University of Nairobi

Department of Diplomacy and International Studies

The Role of Governance in Countering Terrorism in Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya and Somalia

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A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Master's Degree in International Studies

November 2021

Declaration

This research project is my original work and has not been presented before to any university for academic award.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.

Signature .... Date................................

Amb. Prof. Maria Nzomo

Supervisor

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Dedication

This research is dedicated with love and gratitude to my family, especially my three boys (Muhammadmzuul, Muhammadamin and Muhammadsadiiq) who many times were patient with me when doing this work. I am also grateful with entire family for their support during my studies.

Acknowledgement

I thank God for enabling me to complete my studies. I am particularly grateful but indebted immensely by my supervisor Amb. Prof. Maria Nzomo who read each sentence in this project report, tirelessly criticized my work after doing so many mistakes and gave me innovative suggestions to improve my project. Thank you Madam I'm greatly humbled by your support.

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
EAC	East African Community
EACPCCO	Eastern African Police Chiefs' Conference
GSU	General Service Unit
HOA	Horn of Africa
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
OAU	Organization of National Unity
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NIS	National Intelligence Service
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SNA	Somali National Army
TFG	Transition Federal Government of Somalia
UDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOCT	United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United State of America

Abstract

With key focus on assessing the role of governance in countering terrorism in HoA: A case study of Kenya and Somalia the study sought to examine existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region, analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism and lastly analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region. The study uses realism theory of International Relations as a tool to explain the role of governance in counter terrorism and the best strategy to counter terror. The study accepts the hypotheses that: the States in HoA used state centric approach in fight against terrorism and has failed to adequately address the threat of terrorism. The states ignored the role of non-state actors in war against terrorism and give more effort on military centric approach. The data findings indicates that counterterrorism effort in Kenya and Somalia have not yet appreciate the role of non-state actors in the war against terrorism and mainly concentrate on militaristic approach. The analysis points out the state centric counterterrorism approach in HoA is counter-productive and has not been effective. The study recommends that the states to widen their counterterrorism approach to include no state actors such civil society, scholars, local leaders, youth and women. Furthermore, the militaristic and State centric approach incounter terrorism such as crack down, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings of terror suspects and innocent victims has fueled terrorism. In contrary, the inclusion approach where Non-State Actors have been considered, states address structural issues that provide safe environment for terrorists, equality and other soft-power measures reduces terrorism.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background of the Study

The growth of terrorism has become an issue of global concern due to the advancement in the scope, frequency and lethality of terror attacks. Terrorism has advanced to cope with modernization and the challenges associated with modernity. The sophistication in terrorism has created massive fear around the globe, loss of life and property destruction. Terror activities have also yielded retaliatory measures with the same severity level, attracting global criticism on the suitability of the proactive measures and whether they yield the desired positive outcomes. Responsive efforts by states are geared towards protecting homeland security.

Since the mid-1970s, terrorism has been a common but "unwelcome visitor" in some African countries, particularly those in or near the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia and Kenya. The first terrorist explosion in Kenya occurred in 1975, and another occurred in 1981. The most eminent terrorist assault, however, was the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) in August 1998, resulted in several casualties in both countries. 250 Kenyans and 4 Americans were killed in Kenya, with 4,000 others injured and all nearby houses and properties destroyed. Al Shaabab's inception as a terrorist organization based in Somalia with ties to Al Qaeda, has increased frequency and intensity of terror attacks especially in Somalia and Kenya. These and subsequent attacks changed the focus of Africa's governments attention to finding credible anti-terrorist solutions, including drafting anti-terrorist legislation and beefing up anti-terrorist surveillance.

Several states have opted for the use of force to combat terror during attacks. Kenya has been a victim of terrorism on several occasions, forcing the state to review its strategies to combat

terrorism, assure national security, and anticipate and prevent future terror attacks. With the backing of other states like the United States, Kenya has taken an active role in the war against terror both internationally and also internally against the Al-Qaeda affiliated Somalia based Al-Shabaab. This study will examine the role of governance in counterterrorism in Kenya, Somalia and the Horn of Africa and the suitability of the measures used, and the effectiveness and challenges faced.

Counterterrorism refers to strategies aimed at combating terrorism and doing away with environments that breed terrorism. The response can either be a hard-line or a soft-line approach. Counterterrorism is aimed at minimizing or preventing terrorist attacks. As Kolodkin (2017) posits, various counterterrorism options are available, and no particular option can be employed efficiently to address all the different terror groups or threats from them.[1]

The use of force is a hard-line strategy to counter the activities of terrorists and their supporters. The strategies range from military expeditions, repressive paramilitary options and covert operations to instill punitive measures to do away with the terrorism group.[2]Military and paramilitary repressive options are suppressive campaigns involving military strikes against terror groups. It involves punitive and preemptive strikes geared towards disrupting or destroying the terror groups, often initiated as retaliation attacks or precautionary strategies against a probable attack.[3]Covert operations, on the other hand, are secretive attacks against terrorist groups by Special Forces.

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[1]Kolodkin, B. (2017, 20th May). What is counterterrorism? ThoughtCO. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-counterterrorism-3310298

[2]Martinez. (2013). Kenya terror timeline: four deadly days of a store-tostore siege. CNN. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/24/world/africa/kenya-mall-attacktimeline/index.html

[3] Ibid

These are non-military techniques that comprise four strategies. First, they involve secret nonviolent operations such as infiltration, cyber war and disinformation. The second strategy involves gathering intelligence by collecting information to create criminal data that would aid in determining future trends of a violent group or unveil their operations. Intelligence gathering is helpful in detecting and preventing terrorism. Third, beefing up security measures make it extremely difficult for the terrorists to execute their activities. This strategy involves setting up checkpoints, beefing up a surveillance system, setting up security barriers, and using metal detectors. Lastly, the use of economic sanctions is a perfect strategy to curtail states that sponsor terrorist groups. This forces them to cut down their support for terrorism.

These are soft-line approaches free from violence and are aimed at addressing the underlying issues. The first strategy under this includes diplomatic approaches that involve negotiation to reach an agreement with the terrorists. Secondly, it may entail social reforms to address the underlying issues that allow terrorism to prevail and flourish in their environments. Finally, concessionary options require immediate adherence to specific demands or accommodation of broad demands. These are aimed at tackling the root causes of violence within the terrorist group.[4]

Counterterrorism laws have been enacted which criminalize certain actions as being aligned to terrorism. Also, international law in conjunction with state laws and international treaties is vital in combating terrorism. Terrorism is a broad and multifaceted phenomenon, with studies failing to provide an adequate description of what it is. This challenge has prompted scholars and policymakers to devise their individual suggestions to describe terrorism. Often, this is dictated by

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[4] Ibid

the scenario and the message they intend to pass at that particular time. As a result, terrorism lacks a legally binding definition giving birth to over 200 descriptions created to define acts of terror.[5]

The United Nations definition of terrorism has been through scrutiny due to its ambiguity and favoritism to the privileged. State terrorism is a form of terrorism where the government and particular individuals are the perpetrators of state-sponsored acts of terror.[6] State terrorism is perpetrated by the state, which employs violence targeting masses, sects within the government, or other governments. This has led to the branding of particular states such as Iraq, Syria, among others, as sponsors of terrorism by the US.

According to the US legislation, terrorism refers to activities leading to violations of the criminal law of the US or any other state and which threatens or coerces the masses intending to sway the government policy by use of force. According to the United Kingdom, terrorism is defined as the use of a threat to manipulate the government or coerce the public to spread a political, ideological or religious cause. On the other hand, the European Union defines terrorism as acts that intimidate a population, thus coercing a government or an international organization to perform or stop performing a particular act, thus destabilizing the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or economic social structures within the state or international organization.[7]

Contemporary terrorism is now an international problem tormenting many nations, with some suffering more significant impacts than others. The war on terror bears its root in the United States, which declared war against terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, leading to the loss of over 3000

[5]Westra, L. (2014). Faces of Terrorism .Retrieved from
  http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uskenyaebooks/reader.action?docID=934327&ppg=19
[6]Martinez. (2013). Kenya terror timeline: four deadly days of a store-tostore siege. CNN. Retrieved on 9th July 2021
  from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/24/world/africa/kenya-mall-attacktimeline/index.html
[7]Mannik, E. (2011). Terrorism: Its past, present and future prospects. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from
  http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/KVUOA_Toimetised_12-M%C3%A4nnik.pdf

Americans. Henceforth, the US has been central in counterterrorism, with the then Bush administration terming it as an "axis of evil" and declaring an open-ended war on international terrorism.[8]

Europe has also been a target of terror after the 9/11 incidence, attributed to the growth of political instability in the Middle East. As Michaels 2016 posits, Europe is susceptible to terror attacks due to the increase in Muslim immigrants in the region and the porosity of the security systems in these states.[9] In Africa, the heat of terrorism is also deeply felt. The Boko Haram tormenting Nigeria and Al-Shabaab, a faction of Al-Qaeda attacking Somalia with spillover effects on neighboring states like Kenya and Ethiopia.

The increase in global terrorism provokes the urge to counter terrorism through either pre-emptive or deterrence approaches by the state or retaliation when attacked. These measures are aligned with international law that approves a state to act in self-defense when attacked or when an attack seems likely. These measures aimed to combat terrorism are referred to as counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism is targeted towards non-state actors. Islamic terrorism is perceived as an impending danger, affecting states' counterterrorism measures, prompting them to act swiftly against the threat, ending up with human rights-violating measures. The majority of the states have adopted counterterrorism measures that violate individual's physical rights. Thus both the terrorists end up being blamed for taking away innocent lives and the state for using hard approaches to counterterrorism, contravening fundamental human rights and freedoms.

[8]Global Policy Forum (2017). US military expansion and intervention. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from https://www.globalpolicy.org/us-military-expansion-andintervention.html

[9]Michaels, J. (2016).Analysis: String of terror attacks likely to continue. USA Today. Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/26/analysis-string-if-terrorattacks-europe-likely-continue/87578584/

Kenya is not new in terror attacks since independence and has been on the frontline in the war against terrorism, primarily targeting Al-Shabaab. The Al-Qaeda affiliated group has threatened Kenya and its neighbors since the 1998 religious terrorism in Kenya and Tanzania.[10] Somalia is an integral part of Kenya's national security concerns. The US has been instrumental in fighting Islamism related terrorism and has been at the forefront of rallying other states to join the war. In East Africa, the efforts are geared towards fighting the Al-Shabaab.[11]

The US has been helping key states in the horn of Africa and East Africa in the war against Al-Shabaab. What prompted the US to join the fight against terrorism in the region is that the US embassies have been direct targets of terrorism. Also, the Islamist radicals view the US and other non-Islam states as enemies, threatening the Somalia government and its neighbors.[12] The US provided US dollars 100 million to counter terrorism in the region, with Kenya benefiting more from the initiative. US intervention to counter terrorism in the region signifies the seriousness of the threats terror actions pose.[13]

Several attacks have been carried out on Kenyan soil by the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda after the 1998 bombing of the American embassy. On 24th October 2011, a bomb was dropped at a local pub in Nairobi, resulting in the death of 2 civilians and injuring 20 more. These attacks happened as retaliatory attacks on Kenyans following the launching of a Kenyan military expedition against the Al-Shabaab for illegally entering Kenya and attacking foreign workers and tourists.[14]

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[10]Ibrahim, M. (2010). Somalia and global terrorism: A growing connection. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(3), 283-295.

[11]Liepman, A. M. & Chandler, N. (2016). Counter terrorism and counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the campaign against al-Shabaab. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1017498.pdf

[12] Ibid

[13] Shinn, D. (2011). Al Shabaab's foreign threat to Somalia. Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 203- 215

[14]Omar, C. (2013). Timeline: Terrorist related events in Kenya since. English People. Retrieved on 9th July 2021 from http://en.people.cn/90777/8407044.html

These attacks and threats changed Kenya's approach to counterterrorism from a pacifist to an open war approach. Under the leadership of President Kibaki, Kenya launched *Operation Linda Nchi,* marking a radical shift in the approach to terrorism since the state gained independence in 1963. This shift in counterterrorism approaches is particularly a result of the globalization and sophistication of international security that has yielded a more complex security challenge due to the infiltration of sovereignty threatening non-state actors. These security challenges have forced states to take up controversial measures that violate human rights and trigger insecurities.[15]

Past research has dwelled much on governmental militaristic counterterrorism approaches in the Horn of Africa and Kenya, with little concern for alternative approaches that involve non-state actors. Moreover, past studies have not deeply addressed the concept of terrorism concerning its root causes and its relation to governance and social-economic issues. The use of hard-handed approaches has not yet won the war against terrorism. Thus, in the search for a holistic approach that would help combat terror, there is a need for an extensive investigation that would consider and include non-state actors for a more comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and that promise effective preventive and retaliatory measures that do not violate human rights.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Terrorism has been serious security concerns throughout the world since 19th Century to the date of this study and states have been looking for the best way to respond to terrorism which has proved to be one the most difficult, complex and sophisticated security issue in the world. However, with all efforts and resources used in countering terrorism, in the time of conducting this study, states

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[15]Mwangi, O. G. (2016). Continuity and Change in Kenya's Defense and Foreign Policies: The Impact of the New Security Dilemma. In Kenya After 50. pp. 245-266. Palgrave Macmillan US.

are yet to succeed in the war against terrorism. After reviewing previous studies, the available data indicates that the missing link in the war against terrorism is the governance question. The previous studies have not conclusively analyzed the role of governance in countering terrorism. The scholars have not taken the time to really analyze the type of governance, the way countering terrorism have been managed by the state actors, the approaches and methodologies used in countering terrorism. My study therefore will focus on this missing link and look at various forms of governance that have prevailed in Horn of Africa region in particular Kenya and Somalia.

1.3 Research Questions

The study seeks to examine and evaluate the role of governance in countering terrorism. It examines the counterterrorism measures utilized in HoA, a case study of Kenya and Somalia. The study focus in answering the following questions:

1. What are the existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA region?
2. What type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism?
3. What governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region?

1.4 Study Objectives

1.4.1 Broad Objective

The study's primary objective would be to examine the role governance plays in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa, focusing on Kenya and Somalia.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

1. To examine existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region.

2. To analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism

3. To analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Theoretical Literature Review

This section reviews theories relevant to the study

1.5.1.1 Realism Theory

Realism theory identifies power, state survival and national interests as critical components in examining inter-state relations (Christopher 1996). Proponents of realism theory argue that sometimes for states to secure their interests, military capacity maybe the key. Realists' main reason for conceptualizing the world in this manner originates from a strongly held view that countries have for a long time had the habit of using military force to secure their interests in the international arena. Hans (1948) discusses a number of territorial-related components of national power like land, minerals, water, and strategic positioning as the key to a state's survival. The key components may also be critical in increasing state power and dominance.

Proponents of the theory make several assumptions in relation to realism. One of the assumptions is that sometimes national interests particularly in times of war can drive a state to act and speak with one voice. The second assumption is that decision makers have to be rational actors in order

for rational decision making to lead to the pursuit of national interests. Realists suggest that no matter the political persuasion of any leader, they all recognise that managing their state's affairs is in order for them to survive in a competitive environment. Certain realists argue that war has been so common throughout human history because human selfishness, appetite for power and little trust for others often leads to predictable outcomes. Therefore, since humans are organized into states, the nature of individuals in that state impacts on their national behavior.

1.5.1.2 Copenhagen School Theory

Copenhagen School theory was first endorsed by Barry Buzan and perceives security as all about survival. The propositions of this theory are suggestions that in international relations, something becomes a concern to security when it is considered as posing existential threat to a referent object.[16] The threat therefore should be tackled through extraordinary means and with immediate attention. The conceptual framework of Copenhagen School theorists is a blend of social constructivist and neorealist concepts and deviates substantially from its traditional counterparts. It endorses the argument that in international relations something qualifies as a security concern not because it forms an objective threat to the state but because an actor has deemed it to constitute an existential. By defining an issue, an actor claims the power to attend to the concern as a means to guarantee the survival of the referent object. Security is therefore a self-referential practice because something only assumes the state of being a security issue only after being classified as such. Despite the fact however, that security is an inter-subjective and a social construct, it is not to say that every issue can easily be named a security issue. For an issue to be successfully securitized, a securitizing actor has to conduct a securitizing action which in turn has to be accepted

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[16] Buzan, B., (1983) *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Boulder, Colo,: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

by an audience that is targeted. It is only after being accepted by an audience that an issue can move to the realms of normal politics where the elites can be allowed to break normal rules and procedures to and implement emergency measures.[17]

1.5.2 Empirical Literature Review

The empirical literature review is based on the study's three objectives, which are as follows: To evaluate and examine the existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region, to analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism and to analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region.

1.5.2.1 Existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region

According to the Global Terrorism Index, the two most effective techniques for stopping the operations of almost 80% of terrorist organizations have been police or initiating a political process. Only 7% of the population was wiped out by a full-scale military operation. A major goal of any counter-terrorism plan is to have both short and long-term objectives. Efforts should not be focused solely on preventing specific terrorist attacks, but also on disrupting, disbanding, and finally dismantling terrorist organizations.[18]Mustafa argues that as many African countries look for or expand counter-terrorism policies and operations, the new concept of focusing on softer measures, particularly directed at vulnerable youth and populations will be a crucial deciding factor in lowering terrorism and related violence. The existing understanding of terrorism, as well

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[17]Ibid.
[18]Ibid.

as the way the so-called "war on terror" is being waged, makes victory difficult, if not impossible. The majority of countries and agencies appear to be merely 'managing' the terrorism threat.[19] Furthermore, Mustafa observes thatterrorism has evoked a predominantly state-led institutional reaction in the Horn of Africa. The majority of the reactions have been legislative or administrative in nature. On the other hand, Bjorgo observes that Police detectives and the criminal justice system, as well as military troops, are the primary deterrents that African nations can employ. Depending on the methods taken, political authorities may also play a vital role.[20]

Carson argues that Kenya's police force now has a dedicated anti-terrorist squad. Kenya established the National Counter-Terrorism Centre in January 2004 under the aegis of Kenya's statutory security intelligence organ, the National Security and Intelligence Service. To aid in the battle against terrorism, the Centre provides intelligence. As a result of the same, security measures at airports, government institutions, foreign embassies in Kenya, and other areas considered vulnerable to terrorism have been beefed up. Kenya's counter-terrorism policy includes a variety of agencies to this goal.[21] The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) remains a dedicated US partner in the ongoing fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, taking substantial measures to execute security sector and other institutional reforms aimed at improving the country's anti-terrorism capabilities. However, Alshabaab maintained de facto control over large swaths of the country, particularly in south-central Somalia, moving freely, collecting "taxes," and exercising governing authority in those areas.[22]

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[19] Ali. Mustafa Y. and Mujahid, Othman B. (2015). The BRAVE Manual and Resource Guide. Nairobi. CSCR.
[20] Bjorgo, T. Counter-terrorism as crime prevention. A holistic approach, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8:1, 25-44
[21] Carson, J. (2005). Kenya: The struggle against terrorism. In: *Battling terrorism in the Horn of Africa,* eds. R. Cambridge: R Rotberg. Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press.
[22] Ibid.

Terrorism dates its origin back to the French revolution, and thus it is not a recent subject and similarly has no relation to Islam. However, the 9/11 terror attacks in the US brought a new understanding of contemporary terrorism, often linking it to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic religion. Terrorism was in the past viewed on the premise of patriotism and revolutionary actions, but the recent advancements in its scope and severity have proved contemporary terrorism contrary to this. The 9/11 attacks have yielded a wrong perception of terrorism, linking it with the Islamic religion. Terrorism is a broad concept bearing its roots in the French Revolution and therefore should not be mistaken as a contemporary phenomenon or exclusively linked to the Islamic religion.

Terrorism and terrorism networks have become sophisticated as they struggle to keep pace with modernization and the opportunities and challenges it causes. As such, the type, scale and frequency of terrorist attacks have evolved. This growth in sophistication and extensiveness has yielded fear, death and loss of property. Also, it has provoked reactions to counter terrorism at a similar measure, raising global debates on the repercussions of counterterrorism strategies. The core driver of counterterrorism among nations is the desire to protect its homeland security and establishing security for the nationals.[23]

According to Schmidt (2005), terrorism is a broad subject, and he breaks it down into five types; social revolutionary, racist, single issue, nationalist and separatist types of terrorism.[24] Terrorism in the past decades was viewed from the perspective of national patriotism and revolutionaries, but the context of contemporary terrorism has changed this view. This is because of the sophistication

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[23]Brown, D. (2017, 15th November). Most of the world has seen an increase in terrorism-but deaths from terror attacks have decreased. Business Insider. Retrieved on 7th July 2021 from http://www.pulselive.co.ke/bi/politics/politics-most-of-the-world-hasseen-an-increase-in-terrorism-but-deaths-from-terror-attacks-have-decreasedid7604646.html

[24]Schmid, A P, "Framework for Conceptualizing Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, 16, no. 2, 2005, pp. 197 – 221

in the scope, ruthlessness, ideologies and structural interconnectedness of present-day terrorism. Modern terrorism has assumed a global outlook due to its desire to restructure the world society.[25]The globalization of their ambitions in conjunction with the extensiveness and brutality of the ways used to carry out terrorism has resulted in the rise in massive destruction of properties and casualties.[26] This can be attributed to the advancement in weapon technology, transportation and communication systems.[27] Present-day terrorist groups are also highly organized and neatly networked, resulting in unique levels of highly coordinated operations.[28] Following the 9/11 attacks, Somalia came to the limelight as a global threat to security, leading to a worldwide campaign against the radical Islamic ideology on global Jihad, which aimed at promoting terrorism globally.[29]

The terrorist attacks in Kenya have prompted the Kenyan government to revisit and review its efforts and strategies towards countering terrorism. Protecting national security is the government's central concern, and efforts to predict and defend against future attacks are underway. The government of Kenya is an active player in countering both domestic and international terrorism threats from Somalia's Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of the international terrorist group Al-Qaeda. The magnitude and lethality of terror attacks on Kenyan soil have prompted the government to shift from a restrained counterterrorism approach to a more proactive counterterror policy.

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[25] Ibid

[26]Gupta, D.K. (2005). "Exploring roots of terrorism, in: Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward," New York: Routledge

[27] Ibid

[28]Sahar Mohammad, A.Y. (2005). "Roots of terrorism in the Middle East" in Tore Bjorgo, Root Causes of Terrorism, Routledge, Madison Avenue.

[29]Shay, S. (2011). Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers.

1.5.2.2 Governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region

The UN resolution 1373, which compels all member nations to pass counter-terrorism legislation, serves as the foundation for transnational counter-terrorism initiatives in the Horn of Africa. A number of UN bodies also back efforts to carry out the UN's anti-terrorism mandate. The UN Security Council's counter-terrorism executive directorate, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights are among them. In the Horn of Africa, transnational counter-terrorism measures include both country-led and multilateral missions led by a variety of countries.[30]According to Wachira, in collaboration with specialized regional entities, the Horn of Africa states have built counter-terrorism frameworks. Eritrea has developed information-sharing channels with Interpol and the Eastern African Police Chiefs' Conference (EAPCCO), in addition to participating in the IGAD counter-terrorism campaign. EAPCCO and Interpol are also members of Kenya and Uganda. In summary, all countries in the Horn of Africa, together with other counter-terrorism actors, have signed up for a regional fusion center, which will serve as a clearinghouse for sharing information on terrorism and transnational crime.[31]Gray argues that, the USA-sponsored Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is one of the country-led activities in the Horn of Africa from a powerhouse country (CJTF-HOA). It was created in Djibouti, Ethiopia, to combat terrorism. Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, as well as the entire Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Eden are all included. The CJTF-HOA has concentrated on training allied forces as well as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenyan troops. The task force has also made intelligence exchange with regional countries easier.[32]

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[30]UN Resolution 1373.

[31] Wachira, A. (2013). How IT-based solutions can help to counter security threats in Kenya. The Standard on Sunday, 7th July 2013.

[32]Gray, David H. and Albon Head, (2015). *"The Importance of the Internet to the Post-modern Terrorists and its role as a Form of Safe Haven'.* Eurpoean Journal of Scientific Research, Vol.25, No.3.

In partnership with Africa and East Africa in particular, the US has implemented programmes to counter terrorism based on empirical studies on radicalization in the region.[33] The US provides aids to the region to combat terrorism and radicalization in the region. The programs are initiated to target specific communities at higher risks of not benefiting from other development programs hence falling victims to joining terror groups.[34]

The war on terror will only be effective if the causes of terrorism are categorized into main categories. These categories include factors leading to the joining of terror groups, communities' support for the activities of the terror groups, and factors that create a conducive environment for terrorism to thrive. The war on terror should be specific for every country or community based on the context of radicalization and drivers or terrorism in that particular country or community. This is so because the scope, context and drivers of terrorism are different within different regions. As such, the drivers of terrorism are constantly under scrutiny to establish suitable approaches to combat terrorism in Kenya and the Horn of Africa.

Following the events of 9/11, the UN Security Council attempted to make targeted *ad hoc* interventions to counter terrorism. It established a general framework on counterterrorism under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[35] The framework involved Resolution 1373, which established specific measures states should take to combat terrorism.[36] These were prevention and destruction of financing of terrorism, nonparticipation in supporting people or groups involved in terrorism, ensuring terrorism is marked as a serious criminal offence in domestic law attracting

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[33]Bureau of African Affairs, "US Policy in Somalia, Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome," Washington DC, 12th March, 2010. Retrieved on 26th February 2016, from http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm

[34]USAID, "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, 2009. Retrieved on 7th July 2021, from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt978.pdf

[35]Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on 12th September 2001, Security Council determined that 'terrorism' constitutes a threat to international peace and security in Resolution 1368

[36]Security Council Resolution 1373 UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) adopted (28th September 2001).

punishment that aligns with the seriousness it deserves. It also required states to cooperate with other states to respond to early warning systems and investigations on terrorism and adopt strict border controls to regulate crossing over individuals involved in terrorism.[37]

Kenya has acceded to all the conventions of Resolution 1373.[38] It has submitted reports to the counterterrorism committee as per Resolution 1373, and the committee has praised its plan to combat the financing of terrorism. Kenya is also a beneficiary of $431,000 from UNDP and UNODC projects to strengthen Kenya's capacity to counter terrorism, funded by the Government of Denmark.[39]

Kenya's counterterrorism reactions include military expeditions, intelligence, legal measures, economic and financial controls, diplomacy and dialogue. It has made efforts to incorporate mixed approaches which involve military and non-military strategies. It employs the services of the National Intelligence Service to carry out surveillance, GSU to address civil rebellion, and the Anti-Terror Police Unit to counter terror. Regardless of the counterterrorism responses, the state faces criticism for its combative approaches.[40] The strategies to combat terror have been termed controversial due to arbitrary arrests, religious profiling and killings of terror suspects.[41]

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[37] Ibid
[38] Counter-Terrorism Committee, "International Law and Terrorism" available at:
http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/law.shtml
[39] UNODC, "Project Portfolio of UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa"
http://www.unodc.org/kenya/en/projects.html
[40] Kirechu, P. (2016, 4th August). Kenya Counterterrorism Approach is Floundering. The National Interest. Retrieved 9th July, 2021, from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kenyas-counterterrorism-approach-floundering17247
[41] Namwaya, O. (2017, 31st July). Kenya: Candidates Should Commit to Addressing Abuses. Daily Nation. Retrieved 8th July 2021, from 123 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/31/kenya-candidates-should-commitaddressing-abuses

The war on terrorism is still on in Kenya, with the state still facing uncertainties over the future of its national security due to the constant threats from Al-Shabaab.[42] Hoeft (2015) posits that the soft hand measures by the Kenyan government are meant to hinder terror groups by crippling their organization.[43] The soft approaches are also aimed at combating radicalization through the states' counter violent extremism programme.[44] A study by Gaituku (2014) focused on non-state actors in counterterrorism in Kenya.[45] The study investigated Kenya's efforts in connection to AMISOM, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and *Operation Linda Nchi*. It also emphasized Kenya's partnership with NGO's, the private sector, and media in the war against terrorism.

1.5.2.3 The type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism

Agbiboa asserts that despite government efforts to combat terrorism, the most well-known terrorist organizations have survived throughout Africa, partly due to dictatorial nature of governance in Africa. Boko Haram, for example, has resurrected despite the fact that Nigerian security forces killed the group's leader and about 800 members in a large-scale attack on the group in 2009.[46] Moreover, the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi demonstrates that, despite all of these terrorist attacks on the continent, Al Shabaab still has the capability to strike beyond

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[42]Kirechu, P. (2016, 4th August). Kenya Counterterrorism Approach is Floundering. The National Interest. Retrieved 9th July, 2021, from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kenyas-counterterrorism-approach-floundering17247

[43]Hoeft, G. (2015) "Soft" Approaches to Counterterrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs. International Institute for CounterTerrorism. Retrieved from https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-Soft-Approachesto-CT-Hoeft.pdf

[44]Cherono, S. (2016, 7th September). Uhuru launches counterterrorism strategy, names special envoy. Daily Nation. Retrieved on 8th July 2021 from https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-launches-counter-terrorism-strategy--names-special-envoy/1056-3372608-w4du8t/

[45]Gaituku, P. (2014).Countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Masters thesis, University of Nairobi).Retrieved on 7th July 2021 from http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/99276/Gatuiku%20_%20Co untering%20Terrorism%20In%20The%20Horn%20Of%20Africa%20A%20Case %20Study%20Of%20Kenya.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

[46] Agbiboa DE. (2013) Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the state of emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37: 41-67.

Somalia's borders. More specifically, the attack in Nairobi revealed shocking revelations about the continent's lack of capacity for appropriate response as experts were to be outsourced from other regions such Israel for help. All of this presents a bleak image of the AU Commission's counter-terrorism activities, which are assigned to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria, including the facilitation and delivery of counter-terrorism technical support to AU member states. The ACSRT's mandate includes offering knowledge in topics relevant to the prevention and combatting of terrorism in Africa, as well as boosting AU member states' capabilities, including full implementation of international anti-terrorist treaties.[47]

The ACSRT's mission and mandate include the creation and maintenance of a database on a variety of issues related to the prevention and combating of terrorism, particularly information on, assessments, and analyses of terrorist groups and their activities in Africa, in order to better inform AU member states and international partners on the threats, as well as the need for, and availability of experts and technology. The organization, on the other hand, has not lived up to its full potential. This could be demonstrated by the continent's ineffective response.[48]

Joan asserts that the AU's anti-terrorism protocol, which was adopted in 2004, required 15 states to ratify it before it could enter into force. It was only a decade later, in February 2014, when it reached this milestone. Furthermore, significant African state actors in the battle against terrorism, including as Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Uganda, have yet to ratify it.[49] Similarly, just around a third of AU member states have enacted specific counterterrorism law, despite the AU's

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[47] African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Strategic Plan of Activities, 2010-2013, p.2
[48] Ibid.
[49] Joan, M. (2016) African Union, List of countries which have signed/ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Retrieved on May 2016, from www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20 on%20terrorism.pdf.

recommendation, so much for reducing the gaps. Of course, there are good reasons for this. Terrorism has diverse meanings for different countries. For some, it is a life-or-death issue that must be addressed immediately, while for others, it is a more abstract concept with little immediate impact. To put it another way, terrorism is not a top concern for all leaders. Many governments simply lack the resources to undertake the suggested counter-terrorism measures, even when it is a priority.

Murithi observes that Africa has faced a slew of issues that must be addressed in order to combat the recent threats of terrorism. The continuance of insecurity difficulties in Africa calls into doubt the validity of most African leaders' mantra of "African solutions to African problems." It was thought that the AU, with its much-loved concept of "African solutions to African problems," would be the one to discover solutions. However, the organization has adopted half-measures in the past and has experienced internal conflicts among its members over how to respond to crises and their effects. Despite the establishment of a regional legislative framework with the OAU Convention and Plan of Action, the AU member states' capacities to implement counter-terrorism measures remain outside the financial and personnel resources of the majority of the continent's countries. Terrorism is also not considered as a top concern in many African countries, which are grappling with other serious issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, social and political instability, disease, and violence.[50]

1.6 Gaps in Literature

Relevant literature has been reviewed on the theme of the study, and it has revealed that past research had emphasized more on state-centered counterterrorism measures with little emphasis

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[50] Murithi (2014), African Peace and Security Architecture Hand Book Addis Ababa: AU Publishers.

on non-state actors in the war against terrorism. Past studies have also not addressed the core drivers of terror concerning governance and socio-economic aspects. The review has established that the US has been at the forefront in counterterrorism after the 9/11 incident and has played a significant role in shaping counterterrorism measures in other states.

Many of the states have embarked on hard-handed approaches using military force and repression in combating terror. The increased threat of Al-Shabaab and the influx in Islamic related terrorism in Kenya has forced the state to reshape its counterterrorism responses. The state has applied military and non-military strategies as recommended by past studies and policy experts, although these have faced much criticism. This study will therefore examine the measures of the Kenyan and Somali governments to combat terrorism without violating human rights.

1.7 Justification of the Study

This study proposes two broad justifications: policy and academic.

1.7.1 Academic Justification

This study is crucial since it will aid in academic studies and expand earlier studies on the same topic. Second, the analysis will point to areas where more research is needed in the discourse of role of governance in countering terrorism. Furthermore, the literature review reveals a dearth of knowledge about the importance of proper governance in countering terrorism. As a result, the aim of this research is to help close the gap.

1.7.2 Policy Justification

Policymakers have been hesitant to acknowledge the importance of governance in countering terrorism. This research will provide policymakers with in-depth knowledge on the role of proper governance in countering terrorism. Finally, the study's policy importance is solely dependent on how the results are applied. The findings of this study will serve as a basis for policy development, planning, and implementation by decision makers.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

1.8.1 Realism

The study will dwell on the international relations theory of realism. The theory bears its origin in WWII and traces its roots in the Thucydides in the Peloponnesian wars. It dwells on the view of the centrality of the state as it pursues power and self-interest. The realism theory is evident in the US approach to pressure Kenya to combat terrorism that led to the 2011 invasion of Somalia by

the Kenyan military. The Kenyan government has to comply with the demands of the US to benefit from the financial aids it receives. This depicts how a state can leverage the realist goals of power to manipulate another state's foreign policy. The material powers of a state determine the power it controls. This is what the US is doing as the leading world economy, and Kenya seems to be on the receiving end of the influence of this superpower.

Human beings desire to dominate, exercise power and safeguard themselves from any form of attack. This is the case in the US. Besides prioritizing maintaining homeland security through military and economic wars against terrorism, they have also used their power and global influence to lobby other states to join the fight against terror. That involved coercing other states into the anti-terror agenda, including Kenya, due to its growing risk of attacks from the Somali based Al-Shabaab.

Kenya enjoys significant power and influence in the East African Community (EAC), thus succeeding in lobbying for the EAC to send troops to Somalia under the umbrella of AMISOM. Besides pressure from the US to join counterterrorism, Kenya also wanted to exercise its spirit of realism and test its military muscles by sending its troops to join AMISOM. Besides this was the desire to safeguard Kenyan borders to ensure economic prosperity.

Realism is also witnessed in Kenya's effort to combat terror activities through the use of the police. This is aligned with its desire to maintain domestic security. According to realists, security is a crucial component in the global setting and should be treated with a lot of importance since it is paramount for survival. Force and repressive strategies in the anti-terror war are all realist ideologies aimed at depicting a state's power and influence.

1.9 Study Hypothesis

The hypotheses provided an experimentally testable variable that guided the data collected in order to meet the study's aims. As a result, the data needed to be gathered included the following hypotheses:

1. States in HoA used state centric approach in fight against terrorism.

2. States' approach in war against terror has been inclusive.

1.10 Research Methodology

Under the study's methodology, a detailed explanation of how the research objectives will be investigated is provided.

1.10.1 Research Design

A "research design" consists of a collection of conditions or sets, as well as the methods and procedures for gathering and analysing data on the variables described in the study topic. A mixed-methods case study design will be used in the study, which will include both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The descriptive data will be collected and managed using the qualitative methodology. Qualitative method will be used to evaluate qualitative elements such as the respondents' attitudes and views, which do not have standard metrics. The quantitative method, on the other hand, will be used to collect and manage numerical data that will be used to quantify disparities, predict relationships, and identify characteristics.

1.10.2 Study Location

The study location will be Kenya and Somalia. Kenya, officially known as the Republic of Kenya, is an East African country. Kenya has a total land size of 48 million square kilometers, making it the world's 48th largest country. According to the 2019 census, the country's population is anticipated to be above 47.6 million people. International organizations based in Kenya include the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Somalia is a country in the Africa. It is bordered by Ethiopia to the west and Djibouti to the Northwest. The estimate population of Somalia is 15,893,219 million. Both Kenya and Somalia have experienced numerous terrorism attacks.

1.10.3 Target Population

The study's target population will be Kenyans. The study will include representatives from the Kenya Defense Forces, Somalia Police Force, National Intelligence Security Agency, AMISOM, Ministry of Defense Kenya, Ministry of Defense Somalia, National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and Scholars.

1.10.4 Sampling technique and sampling Design

The study's response rate will be calculated using the Mugenda & Mugenda (1999) method for calculating a population of more than 10,000 people.

$$n= \frac{Z^2pq}{d^2}$$

Where:

N is the number of people who should be included in the sample.

z = the standard normal deviation at the specified degree of confidence

p = the estimated proportion of people in the target population who have the traits being measured.

q = 1 - p

d = level of statistical significance set

$$n = \frac{(1.96)^2 (.50) (.50)}{(0.5)^2}$$
= 384.

The following table depicts the study sample.

Table 1.1: Study Population and Sampling Methodology

Respondents	Number of Respondents	Sampling technique
Kenya Defense Forces	84	Random Sampling
Somalia Police Force	50	Simple Random
National Intelligence Security Agency	40	Purposive Sampling
AMISOM	20	Random Sampling
Ministry of Defense Kenya	50	Random Sampling
Ministry of Defense Somalia	20	Purposive Sampling
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)	30	Purposive Sampling
Scholars	10	Simple Random
TOTAL	**384**	

Source: Researcher, 2021.

The four categories listed in table 1.1 will make up the sample. As shown in the table above, different sample approaches will be used for each category.

1.10.5 Data Sources and Data Collection Methods

Primary and secondary data will be used in the investigation. Primary data will be collected using open-ended questionnaires and interview guides, while secondary data will be gathered through academic books, journals, periodicals, reports, and the internet. Print media as well as publications from important non-profit organizations will be considered.

1.10.6 Reliability of data collection instruments

The consistency with which a system tests things is described as reliability. The measurement is accurate if it can provide the same results under the same conditions using the same processes. When a liquid sample's temperature is measured several times under comparable conditions and the thermometer consistently displays the same temperature, the results are accurate.

1.10.7 Validity of data collection instruments

This is the accuracy with which an instrument estimates the object it is designed to measure. Validities to consider include material validity, construct validity, and criterion validity. As a result, the investigation will employ tools that exactly calculate the required elements.

1.10.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

Qualitative methodologies will be used to analyze the data acquired in the field. The information will be organized into topics that are relevant to the study topics. The replies to the questionnaire will be coded, tabulated, and analyzed using social science statistical software (SPSS).

1.10.9 Ethical Considerations

To ensure the confidentiality of participants' information and identities, the study will take all possible safeguards. The project will also apply for a NACOST research license. As a result, Kenyan research legislation will control the investigation. Furthermore, by identifying the authors, origins of all content and references that will be mentioned in the research, the research will retain intellectual integrity and neutrality.

1.11 Chapter Outline

1.11.1 Chapter one: introduces and contextualizes the subject. It also establishes the overall background of the research project, as well as the issue statement, justification, theoretical framework, literature evaluation, hypothesis, and research methods.

1.11.2 Chapter two: This chapter will focus on the study's first objective, which is to examine existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region.

1.11.3 Chapter three: This chapter endeavors to analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism

1.11.4 Chapter four: This chapter will concentrate on the study's third objective, which is to analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region.

1.11.5 Chapter Five: This chapter will deal with data analysis and presentation.

1.11.6 Chapter six: The study's Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations will be covered in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: EXISTING MEASURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED BY STATES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICAN REGION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the existing measures and methodologies used by the sates in countering terrorism. It scrutinizes and examines how effective are these measures and methodologies and whether the states' efforts in the implementing these measures and methodologies have yield result in countering terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorism emerged as the major security threat in the world and particularly in the Horn of Africa. States in the region joined the rest of the world in putting measures to counter terrorism. These measures range from enacting laws to military intervention. This chapter therefore looks into the various measures and methodologies adopted by the states in countering terrorism in the region.

2.2 Theoretical framework

The issue will be shaded out basing the arguments on the ideas of realism theory arguing that actions such as intercommunity wars, terrorism, conflicts and riots are unsavory, hence, can only be used by states and governments when it serves the interests of the state. This is true, especially when the survival of the state is pre-eminent. Considering the fact that the theory focusses much on the international position of nations regarding the distribution of power, it has played a crucial role in putting forward ways of containing and eliminating terrorism through the use of state-centrism, anarchy, egoism and power politics as evidenced by states in the horn of Africa.

2.3 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa in 1977

The HoA faced security challenges in post-colonial era. Each state in the region had its own security challenge which in some cases interrelate. The Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda,

Oromo Liberation Front of Ethiopia, Somali National Movement of Somalia, the Shifta war of Kenya were among the extremist groups, making the region a bed of conflicts just after the decolonialization. In response to the security dynamics in the region, the then Organization of African Unity was involved by the members states to put in place measures to address the security uncertainty in the region. As Gatuiku argues, some of the measures OAU adopted was the convention for the elimination of mercenaries, which had been the significant take for the conflicts in the region.[51] As OAU members, all the states in the Horn of Africa resorted to the convention services of the union in eliminating the mercenaries by declaring their activities as criminal, hence, bound to legal punishment when committed. The convention treated mercenarism as a crime committed by an individual, a group, an association, a government or state representatives to suppress other communities or states over political matters, resources or boundaries. Realists affirm that the success of every state depends on the presences of security to her peoples, where the key actors can execute self-help actions as no other outside agency can be count responsible for providing the same.[52] According to Gatuiku, mercenarism was declared an illegal undertake in the region to remind the bearers that their actions are purely crime, thus, deserve a severe punishment according to the law. Ethiopia, for instance, managed to utilize the OAU strategy to counter the Somali-based terrorists by raising the profile and non-state actors, hence, being able to reinstate their religious integrity and national security.

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[51]Gatuiku, P. V. (2016). *Countering Terrorism In The Horn Of Africa: A Case Study Of Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, University Of Nairobi).

[52]Walt, S. M. (2018). US grand strategy after the Cold War: Can realism explain it? Should realism guide it?. *International Relations*, *32*(1), 3-22.

2.4 Adoption of Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among States in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of AfricaStates utilized the strategy to eliminate terrorism across the region by strengthening the cooperation and coordination between countries by introducing a common agenda, such as peacekeeping and nation-building. As put by Kirimi, the strategy was declared a regional counter-terrorism milestone in 1992.[53] It was dedicated to fighting the phenomena of extremisms and terrorism that had held its roots deep in the HoA. This strategy was effective following the support by OAU, which facilitated the declaration of the code of conduct for inter-African relations that had been compromised by sectarianism, ethnicity, religion and tribalism. Since its invention, the strategy was bold in condemning all kinds of terrorism in the horn of Africa by bringing on board methods and practices embracing peace among states, such as combating terrorism and advocating for corporations.

2.5 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

This is an ante-terrorism strategy being used by states in the HoA in a bid to counter-terrorism. In addition, Karimi, the strategy was established in 1999 and put into full practice in 2002, calling for the states on the HoA region to criminalize terrorism through the establishment of acts and national laws, hence, making it an extreme criminal offence to be charged with severe punishment when found guilty committing it. The prevention and combating of terrorism strategy among the states of the HoA work by identifying and defining areas needing cooperation by establishing them under the jurisdiction of terrorist acts. Therefore, Viotti& Kauppi, observes that the strategy was substantive for the states because it complies with the fact it treat terrorism as a disease threatening

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[53]Kirimi, F. M. (2017). Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: the role of public diplomacy (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

international peace and security, hence, should be prevented as much as possible.[54]Eventually, they are provided with the lead ways and legal framework for repatriation attributed by extra-territorial apprehension with the accompaniment of mutual legal assistance, hence, playing a significant role in suppressing inter-state conflicts by surfacing them amid differences. Countries such as Kenya and Somalia resorted to this strategy after coming across the looming threats posed by the Al-Shabaab militia seeking to disturb the mutuality sought by the two states in HoA. The strategy helped a great deal between these two countries by informing them about the dangers alarmed by the terrorists in the region and informing about the growing linkage between terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and transnational organized crimes. As a result of implementing the strategy, both Kenya and Somalia have been able to put a significant effort in combating international terrorism within and outsides their borders.

2.6 Applying action plans such as the African Union Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

Mwaniki argues that the establishment of the African Union with theHoAstates showing their absolute membership was akin to adopting and putting into practice a number of important terrorism instruments to eliminate terrorism.[55] As a strategy, the plan of action was objective in preventing and combating terrorism in the region. The strategy was applied by the states in the HoA to revive and strengthen the existing commitments and obligations of state parties, such as the implementation and to put into action the 1999 anti-terrorism convention. Through this plan of action, countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia were able to strengthen aspects such as border policing and controls, strengthening legislative and judicial measures to judge the terrorist

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[54]Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2019). *International relations theory*. Rowman & Littlefield.
[55]Mwaniki, D. M. (2019). Changing Strategies in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Case of Kenya (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

in line with the anti-terrorism laws harshly, thus, help in eliminating the factors contributing to such vice events. For instance, the National Police Services of Kenya recognized the placement of police officers along with Kenya and Somalia's borders to tighten the chances of terrorists creating havoc on the two countries. The strategy has also been focusing on investigation to determine the individuals and organizations funding the terrorism activities and monitor the communication methods used by the terrorists to organize their detrimental acts. Also, Mwaniki report that terrorists threatening the peace of states in the HoA use high notch communication techniques, which the strategy has battled out for over decades. Extensively, the strategy took the matter of counter-terrorism more serious by establishing an African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism charged with the responsibility of doing intensive research about terrorism, analyzing and providing more recommendations on how they can be managed among states on the horn of Africa.

2.7 Offensive military operations

In an effort to support the Transition Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and ensuring both regional and international peace and security, the international community backed the deploymentof Africa Union Mission toSomalia (AMISOM) in 2007. Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) were the first foreign force to deploy and support the Somali National Army (SNA). The governments of both Kenya and Somalia have been on the frontline, taking security measures seriously to protect the target for terrorist.[56]Wepundi Posits that Kenya and Somalia have been threatened by the Al Qaeda affiliated extremist group Al Shabab, prompting Kenya to send its defense forces to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to

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[56]Bruton, Bronwyn E., and Paul D. Williams. *Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013*. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV MACDILL AFB FL, 2014.

reinstate peace and order in Southern Somlia.[57] The strategy has been in place since October 2011

when the Kenya Defense Forces moved into Southern Somalia to pursue the insurgent groups Al

Shabab. The later have reportedly conducted several killings and kidnapping tourists and

international investors across the borders. According to Bor, the integration of regional and

international security agencies into terrorist prone areas is another existent measure used in HoA

to counter terrorism. First, Bor observers that the integration of the Kenya Defense Forces with

the AMISOM to engage in peace keeping mission in Somalia has effectively helped a great deal

in countering terrorism in the region.[58] Despite the fact that integration of various actors in the

counter terrorism process proving effective, Kimunguyi, contends that the governments of the

HoA states still face critical challenges in the process of countering terrorism because of the failure

to integrate various non-state actors with a high potential to iron out the issue of regional

terrorism.[59]

2.8 Recognizing radicalization

Before an individual or group resorts to and engage in violence, terrorism and extremist action, it

is evident that they go through an intense radicalization process. Informed consent about

radicalization has helped rehabilitate distressed groups who could advance to extremists. States in

the HoA embraced the recognition of possible radicalization as a strategy to counter terrorism. The

violent Islamic groups in the region have proved to throw threats as a form of radicalization, which,

when not addressed earlier, ends up forming an extremist group whose consequences are

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[57]Wepundi, M. J. (2020). Role of Regional Organizations in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism-the Case of Igad (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

[58]Bor, T. K. (2020). Military Involvement in Multi-agency Security Operations in Eastern Africa: a Case of Kenya Defence Forces (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

[59]Kimunguyi, Patrick. "Terrorism and counterterrorism in East Africa." *Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash University, Australia* (2011).

detrimental to the states' peace and stability. The strategy of recognizing radicalization has helped advocate the changing dynamics of states in the HoA and eventually eliminating the bad culture of violence being embedded into the political process, hence, creating conflicting views between the Christian and Islam religions. With this strategy in place, Ojwaka states that it has brought to an end the many radical Islamic institutions in the HoA through the destruction of their roots of the networks and social fabric of the people in the region.[60] For instance, the strategy confronted the violent Jihadists, an Islamic extremist group whose target was to bring down the governance institutions of the states in the HoA, in the bid to gain political dominance by all means, be it political outrage or armed religious struggles. The major goal of the Islamic radicalization was to introduce political governance that was purely based on Islamic theocracies, such as the one depicted by the purist *Wahhabism.* The extremist Jihadists targeted countries with weak governments following the bi-polar international after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The tectonic shift in world politics left Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti exposed to violent radicalization driven byWahhabists trained and educated in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan with significant financial and military resources to distract peace in HoA. To eliminate such dominance and killings, and the rise of violent extremists, humanitarian civil societies condemned the extremism, as Anyim aptly states.

2.9 Prevention of attacks by cutting down all terrorist networks

Leriari argues that states in the HoA have tried many ways to eliminate terrorism,albeit unsuccessfully.However, advancing freedom, opportunity, and embracing human dignity through the idea of democracy has offered a lasting solution to terrorism in the past. Herein, states adopt a

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[60]Ojwaka, B. (2017). An examination of factors influencing the emergence of terrorism in the horn of Africa (2001-2015) (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

preventative approach to terrorism by eliminating the socio-structural grievances and conditions that terrorists exploit to establish and sustain their campaigns.[61] The governments of the HoA states have been obliged to protect the people's lives from any terrorism. This has seen states in the HoA have leaders who reveal the organizations funding terrorism, facilitating foot soldiers who confront the terrorism chains such as the AMISOM and the Kenyan Defense Forces personnel, providing enough weapons and military equipment created with the high technology to suppress the actions of extremist groups in the blog.

2.10 Conclusion

In summary, the HoA countries reported increased cases of terrorism that threatens their peace, economic and political sustainability. Consequently, they are in dire need of counter-terrorism strategies as a block. One such strategy is the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa in 1977, which has seen several terrorism activities to cessation. In addition, the convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism was considered and strategically proved to eliminate terrorism in the region. Lastly, seeking help from international security agencies such as the United Nations Security Agencies, the AMISOM and Kenya Defense Forces to strengthen the war against terrorism in Somalia and other states in the horn of Africa played a significant role for the horn of Africa states in countering terrorism.

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[61]Leriari, M. L. (2020). Countering International Terrorism by the Military in Africa: a Case Study of the Kenya Defence Forces (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

CHAPTER THREE: TYPE OF GOVERNANCE THAT HAVE PREVAILED IN KENYA AND SOMALIA AND HOW THIS FAILED IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

3.1 Introduction

The narrative revolving around terror attacks seems a rare occasion to reminiscence, especially within the states in the horn of Africa, with Kenya and Somalia being the most vulnerable states. Kenya and Somalia have since invention reported a series of terrorist attacks. This matter attracted the concern of their governments in the bid to address and counter the same vice. Several governance strategies have been in place by the Somalian and Kenyan founding leaders to eradicate terrorism, considering that their respective countries have been a haven for terrorism. However, it is shocking to note that terrorism is still a threat. Owing to the myriad concerns and threats brought by terrorism to the regional integration, economic events, and political matters in the region, it is worth focusing on the analysis of a number of governances that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how they failed in countering terrorism.

3.2 Kenya

Juliet, Atella, and Masinde posit that terrorism has existed in Kenya for a long time since the founding regime under the leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta. According to Juliet, Atella, and Masinde, three bombs exploded at the OTC bus stop in Nairobi in 1975, ending up killing 27 people, with over 100 being injured severely. Despite the massive havoc caused by the terrorist actions at the bust stop, it is shocking that the regime failed to shoulder responsibility for the attack as no one was held accountable for the incident.[62] It is devastating to note that the Kenyan police serving under the same regime declined to enhance speculation on the identification of the culprits

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[62]Juliet, Atella, and Masinde Yvonne. "A timeline of terror Attacks in Kenya Since 1975." *The elephant* (2019).

and the exact motives of the bombers. Juliet, Atella, and Masinde assert that the regime failed to take full responsibility for its citizens by implementing stiff measures towards countering terrorism across the country, making the country a haven for terrorist attacks.

Williams contends that the Kenyan government has failed to address the issue of marginalization in the Northeastern and Coastal region of the countries such as Mandera, Moyale, Lamu, Kilifi and Garissa, hence, attributing to failed counter-terrorism. Kenyan governments have been reported to be reluctant in addressing the needs of Kenyan-Somali communities in the northeastern part of the country, leaving room for extremist groups such as the al-Shabab to radicalize the region in an attempt to remind the governments to address their needs as well as to get resources from militia groups whose major aim is to cause havoc on the regional integration.[63] Williams affirms that communities inhabiting the region have been sidelined by the governments for years in terms of distribution of national resources and development, hence, creating a huge gap between the Kenyan-Somalis communities in the region with other Kenyans, making them resort to extremist groups to remind the government about their failures.

Chuma also confirms that Kenya was under the dictatorship under the leadership of the late President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, who took over from the late Jomo Kenyatta. In 1980, the Fairmont Norfolk Hotel was bombed by terrorists, leaving 20 people dead, with approximately 80 of them being seriously injured. According to the aftermath analysis of the scenario, Chuma contends that the facility was extensively damaged, despite being a famous hotel, known to harbor a good number of local and international visitors playing a key role in the country's economy. Immediately before the attack, there were a number of terrorist actions that hinted at the likelihood

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[63]Williams, M. "Marginalization lies at the heart of Kenya's insecurity: Q&A with Moses Onyango." *IPI Global Observatory* (2015).

of the bombing. Still, the Kenyan security team was so reluctant to intercept and apprehend the bombers.[64]Chuma proclaims that on a fateful day, the terroristwho was identified later by the Kenya police officers and the Interpol agency as Quddura Mohammed Abd-el-Hamid to have boarded a plane at around 2:30 p.m bound for Jeddah through Khartoum before the bomb exploded six hours later. Kenya is known to be a democratic country that believes in honoring and guarding all the rights of its citizens. However, then-president Moi was adamant about intervening and putting the officers on the radar to salvage the people, giving the terrorists enough time to plan the terrorist activities, install their bombs, and escape without being apprehended.[65] The regime failed to shoulder its expected responsibility in countering terrorism because it has been reported to be a norm that terrorists were traveling under the name of Muradi Alkali using a Maltese passport without being questioned by the authorities, both the governments and the travel agencies.

Hope confers that corruption among security personnel placed to guard the Kenya-Somalia border contributed to the failure of counter-terrorism strategies between Kenya and Somalia. Hope proclaims that Kenya police have been in the frontline soliciting bribes from terrorist groups to pave the way for them into the countries.[66] The major reason as to why police corruption is becoming toll in the northeastern part of Kenya, such as Garissa, Moyale, and Mandera, is that the governmenthave been negligent in meeting and honoring the demands of the security officers in terms of payment of salaries and paying them reasonable amounts accompanied by sufficient

[64]Chuma, Matthew S. *The Scourge of Terrorism: Theater of Conflict Moves to Africa*. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 1999.

[65]MUGA, SIMON ODERO. "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF NAIROBI CITY COUNTY: 1975-2013." PhD diss., KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 2019.

[66]Hope, Kempe Ronald. "Police corruption and the security challenge in Kenya." *African security* 11, no. 1 (2018): 84-108.

allowances with leaves. Also, Hope attests that police officers engage in corrupt activities due to the lack of adequate security equipment to enhance the safety of the officers and the citizens.

Thielman confers that in the August of 1998, the U.S embassy in Kenya was bombed by organized terrorist groups killing 212 people with over 4500 others seriously injured. The blast occurred in the midmorning of the day, which signifies some reluctance of the security agencies within the region because the explosion happened in Kenya's capital in broad daylight. Thielman observes that the case indicated that the Islamist Insurgent group al-Qaeda was responsible for the bombing, but the Kenyan government remained silent over it.[67] There were no future strategic plans to monitor and prevent such occurrence, thus, giving the insurgent groups more room and opportunities to seize more attacks and bombings. Thielman argues that it is evident the Kenyan government is little considerate in taking matters of terrorism seriously and has not shown any concern over the alarming killings caused by the terrorist attacks. Hence, proving to be a failed government with unexercised democratic rights for its people. It is the role of the government to fully protect its people and territories from any security threat and assure them of total security and safety whenever they are carrying on their activities. Failing to address such matters made the governance and the entire states lose key investors, following the fact the among the 212 people who died as a result, 12 were American investors. Moreover, Raitt argues that the bombing of the U.S embassy that killed the 12 U.S nationals attracted several proclamations, citing that the Kenyan government neglected foreign investors by exposing them to bombings and other terror attacks, scaring them from trusting their nationals in Kenya.[68]

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[67]Thielman, Samuel B. "Psychiatric consequences of the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya." (2004): 644-649.

[68]Raitt, Josh M., Samuel B. Thielman, Betty Pfefferbaum, Pushpa Narayanan, and Carol S. North. "Psychosocial effects on US government personnel of exposure to the 1998 terrorist attack on the US embassy in Nairobi." *Psychiatry* (2021): 1-17.

Lyman, Princeton, and Stephen argue that the political instability in Kenya has been read and mastered by terrorist groups and using it as an avenue to cause attacks. This is in line with what took place in November 2002 when Kenya was in the middle of electioneering preparation. Lyman, Princeton, and Stephen affirm that an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa was bombed immediately after two missiles were fired at an Israel holiday jet that had taken off from the city's airport. It is a clear depiction that the country at this juncture was taken over by military governance before the new president could be voted in and allowed to take the oath of office.[69] According to Lyman, Princeton and Stephen, it is clear that the government failed to consider stiffening its security agencies about guarding the country during the electioneering period, hence, creating a loophole for the insurgent groups to commence their attacks and fly off without any apprehension. Lyman, Princeton, and Stephen avowed that the missiles narrowly missed a Boeing 757 plane with 261 passengers on board, ending up distracting a large part of the facility while smoldering 15 people to death. The Kenya police officers could only report the casualties. After being notified that the Palestinian army was responsible for the attack, it was still annoying that the Kenyan governance commenced no further interception. This illustrates how the Kenyan government was a bit reluctant in addressing matters of insurgency and terrorism across the country, apart from believing in speculations and hearsays.

After the 2002 terrorist attack that marked the end of Moi's regime and ushering Kibaki's governance, Jal posits that at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, Kenya engaged in political turmoil over a discrepancy in election outcomes. This was when the whole country struggled for safety over the clashes, and border officers were deployed to contain the adverse situation in

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[69]Lyman, Princeton N., and F. Stephen Morrison. "The terrorist threat in Africa." *Foreign Aff.* 83 (2004): 75.

vulnerable regions.[70] Thereafter, the Ugandan army organized in an insurgent manner utilized the

porous border for bombing over 5,000 Turkana pastoralists in Koten to flush them out of the region

that had been reported to be under conflict between Kenya and Uganda for a long time. Jal observes

that the Ugandan People's Defense Force was held responsible for the attack. Still, the Kenyan

government had no time for interception since the country was set ablaze over election outcomes.

In whatsoever case, it is convincing to accuse the governance under the Kibaki's reign that it failed

to deliberate border security and controls against insurgent groups.

Stites affirms that in October 2010, another thirty people were reportedly attacked by al-Shabab

following a night clash with a pro-government Somalia Militia on the Kenya-Somalia border. This

indicates that the Kenyan government had no consideration of regional integration as a tool to

counter-terrorism attributed to border conflicts. Such negligence and inconsideration have made

Kenya-Somalia-border a terrorist breeding zone and have threatened the two countries' security,

with Kenya being a democratic state.[71]Stites also posits that the border issue resulted in the Somali-

based Islamist militant group Al-Shabab carrying out several cross-border raids that resulted in

many people being killed before the Kenyan government sent troops from the defense forces to

contain such attacks, which is still operational to date. This implies that the Kenyan regime under

president MwaiKibaki was hesitant to deploy the troops to guard the border until the killings were

advocated by public outcry.

Simon et al. maintain that in November 2013, Kenya was struck by another severe terror attack in

Westgate Shopping Mall, Nairobi. This was during the regime of President Uhuru Kenyatta, who

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[70]Jal, Gatluak Ruon. "Cross Border Conflict in Gambella Regional State (from 1991 to 2011): The Impacts of the Cross Border Conflicts in Gambella Regional State."

[71]Stites, Elizabeth, Darlington Akabwai, Dyan Mazurana, and Priscilla Ateyo. "Angering Akujů: survival and suffering in Karamoja." *A Report on Livelihoods and Human Security in the Karamoja Region of Uganda* (2007).

had just resumed office. Sixty-eight people were killed, with over 150 being reported to be seriously injured. According to Simon et al., it is evident from the onset of the events and claims from witnesses that the attack was highly organized, with the attackers having pre-positioned weapons across all the sections of the building.[72] It is devastating to note that such an attack can be planned without security officers being judged with the responsibility to guard the building. Only, also contends that after the security agencies were informed about the access of the terrorist attacks to the service elevators, there was no immediate response on the same as ordered by the government until the information was all over social media.[73]Onguny attests that there is no way such sensitive information about terror attacks can circulate all over media sites without the responsible security agencies showing any concern. At last, it was declared that the insurgent and notorious terrorist group Al Shabab was accountable for the attack.

3.3 Somalia

For the case of Somalia, terrorism has been a significant governance problem facing the state for decades, with minimal intervention being put in place to counter the same. Jama argues that Somalia is known to be under the headship of dictators, sacrificing the country for their interests. In 1988, Somalia experienced a bombing and shelling of Hargeysa, the second-largest city in the state.[74] This was attributed to the collapse of Siyaad Barre's dictatorship regime that had been plunging the country into severe violence due to civil wars. The wars paved the way for several

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[72]Simon, Tomer, Avishay Goldberg, Limor Aharonson-Daniel, Dmitry Leykin, and Bruria Adini. "Twitter in the crossfire—the use of social media in the Westgate Mall terror attack in Kenya." *PloS one* 9, no. 8 (2014): e104136.

[73]Only, Philip. "Framing the fight against terrorism in Kenya: perspectives on the attacks at Westgate Mall and Garissa University." *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* 1, no. 1 (2020): 77-101.

[74]Jama, Hassan Ali. *Who Cares about Somalia: Hassan's Ordeal; Reflections on a Nation's Future*. Verlag Hans Schiller, 2005.

terrorist attacks because the country lacked a well-established functional central government to stand in place and salvage the country from being a haven for terrorism.

Issa-Sale contends that Somalia is a failed state, as indicated by the acknowledgment of the dictator Siyaad Barre, which turned the country into a pool of blood following the civil war that began in 1991. Being the most impoverished country in the horn of Africa and probably in the whole world, Issa-Sale infers that Somalia lacks a considerable and consistent government to address the insurgency in the region, thus, confirming to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.[75] The country has seen several militant groups coming and going for decades following political upheaval. Stewart claims that Al Shabab was the major forerunner in Somalia, provoking national unity and regional integration. This is true as suggested by the failed governance to provide informed leadership in the country and instead of acting as incubators for all the insurgent groups under al-Ittihad al-Islamic, also known as the Unity of Islam, which picked from the collapse of Barre's regime to execute terrorist activities.[76] The major booster of such extremist groups was to band of the Middle-East-educated Somali extremists. They were fully funded and armed by al-Qaeda's late chief Osama Bin Laden. Being a failed state was the major reason why Somalia was full of extremists. There was no government to control or inhibit such funding of terrorism in the state, thus, causing a civil war.

Gardner, Judith, and Judy argue that in the early 2000s, there was a rift established between the AIAI's old guard in Somalia, which ended up creating a political front with the formation of a younger group who decided to form a Greater Somalia that was purely obedient to a fundamentalist

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[75]Stewart, Christopher. "A bet on peace for war-torn Somalia." *Wall Street Journal* 26 (2013).
[76]Stewart, Christopher. "A bet on peace for war-torn Somalia." *Wall Street Journal* 26 (2013).

Islamic rule.[77] With the hardliners in place, guaranteed by the fact that there was no stable government, resorted to joining forces with an alliance of sharia courts, also known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), serving in favor of youth militia. Gardner, Judith, and Judy attest that the ICU and Al-Shabaab seized absolute control of the capital in 2006, eventually stoking fears in the neighboring country Ethiopia, which threatened the regional integration because of the spillover jihadi violence.

Omar affirms that Somalia has no strict government that can prioritize national interests such as security. Insurgent groups enjoyed such freedoms to the extent that they had sober leaders surpassing the national leaders. Al-Shabab was led by Ahmed Ummar, installed in 2014 after Ahmed Godane Abdi was killed in a U.S drone strike.[78] The problem here implies that the dictatorship portrayed by all the leaders who had opportunities to deliver the state out of the insurgence was self-centered, paving the way for establishing the terrorist groups with no proper governance strategies to counter-terrorism.

3.4 Conclusion

In summary the form of governance that prevailed in Kenya and Somalia provided a safe environment for terrorist to take advantage. Lack of policies to address inequality in the socio-economic factors, corruption, security forces approach in dealing with crimes has created structural problems that have enhanced prevalence of radicalization and violent extremism in both Kenya

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[77]Gardner, Judith, and Judy El Bushra, eds. *Somalia-the untold story: the war through the eyes of Somali women*. CIIR, 2004.

[78]Omar, Mohamed Osman. *Somalia. A Nation Driven to Despair. A Case of Leadership Failure*. Somali Publications, 2002.

and Somalia. The extremists group take advantage of the governance system in Kenya and Somalia to radicalize more youth into their course.

CHAPTER FOUR: GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES THAT ARE EFFECTIVE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Terrorism in Africa and globally has lacked specific identification of cause and genesis, and still making future efforts to bring it to a halt and embrace peace difficulty. Several African nations, especially those in the eastern part of the continent, have been vulnerable to terrorism. There are no accessible and universal reasons to advocate for the origin of terrorism in the horn of Africa because of the existing complexities attributed to the vice. Countries making the horn of Africa, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti, have been significantly affected by the impacts of terrorism ranging from the distraction of economic activities, causing political havoc and devastation on cultural norms and religious values. Of all the time, the insurgent groups are always riven by internal conflicts motivated by local objectives, which sprouts to an international jihadist objective. Governments have been infringed by terrorism and have resorted to governance strategies and lead ways that are effective in countering terrorism in the horn of Africa and fulfill the objective of realism which beliefs in the survival of the states through mutual interaction and interrelation according to ethical norms of rather than moral principles.

4.2 Border security and management

Kilonzo observes that members of insurgent groups and foreign terrorists move across remote areas of the vulnerable countries, sparsely controlled, taking advantage of the porous borders. However, it is pretty necessary to stem these flows as one of the elements of governance that have proved to help a great deal in countering terrorism in the region and across the world. Kilonzo posits state the global border and security management programs were put in place by the

governments of states, making the horn of Africa play a significant role in preventing the illegal cross-border movements of terrorists.[79] Hence, stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters through all means such as air, land, and maritime borders. According to Kilonzo, border security and management as a governance strategy to counter terrorism is imperative in curbing the illicit cross-border movement of war equipment such as arms, explosives, ammunition, goods and cargo, and hazardous materials that terrorists might use execute their vices.

Kagwanja also argues that border security management programming has given rise to many organizations and agencies targeting capacity-building training, based on establishing the best practices for border security management to limit the entry and exit of insurgent groups. Kagwanja affirms that such programs have been established in the Ethiopia-Somalia border as commissioned by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to curb the smuggling of drug substances out of or into the horn of Africa states.[80] Such programs utilize the use and share of biometric data about individuals crossing borders, hence helping to identify persons crossing the borders illegally. Kagwanja affirms that the integration of such practices within the national strategies and action plans to counter-terrorism has helped states in the horn of Africa significantly reduce terrorism cases.

4.3 Countering terrorist travels

Ploch argues that states in the horn of Africa have become a haven for Islamic extremist groups for various decades. Al Qaeda is known to have stormed the region whose motives threaten the region's stability to make a purely Islamist region with the great powers dominated by religion.

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[79]Kilonzo, Boniface K. "Managing terrorism in the horn of Africa: a case study of Kenya." Ph.D. diss., University of Nairobi, 2013.

[80]Kagwanja, Peter. "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies." *African Security Review* 15, no. 3 (2006): 72-86.

Having caused a lot of havoc, the states became so concerned and dedicated to digging deep into the cause of such extremism and developing avenues to eradicate the occurrences. After noting that the extremist groups traveled from as far as Middle East regions, Ploch observes that countering terrorist travels as a governance strategy to counter terrorism worked effectively for states in the horn of Africa region.81 Conferring to Ploch, such controls on terrorism travel bans can only be enhanced by building detection capabilities to identify genuine travelers and terrorist travels to and out of the region. The UN Countering Terrorist Travel Program, one of the global flagship initiatives of the UNOCT, assisted the states in the horn of Africa with capabilities and techniques to detect and counter-terrorists and serious criminals from entering the territories as well as moving out of the region. Lyons contributes that those states in the horn of Africa, such as Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, were provided with devices and technical know-how used in collecting data and passenger information to be recorded and searched for any criminal and terrorist record before allowing them to proceed with their travels.82 The INTERPOL database is a modern data relating system used to detect suspected criminals and terrorists by enhancing information exchange. Kenya, for instance, has been using such devices at its airports, maritime borders, and land border regions in accordance with the security council resolution and relevant border laws and policies.

4.4 Cybersecurity

Most terrorist activities are commissioned, planned, and financed by individuals with high-tech technological capabilities and have been reported to threaten global security. CHARLES posits

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81Ploch, Lauren. "Countering terrorism in East Africa: the US response." *Congressional Research Service* 41473 (2010).

82Lyons, Terrence. "The Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict and the search for peace in the Horn of Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 120 (2009): 167-180.

that stabilizing cyber security is a counter-terrorism governance strategy being implemented by several states in the horn of Africa to prevent cyber-attacks carried out by terrorist actors against critical technological infrastructure. In addition, CHARLES asserts that the misuse of information and communication technologies has raised many concerns as terrorists use the available internet and new technologies to commit, incite, fund, recruit and plan their vices against the states in the horn of Africa and the rest of the world.[83] CHARLES also claims that curbing cyber insecurity has been realistic among the terrorist vulnerable regions. According to CHARLES, Kenya is among the countries in the horn of Africa that managed to apply cybersecurity. The United Nations Security Council rolled out new technologies programs to prevent cyber-attacks carried out by terrorism actors across its crucial infrastructures such as shopping malls, travel routes, and learning institutions following a series of terrorist events in such areas. Since the invention and implementation of cybersecurity prevention strategies, states in the horn of Africa have proved their ability to mitigate the impacts caused, recovering and restoring all the targeted systems that the terrorists and insurgent groups have hunted to threaten the security of the region in the attempt to satisfy their interests as put by realists.

4.5 Gender Equality

Banks posits that mainstream gender considerations into counter-terrorism activities have played a significant role in providing preventive and responsive efforts. However, there are several citing linking the increasing terrorism issues in the horn of Africa with feminism. Banks confers that women, upon noting that their rights have been deprived and no one seeks to advocate for them, might feel humiliated and might be forced through radicalization in the bid to remind the bearers

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[83]CHARLES, N. DRAGONETTE. "Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa." (2011): 141-143.

about the unrecognized feminist rights. Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti are among the states in the horn of African that have embraced the recognition of gender equality as the most plausible way of eradicating radicalization and seeking to recognize the influential role women play in addressing the menace of terrorism. Banks deliberates that most terrorists' affiliates in the region recruited many females to their insurgent groups following the fact that the governance in the region is always unsuspecting on women compared to men.[84] The strategy is known to play a great deal in countering terrorism in the horn of Africa by eradicating any gender sidelining or favoritism that might inspire radicalization and eventually terrorism. In addition, Banks asserts that on matters of interests and governance as advocated by realists, gender equality as a counter-terrorist governance strategy has helped the susceptible countries in the horn of Africa to eliminate the belief and assumption that men always commission terrorist activities. Gender equality as a counter-terrorism strategy does not discriminate any gender but brings on board that everyone is a potential terrorist depending on what inspires them to do so.

Gender discrimination has been cited by Haner et al. to be the primary cause of radicalization between women and men, even though many believe that terrorism is the last thing feminists can resort to. Female suicide bombers have been apprehended across the states in the horn of Africa. Upon interrogation, they attest that some agencies recruit, equip them before being deployed to accomplish specific missions.[85]Haner et al. observe that a good number of the women being recruited and facilities to conduct terrorist activities admitted to have ended up in such insurgents' groups out of discrimination and unaddressed radicalization. Most realists always say that terrorist and suicide bombings are successful when women are more engaged than men. This is true because

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[84]Banks, Cyndi. "Introduction: Women, gender, and terrorism: Gendering terrorism." (2019): 181-187.
[85]Haner, Murat, Francis T. Cullen, and Michael L. Benson. "Women and the PKK: Ideology, gender, and terrorism." *International Criminal Justice Review* 30, no. 3 (2020): 279-301.

when a terrorist act is a woman, less violence is always expected from them, unlike the phenomenon that male terrorism is prone to violence provided it earns them the success of their missions. Haner et al. conclude that gender equality has been an excellent strategy to counter terrorism because it polishes claims that women are victims of violence, hence, embracing the fact that every gender is a potential terrorist considering the attributes and inspirations.

4.6 Advocation for human rights and the rule of law

Masferrer & Walker claim that terrorism in the horn of African states has been a dire menace to regional integration, a matter that has called the member states and UN security agencies to embrace respect for human rights and the rule of law across the region.86 Masferrer & Walker argues that the UN global counter-terrorism strategy underscores the member states from the horn of Africa to shoulder and respect human rights obligations under the international and regional laws. According to Masferrer & Walker, the idea of refugees being used as avenues for terrorism in the region such as Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya has been deemed as a failure to respect the international rights laws and refugee and humanitarian law. Such laws were put in place to necessitate the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. While playing a crucial role in protecting such vulnerable individuals, upholding human rights and the rule of law has helped a great deal in countering terrorism and violent extremism in the horn of Africa. Also, Monshipouri maintains that when all the states in the horn of Africa implement their human rights obligations within the context of terrorism and crime activities, counter-terrorism and violent extremism have been halted across the states.87 The human rights and the rule of law

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86Masferrer, A., & Walker, C. (Eds.). (2013). *Counter-terrorism, human rights and the rule of law: crossing legal boundaries in defence of the state*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
87Monshipouri, Mahmood. *Terrorism, Security, and Human Rights: Harnessing the Rule of Law*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.

in the region have earnest the member states to have a collaborative security dogma in line with the UN security agencies to protect human rights of refugees who can be compromised by terrorists hence, reducing the possibility of threatening the welfare of such refugees' camps in the region.

4.7 Preventing violent extremism

As stated by realists that terrorism is inspired by the need to fulfill a specific interest, governments of states in the horn of Africa have shown their intensive concerns, hence, creating the need of having renewed and sustained focus on prevention such as addressing all the underlying conditions that cause young men and women to be lured and recruited to terrorism. According to Luengo-Cabrera, José, and Annelies, the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism in terrorist-prone areas always focus on preventing and countering violent extremism, which is the hotbed for terrorism in the region. Since its invention, UNOCT has played a significant role in the horn of Africa, such as coordinating and complementing the work of UN security agencies to reduce the vulnerability and the tendency of such states to engage in terrorism.[88]Luengo-Cabrera, Jose, and Annelies purport that preventing violent extremism as a governance strategy to counter terrorism in the horn of Africa states is known to offer capacity-building support to all the states among other regional organizations such as AU, IGAD, and EAC on matters PCVE issues. These include developing national and regional PCVE action plans, embracing the prevention of radicalization to violence in rehabilitation centers, prisons, and corrective facilities, and eliminating violent extremist offenders' reintegration. Moreover, Luengo-Cabrera, José, and Annelies contend that preventing violent extremists as a governance strategy to counter terrorism in the horn of Africa embraces strategic communication to promote alternative and counter-terrorist narratives as well as engaging

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[88]Luengo-Cabrera, José, and Annelies Pauwels. *Countering Violent Extremism: the Horn of Africa. EN*. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016.

the youths who are at the risk of getting dubbed to terrorism activities in various PCVE programs and eventually making them busy.

4.8 Curbing terror financing

The dynamic nature of terrorism financing has been a significant attribute of the advancing cases of terrorism and an obstacle towards terrorism preventive efforts. Möller informs that curbing terror financing and facilitation has helped a great deal in countering terrorism within states in the horn of Africa.[89] Being an evolving threat in the region, Möller affirms that a comprehensive address on such threats is one of the most effective strategies being employed by governments of states in the horn of Africa as far as countering terrorism is concerned. Since individuals and group needs and interests inspire terrorist activities, they are always linked with motivations such as financial resources offered at the expense of compromising human rights. Möller attests that since the governments and security agencies in the horn of Africa states went for individuals and organizations funding terrorism activities, countering terrorism has proved effective significantly.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed some of the governance strategies effective for countering terrorism in the HoA. Such strategies include; promoting the international legal framework in dealing with terrorism, preventing radicalization and violent extremism leading to terrorism, preventing terrorism financing, inspecting the use of the internet for terror activities, supporting dialogue and cooperation, strengthening the national efforts of implementation of U.N. security council

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[89]Möller, Björn. "The Horn of Africa and the US" War on Terror" with particular Focus on Somalia." (2009).

resolutions, recruiting more military officers within the borders, and coming up with the strict

policies of dealing with those found guilty of terrorism.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM-DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

Governance plays a key role in preventing terrorist attacks and in helping law enforcement agencies arrest individuals suspected of committing terrorist acts, either before or after an actual attack[90]. This section analysis presents and interprets the findings of the study. The study seeks to analyze the role of governance in countering tourism based on three specific objectives; to examine existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in the HoA Region, to analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia, and how this failed in countering terrorism and to analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the region. In this analysis, a questionnaire is delivered to 384 respondents, and the results are analyzed using Microsoft Excel 2016, and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v.26). In addition, the findings of the study are presented in form of tables, pie charts, and columns (2-D and 3-D) among other important output tools.

5.2 Demographic Characteristics

5.2.1 Gender

The study sought to find the gender of the respondents. According to Maina gender is important in countering extremism and enhancing radicalization[91]. Both male and female respondents play a

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[90]Xianghong, Z. (2019). The Global Governance of Terrorism: An Assessment of Different Regimes. *Social Sciences in China*, *40*(1), 100-126.

[91]Maina, M. W. (2020). *The Gender Factor in Countering Terrorism in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

major role in terrorism and conflicts. The following table shows the distribution of 384 respondents by gender.

Table 5.1: Gender of the Respondents

Gender of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Female	171	44.5	44.5	44.5
	Male	213	55.5	55.5	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

From the table, it is clear that 171 out of 384 respondents were female while 213 out of 384 respondents were male. Therefore, the majority of the respondents were male and are thought to play a major role in evaluating the role of governance in countering terrorism in Kenya and Somalia. The percentage distribution shows indicate that 44.5% were females while 55.5% were males, implying a percentage difference of 11.0% as shown in the following pie chart;

Figure 5.1: Percentage Distribution of Gender

Source: Researcher (2021)

5.2.2 Age

The study determined the age of the respondents since the aging population helps in shaping their perception of demographic trends terrorism and counter-terrorism. In this study, the indicators of respondents' age contribute to the dramatic demonstration of demographic changes. The age of the respondents ranged from the age of 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 51-60 as shown in the following frequency distribution table.

Table 5.2: Age of the Respondents

Age of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	20-30	104	27.1	27.1	27.1
	31-40	126	32.8	32.8	59.9

	41-50	96	25.0	25.0	84.9
	51-60	58	15.1	15.1	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

The table above indicates that 104 respondents were aged between the age of 20-30 years, 126 respondents aged between 31-40 years, 96 respondents were aged between 41-50 years, and 58 respondents were aged between 51-60 years. This implies that the majority of the respondents were that of youth aged 20-30, and those of 31-40 years. Therefore, the youthful population was responded in much in evaluating the role of governance in countering tourism. The pie chart below shows the percentage distribution of the respondents' age.

Figure 5.2: Percentage of Respondents' Age

Source: Researcher (2021)

5.2.3 Highest Level of Education

The study sought to find the highest level of education of the respondents. According to Al-Kurdi, El-Haddadeh, and Eldabi, the highest level of education is important in a study as it plays a key

role in advancing different fields across the study[92]. In the study, different levels of education included primary, secondary, College, University, and None as shown in the table below;

Table 5.3: Highest Level of Education of the Respondents

Highest Level of Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Primary	30	7.8	7.8	7.8
	Secondary	74	19.3	19.3	27.1
	College	135	35.2	35.2	62.2
	University	141	36.7	36.7	99.0
	None	4	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

From the table, the study found that; (Primary=7.8%, Secondary=19.3%, College=35.2%, University=36.7% and None=1.0%). This implies that the majority of the respondents were from college and university, with the university having the highest number of respondents of 141 out of 384. In this case, determining the role of governance in countering terrorism was a successful study that give reliable information from educated respondents. The following histogram indicates the distribution of the respondents based on the highest level of education.

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[92]Al-Kurdi, O., El-Haddadeh, R., & Eldabi, T. (2018). Knowledge sharing in higher education institutions: a systematic review. *Journal of Enterprise Information Management*.

Figure 5.3: Histogram Showing the Highest Level of Education by Frequency

Source: Researcher (2021)

5.3 The Existing Measures and Methodologies Used by States in Countering Terrorism in HoA Region

Kenya and Somalia have agreed that terrorism is the most significant threat to its peace, stability, security, socio-economic development, and enjoyment of human rights. According to Mukhammadsidiqov, and Turaev, terrorism undermines important unity values, especially those uniting regions, states, and the entire global[93]. The study sought to examine the existing measures and methodologies used by the states in countering terrorism in the HoA region. In this case, a questionnaire was delivered to 384 respondents, to ask on "What measures and methodologies have the government of Kenya and Somalia adopted to counter Terrorism?". Out of the 384 respondents, 270 respondents responded, indicating a response rate of 70.3% as shown in the table below;

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[93]Mukhammadsidiqov, M., & Turaev, A. (2020). Influence of us neoconservatism on the formation of the national security paradigm. *The Light of Islam*, *2020*(3), 113-120.

Table 5.4: Measures and Methodologies Have Government of Kenya And Somalia Adopted to Counter-Terrorism

What measures and methodologies have the government of Kenya and Somalia adopted to Counter Terrorism?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No Response	114	29.7	29.7	29.7
	Responded	270	70.3	70.3	100.0
	Total	**384**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Source: Researcher (2021)

In this case, 70.3% of the respondent provided feedback on the existing measures and methodologies adopted by the government of both Kenya and Somalia in countering tourism. The percentage of the respondents who never respondent was 29.7% as shown in the pie chart below;

**Figure 5.4: Response Rate to measures and methodologies**

Source: Researcher (2021)

Some of these methods and measures provided by the respondents include adoption of the resolution, cooperation, and coordination, convention on prevention, application of action plans, offensive military operations, recognition of radicalization, and prevention of attacks by cutting down all terrorist networks.

Table 5.5: Existing Measures and methods of countering terrorism in HoA

Existing Measures and methods of countering terrorism in HoA

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Adoption of resolution	86	22.4	22.4	22.4
Cooperation and coordination	23	6.0	6.0	28.4
Application of action plans	22	5.7	5.7	34.1
Convention on the prevention and combating terrorism	40	10.4	10.4	44.5
Offensive military operations	41	10.7	10.7	55.2
Prevention of attacks	22	5.7	5.7	60.9
Radicalization recognition	36	9.4	9.4	70.3
No response	114	29.7	29.7	100.0
Total	**384**	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

These measures and methods were given as options to the respondents, hence different in the percentage of respondents in each of them. Therefore, it is clear that 86 out of 270 respondents pointed out on adoption of a resolution on the strengthening of cooperation and coordination that was responded to by 23 respondents. According to the respondents, this measure and method were important in the elimination of terrorism across the HoA region, especially when cooperation and coordination between Kenya and Somalia is taken into consideration. These respondents agreed with Mwaniki by adding that adoption of resolution helped in fighting extremism and terrorism

held in the deep in the roots of HoA[94]. Finally, the respondents pointed out that this method and/ or existing measure helped in bringing onboard methods and practices, important in embracing peace in the region.

Another important strategy that was mentioned by 40 out of 384 respondents in the study was a convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism. According to these respondents, they agreed with Viotti, & Kauppi that this measure and method is important in that it complies by treating terrorism as a life-threatening disease on both security and peace[95]. The respondents also pointed out that convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism suppresses inter-state conflicts of terrorism through the surfacing of existing differences amongst them. From the table above, the application of action plans is another measure that was pointed by 22 out of 384 respondents. This implies a response rate of 5.7%. According to these respondents, the application of actions plans, especially in the prevention and combating of tourism was important in that it revives and strengthens the existing commitment and obligations of state parties, especially in the implementation of counter-terrorism conventions. The respondents added by agreeing with Nyesiga that, application of actions such as the African Union Plan helps in eliminating the terrorism factors[96]. They cited an example of the Kenya National Police Service as a body responsible for applying plan actions, especially along the Kenya-Somali border.

As if that is not enough, the respondents continued providing feedback on the existing measures and methods to counter-terrorism in HoA. 41(10.7%) out of 384 respondents pointed out offensive military operations as a measure and method of countering terrorism in HoA. They pointed on the

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[94]Mwaniki, D. M. (2019). *Changing Strategies in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Case of Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

[95] Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (2019). International relations theory. Rowman & Littlefield.

[96]Nyesiga, N. H. (2017). *Combating transnational terrorism in the East African region: The role of the African Union Mission in Somalia*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States.

importance of this method by stating that offensive military operations support the federal government while ensuring the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. In addition, the recognition of radicalization was pointed out by 36 out of 384 respondents as a measure and method to counter-terrorism in the HoA region. The importance of this method and measure is evident when the respondents pointed out that radicalization helps in the rehabilitation of distressed groups who could end up being extremists. In addition, the respondents agreed with Muga by stating that, radicalization advocates the changing dynamic Kenya and Somalia and other states in the HoA while eliminating the eminence of the bad culture of violence[97]. The final method and measure are the prevention of attacks by cutting down terrorist networks. This was pointed out by 22 out of 384 respondents. According to the respondents, cutting down terrorist networks is important as they reduce attacks given the supply of weapons peace building groups like AMISOM.

As a summary of the methods and measures of countering terrorism in HoA, the following column summarizes the responses given by the respondents in the study;

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[97]MUGA, S. O. (2019). *INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF NAIROBI CITY COUNTY: 1975-2013* (Doctoral dissertation, KENYATTA UNIVERSITY).

Figure 5.5: Existing Measures and Methods to Counter Terrorism in HoA

Source: Researcher (2021)

5.4 The Type of Governance That Has Prevailed in Kenya And Somalia And How This Failed in Countering Terrorism

According to Acharya, governance is defined as a system whereby government entities get directed and controlled on their structure and accountability[98]. Here, the study sought to find out the prevailing governance between Kenya and Somalia and how its accountancy has failed in countering terrorism. The prevailing governance in Kenya and Somalia was based on the question, "Do you think governance plays a key role in Countering terrorism in both Somalia and Kenya?" and the role played by governance in countering terrorism in both Kenya and Somalia. When asked on whether governance plays a key role in countering terrorism in both Kenya and Somalia, the respondents provide a "Yes" and "No" answer as shown in the table below;

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[98]Acharya, K. K. (2018). Local governance restructuring in Nepal: From government to governmentality. *Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, *12*, 37-49.

Table 5.6: Response on Key Roles of Governance in Countering Terrorism in Kenya and Somalia

Do you think governance plays a key role in Countering terrorism in both Somalia and Kenya?"

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	22	5.7	5.7	5.7
	Yes	362	94.3	94.3	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

From the table, it was found that 94.3% of the respondents, that is 362 out of 384 said that governance plays a key role in countering terrorism in both Kenya and Somalia. However, 5.7% said that governance plays no critical role. According to Ebert et al., a response rate of more than 50% is acceptable and the percentage of the respondents of 93.3% in Yes qualifies the study to analyze this objective[99]. This percentage distribution on the key role of governance response rate by the respondents is given in the pie chart below;

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[99]Ebert, J. F., Huibers, L., Christensen, B., & Christensen, M. B. (2018). Or web-based questionnaire invitations as a method for data collection: a cross-sectional comparative study of differences in response rate, completeness of data, and financial cost. *Journal of medical Internet research*, *20*(1), e24.

Figure 5. 6: Percentage of Response on Key Role of Governance

Source: Researcher (2021)

The study was processed with a strong focus on the respondents who provided "Yes" as their feedback from the above. Based on the prevalence of the type of governance that has prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism, the respondents pointed out the "hard" and "soft" governance approaches, and how they have failed in countering terrorism. The respondents agreed with Oberthü by defining "hard" governance as a system that operates on rules, arising from treaties, regulations, and directives, while "soft" governance refers to the informal, and non-binding system that is less authoritative[100]. According to the respondents the "hard" governance approaches include arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture, victimization, and military attacks as shown in the following frequency distribution table

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[100]Oberthür, S. (2019). Hard or soft governance? The EU's climate and energy policy framework for 2030. *Politics and Governance*, *7*(1), 17-27.

Table 5.7: "Hard" Governance Approaches

"Hard" Governance Approaches

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Arrests	100	27.6	27.6	27.6
	Extrajudicial killings	65	18.0	18.0	45.6
	Torture	52	14.4	14.4	59.9
	Victimization	90	24.9	24.9	84.8
	Military attacks	55	15.2	15.2	100.0
	Total	362	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

From the study, 100 out of 362 respondents who agreed on governance playing a key role in countering terrorism in Kenya and Somalia, pointed out "arrests" as a "hard" governance approach. According to these respondents, arrests have failed in countering terrorism because it increases more violence compared to building peace. In addition, the respondents pointed out that through arrests, the terrorists may decide to retaliate back to those arresting their colleagues. The prevailing terrorism witnessed in Kenya and Somalia is at times brought in by the kind of arrests made by both countries, hence increasing tension among the residents of both countries. Secondly, extrajudicial killings were mentioned by 65 out of 362 respondents as a "hard" governance approach. Here, the respondents' associated extrajudicial killings with the disappearance of religious leaders, youths, and business people who are kidnapped and end up being killed by the police. This has failed in countering terrorism in Kenya and Somalia because it turns counter-terrorism into conflicts in both states.

Torture is another "hard" governance approach that is believed to counter-terrorism. According to 52 out of 362 respondents, torture involves the arrest of terrorist suspects, and the criminal investigators want to get information from them by being taken through harsh conditions. According to the respondents, it is difficult for the government to apply this approach since most of the criminal suspects arrested never give information about terrorist activity in which they are believed to engage in. The respondents also agreed with Nyadera, and Bincof, pointing out that torture is not reliable, considering that it is a trial method[101]. Victimization and military attacks are "hard" approaches pointed out by 90 and 55 respondents respectively. According to the respondents, victimization has failed in countering terrorism because it has increased the number of police shootings making people always feel like they are insecure. On the other hand, the failure in military attacks as pointed by 55 respondents is that military officers are characterized by brutality and extra-judicial killings. The "hard" governance approaches are summarized in the figure below;


Figure 5.7: "Hard" Governance Approaches

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[101]Nyadera, I. N., & Bincof, M. O. (2019). Human security, terrorism, and counterterrorism: Boko Haram and the Taliban. *International Journal on World Peace*, *36*(1), 4-15.

5.5 Effective Governance Strategies in Countering Terrorism in The Region

In Africa and the entire, terrorism has lacked specific identification of cause and genesis. However, it is still making future efforts to bring it to a halt and embrace peace difficulty by improving on the governance strategies. The study sought to analyze the effective governance strategies in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. In this case, a questionnaire was delivered to 384 respondents, out of which 250 respondents responded, implying a response rate of 65.1%. The study summarized the respondents' feedback on strategies into seven major and effective governance strategies as shown in the table below;

Table 5.8: Effective Governance Strategies in Countering Terrorism in The Region

Effective Governance Strategies in Countering Terrorism in The Region

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Border Security and Management	70	18.2	18.2	18.2
	Countering terrorist travels	55	14.3	14.3	32.6
	Gender Equality	15	3.9	3.9	36.5
	Advocation For Human Rights and The Rule of Law	20	5.2	5.2	41.7
	Preventing Violent Extremism	55	14.3	14.3	56.0
	Curbing Terror Financing	20	5.2	5.2	61.2
	Cybersecurity	15	3.9	3.9	65.1
	No Response	134	34.9	34.9	100.0

	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher (2021)

The study found that 18.2% of the target population identified border security as an effective governance strategy. According to these respondents, border security is important, especially in curbing the illicit cross-border movement of war equipment such as arms, explosives, ammunition, goods and cargo, and hazardous materials that terrorists might use to execute their vices. The respondents also agreed with Gerstein et al. and added that border security and management give rise to many organizations and agencies targeting capacity-building training, based on establishing the best practices for border security management to limit the entry and exit of insurgent groups[102]. Secondly, Countering terrorist travels was pointed to as an effective governance strategy by 14.3% of the target population. In this case, the respondents agree with Ploch, arguing that the horn of Africa has become a haven for Islamic extremist groups for various decades[103]. In addition, the respondents pointed out that countering terrorist travels is an important and effective governance strategy that calls for a better understanding of radicalization while recognizing the importance of addressing terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

Cybersecurity strategy was provided by 3.9% of the target population. Here, the 15 respondents pointed out that the United Nations Security Council has launched new technological programs to prevent cyberattacks by terrorist actors on its critical infrastructures, such as shopping malls, travel routes, and educational facilities, following a series of terrorist attacks in these areas. These respondents agreed with Park et al. that cybersecurity is important in mitigation of the effects

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[102]Gerstein, D. M., Atler, A., Davenport, A. C., Grill, B., Kadlec, A., & Young, W. (2018). *Managing international borders: balancing security with the licit flow of people and goods*. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States.

[103]Ploch, Lauren. "Countering terrorism in East Africa: the US response." *Congressional Research Service* 41473 (2010).

caused, restoration and restoration of all target systems that terrorists and insurgent groups[104]. As if that is not enough, the respondents pointed out gender equality as an effective governance strategy. According to 15 respondents and 3.9% of the target population, gender equality helps the susceptible countries in the horn of Africa to eliminate the belief and assumption that men always commission terrorist activities. In addition, these respondents pointed out that gender equality does not discriminate any gender but brings on board that everyone is a potential terrorist action.

Further, the study found that advocation for human rights and the rule of law is an effective governance strategy. Here, 5.2% of the study population and 20 respondents agreed on this as an effective structure by stating that through the strategy HoA states seriously establish a common security dogma, in line with UN security agencies, to protect the human rights of refugees who may be threatened by terrorists, thus reducing the possibility of endangering the well-being of such. refugee camps in the region. Other effective governance strategies included curbing terror financing and preventing violent extremism[105]. This was highlighted by 5.2% and 14.3% of the study population respectively. According to 20 out of 384 respondents, curbing terror financing helped a great deal in countering terrorism within states in the horn of Africa. On the other hand, 55 respondents pointed out that prevention of violent extremism offers capacity-building support to all the states among other regional organizations like AU and IGAD.

The effective governance strategies in countering terrorism in the HoA region are summarized in the following bar chart;

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[104]Park, J., Levy, J., Song, M., Park, C., & Hwang, H. (2018). Advances in cybersecurity design: an integrated framework to quantify the economic impacts of cyber-terrorist behavior. In *Security by Design* (pp. 317-339). Springer, Cham.

[105]Mwaniki, D. M. (2019). *Changing Strategies in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Case of Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

Effective Governance Strategies in Countering Terrorism in The Region

Figure 5.8: Effective Governance Strategies in Countering Terrorism in The Region

Source: Researcher (2021)

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

With key focus on assessing the role of governance in countering terrorism in horn of Africa: case study of Kenya and Somalia the study sought to examine existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region, analyze the type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism and to analyze governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the HoA. This chapter therefore, covers summary of the key findings, presents conclusion and recommendations flowing from the three key objectives that guided the study.

6.2 Summary of the Findings

This section covers key findings from each objective of the study.

6.2.1 Existing measures and methodologies used by states in countering terrorism in HoA Region

The study found that despite a lengthy history of terrorism in HoA, particularly domestic terrorism, countries in the region had not been serious about devising and implementing policies before the September 11, 2001 attack.This is because Africans have a different understanding of terrorism, the threat of terrorism or vulnerability varies by continent, sub-region, and country, and each country will react differently depending on its perception of terrorism. HoA is not immune to factors that contribute to international terrorism, such as globalization, technology, and the impact of US foreign policy.The African Union has produced a number of counter-terrorist tools,

including the African Union Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism, which intends to improve border controls, intelligence collecting, and the exchange of key terrorism information. It also entails strengthening continental collaboration in the fight against terrorism by upgrading legislative and judicial procedures. Because HoAcounter-terrorist strategies differ based on their perceptions of terrorism, there is a need to align national counter-terrorism measures with those of the sub-region and the region itself. Specific countries, in the HoA have established specific country measures to counter terrorism. For instance, In Kenya, a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) has been established, which brings together multi-agency institutions to increase coordination in the fight against terrorism. The NCTC has set up forums in each county to identify, prevent, and de-radicalize potential and previous terrorists. The NCTC has devised community policing and the 'NyumbaKumi' Initiative to detect terrorists. Following the tragic Westgate Mall attack by Al-Shabaab group in 2013, several forums were established. Preventive approaches in Kenya, according to Barton, aim to address the push and pull elements that lead to radicalization and violent extremism.

6.2.2 Type of governance that have prevailed in Kenya and Somalia and how this failed in countering terrorism

The governments of Kenya and Somalia have tried to come up with some effective governance strategies for counterterrorism in their respective countries. According to Alan, the major terrorist group that has been disturbing Kenya and Somalia is Al-Shabab. In the past, the governments of Kenya and Somalia have been using the "hard" approaches to respond to terror attacks. The Kenya Security Forces and that of Somalia, in this case, are ordered to arrest, torture, and victimize the local communities in the Northern part of Kenya. In addition to that, these governments have been using extrajudicial killings, and disappearances of religious leaders and youth and business people

have become common in the region. Recently, the governments of Kenya and Somalia have realized that the "hard" approach to terrorism is not working effectively hence coming up with the "soft" approaches, which are more diplomatic than violent.

The study also noted that sometimes it gets difficult for the government to initiate some strategies because of the reasons such as; inadequate legislation in countering terrorism, insecure borders, corruption, inadequate finances to support counterterrorism programs, lack of reliable measures of controlling the foreigners coming and leaving the country, poor handling and monitoring of the suspected terrorists, inadequate technology, and conflicts among the counterterrorism authorities.

6.2.3 Governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the HoA

The study found that collaboration with specialized regional entities, the Horn of Africa states have built counter-terrorism frameworks. Eritrea has developed information-sharing channels with Interpol and the Eastern African Police Chiefs' Conference (EAPCCO), in addition to participating in the IGAD counter-terrorism campaign. EAPCCO and Interpol are also members of Kenya and Uganda. In summary, all countries in the Horn of Africa, together with other counter-terrorism actors, have signed up for a regional fusion center, which will serve as a clearinghouse for sharing information on terrorism and transnational crime.The USA-sponsored Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is one of the country-led activities in the Horn of Africa from a powerhouse country (CJTF-HOA). It was created in Djibouti, Ethiopia, to combat terrorism. Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, as well as the entire Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Eden are all included. The CJTF-HOA has concentrated on training allied forces as well as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenyan troops. The task force has also made intelligence exchange with regional countries easier.

The study noted that Kenya and Somalia counterterrorism reactions include military expeditions, intelligence, legal measures, economic and financial controls, diplomacy and dialogue. It has made efforts to incorporate mixed approaches which involve military and non-military strategies. It employs the services of the National Intelligence Service to carry out surveillance, GSU to address civil rebellion, and the Anti-Terror Police Unit to counter terror. Regardless of the counterterrorism responses, the state faces criticism for its combative approaches. The strategies to combat terror have been termed controversial due to arbitrary arrests, religious profiling and killings of terror suspects. The war on terrorism is still on in Kenya, with the state still facing uncertainties over the future of its national security due to the constant threats from Al-Shabaab. The soft hand measures by the Kenyan government are meant to hinder terror groups by crippling their organization. The soft approaches are also aimed at combating radicalization through the states' counter violent extremism programme.

6.3 Conclusion

Counter-terrorism is an intricate and complex phenomenon due to its ever-evolving nature in modern times that has seen its scope, frequency and lethality increase. Kenya, in particular, has faced a couple of challenges and criticism and constant cross-examination of the counter-terrorism approaches it employs. Efforts by Kenya to combat terror attacks have involved a mix of military and non-military approaches. Kenya's reliance on military-centric strategies over the years in the war against terrorism, while past studies recommend holistic and mixed propositions to combat terrorism. Even after applying mixed reactions, the state faces criticism for its hard-handed approaches to counter-terrorism.

The strategies to combat terror have been termed controversial due to arbitrary arrests, religious profiling and killings of terror suspects. The war on terrorism is still on in Kenya and Somalia, with the states still facing uncertainties over the future of their national security due to the constant threats from Al-Shabaab.

As a remedy, the study observes that Kenyan counter-terrorism strategy leans heavily towards a military-centric approach or hard approach. For a more robust and efficient counter-terrorism strategy, the state should consider a more pronounced multi-lateral approach. Herein, the state should involve a wide range of non-state actors including but not limited to, inter-religious and traditional leaders, youth and women groups, developing partners and other key stake holders such as NGOs and human rights organizations.

The study advances that country-specific strategies should promote holistic counter-insurgency strategies that align with international legal frameworks in countering violent extremism. These should focus on aspects including preventing terrorism financing, inspecting the use of the internet for terror activities, supporting dialogue and cooperation, strengthening the national efforts of implementation of U.N. security council, recruiting more military officers within the borders, and coming up with strict policies of dealing with those found guilty of terrorism.

6.4 Recommendations

The study recommends that there is need of advancing democracy, strengthening institutions of governance, empowering youth, promoting development especially in those marginalized regions and embracing the concept of human security in order to holistically counter radicalization. Furthermore, there is need of proper coordination of security multiagency especially in the area of effective intelligence gathering, analyzing and sharing of intelligence. There is also need states to

consider inclusion of non-state actors in the war against terrorism. Non-state actors paly critical role in the society and their presence in countering terrorism cannot be ignored. Finally, there is need to address the issue of institutionalized corruption since it has insecurity implications especially in countering terrorism.

6.5 Areas for Further Research

The study has noted that there in a close link between institutionalized corruption and the increasing rate of radicalization and terror attacks. Therefore a research needs to be carried out to establish the extent relationship between institutionalized corruption and rising level of violent extremism in Kenya and Somalia. The study has also noted a close link between poverty, insecurity and terrorism; therefore there is need of a research to establish their relationship.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dear Respondents,

RE: <u>DATA COLLECTION.</u>

I am masters' student at University of Nairobi, in department of diplomacy and international studies. Currently am undertaking research study to fulfill requirement for award of Master of Arts in diplomacy. My project topic is **"THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN HORN OF AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND SOMALIA"**. You have been selected to participate in this study; however your participation is free and voluntarily. Please I request you to feel the questionnaire honestly.

Special thanks for your cooperation.

Best Regards,

Ibrahim Bulle Abdullahi.

OPEN ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE

Kindly no reference will be made to any person or organization. Confidentiality will be my priority.

PART A: PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your gender?

[ ] Female   [ ] Male

2. How old are you?

   ………………….

3. What is your highest level of education?

[ ] Undergraduate   [ ] College   [ ] College Not Completed   [ ] Secondary School

[ ] Primary School   [ ] Never Attended.

What is your occupation? _____

PART B

1. Do you think governance plays a key role in Countering terrorism in both Somalia and Kenya?

[ ]   Yes   [ ]   No

2. If yes, kindly explain the role played by governance in Countering in both Somalia and Kenya.

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3. What is the type of governance that has prevailed in Kenya and Tanzania and how has it failed in countering of terrorism?

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3. What are the conceptual issues that concern the role of governance in countering terrorism in Kenya and Somalia?

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4. What are governance strategies that are effective in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa?

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5. What governance challenges are encountered in countering terrorism in Kenya and Somalia?

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6. What measures and methodologies have government of Kenya and Somalia adopted to counter Terrorism?

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7. How effective are counter terrorism measures to counter terrorism in in Kenya and Somalia?

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8. Do you think use of hard power like military is effective in countering terrorism?

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9. Does use of soft power like diplomacy, private-public partnership and financial controls in countering terrorism effective in the Horn of Africa?

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10. Does dictatorial governance incapacitate war against terrorism?

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11. Which strategies are effective in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa?

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