



# **UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies**

**EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF MULTI –AGENCY COUNTER  
TERRORISM STRATEGY ON YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN  
KENYA: A CASE OF MOMBASA COUNTY**

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**Reg No. R47/35874/2019**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE POST GRADUATE DIPLOMA IN  
STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**2020**

## **DECLARATION**

**Student:** This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other award in Nairobi University or any other University.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my family for the undying support, encouragement, prayers and a profound desire to see me through the research and achieve excellence in my studies. They have been a foundation of my success in this journey academic excellence.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

My profound appreciation first goes to God for His endless provision and grace. I thank my supervisor Col (Dr) Stephen Handa, PhD for his selfless support and unfailingly critiqued my research and gave valuable guidance and necessary support that led to the completion of this research project.

My appreciation also goes to the Academic Coordinator Defense Staff College, Lt Col Rono for his wise guidance and continued support as per timelines required.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CT	Counter Terrorism
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission Somalia
HUMINT	Human intelligence
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
ICEPCVE	IGAD Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenyan Defence Forces
KPA	Kenya Ports Authority
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MAW	Multi-Agency Working
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Taskforce
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NSCVE	National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
SNA	Somali National Army
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UN	United Nations
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

## ABSTRACT

One of the challenges of tackling violent radicalization lies in the elusiveness of the concept. The possible motivation, ideas and other factors that drive an individual towards violent radicalization can be diverse and complex. Further, no single factor can be sufficient to explain violent radicalization nor is there a single profile of individuals that have become radicalized. The main objective of this study was to evaluate the impacts of multi-agency counter terrorism strategy on youth radicalization in Kenya with specific reference to Mombasa County. Specifically, it sought to: establish the extent of and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization in coast; to establish the multi-agency strategies for de radicalization of the youth in coast and analyze the impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies of youth radicalization in coast. In understanding the causes that motivates individuals into terrorism, the study is guided by the theory of relative deprivation proposed by Gurr. Gurr explains that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves. The study is a qualitative study. This study focused on the youth who live in Mombasa County which is prone to radicalization. The study focused on the areas and persons living in Majengo, Nyali, Kisauni and Jomvu where radicalization has been reported. Both secondary and primary data were collected in this study. Secondary data from the previous studies on the area of study was considered. The interviews were conducted using pretested interview guides that were administered to those that have/had been radicalized, parents, preachers (Imams), local administrators and intelligence /anti-terrorism operatives. Since data qualitative it was analyzed using content analysis method and presented in prose form according to the study objectives. It was noted that various counter violent extremism and terrorism strategies had been applied globally, regionally and in Kenya to fight radicalization; violent extremism and terrorism. The strategies included Military strategy, Police and Intelligence Assets, and Legislative and financial controls. Regional bodies have been of help as a strategy in fighting terrorism in Kenya. The role of international organizations like the United Nations, European Union, African union, civil societies and IGAD was noted and their impact widely felt. The study concludes that in order to overcome radicalization in the coast of Kenya and elsewhere the state ought to have a comprehensive policy framework for youth empowerment that should go beyond peripheral job creation and entrepreneurship promotion to address root causes of youth alienation and disenchantment with the state and society. The youth need to be made to feel as useful and appreciated members of the Kenyan state if they are to be shielded from the ramifications of radicalization. It is recommended that local agencies be provided with awareness-raising training and education material. The study recommends the involvement of a wide range of organizations. The study also recommends the involvement of the communities. All actors should do evaluation and follow up.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

There have been increased terrorist activities in the international system. In Africa, groups of terrorism such as the Al-Shabaab in East Africa, the Boko Haram in both Nigeria and West Africa, insurgency operations in DRC, Sudan and South Sudan countries. Their activities have permeated the main countries' borders into the neighboring states. The effects of these terror activities have been felt on the social, politics and economy aspects of countries. Consequently, so as to bring sanity to the affected regions, coordinated actions between and among both countries and international organizations have been pulled to counter the terrorists and violent extremist groups.

Bringing radicalization of the youth to an end or taming it is therefore a major issue when dealing security challenge of countering terrorism for it often requires more deliberations on the factors that contribute to it and more specifically on the actors engaged in the process<sup>1</sup> He adds that for a very long time radicalization was tied to revenge and/or grievances of youth who had no identity or engagement after school.

Counter terrorism has often been referred to as being synonymous with the state crime.<sup>2</sup> Counter terrorism is known to involve the use of military techniques and tactics governments and several other security agencies employ to fight against and prevent terrorists and their activities. In the process, states engage in massive cover-ups, use of excessive force against a populace and secrecy in its operations. States therefore in extremely volatile situations where there is threat of a terrorist attack, they may in attempts to quell the threat breach fundamental rights of humans.

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<sup>1</sup> Silke, A. "Becoming a Terrorist" in Silke (ed) *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences*. Hoboken. New Jersey. Wiley. (2013)

<sup>2</sup> Abarca, Carlos A. "PERPETUATING PARANOIA: Citizenship, Civil Liberties and Counter-Terrorism." (2018).

The UN for instance has the UN Worldwide Anti-Terrorism Strategy,<sup>3</sup> in its resolutions under plan of actions says; The UN shall “continually, constantly, explicitly and toughly condemn all acts of terrorism in any form or manifestation, which shall happen for any purpose, wherever or whenever it may happen.” UN Charter. In Africa, under the council of Security and Peace, the AU member countries ensure that they collectively reach out to the areas within the continent facing the terrorist threats. In Somalia, a country highly infiltrated with the al-Shabaab terrorist group, there was established inter-state military personnel termed as AMISOM- AU Mission in the Republic of Somalia that drew its soldiers from countries in the continent such as Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti.

During security and peace meeting of the AU which were hosted at Addis Ababa in 2018, January, the UN, the AU and African Union PSC through their leaders<sup>4</sup> voiced the same sentiments as they called and reiterated on the need for a comprehensive approach towards dealing with the terrorist groups in the continent. It is during the African Union Peace and Security meeting that President Uhuru Kenyatta mentioned to the committee that Kenya had established the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which will be a multi-organization instrument to ensure the effective implementation of counter terrorism policies. He added differently, “Other measures include rehabilitation programs and initiatives to improve the amnesty of all Somalia returners who wish to renounce their criminal commitment to reintegration.”<sup>5</sup>

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

One of the challenges of tackling violent radicalization is in the indefinability of the notion. The probable motivation, concepts and other issues that drive a person into violent radicalization can be diverse and complex. Further, no single factor can be adequate to explain violent radicalization nor

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<sup>3</sup> The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2016. The strategy is a unique global instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism.

<sup>4</sup> UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, AU Peace and Security Council Chair who is also Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki.

<sup>5</sup> PSCU, January 28<sup>th</sup>, Kenya has Instituted Measures to Fight Terror, President Kenyatta says, Capital News. 2018

is there a single profile which explains people who have become radicalized.<sup>6</sup> Its association with terrorism has always been problematic as well hence the concern whether radicalized individuals are necessarily terrorists, at least in its everyday conception. The assumptions based on past or current individual cases have glaring limits in application. Possession of radical views in itself is not necessarily a problem, for some of the scientific discoveries or movements of liberation were born out of radicalized views. However, the moment radicalization becomes a problem to society is when it begins to glorify, justify or practice violence.<sup>7</sup>

Today, youth radicalization is prevalent in the coastal region with tentacles attached to organized criminal groups. Increasing numbers of youth have been recruited into radicalizing groups even though the extent, numbers and the modus operandi remains unknown. While state response at legal and policy level is well documented, counter-terrorism strategies are not yet fully understood as well as the capacity to forestall the problem in the coastal region.<sup>8</sup>

Despite several terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab being instigated against Kenya since 1975 with massive number of deaths, properties destruction, spurning ethnic rivalry and religious disharmony; terrorism there is no single study according to the researcher's knowledge investigating on the impacts of multi-agency counter terrorism strategy on youth radicalization in Kenya specifically referencing coast of Kenya. This research proposes to interrogate the aspects of radicalization extent and operations; multi-agency counter terrorism strategy and its effects on youth radicalization that has ensued in Kenya. To further address existing gaps identified, the study interrogated, through further research on policy recommendations from

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<sup>6</sup> Ghosh, Priyo, Nasir Warfa, Angela McGilloway, Imran Ali, Edgar Jones, and Kamaldeep Bhui. "Violent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism: Perspectives of wellbeing and social cohesion of citizens of muslim heritage." *Sociology Mind* 3, no. 04 (2013): 290.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid pp.207-208

<sup>8</sup> Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). Youth Radicalization in the Coastal Region (2016)

other studies and theories integration, on the best methodological and strategic approaches to apply in bridging these gaps.

### **1.3 Study Questions**

The research was done following this study question:

1. The extent and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization in coast of Kenya?
2. What are the multi-agency strategies for de radicalization of the youth in coast of Kenya?
3. What's the impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies of youth radicalization in coast of Kenya?

### **1.4 Objectives of the Research**

The objectives of this study include both general and specific. The specific are three.

#### **1.4.1 General Objective**

The main objective of the research was evaluating the impacts of multi-agency counter-terrorism strategies concerning radicalization of youth in Kenya specifically referencing the county of Mombasa.

#### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The main objectives of this research are to:

1. Establishing the extent and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization in coast
2. To establish the multi-agency strategies for de radicalization of the youth
3. To analyze the impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies of youth radicalization.

### **1.4 Literature Review**

This section shows review of the literature thematically in line with objectives.

### 1.4.1 Recruitment of Youth Radicalization

Knowledge of how young people join violent extremist groups should provide information on ways to try to prevent young people from participating in terrorism. The path for terrorist or violent extremist groups is extremely complex. Many youths are recruited by family members or lead to the belief that membership helps protect their families or communities. Others are cheated, smuggled, kidnapped or forcibly recruited. Forcible recruitment of children through abduction or direct violence is nothing new. The Uganda Lord's Resistance Army has abducted more than 20,000 children since 1987.<sup>9</sup> Boko Haram widely abducted people in Nigeria, including the abduction of 276 female students in Shibok in April 2014 and 110 female students in Dabashi in March 2018.<sup>10</sup> About 1,770 youths were kidnapped. Al-Shabaab admitted to the kidnappings citing victimization by the government of Somalia due to arrest, violence and intimidation.<sup>11</sup> The first happened in 2017 when an ISIS expanded into Iraq, its members abducted thousands of children from orphanages, schools, and even homes.<sup>12</sup> ISIS kidnapped 6,800 Yazidis in Sinjar in 2014, including one third of children less than 14 years of age. It is alleged that 800 to 900 children have been kidnapped from Mosul for religious and military training.<sup>13</sup> Young people also voluntarily join terrorist organizations based on a wide variety of objectives, including: exploring collective identities, attracting mass tourists, actual or perceived exclusion, cultural grievances or threats,

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<sup>9</sup> Özerdem, Alpaslan, and Sukanya Podder. "Disarming youth combatants: Mitigating youth radicalization and violent extremism." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 63-80.

<sup>10</sup> Baines, Erin. "Forced marriage as a political project: Sexual rules and relations in the Lord's Resistance Army." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 3 (2014): 405-417.

<sup>11</sup> Danjibo, Nathaniel Dominic, and Abosede Omowumi Babatunde. "Youth Bulge, Radicalization, and Deradicalization in the Lake Chad Basin." *New Architecture of Regional Security in Africa: Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin* (2019): 413.

<sup>12</sup> Amble, John C., and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens. "Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: two case studies." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 6 (2014): 523-540.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid pp. 67-68

economic benefits or long-term economic stability, which includes connecting with different individuals, friendship and family member networks.<sup>14</sup>

Youth radicalization and their recruitment into violence and illegal activities are not new to Kenya. Criminal gangs, ethnic groups and local militias have been recruited this way for years. Young politicians are used to buying votes, especially during elections. Politicians have used the young people more so in times of elections for intimidating the opposition, creating disturbances, and to even violently attack their opponents. This practice led to widespread violence across the country in the disputed 2007 elections. In the last few years, the risk of youth radicalization has increased due to the increased terrorist activity in the country and region.<sup>15</sup>

Fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon, and research has shown that the reasons for the unification of extremist organizations vary among social groups. Some young people living in poor areas are attracted to promises of wealth and material rewards, others believe in the minds of jihad, some lose faith in evil politics, others go on an adventure and follow a chain there are clear rules and laws, but others are covered because of peer or family pressure. These organizations are very good at targeting these different youth groups with different obligations and messages. Terrorist organizations have also succeeded in recruiting youth to the West and elsewhere. However, as poverty, inequality, ethnic and religious tensions, political marginalization and insecurity are already rife, the task is easy.<sup>16</sup>

The extremists of Islam didn't emerge in Kenya after the intervention of Kenya AMISOM in Somalia in the year 2011 but it was because of the attacks in the country especially in public

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<sup>14</sup> Subedi, Dambaru B. "Early warning and response for preventing radicalization and violent extremism." *Peace Review* 29, no. 2 (2017): 135-143.

<sup>15</sup> Watts, Clinton. "Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models." *Small Wars Journal* 22 (2008).

<sup>16</sup> Al-Badayneh, D., and K. Al Hassan. *Religious behavior and radicalization among Arab Youth: Implications for Terrorism Recruitment and De-radicalization*. IOS press, Amsterdam, 2016.

places.<sup>17</sup> The first major appearance of the extremist growing threat in the region was the bombing of the American Embassy in both the country and Tanzania in August 7, 1998 by the Al-Qaida. Although many political officials in Kenya and Tanzania claim that their country were used only as a battleground against the United States and its interests, the individuals involved in the attacks were foreigners and locals. From that time, extremism violence has progressively gained unique international character, and the scope of national and regional extremism has also grown, suggesting that local / national and regional components are needed to respond to this growing threat.

Although the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) has not been involved in terrorist acts, it is usually associated with Al-Shabaab in coastal Kenya. Demonstrations calling for the isolation of the Nairobi area led to a short suspension of work in October 2010 and the arrest of its members. Although Kenya has an extreme history of extremism and unconventional political developments, there are relatively few empirical studies and reasons for how to radicalize individuals and recruit them to youth movement and immigration resource centers. As part of the Immigration Resource Centre's operation is in the place as the regions in the coast are controlled by the Al-Shabaab drawing more security attention.<sup>18</sup>Hence the current study seeks to bridge the gap by investigating the extent of and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization in coast.

#### **1.4.2 The Multi-Agency Strategies for De Radicalization of the Youth**

The value of multi-agency work (MAW) to respond to threats of violent extremism has been widely discussed among stakeholders in politics, law enforcement, security, prisons, surveillance and education (and other stakeholders). However, this debate often fails to take into account the

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<sup>17</sup> Amble, John C., and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens. "Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: two case studies." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 6 (2014): 523-540.

<sup>18</sup> Chatfield, Akemi Takeoka, Christopher G. Reddick, and Uuf Brajawidagda. "Tweeting propaganda, radicalization and recruitment: Islamic state supporters multi-sided twitter networks." In *Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research*, pp. 239-249. 2015.



complexity of covered work, the heterogeneity of the terrorist incident, and the true barriers to sharing information between agencies.

The inter-agency approach involves creating a violent extremism infrastructure (CVE) to ensure that multi-agency support is at risk for those who will soon participate and the ability of practitioners to exchange information across hierarchies and departments to provide. <sup>19</sup>A multi-stakeholder approach is where by actors possess knowledge and the ability to identify and support individuals at risk. The main objectives of the multi-agency partnership are: to identify individuals at risk, to assess the nature and extent of potential vulnerabilities or risks; to develop appropriate support packages and to ensure the sharing of relevant information. <sup>20</sup>

Safety, security and service measures cannot be implemented effectively, and cannot be implemented by any one agency. The definition refers to the fact that many institutions are involved in protecting physical activity. Because these measures overlap within the three pillars, their collective implementation should be coordinated and distributed as part of a multi-agency package. If not, then it will be possible to track the activities of each column and each organization individually, causing significant losses to the overall response efficiency. <sup>21</sup>

Many actors in government and civil society can participate in the fight against extremism. Here is a (incomplete) list: law enforcement officers; screw; viewer; Customs / Customs Control agents. Youth activists: such as teachers and instructors in schools, colleges and universities. - Services for youth criminals, child services, and sports coaches. Social workers / youth activities; Local authorities on family matters; Legal aid; Government / social work such as housing authorities. Health care professionals such as medical assistance, psychological and, and the specialized doctors. Examples include civil society, community workers, philanthropists and

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<sup>19</sup> Olonisakin, F.Okech A.(eds), Women and Security Governance in Africa, (Nairobi, Pambazuka Press, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Miller, L.S. Hess K.M. & Orthmann C.H. (eds.), Community Policing: Partnerships for Problem Solving, (Ohio, Cengage Learning, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> Malan, M. "The OAU and African Sub-regional Organisations; A closer look at the 'Peace pyramid,'" Occasional Paper No. 36-January (1999).

volunteers, and religious groups.<sup>22</sup> Despite the existence of many strategies in Kenya, no study has been carried out in coast regions of Kenya to establish the application of multi-agency counterterrorism strategies. The current study seeks to establish the multi-agency strategies for de-radicalization of the youth in coast.

### **1.4.3 Impact of Multi-Center Anti-Terrorism Strategies on Youth Extremism**

The multi-institution approach focuses on building a CVE infrastructure, providing vulnerable people at all levels of authority and early support from the organization. This joint effort is called a multi-agency because it includes public and private sector support at the national and regional levels. The government cannot face extremism. In some cases, violent extremism can be prevented, and actors collaborate between different levels, institutions, and regions to exchange information of great importance is an approach of multi-partner with the capability, knowledge, and ability of the involved participants to identify and support those at risk. Stakeholders working in organizations need to explore ways to identify individuals at risk to develop a general approach to exchanging concerns and information and supporting people at risk.<sup>23</sup>

An approach of multi-partner is a system for exchanging information, which is very important for identifying and processing dangerous and dangerous individuals. These multi-agency business structures and processes can better identify individuals at risk, better information exchange, joint decision making and coordinated practices.<sup>24</sup> The National Counter-Terrorism Center has become a center for implementing policies by supporting and supporting various government departments, departments and agencies in combating terrorism. Currently, some

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<sup>22</sup> Dandurand, Yvon. "Social inclusion programmes for youth and the prevention of violent extremism." *Countering radicalisation and violent extremism among youth to prevent terrorism* (2014): 22-36.

<sup>23</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas. "Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (2006): 39-60.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid pp.90-91

provinces have developed county-level action plans to strengthen CVE national action plans.<sup>25</sup> Past studies have emphasized much on CVE national action plans without considering the impact on radicalization of youths in coast region. This study seeks to establish the implementation and impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies of youth radicalization in coast.

## **1.5 Justification of the Study**

Research on terrorism and violent extremism has been conducted but not adequately, particularly on radicalization among the youth. The study notes the importance of studying the multi-agency as a strategy for counter terrorism. The research study seeks to benefit the policy making and formulation, and contribute to existing academic knowledge.

### **1.5.1 Policy Justification**

In policy formulation, the study emphasized on effectiveness of multi-agency counter-terrorism strategies; it benefits the formulation of other effective strategies for countering terrorism by the governments, societies and security sector. The findings from the study highlights the legal, socio-economic and political challenges faced in counter radicalization. The recommendations aids policymakers as well as law enforcement officers in providing a methodical accepting the menace posed by radicalization and the ultimate consequences.

### **1.5.2 Academic Justification**

The study contributes to academic knowledge adding to the existing body of literature. Out of the findings the research sought to add to the existing body of academic sources in radicalization studies. This provides valid and relevant information on the factors contributing to radicalization to enable the security agencies combat the threat. More so the study highlights all emerging issues on multi-agency counter-terrorism strategies that are important for further studies.

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<sup>25</sup> Stephen, Ekpenyong Nkereuwem. "Youth Radicalization and the Future of Terrorism in Nigeria." *Canadian Social Science* 12, no. 10 (2016): 42-50

## 1.6 Theoretical Review

The fight against terrorism can hardly ignore the anti-terrorist dynamics surrounding the rapid development of individuals. In understanding the causes of individual terrorist motives, the research is guided by the theory of relative scarcity proposed by Gurr.<sup>26</sup> Gurr explained that the gap between expectations and achievement is not a measure of total lack, but rather the cause of collective dissatisfaction.<sup>27</sup> This principle also applies to those who find that their life is not as good as that of others. The injustice of political violence is due to the relative sense of loss caused by collective dissatisfaction. Gurr also wrote that the term "relative absence" was used to denote the tension caused by the contradiction between "must be" and "must be collective" where people are exposed to violence.<sup>28</sup> "This distinction between expectation of outcomes and personal well-being caused collective dissatisfaction. The relatively lacking concept of Aristotle in ancient Greece clearly shows that the revolution was driven by relativity or lack of equality instead of a measure which is absolute."<sup>29</sup>

As of Aristotle, the main reason for this revolution is the desire of those who seek to achieve economic or political equality on behalf of the general public, but lack of ambition.<sup>30</sup> The difference between price expectations and price power is the cause of dissatisfaction. Rather than the status of a mature economic millionaire, "Gurr's principle explains the relative absence of terrorism and the frustration of aggressive behavior. Thus, the degree of terrorism can be interpreted as partially expressing the state of the state that caused relative deprivation. They discuss and question various aspects of the theory of the premises, critics especially question the relationship between depriving

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<sup>26</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid* p. 56

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid* p.85

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid* pp. 63-64

<sup>30</sup> Githens-Mazer, J. "Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10, no. 4 (2008a): 550–570

and the rising of social movements, and the study of relative deprivation must admit self-deprivation, sibling deprivation and relative exploitation claiming to refer to yourself.<sup>31</sup>

The second serious criticism of the theory of relative deprivation is associated with a lack of personal focus. Critics argue that sociologists who use the theory of relative deprivation tend to study the relative deprivation of individuals and groups, while ignoring the self-referential relative deprivation. Sociologists who reject the denial of self-referral argue that the denial of self-referral has a greater impact on individuals' efforts to change their status than on political or social behavior at the group level.

Sociologists use the theory of relative deprivation to explain the origin of social movements. Social movements are conscious voluntary efforts that aim to organize individuals to work together to get an influence group and bring or prevent change. The social movement is a power-oriented group, not a participatory movement.<sup>32</sup> This distinction means that teamwork in social movements may not necessarily be very beneficial to individuals, but rather contributes to achieving the group's larger goals. Concerted and collective action has been taken to bring about changes in the larger socio-political environment. Social movements in an open democratic society are often the most successful, as a democratic society is a concept that includes social mobility and social change. Social movements directed at the base are more common than value oriented social movements.<sup>33</sup>

In Kenya, most youths exposed to Islamic terrorists are exploring and experimenting with relationships, justice, beliefs, traditions and peer groups without being allowed to discover their identity. However, some young people prefer to choose a basic religious identity, which may be the result of an initial "identity crisis" or "identity confusion" to mediate potential conflicts, struggling

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<sup>31</sup> Morrison, D. (1971). Some notes toward theory on relative deprivation, social movements, and social change. *The American Behavioral Scientist* (pre-1986), 14(5), 675.

<sup>32</sup> Krahn, H. & Harrison, T. (1971). 'Self-referenced' relative deprivation and economic beliefs: The effects of the recession in Alberta. *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology*, 29(2), 191-209.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid* pp.57-58

with an early generation "identity" Could have. This is unacceptable or community wide. Lack of experience in discrimination or discrimination and lack of confidence in social mobility and political systems can further strengthen this. It can encourage people to pursue their identity in times of crisis, accepting religious fundamentalism as the antidote to unresolved internal conflict that is vulnerable to radical influences or imparts highly organized consciousness and practices is.<sup>34</sup>

Discontent both socially and economically can also lead Muslim youth towards violent extremism. Although economy indicators of people don't appear to be closely related to involvement with terrorist, the interacting between variables of economy, unemployed and socially can improve understanding of terrorism.<sup>35</sup> Comparative deprivation can also be employed in explaining the contradiction of a person's ownership of an economic product and which is actually considered worthy, so this theory is more effectively taken into account the increasing effects of international interaction can be applied.<sup>36</sup>

## **1.7 Hypothesis**

1. There is increased recruitment of youth radicalization in coast.
2. There are many existing multi-agency strategies for de radicalization of the youth in coast.
3. The multi-agency counters terrorism strategies for youth radicalization in coast are effective.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

### **1.8.1 Research Design**

The study is qualitative one and aims to obtain preliminary and equivalent information at multiple levels, while at the same time detecting violent extremism and capturing different situations. The

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<sup>34</sup> Botha, Anneli, and Mahdi Abdile. "Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia." *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2014, no. 266 (2014): 20.

<sup>35</sup> Githens-Mazer, J. "Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10, no. 4 (2008a): 550–570

<sup>36</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 1970)

proposed study design is an exploratory design that uses an interview guide to collect qualitative explanations. By using qualitative techniques, researchers can gain valued insights into situations or feelings. It gives the chance in capturing the environment and the fragility of extremism of Kenyan youth.<sup>37</sup>

### **1.8.2 Target Population**

This study focused on the youth who live in Mombasa County which is prone to radicalization. Also, with specific interests on assessing the effectiveness of the counter terrorism measures, the study studied the families, estates and schools who would otherwise lose their youth to radicalization. Teachers, parents and elders were of great importance in informing the study.

### **1.8.3 Sample Determination**

The study focused on the areas and persons living in Nyali, Kisauni and Jomvu where radicalization has been reported. This ensured that the responses gotten are from the families that have either lost their relatives to radicalized groups or those families that have their members at home who would otherwise be lost to radicalization if the counter- terrorism strategies had not been put in place.

### **1.8.4 Data Collection Methods**

Both secondary and primary data were gathered in the research. Secondary data was collected from the previous studies on the area of study was considered. The interviews were conducted using pretested interview guides that were administered to those that have/had been radicalized, parents, preachers (Imams), local administrators and intelligence /anti-terrorism operatives. Different means of reaching respondents were employed including: phone calls, use of mail as well as face to face interviews.

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<sup>37</sup> Al-Badayneh, Diab M., Rami A. Al-Assasfeh, and Nisreen A. Al-Bhri. "Social Causes of Arab Youth Radicalizing." *Journalism* 6, no. 12 (2016): 743-756.

### **1. 8.5 Data Analysis and Presentation**

Since it is a data qualitative study, data was analyzed using content analysis method and presented in prose form according to the study objectives.

### **1. 8.6 Ethical Considerations**

The study ensured that all the necessary permits were available for the study to take place. To the respondents, their involvement was voluntary and through clear explanation of the objectives to them to ensure that they know understand why their involvement is necessary. Issues such as anonymity were granted when sought by the respondent.

### **1.8.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The research did examine several effects in the country which have raised because of multi-agency counter terrorism strategy on radicalization of youth in Kenya. It zeroed in on the strategies the multi-agency counter terrorism strategies have employed and the achievements made so far for policy recommendations on how to improve de-radicalization through the multi-agency teams in Kenya.

## **1.9 Chapter Outline**

This study was organized in five chapters, chapter one covers the introduction to the research study, background of the study, broad context of the research study, statement of the problem, justification of the study, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and the study methodology. Chapter two presents extent of and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization. Chapter three evaluates the impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies on youth radicalization. Chapter four examines achievements of multi-agency counter terrorism on youth radicalization.



Chapter five presents summary of the findings; conclusion and recommendations made by the study.

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**EXTENT AND MODUS OPERANDI OF RECRUITMENT OF YOUTH**  
**RADICALIZATION**

**2.1 Introduction**

This chapter does present analysis on extent of and modes operands of recruitment of youth radicalization. It's further broken into the following sub-headings: concept of youth radicalization; recruitment of radicalization of youth in Kenya and youth radicalization into the Al-Shabaab; key factors enhancing the extent and operation of both radicalization and extreme violent in the region of coast in the country and extent of and effects of violent radicalization on the coast of Kenya.

**2.2 Concept of youth Radicalization**

Radicalization occurs when a person's thoughts and actions differ from how the most people in the societies and communities see social issues and participate in them. <sup>38</sup>Radicalization is "the process of adopting extremist belief systems and using, supporting or encouraging violence and fear as a means to achieve social change. Radicalization can happen at any group from the terrorist groups and even environmentalists. It can start from a small group of individuals from different ethnicity, nationalities, societies and beliefs. As mentioned before when a person radicalizes can use the same to change their situation although violent extremism is when persons decide to use fear to achieve ideology, political or social change. <sup>39</sup>

From chefs to armed fighters, youth are an important source of support for many terrorist organizations. However, depending on the situation, the methods for recruiting young people vary widely. In many cases, adolescents join terrorist groups when deceived, smuggled, abducted or

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<sup>38</sup> Sengupta, Nirmal. "Agrarian movements in Bihar." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 9, no. 3 (1982): 15-39.

<sup>39</sup> Mutuku, M. A., and B. Mutsotso. "The Effects of Organized." (2017). Garcelon, Marc. *Revolutionary passage: From soviet*

forced to recruit. <sup>40</sup>Others have volunteered to join terrorist groups because of their group-based identity appeal; Perceptions of exclusion, awareness of complaints or cultural threats; making personal contacts, including financial stability, fame, and reputation for glory or honor, and family and friendship networks. <sup>41</sup>

Young people's exposure to terrorist organizations can be affected by many factors, including geographic distance from terrorist organizations, awareness of economic vulnerability, social or political alienation, exposure to social networks, and exposure to extremist propaganda. However, the relative importance of these factors depends on personal and local circumstances. <sup>42</sup>

Young men and women often play support, recruitment and combat roles in terrorist groups, but the proportion of young fighters is high. In general terrorist members associated to Islam like (ISIS) ideology often limits the role that wives and mother women can play. Boko Haram is an important exception because young women and girls are widely used as suicide bombers. However, women terrorists take part in an important role in advancing the organization's mission. <sup>43</sup>

### **2.3 Recruitment of Youth Radicalization in Kenya**

Basing on what was found, there can be a conclusion that the coastal region of Kenya is a center for extremists and terrorism. According to the survey results, the cause of terrorism and the rapid development along the coast of Kenya can be traced back to the country's failure to act. Several respondents stated that Kenya had not controlled borders and territories, ensured a safe environment, created identity and met the social and economic needs of citizens. Studies have shown that it was from the colonial era to the three post-colonial regimes. For example, as of the

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<sup>40</sup> Garcelon, Marc. *Revolutionary passage: From soviet to post-soviet Russia, 1985-2000*. Temple University Press, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Ker, Iomongu. "Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria: The Cultural Dimension." In *The Eminent and Expert Working Group Meeting on National Counter-Insurgency Strategy*. 2012.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid pp. 102-103

<sup>43</sup> Gessler, Michael, and Falk Howe. "The German dual vocational training system: The origin of the current architecture." *Bulletin of Institute of Technology and Vocational Education, Nagoya University Japan* 10 (2013): 17-28

Kenya's census (2009), anyone over 3 years old in Mombasa County were requested to show their schools attendance statuses. About 31,391 (34%) were at school, 257,826 (53.5%) left school in fourth grade, 42,827 (8.9%) did not attend school, and 17013 (3.5%) did not reveal their identity. Looking at this data, you can see that about 62.4% of the population six years ago did not have formal business skills. In effect, they withdrew from official business and availed themselves to crimes. Extremists poisoned trafficked youth for training in terrorist activities later so as to use them in supporting and involving them in their terrorism activities. Some prominent Muslim scholars have called for the education of the youth who had returned from the terrorism. Imams called for deepening of scholarships so as to provide advice and guidance on the true meaning of the word "jihad".<sup>44</sup>

In 2013, 160 Muslim scholars published a Fatawa decree on the youth movement in Mogadishu based on literary works.<sup>45</sup> Muslim scholars must meet again at the end of 2014 to assess the progress of the regulation. The purpose of this meeting is therefore to start a gradual rehabilitation and reinvestment of people in terrorist acts and education to reflect measures related to how to tackle extremism among young people. Hot spots for juvenile extremism are Mombasa (Kisauni, Mvita, and Likoni), Kwale (Matuga), Kilifi (Kikambala), Malindi (Malindi City), Lamu (Island, Kiunga and Faza).<sup>46</sup>

Based on the findings, civil society groups in Mombasa and Nairobi reported the first cases of recruitment and trafficking of Kenyan youth to combat extremism, Somali militia and Al-Shabaab in the year 2006. Some areas of Mombasa and Nairobi have become foci of these activities. Over time, these extremist activities have taken root in the country. Unlike bombings by

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<sup>44</sup> Amble, John C., and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens. "Jihadist radicalization in East Africa: two case studies." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 6 (2014): 523-540.

<sup>45</sup> Badurdeen, Fathima Azmiya, and Paul Goldsmith. "Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya." *Journal for Deradicalization* 16 (2018): 70-102.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid p.59-60

the Al-Qaida group in United States embassies, all suspects who attacked Kikambala in November 2002 were Kenyan civilians, except a Sudanese Abu Taha. Suicide bombers Fumu Muhammad Fumu and Haruni Bamosa are also included. Following the investigation, Kenyan citizen and suspect Faisal Ali Nassur killed himself and the Kenyan police while heading custody, rather than being arrested by detonating a hand grenade on August 1, 2003. The bombings show that extremist views and previous foreign perceptions of suicide and hardship are more common in Kenya. Therefore, it is wise to discover the real factors that cause this trend of anxiety.

## **2.4 Youth Radicalization into the Al-Shabaab**

In contemporary Kenya, young adult's radicalization into the Al-Shabaab poses a security threat. When many Kenyan ethnic minorities are with Somali, youth activity gives important warning. Kenyan youth are mostly those from the north eastern shores and are more like to live in Majengo (informal settlement in Nairobi). Hundreds of poor Kenyan citizens were recruited as observed by UN observers in Eritrea and Somalia, as young extremists by the Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab not only trained the Kenyan fighters, but also trained in suicide. For example, on April 19, 2007, a suicide bomber exploded at the door of an Ethiopian military base in Mogadishu. The suicide bomber was Osman Otayo who was later identified to be a Kenyan citizen raised in the North Eastern region of the country.<sup>47</sup>

According to the results of the survey, respondents were unable to determine the number of youth recruited by the youth movement. However, interviewees say that although many Kenyans have become members of al-Shabaab, this is sufficient to justify further review of the situation, which has led to increased attacks and recruitment of Kenyan youth. Among them, young people in poor areas (coastal areas) are very vulnerable. This is because young people who recruit new

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<sup>47</sup> UN Report, 2012

members take advantage of local weaknesses and background conditions to benefit. The number of young people in Kenya is increasing, and the background elements of the extreme groups provide a mature place for young people.

## **2.5 Key Factors Enhancing the Extent and Operation of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the Coast of Kenya**

Many factors explain ways in which youths in coastal regions are encouraged to join terror groups. Many youths find it easy and are much influenced by different factors. The operations of radicalization according to the respondents are also boosted by many factors.<sup>48</sup> Some of the factors listed included; Political purpose (California agenda), cultural purpose (tension between religions and abuse of religion by small groups to justify the use of violence against innocent people, social perspectives on youth as violence), economic drivers (the currency of young people) Inflation is a profitable business for more than 50% of young people, insufficient infrastructure and financial support provided, no cancellation policy), legal / political goals (weak infrastructure, industry collapse, severe mistrust between politics and society, high levels of corruption , weak policy, among other factors were also mentioned. We recommend less than 50% education at Alba Middle School, most of which do not require proof of identity and citizenship.

It can be seen from this study that essential groups understand and rely on a range of realities of politics, social and economic factors, and personal individualities that make young people susceptible to being recruited by violent extremist organizations (VEOs). It is to be noted that radical groups have started inculcating their views on children as young as eight years and youth in colleges. This is in line literature where Warucu Ngethe, a clinical psychologist told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting's (IWPR) that such children become the worst kind of killers.

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<sup>48</sup> Hellsten, Sirkku. *Radicalisation and terrorist recruitment among Kenya's youth*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2016.

Recently (14<sup>th</sup> November 2014) clerics under the umbrella of The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) have suggested that there should be an amnesty period for the radicalized youth to turn in arms without fear of prosecution. Subsequently, they have urged the youth to appoint their mediators, time and venue for dialogue between them and moderate clerics. This might be a positive way of ensuring the radicalized youth feel that their views are listened to.

### **2.5.1 Social Causes of Youth Radicalization in the Coast of Kenya**

As stated by all respondents lack of employment is a leading factor that eases the process of radicalization. Terror group leaders find it easy to convince many youths who lack employment and promise them good pay to carry out the terrorism operations. It is believed that economic marginalization, youth unemployment, religious and ethnic marginalization are at the root cause of the radicalization of the Coast of Kenya. However, this may not fully explain why the situation persists. It is noteworthy that despite a number of steps taken to facilitate youth engagement in income-generating activities by the current government; full implementation remains a challenge because of slow uptake, bureaucracy and corruption. Furthermore, by appearing to condone and organize politics and economic benefits around ethnicity, the (Kenyan) state inadvertently promotes youth radicalization in a manner that may not be fully addressed by economic policies such as creating job opportunities for the youth at the coast.

Kenya needs a comprehensive evidence based policy framework for youth empowerment that should go beyond peripheral job creation and entrepreneurship promotion to addressing the main causes of youth alienation and disenchantment with the state and society. The youth need to be made to see themselves as valuable and appreciated individuals of the Kenyan community if they are to be shielded from the temptations of radicalization.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Protest: East Africa Tries to Tame an Arm of Angry Young Men PP 32-33 “ East African December 20-26 2014

Other respondents indicated that the Coast of Kenya is also prevalent with chronic poverty among significant sections of the population, serious youth unemployment amid increasing growth of population, rising lack of security, lack of infrastructures and the basic needs for the poor have intensified the “youth bulge” threat. Despite this threat, the government has lacked an effective engagement strategy with the general public and the youth in particular to facilitate reintegration of informal youth formations and militarized youths, thus compounding the problem by feeding into stereotypes and furthering social marginalization.

The information collected from the respondents clearly indicated the isolation and neglecting feeling among youths the Coast of Kenya. This has offered a good chance and opportunity of increased radicalization rate of youths the Coast of Kenya. There is a strong perception that the government and other private sector employers do not prioritize coast people for employment. For example, at the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), a person from the coastal region last occupied the position of managing director over ten years ago; since then, however, that position has increasingly become the preserve of upcountry people.

At the Kenya Maritime Authority, most top management and 80% of the Board of Directors are people from upcountry. At the Kenya Shipping Line most senior positions and the Board of Directors has a heavy upcountry representation. Private investors like Naivas supermarket allegedly recruited most of their staff from Nairobi. The staffs were allegedly ferried in two buses to Mombasa for employment at the expense of local people. That the apparent discrimination against coast people by government and private sector functions to inflame radicalization tendencies. What however, makes youth feel even more demoralized is those local leaders do not appear to protest the discriminatory employment tendencies that local people are subjected to. The level of unemployment is high in the coast region while opportunities for a livelihood are few. As such all the respondents said that unemployment has contributed to youth developing violent radicalization



views and joining Al Shabaab who readily offer a source of livelihood and 60% agreed that there is discrimination in employment against people from coast region.

### **2.5.2 Security, Corruption and Terrorism**

Based on the findings it was clearly noted that today recruitment is open. The researcher noted that Police and security officers often they participate or ignore such activities in exchange for bribery and other "benefits". Likewise, Kenyan border immigration officials are said to take illegal immigrants from Somalia, Ethiopia and elsewhere at a low fees. Admittedly, a direct link between anxiety and corruption is the biggest obstacle in the fight against terrorism. Corrupt officers brought over 100,000 foreigners to the country, many of them criminals, and even after passing several police checkpoints, they found explosives.<sup>50</sup>

According to the results, Kenyan soldiers accused the police and immigration officials of corruption, but they claimed that the soldiers were largely involved in the illegal sugar and coal trade, and even cooperated with Somali militants to send Aisha Bob an income provider. Kenya is an essential partner to the US and Europe and has received international assistance, especially after the Westgate attack. As mentioned earlier, innocent security is often enhanced and annoyed, but Kenyan soldiers and police often fail to prevent failed cooperation and fail to use intelligence attacks. It was also established that if national security services were heavily involved in corruption, it would be nearly impossible to avoid anxiety. Smuggling drugs, weapons, and rewards for animals, ivory and people, including terrorists, is endless. On the other hand, the more mandatory security measures for citizens, the more the exclusion and spread of extremism.

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<sup>50</sup> Patterson, William R. "Islamic radicalization in Kenya." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (78) (2015).

### **2.5.3 Religious and Political Leaders Involvement**

Based on the literature with regards to the clerics, incredibly, there have been many attacks on them, some resulting to deaths such as those of Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Sheikh Salim Bakari Mwarangi. With every tragic death of these religious leaders there seemed to be heightened tensions in the region. Consequently, there have been many allegations of police involvement in the killings with particular criticism directed to the RECCE squad. In November 22<sup>nd</sup> 2014, Mohamed Ali Abdallah, a former ally of Makaburi was arrested on accusation of radicalizing Muslim youth and inciting violence at the Coast. He adds to the increasing list of suspected religious leaders' radical recruiters. Moreover there have been reports of overthrowing of moderate religious leaders and occupation of holy places by radicalized youth, such as Masjid Swafaa, Masjid Musa and Masjid Sakina. Some of these acts like the takeover of Masjid Swafaa (October, 2014) have links with Islamic State making the fight against terror not just a national issue but an international one.

Non-governmental organizations have also come under criticism of inciting the youth to engage in radical acts. Such allegations have been denied by the respective organizations. After the Mpeketoni attack (June 2014) there was assertion that the attacks were in fact politically instigated. Is it possible then that there are hidden political interests behind the said radicalization and growing threat of terrorism? Furthermore, the police handling of radicalization of youths and terrorism suspects has also come under scrutiny in public eye. According to Human Rights Watch there have been extrajudicial killings as well as enforced disappearances.<sup>51</sup>

The forceful storming in into Masjid Musa was also seen as excessive and encouraging even more radical views when seen as disrespect to a holy place. This is in spite of paraphernalia such as Al Shabaab flags and guns being found in the mosque. In addition to this, the eventual closing down

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<sup>51</sup> Human Rights Watch (2014)

of the four mosques in November (2014): Masjid Shuhadaa-formely known as Masjid Musa, Masjid Minah, Masjid Swafaa and Sakina Mosque also did not go well with the community at the Coast.

The police raid was highlighted with the storming in with shoes and sniffer dogs, both sacrilegious acts to the Muslim faith. As the local leaders such as Mombasa Senator Omar Hassan citing the move as unconstitutional, there was deep fear from the Imams who would have otherwise taken over the mosques.<sup>52</sup> In retrospect the government's condition of opening the holy places was a formation of new committees to govern each mosque. However some Imams feared that they will be victimized when viewed as collaborating with the government. This led to a stalemate and opening of the mosques much later than was expected (27th November 2014). Barely a week from the opening of the four mosques, another mosque, Pumwani Riyadha Mosque was raided by 100 APS at around midnight on 4<sup>th</sup> December 2014. This time however no weapons were found and the police obliged the mosque treasurer by removing their shoes before entering the mosque. This time also there were no angry youths to protest the raid.

Respondents indicated that some youth were been involved in radicalization as a form of ravage. It was noted that during government crackdowns on radicalized youth, several places of worship mosques and churches were closed down. Sakina Mosque, Musa's Mosque and Swafar Mosque at Mwandoni were affected by this action. The SDA churches at Newlife Majengo, Salvation Army Church Majengo, and Ziواني SDA Church at Mwandoni were closed by the owners for fear of security. Respondents said that the closure of places of worship by the government created more violently radicalized youth than the action was meant to control. Many followers took that as an affront on their religion by the state. In addition, the police forcefully entered the mosques in shoes, an action considered a defilement of their place of worship. This act

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<sup>52</sup> Wuthnow, Robert. "Religious involvement and status-bridging social capital." *Journal for the scientific study of religion* 41, no. 4 (2019): 669-684.

by government created the unintended and it became a rallying call for Al Shabaab recruitment in the coast region.

Respondents indicated that the police could have arrested the youths if they laid siege outside the mosques instead of abusing them or even used intelligence to make the arrests. The Constitution of Kenya provides for freedom of worship. By police closing the mosques and churches the people were denied their constitutional right to worship freely. In this regard 30% of the respondents indicated that the government handling of religious issues contributed to more violent radicalization in the coast region. In addition, 50% of the respondents agreed that religious leaders contribute to youth developing radicalized views. Overall however, 20% respondents agreed that the highest form of youth radicalization is caused by religious people.

The findings in addition shows that politicians are out to make a name; regularly make a passionate appeal to the youth to show that the government and other regions of the nation are against young people from coast region. For instance when youth are arrested certain politicians protect them and fete them on release from custody.

Statements like “*government discriminates against coast people, we coast people are not educated, government hates Muslims, coast people have no intellect to be employed*” are common fodder for politicians. Such views have functioned to make many youth develop radicalization against upcountry people and government.

In this regard 70% respondents showed that politicians considerably contribute to youth radicalization in the coast region. Overall, 30% respondents said politicians are the authors of radicalization in the coast region as they use statements that appeal to and endear themselves to the electorate. The more anti-upcountry and anti-government statements one makes the more they position themselves as championing interests of coast people.

#### **2.5.4 Emergence of Organized Criminal Gangs**

Further it was noted that new organized criminal gangs with very radical views now exist in many parts of the coast region. This encouraged more youths to join the groups. Some new criminal gangs noted included: Wataliya Wao in Mombasa, Wakali Kwanza and Wakali Wao now rule certain parts of Kisauni.

As far as the respondents were concerned, the gangs are associated with certain politicians and the police are aware of their existence but take no action, hence this has helped to buttress the common view that they exist with police and administration complicity. The criminal gangs have now become the bastion of Al Shabaab recruitment in Mombasa County especially.

#### **2.5.5 Use of Internet**

Internet was also noted as a great field of youth radicalization. It was established that 60% and above of the youths are connected to the internet and therefore any information's could be passed easily. The ongoing conflict all over the world presents useful lessons for Kenya on how foreign radicals use the internet to document their involvement in real time with a view to inspiring others to join. The internet is increasingly used to radicalize home-grown domestic extremists. Therefore, countering online radicalization should continue to be a major priority for governments.

One strategy to help counter online radicalization is creating the environment in producing and consuming radicalization material is difficult as well as socially unacceptable or less desirable. The strategy should deter those producing extreme materials, empowering online societies to do self-regulating, reducing the appealing of extreme messages and promoting the positive issues and messages.

### **2.5.6 Prisons as Centers of Radicalization**

It was also established that prisons are vulnerable to radicalization since radicalized individuals use their period in the prison in mobilizing and radicalizing other individuals in prisons and even recreate operational command structures. Pettinger, implored prisons services to be more determined in promotion of positive influence in the prisons and as well as developing more inventive ideas in facilitating transition of prisoners back to the communities.<sup>53</sup> Such efforts can lead to collective de-radicalization and disengagement which may include a political settlement and full re-integration into society.

### **2.5.7 Absence of Consistent Counter Radicalization Messages by Government**

As indicated by the respondents government rarely released warnings on radicalization and terrorism. There exist much false and unsubstantiated information in the coastal region. It was noted that the CDs with extreme messages are openly sold in the market, therefore, easily accessible. Several claims including: that National Youth Service recruits in the coast region are only meant to collect garbage in the towns while those from other regions are in the training institutes; the other is that Pwani University was allocated very low student admissions in 2015 while other universities in other regions had higher numbers; Utalii College was deliberately positioned away from the coastal region to deprive them of opportunities; that public funds offer coastal youth lower loan thresholds compared to youth from other parts of the country and that government intention is to reduce the Muslim population in Kenya. The existence of such misinformation has been exploited by radicalized groups to win followers. However, the researcher noted that there were apparently no counter-messages to confront and correct the false information being peddled.

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<sup>53</sup> Pettinger, Tom. "De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization: Valuable Tools Combating Violent Extremism, or Harmful Methods of Subjugation?." *Journal for Deradicalization* 12 (2017): 1-59.

## 2.6 Extent of and Effects of Violent Radicalization on the Coast of Kenya

Radicalization had caused great damage and loss as well as other effects to the people of coastal areas of Kenya. The study noted effects such as decline in Business and rise in unemployment. In areas most affected many retail businesses were closed for fear of being arrested. The hotel industry has been the most affected. Many hotels have been closed due to lack of business thereby occasioning loss of employment. According to key informants familiar with the hotel industry there were 5000 employees working in the hotels in Malindi and Kilifi beach areas.<sup>54</sup> However, after the rise of violent radicalization only about 50% are retained on seasonal employment. Currently bed occupancy is between 16 – 20%.<sup>55</sup> This has forced many investors to close their hotels. Similarly, some hotels have now turned to conferencing as a survival strategy. In all 54.3% of the respondents were aware of general business closures in the area but 37.0% knew of particular businesses that closed down following the dynamics of youth radicalization. Again radicalization has affected youth in various way: Loss of employment 38.1%, loss of family members 36.4%, and loss of friends 12.4%. Areas most affected by business closures are Majengo 34.5%, Likoni 21.2%, Watamu 14.2%, Chagamwe 8.0% and Kisauni 8.0%.

In addition there were noted effects such as relocation of residence. Many areas that suffered regular police swoops were vacated. In these areas there has been a radical decline in housing rent and many houses are still vacant. The house owners have been badly affected following loss of income. According to respondents 49.1% some people abandoned their homes or relocated to perceived safer areas and 16.4% know family friends who relocated The area's most affected by relocations are Majengo 39.3%, Likoni 22.1%, Lamu 17.9%, Kisauni 13.6%, Mpeketoni 10.0% and Ukunda 6.4%.

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<sup>54</sup> Yarrow, Abdiaziz B. "Countering Radicalization And Its Impact On National Security In East Africa: The Case For The Diplomatic Approach In Kenya." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

<sup>55</sup> Patterson, William R. "Islamic radicalization in Kenya." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (78) (2015).

Radicalization had effects on travel patterns. Many people are forced to revise their travel patterns. The areas perceived to be insecure are now avoided. The avoidance is at two levels: one can be a victim of police swoops or a victim of criminal gangs. Among the respondents 26.8% had not visited Majengo and Kisauni and had no intention of doing so in the near future.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

The involvement of youth in violence all over the world has become an important issue politically, socio-economically and psychologically. The consequences of youth violence are much traumatic both for themselves and for the victims, their families and communities. The involvement of youth in political and religious violence especially requires special attention, due to external actor to the violence, such as organized crime like terror networks. It is crucial to identify the risks and vulnerability of the youth under risk of getting involved in violent activities in order to understand why they radicalize.



**CHAPTER THREE**  
**MULTI-AGENCY STRATEGIES FOR DE RADICALIZATION OF THE KENYAN**  
**YOUTH**

**3.1 Introduction**

The chapter has discussed the various counter violent extremism and terrorism strategies that have been applied globally, regionally and in Kenya in the fight. The strategies included Military strategy, Police and Intelligence Assets, and Legislative and financial controls. The chapter has discussed their effectiveness in ensuring the terrorism vice is dealt upon with. In addition the chapter has also discussed how regional bodies have been of help as a strategy in fighting terrorism in Kenya. The role of worldwide institutions such as the UN, AU, civil societies and IGAD has all been discussed.

**3.2 Multi-Agency Strategies for De Radicalization of the Youth in Kenya**

Based on the findings respondent were aware of a few multi-agency strategies. However these strategies were gaining effectiveness in reducing the cases of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya. Respondents urged due to increasing the number of youth in radicalization and recruitment cases, national agencies in security and partners in development should come up with more anti-terrorism strategies, development and underdeveloped policies such as the Terrorism Act; 2012 and Security (Amendment) Act; 2014.

Other studies have shown that extremist leaders and extremist practitioners respond to rapid growth and recruitment, increased development investment in coastal and fringe areas of the northeast, rehabilitation of ex-combatants, increased inclusive value, and more education. It has been found that several measures are needed to reduce the spreading of the idea of extremism. It

includes interventions covering the three levels of prevention (primary, secondary and tertiary) of the public health model.<sup>56</sup>

As per the findings the multi-agency primary prevention strategy is a comprehensive approach that targets the entire community. The intervention at primary level aims to reduce the main causes of the behavior of extremism violence through addressing of economic and other grievances which drag the group towards violent extremism. The multinational prevention strategy at secondary level targets organizations recognized as at risk of severe extremism. This level of intervention is designed to halt rapid evolutionary processes and reduce future evolutionary efforts. The third-stage multilateral strategy is actively planning for extremists and focuses on extremist individuals or groups. In many parts of the world, the term "multi-agency strategy" and in Kenya are the efforts to preventing and countering the rapid development of terrorists in the world.<sup>57</sup>

### **3.3 The Frameworks for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Mombasa County**

Mombasa County has suffered perhaps some of the worst cases of violent extremism in recent history in Kenya. This has been manifested through a number of attacks related to VE which have resulted into deaths of innocent people and destruction of property. Initially use of hard security approaches seemed to be the state's response to acts of violent extremism and terrorism in the county.<sup>58</sup> However, in recent months, the move towards soft approaches has received prominence since the development and launch of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC).

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<sup>56</sup> □ Subedi, Dambaru B. "Early warning and response for preventing radicalization and violent extremism." *Peace Review* 29, no. 2 (2017): 135-143.

<sup>57</sup> Chatfield, Akemi Takeoka, Christopher G. Reddick, and Uuf Brajawidagda. "Tweeting propaganda, radicalization and recruitment: Islamic state supporters multi-sided twitter networks." In *Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research*, pp. 239-249. 2015. □ □

<sup>58</sup> Lang, Adam Peter. "The 'Prevent Duty' (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) and its Impact on English Secondary Schools: A View from Leadership." *Journal of Dialogue Studies* (2019): 185.

The NSCVE has proposed nine pillars through which the soft approaches can be actualized. These are: Psychosocial, Educational, Political, Security, Faith Based and Ideological, Training and Capacity Building, Arts and Culture, Legal and Political Pillar and Media and Online. While the hard security approaches looked at CVE purely as a security problem and the government security structures as the sole body with the monopoly to respond to violent extremism, the soft approaches as propagated by the NSCVE encourage multi-sectoral approaches to CVE.

Whereas the NSCVE is being implemented at the national level through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the NCTC requires that counties formulate Action Plans which explain how specific counties intend to implement the NSCVE at the county level.<sup>59</sup> The County Action Plans (CAPs), respond to issues which are peculiar to the county. It therefore means that while the NSCVE provides broad guidelines to prevent and counter violent extremism as any strategy would do, the CAPs go into the historical and contemporary backgrounds of each of the counties, analyses how these histories have led people to embrace VE ideologies and recommends remedial actions based on the nine pillars. The NCTC has issued the Guide to Developing County Action Plans (GDCAP) which is a framework through which CAPs are formulated.<sup>60</sup>

The GDCAP provides for the process of developing the CAPs and participation of a diversity of stakeholders from various sectors in the county. It further provides that CAP process is co- chaired by the County Commissioner and the governor. The two similarly co-chair the County Engagement Forum- a multi-sectoral forum in charge of the CAP implementation process. This participatory approach is consistent with the spirit of the NSCVE and the GDCAP which require that all PCVE activities in the county get their mandate from the CAP. Besides the Mombasa

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid pp. 90-92

<sup>60</sup> Anyim, Tom. "The Role Of Border Communities In Counter Terrorism In Africa." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2019.

County Action Plan, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu have also finalized their CAPs and there are a number of other counties in the process of formulating theirs. Ideally, all the 47 counties should have theirs since VE is very dynamic and counties which are yet to report VE activities may be hotspots in the future. Therefore, the CAPs should provide for opportunities for inter-county learning and sharing of information.<sup>61</sup>

### **3.3.1 The Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE)**

It is with the above background that the Governor for Mombasa County and the County Commissioner of Mombasa with support from HAKI Africa and Coast based civil society organizations led the process of developing the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE). The MCAP-PCVE was launched on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2017 at the Mombasa Technical Training Institute before local, national and international CVE stakeholders including the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Centre who was the Chief Guest.<sup>62</sup>

The Governor and County Commissioner as co-chairs worked with a steering committee comprising of members from various state and non-state actors from Mombasa in spearheading the entire process of developing and launching the plan. The MCAP-PCVE is informed by the NSCVE, GDCAP and the County Government's Strong Citizenship (CGSC) Framework. The CGSC recognizes that without civic knowledge and a disposition to responsibly engage, a person cannot effectively practice citizenship.

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid p. 60

<sup>62</sup> Danjibo, Nathaniel Dominic, and Abosede Omowumi Babatunde. "Youth Bulge, Radicalization, and Deradicalization in the Lake Chad Basin." *New Architecture of Regional Security in Africa: Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin* (2019): 413.

In the context of Mombasa, the CGSC is premised on telling the Mombasa story and developing credible narratives which respond to the strong cultural heritage of Mombasa. The CGSC approach is further aimed at building the resilience of residents of Mombasa County towards countering violent extremism.

### **3.3.2 Peace Efforts in Coast Counterterrorism**

Efforts of Peace Building and responding to racial and religious extremism in coastal areas began in 2005 with the Danish International Development Agency. It emphasized on peace, security and development programs, and it organized five civil society organizations to combat extremism in coastal areas. From that time CT has emphasized a non-violent extremist approach based on efforts to strengthen the society and reduce violent extremism. The Coastal CVE program was strengthened through the KTI Kenya Transition Initiative, which is a U.S. Supported Agency for International Development (CVE), which focuses on select areas in the coast and Nairobi and addresses the main objectives of violent extremism. The country's Strategy for Counter-Terrorism was started in the year 2015 represents the government's obligation to integrate barrier-free methods designed to prevent the country from carrying out stringent counter-terrorism measures.<sup>63</sup>

The Strategy for National Combined Violent Extremism (NCVE), officially started in 2016 September, focused its attention on terrorism by incorporating CVE volunteer cooperation practices that bring together government, society, civil society, the worldwide organizations and the private institutions. Since then, the control of the CVE program has been spread, by preparing CVE district-level action plans in Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale and some places in North of Kenya.

Corporations of county governments and society individuals (especially in the most affected places) need to be established with the aim of increasing interventions of CVE as legitimate ones,

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<sup>63</sup> Ruteere and Mutahi, 2018

considering local framing, violent extremism history, and evolving methods of extremism.<sup>64</sup> From the year 2016, the SCORE Foundation (strengthening communities resilient for extremism) did provide training and grants to CSOs (Civil society's organization) in several coastal places. In this context, the Government of Kwale County Program is admirable, as it was one of the first CVE program strategies at the county level. The counties-level strategy focuses on specific attractions for VEs in counties, and attempts to resolve VEs through specific interventions in the county levels. The Kwale county strategy being successful has led to the development of similar county strategies in, Lamu Kilifi and Mombasa.

### **3.4 Multi-Agency Strategies for De Radicalization of the Youth: Local Actors**

Kenya's Strategies on counterterrorism and radicalization affect all the 47 counties including Mombasa County. It was noted that due to the intersection with local and regional politics, the United States-led Worldwide War on Terrorism (GWOT) has emerged in different ways in diverse regions. Peacekeeping efforts to address serious ethnicity and issues of religion in coastal areas begin with the Peace, Security and Development Program implemented in 2005 by the Danish International Development Agency, which aimed to respond to rapid coastal development civil society brings organizations together. Since then, anti-terrorism rhetoric has emphasized counterterrorism strategies and radical approaches by solidification of efforts of society in preventing and reducing violent extremism. The Coastal CVE program was strengthened through the Kenya Transaction Plan (KTI), a CVE program supported by the US Agency for International Development, which focuses on selected communities in Nairobi and coast region.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Forster, Peter. "Beslan: Counter-terrorism incident command: Lessons learned." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, no. 3 (2018).

<sup>65</sup> Grieve, John. "The complexity of partnerships in the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy. What might we learn from contemporary efforts to counter hate crime?." *Multi-Agency Working in Criminal Justice 2e: Theory, Policy and Practice* (2019): 155.

Based on the findings the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was started in 2015, demonstrates the government's flexible approach to complement the country's tough security measures against terrorism. The state's counterterrorism and offensive strategy was officially launched in September 2016, enabling the government, civil society, the worldwide institutions and private organizations to simultaneously expand counter-terrorism, by integrating collaborative counter-terrorism strategies and aggressive approaches.<sup>66</sup>

Subsequently, the designed decentralized anti-terrorism strategies and aggressive plans by designing strategic district-wide strategic action plans, including quail, Lamu, Mombasa, and several provinces in the north. Partnerships with Kenya's county government and community actors, especially in the most influential states, need to increase the involvement of multiple agencies locally in relation to local, violence, and history and violence extremism. Justification takes into account the history of the family tree and the genealogy of the evolving extreme ideologies.

### **3.4.1 Legislative, Law Enforcement and Border Security**

It was also noted that the government of Kenya actively used the Anti-Terrorism Act (revised in 2014) in investigating and prosecuting terrorists, although in 2017 a law enforcement plan to improve suspected terrorists seeking legal aid was rejected. In August, the government launched a plan to assist with national legal aid, but the total guards stipulated by law did not provide funds. The judiciary supports prosecutions based on the rule of law when prosecuting terrorism cases with the same clear laws and standards as other cases of criminal. In a ruling, the Supreme Court overthrew five criminals convicted of terrorist visits to Somalia after the government of Kenya had failed to follow lawful processes to classify Somalia as a non-moving area.

According to the study, anti-terrorism operations are divided into three major divisions which are: National Police, Kenyan Police General Service, the Directorate of Criminal

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<sup>66</sup> Hellsten, Sirku. *Radicalisation and terrorist recruitment among Kenya's youth*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2016

Investigation Service (which does include this units the Police Anti-Terrorism Service, Bomb Disposal Unit, and Cyber Forensic Department) and Kenya Administrative Police (including Rural Border Patrol Unit).<sup>67</sup>

### **3.4.2 The Elements of the Kenya Defence Forces**

The study established that responsibilities have also been shared between agencies. In some cases, information sharing has improved, and if the threat information cannot be distributed correctly, compromises are uneven. Overall, resource scarcity, inadequate training, corruption and unclear leadership and control have hampered this effect. The Kenya National Counter-Terrorism Center (NTC) has expanded its support for weak attacks by private security companies and key sectors. Kenyan security agencies have focused on the immediate dangers of large cities and tourist areas, especially universities, shopping malls, hotels and resorts.

Findings reveal that terrorists exploited Kenya's sparsely populated border regions and largely uncontrolled land borders to conduct attacks and move operatives in and out of the country. The State Department's Anti-Error Assistance (ATA) program trained Rural Border Patrol personnel and provided equipment for strategic land reconnaissance and border security operations.<sup>68</sup> Other ATA programs include law enforcement training on active shooter threats. Kenyan officials continue efforts to develop a coordinated inter-agency oversight strategy. In April, Kenya agreed to introduce a global automated target system with the United States to facilitate the exchange of pre-flight information by air travel. Kenya Worked to Improve Aviation Safety and Security at Kenya International Airport, Nairobi.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Coppieters, Bruno. "Conscientious objection policies and the Soviet national ethos." *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 8, no. 4 (1992): 186-209.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid pp.45-46

<sup>69</sup> Sesay A. 'Regional and sub-regional conflict management efforts', in S. Akinrinade and A. Sesay (eds), *Africa in the Post-Cold War International System*, London, (1998).



Kenya has proven a common cross-border operations center in several immigration and cross-border ports to facilitate the exchange of information using the Personal Identity Security Comparison and Assessment System (PISCES) of major immigration. Maintain a passenger inspection partnership Immigration officials have rented government watch lists. Checklists often lack basic equipment for small entrance ports.<sup>70</sup>

It was further established that, the government of Kenya is preventing the passage of international terrorists in the country, this include Kenya returning overseas by joining Al-Shabaab or ISIS. In 2014, March, the Kenya's Police did arrest 3 ISIS pilgrims in Malindi. In May, police from both South Sudan and Kenya cooperated to return three Kenyans and Somalis believed to have been hired by ISIS in Malindi to the arrested ISIS (Libya). Yes Kenya security services have identified and protested plots by the terrorists and stopped several of terrorist planned attacks and incidents in the country. The Kenyan government or its agents are still accused of arbitrary and illegal killings of known or specifically suspected criminals, including terrorists.

As noted, court cases of terrorism are often solved slowly. In the second half of 2017, four Kenyan cases were also accused of attacking Westgate Mall in 2015, and four Kenyans and Tanzanians helped in the attack at Garissa University in 2015. At the end of 2016, accused of explosives against British terrorism, Jeremy Grant was given a sentence of nine year imprisonment for further convictions in the year 2015.<sup>71</sup>

The findings reveal that the Kenyan government has been working with the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi on security information issues and security threats, and is backed by a professional public services team to combat the war on terrorism. Kenya's national elections require additional

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<sup>70</sup> Owuor, Naman. "Impact of Strategic Communications in Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism by The National Counter Terrorism Centre in Pumwani Area, Nairobi Kenya." PhD diss., United States International University-Africa, 2019

<sup>71</sup> Anyim, Tom. "The Role Of Border Communities In Counter Terrorism In Africa." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2019

resources and additional personnel to perform security activities, and the Kenyan government must restrict some terrorist training and redistribution.<sup>72</sup>

### **3.4.3 The National Intelligence Service**

The unique social, cultural, religious, political, psychological and economic aspects of the Republic of Kenya allow the generation of terrorists from different generations. The affinity of both these negative and social issues required equal different reverse evaporation strategies. Various strategies determine the threat put by terrorists based on their gender or public image. Therefore, every aspect of the strategy did focus on the unique inputs adopted by the terrorist for the rapid development of youth.<sup>73</sup>

Recent events in Kenya have shown that the existence of information has contributed to the development of a terrorist strategy. The rapid development and elimination of terrorist cells and gangs in East Africa by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is a successful multi-faceted strategy. It was noted that the intelligence service found dozens of terrorist recruits working in cyberspace, and several were arrested. Since the fourth quarter of 2015, Hammer has been expanding its work on terrorist cells managed by Somali Islamic Young jihadists.

In addition to Special Forces border operations, military operations against Islam are also increasing in Somalia and terrorist groups are confused. According to the findings this has led to the arrest and apprehension of dozens of major terrorists in al-Shabaab, before several cases are on the watch list of about 100 terrorists in courts, and intelligence agencies are closely monitoring the cells of key African terrorists.<sup>74</sup> The role of information services is to identify and provide effective

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<sup>72</sup> Soderbaum,Fr.and Tavares,R. *Problematizing Regional Organizations in African security*, in *Regional Organizations in African Security* (Fredrik Soderbaum and Rodrigo Tavares,eds), (Routledge,New York,2011).

<sup>73</sup> Ratcliffe, Jerry, ed. *Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence*. Federation Press, 2009 □

<sup>74</sup> Den Boer, Monica, and Irina Wiegand. "From convergence to deep integration: Evaluating the impact of EU counter-terrorism strategies on domestic arenas." *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no. 2-3 (2015): 377-401.

response information to national security threats. This is because information services are limited to processing related information. So as to neutralize any threat effectively it depends on the police.

However, the National Intelligence Agency needs strong internal security policies, awareness to the public, efficient enforcement of the law, and most essential coordinating and combating terrorism efficiently.<sup>75</sup> The strategy of Kenya is focusing on extremist and terrorist threats. The main goal of this strategy is to ensure that the country's assets are protected from civilians and terrorism. The government ensures that terrorist attacks and fueled conditions are defined and destroyed. Differences play an essential part in creating negative economy, political, and social conditions, so terrorists cannot exploit them. However, these various strategies do not rule out the use of power to enforce law, protect lives and protect Kenyan property.

#### **3.4.4 Civil Society Organizations**

According to the findings, a strong civil society is essential for democracy, security and prosperity. In particular, the United Nations strategy recommends "encouraging NGOs and civil society to participate appropriately to strengthen efforts to implementing the strategy." The General Assembly is the first official review of the September 2008 "appropriate participation in strategy implementation" strategy and is expected to advance further, especially through encouragement. The increase includes interactions with member countries, the United Nations and the United Nations system. The "proper" founding conditions are defined by civil society organizations, and thus reflect the views of UN member states on civil society organizations. This diversity was reflected in the September 2008 negotiations that many countries oppose the inclusion of language, proposals that encourage the participation of civil society organizations.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> McIntyre, Joan, Douglas Palmer, and Justin Franks. "A framework for thinking about collaboration within the intelligence community." *Pherson Associates* 1 (2009).

<sup>76</sup> Kundnani, Arun, and Ben Hayes. "The globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism policies." (2018)□

It was noted that while the strategy is not self-evident and will be discussed in more detail below, civil society organizations can play an important role in implementing many different elements. This strategy is distinguished as a "survival file" that changes over time. Civil society organizations can play an important role in ensuring timely implementation, with a longer understanding of strategies to be implemented in the long term, by sector. For an anti-terrorism strategy to be effective, civil society must be part of its development and implementation, as extensive participation of state and civil society organizations is used as a means of addressing issues between the state and society. Anti-terrorism can be used to reduce terrorism if necessary. Non-governmental organizations and other civil society organizations are actively involved in long-term efforts to address the spread of terrorism that will support this effort. For example, civil society organizations support sustainable development, reach Millennium Development Goals, provide humanitarian aid, promote marginalized societies, encourage dialogue, protect human rights and governance. Violent conflicts aimed at expanding political participation and empowering women to prevent and resolve women. They are committed to providing a constructive way to resolve complaints and address marginalized and vulnerable groups.

In many cases, the involvement of civil society organizations is through contact with groups that have little or no access to the country. More broadly, civil society organizations can provide the power of community stability when the government is an interim government with no government every few years.<sup>77</sup>

As it was asserted by a respondent, the mistrust of mainstream Civil Society clouds its judgment towards the need to focus at common citizen is focused more to their targets and goals. Information as to how Civil Society could participate in the meeting was not readily available, and some NGOs discovered that they were required to apply for accreditation and "vetting" to the NGO

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<sup>77</sup> Thomas, Paul. "Changing but still controversial: Britain's Prevent Counter-Terrorism Strategy."

Council if they wished to participate.<sup>78</sup> A Summit addressing such grave issues affecting the region, while it seems intent on not being a cosmetic talk shop of profound speeches also seems fearful of dissenting opinion and criticism. This could also mean it is a missed opportunity that will certainly not have the buy-in of a vital sector in society that could offer a vital bridge between the state and sometimes marginalized communities. *“The exclusion of Civil Society from this regional conference on CVE is a disturbing indication that Kenya continues to employ a tactic to countering both terrorists and the extreme violence which has proved to be divisive. This, as has been evidenced in the past, is not useful for the longer-term tackling of CVE,”* says Njonjo Mue, Senior Advisor of Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice.

### **3.4.5 The Judicial System in Kenya**

As established by the study, the judicial system and the police weaknesses have resulted in failure because the police have not provided enough evidence to prosecute the suspects. Domestic law is not the only way to determine whether or not you have the ability to arrest and prosecute terrorists, and does not necessarily reflect the country's ability to halt terrorist activities.<sup>79</sup> Other factors are also important, including the effective implementation of these laws, the state and strengths of the system of justice together with effectively implementation of a country's unique path. However, with the growing interest in enforcing and expanding anti-country laws among African governments, activity will increase over the next few years. The recently passed Kenyan Security (Revised) Act provides a warning of how these laws can demand political and structural imbalances.

It was further noted that Kenya has been one of the strongest opponents of the anti-terrorism legislation since September 11, but in 2014, the Kenyan government, at least the administration and

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<sup>78</sup> Kuzmič, Michal. "Community approach in preventive counter-terrorism policies of the United Kingdom." (2011).

<sup>79</sup> El Salahi, Zakariah. "Preventing violent extremism through community work? Essentialism and manipulation." *Community Empowerment: Critical Perspectives from Scotland* (2010): 13□

its allies within the parliament, introduced and passed conflict-safety laws.<sup>80</sup> Major political opposition parties and many civic groups alleged that the law violated parliamentary rules and constitutional requirements, fiercely protesting the provisions of the bill and how it was passed. The Supreme Court supported some opposition in the ruling that the eight provisions of the law were unconstitutional. Despite the most controversial provisions, the law expanded the powers of the president, cabinet secretaries and secretaries of the National Intelligence Service, arguing that human rights activists and political commentators were returning back to Kenya after the end of the Moi era.<sup>81</sup>

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) can now approve classification to perform tasks such as entering locations, receiving information, compiling information, storing information, returning information, and establishing information. It is not the only provision that has a comprehensive definition. The court sentenced him to 14 years in prison, saying: "It can be understood directly or indirectly, and incited or wanted out to carry out terrorist acts. All the intelligence personnel of the other department said:" They were arresting and detaining anyone suspected of involvement in a case or case that is a threat to national security. "

Other remaining provisions in the bill reduce New Shekel's legislative oversight, allowing organizations to request information from government agencies, detain suspects for 90 days, and arrest individuals multiple times for the same crime.<sup>82</sup> It was asserted that in Kenya, counterterrorism laws focusing on expanding government prosecution power may be a problem and not a beneficial one. As long as the second piece of terrorism law gains momentum, the third piece of legislation, which focuses on protecting civil liberties and human rights from terrorism, will

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<sup>80</sup> Den Boer, Monica, and Irina Wiegand. "From convergence to deep integration: Evaluating the impact of EU counter-terrorism strategies on domestic arenas." *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no. 2-3 (2015): 377-401. □

<sup>81</sup> Odero, Hillary Odhiambo. "Multilateral Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: Kenya and the UN." PhD diss., MA Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2009 □

<sup>82</sup> Miles, William FS. "Deploying development to counter terrorism: Post-9/11 transformation of US Foreign Aid to Africa." *African Studies Review* 55, no. 3 (2012): 27-60

progress towards peace and stability. In Kenya, and many other countries that enjoy extensive constitutional protection in the region, the independence of the judiciary and its strength, as well as the decisions of the leadership of the government that balance civil protection and civil liberties, determine progress in this area.<sup>83</sup>

### **3.4.6 Efforts by Religious Leaders and Groups**

An important component of religious leaders can help addressing the issue that promotes the spreading of terrorism within and across multiple religious groups. Leaders in religion at the diverse levels, in diverse religions, play an important part in promotion of inter-religious interaction, tolerance and inter-religious understanding, and strategies are all important.<sup>84</sup> For example, one of the defendants said that priests are often in a unique position to occupy senior government positions and interact with the public when compared to other government societies. The role of religious groups and leaders in Kenya in fighting terrorism cannot be underestimated. In Kenya, acts of terrorism are religiously based, so terrorist groups try to divide the state into religious marches and create such conflicts.

A recent major attack on the University of Garissa gathered religious leaders in condemning the attacking and destroying the conflicts among Muslim and Christian leaders.<sup>85</sup> Bishop Julius Kalu, a bishop of the southeastern coastal city of Mombasa, said that terrorists wanted to divide the country along religious lines and called for resistance to the religious conflict. As a fact, the leaders of Islam did condemn attacking and urged terrorists to not commit crimes using religion. Abdullah Silat of Kenya's Supreme Council said after the attack on Garissa University, the Muslim

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<sup>83</sup> Skoczylis, Joshua J. "Is CONTEST Innovative? Counter-Terrorism and Prevent." In *The Local Prevention of Terrorism*, pp. 45-73. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid pp. 34-35

<sup>85</sup> Grieve, John. "The complexity of partnerships in the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy. What might we learn from contemporary efforts to counter hate crime?." *Multi-Agency Working in Criminal Justice 2e: Theory, Policy and Practice* (2019): 155.

community in Garissa County strongly condemned atrocities against innocent college students. In addition, Vatican Foreign Minister Cardinal Pietro Barrollin sent a telegram to the Catholic Bishops' Conference in Kenya to express Pope Francis condolences. The telegram said that the Pope, who leads the Catholic Church around the world, condemned this cruel and uncompromising terrorist act and prayed for the criminals. He urged new efforts to cooperate with all men and women in Kenya to stop this violence and start a new era of brotherhood, justice and peace.<sup>86</sup>

It was also found that Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) has been on the fore front in counter terrorism measures within the Muslim community. SUPKEM conducted an investigation to deepen its understanding of the motivations of extremists in coastal areas, calling for amnesty regulations and asking the al-joining youth to return to join the National Cohesion and Integration Committee Youth organization. Established in 1973, SUPKEM is a Kenyan government official among senior officials under an organization dedicated to promoting Islamic understanding. In 1979, it was formally recognized as the only organization capable of representing all Muslims in Kenya and maintaining contact with Islamic organizations outside Kenya. As everyone knows, the Imam Committee, supports the Islamic faith, the Imam community in Somalia, the Movement of Liberation of People in Sudan together with the Senate, along with the Kenyan government to eliminate the mistaken ideology towards Muslim extremists for many innocent people have vowed to unite.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Groot, Anouk. "Developing Counter-narratives to Challenge Violent Extremist Narratives as Part of a Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Effort: Singapore and the United Kingdom." Master's thesis, 2016.

<sup>87</sup> Piombo, Jessica R. *Terrorism and US counter-terrorism programs in Africa: An overview*. Naval postgraduate school Monterey CA center for contemporary conflict, 2007



### **3.5 Multi-Agency Strategies for De Radicalization of the Youth: The Role of International Organizations**

The role of worldwide institutions like the UN, EU, AU unions, civil societies and IGAD were noted as part of multi-agency interventions toward reducing cases of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya.

#### **3.5.1 The Role Played by UN Security Council**

Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) imposes legally binding obligations on all countries and requires the establishment of suitable legislation, regulations and good framework and Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) and subsequent resolutions to ensuring that forces take any measures to combat terrorism. This is in line with international law, especially international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.<sup>88</sup>

It was noted that the role of anti-terrorist intelligence is to obtain reliable and timely information about the details of attacks by terrorists and to prevent such attacks.<sup>89</sup> The core component of intelligence is the collection, analysis and dissemination of relevant parties. In addition to gathering intelligence, effective intelligence analysis can warn terrorists against attacking or assessing terrorists. The process also directs more intelligence gathering to fill gaps in assessments. Intelligence analysis can determine the intent, capabilities, and threats of terrorist organizations. The link between security and development is clear. The government's weakness affects the stability of the region and its ability to withstand the growing threats of poverty and security. Poverty creates inherent instability and may affect uncontrolled migration flows.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4345th meeting, on 28 September 2001 (S/RES/1373 (2001), ., Resolution 1456 (2003) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 4688th meeting, on 20 January 2003 (S/RES/1456 (2003), .

<sup>89</sup> Spencer, Alexander. "Counter-Terrorism in New Europe." *International Public Policy Review* 2 (2006): 92-112.

<sup>90</sup> Hunsicker, A. 2006. *Understanding International Counter Terrorism*. Washington: Universal Publishers.

As revealed by the study, lacking education and opportunities of employment by the young people has heightened tensions and made them tend to collaborate with terrorist groups, recruit or recruit them for financial reasons.<sup>91</sup> The social and political consequences of development issues and the use of resources are not limited to economic considerations, but violence and terrorism are often part of the problem. An increase in economic opportunities among high-risk populations may address attitudes that lead to violent extremism. Women may be particularly important in the local counter-extremism (CVE) action. Terrorists combat violent extremism by targeting resistance to recruiting and resilience creation by groups exposed to violent bias.<sup>92</sup>

According to the findings, over the past decade, government initiatives to combat CVE have evolved in a sustained response to terrorist incidents and have become part of a coordinated national policy or workflow for coordinating the resolution of terrorism and the rapid development of violence. Rapid development as a simple security issue is misleading. It is a multidisciplinary issue requiring a deep understanding of the nature of multi-faceted response, the arrival of multiple agencies in a country, and violent extremism between agencies of government and non-governmental organizations. PPPs (public private partnership) can facilitate major efforts by providing story and information about violence. To propose alternative non-violent means to achieve common goals, promote institutional diversity. States should ensure meaningful participation in building trust in society and mobilizing community resources. Law enforcement must recognize that one of the most important CVE regulations is rulemaking and trust, particularly those at risk.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Zagaris, Bruce. "I. MONEY LAUNDERING, COUNTER-TERRORISM, FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT AND BANK SECRECY." *MONEY* 20, no. 5 (2014). □

<sup>92</sup> Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*. Industrial Coll of The Armed Forces Washington DC, 2008.

<sup>93</sup> Bograkos, William. "Convergence: a review of narco-terrorism for the osteopathic family physician." *Osteopathic Family Physician* 4, no. 2 (2012): 48-54.

In addition the study noted that EU's support to counter-terrorism in Africa assumed a number of dimensions and is based on a range of instruments and mechanisms. Perhaps the most prominent dimension of the cooperation is the support given to different peace support operations, some of them having specific counter-terrorism mandate.<sup>94</sup> The Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), was established in 2015 to tackle the terrorist risk created by the group of Boko Haram in the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and with full endorsement and retroactive formal authorization by the AU PSC.<sup>56</sup> The MNJTF was mandated to carry out a number of tasks including "executing military operations to curb the Boko Haram growth and other affiliate terrorist groups undertakings and eliminate their presence".<sup>95</sup>

As observed, in the Horn of Africa, the EU increased its security cooperation, including in CT, through various mechanisms. Some of the existing EU missions (ESDP) such as the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) have the specific objective of supporting the security sector in Somalia. Among other things, the EUTM has been engaged on the provision of individual and specialized training to Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers as well as in enhancing the civilian personnel and parliamentary committees' capacities in executing their functions within the country's security sector.<sup>96</sup>

In addition, the EU became one of the key actors in launching the violence prevention policy in September 2016 by providing technical assistance supporting the establishment of the plan and taking the helm of CVE-lead within the S-6, i.e. the six main security supporters in Somalia. Moreover, the EU has provided support in P/CVE through different regional and country specific projects. Some of these P/CVE projects, such as the STRIVE project focused on countries such as

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<sup>94</sup> The MNJTF was mandated to carry out a number of tasks including "conducting military operations to prevent the expansion.

<sup>95</sup> 106Purdy Margaret, "Countering Terrorism: The Missing Pillar," in, *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No.1 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 3-24.

<sup>96</sup> Nelles, Wayne. "American public diplomacy as pseudo-education: A problematic national security and counter-terrorism instrument." *International Politics* 41, no. 1 (2004): 65-93.

Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Other projects have a regional dimension on the Horn of Africa region and focus on specific issues related to counter-terrorism. Cases in point are two of the EU funded projects on the region namely, “Law Enforcement capacity on counterterrorism in the Greater Horn of continent of Africa and Republic of Yemen” and “Countering the financing of activities of terrorists in the Horn of the continent.”<sup>97</sup>.

### **3.5.2 African Union**

Though the post 9/11 period is touted a significant landmark in curbing terrorism, global and regional counter-terrorism efforts actually date back to a much earlier era. Contrary to this prevailing assumption, various legislations and institutional frameworks have been developed to address different forms of terrorism at the global level starting from the 1960’s. The international community adopted about 12 conventions dealing with different aspects of terrorism between 1963 and 1999 which are still serving as some of the key universal instruments to date.

In the context of the African continent, it was established that attempts at collective efforts of addressing the threat of terrorism in Africa already took place at the beginning of the 1990’s. In regardless of the contentions surrounding the novelty of some of these changes, this narrative has gradually established itself and is serving as a basis not just for understanding the existing threats but also for the quest for the requisite remedies thereof. One of the enduring implications of these changes has been a re-examination of existing global peace and security structures and norms. A key dimension of this re-examination has been the growing roles of the United Nations and regional organizations in managing crises either on their own or in collaboration with one another.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Schmid, A. Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism: terrorism and political violence Columbia: University Press. (2004).

<sup>98</sup> Ibid pp.79-80

According to the findings, inter-state cooperation was a vital aspect of the Convention.<sup>99</sup> The latter took various dimension including refraining from participation in and giving any type of support to the terrorists, to adoption of any legitimate measures to preventing using of their territories for purposes of terrorist; developing and strengthening ways to monitor and detect strategies related to committing terrorist acts; developing and strengthening border control; strengthening the protection and security of specific entities and individuals against terrorist acts; encouragement of the sharing of information and know how on actions and establishments of terrorist of data bases and for the collecting and analyses of data and information on elements of terrorism, crime groups, movements, and organizations; arrest, try, and/or transfer perpetrators of terrorist acts, to mention just a few.

Primarily, the threats and vulnerabilities arising from terrorism outweigh any of the existing frameworks and the capacities of many of the Member States or that of their regional or sub-regional organizations. The prevalence of these threats is further compounded with poor social, political, security, and economic conditions of most African states rife with unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, etc. Pockets of limited or “ungoverned spaces” in different corners of the continent create the enabling environment for breeding, training, and mobilization of terrorist groups. Furthermore, weak state capacities in these environments hamper counter- terrorism initiatives. The prevailing crises in certain parts of the continent create an additional layer of insecurity as in the case of Sahel-Sahara belt and Somalia. These are complex crises which have their own effects beyond the national borders, projecting serious security challenges to their wider neighborhoods.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Zedner, Lucia. "The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism." (2013): 681-685.

<sup>100</sup> Luke, Timothy 'Deterrence of contemporary terrorism has not been able to be thwarted by deterrence theory, 1993, p229-258

The AU and IGAD experience a number of common challenges which hold back the execution of effective CT strategies. These include the absence of effective criminal justice systems in their Member States; weak border control, coordination challenges (among different institutions and among member states); failure to designate national Focal Points of the ACSRT which is the continental coordinating organ for counter-terrorism. From a more operational or technical point of view, most member states lack the requisite technical capacity and know-how to conduct counter-terrorism effectively.<sup>101</sup> At least in the case of IGAD, most Member States lack “a comprehensive Counter-IED (C-IED) strategy. Evidently, the discussion in this paper reflects not just the state-of-the-art of counter-terrorism efforts in Africa but also the predicaments of implementing APSA in the wider sense. Extensive donor dependence is an important hurdle to implement APSA, wherein more than 90% of the security and peace budget is financed by external partners with clear implications for the sustainability of APSA and its interventions. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between the challenges of conducting effective counter terrorism in the continent and implementing APSA.<sup>102</sup>

According to the findings, as successive APSA Assessment Reports indicated, Africa’s continental peace and security framework is subjected to a big variety of challenges linked to absence of political will to utilize existing instruments, lack of coordination; limited role of CSOs; lack of coordination of existing legal contexts and procedures of decision making, to mention just a few. While these challenges have multiple implications on the outcome of the responses, two dimensions are worth highlighting, especially in relation to the theme of this workshop.

As a result of the collective effect of these problems, most interventions within the context of APSA have become ad hoc, erratic, and unsustainable, the latter due to the gross mismatch

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<sup>101</sup> Bograkos, William. "Convergence: a review of narco-terrorism for the osteopathic family physician." *Osteopathic Family Physician* 4, no. 2 (2012): 48-54

<sup>102</sup> While these challenges have multiple implications on the outcome of the responses, two dimensions are worth highlighting, especially in relation to the theme of this workshop, in February (2004).

between needs and existing resources. To a large extent, military solutions to crises have prevailed over political solutions to most crises. It is within such complex context that African actors have forged several partnerships with external players with so as to address some of the prevailing challenges and to share the burden of addressing crises. Against this background, the next section examines the nature of partnership among the AU, IGAD, and EU in the realm of counter-terrorism.<sup>103</sup>

### 3.5.3 Civil Societies

The findings shows that UN'S Strategy supports both non-governmental institutions and the governments to be in involved as suitable on how to boost determinations to execute the approach especially the objective that help in counterterrorism in local levels, national levels and international level. Clearly, the field of counter-terrorism has emerged as a crowded policy field with many players, some having shifting priorities and competing preferred approaches. Different forms of counter-violence extremism and terrorism have evolved in Africa through the years, but none achieved the level of effectiveness and coordination among the different actors required to tackle the versatile techniques of the terrorists and their determined commitment. This is also true in the case of the cooperation between the EU on one side and different African regional organizations, including the AU and IGAD, on the other side.<sup>104</sup>

Despite the number of areas of counter-terrorism cooperation mentioned in the paper, these regional and international players have not sufficiently coordinated their efforts at a continental level in a manner that benefits African states to effectively tackle the threat of terrorism. This is also the case in when it comes to the EU and its member states, as much of their engagement “have been

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<sup>103</sup> Horn of Africa, the EU has increased its security cooperation, including in CT.

<sup>104</sup> Richards, Julian. "State Policy and Strategy: Prevent,“Multi-agency” Responses, and the Way Forward." In *Extremism, Radicalization and Security*, pp. 173-201. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017.

<sup>104</sup> Wilkinson, P; Stewart, A.M Contemporary Research on Terrorism. By University of Aberdeen (1987).

with AU member states, not the commission”. To a large extent this is attributed to the AU’s lack of a coherent plan to combat terrorism.

In addition, effective counter-terrorism cooperation among these actors is undercut by other factors such as member states reluctance to cede sovereignty on what they see as an issue of domestic security, and because EU member states’ preference to deal directly with militaries they know well.<sup>105</sup> Information and intelligence sharing between governments has been erratic, and is generally perceived to be inadequate”. Among other things, a prevailing trust deficit that is among countries found in the sub-region compounds the above-mentioned challenges. Most importantly, over-reliance on external actors has been a teething problem in counter-terrorism both in the continental and sub-regional context. The combined effect of all these challenges have rendered the continent’s counterterrorism being mainly as “mainly ineffective and unsustainable”.<sup>106</sup>

#### **3.5.4 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

Arguably, the study established that IGAD has been lauded as pioneering Anti-terrorism cooperation in the sub-Africa Region. Reflecting this, the IGAD Task Force on Legal Cooperation against Terrorism in Sub-region, convened by the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation<sup>107</sup> (CGCC), characterized the sub-regional institution as one that is taking part in dealing with terrorists in the Horn of Africa more practical responsibility in firming up institutions against terrorists and international organized crimes.. The IGAD’s role as a fore-runner in CT cooperation is similarly presented in a relative perspective as “more proactive in comparison with other sub-regional organizations”. As Jolyon Ford argued, that

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<sup>105</sup> Wilkinson, P; Stewart, A.M Contemporary Research on Terrorism. By University of Aberdeen Press, Aberdeen, United Kingdom. (1987). pp 144.

<sup>106</sup> Asamoah, A. A. More importantly, the political vacuum and long-standing insecurity in Somalia has enabled various forms of terrorist and extremist elements to thrive in the country, (2008).83(1), pp 87–100.

<sup>107</sup> de Londras, F. explaining IGAD’s role in counter terrorism is the prevalence and gravity of terrorism in the region =(2014). 2399477



IGAD has helped some nations on the way to deal with terrorism through its way capacity building program since June 2003.

According to the outcomes, what helps in explaining IGAD's role in countering terrorism is the prevalence and gravity of terrorists in the region, along with other major security threats such as transnational organized crime and existing inter- and intra-state conflicts. Since 1993 Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have encountered terrorist attacks emanating from radical organizations based in Somalia. In the pre-9/11 era, two of Africa's landmark terrorist attacks, symbolized by the United States buildings of Embassies (in both the cities Nairobi and Dar es Salaam respectively) took place in the heartland of the sub-region in Kenya and in its adjacent neighborhood Tanzania. More importantly, the political vacuum and long-standing insecurity in Somalia has enabled various forms of terrorist and extremist elements to thrive in the country.<sup>108</sup> These terrorist elements have increasingly projected regional vulnerability and threats to most of the countries in the IGAD region, enmeshing a complex interplay among the regional aspirations of some of these groups and the historical, political and security dynamics of some of the states in the sub-region.

Driven by the gravity of these threats and other sources of vulnerabilities, IGAD has developed several legal and institutional outlines for addressing terrorism in the region as early as 2002. IGAD developed the IGAD Plan of Action for Preventing and Combating Terrorists in the year 2002. Among other things, the Plan of Action did recognize the importance of inter-nations law enforcements and crime justice to be place using a firm legal outlines.<sup>109</sup> In 2006, IGAD launched the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), a four-year program

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<sup>108</sup> Kagwanja, P. More importantly, the political vacuum and long-standing insecurity in Somalia has enabled various forms of terrorist and extremist elements to thrive in the country, Issue 3, (2006). 72-86.

<sup>109</sup> Dr. Attalah H. Bashir, Within ISSP, Counter-terrorism has been embedded as one pillar, among other components namely Trans-national Organized Crime," 20 September 2007. [On file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

funded by EU and other donors.<sup>110</sup> ICPAT had its primary focus on capacity building and confidence building among the member states, and targeted the following five areas of counter-terrorism measures in judicial enhancement; promoting in the inter-agency coordination in counterterrorism with IGAD members; controlling the border enhancement; training provision, best practices and information sharing; corporation strategy sharing.

In 2009, the Ministers of justice of IGAD member countries accepted on two draft conventions on extradition and mutual legal assistance. These conventions, which have been ratified so far by two-member states, did provide a firm outline for cooperation of legal frameworks against terrorists in the sub-region.<sup>111</sup> In October 2011, IGAD's main counter-terrorism organ ICPAT, having a limited mandate of constructing nations abilities to resisting terrorists and promote the region's securing cooperation, was restructured into IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP). This transformation was born out of the wide-ranging nature of the sub-region's security threats and the ensuing demand for concerted, holistic, regional approach and collaboration among IGAD's member states.<sup>30</sup> Within ISSP, Counter-terrorism has been embedded as one pillar, among other components namely Trans-national Organized Crime, Maritime Security, and Security Institutions Capacity Building. This pillar has the central objective of constructing both nations and the regions ability in fighting terrorists, organized crimes, violent extremists and radicalization in the region.<sup>112</sup>

The study found that, IGAD has recently launched the IGAD Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), based in Djibouti, with the main objective of promoting regional giving out of good practices and lessons learnt in curbing and opposing violent extremism initiatives and bringing together actors involved in P/CVE work in the

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<sup>110</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 199.

<sup>111</sup> Schmid, A. having a limited mandate of building national capacity to resist terrorism (2013). Pp.56-57

<sup>112</sup> 114For a discussion of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, see, e.g., Jason Mc Lure, "Dueling Dictators," *Newsweek*, 28 November 2007, [www.newsweek.com/id/72707](http://www.newsweek.com/id/72707); "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War," *International Crisis Group*, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5

region to ensure an inclusive and holistic approach. Over and above these current institutional and legal frameworks, IGAD and its member states also participate in various forms of counter-terrorism activities such as in peace operations such as AMISOM which has emerged as a critical element of fighting groups of terrorism like the Somali's Al-Shabaab.<sup>113</sup> African regional and sub-regional organizations have wanted to come up with different mechanisms of solving the threat of terrorism in the form of legislations, norms, institutions, etc. Largely epitomes of earlier responses to a growing global threat, the mere presence of these elaborate mechanisms, however, should not mask the critical challenge of practically implementing these measures in the broader continental efforts of countering terrorism.<sup>114</sup> To a large extent, the challenges of implementing these counter-terrorism mechanisms showcases the difficulties of implementing APSA in the wider sense and offer some explanation also for the latter's securitization and militarization of African states, both in continental and sub-regional contexts, have failed to ratify some of the major protocols and conventions, resulting in a "generally poor and uneven pattern of sanction of anti-terrorism measures.. It can be illustrated, for example, by looking at the slow ratification of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism Convention and its 2004 Protocol.

It was observed that primarily, the threats and vulnerabilities arising from terrorism outweigh any of the existing frameworks and the capacities of many of the Member States or that of their regional or sub-regional organizations. The prevalence of these threats is further compounded with poor social, political, security, and economic conditions of most African states rife with unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, etc. Pockets of limited or "ungoverned spaces" in different corners of the continent create the enabling environment for breeding, training, and mobilization of

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<sup>113</sup> Both the Lords Resistance Army and the Alliance of Democratic Forces are listed as terrorist organizations by Uganda and the US. For a discussion of the situation in Uganda, see, e.g., Anika Long, "A Survey of Terrorism and Human Rights in Uganda

<sup>114</sup> Thomas Dempsey, "Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions," Strategic Studies Institute, US Pa. Army War College, Carlisle, 2006, p. 8.

terrorist groups. Furthermore, weak state capacities in these environments hamper counter-terrorism initiatives.

The prevailing crises in certain parts of the continent create an additional layer of insecurity as in the case of Sahel-Sahara belt and Somalia. These complex crises which have their own domino effects beyond the national borders project serious security challenges to their wider neighborhood. African inter-regional organizations have sought to establish different mechanisms of addressing the threat of terrorism in the form of legislations, norms, institutions, etc. Largely epitomes of earlier responses to a growing global threat, the mere presence of these elaborate mechanisms, however, should not mask the critical challenge of practically implementing these measures in the broader continental efforts of countering terrorism.<sup>115</sup> To a large extent, the challenges of implementing these counter-terrorism mechanisms showcases the difficulties of implementing APSA in the wider sense and offer some explanation also for the latter's securitization and militarization.<sup>116</sup>

Similarly, there is lack of progress towards ratification of pertinent the IGAD treaties as well as slow domestication of protocols and policies. Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD's convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in 2009 and only ratified by two countries by 2017. The above also speaks and relates to a perennial problem of failure to implement the numerous conventions both at the continental and regional level.<sup>117</sup> A similar challenge also exists in the case IGAD, where its member states have more or less lagged behind in terms of implementing the various instruments. Given the disparity among its member states to

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<sup>115</sup> Steve Bloomfield, "Somalia: The World's Forgotten Catastrophe," *The Independent*, 9 February (2008).

<sup>116</sup> ICPAT Meeting Report, "Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD's convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in 2009- 2008.

<sup>117</sup> Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD's convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in (2009). 120

implement these instruments, “much of the security cooperation instead takes place on a bilateral and largely ad hoc basis” in the IGAD region.<sup>118</sup>

### **3.6 Conclusion**

Kenya and specifically Mombasa generally have several implications of youth radicalization. Whether you are a potential promoter or opposed to violent extremism is an important factor when dealing with extremists. Therefore, the government must approach many facets, and leaders and mentors must have drastic planning and implementation. Some of the young people in the country have experienced conflicts, ethnicity violence, violence of post-elections, although others are relatively peaceful. Furthermore, the youth of Mombasa have different experiences in public institutions in the country. Various interactions with youths in Kenya indicate that youth see political participation as disappointment because of a number of politicians. As a result, confidence in many organizations discourages young activists, while skepticism leads to despair and increases vulnerability.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid pp.28-29

## CHAPTER FOUR

### IMPACT OF MULTI-AGENCY COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis on the effects of Multi-Agency Counter Terrorism Strategies of Youth Radicalization. It was broken into 4 subheadings: general overview of multi-agency approaches to fight against terrorism; impact of multi-agency counter terrorism strategies; effectiveness of interventions at the secondary level and effectiveness of interventions at the tertiary level.

#### 4.2 General Overview of Multi-Agency Approach to Fighting Terrorism

The multi-agency approach to combat terrorism in Kenya is largely a test flight to Kenya, as it does not rely on any experience of such wars in the past. The state has established significant strategic partnerships with other states to conduct joint exercises with asset protection personnel to improve terrorist capabilities against the state. In recent years, the ongoing multi-agency terrorist activities have had a long-term positive impact on the country in terms of prevention and detention.

It is worth noting that the large-scale Hump tonic attack in 2014, the attack on Garrisa University in 2015 or the attack on Westgate Mall in 2013 have been greatly reduced. Instead, al-Shabaab concentrated its smallest sporadic operations in areas along the Kenya-Somali border, where it waged unconventional wars against shopping security agencies.<sup>119</sup> An official familiar with the situation said: Many militia groups use asymmetric warfare against disciplined and organized

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<sup>119</sup> Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD's convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in (2009). 120

national forces to quell terrorist efforts aimed at wiping out national forces and destroying the economies of counter-terrorism countries.

As per the findings, Kenya's comprehensive approaches to anti-terrorism have led to the arrest of hundreds of terrorist suspects through the court system. Insiders said the attack forced Kenya's security agencies to hand in hand in developing an improved, more coordinated and comprehensive strategy for the involvement of multiple agencies in terrorism. Several suspected terrorists were still being appealed during the trial.<sup>120</sup>

The study noted that the adoption of a national strategy against Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016, counter-terrorism efforts against terrorists in Kenya have been successful, the first of their kind in Africa. Understanding the national policy of 2016 is that terrorists are threat to the security of the state, which is a sign of a feeling of unsafe to a state or individual.<sup>121</sup>

The National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) has become the core of policy implementation by recruiting and maintaining support for ministries, departments, and government agencies (MDA) in countering terrorism and organized crimes in the country.<sup>122</sup> To reintegrate these people into society, many provinces have county-level action plans to prepare CVE national plans of action.

According to the study findings there is no accurate data to determine how many radicalized youths that have being de-radicalized and reintegrated back in society, however more than a hundred Kenyan youths have defected Al-Shabaab and joined the National Amnesty Program in

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<sup>120</sup> ICPAT Meeting Report, "Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD's convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in 2009- 2008

<sup>121</sup> Luke, Timothy 'Deterrence of contemporary terrorism has not been able to be thwarted by deterrence theory, 1993, p229-258

<sup>122</sup> Richards, Julian. "State Policy and Strategy: Prevent,"Multi-agency" Responses, and the Way Forward." In *Extremism, Radicalization and Security*, pp. 173-201. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017.

2015.<sup>123</sup> There is also a need to increase the capacity of some of the main stakeholders, which is to eliminate activists' plans. Eliminating activity because of a lack of religious appreciation is not a linear process, and the scale appropriate for all is truly effective. As a result, officials working with fundamentalists need to understand not only human behavior, but also deal with the issue of some young people to join, attract and reinforce religious groups.<sup>124</sup>

#### **4.2.1 Cases Already Contained**

Based on the findings in March 2014, Kenya's security agencies intercepted a VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device) placed so as to carry out a major attack in Mombasa. In September 2014, authorities in Kenya, along with their Ugandan counterparts, carried out suicide bomb attacks in both regional capitals, Nairobi and Kampala. In October 2014, the Kenyan Security Service announced plans to attack the Nikkubi Jicamba market. Then, before the attack, three members of al-Shabaab were arrested in the country, they were known as Zachariah, Miriam Muhammad Abdi, Guru Muhammad Hasan Abbas and Rahman Muhammad Jama.

In February 2015, intelligence investigations led the security services to arrest Abdullah Ibrahim Ali and Mahat Muhammad Jama, known as Zakaria (being both members of al-Shabaab, stationed in the West Somalia, Muhammad Aiden Gerrier Planner. A month later, Zarar was killed in an airstrike in Somalia. In September 2015, Al-Shabaab assassin and Garissa attack facilitator Abdulahi Aden Hidig was arrested while planning to assassinate a prominent politician in the North Eastern.

On January 13, 2018, an interrogation agency disrupted a large recruitment and consulting network in Masarbit district and arrested a young recruiter and chief mentor, Sheikh Jojo (Sheikh

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<sup>123</sup> Asamoah, A. A. More importantly, the political vacuum and long-standing insecurity in Somalia has enabled various forms of terrorist and extremist elements to thrive in the country, (2008). 83(1), pp 87–100.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid p 90



Jojo Jose) and recruiter Mubarak Abdi Huqa. In February 2018, Isiolo police found a car loaded with explosives and firearms from Somalia, hidden in a forest of Marti in Isiolo district by al-Shabaab militants. Meanwhile, hundreds of radical extremist youth trying to settle in Somalia and join al-Shabaab were also arrested. This was done in cooperation of the Army, National Intelligence Agency, Police and Courts.

#### **4.3 Effect of Counter Terrorism Strategies: Early Prevention**

Based on the public health model, the multi-dimensional prevention strategy emphasizes wider access to society overall. The intervention focused on reducing the main causes of violent extremism through addressing the demands of those who were vulnerable to the extremism. The interventions which were used did include address of deeply rooted claims of lacking education and opportunities in employment, support of participation in programs whether political or social ones.

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As observed the reasons for the collective contributions of coastal societies are lacking both social and economy opportunities, marginal discrimination, human rights violations, and the selective use of the laws. The same factor has also become a driving force for recruits who advocate violent extremism. The maturity and recruitment strategy of Al-Shabaab recruits highlights the plight of societies and individual victims, as the ideologically driven novel focuses on the Kenyan government and its common enemy with Western government partners taking advantage of group complaints. Recruits respond to their essentials in terms of material gains.<sup>126</sup>

To address the general needs of coastal residents is at the heart of early CVE interventions. One of the main reasons is that when dealing with collective complaints about marginalization and

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<sup>125</sup> Spalek, Basia, Zubeda Limbada, LAURA ZAHRA MCDONALD, D. Silk, and Raquel Da Silva. "Impact of counter-terrorism on communities: methodology report." *Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Open Society Foundations* (2012)

<sup>126</sup> Devitt, Katherine R., and Edward P. Borodzicz. "Interwoven leadership: the missing link in multi-agency major incident response." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 16, no. 4 (2008): 208-216.

poor governance, it can reduce the appeal of networks of violent extremists like Al Shabaab based on collective complaints. Investing in development, large-scale developments or infrastructure projects are viable options for job creation, including other economic opportunities that may prevent young people from joining extremist organizations. Driven by economic hardships, believers in the youth movement and advocates of investment in development in poor areas have increased. Most of the young people at risk of extremism or recruitment come from economically weak areas along the coast, where employment opportunities are limited.<sup>127</sup>

As per the study findings, government officials and civil society are trying to focus more resources on addressing the root causes of social and economic drivers of violent extremism in the society. One of those interviewed explained that the promotion of public education, poverty reduction and unemployment are necessary to address the harsh conditions of the coastal areas. Such initiatives can help young people find goals in their societies, and prevent them from acquiring new identities through the extremist ideology of the youth movement. Investing in large-scale projects in coastal areas, such as public infrastructure projects, may provide employment opportunities for young people who may be involved in extreme causes. This would not have happened without special ideas made to help the young people. For instance, large projects such as LAPPSET (Lamu Port and the transportation corridor between South Sudan and Ethiopia) led to demonstrations due to a lack of community involvement and the realization that most of the work would benefit from abroad.<sup>128</sup>

In addition, other factors include ethnic sponsorship and lack of skills of young people to match the work required for the project. This is why these projects are seen as government-led programs that are more likely to promoting foreigners in the country. Vocational education and

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<sup>127</sup> Harris, Stan, Max Fenn, Robert J. Arndt, and Tom Bartlett. "IMPACT-Intensive Marine Port Area Counter-Terrorism Program." *US Att'ys Bull.* 52 (2004): 28□

<sup>128</sup> Richards, Julian. "State Policy and Strategy: Prevent, "Multi-agency" Responses, and the Way Forward." In *Extremism, Radicalization and Security*, pp. 173-201. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017

training, career training programs, credit programs and opportunities for networking can be used to improving employment opportunities for local youth.

It was observed that Coastal livelihood potential is harnessed through policies that modernize fisherman, revitalize the coconut and cashew industries, train the hotel industry and support other non-formal businesses that now employ large numbers of coastal youth Huh. Another thing is often referred to as ownership of land in the coast areas of the country.<sup>129</sup> Complaints concerning land that reflect the margins of coastal areas are the product of a series of policies taken by the government after independence. Land issues in the IDF (like the Republic of Mombasa) and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale play an important role in social movements. Implementation of reforms of land as was mandated by the constitution of Kenya 2010 did demand immediate addressing to solve those issues.

It was noted that poor governing and corruption are the reasons for mistrust of the government, which has disappointed many coastal societies. The mandate of the 2010 Constitution is to respond to the current government deficit. However, the county government system has strengthened elite companies where opportunities of employment are very based on preferences and progress rarely flows to marginalized families. The YMCA recruits depressed (like youth) community members due to the deterrence of the Kenya elite culture in politics.<sup>130</sup> Therefore, players of the civil societies needed to take part in monitoring new developments build so as to assist the marginalized once.

One of the respondents emphasized efforts to restore trust in law enforcement and the public. Community law enforcement programs can build trust and improve communication between

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<sup>129</sup> Forster, Peter. "Beslan: Counter-terrorism incident command: Lessons learned." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, no. 3 (2006). □

<sup>130</sup> Owuor, Naman. "Impact of Strategic Communications in Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism by The National Counter Terrorism Centre in Pumwani Area, Nairobi Kenya." PhD diss., United States International University-Africa, 2019

the police and the community. The second aspect should be to strengthen the interrelation between law enforcement and civil society, and strengthen the capacity of security agencies, law enforcement agencies, and civil society in preventing abuse of violence.<sup>131</sup>

The efficiency of the National Police Inspectorate is critical to investigation of all types of misconduct of police, such as deaths resulting from police actions and serious detention, as it involves investigating complaints against police, monitoring police actions, and consideration has the power to do whether the incident was late or not. These initiatives have helped to raise awareness about violent extremism drivers and CVE response among law enforcement officials. The role of civil society and their attitudes and attitudes to the national police service can make a better collaborative and more participation of individuals, thereby creating positive relationships between citizens and law enforcement, reducing the stories of extremist groups and reducing recruitment in the process.

#### **4.4 Impact of Multi-Agency Counter Terrorism Strategies: Secondary level**

A multi-agency strategy for secondary prevention for people and groups identified as at or being near the risk of violent extremism in societies. Involvements in this level include society's participation and countermeasures. In this one it focuses on intervention including ability to prevent radical processes and reduce radicalization in the future. It undermines the current aggressive fencing by addressing factors such as the influence of peers, group relationships, the process of collective socialization, and the need for group solidarity in youth activity and recruitment.

Responses include addressing the idea of extreme groups, terminating channels to promote ideology, or eliminating ideological promoters or conscripts. Disabling these networks has become the key to CT or CVE methods. On the coast of Kenya, most of the interventions aimed primarily at

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<sup>131</sup> Janssen, Marijn, Jinkyu Lee, Nitesh Bharosa, and Anthony Cresswell. "Advances in multi-agency disaster management: Key elements in disaster research." *Information Systems Frontiers* 12, no. 1 (2010): 1-7

the middle level aim to counter radical ideology. Initiatives such as the Imam, the Missionary Council of Kenya (CIPK), the Supreme Council of Muslim Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM) and building resilience against violent extremism (the BRAVE) have led to significant opposition to the religious basis of Islamic radical ideology, including replacement of some verses of Quran which were seemly misused.

One interviewee stated that: “*interventions are necessary to focus more on ideology and on interventions at the group level*”. It helps to understand how young people understand ideology and use the networks to build relationships with them.<sup>132</sup>

Many respondents stated that effective counter-information relies on great information designed by young people who know their colleagues' needs better and are able to develop appropriate conceptual information. Effective dissemination of anti-radical information and information to the bigger public is a use of providing reliability to religious sources and leaders. This does require the traditions and leaders of coast Muslim societies to reduce the bias of the youth movement. Because religious extremism affects all other societies in Kenya, it is also necessary to discuss the concept of violence against religion specifically with other non-Muslim societies.<sup>133</sup>

In addition it was noted that public awareness has been at the core of many outreach programs organized by NGOs such as the Kenya Community Support Center, Muslim Human Rights (MUHURI) and HAKI Africa, with the aim of discouraging individuals from separating or excluding extremist groups.<sup>134</sup> These institutions have taken part in an important role of bringing

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<sup>132</sup> Kingshott, Brian F. "Violence in educational establishments: cause, effect, and response." *Criminal Justice Studies* 25, no. 1 (2012): 41-65.

<sup>133</sup> UNDP, 2017

<sup>134</sup> Lee, JinKyu, Nitesh Bharosa, Jing Yang, Marijn Janssen, and H. Raghav Rao. "Group value and intention to use—A study of multi-agency disaster management information systems for public safety." *Decision Support Systems* 50, no. 2 (2011): 404-414

together governments, organizations of religion, and launching the awareness of the public campaigns.<sup>135</sup>

The Mombasa based Council of Interfaith Council (CICC) organizes interfaith dialogue between young people, religious leaders, and government officials to use the faith as the CVE promotes relationships. The interfaith dialogue between the Imam of Kenya and the Missionary Council (CIPK) and the Traditional Religious Scholars Council (CICC) made it easier for moderate religious leaders to appeal to young people and strengthen their ability to find starting signs of being extremism. They also trained Muslim leaders to regularly assess the quality of the sermons and their content, and to monitor the presence of the mosque. The program focuses on improving promotional skills, focusing on issues that are important to young people, while maintaining a reputation for the mosque while better understanding the process of personal extremism. The program also focuses on increasing the presence of mosques shortly after they were closed in 2014, eliminating negative perceptions related to mosques and providing access to high-risk youth who exaggerate mosques. Extremists are not determined or ideologically drawn to join liberals. This initiative is accompanied by the development of school curricula to improve leadership and mosque management as well as the flexibility of religious institutions.

The study established that early warning systems provide law enforcement personnel with information about specific radical activities, suspicious people, or extreme tasks in the community. The Nyumba Kumi initiative, based on a security group of ten families, has been lauded for collecting data on the risk factors for extremism and to report them to the National Police station or the village head of the initiative. However, the system caused problems in Kavali district, where Nyumba Kumi leader was killed by extremists after informing the police about their activities.

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<sup>135</sup> Forster, Peter. "Beslan: Counter-terrorism incident command: Lessons learned." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, no. 3 (2006). □

In addition, given the new role played by young women leaders, especially in the coastal areas, sexual obligations are now required to end violent extremism. The roles of women as mothers, spouses, and friendships are becoming increasingly direct and indirect support for their activities by extremist groups. Societies' supporting groups rehabilitate women involved in violent extremism, such as women returning from Somalia or women who are dissatisfied with the youth movement, which is an active place to support their society for discussion and rehabilitation, recovery and recovery. These supporting organizations have contributed to building of individual's capacity, training on the significance of government interventions, and help those who affected change their lives.<sup>136</sup>

According to the findings the Media has been very essential in constructing of bridges among role the companies in a constructive debate that reduces the appeal of violent extremist ideologies and promotes the reduction and mobilization of youth extremism.<sup>137</sup> For example, radio in Mombasa discusses broadcasting facilities as well as extremes and recruiting. Intense discussions and debates on issues of violent extremism can not only encourage thought and influence related decisions, but can also increase the commitment to raise awareness and reduce the voice of Al-Shabaab leaders in mobilizing the youths.<sup>138</sup>

As observed the social media is supporting directly the growth of online extremism and youth mobilization. These sites reveal extreme sites and forums in online network forums. Law enforcement measures face challenges at the pace of various technology forms, such as new coding platforms used as forums by extremists to recruit and radicalize the young people. Checking platforms in the internet containing extreme content is an ongoing requirement for addressing

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<sup>136</sup> Spalek, Basia, Zubeda Limbada, LAURA ZAHRA MCDONALD, D. Silk, and Raquel Da Silva. "Impact of counter-terrorism on communities: methodology report." *Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Open Society Foundations* (2012)

<sup>137</sup> Daily Nation, 2016; Badurdeen 2017

<sup>138</sup> Badurdeen, Fazleena, "Extending total life-cycle thinking to sustainable supply chain design." *International Journal of Product Lifecycle Management* 4, no. 1-3 (2009): 49-67.

online extremism and recruiting. The strategy emphasizes on the need to equip community leaders and law enforcement professionals with the necessary know-how in using the technology in the Anti-Terrorism measures.

#### **4.5 Impact of Multi-Agency Counter Terrorism Strategies: Tertiary Level**

The tertiary level multi-agency strategy focuses on the perspectives of extremist individuals and organizations that can plan, mobilize, or actively promote violent extremists. At this level of extremism, some people may need to use anti-terrorism methods rather than CVE methods. In the third level, the strategies do use both the law enforcements with the intelligence of the community and the personals of security. CVE Phase III interventions include anti-initiation, disengagement and rehabilitation. Such interventions require the expertise of psychologists, religious officials, skilled professionals and extremists in society. Interventions are focusing on the prevention the imminent threat of violence by individuals or groups for future violence. The study of extremism among Kenyan adolescents documented the number of drivers involved and the difference between these drivers. For example, if someone's driver is unemployed, poor and vindictive in the country, and is willing to accept extremist recruits, interventions may include career guidance, scholarship, professional training, credit planning, and ideological resistance.<sup>139</sup>

The state has been active in converting and integrating former recruits to al-Shabaab, often known as "returns", however some have described them as part of the amnesty of the government scheme as dissidents. Former members of al-Shabaab played a major role in CVE for three reasons: First, their stories provided insight and understand the extremist recruiting processes as well as the internal dynamics of the al-Shabaab group. Secondly, they can provide proactive information about

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<sup>139</sup> Paschal, David G. *Irregular warfare: Impact on future professional military education*. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2006



the tactics and strategies which are employed by al-Shabaab. Thirdly, they successfully contribute to helping in developing interventions aimed at isolating and helping other youth.<sup>140</sup>

According to the study findings, community organizations have worked hard to employ individual young people to working as community patrons or recruits. However, these efforts were rare due to difficulties in the trust of former members of the youth movement and the vague nature of the law for returning or returning members or cooperating with the youth movement. Their involvement depends on providing security and environment that gives them hope for a new future. Former al-Shabaab members should be treated with caution, as they may come through a government apology program because they are considered spies or outdated, or participate in gathering information about the whereabouts of other returns doubt.<sup>141</sup>This could endanger the lives of other returnees, such as the people of Kavala being threatened or killed after their return. The former militia needs to be checked and included in the plan, especially if it is properly recovered and integrated.

It was noted that plan of rehabilitation designed for individual circumstances. Credible leaders continue to support and oppose extremist ideology, reducing the extremist leanings of extremist prisoners. Similarly, regular rehabilitation program for former members of youth movement helps these members to contribute positively to the society.<sup>142</sup>

#### **4.6 Conclusions**

In spite of the temporary success of the security sector's rigorous response to violent extremism, the random impact of these actions has exacerbated the unexpected impact because of the fundamental

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<sup>140</sup> Carter, Holly, John Drury, G. James Rubin, Richard Williams, and Richard Amlôt. "The effect of communication during mass decontamination." *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* (2013).

<sup>141</sup> Pycroft, Aaron, and Dennis Gough, eds. *Multi-Agency Working in Criminal Justice 2e: Theory, Policy and Practice*. Policy Press, 2019.

<sup>142</sup> Lang, Adam Peter. "The 'Prevent Duty'(Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) and its Impact on English Secondary Schools: A View from Leadership." *Journal of Dialogue Studies* (2019): 185.

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effect of the innocent or the ones at risks. They can also form sympathy groups or open new crimes for the extremist organizations.

Kenya's sector of security must always rely on the results of its counter-terrorism strategy, especially Somalis and Muslims offshore. This is important for community police work that requires continued involvement with the local community. Community confidence depends on the security services' credibility of being alleged against extra-judicial killings and torture.

When institutions fail to enforce the law, they do not have the ability to efficiently prosecuting crimes which are related to violent extremism, or existing laws bypass or resort to unconventional methods to combat violent extremism, the state becomes part of the problem of violent extremism. These issues constitute collective claims and use of reasons for Indigenous coastal communities, and extreme narratives focus on unfair treatment of government officials and law enforcement. These problematic responses to extremes are based on overreaction trends, are politically driven and have religiously biased security practices and unjust judgments because of vulnerable groups.

The government's lack of swift response to the Westgate attack in Kenya has changed the terrorist account. First, the government strengthened the Counterterrorism Act 2012 and passed amendments to the Defense Protection Act (Amendment) 2014. The civil society response included false reports of NGOs and community organizations, accusing NGOs and community organizations of funding or supporting terrorism, and blaming NGOs and some donors of blocking terrorist-led initiatives against the government. These changes have resulted in stricter scrutiny of organizations and their intervention, which has reduced the political realm of opposition and anti-terrorism measures against the government.<sup>143</sup> When NGOs coordinate CVE strategies together with Non-

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<sup>143</sup> Kenya Human Rights Commission Report, (2016).

Governmental ideas led by the government hence reducing the NGO criticizing the governments cash transfer that have broad implications for agency access overall.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents Summary of the Findings; Conclusion and Recommendations made from the study.

#### **5.2 Summary of the Findings**

The involvement of youth in violence all over the world has become an important issue politically, socio-economically and psychologically. The consequences of youth violence are much traumatic both for themselves and for the victims, their families and communities. The involvement of youth in political and religious violence especially requires special attention, due to external actor to the violence, such as organized crime like terror networks. It is crucial to identify the risks and vulnerability of the youth under risk of getting involved in violent activities in order to understand why they radicalize.

It was noted that various counter violent extremism and terrorism strategies had been applied globally, regionally and in Kenya to fight radicalization; violent extremism and terrorism. The strategies included Military strategy, Police and Intelligence Assets, and Legislative and financial controls. Regional bodies have been of help as a strategy in fighting terrorism in Kenya. The role of worldwide institutions like the UN, EU, AU, civil societies and IGAD was noted and their impact widely felt.

Based on the results, the multi-agency approach aims to exchange knowledge and experience from anti-radicalization programs in a more radical, effective, and manageable manner. This can be an effective way to discuss the individual basing on each case to reach a consensus on

the biggest correct action supporting the case and contributing to solve the issue. Each organization has different contextual information about at-risk people and can provide a more comprehensive 360-degree view of the needs and scope of intervention programs.

As researchers point out, in order to see its efficacy, a diverse approach should be used at all stages of extremism during extremism to eliminate activity and withdrawal. All actors dealing with (potentially) violent extremists can access relevant information and resources for appropriate intervention and surveillance. The multi-agency approach is entrenched in occupation, roles and must be implemented in daily work arrangements.

To ensure coordinated visits by multiple agencies, it is necessary for a leading organization to coordinate and organize processes of information exchange and making of decision concerning cases of people, actions and outcomes with ultimate responsibilities. Leading organizations (local authorities, police, etc.) differ from state or city to another, but they must first identify the responsible organization. Coordinated decision making in this case may lead various organizations to lead the intervention.

Any successful multi-agency approach relies on the local authority, legal requirements (like education, health, social services, children's and youth services, and crime management services), and existing relationships with the police and in some cases communities of cooperation, new complex Not a system. This is absolutely necessary to prevent repetitive work. Additionally, multi-agency cooperation requires a shared understanding of mandates and cooperative objectives. This may improve joint owning and being accountable. The role and expectation being clear is a prerequisite for succeeding.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

As of a 2011/2012 report from the United States Embassy, more than seventeen attacks using explosives occurred in Kenya due to increased violent extremism and corruption in the security sector. Shopping centers, police cars, night clubs, churches, religious gatherings, build small downtown shops and bus stops were among those targeted. More than 48 individuals were left dead with more than two hundred severely injured. Four of these attacks in the county occurred in Mombasa.

Based on what is found in the research, it concludes so as to overcome radicalization in the coast of Kenya and elsewhere the state ought to have a comprehensive policy framework for youth empowerment that should go beyond peripheral job creation and entrepreneurship promotion so as to addressing the main causes of youth alienation and disenchantment with the state and society. The youth need to be made to feel as useful and appreciated members of the Kenyan state if they are to be shielded from the ramifications of radicalization.

A multi-agency structure that focuses on a wide variety of social matters, such as, serving the broader purpose of preventing crime and includes preventing radicalization instead of making it the main course of the structure, it does prevent stigmatizing and labeling people as radical, or even as terrorists. For example, when you want to get more information from schools or youth workers, build a more common structure around, making vulnerable children and adults also useful. An alternative is to help in cases of violent extremism by building a team or teams of experts inside the community to help in the matters related to that.

The historical land related injustices at the coast by surveying the land and allocating it to the local people should be addressed. It's vital to include easier processing of title deeds. The government needs to streamline Islamic education by developing content and teacher training in

order to control its teaching and forestall avenues for radicalization. National and county governments in the coastal region should set aside special funds to purchase land for redistribution to local people (especially, squatters). In order to ensure bona-fide local people obtain such land, a register should be developed by local people and overseen by the local people. Police officers be reigned-in and encouraged to adopt intelligence-led action that does not victimize innocent people. The ID registration and issuance process should have a human face to encourage genuine Kenyans to obtain these invaluable documents.

It is important to have a clear national de-radicalization framework for youth who return from Al Shabaab to encourage defections. Such youth could be a useful resource towards the anti-radicalization programmes. Use of counter messages by those credible voices and use of those who have disengaged from violent radicalization could help design more effective, factual based counter-radicalization messages. Intelligence which bases its policing on , documentation, analyzing and disseminating of the intelligence police officers to informing and directing the deploying and undertaking of arrests. This is contrary with the use of brute force dependent on an individual officer's suspicions that unlawful happening to influence police response.

Importantly Kenya need to adopt more community oriented multi agency counter-radicalization mechanism that is locally driven between police and the local community to increase community participation and build trust with the police. The study concludes that entrenching and utilizing community policing and its Nyumba Kumi strategy can also be very effective. The collaborative effort between police and community built on trust on both sides can be more effective in identifying, preventing and resolving issues that are likely to lead to radicalization.

In order to fight radicalization, the state agencies need to engage with communities as it more beneficial to policing. It was noted that effective engagement with the youth enhances their general awareness concerning the happenings in the community and deepen the knowhow of

concerns within communities and this will in itself become the base of informed police. This will also help police identify critical situation.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

The study made these several recommendations based on the results. It is recommended to provide training and educational materials to local agencies. The resources for training must plainly define and clarify the risk of bias and define methods and models for operating with people from the viewpoint of different institutions in this field. All specific levels of training, from senior executives to frontline employees, must be provided to respond to extremes. Get toolkits and guides which provide a framework used in assessment and to respond to people who are at risks of extremism.

The study suggests widespread organizational participation. Participation in partnerships ensures that sensitive people receive widespread support from special services retraining activities. So when the (local) police, in addition to creating clearer organizations (such as schools and local authorities) and identifying potential partner organizations when creating a multi-agency structure, you should try to include these organizations, usually involving a smaller number of arrangements such as the health and welfare sector, even prisons and contemplation. The model can include the basic structure of many key partners, while other partners may be included as needed.

The study also recommended community involvement. It is generally recommended to include structural organizations that adhere to privacy and confidentiality laws. This will exclude those invited from the NGO process. However, it is important to recognize the need to build relationships with actors and communities in civil society when implementing various interventions. It is necessary to build lasting relations with companies not only during the time of need. Collaborating with familiar faces and their vision will help disadvantaged groups overcome their potential problems. Therefore, it is important for the majority structure to build long-term



relationships with society on the basis of community concerns. Regular meetings: for example, face to face every two or two months to increase the understanding of professionals, organizations and other fields. It is essential for those partners to have a chance of meeting to hold discussions about those issues.

All players must evaluate their strategies perfectly and follow them. Ensure a joint assessment of ongoing operations in the multi-functional arrangement along with situation-specific interferences. It is also important to keep track of all the assignments transferred to the partner, feedback to the partners on what is gotten from the learned lessons. In general, the important final step is making it necessary to adapt a multi-agency organization and gain experience.

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## APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Kindly fill the interview guide below. The information is meant for research only and the information provided will be treated with confidence.

- i. Are there cases of radicalization in your area? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- ii. If yes for how long have you witnessed them?.....
- iii. What areas in the coast of Kenya are the most affected by the acts of radicalization and terrorism? .....
- iv. What association can you attach to the origin of radicalization and terrorism in the coastal areas of Kenya?.....
- v. In your own opinion how many youths in approximation have been recruited to serve Al-Shabaab terror group? .....
- vi. What key factors can you associate with enhancing the extent and operation of radicalization and violent extremism in the Coast of Kenya?
- vii. What are the effects can you associate with violent radicalization on the coast of Kenya?  
.....
- viii. Are you aware of existence of Multi-Agency Strategies for De Radicalization of the Youth in Kenya? Yes [ ] No [ ]
- ix. What are some of the Multi-Agency strategies applied in Kenya?
- x. What impact do the Multi-Agency strategies applied in Kenya have on youth radicalization in the coast of Kenya?