

# Final Research Project

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**Assessing the Factors Influencing Inter-State Relations in the Horn Of Africa: A Case Study of the Kenya – Somalia Relations.**

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**Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of Masters Degree in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.**

**2021**

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY FORM



### DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.




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


Date

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.



Dr. Kizito Sabala



Date

Lecturer

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)

University of Nairobi



## DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family for believing in me and supporting me in pursuing further studies.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The project was intellectually and creatively rewarding. My first thanks goes to God for giving me life, insight, and wisdom, all of which helped me finish the course. Second, I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Kizito Sabala, for his constant counsel and patience.

Furthermore, I commend the Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations for having in place a modern library that is well stocked. Finally, my sincere appreciation goes to my family and colleagues for their resourcefulness in terms of motivation and material support.

May the almighty God bless you all. Thank you

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

HOA: Horn of Africa

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

SNM: Somali National Movement

SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front

USC: United Somali Congress

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IR: International Relations

KDF: Kenya Defense Forces

KANU: Kenya African National Union

NFD: Northern Frontier District



## ABSTRACT

Generally, the study was about the assessment of the factors influencing inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa, a case of Somalia and Kenya. The investigations scrutinised the associated conflict risk factors and related impacts, as well as the counter terrorism measures adopted by the Kenyan government. Finally, the discussions established possible recommendations for improving efficiency. The hypotheses that guided the project were; there are no factors which contribute to the inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa; there is no social-economic factors influencing the relations between Kenya and Somalia and; there is no political and security factors influencing present day relations between Kenya and Somalia. The findings were presented using a thematic approach, which relied heavily on secondary data such as maps and tables. The theoretical basis used was the realism theory of international relations. With regards to the factors influencing interstate relations in the HoA, including social-economic factors, as well as political and security factors, the investigations realized that the region was a hub of conflicts. The risk factors were resource based, boundary related and state failures to take care of their citizens among others. The long-term effects of the unending wars are permanent displacements of persons, death, loss of property, stagnated development, ballooning population growth and heightened levels of insecurity. However, through Foreign Direct Investments, aid and partnership with developed countries has seen a rise in construction of roads and rails. In the meantime, the general governance and leadership in the HoA is weak coupled with poorly formed state institutions. The Study also looked at social-economic factors affecting Kenya and Somalia relations which it found out that, Kenya hosts refugees from Somalia in one of the largest camps in Africa. In addition, there is a large number of Somalia nationals occupying Eastleigh a town in Nairobi. Although, the study found out that the Somali nationals do contribute to the GDP of Kenya, the Kenyans are not so happy with their presence. The Study also found out that Somalia provides Kenya with a huge market for *Khat/Miraa* that positively contributes to its economic growth. In terms of aviation industry, the study found out that both states have flights operating in both countries. However, Kenya suspended flights to and from Somalia which negatively impacted on diplomatic ties between the two countries. The investigations also recognised that the instability in the Somalia government and associated apparatus, coupled with extremism and terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, have negatively influenced relations between the Kenya and Somalia. The study also found out that Somalia, expulsion of the Kenyan Ambassador from Mogadishu and recalling of their own went a notch higher in deepening the unpeaceful relations. In Kenya, it was seen that the country feels Somalia has not appreciated the support it has been receiving since 1991 when Mohammed Siad Barre and the country descended into chaos. Consequently, the continued interference of Kenya into Somalia's national matters was considered a cause of dicey relationships. The recent judgement on the border maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia was seen as the defining moment for both countries on their existing un-peaceful relations. There are fears that the judgement may spark an armed confrontation if not handled diplomatically. The study found out the real war is for the natural resources; the oil, gas and the fish which will attract the interests of international states who may take sides in order to benefit from the resources. Recommendation of the study were; to secure the operation of the new administration in Somalia, it is critical that security measures be enhanced and infrastructure be rebuilt. Kenya as a neighbouring country of Somali can assist by deploying professional and security personnel as well as advisers and at the same time help in reinforcing security

across the border to guard the region. The study also recommended that industries be established in Somali by Kenyan government in order to bring about strong trade ties to enable it export manufactured and agricultural products hence stabilization of the whole of Horn of Africa. in order to realise this goal, there must be peaceful cohesion between the two countries.



## Chapter One

### Introduction and Background to the Study

#### 1.0 General Introduction and Background to the Study

The nations of Kenya and Somalia share a number of socio-economic domains, despite the latter being embroiled in decades-long civil war. Clapham points out that the Somali people had many historical and societal similarities before the colonial powers divided the country where they spoke one language, culture, and shared religious values. Somali people still share heritage, tradition, cultural practices and beliefs despite living in neighbouring countries hence a good case study in conflict resolution and foreign policy analysis.<sup>1</sup> Somalia has been devastated by internal strife and the overthrow of the Barre dictatorship in 1991, which has expanded beyond the country's borders to neighbouring countries.<sup>2</sup>

Kenya's national interests were directly and indirectly impacted by the Somali crisis, necessitating a rearrangement of the country's foreign policy goals. Given the country's current socioeconomic circumstances, a well-functioning foreign policy encompassing national security and interests is critical. Somalia's insecurity has the potential to jeopardize the stability of its bordering neighbours. In fact, national security is at the heart of Kenya's foreign affairs.

Kenya's historical ties with Somalia as well as the former's meddling in the latter's affairs has created an urgent need for research to investigate the impact on Kenya's foreign policy and factors that influence the relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Clapham, C. 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Brons, M.H 2001, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia. From Statelessness to Statelessness?* Utrecht: International Books.



According to Damboos, the Somali Republic was founded by former Italian (South Central Somalia and Puntland) and British (Somaliland) colonies (1960-1991) <sup>3</sup>. Since 1991, the protagonists in Somalia's violent clashes have been clan-related, with tribal kingpins driving the conflict. Among the organizations participating are the Somali National Movement (SNM), The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the United Somali Congress (USC). Kenya's role in the Somalia crisis has influenced the country's foreign policy. Kenya has played an essential role in facilitating discussions between conflicting factions in Somalis through IGAD, despite the fact the governments in the Horn of Africa are frequently considered as unstable.

### **1.1 Statement of the Research Problem**

Inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa, are understood by not only examining developmental aspects of the region but social, cultural, political and economic factors that shape and influence inter-state relations among the states. Although there is a level of interconnectedness among these neighboring states ranging from post war, pre-colonial and the current era, inter-state relations in the Horn are marred with conflicts and wars that are underpinned by territorial disputes, resources scarcity, and ethnic violence among others.

Conflicts over border demarcation have been on the rise in the region since the colonial time. For instance, both Kenya and Uganda claim ownership of the Migingo Island. In addition, Somalia and Kenya have a persistent maritime delamination in the Indian Ocean, which has significantly posed a threat to their relations and stability. Moreover, the Shifta War was as a result of this specific area in dispute. Therefore, it is a clear indication that most of the countries in the region risk going to war because of border disputes. The wars that have reshaped the interstate relations include the Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sudan-South Sudan and

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<sup>3</sup> Domboos, M 2002, "State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections" *Development and Change* 33 Vol:5:pp.797-815

Djibouti-Eritrea conflicts. These conflicts which are among the key factors influencing the interstate relations in the HoA have led to more destructive relations than development, for example, the Shifta war led to the loss of life and destruction of properties not forgetting displacement of persons. The rise of terrorist groups like Al AlShabaab has been linked to the weakening of internal governance and instability in the region. Therefore, this terrorist attack has necessitated the decline in Tourism industry because of fear, massive loss of life and property through bombing and attacks. In addition, there is the spill-over effect from the attacks that has an impact on the inter-state relations. The socio-economic status of states in the HoA is wanting considering being a developing region. It is in this context that the study seeks to discuss these dynamics influencing interstate relations in the region and possible solutions.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

**1.2.1** What are the factors that contribute to the inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa?

**1.2.2** How do socio- political factors influence the relations between Kenya and Somalia?

**1.2.3** What are the political and security factors influencing present day relations between Kenya and Somalia?

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The overall objective of the study is to assess the factors influencing inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa. Specifically,

**1.3.1** To assess the factors that contributes to the inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa

**1.3.2** To examine the socio-political factors influencing the relations between Kenya and Somalia



**1.3.3** To evaluate both political and security factors influencing present day relations between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **1.4 Hypotheses**

**1.4.1** That there are factors ranging from conflicts, socio-economic, political and security that largely influence inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa.

**1.4.2** The socio-economic factors influencing the relations between Kenya and Somalia are majorly as a result of further underlying issues.

**1.4.3** Political and Security factors influencing present day relations between Kenya and Somalia will have a long term effect on both states and the region at large.

#### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

**Academic justification:** This study will generate and contribute into the existing knowledge on the Kenya and Somalia relations in line with the following factors, security, economic and political and the inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa. This will benefit the academic researchers and the future generation.

**Policy justification:** This study will help in identifying the policies influencing interstate relations and helps in improving on the existing policies for the two states to improve on their relations. From the policy perspective, the continued relations amongst states, whether through cooperation or conflictual is of essence to the policy makers and implementation of policies.

#### **1.5 Literature Review**

The section below explores the literature review on key factors that influence inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa and more specifically Kenya and Somalia.



### 1.5.1 Theoretical Literature Review

There are competing general theories or theoretical perspectives in the field of international relations that explain the reasons for varied state behaviours. Realism, often known as political realism, is a branch of international politics that emphasizes the competitive and conflictual aspects of international relations. States, according to the Realism theory, are the primary actors in the international arena. Other bodies, such as persons and organizations, do exist but their capabilities are restricted. Secondly, while states are unitary entities, national interests, particularly during crises, drive them to speak a common voice. Finally, the state being rational actors always makes logical decisions. The emphasis on power and self interest among realists might lead to skepticism about the application of ethical precepts to interstate relations. They say that national politics is a location of power and law, whereas global politics is a place where justice does not exist

One of the key classical realists, Hans Morgenthau whose work and theoretical approach dominated the study of IR up to the 1970s, says that Africa did not have a history before the First World War and hence "it was a political space"<sup>4</sup> Another scholar of IR, Kenneth Waltz, argues that people tend to believe that big nations are the only states capable of affecting foreign affairs, and hence African and developing-world issues are frequently ignored in IR research. As stated by the proponents of the realist theory indeed the relations among states is always influenced by the national interest of every state and all the states are rational actors and they will be able to enter into relations which benefits them. As shown in the region, most of the states ,particularly Kenya and Somalia ,are interested in defending their economic and security interests in their borders as well as providing a welcoming environment for its tourists and thus respond logically. Also when it comes to realist that states can use war in pursuing its national interest by using its military power and thus as in the case of Kenya

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<sup>4</sup> Morgenthau, H. (1985). *Politics among Nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York: Alfred Knopf

using KDF in Somalia and even Ethiopia in Eritrea. This clearly shows that states in the Horn of Africa use military to pursue its national interest.

### 1.5.2 Empirical Literature Review

According to the author, Adar Khadiagala, African foreign policy decisions have always been the domain of powerful individuals. Due to the weak institutional frameworks that lack objectivity, the overlapping interests have continued to shape the countries' internal affairs. According to Adar, the Kenya's ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), political ambitions influenced the country's foreign policy. Following independence, Kenya's foreign policy was centered on defending national interests and treaties with other states in the region. Kurgat goes on to say that the country's foreign policy has been oriented on protecting its national integrity while working with African democratic movements to remove colonialism, discrimination, and other social injustice. The manifestos further declared that Kenya must work for world peace and peacefully settle international conflicts within the United Nations framework.<sup>5</sup> According to Mwangi, the manifestos respects the existing boundaries and affirms it as the only guaranteed method to safeguard the pre-independence stability.<sup>6</sup>

Kenya is used as an example because of its political and ideological proximity to the United Kingdom. According to Zartman, Kenya fought and protected itself against Somali irredentism. He states that Britain delivered Kenya statehood in conformity with colonial regulations, resulting in a break in bilateral relations with Somalia.<sup>7</sup> Farah observes that the Horn of Africa region's foreign policies have been heavily influenced by its reliance on the

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<sup>5</sup> Kurgat, P. K. "Kenya's Foreign Policy and African Conflict Management," in G. P. Okoth and B. A., pp.1 17-126.

<sup>6</sup> Mwangi, M. 2000, "The Elusive Quest: Conflict, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Kenya," in Okoth, G. P., and Ogot, B. A., (eds.), Conflict in Contemporary Africa, Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation.

<sup>7</sup> Zartman, W. I. 1989 Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press.



industrialized world, which sometimes prevented them from developing their own countries' interests.<sup>8</sup>

Somalia is a sovereign state and is known for its long history of violence, anarchy, and insecurity. It maps Somaliland to the northwest, Puntland to the north and northeast, and Southern Somalia or South Central Somalia is in the south. Despite having official contacts in the precolonial era, Kenya-Somalia relations are characterized by antagonism and insecurity. Interstate tensions arose as a result of the colonial splitting of Somaliland as one of the Kenyan North Frontier region. Despite Somalia's quest for independence, relations between the two countries continue to deteriorate.

The collapse of Somali regime has impacted on Kenya's foreign policy decisions due to insecurity. President Moi in a presidential proclamation issued on July 28, 2001 closed the Kenya-Somali border citing that armed refugees entering Kenya contributed to an upsurge in crime and instability in Nairobi<sup>9</sup>. The border closure occurred less than two years after flights from Somali was stopped in August 1999.

## **1.6 Research Design and Methodology**

This section provided the research methodology for this study which consists study design, study site, data collection methods, target population/sampling frame, sampling and sampling size, ethical issues, data analysis and presentation, scope of the study, limitations of research and chapter outline.

### **1.6.1 Research Design**

The research design shows how research will be carried out in a study and explains how data is gathered, what instruments to use and how to analyze the results. The descriptive and

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Samatar, A.I. 1988, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, London: Zed Books

explorative research methods were used in this study. These study designs were chosen because they are open and flexible; they allowed for a variety of viewpoints on the research issue and were suitable for open-ended data gathering tools. Data was gathered by use of secondary data in identifying variables and hypothetical constructions using descriptive and explanatory methods. The goal of the exploratory research was to identify elements that influence interactions within countries in the region hence better understand Kenya's connection with Somalia.

#### **1.6.3 Target Population/Sampling Frame**

A well-designed sample can be used to describe the amount of people who make up a sample framework. The study targeted 50 participants, which comprises of civil society organizations, government institutions, security agencies, and businesses that are active in Kenya's Somali economy and security.

#### **1.6.4 Sampling and Sampling size**

Since the sampling procedure was based on the study's research goals, the researcher used a non-probability sampling method known as purposive or judgmental sampling. Purposive sampling considers the most prevalent traits of the sampled type, attempts to locate and analyze these individuals, and then reports back. The researcher noted that Somalia is relatively unstable and that Kenya has had security consequences for the war-torn economy. A total of 48 people were included in the study. The researcher then applied the methods from Neumann's book to a small population (under 100); for a high degree of accuracy, a big sample ratio (about 30%) is required.

#### **1.6.5 Case Study**

A Case Study is a common type of qualitative research that entails meticulous and thorough observation of the civilian component. The case study method, according to Kothari, is



distinguished for its depth rather than its breadth. The case study focuses on a comprehensive examination of a small number of events and their interrelationships. As result, a case study is a thorough assessment of the civilian component that identifies the elements that contribute to the behaviours and patterns as a whole.<sup>10</sup>

#### **1.6.7 Data Collection**

This research used secondary data collections methods. Secondary data from published literature on the Horn of Africa, Sources on the Internet, Journals and Books.

#### **1.6.8 Data Analysis**

Data analysis is the application of logic to understand data acquired with the purpose of detecting similarities and summarizing the essential elements revealed in the investigation. Data analysis includes lowering the bulk of the data, providing summaries, looking for trends, and using statistical tools. An interview summary sheet was used to analyze data from interviews. To begin, specific phrases and key terms used by respondents in scenario descriptions will be compiled to illustrate themes.

To identify and explain the qualitative data, the researcher used numerical codes. The relevant concepts from key informant interviews were organized into themes. Following that, similarities and differences were detected and classified into sub-themes. Content analysis was performed to establish which topics appear most frequently, in what situations, and how they relate to one another.<sup>11</sup>

#### **1.6.9 Ethical Issues**

Neuman (1997) asserts that ethical research does no harm, whether bodily, psychological, or legal. These principles are taken into account since they benefit the research team as well as

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<sup>10</sup> ibid

<sup>11</sup> Patton M. Q. (2002) *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, 3rd ed. (Sage Publications Inc).

beneficiaries. It contributes to the establishment of credibility. Even if his research subjects are misinformed or uninterested in ethics, the researcher has a moral and professional need to be ethical because doing social research involves an intrusion into the lives of those whose information is sought.

### 1.7 Outline of the Study

This study is structured under four chapters. **Chapter One entitled Introduction and Background to the Study**, introduces the research topic outlines the background and defines key terms used in the study. The statement of the problem highlighted the purpose of the research. Also discussed are the three objectives with the overall objective being to examine the inter-state relations between states in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Chapter One strives to respond to relevant questions to the study and test the hypotheses. Realism Theory informs the theoretical framework of the study considering its basic tenets that supports the states as the main actors of IR. **Critically assess factors influencing inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa is Chapter Two**, and the literature review in this section presents an overview of the studies regarding various factors influencing states relations in the Horn of Africa. The scope of the literature includes an analysis of the inter-state relations and the states in the characteristic of states in the Horn of Africa.

**The Third Chapter seeks to examine the Socio- Economic factors affecting Kenya-Somalia Relations.** This chapter narrows down on the factors influencing inter-state relations and focuses on the Socio-Economic factors and specifically those affecting Kenya and Somali. It reviews literature on past and present relations between Kenya and Somali and highlights in-depth the key factors influencing their interaction. **Fourth Chapter which is to examine the Political and Security factors affecting the Present Day Kenya -Somalia Relations**, this final chapter presents the political and security areas that have affected the



relations of the two states. A critical review of the internal affairs of both states is analysed. Through which the study is able to question some of the actions taken and their consequences on the overall stability of the region. Some of the key issues addressed include the maritime border dispute that was taken up the ICI that ruled in the favour of Somalia. Thus, the purpose of this chapter among others is to look at the peaceful way forward for both states.

## **Chapter Two**

### **An Assessment of the Factors Influencing Inter-State Relations in the Horn of Africa**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter examines the different elements influencing inter-state interactions in the Horn of Africa and how they influence the relationships of various governments, including conflicts, economic, political, social, and security factors.

#### **2.0 Conflicts**

The region is seen as very vulnerable to war, and it is one of the continent's most conflict-prone places. The region has also been plagued by chronic warfare and insecurity for more than four decades. According to some researchers, it is one of the world's most sophisticated combat systems. The worst military conflicts have occurred in Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, and Somalia. These intra- and inter-state conflicts have resulted in severe environmental degradation and general livelihood insecurity. The region's ongoing civil unrest has resulted in the development of war habits in which fighting force is employed to attain political aims.

##### **2.1.1 Conflicts on Shared Resources**

States relations over shared resources, such as water that flows across international borders, can either increase tensions or promote cooperative behaviour. A sense of foresight has arisen as a result of paying attention to international water channels a key internationally shared natural resource. Water is a vital necessity for development, and it has been shown to influence state correlations.

For instance, in the Horn of Africa, the Nile River Basin has been a constant source of tension between the sharing states. The claims over natural historical rights over the Nile



Waters by Ancient Egypt, have created a negotiations focal point all through the upstream states. No matter the fact that there is existence of these rights, for Egypt, tampering with the water, then means tampering with national security, and this could be subject to triggered potential conflict. A focus to Egypt in the past, some interstate occasions over the Nile, has made Egypt to threaten to go to war over the water.

The reason for the issuance of threats by Egypt is based on the fact that it has an agriculturally dependent economy that is on the Nile River and virtual water imports, which if disturbed may lead to an attempted water conflict. Such threats have impacted on interstate cooperation in the past, with Ethiopia and Tanzania as states that have befallen victims of Egypt's threats, evident through Egypt arming Somalia separatists in Ethiopia. These threats have in the recent past made the states to enter into agreements and treaties.

#### **2.1.2 Conflict in Sudan**

The civil war between northern and southern Sudan began in 1955, long before the country gained independence. Military government was imposed in 1958 which prohibited southern political organisations from operating. The sides signed the Addis Ababa Accords after 17 years of conflict, on the 27th of March 1972.<sup>12</sup> Following the discovery of hydrocarbon resources, Sudan's government, led by Gaafar Mohamad Nimiery, declared the Addis Ababa Accords null and void after ten years of tenuous peace. The National People's Assembly and the Southern Regional Assembly were dissolved on September 8, 1983, and the national adoption of Islamic Sharia law took effect<sup>13</sup>. Given the spill over effects in terms of economic and humanitarian needs, the wars drew the attention of various regional and international powers, including Kenya.

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<sup>12</sup> Edgar O'Ballance, H (1977) *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972* (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1977): 48-53.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

### 2.1.2 Somalia conflict

In Somalia, the transitional government and Al-Shabaab have fought for control of political power. However, terrorism is an issue affecting the IGAD member states and not just Somalia. Therefore, the January 2002-IGAD Heads of State Summit in Khartoum reinforced a resolution to promote regional cooperation in order to counter extremism. The increasing number of terror incidences across the region was the main reason for a united front in combating the crude elements.

Over the years, the Kenyan government has faulted the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps for providing a breeding ground for terrorism-related acts within the country, thus affecting Kenya-Somalia relations. The antagonism and enmity between IGAD member states has been an impediment to a united front in the battle against extremism and regional instability.<sup>14</sup> Even while they share responsibility in battling other vices such as territorial disputes and tribal strife, the partner states frequently accuse one other of indirectly fostering radicalism within their borders. For example, in Djibouti, a decade-long ethnic conflict between the Afar and Issa groups over control of governmental power has seen both Somalia and Eritrea intervene, with each supporting either side. Sudan also intervened in Uganda's civil war from 1990 to 2006. Both Uganda and Ethiopia were involved in the Sudan war between the SPLA and regime forces over secession from 1993 until 2005. The sectarian strife that has afflicted Somalia since 1991 has attracted the attentions of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Eritrea.

Furthermore, from the 1960s to 1991, Kenya was embroiled in a civil war to consolidate governmental power. In Ethiopia, from 1991 to the present, there has been intra-state combat between small-scale armed opposition groups like the OLF and ONLF and the central government to dominate state power, which has been successful. Then Eritrea and Somalia

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<sup>14</sup> ibid



become involved. All of the foregoing reasons indicate that IGAD member nations are cooperating and interfering with one another. IGAD member nations, on the other hand, have repeatedly committed their attention, time, and resources to resolving the protracted war.

Inter-state conflicts are extremely rare in the HOA, in contrast to the widespread intra-state conflicts. When they occur, however, they have terrible consequences for human life, property, and the environment. A terrible inter-state war erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000 which came to an end in December 2000, with the signing of the Algiers Agreement. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the border issue was settled by the judgement of Permanent Court of Arbitration in April 2002, warless and no peace disagreements do still exist.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict remains crucial and has serious implications for other conflicts in the Horn of Africa.<sup>15</sup> The Eritrea-Djibouti dispute is one of these. Eritrea and Djibouti have had boundary conflicts on and off since 1994. The most recent and violent dispute, on the other hand, erupted in June 2008.

When the Ethiopia-Eritrea armed war (1998-2000) erupted in May 1998, many observers and inhabitants from both countries were taken aback, given that the two governments appeared to be allies after the first conflict (1961-1991).<sup>16</sup> The relationship between the two fronts, on the other hand, was affected by a basic disagreement which was never resolved in the post-Dergue cooperation.<sup>17</sup> Their relationship was portrayed as an example of post-conflict ties between nations that had been mired in protracted combat. The response was overwhelmingly positive, with many suggesting that the concept be replicated in other situations. The leaders of the two countries have been hailed as a new generation of African leaders.

<sup>15</sup> Edgar O'Ballance, H (1977) *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972*(Hamden, CT: Archon, 1977): 48-53.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>17</sup> Tadesse, Medhane (1999). *The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospect*. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise.

However, internal anxiety, particularly among Ethiopians, was growing, indicating the relationship's lack of public and institutional anchorage. The friendly relationship was built on false hopes and expectations. As it would become obvious a few years later, the two administrations' strategies were based on opposing expectations.

The Eritrean government appeared to expect the connection to maximize its access to the larger Ethiopian market in order to rehabilitate its war-torn country. Ethiopia, on its part, hoped to contain Eritrea within its area of control, eventually leading to political unity. Eritrean-Ethiopian relations were severed due to miscalculations on both sides. The most major blunder was Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, which sparked a horrific struggle in 1998-2000. Ethiopia was instrumental in bringing forth the Sana'a Forum in 2002, which brought together Sudan and Yemen but excluding Eritrea. Furthermore, they fought in proxy warfare in what was largely regarded as taking their struggle to Somalia<sup>18</sup>.

Domestically, both regimes openly hosted opposition organizations from the other. Eritrea has also accused Ethiopia of equipping, training, and funding groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (PLF), the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF), and others. Ethiopia played a key role in the formation of a coalition of Eritrean opposition groups in 1999. All of Eritrea's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been labeled as terrorists by Addis Ababa. It has long been typical for both regimes to trade accusations of inciting extremism in the region.

The most significant barrier to restoring the current Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship was the failure to apply the final and enforceable Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) boundary verdict. Eritrea denied any engagement prior to border demarcation, citing the

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Algiers Agreement's definitive and binding nature. The EEBC completed its work in 2007 by demarcating the line with virtual coordinates and declaring it legally defined. Relations between Djibouti and Eritrea have been impeded by stumbling blocks caused by ambiguous borderlines. As a result, the standoff persists, setting the path for a scenario of "no war, no peace. This situation in the Horn of Africa exacerbates tensions and generates instability.<sup>19</sup>

Nonetheless, a schism in between two economies emerged in 1999, when they swapped accusations. Eritrea alleged that Djibouti was siding with Ethiopia during the latter's war because given it used Djibouti's port to import weapons. Djibouti also suspected Eritrea of supporting Djiboutian opposition groups which engaged in overthrowing the government and claiming the Ras Doumeira region. The disparity seemed to resurface, spurred by the Ethiopia-Eritrea hostilities.

Djibouti may have brought the matter to light in order to put a stop to the long-running border conflict. It has been shown that it had political and military support from powerful countries such as France, the United States, and Ethiopia, which aided it in gaining strategic relevance.<sup>20</sup>

*"The peoples and traditions of the Horn of Africa are caught in multiple binds arising from the intersection of history and politics. For almost 40 years, the region has been wracked by wars and famine and the indignities and oppression of misrule. In the last half century, the peoples of Ethiopia have suffered, first, from a personal autocracy, and, subsequently, from the ill-considered and poorly founded rule of two self-proclaimed revolutionary regimes. The peoples of Eritrea endured 30 years of*

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<sup>19</sup> Healy, Sally & Martin Plaut (2007). Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion. Africa Programme Briefing Paper AFP BP 07/01. London: Chatham House.

<sup>20</sup> Mengisteab, Kidane & Okbazghi Yohannes (2005). Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic and Foreign Policy Crisis. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press.

*warfare only to end up with a government that has betrayed the democratic promise of the struggle. The Somali people have been afflicted by misrule and an anarchy dominated by violence and the brutal self-interest of warlords. All across the Horn, warfare has been accompanied by famine and pestilence, and its peoples have been caught in conflicts between their traditions and values and the practices of their political elites” Said Ahmed Muselem Orji, expert on Peace, Conflict and Security studies in the Horn of Africa.*

## **2.2 Economic Factors**

Some of the economic factors influencing inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa includes: Growth and investment, access to finance, infrastructure, human capital and others

### **2.2.1 Growth and Investment in the Horn of Africa**

In the 1990s, growth in the Horn of Africa was low, and it had only begun recently to recover. The sector in the sub-industrial region has not been modernized, and its contribution to regional GDP is small. The countries of the sub-fragile area have enjoyed rapid economic growth in recent years. Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan make up 74% of the sub-population region's population and produce 72% of its GDP. Ethiopia's real GDP growth rate was 10.7% from 2005 to 2009, Uganda's was 8.3%, and Sudan's was 7.8%. Lack of investment and slow economic growth have been a problem in the Horn of Africa. This can be linked to a lack of personal ownership or low social returns. If specific diagnostic markers of inadequate capital are evident, the sub-region is labelled as socially limited.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Felipe, J., & Usui, N. (2008) Rethinking the Growth Diagnostics Approach: Questions from the Practitioners, retrieved on May 2, 2011.



### **2.2.2 Access to finance**

The Horn of Africa features some of the world's most underdeveloped financial systems. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya, despite this, have boosted their investments in the region. Kenya has access to the sea, putting it in a prime position to open up the Horn of Africa to trade.

### **2.2.3 Infrastructure**

Many developing countries, particularly those in East Asia and the Pacific, are concerned about road infrastructure. In 2004, Ethiopia's road density per 100 square kilometre of land area was 3 kilometres, Uganda's was 11 kilometres, and Kenya's was 17 kilometres. The sub-standard roads in the region are due insufficient funds, settlement patterns, and topographical makeup.<sup>22</sup> According to the same source, the sub-percentage region's of paved roads in total roadways is low: Djibouti received 45 percent in 2001, Eritrea received 21 percent in 2001, Ethiopia received 12.8 percent in 2007, Kenya received 14 percent in 2004, Somalia received 36 percent in 2001, and Uganda received 23 percent in 2003.

Poor infrastructure has strained relations among the countries in the Horn area, making markets inaccessible and perishable goods unable to reach markets on time. In 2008, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya consumed 43, 96, and 156 kWh per capita, respectively. East Asia and the Pacific used 1964 kWh and Sub-Saharan Africa used 536 kWh, respectively. Access to power is a critical economic infrastructure that can have a good or negative impact on growth.

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<sup>22</sup>Escribano, A., Guasch, J. L. and Pena, J. (2008) Impact of Infrastructure Constraints on Firm Productivity in Africa. AICD, Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC

#### **2.2.4 Human Capital/Education**

In traditional growth theories, human capital is a significant predictor of economic growth. According to growth models, countries with high literacy rates have higher economic growth rates. With reduced school attendance and less access to trained professionals, education is a stumbling block in this part of the world. This region is ranked among countries with the lowest levels of human capital with only 2% of those in the eligible age range attending university, compared to 18% in emerging East Asia and the Pacific countries and 5% in developing Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>23</sup> Because of the low literacy rate, there has been an increase in criminality to fund their basic requirements, which has resulted in cattle rusting between Kenyan and Sudanese populations, as well as between Kenyan and Ugandan fisherman on Migingo Island, straining relations between these states.

#### **2.3 Political Factors**

The Horn also faces numerous security issues, including internal fragility and displacement, a lack of inclusive administration, and the rise of ethnicity as a "political instrument"<sup>24</sup>. The amount to which political governance is an inclusive process in both social and geographic elements, as well as the kind and quality of power-sharing agreements in place in numerous countries, are critical factors that may continue to spark violent conflicts inside and across countries. It is important to recall that political governance encompasses not only how a regime gains state power and manages and maintains it, but also how it expands and/or consolidates its legitimacy over its tenure. As a result, accountable and transparent power

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<sup>23</sup> Dobronogov, A., & Iqbal, F. (2005). *Economic Growth in Egypt: Constraints and Determinants*, October 2005.

<sup>24</sup>Kabandula, A., & Shaw, T. M. (2018). Rising powers and the horn of Africa: conflicting regionalisms. *Third World Quarterly*, 1-20.



transitions and political governance have the potential to reduce violence and foster peace on a regional scale in the Horn of Africa."

Challenges to developing inclusive forms of governance continue to be key sources of violence in the Horn of Africa. When significant groups are denied access to political spheres or a portion of economic resources, their frustrations manifest in societal tensions or increased criminal activity such as terrorism and human and arms trafficking. Inclusivity provides greater resource use and results in economic opportunities for young to be incorporated into society through debate, fair elections, and respect for human rights. Efforts aimed at enhancing access to socioeconomic opportunities and fostering interaction between and among various actors and constituencies have the potential to reduce tensions in the Horn.

#### 2d.1 The Competition for Political and Economic Influence

In addition to the governance domain, the Horn continues to grapple with myriad geostrategic issues. By virtue of its proximity to the Red Sea, the Horn occupies a vital position not only for the continent but also for the Middle East, Asia and Europe, with thousands of ships passing through the sea annually. It is also a strategic point-of-interest for various international powers (especially Russia, the European Union states, the US and China), several Arab Gulf states and Turkey, all of who have vested military, economic and infrastructure projects in the region". Unless states in the region take deep cognisance of how the presence of external actors might affect them, they will potentially face economic and political challenges in the future. The rivalries in the Middle East, for example, could potentially have multiplier effects in the Horn as the recent turn of events in Yemen have

<sup>17</sup>Johnstone, M. (2012, July 07). "Good Governance: Rule of Law". TI Insp non }' md Accorin I lib i lit}"" . Rett ie've'd f'tonJ United Ndtiondl - Public AdnJinistrcttion Nctr'ot k  
<http://Pulp III I .rifl .of /imtrtdx:/torips/pfibli@d:cx:rinJelJis/tiJ/rinprm0101 +J3.pJ>  
-H ilicras. A. & K(dantzak)s. S. (ii) 17). The Gulf" St ties :x d the H(on o/ Af'ica: A Ne Hime'land'\* Middle East P(olic y. 24(4). G3-73.

shown. The competition for global domination between the US and China to secure resources to feed their growing economies, on the other hand, should be carefully considered in the foreign policy and economic agendas of the Horn states. While regional integration as a policy instrument contributes to economic growth and improved welfare through the enhancement of trade, According to Kabandula and Shaw, emerging powers with domestic and regional border conflicts could have a long-term impact on human security<sup>27</sup>.

In the face of the above impulses, there is keen interest to promote a regional approach to investment and security by member states to act as a safeguard against excessive outside influences. Apart from reducing internal frictions between and among countries in the region, a more regional outlook could help to address global issues collectively rather than individually, and allow individual states to withstand external

### **2.3.2 Harnessing the Role of Multilateral Cooperation and Engagement**

IGAD is primarily a regional organization for conflict prevention and settlement among its eight member states, which are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. The peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea provides an opportunity for IGAD to encourage the improvement of relations between other member states. IGAD, as a Regional Economic Community (REC), is responsible for fostering economic integration and development as a primary tool of conflict prevention and a basis for long-term peace<sup>28</sup>. It is worth noting that, due to their dry position, governments in the region encounter with difficulties in water use, pastoralism, and access to grazing land, to name a few. The memberships of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC), which includes six countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, overlap

<sup>27</sup> abandula, A., & Shaw, T. M. (2018). Rising powers and the horn of Africa: conflicting regionalisms. *Third World Quarterly*, 1-20.

<sup>28</sup> Adejumobi, S. (2000). "Africa and the Challenges of Democracy and Good Governance in the 21st Century". Retrieved from United Nations Public Administration Network: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan008483.pd>



significantly. In terms of achieving economic integration among its member states, the EAC is far ahead. This presents an appealing and potentially advantageous opportunity for these states to get access to the region's broader market. Beyond peace and security, the area may learn from its neighbour about attaining economic and political integration.<sup>29</sup>

AMISOM's withdrawal is scheduled to be completed by December 2020. Despite many failures in the war against Al-Shabaab, the mission has played a significant role in stabilizing Somalia over its years of existence. There are legitimate concerns that the winding down would be difficult, but it should nevertheless provide the region with an opportunity to carefully manage the aftermath if possible security threats are to be eradicated or greatly reduced. The AU and UN, in collaboration with IGAD member states, would have to guarantee that the departure process is not hastened and that Somalia is not left worse off than before. A badly managed withdrawal might create an even more hazardous gap if it is not swiftly occupied and handled by legal and robust governmental institutions. Multilateral partners must collaborate with troop contributing countries both inside and outside the area to manage this process and its outcomes without imposing their own preferences.

#### **2.4 Security Factors**

Several types of civilian militarization in the Horn of Africa's wars revolve around security. Large sectors of the Horn's societies are disillusioned, putting the countries in jeopardy. Citizens' security is jeopardized due to political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination, to the extent that they see the state as the major threat to their survival. The seriousness of the situation described above leads to frantic measures by disadvantaged citizens to take the law into their own hands in order to safeguard their fundamental principles from the threat of unjust government acts. People lose hope with the government

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid

who no longer support their interests and in the long run may want to form a new state to or overthrow it by any means necessary<sup>30</sup>. Consequently, countries in HoA are often vulnerable to internal insecurity than their neighbours. In battles between states and armed political forces, the complexities of self-defence by ethnic communities, social classes, and intra-state regions have a major effect on civilian militarization.

Governments have differing perspectives on rebel parties who engage in violent resistance movements. They disband the factions before they can grow into complete rival armies. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) were considered criminal groups in Sudan and Uganda, respectively, and were anticipated to be wiped out soon but instead, with time they become strong groups to reckon with. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) cases, on the other hand, were distinct. Eritrean and Ethiopian governments fought alongside each other against Ethiopian administrations.

#### **2.4.1 Sudan versus Eritrea**

Sudanese movements located in Eritrea include the SPLM and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Ethiopia and Sudan fomented the Eritrean Jihad Movement (EJM) and the Eritrean National Forces Alliance (ENFA) at different times, depending on the development of new events. For example, Assefa claims that ENFA was created by Ethiopia and Sudan to destabilize Eritrea following the commencement of hostilities in 1998<sup>31</sup>. Complaints from the Sudanese government continue to be addressed towards Eritrea on the activities of the NDA and the SPLM in eastern Sudan, harming relations between the two countries.

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<sup>30</sup> Berman, E. and K.E. Sams. 2000. *Peace Keeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* New York: United Nations.

<sup>31</sup> Assefa, H. 1999. "A Lack of Visionary Statesmanship and Democratic Leadership" in *Searching for Peace in Africa* Utrecht: European Platform on Conflict Prevention and Transformation.



#### **2.4.2 Sudan versus Ethiopia**

Ethiopia's Oromo and Ogaden National Liberation Front's are veteran insurgents. They hide and reawaken in response to events in the surrounding area. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was created in Sudan in the 1980s with Ethiopia's support,<sup>32</sup> the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was founded in Sudan with the active backing of Ethiopia.

#### **2.4.3 Sudan versus Uganda**

Ethiopia's Oromo and Ogaden National Liberation Fronts are veteran insurgents. They hide and reawaken in response to events in the surrounding area. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was created in Sudan in the 1980s with Ethiopia's support, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was founded in Sudan with the active backing of Ethiopia. Sudan is accused by Uganda of giving military and logistical support to terrorist groups. On the other hand, the Sudanese have long claimed to have defeated the SPLA in Equatorial Guinea. Ugandan armed forces are the only ones still fighting in parts of Sudan therefore both countries admit their relationships with the rebels of the other country.

#### **2.4.4 Eritrea versus Ethiopia**

Ethiopia and Eritrea's regimes are the consequence of an alliance of rebel forces trying to overthrow Mengistu Haile Mariam's dictatorial regime.<sup>33</sup> Ethiopia was subdivided by joint decision of the rebel army administrations. Ethiopia actively participated in the founding of the ENFA to destabilize Eritrea, in collaboration with Sudan. According to credible sources, Eritrea ordered the OLF and ONLF to intensify their deadly activities against Ethiopia. The dispute began in 1998, when a border battle between the two countries erupted.

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<sup>32</sup> ibid

<sup>33</sup>Beurden, J. van 1999. "Ethiopia Vs Eritrea: A Devastating War Between Former Friends" in Searching for Peace in Africa. Utrecht: European Platform on Conflict Prevention and Transformation

This destabilization tendency may also be seen in Ethiopian-Somali relations, with suspicions of Ethiopian military action in Somalia. Excluding Somalia, wars in this region have a higher influence on Sudan's national sovereignty and integrity than on the other governments in the region. The fear is that Ethiopia would disintegrate, and Eritrea will become a separate nation. Consequently, Somalia is on the verge of collapsing if non-governmental entities such as Somaliland and Puntland gain legitimacy.

Tensions in the Horn of Africa have resulted in a considerable increase in weaponry flow, which has exacerbated militarization. Some tribes or organizations take advantage of the disarray to arm themselves in anticipation for a crisis. Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda are all grappling with this issue. Armed violence casualties are registered in Kenya, but there are no recognized political rebel groups<sup>34</sup>. This is owing to the flow of small arms gained from civil war actors over borders with these mentioned countries.

*“According to the Ethiopia’s foreign ministry that we contacted on phone, he said that Ethiopia has laid out conditions for possible talks with the TPLF, including a halt to attacks and the withdrawal from the regions of Amhara and Afar bordering the northern Tigray region. “Ethiopia has given some conditions. The conditions included that TPLF should stop the attacks. Secondly, that they leave the areas they had earlier occupied [Amhara and Afar]. Third, to recognise the legitimacy of this government,” Ethiopia’s foreign ministry spokesman Dina Mufti.*

*But TPLF spokesman Getachew Reda has previously said that pulling out from Amhara and Afar before talks begin is “an absolute non-starter”. The Tigrayan forces said earlier this month they had seized Kemise, 325km (200 miles) from the capital, Addis Ababa, and threatened to march on it.” Karumba T Aljazeera news reporter based in Nairobi, Kenya*

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid



## Chapter Three

### Socio-Economic Factors Affecting Kenya-Somalia Relations

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the Socio-Economic factors and specifically those affecting Kenya and Somali relations. It reviews literature on past and present relations between Kenya and Somali and highlights in-depth the key factors influencing their interaction.

#### 3.1 Socio-Economic Factors

Despite the absence of efficient state governance, Somalia has maintained a robust informal sector centered primarily on livestock, remittance/money transfer enterprises, and telecommunications. Agriculture is the most important industry, accounting for more than 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export revenues. Somalia's main exports include livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas, while its main imports are sugar, sorghum, grain, qat, and machined goods.

If the Jubbaland political process is not handled properly, Kenya risks becoming entangled in a protracted and bloody struggle in Somalia. The Somali government's suspicion of the KDF's ties to Madobe benefits al-Shabaab, which has campaigned for a foreign-led invasion. According to Menkhaus, Jubbaland as an administrative agency with authority concentrated in Kismayo, is bound to fail. He contends that equal involvement at the ruling level is essential. There are no roads connecting the provinces as well as no shared administrative or governance history.

Despite UN Security Council and Somali government bans on charcoal exports, Al Shabaab's charcoal shipments from Kismayo, which is under Ras Kamboni's authority, continue uninterrupted. In November 2012, an estimated 700,000 bags were exported, followed by 800,000 in December. Just for these two months, this would have resulted in a total worth of at least \$37,500,000. Al-Shabaab continues to dominate large parts of the countryside and coordinate supply routes from the rural. There is general belief in Kismayo that the KDF approves the loading of charcoal into ships. Every week, the UN Support Office for Somalia procured 52 tons of charcoal for AMISOM's cooks. There is a general belief that linked finances were channeled through prominent Ogadenis to fund Kenya's recent election campaigns.

These individuals, as well as border force officials and the KDF, are suspected of profiting from the contraband sugar cross-border trade. 20,000-40,000 metric tonnes of imported sugar are shipped from Somalia each year, ending up on the Kenyan market via Dadaab and Garissa. Import charges on this type of trade have recently given al-Shabaab with between \$400,00 and \$800,000 per year<sup>35</sup>.

Kenya and Somalia are at odds over their shared sea border. Conflicts are rising as a result of oil interests. Kenya has awarded Somalia exploration rights, which Kenya maintains should not be used until a bilateral agreement is reached, while Somalia insists that they must be honored<sup>36</sup>. Both governments renewed an agreement on a Joint Commission for Cooperation as the key framework for discussing bilateral ties in December 2012 hence an ideal venue for them to quickly resolve their differences.

*"Kenyan Somalis are drawn back and forth between an emphasis on their ethnic Somalianness and their belonging to Kenya as citizens – they share their socialization*

<sup>35</sup> Nair, K.N.S & Abdulla, F. (1999) Somalia 1997-1998: A Status Report Nairobi: UNDOS

<sup>36</sup> Del Buono, M. & Mubarak, J. (1999, January.) The Macroeconomy of Somalia: A Conceptual View. (draft) Nairobi: UNDOS p.7.



*with other fellow Kenyans, but are treated as if not quite belonging to Kenya. The term "ambiguous citizens" seems to capture this situation better than the often-used expression "second class citizens", as it carries the notion of uncertainty and the undetermined, as well as the emotional side of citizenship, going beyond a purely legal definition. Kenyan Somalis at times naively buy into this national delusion until they are violently awakened to the reality by events like the current exercise [operation usalama watch], and then put in their rightful place. Fifty years of abuse and neglect is too long to endure. But it is not that Kenyan Somalis don't want to be part of Kenya. It is Kenya that does not want Somalis in Kenya." Said Salim Mohamed Juma (Kenyan Somali) freelance journalist and filmmaker.*

### **3.1.2 Pastoralism**

Trade has historically played an important role in Somalia's economic system. Coastal city-states used to link the Somali interior to regional trade networks, and nomadic people traded livestock for wheat and salt. Trade has become an enormously important component of the economy as a result of the wartime collapse of agricultural production, manufacturing, and public employment. Due to the collapse of agricultural production, manufacturing, and public employment, trade has become a crucial part of the Somali economy.<sup>37</sup> The patterns of Somalia's exports and imports are undeniably significant for the country's human development. Many Somali households rely on trade for jobs and revenue. The fleet and volume of imports and exports passing through Berbera and Bosasso ports has grown since the early 1990s.

Food requirements are the main imports for domestic consumption, however there has been an increase in secondhand clothing, construction materials, vehicles, and qaat.<sup>38</sup> Somalia's chronic trade imbalance is financed in part by remittances from abroad. Field reports, on the other hand, show a major growth in Somali cattle exports for sale in Kenya, as well as a rising southern enterprise and industry economy. Although it is evident that commercial activity through tax - free terminals has increased since the mid-1990s, there are no credible

<sup>37</sup> World Bank (1993, October) Somalia Framework for Planning of Long-Term Reconstruction and Recovery. Draft report of a Multi-Donor Task Force under the Coordination of the World Bank.

<sup>38</sup> Linkenback, L. (2001) Analysis of the Socio-Economic Drivers behind the Charcoal Trade in Somalia

statistics on ships<sup>39</sup>. The most prevalent goods sent to Kenya are sugar, gasoline, and fabric. Mogadishu is quickly becoming a regional hub for automotive spare parts. Despite the partial suspension, activity at Kismayo and Berbera's all-weather ports has surged<sup>40</sup>.

This function as an entrepreneur economy has a lot of possibilities. It is a developing livelihood source and cash for the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. However, the expansion of this economy is dependent on effective, safe, and attractive transit transportation services, as well as an enabling regulatory framework. Insecurity and poor road conditions in southern Somalia are impeding the expansion of the transshipment trade. Another impediment is the fact that much of the commerce is illegal.

The lack of legal economic linkages with other countries hurts Somali traders' bargaining position. Despite the fact that economic liberalization has increased foreign trade, Somalis' ability to benefit from it is constrained due to a lack of leadership. Because the rewards of this business are left in the hands of a few wealthy traders, it's impossible to estimate them.

Smaller dealers may now reach global markets such as Dubai, which became Somalia's commercial capital in the 1990s, thanks to low-cost connectivity. In addition, the conflict has shattered previous commercial dominance in the south. For example, the lucrative trans-border cattle traffic into Kenya supports decentralized, small-scale overland livestock and product transit, allowing many more mid-size merchants to profit from the trade.

### **3.1.3 Piracy as an Economic problem**

Since 1991, the Somali state has lacked a centralized government, leading in the collapse of all institutions and government. Foreign waste treatment corporations have transformed Somalia's waterways into a landfill for toxic and even radioactive trash. Local fisherman

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<sup>39</sup>Burton, J & Dukes, F., (eds). (1990). *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*. Macmillan Press Ltd, London.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid



were outraged, and launched attacks to defend their way of life. Certain organizations declared themselves to be marine to serve as the Somali maritime government in order to secure their money, which intensified the situation. They armed themselves and attacked ships, abducted the crew in exchange for ransom money, with the support of local warlords<sup>41</sup>.

Piracy in Somalia stems from a variety of socioeconomic factors, including poverty, malnutrition, and civil upheaval among the coastal population. Punt land is the epicenter of piracy partly due to the fact that ships going through the Gulf of Aden may be seen and targeted much more easily. According to reports from the UN Secretary-General and an expert panel convened by the representative of Secretary General, the organizations have different capabilities and an operational pattern hence countering them is quite a challenge.

The ransom money, according to the pirates, is paid in US dollars and brought to them in burlap sacks that are either dropped or transported in waterproof suitcases. At the same time, parachutes are employed to transport this money; In January 2009, for example, an orange container containing \$3 million was dumped onto the deck of the super tanker MV Sirius Star to ensure the ships' and crew's release. To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency counting systems, which are the same technology employed by foreign exchange bureaus around the world.. Somali pirates purportedly receive assistance from the Somali Diaspora. Somali piracy has posed a security danger to Kenya, as several Kenya-bound ships have been hijacked on the high seas, limiting the amount of cargo and tourist ships arriving at Mombasa and so jeopardizing Kenya-Somalia relations.

With Somalia on its border, the threat of piracy to Kenya's national interests had ripple effects throughout the country. Nairobi recognizes the importance of Somalia's stability and

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<sup>41</sup> Keen, D (1998) *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil wars*, Adelphi London.

security in realizing its national goals. Kenyans have realized this as a result of the failed state over the last two decades<sup>42</sup>. Kenya's economy has suffered as a direct result of maritime piracy whereby the expenditures the shipping industry alone were between \$300 million and \$400 million per year. The reason for the piracy surcharge was that insurance firms had to raise their costs to account for the risk of traveling through pirate-infested waters. Piracy penalty raises expenses by approximately US\$ 260 million for dry bulk and liquid cargoes, which are expected to average 13 million tons in 2012<sup>43</sup>.

Maritime piracy has also been connected to a negative impact on the tourism industry, particularly the cruise liner industry. In 2008, thirty-five cruise ships visited Kenyan ports, with hopes that this number will increase to fifty in 2009. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Kenya lost approximately US\$ 15 million per year in revenue earned by cruise ship visits to its ports. Since then, the number of cruise ships operating in Kenyan waters has been cut in half, resulting in the loss of port charges, taxes, immigration, tourism, and shopping.<sup>44</sup>.

The foregoing costs paid by the local consumer, worsens Kenya's severe levels of unemployment and poverty. The exorbitant cost of doing business in Kenya was associated with significant risks, resulting in a decrease in foreign currency inflows as investors sought safer destinations for their cash. Food costs skyrocketed, with imported staples costing 10% more on average than in previous years. Food price inflation has also put local communities in jeopardy.

According to the Institute of Security Studies, there is evidence that a significant share of the top levels of pirate gangs or activities were situated in Kenya. This has resulted in an influx of money, which is frequently directed at the property market in what has been referred to as

<sup>42</sup> Lehr, P., and Hendrick, L., *Somalia – Pirates' New Paradise*, in Peter Lehr ed, *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global terrorism*, Taylor and Francis Group: New York, 2007, 14.

<sup>43</sup> Le Billon Philippe (2001). *The Political Economy of War: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, HPG).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid



a money-laundering scheme. According to Bowden, "many pirates are investing in property in neighboring Kenya, so fueling a construction boom and transforming Nairobi and Mombasa suburbs into Somali havens." These safe havens have resulted in additional financial ties, with piracy ransoms being brokered by Mombasa-based intermediaries. Maritime piracy from Somalia poses a significant threat to Kenya's national interests."

#### **3.1.4 The Aviation Sector**

Somalia's principal airport is Mogadishu International Airport and 15 companies which operate with over 60 aircraft serving six foreign destinations. Somali Airlines, created in 1964, was the country's national air line. Civil strife necessitated the termination of all flights, and the airline has been inactive since. The demand for air transportation to Somalia is extremely high. This apparent desire derives from both the Somali diaspora's desire to visit their country of which this requirement has prompted the establishment of commercial airlines. Jubba Airways, Damal Airline, and Inter-Somalia are three of Mogadishu's few commercial airlines. They offer direct flights to Dubai and Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, as well as Jeddah, Mecca's main entry point. It has, however, fallen short of meeting the demands of international criminals and illegal traffickers wanting easy entry to Kenyan territory by air, sea, or land. Somalia has become a crossroads for illegal goods and illegal migrants looking for a quick way into Kenya.

#### **3.1.5 The Telecommunication Sector**

In most of Somalia's main cities, wireless services are excellent. The telecommunications market is extremely competitive, resulting in businesses offering the continent's lowest international call prices. Previously, public monopolies, bureaucracy, and corruption reigned

<sup>10</sup> Binton, J & Dukes, F. (eds). (1993). Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution. Macmillan Press Ltd.

<sup>11</sup> Talle, A., Severine, R., and Abdel G.M.A. Ed.. Globalization, Democracy and Development in Africa: Challenges and Prospects. Addis Ababa: OSSREA.

supreme, and Mogadishu was the only place where riches could be made." While it is true that telecommunications businesses boost economic activity, their most crucial responsibility is to maintain social cohesion. Cybercrime in Somalia has extended to various parts of Kenya as a result of the rise of unregulated telecommunications industries<sup>47</sup>.

### 3.1.6 The Remittance Sector

Finally, remittances have become one of the most important economic sectors in modern Somalia. Due to the lack of a formal banking system, the number of money transfer companies have increased. Dahabshiil Financial Services Inc. is the largest money transfer company in the world, with 400 branches in 34 countries. Amal Express, Al-Mustagbal Express, Dalsan Trading, and lowfiiq are some of the well-known money transfer providers. With an annual financial flow of around 1-1.5 billion dollars from the Somali Diaspora, this industry has a significant and unequalled economic impact. The strategy helps Somali families survive while also facilitating trade between Somalia and the rest of the world.

According to a recent UNDP poll, almost 25% of Somali families receive such subsidies and rely on them to make ends meet<sup>48</sup>. Technically, they're used for a range of necessities including buying food and clothing, making small expenditures like buying land or a house, and forming small businesses. However, because this is an unregulated industry, these figures are simply estimates. There are growing concerns regarding the usage and potential misuse of those money, particularly since 9/11 and in the context of terrorism. The free access to financial remittances in Somalia has aided terrorists in obtaining foreign currency in Somalia and using it to recruit Al-Shabaab sympathizers in Kenya.

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<sup>47</sup> UNDP (2001). Human Development Report 2001-Somalia. New York: UNDP.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid



### **3.1.7 Trade in Charcoal**

The charcoal trade began in 1997, after it was determined that mining might be profitable. Its exploitation is most likely the result of the destruction of acacia woods in southern Somalia, which has caused significant environmental harm. The main issue is getting charcoal to major ports so that it can be sold to countries like the UAE or Saudi Arabia. The vast majority of warlords and clans have power over the country's financial arteries. Transporting commodities to multiple markets excessively expensive due to transportation charges. Other expenses, such as middlemen and clan-based taxes, enhance the freight prices as well. Because of Eastleigh's economic relations, the charcoal revenue is frequently used to fund criminal activities aimed at Kenya.

### **3.1.8 The Banana Sector**

Another example comes from the banana trade where disagreements over the exploitation of banana crops in southern Somalia between two significant Italian firms, (De Nadai) and American company (Dole) arose. Both firms have Somali affiliates, and fierce competition has erupted between them. Alliance systems and the formation of militias on both sides fueled the conflict's escalation<sup>46</sup>. Nevertheless, warlords and local clans could offer security for both businesses' operations.

Banana transportation from the fields to the ports were also taxed and instead of serving the interests of the people and promoting favorable benefits for everybody, the revenue generated was being used to increase the power of warlords. Through these examples, it is obvious that Somali traditional sectors might have aided the country's growth in terms of human development, since income could have channelled towards healthcare and educational

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<sup>46</sup> Little, Peter. (2001). "The Global Dimension of Cross-Border Trade in the Somalia Borderlands."

facilities". The same reasoning can be extended to other industries where money is exchanged for protection and control, such as shipping and cash transfer. All of these sources of cash could have been channelled on a regular basis by warlords in order to fund the war, but at the expense of Kenyan security.

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"Leht, P., and Hentrick, L., Somalia — Pirates' New Paradise, in *Pictorial Violence at Sea (Piracy) in the Age of Global Terrorism*, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2007, 4.



## **Chapter Four**

### **Political and Security Factors Affecting the Present Day Kenya-Somalia Relations**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter presents the political and security areas that have affected the relations of the two states. A critical review of the internal affairs of both states is analysed. Through which the study is able to question some of the actions taken and their consequences on the overall stability of the region. Some of the key issues addressed include the maritime border dispute that was taken up the ICJ that ruled in the favour of Somalia. Thus, the purpose of this chapter among others is to look at some of the political and security factors affecting the relations.

#### **4.1 Security Factors**

There are many security factors affecting Kenya- Somalia relations and they include the following;

##### **4.1.1 Border Dispute**

The border between Kenya and Somali has long been contested. When Somalia gained independence, the issue of the status of other Somali-inhabited regions arose. When Kenya was on the verge of independence, the majority of Kenyan Somalis desired to join Somalia, but the Regional Boundaries Commission proposed that the predominantly Somali-populated districts remain in Kenya and form a separate North Eastern Province. Kenyan Somalis were unable to breakaway from Kenya and hence initiated a revolt with Somalia's help. This is known as the Shifta war of 1963-1967. According to the official story, it was a conflict between deceitful Shifta (bandits) supported by Somalia.

To deal with the consequences of the post-independence uprising, the Kenyan government established emergency regulations that were not abolished until 1991. As a result of these events, the government mostly overlooked and the North Eastern Province, which was scarcely populous and had no proved resource potential, resulting in the creation of a porous border between Kenya and Somalia.<sup>51</sup>

Unlike other regional powers such as Ethiopia and Uganda, Kenya's concern for Somalia's stability has not led it to affiliate itself with any group in Somalia, with the country continually refusing to take sides in the conflict between Ethiopia and supporters of the Transitional Federal Government.

*"I have been caught several times in explosions and gun battles and I worry that one day I will run out of luck. I stay off the streets as best as I can by keeping myself locked in the house, though this is merely surviving and no progress .it's really bad. Kenya see refugees as security threat. They link us to Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group. But there is no proof from Kenya connecting Daadab to terrorism. I am 33years old now, I came to Daadab when I was only 2.Daadab is my home. Somalia in my mind is a troubled and fragile place to be but it is my home country" Aden, student in Nairobi*

#### **4.1.2 The Presence of Somalia as a Weak State**

A wide concept of security, according to constructivists, informs us little about who to defend, what basic values to maintain, where challenges to those values may originate from, and how to preserve or advance those values. They argue that the answers to these questions differ depending on the circumstances and emerge through social interaction amongst actors. As a result, in order to provide security, the answers to these concerns are defined and negotiated in a specific social and historical context through social interaction. As a result, it is critical to examine Somalia's position as a failed state and through social connections.

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<sup>51</sup>Nafziger E., Stewart, F and vayrynen, R. (eds) (2000). Weak states and vulnerable Economies: Humanitarian Emergencies in developing countries: Oxford University Press, Oxford



Security issues in Somalia were exacerbated by the presence of warring clans, which made matters worse because weaponry supplied to Siad Barre's government by the Soviets and Americans during the cold war ended up in the hands of the clans<sup>52</sup>. The kingdom frequently deteriorated into a jumble of armed clan fiefdoms with no centralized government. In the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes asserts that if no power is erected or is not great enough for our security, every man will and may validly make decisions based on power and cautiousness against all other men, and they endeavor as much as they can to suppress or undermine their neighbors by open force and secret acts.<sup>53</sup>”

The United States enraged Somali clan militias by using humanitarian missions to impose forceful peace enforcement. This culminated in the historic "Black Hawk Down" clash in October 1993, in which eighteen US army rangers and hundreds of Somalis were killed. This debacle resulted in a hasty American retreat, increased anti-Americanism, and enhanced al-contacts Qaeda's in East Africa, with Osama bin Laden's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri portraying the United States as a "paper tiger" with no lasting power.

The final UN Peace Keeping mission left Somalia in early 1995. Somalia was labeled a failed state from that point forward, and the international community assumed it was a place of anarchy and perpetual criminal strife. This was due to the absence of a recognized central government. Because of terrorist threats from extreme Islamist groups, the international community has recently rekindled its attention in Somalia. Al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations have used it as a safe place to recruit and organize terrorist attacks. Since the ouster of Dictator Siad Barre in 1991, fourteen governments in exile have been constituted to govern. Somalia has long been seen as a possible source of Islamic terrorism. This danger stems from the fact that Al-Qaeda has evacuated their hideouts in Central Asia and the

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<sup>52</sup> Mubarak, J., (1997). "The Hidden Hand Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy in Somalia." World Development. 25.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

Middle East, and there are fears that they would reconstitute their operational base in weak regimes in the Gulf or Sub-Saharan Africa. Other causes include the presence of a homogeneous Sunni Muslim population, the absence of state enforcement mechanisms, the rise of militant Islamism throughout time, and proximity to the Persian Gulf. Islamic extremists from Somalia, have been engaged in the growth of terrorism across the region. For example, the perpetrators of a grenade attack on Israeli tourists in Mombasa, Kenya, in December 2002, were of Somali ancestry. Some Somalis are believed to have traveled to Lebanon in exchange for combat training to join Hezbollah in its struggle against Israeli soldiers during the 2006 "summer war."

Kenya's North Eastern Province has been susceptible to events in Somalia across the border. Refugees have established themselves along the border as well as in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major cities. The Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps have been a source of persistent tensions with the local communities, occasionally resulting to armed conflicts. For example, the Somali-inhabited neighborhood of Eastleigh in Nairobi, which was formerly an Asian neighborhood of the city, is now home to nearly 100,000<sup>54</sup> ethnic Somalis and has emerged as a refuge for illegal operations like as gun smuggling and money laundering.

According (UNHCR), Kenya is home to about 500,000 Somali refugees, with Dadaab refugee center being the largest settlement. The government has been concerned about the increase of the native ethnic Somali community, which has reached over 2.4 million people according to the 2009 census. This has resulted in rising anti-Somali sentiments. It has been difficult to distinguish between Al-Shabaab members and legitimate refugees entering the country. Al-Shabaab members have been allegedly been entering Kenya in the pretence of being refugees. They then use the refugee camps to recruit, plan and launch attacks on

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<sup>54</sup> UNHCR country operations profile-Kenya," UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at <http://www.unhcr.org> (<http://blogs.lsc.ac.ke/africastsc/>), 24 November 2011



Kenyan towns. Therefore, it has been difficult for Kenyan security officials to screen the refugees entering the country<sup>55</sup>.

Even though the Kenyan government would want to have the refugees return back to Somali, it is important to note that Kenya is a signatory of the UN refugee convention which bars forced return of refugees. Nevertheless, Kenya still views Somalia a national security threat which it is socially constructed from the above mentioned threats it poses.

*“Somalia is a weak state, with very weak institutions, both in economic and political. Somalia needs an ‘extreme make over’ in terms of leadership, sound economic policies, revamped security to drive away Al-shabaab. To rehabilitate its nationals ,and only then will it earn respect from its neighbouring states. Kenyan Political leader when asked about the relationship between Kenya and Somali.”*

#### **4.2 The Maritime Dispute**

The maritime boundary dispute is reflected in the growing diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The Kenyan government dismissed Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya, Mohamud Ahmned Nur, and recalled Kenya’s ambassador to Somalia, Lucas Tumbo, on February 17, 2019. Furthermore, the Kenyan government took a number of steps last year including suspending flights and closing the border with Somalia.

Despite both nations’ continuous efforts to find diplomatic solutions, notably in the matter of their maritime territorial dispute, it appears that there will be no prospective rapprochement between Nairobi and Mogadishu anytime soon. The income from possible hydrocarbon resources in the contested territory is too good to pass up for both governments. It should not, however, prevent both governments from strengthening their security collaboration, notably against Al-Shabaab, which remains a substantial threat to both nations. It is in both states’

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid

interests to keep the terrorist group in restraint. Al-Shabaab continues to represent a substantial threat to Somalia's domestic security and calls into question the federal government's efficacy, which is already under strain owing to frosty relations with its member states. It is also in Kenya's best interests to preserve Somalia's political stability, which, if unchecked, might endanger and impact its inhabitants.

Kenya and Somalia both claim territorial authority over the same marine zone in the Indian Ocean beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from the continental shelf. The former claim to the coastal area is based on the parallel of latitude or straight-line boundary delimitation theory, which results in an eastward-running border south of Kiunga. The latter, on the other hand, asserts the land based on the equidistance concept, which results in a border going south-eastward. Kenya claimed the now-disputed territory, which neither state had demarcated or designated prior to 1979, via presidential proclamations in 1979 and 2005; Somalia did not object. Somalia's position on Kenya's proclamations appeared to alter in 2014, when Somalia sought the assistance of the World Court (the International Court of Justice, ICJ) to decide which of the two states owned the land. The jury is yet out on the demarcation of the area of overlapping claims, but worries about the Court's ruling and how it may effect Kenya-Somalia relations, as well as the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa region, abound<sup>56</sup>.

What began as a dispute over the position of the sea border has evolved into a functional issue as well (the now-disputed territory is reported to contain high-value hydrocarbons such as oil and gas), endangering both states' national security. The dynamics of the situation have evolved in various areas, including regional power, national elections, petroleum laws, Somali refugees, and national security (al Shabab). Kenya, which had signed a Defense Pact with Ethiopia in the 1950s, has served as a regional peacemaker since the 1970s. Abiy

<sup>56</sup> Najad A Toxic waste" behind Somali piracy, Al Jazeera, 11 October 2008, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html> (accessed 21 September 2009).



Ahmed Ali, Ethiopia's new Prime Minister, was elected in April 2018. Ethiopia has formed new alliances with Eritrea and Somalia since then, altering the current Kenya-Ethiopia relationship. Ethiopia is emerging as a regional peacemaker, offering to arbitrate the Kenya-Sudan conflict in July 2019. Kenya, which had signed a Defense Pact with Ethiopia in the 1950s, has served as a regional peacemaker since the 1970s. Abiy Ahmed Ali, Ethiopia's new Prime Minister, was elected in April 2018. Ethiopia has formed new alliances with Eritrea and Somalia since then, altering the current Kenya-Ethiopia relationship. Ethiopia is emerging as a regional peacemaker, offering to arbitrate the Kenya-Sudan conflict in July 2019.

Disputes over the territorial waters had not played a key role in previous national elections. Currently, elections are taking place in Somalia's regional states ahead of a presidential election in 2020. One of the regional candidates is believed to be connected with Kenya, causing disunity among pro- and anti-local Somali voters. It is unclear yet if the two al Shabab attacks in Mogadishu (July 23, 17 dead, 28 injured) and Kismayo (July 13, 28 dead) in July 2019 were driven primarily by the elections or by other influences, but there is little assumption that the Kenya-Somalia conflict has become an element on President Farmajo's re-election agenda.<sup>57</sup>

*"President Kenyatta said the verdict was "zero-sum" and Kenya will neither accept nor recognise it. The Kenyan leader said he will not, in the aftermath of the courts' decision "intend to abrogate my solemn oath; and, I will do everything possible as President and Commander-in-Chief, to preserve the territory of this our great Republic and bequeath the same, intact and unencumbered."The decision, he argued, embodies "a perpetuation of the ICJ's jurisdictional overreach and raises a fundamental question on the respect of the sovereignty and consent of States" to international judicial processes. "In fact, Kenya doubts that any State would have appeared at all in a case such as this."The President of the Republic of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta"*

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<sup>57</sup> Brown, Michael E. (1996). *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Centre for Science and International Affairs, John F. Canady School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

*"This ruling comes at a bad time, already the relations between Kenya and Somalia is not good. Recently, you both states recalled its ambassadors. Before that, Kenya cancelled its commercial flights to Mogadishu. Kenya feels its efforts towards Somalia are undermined and unappreciated. Kenya has hosted several of Somalia delegations for peace and reconciliation. It is home to one of the largest refugee camps hosting Somali refugees. Eastleigh is home to Somali nationals. All this is for peaceful existence. As a sovereign state, we will protect our borders just like our forefathers did. We cannot accept the verdict as it was not a fair ruling" Leila S, staff at Ministry of foreign affairs.*

#### **4.3 The Food Security Crisis in Somalia**

COVID-19, desert locust infestation, and 2019-2020 floods are all wreaking havoc on Somalia. The majority of Somalia. Somaliland's rely on remittances from relatives in other nations. The country has had the misfortune of experiencing a series of crises one after the other<sup>58</sup>.

At least 34 districts in Somalia are experiencing severe water shortages, with some areas reporting pre-drought conditions. Between October 2020 and March 2021, about 116,000 Somalis were relocated owing to water shortages caused by floods and a locust infestation. Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Juba are among the areas hardest hit by the drought this year. These communities are worried that the devastating drought that killed a quarter of a million people in 2017 could happen again<sup>59</sup>. Somalia was already facing a fragile food security situation due to previous drought and famine.

#### **4.4 Alliances in the Horn of Africa**

Due to economic and coastal issues, Kenya-Somalia ties have been strained for some time. The dilemma is being exacerbated by new regional collaborations. The violence is engulfing countries in the Horn of Africa, threatening to destabilize an already fragile region. Despite

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<sup>58</sup> UNDP. 1996. Human Development Report 1996. New York: Oxford Printing Press.

<sup>59</sup> Albert, O (2001) Introduction to Third Party Intervention in Community Conflicts (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers.



its involvement in the latest crisis, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) may not be able to fix the matter on its own<sup>60</sup>.

The African Union (AU) and the intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD) must take significant combined action on this matter with the support of foreign allies to work together towards realizing that peace reigns in the HoA. peace among the wrangling territories. To avoid a future catastrophe in the Horn of Africa, the African Union should increase its engagement and implement concrete initiatives in the region. A fact-finding team led by Djibouti was allowed by the IGAD conference that month to investigate Somalia's allegations. There was little evidence to back up Somalia's claims, according to the probe. Somalia rejected the findings of the expedition, claiming that Kenya had convinced Djibouti and hence the results were skewed. This accusation sparked a new diplomatic row between Somalia and Djibouti. The former has also threatened to leave the (IGAD) if the verdict is not reconsidered.<sup>61</sup>.

Since 2014, Somalia and Kenya have had a long-running contested coastal conflict. Their relationship has disintegrated even more in recent years, owing to disagreements over the situation of Jubbaland where President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) of Somalia wants to consolidate power.

The region's alliances have been changed over the last three years, worsening the disputes. Ethiopia's rising support for Somalia's central government and Eritrea's resumption of cooperation with Somalia after more than a decade apart have improved Somalia's central

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<sup>60</sup> Chege, M. 1987. "Conflict in the Horn of Africa" in E. Hansen ed. Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development. London: Zed Books.  
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Lessons learnt from the Sudan and Somalia Peace Processes, Brief Report of the Mombasa workshop on July 9- 11. (2007a)

<sup>61</sup> Adibe, C. 1995. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia New York: United Nations.

authority. The three countries work together and reach agreements on a variety of political, social, and economic concerns.

Kenya's ally Madobe was re-elected, but the election was nullified by the federal government due to irregularities. Ethiopian and Kenyan troops backed up Jubaland forces. Kenya's battle with Somalia over Jubaland was intensified by these acts, which also put Ethiopia and Kenya at odds over Somalia."

The situation has an impact on Somalia's continuing electoral process as well. According to the country's Foreign Ministry, Kenya's alleged meddling in its domestic affairs forced Jubaland to pull out of the September 2020 election pact. However, Mogadishu is also at strife with Puntland, another autonomous federal state, over voting procedures. The independent federal state of Jubaland has withdrawn from the September 2020 election deal. Mogadishu and Puntland are also at disagreement over voting procedures for upcoming elections. Both countries have cut ties diplomatic ally earlier this year."

Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti's strained relations are undermining collaboration in the Horn and within IGAD. By pushing neighboring states against each other, the situation has the potential to fracture the area. Due to an intergovernmental agreement, Somalia has active allies in the region. Eritrea is apparently training roughly 3,000 Somali forces, while neither government has confirmed this, nor does Ethiopia have different interests in Somalia than Kenya".

"Ibid.

"Mollet, Bjorn. (2007). The Somali Conflict: the Role of External Actors. Danish Institute for International Studies, 3

"Olsuu, T. I. J. G. "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in a Southern African Context" I. M. J. J. J. (ed.) Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Harare: SAPES.



IGAD is now handling the matter after obtaining the report of the fact-finding mission. The Ethiopia-Sudan border war and deteriorating relations between the two countries have further restricted the IGAD Secretariat's emphasis. More stronger action by the AU in the region is required, beginning with the integration of multiple crisis response structures with IGAD. A strong AU-IGAD relationship could help to stabilize the area at a time when it is required more than ever.

#### 4.5 Political Factors

The Somalia crisis, as well as changes in Kenya's political framework led to restructuring of the north-eastern regions' economic and political institutions. A number of violent incidents occurred as a result of political competitiveness spurred by the reintroduction of multi-party systems, "unrest between local residents and refugees over environmental degradation, jobs, and access to services." New trade routes between Kenya and Somalia were also established at the same time. Over the recent decade, the government has become deeply concerned about this region. In 2009, the LAPSSET (Lamu Port-South Sudan Ethiopia Transport) project was planned to link northern Kenya with central Kenya.<sup>65</sup>

From the 1990s onwards, the Somali population's situation in towns outside of the north-eastern region changed as well. In 2010, the country had about 10,000 Somalis, with roughly 2,000 of them being refugees. Kenyan Somalis have become more prominent (albeit still minor) in political administration. As a result of Somalis' prominent participation in the economic and political sectors, anti-Somali sentiment has grown stronger. Their presence had an impact on urban trade, which grew in the 1990s from Somali traders and their shopping malls<sup>66</sup>. These concerns are held not only by Christians, but also by Muslims, whose

<sup>65</sup> Abdi, Shamsa Birik. "Accidental Citizens: Etherealizing Securitized Identities of Somalis in Kenya; Contesting Representation, Identity and Belonging." Master-Thesis, Lund University, 2016.

<sup>66</sup> Abraham, Korir Sing'Oei. Kenya at 50: Unrealized Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Report published by the Minority Rights Group International, 2012.

communities have seen a shift in power relations as a result of Somalis migrating to cities. Some claim that Somalis in Kenya are doing better economically and politically than other Muslims.

#### **4.5.1 Elections 2013: The heightened importance of Somalis in Kenyan politics**

Elections are an important part of Kenya's "politics of belonging." The implementation of new county-level elections in 2013 coincided with the presidential elections, stressing this dimension of Kenyan politics. Minority groups were reluctant to embrace devolution, expecting for more control. Decentralization, on the other hand, has resulted in new power struggles.

Additionally, the 47 county governments control approximately 30 percent of national revenue, which is shared among them in part based on population size, intensifying debate over the 2009 census estimates. The election campaigns in Kenya in 2013 shifted "a considerable electoral attention to the north." The elections are causing a lot of enthusiasm across the country. Despite Kenyans' overall low voter registration rates, voter registration rates in the north-eastern region are low.

In 2013, a large number of Kenyan Somalis were elected, with several earning prominent positions in parliament and the cabinet. Despite the fact that Carrier and Kochore do not explain why the registration rate is so low, it appears to be the outcome of a number of variables<sup>67</sup>. Aden Duale, who became the National Assembly's Majority Leader, Amina Mohammed Jibril, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Adan Mohammed, the Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization are three examples. The rise of Somali politicians in Kenya, particularly in areas with a non-Somali majority population, as well as the increase of

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<sup>67</sup> Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Post-election Evaluation Report on the March 4th 2013 General Elections. October 2014.



the Kenyan Somali community, according to the 2009 census, has fuelled fears of the latter "taking over" the country.

#### **4.5.2 Violent Extremism Terrorism and Its Implication on Kenya Somalia relations**

Kenyan security authorities have taken harsh steps against ethnic Somalis living in the country. In October 2011, Kenya launched "Operation Linda Nchi" with the goal of forcing al-Shabaab fighters back into southern Somalia. Over 400 people were killed as a result of these attacks. The assailants repeatedly targeted non-Muslims, claiming to be in response to non-Muslim encroachment of Muslim land.

The administration was unable to appropriately respond to the attacks. There had been warnings that were not taken seriously in the aftermath of the attacks on the Westgate Mall (2013), the coastal village of Mpeketoni near Lamu (2014), and the Garissa University College (2015). Furthermore, when Kenya's security system intervened, it did so incoherently and chaotically. Instead of strengthening cooperation among multiple security agencies, politicians continued to blame terrorism on Somali refugees in particular and Kenyan Somalis in general, despite the fact that the majority of the attackers were neither Kenyan Somalis nor Somali nationals.

Kenya's plan to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex demonstrates the government's commitment to shutting all of the country's refugee camps. Despite a High Court ruling declaring the intended shutdown unconstitutional, events reveal that this is no longer just a political show.

Kenya's government has carried out extrajudicial killings and kidnappings, mainly in the country's north-eastern area. One of the largest, termed *usalama* watch ("security watch"), took place in April 2014, when police stormed urban communities populated by ethnic

Somalis to arrest foreign nationals<sup>68</sup>. Kenya temporarily closed its border with Somalia and began building a wall around it in 2015. Despite the fact that the project is developing slowly, this structure could have an impact on the living conditions of Kenyan Somalis in the north eastern region, where many still rely on pastoralism for a living.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Lonsdale, John. "Soil, Work, Civilisation, and Citizenship in Kenya." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2 (2008): 305–314

<sup>69</sup> Menkhaus, Ken. *Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland*. Danish Demining Group, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589109>.



## Chapter Five

### Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of research findings, conclusions and makes policy recommendations.

#### 5.2 Summary

The study sought to assess the factors affecting inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa a case study of the factors influencing present day relations between Somalia and Kenya. This last chapter of the study provides a summary of the findings of the study, conclusion, and recommendations based on the three specific study objectives, which were; To assess the factors that contributes to the inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa, to examine the socio-political factors influencing the relations between Kenya and Somalia, and to evaluate both political and security factors influencing present day relations between Kenya and Somalia.

#### 5.1 Summary

The first objective established that interstate relations in the Horn of Africa are largely influenced by a number of factors, including but not limited to conflicts and wars, social-economic factors, political and security factors. The objective further revealed that these conflicts are as a result of shared resources, internal disputes and poor governance. In turn, there is mass destruction of property, loss of lives, permanent displacement of people, unemployment and further regional instabilities. The objective further established that the HoA location is of strategic relevance hence attracting interests from outsiders. However, the Region is coming up with both economic and security institutions in line with international regulations that is shaping not only regional relations but even global. The region is

characterized by high levels of poverty and underdevelopment thus its capacity to fight terrorism is compromised.

The second objective of the study found out that Kenya and Somalia have had a share of differences that fall back in time. That despite their border proximity; they have never enjoyed peaceful co-existence. This objective found out that both countries have engaged in trade activities that have contributed to their countries economic growth, this is in the areas of aviation industry and trade of miraa. Furthermore, there is the concern for refugees from Somalia currently inhabiting a camp in Daadab. This is considered one of the largest camps, because of the unfriendly relations, Kenya threatened to close it down until the intervention by UNHCR. In addition, there is a sizeable population of Somalis in Kenya currently inhabiting Eastleigh, and however, they contribute to economic growth. This objective found out that the Kenya —Somalia relations faced a number of challenges and opportunities in terms of trade.

The third objective documented that political and security factors have to a large extent affected the relations between Kenya and Somalia. Although Somalia recently formed a federal government, she has for a long while been regarded a failed state lacking the capacity to protect its boundaries. The objective found that the heavy presence of Al-shaabab terrorist group in Somalia forms a threat to the security of Kenya, hence the decision by Kenya to have its security agency at Kismayo. The recent ICI Judgment on the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia is a major determinant of how and what the relations between Kenya and Somalia will be. The contested area is said to contain four maritime gas and oil blocks and it's equally rich in aquatic fish. The objective found that already the current relations have been hampered by Kenya feeling unappreciated by Somalia, while Somalia feeling bullied by Kenya. These security threats as a result of Alshabaab have resulted to into



deaths and loss of property in both states Kenya feels the need to secure its borders something that makes Somalia feel undermined and claim interference by Kenya into its affairs.

## **5.2 Conclusion/ Findings**

As per the first objective, the study assessed the factors influencing interstate relations in among the states in the region. Historically, it has been regarded as important geo-strategic region of the world. It is adjacent to the Middle East's most volatile region, where oil and the Arab-Israel conflict collide. Because the Red Sea became a crucial point of communication connecting Europe and the East, the Sue-Canal became even more important. Furthermore, the region is an integral part of the Superpower competition's Red Sea/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean Sectors. The Horn of Africa is equally highly diversified and contrast so that the states are characterized by ethnicity, religious, linguistic and cultural groups. However, this diversity has not been in the favor of the states for mutually enhancing inter-relationships. Instead, diversity has led to deep rooted antagonism distrusts and ill will, cultivating fierce nationalistic values, beliefs and attitudes that have not only affected, but in turn, have been largely influenced by both political and ideological differences of the states in the region. There are a number of states, Somalia, for example, is a homogeneous state in desperate need of unity among a people who live in four separate neighboring states. This region in the African continent has become a zone of unending political upheavals, social instability, economic chaos, civil strife, and battleground for multiple horrific wars as a result of these centrifugal factors.<sup>70</sup>

Disputes between the countries occur in many ways, including direct inter-state wars and armed conflicts, as well as intra-state civil wars and conflicts. According to statistics, the

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<sup>70</sup> Tekle, A. (1989). Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa: Problems and Prospects. *Northeast African Studies*, 11(1), 75-108. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43660263>

region has had four major wars and three violent conflicts since independence. In addition, Imperial powers and their desire to impose their hegemony also impacted the region's boundaries. The Ogaden conflict, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1960-91) and the Southern Sudanese war (1956-72; 1983-2005) cannot be described apart from their historical foundations. The postcolonial state could have controlled them without resorting to violence if it had effective internal and regional governance.<sup>71</sup>

As per the second objective, that sought to analyze the socio-economic factors affecting relations between Kenya and Somalia, the study concludes that hosting large Somalia refugee population has created an economic burden on Kenya, the smuggling of contraband goods to Kenya has killed the local industries and the smuggling of small arms and light weapons into the country. The study also concludes that lawlessness anarchy and lack of government structures to contain the warlords had opened avenue for the smuggling of illicit goods and contrabands including SA& LW to push their agenda and continue the mayhem. Looting of property including land control of charcoal, banana trade diversion of foreign aid, and control of fishing and harbour and controlling of port as some of the ways in which the warlords have economically benefited from the failure of the Somali state. On the other hand, the study concludes that the monies raised by the warlords gives them financial muscle to buy and influence the youth in radicalism, jihadism and related crime in Kenya especially due to its geo-location and porous borders. The study also concludes that Kenya and Somali share the Indian Ocean and by virtue of Kenya being a centralized powerhouse, the proceeds from piracy were quickly converted into investments through their Kenyan Somali brothers who blend easily into the country to service a corrupted society that is very financially obsessed.

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<sup>71</sup> A recent four-country study by Mengisteab, Hagg, et al. (2011) shows that an overwhelming majority of survey respondents in rural and peri-urban areas (71.2% in South Africa, 65% in Kenya, 59.2% in Somaliland and 78.7% in Ethiopia) take intra-community conflicts to traditional institutions instead of to formal courts for settlement.



As per the third objective, on the political and security factors affecting present day relations between Somalia and Kenya, the study sought to analyze the recent ruling on the Maritime border dispute and its impact on future diplomatic relations for the two states. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgement that settled the Somalia-Kenya maritime dispute is likely to have far-reaching political, security and social-economic ramifications on foreign and diplomatic relations in the region and beyond. These implications will be affected by internal factors within Kenya and Somalia including regional and extra-regional interests. The decision by the political elite on how to respond to the issue will form part of the internal factors. In Kenya for instance, a number of the political elites have urged the president to dispatch security to the disputed area to secure it while others are calling for dialogue. The same scenario applies to Somalia. Already, there exists strained diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somali, considering how they both recalled their ambassadors in June 2021. It is obvious therefore that this ruling would be a catalyst for further bad relations. Although, neither Kenya nor Somalia have made any threats to recall its ambassador or sever the

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The study presents the following recommendations based on the findings of the study on the assessment of factors influencing interstate relations in the Horn of Africa through the case of Somalia-Kenya relations. As a general rule, significant drivers of Africa's future will be how its leaders tackle the continents' issues and there must be a consensus among African nations regarding the type of security required for growth to take place.

#### **5.3.1 Increased Awareness to Change Negative Attitudes**

Somalia's people must remain unwavering in their support for this new revolution. The importance of rebuilding critical infrastructure must be underlined. Bordering nations must

work together to guarantee that their borders are not utilized for weapons trafficking in compliance with the UN arms embargo against Somalia.

#### **5.3.2 Increased Support in Realization of Stable Region**

Kenya and Somalia should collaborate to defend the region, notably the North Eastern Province, where banditry, arms trafficking, and porous borders serve as entry points for terrorists. Kenya should act rapidly to strengthen its relations with Somalia by providing border security assistance. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta has called for an end to the turmoil in neighbouring Somalia, claiming that a stable Somalia will not only assist to stabilize the Horn of Africa as a whole but will also support Kenya's progress.

#### **5.3.4 Cushioning a Fragile Somalia**

The African Union (AU) should send skilled workers, security troops, and consultants to Somalia to assist in the reconstruction of the country's infrastructure. Somalia's government must devise a systematic strategy to improve peace, security, and stability by involving clans and their leaders rather than just warlords. The government must address the issue of people not being able to unite at all levels of society, including inter and intra clan and sub-clan differences.

#### **5.3.5 International Institutions Security Framework**

The UN, in collaboration with the African Union, should speed up the deployment of peacekeeping soldiers in Somali. In order for the new administration to function effectively, peace and security must be maintained. To avoid the scene of people reverting to clanism and lawlessness, a peaceful environment will be required, which will necessitate the development of a transparent, representative, and interactive political structure. Numerous parties and people in Somalia have received support from governments and other outside actors. The UN, AU, and the rest of the donor community and international community must continue to



provide steadfast assistance to Somalia. Somalia's long-term stability and development requires the emergence of a true government that is accountable to its population.

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