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IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE ON STATE SECURITY IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY LILONGWE IN MALAWI

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted for the award

of degree in any other university

Signature .... Date. 25 May 2022

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family for their moral support in my academic pursuits away from home, you have been a great inspiration.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF APPENDICES

1.   Questionnaire

2.   Map of study area

3.   Letter of authorization

4.   Turnitin Plagiarism test report

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBS   Bodu Bola Sena (Sri Lanka Extremist Bhdddist Religion Group)

CEDAW   Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

DCA   Danish Church Aid

EAM   Evangelical Association of Malawi

EU   European Union

GWOT   Global War on Terror

ICCPR   International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR   International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICT   Information Communication Technology

MAM   Muslim Association of Malawi

MA BA THA   Organization for Protection of Race And Religion (Myanmar Extremist Buddhist

            Religion Group)

MDAs   Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies

NCA   Norwegian Church Aid

NHRI   National Human Rights Institution

NPA   National Peace Architecture

OIC   Organisation of Islamic Countries

RDT   Relative Deprivation Theory

SADC   Southern Africa Development Community

SIT   Social Identity Theory

UDF   United Democratic Front

UDHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNDP   United Nations Development Program

USA   United States of America

OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS

Religion - Religion is the relationship between human beings or a group of human beings to that which they believe and regard as sacred, absolute, divine, spiritual and deserve a special reverence. Such a relationship makes individuals to devotedly follow the dictates of such a social-cultural system.

Religious Intolerance - Failure to respect beliefs of other religious groups leading to discrimination. This may include sentiments that own religious beliefs are correct and all others that differ are wrong.

State - A composition of a nation or nations in a defined territory with organized political and functioning institutions of governance under one government.

State Security - A condition where there are no threats to sovereignty, territorial integrity, national stability, constitutional order, well-being and safety of citizens.

ABSTRACT

There is general consensus that contemporary African conflicts are fueled by the need to protect identity and are based on ethnicity, religion or the combination of the both. These conflicts start as latent with identity structural causes and if not resolved they have most often turned violent and protracted becoming more difficult to resolve. To this end, this study explored implications of religion intolerance on state security in Africa using Malawi as a case study, Lilongwe City to be specific. The study was anchored on Social Identity Theory which argues that groups or individuals dedicate themselves in protecting what they believe is in the best interest of the group to protect or further group identity. The study was more qualitative though some quantitative techniques were also incorporated. Apart from using secondary data, primary data was collected using questionnaire. Analysis involved content analysis for qualitative data and quantitative data was analyzed using Microsoft Excel software.Key findings of this study are that intolerance in Malawi is existent and is increasing over time with waves of violent events, thus negatively affecting state security. The policies and strategies in place now are less effective while some policies and strategies which could have been useful are non-existent. Resource constraints and contradicting irreconcilable beliefs are among some of the obstacles to effective implementation of the available policies and strategies. Uses of coercive measures to address religious intolerance have not been effective because they only address the surface while underlying causes remain intact. On the other hand, faith-based organizations have proved to be useful in addressing such issues. Overall, the study recommends that Malawi government; explore proactive measures that would address religious conflicts in their latent stages using non-coercive strategies and policies. The government should also provide sufficient resources for effective implementation of available policies and strategies. At the same time there is a need to fast track drafting new policies to cover gaps exposed by this study.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0   Introduction to the Study

Inter-religious conflicts have a long history of negatively affecting societies. Origins of the ancient crusades, through Jihads to the current Global War on Terror (GWoT) can all be linked to religious intolerance[1]. Religious intolerance is one of the major causes of conflicts, which most often than not turn violent, thus undermining state security. Challenges to state security in one country cannot be confined within its boundaries alone but they quickly become transnational and eventually globalized. This study consequently intends to examine the implications of religious intolerance in Africa with a keen eye on Lilongwe City in Malawi. This chapter covers the study background, problem statement, research questions, literature review, hypotheses, and justification of the study, theoretical framework and research methodology.

1.1   Back ground of the Study

In this study, religious intolerance has been used to refer to the hostility of one religion towards the other religion(s) and inability to accept and coexist in a community[2]. Wood[3] asserts that religious intolerance is as old as religion itself and originates from the tendency of religious groups considering themselves as the only rightful entities to enjoy the freedom of worship. For thousands of years, this perception has led to religious intolerance including discrimination and persecutions of the perceived opponents[4]. Whether this problem turns into a violent conflict or not depends on how states handle the latent conflicts before they are triggered into an open conflict. Different states handle such structural conflicts differently. While in some countries the

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[1] Saighal Vinod. "Jihad And Crusades.", 20-28.
[2] Nussbaum, Martha. "Religious Intolerance", 44-45.
[3] Wood, James E., Jr. "Religion and Religious Liberty", 225-230.
[4] Ibid.

intolerance turns violent, in some states it has been contained. States like Indonesia have to a larger extent managed to contain religious intolerance between the majority Muslim community and other religious minorities[5].

State security in this study is the capacity of the state to guard against any threats to its national values including the population, economy and institutions[6]. A state is therefore secure if there are no dangers to its territorial integrity, the population is safe, governance structures are effectively functional and the government is able to exercise sovereignty on them.

1.1.1 Religion and State as Concepts

Nash[7] contends that trying to define religion has been regarded a risky adventure that may lead into an intellectual misperception, this is because religion bears numerous immeasurable dimensions. He however defines religion as "…the feelings of absolute dependence upon the First Cause of life…" In this definition, three important elements require clear understanding and these are feelings, absolute dependence and first cause of life.

Feelings are emotional translation of a situation or an activity; this means that feelings are socially constructed. 'Absolute dependence' means individuals are completely reliant on some Supreme Being without whom nothing can work out; this is a belief. Lastly, 'first Cause of life' means the one who started life, thus the Supreme Being. Looking at contemporary dispensation and religious paradigms, definition by Nash[8] though not directly clear and inapplicable to some religions, seem to fit well to the purpose of this discourse. On the other hand, a state as explained

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[5] McCoy, Mary E.. "Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Corporatist Metaphors and the Rise of Religious Intolerance.", 279-280.
[6] Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflicts and International System,* 1-12.
[7] Nash, Henry S. "Nature and Definition of Religion", 1-30.
[8] Ibid.

by Buzan[9] is a composition of four elements: geographical territory, a society of population living therein, institutions to govern and lastly sovereignty. Governing institutions are entrusted in administering, preserving and provide security of the state.

1.1.2 Religious intolerance and state security

Religious intolerance means hostility towards other religions and inability of religious enthusiasts to harmonize their theories and the practical aspect of religion[10]. Religious intolerance emanates from two elements; the first element is the perception of taking one's religious conviction to be the only morally true religion including its teachings. The second and dangerous element is when the state and/or private citizens coerce or attempt to coerce one religion into another religion. Arguably, these circumstances may lead to intolerance between different religious groupings as they strive for superiority and to retain integrity of their religious communities[11].

Religions are entities that bear too much influence that grow from the construction of social identities that they feel obliged to protect once their survival is threatened. Social Identity Theory (SIT) as ascribed to Henri Tajfel (1981) explains that groups or individuals dedicate themselves in protecting what they believe is in the best interest of the group to protect or further group identity[12]. This need for protection translates to disliking other religions or entities that are a perceived a threat; if the structural causes of that insecurity feeling are not timely resolved, the result is violence that will affect state security[13]. For instance in 2012, Myanmar in Eastern Asia experienced conflicts that emanated from failure to resolve religious intolerance resulting into

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[9] Barry Buzan. *People, States & Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. (2nd Edition),* 65-74.
[10] Nussbaum, Martha. "Religious Intolerance", 44-45.
[11] Nussbaum, Martha. "Religious Intolerance", 44-45.
[12] Cook-Huffman, Celia. "The Role of Identity in Conflict.", 19-28.
[13] Ibid.

violent clashes between Buddhist and Muslim communities where lives were lost, and businesses, houses and property belonging to Muslims got destroyed[14].

Religious intolerance has not spared Europe either as historically the crusades started from ancient Roman Empire. In the contemporary era, Europe has witnessed violent conflict in Yugoslavia. Kunovich and Hodson[15] contend that Yugoslavia collapsed because of religious intolerance conflicts. The argument is that being a meeting place for Croats who were Catholics, Serbs who were Orthodox and the Muslims resulted into violent conflicts. This intolerance eventually became the major cause of the breakup of former Yugoslavia[16]. Modern Europe also experienced incidents of religious intolerance as argued by Nussbaum[17] who also contends that religious intolerance is prevalent even in the modern Europe states citing examples of France where the government is reluctant to accept displaying of religious symbols in schools[18].

State security for several North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa countries has been chaotic for a long period due to armed conflicts related to religion. Countries like Somalia, Nigeria, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) among many others are insecure today due to religious intolerance[19]. International Crisis Group report for 2015 indicate that other than the intolerance between different religious groupings, there is also an issue of intra religious group intolerance resulting in creation of rival subgroupings to defend subgroup interests; a quick example is the Sunni-Shia divide in Muslim religion[20].

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[14] International Crisis Group. "Violence in Other Parts of Myanmar", 1-10.
[15] Kunovich, Robert M. and Hodson, Randy. "Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia", 648-651.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Nussbaum, Martha. "Religious Intolerance", 44-45.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] International Crisis Group. "Cameroon.", 1-10.

Malawi just like other African countries is not spared from issues of religious intolerance only that the conflict is in latent state. There are reported incidences of inter and intra religious intolerance in the country, one of them happened on 12 February 2003 as the Muslim community was protesting against a decision by the government in allowing the USA government to take five Muslims suspected to have links to terrorism for interrogation. Surprisingly, the Muslim community directed their wrath towards burning five churches[21]. Most of this damage happened in southern Lake District of Mangochi where the dominant ethnic tribe, the Yao is mostly Muslim. The violence also resulted in damage of offices of the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM) and offices of governing United Democratic Party (UDF).

The USA government's International Religious Freedom Report on Malawi from 2015 to 2020 recorded several incidents that indicate religious intolerance. During the period, several Rastafarian children were denied enrolment because of their dreadlocks; the issue was referred to the courts and it remains unresolved to date[22]. Muslim leaders have shown resentment on the government school curriculum that offers bible knowledge. Another incident turned violent when an Anglican school sent back several girls for wearing hijabs. The violence that followed resulting in government schools to being closed for eight weeks. In yet another standoff that occurred in Blantyre in November 2020 where Muslim community erected billboard, which was translated to derogatory Christians, and they pulled down the billboard. There are also incidents where the Muslim community in Mangochi has closed liquor joints and pork market justifying their actions that the area is a state that follows Sharia Law[23].

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[21] Mchombo, Sam. "Religion and Politics in Malawi.", 1-16.
[22] USA Government International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi from 2015 to 2020.
[23] Ibid.

1.2   Statement of the Problem

Rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) have led to the emergence of diverse religious groups. These different groups have diverse beliefs that call for total submission from their followers, strict pursuance of the beliefs and teachings that at times contradict those of other religious groups, resulting into intolerance which in turn leads to conflict and violence.

Religious intolerance being a threat to state security and a major cause of violence in Africa has never received adequate attention among the scholars and academicians. Africa has for a long period of time suffered religious intolerance which if not resolved at the latent stage graduates into violence, thus affecting state security[24]. Despite these historical and current events, states are doing very little to address this kind of vice.

Some countries in North and West Africa have seen such intolerance turning into full-fledged violent conflicts destabilizing state security. Currently, events in the Southern African countries indicate the existence of latent religions, unfortunately, some governments are not being proactive enough in securitizing this issue to resolve the structural causes of the phenomena. Inactivity of governments in this region raises a question as to whether policy makers understand the risks of failure to timely resolve religious intolerance.

In Malawi, despite all the evidence of the presence of religious intolerance and the impact it has on state security, the state seems not to be doing much to address the issue. Resultant violence from the neglect to resolve these structural conflicts can have far-reaching ramifications in

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[24] Sulaiman, Kamal-deen Olawale. "Religious Violence in Contemporary Nigeria:: Implications and Options for Peace and Stability Order" , 85-103.

Malawi and beyond the geographical boarders. This threat required a critical study to help create a detailed understanding of the phenomena. This study therefore endeavored to examine how religious intolerance influences state security in Africa using Lilongwe City in Malawi as the case study.

1.3   Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study was to investigate implications of religious intolerance on state security in Africa using Lilongwe City in Malawi as the study setting. The study specifically endeavored to:

1.3.1   Examine the impact of religious intolerance on state security in Africa.

1.3.2   Investigate strategies applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi.

1.3.3   Explore challenges encountered in addressing religious intolerance in Malawi.

1.4   Research Questions

The study covered the following research questions:

1.4.1   What implications do religious intolerance have on state security in Africa?

1.4.2   What are some of the strategies being applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi?

1.4.3   What are the challenges encountered in addressing religious intolerance in Malawi?

1.5   Literature Review

This section intends to review existing literature on linkages of religious intolerance and state security. With the use of relevant theories, the section examines the key debates by different

scholars on aspects of the impact of the religious intolerance on the state security in Africa, with specific focus on Malawi.

1.5.1 Theoretical Literature Review

There are several theories, which can be employed to study and understand the impact of religious intolerance to state security. This study uses the Thomas Theorem and Relative Deprivation Theories. These theories explain how groups interpret situations and react violently to such interpretations thus affecting state security.

1.5.1.1 Thomas Theorem

Amongst many other theories, Thomas Theorem[25] can be a useful theory to study the impact of religious intolerance to state security. The Theorem propagated by American sociologists; William Isaac Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas (1863–1967), uses sociological perspectives to explain how religious intolerance may affect state security. The key argument in this theorem is that people tend to interpret events differently; those situations interpreted to be real threats will be met with real reactions[26]. This therefore means that religious groups use their cognitive abilities to define situations around them including activities of other players in their community and the way they interpret their analysis will determine their reaction, which sometimes becomes violent. Groups can therefore interpret situations as threat whether real or perceived and consequently react to them.

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[25] Merton, Robert K.. "The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect.", 380-386.
[26] Ibid.

Freemen of Montana group that refused to corporate with the United States of America (USA) government by refusing to pay taxes and rather chose to commit mass suicide at Jonestown[27]. Kippenburg[28] explains this incident with Thomas Theorem linking it to state security in the way that once religious groups have formed an interpretation of an event, they react violently to anything they regard as external and may even resist state control as they may regard it external hence becoming ungovernable. He further argues that there have been instances where political struggles are interpreted as religious wars thus giving them the impetus and ideological support from their sympathizers[29].

1.5.1.2 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory (RDT) uses social science approaches and is ascribed to Samuel Stouffer. The main preposition of this theory is that individuals or groups will compare their status and that of other similar constructs and determine whether they are socio-politically better or inferior. When the determination is negative, it results into resentment, anger and a feeling to claim their presumed entitlement[30]. Three elements need to occur for RDT to be realized and these are: a comparison of individuals or groups to other referent individuals or groups, secondly the determination from the first step must be negative and lastly the perceived or real deprivations provoke anger. The three steps must be present for RDT to be ignited; the absence of one of them will not yield any reaction[31].

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[27] Kippenberg, Hans G. "Searching for the Link between Religion and Violence by Means of the Thomas-Theorem.", 102-103.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Pettigrew, Thomas F. "Samuel Stouffer and Relative Deprivation.",24.
[31] Pettigrew, Thomas F. "Samuel Stouffer and Relative Deprivation.",24.

When anger is provoked, in case of a group the result is collective action, in case of individuals the result is either individual action or joining and forming groups of similar personalities and initiate collective action[32]. However, RDT provided a disparity between relative deprivations and absolute ones, absolute deprivation is presumably supposed to be one that can cause violence[33]. The justification is that individuals that are in objective or absolute deprivation may not feel deprived if they do not have a referent entity or they are satisfied with their status quo and never expect any change. What matters in RDT are the interpretations of the status to a referent entity and a feeling of being entitled to a situation better than or equal to the referent object, the theory is therefore not concerned with the absoluteness but the perceived conditions with regard to the referent entity and the feelings of being denied better entitlement[34].

A study conducted by Sayre[35] proved that RDT is a useful tool in analyzing social conflicts. He compared the number of suicide bombings in Israel, West Bank and Gaza with the income of the Palestinians from 1995 to 2004. The findings were that the bombings were highest during the period of Palestinian economic crisis. The RDT is therefore a useful tool in studying social and religious groups inclusive in their involvement or possible involvement in violence as empirically proven by researchers.

1.5.2   Empirical Literature Review

This section examines the empirical literature organized around the three specific objectives that guide this study: to examine the impact of religious intolerance on state security in Africa, to

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[32] Ibid.
[33] Sayre, Edward A. "Relative Deprivation and Palestinian Suicide Bombings.",443.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 448.

investigate the strategies applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi, and finally, to examine the challenges encountered in addressing religious intolerance in Malawi.

1.5.2.1   Religious Intolerance and State Security

The end of cold war caught scholars unaware of the existence of religiously motivated wars as the focus was on interstate wars, this period was filled with liberation struggles and which had already subsided and many colonies had gained independence. Rubenstein[36] contends that most secular struggles of this period were deliberately transformed to religious ones, the reason being religious wars generate morale for themselves as fighters are convinced that they are fighting for a godly cause and rewards are martyrdom. Again, leaders of such wars were assured of getting financial and logistic support from religious sympathizers even from individuals within the ranks of their adversary. Lastly, the conversion happened because religious wars cannot be easily won or lost as members may not easily surrender due to the perception that god is fighting on their side[37].

Globally and historically religious intolerance has threatened state security. Drake[38] posits that early incidences of religious intolerance were recorded after Roman Emperor Constantine was converted to Christianity. He claims that such intolerance led to violent conflicts between Christians and pagans within the empire resulting into protracted wars that eventually become a major contributing factor to the fall of the Roman Empire among other causes[39]. Further claims are that deadly religious based conflict commenced in the 4th century, the same period the

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[36] Rubenstein Richard E. *Resolving Structural Conflicts*, 113-118.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Drake, H.A.. "Intolerance, Religious Violence, and Political Legitimacy in Late Antiquity.", 193-235.
[39] Drake, H.A. "Intolerance, Religious Violence, and Political Legitimacy in Late Antiquity.", 193-235

concept of martyrdom became very popular. This concept gave an ideological reason for religious violence.

The study further indicated that political leaders including emperors of the time either condoned or turned a blind eye on issues of religious intolerance because they were also culprits of the identity-based misconceptions[40]. Failure by the Christian emperors to resolve the issue of religious intolerance and violence was negative to state security because as guarantor of safety to both Christians and pagans, these ancient emperors left the pagans to provide safety for themselves thus creating security vacuum and breaching the social contract. Additionally, the inaction gave Christian bishops more power and authority more than emperors hence losing the authority to exercise sovereignty. Several studies in different regions of the world have also empirically concluded the existence of a relationship between religious intolerance and state security.

Globally, issues of religious intolerance continue to affects state security. Neuberg et al [41] argue that where there is difference in power, access to resources or any perceived threat, rival religious groups will engage in a conflict to improve the status quo. The larger group of the two contending adversaries is more likely to oppress the smaller party as the perception is to exploit their advantageous position. However, a smaller motivated group will fight back to attain whatever they believe is just as evidenced in Sri Lanka and Myanmar[42].

Studies in Eastern Asia, Myanmar found three key factors that fuel violence; participation of religious leaders in state politics, ineffective reactions by state agencies to counter the threats and

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[40] Ibid.
[41] Neuberg, Steven L et al. "Religion and Intergroup Conflict: Findings from the Global Group Relations Project.", 198-206.
[42] Ibid, 199.

the majority-minority construct which motivated the majority to attack the minority Muslim groups[43]. The study covered Sri Lanka and Myanmar with the determination to investigate the emergence of fundamentalist Buddhism with regard Rohingya security crisis and extremist Buddhist violence on Muslims in Sri Lanka. The involvement of political leaders in extremist religious fundamentalism and intolerance and their failure to provide security to the Muslim minority has a negative effect state security.

Population construct between Bhuddist and Muslims played a critical role in the events in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Buddhist - Muslims population ratio in Sri Lanka and Myanmar is 75 to 25 % and 90 to 10 % respectively. This construct and the absence of state initiatives to counter religious intolerance resulted in formation of extremists Buddhist groups named Bodu Bola Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar[44]. These groups were allegedly advocating for narratives against the minority Muslims insinuating they are a threat to state security of the two countries and thus justifying violence against them. The population structure in populist politics meant politicians' reluctance to discipline the majority group in fear of losing popular support thus fear of losing elections. Gunasingham[45] explains that BBS and the Sri Lankan government discriminated the Tamils who are minority Hindus; it is for the same reason that Sri Lanka experienced a 30 year long with the separatist Tamil Tigers.

Lack of effective legal system led to uncontrolled violence emanating from religious intolerance in Myanmar. Since 2012, Ma Ba Tha has managed to mobilise Buddhist against Muslims killing hundreds and destroying their properties and some fleeing as refugees to China[46]. In Myanmar, such killings and property destruction were rampant and went without any sanction from the

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[43] Gunasingham, Amresh. "Buddhist Extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar.",1-6.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Min Zin. "Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now?", 375-397.

state due to lax in security. In the town of Arakan extreme Bhudhhidts killed 200 Muslims and displaced 140,000. Myanmar government is accused of taking no action to hate speeches propagated by Ma Ba Tha the negligence that led to loss of lives and property[47]. The reason could be the same populist politics as Buddhist constitute majority of the votes.

Religious intolerance has also affected some states in Europe with some states experiencing rise in terror and xenophobic attacks by different extremist groups. European states regard religious intolerance and its associated violence as both interior and external threat to state security. In an investigation by Niemi[48] et al on the adult youths in Finland, they empirically found that there is religious intolerance between Finnish and migrant Muslim population. This intolerance has created fears of violent jihadist in the Finnish population and further exacerbated discrimination towards Muslims[49]. Key findings include the direct link between religious intolerance and issues of state security due to ever-increasing occurrences of violent religious related attacks and the feeling of insecurity among the population. These authors also found that that number of arrested suspected jihadist rose from 159 in 2012 to 718 in 2016. This rise in threat presents a threat to state security of European countries as Europeans have a feeling of insecurity[50].

The main recommendation from this study is that in order to reduce the chances of religious intolerance, radicalization and jihadist education should offer learners with the neutral view of the world. The argument is that once learners acquire broad worldviews of all religions it will be difficult to radicalize them. They also recommended that religious leaders to hold a minimum of a higher degree as this would reduce probability of religious fundamentalism and intolerance

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[47] Ibid.
[48] Niemi, Pia-Maria et al. "Religion as a Human Right and Security Threat – Investigating Young Adults in Finland", 1-16.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

thereby minimizing the threat to state security. Further, they recommended the government to introduce laws regulating parents from forcing their children to belong to any religion regardless of their age, as Finland is a secular state. The justification is that starting attending religious functions at early stages stimulates fundamentalism. Another notable recommendation is that religion and state affairs should clearly be separate and not influencing each other[51]. African has also its own experiences on the issues of intolerance.

Africa's most populous nation of Nigeria gives a useful perspective on how religious intolerance can negatively affect state security. Nigeria's religious construct is composed of 50.5% Muslims and 48.2 % Christians while other religions share the remaining 1.4%. It is regarded as the most religious country in Africa with individuals even pledging to die defending their religion, even politicians are said to call themselves 'soldiers' in defense of faith. Geographically Christians dominate the south while Muslims dominate the north[52].

Agbiboa[53] explored the role of religion in developing identity to religious terrorism in Nigeria and brought out several useful findings. The important finding is the role ethnicity plays in strengthening religious identities. In Nigeria, most of the Hausas are Muslims while Igbos are mostly Christians; the ethnic divide duplicated by a redundancy of religious difference increased the levels of intolerance[54]. The second important finding is the religion-political interplay where electorates vote in line with ethno-religious divide. Christians who will mostly happen to be Igbos by tribe will vote for Christian candidate while Muslims mostly Hausa votes for Muslim candidates. Politics presents a third conflict area adding to ethnicity and religion. These aspects

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[51] Niemi, Pia-Maria et al. "Religion as a Human Right and Security Threat – Investigating Young Adults in Finland", 1-16.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Agbiboa Daniel Egiegba. "Living in Fear: Religious Identity, Relative Deprivation and the Boko Haram Terrorism", 153-170.
[54] Ibib.

triggered violence in 2001 killing 165 people when a Christian candidate won council election against a Muslim candidate. In 2011, a Muslim presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari lost to a Christian candidate Goodluck Jonathan, the violence that followed killed 800 people and displaced 65,000[55].

Another interesting finding concerns government policies and declarations on Islamic religious affiliations, which did go well with the Christians. President Ibrahim Babangida unilaterally took Nigeria to Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) while Sani Abacha declared Nigeria as a member of Developing 8 (D-8), a development grouping for Muslim countries. Disapproval by Christians on Nigerian these policy decisions and approval on the same by Muslims led to violent clashes resulting into deaths and damage to property. These presidential decisions also ignited Sharia Law debate with some Federal States in the North adopting Sharia Law though there were some Christian residents within. Kaduna State had half of its population as Christians and attempts to introduce Sharia Law resulted into fierce clashes resulting into deaths and damage to property[56].

The above religious intolerance phenomena gave a fertile ground for the formation of a radical group, Boko Haramu. Boko Haramu advocates against Western education, Western style of governance and organization. They viewed Western education as a way of dominating Muslims, government institutions as dominated by Christians and then interpreted it as threat to Islam. Boko Haram therefore withdrew obedience to laws of Nigeria; law enforcement agencies crushed Boko Haram giving rise to reprisal retaliation. From 2009, Boko Haram has killed and kidnapped thousands and has attempted to politically control the whole of Nigeria and administer

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[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.

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Sharia Law[57]. The findings indicate how quickly religious intolerance can transform into socio-political violence affecting state security.

In studying Boko Haram, Agbiboa used the Relative Deprivation Theory to understand the rise of insecurity emanating from violence perpetrated by the group. He argues that dissatisfaction translates to frustration against interpreted threats; these threats can be either real or perceived. He recommends governments to dissolve religious tensions by embarking on religious dialogue among religious leaders and their members as this will create an atmosphere of trust. He further suggests governments need to introduce joint projects in communities that have mixed population to create cohesion. He claims religious education directed towards understanding all religions and respect will create an environment of tolerance. Lastly, he calls on governments to invest in improving the socio-economic status of local societies to reduce or eliminate economic despair among the youth as they become easy targets for radicalization if left idle.

Religion will only act as a mobilization element for violence when there is an intersection between religious and tribal identities; this is what Basedau et al calls religious polarization[58]. In their study on Sub-Saharan countries from 1990 to 2008, Basedau et al found linkages between religious intolerance, armed conflict and state security which they claim is exacerbated when religious intolerance is politicized in the presence of religious polarization. He says the presence of politicized religious intolerance and religious polarization can easily be exploited to mobilize individuals and groups for violence, negatively affecting state security[59].

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[57]Agbiboa Daniel Egiegba. "Living in Fear: Religious Identity, Relative Deprivation and the Boko Haram Terrorism", 153-170.
[58] Basedau. Matthias et al, "Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa", 1-30.
[59] Ibid.

In Malawi, Muslim-Christian intolerance is claimed to continue growing as these two are the major religions in the country[60]. Apart from this there are also intra-religious conflicts happening within Muslin and Christian communities. Malawi has a multi religious construct of Christians (77.3%), Muslims (13.8%) and other religions; Baha'is, Hindus, Sikhs and Rastafarianism compose 5.6%. The Christian community comprises of Catholics (17.2%), Central Presbyterians (14.2%), Seventh Day (9.4%), Anglican (2.3%), and Pentecostals (26.6%)[61]. While the Christian community is multi ethnic, more than half of the Muslim community is from the same ethnic tribe, the Yao. For the Yaos, an overlap of ethnicity and religion creates what Matthias Basedau et al called Polarization[62].

On 27 June 2003, some violent events emanated from religious intolerance in Malawi left property damaged and some people injured. This was when USA authorities in collaboration with the Malawi government detained five Muslims to interrogate them on their possible links to terrorism acts[63]. Muslims interpreted this detention as an attack on their Muslim identity resulting in retaliatory violence. The violence resulted in burning down of churches, assault of priests and declaration of Mangochi district as a Muslim territory. The police were called in to pacify the situation.

Mchombo[64] argues that historical societal structures have led marginalization of the Yao ethnic community. Islam was the first religion to come to Malawi by the slave trade through Arabs, arrival of the colonialists stopped slave trade and brought Christianity. Early missionaries built schools across the country, which Muslim children had to attend Christian schools as these were

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[60] Mchombo, Sam. "Religion and Politics in Malawi.", 1-16.
[61] USA Government 2020 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Mchombo, Sam. "Religion and Politics in Malawi.",1-16.
[64] Ibid.

the only schools available at the time. By attending Christian schools, some kids were slowly getting indoctrinated into Christian beliefs, a development that made parents to stop sending their kids to school thereby reducing their life time opportunities[65]. Using relative deprivation theory, this group would be a future threat to state security. On the other hand, Christian children attend school thus giving them a marked advantage, this according to Mchombo could cause resentment and anger later.

There were some violent incidents recorded in 2020 most of which were interpreted as a product of religious intolerance; one of such incidents is the denial of seven Rastafarian children primary school registration due to their dreadlocks. On 28 October, a group of Muslims burned the office of a primary school head for denying Muslim girls wearing hijabs entry into classes, the school also closed for some days owing to this incident. This was a Christian school and the headtreacher thought wearing hijab was not in the interest of the school and the church therefore decided to send them back [66]. On 27 November 2013, running battles broke between pork vendors and Muslim believers in Mangochi town where the earlier claimed selling pork in a Muslims dominated area is against their right to religion. The issue went to court and the court temporarily halted the sale of pork in the area[67].

Another sticky and long hanging issue is the request by MAM to revisit the curriculum for schools. The MAM requested the ministry of education to remove the Bible Knowledge curriculum from primary schools and replace it moral and religious education. MAM argues that such adjustment will be more acceptable to both Christians and Muslims as it will incorporate interests of them all, this is not yet resolved. In a separate incident on 29 July, Muslim

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[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] *Malawi Muslims riot in Mangochi over pork Sale*. Nyasa Times. Accessed on 20 August 2020.
https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-muslims-riot-in-mangochi-over-pork-sale/

community erected a billboard in Blantyre that read, "If you have read the Old Testament now read the Last Testament, The Ultimate Miracle." Christians as considered this content as a violation of their belief and the night that followed this billboard was vandalized. The EAM and MAM held a round table discussion convened by the Blantyre City Assembly where they amicably resolved and the content was changed[68].

1.5.2.2   Strategies to Address Religious Intolerance

Societies need to detect and study conflict systems including their structural causes then determine how to manipulate the links and nodes of the conflict systems in order to resolve them. The argument is that dealing with the violent conflict is like resolving the tip of the iceberg while the cause remain unresolved. For instance, after the Catholic-Protestant wars European governments decided to depoliticize religion and secularize states, arguably this reduced religious-based conflicts from the underlying causes. Further to that, meeting the basic needs of the conflicting parties also reduced the triggers for violent conflicts[69].

Drake[70] contends that during the ancient times of the Roman Empire, emperors were sole directors of policies and were responsible for strategies for controlling religious related violence. The first-tier strategy was using local men of authority to calm the situation through negotiations, this strategy failed in most cases. The second tier was using the paramilitary, which was also mostly weak. The final and last tier was the army; emperors avoided deploying their armies due to the harshness in which they handled such situations, thus deploying an army in most cases would just worsen the situation.

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[68] USA Government 2020 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.
[69] Rubenstein, Richard E. *Resolving Structural Conflicts*. 113-118.
[70] Drake, H.A. "Intolerance, Religious Violence, and Political Legitimacy in Late Antiquity.", 193-235.

Empires also had court systems that played a role as a strategy to address issues that resulted from religious intolerance; some cases that were brought to the courts and determinations were delivered. Drake further states that government should be understand religious intolerance from the social-political perspective to state security and strive to resolve socio-political causes of religious intolerance[71]. The 'social contract' that bound the empires to protect their citizens is the same that binds states today to protect their citizens against the threats posed by religious intolerance. The most recent global tool to combat religious intolerance is the UN Assembly Resolution 75/187 dated 28 December 2020 that encourages states to foster religious tolerance. States are yet to make miles in implementing this resolution. Before this resolution states have used different policies and strategies to resolve this persistent problem.

In Myanmar, when violence started to be order of the day, the president decided to appoint a cabinet minister responsible for religious affairs. The appointment of this cabinet minister to an extent diffused the tension caused by Ma Ba Tha needs to be acknowledged. Additionally, Myanmar government drafted "protection of race and religion laws" that banned converting religions, inter-religion marriages and polygamy, legislature passed them into laws on 15 March 2015[72]. The laws were however favoring Buddhist as Ma Ba Tha took a leading role in drafting these.

Just like the ancient emperors did, the Myanmar government also deployed police as documented in the International Crisis Group Report (2013) saying that at various occasions the police arrested and prosecuted suspects of violence. The government and the police however received

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[71] Drake, H.A. "Intolerance, Religious Violence, and Political Legitimacy in Late Antiquity.", 193-235.
[72] Zin, Min. "Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now?", 375-397.

serious criticisms for their inaction[73]. The report also indicated the police were ill equipped and poorly trained to manage violence that emanated from religious intolerance. Myanmar civil society organizations composed of different religious backgrounds played the role of an impromptu strategy by protesting against laws that were seen to be reinforcing religious intolerance. They mobilized moderate citizens and campaigned in opposing to seemingly discriminating legislation, they eventually succeeded[74].

There are provisions in International Law that call for elimination of intolerance and violence including those emanating from religion. Convention or the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is one of such conventions whose purpose is to protect women and Malawi is part of this treaty. Malawi also ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights among many others. Mostly, contents of these treaties were domesticated in Malawi as a dualist state[75]. Additionally, Section 20 (1) of Malawi Constitution offers rights and protections against discrimination in any form. This means denying kids to enroll based on religion is outlawed by the constitution[76]. The constitution of the Republic of Malawi becomes a key document that provides direction with regard to enjoyment of rights. In the incident where Rastafarian kids were denied enrolment into school due to wearing dreadlocks, courts gave a ruling that guided that they be enrolled, as it was their right to access education and freedom of religion. It is however unclear whether issues of wearing hijabs and dreadlocks are covered under this

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[73] Gunasingham, Amresh. "Buddhist Extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar.", 1-6.
[74] Zin, Min. "Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: Why Now?", 375-397.
[75] Human Rights Liaison Unit. "Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights."
[76] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010) Chapter IV p 1.

provision ruling. It is also not clear if forcing Catholic schools to enroll Muslims wearing hijabs is not infringing right of the Catholics.

In Malawi, there are three categories of schools; government schools, Christian private schools that are government sponsored and private schools not sponsored by the government. As a policy, Malawi government funds several Christian private schools to enable communities send their schools to such schools in communities where government schools are not in proximity. This policy allows kids including Muslims to attend even Christian schools with no restriction with regard to religious demands.

The Malawi government has a policy which empowers the ministry of education to intervene where issue of discrimination in schools emerge. For example, when issues of Muslim girls wearing hijab in government and government-funded schools emerged, the ministry in consultation with the attorney general resolved the issue to an amicable conclusion[77]. When necessary, the Malawi government requests faith-based organizations like the MAM and Public Affairs Committee (PAC) to assists resolve religious based conflicts. Recently in August 2020, Malawi government established ministry of civic education and national unity whose mandate is not yet clear but this could have been a better approach to analyzing policies on religious intolerance.

Malawi government also deploys the police to quell violence that emanates from religious intolerance several times as one of the strategies. At one time during a fracas in Mangochi where Muslims attempted to declare the area as a Muslim territory the police were deployed to calm the situation and they successfully did so. The time they burned houses, closed bars, pork markets

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[77] USA Government 2020 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.

and school offices the police were also deployed to provide security for some days. Another strategy that Malawi has employed is the use of courts where for example the Rastafarian kids got a court relief when denied enrolment.

Religious organizations have established several mediation faith groups with the purpose of assisting the government in resolving religious issues. Where there are issues either these groups approach the government or when necessary, the government approaches them. For instance, the 29 July Billboard incident was resolve by the EAM, MAM and the PAC with the guidance of the Blantyre City Assembly. Additionally, the government initiated the formation of the Joint Technical Committee (JTC) composed of seven Christians and seven Muslims with the purpose of resolving some faith related issues among their faiths.

Some diplomatic missions especially the US embassy has also taken the initiative to mediate the faith groups whenever issues arise. The embassy convenes regular meetings for faith groups to build trust among the faith communities, such meetings act as an important forum for religious groups to resolve sticky issues among them[78]. Whether these strategies are effective enough remains an issue to be determined later.

1.5.2.3 Challenges in addressing religious intolerance

Globally implementing policies and strategies to address religious intolerance has been an uphill task as the international legal system was the first to fail such a test through 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination[79]. This treaty was

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[78] USA Government 2020 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.
[79] Sullivan Donna J. "Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination.", 488-489.

not implemented due to what Sullivan[80] termed as ambiguity and failure to define terms and the sensitivity of the matter in discussion. This declaration took four decades of negotiations to produce this document, which is regarded as weak and only not to be implemented despite the provisions therein binding states to abide by the provisions, countries failed to implement the declaration because they faced same problems of defining terms and sensitivity of the subject[81].

A study done in Kenya by Moyway[82] discovered six challenges leading to failure in implementing measure to address religious intolerance. The study explains that leaders of respective religious groupings take uncompromising stances to the extent that sometimes they view other religions as intruders to their areas of influence especially when they are a majority. This impression becomes difficult to change because even if the same leaders come with a contrary view, their followers may not accept the new stance convinced that he or she is corrupted. The second finding describes that mixing combining religion and politics as an unproductive combination with regard to eliminating religious intolerance, political decision makers are reluctant to employ effective measure to root out intolerance because they exploit the same to gain and retain power. Studies by Basedau[83] et al in Nigeria and Gunasingham[84] in Sri Lanka and Myanmar brought out exactly the same findings.

Still on Kenya, some beliefs of different religious groupings are poles apart that finding a common ground is close to impossible, conceding such beliefs would be betraying the whole religion. Allocation of resources by the government was another setback for implementing measure to reduce or eliminate religious intolerance. This inadequacy made establishing conflict

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[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Moywaywa Charles K. "Management of Religious Conflicts in Kenya: Challenges and opportunities." ,137.
[83] Basedau. Matthias et al, "Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa", 1-30.
[84] Gunasingham, Amresh. "Buddhist Extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar." 1-6.

management systems and capacity building a nightmare. Last but important finding was the role of ICT in the phenomena with the youth being the majority and the most versed in the field than their religious leaders. This means these youth access all sort of information; true or false and susceptible to more radicalized from internet sources.

Another study by Baumann et al[85] produced three key findings; the first is that different worldviews are difficult to unite regardless of whatever policy or strategy is applied. The explanation is that different religions have different views of the world making them incommunicable to the extent that they may not understand each other. The second finding was that religious groups never agree to compromise on something each feel is the sacred resource giving an example of the failed arrangement to divide Jerusalem, another example is the feeling of sacredness of the Sri Lanka to the Buddhist nationalists. The last finding focuses on the religious groups and the secularists on physical and spiritual life spans, while the secularists timelines are short those of the religious fundamentalists are long and at times eternal with expectation of martyrdom. The perceived length and eternality of their lives coupled with martyrdom beliefs translate to the determination to persist, wait and act[86]. The findings of these two studies are much related and can be married, the only difference is that Bauman et al did not mention ICT as a factor.

Like other Sub-Saharan countries, Malawi also faces challenges in implementing strategies aimed at addressing religious intolerance. Ashafa[87] argues that one of the reasons is the unwillingness of various religious followers understand each other. In separate forums, attempts

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[85] Baumann Jonas, Daniel Finnbogason, and Isak Svensso. "Rethinking Mediation: Resolving Religious Conflicts", 1-4.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ashafa, Abdullahi M. "Prospects, Possibilities and Challenges of Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Centre for World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology Journal* (2015).

to introduce the subject that would address religious intolerance has faced passive response, visibly are the attitudes between Christians and Muslims. The second challenge according to Ashafa is differences in interpretation of religious texts as their meaning is not clear; for instance, Christian and Muslims have different proclamations with regard to peace in relationship to jihads and crusades as these religions proclaim peace and at the same time devote violence. He argues that this plays a critical role in increasing the resistance to cooperate in implementing the measures to address intolerance.

Some religions do have superior spiritual leaders that have worldwide authority, lack of such global religious figures is argued to be another factor that derails the implementation of some strategies[88]. Just the way the Catholics have the Pope, if all religions had such global figures, then the spiritual directions would be coming from such figures. As argued by Ashaf, the absence of global religious figures give room for intra-religion manipulations and differences in the interpretation of the religious texts, this inhibits interfaith dialogue[89]. Ashaf also notes that most states do not dedicate sufficient resources for the implementation of strategies intended to address religious intolerance, this has led to reactionary actions when events occur. Committing enough resources would give flexibility to role players and facilitating effective policies and strategies that would cumulatively reduce religious intolerance, availability of resources would enhance proactivity.

Malawi also faces challenges in implementing policies aimed at addressing religious intolerance, the first challenge being financial resources. The country recently established a ministry responsible for national unity and civic education, being a new establishment, the ministry is not

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[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

yet receiving enough funding which it can in turn use to addressing religious intolerance. Again, the ministry has not yet established structures and acquired human resources to venture into effective implementation of the policies. Secondly, different religious groups do have the will to embark on dialogue so they can create informal relationships that can allow them to understand each other, this is due to mistrust especially from Christian's perception of Muslims as perpetrators of violence, this brings a challenge when it comes to interfaith dialogue. Additionally, there is lack of grass root structures for implementing the policies to address religious intolerance.

1.5.3   Gaps in Literature Review

From the literature review, one can commend the great work done by scholars to acknowledge the linkage between state security and religious conflicts emanating from intolerance. The literature review has clearly revealed that there is very little scholarly research done with the focus on SADC countries, Malawi inclusive, more studies done are from West African countries with others generalizing the Sub-Saharan Africa. This necessitated a conduct of a study that fits better the southern Africa landscape.

Additionally, the studies in Asia and Africa were done while religious intolerance had already erupted into violence. Recommendations made in these studies mostly fit into a violent conflict. However, religious intolerance is present in many areas where violence has not yet erupted. A study in such areas would help resolve the conflict in its structural stages. Further to that, population sample for studies that were done in Finland was taken from what the researcher called 'Politically Active" population between 18 to 30 years only. It is doubtful if the same African age bracket record findings similar to their European counterparts, secondly the study

focused on religion imported from mostly Muslim migrants so the results might be affected xenophobic sentiments.

This therefore means that while there are studies conducted elsewhere and whose findings are also useful and can be borrowed, there is a shortage of scholarly documents for studies conducted in the current context of most Southern African countries. It is therefore paramount to conduct such study so the gap in empirical literature that exist is covered.

1.6 Study Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated for the study:

1.6.1   Increase in religiosity and religious intolerance creates an inverse relationship with state security.

1.6.2   Effectiveness of the policies and strategies applied in managing religious intolerance is directly proportional to the effect such intolerance on state security.

1.6.3   Implementation of policies and strategies to deter religious intolerance is hampered by challenges.

1.7 Study Justification and Significance

This study is justified on the following premise:

1.7.1   Academic Justification

The study examines the implications religious intolerance may cause on state security in Africa using Lilongwe City in Malawi a case study. This is a real scenario and a replica of most countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, SADC region to be specific. Literature review has revealed that this phenomenon has not received focused attention in the area of the sub-Saharan region in

general and case study area in particular. The findings will therefore provide valuable literature for upcoming scholars and further act as a basis for further studies in the phenomena.

1.7.2   Policy Justification

The study will analyze current strategies and policies then determine their effectiveness. Observations in this analysis will help suggest ways in which these strategies and polices can be enhanced and where necessary propose for new ones. The findings will therefore be useful to policy makers in African countries and act as a basis in guiding strategy and policy reviews and formulation to address the phenomena.

1.8   Theoretical Framework

The study has adopted Social Identity Theory to establish the effects religious intolerance may cause on state security. Social Identity Theory (SIT) as ascribed to Henri Tajfel (1981) explains why groups or individuals therein gather the courage to act in what they believe is in the best interest of protecting and promoting group identity[90]. SIT views religious intolerance with psych-socio lens and is useful in analyzing socio and cognitive conceptions of groups and individuals therein including the formation of group cohesion. SIT creates categories by self-perceptions with regard to "our group" and "their group, this perception of the group ownership and sense of belonging boosts egos, self-esteem and personal dedication to the group. Individuals will therefore strive to fortify connections with their in-group; such connections can be in form of beliefs, values and shared threats[91].

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[90] Cook-Huffman, Celia. "The Role of Identity in Conflict.", 19-28.
[91] Ibid.

While fortifying their cohesion with in-group similarities, they emphasize the differences with the out-groups. This process sets the standard of behavior and form a collective identity[92]. Individuals therefore surrender their personal identity and adopt that for the group. Prominent scholars in conflicts agree that recent conflicts worldwide are mostly based on identity related causes[93]. This study will therefore use SIT as a theoretical framework.

1.9   Research Methodology

This section discusses methodological approaches that were utilized. It first outlines the study design, the study area, target population, sample size and sampling technique. It further explains tools for data collection, data analysis and finally the ethical considerations.

1.9.1   The Study Design

The study applied pragmatic design that combined both qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to capture the various aspects of the relationship between religious intolerance and state security.

1.9.2   Study Area

The study area for this case study was Malawi specifically Lilongwe City. Malawi is located in the South-Eastern part of Africa and has 28 administrative districts Lilongwe being the capital city. Lilongwe City is at the central of Malawi and it has been chosen because it is a cosmopolitan centre with diverse religions (See Appendix 2). The population religious fabric and context of Lilongwe City is similar to that of other cities in the SADC region and most countries in East Africa, thus the findings of this study can also be used in other countries in the region.

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[92] Ibid.
[93] Korostelina, Karina V. "Identity Conflicts, Models of Dynamics and Early Warning.", 100-101.

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1.9.3 Target Population

Religious Leaders, military officers, police officers, officials from the national intelligence services and some members of the public as indicated on table 1.1 below:

1.9.4 Sample Size and Sampling Frame

The targeted 112 respondents distributed among religious leaders, security officers and the general public. Sample size was determined using a formula recommended by Yamane[94] as enumerated below:

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N\,(e)^2}$$

Where: n= Sample size, N= Population size e= Level of Precision (0.005).

$$n = 98/1+98(0.05)2$$

$$n = 112$$

The sample size was selected through of purposive and simple random sampling, as indicated on table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1: Target Population, Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Ser No.	Target Population	Sample	Sampling Procedure
1.	Religious Leaders	20	Purposive
2.	Military Officers	20	Purposive
3.	Police Officers	20	Purposive
4.	Officials NIS	20	Purposive Sampling
5.	General Public	32	Random Sampling
Total		112	

(Source: Researcher 2021)

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[94] Yamane, Taro. "Statistics: An introductory analysis.", 133.

1.9.5   Data Collection Procedures

Primary data was collected using questionnaires (See appendix 1). Secondary data was collected by a desk review of the available books, journals and government official documents among many other sources.

1.9.6   Data Analysis Technique and Presentation

Quantitative and qualitative data were verified and analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Analyzing quantitative data involved content analysis and whose results are reported normatively. On the other hand, quantitative data was entered into Microsoft Excel for analysis. This data analysis was done with the purpose of achieving the objectives and answering the research questions. After data analysis, the results are presented in tables, graphs and charts in a clear, systematic and orderly manner in the Chapters corresponding to the objectives.

1.9.7   Ethical Considerations

In order to adhere to ethics of research, consent was sought from all respondents before taking part in the study and they were fee to withdraw this consent anytime they wanted to do so. Additionally, the researcher undertook an obligation to use the obtained information for academic purpose in this study only. No form of identity for the respondents was required on the study instruments.

1.9.8   Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study concentrated on religious intolerance and its effects on state security in Africa using Lilongwe City of the Sub-Saharan country of Malawi as a case study. Among the respondents,

there were intelligence, military and police officers who are secretive at times. Deriving more information from them was slightly difficult due to the nature of their job. On the other hand, getting information from religious leaders was also be difficult as the sensitivity of the subject made them less willing to give more information, there was also a high possibility of them giving biased information as they may be interested parties. Lastly, religious issues are treated with special thoughtfulness by those who believe and belong to particular religions that may be culprits of some activities that may be regarded as religious intolerance, responding to the instruments was not easy to such respondents.

1.9.9   Instruments Validity and Reliability

There was a need to determine the reliability and validity of the research instruments. Reliability on the instruments helped in ensuring consistency of the results in the event that the process is repeated over time under the same circumstances while validity helped to ensure accuracy of the results[95]. Questionnaires and interview guide were pretested to determine their suitability, lastly the researcher sought the opinion of the university supervisor in order to improve on the quality of the tools.

1.9.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction. This Chapter is an introduction of the study, it starts by the general introduction of the study then explains the background. Thereafter it describes the statement of the problem, objectives of the study and research questions. Then the chapter covers literature review which includes theoretical and empirical literature review before identifying the gaps of

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[95] Kothari C R. *Research Methodology: Methods & Techniques 2ⁿᵈ Edition*. New Delhi: Wishwa Prakashani (2003): 90-93.

the same.   This is followed by research hypothesis, study justification, theoretical framework and lastly research methodology.

Chapter Two: Religious Intolerance and State Security. The Chapter examines how implication of religious intolerance affects state security in Africa. It investigates empirical literature using global and African examples on religious intolerance and state security in detail. The chapter strives to bring out linkages between religious intolerance and state security.

Chapter Three: Strategies to Address Religious Intolerance. The Chapter examines policy measures and their effectiveness in addressing religious intolerance in Malawi. Examples are drawn from different countries where successful interventions have been implemented, this is an effort to identify and make recommendations for future strategies and refining of the existing ones.

Chapter Four: Challenges in addressing Religious Intolerance. The Chapter looks at challenges Malawi faces in implementing policies and strategies to address religious intolerance.

Chapter Five: Summary Conclusions and Recommendations. The Chapter presents some summary recommendations, conclusions and recommendations on each of the three study objectives.

CHAPTER TWO: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE AND STATE SECURITY IN AFRICA

2.0   Introduction

Contemporary conflicts are very complex ranging from their causes, actors, objectives and the tactics[96]. Many scholarly studies have been done to establish the linkage between religious intolerance and state security. Nsereko[97] argues that contemporary states have no monopoly of allegiance as was enjoyed by ancient kingdoms due to the influence religions have as they have literally taken a major share of that allegiance. It is this allegiance to religion that translates into threats to national security. While most African states have principally separated religion and the state, others have been declared Christian, Muslim or other religious states. Such declarations create discontent and a sense of insecurity to those who see themselves to be left out. This chapter borrows from existing literature and other secondary data sources to examine how religious intolerance affects state security in Africa. It investigates this empirical literature using African examples on religious intolerance and state security in detail and also present primary data findings on the first objective which was to examine the impact of religious intolerance on state security in Africa. The chapter then strives to bring out linkages between religious intolerance and state security using both secondary and primary data.

2.1   The Demographic Characteristics of the Study Respondents

In this study, out of the projected 112 respondents, 90 responded translating to 80.36 % and the demographic characteristics are presented in Table 2.1 below. Most of the respondents interviewed were male (58.89%), given the fact that occupations of the sample frame are male dominated. The majority of the respondents were mature adults ranging 40 – 45 years of age

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[96] Chinkin, Christine and Mary Kaldor. "Gender And New Wars.", 167-187.
[97] Nsereko, Daniel D. "Religion, the State, and the Law in Africa.", 269-287.

followed by those in the range between 40-45 years old. Almost all the respondents had some religious belief in that only 4.44% did not indicate their religion, the majority of respondents were Christians (77.78%) followed by Muslims (15.56%), this is a reflection of the religious demographics of the study area. More details are as tabulated below:

Table 2.1: Respondent Demographic Characteristics

Characteristic	Description	Total Respondents	Percentage
Sex	Male	53	58.89
	Female	37	41.11
Age	35-40 Years	8	8.89
	40-45 Years	37	41.11
	45-50 Years	28	31.11
	50-55 Years	17	18.89
Religion	Christians	70	77.78
	Muslims	14	15.56
	Rastafarians	2	2.22
	Others	4	4.44
Occupation	Religious Leaders	13	14.44
	Military Officers	20	22.22
	Police Officers	17	18.89
	NIS Officers	15	16.67
	General Public	25	27.78
Total		**90**	**100%**

(Source: Researcher 2021)

2.2   Religion as a Cause of Violence

According to Hashmi[98], extremism and violent conflict can be categorized into four schools of thought. The first school of thought as ascribed to Hent de Vries and Mark Juergenmeyers contends that religion always has violence of some sort and there is no violence without religion. In the same context Juergenmeyers argues that the violence emanates from the belief that people treat their lives as a struggle for their God. This struggle may lead them to take innocent lives of victims and sometimes sacrifice their own, the struggle to them is viewed as the struggle between evil and uprightness, light and darkness[99]. The second school of thought view religious violence as a product of incapability between radical religions and secular ones. The proponents of this school include Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Jessica Stern. Another school of thought as ascribed to Tedd Hurr argue that religious violence is caused by radicals that are united by fear of losing their influence in the society, fear for loss of followers thus may not realise their desires[100].

Hasenclever and De Juan[101] conceptualise three conditions required for religion to cause violence which may affect state security; the first possibility is when the forms of religious beliefs of different groupings cannot coexist leading to irreconcilable persuasions resulting to clashes. They further posit that religious beliefs which are regarded uncompromisable have a higher chance of causing a violent conflict with a contrasting religious grouping within the proximity, to them religiously homogenous societies are likely to be more stable than heterogeneous ones. Secondly, the argument explains that religions exploit populations' numbers in the religious

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[98] Hashmi, Arshi Saleem. "Pakistan Report: Politics, Religion and Extremism." Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2009).
[99] Ibib.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Hasenclever, Andreas, and Alexander De Juan. "Grasping the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts: Empirical findings and theoretical perspectives." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007): 19-47.

groupings mostly in bipolar constellations where the higher figures will be used to mobilise fighters, they argue that mobilisation is not possible when there are high degrees of religious fragmentations which act as barrier to mobilisations. The last condition is that there must be rivalry and a perception of being threatened and requires the need for self-protection as the state is not able to provide [102]. The second argument however may not be applicable in the contemporary era where terrorist Lone Wolfers attack target individually.

Fox[103] contends that although religion might not cause violent conflict at all times, where there is existence of religious polarity and violence is triggered, religion acts as fuel to escalate the violence. In his study he observed that conflicts that are ethnically oriented become more brutal, complicated and intense if there is a religious connotation. Termination of such conflicts also becomes a problem as the underlying causes are difficult to resolve. Hasenclever and De Juan[104] in their study concluded that the greater the number religious grouping involved in a conflict the more intense, deadly and difficult to resolve. These findings are corroborated with many other studies that link religious violence and its negative affects to state security[105].

Basedau et al argue that religions can both cause violence or help in fostering peace, for instance in Mozambique Sant Egidio Catholic community helped resolve the civil war. These authors contend that there are a number of suppositions that can explain the link between religion and conflict; first, they argue that religious identities form a collective group identity which can act as unit for violence. Secondly, they explain that religious identities are very special and are not

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[102] Hasenclever, Andreas, and Alexander De Juan. "Grasping the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts: Empirical findings and theoretical perspectives." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007): 19-47.

[103] Fox, Jonathan. *Religion, civilization, and civil war: 1945 through the new millennium*. Lexington Books, 2004, 46.

[104] Hasenclever, Andreas, and Alexander De Juan. "Grasping the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts: Empirical findings and theoretical perspectives." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007): 24.

[105] Ibid.

subject to compromise or discussion, they are to be defended at all times, the last supposition is that religion is the easiest way of mobilising resources required for waging violence. In their study of 48 Sub-Saharan African countries, they found that politicisation of religion increases the risk of escalating a latent religious conflict to an open conflict.

Basedau et al further discovered that overlaps in ethnicity and religion have a nine-fold increase on the probabilities of occurrence religious violence[106]. In Malawi, most of the Muslims are from the same Yao ethnic group thus going by the argument as posed, chances of violence in Malawi are high. One can however counter argue that the argument by these authors cannot fit in all scenarios as some interventions can reduce the purported increase in the likelihood of violence.

Religious conflicts expose people to insecure environment whether they are directly taking part in the violence or not. Some religious traditions increase the willingness of the followers to engage in violence. Such beliefs make religions to view each other as evil powers and that their differences are not reconcilable, the violence is therefore considered being anguished on the evil not fellow human beings. Some beliefs also act as motivators of violence, these may include promises of martyrdom and rewards for doing according to the "will of God or eternal anguish" for those who do not do according to his will[107]. Religion can also be exploited by religious leaders and even politicians to achieve their political ends[108]. Brubaker argues that for easy understanding, religious violence should be treated as tool to achieve political goals. The same conclusion was reached in a study by Nilsen and Hara arguing that most of the militant religious

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[106] Basedau. Matthias et al, "Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa", 1-30.
[107] Hasenclever, Andreas, and Alexander De Juan. "Grasping the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts: Empirical findings and theoretical perspectives." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007): 26.
[108] Brubaker, Rogers. "Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence.", 1-19.

groups have political reasons as their primary target but mostly use religious rhetoric to sustain themselves[109].

2.3 African Religious Based Insecurity

Many African countries face security threats emanating from religious fundamentalism which usually graduate to violence, religious diversity plays a complex role in such conflicts[110]. Religious intolerance and the resultant conflict threaten the survival of many African states. Nigeria is an example where the federal government and provincial governments' effectiveness is slowly being submerged due to religious violence. Many countries in all parts of Africa have had their own experiences as to how religious intolerance affected their state security as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.3.1 West African Religious Based Insecurity

Omotosho[111] contends that over the last decade Nigeria has suffered the worst of religiously motivated violence spreading to many parts of the country with distressing effects on the citizens. In 2000, the Nigerian government nearly lost control of Kaduna State due to religious violence. On 21 February 2000, Kaduna State introduced Sharia Law despite the state having both Christian and Muslim populations in notable proportions. This Sharia Law introduction did not please Christians and they started protesting resulting in clashes with Muslims that supported the law. Over 1,000 people died from these clashes. The attacks spread to other states including Abia State where on 28 February 2000 several hundreds were also killed. In the Northern part of Nigeria, Niger Delta and South Western regions, thousands have been killed over the years due

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[109] Nilsen, Marte and Shintaro Hara. "Religious Motivation in Political Struggles." *Journal of Religion and Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2017), pp. 291-311.

[110] Omotosho, Mashood. "Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Inter-Religious Mediation Peace Strategy.", 133 – 151.

[111] Ibid.

to religious clashes[112]. Similar attempt to introduce Sharia Law in Benue, Plateau and Nasarawa states also resulted into over 3,000 deaths.

There are also other isolated incidents of religiously motivated violence that have affected Nigerian state security, for instance during 2002 Miss World competition a local Christian journalist named Isioma Daniel caused controversy when he commented that the beauty of the contestants would even force Prophet Muhammed to choose a wife among them, the riots that this caused cost hundreds of lives. Similarly, clashes triggered by cartoons of Prophet Muhammad by a Danish media in 2006, left more people dead in Nigeria than any other country in the world[113].

Authorities in Mali also blame the insecurity in the northern part of that country on religious factors. The country has an approximate population of 19.6 million as per 2020 estimates, 95% of this population is Sunni Muslims and they follow Sufism and the remaining 5% are Christians. Mali constitution however defines the country as secular. The narrative is that the diffusion of Wahhabism has led to radicalization of many people in the north. Specific examples point at the teachings of Islamic clerics from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan which they claim has made the Tuareg rebels more radical and brutal. These clerics are said to have radicalized Tuareg traditional leaders namely Lyad al Ghali and son to Ifoghas, these are influential Tuareg leaders and their radicalization has complicated the Mali conflict[114].

In 2015, the International Crisis Group expressed concern over the growing religious intolerance in Cameroon which is argued to be threat to state security, the report however claims the

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[112] Omotosho, Mashood. "Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Inter-Religious Mediation Peace Strategy.", 133 – 151.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Chauzal, Gregory and Thibault Van Damme. "The Roots of Mali Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis." CRU Report (2015).

government seemed underestimating the threat. The rise in intolerance is blamed on rising of Christian revivalism also called "Born Again" and the newly emerging Islamic fundamentalism. Cameroon has never experienced violent religious conflict this far but recent developments are starting to change the landscape. Cameroonian Muslims initially followed their traditional Sufi Islam but recently there is a change to Wahhabism, these competing sects are argued to be presenting a security threat as localized clashes are already appearing. With regard to the "Born Again" preachers, they are said to be propagating teachings that are intolerable to other Christians and more so to the Muslim community. These are said to be recipe to violence and called on the Cameroonian government to timely resolve the rising tensions[115].

2.3.2 North African Religious Based Insecurity

Egypt has its own security problems that emanate from religious intolerance. The Egyptian problem is mostly on the attacks directed at Coptic Christians. According to the 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Egypt by the USA government, Egypt has a population 104.1 million 90% of which are Muslims and the remaining 10% are Christian out of which 7% are Coptic Christians, this translate to over six million people.[116] Coptic churches have been subject to bombing and armed attacks coupled with state failure to provide adequate security. These attacks are mostly linked to Muslim Brotherhood and other radical Islamist groups. One notable incident happened on 5 April 2013 when St Mark's Cathedral was stormed by militants taking hostage scores of people. Earlier on in 2011, a car bomb killed 23 worshippers in a church in

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[115] International Crisis Group. "Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism." Report No. 229/Africa (3 September 2015).
[116] USA Government 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Egypt.

Alexandria[117]. Scholars argue that the government is not doing enough to address the insecurity the Copts face in exercising their freedom of religion.

In another study, Brownlee also argues that Egypt is not immune from the insecurity that is caused by religious intolerance. His study focused on the Orthodox Christian community which he claims is a target of attacks from both adversary religious groups and state actions, he argues that Coptic Christians are barred from political leadership positions and are the most vulnerable group of people. He found that Coptic Churches are flash spots for religious violence citing examples where Islamists especially the Moslem Brotherhood attacks Churches and prayer gatherings leaving hundreds dead[118]. The 2019 USA Government Religious Report for Egypt contend that state security in Egypt is affected by religious intolerance in several way including by use of social and main stream media where discriminatory messages against Coptic Christians are broadcast. Islamic State if Iraqi and Syria (ISIS) in 2019 broadcast a video warning Christians of brutal attacks. The report recorded a total of 28 religious related brutal attacks between 2018 and 2019[119].

The USA government reported several incidents that indicate how religious intolerance has affected state security in the country, for instance it reported of violence between Muslims and Christians on 03 October 2020 in Dabbous in Minya Governorate during a wedding ceremony for Coptic Christians, the violence continued for the next two days leading to arrests. Egyptian constitution is more aligned to Sharia Law although it officially recognizes Islam, Christian, and Jewish religions. The country has established procedure for religions to apply for them to be officially recognized by the government, without this they cannot practice, establish prayer

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[117] Bownlee, Jason. *Violence Against the Copts in Egypt*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.
[118] Ibid.
[119] USA Government 2019 Religious Freedom Report for Egypt.

houses or publish, import or own religious literature. According to the constitution, Muslim women are banned from marrying non-Muslim men unless they convert to Islam and on the other hand a non-Muslim woman who converts to Islam must divorce if the husband is unwilling to convert. These and several other constitutional provisions are argued to favor Muslims thus becoming a threat to the other non-Muslim communities. To ensure religious intolerance does not affect state security, the Egyptian Penal Code prohibits use of religion to promote extremist, inciting strife and demeaning of any religion. Any contravention of the same can be sanctioned with a custodial sentence of up to five years[120].

2.3.3 East and Central African Religious Based Insecurity

Mathews[121] contend that religious intolerance can make strong states to disintegrate if the situation is not well diffused. His argument comes from his study of the 1983–2004 Sudanese civil war. Before the secession of South Sudan, Sudan was geographically the largest country in Africa at the time. It was however composed of Arabs and Blacks with 70% of the total being Arabs and Muslims by religion mostly living in the North while the remaining 30% were Christians mostly staying in the south as semi-autonomous region, there were also some indigenous beliefs in the region. In 1983, the then President Nimeiry introduced Sharia Law to the whole country thus attempting to abolish the Christian identity. This was immediately met with resistance from the Christians and indigenous religious groups in the south, led by John Garang they formed the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM).

War broke out between the North and South on these religious grounds and was fought from 1983 to 2004. President Nimeiry was however ousted by a coup de etat in 1985 and the new

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[120] USA Government 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Egypt.
[121] Mathews, Robert and Johnson Dauglas. "The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars." *International Journal*, 60, No.2 (2005): 608.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Madi rescinded the Sharia Law decision verbally with no formal communication, SPLM meeting in Ethiopia's Koka Dam also unilaterally abolished the Sharia Law. In January 1991, President al-Bashir signed a decree declaring that Islamic Law would be applicable only to the courts in the North while those in the south would apply constitutional law. It was after this abolishment that peace negotiations commenced in earnest reaching the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 05 January 2005. The CPA provided for a separate legal system for the south. Ronen argue that it was by removing the Sharia Law that the SPLA was able to be drawn to the negotiating table[122]. Just as argued by Hasenclever and De Juan[123] that religious issues cannot be compromised as they are highly valued by the bearers and can result into violence as they are issues of social identity as per the prepositions of the Social Identity Theory (SIT).

Van Acker argues that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has a history of religious basis of their conflict. They were originally called the Ugandan Christian Army and had the objective of establishing Christian rule in Uganda. LRA leader, Joseph Kony who regards himself as a prophet also nicknamed "Africa's David Koresh" claim that they are fighting a religious war although most scholars and analysts argue that their ideologies are too political than religious. LRA is accused of human rights violations including murders, mutilations, sex-slavery and child soldiers. It has also killed over 1,600 people and abducted over 3,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR) and Uganda[124]. Another religious armed group that originated from Uganda is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which is a long

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[122] Ronem, Yehudit. "Religions at War, Religions at Peace: The Case of Sudan." *Zeitschrist fur Politik*, (2005): 80-96.
[123] Hasenclever, Andreas, and Alexander De Juan. "Grasping the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts: Empirical findings and theoretical perspectives." *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007): 19-47.
[124] Van Acker, Frank. "Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: the new order no one ordered." *African Affairs*, Vol 103, Issue 412 (July, 2004): 335-357.

time Islamic extremist group and mostly operating from the DRC-Uganda border. It initially used the name "Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahadeen" meaning "City of Monotheism and Holly Wars. They aim at establishing an Islamic State in Uganda and the general areas around the DRC. ADF therefore use religious ideologies to pursue political objectives and in 2019 declared affiliation to ISIS. Over the years they have killed United Nations peace keepers, civilians and child soldier recruitment. Scholars project that the group will continue to destabilize the area for several years to come affecting state security of countries involved.

Bernhard contends that the instability in Western Congo and part of Kinshasa is due to religious intolerance between religious groups and the state. Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) is a religious group that follows traditional spiritual and messianic religion. Based in the Bas Congo Province, the BDK was founded in 1986 by Muanda Nsemi who considers himself as a prophet to complete a mission of facilitating freeing the black people from oppression[125]. BDK have the belief that they are the selected people of God to lead African religious and cultural emancipation with Muanda Nsemi as their spiritual leader. BDK despise Christianity claiming that they are following a liberator of the Whiteman, Jesus who is not meant to liberate black people. They contend that Africans do not have to rely on the Whiteman's savior while they have their own. This teaching creates tension with the Christians who express concern that the BDK is misrepresenting their faith and values.

Tull found that since 2005, the BDK has increased their violent confrontations with the police as they struggle to establish their own religious kingdom. The group promotes resistance to all values that are regarded foreign and their objective is to establish a federal state in Central Africa

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[125] Bernhard, Wendy Lee. Bundu Dia Kongo: A New non-Christian Religious Movement in Zaire." Fuller Theology Seminary, School of World Mission, (1997): 1-24.

with traditional religious values and adhering to historical spiritual heritage. Due to the weakness of governance structures in some areas, the BDG fills the vacuum performing governance functions, it has its own local police called "Makesa", have own flag including legal and judicial framework. They have been involved in violent clashes the DRC Police called Police National Conglais (PNC), in February 2007 clashes with PNC in Matadi, Muanda, Boma and Songolo resulted in 134 deaths which included civilian and PNC personnel[126].

Another incident in March 2008 in Luozi and Seke-Banza resulted in the deaths of 25 people and several injuries. Mass graves were also discovered at Seke-Banza allegedly of massacred BDK supporters. DRC government under President Joseph Kabila declared the BDK a serious national threat and banned all activities of the group. Recent clash between the PNC and the BDK happened in April 2020 where 14 BDK supporters were killed and 203 arrested and others injured. Tull concluded that the insecurity in Western DRC is a result of religious issues which are not amicably resolved to date.

The Tanzanian state has over the years experienced distinct changes, firstly from a religiously tolerant society before 2005 to a religiously intolerant one after 2005 and another change from the intolerant period to moderately tolerant community that Ramadhani argues currently exists as there is a reduced occurrence religious violence[127]. Tanzania has a population of 58.6 million (2020 estimate) with 63% Christians, 34% Muslims and other religions composing 5%. Christians are evenly divided among the Catholics and the Protestants while the majority of the

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[126] Tull, Denis M. "Troubled State-Building in the DR Congo: the Challenge from the Margins." The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 48, No 4, (December 2010): 643-661.

[127] Ramadhani, Lupa. "Religious Tolerance, Transitional Dynamics and the State in Tanzania." *Tanzanian Journal of Sociology,* Vol 2 & 3 (2016/7): 85-102.

Muslims are Sunni Muslims. On the Mainland Tanzania, the Muslims are mostly concentrated along the coast while out the 1.3 million citizens in Zanzibar has 99% of it Muslims[128].

In a study by Ramadhani where he examined the nature, character and relationship between religious tolerance, transitional dynamics and Tanzanian state security, the scholar found that Tanzanians rarely use violence for conflicts that emanate from differences in ethnicity but that religious differences are more likely to cause violence. He contends that before 2005, Tanzanians of different religions lived in harmony until the violence over use of abattoir emerged in Geita. The issue started when some Protestant Christians slaughtered a cow near their Church a thing that did not please the Muslims. Muslims wanted all slaughtering be done in the abattoir by them, due to public health concerns the government seemed to side with the Muslims a thing Christians took for offence. Christians further argued that they eat meat slaughtered by Muslims therefore Muslims should also eat meat slaughtered by the Christians. The conflict ended in violence leading to the death of a Reverend and injury of scores. Ramadhani argues that this was the start of growing tensions between Christians and Muslims.

According to Ramadhani, the tensions were further fueled by the increase in birth of new religious denominations increasing the competition for followers, again there was a registered growth of uncontrolled open-air preachers whose teachings promoted intolerance. In 2007 there were allegations that some Muslims teachings were demonizing Christianity and the government could not decisively act on such complaints as raised Christian authorities due to what they said lack of evidence, once again the government was seen to be siding Muslims. Attempts by the government to ban open air preaching resulted into violent demonstrations by the Christian who

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[128] USA Government 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Tanzania.

wanted to protect their identity which they thought was under threat from both the government and the rival Muslim community[129]. Political leaders however managed to calm the tensions.

In Zanzibar, political processes are argued to be spurring religious violence on the island while others argue to the contrary saying religion is being exploited to pursue political ends. For example, in 2000 after the highly contested election, nine bombs that were exploded targeting bars, churches, tourist resorts and political headquarters. Later in 2004 the government banned selected Muslims events the reaction was burning of Catholic Church, Catholic School bus and several police vehicles. The Muslim-Christian rising tension led to several violent attacks, between May 2013 and July 2014 Arusha experienced 7 bomb explosions and one such bomb attack happened on 05 May 2013 killing 4 people including a Papal Envoy and injuring 60 others at Olasiti Catholic Parish. Another bomb exploded at a political rally in Soweto, Arusha killing 4 people[130].

In Zanzibar there is a radical group which though not active in recent years, the group is still in existent. The Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation (UAMSHO) also called the "Awakening" was formed in 2002 and registered as an Islamic Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). UAMSHO later changed agenda and developed a more religious radical approach and politicized its activities. The spiritual leader of the group, Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmed's concern is the secular government of Tanzania that Zanzibar found it under, therefore demanded secession and formation of an Islamic state. Objectives of UAMSHO include spreading of Islam, defending Islamic identity and forming an independent Islamic Zanzibar. Zanzibar government authorities treat UAMSHO as a threat to the state security accusing it of using religion to disrupt

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[129] Ramadhani, Lupa. "Religious Tolerance, Transitional Dynamics and the State in Tanzania." *Tanzanian Journal of Sociology,* Vol 2 & 3 (2016/7): 85-102
[130] Ibid.

peace and harmony, UAMSHO is also accused of diverting from the objectives it was registered for and getting involved in radicalization, religious violence and politics. There have been recorded cases of clashes between the police and UAMSHO operatives in Unguja. "Awakening" is accused of being responsible for arsons, shootings, bombings and murders in Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania. In 2013, 36 leaders of the group were arrested 26 of which were still in custody as of 2020. UAMSHO has therefore succeeded in exploiting religious identity in pursuing political objectives and mobilization of resources for achieving objectives[131].

Akaranga and Ongong'a contend that monotheism that is prominent in Kenya is prone to promoting intolerance and violence saying social functions and religion cannot be ignored in igniting and fueling violence[132]. Kenya has a population of 49.1 Million (2019 estimate) with Christians making 83%, Muslims 11% and other religions making 2%[133]. Akaranga and Ongong'a argue that use of religion to achieve goals is historical in Kenya citing examples of "Dini ya Msambwa" which was led by Elijah Masinde, "Mumbo" by Onyango Dunde, "the Mau Mau", the 1914 "Namiyo Luo" Church and the "Mungiki" as groups that have used religious ideologies to pursue political issues. Kenyans have therefore over the years used religious ideologies to react against western colonialism and present their grievances to the government.

The scholars argue that the most prominent religious divide that presents a threat to state security in Kenya is the Christian-Muslim divide. Some of the events that have raised the divide are imported violence from other countries, an example is the bombing of the USA embassy in Nairobi by Al-Qaeda in 1998 which left over 200 Kenyans dead mostly Christians. Other local

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[131] Ramadhani, Lupa. "Religious Tolerance, Transitional Dynamics and the State in Tanzania." *Tanzanian Journal of Sociology,* Vol 2 & 3 (2016/7): 85-102
[132] Akaranga S I and Ongong'a J J. "The Phenomenon of Intolerance and its impact on Christian-Muslim Relations in Kenya. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences. 2015:5(8): 105-121.
[133] Unites States Government 2019 Religious Freedom for Kenya.

attacks include the Nairobi South Church burning by Islamic radical groups. Al-Shabaab from Somalia has been another problem to state security with attacks in Mandera, Nairobi, Garrissa and Lamu among others. Al-Shabaab attacks has raised tensions and mistrust between Kenyan Christians and Muslims. The killing of 36 non-Muslim quarry workers and 28 Christian bus passengers and in Mandera in November 2014 raised concerns on the security of the citizens in these areas. On the other hand, Cunni[134] blames government anti-terrorism policies that the way they are implemented is discriminative and is punitive to Muslims arguing they further create a fertile ground for radicalism and facilitate support and recruitment of the terror groups. He claims the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) was responsible for killings and disappearances of Muslims in implementing anti-terrorist policies.

Al-Shabaab as mentioned on the earlier paragraphs is a Somalian Radical Islamic group which uses high levels of violence against those seen not to subscribe to their version of Islam. The group reject any form of democracy and opposes the structuring of the government, it targets United Nations Forces in Somalia, government officials and civilians including fellow Muslims seen not abide by their ideological teachings. They group has since expanded its operations beyond the Somalian boarders to other countries including Kenya, Uganda and beyond. Recently, it also extended its recruitment to Ethiopia[135].

Ethiopia has a population 108.1 million with 44% of them being Ethiopian Orthodox Tewaledo Church (EOTC), 34% Sunni Muslims, 19% Evangelical Christian and Pentecostal Christians[136]. EOTC is mostly in Tigray and Amhara regions, Islam mostly in Afar, Oromia and Somali

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[134] Cunnings, Ryan. "Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of Kenya's Religious Divide." IPI Global Observatory (2014).
[135] Abbink, Jon. Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation between "Political Islam" and the State." Politcs, Religion & Ideology, 21:2 (2020): 194-215.
[136] United States Government 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Ethiopia.

regions while protestants mostly are in the south of the country. In a study by Abbink, he found increasing attacks overtime mostly on churches, for instance in a period from July 2018 to September 2019, he found that 30 churches were destroyed, 07 priests killed and 2 Mosques destroyed. Previously in 2011, 69 churches were burnt, over 4,000 Protestants displaced when construction workers at a protestant premises claimed to have found a Quran being used as a toilet paper. Abbink concludes that the religious tensions in Ethiopia are negatively affecting state security in Ethiopia.

Insecurity in the Central African Republic (CAR) has also been linked to religious intolerance[137]. CAR is estimated to have an approximate population of 6 million people 61% of which are Protestants, 28% Catholics, 9% Muslims and other religions composing the remaining 2%. Since independence, CAR has witnessed several political turbulences but to a larger extent the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) managed to resolve. Things got complicated in 2012 when the Muslim anti-government militia group, the Seleka emerged. In December 2012 the Seleka commenced an offensive that toppled President Bozize. The Seleka victimized Christians killing hundreds, the Christians reacted by forming the anti-Balaka movement by victims of the Seleka persecutions seeking to revenge Seleka's actions. The objective of the anti-Balaka was to dislodge all Muslims from power and they achieved this in February 2014. The conflict displaced over 30,000 Muslims and the international community nearly called this genocide.

CAR conflict has however mutated from being religiously motivated and now the objective of political control of territory, xenophobia and commercial benefits mostly controlling mines. The anti-Balaka are promoting the narrative that the Seleka and all Muslims are not CAR citizens but

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[137] Welz, Martin. "Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International Response.", 601-610.

came from Chad and Niger to destabilize their country, this propagation might make the Muslims stateless people. This stigmatization has further polarized the country making it very difficult to resolve this conflict. CAR conflict is an example of how religion can be exploited for political and economic motives, it has also shown how reasons for engaging in violence may change over time complicating efforts of resolving them. CAR conflict is regarded to be complicated mainly because of overlaps between religious and ethnic identities. This has resulted into state insecurity to the extent that the government has little or no control in some areas as they are controlled by armed groups. The conflict has created 630, 000 refugees and 631 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)[138].

2.3.4   Southern Africa Religious Based Insecurity

Religion is a major mobilizing factor in the insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. The social fabric of Mozambique comprises 60% Christians, 18.3% Muslims while other religions compose the remaining 21.8%. The majority of the Muslims are from the Mwani ethnic group while the Christians are from Makonde ethnic group. The Muslims who are ethnic are settlers of the Cabo Delgado Province[139]. Cabo Delgado is said to be among the poorest region of the country yet has gas resources which the government was exploring.

In his study, Conce[140] found that Muslim clerics from Tanzanian and Kenya; Sheikh Hassan and Aboud Rojo Mohammed respectively, exploited the economic vulnerability of the youths by promising them religious abundant wealth, in the process the two indoctrinated them into radical Muslims. The two clerics introduced their new members to new praying habits, values and

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[138] USA Government 2020 Religious Freedom Report for Central African Republic.
[139] Conce, Cao Paulo J F. "The Rise and Root Cause of Islamic Insurgency in Mozambique and its Security Implications to the Region." *IPSS Policy Brief*, Vol 15-04 (March 2021).
[140] Conce, Cao Paulo J F. "The Rise and Root Cause of Islamic Insurgency in Mozambique and its Security Implications to the Region." *IPSS Policy Brief*, Vol 15-04 (March 2021).

beliefs, the clerics also convinced the youths that Jihad will allow them realise their wealth emphasizing the importance of challenging government authorities. The end result was the formation of a radical Islamic group of over 1,000 members that became to be known with several names like Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, ISIS Mozambique and Al-Shabaab, they thus created a social identity they had to defend. Later the group created a decision-making body which established affiliations with ADF and ISIS.

The group commenced violent attacks on churches and civilians, they even attacked Mosques when they are convinced that their prayer habits are not adequately abiding to their understanding of the religion. They later started attacking government institutions and economic interests. According to Conce, 3,926 people had been killed and 710,000 displaced by February 2017. The objective of this radical group was to establish a society that follows strict Sharia Law[141]. On 24 March 2021 the group attacked the town of Palmer and killed 87 people and took control of swathes of territory of Cabo Delgado Province. ISIS claimed responsibility of this attack although scholars doubt the truthfulness of the claims. The Mozambican government struggled to contain the situation and sought assistance from Allies[142].

In Malawi there are also Muslim clerics who are spread across in the country and the government rarely traces what they do. Just like in Makonde in Mozambique, some areas in Malawi like Mangochi, Machinga and others also have high Muslim population with their own social grievance. This social context makes such areas a fertile ground for events to progress as what what happened in Calbo Delgado especially with the discovery of gold deposits in Namizimu

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[141] Ibid.
[142] Hanlin, Joseph. "Mozambique Palma Attack: Why IS involvement is exaggerated." (17 April 2021).

Forest. The government therefore needs to pay particular attention in religious matters and what teaching is being delivered to the population.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Malawi is no exception as it has witnessed incidents which are a result of religious intolerance. One recent incident happened on 03 November 2021 in Mpilipili village where angry Muslims burnt an Emmanuel International Church to ashes accusing the church for blasphemy. Quoting the Mangochi Police public relations officer, the author claimed the security situation general area of Mangochi and Machinga to be fragile[143]. There have also been incident where Muslims have been attacked by Christians, for instance Chiumia reported an incident where a traditional leader was attacked for offering land for construction of a Mosque. In a separate incident in Lilongwe, in 2016 scores of Christians belonging to Enlightened Christian Gathering (ECG) were attacked by panga-weirding gangs presumably on religious grounds leaving several seriously injured[144]. The above incident entails how fragile Malawi including the Capital Lilongwe is with regard to religious related violence.

2.4   Prominence of Religious Intolerance Incidents in Malawi

When asked on their opinion with regard to whether religious intolerance and its related violence has increased over the last 10 years, the highest number of respondents opined that it increased while a few responded that it has extremely increased. Another group had the opinion that there

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[143] Njenekera Gladson . "Angry Muslims torch Emmanuel International Church in Mangochi.", The Malavi Post, https://www.maravipost.com/angry-muslims-torch-emmanuel-international-church-in-mangochi/ accessed on 06 January 2022.
[144] Chiumia Thomas. "Religious Intolerance in Malawi in Unacceptable; it represents an insult to God and human dignity." Nyasatimes (June 2026) accessed from https://www.nyasatimes.com/religious-intolerance-malawi-unacceptable-represents-insult-god-human-dignity/ on 06 January 2016.

was a slight increase within the last 10 years whilst none felt there was a decrease. The graph

below shows the details of the findings from the respondents:

FIGURE 2.1: INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE THE PAST 10 YEARS
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Basing on the data collected as shown above, it can be concluded that the threat of religious

intolerance (whether actual or perceived) is a matter of concern and requiring urgent

intervention. These findings are similar to those in a study by PEW Project. In the Malawian

context, these findings can be attributed to an increase in recorded incidents of religious

intolerance over the years. Additionally, the insurgency situation in Calbo Del Galdo in

Mozambique which is exporting refugees to Malawi also affected the respondents' attitude.

Most of the respondents had the feeling that districts of Mangochi and Balaka are at the highest

risk of erupting to violence due to the relatively higher numbers of Muslims and the presence of

Christians spiced up by the close proximity to Calbo Delgaldo. The influx of refugees from

Calbo Delgado might also bring in extremists who may infiltrate genuine asylum seekers, thus

exposing the Muslims in their hosting destinations to radical Islamic teachings. Feeling threatened, Christians in the area may opt to defend their identity.

In justifying their answers, most of the respondents gave examples of the burning of churches in different parts of the country. All these incidents indicate an increase in religious violence in Malawi. Some respondents also claimed to have witnessed clashes between Christian local traders selling liquor and pork with Muslims. They also mentioned a case where Christians burned down a Mosque to ashes.

Apart from inter-religious conflicts, respondents also mentioned the presence of intra-religious conflicts citing the existence of bad blood between the Nkhoma and Livingstonia Synods of the Church for Central African Presbytery (CCAP). These two Synods initially cooperated as a single Church with three Synods sharing boundaries; Livingstonia in the Northern Region, Nkhoma in the Central Region and Blantyre Synod in Southern Region of Malawi. After some misunderstandings the cooperation was terminated with Livingstonia breaking away as an independent denomination which now operates across the country leaving the other two in their cooperation[145]. A few of the respondents justified their opinion by indicating that increase in religious intolerance and its related violence is a global phenomenon and that Malawi being part of the global village cannot be different. They further contended that terror groups like the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, ISIS and AL-Qaeda in Sahel and Calbo Delgado have increased their activities in Africa and Malawi is also at risk being part of Africa.

The findings therefore means that while the respondents differed in justifications and examples given, they generally agreed that incidents related to religious intolerance are on the rise though

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[145] Mapala Cogitator Wilton. "A Historical Study of the Border Dispute Between the Livingstonia and Nkhoma Synods of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (1956-2015- A1 & C1)."

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the degree differed with some suggesting it to be on the extreme rise. This is matter of concern requiring both proactive and reactive measure in order to change the course of the phenomena.

2.5   Impact of Religious Intolerance on State Security in Malawi

The respondents were asked for their opinion with regard to whether religious intolerance and it related violence affect state security in any way whether positively or negatively. The highest number of respondents strongly agreed that religious intolerance and the related violence is a threat to state security, another group just agreed while less that around 15 % of the respondents either partly agreed or disagreed. The graph below shows the details of the results from respondents as to whether the phenomenon is an issue to state security:


FIGURE 2.2: RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IMPACT ON MALAWI'S STATE SECURITY
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Overall, 87.75% had the consensus that religious intolerance negatively impacts the integrity of state security. Examples given included how religious intolerance has driven armed conflicts in countries such as DRC, CAR and Nigeria. The findings also discussed that a community that has no cohesion can easily become a recruitment ground for extremist groups and thus increasing tensions in communities. Some respondents further described teachings by some religions as recipe that fuels intolerance claiming such teachings to be demands from the Holy Scriptures.

The respondents further argue that issues of religious intolerance result into polarization of the country along religious lines, thus building tensions which upon a slightest spark will ignite deep rooted conflict that may escalate beyond state control. At the same time, issues of extremism crop up eventually as one religion seeks to overshadow the other or persuade the other grouping to its fundamental beliefs through means of verbal or violent attacks. The respondents also claimed that religious intolerance impinges on human security in that it denies individuals or groups freedom of worship and can sometimes lead to threat to personal physical safety. In extreme cases religious intolerance if not timely resolved turn to armed hostilities negatively impacting on societal and state security.

The respondents identified some presumed hot spots which require special and immediate attention in terms of early warning and employment of proactive measure to diffuse all religious tensions that may be identified. Additionally states to ensure the presence of immediate quick reaction responses in the event that violence breaks out. Although some of these hot spots are outside the city of Lilongwe, these finding necessitates adoption of policy, legal and security measures to address religious intolerance before it degenerates into violence.

Other respondents approached this question by first trying to define state security as a broad phenomenon that encompasses a number of parameters that are all intertwined. They explained

that any state relies heavily on the social structures that tend to define how people relate to each other and that religion, a social parameter, has profound impact on the development of a society thus playing a critical role in fostering social development. Social development, as is the case with other dimensions such as economic and political, plays a critical role in state development. Religious intolerance like violence that happened in Mangochi, Blantyre, Karonga and other areas would be a catalyst to breaking the foundations of social development, which will eventually hamper state development with serious security ramifications. Similarly, religious intolerance has the ability of fueling sectarian conflicts, which affects the security of a state. In essence, social underdevelopment which could be a result of religious intolerance or any other social problem could have a negative impact on the security of a society or state as a whole.

2.6   Causes of Religious Intolerance in Malawi

In order to produce good solutions, there was a need to understand the perceptions of the respondents on their opinion as to what causes religious intolerance. According to the collected and collated data, the major cause of religious intolerance is real or perceived threat of one religious grouping towards the other and religious fanatism, these two had the same average rating, social media and secularism tied on second cause of religious intolerance. Lack of trust between religious groupings was not regarded as a real cause for religious intolerance and it featured with the least average. The graph below has the details of the averages on the findings.

FIGURE 2.3: AVERAGE RATING FOR CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN MALAWI
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Perceived or real threat from other religious groups and religious fanaticism are considered the most frequent causes of religious intolerance. Most respondents opined that religious fanatics are more likely to embrace violence because it blinds them to the belief that other religions are not as good as theirs; or that all religions must subscribe to their only one god. This fanaticism may also cause individual or group perception that other religions are a threat to their religion requiring them to actively seek ways to degrade the perceived threat. This observation is true with regard to threats from other religions. It has been observed that most recent acts of intolerance have involved Muslims and Christians which suggest that these two religions view each other as a possible threat.

2.7   Summary of the Chapter Key Findings

2.7.1   After analyzing both secondary and primary data on the first objective, the following key findings have been drawn:

2.7.1.1   Religious intolerance is a threat to state security in African states as states are not able to exercise effective sovereignty in affected parts of their territory, it impacts negatively on the freedoms of citizens to enjoy human rights and development. It also becomes a primary cause for identity conflicts and a tool for mobilizations for violence.

2.7.1.2   An overlap or duplication in identities in terms of religion and ethnicity multiplies the feelings of the occurrence of the intolerance by the ingroup against the outgroup.

2.7.1.3   Intolerance in Malawi exists and violence related events are increasing over time though the phenomena have not turned to a fully-fledged violent conflict. These violent attacks are a cause for state security concerns. The emerging intentions of creating an Islamic State under Sharia Law in Mangochi and Machinga presents a threat as it might over time graduate to secessionist movement.

2.7.1.4   Although there are many religious related conflicts between various religious groups, the most prominent ones in Malawi occur between Christians and Muslims.

2.7.1.5   The major causes religious related conflicts is presence of perceived or real threat posed by one religion on the other and religious fanatism or fundamentalism. Interpretation of religious scripts in a manner that creates hatred has fueled the intolerance between religious groups.

CHAPTER THREE: CURRENT STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN MALAWI

3.0   Introduction

The emergence of identity-based conflicts has exposed shortfalls of diplomatic conflict management techniques that were employed in conventional conflicts because the actors do not act like cost-benefit calculators. In conventional conflicts, interest-based negotiations and mediations proved effective but this is never the case with identity-based conflict and interest-based approaches to conflict management have therefore proved to be a failure[146]. The failure is a result of what Rubenstein argue to be the presence of innate driver of the minds of the actors which may include prejudices ingrained in the minds, the need to pronounces one's group as superior, need for identity, recognition and group security. These factors are fundamental in leading to the failure of power-based conflict management methods as these aspects can hardly be traded with anything[147]. In identity-based conflicts most important basic underlying cause becomes identity needs which are most times difficult to satisfy using power-based approaches.

This chapter borrows from existing literature and other secondary data sources to examine policies and strategies applied to address religious intolerance globally and in Africa determining the effectiveness of such strategies considering the complexities of identity-based conflicts. This is done by reviewing discussions by different scholars on the methods that can resolve the phenomena under investigation. This is followed by investigating empirical literature on policies and strategies that have been applied in other African countries in comparison to what is done in the case study setting. The chapter will also present, analyze and discuss primary data collected

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[146] Rubenstein, Richard E. *Resolving Structural Conflicts.* New York: Routledge, 2017. P 39.
[147] Ibid.

with regard to the second study objective which was investigating strategies applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi.

3.1   Post-Independence Identity Conflict Resolution Strategies

Identity conflicts in the post-independence Malawi were more ethnic and not religious. With a population of four million and 15 major cultural entities authorities had to devise strategies to enhance cohesion of the new independent state. During the colonial period, Malawi had three official languages namely English, Chinyanja and Tumbuka. Chinyanja was mostly spoken in the central and to an extent in the Southern regions of the country while Tumbuka was predominantly used as an official language of the Northern region. The first effort by the new government to erase ethnic identity which Hastings Kamuzu Banda was the president was to declare Chinyanja now renamed Chichewa and English as the only two official languages of the country. Coincidentally, Hastings Kamuzu Banda was a Chewa by tribe himself[148].

Imposition of Chichewa and removal of Tumbuka created resentments as other tribes regarded this as an attempt by the President to make his tribe dominant over all others. All schools including those in the North that were using Tumbuka were forced to adopt Chichewa under the argument that using one language as strategy would propagate national identity and eliminate ethnic identities. This however led to cabinet rebellion in 1964 by ministers mostly from the Northern and Southern regions until the military was used to crush the rebellion[149]. This therefore means initial conflict resolution strategies were aimed at resolving cultural identity and the only strategy was use of force. Religious based identity conflicts appeared after 1994 when Malawi became a multi-party democracy as the single party government machinery could easily

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[148] Chilivumbo, Alifeyo. "Malawi's Culture in the National Integration." *Presence Africain,* (98)234-241.
[149] Mkandawire, Bonaventure. "Ethnicity, Language and Cultural Violence: Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda's Malawi, 1964-1994." *The Society of Malawi Journal,* 63, No.1 (2010): 23-42.

and forcefully crush such a phenomenon by force. The new constitution of Malawi embedded human right including religious freedoms. Globalization also played a critical role in the emergence of religious based conflicts as citizens now knew what was happening in other parts of the world. This called for Malawi to devise new strategies to contain the emerging phenomenon.

3.2 Strategies Used to address Religious Intolerance

Resolution and peace-making in identity-based conflict is complex, resource and time consuming. The path to peace is usually laden by successes and failures as leaders make rational choices in balancing their demands and identity requirements. In the context of Malawi, open violent conflict has not yet been manifested but events indicate the existence of structural conflict emanating from religious intolerance, however the same strategies that are applicable in violent conflicts can also be applied in latent religious conflicts. It might however be easier to apply them in a latent conflict that in an open conflict because in the later conflict managers look for a ripe moment. The argument in the ripe moment is that actors in the conflict are only prepared to resolve their conflict when they think cannot succeed in their current struggle and consider their status quo to be costly[150].

In Malawi, like many other African countries, there are some policies and strategies that are in place for the purpose of addressing religious intolerance. According to Baumann et al, the measures can be classified into two: elimination the sacredness from the conflict and adapting to conflict resolution tools[151]. The first approach also called "the desacralization" is an attempt to

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[150] Zartman, William I. "The timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemate and Ripe Moments." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics,* Vol 1, Issue 1, (2001): 8-18.
[151] Baumann, Jonas, Daniel Finnbogason, and Isak Svensson. "Rethinking Mediation: Resolving Religious Conflicts." *Policy Perspectives*, Vol. 6/1, February 2018.

water down the emphasis on the sacredness of the issue under conflict without undermining their religion, the argument is that once successful the parties are influenced to reorder their priorities thus removing the conflicting issue out of the discussion or lower its importance that's making it easy to reach an agreement. The elimination of sacredness approach is said to have been successful in Indonesia against the Free Aceh Movement where the structural dynamics of the conflict also changed and reduced the moral and mobilization support. The second approach; adapting to conflict resolution tools, does not focus on resolving issues under contest but rather finding a common ground where parties coexist with their beliefs. Negotiation and mediation focuses on making actors positively manage their differences[152]. The advantage of this approach is that it increases trust and maintain group identities. This second approach seems more feasible because resolving identity conflict is not easy because some religious beliefs might be non-negotiable and, in that situation the desacralization approach might not be successful.

3.3 Constitutional Provisions and Policies

There are several strategies that are in place to address religious intolerance in Malawi, the Constitution is one of them. Provisions of the Laws of Malawi are to a major extent a form of a "desacralization" measure as there is silence on the religious alignment of the state. This silence can make one conclude that Malawi is a secular state. Chapter IV of the Malawi Constitution is enshrined with the Bill of Rights which was adopted from the UDHR with clear enforcement mechanism. Section 20 (1) specifies the rights that are to be enjoyed without discrimination and among them is freedom of religion[153]. Furthermore, Section 15 (1) empowers the judiciary, the legislature and the executive to enforce enjoyment of the rights. The Ombudsman is also

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[152] Baumann, Jonas, Daniel Finnbogason, and Isak Svensson. "Rethinking Mediation: Resolving Religious Conflicts." *Policy Perspectives*, Vol. 6/1, February 2018.
[153] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010).

empowered to enforcing the protection of the enjoyment of human rights. The Constitution further under Chapter XI establishes the Human Rights Commission with the mandate of promoting, protecting and enforcing the rights. All citizens are obliged to help the courts, the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman in enforcing the rights.

Section 129 of the Constitution of Malawi mandates the MHRC the primary function of protecting and investigation all kinds of violations of rights accorded by the law. Additionally, Section 12 Human Rights Commission (HRC) Act empowers the MHRC with authority to protect and promote every aspect of human rights in Malawi in its widest possible sense including investigations on the violations of the same. As argued by Gondwe, this mandate is befitting a nation that has the will to protect its citizens from any violence and discrimination that may emanate from enjoyment of rights, she also posits that such a broad mandate satisfies the requirements of the Paris Principles[154].

Despite the constitutional provisions empowering the Malawi Human Right Commission (MHRC) and the judiciary, there is no empirical evidence that the commission is really involved in addressing religious discrimination which result from intolerance while on the other hand there is evidence that the courts are taking their role in enforcing the constitution in addressing religious intolerance. For instance, when violence broke due to selling of pork, the courts were involved and temporarily offered a relief. In another case, the court also resolved a situation where Rastafarian children that were denied registration in school due to the dreadlocks they

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were wearing[155].   While there some visibility of the actions of the judiciary, there is less or no literature on the MHRC.

Established by Articles 129-131 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, the MHRC is mandated to facilitate amicable resolution of disputes that emanate from enjoyment of human rights. The Commission is also conferred the powers to conduct investigations on the violations of rights and provide other agencies enforcing the protection of human rights[156]. However there is little empirical evidence of any effort by the MHRC in resolving incidences of religious intolerance and Hatchard contend that the MHRC show less willingness in doing so. He argues that inactivity of the MHRC is a result of lack of oversight mechanism as the commission is only required to submit an annual report of its activities to the Parliament and this report is not even debated on. He proposes that if the Commissioners were summoned to discuss their report, they could have been doing commendable work in resolving religious based conflicts[157]. To hold MHRC accountable, there is a need to constitute a Parliamentary Committee to act as an oversight body just as it is done on defense and security which oversee the military and the MPS. The choice of the Commissioners should also be a reflective of inclusiveness of the religious divides of the country if they are to be effective. The proposed Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights should initiate the amendment of the Constitution to reflect the required changes to make MHRC an effective organ in addressing religious intolerance, on the hand it should also lobby for funding of the MHRC to enable it carry out its tasks as required.

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[155] *Malawi Muslims riot in Mangochi over pork Sale*. Nyasa Times. Accessed on 20 August 2020.
https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-muslims-riot-in-mangochi-over-pork-sale/
[156] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2020).
[157] Hatchard, John. "The Human Rights Commission Act, 1998 (Malawi)." Journal of African Law, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1999): 253-131.

Chapter 7 of the Laws of Malawi stipulates the Penal Code of the Republic. The code outlines all offences, punishments and their corresponding punishments for the purpose of ensuring protection and enforcement of rights as granted by the UNDHR[158]. The code however did not include the clarity on offences relating to religious discrimination and incitement of violence related to the same. Para 5 (f) of UN Resolution 16/18 requires states employ clear domestic mechanisms to address religious intolerance including criminalization of religious violence[159]. Clarity on such offences and their punishments would encourage prosecution of perpetrators thus deterring other would-be offenders. It is the duty of the MHRC to recommend such constitutional amendment for the purpose of reducing or eliminating religious intolerance and inciting violence.

The Malawi National Peace Policy (NPP) is another instrument that was designed to help in settling dispute. Launched in August 2017, NPP was a compliment to Section 13 (l) of the Laws of Malawi, a blue print aimed at ensuring disputes are settled peacefully through good offices, mediation, arbitration negotiation and conciliation. The policy objective is the promotion of peace and unity in a well-coordinated, structured manner with other key institutions. The NPP basically outlines measures and mechanisms that enhance integration of Malawi's peace building strategies among different stakeholders including media, women, youth, civil society, traditional leaders and the government among others. The policy clearly stipulates institutional establishments that will facilitate the coordination of peace building initiatives from various stakeholders[160].

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[158] Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010).
[159] Limon, Marc, Nazilla Ghanea and Hilary Power. "Policy Report: Combating Global Religious Intolerance, The Implementation of Human Right Resolution 16/18." (December 2014).
[160] Republic Of Malawi Periodic Report on the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Maputo Protocol May 2015 to March 2019.

The NPP was formulated by a group of stakeholders including traditional leaders, political leaders, the academia, civil society, media, and representatives of the youth, women, people with special needs and government officials from the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is important to note that religious leaders are not appearing on the list of stakeholders during the formulation of this policy yet they are an important and influential group with regard to religiously related conflicts. Nevertheless, NPP demonstrates Malawi's effort to adopt peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflicts through arbitration, negotiation, conciliation and mediation. Institutions like the PAC, National Forum for Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts (NAFPESCO), Presidential Contact and Dialogue Group, Council for Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOMA), National Social Dialogue Forum (NSDF) among others, are the institutions the policy aims to work in conjunction with to achieve the objective.

NPP establishes the Malawi Peace Commission (MPC) as the highest umbrella to oversee the implementation of the strategy. The MPC composition as stipulated in the policy does not have any religious representation making it difficult to resolve religious based conflicts. The policy also establishes the MPC Secretariat mandated to oversee the District Peace Commissions as established by the same document[161]. The policy was not however operationalized as of November 2021. Additionally, the content of this policy does not place emphasis on religious based conflicts making it a weak instrument in addressing religious based conflicts. It further does not clarify under which ministry or department the MPC Secretariat will be. NPP therefore as tool needs to be revisited and effort be made to operationalize it.

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[161] Republic of Malawi National Peace Policy (August 2017).

3.4 Religious Grouping Registration Policy

It is a requirement by law in Malawi that all religious groupings must register with the government. This process is used only to allow the grouping to own property and act as a legal entity in the country. The process is that the new religious group submits the required documentation to the Ministry of Justice explaining the detailed structures of their organization including their mission along with a small fee, once the Ministry approves then the group formally registers with the Office of the Registrar[162]. Other countries like Egypt use the same process to vet the religious organization with regard to security.

The Egyptian government also demands that every religious grouping register with the government before construction of any praying house commences. All preachers are licensed and issued with guidelines to make them avoid teaching sermons that may enhance religious intolerance. All the religious registration processes and vetting are done by the ministry of Interior and Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments). Any unlicensed preacher once found can be fined up to USD 3,200 and get up to a year of imprisonment. The Ministry of Awqaf also deploys monitors mostly during Friday Muslim sermons to verify if the preachers are abiding to the ministry guidelines, those found not to be in compliance face sanctions[163]. This is to demonstrate that the Malawi government is not fully exploiting the provision of registering religious groups. The Ministry of Justice where the documentations are submitted does not have the capacity to vet the groups and there are no mechanisms to monitor the teachings of the preachers as done in Egypt.

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[162]USA Government 2019 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.
[163] Ibid.

3.5   Government Strategies

Recently, in August 2020, Malawi government established Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity. The mandate of this new Ministry was to create a favorable environment for civic education for the public and pursuing measures to unite the citizens and promote sustainable peace for economic development. In its ministerial statement, the Ministry expressed commitment to promote national unity and cordial coexistence among citizens. The statement outlined several areas that require reforms for achievement of effectiveness and among them is Reform Area 4 in which the ministry plans to establish Malawi Peace and Unity Commission and District Peace and Unity Committees. Another area the Ministry expressed commitment to improve is what called Reform Area 5 which establishing mechanisms for early warning of a potential conflict occurrence and corresponding response mechanism. The objective of this reform is to ensure possible violent conflicts are harmoniously resolved before they turn violent[164].

Education is argued to have a bearing on religious intolerance[165]. There are several categories of schools in Malawi. Malawi has private schools belonging to individuals, private religious schools which are mostly owned by either Christian or Muslim and public schools. The curriculum for public schools is more Christian oriented as they contained Bible Knowledge while in Muslim schools have teachings on Islamic faith. The government also funds some schools owned by Christian religious groups so that the public can access them, these include children from other religion. The "grant aided" usually decide whether to include Bible Knowledge in their curriculum, this aspect has been a bone of contention between Christians and Muslims. While

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[164] Republic Of Malawi. Public Sector Reform Areas, MDA: Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity, 18 August 2020.
[165] Niemi, Pia-Maria et al. "Religion as a Human Right and Security Threat – Investigating Young Adults in Finland.", 1-16.

Christians insist on "Bible Knowledge", Muslims argue that "Moral and Religious Education" would be a better and neutral subject that can enhance religious tolerance[166]. This indicates that while Malawi government has attempted to exploit education to enhance religious tolerance, more needs to be done so the curriculum does not seem to be biased towards some religions.

Malawi government also has a National Peace Architecture (NPA) with the prospect of establishing sustainable peace. The aim of the NPA was to ensure sustainable peace and develop proactive measures to address societal conflicts including religious related conflicts. Supported by UNDP, NPA was expected to provide a platform for proactive dialogue for peace building and conflict prevention. NPA provisions of include projects that will enhance social cohesion and enable sustainable peace. NPA with support from UNDP was to provide technical support in conflict analysis, conflict early warning and early response measures. Actors to be involved in implementation include UN agencies, civil society, and government agencies among others. The absence of legal backing has however derailed the timeline of the NPA. The NPA establishes the District Peace Committees which are an implementation tool of the NPA[167]. The NPA is a commendable effort which if effectively implemented will to a larger extent reach out to many citizens thus reducing levels of religious intolerance.

3.6 Coercive Government Strategies

Malawi government uses some reactionary coercive measures to subdue religious related violence as one of the strategies by deploying the MPS deriving the authority from Section 153 of the Laws of Malawi which mandate MPS with the protection of public safety and ensuring that citizens enjoy their rights. On several occasions, the government has employed the MPS to

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[166] USA Government 2019 International Religious Freedom Reports on Malawi.
[167] Malawi National Peace Architecture.

quell violence emanating from religious intolerance. For example, on 27 April 2003 there was a fracas in a Muslim dominated Mangochi district where Muslims attacked Christian installations burning down churches and other properties including vehicles belonging to Jehova's Witnesses, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventist, Presbyterians, Assemblies of God and other Christian minority congregations. The government responded by deploying the MPS to calm down the situation, the MDF has also several times deployed to address violence related to religious intolerance[168].

3.7 Religious Organizations' Confliction Resolution Measures

Well organized religious organizations are an effective and efficient source for building peace. These organizations act as an authoritative guarantor for managing conflicts, enhancing social tolerance and democratic diversity. Under a good political climate, religious organizations are good peacemakers, peace-builders and a source of social cohesion with moral legitimacy[169]. These characteristics make religious organizations an important element in resolving religious identity conflicts and they have been successfully employed in different conflicts in Africa and beyond. One of the most active religious organizations in Malawi is the PAC.

Formed in 1992 by the religious community, the purpose of PAC at its inception was to caution the conflict between then then ruling elite and the pressure groups demanding a change from a single party to multi-party system of governance. It acts as an umbrella organization for all major religious groups in Malawi. PAC has representation from Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM), Quadria Muslim Association of Malawi (QMAM), Malawi Council of Churches (MCC), Evangelical Association of Malawi (EAM) and the Episcopal Conference of Malawi

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[168] Mchombo, Sam. "Religion and Politics in Malawi.", 1-16.
[169] Omotosho, Mashood. "Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Inter-Religious Mediation Peace Strategy.", 133 – 151.

(ECM). PAC also represents Malawi Chapter of the World Conference of Religion and Peace (WCRP).

The objective of PAC is to organize the religious community, other stakeholders and the public in general in promoting democracy, development, peace and unity through advocacy, civic education and mediation. Activities of the organization can be grouped into three categories; first, PAC implements social cohesion activities. An example is in October 2016 when PAC with support from the UNDP formed a Woman in Faith (WIF) Peace building Network which comprised women from different religious faiths. The purpose of this group is to enhance the skills of women in different faiths in conflict resolution measure with regard to religious conflicts. This is collaborative effort to prevent violence and promote sustainable peace[170]. Secondly, PAC embarks of conflict prevention activities and lastly its activities are aimed at enhancing advocacy. These includes interface meetings, creating dialogue platforms, advocacy programs, shuttle diplomacy, early warning and response, WIF peace building network, district stakeholders, including publicity and publications among others. In 2016 PAC initiated All Inclusive Conference where government officials and traditional leaders from different parts of the country attended[171].

PAC has assisted in addressing issues of religious intolerance in several ways. In one instance, Muslim girls were sent back from school for wearing hijabs and the event turned violent, the government delegated PAC to resolve the issue in coordination with the Ministry of Education. The key recommendation by PAC and Ministry of Education conflict managers was that Islamic girls be allowed to wear masks that match their school uniform and that no girl child would be

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[170] UNCT Malawi. Malawian women gather for peace building conference, 18 November 2016.
[171] Public Affairs Committee 2016 Annual Report.

forced to wear it if she wishes not to. However, Muslims argued that the color restriction does not make sense because Christian children come to the same schools with rosaries of different kinds and colors. The feasibility of the recommendation of not being forced to wear hijabs was also difficult to apply in Islamic schools. This means conflict management measures proposed the religious institutions in Malawi are reactive, not proactive and are mostly not applied or difficult to be applied equally.

Unlike other countries where religious organizations are many and take a proactive role in resolving religious related conflicts, literature shows Malawi is lagging behind in employing religious based organizations to resolve conflicts. For instance, in Nigeria there are a number of faith-based organizations that are proactively addressing religious conflicts by establishing numerous institutions. One such organization is the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) which is a composition 50 religious volunteers 25 each from Christian and Muslim communities. Also called the "Council", NIREC is a permanent neutral body that provides religious leaders a platform for promoting increase interaction among the leaders as a tool for sustainable peace. NIREC was formed to address an increase in ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. The Council regularly organizes joint prayers between Christians and Muslims to enhance interacting and understanding between the two religions[172]. On the other hand, PAC only organizes joint prayers to pray for rain and peaceful election not to stimulate tolerance.

Another group that proactively helps resolve religious conflicts in Nigeria is the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC) which is a composition of various religious leaders. It is a nonprofit faith-based organization whose focus is building an inclusive society without ethno-religious

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[172] Omotosho, Mashood. "Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Inter-Religious Mediation Peace Strategy.", 133 – 151.

conflicts. The IMC is a unique congregation of religious leaders highly effective and visible in reconciling conflicting religious factions in Northern Nigeria. The organization establishes itself within the communities and creates contact with other religious leaders that are vulnerable to extremism and encourage them in accepting the existence of the differences in the societies and educate them on how to leave within that context. Dialogue and mediation are the main tools IMC use to create cohesion in the societies they operate[173].

Other faith-based organizations that help resolve conflicts in Nigeria include the Interfaith Mediation Centre of Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum (IMCMCDF), the International Peace League and Conflict Management Stakeholders Network among many others. These organizations work under the premise that religious leaders have moral authority on their religious communities and that actors of all conflicts in African context belong to a religion. According to these groups, this authority makes religious leaders a key factor in addressing conflicts. There are some recorded successes made by such faith-based initiatives in Nigeria. Among them is August 2002 signing of the Kaduna Peace Declaration[174] and the Yelwa-Shendan Peace Affirmation of 19 February 2005[175], these agreements were between Christians and Muslims. Literature therefore shows that unlike in Malawi, Nigeria has many active purposively faith-based organizations that proactively resolve religious conflicts.

3.8 Policies and Strategies to Address Religious Intolerance in Malawi

During primary data collection, respondents were asked about their knowledge on the strategies used to address religious intolerance, they mentioned some including dialogue between the government and religious leaders and among the religious leaders themselves. They also

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[173] Ibid.
[174] The Kaduna Peace Declaration of Religious Leaders.
[175] Yelwa Shendam Peace Affirmation 19 February 2005.

mentioned community sensitization initiatives by the government and civil society. It was further mentioned that the government mostly relies on the Constitution which provides for the freedom of worship for all. As mentioned by the respondents, creation of the Ministry of Civic Education was aimed at mandating it to implement policies and strategies that address religious intolerance. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies like the MPS, MDF and NIS were also mentioned to be part of the strategies to address intolerance. They also mentioned the MHRC though they doubted the effectiveness of the Commission.

On the part of the civil society, respondents mentioned PAC as an important tool and strategy that brings clerics from different religions under one roof to address religious issues including intolerance. Scores of respondents mentioned introduction of religious studies as a strategy to help address religious intolerance. They claim that there is a need to have several organizations like PAC so they can complement effort in advancing religious tolerance. Religious based organizations like PAC have demonstrated certain levels of success in addressing issues of religious intolerance.

3.9 Effectiveness of Current Strategies in Malawi

With regard to the effectiveness of the current strategies, over half of the respondents had the consensus that the strategies are moderately effective. This dissatisfaction shows that something can be done to make the strategies more effective. The graph below has the details:

FIGURE 3.1: EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT STRATEGIES
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Data above indicated that the strategies are not effective as expected, the justification as given by the respondents is that there is lack of political will on the part of the government to enforce the constitutional provisions by the politicians due to the fear of losing votes because Christians and Muslims constitute over 90% of the voters. They also claimed that lack of resources for the ministry and the civil society contributes to poor performance.

3.10   Effectiveness of MPS

The study required to determine the opinion of the respondents on the effectiveness of the MPS in addressing religious intolerance including the violence that emanate from it. Half of the respondents had doubts on the effectiveness of the MPS as they indicate they only partially agreed with this notion, no respondents strongly agreed while the remainders either were not sure or disagreed. The details are as shown on the graph below:

FIGURE 3.2: MPS EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

As indicated in the graph above, majority of the respondents partly agreed and justified their opinion by arguing that the MPS has been able to control a series of religious intolerance incidences in the eastern region, for example the demolition of a cross in Zomba, they ably controlled the mob. They also said MPS managed to control angry Muslim mob in Mangochi that went on rampage destroying kiosks. Their opinion is therefore that although the MPS has some shortfalls in their performance, they still make a notable impact in implementing coercive strategies to address violence related to religious intolerance.

On the other hand, those that are skeptical of the MPS effectiveness in addressing religious intolerance argue that the MPS lack capacity and only until such capacity is built then it can be effective. They also contend that the MPS lacks the urgency to decisively address violence that emanate from religious intolerance arguing that in several instances they either reported late or withdrew early leaving violence still in progress only for the military to calm and address the

81

situation. They further argue that the population disrespects the MPS and their presence in a scene where violence is occurring does not deter the perpetrators to stop committing violence but rather they continue doing so with impunity. The study then sought to determine the effectiveness of the NIS in addressing religious intolerance.

3.11 Effectiveness of NIS

To determine the opinion of the respondents on the effectiveness of the NIS in addressing religious intolerance including its related violence, the study asked the respondents for their opinion ranging from Strongly Agree, Agree, Partly Agree, Not Sure and Do Not Agree. Over half of the respondents had doubts on the effectiveness of the NIS as they indicated that they Partially Agree, no respondents strongly agreed while the remainder either were not sure or disagreed. The details are as shown on the graph below:


FIGURE 3.3: NIS EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Those that are not sure and those that disagree claim that the NIS has failed to predict the occurrence of violence, if they were able to do so then proactive measures could have been done to diffuse the issues that triggered violence in previous events. They also claim that the NIS is more involved with issues of regime security leaving out issues of national security which is similarly in their domain. The NIS works in total secrecy making it difficult to determine its visibility and contribution in addressing issues with regard to religious intolerance. On the other hand, those that are in partial agreement contend that NIS works as an independent and secret organization that does not share their information in most cases. This makes their contribution invisible and difficult to judge despite being clear that due to regional arrangements they share intelligence with similar organizations in the SADC region. They therefore argue that there is obvious contribution by the NIS towards addressing issue of religious intolerance.

3.12   Effectiveness of MDF

The study sought to determine the effectiveness of the MDF in implementing strategies aimed at addressing religious intolerance including the violence that comes with it. Respondents were therefore asked to rate MDF effectiveness ranging from Strongly Agree, Agree, Partly Agree, Not Sure and Do Not Agree. Less than half of the respondents Agreed, a quarter Partially Agreed while the remainder either Strongly Agreed, were Not Sure or did Not Agree. The details are as shown on the graph below:

FIGURE 3.4: MDF EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Comparing the data for the security agencies, the findings indicate that respondents opined that the MDF is more capable and deals better with issues of religious intolerance followed by the MPS. Surprisingly, almost all respondents expressed doubt or skepticism with the role and abilities of the NIS. These findings could result from the fact that the majority of the respondents were military officers, their responses could thus be biased. The findings would also explain the negative perception that most people have with the NIS. Some respondents actually indicated that the NIS is just used as a political tool such that it does not understand its role in deterring security threats. It becomes disturbing to learn that some of the respondents are not even sure of the role that the NIS play in Malawi and others have never heard about its activities.

Notwithstanding any perceived or actual bias with the NIS, the above findings are worrisome. The NIS is supposed to be the main intelligence hub for the country. Its intelligence products are to feed both MDF and MPS operational plans and strategy. Having a dysfunctional NIS is as

good as having no security architecture. This state of affairs needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Among others, the government can enhance the capacity of the MDF and MPS in terms of equipment and training. There is a need for a deliberate effort to establish a combined force element between the MDF, MPS and the NIS with a joint headquarters to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and ensure swift action once the need arises.

3.13   MDF and MPS State of Preparedness

To make feasible policy recommendation that would enhance capacity development of the security agencies, there was a need to determine the level of preparedness for the MDF and the MPS. Respondents were therefore asked to rate if the MDF and MPS are very prepared, well prepared, moderately prepared or not prepared. Over three quarters of the respondent opined that the MPS are moderately prepared while the remainder thought it is not prepared. On the other hand, close to half of them said MDF also moderately prepared, a quarter said the MDF is not prepared while the remaining fraction thought the MDF is very prepared. Finer details are shown below:

FIGURE 3.5: MPS AND MDF STATE OF PREPAREDNESS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS RELATED VIOLENCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

The above statistics show that people have some belief in both the MPS and MDF to deal with religious intolerance. However, some express doubt with the MPS citing unprofessionalism and lack of motivation. Others think the MPS is always quick to leave scene of violence and call for support from MDF. On MDF, a good number of people believe MDF is moderately prepared. They cite recent activities by MDF to deal with civil disturbances as a classic example. However, others think MDF is not prepared and does not have adequate equipment to deal with such issues. They state that MDF's training does not prepare it for such interventions. Bearing in mind that the respondents were mostly from government security agencies, only 15% opined that their agencies are well prepared to deter violence related to religious intolerance. With proper equipment and focused training, these agencies can be turned into a reliable instrument that can

be employed to execute strategies aimed at addressing religious intolerance. Security agencies need proper training and equipment to improve their effectiveness.

3.14   Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity

The Malawi government recently established the Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity and one of its mandates was to address issues of religious intolerance. It therefore became paramount for this study to determine the effectiveness of this ministry so that ways of improving its operations can be suggested. Respondents were asked to rate if the operations of the ministry are producing the desired impact with regard to addressing religious intolerance. Close to half of the respondents, after over a year since its establishment, were not sure whether it is having a notable impact, the other quarter partially agreed while the last quarter agreed. The figure below contains finer details of the findings:

FIGURE 3.6: IMPACT OF THE MINISTRY OF CIVIC EDUCATION IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

It is possible that most people are not aware of the ministry and its functions. There is need for sensitization of the ministry's roles. The findings mean the ministry has not been active and visible enough to make its presence felt in communities. Importantly, the above observations call for a holistic approach to dealing with religious intolerance. The ministry must engage and work with security agents in dealing with religious intolerance. Borrowing from the secondary data, Egypt has a whole ministry dedicated to religious matters.

3.15 Impact of PAC

One of the religious organizations that are involved in addressing religious intolerance issues in Malawi is the PAC. Determining the impact of the activities of the PAC would be very useful in seeking measures to improve and maximize benefits from the efforts of the faith-based groups. It was therefore paramount to seek opinions from the respondents as to how they rate the effectiveness of PAC. Over half of the respondents noted that PAC is either absolutely effective or very effective while over a quarter believe the grouping is moderately effective. The figure below has the details of the findings:

FIGURE 3.7: IMPACT OF PAC IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
(Source: Researcher 2021)

88

The above statistics shows some belief and confidence in PAC. This could be because PAC generally is composed of religious leaders who are well versed with religious issues. Another reason could be that the religious nature of PAC allows it to command a lot of respect from the population who in one way or the other belong to one of the religions affiliated to the committee. The respondents claimed that PAC has been spearheading the fight against religious intolerance citing a number of programs the committee rolled out such as deliberate sensitization campaigns on religious inclusivity. PAC interventions can be said to have been strongly effective because of the results observed. The best example given is the Machinga case concerning the Hijab where PAC was able to engage all stakeholders including the Ministry of Education, the Muslim Association of Malawi, and the Anglican Diocese in Machinga, among others; and eventually resolved the issue.

Respondents also touted PAC for effectively initiating talks between Ministry of Education, Catholic Schools Authorities in Eastern region of Malawi, and Muslim Association of Malawi over the wearing of Hijabs by Muslim students in Christian Schools. They further claim PAC led the mediation with the Ministry of Education and Muslim community on their quest to discontinue Bible knowledge in schools. It is further claimed that the organization engages local authorities on cultural diversity and religious tolerance stressing that Malawi is a circular state.

However, PAC is accused of being swayed by the political pressure and at times forgets its roles, thus the reason some respondents thought PAC is not effective. Lack of capacity due to inadequate resources has also been cited as one of the reasons PAC is not as effective as expected. The government can consider complementing the resource base of PAC or funding selected projects that can be jointly initiated by the government and PAC. The local legitimacy PAC enjoy need to be exploited to ignite projects than can initiate social cohesion between

different religions thus eliminating or reducing religious intolerance. Religious organizations like PAC enjoy local legitimacy and can best resolve religious related disputes and its related violence, proper coordination between government and faith-based groups is critical to exploit their local legitimacy.

3.16 Suggested Improvements on Existing Strategies

Respondents suggested some measures that can help improve the performance of the existing policies. One of the suggestions is the introduction of education curriculum with specific lessons on religious tolerance. The suggestion comes on the background that current lessons do not include specifics that may help enhance religious tolerance. Secondly, religious institutions with the responsibility of propagating message on religious tolerance should have an enabling policy through a respective ministry who may also initiate joint projects so that they cultivate the local support enjoyed by the civil society and religious organizations like the PAC. Additionally, there has to be a special legislation that will regulate creations of religious denominations including limiting the content of their teachings.

Respondents also suggested that hastening the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Panel which is underway but dragging, as well as the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Centre and the Counter Terrorism Strategy which would go a long way in addressing issues such as religious intolerance and violent extremism. Malawi currently does not have a Counter Terrorism Strategy which would facilitate the crafting of a National Counter Terrorism Act. The Counter Terrorism Act would subsequently provide a mandate for enforcement and apprehension of culprits including those engaging in religious intolerance and violent extremism. Respondents also proposed that the government should dedicate effort to train the MDF and the MPS in countering violent extremism.

The Ministry of Civic Education should endeavor to come up with a workable road map and strategy in order to facilitate a full and legitimate roll out of measures to incorporate research on topics of religious intolerance and develop policies that will inculcate national patriotism in the youths. Other proposed measure includes increased dialogue among religious leaders and followers, this may also involve organizing interreligious prayers, community sensitization and law enforcement. The government can also constitute an independent Council that will be working with the civil society and other religious groups that deal with issues that are aimed at addressing religious intolerance.

3.17   Summary of the Chapter Key Findings

3.17.1 After analyzing both secondary and primary data on the second objective, the following key findings have been drawn:

3.17.1.1   There are several strategies several strategies and policies the Malawi government has put in place to address issues of religious intolerance. Amongst them is the Constitution, NPP and NPA. The constitution has an embedded bill of right, there are also provisions that constituted the MHRC to enforce the enjoyment of these rights. The government also empowers the Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity to handle issues of religious intolerance. These measures are however to a larger extent less effective or are yet to be tested and determine their effectiveness.

3.17.1.2   The Religious Groups Registration Act provisions are not strong enough to help the government to monitor the teachings of the religious groups met alone sanctioning them. The implementing authority which is the judiciary is preoccupied with other judicial tasks and provides less focus to this Act, mandating a separate entity to handle this responsibility might be

important. This may be either creating a separate ministry or creating an Independent Religious Council to handle issues of religion.

3.17.1.3   Controversy on the education curriculum as to whether it should be Bible Knowledge or Moral and Religious Education shows that education is an important element in the community, the government could have exploited the content of the subject to address religious intolerance from grassroots.

3.17.1.4   The government also deploys MPS and MDF to deal with incidents of violence. Though these coercive strategies produce immediate and temporary relief, they are however only reactive and does not resolve the underlying causes. This entails they cannot bring durable stability.

3.17.1.5   Faith-based organizations like the PAC have taken several initiatives to address religious intolerance, such measures are regarded to be effective as the religious based organizations enjoy local legitimacy and trust due to the fact most of the population have are ligious representation in the group.

3.17.1.6   Malawi does not have some of the very important policies and institutions that could complement the fight against religious intolerance and it related violence. Examples include the Counter Terrorism Strategy and the National Counterterrorism Center.

3.17.1.7   Political leadership in Malawi do not view religious intolerance as an issue of state security requiring urgent response, that is possibly why there are indescribable delays in actualizing the NPP and NPA including the absence of National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NCTS) and the National Counter Terrorism Center. This disregard is happening while there are new lessons from Calbo Delgado in the neighbouring Mozambique.

CHAPTER FOUR: KEY CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN MALAWI

4.0   Introduction

Although there are some policies and strategies that are aimed at addressing religious intolerance in Malawi, there are challenges encountered in their implementation. This Chapter examines challenges faced by the government and other actors in implementing policies and strategies intended to help reduce religious intolerance in Malawi, this examination will include presentation, analysis and discussion of the secondary and collected primary data on the third study objective which was examining challenges encountered in implementing strategies to address religious intolerance. Amongst the many challenges, empirical evidence points to lack of resources, lack of enabling legislation and unattractive socio-political environment. The social political environment plays a critical role in creating an enabling environment where the policies can be implemented either successfully or not, evidence has indicated that the socio-political environment in Malawi is not accommodative.

4.1   Lack of Resources

Lack of resources has negatively impacted on the implementation of the policies for addressing religious intolerance. The MHRC is among the institutions affected by the lack of resources to execute its mandate as enshrined in the 1994 Malawi Constitution. The MHRC was established when the country was transitioning from one party to multiparty democracy, it however only became functional in 1999 due to inadequate funding. Though the Constitutional provision was passed in 1994, the first small funding was provided two years later in 1996[176]. All MHRC

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[176] EISA. "Malawi: Malawi Human Rights Commission: African Democracy Encyclopedia Project. www.eisa.org/wep/malagency1.htm.

annual reports from 2013 have indicated resource inadequecy as a stumbling block for operations for the organization.

The MHRC is an independent constitutionally constituted institution mandated to protect and promote human rights. It is also mandated to institute investigations of all human rights abuses and related issues. Article 15 (g) of the Human Rights Act in Malawi mandated the MHRC to initiate visibility measures at all levels starting from sub-district, district, regional to national levels. This is for the purpose of ensuring outreach to far and remote areas of the country, the institution has however failed to achieve that visibility because as of now it only has permanent visibility at national and regional levels. Most people in remote areas have no or very little knowledge on the functions let alone the existence of MHRC. All this is because the organization has no resources to execute its mandate successfully[177].

Additionally, MHRC relies on donour funds which is most often unpredictable, this unpredictability makes it hard for the Commission to effectively plan and use such resources. According to 2015 annual report, MHRC did not have enough personnel to enable it operate as per the requirement of the Human Rights Act. Lack of human capital translate to absence of people who can embark on outreach activities, the report further exposed lack of office space and equipment to facilitate its operations.   All these entail that the MHRC cannot effectively execute its mandate and therefore ineffective in addressing religious intolerance. The Commission also fails to produce its annual reports timely so stakeholders involved in overseeing the Commission can determine how to improve the operations of the organization[178]. Further, lack of resources slows down the speed at which complaints are supposed to be resolved. For instance, in 2017,

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[177] United States Department of State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Malawi 2017. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
[178] Ibid.

only 29% of the total complaints were investigated. Delays in investigating cases and resolving them is slowly eroding the trust from the population thus reducing the numbers of reported complaints. Additionally, lack of resources has led to poor record keeping, one can thus conclude that resource constraint has suffocated operations of MHRC in addressing religious intolerance[179].

Another organization which is involved in addressing religious intolerance in Malawi is the PAC. According to 2017 PAC Annual Report, the organization is also faced with resource deficits. PAC is funded by donors and other well-wishers. Funding partners include the UNDP, Danish Church Aid (DCA), European Union (EU), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Tilitonse Fund among others[180]. Apart from the EU, the other financiers DCA, NCA and the Tilitonse fund also depend on donations from other parties. PAC therefore has to wait until their financiers have received donations and then they can expect some funds. This has resulted into delays of funds transfer thus negatively affecting activities of the organization including those aimed at addressing religious intolerance. Additionally, due to lack of resources PAC staff mostly work on volunteer structure which becomes detrimental to its efficiency because members prioritizes activities that will earn them a living rather than voluntary activities[181].

Insufficient funds have further made it difficult for recruit and retain personnel who could have helped in implementing measures to address religious related violence[182]. In his study, Hussein found that most PAC district offices are closing down due to lack of operational funds. He further contends that the major challenge facing PAC is lack of capacity giving an example of

[179] Mtendere, Mute Gondwe. "Utilizing national human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights: a case study of the Malawi Human Rights Commission." *Commonwealth Law Bulletin*, 45:3 (2019): 556-579, DOI: 10.1080/03050718.2020.1733035
[180] https://www.pacmw.org/about-us/
[181] Public Affairs Committee 2017 Annual Report. Accessed from https://www.pacmw.org/reports/ on 31 January 2022.
[182] Ibid.

lack of competent and skilled human resource with expertise in negotiation, mediation, peace building and conflict prevention. In some instances, the government has asked PAC to be involved in conflict management activities without providing funding[183]. This has resulted into minimal execution of activities that would help address religiously motivated conflicts. Inadequate resources have denied PAC a chance of creating effective partnerships that would enhance networks, such networks could promote peace by addressing root causes of such conflicts[184]. This resource scarcity makes it difficult to employ home grown solutions to address the growing religious intolerance.

The MPS also faces shortage of resources which affect their quality of service delivery. These include operational equipment, transportation and personnel specifically trained for religious conflicts including terrorism. Lack of transportation has in several instances delayed response by MPS. For example, when violence started in Mangochi the police took approximately two hours to arrive at the scene and when they arrived the church had already been burned down. The same thing happened when a school was attacked due issues of hijab, the police arrived late when the damage was already done and the schools was closed for eight weeks while the police failed to provide security to the school[185]. Secondly, the MPS do not have a specially trained element to capably deal with terrorist attacks that can emanate from religious intolerance as found out from the primary data. This entails that their ability to deal with religiously related violence is reduced.

The government itself over relies on donor funding to implement its policies and strategies. For example, the drafting and pilot implementation of the NPA was to a larger extent funded by the

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[183] Ibid.

[184] Hussein, Mustafa Kennedy. "Intra-state conflict and indigenous-based conflict resolution mechanisms in Malawi: the role of the Public Affairs Committee." *African Security Review* 20, no. 1 (2011): 26-39

[185] *Malawi Muslims riot in Mangochi over pork Sale*. Nyasa Times. Accessed on 20 August 2020.
https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-muslims-riot-in-mangochi-over-pork-sale/

UNDP. The establishment of the DPCs that are constituted by the NPA is only done as a pilot phase to date and this pilot phase was also funded by the UNDP. While the NPA was adopted in 2013, as of 6 January 2021 the DPCs were only operational in 6 districts namely Karonga, Kasungu, Salima, Nkhatabay and Mulanje while the country has 28 districts. This rate of implementation leaves a lot of questions as to whether it will be possible to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of the NPA country wide. Nevertheless, it is claimed that where the DPCs are established, the operations have made a positive difference[186].

4.2   Lack of Enabling Legislation

According to Gondwe, the HRC Act has some gaps that may affect operations of the Commission, the first gap is with regard to the appointment of Commissioners. The HRC Act provides that the composition of the Commission shall include the Ombudsman and the Law Commissioner plus seven other appointed Commissioners to serve for a period of three years, making a total of nine Commissioners. The Act however does not specify qualifications for the appointed commissioners and whether they can be reappointed after expiry of the initial three-year period. In her study, Gondwe contends that the three-year period is counterproductive preferring longer periods which she claims would benefit continuity. Another gap is that HRC Act is silent on whether Commissioners should serve on full or part time basis, this has resulted into some of them serving of part time basis thus reducing their commitment to duties at the Commission.   Thirdly, international standards require that members of the National Human

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[186] UNDP Procurement Notices. https://procurement-notices.undp.org/view_notice.cfm?notice_id=62381

Rights Institutions (NHRIs) be protected with legal liabilities for the decisions they undertake in the course of their duties, this provision is however absent in the HRC Act of Malawi[187].

Similarly, the initiatives undertaken by the PAC are also not legally binding on their own unless they work with other government institutions like the MPS, independently PAC cannot implement coercive or punitive measure to those that are found to be on the wrong. Being an established institution with proven relevance, PAC can have a standing constitutional arrangement with security agencies so that if their recommendations are coercive then such institutions would implement where necessary[188].

Dzinesa argues that implementation of the NPP is off the intended track. The NPP was designed to promote positive peace in the country by identifying structural and emerging causes of conflicts in the communities. The NPP which was adopted in 2017 established the MPC which was an implementation tool. As of November 2021, the Bill had not yet been tabled in Parliament, this means four years after the adoption of the UNDP funded NPP and NPA, the legislation is not yet in place to facilitate the implementation. The delay can be attributed to insufficient political will because the NPP and MPC framework document placed the Commission under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), later in the year 2020 when a new government was voted in, the President decided to move the MPC to the Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity. As of November 2021, the MPC was not yet constituted. This therefore means implementation of the NPP has no legal backing although pilot implementation of the DPCs already commenced in some districts. Lack of backing legislation for some

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[187] Mtendere Mute Gondwe. "Utilizing national human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights: a case study of the Malawi Human Rights Commission." *Commonwealth Law Bulletin*, 45:3 (2019): 556-579, DOI: 10.1080/03050718.2020.1733035

[188] Public Affairs Committee 2017 Annual Report. Accessed from https://www.pacmw.org/reports/ on 31 January 2022.

strategies has therefore hampered implementation of such strategies as exemplified with the NPP and NPA[189].

4.3   Unaccommodating Socio-Political Environment

Apart from resource deficit and lack of backing legislation, Malawi also lacks accommodative socio-political environment required to implement policies and strategies to address religious intolerance. For example, EISA project on human rights in Malawi found out that MHRC Commissioners are not free to make acceptable and beneficial decisions for fear of reprisals from politicians as they are not protected by any legal provision. Despite Section 121 of the Constitution prescribing for independence of the MHRC, EISA found that that there is political interference into activities of Commission thus leading to inactiveness of some Commissioners. According to EISA, lack of political will has also led to delays in implementation of rulings by the Ombudsman and the Courts meant to enforce enjoyment of human rights[190].

2017 PAC Annual Report indicated that there was mistrust between the then government and the Commission thus derailing activities that would enhance social cohesion among the citizens. The government viewed PAC as a competitor when the organization tried to confront the government on issues of governance that seemed to be structural cause for a conflict. On the other hand, the population had the perception that PAC had been receiving favours from the government thus causing the Committee to almost lose the local legitimacy it enjoys[191]. The operating environment for PAC was therefore not rosy for a while until it regained the local legitimacy after some dialogue.

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[189] UNDP Procurement Notices. https://procurement-notices.undp.org/view_notice.cfm?notice_id=62381
[190] EISA. "Malawi: Malawi Human Rights Commission: African Democracy Encyclopedia Project. www.eisa.org/wep/malagency1.htm.
[191] 2017 PAC Annual Report.

Another challenge in the socio-political environment in Malawi is the perception of different religious groupings and unwillingness to understand each other. As already discussed, the most common religious conflict in the study area involves Christians and Muslims. Ashaf argues that amongst the challenges in implementing conflicts, unwillingness of the religions to understand and appreciate the values of the other becomes a major setback. Beliefs of different religions are viewed as incompatible due to perceptions and sacred theories created around them[192].

4.3   Challenges in Implementation of Strategies to Address Religious Intolerance in Malawi

Respondents were asked to weigh the challenges that negatively affect the implementation of strategies intended at addressing religious intolerance from 1 being lowest to 6 as highest. The top highest rated challenges at 6 by 40% of the respondents was that followers of different religious groupings hold uncompromising attitudes and beliefs making it very difficult for them to compromise and interact cohesively. Lack of resources and misleading interpretation of scriptures were the second highly rated challenge with an average of 5 by 50% of the respondents. Combining religious and political roles by leaders tied together with beliefs in incompatible teaching which was rated 5 by 40% of the respondents. Details of the highest rated challenges are as shown on the figure below:

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[192] Ashafa, Abdullahi M. "Prospects, Possibilities and Challenges of Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Centre for World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology Journal* (2015).

FIGURE 4.1: CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES
(Source: Researcher 2021)

Asked as to how the identified challenges can be resolved, the respondents claimed that resolving incompatible beliefs is an uphill task because those beliefs are what constitutes part of the religions. The suggested solution is civic educating the population to accept their differences, live with them and learn to respect diversity. The first aspect is to make them understand that what bind them together is their nationality despite their differences in religion. Secondly, scriptures are often open to interpretation and some scriptures contains elements of violence, these factors pose a great challenge in addressing religious intolerance. Therefore, the government should work with religious leaders to influence proper interpretation of scriptures especially against those that induce violence. Another option is to increase religious studies in

schools to improve proper interpretation of scriptures and discourage elements of violence in their teachings. This may also require the government to introduce minimum education requirement for clerics and preachers. Furthermore, respective religious bodies should establish internal mechanisms to ensure that their religious clerics and preachers stick to the right interpretation of the scriptures and prevent propagation of intolerance. Sticking to uniting interpretation of scriptures will help avoid radicalization and religious fanatism.

With regard to the issue of inadequate resources, the respondents claim that most institutions in Malawi are always ill equipped to deal with any conflict that emanates from of religious intolerance or otherwise. Police, NIS and MDF should all be adequately funded to deal with any conflict. Similarly, all institutions such as the Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity and PAC should be adequately funded to implement the proposed strategies in addressing the vice.

There is also a challenge where religious leaders combine religious and political roles. The political landscape hampers efforts on different programs aimed at social development. Political leaders have either different priorities or a mere negligence in stemming the problem in its bud. Respondents proposed that the government through its relevant ministries should ensure that strategies are being implemented through a well-crafted system with clear evaluation mechanisms. The government should also separate politics from enforcing the strategies. This therefore means there has to be deliberate effort to civic educate politicians on the evils of politicization of religion and religionization of politics because they spark religious intolerance.

Respondent suggested that ICT including social media platforms should be monitored to detect access by the youth and general public to material that promotes intolerance and extremism. The ICT issue is twofold as it can also be exploited to disseminate messages that can enhance social

cohesion. The government and the civil society can therefore take advantage of ICT and conduct projects that will reduce religious intolerance. Additionally, Malawi has over 200 radio stations and over 40 TV stations, these can be utilized to disseminate messages than can enhance social cohesion. The government can partner with the Media Council of Malawi or individual radio and TV stations for this project. There can also be a media regulation demanding each registered radio and TV station to dedicate some time for messages that may help reduce religious intolerance.

4.4   Summary of the Chapter Key Findings

4.4.1   After analyzing both secondary and primary data on the third objective, the following key findings have been drawn:

4.4.1.1   Implementation of policies and strategies to address religious intolerance faces several challenges key among them is presence of incompatible beliefs the lack of resources, this is further compounded by lack of political will to allocate the scarce resources to pass related legislation and resource them accordingly. That is the reason the fruits of the NPP and NPA are not yet realized as of March 2022 despite being launched in 2017.

4.4.1.2   Some of the policies, strategies and activities taken to address religious intolerance do not have any backing legislation. This makes them illegal and can be challenged in court.

4.4.1.3   Socio-political environment in Malawi is prohibitive for implementation of strategies and policies to address religious intolerance. These include political

interference on activities of independent entities like the PAC and MHRC, such interference jeopardizes the legitimacy and effectiveness of such organisations.

4.4.1.4   Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) including security institutions are not well prepared to handle violence that emanated from religious intolerance, this unpreparedness relates to both training, equipment and work ethics.

4.4.1.5   ICT can be a double-edged sword which can hamper implementation of strategies and policies to address religious intolerance and at the same time can be exploited to enhance community cohesiveness despite of religious differences.

4.4.1.6   They way preachers and clerics interpret scripture is critical in either promoting or eliminating religious intolerance in Malawi.

4.4.1.7   Implementation of the strategies and those by religious groups like the PAC are not coordinated and complementary to each other.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The Chapter presents some summary key findings, conclusions and recommendations. These are drawn from the processes of the previous chapters on each study objective, these will also be presented as per objective.

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

5.1.1 According to the first objective of this study which was to examine the impact of religious intolerance on state security in Africa, the study finds that:

5.1.1.1 Religious intolerance is a threat to state security in African states as states are not able to exercise effective sovereignty in affected parts of their territory, it impacts negatively on the freedoms of citizens to enjoy human rights and development. It also becomes a primary cause for identity conflicts and a tool for mobilizations for violence.

5.1.1.2 An overlap or duplication in identities in terms of religion and ethnicity multiplies the feelings of the occurrence of the intolerance by the ingroup against the outgroup.

5.1.1.3 Intolerance in Malawi exists and violence related events are increasing over time though the phenomena has not turned to a fully-fledged violent conflict. These violent attacks are a cause for state security concerns. The emerging intentions of creating an Islamic State under Sharia Law in Mangochi and Machinga presents a threat as it might over time graduate to secessionist movement.

5.1.1.4   Although there are many religious related conflicts between various religious groups, the most prominent ones in Malawi occur between Christians and Muslims.

5.1.1.5   The major cause religious related conflicts is presence of perceived or real threat posed by one religion on the other and religious fanatism or fundamentalism. Interpretation of religious scripts in a manner that creates hatred has fueled the intolerance between religious groups.

5.1.2   According to the second objective which was to investigate strategies applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi, the study finds that:

5.1.2.1   There are several strategies several strategies and policies the Malawi government has put in place to address issues of religious intolerance. Amongst them is the Constitution, NPP and NPA. The constitution has an embedded bill of rights, there are also provisions that constituted the MHRC to enforce the enjoyment of these rights. The government also empowers the Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity to handle issues of religious intolerance. These measures are however to a larger extent less effective or are yet to be tested and determine their effectiveness.

5.1.2.2   The Religious Groups Registration Act provisions are not strong enough to help the government to monitor the teachings of the religious groups let alone sanctioning them. The implementing authority which is the judiciary is preoccupied with other judicial tasks and provides less focus to this Act, mandating a separate entity to handle this responsibility might be important. This may be either creating a separate ministry or creating an Independent Religious Council to handle issues of religion.

5.1.2.3   Controversy on the education curriculum as to whether it should be Bible Knowledge or Moral and Religious Education shows that education is an important element in the community, the government could have exploited the content of the subject to address religious intolerance from grassroots.

5.1.2.4   The government also deploys MPS and MDF to deal with incidents of violence. Though these coercive strategies produce immediate and temporary relief, they are however only reactive and do not resolve the underlying causes. This entails they cannot bring durable stability.

5.1.2.5   Faith-based organisations like the PAC have taken several initiatives to address religious intolerance, such measures are regarded to be effective as the religious based organisations enjoy local legitimacy and trust due to the fact most of the population have religious representation in the group.

5.1.2.6   Malawi does not have some of the very important policies and institutions that could complement the fight against religious intolerance and its related violence. Examples include the Counter Terrorism Strategy and the National Counterterrorism Center.

5.1.2.1.7   Political leadership in Malawi do not view religious intolerance as an issue of state security requiring urgent response, that is possibly why there are indescribable delays in actualizing the NPP and NPA including the absence of National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NCTS) and the National Counter Terrorism Center. This disregard is happening while there are new lessons from Calbo Delgado in the neighbouring Mozambique.

5.1.3 According to the third objective which was to examine challenges encountered in implementing strategies to address religious intolerance in Malawi. The study finds the following:

5.1.3.1 Implementation of policies and strategies to address religious intolerance faces several challenges key among them is presence of incompatible beliefs and lack of resources. This is further compounded by lack of political will to allocate the scarce resources to pass related legislation and resource them accordingly. That is the reason the fruits of the NPP and NPA are not yet realized as of March 2022 despite being launched in 2017.

5.1.3.2 Some of the policies, strategies and activities taken to address religious intolerance do not have any backing legislation. This makes them illegal and can be challenged in court.

5.1.3.3 Socio-political environment in Malawi is prohibitive for implementation of strategies and policies to address religious intolerance. These include political interference on activities of independent entities like the PAC and MHRC, such interference jeopardizes the legitimacy and effectiveness of such organizations.

5.1.3.4 Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) including security institutions are not well prepared to handle violence that emanated from religious intolerance, this unpreparedness relates to both training, equipment and work ethics.

5.1.3.5 ICT can be a double-edged sword which can hamper implementation of strategies and policies to address religious intolerance on one hand and at the same time can be exploited to enhance community cohesiveness despite of religious differences.

5.1.3.6 They way preachers and clerics interpret scriptures is critical in either promoting or eliminating religious intolerance in Malawi.

5.1.3.7 Implementation of the strategies government Ministries, Departments and Agencies and those by religious groups like the PAC are not coordinated and complementary to each other.

5.2   Conclusions

5.2.1   Chapter two of this project has shown that religious intolerance if not well managed in most cases has resulted into tensions which eventually turn into violent conflicts and it has affected state security in different regions of the world including scores of African countries. Management of such identity-based conflicts once they turn violent has not been easy as many states are still struggling to manage them. In the case of the study area, incidents of religious identity violence are occurring but they have not yet graduated into generalized violence. It is worthy to note that the occurrence of the isolated cases of violent events connected to religious identity has been on the increase over the last ten years. This trend means any meaningful trigger event can cause generalized violence between religions; mostly Muslims and Christians. This calls for the Malawi government to proactively act to diffuse the existing tension and manage the structural causes of the violence mostly using non-coercive measures.

5.2.2   Addressing religious identity-based conflicts whether latent or open is a complex, resource and time-consuming adventure. The complexity compounds when the violence turns retaliatory especially because it is difficult to determine the ripe moment, specifically most times the conflict becomes protracted. The presumed sacredness of the contested issues requires multidimensional approach during the management process. Experiences from other parts of the world have shown that apart from government policies and strategies, religious groupings, civil

society and other positive non-state actors play a vital role in resolving such conflicts. Since religious identities are socially constructed, strategies that target elements involved in the construction of such religious identities could be useful.

In Malawi, there are several policies and strategies that are currently under use in an attempt to address religious intolerance. These strategies include those designated by the government and others by religious groups especially the PAC although there is an observation that government strategies and those of the PAC are mostly not coordinated. Government MDAs also take part in the process but their contributions seem largely reactive and less effective. One can therefore conclude that more has to be done to make the policies and strategies under implementation effective. More importantly, the absence of policies that could have been useful in addressing religious intolerance is an urgent matter requiring immediate attention while addressing obstacles hampering successful implementation of the current strategies.

5.2.3 Inadequate resources are hampering implementation of strategies that could have otherwise produced some fruits in resolving religious intolerance. Even the best policies or strategies cannot bear the desired outcomes if the allocated resources are inadequate. Political will is the capital for successful implementation of policies and Malawi seems to lack such capital. Furthermore, coordination between government MDAs and religious groups like PAC would reduce redundancy of activities hence maximize the use of available resources. This study identified Mangochi, Machinga and Balaka as hot spots for religious related violence and it might be important to focus efforts in these areas.

Reluctance by the Ministry of Education to revisit the issue of Bible Knowledge vis a vis Moral and Religious Education is counterproductive in as far as addressing religious intolerance in Malawi. Another obstacle that government MDAs must address is devising measures to control

preachers and clerics from harmful scripture interpretations. Further, another issue that may be detrimental to the effort of resolving religious intolerance is politicization of politics and politicization of religion which Malawian politicians and religious leaders must avoid at all times.

5.3   Recommendations

5.3.1   To avert the ever-increasing events of religious intolerance and the resultant violence, the study has come up with some recommendations. With regard to the finding of the first objective which was examining the impact of religious intolerance on state security in Africa, the study has the following recommendations:

5.3.1.1.   There is a need for high level political involvement in securitizing religious intolerance so that existing the missing policies and resource allocation prioritized to both the new and existing strategies.

5.3.1.2   There has to be regional arrangements facilitated by regional bodies to spearhead in proactively addressing issues of religious intolerance in their respective regions. This will help oversee and coordinate activities of governments while ensuring that successful lessons from one part are borrowed, adjusted and applied somewhere.

5.3.1.3.   Eastern part of Malawi needs special focus in addressing issues of religious intolerance as the region has been identified as a hot spot. Attention should be given to major religious groupings in this region which are Muslims and Christians.

5.3.1.4   Deliberate policies and strategies must be put in place to establish trust and confidence between religions. Such policies could also help address religious fundamentalism.

5.3.2   With regard to the finding of the second objective which was to investigate strategies applied to address religious intolerance in Malawi, the study has the following recommendations:

5.3.2.1   Legislation that control registration of religious groups need to be strong enough to control religious intolerance.

5.3.2.2   The government to devise strategies that will employ education curricula as a tool to address religious intolerance at grass roots level.

5.3.2.3   The government to train and equip the MDF, MPS and NIS on how to handle issues of religious intolerance and its related violence.

5.3.2.4   The government to consider mobilizing the civil society and faith-based organisations to focus their effort in resolving issues related to religious intolerance.

5.3.2.5   The government to fast track the drafting and passing of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy and establishing the National Counter Terrorism Centre.

5.3.2.6   Creating a separate ministry or creating an Independent Religious Council to handle issues of religion might be an effective way to manage religious intolerance.

5.3.3   According to the third objective which was to examine challenges encountered in implementing strategies to address religious intolerance in Malawi. The study recommends the following:

5.3.3.1   Government to ensure enough resources are allocated to implementation of policies and strategies aimed at addressing religious intolerance.

5.3.3.2   There is a need to exploit ICT and media to address religious intolerance.

5.3.3.3   Devise measures that will deter interpretation of scriptures that promote hatred.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Research Questionnaire

INTRODUCTION

I am Colonel Alfred Luciano Matambo, a serving member of the Malawi Defence Force (MDF) currently pursuing a Master's Degree in International Studies with the University of Nairobi in partnership with the National Defence College, Kenya. It is a mandatory requirement for students pursuing to embark on research related to international security or international relations as partial fulfillment condition of the programme. My research topic is on the implications of religious intolerance on state security in Africa using Lilongwe in Malawi as a case study.

Voluntary Participation: Taking part in this study is voluntary and this consent can be withdrawn anytime the participant feels so.

Confidentiality and Ethics: All your contributions to this study will be confidential and used for the purpose of this study only. No individual information may be revealed without the consent of that particular participant.

SECTION A: RESPONDENT / INTERVIEWER DETAILS

1. Date of the Interview
   a.
2. Gender and Age of the Respondent
   a.　　Male
   b.　　Female
   c.　　Age ……..
3. Religion
   a.　　Christian.
   b.　　Moslem.
   c.　　Rastafarian.
   d.　　Others ……………………… (Specify Please)

SECTION B: IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE ON STATE SECURITY

4. How strongly do you agree that religious intolerance and its related violence been on the rise over the last 10 years?

    a.   Extremely Increased.

    b.   Increased.

    c.   Slightly Increased.

    d.   Not Increased.

    e.   Slightly reduced.

    f.   Drastically Reduced.

Explain your answer above: ……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….…………………...............

……………………………………………………………………………..……………………

5. How strongly do you agree with an opinion that religious intolerance negatively impacts on state security?

    a.   Strongly Agree.

    b.   Agree.

    c.   Partly Agree.

    d.   Not Sure.

    e.   Do not Agree.

Explain your answer above: ……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….…………………...............

……………………………………………………………………………..……………………

6. In a rating 1-5, what is your opinion on the frequency of causes religious intolerance listed below?

Ser	Description	1	2	3	4	5
1	Perceived or real threat from other religious groups					
2	Distrust on other religious groups					
3	Secularism					
4	Religious fanaticism					
5	Social media influence					

7. Give a short explanation for your answer in 10 above.

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

SECTION C: POLICIES AND STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

8. What strategies are some of the strategies being applied in addressing religious intolerance and related conflicts?

   a. …………………………………………………………………………………………

   b. …………………………………………………………………………………………

   c. …………………………………………………………………………………………

   d. …………………………………………………………………………………………

   e. …………………………………………………………………………………………

9. On the rating of 0- 100%, what is the effectiveness of the strategies being applied?

   a. Absolutely effective (90-100%)

   b. Strongly effective (80-89%)

   c. Very effective (70-79%)

   d. Moderately effective (60-69)

   e. Dismally effective (50-59)

   f. Not Effective 0-49

10. How strong do you agree that the Malawi Police Service is doing the best of its abilities in retarding incidents of religious intolerance when called upon or on its own?

    a.   Strongly Agree.

    b.   Agree.

    c.   Partly Agree.

    d.   Not Sure.

    e.   Do not Agree

Explain your answer above: …………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………….............

……………………………………………………………………………….…………………………

11. How strong do you agree that the Malawi National Intelligence Service is doing the best of its abilities in retarding incidents of religious intolerance when called upon or on its own?

    a.   Strongly Agree.

    b.   Agree.

    c.   Partly Agree.

    d.   Not Sure.

    e.   Do not Agree

Explain your answer above: …………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………….............

……………………………………………………………………………….…………………………

12. How strong do you agree that the Malawi Defence Force is doing the best of its abilities in retarding incidents of religious intolerance when called upon or on its own?

    a.   Strongly Agree.

    b.   Agree.

    c.   Partly Agree.

    d.   Not Sure.

    e.   Do not Agree

Explain your answer above: ……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….……………............

……………………………………………………………………..……………………

13. To what extent is the Malawi Police equipped, trained and psychologically prepared to handle violent conflicts that may emanate from religious intolerance.

    a.   Very Prepared.

    b.   Well prepared.

    c.   Moderately.

    d.   Moderately prepared.

    e.   Not prepared.

    f.   Not prepared at all.

Explain your answer above: ……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….……………............

……………………………………………………………………..……………………

14. To what extent is the Malawi Defence Force equipped, trained and psychologically prepared to handle violent conflicts that may emanate from religious intolerance.

    a.   Very Prepared.

    b.   Well prepared.

    c.   Moderately.

    d.   Moderately prepared.

    e.   Not prepared.

    f.   Not prepared at all.

Explain your answer above: ……………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….……………............

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15. How strong do you agree that the newly established Ministry of Civic Education and National Unity is doing the best of its abilities in retarding incidents of religious intolerance when called upon or on its own?

a.   Strongly Agree.

b.   Agree.

c.   Partly Agree.

d.   Not Sure.

e.   Do not Agree

Explain your answer above: …………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………….………………...............

………………………………………………………………….…………………………

16. The Public Affairs Committee has largely been involved in resolving religious conflicts.
What is the effectiveness of such interventions?

a.   Absolutely effective (90-100%)

b.   Strongly effective (80-89%)

c.   Very effective (70-79%)

d.   Moderately effective (60-69)

e.   Dismally effective (50-59)

f.   Not Effective 0-49

Explain your answer above: …………………………………………………………………

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17. What new or improvement on existing policies strategies would you propose to advance
religious tolerance?

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SECTION D: CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

18. Rating from 1 to 6 what do you think are the challenges on addressing religious intolerance? (If your thoughts are not captured in the offered challenges add in the **Divergent Views** row please) (Tick or Cross once in each row)

Ser	Description	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Lack of resources to implement available policy and strategy measure						
2	Incompatible religious beliefs						
3	Combination of roles of politicians or policy/Decision maker and a religious fundamentalism/leader						
4	Uncompromising attitude of religious leaders						
5	Issue of ICT, Globalization and the youth factor vis a vis aged religious leaders						
6	Scriptures used in different religions						
Divergent Views: ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………... ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………							

19. Any possible ways of resolving the first highest rated challenges?

Challenge Number 1:

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……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

Challenge Number 2:

……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

Challenge Number 2:

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Divergent Challenge:

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…………………………………………………………………………………………

Thank you so much for your participation in this interview

Appendix 2: Study Area (Lilongwe, Malawi)

Appendix 3: Letter of Authorization

MDF HEADQUARTERS

2 1 JAN 2022

PRIVATE BAG 43, LILONGWE

21 January 2022

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

The bearer of this letter is **COLONEL ALFRED LUCIANO MATAMBO**, a serving member of the Malawi Defence Force (MDF) and student from University of Nairobi in partnership with the National Defence College, Kenya. He is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in International Studies programme.

It is a requirement for students to complete research in partial fulfilment for the award of the Master's Degree. As such, the senior officer is expected to gather information relevant to his research topic; *Implications of Religious Intolerance on State Security in Africa: A Case Study of Lilongwe, Malawi."* In view of this, be assured that the collected data shall be treated confidentially and used for the study and not anything else.

This also serves as an introductory letter so that the student is permitted to collect data from your institution.

I thank you in advance for the assistance you will render the student.

E K MLELEMBA
Major
For Commander
MALAWI DEFENCE FORCE

Appendix 4: Turnitin Plagiarism Report

IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE ON STATE SECURITY IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY LILONGWE IN MALAWI

ORIGINALITY REPORT

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