10th January 1900.

Officers for 27. The following officers will be on duty to-night
 at the times stated opposite their names:-
 Lieut de Carteret 9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
 Lieut Storey 11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
 Mr. W.E. Fensted 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
 Lieut Fitzgerald 3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Sd. J.E. Bailey Captain

G.S.O.'s branch K.L. force.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

ISSUED 28th January 1908.

Officers for 29. The following officers will be on duty
at the times stated opposite their names:

Lieut. Glaser	9 a.m. to 11 p.m.
Lieut. Hoffmeister	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
S. J. Joyce	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Dr. Leys	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Sd. J. E. Bailey Captain

S. O. A.'s branch K. E. Force.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

ISSUED 28th January 1908.

Officers for 29. The following officers will be on duty to-night
at the times stated opposite their names:

Mr. Armitstead	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Masud Effendi	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Captain Stigand	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Sgt. Taylor	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Stigand 30. Captain Stigand I/K.A.S. Survey Officer, having
reported his arrival on 27th inst. at KISSI Boma
is taken on the strength of the KISSI Expeditionary
Force.

Leys off 31. Dr. Leys M.C. was taken off the sick list on the
27th inst. and regained headquarters at BOGORO
camp on the 28th inst.

29. The lights and fires will be put out
and all talking cease.

Sd. J. E. Bailey Captain

S. O. A.'s branch K. E. Force.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackey
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force
NDUVIS Camp January 1908.

153

- Officers for 33. The following officers will be on duty to
at the times stated opposite their names:-
Captain Sadler 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.
Captain [unclear] 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.
Major [unclear] 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.
Captain [unclear] 3 p.m. to 5 p.m.
- Officers 34. With reference to standing order No 12 of the 15th
instant the fatigues therein mentioned will be
found by No 3 Coy.
- Orders 35. Commencing from to-day a meat ration will be
issued to the troops every third day.
- ent. 36. All officers who require stores should indent on
S.O. Finance who will keep an account of every-
thing issued.

Sd. J.E. Bailey Captain
S.O.A.O.'s Branch [unclear]

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackey
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force
NDUVIS Camp 31st January 1908.

- Officers for 37. The following officers will be on duty to-night
at the times stated opposite their names:-
Maj. Royce 9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Lieut de Carteret 11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Lieut Hoffmeister 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Mr. [unclear] 3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Sd. J.E. Bailey Captain
S.O.A.O.'s Branch [unclear]

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

MUVIS Camp 1st February 1908.

Officers for 38. The following officers will be on duty to-night

at the times stated opposite their names:-

Captain Sticant	8 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Mr. Lutz	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Mr. Amittstead	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Masud Effendi	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Arrival of 39. The LUCHWA Luvias joined the Force to-day under
headman ARAB HIRAY.

Sd. J.F. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.G's branch K.A. Corps.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force

MUVIS Camp February 2nd 1908.

Officers for 40. The following officers will be on duty to-night

at the times stated opposite their names:-

Captain Bailey	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Captain Sailer	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Sgt Taylor	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Major Pinketrick	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

Sd. J.F. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.G's branch K.A. Corps.

Routine orders by Lieut Colonel J.D. Mackay.

Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force

DOKONO Camp 3rd February 1908.

Officers for 41. The following officers will be on duty to-night

at the times stated opposite their names:-

Captain Grishaw	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Lieut Hoffmeister	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Lieut Sladen	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Lieut de Carteret	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

42. Asst. Surgeon W.H. Chipshart having arrived at

KISSI

KISUMU Station on the 30th ultimo is taken on the strength of the L. I. from that date.

155

Sd. J.K. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.G's branch R.E. Force

Soutine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Commanding KISUMU Expeditionary Force

CHUYA Camp 4th February 1908.

Officers for 43. The following officers will be on duty to-night at the times stated opposite their names:-

Masud Effendi	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Mr. Armitstead	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Dr. Leys	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Sgt Maj. Joyce	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

44. Sgt Taylor, Dispenser, remained behind at ADUVIS camp, with orders to proceed with the cattle convoy to KARICHO and from thence to KAIOMI.

45. Owing to the inclemency of the weather the M.O. will arrange for an issue of stimulant to the troops who were engaged in to-day's operations.

46. The Transport Officer will arrange for the issue of a meat ration to all porters to-day.

Sd. J.K. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.G's branch R.E. Force

Soutine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay

Commanding KISUMU Expeditionary Force

CHUYA Camp 5th February 1908.

Officers for 47. The following officers will be on duty to-night at the times stated opposite their names:-

Masud Effendi	9 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Mr. Armitstead	11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Dr. Leys	1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Sgt Maj. Joyce	3 a.m. to 5 a.m.

48. A.D.S.P. Fagan with the two dispensers who were captured in the fight of the 29th ultimo L/O M'Carthy M'Carthy of the Police with all evidence in the case will proceed to KISUMU on such date as may be fixed

by the

by the I.R.O. the prisoner who attempted to murder Mr. Westcott, A.S.P. will accompany this party. On the departure of A.S.P. Force from KISSI Station, Police Inspector Fitzgibbon will proceed on KONGA WAY to KISSI Station to take charge of the Police there.

Sd. J.H. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.'s branch E. Force.

Operation orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

OKNYGA Camp 6th February 1908.

49. Captain Stigand will be on duty to-night from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. and will visit the sentries three times during his tour of duty.

Sd. J.H. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.'s branch E. Force.

Routine orders by Lieut-Colonel J.D. Mackay
Commanding KISSI Expeditionary Force.

OKNYGA Camp 7th February 1908.

50. Lieut G. Wynn Finch & 50 rank and file of I.R.O. having reported their arrival at KIRIKHO on 6.2.08 and Inspector Likiep with 4 S.A.P. Police on 8.2.08 are taken on the strength of the KISSI Expeditionary force from those dates.

Sd. J.H. Bailey Captain

S.O.A.'s branch E. Force.

Net result of the operations in Kisii up to the 5th February, on which the G. O. requested the O. G., E. S. F. to suspend hostilities.

1. The Kikuyu clan which has revolted has been severely punished and is demoralized.
2. The enemy have suffered over 200 casualties, as far as can be ascertained.
3. Over 7000 of their cattle have been captured, and some 5000 sheep and goats.
4. The man who spared Mr. Northcote is now in the hands of the Government.
5. A number of huts have been burnt, also cattle bomas.
6. It is to be hoped that the punishment meted out to the Kikuyu has had and will have for the future the effect of ^{showing} the neighbouring tribes and clans that the Government can and will punish all wrong doers.
7. The prestige of the witch woman has been considerably lessened in the eyes of the Kisii.

235 killed & wounded
 mostly by the white
 men in the Staff

Accepted

Chief Staff Officer R. A. Forde.

Class	Members	Discussion From Kineti Station	Registration	Notes
1. KOSIYA	OLAFU, ONYONDA, B			
2. MARIKI	SAWA, V			
3. KANIKI	OSIPI			
4. KOTI	INDIJA			
5. KIKI	ETIPI			
6. KIKI	ETIPI			
7. KIKI	ETIPI			
8. KIKI	ETIPI			
9. KIKI	ETIPI			
10. KIKI	ETIPI			
11. KIKI	ETIPI			
12. KIKI	ETIPI			
13. KIKI	ETIPI			
14. KIKI	ETIPI			
15. KIKI	ETIPI			
16. KIKI	ETIPI			
17. KIKI	ETIPI			
18. KIKI	ETIPI			
19. KIKI	ETIPI			
20. KIKI	ETIPI			
21. KIKI	ETIPI			
22. KIKI	ETIPI			
23. KIKI	ETIPI			
24. KIKI	ETIPI			
25. KIKI	ETIPI			
26. KIKI	ETIPI			
27. KIKI	ETIPI			
28. KIKI	ETIPI			
29. KIKI	ETIPI			
30. KIKI	ETIPI			
31. KIKI	ETIPI			
32. KIKI	ETIPI			
33. KIKI	ETIPI			
34. KIKI	ETIPI			
35. KIKI	ETIPI			
36. KIKI	ETIPI			
37. KIKI	ETIPI			
38. KIKI	ETIPI			
39. KIKI	ETIPI			
40. KIKI	ETIPI			
41. KIKI	ETIPI			
42. KIKI	ETIPI			
43. KIKI	ETIPI			
44. KIKI	ETIPI			
45. KIKI	ETIPI			
46. KIKI	ETIPI			
47. KIKI	ETIPI			
48. KIKI	ETIPI			
49. KIKI	ETIPI			
50. KIKI	ETIPI			
51. KIKI	ETIPI			
52. KIKI	ETIPI			
53. KIKI	ETIPI			
54. KIKI	ETIPI			
55. KIKI	ETIPI			
56. KIKI	ETIPI			
57. KIKI	ETIPI			
58. KIKI	ETIPI			
59. KIKI	ETIPI			
60. KIKI	ETIPI			
61. KIKI	ETIPI			
62. KIKI	ETIPI			
63. KIKI	ETIPI			
64. KIKI	ETIPI			
65. KIKI	ETIPI			
66. KIKI	ETIPI			
67. KIKI	ETIPI			
68. KIKI	ETIPI			
69. KIKI	ETIPI			
70. KIKI	ETIPI			
71. KIKI	ETIPI			
72. KIKI	ETIPI			
73. KIKI	ETIPI			
74. KIKI	ETIPI			
75. KIKI	ETIPI			
76. KIKI	ETIPI			
77. KIKI	ETIPI			
78. KIKI	ETIPI			
79. KIKI	ETIPI			
80. KIKI	ETIPI			
81. KIKI	ETIPI			
82. KIKI	ETIPI			
83. KIKI	ETIPI			
84. KIKI	ETIPI			
85. KIKI	ETIPI			
86. KIKI	ETIPI			
87. KIKI	ETIPI			
88. KIKI	ETIPI			
89. KIKI	ETIPI			
90. KIKI	ETIPI			
91. KIKI	ETIPI			
92. KIKI	ETIPI			
93. KIKI	ETIPI			
94. KIKI	ETIPI			
95. KIKI	ETIPI			
96. KIKI	ETIPI			
97. KIKI	ETIPI			
98. KIKI	ETIPI			
99. KIKI	ETIPI			
100. KIKI	ETIPI			

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including "K. W. ...", "6. 1. 0. K. E. ...", and other illegible scribbles.

Approved 1/4

162

MEDICAL SERVICES REPORT
MISSI EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The general health of the troops through out the campaign was excellent. The principal diseases were chiefly Malaria. Local outbreaks of Dysentery—all being trivial in character. Four cases of Pneumonia were treated at the Base Hospital, and all recovered.

Amongst the Officers only one case of a mild attack of Dysentery was treated.

The list of sick reports during the campaign is attached.

Monquitos are met in swampy localities. Both the Culex and Anopheles were observed.

I wish to mention that the Medical Services rendered by Doctor Leys, Assistant Surgeon Thirskery and Dispenser Taylor were carried out in a most satisfactory and excellent manner; and I have to thank them all for their generous assistance through out the campaign.

Ed. H. Becker

In Medical Charge of the Missi
Expeditionary Force.

21st January 1902.

WEST BENGAL DISTRICT MILITARY COMMISSION

Disease	Troops	Police	Levies & Porters	Total
Malaria Fever	7	2	0	9
Amoebic Dysentery	3	0	0	3
Shigellosis	1	0	0	1
Cholera	1	0	0	1
Typhoid	1	0	0	1
Scarlet Fever	6	1	0	7
Dysentery	4	0	0	4
Enteritis	14	0	1	15
Colitis	1	0	0	1
Proctitis	0	1	0	1
Haemorrhoids	0	1	0	1
Parasitosis	0	1	0	1
Ascariasis	12	0	0	12
Trichuriasis	27	3	16	46
Hookworm	4	0	0	4
Ascariasis	1	0	0	1
Trichuriasis	1	1	0	2
Ascariasis	25	19	2	46
Trichuriasis	11	5	3	19
Ascariasis	6	9	4	19
Trichuriasis	2	0	0	2
Ascariasis	1	0	0	1
Trichuriasis	0	1	0	1
Ascariasis	1	0	2	3
Trichuriasis	0	2	1	3
Ascariasis	0	1	0	1
Trichuriasis	1	0	0	1
Ascariasis	10	0	0	10
Trichuriasis	0	0	0	0
Ascariasis	20	2	5	27
Trichuriasis	4	0	2	6
Total	154	51	28	233

581

STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT - CHICAGO

Disease	Troops	Police	Levies & Porters	Total
Malarial Fever	7	2		12
Amoebiasis	3			3
Trichinosis	1			1
Ascariasis	1			1
Giardiasis	1			1
Cholera	1			1
Dysentery	6	1	0	7
Shigellosis	4	0	0	4
Amoebic Dysentery	14	0	1	15
Bacillary Dysentery	1	0	0	1
Enteric Fever	0	1	0	1
Typhoid	0	1	0	1
Paratyphoid	12	0	0	12
Scarlet Fever	27	3	15	45
Diphtheria	4	0	0	4
Whooping Cough	1	0	0	1
Measles	1	1	0	2
Scarlet Fever	25	19	3	47
Typhoid	11	5	3	19
Paratyphoid	8	9	4	21
Cholera	2	0	0	2
Bacillary Dysentery	1	0	0	1
Amoebic Dysentery	0	1	0	1
Shigellosis	1	0	2	3
Enteric Fever	0	2	1	3
Typhoid	0	1	0	1
Paratyphoid	1	0	0	1
Cholera	10	0	0	10
Bacillary Dysentery	4	0	0	4
Amoebic Dysentery	20	2	5	27
Shigellosis	4	0	3	7
Total	104	51	38	193

163

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

INDEXED

CO. 533

43

COPYRIGHT NOTIFICATION - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED, PHOTOGRAPHICALLY, OR BY ANY MEANS, WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, BOSTON.

Government Office,
Nairobi,
January 10th 1906.

Sir,

I am desired to inform you that, subject to the approval of the Inspector General, Sir's Air Force Rifles and any modifications he may consider necessary with Excellency the Governor approval of the measures you propose to take to restore law and order in the Kivu country.

2. The objects of the expedition will be:-
 - (1) To quell the revolt and restore order in the disaffected area.
 - (2) To cause the surrender of the natives and perpetrators of the attack on Mr. Northcote.
 - (3) To obtain the surrender of the native who murdered the two Indians and the Kavirondo Native, if they can be identified, or if they have murdered by a clan or clans collectively, to inflict a fine on the clan or clans the amount of which will be fixed by the Chief Political Officer Mr. Ainsworth.
 - (4) To inflict such fines on the clans who have revolted as may be determined, with my approval, by the Chief Political Officer when the causes of the disturbance have been ascertained.
 3. Arrangements have been made to send the steamer due to sail from Mombasa tomorrow in order to transport the troops to Kivu Bay.
 4. Whilst all opposition must be suppressed, hostilities will be limited to the clans actively in revolt, and
- Officer Commanding Troops
Nairobi.

Governor's Office,

Nairobi,

January 13, 1914.

Sir,

I am desired to inform you that, subject to the approval of the Inspector General, His Excellency the Governor approves of the measures you propose to take to restore law and order in the Kisii country.

2. The objects of the expedition will be:-

(1) To quell the revolt and restore order in the disaffected area.

(2) To cause the surrender of the natives and perpetrators of the attack on Mr. Northcote.

(3) To obtain the surrender of the native who murdered the two Indians and the Kavirondo native, if they can be indentified, or if they have murdered by a clan or clans collectively to inflict a fine on the clan or clans the amount of which will be fixed by the Chief Political Officer Mr. Ainsworth.

(4) To inflict such fines on the clans who have revolted as may be determined, with my approval, by the Chief Political Officer when the causes of the disturbance have been ascertained.

3. Arrangements have been made to transport the troops to Murgu Bay.

4. Whilst all opposition must be suppressed, there will be limited to the clans active in revolt.

Officer Commanding Troops
Nairobi.

and

and must cease when the objects above noted are obtained.atives may to 181. the disaffected class should be interfered with as little as possible. I could suggest that strict instructions be issued to the officers & men not to interfere and as possible with the cool supplies of the country they pass through: the present is a time of emergency and we must avoid having to deal with the possibilities of a famine later on if this can be avoided.

5. As to the particular class against whom it will be necessary to operate you will be guided, as in other matters which come within his province, by the advice of the Chief Political Officer.

6. I trust that order may be restored within a very short time of the arrival of the troops in the Kisii district and that you will then be able to withdraw them with the exception of the Company which is quartered at Lambara, which it is advisable should be stationed at Kisii for some time to come.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

Ed. J. Benson.

In Camp

February 25th 1908.

Sir,

On the termination of hostilities in the Kisii Country and in continuation of my letter of this date I have the honour to inform you that in my opinion the Expedition has achieved the object for which it was mobilized.

The Kitutu section of the Kisii tribe has been utterly demoralized, and have been taught a most severe lesson.

Undoubtedly the prestige of the Government has been maintained in a most striking manner. The presence of an imposing force in the country and the harassing tactics adopted by the troops, has been an object lesson to the Kisii which it will take a long time for them to forget.

I beg to convey to you my sincere appreciation of the way in which the operations have been conducted. I fully understand the difficult position in which at times your Company Commanders were placed owing to certain parts of the enemy's locations being adjacent to friendly locations, it is however satisfactory to know that their forbearance and watchfulness has enabled us to avoid all difficulties.

It would have been a great satisfaction to note that practically no food supplies have been destroyed.

Yours faithfully

Col. J. B. Mackay

Commanding Kisii Expeditionary Force

Kisii

The general result of the punitive measures adopted must necessarily be to impress upon the King and surrounding tribes the fact that the Government is not slow to inflict punishment on a tribe that defies its authority.

For possibly a year it will be necessary to maintain a company of troops in the country in order that the natives may, until such time as they absolutely settle down, be kept to a sense of their obligations as one of the tribes in this Protectorate.

I have the honor to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

Sd. John Ainsworth.

P/O. & C.S.O.

Final remarks on the Kisii Expedition.

The condition of the police which accompanied the expedition can only be described as deplorable. The following extracts from a letter of January 1914 and a letter dated December 1913 speak for themselves.

- a. "That of the six police sent by you to Kungo Bay, all have returned here, but 5 constables of the same are under arrest for refusing to go on guard in camp when escorting the Hospital Assistant from Kungo Bay here.
- b. "The police were hopeless and proved quite unmanageable, refusing to return or cease fire when the bugle sounded."
- c. "Further I do not trust the police and feel obliged to protest against being left with such an incompetent and untrustworthy body of men."

The above extracts are, I think, sufficient to show the state of the police.

It must be noted that these extracts are from a letter written by a police officer.

This would have been avoided had the District Officer complied with the instructions sent to him by the Traffic Manager. Whilst as it was the delay did not affect the expedition, it might have had the most serious consequences.

On the whole worked satisfactorily. The only difficulty, i.e., that of seeing a long string of porters closed when on the march - was experienced

The signalling work was, I consider, well carried out though difficult times, experienced in maintaining communication between posts owing to the prevalence of a thick haze during the day.

Just over 9000 rounds were expended inclusive of Maxim Gun ammunition.

Taking the enemies casualties at 300, this gives a percentage of 2 hits per 100 rounds, which may be regarded as a satisfactory result.

The fire discipline was good and the N.C.Os kept their men well in hand.

H. Kirkpatrick

Major

Chief Staff Officer Kisi B. Force.

Officer's File
P/2

REPORT BY THE PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER, KISUMU, TO HIS
EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR ON THE KISUMU KISILI REBELLION, AND
ITS SUPPRESSION.

PART I.

On Sunday the 13th January 1905 a special messenger
arrived from the Assistant District Commissioner (Mr
NORTHCOOTE) with information that a Native belonging
to the KISUMU Clan of KISILI had wounded this Officer
in an attempt to murder him. Mr NORTHCOOTE in his
letter stated that he wished it to be clearly understood
that the matter was not a tribal affair, it being, in
his opinion, a matter in which an individual whose he
had fined had attempted to carry out private vengeance.
A doctor was despatched from here early on the morning
of the 13th to attend to Mr NORTHCOOTE.

I decided to visit KISILI with a military Patrol and
enquire into the matter and with this object in view,
asked Your Excellency to sanction by employing 50 E.A.S.
with an European Officer from LUMBA. Before the Patrol
arrived here however, I received further information
from KISILI to the effect that the whole of the KISUMU
Clan had risen against the Government. This informa-
tion came to hand on Tuesday the 14th January, and
on receipt of the news I instructed the Assistant Dis-
trict Superintendent of Police (Mr FURAN) to take
all available Police and send a strong force to KISILI
immediately.

Mr FURAN left at 3 p.m. on the 14th January with
50 E.A.S. & men of the EAST AFRICAN POLICE. At the same
time I wired to the O.C. Troops LUMBA, requesting him to
send forward without delay the 50 men asked for with an
European Officer.

RECEIVED
DISTRICT OFFICE
KISUMU
JAN 15 1905

RECEIVED
MILITARY PATROL

RECEIVED
KISUMU CLAN

RECEIVED
KISUMU

I wired to Your Excellency on the 14th that further hostilities were reported from [redacted] and on the same date I wired fully the position of affairs to that date.

BOIS arrived
on 14th
to KISUMU
to safeguard
life and property.

Capt BOIS with 60 K.A.R. arrived from LAHWA on the night of the 14th and proceeded by land to KISUMU on January 15th. These advance parties were instructed to proceed with all despatch to KISUMU and on arrival there to safeguard life and property.

They were not to undertake any offensive operations apart from their instructions, i. e. they were not to do anything to the natives unless attacked pending the arrival of the O. C. Troops and the Military Expedition. These instructions were, I eventually found out, obeyed in every way.

Station of
Camp at
KONGO BAY.

On Thursday the 16th, I despatched Mr STOKES, Assistant District Commissioner with Inspector FITZGERALD, 16 Police and a number of porters to form a Base Camp at KONGO BAY, and Mr DEACON, Assistant District Commissioner was made local Transport Officer at KISUMU to recruit porters and forward loads. To assist in the work of transport, I found it necessary to employ the Railway Steam tug "Fercy Anderson" and two lighters to keep up communication between KISUMU and KONGO BAY.

Mr HACKETT
arrives at
KONGO BAY
on 18th

Lt. Colonel HACKETT with Officers and troops arrived at KISUMU on Saturday the 18th January and proceeded to KONGO BAY on Sunday the 19th. Major KIRKPATRICK, Chief Staff Officer with a further number of Officers and men of the K.A.R. arrived here early on Monday morning, the 20th January and left for KONGO BAY. I went on with the party and joined the Expedition as Chief Political Officer in accordance with your instructions.

Mr HACKETT
arrives at
KONGO BAY
on 18th

The whole of the Expedition consisting of -

13 Officers

1 Warrant Officer

227 N.C.O.s & men

1 Doctor

1 Compounder

and some 500 porters and followers left the Base Camp at 6.30 a.m. on 31st January.

The expedition arrived in the unfriendly country on the 31st when armed natives were seen everywhere. Punitive measures were then demanded and before nightfall a considerable number of cattle was captured and brought into camp.

In undertaking the first day's operations the troops were employed in three columns. These tactics were evidently quite unexpected by the KISII who consequently became greatly demoralized. Personally I believe that the first day's operations were responsible for the almost entire collapse of any fighting qualities which the KISII fighting men may have had, certain it is, however, that after the first day they showed no inclination to again face any of the fighting columns. Afterwards they attempted to cut off the cattle from the convoys but never with success.

We arrived at KISII Station on the 2nd and found the people right through the Station hostile. We were however not molested.

On the 24th and 25th I remained at KISII while columns were sent out to look for and seize cattle. Mr. A. V. HENKOTE, the District Commissioner of KASHU, who on hearing of the accident to Mr. HENKOTE made a forced march from KASHU to KISII, leaving the former Station on the

18th and arriving at the latter on the 14th. This Officer was at KISII on my arrival, and on my learning from the Medical Officer that Mr HUSKOTTE was quite unfit for duty, and in accordance with Your Excellency's instructions, Mr HUSKOTTE joined me Assistant Political Officer; he was utilized in accompanying the Column and in this capacity rendered most useful service. I beg to specially bring this Officer's name before you on account of the services rendered. He was not only most useful, but was also most tactful and exercised most sound judgment, and a ready comprehension of his duties.

On the 30th January the whole of the expedition less half a Company of K.A.R. and the whole of the Police Force then in KISII which remained at KISII Station to look after the cattle and guard the Station, left for the MANGA ESCARPMENT. We reached HEBWICHU Camp the same day when two Columns were sent to the North and East returning in the course with cattle.

On the afternoon of the same day I learnt that two divisions viz; ANGUIN'S and MAINHA'S of the KITURU Clan desired to disassociate themselves from the remainder of the sections then in revolt. As I learnt that these two sections had committed no specific act of violence and were only concerned to the extent of joining generally with the other sections, and as they had already suffered some loss in cattle, I arranged to visit the locations next day. In the meantime the Officer Commanding suspended operations as far as these locations were concerned. On the 27th, I proceeded, accompanied by O.C. Troops, the Assistant Political Officer and four other Military Officers into the KITHN valley to meet ANGUIN who in due course came to the meeting place. The result of the meeting was satisfactory. We then proceeded to East MAINHA

REMARKS
REMARKS
REMARKS
REMARKS
REMARKS

REMARKS
REMARKS

REMARKS
REMARKS
REMARKS
REMARKS

and his people with a similar result to the meeting with ANGUIN. On the 28th ANGUIN and MAINHA with their representative Headman and many followers came to our camp with food, and discussed questions generally to our mutual satisfaction. They also brought a portion of their Hut that which the District Commissioner (MR HIRSTON) received.

On the 29th we left for the HEGARANGU (North) location and were there met by friendly Chiefs. HEGARANGU is just outside of the KIRIPIU area. On the 30th we proceeded to HUIVI's and here the natives were extremely friendly and assisted us in every way possible. The Column remained at HUIVI's during the 31st January and the 1st and 2nd February, during which time arrangements were completed for sending in all the captured stock in hand to that late at KISIIHO which is three days distant from HUIVI's.

Instructions had been sent by the C.C. to have the stock left at KISII Station brought on to this Camp.

All these arrangements were carried out successfully.

On the 2nd of February I received information from KISII Station that a convoy while proceeding from the Station to KONGO BAY under Police escort had been attacked by the KISII of HATARA, and so we decided to proceed to that location where we arrived on the 4th. We succeeded in surprising some of the enemy's live stock en route which was brought into camp. The O.N. by an enveloping movement succeeded in completely defeating any further idea of resistance by this section.

On the afternoon of the 5th the Elder ANGUIN came into camp from his location and informed me that the revolted Clans of the KINSHI had by now received a severe lesson and that most of them were anxious to make peace. I had already received information from the Station that two other Elders were making overtures, and an ANSHIN had captured and handed over the man who admitted to murder Mr. NORTHWOODS. I considered it desirable to bring the operations to an end, and on the evening of the 5th, therefore, I informed the Officer Commanding Troops that active operations could cease from that date. I attach copy of my letter to the O.C.

The net results of the operations have been as follows:-

- (1) All the hostile sections of the KINSHI Clan have been punished.
- (2) Just over 7000 head of cattle were captured.
- (3) Some 5000 sheep and goats captured.
- (4) A number of living huts and cattle pens burned (only the worse or more involved sections were treated in this manner,) but in the aggregate not much damage was done in this connection.
- (5) The number of the enemy killed is difficult even to estimate. The Military Authorities put it at 240. It is quite possible however, that this is an over-estimate.

The effect of the operations of the M.A. has undoubtedly been most wholesome. They have learnt a lesson which they have long undoubtedly needed, and which they in every way asked for.

The moral aspect of the operations on the neighboring clans of the KIKUI and upon the surrounding Tribes will be official, and I anticipate that for a long time the general peace in the District concerned and the districts adjacent will not be disturbed.

In concluding this part of my report, I would like to be allowed to place on record my sincere appreciation of the cordial sympathy and co-operation extended to me by Lt. Col. MACKAY and all the Officers under his Command. This good feeling made it a comparatively easy matter for me to deal with the various questions and positions that always arise in affairs of this description.

My thanks are also due to Mr FORAN, Assistant District Superintendent of Police for his willing assistance rendered at all times; and both Mr STOKES and Mr DRACON carried out their respective duties most satisfactorily.

(Signed) JAMES HANCOCK

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER &
CHIEF POLITICAL OFFICER,
KIKUI EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1891, February 18th 1906.

100

Part II

The Kisii Revolt - Its causes and

was employ-
to investi-
the cause.

On my arrival in Kisii I enquired as fully as possible into the cause of the Kisii revolt, and on subsequent occasions I made every possible endeavour to find substantiation for previous statements made. I obtained very full information from such elders as DEVI, DELECHA, NYAMOSI, CHORI, MALONGA and NYATI who have been friendly throughout, and from ANGEN, MAINHA MWYIKUMBI and MUKIAB who became friendly subsequently. Independent of the foregoing, I also questioned certain prisoners brought into camp. The result of my investigations made it perfectly clear that the following are the causes which have led to the revolt:-

dispos-

The Kisii country lies away from all near intercourse with the outside world. It is practically surrounded by other tribes with whom, more or less, the Kisii have been continually on bad terms.

The Kitutu clan of the Kisii tribe is, if anything, more isolated than the other clans. This clan has quarrels with all the remaining Kisii clans and also with the Kavirondo and Lumbwa, and on various occasions in the past succeeded on various occasions in raiding other clans of Kisii. They are reported to have only once penetrated into the Kitutu valley, when they were severely defeated and left the greater part of their party dead in the valley. These and other similar causes gave the Kitutu clan an apparently predominant influence in the Kisii affairs, and made them feared.

Amongst the Kavirondo the Kisii had a name for great ferocity and were greatly feared, which was that, whereas the Kisii continually raided the Kavirondo, the latter never dared enter the Kisii country. There is no doubt but that these points alone caused the Kisii, and more especially the Kitutu clan, to have a considerable estimate of themselves.

The Kisii generally and the Kitutu in particular are believed in sorcery, and appear to have been at one time influenced by the reputed powers of a witch who lived in Kitutu. This witch who is a woman has the reputation of making medicines for good or evil.

Kisii practically do not intercourse with any of the tribes who live to the west, speaking a different language to the Luo and the Nilotic tribes of their other frontiers (the Kisii speak undoubtedly a Bantu dialect) though they are not in a position to know of the Government, its power or resources: in fact they appear to know nothing of any of the existence of any authority apart from what they understood existed at Kisii Station itself.

Certainly the expedition under Captain Jenkins had visited parts of the country in 1906 and had punished certain sections. These sections, principally WANJARI with the exception of MARIANI (Muyumbani) held aloof from the present revolt. There is however evidence to show that any neutrality was more due to the desire to see how the rebel clan was dealt with in the first instance than from any other idea of loyalty, especially all the so-called friendly clans sheltered stores and people of the revolted Kitutu. This is a feature however, very common in such cases and one not to be surprised at.

When Mr. Northcote commenced early this year to establish a Station in Kisii, he selected a site on the south

the South and of the Kitutu clan and immediately adjoining their location. It appears that from the start the Kitutu people became suspicious of our intentions. They made no secret of their dislike to our locating ourselves amongst them, and even went so far apparently as to ask what we wanted. It would appear that either intentionally or through some error of interpretation these enquiries were told that such as the person was feminine. Kavirondo then, North side Malindi, where there was plenty of food for a while. From the morning some of importance seems to have happened. Their date commencement of permanent building with them to have started the Kitutu once more. It would then seem to have been divided in their midst, and here for running the Station and settlement west of Malindi, the all of the witch. This is the of the Kitutu seem to have been most frequent and the whole clan were the state of absolute respect. The witch then said to have made medicine and to know that it was good for the European to die, and it was believed further that the destruction of Kisii was simply a personal matter and would cease for ever with the death of Mr. Northcote. He came the attempt on his life.

The whole of the Kisii tribe is divided into numerous clans. These clans are again divided into families. Each clan and each family is hostile to the other, and so it was evidently a difficult matter for ever the whole of the divisions of the Kitututu to join together even on a matter which they seem to have been unanimous about. Evidently the Medicine woman realized this because she took the first opportunity that offered and ordered her foster son to go out on an occasion when Mr. Northcote was passing through her location and spear him. This act though approved of by the Kitutu section generally, was apparently not anticipated at any

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
C.O. 533
43
COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

at any particular moment; hence before the news could get about to enable the people to meet, Mr. Northcote was safe back at the station. To this want of combination and the fact that the wounding was simply a matter of chance in the manner described, Mr. Northcote undoubtedly owes his life; for there was no doubt whatever that, had there been time for the people to have got together and intercepted him, they would, in the state of mind they then were, have finished what the witch's sorcery had commenced. After the event some thousands of natives hung round the station for days, and only began to disperse after the arrival of Mr. R.W. Hamsted from Kariakoo.

In a few words it is evident that the Kikuyu did not want a station near them. They resented the white man intruding amongst them. They were extremely ignorant and isolated, and the witch's medicine showed it was bad for them if the European remained, and that it was good for the Kikuyu that he should die.

Northcote
re of Mr.
andly
img.

Mr. Northcote was apparently more or less aware of this state of affairs, but in reply to my queries as to why he never warned the Provincial Commissioner, he replied that he attached very little importance to all the information he received in this connection.

Mr. Northcote
re of Mr.
andly
img.

I have made all further enquiries possible with a view of finding out whether any other causes than those already related existed, to account for the hostile feelings. I firmly believe however, that there is nothing.

Mr. Northcote
re of Mr.
andly
img.

I consider it a great mistake to leave these outstations with only one officer in charge. It is not fair to the officer concerned. It is against the interests of the Administration; it is offering chances that should not be offered, and such a system is responsible in certain cases for many wrong impressions.

gained by the natives, and also at times for officers becoming narrowed down to the limits of their immediate surroundings and forgetting that their district, one of the units of the Administration.

When the expedition entered Kinal, I was unable to get much information from Mr. Northcote, and had as a consequence to rely partly on Mr. Hemsted and information from natives.

(Mr. Northcote was very feebly: a temperature of 105° for the two days I was at his station. Consequently he could not be worried with any detail.)

different div-
are located.

By working up information and ascending the high escarpment and taking a birds eye view of the country, we soon got all the locations well defined.

In part I of this report I have shown how we got into touch with the *Witch* and *Wichha*. The former was responsible for the capture of a native who attempted to murder Mr. Northcote.

we in co-
tion with
Witch.
Wichha.

It may possibly be necessary for me to explain my views with regard to the *Witch* witch. They are as follows:-

I consider she has a great power in the country, but am inclined to think that her authority as at present is practically non-existent. I have said nothing about her to the people and have *induced* Mr. Hemsted to say nothing either. It is quite possible that if we have any attention to her existence that it might be the cause of the creation of an idea that we had some fear of her medicine, left to herself and the usual anger of leaders of cattle etc., she may have time to realize that her medicine, which the Government is concerned, is not a very powerful mixture. Then if considered desirable she might be captured quietly and moved from the country she has disturbed. If, considered

frontier into Kavirondo when numbers were detained by the Kavirondo. The latter are, of course, only getting some of their own back. These incidents, coupled with an idea to regroup themselves for what the expedition took from them, may induce irresponsible members of the Kisi to attempt raids into the Kavirondo and in anticipation of such possibilities the patrols will require to move frequently and at irregular intervals along the boundary.

185

Certain Chiefs etc., who rendered assistance to the Government in various ways, and Anguin who captured the Kisi who attempted to murder Mr. Northcote have been paid awards out of the captured stock.

Over 200 head of cattle and a number of goats belonging to friendlies seized with the enemy's stock have been returned.

Two or three cases of compensation arose and were settled all amicably.

Part III of my report describes the Kisi country and gives particulars of the population and Resources.

Sd. JOHN AINSWORTH

Provincial Commissioner &
Chief Political Officer,
Kisi Expeditionary Force.

Uganda, February 15th 1908.

March 17th 1908.

Sir,

I have the honour to Forward herewith statement showing the estimated expenditure on account of the Kisii Expeditionary Force up to the 29th February '08.

You will observe that the estimated expenditure amounts to Rs 34,216 :85 and the estimated receipts to Rs 220082 : 50, giving an estimated balance on hand of Rs 185,866 + 15 cents.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant

M. M. M. M.
Staff Officer (Finance)

Kisii Expeditionary Force

The Chief Staff Officer

Kisii Expeditionary Force.

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

10.0000

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE UP TO 30th FEBRUARY 1908.

Cr.
188

To sale of stock at Kisil	Rs. 2000.00	
Estimated value Stock on hand (1000)		
Cattle at Rs 30/- each	30000.00	
Estimated value Stock on hand (1000)		
sheep & goats at Rs 10/- each	10000.00	230082.50

230082.50

Approved balance of Rs. 230082.50 - 6. 13. 5. 1. 0.

W. H. ...
 Staff Officer Finance
 Kisil Expeditionary Force

Captain K. S. HAYES, Indian Army 7th Gurkha
Battalion, was attached to my Command for Special
Survey work during the Expedition; he rendered me
most valuable service during the operations and made
a most excellent and useful map of the 1811 country,
while working under very busy and unfavourable cir-
cumstances. His prepared map was invaluable to me
during the expedition.

He has proved himself to be a very skillful topo-
grapher.

Lieut. J. H. SHANN, Ist B.A. Rifles, (Rifle Brigade)
was my transport Officer during the expedition; he
proved himself to be a very keen practical Officer,
hard working and showed marked ability in organizing
native transport from tribes whose language was most
difficult to understand and who never before had any
knowledge of organization. It was very noticeable
the good work he got out of those natives through
his resourcefulness under very trying circumstances.

I do not wish to notice the Uncommissioned Officers
for general good work done during the expedition and
are worthy of consideration:

Captain J. H. BALLEW, 3rd B.A. (The King's Shropshire
Light Infantry),

Captain J. BOIS, 3rd B.A. (The King's Own Royal
Lancaster Light Infantry).

I have the honour to bring to notice the name of
No. 2000 Sergeant Major A. R. H. (The King's Own
Grenadier Guards). This is a most capable and hard working
Non Commissioned Officer and is worthy of a reward
for the excellent hard work he performed during the
operations.

special responsibility if he shall direct the troops to be employed in a manner which the officer may consider open to military objection;

(c) shall forward a report to the High Commissioner under the command of the troops any orders which he may give to any of the troops, and shall give any orders immediately through the senior military officer present, and shall be responsible for their communication to all officers and troops concerned, and if military operations have been decided upon, shall be responsible for their actual conduct;

(d) shall not, in any station or place where the High Commissioner is present in person, give any orders to troops directly or with the consent of the High Commissioner;

(e) shall, if the High Commissioner is not present in person, when practicable, communicate with the High Commissioner before issuing any such orders.

II. DEFINITION OF EXPEDITION

Expeditions, Patrols, Raids, etc.

Expeditions. The term "Expedition" will only be used to denote military operations carried out with the sanction of the Secretary of State, and denoted as such by the High Commissioner, who will give orders as to the objects and details of the operations.

Other operations where the assistance of the regular forces is required will be dealt with as follows:

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference -

C.O. 533

43

COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

- (a) Suppression of armed insurrection.
- (b) Suppression of armed disturbances.
- (c) ...
- (d) ...
- (e) ...

...armed insurrection. This will be taken into account in the event of a state of rebellion or of open and active interference with the execution of the law by a large proportion of the community under arms, within districts under settled administrative control.

When an armed insurrection actually occurs, it is for the Resident to determine the extent to which troops are to be employed in its suppression. He will consult with the Officers commanding troops, who will state whether he has any military objection to the manner in which the Resident proposes that the troops should be employed; but the ultimate responsibility for their employment rests on the Resident, the military officer's responsibility being limited to seeing that proper military precautions are taken. It is for the Residents to determine whether "armed insurrection" necessitating the use of troops exists in his province, and whether the emergency is such that it is necessary to act without delay or after reference to the Government. In the latter case, the Government will be consulted as to the extent to which troops should be sent to the province.

General Disturbance. This will be taken to mean a state of riot or lawlessness by a considerable proportion of the community in districts under settled administrative control as to necessitate the employment of troops for its suppression. The regulations set forth above for the suppression of armed insurrection are equally applicable to cases of disturbance.

5. Punitive Patrols. A "punitive patrol" may be

(a) A patrol sent into a settled country for the purpose of inflicting punishment.

(b) A patrol sent into an unsettled country with the definite object of inflicting punishment and when there is no intention of following such action by bringing the district under immediate administrative control.

Before sending a punitive patrol into a settled country, the sanction of the High Commissioner will, when practicable, and provided the case is not one of great urgency, be obtained. In the case of punitive patrols into an unsettled country, the prior authority of the High Commissioner will invariably be obtained. It is for the Resident to determine, (subject to the approval of the High Commissioner) in the case of a punitive patrol, the extent to which punitive action shall be taken.

6. Patrols. A "patrol" will be taken

operations where no actual disturbance exists, but where opposition may be met with.

"Patrols" will always be accompanied by a Political Officer, and the prior sanction of the High Commissioner must be obtained. The proximate cause of the permission for a patrol being given may be the fact that the inhabiting the district has not continued raids upon its neighbours who are under Government protection, but no one village may be more immediately responsible for these raids than another, and the ignorance of the tribe of the prohibition of such raids renders their action (which is in accord with their savage traditions) far less reprehensible than similar outrages by tribes who well understand the liabilities they incur. Permission may also be accorded when no outrages have occurred, in the endeavour to peacefully open up a district hitherto closed to civilising agencies. In both cases, but more especially, of course, in the latter every possible effort will be made to avoid any friction or hostilities. The patrol will march slowly, and not alarm the people by a sudden appearance in their midst. The political officer will always send peaceable and conciliatory messages ahead, but, if hostilities should take place, he will exercise the greatest leniency, and any fine to be considered necessary will be minimal in amount. The patrol will be accompanied unless the district is a very advanced one, in which case one of his staff will accompany him to administer the district. The Political Officer, on the order of the High Commissioner, will arrange with the Officer Commanding troops for occasional "patrols" through

through districts thus being brought under administrative control;

... This word will be used when no opposition is expected, and may be used for... troops. When constabulary are not available... Recipient may requisition troops by an order for himself or other Civil Officers or for specie or prisoners. Except in case of urgency or emergency, the prior authority of the... will be obtained for the use of troops as... required is less than...

III. PROCEDURE

1. (Procedure when orders to be used before force is actually reported to an ultimatum should be delivered, with a clear intimation that disregard beyond the time limit assigned will result in forcible measures. The ultimatum should consist of a demand for the due performance within a specified time of a specific act or acts capable of being performed within that time by the Chief or Headman to whom the ultimatum is sent. The greatest care must be taken that he and as many of his people as possible clearly understand what it is they are required to do or to refrain from doing and which has given rise to the ultimatum. It is also that the ultimatum... which it is intended to... effect... when police... effect... have been... of threatened... or... to...

to effect their object the ultimatum should consist of a demand for the surrender within a specified time of the accused and of the persons who have shielded him or who fired upon or threatened the police, and the consequences of failure to comply with the demand should be plainly stated.

If the demands of the Political Officer are refused, the troops will at his request, be despatched to the immediate locality concerned; the ultimatum will be repeated, and if still disregarded, the Officer commanding troops will be directed to take action. Time having been allowed for the non-combatants to escape, the troops would then advance, but no fire should be opened until the troops are attacked or until it is evident that an attack is imminent. Every effort should be made to avoid bloodshed.

An Officer or experienced British Non-Commissioned Officer will always be personally in command of troops when action has to be taken. If a British Non-commissioned Officer is in command, he must have definite orders in writing, especially as to the circumstances under which he is justified in opening fire. Should such written instructions be impossible, his oral orders will be most definite and precise. Under no circumstances will operations be conducted by native troops without a European, native or British, being sent to effect an arrest or carry out any object which will probably involve hostilities, unless accompanied by a European. In the event of resistance being met with, as soon as this has been broken down,

the first object will be to secure the...
as passengers to the defamed people. These will be
some of the primary objects with a view to
what their lives will be saved and they will not
be secured as prisoners.

Political Officer not to interfere with military operations. The Resident or other civil or political officer is not authorized to interfere in any way with the formation or details of the force, the military officer being responsible for the success of the operations to be undertaken, and it is for the latter, and for his alone, to judge in what manner the troops can effect the object which the civil officer has indicated, and to direct the force in the execution of the service in which he is engaged.

It is, however, the military officer's duty to consider his force inadequate for the performance of the service required, or the service itself impracticable or likely to be a disaster to the military government, it would be competent for him to decline to accede to the requisition; but, in so doing, he must be prepared to justify his refusal to the satisfaction of the High Commissioner.

It is for the Resident, or other civil officer, to refer the requisition to the approval of the High Commissioner, and of the military authorities, and to place the same upon the Military Council for the general command, and he is not called upon to justify his requisition to the High Commissioner, or to the military officer to whom the requisition is referred.

such manifestations of confidence and cordiality are
desirable to be desired; but only required in order
that the state distinctly (or virtually) be known to
desires to see performed, and the necessary conditions
for the purpose, and to afford such further informa-
tion as may be necessary, to enable the officer in
command, efficiently to perform the service he is
called upon to execute.

10. Prisoners not to be retained. After military
operations, no prisoners should be retained,
except for a few hours, or at most, a day, for the
purpose of sending them as messengers to their people
in their hiding places, or for a day or two, as tem-
porary guides.

11. Despatches and Reports. (Other than Progress
Reports) will be furnished as set forth in
paragraph 25.

Return will be furnished as set forth in
G.S.O. 1, paragraph 26.

An Intelligence Officer will be detailed as
laid down in paragraph 27 of G.S.O. 1. This term
refers to "Expeditions".

Special Precautions will be taken as detailed
in G.S.O. 1 paragraph 28.

Native Levies as formed, will be

Casualties among natives will be ac-
counted for as laid down in G.S.O. 1, paragraph 29.

Followers not allowed. (View paragraph 34 of

12. Progress Reports. Officers in command of military operations, irrespective of whether they are ordered as an "expedition" or otherwise, will report as fully and frequently as circumstances demand to the High Commissioner for the submission of the High Commissioner.

The Political Officer will make a report to the Resident of the Province invariably repeating any telegraphic report direct to the High Commissioner.

13. Opponent's casualties. As reported on cables as the circumstances admit, of all the kind of the casualties on the side of the opponent in every case where the troops are actively engaged. The Officer in Command will furnish this report through the proper channel to the Commandant for the information of the High Commissioner, and the Political Officer will furnish a similar report to the Resident in charge of the Province, repeating such as above to the High Commissioner.

14. Political Officers with Troops. The Resident in charge of a Province wherein troops are engaged in military operations, when practicable, accompany the troops. When this is impracticable, he will give instructions to the Officer in Command of his Staff to act for him. The Political Officer will accompany the troops.

Gov. E.A.P.
16/11/18

DRAFT

WEST AFRICA PROTECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Downing Street,

8 March, 1908.

Sir J. Hayes Sadler, K.C.B., G.C., C.F.

MINUTE. Sir,

Mr. Butler, March 4

Mr. Read 4

Mr. Just.

Mr. Antrobus 5/2

Mr. Cox 4

Sir C. Lucas

Sir F. Hopwood

Mr. Churchill

The Earl of Elgin

I have the honour to inform you that your attention has been called to your confidential despatch No. 28 of the 1st of April last, relating to the Kisi Expedition of 1908, and to express to you my regret that by an oversight no reply has hitherto been sent to that despatch.

2. It is evident that the operations undertaken by the expedition were very successful in attaining the object in view without loss of life among the Government forces.

for custody

I have to express to you my satisfaction at
 the result, and my hope that, as you an-
 nounce, the pacification of this district and
 its peaceable administration henceforth are
 now assured.

3. It is not clear to me whether you
 intended the despatch under reply to be a
 Despatch relating to Field Operations in the
 sense in which that expression is used in
para 169 to 177 of
 the Regulations for the King's African Rifles.

I gather that this was probably your inten-
 tion because you have enclosed in the des-
 patch reports from the Officer Commanding
 the Expedition, in particular his letter
 dated the 17th of March 1908, which are
 plainly intended to be enclosures in a des-
 patch of that nature. If this is the case,

I have to point out that the regulations for
 the submission of such despatches have been
 contravened by more than one particular
 despatch itself is not headed "Despatches
 relating to Field Operations" in the manner
 prescribed.

DRAFT.

prescribed in paragraph 170 of the Regulations for the King's African Rifles. You will see from that regulation, in the absence of this heading, a despatch will be regarded as sent for information, and not as a recommendation for rewards. You have, on the other hand, marked your despatch "Confidential", which would seem to indicate that it was not your intention that it should be published, whereas a despatch relating to Field Operations is ^{intended} of course, if the operations are of sufficient importance, often published in the London Gazette.

In paragraph 171 of the Regulations it is laid down that despatches relating to field operations should not contain reference to previous correspondence. Your despatch under reply does contain such a reference, mentioning in paragraph 2 your despatch No. 97 of the 3rd of March, 1908, which dealt with the political aspect of the expedition.

and

and which I should not regard as suitable for publication in the ordinary course.

Paragraph 123 of the Regulations provides that the name of an officer or soldier whom it is desired to recommend for reward must be mentioned with commendation in the covering despatch of the Governor, as well as in the report of the Officer Commanding the Operations. In his letter of the 19th of March, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay furnishes a long list of recommendations for individual reward, but none of these recommendations are mentioned in your covering despatch, either by way of support or dissent. You also have not expressed your opinion, which would be indispensable for any consideration of the proposal, on the recommendation made by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay that the Africa General Service medal should be granted for the operations.

DRAFT.

4. If I am right in thinking that ^{what is the} the operations to be considered with a view to the grant of a medal or of individual rewards, the best course would be that the operations should be included in any general despatch which you may write concerning such minor fighting in 1908 as is contemplated in paragraph 172 of the Regulations of the King's African Rifles. It would seem that, successful as the operations were from the political point of view, they were not either in point of arduousness, danger, or intrinsic importance, such as to demand a separate despatch relating to Field Operations. In suggesting to you that they should be included in a general despatch relating to such operations, I must not be understood to express any opinion as to the probability of a medal or of any individual rewards, either granted in connexion with them. this is a matter

which

which must be carefully discussed with the
Army Council *reference*
~~the~~ Office with a view to the relative im-
portance and cost of these operations from
a military point of view in comparison with
similar operations undertaken in East Africa
and other Colonies and Protectorates.

I have, &c.

Gov./15165/1909.

East Africa Protectorate.

DRAFT.EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATEConf.The Officer Administering
the Government ofThe East Africa Protectorate,
MINUTE.

Mr. Butler. Sir,

Mr. *Maule*Mr. Just. *J.*

Mr. Antrobus.

Mr. Cox.

Sir O. Lucas.

Sir F. Hopwood.

Col. Seely.

The Earl of Cromer.

Hand 23078

Downing Street,
Gran 14 May, 1909.

With reference to Sir J. Hayes Sadler's Confidential despatch No. 28 of the 1st April, 1908, I have the honour to request that you will furnish me with a report upon the present condition of the Kisiicountry, describing particularly what prospect there is that the ^{1/2} pacific effect) by the military operations which took place early in 1908 will ^{1/2} result in a permanent and well degree of effective administration. Such a prospect has not actually been attained.

I have, etc.,

(Ed.) CREWE.

Gov./15165/1909

East Africa Protectorate

DRAFT

UGANDA. Confidential.

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE. Conf.

Downing Street,

The Officers Administering
The Government of

14 May, 1909.

Iron

MINUTE.

- Mr. Butler. Sir,
- Mr. *May*
- Mr. Just. *J*
- Mr. Antrobus. *A*
- Mr. Cox. *C*
- Sir C. Lucas. *L*
- Sir F. Hopwood. *H*
- Col. Seely.
- The Earl of Crewe.

I have the honour to transmit to you for your consideration, the enclosed copy of *the* Regulations which have been drawn up for use in Northern Nigeria with regard to the control of expeditions, patrols, and escorts, and the duties of the troops generally in specified circumstances.

2. It has been found possible to adopt these rules almost in their entirety for use *in Northern Nigeria* and the Gold Coast, and I should be glad if

provisions for the control of expeditions, patrols, and escorts in Northern Nigeria
29/5/09
copy to be kept with

Gov./15165/1909
East Africa Protectorate

DRAFT

UGANDA Confidential

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE Conf.

Downing Street

The Officers Administering
The Government of

14 May, 1909.

MINUTE.

Mr. Butler. Sir,

Mr. *Mayer*

Mr. Just. *for the*

Mr. Antrobus. *of*

Mr. Cox. *instructions*

Sir C. Lucas. *of*

Sir F. Hopwood. *of*

Col. Seely. *of*

The Earl of Crewe. *of*

I have the honour to transmit to

you, for your consideration, the enclosed copy

of Regulations which have been drawn up for

use in Northern Nigeria with regard to the

control of expeditions, patrols, and escorts,

and the duties of the troops generally in

specified circumstances.

2. It has been found possible to adopt

these rules almost in their entirety for use

in a similar manner in Southern Nigeria

and the Gold Coast, and I should be glad if

for the control of expeditions, patrols, and escorts in the N. Nigeria
of the N. Nigeria

Mr

12
011

for

2 d/1/2

you would consider whether they cannot be adapted to the requirements of the ^{United} States Protectorate. Certain ^{modifications} requirements will no doubt be necessary in order to meet local conditions and I should be glad if you would transmit to me a revised draft, embodying such alterations ~~of this kind~~ as you may deem indispensable.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) CREWE.