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INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE OF IGAD**

BY

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DECLARATION

This research project my original work and has not been presented in any other university for the purpose of examination.



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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor

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DEDICATION

To those whose toil, sweat, and lives have shaped, and continue to shape, my life's trajectory, the living and the departed. My parents - Oliver and Freda Mulati Wepundi - you are my standard bearers.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM:	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
AU:	African Union
OAS:	Organization of American States
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
JTIC:	Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre
CFR:	Council on Foreign Relations
CJTF-HoA:	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CTED:	Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
CVE:	Counter Violent Extremism
CBD:	Central Business District
EACTI:	East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives
EU:	European Union
FTF:	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
IGAD:	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JTTF:	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LRA:	Lord Resistance Army
MNJTF:	Multi-National Joint Task Force
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
OLF:	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF:	Ogaden National Liberation Front
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UN:	United Nations
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA:	United States of America

ABSTRACT

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region has been the most conflict and terrorism torn zone in the world. Following the adoption of the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in 2003, IGAD has taken a more proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime in region. The general objective of the study is to establish the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD. The study was guided by three specific objectives: to determine the causes of terrorism and violent extremism in IGAD region; to examine the measures implemented by Kenya in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD; and to analyze the challenges faced by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD. The study was anchored on regional security complex theory (RSCT). This research employed a case study approach. The target population of the study was 07 officers from IGAD offices in Nairobi. The study also targets the other staff members at the IGAD office in Nairobi. The data for this research was collected from both primary and secondary sources. An interview guide was used to collect data from the 7 officers at IGAD while a focus group discussion collected data from the other staff members at the IGAD office in Nairobi. The data collected was analyzed using content analysis and presented in narration form. The findings revealed that in the contemporary scholarly world, scholars believe that fanaticism in religion is a contributor to terrorism. Other factors identified to lead to terrorism included corruption, poor governance, poverty, and porous borders. The study also found that the measures adopted to Counter Terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya include the use of military, adoption of public policies, empowering the youth and collaborating with other nations in the war against terrorism. In addition, the study identified the challenges facing regional organizations such as IGAD in countering terrorism to include: poor coordination by member states, poor policies, poor policing, corruption, modernization and support from terror group sympathizers. The study recommends that better governance should be adopted. Also, the study recommends that proper policies need to be adopted not only in Kenya but by other members' states of IGAD such as Somalia.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

In recent years, the world has witnessed a new wave of violent extremism that has taken the lives of many innocent people of different faiths, races and nationalities. Since the beginning of the 21st century there has been more than a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from violent extremism and terrorism, from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014.¹ According to the Global Terrorism Index 2016, there has been a continued rise of terrorism which is cause for serious concern today.² Terrorist groups with time have continued to expand into other countries for instance; the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates have expanded into 15 new countries. Countries that have also been affected by terrorism over the past years are Europe, United States of America (USA), Turkey, France, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya to mention a few.³ Consequently, terrorist attacks and activities have globally led to a rise in insecurity, fear and a higher perceived risk of terrorism.

Africa faces the same terrorist threat as the rest of the world. However, for various reasons such as weak government, weak borders and weak security institutions, Africa appears to be more vulnerable to the war against terrorism. Some of the terrorist organizations operating in sub-Saharan Africa include Youth in Somalia, Boko Haram in

¹ Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index 2015: 2015 (available at <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>).

² Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2016*, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index>.

³ Magogo, Samini. *"The effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Kenya: a case study of Eastleigh location, nairobi county."* (2017). Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Nairobi.

Nigeria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Sahara and LRA in Uganda.⁴ In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab is the region's biggest security threat. Al Qaeda's branches operate from "lost territories" in Somalia, and behind the scenes of several terrorist attacks in the region, especially during the last five years. In Nigeria, the actions of Boko Haram have left thousands of people dead and displaced. It has also made neighbouring countries susceptible to bombings and kidnappings. The same can also be said for Somalia, where al-Shabaab threatens to destabilise an already fragile state, impeding sustainable development and democracy.⁵ Whilst these and other groups are prevalent in the north, east, west and Horn of Africa, they have created a continental dilemma as they threaten the larger African political, social, and economic security.

Counterterrorism measures have been put in place over time through data collection, analysis, monitoring and evaluation. Although some of these measures have led to the decrease of terrorist activities in some areas, in some, terrorism has been exacerbated. The security threats posed by terrorism to the global community and the way forward have currently dominated the public discourse. A wide array of measures, consolidated efforts from different sectors and agencies and learning from past mistakes have contributed to improved counter terrorism strategies with time. Nevertheless, some regions still continue to be highly affected and vulnerable to terrorism.⁶

Terrorism has become a worldwide phenomenon and thus countries are becoming more and more engaged in counter terrorism measures. Terrorism is

⁴ Wang, Shiyu, and Randal J. Kaufman. "The impact of the unfolded protein response on human disease." *Journal of Cell Biology* 197, no. 7 (2012): 857-867.

⁵ Ramdeen, Marisha. "Countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa." *conflict trends* 2017, no. 2 (2017): 49-56.

⁶ Ibid, Magogo

dynamic and measures must keep evolving to deal with the threat effectively. After the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States of America, some of the counter terrorism measures that have been employed in the United States are utility of hard and soft power combined which entail military retaliation or reprisal, military pre-emption therefore, striking before terrorists do, commando raids, assassinations, hostage rescue missions and hard non-military strategies which include economic sanctions.⁷ As for the use of soft power techniques deterrence, diplomacy, talking to terrorist groups for more understanding and conciliation and peace are key as well as developing of more anti and counter terrorism laws in relation to the dynamic nature of terrorism.⁸ More so governments, international and regional organizations have taken an active step in countering terrorism. International organizations such as the United Nations is leading in the implementation of strategies to combat terrorism. In addition, regional organizations such as ECOWAS and IGAD have followed suit in the fight against terrorism. This is after the realization that terrorism is a global challenge.

The role of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is to ensure conflict prevention, management and resolution. The ultimate objective of IGAD is to achieve economic cooperation and integration by averting the destructive energies of conflict into regional cooperation and development.⁹ The IGAD region has been the most conflict and terrorism torn zone in the world. Since the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania fighting terrorism has been one of the international

⁷ Jordan Kiper, and Richard Sosis, "Why terrorism terrifies us," *Evolutionary Psychology and Terrorism* (2016): 103-123.

⁸ Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 5th ed. (NewYork, NewYork: Routledge, 2016).

⁹ Ibid, Demeke *et al.*

obligations of IGAD. Following the adoption of the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in 2003, IGAD has taken a more proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime in region.¹⁰ The IGAD region has seen three types of terrorism. The first type of terrorism is acts perpetrated by organizations outside the region. The second type is acts committed by organizations within the region. The third type is terrorist acts instigated by insurgent groups fighting the government within a particular state.¹¹ It is crystal clear that the most common and dominant form of trans-national terrorism in the IGAD region has been the second type; an act of terror committed by organizations operating within the region. Al-shabaab has been the major terrorist organization operating within the IGAD region. It declared itself as an al-Qaeda affiliated organization with the primary objective of establishing an Islamic republic state in Somalia.¹² IGAD, has been active in countering terrorism in Africa, As such, it is important to have a clear understanding on the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism focusing on the case of IGAD.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Terrorism is one of the major security challenges in the international system along with other threats posed by weapons of mass destruction including atomic bombs and biological weapons. Terrorism has always been a threat to security in Africa, but the

¹⁰ Schwartz, Matthew. *Criminal justice and rule of law capacity building to counter terrorism in fragile institutional contexts: Lessons from development cooperation*. Global Center on Cooperative Security., 2012.

¹¹ Demeke, Memar Ayalew, and Solomon Gebreyohans Gebru. "The Role of Regional Economic Communities in Fighting Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)." *European Scientific Journal* (2014).

¹² Menkhaus, Kenneth J. "Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, political Islam, and state collapse." (2005): 23-47. Virginia: R.R Donnelley Harrioshburg.

serious involvement of regional organizations in efforts to address the threat is a fairly recent development.¹³ The bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and the tragic terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001 (or what has been captioned 9/11) were vicious illustrations of the magnitude of the threat that the continent and the world at large must face in the 21st century.¹⁴ The international anti-terrorism campaign that emerged in response to 9/11, and particularly the unprecedented international solidarity that ensued, brought to the fore the important role that international and regional organizations could play, as agents of inter-state cooperation and coordination of regional counter-terrorism activities.

One of the key concerns across the globe has been the phenomenon of 21st century terrorism orchestrated by organized criminal groupings primarily seeking to change policies to suit their ideologies such as restoring Islam to its historical significance in the case of the al Qaeda.¹⁵ The lack of understanding of these terror groups has made it impossible to effectively counter terrorism and violent extremism. Furthermore, the law enforcement approach has been ineffective in working together towards an ultimate goal of countering terrorism largely leaving pivotal dimensions of the issue unexamined. In addition, although different legislations such as Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in 2003 and regional organizations such as IGAD have been established with the aim of countering terrorism, terror attacks are still experienced in both developed and developing nations. Hence, the issue raised is whether

¹³ Ibid, Demeke *et al.*

¹⁴ Jordan Kiper, and Richard Sosis, "Why terrorism terrifies us," *Evolutionary Psychology and Terrorism* (2016): 103-123.

¹⁵ Ngwodo, Chris. "*Understanding Boko Haram: A Theology of Chaos.*" 2014. [online] <http://chrisngwodo.blogspot.com/2010/10/understanding-boko-haram-theology-of.html>. Retrieved August, 21 (2020):

Member States to these legal provisions are in compliance with the requirements of legislation in combating and preventing terrorism.¹⁶ Poor implementation of regional organization's legislation has contributed to the continued terrorism in the world.

In Europe, Mwaniki¹⁷ observed that the European Council in 2005, approved the EU counter-terrorism strategy with the aim of making Europe safe. These strategies adopted by the EU are aimed at curbing terrorism in the region. This is an indication that the issue of terrorism and violent extremism is a universal challenge. However, the strategy adopted by the EU was only applicable to its members' states hence cannot be implemented by IGAD member states in Africa to counter terrorism. Memar and Gebreyohans¹⁸ also found that regional organizations play an essential role in countering terrorism. The study revealed that IGAD, was a key regional organization in Africa that has propelled the fight against terrorism. The study however is more than five years old, warranting the need for a current study. This is because, since 2014, new strategies have been adopted by IGAD in the war against terrorism which the current study will highlight.

In Kenya, Muliro¹⁹ found that the challenge of countering violent extremism in Africa attributes to the non-inclusion of the various actors and the different spaces that provide vulnerabilities to radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. The study acknowledged that all individuals in the community have a key responsibility of fighting terrorism and violent extremism. Further, the author revealed that there is need for

¹⁶ Okpala, Chinyere Christiana. *"A Re-Assessment [sic] of the Effectiveness of OAU (AU) Conventions on Preventing and Combating Terrorism."* Golden Gate University. (2014).

¹⁷ Ibid, Mwaniki (2017)

¹⁸ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

¹⁹ Muliru, Scofield YA. *"Challenges of Countering Terrorism in Africa: Youth Radicalization in Schools in Kenya."* PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

cooperation between all stakeholders which includes the local communities, governments, regional and international organizations in countering terrorism. The study however, was limited since it focused on the radicalization of young people into terrorist groups while the current study will focus on the direct and indirect roles of IGAD in countering terrorism and violent extremism. In addition, Ongere²⁰ revealed that the counterterrorism strategies adopted in Kenya are still inadequate in addressing the rising rate of radicalization of young people into joining terrorism groups. According to the study, Kenya is still lagging behind in implementing effective approaches to ending terrorism in the country. As such it is imperative for Kenya to collaborate with other regional organizations such as the IGAD, whose aim is to fight violent extremism and terrorism in the region. Although, the study focused on the need to counter terrorism, it failed to address the role played by IGAD in accomplishing the same.

Despite the several studies on this phenomenon of terrorism it is clear that there is a lacuna in theory and effective strategies to curb terrorism threats. It is on this background, that this study aims to answer the question, what is the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective of the Study

The general objective of the study is to establish the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD

²⁰ Ongere, Vincent A. "*Counter Terrorism Strategies in Africa: a Case Study of the Media in Kenya.*" PhD diss., university of Nairobi, 2018.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives of the Study

- i. To determine the causes of terrorism and violent extremism in IGAD region
- ii. To examine the measures implemented by Kenya in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD.
- iii. To analyze the challenges faced by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD

1.4 Justification of the Study

Macionis explains that terrorism mutates, it changes face and shape from time to time thus demanding pro-activeness from intelligence to counter it.²¹ Formulation of strategies to counter terrorism is key and the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism cannot be ignored. In its own right, the study will be significant. Moreover, it is evident that states alone cannot effectively fight terrorism, hence the need for integration and cooperation between states in order to defeat terrorism and violent extremism. Regional organizations such as IGAD, offer states the opportunity to work together in countering terrorism and violent extremism. Hence, this study seeks to illustrate the essential role of regional organizations in ending terrorism.

More so, this study is also relevant because it goes a long way to create reference for the future academicians. This will contribute to more knowledge of countering terrorism not only locally but will contribute as a case study regionally in Africa. The study findings will contribute to the filling up of knowledge gaps in the study of violent extremism. Researchers carrying out security related studies will use

²¹ John J. Macionis, *Social Problems*, Pearson, 2013

this study's findings to get more information on the role played by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study area will be Kenya. The study targets the officers of IGAD. This is because, one of the key objectives of the regional organizations is to fight terrorism and violent extremism. The study will target the IGAD officials since they are based in Africa one of the regions where terrorism is highly prevalent. The security challenges occasioned by terrorist groups including the Boko Haram and the Al-Shabaab warrants the need to study how regional organizations respond to terror attacks. Moreover, the study focuses on countering terrorism and violent extremism since, from literature, it appears that the fight against terrorism is not near to be accomplished. Moreover, terrorism is still a challenge experienced across the globe.

1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

The study is bound to face some limitations. Some of the respondents may refuse to participate in the study on suspicions driven by the natural fear that the information they would give would most likely fall into the hands of unauthorized persons who would use that information to pursue their selfish interests. This will be addressed by ensuring confidentiality of information and assuring the respondents that the information shared would be used only for academic purpose. There may be limited access to confidential information and documents held by the IGAD officials. This will be mitigated by writing a request letter in advance to the relevant authorities and to make follow ups through phone calls to be allowed access to the data for academic use only.

1.7 Empirical Review

1.7.1 Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The meaning of terrorism and violent extremism has been a bone of contention among scholars and politicians since antiquities. It did not start with the demise of the Soviet Union or with the horrors of September 9/11. It has deep roots in history. The term terrorism entered in the English language at the time of the 1789 French Revolution.²² At that historical juncture the term was used to refer to a time (1793-1794) during the revolution when the Jacobins, a radical group, who controlled the government, executed thousands of people at the guillotine whom they considered as threats of the revolution (Ibid). Since then, the term has been used to refer different forms of political violence by different actors. However, the modern usage of the term, developed in the mid-twentieth century, regards terrorism as a tool of ethnic and religious fanatics to serve political ends, such as liberation from an alien occupying group, or simply to exact righteous vengeance against a group labeled as a threat or enemy.

As its meaning, labelling the perpetrator of the act as a terrorist is also debatable. This is to say that what is a terrorist for one group may be a freedom fighter for the other. Needless to say, some individuals who involved in a "liberation" struggle were labelled as "terrorists" by the Western governments or media. Later, the same individuals, as leaders of the liberated nations, were called "statesmen" by Western governments. Two

²² Weinberg, Leonard, and William Lee Eubank. *"The Roots of Terrorism What is Terrorism?."* (2006). New York, Chelsea Hose Publisher.

examples of this phenomenon were the Nobel Peace Prize laureates Menachem Begin and Nelson Mandela.²³

In November 2004, the United Nations Secretary General report described terrorism as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. For the purpose of this study, Seumas Miller's²⁴ definition of terrorism will be adopted. According to him, terrorism is a political or military strategy that consists of violent actions directed against civilians involving such methods as assassination (targeted killings), indiscriminate killing, torture, hostage taking, kidnapping, ethnic cleansing and the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in order to cause some other group to do what they otherwise might not have done. In his definition, he underscores that terrorism is a strategy used by state or non-state actors to engender widespread fear in the target political or social groups and to achieve a political goal. Generally, terrorism has been carried out in different forms by different actors. The purpose of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) to achieve short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states.²⁵ What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence and war is the deliberate killings of innocent people and this has been widely considered as the central characteristics that defines terrorism.

²³ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

²⁴ Miller, Seumas. *Terrorism and Counter: Terrorism*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

²⁵ Held, Virginia. *How terrorism is wrong: Morality and political violence*. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Gerd²⁶ stresses that what is important to know is that terrorism is not an ‘-ism’ which refers to ideology. It is a tactic which can be used by an individual, groups or a state for any ideological or other motives. He defines terrorism as “the act or threat of violence targeting non-combatant population and/or institutions, often but not always in arbitrary fashion, in order to create fear and/or to damage the institutions that are being challenged.” For him, the aim of threatening or using violence ranges from destabilizing the target, demonstrating the movement’s strength, forcing policy change or extracting financial gain. Gerd identifies four main categories of terrorism: one, revolutionary or ideological which aims to replace the existing order using a clearly new order, two, Nihilist or anarchist which aims to destroy the existing order without any clear roadmap of preferred alternative, three, nationalist which aims at liberating people or territory and fourthly, criminal type which entail creation of or maintaining an environment conducive to the interests of organized crime.²⁷

In general terms, terrorism landscapes continue to evolve throughout the globe with escalating challenges to international and regional peace and security. According to the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) Global Attack Index, the number of terror attacks continues to rise. In 2016, the Centre recorded 24,202 attacks by non-state actors and individuals, representing 27.5% increase as compared to cases recorded in 2015.²⁸

²⁶ Gerd Nonneman, ‘Terrorism and Political Violence in the Middle East and North Africa: Drivers and Limitations, in Asaf Siniver (Ed.), International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, Routledge Publishers, 2010, New York, pp.12-13

²⁷ Ibid, Gerd (2010)

²⁸ Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, <https://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html>

The globe has and continues to experience terror related attacks and threats with varying levels of impact. International Terrorism transcends territories in its operations, and involves actors of varied nationalities. For instance, the 9/11 Al-Qaeda- sponsored attack in the US was planned and executed by individuals of diverse nationalities. The unrestricted movement of terrorists across different territories is evident in the contemporary world as individuals from different countries travel to join terrorist groups in other parts of the world such as the ISIL and AQAP in Yemen. Likewise, the 1998 terrorist attacks in Nairobi was authorized by Al-Qaeda coordinated and executed by individuals from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Comoros and local cells in Kenya.²⁹

The 9/11 attack was a turning point when focus on terrorism in Africa became much more pronounced and counter terrorism strategies by states and non-state players intensifies.³⁰ The event created widespread fears, uncertainty and seriously undermining global and regional security. It is instructive to note that before the 9/11, the known ideology of the terrorist was not so much seeing many people dead but many people watching as a strategy to publicize their cause. However, in the new age of terrorism, the terrorist aims at inflicting mass killings and cause mass casualties to elicit and amplify their cause. In the information age, terrorists are able to adapt by exploiting new technologies. They have also demonstrated that they can not only adapt to counter terrorism measures in place but can also develop new capabilities using the new technologies.

²⁹ Ibid, Gerd (2010)

³⁰ Ibid, Jordan & Richards (2016)

Internationally, terrorism has been orchestrated by transnational terrorist groups as well as sub-national terrorist groups operating in the global stage. At this stage, the attack involves at least two nations. Scholars have given a causal relationship between globalization and terrorism. The scholars argue that globalization facilitates resistance that can be turned into terrorist attacks.³¹ In relation to this, terrorism is viewed as reactionary, defensive, solidarity movement against change in economy and culture globally. In this case, terrorism is seen to be supported by a disgruntled tribalism.³²

At the regional level, in Africa, terrorism has normally included two actors; state and non-state stakeholders. With respect to non-state actors, terrorism in Africa involves sub-national actors who for gainful purposes choose to regionalize their actions to other countries for purposes of survival. They are normally seen in dysfunctional societies. For example, in West and North Africa, we see the al Qaeda in the Maghreb operating in the politically oppressed nations of the Arab Maghreb as well as the dysfunctional states of the Sahel such as Mali and Niger. In Nigeria, the poor north east has been a hot bed of the terrorist group Boko Haram.³³

In Kenya, terrorist groups have normally existed as groups of unemployed and largely economically disenfranchised youths operating in urban areas and activities of regional and international terrorist corporations such as al Shabaab and al Qaeda with

³¹ Davis, John. "The Bush Model: US Special Forces, Africa, and the War on Terror." *In Africa and the War on Terrorism*, pp. 151-170. Routledge, 2016.

³²Bergesen, Albert J., and Omar Lizardo. "International terrorism and the world-system." *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 1 (2004): 38-52.

³³Ngwodo, C. (2010, October 6). *Understanding Boko Haram: A Theology of Chaos*. Retrieved May 20, 2014, from Revolution By Other Means:<http://chrisngwodo.blogspot.com/2010/10/understanding-boko-haram-theology-of.html>

the example of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi as well as the Westgate siege in 2013 not ringing far from the mind.³⁴ Since 1998, Kenya has been a country rocked with rigorous terrorist attacks. The geographical, political, economical, socio-cultural, regional, and historical elements of Kenya make it a target for global terrorism. 1998 saw the al Qaeda bomb the then US Embassy situated in the busy Central Business District (CBD) of the nation's capital Nairobi. In 2002, a terrorist attack saw the bombing of an Israeli owned tourist hotel at the Kenyan coast as well as an attempted shooting down of a jumbo jet carrying Israeli passengers.

Ever since the raid of the Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia in 2011 to bring an end to Al Shabaab (Affiliate of Al Qaeda Based in Somalia), the country has come under unending attacks from the Somali terrorist group with the country experiencing more than 87 terrorist attacks and still counting, from shopping malls to hotels, police stations, open air markets as well as the public transports. In addition to that, among the worst terror attack claimed by Al Shabaab that took place in Kenyan soil was the massacre of over 150 university students in their dormitories in the North Eastern City of Garissa on April 2015. The effect of these attacks has been the great loss of lives, tensions between Christians and Muslims, undermining of the country's economy especially tourism and the fading away of the country's' sovereignty.³⁵

³⁴Otiso, Kefa. "Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: fighting terrorism at the periphery." *Kenya Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (2009): 107-132.

³⁵ Kamindo, Anthony. "*Social and Economic Causes of Terrorism in Kenya: a Case Study of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County.*" PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

1.7.2 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

IGAD was established in 1996 to supersede the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) which was created in 1986. The original founding members of the organization were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Later on, Eritrea became the seventh member of the Authority in Addis Ababa in 1993.³⁶ However, it withdrew from its membership in 1998. In 2011 South Sudan admitted as a new member to the Authority. Initially, IGADD was created to mobilize and coordinate resources of member states to prevent the spread of drought, famine and desertification. Later on, the organization was revitalized into a full-fledged regional political, economic and security entity in the mid-1990s. This time, member countries recognized that economic development and regional integration could not be achieved without the existence of perpetual peace and security in the region. Consequently, they transformed the organization and expanded its mandate to incorporate wide array of regional issues especially in areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1995.³⁷

The role of IGAD in conflict prevention, management and resolution had shown significant progress when it carried out conflict resolution and mediation attempts in the Sudan and Somalia. IGAD also attempted to mediate Ethiopia and Eritrea during the 1998- 2000 war although they remained to date in a state of no-war no-peace situation. The ultimate objective of IGAD is to achieve economic cooperation and integration by averting the destructive energies of conflict into regional cooperation and development.³⁸

³⁶ Demeke, Memar Ayalew, and Solomon Gebreyohans Gebru. "The Role of Regional Economic Communities in Fighting Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)." *European Scientific Journal* (2014).

³⁷ Abraham, Kinfe. "The Horn of Africa: Conflicts and Conflict Mediation in the Greater Horn of Africa." *Addis Ababa, EIIPD and HADAD* (2006).

³⁸ *Ibid*, Demeke *et al.*

It also aims to harmonize the policies of member countries in order to maintain lasting peace and security in the region. To achieve these objectives, it has established four hierarchical and complementary operational structures which include the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat. The IGAD region has been the most conflict and terrorism torn zone in the world. Since the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania fighting terrorism has been one of the international obligations of IGAD. Following the adoption of the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in 2003, IGAD has taken a more proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime in region.³⁹ In 2016, IGAD established the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). ICEPCVE facilitates coordination among state and non-state actors to develop and implement inclusive and holistic strategies to build resilience against violent extremism in the Horn and Eastern Africa.⁴⁰

1.7.3 Causes of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The rise in terrorism and violent extremism in the world has created severe security threats as this growing phenomenon has resulted in death, destruction and instability in the countries and regions where terrorist groups operate. Social, political

³⁹ Schwartz, Matthew. *Criminal justice and rule of law capacity building to counter terrorism in fragile institutional contexts: Lessons from development cooperation*. Global Center on Cooperative Security., 2012.

⁴⁰ National Democratic Institute. “*NDI Partners with Eastern African Regional Organization to Promote Democratic Principles*.” 2017. [Online] <https://www.ndi.org/our-stories/ndi-partners-eastern-african-regional-organization-promote-democratic-principles#:~:text=Established%20in%202016%2C%20the%20ICEPCVE,the%20Horn%20and%20Eastern%20Africa>. Retrieved August, 24 (2020)

and economic factors can be attributed to the causes of this threat. Ngwodo⁴¹ in Nigeria argues that the social conditions that permit the existence of terrorism and violent extremism are rife across the country. Millions of unschooled and unskilled able-bodied young men reside in major cities and towns and provide a ready pool of malcontents for extremist recruitment. Even among the educated, the crisis of unemployment in Nigeria where 40 million youths are jobless makes them vulnerable to sectarian preachments. Into this breach, groups like Boko Haram enter offering a theological framework of social analysis: rampant poverty and existential meaninglessness emanate from the Nigerian state and its un-Islamic provenance; from the presence of western education and the intrusion of modernity into an Islamic society. Boko Haram imparts to its members a sense of purpose and mission as warriors for the cause of God ordained to cleanse the society of moral impurities and establish an alternate order. The study was comprehensive in elaborating the challenge experienced by the people of Nigeria as a result of the Boko Haram. However, the study did not address other terrorist groups in Africa such as the AlShabab in Somali that are recruiting young people from Kenya and Somalia to join the militia group.

On the other hand, Kamindo⁴², in Kenya has challenged the view that poverty creates terrorism. This is because a more plausible explanation for terrorism than poverty exists. This is alienation i.e., the alienation that results when economic success has been achieved, yet a corresponding increase in political power has been denied. To this end, likely terrorists have been described as people who by virtue of their educational and/or

⁴¹ Ngwodo, Chris. "Understanding Boko Haram: A Theology of Chaos." 2014. [online] <http://chrisngwodo.blogspot.com/2010/10/understanding-boko-haram-theology-of.html>. Retrieved August, 21 (2020):

⁴² Kamindo, Anthony. "Social and Economic Causes of Terrorism in Kenya: a Case Study of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

income backgrounds are potential members of the elite, but for some reason or another they are excluded. Their chief grievance is the blockage of their ambition. They cannot translate their socio-economic assets into political clout. Add to this religious fanatic actively recruiting these young men and offering them the ultimate political power that of Allah and the result is terrorism. This study focused on the Eastleigh area in Kenya. The study did not recognize other areas that have been faced with the challenge of terrorist recruitment such as Mombasa. Moreover, the study failed to acknowledge how access to financing equips radicalized groups to take part in terrorism.

De La Corte⁴³ looks at the psychosocial approach to the study of terrorism by reviewing seven attributes that justify it as the best way of considering the terrorist and terrorism as a process. In his analysis, he reviews the environment by stating that the society and political influence fuels the terrorist idea as illustrated in the Anarchist saying of; “Propaganda by fact”. His analysis also moves further and looks at the social interactions that shape the organizational behavior of a terrorist. He highlights the concept of secondary socialization which is the process by which the terrorists become engaged after the joining.⁴⁴ He also highlights not only the access to specific resources; which form some of the drivers to violent extremism but also the continuous sustenance of the group or its members in the fold. He calls this the legitimization through extreme ideology.⁴⁵ The study focused on the psychosocial drivers that cause terrorism. The study failed to mention how political drivers which are prominent in African nations result in terrorism and violent extremism.

⁴³ De la Corte, Luis. "Explaining terrorism: A psychosocial approach." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 1, no. 2 (2007).

⁴⁴ (de la Corte, 2007)

⁴⁵ (de la Corte, 2007)

Observations by the United Nations revealed that terrorists need finances to carry out their plans. Without the money, the extremist/terrorist cannot purchase weapons, and other equipment's to carry out their heinous acts. These financial sources can either be legal or illegal and mostly they take the mode of minor contributions, rather than large sum of donations.⁴⁶ In 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report revealing donations as the major source of terror funding. The donations came from wealthy personalities and charities affiliated to them. The report disclosed that for many years, charity organizations based in Saudi Arabia were the key financiers for alQaeda.⁴⁷ Prior to the CFR report, on July 2001, then US President Bush started a mega crackdown on curbing the flow of illicit funds after two financial systems were identified as key financiers of al-Qaida. The US government had identified the so-called Hawala system (financial system operating as unlicensed banks). The Hawala systems are very hard to crack, as they are extremely informal, no existence of paper trail, and purely operate on a system of trust. The report by the UN emphasized on the way terrorist groups get their funding. The report explained that for any terror attack to take place, finances are key. The report presented a research gap since it did not identify the source of financing for other terrorist groups such as the Alshabaab and the Boko Haram in Africa. Moreover, the report failed to identify the strategies that can be adopted by regional organizations to cut the sources of finances to terrorist groups.

⁴⁶ United Nations, *Terrorism financing*, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, (2017_). Available at: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/financing-of-terrorism/>, Accessed on: August, 21, 2020.

⁴⁷ Kaplan, Eben. "Tracking down terrorist financing." *Council on Foreign Relations* 4 (2006).

Ngunyi and Katumanga⁴⁸ offer a much more plausible explanation to the cause of terrorism under the Kenyan context. They argue that the proliferation of terrorist groups can be explained from a focus on the governance of geographical spaces. Their central thrust is that new “spaces” tend to skew the space to force ratio. They result in far too many spaces being policed by a too small a force. Because of this imbalance, the distant spaces close themselves out, limiting the influence of the center on their activities. This phenomenon of closed spaces invites militia to police them and increases their de facto legitimacy in community. In fact, a symbiosis between the supply of criminal activities and its demand by community begins to emerge. The further away the state is from the closed spaces, the higher the legitimacy of gangs as the alternative state. And this is how organic militia and terrorists emerge. They are organic because community demands for them and legitimizes their activities. However, the authors argue that security gaps are not occasioned by state absence alone but by state abstinence as well. This is a situation where the state agencies are either overpowered by the militia or are partakers of illicit activities with the militias.⁴⁹ The study revealed that poor governances pushes people in the community to seek better governance. The lack of a stable governance makes militia groups look favourable in the eyes of the community members. Though the study explained the organic acceptance of militia groups as a cause for terrorism, it failed to highlight the role of regional organizations in ensuring good governance in member states so as to prevent the acceptance of militia groups.

⁴⁸ Ngunyi, Mutahi, and Musambayi Katumanga. *From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence: Exploration of a Four-point Hypothesis Regarding Organised and Organic Militia in Kenya*. UNDP, 2014.

⁴⁹ Ibid, Ngunyi and Katumanga

Religions people, ideas, beliefs, cultures, ideologies and other systems will always be reluctant to change, especially when change has been largely dormant for a significant period of time and then becomes necessary. Out this scenario, extremism forms as a means of protecting the 'old ways 'and what exists, lest they be lost to a new system that completely negates and replaces them. These forms of terrorism tend to be tied to a small leadership that has enjoyed the benefits of power and are willing to surrender them to a new system in which they will be replaced and cease to be relevant. The threat also extends to their economic prosperity which is equally threatened through a loss of power.⁵⁰ Religious and cultural extremism was cited as contributing to terrorism in Nairobi according to Kamindo.⁵¹

Religion however does not cause terrorism. If anything, religion roots for peace in any given setting. However, fundamentalists and extremists within these religious and cultural establishments are to blame. This is because they purposely misinterpret religion-cultural doctrines. To this effect therefore, they use the failings of one system and the perceived persecution of people to inculcate fear and hatred in order to undermine that system in favor of another. In so doing, they create the "We" versus "Them" feeling. To these people, what is traditionally wrong becomes acceptable when traditional values no longer hold and terrorist activities become a virtue rather than a vice.⁵² Gibson propels religious terrorism comprises of acts that unnerve, the meaning of which is given by the witnesses, the ones frightened, and not by the gathering submitting the demonstration;

⁵⁰Kamindo, Anthony (2016). *Social And Economic Causes Of Terrorism In Kenya: A Case of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County (thesis)*. Nairobi: University Of Nairobi

⁵¹Kamindo (2016)

⁵²Kamindo, Anthony. *Social And Economic Causes Of Terrorism In Kenya: A Case of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County (thesis)*. Nairobi: University Of Nairobi. (2016)

followed by a religious inspiration, legitimization, association, or world view. Researchers have anyway contended that religion is neither the chicken nor the egg in relation to creating terrorists. Or on the other hand possibly, religion is one of various segments in the shaky blend of administrative issues, and culture that leads fans to target legitimate individuals and take their own lives at the same time.⁵³

Gibson contends that religion is vital for terrorism acts because it offers a moral defence for the slaughtering and gives pictures of vast war that enables fanatics to trust that they are pursuing religious situations.⁵⁴ It doesn't imply that religion leads to terrorism, however it means that the religion regularly gives images that make conceivable slaughter even disastrous demonstrations terrorism. As proof we can see that most of the groups of terrorists are roused by the religion. Religion has been a reason for terrorists activities where those whose inspirations and goals have a transcendent religious character or impact.⁵⁵

Culture has also been blamed for contributing to terrorism. According to Kamindo,⁵⁶ cultural extremism, political influence and religious extremism were also a net contributor of terrorism in Nairobi County. For instance, there is a terror gang by the name of superpower that operates in Easleigh and Majengo estates of Nairobi due to a negative social influence that has strengthened deviance. This terror gang also serves as a recruitment base for al Shabaab and al Hijra as the disenfranchised youths seek an

⁵³Gibson, David. "Does Religion Cause Terrorism? It's Complicated." *The Huffington Post* 31 (2011).

⁵⁴ Ibid, Gibson, 2011

⁵⁵Michael, Sabir. "Terrorism a socio-economic and political phenomenon with special reference to Pakistan." *Journal of management and social sciences* 3, no. 1 (2007): 35-46.

⁵⁶ Ibid, Kamindo (2016)

identity. Politicians have been a source of negative influence for the residents..⁵⁷ To Kamindo⁵⁸ culture does not cause terrorism but a lack of understanding of other cultures does. The fear of the unknown leads to false representations. That said, the “culture” of corruption does allow terrorism to breed.

1.7.4 Measures Implemented by Regional Organizations in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The UN resolution 60/2 88 of 2006 gave rise to the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Thereafter, it adopted the UN-steering Global Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism.⁵⁹ The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy comprises of four pillars. They are: Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard, and procedures to enforce respect for human rights and the rule of law in the process of fighting against terrorism. The said pillars have been adopted by all UN affiliate states. This sends a clear message that the various states are willing to have a common operation and tactical methodology to fight terrorism. This notwithstanding, the UN General Assembly pledged to review the strategies at an interval of two years.⁶⁰ Other adopted strategies globally are the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2178 of 2014, the updated Resolution 2368 of 2017 on CVE and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) of 2005, which acts on issues touching on incitement and Resolution 1373 which established the United Nations

⁵⁷Ibid, Kamindo (2016)

⁵⁸ Ibid, Kamindo (2016)

⁵⁹ U.N, *United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*. New York: UN General Assembly Agenda Items 16 and 17, 2015

⁶⁰ United Nation, —UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism.

Counter-Terrorism Committee as well as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and the recent United Nations Secretary General's Plans of Action to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.⁶¹ Also, UNESCO Member States adopted Decision 197EX/46 to enable UNESCO's to provide the required support to its Member States as they develop strategies to combat violent extremism.

The Americas have experienced the effects of violent extremism, with the most significant attacks to date being those of 9/11 which greatly increased the regional attention given to terrorism and violent extremism related matters. For instance, soon after the attacks, in 2002, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism . Reflecting regional priorities at the time of its adoption, the primary focus of the Convention's text was on CVE through criminal justice measures, emphasizing as well the importance of starving terrorist organizations of the financial resources needed to support their terrorist activities. It was further recognized that a concerted effort was needed towards "strengthening and establishing new forms of regional cooperation" with a view to eradicating violent extremist behaviour. By June 2018, 24 out of the 33 OAS Member States had ratified the Convention. Violent extremism continues to pose significant challenges and security threats across the region, whether it is in the form of 'lone wolf' attacks, as have occurred in North America⁶² or cooperation or convergence between violent extremist actors and organized criminal groups in South America.⁶³

⁶¹ UNDP, *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, New York: Regional Bureau for Africa, (2017).

⁶² Bajekal, Naina ". The Rise of the Lone Wolf Terrorist." *TIME*, (2014).

⁶³ Fowler, Jeffrey T. " *Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas all Active in South America.*" *In Homeland Security*, (2016).

Subsequently, the European Council in 2005, approved the EU counter-terrorism strategy with the aim of making Europe safe.⁶⁴ The EU counter-terrorism approach was pegged on four key thematic structures. These are Prevents, Pursue, Protect, and Respond. These four thematic structures encompassing the EU counterterrorism approach underscored the significance of cooperation with global institutions and other regions. Further, in February 2015, the European Union leaders emphasized the significance of the European Union affiliated States EU to work hand in hand with third world countries on Counter-terrorism and security issues. In May 2015, the European Parliament and the Security Council approved new guidelines to avert laundering of money and terrorist financing. This notwithstanding, on March 24, 2017, resolution 2347 linking the financing of terrorism and illicit trade in cultural property.⁶⁵ Further, on December 21, 2017, Resolution 2396 was adopted to elaborate more on how to handle Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF)s returning to their home countries.

Looking at the form that regional responses to violent extremism have taken, it is interesting also to note that within The Astana Declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation document, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) gave little direct attention to non-securitized responses on these matters. That said, the SCO does recognize the significance of socio-economic development, in general terms, and that States should act to fulfil their own economic potential, which should assist in mitigating, at least to some extent, drivers of violent extremism. Some related challenges remain though, illustrated by the fact that many

⁶⁴ Ibid, Mwaniki (@017)

⁶⁵ Minnella, Carlotta M. "Counter-Terrorism Resolutions and Listing of Terrorists and Their Organizations by the United Nations." *International Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism* (2019): 31-53.

national level proposals aimed at countering violent extremism are, primarily, security focused.⁶⁶

The 9/11 attacks in New York, regarded as a watershed moment in major international terrorism, led to a widespread military campaign against terror. In Africa, however, national, regional and continental efforts to address this growing crisis have been underway as far back as the early 1990s. For example, from 1992 onwards, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had adopted various counterterrorism frameworks that focused on the efforts of cooperation and recognizing terrorism and violent extremism as criminal acts. These frameworks were refined and expanded after the transition of the OAU into the AU. In 2002, the AU adopted the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which embraces practical measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges. It takes into consideration measures in areas such as police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, the financing of terrorism and the exchange of information.⁶⁷ The AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognizance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

A central concern of the African Union is to deal effectively with the threat that violent extremism poses. To this end, the Peace and Security Council has concentrated much of its work on addressing this. For instance, in October 2017, the Council convened its 728th meeting to address the role of women in preventing and countering violent

⁶⁶ Almuttaqi, A. Ibrahim. "The Islamic State and the Rise of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia." *ASEAN Studies Program*, (2015).

⁶⁷ Ramdeen, Marisha. "Countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa." *conflict trends* 2017, no. 2 (2017): 49-56.

extremism in Africa, reflective of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.⁶⁸ By way of a preamble to the discussions, the Council reiterated the significance of the threat that violent extremism poses not only to peace and security matters, but additionally for the realization of long term sustainable development in the African continent. The Council further acknowledged the pivotal role that women can play in combating violent extremism, and that to facilitate this the African Union should continue to promote women's rights due to related work being one of the success factors in preventing and combating the scourge of violent extremism. The Council went on to stress the importance of institutionalizing the integration of gender perspectives in all national policies and programmes, as well as of promoting and ensuring women's effective participation in decision making, particularly in the implementation of the peace and security agenda in the African continent".

Similarly, the African Union Youth Division has recognized the importance of increased engagement with the youth of Africa on PVE/CVE issues, as part of a more comprehensive regional approach. The aim of the Youth Division, on matters of violent extremism, is to draw on the "soft power of religion and dialogue" in order to promote "values of tolerance, mutual respect and better understanding centred on intra and interfaith, interreligious and inter-cultural values that are the core principles for integration and peace", with the hope that this will encourage behavioural change in

⁶⁸ UNODC. Regional and multilateral approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism. (2018). Retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-2/key-issues/regional-and-multilateral-approaches-to-pve-and-cve.html>.

communities and individuals. Such a 'soft approach' has been adopted, for instance, in Nigeria by the Office of the National Security Advisor.⁶⁹

Moreover, the member States of IGAD plus Tanzania from July 2016 embarked on the process of developing the now adopted 2018, regional strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism. This strategy will be reviewed after every three years.⁷⁰ Kenya too has played its role in various regional initiatives to curb acts of violent extremism. These includes, adopting the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (EACTI), enforcing the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and being part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA).⁷¹ These strategies have led to the adoption of legal, operational, and strategic strategies that are now currently being used to combat violent extremism. These strategies tend to function through four jointly underlining elements: Detect, Prevent, Deny and Respond.

Well-coordinated intelligence-driven strategies have disrupted many heinous acts from terrorist and violent extremist. Also, the intelligence acquired has resulted to further operations. However, intelligence has also had its share of failures. Yet, overall, it has been the most critical source of vital information for the global community early warning systems. Intelligence collaboration is key to the various counterterrorism partnerships and regional organizations. This can be in the form of merging the military personnel's to gather credible information, and intelligence sharing.⁷² During the Prague Summit

⁶⁹ Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. " Workshop Report - National Workshop on Effective Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005 and 2178 (2014)." Tunisia, (2015).

⁷⁰ Ibid, Mwaniki (2017)

⁷¹ Mogire, Edward, and Kennedy Mkutu Agade. "Counter-terrorism in Kenya." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2011): 473-491.

⁷² Stephen Tankel, Sixteen years after 9/11, are we any better at fighting terrorism? *The Washington Post*, 2017. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/09/11/fighting-terrorism->

meeting in 2002, gathering of intelligence key stakeholders was acknowledged as a critical trait of collaboration among Partners. A Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was established in 2003 and housed at the NATO Office of Security. The TTIU operated for seven years as a joint NATO body comprising of civilian officers and military officers from intelligence organizations.

1.7.5 Challenges Faced by Regional Organizations in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Terrorism has evolved over time with the effects of the environment determining the cause of action for responders, participation, and involvement of the primary perpetrators and the audience to which the output of its activities is intended. Governments have had their share of challenges when dealing with the issues of terrorism. These challenges span from not only the agreeable definition of terms as seen above; but also, the methodologies of engagement especially when it comes to balancing between the hard power, the inclusion of partners and finally the process of radicalization recruitment and mobilization into extremist organizations. It was established that lack of full cooperation from the member states of regional organizations is an issue. In the case of Kenya, a member states of regional organizations, most community members are not cooperative in fighting terrorism despite the introduction of the Nyumba Kumi imitative which aims at promoting community members' participation. Most of those appointed as the ambassadors in the initiative are not conversant with their roles and do lack incentives for motivation. The members of the public are also poorly trained on their role in policing as they have not fully appreciated their role in

takes-a-global-effort-how-have-3-u-s-presidents-fared-16-years-after-911/?utm_term=.baad4cf50cf0,
Accessed on: August, 21, 2020.

cooperating with the police so as to ensure that security prevails. Therefore, they do not cooperate with the security in providing vital information which will be helpful in combating terrorism in the region.⁷³ The study revealed that although most community members are aware of the dangers of terrorism, they fail to be vigilant. The study focused on Kenya while the current study will focus on the member states of IGAD and how the regional organization has contributed in countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region

Further, Memar and Gebreyohans⁷⁴ revealed that the difference on the definition of terrorist organization and lack of cooperation among member states in fighting domestic terrorism. Due to the dynamic nature of terrorism, member states do not have common definition on what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. Moreover, while majority of terrorism in the IGAD region do not constitute international terrorism, as a regional body, IGAD has been focusing on terrorist acts emanating from Islamic fundamentalist and Al-Qaeda linked terrorists operating in Somalia. However, the vast terrorist acts in the IGAD region has been committed by groups labelled as domestic terrorist in the respective countries, where IGAD had no significant role in abating it. Such terrorist acts were committed by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Janjaweed in Sudan, and Al-shebab in Somalia and [the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia.⁷⁵ The study acknowledged that different states define terrorism differently, hence there is a need to have a clear

⁷³ Hassan, Hared. "*Dynamism of Terrorist Threats in Kenya*." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2015.

⁷⁴ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

⁷⁵ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

definition of terrorism to facilitate better coordination and cooperation between the member states of IGAD.

Davis⁷⁶ postulates that curbing terrorism activities has been hardened greatly by the modernization of technology. Particularly, technology has been found to ease how the terrorists undertake their transactions such as media propaganda, money transfer, communication and overall terrorist operations activities. Further, attributed to the fact that most parts of the world including Africa has significantly made strides in the technological advancement it makes it highly prone to the terrorist attacks. Additionally, the terrorists are able to familiarize themselves with the available counter strategies, and how to evade them.⁷⁷ The non-availability of modern and sufficient equipment in the counter terrorism sectors tends to handicap it in terms of its law enforcement role. The inadequacy of facilities besides limiting the efficiency of the police also endangers life in case of occurrence of terror. This shows that despite their being resistance among some individuals, it is essential to modernize the activities at the anti-terrorism sectors. The study concluded that technology is changing the way terrorists are conducting their activities. Further, the study suggested that in the same way, governments and organizations should also adopt technology to have an upper hand in the fight against terrorism. However, the study did not acknowledge the role of the IGAD in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

⁷⁶ Davis, John. "The Bush Model: US Special Forces, Africa, and the War on Terror." *In Africa and the War on Terrorism*, pp. 151-170. Routledge, 2016.

⁷⁷ Ibid, Davis

Magogo⁷⁸ found that another challenge that deters effectiveness of the counter terrorism strategies by regional organizations is increased youth radicalization. Radicalization acts to increase the amount of terrorists operating in any region. Owing to the fact that the large percentage of the world's population are youths, the opportunity to recruit more youths in terrorist groups increases. For instance, in Kenya, over one-third of the population of 40 million are young people (18-35 years old), and a large number are unemployed and out of school, making them particularly vulnerable targets for extremist recruiters. Hence, the radicalization aims to exploit the existing fissures and fault lines including relative deprivation, high unemployment, lack of education, political marginalization. Most of the terrorist attacks in Kenya have been carried out by local youth radicalized and recruited by the terrorist group called the Al Shabaab. Young people from all over the world are recruited to perform terrorism activities thus making it difficult to completely eradicate terrorism.⁷⁹ According to the study, the youths are most vulnerable to being recruited into radical groups. The research failed to explain the strategies that regional organizations can advocate or implement in order to curb the radicalization of young people in Africa.

Memar and Gebreyohans⁸⁰ found that lack of trust among member states of regional organizations due to the legacy of inter-state and intra-state conflict was a key challenge in countering terrorism and violent extremism. The IGAD region is characterized by endemic inter-state and intra-state conflict. Some IGAD member states were and (still are) supporting or hosting each other's rebel groups (including those

⁷⁸ Magogo, Samini. *"The effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Kenya: a case study of Eastleigh location, Nairobi county."* Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Nairobi. 2017

⁷⁹ Kihara, Andrew W. "Community Policing best way to arrest run away insecurity." *Daily Nation* (2007): 12.

⁸⁰ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

classified as terrorist groups) fighting a neighboring member state. Such acts happened between Ethiopia and Eritrea. IGAD states have been showing competing national interest over the Somalia civil war and towards the Al-Qaeda liked terrorist and other Islamists in Somalia. For example, in 2006, IGAD warned particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea from taking unilateral actions that undermine the powerless but internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG).⁸¹ All such experiences might have made it difficult for IGAD states to fight domestic and international terrorists effectively. The study however, was limited since it relied on secondary data that was more than ten years old, thus the need to conduct an up-to-date study that will collect both primary and secondary data.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The study will be anchored by regional security complex theory (RSCT). This theory was first used to describe the world after the Cold War, and is known to be durable but not permanent. This means that it offers an explanation of instances over a long period but does not exhaustively explain the lasting effects of a conflict. The theory by Buzan and Waever⁸² espouses that security is highly interdependent and has structures that support one another. This dependency is due to either confrontation or cooperation between states. In particular, RSCT offers a means to evaluate the relative balance of power of and mutual relationship between regionalization and globalizing trends, and its central idea is that since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over

⁸¹ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

⁸² Buzan Barry, and Ole Waever Barry Buzan. *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*. No. 91. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes.⁸³⁸⁴

This theory well explains the situation in the IGAD region which has experienced terror attacks for years. The security concerns in the IGAD region are too interconnected to be resolved independently due to the infiltration of terrorism groups such as the Al Shabaab in the region.⁸⁵ The Al Shabaab are based in Somalia and have continuously managed to mete attacks on Kenyan soil with coordination from local recruits⁸⁶ and other compromised institutions in the country. Although Kenya has tried to fight the Al Shabaab by deploying its troops in Somalia in 2011, the move has only fueled the attacks by the terror group. Hence the need of integration between IGAD member states to defeat the Al Shabaab.

The prevailing understanding in regional security complex theory is the importance of the geographical coherence.⁸⁷ Hence the eight member states of IGAD must come together to end terrorism and violent extremisms in the region. Through coherence and cooperation by the IGAD member states, it is likely that the challenge of terrorism and violent extremism may be alienated. Hence, this theory anchors the study with the aim of determining the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

⁸³ Hills, Alice. "Managing the interface: regional security and substate politics in Africa." *African security* 1, no. 2 (2008): 92-114.

⁸⁴ Ibid, Buzan, and Waever, 2003.

⁸⁵ Wabwire, Audrey Kawire. "*Resource Distribution and Security in Kenya: A Case Study of North Eastern Kenya.*" PhD diss., United States International University-Africa, 2017.

⁸⁶ Atta-Asamoah, Andrews. "East Africa Report." *The Nature and Drivers of Insecurity in Kenya* (2015).

⁸⁷ Vural, Ebru. "The Middle East As A Regional Security Complex: Continuities and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Under the JDP Rule." *ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing* (2010).

1.9 Hypothesis

The study will be based on the following hypothesis;

H₀₁ There are no causes of terrorism and violent extremism in IGAD regions

H₀₂ There are no measures implemented by Kenya in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD

H₀₃ There are no challenges faced by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD

1.10 Methodology

1.10.1 Research Design

This research will employ a case study approach which describes or defines a subject matter through creation of a profile of a group of issues, people, or events, through collecting data and tabulating of the frequencies on variables under research or their interaction. A case study research design offers focused insights to phenomena that may otherwise be imprecisely recognized or understood.⁸⁸. The case study design will be considered appropriate due to its ability to give the in-depth account of the relationship between study variables. The choice of case study approach will enable the researcher to deeply analyze the phenomena with a view to generalization about a wider population.

1.10.2 Population of the Study

The target population of the study will be 07 officers from IGAD offices in Nairobi. Among the respondents will include 4 officers from the Peace and Security

⁸⁸ Creswell, John W., and J. David Creswell. *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Sage publications, 2017.

Division and 3 officers from IGAD Security Sector Program. The target population of the study is appropriate since it comprises of professionals who can offer insight on the role of IGAD in countering terrorism and violent extremism. The study also targets the other staff members at the IGAD office in Nairobi.

1.10.3 Sampling Procedure

A sample size is the actual number of respondents selected from the target population that a research will collect data from. The study will employ census sampling to sample the population of the study. Census sampling will be used to sample all of the 07 officers from IGAD. In addition, the study will purposively select the other subordinate staff members at IGAD office to take part in a Focus Group Discussion. The sampled respondents will be considered proficient on the topic and in this manner, they are in a superior position to give tenable data as sought by the research.

1.10.4 Data Collection

The data for this research will be collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will be the subjects of the study who will give the actual data collected from the field. An interview guide will be used to collect data from IGAD officers in Kenya for thorough and in-depth collection of data. This will allow oral face to face interview in order to get as much information as possible. The interview allows for detailed discussions with the respondents on the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: the case of IGAD. In addition, a Focus Group Discussion will be used in the collection of primary data from the subordinate staff members at the IGAD office. This will help in collecting data from a group of

respondents on the issue under study. The secondary source will include records, past research and documents.

1.10.5 Data Analysis

The interview guide will collect quantitative data. The data will therefore be analysed on the basis of conceptual content analysis. According to Creswell,⁸⁹ content analysis is the method of creating inferences by identifying systematically and accurately the definite characteristics of information and using the same technique to relate to the trending facts. Content analysis is often used to find out certain factors that are connected to a specific idea or phenomenon. Kothari⁹⁰ stated that content analysis uses a given way to categorize in order to make valid and transferable inferences from a given data to its context. Qualitative data will be presented in narration form since it involves in-depth discussions between the researcher and the respondent. The narration form of presentation allows for more information on the analysis to be recorded. Moreover, narration form allows for direct quotation of answers from the respondents. Notably, the respondents will remain anonymous when presenting the analysed data.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter one will be the introduction to the study. It includes the background, the statement of problem, objectives of the study, research questions, and significance of the study, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology and arrangement of chapters. Chapter two will cover the causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the

⁸⁹ Ibid, Creswell and Creswell.

⁹⁰ Kothari, C. R. "Research Methodology Methods and Techniques, new Age International (P) Ltd." *New Delhi* (2004).

IGAD region. Chapter three will delve on the measures implemented by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter four will cover the challenges faced by regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter five will be the analysis of the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism. This chapter will also test the stated objectives as well as the hypotheses to ascertain if they were met during the course of the study. Chapter six will be the summary, conclusion and recommendations of this study.

CHAPTER TWO: CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN IGAD REGION

2.1 Introduction

Terrorism has become a worldwide phenomenon and thus countries are becoming more and more engaged in counter terrorism measures. The rise in terrorism and violent extremism in the world has created severe security threats as this growing phenomenon has resulted in death, destruction and instability in the countries and regions where terrorist groups operate. Social, political and economic factors can be attributed to the causes of this threat. In the IGAD region, terrorist groups have normally existed as groups of unemployed and largely economically disenfranchised youths operating in urban areas and activities of regional and international terrorist corporations such as Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda with the example of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi as well as the Westgate siege in 2013 not ringing far from the mind.⁹¹ East Africa's terrorism trend for the period from 1998 to 2019 shows that from 1998 to 2009, Kenya experienced relatively low levels of terrorism compared to the rest of the region, and generally registered more domestic terrorist attacks than international attacks. In contrast, between 2010 and 2019, Kenya experienced far higher levels of terrorism than the other countries in the region, and most of the attacks were launched by transnational groups. Therefore, the main puzzle for this chapter is to assess the causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the IGAD region.

⁹¹Otiso, Kefa. "Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: fighting terrorism at the periphery." *Kenya Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (2009): 107-132.

2.2 Religion and Culture

Religion has been at the focal point of discussions on the causative operators of terrorism across the world of academics. In a large portion of these discussions, religion has been reprimanded for causing terrorism. For example, in the contemporary scholarly world, scholars believe that fanaticism in religion is a contributor to terrorism. Religion is critical for these demonstrations since it avails moral defense for the slaughtering and gives pictures of vast war that enables activists to trust that they are pursuing otherworldly situations. This, Sabir⁹² contends, does not imply that the religion is the cause for terrorism but rather it means that the religion regularly gives images that make conceivable shedding of blood even disastrous demonstrations of terrorist attacks are enlivened by the religion or possibly it is claimed. Religion has been a reason for terrorism where those whose inspirations and points have a transcendent.

According to the seven interviewees religions people, ideas, beliefs, cultures, ideologies and other systems will always be reluctant to change, especially when change has been largely dormant for a significant period of time and then becomes necessary. PSD1 AND PSD4 noted that out this scenario, extremism forms as a means of protecting the 'old ways 'and what exists, lest they be lost to a new system that completely negates new and replaces them. This argument concurred with that of Glucklich,⁹³ that the principle motivation behind why there is a nexus among terrorism and religion is that religion instructs scorn. The extreme violence emanates from the desire of affection and capability to take the necessary steps to get it and as he calls it, the Prozac impact. A few

⁹²Michael, Sabir. 2007. Terrorism a Socio-Economic and Political Phenomenon with Special Reference to Pakistan *Journal of Management and Social Sciences* Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring 2007) 35-46 ; pp. 37

⁹³ Glucklich, Aerial. *Dying for Heaven: Holy Pleasure and Suicide Bombers - Why the Best Qualities of Religion Are Also Its Most Dangerous*. Georgetown: HarperCollins Publishers. 2010.

religions do, truth be told, cause disdain, as he contends, however frequently the underlying foundations of religious savagery are covered some place in the positive parts of religion. Terrorism is accordingly an impact of religion's socialization impact i.e., when social orders separate, people are helpless to magnetic pioneers who lecture a debased sort of religion.⁹⁴

From the FDG, the staff agreed that faith-based terrorism has for quite a while been a part of human endeavors. The stories of people, urban foundations, nations, and domains are stuffed with points of reference of radical fanatics who partake in violence to propel their conviction structure. This was in agreement with Hoffman⁹⁵ who established that some religious terrorists are attracted by careful expectations, others attempt to ensure the intensity of their certainty, and others are influenced by a mighty amalgam of these tendencies. Religious based terrorism can be normal, dangerous, skeptic, or dynamic. It might be put together by lone wolves, stealthy cells, extensive protester improvements, or governments. Likewise, dependent upon one's perspective, there is routinely exchange about whether the offenders should be religious warriors or terrorists.

According to Kamindo,⁹⁶ cultural extremism, political influence and religious extremism were also a net contributor of terrorism. This was supported by SSP3 who noted reminisced on the Westgate terror attack and revealed that the attack was by Muslim extremists whose extremist ideology and socio-cultural beliefs vehemently

⁹⁴ See for example Gibson, D. (2011, August 31). Does Religion Cause Terrorism? It is Complicated. *The Huffington Post*; pp. 13 See also Glucklich, A. (2010). *Dying for Heaven: Holy Pleasure and Suicide Bombers - Why the Best Qualities of Religion Are Also Its Most Dangerous*. Georgetown: HarperCollins Publishers; pp. 4

⁹⁵ Hoffman, Bruce. "Inside Terrorism New York." *NY: Columbia University Press [Google Scholar]* (1998).

⁹⁶ Ibid, Kamindo (2016)

oppose and seek to challenge the modernity of a secular and Western-oriented culture. The environment and shopping experience at Westgate portrays Kenya's anticipated economic transition from third world to first world, and this could be the reason why the upscale shopping complex is popular amongst foreign nationals, expatriates, diplomats, and tourists from Asia, Europe, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Bruton⁹⁷ notes that Nairobi is East Africa's most prosperous hub, full of Western tourists, business interests, aid operations, and diplomats; the Westgate mall attack could have killed shoppers from any corner of the globe. It may be against this background that the Westgate mall qualified as a high-value target for radical Islamic militants, whose extremist ideology and socio-cultural beliefs vehemently oppose and seek to challenge the modernity of a secular and Western-oriented culture, which is considerably predominant in the East African region. Further from the interviews it was reported:

SSP1: In a deliberate attempt to avoid Muslim casualties during the mall siege, the attackers openly segregated amongst their hostages by freeing those who ably identified themselves as Muslims.

SPD2: The aim of the Muslim extremist during the Westgate attack in Kenya was to set a record for the world to see, that they are not afraid of killing any nationality including the American.

SPD3: The Westgate mall attack through fueled by religious terrorism aimed at crippling the economy of Kenya and to discourage modernization.

⁹⁷ Bruton, Bronwyn. "Africa terrorism: The real reason al-Shabaab attacked a mall in Kenya." *Defense One* (2013).

Further from the focus group discussions, it was revealed that homegrown terrorism in Kenya has been attributed to the radicalization and recruitment of young persons into Muslim extremism. This concurs with supporting evidence from face-to-face interviews with Muslim preachers, government leaders in Northern Kenya, Nairobi, as well as secondary sources, that Islamic extremism (practiced in Mosques for adults and madrassas or Muslim schools for youngsters) leads to religious and social conservatism and intolerance, thereby serving as precursors of homegrown terrorism.⁹⁸ In addition SSP3 explained that in 2011, Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, a founder of the Muslim Youth Center in Pumwani, Nairobi, was named al-Shabaab's leader and coordinator in Kenya because of his large following of jihadists. This was backed up by Botha⁹⁹ who was of the opinion that al-Shabaab was driven by a radical interpretation of Islam, which was of an external origin, and therefore, its developments were beyond Kenya's influence.

The interviewees all agreed on the religious context that has resulted in terrorism in the IGAD region.

PSD1: al-Shabaab is a terrorist group with an affiliation to al-Qaeda and is known to use religion to achieve its goals

PSD4: madrassas were used for radicalizing young children, while mosques served as centers for distributing jihadi materials and a recruitment hub to channel youths where they were further radicalized, with their national identity cards and birth certificates being confiscated and burned.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG). *Kenyan Somali Islamist radicalization*, 11 Nairobi/Brussels (2014).

⁹⁹ Ibid, Botha, (2014)

According to the two interviewees, the radicalization of young people through religion has remained successful, since the terror groups instill a purpose to the young people. This was supported by Ngwodo¹⁰⁰ in Nigeria who noted that the Boko Haram imparts to its members a sense of purpose and mission as warriors for the cause of God ordained to cleanse the society of moral impurities and establish an alternate order. Further, Kamindo¹⁰¹, in Eastleigh area in Kenya noted that religious fanatic actively recruiting these young men and offering them the ultimate political power that of Allah and the result is terrorism. From this findings, it was evident that religion plays an essential role in leading terrorism in Kenya, a member state of IGAD.

2.2 Economic Issues

Economic issues such as poverty, unemployment, high cost of living and illiteracy were also blamed on the high rate of successful recruitment by terror groupings. From the FGD it was evident that the Kenyan youth face economic, religious, and social coercion to convince them they have no alternative to joining extremist organizations. According to PSD3 and SSP 2 some youth convert to Islam for the promise of economic benefits or even just food. This was supported by a June 2018 report by PeaceTech Lab report found that increased economic opportunity was one of the primary reasons for conversion to Islam among the region's Christians. The report noted that east African Christians who convert to Islam are often more at risk of radicalization due to social isolation. PeaceTech Lab researchers focused on the area of Mombasa and found that the families and friends

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Ngwodo, (2010)

¹⁰¹ Kamindo, Anthony. "*Social and Economic Causes of Terrorism in Kenya: a Case Study of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County.*" PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

of Christian converts to Islam tend to break their ties, increasing the converts' isolation and susceptibility to recruitment.

The FGD agreed that poverty or the lack of basic necessities has pushed many young people to join terror groups.

SSP1: a lack of a basic standard of living has exposed individuals and their families to seek or source alternative incomes which have become increasingly available through terrorist organizations.

PSD3: Majority of the terrorist suspect reported often come from poor backgrounds.

PSD1: The terrorist groups take advantage of the high level of poverty among the youth to entice them to join the organizations for a better and promising life.

This concurred with Kamindo¹⁰², who was of the opinion that in Kenya poverty creates terrorism through alienation. According to the interviewees terrorism provides incentives both ideological and economic. A failure by the elected powers to provide for the needy allows terror organizations to take advantage of the void and fill it while simultaneously ideologically preaching a solution that undermines the existing powers. Furthermore, poor people are easily enticed to join terrorist activities than richer people.

In addition, resource marginalization was also cited by three participants of the FGD as a cause of terrorism in the region. Most people seek a better life and standard of living which includes access to basic resources. For a majority of the population, a lack

¹⁰² Kamindo, Anthony. "*Social and Economic Causes of Terrorism in Kenya: a Case Study of Eastleigh Estate, Nairobi County.*" PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

of resources leads to want and desperation which makes them vulnerable to those who can provide it. Resource marginalization causes terrorism since most of them lack employment opportunities as well as capital and other essential incentives to work.¹⁰³

SSP 2: High unemployment rates have been associated with the vulnerability of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

PSD 2: High unemployment rates in Kenya, and indeed in many other countries, are undisputed.

This was similar to a United Nations report of February 2012 which quoted the then United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (United Nations) as saying that young people were increasingly in fear of a future without jobs, with the youth doubting that the education they received would fully equip them for professional life.¹⁰⁴ The UN report further highlighted that young people complained of being made the last in and first out of jobs in firms, resulting in high rates of unemployment among youth around the world.

The FGD revealed that poor unemployment status among graduates was a leading cause of young people joining terrorist groups. In addition four of the staff members from the FDG indicated that most of the terror groups are made up of graduates. The participants reminisced on the Garissa university terror attack where one of the terrorists who died in the incident was a law graduate who worked in a local bank and whose father was a Kenyan government employee.¹⁰⁵ This finding was supported by Botha¹⁰⁶ who also

¹⁰³Kamindo (2016)

¹⁰⁴ Kariuki, Alice Mary Wamuyu. "Challenges of Combating Homegrown Terrorism in Kenya: A Youth Radicalization Perspective." (2019).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

found that 33% of those who joined al-Shabaab were employed and that 17% were attending school at the time of their recruitment. In addition, Ngwodo Millions of unschooled and unskilled able-bodied young men reside in major cities and towns and provide a ready pool of malcontents for extremist recruitment.

2.3 Poor Governance

The region's security policing system was identified by the interviewees as a leading cause of terrorism as a result of its mediocre ways of solving security problems opening a Pandora's Box of a myriad of other security problems. In the Kenya's security system, the lack of effecting policing and cohesion amongst as well as across the security service forces means that there are no good practices to policing and no sharing of vital information. Furthermore, PSD3 was of the opinion that poor policing and corruption allows terrorists to exist and grow without consequences. This supported the argument by Ngunyi and Katumanga¹⁰⁷ that the proliferation of terrorist groups can be explained from a focus on the governance of geographical spaces. Poor governances push people in the community to seek better governance. The lack of a stable governance makes militia groups look favourable in the eyes of the community members. In addition, the FGD participants agreed that the lack of effective policing and cohesion amongst and across the policing services means that there are no good habits to policing and hence no sharing of vital information. Furthermore, poor policing and corruption allow terrorism to exist and grow without consequence.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, Botha, 2014

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2014

Further, two of the participants from the FGD argued that the lengthy absence of central democratic governance in Somalia between 1990 and 2012 triggered the resurgence of several clan based and religiously inspired terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, which has now gained the capacity to operate beyond Somalia's borders. SSP2 stated that being host to many Somali refugees and a full-fledged democracy, Kenya is an obvious target of radical Islamic militant groups for recruitment, training, planning, and subsequent attacks on high-value targets. According to Kouri¹⁰⁸ publically available information and credible media reports indicate that high profile members of the al-Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab are actively recruiting Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees from parts of Kenya and refugee camps in particular.

Police cruelty was also cited by PSD3 and PSD 4 as contributing to terrorism in the region. Police cruelty sets the precedent that certain individuals, beliefs, ideas, and practices will be persecuted, and so those directly affected and those indirectly affected who share in the same must seek alternative support structures¹⁰⁹

The participants of the FGD added that the politics of resource allocation was a cause of terrorism. The respondents were of the view that to a large extent, most people seek a better life and standard of living which includes access to basic resources. To Mbugua, the net impact of the crumple of Somalia was political agitation and disorder and in addition rivalry over assets particularly the port of Kismayu after the fall of SiadBarre in 1991. The warlords, for instance, battled to control Mogadishu, Kismayo or Baidoa to get to assets. According to SSP1, foreign organizations additionally fuelled the

¹⁰⁸ Kouri, J. U.S Officials post bounties on the heads of Al Shabaab terrorist leaders. Law Enforcement Examiner. 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.kenyaforum.net/2012/07/01/kenya-garissaattack-breaking-news-sunday-am/>

¹⁰⁹Kamindo (2016)

perpetual clash as they investigate gaseous petrol in debated regions between areas, organizations and factions. The contention over assets is exemplified by the contention between the Hawiye and Darood over the control of Juba and Shabelle waterway valleys.

Five of the respondents from the FGD blamed the terror attacks in Kenya on corruption of the immigration officials and the police. There have been reports that one can easily buy a Kenyan passport and legalize their stay in Kenya simply if they have money. This is in addition to the long and porous border that Kenya shares with Somalia. Moreover, FSD2 was of the opinion that the same money buys terrorists a blanket ticket to do as they want as long as they can pay for it. To this effect, corruption effectively endorses terrorism for the right price while correspondingly fundamentally undermining existing systems of policing.

2.4 Easy Movement in The Region

The interviewees agreed that Kenya has become a prime location for al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment amid the terror group's rise in Somalia. As early as 2012, reports indicated that al-Shabaab was attracting a large number of Kenyan converts to Islam. By December 2014, it was estimated that Kenyans comprised around 25 percent of the terror group's ranks.

SSP3: Al-Shabaab has primarily recruited within Muslim communities along the Kenyan coast.

SPD4: School heads in these communities have said that al-Shabaab militants have infiltrated their institutions, influencing students and recruiting youth to their cause.

The participants in the FGD indicated that in December 2017, Kenyan police raided an Islamic school in Likoni, Mombasa, arresting two to four teachers and taking 100 students into protective custody. The children were being indoctrinated to an extremist Islamist ideology. This findings aligned with that of De La Corte¹¹⁰ who noted that radicalization to terror groups has become easy since society and political influence fuels the terrorist idea as illustrated in the Anarchist saying of; “Propaganda by fact”.

Further, the seven officers from IGAD revealed that radicalization to terror groups has become easier since majority of the recruiters are well known individuals in the society. Al-Shabaab recruiters with links to both Kenya and Somalia pose a major security threat to Kenya. For example, well-known al-Shabaab militant Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir is a Kenyan national of Somali origin and an effective liaison between extremists in the two countries. Abdukadir, also known as Ikrima, is able to travel freely between the two countries and leverage his linguistic and cultural knowledge to radicalize young Kenyans and convince them to enlist with al-Shabaab. A 2018 study by U.S.-based NGO PeaceTech Lab found that al-Shabaab had expanded its recruitment inside Kenya to include Kenyan Muslims as well as the Somali diaspora.¹¹¹ This is a clear indication that radicalization in the region is on the rise.

PSD4 explained that refugee camps in Kenya are being used by terrorists as safe havens where terrorists can easily access, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate freely and securely due to weak or inadequate governance. According

¹¹⁰ De la Corte, Luis. "Explaining terrorism: A psychosocial approach." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 1, no. 2 (2007).

¹¹¹ PeaceTech Lab. *Youth Radicalization in Mombasa, Kenya*. Report 2018. Retrieved from <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54257189e4b0ac0d5fca1566/t/5b0d8d451ae6cff5a4798d9b/1527614790742/Kenya+VE+Lexicon+Final.pdf>.

to the Arab Times,¹¹² the Kenyan interior minister publicly decried the senseless terrorist violence perpetrated by some Somali refugees, yet a considerable number of them are not legally documented by Kenyan immigration department as refugees. He stressed the fact that for many years, Kenya has been host to the largest refugee community in the world with almost 600,000 refugees; some of these refugees have abused this hospitality and kindness to plan and launch terror attacks from safety of refugee camps.¹¹³

In addition the participants of the FGD revealed that the notion of refugee camps being used as terrorist safe havens is neither new nor unique on the global scene.

SSP3: Some countries in the Middle East experienced similar situations, which were widely generated by a resurgence of radical Islamic militancy and international terrorism.

PSD2: The U.S Department of State in 2011 reported that Palestinian refugee camps were also used as safe havens by Palestinian armed groups and are used to house weapons and shelter wanted criminals.

Similarly, two of the participants from the FGD indicated that the current political turmoil and civil conflict in South Sudan has displaced many people, and the majority of them have sought refuge in Northern Uganda. According to Uganda's security agencies

¹¹² Arab Times. "Somali refugee camps in Kenya safe haven for Islamists Militants." *Nairobi piles pressure on Somali refugees to return home*. Arab Times Kuwait English Daily. 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetail/tabid/96/smId/414/ArticleID/200784/reftab/69/Default.aspx>.

¹¹³ Muhwezi, Andrew M. *Transnational terrorism in East Africa: a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the recent rise in Kenyan violence*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA, 2014.

and media reports, some of the undocumented Sudanese refugees are already on a rampage of ruthless armed robbery and terrorist violence in Uganda.¹¹⁴

In addition, it was revealed that transnational terrorists in East Africa have demonstrated a high level of planning, sophistication, and effectiveness in terms of target sourcing and selection. Al-Shabaab's foreign fighters, who are largely responsible for the recent surge of transnational terrorist violence in Kenya, often utilize the opportunity of possible cover and concealment offered by Somali refugee communities to infiltrate into Kenya's cities and mainland for initial target reconnaissance and subsequent attacks. Six participants of the FGD observed that Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have both managed to infiltrate cross border refugee traffic and some Somali refugee camps in Kenya's North Eastern Province and have made their way into Somali dominated neighborhoods in Nairobi and Mombasa, and from these convenient hideouts, these terror groups have been able to map their targets and mount terror attacks.

With reference to the embassy bombing in 1998, PSD1 reported that a key area exploited by terrorists was the lack of security awareness at the country's entry points. The ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the Immigration Department. According to the participants of the FGD the corruption within the Kenyan police force in the 1990s was rampant; failure of effective law enforcement also contributed to the problem. The police force was so ill-equipped it could not respond to emergencies because of a basic lack of transportation and communication resources.

¹¹⁴ Uganda Police Force. Police arrest robbers who killed a Police Officer. Police Information Resource Centre. 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.upf.go.ug/index.php/23-latest-news/56-police-arrests-robbers>

In addition, SSP3, SSP1 and SPD4 revealed that the porous borders of Kenya have continued to place the country at risk of terror attacks. The three respondents explained that on April 2, 2015, al-Shabaab militants launched a 15-hour attack on Kenya's Garissa University, killing 148 students and faculty. The Islamist group targeted victims on the basis of their Christianity, and said the attack was a direct result of Kenya's military presence in Somalia. The porous Kenyan-Somali border allows for the relatively free flow of al-Shabaab militants between the two countries. Garissa County also hosts Dadaab one of the largest refugee camps in the world with over 336,000 Somalis—making the area especially vulnerable to al-Shabaab attacks.¹¹⁵

2.5 Financing of Terror Groups

SSP2 and PSD2 explained that access to specific resources such as finances is a key driver to violent extremism but also the continuous sustenance of the group or its members in the fold. In 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report revealing donations as the major source of terror funding. The donations came from wealthy personalities and charities affiliated to them. The report disclosed that for many years, charity organizations based in Saudi Arabia were the key financiers for alQaeda.¹¹⁶ Prior to the CFR report, on July 2001, the then US President Bush started a mega crackdown on curbing the flow of illicit funds after two financial systems were identified as key financiers of al-Qaida. The US government had identified the so-called Hawala system (financial system operating as unlicensed banks). The same situation was

¹¹⁵ Abdalle Ahmed and Alexander Wexler. *Islamists Kill Scores in Kenya College Attack*. The Wall Street Journal. 2015. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/gunmen-attack-kenyan-university-firing-randomly-in-student-hostels-1427960178>

¹¹⁶ Kaplan, Eben. "Tracking down terrorist financing." *Council on Foreign Relations* 4 (2006).

identified by the interviewees who also acknowledged, that the IGAD region is yet to master a tactful approach of curbing financing to terror groups.

Further, PSD3 and SSP1 reported that it is worth noting that the time period of 2010 to 2012, when Kenya registered a spike in the number of terrorist attacks, coincided with the time period when Al Shabaab was officially affiliated to Al Qaeda, and had thereby gained significant reinforcement of foreign fighters to its rank and file purposely to foster and strengthen Al Qaeda's doctrine, ideology, and targeting strategy. For instance, PSD1 indicated that the terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, was planned and executed by a cell of Al Shabaab's foreign fighters, who are believed to have disguised themselves as refugees and entered Kenya from neighboring Somalia. Moreover, these terrorist were financed by Al Qaeda one of the largest terrorist groups in the world.

Moreover, SSP3 and SSP1 explained that to finance their operations, Al-Shabaab became actively involved in the Indian Ocean piracy which earned them a lot of financial muscle. They also started kidnapping foreigners from Kenya to Somalia and then seeking ransom for them. This began to have a negative impact on the Kenyan tourism industry as was revealed by three of the FGD participants. The Kenyan government therefore decided to send foot soldiers to Somalia who would counteract the Al-Shabaab and help the government there to establish itself. The operation was dubbed "Operation Linda Nchi" led by the Kenyan Defence forces.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Bundotich, Josphat Kiprono. "*Challenges In Counter Terrorism In The Third World Countries A Case Study Of Kenya.*" PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2013.

2.6 Retaliation from Terror groups

Although the war against Al-Shabaab is being fought by the joint forces of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Somalia, it seems that Kenya is paying the highest price in this war. PSD4 explained that in retaliation to Operation Linda Nchi, the Al-Shabaab has carried out a number of attacks in Kenya from 2011. The FDG participants also revealed that the attacks aimed to force Kenya to withdraw her soldiers from Somalia where they are jointly fighting as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Most of the attacks have occurred in Nairobi, Mombasa and the North- Eastern province, particularly in Mandela, Wajir and Garissa counties. The attacks were small and large scale and were carried out on churches, buses, bars, bus stations, military camps, market places, shopping centres, colleges, hotels and malls. For instance, SS1 noted that the massacre at Garissa University was the country's deadliest attack since the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings. Al-Shabaab swiftly claimed responsibility for the attack, exclaiming: "Our Mujahideen brothers today managed to carry out a successful operation in Garissa town. We told the Kenyans to withdraw their army from Somalia. They did not want to listen us, so this is our message to them." Garissa University is located 90 miles from the Somali border.

Kenya has experienced a number of attacks in the recent past, with the most notable ones being the 1980 terror attack at the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi owned by a Jewish block company. A total of 20 people perished and more than 80 were wounded. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was blamed for the attack. According to the FGD respondents the attack on Kenya was linked to the role Kenya played in allowing the Israeli rescuers to fuel in Nairobi after fleeing Israeli hostages

from Entebbe Airport in 1976. The FGD participants responded that the increase in terror attack in Kenya have been due to the entrance of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia. Six FGD participants also asserted that Kenya was the best target because Kenya is considered to be a hub of security and economic prosperity in East Africa. Destabilizing Kenya would destabilize the whole of East Africa and this would assist the terrorists to secure control of the region.¹¹⁸

The Kenyan government deployed KDF troops to join others from AMISOM in tracking down al-Shabaab militants. SSP1 noted that in retaliation the Al-Shabaab issued threats to Kenya because of this action and vowed to bring down all skyscrapers in Nairobi. This threat was implemented during the attack at West Gate Mall on September 26, 2013, which claimed 67 lives, and the terror attack staged in Garissa University in April 2015, in which 147 people, most of whom were university students, were killed. This finding concurred with Momanyi¹¹⁹ who noted that revenge attacks are further cited in terms of avenging for Muslims in Somalia and the world over because of perceived persecution by Christians, so that because Kenya has strong ties with Western countries, revenge attacks remain imminent.

¹¹⁸ Momanyi, Simeon Mokaya. *"The Impact of Al-Shabab Terrorist Attacks in Kenya."* Master's thesis, UiT Norges arktiske universitet, 2015.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, Momanyi, 2015

CHAPTER THREE: MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY KENYA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

3.1 Introduction

Terrorism is a contemporary security threat not only to Kenya but also the international community of nations. Measures put in place to combat this threat by individual nations and the international community have achieved varied results. Whereas to a significant extent, successes have been realized, terrorism continues to threaten security due its dynamic and fast Counterterrorism measures have been put in place over time through data collection, analysis, monitoring and evaluation. Although some of these measures have led to the decrease of terrorist activities in some areas, in some, terrorism has been exacerbated. This chapter covers the measures adopted by Kenya in relation to countering terrorism in the IGAD region.

3.2 Military force

Security organs tend to swing into action to detect, disrupt and dismantle the terrorist capabilities. Military action is one of the tools available to counterterrorism and is the most effective measure to physically eliminate terrorists. The FGD participants that military force has been implemented by many countries across the world. For instance, Bundotich¹²⁰ notes that military action was witnessed in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda structures were dismantled and many terrorists were killed or captured tends to minimize and weaken terrorist networks. In Kenya, PSD4 noted that the British army has trained 1,000 Kenyan military and police officers in the disposal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since 2015. This concurred with an article by Gov.

¹²⁰ Ibid, Bundotich, 2013

UK¹²¹ that during an August 2018 visit to Kenya, British Prime Minister Theresa May signed an agreement to further expand cooperation between the two countries. The agreement includes the expansion of a joint Kenyan-United Kingdom counterterrorism installation into a regional training facility on IED disposal. The facility is expected to be fully operational by the end of 2020. Under the agreement, the United Kingdom will also provide funding and material resources for Kenya to enhance its border and aviation security procedures.

The interviewees also revealed that Kenya collaborated with the US in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to launch drone strikes against al-Shabaab fighters in portions of eastern Kenya. The new authorities, which need to be approved by the U.S. defense secretary and president, were requested in response to the January 5, 2020 attack that killed three Americans at the U.S.-Kenya Manda Bay Airfield. Moreover, PSD4 noted that though the United States has carried out a sustained drone operation in neighboring Somalia, military officials currently lack guidelines on such conduct in Kenya. In addition, SSP2 and SSP1 revealed that there are approximately 200 American armed forces and 100 U.S. Department of Defense civilian employees and contractors in Kenya engaged in training and assistance, most of whom are stationed at Manda Bay Airfield. This is a clear indication that the use of military forces has been supported by both Kenya and the US in the aim of fighting terrorism as was supported by Bundotich.¹²²

Moreover, from the FGD it was evident that the member States of IGAD plus Tanzania from July 2016 embarked on the process of developing the now adopted 2018,

¹²¹ Gov. UK. *UK expands counter-IED support in Africa*. 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-expands-counter-ied-support-in-africa>.

¹²² Ibid, Bundotich, 2013.

regional strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism. This strategy is to be reviewed after every three years.¹²³ Kenya too has played its role in various regional initiatives to curb acts of violent extremism. These includes, adopting the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (EACTI), enforcing the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and being part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA).¹²⁴ These strategies have led to the adoption of legal, operational, and strategic strategies that are now currently been used to combat violent extremism. These strategies tend to function through four jointly underlining elements: Detect, Prevent, Deny and Respond

PSD1: In 2018, Kenyan security experts noted that Kenya's military strategy had led to a general decrease in al-Shabaab's violent activities but there had been a simultaneous increase in online radicalization.

SSP3: The use of military force by Kenya especially in Somalia has elevated the country as a fighter against terrorism in the world.

However, five of the participants from the FGD explained that military actions are at times counterproductive. Instead of serving as deterrents, such strikes serve to advance some of the political and organizational purposes of terrorist leaders; increase publicity for their cause; bolster their sense of importance; and reinforce the message that the United States is an evil enemy that knows only the language of force. In the final

¹²³ Ibid, Mwaniki (2017)

¹²⁴ Mogire, Edward, and Kennedy Mkutu Agade. "Counter-terrorism in Kenya." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2011): 473-491.

analysis, such strikes are almost always message-sending exercises rather than a means of significantly crippling terrorist capabilities.¹²⁵

3.3 Enacted Policies

Public policy involves the decisions of a government or other authority aimed at solving public problems so as to improve the quality of life of a population. These include statutes, laws, regulations, executive decisions, and government programs.¹²⁶ Means and goals in the form of procedures and rule statements are also public policies. Administrators, also known as street-level bureaucrats, implement policies. However, according to Schneider and Ingram¹²⁷ policies sometimes fail to solve public problems. In relation to policies on countering terrorism and extreme violence, SSP2 noted that the UN resolution 60/2 88 of 2006 gave rise to the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. According to three FGD participants, thereafter, the UN adopted the UN-steering Global Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism.¹²⁸ PSD1 explained that Kenya being a member of the UN is a supporter of the strategies adopted by the international body with the aim of countering terrorism. According to the United Nations¹²⁹ the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy comprises of four pillars. They are: Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard, and procedures to enforce respect for

¹²⁵ Nasongo, Joseph Wamocha. "The effectiveness of Kenya's counterterrorism measures since 1998." *International Journal of Research Science and Management* 2349(1) 54-64

¹²⁶ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹²⁷ Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. "Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and policy." *American political science review* 87, no. 2 (1993): 334-347.

¹²⁸ U.N, *United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*. New York: UN General Assembly Agenda Items 16 and 17, 2015

¹²⁹ United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006, Pillar III.

human rights and the rule of law in the process of fighting against terrorism. The interviewees agreed that Kenya as a member state of the UN has been active in countering terrorism following the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.

In addition, the interviewees explained that in an aim of curbing terrorism in Kenya, different policies have been enacted.

PSD4: The 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act together provides a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism.

SSP2: The Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA) amended 20 laws to strengthen Kenya's legislative framework to fight terrorism.

The 20 laws strengthened by the Security Law (Amendment) Act 2011 include: criminalization of participating in terrorist training; establishing a framework for a coordinated border control agency; strengthening the mandate of Kenya's National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC); and broadening evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions (US Department of State, 2017).

The participants of the FGD revealed that Kenya has prioritized the development of counter terrorism policies and strategies and has enhanced efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and extremism. To this end, Kenya supports the efforts of the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT) to establish a Global network of counter terrorism centres to address new terrorism developments, share good counter-terrorism capacity-building practices and experiences and identify new opportunities for collaboration. Replicate good practices. No need to reinvent the wheel.

In addition, SSP3 indicated that Kenya has ratified and domesticated all International conventions against transnational organized crime including the relevant protocols on terrorism and associated crimes such as money laundering, drugs trafficking, human trafficking and corruption and is implementing Security Council Resolutions on fighting terrorism. According to Momanyi,¹³⁰ in 2014 through the Security Laws Amendment Act Kenya amended all its security laws to strengthen Kenya's anti-terror legislative framework and established agencies to deal specially with the terror threat. This as espoused .by five of the participants in the FGD also led to the establishment of the anti-terrorism police unit, a bomb disposal unit and a cyber-forensics investigative unit. Kenya's Defense Forces were brought on board. Currently, all security agencies have the constitutional and legislative mandate to take counter-terrorism measures to safeguard national security. This concurred with Kariuki,¹³¹ who observed that Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA) This law altered 20 existing laws in order to strengthen Kenya's counterterrorism legislative framework. For example, it criminalized participation in terrorist training; laid out the foundation for a coordinated border control agency; strengthened the mandate of the Kenya National Counterterrorism Center; and broadened evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions.¹³²

In addition, the FGD participants explained that the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has been responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and mistreatment of individuals arrested on terrorism charges. Instead of responding to

¹³⁰ Ibid, Momanyi, 2015

¹³¹ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹³² Government of Kenya. *Youth Empowerment Project*. Government Printer. (2014).

these concerns, Kenyan lawmakers passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014, which further empowers security forces and inhibits the freedom of the media and other sources of independent scrutiny. This new legislation also allows Kenyan police to hold terror suspects for nearly a year, and gives authorities the power to monitor and tap phones.¹³³

PSD1 and PSD4 added that the National Youth Policy was developed with the overall goal of promoting youth participation in democratic processes and community and civic affairs. This is in agreement with the government of Kenya¹³⁴ that is of the opinion that the policy envisaged the formation of a National Youth Council to assist in coordinating youth organizations, designing youth programs, continuously reviewing the implementation of youth-focused policies and programs, and mobilizing, sensitizing, and organizing youth to consolidate their voice regarding political, economic, and sociocultural activities (National Youth Council Act 10 of 2010/2012). The government of Kenya devised this policy in a bid to solve problems and improve the lives of its youth. The targeted youth are dependents who are politically weak, but positively constructed and seen as deserving of benefits and protection.¹³⁵ This policy acted as a catalyst for other youth policies and programs in Kenya.

According to SSP1, PSD2, and SSP1, Kenya invoked the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations charter in pursuing the Al Shabaab militants into Somalia. The article states that “nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individuals or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the

¹³³ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹³⁴ Government of Kenya. *Kenya National Youth Policy*. Nairobi: Government Printer. (2006).

¹³⁵ Ibid, Schneider & Ingram, 1993

UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Kariuki¹³⁶ explained that the Kenya defense forces further sort endorsement of regional organizations like the African Union and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Subsequent to this, Kenya's military was cleared by IGAD to employ air and naval blockade which was meant to cut off food supplies, war materials and communication from Kismayu by force. Consequently billions of dollars which the militants earned from Al Shabaab to finance piracy was curtailed.¹³⁷

3.4 Focus on Youth

As noted early, the youths are the targeted demographic of terrorism groups. As such, the interviewees together with the FGD participants emphasized on the need to focus on the youth as a measure of curbing terrorism. According to PSD1, PSD2, and PSD4 the Uwezo Fund (Empowerment Fund) was set up by the government of Kenya in 2013, with the aims of expanding access to finance and promoting women, youth, and persons with disabilities at the constituency level. It was also intended to provide mentorship to enable the beneficiaries to take advantage of the 30% government procurement preferences.¹³⁸ According to the respondents the UWEZO fund, facilitated in financing vulnerable groups to be active in society by focusing on other initiatives and activities.

In addition, from the FGD, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) was identified as a state corporation under the Ministry of Public Service, Gender, and Youth

¹³⁶ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹³⁷ Goldman David, *Operation Linda Inchi By Kenya Remification On Geopolitics*, 2013. Retrieved from:<http://horn.so/oln>.

¹³⁸ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

Affairs. It was launched in the Kenya Gazette in December 2006, with the aim of increasing economic opportunities for, and participation of, Kenyan youth. According to the government of Kenya,¹³⁹ the YEDF also seeks to create employment opportunities for Kenyan youth through entrepreneurship and by encouraging them to be job creators and not only jobseekers. To achieve this, the fund provides easy and affordable financial and development support services to the youth who are keen on starting or expanding business.¹⁴⁰

The interviewees explained that the Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) was set up by the Kenyan government in 2010. It was a 4-year program aimed at building the capacity and improving the employability of youth by providing them with training and internships in the private sector. Further, Kariuki¹⁴¹ explained that the project targeted 11,000 youth in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu over a period of four years. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) was appointed by the government to implement the project. No evaluation has been carried out to gauge its effectiveness and benefits to the beneficiaries.

According to SSP3, SSP2 and SSP1 the Kazi Kwa Vijana was introduced by the Kenyan government and incorporated in the country's 2009/10 budget under the KYEP. The World Bank also partnered with the government and disbursed some funds to support the project. Its aim was to provide youth with income through public works projects and by tackling youth unemployment.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Government of Kenya. *Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF): Fund Status Report*. Nairobi. (2009).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, YEDF, 2009

¹⁴¹ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹⁴² Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

3.5 Policing and Establishment of Task Forces

According to four of the FGD participants the establishment of a task force on anti-money laundering and on the financing of terrorism aimed at reviewing existing legislation and to come up with a draft of a national policy on combating the financing of terrorism. SSP1 noted that it was until 2011 that the proceeds of crime and anti-money laundering Act was legislated. This was supported by Nasongo¹⁴³ who established that the delay in putting in place this legal instrument can be said to have given room for the entrenchment of terror activities since undetected avenues of finance to such groups is dangerous to state security.

Further, from the FGD it was revealed that in May 2015, the government relocated NCTC, NIS, and the National Security Council to the Office of the President. As a result, interagency coordination improved, particularly in information sharing; however, shortages in resources and training, corruption among some personnel, and unclear command and control hindered operational effectiveness.¹⁴⁴

PSD1: The move to establish some form of crisis response command centre arose as a result of lessons learned from the 2015 attack at Garissa University College in which al-Shabaab terrorists killed at least 147 people.

PSD4: The Garissa University siege and massacre continued for several hours since early morning till late afternoon when specialized police unit arrived from Nairobi to neutralize the militants. The delay in response was appalling given the

¹⁴³ Ibid, Nasongo, 2018

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, Nasongo, 2018

fact that security agencies in Garissa including KDF were unable to neutralize and rescue the students.

SSP2 explained that Internally the Security agencies in Kenya have also made strides in the hunt for Al Shabaab operatives who are either Kenyan born or foreigners out to cause mayhem in the country. In the year 2013, suspects linked to the terror attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 7, 1998 were shot dead by police. The two Mr. Omollo Kassim and Salim Mohammed Nyiro were believed to have links with Al Shabaab and the slain Al Qaeda operative Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who was gunned down in June 11, 2012 in Mogadishu.¹⁴⁵

Successful hunt for terrorists on the run and particularly those believed to be in leadership positions within the ranks of the terror cells is an indication that the Kenyan security forces are not relenting in the fight against this crime. The local media quoted the police who described Kassim as “an expert bomb maker trained with Al; Qaeda allied terrorists in Somalia”.¹⁴⁶ The area Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) within whose jurisdiction the two terror suspects were killed told the standard interviewers “we managed to gun down Omollo who was one of the most wanted terrorist police have been looking for, and recovered a cache of Firearms, Ammunition, subversive literature, explosive making devices, a digital video disc and mobile phones”. The police boss was interviewed at Kisauni Police Station Dog Section.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, Bundotich, 2013

¹⁴⁶ Benyawa. L., Mwakio .P. and Mwahanga .S. Police Gun Down Terror Suspects In Mombasa Night Attack, Standard Digital, Found At: www.Standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000086178 Accessed on July 21, 2013, 11:00hrs

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, Bundotich, 2013

From the interviews, it was established that since the April 2015 terrorist attack on Garissa University, Kenyan police have increased their presence in vulnerable areas including on college campuses. Kenya has also retaliated vigorously against al-Shabaab forces, sending fighter jets to bomb the terrorist group's camps in Somalia. Kenyan military spokesmen claim uncertainty about what effect, if any, the bombing campaign has achieved. Moreover, it was observed that while Kenyan authorities have expanded their campaign to stop violent extremists, the harsher aspects of its implementation have exacerbated historical conflicts between the Kenyan government and Kenyan Muslims. Kenya's sizable Muslim population has borne the brunt of these security measures. Some counterterrorism efforts have also enabled human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, and torture by government security forces.¹⁴⁸

SSP3 observed that the project to Strengthen Communities' Capacity against Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kenya was jointly established in 2015 by the government of Kenya and the UNDP. The 1-year project aimed to strengthen institutional and community capacity to counter radicalization and violent extremism as well as to build the capacity of the National Counterterrorism Center in implementing radicalization strategies and effective engagement in countering violent extremism. This was similar to the government of Kenya and the UNDP¹⁴⁹ who were of the opinion that this strategy took the form of developing information, education, and communication material to raise awareness at the community level to counter violent radicalization and extremism;

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, Bundotich, 2013

¹⁴⁹ Government of Kenya and UNDP (2015). Strengthen community's capacity against radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya. Project Document. Retrieved from [https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/KEN/\(Kenya%20rev%20270115\)%20Kenya%20Counter%20Terrorism%20project%20Document%20FINAL.pdf](https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/KEN/(Kenya%20rev%20270115)%20Kenya%20Counter%20Terrorism%20project%20Document%20FINAL.pdf).

provide training and guidance for trainers who interact with the youth and women; support dialogue between interfaith groups and increase tolerance and harmony between and within groups; and support community awareness in countering violent extremism.

The FGD revealed that the government of Kenya conceptualized the Nyumba Kumi Strategy in 2013 to address the problem of terrorism. The strategy was integrated into community policing to ensure that the current system of villages under a village elder was restructured into Nyumba Kumi (10 households), with a clear leadership structure that would be responsible for the security of the corresponding households.¹⁵⁰ The concept was borrowed from Tanzania, where its success was reported in addressing security challenges.

3.6 Cooperation with other Countries

Kenya is one of six countries participating in the United States' Security Governance Initiative (SGI), focusing on management, oversight, and accountability of security services. According to PSD3 Kenya's SGI priorities include border security, administration of justice, and police human resource management, with each area having a special focus on countering violent extremism. Kenyan civil society organizations are actively engaged in countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. This finding concurred to Blachard¹⁵¹ that on a visit to Kenya in 2015, then-U.S. President Barack Obama discussed increasing U.S. assistance to Kenyan security services to "improve intelligence capabilities." Part of \$95 million in U.S. aid to the Kenyan military in 2015 was used to "enhance" intelligence and help Kenyan security forces "identify and target" al-Shabaab

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹⁵¹ Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. *Kenya: Current Issues and US Policy*. Congressional Research Service, 2013.

operatives. In December 2016, the United States gave the Kenyan government six of eight promised Huey II helicopters for use in counterterrorism activity by the Kenyan Air Force.

SSP1 reminisced that after the 1998 US Embassy bombing, the GoK fully cooperated with the US government in intelligence sharing and in giving US investigators access to investigate the incident. The government also helped apprehend and hand over the suspects to US investigators to stand trial in the United States. Apart from the United States, the GoK approached the Israeli government to obtain its assistance in rescue operations. This was followed by the dispatch of rescue teams and intelligence agencies to help track those responsible for the attacks.¹⁵²

PSD3 and SSP3 explained that the Al-Shabaab fighters have been reportedly crossing into Kenya through neighboring Somalia's Bula Hawa border region. The participants observed that in early April 2016, local government representatives from both countries' affected border regions met to discuss the issue. Both governments pledged to work together to fight terrorism and prevent cross-border crimes. Representatives of the respective governments met again the following year to continue discussing enhanced security relations and other bilateral issues. The two countries agreed to open two new border crossings and resume flights between Mogadishu and Nairobi. Kenya also committed to training Somali nurses and teachers, and to supporting technical training for at-risk Somali youth. The sides also agreed to continue regular meetings on bilateral relations.

¹⁵² Ibid, Aden, 2005

Further, seven participants of the FDG revealed that in February 2016, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta met with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin to seek Israel's support for Kenya's counterterrorism efforts. Kenya was specifically interested in having Israel conduct "more overt" counterterrorism operations in the country and East African region.¹⁵³ SSP3 explained that the cooperation between the two countries dates back to Operation Entebbe in 1976 when Kenya provided operational support to Israel during a hostage rescue mission in Uganda. Kenyatta was concerned about the safety of his country since the United States closed its drone base at Arba Minch in 2015 and stopped flying drones from Djibouti. Rivlin and Kenyatta agreed to further cooperation in the war against terrorism. Israeli Deputy Ambassador to Kenya Nadav Peldman stated that Israel is ready and willing to assist Kenya to fight terrorism.¹⁵⁴ Israeli security advisers reportedly provided Kenyan forces with strategic assistance during the 2015 Westgate Mall siege.

¹⁵³ Oluoch Fred. *Kenya Asks for Israel's Help in War On Terror*. The East African. 2016. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/201603010235.html>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, Oluoch, 2016

CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGES FACED BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE OF IGAD

4.1 Introduction

The fight against terrorism and violent extremism is not easy. This is because, as more and more countries engage in counter terrorism, the terror groups continue to change and advance their strategies. Governments have had their share of challenges when dealing with the issues of terrorism. These challenges span from not only the agreeable definition of terms as seen above; but also, the methodologies of engagement especially when it comes to balancing between the hard power, the inclusion of partners and finally the process of radicalization recruitment and mobilization into extremist organizations. It was established that lack of full cooperation from the member states of regional organizations is an issue. This chapter covers the strategies faced by regional organizations in the fight against terrorism and violent extremisms.

4.2 Poor Cooperation

PSD2 revealed that the difference on the definition of terrorist organization and lack of cooperation among member states in fighting domestic terrorism is a hindrance towards efforts by regional organization in ending the vice. Due to the dynamic nature of terrorism, member states do not have common definition on what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. This finding concurs with Memar and Gebreyohans¹⁵⁵ who found that lack of trust among member states of regional organizations due to the legacy of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

inter-state and intra-state conflict was a key challenge in countering terrorism and violent extremism. In 2006, IGAD warned particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea from taking unilateral actions that undermine the powerless but internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG).¹⁵⁶ All such experiences might have made it difficult for IGAD states to fight domestic and international terrorists effectively

In addition, SSP3 observed that concerns have been raised by the US, however, on the capacity and ability of Kenya to counter financial transactions that favours terrorist organizations. This then puts the country on the international watch list of countries vulnerable to money laundering. Kenya enacted legislation that established the financial reporting center tasked with monitoring money transfers exceeding \$ 10,000 thereby surviving further condemnation from the international community. Although, Kenya has had cooperation with the US in countering terrorism, the concerns of the US is an indicator of lack of trust between the two countries in relation to countering violent extremism.

4.2 Poor Policies

Another area exploited by terrorists as was identified by PSD2 and PSD4 was the lack of security awareness at the country's entry points. The ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the Immigration Department. According to Aden¹⁵⁷ corruption within the Kenyan police force in the 1990s was

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, Aden, 2005

rampant; failure of effective law enforcement also contributed to the problem. The police force was so ill-equipped it could not respond to emergencies because of a basic lack of transportation and communication resources (Aden, 2005)

While Kenyan officials state that its counterterrorism policies are necessary to counter terrorism effectively, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding this legislation. Opponents such as Nasongo,¹⁵⁸ who claim that it is unfairly infringing on basic human rights. According to two FGD participants the Anti-terrorism act of 2002 places restrictions on the media, for instance, that arguably violate the freedom of expression. In addition, the law strictly limits the number of refugees permitted to reside in Kenya, which critics argue also violates constitutional provisions. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society groups, and opposition leaders have called the bill “suppressive” and “draconian.” In addition, PSD4 explained that on March 15, 2017, London-based Privacy International released a report accusing Kenyan security agencies of violating individual privacy rights and using information collected to commit human rights abuses, including targeted killings. Reports by other groups, including Human Rights Watch, claim that dozens of Kenyans suspected of links to extremist groups have disappeared and some were found executed.

According to five participants of the FGD, lack of appropriate and effective domestic legislation on terrorism-related issues, hinders efforts in countering terrorism and violent extremism. SSP1 observed that it was until parliament came up with the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 that a semblance of proposed legislation came to be. The bill was similar to the US Patriot Act. It was vehemently opposed by individuals,

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, Nasongo, 2018

human-rights organizations, Muslim organizations, and some parliamentarians who feared it would infringe on basic human rights and target specific communities, especially the Muslim community.¹⁵⁹ The delayed process of formulating legislation delayed fully fledged war against terrorism in the country. Terrorist suspects of foreign origins who were arrested tended to be extradited to other jurisdictions for prosecution. Suspects of Kenya citizenship were prosecuted using the general criminal law. In addition, PSD4 observed that it was until 2012 that the Kenya government enacted the prevention of terrorism act. It is surprising that the country took fourteen years since 1998 to come up with legal frame work to combat terrorism. Kenya's counterparts in the region enacted antiterrorism laws way back in 2002. Tanzania adopted its Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2002 and Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002.¹⁶⁰ The delay to put in place legal architecture is indicative of the governments' reluctance to swiftly address the threat of terrorism. The enactment of the act of parliament came long after terror networks had become deep rooted not only in the country but also in the region. It is worth noting that counterterrorism legislation is an important instrument of an effective counterterrorism strategy, and any government confronted with the threat of terrorism should enact such legislation as soon as possible.

Suppression of Terrorism Bill No. 30 of 2003, the first ever statute for dealing with terrorism in Kenya had been twice rejected in the same parliament in the years 2003 and 2006 for arguments that it was oppressive to Muslims.¹⁶¹ According to six FD participants the rejection of this legislation was triggered by Muslim preachers who

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, Aden, 2005

¹⁶⁰ Kagwanja, P. *Ruling on anti-terrorism law a triumph for Kenya's Judiciary*. Daily Nation, (2015)

¹⁶¹ Lind, Jeremy, Patrick Mutahi, and Marjoke Oosterom. *Tangled ties: Al-Shabaab and political volatility in Kenya*. No. IDS Evidence Report; 130. Ids, 2015.

lobbied Muslim legislators in parliament to reject it, alleging that it was meant to antagonize and alienate Muslims. Muslims and Kenyan Somalis are negatively constructed populations who complain of being treated with suspicion and as second-class citizens by their own government.¹⁶²

According to PSD2 and PSD3 SOME civil society groups, the political opposition, and rights groups appealed against some sections of the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA) that they viewed as negative, for example, those that affected freedom of speech, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the rights of the accused and refugees, arguing that they violated constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and contravened Kenya's international obligations. In February 2015, the High Court struck down eight provisions of the SLAA as unconstitutional.¹⁶³

4.3 Poor Policing

The Nyumba Kumi initiative aims at promoting community members' participation. However, SSP3 and PSD3 explained that most of those appointed as the ambassadors in the initiative are not conversant with their roles and do lack incentives for motivation. The members of the public are also poorly trained on their role in policing as they have not fully appreciated their role in cooperating with the police so as to ensure that security prevails. Therefore, they do not cooperate with the security in providing vital information which will be helpful in combating terrorism in the region.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Ibid, Lind *et al.*, (2015)

¹⁶³ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹⁶⁴ Hassan, Hared. "*Dynamism of Terrorist Threats in Kenya.*" PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2015.

Moreover, due to poor policing on matters terrorism and violent extremism Magogo¹⁶⁵ found that another challenge that deters effectiveness of the counter terrorism strategies by regional organizations is increased youth radicalization. Radicalization acts to increase the amount of terrorists operating in any region. SSP1 explained that due to increased radicalization, policing of the IGAD region has been difficult presenting a challenge in curbing terrorism.

4.4 Modernization and Technology

SSP3 postulates that curbing terrorism activities has been hardened greatly by the modernization of technology. This concurred with Davis¹⁶⁶ who noted that particularly, technology has been found to ease how the terrorists undertake their transactions such as media propaganda, money transfer, communication and overall terrorist operations activities

From the FGD responses, modern equipment for surveillance and detection of ammos was cited as lacking and should be provided. Many respondents also said staff in the regional organizations should be exposed to frequent trainings. eight of the FDG participants advised that procurement channels be fool proof so that the right equipment like those used in bomb detection are of the right quality and work efficiently and effectively. Enhanced technology was seen as an area that requires priority if government is committed to improving security. The respondents commented that quality intelligence collection and surveillance can be achieved if the country invested heavily on modern

¹⁶⁵ Magogo, Samini. *"The effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Kenya: a case study of Eastleigh location, nairobi county."*. Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Nairobi. 2017

¹⁶⁶ Davis, John. "The Bush Model: US Special Forces, Africa, and the War on Terror." *In Africa and the War on Terrorism*, pp. 151-170. Routledge, 2016.

technology. This according to them would mean conformity with the changing crime trends and tactics adopted by terrorist groups. They cited internet hacking and general cybercrime and money laundering as areas that need to be addressed by putting in place good legislation.

In addition, PSD4, PSD1 and SSP2 were of the opinion that the Immigration department needs to update its procedures to match with current trends across the world this according to some respondents is because current procedures have loop holes that can easily be manipulated by terrorists. A good example is the need to inter-link points of exit and entry among states. A common data base through which information on suspected terrorists and their activities can be monitored was also mentioned as critical.

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4.5 Corruption

A key challenge espoused by PSD 4 in countering terrorism and violent extremism was identified to be corruption. In Kenya Kazi Kwa Vijana The fund was looted by powerful government operatives, forcing the World Bank to withdraw its financial support.¹⁶⁸ This denied the beneficiaries the intended benefits of the program, who in turn became incensed by the embezzlement. Given that the consequences of radicalization prevention policies and programs will depend partly on their implementation and presentation to citizens by street-level bureaucrats,¹⁶⁹ the way in

¹⁶⁷ Arab Times. "Somali refugee camps in Kenya safe haven for Islamists Militants." *Nairobi piles pressure on Somali refugees to return home*. Arab Times Kuwait English Daily. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetail/tabid/96/smId/414/ArticleID/2_00784/reftab/69/Default.aspx.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, Government of Kenya, 2009

¹⁶⁹ Lipsky, Michael. *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service*. Russell Sage Foundation, 2010.

which this program was implemented may have had some unintended negative consequences.

SSP1, PSD4 and five FGD participants explained that the YEDF projects were marred with mismanagement, corruption, lack of supportive implementation structures, and ambiguous eligibility criteria. They espoused that it was extremely difficult for to access finance from the fund. It is doubtful that this program solved the problems of the intended youth beneficiaries.¹⁷⁰ This concurred with observation by Schneider and Ingram¹⁷¹ that public policies sometimes fail to solve public policy problems is critical here.

4.6 Support of Terror groups from sympathizers

Although the challenges facing IGAD in the fight against terrorism is seemingly overwhelming security agencies a report by the United States Bureau of counter terrorism acknowledged that IGAD security forces managed to avert many major terror attacks and that much of the attacks that slipped from them were small scale. The report also mentioned the successful arrests and convictions of two Iranian citizens who were sentenced to life imprisonment on May 6, 2013 for the offence of plotting terror attacks in Kenya. Mr Sayed Mansour Mousavi and Ahmad Abolfathi were arrested by Kenya security personnel in Mombasa Golf Course along Mama Ngina drive.¹⁷² They were in found in possession of 15 kilograms of RDX explosives.¹⁷³ According to a participant of the FGD, It goes without saying that detention of criminals of the magnitude seen in the

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹⁷¹ Ibid, Schneider and Ingram, 1993

¹⁷² Ibid, Bundotich, 20113

¹⁷³ Limo Lucianne, 'Justice Served', Iranian Terror Plotters Sent To Jail For Life, The Standard Newspaper, Tuesday May 7, 2013. P 1 & P 4

Iranian's case is another major challenge to Kenya or any other third world country. This is because of the international attention that such terrorists attract and particularly from states that sponsor them. SSP1 and SSP3 espoused that the possibility of continuous terror from sympathizers of these detainees is eminent. Third world countries have more problems that need urgent redress and therefore the burden of watching over international terrorists in their local prison facilities is a taunting task given the amount of surveillance and security required to secure such places.

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter covers an overview of the data analysis and discussion of the findings. The chapter incorporates the findings collected by the study while aligning it to the existing literature review.

5.2 Causes of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Kenya

The findings revealed that religion has been at the focal point of discussions on the causative operators of terrorism across the world of academics. In the contemporary scholarly world, scholars believe that fanaticism in religion is a contributor to terrorism. Further, the data collected espoused that religions people, ideas, beliefs, cultures, ideologies and other systems will always be reluctant to change, especially when change has been largely dormant for a significant period of time and then becomes necessary. In addition, the findings noted that homegrown terrorism in Kenya has been attributed to the radicalization and recruitment of young persons into Muslim extremism.

The region's security policing system was identified by the interviewees as a leading cause of terrorism as a result of its mediocre ways of solving security problems opening a Pandora's Box of a myriad of other security problems. In addition, the results revealed that politics of resource allocation was a cause of terrorism. Kenya has become a prime location for al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment amid the terror group's rise in Somalia. Radicalization to terror groups has become easier since majority of the recruiters are well known individuals in the society. Al-Shabaab recruiters with links to both Kenya and Somalia pose a major security threat to Kenya. Moreover, the findings

indicated that transnational terrorists in East Africa have demonstrated a high level of planning, sophistication, and effectiveness in terms of target sourcing and selection.

According to the findings, access to specific resources such as finances is a key driver to violent extremism but also the continuous sustenance of the group or its members in the fold. Moreover, the study found that more to relying on financing from other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab became actively involved in the Indian Ocean piracy which earned them a lot of financial muscle. Although the war against Al-Shabaab is being fought by the joint forces of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Somalia, it seems that Kenya is paying the highest price in this war. In addition, the findings revealed that attacks aimed to force Kenya to withdraw her soldiers from Somalia where they are jointly fighting as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

5.3 Measures Implemented in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Security organs tend to swing into action to detect, disrupt and dismantle the terrorist capabilities. Military action is one of the tools available to counterterrorism and is the most effective measure to physically eliminate terrorists. It was also established that Kenya collaborated with the US in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to launch drone strikes against al-Shabaab fighters in portions of eastern Kenya. Notably, the findings also cautioned that military actions are at times counterproductive. Instead of serving as deterrents, such strikes serve to advance some of the political and organizational purposes of terrorist leaders. Public policy involves the decisions of a government or other authority aimed at solving public problems so as to improve the quality of life of a population. According to the finds some of the policies adopted by

Kenya include; the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act which provides a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA) amended 20 laws to strengthen Kenya's legislative framework to fight terrorism. According to the findings, the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has been responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and mistreatment of individuals arrested on terrorism charges. It was established that Kenya invoked the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations charter in pursuing the Al Shabaab militants into Somalia.

As noted early, the youths are the targeted demographic of terrorism groups. The Uwezo Fund (Empowerment Fund) was set up by the government of Kenya in 2013, with the aims of expanding access to finance and promoting women, youth, and persons with disabilities at the constituency level. Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) was identified as a state corporation under the Ministry of Public Service, Gender, and Youth Affairs. Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) was set up by the Kenyan government in 2010. Kazi Kwa Vijana was introduced by the Kenyan government and incorporated in the country's 2009/10 budget under the KYEP. The study also revealed that the establishment of a task force on anti-money laundering and on the financing of terrorism aimed at reviewing existing legislation and to come up with a draft of a national policy on combating the financing of terrorism. Further, the NCTC, NIS, and the National Security Council to the Office of the President improved interagency coordination improved. In addition, as a measure of countering violent extremism

Kenyan police have increased their presence in vulnerable areas including on college campuses and Nyumba Kumi Strategy was adopted in 2013.

5.4 Challenges Faced by Regional Organizations in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The findings established that implementing measures of counterterrorism was not easy and regional organizations faced many challenges. Among the challenges identified included poor coordination by member states, poor policies, poor policing, corruption, modernization and support from terror group sympathizers. the difference on the definition of terrorist organization and lack of cooperation among member states in fighting domestic terrorism is a hindrance towards efforts by regional organization in ending the vice. In addition, while Kenyan officials state that its counterterrorism policies are necessary to counter terrorism effectively, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding this legislation.

5.5 Discussion of Findings

Religion was identified to be a leading cause of terrorism and violent extremism in the IGAD region. This was supported by Sabir¹⁷⁴ who contends that religion is not the cause for terrorism but rather it means that the religion regularly gives images that make conceivable shedding of blood even disastrous demonstrations of terrorist attacks are enlivened by the religion or possibly it is claimed. Glucklich,¹⁷⁵ explained that the principle motivation behind why there is a nexus among terrorism and religion is that

¹⁷⁴Michael, Sabir. 2007. Terrorism a Socio-Economic and Political Phenomenon with Special Reference to Pakistan *Journal of Management and Social Sciences* Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring 2007) 35-46 ; pp. 37

¹⁷⁵ Glucklich, Aerial. *Dying for Heaven: Holy Pleasure and Suicide Bombers - Why the Best Qualities of Religion Are Also Its Most Dangerous*. Georgetown: HarperCollins Publishers. 2010.

religion instructs scorn. According to Kamindo,¹⁷⁶ cultural extremism, political influence and religious extremism were also a net contributor of terrorism. In addition Bruton¹⁷⁷ notes that Nairobi is East Africa's most prosperous hub, full of Western tourists, business interests, aid operations, and diplomats; the Westgate mall attack could have killed shoppers from any corner of the globe. It may be against this background that the Westgate mall qualified as a high-value target for radical Islamic militants, whose extremist ideology and socio-cultural beliefs vehemently oppose and seek to challenge the modernity of a secular and Western-oriented culture, which is considerably predominant in the East African region.

The study found that poor governances pushes people in the community to seek better governance. According to Ngunyi and Katumanga¹⁷⁸ the proliferation of terrorist groups can be explained from a focus on the governance of geographical spaces. The findings explained that the ease of movement within the IGAD region has been a contributor of terrorism in Kenya. This was aligned with Kariuki¹⁷⁹ who noted the that the recent terror attacks in Kenya have been propagated by individuals who had easy access in and out of Kenya.

In an aim to finance their operations terror groups use different financial systems. The US government had identified the so-called Hawala system (financial system operating as unlicensed banks). The same situation was identified by the interviewees who also acknowledged, that the IGAD region is yet to master a tactful approach of

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, Kamindo (2016)

¹⁷⁷ Bruton, Bronwyn. "Africa terrorism: The real reason al-Shabaab attacked a mall in Kenya." *Defense One* (2013).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2014

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

curbing financing to terror groups. In order to curb the kidnapping by AlShabaab as a strategy of financing their operations, Kenya started the project “Operation Linda Nchi” led by the Kenyan Defence forces.¹⁸⁰ Retaliation attacks by terrorism groups was identified as a leading cause of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya. This finding concurred with Momanyi¹⁸¹ who noted that revenge attacks are further cited in terms of avenging for Muslims in Somalia and the world over because of perceived persecution by Christians, so that because Kenya has strong ties with Western countries, revenge attacks remain imminent.

The study revealed that the use of military force has been adopted by many countries in the fights against terrorism and violent extremism. Bundotich¹⁸² notes that military action was witnessed in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda structures were dismantled and many terrorists were killed or captured tends to minimize and weaken terrorist networks. However, the study also notes that military force may not always be effective. This is because, such strikes are almost always message-sending exercises rather than a means of significantly crippling terrorist capabilities.¹⁸³ The study also revealed that Kenya has enacted different policies in an aim of countering terrorism. This concurred with Kariuki,¹⁸⁴ who observed that Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA) This law altered 20 existing laws in order to strengthen Kenya’s counterterrorism legislative framework. Moreover, Kariuki¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Bundotich, Josphat Kiprono. "Challenges In Counter Terrorism In The Third World Countries A Case Study Of Kenya." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2013.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, Momanyi, 2015

¹⁸² Ibid, Bundotich, 2013

¹⁸³ Nasongo, Joseph Wamocha. "The effectiveness of Kenya’s counterterrorism measures since 1998." *International Journal of Research Science and Management* 2349(1) 54-64

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, Kariuki, 2019

explained that the Kenya defense forces further sort endorsement of regional organizations like the African Union and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The findings revealed that in an effort of curbing the radicalization of the youth, specific funds such as the Uwezo Fund, Kazi Kwa Vijana, KYEP and YEDF were started in Kenya. This finding aligned with According to the government of Kenya,¹⁸⁶ the YEDF also seeks to create employment opportunities for Kenyan youth through entrepreneurship and by encouraging them to be job creators and not only jobseekers.

The study revealed that certain task forces and policing initiatives were adopted in Kenya with the im of countering terrorism. They included the Nyumba Kumi initiatives and interagencies coordination. These findings were aligned Nasongo¹⁸⁷ who established that the delay in putting in place this legal instrument can be said to have given room for the entrenchment of terror activities since undetected avenues of finance to such groups is dangerous to state security.

The findings established that implementing measures of counterterrorism was not easy and regional organizations faced many challenges. Among the challenges identified included poor coordination by member states, poor policies, poor policing, corruption, modernization and support from terror group sympathizers. These findings concurred with Memar and Gebreyohans¹⁸⁸ who found that lack of trust among member states of regional organizations due to the legacy of inter-state and intra-state conflict was a key challenge in countering terrorism and violent extremism. The study further found out that

¹⁸⁶ Government of Kenya. *Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF): Fund Status Report*. Nairobi. (2009).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, Nasongo, 2018

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, Memar and Gebreyohans

there is need to review the law on counter terrorism and greater emphasis be placed on investigation and scenes of crime management. Another policy concern raised was the need to introduce a mechanism to be used to determine the minimum number of employees in the Counter terrorism Police Unit to avoid under staffing. The policy should also be able to ensure professionalism, enhance motivation of employees and ensure there is DNA data bank.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the conclusion drawn from the study. The conclusion is based on the objectives of the study and the theoretical foundation. Further, the chapter highlights the recommendations of the study.

6.2 Conclusion

The findings of this study both confirm and disrupt assertions by other scholars and researchers regarding the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism. It has been explicated that the IGAD region has made major strides in combating terrorism. It has put in place sufficient prevention of terrorism legislative architecture. Also, the military and other security capability has been greatly enhanced. This is not without enormous investments in hardware and skills at the expense of other competing expenditure needs. The governments in the region also tightened acquisition of Identifications and registration of people's procedures to weed out terror elements. However, the study also revealed that the fight against terrorism and violent extremism has been challenging due to immigration procedures and screening processes which have been identified to be lacking. Although, securities of institutions and installations have been tightened with CCTV cameras installed to aid in surveillance work following the Garissa University attack, the increased radicalization of unemployed youth hinders this effort. In addition, from the study, it was noted that IGAD still has a lot of work to do to ensure that terrorism in the region is curbed completely.

6.3 Recommendations

The study recommends that better governance should be adopted. From the findings of the study, it was established that one of the leading causes of terrorism and extreme violence in Kenya, was increased corruption. Hence, this study calls out the government officials especially those in the immigration department to implement better governance procedures.

In addition, the study recommends that the public should take an active role in monitoring any activities that may be terror and violent extremism related. The study recommends that the Nyumba Kumi initiative needs to be implemented effectively by educating the public on their role of countering terrorism. This will go a long way in facilitating the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

Lastly, the study recommends that proper policies need to be adopted not only in Kenya but by other members' states of IGAD such as Somalia. This is because, if all of the IGAD member state implement appropriate policies, they stand a chance to fight terrorism and violent extremism. From the findings, it was revealed that majority of the cooperation in the fight against terrorism has involved Kenya and other international countries. Hence, there is need for cooperation between the IGAD members in terms of policies to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

6.4 Suggestion for Further Studies

Further research can be carried out to explain more on the role of radio in peace building regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism in other regions of Africa which have experienced terrorism such as Nigeria. The study was

limited to the case of IGAD while terrorism and extreme violence is experienced in other parts of the world. More studies can be carried out to explain the regional organizations can be instrumental in countering terrorism and violent extremism in other parts of the world. Moreover, further studies need to be conducted focusing on other regional organizations such as COMESA in Africa whose member states experience terrorism and violent extremism.

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0Horn%20and%20Eastern%20Africa](https://www.ndi.org/our-stories/ndi-partners-eastern-african-regional-organization-promote-democratic-principles#:~:text=Established%20in%202016%2C%20the%20ICEPCVE,the%20Horn%20and%20Eastern%20Africa). Retrieved August, 24 (2020)

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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

I am conducting a survey on the role of regional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism: a case of IGAD. The interview takes about 45 minutes to 1 hour. Participation in the survey is completely voluntary. However, we hope you will participate in the survey since your views are important. Whatever information you provide will only be used for general reporting.

1. What is your position in the organization?
2. What is your role in the organizations? Please explain
3. What is the definition of terrorism and violent extremism according to IGAD?
Please explain
4. What role does IGAD play in relation to countering terrorism and violent extremism? Please explain
5. What are the causes of terrorism in the IGAD region? Please explain
6. How does IGAD identify the causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the IGAD region? Please explain
7. Does IGAD monitor all possible causes of terrorism and violent extremism?
Please explain
8. What regulations has IGAD implemented to counter terrorism and violent extremism? Please explain
9. Which stakeholders has IGAD partnered with to counter terrorism and violent extremism? Please explain
10. Does IGAD allocate finances in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the region? Please explain

11. Does IGAD rely on western countries to finance the activities to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the region? Please explain
12. Have the measures implemented by IGAD to counter terrorism and violent extremism been effective so far? Please explain
13. In your opinion which measures should IGAD implement to counter terrorism and violent extremism? Please explain
14. What are some of the challenges faced by IGAD in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism? Please explain
15. What strategies has IGAD implemented to address the challenges faced in countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region? Please explain
16. In your opinion, do you think that IGAD will manage to end terrorism and violent extremism in the region? Please explain

“THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME”

APPENDIX II: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

KNOWLEDGE OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREEMISM

1. What is your opinion on terrorism and violent extremism from a global and local perspective?
2. In your opinion, is terrorism and violent extremism a global challenge?
3. What are the leading causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the IGAD region?
4. Who are the main actors of terrorism and violent extremism?
5. What are regional organizations doing wrong that increases the risk of terrorism and violent extremism?
6. How are people recruited to join terrorism groups?
7. In your opinion, can terrorism and violent extremism end?

ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREEMISM

1. What is the vision of IGAD with respect to countering terrorism and violent extremism?
2. What other regional organizations focus on countering terrorism and violent extremism?
3. What are the measures that IGAD has implemented in countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region?

4. Which of the implemented measures by IGAD in countering terrorism and violent extremism have been successful and which have failed?
5. In your opinion, have regional organizations implemented effective measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism? (probe the measures implemented)
6. In your opinion, are the efforts put by regional organizations enough in countering terrorism and violent extremism?
7. What other strategies can IGAD implement in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism?
8. How does IGAD create awareness on the importance of countering terrorism and violent extremism in the region?
9. How does IGAD allocate its resources with respect to countering terrorism and violent extremism?
10. What challenges does IGAD face in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism?
11. How does IGAD address the challenges it encounters in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism?

CONCLUDING QUESTION

1. How can IGAD instill the responsibility of fighting terrorism and violent extremism to each and every individual in the region?

CONCLUSION

Thank you for your contribution to this study.


APPENDIX III: WORK PLAN


	2020							
Activity	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Development of writing the concept								
Proposal writing and presentation								
Submission of proposal to Ethics Board								
Pretesting the instrument								
Data collection and analysis								
Report writing and corrections								
Presentation of the project								

APPENDIX IV: BUDGET

Item	Number	Unit cost	Total cost (Kshs.)
Assorted stationery (pens, pencils, rubber & note books)	5 each		500
Typesetting, photocopying and printing of the proposal		@ 8,000	8,000
Transport	1	@ 1,000x7 days	7,000
Telephone and internet		10, 000	10,000
Typesetting and printing of the final research proposal		@ 10,000	10,000
Proposal loose binding	4	4@100	400
Data analysis SPSS program		@30, 000	30,000
Typesetting and printing of research project		@10, 000	10,000
Project final binding	4	@ 500	2,000
Sub Total			77,900
Contingency (10% * 77,900)		@ 7,790	7,790
Grand total			85,690


APPENDIX V: NACOSTI PERMIT


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APPENDIX VI: PLAGIARISM REPORT

ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE OF IGAD

ORIGINALITY REPORT

13%

SIMILARITY INDEX

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INTERNET SOURCES

7%

PUBLICATIONS

3%

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