INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

TO ASSESS THE SUCCESSES OF IGAD IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

EVERLYNE NAMISI WAFULA

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SUPERVISOR: DR. ANITA KIAMBA

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree at any other university.

Signature: .... Date: ...07/12/2021...........

EVERLYNE NAMISI WAFULA

R52/35629/2019

This research project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as the candidate's University Supervisor.

Signed.......................... Date.14 th Dec. 2021...........

DR. ANITA KIAMBA

LECTURER,

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family who have greatly supported and encouraged me during the entire period of my study and their continued dedication and prayers towards my successful completion of this course.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	-	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	-	Arab Maghreb Union
AU	-	Africa Union
BCP	-	Basotho Congress party
BNP	-	Basotho National Party
CEWARN	-	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
COMESA	-	Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	-	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	-	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPs	-	Development Partners
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG II	-	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group II
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
GONU	-	Government of National Unity
GOSS	-	Government of South Sudan
ICPAT	-	IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism
ICU	-	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGADD	-	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	-	IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IGO	-	Intergovernmental Organization
JS	-	Jonglei State
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organisations
OAU	-	Organisation of Africa Unity
PDF	-	Protection and Deterrence Force
PSC	-	Peace and Security Council
RIGOS	-	Regional Organisations
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	-	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SDM	-	Somali Democratic Movement
SPLA	-	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SPLM	-	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	-	Somali Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Council
SSDF	-	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSLA	-	South Sudan legislative Assembly
TFC	-	Transitional Federal Council
TFG II	-	Transitional Federal Government II
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	-	Transitional National Government

U.N   -   United Nations
UNITAF   -   Unified Task Fo

ABSTRACT

The civil war experienced in Somalia has lasted over twenty-five years. Since 1991, the ruling government of Said Barre was overthrown by one of the leading militia clans. This resulted to the failure of state institutions due to poor coordination by the militia group on the post Said `Barre era. As a result, Somalia was ruled by several militias from various clans, who divided the country up according to their strength, and at times contested territory with competing militias and warlords.

The dynamics nature in conflict needs to be more understood, for more knowledge on this so that wars can better be dealt with, thus the use of diversified approach for conflict resolution. Conflict management has mostly been done from reactionary perspectives rather than proactive perspective, by getting to understand the primary source and avenging factors to make sure there is the use of actual resolutions than the management.

However, the IGAD's attempts have run into a number of impediments. Overreliance on foreign aid due to member countries' failure to meet their financial contribution obligations. The IGAD member nations will be required to eliminate all difficulties, which will necessitate coordination, long-term partnerships, and dedication on their part in efficient conflict resolution. IGAD should continue to work and support closely with the Somali government to strengthen its activities and institutions to ensure peace resolutions arrived at are implemented and enforced through domestic channels and institutions regardless of change in governance or leaders of the present government

<center>**CHAPTER ONE**</center>

<center>**INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY**</center>

1.1 Background to the Study

Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) can be defined as an organization that is formed by sovereign states or through formal treaties with an intention to undertake a common interest. Or in conceptual terms IGOs can be defined as entities with established organizational structure that possess autonomy to carry out the formal, ongoing and multilateral process of making the decision between and among states in order to execute collective will of member states.[1] The contemporary definition of IGO describes several attributes of IGO which include formal entity, member comprises three or more foreign states; must have permanent secretariat; headquarters and permanent staff. Statistics from the UN indicated that there were close to 6000 organizations categorized as intergovernmental organizations in 2005.[2] Factors such as multilateral treaties, common objectives, and private constitutional structure are the basis on which intergovernmental organizations are based. The U.N remains the sole organization with a global outlook, but other intergovernmental organizations have limited goals depending on the number of their members and the domains they operate in.[3]

The mechanisms used by Regional Organizations (RIGOS) organization comprises the RIGOS facilitation forum which states can use in communicating to one another directly and also, to reduce level of misperceptions among members. Last but not least, RIGOS disseminate necessary

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[1] Ani, Ndubuisi Christian, and Adeoye O. Akinola. "Rethinking African Union's capacity for regional conflict management." Journal of African Union Studies 4, no. 1 (2015): 47.

[2] Boutellis, A. and Williams, P.D., 2013. Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward more effective partnerships (pp. 1-21). New York: International Peace Institute.

[3] Kenneth Chukwuemeka. "Regional Peace and Security: Can ECOWAS and IGAD Contain Mutating and Emerging Threats?." AIPGG Journal of Humanities and Peace Studies 2, no. 1 (2021).pp 23

<center>1</center>

information among member states. RIGOS are also familiar with local conditions, actors, and cultures. RIGOS also benefit from lower cost and able to respond faster.

In order to strengthen Africa's voice globally however, the ability of regional RIGOS to reach a common approach to the issue of concern to Africa and the globe, there is need to such issue as reforming the UN Security Council to be factored in. Although, such idea sound utopian the African Union (AU) on another hand, must play this role the organizations find unable due to internal conflict within AU. [4]

In an article by Edozie referred the OAU as the "Dictators Club" referring to the presence of dictator heads of states who had resisted to hand over power in their home countries.[5] The principle of non-interference or non-intervention in member states' internal domestic problem has proved futile and contributed neighbouring governments to ignore human right violation committed by neighbouring government. Even when some of the countries that are members of the organization committed atrocities against their own people the OAU bloated bureaucratic paths and did not intervene. This inability for OAU to act on such weighty matters is that member states were driven by self-interest and invoked non-interference clause as each member state sovereign.

The idea to establish IGAD was proposed by the UN after realizing that there was need to a regional organisation in order to deal with the problem of famine and drought which devastated the Horn of Africa in the period of 1984 and 1995. IGADD was established in 1986 with the following as member states: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Uganda. The main

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[4] Ancas, Sarah. "The effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa-problematizing the United Nations-African Union-Southern African development community relationship." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 11, no. 1 (2011):152.

[5] Edozie, Rita Kiki. "The sixth zone: The African diaspora and the African Union's global era pan Africanism." Journal of African American Studies 16, no. 2 (2012): 268.

functions of the organization were to coordinate and oversee conservation of the environment, enhance food security, and natural resource management.[6] On April 1995 a proposal intending to expound IGADD's mandate was discussed during the extraordinary summit of heads of state held in Addis Ababa where a ministerial committee to spearhead amendments to be made to the charter of IGADD and to make the necessary amendments to the charter creating the organization in order to enhance cooperation in areas of food security, agriculture and environmental protection was formed. This committee was tasked with developing proposals in an attempt to increase the capacity of the member states in order to address the deterrence, handling and dealing of conflicts both inter and intra-state conflicts amicably. The amendments to its mandate were endorsed at a summit meeting held in Nairobi in March, 1996 therefore giving birth to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD lacks special organ to enable it to facilitate the process of peace and security[7]

Somalia has experienced political and socio-economic crisis since the collapse government in Somalia in 1991. This resulted in a intra conflict carried out by different rival groups with help from outside actors. Nevertheless, the civil war in Somalia attracted interventions from both the region and the globe aimed at bringing stability in the war-torn country. Regional actors such as IGAD have played a significant role in maintaining peace in the region and in particular Somalia. It can be argued that IGAD has played a significant role in mediating various rival clans in order

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[6] Idris, A.A., 2019. The Role of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development) in Facilitating Civil War Peace Settlements in the Horn of Africa. Pp 67

[7] Levitt, Jeremy I. "Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):(Nairobi, Kenya, March 21, 1996, entered into force November 25, 1996)." In Africa: Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conflict and Security, Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues, pp. 145. Brill Nijhoff, 2003.

to end the crisis. However, the organization's conflict resolution mechanism experienced weakness in implementing and consolidating efforts to resolve conflict.

According to the Capacity Building Workshop report of IGAD, there are numerous constrains limiting the organization in its initiatives for development in the sub-region. Challenges such as Social political factors that is as a result of influx illegal firearms that heightened lawlessness in both rural areas as well as urban centres of the region. The widespread intra-communal conflicts, for example, cattle rustling, natural based resource conflicts over water, pasture, and land. Moreover, the existence of inter-state tensions among member states of the sub-region (Ethiopia and Eretria, Uganda and Sudan) and also governance issues which led to the collapse of states such as Somalia.[8]

Economically, there is poor performance of economies in the region. Basically, this is attributed to the fact that there is stagnant economic growth, poor investments leading to less development. Economies of this region are producers of primary products that are continuously resulting in poor returns in the international market. Possibly, the sub- region also experiences a decline in foreign investment.[9] IGAD member states are in the periphery with high levels of poverty with majority of them ranked among the poorest nations in the world. The sub-region is currently faced with environmental degradation issues. This is mainly causing scarcity of natural resources; this alluded to the fact that there have been long droughts resulting in famines in states such as Somalia and Kenya. The insufficient seasonal rainfall poses many challenges such as poor agricultural

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[8] Kulang, Timothy T. "The Power of Readiness Theory and the Success of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process in South Sudan." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 6, no. 11 (2019).
[9] Asgedom, Messay. "The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partnership in Peace and Security: Achievements and Challenges." Journal of Citizenship and Morality 2, no. 1 (2019): 80.

production, and shortage of enough water and pasture for livestock which triggers intra- state conflicts among pastoral communities in search of pasture and water.[10]

Lack of infrastructure and telecommunication networks undermine sharing of resources and intra-regional trade. After the transformation of IGADD to IGAD, the biggest challenge was to address the long-standing inter and intra-state conflicts in the region. IGAD has been involved in several initiatives to address many conflict issues among them the Somali crisis. After the coup d'état that removed Siad Barre from office in Somalia in 1991 President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti tried to mediate in the Somalia conflict. Therefore, a second conference was convened by the government of Djibouti in July 1991 where the fighting groups within Somalia agreed to a ceasefire and to the formation of a transitional government.[11]

In a summit of IGAD held in 1998 the member states further supported Ethiopia's new proposal which with the basis of regional autonomy as foundation of reconciling warring groups. IGAD also prepared strategic paper named "New Approaches to the Somalia Reconciliation process." This facilitated both Ethiopia and IGAD to hold First and Second International Consultative Conferences for Somalia towards the end of 1998. Somali faction leaders and Global leaders attended these meetings and these conferences facilitated the creation of a Somali standing committee as well as a Fact Finding Mission for Somalia.[12]

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[10] Ingris, Mohamed H., and Markus v Hoehne. "The impact of civil war and states collapse on the roles of Somali women: a blessing in disguise." Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, no. 2 (2013):314. Al

[11] Mechuol, James CD. "A Critical Analysis of the Igad Mediation in South Sudan and the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (Arciss)." PhD diss., university of Nairobi, 2018.

[12] Mutembei, M.A., 2013. The Role of regional organization in addressing climate change as an emerging security threat in Africa: A Case Study Of IGAD Pp 45 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

On January 9, 2004, a retreat by leaders of Somali factions as well as IGAD representatives was held in Safari Park Nairobi that lasted until 29 January 2004. After a period of negating and lobbying, a consensus was reached, and a deal signed thereof. This agreement reached contained the charter establishing a new government, IGAD in 2004.[13] IGAD Secretariat Annual Report 2004 composition of the legislature, and the term of the transition authority. The signing of the declaration would have set final stages for subsequent conferences and bring to an end the process. However, confusion over the declaration emerged due to some Somali leaders again rising to restructure the declaration. Therefore, IGAD in an attempt to save the peace process and stabilize Somalia threatened the factions of Somali leaders who pulled out of the peace process with sanctions.

Despite the Somali leaders protesting, IGAD council of ministers reinforced the mandate given to IGAD. Towards the conclusion stage of the peace process, IGAD facilitation committee proposed 4.5 formula based on clan factor and appealed to Somali leaders to agree. Therefore, with the adoption of 4.5 formula, Somali Transitional parliament was established leading to the election of members of parliament and president.[14] IGAD continues to play a pivotal role in enhancing regional. Specifically for the Sudan conflict, there were traded alliances between the SPLA and Ethiopia and Uganda; and between the north and its Muslim allies such as Libya.[15]

These alliances were the drive behind the militarization of the conflict. The alliances were also seen with respect to the flow of displaced and fleeing refugees from the hot zones. The alliances

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[13] Onditi, Francis, Gilad Ben-Nun, Edmond M. Were, and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera. "Partnership in Peace Support Operations." In Reimagining Security Communities, pp. 291. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.
[14] Samatar, Ahmed I., and Abdi Ismail Samatar. "Somali reconciliation: Editorial note." Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 3 (2003):15
[15] Nanwani, S., 2014. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in International Financial Organizations: Experiences and Collaborations in Broadening the Informal Process. Global Policy, 5(3), pp.381-.

severed the categorization and polarization both within the borders of Somalia and without. Neighbouring states became parties to the internal conflict. This was reflected in the selection of an appropriate neutral state, later by the IGAD to lead and host in the mediations with a view of conflict management.

1.2 Problem statement

The civil war experienced in Somalia has lasted over twenty-five years. Since 1991, the ruling government of Said Barre was overthrown by one of the leading militia clans. This resulted to the failure of state institutions due to poor coordination by the militia group on the post Said Barre era. As a result, Somalia was ruled by several militias from various clans, who divided the country up according to their strength, and at times contested territory with competing militias and warlords. However, as a result of the erroneous strategy taken by the external powers in Somalia, a US-led coalition and a trusteeship mandated by the UN-mission dubbed UNOSOM II were mandated by the UN. Despite the numerous successes that IGAD have achieved in enhancing peace and security through conflict management strategies such as operationalizing the Conflict Early Warning System.[16]

This study therefore seeks to explore the effectiveness of the measures put in place to address the prolonged conflict in the Horn Africa. The study further seeks to explore various reasons hampered international mediation initiatives, including conflicting interests from external parties in resolving

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[16] Hettne, Björn, and Fredrik Söderbaum. "A regional approach to conflict prevention and management." In Paper delivered at conference of Comparing different approaches to conflict prevention and management. Stockholm December, pp. 18. 2005

internal conflicts in Somalia Finally, the study will explore possible policy measures that will

enhance the effectiveness of IGAD in conflict management.[17]

1.3 Research questions

  i. What are the mediation strategies of conflict management by regional organization in

      Africa?

  ii. Why is there recurrence of conflict in Africa, a case study of Somalia and IGAD's peace

      strategies?

  iii. What is the effectiveness and challenges affecting IGAD in the Horn of Africa, Somalia?

1.4   General objective

The main objective General objective is to investigate the effectiveness of IGAD in conflict

management in the Horn of Africa

1.4.1 Specific objectives

  i. To explore the peace strategies of conflict management in Africa

  ii. To examine the recurrence of conflict in Somalia and IGAD's peace strategies

  iii. To analyze the effectiveness and challenges of IGAD in conflict resolution in Horn of

      Africa; Somalia

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[17] Diehl, Paul F., Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel. "United Nations intervention and recurring conflict."
International Organization 50, no. 4 (1996): 683.

1.5 Literature review

This section analyzes the literature on IGAD's success in resolving conflict in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on Somalia. This research, in particular, enumerates theoretical framework on which it is based before offering empirical literature from a variety of experts in order to construct a clear appraisal of IGAD's accomplishments in its mission to resolve conflict in the Africa. Section 1.5.1 summarizes results of previous studies on the success of IGAD peace strategies in conflict management, while section 1.5.2 delves on the recurrence of conflict in Somalia affected the onset of the Somalia civil war, and finally section 1.5.3 will explore the effectiveness and Challenges of IGAD .

1.5.1 Peace strategies of conflict management

According to Zartman, the success or failure of mediation attempts is determined by the ripe periods in the process.[18] The optimum time to resolve a problem through mediation is called the ripe moment. It is at this point when belligerents see nonviolent conflict as the most suitable and self-preserving means of achieving their goals.

Ripe moments occur when conflicting parties recognize that continuing the violence will harm them rather than promote their cause, and they recognize the importance of the rewards that will accrue from deciding to participate in the negotiations. The parties to the disagreement are well aware of the advantages of agreeing to negotiate. Mediators can influence events so that competing parties perceive mediation as the greatest option for attaining their objectives. They can either

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[18] Zartman, I. William. "Mediation: Ripeness and its Challenges in the Middle East." International Negotiation 20, no. 3 (2015): 479-493.

create an environment in which violence is extremely harmful to the parties involved, or they can establish incentives that make mediation the best option for achieving their objectives.

Giroux et al explains the regionalized aspect of the Somali conflict, alongside others pointing out the need for regionalized mediation. With respect to this, this literature mentions the role of the AU mediation in the Abuja I and II Conferences and its failure to broker a peace agreement. However, there is little mentioning of either the IGADD or the IGAD regarding the Somali conflict. This notwithstanding, the literature underlines the regionalization the conflict. Regionalization exacerbated the conflict within the Horn Africa and spread impact within the region. Maundi highlights the impact if refugees as a socioeconomic burden to host states, as well as cross-border destabilization of peace and security.[19]

Whereas Giroux et al underline the need to change the mediation and conflict management approaches in Africa to long-term.[20] Midozi goes further to discuss what this change involves. Midodzi discusses the IGAD process as resonating with a new perspective of establishing external actors' reluctance and inability to resolve rather than just the regional impact of African conflicts. This approach reflects the benefits accrued by a mediation process that adequately understands a conflict in all its possible dimensions prior to entry attempts. Maundi also makes a comparative observation of the process with respect to mediation entry. The literature suggests that the entry into a mediation process greatly affects the effectiveness.

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[19] Midodzi, P.F., 2013. Assessing the effectiveness of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism in the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta Region of Ghana (pp 81) (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Coast).
[20] Giroux, Henry A., and Christopher G. Robbins. Giroux reader. (pp 56) Routledge, 2015.

Entry is defined as the process by which a mediator achieves acceptability to be involved as an intermediary in negations. Mediation entry is a voluntary process that is either by proposition or by invitation. There were nine attempts to resolve the conflict between 1983 and 1993. Key entry effectiveness factor for the IGAD were neutrality and acceptability by conflicting parties. This sets a strong basis for the identification of other success factors for the IGAD as compared to the previous entries. Midodozi also underlines the importance of regional organization's getting involved in conflict resolution. Indeed, the inauguration of the IGAD was with an enhanced emphasis on regional settlement of conflict as a means to achieving sustainable development. This study set to explore other unique success within the mediation process and post-mediation involvement of the IGAD.

There are many other factors that are important for any mediation process to be effective. Regional organizations can be effective in mediating a conflict and this effectiveness may be assessed. These organizations are best positioned to deliver African solutions to African problems by pursuing pan-African and self-reliance mind-sets. Citing the achievements Nathan indicates that the organizations have been involved in preventive diplomacy, peace operations, mediations, post-conflict reconstruction disarmament and arms embargos. Hence, their importance is not only acknowledged by the UN but also by the member states. The UN specifically entrenches another perspective of viewing their importance as providers of security governance.[21]

It is thus vital to assess their effectiveness in any engagement and provide feedback for reference in the future. Although there are epistemological problems in gauging effectiveness, the term is

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[21] Hassan, Hamdy A. "Ethnicity, Insecurity and Geostrategic Transformation in the Horn of Africa." In Risks, Identity and Conflict, pp. 83. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2021.

defined in various ways such as ending and preventing hostilities, brokering efficacious peace and security protocols and mechanisms and long-term prevention of crises.[22] Effectiveness may also be measured with respect to the aims and objectives of the organization or as a reflection of the situation. Against this benchmark, the study evaluated whether the IGAD was successful and what factors made it succeed in comparison to other previous entries into the Sudan conflict.

Franke observes that both regional and sub regional organizations may provide a faster and less costly response to conflicts due to their geographical proximity in comparison to global bodies such as the United Nations. These findings are further reinforced by Moore who posits that regional organizations are both effective and efficient in mediating conflict due to shared common interest making their interventions timelier.

Wehr and Ledrach hold a similar opinion that mediators who are closer to both conflicting parties are in a much better position to build trust and consensus which is crucial in attainment of more binding agreements.[23] Alexander, argues that "the interlocking nature of African conflicts has led to the view that political communities are locked in a regional security complex, hence response and interventions in domestic wars require a regional approach to the containment, management and resolution of these conflicts."[24]

Garmet observed that there were better chances between conflicting parties were more warmed up and inclined to manage their disputes at the regional level rather than the international level. Bergnas on the other hand observed that some nation states normally shy away or resist in totality

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[22] Boutellis, A. and Williams, P.D., 2013. Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward more effective partnerships (pp. 21). New York: International Peace Institute.
[23] Fisher, Simon, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, Vesna Matovic, Jawed Ludin, Bridget Ann Walker, Dylan Mathews, Richard Smith, Sue Williams, and Steve Williams. Working with Conflict 2: Skills and Strategies for Action. Zed books, 2000.pp 16
[24] Väyrynen, Raimo. "Regionalism: old and new." International Studies Review 5, no. 1 (2003): pp 51.

both regional and international assistance in managing conflict rather they opt to invoke the sovereignty clause. He cites the classical case of Sudan's president refusal to permit the replacement of the African Union force with the United Nation troops. In addition to his findings, he observed that peer pressure from regional and sub regional had a higher degree of flexibility compared to international organization such as the UN which is subject to veto powers. Francis noted that a mixture of both flexibility and proximity were a positive catalyst in enhancing the efficiency in tackling conflict by rapidly deploying peace keeping troops, initiating mediation processes keeping in check member states when conflict arise.

1.5.2 Exploring the recurrence of conflict in Somalia

Maundi presents a regional view to the conflict comparing it to others in the Central and Northern regions of Africa within the same period. The Somali conflict was more than just a centralist conflict exclusively aiming at state control. The conflict was both dual in nature, and it also generated a dual approach.

Oloo debates and takes the view that the success of regional and sub regional organization ion conflict management is hinged to the political will and collective interests of member states, which would only be attained by each member state giving up some certain degree of sovereignty in pursuit of a common objective. This will enable member states to act collectively towards ending conflict in their region

Francis in 2006 examined peace and security systems at the regional level in Africa. He made observations that one major bottle neck that hindered the regional organization in managing

conflict was the lack of operational expertise to tackle the complex various nature conflicts. In addition, he highlighted other challenges as regional organization lacked the capability of preventing conflict commencement as well, they have failed to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping capacity.

In as much as each of the regional states have experienced an internal-affair conflict, the 'tormented triangle' reflects conflict dynamics intertwined between state and non-state actors utilizing the regional alliances to acquire and maintain power.[25] In retrospect, any mediation process would require as regionalized an approach as the conflict was.

In the late 1990s, IGAD and the OAU assigned to Ethiopia the role of leading mediation efforts. This, unfortunately, did not accomplish much, as evidenced by the Sodere peace summit conducted in Ethiopia in 1997, which fell short of its intended purpose. This one was foreseeable because Ethiopia lacked neutrality as a conflict mediator since it employed a double standard policy in which it acted as a regional hegemony, a spoiler, and a mediator. Ethiopia was accused of arming and aiding Somaliland insurgent factions.

1.5.3 The effectiveness and Challenges of IGAD

Nathan cites the IGAD led process in Sudan as highly successful amid failures of the organization to resolve other conflicts between member-states. This literature cites exceptional performance with respect to the Sudan and Somali conflicts ended in 2004 and 2005 respectively. It cites the

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[25] Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. "Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." (2009).

organization's institutional framework as being fundamental in sustaining the mediation through the many challenges it faced such as withdrawal of parties, regional fluidity and instability, as well as financial constraints. However, this literature does not in any case compare this fundamental factor with respect to the previous entries.[26]

Apuuli corroborates this by citing the success of the IGAD in both Somali and Sudan, conflicts that had been undertaken ostensibly to test the efficacy of the expanded and revitalized IGAD. [27]The success notwithstanding, this literature indicates that the mediation was ad hoc and there lacked a comprehensive and formal framework by which to tackle conflict issues in the region. It was in the interest of this study to establish why this ad hoc arrangement succeeded in brokering a peace agreement when the previous entries had failed. The study intended to fill in the gap by exploring how the ad hoc was managed and the reasons behind its success in brokering for peace in the conflict.

Clement in 2003 undertook a comparative study between regional organization in West Africa and the Great Lakes[28], he concluded that proximity element had a negative role in conflict management amongst member states as it overlooks neutrality of member states leading to more tensions accelerating the conflict more.

Ghebremelskel postulates that regional actors tend to examine conflicts within their regions in

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[26] Levitt, Jeremy I. "Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):(Nairobi, Kenya, March 21, 1996, entered into force November 25, 1996)." In Africa: Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conflict and Security, Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues, pp. 145-158. Brill Nijhoff, 2003.

[27] Apuuli, K.P., 2020. Uganda and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa (pp. 161-173). Routledge.

[28] Clement E. "Do regional organizations matter? Comparing the conflict management mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region." In Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, pp. 79-108. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.

narrow lenses of self-interest, hence in occasions where there is conflicting national interest amongst the member states, this leads them to putting more emphasize on their political and military gain overshadowing the need to finding a long-term solution for conflict management.[29]

1.6 Hypotheses

This study will seek to examine the following hypothesis.

H1: IGAD peace strategies are effective in conflict management in the Horn of Africa

H0: IGAD peace strategies are not effective in conflict management in the Horn of Africa

1.7 Justification of the Study

1.7.1 Academic Justification
The result of this study will be beneficial to academicians and international studies scholars. It will extremely contribute to the current literature on Diplomacy and International Studies on mediation efforts by intergovernmental organization in Africa and specifically in this case the Horn of Africa. This study will also benefit diplomats in an international organization such as the UN and AU as well as in Governments. This study notifies detailed analysis of the effectiveness of IGAD in terms of its roles and its contributions to stability in Somalia. The study assesses various approaches used by IGAD such as negotiations in managing conflicts and conflict prevention mechanisms.[30]

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[29] Ghebremeskel "ECOWAS and Conflict Management in West Africa: A Study of the Gambian Transition of Power between Presidents Yahya Jammeh and Adama Barrow." PhD diss., Kwara State University (Nigeria), 2021.
[30] Asgedom, Messay. "The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partnership in Peace and Security: Achievements and Challenges." Journal of Citizenship and Morality 2, no. 1 (2019): pp 80.

1.7.2 Policy Justification

This study seeks to inform ways in which IGAD can enhance its various procedures of diplomatic interventions such as negotiation, mediation conflict prevention, and conflict mapping abilities. On

the other hand, the outcome of this study will have an impact on various stakeholders such as to the regional organizations and governments. It will provide the basis for policy formulation and improve existing ones. This will ensure efficiency in policy making. This study will also benefit diplomats and peace mediators because the study will give them a better understanding of necessary strategies in intervening in regional diplomacy. Perhaps, the study will also aid them in providing intervention suggestions making it more targeted and successful.

Last but yet importantly, this study will also be useful to the governments of other states experiencing political instability either internally or externally because it gives better ways to seek interventions. Literally, it can give them preferred suggestions in addressing the conflict, and political instability issues.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Many concepts and theories have been proffered to provide explanations and understanding to the nature of conflicts and the means of conflict management. A conflict refers to a situation where two or more parties have incompatible goals about something.[31] There are many schools of thought explaining the nature of conflict and management or resolution approaches. One such school is the conflict transformation theory. Essentially, this theory seeks to address the wider

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[31] Wobodo, Chinonye Chris, Richard Orianzi, and Bethel Oko-Jaja. "Conflict and crisis management: A theoretical comparison." European Journal of Business and Management 12, no. 2 (2020): 16-22.

and multidimensional social, economic and political sources of conflict with a basic intent of transforming the negative conflict energy into positive change in all concerned areas, the theory has been advanced by John Paul and Johan Galtung.[32]

Theorists in this school of thought ascertain that contemporary conflicts should not be viewed just within the traditional frame of reframing conflicting parties' positions and identifying win-win situations in resolution. Rather, it is imperative to view the contemporary conflict as with structures and relationships that are complex, multidimensional and conflictual associations extending beyond the conflict. As such, the fundamental pillar of such an approach is to change from a protracted and destructive relationship between warring parties towards a 'constructive accommodation' between or amongst them. The goal of this theory is to analyse and understand a conflict from all possible perspectives, to change the inequality and injustice frameworks and structures, rebuild and establish long-term and enduring relationships amongst the parties, and to develop systems, rules and process aimed at ensuring sustainability of peace and cooperation. According to Kurtz, transformation has both structural-behavioral and subjective-attitudinal features. Structurally, the transformation is a joint one with changes in mixture of behaviors and focus to mutual dependence.[33] Subjectively, there are changes in feelings and beliefs with parties tending to mutual acceptance. It assumes that any conflict is caused and fueled by competing social, cultural and economic problems. There is denial of basic needs, security, economic development and governance leading to protraction of a conflict. In addition, this theory emphasizes a dynamic analysis of a conflict with respect to relationships and structure. As

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[32] Lederach, J. P., & Appleby, R. S. (2010). Strategic peacebuilding: An overview. Strategies of peace: Transforming conflict in a violent world, pp 44.

[33] Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey. "Information and ethnic politics in Africa." British Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (2013): 345

such, it posits that contemporary conflicts can broaden, widen or intensify. By broadening, the conflict draws in new issues; by widening, the conflict sucks in new parties and by intensifying, it has more victims. This means that there are newer goals, actors, situations, alliances and relationships as well as structure.

1.9   Research Methodology

The study focuses on the IGAD roles in conflict management in Somalia. In social science research case studies are advantageous in the sense that they provide the researcher with a platform to examine areas of focus in particular phenomena to understand and generalize them. Furthermore, in this research IGAD as an actor of diplomacy in Somalia will be representative of greater Horn of Africa.

1.9.1 Data Collection

The study will be using qualitative data collection. This study will be based on secondary data by reviewing library data, written books, online source materials, articles, reports, magazines and conference papers. The study will approach these materials from diplomat's point of view meaning the study will review available literature from scholars of diplomacy, International Relations, and practitioners.

1.9.2 Scope of the Study

This study focuses on the effectiveness of IGAD in conflict management in the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia. The success and failures IGAD had in a country that deeply experienced

conflicts such as civil war and drought crisis, insurgents and other proxy conflicts of other actors in Somalia.[34] The study will provide an overview of diplomatic interventions of IGAD in Somalia in an effort to stabilize the country. The study will generate on suggestions to improve IGAD's conflict management interventions in Somalia.

1.9.3 Target population

Target population can be defined as the total group of persons from which the study samples might be drawn. These are the target research population that the researcher focused on in getting the primary data. They include embassy officials, Ministry of Health officials due to their exposure and knowledge to the practice of global health diplomacy, university students due to their in-depth knowledge, ministry of foreign affairs officers, in order to capture for the official data.

1.9.4 Sample for study

The sample for study will narrow down to international relations students due to their in-depth insight in this international relations topic, ministry of foreign affairs officers in order to capture for the official data, Ministry of Foreign affairs officers and Ministry of health officials who will provide accurate information in assessing impacts of global health diplomacy in relation with other trading nation states.

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[34] Marnika, Maurice. "The challenge for peacemaking in Africa: Conflict prevention and conflict resolution." Peacekeeping & International Relations 24, no. 4 (1995): 5.

1.9.4 Sampling procedure

Target Group	Category	Number of respondents
Embassy Official * Relations officer Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda. And Eritrea Embassy in Nairobi	Key Informant	7
Academicians and Scholars of political science and international politics. (Includes lecturers, professionals and political analysts)	Key Informants	9
Political Science and International relations Doctorate students (in their final year)	FGD (Split into 2 separate groups of 9 members and 10 members)	19
Total Target Population		**35**

1.9.6 Sampling frame

Simple random sampling was used to the staff from the ministry of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and each member has an equal probability of being chosen and on the other hand simple random sample is meant to be an unbiased representation. Purposive sampling was appropriate towards Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffs and Embassy staffs because it will enable to reach a targeted sample quickly such as the experts officials from the county. Convenience sampling will used towards the Masters' Student undertaking because the subjects will be selected due to convenient accessibility and proximity to the researcher.

1.9.8 Tools for data collection

The researcher gathered Information from a range of sources hence there are a variety of tools and techniques that will be used when gathering primary data. These include questionnaires which will be administered to participants.

1.9.9 Data Collection

This research will rely on both primary source of data and secondary sources of information in gathering and measuring information on targeted variables. Primary data will be derived from structured interview that is typically formal and organized, unstructured interview and administration of structured questionnaire, unstructured questionnaire, open and closed ended questionnaire.[35] This will be conducted on the Ministry of Foreign affairs staffs, selected embassy officials, and masters' students undertaking conflict management. Secondary data will be sourced from a collection and review of books, journals, academic and research paper.

1.10 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations will be observed by the researcher will undertaking the study. The researcher will be obligated to full disclosure so as to ensure that the respondent is given adequate information to enable him or her to give an informed consent and that the privacy of the respondent is protected while the information he gives is treated with utmost confidentiality.[36] The other burdens include the right of the respondent to remain anonymous without disclosing his identity and the researcher being sensitive to human dignity and well-meaning in his or her intentions.

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[35] White, Michael A., Leanne Y. Atwater, And Deborah A. Mohr. A Practical Methodology For Identifying Impediments To Productivity.(Pp 112) Navy Personnel Research And Development Center San Diego Ca, 1981.
[36] Brodin, Jane, and Vaska Stancheva-Popkostadinova. "Ethical considerations in child research in light of the convention on the rights of the child." Journal of Global Change and Governance 2, no. 2 (2009): 16.

Bearing these ethical considerations in mind, the researcher will strive to be guided by the highest form of restraint and utmost discipline towards the respondent in the course of the research.

1.11 Chapter Outline of the Study

Chapter One: This will basically be an introductory chapter, which will entail the project proposal of the study

Chapter Two: will assess peace strategies utilized by regional organization in conflict management.

Chapter Three: this chapter will look into the effectiveness and challenges faced by IGAD in conflict management in the Horn of Africa

Chapter Four: The analysis of policy recommendation that enhance the role of IGAD in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa

Chapter Five: This chapter will entail a summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study

CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

2.0 Introduction

Conflict Resolution evolved from the idea of wide study of the concept which evolved due to it continuously being used and introduced in the process of solving the conflicts that existed in between regions and states. research conflict transformation theory hers such as Francis in 2006 come up documenting the whole practices and even making it more familiar to point of making being used in the field of medicine and even human resources where data analysis and evaluation is needed that is required for the process of data entry that highly regarded in even application of the knowledge that is required for management are several terms that are used to refer the same concept such include conflict management, conflict prevention, and conflict transformation.

The terms are vividly defined independently, and each term is treated differently for example, Ezar come up with different meaning which will differentiate conflict resolution[37] despite of these other writers have documented Similarities as well that exist between the two terms for more clarity. Some of them have even decided not only to document the whole thing but have also even attended and even arranged the debates that are concerned more about the concept.

Also some writers such as Ramsbotham, Miall and Voodhouse[38] when the they decided and held a debate they concluded that it was not effective and no need of it being applicable however, however they generalized that its can be only effective under the following reasons ,since it was

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[37] Ngendahimana, Jerome. "Managing endemic conflicts analysis of regional mechanism for response to DRC conflict." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2014.pp 15

[38] Ramsbotham, O. M. H. and Voodhouse, T.(2011) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. pp 5

the first method and system of solving conflicts too have emerged , it has higher upper hand on being relative in the field, Second, because it is famous then it is widely applied and used because of these and many other reasons the method takes the upper hand in sand it's the key centre root which determines the key sources of the conflict.[39]

Some writer and scholars such as schellenberg and Gambari did borrow a lot from this concept to write on their materials which up to date have really helped out the entire proves of solving the conflict resolution, he even concluded that the issues of conflicts cannot be environmental, and the major target is achieve the justice and obtain mutual satisfaction this is according to Schellenberg. Gambari held that to have conflict resolution that can serve for lone time, it is important to understand the main source of the conflict thus ending these sources which will effectively eradicate the disagreement caused by them.[40] These sources are not only political but also market and business behaviour ways of socialization and individual disagreement.

2.1 Conflict Resolution Strategies or Mechanisms

Conflict management can be undertaken at different levels that is from the national level, regional level for example IGAD or from the international level for example the United Nations. Nation states handle their disagreements or internal conflicts majorly within their set rules and laws.[41]

During conflict resolution, strategy selection can not only be based on suitable mechanism selected but also the answers for the questions. For example: What are the sources the conflict?; and for

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[39] Midodzi, P.F., 2013. Assessing the effectiveness of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism in the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta Region of Ghana (pp 75-81) (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Coast).

[40]Deng, Francis M., and I. William Zartman, eds. Conflict resolution in Africa. Brookings Institution Press, 2011.

[41] Nanwani, S., 2014. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in International Financial Organizations: Experiences and Collaborations in Broadening the Informal Process. Global Policy, 5(3), pp.381-385.

how long has the conflict been there?; and which measures of solving conflict have been employed and the reasons as to why they were unsuccessful? Answers will assist the conflict resolution person to understand the ambiguity of that problem and derive into the most suitable solution. For example, a peaceful talk cannot be successful in win-lose situation or when the disagreement is between two societies and has taken long time. [42] In these, practitioner must first make ground negotiation done through decorum and measures that bring in confidentiality.[43]

Inter-state war was mainly resulting from ideological conflict in the in the power blocs. Despite of the cold war ending, intra-state war or war at the border of a state became a new emergent threat to the world peace as states were driven by self-interest and guarded their sovereignty resulting to conflict along disputed border lines. The main remade with these intra state disputes is the broadness and complexity related to the absence of open ground battle and inclusivity of more than two parties, of which many are directly involved in militant groups. In addition, the main causes of these intra-state disputes are difference in idea as in cold war, but discontent of some groups in the state. The discounted results from people's unmet needs thus they tent to meet them forceful thus conflict.

The old strategies of conflict management and resolution for example decorum are not made to deal with the ambiguity in the conflict. The new selected strategies are empowering politics in the state, change of the dispute through reconciliation, prevention of the structure and normal changes.

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[42]Burton, John W. ",,Conflict Resolution." Prevention. New York: St. Martin's Press (1990).Pp 69
[43] Biraaro, Wendy. "Assessing the role played by regional organisations in conflict resolution in Africa." Master's thesis(Pp 16-17) University of Cape Town, 2009.

2.2 Regional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution

Due to the new development of the United Nations and liberal celebration of championship and historical wins progressive freedom communism, some sections of pro-American scholars have decided come with prediction and interpretation of ascertaining the existence of just and conflict free environment, this has been made it possible by the foretellers who are now predicting and trying to testify that the there are no more conflicts and the world is free of conflicts and disagreements and is open and it's just. They further predict that there will be no conflicts that will rise to mix up of ideas and that what is there will be clear understandings that will lead to team work that will result to great achievements.[44] Despite of this efforts there are a lot of challenges which makes it not possible and this is due to consistent outbreaks of conflicts and various confrontation in some parts of world such Asia some parts of Europe and even in central and West Africa parts. Theses has become a really challenge for the international bodies whose aim is to keep and maintain peace. Despite of it bringing new ideas and efforts that will enable to execute the peace internationally it has just failed because it tends to be expensive for them to help out each region because each requires different techniques and methodology of solving each problem and root cause of the conflict. Because of this then toll cold clashes tend to emerge because of various reasons and circumstances as described by Diehl.[45]

Despite of these though, United Nations was created with main aim being solving any unusual conflicts or disagreements that will rise in country through an aim of having one peacefully region, this is evident in Chapter 8 of the Charter of United Nations which emphasises on ensuring the

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[44]McMahon, Robert J., ed. The Cold War in the Third World. pp 16 Oxford University Press, 2013.
[45] Suleiman, Oghogho Hauwa. "Conflict Resolution in Africa: Analysis from Global and Regional Perspectives." PhD diss., Pp 65 Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU), 2010.

that both parties that are experiencing any conflicts there is an agreement and they should be handles from cantonal level.

The regional organizations which are as well existing up to now, they tended to be present even before Cold War.[46] They began to evolve after there was a beginning of completion of WWII, however it's okay to note that they were using idea of cantonal security in place of peace, and they had a lot of impact.[47]However, Diehl did outline very crucial and sensitive ideas and gave concrete deliberate cause of unsuccessful and failure of international conflict resolution for both regional and state conflicts. [48]

Despite of this there are specifications   tend to occur to some parts and thus not all the parts of the world or those parts the method doesn't always occur or is not applied some countries such as the Afghanistan which have experienced both civil and Gulf wars which have led to several series of conflicts. Despite of this fact, though, it seems not be true entirely because some countries found in central Asia and even in Africa not to be trues because they have different interests thus, they don't borrow the idea of Europe or USA. This evident only on those states and regions that have more resources and capabilities which will make more accurate and more relevant when trying to understand and analyse the sources, the relevancy of this conflicts because of the similar historical dynamics they have once shared. Due to close attention given to regional and states, there is a tendency of denial and the systems that are globally applied in solving the conflicts globally. However, as quoted by Hettne and Söderbaum, he claims that when there is high demand and

[46]Morris, Justin, and Hilaire McCoubrey. "Regional peacekeeping in the post-cold war era." International Peacekeeping 6, no. 2 (1999): 129-151.

[47] Odera, Josephine Ajema. "Civil Society and Conflict Management in Africa-A Re-emerging Role?." Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa (1997): 143.

[48]Diehl, Paul F., Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel. "United Nations intervention and recurring conflict." International Organization 50, no. 4 (1996):pp 683.

concern ways in which the system is applied when solving conflicts it leads to greater bond being developed and on with this increased emphasis on regional mechanism to conflict resolution, "the relationship between multilateral (UN) and regional approaches have become strenuous and diffuse."[49]

It's good to understand regional actors play a very crucial role when it comes analysing and evaluating the really causes of problems that each state experience in the process of analysing and understanding the root cause of the conflicts which tend to evolve from shared norms and value because of the variation in the expectation and needs from different states they tend to develop bridges which seemingly tend to take sides and in the process there are no serious attempts that are even taken into account to come up with structures that will necessity whole thing done in community or done on common ground of interests this leads to even less attention paid to even establishment of the structures that will be necessary to come up with structures that will enable facilitation of the process.

In addition to other methods of conflict solving some are really applicable and are used to regional in ensure the objective of conflict resolution is achieved, it's important to note that those tools that are effective and well applicable to regional mechanism they should coincide with some in a certain given institutional ability of these regional organizations and are categorized on the assumption of combining the member state.[50] Despite of these, it is not necessary to conclude whenever there is a conflict or disagreement that is intended to be solved, despite of it being unprecedented, if not well handled well, it may cripple the process of solving the conflicts and

[49]Asgedom, Messay. "The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partnership in Peace and Security: Achievements and Challenges." Journal of Citizenship and Morality 2, no. 1 (2019): 80-100.
[50]Gebhard, Carmen, and David J. Galbreath, eds. Cooperation or Conflict? Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013.

these can adversely affect the process.[51] There is a need then to set and underlined the necessary rules and laws which should guide and give a clear way on what is outlined I the conflict resolution culture.

2.3 Principles of Conflict resolution

Accepting that conflict resolution is majorly aimed at ensuring there is a system that is well balanced and thus creating a clear and favourable environment for the existence of peace in the globe and in the world and them co- existence in the world. There is a time each state or region tend to follow different aspects in their own dependent way and tend to create more time in analysing and ensuring that the solution is solved according to its interests. Having high level of literacy on conflict resolution will enable not only to draw but also having all the information of what is entailed in the process of solving the conflicts   this is because not only we are concerned with the relevancy of applicability of the system, they form part of the content of what is entailed in solving the conflict thus facilitating process of decision making.[52]

Due to this, the whole process can be concluded in three aspects taken into account. They include, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace fostering. It's also important to note that the whole process of conflict resolution or management is characterised by various formulas which are based on monitored aspects and other guided creeds. The methods ensures that the appropriate techniques and formulas are used and applied in the process of establishing the centre stage of method that can be used in establishing the root cause of the conflict.[53]

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[51] Abdi, Yussuf A. "Regional powers and conflict management: an analysis of Kenya and Ethiopia's interest in Somalia." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2017.pp 23

[52] Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. Sovereignty as responsibility: conflict management in Africa. Brookings Institution Press, 2010.pp 34

[53] Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. Sovereignty as responsibility: conflict management in Africa. Brookings Institution Press, 2010. Pp 15

For the process to be effective and valuable, there are certain techniques that have to be applied from the objective to achieve this.

2.4 Techniques of Conflict Management

Conflict resolution is commonly aimed at eradication of tension in the parties involved in the conflict.[54] It would involve a continuous effort to eradicate disputes, thus promoting peace as a development factor in a society. Some levels of conflict resolution can be explained as; contingency which expounds as the nature of the conflict which assists in increasing chances of achievement of conflict resolution. Conflict transformation includes, largely building of cultural and structural peace status, conflict settlement is made up of a peaceful talk among the involved and they are outlined below.

2.4.1 Good Offices

Good offices create an enabling environment which creates better probability for the conflicting sides to arrive at consensus and thus controlling the disputes. Examples of good offices include the African Union or humanitarian Dialogue mediation that aided Kofi Annan in 2008 in Kenya another example is the joint Madagascar in 2009 that brought on board the UN, SADC, the organization de la Francophonie and the African Union

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[54] Posibi, A. Preye. "Aftermath of the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970): The struggle for peaceful coexistence between parties in post-war Nigeria." Asia and Africa Today 6 (2021): 77.

2.4.2 Fact Finding

One of the common methods is this one here where individuals argue and even make the decision based on valid and factuality of the information, the method thus tend to avoid usage of propaganda or any other rumours in the process of doing the research and making the right decisions. .[55] These are affective method where there is no biasedness which can be a result of unwell documented or vague information Thus, the success of fact-finding it expresses itself from the two censuses between two people. The method though has its own weakness and advantages too. This includes decision, the actual fact or law may never emerge at all.

2.4.3 Arbitration

In these process that is valid and for it to be effective the arbiter must be present.[56] But in case there are no natural and official ways of implementing what is needed, it cannot be a limit of there is nobody from not exercising or adhering the rules that will delay the process of implementing peace This however does not take into considerations the effectiveness of the conflicts as they are able to Make valid reasons and hence making the most valid decision on when and shall be subjected submit their dispute for arbitration, and then make the right decision and enable propel the process of conflict solving.[57] An example an arbitration process before the international court of justice is the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia and the Bakassi Peninsula dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, the international court ruled in favour of Cameroon in 2002

2.4.4 Independent Settlement

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[55]Kelman, Herbert C., and Ronald J. Fisher. "Conflict analysis and resolution." (2003).pp 34

[56]Eagleton, Clyde. "A Summary of the Stages in the Development of Arbitration." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 138, no. 1 (1928): 146.

[57] Boutellis, A. and Williams, P.D., 2013. Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward more effective partnerships (pp. 21). New York: International Peace Institute. pp 43

Usually when the parties don't have a common ground there is a period where both the parties tend to get discouraged   as they fail to give desired outcomes, such talks or negotiations tend to fail. Resulting to unfinished talks and yet every talk needs to bare fruits.[58] Hence there is a need for each party involved to have fully entire talks that will produce favourable outcomes this is because, the previous swill determine that the conflict process has been solved and all the virtues that involve the entire process of negation and arriving at the appropriate process of solving the conflicts.

2.4.5 Coercive Settlements

A treaty in form of peace is signed and the two parties are interlinked with one person.[59] The method tends to and appropriate in areas where be stable in areas where there has been consistent attacks and wars are every common. There is reorganization of the societies where law has been breakdown and not even being not implemented because of brutality nature in those places owing to the fact that most of these global aspects do work or are applied in the process when the military is in the process and performing their operations thus making them more effective and easily applicable.

Therefore, the international bodies are required to carry out the entire process despite of it taking a long time, it's effective because it immediately seeks the solution to any problems that might be encountered by that country hence giving out the desired solution. The African union has an array

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[58] Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. "5 Negotiating for Peace in Angola and the Philippines: Case Studies of Failure and Success." In Crafting Peace, pp. 109. Penn State University Press, 2021.
[59] Yadav, R. S., K. Savitri, Sailaja Gullapalli, and Jai Narain Sharma. "Block-3 Methods of Conflicts Resolutions: Global Perspectives." (2020).pp 12

of conflict management instruments at its disposal; diplomacy, sanctions, peace keeping and inclusive of military intervention as outlined in Article 4(h) carried out by regional organization for example, the East African Standby Force. An example of coercive conflict management is the deployment of troops in Burundi.

2.6 Conclusion

Objective one looked into the various mechanism of conflict management that can be utilized in Africa by regional institutions and organizations. The dynamics nature in conflict needs to be more understood, for more knowledge on this so that wars can better be dealt with, thus the use of diversified approach for conflict resolution. Conflict management ensures that there is restoration of normal societal good relationship after a long time conflict. While conflict resolution is the way of achieving the total solution of the conflict, by going beyond the satisfying

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSING RECURRING AFRICAN CONFLICTS: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

3.1 Introduction

The conflicts experienced in Somalia has lasted over twenty-five years. In 1991, the ruling government of Said Barre was overthrown by one of the leading militia clans. This resulted to the failure of state institutions due to poor coordination by the militia group on the post Said Barre era.[60] As a result, Somalia was ruled by several militias from various clans, who divided the country up according to their strength, and at times contested territory with competing militias and warlords.

However, as a result of the erroneous strategy of the US invasion in Somalia without regional buy in taken by the external powers in Somalia, a US-led coalition and a trusteeship mandated by the UN-mission dubbed UNOSOM II were mandated by the UN. In Somalia, forming a new administration was difficult due to the condition of lawlessness and the intricacy of the battle. Various reasons hampered international mediation initiatives, including conflicting interests from external parties, particularly Ethiopia and Egypt, who promoted opposing agendas in these crises. Both sides held conferences and counter-conferences in order to promote their respective interests and outmaneuver each other.[61]

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[60] de Waal, Alex. "Somalia's disassembled state: clan unit formation and the political marketplace." Conflict, Security & Development 20, no. 5 (2020): pp585.

[61] Ingris, Mohamed H., and Markus v Hoehne. "The impact of civil war and states collapse on the roles of Somali women: a blessing in disguise." Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, no. 2 (2013):pp333.

In the late 1990s, IGAD and the OAU assigned to Ethiopia the role of leading mediation efforts. This, unfortunately, did not accomplish much, as evidenced by the Sodere peace summit conducted in Ethiopia in 1997, which fell short of its intended purpose. This one was foreseeable because Ethiopia lacked neutrality as a conflict mediator since it employed a double standard policy in which it acted as a regional hegemony, a spoiler, and a mediator. Ethiopia was accused of arming and aiding Somaliland insurgent factions.

3.2 Ongoing Revitalization of IGAD

Much of IGAD's initiatives have been focused on issues of peace and security, with so little consideration given to economic integration and collaboration. This is what prompted member states to reinvigorate IGAD at its 12th regular summit in June 2008.[62] In 2008, IGAD and the EAC collaborated to develop a Minimum Regional Integration Plan (MIP). This was a synopsis of the methods and approaches that IGAD has been using since its inception, as well as the results achieved in regional unification. As a result, the relevance of regional cooperation is highlighted in light of present global economic difficulties, regional problems, and prospects. This also lays out a road plan for cooperation, which includes topics such as infrastructure, agriculture, peace and security, trade, environment, and natural resources.[63]

3.3 The Role of IGAD in Somalia
3.3.1 IGAD's Involvement from 1991 to 2002
Somalia is embroiled in one of the region's longest conflicts. The Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) has put a lot of work into addressing these problems through a mediation

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[62] Onditi, Francis, Gilad Ben-Nun, Edmond M. Were, and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera. "Partnership in Peace Support Operations." In Reimagining Security Communities, pp. 291. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.
[63] Abdi,Ali I., and Edris H. Seid. "Assessment of Economic integration in IGAD." (2013).pp 45

process involving key parties both inside and outside Somalia. Some of IGAD's members were given a mission to organize and hold talks aimed at securing a ceasefire. This showed that member nations were worried about the situation in Somalia, and that they had a common goal of assisting Somalia's stabilization, and that they were willing to support efforts from any of the member states.

3.3.2 Djibouti, Initiative in 1991

Said Barre was overthrown I In June 1991, with the outbreak of civil war in Somalia. Djibouti, led by President Hassan Guoled Aptidon, intervened to mediate between the warring sides, a move praised by IGAD.[64] A month later, in July, Djibouti made a second meeting, where a ceasefire was consented in order to form a transitional government. However, this did not accomplish much because General Aidded and the SNM, which had declared Somaliland independent, rejected the agreement, and the provisional government, reigniting the conflict as a result.

3.3.3 The 2000 Arta Conference

After having failed in the last attempt, Djibouti came up with a new proposal that prioritized members of civil society groups, in line with the IGAD's 1998 bottom-up approach. According to IGAD, the bottom-up strategy is the only way to achieve peace in Somalia, and civil society participation is like the key components of peace. In May 2000, the city of Arta hosted the Somalia Reconciliation Conference, which drew close to 400 people. The Somaliland and Puntland regions, [65]which declared its independence from Somalia, as well as a few other major warlords within Somalia, shunned the conference, calling it unrepresentative and dictated from outside Somalia. In August 2000, the Arta conference authorized the formation of a Transitional National

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[64] Hussein, Mohamed Abukar, and Kennedy Mutundu. "Analysis Of The Role Of Igad In The Resolution Of Conflicts In Somalia: (pp 32) A Case Study In Southern Somalia."
[65] Samatar, Ahmed I., and Abdi Ismail Samatar. "Somali reconciliation: Editorial note." Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 3 (2003):pp15

Government (TNG) in Somalia, with Dr. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as President, following months of deliberations and bargaining. Despite the fact that all member states embraced and endorsed the TNG, Ethiopia's sincerity was questioned. Djibouti and Eritrea were the only countries to completely back the TNG.[66]

Even though it had played a major part in promoting the Arta conference, Ethiopia unwillingly backed the TNG, describing it as a hate group for Islamists and terrorists. Ethiopia openly backed the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) in an attempt to destabilize the TNG. Kenya and Uganda were worried that the TNG was leaning toward groups suspected of having ties to terrorism, worrying that they might acquire a foothold in neighboring countries and commit strikes.[67] This is how the TNG squandered much-needed political support from most IGAD members. The result was a system in which regional powers conducted proxy wars in Somalia by arming and supporting local militias.

The continuing support from the opposing powers has resulted in an influx of weapons into the country. Somalia's civil war raged on. IGAD supported the mediation process in Somalia between 1991 and 2002 by adopting member state efforts, particularly the Sodere peace process and the Arta peace initiative, despite the fact that the conflict in Somalia was not resolved.

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[66] Apuuli, K.P., 2020. Uganda and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa (pp173). Routledge.
[67] Odobo, S. O. "Comparative analysis of the conflict management frameworks in IGAD and ECOWAS." PhD diss., M. A. dissertation, Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, (Pp 45-46) Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, 2011.pp 86

3.4 The Role of IGAD Played in the Formation of the Transitional Federal Government
3.4.1 The Eldoret Peace Conference

Even though Somaliland, which had declared independence, boycotted the Eldoret meeting, it demonstrated a high level of inclusion. On October 27, 2002, a declaration was issued outlining what had been resolved upon among them, including an end to the fighting and the structure and agenda of the Somali National Reconciliation Process. Signatories to the declaration agreed to a cease-fire, recognize the federal charter, devolution and federalism principles, abide by the declaration, and support the enforcement criteria.[68] The second session of the Eldoret Conference was jeopardized by the issue of representation to the six reconciliation groups.

The second part of the Eldoret summit was jeopardized by the issue of representation to the six reconciliation panels. The number of delegates representing Somalia politicians greatly exceeded the secretariat's projections of 300 delegates. The attendance of 1000 delegates at this particular gathering complicated affairs and preceding planning. This consternation sprang from the Technical Committee's failure to devise and stick to a reliable formula for selecting delegates to this meeting. Furthermore, two members of the Technical Committee, Ethiopia and Djibouti, differed on the allotment of slots to the different parties that were supporting.[69]

The Expert Committee came up with a formula for allocating the spots. They recommended a 4:5 system for seat allocation, with the four largest clans receiving an equal number of seats and the minority groupings receiving half as many seats as the major clans. Each major clan received 84

[68] Nyombe, Theresa Doggasuk Mori. "African Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution: Analyzing the Contribution of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) In the South Sudan Conflict Resolution 2013-2018." PhD diss., United States International University-Africa, 2019.
[69] Asgedom, Messay. "The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partnership in Peace and Security: Achievements and Challenges." Journal of Citizenship and Morality 2, no. 1 (2019): pp 80.

seats, the smaller clans 42 seats jointly, and the remaining 22 seats were allocated according to the technical committee's decision. This was done to guarantee that the approach was participatory and that any decisions made were inclusive of all stakeholders, despite the fact that no agreement was reached, thus keeping the process hostage for four months.[70]The Facilitating Committee persuaded those leaders who had canceled their delegation to reconsider their choice. The retreat was postponed, however, due to a lack of agreement on who should be invited and disagreements between Kenya and Uganda about the retreat's location.

3.5 The Retreat and the Formation of TFG

Delegates retreated for three weeks at safari park hotel in Nairobi, where they issued a statement on the decision made at the consultative conference at State House in Nairobi. The delegates came to an agreement on a new charter and a transitional government. The size of parliament and the transition time were also agreed upon. However, when some delegates attempted to change one of the charter's clauses, a problem arose. Dissatisfied individuals considered forming an alternative alliance.

The nomination of 275 representatives for the transitional parliament was a source of disagreement, prompting the Facilitation Committee to propose a 4:5 formula, with the big clans receiving 61 membership each and the minor clans receiving thirty-one seats jointly. As a result, the interim parliament was established. The constitution, which established institutions, duties, and rights, was passed by the new parliament. The president and prime minister, who would be assisted by three premiers, formed the executive. On October 10, 2004, the National parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf to the presidency of the TFG. This was a feat that had hitherto eluded other

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[70] Shuriye Ao. The New Face Of International Intervention And Conflict Management. And Education (Icepee '11). pp 478.

organizations. This was feasible due to the absence of spoilers and other external actors like Egypt,

Libya, and Yemen. Furthermore, the fact that IGAD was able to start and sustain a diplomatic

process in the Horn of Africa garnered it worldwide credibility. [71]

3.5.1 The Role of IGAD in Sustaining the TFG

The TFG was initially hesitant to proceed to Somalia due to opposition from the Union of Islamic

Courts (UIC), which had emerged and assumed control of Mogadishu, and the volatile security

situation within Somalia. The TFG lacked a sufficient military to counter the UIC, which was

backed by Hayiwe, Mogadishu's most powerful clan.

3.5.2 The Unrealized IGAD peacekeeping Mission

On the 31st of January, 2005, the IGAD heads of state and governments met in Abuja, Nigeria,

and announced that a peacekeeping operation would be sent to Somalia to assist in the restoration

of order. This was made in order to assist the TFG in efficiently establishing its jurisdiction in

Somalia so that the achievements made could be sustained. It was also meant to assist in the

training and empowerment of Somalia's army and police so that they might eventually assume

charge of the security situation. IGAD's proposal was adopted and approved by the AU's Peace

and Security Council at its 24th meeting on February 7, 2005, during the 4th Ordinary Session of

the AU. On February 14, 2005, a combined AU/IGAD fast-finding mission was sent to Somalia

to collect information and assess the situation, with the goal of recommending the force's size,

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[71] Idris, A.A., 2019. The Role of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development) in Facilitating Civil War
Peace Settlements in the Horn of Africa. Pp 67

mandate, and involvement in Somalia. The IGAD ministers of defense accepted the deployment

plan, which calls for 10,000 troops to be sent annually at a cost of US$ 413 million.[72]

On the 18th of March 2005, the IGAD council ministers in Nairobi approved a resolution to

send IGASOM to Somalia, with Sudan and Uganda suggesting to send their troops, whereas the

other IGAD members were anticipated to assist in the training and logistical support of Somalia's

forces, with the prospect of contributing troops for a combat mission later. They also changed the

charter's clauses to enable for the deployment of IGASOM.[73]

Some Somali factions, particularly UIC, were opposed to the proposed operation. Another

important reason for IGASOM's failure to be deployed was a lack of finance and logistical

assistance from key powers, particularly the United States, putting his entire plan in jeopardy. Due

to the presence of IUC, that had an advantage of military force and expanded its operations to the

central and southern parts of Mogadishu, the TFG lacked a robust army to enable it to assert its

authority in Mogadishu in 2006.[74]

3.6 TFG's Weaknesses in what?

The TFG and TFI succeeded in establishing some institutions, including the supreme

court, regional and district councils. During the TFG's leadership, a National Reconciliation

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[72] Nwoko, Kenneth Chukwuemeka. "Regional Peace and Security: Can ECOWAS and IGAD Contain Mutating and Emerging Threats?." AIPGG Journal of Humanities and Peace Studies 2, no. 1 (2021).pp 67

[73] Kulang, Timothy T. "The Power of Readiness Theory and the Success of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process in South Sudan." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 6, pp 11 (2019).

[74] Levitt, Jeremy I. "Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):(Nairobi, Kenya, March 21, 1996, entered into force November 25, 1996)." In Africa: Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conflict and Security, Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues, pp. 158. Brill Nijhoff, 2003.

Congress was also organized and held. The TFG, on the other hand, faced some difficulties, including a lack of resources as a result of foreign parties' unwillingness to assist, and, most all, institutional incapacity. As a result, the TFG was unable to fund the creation of its own national security force, which would have allowed it to exercise its power more effectively throughout the country. Instead, Mogadishu and other provinces were taken over by warlords and clan-organized security forces.[75]

This rivalry made its way into the TFG, with President Abdullahi Yusuf battling his prime minister, Professor Ahmed Ghedi, for power. In this dominance war, issues of openness and accountability, as well as the prime minister's term as contemplated in the constitution, took center stage. Because of their tense working relationship, the president and his prime minister were unable to bring the two clans together.[76]

3.6.1 The Formation of the TFG II

The TFG lost credibility with the main clans since its commander was more concerned with fighting for dominance rather than building a path forward that would bring all clans together for the sake of peace and stability. This spurred the international community to devise yet another strategy to restore order in Somalia and avert a humanitarian calamity. This was done to attract on board the so-called moderate ARS while isolating those considered to be extremist. On the 9th of May 2008, Djibouti hosted another peace meeting on Somalia.

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[75] Abdi, Yussuf A. "Regional powers and conflict management: an analysis of Kenya and Ethiopia's interest in Somalia." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2017. Pp 32

[76] Zartman, I. William. "Conflict resolution in Africa: can it succeed?." Great Decisions (2001): pp96.

However, there was a split inside the ARS between those who backed Djibouti and those who supported Asmara. ARS-Asmara, as they were dubbed, refused to engage in dialogue with the TFG unless foreign soldiers stationed in Somalia were removed. The ARS, which is backed by Djibouti, agreed to create a government of national unity with the TFG, bringing the total number of members of parliament to 550.[77] Sheikh Sharrif was chosen president of the TFG, while Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was named prime minister. To assist the TFG, a combined security force was formed. The United Nations has endorsed this new initiative. IGAD attempted to provide the sufficient help after learning from the TFG I's issues. This was accomplished by taking steps to ensure that all members of the ARS, particularly those who were believed to have a moderate stance, were called into action in order to broaden the representation of different clans in the TFG and to send a signal to those leaders who repudiated the agreement. A Somalia Peace Process was also launched to provide information to the IGAD on the progress of the peace process implementation.[78]

3.7 IGAD Facilitation Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation

There was an IGAD facilitation office for Somalia peace and reconciliation established in Ethiopia in October 2008 with the mission of encouraging unification, assisting institutions in building capacity, mobilizing financial and logistical assistance for TFG II, and assisting TFG II in fulfilling the objectives in Somalia. It served as the coordinator for the IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations. In order to promote the office's operations and solve obstacles in Somalia, a two-

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[77] Mohamed, A.A., 2020. Power sharing as a conflict management tool in Somali (Doctoral dissertation, Moi University).Pp 56

[78] Levitt, Jeremy I. "Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD):(Nairobi, Kenya, March 21, 1996, entered into force November 25, 1996)." In Africa: Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conflict and Security, Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues, pp. 145-158. Brill Nijhoff, 2003.

year strategy plan called "Re-establishing Effective Institutions in Somalia" was prepared between 2009 and 2011. In Mogadishu, there was also a contact office that was supposed to provide information and updates on daily activities to the facilitator's office. With Ethiopia and Kenya training TFG II soldiers, Uganda sending troops to AMISON, and Djibouti convening a peace conference, the TFG received unflinching support from IGAD member nations.

3.8 IGAD's Successes in Mitigating the Somali Conflict.

3.8.1 The Continued Engagement in what?

The IGAD's involvement in mediating the Somalia crisis cannot be overstated, despite inconsistent results. Due to the international community's unwillingness to assist Somalia, a variety of measures were launched by member nations between 1991 and 2002. IGAD assisted in the formation of the TGF and the GNU, which it aimed to assist in achieving the TFG's aspirations for the Somali people by organizing financial and diplomatic support.[79] The creation of the Facilitator's Office for Somalia to assist the TFG II clearly demonstrated IGAD's commitment to Somalia's and the region's stability in the region.

3.8.2 The Commitment of Member States

The accomplishment that was accomplished was only possible because of the dedication of member states. Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya did an excellent job in launching various peace efforts and hosting peace talks aimed at ending the Somalia conflict. By holding a conversation, we can put a stop to the carnage and create the rule of law. [80] The IGAD's Assembly of Heads of

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[79] Rotich, Hillary K. "Al-shabaab Militia, a Threat to Security in the Horn of Africa: a Case Study of Kenya." PhD diss., university of Nairobi, IDIS dept 2020.pp 12

[80] Mutembei, M.A., 2013. The Role of regional organization in addressing climate change as an emerging security threat in Africa: A Case Study Of IGAD Pp 30 IDIS Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. "Conflict early warning and

States and Governments and Council of Ministers have attempted to resolve the conflict by holding summits on a regular basis. Two extraordinary meetings for heads of states and governments took place in 2008, as well as five extraordinary meetings for the Council of Ministers that was held purposely to discuss the Somalia crisis. In addition, the Council of Ministers had four conferences in 2009, all of which focused on the Somalia issue.

The hosting of the Eldoret peace summit on Somalia was another strong sign of dedication to the path of peace. Despite some itchiness at first, member states did not take any chances and instead utilized their knowledge to try to address certain disputes that had arisen among the delegates.[81] Despite severe budgetary constraints throughout the process, Kenya took it upon itself to ensuring that they were addressed, and the summit ran successfully for the duration. Member states' determination to mobilize resources and dispatch peacekeeping missions in Somalia to help the TFG carry out its purpose demonstrated their commitment to peace, stabilization, and the establishment of a functional central government in Somalia.

3.8.3 The Efforts of the Secretariat

The accomplishments in Somalia would be incomplete without acknowledging the commitment of the IGAD Secretariat, which has been at the frontline of coordinating the organization's operations throughout.[82] All of the summits were coordinated by the Secretariat. It also collected

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response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." (2009).IDIS department (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi pp 24). Are there two authors in this Doctoral dissertation?

[81] Boutellis, A. and Williams, P.D., 2013. Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward more effective partnerships (pp21). New York: International Peace Institute.

[82] Chesterman, Sabrina, and K. Downie. "Preliminary review of datasets to inform the development of IGAD member state baselines." (2014).Pp 15

data and provided frequent updates, as well as advising the Council of Ministers. It also created concept papers for the council meeting of ministers. Regular workshops and expert consultations with the goal of developing concept papers to help IGAD's initiatives to enhance peaceful relations in the area. The Secretariat offers material support for special gatherings and produces necessary materials.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter examined IGAD's efforts to address the insecurity problems arising in Somalia. Peacekeeping entities such as IGASOM, liaison offices, and, most recently, AMISOM are examples of these efforts. However, IGAD was unable to efficiently and successfully resolve this situation due to long-standing animosity and strain between some member states, which was manifested through proxies during the Somalia crisis, as well as support staff deficiencies at the Secretariat and lack of experience in dealing with conflicts of this nature, among many other factors. However, the IGAD's attempts have run into a number of impediments.[83] Overreliance on foreign aid due to member countries' failure to meet their financial contribution obligations. The IGAD member nations will be required to eliminate all difficulties, which will necessitate coordination, long-term partnerships, and dedication on their part in efficient conflict resolution. By tackling the challenges and gaps such as having trained conflict management personnel at the secretariat in the ever-changing landscape of conflict, adequate financing by member state will help greatly improve the effectiveness of IGAD in conflict management

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[83] Pica-Ciamarra, U., S. Nouala, and S. Kim. "Livestock and livelihoods in the IGAD region: a policy and institutional analysis." IGAD LPI Working Paper pp 11 (2011).

CHAPTER FOUR

IGAD'S MANDATE: AN ASSESSMENT OF IGAD'S SUCCESS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will assess the peace and security in Somalia by looking into the causes of the prolonged conflicts, it will further assess the strategies utilized by IGAD and finally review challenges affecting IGAD effectiveness in carrying out its mandate. This was attained through interviews and questionnaires to a sample size of 35 respondents as outlined in the research methodology

4.1 Causes of Insecurity in Horn of Africa

In carrying out an assessment of peace and security in Somalia on conflict management the study sought to seek the perennial causes of conflict so as to establish how adequately IGAD is equipped to tackle the conflicts arising in the Horn of Africa. The respondents cited the following as the major contributors of conflict in Somalia.

4.1 Ethnic and religious marginalization

Table 4.1 Ethnic and religious marginalization

	Yes	No	Total
■ Frequencies	26	9	35
■ Percentages	74%	26%	100%

According to statistical data collected from a sample size of thirty-five respondents, twenty-six of among them felt that religious and ethnic marginalization was the main factor that triggered conflicts in Somalia. This group accounted for 74 percent of all responses drawn from the two focus groups drawn from the Political Science and International relations Doctorate students (in their final year 2021 University of Nairobi), with the remaining 26% claiming that ethnic and religious marginalization was not a major source of conflict in Somalia. There were nine people in this group. This finding is consistent with a study conducted by Ofungo, who believes that ethnic and religious diversity is not in and of itself a source of insecurity, but that when a religious or ethnic group feels marginalized, they may express their dissatisfaction means of conflicts or unrests.[84]

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[84] Ofongo. "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: What could have been the precursors." Journal for Deradicalization 7, no. 2 (2016): (pp 145)**.**

As a result, groups who feel marginalized by the ruling class as a result of poor governance usually feel unimportant and discriminated, causing them to get frustrated and furious, prompting them to result into conflicts in search of a solution.

4.4.3 Lack of Strong Political Institution

Table 4.3 Lack of Strong Political Institution

	Yes	No	Total
■ Frequencies	31	4	35
■ Percentages	88%	12%	100%

According to the data results collected from the two study groups drawn from University of Nairobi in their final year 2021, it's evident that a bigger portion of them were in agreement that presence of a weaker political institution that did not stamp its authority over its subjects was a major factor that escalated conflict in Somalia as extremist rival militia groups scrambled to control and exercise their powers in quest to gain more territorial borders.

Only 12% of the respondents that did not ascent that this factor was a major cause of conflict in Somalia while 88 % of them agreed that lack of strong political system played a bigger roles in conflicts eruption in Somalia. For example, Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D. Director at Horn Institute a

conflict analyst in an interview cited lack of a strong governance institutions in Somalia as a major bottleneck hindering conflict management in the Horn of Africa.

The findings there demonstrates that weak political institutions significantly contribute to conflicts. These findings are in line with a study undertaken by Frank and Kirimi postulated that weak political institutional framework in Africa is a cause of conflict, this was because the weak institutions, were incapable of resolving a conflict when it emerged, meting out justice to offenders, allowing political involvement, and bribery, which is linked to uneven resources allocation.[85]

In reality, the African Union's 2002 plan of action recognized the critical role that institutions like the legislative, judicial, defense, and finance play in combating conflict in Africa. These organizations, in addition to being actors of equity, are the glue that ties society together through dispute resolution, adjudication, and intercommunal discussion anytime any type of conflict arises or threatens to arise.[86]

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[85] Kirimi, Frank M. "Countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa: the role of public diplomacy." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2017. Pp 23

4.5 The following factors hinder the efficiency of IGAD Success
4.5.1 Member-state rivalries

Rivalry amongst members

		Yes	No	Total
■ Frequencies		26	9	35
■ Percentages		75%	25%	100%

■ Frequencies ■ Percentages

The majority of the respondents in the study (75%) saw IGAD rivalry as a major factor impeding

the organization's performance in dispute settlement in the East Africa. The strife was mostly due

to member countries' strive for self, which has resulted in a lack of trust and spread mutual hostility

among them. This has produced a complicated and fragile situation in which finding common

ground on attaining peace in Somalia.

Which nations have rivalries?

4.5.2 The absence of a regional power

Lack of regional power

	Yes	No	Total
Frequencies	23	12	35
Percentages	65%	35%	100%

The lack of regional power among its members, according to two focus groups drawn from the Political Science and International relations Doctorate students (in their final year 2021) comprising of 2 separate groups of 9 members and 10 members respectively 65 percent of respondents, is a challenge that undermines IGAD's efficacy. Because the IGAD area lacks a regional influence, no country can take the initiative and exercise undisputed control, as Nigeria and South Africa do in ECOWAS and SADC, combined.

4.5.3 The absence of political will

Lack of political will

		Yes	No	Total
■ Frequencies		29	6	35
■ Percentages		84%	16%	100%

■ Frequencies ■ Percentages

According to 84 percent of respondents, the IGAD secretariat's ability to influence policies is curtailed due to a lack of political commitment. It can only carry out decisions made by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. For example, in the Somali negotiation in Eldoret, the secretariat fell out of favor as frontline governments gained complete leadership of the process. It is said that member nations have no desire to strengthen IGAD, preferring instead to weaken it so that they may outmatch it in order to advance their own goals.

4.5.4 Budgetary Restriction:

Financial Constraints

		Yes	No	Total
▪ Frequencies		22	13	35
▪ Percentages		64%	36%	100%

▪ Frequencies ▪ Percentages

The larger portion of participants (64%) believed that IGAD's competence to successfully carry out its mandate was restricted by a lack of sufficient financial resources. In needed to conduct its daily activities, IGAD relies heavily on money from donors, particularly the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which consists of donations from donor states and organizations. Member states, on the other hand, are accountable for the operational expenditure, which is funded through sporadic membership contributions

4.5.5. Inadequate Enforcement Capability:

	Yes	No	Total
■ Frequencies	26	9	35
■ Percentages	75%	25%	100%

IGAD's efficacy in conflict management in the Eastern Africa is being hampered by a lack of enforcement capability, that is to ensure that resolutions and negotiation agreed upon are adhered to by all parties are upheld due to issues of sovereignty. In order to properly meet its obligations, IGAD counts on member states to contribute. This means that the effectiveness of IGAD's policies is entirely dependent on member governments' cooperation. As a result, the IGAD has limited itself to releasing communiqués, some of which are not executed and, if they are, are financially constrained. There is also a propensity to impose only less sensitive subjects, such as environmental preservation, both politically and in nature.

4.5.6 Inadequate Peace and Security Policies

Poor Policies & Security

	Frequencies	Percentages
■ Yes	22	64%
■ No	13	36%
■ Total	35	100%

■ Yes ■ No ■ Total

Adequate security and peace policies under IGAD ought to cover the core issues, priority areas of

concern and key opportunities in three priority areas of food security and environmental protection,

economic cooperation, regional integration and social development, peace and security. According

to an interview with liaison officer of Kenya domiciled in Hargeisa, Benson Mwaliko cites that

there was need for the IGAD members to continuously strengthen the existing peace and security

policies in the Horn of Africa due to the emerging threats of insecurities more specifically with the

of ending the prolonged conflicts in Somalia. Poor practices were cited by 64% of respondents

as a major cause to IGAD's poor performance. IGAD's incapacity to develop an integrated peace

and security framework for the area in order to reduce the region's main source of conflict was

evident during its participation in the Somalia conflict. This demonstrated that IGAD lacks strong

policies and goals in response to the region's insecurity. IGAD has made attempts to identify

mutual understanding in regional conflict, albeit the emphasis has always been on regeneration

rather than a shared strategy on security policy with short-term political rewards. Non - democratic

trends, a negative record on human rights, intolerance of various differences, and a worsening

business situation are all factors limiting the establishment of a shared policy.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1   Summary

This study was undertaken to establish the effectiveness of IGAD role in enhancing conflict management in the Horn Africa with a specific focus case study of Somalia which for a long time has been faced with conflicts and insecurity which has had contributed to insecurity in the East African region. Countries like Kenya have had to deal with terror attacks like the Garissa University and Westgate Gate Mall carried out by Al-shabab that originates from Somalia. This study was guided by three objectives namely, analysis of peace mechanism and strategies deployed by IGAD, secondly to examine the factors hindering the role of IGAD in enhancing conflict management and finally to examine policy solution to enhance the role of IGAD in conflict management. In addition, the study was guided the securitization theory deployed by the IGAD community in a collective agenda to enhance peace and security in the region.

The conflict in Somalia is among Africa's longest. It has had a great impact both within Somalia and in the region.[87] The human cost of the war has certainly been immense although no reliable figures exist to tabulate the cost. The war casualties are estimated at half a million. The actual figure notwithstanding, separate reports of the various clashes leave no doubt that the war has been catastrophic in terms of human life.[88] Apart from the dead, the war had caused a lot of displacement

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[87] Hassan, Hamdy A. "Ethnicity, Insecurity and Geostrategic Transformation in the Horn of Africa." In Risks, Identity and Conflict, pp. 83. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2021.

[88] Wallensteen, Peter, Erik Melander, and Frida Möller. "Preventing Genocide: The International Response." In *Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable*, pp. 401. Springer, Cham, 2021.

both internally and into neighboring states. Even after the numerous peace processes, the issue of rehabilitating of displaced persons is still high on the agenda.[89]

Member states within IGAD have taken upon themselves to seek to find short and long-term solutions to promote attainment of peace and security in the Somalia by initiating several processes for example holding several peace conferences within and out of Somalia led by delegations of both Heads of states and ministers of the respective member states. These conferences have been held with the main agenda been resolving the conflicts and security threats posed by terrorist groups residing within Somalia. One example of a high-level conference meeting was witnessed when two extra-ordinary summits of Heads of States coupled with five additional extra-ordinary conferences of council of ministers were held in 2009 purely to deal with the Somali matter.

The United Nations Charter has a provision of principles and intent of roles within which regional organization such as IGAD have in managing regional conflicts like those facing the Horn of Africa.[90] Those actions accord regional organizations to commence actions deemed necessary but with the approval of United Nations Security Council. This however, makes regional conflict prone to interests of regional actors.

This study purposed findings examined the role played by regional organization through various strategies such as mediation, peace keeping, dialogue, track one and track two diplomacy, and use

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[89] Moriasi, Edward M. "Mediating Conflicts in Africa-Comparing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) Mediation Processes in South Sudan and Somalia: Lessons for Regional Organizations." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2020.pp 56

[90] Mativo, B.M., 2008. Sub-regional conflict early warning and response mechanism: a case study of IGAD 2002-2007. Pp 24 full citations

of force to seek regional peace and security. The role played by IGAD is a clear illustration of intra-regional institution role in enhancing peace and security by dealing with conflicts within member states and in this case in Somalia. Member states have aligned their national security interest as insecurity in one member state imposes insecurity not only to the neighboring member states but to the continent and to the entire international system. The competing interests from the various states and other actors in the case of Somali was achieved by applying the principle of neutrality, by selecting a neutral venue and mediator in spearheading the process.

5.2 Conclusion

Objective one looked into the various mechanism of conflict management that can be utilized in Africa by regional institutions and organizations. The dynamics nature in conflict needs to be more understood, for more knowledge on this so that wars can better be dealt with, thus the use of diversified approach for conflict resolution. Conflict management has mostly been done from reactionary perspectives rather than proactive perspective, by getting to understand the primary source and avenging factors to make sure there is the use of actual resolutions than the management. Conflict management ensures that there is restoration of normal societal good relationship after a long time conflict. While conflict resolution is the way of achieving the total solution of the conflict, by going beyond the satisfying

Objective two examined IGAD's efforts to address the insecurity problems arising in Somalia. Peacekeeping entities such as IGASOM, liaison offices, and, most recently, AMISOM are examples of these efforts. However, IGAD was unable to efficiently and successfully resolve this situation due to long-standing animosity and strain between some member states, which was

manifested through proxies during the Somalia crisis, as well as support staff deficiencies at the Secretariat and lack of experience in dealing with conflicts of this nature, among many other factors. However, the IGAD's attempts have run into a number of impediments.

Overreliance on foreign aid due to member countries' failure to meet their financial contribution obligations. The IGAD member nations will be required to eliminate all difficulties, which will necessitate coordination, long-term partnerships, and dedication on their part in efficient conflict resolution.

Objective three on the side sought to explore some of the possible policy recommendation solutions to enhance the effectiveness of IGAD in conflict management in Somalia, so that the achievements made could be sustained through capacity building by forces drawn from IGAD member states meant to assist in the training and empowerment of Somalia's army and police so that they might eventually assume charge of the security situation.[91] IGAD should continue to work and support closely with the Somali government to strengthen its activities and institutions to ensure peace resolutions arrived at are implemented and enforced through domestic channels and institutions regardless of change in governance or leaders of the present government.

[91] Moriasi, Edward M. "Mediating Conflicts in Africa-Comparing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) Mediation Processes in South Sudan and Somalia: Lessons for Regional Organizations." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2020. Pp 67

5.3 Recommendations

Despite the critical role played by IGAD in promoting regional peace among member states especially in the Horn of Africa, Somalia there were gaps identified by the study that it ought to address so as come up with long term solutions in addressing the re-occurrence of conflicts that has been witnessed for a prolonged period of time especially in Somalia.[92] Further the study findings identified bottlenecks that have limited its effectiveness in conflict management in Somalia.

First and foremost, IGAD member states should ensure availability of funds amongst member states to carry out their activities more efficiently and avoid overdependence of donor funding to undertake their activities. A key challenge of the Secretariat was constriction of funds.[93] Throughout the process, it was cash-strapped and had to contend with inflexible structure and issues in budgeting. The costs of the process revolved around facilitating the negotiations and payment of salaries. However, the funds from the Forum were used to facilitate meetings and partially pay mediators and staff salaries.

The lack of adequate funds also resulted in lack of supportive structures. The greatest concern in these challenges was failure for donors to honor their pledges and that the involvement of the international community was uncoordinated and unstructured. The study established that several member countries either failed to remit their annual quota payments or failed to contribute to joint

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[92] Akinyi, Elizabeth A. "He Africa European Cooperation in Maintaining Peace, Security and Stability in Africa: a Critical Analysis of the Joint Africa-eu Strategy Framework." PhD diss., university of nairobi, 2018. Pp 34 which department?

[93] Asgedom, Messay. "The African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partnership in Peace and Security: Achievements and Challenges." Journal of Citizenship and Morality 2, no. 1 (2019): 80.

activities. Donor funding has been characterized by attachment of conditions in the manner in which it's utilized, the purpose, and to what extent.[94] Donors tend to utilize donor funding as a tool to advance their interests in the region thus limits the autonomous hand of the regional body IGAD. To enhance its effectiveness and efficiency IGAD has to ensure has a fund which is adequately funded by member states to ensure that projects they have initiated are implemented fully.

Secondly IGAD member states should enforce resolutions agreed upon through use of sanctions to ensure full compliance of any member state.[95] This will be crucial in ensuring that member states take upon themselves to enforce resolutions emanating from peace processes that have been mutually agreed upon. This will help IGAD's achieve its mandate and objective role of promoting peace and security regardless of change of governments. Such a recommendation will be key in unlocking the binding peace resolutions from a fragmented Somali autonomous state such as Somaliland.

IGAD should take a more prominent role in dealing with internal conflicts rather than leaving such mandate to global institutions such as the United Nations especially as there is a local regional mechanism that already exists.[96] Having regional institutions take prominent roles especially in post conflict phase is crucial as it will aid Somali in enhancing domestic national structures. This will be beneficial to the regional as their efforts to seek regional peace and security will be easily enforced and monitored.

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[94] Müller, Patrick, and Julian Bergmann. "Orchestrating peace in South Sudan: exploring the effectiveness of the European Union's mediation support." European Security 29, no. 2 (2020): pp169.

[95] Mechuol, James CD. "A Critical Analysis of the Igad Mediation in South Sudan and the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (Arciss)." PhD diss., university of Nairobi, 2018.pp 56

[96] Svicevic, Marko, ed. Compendium of documents relating to regional and sub-regional peace and security in Africa (2021). Pretoria University Law Press, 2021. Pp 15

Further recommendation in attaining peace and conflict management is to ensure the principle of inclusivity so as to ensure that the numerous group interest witnessed in Somalia are all factored in peace negotiations. This is so as to get a buy in and the local community groups in Somalia will own the peace process right from the commencement. This will further boost compliance on the resolutions agreed upon through a bottom-up approach from the community level, local leadership to national level and final to the regional level.

There will be a need to solve the developmental issues in the Horn of Africa through equitable sharing of resources in order to raise the living standards of the citizenry, ravaged by war for so long, and embrace them in a unified Somali.[97] These challenges can be adequately addressed of the mediation parties are continually in follow-through actions. The study observed that the identified success factors are required to make peace not only sustainable but also long lasting. Post-conflict reconstruction of Somali will require the engagement of all stakeholders. The regional and international communities with close proximity to the impacts of the conflict and long-term needs of the parties have a role to play in overseeing the return to normalcy of the parties.

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[97] Mitchell, John Talmadge. "A Framework for Development in Rural Arid and Semi-Arid Environments in Africa: The Somalia Case." PhD diss., Virginia Tech, 2020. Pp 34-37

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Appendix

Questionnaire

PART A: Peace resolution methods employed by IGAD in the Horn of Africa.

1.What role did the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) play in Somalia's re-establishment of peace?

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2. Name any of the achievements that IGAD has had in Somalia through peacekeeping.

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3. Is IGAD involving all actors in Somalia's conflict resolution efforts? (To what extent does IGAD adhere to and apply the principle of inclusivity?)

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4. How do you evaluate IGAD's decision-making capacity? Is it given attention when it makes decisions?

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5. In what ways has the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) helped to alleviate resource constraints? To what level do they have influence in IGAD's actions?

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6. How does the IGAD integrate its operations with other entities such as the African Union and the United Nations?

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PART B: IGAD's successes and challenges in settling disputes in the Horn of Africa

7. What is the extent to which IGAD makes use of local conflict resolution mechanisms?

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8. What are the obstacles to IGAD's position in Somalia's conflict resolution strategies?

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9. Is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) equipped with the necessary policy framework and implementation capabilities to address the root causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa?

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PART C: proposed policies to strengthen the IGAD's position in Somalia's dispute resolution

10. Mention a few ways to improve Somalia's long-term peace-building mechanisms.

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11. What should be implemented to promote the IGAD's peace and structure?

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12.What should be done now, and in the future, to actively engage IGAD in post-conflict reconstruction activities?

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