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Chapter 3

NEPAD's resource mobilisation strategy: the gender dimensions

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Introduction

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the most current in a long series of blueprints and policy frameworks aimed at laying the foundation for a viable path for Africa's socio- economic development. Hailed as the Marshal Plan for Africa, NEPAD purports to do what its predecessors such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio Economic Recovery and Transformation (1989) and the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) failed to do. At the international level, NEPAD has generally been embraced as a good model for international cooperation and implementation of economic and political reforms in Africa along a neo-liberal path closely linking the restoration of good governance to development.

On the African continent, NEPAD has received mixed reception, with the state managers fully endorsing it and even rapidly moving towards its implementation. Some non-state civil society sectors on the other hand, have reacted with a sense of anger and feeling of betrayal by their governments for literally ambushing and presenting them with a ready made document prepared without their participation and input, despite its claim to being designed and owned by African people. Radical African intellectuals and civil societies have however critiqued not only the process but also the content of NEPAD, which many view as inadequate and with a heavy neo-liberal ideology, which has already spelled disaster for Africa, in the form of

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). NEPAD's gender critics also point to its gender blindness and its failure to appreciate that any development policy that ignores the gender dimension is doomed to fail.

In addition to these reactions, most commentators have acknowledged that NEPAD objectives are basically sound and the identification and analysis of the socio-economic and political problems that require action are appropriate. However, the Action Plan and the implementation strategies continue to provoke criticism and numerous debates.

NEPAD's central goal is to eradicate poverty and in so doing help Africa to achieve sustainable growth and development. Specific goals of the initiative are based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations. Broadly speaking the goals of the NEPAD are to:

- Eradicate poverty in Africa
- Promote accelerated growth and sustainable development
- Promote the role of women in all activities
- Halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process
- Restore peace, security and stability

NEPAD envisions the implementation and promotion of Africa's developmental goals, primarily through the intensification of efforts to mobilise resources for development of the following priority sectors and areas:

- Infrastructure-especially Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and energy
- Human resources (skills development and reversal of the brain drain from the continent)
- Health
- Agriculture
- Access to markets for Africa's exports by enhancing competitiveness
- Structural diversification

A key aspect of the implementation plan involves a resource mobilisation strategy (RMS), which is two-pronged and involves:

The Capital Flows Initiative (CFI) from international sources through:

- Increasing resource mobilisation
- Debt relief
- Official Development Assistance (ODA) reforms
- Private capital flows

The Market Access Initiative (MAI) from domestic and international sources through diversification of production in:

- Mining
- Manufacturing
- Tourism
- Services
- Private sector development
- Increase in Africa's exports
- Removal of barriers to trade

The Capital Flows Initiative: An Overview

In order to appraise NEPAD's resource mobilisation strategy, it is important to understand the conceptual and ideological framework within which the strategies are proposed. The strategy is crafted in the context of an Africa which is integrated within the global economy where various forms of financial resources are assumed to exist and can be made available for Africa's development. These resources are in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA), debt relief, and private capital flows.

NEPAD envisions that most of the capital required should come from its foreign partners. In this connection, NEPAD states that there is a resource gap in Africa, and hence Africa must depend on foreign capital to fill the gap. And this, for all its intents and purposes, means capital from the highly industrialised countries. NEPAD considers debt reduction and ODA as 'complementary external resources required in the short to medium term' and addressing private capital flows as a 'long term concern'. NEPAD sets its target at an estimated 7 % annual growth rate needed to meet the millennium goals, particularly, the goal of reducing by half the proportion of Africans living in poverty by the year 2015. (NEPAD paragraph 68) 'To achieve this [growth rate] Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12% of its GDP or 64 billion dollars... the bulk of which is envisaged to be obtained from outside the continent' (NEPAD paragraph 147).

NEPAD naively expects the West to provide the required resources on moral and self interest grounds; it argues that Africa is 'an indispensable resource base that has served all humanity for so many centuries, and in this new millennium, when humanity is searching for a new way to build a better world', the West must recognise that Africa's past and present contribution place Africa"on a pedestal of equal partnership in advancing human civilisation'. The West then must help Africa to end the underdevelopment and marginalisation of the continent (paragraphs 17, 39, 204, 205). Furthermore, according to NEPAD, improvements in the living standards of the marginalised Africa offer massive potential for growth in the entire international economy, through the creation of new markets, greater stability on a global scale, accompanied by a sense of economic and social well-being.

The question however remains: What will foreign capital do that it has not been doing for all these decades? How will the flow of more foreign capital help tackle the "structural impediments, or reverse the resource outflows and unfavourable terms of trade? Indeed, is it not one kind of resource flow i.e. capital from outside, the very reason why there has been resource outflow of another kind i.e. in form of minerals and other resources, and in terms of trade that are not only not changing but also getting worse over the last 40 years and more? The Capital Flows Initiative (CFI) of NEPAD appears oblivious certain harsh realities such as the fact that in recent years Africa has only managed to attract the smallest amount of flows. It also seems to ignore the potential pitfalls for countries which rely on external private capital flows of the type which sunk most Asian countries into financial crisis in recent past. Furthermore, the danger posed by the anti-poor conditionalities attendant upon some of the forms of the finance envisioned cannot be ignored particularly in view of the central goal of NEPAD, which is to reduce poverty in line with the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations.

It is also assumed that Africa has the possibility to mobilise resources by accessing the markets of other countries in the global economy and therefore promoting its exports. This optimism is surprising given that this strategy has for over 40 years proved to be untenable.

This delusionary optimism in regard to NEPAD's international resource mobilisation strategy is based on the ideology of a new global partnership which operates on the principles of shared responsibility and mutual interest and benefits. NEPAD further views this partnership as though it were neutral. The reality however is that historically, multinational corporations and other forms of foreign capital have exploited Africa in economic relationships that were never mutually beneficial, as envisaged under the NEPAD. In view of this, NEPAD needs to recognise the fact that in a global environment where the distribution of power both economical and political is distributed unfairly between developed and less developed countries, the struggle for better terms for African goods remains a challenge which calls for African leaders to unite and challenge effectively the institutions, mechanisms and policies which continue to marginalise Africa.

Specific strategies to challenge certain institutions such as the WTO for example need to be articulated and implemented. Africa's past reliance on foreign sources of financing, as well as efforts to access the markets of industrialised countries have to date met with limited success due primarily to the unfair international trading arrangements such as those imposed under the WTO.

Statistics actually show that in the last few years, Africa has not been an attractive destination of all forms of capital flows. In view of this, sub-saharan Africa has the lowest share of foreign direct investment (FDI). It does not even compare favorably to other developing regions. For example, between 1990 and 1998, while Africa attracted FDI valued at between $843 million and $4,394 million, Latin America and the Caribbean were able to attract between $8,188 million to $69,323 million worth of FDI over the same period. Furthermore, as a group, Africa and the Middle East have received less than 10% of total FDI flows worldwide. In 1997, the stock of such investment in Africa was less than

2% of the world total. Hence most sub-saharan countries will continue to rely on bilateral and multilateral aid to finance investment projects (World Development Report 1999/2000). Similarly, in regard to overseas development assistance (ODA) flows, sub-saharan Africa received $17,449 million worth of these flows in 1993, but this declined to $14,186 million in 1998.

In view of this, any model of development which disproportionately relies on external flows for finance is unlikely to succeed and clearly overlooks or downplays the many risks associated with over reliance on external capital flows. The experience of East Asian countries is a glaring example of the potential pitfalls of such finance. Furthermore, even if Africa can hope to attract adequate international capital flows, the terms and conditions under which such financing are provided have been known to exacerbate rather than reduce poverty. Furthermore the decline in ODA is worth noting and it also raises concerns as to the wisdom of relying on these external flows to finance NEPAD. The second issue is the implication of sourcing capital from these sources given the historical challenges and problems associated with dependency. It would appear that Africa will have to engineer the new financial architecture in order to ensure that the cycle of poverty and dependency of the previous foreign aid approach does not further retard Africa's development.

NEPAD's optimism and naïve belief in the new global partnership of Africa with the international community also leads it to assume that globalisation would provide better market accessibility to African exports, as long as African countries diversified their production bases and improved value added in key sectors such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and agro-industry. Whilst the importance of promoting manufactured exports is indeed valid for Africa and previous policy documents have also underpinned the strategy, NEPAD fails to identify the major reasons why African countries have in the past failed to improve exports of manufactured goods and how the NEPAD initiative proposes to overcome these hurdles.

Commenting on NEPAD's overall resource mobilisation strategy, Moyo (2002) notes that Africa's experience since the 1970's has shown the limitations of the neo-liberal approach to development. Hence the neo-liberal ideological and conceptual underpinning behind NEPAD's resource mobilisation strategy in a global environment where power relations between Africa and the North are highly unequal, is considered unrealistic and naïve. Access to markets for Africa's goods remains limited due to barriers engineered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international mechanisms of perpetuating the status quo. Moyo therefore recommends that Africa should rely more on domestic mobilisation of resources. To do that successfully, the continent needs to identify the underlying causes behind its poor performance in terms of mobilising local resources through for example, the fiscal domestic financial and capital markets etc. The priority should be to improve governance, accountability and transparency in all spheres of central and local government, the corporate sector and community levels. However, a more inward looking approach to resource mobilisation should not be interpreted to mean total exclusion of external sources of capital. Rather, in view of the historical record, Africa needs a more selective approach, which ensures consistency with its own development agenda (Moyo 2002).

Similarly, Tandon (2002) rightly observes, 'It is sad to see how little the architects of the NEPAD document have learnt from history, or from the experiences of other countries in the third world. There is even a degree of innocent belief that FDIs will really come to Africa, that conditions of peace and security will be maintained in Africa, that deviant states like Zimbabwe will be disciplined so as not to scare FDIs away, and that no demands will be made to write off debts so as not send wrong signals to owners of the FDIs' (Tandon 2002).

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

In regard to FDI, Africa has for years received transnational capital which mainly went into large scale commercial agriculture, forestry, mining and to some extent, manufacturing in the form of extractive industries. The record of transnational corporations is well known. While they did bring a lot of technology and know-how, it is widely acknowledged that they were the net beneficiaries of the partnership. The record of FDI in Africa is one associated with transnational capital coming into Africa and benefiting from long-tax holidays, subsidies and benefits of repatriation of dividends and profits. Transnational corporations exported, and in many countries they still continue to export, primary commodities under unequal terms of trade and this has disadvantaged African economies. In this connection, although NEPAD recognizes the importance of domestic resources, it appears that greater reliance is placed on external sources of financing. The question therefore is: how does NEPAD hope to maximize returns from FDI this time around?

Debt relief

Debt relief as an element of a resource mobilisation strategy is untenable as it is largely dependent on the goodwill of the Bretton Woods institutions who determine which countries in the High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) category qualify for relief. Only a few African countries have to date been assisted (Mozambique, Uganda and Burkina Faso) due to the difficult conditions or criteria for countries to qualify and the absence of an automatic linkage between the resources thus released, and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the conditionalities associated with the implementation program under the World Bank Country Assistance Plan, have some heavy social costs.

The NEPAD architects were therefore being very naïve to expect the debt relief strategy to churn out some of the resources it required for Africa's development. As noted, above, the eligibility requirements are difficult to achieve and therefore excludes many countries which need support, while the link to poverty reduction is weak.

Market Access Initiative: (MAI)

This is both a domestic and international resource mobilisation strategy as it entails collaborative actions at national, regional and global levels. NEPAD is again being naïve here in expecting billions of resources to be churned out through the MAI.

Some of the specific actions proposed under the MAI remain too general and vague, even though the main strategy is relevant. For example, the MAI cites the need for improving terms of trade, enhancing food security, improving productivity, and improving standards. It does not offer more details on how to achieve these objectives. In order to achieve value added in key sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing), African countries have to develop and implement policies that promote processing of the output of these sectors. For example, the strategy to improve terms of trade must address and suggest how the capacity of African leaders can be enhanced in order to improve their negotiations with WTO and other multilateral trading bodies. Needless to say the current struggles of developing countries with the WTO are evidence that the international rules of the game are not fair to developing countries and therefore, a policy initiative which assumes this problem away, is naïve. NEPAD should instead be advocating strategies to educate and raise awareness within African leaders on how to negotiate for better terms at various international forums which address issues of trade agreements. This is an area of weakness.

Therefore, in order to make inroads into the MAI strategy African countries need to mobilise and unify efforts in their fight for a fairer international trading and financial system.

Revisiting the NEPAD resource mobilisation strategy: the gender dimension

About one quarter of the world's population (1.3 billion people) live in extreme poverty. Of those living in extreme poverty, about 70% are women surviving on less than a dollar a day. 17% of this category are in sub-saharan Africa. They lack the access to opportunities and services (Randriamaro 2002; Cagarty 2001).

The above statistics clearly indicate that if we take it that the main purpose for resource mobilisation is to contribute to eradication of poverty, sustainable development and economic growth, then the NEPAD resource mobilisation strategy must take into account gender relations and women's status in particular, as the latter are both agents and objects of both domestic and international resource mobilisation strategies. NEPAD needs to specifically address the central issue of women's labor, access, and control over resources in promoting women's economic empowerment in the context of a rapidly globalising economy.

Despite the fact that NEPAD identified the promotion of the role of women as one of its two major long-term objectives, surprisingly, the NEPAD reduces the implementation strategy of this objective to 'promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by developing revenue-generating activities through facilitating access to credit and participation in the political and economic life of African countries'. This clearly demonstrates a major flaw in NEPAD's approach to gender equality issues and women's economic empowerment as it wrongly assumes women's empowerment will be achieved by addressing instrumental issues related to women's income generating measures, education, training and access to credit, instead of an empowerment strategy targeted at the gender-based constraints that are intrinsically linked to women's subordination. The latter strategy is aimed at tackling the fundamental structural causes of women's poverty and inequality such as discriminating laws, cultural norms, male-biased development priorities, land reform, or male biased public expenditure, and macroeconomic policies, etc. The latter approach also recognizes that women are not passive recipients but are pro-active agents who participate and contribute to the economic life of their countries through their unpaid and uncounted work in production and reproduction.

In the context of resource mobilisation, women's agency is perhaps the most critical factor in mobilising domestic resources especially from the agricultural and informal and domestic sectors. Despite this, there is no mention of women or gender issues in the initiatives and sectors of the plan that are absolutely critical to addressing women's poverty and promoting food security and agricultural production.

In general then, the NEPAD plan is characterized by an instrumental superficial approach to the gender question which is treated merely as an after thought and a public relations exercise. As Longwe rightly observes: 'NEPAD's near complete lack of internal coherence, where principles do not follow through into goals, and goals don't follow through into objectives, the subject of gender, small to begin with, soon fades away entirely. In its little mention of gender issues the document does not acknowledge the prevalence, or even the existence, of the many serious issues of structural and institutionalised gender discrimination. The unsatisfactory attempt to formulate a gender goal in the area of gender equality and women's empowerment merely reveals the authors' implicit belief that women's subordinate position is due to their own inadequacies. So they recommend more education!'

Consistent with the gender blindness that pervades the entire NEPAD action plan for international resource mobilisation, a gender and institutional analysis of its macro economic framework shows fundamental flaws which unless corrected, will negatively affect the achievement of its stated goals regarding poverty eradication and empowerment of women and other vulnerable groups.

According to Randriamano, perhaps the most glaring evidence of the gender-blindness of NEPAD in its resource mobilisation strategy is the fact that it ignores the devastating impact on women and other vulnerable groups of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and other such policies imposed by international financial institutions. NEPAD does not make mention of the heavy burden African women still have to carry as a result of SAPs and other stabilisation measures which have led to cut backs in social services expenditure, increased taxation, reduced access to credit and productive resources among small farmers and micro enterprises, and an increase in women's domestic work load (Randriamano).

NEPAD does not also pay attention to the major trends in the global economy and the African economic experience from the 1970s, whereby women's average share in formal employment increased significantly in all regions except sub-saharan Africa. Moreover African women have been working harder and longer hours since the onset of SAPs in the early 1980s. This grim situation is likely to get worse unless the NEPAD strategy of resource mobilisation and utilisation takes into account the need to increase women's access and control over productive resources. Women's labour in formal and informal sectors including the domestic arena must be accounted for and accorded value (Randriamano; Moyo, 2002; Cagarty, 2001).

In its resource mobilisation strategy, NEPAD identifies international trade exchanges as one of the ways of mobilizing resources. This in turn requires the intensification and diversification of export-oriented production. One such export orientation strategy is often a bias towards the export-processing zones (EPZs). In general, such EPZs tend to employ more women than men precisely because such jobs are characterised by low wages, low standards of health and safety, poor workers' rights, numerous cases of violence against women, low security, and limited career opportunities. A case in point in the Kenyan context is the flower industry. The NEPAD export orientation strategy must take cognisance of these detrimental effects and incorporate legal and policy mechanisms for humanising and promoting rights in this sector.

Privatisation and Private Capital flows

While a case can be made for privatisation in some instances in Africa of once state-controlled enterprises, the privatisation of basic social services such as water, electricity, public transport and telecommunications has been widely criticised. This is because privatisation has resulted in an increase in prices beyond the capacity of many low-income consumers to pay. Privatisation also been associated with massive retrenchments of labour, which has increased unemployment levels, reduced incomes, and increased poverty.

The NEPAD privatisation plan supports a framework within which the criteria for economic policy making are financial rather than social, and short term rather than long term. There is also an assumption that the private sector only includes the formal sector. From a gender perspective, it should be noted that the exclusion of the informal sector from the definition of the private sector, where the major part of women's economic activity is located, has the effect of marginalising and rendering invisible a key element of women's economic contribution. This situation has further been aggravated by the fact that in the past, measures to promote the development of the private sector in Africa have mainly been directed at large-scale industries and ignored the small-scale sector in which the majority of women are engaged.

Privatisation also raises the issues of provision, ownership and control of global public goods and services, whose benefits accrue to all sectors of society and should therefore be equitably available to all people with equal opportunity. As such, such public goods should include water, fuel, food and shelter whose provision should be treated as a basic need and right. As such therefore, the provision of these global public goods by the state rather than the private sector is crucial. Indeed, the trend towards privatisation schemes of public utilities in Africa has to date resulted in failures in terms of performance and most importantly, in the disconnection of the poor, including a majority of women, from basic utilities, due to the fact that the poor especially women may not have the required purchasing power. Water privatisation is a case in point.

Credit is a major component of NEPAD's plan for women's economic empowerment through resource mobilisation. The plan ignores the interlocking set of disadvantages faced by the poor women, especially the political issues of community decision-making and markets. In this regard, it is critically important for NEPAD to recognise that the capacity of poor women to take independent advantage of credit remains quite limited as long as the structures of exploitation, which made them poor in the first place, are not addressed. It is also important to consider that 'credit may not be the most appropriate tool for poverty eradication among the very poor, [the majority of whom are women], without complementary access to resources necessary to convert an asset into a profitable enterprise, access to credit cannot form the basis of the longer term movement out of poverty' (Mbilinyi, 2001).

Because of its gender-blindness, NEPAD does not take into consideration the fact that gender inequalities mediate relationships between macroeconomic policies and poverty reduction strategies, and have an impact on their outcomes and growth performance. While NEPAD argues that gender inequalities are addressed at the implementation stage through the planned actions targeted at women, none of these actions addresses key issues of access to resources such as property rights. Indeed, poverty is not approached as the consequence of intersecting structural inequalities across and within nations such as those based on class, race and gender. As a result, the plan addresses the symptoms instead of the interlocking structural causes of poverty and its perpetuation (Catagay, 2001; Randriamaro, 2002).

Private Capital Flows

According to the NEPAD, the private sector is the major future engine for Africa's economic development and the only source of finance that can provide the long-term finance required for economic growth and poverty reduction. This position is based on the assumption that 'business and markets are the cornerstone of development, and are the essential means of achieving a transition from previous ODA-dependence to sustainable growth.' With regards to development financing, the objective is then to ensure that private capital flows provide 70% of external finance in the medium term and 100% in the long term.

Among the implications of this envisioned over-reliance on external private financing is an increased concentration of power in the hands of transnational corporations and international finance institutions, which exclude the majority of people, especially women, and are not accountable to the public. Indeed, decisions about fiscal and monetary policy, about the rules governing financial markets, about corporate accountability, are likely to continue to be taken by a small group of officials, politicians, and financiers with little participation of citizens and their elected representatives. The reliance on private capital flows also implies an implicit priority given to corporate welfare over the welfare of citizens, especially the poor, through contracts, including the privatisation of public assets and basic utilities, provision of infrastructure, tax breaks, free supply of African countries' natural resources (often non-renewable), full repatriation of profits, etc. This bias in favor of corporations contradicts the claims of the NEPAD for people-centered development, while endangering the social and economic rights of the poor and disadvantaged groups, especially women. '

FDI Flows

The romanticised conception of the private sector in NEPAD and the uncritical support to the promotion of FDI does not take into account that the profit-seeking FDI will not necessarily give priority to sectors of investment for sustainable and people-centered development.

Furthermore, focus on unchecked FDI may accelerate rather than reduce its negative consequences on employment, balance of payments and income distribution in African countries. In this connection, there is need for NEPAD to put in place measures for ensuring that foreign investors uphold the values and principles of good corporate citizenship, and corporate social responsibility and accountability.

More generally, the drive of NEPAD towards the provision of social services by the private sector clearly shows a 'commercialisation bias' (Elson, 2001) that ignores the human rights and basic needs concerns. Indeed, past experience from liberalisation and privatisation policies in Africa and other countries shows that not only is the hidden reproductive tax extracted from women, but also 'women are called upon to spend more time and effort in providing non-market substitutes for marketed goods that their families can no longer afford to buy, and providing substitutes for public services that are no longer available' (Bakker, 1994). Further, the uncontrolled open door policy of African economies by NEPAD to competition from foreign companies without any form of protection for domestic industries is a major threat on local enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises where women predominate.

Other issues of concern in regard to the mobilisation of resources for financing development from a gender perspective include:

- The absence of any call for full cancellation of the debt of poor countries, and for the removal of the structural adjustment conditionalities attached to debt relief: this is a major concern from a gender perspective, because women carry a disproportionate burden in the debt crisis which has led to reduced public expenditures in the social sectors, thus intensifying their role as caregivers and in turn presenting additional obstacles for their capacity for income generation.
- With regards to incomes, the proposed measures focus on savings mobilisation, not on savings generation, and boil down to reforms to increase the returns on domestic investment and reduce risks. In other words, NEPAD is more concerned about investors than the ordinary citizens who are assumed to benefit automatically from the trickle-

> oriented and private sector-led growth, without consideration for inequalities based on class, gender, and other forms of identity.

In general, the plan does not link the mobilisation of financial domestic or international resources to other conditions at the national and global levels and/or in other sectors of its programmes of action. Hence, the planned actions are about matters almost entirely concerned with national policies, while the impact of macroeconomic conditionality and policies on the generation and redistribution of domestic financial resources is not taken into consideration. £

In conclusion, NEPAD demonstrates a bias against the interests and needs of the poor and women with respect to the mobilisation and redistribution of resources. The fundamental flaws in NEPAD's economic policy framework and orientation also affect its strategic options for the mobilisation of resources and hinder the achievement of its stated objectives and goals. This is compounded by the fact that these strategic options have not been based on an appropriate assessment of benefits and costs that result from domestic and international policies from a pro-poor and gender perspective.

Conclusion: Way forward

NEPAD needs to revisit its stated principles of restoring democratic governance, upholding human rights and promoting human development especially poverty eradication. In view of the fact that the first phase of the NEPAD process almost entirely excluded the participation of domestic non-state actors, the second and subsequent phases must be fully inclusive and ensure full participation of key non-state actors in decision-making, as they are likely to be the only reliable engine for both the mobilisation of necessary resources, as well as the agents for its implementation. In this regard, the centrality of the role of women, as shown above, cannot be overemphasised.

NEPAD should therefore focus on the establishment of a new social contract based on new alliances with popular forces, in particular women's groups and other civil society organisations, thereby fulfilling their rights to participate in decisions about policies that shape their lives, and recognising their unique power to effect change towards people-centered, equitable and sustainable development.

African countries must also re-think and restructure the terms of their new global partnership with the North, and insist on:

- Democratic global governance, involving the transformation of northern policies and multilateral institutions that shape the global economic and political dynamics.
- The urgent implementation of the required reforms in the international financial architecture, trade and investment regimes to redress the imbalances and biases against African countries, including the enforcement of legislative measures to ensure corporate social and environmental responsibility.
- Concrete commitment by the international community to finance the NEPAD in accordance with UN Millennium Goals and other commitments
- De-linking of economic aid, trade and investment from political and military conditionalities.

The first source of capital must be domestic. Only the restructuring of the productive sectors through more appropriate public policy can ensure economic opportunities, resources and benefits to all segments of the population.

African governments must pledge to provide the basic services to the people, drinking water, basic food, essential transport and housing, and access to energy, etc. as necessary elements of their basic human rights and not leave these matters to the whims of international capital. If foreign capital is absolutely necessary, mostly in the form of technology, then its entry into Africa must be negotiated and its operation and exit must be monitored closely, if possibly on a pan-African, or regional basis. The point being made is that Africa must strengthen is capacity to negotiate global partnerships including the terms and conditions of entry and exit of foreign capital. Africa needs to recognise that whether or not foreign capital comes to Africa to provide basic services such as water, these remain basic human rights not privileges and hence should not be subjected to the whims of profit.

No strategy for development can be successful if the problem of poverty is not first resolved. Furthermore, for poverty to be reduced, and eventually eliminated, and for development to be effectively sustainable, there must be a dynamic balance between policies and actions that promote job creation, decent living standards and a better management of the physical environment of all members of the society, especially the poor, children, women, and minorities.

The NEPAD Plan of Action needs complete revision if it is to recognise and address the gender issues, which are intrinsic within all the problems that need to be addressed in African development.

African countries should primarily pursue a self-reliant inward looking strategy. The starting point for this resource mobilisation strategy is for African countries to address the current sources of leakage and potential leakage of mobilised resources. Massive resources for example are wasted through inefficient uses, wrong prioritisation, leakages through corruption, and embezzlement. This happens at central as well as local government levels. Major challenges for NEPAD include how to address the issue of governance, efficiency, transparency and accountability; how to improve fiscal management and performance; how to strengthen domestic capital and money markets; how to improve the performance of development banks, micro finance institutions, small and medium enterprises etc; and how to create a policy environment that will promote processing industries in the major sectors of the economy, such as agriculture mining, manufacturing, and tourism.

NEPAD does not emphasise the potential role that communities can play in the mobilisation of resources for development. In housing, water projects, and transport for instance, there are possibilities to promote micro-level projects which are managed and implemented at community level. Africa's development in the light of the harsh realities of globalisation and the domination of the north, must seriously be anchored and originate from within the continent, at grassroots, national and sub-regional levels. There is also need to promote regional integration as a strategy of collective self-reliance. The African Union, though overshadowed by the failures of its predecessor, the OAU, should become a vibrant entity and the center of innovation and direction for the rest of Africa to achieve development. NEPAD in this regard should stop relying too heavily on external funding when historical record clearly indicates that there is no basis to assume that the imposed capital flows initiative can yield the kind of resources which are required by NEPAD.

Africa also need to intensify efforts to restore peace, good governance, and the rule of law in those countries where civil conflicts, intolerance, and break down in law and order, have seriously tarnished the image of the rest of Africa and made it unattractive to capital.

The international resource mobilisation strategy of NEPAD as currently conceived cannot be relied upon to help Africa to achieve development in the years to come. The strategy should be thought through more carefully in a pragmatic and realistic manner. The resource mobilisation strategy should put more emphasis on domestic resource mobilisation and provide more details on how that can be achieved. In this connection strategies should include:

- Design of multi-level strategies to fight corruption, at all levels: central government, sub-national government, public institutions, corporate sector, etc.
- Investment in human resource development and systems of accounting and controls which work.
- Consistency between the resource mobilisation strategy and NEPAD goals of poverty reduction and development.
- NEPAD must center its market access initiative on how African leadership can intensify efforts to bring about meaningful reforms of those international institutions which are hampering Africa's development and Africa's leadership should collaborate with and strengthen alliances with those northern governments and institutions which share in the vision of Africa's development and eradication of poverty.

In summary, the priority issues for NEPAD therefore in mobilising international resources should be:

1. Lobby for democratic governance in the international trading arrangement and the new financial architecture.
2. More inward looking approach: domestic resources mobilisation to be accorded higher priority than external resources.
3. More efficient fiscal management

From a gender perspective the way forward is not to dismiss privatisation altogether but rather to seek ways of changing the gendered access to resources, the gender division of labour ,and gender gaps in knowledge, skills, income and economic decision-making power. One of the proposed strategies could be the macro economic empowerment of women through building women's knowledge base on macro economic issues and policies so as to use that knowledge to advocate, lobby and intervene in political decision-making and macro economic programmes. Regular gender analysis, assessments, audit of macro economic policies, and monitoring of national policies and global agreements need to be performed. Research and documentation on viable alternatives to privatisation should be conducted.

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