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## **Party Institutionalization in Africa: Kenya's 2013 Elections in Comparative Perspective**

*Oscar M. Otele\* & Oita Etyang*

### **Abstract**

*Since the return of multipartyism, Africa has seen the proliferation of political parties as vehicles for political contestation. Consequently, this has triggered curiosity among scholars to ask one main question: Are they institutionalized? Using cases from former Anglophone countries; this article offers a comparative assessment of party institutionalization in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. Although Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia epitomize weak levels of party institutionalization, Ghana comes nearest to party institutionalizing based on Randall and Soasand model. It is our supposition that most parties in Africa have failed to institutionalize and this has hampered the performance of political parties in consolidating the ideals of democracy. On the strength of the evidence from Ghana, we contend that there is need for political party renaissance in Africa to enable them play their envisaged roles in a democracy.*

### **Introduction**

Democracy has long been recognized as unthinkable without political parties. In a political system, political parties are known for their ability to perform the following functions "recruiting political elites, organizing opposition, resolving conflict by establishing channels of representation, providing accountability, aggregating [and articulating] interests", mobilizing the electorate during elections and forming governments (Ufen, 2008: 328; Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, 2005: 495). In Africa, the performance of these functions can be viewed in light of the evolution of political parties. However, the genesis of political parties in Africa can be traced to 1860, when the first party the True Whig Party was established in Liberia (Mozaffar, 2005: 395). By around 1950, following the end of the Second World War, political parties started to emerge in the continent.

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During this period, majority of Africans were restricted from governance process thus they found it necessary to form nationalist movements to articulate and aggregate their interests, gain representation in the colonial government and influence colonial policy. Indeed, most nationalist movements in Africa transformed into political parties and ushered independence. However, under the guise of galvanizing national cohesion and imperatives of economic development, post-independence African leaders abandoned multiparty system inherited from the colonial administrators (exception were Botswana since 1966, and Senegal between 1976 and 1980) and established a *defacto* or *dejure* one-party states. Across Africa in one-party systems, political parties were highly personalized and the executives had little room for dissent. This form of governance reached its brink in late 1980s. By this time, Thomson (2000: 219) notes that the ruling elites lacked adequate resources to sustain themselves in power and the state had failed to mobilize citizens to support its policies. This created a crisis of legitimacy.

The general state's loss of legitimacy and authority found expression in the wave of democratization blowing across third world countries. This wave reverted multiparty system in several countries. Thus the number of political parties that have participated in the general elections since early 1990s has varied from one country to another. During the first multi-party election, for example, only two parties competed during 1992 legislative election in Djibouti, 44 competed during 1997 general elections in Chad. Countries such as Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia had relatively few parties during the first multi-party elections (Van de Walle, 2003). Over the years the number of political parties has equally changed. The number of political parties almost tripled in Mauritius between 1992 and 2000; while in Madagascar it almost decreased by a third (Van de Walle, 2003). As we shall demonstrate, in the case of Kenya, the party system has been fractioned since 1992 with new parties emerging in subsequent elections, as well as short-lived political coalitions.

Democratization literature attributes this mutation to several plausible explanations. Some authors focus on party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Manning, 2005; Lindberg, 2007), while others focus on party institutionalization (Randall and Svasand, 2002). Both groups utilize data sets to put forth their cases for party system and party institutionalization in Africa. Aware that there is some overlap in either of the group, this paper utilizes Randall and Svasand's four-dimensional model of party

institutionalization as touchstones to examine the behaviour of individual political parties in the sampled African countries.<sup>1</sup>

The article is structured as follows: the subsequent section describes Randall and Svasand's four-dimensional model of party institutionalization used as our analytical framework. Section three provides a broad analysis of party institutionalization in sampled African countries: Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. Section four looks at the political parties in Kenya since independence. Section five assesses Kenya's 2013 elections in light of Randall and Svasand's model.

The four sampled countries together with Kenya constitute an exciting set of cases for comparative analysis. All five are Anglophone countries and share the same colonial history and legacy. The five countries also have ethnically heterogeneous societies occupying distinct regions of the countries. The paper draws heavily on existing literature, the authors own perspective on the thematic issues having participated in election observation in some of the countries and personal interviews in Lusaka. It is envisaged that this article will contribute to the emerging literature on party politics and institutionalization. It will significantly be useful to students of political science in their appreciation of the emerging discourse on African party politics.

### **Analytical Framework**

Party institutionalization has been analyzed through different diverging lenses. This is reflected by the different conceptualization that has been postulated by different scholars (Selznick, 1957; Huntington, 1968; Janda, 1980; Panebianco, 1988; Levitsky, 1998; Randall and Svasand, 2002). However, there is disagreement on dimensions of party institutionalization. For example, Selznick and Levitsky use the concept of value infusion and behavioral routinization respectively.<sup>2</sup> Huntington provides a four-dimensional model that encompasses adaptability, organizational complexity, autonomy and coherence<sup>3</sup>; Panebianco offers autonomy and systemness as the two dimensions we can use to measure party institutionalization<sup>4</sup>; while Janda utilizes the concept of reification to refer to the extent to which a party relates with external environment. Because of this divergent lenses, Randall and Svasand develop a four-dimensional model that combines common elements from previous studies: systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy and reification. The two authors used their model to analyze party institutionalization in new democracies in Latin

America, Asia and Africa ten years after the onset of third wave of democratization.

Twelve years since they published their article in the journal of *Party Politics* a lot has happened within the realm of political parties. Therefore we seek to examine the relevance of the model in African context through a comparative approach. This approach will offer readers the perspectives on the variation in party institutionalization along four dimensions in Africa and Kenya in particular. But the debate on institutionalization of political parties is ongoing as new approaches such as postmodernism, feminism, neo-liberalism gain momentum in different polity.

Broadly, Randall and Svasand conceive party institutionalization as the development of party’s patterns of behaviour and attitudes. This process can be understood along internal and external aspects relevant to the development process. Internal aspects encompass developments within the party, while external aspects encompass development of the party relative to the context within which it operates (Randall and Svasand, 2002:12). The two aspects have structural and attitudinal components which when put together result to a two by two matrix shown in the **Table 1**.

**Table 1: Four-Dimensional Model of Party Institutionalization**

	Internal	External
Structural	Systemness[cell 1]	Decisional autonomy[cell 3]
Attitudinal	Value infusion[cell 2]	Reification[cell 4]

Source: Randall and Svasand 2002:13

The first cell has systemness which encompasses the structural component of the internal aspect. Systemness refers to the extent to which party increases its “scope, density and regularity of interaction” between various parts of the party (Randall and Svasand, 2002:13). The scope refers to how much various parts of the party can interact, density is the compactness of the sub-units within the party, while in regularity, we look at how various parts within party follow certain patterns and norms during interaction. The second cell has value infusion (Selznik, 1957 and Levitsky, 1998) that refers to the extent to which electorate and party members see the party as an entity they cannot

survive without. In other words the party has impacted certain values to their supporters that mobilize them beyond their parochial interests.

The third cell has decisional autonomy which encompasses the structural component of the external aspect. The nature of the relationship with external environment is important when examining decisional autonomy. From an organizational point of view, external environment has both threats and opportunity. For example, where a party depends on financial and logistical support from the sponsor, this becomes a threat to decision making internally. However, where a party creates linkages with sponsor on matters pertaining to the running of the party, this becomes an opportunity. Randall and Svasand suggest that there should be some level of control as far as interaction with the external environment is concerned. The final cell is reification, which refers to the degree to which party's existence remains in the minds of members of the public. In other words the extent to which the wider society think about the party.

In summation, Randall and Svasand posit that a party becomes institutionalized through systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy and reification. In theory we would expect these four dimensions to converge to give an overall picture of the level of party institutionalization. However, in practice there could be variation among these dimensions leading to different forms of party institutionalization. In the next section we apply this analytical framework in the comparative context in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia and in the subsequent section we specifically narrow down to Kenya. Two caveats are in order before we commence our analysis. First, due to scarcity of data on some aspects (funding of political parties) of political parties, some dimensions of party institutionalization may not be applicable to selected cases. Second, party institutionalization is a process implying that temporal dimension is critical in our analysis. To take care of this we examine party formation, organization, behaviour during and after elections and durability. In doing so our analysis departs from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2010) study which assumes that individual parties institutionalize in the same way organizations do. Indeed, parties are organizations however they don't institutionalize through a linear process as is the case in typical organizations.

### **Party Institutionalization in Africa: A Comparative Analysis**

Before we start assessing level of party institutionalization, it is advisable to consider the broad context within which political parties operate in Africa.

African countries are culturally diverse and vary in terms of development since the advent of multi-party politics. It appears globalization forces are likely to reinforce these patterns even in future. Structural indicators such as poverty, dependency, neo-colonialism, late industrial take-off, illiteracy, ethnic and religious cleavages are commonplace and likely to influence the degree of party institutionalization. This section is organized around the four dimensions identified in the analytical framework: Internal/structural, internal/attitudinal, external/structural, external/attitudinal. Much of our empirical cases will be drawn from 1990s in the selected cases.

### *Internal/Structural Dimension*

As earlier noted by Panebianco (1988) attention should be paid to the extent which a new party is able to move from a centralized headquarter to other parts of the country, or diffuse from one part of the country to another part. According to Panebianco, the more the party moves from the centre or from one part of the country to another the more it is likely to be institutionalized. Systemness is well rooted in established democracies of the West, however, in Africa the penetration from either the centre to the periphery or diffusion from one region has been constrained. In many African countries, general party development has been regularly interrupted. In Zambia, parties have not been able to decentralize to other regions. In essence parties lack the national outlook in their orientation. Regionalization of political parties has become the norm rather than the exception. For example Patriotic Front (PF) which is currently the ruling party has its political bed rock in the northern Bemba speaking regions of Luapula, Muchinga and Northern province, while the United Party for National Development (UPND) which is largely considered a Tonga party draws its support from Southern, Central and parts of Western and North-western provinces.

In Malawi regionalization of political parties is still rife. Malawi Congress Party (MCP) draws much of its support from the Central Region where its leader, John Tembo, comes from. The United Democratic Front (UDF) draws much of its support from the Eastern and Shire highlands districts of the Southern Region, where its former leader, Bakili Muluji, came from. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) also drew much of its support from the Shire highlands district in the south, where its former leader, Brown Mpinganjira, came from. Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and the Movement for Genuine Multiparty Democracy (MGODE) are regional parties in the north with leaders from the same region. The leader of the Republican Party (RP), Gwanda Chakuamba, is from the lower Shire in the

Southern Region. His party won most seats in the two districts of the region: Nsanje and Chikwawa in 2004 elections (Jodal, 2004). The seats they won in the Northern Region were on account of the party's pre-election coalition with the Progressive Party Movement (PPM) whose leader, the late Aleke Banda, was from the north and where it won most of its seats. Both the Congress for National Unity (CONU) and the People's Transformation Party (PETRA) won their single seats from the regions and districts where their presidents came from (see Chirwa, 2014). In Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the All Nigerian People Party (ANPP) and the Alliance for Democracy operate like regional parties. For example, a struggle between Northerners and Southerners ensued within PDP following the death of Umar Yar' Adua in 2010. Given that the former President was a Northern Muslim, thus based on the gentleman agreement it followed that the successor would automatically come from the North since the late had not completed his term. However, the decision by Jonathan Godluck, a Southerner Christian to run for presidency threatened to stability of the party. Unlike Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria, in Ghana National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) have managed to penetrate all regions and party members and supporters cut across several social cleavages including ethnicity.

The second indicator is the resource base, particularly funding. Given the general poverty level in the continent political parties in Africa are unlikely to raise adequate funds from its members. Given the ever changing circumstances in every election, parties would require adequate funds to amount a meaningful election. On this indicator again the two major parties in Ghana (NDC and NPP) stand out. "Having held power previously a political party is able to consolidate its popular support base, credibility of its ability to govern and party financing...the NDC gained its popular base, credibility and financing as it emerged out of the political elite of the [Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)] regime that ruled from 1982 to 1992" (Whitfield, 2009:12). Perhaps this explains why the two parties have survived since their inception in early 1990s.

In several African countries uneven playing ground is created in elections where one party is able to raise funds to finance office space, pay staff, meet overhead costs and other related electoral matters than its opponents. For this reason it has become common place in Africa for wealthy politicians in a given political party to break away and form their own parties. Alternatively, wealthy businessmen may decide to sponsor candidate to moribund party as



is the case in Nigeria. During the Fourth Republic, for example, Olarinmoye (2008) illustrates how Chris Uba capitalized on his direct connection to the presidency and the accompanying privileges to take control of the PDP machinery in Anambra state and ensured that Dr. Chris Ngige won gubernatorial seat. He similarly extended his influence to ensure that his preferred candidates carried the day in the State House of Assembly, Federal House of Representative and Senate elections. In Malawi, party leaders have been instrumental in financing party activities and sponsoring candidates for various elective posts. Commack (2009:179) remarks that Malawi has seen times of rich *bwanas* (big men) helping parties funding. In the 2009 elections for instance, Wickman (2011) observes that Democratic Progressive Party (that had been in existence for only 6 years) was able to pay nomination fees for all its parliamentary candidates. The party also managed to contribute 2000 t-shirts, 10 rolls of cloths and 30 bicycles for all its candidates. Much of the resources came from state funds and individual power barons. The interesting observation is that most party members do not ask where the money comes from as this is tantamount to questioning the party leader. This scenario provides a fertile ground for corruption to thrive. The same scenario is replicated in Zambia where wealthy party leaders bankroll the activities of the party. The situation may be exacerbated in Zambia premised on the fact that political parties are not funded by the states, the situation is more pronounced.

The third indicator is the influence of party leader. Panebianco recognizes the role played by personal charisma in the formation of a party, noting that elements of charisma play a key role during the initial phases of party formation. However, as these elements gain ground in the parties they are likely to stifle institutionalization. (Panebianco 1988:53). This view holds for the mobilization of party support during elections in Africa. In reference to Kenya, Oloo (2010:56) aptly states "ethnic groups are mobilized around ethnic leaders, whether in mono parties, coalitions or pacts. The ultimate goal is to either capture the presidency for the ethnic community or belong to a power sharing formula that caters for [the interest of] particular communities". In other words parties are controlled by the perceived ethnic leaders who decide political direction of the respective ethnic group. In Zambia, parties are formed around prominent and propertied individuals. Thus the party leaders define the political trajectory of the party. Party leaders develop and finance party programmes leading them to be a one man show. For instance in the early 2000, United National Independence Party (UNIP) was associated with Kenneth Kaunda ; Zambia Alliance for Progress

(ZAP) was associated with Dean Mungomba; and Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) by Ben Mwila. The situation is not different in the current political set up where United Party for National Development (UPND) was associated with Anderson Mazoka and currently it's associated with Hakainde Hichilema - a native bourgeois, Patriotic Front (PF) with Michael Sata, National Restoration Party (NAREP) associated with Elias Chipimo Jnr, Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD) with Charles Milupi, Heritage Party (HP) associated with Brig. Gen Godfrey Miyanda and Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) associated with Edith Nawakwi among others. By 2011 only a handful of these parties were surviving. During the 2011 elections while PF, MMD and UPND performed relatively well, NAREP, UNIP, ADD and FDD performed poorly.<sup>5</sup>

Closely linked to leadership is the variable of party ideology. Phiri (2000) and Maliyambono et al. (2003) observe that the current problems in Malawi can be attributed partly to lack of ideology in the parties. This, they attributed to fuzziness and imperviousness among political leaders. The lack of party ideology has contributed to unprecedented party-hopping. An example is cited of Khumbo former 2nd vice president and a member of parliament (MP) who moved from MCP to UDF, continued to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and was instrumental in the formation of Peoples Party (PP). Parties are also run as private properties where party leaders are the beginning and the end of the party thus a disagreement leads to defection for political survival. As Ihonvbere (1996:21) ably summarizes, African political parties suffer from "a pathological fixation on the leader". Therefore, where political parties find it unnecessary to utilize existing organizational base and ethos, they simply become political vehicles for ambitious politicians with charisma and resources. Such parties rarely survive first set of elections, and if they do, commitment to democratic ideals becomes a mirage.

The above reality breeds clientelism where party officials and supports are expected to pledge their loyalty to the party leader. Randall and Svasand (2002:20) assert that clientelism "undermines rules and regularized procedures, reducing the party constitution if there be one to a meaningless sham. It constrains the possibilities for concerted party leadership or programme-making". In Nigeria, during PDP convention in 2003, presidential aspirants complained that party primaries had been arranged in favour of the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo. And come 2005 clientelism was at its best. Obasanjo ensured that all his cronies were elected as party officials, while those opposed to his leadership were rigged out. PDP

perfected the trend in 2007 by substituting candidates who won party primaries but were disloyal to the party leader, with those that lost but were loyal (Omotola, 2013:193). In Malawi, following the death of Bingu wa Mutharika in April 2012, there was mass defections to Joyce Banda's PP. This defection highlights the importance of patron-client relations in Malawi politics. Mutharika's death opened a window of opportunity for Banda to rise to the top of patron-client chain and use her incumbency advantage to reward loyal supporters (Dionne and Dulani, 2012:135).

The influence of the party leader leads to the fourth indicator- factionalism within the parties. Although the concept factionalism is essentially contested, Beller and Belloni's definition seems to have gained currency: "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part (Beller and Balloni, 1978:419). Factions in a party are expression of several differences including ideology, issues, social, cultural or leadership struggles. Rakner et. al (2007) account of the role of fission within Malawian political parties demonstrates how eroding it can be on party institutionalization. In the run-up to 2004 general elections intra-party conflict within MCP resulted in two senior members leaving the party and forming their own. In December, 2003 the former MCP publicity secretary, Hetherwick Ntaba formed New Congress for Democracy (NCD), and in early 2004, the deputy party leader of MCP, Gwanda Chakuamba defected and formed, the RP. Their defection had a ripple effect; Ntaba took off with two MCP MPs while Chakuamba took nine MCP MPs. These splits were attributed to personal leadership struggles over the control of the party. Disagreement between B. J. Mpinganjira a cabinet minister and President Bakili Muluzi over his attempt to change the constitution to grant him a third term, prompted Mpinganjira to take over NDA. Several politicians left the ruling party and formed the People's Progressive Movement (PPM). Also the third term issue played role in breaking AFORD party that had entered into a coalition arrangement with the UDF government. A faction within The AFORD formed MCODE (Rakner, 2007:1121-1122).

In the case of Zambia, the reintroduction of multiparty politics led to the emergence of factionalism within the MMD which had won election in 1991. The MMD became increasingly divided along ethnic lines (Bemba vs. non-Bemba). Consequently, leading MMD political luminaries -Baldwin Nkumbula and Humphrey Mulemba, broke away to form then National

Party (NP) citing massive corruption in the party. Around 1994 a different group of MMD founding members led by Dean Mung'omba formed Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC). Following Fredrick Chiluba's attempt to go for the third term, 12 senior cabinet ministers led by the Republican Vice president General Christone Tembo and ruling party vice president Godfrey Miyanda resigned in protest. This culminated in the formation of the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) led by the former and Heritage Party (HP) led by the latter in 2001. Finally when Chiluba settled on Levy Mwanawasa as his preferred successor, Michael Sata left the party and formed Patriotic Front (PF) in 2001.<sup>6</sup>

Assessing party performance since 1999 in the context of Nigeria Omo Omoruyi observes that "the so-called parties are not in competition with one another. They are in factions; these factions are more in competition with themselves than with another party" (Omoruyi, 2002:8). The recent factionalization within the ruling party, PDP is the most outstanding. PDP split into two: the old and the new PDP. Spearheaded by Atiku Abubakar, former Vice President, Abubakar Baraje, a former National Secretary and several governors, they challenged what they termed as impunity in the old PDP, breaking away to form the new PDP. In response old PDP with state machinery at its disposal has continued to harass and intimidate supporters of the new PDP, even to the extent of issuing notice to new entity to close its National Secretariat based in Abuja (Omotola, 2013:191).

Although Ghana has also witnessed factionalism in political parties, however, unlike in Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya (discussed below), its impact is negligible in influencing voters. For example, two of the six presidential candidates in 2008 general elections came from parties formed by factions within NDC and NPP, but performed dismally at the polls (Whitfield, 2009). This comparison serves to demonstrate that Ghana diverts from the common practice in Malawi and Zambia, where parties revolve around an individual who is empowered with a financial and popular support base.

### *Internal/Attitudinal Dimension*

Value infusion is stronger in the instances where party is associated with a social movement (Randall and Svasand, 2002:21). The typical example of association of party with a social movement was the class mass party in the Europe. The mass party managed to penetrate a broad socio-economic group integrated into party hierarchy through extended networks. The party also

depended on several social movements like trade unions and cooperative movements (Duverger, 1964; Kirchheimer, 1966). Thus, the party integrated eligible voters into the activities of the movements and infused to them values of the party.

A look at Africa's fledgling democracies, it is indicative that formation of a mass party is still farfetched. As earlier noted by Bienen and Herbst (1996:26) "class still is not a salient cleavage in most Africa countries". Although mass parties based on the European model are limited in Africa-Zambian case suffices to illustrate this. In the run-up to 1991 Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) offered an ideal popular and organizational base for the MMD under Chiluba to defeat incumbent president Kenneth Kaunda of UNIP. However, once in power MMD failed to infuse some values into party supporters as was evident in the way senior members of the party left in search of their own parties. Citing corruption, a number of MMD founders left and formed the National Party (NP), at the same period several parties associated with MMD sprang before 1996 elections such as Agenda Zambia (AZ), Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), Liberal Progressive Front (LPF) and the National Lima Party (NLP) (Rakner and Svasand, 2004:53).

Linking clientelism to value-infusion in the party, generally it is assumed that clientelism promotes instrumentalist orientation, as opposed to promoting long term party loyalty (Randall and Svasand, 2002:22). In Malawi, AFORD emerged as a pressure group and culminated into a political party under its leader Chakufwa Chihana who had been a trade unionist leader. The party played a critical role in Malawi's political course from 1994 until 2003 when the third term bid by Muluzi seriously affected intraparty relations among its leaders and supporters.

Closely linked to value infusion is the concept of partisanship. Partisanship is critical within the framework of party institutionalization. Party members need to participate in the activities and programmes of their party. Participating in party elections, membership recruitment drives, and formulation of party manifestos create a sense of belonging, ownership and party loyalty. In Malawi, partisanship is lacking, most party members have minimal or no contacts at all with their party leaders or party officials. According to Chunga (2014) a paltry 14 percent of Malawians had made at least one contact with officials of a political party in 2013. The problem is not only confined to 2013 but the contact levels have been low overtime. It was

22 percent in 2003. In 2005, only 10 percent of Malawians indicated that they had made at least one contact with a political party official over the preceding year. Chunga (2014) concludes that the low level of contact between the principal, the people, and political parties acting as agents casts doubts on the relevance of political parties and their effectiveness in playing their representative role. Indeed the role of party members should not diminish with the casting of their votes in an election but they should continue to engage with the party structures if the cherished democratic ideals are to be realized.

In Ghana there is a sense of party loyalty. The electorate is broadly categorized into two: core voters and floating voters. The former group votes purely on the basis of party loyalty, while the latter group alternatives between the NDC and NPP in successive elections based on the performance of party once in power. According to a survey conducted by Staffan Lindberg and Minion Morrison in 2003, they approximated core voters at 82 per cent (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). Some regions like Ashanti and the Eastern side are seen as the strongholds for NPP, while the Volta Region is considered stronghold for NDC. All regions have core voters which reduce party competition during elections. However, ethnicity is not a determinant of party loyalty. For instance, voters in Volta Region predominantly Ewe continuously supported John Atta Mills from Akan ethnic group as the NDC's presidential candidate during 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections (Whitfield, 2009:632).

### *External/Structural Dimension*

Autonomy encompasses the extent to which party relies on the external interests. These interests may be within the countries or without. In his formulation, Panebianco notes that external funding reduces the extent of party institutionalization, because the party leadership would act on the behest of external interests and not party members and supporters. Nigerian case on how Chris Uba influenced choice of candidates is a good example. In this case Uba is the external force within the country that influences activities of PDP. Indeed external forces outside the countries have also influenced operation of parties in several countries, however, their manifestation is largely covert. As Ihonvbere (1998:26) observes since early 1990s "parties in a number of African countries ...have turned to the international donor community for support instead of cultivating links with national civil groups as a mean of resource mobilization". He adds, growth and development of nascent parties in Africa is a reflection of their external supporters. But

Panebianco concludes that in some instances external support may contribute to party institutionalization, especially where such support seeks to further a certain ideological orientation for the new party. However, it remains to be seen how this can be fused into new parties in Africa. In the four countries selected, it was difficult to ascertain the level and extend to which parties are in close association with external interests. This is attributed to the fact that such link is clouded in secrecy.

### *External/Attitudinal Dimension*

The last dimension of party institutionalization is party reification. This refers to the degree to which a party is established as an image and a tool that shape the behaviour of politicians, party supporter and the wider society. The extent to which a party is able to install itself will be attributed to factors like historical place, symbolic values that party purports to represent and organizational base on matters like communication. Ultimately party reification depends on party longevity that is the ability of the party to stay on for a long period of time. For instance, Whitfield (2009) seeking to explain why Ghana's parties stand out in term of institutionalization, identify the existence of two-party system rooted in two political traditions that emerged during decolonization in the 1950s: the Danquah/Busia tradition versus the Nkrumahist tradition. The former is considered "elitist, ethnically exclusive...liberal-democratic and right wing...[the latter is considered]...ethnically and social inclusive, broad-based, populist and left-wing" (Whitfield, 2009). The two traditions supply NDC and NPP (especially NPP) with founding mythologies, ideological images, and distinct political styles which have become instruments for elite and voters mobilization (Whitfield, 2009:630). While the NPP's institutional network dates back to the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and National Liberation Movement (NLM) in the 1950s, the NDC institutional network merged only in the early 1990s and replaced Convention People Party (CPP). The NDC was formed around Rawlings, who led a people revolution in 1981 against Hilla Limann government under People's National Convention (PNC). In 1979 elections, PNC had ousted the Progress Party (PP) led by K.A Busia who took over after Nkrumah was overthrown in 1969. Although the two political traditions have played a key role in party institutionalization, however, NDC and NPP cannot be distinguished along ideological lines. There is a great variance between the ideological imagination and what parties implement once in power. For instance, NDC has christened itself as the Social Democratic party, while the NPP as the Right party, however,

thorough scrutiny of NPP and DNC policies implemented since 1990s shows no difference (Whitfield, 2009:630).

The foregoing discussion has looked at the behaviour of individual political parties along the four dimensions. From discussion there is variation in the four dimensions of party institutionalization. Whereas the performance of parties in Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia indicate low level of institutionalization, at least in the three dimensions, parties in Ghana are fairly institutionalized.

### **Party Politics in Kenya: A Historical Perspective**

The colonial legacy accounts for the evolution of political parties in Kenya's political history. During the colonial period, Kenyan political elites coalesced around nationalistic movements to agitate for independence. With the fight against colonial rule accomplished, nationalist movements transformed into political parties. Thus in the post-independence Kenya, two major parties - Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) emerged. The former was associated with the large ethnic groups namely: Kikuyus and Luos while the latter was considered a party representing the small ethnic groups. However, it suffices to note that some small ethnic groups were also closely associated with KANU. In 1964, just after independence, the country's first President Jomo Kenyatta consolidated his personal rule by crafting a government of national unity. KANU government applied Machiavellian tactics that obligated KADU MPs in joining the ruling party.

With Kenyatta at the helm of the party and occupying the presidency, he started consolidating his hegemony by surrounding himself with Kikuyu elites - the so called "*Kiambu Mafia*"<sup>7</sup>. Lonsdale (2006: 87) notes that as the founding president, he guaranteed that members of the Kikuyu ethnic group and loyal party supporters dominated political and economic realm for self-aggrandizement. Thus Kenyatta associated himself with Kikuyu elites and the mode of operation was accumulation and self-perpetuation of the house of "*Mumbi*"<sup>8</sup>. As a consequence, other members of the party and government felt marginalized thus internal dissension started brewing. Interestingly the internal discord in KANU was perceived to be a Kikuyu - Luo rivalry.<sup>9</sup> Failure to resolve intraparty dispute within KANU, prompted Oginga Odinga<sup>10</sup> to decamp and form the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) in 1966. Just like KANU and KADU, KPU was construed to be an ethnic party dominated majorly by the Luos. It is cognizant to note KPU ingratiated itself to urban



workers, trade unionists and students, and advocated for socialist policies to socio-economic and political development. Three years later KPU was proscribed and its leadership detained following a bitter exchange between Kenyatta and Odinga supporters in Kisumu. This marked the beginning of a defacto one-party system in Kenya. As Nyong'o (1989) adeptly puts it "with opposition parties gone, and firm constitutional machinery in place to silence government critics KANU had in place critical infrastructure to run a single-party state."

Following the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Moi took power. He also assumed the chairmanship of KANU. Just like his predecessor, Moi began his reign with consolidating his supremacy in power. He encircled himself with Kalenjin elites. Indeed, the Kalenjin dynasty stated to be built in earnest. To lend credence to the assertion, Amutabi (2009: 60-61) asserts that whereas in 1978 there were 35 Kikuyu District Commissioners (DCs) out of 41, 5 Kikuyu Provincial Commissioners (PCs) out of the 8, and 13 Permanent Secretaries (PSs) out of 19 available; in 1991, 45 Kalenjin DCs out of 66 available positions, 4 Kalenjin PCs out of 8, 17 Kalenjin PSs out of 28 in the country. In essence, Moi monopolized the institutions of governance with members from his own community. In 1982 KANU engineered a constitutional amendment making Kenya a *de jure* one-party state. This constitutional change had a lasting impact on the continuum evolution of political parties in Kenyan politics.

The pressure from international and domestic actors and the prevailing political events in Eastern Europe and other parts of Africa forced Moi's government to repeal Section 2 A of the constitution ushering in a new era of multiparty politics in December 1991. Several political parties were formed. Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) led by Oginga Odinga, Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) led by Mwai Kibaki, the Kenya Democratic Alliance (KENDA) headed by Mukaru Nganga, and the Kenya Social Congress (KSC) led by George Anyona emerged to challenge the hegemonic reign of KANU. It is imperative to mention that the new found parties lacked ideological underpinnings; ethnicity took center stage in the formation of the parties. Due to internal wrangles and personal idiosyncrasies, FORD split into two: FORD- Asili headed by Kenneth Matiba and FORD- Kenya led by Oginga Odinga. The eminent fragmentation of the opposition enabled KANU to win with ease during 1992 elections. At the onset of the Seventh Parliament (1993-1997) KANU was weakened numerically. Thus it embarked on a clandestine approach of poaching opposition MPs. Kanyinga (2003)

notes that in span of less than three years, several MPs from FORD Asili had defected to KANU. The reason for their defection was premised on the desire to continue enjoying the state largess.

The defeat of the opposition in the 1992 election, forced it to craft a strategy to dethrone KANU in 1997 elections. This saw the formation of the United National Democratic Alliance (UNDA), however, the systemic malaises that faced the opposition parties in 1992 came to haunt UNDA, culminating to its untimely demise. Moi went on to win the 1997 elections. With Moi's constitutional two terms coming to an end, political actors stated engaging in strategies to succeed him. This saw the merger of KANU and National Development Party (NDP) led by Raila Odinga.<sup>11</sup> (Un) fortunately, the "political marriage" was short-lived after Moi settled on Uhuru Kenyatta<sup>12</sup> as his preferred successor. A faction of KANU rebel MPs (Rainbow Alliance) led by the maverick Raila Odinga walked out, formed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and joined opposition to form a united opposition under the umbrella party, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with Mwai Kibaki as the presidential candidate. NARC ousted KANU in December 2002 polls. The failure by Mwai Kibaki to implement the pre-elections agreement fractured NARC. In the 2007<sup>13</sup> elections new political parties/coalition emerged - Party of National Unity (PNU)<sup>14</sup> headed by Mwai Kibaki, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)<sup>15</sup>, ODM-Kenya among others.

From the above trajectory, it is apparent that Kenya's political parties have failed to institutionalize. Since independence, ethnicity, cronyism, the big man syndrome, party-hopping, regionalism have played a pivotal role in the formation of political parties in Kenya. Very little attempts have been made if any to institutionalize political parties. Indeed, weak level of institutionalization seems to have been a deliberate move by party leaders to ensure that they continued to perpetuate themselves in leadership position. The failure to institutionalize preserved Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki's presidency. In the next section we apply Randall and Svasand (2002) model to show development of political parties in the period leading to March 2013. Where necessary we link political parties or actors to previous elections to highlight how that has militated party institutionalization.

### **The Kenya's 2013 Elections and Quest for Party Institutionalization**

The Kenya's 2013 election was historical in twofold: First, it was being conducted under a new constitutional dispensation. The new constitution was considered revolution in that it introduced devolved system of

government, a new electoral system, an elaborate Chapter on bill of rights among others. Second, there was an enacted law, Political Parties Act 2011 to guide the operations of political parties. Among the salient features in the Act include: formation, registration and regulation of political parties, funding and accounts of political parties. Drawing on this constitutional and legal framework, we now proceed to assess how characteristics of political parties and their development affected party institutionalization. Due to scarcity of data we only focused on internal/structural and internal/attitudinal dimension.

**Internal/Structural Dimension**

Beginning with internal/structural dimension we seek to assess the extent to which parties were able to penetrate various parties of the country. Regionalism continued to define the organization of political parties in 2013 elections.<sup>16</sup>The political coalitions that emerged in the elections were predominantly regionally based. The Jubilee coalition which is made up of The National Alliance (TNA)- associated with Uhuru Kenyatta and United Republican Party (URP)-associated with William Ruto got their majority votes from Rift Valley Region (Rutos political bedrock) and the larger Central Region (Uhuru’s political backyard). Concomitantly, the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) brought together Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led Raila Odinga, Wiper Party led by Kalonzo Musyoka and Ford- Kenya led by Moses Wetangula garnered majority votes from their perceived strongholds-Nyanza, Eastern and Western regions respectively. The Amani Coalition performed dismally in Western its perceived stronghold. Nevertheless, Musalia Mudavadi managed more votes in his home County of Vihiga than the rest (82, 426 representing 49.19 percent). The regionalization of voting patterns can be summarized in the Table 2.

**Table 2: Regional Voting Patterns in 2013 Elections**

Coalitions	Dominant Counties	Coalitions Number of Votes			
		Jubilee No. of Votes	County Percentage	CORD No. of Votes	County Percentage
Jubilee		<i>Central - Considered Uhuru’s Political Bedrock</i>			
	Kiambu,	705,185	90.21%	61,700	7.89%
	Murunga,	406,334	95.92%	10,312	2.43%
	Nyeri,	318,880	96.33%	5,638	1.70%
	Kirinyaga,	231,868	95.99%	3,471	1.44%

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	Nyandarua	232,808	97.11%	2,889	1.21%
	Embu	177,676	89.00%	15,912	7.97%
	Meru	384,290	89.41%	32,447	7.55%
	<b><i>Rift Valley - Considered Ruto's Political Bedrock</i></b>				
	Uasin Gishu	211,438	74.26%	60,060	21.09%
	Nandi,	192,587	81.52%	20,549	8.70%
	Elgeyo-Marakwet	113,680	92.07%	5,993	4.85%
	Baringo	138,488	87.93%	14,824	9.41%
	Bomet	210,501	92.68%	10,463	4.61%
	Kericho	238,556	90.74%	17,326	6.59%
CORD	<b><i>Nyanza - Considered Raila's Political Bedrock</i></b>				
	Kisumu	4,630	1.33%	337,232	96.64%
	Migori,	26,055	9.97%	225,645	86.38%
	Homabay	725	0.24%	303,447	98.93%
	Siaya	884	0.31%	284,031	98.47%
	<b><i>Eastern - Considered Kalonzo's Political Bedrock</i></b>				
	Machakos,	35,660	9.58%	319,594	85.89%
	Kitui	40,752	14.76%	219,588	79.53%
	Makueni	12,652	5.02%	228,843	90.73%
	<b><i>Western - Considered Wetangula's Political Bedrock</i></b>				
	Bungoma	42,988	12.25%	185,419	52.83%
	Busia	8,186	3.71%	189,161	85.62%
	Kakamega	12,469	2.63%	303,120	63.84%

Source: Extrapolated from IEBC Presidential Results 2013

Regionalism was so entrenched in 2013 elections where by political parties within a coalition agreed not to field candidates for other elective positions (governor, senator, member of national assembly, women representative and country representative) in areas perceived to be strongholds for the other party. For example, TNA was not to field candidates for other elective positions in Counties perceived to be URP strongholds and URP was not to field candidates in Counties considered TNA strongholds. This scenario was replicated in CORD. Closely linked to regionalism is ethnicity. The 2013 elections underscored the centrality of ethnicity in the organization of political parties in 2013 election. Ethnic kingpins continued to thrive and assert their influence in political parties. Ajulu (2002) captures these sentiments by noting that “political activity since the renewal of competitive

politics in 1992 has seen the reconstruction of ethnicity, ethnic mobilization...as the main instruments of political contestation. Political parties have been organized along ethnic identities and state-power aggressively contested on the basis of mobilized ethnicity" (Ajulu 2002:251). Turning to the resource base, during 2013 uneven playing ground was created among parties. Initially wealthy politicians broke away from the party that had sponsored them to parliament. ODM suffered a major blow when its founding luminaries left. William Ruto and Musalia Mudavadi considered amongst the wealthy politicians in Kenya left ODM and formed their URP and UDF respectively. Uhuru Kenyatta also left KANU and took over TNA, rebranded it and used it as campaign vehicle. Political parties formed by poor Kenyans were not heard, neither did they feature in the main communication channels, further highlighting the extent to which wealthy politicians are able to buy space in the media and influence the minds of voters.

The influence of the party leader was equally significant. In March 2013, major political parties were associated with perceived ethnic leader. Thus ODM was linked to Raila Odinga (Luo), TNA with Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), URP with William Ruto (Kalenjin), Wiper with Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) and FORD-K with Moses Wetangula (Luhya) and UDF with Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya). Their respective ethnic numbers were used as a major factor in coalition building because no ethnic community has absolute majority. According to the 2009 National Housing and Population Census Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba are the five largest tribes in descending order. The influence of these leaders was also key in determining candidates for other five elective positions. For example, when William Ruto fell out with Raila Odinga he managed to bring up a formidable faction predominantly from his Kalenjin native. The rewards to those who remained loyal to William Ruto was assured nomination certificate. Indeed, several Kalenjin MPs in the Tenth Parliament (2007-2012) who supported William Ruto's course was re-elected on URP ticket.

### ***Internal/Attitudinal Dimension***

Although opposition politics in Kenya is rooted in social movements, political parties in Kenya since 1991 have failed to craft mass parties. Ethnicity emerged as a centripetal force that pulled parties members together. Closely linked to this is the inability of party members to participate in the activities of the party-election of party officials, nomination of party candidates and contribution in the formulation of party manifestos.

A critical evaluation of the 2013 elections indicates that coalitions and parties failed in this front. No coalition/ party organized a member's convention to select their flag bearer. On the contrary, board room meetings were held and political leaders distributed positions among themselves. Members were called in to endorse the decisions in pompous and colorful luncheons. This was the case with the major coalitions – CORD, Jubilee and Amani.

The Constitution (2010) and the Political Parties Act (2011) required that political parties conduct free and fair nominations process in accordance with the party's nomination and election rules.<sup>17</sup> In the run to 2013 elections, parties decided to hold primaries at the tail-end of the deadline for nomination, for fear of unsuccessful aspirants switching parties. The resultant effects were that party nominations were disorganized, flawed with logistical challenges and surrounded by perception of fraud, rigging and manipulation of results. Where nominations were done they were marred with chaos as was experienced in Siaya, Kisumu, Othaya, Busia and Mombasa. It was also apparent that parties had no clear framework regarding members eligible to vote in the party primaries, as result non-party members participated in the nomination, in some instances, voting in multiple party nominations.

As part of value infusion, political parties need to develop mechanism through which party disputes can be dealt without necessarily leading to factionalism within a party. A look at the Kenya's 2013 elections, it's evident that parties failed to deal with disputes that arose from the party primaries as stipulated by party constitution. Due to this, disgruntled party members launched their grievances with the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC). As reported by The Carter Center (2013: 34-35) IEBC handled 260 cases regarding disputes from the party primaries; 160 cases were dismissed after being heard and 10 were withdrawn by the party instituting it, while 36 were allowed by the tribunal. From parties and individuals disgruntled by the IEBC's decision, the center further notes that 74 petitions and judicial reviews were instituted at the High Court. Out of these, 43 were dismissed for lacking merit amongst other reasons, 10 were marked as withdrawn, and the court allowed 17 petitions Four were referred back to the IEBC(The Carter Center: 2013: 34-35). This can be extrapolated in Table 3.

**Table 2: A Summary of Political Parties Dispute in 2013 Elections**

Case Field	No. of Cases	Dismissed	Allowed	Withdrawn
High Court	74	43	17	10
IEBC Tribunal	260	160	36	8

Source: Election Observation Report Carter Center 2013

The above discussions reflect the weaknesses that are inherent in political parties in Kenya. Political parties have failed to conduct their affairs according to the existing party and national legal regimes. More importantly, it reveals the lack of party institutionalization.

### Conclusion

The article has provided a historical and empirical analysis of institutionalization of political parties in Africa – Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia. Our analysis suggests that unlike Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia, political parties in Ghana have been able to overcome ethnicity, regionalism, and big man syndrome often associated with African political parties. This finding contracts the assumed notion that political parties in Africa have low level of institutionalization. While acknowledging that party institutionalization remains a challenge to African democracy there is therefore need for a paradigm shift in the way political parties are formed and organized if political parties are to play their manifest roles. Moving forward we suggest need for strong legal frameworks, adequate party funding, training and sensitization of party leaders, officials and members. Finally this article has highlighted only a selection of the elements that influence party institutionalization in Anglophone countries future research should examine systematically the factors influencing party institutionalization across Africa to further our understanding of African political parties.

### Notes

1. Randall and Svasand unpack conceptual fog between party system institutionalization and party institutionalization. In anticipation to offering a conceptual framework of party institutionalization, they conceive party system along how internal/external dimensions interact with structural/attitudinal dimensions. Internal/structural

component refers to the relationship between parties within a party system, while internal/attitudinal refers to the extent to which parties accept that indeed there exists a genuine competitor in form of another party. The external/structural refers to the extent to which party system relate with the state, while external/attitudinal component refers to the extent to which public has trust in parties as institutions of governance (Randall and Svasand 2002:7-8). They further note that party system institutionalization is determined by many factors, key among them party institutionalization discussed section two.

2. For Selznick, institutionalization occurs when a party becomes “infused with value beyond the technical requirement of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957:17); behavioral routinization according to Levitsky is how the rules of the game are embraced in a party.
3. According to Huntington, adaptability refers to longevity of the party, organizational complexity refers to total number of sub-units, autonomy refers to the degree of independence from other social groups, while coherence refers to degree to which members within a party agree on something.
4. Like Huntington, Panebianco uses the term autonomy, while the term systemness combines the elements of organizational complexity and coherence.
5. Personal interview with a colleague in Lusaka (January 2013).
6. PF is currently the ruling in Zambia.
7. A coterie of politicians from Kiambu home tuff of Kenyatta.
8. A mythological figure regarded as the mother of all Kikuyus. Kikuyus trace their descent from Mumbi thus she is highly revered among the Kikuyus. In some circles Kikuyu brethren’s refer to themselves as *modo wa nyumba* (one of our own).
9. The Kikuyu - Luo rivalry has continued to define Kenya’s political landscape. However, the relationship was temporarily demystified in



2002 when Raila Odinga (Son to Oginga Odinga) supported Kibaki's candidacy.

10. Oginga Odinga was the Kenya's first Vice President. Interestingly, he Odinga was one of the founding members of KANU when Kenyatta was in detention. His sympathizers argue that Odinga turned down an offer from the British Government to lead Kenya into independence. According to the sympathizers he could not form government without Kenyatta.
11. Raila Odinga is the son to the doyen of opposition politics - Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Raila broke away to form NDP after leadership wrangle within FORD-K.
12. Uhuru Kenyatta is the Son of the Kenya's founding father Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. He is currently the President of Kenya after winning the 2013 elections.
13. The 2007 election was highly contested leading to unprecedented post elections violence. A report by International Crisis Group indicate that close to 1000 people were killed in less than two months and about 400,000 were forcefully displaced.
14. The PNU was a coalition of KANU, FORD-K, FORD-P, DP, Safina and Shirikisho.
15. The ODM consisted of ethnic kingpins (pentagon) who represented different ethnic regions namely Raila Odinga (Luo Nyanza), William Ruto (Kalenjin, Rift Valley), Najib Balala, (Coast) Joseph Nyaga (Kikuyu/Embu/Meru- Mt. Kenya Region), Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya, Western), Charity Ngilu (Kamba, Eastern).
16. The Jubilee, CORD and Amani coalitions were the predominant coalitions in the 2013 elections. Other coalitions and parties that participated in the 2013 elections include the Eagle alliance of Peter Kenneth, National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya of Martha Karua, Restore and Build Kenya of James Ole Kiyiapi, Safina Party of Paul Muite and Alliance of Real Change party of Mohammed Abduba Dida.

17. Refer to Constitution, Art. 91 and Political Parties Act, Sections 6(2)(e) and 21(1)(b).

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