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

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

IN THIS ISSUE

Mozambique provides the cover story, with articles focusing on its internal situation and international relations. Allen and Barbara Isaacman examine in detail the threat posed by antigovernment guerrillas. Their assessment is set within the wider framework of South Africa's relations with its neighbors.

Shirley Washington describes the recently improved ties between Mozambique and Portugal, the former colonial power. The most recent development was the conclusion of a military agreement. Michael Clough also looks at the regional situation in southern Africa, urging a more active U.S. role in light of Pretoria's efforts to destabilize its neighbors.

David Robbins has been studying South Africa's plans to hand over areas of territory to Swaziland. The deal, which was accepted by Swaziland before the death of King Sobhuza, has caused controversy in both countries and has aroused old ethnic rivalries. Also from South Africa, Miriam Lacob analyzes the strengths and activities of black trade unions.

Senegalese journalist Justin Mende examines the record of President Diouf in the two years since he took over from President Senghor. While Diouf is certain to remain in power following next year's presidential elections, he does face growing economic and social problems. From Botswana, Jørgen Rask Hansen examines the debate that has arisen regarding the future role of the country's youth brigades.

This issue also contains a selection of book reviews plus African Update's country-by-country analyses of recent developments.

Photo Credit
The cover photo of President Samora Machel of Mozambique was taken by Laffont/Sygma.

South Africa's Hidden War

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN AND BARBARA ISAACMAN

South Africa is waging an undeclared war in Mozambique. Its main weapon at the moment is the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Over the past year the MNR has intensified its military activity in Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane, and extended its operations to four other provinces including Gaza, long considered a Frelimo stronghold. Attacks on bridges, roads, the railroad lines leading to Zimbabwe, country stores, and communal villages have created havoc in the countryside, threatened to paralyze key sectors of the rural economy, and disrupted internal and international road and rail traffic.

Conversations with several ministers and senior military officers in August and September underscored the gravity of the situation. As one high-ranking official noted, "We are in a decisive battle in which the real enemy is South Africa." The recent warning from South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" reinforced this concern.

Allen Isaacman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota and author of several books on Mozambican history. Barbara Isaacman, a lawyer, has recently published *Mozambique: Women, the Law and Agrarian Reform*. A new book that they have just completed, entitled *Sowing the Seeds of Revolution: Mozambique in the Twentieth Century*, is to be published in 1983 by Westview Press.

Photo: Ricardo Rangel

A woman whose ears were cut off by the MNR was held captive at their base at Sitatonga. The Mozambique army captured the base.

South Africa's threats and support of the MNR have two interrelated objectives: to destabilize Mozambique and to sabotage the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference), the integrated regional alliance of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, forged to break Pretoria's economic hegemony. Thus, its assistance to the MNR cannot be separated from its heightened economic and military pressure against Zimbabwe, its increased attacks on Angola, and its efforts to seduce Swaziland with the KaNgwane Bantustan and the Ingwavuma strip. Viewed from this regional perspective, MNR activity, like that of UNITA in Angola, is a valuable South African weapon to keep the region divided and in turmoil.

But what is the MNR? According to former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers, the Rhodesian special branch organized the MNR as an anti-Frelimo fifth column to work inside Mozambique. Gordon Winter, in his book *Inside Boss*, which documents his career as a South African spy, claims that the idea came from South African military intelligence. Whatever the case, from 1976 onward, Rhodesian security officials, working with their South African counterparts, recruited Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white, secret police agents, and former African members of the elite special forces of the colonial army (GE) who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence. To this initial group were added ex-Frelimo guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions.

Andre Matzangaiza and Alfonso Dhlakama, two former Frelimo soldiers, received prominent positions to give the MNR nationalistic credentials. Although depicted by Rhodesian and

South African propaganda as long-time freedom fighters who had become alienated by Frelimo's Marxist orientation, both had been members of the liberation movement for relatively short periods before being removed for corruption. The MNR also sought to legitimize its position in the West by adopting anticommunist cold war rhetoric. Domingos Arouca, one of its initial spokespersons, proclaimed, "Support for the Soviet Union and its imperialistic ambitions now comes solely from tyrants like Uganda's Amin, and Ethiopia's Mengistu, from failures like Guinea's Sékou Touré or from fumbling incompetents like Frelimo." Aided by South African intelligence, the MNR was able to plant a number of stories in *To the Point* and *The Citizen*, parts of which were reproduced uncritically in the Western press.

In 1976 the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with arms, a military base at Bindura, and extensive military training. From there MNR bands crossed into Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines and road traffic, disrupt commerce, and raid reeducation camps, from which they recruited additional members. They also collected valuable intelligence data on ZANU forces in Mozambique and intimidated Zimbabwean refugees. By 1979, Rhodesia had established two more training centers and was regularly resupplying by air guerrilla military bases in the mountains along the Mozambican-Rhodesian border and the Gorongosa mountains farther inland.

In return for its assistance, Rhodesian security demanded MNR subservience — as is clear from MNR documents found stuffed down a latrine when the Mozambican army captured the Garagua base. In the words of Matzangaiza's successor, Dhlakama: "We were oppressed by the Rhodesians and the leaders of our movement were not allowed to make any of the decisions. . . . We worked for the English, neither I nor the deceased Andre could plan any military operations. It was the English who determined the areas to attack and where to recruit."

In 1979, however, the tide turned against the MNR. In October, Frelimo forces overran its main bases in the Gorongosa mountains, and Andre Matzangaiza was killed. The Lancaster House Agreement, guaranteeing the end of minority rule in Rhodesia, forced the MNR to abandon its Rhodesian sanctuaries and bases. In June 1980, Mozambican troops destroyed the large base at Sitatonga and claimed to have killed or captured almost 600 guerrillas. At the same time many guerrillas were killed during the power struggle in which Dhlakama eventually prevailed. According to captured MNR documents, "this was a disastrous period in which many soldiers and leaders were killed."

By the middle of 1980 the Mozambican government, feeling confident that it had the situation firmly under control, began to turn its energy toward national reconstruction after nearly five years of war. It was during this period that SADCC programs were crystallized, contacts with multinational corporations were intensified, and several important economic agreements were signed. The popular militia was also disbanded in many frontier regions.

Machel's government failed to anticipate, however, that the remnants of the MNR would seek protection from South Africa which, since 1979, had been providing direct logistic and military assistance. Even after it became aware of this new alliance, it underestimated the amount of support South Africa would provide and the rural disaffection to which the MNR could appeal.

At a meeting between Dhlakama and Colonel Van Nierok of South African security on October 25, 1980, at Zabostad, a military base in the Transvaal, the MNR supreme commander unveiled plans to restablish bases in Sofala and Manica, and to attack both the railroad lines between Beira and Umtali and road traffic on the north-south highway. Van Nierok insisted that this was not sufficient. By the end of 1981 he ordered them to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo [southern Mozambique], establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo province, and provoke incidents in Maputo and Beira." The South African strategy was clear — the MNR must extend its activity to the strategic southern provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe from exporting its commodities through Maputo, which had replaced Beira as the major Mozambican outlet for Zimbabwean products and was drawing substantial traffic away from South African ports. Ten days later, Orlando Cristina, a former Portuguese secret police official working with Sou[illegible] urged Dhlakama to "destroy power lines that transport energy from Cabora Bassa Dam to South Africa in order to deflect charges that South Africa was aiding the MNR." To accomplish these broader objectives, South African officials agreed to provide large supplies of war material, including rockets, mortars, and small arms as well as instructors "who will not only teach but also participate in attacks."

Although it is difficult to determine the number of South African soldiers actually participating in MNR actions, there is no doubt that they are present. Mozambican field commanders with whom we spoke indicated that they had encountered "Boers" in a number of actions in the central part of the country. When pressed for concrete examples, a young officer who had fought in Manica province informed us that his battalion discovered several dead European soldiers when they overran

an MNR base at Chidogo. Mozambican military officers also have photographs of South African passports and other documents captured at MNR bases at Chimanemane and Garagua. Sara Muchalima, a 26-year-old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, saw 10 European advisors who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before Garagua fell. The white man blown up last October in the process of mining the Beira-Umtali railway was probably another of the "instructors," as were three South African soliders killed by Zimbabwean security forces near the Mozambican border this August.

Principally, however, South Africa trains MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and provides supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. According to Mozambican field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces, MNR forces are regularly resupplied between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., both by C-47 transports and by helicopters, and Frelimo forces lack the communication and air support needed to prevent these air-drops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route — it is much cheaper for South Africa, and Mozambique's fledging navy cannot patrol effectively. In addition to the small arms, mortars, mines, and antiaircraft weaponry, Mozambican officials acknowledge that the MNR receives communications equipment that is far more sophisticated than that available to their own forces. This enables MNR bands to maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flying inside Mozambique provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movements.

South African support breathed new life into the MNR whose numbers increased substantially. John Burleson, a British ecologist held captive by the MNR for several months, was told in early 1982 that it had between 15,000 and 17,000 troops. Most observers place its strength at no more than one-third this figure which, nevertheless, represents a sizable guerrilla force for Mozambique's 25,000-person army to try to contain.

Photo: Ricardo Rangel

Documents of South African "advisers" working with the MNR were found at their Garagua base

Most MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. According to Sara Muchalima, "The bandits came to my house and told my parents I had to go with them. My father refused, but they beat him up, tied my hands, and with a gun to my head took me to their base at Garangua." Burleson observed that those forcibly recruited were kept under armed surveillance until they participated in their first raids, whereupon they were warned that if they fled and were captured by government troops, they would be killed as terrorists. Fearing retribution, most feel that they have no choice but to stay and participate in future MNR activities, although a number have managed to escape.

The MNR has also skillfully manipulated tribal divisions and appealed to "traditional" Shona values to gain support. Like the Portuguese colonial regime, MNR propaganda claims that Frelimo is dominated by southerners and that it has systematically discriminated against groups living in Manica and Sofala provinces, especially the Shona-speaking Ndau and Manica. That the MNR military commanders tend to come from these two groups adds credibility to the claim that when Mozambique is liberated the situation will be reversed. The MNR embraces the chiefs and spirit mediums and seeks to enshrine itself in the Shona past in order to enhance its legitimacy. These positions appeal to the region's "traditionalists" who are dissatisfied with the government's attacks on such practices as bride-price, polygamy, and ancestor worship, which are considered to be reactionary and exploitative.

Finally, the economic problems plaguing Mozambique make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attribute to the alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane provide fertile ground for MNR overtures.

Whatever the initial attraction of MNR appeals to economic dissatisfaction and tradition, wide-scale plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate its support and alienate the rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Peasants from Gaza who fled to Zimbabwe to avoid the MNR spoke of repeated MNR atrocities. "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips, and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to Frelimo." Another refugee added: "They raped girls, using sticks, and left them to die. In some cases, they cut off men's private parts and hung them on a tree." Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding, and terrorism. A captured bandit, Raque, admitted that he and his compatriots were ordered to rob and terrorize the population in order to discredit the government. "We cut off many people's ears," he said. "We sent them off and said, 'Now go to Frelimo and say that we've been here.'" A young officer told us how MNR guerrillas had attacked unarmed peasants living in communal villages in Sofala. "Those whom they did not initially kill were locked in their houses, which were set afire." According to accounts from Inhambane, the MNR murdered people and stuffed them in wells in order to poison the water, and in one of its most violent actions, terrorists stopped a packed train on August 9 and raked it with machine-gun fire, killing 14 and wounding 50 others. One high-ranking Western diplomat, who admitted that he was initially skeptical, now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible."

The MNR's intensified reign of terror and its reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the Marxist strategy of the present government. Apart from its anticommunist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates. All the evidence suggests that it is little more than an arm of South African security.

Nevertheless, the MNR is an important arm and has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political, and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. Roving bands repeatedly attack strategic economic targets, cutting railroad lines, mining roads, and bridges, interdicting traffic, and plundering communal villages, state farms, and shops. In many parts of Sofala, Manica, and Inhambane their actions have paralyzed the already fragile rural economy. MNR forces have also disrupted key development projects. In May 1982, Sweden evacuated 50 technicians working on a major reforestation project in Manica that is to supply a multimillion dollar wood processing and paper industry. Mineral prospecting and geological surveys in Sofala, Zambezia, and Manica were also disrupted earlier this year.

But South Africa's main target right now appears to be SADCC. At the SADCC organizing conference in 1980, the member nations agreed that strengthening the transportation and communication links, without which all other forms of regional cooperation are impractical, had to receive the highest priority. About $600 million was pledged by foreign donors for transportation projects, including upgrading Mozambican railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira and Maputo so that land-locked Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia could divert their traffic from South African ports.

The importance of the two railroad lines from Zimbabwe to Maputo and Beira to this strategy explains the insistence of South African security officials in their 1980 meeting with Dhlakama that both be regularly sabotaged. In fact, this has occurred repeatedly. The latest attack on the line from Maputo to Zimbabwe took place in July 1982, cutting service for 50 days. Although it is now open, many Zimbabwean companies have decided to continue relying on Durban despite the appreciably lower cost of shipping through Maputo and the 10-day shorter

Photo: Noticias

The Mozambique army displays captured South African weapons

turnaround time there, when all runs well. The port of Beira, historically Zimbabwe's major international outlet, has suffered the most. Last year Zimbabwe exported only 12,000 tons through Beira, a mere fraction of pre-sanctions trade. Mozambican officials acknowledge that MNR attacks "have created a profound sense of insecurity and discredited the port in the eyes of many Zimbabwean firms."

Early this year the Mozambican leadership turned its attention to combating the escalating MNR threat. It quickly acknowledged the need for a new military and political strategy, one that would incorporate aspects of guerrilla warfare and peasant mobilization that Frelimo had previously used successfully.

Shortly after independence, in the face of impending attacks from the Smith regime, the government had disbanded most guerrilla units and begun to organize a conventional army composed of draftees, believing that tanks, artillery, and jets — however antiquated — would be an effective deterrent. Then, in late 1979, euphoric about Zimbabwean independence, Mozambique disbanded many rural militia units thinking that MNR activity would cease. As a result, it was unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980. Frelimo, which during the armed struggle had been so effective as a guerrilla movement, found itself trying to contain guerrillas — who had sophisticated logistical support from Pretoria — with a relatively inexperienced, poorly equipped conventional army. To remedy this situation the government, in May 1982, activated more than 1,500 former freedom fighters, many of whom are organized into counterinsurgency forces whose job is to harass the terrorists deep in the bush. Others, working under newly appointed provincial military commanders, all with substantial experience in the armed struggle, have assumed responsibility for revitalizing the civilian militias in the war zones. As of August 1982, about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the capital the newly formed militia boasted upward of 30,000 men and women. Although the quality and performance of the militia are varied, they have blunted several MNR attacks in Inhambane and Sofala.

Revitalizing the militia is part of a broader strategy of regaining the confidence and support of peasants living in the war zones. This is not an easy task. For more than five years, many in the affected areas have been subjected to periodic attacks, first from Rhodesian forces and then from the MNR, from which the FPLM (the Mozambican army) could not protect them. As one close advisor to President Machel acknowledged, "Frelimo used up a lot of its political capital during the Zimbabwean war" by assuring peasants that peace in Zambabwe would bring prosperity to Mozambique. That the peasants have legitimate grievances that the government must now address was also stressed by Armando Gabueza, ranking member of Frelimo's Central Committee, and resident minister of war-torn Sofala: "We cannot stand idly by but must attack the economic and social problems, especially the lack of material goods."

There is evidence that this is already taking place. According to a knowledgeable Western journalist based in Maputo, "The army is helping to rebuild villages, dig wells, and so on, as it did in the liberation war." And despite acute shortages of capital, the Frelimo party made the political decision to provide state support for the family sector that it had ignored in its campaign to promote communal villages and state farms. Thus, this year for the first time agricultural implements, seeds, and basic consumer goods, such as cloth and oil, may be available to peasants living in the war zones.

About the long-term effects of these new policies, senior Mozambican officials are cautiously optimistic. Since May 1982, government forces have become more active and have captured a number of MNR bases. The oil pipeline to Zimbabwe has been functioning since June, and the railway between Maputo and Zimbabwe reopened in August.

Nevertheless, Mozambican authorities emphasize that these are just the first skirmishes in a long-term struggle with the MNR's backer — the apartheid regime of South Africa. That regime has invested a great deal, and is likely to invest even more, to ensure that the SADCC nations remain in a perpetual state of economic dependency. Of equal importance is Pretoria's need to prevent the emergence in Mozambique of a prosperous, nonracial society that could serve as a beacon of hope for South Africa's oppressed millions. □

Photo: R.N. Tuluhungwa/UNICEF

The MNR's plundering and terrorism evaporate its support and alienate the rural population

Portugal's New Initiatives

BY SHIRLEY WASHINGTON

Though it has little direct influence in southern Africa, Lisbon faces both opportunities and challenges to its interests in that region. Recent policy initiatives indicate how highly it values the area. In June of this year, Portugal signed a military assistance pact with Mozambique that signaled a dramatic shift in relations between the two nations. The agreement has broad implications for Portugal's domestic politics as well as for its foreign policy towards the entire southern African region. The pact also represents some political readjustment by Mozambique. Part of Portugal's earlier weak position in Africa reflected the internal contradictions within its foreign policy establishment, exacerbated by the ongoing struggle between the left-of-center presidency and the cabinet of the Democratic Alliance, a center-right coalition.

Shirley Washington is an assistant professor of political science at Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts. She is currently writing a book on the relations between Portugal and its former African colonies. She was a Gulbenkian Scholar in Lisbon.



Colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique was characterized by forced labor and economic and social deprivation. The wealth of the colonies and their trade were directed to benefit the metropole. In the five centuries of Portuguese presence in Africa, few Africans benefited in terms of education and economic or social well-being, despite the stated "civilizing mission." Metropolitan economic insufficiency was resolved by transferring problems to the colonies, in the form of thousands of peasants who were in search of an escape from the poverty of their homeland. The physical presence of these settlers was intended as a permanent claim on retaining the colonies. Any form of indigenous self-government had been categorically rejected by the dictatorial regime in Lisbon, which had denied democratic freedom to its own citizens as well.

In the early 1960s when most African nations were gaining independence, various groups in Angola and Mozambique began to revolt against the colonial system. Bitter and brutal wars ensured for several years, finally ending when the government in Lisbon was overthrown in 1974. Soon after, the liberation movements in the colonies and the new revolutionary government in Lisbon worked out independence arrangements. Unfortunately, Portugal's departure from Africa was disorderly because of the political confusion in the metropole and armed conflict among competing liberation groups in the case of Angola. Added to the picture was the sudden departure of most of the settlers from both colonies. The relationship since then has evolved in an uneven fashion colored by outstanding economic disputes between the ex-colonies and Portugal, further exacerbated by the grievances of the returned settlers. As the turbulent political situation stabilized with the election of a government under the 1976 constitution in Portugal, the new president, Antonio Ramalho Eanes, embarked upon a policy of rapprochement with the former colonies. Political parties on the Portuguese Right, which had a strong ex-settler component, resisted the president's efforts. The Africans seemed to welcome a more stable relationship with Lisbon, not least for the practical reasons of seeking economic and technical assistance. Relations have gradually improved.

Portugal's ambiguous position in world affairs stems from finding itself physically present in Western Europe, yet having some of the attributes of a developing Third World nation. Though a long-standing (albeit not key) member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Lisbon has often seen its national interests subordinated to those of its most powerful ally, the United States. To complicate matters further, as it seeks greater cooperation with black African states, Portugal has had to walk a fine line in its relations with South Africa. The Africans detest and fear the South African regime because of its oppressive racial policies toward its non-white citizens and its powerful military apparatus that threatens the surrounding independent nations. But while Portugal officially opposes the racial policies of South Africa in international fora, there are persuasive economic and political reasons for maintaining good relations with Pretoria. There is the presence of thousands of Portuguese immigrants in South Africa, as well as trade between the two nations. Nevertheless, its enlightened policies in recent years have gained Portugal a certain prestige in southern Africa. What is at stake then is the maintenance of the favorable position it currently enjoys and the assurance of an important role in the future development of the area.

The colonizers, Portugal and Britain, seemed oblivious to the interests of the indigenous majority in southern Africa when they planned the infrastructure of the region, ensuring permanent domination by South Africa. Today that colonial legacy has imposed upon the nations of southern Africa an economic dependence from which they are determined to escape. They need strong external assistance to be successful and Portugal appears to be one possible source. Friendly relations with Angola and Mozambique have resulted in a steadily increasing favorable trade balance for Lisbon, and have afforded it an opportunity to penetrate the markets of neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe. Mozambique had given vital support to the Zimbabwean leadership and military during their long armed struggle with the former white minority regime. These close ties and the rapidly improving relations of a democratic Portugal with its former colonies have predisposed Zimbabwe to cooperation with Lisbon. The same reasons generally apply to the other independent nations in the region. However, the growing resistance to the established governments in the former colonies by South African-sponsored domestic guerrilla groups is a continuous source of instability in the area and another source of difficulty between Portugal and South Africa. The major challenge now is whether the increasing demands by the new African states can be kept within the limits of the fragile Portuguese economic base and resources.

Portuguese soldiers during Mozambican war: A military pact between the two countries is "a twist of irony"

The most important current political problem facing the region is the future of Namibia. The elusive settlement in the bitter struggle between the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the South African regime over the independence of that nation portends danger for Portugal and its Western allies. South Africa's repeated invasions and occupations of the border area, ostensibly in search of SWAPO guerrillas, have left in their wake massive destruction to Angola's infrastructure as well as the mass migration of the local populace in the southern region of that country. Aside from these severe disruptions, there is the tragically high toll in lives among the villagers. This situation has fed Angolan frustrations that have driven them to seek still further military assistance from the Eastern bloc, thus aggravating the cold war dimensions of regional issues.

The other danger is South Africa's unpredictable behavior. Does it seek to annex Angolan territory or to set up a puppet regime in the area it already occupies in southern Angola? Portugal is required to ponder these questions, although it is not a member of the Western Contact Group seeking a solution to the problem of Namibia, which is at the heart of the puzzle.

Within the Western alliance, Portugal's interests seem secondary compared to those of its more powerful partners. Nevertheless, if an alliance is assumed theoretically to consist of equals, then it follows that the vital interest of all members should be carefully considered by the others. Though the United States and Western Europe seem to support Portugal's traditional role as an ex-colonial power with natural interests in its former colonies, the East-West cold war perception takes precedence over individual members' concerns. The United States is predisposed to oppose all regimes that appear to be allies of the Soviet Union or who officially proclaim themselves to be Marxist-Leninist. Angola and Mozambique are officially Marxist states. The United States has had difficult diplomatic relations with Mozambique and no diplomatic relations at all with Angola. American authorities have openly attempted to overthrow the government of Angola, and though thwarted by Congress, powerful elements in the U.S. have not changed their attitude, even in the face of Portuguese opposition to such policies. Mozambique and Angola are of extreme importance to Portugal for historical and economic reasons.

Lisbon regards its future entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) as crucial to its own economic well-being. The largely positive EEC reaction to Portugal's application for membership is due in part to Lisbon's presumed good relations with Africa. Among the reasons for this interest is the member-nations' desire for access to the markets of Angola and Mozambique. Unlike most African nations, the former Portuguese colonies have not sought association with the EEC through adherence to the Lomé Convention nor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Portugal has been a troubled democracy since 1974 when its military overthrew the authoritarian regime that ruled for more than 40 years. Frequent changes in government and political direction have had a deleterious effect on its interaction with its former African colonies. One constant figure through this period has been the president, General Eanes, considered to have leftist sentiments. For the past two years, Portugal, in line with much of Western Europe, has had a center-right government. This difference in political orientation has produced uneasy relations between the presidency and the government, which often seem to undermine the stability of the new democracy. The idiosyncracies of the former constitution permitted parallel diplomacy. The practice was challenged by the Democratic Alliance government. The alliance includes the Social Democrats (PSD), the largest political party and considered left of center. It has sought contact with the ruling revolutionary parties that have controlled all of Portugal's former colonies in Africa since independence. The initial difficulties in these contacts were eventually surmounted and gradual cooperation appears to have materialized with most parties. The Centrist Democrats (CDS) on the other hand, the second largest political party in the alliance, is more conservative and contains strong elements of *retornados*, or former settlers, who were unhappy with the decolonization process. The CDS tends to support the opposition groups to the current governments in power in Portuguese-speaking African nations mainly on ideological grounds. But even this party, whose leader, Freitas do Amaral, had stressed the European option when he was foreign minister, has come to realize that at least minimally correct relations with the regimes in the ex-colonies are in the national interest. In the past, the CDS has been hostile to the forces that led the armed opposition to colonial rule, and there is lingering suspicion among African regimes that these attitudes have not changed.

The importance of the CDS' attitude has become critical with the recent request by the Mozambican authorities for military assistance in combating a rebel group called the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), which is being supplied and trained by South Africa. This request culminated in the unprecedented military agreement, which has had ramifications for the domestic politics of Portugal. Freitas do Amaral is now the minister of defense and must approve any important military matter. His initial reaction was to temporarily shelve the issue during Portugal's constitutional review debate despite the urgency of Mozambique's request. Needless to say, as the principal leader of a rightist party with some relations with the MNR, while at the same ti[illegible]ority in charge of defense, Amara[illegible] attitude is ambiguous concerning military assistance to the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) government. But his alliance partner, the PSD, remains committed to benefiting from the course of mutual cooperation with African regimes already established by President Eanes. Though both parties had earlier been critical of Eanes' foreign policy initiatives in Africa, the CDS has been particularly vociferous in its opposition.

Since his 1976 election, the president has consistently pursued a policy of conciliation with Lusophone Africa. He began [illegible] Guinea-Bissau, subsequently e[illegible] support of the former Guinea[illegible]nt, Luis Cabral, and then the Cap[illegible]erdean president, Aristides Pereira, in his efforts to achieve reconciliation with Angola and Mozambique. The outstanding problems with the latter two nations had been more intractable than those with the former two. But with patience and goodwill on all sides, the president's policies are now beginning to pay off. Not even his harshest critics can deny that fact. (For more specific information concerning this, see my article in the March-April 1980 issue of *Africa Report*.)


Photo: Nuno Mendonca/Sygma

Portugal's President Eanes (*standing*) and Prime Minister Balsemao (*seated*) have made several recent visits to the former African colonies

The Portuguese president has made official visits to several states in southern Africa recently. From late November through early December of 1981, he traveled to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia where he was greeted warmly. But perhaps his trip to Angola in April 1982 revealed the true test of his policy of solidarity with the peoples of the region. There he made a politically significant digression to the war zone in the south that had been invaded by South African troops. That gesture, which put his personal safety in jeopardy, impressed the Angolans greatly and he was warmly hailed by them. The prestige of Portugal in that region of the world is at an all-time high. Pinto Balsemao, the prime minister and also titular head of the PSD, made a subsequent state visit to Mozambique and Zimbabwe in June 1982. The Mozambican trip was particularly successful in terms of prospective Portuguese investment. Both Balsemao and the accompanying businessmen were greeted warmly by Samora Machel, the Mozambican president. Subsequently, the annual international trade fair was held in Maputo, the capital, which evidenced still further the correlation between good relations and commerce. The Portuguese pavilion was honored as the best national exhibition. But more concretely, some $40 million worth of orders for Portuguese goods were placed. Prospects also look promising for trade with Zimbabwe. If present trends continue, Lisbon is likely to give more attention to its trading patterns with Africa as it attempts to sort out its problems with Europe, an area less favorable to its products.

Between 1975 and 1980, relations between Portugal and Mozambique had been difficult, as mentioned earlier. In fact, it was not until 1980 that Maputo had exhibited any real interest in Lisbon. There were a variety of reasons for this, some of which included the Frelimo leadership's disappointment with the failure of the Left to maintain power in Portugal. Another reason was Mozambique's own growing involvement in the affairs of the region, as reflected in its ardent support for Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in its long struggle against the former white-minority government in Rhodesia. This support had been at considerable cost to Mozambique's own security, and a weak, distant Portugal seemed of little relevance to its daily problems. Furthermore, there had remained knotty financial entanglements between the two nations that seemed to defy solutions, regardless of what kind of government was in Lisbon. Hence the Mozambican leadership turned to its ideological counterparts in Eastern Europe for economic and military support. Through the years, Eastern bloc assistance proved disapointing to Mozambique in its effort to overcome economic crises. Perhaps, more importantly, the military training provided by the socialist nations had failed to decisively curtail the armed activities of guerrilla rebels who stood to benefit from the shortcomings of government's economic performance. The rebels represent a serious threat to the Frelimo government, and because of their alleged South African communications and weapons support, they have ominous implications for the whole region. Though it seems unlikely that the government is in any real danger of falling, the Mozambican authorities are experiencing a security crisis that they had hoped would be alleviated with a Mugabe-led independent Zimbabwe. Instead, all of the Frontline states have encountered serious security problems due to the activities of the South African regime. Mozambique's army has become a conventional one, but for years they had been guerrillas who had successfully pinned down a good portion of Portuguese colonial forces during their long armed struggle. Perhaps that is why it seems a twist of irony that the victor would ask the loser to assist in retraining its soldiers in counterinsurgency methods. If the Portuguese were so efficient in such methods, why is Frelimo in power today in Mozambique? It is a bizarre indication of Frelimo frustration in controlling the situation. Nor is Mozambique's explanation illuminating when it states that Portugal had been in the country for some 500 years and knows the terrain well. Presumably the Mozambicans should know *their* terrain even better.

On the other hand, the Portuguese prime minister also has experienced some political awkwardness as members of his own alliance in Parliament sought the details of the military agreement that has not been made public. Hints of uneasiness over the terms of the pact among some elements of the Democratic Alliance seem to reflect its diversity of views. Outside the alliance, criticism has come from the Communist party (the PCP), whose leader, Alvaro Cunhal, alluded to the pact as a Trojan horse of which Frelimo leadership ought to be aware. The statement, no doubt, was more for domestic consumption than for Frelimo, but the sensitivity of the Mozambican leadership exposed itself in the heated rejection and accusation of gross interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation that followed. The response must have come as quite a surprise to the PCP, an erstwhile traditional ally of Frelimo on the Portuguese political scene. The misunderstanding was quickly patched up when the Communists bowed to Frelimo testiness on the subject. These are a few examples of the political impact that the military pact has had on the politics of both nations. There are few details available about the pact but it does seem to provide for the supply of weapons as well as for the training of officers in Portugal and Mozambique in counterinsurgency. Routine military administrative training will also be provided.

The implications of the agreement for Portugal's foreign policy toward the southern African region are considerable and even novel, given its loyal membership in NATO. The West could benefit from Lisbon's new position by the gradual reduction in dependence of the nations of the region on Soviet military assistance. At least it could help to diversify their sources. The question must be raised, however, about Portugal's capacity to assume such responsibilities or whether it is wise to extend itself in that direction. Certainly the immediate issue is its support to a nation with which it has had historic ties and which has requested help. A positive response seems the only practical one given Lisbon's stake in Mozambique's future. But can it afford to get involved militarily even in a limited way in the area with the danger of confrontation with South Africa, the strongest nation militarily and economically in the region?

Portugal is a poor European nation for which the emigration of its citizens is a key factor in domestic politics and in foreign relations. It has to be sensitive to the opinions of governments of countries in which large numbers of its people live. There are believed to be some 800,000 Portuguese emigrants in South Africa who mainly moved there because of the upheavals of the decolonization process. At the same time, Portuguese leaders publicly state their abhorrence for apartheid, the official policy of South Africa. But like South Africa, Portugal regards itself as a staunch member of the Western world, the difference being, however, that it has had a long history of living fairly well with non-European peoples. Lisbon might even see itself in some ways as a bridge between the West and the Third World with whom it shares such ideas as the need for a new world economic order. The policies of South Africa have been extremely troublesome for Portugal and have caused much havoc and loss of life and property in the neighboring Frontline states including Portugal's former colonies, Angola and Mozambique. These states are not only actively hostile to apartheid, but they have also been seeking a means of reducing their economic dependence on South Africa, a process that requires a massive effort in restructuring their trade and infrastructural development. They are in great need of external assistance. South Africa considers their efforts as unfriendly acts and is determined to thwart them in every way. Destabilization of the neighboring regimes appears to be the course chosen by the Pretoria government. Portugal is now being drawn more and more into an economic and perhaps a military relationship with those African nations, especially with its former colonies.

Perhaps no nation appreciates the extremely dangerous nature of the South African regime more than Portugal, which had historically depended upon Pretoria in order to maintain its own tenuous hold as a colonial power in the region. It has recently seen South African technological capability unleashed in murderous fashion in the mail bomb assassination of one of the regime's opponents, Ruth First, a white South African living and working in exile in Mozambique. South Africa has virtually declared war on all external and internal foes. A number of Portuguese citizens working in Mozambique have been killed as a result of South African policy.

Portugal recognizes the urgency in settling the Namibian problem rapidly if the region is to develop in peace. In this regard, it has done what it could. It has opened Lisbon, its capital, to international conference on the issue and on apartheid, and has been supportive of the liberation group, SWAPO. It has used its good offices wherever possible to help the negotiation process along.

Portugal has been consistent in condemning South Africa in international fora such as the United Nations for its domestic racial policies and its repeated incursions into Angola. These acts have cost Portugal in real terms. South Africa, acting out of pique, canceled Portuguese fishing rights off the coast of Namibia. And of course Portuguese emigrants could be at risk in South Africa. But both nations share Western security concerns and Western cultural values. It must have been somewhat uncomfortable for Balsemao to hear himself denounced by this South African counterpart as a traitor to the Western world when he visited Mozambique and the military pact was announced. This is the crux of the contradiction in Portuguese foreign policy aspirations and strategic interests. By its own wishes and its history, Portugal relishes being a part of the West, but its national concerns in Africa are also compelling. Balsemao's defense of his government's actions in the wake of protests from South Africa, as well as from some elements inside his coalition, is perhaps indicative of the dichotomy in Portuguese world affairs and specifically its dilemma in southern Africa. When NATO engaged in a massive mock war maneuver in the South Atlantic a few months ago at the behest of the United States, the main targets were the Soviet Union and its allies, one of which was considered to be Angola. The potential for a real crisis in choice grows menacingly close. Had there been an actual war in that area, what would have been Portugal's decision in that regard? The ambiguity of Portugal's position is a continuing puzzle in world politics, and nowhere is it more apparent than in southern Africa.

Portugal has a vital stake in Africa. Its future role in the development of the area and the economic benefits deriving therefrom are too critical to risk. Unless there is a resolution of the Namibian conflict in the near future, the entire region may fall into chaos with unforeseeable consequences for everyone. It has taken Lisbon a long time to build a new and mutually beneficial relationship with the African nations, which has evolved painfully over the years since the days of the armed struggle against the colonizer. Portugal has gained a respectable place in the world mainly as a result of its own dramatic twentieth-century revolution, an achievement that no other European ex-colonizer can claim. It has reached out since then and has embarked on enlightened policies. But Portugal is a small nation in a world where events seem out of control even for powerful nations. Southern Africa, while offering many opportunities, is also proving to be a difficult testing ground in the evolution of Portuguese foreign policy. □


Photo: Michel Philippot/Sygma

Freitas do Amaral, leader of a rightist party and minister of defense: Ambiguous about military aid to the Mozambican government

American Policy Options

BY MICHAEL CLOUGH

Photo: Camerapix

Mozambican President Machel is deeply concerned about the increasing scope of the MNR's activities

In the near future, the Reagan administration may be forced to make a major decision on relations with Mozambique that could have far-reaching effects on American policy toward the entire southern African region. The need for such a decision may be created by the continued escalation of attacks on Mozambican President Samora Machel's government by the South African–backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and the actions taken by that government in its efforts to counter this growing threat to its survival.

In the past six months, the MNR has expanded and intensified its operations to the point that some American analysts have begun to predict the imminent collapse of the Machel government. Although other analysts dispute the immediacy of this danger, none questions the potential seriousness of continued conflict in Mozambique. As evidenced by President Machel's abrupt decision last June to postpone an important trip to Western Europe in order to take personal control of the anti-MNR campaign, there can be no doubt that Mozambican leaders are deeply concerned by the increasing scope of guerrilla activities.

Developments in Mozambique are very important to the United States for three reasons. First, conflict in Mozambique serves to increase instability in the entire eastern half of southern Africa. This inevitably increases pressure on other governments in the area, several of which are already on shaky grounds as a result of their own internal problems. Zimbabwe is already being affected, as was evidenced recently by the killing of four members of the South African Defense Forces on Zimbabwean territory while they were evidently in transit to Mozambique to provide support for the MNR. Were the conflict in Mozambique to continue to escalate, it is not inconceivable that it could spill over into Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia. If this were to occur, the United States and other Western governments would find it very difficult to avoid potentially costly and dangerous involvement in the region. Even if the conflict in Mozambique does not spread, it will have a significant effect on neighboring countries because of their dependence on Mozambican ports and railways.

Second, the fate of the Mozambican government could have a long-run effect on African perceptions of American policy toward southern Africa. Rightly or wrongly, many Africans tend to believe the U.S. could, if it possessed the will, prevent South Africa from acting to destabilize its neighbors. Consequently, the overthrow of the Machel government by South African–backed forces would lead African leaders to one of two conclusions. On the one hand, they might decide that U.S. leverage over South Africa is indeed limited, in which case the perceived advantages of cooperating with the United States, as African leaders have done in the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations, would be greatly di-

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minished. This would in turn significantly reduce the ability of American policymakers to play a constructive role in the region. On the other hand, African leaders might conclude that the United States in fact supported South Africa's activities. This would serve to confirm the contention that in the final analysis American governments will always side with the white regime in Pretoria and that therefore the struggle against apartheid will inevitably involve conflict with the U.S. It is this logic more than any other single factor that could (1) cause the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe to attempt to put aside its past differences with the Soviet Union and seek Soviet assistance as an alternative to its current reliance on the United States and Great Britain for security support, and (2) lead South African black nationalists to conclude that the Soviet Union is in fact their "natural ally."

Finally, a growing threat to the survival of his government could lead President Machel to invoke the defense clauses contained in the treaties of friendship and cooperation that he has entered into with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations. In this respect, it is important to note that Soviet naval vessels were quick to appear off the Mozambican coast in February 1981 after South African forces raided the political headquarters of the African National Congress of South Africa in Maputo. Were Machel to request more extensive support as a result of a deepening internal crisis, Soviet leaders might find it difficult to deny him assistance even if they wanted to, since a failure to protect an endangered ally could seriously damage Soviet credibility throughout Africa and the rest of the Third World. If the Soviets or Cubans, or both, were to intervene to save the Machel government, they would doubtless receive the blessing of the majority of African nations, as they did in 1975 when they supported the MPLA in Angola and again in 1978 when they came to the aid of Ethiopia. The placement of communist troops so close to the South African heartland would create a situation far more dangerous than that which existed at the height of the conflicts in Angola and Rhodesia or that which currently exists in Namibia. At the same time, were such a situation to develop, American options would be extremely limited.

Admittedly, the picture painted above is an extremely dire one. Unfortunately, it is not unrealistic. Moreover, refusing to think in these terms could prove to be very costly. In fact, just such a lack of foresight in the early 1970s was responsible for the failure of the Nixon and Ford administrations to recognize the need to abandon their policy of malign neglect toward southern Africa before it was too late to avert a conflict in Angola that quickly developed into a no-win situation for the United States. In the case of Mozambique, it is all the more important to think in these terms because of the obvious interest of President Machel's foes in the United States and elsewhere—especially the South African government—in downplaying the dangers of efforts to destabilize or overthrow his government. In this respect, one of the most instructive ironies of debate on this issue is the fact that those individuals who claim to be most concerned about Soviet expansion in southern Africa are the quickest to discount the possibility that the Soviet Union or Cuba might intervene to protect the gains of socialism in Mozambique.

The surest way to avert a crisis over Mozambique would be for the United States to launch a concerted effort to develop a stable, cooperative relationship with the current Mozambican government. Is such a relationship possible? The pattern of Mozambique's relations with the West since 1979 indicates that it may be.

It was in 1979 that Mozambique officials first appeared to evince a genuine interest in cooperation with the U.S. and other Western powers. This interest manifested itself in two ways. First, President Machel and his aides began to play an increasingly helpful role in efforts to bring about a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. This was particularly true during the most difficult phases of the Lancaster House negotiations in late 1979 and the uneasy transitional period that preceded the election of an independent government in Zimbabwe. In fact, most informed observers believe that a negotiated settlement would not have been possible without Mozambican pressure on the Patriotic Front. Second, in late 1979 and early 1980, Mozambican officials started to signal actively their interest in improved economic relations with the West. At least two major meetings were held in the United States with representatives of the American business community. In addition, President Machel made a much-publicized speech in which he emphasized the pragmatic side of his government's commitment to socialism and declared his willingness to permit the growth of an indigenous private sector in the country.



What accounted for the apparent weakening of the Mozambican government's earlier embrace of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and the reversal of its movement toward increasingly exclusive geopolitical ties with the Soviet bloc? Some observers contend that these openings to the West were nothing more than tactical moves forced on the Machel government by the growing cost of support for the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and the deteriorating state of the Mozambican economy. What this view fails to understand is that even merely tactical moves could not have been considered without a basic change in Mozambican perceptions of the possibilities for cooperation with the West. This is especially true with regard to President Machel's decision to trust in the sincerity of the British and American commitment to fair elections in Zimbabwe. To suggest that support for the British settlement initiative was the only option open to Mozambique at the time would require one to ignore a considerable amount of contrary evidence—such as indications that both the Soviet Union and Cuba were willing to increase their support for the Zimbabwean liberation movements. At the time the negotiations were taking place, Western leaders certainly did not believe Mozambican options were so tightly circumscribed.

Shortly after Ronald Reagan took office, American relations with Mozambique appeared to deteriorate sharply. In early March 1981, the Mozambique government announced that it had uncovered a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "spy" network operating out of the American Embassy in Maputo. Six American citizens attached to the embassy were ordered to leave the country. Nine other individuals who had previously served in Mozambique were also identified as CIA agents. Blaming Cuban intelligence agents for instigating these actions, the United States immediately retaliated by suspending an American food assistance program in Mozambique. Given this rocky start and the clear ideological chasm separating the Reagan administration and the Machel government, the prospects for an improvement in relations between these two countries appeared dim. Yet by the summer of 1982, there were a number of clear indications that the Machel government was committed to improving its relations with the West. These included:


Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

Under Reagan, American relations with Mozambique have deteriorated sharply

1. Dramatic improvements in relations between Mozambique and Portugal culminating in a visit to southern Africa by the Portuguese prime minister, Pinto Balsemao, last June and the signing of a military cooperation agreement between the two countries.
2. Meetings between Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano and officials in Bonn that led to the announcement of Mozambique's decision to recognize West Germany's position in West Berlin, thus removing the only remaining barrier to increased aid to Mozambique by the European Economic Community.
3. Rumors of several behind-the-scenes meetings between American and Mozambican officials.

Do these developments reflect a lasting commitment on the part of the Machel government to improve relations with the West? I think they do for several reasons. First, in the economic area, Mozambican leaders now appear to have recognized that the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies are in no position to provide the markets and assistance essential to the long-term economic development of their country. This is evidenced by their apparent decision to give up on efforts to associate Mozambique with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Some analysts have attempted to discount the significance of Mozambique's economic pragmatism by drawing analogies to similar moves by the Soviet Union following Lenin's announcement of the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s. Such arguments ignore very important differences between the economic realities of these two cases. Even if the Mozambican opening to the West were merely tactical, the dependent nature of that country's economy would make it very difficult for it to reverse direction in the way that Stalin did when he abandoned the NEP. As Mozambique's economic ties with the West expand, the costs of breaking those ties are certain to increase. In short, regardless of whether Mozambican leaders presently regard improved economic relations with the West as short-term expedients, there is reason to believe that such relations will prove to be enduring. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to rely entirely on economic determinism to bring about a lasting improvement in Mozambique's relations with the West.

Like all Third World governments, the Machel regime will always place short-term security considerations ahead of longer-term economic interests. However, this consideration need not cause Mozambique to attempt to solidify its ties with the Soviet Union, as it clearly did during the 1975-78 period. In fact, by actively working to promote stability in southern Africa, Western powers can greatly reduce the Mozambican government's perception of the need for Soviet protection. This is exactly what happened in the period immediately following the settlement in Zimbabwe. Had it not been for the South African government's subsequent decision to launch a vigorous campaign to destabilize Mozambique by providing arms and advisers to the MNR, the likelihood of an expanding Soviet presence in that country would have been small and the prospects for a continued improvement in U.S.-Mozambican relations good.

The major impediment to the development of a positive long-term relationship between the U.S. and Mozambique, as well as other southern African states, is the widely held conservative assumption that the United States and the current South African government share similar regional interests. This view is dangerously mistaken. As is becoming increasingly clear, the apparent belief of South African leaders that their country benefits from the continued existence of weak and unstable governments on its borders is creating an ironic situation whereby the supposedly pro-Western white regime in South Africa is becoming the Soviet Unions's most valuable, and some might say "natural," ally in the region.

What can the U.S. realistically do to promote stability in southern Africa and reduce the danger of an escalating conflict in Mozambique? I would suggest three actions. First and most important, the United States must move quickly and decisively to force South Africa to halt its efforts to destabilize Mozambique. At a minimum, this means sending the South African government unambiguously worded public communications of American opposition to support for the MNR. Such communications are necessary to dispel the impression that the United States opposes only guerrilla campaigns directed against pro-Western regimes. At the same time the Reagan administration needs to give serious thought to discovering ways of increasing the costs to South Africa of maintaining its current course of action in the region. Two potentially effective means of doing this would be to threaten to abstain on future Security Council votes on South Africa or to threaten to recognize the African National Congress and other exiled South African nationalist movements. Less dramatic actions could include retightening restrictions on exports to the South African government and expelling all South African military attachés in the United States.

Second, the Reagan administration should do everything it can to encourage Portugal and other West European nations to provide military assistance to Mozambique. Domestic political realities preclude any direct American activity in this area, but there are certainly plenty of ways in which we could make it easier for our allies, who are less constrained to assume this burden. An indirect means of providing such support would be to extend military aid to the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe.

Third, a major commitment must be made to aid the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) plan to rebuild the region's transportation network. This would mean providing direct support for the renovation and modernization of Mozambican ports and railways. In the short run, such aid would provide indisputable evidence of U.S. willingness to support programs that enhance regional stability even when those programs run counter to South African interests. In the long run, the development of alternatives to South African transport outlets would make it easier for southern African states to buffer themselves against the effects of escalating conflict in South Africa. This would serve to reduce the insecurity of leaders in these states and thus reduce pressure on them to seek external allies.

A final word of caution. American relations with socialist regimes in the Third World, like the one in Mozambique, will always be troubled. It would be unrealistic to expect the United States to readily embrace a regime that is so consistently critical of American society and American foreign policy. However, ideological disagreements should not be allowed to prevent us from cooperating with such governments if such cooperation can serve our national interests, especially when, as is the case in southern Africa, a failure to cooperate could prove to be disastrous. □



Photo: Bill Campbell/Sygma

Maputo, Mozambique: The government has shown a willingness to cooperate with the West and not rely exclusively on the Soviet bloc

The South African Land Deal

BY DAVID ROBBINS

A strange and bitter constitutional battle is being waged in southern Africa by the leaders of nearly a million black South Africans against the proposed cession of their land to a foreign state and the resultant loss of their South African citizenship.

In May this year, the South African government announced its intention to cede the entire homeland of KaNgwane and the district of Ingwavuma, part of the homeland of the five-million-strong Zulu tribe, to the tiny, landlocked Kingdom of Swaziland thereby raising the territorial hopes of King Sobhuza II and his Swazi government and unleashing a wave of protest and uncertainty in KaNgwane and KwaZulu.

The two homeland governments have already won a series of legal skirmishes with the South African government on the constitutionality of the proposal on the grounds that South Africa cannot take two million acres of land from the homelands without prior consultation. Although the South African government claimed its decision was the result of two years of intensive negotiation with Kwazulu's chief minister, Gatsha Buthelezi, said he had been consulted on the matter only once, in December 1979, and had heard nothing more until called to Cape Town in May to be told of the proposals. Speaking in Ulundi, capital of KwaZulu, the day after the announcement, he said bluntly: "I could not contain my anger when I saw what they wanted to give away. . . . If we had the guns, we would resist with the guns."

Ultimately the South African Parliament has the right to overrule the court decisions when it meets again at the end of next January, so the court hearings, which have been going on since June, are simply a staving-off mechanism, giving opponents of the land cession time to consolidate their opposition and negotiate support for their stand abroad.

Chief Buthelezi has totally ignored the bait offered by the South African government in exchange for Ingwavuma; Natal's three internationally known game preserves, Hluhluwe, Umfolozi, and Mkuze; the Josini Dam irrigation project; and some other minor areas of state land. He sees KwaZulu as inextricably intertwined, politically, economically, and geographically, with the white-controlled province of Natal and rejects the South African government's long-term plan to force KwaZulu into taking independence. and so refuses on principle to discuss any land deals. (KwaZulu is at present made up of 10 separate land blocks within the boundaries of Natal.)

What are the motives behind this controversial land-swap deal? For Swaziland, independent from Britain since 1968 and smaller in area than Massachusetts, the gains are obvious. Through the cession of Ingwavuma on its southeastern border, the country would have direct access to the sea, a long-held objective given greater urgency in recent times since its closest port — Maputo, in troubled Mozambique — is no longer being efficiently operated. Although a natural harbor exists at Kosi Bay on the Ingwavuma coast, siltation and access transport problems through low-lying and often marshy country would probably render a site further south, notably Black Rock, more attractive. Rumors that the United States might develop a port for the Swazis in exchange for use of the facility as an Indian Ocean naval base persist, in spite of denials by the American consul general in Durban, Harry Geisel. The rumor is based largely on the swing towards Moscow in the Seychelles and Mauritius and the resultant threat to Diego Garcia. It is

David Robbins is a South African writer who has recently made a special study of the proposed land deal.

argued that Washington cannot afford to negotiate directly with Pretoria for a naval base but that nothing would prevent a liaison with Mbabane.

A more likely use for the magnificent Kosi Bay, already a unique nature reserve, would be the establishment of a multimillion-dollar holiday resort and casino. Although Swaziland already has such facilities near its capital, much valuable tourist trade has been diverted to other gambling resorts recently established in the so-called independent homelands of Bophuthatswana and, last year, on the Wild Coast in Transkei to avoid South Africa's antigambling laws.

A further gain for Swaziland, a country that manifests the classic cash flow and general economic problems of the Third World, is the presence of viable deposits of gold in KaNgwane.

But while it is not difficult to find motives for Swaziland's welcoming the proposed extensions to its borders, the same cannot be said about the South African government's enthusiasm for the deal. Dr. Piet Koornhof, South Africa's minister of cooperation and development (the modern term for African affairs), has publicly stated that the border adjustments promise greater political and economic development for the entire area and would be "a step towards the long-cherished idea of the Swazi people to be united under one king in one country."

Though it is true that the vast majority of the 750,000 South African citizens living in KaNgwane are Swazi-speaking, the situation in Ingwavuma is very different. According to an official census in 1981, there were only 48 Swazis out of a total of over 95,000-Zulu-speaking people in the area, a fact that prompted Chief Buthelezi to declare: "These figures show up once and for all the lies being told about 'bringing together people who belong together' in the present dirty deal with Swaziland."

In any event, a large percentage of the people of Ingwavuma are of Tonga rather than Zulu descent and therefore, according to Dr. Koornhof's own criteria, would have more natural affinity with the southern areas of Mozambique than with Swaziland.

But if the altruistic sentiments expressed by Dr. Koornhof must to a large extent be discounted, what in fact does South Africa stand to gain by giving away sovereign land to a neighboring state? There is only conjecture.

There is, for example, the theory that Ingwavuma in particular, if ceded to a relatively friendly Swaziland, would act as a convenient buffer against African National Congress insurgents attempting to infiltrate into South Africa from Mozambique.

There is also the argument that the land deal is being used to lure Swaziland closer to the South African government's ideal of a constellation of southern African states with individual political independence being coupled to inevitable economic dependence on South Africa as the biggest star. By so doing, South Africa could seriously undermine the Southern African Development Coordination Conference's avowed aim of lessening the economic dependence on South Afri[illegible] of countries in the region. The imp[illegible]ations of this on the military security of South Africa's minority government are obvious.

In addition, parliamentarians representing South Africa's official opposition, the Progressive Federal party (PFP), have accused the government of using the land deal to get rid of nearly one million black people it would otherwise sooner or later have to accommodate both economically and politically, a motive that Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the PFP, described as "riddled with cynicism."



Certainly, the people of KaNgwane and more especially Ingwavuma view the proposals in this light, and reaction has been angry and defiant.

When Dr. Koornhof went to the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi in June to announce details of the land deal, he was greeted with insults from an enraged and gesticulating crowd of Zulus, who surrounded his car outside the Legislative Assembly. A week later, thousands of people cheered Chief Mzimba Tembe when he told a rally at Manguzi, an Ingwavuma town not far from the Mozambique border, that the area would be ceded to Swaziland only over his dead body. At another rally, more than 3,000 tribesmen vowed to fight to the death if the proposals were forced through. Leaders of both KaNgwane and KwaZulu took the matter to court, and some 20,000 Ingwavuma residents pledged the equivalent of about $2 each to help cover the costs of the numerous legal battles that followed.


Photo: David Robbins

Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu, arriving at Ingwavuma protest rally against land deal proposals

An Ingwavuma chief, Johannes Mngomezulu, has openly accused the South African security police of holding meetings in the area in an attempt to persuade the people to accept the land deal proposals. Among white South Africans, too, anxiety over the possibility of bloodshed and doubt about the South African government's real motives have been expressed. A petition protesting against the proposals was signed by over 10,000 people in Natal alone, and an attempt by the Natal Provincial Council to hold a referendum on the matter was blocked by the prime minister, P. W. Botha.

Nor do the Swazi people themselves view the proposed acquisition of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane with the same enthusiasm as their leaders. Apart from the threat of animosity and violence in the border areas, many people outside official government circles have expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of a situation in which at the stroke of a pen the tiny kingdom's population, currently standing at just over 500,000, will be almost trebled.

Yet ever since the colonial delineation of state boundaries of southern Africa late last century, the Swazis have been eyeing territory beyond their current borders. Swaziland was first established as a kingdom in the middle of the nineteenth century and, although borders then were not accurately defined, the country was generally considered to be approximately twice its present size. In the 1870s the Transvaal Republic virtually laid claim to the mountainous region in its attempts to find an outlet to the sea. But these designs were cut short when Britain annexed the Transvaal in 1877. The following year, the present northern, western, and southern boundaries of Swaziland were defined in the Pretoria Convention.

But the Swazi government insists that its border with Ingwavuma has never been officially determined, not even when Swaziland was annexed by Britain, along with the other southern African protectorates, at the close of the Anglo-Boer War. Swaziland laid claim to Ingwavuma "at an early state," according to the country's present foreign minister, Richard Dlamini. These claims became more vocal in 1895, when Britain declared Ingwavuma a protectorate after a decisive victory over the Zulus. Two years later, Britain annexed it to Natal with the rest of Zululand. Yet it was not until 1976 that the area was incorporated into the semiautonomous homeland of KwaZulu, thus coming for the first time under the political control of the Zulu people as a whole, an event that caused approximately 7,000 refugees to cross the Ubombo Mountains into Swaziland.

Virtually all these refugees are members of the Mngomezulu clan and followers of its deposed chief, Ntunja Mngomezulu. According to Ntunja, he was deposed by the South African government in 1973 because he refused to call himself a Zulu. According to his half brother, Johannes, who assumed leadership of the clan in his place, Ntunja had been party to a Swazi plot to absorb the clan into King Sobhuza's domain. King Sobhuza II had married his sister to Ntunja's father with this clear purpose in mind. King Sobhuza often used his vast family — he is reputed to have sired 600 children — to spread his influence throughout the region, even marrying one daughter to the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini on the understanding that she would be given the status of chief wife. The heir to the Zulu throne is traditionally the first son of the chief wife.

The deposed chief Ntunja, who has been living in exile at Nsoko in eastern Swaziland since 1973, is now being portrayed by the South African and Swazi governments as one of thousands of victims of anti-Swazi racism in KwaZulu. Ntunja claims that the people of Ingwavuma have been terrorized into renouncing their Swazi heritage. When I visited him at Nsoko recently, I learned to my surprise that the car he drove is registered in the name of a South African security policeman.

Since the announcement of the land deal proposals, approximately 30 more refugees, claiming to have been chased from Ingwavuma for expressing pro-Swazi sentiments, are living under canvas in the main settlement camp at Ndzevane, a few miles south of Big Bend in eastern Swaziland.

But this dislocation and misery, almost certain to degenerate into open tribal warfare should the land deal go through, would not be the only unpleasant consequence to plague the Swazis. The aquisition of two million acres of undeveloped rural land, and almost half as many people, could create major political, social, and economic problems.

These problems need to be seen in relation to the existing rigid class structure in Swaziland. Currently there are three classes: the Abantwana Benkosi Swazis, or those with royal connections; the Swazi Mba Mba, or those born in the country; and the amaSwazi Ephepha, or Swazis born elsewhere but of Swazi parents. Now a fourth class, likely to be called the amaSw. : Etive, or foreign Swazi, far outnumbering any of the existing classes, will be added.

Politically, in a free election, this could have the effect of profoundly altering the status quo in government. It is more likely, however, that the existing autocracy, generally considered fairly benign, would be forced into a progressively more dictatorial position as it attempted to retain power.

Even more grave are the economic repercussions. Swaziland is currently struggling with a huge disparity between urban and rural development. In 1977, Swaziland's urban areas, which lie predominantly in the Mbabane/Manzini corridor, contained less than 20% of the population yet generated 66% of all income. The rural areas, on the other hand, support roughly 80% of the population while generating just over 30% of personal income.

The inevitable consequence of figures like this is urban drift, a problem that even now is visible in the form of shanty towns on the periphery of the corridor. The addition of nearly 850,000 people, both poor and rural, could create for Swaziland a social problem of staggering proportions.

Although Elphas Shabangu, permanent secretary in the deputy prime minister's office, told me in July that the people of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane would continue to work in South Africa as at present, this is hardly likely to be the case. Most income in the two South African areas is generated by the migrant labor system, and it is optimistic to expect that men will continue to leave home for long periods of time to work in South African towns rather than take their families to Mbabane and Manzini in the hope of improving their lot.

Another complication that could lead to serious social conflict in Swaziland is the assurance by the South African government that existing benefits enjoyed by the people in the areas to be ceded would not be forfeited. This could mean a foreign state's providing old-age pensions, for example, to certain sections of the population, while the Swazi government itself offers no such benefit to its existing citizens.

Photo: Percy Khumalo

Part of the large, politicized audience at one of the Ingwavuma protest rallies

But what of the legal implications of the proposed land deal? Attempts by the South African government to place the affected areas under the control of officials of the Department of Cooperation and Development (CAD) as an interim measure before actual cession met with fierce opposition in the courts.

The South African government unilaterally dissolved the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on June 18 and, although the action has been contested in court, CAD officials are still administering the area. The chain of events in Ingwavuma, however, was very different.

The proclamation to remove Ingwavuma from KwaZulu control, published in mid-June, was immediately challenged by Dr. Oscar Dhlomo, KwaZulu minister of education and culture, who brought an urgent application in the Supreme Court for the setting aside of the proclamation. The result was that on June 25, a Natal judge declared the placing of Ingwavuma under CAD control illegal and ordered that the remote area revert to KwaZulu control until the full hearing by the Natal Supreme Court on August 2.

Undeterred by this legal setback, the government issued a second proclamation on June 28, and once more Ingwavuma was excised from KwaZulu and placed under CAD control. Again KwaZulu lawyers challenged the move, and again the Supreme Court found that the state had exceeded its powers and that the proclamation was null and void.

CAD officials had in the meanwhile moved into the area, only to be met by a KwaZulu civil service that refused to cooperate. KwaZulu's legal team went back to the Supreme Court, and on July 5 a full bench of three judges ordered the CAD officials to leave and banned the South African government from interfering in the area until the main hearing on August 2.

The result of this hearing, too, went against the South African government. The court decided the situation should remain unchanged until a final ruling could be made by the appeal court in Bloemfontein. Lawyers representing the South African government contended that, while self-governing but not independent, KwaZulu was an organ of the South African government and as such had no right to institute legal action against it or one of its ministers. KwaZulu lawyers argued, however, that the first proclamation excising Ingwavuma was invalid because KwaZulu had not been consulted and that the second proclamation was based on outdated legislation.

At the time of writing, the appeal court has not yet given its judgment, but legal experts have questioned the ultimate relevance of the decision, whatever the outcome. Witwatersrand University Professor John Dugard has said the South African government would not face domestic legal obstacles in handing over the areas to Swaziland. The procedure, he explained, would be similar to the granting of "independence" to homelands. A treaty would be signed in which Swaziland agreed to confer its nationality on the people affected. South Africa would then pass legislation depriving them of South African nationality, while Swaziland passed legislation accepting them as Swazi nationals. Professor Dugard's opinion is that it would not be possible to block this procedure in a South African court.

It is for this reason that Kwazulu has sent delegations abroad, notably to the United Nations, in an attempt to canvas support for its cause and to discuss the possibility of taking the matter to the World Court. Yet, whether the South African government will allow this or whether a compromise will be sought (as is now being mooted), the repercussions at regional and even international levels have already been considerable.

The government of Lesotho, inspired by the ethnic reasoning used by the South Africans, has already indicated that it could legitimately lay claim to the small Qwa Qwa homeland in the Orange Free State; and there has been speculation that large sections of Bophuthatswana, already a so-called independent homeland comprising several separate tracts of land in the western Transvaal and northern Cape, could be conveniently given away to Botswana.

The proposals have led to a spate of delegations between the Frontline states in southern Africa, yet the stance of these countries is far from clear; African National Congress leadership, on the other hand, while appearing to waver on the issue after visiting Swaziland in July, has come out firmly against the proposals.

Further afield, the proposed land deal has threatened to deepen the rift in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) over Libya's role in the organization and the chairmanship of Colonel Qaddafy. Years ago the OAU resolved that colonial boundaries on the continent should not be tampered with, and indications are that the OAU will not accept the proposed redrawing of Swazi–South African boundaries, even though in June Libya gave her support to "Swaziland's right to get her people together."

As the people of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma await the outcome of the various court cases, and even more important (certainly for Ingwavuma) the appointment of a special commission of inquiry the South African and KwaZulu government have agreed shall investigate the whole affair, there has been conjecture that the death of Swaziland's King Sobhuza II on August 22 could spell the end of that country's willingness to go through with the deal. Whether this conjecture proves to be accurate or not, the whole of southern Africa has been disturbed by the controversial proposals, and the political climate, especially at the black/white interface in South Africa itself, has become inevitably more threatening. □

Photo: David Robbins

A family that fled from Ingwavuma in July now lives in the Ndzevane refugee settlement in Swaziland

AFRICAN UPDATE

Monitoring economic and political developments around the Continent

November-December 1982

Namibia plan negotiations continue over Cuban troops issue

The impasse over the Cuban troops issue showed little sign of breaking in October with an intensification of diplomatic negotiations by the U.S. and its contact group allies.

"Parallel movement"—withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and South African troops from Namibia—is considered the key element in the resolution of independence for Namibia. Both the U.S. and South Africa have insisted on the removal of the Cubans, although this is not part of the UN's settlement plan, while the six front-line African states last month flatly rejected what they termed U.S. attempts at "linkage."

High-level talks were held in Geneva on September 20 between Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and Leonid Ilychev, the Soviet deputy foreign minister. The Soviet Union is viewed as having considerable influence with Angola, with whom the U.S. has been negotiating intensively over the last six months on the Cuban troops issue. After the talks, Crocker's deputy, Frank Wisner, went to Luanda for talks with the MPLA government.

Lisbon Radio commented in September that a partial withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces "is not to be ruled out." But Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge said that reports of an imminent settlement were an attempt to make Angola a scapegoat, on the grounds that it refused to discuss the presence of Cuban soldiers on its territory.

There was also a report that France, which recently has accused the Reagan administration of supporting South African "intransigence," has told Cuban leaders it is willing to replace Angola's Cuban force with French army volunteers. The plan may have been outlined in a sudden visit by Jean Ausseil, the head of the foreign ministry's Africa department, to Havana on September 19. The idea reportedly is the brainchild of Regis Debray, the former revolutionary who is now a foreign policy adviser to President Mitterrand.

South Africa also made a move in September which could be interpreted as either preparing for independence or postponing the matter. Prime Minister Pieter Botha signaled that he was fed up with the South African-created Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. DTA leader Dirk Mudge claimed that South African military intelligence had hatched a plot to dump him in favor of Peter Kalangula, the former DTA president who broke away to form his own party among the territory's numerically dominant Ovambos.

Namibia's administrator-general said after talks with U.S. officials that Washington had given its OK to the establishment of a new interim government. (*Financial Times*, September 27, 1982; London *Sunday Times*, September 26, 1982; *New York Times*, September 26, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, September 18, 1982; Lisbon Radio, September 13, 1982.) □

Apartheid far worse, says Bishop Tutu

Bishop Desmond Tutu, on a short visit to the U.S. in September using a special travel permit, declared that apartheid is "far worse" now than five years ago.

After the international outcry over the death in police detention of black consciousness leader Steve Biko in September 1977, there was hope for "a very significant change," Tutu said. But the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches added: "I am afraid that unless something happens quickly, we may be faced with Armageddon."

Tutu said he is especially outraged at a new draft law intended to tighten up influx control restrictions for blacks. The bishop said the bill is the ruling National Party's "final solution" for blacks in much the same way as "the Nazis had a final solution for Jews."

Tutu's trip to the U.S. was facilitated by intervention from the Reagan administration. Pretoria has twice withdrawn the bishop's passport because of his outspoken comments abroad and has rejected his application for another.

For this trip he was issued a document that lists his nationality as "undeterminable at present."

When Tutu was refused a passport earlier this year, Dr. Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said: "We believe that communication between representatives of a variety of opinion in our two societies is a vital element in our developing relations with South Africa." (Johannesburg *Star*, September 11 and 18, 1982; London *Times*, September 13, 1982; *Sowetan*, August 20, 1982.) □

Pretoria plans to sell more arms overseas

Already among the ten biggest weapons manufacturers in the noncommunist world, South Africa has announced it intends to break into the arms exporting business in a big way, hoping to boost overseas sales from the present \$10 million annually to about \$150 million.

Armscor, the government-owned arms producer and procurement agency, kicked off its sales drive in

Continued on next page

WESTERN AFRICA

Benin

• Following a ministerial reshuffle earlier in the year, President Mathieu Kérékou reorganized the **parastatal bodies** as well as the administration at the provincial levels of his government.

Fifteen of the numerous quasi-public bodies were merged or disbanded by the new cabinet and the most notable changes were in the agricultural field. The former Société Nationale pour le Développement Agricole and the Société Beninoise de Palmier à Huile were among those merged and reorganized into two new agencies: l'Office Beninoise d'Amenagement Rural and the Société Nationale pour la Promotion Agricole, the former for managing and the latter for promoting agricultural development projects, in coordination with the regional centers for rural development.

Observers noted that Kérékou's revision of the country's overall development strategy is intended to rectify the corruption and inefficiency that followed the large-scale nationalizations of the mid-1970s. However, it is believed that his commitment to socialism remains fixed despite what has been characterized as a "gradual liberalization of Benin's political economy." (*West Africa*, August 9, 1982.)

Cape Verde

• Earlier in the year, the government of Cape Verde launched its first national **development plan** for 1982-1985, aimed at self-sufficiency in food and the fight against desertification. The $405 million plan, focusing on rural land reform, includes incentives for increasing agricultural productivity via the creation of production cooperatives and the eventual transferral of land ownership to those who work it.

Opposition to the land reforms, however, resulted in one instance in the deaths of two peasants and the arrests of 18 farmers and laborers on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Criticism of the reforms was believed fueled by UCID, a right-wing party operating primarily among Cape Verdean emigrants abroad and former Portuguese colonial administrators in Lisbon.

According to the Cape Verde government, those detained had been attempting to whip up opposition to the land reforms with UCID's encouragement by characterizing the measures as "a communist law" intended to expropriate property and small-holdings so that "no one will be able to inherit his father's house." The government, however, maintains that the reforms are mainly aimed at absentee landlords who have left the islands permanently. (*Financial Times*, September 13, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 31 and August 15, 1982.)

Chad

• Hissene Habré, Chad's de facto ruler since June when he seized control of Ndjamena from President Goukouni Woddeye, eliminated his remaining **major rival**, southern leader Col. Wadal Kamougué, in early September, leaving him in control of the country's 14 provinces.

Kamougué fled into exile after being surrounded in his stronghold, Moundou, by Habré's forces and rebels from his own Chad Armed Forces (FAT). The southern leader and Habré had met secretly in July to initiate negotiations on reconciliation. However, Kamougué's proposal for Chad's political unification—a federation of north and south—apparently did not meet with Habré's approval. Habré, who seeks a unified government for the entire country, claimed a federation would only exacerbate Chad's religious and tribal divisions and warned Kamougué that his patience was wearing thin.

Meanwhile, Habré announced in late September that a new government which "will be representative and capable of ensuring the unity, defense, independence and territorial integrity of the country" will soon be formed to replace the ruling council of state. A new army composed of his Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and FAT will also be created.

Habré charged that Kamougué and his allies were preparing to send in "mercenaries" and to land foreign aircraft in southern Chad and said, "We will stamp out any such attacks firmly." He also alleged that Libyan troops and rebel forces of former President Woddeye were still in control of Woddeye's tribal homeland nearly a year after Libyan troops withdrew from the rest of Chad.

Woddeye reportedly chaired a late September meeting in Algiers of leaders of the eight factions that composed his Transitional Government of National Unity, including a Kamougué representative, and declared the formation of a government in exile.

Habré intends to begin discussions with the Tripoli government over the return of the Aozou strip, occupied for more than ten years by Libya. The Aozou strip is said to

Arms *continued*

September by showcasing its G6 field gun, a 155mm artillery piece mounted on a six-wheel vehicle. Ironically, this example of the country's "home-grown" weapons industry over the last five years of the international arms boycott is almost entirely a product of American technology. It was developed by a U.S. firm, Space Research Corp., in which Armscor secretly bought a controlling share, and illegally shipped to South Africa. The G6 has the capability to "fire a nuclear warhead" but this is "not government policy."

Armscor has bragged that it has an advantage over other arms exporters: its weapons are combat-tested in the Namibian guerrilla war.

The company itself is huge, one of the largest in the country with 28,000 employees. In addition, 3,000 private sector contractors and sub-contractors, including many local subsidiaries of U.S. and European firms, provide about half of Armscor's requirements.

Analysts say the reason for the export drive is that the domestic market for weapons has reached saturation point. Also, many of the weapons, such as the G6 heavy artillery, are virtually useless in the Namibian war. (*Financial Times*, September 14, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, September 9, 11 and 12, 1982.) □

contain substantial uranium and petroleum deposits. The Chad Minister of Foreign Affairs, Idris Miskine, said, "We are seeking a peaceful solution to this question in accordance with UN and OAU conventions and we may even bring the matter before an international court." (London *Guardian*, October 4, 1982; Ndjamena Radio, September 28, 1982; *West Africa*, September 27, 1982; *Le Monde*, September 18, 1982.)

The Gambia

• In late August, the Gambian parliament ratified the first protocol agreements on the implementation of the pact establishing the **Senegambian confederation.** This protocol, which had already been signed by the foreign ministers of both countries in early July, defined the institutions of the confederation—the presidency, vice presidency, council of ministers and foreign affairs.

Under the agreement, the positions of President and Vice President will be filled by the presidents of Senegal and the Gambia respectively. Assisting the President will be a general secretariat charged with implementing all decisions. The protocol also established a confederal assembly which is to consist of 60 parliamentarians, two-thirds of whom are from the Senegalese parliament and one-third from the Gambian parliament. Foreign policies will be coordinated via a schedule of consultations and an exchange of information between the respective presidents and foreign ministers of each state.

In other news, President Dawda Jawara said in August that "budgetary austerity, financial discipline and patriotic commitment" will be the guidelines for the Gambia's policies in the immediate future. He also placed emphasis on security and defense problems, in the wake of last year's abortive coup attempt. A regular army will be set up and plans are being formulated for its integration with the Senegalese army.

In August, Alhaji Abdoulie Mboob, the Gambian Minister of Interior, submitted his resignation for unspecified reasons. Mboob, inspector general of the police at the time of the 1981 coup attempt, had been instrumental in putting down the rebellion and was appointed Minister of Interior after the revolt was crushed with the aid of the Senegalese armed forces.

According to observers, however, he fell from favor with the Gambian government as allegations surfaced that as chief of police, he had known about the plot to overthrow the government almost six months in advance. Mboob denied the allegations during the June treason trial of opposition leader Sheriff Dibba. (*West Africa*, August 23 and 30, 1982; Dakar Radio, August 19 and 20, 1982.)

Ghana

• Ghana's government, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), ordered closed the land **borders** in late September in a move designed to curb smuggling, black marketeering and currency trafficking. The ban on people leaving and entering Ghana does not apply to air and sea travel or telecommunications.

Ghana has had problems for many years with "clandestine trade"—particularly the smuggling and black marketeering of cocoa. In the mid-1970s, it was estimated that as much as one-third of the annual cocoa crop was smuggled into Togo and Ivory Coast where it fetched higher market prices. Manufactured goods and imported essential commodities also were taken across the border and sold for more convertible currencies than the Ghanaian cedi.

The border closure was seen as one of the "drastic economic measures" Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings warned of in a radio message to the nation in August.

In other news, two of the three civilian members of the PNDC resigned in August, the first signs of discord within the government since it was created early in 1982. No official explanations were given for the departures from the PNDC of the Rev. Vincent Damuah, a Roman Catholic priest, and Joachim Amarte Kwei. Damuah, however, was known to have issued strong denunciations of the July murders of three high court justices, angering the radical members of the council. Kwei reportedly upset moderates by dismissing fears of many Ghanaian professionals following the crime.

And in September, the first high-level contacts between the Ghanaian and U.S. governments took place in Washington. Ghana's Foreign Minister, Obed Asamoah, and the Finance and Economy Minister, Kwesi Botchway, held discussions with the American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, on bilateral relations and the state of the Ghanaian economy and included an appeal for U.S. technical aid to agriculture. Asamoah, who was in the U.S. for the opening of the UN General Assembly session, said, "Both sides had the opportunity to clear our minds about each other's positions." (Kenya *Weekly Review*, October 1, 1982; *West Africa*, September 6 and 27, 1982; *Washington Post*, August 20, 1982.)

Guinea

• In mid-September, President Sékou Touré paid his first official **visit to France** since Guinea's independence in 1958, marking a reconciliation between the two nations after 24 years of stormy relations. Touré's 1958 refusal of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's offer to join the French West African Community, an economic union, precipitated a sharp deterioration in relations with Guinea's former colonial power and its eventual economic isolation from the West.

Although the ice was broken by the visit to Conakry by former French President Giscard d'Estaing in 1978, relations with France's Socialist Party had continued to be rocky because of its denunciations of Guinea's human rights record.

Although Touré met with Socialist President François Mitterrand during his four-day visit, as well as with government ministers and industry representatives, the Socialist Party refused contact with him. French police had to break up several demonstrations against Touré's visit, organized by Guinean opposition groups and supporters of the Association of Families of Political Prisoners in Guinea.

Eight white French women who had been campaigning for years for information on the fates of their Guinean husbands, missing since an attempted coup in 1970, received information from Touré just prior to his departure for France that they had been executed.

During his visit, Touré denied allegations of massive human rights violations—among them that some 20,000 have been executed since independence—and maintained there were no restrictions on personal freedom in Guinea. No one has ever been prosecuted for questions of free speech or political activity, he said, but those executed had been "traitors."

Observers indicated that Mitterrand's decision to host Touré despite vocal opposition was related to the Guinean President's efforts to break out of isolation both within Africa and vis-à-vis the West. Guinea is scheduled to host the 1983 OAU summit and Touré paid a private visit to the U.S. in June to attend an investment forum sponsored by Chase Manhattan Bank.

French companies have begun to manifest interest in Guinea's mineral and energy potential, participating in projects formerly reliant upon Soviet, East German, Czech, Cuban and Chinese aid. French aid, however, remains modest. (London *Guardian*, September 15 and 21, 1982; *Le Monde*, September 17 and 18, 1982; *Financial Times*, September 17, 1982.)

Guinea-Bissau

• In August, the first ministerial level discussions between **Cape Verde** and Guinea-Bissau since the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations in mid-June were held concerning a joint telecommunications project and former maritime industry links.

A technical commission was formed, its first meeting scheduled for September in Cape Verde. A communique issued following the meeting said everything within the two countries' powers would be done to heal the political rift caused by the 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau. Ambassadors will not be exchanged for the time being, however, because of the cost and "lack of trained people."

Another sign of the reconciliation was the September summit meeting in Cape Verde of the heads of state of the five former Portuguese African colonies—Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe—to discuss South African attacks on Angola and Pretoria's involvement in antigovernment activities in Mozambique. The meeting took place a year late because of the 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau. (*West Africa*, August 9 and September 27, 1982.)

Ivory Coast

• An average of over 18,000 barrels of oil per day is being pumped from the offshore Espoir field, 25 miles south-west of Abidjan, according to spokesmen for **Phillips Petroleum**, leader of a consortium which includes the Italian AGIP, Ltd., Sedco Inc. and the Ivory Coast's national oil company, Petroci.

The announcement that oil production from the Espoir field had begun was made in early September. Phillips has four completed wells tied to the system and is expected to add a fifth. Output from the field could reach 30,000 barrels per day.

The consortium holds three separate production sharing contracts with the Ivory Coast government to explore and develop more than 3.5 million acres offshore.

Although the Ivory Coast's exploitation of its petroleum reserves appears to be netting favorable results, the government is continuing to implement "existing austerity measures," according to the political bureau of the ruling Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast. Measures will be adopted aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food, improving educational facilities and reducing public spending in the wake of depressed conditions on the world commodity markets. Retail cooperatives will be reorganized to promote more Ivorian participation. President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, urging increased self-reliance, emphasized that "the campaign for self-sufficiency in food serves no purpose unless farmers have the means of getting their produce to the markets." (*West Africa*, September 13, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, September 3, 1982.)

Liberia

• President Reagan characterized discussions in Washington in August with Liberian head of state Samuel Doe as "an opportunity to reaffirm the special friendship and mutual respect between our two countries." Doe followed a 14-day official **visit to the U.S.** with stops in Britain, France and Morocco.

Doe said the objectives of his trip to the U.S. were "to give the American people an accurate account of developments in Liberia which are geared toward ensuring stability, national reconciliation and economic recovery following the revolution of 12 April 1980," and "to win a pledge from the American government and people for increased assistance to Liberia in all fields of its development."

In addition to discussions with Reagan, Doe met with State Department, Pentagon, and congressional representatives and attended a dinner of businessmen in New York, where he sought to encourage American investors, citing Liberia's liberal investment policies. He canceled a news conference and a visit to the Voice of America headquarters because of displeasure over an article about him in the *Washington Post*.

During the current fiscal year, the U.S. has pledged some $74.5 million in economic and military assistance to Liberia, with roughly the same amount requested for FY 1983. Doe said the U.S. promised to help develop Liberia's air force and was providing $15 million for military housing, the poor conditions of which had been a factor behind Doe's 1980 coup against the late President William Tolbert.

In Britain, the Liberian head of state canceled meetings with representatives of the Queen, the government and the foreign office because, according to aides he was "resting" after his U.S. visit. He met with President François Mitterrand in France, however, as well as with leading industrialists, and said, "We hope to receive aid from France very soon." The substance of his discussions with Moroccan King Hassan and Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta was not known. (Monrovia Radio, August 31 and September 3, 1982; London *Times*, August 31, 1982; *Washington Post*, August 18, 19 and 20, 1982.)

• Following two years of government efforts to restructure the economy, the **International Monetary Fund** announced earlier in the year that it was "satisfied with the efforts made by the Malian authorities to apply the financial and economic program worked out with the fund" and has agreed to a stand-by credit agreement worth $41 million.

The IMF money comes nine months after Mali began its national plan for 1981-1985, a program designed to achieve self-sufficiency in food, better water management and a "clean-up" of public funds. The latter reform involves channeling various state-controlled activities into private hands, and it was reportedly this measure that chiefly earned the IMF approval. (*New African*, September 1982; *West Africa*, August 9, 1982.)

Nigeria

• Nigeria's 22nd anniversary of independence on October 1 was celebrated at the country's new federal capital, **Abuja**, located in the central part of the country. Abuja is to replace Lagos, 300 miles away, as the political and administrative headquarters of Nigeria.

President Shehu Shagari honored an earlier promise to be in Abuja by September 1982 by establishing temporary residence in the presidential guest house, despite the fact that construction of the city is nowhere near complete. More than $1 billion has been spent on the capital already, but there is still no national assembly building, few completed structures, and the Kaduna airport, 75 miles north, must be used.

And in other news, the first stage of preparations for the 1983 presidential and general elections was completed in August and September, with the nationwide registration of voters. There are somewhere between 46 and 60 million eligible voters in Nigeria.

Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission (Fedeco), Justice Ovie-Whiskey, rejected calls for the mass cancelation of the registrations on charges of such irregularities as rigging and stealing of registration papers. Registrations were held up in the Rivers and Lagos states because of alleged malpractices.

Ovie-Whiskey said in the wake of the registration campaign that Fedeco might seek the army's assistance in maintaining peace and order during the 1983 contests to ensure "free and fair elections." The statement provoked controversy in Nigeria, with the *Daily Times* commenting: "We believe that the soldiers have no business whatsoever with the processes that help sustain democracy and that securing their assistance for the stated objective will only serve to expose a number of them to undue partisan influences."

In preparation for the 1979 elections, voters had been registered in a door-to-door campaign. This time, voters had to go to 127,000 booths all over the country which will also serve as the polling places next year. Shortages of money and time reportedly led to problems with the booths, and thus charges of irregularities in the registration process.

In addition, the electoral law signed by Shagari in August contains a clause instructing Fedeco to pay $15 to party agents to supervise voting at each booth. According to the *Economist*, with six political parties, 127,000 booths, and five elections—for president, senate, federal assembly, state assemblies and state governors—this could add up to over $50 million at a time when the country is operating under austerity measures. (London *Guardian*, October 1, 1982; London *Times*, October 1, 1982; *West Africa*, August 23, September 6 and 13, 1982; *Economist*, September 4, 1982.)

Senegal

• In September, Senegal's Minister for Industrial Affairs and Mines, Cheikh Hamidou Kane, issued a formal request for **European Economic Community** aid for the development of the Falémé iron ore mines, adding itself to the list of African requests, headed by Guinea and Gabon, for EEC support.

Senegal is hoping to develop its mineral sector in order to diversify the economy which has been dependent on agriculture. Kane said the EEC is considering a "positive response" to his request for funding for the $900 million Falémé project, which is expected to produce up to 12 million tons of iron ore per year for 40 years.

The EEC is drawing up a mining strategy to persuade European investors to participate in developing Africa's mineral resources. In addition to the Senegalese mines, the EEC has demonstrated interest in the Mount Nimba iron ore reserves in Guinea and the Belinga deposits in Gabon. The EEC strategy in Africa was dealt a blow by the European Coal and Steel Community's decision to invest some $600 million in Brazilian iron ore mines. (*West Africa*, September 20, 1982.)

Sierra Leone

• In a budget speech earlier in the year, Minister of Finance Salia Jusu-Sheriff described an "economic and financial **crisis** of considerable dimensions," with only "the grimmest prospects" for recovery. He said, "The combination of declining production, growing fiscal deficits, rising public sector indebtedness to the banking system, balance of payments deterioration and rapid accumulation of arrears" risked "financial collapse if timely action is not taken." The 1982-83 budgetary expenditures were estimated at $480 million against revenues plus grants of $243.3 million, leaving an "alarming deficit" of $236.7 million.

Subsequent reports have characterized Sierra Leone's economic situation as never having been as bad in all its existence as an independent country. In addition to daily lay-offs of workers and shortages of consumer goods, key industries such as rutile, diamonds, bauxite, and coffee have either lost markets or failed to meet expected quotas.

Petroleum shortages which began earlier in the year have become more serious and unconfirmed reports stated that Sierra Leone attempted to "blackmail its way" into attending the abortive 1982 OAU summit by demanding two years' supply of Libyan oil in return. Sierra Leone will have to import 20 percent more rice this year than last in order to supplement local production. (*West Africa*, August 23, September 6 and 13, 1982; *Jeune Afrique* September 1, 1982; *Moto*, September 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 31, 1982).

• The controversial **Newspaper Act**,

put forth in 1980 by the former Minister of Information and Broadcasting Thaimu Bangura and then shelved, became law in September with President Siaka Stevens' ratification. The law requires owners of newspapers to pay a $2,000 fee for an initial license to publish, and $1,000 yearly to have the permit renewed, subject to the ministry's approval.

The enactment of the bill is expected to put out of business several smaller papers which have sprung up in recent months and have been critical of government corruption and nepotism.

Observers said that Sierra Leone would probably be left with the six newspapers that can afford the registration fee: the government-owned *Daily Mail; We Yone*, owned by the ruling All Peoples Congress party; *Flash*, an independent; two sports papers, *Progress* and *Sports Star*, and a mission paper, *Geeta*. (*West Africa*, September 27, 1982.)

Upper Volta

• In mid-September, the Voltaic Ministry of [illegible]nning announced the creation of [illegible]-member council to assist in the preparation of a five-year **national plan** for 1982-1986. The Higher Council of National Planning, consisting of government ministry employees and representatives from trade unions and other public bodies, will confront the need to increase food production given a growing population, better marketing facilities based on the construction of a tarmac road to the north, and the large-scale incorporation of women into agricultural training programs.

Observers noted that even if the government goal of food self-sufficiency is not realized, the building of the paved road would be a significant incentive in increasing agricultural production. At present, inadequate marketing means and facilities are the primary constraints affecting increased food production.

In other news, trade union leader Soumana Toure, wanted by the Voltaic authorities since November 1981, was arrested near the Ghana border in early September. Toure was outlawed and his Voltaic Trade Union Confederation (CSV) banned as part of a government crackdown on the powerful trade unions. Ironically, on the same day of his arrest, 82 workers went on trial for participating in an illegal strike last April stemming from the banning of the CSV. (*West Africa*, September 20 and 27, 1982.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Ethiopia

• The Ethiopian government released 716 **political prisoners** in September, including three former ministers in the Haile Selassie government, to mark the eighth anniversary of the coming to power of the military regime. A year earlier Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam had freed 500 political prisoners.

Among those released were ex-Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru, former Finance Minister Mamo Tadesse and Girmatchew Tekle-Hawariate, a prominent author and former Information Minister. Also freed were the former air force commander, a former ambassador and three bishops of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, as well as some members of the Selassie royal family.

In the Eritrean conflict, relations with Sudan, which once held out the prospect of playing peacemaker until ties soured, improved in August and September. The Ethiopian Defense Minister, Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, led a delegation to Khartoum to discuss, among other topics, strengthening "the security and defense of the common borders of the two countries."

This may refer to the possible sealing of the Sudanese border with Eritrea, through which the secessionists receive much of their supplies. Last year, the Ethiopians had hopes the Sudanese would close down the frontier, but Sudan's government did not because of suspicions that Addis Ababa was conniving with Libya to stir up internal dissent against President Gaafar al-Nimeiry. (Addis Ababa Radio, September 18, 1982; London *Times*, September 15, 1982; *Washington Post*, September 12, 1982.)

Kenya

• The expected crackdown on **political dissidents** began just days after Kenya's August 1 attempted coup. And President Daniel arap Moi's efforts to revive the flagging economy and restore investor confidence received a blow in October when the International Monetary Fund suspended its $163 million standby loan.

Charged with treason were Raila Odinga, the son of Oginga Odinga, and a well-known journalist, Otieno Mak'Onyango. Charged with having knowledge of treasonous activities were a Nairobi University professor, Alfred Otieno, and Didacus Diego, an employee of the directorate of civil aviation. A lecturer at Kenyatta University College was charged with possessing a seditious document. By mid-October, 38 Nairobi University students had been charged with sedition and another, who had pleaded guilty to sedition, was jailed for ten years.

In addition, more than 100 mostly low-ranking members of the disbanded air force, which the government has blamed for the abortive coup, were sentenced to long prison terms for mutiny.

In August, Moi harshly criticized Nairobi University lecturers who, he said, were educating students in "foreign ideologies which do not have any room in Kenya today."

The treason charges, which carry a potential death sentence, state that Odinga and Mak'Onyango "intended to overthrow the Kenyan government." Odinga is an assistant editor at the Kenya Bureau of Standards and Mak'Onyango is assistant managing editor of the *Sunday Standard*. Oginga Odinga, a persistent critic of Moi's government and a former Vice President of Kenya, reportedly went into hiding after his son's arrest in August, and in October the government ordered him to remain within his home area of western Kenya.

The IMF loan suspension came as Kenya's foreign exchange reserves dwindled to the lowest level in six years—only $173 million, less than a month's import cover. The country's only oil refinery closed temporarily in late September after running out of crude oil. That was a worse blow to neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, which rely heavily on the refinery for their fuel.

One economic bright spot was the decision by New York-based Bankers Trust to open its first African office in Nairobi to cover the eastern and southern parts of the continent. A company spokesman said the move indicated continuing and growing commitment to Kenya and to Africa. (*Financial Times*, September 24, October 1 and 7, 1982; London *Times*, October 6, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, August 29 and Ocober 3, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, September 24 and October 1, 1982.)

Madagascar

• The November **election** is not expected to be a shoo-in for President Didier Ratsiraka, running for his second term as Madagascar's leader. This time Ratsiraka has an opponent, although he is still expected to win.

Monja Jaona, the other candidate, was named to stand by his Monima party, which with Ratsiraka's Arema party and five others makes up the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution. Jaona is basing his campaign on two issues: the deteriorating economy and a series of killings by government troops. This year there has been an outbreak of social unrest leading to demonstrations in which police and troops killed about 20 people.

However, Jaona has charged that the unrest was far more widespread than the government admitted and claimed that in three unreported incidents a total of about 180 people were killed. Jaona said most people in Madagascar are "victims of cattle-stealing, murders, embezzlement of public funds, and destruction of the economy, the educational system and the health service."

Although Jaona was appointed to the ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council in late 1981, he still speaks out against the government and has considerable support among Ratsiraka's opponents, especially the students, who have touched off several of the demonstrations. There was also a report that right-wing members of Ratsiraka's Arema are secretly supporting Jaona.

The economy, which Ratsiraka took direct control of in January, got a lift from a $69 million International Monetary Fund loan in June and by the possibility of oil discoveries. A subsidiary of Amoco is prospecting off the west coast and, according to its agreement, will pay all the costs. If oil is found, the government then will pay the company its share. (*Africa Now*, September 1982; *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, September 18, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, August 31, 1982.)

Mauritius

• The Mauritian government has introduced a tough **austerity budget**, proclaiming that it had no choice because of the "catastrophic" economic situation inherited from the last government ousted in the June election by the Mauritian Militant Movement.

Essentially, the budget is an attempt to revive the stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund that was suspended when the previous government failed to meet the IMF's guidelines. The budget includes curtailment of public spending, reduction of subsidies on rice and flour, increased taxes on imports and introduction of a sales tax.

Finance Minister Paul Berenger said, "We have been forced to make meeting the conditions of the IMF our top priority, followed by revival of the economy with the promotion of social justice only a third priority." (*Financial Times*, September 7, 1982: *Africa Research Bulletin*, August 31, 1982.)

Seychelles

• The government has decided to pump another $1.7 million into its **tourist industry**—the major foreign exchange earner for the Seychelles—in the aftermath of two coup attempts, the last in August.

In the first six months of 1982, the number of tourists declined precipitously, by 31 percent. The image of political instability following the November 1981 coup attempt by South African mercenaries was blamed for the decrease.

After August's army mutiny, British press reports played up the capture of (British) tourists. The publicity led to an immediate drop in package tour bookings from Europe. Originally, President Albert Rene had planned to switch the mainstay of the economy from tourism to fishing, but so far this has not been successful. Fewer ties to South Africa were also on the program, but ironically Pretoria now provides most of the food imports and South Africans continue to make up the largest contingent of tourists.

According to a South African correspondent, the army mutiny, which was quickly crushed with a cost of seven lives, publicly revealed the Seychellois' dislike for the presence of Tanzanian troops. Tanzanian soldiers helped Rene overthrow the previous government in 1977 and since then have stayed on to train the army and police the islands. (London *Guardian*, September 21, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, September 4, 1982; *Africa Now*, September 1982; London *Observer*, August 22, 1982.)

Somalia

• After heavy fighting in July and August resulting in the capture of the towns of Balambale and Goldogob, as well as the placement of well-supplied troops within those towns and in various positions along the Somalia-Ethiopia border, the Ethiopian-backed **Somali Salvation Democratic Front** (SSDF) failed to achieve a decisive success in the effort to topple the regime of President Mohammed Siad Barre.

Although Ethiopia vigorously denies participating in the conflict, which it describes as a "Somalian internal affair," there were reports that one of two 10,000-man divisions inside Somalia were withdrawn from Goldogob while Balambale remained occupied.

Siad Barre declared a state of emergency less than two weeks after being re-elected for another five-year term during the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party Congress in early August. The renewed attacks appear to have permitted Siad Barre to reconsolidate his power base by giving his regime sweeping powers to crack down on all opposition. These have so far included a mandatory induction of youths into the military, concentrating especially on trouble spots in his country such as Hargeisa in the north. (*New York Times*, October 8, 1982; *Africa Confidential*, August 25 and September 8, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 15, 1982.)

Tanzania

• Prolonged drought in northern Tanzania threatened a possible **famine** affecting about a million people and the government put into effect emergency measures on food distribution.

These steps included collecting grain from villagers and strictly controlling distribution to prevent smuggling across the borders. The state-owned National Milling Corp. will make up any shortfall, which could amount to 33,000 tons in Arusha region alone over the next year.

President Julius Nyerere has blamed black marketeers and profiteers for the poor state of Tanzania's economy and said the country might need 12 years of hard work and discipline to make the economy sound. Vice President Aboud Jumbe said also that certain parastatals were engaged in profiteering and smuggling.

One hopeful aspect of the economy was the discovery of natural gas near Dar es Salaam. The pool was found by an Algerian gas rig and financed by a $10 million loan from the Algerian government. The reserves are estimated at 130 billion cubic meters (a second pool has 41 billion) but it may take as long as ten years to realize the benefits. (Dar es Salaam Radio, August 18, September 14 and 30, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 30, 1982; *Africa Now*, August 1982.)

Uganda

• The Ugandan government denounced a September report by Amnesty International on continuing widespread **human rights violations** as "malicious and unfounded."

Amnesty detailed "systematic torture of prisoners and mass arbitrary executions of civilians" by the army acting "with apparent impunity" because the government's "failure . . . to take effective remedial action indicates that it condones such abuses." Other observers suggested that President Milton Obote, who has said he will not tolerate army "indiscipline," lets the army carry out abuses rather than risk losing its strong support of his government.

Obote has declared that he will soon wipe out "banditry," a reference to the various guerrilla groups battling to oust him. In August, it was revealed that an exiled former President, Godfrey Binaisa, had planned a mercenary coup but had to shelve the plot when his backers—from "the southern states of America"—failed to raise the necessary funds.

On August 27, Uganda released 1,160 detainees, most of them former soldiers held since the 1979 overthrow of Idi Amin, but including some more recently jailed political prisoners. Following a previous Amnesty International report six months ago, Obote had said there were only 237 political prisoners.

In an apparent effort to induce the more than 50,000 Asians expelled by Amin in 1972 to return to Uganda, the government has decided to restore their property and businesses if they come back. Ugandans now running these businesses would be given three months to pack up and vacate the premises. Already, the government has settled with three businesses that used to operate in Uganda—the British company Mitchell Cotts (tea estates) and the Asian families Madhvani and Mehta (sugar estates and businesses)—with the government taking a majority share and paying compensation.

International aid continues to trickle in. In August, the International Monetary Fund authorized a loan of $121.5 million, the European Investment Bank pledged a $10 million loan, the OPEC Fund loaned $15 million, and the U.S. granted $4 million for rehabilitating the agriculture industry. Since Amin's ouster, the U.S. has provided about $50 million. (London *Times*, August 27, 28, September 4 and October 3, 1982; Kampala Radio, August 27 and September 2, 1982; London *Sunday Times*, August 29, 1982.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

• Earlier in the year, President Ahmadou Ahidjo replaced the board of directors and amended the statutes of the **Cameroon Development Corp.,** (CAMDEV), an agro-industrial giant, in a move designed to resolve the company's financial ills, which include unsatisfactory economic and accounting management.

Subsequent to Ahidjo's actions, some 2,000 workers were sacked in a "mass retrenchment" exercise, the third in the history of CAMDEV, which employs over 21,000 laborers and 300 senior staff members. Critics of the retrenchment said it did not affect the senior staff, which has been charged with mismanagement, large-scale fraud and corruption, and therefore was not a solution to CAMDEV's problems.

CAMDEV's annual report for 1981 showed only marginal increases in the sales of its various crops, which include oil palm, rubber, pepper, tea and bananas, due in part to low world prices for the commodities. The Cameroonian government has appointed a fact-finding mission to investigate CAMDEV's current financial crisis. (*West Africa*, September 6 and 27, 1982.)

Central African Republic

• Dr. Abel Goumba, leader of the Oubangui Patriotic Front (FPO-PT), an **opposition** party, and Patrice Endijimoungou, secretary-general of external relations of the party, were arrested in mid-August for possessing "subversive documents" which contained "formal proof" that they were conspiring with "the leader of a foreign political party" to overthrow the military government of Gen. Andre Kolingba.

When Goumba, an exile for 12 years and one of the most popular Central African politicians, was offered the job of rector of the University of Bangui by the government, his appointment was interpreted as a sign of political liberalization and perhaps a tacit tolerance of the FPO-PT. In the wake of Goumba's arrest, however, observers said his appointment may have been part of an attempt to silence political dissidents by placing them in prestigious positions.

Goumba had continued to pressure the military government to honor its promise of a return to civilian democratic government and had thereby violated "his chance" to stop meddling in politics as rector of the university. The jailed men will be put on trial, according to military authorities.

And in other news, Kolingba reshuffled his cabinet for the second time since coming to power in September 1981 in a bloodless coup against President David Dacko. In what was officially described as a "technical" change, a number of portfolios were reassigned and the cabinet was reduced in size from 22 to 19. A commission for financial and economic international relations was created, to be headed by Guy Darlan, a former financial adviser to ex-Emperor Bokassa. (*West Africa*, August 30, September 6 and 13, 1982; *Le Monde*, August 31, 1982.)

Congo

• The Minister of Finance, Itihi Ossetmoumba Lekoundzou, paid the first official **visit to Britain** by a Congolese cabinet minister in September to discuss business opportunities with the British government and industrialists.

A memorandum of understanding was signed by Lekoundzou and the UK Minister of Consumer Affairs, Gerald Vaughan, identifying areas in which British companies could cooperate, such as post and telecommunications, electricity generation and distribution, water supply, construction, public works, transport and agriculture.

The British Overseas Trade Board was scheduled to send a team of business advisers to Congo in October. (*Financial Times*, September 28, 1982; *West Africa*, September 27, 1982.)

Equatorial Guinea

• A liberal **constitution** for Equatorial Guinea was approved in a national referendum in August, signifying a step in the direction of democracy for the country that was terrorized for 11 years by the rule of dictator Macias Nguema.

The constitution put forth by the head of state, Col. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo, guarantees human rights and universal suffrage and prepares the way for a national assembly, local government and a free judiciary. It provides a further seven-year term of office for Mbasogo, after which "real elections" are promised.

Despite criticism of the constitution by some exile opposition groups, which characterized it as a maneuver to attract foreign aid and capital to the country and to legitimize Mbasogo's continued rule, 95 percent of the population reportedly approved the new law. Mbasogo was expected to call the first legislative elections since Equatorial Guinea's independence in the near future. (*West Africa*, August 23 and 30, 1982.)

Zaire

• In early October, a report written by a former IMF representative in Kinshasa detailing Zaire's overall **financial picture** and concluding that there is "no chance for Zaire's numerous creditors to get their money back" was made public and enumerated widespread instances of high-level corruption, which in some cases link key Belgian officials to Zairian financial deals and payments. The report came out as Zaire failed for the second time this year to meet service payments on its $4.1 billion foreign debt and in the wake of deteriorating relations with Belgium.

In early October, Zaire paid only $3 million out of a scheduled $31 million service payment on its outstanding foreign debt. The most recently failure to meet debt obligations follows similar actions last April when the country paid only $10 million out of $44.5 million due. At that time, the IMF suspended its nearly $3.3 billion assistance program over Zaire's failure to meet performance criteria. A delegation of Western bankers was scheduled to meet in Kinshasa in mid-October to discuss the country's debt problems.

Zaire's relations with Belgium have taken a turn for the worse since the report prepared by West German Erwin Blumenthal cited payments made by Zaire to a number of leading Belgian politicians to secure their goodwill. The allegations in the report were made by Zaire's former Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond. The former Belgian Prime Minister, Edmund Leburton, the wife of a former foreign minister and a former leader of the Belgian Christian Democratic Party are among those named in the report, all of whom have denied the allegations. The Blumenthal report is being investigated by the Belgian Prime Minister at a time when the country's relationship with Zaire is being reassessed. Earlier in the year, President Mobutu Sese Seko canceled plans for a working visit to Brussels after Belgian government officials hinted it was not approriate, given criticism of Zaire's human rights record by exiles residing in Belgium. (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 8, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1982; *Financial Times*, October 5, 1982; London *Guardian*, October 2, 1982.)

Zambia

• Four of the 12 defendants on trial and charged with treason for their part in an **alleged plot** to overthrow President Kenneth Kaunda in 1980 were acquitted by the Zambian high court in late August. The 16-month-old trial of the eight others was continuing.

The four, former Brig. Godfrey Miyanda, former Col. Patrick Mkandiwire, former Maj. Macpherson Mbulo and Lusaka lawyer Mundia Sikatana, all remained in detention after the acquittal, but were subsequently freed.

Those still on trial include the former governor of the Bank of Zambia, Valentine Musakanya, Lusaka lawyer Edward Shamwana, and four Zairian nationals. All have pleaded not guilty.

In other news, according to September reports, the government reopened discussions with the International Monetary Fund on further drawings from a suspended $865 million stand-by credit agreement. Zambia's displeasure over the IMF's terms for the credit—devaluation of the currency, reduction in food subsidies and internal credit limits—caused it to launch an unsuccessful attempt to obtain commercial bank loans. Although it drew the first $325 million from the credit, Zambia violated other terms of the agreement resulting in its suspension by the IMF earlier in the year.

And Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party was scheduled to acquire the mass-circulation newspapers, *Times of Zambia* and *Sunday Times of Zambia*, in early October. (London *Ob-*

server, September 19, 1982; London *Guardian*, September 17, 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 15, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, August 21, 1982.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

• Two U.S. companies, Panhandle Eastern and Distrigas, finally renegotiated long-standing contracts with Sonatrach, the Algerian national oil and gas company, for purchases of its **liquefied natural gas** (LNG) in August and September. The amended agreements, however, must be approved by both the U.S. and Algerian governments.

The Boston-based Distrigas Corp. agreed to amend its 1976 contract with Sonatrach for the supply of 43 billion cubic feet of LNG per year over 20 years, with the price increased from $4.95 per thousand cubic feet to $5.47. A price escalation formula will be tied to the cost of six high-quality foreign crude oils from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Algeria and Venezuela, thus gaining for Algeria the condition it had sought when the agreement was suspended in 1976.

Panhandle Eastern also agreed to a substantial price increase and to an indexation formula for its purchase of 3.3 trillion cubic feet of LNG, or 165 billion cubic feet annually over 20 years.

In late September, the Italian government reached an agreement with Sonatrach under which it will pay above market prices for LNG to be transported via the trans-Mediterranean pipeline. A deadlock in negotiations had delayed the opening of the pipeline by nearly a year. The Italian state-owned gas company, Snam, will pay Algeria $4.41 per thousand cubic feet of gas, with the price indexed to a "basket" of petroleum products. Some 441 billion cubic feet will be supplied annually for 25 years and gas deliveries are expected to begin in November.

The agreement also calls for the normalization of trade between the two countries, as Algeria had frozen all commercial contracts with Italy during the LNG negotiations.

Algeria held its 19th international trade fair in September, attracting its highest-ever attendance, with 1,300 companies from 50 countries represented. In 1981, 80 percent of Algeria's $11 billion in imports came from the West, signifying Western corporate confidence in President Chadli Benjedid's government. France is Algeria's main trading partner.

And for the first time, the U.S. Trade Department was represented at the fair. American exports to Algeria increased by 20 percent during the first six months of 1982, to $504 million. The U.S.'s principal exports to Algeria, apart from grain, are capital goods such as aircraft, electric power machinery, oil field equipment and computers. Three U.S. trade missions were scheduled to visit Algeria before the end of the year. (*Wall Street Journal*, August 27, September 28 and 30, 1982; *Financial Times*, August 27, September 7 and 28, 1982.)

Egypt

• In late August, President Hosni Mubarak reshuffled his **cabinet** for a second time since he took office in October 1981, sacking seven ministers, including three of the five deputy prime ministers, and adding five new appointees.

Key ministers who lost their positions were Dr. Fuad Mashem, Minister for Economy and Foreign Trade, and Mohamed Abdel-Fattah Ibrahim, deputy prime minister for economic affairs and Minister of Economic Cooperation. Mashem was replaced by Mustafa Kamel El-said, and a newly created post, Minister for Investment and International Cooperation, was filled by Dr. Waguih Shindi, one of the five economists asked by Mubarak earlier in the year to present a comprehensive report on the economy.

The Interior Minister and the Ministers of Tourism, Justice, and Popular Development and the deputy prime minister for parliamentary affairs were all ousted.

The cabinet changes came amid concerns that the economic team appointed in the January reshuffle failed to develop an effective plan to deal with Egypt's economic problems which include rising prices, shortages of consumer goods and excessive imports. Mubarak is keen to attract foreign investment in order to boost industrial production and thereby resolve some of the economic ills. In late September, Shindi, the new Minister for Investment, announced a new investment code under which foreign companies can have the majority share in joint ventures. The code also provides for the elimination of long delays caused by the decision-making process on potential investments. Foreign investment has been on the decline since the assassination in 1981 of President Anwar Sadat. (*Financial Times*, September 1, 2 and 27, 1982.)

Libya

• **American oil companies** in Libya were reported in September to have increased production to levels above the 750,000 barrels a day quota set for Libya by OPEC, in response to pricing incentives that enable the companies to purchase crude at $32 a barrel, a $3.50 discount from the OPEC-set cost for the highest grade of Libyan oil.

Despite Reagan administration efforts to curtail the American oil companies' activities in Libya, only Exxon Corp. withdrew its concession, leaving Amerada Hess, Occidental Petroleum, Marathon Oil, Mobil and the Conoco subsidiary of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. still pumping oil.

Although some 2,000 American citizens employed or resident in Libya returned home in response to a travel ban instituted by the Reagan administration late in 1981, reports indicate that many are returning to the country and between 300 and 400 are working there now.

Libya's oil production hit a low of 600,000 barrels per day in April because of the world oil glut and previous high prices. In June and July production increased to 1.3 million barrels per day. Oil revenues for the year are projected at $10 billion, down from $15 billion in 1981 and $22 billion in 1980, requiring the Libyan government to freeze some of the projects envisioned in the current $62 billion five-year plan. Imports of consumer items have been banned to concentrate resources on purchases of food, medicine and construction equipment.

In addition to unauthorized price reductions, Libya has also been flouting OPEC guidelines by seeking barter arrangements with countries such as the Soviet Union in order to pay off foreign debts totaling some $2 billion this year.

And in other news, Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafy signed an agreement with Polish authorities in September under which Libya will invest in Polish manufacturing units that would have closed under the country's anticipated economic reform involving cutbacks in investment and abandonment of unfinished projects. In return, Poland will step up its own investment in Libya's industrialization. Some 14,000 Polish construction workers, geologists, teachers, architects and doctors are currently employed in modernizing Libya's infrastructure. More are to work on contracts said to be worth nearly $1 billion. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 13, 1982: *New York Times*, September 13, 1982.)

Morocco

• Despite efforts by the Minister of Trade and Energy, Azzedine Geussous, to attract new investment partners and markets for exports, the Moroccan **economy** remains hard hit by low world demand for its major currency earner, phosphates, resulting in an increase in the trade deficit from $610 million last year to $706 million.

Export receipts from phosphate rock declined by about 6 percent for the first four months of 1982. Morocco also exports fruit, vegetables, leather and textile goods, but those products have been hurt by the increased protectionist policies of the European Economic Community, where over half of Morocco's goods were destined last year.

The cost of Morocco's imports has also gone up, particularly as a result of a two-year drought which cut food production by 22 percent, resulting in an increase in food imports by 60 percent. The balance of payments deficit has also grown as Morocco's debt service repayment on its $1.04 billion foreign debt has risen and the country continues to finance its war in the Western Sahara.

Last winter's rains, however, provided a hopeful note for improving economic conditions, as the necessity for large grain imports will be reduced. In addition, Arab aid and soft loans, the value of which doubled last year to $1 billion, are expected to increase further following the Arab conference held in Fez, Morocco, in September. (*Financial Times*, September 14, 1982; *New African*, September 1982.)

Sudan

• In mid-September, Standard Oil Co. of California announced plans to build a 900-mile **pipeline** from its oil fields in the interior of Sudan to a terminal near Port Sudan on the Red Sea, thus speeding up the schedule for projected oil deliveries from 1986 to 1985. Socal said the pipeline would take the place of the 25,000 barrel per day Kosti refinery it had planned to construct in Sudan next year.

The pipeline will have an initial capacity of 50,000 barrels per day, ultimately to rise to 100,000 per day. Socal will take bids on the pipeline project through its Chevron Sudan unit and White Nile Petroleum Co., its affiliate for construction of Sudanese oil production facilities. A company spokesman, Phillip Harvey, would not put a dollar figure on the project, but said "it undoubtedly will run into the hundreds of millions of dollars."

The American company has a large exploration area in Sudan and estimates the country's oil reserves at ten billion barrels. Socal has already discovered a field in southern Sudan with reserves of some 400 million barrels.

The pipeline project is expected to ease some of Sudan's chronic economic woes. Harvey said: "There is a balance of payments problem and this project deals with that by developing their resources faster." Observers noted, however, that some political problems may result, as the oil, located in the south-west of Sudan, is to be shipped by pipeline to the north—a plan likely to draw fire from the newly elected government of the semi-autonomous Southern Region.

Meanwhile, in September the Sudanese economy continued to teeter on the brink of bankruptcy. It was feared that Sudan would be required to reschedule its $600 million commercial debt for a second time because of delays in payment of the latest tranche from the IMF.

Sudan failed to make a $22 million interest payment to commercial banks in June and told bankers it did not have funds available for the following payment due in early September. The IMF held up Sudan's second drawing of funds scheduled for June because the government, contrary to the fund's stipulations, introduced a directive to fix the free market rate for foreign currency. The measure was withdrawn in late August and the Sudanese authorities were hopeful about securing the second draft of IMF funds. (*Financial Times*, September 3 and 16, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, September 15, 1982.)

• The official Sudanese news agency announced in early October that Sudan will send **troops** to fight with Iraqi forces in the two-year-old war against Iran. The decision, the agency said, was in compliance with resolutions adopted at September's Arab conference in Fez calling foreign aggression against the territories of any Arab country an assault on all Arab states.

The proposed dispatch of Sudanese troops would be the first involvement of an official military force of an Arab state since the fighting broke out, although Jordan has encouraged its nationals to go to war. There are, however, Moroccan, Tunisian, Somali, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian and Sudanese volunteers fighting on Iraq's side.

Egypt is supplying Iraq with weapons and ammunition and Gulf states have supplied economic aid. The Sudanese army of 53,000 includes seven infantry brigades and analysts said the supply of even two brigades would strengthen Iraqi resistance to the Iranians. (London *Times*, October 4, 1982; *New York Times*, October 4, 1982.)

Western Sahara

• As of early October, no resolution to the problems plaguing the **OAU** over the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member state had been found. The presidents of six countries—Congo, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia—chosen at the abortive OAU summit in Tripoli, Libya, in August, were visiting those countries which boycotted the meeting over the seating of the SADR to attempt to convince them to attend a rescheduled meeting before the end of 1982, as required by the organization's charter.

Meanwhile, some governments were calling for an extraordinary summit to resolve the conflict over the SADR admission before the reconvening of the ordinary summit. Others indicated that they would attend a summit if a venue other than Libya were chosen. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, September 24, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 21, 1982.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

• In late September, the governments of Angola and **China** announced agreement on mutual recognition and were beginning talks in Paris on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

China's backing of the two guerrilla movements that opposed the ruling MPLA during Angola's civil war and Luanda's post-independence ties with the Soviet Union had been the major impediments to improved relations. The move toward mutual recognition began in June 1979 when Angola accepted Peking's request to begin discussions.

Meanwhile, the U.S. remains the only major Western nation that does not recognize the Angola government and has attempted to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country to the normalization of relations. And U.S. diplomatic efforts to find a Namibia settlement by attempting to secure simultaneous withdrawals of the Cuban troops from Angola and South African forces from Namibia had not succeeded by October.

The American deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Frank Wisner, was unsuccessful in his mission to Luanda to gain Angolan approval for the plan. And the Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, in New York in October, said that the Cuban presence is not subject to negotiation. Angola is a sovereign state and can call on foreign troops to be stationed inside its territory if it wishes, he said.

Jorge said the U.S. proposal to remove the Cuban troops could be a trap and that there was the possibility that once the forces left, the government could be overthrown and replaced by "more reliable" pro-Western elements. "We shall not place our heads inside the noose," Jorge remarked.

Meanwhile, President Antonio Ramalho Eanes hinted in late September that Portugal would be prepared to send troops to southern Angola to replace at least some of the Cuban troops, thereby resolving one of South Africa's latest obstacles to progress on Namibia's independence. (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 7, 1982; London *Guardian*, Septemer 28, 1982; *Washington Post*, September 28, 1982.)

• Oil and natural gas were discovered in late August off the coast of northwestern Angola by a consortium formed by **Texaco Inc.** The three wells where the discoveries were made are within the consortium's one million acre Block 2 in a basin near the mouth of the Congo River.

Texaco Angola operates the consortium with a 40 percent interest. The other partners are: the Angolan state oil company with a 25 percent stake, and the Brazilian state oil company and Total of France with 17.5 percent shares each.

Most of Angola's 100,000 barrels of oil per day is derived from its Cabinda province, a noncontiguous territory inside neighboring Congo. Western oil companies are expanding exploration south of Cabinda off the main Angolan coast in hopes of discovering more oil. The French oil concern, Elf Aquitaine, also found oil in late August off Soyo on the Angolan coast.

Angola hopes to resume iron ore production next year despite South African bombing raids on its southern mines. Production was suspended seven years ago. A contract was signed with an Austrian company to revive the Cassinga mines in southern Huila province with expectations of an annual production of one million tons of high grade hematite.

The Kassala-Kitungo deposits north of the Kwanza River—a politically safer area—are expected to yield up to two million tons of ore a year. The Angolan government hopes to produce aluminum near the deposit, using untapped bauxite from Guinea-Bissau and energy from a $600 million dam to be built by the Soviet Union at Kapanda on the Kwanza River.

And in other economic news, Lopo do Nascimento, Angola's Minister of Planning and Foreign Trade, lost the latter part of his portfolio in an August cabinet shuffle. He retained the position of Minister of Planning, however, and Ismael Gaspar Martins was named Minister of Foreign Trade. Martins was succeeded in his post as Finance Minister by the former deputy minister for the budget, Agosto Teixeira de Matos.

The reshuffling of the positions with primary responsibility for the economy was seen as part of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' new initiative to improve economic conditions in the face of falling world commodity prices and ongoing military confrontation with South Africa. The move was said to be part of an "emergency plan" for the economy, outlined by dos Santos in August. (*Financial Times*, September 24, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, August 24 and September 1, 1982; London *Guardian*, August 17, 1982.)

Botswana

• Earlier in the year, President Quett Masire opened Botswana's third **diamond mine** at Jwaneng, owned jointly by the government of Botswana and De Beers Consolidated Mines. Jwaneng is expected to produce three million carats of medium quality stones this year and 4.5 million carats by 1985.

Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of De Beers, characterized Jwaneng as "probably the most important kimberlite pipe discovered anywhere in the world since the original discoveries at Kimberley more than a century ago." With Jwaneng and its two other mines, Orapa and Letlhakane, Botswana produces about eight million carats a year or 15 percent of the world's output. (*West Africa*, August 23, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, August 21, 1982.)

Lesotho

• In August, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan reshuffled his **cabinet** and has apparently postponed general elections in an effort to consolidate his government's power base in the wake of the intensified violence of the Lesotho Liberation Army's (LLA) destabilization campaign.

Following the early August assassination of Jobo Rampeta, the Minister of Public Works, Jonathan reshuffled several portfolios. Emergency legislation was enacted and elections which were promised in October last year were believed indefinitely postponed. Jonathan said that "peace, freedom and fairness are indispensable conditions for elections and the election date will be set when we are absolutely convinced that these conditions will not be disturbed."

Jonathan, who has held power since 1966, refused to accept the results of the last elections held in 1970 when Ntsu Mokhehle, leader of the Basotho Congress Party whose military wing is the LLA, received the majority of the vote. (*New African*, September 1982; *Washington Post*, August 18, 1982.)

Malawi

• The **treason trial** of Orton Chirwa, Malawi's former Minister of Justice and leader of an exile opposition movement, the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo), and his wife Vera, entered its second month in September as Chirwa continued to produce evidence in his own defense.

The couple are jointly accused of having "prepared, endeavored or conspired to overthrow" the Malawi government "by force or other unlawful means." The primary piece of prosecution evidence is the transcript of an interview with Chirwa on the BBC World Service last year. Asked about a proposed conference of opposition groups, Chirwa replied, "We are fighting for the same thing. We want to remove [President Kamuzu] Banda."

The court hearing the trial is a traditional one consisting of five judges and three tribal chiefs appointed by the President, as well as a prosecutor. There is no provision for defense counsel and the court's verdict is final and subject to appeal only by Banda. Observers noted that holding the trial in a traditional court reflected Banda's determination to obtain a conviction, despite the fact that Mafremo is not the most threatening of Malawi's exile opposition groups.

Amnesty International and other human rights organizations were trying without success to obtain a fair trial for the Chirwas, citing the dubious circumstances of their arrest last Christmas. Malawi authorities claim that the couple was on the Malawi side of the Malawi-Zambia border. However, the Chirwas maintain that they were abducted from Chipata, a small town in Zambia, several miles from the border. (*Africa Now*, September 1982; *New African*, September 1982.)

• The Paris Club of Western creditor nations agreed to reschedule Malawi's official **debt** in late September and to offer the country new credits. Representatives of the U.S., West Germany, Britain, Sweden, Japan and South Africa met in Paris in response to an official request by the Malawi government.

The amount rescheduled was not disclosed, but the country's official debt was reportedly about $800 million in 1981. The creditor countries reportedly were satisfied with Malawi's efforts to restructure the economy and agreed to extend its repayment schedule over eight years, with a three-year grace period. (*Wall Street Journal*, September 24, 1982.)

Mozambique

• As the South African-supported **Mozambique National Resistance** (MNR) stepped up its destructive sabotage attacks in the last few months, the Frelimo government changed its tactics to deal with the guerrillas.

The government began arming the people and organizing local militias in July but the effect only began to be felt in September. Mozambican government sources blamed the intensification of the MNR's activities on Pretoria, which is alleged to have infiltrated hundreds of guerrillas trained in South Africa into Mozambique and to have escalated air and sea drops of supplies.

The MNR has also started using Malawi as a base, from which it sends raiding parties into Zambezia province of central Mozambique. The guerrillas have cut rail lines and the main road from Mozambique to Blantyre in Malawi; they have razed a cotton factory, destroyed farm machinery, burned a tea factory and stolen vehicles. According to reports, the MNR group operating from Malawi does not use terrorism as do troops further south, where village officials and schoolteachers are often killed or have their ears and lips cut off.

In late August, the MNR kidnapped six Bulgarians working near the Malawi border on a road project sponsored by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, which aims at lessening economic dependence on Pretoria. MNR activities in Morrumbala district were blamed for delaying a $20 million cotton project funded by France and the African Development Bank. (London *Guardian*, August 20, September 2, 28, October 1 and 6, 1982; Maputo Radio, August 25, September 24 and 25, 1982.)

South Africa

• A white union activist, Barbara Hogan, 30, was **on trial** in September for high treason and furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress.

Hogan, a self-confessed member of the ANC, had been expected to be involved in the long-awaited conspiracy trial the government was preparing to prove a link between the ANC and the emerging black union movement. The president and vice president of the militant South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) are still in detention following the massive clampdown on union activists over the last year. Charges under the Terrorism Act against SAAWU's general secretary, Sam Kikine, were suddenly dropped on September 2, without explanation.

Hogan's trial apparently is not the promised conspiracy showcase but may be an effort by the government to dissuade white union activists from joining the ANC. Hogan admitted helping to organize two consumer boycotts on behalf of striking unions and working to set up a union for unemployed blacks. She said she had worked on these projects without instructions from the ANC.

Hogan also speculated in court on which of her white unionist associates might have been members of the ANC. Dr. Neil Aggett, the Food and Canning Workers' Union secretary who died in security police detention, was definitely not a member of the ANC, she said.

But she named several others she thought were either ANC members or supporters. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 21, 1982; *Rand Daily Mail*, August 26 and September 9, 1982.)

• Three members of the banned **African National Congress** were convicted of high treason in September in Pietermaritzburg and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The three, Patrick Maqubela, 32, Mboniswa Maqhutyana, 29, and Seth Gaba, 24, were found guilty of carrying out seven bomb blasts in Durban in 1981, injuring nine people.

In another case, lawyers for three other ANC men who were sentenced to death for high treason, murder and other charges say they will petition the state president for clemency. Another three ANC insurgents, who were given the death sentence last year, have appealed the sentence and are awaiting the court's decision. (London *Guardian*, September 4 and 8, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, September 6, 1982.)

• An Anglican bishop from Britain working in South Africa has resigned after being effectively **banned** from visiting most of his diocese.

The Rt. Rev. Graham Chadwick had been bishop of Kimberley and Kuruman since 1976 but ran afoul of South African authorities in March after trying to secure the release of detained priests and students in Kimberley.

Chadwick was ordered to move from Kimberley and he went to Kuruman in BophuthaTswana, the homeland made independent by Pretoria. On a routine visit to Kimberley in May, he was detained by security police and his visa exemption as a British citizen was withdrawn, thus forcing him to remain in BophuthaTswana. (London *Times*, August 23, 1982; London *Guardian*, August 23, 1982.)

• The government increased the general **sales tax** and raised the price of bread in October, adding further burdens to South Africa's poor, the black majority.

The sales tax, which applies to food as well as goods, rose from 5 to 6 percent. White bread increased 10 cents to 50 cents a loaf, while brown bread went up from 28 cents to 33 cents. Bread is subsidized by the government at a cost of about $190 million annually, despite the fact that this year's wheat crop was a record 2.2 million tons.

Both a consumer's organization, the Housewives' League, and a large supermarket chain criticized the increases as "totally unacceptable." A spokesman for Checkers supermarkets said: "It is shocking and despicable that the food system is so inadequately managed that the most basic of foodstuffs can be increased by such a large amount." (Johannesburg *Star*, August 28 and September 11, 1982.)

• The series of recent **strikes** in the eastern Cape auto industry has prompted the government to undertake a controversial plan to compensate non-striking workers with either funds or alternative employment during the time their factories are closed.

The plan, which has earmarked an initial $2 million from the Unemployment Insurance Fund, was strongly criticized by some unions and by the opposition parliamentary party. The plan was introduced at the express request of South Africa's biggest all-white union, the Iron, Steel and Allied Workers' Union.

Announcing the project, Manpower Minister Fanie Botha said that during the recent strikes by black and Coloured (mixed-race) auto workers, "responsible workers" were prevented from working "by a disruptive work stoppage."

A spokesman for the opposition Progressive Federal Party said the scheme would "seriously affect relations between management and workers and between worker and worker." (*Rand Daily Mail*, September 3 and 4, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, September 4, 1982.)

• **Dr. Henry Kissinger** delivered the keynote address in September at a private conference in Pretoria organized by moderate businessmen, 400 of whom paid $350 each to hear the former Secretary of State.

Kissinger told the South African Institute of Foreign Affairs conference that Pretoria's efforts to modify apartheid had been noted, but that the government needed to do more. "A system which respects human dignity, extends due process, provides for equal individual rights and protects the principle of citizenship will get sympathetic outside support in many quarters," he said.

Kissinger's advice was received with mild approval by the National Party newspaper *Beeld*, which noted that he had "not proclaimed the facile slogan of one man-one vote."

"Those who wish South Africa well," Kissinger said, "and would like it to take its full place in international affairs, will not be able to find common ground with you as long as institutionalized racial discrimination persists."

Kissinger visited Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa, and he met with Prime Minister Pieter Botha and Gatsha Buthelezi, the KwaZulu homeland leader.

Another foreign invitee to the conference canceled her planned visit after considerable criticism. Shirley Williams, a leader of Britain's Social Democratic Party (later elected its president), admitted she had made "a serious political mistake" by accepting the invitation. She noted that she had not originally known of the involvement of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, an organization financed by Pretoria that conducts research in defense and internal security. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 4 and 11, 1982; Johannesburg Radio, September 8, 1982; *Beeld*, September 7, 1982; London *Guardian*, August 19, 1982.)

• The **division** of the Afrikaners' oligarchy into two camps—conservative and extremely conservative—became pronounced in September with the dismissal of an Afrikaans newspaper editor.

Dr. William (Wimpie) de Klerk, an enthusiastic supporter of Prime Minister Pieter Botha's reforms, was fired from *Die Transvaler*, ostensibly the official mouthpiece of the National Party in Transvaal. De Klerk said his dismissal by Perskor, one of the two main Afrikaans press groups, was politically motivated, implying that Perskor may switch allegiance to the right-wing Conservative Party. The CP, founded by Dr. Andries Treurnicht, came within 308 votes of ousting the Nationalist MP in an August by-election.

If Perskor does shift its newspapers to the CP line, it may be as much for business as political reasons, since the chain is losing a circulation battle to its rival, Nasionale Pers. One Perskor paper, *Oggendblad*, has recently been strongly criticizing the government's constitutional reform plan.

However, the new editor of *Die Transvaler* said the paper would continue to support the NP. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 4, 11 and 18, 1982.)

• South Africa's two main **Afrikaans churches** have been suspended from the 149 church member-World Alliance of Reformed Churches after apartheid was declared a "heresy."

For years, the alliance has supported resolutions condemning apartheid before it took the step of ousting the racially segregated Dutch Reformed Churches, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), with 1,487,000 members, and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika, with 191,500. The NGK is sometimes referred to as "the National Party at prayer" since virtually all members of the South African government belong to it or the smaller church.

Compounding the blow, the alliance elected as president a South African clergyman of the Coloured (mixed-race) branch of the NGK, the Rev. Alan Boesak. He has been a persistent critic of apartheid and his election is expected to deepen the divisions between Coloureds and Afrikaners just when Prime Minister Pieter Botha is trying to lure Coloureds into limited political participation.

Botha reportedly had been counting on ministers in the Coloured NGK to influence their congregations into supporting the new constitutional plan. About one-third of South Africa's Coloureds belong to the NGK. Now, however, the Coloured NGK may have to sever all ties with the white NGK if it wishes to remain in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and will probably have to take a stronger stance against apartheid. (London *Observer*, August 29, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, August 28, 1982; London *Times*, August 27, 1982.)

• **BophuthaTswana**, the homeland made independent by Pretoria in 1977, has managed to get its foot in the door of international recognition South Africa is seeking for the four homelands it has spun off.

In September, the homeland president, Lucas Mangope, formally opened the $1.7 million Bophutha-Tswana House in London, which will act as a kind of consulate to drum up support for and investment in the impoverished homeland. Mangope said on his return to South Africa that the facility would be "a great advantage for the business activities of BophuthaTswana in Britain."

A British public relations firm, Shenley Trust Services, has been hired to handle the homeland's affairs in Britain. According to a spokesman, Shenley plans to further the "commercial, international and tourist potential" of the homeland. BophuthaTswana is best known for its $85 million casino-entertainment complex of Sun City, which is run by South African businessmen in partnership with the homeland authorities. (Johannesburg Radio, September 15, 1982; London *Observer*, September 12, 1982; London *Guardian*, September 4, 1982.)

Pretoria toughs it out against union

A year-long struggle in eastern Cape province between a black union and the government-owned company which runs the railroads, harbors and airline—South African Transport Services (SATS)—remained at a stand-off.

Despite the fact that other employers in the region, particularly the auto manufacturers, advise negotiating with unregistered black unions, SATS has refused to recognize the General Workers' Union (GWU), which represents about 900 black dockers in Port Elizabeth. The private firms are worried that a shutdown of the docks would paralyze their industries, which are dependent on components from overseas.

SATS' refusal to negotiate is based on its claim that there is a perfectly adequate "staff association," or company union. The Minister of Transport, Hendrik Schoeman, contends that the GWU is "against anything the government stands for" and is "a concept from overseas." The union is affiliated to the International Transport Workers' Federation, which has warned of possible sympathy action—a refusal by overseas dockers to handle cargo bound for South Africa. In addition, there is a domestic political element: the government's wanting to show the right-wing backlash that it won't give in to "militant" black unions.

The union's only industrial action so far was a go-slow, which backfired when SATS promptly fired 400 dockers on September 1. Since then, both sides appear to have moved cautiously. The union has not threatened any action, and SATS announced it has set up a committee to investigate the staff associations, a step welcomed by the GWU. (*Financial Times*, September 3 and 24, 1982; *Rand Daily Mail*, September 2, 1982; London *Times*, September 1, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, August 21, 1982.) □

Swaziland

• The death of Swaziland's King Sobhuza II apparently has put the projected **transfer** of South African land in abeyance.

The proposal set off a furor in South Africa when the government revealed its plan to cede the entire ethnic Swazi homeland of KwaNgwane and part of KwaZulu homeland to landlocked Swaziland.

Reportedly, the Swaziland government is now split, with the old-guard faction led by Foreign Minister R.V. Dlamini in favor of increas-

TB—no. one disease

South Africa's most prevalent disease is tuberculosis, accounting for 83 percent of instances of notifiable disease, according to a conference on TB held in August in Cape Town.

Ten people a day die from TB, which is often referred to as the "poor people's disease," and ten million South Africans have latent tuberculosis. According to experts at the conference, the chief determinants of TB are socio-economic factors.

ing the country's territory at almost any price.

Following a South African court ruling blocking the land transfer, Dlamini said Swaziland would continue its "demands" and was prepared to take its case to the World Court.

However, since the death of Sobhuza, the former leader of KwaNgwane ousted by South Africa, Enos Mabuza, has escalated his public hostility to the deal. In September, Mabuza suggested that if the deal goes through, the KwaNgwane people—who outnumber the indigenous Swazis—would overthrow the Swaziland government.

The proposed deal has aroused the antagonism of a wide spectrum of black activists in South Africa, including Gatsha Buthelezi, the KwaZulu leader, Bishop Desmond Tutu of the South African Council of Churches and the banned African National Congress. (Johannesburg *Star*, September 4, 11 and 18, 1982.)

Zimbabwe

• Earlier in the year, Zimbabwe's Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Bernard Chidzero, presented a fiscally conservative **budget** for 1982-82, hailed by the business community as fair and "well-devised under difficult circumstances."

Government expenditure is to be increased by 50 percent to $3.6 billion, to be financed by heavier international borrowing, $358 million more in international aid and income from direct and indirect taxation. Sales taxes and taxes on higher incomes were increased.

With the emphasis in the three-year transitional development plan, scheduled to be published in October, to be placed on education, the Ministry of Education was given the largest budget appropriation, up 27 percent to $530 million. Budget items were also increased for the Ministries of Agriculture, Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Water Resources, Natural Resources, and Roads and Road Traffic.

Among those budget measures designed to boost the business sector were: a $6.4 million export incentive scheme; a $65 million provision for loan guarantees for the hard-hit mining and manufacturing industries; postponement of proposed abolition of investment allowances; and a pledge to publish a document clarifying investment procedures. The aim of the measures is to encourage exports and investment and to bolster those industries, particularly mining, that have been hardest hit by the international recession.

Zimbabwe's central bank said in late September that the balance of payments deteriorated sharply in 1981 and the current account deficit worsened to $570 million from $197 million in 1980. A trade surplus of $11 million became a deficit of $75 million. In light of the balance of payments picture, businessmen were questioning whether the government would be able to manage the ambitious level of investment envisaged in the development plan. Roughly 60 percent of the investment will be carried out by the state and the remaining 40 percent by the private sector. It is expected that when Zimbabwe holds discussions with the IMF on borrowing, the fund may press for higher interest rates, currency devaluation and reductions in government subsidies, left virtually untouched in the 1982-83 budget. (London *Times*, September 23, 1982; *African Business*, September 1982; *Moto*, September 1982; Zimbabwe *Herald*, July 30, 1982.)

• The Zimbabwe government, plagued with **internal security** problems, launched plans in early October to build a 20,000-member militia of men and women between the ages of 16 and 65. According to the deputy defense minister, William Ndangana, the force, to be established within four years, "would be the government's watchdog."

In late August, the South African army admitted that the three white men killed in an encounter with the Zimbabwean army near Sengwe, about ten miles from the Mozambique border, were its own troops, but denied that they had been on an authorized mission. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe maintained that the men, along with a group of others who escaped, had entered Zimbabwe to undertake sabotage operations as part of a larger South African destabilization campaign against neighboring countries.

And in September, two of the Zimbabwe air force's top leadership, Air Vice-Marshall Hugh Slatter, and Air Commodore Phillip Pile, were arrested and charged with conspiracy in the July sabotage attack on the Thornhill air base in Gweru.

And two convicted murderers, one an army deserter, were the first to be executed in Zimbabwe since independence, apparently as a warning to "dissidents"—former guerrillas who are believed responsible for the wave of violence in the southwest of the country.

Mugabe made his first tour of the troubled Matabeleland province earlier in September and pledged to step up military efforts to crack down on dissident activities. He blamed Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) for the lawlessness in which some 50 people have died. "The problem needs correction and part of the correction must come from ZAPU," he told white farmers.

Nkomo, in a rare address to parliament in September, said politicians could not stand by "blaming each other across the table" while the country was split along tribal and party lines. He also castigated the security forces engaged in the anti-dissident operations in Matabeleland, accusing them of being responsible for "a lot of beating, rape and torture." He was ruled out of order on grounds that the platform he sought did not permit controversial speeches. (*New York Times*, October 10, 1982; London *Times*, September 15 and October 2, 1982; London *Guardian*, August 28, September 20 and 21, 1982; *Economist*, August 28, 1982.)

What Role for Black Unions?

BY MIRIAM LACOB

In Wadeville, an industrial area about 30 miles from Johannesburg, a hard-pressed union organizer rushes to mediate in five separate strikes by thousands of metal workers.... In Norwood, heart of Johannesburg's wealthy white northern suburbs, housewives are forced to wheel their own supermarket trolleys to their cars while 300 black workers protest their half-yearly payrise.... In Port Elizabeth, worried industrialists call on the minister of transport to talk to an unregistered union before sympathy strikes cripple the port.

Throughout South Africa this year, despite a deepening recession, these scenes are being repeated almost daily. The strikes and stoppages, in factories, stores, even a workshop for the blind, have all been illegal. But so were almost 300 strikes involving black workers last year, and so have been the wave of stoppages that have characterized black worker unrest in the early months of this year. And few industries have been exempt, as black workers, expressing widespread militance and anger, turn in ever-increasing numbers to trade unionism.

Photo: Themba Nkosi

Triumphant Edgars workers march after management agrees to discuss union recognition

Miriam Lacob, a South African by birth and a graduate of the Columbia School of Journalism, recently returned to her homeland for the first time in two-and-a-half years.

Union memberships are expanding daily. Union organizers, described as "the busiest people in South Africa," talk of black workers floating around looking for unions." The Metal and Allied Workers' Union, which responded to the wave of strikes in the metal industry earlier this year, gained about 20,000 new members in the process. The Commercial, Catering, and Allied Workers' Union, which represented the Norwood supermarket workers, gained at least 500 new members in one strike alone earlier this year that temporarily crippled a large and profitable retail clothing chain.

Observers, awed by the swift growth of the black trade union movement in South Africa in the past three years, should note that this is not the first manifestation of black worker militance in the country. There have been earlier, highly politicized union movements that have toppled with the same swiftness that characterized their rise. In the early 1900s, for example, Clements Kadalie's Commercial and Industrial Workers' Union had an estimated membership of a quarter of a million people. In the 1950s, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, still the only black South African labor organization recognized by the Industrial Labor Organization, had a membership of over 100,000. But these union movements, lacking a secure industrial base, crumbled swiftly under state pressure.

Mindful of this, unionists warn that the present movement, which as yet encompasses about 10 percent of the black workforce, is still fledgling and vulnerable. But unionists and observers have also noted that this latest wave of black worker organization has several advantages its predecessors lacked. Job barriers that up to several years ago kept blacks away from skilled employment have eroded under the pressure of labor shortages, making black workers somewhat less expendable. The authorities, in their 1979 acceptance of Professor Nic Wiehahn's recommendations, permitted black workers to unionize — albeit under strictly controlled conditions. And, in an important development, this new generation of unionists has changed its tactics. Eschewing the temptation to sign up thousands of workers on a broad front, all the emerging unions have concentrated on laborious plant-by-plant organization, thus ensuring that the rank-and-file of their memberships are as schooled in the principles of worker organization and bargaining as are their leaders.

But even as the movement grows, unionists are struggling to control its direction and define its limitations. They face a gamut of problems, ranging from state repression to disunity in the ranks of the unions themselves. Many are struggling to find a middle ground between worker militance and state repression, and to define the role of the black union movement in the political balance of power. In themselves, the triumphs of the movement are important. They are a hopeful development, one analyst noted, in a country in which a "major stumbling block towards change is blacks' perception of their own powerlessness." But when black enfranchisement is limited to elections for government-approved leaders, and black power is limited to as yet sporadic

THE UNIONS

Observers seeking to dissect and describe South Africa's black trade union movement, presently estimated to encompass more than 300,000 black workers, usually group the unions around three major issues. These are whether the union follows a "nonracial" or "black consciousness" philosophy; whether it has chosen to seek registration with the government, and whether it is affiliated to a larger umbrella organization or remains independent. The following are the most important unions and union groupings:

Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu)

This federation, the largest black union grouping in the country, consists of 11 unions with a membership estimated to be reaching 100,000 following a wave of unionization in the metal industry earlier this year. The federation is nonracial but mostly African. Its white general secretary and founder, Alec Erwin, resigned last year to hand over the post to a Coloured, Joe Foster. Chris Dhlamini, the president of the federation, is black. Most Fosatu unions have sought nonracial registration, and the federation is presently locked in a confrontation with the authorities over their refusal to grant six affiliated unions nonracial registration.

The predecessor of Fosatu, the Trade Unions' Advisory and Coordinating Council, was founded in Durban in 1973 to link the unions that emerged in the wave of strikes there that year. Fosatu itself was founded in April 1979 with a claimed membership of 20,000. Much of the recent labor unrest in South Africa has involved Fosatu-affiliated unions. Among the most active unions presently in the federation are:

National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union (Naawu): This union, with a membership estimated at 15,000, has been involved in the recent wave of strikes that have crippled the country's automobile industry. It was until recently one of the few black unions that sat on an industrial council—an industrywide bargaining organization.

Chemical Workers' Industrial Union: This union had launched proceedings to declare a "legal" strike against the South African affiliate of Colgate-Palmolive last year over the issue of union recognition. Colgate, after refusing the union recognition for almost three years, then backed down.

Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Mawu): Membership of this union, which stood at 8,400 in 1981, more than tripled earlier this year in a wave of worker unrest in the metal industry.

Confederation of Unions of South Africa (Cusa)

The confederation consists of nine unions with a total membership estimated at 45,000—all black. The second-largest black union grouping in the country, Cusa is an outgrowth of the Urban Training Project, a workers' service organization founded in Johannesburg in 1971. Five unions that split with the future Fosatu in 1978 over the issue of the participation of white worker aid bodies joined with three others to form Cusa in late 1980.

The main objective of Cusa is a completely black-led union federation. Its unions have sought government registration, and to date have concentrated solely on union recognition and economic issues. The confederation recently announced the formation of a National Union of Mineworkers and has applied to the South African Chamber of Mines for permission to organize.

Among the most active unions in the grouping are the following:

Commercial, Catering, and Allied Workers' Union: Its secretary, Emma Mashinini, was released in May after more than six months in detention. This union has recently been active in several strikes involving retail stores in Johannesburg.

Food and Beverage Workers' Union: The secretary guerrilla activity, a disproportionate share of the burden of political change rests on the union movement. This, some unionists warn, is when the movement by its very nature can only serve a portion of South Africa's oppressed peoples.

Already, the leader of one major union grouping has warned that his organization will place workers' interests before that of a popular political movement. Joe Foster, general secretary of Fosatu — the 100,000-member Federation of South African Trade Unions — told union members earlier this year that "a worker's organization is necessary to protest and further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked by elements who will in the end have no option but to turn against their worker supporters." But in the same address, Foster committed the federation to a potentially political stance, and the authorities are already taking steps to curb the growing power of the black unions. Labor Minister Fanie Botha, in a nationwide program of addresses to employer groups last September, sternly warned employers against "bending backwards to the dictates of outsiders or militants." Unions, he said, should put the country's interests before those of their members. And in another apparently unprecedented move, the government set aside about $2 million in unemployment insurance funds to help white motor workers who refuse to join strikes but are unable to work because their factories are strikebound. This is a tactic that could conceivably be used in any industry affected by black worker unrest.

Within the unions themselves, hints of factionalism and rivalry periodically emerge. Mwasa — the Media Workers' Association of South Africa — has been trying to woo newspaper distributors away from a Cusa-affiliated union. Personnel managers blamed some of the recent unrest in motor man-

is Shakes Sikhakane, and membership stands at about 4,000.

Unaffiliated Trade Unions

There are about 15 unaffiliated and unregistered trade unions in the country. Among this grouping are three of the fastest-growing and best-known unions in the country: the South African Allied Workers' Union, the General Workers' Union, and the African Food and Canning Workers' Union. All three subscribe to a non-racial philosophy. The Food and Canning and General Workers' unions appear to be moving towards a supportive alliance with Fosatu.

African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU): This unregistered union, with a membership estimated at 20,000, is one of the oldest black unions in the country. It has spread nationwide from its western Cape base, and won a highly publicized dispute with the Fattis and Monis pasta company that involved widespread consumer boycotts in 1979. Dr. Neil Aggett, who died in detention last year, was the union's Transvaal secretary.

Western Province General Workers' Union (GWU): This union, which began in Cape Town as a workers' advice bureau, has about 15,000 signed-up workers, mostly migrants. The union, although unregistered, has successfully organized dockworkers at all of South Africa's major ports and is locked in a struggle with the government-run South African Transport Services over the unionization of its black dockworkers.

South African Allied Workers' Union (Saawu): Formed in the eastern Cape in 1979, Saawu, with about 20,000 members, was at one time considered the fastest-growing union in the country. It has succeeded in organizing a variety of eastern Cape factories, despite widespread unemployment in the area. The union's high political profile and opposition to the independence of the Ciskei homeland have led to the periodic detention of all of its leadership.

Media Workers' Association of South Africa (Mwasa): This union led the eight-week black journalists' strike against newspapers in late 1980. It adheres to the black consciousness philosophy and has opened its doors to all black media workers. Much of its leadership, including former president Zwelakhe Sisulu, is banned. Two of its senior members, Joe Thloloe and Mathata Tsedu, were detained in June and were still being held in September.

Motor Assembly and Component Workers' Union of South Africa (Macwusa): This small union was established at the Ford Cortina plant in Port Elizabeth in a 1980 breakaway from the United Auto Workers (now Nawu), after dissatisfaction with the Fosatu union's handling of an industrial dispute. It is linked closely with the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization and with the black consciousness philosophy and has not joined the Fosatu union in the present wave of strikes in the motor industry.

Municipal and General Workers' Union: Formerly the Black Municipal Workers' Union, this new grouping was formed in July. The unregistered Municipal Workers' Union, led by Joseph Mavi, crippled white Johannesburg in 1980 in a quickly crushed strike.

Black Mineworkers' Union: This union, led by general secretary Chillian Mottha, was earlier this year granted permission by the South African Chamber of Mines to begin organizing black mineworkers. The union has said it is seeking registration, and it is regarded with some cynicism by those knowledgeable in the labor field. "It's one of those one-man/one-union jobs," commented one knowledgeable academic, asked about the importance of this new labor development in the mining industry.

Parallel Unions

About 100,000 black workers are counted as being organized in white-dominated unions, usually in racially separate branches, and sometimes against their will as a result of closed-shop agreements. Among these unions are the South African Typographical Union and the Garment Workers' Union.

ufacturing plants to rivalry between a Fosatu-affiliated union and a smaller breakaway. A "unity" summit in Johannesburg this year brought together unions representing 150,000 black workers, but was notable for the absence of the Confederation of Unions of South Africa (Cusa), the second-largest grouping in the country, and the Transvaal wing of Mwasa, as well as a walkout by the breakaway, more militant Motor and Component Workers' Union of South Africa. Cusa unionists were unwilling to explain their absence, describing it as a "misunderstanding," but some observers have noted that the unions still cool on "unity" are those with an all-black leadership.

The unions that are moving toward an alliance are those with some white leadership, a fact that is causing resentment in some quarters. The general secretary of a small engineering workers' union, expelled from Fosatu earlier this year, complained of the federation's white leadership. Among the reasons he gave for disaffection was that "some white academics in Fosatu advocated a salary of about $250 a month for Fosatu employees" — enough, he claimed, for whites from affluent backgrounds, but not for blacks with limited resources. "We believe that these low salaries were deliberately designed to discourage capable and well-educated blacks from taking an interest in the organization," he wrote.

Another major source of rivalry is the extent to which a union or union grouping is seen to be making accommodations with the government. In the legislation permitting blacks to join and form unions, the authorities attempted to ensnare and neutralize the movement in bureaucratic regulations. One was a requirement that unions register with the Department of Manpower, another that they work their way into industry-wide bargaining systems. (Two major strike waves this year, in the metal and motor industries, have centered around employers' unwillingness to bargain outside of the industrywide system, known as an industrial council. To date, the disputes remain largely unresolved.) Some black unions, attracted by the advantages of legality, have sought registration. Many, including the unions considered the most militant, have not.

But significantly, unregistered unions have succeeded in a series of battles in winning recognition agreements from various factories. "They [factory managements] found it better to deal with a representative union than a legal one," explained one unionist. But at least one company has since chosen to flout a recognition agreement (a provincial Supreme Court judge is presently deciding on the legality of the action), and the pressures to work within the system are strong. Unions that have chosen to work within the system to a degree are presently those with the largest membership. These unions, like Fosatu and Cusa, have avoided political challenges, giving priority to wages and union recognition. They have also therefore largely avoided state repression. But they have their critics. Leaders of more militant unions predict that those who make some accommodation with the government "will be pushed out of business."

Black workers, they say, cannot be separated from their environment. "You don't feel the cost of living when you are on duty, you feel it when you are at home. You are only a worker when you get to work," said Black Municipal Workers' Union leader Joseph Mavi. (Mavi, who led thousands of Johannesburg's low-paid municipal workers in a brave but largely futile strike in 1980, was killed in a car crash last June.)

The workers are going to get disillusioned with the moderate, 'responsible' unions," said another union leader. "It's the structure that has to be changed, not just getting two rand [about $2] extra a day, or getting a better lunch subsidy."

This leader is presently in detention, pointing to a fact of most of South African black life. The Nationalist government is unlikely to permit any organization that takes a strong line in opposition to the state to survive. Unions that have taken a more confrontational approach to the state — refusing registration, eschewing industrywide bargaining, and taking activist positions on political issues — have already borne the brunt of state action.

The list of jailed, detained, and banned unionists is long. Mwasa, the union of black media workers, has seen all of its highly articulate leaders banned and thus barred from both their union and professional activities. Three leaders of the militant Motor and Component Workers' Union of South Africa (Macwusa), which has a large representation in South Africa's Ford motor plants, were banned this year. Oscar Mphetha, former general secretary of the African Food and Canning Workers' Union, is on trial with a group of youths for the alleged murder of two whites in township rioting in 1980. Mphetha is more than 70 years old.

One of the hardest hit "political" unions is Saawu — the South African


Photo: Themba Nkosi

Striking workers seek recognition for their union from the management of Edgars, a retail clothing chain in Johannesburg

Allied Workers' Union — which is based in the volatile eastern Cape province. Saawu, rated at one time as the fastest growing union in the country, has of late taken a beating from the "triple alliance" — the South African authorities, the Ciskeian authorities, and the bosses. The Ciskei, an impoverished homeland that borders the harbor towns of East London and Port Elizabeth, has become the "country" of thousands of black workers since gaining its "independence" from Pretoria last December. Saawu's vocal opposition to this independence earned the wrath of the Ciskeian authorities. That "country" would have preferred, said one observer, to provide South Africa industry with a cheap and tame labor force. Union president Thozamile Gqweta has been detained seven times in the Ciskei and in South Africa. He, his general secretary, Sam Kikine, and national organizer Sisa Njikelana recently ended a lengthy spell in detention after authorities dropped unspecified Terrorism Act charges against them. Gqweta's mother and uncle were killed in a mysterious house fire last year, while his lover died in a police shooting incident at the funeral. Apparently emboldened by state support, some factories have been using the Ciskeian authorities to help break the union. At one half-organized factory, management fired all the workers and used the Ciskeian authorities to help to recruit more. The deputy president of the Ciskei announced the vacancies: candidates were told to assemble at the offices of the Ciskei Intelligence Services for personal screening.

But militance has not excluded triumphs. Mwasa earlier this year gained an 18 percent increase for its journalists members in an agreement signed by the two large English-language newspaper groups. Saawu is credited with helping greatly improve productivity at factories it has succeeded in organizing. Learning the lessons of previous unsuccessful waves of unionism, all the emerging unions have concentrated on slower plant-by-plant organizing, seeking to base their union membership firmly on the factory floor. Their emphasis on democratic organization and factory floor leadership has often helped improve communication in a working world that is fraught with distrust on both sides. "We're keeping their factories running," commented one union leader.


Migrant workers for Johannesburg municipality during their 1980 strike

In addition, "militance" in the present South African context is a relative term. "Simply organizing a group of black workers in a democratic way in an undemocratic society is a political act," commented one leading trade unionist. Changing the wage structure of an economy predicted on the plentiful supply of docile cheap labor could be similarly viewed. Most unions at this point are demanding little more than what amounts to a decent living wage. Shakes Sikhakane, general secretary of the Food and Beverage Workers' Union, for example, considers it a victory to have won a weekly wage of about $95 for workers at a Colgate-affiliated rice company. This in a country where the cost of necessities is not that much lower than in the United States. All the unions have so far steered away from any demand that amounts to a real challenge to the state, or the bosses. Workers at a paper mill, for example, struck earlier this year for a 30 cents an hour food allowance. They apparently settled for 7 cents an hour instead. And so far, no workers have gone on strike in an attempt to force a larger issue, like against the migrant labor laws that separate a worker from his wife and family for much of the year.

But the government distinction between union activity and subversion is hazy. Two trials recently in progress in Johannesburg give some indication of what the authorities consider "improper" political behavior on the part of trade unionists. Alan Fine, a union organizer, was charged with terrorism for allegedly sending several admitted "innocent reports" about the black trade union movement to the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions. Barbara Hogan, a labor researcher, faced more serious charges in a related trial. A member of the banned African National Congress (ANC), Hogan faced charges of high treason stemming from her involvement in the labor field.

In both trials, the prosecution has attempted to identify union activism with ANC involvement. In Fine's case, the prosecution has attempted to prove that sending information to the exiled trade union organization is tantamount to furthering the aims of the banned ANC. Mentioned in Hogan's trial has been her alleged role in helping organize consumer boycotts on behalf of two emerging unions. They are the African Food and Canning Workers' Union, whose Transvaal secretary, Neil Aggett, died in detention last year, and the Cape Town-based General Workers' Union.

Unionists claim — and fear — that the authorities are using the "taint" of ANC involvement in the emerging black union movement as a way of discrediting these unions. As with most schisms in South African society, blacks are expressing growing support for the ANC, but most whites, and therefore most industrialists, fear it. Labeling a troublesome union "ANC controlled" would give the authorities an excuse to crush it.

Union leaders, meanwhile, are adamant that the banned movement has no role in their organizations. "Union members may be sympathetic to the aims of the African National Congress," said one union leader, "but to think that unions are puppets of anybody else is really nonsense."

These trials are apparently the culmination of a wave of arrests between September 1981 and February 1982. Security policy detained about 59 people, mostly unionists, in an attempt to prove an ANC-linked conspiracy among trade unionists and student activists. The majority have been released — police were apparently unable to prove a conspiracy. But observers saw the police acts as an indication of government attempts to bring the black trade union movement to heel. The government, noted one observer, was forced to acknowledge the need for black worker unionization, but its plan to control the development of black unions has gone awry. They [the authorities] have saddled a tiger which they cannot ride," commented one white unionist.

The unregistered General Workers' Union has already brought confrontation right into the government camp, in its organizing of black dockworkers employed by the government-run South African Transport Services. The GWU, which has been organizing SATS black dockworkers for almost a year, is now pushing for union recognition. SATS has so far responded with intransigence and sackings, but if the GWU and its dockworker members do not back down, the outcome could show just how far the government is prepared to go.

One unlikely action is the outright banning of a politically activist union. (Sactu, for example, which took an activist part in the Defiance Campaigns of the late 1950s, was never banned, but was rendered impotent by the bannings and detentions of its leaders.) What appears to be emerging is an attempt on the part of the government to incorporate the unregistered unions into its system, as shown in the recent step of offering them access to machinery for settling disputes. Observers take this as an indication that the authorities, faced with the worse option of uncontrolled labor unrest, have conceded that representative worker organizations will have to be accepted as a permanent part of the South African scene. □

Photo: Joe Molefe

Metal workers involved in a wave of strikes earlier in the year gather to wait for news

Diouf's New Directions

BY JUSTIN MENDE

A fragile economy, multidirectional diplomacy, and 14 political parties — such is the broad outline of the current situation in Senegal. With an area of 75,955 square miles and a population of 5.5 million, the West African country is now going through a democratic experiment that has earned admiration from countries of the Free World, disturbed the countries in the socialist camp, and worried many African regimes.

Senegal is a special case in Africa. Having experienced more than 300 years of French presence, it inherited the spirit and methods of government of its former colonizer. Senegal was represented in the French Parliament from the beginning of the century until the period of decolonization beginning in 1958, in contrast to other French African territories that came into the *Palais Bourbon* only after World War II.

Justin Mende is a Senegalese journalist who works for Reuters News Agency.

Photo: Camerapix

President Diouf faced serious economic and social problems when he took office

Senegal has never suffered from internal tribal antagonisms, having the good fortune of only six principal ethnic groups (Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur, Mandinka, Diala, and Peulh), which for the most part resemble one another. Furthermore, one language, Wolof, is spoken by the majority of the population, rendering ethnic tension nearly nonexistent.

Paradoxically, Senegal, 80 percent Islamic, was dominated for 35 years by a non-Moslem, Leopold Sedar Senghor. A fervent Catholic and astute political strategist, Senghor built his support on various pressure groups, some of the most important of which were the Moslem religious sects. His defense of the "negritude" of the West Indian, Aime Cesaire, seemed in conflict with his general political line that many at home and abroad considered pro-French.

From the year of independence in 1960, Senghor's presidency earned Senegal a reputation as a point of stability in a politically volatile region. Although the country is part of the Sahelian zone, its economy survived the droughts of the 1970s better than those of its landlocked neighbors.

In spite of the close links with

France, Senghor managed to maintain Senegal's standing in Pan-African and Third World circles. Under his leadership, the country pursued a modified social democratic course within the African context. His moves away from the one party state towards a more open system ran counter to the general trend in Africa.

His voluntary retirement from office was even more unusual, in a continent where most heads of state have the position for life, either de facto or de jure, unless removed by force.

Unfortunately for his chosen heir, Abdou Diouf, the old man's departure at the end of December 1980 came at a time of serious economic and social problems. Shaken by the energy crisis and by inflation, as well as by the continuing deterioration of trade, in 1980 Senegal experienced the most catastrophic harvest of groundnuts, its principal wealth, in current memory. Total sales were only 200,000 tons, whereas in a normal year the figure would be between 700,000 and one million tons. The country was also faced with endemic unemployment, dramatized by the inability of 500 young master's degree graduates in legal and economic studies to find work, and with constant agitation by the powerful teachers' union. One can appreciate the situation faced by the new head of state, Abdou Diouf, when he initiated his administration on January 1, 1980 by announcing the immediate convocation of a general conference on education.

The conference, held that month, brought together those who had special knowledge concerning education, including ministers and other relevant officials, the teachers' union, the parent-teacher associations, and the private sector. The conclusions of these discussions were bold; they upset those who believed in the traditional kind of instruction that had been inherited from the colonial era, as one of the recommendations called for indigenous languages to be used in the educational system.

The conclusions of the conference are currently the subject of a study by a governmental committee that is to present its views in July 1983. It is generally believed that the new system of education must take account of the need for balance between training on the one hand and job opportunities on the other, in hopes of doing away with unemployment among university graduates. The current situation is paradoxical as Senegal needs talent so badly to develop itself, yet it is obliged to call on technical assistance from overseas, particularly France.

The manpower policies of the Diouf administration are linked to the modernization of Senegalese agriculture, which is aimed at facilitating the establishment of new agro-industrial units and other industries to create employment opportunities. Also under study is a system that should enable civil servants, of which there are 60,000, to be reintegrated into the private sector.

Financial institutions such as the National Development Bank have been ordered to pursue the rigorous collection of all outstanding private debts. Real estate transactions are now strictly regulated under the law on illicit enrichment. In the short term, the country's economy can survive the lack of liquidity. The official view is that these measures will permit the collection of money owed to the state, will stop the misuse of funds, and will bring about a return of morality in public life. Only a few minor cases of government corruption are now evident, as compared with major financial scandals of the past.

"Our country," says Diouf, "must live within its means." Because the summer of 1980 was a catastrophic one and the previous groundnut harvest had been no better than normal, strict measures were all the more necessary as a rejuvenation of the economy under such conditions was most difficult. Some comfort was gained by virtue of the debt rescheduling obtained from the Club of Paris in October 1981.

Provided that the catastrophe of invasion of locusts or other predators is avoided — some have been seen in certain places in the groundnut region

— the 1982-83 agricultural season looks promising. The minister of rural development, Serigne Lamine Diop, said at the end of August that the harvest season "carried hope." An agricultural success could put the country on the road to economic recovery and permit at least partial success of the mid-term plan for financial and economic recovery (1981-85).

ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

Given that the country has experienced 10 years of drought out of the last 20, with the resulting increase in the food deficit, the Senegalese government no longer intends to continue to rely on groundnuts and the capricious rains as the basis for the economy. Hence, it is essential to conquer the water-shortage problem, and the campaign is already underway. The laying of the foundation stone of the Diama Dam at the estuary of the Senegal River in December 1980 was followed last year by the creation of the infrastructure for the construction work. Last year, at Diouf's initiative, the member countries of the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) — Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal — obtained funding for the organization's major projects, and the foundation stone for the Manantali Dam, between Mali and Senegal, was laid. The two dams should permit the development of some 200,000 acres in the three member-countries. Studies are also rapidly moving forward on other major dam projects within the framework of the Organization for the Development of the Gambia River (OMVG), which should put into production thousands of acres of arable land in cooperation with the Gambia and Guinea. Guinea-Bissau is also expected to join the organization soon. The Senegalese government has embarked upon an ambitious program for small and medium-sized dams, particularly along the Casamance River, and for digging and equipping wells. A Ministry of Water Resources was created last year and a plan was put into effect for water development on a priority basis.

A goal of the Diouf administration is to carry out a water-supply program that will service the entire country with a network of projects to make possible irrigated, modernized, and more productive agriculture, bringing rural populations regular and more substantial income, and assuring self-sufficiency in food. "Thus," says Diouf, "the catastrophic effects of drought will be in large part diminished and the problem of desertification will finally be overcome thanks to water."

Thermal, biomass, and tidal sources of energy continue to be the subject of research and experiment, part of a plan for energy development. The plan envisages modification of the structure of energy consumption by reducing the imports of petroleum by about half by 1990. The aim is to utilize petroleum only when it is absolutely indispensable. The government has undertaken a program of energy economy and of cutting down waste, particularly in the public services. The first efforts in 1980 had positive results, and a second effort is about to be launched.


Photo: Camerapix

Leopold Senghor's presidency earned Senegal a reputation as a point of stability

Exploitation of other resources is similarly envisaged, with the speeding up of studies concerning iron ore and limestone deposits in the eastern part of Senegal, and others involving the production of phosphoric acid. The anticipated reserves of iron ore should result in an annual production level of 12 million tons over a 30-year period. Production should begin around 1987, when world demand, currently at a low point, should begin to grow. The exploitation of the deposits, which are situated in the eastern region of Senegal, requires the construction of a railroad to evacuate the ore or a hookup with the Dakar-Bamako rail line. Such an infrastructure should also benefit the exploitation of other raw materials in the area, including marble, gold, and phosphates.

There can be no economic development without power. Countries that do not have petroleum reserves are forced to base their development upon an energy source that is extremely costly. Senegal is among those nations that have seen their petroleum bills triple over the span of five years. Petroleum deposits have been found in the southern Casamance region, but production and pricing conditions do not permit a clear profit from the modest reserves at a time when much of the rest of the world is seeking substitutes for petroleum. The Casamance deposits are being evaluated by the Elf company, however.

Investigations are underway to exploit other sources of energy. In addition to uranium and lignite, both of which are found in Senegal, the government is paying particular attention to peat, which exists in important quantities. Feasibility studies should be completed in 1983, and the government hopes that production can begin the following year. The quantities are such as to assure self-sufficiency in electricity for 40 years, according to the Ministry of Industrial Development. Several wind and solar energy installations are already in production. Nevertheless, the utilization of such energy sources will remain limited for the time being in view of the excessive investment costs. Wind and solar energy installations are estimated to cost 10 times as much as traditional fuel. Research in the area of biomass is equally being stressed. Official sources state that the utilization of biomass should cover the electricity needs of the iron mines of eastern Senegal.

CONCENTRIC CIRCLES

President Diouf's trips abroad have all been economic rather than political in character. They have been limited to "working visits" and have never lasted longer than 48 hours. Their purpose has been above all to obtain funds for the projects outlined in the country's economic and social development program. Diplomacy has been put to the service of development. This concept is based on the theory of "concentric circles" developed by Diouf's predecessor, Senghor. The theory envisages starting with Senegal at the core and building a progressively expanding network of cooperative outreach.

The policy gives top priority to the Gambia. While Senegalese troops intervened in July 1981 in Banjul to help put President Jawara back in power after he was the victim of a coup attempt, the purpose was to avoid the contamination of Senegal itself and to remove the risk of having a neighbor unfriendly to Senegal. Libya and the Soviet Union have been accused of having been behind the coup attempt. Dakar wants to pursue its road to development without being distracted by political problems on its internal frontiers.

The Senegalese economy suffers considerably from the long-standing problem of smuggling from the Gambia, which according to experts can absorb only one-third or one-fourth of its imports. The remainder pass through holes in the customs barriers between the Gambia and Senegal. Thus, Senegalese manufactures such as textile, tobacco, and pharmaceutical products are up against difficult competition with those that are imported at less cost via the Gambia.

The result of all of this has been the creation of the Senegambian confederation, considered by some people to be purely the annexation of the Gambia by Senegal. The confederation involved the integration of the armed forces and police of the two countries, harmonization of their foreign policies and communications, such as transport, telecommunications, and information, as well as the creation of an economic and monetary union. It is expected to reduce customs fraud — with some results already evident — and to assure the control of "the soft underbelly of Senegal." At the same time, dam construction and other projects on the Gambia River, set forth in OMVG

Photo: Carolyn Watson/UNICEF

The Senegalese government has launched a program for digging and equipping wells planning but held up for a long time, will be accelerated.

Guinea recently joined the OMVG organization, as the completion of the Sambagalou Dam on the upper stretches of the Gambia River will create an artifical lake 40 miles into the interior of Guinea. Cooperation between Dakar and Conakry has improved considerably since Diouf's arrival on the scene. President Sékou Touré seems to get on better with him than with his predecessor. Guinea-Bissau is preparing to join the OMVG as well. This could cut short any tendency toward secession in the Casamance that may spring from its sharing many of the same customs with Guinea-Bissau. This is another case in which relations that were already good have become even better and might well permit the settlement of a four-year-old disagreement over maritime frontiers.

Better yet, as president of the Senegambian confederation, Abdou Diouf might be able to intercede with Banjul, accused by Bissau of harboring citizens of Guinea-Bissau who are hostile to the current regime. With the support of Sékou Touré, Diouf has already obtained the agreement of the Bissau authorities to expel Kukoy Samba Sanyang from Guinea-Bissau, where he took refuge after leading the abortive Gambian coup in July 1981. Neither of the two parties will henceforth tolerate on its territory any activities by individuals bent on destabilizing the other.

The Senegalese head of state has similarly lent a hand in the settlement of the differences between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde following the overthrow in Bissau in November 1980 of the former head of state, Luis Cabral. It was President João Bernardo Vieira who made this announcement recently. Diouf's intervention, along with that of others, resulted in a June meeting in Maputo of Vieira and his Cape Verdian counterpart, Aristides Pereira, under the auspices of Mozambian President Samora Machel.

Similarly, Diouf's excellent relations with Nouakchott and Bamako demonstrate the cooperation that is actively developing within the OMVS. Also solid are Senegal's relations with other partners of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), such as Upper Volta, Niger, and Ivory Coast. Diouf is currently president of the regional organization. While the affinities between Diouf and Colonel Saye Zerbo of Upper Volta seem somewhat less obvious, due to Zerbo's reserved character and to his late arrival on the political scene, it is clear that contacts are comfortable between Diouf and Colonel Seyni Kountché of Niger, who received Diouf with pomp and circumstance last year during an airport stopover in Niamey.


Photo: Maguette Bâ

President Mitterrand and Diouf: France plays the predominant role

As for President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Diouf himself has said that the relationship is that of father and son. At the time of a working visit in 1981 to the Ivorian leader's Yamoussoukro home, Diouf not only agreed to prolong his stay at the request of Houphouët-Boigny but was also introduced into the latter's most intimate family circle. In addition, several months earlier, Houphouët-Boigny made laudatory comments concerning Diouf at the close of a conference of ECOWAS chiefs of state in Dakar. The "Dakar-Abidjan axis" thus seems in good order. Announced by Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor in December 1971, this axis was subsequently shaken by misunderstandings between the two leaders, due to occasionally divergent interests and long-standing rivalry. During the colonial period they had represented their respective territories in the French government and were the two principal spokesmen for French Africa.

Even the Marxist government of Mathieu Kérékou in Benin, which kept is distance from Senghor's regime, has come closer to the Dakar government. As for Anglophone Africa, bilateral as well as subregional relationships are developing in a favorable way. Hilla Limann, former president of Ghana, was the first head of state to pay an official visit to Diouf in Senegal. He remains the only African president to have done so. Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone is expected to visit Senegal in the near future and Shehu Shagari of Nigeria never hesitates to stop in the Senegalese capital and talk with his counterpart there whenever there is the need.

Diouf is similarly respected in the halls of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), where the support of Senegal for the independence of Namibia and on behalf of the combatants of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa is accepted without argument. An ANC office has been functioning in Dakar since Senghor's time.



Photo: Maguette Ba

Presidents Diouf (*left*) and Jawara sign the treaty creating Senegambia

BEYOND THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Senegalese cooperation with the Arab world has been primarily focused on those countries that have made the most impressive economic progress in recent years. In addition to the normalization of relations with Algeria that accompanied the accession to power of Chadli Benjedid, the improvement in relations with other Arab countries in the Middle East and the Gulf area was demonstrated by Diouf's numerous visits to these regions. It is here that he obtained the most important financial support for major economic development projects in Senegal and on behalf of the OMVS.

He made a good impression at the Islamic Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia in late January 1981, where he was mandated by his colleagues to reply to the welcoming speech of King Khalid. His success was all the more notable since he had taken office in Senegal only a month earlier. There were favorable repercussions from this success inside Senegal where Islam, the principal religion, plays an important role both in public opinion and in politics.

Senegal's relations with the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) are in good order. The EEC, one of Senegal's principal providers of capital, continues to show confidence in Senegal and to provide logistical as well as financial support. Among the members of the EEC, France continues to play the predominant role, with the ruling French Socialist party a member of the Socialist International as is the Senegalese government party. This cooperation is strengthened by the personal relationships between certain members of the Senegalese government and French authorities, notably between Prime Minister Habib Thiam and Jean-Pierre Cot, the French minister of development and cooperation, who were university classmates.

West Germany is also strengthening its position with Senegal. After France, it is the only Western country that Diouf has visited since January 1981. This trip was, like all the others, a "working visit."

As for Britain, it is grateful for the facilities offered by the Dakar government — the use of the Dakar-Yoff airport — during the war over the Falkland Islands. The same facilities were offered to Argentina, in the knowledge that the South American country's strategic needs did not require the airport's use. As a general rule, Senegal's relationship with Latin America is based on a shared need to harmonize policies within the framework of the North-South dialogue. South-South economic cooperation is inhibited by the lack of commercial exchange that grows out of the underdeveloped nature of the two subcontinents.

HIGH REGARD FOR THE UNITED STATES

On the other hand, relations with North America offer interesting prospects. Cooperation with Canada, already flourishing under Senghor, continues to be valued by Senegalese authorities.

As for the United States, Dakar's mistrust seems to be on the wane. This mistrust was due to a fear, justified or not, that the American economy and multinational corporations might obtain too strong a grip on the Senegalese economy. Rightly or wrongly, in Dakar as elsewhere in Africa, U.S. aid policies are generally perceived as being too rigid, too expansionist, and too heavily influenced by East-West competition.

Assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is nonetheless appreciated, particularly in light of the new U.S. policy of tailoring aid to the medium-term economic and financial recovery objectives of the Senegalese development plan. This concentrates on the three regions of the Casamance, the Senegalese River Basin, and Sine Saloum, which is designed to enable Senegal to reach self-sufficiency in food by the year 2000.

Beginning in 1983, American assistance will be more useful. The new aid program, which places increasingly heavy emphasis on assistance outside the conventional project's framework, provides for more than 50 percent of the aid to be devoted to financing "the importation of essential products that will contribute to re-establishing equilibrium in the balance of payments, and will encourage the utilization of local money generated by the sales of these importations, thus sustaining development activity and providing for studies of food policy."

The first disbursement of this kind of assistance totaling $21 million was in 1980 and was much appreciated by the Dakar government. Similarly useful was U.S. assistance provided to regional rural development agencies. U.S. AID has decided to continue and strengthen this role, which coincides very nicely with the decentralization policies of the Diouf administration. Most welcome have been programs to subsidize nongovernmental organizations and co-ops, as well as to support private enterprise in rural areas. Similarly popular have been school projects, village dispensaries, and grain mills financed by the self-help fund of the U.S. Embassy at Dakar. These projects are considered among the most successful of all assistance programs.

Inquiries by American businessmen have been favorably received by their Senegalese counterparts who, more and more, are themselves going to the United States to examine the American market. According to Djim Kebe, one of the leaders of the Senegalese business community, "Senegal is nobody's private preserve."

The policy of outreach abroad has been defined by President Diouf: "Our diplomacy will enlarge the circle of our friendships and of our alliances without rejecting those that are already in place. We will weave new links of friendship and solidarity in order to further affirm our presence in the world; in our international relationships, it is thus a question of fostering a wider outreach policy just as we have done inside our country."

But all of this must take place "without foreign interference." This warning has been issued to all powers, from the West and the East. With the Soviet Union, relations that were uncomfortable under Senghor have not yet improved in the slightest. With the other states of East Europe, relations remain merely "good."

Relations with Peking are even better, as is generally the case with all Asian countries, even though Senegal no longer maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China and Japan give considerable aid to Dakar which, in addition, hosts diplomatic missions from both South and North Korea. Seoul made a remarkable breakthrough with the visit to Senegal last August of its President Chun Doo Hwan.

The Senegalese head of state told his South Korean guest of the effort that his government was prepared to make to foster cooperation between the two countries, "on the economic and technical level in particular, as a measure of the great friendship that links our peoples, their governments, and their leaders." Diouf went on to declare: "The government of Senegal has always supported and will continue to support any effort to further the independent and peaceful reunifiction of the Korean people."

FIRMNESS AND DIALOGUE

In its articulations of policy, the Diouf administration puts forward two concepts: firmness and dialogue. "Dialogue," according to Diouf, "because it is the best way to prevent conflicts, to develop cooperation, and to assure understanding and peace; firmness, because we refuse to backtrack on principles without which there could be no viable international relationships."

Abdou Diouf maintains that these principles are the right of peoples to determine their own lives, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and respect for the charter of the OAU, for the charter of the United Nations, and for the principles of nonalignment.

It is pursuant to these principles that he continues to provide firm support for the Palestinian cause and for Afro-Arab cooperation. The Senegalese claim it was out of respect for these same principles and by virtue of the firmness that characterizes Diouf (to whom the constitution reserves the domain of foreign affairs, as well as other responsibilities) that the delegation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was expelled from the country early in 1982.

The SADR delegation had turned up at the Dakar-Yoff Airport in hopes of participating in an OAU ministerial meeting on the Pan-African Information Agency. Their expulsion was a consequence of the Dakar government's opposition to the admission of the SADR at an earlier budget session of the OAU Council of Ministers. The case arose again last August at the OAU summit in Tripoli, where Senegal was one of the first countries to refuse to attend, in protest against the presence of the SADR. The Senegalese say their position is in conformity with the decision made in 1981 at Nairobi by the African heads of state to organize a referendum in the territory.

By means of an independent foreign policy that he likes to call "coherent," Diouf wants to impart a cardinal objective to his diplomatic activities: "To defend and consolidate independence in this period when hegemonic designs of all sorts are gathering strength, notably among us in Africa." He declares that he wants to do this on the basis of open dialogue that is frank and direct and that seeks "dynamic compromises." As a result, Senegal's prestige abroad has at least remained solid, if not increased. On January 1, 1981, Diouf said: "I take responsibility for the continuity of President Senghor's policies; I will bring about change while at the same time protecting what has already been accomplished."

DEMOCRATIC OUTREACH

The same broad principles apply to his domestic policies regarding democratic processes. Upon taking office, Diouf proposed a law eliminating any limitation on the number of political parties, as long as they are not based on religion, sex, or region. This broad political pluralism is in contrast with the limited pluralism of Senghor's regime which, from 1975, permitted only four political parties characterized by four ideologies: socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and Marxism. His own Socialist party (PS) preempted the use of the socialist label.

The Senegalese Democratic party (PDS) of Abdoulaye Wade, a Daker lawyer, who had earlier parted company with the PS, was set up in 1974. In order to survive, it was forced to place itself in the "liberal" slot since it did not want to call itself either conservative or Marxist. But it nonetheless continued to profess "workers' socialism," the PS having already called itself "democratic socialist." The PS nonetheless adhered to the Liberal International and entertained warm relationships with the French regime of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as well as with other Western circles including American, to the extent that it was charged with being financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

At the same time, the PDS supported

Polisario in the Western Sahara and maintained excellent relations with Algeria (with whom the Senegalese government was at that time on poor terms) as well as with Libya, which was accused by Dakar of subversive moves in West Africa.

Since the normalization of relations between the governments of Dakar and Algiers, PDS relations with Algerian authorities have become less close. A similar situation arose with regard to Angola, whose MPLA government the Diouf administration, breaking with Senghor's policy, recognized last year. Senegal continues to voice its opposition to the Cuban presence in Angola.

In the general elections of 1977, Abdoulaye Wade's party succeeded in obtaining 18 percent of the vote and was thus entitled to seat 18 of its deputies on the National Assembly, constituting the entire parliamentary opposition. Since then, nine of its deputies have fallen out of its ranks; some resigned (seven of them rejoined the ranks of the PS); others were fired. With only a few weeks left before renewing the mandate of the deputies (legislative and presidential elections are scheduled for February 1983), the makeup of the National Assembly has undergone considerable change and is now as follows: 89 deputies from the PS (in contrast to 82 previously), 9 PDS, 1 Independent, and 13 MDP (the Popular Democratic Movement of the former chief of state, Mamadou Dia, who created his party as a result of the loosening up of the system).

THE ELECTORATE

The African Party of Independence (PAI), of Marxist persuasion and directed by Majhmout Diop, who founded the party in 1946 and saw it subsequently banned, obtained less than 1 percent of the vote, which does not entitle it to be represented in the Assembly since the electoral system is based upon proportional representation.

The conservative Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS) of Dakar lawyer Boubacar Gueye, nephew of the late President Lamine Gueye, became significant only after these last elections. This movement has had difficulty in establishing itself, due to lack of funds and because the Senegalese electorate leans more to the Left.

Since the opening up of the system by Diouf, 10 other political groups have achieved official recognition. All of them call themselves revolutionary. Out of a total of 14 parties, seven claim to be Marxist-Leninist of various stripes: Stalinist, Trotskyite, Maoist, and nationalist.

Four call themselves socialist, of which the most active are the PS with its "democratic" socialism, the PDS with its "workers'" socialism, and the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) with its "self-generated" socialism. Two claim quite simply to be "nationalist" although one of these, *And Jef*, seems to lean toward the communist side. Its leader is the statistician Landing Savané, who was several times interrogated by the police when he was operating clandestinely as a Marxist. There is also the National Democratic Alliance (RND), led by Professor Cheikh Anta Diop, the famous Carbon-14 researcher, Egyptologist, and author of numerous works of which his most famous is *Black Nations and Culture*.

The RND always refused classification according to the four ideological categories for parties established by Senghor, and it has never hidden its activities. It published, legally, a monthly entitled *Taxaw*, which means "Stand Up."

Several other leaders of the so-called clandestine opposition got together around Mamadou Dia to create the Unified Senegalese Coordination (COSU) and published, also legally, a journal whose title, *Ande Sopi* (A Group for Change), explained very clearly the spirit that animated them.

The political pluralism authorized by Abdou Diouf, while not preventing coordination among the opposition, at least blunted their cooperation by providing the opportunity for them to dissipate their energies. Mamadou Dia created his MDP; mathematics professor Maguette Thiam and his Marxist friends got together to form PIT; Babacar Sane and Amadou Top, both of Marxist leanings, had their "Democratic League" legalized. Yet all of them continued to claim kinship with the National Democratic and Popular Revolution Movement stemming from COSU.

Photo: A. Holbrooke/UN

Water development is a government priority

Photo: Maguette Bâ

Relations between Presidents Diouf and Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast are those of a son and father

There is clearly a problem of political unity. Most leaders on the Left believe that unity must be fashioned at the level of the opposition parties. For them, it is essential to overturn the power of the PS by democratic means. But there are nuances in the degree of unity among the oppo ition: there are some who stop at consultation — permanent if necessary — between the various groups; there are others who claim that simple consultation between "political bigshots" will resolve nothing. For others, unity must include all parties including the PS. This thesis does not have as many supporters within the opposition parties or in the PS itself. It is more often put forward by those who are outside the party structures, who feel that this scattering of forces is both a source of weakness and a brake on national development. A group was created in August that calls itself *Groupe de Rencontre et d'Exchanges pour un Sénégal Nouveau* (GRESEN); that is, the Group for Consultation and Exchange for a New Senegal. This body plans to provide a channel for "free, open, and far-ranging discussion on questions of national interest."

Abdou Diouf does not seem hostile to this idea. Having committed himself "solemnly to guarantee political pluralism and respect for all liberties and having affirmed that the Senegalese democratic experience is irreversible," he nevertheless links this desire to strengthen democracy with a concern for unity and national reconciliation. "Let's look for what unites us along the road that brings us together," he said, adding: "The battle for development in which we are engaged can be won only by a forward leap of the entire Senegalese nation." On January 1, 1981, he said: "I will be the president of all Senegalese without exception." And he added: "Gather round the chief of state to face the challenges before our country."

ABDOU DIOUF THE FAVORITE

The man who spoke in this fashion is still only interim chief of state because the constitution gave him the right to the mandate of president of the republic in the event of impeachment or resignation of the incumbent. He is now in line for accession to full powers if the presidential elections of February 1983 are favorable to him. Unless there should be an accident of major significance, and in spite of the absence of formal poll-taking, it is safe to say that the confirmation of Abdou Diouf is assured.

Arguing strongly in his favor are the actions of his government on behalf of the rural population (80 percent of the Senegalese people are farmers); the measures taken to clean up the administration; the strengthening of his party (which has one million members and is still growing); the cleanup of political activity within the party; the democratization of the system coupled with the divisions among the opposition; and, finally, the fact that he himself holds control over the apparatus of the state. The general opinion is that when he becomes the elected hoice of the nation, Abdou Diouf will have a fairly free hand, with fewer restraints to carry out the changes that he has promised.

But there are still structural and organizational shortcomings in rural development. The question of water policy demands even greater effort; the problem of unemployment will increasingly require government action; and the implementation of the austerity policy and moves against corruption will need further attention.

On the political level, the cleanup of the activities of the ruling party must be pursued with greater energy; such practices as violence, corruption, and cheating that have declined over the past year must be wiped out of the party completely.

While political pluralism no longer looks like a masquerade, Abdou Diouf has nonetheless promised to consolidate and reinforce the initiative. Supporters of his Senegalese system say the extension and reinforcement of political democracy should not be considered synonmous with weakness or anarchy. On the contrary, as explained by the interim chief of state, the process presupposes "the existence of a strong and viable nation, capable of assuring the precedence of the commonweal over private concerns under all conditions." Diouf has pledged: "Whatever mistakes have been made, and whoever may be responsible, I will deal with them vigorously, firmly, and equitably to the fullest extent of my abilities." □

The Brigades Controversy

BY JØRGEN RASK HANSEN

At midday, when the Kalahari sun is approaching its zenith, the busy sound of pounding and shouting dies, and a hot, soothing stillness announces the arrival of the noon hour. It is lunch break at the brigade.

From all corners, trainees saunter towards the kitchen, attracted by the sweet smell of burning wood and broiling meat. The boys form a line in front of the small building, 50 cheerful faces awaiting the highlight of the day.

Among them are Sethwara and Keiponye, two carpentry trainees in worn, blue overalls. Sethwara is 17. He received good grades on his Standard Seven exam, but not quite good enough to secure him one of the limited places in the secondary school. His friend, Keiponye, dropped out of the sixth grade when his uncle died, and the 14-year-old boy had to help on the family's cattlepost.

Now Keiponye and Sethwara are working side by side at the brigade in their village. They both realized that practical training was their only chance for an education, and thereby a ticket to a more promising future. The two boys share their view with 1,400 other brigade trainees throughout Botswana. All these young school leavers are participating in an educational experiment that not only helps them learn a trade, but also contributes significantly to the development of their young country.

After Botswana's independence in 1966, the new country — like most former colonies — gave priority to educational programs based on West European practice. These formal programs were seen as the best way of fighting illiteracy and creating a well-educated minority that could then take the key positions in the administration of the new nation.

This approach had one disadvantage. It removed the spirit of self-reliance, self-confidence, and independence of the rural population, who saw this formal type of schooling as the only way to a higher living standard. And, since only one-fourth of the primary-school students were able to continue into secondary education, the majority of them, after seven years of schooling, were left idle and disappointed.

The first man to challenge these shortcomings in Botswana's educational system was Patrick van Rensburg. As a white, progressive scholar in conservative, apartheid-practicing South Africa, he wasn't allowed to develop his ideas about education in the poor rural areas. He thus fled his homeland and settled in Serowe, Botswana's largest village, where in 1963 he started that village's first secondary school, the later renowned Swaneng Hill School.

Van Rensburg's idea was to reestablish and develop the disappearing virtues of self-reliance and independence, and his new school had from the beginning an approach to education quite contrary to that of the British-influenced secondary schools. The students built their own classrooms, and the curriculum taught inside them was geared towards local development, stressing practical skills such as nutrition, gardening, and building.

The school soon grew extremely popular, and the number of primary-school leavers waiting for a place grew larger. In response, van Rensburg, using his experience from Swaneng Hill, started a vocational training program that was later to develop into the unique Botswana Brigades.

In Ngamiland District, 600 miles from the capitol of Gaborone, lies Maun Brigade Development Trust (MBDT), one of Botswana's 20 brigade centers currently in operation. Here, 100 people are engaged in building, carpentry, plumbing, and textiles.

In the three construction brigades, 50 primary-school leavers are offered an on-the-job apprenticeship-type training in which they work four days a week,

Jørgen Rask Hansen is a vocational educator who worked for two years with the Botswana Brigades under the auspices of the Danish Volunteer Service.

building and producing goods to be sold from the centers's store in Maun village. The remaining day is set aside for instruction in technical and academic subjects. The textile unit is a commercial operation providing employment for 10 village women.

To a large degree, training costs are covered by production profits. Thus the center is trying to live up to its goal of becoming economically independent, an important feature of the brigade movement, which enables the brigades to train a tradesman at about one-fourth the cost of educating a secondary-school student.

Trade conditions in Botswana have made this goal difficult to achieve. The brigades' products compete with those from the technically more sophisticated South Africa, and Botswana's trade agreement (Customs-Union) with that country allows for mass-produced goods to be imported and sold at minimum prices from the stores of rural Botswana.

To help the brigades overcome their financial difficulties, organizations all over the world have willingly sponsored the training programs. Substantial grants from the World Bank, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and others have been justified by the brigades' commitment to education for rural development.

Education, however, tends to create ambitions in people that cannot be fullfilled in the rural community.

In most African countries, the "boom" in production and money exchange is almost solely taking place in the larger towns, where investors find the framework of communication, transportation, and a potential market already at their disposal. Very often, the rural areas become merely sources of labor and raw materials. The result is the often futile migration of "country" people to the urban areas, where they congregate in self-built, slumlike suburbs, the cities being unable to absorb them.

In Botswana, this movement in the population has been especially significant. At the time of independence only two "modern" towns existed (Francistown and Lobatse), both with under 10,000 inhabitants. By 1978, 15% of the total population lived in urban settings. Since 1964, more than 10% of Botswana's people had moved from the country to the city.

These drastic figures are partly a result of the urban bias in the distribution of investments over the last 16 years. In 1966, 49% of the government's capital expenditures went to urban projects; 25% went to communication, and only 26% was spent in the rural areas. By 1976, the expenditures in rural areas had increased only one point, to 27%. And the trend is expected to continue. Large investments are being placed in the growing mining industry, especially that of diamonds, which currently accounts for the third-largest diamond production in the world.

But concentrated investments in the modern sector have not been able to solve employment problems for Botswana. Although mining towns such as Selebi-Phikwe have had an annual population growth of 20%, the growth in employment has been only 11%, creating the new problem of a poor, unemployed urban class.

The rural-to-urban migration naturally affects the brigade centers and their communities, which lose their skilled graduates to the more promising cities. From MBDT, the brigade leavers often travel the 300 miles to Francistown to seek employment.

Some even consider going farther away. Sethwara has been at MBDT for two years. When asked about his future plans, he replied, "When I finish next year and take my exam, I'll go to South Africa and work as a carpenter. The money is better there."

On the average, some 30,000 Botswana are working in the mines of South Africa. In 1977, their earnings there totaled P32.17 million (one pula=1.2 U.S. dollars), 40% of which was spent in South Africa. Only 60% was brought back to Botswana, much in the form of goods. Part of the remaining cash was spent purchasing imported products, which also did not help boost the internal economy.

The problem of securing jobs in the rural areas has been dealt with in various ways. The brigade centers, with the help of foreign donations, have expanded the production aspect of their operations by establishing special industrial units that have employed some of the brigade graduates. And a Swedish-sponsored project, Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU),

Photo: Jørgen Rask Hansen

Building trainees construct new staff housing, financed by the World Bank

has tried to increase economic growth in rural areas by providing management training and workshop facilities for small local businesses, mainly in the traditional crafts and trades.

In 1979, MBDT started a general contracting company, Itsholetseng Baagi ("Moving Up with Builders"), which was run as a strictly commercial unit. Baagi, employing graduate builders and carpenters, contracts building projects in and around Maun, which the brigade students are used to aid the training programs with recurrent costs. A grant from HIVOS foundation of the Netherlands covered the investments necessary to start the enterprise. But recently Baagi has found it difficult to find jobs in the economically depressed area of Maun, and it may eventually have to close its operations.

Despite the financial problems these efforts are burdened with, some success can be measured. More jobs are being created, and the production and exchange within the rural communities is increasing, however slightly.

The brigade movement's goal of financial viability for each center has not yet been reached.

Realizing this, the Botswana government in 1975 began to subsidize the training programs by paying half of the instructors' salaries and by giving an annual training allowance of P200 for each enrolled trainee. And, in an effort to coordinate the growing movement, the National Brigade Coordinating Committee was formed under the Ministry of Education.

But since becoming financially involved with the brigades, the government has started to express a desire for gaining more influence in the development of the training programs. This has resulted in a conflict between the original philosophy of the movement (that of rural development), and Botswana's current need for developing and expanding the modern sector.

Although the government recognizes the concept of on-the-job training and appreciates its application in the rural areas, its main interest is to meet the country's demand for skilled manpower in the rapidly growing industries. Since the brigade centers are the only existing training facilities with a capacity large enough to cope with this demand, strong pressure is being put on them to adopt more efficient training programs geared toward the needs of Botswana's modern sector.

The individual brigade centers are still free to experiment with their internal organization. The curriculum, though, for the basic trades of building, carpentry, and mechanics has been standardized throughout the country, and the demand for fast, efficient training in these fields leaves the centers with less time for experimentation with local materials and more appropriate technologies. The conflict in the curriculum-development within the brigades exemplifies the overall priority problems Botswana is faced with.

The government's official policy has been to lessen the income gap between rich and poor and to accelerate rural development by providing better schools, health facilities, and employment opportunities in the remote areas. But these efforts have been strained by a too rapid growth in the modern, urban sectors.

During the first 12 years of independence, the gross domestic product (GDP) increased from P37 million in 1966 to P330 million in 1977, the major factor in this phenomenal growth being the exploitation of minerals. This industry demands large investments but creates only limited long-term employment opportunities, restricted to a few central locations. Thus, Botswana's economic development has been rather lopsided geographically. Despite a current 10% growth rate in the GDP, the rural areas benefit very little, and 50% of the rural families still have no income.

The Botswana brigades are caught in the middle of this "urban-versus-rural" conflict. The movement has proven to be of immense help in the development of the rural areas, but has also proven a fast way of training large numbers of skilled workers for the industries. Botswana must choose whether to consolidate the already existing centers in the major villages and train for the benefit of the national manpower need or to diversify the movement into smaller villages and help develop the remote areas that would not otherwise benefit from the modernization of the country.

When Patrick van Rensburg, attending a seminar of volunteers working at the brigades, was asked about the future of his invention, he replied: "Whatever happens to the Botswana brigades, remember and maintain the basic model: training/production/cost covering. Results have proven that the concept can work, and there are still many places in the world where it can be used." □

Photo: Jørgen Rask Hansen

Before classrooms were built, trade theory was taught under the shade of a tree

Books

THE CONFLICT IN CHAD

Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, pp. 180 + vii, $7.50.

Though hardly a household word for most Americans, Chad calls forth strong emotional reactions among politically conscious Frenchmen: for some it conjures up visions of Félix Eboué declaring his *ralliement* to the Free French in World War II, and the epic story of the ragtag army of Gaullists who fought their way across the Libyan desert to join forces with Montgomery's Eighth Army; among the younger generations it brings back memories of a long drawn out and inconclusive civil war among Africans, in which the French Foreign Legion played a less than glorious role; for others still it is evocative of the dramatic capture of Françoise Claustre by Hissene Habré's rebel army in the desert outpost of Bardai in 1974. The coverage given to "l'affaire Claustre" in the metropolitan press produced a new public awareness among the French of the costs of the civil war, and ultimately of the futility of the French intervention.

There is no better point of entry into these events and their wider significance than this slim volume written by two of the most prolific and knowledgeable contemporary writers on French-speaking Africa. *Conflict in Chad* fills a major gap in the literature on Equatorial Africa: it is the only book-length study of Chad's recent political evolution available to the English-speaking reader.

In six brief descriptive chapters the authors offer a reasonably comprehensive *tour d'horizon* of Chadian politics since independence. Their story begins with the impact of French policies on Chadian society, and unfolds, chapter by chapter, through the political miasmas of Tombalbaye's "reign" ("From François to Ngarta Tombalbaye"), the convulsions of the northern rebellions ("The Frolinat Revolts and the Military Junta"), and the chaotic years unleashed by Tombalbaye's death in 1975 ("The Process of Disintegration"). They conclude their saga with an account of Chad's relations with its neighbors ("Relations with Other African States") and a depressing *bilan* of the post-independence years ("A Balance Sheet").

The authors must be congratulated for their painstaking attention to historical detail, their effort to provide a sense of continuity through their description of the different stages in the country's evolution, their awareness of the byzantine interactions between the Chadian factions and their wider geographical environment. The result is a thorough and well-balanced treatment of an exceedingly complex sequence of events. Honesty compels us to note, however, that if their book is long on description, it is disappointingly short on analysis. Their inability to come to grips with the dynamics of ethnicity and factionalism otherwise than in the most superficial fashion is a major weakness of their treatment of Chadian politics. Nowhere does their study rise to the level of a serious analysis of the impact of social change on collective identities; nowhere does the reader get a sense of how the traditional structures of Chadian societies, especially the segmentary systems of the northern populations, have affected the course of the rebellion. Their almost exclusive reliance on French official sources, together with their all-too-obvious neglect of the recent Anglo-American social science literature on ethnicity, appears largely responsible for these shortcomings. Their highly selective use of materials also explains the tour de force they manage to perform in exonerating French policymakers in Chad and the metropole of virtually all responsibility—except in the most lenient and indirect terms—for the occurrence of ethno-regional conflicts. That the book should be dedicated to Bernard Lanne—a former colonial civil servant whose encyclopedic knowledge of Chadian politics is matched only by his pro-French biases—speaks volumes on the Francophile dispositions of the authors. Here at last is a book by Anglophone scholars on Francophone Africa that will surely evoke a positive reaction from Professor Cornevin, which in itself must be viewed as a considerable achievement.

Where the authors' sympathies clearly get in the way of scholarly objectivity is in their endorsement of the old myth, kept alive in countless French publications, of a Franco-Chadian brotherhood forged under fire on the battlefields of the Fezzan during World War II. To quote: "Because Chad served as a recruiting ground and base for General Leclerc's conquest of the Fezzan (1940-1943), an unusually close relationship developed between Chadians and Frenchmen of that era, which to some degree has survived to this day" (p. 12). My own reading of the history of Franco-Chadian relations, supplemented by my own first-hand experience of Chadian society, would seem to suggest a rather strong qualifier to the notion that "there remains an emotional factor between the two countries that transcends practical and material considerations" (p. 12).

Despite these reservations, *Conflict in Chad* makes an important contribution to the history of Chadian politics; it has the added merit of an appendix listing the various governments and governing bodies that have tried to govern since 1975, the regional conferences on Chad held in Libya, Nigeria, Toto, and Chad, and the key military formations that have claimed the mantle of legitimacy of the Frolinat. The bibliography will be especially useful for readers unfamiliar with official and unofficial French sources on Chad.

René Lemarchand
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AFRICAN REGIMES COMPARED

Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.

Crawford Young, in this important essay on how regimes differ in their economic, social, and foreign policy development, breathes new life into the study of African ideology. Separating African states into "Afro-Marxist," "populist socialist," and "market-leaning capitalist" categories, Young evaluates their achievements according to six criteria: economic growth, equality of distribution, the preservation of human dignity, relative autonomy, popular participation in government, and capacity to meet changing needs.

Although impressionistic, based largely on secondary sources, and uneven in its treatment of both countries and problem areas, most readers will find Young's summaries useful and informative. Moreover, in his comprehensive effort at an overview, Young performs the service of openly inviting more precise, if more limited case studies.

Young has a good sense of what matters, an eye for the significant issues and for the most important studies. One trusts his judgment. He works at being fair, he never goes for the easy target. He immediately follows his conclusion that Marxist-Leninist regimes have thus far not succeeded in achieving rapid economic growth with the observation that neither have any mismanaged themselves into bankruptcy as has Ghana or been marked by high levels of venality like Zaire. If major rural public services are ineffective in Tanzania, this is not unique to the "populist socialist" state but part of a general pattern. If the Nkrumah experiment did do damage, it pales into "virtual insignificance" compared to the "stupendous corruption" of Acheampong's rule. Despite self-aggrandizement of the state bourgeoisie, the "positive elements" in the Tanzania, Algeria, and Guinea-Bissau cases preclude judging that the populist-socialist strategy is "not viable." Despite the disabilities of dependency, Kenyan and Ivory Coast capitalism has maintained legitimacy and their economies have continued to grow. On the other hand, although the sustained growth rates of the Ivory Coast and Kenya clearly do stand out, there is no guarantee that the market-economy formula will always produce positive results as illustrated by the "mediocre record" of imperial Ethiopia, Liberia under Tubman and Tolbert, and the "calamitous" case of Zaire.

After two decades of independence, ideology clearly matters not merely in the "tame" 1957 contrast between the "dependent Ivorian capitalism" and "the nationalist but liberal economy" of Nkrumah, but in "the extreme gulf" between the Marxism-Leninism of Ethiopia and the free-wheeling market of Kenya. Brazzaville and Kinshasa, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi differ in significant and not merely rhetorical ways.

Young relies upon "the ideological self-ascription" of a regime's leadership in classifying governments. Admittedly a subjective system of categorization, one may well balk at, for example, lumping Senghor and Nyerere together as "populist socialists." Nyerere's ideology of African socialism helps him to appeal and to create a mass constituency. Senghor's doctrines appeal to marabout and bourgeois interests and his ideology functions to prevent the creation of a mass following or of broad peasant and worker support. Nyerere is devotedly anti-racist; Senghor admits that Negritude has a racial content even if it is a defensive "anti-racism racism."

Readers may also question whether Young succeeds in establishing a causative relationship between ideology and policy or in illustrating the mechanism of their connection. His evidence is of the type that shows: (1) that certain leaders alleged their commitments to certain principles, and (2) outcomes congruent with those principles occurred. Intervening variables, of all sorts, however—such as external interventions, ethnic conflicts, religious disputes, and the personalities of leaders—can also affect the outcomes. Young himself limits (p. 6) the final verdict in the "Afro-Marxist pathway" to the political and economic development of Mozambique because he states military and regional factimatism complicates all the other cases—Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Madagascar, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola. Yet surely geography, its proximity to South Africa, natural resources, and other nonideological factors will affect Mozambique as well.

Despite these difficulties, inherent in any work of this scope and nature, Young has produced a book that clearly aids our inquiries into the substantive policy outcomes of different types of regimes, and one that will spur additional studies into many aspects of African ideologies.

Irving Leonard Markovitz
Queens College

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

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

West African cooks took the versatile okra plant to the heights of culinary excellence and gave the world a soup called gumbo.

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