

**THE STATUS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM EARLY WARNING
COMMUNICATION
A CASE STUDY OF NYUMBA KUMI INITIATIVE IN KWALE COUNTY**

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this research project is a product of my own work and has never been submitted for examination in any other learning institution.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.

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DR. GEORGE GATHIGI

DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to the numerous actors working in preventing and countering violent extremism initiatives in Kenya, who, in their course of duty strive to find the connection between theory and practice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to first acknowledge God, for His blessings of good health and sound mind to undertake this research work. Second, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. George Gathigi for providing his invaluable guidance, comments, and suggestions throughout the project. His advice, insightful criticism and encouragement supported the writing of this project.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMISOM	-	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
CVE	-	Countering Violent Extremism
ECOWAS	-	Economic Commission of West African States
ECOWARN	-	ECOWAS Warning and Response Network
EW	-	Early Warning
EWER	-	Early Warning and Early Response
EWS	-	Early Warning System
ER	-	Early Response
FDGs	-	Focus Group Discussions
GIS	-	Geographic Information Systems
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority and Development
ICECVE	-	IGAD Centre of Excellence and Countering Violent Extremism
IPSTC	-	International Peace Support Training Centre
KCPCVE	-	Kwale County Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism
MRC	-	Mombasa Republican Council
NACOSTI	-	National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation
NSCPBCM	-	National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
SPSS	-	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UN	-	United Nations
VE	-	Violent Extremism
CRSV	-	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
RSP/ CVE	-	Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

- UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
- UNDOC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes

DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Early Warning (EW):** The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; the development of strategic responses to these crises; and the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision making (NCTC, 2016).
- Early Response (ER):** Any initiative that occurs as soon as the threat of potential violent conflict is identified and that aims to manage, resolve, or prevent that violent conflict (Subedi, 2017).
- Radicalization:** A gradual or phased process that employs the ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialize them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist groups or campaigns (Romaniuk, 2015).
- Terrorism:** Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature (Striegher, 2020).
- Violent Extremism (VE):** Acts of individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals (NCTC, 2016).
- Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE):** The employment of conflict sensitive, voluntary, people centered non-coercive measures to delegitimize violent extremist ideologies to

reduce the number of terrorist supporters and recruits
(Chome et al., 2016).

ABSTRACT

Often, prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs take reactionary approaches aimed at tackling the consequences of extremism only after extremist violence (VE) has erupted. Yet, literature shows that the primacy of Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) preventive mechanisms is critical. This study is an assessment of EWER mechanisms in P/CVE in Kwale County. The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design and the sample size was determined based on principle of information power for respondents in qualitative research and principle of saturation in quantitative research. Non-probability sampling using purposive, expert, convenience and snowball techniques was employed to select respondents. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected through mixed methods, employing techniques like questionnaire, Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews guides. Collected data was subjected to statistical analysis. Findings revealed challenges in mitigating P/CVE including problem of definition and contextualization of VE, diversity and fluidity of drivers of VE, disconnect and lack of trust between stakeholders especially between the community and government security structures have a direct impact on development, adoption and application of EWER initiatives. The study concludes by identifying aspects critical in the improvement of existing EWER initiatives. These include clear interpretation and agreement on terms used in VE discourse, bridging trust and confidentiality gaps between and among stakeholders, security of personal data and observation of personal rights, de-securitization of relationships between the community and security structures, recognition of specific gender roles in EWER and capacity building on EWER.

Key words: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, Early Warning, Communication and Preventive Mechanisms

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY

1.1 Overview

This chapter covers background of the study, the statement of the problem, objectives, and research questions. Additionally, this chapter includes the justification and significance of the study. Finally, the chapter will outline the delimitations and limitations of the study.

1.2 Background of the Study

Security agencies have to reassess their current policies in light of the growing demand for a new strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). Kenya was ranked 153 out of 163 countries in 2020, as the global rate of peacefulness continues to decline (Global Peace Index, 2020; Measuring Peace in a Complex World). Terrorism in Kenya is at an all-time high, and this is a clear sign of the severity of the problem. Since Kenya's pursuit of the Al-Shabab terrorist group into Somalia in 2011, the country's security problems have been mostly attributable to terrorist acts. Terror incidents such as the 2013 Westgate Attack, the 2015 Garrissa University Attack, and the 2019 Dusit D2 Attack have since occurred, resulting in the deaths of many people, the injury of many others, and the general destabilization of the country (Adan & Sharamo, 2020).

Motivations for violent extremism (VE) are dynamic and highly contextualized, according to Romaniuk et al (2018). According to Subedi, development difficulties such as poverty, inequality, socioeconomic marginalization, and lack of political representation are the driving forces for VE. As a result, development issues cannot be effectively addressed unless they can be solved through effective communication (Subedi, 2017). When looking into Nyumba Kumi Initiative early warning communication as a strategy for preventing and fighting violent extremism, this study was motivated by this backdrop.

It's crucial to consider not only the state's methods for reducing VE activity, but also how Early Warning (EW) components of such policies impact people's perceptions and attitudes, which informs whether or not they're successful. A community policing approach called the Nyumba Kumi Initiative (NKI) was launched by the Kenyan government in 2013. To ensure security, the method relies on devolving power to the lowest rungs of the ladder. NKI is predicated on the critical role that ordinary people can play in helping to keep the country safe. On the assumption that local residents are well-versed in their area, they are able to recognize and report suspicious or odd activity.

Kenyans will be grouped together in constellations based on their physical location and their interests, a safe and secure neighborhood. Neighbors are expected to know each other's names and keep an eye out for one another in the government's ideal neighborhood. Not only would this promote social cohesion and integration, but it would also aid in the establishment of safety and tranquility. Nyumba Kumi was put forward as a remedy for criminality and terrorism in general. Locals are supposed to monitor security concerns and offer information to local administration and security organs as part of this effort, which encourages them to continually engage and share information about one another.

The model is considered as a bridge to promote cooperation between local authorities, especially the Police, and the people as a community policing program. In order to reduce crime and conflict, the Kenyan government has adopted this participative and collaborative strategy.

When it comes to government efforts to prevent and confront violent extremism in Rwanda, Nyumba Kumi's letter is determined and hopeful, but reality on the ground speaks to a frustrated public that is more skeptical of government efforts. That's why this study sought to examine critically how an early warning component of the NKI worked to

reduce acts of violent extremism by increasing reporting, surveillance and collaboration between Kwale County's Public Police and local residents.

In the field of communication, Early Warning (EW) is not a new notion. Over the years, early warning has shown to be a useful tool in preventing conflict and preventing calamities (Subedi , 2017). There are a number of EW tools that have been developed to help persons in conflict monitor the environment and respond quickly to an imminent threat, such as the 2011 UN Early-warning indicators of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) matrix. A number of conflict zones have been able to track and report human rights breaches since then, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali.

In contrast to the success of early warning, little attention has been paid to the prevention and countering of violent extremism. Preventative measures for conflict and peacebuilding have a wealth of experience and learning that can be applied to early warning systems. The most critical aspect of NKI is how security agencies can plan and respond in a timely manner to minimize harm, loss, or risk.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

In the past decade, the country has recorded approximately 2,500 deaths and lost hundreds of millions of Kenyan shillings due to terrorism (Kisang, 2014). Indeed, Kwale County has the highest number of returnees and victims of violent extremism. Prevention and countering violent extremism denotes addressing root causes of terrorism before they escalate. Reality however indicates that many response mechanisms available have been reactive and programmes in place have been informed by these mechanisms. Undeniably, the launch of the NKI was in response to increased gruesome terror attacks namely 2013 Westgate.

The importance of the role of early warning in prevention and countering violent extremism initiatives like NKI is an avenue that has not been fully exploited. In retrospect, NKI has been found to be helpful in reducing general crime in other parts of Kenya such as Makongeni in Thika Sub County (Ngigi, 2018). If not fully harnessed, the use of the NKI policy would amount to counterproductive efforts by P/CVE stakeholders and further an increase in the divide between state security agents and the local community in Kwale County. The success of Nyumba Kumi Initiative must be hinged on the premise of strong trust relations within society itself and between the society and the security agencies. It further relies on the quality of information gathered through early warning and the nature of response. How information is collected, processed, and finally disseminated is critical when evaluating the efficacy of early warning.

With the drivers of violent extremism always changing due to the evolving nature of violence, some key drivers have been missed in programming of prevention and countering violence, especially at an early stage which would otherwise inform any change in the trends and nature of the evolving field. The existing early warning component of NKI can be informed further by learning experiences from other parts of the world such as the ECOWAS region through ECOWARN. Community engagement through early warning for data collection, verification, and dissemination to enhance program delivery can be a great pedestal for improved P/CVE programmes in Kwale County.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 Main Objective

The main objective of this study was to evaluate the status of early warning communication of Nyumba Kumi Initiative in preventing and countering violent extremism in Kwale County.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

- a) To evaluate the level of awareness of EW in Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kwale County.
- b) To find out the level of efficacy of EW in Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kwale County.
- c) To identify potential evidence-based EW mechanisms adaptable for mitigating VE in Kwale County.

1.5 Research Questions

- (i) What is the level of awareness of early warning in Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kwale County?
- (ii) What is the level of efficacy of early warning within the Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kwale County?
- (iii) Which evidence-based early warning mechanisms can mitigate violent extremism in Kwale County?

1.6 Justification of the Study

Being alive and capable of detecting early warning signs of factors or attributes of violent extremism and having the ability to mount early response to mitigate them is

critical in ensuring and enhancing peace and security. It highlights the central role both communication and information play in tackling societal challenges. Because violent extremism is a multiple sector problem, advance preparedness provides spaces for various stakeholders to work and tackle it effectively.

There are diverse drivers and conditions that propel one, especially the youth, towards violent extremism. Importantly, the conditions that blend the violence are usually generally the same and affect the majority in a community. However, it is usually only a smaller number in the community that espouse violent extremism as a way of expressing their grievances. What is key to note is that these disgruntled people are part of and live among the communities affected. They are sons and daughters in families whose behaviours are known, and any deviations from 'normal' behaviour e.g., seclusion and disinterest in communal association, should be, at least, apparent to observant parents or peers. These deviations from the 'normal' is what constitute early warning signs that must be identified and responded to early enough before they manifest into violence. Thus, awareness to this end through research and other avenues is key to a peaceful and secure society.

The coastal counties in general are no strangers to various forms of radicalization that ultimately lead to acts and/or associations that are violent extremism related. It is important to interrogate the extent to which early warning indicators that should have elicited early responses are identified and acted upon. Early warning in Nyumba Kumi Initiative, if properly understood and used in mitigating violent extremism, could prevent the involvement of the youth in acts of violence.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The research study will be of significance to policy makers as it will furnish them with information on the status of the level of efficacy of early warning within Nyumba Kumi Initiative in P/CVE in Kwale County. It will aim at documenting the achievements made as well as highlight existing gaps in policy regarding the aspect of early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism. Ultimately, through the research findings, the study will provide evidence-based recommendations on how to incorporate early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism programs in Kwale County.

The findings of the study will also be of importance to stakeholders involved in practical mitigation interventions in Kwale County. The stakeholders include, among others, representatives from the National Government, Kwale County Government, National Counter Terrorism Centre, Kenya Defence Forces- Counter Terrorism, National Intelligence Service and Kenya Police Service, non-state actors encompassing representatives from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) including Human Rights Groups, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Universities/College and actors from the business sector that carry out preventing and countering violent extremism programs.

The outcomes of the study will also inform the academic fraternity who are tasked with deriving new knowledge to elucidate existing phenomena. Thus, findings of the study will help to address and fill in the gaps to existing literature especially on the role early warning plays in prevention of societal challenges such as violent extremism.

Importantly, returnees and/ or those who have renounced violent extremism, mothers of violent extremism victims and a section of the local public will be critical respondents as they offer firsthand experiences. The study will equally be useful to the

research and academic fraternity as it will endeavour to fill knowledge gaps on early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism programming in Kwale County.

1.8 Delimitations of the Study

The following are the key areas that will be delimited in the study.

General Purpose/subject matter scope: The study's objective was to evaluate the Early

Warning component of Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Kwale County.

Geographical Scope:

The study was conducted in general area of Kwale County with a focus on Bongwe, Mbuani, Shamu, Mabokoni, Mlungunipa, Kibundani, Ukunda, Matuga, Diani, Tiwi, Kombani, Denyenye, Waa, Ng'ombeni, Muhaka, Mwabungo, Kinondo, Shimoni, Kibuyuni and Wasini.

Time Scope:

The study was carried out between the months of January 2021 to October 2021, Data collection phase took place in August 2021.

Methodological Scope:

Standard research theories and approaches were explored and used to inform the research. Similarly standard methods of data gathering, collation, analysis and presentation were adopted in the study.

The main respondents were drawn from both state and non-state practitioners involved in countering and prevention of violent extremism. Importantly, returnees, those who have renounced violent extremism, parents of violent extremism victims and a section of the local population were critical respondents as they offered firsthand experiences.

Additionally, the research closely interrogated alternative existing early warning mechanisms in practice in the County particularly those that have a conflict mitigation bearing. The interrogation explored the extent to which violent extremism is specifically considered thus, the gaps and, importantly, the opportunities that are available to use existing practices/approaches and (re-)frame them to be particularly sensitive to the violence indicators.

Further, the research explored the interface between the formal (state-led) and non-state (community-led) approaches in early warning in the County and how they might be in conflict and how they can mutually reinforce one another to increase their efficacy or effectiveness.

The study employed all the accepted and standard research dictums regarding voluntary participation, anonymity, age, confidentiality, among others.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

Time Scope: The timeframe for data collection was two weeks. Violent extremism issues are highly complex thus affecting general access to information. To ensure quality data was obtained from respondents. The researcher used research assistants to assist in data collection in a limited timeframe.

Geographical Scope: To ensure that the ground was covered extensively, the research assistants were used to disseminate data collection tools in hard-to-reach areas.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Overview

This chapter covers the review of literature as well as the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study.

2.2 Understanding the Evolution of Early Warning

In order to better understand the evolution of early warning in preventing and opposing violent extremism, conflict prevention should be used as a lens (Subedi, 2017). Conflict early warning, according to Nyheim, is designed to save lives (Nyheim, 2018). In the 1970s and 1980s, the globe was dealing with the break-out of intra-state conflicts, which led to the first conceptualization of early warning. State and non-state actors must be involved in the development of better early warning and response methods, which were spurred on by the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Balkan wars (Rupesinghe, 1989). In all cases, regional and international mechanisms for alerting people to human rights violations and responding to them were unable to do their jobs.

Ending the Cold War accelerated the pace of progress. An Agenda for Peace by then UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in 1995 laid out the UN's objective to recognize at the earliest possible stages, conditions that could escalate into violence and the means for responding. According to the final report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in 1997, "the circumstances that give rise to violent conflict may typically be foreseen. This was absolutely true in 1992 in Bosnia and 1994 in Rwanda." Local remedies to violent conflict and early international reactions to assist these are also highlighted in the report.

Global developments, such as the UN Panel on the United Peace Operations United Nations (2000), placed the early warning role inside UN peacekeeping. Africa's Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol mandates the construction of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to aid in the early detection and prevention of conflict. As a result of Article 12(2), early warning procedures were established in each of Africa's five regional areas (North/West/South/Central/East).

The Khartoum Declaration of 2000 endorsed the construction of a framework in the IGAD sub-region to prevent, manage, and resolve intrastate disputes. CEWARN was born as a result of this effort. The Peace and Security plan implemented by IGAD in 2016 was a significant improvement over the previous strategy, which ran from 2010 to 2014. IGAD's activities were re-aligned to the Africa Peace and Security Architecture in 2016. (APSA). A plan of action to address violent extremism was prepared by CEWARN in 2010 to expand its scope and mandate, IGAD's Peace & Security Strategy (IPSS) (Demeke & Debru, 2014).

Two opposing viewpoints muddle the issue of what early warning is supposed to accomplish. Early warning systems have been advocated by some scholars, such as Holmer (2013), as a way to anticipate the onset, escalation, or reappearance of violent conflict. Early warning analysis and lobbying for response should be kept separate, according to this school of thought. Scholars in this school of thinking also advocated for a non-political approach to early warning. Those who argued for a strong correlation between early warning analysis and effective reaction mechanisms as well as advocacy efforts across the national, regional, and worldwide spectrum argued on the opposing

side of the dispute This was in line with the conclusions of the Joint Evaluation of Rwanda (Education at a Glance, 2009).

Inconsistency, political bias, and poor coordination damaged international responses despite theoretical frameworks on how early warning and early response should be driven, according to Barrs (2006). The state-centric approach in EWER conflict management does not depict the role of non-state actors, especially in circumstances where such measures have failed, according to Smith (2003).

In the study of conflict early warning, the question of whether approaches are most adapted to anticipate and avert violent conflict became a crucial issue. The practice of early warning needed robust empirical instruments to guide it. There has been a substantial advancement in the coding of information through initiatives such as the Global Events Data Systems (GEDS) and Minorities at Risk A few qualitative conflict analysis approaches were established during the end of the 1990s, such as the Fund for Peace, the World Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

There are three generations of EWER that can be plotted. Early warning systems that date back to the 1990s are mainly housed in the headquarters of the countries involved. Indicator-based systems developed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) gather data from a number of sources and evaluate it using a variety of qualitative and quantitative approaches (OECD, 2009).

In the early 2000s, the second-generation systems began to emerge, and they have a more direct connection to the field. Networks of monitors in war zones employ these systems to collect and analyze data, drawing conclusions and making recommendations that might be used to formulate responses.

Systems of the third generation have been in operation since 2003 in conflict zones. These systems bear striking resemblance to those of the previous generation. As "first" responders to violence in the early stages of an incident, early intelligence is utilized to de-escalate situations. The systems include a network of local responders at the national level. CEWARN, ECOWARN, and the Program on Human Security and Co-Existence in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province are all examples.

Scholars and practitioners continue to investigate conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention. Whether early warning has a greater impact on conflict prevention than other preventive measures is the underlying question. It is crucial to consider the social context of indicators and the total effect on early response success (Subedi, 2017). It may be more difficult to recognize signs of violent extremism, such as "isolation," when the social norm is to keep women and men apart. Accurate forecasting, a lack of forethought and a lack of coordination with operational reactions are also cited as flaws by critics (Matveeva, 2006). However, because early warning systems are based on information that is freely available, they are unable to capture the conflicting interests of those who decide when and how to intervene.

2.3 A People-Centred Approach to Early Warning Systems (EWS)

It is clear that early warning systems (EWS) have been over-emphasized in the above literature as a top-down strategy that relies on technological innovation rather than human aspects for its effectiveness. Over time, it is impossible to ignore the human factor's role in establishing a strong early warning system. As part of a good early warning system, it needs to focus on people and their well-being rather than just being activated when something bad happens. While this may be true, a 2005 conference on disaster reduction affirmed the significance of creating systems that provide early and understandable warnings to those at risk, and the "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015" was approved. Toward the end of 2006, the Third International Conference on Early Warning (EWC III) released a checklist for early warning systems that may be used as practical guidelines for implementing the Hyogo Framework. Following the Hyogo Framework's attempts to improve early warning systems for complex societal concerns, these were later incorporated into the Sendai Framework (2015-2030). According to A/RES/69/283, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction that adopted the "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters" reiterated the importance of building systems whose warnings are both timely and understandable to those in danger.

An early warning system that follows the Sendai framework, EWC III, provides an essential checklist of four crucial criteria. Some examples include hazard awareness; a monitoring and warning service; the ability to communicate warnings; and the ability to respond. A community's current dangers and vulnerabilities can be assessed by a community's risk knowledge. As a result, it aids in the prioritization of emergency preparedness and response efforts by providing a clearer picture of the current state of

affairs. A well-functioning early warning system relies heavily on technical monitoring and alerting. It is critical to have a solid scientific foundation for making conclusions and determining why things happen the way they do. If warning services can be harmonized, they can benefit from shared institutional, procedural, and communication networks. This is the most significant consideration.

In order to be effective, warnings must be communicated and disseminated to their intended audience. The ability to respond appropriately and protect people's lives and livelihoods depends on clear signals that offer straightforward, meaningful information. Warnings must be disseminated at the regional, national, and local levels, as well as at the grassroots level. In order to achieve success, the three levels must work together effectively. The quality of the information is critical to the response. Community members need to be aware of the dangers they face and how to respond to them. Preparation and education programs are critical. To ensure the reliability of mitigation plans, they must be thoroughly practiced and tested.

When it comes to setting up an early warning system that is centered on people, the EWC III standards are straightforward and easy to understand, but they fail to explain the actions necessary to put such a system in place. In retrospect, therefore, other overriding difficulties appear when seriously evaluating the early warning system's effectiveness. The following is how the Office for the Reduction of Disaster Risk summarizes these concerns: When evaluating the effectiveness of an early warning system, effective governance and institutional frameworks cannot be disregarded. The establishment and long-term viability of solid early warning systems is guided and influenced by good governance. It serves as the foundation for the other three main aspects. When developing an early warning system, a multi-hazard approach is essential.

A wide range of factors contribute to the rise of violent extremism, as stated in the context of the discussion in the previous paragraph.

For example, unemployment, inequality, marginalization, and historical injustices are all factors that contribute to violent extremism. As a result, an early warning system's effectiveness is improved by taking a multi-faceted approach that considers all relevant factors. A multi-hazard strategy helps the public better grasp the spectrum of hazards they face and reinforces the ideal preparedness measures and warning response behaviors that are sought. The efficiency of an early warning system is also influenced by the participation of local communities. Local ownership of systems can only be achieved by direct participation by the local population. It provides a forum for grassroots actors to understand their threats and devise remedies.

Gender and cultural diversity must be taken into account while building early-warning systems. This is due to the fact that men and women, as well as boys and girls, confront a variety of risks and vulnerabilities. As a result, people have varying amounts of access to information and resources. Keeping an eye on these facts can assist reduce the use of group-specific methods to early warning systems that cater to their specific demands. Finally, the fight against violent extremism cannot be won solely by the federal government. In the development of an early warning system, it is critical to assess the strengths and limitations of various stakeholders and how they can work together to reach a common goal. Actor mapping provides this chance.

Community involvement in security is at the heart of the Nyumba Kumi Initiative. There has been a marked decrease in crime rates in several parts of the country since the

initiative's beginning (Ngigi, 2018). Coastal counties, such as Kwale County, are an exception to this rule. Nyumba Kumi's discrepancy in achievement raises the question of why. In the words of Baudoin et al. (2016), the nature of a threat can influence community engagement. There were four EWC III items that were examined as part of this study. This will aid in the evaluation of the Nyumba Kumi Initiative's early warning system in Kwale County.

2.4 Combatting Violent Extremism and the Place of Early Warning in Kwale County

The underlying causes and drivers of violent extremism are not only emanating from challenges in the security sector but date back to the county's dynamic history of power, politics, and marginalization. Land ownership has long been a contested debate in Kwale County and often escalates into violence between indigenous communities and immigrants. This was clearly exemplified during the 1999 Kaya Bombo clashes. These historical grievances have bled disparate groups and formations that claim to fight for the rights of the indigenous community. In particular, the emergence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in 1999 was pivotal as it called for the cessation of the entire coastal region. According to Shauri (2017), it is the politicization of the relationship between the indigenous communities and immigrants that largely contributes to violence.

In the communication dictum, Shauri (2017) observation can be very well understood through (Krippendorff, 2009) explanation on the concept of otherness. The relationship between indigenous communities in Kwale County and immigrants is important in understanding how the majority and minority identities are constructed. It also informs on social ordering within a society. This is because the representation of different groups within any given society is controlled by groups that have greater

political power in this case the immigrants. Mead (1934) further argues that social identities are created through ongoing social interaction with other people and subsequent self-reflection about who we think we are according to these social exchanges. The perception by the indigenous community in Kwale County that the immigrants are the cause of their marginalization therefore explains their discordant relationships.

A study carried out by Search for Common Ground in 2018 summarized that the drivers to violent extremism in Kwale County emanate from social issues. According to the survey, 21.1% cited drug related conflict, 11.6% land, 9.4% crime while (4.75%) cited religious differences as drivers of the violence. At 46% respondent tally, land issue was seen as the biggest contributor to conflict. Interesting to note is the seemingly low percentile elucidated by the respondents who perceived the role of religion in propagating violent extremism. This continues to expound on the 'Good vs Bad' religion debate. Kruglanski et al. (2018) contend that the terms radicalization, extremism, and religious fundamentalism have been used interchangeably to imply a strict interpretation of scriptures often associated with a particular political agenda.

Arena and Arrigo (2005) observe that the nexus between violent extremism and religion is that it comprises ideological beliefs about an obligation to bring back the political system to a form suggested by religious norms through violence. Whereas this speaks to the misinterpretation of religious teachings by violent extremist actors, other scholars like Glock and Stark (1965) have warned on the dangers of the oversimplification of the religion in furthering violent extremism. Such a generalized and crude approach has proven counter-productive and increased the divide between Muslim community and non-Muslims. The latter call for a multidimensional approach to the role of religion in violent extremism, for example, the investigation of the link between religion to factors such as life satisfaction, stress, and youth deviancy.

Still on the notion of otherness, the linkage of Islamic teachings to violent extremism has led to the profiling of Muslims as terrorists. *The Standard* for instance, recounts the crackdown of Somalis in 2014 by the Kenyan government whereby more than 3,000 people were detained in an operation aimed at flushing out Islamist militants. Not only was the move a direct infringement of human rights, but it also highlights the securitization and gross misinterpretation of the Nyumba Kumi Initiative by the security agents.

Mwakimako (2018) posits that there is a direct link between youth and violent extremism. Promundo-US (2019) continues to defend that most of the world's war is carried out by men, often young men. The youth can be seen as victims of violent extremism or as carriers of acts of violence. In both situations, they form a vulnerable group whose resilience needs to be bolstered to dissuade them from malpractices. This however does not negate the participation of violent extremism by other factions within the society. Importantly, is the role of young girls and women and the elderly who often than escape suspicion in their involvement of the violent.

In a study conducted by Munyao and Ng'ang'a (2017) to establish the effectiveness of Nyumba Kumi Initiative in security management in LungaLunga sub county, findings revealed that males were more comfortable to discuss issues on security than the women. This gender parity fails to reconcile the key role played by women in surveillance who are considered the overall overseers in the society. Moreover, KCPCVE (2017) indicates that violent extremism in Kwale County can be attributed to the linkages with the MRC activities and/or influenced by Al Shabaab returnees who have travelled to Somalia and either gained knowledge on the use of weapons or have been indoctrinated with extremist ideologies. As such, the efficacy of an early warning framework must

consider the different roles played by individuals in the society and factors that contribute to their vulnerability to violent extremism recruitment.

In 2016, Kenya launched the National Counter Terrorism Strategy to combat violent extremism in a bid to respond to Al-Shabaab terror attacks (Ogada, 2017). The strategy laid out a roadmap on how the government would interact with the local public, CSOs and other stakeholders to combat violent extremism. Subsequently, counties developed their own Action Plans (CAP) to inform how they would address violent extremism and acts of terror at the grassroots level. Indeed in 2017, Kwale was the first county to launch its CAP. This symbolizes the magnitude of violent extremism problem and the drive to seek innovative ways to combat it.

The Kwale Countering Violent Extremism County Action Plan (KCPCVE) was not a re-invention of the wheel so to speak but rather an effort by the county government to marshal a harmonized way of addressing violent extremism. Amongst other approaches, KCPCVE enshrines earlier approaches like the Nyumba Kumi Initiative. As one of its objectives, the 2017 KCPCVE clearly outlines six substantives guiding and interlinked stages of interventions for preventing radicalization and violent extremism. In its Chapter 3 para 9, the Action Plan posits that “...plan must include systems for monitoring and evaluating the impact of government efforts and those of grantees.” Through this, the action plan reaffirms the importance of establishing indicators in monitoring and evaluation as key to the success of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) programming. It is worth mentioning that the existence of several other measures of preventing and countering violent extremism often results in a *fog of more*¹ ‘breeding confusion amongst community, state and non-state actors on which

¹ A phrase used to refer to a situation where too much information leads to competing options, priorities, opinions, and claims that cloud judgment hence improper decision making. <https://www.toreon.com/the-fog-of-more/>

framework takes precedence. As a result, this amounts to chaos as well as duplication of efforts in some instances.

The KCPCVE (2017) was meant to be a value addition in the fight against violent extremism. However, just like the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, it fails to provide an early warning matrix through which stakeholders carrying out prevention and countering violent extremism activities in Kwale County can use. This therefore creates a gray area in harmonization of early warning activities and the necessary guiding principles of engagement. The lack of a harmonized matrix for early warning is prone to arguments on what constitutes information worthy of response. This disagreement on what is worthy information can lead to inadequate, late or no response at all rendering early warning meaningless. In the absence of such a consensus on what constitutes useful information, the study sought to find out what indicators for early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism like Nyumba Kumi Initiative are available and used. Further the study endeavors to assess the efficacy of these existing early warning indicators to churn a way forward in future preventing and countering violent extremism programming.

Some practitioners in the prevention and countering violent extremism field are concerned that the Nyumba Kumi Initiative was developed in a rush and without adequate relevant stakeholder consultations. As a result, public ownership is low (Shauri, 2017). Similarly, the 2018 Justice for Peace Report by Search for Common Ground showed that locals in Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi and Kwale had little trust in the Nyumba Kumi Initiative. In addition, the implementation of the Initiative has been hampered by a high level of mistrust between the community and state-policing agencies, which is compounded by the poor relations between the national and county governments, a situation that has not been properly and deliberately addressed by both levels of

government. While the data collected informs on reporting and response to information, they fail to clearly state the factors that attribute to the causes of these challenges. Therefore, this hinders the possibility of building effective state and non-state security partnerships that is critical for effective prevention and countering violent extremism interventions.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

2.5.1 Public Participation Theory

Theories of governance emphasize the importance of public participation, which aims to explain the involvement of stakeholders in policy, plan, or program decision-making (Freeman, 2010). Power and authority are addressed in this book. The quality and legitimacy of the public involvement process can't be judged without taking into account things like who is represented, their influence, and the strategies they use to combat exclusion (Young, 2000).

Participation provides an opportunity for participants to develop their own democratic citizenship skills, which in turn helps to produce long-term public value. Despite the fact that not all types of public engagement necessitate deliberation, it is vital to point out that not all forms of public participation are deliberative. Collaboration in public administration and planning, in which several governments, non-profit organizations, community or business entities work together to address public issues and pursue public value, is also a kind of participation (Bryson et al., 2006). As envisioned by the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, community participation can be placed in this context.

According to the authors of Renn et al. (1993), the role of public participation is essential because it helps government and the public become better educated by providing

new knowledge and new perspectives on topics, as well as motivating them to take action to solve problems. Researchers in the field of public engagement have identified a number of variables that could hinder the achievement of common objectives. Most controversial, according to Innes and Booher (2004) are public participation's validity and participation itself. The sufficiency of the representation, the technical workability of the decision outcomes, and the perceived procedural fairness of the process all contribute to the legitimacy of a judgment. A lack of legitimacy in public engagement can alienate the people from government and impede policy implementation.

An additional theoretical lens for determining legitimacy is the quality of the process. Processes that are procedurally just and procedurally rational are more likely to be of high quality. Whether or to what extent a process represents democratic ideals including fairness, transparency, responsiveness to stakeholders' concerns as well as public engagement is considered in the context of procedural justice. As a result, actors are more likely to accept the decisions they make.

Nyumba Kumi Initiative has been avoided in Kwale County, for example, since the community is afraid of being targeted. It was revealed in the 2018 Search for Common Ground report, that citizens have reported incidences of inexplicable killing and abductions by security officers. The government's response to early warning information is tainted by ethical and morality difficulties, which undermines the effort itself. Procedural rationality assumes that actors' final decisions make sense on a variety of grounds, such as technical, administrative and legal, ethical and stakeholder backing.

Trust is linked to the legitimacy of a process as well. There are high payoffs to incorporate and manage power to ensure that marginalized groups have an impact on the process, the quality of decisions and successful execution of decisions, even when trust is an issue in a varied set of interests (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). The foundation of successful community participation is built on trust between stakeholders. The initiative's beneficiaries must have complete faith in the initiative's ability to preserve and respond to information in a manner that is beneficial to the public. The local populace in Kwale has viewed the security agents as enemies because of rumors of abductions, kidnappings, and enforced disappearances.

Diversity and inclusion are also important aspects of this topic. A major difficulty in participation is to ensure that all stakeholders, especially those traditionally excluded from decision-making due to systemic injustices, are represented in the process (Young, 2000). Too frequently, "consulting" with the public to get input or simply allowing people to express their opinions is how public engagement is framed instead of debating and generating new understandings together. In order to ensure that under-represented and disadvantaged groups have a seat at the table, stakeholders analysis and active conflict and power management are necessary. Inclusion and exclusion are frequently employed in connection to the ethnic, racial, gender, or socioeconomic diversity of the persons participating in public involvement, according to Ibid (2000).

To put it another way, this focuses attention on the status of those participating in a participation process. In addition, it may be linked to worries about the participants' socioeconomic diversity and how it compares to the people who have a stake in the decision. Rethinking inclusion as a practice of engaging diverse views to uncover new

insights into challenges, resources, and solutions is a complementary theoretical viewpoint (Quick & Feldman, 2011). Inclusion, according to this perspective, requires a constant effort to reconcile divergent viewpoints, identities, institutional boundaries, and conceptualizations of issues.

The third factor is expertise and involvement. Concerns regarding whether logical outcomes can be achieved and legitimized by public engagement are commonly raised by a wide range of viewpoints. Expertise in governance is the subject of a wide range of debates. In spite of this, it's critical to recognise that the sympathetic, experienced understandings articulated through public engagement incorporate significant information and values into decision-making processes and can serve as a vehicle for crucial civic learning needs (Ansell, 2011).

It's not easy to design a participative process. No method exists for a successful involvement. There are a number of factors to consider when looking at how people participate in a process. These include things like how easily people can access the area for participation and how representative participants are.

Design science offers a new viewpoint on how to select the optimal resources, methodologies, or procedures for a given challenge. It focuses on reaching desired outcomes in real-world circumstances that are difficult to solve. Knowledge based on evidence is used to make decisions based on a variety of settings (Romme, 2003). This is why design science emphasizes the importance of including the general public in the process of creating new procedures (Bryson et al., 2013). Finding evidence-based early warning techniques for combating violent extremism was the goal of this project.

Theories about community involvement in the political process are helpful, but there are two areas that could benefit from further research. According to Huxham and Vangen (2005), it's easy to mistake the quick development in the popularity of collaborative governance for an easy or good answer to a difficult set of difficulties. Furthermore, public participation is not always feasible, and may not be necessary. There is also a concern about the impact of increasingly dispersed systems of governance on public engagement chances. It is possible that this new form of governance may allow for greater public participation in the design and implementation of public policy. Concerns about where and how public participation can take place to ensure accountability, openness and responsiveness of these governance actors have been raised as a result of the changes in the governance structure.

2.5.2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework is an interrelationship of the independent and dependent Helmenstine (2019) variables with intervening Crossman (2019) variables that may confound the findings of the study requiring to be mitigated in the research process. Independent variables are those that stand alone, that is, they are not affected and/or changed by other factors. Under these we have the state and non-state security structures and Nyumba Kumi Initiative governing early warning and violent extremism in general.

Dependent variables represent variables that rely on other factors to change. Simply put, changes or attributes of dependent variables are determined or are influenced by the nature and type of the independent variables. Under this are the early warning mechanisms in preventing and countering violent extremism, coordination and public participation.

On their part, intervening variables are taken as those variables that determine the degree, nature and extent to which the dependent variables can change depending on the prevailing independent variables (Helmenstine, 2019). The intervening variables for this study that may confound the level of efficacy of EWER mechanisms are resource allocation, coordination, capacity building, awareness campaigns, amnesty, community resilience and leadership.

The Figure 2.1 below is a graphical depiction of the interconnectedness and interdependence of the study variables.

Independent Variables

- State Security structures
- Non-state structures
- Community structures
- Policies, rules and regulations

Intervening Variables

- Resource Allocation
- Capacity Building
- Community Resilience
- Leadership
- Awareness campaigns

Dependent Variables

- Level of efficacy in Early Warning



Figure 2. 1 Study Variables

Source: Author (2021).

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Overview

This chapter covers the description of the study site and research methodology that informed the conduct of the study. The chapter also covers the study population, the sampling procedures and sample size determination. It sheds light on the data collection tools and techniques as well as the aspects of validity and reliability. Further, the chapter addresses how the collected data, quantitative and qualitative, was analyzed. The chapter also highlights the ethical considerations of the study.

3.2 Study site




Figure 3. 1 Kwale County

Kwale county is domicile to an estimated population of 866,820 (Kenya Data Census, 2019). Of this population 80% are indigenous Mijikenda community particularly the Digo sub- tribe, of whom 75% are Muslims (IPSOS Survey, 2013). The poverty level is high and is characterized by high inequality. Indeed, according to the Human Development Index Report (2014), nearly half of all households in the area live on less than Ksh.10, 000 (US\$100) per month.

The county boasts of luxurious tourist hotels and breath-taking scenery that are key to Kenya's foreign exchange earnings through assorted tourist activities. Besides tourism, other existing economic activities include titanium and limestone mining, glass making, sand and sugar manufacturing. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2014) reveals that only 51% of the population have completed primary school, which leads to outsourcing of labor thus reinforcing the problem of unemployment and inequality.

The county also has a history of marginalization of indigenous people which is a common impetus for radicalization and violent extremism (Mutuku et al., 2017). In research carried out by Mutuku and Opondo (2020), a youth correspondent denoted that – violent extremism is so much ingrained in the County that it felt like “sleeping with a snake in the same bed.” Human- wildlife interaction in many instances leads to conflict. Snake bites from certain species for example are extremely venomous and may result to death if not timely attended to (Anon, 2005). As such, the allusion of violent extremism problem to sleeping with a snake in the same bed denotes the catastrophic impact that may befall the society owing to the violence.

The study site included the following areas within Kwale Cuntty; Bongwe, Mbuani, Shamu, Mabokoni, Mlungunipa, Kibundani, Ukunda, Magutu, Diani, Tiwi, Kombani, Denyenye, Waa, Ng'ombeni, Muhaka, Mwabungo, Kinondo, Shimoni,

Kibuyuni and Wasini. These areas were carefully chosen to mirror the current shifting trends and patterns that have seen increased violent extremism activities.

3.3 Research Design

The study deploys a cross-sectional descriptive survey research design. According to Raimundo et al. (2018), guided by the research questions, this research design is the most ideal because: First, the study is based on occurrences that have already occurred. Second, the desired sample is already existing in their environment. Finally, researchers can barely manipulate the environment within which the desired sample resides. Thus, they will study phenomena exactly as it occurred.

3.4 Study Population

The study population was drawn from both state and non-state practitioners involved in preventing and countering violent extremism. Under the state actors, the study specifically targeted respondents from the following institutions: National government; (Village elders, Ward Administrators, Chiefs and County Commissioner). Kwale County Government (County Implementation Committee). National Counter Terrorism Centre. Kenya Defense Forces- Counter Terrorism Branch. Kenya Police Service (Anti-Terror Police Unit and Community Police),

Respondents from the non-state actors encompassed representatives from the following institutions: Beach Management Units (BMUs). International Organization for Migration (IOM). Human Rights Agenda (HURIA). Human Development Agenda (HUDA). Ummah Initiative Group (UIG). Kwale Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA). Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC). Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE). Kwale Women and Teens Care

Importantly, returnees and/ or those who have renounced violent extremism together with parent victims of violent extremism children and a section of the local population were critical respondents as they offered firsthand experiences.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

A sample size should be efficient, representative, reliable, and flexible to produce optimum desired results in research (Kothari & Garg, 2014). To generate qualitative data, the study employed Malterud et al. (2015) *principle of information power* held by respondents to inform the objectives of the study. The researcher investigated information power of the respondents based on their specificity of experiences and knowledge, quality of data and accessibility in carrying out early warning and early response in preventing and countering violent extremism as directed by (Morse, 1991). Braun and Clarke (2013) recommend a maximum of 4 FGDs, 50 participants generated knowledge and 100 respondents for secondary data as sufficient for optimum results in qualitative research.

The saturation principle coined by Glaser and Strauss (1999) where every new observation is compared with previous analysis to identify similarities and differences formed the justification of the number of participants to be used in quantitative collection of data. Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) contend that it is unclear how researchers arrive at numbers of respondents to qualify as small, medium, or large research projects.

However, this study adopted Fofana et al. (2013) standpoint that a sample of 12 interviews is sufficient to achieve saturation of knowledge in a small or medium research. This was a medium research study and therefore endeavored to interview 12 KIIs for an in-depth and knowledge-based perspective of the subject matter. Additionally, borrowing from Braun and Clarke (2013) recommendation, the research study interrogated respondents from 3 FDGs comprising of 8 participants each as well as 150 different

preventing and countering violent extremism stakeholders engaging in early warning activities.

Since the nature of the study dwells in early warning mechanisms in preventing and countering violent extremism, the study deliberately selected sample representation based on non- probability sampling design (Kothari, 2014). This sampling design is ideal due to the relative advantage of time and resources since the number of actors working on early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism is relatively small, thus the element of bias was low.

Purposive, expert, convenience and snowball sampling techniques were applied to select knowledgeable respondents who provided the richest information which was critically analyzed by the researcher based on the public participation theory adopted (Patton, 2015). Specifically, purposive, and expert sampling were applied in determining the key informants whose choice is based on in-depth knowledge that they possess. Key informants were drawn from state security agencies as well as CSOs dealing with early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism. Convenience and snowball techniques were applied to determine respondents who have experienced violent extremism such as the returnees, violent extremism renouncers and parents of violence victims for firsthand account.

3.6 Data Collection and Analysis

The capacity of the mixed methods approach to overcome the drawbacks of qualitative and quantitative research has made it popular in scientific study (Creswell, 1994). Qualitative and quantitative approaches, or methodologies, can be used in a single study to gather and analyze data, integrate findings, and draw conclusions (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007).

As a result, a mixed-methods approach to data collection and analysis was used to aid in comparison analysis, particularly in tracking correlations between concepts and variables highlighted during the fieldwork. Field visits/observations included desk reviews, interviews with key informants, and focus groups. To collect data, an interview guide was used in conjunction with audio recorders, which were used only when necessary. Semi-structured, non-disguised interviews were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data from the participants listed in the sample size.

Microsoft Excel and SPSS (version 23) software were used for data analysis. Nyumba Kumi's early warning system was evaluated using rubrics in a research. Effectiveness can be measured using rubrics, which define standards for an actor's work and performance level descriptors across many quality levels (Andrade, 2000). Requirements describing what to look for in a piece of work and descriptions of how those criteria are manifested in a variety of quality levels, from poor to high, are the focus here.

Studying early warning in Nyumba Kumi based on Sendai framework 2015-2030's four elements of risk knowledge; technical monitoring and warning service; communication; and community reaction capabilities was the goal of the project.

Qualitative data was transcribed and organized into topic areas based on the study's aims. Whenever necessary, descriptions were added in the presentation of qualitative data.

3.7 Validity and Reliability of the study

To assure the veracity of the research the four key aspects applicable in qualitative research –credibility, dependability, transferability, and conformability-that are necessary to establish trustworthiness guided the design of all the tools, methods

and approaches applied in the research. Triangulation – use of multiple methods, data sources, theories-and validation – sharing the data, interpretations, and conclusions with relevant stakeholders-were the two main techniques used to clarify, correct errors and fill in data gaps (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). In addition, the study conducted pre-test, member checks and cross referencing to increase reliability of the results. Once this was done, the research findings were regarded as sufficiently robust, consistent and comprehensive and thus guaranteed their validity and reliability ensuring study replication.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Authority to conduct the research study was sought from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). Consequently, the study was undertaken upon approval by NACOSTI and the County Government of Kwale. In addition, the Kwale County Commissioner was alerted of the presence of the research team as well their intent and activities.

Participants were briefed on the aim of the study by the researchers as well as on the issues of confidentiality and use of information. Data collection from participants proceeded once they gave informed consent. Information is contained in the transmittal document. Consent applies in the event where sensitive data is to be used. Moreover, sources were concealed for confidential purposes. The findings of the study will be disseminated through the University of Nairobi guidelines. A publication will be made where feasible.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Overview

This chapter outlines the field research findings from a total of 200 respondents who participated in the study.

4.2 Characteristics of the Respondents

Demographic analysis is central in research because it connects the dots to how populations interact with existing phenomena (Landry, 1945). In this case, gender representation, age, level of education, type of employment, religion and residence helped to draw meanings on the relationship of the respondents to the dynamics of early warning and early response in preventing and countering violent extremism in Kwale County.

Of the respondents, 59% were male while 41% were female even though women in Kwale County make up 51% of the entire population. Morgan (2000) argues that male dominance is a characteristic of nearly all societies. The providence role customarily lies with the men as such they act as the head of the household. This transcends to the political, economic as well as cultural spheres. Masculinity, therefore, is culturally associated with power – a seemingly natural, even biologically determined, quality required to organize society and the state. Morgan's inferences about male dominance in security thus helps to understand the lesser participation by women in this research study. Additionally, the outlook in gender representation further confirms Munyao and Ng'ang'a (2017) findings that men are more willing to discuss security issues as illustrated in the literature review. Thus, the failure to reconcile women's willing participation undermines the key role they play in security matters.

Census (2019) reveals that 29% of Kenya's population is made up of the youth. Generally, the youth make up the biggest population in most counties. 50% of the respondents were between the ages of 18-29 years, 32% were between 30- 35 years, while 18% were 35 years and beyond. Furthermore, 82% of the respondents strongly believed that they could contribute towards early warning and early response in preventing and countering violent extremism within the community.

41% of the respondents had attained tertiary level of education while 24% had reached secondary level. It is worth mentioning that 20% of the respondents had no formal educational background. The responses from this sect of population would be critical in informing the recommendations on early warning in preventing and countering violent extremism in Kwale County. This is because, 20% is no small feat as it is a representation of the larger population. Moreover, lack of formal education increases the vulnerability of individuals to violent extremism propaganda. Notably, 76% of the population took to informal employment whereas 13% was private sector and 11% in formal employment. However, the study was unable to show any causality between the respondents in informal employment with the 41% of those who had reached tertiary education level.

As earlier indicated in the literature review, Islam is the most commonly practiced religion in Kwale County. As such, 86% of the respondents were muslims, 14% christians, while 10% encompassed others. Violent extremism is an everchanging phenomena. Whereas the 2017 Kwale County Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism listed violent extremism hotspot areas, this has changed over the years. Trends in patterns and events have seen the mushrooming of new areas. This necessitated a shift on the areas of focus on data collection as illustrated in the figure 4.1 below.




Figure 4. 1 Ward Representation

Specifically, the research targeted the following areas: Bongwe, Mbuani, Shamu, Mabokoni, Mlungunipa, Kibundani, Ukunda, Magutu, Diani, Tiwi, Kombani, Denyenye, Waa, Ng’ombeni, Muhaka, Mwabungo, Kinondo, Shimoni, Kibuyuni and Wasini.

4.3 Status of Violent Etremism Prevalence in Kwale County

To situate early warning in Nyumba Kuni Initiative as a prevention of prevention and countering violent extremism mechanism, the study first interrogated how the target population understood the problem of violent extremism in the County. The study focused on the status of the violence prevalence, the drivers of the violence, forms of violent extremism witnessed and at-risk groups. The study employed the use of a Likert scale to assess the prevalence of violent extremism. This also provided for an assessment of the opinions, attitudes on the drivers and forms of violent extremism for the researchers to operationalize the findings.




Figure 4. 2 Status of Violent Extremism Prevalence

55% of the respondents rated the prevalence of violent extremism as medium. It is worth mentioning that from the 3 Security agencies interviewed, 2 rated violent extremism prevalence as high. The medium rate of the violence cases is largely attributed to a seemingly calm episode. Feedback from a KI stated that:

‘Right now, the situation is lull I can say. We have not experienced a lot of violent extremism cases, but then again, we don’t know what is cooking. Wajua Kimya pia kina mshindo.’ (KI 5, 20 August 2021)

The phrase *‘Kimya kingi kina mshindo’* loosely translates as *‘Too much silence comes with a bang’*. The prevailing calmness draws two underpinnings. One part could allude to intensified sensitization campaigns by various violent extremism actors thus behaviour change. The other part could indicate the possibility of eminent threats. In both inferences, the current activities, and future plans of violent extremism actors cannot be very well deduced. The inability to inform on violent extremism actors further show the importance of having a robust early warning framework. These echoes Matveeva (2016) standpoint that a weak early warning mechanism may result to inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events and track new patterns.

Subsequently, this was addressed when analyzing the ability Nyumba Kumi Initiative to inform on eminent threats.

The study also sought to find out how the forms of violent extremism witnessed in Kwale County were perceived.




Figure 4. 3 Forms of Violent Extremism

Gaps in the literature highlighted on the problem between crime- terror nexus. Clarke and Newman (2016) contended that even though the two are overlapping, the point of deviation is based on motivation. Most criminals do not use ideology to justify their actions, unlike violent extremists whose motivation for violence is often the furtherance of a political or ideological cause. Most importantly, not until a terror group confirms participation in an act of violence, then it is difficult to differentiate between the two.

This polarization is demonstrated by the sentiments of a KI respondent who claimed that *'Most of the targeted people are real suspects'* (KI 10, 24 August 2021). What this means is that even though the majority in the community might lay blame on the security agencies, there are those among them who believe that the general populace and/or certain members are active perpetrators of violent extremism. This therefore points to the need of clear understanding and deduction of specific community and individual potential or active roles in violent extremism for purposes of developing viable mitigation approaches including aspects of early warning and that if necessary are targeted. An early warning framework with a clear understanding of the indicators therefore becomes

critical in differentiating acts of violent extremism from general crime. The characteristics exhumed by perpetrators, therefore, becomes fundamental in early warning as we shall see further below.

44% of the respondents strongly perceived abductions, enforced disappearances and mysterious killings as linked to manifestation of violent extremism. The debate around the aforementioned is highly contested and many a times results to polarization between the community and government. On their part, the community allege that their members are wrongfully targeted by the government. However, the government continues to affirm zero tolerance and non-participation in enforced disappearances and extra judicial killings. It is significant to note that mysterious killings were not only perceived to be targeted to community members by security agencies but also the security agencies pointed towards attack on their officials such as village elders and local administrators. The inability to reconcile claims of abductions, enforced disappearances and mysterious killings further highlights how existing approaches contribute to a polarized community between members and the security agencies.

The rise in juvenile gangs provides an impetus for increased vulnerability to violent extremism. In a KII discussion, the respondents hinted that there could be about 100 criminal gangs. (KII 11, August 25, 2021, Mombasa).

Similarly, another respondent remarked that:

'Juvenile gangs coupled with the use of drugs provide an ideal ground for violent extremism recruitment and increase of acts of terror because the young people who are already exposed to crime are more vulnerable to fall into violent extremism.' (KII 7, August 23, 2021, Diani)

Reference to literature review highlight that the drivers of violent extremism in Kwale County not only emanates from the push and pull factors but also underlying causes such as historical injustices (Shauri, 2017). The survey found that the most cited drivers of recruitment to acts of violent extremism are social issues as illustrated by the

figure below. Unemployment remains the biggest contributor to actors joining violent extremism. From the FDG discussion, participants cited victims were unknowingly lured into acts of violent extremism through the promise of employment.




Figure 4. 4 Drivers of Violent Extremism

The study further established that there was a growing motivation into violent extremism due to revenge. Participants cited that family members of those mysteriously killed or disappeared were frustrated in their quest for justice and thus resorted to carrying out acts of violent extremism to avenge their loved ones. Revenge as a driver of violent extremism has gained traction as it often creates a cycle of retaliation, in part because one person’s moral equilibrium rarely aligns with another’s.

With the foregoing observation in mind, the study sought to find out how the community addressed psycho-social issues to individuals at risk as a preventive mechanism to avoid them from falling victims of violent extremism. One KII respondent affirmed that ‘There are gaps in dealing with trauma healing and mental wellness for violent extremism victims and suspects’ (KII 10, 24 August 2021). A mother whose son was killed for suspected violent extremism noted that:

‘Ni ngumu na inauma sana. Manake sasa mwanangu alishauwawa. Na tena bado kuna kero la polisi wananiandama. Ndugu zake huyo aliyekufa naye wanachuki sana na serikali. Siwezi kupiga ripoti yeyote kuhusiana na maswala hayo ama

sivyo wanangu hawa waliobaki pia watapotezwa. Serikali haijanisaidia kwa viovioe; (It is difficult and it hurts. This is because now my child has been killed. In addition, I am still being frustrated by the police who continue to pursue me. The siblings of the one who died harbor hatred towards the government. I cannot make any report in regard to this subject matter otherwise the remaining children will equally be targeted. The government has not helped me in anyway (Anonymous, 20 August 2021).

The lack of appropriate and adequate psycho-social support to both perpetrators and survivors represents a significant gap both to the healing process of both, acceptance and reconciliation in the wider community. This means that a hurting community is less amenable to any overtures for openness, sharing of information, cooperation or adoption of strategies aimed at mitigating violent extremism or early warning and especially if the same has any connection with the government, national and county, and more specifically the security arms of either.

39% of the respondents regarded the youth between 18-24 years as being the most vulnerable to violent extremism. Additionally, 33% of the respondents suggested those vulnerable were between the ages of 25-35 years. This finding further validates previous research on the vulnerability of youth in violent extremism.




Figure 4. 5 At Risk Members




Figure 4. 6 Reasons as to why they are at risk

The debate around youth involvement in violent extremism is not new as illustrated in literature. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) contend that there is a strong correlation between age and criminal behavior. Erik Erikson (1963) further postulates that it is the socio-emotional factors that influence a person’s growth and not the age factor. He argues that the age group between 19-40 years undergo the most psycho-social crisis thus individuals are forced to come up with coping mechanisms. Precisely, individuals within 19-40 years explore their issues of identity and ability to intimate thus informing the lasting relationships that they forge.

In Kwale County, youth would meet in groups in spaces referred to as *maskanis* (<https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/maskani>) to discuss their issues. Undeniably, Saferworld (2018) noted that youth in Kwale County had limited platforms to air out their frustrations. As such, this made such places a breeding ground for recruitment.

During a KII brief, a P/CVE expert observed that: ‘Currently we are not even focusing on P/CVE because that is also subjective. Our organization is more inclined to transforming violent extremism (TVE). We are taking our activities to the Maskanis because that’s where the youth are. We want to transform such places... to pre-occupy the youth with sound activities in their own environments to dissuade them from taking part in VE activities and other crimes.’ (KI 3, August 17, 2021, Kombani).

Two key themes can be deduced from the above remarks. First and foremost, the phrase '*we are taking our activities to the maskanis*' implies the non-qualification of *maskanis* as being bad. As a result, it provides actors with an opportunity to communicate with vulnerable groups and victims on their own terms. Secondly, the concept of transformation is introduced as a way to combat violent extremism. Transformational approaches are based on a positive attitude toward conflicts and an openness toward participating in them (Lederach, 2003). An opportunity exists for performers to extract deeper meanings out of violent extremism and how constructive change might be achieved. In a nutshell, countering is the act of opposing something. When it comes to conflict, there are three perspectives that can help us make sense of it, according to Lederach (2003). The first is the ability to observe the immediate situation through a lens that allows for direct involvement and a better knowledge of violent extremism.

For the second time, the lens to look beyond the immediate issues and understand the deeper relational patterns that form the background of violent extremism is available. In order to get to the root of the issue, this extends beyond finding easy fixes to the situation at hand. For example, the government's securitization tactics have been counterproductive in combating violent extremism. There are three lenses that can be used in conjunction with each other to construct an overall framework to address the content, context and structure of a relationship. Actors can begin to think creatively from this platform.

Because of the many facets of Islam that complicate and complicate fighting violent extremism, it is important to avoid a problematization of Islam. A difficult issue among scholars and practitioners of preventing and countering violent extremism is the role of religious doctrine in promoting violent extremism. Misinterpretation of religious teachings is the driving force behind violent extremism rather than religion as a stand-

alone. 75 percent of Kenya's Muslim population lives in Kwale County, as previously stated (IPSOS, 2013). However, a lack of fundamental Islamic teachings has led to the indoctrination of Muslims despite the fact that most of the population is Muslim. A remark from a field respondent stated that:

'Ingawa Kwale kuna waislamu wengi, wengi wao hawajui Dini kabisa, ni uislamu wa juu juu. Sasa utapata watu kama hao ni rahisi sana kupotoshwa'. (From General Questionnaire)

The statement above loosely translates to *'although there are many Muslims in Kwale, most of them do not know the religion at all, it is a superficial Islam. Now you will find such people are very easy to be deceived'*

Several things can be inferred from this observation. They include a warning on the hazards of categorically condemning Islam as a source of violent extremism. As a result, despite the fact that they may be Muslims, they are not necessarily extremists in the truest sense. Violent extremism is practiced by a small number of people who are either ignorant of the rules of their religion or are motivated by factors unrelated to their religious beliefs. There are numerous advantages in employing religious institutions as an access point and important partners in reducing violent extremism and providing early warning. We must help pastors and other religious leaders communicate and teach the appropriate things in order to counteract the vices they preach about. As a result of this backing, those who are vulnerable to incorrect teaching or misinterpretation will turn to these preachers first and foremost.

It is vital to take note of these narratives because they link directly to major push and pull elements described in the research and translate them into recruitment techniques. Only by addressing the fundamental causes of violent extremism can the problem be entirely eradicated.

4.3 Level of Early Warning Awareness on Nyumba Kumi Initiative as a P/CVE Mechanism

The first objective of the study objective was to find out the level of early warning awareness on Nyumba Kumi Initiative in Kwale County. Besides, the study also sought to find out whether there were alternative homegrown early warning mechanisms used by the community.

To achieve this, the study probed respondents' understanding of what early warning meant and the indicators used when identifying individuals at risk of violent extremism. The study found out that there was a general understanding of what early warning means with many alluding it to '*ishara*' the *early tell-tale signs*.

Even though there was a general understanding of what early warning meant, respondents found it hard to conclusively agree to indicators of violent extremism. For example, during a (FGD 2, 24 August 2021), participants debated on the aspect of growing the beard as being associated to violent extremism. They saw this as profiling because Sunna teachings of Islam provides for growing beard among the male faithful to emulate the life of the Prophet Muhammad S.A.W. In this case, participants noted that at the height of intensified crackdown of violent extremism suspects by security agencies, those who wished to grow their beards had to sign a book as a sign of authorization. They saw this as a direct infringement on their freedom to worship. This highlights the securitization of early warning policies in preventing and countering violent extremism thus informing their counter productiveness. Further, such occurrences in effect, are exploited terrorist actors for their own gains. As Saferworld (2018) points out, terrorists want to exploit the divisiveness that results from such acts in order to attract new recruits.

Some of the most widely accepted signs of violent extremism include isolation, increasing online activity, and admiration for sacrifice. Social networking platforms,

internet video channels, and radical chat rooms are being used by violent extremists to find new means of interacting with disenchanted youth. In general, they are able to communicate their message more quickly, more effectively, and easier than governments.

Early warning symptoms of violent extremism were a more pressing worry. Early warning indicators could not be identified using a consistent methodology. Violent extremism has many forms and indications, and identifying them can be a challenge because of the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes it. In addition, there are a number of anti-extremism efforts, such as the Kwale CVE Engagement Forum (CEF) and community policing, that compete with one other, causing further uncertainty. Violent extremism is always evolving and acquiring new powers and forms. They have the ability to take over vast areas of land, create enormous resources (such as kidnappings and illegal trade), and use social media to spread their message. They can also use these technologies to spread their ideology. Violence-inducing tendencies and methods are expanding at an equal pace. A wider range of beliefs are now being used as inspiration for violent extremism, and its operations are no longer the sole realm of huge, centralized and hierarchical organizations (UNODC, 2016).

As the threat has grown to include smaller organizations, cells, and lone individuals, it has become more and more difficult to forecast how they would respond. There are new emergent tendencies in Kwale County, including as the relationship between juvenile gangs and acts of violent extremism, particularly in the Bongwe, Denyenye-Gombe-Gombo area. They plot their attacks with little or no guidance from an organization, making it even more difficult to prevent them from happening. The above was clearly reiterated during a KII session. The key informant remarked:

‘The gangs are made up of very small boys and not even more than 5. Just recently around Denyenye, in fact the one commanding them had hardly finished

standard 8. Yet he was commanding the rest with bows and arrows ready to attack.’ (KI 11, August 8, 2021).

The lack of a harmonized system can further be illuminated by a KII who uses early warning in addressing conflict. He indicated the lack of harmonized early warning indicators as being problematic because there exists a thin line between profiling and early indicators (KI 12, August 25, 2021, Mombasa). This further confirms the gaps in the study’s literature. He also added that acts of violent extremism can generally take the form of general crime thus becoming hard to distinguish the motivation of the acts of crimes. This continues to cement the foregoing debate among scholars of violent extremism on the challenges faced when situating and persecuting the crimes of the same.

Another cause of concern was the awareness level during recruitment cycle of individuals at risk. As earlier mentioned, violent extremism actors, over time have incorporated new forms of recruitment that are subtle as such individuals may find it difficult to know when they are being recruited. For instance, promise of job opportunities and courtship were some of the examples given. As such victims of violent extremism found themselves trapped through seeking job employment or being in romantic relationships with violent extremism actors.

Early response lies on the quality of information shared. Responses should be fashioned to mirror the push and pull factors of violent extremism as well as the trend portrayed by early warning. Respondents exhibited understanding of what early response entails. For example, some of the responses given included providing counselling services to at-risk individuals, providing livelihood skills to youth to enable them create employment, empowering the community with prevention of violent extremism knowledge and reporting extremist individuals to authorities.

The county government through the Department of Social Work, Youth and Gender has established different initiatives to enhance resilience among citizens of Kwale especially the youth and women. The Village Savings and Loans Association for example, provides an opportunity to increase economic empowerment among women. Despite the existence of several initiatives, there is still a concern in the uptake of such opportunities. The overall question lies on the rationale behind distribution of the opportunities. Kwale is among the counties with the least turnover of students from primary school to high school². Poverty largely remains a key problem. In a KII session, a subject matter expert expounded on the blanket requirements for bursary and other scholarship opportunities. According to him students from other sub counties within Kwale were left behind because they had lesser comparative advantage than the cosmopolitan areas (KI 6, August 20, 2021, Diani). *‘For instance, the conditions faced by a student in LungaLunga would not be the same faced by another in Diani or even Kombani,’* he added.

Amid the strained existing resources is the issue of exploiting existing opportunities. The contention lies in the ability of the community to recognize existing opportunities and tap into them. Marginalization and the issue of land grabbing cultivated an *Us vs Them* mentality Shauri (2017), where the indigenous Digo community viewed Kenyans from the upcountry region as outsiders. This translated into the notion that opportunities in Kwale were a reserve of the up country. However, critical analysis of the question of access to resources and opportunities reveals instances where some members of the indigenous community failed to take up job opportunities thus rendering them open for consideration by other interested citizens (FDG 2: 24/08/2021).

² A survey done by the Kwale County Government to establish the general situation of education in Kwale County. https://kwalecountygov.com/kwale/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=936

The role of education cannot be overlooked when analyzing the culture of a particular society. Religious education plays a fundamental role in the predominantly Muslim set up community in Kwale. Indeed, it is estimated that there are over 800 madrassas within Kwale county alone (KI 11: 25/08/2021). Religion, therefore, if well exploited can be a powerful unifying tool in the fight against violent extremism. In Kwale County, organisations such as the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance and Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics have used religious teachings to counter violent extremism propaganda. However, the lack of a harmonized madrassa curriculum heightens the possibilities of mushrooming radical ideologies because there is no sanctioning body that governs how religious education in madrassas is taught.

The Muslim clerical fraternity through umbrella organisations like SUPKEM and KYMA need to charter the way forward on the ultimate curriculum that can be adopted by the various Muslim denominations. The Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance has made attempts to address the gap by establishing Peace Clubs in schools. Through its peace club manual, KYMA has been able to come up with a guide on the generally accepted Muslim teachings that can be taught to students across. In addition, the organization has also established a Union for madrassas in a bid to lay the foundation towards the realization of a harmonized curriculum.

4.4 Assessing the Level of Efficacy of Early Warning in Nyumba Kumi Initiative as a P/CVE Mechanism

The second objective of the study focused on measuring the level of efficacy of early warning in Nyumba Kumi Initiative as a prevention and countering violent extremism mechanism in Kwale County. The study employed the use of rubrics to measure the level of efficacy of early warning. Specifically, the study analyzed the

following factors: technical monitoring and warning service; communication and dissemination of warnings; and community response capability (UNISDR, 2015).

To begin with, the research study sought to find out whether respondents had ever been engaged in early warning activities. Secondly, the study sought to assess the effectiveness of early warning in Nyumba Kumi Initiative.

Despite being aware of what early warning meant, the figure below reveals poor engagement of the community in its activities. 76% of the respondents had never been engaged in any early warning initiative. Of the 24%, respondents confirmed to have participated in early warning, some mentioned that this was done through training carried out by a local non-governmental organization HUDA, CVE training, participation in sports and peace barazas and participation in radio programs such as *wajibika salimika*.




Figure 4. 7 Percentage of People Engaged in EW Initiatives




Figure 4. 8 Feedback on Efficiency of Programme

For a county with the highest number of returnees (KII 9: 23/08/2021), it would be assumed that early warning through Nyumba Kumi carried out by prevention and countering violent extremism actors are both intensive and extensive. However, the figures above depict a low engagement of communities in prevention and countering violent extremism and more specifically early warning initiatives. One KI noted that there was little appreciation of the violent extremism problem in Kwale by the county government (KII 6: 20/08/2021). This in turn has affected the level of the county’s lead role in spearheading the fight against violent extremism. The KI further alluded to the fact that branding Kwale as facing violent extremism challenges by the county government may affect the economy which is heavily reliant on tourism. This further confirms Aroussi et al. (2020) position that there is a seemingly ‘denial’ of the extent of violent extremism problem.

Not only does this denial impact on the level of active engagement by the county, but it also speaks to other aspects such as provision of adequate resources to address early warning in violent extremism. In this case, both the human and financial resources are in

jeopardy. A lack of appreciation of the extent of the problem could also impact on the formulation of policies. The devolved system of governance places heavy responsibility on the county as the principal entity to steer development and policies in their areas.




Figure 4. 9 Existence of EWER Framework

96% of the respondents indicated that an early warning framework within Nyumba Kumi did not exist. A well-functioning and effective mechanism is founded on the ideals of human capital. Fundamentally, such a mechanism must be characterized by strong interwoven trust channels between those who use it and those who respond to information. Trust can be linked to the strength of three kinds of relationships; within communities; between generations; and between citizens and the state.




Figure 4. 10 Three Kinds of Trust Relationships within a Community

A well-functioning and effective early warning mechanism is founded on the ideals of human capital. Fundamentally, such a mechanism must be characterized by strong interwoven trust channels between those who use it and those who respond to information. From the literature review, Shauri (2018) echoes that poor trust relationship between community and the police can be attributed to the community's perception of the government as repressive. Reality on the ground further indicates to a deteriorating trust level. The study found out that there was over-reliance on the Nyumba Kumi Initiative as an early warning framework to prevention and countering violent extremism. This is despite the fact that there is poor level of interaction between the community and the security frameworks.

In one (FGD 26/08/2021), a village elder remarked to the area chief that he could share all information with the chief except on matters related to violent extremism. He continued to point that, *the chief will pass it over [the information] to his seniors and before he knows [sic] it, a helicopter will [sic] come hovering in search of him'* (FDG 3, 26 August 2021). Similarly, a KI, further corroborated the claim stating that '*violent extremist youth have instilled fear therefore the community is afraid. Even chiefs are scared'* (KI 10, August 24, 2021).

Even though community engagement is at the heart of a well-functioning early warning system, the role of the security apparatus cannot be overlooked. The responsibility to ensure security principally rests with the state. What is clear from the above observations by respondents is the lack of confidence between the community and security agencies and worse even among the different units of the latter. The fear expressed by the village elder signals a lack of confidentiality in the way information is handled and the response thereafter. Moreover, there seemed to be a consensus among the

participants on the role of the government in instilling fear through repression. One participant observed that *'Kwa maoni yangu, ningesema kwamba mimi naona ni kama serikali pia inachangia katika maswala haya ya ugaidi wa itikadi potofu ili kutufinyilia sisi wenyeji wa Kwale'*; *'In my opinion, I would say that I feel that the government is also contributing to these issues of terrorist ideology to stifle us, the people of Kwale'* (FDG 3, 26 August 2021).

The allegation that the government castigates violent extremism to victimize its own population is no small feat. One would beg to ask the question, why a particular sect of citizens harbor such views. An analysis of such claims highlights the critical aspect of identity and power struggles. The perception by the local citizens is that the government intentionally marginalizes them in order to disempower them. Reiterating Mead (1934) argument on the role of identity, power and social relations, there is need to appreciate that identity shapes the perceptions and behaviour of the society and directly informs their participation in social change as provided for by the early warning system checklist by (UNISDR, 2015). As such, the importance of early warning, specifically on preventive measures that foster the cultivation of restorative narratives between the community and the security agencies is important in ensuring that government initiatives are accepted and owned by the community.

Trust between prevention and countering violence extremism practitioners from Civil Society groups also expressed their frustration with the security agencies and county government. According to them, they saw their interrelationship as being skewed. A KI stated that *'Information sharing with the government agencies is one way and low. The government representatives do not give feedback on their activities. When asked, they normally say "hio ni yetu ama tuwachie sisi" (that is ours or leave that to us)* (KI 7, 23 August 2021). This contention by the security agencies confirms the one-sided

relationship between state and non-state prevention and countering violence extremism actors.

It further highlights the discrepancies in the approaches used by security agencies in implementing Nyumba Kumi Initiative and further in handling the problem of violent extremism. As stated in the literature review, in Kenya, security remains a national government function and hence the opposition by security agencies to allow for optimum stakeholder management (Githinji, 2021). Besides, Githinji (Ibid) argues that some of the issues raised to oppose involvement in managing security includes the sentiments that it amounts to interference in police work. It is worth mentioning that there is genuine fear that this skewed relationship in information sharing can lead to the civil society actors at the risk of being instrumentalized for collection of intelligence by the security agencies. For this reason, one of the KI noted that *'Information is shared to other actors on need-to-know basis'* (KI 2, 17 August 2021).

UNISDR (2015) on communication and dissemination of warnings denotes the importance of analyzed data reaching the intended audience. Clear messages containing simple, useful information are critical to enable proper responses that will help safeguard lives and livelihoods. Dissemination of warnings must mirror the regional, national as well as the grassroots levels of communication systems. Whereas the need-to-know policy aims at protecting data and making sure it only reaches the intended audience, it fails to explain the classification criteria of information used. This leaves an opportunity that cultivates notions of secrecy amongst actors and thus exacerbating mistrust. 52% of the respondents indicated that existing Nyumba Kumi Initiative used by citizens was not useful in encouraging reporting and sharing of information on individuals at risk of violent extremism. The study did not however specifically probe how existing programmes carried out the sharing and reporting of information.

4.5 Evidence-Based Early Warning Mechanisms Adaptable for Mitigating Violent Extremism in Kwale County

The final objective focused on establishing an evidence- based early warning mechanism adaptable for mitigating violent extremism in Kwale. The study investigated the alternative existing early warning mechanisms that were being used to address the violence not only in Kwale county but also elsewhere. Despite the non- existence of a harmonized framework, the study found out that the Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response mechanism (SCEWER) and the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance early warning model, can be improved on and adapted as complimentary harmonized framework to prevent and counter violent extremism.

The SCEWER is managed by a civil society organization; Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) and is operational in six counties along the coast (KECOSCE, 2021). Established in 2012, the primary focus of the system was to monitor events leading to the 2013 elections to avoid a repeat of the 2007 post election violence. Since then, the system has evolved to address other challenges such as inter ethnic conflict, disasters, crime and violent extremism. Some of the successes of the system include; for example, in Tana River, SCEWER alerts pointed out inter-ethnic clashes that erupted in 2012-2013 leaving over 100 people dead. Similarly, the system picked up the relocation of alleged Mombasa Republican Council youth from Kwale to Kilifi County (KECOSCE, Ibid). The SCEWER comprises of 5 models which comprise of field monitors, incident reporting platform, heat map, response and prevent committees , research and analysis. Through these five components, the early warning system collects information, identifies and mobilises appropriate actors and resources for preventive interventions. The

outcomes of the interventions are further assessed through joint planning, shared knowledge and best practices amongst stakeholders.

A critical analysis of the effectiveness points to the fact that although the system has been able to identify and warn on eminent crime and disasters, its success on preventing and countering violent extremism can be improved. Indication of the risk/emerging threats commonly referred to as warning signs is fashioned in a way that does not fully address the concerns as expounded in the analysis of objective two. The system receives alerts based on the activities illustrated below:




Figure 4. 11 Types of Activity Reported through SCEWER

Source: (<https://kecosces.usshahidi.io/views/map>)

This view was better expressed by a KI who stated that: *'There is a catch why the categories do not have indicators. There is a thin line between profiling and early*

indicators of VE. Some indicators when put, the Muslim community claims that they are being targeted. Then you end up having problems with them, the county...’ (KII 12, 25 August 2021)

The main issue of concern is that the early warning system encompasses six counties and is based on crimes that are prevalent in a specific region, thus a generalized categorization of activities to report on. The categorization of early warning indicators on violent extremism on SCEWER still remains a challenge. Although the system follows the *Do No Harm Approach*, the issues of vulnerability and profiling come into play thus limiting what should or should not constitute as an indicator for violent extremism.

The lack of indicators further highlights the level upto which the community has understood the problem of violent extremism and its delineation to issues such as religion. As per UNISDR (2015), a better understanding of the risk knowledge in an early warning system is fundamental as it helps with identification of signs. As such, the lack thereof translates to fear of missing out on the early tell-tale signs by the system.

The understanding of early warning system on violent extremism needs to take a different approach, one that first hinges on strong social capital and second on strong spheres of influence. The issue of trust and security of information on this system was also highlighted (KII 12, 25 August 2021). The main concern expressed is that early warning signals are channeled to a non- governmental source. Security as earlier mentioned is the primary role of the state. In such a system, issues on how and what information is shared to the security agencies becomes a subject matter of discretion bestowed on the organization. This is because KECOSCE has right of ownership of the system. As such, security agencies as well as other prevention and countering violent extremism actors may not have full leverage over the information amassed by the SCEWER.

On social capital, trust in channels of information is still problematic. The SCEWER uses a 10 digit hotline number which the community can use to report incidences. In addition, the system uses EWER contact cards bearing the numbers of local CSIC committees members to encourage a connection between citizens and security service providers (KECOSCE, 2021). Reporting of violent extremism issues through the hotline number is ineffectual. This is because of the prompting question ‘ *Where does one first turn to when faced with an issue on violent extremism?*’ The hotline number fails to answer to this. Moreover, the findings in objective two confirmed that 34% of the respondents prefer social media to air their concerns. Likewise, with security agents being subject to changing job posts within the country, this makes it hard for the early warning contact cards to be dully updated at all times rendering the cards invalid every time a security member/ members are posted to serve in other parts of the country.

Secondly, a good early warning systems is one that taps into strong spheres of influence to address violent extremism. SCEWER has been able to adapt this in the fight against the violence through the use of field monitors and prevent committees. The field monitors are community- based volunteers that are trained as peace monitors of the EWER system. They are trained by KECOSCE to be able to identify early warning signs and report through the incident reporting platform, coded SMS or phone calls. Nonetheless, the theme about security of those who interact with such systems come into play. A good warning system should ensure that the safety of those who use it and safety of vulnerable persons to the violence is guaranteed.

Whereas the safety of those interacting with SCEWER lies on the sole responsibility of KECOSCE as the primary custodian of the system, safety of vulnerable persons to violent extremism is informed by the responses as a result of the information shared. SCEWER uses a multi-stakeholder approach when it comes to early response.

The Ministry of Interior as a key stakeholder at the national level, coordination with the county commissioner as well as the county government are important stakeholders as first responders to conflict and violence at the county level.

The systems also work with other non state actors such as religious groups, civil society organizations and community based organisations. With a lack of a harmonized early response mechanism as discussed under objective two, every actor therefore becomes privy to the individual responses which are shrouded with issues of legality such as the allegations on extrajudicial killings, abductions and or enforced disappearances. This therefore, becomes the start towards harmonization of SCEWER system if adapted by all stakeholders.

Finally, being a non governmental organization, KECOSCE relies on donor funding to carry out its activities. As earlier discussed under objective two, resource planning is crucial to the effectiveness on any early warning system (UNISDR, 2015). Besides, resources speak directly to how an organization shapes and pursues its interest. It also has a direct correlation with perception of ownership, inclusivity and diversity of the system. As it is, the system is primarily sponsored by KECOSCE through external partnerships thus allowing little room for the involvement of the security agencies who are primarily tasked with ensuring security.

Unlike the SCEWER, the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KYMA) early warning model is not a system generated mechanism and is mainly used by the organisation to conduct its work in preventing and countering violent extremism. The model is comprised of youth, women and religious leaders influencers from various villages within Kwale, who are considered as change agents within the community. The framework is founded on the values and social norms of the Digo community in a bid to maximise on the positives that brings the community together (KII 11, 25 August 2021). The approach to

tap into shared identities is promising towards transforming violent extremism (Lederach, 2003). Additionally, this approach echoes the tenets of structural functionalism theory on the importance of understanding social norms to inform social interaction thus social order.

The model however, failed to provide systematized channels of communication and reporting. According to (KI 11, 25 August 2021) information is collected and shared through internal consultation with other networks. An individualistic approach by the model therefore fails to answer how harmonized information is collected, verified, analysed and disseminated to the intended audience. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the challenges on the lack of a common understanding on the violent extremism indicators and the non existence of a harmonized framework in Nyumba Kumi as discussed on objective two resurface in the actual use of the few existing frameworks.

Of major concern is the starting point as per UNISDR (2015) where the lack of a shared understanding of the concept of violent extremism has led to the cascading of different meanings of violence taken up by actors and the consequent approaches in implementing Nyumba Kumi as a prevention and countering violent extremism mechanism. However, the remaining constant factor is the reigning role of community participation in creating an efficient early warning system. If well integrated, the community offer greater hope towards nipping the extremism problem before it manifests.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Overview

This chapter covers the summary of findings, key recommendations to scholar, policy makers and practitioners of prevention and countering violent extremism in Kwale County and the conclusion of the study.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The paradox in addressing prevention and countering violent extremism is twofold. On one part lies the emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of target populations while the other rests on the dominance of hard military and security approaches. To mitigate against violent extremism and harnessing the capacities and actions of front-line communities, a common understanding of the existing threat (UNISDR, 2015) and avenues for exploitation is crucial. The study findings presented in chapter four reveal the existence of a weak early warning system in Nyumba Kumi Initiative as a prevention and countering violent extremism mechanism in Kwale County.

Yet, if well established, early warning promises benefits in addressing extremism as it denotes nipping the problem in the bud before it manifests itself. An appreciation of the problem and the opportunities for early warning should be informed by a good understanding of violent extremism concepts as espoused by state and non- state actors.

The study draws its summary as per the three objectives as follows: On the level of awareness, the study highlights that there is lack of a common understanding of the forms of VE thus the inability to differentiate between acts of general crime from acts of violent extremism. This challenge impedes the persecution of acts of violent extremism thus impacting on dispensation of justice. Second, there is inadequate understanding of

EW indicators to VE. This emanates from the perception by the community members as being targeted. Lack of harmonized understanding to what ought to be part of VE indicators further widens the divide between the government and the community members. Finally, the current EW mechanism in place through the Nyumba Kumi Initiative is unable to adequately predict emerging trends in VE.

On the second objective, the study summarizes that there is a low engagement level of the community in EW through the Nyumba Kumi Initiative. This largely emanates from the notions of the community as being targeted. Second, there is a level of 'Denial' of the extent of VE problem by the county government. The inability to acknowledge the extent of the VE problem affects the county government's goodwill and commitment to tackle the problem. This can also be seen in the low level of financial prioritization to counter violent extremism by the county government.

Third, there is low level of information sharing across the divide. Moreover, information sharing between state and non-state actors is one sided. This breeds feelings of secrecy, mistrust and use of EWER platforms to collect intelligence. Fourth, the study summarizes that communities have little knowledge on existing laws or policies on EW/PCVE. The Kwale County Action Plan is an Up- Down approach did not incorporate community participation in its formulation. As such there is little ownership of existing P/CVE policies particularly those that address EWER. Lastly, the study concludes that there is inadequate resourcing of EW initiatives through the Nyumba Kumi. The strained resources further impedes the level of preparedness of P/CVE stakeholders to respond to emerging issues on VE.

On the last objective, the study summarizes that effective adaptation of existing alternative EWER mechanisms requires cooperation among stakeholders, cultivation of

trust, involvement of all stakeholders, adequate resourcing and proper monitoring and reporting.

5.3 Recommendations

The study presents additional possibilities to enhance early warning in prevention and countering violent extremism in Kwale County. The study suggests the following recommendations for policy makers, practitioners and academia:

5.3.1 Recommendations for Policy

First, there is need for revision of the NSCVE 2016 to address the issue of harmonization of EWER activities to P/CVE. Second, the Kwale County government should initiate the establishment of a P/CVE department within county government structure that will oversee all issues on violent extremism. Further, the Kwale County government is to allocate sufficient funds towards the implementation of the County Action Plan. Finally, the Ministry of Interior should support a non-securitized approach for existing PCVE policies such as the Nyumba Kumi Initiative and delineate it from Community Policing in order to increase community ownership and trust to the existing mechanisms in P/CVE.

5.3.2 Recommendations for Practitioners

The Council of Muslim Scholars should spearhead the development of Islamic curriculum that include issues of VE/EW that can be taught in Madrassas. Second, the Kwale CVE Engagement Forum secretariat should take lead in coordinating structured harmonization of monitoring EWER activities by P/CVE actors. In addition, the Kwale CVE Engagement Forum secretariat should take lead in intensive sensitization campaigns on the County Action Plan to promote local ownership of homegrown policies.

Fourth, the Kwale county government through the Department of Social Work, Gender and Youth Affairs should increase spaces for continuous capacity building of female & youth led grassroots organizations particularly those that offer psychosocial support.

Lastly, Non- state actors in P/CVE umbrella should embrace Transformative approaches to VE in their programmes.

5.3.3 Recommendations for Academia

The University of Nairobi together with NCTC should take on active roles in leading a full range of stakeholders and actors to deliberate and expand the definition and concepts of VE and terrorism. A homegrown common understanding of the problem of VE would promote the opportunity for harmonized approaches to P/CVE.

5.4 Conclusion

Even though the peril of violent extremism is great, so is the promise for a better and secured community through sound communication approaches. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the role of early warning communication sits at the heart of the success of participatory approaches. The study has been able to highlight the gaps in literature in addressing the problem of VE through EW. Moreover, the public participation theory has helped to premise and guide the study on what ought to be put into consideration when coming up with a people centred early warning system.

Narratives are at the core of a people centred early warning system. The notions of perceived historical injustices, targeting and systemic marginalization as held by the locals in Kwale County are as painful as they are disastrous. With the dynamic nature of the war against violent extremism, actors, now more than ever there is need to embrace harmonized communication approaches that are founded on the ideals of mutual trust,

comprehension and transparency to avoid issues of secrecy, misinformed approaches and duplication of efforts. Further research from an ethnographical approach will be useful in the generation of new knowledge to solve the academic dilemma in the definition of violent extremism issues and concepts.

5.5 Recommendations for further research

The study recommends further studies on the youth political extremism, the early warning system and early response for preventing violent extremism in Indonesia, the building of local-level collaborative networks, and radicalization and violent extremism: their causes, as well as their solutions.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Your answers will be used just for this survey and will not be shared with anyone else for any reason. You are allowed to ask any questions you may have about this survey or not to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with. Your participation in the interview is completely voluntary and will only take about 30 minutes total. We hope you'll take the time to answer this survey, which will help us improve our study of the subject matter.

If so, may we proceed with the interview? YES () NO ()

Date:

BIO DATA

Gender: Male () Female () Other ()

Age: 18- 29 () 30-35 () 35 and above ()

Ability: Abled () Persons Living with Disability ()

Please state disability:

.....
Formal Education Level: None () Elementary () Secondary () Tertiary ()

Religion: Muslim () Christian () Hindu () Other ()

Location:

Ward:

Sub-county:

Profession: Formal () Private Sector () Informal ()

1. (On a scale of 0 to 5) How would you define the problem of VE in Kwale County?
.....

i) What is the status of prevalence of VE?

Low Medium High

ii) How would you describe the forms of VE witnessed?
.....

iii) What drives and triggers people into VE?
.....
.....

iv) Who are at risk members of the community?

a. 6- 10 yrs

b. 11- 17 yrs

c. 18- 24 yrs

d. 25- 35 yrs

e. 36- Above

- Why are they considered "at risk"?
.....
.....

v) How did these people and groups become at risk?
.....
.....

- How has this changed over time?
.....
.....

vi) How does the community engage with at risk community groups?
.....
.....

2. In your own words, what is your understanding of Early warning?
.....
.....
3. What do you consider as early warning signs of radicalization into violent extremism?
.....
.....
4. What would you consider as appropriate early response interventions to counter violent extremism?
.....
.....
5. Have you ever been engaged in the past in any early warning in prevention and countering violent extremism initiatives in your area?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, please cite an example of these initiatives (e.g Nyumba Kumi, CBOs, CSOs, County Government e.t.c)
.....
6. Did these programmes address early warning in identifying individuals at risk of violent extremism (VE)?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, please explain how
.....
7. Have you ever participated in any early warning initiative?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, how?
.....
8. According to you, is there a framework to guide early warning in Nyumba Kumi for your community/ organization?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, please cite an example
.....
- If yes, how would you rate its effectiveness
High: ... Above Average: Average: ... Low:
9. In your opinion, is there a harmonized framework to guide Early Warning with other actors working on PCVE in Kwale County
YES () NO ()
- If yes, please indicate the framework
.....
- If yes, how are they effective/not effective
.....
- If yes, do you feel that the framework in place is inclusive of all stakeholders in the community (youth (boys & girls) women & men, NGOs/ CBOs, Government (County & National), Faith Based Organizations?
.....
- If no, which agency is best placed to take lead in developing an inclusive framework to guide Early Warning?

-
- Why do you think they are best placed to develop an inclusive framework to guide Early Warning?
.....
-
10. Do you feel that Kwale citizens can contribute towards early warning through Nyumba Kumi in preventing and countering violent extremism in the community?
YES () NO ()
- If no, which alternative forums/ mechanisms have they used to contribute to early warning?
.....
 11. Are the prevention and counter violent extremism engagement opportunities used by citizens in your local area useful in encouraging reporting and sharing of information on individuals at risk to violent extremism?
.....
 12. What were the main issues discussed during the sessions pertaining sharing of information concerning violent extremism?
.....
 13. Are there other Early Warning interactions organized in networks or other models that coordinate youth voices?
YES () NO ()
- Mention names of some of these networks e.g (drought& famine, human-wildlife conflict, conflict, floods, disease control)?
.....
 14. How do you channel your voices and concerns regarding Early Warning in PCVE?
.....
 15. Are these voices and concerns heard and considered?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, who addresses the PCVE concerns (e.g Nyumba Kumi, County/ National Government, CSOs, Chief, Police, Faith Based Organizations)?
.....
 16. Are there certain types of information known to the community but are never reported to the relevant authorities?
- If yes, what are these types of information?
.....
- Why are they never reported or shared with the relevant authorities?
.....
 17. Do you know of any laws, policies or measures which the county government has developed in response to Early Warning in P/CVE initiatives?
YES () NO ()
- If yes, are you able to mention any of these laws, policies or measures which the county government has developed in response to Early Warning and Early Response in P/CVE initiatives?
.....
- What was the community's role in the development of these laws, policies or measures on early warning and early response mechanisms?
.....
 18. Who implements these laws, policies or measures?
.....

-
19. Specifically, what do you think should be your responsibilities within your community in regard EW in PCVE?
-
20. What would you recommend that the Government of Kenya does to fairly address gaps in Nyumba Kumi in preventing and countering violent extremism?
- National
 -
 - County
 -

APPENDIX II KII GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. How would you define the problem of VE in Kwale County?
 - What is the status of prevalence of VE?
 - How would you describe the forms of VE witnessed?
 - What drives and triggers people into VE?
 - Who are at risk members of the community? Why are they considered “at risk”?
 - How did these people and groups become at risk? How has this changed over time?
 - How does your office engage with at risk community groups?
2. Is the primacy of Early warning crucial in your PCVE initiatives?
 - Are there any EW indicators that you use to identify VE cases? If yes, which are they?
 - In your opinion, are these indicators harmonized across all the PCVE actors?
 - What are the national and county legislations and policies on Early warning that influence positively and negatively VE? Why?
 - What have been the Early response initiatives taken to respond/ prevent VE?
 - Who coordinates these actions? Where?
 - How would you describe the effectiveness of the coordinated actions (May be on a scale of 0 to 5 rate them separately). Please explain why you would rate the effectiveness.?
 - What challenges have you faced in the collection, analysis, verification and dissemination of information on VE? (Maybe on a scale of 0 to 5 rate them separately)
 - Please elaborate how you have mitigated these challenges.
 - How effective have the above-mentioned initiatives helped in improving EW through Nyumba Kumi in PCVE? (Maybe on a scale of 0 to 5 rate the level of effectiveness)
 - How is information on VE verified prior to response?
 - Who verifies this information?
 - What are the standard operating procedures that guides this process?
3. Do you think that the county government contributes to the coordination of Early warning through Nyumba Kumi in PCVE? If yes, how?
 - If yes, what should the national government do to enhance these efforts?
 - If no, who within the system is best placed to do it?
 - Who influences the decisions within the county government system to implement responses to early warning?
4. How would you describe the engagement between state security agencies, the county government and non-state actors in coordinating information on VE through Nyumba Kumi?
 - How are the relationships between the criminal justice sector and at-risk communities?
 - How effective would you say the engagement with community at risk and youth at risk is? (May be on a scale of 0 to 5 – rate them separately). Please explain why you would rate the effectiveness.
5. What opportunities exist for better engagement between PCVE actors and community members on Early warning through Nyumba Kumi?
 - How has local community been emancipated to identify possible individuals at risk to VE?
 - Does the local community have awareness on the reporting mechanisms available?
 - If yes, do they have confidence in these mechanisms?

- If no, what do you think the reason is?
- What do you think can be done to enhance their participation in EWER?
- Does the local community have a broader connection with other communities who face common challenges on violent extremism?

6. Are there resources allocated / any other support initiatives to oversee/ improve the work on early warning through Nyumba Kumi?