

**REGIONAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EASTERN
AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF EASTERN AFRICA STANBY FORCE (2010 – 2017)**

Evans Otieno Oduma

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Supervisor

Mr R N Omwega

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DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented to any other University for academic award.

Sign: Date:

Evans Otieno Oduma

This Research Project has been submitted for review with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Sign: Date:

R N Omwega

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DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this work to my wife Jordanah Otieno and sons Ryan and Rayner whose support is a pillar of strength, always.

ABSTRACT

From its inception, the African Union (AU) was to be more proactive and stout in dealing with preservation of peace and security than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU, through its framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) to handle security collectively in the continent. The ASF consists of standby forces from five sub-regional forces based on Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is one of the sub-regional forces of the ASF whose objective is to uphold regional peace and security. The EASF attained the status of full operational capability in 2015, declaring to have an operationally ready, multidimensional integrated Standby Force that is ready to address the continent's security challenges. However, the AU has failed to act through the ASF and regional standby forces when their intervention was needed to maintain regional peace and security. The conflict management strategies have not been effective in addressing and solving various conflicts in the Eastern Africa region. Eastern Africa countries such as Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi are still plagued with conflicts. Therefore, the general objective of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of the EASF in management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa region. The specific objectives of the study were: to analyze the capability gaps in the EASF that affect the management of conflicts in the region, to investigate the impact of EASF operational readiness on the management of regional conflicts, and to investigate challenges of the EASF in the management of regional conflicts. A descriptive survey design was adopted for this study. Secondary data was analyzed from the internet, books, publications from security ministries and books. The study found that there are political, financial, logistical structural capability gaps in the EASF that affect the management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa region. The study found that the EASF is yet to deploy in a peace support operation and therefore it is yet to demonstrate its ability to fulfill its mandate. It was also established that the force faces political and policy challenges, training inadequacy, infrastructure and equipment unavailability, operational and administrative challenges in the management of conflicts in the region. The study recommends the following: the EASF should develop a more structured relationship with partners; member states should show commitment to the organization; the EASF should develop a better logistical organization and that the force standby rotation matrix should be better managed by having actual forces placed on standby during their rotation.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS:	AU Mission in Sudan
AMIS:	African Union Mission in Sudan
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
AUC:	African Union Commission
CEWS:	Continental Early Warning System
CLB:	Continental Logistics Base
CMCC:	Continental Movement Coordination Center
DMZ:	Demilitarized Zone
E.A:	East Africa
EAC:	East African Community
EAPSM:	Eastern Africa Peace and Security Mechanism
EAPSS:	Eastern African Peace and Security Secretariat
EASF:	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EASFCOM:	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
FOC:	Full Operational Capability
ICRC:	International Community of the Red Cross

IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPSTC:	International Peace Support Training Centre
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSO:	Peace Support Operation
RDC:	Rapid Deployment Capability
REC:	Regional Economic Community
RLD:	Regional Logistics Depot
RMCC:	Regional Movement Coordination Center
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
UNAMID:	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR:	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNITAF:	Unified Task Force
UNMISS:	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOSOM:	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS:	United Nation Political Office for Somalia
UNSC:	United Nations Peace and Security Council
UNSOA:	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALISATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

- Complex humanitarian emergency:** This is a situation that is occasioned by gross violation of human rights leading to collapse of public support delivery system.
- Conflict:** A situation where there are two or more distinct groups pursuing incompatible goals in conscious opposition to each other.
- Contingent:** This is a combat troop contributed by a particular country.
- Follow-on forces:** When the task at hand is overwhelming, additional forces are deployed to reinforce the troops deployed initially.
- Full operational capability:** This term has been variedly defined in the AU context as the capacity and readiness of the AU through the regional Standby Forces to deploy a multidimensional force comprising of military, police and civilian components within the APSA structure. This deployment is done in intervene situations of actual or potential violent conflict eruption, within the stated periods (AU Draft Document, 2005).
- Interoperability:** The ability of different national armies being able to operate in a joint exercise or mission.
- Intervention trilemma:** A situation in which the command leadership has to strike a balance in protecting the civilians, protecting own force and destruction of the insurgents while at the same time accomplishing the mission.
- Logistics:** This can be described as the science of planning for movement, sustenance and maintenance of

forces and military equipment. This study is specific refereeing to in-service and operational logistics. This entail the procurement, mobility, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of the equipment and store that are needed for operations. It also comprise the transportation of personnel to the mission area (strategic lift), within the mission area (in-country movement), and from the mission area, the acquisition or furnishing of services, accommodation and catering, medical, hygiene and postal services.

Mandate:

This is a military assigned duty that should be accomplished by the troops at host country.

Military intervention:

This involves the threat to use or actual use of military forces across international boundaries by a nation or coalition of nations with the aim of preventing widespread human right violations of individuals or communities. This may happen without the consent or authorization of the state whose territory is the object of the intervention.

Mission scenarios:

Guidelines under which EASF is supposed to operate.

Missions:

These are military assignments that are meant to neutralize the belligerents thus ending the hostilities.

Peace support operations:

These are military operations that are conducted in an area undergoing violent armed conflicts. It's geared towards making the armed groups submit to ceasefire agreement.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The African peace and security landscape has witnessed great transformation over the past two decades. There has been a paradigm shift in the type of threats faced, the nature of conflicts and definition of security. The continent is confronted with multiple challenges in maintaining peace and security, which has been compounded by trans-border threats, territorial disputes, and complex intrastate conflicts. This transformation has in turn made it necessary to rethink the approaches to peace support operations across the globe as the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and United Nations (UN), attempt to develop appropriate mechanisms. The approaches have been often characterized by the need for rapid and robust reactions to these threats to peace and security.

The African Union (AU) constitutive Act sought to have a more robust role than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in handling issues of peace and security within the continent.¹ In order to harmonize the continent's numerous security initiatives and to ensure efficient utilization of resources, the AU, through its framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) to handle security collectively in the continent.

¹ Waag Van der, "Interstate Collective Security: its development and decline," *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 19-1 (2014): 25-30.

The African Standby Force consists of standby forces from five sub-regional brigades based on Regional Economic Communities (RECs). These are Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and Regional Mechanism (RMs) as is the case with the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and North African Regional Capability (NARC).²

The EASF is the Regional Standby Force for Eastern Africa. Its aim is to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the continent. The EASF was initially under the coordination of IGAD, a situation which was resisted by the non IGAD member states. This resistance led to the formation of Eastern Africa Brigade Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) whose mandate was to coordinate activities as an independent body. The EASBRICOM changed the name to Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASF.COM).³

EASF is organized in three levels; the assembly of the heads of states being the highest, followed by the council of ministers and committee of Chiefs of Defense. This forms the Policy Organs of the EASF. The EASF has four main structures which are located in the Kenyan capital city Nairobi and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The Nairobi office comprises of the EASF Secretariat that is tasked with the responsibility to coordinate the activities of the force. The Addis Ababa office is the Headquarters and the logistical base (LOGBASE). This office deal

² Spillman, R. & Günther, B., Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation. Environment and Conflicts Project Occasional Paper No. 14. (Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 2013).

³ Robinson, C. "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects," *International Peacekeeping* (2014): 10

with logistical issues and serve as Force Headquarters respectively. Regional organizations have been slow in management and resolving of conflict in East Africa.

The ASF has sought to have a rapid deployment capability in all the regional standby forces which will be able to react to crisis quickly before it grows out of proportion. The aim is to save lives and property and prevent escalation of conflicts. However, African peace and security efforts is yet to achieve its mandate due to political challenges, resource mobilization difficulties and limited capacity.

African countries lack the mechanisms to handle these violent conflicts.⁴ Furthermore, the regional security mechanisms have not been able to deliver on their mandates. These military undertakings require huge amounts of money for the operations to realize any gains and the source has to be reliable. Funds, too, are needed to buy modern communication equipment, weapons, and utility and attack aircraft, kit the personnel and pay them.

The ability to deploy forces in a timely manner and with the capability to meet their mandates is what is required of a peace support operations standby force.⁵ Effective management of conflict such as deployment of missions requires authorization, commitments by countries willing to provide troops, availability of sufficient logistical support and capabilities for rapid reaction. In addition, a mission will also need timely intelligence, and effective information and communications systems to succeed. This study therefore seeks analyze the performance

⁴ Dickson, Y., "Conflict Resolution in Africa: Challenges for the 21st Century," *Abuja National War College* 8 (2014): 13.

⁵ Walt, S., "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35:2 (2015): 221.

of the Eastern Africa Standby Force in the management of regional conflicts in Africa between 2010 and 2017.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is one of the regional standby forces making up the African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational and multidimensional peacekeeping force which was created with the aim of intervening and bringing an end to violent conflict in the continent. However, the African continent continues to face many security challenges with many unresolved conflicts across many regions. Some of the regional standby forces, notably ECOWAS, carried out interventions in crisis situations in the Western Africa region. Nevertheless, there have been some failures by the AU, the ASF and regional standby forces to react when their intervention was needed, while some interventions ended in failure. The conflict management strategies have not been effective in addressing and solving various conflicts in the Eastern Africa region. Eastern Africa countries such as Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi are still plagued with conflicts. To this effect this study will analyze the effectiveness of regional approaches to conflict management in the Eastern Africa region, focusing on a case of Eastern Africa Standby Force.

1.3 General Objective

To analyse the effectiveness of the EASF in management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa region.

1.4 Specific Objectives

- i. To analyse the capability gaps in the EASF that affect the management of conflicts in the region.

- ii. To investigate the impact of EASF operational readiness on the management of regional conflicts
- iii. To investigate challenges of the EASF in the management of regional conflicts.

1.5 Literature Review

Conflict continues to be an ever present phenomenon in the African continent. To counter this there is need for rapid response to ensure war does not escalate to serious massacre as witnessed in Rwanda Genocide. The United Nations Organization (UN) in its aim to change the situation and improve security in the worlds has enhanced the peace and security by promoting a collective security system that would deal with major issues that adversely affect world peace and security.⁶

The UN has not lived up to its goal of a peaceful and secure world and this is more so in Africa.⁷ The UN charter in chapter VIII guides countries to engage in pacific settlement of disputes before referring the disputes to United Nations Security Council such as the Au and the European union. Despite the existence of challenges, the UN has continues its commitment in enhancing capacity of security units. This has been done through provision of framework for managing conflicts thus reducing friction between countries in the international system.

The thought of establishing a military force for Africa was conceptualized by Kwame Nkrumah the president of Ghana in the early 1960. Nkrumah suggested that African High Command

⁶ Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts. *Review of African Political Economy*.30; 97(2013): 405-422.

⁷ Prendergast, J. and Mozersky, D., Love Thy Neighbor: Regional Intervention in Sudan's Civil War, *Harvard International Review*, 26 (2014)

should be establishment to ensure that African states maintained their sovereignty and territorial integrity after independence.⁸ However, this noble idea could not be realized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) because of many reasons, among them being the prevailing Cold War conflicts and politics, personal ambitions and differences of the African leaders and structural weakness of the OAU.⁹

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) sought to have a more robust role in handling matters of peace and security in Africa than the predecessor.¹⁰ The AU, through its larger framework of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), established the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF) to serve as an agency for collective security in the continent. This was necessary for the purposes of harmonization of the continent's numerous security initiatives and to ensure efficient utilization of resources.

The idea of an African Rapid Deployment capacity was floated as a strategy for immediate response to rising conflict in African countries. This proposal was made to temporarily fill the existing gap and accord the ASF time to be fully established and capable of undertaking its mandate.¹¹ RDC is keen on addressing the complex local conflicts that often transcend national boundaries which are a great threat to peace and security and require considered responses by the relevant institutions.

⁸ Gebresilassie, F., "Collective Security at Stake. Challenges of the Current Collective Security System," (2012): 19.

⁹ Dier, A., *The African Standby Force Put to the Test*, (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2013).

¹⁰ Waag Van der, "Interstate Collective Security: its development and decline," *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 19-1 (2014): 25-30.

¹¹ Walraven, T., "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned," Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency 2013).

Like the African Standby Force, RDC consists of standby forces, from five sub-regional brigades based on Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The regional blocks represented by RDC are SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and EASF.¹² In Kenya the RDC is based in Embakasi with a combat capacity of 7000 troops.

1.6 Justification of the study

The study will help member states of the EASF in assessing whether the Force is in a position to play a significant role in management of conflicts in Africa. It will therefore provide information which can enable the regional governments to make policy decisions to strengthen the Force. The study is of great value to the EASF that may use it for capacity building and policy implementation to make the institution stronger and better prepared to meet future challenges. The other Regional Standby Forces can use the recommendations of the study to address similar challenges in their regions.

1.7 Theoretical framework

1.7.1 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Theory

This study will be informed by the Neo-Liberal institutionalism theory as proposed by Robert Keohane, Robert Powell, and Joseph Nye. The Theory postulates that states can overcome their fear of the chaotic and anarchic international system through international cooperation by the formation of international institutions of cooperation.¹³ The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists are

¹² Sitkowski, R. African Regional and Sub-Regional Organization's Security Policies: Challenges and Prospects, *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, vol.7 (2) (2015): 245.

¹³ Dersso, S., The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture: *ISS Paper* 209 (2015): 6-7.

optimistic of international institutions and advocates for their existence. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism assumes that states are utilitarian and rationalistic: they make their decisions based on cost and benefit analysis. Also, states are rational unitary actors which are interested in absolute gains.¹⁴ The theory advocates for cooperation among states in an anarchic international political environment that does not acknowledge hierarchy. It supports the existence of international institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) and further argues that these institutions facilitate international cooperation.

The coming together of African states to form the African Union (AU), with a common agenda depicts international cooperation, which aims at enabling states to maximize absolute gains, while trying to attain a common goal. In this situation, the common agenda here is peace and security for Africa and the operationalization of the EASF to serve as forces for actualizing peace and security goals of the continental body.

International institutions encourage compliance from states through the application of their mechanisms and states do attach great importance to the existence and the functioning of these institutions and preserve them regardless of cost.¹⁵ States support regional security bodies by financing their infrastructure, equipment and provision of other logistical support. For states to enjoy the benefits of regional cooperation and integration, they must also be willing to meet the costs of the regional body's existence.

¹⁴ Omar, M., The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region, *Intercom*, 2 (2014): 27-29.

¹⁵ Metaferia, H. Critical Reflections of the African Standby Force: The Case of its SADC Contingent, *Southern African peace and security studies*, vol. 1(2) (2015): 20-28.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study will be conducted at the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM) in Kenya. This study will focus on investigating the existing gaps and effectiveness of logistics, finances, personnel, equipment and training on effective management of conflict in Eastern Africa. Access to information is one of the anticipated limitations for the study due to the military nature of the organization.

1.9 Research Methodology

The main objective of this research is to analyze effectiveness of EASF in management of conflicts in the region. A case study of the Eastern Africa Standby Force will be used to help analyze factors affecting effective conflict management by EASF.

1.9.1 Research Design

Descriptive survey design was used by this study. This design is preferred for its appropriateness in collecting information that help the researcher in answering the research questions. In addition, descriptive research helps to study and report on the situation as it exists and also helps a researcher in describing the attitudes, values and characteristics of a phenomenon.¹⁶ This study is a desktop review where secondary data is analyzed from the internet, books, national printouts, publications from security ministries and books. The analysis is qualitative in nature and information is arranged according to common themes

¹⁶ Mugenda, O.M. and Mugenda, A.G., *Research Methods: Quantitative & Qualitative Approaches*. (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 2003).

adopting content analysis technique.¹⁷ This approach enables the researcher to analyse the effectiveness of the Eastern Africa Standby Force in the management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa region.

1.9.2 Data Collection Instruments

The study relied on secondary data that was obtained primarily from books, academic journals, articles, publications by respected authors in their respective fields, previous research papers, EAC, IGAD and EASF protocols, communiqués, periodicals, minutes of meetings, reports and the internet.

1.9.3 Data Analysis

Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected. Content analysis was applied in the analysis of qualitative data whereas descriptive statistics was used to analyze quantitative. For content analysis, data is coded and themes are generated based on data from secondary sources. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used for this analysis. SPSS Version 21 is considered appropriate because it provides a clear path to follow and a set of quantitative data analysis procedures which lead to increased data validity and reliability and helps in bringing out the relationship between the variables. SPSS also assist in producing frequency tables for descriptive analysis. For inferential statistics, multiple regression analysis will be used.

¹⁷ Orodho, C.R., *Elements of Education and Social Science Research Methods*, (2nd ed.), (New Delhi: Kanezja Publishers, 2009).

1.10 Research Hypothesis

- i. EASF Capability gaps impact on their ability to manage conflicts in the region.
- ii. The EASF attained sufficient operational readiness capability to manage conflicts in the region.
- iii. The EASF faces challenges in the management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa Region.

CHAPTER TWO

CAPABILITY GAPS IN EASF AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE REGION

The management and resolution of armed conflicts require more than just the equipment and resources that are associated with peacekeeping operations. Conflict management capabilities involve other factors such as diplomatic, economic, and infrastructural dimensions. The capability gaps in the EASF affecting management of regional conflicts could include resource mobilization, technical capacities, manpower availability, policy issues and political will among many other areas.¹⁸

2.1 Political Dimension

There are many ongoing interstate and intrastate conflicts plaguing the Eastern Africa Region and this largely affects the development of a strong (Eastern Africa Standby Force) EASF.¹⁹ Internal conflicts continue to be witnessed in Somalia, Sudan's Darfur area, and in other countries in the region. The hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia hostilities and also those between Djibouti and Eritrea are affecting the development of the EASF. Conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia have even resulted into Eritrea withdrawing its active participation from

¹⁸ Jackson R, "Violent internal conflicts and the African state: towards a framework of analyses," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 20(1) (2015): 29.

¹⁹ Lewis, I. M & Mayall, J, Somalia in *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017)

the EASF and IGAD. This goes against the principle of inclusivity of all member states for an effective collective security arrangement thus undermining the progress of the EASF.²⁰

The institutional development of EASF is constrained by conflicts in two dimensions. Internal conflicts within member countries of the EASF affect EASF development as these countries are largely preoccupied with internal insurgencies and devote their best resources first to internal demands rather than to a world order like the EASF with a planned capability of ensuring regional security.²¹ In essence, for such states in the EASF, regional security duties are only secondary to their national security. This phenomenon results in reduced resources to the EASF as some member states fail to meet their financial obligations or only pledged limited number of personnel and equipment, probably maintaining a substantial amount of resources to counter internal security threats.²²

In addition, conflicts in the region like the one in Sudan and Somalia have equally reduced the resources that would have been used to improve the institutional framework and develop the capacity of the EASF.²³ These conflicts have necessitated the deployment of the UN and AU peacekeeping missions in which countries of the EASF participate. The financial, human and material resources committed to these operations limit what the countries are able to commit to the strengthening the regional force. Tension between countries in the EASF because of

²⁰ Tlalka, G., "Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects," *Military Review*, (2013): 68-71.

²¹ Stahn, C., "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm," *The American Journal of International Law*, 101(1) (2012): 111.

²² Van der Waag, *Interstate Collective Security*, 35.

²³ Sarjoh, G., "African Peace and Security Architecture: A Handbook," *Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung (FES), Addis Ababa Office and the African Union (AU)*, (2014)

among other issues, support for proxy wars by member countries and their international relations, has resulted in mistrust among Member States. This has greatly affected the collaborative efforts required to nurture this new security organization.²⁴

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) cuts across a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). These are the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).²⁵ It is important to appreciate the commitment that member states have to these organizations, their loyalty to these organizations and the impact thereof, positive or negative. This multiple and overlapping memberships to regional organizations puts a toll on the financial commitments of many poor states, thereby limiting their capacities to honour their assessed contribution to the EASF. In addition, the competing goals of these sub-regional organizations and their lack of a clear and coordinated agenda on upholding of peace and security has jeopardized the prospects for the force to develop into a strong force. All these organizations require donor assistance as they pursue their objectives in the same field of peace and security thus creating unnecessary competition for donor support. Obviously, the existence of these multiple organizations with overlapping mandates or objectives affects the development of the EASF.²⁶ Overlapping

²⁴ Kasumba, Y., An Overview of the African Standby Force (ASF), In De Coning, C. and Kasumba, Y. eds. *The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force*, (Mount Edgecombe: AU & ACCORD, 2014), 19.

²⁵ Markakis, J., "Environmental Degradation and Social Conflict in the Horn of Africa," in Nhema, Alfred G. (ed) *The Quest for Peace in Africa*. Addis Ababa: International Books with OSSREA. (2015).

²⁶ Kruys, G., Combat readiness with specific reference to armies, In M. Hough & L. du Plessis (Eds), *Selected military issues with specific reference to the Republic of South Africa*, (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 87.

membership by Member States also creates the problem of commitment and loyalties thus complicating the support of member states for EASF.

Member States usually lean towards organizations that best meet their expectations or interests. Tanzania, which is geographically located in the EAC bloc and is founder Member of the EAC, preferred to join the SADC.²⁷ Therefore, unlike the other standby forces which enjoy the participation of almost all member states because of the existence of one strong REC upon which they are anchored, EASF is greatly affected in terms of commitment by member states as well as competition for external donors with the regional economic communities. Greater collaboration among member states and among the security and development organizations is important so that members take advantage of the synergies that exist among the different organization and reduce duplication of resource and divided commitment. More collaborative efforts in this area have got to be done to create synergies and reduce competition and duplication of resources in a region that already has constrained resources.²⁸

Only 10 Out of the 14 member states of the Eastern Africa area participate actively in the EASF. The active countries are Kenya, Comoros, Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.²⁹ Eritrea has suspended its engagement in the force, as it has in many organizations where Ethiopia is a member due to the hostile relations between

²⁷ Kasumba, Y., An Overview of the African Standby Force (ASF), In: De Coning, C. and Kasumba, Y. eds. *The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force*, (Mount Edgecombe: AU & ACCORD, 2014): 15.

²⁸ Ebegebulem, J., The Failure of Collective Security in the Post World Wars I and II International System, *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 1, No.1 (2012): 7.

²⁹ Coleman, K., "Innovations in African Solutions to African Problems: The Evolving Practice of Regional Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 49; 4 (2011): 537

the two countries. This could soon change with the thawing of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. At the same time Tanzania, which is geographically in East Africa and is a founder member of the East Africa community, has chosen to work with the SADC countries in the SADC Standby Force (SSF). Madagascar and Mauritius too, have since joined the SSF from the EASF. Given that the standby forces depend on member states for financial, equipment and personnel, the withdrawal of these countries and or their lack of participation in the force directly affected the development of EASF, more so in terms of capacity building.³⁰

2.2 Financial and Logistical Capability Gaps

Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are an expensive affair, requiring huge amounts of money to conduct successfully.³¹ Day to day operations, deployments, training and exercises and humanitarian support have to be properly funded to succeed. Despite declaration of attainment of full operational capability in 2015, the EASF suffers from lack of the financial resources and logistical capability to independently deploy a peace support mission. At the continental level, the AU under which the standby forces fall lacks finances to discharge its duties effectively, and has had to rely on the UN, donors and partners to discharge its duties. On the other hand, the UN seems to be getting overwhelmed with the demands for peace support operations in the African continent and the attendant financial burdens of such operations. The UN relies on funding from member states cater for the PSOs. When a country like the US

³⁰ Bah, S., "The Evolution of Regional and Sub regional Collective Security Mechanisms in Post- Cold War Africa," in (eds.) Jones, B, Forman S and Gowan, R. *Cooperating for Peace and Security and Security : Evolving institutions and Arrangements in a context of changing U.S security Policy*, (New York, 2016), 201.

³¹ Rummel, R., "Power, genocide and mass murder," *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(1), (2013). 9.

which shoulders the greatest financial burden reduces funding for the UN Peace fund, as it recently did; this affects all UN PSOs.

The AU has established a peace fund and it is to be supported through contributions by member states are supposed to contribute. However, member states have not honoured their obligations to the AU peace fund, and even if they did, the fund would never be enough to meet the many demands for peace missions around the continent. Similarly, in the EASF, Member states are supposed to meet their assessed contributions but few have regularly done so either because of low financial capacity or because of their national commitment/ priorities.³² There have been accusations of mismanagement of funds by the EASF from the partners.³³ Just like in the AU, EASF which is supposed to be supported by member state has to work with partners or donors to realize its objectives.³⁴

The ASF policy framework provides for several mission scenarios under which the force can deploy. These scenarios are categorized into Scenarios 1 - 3 that is executed for self sustainment of up to 30 days. The second scenario 4 - 6 should be deployed with up to 90 days self sustainment, before the AU or the UN takes over the responsibility for sustaining the missions. The UN or AU will then reimburse the TCCs for self sustainment.³⁵ For the EASF to possess the capability to deploy contingents in fourteen days it will need to conduct regular

³² Thakur, R., "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 32, 3 (2016): 387

³³ Kurt, R. & Günther, L., *Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation. Environment and Conflicts Project Occasional Paper No. 14.* (Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research. 2016)

³⁴ Mwaaura, C. & Schmeid, S., *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2015), 45.

³⁵ Miranda, V., 'Towards a Stronger Africa- EU Cooperation on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organizations and Civil Society', *IAI Working Papers*, (Roma: IstitutoAffariInternazionali, 2018).

joint field training exercises involving all arms and components. Although EASF is said to be ready for such operations, in actual sense, the member states don't seem to be prepared with the requisite resources and forces to do so within the given timelines.³⁶

In addition the force is still limited in terms of tactical and strategic airlift capabilities.³⁷ The force's lack of financial and material resources has made it to be reliant on external support, a situation that has undermined its local ownership and therefore undermining the role of the ASF in providing African solution to African problems. The EASF receives support from a several countries and international organizations through the forum of 'Friends of EASF' established in 2007. The Netherlands has played a very instrumental role towards the achievement of the strategic plan of the organization by helping it develop a command and control Communication Information System (C2 CIS).³⁸ Deployment of the EASF will be in accordance with the authorization of the AU and mandate by the UN as per international law.³⁹

Issues of cultural differences among the peoples of Eastern Africa have affected the process of attaining a united EASF.⁴⁰ These cultural differences are defined by various ethnicities, culture and values, religion and the Anglophone-Francophone divide. It has been argued that the

³⁶ Kimathi, L., "A Common Agenda of Post-Conflict Reconstruction among Eastern Africa's sub-Regional Organizations: Exploring the Challenges," *Occasional paper series 1*. (2014)

³⁷ Kagwanja, P., "Enhancing Capacity for Regional Peace and Security through Peace Operations Training," *Issue briefs series, issue No. 5, third quarter*, (Karen: International Peace Support Training Centre, 2017)

³⁸ Jackson, R., "Africa's wars: overview, causes, the challenges of conflict transformation," in Furley O and May R (eds), *Ending Africa's wars: progressing to peace*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2016).

³⁹ Franke, B., "Steady but Uneven Progress: The Operationalization of the African Standby Force" in: Besada, H. eds. *Crafting an African Peace and Security Architecture. Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2014), 179.

⁴⁰ Dersso, S., "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture," *ISS Paper*, 209 (2015): 6-7.

cultural diversity has hindered growth of EASF. Language barrier is a major hindrance to communication in operational environment. In addition, commanders may experience difficulties in communicating with troops of different nationalities, having different values and cultures. Since EASF aims at deploying troops from different countries, cultural background of the different personnel of the troop contributing countries have to be integrated in the training programs, otherwise interoperability of the force may be jeopardized.⁴¹

2.3 Structural Gaps

For over ten years, EASF was structured based on a relatively weak legal basis operating under the Policy Framework for the Establishment of EASBRIG (adopted in 2004) and Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (signed in 2005) which were not binding.⁴² It is only in December 2014 that an agreement on the establishment of the EASF was signed by ten participating states. Although an agreement has been put in place to replace the loose MoU that existed before, there still exist several grey areas in the system of pledging forces by member states. There is still no arrangement that binds member states to deploy their forces if mandated, although they have pledged forces by signing MoUs. EASF operations largely depend on the good will and the shifting political will of states.⁴³

⁴¹ Dickson, Y., “Conflict Resolution in Africa: Challenges for the 21st Century.” *National War College* 8, Abuja. Dream” (2014): 22.

⁴² Curtis, W., “The Inevitable Slide into Coercive Peacekeeping: The US Role in the New World Order,” *Defense Analysis*, 10(3): (2015): 305

⁴³ Chukunov, V., “Military Security Consciousness and the Mechanism of its Moulding in the RF armed forces,” *Military Thought*, 9(2): (2016): 67.

The PLANELMs is vested with the responsibility to plan, prepare and train the force and to verify the brigade headquarters and standby elements.⁴⁴ This necessitates the need to staff the PLANELM on a permanent basis as it is considered to be a full time requirement. It would be preferable to have the PLANELMs co-located with the brigade headquarters so as to have efficient command, control and communications. However, for the EASF, the PLANELM is based in Kenya while the force headquarters is located in Ethiopia. This renders the coordination of these structures difficult and also causes logistical and communication constraints especially for an organization like EASF , which just like the others in the region is constrained in terms of resources. Arrangements like these may satisfy the countries concerned but they may also jeopardize the effective function of the force.⁴⁵

The decision to have Kenya hosting the planning element (PLANELM) and Ethiopia the Force HQ, though politically expedient, but operationally, has constrained the already under resourced organization.⁴⁶ Decision-making especially at the policy and operational level poses a big challenge to the EASF organization.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Bachmann, O., “The African Standby Force: External Support to an ‘African Solution to African Problems,’” Institute of Development Studies Research Report. (2011), Available at: <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Rr67web.pdf> [Accessed: 20 August 2015].

⁴⁵ Mohammed, A., “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *The International Journal of Human Rights*. 6; 1 (2017): 81

⁴⁶ Alusala, N., “African Standby Force: East Africa Moves On,” *African Security Review*, vol. 13(2), (2016): 113

⁴⁷ Alamin M. & Mazrui A. “The Tensions of East African Integration: Failed Pan-Africanism, Emerging Pax Africana?” Paper presented at the International Peace Academy/ Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

In most situations, security matters are sensitive and therefore call for prompt decisions or actions.⁴⁸ In regional security architectures, the significance of a lead nation cannot be underestimated. In the EASF, there is no one country that can be said to be the dominant power as is the case with Nigeria in ECOWAS and the Republic of South Africa in SADC Standby Forces. ASF deployment in scenario six which calls for deployment within fourteen days would not be easily realized by the regional standby forces of the ASF because of the limitations of mandates and logistics. Only a lead nation would help as happened with ECOMOG intervention force in Liberia led by Nigeria. In the EASF, the two regional powers, Kenya and Ethiopia, are engaged in a perpetual jostle for regional supremacy. This has been manifest from the inception of the EASF with the bidding for the hosting rights of the body. In addition, Kenya was among the states that resisted having EASF under the coordination of IGAD due to Ethiopia's perceived dominance in the organization.

Consequently EASBRICOM, later replaced by EASFCOM, was established and is based in Nairobi. While Kenya proposes the EASFCOM to be regarded the supreme organ for all the EASF structure, Ethiopia wants the structures to be regarded as equal.⁴⁹ This shows that even though the establishment of the EASFCOM was supposed to solve the problem of coordination of the EASF, the rivalry between the two countries still continues to hinder the seamless operations of the force activities. Their antagonism as they seek to exert influence in the regional security sphere is made more manifest by the allocation of EASF structures. The

⁴⁸ Green, R., "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction," *Third World Quarterly*. 20(1) (2015): 113

⁴⁹ Aboagye, F., *A Stitch in Time Would Have Saved Nine. Operationalizing the African Standby Force*. Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief no 34. (2012), Available at:<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf> [Accessed: 12 January 2013].

location of elements of the EASF between the two countries was as a result of compromise and not based on any advantage that such location would bring to the organization. Having these EASFCOM, PLANELM, LOGBASE and Headquarters in two different countries has affected the coordination of the EASF activities and may, in future interfere with the ability of the force to deploy rapidly if needed. For effective coordination, if not all elements of the EASF, then the PLANELEM and the Force Headquarters should be in one place for better coordination.⁵⁰

Despite the above discussed capability gaps in the EASF that affect the management of conflicts in the region, the force has made strides towards attainment of full operational capability. Some of the achievements include the establishment of an independent coordination mechanism, advisory role in Somalia and collaborations with the UN and AU in Somalia, the formation of a Maritime Cell, successful conduct of exercises, and the continuing capacity development of the police components and civilian. Continuous exercises between troops from different states should be emphasized more, key leadership engagements and exchanging views, among other measures should be emphasized to address some of the shortcomings of the force.

⁵⁰ Cilliers, J. and Pottgieter J. 'The African Standby Force.' in Engel, U. and Porto, J.G. (eds.) *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions*, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2016), 111.

CHAPTER THREE

EASF OPERATIONAL READINESS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS

This chapter set out to take an in-depth analysis of the operational readiness of the EASF in the management of conflicts in the Eastern Africa region. The chapter starts by looking into the operational readiness of the EASF. The chapter then delves into providing an overview EASF Peace Support Operations involvement from its inception in 2004 to date. Case studies of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) are also reviewed to provide an insight into how complex peace support operations have been conducted in the past, the past successes, challenges and failures, and show how the EASF can be engaged in future operations.

3.1 Operational Readiness of the EASF

The term peace support operational readiness can be conceptualized at three levels namely; at the individuals, unit, and national levels.⁵¹ The term operational readiness in peace support operations is as the ability of a force to deploy to a mission area in a timely manner and conduct peace support operations successfully against a hostile force.⁵² Peace support operational

⁵¹ Diani, M., Political opportunities and Linking mobilization frames: regional populism insights in Brazil. *American Sociological review*, 61 (6), (2015): 1053

⁵² Lind, J., & Howell, J., Politics of Aid and Counter-terrorism: Kenya Civil Society Responses. *Change & Development*, 41(2), (2015): 335.

readiness can be determined in terms of strategic, operational and tactical planning and execution of peacekeeping operations.⁵³

Peace Support Operational readiness can also refer to the possession of materiel that are kept ready and can be brought to bear when need arises.⁵⁴ Under Article 13 of the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council which was signed in 2002, the functions of the EASF include the following: Conducting observation and monitoring missions; Conducting peace support missions; military intervention in a state when there are grave circumstance for example genocide or at the request of the state; Preventive deployment to de-escalate tensions, control spread of violence, or prevent relapse back into conflict; Conducting peace-building activities like disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; humanitarian assistance in response to disasters and conflict; and perform other functions assigned by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.

Despite declaration of attainment of full operational capability in the year 2014, the EASF still faces some challenges. Against this backdrop, this study proposes that peace support operations readiness for EASF is determined by availability of well trained military, police and civilian personnel and also equipment and requisite facilities.⁵⁵

⁵³ Chinery-Hesse., “A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture,” *International Affairs*, 89 (1), (2012): 103.

⁵⁴ Berouk, J., “The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region,” *Intercom*, 2 (2014), 27-29.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

The fact that the EASF is not yet ready to deploy a fully fledged multidimensional peace support mission was aptly illustrated by the Burundi Crisis where Protests and violence erupted in April 2015 following the ruling party's announcement that the incumbent would seek a third term. In December 2015, there were violent confrontations between rebel groups and the Burundian army. Consequently, the AU gave authority for the deployment of a peacekeeping force of 5,000 personnel. Despite the challenges in the diplomatic front towards securing legitimacy and consent for the force, there was a major challenge in mobilizing and deploying the force. The EASF preparedness is therefore greatly hindered by lack of Member State's commitment to the signed MOU on provision of troops and other logistical support.

3.2 An Overview of EASF Peace Support Operations Involvement: 2004 to date

The Eastern Africa region has gone through some of the most tragic conflicts, some of which are still ongoing. These conflicts, some of which are interstate while others are intrastate, have negatively impacted on the prospect of developing a strong regional standby force.⁵⁶ Currently, the new state of South Sudan is still recovering from the recent internal ethnic motivated conflicts between the Dinkas and the Nuer, the internal crisis in Darfur is still going on, Eritrea has strained relations with Ethiopia and Djibouti, factional groups fighting unconventional war continues to be witnessed inside Somalia and beyond. These conflicts continue to undermine the progress made and efforts of securing the Eastern African Region.⁵⁷

Since declaring the attainment of full operational capability on 22nd November 2014, well ahead of the 2015 deadline, the EASF has acknowledged that it is ready for deployment for

⁵⁶ Metaferia, H., "Critical Reflections of the African Standby Force: The Case of its SADC Contingent," *Southern African peace and security studies*, 1(2), (2015): 20.

⁵⁷ Mwaura, C. & Schmeid, S., *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2015), 45.

peace support operations across the continent. However, as at now, the force contribution to the preservation of regional peace and security remain minimal.⁵⁸ It has undertaken some military observation, advisory and fact finding missions as part of conflict prevention activities. The EASF is to a limited extent involved in conflict prevention activities in Somalia and South Sudan and also in the ongoing AMISOM operations. On request by the AU, the EASF sent a fact finding Mission to Somalia. The force has also conducted Force generation Workshops to augment the AMISOM forces in Somalia.⁵⁹

In 2011, the EASF provided personnel to form part of the UN team that conducted the training needs analysis for the now defunct military forces for the Transitional Federal Government. Additionally, the EASF deployed a technical assessment team made of 14 officers in support of AMISOM.⁶⁰ EASF has also been variedly worked together with the United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and in Technical Working Group Meetings for the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). The regional force has also in the past deployed police as part of an observer group to AMISOM, a significant step towards the development of the police component. Besides, EASFCOM signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union Commission (AUC) to assist AMISOM with operational

⁵⁸ Omar, M., "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region," *Intercom*, 2 (2014): 27-29.

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Allehone, M., "Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa," *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014): 171.

and logistical planning, provision of training and medical support. Indeed there has been some progress made in the process of ensuring the operationalization of the EASF.⁶¹

EASFCOM was created as an independent regional coordination mechanism replacing IGAD which was previously undertaking the responsibility. The creation of the coordination mechanism that is separate from IGAD was to give non-IGAD member states assurance and confidence that they are equal participants in the EASF.⁶² This, among other developments, including the adoption and implementation of The EASF Strategic Development Plan by Member States, demonstrates that despite political tensions, there is mutual understanding among Member States who have worked together to achieve most of the strategic objectives in the plan that were important towards achieving F.O.C.⁶³

It is evident that the EASF has the potential to develop into a dynamic security management tool for Africa.⁶⁴ In preparation for possible future roles in the maritime security domain, the EASF has established a Maritime Cell. This has been prompted by the growth of the piracy menace within the waters of the Eastern African coast, which has hampered this important maritime trade route. There is also significant developments and investments in the blue economy by the Eastern Africa states with major port projects in Kenya (the Lamu port and the LAPSSSET project), Tanzania and expansion of the port of Djibouti. The other sectors of the blue economy that have seen increasing interests by the Eastern Africa coastal states as

⁶¹ Robinson, C., "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects," *International Peacekeeping*, (2014): 8.

⁶² Ibid, 13

⁶³ Alusala, N., "African Standby Force: East Africa Moves On," *African Security Review*, 13(2), (2016): 113

⁶⁴ Sitkowski, R., "African Regional and Sub-Regional Organization's Security Policies: Challenges and Prospects," *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, 7 (2), (2015): 23.

include fishing and fisheries development, offshore oil prospecting among others. The threat to these interests demands a force that is capable of meeting the challenges.

The present day peace support operations environment is multidimensional and highly dynamic. Therefore, the EASF is making good progress towards the establishing a police and civilian component to enable it perform effectively. Having initially laid emphasis on the military component in line with the ASF development strategy, there was increasing demand to incorporate the multidimensional aspects in the force owing to the realities of modern peacekeeping operations that require them to be multidimensional and multifunctional in order to address the multifaceted nature of conflicts.⁶⁵

As of 2011, the EASF had 176 Civilian Personnel in its Standby Roster register and 635 police officers had also been trained. In 2017, the EASF conducted a field training exercise (FTX) code named EX-MASHARIKI SALAM II in Port Sudan, the Republic of the Sudan. This was a follow up to the FTX MASHARIKI SALAM I that was conducted in 2013. In both of the exercises, there was significant participation by both the police and civilian components. The role of civilian and police components in a multidimensional peace operation cannot be overemphasized, hence the need to enhance their participation in the force.⁶⁶

Beside the multidimensional aspect of the force, EASF recognizes the role of women and is trying to implement the UNSC resolution 1325 on gender mainstreaming. In 2011, of the 635

⁶⁵ Allehone, M., "Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014): 171

⁶⁶ Dersso, S., "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture," *ISS Paper* 209 (2015): 6-7

trained police officers, 209 of them were female. EASF has made notable achievement in training its staff individually and collectively both in the EASF structures and in member countries.⁶⁷ These training programmes have culminated in successful conduct of various command post exercises and field training exercises.

Between 2010 and 2018, the EASF hosted the African Union Continental Command Post Continental exercises on Logistics preparedness. These exercises enable the force to gauge the level of preparedness for peace support operations in the continent, thereby helping force move closer to achieving its strategic objectives. Besides, The EASFCOM works with regional training institutions such as the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) with a view of having standardized doctrine and training that follows the UN requirement on doctrine and training for multidimensional PSOs. The programs are also developed in cognizance of the African realities. There are three peace support operations training regional centres of excellence based in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. These offer standardized pre-deployment training to troops contributed by member countries in view of having effective joint peace support operations.⁶⁸

In March 2014, the EASF took part in the election monitoring process in the Union of Comoros under the invitation of the government. These, among other achievements have served to show that EASF is well on the path to solidifying its Full Operational Capability (F.O.C) achieved in 2015.⁶⁹ The organization has achieved most of the F.O.C requirement such as bolstering its

⁶⁷ Hamad, G., "A Nascent Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges," *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 22 (3), (2014): 4.

⁶⁸ Robinson, C., "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects," *International Peacekeeping*, (2014): 11.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 15.

structures, establishing the PLANELM, force Headquarters, a 5200 multidimensional, multifunctional and integrated standby forces in member counties, signing of an agreement on the establishment of EASF in 2014 by Member States which is more binding than the earlier arbitrary agreement based on a memorandum of understanding.⁷⁰ EASF Member States have also signed framework documents and memorandum of understanding in 2014 on pledged forces. EASF constantly develops military, police and civilian component training and through numerous exercises.

Even though EASF has not deployed on a peace support mission independently as a force, the bulk AMISOM forces consists are from of EASF countries. The force has also conducted training to AMISOM forces and also some of the personnel who have gone through EASF training have served in several missions across the continent.⁷¹

3.3 Case Study I: UNITAF, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in Somalia

In 1969, the then Somalia president Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated. The army commander Maj Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre seized power and dissolved all democratic institutions.⁷² Siad Barre, though a despotic leader, was able to propagate his leadership through the manipulation of the Ogaden situation. He propagated the idea of uniting all the Somali people under a greater Somali by incorporating the Ogaden Province, then a province within Ethiopia. In 1977, he launched an offensive into Ethiopia with a view to annex the Ogaden region, believing Ethiopia to be weak and unable to mount a successful defence.

⁷⁰ Sitkowski, R., "African Regional and Sub-Regional Organization's Security Policies: Challenges and Prospects," *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, 7 (2), (2015): 235

⁷¹ Allehone, M., "Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014). 179.

⁷² Metaferia, H., "Critical Reflections of the African Standby Force: The Case of its SADC Contingent," *Southern African peace and security studies*, 1(2), (2015): 25.

Ethiopia was however able to get reinforcements from the USSR and Cuba, consequently defeating Somalia. Siad Barre was ousted from power in 1991, having ruled for 22 years. There was an ensuing power vacuum due to the fragmented nature of the Somalia rebellion that ejected Barre from power and it did not have a national military that could enforce law and order. There was a lengthy power struggle among the rebel leaders as they contended for political power economic control. It is believed after only 2 years of the civil war, between 300,000 and 500,000 people had died, either directly from the war or killed by famine.⁷³

International media broadcasted images of the misery of the Somalia population which sent shock waves in the Western world and put pressure on their governments and the UN to intervene and find a solution to the humanitarian crisis. Following a ceasefire agreement between the warring factions on 3rd March 1992, UNSC Resolution 751 on 24th April 1992 established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Its mandate was Mogadishu ceasefire monitoring, provide security to UN personnel and supplies, and escorting humanitarian supplies.⁷⁴ However, UNOSOM's establishment did not pick up well because of the unwillingness of countries to contribute troops to the mission. This was majorly attributed to the incessant fighting that was still going on despite the ceasefire. The various militias were not ready to lose their economic bloodlines that were the ports and distribution routes. They even stole humanitarian relief supplies meant for the starving population, a fact that was clearly illustrated by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, who noted that the problem was not lack of humanitarian relief supplies, but the providing security and escort for the supplies to reach warehouses and the population.⁷⁵

In a bid to bolster the UN efforts, a fresh resolution was issued, UNSC Resolution 775 which authorized additional force strength of 3,000 personnel for UNOSOM to be effected

⁷³ Spillman, R. and Günther, B., *Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation*. Environment and Conflicts Project Occasional Paper No. 14. (Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 2013).

⁷⁴ Stahn, C., "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm," *The American Journal of International Law*, 101(1), (2012): 109.

⁷⁵ Mohammed, A., "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 6 (1), (2017). 89

immediately. This raised the total number of UNOSOM forces to 4,219-strong with the mandate of providing humanitarian relief, monitoring the ceasefire agreement, security provision, carrying out disarmament and demobilization, and facilitating national reconciliation.⁷⁶ However, despite having more forces, UNOSOM were still not effective in the face entrenched militia groups whose survival depended on plunder and robbery. The situation grew worse and the gory pictures of starving and dead Somali civilians were broadcast across the globe. This pressured the Bush administration into authorizing a humanitarian relief operation. The US military deployed transport aircrafts and some 400 personnel to conduct airlifts of humanitarian relief and consequently ensuring that the militia groups that were profiting from ambushing relief trucks were cut off.⁷⁷

Despite the success of Operation Provide Relief, the security situation in Somalia, and more so, Mogadishu continued to deteriorate.⁷⁸ It was therefore all too clear that delivery of aid was not contributing much to the peace effort. Consequently, Boutros Ghali outline five options to the UN as follows: The first was continued deployment of UNOSOM under the established UN peacekeeping principles of consent and non-use of force. This was however deemed inadequate because the humanitarian crisis was so grave.⁷⁹ Alternatively, the mission could be disbanded and the operation terminated. However, this admission of failure was unimaginable to the UN was unlikely to be supported. On the option concerning the use of force, UNOSOM could adapt an aggressive posture, especially in Mogadishu, with the aim of deterring the negative forces from interfering with relief efforts.

Another option which was seen as logistically impractical was the conduct of a wide and robust peace enforcement operation in the entire country commanded by the UN. Finally, and more

⁷⁶ Tlalka, G., “Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects,” *Military Review*, (2013): 68-71.

⁷⁷ Mohammed, A., “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 6 (1), (2017): 89

⁷⁸ Menkhaus, K., “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 30 (97) (2013): 405

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 411

realistically, the last option was for the UNSC to authorize a few countries to carry out the operation.⁸⁰ The latter option was preferred and, the US agreed lead a UN mandated enforcement mission to establish a secure environment which would facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief in Somalia. Consequently, a Chapter VII mandate was given by the UNSC on 3rd December 1992 which authorised the use of force for the purpose of securing humanitarian aid delivery.⁸¹

UNSC Resolution 794 which authorized the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under the lead of the US necessitated a rethink into the strategies and responses to the Somalia situation.⁸² The mandate of the mission was protection of humanitarian relief, protection of civilians and facilitation of political, economic and social reforms. It was meant to be a transitional arrangement which was to be succeeded by UNOSOM II. The major success that can be attributed to UNITAF was that it was able to ensure successful delivery of humanitarian aid. However, in the area of securing Somalia, it achieved very limited success. UNOSOM II was mandated under Chapter VII and with a force a 20,000 strong force. It was however perceived to be weaker than UNITAF because it was UN led. As a result, some rebel factions in Mogadishu were emboldened because of this perception, a situation which led to deterioration of the security situation.⁸³ The UNSOM II efforts were finally put paid by the events following the battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 American soldiers were killed, the mandate of the force ending in 1995.

⁸⁰ Green, R., “The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,” *Third World Quarterly*, 20 (1), (2015): 113

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 120

⁸² Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 30 (97) (2013): 405

⁸³ Thakur, R, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 32 (3), (2016): 393

3.4 Case Study II: UNAMIR in Rwanda

Rwanda is a country with a turbulent history of ethnic violence dating back to the colonial period. During the Hutu revolution in 1959, more than 330,000 Tutsis minority were forced into exile in the neighboring countries. At independence in 1962, ethnic conflict continued till 1973 when Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a moderate Hutu carried out a successful military coup. However, the immediate lead up to the genocide can be said to have begun in 1990 when Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) forces, formed majorly by Tutsi refugees, crossed over from Uganda into Rwanda. Habyarimana believed that the Tutsi community was collaborating with the RPF and many of them suffered reprisals including murder and arbitrary arrests.

The neighboring countries, under the auspices of the OAU tried to mediate between the two parties through a series of negotiated agreements culminating in Arusha in 1993.⁸⁴ This process of mediation resulted in the formation of a 55 man Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) with the task of monitoring the cease fire agreement. The NMOG was later expanded to 120 observers, but its effectiveness was hampered by lack of logistics support and small size which was not adequate to cover the more than 150km demilitarized zone (DMZ).⁸⁵

The Arusha Accord between President Habyarimana and the RPF was finally brokered by the Great Lakes Region leaders in 1993.⁸⁶ The Accord provided that a transitional government was

⁸⁴ Kabunduguru Mathias, "Peacekeeping and the UN: lessons from Rwanda," *Asia Pacific Press*, (1999): 5

⁸⁵ MacQueen, N. *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. (Great Britain: Pearson Education 2012)

⁸⁶ Kuperman, J.A., "The other lesson from Rwanda: mediators sometimes do more damage than good," *Journal of International Affairs*, 22 (1996), 19.

to be created, a fact that angered the extremist Hutus. It also recommended that a neutral UN force be created with the mandate of monitoring the ceasefire implementation, reforming the military, and elections.⁸⁷ The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) succeeded the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group in October 1993.

The onset of the genocide was on 6th April 1994 with the shooting down of the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi's president Cyprien Ntaryamira as it was preparing to land in Kigali, killing all on board.⁸⁸ As the genocide raged on, there was no reaction from the international community; the world maintained a studious silence as people were being massacred. In fact, the Belgium government withdrew their UNAMIR contingent following the killing of ten of their soldiers. UNAMIR was downsized from 2,548 to 270 personnel through the infamous UN Security Council resolution 912 of April 1994. This downsizing gave room for the genocide to continue. The RPF on the other hand strengthened their offensive and made rapid progress. Consequently, France made the decision to unilaterally intervene southern Rwanda for humanitarian reasons in operation TURQUOISE to protect the Hutus from massacre by the RPF.⁸⁹ UNAMIR was initially unwilling to cooperate with the French because Operation TURQUOISE was not mandated by the UN.⁹⁰

After immense pressure by the OAU, the ICRC and international press, the UN passed the resolution 918 of 1994 authorising a 5,500 strong force in Rwanda under chapter VII. It was

⁸⁷ Kuperman, J.A., "The other lesson from Rwanda: mediators sometimes do more damage than good," *Journal of International Affairs*, 22 (1996), 27.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 34.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 37.

⁹⁰ Kabunduguru Mathias, "Peacekeeping and the UN: lessons from Rwanda," *Asia Pacific Press*, (1999): 5

tasked to stabilize the Western region of Rwanda, monitor the security situation in the country, secure humanitarian assistance operations, and promote dialogue and national reconciliation.⁹¹ However, even with the expanded mandate, it was proving a challenge to get offers for troop contributing countries and a part from a number of military observers, there were less than 500 personnel on the ground.

From the foregoing findings, it can be deduced that the EASF is an idea whose time is long overdue. It is meant maintain peace and security in the African continent and Eastern African region specifically. The above cases demonstrate the depth and multiplicity of interrelated challenges and dynamics in the Eastern Africa region. The EASF therefore must be ready to fill the void by having a capability for rapid response to crisis in the region and the entire continent of African. Intervention in another country whether by a single nation, regional body or the UN is a complex political, diplomatic and military balance.⁹²

EASF participation in peace support operations in Africa remain negligible as it is yet to deploy a peace-keeping force independently. This is attributed to the fact that EASF is under the continental force ASF and therefore draws its mandate in terms of operational activities from the AU. For the EASF to deploy, it will have to be mandated by the UN and authorised by the AU. At the moment, the EASF has conducted several exercises to show its operational readiness and the AU has conducted a verification exercise, all of which have indicated its readiness to deploy. Despite the limited role that the EASF has so far played in the maintenance

⁹¹ Ibid, 7.

⁹² Kagwanja, P., “Enhancing Capacity for Regional Peace and Security through Peace Operations Training,” *Issue briefs series, issue No. 5, third quarter*, (Karen: International Peace Support Training Centre, 2017).

of peace and security in the region, the trajectory that the organization has taken gives hope that it has a good future prospect of being a game changer as a guarantor of regional stability.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY EASF

4.1 Challenges to Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa

The African Union (AU) has developed a rotational standby system for the sub-regional Standby Forces where each force serves a six month standby period in which they are responsible for response to crisis anywhere across the continent. Therefore, through this system, the sub-regional standby forces have a responsibility for peace and security across the continent.

Peace support operations in Africa and specifically Eastern Africa have been faced with many challenges, both at the strategic and operational levels. Most of the operations have not been able to achieve their mandates or have taken too long to realize any significant results.⁹³ The never ending problems are a testament to the unreliability of political support and the general misapplication or reluctance to apply the peacekeeping tool at all. Therefore, for the peace support operations to succeed, political support and a good strategy for the resolution of the conflict are imperative. Peacekeepers may be able to deal with the superficial issues that are overtly manifest in a conflict, however, they may not be equipped to resolve the underlying issues which are the real causes and drivers for the conflict. For many years, this has been the problem faced in Darfur, the DRC and more recently in South Sudan. In these conflicts,

⁹³ Allehone, M., "Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014), 178.

peacemakers have not been successful in resolving conflicts and have leaving peacekeepers with the onerous tasks of picking up the pieces.⁹⁴

The AU has attempted to develop broader capabilities in the manage conflicts in the continent through its Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework has the following five pillars: First is the Peace and Security Council comprising heads of state and Governments, second is the Early Warning System, third is the Panel of the Wise, fourth is the Peace Fund and lastly is the Africa Standby Force (ASF).

Therefore, the AU recognizes that Peace support operations cannot function in isolation but need to be viewed as part of broader activities that can be used in resolving a conflict.⁹⁵ The other pillars have had some effects in maintenance of peace in Africa except for the peace fund which has not been successfully implemented, and therefore the continent still remains dependent on donor funding.⁹⁶

Obtaining the support of and relating well with the host nation is also an important consideration for the success (or failure) of peace support operations.⁹⁷ Eritrea, Burundi, and Sudan governments have on diverse occasions rejected peace support operations in their countries. DRC and South Sudan governments have on many occasions launched complaints

⁹⁴ Allehone, M., Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa”, *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014): 180

⁹⁵Ibid, 187.

⁹⁶ Tlalka, G., “Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects, *Military Review*,” (2013): 68-71.

⁹⁷ Mumma-Martinon, C., “Efforts towards Conflict Prevention in the Eastern African Region: The Role of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms,” Occasional paper, series 1, No. 1. Karen: *International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)*, (2013).

about peacekeepers. The debate is therefore whether peace support operations should be deployed into theaters where there is official consent for a mission by the host nation government but in reality they interfere with the operations of the force through many unofficial and administrative obstacles. There is also the problem of the international community siding with one party by giving them recognition as the official local authorities when there is contention between parties, for example when there is a contested election (a case in point is what occurred in the Ivory Coast when there was a contested elections in 2010) or when there are two or more factions contesting for power (as was the case in South Sudan).⁹⁸ Peace operations should be given unequivocal support by the UN security council and the international community at large.

Eastern Africa, a region plagued by many conflicts has a daunting task of attracting the necessary attention to its plight, enough to attract financial support needed for the peace support operations. The EASF is unable to get adequate support from the AU since it is also not self reliant and still depends on the United Nations and other donors to fund its activities.⁹⁹ The AU has proposed the establishment of a peace fund which is supposed to make it independent of donor funding for peace support operations. However, this has never been implemented as most of the countries have not honoured their obligations to the fund. The same problem exists in the EASF where few of the member states actually honour their assessed contributions, which is also hardly enough to meet the running expenses. As a result, the AU goal of being able to provide African solutions to African problems remains a mirage.

⁹⁸ Alusala, N., "African Standby Force: East Africa Moves On," *African Security Review*, 13(2), (2016): 116.

⁹⁹ Karagiannis, E., "European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization," *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 13(1), (2012): 108.

The true financial situation was clearly illustrated by the AU's budget of 2015, where out of a total program budget of \$379 million, only \$8.7 million (2.3 percent) was to be paid for by AU member states; the rest was expected to be provided by external partners like the United States, European Union, Japan, among others.¹⁰⁰

Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa take place under the most challenging and uniquely complex and volatile environments. They are in areas where there are active wars and conflicts where there is no peace to keep in the first place but literally a war to fight. This has led to the death of peace keepers and the Eastern Africa region is rife with examples, from South Sudan to Somalia.¹⁰¹ The tasks for which the peace keepers are assigned are also increasingly more complex, ranging from combating negative forces, protection of civilians, and prevention of serious crimes like human trafficking, weapon smuggling and promotion of expansion of state authority.¹⁰²

Peace support operations are increasingly being given multifaceted mandates that are contributing to blurring of the lines that are separating activities that were by tradition obviously distinct.¹⁰³ For the most part, contemporary peace support operations in the African have required the involvement of very robust combat operations, restoration of stability, countering insurgency, counterterrorism, state-building, and regime-consolidation. The case of

¹⁰⁰ Berouk, J., "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region," *Intercom*, 2, (2014): 27-29.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Chinery-Hesse, "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture," *International Affairs*, 89 (1), (2012): 99.

¹⁰³ Bah, S., "The Evolution of Regional and Sub regional Collective Security Mechanisms in Post- Cold War Africa," in (eds.) Jones, B., Forman, S., and Gowan, R., *Cooperating for peace and Security and Security: Evolving institutions and Arrangements in a context of changing U.S security Policy*. New York, (2016): 209

Somalia, where the AMISOM forces have been battling the Al' Shabaab militia group serves to illustrate the point well. It has therefore become necessary to define the limits of peace support operations and make a distinction with other military operations such as war fighting, counterterrorism, or counterinsurgency.

The Eastern Africa Standby Force still suffers from very limited rapid deployment capability, basically due to logistical challenges including lack of mission start up kits, lack of equipment and supplies, limited strategic lift capabilities among others. These challenges are made worse by operating in environments with limited infrastructure, dangerous negative forces employing such unconventional means as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); these have created unfamiliar problems to peacekeeping forces, especially in Somalia. This calls for novel ideas on how peace support operations should be conducted in the Eastern Africa Region.¹⁰⁴

4.2 Policy challenges

Since the establishment of the ASF in 2003, it has made much progress as regards the development of various policy documents which seek to guide its operations. The ASF drew up five key policy documents at the time the organization was being established.¹⁰⁵ They included doctrinal policy; the logistics and training and evaluation policy; command, control, communications and information systems; and standard operating procedures. The African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) authenticated them before they were finally adopted

¹⁰⁴ Cilliers, J. and Pottgieter J., "The African Standby Force," in Engel, U. and Porto, J.G., (eds.) *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms and Institutionalizing Solutions*, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2016), 111.

¹⁰⁵ Feldman, R., "Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces, Defence & Security Analysis," 24 (3), (2013): 267.

by the African Ministers of Defence and Security (AMDS) in March 2008. They are the documents that provide the framework for the regulation, administration and operations of the ASF.¹⁰⁶

It was also of importance to set forth clear structures and systems for the ASF command and control system which was done to fulfill Phase I priority requirements for ASF operationalization.¹⁰⁷ However, the effectiveness of these policies are yet to be ascertained since merely putting in place a command and control system is not enough and much more is required to be effective. Recruitment of people with the required expertise at the continental headquarters capability and also the regional standby forces is needed to implement the policies.¹⁰⁸

4.3 Political Challenges

Political support for peace support operation is a prerequisite for their success. The EASF has struggled to attain the required political support, basically due to the unique environment in which it is domiciled, as compared to the other regional standby forces like SADC and ECOWAS domiciled in single Regional Economic Communities (REC).¹⁰⁹ The member states of the EASF belong to a multiplicity of RECs, for example COMESA, EAC and SADAC and

¹⁰⁶ Feldman, R., "Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces," *Defence & Security Analysis*, 24 (3), (2013): 270.

¹⁰⁷ Franke, B., "Steady but Uneven Progress: The Operationalization of the African Standby Force" in: Besada, H., eds. *Crafting an African Peace and Security Architecture. Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, (2014): 182.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 193

¹⁰⁹ Ebegbulem, J., "The Failure of Collective Security in the Post World Wars I and II International System," *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 1 (1), (2012). 1-10.

regional mechanisms for example IGAD. There is no single, all encompassing regional body to which all members of the EASF belong. This has meant that there is a lack of a unifying political forum through which the member states could discuss the standby force issues. The EASF was initially under the coordination of IGAD, a situation which was resisted by the non IGAD member states. This resistance resulted in member states agreeing to form the Eastern Africa Brigade Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) as an autonomous body to coordinate its activities. EASBRICOM was later renamed the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM).

The jostling for power and position between the countries making up the EASF, especially Kenya and Ethiopia coupled with the existing differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which has made Eritrea to keep away from contributing to the force have also hampered the development of the force.¹¹⁰ The diminished Political support because of these issues has led to unstable funding of the EASF as the member states tend to withhold their assessed contributions as a tool of forcing their agenda in the Force.

Colonial legacies of the EASF member states have also hampered the process of establishing the force. The former colonial powers have tended to interfere with activities and decisions of the EASF by using their former colony countries as a conduit to further their agenda. In addition, Ethiopia, which was never colonized feels entitled by this fact to provide leadership to the force and play host to it. This has led to competition with Kenya which also wanted to host the force. Eventually, the two countries agreed to share the hosting with the EASF

¹¹⁰ Feldman, R., "Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces," *Defence & Security Analysis*, 24 (3), (2013): 277.

secretariat and Planning Elements in Nairobi and the headquarters and Logbase are in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

According to the APSA framework, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the political body charged with the responsibility for policy and making strategic decisions on matters of peace and security in the continent. Therefore, it seems that on paper, the AU is committed addressing peace and security challenges in Africa.¹¹¹ However, it is a corporate body made up of member states and can only act as member states will it to. The member states provide personnel, materiel and finances that may be required for a peace mission deployment. The missions that the AU has deployed in the Eastern Africa region attests to the capacity and capability deficiencies of the continental body to deal with the challenges faced. This can to a large extent be attributed to the half hearted support that the member states give to the organization. The AU Missions in Darfur (UNAMID), and Somalia (AMISOM) have struggled to obtain the authorized or required troop levels. Indeed for the AMISOM mission, very few countries were even willing to pledge forces. The situation as it stands is likely to continue, given the persistent idiosyncrasies of the African leaders among other political challenges.¹¹²

4.4 Training Challenges

The EASF has focused much of its efforts on training in a bid to bolster operational readiness. The successful conduct of “EXERCISE AMANI AFRICA II” led to the validation of the EASF

¹¹¹ Omar, M., “The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Enhancing Peace and Security in the Eastern Africa Region,” *Intercom*, 2 (2014): 27-29.

¹¹² Robinson, C., “The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects,” *International Peacekeeping*, (2014): 1-17.

operational capability in the year 2014.¹¹³ However, there is no identified, specific standby force that can be kept together and tracked since the member states have not offered forces exclusively for standby duties. This implies that different groups are trained each time and this hampers the level of preparedness for the force, given that those who have received the requisite training may not be readily available for deployment for peace support operations as their availability will depend on the discretion of their militaries. EASF has been conducting training for all components of its force including the military, police and civilian elements. The training has also been continuously conducted for various levels of staff including operational and tactical levels.¹¹⁴

The EASF has been using facilities of International Peace Support Training Centers in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia to conduct its training activities.¹¹⁵ The training centers however do not have adequate facilities to meet all the training needs especially as regards conduct of exercises. There is need for the improvement of the training infrastructure, enhance personnel capacity and update training curricula to meet current requirements.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Kruys, G., "Combat readiness with specific reference to armies," In M. Hough & L. du Plessis (Eds), *Selected military issues with specific reference to the Republic of South Africa*, (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 87.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 91

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 94

¹¹⁶ Chinery-Hesse, "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture," *International Affairs*, 89 (1), (2012): 95

4.5 Infrastructure and Equipment Availability Challenges

The deployment and sustainment of a peace support operation is also largely dependent upon availability of the necessary infrastructure and equipment.¹¹⁷ The EASF needs, as a matter of priority, the necessary equipment, sea and air lift capabilities, ground transportation and communication and information systems that can enable it deploy a force as may be required. These have been established to be lacking and the situation is a major inhibitor to the force's effectiveness and operational readiness. This is one of the factors that greatly undermine the ability of the EASF to respond to crisis situations.

The experience of UNAMID in Darfur clearly illustrates this situation, as tacitly stated by former force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai who said in an interview that in addition to utility helicopters the mission required between 12 to 18 combat helicopters at the minimum for reconnaissance purposes. He lamented the fact that there were no pledges for such capability. There was an attack in the UNAMID camp in Haskanita where 10 peacekeepers lost their lives and it took the force about eight hours to conduct casualty evacuation because of lack of military helicopters and pilots.¹¹⁸

Equipment inter-operability has hampered peace support operations by the EASF and AU forces. This is more of a challenge as concerns communications equipment, a fact that has made it difficult for forces from different troop contributing countries to communicate with each other and call for support when needed. Compatible ground to ground, and ground to air

¹¹⁷ Bachmann, O., "The African Standby Force: External Support to an 'African Solution to African Problems,'" Institute of Development Studies Research Report. (2011). Available at: <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Rr67web.pdf> [Accessed: 20 August 2015].

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

communications between different forces has proved a critical requirement in AU missions especially AMISOM and AMISS. The ASF and the EASF are in the process of remedying the issue of interoperability by acquiring standard mission start-up kits which are centrally kept at the AU Logbase on Douala, Cameroon.

The ongoing missions in the region have shown that early response is critical in ensuring that conflicts are resolved before they become too complex to address. But unfortunately the EASF is still ill equipped and not capable of early intervention.¹¹⁹

4.6 Operational Challenges

The command structure of the EASF in deployment is not comprehensive enough to provide for a clear chain of authority. The structure by the AU is adapted from that of the UN and has often been a challenge to implement in the mission area. One of the significant challenges that has hampered success of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is the fact that most of the TCCs are taking orders and instructions from their countries of origin and that they still run most of the tasks and assignments given to them through their home countries. This has made decision making in the missions very difficult and implementation of some of the mission mandates has often been challenging.¹²⁰ This was clearly evident during the Juba crisis of 2016 where the UN forces could not react in time to stop the opposing forces from committing atrocities in South Sudan.

¹¹⁹ Prendergast, J. & Mozersky, D., "Love Thy Neighbor: Regional Intervention in Sudan's Civil War," *Harvard International Review*, 26 (1), (2014)

¹²⁰ Zambakari, C., Kang, T. K., and Sanders, R. A., *The Role of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in Protecting Civilians*.(New York: Routledge, 2018).

The EASF remains largely reliant on funding from donor partners like the European Union, individual donor countries and the UN. The availability of this funding is often unpredictable and unreliable. The lack of reliable and steady source of funding has considerably limited the operational capabilities of the force. It has made the possibility for the force to raise troops required for operations appear more difficult. The missions supported by the AU have also had to have a short term outlook due to the unpredictability of funding possibilities. Another limitation is the structure of the EASF that places a heavy administrative and financial burden that requires reporting to multiple donors for oversight.¹²¹

4.7 Administrative Challenges

In addition to the resource mobilization challenges, the AU needs to formulating financial administrative and regulatory policies that will enhance transparency and efficient funds management. This would safeguard the available resources and give reassurance to the donors that whatever kind of support is given is properly utilized.¹²² There is still much to be done to ensure that resources are not misapplied but are allocated to the most deserving and mission critical operation areas. However, it is worth noting that the AU missions have proved to be more cost effective as compared to UN missions. This is evidence when comparing the AMISOM budget and that of MONUSCO in the DRC. There is still a lot to be done to ensure that funds received for peace support operations are properly administered and channeled to

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Tlalka, G., “Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects,” *Military Review*, (2013): 68-71.

the proper use. The donors should also avoid overburdening the AU with winding financial administration and accountability requirements.¹²³

The AU has been able to develop procedures to administer and manage funds from the donor partners.¹²⁴ However, there has been a lack of trust by the donors, a fact that continues to interfere with disbursement of funds and consequently, smooth operations of AU missions like the AMISOM. These challenges are not simple to address as that would involve several diplomatic, policy and regulatory changes by nations and organizations whose systems are diverse and highly complex. Therefore, these financial administrative challenges are expected to continue in the short and medium terms and hence the ASF missions will have to work around these challenges in the meantime.¹²⁵

¹²³ Van der Waag, "Interstate Collective Security: its development and decline in Scientia Militaria," *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 19 (1), (2014): 30.

¹²⁴ Chinery-Hesse, "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture," *International Affairs*, 89 (1), (2012): 91.

¹²⁵ Allehone, M., "Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), (2014): 173.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The EASF as a regional security mechanism which is responsible for conducting peace support operations in the region and the African continent at large is faced with a multiplicity of challenges. Among the challenges that the organization faces are those emanating from the political differences among member states which has limited the organizations capability development. It was established that the member states have continuously had disagreements on issues as simple as sharing the positions of key staff to the organization among member states. Though there is an agreed upon rotation matrix which is supposed to guide which country will provide which staff and for what period, some countries have seconded staff that are not qualified for the appointed positions, thereby causing inefficiencies in the functions of the force.

The EASF member states lacks a country that is willing to take the mantle of a regional power and play the lead nation role for a peace support operations, a role played by the Republic of South Africa in SADC and Nigeria in ECOMOG. On the contrary, the EASF suffers from competition by member states as to who takes the lead. This struggle has been manifested clearly when the logistic base of the force was taken to Addis Ababa whereas the planning elements are stationed in Nairobi, Kenya. This poses many challenges because of the fact that a logistic base ideally should not be situated in a country that is landlocked. It increases the cost of transportation of materiel thus eating deeper into EASF's pocket.

Some of the countries in the region have had open hostilities and unresolved issues which interfere with the smooth running of the force. For example, the Ethiopia and Eritrea border

conflicts are such that the two countries don't see eye-to-eye on any issue. This led to Eritrea's exit from the EASF. Other simmering conflicts are Somalia and Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia maritime boundary disagreements among others. These differences have put in jeopardy the progression of the EASF towards operational capability.

Even though the EASF attained the full operational capability in the year 2014, it is yet to deploy in a peace support operation as an independent force. The force has however carried out two validation exercises, EX MASHARIKI SALAM I and EX MASHARIKI SALAM II which have showcased its capabilities and areas of improvement. Some areas were identified to be deficient; among them being inadequate attention and focus on the civilian component of the EASF, especially in the area of training. It should not be lost that peace support operations may start by the military stabilizing the area, but will ultimately end by civilian components providing humanitarian support, doing reconstruction work, undertaking security sector reforms (SSR), judicio-legal reforms, providing election support, conducting training for local administration, support for parliamentary work, among others.

There is a gap in air operations training for the EASF. This requires dedication of resources to air-crew training, and training on aircraft maintenance, ground support operations, ground to air communication integrations, and air logistics operations. Air operations training is a resource intensive and expensive affair and need an assured, steady funding to be implemented effectively. The air operations should also be integrated in the EASF exercises.

The support of EASF partners is mostly dependent on their national or institutional interests and priorities and not the interests of the organization. The funding decisions that are made without prioritising the interests of the organization only serve to create confusion as to the

direction towards which it should grow. The EASF is bogged down by the fact that the member states have failed to take political and financial responsibility of the organization. This situation has led to an undefined collaborative approach by the involved partners, an unwilling alliance where national interests trounce everything else, even the noble aim for the formation of the organization. The EASF member states must make deliberate efforts to have political and financial ownership of the organisation in order to discredit the notion that it is a European-driven organisation.

The EASF, which is part of the ASF is a big step toward formulation of the much talked about “African Solutions to African problems”. It gives the African Union a multinational force that has the capability to intervene in deserving crisis situations anywhere across the breadth and width of the African continent. The ASF deploys under Chapter VIII of the UN charter that mandates regional bodies to intervene and preserve world peace. Often, however, regional intervention mechanisms have served as bridging forces for UN deployments rather than a replacement. This is to say that the exit strategy for AU missions has often been relating to or complete handover to a UN operation. This is because of the obvious financial challenges of the AU and the capacity gaps of in their ability to handle complex security challenges of the peacekeeping operations which involves military as well as civilian capabilities.

Formation of the EASF gives great hope to the region and Africa as a whole since the continent has had a disproportionately large share of conflicts. Therefore, the continent is anxious for the success of the organization so as to help in solving some of the conflicts in the region and eliminate over-reliance on the Western World to maintain peace and security in the region and beyond.

The EASF needs a logistical capability that can enable it to deploy and carry out an effective peace support operation. This logistical capability, especially equipment and stores should be kept ready in a central logistics base that meets the basic characteristics of such a facility. To address the question of interoperability of equipment, the AU has established a Logistics Base in Douala Cameroon and is in the process of building up a start-up kit stock for a mission deployment. Donor support for this initiative has been quite good as the AU received a donation of armoured personnel carriers, troop carrying vehicles, engineering equipment among other items from the Chinese government. However, the stocks are barely enough to start-up any mission. More effort needs to be made to obtain more donor support and the AU itself should also show commitment by procuring some of the required items. There is also need to distribute the equipment to the regional logistics bases for ease of maintenance and deployment. Currently, the equipment are deteriorating very fast at the Continental Logistics base.

The EASF still lacks strategic lift capability that can enable it deploy at short notice in a crisis scenario. Since strategic lift requires huge financial investment, the AU should consider taking up the responsibility by establishing contracts with private and public entities that have such capabilities. The AU can also negotiate MOUs with countries, both African and otherwise, for the provision of strategic air and sea lift capabilities on a need basis.

On the pledged forces, the ASF has instituted a standby mechanism whereby one regional standby force is placed on a standby rotation for 6 months. During this time, the regional standby force is obligated to respond to any security issue as will be authorized by the AU. However, the challenge arises that these standby forces are composed of only pledged capabilities and not actual forces on the ground. This poses a challenge as the reaction time

will still be slow because it will take time to mobilize the forces from the different countries and deploy them in a timely manner to attend to an emergency security situation. Therefore, a better scenario would be to have the physical capabilities present on standby even if they were to be in their respective countries. Alternatively, a skeleton force composed of critical staff and command elements could be put on standby so as to ease the process of mobilization if such a need arose.

The EASF member states need to improve working relationships among them and reduce tensions, suspicion and unnecessary competition. The member states should commit to honoring their assessed contributions to the organization and participate fully in its activities. There should be improved political and diplomatic relationship among the member states.

The AU does not have a clear policy on reimbursement for troops and equipment. Furthermore, even if it did, it doesn't have the financial capacity to reimburse member states for their troops and equipment contributed for a peace support mission. This will make it very hard for the member states to commit their troops since they also have different national interests back at home.

5.1 Recommendations

A continued partnership is recommended with other donors and the friends` of the EASF. Yet, care must be taken that EASF advisors continue only to have an advisory function so that the organization's regional ownership is not at risk of being compromised.

The EASF member states need to show commitment to the organization by honoring to pay their assessed contribution. The member states should develop mechanisms for dispute resolution that will prevent having them spillover into the organization.

The AU should increase her efforts towards securing donor/partner support for the acquisition of mission start up kit. The continental logistics base should distribute some of the equipment and stores to the regional logistics bases especially to the more established standby forces like the EASF. The AU should also show commitment by procuring some of the required equipment and stores and reduce donor dependency.

It is recommended that the AU negotiates MOUs with countries and corporations that have the capability for strategic air and sea lift for the provision of the same when need arises.

It is recommended that when the AU places the EASF on standby, the pledged forces should be actually present and on standby, conducting training in their own countries for the 6 month duration of the rotation.

It is recommended that the AU should adopt a standardized allowance structure together with the UN for personnel taking part in an AU and UN Peace support operation.

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