

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**  
**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENCE AND STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA; A  
CASE STUDY OF AMISOM**

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**2021**

## DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been submitted to any other examination body for the award of any academic certification.

  
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26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 2021

Date

This research project has been submitted for examination purpose with my approval as University of Nairobi Supervisor.

  
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Date

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate my dissertation work to my family and many friends. A special feeling of gratitude to my loving mother whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity ring in my ears.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This research project was made a success through the help, cooperation and contribution of IDIS together with the Leadership and the staff. I acknowledge the efforts of the lecturers that taught me during the course. Special thanks to my Supervisor Dr.Martin Ouma for his invaluable support and meaningful contribution that immensely shaped and enriched this study. I also appreciate his patience and dedication in ensuring that I deliver a sound academic paper. God bless you all.

## ABSTRACT

Collective Self-Defense has produced different implications to various states and regions where it has been practiced. Collective self-defense entails pre-emptive use of force against emerging forces authorized under existing legal framework. This study aims at analyzing collective self defence and stability in the HoA utilizing a case study of AMISOM. It was guided by three objectives which include; to determine the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the HoA region, to analyze the strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the HoA region and to establish the challenges confronting the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the HoA region. The study utilized collective security theory which was developed by Claude Jr in 1971 to examine the nexus between collective self defence and stability in the HoA utilizing a case study of AMISOM. The study adopted a pragmatic design that combines a descriptive research design and a case study to analyze collective self-defense and stability in the horn of Africa utilizing a case study of AMISOM. The study targeted a sample size of 104 respondents drawn from officials from AMISOM, Diplomats from HoA, Academics, Refugees from HoA, officials from National Counter Terrorism Center and Security experts who were deemed knowledgeable on the subject under research. The study also utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods to gather data. Qualitative data was sourced from websites, books, journals among other sources while quantitative data was gathered through use of Questionnaires and interview guide where the researcher conducted interviews with some of the respondents using Google zoom, WhatsApp Video and through telephone calls due to Covid 19 pandemic movement restrictions. From the findings, it's clear that, there is a direct relationship between the increased and decreased Al shabaab attacks in the HoA region. The frequency of the attacks increased during the initial years of the deployment of the AMISOM troops and was directed towards the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) as a retaliation mechanism. Further, there are various strategies that have been adopted by AMISOM to stabilize and secure the HoA region where stabilization as a strategy has been quoted by respondents who participated in this research as the most effective. Additionally, AMISON operations have been confronted by myriad of challenges such as the problems of internal coordination among the mission's troops contributing countries-TCCs which continue to derail achievement of its goals. The study makes various recommendations which include; there is need for creation of a buffer zone (security zone) between areas which have been pacified and those which are still held by militias. AMISON should have well elaborate exit strategy within which to pull out their troops in Somalia, stating clearly the exact date when the mission will come to an end.

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## ACRONYMS

AMISOM -African Union Mission in Somalia

APF- African Peace Facility

APSA-African Peace and Security architecture

ASF-African Standby Force

AU- African Union

AUPSA-African Union Peace and security Architecture

AUPS-African Union Peace and Security

CIL- Customary International Law

CS-D Collective Self-Defense

CSS-Collective Security System

ECOWAS-Economic Community of the West African countries

FG-Federal Government

FGS-Federal Government of Somalia

FMS's-Federal Member States

HoA- Horn of Africa

ICISS- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IGAD-Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IL-International law

IMF-International Monetary Fund

IRRI-International Refugee Rights Initiative

ISSAT-International Security Sector Advisory Team

MoU- memorandum of understanding

MRC- Mombasa Republican Council

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPF- National Police force

ONUMOZ- UN Mission in Mozambique

PLO-Palestinian Liberation Organization

PoC-Protection of Civilians

PSC-Peace and security commission

R2P-Responsibility to protect

SA-Security Agency

SC-Security Council

SDF-Somalia Development Fund

SNA-Somalia National Army

SNDF-Somalia National Defense Forces

SNF-Somalia National Forces

SNI-Somalia National Intelligence

SNP-Somali National Police

SNSA-Somalia's National Security Architecture

SNSC- Somalia's National Security Council

SOP's-Standard operating procedures

SPF-Somalia Police Force

SRCC-Special Representative African Union Commission

SSF-Somali Security Forces

TCC's-Troops Contributing Countries

TFG-Transitional Federal Government

UNAMSIL-UN mission in Sierra Leone

UNCLOS-United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNOSOM-UN Operation in Somalia

UNSC-United Nations Security Council

UNSOS-United Nations Support Office in Somalia

WTC-World Trade Center

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.0 Introduction

This study aims at analyzing collective self defence and stability in the HoA utilizing a case study of AMISOM. This chapter covers “the background of the study, problem statement, research questions and objectives of the study, justification, literature review, hypotheses, theoretical framework, research methodology and chapter outline”.

### 1.1 Background to the Study

The United Nations Charter describes collective self-defense “as the permission by member states to intervene in the defense of another member state when that state has been subjected to unlawful armed attack”.<sup>1</sup> The dogma of collective self-defense dictates an interceding state to independently assess the foundation of the requesting states’ rights to force self-defense. Partner states to a certain regional bloc or arrangements such as the EAC or SADC can jointly declare undertaking such defenses if one of their members is under attack from a country outside their bloc. The dogma of CS-D states that; hostility toward one state means hostility to all states and thus, they all have the right to exercise legal defense against the attacked by giving support to the country that is under attack with an aim of averting such hostilities in future.<sup>2</sup> Under the CIL, the idea of armed attack has been the central notion informing self-defense. According to Fu-Shun Lin, states resort to self-defense as a consequence of an armed attack, invasion and armed

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations. (2021). *Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII. Article 51. Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*. UN: Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs

<sup>2</sup>Shih, M., & Padmanabhan, A. (2012). *Collective Self-Defense: A Report of the Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges*. New Haven: Yale Law School

aggression.<sup>3</sup> Armed attack was formally introduced in the UN Charter under Article 51 on the unilateral use of force.

### **1.1.1 Self-Defense under Customary International Law**

As stipulated under the IL, there are two circumstances under which a state can exercise the right to self-defense. First; unilaterally, to eliminate the threat under international law and secondly, in addressing an armed attack. The UN Charter described that as an essential right to self-defense.<sup>4</sup> Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of force is legally justified, only in circumstances in which it is in line with the key aims of the UN which espouse; preserving peace and regional stability.

The classic concept of self-defense stems from the international military tribunal held at *Nuremberg* which clearly spelt out that; aggressive war is the supreme international crime, a decision upheld by the UN and utilized in the prosecution of many Nazi leaders. The Nazi leaders posit that they took that action as self-defense against an assumed attack by Soviets.<sup>5</sup> Whereas, the tribunal accepted the self-defense right of the Nazis, it rejected their justification of mass murder which led to many of them being hanged following a fair trial. Under Article 2(4) the UN Charter states that; “all member states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the general principles and purposes of the United Nations”. This kind of rule gained universal acknowledgement and formed part of ICL. The rule

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3 Fu-Shun Lin, (1963). *Self-Defence - A Permissible Use of Force under the U.N. Charter*. DePaul L. Rev. 43

4 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art 51.

5 Shiryaev, Y. (2008). *The Right of Armed Self-Defense in International Law and Self-Defense Arguments Used in the Second Lebanon War*. Acta Societatis Martensis (2007/2008) 80-97

was referred to during the *Nicaragua v. USA* case.<sup>6</sup>The justification for collective self-defense was famously invoked by the US in “the *Nicaragua* case”, when the US claimed that their armed activities against Nicaragua were acts of collective self-defense of “El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras” in response to an alleged armed attack conducted by *Nicaragua*. Contrastingly, under “Article 51 of the UN Charter”, the member states can use force in exceptional circumstances. Article 51 states that;

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, applying force for other purposes except for an armed attack is regarded as illegal. Collective self-defense is therefore justified under the current Charter which permeates debate on the applicability of a pre-emptive anticipatory collective self-defense by member states. When applied for self-help purposes, Cs-d demands that the aim of self defense to be clearly stated and hastened so that it leaves no space for moment of deliberation. Therefore, based on this definition which has widely been accepted by different scholars, it can be deduced that, the concept of self-defense encompasses some ideas of immediacy, but which requires a state to take some time and strategize on the appropriate measures to adopt in defending a states under attack.

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6ICJ. (1984). *Judgement of 26 November 1984. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*. Available online at; <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/70/judgments>  
Accessed on 26/5/2021

7Ibid. UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art 51.



Globally, collective-self-defense has been practiced by sovereign states since the emergence of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. Before the outbreak of the World War I, a collective self-defense alliance was reached between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy (Triple Alliance) and another entente of France, Russia and Great Britain. These alliance systems provided collective self-defense mechanisms which were anticipatory in nature.<sup>8</sup> Collective self-defense was also admitted during the *Caroline case* between the U.S and Britain in 1842 following an incident which had taken place in 1837. The classical examples of anticipatory collective self-defense can be referred to triple alliance and the Entente of France, Great Britain and Russia. Specifically, in 1878, Britain allied with Turkey with a purpose of concluding Russian territorial expansionist agenda, where they promised to defend Turkey by supporting her with arms in case of any attack. Additionally, in 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary concluded a collective defense alliance aimed at curtailing Russia's ambitions in the region. Since then, sovereign states have established collective self-defense systems which slightly differ from collective security arrangements.

According to Gallis, "a collective security organization settles disputes among its members, while, a collective defense organization assists a member state under attack by an outside country".<sup>9</sup> One way of exercising collective self-defense is through a military alliance established to that purpose. The most significant collective self-defense international organization today is NATO. NATO is a collective defense organization comprising of thirty European and North American countries, which mandates member states to contemplate supporting an ally under attack. Article V of the NATO which establishes the NATO stipulates in part, that; "an armed

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<sup>8</sup>Walker, G.K. (2008). Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era. What the treaties have said. International Law Studies. *Cornell International Law Journal*, 31(2), 1-57

<sup>9</sup>Gallis, P.E. (1997). *CRS Report for Congress. NATO: Article V and Collective Defense*. Washington D.C: Library of the Congress

attack against one or more (allies) shall be considered an attack against them all”.<sup>10</sup> In full, Article V states that; “*the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area*”. The foundation of NATO collective self-defense organization emanates from emergence of nuclear weapons by U.S.S.R and the threats they posed to the US.<sup>11</sup>

Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty, in 1950 the Arab league signed a joint defense treaty under whose Article 2 provides that; “*contracting States agree that an armed aggression, directed against any one or more of them or against their forces, shall be considered as directed against all .... [T]hey agree, in virtue of the right of legitimate self-defense, both individual and collective, to assist at once the State or States so attacked and to adopt immediately, both individually and collectively, all ... measures and means at their disposal, including ... employment of armed force, to repulse the aggression and restore peace and security*”.<sup>12</sup> The joint defense and economic cooperation treaty binds the contracting states of the Arab league to assist any states that is under an armed attack despite the circumstances.

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<sup>10</sup>Article V, North Atlantic Treaty

<sup>11</sup>Karasov, S. (2018). *Collective Self-defense in the NATO framework against cybercrime attacks and Modern International Law*. Vilnius, Lithuania: Mykolas Romeris University

<sup>12</sup> Article 2. Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty.

In Africa, collective self-defense has been practiced under the auspices of the continental body- the AU as stipulated under “the constitutive Act of the AU and the AU AUPSA”.<sup>13</sup> Various sovereign states in Africa have pursued collective self-defense strategies premised on individual or collective self-defense principles. For instance, Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia is justified under right to exercise legitimate self defense which is provided under Article 51 of the UN Charter.<sup>14</sup> Ethiopia justified armed attack to her security to be emanating from Islamists operating in Somalia particularly, the Al shabaab terrorist group which has declared a jihad-holy war against Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Prime Minister told Ethiopian Parliament that “the Islamists in Somalia (Al shabaab) have presented a “clear and present danger” against the country’s peace and security”. The Ethiopian Parliament passed a resolution which justifies their military intervention in Somalia under four factors which include; “First, the presence of Eritrean troops in Somalia with the sole purpose of destabilizing the peace and stability of the Ethiopian State, second, the repeated declaration by UIC of a holy war called *jihad*-against Ethiopia and the flow of arms and financial support to the group from several Middle Eastern countries, third, the operation of armed Ethiopian opposition groups from within the areas under the control of the UIC with the view to overthrowing the legally constituted government of Ethiopia; and lastly, the presence of foreign militant fighters alongside the UIC which constituted a situation of "clear and present danger" against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Ethiopian State”.<sup>15</sup>

Additionally, since 2007, the AMISOM has been engaged with collective self-defense operations in Somalia as part the continental efforts to stabilize and bring security to the war-torn country in

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13Fafare, O.A. (2020). *The African Union’s Collective Security Mechanism and the Challenge of Armed Non-State Actor*. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal-South Africa

14Allo, A.K. (2010). Ethiopia's Armed Intervention in Somalia: The Legality of Self-Defense in Response to the Threat of Terrorism. *Journal of International Law & Policy*,39(1),23-59

15 Ibid, p. 157

the HoA. The AMISOM military intervention in Somalia follows the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” that includes a provision which dictates states to request for authorization before they can use force from regional groups for purpose of collective self-defense. The AMISOM brigade in Somalia constitutes of troops from neighboring countries, Uganda being the first country to send 1,650 troops in 2007, followed by contributions from “Burundi (5,432), Djibouti (1,000), Kenya (3,664), Sierra Leone (850) and Ethiopia (4,395)” making military personnel of more than 20,000 soldiers operating in Somalia. The AMISOM military intervention is also directed towards complimenting the Somali National Army to effect territorial integrity and stability of the HoA region and the countries thereof.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Whereas, collective self-defense was framed with the assumption of a state actor as the aggressor in an armed attack, several non-state actors have emerged to challenge both sovereignty and territorial integrity of states which were not captured in the international law under “the Article 51 of the UN Charter”. The customary international law of collective self-defense referred to state aggressors and was not categorical on non-state actors who posed threats to state actors. In this regard, this research examines the applicability of self-defense doctrine against a non-state actor, referring to the case of AMISOM and Islamists groups operating in Somalia. According to the *Caroline case* between the U.S and Britain, the necessity that demands self defense dictates that, it should be clearly stated and hastened so that it leaves no space for moment of deliberation.<sup>16</sup> However, “what is instant and overwhelming depends on a number of factual circumstances ruling and there is no empirical formula that helps make an objective determination of what fits into this parameter”. Illegal activities such as terrorism which are

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<sup>16</sup>Hyde, C. (1954). *International Law and the Use of Force: Cases and Materials*. Michigan: Michigan Law Review

sometimes fashioned as holy war (Jihad), pose a great threat to the states which dictates the states to equip themselves with the most sophisticated and advanced military technology in responding to these terror attacks and they should not be held to the same standard of necessity as a rug-tug militia or a rebel group operating in the juggle and practicing guerilla war tactics. In this study, the researcher is interested in establishing what encompasses an imminent threat of an armed attack to the Horn of African countries and how the AMISOM fits under the Article 51 of the UN Charter on collective self-defense.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

This study will seek to answer the following research questions;

- i. What is the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region?
- ii. What is the impact of collective self defence by AMISOM in Somalia to regional peace and stability among the Horn of African countries?
- iii. Which challenges confront the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the Horn of Africa region?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

This study is guided the following specific research Objectives;

#### **1.4.1 Specific Objectives**

- i. To determine the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region.
- ii. To analyze the strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the Horn of Africa region

- iii. To establish the challenges confronting the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the Horn of Africa region.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

This study makes a literature review drawn from previous studies done on the subject of collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack. The literature is drawn from UN Charter and related documents thereof including; treaties, published research studies, research journals, academic thesis, online sites, Policy pronouncements, newspapers and institutional reports. Literature review enables the researcher to establish knowledge gaps which need further probing and examination.

## **1.6 Theoretical literature Review**

To help examine the key debates by different scholars in the area of AMISOM intervention in Somalia, the study has considered the theoretical literature review. The theories reviewed are realism and intergovernmentalism theories. These theories are applicable to the AMISOM case in Somalia.

### **1.6.1 Realism**

Realism places emphasis on state-based analytical approach to International Relations making it particularly vital in explaining state behavior. Realists view the world from the lenses of perpetual conflict, anarchy, power, state survival and national interests in analyzing the actions of states in the international system. For realists, power is the ultimate tool used by states to attain their interests and by exercising their power in pursuit of their interest is what ultimately leads to conflict among states. From a Realist perspective, foreign intervention stems from an innate desire by states to acquire, conquer and exploit territories of other states in order to

maximize on strategic gains and fulfill their interests. Therefore, territorial issues such as natural resources and geostrategic significance can be a direct incentive for intervention.<sup>17</sup>

Variants of realism such as neorealism also offer an explanation of foreign intervention. Waltz<sup>18</sup> states that defensive realism encourages states to maintain staunch security policies which are far less likely to act as a catalyst for conflict, as opposed to offensive realism which explains that states should strive to maximize their power through hegemonic tendencies thereby directly confronting threats to a state's security.<sup>19</sup> Following this realist thought therefore thus it can be said that Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia was designed to confront the threat that posed an imminent danger to the existence of the state hence the act of intervention was justified. Given that state interests are paramount in realism, any action taken by states to deal with the threats of national interests are justified among realists. Therefore, when the ICU posed a threat to Ethiopia's political, security and economic interests in the region and later on Al-Shabaab posed similar economic and security threats to Kenya, then it can be argued that state interests played a crucial role in understanding the causes of AMISOM intervention in Somalia.

### **1.6.2 Intergovernmentalism theory**

Intergovernmentalism was developed in 1960 by Stanley Hoffmann. He argued that, states in the anarchic international system co-operate in order to pursue varying interests. According to Hoffman, the transnational logic of integration has not replaced national interest and this related intergovernmentalism to realist theory which emphasized the primacy of states in international

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<sup>17</sup>Antunes, S., & Camisão, I.(2018). *Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory*. Portugal: University of Évora

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Ibid

relations.<sup>20</sup> This theory is a decision making method that allows states to interact and cooperate in the international system while maintaining their sovereignty. States do not share power with other actors; they cooperate and engage on basis of consensus especially in decision making.<sup>21</sup>

In a CSS the national government of the member states is the main actor as it holds all the power to delegate the actors in that level. In this regard, different countries in the HoA realized the threat (national and human security) posed by the terror groups especially the Al-Shabaab based in Somalia through their incessant attacks on their soils, and decided to cooperate by sending their troops to Somalia to support its government in the fight against terrorism through a collective security system known as AMISOM.

### **1.7 The nexus between collective security intervention and the increased attacks**

Globally, collective self-defense has been pursued as an address to an armed attack both as a deterrence factor as well as a strategy for global peace. In the international system, survival is the ultimate objective of any nation-state and states should be concerned of the changing nature of this threats so that they can influence power as developed countries tend to pursue more military power in addressing such threats. According to Nasrullah and Sajid military mightly enables powerful states to use their power especially their military power to influence others to achieve their interests.<sup>22</sup> Collective self-defense is evident in the case of U.S invasion of Iraq when Iraq invaded Kuwait during the gulf war. The United States and allies invaded Iraq to stop the atrocities that were being committed on Kuwait for reason justified as self-defense of an ally for regional peace and global stability. The U.S and other states indicate that they shall use force as

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20Hoffmann, S. (2003). *Obstinate or Obsolete? the Face of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

21Lucy, H. (2015). *Theories of EU integration*. London: Institute for the Study of Civil Society

22Nasrullah, M., & Sajid, A. (2019). *Use of Force in Self-Defence for Global Peace: A conceptual Framework*. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies



stipulated under the UN Charter Article 51. These states were invoking the customary law provided by the UN Charter seeking to liberate Kuwait and stop the Iraq forces and the conquest expedition it had tried since 1977. Halberstam writes that: “the right to self-defense includes not only a right to eject the aggressor but a right to take such further measures as are necessary to disable the aggressor from future aggression”.<sup>23</sup>

In Africa collective self-defense has been employed by Ethiopia as a countermeasure to the armed attacks presented by the Islamic courts in Somalia and the Jihadist organizations operating in Somalia. Ethiopia claimed that their intervention to Somalia was legitimate as provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter.<sup>24</sup> IL provides the requirements for validation of collective self-defense, for instance, “the *Nicaragua case* ruled that there should be a declaration by the victim state "which must form and declare the view that it has been so attacked, followed by a subsequent request by that "victim of an armed attack" to another State for help”. Collective self-defense features prominently in the APSA. The concept of CS-D was invoked by the ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis in August 1990. Additionally, both the SADC and ECOWAS conducted various armed attacks in the Great Lakes region. The AU has made a concerted effort towards collective defense strategies in the continent as evidenced by the deployment of military forces in various countries. Countries in the African continent have continued to cooperate and collaborate together with an aim of improving their security and intelligence capacities and fighting threats such as terrorism, trafficking among others in the region. The AU under Article 13 of the AU Protocol provides for the formation of ASF which among other objectives is concerned with the military intervention in countries for purposes of “preventative deployment, peace operations and

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23 Halberstam, M.(1996). *The right to self-defense once the Security Council takes Action*. Michigan: Michigan Journal of International law

24 Ibid

interventions, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict disarmament and demobilization, as well as support in natural disasters”.<sup>25</sup> The deployment of AMISOM forces to Somalia was based on the principle of maintaining regional peace and stability in the HoA region. The AMISOM military intervention was aimed at facilitating the TFG to offer central authority in Somalia after several decades of absence of a central government. According to Ahmed, instability in Somalia was posing a serious security threat to the neighboring countries thereby justification for the deployment of external forces sanctioned both by the UN and the AU.

### **1.8 The impact of Collective self-defense on Regional Security**

Collective Self-Defense has produced different implications to various states and regions where it has been practiced. Collective self-defense entails pre-emptive use of force against emerging forces authorized under existing legal framework. Collective self-defense in a pre-emptive military intervention has been practiced by Israel against her traditional enemies, particularly Palestine and her allies. The implication of such collective self-defense strategies have escalated the conflict and regionalized the threat of armed attack in the entire Middle East region attracting the several other state actors in the conflict, particularly Iran, Jordan and Egypt. Collective self-defense occasioned the six-day war between “the Israel and Arab states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan”. According to Makovsky, the consequences of the 1967 war waged by Israel included the altering of the map of Middle East and the ensuing high octane geo-politics which have lasted to-date.<sup>26</sup> The Six-day war termed by Israel as a self-defense pre-emptive armed attack destroyed the

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25African Union. (2004). *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)*. Second Extraordinary Session, Sirte, Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 28 February.

26Makovsky, D. (2004). *Consequences of the 1967 War*. Washington Institute for near East policy. Available online at; <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/consequences-1967-war> Accessed on 27/5/2021

Egyptian Air force and aroused Arab nationalism in the region, particularly Palestinian nationalism which led to the formation of the PLO and a military wing-Hamas.

The US invoked Article 51 of the UN charter to justify the September, 11, 2001 (9/11) on WTC and Pentagon as threat to individual or collective right to collective self-defense under an armed attack. Consequently, “the state initiated military actions pursued by the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001. The military operation against the al Qaeda organization in Afghanistan could be justified under the customary international law premised on the doctrine of *Jus Ad Bellum*”.<sup>27</sup> The Killing of Osama bin Laden by the Obama administration in 2011 marked the most noticeable achievement of the U.S military intervention in Afghanistan for self-defense, however the question of the elimination of an armed attack remains, with the threat of a terrorist attack remaining severe.<sup>28</sup>

Foreign military intervention encompasses sending of national armed forces into another sovereign state with a purpose of controlling the political space, economic issues among other issues of that country.<sup>29</sup> This type of intervention means that, the foreign country influences the most important elements of that country. According to these two international relations scholars; a foreign military interventions, with over 1000 intervening troops, does not have much impact or influence on physical quality of life in developing democracies, their economy or political space.<sup>30</sup> Further, Kisangani and Pickering assert that; some of the aggressive interventions can

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27Takahashi, Y.A. (2002). *Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum*. Canterbury : University of Kent

28Global Terrorism Database/START. (2017). *Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US)*. Maryland: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

29 Pickering, J., & Kisangani, E.F. (2006). *Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention*. Kansas: The University of Utah/Kansas University

30 Ibid

assist in democratizing some targets as well as promote economic growth and development in the target country.<sup>31</sup>

Collective self-defense armed interventions in Africa have been characterized by distinguishable typologies of peacekeeping which entail; peace enforcement operations which mandated the use of force, both by the UN and the AU . The UN UNAMSIL and UN UNOSOM II constitutes cases of reference of such collective self-defense interventions in the African continent. The UN ONUMOZ has been stabilizing mission which is currently confronted by jihadist attacks emanating from the Al shabaab operating in the region. These collective self-defense interventions in Africa coincide with the nomenclature widely used for non-UN operations similar to those conducted by the NATO.<sup>32</sup> Whereas, there has been other collective self-defense operations in African Countries such, as those in; Namibia, Rwanda, D.R.C and in South Sudan, this research focuses on the AMISOM to learn the concept of security and regional stability. It is to be acknowledged that AMISOM was preceded by another CS-D operation led by the US commonly identified by the “Blackhawk down” disaster in 1993.

The AMISOM collective self-defense military intervention in Somalia is founded on the customary international law of self-defense which is regarded as a fundamental right of both the individual and of the state. The IL acknowledges the right of a state to apply force in case of self-defense as prescribed by the doctrine of *jus cogens* (a tenet of natural law) described as the right to resist attack.<sup>33</sup> Pursuant to a decision by the Peace and the SC of the AU on 19<sup>th</sup> January

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31 Ibid

32 Findley, T. (2002). *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Oxford University: SIPRI.

33 Halberstam, M. (1996). The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes On. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 17(2), 72-229

2007, authorization was granted for the deployment of the AMISOM for a considerable period of six months with a purpose of safeguarding peace, security and stability in Somalia.<sup>34</sup>

The PSC of the AU authorized the deployment of AMISOM during its 69<sup>th</sup> meeting, with the mission element consisting of 9 infantry battalions of both the military, police and civilian components drawn from AU's member states.<sup>35</sup> Among the countries which have contributed troops to AMISOM include; "Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Italy, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe".<sup>36</sup> AMISOM constitutes Africa's led collective self-defense military intervention sanctioned by the UNSC to use armed force in a foreign state for the purposes of regional security and stability.

The implication of the deployment of the AMISOM in Somalia can be examined from various realms, however the security realm constitutes the centerpiece of this research. The deployment of 1040 police personnel in Somalia to assist the Somalia National Police Force marked the strategic precision within which security paradigm of the Somali state was changing. The decisive capture of strategic towns of "Sabiid Anole, Bariire, El Saliin and Awdheegle" which acted as transit towns for the transportation of weapons by Al Shabaab terrorists into Mogadishu from the Lower Shebelle region. The AMISOM magazine announces for the presence of forward operating bases led by Somalia security forces, which is a show of readiness to take over from the AMISOM mission.<sup>37</sup> As a result of AMISOM deployment in Somalia, the country was able to hold the first democratic elections to elect the members of the federal parliament and the

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34 A.U. (2007). *Status of Mission Agreement Between the Transitional Government of Somalia and the African Union on AMISOM*. Addis Ababa: A.U Secretariat

35 Ibid

36 AMISOM. (2019). *The Revival-AMISOM Magazine*. Available online at; <https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Amisom-Magazine-Issue-29.pdf> Accessed on 27/5/2021

37 Ibid

President in 2020.<sup>38</sup> AMISOM was part of the established Electoral Security Taskforce that also included the Somalia Police Force, Somali National Army and federal Member State security agencies. The holding of Elections in Somalia marked a historical turning point of the country which had seen anarchy and lawlessness for over three decades. AMISOM created an environment of security in which the country could conduct an Election.

### **1.9 The challenges confronting regional collective self defense**

Collective self-defense operations world-over have confronted various challenges proportional or un-proportional to threat they seek to resist. For instance, NATO as a collective security organization has been confronted by various challenges which hamper its operations. The partner states consent on utilizing force to combat threats from enemies posed on their territory. The “Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty” is too narrow and does not specify the duration which member states should continue applying force to combat threats which does not necessarily confront them directly but impact on their human and national security or other interests.<sup>39</sup> However, when there is no proper justification for self defense NATO partner states may differ to respond as well.<sup>40</sup>

Radicalization rooted in religious fundamentalism constitutes the major challenge which threatens the effectiveness of AMISOM. Forceful recruitment and deployment of children as combatants by armed groups in Somalia presents a fundamental challenge to collective self-defense in Somalia. The Al Shabaab terrorist group abducts and recruits children as combatants. The recruitment of children to act as soldiers in battle grounds complicates and challenges the SOPs.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Ivo, H. (1999). *NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

The unconventional nature of armed attacks perpetrated by the Jihadist terrorist operating in Somalia has regionalized the threat of terror attacks, thereby putting in the question of the efficacy of AMISOM in the country and the effects on security of even the neighboring countries. The terror groups have continued to launch terror attacks in the HoA with recent one being launched in Nairobi Kenya at Dusit D2 Hotel on January 15<sup>th</sup> 2019 where dozens of lives were lost and other injured.<sup>41</sup> The Al shabaab claimed responsibility and the attack provided three fundamental strands of analysis for the Jihadist group; “first, its Somalia origin; second, its ideological affiliation to the Al Qaeda and third, its increasing foreign fighters composition of trained and experienced radicalized youthful Muslims from East African Countries, particularly, Kenya Coast”. In April 2015, the Al shabaab also launched another attacked where 148 students belonging to the Garissa University Colleges in northeastern Kenya lost their lives. The Killing of the group’s leader Godane by the AMISOM forces led the terror group to invoke tactics similar to those of Boko Haram terror group in Nigeria which targets schools and students. The unconventional nature of jihadist terrorists presents an asymmetrical engagement with the AMISOM forces.

The regionalization of threat of terror which are presented by the by Al shabaab jihadist in East and the HoA region is critical largely due to the political nature and geographical position of Somalia, the HoA military capacity regions and the capacity of these terror networks. The terror networks which include (Al shabaab jihadism and Al Qaeda) continue to expand globally thereby posing a significant threat to peace and security of majority of countries. Regionalization of jihadist terrorism in the HoA challenges the efforts of AMISOM to stabilize the region.

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41Bryden M., &Bahra, P. (2019). East Africa’s Terrorist Triple Helix: The Dusit Hotel Attack and the Historical Evolution of the Jihadi Threat. *Combating terrorism*, 12 (6)

### **1.10 Literature Review Gaps**

The literature review has established a number of gaps not adequately analyzed or presented. The deployment of AMISOM to stabilize Somalia and the Horn of Africa region was to last for six months following the agreement reached between the TFG of Somalia and the African Union PSC, however, the timeframe was extended but there has been no clearly spelt out timeframe for the exit strategy for the AMISOM mission. There is limited literature concerning the illegal business and the atrocities committed by the mission forces in Somalia which have recently captured international news bulletin. The media reports which implicated the AMISOM forces in the illegal multi-billion charcoal business have not been verified and this presents a literature gap and the consequence to the stabilization and security of the region. The available literature is also mute on the readiness of the SSF to assume responsibilities once AMISOM mission mandate comes to an end. Whereas the AMISOM mission entailed building the national capacity of institutions and strengthening others, the readiness of these institutions to carry out their mandate upon the exit of the mission is yet to be ascertained by the available academic discourse.

### **1.11 Theoretical Framework**

This study will be based on collective security theory which was developed by Claude Jr in 1971. There lacks a concrete definition of the concept collective security as it is associated with different ideas and assumptions which give it diverging meanings. Collective security theory deals with issues of how to cause peace in the anarchic international system.<sup>42</sup> A collective security system is necessary for achievement of a peaceful and stable world order because the military power occupies a central part in the international politics. Therefore, it's important to manage the military power through a collective security system such as the AMISOM in Somalia

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<sup>42</sup>Martin,L. (1992). Institution and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict. *International Security*, 14 (4), 174-175



who are fighting the Alshabab and other terror groups, who continue to launch terror attacks on different countries in the Horn of Africa, threatening human and national security as well as causing massive destruction, loss of lives and injuries.<sup>43</sup>

All units in a collective security system must meet the following criteria's which include; "they must have the capacity to counter attacks from the aggressor, safeguard the same conception i.e security and must be willing to sub-ordinate their conflicting political interests to the common good defined in terms of the collective defense of all member states".<sup>44</sup>Kupchan et al defines collective security as, "an agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression".<sup>45</sup> This definition contains three ideas which include; "the purpose or end of stopping "aggression", the reliance on legal norms to determine both the meaning of that term and the appropriate response and the rejection of self-help in favour of collective action".<sup>46</sup> In this regard, different countries in the horn of Africa agreed to sent their troops to Somalia through (AMISOM) and abide by the rules and norms to counter the attacks from the terror groups.

### **1.12 Research Hypotheses**

**H1:** There is some nexus between AMISOM intervention and the increased level of Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region.

**HO:** The operations of AMISOM in the Horn of Africa have had no security impact in the region.

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43Danchin, G. (2009). *Things Fall Apart: The Concept of Collective Security in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 40

44 Claude, Jr,L. (1992). *An Autopsy of Collective Security*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, p. 716

45Kupchan, C, et.al. (1995). "The Promise of Collective Security. *International Security*, 20(1),52-53

46Ibid

### **1.13 Justification of the Study**

This study offers academic, policy and general justification. The justification stems from the realization that; from knowledge point of reference, armed attacks in the HoA can be responded to effectively.

#### **1.13.1 Academic Justification**

Scholars have previously focused on the subject of collective self-defense emphasizing mostly on the European, North American and Middle East countries. These are the regions which traditionally have attracted large-scale armed confrontations resulting to enormous fatalities and great destruction, hence, necessitating adoption of CS-D strategies. While majority of the available research focuses on other regions of the world, limited research is available explaining the feasibility and the implication of collective self-defense in the Horn of Africa region. Consequently, this research offers an insightful academic assessment which comprehensively probes the available information relating to collective self-defense in regards to the HoA region by adopting a case of AMISOM in Somalia. International Relations scholars and security analysts can refer to this research in furtherance of their studies.

#### **1.13.2 Policy Justification**

Collective self-defense constitutes a fundamental right of individual or collective countries in case of armed attack guaranteed by the UN in its Charter under Article 51. Whereas, the states are entitled to the right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack, there exists a raging debate on the right of self-defense in regards to non-state actors which pose a security threat to state actors and the IL is silent on. This research offers a policy recommendation which could be incorporated in the holistic self-defense strategies employed in the Horn of Africa region. The research emanating from this study shall inform the future policy direction, realizing the current

shift in the security paradigm, where terrorism and jihadist characterizes the emerging security threat in the Horn of Africa region.

### **1.13.3 To the General Public**

The frequent security threats originating from the non-state actors in the HoA region presents both regional and state insecurity and instability which need evidence-based research to tackle. This research presents to the general public needful information which compliments governments efforts directed towards preserving peace and stability in the HoA. The general public stands to benefit from the knowledge obtained from this study which shall inform public perception towards the collective self-defense systems and therefore facilitate public confidence in their respective countries contributing troops to such security assignments.

## **1.14 Research Methodology**

This section provides the “research design, study area and target population, sample size determination, data collection methods, sampling procedures, data analysis and ethical considerations”.

### **1.14.1 Research Design**

Research design is “a blue print or a detailed plan of how a research is to be completed”. It encompasses developing research questions, choosing elements of analysis, evaluating the study variables and generating data from the samples of interest.<sup>47</sup> The study adopted a pragmatic design that combines a descriptive research design and a case study to analyze collective self-defense and stability in the HoA utilizing a case study of AMISOM.

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<sup>47</sup>Kothari, C. (2003). *Research Methodologies*, 3rd Edition. New Delhi: WishwaPrakashan

These designs describes and interprets the existing phenomena and later provides information with an aim of assessing the environment of the underlying circumstances, establishing the norms against which underlying circumstances can be compared in the population in terms of attitudes, opinions, values, needs and traits. Primary data was gathered through interviews, questionnaire administration (Personal and Online). According to Kothari<sup>48</sup> case method is known for its depth rather than breadth.

### **1.14.2 Study Area**

The study was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia where AMISOM is based as well as in Nairobi, Kenya where regional foreign diplomats can offer credible insights. Questionnaires were distributed to the targeted respondents in Somalia. However, due to Covid 19 pandemic, the researcher conducted interviews with some of the respondents using Google zoom, WhatsApp Video and through telephone calls.

### **1.14.3 Target Population**

Target population is “the group of individuals or participants with specific attributes of interest and relevance, the researcher wishes to draw the sample from”.<sup>49</sup>The target population in this study was officials from AMISOM, Diplomats from Horn of Africa, Academics, Refugees from Horn of Africa, officials from National Counter Terrorism Center and Security experts who are considered to have knowledge on the subject area. The researcher therefore, targeted a population of 104 respondents.

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48Kothari, R. (2004). *Research Methodology-Methods and Techniques 3rd Ed.* India: New Age International Publishers, pp. 113 - 115

49 Lavrakas, P. (2008).*The target population.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications

#### 1.14.4 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Sample size refers “to the number of individuals to be selected from the target population”. In this study the sample size of 60 respondents was calculated using Yamane’s formula which uses “95% confidence level and 10% level of precision” to avoid biasness.<sup>50</sup> The sample size should be average in order to attain all the characteristics required in a research.<sup>51</sup>The process of choosing sample size also encompasses consideration of the desired precision and confidence level for estimate. The sample size of this study (n=60) entails; officials from AMISOM, Diplomats from Horn of Africa, Academics, Refugees from Horn of Africa, officials from National Counter Terrorism Center and Security experts.

This study employed a formulae by Yamane (1967), which gives the desired sample from the under listed formulae.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$$

Where,

n= the sample size

N = the size of population

e= the error of 5 percentage points

n= 171

N=270

$1+270(0.05)^2$

$1+270(0.0025)$

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup>Kothari, R C, (2003). *Research Methodologies*, 3rd Edition. New Delhi: WishwaPrakashan

n=270/1.675

n=161 Respondents

**Table 1:1 Target Population and the Sampling Size**

<b>Target Group</b>	<b>Target Population (N)</b>	<b>Sample size (n)</b>	<b>Sampling procedure</b>
1. Diplomats from Horn of Africa	30	26	Purposive
2. Officials from National Counter Terrorism Center	40	26	Purposive
3. Refugees from Horn of Africa	50	30	Purposive
4. Officials from AMISOM	50	26	Purposive
5. Academicians/Scholars	50	27	Simple
6. Security experts	50	26	Random Sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>161</b>	

**Source; Researcher, 2021**

The study used purposive and simple random sampling approach to determine the required respondents who were knowledgeable on issues concerning the nexus between AMISOM intervention and the increased level of Al-Shabaab attacks in the HoA region. Purposive sampling “also known as judgment, selective or subjective sampling is a sampling technique in which researcher relies on his or her own judgment for choosing members of the population, who

are rich in the required information to participate in the study”. On the other hand, simple random is used in a larger population, where everyone is likely to be chosen or represent the entire population thereby averting biasness. These sampling techniques are best suited for studies where the objective is to identify information-rich cases.

#### **1.14.5 Data Collection methods**

Primary and secondary data was gathered and used in this study. Questionnaires were administered to the respondents and others through Online due to direct contact limitations occasioned by the prevalence of Covid-19 pandemic during the study period. Care was taken in choosing data collection method to ensure medical safety, cost-effectiveness and time-saving, while not compromising on its ability to capture all aspects of information sought.<sup>52</sup>

The interview schedule consists of open and closed-ended questions. Mobile phone recorder was used to record and review the interviews at a later time. The interview schedule was pretested using a smaller sample of respondents that have similar characteristics to the study subjects. The information from the pretest was used to make corrections on the interview schedule in areas such as wording, lack of clarity of instructions among other errors. Secondary data such as published work was used in discussing the results emanating from this study.

#### **1.14.6 Data Analysis and presentation**

Both quantitative and qualitative data analytical methods utilized in this study employed computer analysis program. Before data analysis, the data collected from interviews was consolidated. Content, regression analysis and SPSS was utilized to analyzed primary data.

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<sup>52</sup>Kombo, DK, & Tromp A. (2009).*Proposal and Thesis Writing: An Introduction*. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, Don Bosco Printing Press, p. 34.

Descriptive statistics was applied and results presented in form of frequency tables, cross-tabulations and graphs.

#### **1.14.7 Ethical Considerations**

This study was subject to certain ethical considerations. This study ensured that the participants are not coerced to engage in the research. The researcher also ensured that she sought the required or necessary documentations to allow her conduct her research. Participants were not coerced to engage in the research and therefore the researcher ensured that she sought their consent first. They were also assured that the information they provided will be used for academic purpose only.

#### **1.15 Chapter Outline**

This research comprises of five chapters.

**Chapter one** introduces and gives “the background of the study, states the problem of the study, provides the research objectives and questions, give the justification of the study, provide theoretical framework, literature review as well as the methodology”.

**Chapter two** to determine the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region

**Chapter three** to analyze the strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the Horn of Africa region

**Chapter four** to assess the challenges facing African Union Mission in Somalia

**Chapter five** provides the summary, conclusion and recommendations



## CHAPTER TWO

### THE NEXUS BETWEEN AMISOM INTERVENTION IN SOMALI AND THE INCREASED AL-SHABAAB ATTACKS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA REGION

#### 2.0 Introduction


This chapter discusses the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somalia and the increased Al shabaab attacks in the HoA. First, the chapter presents the demographic characteristics of the participants. Secondly, the chapter examines the guiding principles justifying the AMISOM intervention into Somalia by examining the stabilization objective pursued by the continental mission and the facilitation offered towards the establishment and strengthening of the TFG, while concurrently analyzing the nature of resultant *Al shabaab* attacks. Thirdly, the chapter makes a summary of the main findings established by the Chapter. To achieve that this chapter utilizes both primary and secondary data to explain the nexus between the AMISOM intervention and increased terrorist attacks in the HoA region.

#### 2.1 The Study Demographic Characteristics

The following demographic information applies to the respondents who participated in this research and offered their consent to avail relevant information related to this study. Such demographic information focuses on the gender composition, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent including the period the respondent has worked for their respective organization.

### 2.1.1 Gender

The proportion of male persons who participated in this research accounted for 64.8 per cent of the total sample size while the proportion of female accounted for 35.13 per cent as shown in the figure 2.1 below.




**Figure 2.1; Gender of the Respondents**

**Source; Field Data, 2021**

The number of males exceeded that of females due to the increased involvement of men into security related ventures and their detailed and analytical perception towards the Horn of Africa geopolitics. While there was no bias in the administration of the questionnaire, the number of females who participated was lower than that of men. Further, the researcher probed the age distribution of the respondents and the findings are as shown in the figure below

### 2.1.2 Age of the respondents



**Figure 2.2; Age of the Respondents**

**Source; Field Data, 2021**

According to the figure 2.2 which presents the age distribution of the participants, most of the respondents aged between 36-50 years of age. This can partly be explained by the high presence of such demographic category in government institutions working as civil servants, security experts and in Diplomats’ corps. The age distribution indicates a suitable category of population which is well informed about the military intervention in Somalia by the regional military alliance hatted under the AMISOM.

**2.1.3 Response rate**

**Table 2.1 Response Rate**

Questionnaires Issued	Questionnaires returned	Response Rate
161	155	96.27%

**Source; Field Data, 2021**

The response rate was 96.27 per cent of the total questionnaires issued. This demonstrates that majority of the respondents were knowledgeable about the AMISOM intervention in Somalia and had first-hand information on the socio-security and economic implications of Al shabaab attacks in the HoA. The table below shoes the occupation of the Respondents.


**Table 2.2 Response Rate**

<b>Target Group</b>	<b>No. of Respondents (N)</b>
7. Diplomats from Horn of Africa	8
8. Officials from National Counter Terrorism Center	22
9. Refugees from Horn of Africa	30
10. Officials from AMISOM	10
11. Academicians/Scholars	73
12. Security experts	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>155</b>

**Source; Researcher, 2021**

### 2.1.4 Level of education of the respondents

The researcher sought to confirm participant's level of education so as to examine the level of understanding of the subject under study. Based on the figure below most of the participants had achieved secondary education accounting for 79.2 per cent of the total respondents. Those who had primary education accounted for 1.8 per cent while those with college/vocational institute's education comprised of 9.0 per cent of all the respondents and lastly 9.9 per cent had university education. The figure below shows the distribution of the results.



**Figure 2.3; Education level of the Respondents**

**Source; Field Data, 2021**

## **2.2 AMISON Intervention in Somalia as guided by the Principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RP2)**

The Canadian government presented the principle of the R2P in the report of the ICISS December 2001.<sup>53</sup> Kofi Annan's queries on justifications of international community in intervening for humanitarian purposes led to formation of the Commission. In the report, “*the Responsibility to Protect*” found that sovereignty not only gave a State the right to control its affairs, it also conferred on the State primary “*responsibility*” for protecting the people within its borders”. It is presumed that, when a country fails to safeguard its populations from the enemies maybe due to lack or inadequate military capacity or resources the sole responsibility changes to the international community.<sup>54</sup> In 2004, a high level panel led by Kofi Annan adopted the norm of R2P affirming that, through a collective international exercise the SC has the power to militarily intercede but as a last resort especially in the event of massive killings such as genocide, terrorism among other crimes.<sup>55</sup>

According to the ICISS report, R2P is guided by three key principles which include; “international responsibility to prevent, to react, and finally to rebuild”. The first principle of preventing is the most crucial tenets of the R2P.<sup>56</sup> Prevention encompasses responding to the root drivers of the conflicts which threaten the lives of the populations. One of the first prominent examples of international intervention fashioned as responsibility to protect was the Gulf War. For instance the, UN accredited a force to intercede in the war and expel Iraq through the provisions provided under the UN Charter that averts crimes of aggression and pose threats to

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<sup>53</sup> UN-Department of Public Information. (2014).*The responsibility to protect*. New York: Published by the Department of Public Information,

<sup>54</sup>Kathryn L. N. (2010). *Responsibility to Protect: Evolution and Viability*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University

<sup>55</sup>Gagro, S.F. (2014). The responsibility to Protect. Montreal. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, , 1(3), 61-77

<sup>56</sup>Evans, G. (2006). From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to protect. *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, 24( 3), 60-84

international peace and security. These provisions also apply to an independent state attacking another.

The UN intervention in Somalia was another attempt by the international community in developing the norm of R2P. “The UN Security Council approved resolution 733” which imposes an arms embargo on Somalia followed by another resolution 746 which established the UNOSOM mandated with monitoring the ceasefire and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Further, the UN Security Council passed resolution 794 which “authorized the use of force as stipulated under Chapter VII to restore peace and stability in Somalia”. The case of Iraq and Somalia demonstrates how the UN utilized the principle of R2P.

The AMISOM intervention in Somalia was commissioned by AUPS on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2007. According to Williams, AMISOM was given a variety of tasks including; carrying out an enforcement campaign against terror group such as Al shabaab and other non-state actors which were dogged in destroying the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).<sup>57</sup> The AMISOM was endorsed by the UN and given the mandate of protecting senior Somali TFG; supporting Somali security agencies and supporting civil-military assistance projects such as provision and delivery of water.<sup>58</sup> The AMISOM comprised of military troops from “Uganda, Djibouti, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia” while police contributing countries included; “Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia”.<sup>59</sup> They were stationed in 6 areas in South and Central Somalia.

The researcher sought to establish whether Somalia was a R2P situation and therefore asked respondents to indicate their approval or disapproval for the deployment of AMISOM troops.


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<sup>57</sup>Williams, P.D. (2013). The Africa Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges. *International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(2), 38-70

<sup>58</sup> Beadle, A.W. (2012). *Protecting civilians while fighting a War in Somalia-Drawing lessons from Afghanistan*. NUPI Policy brief No.12

<sup>59</sup> AMISOM. (2021). *AMISOM Military Component*. Available online at: <https://amisom-au.org/mission/profile/military-component/> Accessed 27/7/2021

Majority of the respondents (93.16 per cent) approved for the deployment of troops by the African Union to Somalia while 6.84 per cent of the respondents disapproved of the AMISOM deployment in Somalia. While an overwhelming majority of the respondents approved AMISOM deployment in Somalia, those who disapproved such deployment cited various negative implications which contravene stability and security of the Horn of Africa. The figure below shows the distribution of the responses as established by the researcher.



**Figure 2.4; AMISON Intervention in Somalia**

**Source: Field Data, 2021 Researcher**

The findings above corroborate Lotze and Kasumba’s study which established that; the AMISOM adopted a mission wide PoC strategy which entailed a series of offensive military operations which destabilized Al shabaab militia and broke the security stalemate created by the



group in Mogadishu and Kismayu.<sup>60</sup> These findings are also consistent with those of William's research study which found AMISOM as appropriately deployed to protect Somalia civilians and humanitarian workers from threats emanating from the Al shabaab.<sup>61</sup> Generally, the researcher found the deployment of AMISOM as guided by the international norm of R2P as legally sanctioned both by the AU and the UN. The increased retaliatory attacks in the region from the Al Shabaab militia group is attributed to perspective held by the natives which perceive the AMISOM troops as foreigners as opposed to them being insiders.

### **2.3 AMISOM intervention in Somali and the Stabilization of the federal government of Somalia**

Somalia has not had a functioning government since the collapse of President Siad Barre administration in 1991. Different actors who have emerged since then to ensure the country have a stable and functioning government have failed to effectively stabilize the country. This has seen the country sink deep into civil war which has not only produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers but also has seen the continental body; the AU sent troops under the umbrella of AMISOM to try and stabilize the country.<sup>62</sup>

After the fall of SiadBarre, a military regime controlled by clan-based leadership was established in Somalia. This military junta engaged in committing gruesome atrocities which entailed the killing of civilians, mass displacement of people and the destruction of property and land inhabited by a certain clan.The deployment of AMISOM aimed at among others stabilizing Somalia and strengthening the TFG a factor which the researcher was interested in verifying.

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<sup>60</sup>Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the protection of civilians in Somalia. *Conflict trends*. 2(1), 17-24

<sup>61</sup> Op cit.

<sup>62</sup>Kirui, P., &Mwaruvie J. (2012). The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya.Karatina. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3(8),36-80

Consequently, the researcher asked the respondents to rate the security of the Horn of Africa region after the deployment of AMISOM Troops. The findings established that majority of the respondents (93.16 per cent) opined that; deployment of AMISOM had stabilized Somalia and enabled the country to achieve security and political stability which facilitated the conduct of the first Presidential general election. Quoting one of the Security Expert respondent,

*“...the deployment of AMISOM is quite commendable and stabilizing to the Horn of Africa geopolitics. Although the countries contributing troops to AMISOM have borne the brunt of Al shabaab attacks, the situation is now conducive for political activity and for trade unlike ten years ago”.*<sup>63</sup>

Further another respondent (Diplomat) expressed confidence in the stabilization of Somalia since the establishment of TFG and the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. Quoting the response from a Diplomat representing South Sudan to Kenya;

*“.....the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo can be attributed to the deployment of AMISOM Troops which facilitated the creation of a stable socio-political environment conducive for conduct of a democratic election.”*<sup>64</sup>

Another respondent from the SRCC for Somalia is quoted

*“Soomaaliya ha noolaato, (Long live Somalia). This part of the world has known peace thanks to AMISOM. Somalia has traversed a long and sometimes very difficult road but it has been the resilience, hope and determination of its people that has kept the national spirit alive and helped*

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<sup>63</sup> Security Expert Respondent (SE08). 2021. Nairobi-Kenya

<sup>64</sup> Diplomat Respondent (D002). 2021. Nairobi-Kenya

*the African Union Mission stabilize the country and offer the TFG government the much needed capacity to forge a formidable and sovereign state”.*<sup>65</sup>

The above findings conform to the study done by Kathryn L. Nash on the responsibility to protect: Evolution and viability which affirms AMISOM’s responsibility to avert abuse of human rights and strengthen the responsibility for states and international community create security and stability.<sup>66</sup> The deployment of AMISOM has greatly reduced Al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu. Similarly, a communique of the summit of the TCCs to the AMISOM affirmed that, the troops have made quite significant progress where the attacks have reduced drastically and the country is headed on the right track to stabilization despite presence of the terror groups which continue to pose threat to the populations as well to the peace, security and stability of the neighboring countries.<sup>67</sup> The stabilization of Somalia has elicited retaliatory attacks in the Horn of Africa because the Warlords who profited from the charcoal and contraband smuggling were denied access to the port of Kismayu and revenue collection point to finance their operations.<sup>68</sup> According to IRRI, the locals and the Al-Shabaab’s use the propaganda of AMISOM mission as a “foreign invading force” and this continue to challenge their operations in the country.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> AMISOM Special Representative (SR) respondent (SR001). 2021. Quoted from the Questionnaire

<sup>66</sup> Kathryn L. N. (2010). *Responsibility to Protect: Evolution and Viability*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University

<sup>67</sup>IGAD. (2018). *Communiqué Of The Summit of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*. Munyonyo-Kampala. Djibuti: IGAD

<sup>68</sup>M’Arimi, J.M. (2020). *AMISOM’S Troops Influence on Peacekeeping Operations in Dhobley District, Central Region, Somalia*. Nairobi: Kenyatta University

<sup>69</sup>IRRI. (2017). *“They say they’re not here to protect us”; Civilian perspectives on the African Union Mission in Somalia*. IRRI Publication

## **2.4 The Impact of AMISOM deployment on Piracy and Safety of Maritime Trade along the Coastal Strip of the Horn of Africa Region**

The 1982 UNCLOS defines piracy “as any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship; or aircraft”.<sup>70</sup> The international community continues to question the increased cases of piracy along the Somalia coast line since 2006 as well as in the EA region because they have exceeded those that were being conducted in countries such as “Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines”.<sup>71</sup> According to congressional research report issued in 2019 on the piracy off the HoA, the increased pirate attacks in the HoA is directly connected to the rise of insecurity and lack of rule of law in war-torn Somalia as well as retaliation to TCCs in the region.<sup>72</sup> The researcher sought to describe the Al shabaab pirate’s attacks in the HoA region since the deployment of AMISOM troops. The respondents described a reduction in pirate’s attacks off the HoA coast upon the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia. Majority of the respondents described a declining trend in the number of attacks.

According to the Congressional report “pirates tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas, high levels of commercial activity, small national naval forces, and weak regional security cooperation mechanisms”. The criminals have utilized this opportunity to conduct other crimes such as smuggling, trafficking, and terrorism among other illegal activities.<sup>73</sup> The U.S department

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<sup>70</sup>UNCLOS. (1982). *The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)*. Montego Bay, Jamaica: UNCLOS

<sup>71</sup> UNACTAD. (2014). *Maritime Piracy. (2013). An overview of Trends, Costs and Trade Related Implications*. New York and Geneva. Studies in Transport Law and Policy – 2014 No.1

<sup>72</sup>Ploch, L., Blanchard, C.M, O’rouke, R., Mason, R.C., & King R.O. (2019). *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

of defense approved funding for the purchase of arms and ammunition to support the TFG and the AMISOM security forces in Somalia.<sup>74</sup>

The Kampala process is a regional mechanism which focuses on maritime security and has been the coordinating mechanism that links the TFG, different regional authorities in Somalia (AMISOM included) to combat piracy in the waters off the Somali coast.<sup>75</sup> The researcher asked the respondents to indicate why piracy had persisted for long time off the coast of Somalia and some of the reasons indicated for the increased piracy included; illegal fishing, dumping in Somali waters and the profitability associated with piracy.<sup>76</sup>

The following table shows the declining numbers of Al shabaab pirate's attacks since the deployment of the AMISOM troops which can be attributed to the Kampala process.

**Table 2.3; Frequency of Somali Pirates since deployment of AMISOM**

	<b>2007-2009</b>	<b>2010-2012</b>	<b>2013-2015</b>	<b>2016-2018</b>	<b>2019-Todate</b>
<b>Total Number of Attacks</b>	163	174	176	35	9
<b>Foiled Attacks</b>	114	65	28	15	6
<b>Ships Hijacked</b>	46	48	25	6	0

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Fantaye, D. (2014). *Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

<sup>76</sup> Responses from Refugees at Dadaab Refugee Camp. (2021).

**Source: IGAD (2019): Report on the Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region, March, Addis Ababa**

The recurrence of number of pirate's attacks off the coast of Somalia and the HoA region can be described as declining since the deployment of the AMISOM troops. This trend is particularly important for this research since piracy was the leading source of revenue for the Alshabaab operations. According to the above table since 2007, the number of attacks has declined from 163 to only 9 occurrences in 2019. In the same period, the number of foiled attacks has also declined from 114 cases to 6 cases. The deployment of AMISOM is also attributed with the successful elimination of hijacked ships from 46 cases in 2007 to none in 2009.<sup>77</sup> The eradication of piracy and safety of maritime trade along the coastal strip of the Horn of Africa has elicited retaliatory attacks in the region because the natives were benefiting from piracy and the mission disrupted their opportunities for revenue collection.

**2.5 AMISOM Operations in Somalia and the Counter Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa Region**

After the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia, the Al shabaab militia group and other organized violent extremists groups organized outside the Somali territory, heightened recruitment of youthful Muslims as foreign fighters popularly known as Mujahedeen. The radical recruitment to join Al shabaab followed an Islamist terrorist agenda which found fertile grounds among the al-Shabaab and the MRC which adopted a secessionist agenda with a common denominator of Muslim religious affiliation.<sup>78</sup> Muslim youths have also been radicalized into terror groups as retaliation to what they perceive as “government-imposed collective

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<sup>77</sup>IGAD. (2009). *Report on the Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region, March, Addis Ababa*. Djibouti: IGAD

<sup>78</sup> Botha, A. (2014). *Radicalization in Kenya; Recruitment to Al-shabaab and Mombasa Republican Council*. Nairobi. : Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. ISS PAPER 265


punishment” guided by perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals are potential terrorists.

The researcher sought to establish the counter radicalization measures adopted by the regional states. The IGAD was the first to launch a counterterrorism program by promoting inter-agency coordination for strengthening border control as well as for sharing information and for training.<sup>79</sup> According to Debisa, counterterrorism has been waged as response to Al shabaab threat after carrying attacks not only in “Somalia but also in Tanzania, Djibouti and in Kenya.”<sup>80</sup> The “African Union, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia” receives counter terrorism funds from the U.S as their main source. The researcher sought to establish the effectiveness of counterterrorism in the HoA and the responses are distributed in the figure below. The researcher asked the respondents to indicate their perceptions on effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies. The findings indicate that majority of the respondents (31.0 per cent) perceive counterterrorism strategies to be highly effective, 24.9 per cent posited that they were effective, while 25.5 per cent do not know on how to rate the counterterrorism strategies. Contrastingly, 18.6 per cent of the total respondents indicated that counterterrorism strategies in the Horn of Africa were less effective as shown in the figure below.

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<sup>79</sup>Gatuiku, P.V.G. (2016). *Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa; A case study of Kenya*. Nairobi. University of Nairobi Press

<sup>80</sup>Debisa, N.G. (2021). *Security Diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa’s security Complex: Ethio-US Partnerships against Al shabaab*. Addis Ababa: BureHOLA University



**Figure 2.5; Effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies**

**Source: Field Data, Researcher, 2021**

The explanation for the high effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies can be attributed to the deployment of the AMISOM troops and the stabilization of the Somalia’s TFG and the strengthening of the SNDF and the SNP as well as increased sharing of intelligence information among regional countries. The number of attacks committed by the Al shabaab has declined drastically as a consequence of inter-state collaboration in intelligence sharing among the regional countries. As Botha posits, the radicalization of the Muslim Youth along the Kenyan coastal region particularly those who belonged to the MRC.<sup>81</sup> The Al shabaab has established offshoots in Mozambique in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa.<sup>82</sup> A terror group known as the “*Ahl al-Sunnahwa al Jamma’ah*” has continued to launch terror attacks in in

<sup>81</sup> Op cit.

<sup>82</sup>Kamil al-Tawil. (2007). *Al-Qaeda and Its Brothers: The History of the Arab Jihadists* (Arabic). London



Mozambique claiming dozens of lives especially in the town of Palma in March, 24<sup>th</sup> 2021.<sup>83</sup> The emergence of Al shabaab attacks in Mozambique shows the continental spread of the militia from Horn of Africa region. This can partly be explained that; when AMISOM started taking roots in Somalia, Alshabaab now started extending their recruitment to other parts of the HoA region as shown by the 2021 Mozambican attacks. Consequently, counterterrorism strategies have aroused operational changes among the Al shabaab militia, spreading the network of operations from the Horn of Africa region to South African countries and close working relations with the global terror networks, particularly with Al Qaeda.

## **2.6 AMISOM intervention in Somali and the Improved Inter-state Counterterrorism and Intelligence sharing in the HoA Region**

AMISOM operations in Somalia have led to the emergence of a complex reprisals attack on the Horn of African nations. It is a kind of unique warfare (Terror/Guerilla) against an enemy that can only be defeated through intelligence sharing among different actors in the security continuum. There is a changing normative dynamics around Africa intelligence which has been occasioned by the changing nature of warfare, terrorism and state interests. According to Sandy Africa and Kwadjo Johnny intelligence organizations in Africa are threatened with the loss of their pre-eminence in providing security information with increase of the competing non-state sources (the internet, NGOs, advocacy groups and terror groups).<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Boinett, Wilson asserts that; “the fate of any nation may well rest on the accurate and complete intelligence that serves as the guide form decision making on policy and action in a troubled world”.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>BBC News.(2021). *Mozambique Palma Attacks. Why IS involvement is exaggerated.* Available online at; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56773012>. Accessed on 5/12/2021

<sup>84</sup> Africa, S., & Kwadjo, J. (2009). *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa.* Nairobi. Africa Security Sector Network

<sup>85</sup>Boinett, W. (2009). *The Origins of the Intelligence System of Kenya.* Nairobi. Africa Security Sector Network

Intelligence gathering (espionage) is “the practice of spying or using spies to obtain information about the plans and the activities of a foreign government or a competing company”.<sup>86</sup> Upon gathering such information a state can institute covert activities designed to influence events in foreign land either through low level propaganda or an attempt to overthrow a government deemed to be unfriendly. While the threat from radical Islam is immediate, counter-terrorism intelligence, in the HoA is not easy meet. Intelligence cannot be shared in many organizations in majority of HoA countries largely because they are unsecure and lacks proper infrastructures and adequate resources. Collier asserts that; “the pervasive corruption of the African public sector therefore precludes substantial intelligence sharing”.<sup>87</sup>

Contrastingly, upon the deployment of AMISOM troops in Somalia the TCCs committed to sharing intelligence among their security agencies with the objective of securing the region and securing respective countries territories against attacks from the Al shabaab. This can be proved by the reduced attacks witnessed in the region since 2017 as indicated by Gituiku in his study of countering terrorism in the HoA utilizing a case study of Kenya and Ethiopia.<sup>88</sup> Intelligence sharing in Kenya has improved significantly with other foreign states other than regional states. According to INCLO, Kenya shares intelligence with Israel on matters related to terrorism as well as with the U.S on matters concerning terrorism investigations and intelligence gathering.<sup>89</sup> The sharing of intelligence information has improved counterterrorism in Kenya and hence, preempting terror attacks in the HOA region.

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid

<sup>87</sup> Collier, P. (2010). *Security Threats Facing Africa and its Capacity to Respond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

<sup>89</sup> INCLO. (2018). *Unanswered Questions: International Intelligence Sharing*. New York: International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations

## **2.7 Summary of the Key Chapter Findings**

This chapter has established a direct relationship between the increased and decreased Al shabaab attacks in the HoA region. The frequency of the attacks increased during the initial years of the deployment of the AMISOM troops and was directed towards the TCCs as a retaliation mechanism. The attacks decreased gradually to near zero attacks in 2019 a factor attributed to the effectiveness of the AMISOM troops and the facilitation they offered to the Somalia's Transitional Federal Government and the stabilization capacity offered to the Somali security agencies. The chapter finds the responsibility to protect as the overriding principle informing the entire mission which attracted both national and international support and therefore ensured the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies adopted. The maritime security off the Somali coast and in the Somali economic exclusive zones has improved with reduced piracy attacks which have demonstrated a direct and close link with the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE STRATEGIES USED BY AMISOM IN STABILIZING AND SECURING THE HORN OF AFRICA REGION

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the strategies used by AMISOM to stabilize and secure the Horn of Africa region. To establish the strategies, the chapter utilizes both secondary and primary data. The previous chapter has already established a reduction in the total number of piracy attacks from 163 in 2007 to only 9 attacks in 2019; similarly, the number of foiled attacks by AMISOM troops decreased from 114 to only 6 in the same period according to a report on the Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region and such drastic change aroused an academic concern on the kind of strategies employed by AMISOM to achieve such success. It therefore, examines such methods and strategies as employed by AMISOM to stabilize and secure the Horn of Africa.

#### 3.2 Strategies for Stabilizing Horn of Africa Region


The HoA is regarded as one of the most unstable regions in the world.<sup>90</sup> This is because the region has continued to experience terror attacks perpetuated by terror groups such as the Alshabaab based in Somalia as well as other forms of violence which continue to threaten both peace and security in the neighboring countries.<sup>91</sup> The researcher aimed at determining the strategies that AMISOM have utilized to improve security in the HoA region. The researcher established that majority of the respondents (35.48 per cent) opined that stabilization strategy was the most effective strategy employed by AMISOM. A total of 25.80 per cent of the respondents opined that security sector reforms constituted the other strategy utilized by

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<sup>90</sup> Martin, P. (2013). How unstable is the Horn of Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 40(136), 321-330

<sup>91</sup> Tannehill, R. (2008). *Forecasting Instability Indicators in the Horn of Africa Region*. Thesis and Dissertations.

AMISOM while 20.64 per cent of the respondents perceived intelligence sharing as the most effective strategy used to achieve security in the Horn of Africa region. Further, 18.06 per cent of all respondents indicated financial, military supports as well as tactical training were the strategies used to secure the region (HOA). The figure below illustrates the study findings.



**Figure 3.1; The strategies used to secure the region (HOA)**

**Source: Field Data, Researcher 2021**

**3.3 Stabilization Strategy**

According to the figure above, stabilization Strategy was the most quoted (with the highest modal frequency) strategy for securing the Horn of Africa as indicated by majority of the respondents (35.48 per cent). These findings corroborate those of “Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams study on the surge to stabilize referring to lessons for the UN from the AU’s experience in Somalia”, which established that; AMISOM transformed from War fighting plan to

stabilization plan.<sup>92</sup> After years of war, AMISOM and TFG forces in August 2011 successfully evicted most of the Al-Shabaab's fighters out of "Mogadishu and other strategic towns of Kismayo, BeletWeyne, and Baidoa in south-central Somalia", and also integrated 4,000 Kenyan forces (rehabbed) into the broader AMISOM contingent in Somalia.<sup>93</sup> Afterwards, the AMISOM forces captured the Mogadishu and this forced the terror group to settle in other areas far from the city. At this juncture that, the AU realized the need to support the stabilization of the city and other towns beyond Mogadishu. This formed the most effective strategy of security in Somalia from which the TFG and other governance institutions were established. The military success against Al-Shabaab prepared for the stabilization of Somalia through strengthening of the police and civilian components of the mission. Such success transformed AMISOM from a military fighting force to a more multifaceted operation for the stabilization of Southern Somalia and South-central region of the Horn of Africa as explained by Amadi.<sup>94</sup>

The idea of AMISOM's role in stabilization was adopted by the UN, consequently, the UNSC through resolution 2036 requested the AMISOM to work with the TFG and its institutions to stabilize Mogadishu. Towards that end, the African Union Security Council realized that the police force would play a pivotal role in the stabilization process and hence they prioritized in developing a police force within the AMISOM. The UNSC resolution 2036 among other objectives mandated "the AMISOM to support delivery of stabilization plans developed by the IGAD and the Somali TFG in areas it had already secured"<sup>95</sup> Second, it called for AMISOM to establish an operational police component to help stabilize Mogadishu". Further, "the UN

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<sup>92</sup>Lotze, W.,&Williams, P.D. (2016). *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*.New York:International PEACE Institute (IPI)

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p.3-4

<sup>94</sup>Amadi, A.,I. (2014). *An Analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi-IDIS

<sup>95</sup>UN. (2012). *Resolution 2036 (2012).Adopted by the Security Council at its 6718th meeting, on 22 February 2012*. New York: RES/2036 (2012)

Security Council passed Resolution 2093 in March 2013”, authorized the current government to stabilize areas where al-Shabaab previously occupied and shifted AMISOM into more of a supporting role.

In 2015, through an operation called “*Juba Corridor*”, conducted by the AMISOM in collaboration with SNA managed to push away the al-Shabaab from areas such as “the Gedo, Bakool, and Bay regions of Somalia between the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders”.<sup>96</sup> The main aim of the operation was to “destroy, secure and consolidate which ultimately resulted into stabilization process.”<sup>97</sup>

The AMISOM pursued the mission objectives successfully which according to Dr. Maman Sidokou led to a secure country out of a very difficult situation, by creating an enabling environment capable of facilitating both socio-economic and political development of the Somalia nation-state.<sup>98</sup> The general objective of the stabilization strategy is the creation of a country at peace with itself and their regional neighbors. The average test for the stabilization strategy entailed political processes which called for the adoption of a constitution, commitment to the conduction of elections in 2016 and the formation of interim regional administrations.<sup>99</sup> The difficulty test was for Somalia to stabilize in such a very difficult situation and grow as a sovereign country with stable institutions, organs and structures particularly, a (SNA and a NPF) that should assume full responsibility after the exit of AMISOM.

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<sup>96</sup>AMISOM Operations Order 01/2015: Operation Juba Corridor-AMISOM

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup>Sidokou, M., & Obe, A.V. (2015). *Securing Stability in Somalia: AMISOM'S Evolving Role and Regional Implications*. CHATHAM House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 3-4

### 3.4 Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence sharing refers to sharing of intelligence information among different stakeholders within the same government or with other governments. It can also be defined “as the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data or knowledge among federal, state, local or private sector entities as appropriate”.<sup>100</sup> Military intelligence is “a military discipline that uses information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to assist commanders in their decisions”. Both civilian and military intelligence cooperates in order to pass information that is crucial. Intelligence sharing has been an effective strategy which has been adopted by the AMISOM troops to stabilize and secure the Horn of Africa region. This assertion is supported by 20.64 per cent of the respondents. To counter terrorism executed by the armed non-state actors originating from Somalia, the TCCs have heightened information gathering and sharing coupled with covert operations which have dismantled active terror cells established in some of these countries, for instance in Kenya.<sup>101</sup> According to Stepanova, “the need to combat terrorist threats in a post-conflict environment involves coordinating activities and sharing information between different security components.”<sup>102</sup> While the role of the military in counter-terrorist operations is by definition limited, the critical challenge is how to achieve an optimal division of functions and establish working cooperation between the two key sectors that bear primary operational responsibility for counter-terrorist activities, that is, the law enforcement and the intelligence and counter-intelligence communities”.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Khadiagala, G.M. (2008). *Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility*. New York: International Peace Institute-IPI

<sup>102</sup> Stepanova, E. (2003). *Anti-terrorism and Peace-building during and After Conflict*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute-SIPRI

<sup>103</sup> International Peace Academy-IPA. (2001). *Managing Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, IPA Workshop Report. Ottawa: Wilson House



The intelligence sector forms the most crucial sector especially for TCC in any given mission.<sup>104</sup> Given the closeness pre-emption, interference and obstruction in fighting terrorism, it is therefore very instrument to gain crucial information in a timely manner so that it can help in planning and retaliating when the terrorists launch attacks security officials can utilize human intelligence and undercover methods with an aim of averting adverse implications. Williams posits that “AMISOM and the TFG’s combined military intelligence sharing managed to deter and drive al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and keep them out and also reclaimed and held territories liberated outside of the capital”.<sup>105</sup> Therefore, intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing can be lauded as an effective strategy which has enabled the AMISOM contingent stabilize and secure the horn of Africa region.

### **3.5 Financial, Military and Tactical Training Support**

The researcher has established that; 18.06 per cent of the respondents affirmed of the financial, military and tactical training support as the strategy which enabled the stabilization and security of the Horn of Africa region. AMISOM has received logistical field support from the UNSOA, UNSOS and the <sup>106</sup>USAID which have supported the mission with experts and financial support to assist in formulating the latest constitution as well as develop government institutions in Somalia. The UK supported the SDF with estimated £5 million (\$7.8 million) in 2015 to refurbish and construct structures and institutions which will help in improving service delivery

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Williams, P.D. (2013). *AMISOM in Transition: The Future of the African Union Mission in Somalia*. Eldoret: Rift Valley Institute

<sup>106</sup> Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. (2018). *Assessing the Effectiveness of the AMISOM*. Oslo: EPON-AMISOM Report

in the country.<sup>107</sup> Other international actors are explicitly supporting the FG considering that state-building is a very important aspect in the stabilization process.

According to the *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, “some of the actors are directly engaged as partners to the mission, while others play an indirect role by supporting the state-building project in Somalia in other ways”.<sup>108</sup> For instance, the WB and IMF play a pivotal role in availing financial support to the FGS, despite not working directly with the AMISOM.<sup>109</sup> The financial support advanced to Somalia has enabled the construction of social amenities and critical infrastructure which enabled the reduction of poverty, illiteracy and both maternal and infant mortality rates. The officers from the TCC who join the AMISOM are trained by the United States through a program known as the ACOTA program which is supported by the U.S. State Department.<sup>110</sup> The US has spent over \$500 million on such operations since deployment of AMISOM troops in Somalia.<sup>111</sup> The continued financial, military and tactical training to the SNFs has contributed immensely to the stabilization and security of the HoA region and is therefore, it is assimilated by this study as an effective strategy for securing and stabilizing the entire region.

### **3.6 Security Sector Reforms**

The security sector reforms have been identified as another strategy which has enabled the stabilization and security of Somalia and the HoA. Whereas the security sector reforms were implemented by the SFG, they were initiated by AMISOM. This is attested by 25.80 per cent of

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<sup>107</sup> International Peace Institute-IPI-(2019). *Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM*. New York: IPI Publication

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Ibid

<sup>110</sup> Olsen, G.R. (2014). Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: The USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali. *European Security Journal*, 23(3), 290-306

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

all total respondents who opined; that they (security sector reforms) were integral in the stabilization and security of Somalia. These findings are similar to the observations made by the ISSAT on the security sector reforms in Somalia.<sup>112</sup>

According to ISSAT, “Somalia is going through a critical phase, moving from the end of a political transition to stabilization and transformation phases due to security sector reforms”.<sup>113</sup>

The transition witnessed in the country through election of a President and nomination of a parliament demonstrates a great achievement and this has presented opportunities for further establishment of security and justice institutions. The government has also managed to formulate new national policy frameworks and it’s presumed that with the international support, the SCF and SNP will be created together with other security and justice sector institutions in the coming years.

Security sector reforms in Somalia started in August 2012, when the new government the SFG assumed all the responsibilities from the TFG as the governing organ. The SNNF are comprised of the SNA, the SPF and the SNI and SA.<sup>114</sup> The FGS acknowledged that security reform was an important concern for the government in the subsequent four years of its rule. The primary responsibility of the security sector reform agreed and reached upon by the FDS and FMSs on 16 April 2017 on SNSA, and endorsed by SNSC on 8 May was the transition from AMISOM to SSF.<sup>115</sup>

The security sector reforms agreed and adopted during the London Conference held on 11<sup>th</sup> May 2017 specifically made an agreement that; “AMISOM remains critical to securing Somalia’s

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<sup>112</sup>ISSAT. (2018). *Security Sector Reform in Somalia*. ISSAT. Washington D.C: ISSAT

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

<sup>114</sup>The London Conference. (2017). *SECURITY PACT*. Available online at; [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/613720/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/613720/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf) Accessed on 10/9/2021

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, London Conference-point 3

security and also agreed that; the transition from AMISOM to Somali security forces from 2018 should be conditions-based with clear target dates linked to the security sector reform milestones set out in the security Pact”.<sup>116</sup> The fundamental security sector reform(s) entailed a transition Plan aimed at ensuring Somalia take full responsibility of ensuring their security as from the year, 2018.<sup>117</sup> Further, it outlined that the security forces should assume AMISOM responsibilities after their exit as well as supports the process of stabilizing, reconstruction, reconciliation, asset recovery, strengthening the government and security institutions, training and capacity building of the SSF among other functions especially in the areas previously occupied by the terror group.<sup>118</sup> The above security sector reform transfers the responsibility for security to SNF after the exit of AMISOM and has been lauded as stabilizing strategy with local ownership.<sup>119</sup>

By 2018, the capacity of the Somali National Forces was greatly improved. The number of Somalis trained for Police work numbers approximately 12,000 while during the same period the SNA was formed and by 2018 there were 19,800 SNA troops.<sup>120</sup> Due to inadequate resources and limited experience the SNA have been collaborating with the AMISOM forces to fight off al Shabaab and any other militant insurgent groups.<sup>121</sup> The UNSC adopted a resolution 2372, which gives the current President Farmajo’s with the mandate of providing security and ensuring

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid, London Conference 11<sup>th</sup> May, 2017

<sup>117</sup> Blyth, F. (2019). *Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM*. New York: International Peace Institute-IPI.

<sup>118</sup> Op.cit.

<sup>119</sup> Beyene, A.D. (2020). *The Security Sector Reform Paradox in Somalia*. The London School of Economics and Political Science: Conflict Research Programme-crp

<sup>120</sup> World Bank. (2018). *World Development Indicators: Armed Forces Indicators*. Washington D.C: World Bank

<sup>121</sup> Dobbins, J., et al. (2019). *Africa’s Role in Nation-Building: An Examination of African-led Peace Operations*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Publication

stability of the country.<sup>122</sup> The move to own the country's security assured the AMISOM contingent of the ability of the SNF to offer security to their country and stabilize the region.

### **3.7 Chapter Summary**

After a detailed probing of the strategies which enabled the reduction of the terrorist attacks and foiling of others by AMISOM, this chapter has established a number of strategies used by AMISOM to stabilize and secure the Horn of Africa region. Stabilization is one strategy mostly quoted by respondents who participated in this research. It was adopted by the UNSC through resolution 2036 which requested the AMISOM to work with the TFG and its institutions to stabilize Mogadishu. Security sector reforms entail the other strategy employed by the AMISOM and directed towards transitioning from foreign security intervention to local ownership of security, achieved through capacity building of the Somali National Forces. This strategy was second most quoted by respondents and it transformed the Somali nation-state to a significant level of security region locally owned. Provision of financial, military and tactical training provided an effective means through which the national forces in Somalia could improve and build new infrastructure critical for state building. Lastly, intelligence sharing has formed the backbone of the stabilization and security mission in Somalia, where TTCs have collaborated in sharing intelligence information which has enabled pre-emptive and covert operations which have dismantled terrorist cells in the HoA region, hence securing and stabilizing the region.

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<sup>122</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 30, 2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2372, para. 4. I

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE CHALLENGES FACING AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA**


#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter assesses the challenges facing the AMISOM contingent in Somalia. The chapter utilizes both primary and secondary data to solidify the arguments advanced therein. It is to be acknowledged that; the AMISOM has registered both success and failures in executing its mission in Somalia. While the previous chapter has discussed the strategies which have enabled the effective attainment of the mission' objectives, there are notable challenges which have constrained the effectiveness of the mission. The challenges presented in this chapter cover from August 2012 when the TFG was established.

#### **4.2 Responses on the Challenges Confronting AMISOM**

The researcher sought to establish the challenges which confronted the AMISOM and the responses were given as follows; majority of the respondents (55) representing 35.48 per cent of the total indicated the problems of internal coordination among the mission's troops contributing countries-TCCs were the main challenges while 14.19 per cent (22) indicated the absence of a local partner who the AMISOM officials can rely with in order to achieve their objectives was the main challenge; 11.61 per cent of respondents (18) opined that; issues of coordination among all the stakeholders involved in stabilization process constituted the main challenges; 15 respondents representing 9.67 per cent indicated that; the nature of the enemy forces facing AMISOM, principally al-Shabaab was the main challenge; 21.29 per cent of the respondents (33) opined that, inadequate resources constrained the effectiveness of the AMISOM's mission. Lastly, 7.74 per cent (12) quoted the challenges of facilitating legitimate and effective

governance structures as the strategic challenges facing AMISOM. The findings are illustrated in the figure below.



#### 4.1; Challenges facing AMISOM

Source: Field Data, 2021

According to the figure above problems of internal coordination among the TCCs was the main challenge confronting the AMISOM contingent as opined by most of the participants. The unpredictable nature of the enemy facing the AMISOM was challenge least quoted by respondents even though it seems as the main challenge of the mission. The challenges shall be analyzed individually to ascertain their impediment to the effectiveness of the Horn of Africa mission.

### **4.3 The Nature of the Enemy Forces facing AMISOM, principally Al-Shabaab**

The AMISOM is fighting an enemy who deploys unconventional tactics of military engagement, particularly al shabaab which uses terrorism as means of war. This assertion was supported by 9.67 per cent of the respondents and corroborates the findings of Lusiola on the key threats which confronts AMISOM operations and deters achievement of its objectives in the HoA.<sup>123</sup>The unconventional nature of armed attacks perpetrated by the Jihadist terrorist operating in Somalia has regionalized the threat of terror attacks, thereby putting into question the efficacy of the AMISOM and the effects on the peace and security including of the neighboring countries. The terror groups have continued to launch terror attacks in the HoA with recent one being launched in Nairobi Kenya at Dusit D2 Hotel on January 15<sup>th</sup> 2019 where dozens of lives were lost and other injured.<sup>124</sup> The Al shabaab claimed responsibility and the attack provided three fundamental strands of analysis for the Jihadist group; “first, its Somalia origin; second, its ideological affiliation to the Al Qaeda and third, its increasing foreign fighters composition of trained and experienced radicalized youthful Muslims from East African Countries, particularly, Kenya Coast”. In April 2015, the Al shabaab also launched another attacked where 148 students belonging to the Garissa University Colleges in northeastern Kenya lost their lives. The Killing of the group’s leader Godane by the AMISOM forces led the terror group to invoke tactics similar to those of Boko Haram terror group in Nigeria which targets schools and students. The unconventional nature of jihadist terrorists presents an asymmetrical engagement with the AMISOM forces.

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<sup>123</sup>Lusiola, M.A. (2021). Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. *African Journal of Empirical Research*, 2 (1), 54-67.

<sup>124</sup>Bryden M., &Bahra, P. (2019). East Africa’s Terrorist Triple Helix: The Dusit Hotel Attack and the Historical Evolution of the Jihadi Threat. *Combating terrorism*, 12 (6)



According to spotlight report issued in 2018 by the Africa Center for strategic studies, this terror group utilizes different tactics and methods when launching attacks in combination with the urban warfare, guerilla warfare and terrorism.<sup>125</sup> This ability to utilize varying tact sans strategies demonstrates their ability and shows that, the network is highly adaptive and resilient and so should the AMISOM troops need to combat and pacify them. The ability of the Al shabaab to attack presidential palace demonstrates the level of threat the militia group presents to the AMISOM mission. The report also highlights an instance in September 2017 when the militia fighters used coordinated mortar attacks and car bombs to overrun a Somali army base in which eight soldiers were reportedly killed.<sup>126</sup> Such an incident demonstrates the lethality with which Al shabaab can attack.

The regionalization of threat of terror which is presented by the by Al shabaab jihadist in East and the HoA region is critical largely due to the political nature and geographical position of Somalia, the HoA military capacity regions and the capacity of these terror networks. The terror networks which include (Al shabaab jihadism and Al Qaeda) continue to expand globally thereby posing a significant threat to peace and security of majority of countries. Regionalization of jihadist terrorism in the HoA challenges the efforts of AMISOM to stabilize the region

#### **4.4 Problems of Internal Coordination among Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs)**

Different states ascribe to unique military doctrines, mainly defined by the respective former colonial powers and therefore undergo different training approaches. Consequently, doctrinal differences have had major impact on internal coordination and training undertaken by different contingents hence differences in the operating standard of militaries. While some of the TCCs

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<sup>125</sup>Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. (2020). *AMISOM's Hard Earned Lessons in Somalia*. Available online at; <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/amisom-hard-earned-lessons-somali> Accessed on 8/10/2021

<sup>126</sup> Ibid

have adequately trained armies possessing modern equipment and standard operating procedures, others have semi-skilled militaries. For instance, while Kenya and Ethiopia have well trained armies with modern weapons, Burundi and Djibouti militaries suffer from colonial inadequacies which have remained at discretion to adopt conventional training practices although the dynamic methods employed by rebels have consistently challenged their effectiveness in coordinating with the other troops.<sup>127</sup>

Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) have often faced slow response to deploying their troops into Somalia despite the approval of 8,000 troops by African Union. The reluctance to send troops by African leaders resulted to chronic delays in allocation of soldiers and equipment in the first several years, making the acquisition of equipment to delay and largely irrelevant in the battle until Uganda sent the first troop deployment of 1,600 soldiers to the mission.<sup>128</sup> There are six TCCs which command and control their troops which demonstrate lack of coordination among them and also between AMISOM headquarters and the TCC. Kenya and Ethiopia continue to argue that Somalia troops do not form part of AMISOM.<sup>129</sup> It is also evident that Kenya and Tanzania have been offering private training programs to their troops in Somalia which makes coordination among the TCCs more difficult.

Following the establishment of “new military and strategic concepts of operations in 2012”, AMISOM has had struggle with challenges in its internal dynamics following the arrival of new troop contributing countries and their redeployment across Somalia.<sup>130</sup> “Kenya, Sierra Leone and

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<sup>127</sup>Brooke, B., Douglas, J., & Dressel S. (2013). *Training the troops: What Today's soldiers tell us about training for information-age digital competence*. Alexandria: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

<sup>128</sup> Paul, W. D. (2017). *Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

<sup>129</sup> Ibid

<sup>130</sup>Musoma A. L. (2021). Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. *African Journal of Empirical Research*, 2(1), 54-67

Djibouti” entered a MoU with the African Union although this was met by protracted debates over the financial, logistical and deployment aspects of their involvement in mission. Consequently, coordination of activities across the four areas manned by the TCCs and respective contingent commands have become a hurdle.

#### **4.5 Lack of Reliable Local Partner**

According to the findings established by this study, 14.19 per cent of the respondents, particularly refugees who participated in this study, who opined that AMISOM was challenged by a hostile host community coupled with a general lack of local recognition as a stabilizing force. This perception is similar to Albrecht and Haenlein study findings which established that; the AMISOM deployment in Somalia was confronted by a negative perception among the Somali elites, security agencies and the general populace.<sup>131</sup> Negative perceptions on the AMISOM have been on the increase due to lots of local perceptions. Some of the perceptions from the locals is that; AMISOM has been a money-making enterprise to its contributing countries which has reduced the incentive to defeat the al-Shaabab; the locals also claim that AMISOM has become a vehicle for the Somalia neighbors who want to pursue their own selfish agenda. The resentment towards AMISOM has created security lacunae which exposes the troops to the danger of being betrayed by the local community instead of being supported.

Although the negative reception is not widespread among the Somalia population, it presents a significant challenge to the AMISOM contingent and hampers the effective realization of the mission’s objectives. In the ranks of the AMISOM, some of the soldiers who had joined the Army in the 1990s had become disgruntled as they realized how weak and vulnerable the Somali

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<sup>131</sup>Albrecht, P., & Haenlein, C. (2016). Fragmented Peacekeeping: The African Union in Somalia. *The RUSI Journal*, 161(1), 50-61

Army had become without the troops from the neighboring countries.<sup>132</sup> According to a remark provided by one of the Security Analyst who participated in this research;

*“The Somalis officials belonging to the AMISOM are realizing the vulnerability and weakness of their national army without the involvement of the foreign troops. Having participated in the overthrow of SiadBarre, these soldiers can honestly conclude that; exit of AMISOM shall translate to collapse of the TFG the next day”*<sup>133</sup>

Another Respondent remarked that; *“The SNA is often unable to keep up with AMISOM’s superior battlefield capabilities in clearing or holding territory. As a result, Somalia is unable to maintain its own security without AMISOM”*<sup>134</sup>

The apathy towards the AMISOM troops from the local community grew stronger after the Kenyan government started making concessions in the oil-producing region off the coast of Somali by claiming exclusive economic maritime zones.<sup>135</sup> The damning report published by the UN on the illegal charcoal trade in the port of Kismayu bolded the local resentment towards the AMISOM troops. The presence of AMISOM has also been criticized by most civilians who were not satisfied with their interactions with the peace keepers. The civilians claimed that the AU mission focused their efforts of protection only of the top government officials and also guarded strategic facilities like the airport and the seaports of Mogadishu but could not offer security to local natives who experienced constant suicide attacks from *Al shabaab* militia. Such challenges have damned the troop’s morale and the overall stabilization strategy.

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<sup>132</sup> Respondent’s Remarks. (2021). Security Analyst-SA 004

<sup>133</sup> Respondent’s Remarks. (2021). Security Analyst-SA 004

<sup>134</sup> Respondent’s Remarks. (2021). NGO Representative 003

<sup>135</sup> Ferras, P. (2013). *Security stakes and challenges in the Horn of Africa. State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa*. Mogadishu: The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies.

#### 4.6 Lack of Adequate Financial Resources

Inadequate resources have presented a major threat to the efficacy of AMISOM troops in Somalia. This assertion is supported by 21.29 per cent of the respondents who participated in this research. The same assertion corroborates De Coning and Freear's lessons from the AMISOM.<sup>136</sup> According to De Coning and Freear, AMISOM has been unable to finance itself with contributions from TCCs which has made it to be largely depended on external funding. The acquisition of ammunition and military hardware generally depends on the availability of funding which the AU cannot relinquish to foreign donors. While AU's collaboration with the international donors has spurred hope on the stabilization of Somalia, it is fraught with challenges particularly in support and financing from UN logistical support packages through the UNSOS and the EU, which finances the police allowances and other expenses, within the framework of its APF.<sup>137</sup>

Although the AMISOM had always faced financing problems characterized by setbacks in payments and inadequate resources, they faced the biggest funding challenge in 2016 when the EU presented the amount they could continue to support in the troops allowances. This meant that their allowances had reduced by 20% per month and this had adverse implications on the AMISOM mission since they entirely depended on the allowance funding from the EU.<sup>138</sup> This also triggered their exit in Somalia and further widened the differences between TCCs and donors over the nature of AMISOM itself and the future trajectory. Although the EU capped the troop's allowances, the AU which is the principle financier of the mission has tried with minimal

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<sup>136</sup>De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). *Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali*. *International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(2), 23

<sup>137</sup>Mahmood, S., & Ani, C. (2017). *Impact of EU funding dynamics on AMISOM*. East Africa Report No.16 Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid

success to bridge the gap by introducing a 0.2% levy on eligible imports in Africa.<sup>139</sup>The resource challenge and the issue of the donor who will support the troops with allowances in future after AMISOM exit is a major question mark which haunts TCCs, the AMISOM and the AU in general.

Apart from financial challenges, the AMISOM is further challenged by logistics and mobility challenges. The UN support office is mandated to transport assistance to the troops up to their designated points. Such transportation of war supplies as well as the transport of troops from the battalion hubs to the field is the mandate of TCCs. The AMISOM has limited air capabilities with only three helicopters as of 2019.<sup>140</sup> The three helicopters cover a distance of 400,000 kilometers which is very expansive for effective surveillance. This makes AMISOM's operations erratic and unreliable to the realization of the mission's objectives. Additionally, AMISOM lacks force enablers and multipliers which facilitates communication and combat capabilities. This includes enablers such as infantry vehicles and heavy artillery. This challenges makes it difficult for the mission to hold liberated areas.

#### **4.7 Other Challenges Facing AMISOM**

Apart from the above mentioned and discussed challenges, the AMISOM is further challenged by lack of adequate intelligence and strategic focus which causes inadequacies in coordination and planning. Up to date the AMISOM has no clear exit strategy from Somalia. According to Balassi AMISOM's exit and transition plan faces serious, challenges as it has not adequately

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<sup>139</sup> ISS. (2017). *The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states, Peace and Security Council Report*. ISS. Available online at;<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/addis-insights/the-new-funding-model-tests-the-commitmentof-au-member-state.org.com> Accessed on 15/9/2021

<sup>140</sup>Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2019). *Advancing military professional in Africa. Africa Centre for Strategic Studies*, African Security Brief No. 35

addressed the issue of lack of strong security structures in the country which can help in combating potential resurgence of al-Shabaab.<sup>141</sup>

The Somali national Army lacks readiness required to take over from the exit of AMISOM while the al-Shabaab terror group continue to use asymmetric tactics. Fighting the Al-Shabaab will depend of policing, law enforcement and intelligence capabilities other than military operation which is solely the responsibility of the infant SNF. Corruption is another challenge which has compromised the effectiveness of the AMISOM operations in Somalia, leading to the downsizing of the US military aid to the mission.<sup>142</sup> These challenges continue to compound the stabilization process in the HoA region and its security. While they are not exhaustive, they constitute a greater part of the challenges hindering the achievement of the AMISOM's objectives as stipulated by the AUSC and the UNSC.

#### **4.8 Chapter Summary**

This chapter sought to establish the challenges which the AMISOM faced in the HoA region, particularly in stabilizing and securing Somalia. The findings establish that; lack of cooperation and collaboration among the actors involved in stabilizing process was the main challenge while absence of a reliable local partner with which to wage a counter-insurgency campaign constituted another main challenge to the mission. Lack of adequate resources particularly the payments for troop's allowances constituted a fundamental challenge which demoralized the mission. The asymmetrical nature of the enemy confronted by the AMISOM proved to be a challenge enough to deter the achievement of the mission's objectives. This followed the

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<sup>141</sup>Balassi, I. (2019). *Africa Union's Mission in Somalia: Assessing Challenges to AMISOM Exit*. Georgetown: Georgetown Security Studies Review

<sup>142</sup>Houreld, K. (2017). *Exclusive: U.S. suspends aid to Somalia's battered military over graft*. Available online at; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft> Accessed on 15/9/2021

unconventional nature of military tactics employed particularly by the Al shabaab group. Other challenges established include; corruption on the AMISOM ranks which occasioned cut in military aid to the mission; problems of coordination among the TCCs and lack of a reliable local partner coupled with the weaknesses exhibited by the Somali National forces stemming from inexperience and local apathy towards foreign troops.



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **5.1 Summary of the Findings**

This section presents a summary of the study findings, conclusion and recommendations. This is done in line with the study objectives which were: To determine the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the HoA region, to analyze the strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the HoA region and to establish the challenges confronting the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the HoA region. The study was also guided by two hypotheses which stated that; there is some nexus between AMISOM intervention and the increased level of Al-Shabaab attacks in the HoA region and the operations of AMISOM in the HoA have had no security impact in the region.

##### **5.1.1 The Nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the Increased Al-Shabaab Attacks in the Horn of Africa Region**

This was the focus of chapter two and it presented findings in line with the first objective of the study which was “to determine the nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region”. The findings show that, AMISOM intervention in Somalia is guided by the Principle of the RP2 which implies “an international responsibility to prevent, to react, and finally to rebuild”. Prevention entails responding to the root causes which exposes the populations to risk. The norm of R2P has been applied by the UN intervention in Somalia and in the Gulf War with a sole purpose of restoring peace and stability in the two countries. Majority of the respondents (93.16 per cent) approved that, AMISOM

intervention in Somalia was a R2P situation since it was mandated by the AU and the UN to protect senior Somali TFG; support Somali security agencies and support civil-military assistance projects such as provision and delivery of water. However, a section of the respondents disapproved such deployment and cited various negative implications which contravene stability and security of the Horn of Africa. Notably, the increased retaliatory attacks in the region from the Al Shabaab militia group is attributed to perspective held by the natives which perceive the AMISOM troops as foreigners as opposed to them being insiders.

It's important to note that, deployment of AMISOM had stabilized Somalia and enabled the country to achieve security and political stability which facilitated the conduct of the first Presidential general election. However, despite these notable achievements, the country still experience frequent terror attacks perpetrated by the terror group which continue to threaten peace and security of even the neighboring countries. The stabilization of Somalia has elicited retaliatory attacks in the Horn of Africa because the Warlords who profiteered from the charcoal and contraband smuggling were denied access to the port of Kismayu and revenue collection point to finance their operations. The continuing insecurity and lack of rule of law in war-torn Somalia as well as retaliation to TCCs in the region is also directly linked to the increased pirate attacks off the HoA

However, since the deployment of the AMISOM troop's the frequency of pirate's attacks off the coast of Somalia and the HoA region has reduced which is a great achievement since piracy was the leading source of revenue for the Alshabaab operations. The eradication of piracy and safety of maritime trade along the coastal strip of the HoA has elicited retaliatory attacks in the region because the natives were benefiting from piracy and the mission disrupted their opportunities for revenue collection. The counter terrorism strategies adopted by various agencies to combat

terrorism have aroused operational changes among the Al shabaab militia, spreading the network of operations from the Horn of Africa region to South African countries and close working relations with the global terror networks, particularly with Al Qaeda. However, it's also clear that, the number of attacks committed by the Al shabaab has declined drastically as a consequence of inter-state collaboration in intelligence sharing among the regional countries.

### **5.1.2 The strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the Horn of Africa region**

Chapter Three dwelt on this aspect and presented findings on the second objective of the study which was “to analyze the strategies used by AMISOM in stabilizing and securing the Horn of Africa region”. The findings show that, there are various strategies employed by the AMISOM to offer security in the Horn of Africa region. They include; stabilization Strategy which AMISOM forces applied to flush out the most of Al-Shabaab's fighters out of Mogadishu and other strategic towns and this culminated to the establishment of the TFG and other governance institutions. The military success against Al-Shabaab prepared for the stabilization of Somalia through strengthening of the police and civilian components of the mission. Majority of the respondents rated this strategy as the most effective as it aims at creation of a country at peace with itself and their regional neighbors. Intelligence sharing has also been an effective strategy which has been adopted by the AMISOM troops to stabilize and secure the Horn of Africa region. To counter terrorism executed by the armed non-state actors originating from Somalia, the TCCs have heightened information gathering and sharing coupled with covert operations which have dismantled active terror cells established in some of these countries. Further, AMISOM and the TFG's used military intelligence which helped them in flushing out the al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other neighboring towns and also reclaimed the regions they previously occupied.

Additionally, the financial, military and tactical training support to the AMISOM by the UN, USAID, the UK as well as the other international actors as a strategy has also enabled the stabilization and security of the Horn of Africa region. For instance, the financial support advanced to Somalia has enabled the construction of social amenities and critical infrastructure which enabled the reduction of poverty, illiteracy and both maternal and infant mortality rates. It has also helped in supporting infrastructural refurbishment, reconstruction, development, and improved service delivery. More so, the security sector reforms initiated by AMISON and implemented by the SFG, as a strategy has enabled the stabilization and security of Somalia and the HoA region as affirmed by majority of the respondents 25.80 per cent. For instance, the handing over affairs from the TFG to the newly elected government the SFG. Also the transition from AMISOM to Somali security forces which transfers the responsibility for security to SNF after the exit of AMISOM has been lauded as stabilizing strategy with local ownership.

### **5.1.3 The challenges confronting the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the Horn of Africa region**

This was the theme of chapter four and it presented the findings of the third objective of the study which was “to establish the challenges confronting the AMISOM in practicing collective self-defense in the Horn of Africa region”. The findings show that, the AMISOM has been confronted by myriad of challenges which continue to hinder achievement of its objectives in Somalia. According to majority of the respondents (35.48 per cent) indicated that the problems of internal coordination among the mission’s troops contributing countries-TCCs were the main challenges confronting the AMISOM contingent. The unique military doctrines ascribed by different states have had major impact on internal coordination and training undertaken by different contingents hence differences in the operating standard of militaries. For instance, while

some of the TCCs have adequately trained armies possessing modern equipment and standard operating procedures, others have semi-skilled militaries. The TCC continue to command and control their troops which demonstrate that there is limited coordination among them and between TCC and AMISOM headquarters.

Further, it's evident that Kenya and Tanzania continue to provide private training to their troops in Somalia which makes coordination among the TCCs more difficulty. Another challenge is the nature of the enemy facing AMISOM, basically the Al-Shabaab who deploys unconventional tactics of military engagement, and uses terrorism as means of war as affirmed by 9.67 per cent of the respondents. The unconventional nature of armed attacks perpetrated by the Jihadist terrorist operating in Somalia has regionalized the of the threat of terror attacks, thereby putting into question the efficacy of AMISOM mission in Somalia and the consequential security implications.

Another challenge confronting AMISON is that it's surrounded by a hostile host community coupled with a general lack of local recognition as a stabilizing force especially by the Somali elites, security agencies and the general populace. Negative perceptions on the AMISOM from the locals such as that AMISOM has been a money-making enterprise to its contributing countries has reduced the incentive to defeat the al-Shaabab. In addition, the locals also claim that AMISOM has become a vehicle for the Somalia neighbors who want to pursue their own selfish agenda. The resentment towards AMISOM has created security lacunae which expose the troops to the danger of being betrayed by the local community instead of being supported as well as it presenting a significant challenge to the AMISOM contingent which hampers the effective realization of the mission's objectives.

Inadequate resources characterized by delayed payments presents a challenge to the efficacy of AMISOM troops in Somalia. AMISOM has been unable to finance itself with contributions from TCCs which has made it to be largely depended on external funding. The acquisition of ammunition and military hardware generally depends on the availability of funding which the AU cannot relinquish to foreign donors. While AU's collaboration with the international donors has spurred hope on the stabilization of Somalia, it is fraught with challenges particularly in support and financing from UN logistical support packages through the UNSOS and EU, who continue to support police with allowances and other expenses, within the framework of its APF. The AMISOM is further challenged by lack of adequate intelligence and strategic focus which causes inadequacies in coordination and planning as well as corruption issues which resulted to the downsizing of the US military aid to the mission.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

It can be concluded that, the responsibility to protect is the overriding principle informing the entire mission who attracted both national and international support and therefore ensured the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies adopted. The deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia has led to reduction in maritime attacks in Somali coast and in the Somali economic exclusive zones, counter radicalization of the youth as well as terrorist attacks in region. Although their actions led to retaliation from the terror groups they have helped in stabilizing the Somalia and the securing the Horn of Africa region. This therefore confirms the first hypotheses which state that, there is some nexus between AMISOM intervention and the increased level of Al-Shabaab attacks in the HoA region and contrasts the second hypotheses which state that, the operations of AMISOM in the HoA have had no security impact in the region.

Further, AMISOM has employed various strategies aimed at stabilizing and securing the Horn of Africa region. Stabilization which was adopted by the UNSC through resolution 2036 requested the AMISOM to work with the TFG and its institutions to stabilize Mogadishu was rated the most effective strategy. However, other strategies discussed above have also been incorporated by AMISOM and they have enabled pre-emptive and covert operations which have dismantled terrorist cells in the HoA region, hence securing and stabilizing the region.

Lastly, it's clear that AMISOM has registered both success and failures in executing its mission in Somalia. There are notable challenges which have constrained the effectiveness of the mission and continue to compound the stabilization process in the HoA region and its security. These challenges discussed above hinder the achievement of the AMISOM's objectives as stipulated by the AU and the UNSC.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

Based on the study findings several recommendations were made.

There is need for creation of a buffer zone (security zone) between areas which have been pacified and those which are still held by militias. AMISOM should have well elaborate exit strategy within which to pull out their troops in Somalia, stating clearly the exact date when the mission will come to an end.

AMISOM should also prioritize discipline among or within its ranks in avoidance of crimes and illegalities for instance, a UN report in 2009 implicated AMISOM troop in illegal charcoal trade in the port of Kismayo. Further, AMISOM should ensure SNF, SNA and SPF should have adequate capacity to take over after their exit.

#### **5.4 Recommendations for Further Study**

This study focused on the collective self defense and stability in the HoA utilizing a case study of AMISOM. However similar studies focusing on sustainability of missions and threats associated to the TCC drawing heavily on lessons learnt by the invasion of the US in Afghanistan and the subsequent takeover by Taliban should be undertaken.



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## Appendices

### Appendix I: Research Questionnaire

#### Introduction

#### Dear Respondent,

I am carrying out a study on collective self-defense and stability in the Horn of Africa utilizing a case study of AMISOM. The findings and recommendations established by this study will contribute to knowledge aimed at improving security and saving lives in this particular region of Africa. In this regard, I would like to collect data that will assist in accomplishing the objectives of this study. Kindly answer the questions appropriately, since your contribution will be much appreciated and the information provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

#### PART [A]: BIO-DATA

**Please tick the one that is applicable to you.**

- i. Age 18-20 years ( ) 21-30 years ( ) 31-40 years ( ) 41-50 years ( ) 51-60 ( )
- ii. Level of education... Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) 'A' level ( ) Tertiary ( ) University level ( )
- iii. Gender..... Male ( ) Female ( )
- iv. Occupation..... AMISOM Official ( ) Diplomat ( ) Security Expert ( ) Scholar ( ) NCTC official ( ) Refugee ( )

#### PART [B]: The nexus between AMISOM intervention in Somali and the increased Al-Shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region

1. Has your Country contributed military Troops as part of AMISOM deployment in Somalia?

Yes {    }

No {    }

2. In your Opinion and understanding of security concerns in Horn of Africa, was it necessary for the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia? Briefly, explain.

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.....  
.....

3. From your knowledge and experience, how do you rate the security of the Horn of Africa region after the AMISOM deployment?

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.....

4. How do you describe the Al shabaab attacks in the Horn of Africa region since the deployment of AMISOM troops?

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.....

5. In your opinion, do you support or oppose the continual deployment of AMISOM to the Horn of Africa? Briefly, explain your opinion.

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.....

**PART (C). The Impact of Collective Self Defence by AMISOM in Somalia to Regional Peace and Stability among the Horn of African Countries**

6. How do you describe the security situation in your country since the deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia?

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.....  
.....

7. What has been the most notable achievement or benefit of the AMISOM deployment in the Horn of Africa

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.....  
.....

8. What Cost implication is associated mostly with the deployment of AMISOM in the Horn of Africa region?

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.....

9. From your knowledge and understanding of security issues, has AMISOM managed to stabilize and bring peace to the Horn of Africa through military incursion to Somalia?

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.....

10. What is the implication of Al shabaab recent affiliation with the global Al Qaeda terrorist organization to the Horn of Africa region?

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.....

**PART D. Challenges confronting the AMISOM in the Horn of Africa region**

11. What challenge does your country experience for contributing troops to AMISOM in the Horn of Africa?

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12. Which challenges confront the AMISOM in the Horn of Africa region?

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.....

.....

13. What strategies are being applied to address the AMISOM challenges in the Horn of Africa region?

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.....

**THANKYOU**

## **Appendix 1I: Research Permit**