

EAST AFRICA

13536

1910  
8 April

S. A. Abyssinian Frontier

Send copy to be addressed to the Ministry  
at Addis Ababa resp. employment of the Zaphira  
& copy of instructions issued to officers in charge  
of Northern East resp. administration of border.

Mr Butler

Although not mentioned in the first despatch  
I observe that in (about) Ilwilyne and  
P. L. Kichpatichie some modern - simultaneous  
occupation of Afjwada and the Abyssinian  
frontier is contemplated. This is a question  
of the gravest military importance and  
the possible results should be fully  
weighed.

First regarding the occupation of Afjwada -  
Putting altogether aside the question of whether  
the advance would be effected or not  
about which is the opinion of those best  
qualified to judge (i.e. about Genl  
Captain Sakhelid, (Genl Mackay lately  
Commander of 5th Bn. The Zaphira) <sup>there is considerable doubt</sup> some military  
responsibilities must be largely incurred

To the Comd 2 June  
Copy/Dir. 3 March 1910  
but the  
referred to  
March

14115

Collier  
No 26407

and our freedom of action in dealing with  
the Sokoland Swahis will be gone.  
Aparanda as Captain Sahlsted points out

is the most important  
EAT  
20700/09  
nature and grazing area in Southern  
Sokoland, when this we shall be  
in direct touch with the Muhammed  
Zakari section of the Swahis who  
whom we have been hostile to us  
Although they may profess friendship for  
us when we do not interfere with  
them, it may be a different matter  
when we are trying to administer  
them and it would be folly not  
to have a sufficient force at Aparanda  
to hold the area, and also a reserve  
by which such a force could be  
employed if necessary. In Colonel  
Gough's scheme EAT  
30000/09  
the force to be sent is necessary to  
deal with the whole Sokoland  
of actively hostile, and in this a  
force of 2000 men is laid down.  
Although one hopes that operations  
in this area may never be  
necessary, it is as well to face  
the possibility.

In view of the despatch to the  
Govt dated 16<sup>th</sup> July 1909, I hope I  
am correct in thinking that no  
further work will be made  
until detailed proposals which

Govt  
20700

110  
should necessarily embrace a fullment  
the military situation has been fully  
considered.

2. Regarding the occupation of posts on the  
Ugandan frontier this appears to be  
the first time since Major Gwynne's  
proposal in 1908 EAT  
6401 that the  
matter has been considered from the  
military point of view, or that any  
local military opinion has been  
taken.

It is clear that it has been decided to  
exercise effective control over the  
southern frontier. It is not however  
clear how this is going to be carried  
out. If it is deemed to be necessary  
control the frontier I do not see how  
a smaller force than that laid down  
by Colonel Sahlsted & Kitchener  
can suffice, and in this I am  
supported by previous military  
opinion. Captain Brand in 1903 laid  
down a force of 350 men  
Major Gwynne 300 men EAT  
6401.

These forces must obviously be based  
on some place past the Seraple.  
At the present time we have a detachment  
at Mayala, 350 miles from Nairobi  
and one 500 miles from Yandi.  
There is also one at Marsabit 250 miles  
from Nairobi, these detachments are

is  
to  
be  
considered  
a  
proposal  
EAT  
6401

as they will at 30 miles or of course  
totally incapable of forming more than  
a general guard for the Political  
officers, and if any trouble broke  
out would perhaps be able to  
withstand under these circumstances  
the last part of the instructions  
to Officers of the Frontier  
District as to dealing with great  
numbers of men heavily with  
the Government would probably  
be taken at their own value by  
the insurgents.

Our policy of frontier control over  
the northern boundary of E.A.P. has  
now been definitely decided  
on and I consider that the  
time has arrived when the  
Govt might be asked to  
submit a definite scheme as  
to the troops he proposes to  
employ how salaries will be  
paid out when the troops  
will be furnished from the  
Government. <sup>effect of</sup> <sup>absence of</sup> <sup>restrictions</sup>  
as reasons why modifications  
could not be made afterwards.  
If that point was not considered  
now there is a great danger of  
our finding out too late in the  
future that our responsibilities  
have outgrown our means.  
At the present time and given the

next few years our dealings with the Somalis  
and other tribes will be completely unaided  
not only in this country but in  
Africa, and it is therefore especially  
important to ensure that if an offer  
of assistance is made we are in a  
position to carry it out.

J.H. May 1909

W. Read

Subaland

As I read your despatch of the  
10<sup>th</sup> of July 1909 on <sup>Govt</sup> <sup>20750/109</sup> the Govt is  
clearly required to furnish the S. of B.  
with his views on the whole situation in  
Subaland before any appreciable  
forward movement is made. <sup>Two</sup> Small  
sums of £200 have been allowed to  
be placed in the Estimates for the current  
year for temporary stations at  
Afmadu and Bardera, but this does  
not exonerate the Govt from his plain  
duty of consulting the S. of B. and

Obtaining his full consent before any  
thing in the nature of an attempt to  
occupy Jibaland effectively is  
understandable. It might be well for  
safety's sake to request the Lt Col  
on despatch of the 10th July 1909  
to say that the 3rd is awaiting  
his report on the situation in  
Jibaland, & that of course no forward  
move will be made until he has  
received & considered that report.

2. The Abyssinian boundary.

It is the settled policy to exercise  
effective control over the district in the  
neighbourhood of the boundary as  
opportunities presents itself. This does  
not necessarily mean that a system of  
effective control will spring into being  
full grown forthwith. That would involve  
an expenditure and possibly an  
expansion of the military force of the  
R. which could not at present be

undertaken. There must be many  
steps before the full system is reached.

The local military advisers of the  
Col have laid before him this estimate  
of military requirements for contemplating  
effective occupation, the other contemplating  
an occupation. The observation only.  
The Lt Col has very definitely, and  
I think very wisely, chosen the  
latter <sup>policy, and accepted the same</sup> estimate as sufficient for  
the purposes which he had immediately  
in view. These are reasons which are  
for observation of the frontier. The  
military arrangements described in  
his instructions to the officer in charge  
are <sup>adequate</sup> those which his military advisers  
have put forward as sufficient for a  
occupation of this nature.

421

I think, therefore, that there is no  
need to fear that the present military  
dispositions are inadequate for <sup>present</sup>  
purposes. How soon those purposes may  
become amplified and complicated



another question, which the answer to which depends perhaps more on events in the frontier district than on the intentions of the Govt. It might be advisable therefore, in approving generally of the instructions to the officer in charge of the policy indicated here, being adhered to for the present to remind the Govt of the possibility that unforeseen events might force us to (making it quite clear that the S. of B trusts <sup>that</sup> they will not, & is not offering the Govt on to a more active policy), & to enquire, as at A in Volume Designer's minute, what dispositions he could make with his existing resources to meet such a contingency.

A copy of this despatch & its enclosure should go to the Govt & the S. of B. (12)

W.P.B.

May 12.

As per order. Passed as proposed by W.P.B.

Mr. Read  
See now the attached memo  
of Col. Theissen. The view of the very  
strong attitude which he takes in  
draft has been prepared on the  
line of as first minute rather  
than in mine. We cannot afford  
to neglect so strong a warning from  
a military adviser. The point I  
wished to make was that we must  
assume, until the contrary is  
proved that the Govt on whom the  
responsibility lies, and who is the  
first to suffer if it is neglected,  
has considered adequately the

Mr. Read

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responsibility lies, and who is the  
first to suffer if it is neglected,  
has considered adequately the

military as well as the other  
requirements of the situation  
The reply to Her despatch - now  
drafted should enable the Sd's  
to judge whether he has done so  
on part of Colonel. The reply is satisfied  
with the draft and is ordered  
to be also.

m. G. G.  
20750/09

H. B.

May 25

Sir I have read

with interest the account of the  
strong warning, the time is  
no longer before us but the  
business to military part of the question  
20750, believe me for the rest, in fact  
20750

P. 29

20750

Colonel [Name] Lt [Name]

Mr. [Name]

I had a talk with Mr. Zaphire yesterday. He outlined me as to the present position of the Abyssinian frontier, and I described to him the posts of observation which, as explained in the enclosure on 12/24, have been established on the frontier. I do not wish to say that Mr. Zaphire speaking with me, would have been able to give any information prevailing on the frontier, but he did say a few words particularly. He said that it was all right, well, as far as the frontiers were concerned, but he could not carry matters with a military force to the narrow gradually and simply report matters to head quarters. This could be done with no loss of prestige to the administration. He thought, however, that the case could be easily different with a British officer supported with regular troops of the Protectorate. The natives would certainly be afraid of having their difficulties then understood before a British officer, and would expect him to pronounce upon them. They would expect him to see to it that any conclusion at which he arrived was given effect to by the parties concerned. There would, he thought, be difficulties with the Abyssinians. He (Mr. Zaphire), if he found a party of Abyssinians or raiders crossing a border could remonstrate with them and endeavour to turn them back; if he succeeded, well and good; if not, he could let them proceed on their way and report to head quarters the fact that they were beyond his control. The British officer could not do this, he would be bound at any cost to stop foreigners carrying arms crossing into the territory for which he was responsible.

Mr. [Name]

Mr. Zaphiro, in fact, saw no half-way house between the irregular and ~~more~~ or less unrecognised sort of influence which he has been endeavouring to exercise for some years past ~~in~~ <sup>and</sup> effective occupation supported by adequate military forces. He was of the opinion that the posts of observation could only lead to a state of affairs which would shortly result in the necessity for such occupation.

I feel it is only right to put this on record, because it ~~comes~~ <sup>suffice</sup> so strongly, from the mouth of a man who is better qualified to speak than anyone else on the subject, of the attitude taken up by Colonel Theisger in his minutes on this paper. I still think that the Governor cannot fail to have contemplated these possibilities, and I still hope that we shall find, when we get the reply to our despatch of the 2nd June, that he is ~~fully~~ prepared with an answer on all points. In the mean time I do not think that we can do any more than we have done by asking ~~that~~ the questions put in our despatch of the 2nd June, which will indicate to the Governor that the Secretary of State is anxious to be satisfied that the military ~~possibilities~~ <sup>responsibilities</sup> created by the presence of an officer of the regular administration on the frontier have been fully realised.

*and 24 - 4 Light Cavalry*  
In the intelligence report from Moyah, just received the following extract appears:  
"I proceeded with Capt Barrett to Moyah with 17 Rifles D Coy & 13 A Coy leaving Moyah on February 26th and returning"

March 27th The Samalis were ordered to withdraw from Wajir but neglected to obey the order, a party of men were detailed to go with Captain Bennett and about 200 camels were seized. The Samalis at once left the vicinity of the wells and were reassembled within 2 days, when they returned however after the departure of the patrol.

Although this incident may lead to nothing, it bears out what Mr. Zaphiro says about the practical impossibility of our being able to hold along from tribal disputes -

217 June 28th

4-2 28/VI

I agree with Mr. Douglas that we must avoid a reply to our despatch of June 27. Any information obtained since especially which might be of some future value should be sent in official communication.

Tyler 28/6

28/6



To Father

See 7 returned loc. 1 and

letter.

- (a) You write in a... authority
- (b) The Read writes without names
- (c) (if you think there is a risk of trouble) you leave it alone

WLB

12/7

as Mr Read has  
 already told Sir R.  
 Groomard in a private  
 letter that he & B.  
 is not happy about the  
 position in the papers  
 only 13 we take course (c)

MEMORANDUM on Military aspect of  
Southern Abyssinian Boundary Question.

On Gov/E.A.P./13834 I brought some points forward dealing with the above subject, and my excuse for writing further on the matter is that from the subsequent minutes I am afraid I did not bring out clearly of what vital importance a correct appreciation of the Military situation appears to me at the present time. I have not the slightest wish to appear in any way to question the policy which is now an accomplished fact, but I consider it my duty that, as far as our meagre information goes, the Government should be kept fully informed of the military aspects of the case, so that we may minimise the undoubted risks we are running of incurring large military expenditure.

I attach herewith a short summary of the papers dealing with the question since November 1909 in order to facilitate reference.

It will be observed that throughout this correspondence the whole question of the military requirements has received but little attention, and it is not until the Governor's despatch of the 8th April 1910 (13834) that any military opinion is received from those on the spot. In this despatch the Governor encloses a Memorandum drawn up by the Officer Commanding Troops but makes no comment thereon in his covering despatch, and yet the whole success of the policy hinges directly on how far we can enforce our will on a country which is termed in one despatch The Alsatia of the Northern Frontier, and in which the state of lawlessness and warfare is described on page 7 of

Major

Major Gwynn's report (4551) -

3. Mr. Butler states in his minute that "The Governor has very definitely and I think very wisely chosen the policy of observation only"

I contend that by establishing political officers and regular troops on the frontier such a policy becomes to all intents and purposes an impossibility, we are bound to interfere with intertribal disputes and to prevent as far as possible Abyssinian raiding.

Reading through the correspondence it seems clear that effective occupation at as early a date as possible, is the intention, and its advisability is insisted on by the Governor, Major Gwynn and Mr. Theisiger. See especially despatches in 40787, 4098 and 4501. Major Gwynn in his report says "It seems in dealing with the Abyssinians to be futile and iniquitous to enter into discussions as to frontiers unless we are prepared to provide protection for the inhabitants of the country we claim."

(7789)

It is impossible in considering the subject to ignore the Jubaland question. When we have occupied posts at SARANLI and DOLO we shall be brought into direct touch with the Somalis, and both Major Gwynn and Mr. Theisiger are agreed as to the necessity for disarming the Verihan and also as to the difficulty of regular military operations against them. Vide page 33 Major Gwynn's report and Mr. Theisiger's Memorandum to Captain Barrett page 3; it follows therefore that although as Mr. Butler states the Governor may have rejected the simultaneous occupation of Afmadu, such

an occupation may be forced upon us at any time and it certainly cannot be left out of our calculations. I regret I cannot agree therefore that there is no fear of the present military dispositions being inadequate and that we should wait for events to shape themselves and then act accordingly. This might be possible if we were talking about a comparatively settled and known country, with means of communication, supplies and an adequate striking force at hand; it might also be comparatively safe if we were dealing with unwarlike and badly armed tribes, but in this case where we have to consider possible enemies both warlike and well armed (the Merihan are reported to have 1000 rifles) and where the question of reinforcements is a matter of weeks and possibly months such a policy is inviting disaster.

I attach herewith a report written by Major Pope Hennessy, this report is undated and is written some years ago. Although of course certain facts especially as regards the general military situation in the Protectorate have changed, in the main it applies equally now as it did then. I would especially invite attention to the remarks by him as to the importance of arid selection of a base. Its importance can scarcely be over-rated. I can find no record that this question has received any attention and yet our whole military position may ultimately depend on whether we have chosen wisely or not.

What now seems to me of urgent necessity is a scheme for the establishing of a properly constituted Frontier Force under the command of a senior officer.

The

*Mrs. Robert ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...*

The fact of having such a scheme need in no way bind us down or force our hands, it can be pieced together bit by bit. It must be borne in mind that putting aside all question of military operations, there are many points requiring settlement in peace time. There will be the supply and transport questions relief and furnishing of officers, tribes composing the force and many other such like minor points. It is clear that such a scheme cannot at this period provide for every point, we have not sufficient information about the country, but we can obtain a framework. Whatever strength is ultimately decided on, whether it be more or less than the 300 suggested by Major Gwynn or the 350 by Captain Macd it must obviously create an entirely new situation in the K.A.R. Such a scheme must clearly emanate from East Africa where the conditions are best known. I am afraid it must necessarily involve increased expenditure but it is better to face this fairly than to be forced to spend large sums by being unprepared.

I have perhaps written somewhat strongly for one with no experience of the country but I feel that the question is one on which a right or a wrong decision may have far-reaching consequences on our future military requirements in the Protectorate.

*[Signature]*  
 (Sd/-) G. H. ... Colonel  
 I. C. King African Rifles

Colonial Office  
 May 23, 1910.



Summary of File of Administrative Proposals from  
November 1911 to May 1912.

of File A  
received.  
Nov. 1911  
111.

Governor in preparing to supersede Zephiro sug-  
gests stations at Meru, Marsabit, Fort Harrington  
Lake for Captain Palmer, V.I.R.

Answered by telegram. Will consider proposals when  
received by despatch. Palmer's seconding will be  
asked for.

November  
115

Major Gwynn line to be accepted. F.N.G. was  
consulted on this point.

December  
134

Foreign Office asks whether British East Africa have  
yet been able to make any arrangements for safeguarding  
and administering the frontier.

December  
1787

Despatch from Governor East Africa Protectorate  
proposes boundaries of District. Lake Rudolf on the  
west. Abyssinia on the north. The Coast Strip and  
Meru on the south. Eastern boundary to be settled  
later when effect of new stations established there can  
be gauged. Four stations primarily necessary; Seyale  
Fort Harrington - Marsabit, with base and headquarters  
at Meru.

Policy to work through the chiefs, prevent Abyssinians  
raiding and control and encourage importation of live  
stock.

livestock.

Post at Fort Barrington and patrols in general should be thinka be found by King's African Rifles. Establishment of strict control is of immediate necessity and will have far reaching and beneficial results.

Letter to Treasury stating - Time has come for more effective control. General approval given but detailed estimates to be furnished.

Letter from British Legation Adis Ababa stating that Captain Aylmer will remain with King's African Rifles until a fresh lot of Abyssinians can be recruited. Answered Frontier officers will receive their orders from East Africa Protectorate.

Zanbird granted 3 months' leave.

Mr. Theodor informed by Foreign Office that arrangements for permanent administration of frontier not yet definitely settled.

Despatch from Governor. He understands that Government approve generally but requires fuller financial details. He assumes that the points which were need for frontier administration will be effectively occupied and garrisoned. Inclines to think that three posts will be sufficient for the present, Dolo, Fort Barrington and one between western extremity of the line. Patrols will be established. Marsabit must be regarded

regarded as the advanced base for the whole with Meru on which to fall back. Levy a tax on Rendile. Apart from transport no additional expenditure in excess of estimates for 1910-11 anticipated. Frontier patrols should be furnished by King's African Rifles. Shall be amply repaid if we can exercise efficient control along the frontier.

Letter to Treasury asking for approval for expenditure £3000.

24th February  
1908  
Despatch from Mr. Theisiger about replacing King's African Rifles <sup>by</sup> Abyssinians. Sent to Governor saying Abyssinian irregulars most suitable for patrol work.

25th February  
1908  
Despatch Foreign Office to Mr. Theisiger saying arrangements now being made by East Africa Protectorate will ensure the protection of the tribes on the British side of the frontier.

In Major Gwynne's report page 7 note his remarks re the Somalis also on page 26 re the Garra tribe

27th February  
Question of post in Turkana country. Brought forward in private letter from Lieutenant Colonel Llewellyn.

1st March  
Despatch to Governor approving of his proposals contained in 3998.

4th March  
1899  
Despatch from Mr. Theisiger to Captain Barrett in which he proposes for the first few years only settle-

ment

1233  
settlement of tribal quarrels and mild taxation, this  
would establish British prestige. Necessary to disarm  
Merhan, punitive measures probably necessary, they  
have about 1000 rifles. Proposes a sudden raid by  
irregulars to be paid by loot obtained. Proposes a  
distribution of the troops.

Question raised from East Africa Protectorate  
of military force required.

*This report was written by Major Pope Hennessy  
for the Board of Administration*

1891

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management  
Washington, D.C.

In Captain Ward's enclosure I traced 4,000 acres of  
harrington's reservation of the 2d. 9. Q. It is suggested  
that the safeguarding of the Anglo-Abyssinian frontier  
is of such importance as to necessitate the employment of 3  
posts at the appropriate positions of which here marked  
A, Y and Z on the accompanying map.

is not now a  
material

It is suggested that these posts be  
garrisoned with 100, 100, and 100 men, strong under  
white officers, while one British Officer should  
act as inspecting officer for the whole.

amount  
paid down 300

It is further held that this officer might be  
employed in some way to either he would be protect-  
ing from Abyssinian raids, or else to induce them  
to pay a voluntary tax in return for the pro-  
tection afforded to them.

Altho' the frontier question as a whole, of which  
the matter of posts is but a part, is still under  
consideration, it is well to submit now the  
purely military aspect of Captain Ward's proposals  
as they appear to soldiers of the post keeping in  
view their bearing on the general military situation  
in the East Africa Protectorate. The first question  
to be decided is the nature of the troops or other  
armed men to be used for the garrisons of the posts  
in question. (a) should Captain Ward's proposals  
be adopted in their entirety, or (b) another alter-  
native scheme be thought preferable.

(a)



(a) Capt. Ward's plan is to post a detachment of 30 men, 120 m.m. and 130 m.m. rifles, supervised by one British Officer. Our experience in Sudan and in East Africa of detachments of native officers only occasionally visited by a British Officer is not such as to commend this scheme to any officer Commanding a Battalion of the King's African Rifles. It has been found in both Protectorates that such detachments lose efficiency rapidly, their moral and discipline deteriorate, and the native officer in command, if of strong character, gain too great an ascendancy over their men who know him better than their British Inspecting Officer. This means possible mutiny which, so far from headquarters would be costly and difficult to suppress.

If we rule out of court the use of regulars in this matter, an alternative would be keeping with Captain Ward's scheme the employment of levies specially enlisted for the frontier garrisons. These might be either:

- (1) taken from the tribes in the immediate neighbourhood
- (2) belong to some tribes of the Protectorate
- (3) Somalis of Arab's.
- (4) little is known as yet of the pagan tribes

between L. Rudolf and the river Juba: no European has ever lived among them, or has been in a position to see them other than as a brief passage. Under these circumstances it would hardly be wise to trust them with frontier defence, or put an officer separated from support by 320 m. of little

known.

the further  
action now  
liable.

known country to confide his life to them.

(2) The Bantu material of the Protectorate has as yet to show its value against rifle fire in the ranks of the 3rd and 4th Battalions, before it is wise to trust it on a frontier which might possibly be the scene of raids by plucky and well armed Abyssinians. Though the moral effect of our posts themselves will most likely put a stop to such raids still it should not be lost sight of that their raison d'être is to stop roving bands if necessary, as a last resource by force, which points to our garrisons being men of proved courage such as Sundasse.

(3) The objections to (2) do not apply to Somali or Arabs but the employment of either of these races of bold raiders under the inevitably loose control of an inspecting officer whose eye cannot always be on them opens the way for ill treatment and general blackbelling of worse of the pagan population which they would be there to protect from similar treatment by the Abyssinians. The last state of the natives would be as bad as the first and they would naturally be prejudiced against Government and extremely unlikely to pay for a protecting force, the benefits of which to them would be questionable. Should the officer in charge of the frontier be a man of exceptional moral ascendancy over natives he would no doubt be able to overcome the difficulties above enumerated, still it would be unwise to trust to, not only, finding such a man in the first instance but to providing him with successors when on leave or promoted elsewhere. The difficulties noted are inseparable

responsible for Cap. ... (a) ...  
 ... (b) ... the only other  
 alternative viz: the holding of ...  
 regular troops who must be ...  
 Uganda Railway or the River Juba. As it is obvious  
 that a force of 350 men cannot be left en ...  
 320 miles from ... to face ...  
 enemies who though now weak can be re- ...  
 the correct selection of its base is a matter of vital  
 importance both as affecting our position for defence  
 should war take place with Abyssinia and in time of  
 peace the important questions of the cost of its  
 maintenance and regular supply. Just as should we  
 be at war on the frontier an error in our strategical  
 deployment through a wrong selection of base would  
 cost us dear in lives so in peace time it will en-  
 tail unnecessary expenditure.

There are 3 lines of approach from the ...  
 to the chain of posts proposed by Cap. ...

- (a) from the Uganda Railway via Barisio
- (b) from the Uganda Railway via Nairobi & Fort Hall
- (c) from the River Juba at Bardera.

The distances respectively of the nearest protected  
 post to them being:

- A. 324 m. to Y (Morindil)
- B. 324 m. to Y (Morindil)
- C. 314 m. to Z or 116 m. to Y.

In favour of A it is to be urged that the selection of  
 this line entails the opening up of a stretch of  
 country adjacent similar to the frontier which is now  
 so rapidly filling up with settlers. In some years  
 hence this portion of the ... any way for itself

and it is always so much the good to have a country  
 suited to Colonists opened up, though its extent is  
 as yet uncertain. This also applies to Bahr in a  
 lesser degree. The value of Gibeon is much  
 greater the more of supply along its banks to  
 of water transport as far as Bahrera goes to  
 for a the year compared to 32,000 of railway carriage  
 available from the Congo to Bahrera and the shorter  
 distance of road by the Bahrera to 401 m. as against  
 the 324 m. of A and of Bahrera. Another argument  
 in favour of Bahrera is that the advanced Bahrera  
 needs are numerous and that will be the best  
 rail supporters what to use for some 100 m. of  
 canal country is needed and a deep canal there. It  
 is clear that supply via the Juba and Bahrera  
 will be very much cheaper than via the Uganda Rly and  
 Bahrera overland. Thus the financial considerations  
 concerning the selection of a route point to its  
 being the line of the Juba.

The purely military aspect of the case cannot be  
 considered apart from that of the Protectorate as a  
 whole for as the frontier cannot be held without in-  
 creasing the garrison so a re-arrangement of the  
 present distribution will be found to enable the new  
 situation to be met in a manner to keep the increase  
 to a minimum.

At present there is in the Protectorate 10 Coy  
 distributed as follows:

*Note: The remainder of the document is out of date and the conditions have since altered. It has been reproduced as an example.*

At Nairobi 4 Coys (2 Coys at escort on road, 1 Coy at Mombasa, 1 Coy at Kisumu)

At Fort Hall 1 Coy (with 1 Coy at Fort Hall)

At Kericho 1 Coy (with 1 Coy at Kericho)

At Mandi 1 Coy (among 1 Coy at Mandi)

Juhuluwa 2 Coys Inf. at Mandi - Det. 50 at Kisumu.

1 Camel Corps at Solwen.

-----

3 Coys. I. Coy. & 1 Coy. I. Coy.

These will be shortly re-inforced by 1 Coy. (K.A. Rifles) which will probably be stationed in the Nyando Valley, giving us 14 Coys. in all.

Now our probable enemies in the Protectorate are

- (a) The Nandi and Lushai
- (b) The Ogada, Somali, and possibly
- (c) the Masai.

So we must find a re-arrangement of the detachments to free sufficient men to find these new posts without unduly weakening us against A.E.C.

To deal with (a) According to Colonel Cole's scheme, 7 Coys. of Regulars plus a Coy. of Masai and other levies are required. This scheme makes no mention of any corps of settlers who when it was drawn up had disappeared in the country in the north.

To deal with (b) 5 Coys. of Infantry and 1 A.C. plus locally enlisted irregulars have been estimated as sufficient by Major Harris at No. 10 of C. 202. A Masai rising (c) is considered by Colonel Harris and Mr Ainsworth (Sub-Commander of Mandi) unlikely but in their joint memorandum submitted dated 26.9.03 (unnumbered) it is estimated that 100

regulars



regulars would be required should such a rising take place. It is well beyond the power of the garrison of East Africa to cope with such a rising as the men are not available locally so it may be taken that in the event of grave trouble with Masai the settlers must hold their own as best they can till a strong force is produced from elsewhere. So our re-arrangement of the detachments must be such as to enable 7 Coys to be concentrated on emergency to deal with the Nandi and Lumbwa and 6 Coys to deal with the Ogaden Somalis without denuding the frontier while the garrisons should be so disposed as to admit of as many men as possible being immediately available for the passive defence of the Railway and certain settled centres against the Masai till re-inforcements arrive.

The following scheme appears to meet the requirements of the case:

If we increase the 3rd K.A. Rifles by 2 Coys we shall have 16 Coys in all to dispose of. If we place 2 in Lower Jubaland at Yonti and 5 on the Abyssinian frontier we have 9 left to garrison the line of the Railway and Kenya Province viz:

- 4 Coys. Iaco in the Nyando valley
- 4 Coys. 3rd K.A.R. Nairobi.
- 1 Coy. 3rd K.A.R. Fort Hall.

Thus 4 Coys. are concentrated to deal immediately with trouble in the Nandi-Lumbwa region, which could be re-enforced in 48 hours by 3 Coys. from Nairobi plus a levy of Masai spearmen from that neighbourhood and Naivasha, while leaving the Jubaland and frontier

garrisons

garrisons to deal with trouble there. The employment of Masai spearmen during a hand to hand fight would effectively prevent a simultaneous Masai rising when the Nairobi garrison had been weakened by the despatch of its Nyando valley re-enforcements.

6 Coys. would also be available at short notice for railway defence against (C) (as follows: 4 from Nairobi and 2 from Nyando valley).

This scheme necessitates the suppression of the detachments at Taveta and Witu-Kericho and Mandi. These posts it is submitted should be held by police as the present garrisons are too weak to hold out in the event of serious trouble in their neighbourhood until re-enforced from elsewhere: while police in well designed forts would be perfectly safe against the local natives until the arrival of a properly organised punitive column. The 7 Coys. thus freed for the land and the frontier would be best disposed as follows:

1 Coy. at X.

1 Coy. at Y.

1 Coy. and the Camel Corps at El Wak patrolling regularly towards Z or keeping a standing patrol there of C.C.

1 Coy. at Harera to cover the advanced base for the frontier.

2 Coys. at Yombete cover the frontier against an Ogaden raid at the outbreak of hostilities with that tribe.

In the event of trouble with the Ogaden a column based on El Wak or Harera and moving towards Z would produce more effective results than a superior force

moving

moving inland from the sea. The first force we  
should be driving the enemy away from the unknown  
winterland on to the frozen portland by our Healy  
levies and the Yonah garrison and then occupy their  
main dry weather water supply, Afradu, when an in-  
crease shall we advance to that point from Afradu  
leaving all Africa open to them to retire into their  
prisons. This scheme does not preclude us from  
later being collected as King of the D.K.A.R.  
brought round by Rail and ship to get us a stop  
if the drive should have been started or, if landed at  
Port Jernard, leaving the enemy to break into  
Spain and attacking the Abnidian trade there. It  
is admitted that in peace time the moral effect  
of holding the frontier with a force of our soldiers  
and the safe way so in rear of our position  
the Jutuland Ogden, is more likely to make them  
keep the peace than to suppress distributions  
only with us their front leaving their rear unprotected  
while should hostilities occur the scheme admitted  
gives us considerable strategical advantage over that  
which our present distribution imposes upon us.  
If our base on a canal country such as that on the  
line of the Jutuland Ogden, or on the coast, or on  
consequently under such one base a non canal  
producing over Jute-Kissayd line to which, unless for  
an expedition could give to be unproductive. It is  
admitted that in peace time the moral effect  
necessary mobility could be secured.

Another

Another argument in favour of fixing the frontier posts on the line of the Juba is that the banks of that River are fertile, we know that foodstuffs can be raised in quantities in the Gosha District and it is reported that the cereals grown in the land above Bardiya could alone support the garrison, while what little we know of the Barigo-Karodil and Korodil-Koft Hall routes leads us to suppose that were inhabited it is only by the local grounds.

This alone considerably affects the question of expense in favour of Bardiya as a proposed base. In conclusion it is submitted that while policy purposes of us the necessity of holding the frontier, if at all only with a force of regular troops, that both strategic and financial considerations point to that force being based on Bardiya and the line of the Juba.

If organized as a "Frontier Province" the number of officers with the garrison would enable a small staff to be formed (as now in Jubaland) to carry on the simpler forms of administrative work by introducing the elements of law and order into a district which now knows neither and even by collecting taxes reduce to some extent the cost of the maintenance of frontier posts entails.

The financial gain to be derived from the post at Bardiya diverting trade to Kismayu, its natural outlet and away from the Italian Benadir ports is too obvious to need further mention and outside the province of this Memorandum.

(s.d) H. Pope Hennessy  
Major  
Int. Off 3rd K.A.R.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
NAIROBI,  
BRITISH EAST AFRICA

April 8th 1910.

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE.

Confidential (37).

(Encl. 3.)

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a telegram, which I despatched to H.B.M. Minister Adis Ababa on receipt of Your Lordship's despatch Confidential of 21st February last respecting Mr. Waphire's retention, and of instructions which I have issued to the Officers in Charge, Northern District.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that I have expressed upon all officers concerned the necessity for avoiding complications with Abyssinia at the present juncture.

3. When Mr. Hope returns from his visit of inspection to Marsabit and Moyale I shall be in a position to

address

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE,

THE EARL OF CREW, K.G.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

Instructions  
Distribution of  
Copies.  
Telegram  
from 25th

address Your Lordship more fully on the whole question.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's humble,

obedient servant,

*W. Pitt Rivers*  
GOVERNOR.

1891  
1034

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General Order

Copy of the following orders are hereby forwarded  
 Office Despatches No. 100 of 1891 to the  
 Adjutant General's Office for transmission to  
 the several Districts.

It is desired that the attention of the several Districts  
 Adjutant Generals be called to the fact that  
 Colonel Kirkpatrick, and other officers are to be  
 relieved. Until I receive further instructions  
 from you, after your visit to the several  
 Districts, it is your opinion that the several Districts  
 should be carried out, these instructions are  
 sufficient for the purposes I have outlined in previous  
 instructions.

You will note from my despatch to the Adjutant General  
 the employment of Mr. Karpis is proposed, with a certain  
 number of irregulars. I leave it to your discretion as  
 to the sum or in which he should be employed if he  
 accepts an appointment.

You will note that the proposals of the Adjutant  
 General involve the substitution of the Adjutant  
 General by a camel corps. What is immediately  
 proposed is the following:

Lieutenant Booth, with Lieutenant ... will  
 proceed at once to meet you. Lieutenant ... will  
 follow. Captain Lely of ... Lieutenant ...  
 proceeding with you to ... Mr. Archer to ...  
 taking with him sufficient escort to ensure the peaceful  
 return of the Abyssinian section of King's African Rifles  
 now stationed at Moyale under Captain Aymer. At ...

by

by Lieutenant Saunders, Captain Aymer will proceed with  
the Abyssinian section, and the escort brought up from by  
Lieutenant Saunders, to Nairobi with the utmost despatch.  
I presume that you with Mr. Archer will return to  
Marsabit with Captain Aymer. As soon as possible 2  
sections of the Camel Corps, 30 men in each, will proceed  
from Jubaland to the northern frontier district and be  
at your disposal. 2 sections will accompany this force.  
They will relieve the remaining section at Marsabit  
will then proceed as may be directed. As I outline at  
present, you will then have available 2 sections of camel  
corps and a section of irregulars with Mr. Saphire, and it  
will be for you to determine where they should be  
stationed to effect the general purposes I have laid down  
for observation of the frontier.

You will understand clearly that in the present  
condition of affairs in Abyssinia which you will gather  
from the despatched telegram that it is most undesirable  
that you should in any way exceed the instructions  
forwarded to you now or heretofore.

It is impossible for me to set in any way upon  
Captain Barrett's various reports, as the matter must be  
left in your hands to determine finally.

If time allows, I would propose myself to visit  
Marsabit and Bayale in the course of the summer. I shall  
hope however to receive reports from you on the whole  
situation, and your recommendations, before I leave  
Nairobi.

With reference to communications with Adis Ababa, you  
will please arrange in terms of my earlier message to H.M.  
Minister. There is of course of course some only as  
matters which might affect the Abyssinian, but it would  
be well for you to inform H.M. Minister, if this is

gained



signed thereby, of all your proposals with regard to frontier stations and the employment of Mr. Zambire. Copies of all communications which you may have with Adis Ababa must invariably be sent to Headquarters.

I would not propose to hinder you in any way as to the choice of stations or as to your own Headquarters. It is for you to make your own recommendations after you have fully considered the whole situation.

The retention of Mera within the Northern frontier district is also left for your recommendation.

Estimates should accompany your reports.

I have already wired to you that you are now to consider yourself as an independent unit corresponding direct with Headquarters.

Copies of all instructions forwarded to you will be sent to Adis Ababa, and there will therefore be no necessity for your communicating with regard to instructions you may receive from Headquarters.

I feel the desirability of your exercising wise and discretionary powers in judicial matters which, as you will see from the correspondence forwarded to you, were entrusted to Mr. Zambire.

You may exercise in so far as necessary or desirable the powers of a first Class Magistrate, but doubtless occasions will arise when you will have to act extra-judicially, and I shall be quite prepared to support you in any measures you may adopt, but you should report all such cases of executive action.

I would particularly impress however the desirability of great caution and vigilance in the immediate dealings with the Abyssinians within our border and of offenders being handed over invariably to the Abyssinian authorities to be dealt with.

Sd/- L. P. C. CIRQUARD  
20-3-10

ABYSSINIAN FRONTIER, GARRISONING OF  
GASBO

(a) In the event of an effective occupation being contemplated simultaneous with the occupation of Afaska and Soronli

Kidwayu	1 Coy. Infy.	3rd K.A.R.
Afaska	1 do.	do.
(Military headquarters)	1 Section Camel Corps	
Soronli	1 do.	do.
Dolo	1 do.	do.
Moyali	1 do.	do.

Total 4 Companies 3rd K.A.R. Rifles.

(b) In the event of the occupation being merely one of observation, (with no intention of enforcing compliance with our orders) the garrison required would only act as personal escorts to the P.O. stationed on the frontier and it would appear sufficient if the troops were allotted in the following manner:-

With the P.O. at Moyali	30 C.C.	3rd K.A.R. (Camel Corps)
do. Dolo	30	do.
do. Soronli	30	do.

To be furnished from the present garrison in Gubana.

NOTE:

In either event the Military force at Moyali is unnecessary and should be abolished.

SECRET  
450  
MARCH 20th 1901

THE SECRETARY

PARIS APRIL 1901

Your despatches to the effect of the 10th January  
also 10th 21st Jan. I. G. A. ...  
Secretary of State for the Colonies ...  
dated 21st February ...  
In your despatch 10th January ...  
in the ...  
An ...  
administrative ...  
in charge of ...  
also number of ...  
establish observation stations ...  
Novate, ...  
Office in charge ...  
deal ...  
Abyssinia in order ...  
so. I trust this will meet your requirements.

Downing Street,

29<sup>th</sup> May, 1910.

Sir,

DRAFT

AFRICA PROTECTORATE

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNOR  
COLONEL SIR E.P.C. GIROUARD,  
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.  
ac ac ac  
MINUTE.

- A.C.C.P. 19/5
- Colonel Thesiger 15
- Mr. Butler 25
- Mr. Read 25
- Mr. Piddis 25
- Mr. Just.
- Mr. Cox.
- Sir O. Lucas.

\* Sir F. Hopwood, *John 26.5*

- \* Col. Seely.
- \* Lord Crewe.

*Handwritten note:* 2

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential despatch (37) of the 8th April 1910, relating to on the Southern Abyssinian frontier, and enclosing a copy of instructions issued to the officer in charge. While approving generally of your

adhering to the policy indicated in these instructions, I would observe that the time has now arrived when a definite scheme, in so far as it affects military requirements, should be drawn up and submitted for approval.

It is clear that the posts which you have authorized for the present, which I understand to be 30 men at Bolo, Moyai and

Senonli respectively, can do little more than act as personal escorts to the

*Handwritten note:* important that the... should read.

*Handwritten notes:* Copy Dmd 3 Nov. 29/10

the

the Political officers, and that in order  
 to carry out the policy outlined in your *confidential*  
 despatch of the 22nd November, 1909, a *(100767/12)*  
 considerably larger force will be re-  
 quired. It is also clear that unfore-  
 seen events might compel you to adopt  
 a more vigorous policy, and it will  
 therefore be necessary to consider the  
 question of reinforcing these posts.

The scheme should show definitely what  
 troops you would propose to employ, and  
 whence they would be furnished. The  
 question of supply and transport *should also be dealt with,*  
*as it is to be*  
*anticipated* this will be a matter of  
 considerable difficulty. The effect on  
 other portions of the Protectorate of  
 withdrawing troops must naturally be  
 taken into consideration.

3. It is of course unnecessary for  
 me to inform you that *in making this statement*  
 I have no desire  
 to urge the adoption of a more active  
 policy

policy than that indicated in your in-  
 structions to the Officer in command of the  
 Northern Frontier District, or that I  
 trust that there may be no occasion to  
 carry out *special* *of other*  
 the measures which would be  
*required*  
 required in such a contingency but I am  
 of opinion that it is very desirable to be  
 fully prepared to meet any emergency  
 that may arise out of the occupation of  
 this district.

I have, etc.