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
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## Women in Southern Africa: Waiting for Liberation?

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**IN THIS ISSUE**

Women in southern Africa provide the focus for this issue of *Africa Report*. Throughout the African continent, women's contributions to their national economies are underestimated and rarely taken into account by development planners, despite the fact that nearly all are engaged in economic activities that provide the backbone of rural life. Women in southern Africa face an additional set of challenges in gaining an improvement in their status and their integration into the development process. The legacies of long colonial histories and the continued economic domination of the subregion by South Africa are further constraints to women's advancement.

South African Ivy Matsepe-Casaburi provides the historical and socioeconomic background to the southern African woman's marginal position in society. From Zimbabwe, Olivia Muchena examines why women have not been integrated into their nation's development strategies. Gwendoline Konie, a member of the Zambian government, offers her point of view on how women can obtain the political power to effect change.

Legal discrimination against women and how it is being addressed in Zimbabwe is the subject of an address by Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Eddison Zvobgo. Gayla Cook Isaacs analyzes how women are portrayed in the media and how it can be used as a vehicle for changing attitudes. And six southern African women talk about their own experiences, reporting on progress made for women and what more needs to be done.

We also provide four points of view, two American and two African, on current U.S. policy in southern Africa, in speeches made during the African-American Institute's 13th annual conference in Harare, Zimbabwe in January. And finally, in a frank interview with Colin Legum just prior to Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's tour of 11 African countries, Gong Dafei, vice-foreign minister for African affairs, provides insights into the People's Republic of China's new initiatives in Africa.

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This issue was prepared with the assistance of Gayla Cook Isaacs, former director of the African-American Institute's Women's Program. Together with a steering committee of southern Africans, the Institute organized a meeting of over 100 southern African women in Harare in November 1982. Key recommendations made by participants included: expansion of educational opportunities for women and the establishment of a women's desk within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, as well as a nongovernmental resource center on women in southern Africa.

**Photo Credit:**  
The cover photo was taken near Domboshawa, Zimbabwe by George Hallett.

# Are Women Integrated into Development?

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BY OLIVIA MUCHENA

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**D**evelopment is a process of change and growth toward the realization of the potential of a person or a nation — a process that takes place within an ideological framework, be it socialist or capitalist. Despite the fact that women in southern Africa are involved in subsistence production, are members of the rural elite as nurses and teachers, and are factory workers, secretaries, and professionals, the overwhelming majority are not integrated into the development process, that is, are not part of the mainstream of growth.

Although African women have always been involved in development through agricultural production — shouldering most of the workload and making rural life tick in the countries of southern Africa, owing to the high rate of male migration — subsistence production is not regarded as an economic activity according to the market econ-

omy definition of the term. Women's activities in subsistence production have not been included in national statistics. Until a different definition and evaluation of women's work is made, the continued association of women with subsistence activities will not enhance their economic status.

Women do not participate equitably in the decision-making bodies nor in the economic spheres of our nations — the nerve centers of power. Power, or the ability to influence decision making, is at the center of the question of ownership, control, and distribution of resources for development. Women want equal power to make decisions on the allocation of resources for development.

The reasons why women are not yet involved in the mainstream of development and decision making are ideological, cultural, and in part due to women's own negative self-images and their responses to their marginal positions. Women in southern Africa have attempted to respond to their status, with little impact or success, through the auspices of women's organizations and international women-in-development agencies. Within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) region, wom-

en's organizations have been organized along three lines. First, there are countries with one all-embracing women's organization, often the women's wing of the ruling party, such as the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) and the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA). Second, other countries have, in addition to the party women's wing, organizations such as the Association of Women's Clubs and the YWCA, which have international affiliations. A third category is the women's organization of indigenous origin.

A study of women's organizations in Zimbabwe established that all of the groups interviewed had the general aim of improving the quality of women's lives via the following activities: home and health care, social service welfare, income generation projects, education, agriculture, fund raising, and civil and political participation. Through these and other activities, women, not only in Zimbabwe but in other SADCC countries, have found channels for self-development and self-expression. Women have made substantial achievements and contributions at personal, family, community, and national levels. But how significant have these been? What structural changes can

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Olivia Muchena has done extensive research on women in Zimbabwe. She is currently a lecturer in the Education Department at the University of Zimbabwe.

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women's organizations institute in a given society?

Institutions working for women's progress have concentrated more on welfare and ameliorative changes rather than aim for alterations in the structural position of women in the economic, political, and social spheres. Those women's organizations operating within a progressive ideological framework vis-à-vis their governments, such as the OMM in Mozambique, have a better chance of effecting meaningful changes in women's lives. The OMM was established to mobilize all women "to teach them Frelimo's political line and to involve them in the revolutionary process." The OMM has now been integrated into planning at the national and provincial levels, and both the party and the OMM are aware that women's participation must increase numerically. OMM has an advantage in that the Mozambican constitution states that the emancipation of women is "one of the state's essential tasks." Legal provisions and the revolutionary process that led to Mozambique's po-

litical independence provide a much stronger basis for women's emancipation than is found in general declarations of human rights common in most constitutions.

The majority of the SADCC countries at present may not have the capacity to effect structural change in their societies. They can only work within the given ideological framework, with which they may or may not agree. Nevertheless, if there were a reorientation of the conceptualization and planning of women's development programs, women's organizations could be more effective in making meaningful changes in women's lives.

It is sadly true that for the past two or three decades the position of women has been perceived as needing nothing more than welfare improvement. First, women's groups in southern Africa frequently prescribe a general welfare solution to problems requiring economic or political action. This is apparent from the examination of virtually any women's program. The prevalent approach to solving women's problems,

be they economic, social, or political, is through knitting, sewing, hygiene, nutrition, and "income-generating activities." There has not been adequate analysis of the situation of women in SADCC countries that have been independent for several years to determine whether what is needed is mere improvement or radical transformation. A clear perception of the issues involved in each case is a prerequisite for effective programs.

A second reason why women's activities have not made an impact on the economic aspects of their lives is the "project approach" to development, whereby it is said that the answer is to create peripheral, piecemeal projects through which women can generate income — handicrafts, poultry projects, market gardening, and tie and dye. Those types of projects are peripheral because they are not part of the mainstream of national development, or even that of the local districts. The projects are conceived in isolation from the local economy. When poultry projects are launched, no feasibility studies



Cassava field in Angola: "Women shoulder most of the workload and make rural life tick in southern Africa"






Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

**"Income-generating activities such as knitting and handicrafts are not in the mainstream of national development"**

are undertaken to determine whether there is adequate infrastructure — roads, vehicles for transporting women and produce to market, water supplies. Therefore, in an effort to generate income, more burdens are placed upon the already overtaxed women. Often there is no relationship between the women's projects and local or national plans.

A second aspect of the project approach that does not contribute to meaningful economic change or gains in women's lives is the small-scale, or "income-generating," mentality. Perhaps because women lack the education, financial resources, and experience, women-in-development agencies at the international level, in conjunction with local women's groups, have promoted such programs. But these projects are usually so small that virtually no income is generated, despite the amount of effort expended. If it is generated, it is for short periods of time only. Donor agencies and government have come to think of women in small-scale terms. A women's group seeking \$100,000 for a vegetable canning factory has little chance of receiving funding, in comparison to what is likely to be available for those \$1,000 projects expected to be self-reliant in three years. Small may be beautiful, but it can also be powerless and frustrating, and a perpetuator of marginality. It appears that rather than analyzing our own situation and determining our own

priorities, we find it easier to imitate or respond to the prevailing band wagons. Income generation, via tie and dye or other projects, may be the latest approach, yet clean water supplies might better be our priority. We should address projects according to our own agendas.

Given the diversity of historical and cultural experiences in the region, it is for each country to work out an optimal strategy for women. Whatever course is chosen, it should ultimately lead countries to address whether the institutions formed to serve women's interests help or hinder progress in reality. At various points in our nations' histories, it has been necessary to create special machineries for women's advancement in order to redress age-old imbalances based upon sex. However, if these institutions had achieved their objectives, their existence would have been temporary and women would now be competing equally with men for the resources and benefits of society. A brief examination of current women's activities suggests that it will be a long time before this happens.

Some of the reasons for this have already been mentioned — poor conceptualization of the problems and lack of holistic long-term planning. An additional reason why women's institutions have not outlived their usefulness is that they protect the interests of a few token representative women. The idea of permanent leaders within women's in-

stitutions is not conducive to exposing the latent talents among women and is contrary to the very cause for which women are fighting. President Samora Machel of Mozambique has said: "The fact that they are exploited explains why they are not involved in all planning and decision-making tasks in society and why they are excluded from working out the concepts that govern economic, social, cultural, and political life." Therefore a first step for women is to study the concepts that govern economic and political life in their countries in order to understand what they are dealing with. When we maintain that women want equal opportunities, while talking about power — economic and political — and yet we do not understand how to get power and use it. We must study the economic and political power structures and determine the pressure points and how they can be used. Proper conceptualization is a prerequisite to planning.

We should also abandon the piecemeal project approach and adopt a long-term coordinated perspective to planning. Governments and businesses spend months working out their development strategies. They seek to ascertain whether they have the resources and whether the components of the plan are complementary. If women's efforts are to make an impact, more time should be spent on planning, monitoring, and evaluation. The position of women in the SADCC countries in the years hence should consistently be addressed by women's institutions.

Men do perceive women as a potentially powerful force — hence their defensiveness toward efforts to emancipate women. Women, on the other hand, do not seem to be aware of their potential for power. Women raise the children and have the ability to influence future generations' attitudes toward women. Women also possess numerical strength in most SADCC countries, particularly in the rural areas. And yet it is the same women who vote in all-male local development bodies or councils. Women must be educated to act as pressure groups, to realize the power of their vote and the way it can be used to bargain for equal political, economic, and social opportunities. □

# The Legacy of Exclusion

BY IVY MATSEPE-CASABURRI

*Women in southern Africa play a critical role in their national economies, particularly in agricultural production, yet as a group, they remain peripheral to development strategies and to the political structures that govern the nations of the region. In order to understand why little attention has been focused on improving the status and participation of women in national development efforts, it is necessary to examine the region's historical background and political economy as it affects women, the nature of their participation in the labor sector, and the extent to which they have access to the resources of their societies. By providing such a framework, insights can be gained into why special attention should be placed on women in relation to the bread-and-butter issues of scarce food supplies and chronic skills shortages.*

The nine nations of independent southern Africa — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe — joined together in 1980 to form the Southern African Develop-

ment Coordination Conference (SADCC), recognizing the need to lessen South Africa's economic domination and to promote the subregion's self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The countries of southern Africa, the longest colonized region in the continent, share the challenge of overcoming the slow pace of development arising from South Africa's dominant economic position.

The decolonization period that began in the mid-1960s has been marked by socioeconomic crises manifested by increasing levels of poverty, decreases in food production self-sufficiency, high levels of unemployment, and deterioration of the health status in the region. A particularly disturbing aspect of this crisis has been the worsening position of women within their societies. The marginal position in which women find


themselves cannot be divorced from the socioeconomic and historical realities of southern Africa. This article is intended to provide a brief overview of the position of women, with a focus on those belonging to disadvantaged groups, because it is these women who are engaged with their menfolk in the daily struggle for survival.

## THE BACKGROUND

South Africa's highly industrialized economy, similar in many respects to the economies of the West, exists side by side with the underdeveloped economies of the bantustans and of the neighboring countries in southern Africa. The integration of southern Africa into the world economy, via white expropriation of African lands and uneven capital investment in the various countries, resulted in structural imbalances

Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, a South African, is a development consultant specializing in issues relating to women. This article is excerpted from a longer study she prepared for a regional conference on women in southern Africa, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in November 1982. The study is available from the African-American Institute.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA





that are causal factors in the region's underdevelopment.

White encroachment on African land had direct repercussions on both men and women of the region reducing the land base and productive capacity of each family or household unit. In these primarily agricultural economies, men were traditionally involved in raising stock and clearing of new fields, whereas women provided much of the labor in subsistence agriculture. Not only did reduced available land area decrease women's economic productivity, but it increased their dependence upon their husbands and fathers, hence reinforcing the patriarchal system and reducing women's social power.

Manpower was required to integrate the southern African region into the world economy, and so male labor was extracted from the African areas. The development of a regional economy that relied upon coerced, low-wage labor (in particular for the South African mining industry) undermined the self-sufficiency of the subsistence agricultural sectors in the African areas. Labor migration became the mechanism through which the dependency of newly independent countries upon South Africa was maintained, and in some southern African nations this system remains today. For example, as much as 50% of the adult male population of Lesotho at a given time may be employed in the South African mines. In Malawi, 33% of the male population works outside the country, and in Botswana, 80% of the households are headed by women. In those areas from which labor extraction was the heaviest, stagnation in agriculture was the most severe.

The effects of male migration weigh heavily on women and have led to a modification in the traditional sexual division of labor. Women were required to become full-time agriculturalists; and because of their limited access to resources, the productivity of agriculture declined. Lowered food production and a bias toward raising cash crops has had serious effects on the health of women and children. With the mechanization of agriculture, little was done to increase women's access to new skills and technologies. Modern methods of farming were taught to men rather than to the dominant subsistence

producers — women. This practice has resulted in an increased definition of sex roles, and hence sexual inequalities. These historical processes have eroded the power and position of women in southern Africa.

### FOOD PRODUCTION AND HEALTH

Female labor participation in southern Africa is highest in agriculture, the dominant form of production. The magnitude of rural women's labor and the range of their activities has been underestimated or ignored. National statistics rarely take into account women's subsistence activities, characterizing women instead as "economically inactive." Changes in traditional patterns resulting from male migration and the commercialization of agricultural production have resulted in an increase in the number of tasks women perform and therefore a decrease in overall productivity. Women are involved not only in food production, but in its processing and distribution as well. They also build their homes — constructing walls, making mud bricks, and preparing the thatch — and perform activities such as hunting and gathering to make ends meet.

Women's workloads can be lessened by the use of tools and animals, by proximity to water supplies, and by access to technical expertise. But women's opportunities to make use of such aids are limited. The majority of female-headed households own no cattle or draft animals. In Botswana, a cattle-rearing country, almost 50% of households headed by women own no cattle, and of those that do possess cattle, 60% own fewer than 10.

In addition, land ownership and use is often based upon the communal system, through which control is in the hands of the chief. Allocation is made only to men as heads of households in Botswana, and there is a similar pattern throughout the region. According to custom, women who are single cannot be allocated land, and therefore women frequently find themselves forced to utilize the least productive land areas.

Changes in the traditional patterns of agricultural production have had significant repercussions in the areas of health and nutrition. Health problems stem from inadequate food production, a result of land deterioration, lack of

labor resources, or substitution of nutritionally inferior but less labor-intensive crops such as cassava for more nutritious foodstuffs such as maize and millet. Where women are engaged in schemes to produce cash crops, it is often at the expense of home gardens where more nutritious food is grown. To fulfill their food needs, they often purchase inferior, processed food from their meager earnings.

Chronic malnutrition and *kwashiorkor*, a disease produced by severe protein deficiency, are prevalent among women and children in all southern African countries. In South Africa, particularly in the homelands, malnutrition is the single largest killer of children. An estimated 50,000 die each year from malnutrition and related diseases. Deficiencies in protein and vitamins exacerbate the problem, and anaemia is widespread. Other diseases, the effects of which are made worse by nutritional poverty, include gastroenteric infections, dysentery, measles, and malaria, all of which have devastating consequences on rural populations.

A study conducted by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Zimbabwean Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs revealed that rural women were aware of the connection between health problems such as *kwashiorkor* and malnutrition and their socioeconomic status but felt powerless to improve the situation because of lack of resources and capital.

### EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Most of the women engaged in wage employment in southern Africa work either in agriculture, as permanent or seasonal/casual labor, or in domestic service. Where demand for permanent agricultural labor is highest, casual labor is drawn from the dependents, usually the women, who live with the employees on the farm or in surrounding villages. In Lesotho, women often divide their time between activities in the subsistence sector and wage employment as casual laborers, which often provides women's only access to cash.

In South Africa, 33% of the African farm labor is female, of which 52% is casual. These women are employed in

low-wage labor, earning only about 49% of male wages. Casual work is not protected by labor legislation on minimum wages and maximum hours of work. Because they earn only minor remuneration from casual work, women in some cases resort to prostitution to generate income, particularly during seasonal low demand for labor.

Changing agricultural technology has had severe implications for women's employment. Although the introduction of mechanization affects both male and female labor, technological improvements such as mechanical fruit picking, chemical weeding, and the use of combine harvesters in maize production have a specific impact upon women, since it is they who performed those tasks by hand. The result is an increase in female seasonal unemployment with severe consequences to the household, which is heavily dependent upon such income.

Throughout southern Africa, the domestic service sector is the second-largest employer of black women. Except in Zimbabwe and Namibia, where domestic service is dominated by men, it is women who provide this form of labor. Historically, domestic service constituted the initial point of incorporation of black women into the wage labor market. In South Africa today, women are drawn primarily from the homelands to accept low-paying, exploitative positions as domestics. Although the South African influx control system restricts entrance of women from the homelands into the urban areas, the stream of women seeking domestic employment has not slackened, because these are the only jobs available to those with little skills.

The governments of independent nations have attempted to regulate the domestic sector through legislation concerning minimum wage and working hours. But the "private" nature of the work makes efforts to improve labor conditions very difficult. Although workers may have government protection against gross forms of exploitation, the domestic sector is dependent upon personal relationships and racial and class attitudes, rendering women workers virtually powerless. Working hours are long, wages low, and conditions harsh.

Women are also involved in wage



Health clinic in Zimbabwe: Chronic malnutrition and kwashiorkor are prevalent among women and children in southern Africa

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

employment in the textile, clothing, and food industries. South Africa possesses the most well-established base in those industries, making it difficult for smaller countries to establish their own. South African factories located in the border industrial areas attract abundant and cheap female labor from the neighboring countries and the homelands. In some cases, women are paid 40% less than men for their work. Since the black-ruled governments surrounding South Africa cannot justify paying such low wages to their workers, they have not been able to compete with South African manufacturing. For this reason, those industries that have traditionally been employers of female labor are absent from the developing countries.

Government is the third-largest employer of women in southern Africa, in health-related fields (nurses, aides, cleaners, and hospital laundry workers), in teaching, and in secretarial work. Teaching has been an attractive profession for women because traditionally it has been one of the few professional career choices. In addition, it provides job security and maternity leave (whether paid or unpaid). Many colonial governments, however, employed only unmarried women on a permanent basis. Once women married, they became temporary workers,

and it was therefore possible for a married teacher to be employed for 10 to 15 years without a promotion or salary increase. Teaching is still one of the lowest-paid and least prestigious jobs within government.

Women are relegated to service jobs in the modern sector, including positions as sales clerks, cashiers, and bank tellers. These types of jobs do not prepare them for administration or policy-making positions and in fact rarely require a high school diploma. Therefore educational and employment opportunities for women in the productive sectors of the economy must be expanded.

Because some governments have accepted International Labour Organization guidelines, working conditions for women in government are better than in other sectors, and job security is greater. Industry and manufacturing provide very insecure employment for women. They are often dismissed if discovered to be pregnant. It is argued that their productivity is lessened and that the companies cannot afford to pay maternity benefits.

The low wages women receive require other members of the family to find work. Family life is disrupted as a consequence. Young children who need attention must be left with older female relatives and nonworking

female youth in the absence of affordable daycare. Working women leave home early and return late because of the long distances they must travel for employment and irregular and expensive public transport, and thus the care of the children suffers. Many urban black women are the sole supporters of their families. But because employers generally consider women dependents employed only for "pocket money," they are reluctant to provide opportunities for training and advancement.

Because of their limited access to employment in the modern sector, women are engaged in a variety of informal economic activities such as petty trading, handicrafts, marketing agricultural produce, and brewing beer. Participation in this sector increases in countries where the domestic economy is depressed. Informal employment provides only marginal sources of income and does not offer the possibility of providing women with any meaningful economic independence. Rather it is one aspect of the survival strategies employed by women.

#### EDUCATION AND LEGAL STATUS

Education is a necessary although not sufficient requirement for an improvement in the status of women and their effective participation in national development. Historically in southern Africa, schools institutionalized racial and male domination by equating blackness with inferiority and the female gender with subordination and domesticity. The perception of women as less competent, independent, and analytical than men overtook traditional images of African women as self-reliant and economically productive.

Access to education is determined by race, class, and sex, although not in any consistent manner throughout the region. Educational opportunities for male and female children are often dependent upon the sexual division of labor. In crop-producing areas reliant upon female labor, a higher percentage of boys are educated, and the converse is true for regions dominated by animal husbandry. Overall, girls outnumber boys at the elementary school level, since parents are reluctant to lose boys' labor. In addition, in those areas where there are high rates of male migration,

there are higher ratios of educated females. But at the secondary and higher education levels, participation of women declines in all countries. Class position appears to be the determinant variable in women's access to higher education. Women whose families are in higher socioeconomic brackets are more likely to be educated and receive parental encouragement.

The legal status of women in many of the southern African nations is determined by a hybrid of traditional or customary law and Western law. The colonial powers, in institutionalizing racial domination, in some cases imposed laws designed to support the values of "tribal society" and at other times sought to undermine the same traditions, depending upon what they perceived as advantageous to them. This conflicting trend partially explains the contradictory and disadvantageous legal position of African women.

In South Africa, the legal status of women was determined by whether her family adhered to African customary law or whether they were Christian and hence governed by hybrid Western-traditional law. Some aspects of customary law that are beneficial to women are not practiced. For example, in traditional society, women had unassailable rights over property acquired through



Road building in Lesotho: The effects of male labor migration weigh heavily on women

their professional services as midwives, herbalists, or potters. However, under the hybrid laws, a working woman may not be entitled to her own salary, nor even, upon the death of her husband, to her own home and children. Women are often not aware of their legal status or the implications of the laws under which they were married. Traditional laws dealing with property rights and inheritance are generally disadvantageous to women.

Many of the consequences of these laws directly inhibit women's income-generating activities. Women have been able to open savings accounts, but they may open checking accounts only with the permission of their husbands, because such accounts involve the extension of credit, which women are prohibited from receiving. Women's lack of access to credit is a major impediment to those wishing to go into business. Governments have generally been indifferent to changing the legal status of women, although some progress is being made in this regard in newly independent Zimbabwe (see "Removing Laws That Oppress Women," in this issue).

#### A DIFFICULT ROAD AHEAD

The economic problems inherited by the independent nations of southern Africa emanate directly from the legacy of exploitation of the peoples of the region. Transforming these societies and improving the lives of the women is extremely difficult because cultural impediments to change, such as discriminatory legislation, are deeply rooted in the structures that sought to control the black populations. Analyses of development strategies indicate that little attention has been focused on the socioeconomic and cultural realities impeding women's advancement. Women can and should be provided with improved educational opportunities and access to skills, expertise, and employment in both the modern and subsistence sectors of their economies. Yet such steps will not have widespread impact unless comprehensive changes are made in the very structures that impede development and progress in southern Africa. In the meantime, the task of transforming women's status will be an uphill struggle. □



# Gaining Political Power

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BY GWENDOLINE KONIE

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**M**ost of the political structures under which we in Africa are governed were erected hurriedly by the negotiators for our independence and the colonial governments in order to speed up independence. The last thought in their minds was the question of equality for women. The overriding consideration was equality for the African. All of the discriminatory tendencies that may appear in the basic documents upon which our governments are built are inherited. It may well be true of all our countries that there are in fact

no principles of discrimination against women included in any of our national constitutions. Why then is women's integration into political structures an issue?

It is apparent that women should play an increased role in the political life of their nations from the grass roots to the national level. But why are they not doing so? Is their inadequate perfor-

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Gwendoline Konie: "Why are there so few women in the existing political structures?"

Photo: George Hallert

other supportive means should be taken to ensure that the contributions of women from the grass roots to the national level are adequate? The answers are not difficult to find. They have been discussed over the past few years in both national and international forums. The difficulty has always been in their implementation. First, the political parties should as a matter of policy give women a quota of posts in the political hierarchy. Secondly, governments should, in order to increase and facilitate the participation of women in the political life of their nations, set aside a specific number of places on commissions, committees, and bureaus at the national level. Third, special steps should be taken to identify and select women whenever possible as project managers, advisers, and experts, and to provide them with national and international fellowships. Fourth, research and evaluation of political structures must be taken by individual governments on a priority basis in order to discover factors impeding the full participation of women in the political fields. Fifth, women's organizations in individual countries must be mobilized to propagate information to make women more aware of their political systems. Sixth, individual governments should take the necessary steps to provide training for women along with support services including child care and household management. Seventh, where promotion, placement, and assignment is concerned, special efforts should be made to give women the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities in senior-level policy-making posts and to provide them with challenging positions to allow them to expand their skills. And lastly, at the grass-roots level, the imperative for governments is to create programs designed to mobilize women in such a way that they can uplift themselves and be assimilated into the structures of mainstream national politics.

It is necessary to examine briefly the significance of the grass-roots level. In my view, it is the most important element in overall national development. More than 60 percent of our communities are found at this level, which is characterized by a lack of education and skills. The majority of these people

are living below the poverty line and yet the future of our nations depends on them.

We in the policymaking positions are the privileged few. If we find it difficult to place ourselves in the mainstream of the politics of our nations, it is infinitely more difficult for the people at the grass-roots level to do so. When we think of women at that level having equal participation and contributions within the framework of existing structures, we have to be aware of the special set of challenges around the whole issue. One of the most difficult problems is that because the present structures have grown out of the rigid Western concept of party organization, they naturally take some forms that are not responsive to the needs of the grass-roots. The strategies for developing the grass-roots level. This in turn makes the development of human resources and their distribution somewhat difficult.

This phenomenon is common in all our countries, and it is at this level that the glaring gaps begin to show. There exist not only gaps between the traditional and modern sectors of our developing nations, but also gaps between men and women; and when there is an elite tradition of educated women, a gap emerges between them and the uneducated women. This factor affects

the functioning of the political structure. The only answer under these circumstances appears to be the introduction of dualistic development programs. While wide-scale educational and training programs designed to meet the challenge by closing the gaps must be introduced in order to bring both men and women into the modern sector on the one hand, efficient change-oriented programs aimed at women's full participation in mainstream political structures must also be mounted. This kind of effort, if well designed, should ultimately result in improvements in the organization of national politics as a whole.

In relation to national political structures, I would like to refer to some ideas proposed by Rosabeth Moss Kanter in her paper, "Changing Organizational Constraints: Toward Promoting Equal Opportunity and Treatment for Women in Public Service Systems" (this paper appears as chapter 12 in "The United Nations and Decision-Making: The Role of Women," Volume II).

Kanter maintains that because public service organizations "have sometimes grown out of earlier colonial administrations, they may have a form that is not necessarily responsive to the current needs of the nation or reflective of the best strategies for developing the



"Women should be assimilated into the mainstream of national political structures"

Photo: A. Matheson/UNICEF



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Photo: A. Matheson/UNICEF

national labor pool and effectively deploying human resources."

A corollary is that most national political structures have tried to get around the problem of unresponsiveness by establishing informal power structures that coexist alongside the formal structures of authority. This kind of development, according to Kanter, enables a country's own traditions to be grafted onto the structure.

She further maintains that the informal structure may sometimes determine the relative influence of people in leadership positions quite distinct from the official hierarchical distinctions. It may also have great influence on whose support is necessary before a decision is made. It is my opinion, however, that this formal structure is more effective and prominent at the grass-roots level than at the national level.

A critical appraisal of the main political structures reveals that, in the main, women are often peripheral to the decision-making mechanisms of existing structures. They are therefore not likely to play effective leadership roles and, as Kanter explains, the constraints that arise become both structural and socio-psychological, resulting in "organizational powerlessness." Organizational powerlessness is something that we all must have experienced at one point or another. It often breeds counterproductive responses, such as, according to Kanter, limiting a "leader's effectiveness by arousing a rigid authoritative leadership style; and generating another vicious circle constraining the success and full participation of women. Those favorably placed in the power structure are more likely to be preferred and effective as leaders, and, thus, do gain more power. People who are excluded from the formal power structure and who are not given much power to back up their functioning as leaders also become less effective leaders, generating lower morale and reinforcing their powerlessness."

I began my analysis by providing critical commentary regarding the performance of women in leadership roles, and then examined the adequacy or inadequacy of existing structures. Suggestions were made as to steps governments can take to ensure greater participation of women in these structures,

and the structural and socio-psychological constraints were also discussed. All these emphasize just how colossal is the problem that we are facing.

In Zambia, for example, in order to try and achieve effective participation of women, a dualistic program for the development of women was introduced. And in order to reach the grass roots from rural areas, the government formulated a policy of convening village-level development committees to enable people to come together to discuss and plan their own development strategies. The next step was the establishment of area development committees, which are composed of representatives from the village committees. Representatives of the area committees then grouped into ward committees. These groups are composed of both men and women.

Running parallel to this is a structure exclusively for women known as the "Women's League." The aim of the league is also to develop leadership among women from villages to the towns. Its hierarchy moves from sections to branches, wards, districts, and finally to provincial organs that are affiliated with the National Council of the Women's League.

Alongside this runs the integrated United National Independence party to which the Women's League is affiliated. The league in Zambia wields substantial political power. This power is reinforced by the fact that there are women on the voter rolls.

I am not suggesting that the political structure of Zambia is ideal. It has most of the weaknesses that I have already mentioned. However, nobody else can perfect our own systems for us. We must do it ourselves. The same applies to the rest of us vis-à-vis our national structures, as we are even less likely to introduce completely new and untried structures. What we need to do is find ways of improving the existing structures:

- By designing means of overcoming the problem of low opportunity and low mobility in the political hierarchy.
- By bringing about the necessary changes through access to advancement in the political hierarchy for those in low-mobility positions.

- By providing training programs to back up opportunity-enhancing structural interventions.
- By ensuring that wherever informal power structures appear, action is taken to remove the constraints these place on decision makers who have no back-up power.
- By ensuring the decentralization of formal power, and the delegation of decision-making authority downwards, as this can only help to empower people caught in powerless positions.
- By identifying those areas where decision-making power can be distributed more widely and providing access to the power structure for women, who are most likely to be excluded.
- By providing meetings and events that give women an opportunity to come into contact with power-holders.
- By ensuring a healthy sex ratio in the political structures, thereby avoiding tokenism.
- By developing in the initial stages strong women's networks to enable women to offer each other feedback and support.
- By providing, wherever possible, flexible organizational structures to facilitate movement from one political arm to the other.

In conclusion, strategies for change can only succeed if based upon thorough and critical analysis of the prevailing structures. Further, such changes can only work if the comment of all key members of the structures in question is sought, particularly of those who are capable of implementing the changes. It must, however, be borne in mind that the cultural context differs from country to country and, therefore, from structure to structure. The role of research as a critical part of any new change project cannot be overemphasized. We must be aware that almost all serious research in this field has been carried out in Western countries. The very structures we are grappling with are Western oriented. It is imperative, therefore, that our nations undertake specific studies in order to increase the prospects for effective innovation in the administration of party politics in order to ensure that our special needs can be accommodated. □

# Southern African Women Speak Out

*The following statements are excerpts from interviews conducted by Africa Report with women representing various walks of life in southern Africa. Whether trade unionists, government officials, or members of a liberation movement, women in southern Africa, by virtue of their nations' similar colonial histories, share similar concerns about the status of women in their societies. Here, six women offer their perspectives on what constraints hinder change, what progress has been achieved, and what is yet to be done.*

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## MOZAMBIQUE

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### Isabel Nkavadeka, Mozambican Women's Organization (OMM)

The Mozambican Women's Organization, formed in 1973, is a democratic organization deeply rooted in the struggle of the Mozambican people led by the Frelimo party. The OMM was created during the liberation struggle because we felt that the women's army branch did not sufficiently involve all the women in the country in the war against the Portuguese colonialists. Therefore it was necessary to create a mass organization.

Today, under the direction of Frelimo, Mozambican women participate actively in building our socialist society and in consolidating our revolutionary conquests. Under Frelimo's guidance, the OMM has as its fundamental task the mobilization, organization, and integration of women into the nation's reconstruction projects in order to obtain economic independence. Women participate in all social, political, economic, and cultural sectors of the national reconstruction process.

During the national liberation war, the OMM mobilized women to work in agricultural cooperatives and also organized women in factories, hospitals, and other work places. Today, the OMM encourages women to make use of

local raw materials to meet the needs of the community. Hundreds of women are involved in poultry and piggery centers under our direction, and these projects contribute to women's economic emancipation.

Conscious that traditional and colonial education relegated women to a status of obscurity and ignorance, OMM believes one of its major priorities is that of increasing women's access to education—political, technical, social, and scientific. At the national level, we have two training centers, which run with the support of the Ministry of Health and offer training, skills, and literacy programs to women. Courses in health education, nutrition, and child welfare are provided. There are 10 regional centers planned, of which three are now in operation, offering vocational



Isabel Nkavadeka: "Mozambican women participate actively in building our socialist society"

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki



training to women from the villages who return home to implement what they have learned.

The OMM reaches Mozambican women from the grass roots to the national level, operating on the local, district, provincial, and national levels. We hold conferences to formulate our national program for a period of five years, in addition to having monthly local assemblies whereby the rural women are mobilized. The OMM receives the bulk of its support from Frelimo, but all our decisions on activities and programs are reached by the women of Mozambique.

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## NAMIBIA

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### Ellen Musialela, South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) Women's Council

The struggle of Namibian women goes back as far as 1884, when the Germans invaded our country. Our women fought side by side with the men. Although women did not take part physically in the war, it was their duty to help the soldiers who were fighting. They participated by protecting and caring for the wounded. The Germans reacted viciously against the women, arresting them and sending them to other German colonies. After the Germans were defeated in our country, the women continued the struggle with our men against the apartheid regime of South Africa.

The women are in the forefront of resistance because it is we who are most affected by the apartheid system and bantustanization. Many of our men go away for months at a

time to work in the South African mines and multinational corporations, while the women are left in the villages. Their work is to till the land, to give birth to the children and look after them, and to raise livestock to support the children so that they can be fed and go to school. The money our men earn is not sufficient to care for the whole family. Our women are very strong, as they must be to carry the responsibilities of the village and the family.

The Namibian women's struggle began on December 10, 1959, when South Africa attempted to remove our people forcibly from their homes. Women responded by immediately launching a strike. Therefore that day is commemorated as Namibia Women's Day. Resistance was engineered by the women. Many people, including women and children, were killed or wounded during this incident. The woman who led the resistance, Kakulukaze Mungunda, is our heroine today.

On April 19, 1960, SWAPO was formed. At that time, few women came to the forefront to show they were willing to fight physically. Yet women in the rural areas and even in the urban areas continued to resist the authorities. Other women did leave the country to wage the struggle side by side with men. Through their work, women inside Namibia were encouraged to become politically conscious and in the early 1970s, began to organize rallies. They were frequently harassed, beaten, and jailed without trial. With the independence of Angola and Mozambique, more women left the country to join the ranks of the people's liberation army and take up arms with our men.

The SWAPO Women's Council was formed in 1969 to mobilize our women and make them understand the need both to fight along with the men against our common enemy, South Africa, and to abolish some of the traditional laws that hinder women's progress. We continue to teach our women that solidarity with the international community and with other international women's organizations is very important. We are mobilizing women in many areas—in agriculture, in literacy campaigns, and even in the battlefield—to take up positions as commanders, communications officers, and combatants. Many of our women have responded.

There are four women members of the SWAPO central committee, but this number is still too low. Because women traditionally were denied education, it is difficult for us to express ourselves. Our president, Sam Nujoma, is very much in favor of incorporating women, and he supports efforts to find scholarships and mobilize funds to enable us to go to the refugee camps and educate the women.

We hope that the international community will come to our aid to help us educate our women. We aim to prepare them for a free Namibia where we will work side by side with our men in reconstructing the country. We need women doctors, engineers, and scientists.

We have started a small weaving project, and also sewing and knitting projects, in the refugee camp in Angola. Although we have not reached a stage where we can generate income, these projects are helpful because they produce garments for our men and children. We have poultry and piggery projects in Zambia, and our women are very in-



Ellen Musialela: "Namibian women are in the forefront of resistance to apartheid"

Photo: George Hallett

volved in agriculture as well, producing potatoes and maize. We also have a driving school and a typing school. We need international sponsors who can provide us with training. The international community has been very helpful in our bitter struggle; we will not let it down. We hope the solidarity it has shown will continue in a free Namibia.

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## SOUTH AFRICA

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### Mittah Seperepere, African National Congress (ANC) Women's Section

The role of the ANC is to wage the liberation struggle to free South Africa. Within the ANC, the women of South Africa have never lagged behind. We have always fought side by side with our men. The ANC was established in 1912, and in 1913 our women started waging a campaign against passes, which culminated in the mass demonstration of 1956, in which 30,000 women participated. Not only are women politically involved in the struggle against apartheid, but there are quite a large number of our young women at the battlefront.

I joined the ANC during the time of the 1956 pass campaign, organizing women, particularly in the rural areas. The struggle continues both from within the country and from outside. Our women are fighting the enemy on many fronts, through bus boycotts and factory strikes, for better working and living conditions until South Africa is free.

### Maphiri Masakela, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of Azania Women's Section

Our struggle is not against apartheid; it is against colonialism. The whites came and settled in our country, usurped our land, and began to oppress the indigenous African peoples. Therefore as women in the liberation movement we define our struggle purely in anticolonial terms. Thus in this respect we women are not different from our men, because the land was taken from all of us. Women's struggles must be related at every stage to the struggle being waged by the people. Politics is our everyday life because our people suffer daily—they are murdered in cold blood, detained for long periods of time, and banished to remote areas where they cannot even grow food to survive. The South African women's struggle is very political and economic.

As all women in southern Africa do, we women have specific problems we must address. Within our liberation movement, we find that women lag behind both in representation and in decision making. We must work harder to educate ourselves, and the PAC women's section is striving to improve educational opportunities, especially because many young women left South Africa during the 1976 national uprising and missed out on secondary schooling.



Photo: George Hallett

Maphiri Masakela: "The South African women's struggle is very political and economic"

We have established a multipurpose center in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, with an emphasis on educational activities, including secondary and vocational training and agricultural projects. One of our priority needs is a daycare center to allow women the time to develop their skills and participate in party activities. Women within South Africa are aware of their oppression, and the level of their politicization is increasing. We who are outside the country are trying to establish links with the women inside so as to work hand in hand in our struggle against oppression.

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## ZAMBIA

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### Alice Siame, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Women's Advisory Committee

I became involved in the trade union movement in Zambia first at the branch level and then at the district level, and finally was elected deputy secretary general for my union. During that time, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions established the Women's Advisory Committee, of which I was elected secretary. The labor movement established the committee in order to address women's problems in the workplace. We in the labor movement agitated for the establishment of this committee because we felt men could not adequately represent our problems and needs. We also wanted to encourage more women to take part in trade union affairs, because the labor movement is dominated by men.





Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

**Alice Slame: "If women are involved in trade union leadership, they become effective tools of reform"**

Women workers face both family problems and difficulties with employers. They are required to rush off and look after their children, and married women are often not allowed by their husbands to take part in other activities. Our committee has served as an inspiration to women in other institutions because we are seen as women who have taken up the challenge in accepting leadership roles. We have seen more and more women joining the labor movement. It is not really our duty to change men's attitudes, because men do respect us for what we do.

Women in Zambia are ready to take up the challenge as more enter economic life in commerce, manufacturing, civil service, and business. The Zambian woman, however, is not alienated from the problems that affect women in developing countries. The majority of our women live and work in rural areas and are engaged in agricultural activities as well as the provision of family necessities. With the advent of industrialization, women are becoming economic and social assets. They have responded favorably to changes brought about by urbanization, in conflict with the traditional role of women in Africa.

Zambia is one of the countries that have ratified the International Labour Organization's conventions regarding equal remuneration and equal opportunities. We in the labor movement eagerly await ratification of the ILO convention pertaining to paid maternity leave. Although Zambian law does not discriminate against women, discrimination still exists in employment and in other areas. A married woman cannot get a mortgage or a loan without the consent of her husband, because she is regarded as a minor. We want the taxation laws revised, because the woman's income is fully

taxed while her husband receives tax allowances for the family. It is the woman's heavily taxed salary that usually provides for the children, for clothing, and for food. We need to have legal backing so that women can have their fair share.

When a woman enters the formal work force, she has two jobs. She must work in the home, an activity both time consuming and demanding but rarely acknowledged as productive labor, and in paid employment. Some women are required to work because they are single parents and shoulder the responsibility of raising the children. The number of women entering the work force is increasing, as are the difficulties. Women are not promoted, because existing career patterns are based on unbroken continuity of service, which women cannot fulfill because of childbearing. Women also suffer from discriminatory employment contracts, lack of education and training, and sexual harassment.

Trade unions are organizations that can help us achieve our goals. Women who go in trade unions not only improve their working conditions, but also protect and defend their interests as women workers. Our main effort in the labor movement is to bargain for better working conditions on behalf of the women members. If women are involved in trade union leadership, they become effective tools of reform. Like any other organization, the labor movement is dominated by men, but it is placing a greater emphasis on training working women and is encouraging their participation in all sectors through the Women's Advisory Committee.

Government can respond to the problems faced by women workers by addressing the following: elimination of obstacles to women's employment; introduction of flexible working hours; ratification of ILO conventions on maternity leave; equal opportunities in training and promotion; and establishment of daycare centers.

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## ZIMBABWE

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### **Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs**

Prime Minister Mugabe and his government after independence saw the need to establish our ministry as a result of research done on women during the struggle. The policy of this government concerning women aims at a transformation of women's status so that they can assume their rightful role in society as participants alongside men on the basis of full equality. The government regards the ministry as an arm through which the general development of our communities and in particular the development of our women can be effected. The department of women's affairs has a program for the progressive removal of all customary, social, economic, and legal disabilities that women have suffered in the past and still suffer now.

My ministry started by embarking on a needs assessment survey, which examined the situation of women with respect to various socioeconomic and legal aspects. With re-

gard to employment, it was observed that most of the work done by women in the rural areas was not accounted for in the gross national product. But given the present structure of the rural economy in Zimbabwe, women's work in agriculture and in the home is fundamental to the survival of their families. As is the case elsewhere in Africa, women's work is either ignored or paid lip service recognition only. Statistics of the past listed 80 percent of women as economically inactive, despite their vital role as food producers and subsidizers of the modern sector of the economy.

There is a need for a new definition and evaluation of work to take into account the contributions made by women. In the urban areas, statistics show that black women comprise only 6.8 percent of the total black and white labor force in the nonagricultural sector. This finding means that only a very small fraction of women as a human resource are gainfully employed.

Education is usually considered a necessary though not sufficient condition for effective participation in national development. In Zimbabwe, education, perhaps second only to race, was the major determining factor in economic participation during the colonial period. This was because of initial male-directed recruitment processes and the resultant parental bias against the education of girls. It is not then surprising that educational needs rank first in the list of priorities for women in the urban areas and are second only to income-generating concerns for women in the rural areas. The ability to read and write is often a steppingstone to education for economic, civic, and social participation.

Women as citizens are entitled to certain basic rights, as stipulated in the constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. In practice, some of these rights are abrogated because of outdated cultural practices or colonial versions of customary law. Women as human beings have suffered injustice because of gender more than anything else. As citizens, they deserve a fair share of social resources to enable them to contribute in family, individual, and community development.

Since independence, the government has adopted several strategies to enhance the position of women. Men and women now get equal pay for equal work. Women now have the right to maternity leave, although at the moment it is without pay. One of the greatest achievements of my ministry is the passage of the Legal Age of Majority Act, which, although it does not provide much to the emancipation of women, is a pivot for the removal of other discriminatory laws. A declaration of women's rights and customary law reform bills are also in the pipeline. The ministry also has a training department, and several courses have been held to enable women's groups and community development workers at the grass-roots level to identify women's disadvantaged status and recommend ways of redressing the situation. Some of the training is aimed at developing skills in project design and management in order to enable women leaders to advise women on village development, on viable development projects, and on their successful management.

The ministry has encouraged various income-generating and development projects for women in the rural areas, such as poultry farming, market gardening, dressmaking, and



Teurai Ropa Nkhongo: "Women's work is either ignored or paid lip-service recognition"

Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

craftwork. These have been made possible by aid from various donor agencies. The ministry still has a lot to do to achieve our goal of the total emancipation of women. Some of the strategies we would recommend follow. As an interim measure, a quota system could be established in order to reserve a certain percentage of job places in the public and private sector, in schools and in training colleges for women. More promotions of suitable women to top-level jobs could be effected through a governmental or presidential directive.

There is a need for a declaration of women's rights to property in cases of divorce, legal separation, or death, and the right to acquire municipal housing and custody of children. Massive adult literacy campaigns for women in the rural areas and family education on nutrition, child care, and legal rights should be mounted. There is also the need for massive social education to effect change of retrogressive social attitudes that form a major stumbling block to many of the development efforts. Women's development programs should be integrated in the conception and implementation of national development plans, thereby obliging every department to take up women's issues that are within its sphere of responsibility.

Although there might be slight differences in the problems of women in southern Africa, our region is united by the same historical social and cultural background and by cooperation agreements and the liberation struggle. There is a great need for women in the region to share ideas and information, and an efficient communications network must be established to achieve this objective. □

# Gong Dafei,

## Vice-Foreign Minister for African Affairs, the People's Republic of China

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INTERVIEWED BY COLIN LEGUM

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*During December 1982 and January 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China made an official tour of Africa, visiting Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaire, Congo, Gabon, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Kenya. It was the first visit to Africa by a high Chinese official since Chou En-lai came and declared the continent "ripe for revolution" in 1964. In retrospect, it is apparent that Chou was speaking in terms of revolutionary theory but at the time his remarks were interpreted by Westerners and conservative African governments to be China's prescription for curing Africa's problems. Others incorrectly determined that China was embarking upon a challenge to U.S. and Soviet influence in Africa. Though China has supported some guerrilla movements during the past two decades, it has remained far from the revolutionary vanguard.*

*Zhao extended China's hand to African countries representing a broad spectrum of ideologies, from pro-Western capitalist Kenya to pro-Soviet Congo. At the end of his journey, the People's Daily in Beijing declared that "China will not seek hegemonism" in Africa. Zhao's tour seemed to be designed to prove the Chinese government's sincerity in that regard. Zhao's speeches in the capitals he visited were low key, pragmatic, and devoid of revolutionary pretense and rhetoric. His emphasis was on practical cooperation and on the mutual advantages to China and Africa of working together toward common goals in international affairs and economic development.*

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*Shortly before Premier Zhao's visit, Colin Legum interviewed a member of his delegation, Gong Dafei, China's assistant minister in charge of African affairs, in Beijing.*

**AFRICA REPORT:** The impression I get from African leaders is that the interest of the People's Republic of China in the continent is declining. Is that so?

**GONG:** In the first place, I would like to say that very important changes are taking place in Africa, and there are lots more to come. The impression of a declining Chinese interest is a superficial one. It is not the truth. Over the past 33 years Africa has been very important to us, and this has been a consistent interest. This doesn't mean there has been a straight-line increase, but our general policy has remained unchanged. We have not followed a policy of expediency. Various factors determine our consistent policy. These vary in practice, but consistency is the key word in the policy we have pursued.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What are the elements that have decided your policy?

**GONG:** China and Africa have similar backgrounds—both have suffered from colonialist and imperialist rule. So it is very natural that we sympathize with and support each other. For both, independence is not the end, but the beginning of building a new future. Both Africa and China were backward at independence, whereas the Western countries were developed in industry, agriculture, and technology. So we and Africa have a common task in correcting that.

Every country formulates its policy based on self-interest. If we don't unite with Africa, we play a weak role in international affairs. So we need to unite with Africa to expand our own role. This was already our policy when Chou En-lai went to Africa in 1958 and stated the importance of our Five-Point Principles. These relations have been much enriched since then, but those basic principles remain unchanged despite the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Zedong.



The five principles are: (1) to fight against colonialism, (2) support nonalignment, (3) promote unity, (4) support the policy that disputes between African countries should be settled by talks among themselves, and (5) oppose interference and invasion from outside. We supplement these basic principles by supporting Africa's efforts at development on the basis of self-reliance, and through efforts to achieve a New International Economic Order.

When Chou En-lai first went to Africa, not all of the then 34 independent African countries recognized China. Now 45 of the 50 independent states have diplomatic relations with us. Both we and they are satisfied with the development of relations among ourselves. We support each other bilaterally as well as in international forums. We have a lot of economic cooperation and cultural exchanges.

**AFRICA REPORT:** How much economic aid has China given to Africa?

**GONG:** We haven't published any figures, but China has provided an average of \$390 million to each African country. For a country like ours it's really a huge burden, considering our own poverty. Our African friends have compared our efforts to somebody tightening his own belt to help others.

Our aid takes the form of either free gifts or low-interest

loans. Our aid policy is guided by the following principles: Latest technologies are offered, not outmoded ones. If debts can't be repaid on time, we allow deferment of up to 10-20 years. No strings are attached. We ask for no privileges for our exports or for the specialists we send. The main purpose is to help African countries become self-reliant and not to become dependent on us, and we hope sincerely that our poor friends will become rich. There is no point in our becoming rich if they stay poor. We seek nothing but that they themselves become richer.

We understand it when people say we don't attach as much importance as before to Africa. There was a decade of turmoil during the Cultural Revolution. We have only recently let people know about this. During that time we neglected our own economic development in favor of political development, and as a result we are in a bad way.

Also during recent years, China has normalized its relations with the United States and Japan, and increased its relations with Europe. This means that many things have needed to be done. Objectively, this gave people the impression that our attention was being given to Western countries rather than Africa.

There are two aspects of these new Western contacts. First, we need new technologies and management systems.



Nairobi: Premier Zhao Ziyang greets Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi during his 11-nation African tour

Second, we need to sort out a number of problems that are a legacy of past history; e.g., with Japan we need to discuss their textbooks; with the United States we have the question of Taiwan; and with the United Kingdom we have the issue of Hong Kong. But with African countries we don't have such historical problems, only friendship.

By 1977, when we removed the Gang of Four, we were on the verge of collapse and we had to rebuild. We still have a lot to do. Nevertheless, we still continue our agreed economic aid, but new items of aid are fewer and most of our total assistance is smaller than before.

From our past experience, we suggest to African friends that we start with small projects and those that yield quick results. For example, the Tanzam railway required lots of resources and time, and a considerable investment. This is true also of the port we helped build for Mauritania near Nouakchott. We can't repeat these big projects now.

There is also the need for serious consideration to be given as to the wealth that can be yielded by building a port like that in Mauritania. We say to our friends we will do our best but, actually, big projects like those in the future will need very serious consideration.

China is making efforts to fulfill its agreements with African countries; for example, in various areas like rice, sugar cane, vegetables, as well as in small processing industries, textile mills, and in highway construction. We are also meeting requests for building sports stadiums and people's palaces. At the moment we are considering building a people's palace in Gabon.

So, economic assistance is continuing, but the number of big projects are being cut down. Because of our national difficulties we are also less able to offer economic loans.

In the last few years a number of African heads of state have visited China, and they all understand our position at present. Our party and leaders say that, along with China's own national economic effort, we will gradually increase our economic assistance to African friends.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What of your relations with Angola?

**GONG:** Our recent talks with Angola in Paris went well. The situation was that during the independence struggle there were three factions and we supported all three. When the war of independence was won and the three factions were in a coalition, we said that China would stop helping all three.

China's consistent policy towards the independence struggle was to help them, so whenever they came for help we gave them appropriate assistance—no matter whether they were progressive or backward forces, because all were fighting against imperialism. We never interfere with the internal affairs of independent countries—how they develop is their own affair.

In the talks about diplomatic relations, Angola set two conditions: mutual recognition and no more Chinese support for UNITA. As to the first condition, we pointed out that we had already recognized the government since Premier Chou En-lai sent a telegram of congratulations to it at independence, and also supported it when the South African army invaded the country. So, de facto, we had already given our recognition. We had also given our moral support. Nevertheless, to show our respect for the Angolan people, we is-

sued a statement formally welcoming and recognizing the government of Angola. As for the second condition, Angola wanted us to say, along with our statement of mutual recognition, that we will stop helping UNITA and the FNLA. We think this is an unreasonable request since we had already said we were stopping aid to all three factions, so why the need now for saying that we are stopping aid to two of the factions? We always gave our aid through President Nyerere of Tanzania, and he would know whether we have stopped such assistance or not. If Savimbi says we help him, that is for reasons of his own propaganda.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What is your attitude to the struggle in South Africa, and to which of the national forces do you give your support?

**GONG:** The South African situation is different from the national independence struggle in other African states. Our embassies abroad have contacts with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), but not with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). South Africa has a population of 20 million, a quarter of them white who have lived there for several hundred years. We support the uprising of the blacks who want to solve the problems of the country. We believe that what is required is that the white regime abandon apartheid and racial discrimination so that blacks and whites should form a national government in which all races cooperate. To support either whites or blacks would only create confusion; white interests will be smashed and this won't benefit blacks. The big powers would get involved and that would lead to big trouble internationally.

After independence in Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Mugabe adopted a very wise policy towards the 200,000 whites in his country. As a result, whites now feel secure and are staying on, and this helps the country's economy. Many African leaders appreciate Mugabe's policies, which set an example for South Africa. For example, Sékou Touré told us so when he recently visited China.

The situation in South Africa is different from that in Algeria. The blacks can't drive the whites into the sea, and the whites can't continue with apartheid forever.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What pressures should be applied to bring about changes in South Africa?

**GONG:** We should encourage international pressures. Africans should be united in exerting more pressures of their own, and should also put pressures on big countries that have influence with South Africa. It will take time; this is a protracted struggle.

For example, the Arab-Palestinian versus Israel struggle has gone on for a long time. The war between them has got worse, and will only be solved through peaceful negotiations. The Arabs can't drive the Israelis into the sea, and the Israelis can't go on forever denying a homeland to the Palestinians.

**AFRICA REPORT:** What of the demand, especially by black youth in South Africa, for an armed struggle as the only means of securing fundamental changes in their society?

**GONG:** We, of course, understand this feeling, but the way we see it is that blacks should unite with progressive whites to change the political system. □



## Pretoria explores 'trial' ceasefire and buffer zone with Angola

South Africa and Angola, which reportedly have been negotiating for several months on a range of issues, were said in February to be seeking a two-month-long "trial" ceasefire and buffer zone on the Namibian border. If the ceasefire went well, then the UN's Namibia settlement plan might be implemented, presumably if negotiations over Pretoria's insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola were successful.

According to the plan, there would be a freeze on all military activity by SWAPO guerrillas, Angolan forces, South African troops and the Angolan rebel movement Unita, which is supported by Pretoria. Then, outside forces would be withdrawn from the area: the Cubans attached to the Angolan army would move to 185 miles north of the Namibian border, and South African troops would withdraw into Namibia. SWAPO forces, moni-

tored by Angola, would stay 250 miles north of the border, and Pretoria reportedly would promise to stop providing Unita with weapons and logistical support.

In the meantime, the U.S. would have the task of trying to persuade Angola that it should send the Cuban troops home.

These negotiations are reportedly only part of a series of agreements that South Africa was trying to reach with Angola over economic cooperation, but they all depend on the cessation of hostilities. South Africa is particularly interested in the completion and efficient management of the Ruacana hydroelectric system, which is intended to serve Namibia (and South Africa) as well as Angola. Another dam, the Lomaum in central Angola, was sabotaged on January 24, causing millions of dollars in damage. Angola said the attack was carried out by South Africans.

The Angolans want to reconstruct the southern and eastern parts of their country, which have been ravaged by eight years of civil war with Unita and by South African military attacks. One project would be the resumption of iron mining at Cassinga, a SWAPO base area subject to frequent South African ground raids and air strikes.

A major complication would be the future role of Dr. Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels, and there has been much speculation that the Angolan government may be willing to seek a political accommodation.

Namibia itself was under South Africa's direct rule again in February, after the Pretoria-created internal government resigned. (*New York Times*, February 3, 1983; *Johannesburg Star*, January 22 and 29, 1983; *Sowetan*, January 26, 1983; *London Times*, January 19, 1983.) □

## Alliance against 'co-opting' Coloureds

The surprise acceptance by the Coloured (mixed-race) Labor Party of the government's proposed limited sharing of power with Coloured and Indians—but not blacks—has galvanized a broad coalition of black, Coloured and Indian organizations united in opposition.

The purpose of this United Democratic Front was explained by Dr. Allan Boesak, a 36-year-old Coloured theologian who has played a central role among the "anticollaborationists." "People realize in this era the strength of the 'politics of refusal,'" he said, "where in the absence of political power they can say 'No' to any scheme which is politically immoral."

Last year, Boesak campaigned successfully in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches for the suspension of the Afrikaners' Dutch Reformed Church and subsequently was elected president of the church body.

The United Democratic Front includes two powerful unregistered black unions that have not previously participated in open politicking, the South African Allied Workers' Union and the General and Allied Workers' Union. It also includes the Transvaal Indian Congress, which was revived in order to help mobilize the rejectionist cam-

paign. The congress carried out with the now-banned African National Congress the passive resistance campaign of the 1950s. It was never outlawed but its leaders were banned or forced to leave the country.

The initial focus of the united front will be to organize a boycott of the election, probably later this year, that will put Coloureds and Indians into a new tricameral parliament. A rallying point will be the widespread belief that once the government gives Coloureds and Indians the vote it will then start drafting them.

The most vociferous opposition to the "co-opting" of Coloureds comes from the young. In February, two Labor Party meetings called to explain the decision to cooperate with the government were disrupted by young Coloureds, many of them from the Coloureds-only University of the Western Cape. The youths heckled and jeered Labor Party leaders, threw stones at them, and chanted, "We want Boesak."

Boesak, along with such black leaders as Bishop Desmond Tutu and Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi and the white opposition leader in parliament, Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, have warned that

*Continued on page 25*

# Mitterrand affirms continuance of French policy toward Africa

When Francois Mitterrand's Socialist Party came to power in France in 1981, Africa prepared itself for a major change in policy. Conservative governments and those accused of repression prepared for the worst while dissident groups in those countries expected to profit from their perceived allies in Paris. These feelings were reinforced when Mitterrand appointed Jean-Pierre Cot as his Minister for Cooperation and Overseas Development.

Cot had a reputation for being a staunch socialist and a captivating orator. He called on France to "decolonize" its relationships with francophone Africa. He openly stated that he "always read the Amnesty International report before he visited a country" and he made no secret of his preference for the "progressive" states.

The fears of the conservative states and the hopes of the progressives and dissidents disappeared quickly in December when Cot resigned after a series of disagreements with Mitterrand and his special adviser for African affairs, Guy Penne. Among the many issues involved were: the possible sale of a second nuclear reactor to South Africa, Mitterrand's decision to receive Guinean President Sekou Toure, the French government's reluctance to take a firmer stand against Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, and its failure to strongly condemn the apartheid government of South Africa.

African leaders such as Abdou Diouf of Senegal, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, and Omar Bongo of Gabon looked to Penne as the man in charge of African affairs and to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the president's son and a former reporter who was appointed chief aide to Penne last August. Given the choice of coming around to the government's *realpolitik* view or resigning, Cot chose the latter.

In mid-January, Mitterrand left on a five-day trip to Togo, Benin, and Gabon. It was his third visit to Africa since coming to power. On his first trip last May he stopped in Niger, Ivory Coast, and Senegal,

and on his second visit he attended the Franco-African summit meeting in Kinshasa.

France's adherence to its old pragmatism in African affairs was evident as Mitterrand assured the leaders and people of France's commitment to economic development and cooperation, and tried to smooth out the rough spots in his relations with each of the three countries.

Mitterrand seemed anxious to keep France out of intra-African politics, preferring to manage his relations bilaterally with individual states and leaving the broader is-

ssues to international bodies. A Mitterrand spokesman said that the OAU should play the main role in pulling African states away from the grip of the superpowers. Later, in his speeches, Mitterrand expressed concern for the rifts that had developed within the ranks of the OAU while he praised the "long-established and celebrated African wisdom" that would "overcome dangerous quarrels." (*West Africa*, January 17 and 24, 1983; *Washington Post*, January 1, 1983; *Africa Confidential*, December 15, 1982; *London Guardian*, December 9, 1982.) □

## Austerity prompts Nigeria expulsions

While most of sub-Saharan Africa was staggering under the burden of high oil prices, Nigeria was financing an unprecedented development effort with the revenues from the export of its high-quality crude.

Transformed by the booming oil economy, Nigeria's economic activity shifted to the cities from the rural areas. Nigeria went from being Africa's largest food exporter to being its largest importer and its markets were flooded by luxury items from the West. Millions flocked to Lagos from Ghana and the surrounding countries in the late 70s and early 80s looking for jobs and willing to work for less than half of what the lowest-paid Nigerian was receiving. Little attention was paid to the formalities of work permits and immigration papers.

By 1981 Nigeria depended on oil for more than 90 percent of its export earnings. It was exporting two million barrels per day and future development plans were made on this basis. But with the oil glut of 1982, daily production fell to an average of 1.3 million barrels and to 800,000 barrels in January 1983.

As the country's economy began to collapse from draining revenues it was expected that the first victims would be the foreign workers; the only surprise was the speed and harshness with which the expulsion orders came down.

The foreign workers were given two weeks to be out of Nigeria and

violators were threatened with jail terms. Though Nigeria's legal right to expel the illegal immigrants has not been widely questioned, there has been anger about the manner in which it was carried out. Nigeria was criticized for acting without consulting or warning the countries affected by the refugee movement and for not providing the means or time for the refugees to make a proper, safe, and orderly exit.

Among the government's harshest critics was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's first president, who is currently head of the Nigeria People's Party, and a leading contender in this year's presidential election. He said that "efforts could have been made to repatriate these people under more humane conditions," and he called the move a "mortal blow against pan-Africanism."

If Azikiwe or one of the other candidates is able to benefit from Shagari's expulsion orders, it would be ironic since the action was widely interpreted as a move by the president to take advantage of the Nigerian people's growing disaffection with the foreigners in order to enhance his own popularity.

There appears to have been widespread popular support for the expulsion. Lagos radio broadcasts referred to the foreign workers as "social liabilities," blaming them for crime, corruption, and the state of the Nigerian economy. Many of

*Continued next page*



## Coloureds continued

what they see as "co-optation" of Coloureds and Indians so they can gang up with whites against the black majority is worse than the present situation and can lead only to violence. Slabbert, for instance, said blacks would be left with no choice but to resort to violence to bring about change.

In apparent recognition that there may be a problem, Prime Minister Pieter Botha announced he was appointing a cabinet committee to look into the situation of urban blacks. The government made it clear, though, that urban blacks will be excluded from South African politics except possibly at the local level.

And, commenting on the constitutional issue, Botha said he had devoted his public life to establishing cooperation between the "diverse population groups," but some elements wanted confrontation. "If they want confrontation and bloodshed despite my efforts," he said, "then I say to them let it come, the sooner the better." (*Sowetan*, January 25, February 2, 3 and 4, 1983; *London Times*, February 2 and 4, 1983; *Johannesburg Star*, January 15 and 29, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, January 27, 1983.) □

## Nigeria continued

the expelled workers said that they feared that Nigerians would turn on them if they did not leave the country quickly.

Once allowed to enter Ghana the refugees found very little awaiting them. Ghana's economy is in far worse shape than Nigeria's and it is doubtful if the new arrivals will find work.

With the foreigners gone, Nigeria's attention will have to focus on the real reasons for economic decline. A leading banker in Lagos was quoted as saying that Nigeria would have to swallow its pride and turn to the International Monetary Fund after the elections. (*Christian Science Monitor*, February 7, 1983; *London Observer*, February 6, 1983; *Financial Times*, February 3 and 4, 1983; *Lagos Radio*, January 31, 1983; *London Times*, January 27, 1983.) □

## WESTERN AFRICA

### Benin

● French President Francois Mitterrand's mid-January visit to Benin was the first visit to that country by a French President since independence 22 years ago. Mitterrand said that it was time to end the coolness and distance in their relations.

Beninois-French relations hit their lowest point in 1977 when France was implicated in an attempted mercenary invasion of Benin. Without officially acknowledging France's role in the failed coup attempt, Mitterrand laid a wreath at the Martyrs' Memorial which was built in the memory of those who died in that attempted coup. At the memorial Mitterrand said, "After I leave here, France and Benin can take a new road as though nothing had happened."

Shortly before Mitterrand's visit France announced amnesty on \$4 million owed by Benin. Later, France publicized plans to lend Benin more money for irrigation and rural development projects.

Three new ministers have been added to Benin's Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly and there have been three changes of portfolio in the cabinet. Romain Vilon Guezo was appointed president of the assembly following the death of Ignace Adjo Boco. Paul Awhanou was appointed Minister of Public Accountability. The former Minister of Justice, Michel Aladaye, became the Minister of the Interior and Public Security while Francois Doussou, the former Minister for Transport and Communications, took the Minister of Justice portfolio. Boureima Taofiqui became Minister for Transport and Communications, while David Gbaguidi became Minister for Youth and Sports and Justin Gnidehpu took the post of Minister for Rural Development and Cooperatives.

While opening a joint party-government conference in Cotonou, President Mathieu Kerekou said that the International Monetary Fund might have to be called in to help bolster Benin's sagging economy. He cited low GNP, poor organization, and the inability of domestic banks to extend credit as

reasons. (*West Africa*, January 10, and 24, 1983; *Washington Post*, January 17, 1983.)

### Chad

● Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi said that he rejected a request by ousted Chadian President Goukouni Woddeye to help him mount a coup to retake Chad. Speaking to the French paper *Le Matin*, Qaddafi said, "In 1980, our forces entered Chad at the written request of the legitimate government of the country... led by Goukouni and conforming to international agreements." He said that he was unlikely to intervene again.

Despite Qaddafi's statements there were still reports that Libya is arming and training Woddeye's troops in the town of Bardai in northern Chad. It is estimated that he has between 6,000 and 10,000 soldiers under his command. Diplomatic sources have said that Chad's President Hissene Habre can expect arms from France in the event of a flare-up and it is reported that Chad has asked the U.S. for military assistance.

Chad is preparing to use almost half its 1983 budget for defense while three-quarters of the budget is coming from external sources. Chad's per capita income of \$110 per year is the lowest in Africa and its economy has experienced a negative growth rate for the past 20 years. Though \$185 million in aid has been pledged, it is far from what will be required to rebuild the war-torn country. (*West Africa*, January 17, 1983; *Washington Post*, December 30, 1982 and January 25, 1983; *London Guardian*, January 4, 1983; *Financial Times*, December 9, 1982.)

### Ghana

● In late December, Dr. Kwesi Botwe, the Secretary for Finance of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council, announced a four-year economic plan whose immediate effect was to mandate state control of the economy, especially over foreign banks and insurance companies, as well as over all areas of domestic and external trade.

While the plan was not officially a budget, Botwe said that all imports and exports would be brought under



a state monopoly, that the compulsory state share in retail banks and foreign-owned companies would be raised from 40 to 80 per cent, that a national network of cooperative shops would be set up to "facilitate popular control of distribution" of essential commodities, and that petroleum and mineral codes would be drawn up to encourage prospecting. However, the plan avoided mention of Ghana's cocoa industry, the principal export staple, and gave no indication that the government was contemplating devaluing the overvalued cedi.

Following last November's coup attempt, Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings dissolved the country's second most important political body, the National Defense Council (NDC), after confirming the involvement of sections of the NDC and its secretariat. The move came after the reported flight into exile in Togo of Chris Atim, the third member of the ruling defense council (PNDC) to leave it within a month following the aborted coup. After dissolving the NDC, the task of reorganizing the defense committee's secretariat was assigned to Aana Inin, a member of the PNDC and perhaps the second most popular political figure in the country after Rawlings.

In other coup-related events, a former president of the Ghana Bar Association, William Adumah-Bossman, and the former chief executive of the Cocoa Marketing Board, Andrew Pianim, were among 22 individuals arrested in late December for the coup attempt. (*West Africa*, January 3 and 17, 1983; *Africa Research Bulletin*, January 15, 1983; *Financial Times*, January 5, 1983.)

## Guinea-Bissau

● Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes' December visit to Guinea-Bissau was of political and economic significance for both nations. For Guinea-Bissau's President João Bernardo Vieira it was at last an endorsement of his two-year-old regime from the former colonial power which could help open the door to wider international relations and aid.

Portugal, which was firmly behind Vieira's overthrown predecessor, Luis Cabral, has been reluctant

to recognize the new regime. Now, however, Portugal is on a campaign to improve relations with all of its former colonies in an effort to create a bridge between them and the West. All of Portuguese-speaking Africa, including Guinea-Bissau, has good relations with the Soviet Union.

The state of Guinea-Bissau's economy has been described as desperate. One of Africa's poorest countries, it is also plagued by hunger, river-blindness, widespread malaria, and leprosy.

A Portuguese official commenting on the protocol reached between the two countries said that it was "modest and realistic."

Portugal and Guinea-Bissau were scheduled to begin a joint mine prospecting operation in December. They will search for diamonds and other minerals, especially gold, following the discovery of veins last year. If enough of the minerals are discovered, a joint mining operation is planned. After receiving positive results in an attempt to find oil, the government is going to the World Bank to request a \$10 million loan to begin drilling. (*West Africa*, December 13, 1982 and January 10, 1983; Lisbon Radio, December 14, 1982; London *Guardian*, December 13, 1982.)

## Ivory Coast

● Expectations of continued drops in cocoa prices have forced a reduction of growth and investment targets for 1983. The new target is 2 percent, a considerable drop from the 5.7 percent growth rate which was the previous goal.

Combined export earnings from coffee and cocoa have dropped from \$3 billion to \$700 million in the last three years. The government is now holding 175,000 tons of coffee which it cannot sell because of the international quota system.

President Felix Houphouët-Boigny pledged that there would be no decrease in government salaries despite the problems. (*West Africa*, January 24, 1983; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, January 9, 1983.)

## Liberia

● Liberia's head of state, Samuel Doe, announced a series of mea-

sures to shore up the country's ailing economy. The most severe of these was an across the board reduction of salaries for civil servants and government corporation employees. The cuts will range from 16 to 25 percent and are expected to save the government around \$27 million per year. Doe explained that he had been advised by the International Monetary Fund to reduce the entire workforce by 30 percent but that he preferred to keep workers employed and reduce their salaries.

Another measure involves the rescheduling of Liberia's \$75 million foreign debt. Liberia's creditors have agreed that the \$46 million due this June would be instead repaid over the next 12 years with the balance to be repaid during the following six years.

Liberia's current financial crisis can be partially attributed to a fall in the prices and demand for its main export commodities, iron ore, rubber, and cocoa. Total export earnings fell by more than \$500 million in 1982 while the cost of importing oil consumed 51 percent of these earnings.

Doe has also reinforced the ban on political activity in Liberia. He said, "For those caught making unfavorable pronouncements against the government, no investigation will be held." He has pledged to return the country to civilian rule by 1985. (*West Africa*, December 20, 1982 and January 10, 1983; Monrovia Radio, December 14, 1982.)

## Mali

● Mali has again been denied admission to the six-member West African Monetary Union (UMOA). As in past applications for membership, Mali's request was vetoed by Upper Volta because of a continuing border dispute between the two countries.

The UMOA is the monetary authority for the CFA franc in the Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Niger and Upper Volta. Mali left the Union in 1962 and established the Mali franc which the French government guaranteed at a rate of 100 to the French franc. But since the guarantee agreement expired at the end of last year, the French government has been trying to convince the other UMOA countries to read-

mit Mali. (*Afrique-Asie*, January 17, 1983; *West Africa*, January 3, 1983.)

## Mauritania

● Observers in Nouakchott believe that the government will be forced to take austerity measures to offset large losses due to declining revenues from exports of iron ore and from fishing. The decline in revenues from iron ore, Mauritania's main foreign exchange earner, can be attributed to a worldwide price slump.

It is believed that the problems of the fishing sector can be alleviated by better organization. The government has recently ordered that all fish caught in Mauritanian waters be brought to Nouadhibou, the main port, for unloading.

The government is also attempting to improve the efficiency of tax and customs revenues collection. (Nouakchott Radio, January 18, 1983; *West Africa*, January 10, 1983.)

## Niger

● In a late January cabinet reshuffle, President Seyni Kountche appointed the Youth, Sports and Culture Minister, Duxarou Mamane, to the post of Prime Minister. He also dismissed three other cabinet ministers.

On a recent tour of Niger's uranium mines, President Kountche decried the effect that the world slump in uranium prices was having on his country's economy. He said that the two mining companies would have to reduce their output to 3,500 tons from last year's high of 4,200 tons, but that despite recent setbacks the country would continue to develop its uranium resources in preparation for future price rises.

Niger is the world's fifth largest producer of uranium with proven reserves of around 150,000 tons. Uranium exports bring in 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange. Between 1974 and 1979 the price of uranium quintupled and Niger was able to triple its production. Riding this wave of unprecedented prosperity, Niger embarked upon an ambitious development program which is now coming to a quick stop. Meanwhile, the countries which hold stock in the mining com-

panies (West Germany, France, Japan, Italy and Spain), have agreed to purchase uranium at considerably higher than market prices.

Niger is also seeking large increases in foreign aid and a rescheduling of its public debt. (*London Times*, January 25, 1983; *West Africa*, January 10, 1983; *Africa Research Bulletin*, December 31, 1982.)

## Nigeria

● President Shehu Shagari presented his 1983 budget late last year, basing approximately 95 percent of the government's earnings on an oil production level of one million barrels per day (b/d). Subsequently, January's production figures were estimated at 800,000 b/d, compared with 1.2 million b/d for December, which is the lowest level since August 1981. And on the basis of the number of tankers scheduled to call on Nigerian ports, oil companies predicted the February figures would be even lower.

Also contained in the 1983 budget, and initiated in early January, was a series of sweeping import restrictions and increased tariffs designed to improve Nigeria's balance of payments status after the slump in demand for its oil exports. The aim of these new measures, following similar actions last April, is to cut Nigerian imports by 30 percent from the present level of \$1.35 billion a month to approximately \$900 million a month. Most seriously affected by these moves will be Britain, which traditionally accounts for more than one-fifth of Nigeria's imports, and whose imports from the country fell from \$2.4 billion in 1981 to \$1.9 billion in 1982.

In the wake of the emergent fiscal crisis, Nigeria's Oil Minister, Malam Yahaya Dikko, embarked on a series of meetings in Europe and the U.S. in early February to discuss the country's long-term oil strategy. However, by mid-February, Nigeria had not reduced the price for its crude, although it had come under considerable pressure to do so.

In late January, Nigeria's international telex and telephone links were destroyed by a fire that ravaged the Lagos headquarters of the Nigerian External Communications Corp., the largest office block in La-

gos. The fire, which left the country without communication links, was purportedly set to cover up a fraud in the organization's accounts and sent bitter shock waves through the nation. It precipitated an unprecedented student demonstration in the streets of Lagos, demanding the resignation of Shagari, and halted proceedings at the Nigerian national assembly. Observers have noted that the fire is taken at large to be a symbol of "national disgrace" and as "conclusive proof of the chronic corruption and inefficiency of the country's public service." (*Financial Times*, December 20, January 8, February 1 and 4, 1983; Lagos Radio, January 24, 1983; *West Africa*, December 20, 1982.)

● The two principal parties in Nigeria's national election scheduled for next July, the ruling National party of Nigeria (NPN) and the opposition Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), opened their campaigns in late January. At that time, Emeka Ojukwu, the Ibo secessionist leader of Biafra in the Nigerian civil war, declared his support for the incumbent, President Shagari. The effect of that declaration has given rise to what is known as the "Ojukwu factor" in Nigerian politics and has generated much debate and fueled old memories within the country. (*London Times*, February 4, 1983.)

## Senegal

● Four politicians were planning to run against President Abdou Diouf in the presidential elections scheduled for late February. Abdoulaye Wade (Democratic Party of Senegal), Mamadou Dia (People's Democratic Movement), Oumar Wone (Senegalese People's Party), and Boubacar Gueye (Senegalese Republican Movement) had declared their candidacies by mid-January, although Diouf was expected to win an easy victory.

Legislative elections, in which eight of the 14 legal political parties were planning to participate, were also scheduled to take place. Deputies to the 120-seat national assembly will be elected to four-year terms. (*West Africa*, December 20, 1982 and January 17, 1983; *Le Monde*, January 12, 1983.)



- In January, the council of ministers and the parliament of the Senegambia confederation held their inaugural sessions in Dakar. Although the initial meetings were largely ceremonial, the confederal cabinet agreed to constitute a special fund to cover the operating costs of the union until a budget is formulated and approved. The council also decreed February 1 a public holiday in each country to commemorate the day the confederal agreement came into effect last year.

During the initial meeting of the parliament, the Gambian speaker of the house of representatives, Aliou Sulayman Jack, was elected president of the assembly. The parliament is composed of 60 members, 20 from the Gambia and 40 from Senegal. The assembly is empowered only to provide recommendations to the confederal executive and decisions will have to be ratified by the parliaments of the individual countries. (*West Africa*, January 24, 1983; Dakar Radio, January 12, 1983.)

## Togo

- French President Francois Mitterrand arrived in Togo on January 13 amid reports, later confirmed, that mercenaries had left London with the intention of assassinating Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema. The story was first reported in a French newspaper which claimed that U.S. intelligence sources had informed the French government of the plot. Eyadema said that opposition groups headed by Gilchrist Olympio, the son of the former President overthrown by Eyadema 20 years ago, were responsible for the plot. The mercenaries were reported to have remained in Ghana and Benin from where they were supposed to have staged the assassination attempt. January 13 is also the anniversary of Eyadema's coup.

Mitterrand and Eyadema discussed Togo's economic problems which are caused by falling world demand for phosphates. Togo is the world's sixth largest producer of phosphates and is capable of producing 3.6 million tons per year but production has dropped from 2.9 million tons in 1980 to a projected 1.9 million tons this year. Exports

of phosphates account for 40 percent of the country's foreign exchange. (*West Africa*, January 10 and 17, 1983; London *Guardian*, January 13, 1983.)

## Upper Volta

- The new government of President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo and his Provisional People's Salvation Council (PPSC) have taken steps to distinguish themselves from the regime of overthrown President Saye Zerbo.

In mid-January, Captain Thomas Sankara was elected to the newly created post of Prime Minister by the PPSC. Sankara had been Information Minister under the government of Col. Zerbo but he resigned after questioning the ability of that government to meet the needs of the people.

The new regime has also lifted the ban on labor union strikes which was imposed by the former government. Addressing the teachers' union, Minister of Education Issa Tiendregeogo said, "This government formed by the People's Salvation Council has the interests of the laboring masses firmly in mind. This is in direct opposition to the former regime which systematically attempted to destroy workers' organizations and workers' rights."

President Ouedraogo has given assurances that Upper Volta will respect its international agreements and debt commitments and that it will remain in the non-aligned movement. (*West Africa*, January 3, 10, and 17, 1983; *Africa Now*, December 1982.)

## EASTERN AFRICA

### Djibouti

- Djibouti, which has only 185 miles of paved roads, is receiving a \$6.4 million loan from the World Bank's International Development Association for a three-year road-improvement program.

Most of the funds will be used for patching and resealing the paved roads, the most important of which links Djibouti-port with the Assab (to Addis Ababa) highway in Ethiopia. Spot improvements will be made on some 500 miles of dirt roads and tracks, which are usable only by four-wheel-drive vehicles.

The loan will also be used to sponsor eight instructors who will train road equipment operators and technicians.

Another loan, from the Islamic Bank for Development in Saudi Arabia, will provide \$3.3 million for expanding the power station in the capital. (Djibouti Radio, December 5, 1982; World Bank news, December 2, 1982.)

## Ethiopia

- Shortly before the opening of the second congress of the Commission Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, chairman of the ruling Dergue and COPWE, purged six members of COPWE's central committee, a move which was intended to "purify" the organization's ranks as COPWE embarked on the final stages of its transformation into the country's only political party.

At COPWE's second congress in early January, Mengistu elaborated plans to impose the Soviet-style political structure on Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Workers' Party, "which will control all national activities," will be inaugurated next September after "expanding the propaganda and ideological work among the masses."

The congress closed with the signing of a "friendship agreement" between the Soviet Communist Party and COPWE establishing channels for a full flood of "fraternal advice." Observers have noted that the signing of such an agreement confirms for the Kremlin that Ethiopian affairs will stay firmly within their grasp, especially since Ethiopia owes the Soviet Union nearly \$2 billion for military and other supplies. (London *Observer*, January 2 and 18, 1983; London *Times*, January 6, 1983; Addis Ababa Radio, January 3, 1983.)

## Kenya

- The seventh death sentence for treason was handed down by Kenya's high court in late January as the country continued its efforts to put last August's attempted coup behind it. Pvt. Madara Bwoza was the first enlisted man to receive the death penalty.

Maj. Gen. Peter Kariuki, the



highest ranking officer yet tried, was sentenced to four years for failing to suppress the uprising. It was charged that he had been informed of the coup plot on July 31, one day before the attempt was made.

So far nearly 1,000 men have been sentenced to terms of up to 25 years. Among those still awaiting trial are Raila Odinga, son of former Vice President Oginga Odinga, who is currently under house arrest, the assistant editor of the *Sunday Standard*, Otieno Mak'Onyango, and Prof. Vincent Otieno of the University of Nairobi. The prosecution has drawn up a detailed list of charges against the three which specify the times and places at which they are alleged to have conspired against the government.

Also awaiting trial on sedition charges are 69 students from the University of Nairobi. They were originally charged with rioting which carries maximum sentence of two years but the charges were recently changed to sedition, which could mean sentences of up to ten years. Among the students are several sons of unpopular members of parliament.

President Daniel arap Moi has lashed out against university professors and dissidents who fled to Britain to wage a propaganda war against the Kenyan government. He has particularly criticized their charges that 2,000 people died in the August 1 attempt. Other rumors about foreign involvement in the attempt and about future coups being planned continue to circulate, frustrating government attempts to maintain the perception that things are under control.

In order to combat these rumors the government has placed loyal military officers in the public view. They have been seen opening schools and attending other public events. The pay for army officers has been raised by 30 percent and they are now eligible for land grants. New barracks are being built for the enlisted men, who will also be receiving increased salaries.

Talks were held in Nairobi in late January between Kenya and Western aid donors about assistance to repair the damage from the coup attempt and to discuss measures for putting the country back on the

track to economic development.

In December, Kenya devalued its shilling for the third time in less than two years. The devaluation was a precondition to a \$169 million International Monetary Fund credit, which will be used to ease Kenya's foreign exchange shortage. Kenya's deficit is estimated at \$550 million.

A financial report commissioned by Moi blamed swollen and inefficient bureaucracies for mismanaging government funds and for the poor planning and implementation of development projects. It also said that Kenyans "are becoming too dependent on government and turning to government for assistance on matters that they themselves should manage."

Attorney General Joseph Kamere was dismissed in January and replaced by Matthew Muli, a former high court judge. Though there were no reasons given for the dismissal, it was widely believed that Kamere's competence had been questioned by parliament and that he had been associated with questionable business deals. (*London Guardian*, January 28, 7, and 3, 1983; *Financial Times*, December 14, 1982.)

## Madagascar

● President Didier Ratsiraka's defeated opponent in Madagascar's November election, 80-year-old Monja Jaona, was placed under house arrest after leading a protest demonstration and calling for a general strike.

According to the government radio, Jaona and his supporters massed in the streets of Antananarivo to protest the "rigging" of the election and looting and vandalism ensued. The government then banned political meetings and demonstrations and also expelled Jaona from the ruling Supreme Council of the Revolution.

In Paris, a former government official who had not spoken out in 12 years of exile, Jacques Rabe-mananta, warned of violence in Madagascar so long as "the people are oppressed."

In January, Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, paid an official visit to Madagascar, the first such visit by a

high ranking American official in 13 years. (*Le Monde*, January 13, 1983; Paris Radio, December 24, 1982; Antananarivo Radio, December 15, 1982.)

## Seychelles

● The 1983 budget for the Seychelles totaled \$65 million, with the largest share, \$13 million, going to the Education and Information Ministry. About 10 percent of the budget will be spent by the Youth and Defense Ministry.

President Albert Rene, who also holds the finance portfolio, said the government's priorities are to reduce the balance of payments deficit and cut down on government borrowing. Import duties were doubled on food products and entertainment items that the government said were not essential and could be produced locally.

As for development, Rene said there should be emphasis on agriculture. Earlier, he had reshuffled his cabinet, naming the Foreign Minister, Jacques Hodoul, to the National Development Ministry, which includes agriculture. (*Agence France Presse*, December 28, 1982; *Kenya Weekly Review*, December 11, 1982.)

## Somalia

● Somalia closed its border with Djibouti and has imposed martial law in northern Somalia in retribution for the Somali National Movement's (SNM) raid on Mardera central prison in early January.

The raid, which freed 724 prisoners, prompted President Mohamed Siad Barre to declare 40 days of military rule in Hargeisa, Somalia's northern regional capital and a center of anti-governmental activity. Among the restrictions imposed were a dusk-to-dawn curfew, a ban of transportation of milk and other foodstuffs and a ban on the sale of gasoline to the civilian population. (*Radio Hagan*, January 10 and 18, 1983; *London Observer*, January 9, 1983.)

## Tanzania

● An army mutiny was crushed in January by loyalist troops who discovered the plot and notified the government. Diplomats said the uprising involved army officers, a

former presidential aide, several politicians and civilians. However, there were no clearcut indications of the exact circumstances surrounding the reported plot.

Later in the month, a group of 27 soldiers and civilians were arraigned in Dar es Salaam and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. Observers noted that the court appearance and insistence on the fact that only 27 people were being held was meant to dispel rumors that up to 1,600 civilians and soldiers were arrested following "the attempt to incite unrest."

The plot highlighted what President Julius Nyerere has described as "the downward spiral of our economy." In January, the Bank of Tanzania announced that exports had fallen by 31 per cent and imports by 53 per cent during the first half of 1982. Although the country's trade deficit did improve from \$268 million during the first half of 1981 to \$73 million during the same period in 1982, the cost has been a painful contraction of the economy.

Currently, factories are running at 30 per cent capacity and inflation is officially cited at 34 per cent. In addition, the country is suffering from shortages in consumer goods and increased duties on cigarettes, various beverages, fuel and cement. (London *Guardian*, January 5, 24, 26, and 29, 1983; London *Times*, January 24, 1983; London *Observer*, January 23, 1983.)

## Uganda

● In February, President Milton Obote signed into effect a law permitting Asians and other non-Ugandans expelled during the regime of dictator Idi Amin to apply formally for the return of their former property.

The law gives individuals expelled under the Amin regime 90 days to reclaim their former property. Amin, who came to power in 1971 and was overthrown in 1979, expelled practically all of the country's Asians as part of his "Africanization" program which subsequently crippled Uganda's commercial activity. Approximately 3,500 Asian and foreign-owned businesses worth an estimated \$400 million were seized at that time.

Those individuals who do not wish to repossess their property are still eligible for compensation, after which the property will be sold to Ugandans. The enactment of the law fulfills an election promise made by President Obote in 1980.

In other news, the government has intensified its efforts in tracking down anti-government insurgents belonging to the loosely allied Uganda Popular Front (UPF). The UPF consists of three guerrilla movements whose leaders include former government officials defeated by Obote's party in 1980 and the country's first post-Amin president, Yusuf Lule. The government has offered resettlement to "bandits" who turn themselves in, but it has also reportedly received increased support from villagers who assist in exposing the "bandits."

And, in January, Obote declared that the government will not deny citizenship to any single Ugandan who is outside the country, "either as a refugee or otherwise," in response to President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda concerning the Rwandan refugee question. Currently, the border between the two countries remains closed and Rwanda is pressing Uganda to readmit most of those now living in the refugee camps on its side of the border. The Rwandan government claims that only about 6,000 of the refugees can be considered Rwandan nationals. (Kenya *Weekly Review*, February 4, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 1983; London *Times*, January 19 and February 3, 1983; Kampala Radio, January 11 and 26, 1983; *South*, January 1983.)

## CENTRAL AFRICA

### Cameroon

● Three members of parliament and a senior member of the country's only political party, the Cameroon National Union (UNC) were sacked at a January meeting presided over by the party chairman and former president, Ahmadou Ahidjo. The four were fired amid rumors of dissent within the ranks of UNC. Later in the month, President Paul Biya assumed "general powers" for running the UNC, the most important political decision-making body in the country. How-

ever, Ahidjo retained his presidency of the union's political bureau. (Yaounde Radio, January 31, 1983; *West Africa*, January 17, 1983.)

## Congo

● In recent months, Congo has proceeded with a series of related projects geared towards the country's reappearance as a significant oil producer in the late 1980s. Present oil production is officially about 80,000 barrels per day and is expected to rise to about 200,000 by the end of the decade.

In mid-December, the Pointe Noire oil refinery and electrical connection between Pointe Noire and Loudima officially opened. In addition, the World Bank has agreed to loan Congo \$12.7 million to rehabilitate high usage roads and improve the country's transportation networks. And, the government intends to open a third commercial bank this spring under the direction of the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO). The Congolese government will be the principal shareholder in the bank with a consortium of foreign banks contributing the remainder of the share capital. (*West Africa*, January 24, 1983; *Africa Research Bulletin*, December 30, 1982; World Bank news, December 23, 1982.)

## Equatorial Guinea

● President Teodoro Nguema Obiang has been reaching out to form economic and political links with neighboring countries and with France. Since September he has visited Paris, Nigeria, Zaire and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) meeting in Cameroon where Equatorial Guinea became the fifth member along with Gabon, Cameroon, the Congo, and the Central African Republic.

In Nigeria, Obiang asked that the Nigerian workers, who had been the backbone of the labor force on Equatorial Guinea's cocoa plantations until they left in the 1970s to protest their poor treatment, return to Equatorial Guinea to work. This was in an effort to boost plummeting cocoa production. Obiang's visit took place before Nigeria expelled all its foreign workers.

The trip to France produced an agreement allowing France to con-



tinue tuna fishing in Equatorial Guinean waters in return for economic and military assistance. (Yaounde Radio, December 23, 1982; *Africa Confidential*, December 1, 1982.)

## Gabon

● President Omar Bongo acted in December to put an end to a movement for an opposition party. Thirteen of the 37 people who were tried for "threatening state security" were sentenced to 20 years of hard labor, while others received lesser sentences and/or fines. All are said to be members of Morena, Mouvement de Redressement Nationale, a group which had been distributing literature attacking President Bongo and calling for a multi-party system.

The recent resurgence of Morena has been perceived as a result of the election of socialist President Francois Mitterrand in France in 1981. Before that, Gabon's security matters were handled officially by France's Service d'Action Civique agents who had installed Bongo's predecessor in office in 1964.

Despite the official removal of the troops by France, many of them remain in Gabon's security forces. Morena's expectation that the new French government would support liberalization in Gabon has not been realized and President Mitterrand's visit to Libreville in January was seen as an indication of France's resolve to support the government.

During that visit, President Bongo surprised his guest by threatening to deport French expatriates who meddle in Gabon's affairs and by requesting that France build him a nuclear reactor. President Mitterrand responded by saying that the proposal for a reactor would have to be studied.

Recently, the French government-owned oil company ELF, which pumps 86 percent of Gabon's 150,000 barrel-a-day production, discovered, along with Amoco, new off-shore oil reserves which will help to maintain Gabon's productive capacity and ensure French involvement in Gabon's economic future. (*Financial Times*, January 20, 1983; *Washington Post*, January 3, 1983; *West Africa*, December 6, 1982.)

## Zaire

● Zaire received partial relief from its massive debt burden in January, when Premier Zhao Ziyang, during his 11-nation African tour, announced that China was canceling Kinshasa's \$100 million debt. The ten-year loan was to have come due this year. The money borrowed will be re-invested in joint Chinese-Zairian projects.

And in late January, the governor of the central bank of Zaire met with representatives of the 18 commercial banks to which it is indebted in the amount of \$350 million to discuss repayment prospects. Zaire's total foreign debt amounts to \$4 billion, the balance of which is owed to Western governments and international agencies. A further meeting with the bankers will be held in June. (*Wall Street Journal*, January 5 and 31, 1983; *Le Monde*, January 9, 1983.)

● Just a few weeks prior to his resignation as Israeli Defense Minister in early February, Gen. Ariel Sharon visited Zaire for discussions with President Mobutu Sese Seko on military cooperation.

A five-year agreement was signed under which Israeli military advisers will restructure Zaire's 20,000-member armed forces. Israel's primary responsibility will be to "recruit, equip and retrain" the Kamanyola brigade, which protects the Shaba province, Zaire's mining center and the site of two invasions by Katanga rebels in 1977 and 1978.

Israeli military advisers will also be sent to Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika where the Zaire navy has its command, and to Mbanza-Agungu, southwest of Kinshasa, to organize a new artillery battalion. Mobutu's special presidential brigade, which has been supervised by Israeli advisers since last year, will be enlarged from 3,000 to 7,500 men.

Last year, Zaire became the first black African nation to resume diplomatic relations with Israel, broken since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. (*London Times*, January 24, 1983; *New York Times*, January 20, 1983; Israeli television, January 20, 1983.)

## Zambia

● The Zambian government tried again in January to put the brakes

on what has been a prolonged slide towards economic collapse. The government announced, following negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, that it would devalue its currency by 20 percent and stop repayment of principal on medium- and long-term loans. It was reported that the IMF had originally pressed for a 42 percent devaluation.

Other austerity measures included the lifting of price controls, an end to food subsidies, and the limiting of workers' pay raises to 5 percent.

Much of the country's problem stems from its reliance on copper and cobalt for an estimated 95 percent of its export earnings. With world prices for these minerals in a protracted slump, Zambia's foreign exchange crisis has become increasingly more severe. The state-controlled Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines has been operating at a substantial loss while export receipts last year were estimated to be down 7 percent from previous years. In December, Zambia was granted a \$37 million loan by the IMF to help offset this loss in export earnings. (*Le Monde*, January 9, 1983; *London Observer*, January 9, 1983; *London Times*, January 8, 1983; *Wall Street Journal*, December 15, 1982.)

● Seven of the eight remaining defendants accused of trying to overthrow President Kenneth Kaunda in 1980 were sentenced to death by the Zambian high court in late January. An eighth was sentenced to a ten-year prison term.

Among the condemned were the former governor of the Bank of Zambia, Valentine Musakanya, Edward Shamwana, a Lusaka lawyer, and Goodwin Yorun Mumba, the former general manager of the National Building Society. The others were Zairian nationals: Deogratias Symba, Albert Chilambe Chimbali, Thomas Mulewa Mpunga, and Roger Kanyambu Kabwita. Sentenced to prison was a former Zambia air force major, Anderson Mporokoso.

## NORTHERN AFRICA

### Algeria

● Algeria has shown an increased



willingness to strengthen its ties with Western Europe and the U.S. In December, U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige led representatives of 30 American firms on a tour to Algeria and Saudi Arabia. It was the first visit of a U.S. cabinet official since 1974. Baldrige told journalists in Algiers that the U.S. would try to act as a moderating influence in Algeria's dispute with Morocco over the Western Sahara. The assistant secretary of commerce, Raymond Waldmann, later described the talks as "more pragmatic and constructive than we had expected."

U.S. trade with Algeria has been improving steadily since Algerian diplomats secured the release of the American hostages in Iran in 1981. At that time, U.S. exports to Algeria climbed 32 percent to \$717 million and it is estimated that they reached \$900 million at the end of 1982.

Also in December, Algerian President Chadli Benjedid visited France, becoming the first Algerian head of state to do so. Relations with France had been improving since President Mitterrand came to power, but they took a sharp downturn before Chadli's visit when French troops engaged in military maneuvers with Morocco without informing Algiers. Algeria has also complained that France refused admittance to 17,000 Algerians who wanted to visit France last year. France has insisted that relations are "firmer than ever" and that these are only minor problems. (London *Times*, December 18, 1982; London *Guardian*, December 11, 1982.)

## Egypt

- The Reagan administration announced in mid-January its decision to sell one million tons of federally subsidized wheat flour to Egypt, which has been a major market for subsidized flour exports from the Common Market countries.

The sale, which is the first American wheat sale to Egypt in over a decade, supplying two-thirds of Egypt's market and representing one-sixth of the world trade in wheat flour, is designed to demonstrate U.S. opposition to European farm-export subsidies. The U.S.

contends that Common Market subsidies have been undermining American farm sales.

The deal came at a time when the U.S. and the EEC were holding talks to resolve the two sides' differences over farm-export subsidies. EEC President Gaston Thorn met Vice President Bush during his late January European tour and said the EEC would contest the recent U.S. sale at the next General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting. At a subsidized price of \$175 per metric ton, Egypt stands to benefit substantially from the U.S.-EEC trade conflict.

In other news, President Hosni Mubarak's late January visit to the U.S. has been described in Egypt by Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan Ali as "most successful" in "political and economic fields." The U.S. confirmed its commitment for continued support of Egypt's current five-year development plan, although it did not promise any increases in its aid to the country. However, U.S. officials did respond sympathetically to Egypt's request for greater flexibility in the utilization of the official aid.

The trial of 300 Moslem fundamentalists of the Al Jihad organization was postponed until mid-February at the request of the defense. The state prosecutor has previously called for the death penalty for the defendants who are accused of capturing a police station and killing 200 soldiers and policemen in an attempt to establish an Iranian-style Islamic state. And the trial of Esmat Sadat, the late president's brother accused of 24 counts of corruption and fraud, ended in February with a guilty verdict. Sadat had challenged his prosecutor to produce the millions of pounds he is accused of swindling. He had also accused the prosecution of using the trial to damage the reputation of the late President Sadat. (*Wall Street Journal*, January 19 and February 4, 1983; *Financial Times*, January 20 and February 3, 1983; Cairo Radio, January 5 and 29, 1983; London *Times*, January 10, 1983.)

## Libya

- Libya announced its intention to repay all of its foreign debts by

March, after which oil production is expected to be cut from approximately 1.7 million barrels daily to around 1.3 million. It has been reported that oil has been bartered to the Soviet Union and other European bloc countries in payment of debts. Libya has also suspended new development projects and reduced imports to items deemed to be essential.

Mobil Oil Corp., which had been pumping 30,000 to 40,000 barrels daily, has announced that it will withdraw from Libya because of "outstanding differences with the government." Mobil blamed the Libyan government for a "fundamental breach and repudiation of the agreements between Libya and Mobil." The move is not expected to have much impact upon the corporation or the Libyan economy. Mobil said that it will begin proceedings against Libya to claim damages to assets and past and future profits lost because of Libyan government actions.

The Boeing Corp. has applied to the U.S. Commerce Department for permission to sell 12 commercial jetliners valued at \$600 million to Libya. A similar request in 1980 had been denied. A Boeing spokesman said that it would be difficult to convert the planes for military use. The Commerce Department must be able to certify that the planes will not contribute to the recipient's military potential. (*New York Times*, January 5, 1983; *Africa Research Bulletin*, December 31, 1982; *Financial Times*, December 24, 1982.)

## Morocco

- Prime Minister Maati Bouabid has announced that he will form a new political party. The party, Morocco's eleventh, will support the constitutional monarchy of King Hassan and follow a "centrist" ideology. Bouabid expects that the party, thus far unnamed, will appeal to people whose interests are not represented by the older parties which have their roots in pre-independence Morocco. He said that the party will promote the "more active participation by the new Moroccan elite." He also added that it will support liberal economic policies, agricultural self-sufficiency,

women's rights, and a balance in the country's relations with the East and West. (*Le Monde*, January 9, 1983.)

● France will be giving Morocco financial aid worth around \$265 million in a package which includes treasury loans and export credits. It was the largest aid allocation ever by France to one of its former colonies and the announcement came ten days before French President Francois Mitterrand was due to visit Morocco. Morocco's relationships with the French socialist government have been deteriorating steadily and last October King Hassan told President Mitterrand to cancel a planned visit. The aid package comes at a time when Morocco has a growing balance of trade deficit and a \$10.1 billion foreign debt. (*Financial Times*, January 22, 1983.)

## Sudan

● Following last November's 31 percent devaluation of the Sudanese pound, officials began negotiating the rescheduling of the country's \$3 billion debt. Talks began in mid-January with Sudan's major creditors, who pledged support and continued financial and technical assistance.

Agreements have been completed for construction of the 900-mile pipeline from Sudan's oil-producing region in the Sudd to Port Sudan. Standard Oil of California (Socal) is now taking bids from Japanese and European companies for the construction of production facilities and a 21-inch pipeline system. The cost of the project will be \$2.5 billion and the goal is to export 50,000 barrels per day by 1985. The government of South Korea has agreed to finance 70 percent of the construction costs and President Gaafar al-Nimeiry expects that Arab countries will provide the remainder.

Sudanese authorities have also announced that harsher penalties will be imposed for those convicted of "illegal assembly, carrying arms, or riot and assault." These penalties will include floggings, fines and prison sentences of ten years. The armed forces and police are now

allowed to arrest accused violators without a warrant. Observers have concluded that the Sudanese government fears that there will be problems caused by a 75 percent rise in the price of gasoline and general inflation resulting from the devaluation.

Riots broke out in Khartoum in January 1982 after the government implemented strict austerity measures. (*Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 1983; *Financial Times*, January 11, 1983; *London Guardian*, January 6, 1983; Khartoum Radio, January 4, 1983.)

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

● Angola's ruling MPLA purged some of its leading members in January, saying they had "misused the right to criticism."

Some 30 other party officials were suspended in a move that Western observers described as a "power struggle" within the MPLA. The purge followed the December assumption by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of sweeping emergency powers to cope with "defense and security, the economy and the state apparatus," according to Angop, the official news agency.

Four leading party members were detained: Costa Andrade, secretary of the journalists' union; Vantagen Lara, adopted son of an influential politburo member, Lucio Lara; Raul Araujo, deputy head of the party's education department; and an unnamed MPLA official. Lucio Lara's wife Ruth was among those suspended.

Angop said the reason for the purge was a play, written by Andrade, and staged on the 26th anniversary of the party's founding, that was "an insulting caricature of the highest authority of the party and the nation." Dos Santos said some of the play's criticisms were unfounded and unacceptable because they "went beyond genuine criticism and were made outside the organs of the party." The militants reportedly have been extremely critical of the so-called "nationalists," a group including dos Santos, who hold a majority on the party's central committee.

Besides the suspensions and imprisonments, the ruling party also carried out a shake-up of the cabinet and state companies. The central bank director was sacked and his job was taken over by the Finance Minister. The entire board of the state shipping concern was suspended and several were arrested following the discovery of fraud and corruption.

The deputy construction minister, Luis Fonseca Santos, was fired, as was the deputy education minister, Artur Pestana, who is also Angola's best-known novelist under the pen name Pepetala. (*Zimbabwe Herald*, January 13, 1983; *West Africa*, January 10, 1983; Angola news agency, December 13, 1982 and January 7, 1983.)

### Lesotho

● Maseru, Lesotho's capital, was the venue for the annual Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) donor meeting in January, but the country's internal problems intruded on the gathering.

Saboteurs damaged two reservoirs on the outskirts of the city with bombs. The attack was presumably the work of the Lesotho Liberation Army, the South Africa-backed military wing of the opposition Basuto Congress Party (BCP), which is seeking to topple Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

Jonathan recently has been trying to patch up his differences with King Moshoeshoe, the constitutional head of state, but the king in his opening address to the SADCC meeting indirectly criticized Jonathan. King Moshoeshoe said, "A national government, before concerning itself with international prestige, ought first to give back all the citizens their dignity. . . . No leader can substitute himself for the popular will."

This was a reference to the fact there have been no elections since 1970 when Jonathan suspended the poll because it appeared the BCP was winning.

Also embarrassing to Jonathan was a January strike by students at the University of Lesotho. The administration closed the campus and ordered the students home. (*Finan-*



*cial Times*, February 1, 1983; *Sowetan*, January 28, 1983; *London Guardian*, January 28, 1983.)

## Mozambique

● The South African-backed **Mozambique National Resistance (MNR)** has widened the scope of its activities in recent months by striking at targets of strategic importance to neighboring Zimbabwe and Malawi. By leveling the Beira oil depot in mid-December and destroying a pumping station on the Beira-Mutare pipeline just as the pipeline was scheduled to resume operation in mid-January, the MNR effectively precipitated a fuel crisis for Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique.

Following the December raid, which destroyed more than 30 tanks and feeder pipes, a spokesman for the MNR stated that the raid was in retaliation for the arrival of several hundred Zimbabwean troops sent to protect the pipeline at the request of Mozambican President Samora Machel. The Lisbon-based spokesman said, "We threaten more attacks on economic targets important to Zimbabwe" and "also foresee military attacks against Zimbabwe itself in the near future." The Beira fuel depot, owned by British Petroleum and Shell, provides the only alternative for southern African nations to obtain oil without routing their supplies through South Africa.

The January raid at the Maforga pumping station occurred only days before the pipeline was scheduled to reopen and 24 hours after Mozambican and Zimbabwean military officials held top-level talks in Beira. At the time of the attack, Zimbabwe's oil reserves were down to an estimated 15 days' supply, from the desired level of six weeks.

Relations between Mozambique and the U.S. appear to have warmed up recently. Two prominent U.S. delegations visited the country in January and Mozambique has openly been seeking U.S. investment, particularly in its energy resources.

In mid-January, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, and his deputy, Frank Wisner, met with Machel and discussed a wide range of political

and economic issues. In addition, a congressional delegation led by Howard Wolpe, chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, visited the country and discussed U.S. food aid as well as political issues affecting Mozambique as a frontline state. Mozambique has also invited American oil companies to bid for 17 blocks along the country's 1,700-mile coastline. Seismic studies have revealed potential oil reserves and Mozambique would like to develop these reserves as well as its coal and fishing resources. (*New York Times*, February 5, 1983; *Maputo Radio*, January 15, 1983; *Financial Times*, January 7, 1983; *London Times*, December 10, 1982; *London Guardian*, December 12, 1982.)

## South Africa

● **Sabotage** bomb attacks struck four times in January across South Africa, presumably carried out by the banned African National Congress. In all but one there were no casualties but damage to buildings was extensive.

One person was killed and seven injured in an explosion at the community council office of New Brighton black township near Port Elizabeth in the Cape. The dead man was believed to have been planting the bomb when it went off.

The other bombs went off at the Johannesburg magistrates' court, the supreme court building in Pietermaritzburg and a railroad bridge near Bloemfontein.

In a communique, the ANC implied it had been responsible for sabotage attacks not publicized by the authorities. This followed a report which claimed that ANC guerrilla attacks dropped last year, to 23 compared to 55 in 1981. However, analysts said the sabotage incidents in 1982 emphasized "quality" rather than "quantity," citing explosions at such heavily protected facilities as the Koeberg nuclear power plant and at courthouses and other government buildings. (*London Guardian*, February 1, 1983; *Johannesburg Radio*, January 26, 28 and 30, 1983; *Addis Ababa Radio Freedom*, January 28, 1983.)

● Amnesty International has appealed to the South African government to lift the banning orders on

six **black journalists** who had been active in the Media Workers' Association of South Africa (Mwasa).

Almost the entire Mwasa leadership has been banned or detained, or both. The banned journalists are no longer able to continue their profession and under terms of the bans are prohibited from seeking other careers.

The banned former president of Mwasa, Zwelakhe Sisulu, who is under house arrest from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m., had his ban slightly relaxed in January. He was given permission to move into his new house in Dobsonville, Soweto, but only on a month to month basis. He had been living at the home of his mother, Albertina Sisulu, who is also banned. His father, Walter Sisulu, a leader of the banned African National Congress, is serving a life sentence.

Another Mwasa journalist, Mono Badela, became unbanned on February 1, when his three-year banning order expired and was not renewed.

In February, two members of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists were in South Africa to investigate conditions for journalists. They met, separately, with Sisulu, and planned to visit other banned Mwasa journalists. (*Sowetan*, January 25, 28 and February 2, 1983; *Johannesburg Star*, January 15, 1983.)

● Black trade union officials have condemned the 18-month jail sentence imposed on unionist Phillip Dlamini for refusing to testify as a state witness in the trial of a young woman charged with "furthering the aims" of the banned African National Congress.

Dlamini, 31, the former general secretary of the South African Black Municipality Workers' Union, said his union would lose its credibility if he testified. He also said he did not want to be branded a "sellout" by the black community. But the magistrate ruled that this was not a justifiable excuse and handed down the sentence. (*Sowetan*, January 14 and 17, 1983.)

● South Africa's Border Council of Churches has criticized the detention without trial of one of its field workers in the Ciskei homeland made "independent" by Pretoria.



Mzwandile Msoki was arrested by Ciskei security police on December 30. The church group said "even his wife has no idea where he is," and went on to ask the Ciskei authorities to try Msoki in open court or release him. (*Sowetan*, January 28, 1983.)

● **Chrysler Corp.** has sold its 25 percent stake in Sigma Motor Corp., the third-largest vehicle manufacturer in South Africa, to the 75 percent share holder, the giant Anglo American conglomerate. The price was believed to be about \$50 million.

The sale reportedly was not politically motivated but a continuation of Chrysler's policy of selling off its overseas operations to concentrate on North American manufacturing. The company's only foreign operations now are in Canada and Mexico.

Sigma assembles Mazda, Mitsubishi, Peugeot and Citroen cars and apparently never marketed vehicles with the Chrysler name. (*Financial Times*, January 27, 1983; *New York Times*, January 27, 1983.)

● Several states are expected to follow the example of Massachusetts, which in January ordered state pension funds to divest over the next three years some \$100 million in corporations doing business in South Africa. And Michigan has enacted a law requiring that state colleges and universities withdraw their South Africa-related investments.

Similar legislation was pending in Connecticut. According to the exiled South African newspaper editor, Donald Woods, "It is hoped that up to 25 other states under Democratic Party control will follow suit by the end of the year to effect the withdrawal of billions of dollars from apartheid-supportive investments." Woods is founder and director of the Lincoln Trust, a British-American organization that lobbies for increased Western pressure on South Africa.

In the U.S., a black South African expatriate, Dumisani Kumalo, has waged divestment campaigns in several states. In Massachusetts, he was one of the few nonmembers asked to address the state senate. Kumalo said the South African gov-

ernment fights hard to prevent the divestment legislation. Last June, he said, Pretoria's ambassador to the U.S., Brand Fourie, sent an 18-foot-long telegram to the Connecticut governor. The mayor of Portland, Ore., was invited to South Africa at Pretoria's expense when a resolution for divestment was pending. Kumalo said the mayor returned more convinced than ever that the resolution was needed.

Ironically, while the divestment campaign has gained more success, the amount of U.S. corporate investment in South Africa has grown, at least through 1981, according to Commerce Department figures. In 1981, the book value of American companies operating in South Africa rose to \$2.63 billion, up from \$2.35 billion the year before. (*Sowetan*, January 14, 1983; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 12, 1983; *London Guardian*, January 10, 1983.)

● Despite repeated boasts that it will soon be 90 percent self-sufficient in energy needs, South Africa is significantly intensifying the search for off-shore oil.

Over the next three years, the government-owned Soekor will spend as much as it spent in the previous 17 years to find oil—\$420 million. The apparent reason is twofold: a tantalizing oil discovery of a minuscule oil field off the southern coast and well-documented charges that Pretoria actually imports three-quarters of its oil requirements, despite the OPEC embargo, at an annual cost of \$4 billion.

Soekor intends to drill 20 wells a year, using two new offshore rigs built in Japan at a cost of \$75 million each. Soekor's general manager, Dr. Piet van Zyl, said an oilfield must produce at least 20,000 barrels daily and have reserves of at least 15 years to be economically viable. (*Johannesburg Radio*, January 25 and 27, 1983.)

● Although hundreds of black workers were laid off in the auto industry last year due to the recession, sales for 1982 were only 6 percent off the previous record year. Sales last year were 283,427 units compared with 301, 528 in

1981, but there was a drop-off at the end of 1982.

Estimates for 1983 sales ranged from 240,000 to 260,000 with Toyota, the industry leader with a 23 percent market share, being the most optimistic. "The industry as a whole is remarkably buoyant," said Toyota's sales director.

After Toyota, Datsun was second with 15.2 percent, then Sigma (13.3 percent), Ford (13.1 percent), Volkswagen (11.8 percent), GM (9.3 percent), Mercedes (5.2 percent), BMW (3.5 percent), Leyland (2.1 percent) and Alfa Romeo (1.9 percent). (*Johannesburg Star*, January 22, 1983.)

● A group of U.S. congressmen were donating a new bedspread to Winnie Mandela in February after hers was confiscated by South African security policy in a January raid.

The seized bedspread sported the black, green and yellow colors of the banned African National Congress, whose jailed leader, Nelson Mandela, is Mrs. Mandela's husband. The seizure took place while Mrs. Mandela was being visited, separately in terms of her banning order, by two opposition MPs, Helen Suzman and Peter Soal.

The new bedspread was acquired by Sen. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) and is of handmade American design, with a Lone Star emblem. It was to be displayed publicly in Washington in February for signing, in indelible ink, by members of the House and Senate. Tsongas said the gift was a symbol of congressional concern over civil rights abuses in South Africa. (*Sowetan*, January 31, 1983.)

● A Lutheran church leader who charged that he was tortured during detention in 1981 by security police in Venda, the homeland made "independent" by Pretoria, is being allowed by the State Department to visit the U.S. even though Washington does not recognize the homeland or its passports.

In sharp contrast, the Reagan administration has barred a top official of Ciskei, another "independent" homeland from visiting the U.S. to purchase a helicopter. Similarly, it seems unlikely that several Venda

officials, including the homeland's president, will be granted U.S. visas. They were still waiting in January for a reply to their applications. tions.

The Lutheran dean, Simon Fari-sani, was invited for a February visit by the U.S. committee of the World Lutheran Federation. The State Department has waived his need for a passport.

The Ciskei official, Lieut. Gen. Charles Sebe, head of the security police, was told by State to withdraw his application because he would not be allowed to buy a helicopter under the arms embargo and there was no point for his visit.

Last year, a group of officials from BophuthaTswana, a third "independent" homeland, were allowed to visit the U.S. on South African passports and made the trip ostensibly to generate investment interest. But State reportedly believed they used the trip for political lobbying and it now appears that "independent" homeland officials will not be allowed to visit the U.S. (*Sowetan*, January 26, 1983; *Johannesburg Star*, January 22, 1983.)

- Black South Africans have started to outnumber whites in some skilled labor now that job reservation laws are being eliminated.

According to the 1980 census report, blacks and Coloureds (mixed-race people) far exceed whites in such trades as bricklaying (42,680 blacks, 20,960 Coloureds, 9,320 whites) and construction carpentry (18,620/12,320/10,320). In motorcycle mechanics, blacks outnumbered whites by about 8,000.

In administrative and managerial jobs, blacks have made few inroads. Professional and technical fields were also dominated by whites, but there were more than 172,000 blacks in these jobs, more than half of them women.

There were 642,000 black domestics. (*Johannesburg Star*, January 22, 1983.)

- Black community leaders expressed shock and outrage at the results of end-of-school exams for high school students because only 50.2 percent passed.

Educators pointed to the "inferior education" accorded blacks in South Africa, as well as the short-

## Confusion over 'destabilization'

Days after Prime Minister Pieter Botha assured parliament that South Africa has no intention of backing rebel movements in neighboring countries, his Defense Minister said the opposite.

Gen. Magnus Malan told parliament that South Africa might have to support rebels if neighboring countries refused to sign non-aggression pacts with Pretoria. He specifically mentioned the Unita movement in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance, two organizations that are generally regarded as already receiving most if not all of their financial and military backing from Pretoria.

In the view of Pretoria's critics, South Africa deliberately wants to prevent its neighbors from becoming stable so that they cannot build up efficient economies, strong political bases or competent armies.

Botha had lashed out furiously at the South African press when it quoted a U.S. State Department comment in *Africa Report* that the MNR "receives the bulk of its support from South Africa." Botha said this was "a mean lie" and reporting these allegations "borders on treason." He added, "If we really wanted to destabilize, we could do it overnight." (*London Times*, February 4, 1983; *Sowetan*, February 2 and 3, 1983.)

age of properly qualified teachers. One teacher said the results followed the pattern of disproportionately low government spending on black students, roughly one-tenth that for whites. White students posted a better than 90 percent pass rate on the Matriculation Board exams.

Percy Qoboza, the former editor of the banned *Post* and *Sunday Post* newspapers, blamed the "racist atmosphere" of education. Black leaders in the Pretoria townships called on the government's Department of Education and Training to investigate the exam results.

Some teachers, however, criticized the press for its heavy coverage of the poor exam results. "If the press, with its widespread influence, could write positively about the black education system, this would help to instill confidence among the children," one teacher said. (*Sowetan*, December 31, January 4, 5 and 13, 1983.)

- The Reagan administration has relaxed the restrictions on sales to the South African military and police, labeling the change "technical" and not a "political statement."

The State Department said the changes "will simplify and clarify the police and military controls and so make them more effective." On balance, though, the changes make it possible for American companies to sell considerably more goods to

the police and military.

Initially, the Carter administration banned the sale of anything to the military and police. But the Reagan administration has since changed the rules twice. The complete ban was eliminated and goods were divided into three categories: goods without restrictions, banned goods and goods requiring export licenses and reviewed case by case.

Goods in the embargoed list are generally military-related, as are those in the export license category, which in practice were seldom permitted to be exported.

In September 1982 and last January, the lists of banned goods and unrestricted goods both were increased, thus effectively broadening the range of U.S. products obtainable by the police and military. (*Johannesburg Star*, January 29, 1983; *Sowetan*, January 25, 1983.)

- South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa declined slightly in 1982 for the second year in a row, amounting to about \$833 million. South Africa bought about \$296 million worth of goods from Africa, up a bit from 1981.

The figures, published by the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, do not reveal the full trade because the origin of many shipments is disguised for political reasons. A South African Foreign Trade Organization official estimated that total exports are 50 percent higher than



the published figures. The government claims that 46 OAU nations trade with South Africa "in spite of the fact that most of them vote in favor of economic sanctions against South Africa in the UN."

The drop in exports was attributed to reduced shipments of food, particularly maize—affected by the drought—and African countries' payments problems. In 1982, sales to Africa accounted for only 5 percent of South Africa's total exports, compared to 7.6 percent in 1980. Exports to all countries rose 5.1 percent last year, to about \$17 billion. (*Financial Times*, February 1, 1983; Johannesburg Radio, January 20, 1983.)

- South Africa's frequent contention that Simonstown naval base is of strategic importance—a contention met with seeming U.S. and British indifference—may have been strengthened in January with the arrest of the dockyard commander as a possible Soviet spy.

Simonstown is the most developed naval base on the African coastline outside the Mediterranean and the nearby Silvermine complex, buried deep inside a hill, is a sophisticated communications center. The arrested officer, Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, was privy to top-secret military intelligence. A senior naval officer said, "He knew everything."

If Gerhardt does turn out to have been a spy for the Soviets it would be ironic because his German-born father was interned during the Second World War for Nazi sympathies, as were former Prime Minister John Vorster and other staunch Afrikaner nationalists. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 29, 1983; London *Guardian*, January 28, 1983; Johannesburg Radio, January 26 and 27, 1983.)

- Last year was a breakthrough for black unions in the mining industry: they were given the go-ahead to organize among the 480,000 blacks employed by member-companies of the Chamber of Mines. And in December, the chamber said these unions could be independent—not registered in the government set-up industrial council system.

The first black union to organize in the mines is the National Union

of Mineworkers, with the largest membership so far, 14,000. There are four other new unions recruiting blacks, including a previously all-Coloured (mixed-race) union, which has opened its membership to blacks. At least two of these unions had rejected registration as a prerequisite for negotiating, so the chamber's concession removed a major stumbling block.

The need for organizing black miners became evident to many mining companies last year when unrest at some mines resulted in several deaths, hundreds arrested and more than 1,000 workers dismissed. Mine managements and the police said it was impossible to hold talks with hundreds of workers at once. (*Sowetan*, December 14, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, December 11, 1982.)

- The Reagan administration's assistant secretary of state for human rights, Elliot Abrams, came away from a South African trip in November expressing cautious optimism.

"It is evident that change is taking place," Abrams said, "in the political system, in the economy and labor force, in the educational system. It is equally clear that such change is very difficult and it is being resisted and opposed."

Abrams said he was encouraged by "the degree to which [South Africans] are taken up with trying to find solutions to their problems." He added, "As long as that continues, it seems to me we should remain optimistic about South Africa's future and that we should do everything we can—to the limited degree that outsiders can and should interfere—to help those who are in favor of peaceful change."

However, Abrams said there were some aspects the Reagan administration found unacceptable, such as "the great restrictions placed on the role of the courts in protecting civil liberties in South Africa," a reference to detention without trial. Abrams said this kind of system inevitably led to abuses. A fundamental problem with detention, he said, is that "there is no outside access to the system. Once you are in, you stay in and you just cannot get to a judge, to an attorney—that is very disturbing."

Abrams also criticized the practice of banning orders, and in particular the banning of Dr. Beyers Naude. "We object [to banning] because it can be used to silence political opponents rather than to protect the security of the state," he said. Abrams added that the cabinet ministers he had spoken to were "quite sensitive" about the need to avoid abuses in the detention system. (Johannesburg *Star*, November 27, December 11 and 18, 1982.)

- Britain has expelled a South African diplomat who spied on anti-apartheid activists and the Reagan administration reportedly requested the withdrawal of a South African diplomat from Washington.

According to the *Washington Post*, Daniel Opperman, a South African intelligence operative posted to the Washington embassy as a first secretary, left the U.S. in November, a move that Pretoria called a routine transfer. But Opperman reportedly had been engaged in spying on American anti-apartheid organizations. Both TransAfrica and the Southern African Support Project have reported unusual break-ins at their offices in recent months. No valuables were taken but documents were obviously perused.

In London, Warrant Officer Joseph Klue of the South African embassy was revealed in a court case to have arranged for break-ins at the offices of three anti-Pretoria organizations, the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress and SWAPO. British anti-apartheid groups claim that Klue is only one in a major London-based South African espionage ring that spies on people in Europe who are active against apartheid, not just on the black nationalist organizations engaged in guerrilla warfare against Pretoria.

The ring reportedly is run from Pretoria by Craig Williamson, the man who posed as a leftist to infiltrate foreign anti-apartheid groups. Williamson now allegedly funnels money to the espionage network to finance "black bag" operations. (*Washington Post*, December 21, 1982; London *Observer*, December 18, 1982; London *Guardian*, December 18, 1982; Johannesburg *Star*, December 18, 1982.)



● The early release of Afrikaans poet Breyten Breytenbach, after serving seven years of a nine-year sentence for promoting the aims of the banned African National Congress, was due to the personal intercession of French President Francois Mitterrand and other contacts between the socialist French government and Pretoria.

The French government took credit for the release, saying "very pressing demands" had been made of Pretoria in the "interests of human rights" but that no concessions had been made to the South African government. Breytenbach, who is also a well-known painter, had lived for 13 years in Paris before his conviction in 1975. He is very popular among French intellectuals.

The French nuclear power industry viewed the South African move as a way to win favor for supplying another nuclear reactor to Pretoria. Framatome built the Koeberg nuclear reactors, a contract strongly criticized by the socialists, who were in opposition at the time. The possibility of supplying another French reactor has already caused a split in the government, with Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson stating his personal opposition. (*Financial Times*, December 6, 1982; *Sowetan*, December 7, 1982; *London Guardian*, December 7, 1982.)

● More than 100 people suffered the death penalty last year in South Africa, one of the few countries that has actually increased the list of capital crimes. Besides murder, treason and rape, housebreaking with "aggravated circumstances" and "terrorism" are capital crimes, but in practice most executions are for murder.

Johannes Mokae, 23, the brother of the Tony award-winning actor Zakes Mokae, was the 100th person hanged in 1982.

There is a distinct racial factor in executions, as a breakdown of figures for 1980 shows. Of 130 people hanged that year, 85 were blacks and 43 Coloureds (mixed-race people), one was Indian and one was white. All but four were convicted of murder. (*Sowetan*, December 20, 1982; *London Times*, November 25, 1982.)

● A former official of the banned African National Congress who tes-

tified before the U.S. Senate subcommittee on southern African "terrorism" last year was assassinated in December along with his wife.

Bartholomew Hlapane, 64, and his wife Matilda, 53, were gunned down in their Soweto home by a man wielding an AK-47 automatic rifle. Police said that Hlapane had been on the "ANC death list" for a long time and was aware of the danger.

Hlapane defected from the ANC about 20 years ago and subsequently testified as a government witness at several political trials. Police said the assassination may have been in retaliation for the South African army raid on ANC members in Lesotho.

## Zimbabwe

● The fuel crisis which paralyzed Zimbabwe in December and January eased late in January, as the government announced the resumption of normal petrol sales. The crisis was brought about by the December sabotage attack on the storage tank depot at Beira, Mozambique, believed to have been carried out by the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

Landlocked Zimbabwe is required to import all its fuel needs via pipeline from Beira, also frequently blown up by the MNR, or by rail through South Africa. The pipeline was meeting most of Zimbabwe's fuel needs, following its re-opening in June 1982.

With the destruction of the storage tanks, and a January attack on the pipeline, Zimbabwe's access to fuel supplies was sharply curtailed, requiring the government to impose stringent petroleum rationing measures. The cutbacks had a devastating effect on agriculture, industry and tourism.

It was not clear how the improvement in the fuel situation came about. Earlier in January, the government denied reports that it had concluded a supply contract with South Africa, despite Pretoria's apparent interest in doing so.

The fuel crisis came amid tough economic times. With declining revenues from major mineral and agricultural exports due to the world recession, the government

implemented restrictive economic policies late in 1982, including a 20 percent devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar and the maintenance of a wage freeze until at least mid-1983. Food subsidies were also cut, government spending reduced and foreign currency allocations to the private sector restricted. It was widely believed that the austerity measures were aimed at securing a \$500 million credit from the International Monetary Fund. (*London Guardian*, December 10, 1982 and January 27, 1983; *Zimbabwe Herald*, January 8, 1983.)

● The treason trial of Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa, commanders in Joshua Nkomo's former Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (Zipra), and five others began in Harare in February. The men were arrested in February 1982 after arms caches were discovered on property owned by members of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (Zapu) and are charged with attempting to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

The trial is considered politically significant coming amid escalating violence in the Matabeleland province, from where Nkomo and Zapu draw the bulk of their support. Dissident activity there began when Nkomo was sacked from the cabinet in February 1982 on allegations that he knew the arms were being stockpiled.

Nkomo, in an address to parliament early in February, denounced the activities of the national army's North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, which has been deployed to root out the Matabeleland dissidents. He maintained they are responsible for a spate of killings of civilians there. He said the brigade was "a tribal and political army come to wipe out the Ndebeles." In response, Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, characterized the dissident situation as "a Joshua Nkomo problem."

Dissidents who kidnapped six foreign tourists in July had demanded the release of Dabengwa and Masuku as a condition for the hostages' freedom. They have not yet been found. (*Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 1983; *London Guardian*, February 3, 1983.)

# Current U.S. Policy in Southern Africa

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*The four statements that follow are excerpts from speeches presented before the African-American Institute's thirteenth African-American Conference, held in Harare, Zimbabwe from January 10 to 14, 1983. The Institute's conference series brings together African and American leaders from the public and private sectors for in-depth discussions on policy issues between the United States and Africa.*

## **Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe:**

Over the last two decades, Africans have made significant progress in achieving the goals of independence, national sovereignty, and a sense of shared destiny continentally. It will be recalled that founder-members of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 were virtually all newly independent countries that sought to forge unity among themselves with a view to the continuation of the struggle to liberate the remaining colonies and to develop their economies for the benefit of their long-suffering people. To this end, the OAU and indeed a number of subcontinental interstate organizations have set out to transform the African condition such that the African personality, long-suppressed and downtrodden, might come into its own.

It is a matter of deepest regret and concern to us that the first and most crucial task that the OAU set for itself 20 years ago is yet to be completed. I refer here to the task of decolonizing our continent and ridding it forever of the cruel scourges of racist domination and oppression. In Angola, South Africa continues to occupy parts of the south and to

give succour to the UNITA bandits who, so we are told by some American writers, have a history of connections with the United States. The people of Angola have not known peace since the invasion of their country soon after independence, which forces the government of that country to ask for assistance from friendly countries.

The United States has not demanded South African withdrawal from that country. Before 1980, South Africa gave the Ian Smith regime in this country assistance in its aggression against Mozambique, Zambia, and even Angola. Today bandits trained as saboteurs and equipped by the apartheid regime are involved daily in acts of banditry against the Mozambican people, while the regime's mercenaries have gone as far afield as the Seychelles. Our own forces here in Zimbabwe have clashed with regular South African forces and also captured some bandits and dissidents who have admitted to having been trained and deployed by South Africa.

Recently, a South African terrorist gang invaded Lesotho's territory and slaughtered innocent Basotho citizens and South African refugees. These barbaric acts associated with South Africa's policy of destabilization will continue to happen for as long as apartheid exists in this region. South Africa's behavior is based on its determination to defend its apartheid system. In the first place, South Africa fears the power of example that may become a potent force, giving further inspiration to the African majority it oppresses if neighboring states develop viable economies and stable democratic societies. Secondly, South Africa's goal is to reduce neighboring states to the status of its economic



satellites in line with its Bantustan policy in order to create the so-called constellation of states in the whole region. Finally, South Africa seeks to intimidate independent states so that they cease to support the liberation movements struggling to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Furthermore, South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia has continued in the face of both the gallant armed resistance of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO and in defiance of the wishes of the international community to implement Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council. Until recently, South Africa had used delaying tactics at the negotiating table in a lone battle to frustrate efforts by the Frontline states and the Western Contact Group to achieve an early and peaceful solution to the Namibian problem. When SWAPO accepted that elections should be held on the basis of either of two electoral systems, preferable proportional representation as opposed to the single-member constituency system, the South African regime refused to indicate the system it preferred.

Up to now this issue has not been resolved. So we wonder: What more concessions must SWAPO make, short of abject surrender to apartheid, before any further forward movement toward a settlement is sanctioned by all the parties in this dispute? But the more distressing aspect of the Namibian problem at present is the fact that blackmail has been introduced in the form of the so-called linkage idea. I am referring here to the American and South African demand for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from the sovereign state of Angola as a precondition for the decolonization of Namibia. As a member of the Western Contact Group, which was supposed to play a mediating role, the United States has obviously introduced a stumbling block that may well impede the decolonization process of Namibia, albeit temporarily.

The Frontline states and indeed the whole of the OAU have rejected this linkage. The United States' insistence on linkage has given solace to the South African regime. Not only has South Africa continued its plunder, incarceration, and murder of the Namibian people, but it has also escalated its campaign to destabilize the independent states of the subcontinent. That Pretoria is now more daring and aggressive cannot be doubted.

In the economic sphere, serious attempts are being made by individual African countries, regional communities, and the OAU to meet the challenges of underdevelopment and promote industrialization, self-sufficiency, and interdependence in Africa.

The OAU drew up the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, which now guides our efforts, first to create regional communities and subsequently to achieve African-wide cooperation. In this regard, I am pleased to say that regional organizations involving many states are already in existence. Here in southern Africa there are two such organizations that address themselves to different aspects of cooperation. These are the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the much larger Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States (PTA). While the former focuses on regional development coordination in such fields as transport and food security, the latter seeks a broad-ranged liberalization of trade among the member countries of the PTA. I am glad to say steady and sure progress is being made towards the realization of the objectives of both organizations.

Yet in spite of our own positive efforts, the economic situ-

ation in Africa continues to worsen in large part due to external pressure. In this respect the inequitable distribution of the world's economic resources must be examined with the urgency the situation deserves. There is a burning need to reorient international economic relations to the benefit of all member countries of the international community. However, it is clearly evident that the concept of a New International Economic Order has not found equal support among all nations, for some nations are reluctant to find a more equitable way to redistribute the wealth on this small planet of ours.

The little progress made towards leading the global negotiations for a New International Economic Order has been disappointing, and one cannot here avoid mentioning the reluctance of some of the developed countries to continue the momentum generated prior to the Cancun summit. Several opportunities in the quest for fairer economic relations between developed and industrialized countries have been missed.

The deteriorating global economic position has regrettably been used as an excuse by industrialized countries to apply protectionist measures against exports from developing countries. Blocking markets to the South only exacerbates the economic imbalance and denies it the chance to experience real development. The lifting of protectionist measures and the liberalization of the terms of trade is an immediate necessity.

The democratization of the international monetary institutions is another economic priority. There is a real and urgent need to restructure and reform these institutions in such a way that they reflect contemporary realities. What is required is greater participation by developing countries in the process of decision making within these bodies.

Zimbabwe attaches great importance to the establishment of a world food security system. The eradication of hunger and malnutrition is a global responsibility and should be viewed as an international obligation. While playing its own role within the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to ensure regional food security, Zimbabwe would welcome greater efforts by the developed countries to establish an international coordinated system of nationally held food reserves. We must make provision now for our expanding populations.

Given our serious economic problems, and in order to achieve our development goals, we in Africa have solicited both bilateral and multilateral assistance from the developed countries. In this respect, I regret to say that the level of aid presently received falls far short of the 0.7 percent of their gross national product, which was recommended more than a decade ago by the Pearson Report and accepted in UN Resolution 2626 of October 1970. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that some powers have tended to provide more military aid than development assistance.

We also find it disturbing that there is an increasing tendency to give aid with political strings in order to reduce the recipients into neocolonies and puppets of the donor countries. It is more unfortunate that some governments believe that aid should be an instrument to pressurize developing nations to adopt or abandon postures at international and national levels irrespective of the latter's own chosen principles and convictions. Such attitudes are not promotive of mutual understanding and the strengthening of good relations.

We are well aware that aid is not charity. We note that it is often given as much to benefit the donor as the recipient.



This we understand as long as the terms are mutually agreed to. Similarly, we in Africa have encouraged trade and investment. However, we note that as far as U.S. trade is concerned, South Africa continues to top the list of non-oil-producing African countries that trade with the United States. The U.S. imports mostly from South Africa. It is our hope that this trend will be reversed.

Politically, Africa is united in its desire to liberate the entire continent from colonialism and its vestiges. Economically, Africa is striving to industrialize to become self-reliant, and establish cooperation among our many nations and with other continents. Africa values cooperation between developing and developed countries, which promotes these goals.

**Nancy Landon Kassebaum,  
U.S. Senator (R-Kans.), Chairman,  
Senate Subcommittee on Africa:**

Each country in Africa has gone through major changes in the last decade. In the United States, our own economic worries cause uncertainty and lowered expectations. In many ways, the African-American relationships and domestic attitudes in each of the African countries have undergone similar shifts. Where once Africa and those who wished Africa well looked forward to the future with a sense of buoyant optimism, today's optimism is guarded. The challenge of economic and social development in a time of worldwide economic lethargy and financial stringency will grow as the decade before us unfolds.

This challenge will require that we find innovative ways to utilize our development budgets. Both the American foreign aid budget and the African governmental budgets should find means of achieving impact at lower cost. We need to streamline bureaucracies, ruthlessly cut programs that are not working, and pay greater attention to the overall environment in which these programs operate.

In no field of development is this need more urgent than in the field of agriculture. The steady decline in per capita food production in Africa must occupy a central place in our discussions. International assistance for Africa's agricultural sector amounted to almost \$5 billion between 1973 and 1980, yet the average African had considerably less to eat at the end of the period than he had at the beginning. There is genuine reason for alarm in the fact that in spite of a major foreign donor commitment, per capita food production is falling by 1.4 percent annually. This is a tragic situation for a continent with the potential for great agricultural wealth.

If present trends continue, by the end of this century almost one-fourth of Africa's food needs will have to be imported. Such imports simply cannot be provided through increased donor assistance, and the cost of commercial food imports at this level would force severe cutbacks, perhaps the elimination, of development efforts. Even if donors were able to provide the needed food assistance, related and equally worrisome trends in the transportation and communications infrastructure suggest that it will be very difficult to assure that food aid reaches those in the rural areas with the greatest need.

Adequate prices to the African producer are an essential element in addressing the decline in per capital food production. They are also an essential element in assuring eq-

uitable distribution of incomes, inasmuch as most of Africa's food producers are among the poorest of the poor in their own countries. Experience has shown that countries that have adopted a policy of fair prices to producers are fully capable of meeting their food needs, while those who have



Photo: Sue Romilly

**Nancy Kassebaum: "The point of diplomacy is to be constructively engaged"**

avored urban consumers have fallen rapidly behind in self-sufficiency, to the ultimate detriment of those whom they sought to help. The problems of African agricultural revitalization are not limited to that sector. They often find their roots in the economic and political environment in which the producers must operate.

Today we find an environment more unstable, more uncertain, more erratic than it has been at any time since Africa first entered the postcolonial age. Hovering over us like an ominous cloud is international indebtedness, particularly as it relates to Third World countries. The tensions thus created strain political alliances.

We must soon address the problem of freely floating exchange rates. The dollar is more overvalued today than at any time in the past decade. The overvaluation of the dollar is placing heavy burdens on every country, as prices for commodities priced in dollars—especially petroleum—are rising.

The decision to allow the dollar to float was made with the belief that market forces would provide a more stable adjustment of foreign currency exchange rates and eliminate the periodic currency speculation crises that we experienced in the 1960s. This attempt to promote stability may have itself become a destabilizing element in our economic system.

We cannot focus entirely on economic questions. Apartheid in South Africa and the continued South African occupation of Namibia are of vital concern to all of us. I visited South Africa and Lesotho enroute to this conference and had the opportunity to witness firsthand the conditions in those troubled lands. The South African raid into Lesotho was tragic. Let there be no misunderstanding, no one in the United States government sympathizes with such activities. I was reminded of a comment made by Alan Paton over 30 years ago, that the beauty of South Africa's landscape "is nothing more than the backdrop against which is being played a great human drama" in which he, his wife, and children were deeply involved. Further, he commented, "all Africa is involved, and all humanity, and the world. For no country is now an island, of itself entire."

To play an important part in the human drama that is South Africa is an appealing prospect. But those who want to play a role in this drama must first ask if they are willing to devote the time, the study, the prayer, and love of our fellow man that is required if our role is to be a positive contribution to the denouement of this drama. Those who seek to simplify this drama into a white hats-black hats cowboy movie by refusing to consider the viewpoints of any but a rigid, narrowly defined group of South African opinion—be it white or black—should not seek to play a role. I was especially struck in South Africa by those, both white and black, who have bypassed the easy living and high salaries they could have had, for modestly paying positions from which they seek to promote a more just society. We should seek ways to support those who seek to demonstrate that there are alternatives to violence and injustice.

It is much easier to condemn than construct. In such an atmosphere, symbolizing overwhelms substance. There has been much talk about the American policy of constructive engagement. The whole point, however, of diplomacy is to be constructively engaged. It can only be successful though if it is a two-way street—Africa is at a crossroad. If ever the full potential of this great continent is to be achieved, Africans and Americans must approach each other with an honesty and candor born of good will and mutual respect.

#### **Ahaji M.B. Kirfi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Nigeria:**

Africa and the OAU endorsed the Lusaka Manifesto adopted by the East and Central African Summit in 1969 opting for a peaceful resolution of the racial and colonial conflict in southern Africa. When there was no response from the racist white minority and colonialist regimes in southern Africa, the OAU changed its strategy in adopting the Mogadishu Declaration, which called for armed struggle if there was no peaceful alternative.

It was only some two years thereafter that the racist South African regime came up with a half-hearted res-

ponse in Vorster's policy of dialogue with black African countries. The OAU rightly rejected this move as a diversionary tactic, urging the regime instead to talk with the imprisoned leaders of the black majority in South Africa.

After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime of Caetano in April 1974, the OAU responded favorably to Vorster's "Voice of Reason" statement. While we genuinely stopped the armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and opted for a peaceful transition to majority rule, the racist white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa used the breathing space thus gained to consolidate and rearm themselves not only with a view to containing the inevitable resumption and escalation of the armed liberation struggle, but also with a view to carrying out attacks on the neighboring states.

Again in 1979, Africa along with the international community welcomed Prime Minister Botha's "adapt or die" statement made to his white audience and electorate. Yet while internally discussing a Presidential Council and more recently a new constitutional dispensation offering limited power-sharing to the so-called Coloureds and Indians, South Africa is becoming more and more aggressive in the subcontinent. It has declared the whole of southern Africa a defense zone.

South African aggression in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho, and elsewhere in the region undermines peace and security in Africa. Angola has never known peace since its independence because of the repeated South African invasions since 1975. We are made to understand that South Africa also gives backing to bandits such as UNITA in Angola and the MNR in Mozambique. The issue of Namibian independence has unfortunately and unreasonably been linked to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Nigeria is not only resolutely committed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on the independence of Namibia, but is also more determined than ever before to continue to support the struggling people of Namibia and South Africa.

The continuing political and armed conflicts in Namibia and South Africa have created serious economic problems for the white minority regime. With a population of 29 million, a gross national product of \$54.3 billion, and defense expenditures of \$2.56 billion, South Africa stands extremely vulnerable to comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions. In 1981, South Africa's total imports amounted to \$21.3 billion, about 54 percent of which came from Western powers. These figures reveal only part of the transactions, which include export of strategic minerals to the Western powers and Japan.

In 1982, despite overwhelming opposition from the UN General Assembly and the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) unconditionally granted a \$1 billion loan to the apartheid regime, whereas most of the African countries with pending applications for IMF loans are being forced to comply with stringent conditions, including substantial currency devaluations. Some of these applications have been pending for more than three years. They have fulfilled the main IMF conditions, but loans are still to be made.

The U.S. response to the military, political, and socioeconomic situation in southern Africa in general and in South Africa in particular is insensitive to the views of Africa and the OAU and at best misguided. The United States and its

Western allies have consistently frustrated the call of the international community for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. According to the thinking of the U.S. and the West, sanctions would hurt the black African majority in South Africa even more, as well as the independent neighboring African states. Even when the leaders of these countries and the black majority in South Africa indicate their preparedness to make the sacrifice, the West insists that sanctions do not work, as was the case in Rhodesia. According to the official U.S. view even under the Carter administration, investment and trade should rather be used as a vehicle for change. But we do know that South Africa takes very seriously even the threat of unilateral sanctions by Western powers.

For years, we have had the Sullivan Principles and the investment code for Western firms operating in South Africa. The U.S. officials are quick to point at the so-called changes in the removal of petty apartheid, in the registration of black trade unions under certain conditions, in the scrapping of certain job reservations for whites, and in attempts at integrated sports at top national and international levels.

The United States has not associated itself with the global effort to isolate the racist South African regime in the severance of sporting links. Yet it is an undeniable fact that the international boycott has helped to bring about what little attempt we now see to integrate sports. In this and other fields, Nigeria has fought relentlessly, at the level of the Commonwealth, the OAU, and the UN, to isolate South Africa from international sporting contacts, thanks to its presidency of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa and the chairmanship of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. Nigeria's vice-president has participated and delivered keynote addresses at several international conferences against apartheid. In 1977, Nigeria hosted an international conference against apartheid.

Nigeria, the Frontline states, and indeed all of Africa are not happy with the situation in which Africa, particularly the southern African subcontinent, is once more being seen from the U.S. viewpoint in terms of East-West confrontation. The Frontline states, Nigeria, and the OAU had succeeded during the late 1970s to make the Carter administration see the South African and southern African situation in its proper regional context. But we are now left to watch with dismay and disbelief as the Namibia question is discussed in superpower capitals behind our backs. Whether it is the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, or Vice-President George Bush, they have been told everywhere they have been in Africa that there should be no linkage of the Namibia question to the Angola situation. Yet under the present administration, the United States persists with its own view that has thus encouraged the racist South African regime to adopt this U.S. stand as a condition *sine qua non*.

We are witnessing today the increasing relaxation of the UN arms embargo by the United States. We even see the international cohesion and solidarity of the OAU threatened because of undue external pressures. We hope that the superpowers would endeavor to view our situation in light of the overriding aspirations of Africa, as enshrined in the principles of the OAU and the UN charters.



Photo: Sue Romilly

**Robert Mugabe: "Blackmail" has been introduced into the Namibia negotiations via the "linkage" policy**

Nigeria therefore fully supports the concept of sanctions and has worked toward the goal set by the UN and its Special Committee Against Apartheid. The efforts of the Frontline countries and Nigeria as well as the struggle of patriotic elements inside Namibia and South Africa represent the catalysts that will eventually hasten the collapse and demise of the system. Nigeria for its part will leave no stone unturned, no avenue unexplored, in its fight against the system of apartheid that represents man's inhumanity to man.

#### **Chester Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs:**

We in the Reagan administration are profoundly aware that there is a close interrelationship between issues of economic, political, physical, and psychological security in Africa as in elsewhere. Too often in discussions of policy there is the tendency to make artificial distinctions between economics, politics, and military affairs. Issues of economic security, economic development, and economic survival are uppermost in the minds of all of us as we look at the current situation in Africa.

We are deeply conscious of the fact that some of the most profound threats to regional and national security in Africa have essentially economic origins. The growth of the economic recession, economic decline, or economic collapse in individual African countries can only provoke further challenges to security of a more physical nature.

My second observation concerns the U.S. role in security issues more traditionally defined. As we have said repeatedly, it is not our objective to seek to promote East-West confrontation in Africa or in any other part of the Third World. We have no mandate to do so, any more than we have a mandate to be a gendarme on this continent. None of our interests in Africa would be served by playing such a



role and we do not have the impression that African countries wish us to play such a role. On the contrary, our interests are served by economic development and it is those objectives that our policy is seeking to push forward.

As we look at the continent in the broadest sense, our overarching strategic goal in Africa is to help establish the rules of the game that will limit and discourage the application of outside force in African conflicts. There are local or regional circumstances in Africa that on occasion give rise to exploitation or manipulation by outside powers, some of them unfriendly to us. In such circumstances, problems that are initially local can acquire a more global implication.

When this occurs, we face a different situation and one that we cannot ignore. This is the second half of our response to African security issues. Neither we in the West nor African states can gain when one outside power seeks unilateral advantage through the projection or application of military force in Africa. Africa, like the West, is the loser when regional actors are encouraged to pursue violent rather than negotiated solutions. Those two points convey the broad thrust of the philosophy we are seeking to represent in our security programs in Africa.

We have security assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa designed to support a strategic goal of helping to establish and maintain the limits of outside force that is applied in Africa. We are not this continent's self-appointed policeman, but we are its partner in economic growth and nation-building. As such, we cannot ignore the real security threats facing our African partners, especially when these are prompted or fueled by our global adversaries. Moreover, the presence of Soviet-bloc forces and bases in parts of Africa that would threaten our communications with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are a serious challenge to vital U.S. security interests. The answer is neither to ignore the problem nor to overreact and provoke an essentially East-West arms race in Africa. The proper answer is for the United States and our allies, in close consultation with our African friends, to provide just the right amount of security assistance to afflicted African nations for them and us to achieve our mutual strategic goals.

Perhaps nowhere in Africa have our security concerns and our security policies been more intensely engaged than in southern Africa. This region, from Zaire to the Cape of Good Hope, contains the bulk of Africa's mineral wealth, its most developed industrial structure, and almost two-thirds of the continent's gross national product. It is also a region threatened with the prospect of heightened violence and polarization that could lead to great power confrontation. It is precisely to avoid that possibility of violence and confrontation that we have fashioned a major effort to bring about regional peace and security.

Southern Africa is a complex region and its many characteristics and conflicts cannot be easily summarized. But two major sources of tension dominate the scene. One is that South Africa—the richest and most powerful state in the region, governed by a white minority that has erected a structure of legally entrenched racial separation to protect itself—feels surrounded and threatened by its black-ruled neighbors. South Africa believes that it must preempt any armed threat—guerrilla or conventional—from its neighbors, and has demonstrated its readiness to use its military superiority to that end. Until there develops a structure of understanding—some reciprocally understood basis for coexistence—between South Africa and its neighbors,

this situation will remain a major source of instability and could result in growing violence across borders to the detriment of American as well as African interests. To say this is not to condone South African military actions or to downplay the urgency or the gravity of South Africa's own domestic agenda. The U.S. government has deplored South African attacks into neighboring countries, and, especially, as in the case of the raid in Maseru in December, the tragic loss of innocent life that can result. We equally deplore acts of violence carried out against the South African population from whatever source. Both actions are antithetical to the peaceful resolution of the problems of that country as well as the problems of the region, and they represent the sort of violence that underlines the urgency of finding a means of resolving the problems of the region through peaceful negotiation and reconciliation. The consistent message of the United States to South Africa has been that there are peaceful means to resolve the problems of southern Africa and they are far preferable to the escalation of violence that continues to occur. This policy approach is at the core of the negotiations we are pursuing with regard to Namibia and Angola. I would emphasize that this philosophy is also at the core of our policy toward the other states in this region.

Movement towards a system based on consent, shaped by South Africans of all races, is essential for that country's stability and survival. But that process is unlikely to occur peacefully in conditions of heightened international violence across South African borders.

It is not overstatement to note that the political future of Africa will be shaped by the ways in which the deep tensions and problems of southern Africa are eventually resolved. It is for these reasons that this administration has adopted a policy of constructive engagement *not* with respect to South Africa, but with respect to southern Africa. It is a policy based on the principle that positive encouragement, close relations, and continuous dialogue with all the countries of this region are more likely to be effective than harsh rhetoric. Regional security, independence for Namibia, and movement away from apartheid in South Africa remain our regional goals.

In this region, the United States is prepared—and has made this clear to all governments in southern Africa—to play a role as facilitator in encouraging the development of a structure of coexistence in this region. We do not say this out of ambition, but because the alternatives are as stark for us as for those who live here. We do not seek to inject ourselves into bilateral or multilateral affairs of neighbors in southern Africa. We have no military ambitions in this region, but where our role, our suggestions, and our good offices are desired and welcomed, we are quite prepared to become involved and we have become involved.

We view it as our proper role to maintain credibility as a potential honest broker and to communicate our concerns directly to the parties involved, typically via diplomatic channels. This is a conflicting region of Africa. Distrust, polarization, and fear are rife. The levers of direct U.S. influence are limited. From this it follows that effectiveness on our part is a function of the following: the maintenance of our credibility with all parties, and the use of private rather than public communication. This explains a simple and little understood reality. More is going on in this region than meets the eye. We are already engaged constructively here and will keep at it. □

# Removing Laws That Oppress Women

BY EDDISON ZVOBGO

Westerners are often shocked to learn that in the newly independent nation of Zimbabwe traditional practice still governs and sharply limits the legal rights of black women. Under customary law, a newly widowed woman is forcibly ejected from her home and all property is inherited by her husband's relatives. In fact, the wife and her children can be inherited. These and other customary practices have a rationale in the cultural milieu from which they rose. But with the advent of independence, that cultural reality has changed, hence the need to adopt a more equitable legal framework that applies to both black and white, male and female. In a presentation made at a Harare conference, "Women in Southern Africa: Strategies for Change," in November 1982, Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, Zimbabwe's minister for legal and parliamentary affairs, explains the technical and societal obstacles involved in removing legalized discrimination against black women and suggests areas requiring immediate change.

In March 1982, I had the great honor of addressing a conference on the report of the situation of women in Zimbabwe. At that conference, which was sponsored by the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs, I expressed my delight at the fact that at long last our women had



Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

Zimbabwe: "Under customary law, mothers have no rights of guardianship over their own children"

got their act together in order to take a long leap forward in their just struggle for emancipation and equality. I also described my ministry, which had only just been formed, and outlined its functions. In particular, I predicted that our department on African law would prove to be of the greatest interest to women in Zimbabwe.

During the months since that address, my ministry has forged ahead to play a full role in our government's efforts to bring about equality between men and women in our society. However, it is still too early for us to report any visible result from our efforts in this regard. Accordingly, much of what I

said then about what I saw as problems facing our women and therefore tasks facing my ministry and the government as a whole still remains valid and worthy of repetition now.

Before I address the problems, however, I wish to report progress in the form of passage through the Zimbabwe Parliament of the Legal Age of Majority Act (which became effective on December 11, 1982). That act is the initial step in hauling our black women from the traditional back-seat role to which they were seemingly condemned in perpetuity by customary law. The act provides that at the age of 18 years all persons will become of age, or adults, irrespective of their sex. Black women, like non-black women and all men, will become adults in the eyes of the law once they become 18 years old. As adults, they become free from parental control and acquire contractual capacity, including the right to enter into a contract of marriage.

I must stress that the Legal Age of Majority Act is only the first step. Research in my ministry and elsewhere has shown, and the government is aware, that by itself the act will not bring about the emancipation of black women. For example we know that as long as the African Marriages Act remains on our statute books the black woman who wants to marry will remain subjected to legal constraints inconsis-

tent with her status as an adult. The constraints include the need for a guardian to consent to the marriage and the requirements for the payment of *roora* or *lobola* (bride price).

You will note that I have used the expression "in the eyes of the law." This is because, as I shall show later, there are other constraints that are not legal but have a very strong bearing on the status of women in this country. That there is a law such as the Legal Age of Majority Act means that the government of Zimbabwe has publicly gone on record for full equality between men and women in all spheres, including the law. Our government is letting it be known that it does not need persuasion concerning the need to achieve the full equality of the people of this country. Indeed, this is as you would expect from a government that was born out of an armed struggle.

During that armed struggle, our women fought relentlessly, like their male counterparts. Therefore there can be no possibility of our government's tolerating the continued subjugation of our women. It is against this background that my ministry is conducting research into all laws having a bearing on the status of women, such as the African Marriages Act, the Married Persons Property Act, the Guardianship of

Minors Act, and the Deceased Estates Succession Act. In this research, the ministry is in touch with all other interested parties, such as the University of Zimbabwe's law department, whose project on fundamental rights and personal law is in progress.

There is one more constraint, however, which is of critical importance to the whole question of the status of women — the customary practices of our society. Some of these practices have become so much a part of our lives that, law or no law, they bind us so rigidly that they can be said to have attained the force of law. Whatever changes we may bring about in the law of marriages will not alter the fact that for most people in this country it will continue to be the practice that a young woman who wants to get married will do so only if her male parent or guardian gives his consent. No law can stop that practice, at least not at the moment. What we can do is to remove the requirement of parental consent from the formalities of a marriage.

Another example of social practices that need to be thoroughly examined is the payment of *roora* or *lobola*. Clearly, in present circumstances, the legal abolition of the system of *roora* will not necessarily enhance the status of women. In at least two other African

countries, *roora* was abolished by law, but it remained as a requirement under customary practice. The law remained on the shelves, where it is still collecting dust. Similar to the issue of *roora* is the question of wills. Under the African Wills Act, black Zimbabweans can make wills and dispose of their property entirely as they wish. However, in practice, wills by Africans tend to reveal a strong preference for willing property in accordance with customary practice, namely, to the eldest son.

Here again, it would be futile and maybe even counterproductive for our legislators to rush into a change of the law before sufficient research has been conducted into what the people really want. These few examples suffice to demonstrate that with the best of intentions, no people's government can promulgate laws so different from what the people themselves do that the laws remain a dead letter. Such a law is worse than no law at all.

In light of the above, what can my ministry do to bring about the full realization of the quality of the status of all our people irrespective of sex? I suggest that the answer lies in a combination of research and law promotion. My ministry is involved in both of these aspects right now. We have begun research into many areas that have hitherto worked against women. This research is continuing, and we shall provide advice on an ongoing basis to relevant government authorities about changes we feel will help bring about the full equality of Zimbabwe's women. Our research will also take into account the experiences of other countries.

Marriage is one of the areas that need urgently to be examined with a view to changing the laws or practices. This matter is being considered by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is our hope that we as a people will soon develop a legislative program that will abolish the present differences in the consequences of marriage — differences that at present depend on whether the marriage is under civil law or customary law. We in the Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs expect that the changes in our marriage laws will be fully comprehensive so that related matters — such as the proprietary rights of



Photo: George Hallett

Slate mineworker in Zimbabwe: "Women are a vital link in our chain of national development"



spouses, the custody of children during marriage, and divorce — will all be regulated satisfactorily.

We must find a way of removing the following existing differences:

- Non-black women can marry in or outside community of property. Marriage in a community means that all property brought into the marriage or that which is acquired after marriage becomes the property of the husband. Marriage outside the community means that the marriage does not affect the right of each spouse to retain separate ownership of property brought into the marriage and property acquired after the marriage was consummated. The black woman finds that under custom she is effectively married in community of property.

- Under the Guardianship of Minors Act, the father has a dominant guardianship but must consult the mother on matters concerning the children. The mother can approach the court for assistance if there is a dispute. Under customary law, the father has absolute custody of the children if *roora* has been paid. If *roora* has not been paid, the mother's father has custody. In both cases, the customary mother has no rights of guardianship of her own children.

- The advantageous position of the father is retained in the event of a divorce in a customary marriage, while for non-blacks, the court is empowered by the Matrimonial Causes Act to grant custody in divorce to either the father or the mother, depending on the best interests of the child concerned.

My final point is that we should all be involved in a family comprehensive study of the status of our women and all the laws that bear on that status. Only a comprehensive study can propose solutions, which reduced into law will become acceptable to the people and therefore permanent. I realize that I have not dealt with important questions such as inheritance or succession to property, especially when the husband has died, or the question of the appropriate level of income tax payable by working wives. I believe, however, that these and similar issues will be covered in the comprehensive study in which my ministry is engaged; in the

three areas of marriage, ownership of property, and the custody or guardianship of children, we have made a start.

Our government does not need to be persuaded of the need to bring about the full equality of women with men. We have an interest in this that not only is born out of our war experience but is selfish. Women are a vital link in our chain of national development. If they remain behind and weak, our total efforts will to that extent be slowed down.

That is why Prime Minister Mugabe has taken steps such as including our women in Parliament as deputy ministers and ministers. What remains is a change in the nation's attitudes toward our women. If we as a nation are prepared to take our women side by side with us in the transformation of our society, I can pledge my ministry's support in preparing the necessary changes in the law to bring this vital transformation about. □

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# The Media and the Ideal Woman

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BY GAYLA COOK ISAACS

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Whether in Africa, Europe, or the Far East, advocates of change for women face a common problem in modifying the prevailing images of women. People develop their value systems and the way they regard themselves and others through information that is available to them. In the past, this information came mainly from the immediate environment — the family, schools, the church, and the community. One of the major developments of the twentieth century is the creation of mechanical means of intruding value-laden information into what were once insular and intimate settings. The media — radio, television, newspapers, books, magazines, records — transmit bits of information that influence how people think. These intrusions alter perspectives and result in

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**Bessie Head, a South African novelist, examines women's universal emotions in her works**

Photo: George Hallett

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different ways of doing and perceiving things.

Before the media explosion, one could live and die in a community, knowing little about the rest of the world. But the media have made the world a smaller place — a global village — requiring us to know more about each other. How a person accepts the information provided through the media depends upon the individual's makeup and the context within which he or she is found. Culture greatly influences how we use and interpret the information we receive.

As an example, the image of the African woman soldier was viewed with admiration in the West, as she fought for independence alongside men in Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, and most recently Zimbabwe. Ironically, the female combatant in Zimbabwe is now seen as something of a social misfit. Postindependence newspaper stories recount men's preference for marrying the girls they left behind instead of the pants-clad comrades with whom they lived in the bush. A flurry of letters to the editor either refuting or explaining this phenomenon frequently follows such stories, and marriages between ex-combatants continue to receive prominence in the press. In the Zimbabwean setting, the media reflect prevailing attitudes toward women and an image of what they should be, despite official government policy supporting sexual equality and nondiscrimination against ex-combatants, male or female.

## THE IDEAL WOMAN

Do the African media truly reflect the values of the majority? Is there a prevailing image of the ideal woman? Because the media are targeted at the mas-

ses, one could assume that they reflect the cultural status quo. Therefore the image of the ideal woman varies from society to society and among diverse groups within each society. Judging from the most frequent images in the Western media, the ideal woman is white, young, and slender, with flowing tresses, sex appeal, and freedom from encumbrances such as children. She is visible everywhere, in advertisements and magazines, regardless of the type of product being sold. It is this image of women that predominates on television; and even in a case like newscasting, where she is permitted to invade the male bastions, it is still the ideal woman who reads us the news.

What is the African ideal woman portrayed in the media? A perusal of magazines, newspapers, and television in southern Africa reveals two clear images of women — the mother/wife, portrayed with her husband and children, preparing food, sending the family off to school and work, or engaged in household work; and the "young modern woman." She is "with it," dresses well, and is often seen outside the home, leaving a department store, buying the latest cosmetics, or jetting off for a fantasy trip overseas.

Southern Africa, like America, is characterized by racial dichotomies. Advertisers saw the need to develop images to which blacks could relate. Because whites largely controlled the media originally and because multinationals had the principal interest in advertising, projecting white images was not a problem and advertising copy was readily imported. In some instances, advertisers have used U.S. television commercials and display ads that feature blacks; however, those were only brought about in the United States by black outcry against their invisible status in the American media.

Advertising is not the only means by which women's images are portrayed. Stories in newspapers and magazines and on television, or the absences of them, reflect how women are perceived in society. The "women and style" pages of the newspapers and women's magazines are replete with recipes, hairstyles, and ads for cosmetics, but they contain little of political or economic substance. Not surprisingly, the

most widely circulated women's magazines in southern Africa come from South Africa.

The media can also reflect their own points of view about women. The editor of Zimbabwe's *Sunday Mail*, Willie Musarurwa, readily admits that he is a traditionalist in his view of women and believes that feminism and advocacy for change in women's status is "reflective of the thinking of an educated elite of less than 1 percent of Zimbabwean women." The *Sunday Mail* chose to concur with a not-guilty verdict in a South African rape case, referring to local cultural mores and the difficulty in distinguishing rape from tacit consent. When a continent-wide, United Nations-sponsored meeting was held in Zambia in 1979 in preparation for the Copenhagen World Conference on Women, the Lusaka daily paper carried a front-page story on the meeting. After praising Zambia's progressive attitude toward women and the aims of the conference, the article concluded with an admonition against women's abandoning their most important role in life — that of good housewives.

Classified ads in southern Africa specify the requisite qualities for a man to fill a management or technical position, while bookkeepers and secretaries are positions slotted for women. And *who* says something with regard to women can be as important as *what* is said. In Zimbabwe, an outspoken proponent of women's rights was criticized in the newspaper for being single and therefore not qualified to hold militant views on marriage. Culture dictates that a married woman has more stature than an unmarried one.

#### MEDIA VERSUS CULTURE

Nationalistic fervor, particularly in southern Africa, where colonialism has persisted the longest, has engendered a renaissance of traditional African culture in the postindependence era. In a region where indigenous culture has been suppressed for so long, it is understandable that there should be a rediscovery and reaffirmation of cultural identity. Yet one must ask, What in fact is African tradition and does being traditional make cultural attitudes correct?

Although the media might be blamed for introducing foreign values, in southern Africa change has been a fact of life for centuries. In addition to encroachment from outside the continent, migration within the region has been a common phenomenon. Colonialism and the economic patterns that were created provided the impetus for further change. Which, then, is "authentic" African culture, and which is foreign?

A classic example of the mixing of cultural values through the media is the wedding ceremony. Among middle-class Africans, marriage and the attendant pomp and ceremony incorporating Western and ethnic conventions is a high point in life. The deep meaning of the marriage act emanates from the African cultural context of joining two families, symbolized by the payment of *lobola* (bride price) and extensive negotiations between the two families well before the Western-style wedding takes place. In fact, in the African cultural context, the couple is married when *lobola* has been paid. The style and dress for the wedding, however, is directly from the West. The white wedding dress, attendants, gold rings, and church ceremony are not entirely attributable to religious beliefs. And the meaning of the ceremony differs from the traditional Western context, since it does not necessarily mark the beginning of the couple's conjugal union. The "white wedding" can take place long after the couple has started living together and even after the birth of children.

The media can be an agent for positive change in the African development process, both in terms of the role of women in the society and in political, economic, and social evolution. Culture is not static, and change involves incorporating the new and modifying the old. The media, like literature, can help explain the process.

Inflammatory rhetoric about foreign encroachment into "authentic" culture can be a smoke screen for a rigorous inquiry into what actually comprises a nation's culture. The media plays a critical role in providing information, fomenting debate, and engaging in criticism of its own participation in the process. Although newspapers or television may not be able to control all the





Photo: George Halliell

Advertising in the print media reflects the image of the "ideal woman"

advertising they transmit, they can feature articles or programs that address how women are presented in the media or in relation to specific issues such as employment, education, social change, and politics. Because of the colonial legacy in southern Africa, which denied African culture, the media and the educational institutions have enormous responsibilities. In addition to adapting to changes in women's roles in society, they must also rewrite the past.

#### HE WHO CONTROLS

If information is power, then he who controls it possesses the power to create the images. Who controls the media in southern Africa? Men do, and until recently those men were usually expatriates. In Africa, it is mainly men who are the authors and publishers of books, the filmmakers, the singers, the photographers, and the editors of newspapers and magazines. This is a universal problem, being also the pattern in the West.

Yet in Africa, it is the women who have been the storytellers, the spirit mediums in touch with the past, the teachers of culture for the coming gen-

erations. Since modern media is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa, is it not possible to change the patterns that exclude women?

The majority of Africa's novels and films have been written and produced by men. Certainly there are some men who write about women with sensitivity. Senegalese filmmaker and author Ousmane Sembene treats the subjects of polygamy and class struggle in his film *Xala*, and women's relationships to society feature as themes in his other films. The Nigerian novelist Cyprian Ekwensi, in *Jagua Nana*, was one of the first to write about women's survival mechanisms in urban Africa.

Yet women may portray themselves in a different light. Buchi Emecheta of Nigeria, in writing *Second Class Citizen*, describes the battle she fought to overcome the negative aspects of the extended family and societal norms in order to become a writer. South African novelist Bessie Head, writing about characters set in her adopted home, Botswana, examines themes such as the psychology of oppression and the human dimensions of the development process in her 1969 novel, *When Rain*

*Clouds Gather*, and in her later books, *Serowe: Village of the Rain Wind* and *A Question of Power*. But her most gripping work, dealing with universal emotions within women mirrored in women's thoughts about themselves, is to be found in her novel *Maru* and her book of short stories, *The Collector of Treasures*. Both works also deal with raw survival in the bleak Botswana environment, and in *Maru*, class oppression within African society is examined.

Perhaps the earliest film by an African woman and one of the few ever made is the Angolan film *Sambizana*, directed by Sarah Maldoror in 1973, about love and suffering in the face of revolutionary resistance to colonialism. A number of films have treated the crime of apartheid through women's eyes, focusing on the selective brutality borne by women. These works include: *You Have Struck a Rock*, by Zimbabwean filmmaker Deborah May and narrated by South African singer Letta Mbulu; *South Africa Belongs to Us*, featuring a clandestine interview with Winnie Mandela; *Crossroads/South Africa*, illustrating women's resistance to resettlement; and *Awake From Mourning*, in which mothers of Soweto students describe their lives in the aftermath of the 1976 riots.

#### NOT MEN VERSUS WOMEN

Men and women must work together in creating positive media images of women. African women are very firm about the fact that their struggle is not one of men against women. African women have seen and rejected the separatist approach adopted in the West. Moreover, with limited resources and pressing priorities, a separatist approach is inconsistent with African reality. Africa is hampered above all by underdevelopment, limiting opportunities for men and women. But beyond that constraint, women must be included as a deliberate policy in efforts to change society.

Southern African possesses unique opportunities borne out of its belated independence to build not only new institutions but also new cultural patterns. The recently formed Institute of Mass Communications in Zimbabwe and the Film Institute in Mozambique can see

to it that women serve on the staff and are adequately represented in the student body. New publishing houses are emerging in Zimbabwe, providing African writers with outlets, some for the first time. The time to create new patterns and role models is in the early stages, when editors are being trained. This is also a propitious time to correct sexist stereotypes in educational materials and classroom texts. In addition to the new publishing houses, overseas publishers such as Heinemann's, which have long distributed to Africa, are responding to new educational thrusts in southern Africa by commissioning new texts. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, from the outset, established a policy of employing women producers, reporters, and newscasters. With new plans to expand facilities, care must be taken to train women in the technical fields such as camera work, editing, and sound.

In Zambia, former ambassador Gwendoline Konie was instrumental in launching a magazine aimed at women in the entire southern African region. Entitled *Women's Exclusive*, the magazine covers regional issues and provides an outlet for fiction, in addition to the regular "women's" features. In Zimbabwe, *Mahogany* offers a different angle to women's magazines' usual treatment of topics by making issues more relevant to the majority of the population. An article on breast-feeding, for example, reflects a practice more common among black women than white.

Some critics maintain that the media are oriented toward the urban educated elite and that the images portrayed are therefore of little consequence and of minimal impact upon the majority of the population. Although the outreach of television in Africa is limited, radios and newspapers do have an impact. Newspapers are relied upon by many for information; it is not uncommon to have one or two newspapers serving the entire nation. For communities with few books and little other reading material, newspapers are often the only printing source of current information.

Radio is a regular source of information and entertainment in Africa. It is not uncommon to find a radio set as the only modern appliance in rural village

homes in southern Africa, particularly in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Botswana, which are reached by regional radio signals. Zimbabwe has four radio stations, more than in most African countries. The new "Radio Four" was designed to provide educational programming in local languages, and women are among the producers at the station.

The power of the media in winning the hearts and minds of the people has never been underestimated in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In her new book, *None But Ourselves* (1982), American journalist Julie Frederikse



Zimbabwean journalist Simomo Mubi: "New role models can be created in the early stages when media personnel are being trained"

analyzes the unsuccessful campaign by the minority government in pre-independence Zimbabwe to control the majority population via manipulation of the media. The creation of the Psychological Operations Unit (POU) by the Rhodesian government in 1977 was aimed at selling the internal settlement to the population and was composed of "media people, advertising people. They were among the finest creative thinkers in the country — copywriters, art directors, advertising visualizers, guys experienced in all the various fields of the art of communicating," said POU member Johan Meiring. *Chimurenga*, or war, songs were ban-

ned by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation, yet they topped the charts because of their popularity with the majority of the population. Thomas Mapfumo, a popular singer who led an underground *chimurenga* movement, was detained by the government because of the perceived influence of his songs, sung in Shona, one of the two main African languages in Zimbabwe.

In South Africa today, broadcasting, of a very high technical standard, is specifically oriented toward the provision of programming relevant to the social and economic interests of the minority population. Radio South Africa's signal is picked up in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and Malawi. The South African population is the most media-oriented in sub-Saharan Africa. Advertising of consumer goods finances most of the printed media, and the government realizes the advantage in selling the illusion that life under apartheid is good for everyone. This year will see the end of the first 12 months of operation of a television service for the black population, broadcast in African languages.

South Africa systematically bans newspapers and books that cast apartheid in a bad light. One response from the populace has been the launching of small-circulation community papers. *Grassroots*, published in Cape Town, has featured discussions on changing attitudes toward women, utilizing a biting satirical cartoon strip along with articles addressing issues such as forced resettlement, rent increases, and educational inadequacy.

Africa's own images are still being created as is its perception of the role of women and whether women's rights will be a priority. At this juncture, there are opportunities to train women in equal numbers with men in order to shape the institutions in the media that will shape people's values and perceptions. When the values of colonial Africa are shaken off and the male defenders of African "tradition" have been successfully debated, then a true picture of the southern African may emerge, one that incorporates the woman who not only toils in the field but also fought for her people's independence. □

# A Statistical Profile

Country/Region <sup>1</sup>	World	More Developed	Less Developed	Africa	Southern Africa*	Angola	Botswana
Population Estimate, <sup>2</sup> Mid-1982 (millions)	4,585	1,152	3,434	498	94*	6.8	0.9
Total Population of <sup>3</sup> Women mid-1980 (millions)	2,201	584	1,617	237	44*	3.4	0.4
% of 1980 Total <sup>4</sup> Women aged 0-14/15-49/50+	34/48/17	22/49/29	39/48/13	44/45/11	44/45/11	43/15/11	46/44/10
Per Capita GNP, 1980 <sup>5</sup> (US\$)	2,620	8,130	680	770	798*	470	910
Crude Birth Rate <sup>6</sup>	29	15	33	46	46	48	51
Crude Death Rate <sup>6</sup>	11	10	12	17	17	23	18
Natural Increase <sup>7</sup> (annual, %)	1.7	0.6	2.1	2.9	2.9	2.4	3.3
Total Fertility Rate <sup>8</sup> (per woman)	3.8	2.0	4.4	6.4	6.3	6.4	6.5
Life Expectancy at <sup>9</sup> Birth (years)	60	72	57	49	49	41	48
Life Expectancy at <sup>10</sup> Birth (Years), Male and Female	56/59	68/76	54/36	47/50	47/50	40/43	47/50
Infant Mortality Rate <sup>11</sup>	85	20	96	121	116	154	83
Infant Mortality Rate, <sup>12</sup> Male and Female	103/92	24/18	116/104	151/129	147/126	218/187	105/89
% Married of Women <sup>13</sup> 15-19	30	8	39	44	17	42	8
Urban Population (%) <sup>14</sup>	37	69	26	28	23	21	29
% Urban Population <sup>15</sup> 1975, Male and Female	39/40	67/68	28/28	26/25	24/19	21/14	18/17
Women as % of Total <sup>16</sup> Labor Force, 1980	35	40	33	32	33	9	51
Labor Force Engaged <sup>17</sup> in Agriculture (%)	46	13	60	66	66	75	58
Employed Women in <sup>18</sup> Agriculture, 1975 (%)	49	13	70	73	73	40	92
% Enrolled in School <sup>19</sup> 1975, 6-11, Male and Female	76/64	94/94	70/53	59/43	60/55	68/43	66/76
% Enrolled in School <sup>19</sup> 1975, 12-17, Male and Female	55/46	84/85	42/28	39/24	41/35	24/16	33/42
% Adults Literate, <sup>20</sup> Male and Female	67/54	98/97	52/32	33/15	37/29	4/2	30/35



Notes. The data sheet was compiled by Kwanele Ona Jirira of the African-American Institute from the 1980 World's Women Data Sheet and the 1982 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Inc., 1337 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

1. Classification of "more developed" regions comprises all of Europe, North America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the U.S.S.R. All other regions and countries are classified as "less developed."
2. Based upon data from a recent census or by incorporating estimates made by the UN, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and official country publications.
3. Mid-1980 female population was estimated by applying 1975-80 sex ratios obtained from population figures as assessed by the UN in 1978.
4. Estimates obtained from the UN 1978 Assessment.
5. Per capita gross national product estimates are from the *World Bank Atlas*, 1981.
6. Annual number of births and deaths per 1,000 population. For more developed countries (MDCs) with complete registration of vital events, nearly all rates refer to 1979 or 1980. For LDCs, most of whom lack complete registration systems, estimates refer to some point in the late 1970s. "Crude" rates, particularly crude death rate, can be affected by a population's age composition; thus, the higher death rates for MDCs are a reflection of the larger proportion of the older population in those countries (which in turn is caused by lower birth rates in MDCs).
7. Birth rate minus death rate; since the rates were based on the unrounded birth and death rate, they do not always exactly equal the difference between the rates shown on the data sheet.

8. The total fertility rate (TFR) of a given year indicates the average number of children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to have children throughout her childbearing years (usually considered ages 15-49) at the same time as women of those ages did in that year. It is a good measure of the current level of childbearing in a particular country or region.
9. Average years an infant can be expected to live under current mortality conditions.
10. Average number of years a newborn child could be expected to live if current mortality conditions were to continue throughout his or her lifetime. Estimates of life expectancy for most less-developed countries should be regarded as rough approximations only.
11. Number of deaths to infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year.
12. Same as Note 11.
13. Data are from the most recent census or survey available and generally refer to some point in the 1970s.
14. Percentages of total population living in areas termed urban by that country. Estimates refer to some point in the 1970s.
15. The percentages of males and females living in areas defined as urban by each country.
16. Projections from ILO, Labor Force Estimates and Projections.
17. Definition of Agriculture also includes hunting, forestry, and fishing.
18. Extrapolations of ILO, Labor Force Estimates and Projections.
19. Percent of males and females in each age group enrolled in school.
20. Country definitions of "adults" and "literacy" vary. These data are generally based on the most recent census or survey from which an estimate can be derived.

Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	South Africa	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1.4	6.6	12.7	1.1	30.0	0.6	19.9	6.0	8.0
0.7	3.1	5.3	0.5	14.3	0.3	9.4	2.9	3.7
40/46/14	47/44/9	43/45/12	43/45/12	41/46/13	44/45/11	45/44/11	47/44/10	47/44/10
390	230	270	1,410	2,290	680	260	560	630
40	51	45	44	36	48	46	49	47
16	19	19	15	12	19	14	17	14
2.4	3.2	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.4
5.4	7.0	6.1	5.9	5.1	6.4	6.5	6.9	6.6
50	46	46	51	60	46	50	48	54
49/51	44/48	44/48	50/52	59/62	44/48	49/52	47/50	52/55
115	172	115	120	96	135	103	106	77
119/102	153/130	160/135	153/130	106/88	181/154	135/114	156/132	134/124
22	—	29	—	1	—	45	37	6
4	10	8	45	50	9	13	40	20
3/4	22/17	8/6	42/37	52/45	9/8	10/9	35/33	22/17
44	37	25	23	35	45	36	32	29
81	84	65	49	29	74	82	67	59
91	93	93	56	38	83	91	64	66
65/94	49/39	56/31	—	84/86	75/75	49/35	75/70	73/61
53/77	61/30	17/8	—	76/72	59/55	35/21	64/42	39/19
44/68	34/12	15/8	45/31	57/57	31/28	43/15	61/34	48/31

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# Books

## POLITICAL AGRICULTURE

Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 132 pp. + appendices, bibliography, and index, \$19.50, hardcover.

If their purpose is simply to increase agricultural production, why then do African governments simultaneously tax and subsidize their agriculture, when paying high producer prices would almost certainly achieve the same goal far more effectively? The question points to a complex socioeconomic and political reality and Bates's book is largely devoted, quite successfully, to the untangling of some of these complexities.

"Peasants will sooner or later become the victims of modernization." Barrington Moore's aphorism quoted in page 7 indicates that Bates realizes that modernization requires a transfer of resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector—this is, after all, how modernization was achieved virtually without exception and Africa is no exception. But the consequences of the "squeeze" that was put on the peasants were largely negative in Africa. Why? What happened? We have to go back to colonial times in order to understand.

Colonialism meant that African economies were "dualistic" in nature: a modern "enclave" made up of large plantations, in some cases large "mixed" farms and mechanized mines; and a largely nondifferentiated, nonmonetized "traditional" agricultural sector. The duality was somewhat blurred by the introduction in the 1930s, sometimes even earlier, of cashcrops such as tea, coffee, cotton, pyrethrum, cashewnuts, etc., in the traditional areas. Marketing boards were in charge of the purchasing, marketing, and sometimes processing of these cashcrops and, especially after World War II and the Korean War, they managed to accumulate quite enormous cash reserves. The latter were, partly, used to offset world market price fluctuations: "In colonial Nigeria 70 percent of the trading surplus of the marketing boards was consigned to the price stabilization fund" (p.13). This was going, unfortunately, to change dramatically after independence; in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and others the surplus began to be diverted into the country's capital investment fund. There were exceptions: Ivory Coast, until recently, "has traditionally secured investment capital in the form of loans from abroad rather than in the form of levies from its farms" (p.17).

Faced with a situation in which very low producer prices were being paid for their produce and no compensation, African farmers reacted imaginatively and selectively. First, they

largely bypassed the government-controlled markets, especially for foodcrops: "In countries that have marketing boards for domestic foodstuffs, no more than 10 to 30 percent of the crops designated for government control actually pass through official channels" (p. 40). Secondly, farmers "alter[ed] their production mix to take advantage of shifting relative prices" (p. 83). Thirdly, they turned to "out-migration": peasants left the countryside en masse in search of employment in the towns—"Farmers can use the market for labour to defend themselves against the market for products" (p. 84).

According to Bates, the main beneficiaries of this transfer of resources from rural to urban areas are "the development coalition in contemporary Africa... [formed by] owners and workers in industrial firms, economic and political elites, privileged farmers and managers of public bureaucracies" (p. 121). And he concludes: "Powerful actors... will continue to adhere to policy choices that are harmful to farmers and collectively deleterious as well.

Another non-negligible merit of Bates's book is that he unravels some of the more insidious processes at work in the extraction of a surplus from the peasantry. These are: an overvalued currency that makes the importation of machines, raw materials, and other goods consumed primarily by the development coalition very cheap; a high-level of endemic inflation that hits

the peasantry far more strongly; the overprotection of manufacturing that creates "rents" by eliminating competition almost totally; and artificially maintained low prices for food and basic goods that creates shortages and encourages a parallel economy based on corruption.

Bates proposes positive pricing policies as a solution to declining agricultural production and also as a means to stimulate industrial production. The argument goes like this: high producer prices will increase food production and cause food prices to fall in urban areas; wages will fall as a result and industrial production will increase. In the meanwhile, more efficient farmers buy out the less efficient and those who fail to survive in farming flee the countryside; again, wages fall and profits in industry are higher; therefore, high producer prices lead to industrialization. The only snag with this strategy is that it doesn't work: new industries in Africa are not, by far, capable of absorbing the large numbers of peasants displaced by agricultural modernization. What can be done? It is quite obvious that the African peasantry needs to acquire more political power to protect its interests; the most promising path seems to be small-holder development. Smallholders must be protected even though that doesn't mean that some differentiation will not occur. It will and there is room for some large-scale farming, but both should be kept within reasonable limits. Also, Bates "sins" perhaps by omission: one of the most unyielding problems in Africa is the absence of infrastructure. Roads, railroads, bridges, and dams will have to be built, even if it takes some degree of coercion to do so. Moreover, at least half of the problem is that resources extracted from the peasantry are not being invested, but used for consumption by privileged and corrupt groups, or, if invested, they are being wasted in mismanaged, irrelevant, and nonviable projects.

Bate's book is provocative and stimulating intellectually and I recommend its reading to all those interested in Third World development.

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## SAFARI IN SUDAN

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Edward Hoagland, *African Calliope: A Journey to the Sudan*, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1981, \$4.95.

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Edward Hoagland's *African Calliope* was first published in 1979 and has now been reissued in paperback by Penguin. It deals with his travels in the Sudan (mostly in the southern Sudan) in the mid-1970s and has been widely acclaimed as a masterwork of travel writing. Indeed, the synopsis on the back cover of the book states that he "transforms the harshness and deprivation of an impoverished and politically unstable country into a wondrous account of marvelous people rich in history." But in fact, unless the book is read carefully and seen as essentially a personal narrative, it will have the effect of "depriving" further the Sudan, the Sudanese, and the reader too.

Any visitor to a foreign land comes equipped not only with camera and notebook, but also with a collection of mental luggage no travel agent provides. What Mr. Hoagland seems to have brought to the Sudan is a batch of images conjured up by a romantic mind. Many of the characters he encounters on his travels are expatriates of the sort we might have seen bargaining for exit visas in Rick's Café Americain: for this is the genre of potted palms and ceiling fans, of beaded curtains behind which shady deals are made in mid-European tones by overweight men in tropical suits. To Macao and Casablanca, to Havana and Saigon, may now be added Juba or Malakal as the setting for the intrigue. And the script provides a bar mitzvah in Khartoum; a hotel lobby "full of Trucial State princes with falcons on their wrists," American bank representatives, "Austrian white hunters and French arms salesmen"; bush pilots and the ubiquitous aid official; misfits and outcasts on the make, whose problems are lost in Africa's. Hoagland's book has all of this and more; but what he shows

us is a portrait of the artist, not a picture of the Sudan.

Mr. Hoagland is not then the latest in the long and distinguished parade of foreign explorers in the valley of the Nile, nor does he pretend to be. But to state that he chose to visit the Sudan "because it has seldom been written about" (p. 5) is either to show disdain for the huge number and quality of travelers' accounts or to admit too casually to an ignorance of them. Further to observe that "a travel book is no substitute for the sort of in-depth work Africans will be producing about their own countries rather soon" (p. 6) is itself no substitute for having read the "in-depth" work Sudanese have already produced about the Sudan. The reader's confidence is eroded further by the book's many errors in historical detail.

One wonders too if the price of a savory phrase is not too often an unpleasant aftertaste. Thus, "The tribesmen who objected to having their picture taken for fear you might thereby possess them were like an American who would never disclose his bank balance, lest somebody think he could 'buy me and sell me'" (p. 220). But is there really a similarity? And leaving aside the fact that "the Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi" was not "the posthumous son of the storied, gorgeous Mahdi" (p. 28), why "storied," how "gorgeous"? The view is reinforced that the author's purpose was not to bear witness to the modern Sudan but simply to recount his own reactions to it. The Sudan is a stage. For this traveler searches for more than the source of the Nile or the mines of Solomon: he seeks, as he tells us, an antidote to his own loneliness; and the loneliness of the search itself is so much more profound that he can long again for the deserts and jungles of New York City. No one should deny Hoagland's license as a poet, but the wide readership *African Calliope* will have achieved cannot be fully aware that the line therein between truth and beauty is obscured. The book can be read with interest by all Sudanese planning a journey to America.

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
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