Editorial

Dealing with Africa's Massive External Debt

Robert S. Browne

In addition to the famine which until recently stalked the continent, Africa faces serious underlying tensions, not least of which is the ongoing economic crisis, reflected most obviously in the magnitude of external indebtedness. In the broad range of opinion concerning the nature of Africa's predicament, virtually all agree that the need for external assistance is, and will continue to be, great. There is also fairly general agreement that financial assistance, by itself, is not a sufficient condition for enabling Africa to reverse its fortune, but the consensus begins to dissolve when one attempts to specify and prioritize the necessary ancillary ingredients. In the view of the World Bank, "If Africa's decline is to be reversed, action is needed on three fronts. First, the region needs more resources for development — both foreign and domestic. Second, it must use new and existing resources more efficiently. Third, it must curb its growth in population."

In the era of the Gramm-Rudman fiscal restraints, the magnitude of the aid flows from the U.S. is not likely to be increased, although the need has never been greater. Most African countries lack the resources to continue meeting payments on interest and principal on foreign debt now in excess of $180 billion, and their prospects are dim for earning the necessary funds from exports. Yet, if they do not service this debt, they reduce their chances of obtaining further capital transfers, capital desperately needed for vital imports and for infrastructure development.

At the moment, the most promising source of relief would appear to be the multi-lateral financial institutions, particularly the World Bank. The World Bank (mainly the International Development Agency, the soft loan window, plus the new Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa) is poised to expand its lending in Africa if its resources are increased, a decision which rests almost entirely with the U.S. In the past, the Reagan Administration has fought its allies in an effort to keep the IDA funding levels well below

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what is needed, but there is some early indication that the recently commenced IDA-8 refunding negotiation will yield a substantial increase over IDA-7. A *minimum* refunding of $12 billion for 3 years is the Bank's request, implying a U.S. appropriation of $4 billion (of which about one third is likely to be used for loans to Africa). Anything less would be both a disaster for Africa and an act of irresponsibility on our part.

Fortunately, the Administration has demonstrated greater understanding of U.S./Third World relationships since James Baker has taken charge at the Treasury Department, and the prospects for a more liberal approach to foreign assistance appear promising. Last September, Secretary Baker called for the IMF to channel the $2.7 billion of Trust Fund repayments which it expects to receive over the next few years into easing the plight of the poorest countries, especially those in Africa, and he is also supportive of supplemental U.S. funding for the World Bank Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa.

The Baker proposals (which also call on the World Bank and the private commercial banks to expand their lending to some 15 heavily indebted Third World nations) signaled a new recognition on the part of the Reagan Administration that U.S. efforts to pull the global economy out of its doldrums and return it to a sustainable growth path would be futile of the key Third World actors remained paralyzed by their indebtedness. Indeed, the chances of massive defaulting on these debts is avoidable only if the debtor nations can obtain access to the capital necessary for reviving their economies. Expansion has thus replaced retrenchment as Washington's "received wisdom" regarding its approach to Third World economies. It remains to be seen, however, whether the funds needed will in fact be forthcoming in the amounts adequate to the task. The widely held criticism that the Baker proposals are too modest is largely neutralized by the belief that even those modest funding targets will prove to be unachievable.

An integral part of the Baker initiative is a requirement that countries may benefit from these supplementary fundings only if they agree to adopt a package of policy reforms set forth by the lenders. This type of conditionality, which has long been the trademark of IMF lending, is fast becoming *de riguer* for virtually all capital suppliers to the Third World, bilateral and multi-lateral, official and private. The conditions imposed tend to be similar regardless of who the lenders and borrowers are: budgetary deficit reduction; de-emphasis of the public sector and encouragement of the private sector; devaluation; greater reliance on the market; and enhanced incentives for agriculture. This package of policy reforms has received a mixed reception in Africa, where some of the reforms are readily agreed to and others are felt to be highly inappropriate. The "take it or leave it" manner in which these "capital plus reform" packages are being presented to the borrowers

is offensive if not threatening, and their effectiveness remains to be demonstrated.

The Baker proposals constitute the first significant U.S. initiative to address Africa's medium to long-term crisis, and while it is welcome and long overdue, it is not nearly enough. America has a glorious history of taking the lead in the foreign assistance arena, beginning with the Marshall Plan. Much of Europe, as well as Canada and Japan, appear to be more committed to meaningful aid to Africa than we are. Admittedly, the American constituencies for foreign aid, and for Africa, are not very strong, but a persuasive case for more than $1 billion for the whole of sub-Sahara can certainly be made — particularly when tiny Israel is receiving three times that amount. If an increase in the foreign aid pie is unachievable (and perhaps even if it is), then a strong effort must be launched to reallocate the pie more equitably. (On a per capita basis, sub-Saharan Africa is receiving less than $7.50 per inhabitant, compared to Israel's $1000 per inhabitant).

We can also take some steps which will help without necessarily adding to our domestic budget deficit, steps which our position of leadership demands of us. The most obvious is for the U.S. to follow the example of some of Africa's other official creditors and to forgive those portions of Africa's debt which appear to be unpayable. The budgetary implications of such a gesture would be marginal, and the direct benefits to the debtor countries would be substantial. A variation on this suggestion would be for the U.S. to remove its objections to a new issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the IMF, an action which, if properly designed, would ease significantly the debt servicing burden of the poorest countries.

The health of Africa's economies is intimately tied to its exports and the Africans have long argued that depressed and fluctuating prices and erratic demand for their goods constituted the most serious obstacle to their national development. The projections of the demand for most primary commodities are not encouraging, and prices are low, so we can expect a renewal of the demands for commodity price stabilization programs of various sorts, as well as for relief from trade barriers which hinder Africa's exports. The U.S. is not very guilty on the latter score, mainly because our imports from Africa generally do not include significant quantities of goods which are protected. There are, however, certain tariff escalation provisions permitted under GATT which have the effect of inhibiting the processing of primary commodities by their exporters. The removal of these provisions could open the way for some African countries to move toward a higher level of development. There might be some cost to U.S. industry, but from a macro perspective it is almost certain to be cost effective.

To attempt to address Africa's problem of declining export revenues through a price stabilization scheme is a misplaced effort, comparable to King Canute's effort to hold back the tides. What Africa must do is to reduce its dependence on the export of a limited range of price and income-inelastic primary commodities. It must diversify its output and target it toward self-reliance. Such a program is the heart of the Lagos Plan of Action, agreed to by all of the African heads of state and governments, but implemented by none. The conventional wisdom of the donor community is not hospitable to this thrust toward self-reliance, presumably for fear that the West's easy access to Africa's resources will somehow be weakened. It is, however, difficult to see how Africa can ever hope to enjoy sustained growth and development until its excessive dependence on western purchasers to buy its output can be broken. The fact that Africa has done little to implement the Lagos Plan is not unrelated to the Plan's lack of support within the donor community.

So, in the final analysis, those westerners who genuinely wish to see an economically strong and independent Africa will have to recognize that this goal is only achievable at the cost of some restructuring of the present international division of labor — a restructuring which we can see taking place in East Asia and elsewhere, but which we vigorously resist in Africa. Is such resistance actually in our best interests? One's answer is likely to depend on how one reads the future. For those who believe that, despite the insuperable obstacles, Africa will eventually burst out of its strait-jacket and become its own master, it probably makes sense that we assist rather than hinder the process. Those with another vision of the future will probably reach a different conclusion. In any case, this issue, even more than the precise magnitude of the aid levels, is the most critical issue for Africa's long-run future. It merits our most serious reflection.

Announcement

THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION announces that for the 1987-88 academic year approximately 24 scholarships will be available for graduate students and young professionals to study or do research for one academic year in 33 African countries. Grants include maintenance for one academic year, round-trip international travel, and health and accident insurance. Applicants must hold a bachelor's degree or its equivalent by the beginning date of the grant, must be U.S. citizens at the time of application, and, where applicable, have language proficiency sufficient to carry out the proposed project; candidates must be in good health. For more information write: Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

Famine in Ethiopia:

Crisis of Many Dimensions

Theodore M. Vestal

The devastating famine in Ethiopia, brought jarringly to the attention of the West by a BBC television report in October 1984, produced an immediate and compassionate response from developed nations. Governments provided emergency food relief, and private citizens gave generously to charitable groups working in Africa. Celebrities organized under such auspices as USA for Africa and the Band Aid Trust joined forces to raise money for famine relief in unprecedented amounts. The "Live Aid" concert alone raised more than $50 million to purchase food, medical supplies, and farming equipment for Africa.[1]

The result of the benevolent outpouring of financial aid and in kind contributions by the West may well have saved as many as seven million lives. By August 1985, ten months after the start of the Western relief effort, the head of the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), M. Peter McPherson, could report that a majority of the famine victims in Ethiopia were receiving "at least some food." He characterized the situation in that country as "greatly improved" and reported that although there were still people dying, the contrast was dramatic. McPherson estimated that food was reaching more than five million of the eight million Ethiopians classified as at risk of starvation. "The skeleton-like people, the kids with bloated bellies, you hardly see that now," said the A.I.D. official.[2]

Eight months later, in April 1986, a U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy reported that the mass starvation found in Ethiopia in 1984 had ended — thanks to the sustained efforts of international and voluntary agencies. According to this report, assistance from the developed world "not only got through to the people in need, but . . . it made a difference between life and death for millions." The prospects for the Big

1. Esther B. Fein, "Reports of Concert Aid Range Up to $50 million," **New York Times**, July 15, 1985. According to Harry Belafonte, USA for Africa raised $50 million, the Live Aid Concert produced $70 million, and Band Aid raised from $12 to $25 million. Ron Wolfe, "Belafonte Brings African Message," **Tulsa Tribune**. October 3, 1985.

2. Clifford D. May, "U.S. Aide Says Ethiopia Plight Eases," **New York Times**, August 30, 1985.

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Rains of the summer were promising, and many villagers had been able to return to the countryside to plant their crops. The extraordinary outpouring of assistance from the "haves" of the world had helped transform drought and famine in Ethiopia into "a new harvest of hope."[3]

The success of Western relief aid has taken the Ethiopian food crisis off the front pages of newspapers, but problems remain and difficult questions need to be asked about the nature of famine in Ethiopia and about the impact of private and official efforts to alleviate the suffering.

The answers to these questions show Ethiopia to be the meeting place of disastrous forces common in sub-Saharan Africa.[4] These forces have been building for the past quarter of a century, but little has been done to combat them. The convergence of these forces in Ethiopia is a harbinger of similar disasters developing in as many as 22 other African countries at the present time.

The gravity of the many-dimensioned crisis cannot be overemphasized. Millions of lives are at risk, and the world has no precedent for the management of a crisis of this scale. The limited means of international collaboration presently available may simply be too insubstantial to avert a major calamity.

Natural and man-made elements combined to create the nightmare scenes of death and starvation in Ethiopian relief camps that were seen on television in Western nations. Among the components were drought, some called it the worst of this century; widespread environmental deterioration, including soil erosion, desertification, and deforestation; unbridled population growth; chronic underinvestment in agriculture; government policies detrimental to growth of the country's agriculture; and civil war.[5]

Nature's role was an extraordinarily severe drought during 1983-85 in northern Ethiopia. Some regions have endured even longer periods — some as long as ten years without rain or food harvests.[6] Good rains during the summer of 1985 finally brought relief and the prospect of improved harvests to many areas in the north.

With improved weather conditions, war rather than drought has become the main cause of hunger and homelessness.[7] A bitter civil war has been fought in north central Ethiopia for the past 23 years, a war that has its roots in ethnic and religious hatreds fueled by ideological differences.

3. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later: Refugee and Famine Recovery Needs,** Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. ii (April 1986).

4. Lester R. Brown and Edward Wolf, "Food Crisis in Africa," **Natural History** 93 (June 1984):16-20

5. May, "Ethiopia Debate: How to Feed Itself," **New York Times,** 23 May 1985.

6. Blaine Harden, "What Caused Ethiopia's Famine?" **Tulsa World,** 6 January 1985.

7. May, "War Rivals Drought in Africa's Hunger Crisis," **New York Times,** 29 September 1985.

Ethiopian farmers have been coping with drought, pestilence, and war for centuries.[8] In the best of times, the farmers of the highlands operated on the brink of agricultural disaster, but somehow the delicate balance needed to farm the same land continually for thousands of years was maintained. This changed when state control of the economy was added to the peasant's plight. The result has been a famine effecting 7.9 million people with as many as one million fatalities.[9] A further 1.2 million were potentially in danger according to the Ethiopian Government's principal relief agency, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). These famine victims were spread among eleven of Ethiopia's fourteen administrative regions. The worst affected regions were Wollo, Tigray, Eritrea and Shewa regions in the north and center of the country, and Harerge, Balle and Sidamo regions in the south.[10]

Traditionally, Ethiopian peasants have cultivated the highlands of their country as subsistence farmers. The peasants, who comprise 88.7% of the population were beholden to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other large landholders.[11] In the feudal order, the farmers paid 50% to 80% of their crops as rent.[12] The peasants usually grew just enough food to feed themselves since there was little incentive to grow more.

Many of the peasants work in spectacularly scenic surroundings in the highlands, which have a general elevation of 6,500 feet and are dissected by enormous gorges and canyons thousands of feet deep. In the north, in Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo provinces, about 7 million people crowd farms located on the spines of ridges 7,000 to 10,000 feet high. Here the pattern of life and agricultural methods have remained unchanged for hundreds of years. The Big Rains of summer and the Little Rains of spring normally provide sufficient moisture,[13] and animals provide natural fertilizer. About 60% of the country is suitable for cultivation or grazing, but crops are grown in only 13% of the land.[14]

8. Allan Hoben, "The Origins of Famine," **New Republic,** 21 January 1985, p. 17; Barry Shlacter, "Ethiopia Leader Secure from Famine Fallout," **Tulsa Tribune,** 28 December 1984.

9. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** p. 4. The estimate of fatalities is based upon the observations, rough statistics, and general impressions of those working in relief organizations in the field. It includes both the mortality estimates inside Ethiopia and those in refugee camps along the Ethiopian border of Sudan. During 1984, it was estimated that there had been 300,000 fatalities. May, "Ethiopians Blame West for Famine," **New York Times,** 12 December 1984.

10. U.S. Agency for International Development, **Briefing Book** (Addis Ababa, August 1985); **The Famine Effects on African Refugees,** Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 48, 99th Cong., 1 Sess., (February 7, 1985).

11. Peter Schwab, **Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society,** (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1985), 1-11.

12. Judith Miller, "The Birth of a New Ethiopia: From Feudalism to Marxism," **New York Times,** 8 October 1984.

13. Edward Ullendorff. **The Ethiopians,** (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 24.

14. See generally Assefi Bequele and Eshetu Chole, **A Profile of the Ethiopian Economy** (Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1969).

In 1974 the feudal regime of Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by a military coup led by junior military officers and enlisted men.[15] The new military junta formed the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, eventually called the Derg, that pledged to wage war against hunger, poverty, disease, and illiteracy.[16]

One of the government's first steps was to nationalize all land and instigate sweeping rural land reforms. Attempts were made to start collectivized farms, but the independently-minded peasants resisted the idea so alien to their traditional family farms.[17] So far only 5% of the farmers are on collectives. A World Bank report calls the state farms "high cost producers" that have not broken even.[18] Nevertheless the government poured 70% to 90% of its agricultural investment into state farms and cooperatives, which in turn produced only 10% of the nation's food.[19]

Collectivization efforts have made the peasants fearful that their land may be redistributed. They have little incentive to make long term investments in the land such as improved irrigation systems. Shortages of consumer goods also discourage peasants from producing and selling more. Why bother, they ask, if they have nowhere to spend their earnings.[20]

The government made farmers accept artificially low prices for the main grains: teff, sorghum, barley, millet, wheat, and maize. Coffee, which earns 65% of foreign exchange, is so heavily taxed that peasants do not bother to expand its production.[21] These policies destroyed the incentive of millions of peasants to grow surplus food, and productivity has declined notably.[22] The 1982 per capita food production was only 81% of what it had been in 1969-71.

For the farmer who does have something to sell, getting his goods to market is another problem. Ethiopia has a scarcity of roads over its rugged terrain, and half of the people of the country live a two days walk from the nearest road.

15. See generally, Marina and David Ottaway. **Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution** (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978); John H. Spencer, **Ethiopia at Bay** (Algonac, Mich.: Reference Publications, 1984), pp. 336-46.

16. Edmund J. Keller, "The Ethiopian Revolution at the Crossroads," **Current History** 83 (March 1984):117. See also, Madan M. Sauldie, **Ethiopia: Dawn of the Red Star**, (Cambridge, MA: ABT Books, 1982).

17. Hoben *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19. For a critical assessment of the Derg's land reform program, see **Ethiopian Perspective**, No. 3 (March 1985):4-6.

18. World Bank, **World Development Report 1983** (Washington, D.C., 1984).

19. Harden, *op. cit.*

20. Glen Bailey, **An Analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution**, Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 40, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1980), pp 80-86.

21. "How to Grow a Famine," **The Economist**, 22 December 1984, p. 27.

22. World Bank, *op. cit.*

Most peasants have no chemical fertilizers, and the animal dung that they once used to enrich the soil is now being burned for fuel.[23] This has happened because of continuing deforestation. At the turn of the century, 40% of Ethiopia was covered by forest. Twenty years ago, the figure was down to 16%, while today only 3.1% forest-land remains.[24]

Deforestation also causes soil to lose much of its capacity to retain moisture and resistance to drought. As vegetation is reduced, the share of rainfall running directly to the ocean increases. Less rainfall then evaporates into the atmosphere to recharge rain clouds that move inland. In this manner, Ethiopia's shrinking forest has contributed to worsening drought.[25]

Soil erosion is also a major problem. It has been estimated that Ethiopia has been losing one billion tons of topsoil a year. When the rains do come, they are often violent and intense, increasing the loss of impoverished soil. Hillside fields have been eroded down to bedrock in only a few years. The loss of land through soil erosion intensifies cultivation on the more productive lands that remain, often shortening the fallow period needed to restore fertility in many areas.[26]

While Ethiopian farm prices plummeted, the price of what fertilizer there was rose. In the cities, food prices were inflated, and there were shortages of wheat, eggs, and flour.[27]

As the supply of food was decreasing, the number of people was on the rise. In 1984, the Ethiopian government census revealed a population of 42 million making Ethiopia the second most populous nation in sub-Saharan Africa.[28] By comparison, in 1974 the population was thought to be only 31 million. The country's growth rate is estimated to be 2.9% a year.

Future projections of too many people and too little food are not optimistic. A 10-year development plan issued by the government in 1984 forecast that Ethiopia would not be self-sufficient in food until 1994 at the earliest. The plan calls for the continued collectivization of farming with the incorporation of 50% of the peasants and land by 1994 in state farms or producers' cooperatives.

International economists see the plan as a prescription for continued disaster. Foreign economists believe that the country needs greater pricing

23. Brown and Wolf, *op. cit.*

24. Miller, *op. cit.*

25. Sandra Postel, "Protecting Forests," in Brown, **State of the World — 1984** (New York: Norton, 1984), pp. 74-94.

26. Brown and Wolf, *op. cit.*; Brown, "Conserving Soil" in **State of the World — 1984,** *op. cit.*: pp.53-73; cf. Brown, **State of the World — 1985,** (New York: Norton, 1985).

27. Miller, *op. cit.* Between 1975 and 1982, consumer prices rose 133.6%. International Monetary Fund, 1983.

28. The 1984 census was based on an actual count in 85% of the country and on sample survey projections in the remaining 15%. "The Derg's Agricultural Politics: The Making of a Disaster," **Ethiopian Perspective**, *op. cit.* p. 1

and marketing flexibility rather than more state farms.[29]

Another factor in the famine is "The Nationalities Problem," divisions between the Ethiopian people. Ethnic and religious distrust has been inculcated in the populace for centuries, and the depth of these divisions is difficult for Westerners to fathom. The Amharas of the central highlands are long time rivals of the Tigreans of the north. In addition, almost half of the Eritreans are Muslim and have suffered from discrimination at the hands of the majority Christians. These rivalries have resulted in Africa's longest and least-noticed civil war.[30]

For 23 years the Ethiopian government has been attempting to defeat the Eritrean and Tigrean Liberation Movements.[31] The conflict has been close to a stalemate, with the Soviet-backed Ethiopians controlling the cities while the guerrillas rule the rugged countryside. In order to crush the rebels, the Marxist Derg cut off government services to the north and instigated a "scorched earth" policy, bombing villages and destroying croplands that might be used by the guerrillas.[32]

Fighting intensified in northern Ethiopia during the summer of 1985, causing a new exodus of refugees into the Sudan. This occured at a time when the first promising crops in years were nearing harvest in rebel-held areas. The main emergency supply routes into Eritrea and Tigray from the Sudan have been largely cut off by government troops since mid-August.[33] Conversely, roads leading to the largest relief camps in government-held areas, including Mekele, Korem, and Alamata, have been difficult to use because of security problems. During most of the year, aircraft were required to keep Mekele supplied.

The Food Crisis

The Ethiopian Government had estimated that 1.3 million metric tons (MT) of food would be needed in calendar year 1985 to feed famine victims (Table I). By December 31, 1985, 1,177,000 MT had arrived in Ethiopia, and a further 56,000 MT had been pledged but had not arrived. Approximately $1,144,319 of total aid was donated by foreign governments and international organizations for famine relief and rehabilitation. The largest single donor was the United States, which contributed $282.3 million of

29. Miller, *op. cit.*

30. Patrick Gilkes, "Recent History: The Eritrean Problem and the Nationalities Question," **Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85**, (London: Europa Publications, 1984), pp. 362-364.

31. "Africa's Longest War Ravages Eritrea," **Tulsa Tribune**, 2 January 1985; Colin Legum, ed., **Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documentation** (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1985): pp. 131-32.

32. Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Politics of Famine in Ethiopia," **The Nation**, 19 January 1985, p. 33.

33. May, *op. cit.*, 29 September 1985.

total aid and 444,000 MT (36% of all food aid).[34] Other major donors were the European Economic Community, 198,000 MT (16.1%) and Canada,

TABLE I
Statistics on the Ethiopian Famine — 1985-1986

	1985	1986
Population	42 Million	42.5 Million
Population "at risk"	7.9 Million	5.8 Million
Food Needs	1.3 Million metric tons (1 Dec. 84 — 31 Dec. 85)	900,000 metric tons (1 Jan. 86 — 31 Dec. 86)
Food Pledges	1.233 Million metric tons committed by donors	824,000 metric tons committed by donors
	Sources:	Sources:
	U.S.: 444,000 MT (36.0%)	U.S.: 300,000 MT (36.4%)
	EEC: 198,000 MT (16.1%)	EEC: 160,000 MT (19.4%)
	Can: 167,000 MT (13.5%)	Can: 85,000 MT (10.3%)
	All Others: 424,000 MT (34.4%)	All Others: 279,400 MT (33.9%)
Food Delivered	Dec. 1984 — Dec. 1985: 1,177,000 Metric Tons	Since January 1, 1986*: 159,837 Metric Tons
	Average of 90,500 Metric Tons per month	Average of 80,000 Metric Tons per month
	Port **offtake** averaged 78,300 Metric Tons per month	Port **offtake** averaged 48,000 Metric Tons per month
	Average **distributed** 62,200 Metric Tons per month	Average **distributed** 62,500 Metric Tons per month
Summary	Dec. 1, 1984 — Dec. 31, 1985	Jan. 1, 1986-to present*
	Food arrivals: 1,177,000 Metric Tons	1985 Carryover: 306,000 Metric Tons
	Still in ports: 159,000 Metric Tons	Food arrivals: 160,000 Metric Tons
	Still in warehouses: 147,000 Metric Tons	Still in ports: 190,000 Metric Tons
	Actually **distributed**: 809,000 Metric Tons	Still in warehouses: 151,000 Metric Tons
		Actually **distributed**; 125,000 Metric Tons

Source: **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later**, (for full citation see footnote 3) p. 5c.

*The precise cut-off-date for these figures was not provided. Since the publication date was April we assume they are first quarter figures.

34. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later**, pp. 5A-5C, 54-55.

167,000 MT (13.5%). The Soviet Union pledged no food aid but contributed $260 million in non-food aid.[35]

So far, there is no accurate estimate of private American donations. Some fifty international non-governmental organizations operating in Ethiopia have cooperated with each other in a splendid way to get food and supplies to the needy.[36] They have also learned to work with or around Ethiopia's Marxist government which is difficult under the best of circumstances.[37] During 1985, the Office of United Nations Coordinator working under the Office of Emergency Operations for Africa (OEOA) successfully coordinated the work of the many diverse agencies, donor governments, the Ethiopian RRC, and other international organizations.

In areas controlled by the Derg, most relief work is conducted by the Ethiopian Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and international and non-governmental organizations. At the heighth of the relief effort in 1985, dry rations were distributed at some 290 centers to more than five million people. The objective of this ration distribution strategy was to allow recipients to remain in their villages, so they could resume farming when conditions improved. There were as many as 800,000 displaced people in Ethiopia who had left their homes in search of food. About half of those people settled in camps or near feeding centers in mid-1985. A further 600,000 to 700,000 people may have fled to Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti.[38]

With the return of the Big Rains in 1985, the rehabilitation of drought victims became a priority. Rehabilitation tasks included replacing seed which had been eaten and draft animals which had died or been sold. Efforts were made to return people in camps to their farms in time to plant. However, because of the disruption caused by the drought and insurgencies, the RRC estimates that 900,000 MT of emergency food aid will continue to be needed through 1986 (Table I). So far, 824,400 MT have been pledged by donors with the U.S., the EEC, and Canada again leading the way.[39]

Presently, the stocks of relief food in country are sufficient to meet requirements. At the outset of the relief effort logistical, transportation, and

35. *Ibid.*, p. 54. In 1984 the Soviet Union provided $3 million in food aid. Soviet officials maintain that food aid should be provided by the West because Third World economic woes are a heritage of colonial and imperial policies. Schwab, "Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia," **Current History** 84 (May 1985):223.

36. See **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** *op. cit.*, for a list of the non governmental organizations in Ethiopia receiving U.S. Emergency Food Aid. Some 121 American private and voluntary organizations joined together as "Interaction" to promote their common interest in development, relief, and refugee assistance.

37. May, "Relations Sour Between Ethiopia and Western Food Donors," **New York Times,** 18 February 1985.

38. **Briefing Book,** *op. cit.* see also Robert D. Kaplan, "Ethiopian Exodus," **New Republic,** 21 January 1985, p. 20, Christopher J. Matthews, "The Road to Korem," *op. cit.*, 23

39. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** p. 5.

port bottlenecks prevented food from reaching the needy. During the first half of 1985, the shortage of long-haul trucks led to enormous stocks of food piling up at Ethiopia's two ports, Massawa and Assab.[40] Concerted action by donors and the Ethiopian Government to devote more trucks, especially to take food from the ports, have now alleviated that situation.[41]

In addition there was a shortage of trucks to take food from central warehouses to secondary warehouses and distribution centers. The UN, the U.S. Government, and other donors worked out an agreement with the RRC to meet this need for short-haul and four-wheel-drive trucks.[42]

In the regions affected by civil war, the famine victims in government-held areas were only a part of the mosaic of suffering. Unseen were the hundreds of thousands of the starving in rebel-held areas of Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo.[43] According to Inerfam, a consortium of agencies supplying emergency relief to rebel-held areas by way of the Sudan, only 10% of the two million famine victims in the area were receiving regular aid shipments.[44] More recently, U.S. Senate staffers report that food and relief are being distributed to needy people in all areas, government-held as well as "liberated" zones.[45] Officially, however, the Ethiopian government refuses to allow private relief shipments into these contested provinces, where Western relief agencies are hesitant to operate for fear of jeopardizing their work elsewhere in Ethiopia.

Approximately 405,000 Ethiopians fled into neighboring Sudan to escape the ravages of famine and war and remain in camps or receive food and maintenance assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[46] The Sudan now has its own problems with food shortages and civil war, and it is becoming increasingly problematic whether food and emergency relief supplies will continue to reach refugee camps. A return flow of thousands of refugees to Ethiopia has begun, however, and if the returning refugees are able to plant and harvest a crop, others may be encouraged to voluntarily leave the Sudan.[47]

40. May, "As Ethiopians Starve, Food Rots on the Dock," **New York Times,** 17 May 1985; "Pause Urged in Shipments to Ethiopia," *Ibid.*, 17 June 1985.

41. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** pp. 7-8.

42. **Briefing Book,** *op. cit.*

43. "U.N. Says Food is Reaching Rebel Area in North Ethiopia," **New York Times,** 4 August 1985; May, "Northern Ethiopia Crisis Said to Worsen," *Ibid.*, 16 June 1985.

44. May, "War Rivals Drought in Africa's Hunger Crisis," *Ibid.*, 29 September 1985.

45. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** p. 27.

46. *Ibid.*, p. v. Another 200,000 to 300,000 earlier Ethiopian refugees are largely self-sufficient and integrated into towns or villages in the Sudan.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 35-41. See also "Refugee Commission Struggles to Keep Up With the Flow," **New York Times,** 16 February 1986, IV, 3.

The nationalities problem is also a factor in the semidesert Ogaden in the southeastern part of the country that spans the Ethiopian-Somali border. During the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78, many of the people of Harerge province, fled to Somalia or Djibouti. Although some returned to Ethiopia during the past three years under resettlement programs of the UNHCR,[48] today there are 800,000 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia. More than 50,000 have migrated since January, 1986, fleeing neither famine nor war but the Derg's collectivization and villagization programs.[49] Most of the recent refugees are Oromos who report coercive and brutal treatment by Ethiopian soldiers and officials.

Harerge province, like the rest of the country, has a rapidly growing population and deteriorating land. The southwestern part of the province has had limited rain for over two years and is described as being in a pre-disaster stage. According to the RRC, crops in 22 of 39 regions of Harerge have almost totally failed, and 1986 agricultural production is expected to fall by 45%. About a third of the area's 900,000 famine victims are former refugees who have come back home.

If some Ethiopians have sought a safer haven in foreign lands, others are on the move within their own country. In 1984, the Ethiopian government launched a resettlement program with the goal of moving 1.5 million people living in the northern region to the more fertile lands in the south and west. The government claimed that the "voluntary" resettlement plan provided those moved with improved social services and a better quality of life, and that it might become a model for other drought-striken countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The mass evacuation, that cost $35 million in its first year, resettled farmers in areas 500 to 800 miles from their homes. Each family that relocated was promised two hectares, or about five acres, of public land, farming equipment, shelter, seed, and enough food to last until harvest. The government sees this evacuation of people from a famine and ecological disaster zone as a means of coping with the immediate food crisis while long-term soil conservation programs are prepared.[50]

Critics charge that peasants are being coerced to move. There are reports that some of those resettled have fled into the Sudan or are making their way back home.[51] Critics also point out that moving Tigrean people of the north to southern areas would be similar to moving Norwegians to Greece.

48. May "Ethiopia's South, Recovering from Somali War, Now Faces Famine," *Ibid.*, 24 February 1985.

49. Philip Revzin, "African Migration: With Famine Easing, Ethiopians are Fleeing Collectivizing of Farms," Wall Street Journal, 27 May 1986.

50. Philip M. Boffey, "Ethiopia is Moving 1.5 Million People," New York Times, 14 December 1984.

51. *Ibid.*, None of the major international donors support the resettlement scheme except the U.S.S.R. U.S.A.I.D. which prepared studies encouraging resettlement ten years ago, now leads the opposition. Harden, "No Amount of Food Aid Will End Hunger in Ethiopia," Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 17 June 1985.

The Tigreans are of a different ethnic stock and culture and speak a different language from those of southern Ethiopians. Furthermore, the resettlers are often in poor health and ill-prepared to move to areas where they encounter new climates, farming conditions, and endemic diseases.[52]

Opponents see a hidden agenda in the government's resettlement plan. It appears to them to be a final solution to the Derg's northern seccessionist problem — to destroy the land and to get rid of the people.

In 1986, after the resettlement of 600,000 people, the government halted the program until after the harvest season ending in December (Table II).

TABLE II
Statistics on the Ethiopian Government's Resettlement Program

I. Area of Resettlement*

Region	Number of Persons
Kaffa	76,640
Illubabor	146,216
Shoa	6,149
Wellega	253,282
Gojjam	101,122
Gondar	6,387
Total:	589,796

II. Area of Resettlement

Region	Area of Origin: Wello	Shewa	Tigre	Gondar	Gojjam
Kaffa	47,492	6,514	22,634	— —	— —
Illubabor	72,226	28,275	45,715	— —	— —
Shoa (Tadele)	— —	6,149	— —	— —	— —
Wellega	220,636	11,279	21,367	— —	— —
Gojjam	29,839	54,858	— —	— —	16,425
Gondar	— —	— —	— —	6,387	— —
Total	370,193	107,075	89,716	6,387	16,425

*The RRC further reported that these 589,796 represent 203,971 families, or an average of 2.89 persons per family.

Source: **Eritrea and Sudan One Year Later,** *op. cit.*, p. 16a.

Meanwhile, the Derg is "consolidating" the program, planning for a better organized, larger scale, truly voluntary resettlement scheme. The RRC has established a major family reunification and tracing program in the resettlement areas to aid families separated during the chaos and coercion.

Another controversial program of the Derg is "villagization" — an effort to move families from widely scattered rural dwellings into centrally organized

52. *Ibid.*

and constructed villages. The government contends that villagization will provide the people with better civic services, such as schools and clinics, while allowing peasants to continue farming their land. Critics see this movement as a "strategic hamlet" concept designed to exert stronger government and ideological control rather than simply providing more government services. The villagization program, which could eventually relocate 30 million people, has been suspended until the end of the harvest season, but the plan could have a profound impact on agricultural production if it is implemented throughout the country.[53]

The World's Response

While food aid from developed nations has helped Ethiopia in the short-run, there is no precedence for continued aid of that magnitude over many years. Long-term food aid will be required in Ethiopia unless there is a dramatic increase in the nation's agricultural productivity.

In response to the world's humane rescue efforts, senior Ethiopian officials accused the Western nations involved in emergency relief efforts of being largely to blame for the extent of the famine.[54] The then head of Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, claimed that had the Western nations acted sooner, many lives would have been saved "with the surplus and waste that exist in most donor countries."[55] This accusation brought the retort from McPherson, head of the U.S. A.I.D. that the charges were absurd and that Ethiopia was "biting the hand" that feeds it.[56]

The Ethiopian government has been accused of far worse. McPherson reported that Ethiopia did not cooperate with American efforts to unload food at ports, preferring to use its limited harbor facilities to unload cement.[57] The government also was reported to have charged an import tax of $12.50 a ton for gift food and handling and trucking charges of $165 a ton.[58]

The Derg has been accused of selling food shipments commercially[59] and using gift foods to feed the army.[60] Although these allegations by Canadian and British reporters were not substantiated, members of a Canadian

53. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** pp. 23-25.

54. According to Schwab, Ethiopian Officials appealed for foreign aid famine relief in 1983 and the government "did what it could, through its own political structures, to distribute food grown in Ethiopia or donated from abroad." "Political Change," *op. cit.*, p. 223.

55. May, "Ethiopians Blame West for Famine," *op. cit.*, 12 December 1984. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam made similar accusations in a statement read at a ministerial session of the Organization of African Unity. *Ibid.*, 11 July 1985.

56. Irvin Molotsky, "Relief Official Accuses Ethiopia of Biting the Hand that Feeds It," **New York Times,** 13 December 1985.

57. *Ibid.*; May, "Ethiopia Said to Fail to Honor Pledge of Priority for Food at Docks," *Ibid.*, 7 March 1985.

58. Flora Lewis, "Moral Test in Ethiopia," **New York Times,** 9 November 1984.

59. Kaplan, p. 20; see also Legum, *op. cit.* p. 142.

60. Tucker, *op. cit.* p. 47.

fact-finding mission thought them worthy of a full investigation.[61] There is precedent for such activity. Haile Selassie's corrupt regime sold relief shipments to the Sudan during the famine of 1974.[62]

According to Dawit Wolde Giorgis, who defected to the West in late 1985, very little of the famine aid sent by the developed world was lost through corruption or diverted into the military. Food was routinely redirected, however, for use in the government's resettlement effort, although American aid was conscientiously exempted from use in resettlement areas, in compliance with conditions set by Washington. Dawit contends that the resettlement program complicated famine relief logistics by absorbing such scarce resources as trucks and money.

Dawit, a former Governor of Eritrea, deputy foreign minister, and an original member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia, believes that his government's policies, as much as drought, were responsible for the catastrophic famine. "If there is no change in our policies, there will always be millions of hungry people in Ethiopia,"[63] he said.

The Derg has been most widely criticized for spending between $45 million to $200 million in 1984 on the 10th anniversary celebration of its Marxist revolution.[64] The showcase celebration was held shortly before the first television reports on the famine were broadcast in the U.S.

The government's spending priorities in general seem bizarre. The Derg is spending less than 5% of its budget on agriculture while half of its expenditures are for the military.[65] Fortress Ethiopia is being maintained to face internal insurrections and any external threats. A standing army of 400,000 highly mechanized troops is being backed up with arms loans from the Soviet Union of from $2.5 to $4 billion.[66] In addition some 3,000 Cuban soldiers are stationed in Ethiopia, along with military advisors and technicians from the USSR, East Germany, Bulgaria, and South Yemen.[67] Although Second World military and security hardware and personnel have poured into the country, Eastern Bloc food aid amounted to only $16.6 million in 1985, out of a world-wide total in excess of $500 million.[67a]

61. May, "Reports of Aid Diversion in Ethiopia Disputed," *op. cit.*, 17 December 1984; "U.N. Aide Denies Food for Ethiopia is Missing," *Ibid.*, 29 May 1985.

62. Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-29.

63. May, "Ethiopian Policies Blamed in Famine," **New York Times,** 21 May 1986.

64. A U.S. Aid official put the estimate at $100 million to $200 million. Molotsky, *ibid;* cf, Jack Shepherd, "Can We Deny the Starving in Ethiopia Because of their Politics?" Letter to the Editor, *ibid.*, 29 July 1985: ". . . the cost of that celebration may have reached $45 million."

65. Miller, *op cit.* Budget projections for 1983-84 allocated 47% of the total to National Defense and Internal Order and 4% to Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, and Mining. **Budget Estimates-Expenditures,** PMAC Central Statistical Office; cf. Negarit Gazeta Proclamation No. 253, 1984.

66. Miller, *op cit.*; Schwab, "Political Change," p. 223.

67. For Cuban involvement in Africa, see H. Michael Erisman, **Cuba's International Relations** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985).

67a. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later,** *op cit.*, table, p. 54.

Past Agricultural Development Efforts

The tragedy of contemporary Ethiopia is that it is potentially the granary of the Horn of Africa. The fertile lands of much of the highlands, with proper irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, and improved varieties of seeds, could be a major source of food production. This potential was evident immediately after World War II when Ethiopia, using only traditional agricultural methods, supplied food to the countries of the Middle East. It was widely believed that only a change in the land tenure system was needed to allow the nation to realize its potential.[68] The revolution of 1974 and the subsequent land reforms by the Derg have not produced the hoped-for results.[69]

Haile Selassie made an attempt to modernize agriculture through one of the first Point Four (subsequently A.I.D.) programs funded by the U.S. government.[70] From 1952-68, Oklahoma State University (OSU) administered this program that created an infrastructure for developing agricultural resources.[71]

With the help of 185 OSU personnel, an agricultural college, an agricultural technical high school, a research experiment station, and an extension service were set-up. When the OSU projects were terminated, well-trained Ethiopians took the places of the Americans.[72]

During the fourteen years OSU operated the agricultural technical high school, 550 students graduated, half of whom continued their studies at the College of Agriculture. Of the high school graduates, 94% worked in agricultural occupations, many manning the Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture.[73]

The College of Agriculture, started from scratch by OSU, graduated 284 students during the time of the OSU contract. These graduates held positions of importance in the government and in the private sector throughout the country. More than one-third of these graduates pursued advanced agricultural studies in the U.S.[74]

OSU's research program aimed to improve the standard of living through the application of scientific principles to farming. Research projects were initiated in all major areas of agriculture, and the results were published in some 125 reports. The work included such practical titles as "The Economics

68. Hoben, "Perspectives on Land Reform in Ethiopia: The Political Role of the Peasantry," **Rural Africana** 28 (Fall 1985):55-70; Paul Brietzke, "Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia," **Journal of Modern African Studies** 14 (Winter 1976):637-660.

69. International Monetary Fund, 1983.

70. Nick Foltz, "OSU Pioneered Help in Ethiopia," **Tulsa World**, 6 January 1985.

71. **Oklahoma State University in Ethiopia, Terminal Report 1952-1968,** (Stillwater, OK: OSU, 1969).

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

of Irrigation with Small Pumps," "Poultry Improvement and Production," and "An Introduction to T'ef." These data were used by Agricultural Extension agents who worked directly with the farmers.[75]

In 1954, OSU helped organize an Agricultural Extension Service with two agents in the field. The basic organizational structure was created, administrative policies defined, and a program of coordinated educational services made available to farmers. By 1963, OSU's last year in extension work, 76 extension posts had been established with 132 Ethiopians serving in the field. Some 2,500 farms throughout the country were being reached by extension services, and farmers were using improved practices in the production of grains, livestock, poultry, and coffee.[76]

The total cost of the OSU project over a sixteen year period was just under $12 million, an investment the equivalent of about $36 million today. Unfortunately the impact of OSU's success was blunted in the North by the devastation of the continuing civil war. In the southern part of the country, the results continue to be promising.

In January 1985, William S. Abbott, Director of International Programs at Oklahoma State University, visited several of the sites in Ethiopia where OSU had operated. According to Abbott the programs begun under OSU contracts have continued to do well. The College of Agriculture at Alemaya has added additional campus buildings financed by the World Bank, and student enrollments are four times larger than they were in 1968.[77]

The Agricultural Technical High School at Jimma was converted into a junior college and continues to graduate badly-needed trained manpower. The Central Experiment Station at Debre Zeit maintains its agricultural research program, although one of its main buildings was converted to other purposes by the Derg. Well-trained agricultural extension agents are still helping farmers in non-war areas.[78]

Abbott reports that the quality of leadership in the agricultural sector has remained high and that graduates of Alemaya and of U.S. universities continue to hold important positions. These leaders act as a moderating influence on the government to keep communications open between Ethiopia and the U.S.[79]

75. Hugh F. Rouk, OSU Office of International Programs, interview, 19 March 1985.

76. Conrad L. Evans, OSU Office of Internal Programs, interview, 19 March 1985.

77. William S. Abbott, interview, 19 March 1985.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.* Ethiopian Airlines, a highly capitalist operation in Marxist Ethiopia, also maintains close ties with the U.S. and is purchasing new Boeing aircraft to augment its all Boeing fleet.

In addition to the OSU program, some 2,500 Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV's) served in Ethiopia between 1962 and 1977 and many were involved in projects designed to improve the agricultural sector. Some 150 PCV's worked as agricultural extension workers cultivating nearly 20,000 acres of land to demonstrate the proper methods of growing corn, cotton, and wheat. This project directly influenced about 2,000 farmers, and through them, an additional 10,000 Ethiopians. PCV's also worked in the resettlement of 600 previously landless farm families. Smaller Peace Corps projects involved work in the areas of varietal trial farms specializing in dry land agriculture, agriculture cooperatives and marketing, erosion control, water supply systems, road construction, and vehicle maintenance. There has been no evaluation of the long-term impact of these projects since the Peace Corps left the country in 1977, but their accomplishments were impressive at the time of their completion.[80]

As of 1984, total U.S. aid to Ethiopia since World War II had exceeded $390 million.[81] Even with this volume of aid, Ethiopia's economic development has not approached the takeoff stage. The U.S.-Ethiopian aid experience raises the question of how long a period the wealthy nations of the North will be willing to bankroll non-development in sub-Saharan Africa.[82]

A Plan for Action

Given the fact that Ethiopia has been extremely slow in developing its economy and has made many wrong moves in combatting its food crisis, what can be done to help the country build back its agricultural productivity?

To minimize the effects of the famine, the Ethiopian people will have to work with a dedication and commitment not seen in Ethiopia since the nation was mobilized to defeat Somalia in the 1977-78 war. Massive outside help from foreign countries will be required too, and the coordination of this assistance will be vital to its success.

To play to its strengths, the Derg could use its authoritative powers to get some needed things done and relax its controls in other areas to let farmers regain their incentive to raise more food. The Derg's All Ethiopian Peasants Association (AEPA) and urban neighborhood associations or kebeles are mass organizations with units throughout the country. The 30,000 local peasant organizations claim 7 million members.[83]

80. **A Survey of Peace Corps Accomplishments,** I, Washington, D.C., ACTION, 1973. The author believes the Peace Corps records understate the number of PCV's and their accomplishments. For a complete listing of PCV assignments in 1965, see Theodore M. Vestal, "Peace Corps in Ethiopia: An Overall View." **Ethiopia Observer** 9 (1965):11-48.

81. "Foreign Grants and Credits." **Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1985,** U.S. Bureau of the Census, (105th edition) Washington, D.C. 1984, p. 809.

82. See generally, Carol Lancaster, "Africa's Development Challenges," **Current History** 84 (April 1985):145; U.S. Department of State, **U.S. Assistance and Africa's Economic Crisis,** 17 January 1985.

83. According to Schwab there are 14 million members. "Political Change," *op. cit.*

These rural and urban associations mounted a successful literacy campaign that lowered the illiteracy rate from 97% to 37% during the past five years.[84] Marshalling the same energy, the AEPA and kebeles could be put to work immediately in a crash program to reduce population growth. Their model could be family planning programs of the Peoples Republic of China that cut that country's birthrate in half in a decade through "mass voluntarism." The network of organizations in Ethiopia operating now as an informal police apparatus could ensure strict adherence to a one-child program and provide population education programs to help Ethiopians understand the long-term economic consequences of their childbearing decisions. In addition, contraceptives such as the newly developed under-the-arm Norplant, injectables such as Depo-Provera, and the "morning-after pill" could be distributed through government channels. Authoritative controls will be necessary to make changes in the people's preference for large families and from extremely low use of contraceptives.[85]

The Marxist organizations could also facilitate reforestation again using the PRC's efforts as a model. China has been able to double its forested area in just 30 years, with an afforestation rate of 3.7 million acres a year. In a similar program, villagers in South Korea have been planting 100,000 acres of trees a year.[86] In Ethiopia, ten Peace Corps foresters working in the 1970s were responsible for the planting of over 30,000 trees on 100 kilometers of terraces.[87] The peasant organizations of Ethiopia should be able to duplicate these efforts and make a significant start in a such a reforestation program.

Small-scale irrigation, which has received little government support in Ethiopia, has increased food production in other African nations.[88] Over a ten year period, 50 Peace Corps Volunteers brought nearly 25,000 acres of Ethiopian farm land under irrigation.[89] The AEPA, which exists to promote improved agricultural techniques, could teach farmers how to use well water and small streams for irrigation purposes. Farmers participate in and control such projects, which are low cost and provide seasonal flexibility.

In Ethiopia's central highlands there is an urgent need to keep the most affected farmlands fallow — some specialists say for as long as a decade.

84. Miller, *op. cit.*; see also Robert Caputo, "Ethiopia, Revolution in an Ancient Empire," **National Geographic** 163 (May 1983): 614-644.

85. Fewer than 5% of the population use contraceptives. If family planning had been introduced in 1970 with the goal of raising the contraceptive use rate from 2% to 35% by 1985, it would have reduced Ethiopia's population by 1.7 million. Phyllis Vineyard, "A Bitter Struggle with Millions of Lives at Stake," **World Population News Service Popline** 7 (April 1985).

86. David Winder, "The World's Shrinking Forests," **Christian Science Monitor,** 10 January 1985.

87. **Peace Corps,** op. cit.

88. Brown and Wolf, *op. cit.*

89. **Peace Corps,** *op. cit.*

This can be done by removing the people, as the Derg is doing, or by paying peasants with food to reclaim their land. In return for food, the peasants would be expected to work on farm-land terracing, tree planting, small scale irrigation projects, and building water reservoirs. The government could convince the peasants that they should not try to grow food, which would continue to destroy the land, in exchange for being fed.[90]

Getting the food for such a plan is problematic, but recent events may facilitate such action. The passage of the African Famine Relief and Recovery Act of 1985 empowers U.S. officials to grant assistance to Ethiopia "without regard" to previous legislation that prohibited development aid to nations that had nationalized American private or government property.[91] On December 19, 1985 — a month after U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker publicly expressed Washington's disillusionment toward the lack of response from the Mengistu government to U.S. efforts to improve relations — Ethiopia signed a settlement agreement to compensate American property losses. Ethiopia agreed to repay $7 million to Americans over a five-year period. The first payment of $1.5 million has already been made.[92] Thus the way is being cleared to initiate Ethiopian development projects such as food-for-work programs.

Another problem is that some of the most affected areas are the battlefields of the civil war. Until fighting ends in Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo, self-sufficiency in food production and long-term reclamation programs will be difficult — if not impossible.

In the parts of the country where reclamation projects can be carried on, a massive nationwide effort will be required to keep Ethiopia from again suffering from a devastating food crisis. If the military is to be maintained at the 400,000 man level, most of them could be put to work in distributing food aid and in reclaiming the land. The military has the organization, discipline, manpower, and the trucks to do what other agencies of the Derg cannot.

An influx of helpers from abroad to supplement the national effort would also be helpful. If the Derg were on friendly terms with the U.S. Peace Corps, volunteers working with peasants would be one of the most useful types of foreign assistance to help in developing the country's agriculture. Such PCVs would not have to be highly-trained experts. "B.A. generalists" with intensive training in agricultural skills needed for a particular project could do the job. In the mid-1960s there were almost 600 PCVs in Ethiopia. Twice that number might begin to make a dent in some of Ethiopia's agricultural problems.

If Americans are unacceptable in present day Ethiopia, the effort could

90. Harden, "Famine," *op. cit.*

91. May, "U.S. Will Give Development Aid to Ethiopia Under New Law," *op. cit.* 9 May 1985; see also, U.S. Department of State, **FY 1986 Foreign Assistance Proposals for Africa**, 5 March 1985.

92. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later**, p. 23.

be made through an international voluntary organization or the service corps of other nations with the "hands on" work ethic of the U.S. Peace Corps. For political reasons, it might be expedient to bring in Peace Corps-like volunteers from Eastern Bloc countries. Why not a Second World *peace* corps of Russian, East German, Polish, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian young people? And why not turn the Cuban soldiers in Ethiopia, that the Derg is paying for, into agricultural project workers?

If the Soviets were able to put a billion dollars of military hardware and nearly 20,000 Cuban troops into Ethiopia between November 1977 and March 1978, they should be capable of using the same energy and organizational skills to bring in a similar amount of resources to assist in the food crisis.

An international food aid organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), sponsored by Western nations and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was set up in 1974 to try to increase the productivity of small farmers in the poorest countries.[93] IFAD has fostered rural development in Ethiopia through the provision of credit to cooperatives and peasant farmers for agricultural production, marketing, and processing.[94] **The New York Times** describes IFAD's performance as outstanding,[95] and the work of the organization could be vastly expanded in Ethiopia.

While socialist organization and discipline may facilitate drastic action to combat aspects of the famine, relaxation of state control of food pricing and marketing might rejuvenate the individual farmer's work ethic. Immediate reforms are needed to allow peasants more freedom in the crops they grow and in the way in which they sell their produce. Collectivization should be halted and coffee taxes lowered or eliminated to spur more agricultural production.

China's experience in abolishing most rural communes, restoring family farms, and reestablishing "free markets" as an alternative to state-run outlets demonstrates that agricultural production can be revitalized in a stagnant socialist economy. In the PRC, peasants are working harder and producing a greater variety and volume of food for sale.[96] Grain output, increasing 8% each year since 1979, has risen to the extent that China has become agriculturally self-sufficient. Ethiopia needs the same turnaround to induce farmers to increase production.

93. Hobart Rowen, "Food Aid Program Threatened," **Washington Post**, 24 May 1985; "Soviet Account No. 904, and Ours," Editorial, **New York Times**, 29 May 1986.

94. United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, **Annual Report 1984**, p. 53; cf. **Program Review of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)**, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. A.I.D. (February 1985).

95. Editorial, "Aid and Sanctimony Do Not Mix," **New York Times**, 18 June 1985.

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94. United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, **Annual Report 1984**, p. 53; cf. **Program Review of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)**, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. A.I.D. (February 1985).

95. Editorial, "Aid and Sanctimony Do Not Mix," **New York Times**, 18 June 1985.

In early 1986 Ethiopia and the European Economic Community entered into a new agricultrual development program. Under the terms of their agreement, Ethiopia must undertake fundamental agricultural policy reforms including more flexibility in marketing and pricing, revised land tenure policies, and higher budgetary priorities for the agricultural sector — major changes from the Derg's ideologically-based plans.[97] Such changes may mark a turning point in improved food production by individual farmers.

Despite the success of the Western nations in getting food to the majority of famine victims in Ethiopia, many problems remain. There is still much to be done to rehabilitate the nation's agricultural production and to provide assistance to refugees and people in war zones. The nation will also have the long-term task of coping with legacies of the famine — 25,000 orphans or abandoned children under 16 years of age[98] and the irreversible physical and mental impairment resulting from calorie and protein deprivation among children.[99] As Congressman Mike Synar (Democrat, Okiahoma) observed upon his return from a Congressional fact-finding trip to Ethiopia in September, 1985: "The famine is still present, and its relief will require continued massive efforts for a number of years." [100]

Conclusion

Ultimately the Ethiopian food crisis will have to be resolved by Ethiopians themselves.[101] Unlike many other African nations, nature has blessed the country with an invigorating climate, normally productive lands, forests, and usually abundant rainfall. If man's folly has destroyed much of this bounty, man's determination and persistence can restore at least some of it and alleviate the human suffering caused by the degradation of the environment.

The restoration effort is already behind schedule. The traditional Ethiopian attitude of "ishi nuggah" or "okay, tomorrow" will have to be replaced with a grim realization that there is a race on between the rehabilitation of the country's agriculture and a resumption of famine, again losing hundreds of thousands of lives. This race should be run without the encumbrance of ideologies. As A.I.D.'s McPherson has said: "A hungry child knows no politics."[102]

96. Tony Walker, "Dismantling China's Communes," **The Age** (June 1982):55.

97. **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later**, p. 26.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

99. "We Are the Children," **Newsweek**, 3 June 1985, pp. 28-34; Erik Eckhomm. "Diet Deficiency of Vitamin A is Revealed as a Major Killer," **New York Times**, 3 September 1985.

100. Telephone interview, 26 September 1985.

101. U.S. Department of State **Africa: The Potential for Higher Food Production**, April 1985; M. Peter McPherson, "The Hope of Africa — A Green Revolution," March 1985, n.p.

102. Molotsky, *op. cit.*

There are encouraging signs of rapprochement between the governments of Ethiopia and the United States. Mengistu Haile Mariam has indicated that his government wants to improve strained relations with the U.S., but that the Reagan Administration must first curb its "anti-Ethiopian stance." "Unfortunately, the United States Government, out of its dislike of the social economic system we have opted for ourselves to free ourselves from underdevelopment and also out of sheer arrogance, has taken this unfriendly stance against us," he said.[103]

In reply, James R. Cheek, head of the American mission in Addis Ababa, stated that the U.S. would welcome an easing of relations with Ethiopia, but that it would have to begin with discussions on basic relations. The Reagan Administration has frequently expressed concern over Ethiopia's ties with the Soviet Union, accusing Moscow of exploiting its position in the region and "generally destabilizing the area and retarding its growth."[104]

The U.S. has shown some flexibility in its relations with another sub-Saharan Marxist state — Mozambique. [105] With Washington's accomodation of Samora Machel as precedent, perhaps U.S.-Ethiopian relations, despite fundamental differences in ideology and world view, can move to a higher plateau. In early 1986, Ethiopia appeared to be signaling detente.

For example, after many months of downplaying, if not ignoring, the U.S. role in famine relief, the Ethiopian leadership is now saying "thank you" in statements to the international press and to visiting Congressional delegations. Foreign Minister Goshu Wolde expressed the new official attitude that "the Ethiopian people deeply appreciate the assistance offered by the American people."[106] The government has also issued standing invitations for American journalists and Congressmen to visit any part of Ethiopia. In addition, the U.S. Information Service has been allowed to re-establish operations in Addis Ababa, and there are Fulbright and other government-sponsored educational exchanges.

The status of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia has a strong bearing on the future of relief programs. The U.S. A.I.D. Mission in Ethiopia plans to end all assistance by the end of 1986. The Reagan Administration is apparently operating on the theory that Ethiopia, having benefitted from a major drought and famine relief operation, will have gone through two years of relatively normal cycles of rain and harvest by the end of the year. After the second cycle, Ethiopia would not need relief and

103. Sheila Rule, "Ethiopian Says U.S. Must Soften Enmity Before Ties Can Improve," **New York Times**, 22 May 1986; for the views of the head of the U.S. Mission in Addis Ababa in 1984-85, see David A. Korn, "Ethiopia: Dilemma for the West," **The World Today** 42 (January 1986):4

104. Rule, *op. cit.*

105. Sam Levy, "Broken Promises?" **Africa Report** 31 (January-February 1986):77

106. Quoted in **Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later**, p. 6.

rehabilitation assistance but traditional development assistance, which the Reagan Administration has so far declined to offer.

Although the prospects for increased food production this year are optimistic, many observers are urging caution until the summer rains and harvest can be fully assessed. Meanwhile the international community must be ready to continue transitional assistance if food shortages develop in vulnerable areas. Under such circumstances, the modest U.S. A.I.D. Mission should remain open until the harvest can be evaluated through Spring 1987. Should official U.S.-Ethiopian relations continue to improve, the A.I.D. office would be in place to facilitate agricultural development and capital assistance projects.

Colonel Mengistu has responded to U.S. overtures and concerns by calling on "well intentioned" members of the Reagan Administration to look into what is actually happening in Ethiopia.[107] For Mengistu, whose laconic thanks to America for its famine aid amounted to one brief news item in 1984-85, the invitation to the Reagan Administration to look at his country may be a diplomatic great leap forward. The U.S. will probably look carefully before it leaps — to offer further development aid.

The situation is far from clear. On the one hand, there is the record of the Ethiopian leadership's harsh dogmas and rigid policies that created "a clear contradiction between political priorities and human needs." In refusing to face the reality of the famine that the Derg considered "an embarrassment and a humiliation to the revolution," the nation's miseries were compounded. As former RRC Director Dawit described it, "The leadership lives in a fantasy world created by their own policies and imagination. We don't realize how much our people are suffering."[108] A reassessment of priorities would appear to be in order.

On the other hand, Ethiopia, with all its problems, did survive. The country has been pulled back from the brink of what a year and a half earlier threatened to become one of the great human tragedies of modern times. Despite the errors, confusion, and chaos of the early days of the relief effort, the Ethiopian Government worked with the United Nations, major donor governments, and private agencies in delivering 1.2 million metric tons of food and millions of dollars of non-food aid to millions of needy people. The result is that there is more food in Ethiopia today than at any time during the past three years with a cushion, a carry-over, and a continued flow of food donations assured through the end of 1986. To turn back the threat of one of the century's worst famines within a year is a major relief success story. What remains to be seen is what food needs will be in 1987 and what the U.S. response will be.

107. Rule, *op. cit.* See also Jack Shepard, "Changing Equations in the Horn." **Africa Report** 30 (November-December 1985):22

108. May, *op. cit.* 21 May 1986; see also "Ethiopia's Other Drought," Editorial, **New York Times**, 28 May 1986.

Achieving Self-Sufficiency in African Agricultural Food Production: The Case of Nigeria

Mark Anikpo

African countries, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have declared their intention to strive towards self-reliant development. This is sequel to the growing awareness that "Africa, despite all efforts made by its leaders, remains the least developed continent . . . Africa was directly exploited during the colonial period and, for the past two decades, this exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonialist external forces which seek to influence the economic policies and directions of African states."[1] Among the consequences of this imperialist exploitation of Africa is the overdependence of the African economy on external forces. While industrial manufacture is virtually non-existent, agriculture is characterized by low production and productivity and rudimentary agricultural techniques. "This situation obviously gives rise to insufficient agricultural growth, especially of food production, in the face of the rapid population growth and has resulted in serious food shortages and malnutrition in the continent."[2]

The question then arises: faced with the structural imperatives of capitalist underdevelopment, especially a very weak industrial base, how do African countries intend to initiate a program for food self-sufficiency which they recognize as the bedrock of the envisioned economic development? What is the possibility of such a program, if established, succeeding on a long-term basis?

This article is an attempt to review, using the Nigerian example, the type of agricultural projects often established by African leaders in the hope

1. Organization of African Unity, **Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa: 1980-2000** (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981), p. 7.

2. *Ibid.*

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of achieving self-sufficiency in agricultural food production. It also reveals what went wrong with these programs in order to provide a basis for understanding the alternative proposals put forward here for realizing African agricultural objectives. Our central argument is that attempts so far made at achieving long-term food self-sufficiency in Africa have failed, not necessarily because of poor soil, drought, desertification, or even low level technology, but because African agriculture lacks an appropriate organizational base to mobilize the predominantly peasant producers into an efficient and more productive work force.

Characteristics of Peasant Agriculture

Nigeria's near-100 million population is estimated to be 75% rural. By virtue of their assymetrical power (socio-economic and political) relationship with the urban population, and because of the nature of their productive activity, Nigeria's rural dwellers are predominantly peasant agricultural producers, whose surplus feeds the urban dwellers.

Their social organization is structured by a network of kinship relationships which give rise to distinct geographically separated villages, towns and clans, where individual peasant households cultivate small areas of land mainly to satisfy the consumption requirements of the family members. The separation, in most cases, is made more distant by differences in linguistic and religious affiliations. By implication, the separate groups of peasants lack effective communication between them. As Marx puts it, "the smallholding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse."[3] In Marx' view, such peasants are incapable of acting together towards a common purpose because they constitute a "simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes."[4]

Studies in peasant revolts confirm that, in most cases, peasants act together and more effectively when organized by non-peasant leadership.[5] It could be argued that the effective mobilization of peasants for group action in this way is not limited to rebellions but extends to agricultural production. External intervention is therefore necessary if peasant production is to achieve a level required to satisfy national food requirements. This is,

3. Karl Marx, **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte** (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1934).

4. *Ibid.*

5. See Eric Wolf, **Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century** (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969); and Ronald Mousnier, **Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth Century France, Russia, and China** (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970).

however, not the crux of the matter. One would want to know what form this intervention would take and also under what conditions it would become necessary. A theoretical point arises here. As La-Anyane correctly points out, when one considers the prospects of agricultural development in Africa, "of vital importance is the interdependence of agriculture and industry."[6] Such a relationship he further notes, "demands a rapid technological change in agricultural production and the promotion of the process of structural transformation."[7]

The traditional concern in relation to agriculture and industry had focused on determining which of the two should take precedence in development priorities. Those who gave the fundamental role to agriculture based their argument on economic and moral grounds. Apart from the fact that agriculture is the source of basic raw materials for industry, agriculture predates industrial manufacture in the order of man's productive activity. There were, however, those who "extolled the virtues of industrial fundamentalism." The argument here is essentially economistic. Again according to La-Anyane:

> "They argue that industry is the sole means of raising the productivity of an economy and that agriculture cannot provide the engine of growth for a developing nation because of the low income elasticity of demand for agricultural products. The pride of place should be given to industrialization, because it is the only sector that can break the vicious circle of poverty — low savings — low incomes — and pave the way for the take-off of the economy."[8]

The problem with such fundamentalist considerations was not just the circularity of the arguments but the one-sided emphasis on the contribution of either agriculture or industry to overall national economic growth.

In recent times, the contention between the two views was resolved by the emergence of a new view which focusses instead on the mutual interdependence between agriculture and industry.

The synthesis emerged out of the realization that the relationship between agriculture and industry is a mutual one and none can achieve any meaningful growth without the other. There is little need to go into elaborate details of how the sectors enhance each other. Suffice it to mention here that agriculture serves industry in two major ways, by providing raw materials for industrial production and also by making food available to the industrial workers in enough quantities and low prices. Industry provides the tractors and other tools required to facilitate agricultural production. The more abundant and sophisticated the technology provided by industry, the higher the

6. S. La-Anyane, **Economics of Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa** (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1985), p. 16.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

tendency for increased agricultural productivity. It is important, therefore, to note that the mutual relationship between industry and agriculture, to a large extent presupposes a correspondence between the growth levels of both. This means that, for effective cross-stimulation between industry and agriculture, their technological levels need to be at par, especially as they affect the organizational structure of agricultural production.

Let us consider, for instance, the situation in Africa, where the technology is still moderate — agricultural implements are mostly hoes, spades and cutlasses, all of which are energized by the human muscle. To achieve high agricultural productivity from such implements. The peasant producer, demands a high labour imput with all its attendant demands on human energy. Alternatively, the peasant producers must be brought together to increase productivity without necessarily working extra hours. The problems inherent in the first option are enormous and inhibitive of productivity. Chayanov explains that a peasant producer encounters a certain amount of drudgery in the application of his labour power for agricultural production.[9] In addition to the inevitable limitations of the human muscle as an energy source, labour drudgery sets a limit to the extent the peasant producer can stretch his own physical potential. Despite the subjectivity of Chayanov's evaluations of peasant productive activity, he nevertheless highlights the important fact that the labour-intensive approach is not the most effective way to achieve agricultural food self-sufficiency, especially where, as in the African case, the population is predominantly peasant. The implication of this for the organization of African peasants is discussed further below. Meanwhile, it may be useful to review some of the approaches that had been adopted in the past by successive Nigerian governments in the attempt to increase agricultural productivity and achieve food self-sufficiency.

Approaches to Agricultural Food Production

Observers of the Nigerian food situation during the colonial period must be shocked at the turnabout in productivity that occurred a few years after independence in 1960. In a historical analysis of scientific and technical advance in African agriculture, Carl Eicher observes that,

> Two major Green Revolution-type breakthroughs occurred in the colonial era — hybrid oil palm in Zaire, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast and hybrid maize in Zimbabwe and Kenya — but no comparable breakthroughs have taken place in the 25 years of independence.[10]

9. A.V. Chayanov, **The Theory of Peasant Economy:** Translation from the Russian original (1925) in Daniel Thorner, et. al., ed., (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1966), pp. 5-7.

10. Carl K. Eicher, **Transforming African Agriculture,** Hunger Project Papers No. 4, January, 1986, p. 9.

Eicher's study was, however, focussed on examining the input of research in science and technology towards transforming African agriculture. The concern here is on the influence of organizational variables such as labor maximization (either through individual or collective production and incentives), state policy, and investment spending and leadership on peasant agricultural productivity. The central thesis is that these variables altered significantly, in terms of their capacity to mobilize the peasants, after the colonial period. Whereas the colonial administration paid some attention towards using the peasants for the production of the essential food products by at least providing markets for their products, the post-colonial Nigerian governments engaged in a progressive alienation of the peasants in the food production process. The policy-makers ignored the peasants by turning away from policies that would enhance domestic food production, and also by forging no mutuality between the rural-based agriculture and the urban-based industrial development. A consequent rural-urban dichotomy was sharpened through a consistent policy of urban bias.

There is presently a useful body of literature on rural neglect and urban bias in Nigeria. One of the best-known of such works is Dupe Olatunbosun's **Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority.**[11] He shows in the book how urban bias in development planning was manifested in sectoral allocation of funds for development programs, and also in the siting of industries. In the table below, Willie Okowa reflects the magnitude of urban bias in Nigeria's First National Development Plan, 1962 to 1968.[12]

Table 1
Planned Rural-Urban Distribution of Government Investment Spending in The First National Development Plan, 1962-68 (in Percentages)

Sector	Rural	Urban	Rural-Urban*
Trade and Industry	2.6	97.1	0.3
Electricity	0.6	97.7	0.5
Communication	0.0	91.4	8.6
Health	3.9	76.2	19.9
Information	0.0	37.8	62.0
Social Welfare	9.2	90.8	0.0
Water Supply	39.6	58.5	1.9
Percentage Total	4.9	91.7	3.4

Source: Okowa, "Urban Bias in National Development Planning," Paper presented at the Staff Seminar, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 1984. Table A.7.2.2
*Items of public expenditure with dual benefits to both rural and urban areas.

11. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1975.

12. "Urban Bias in National Development Planning," Paper presented at the Staff Seminar, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 1984.

In later years, more specifically, during the 1960s and 1970s, this neglect of the rural peasantry was accentuated by the emergence of oil as the country's major revenue earner. Within two decades, the rural population had been deprived of the able-bodied labour force that should carry out meaningful agricultural production. While locally-produced food dwindled, the government engaged in the importation of food from other countries with the oil money. Table 2 below gives an idea of the almost continuous rise in Nigeria's food importation.

Table 2
Food Importation in Nigeria (1962-1980)

Year	Value* (million)
1962	46.986
1963	43.804
1964	41.240
1965	46.976
1966	51.568
1967	42.560
1968	28,392
1969	41.732
1970	57.694
1971	87.910
1972	95.104
1973	126.260
1974	155.708
1975	277.863
1976	438.927
1977	702.013
1978	1,108.662
1979	1,105.901
1980	n.a.

• Note that food includes cereals, meat, dairy products, fish.

Source: Aribisala, T.S.B., **Nigerias' Green Revolution: Achievements, Problems and Prospects: Distinguished Lecture No. 1, NISER, Ibadan, April 1983, p. 7.**

* In Nigerian Naira.

As the figures clearly show, apart from a slight slump from 1967 to 1969 when the country was engaged in a civil war, food importation into Nigeria rose continuously during the post-colonial era, especially the period of oil boom as Table 3 shows.

The implication of the above figures is that as petroleum revenue increased, so did the amount spent on food importation. The consequence was increasingly less reliance on domestic food production and the intensification of peasant alienation. But the money to continue the importation was there and the policy-makers did not realize the full import of the neglect of the rural peasants until there was a slump in the oil revenue. As the oil money stopped flowing in, food importation became more difficult. Suddenly

Table 3
Percentage Value of Petroleum Export to Nigeria's External Balance of Payments, 1966, 1969-1974:

Year	Percentage Value of Petroleum Export
1966	46.7
1969	40.7
1970	49.6
1971	63.5
1972	68.7
1973	74.1
1974	96.8

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (Annual Reports)

Nigerians woke up the uncomfortable realization that unless the country became self-sufficient in food production, there was danger ahead.

Almost as if in panic, the Obasanjo administration (1975-1979) launched the agricultural program known as the "Operation Feed the Nation" (OFN), on May 21, 1976. The obvious aim was to lure Nigerians into agricultural production to save the nation from the impending food crisis. In a national speech to launch the program, the then Head of State, Gen. Obasanjo, specified the Government's involvement and determination with these words:

> Agricultural inputs such as (a) improved seeds, (b) fertilizers and pesticides as well as (c) proper marketing and storage arrangements have to be made. In addition to what the state governments have already ordered for this cropping season, the federal governments 50,000 tons of fertilizers for distribution to farmers. From now on, farmers will pay a uniform price for each type of fertilizer they buy irrespective of where they live. These prices are largely subsidised by the Federal Military Government, etc., etc.[13]

As later events revealed, these lofty proposals turned out to be a camouflage for fraudulent swindling of the nation's finances. As Nzimiro puts it:

> . . . it is evident that the Operation Feed the Nation was controlled and directed by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie for their own benefit. Some of the government functionaries that sold the project retired and became consultants to the very same government. Huge consultancy fees were paid to groups, all of whose surveys and analyses were based on capitalist methods of organising agriculture in an industrial society and never worked for the peasant society.[14]

The government liberalized imports on agro-business and opened the gate wider for imperialist penetration into Nigerian agriculture. Multi-national

13. Quoted in Ikenna Nzimiro, **The Green Revolution in Nigeria or Modernization of Hunger** (Oguta, Nigeria: Zim Pan-African Publishers, 1985), pp. 26-27).

14. *Ibid.*

agro-business acquired more trading posts in Nigeria as get-rich-quick Nigerian businessmen saw the opportunity for compradorial alliance. Their interests were not the interests of the peasant producers. Except trying to get fertilizers to farmers, the program lacked any organizational base to mobilize and motivate peasants for higher agricultural food production. The OFN indeed created more problems for the country than it intended to solve. It died a natural death even before Gen. Obasanjo handed it over to a civilian government headed Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979.

The change fromm Obasanjo to Shagari in the political arena was also a change from the OFN to the "Green Revolution" as a new agricultural program. Nzimiro notes that the Green Revolution was inaugurated in April, 1980, was characterized by the same institutional deformities as in all the development programs of the ruling class of the First Republic and the Military Regimes.[15] It was conceived to boost agricultural production as well as to ensure rural development through (a) agro-business, (b) the construction of feeder roads, and (c) the provision of housing, educational facilities, water and electricity in the rural areas. It had two agrarian aims: to boost export of agricultural products, and to increase food production.

Indeed, the "Green Revolution" was the Operation Feed the Nation in a different garb. The institutional structures remained the same. The class alliances remained unchanged and reinforced the mechanisms of exploiting and alienating the peasants instead of mobilizing them. It was, therefore, not surprising that all that Nigerians gained from the GR program was what Nzimiro calls "the modernization of hunger," and the emergence of the most ruthless political bandits in Nigerian history. Before the scheme collapsed with its apostles in December, 1983, the "Green Revolution" had become a stigmatized idea in the country.

The Buhari military regime (1983-85) was also enchanted with the dream of agricultural self-sufficiency in Nigeria. It quickly launched a new scheme known as "agricultural programme," which was intended to literally force people to take up farming and other agricultural endeavors. Its major strategy was to retrench workers from the civil service and industry so that they would be compelled to return to the villages and engage in agricultural production. The scheme was seriously flawed because the government made no effort to assist the retrenched workers. The retrenchment itself was meant to be a disciplinary measure or forced retirement — either of which demoralized the victims. Moreover, most of them had neither the land nor the money to buy some for agricultural purposes. Some had lived all their lives in the urban towns and had never engaged in agricultural production. Apart from the Rivers State government which organized young school leavers for an

15. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

agricultural project known as "school-to-land," no other attempt was made to organize either the peasants or the newly retrenched workers for the purpose of achieving agricultural self-sufficiency. As the retrenchments continued, the public became more restless and the government became more repressive. Like its predecessors, the "aggressive agricultural programme" — a stillborn child of political circumstances — disappeared with the same circumstances that gave birth to it. The Buhari regime was overthrown in September, 1985 by the current President Ibrahim Babangida. The new regime has not tossed up any fancy name for its agricultural policy but some of its policy decisions have indirectly stimulated agricultural production in Nigeria. The most important of such policies is the ban on the importation of rice and maize. The traders have swamped the rural countryside asking for rice to purchase. The peasant rice farmers have swung into action once more and contrary to expectations that the rice importation ban wold create super-inflation, the price of local rice in Nigeria, one month after the ban, fell by 50% of its previous level.

Yet, from all indications, the present stimulation of agricultural production through market incentives, for purposes of long-term agricultural food self-sufficiency, is inadequate. It lacks the necessary organizational base to ensure continuity and higher productivity. It can at best be seen as a palliative which achieves desirable results only as long as no other venture guarantees better financial profits.

The Organizational Base for Agricultural Food Self-Sufficiency

As I had argued in an earlier analysis,[16] the major defect of the above-mentioned agricultural programs is that they are not geared towards eradicating the sources of the exploitation and disorganization in peasant production. To do this will entail, on a broad basis, a new socio-economic and political framework within which peasants can be effectively mobilized. Such a broad framework will tend towards socialist programs which will focus on the elimination of existing class inequalities by restructuring the social relations of production in industry and agriculture.

In agriculture specifically, because of the already mentioned limitations of individual peasant production, the necessity arises for organizing the peasant communities under direct but limited government control. These of course will fail to accomplish their purpose if they become cooperatives where administrative secretaries and record clerks give orders to estranged farmers

16. Mark Anikpo, "The Peasantry and the Dilemma of Underdevelopment in Nigeria," in Pan-African Social Science Review, No. 1, October 1984, pp. 27-47.

who do not know what cooperative movements are all about. They must be cooperative settlements organized as autonomous communities where the farmers are given relevant education and available scientific and technological assistance, and where they have the right to influence decisions affecting the production and distribution of their products, especially in the determination of commodity prices and the selection of their representatives. Adequate financial incentives must be provided. Such cooperative organizations would have multiple advantages. If effectively linked together they would enable the peasants to exercise power relative to their numbers. They would provide additional leverage for the societies of which they are a part to withstand the manipulations of multinational corporations. They would bring the efforts of many together and adjust agricultural production to the level of existing scientific and technological knowledge.

In addition to providing an organizational structure, the mobilization of peasants for self-sufficient agricultural food production requires two other pre-conditions: a creative and communicable idea and a dedicated leadership. The idea explains to the people why such a reorganization is necessary and binds them to its success. The leadership must be seen to be dedicated in order to inspire confidence and hope in the producers. The leader is usually the symbol of a peoples' aspirations and his role in the mobilization process may prove the decisive organizational factor in ensuring the success of any program of national self-sufficiency. Neither of these prerequisites is easily fulfilled, as a number of such efforts in other parts of Africa have shown. Nevertheless, it remains the most viable alternative to continued stagnation or decline.

Conclusion

The Nigerian case discussed above may not be identical in its practical details with those of other African countries. However, the similarity in the contemporary conditions of African agriculture gives the basic principle of cooperative mobilization a generalized implication. We have argued that because of the predominantly peasant character of African agriculture, especially its low technological basis, any attempt to achieve agricultural food self-sufficiency in the continent must focus on bringing the efforts of peasant producers together in cooperative agricultural enterprises. In this way, it will be possible to bring existing scientific and technological knowledge to bear on existing production practices through direct government control and planning. By ensuring a harmony between agriculture and industry, given dedicated leadership, African agriculture can attain long-term food self-sufficiency.

Food Shortages in Africa: A Critique of Existing Agricultural Strategies

Kidane Mengisteab

Many African countries that have the potential in terms of natural endowments for agricultural prosperity have been unable to feed themselves.[1] Many of them that were net exporters of agricultural products in the 1950s and earlier decades have now become net importers. A recent study shows that only six countries in Africa south of the Sahara (Swaziland, Burundi, Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Malawi and Rwanda) achieved a modest growth in their agricultures between 1961 and 1980. Agricultural production in the other 28 states either stagnated or declined.[2] The continent's population grew at a rate of 2.9% between 1966 and 1980. During the same period, its agricultural production grew at a rate of 1.7% only.[3] The implication of this situation is serious because decline and stagnation of output over time demonstrate the inability of the producers to reproduce themselves.

In Africa agricultural production in general and food production in particular are carried out largely by the peasantry. A situation of serious crisis arises when this social class (up to 85% of the population in some countries) fails to reproduce itself as a viable unit of production. Food shortages cannot be alleviated by imports because the peasantry is often unable to pay for them. Foreign aid, which is needed to save lives when starvation hits, is nevertheless unlikely to be a solution for this recurrent situation.[4] Periodic widespread starvation that has characterized Africa thus becomes almost impossible to prevent.

1. The natural endowments referred to here are arable land, water sources and work force.

2. J. Hinderink and J.J. Sterkenburg, "Agricultural Policy and Production in Africa: The Aims, the Methods and the Means," **The Journal of Modern African Studies,** 21, 1, 1983, pp. 1-23.

3. United Nations, **World Population Trends, Population and Development Interrelations and Population Policies,** 1983 Monitoring Report, Vol. II, New York, 1985, p. 28.

4. In the long run, food aid might actually have a negative impact since it can depress the price of locally produced food.

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Explanations For The Crisis

Environmental deterioration that has resulted in recurrent droughts is one obvious cause of the problem in many countries. But it is generally agreed that there are other causes as well. The environmental deterioration and the failure to contain it are, to a large extent, attributable to social factors. There is no agreement, however, in identifying these other causes. One objective of this article is to re-examine the various diagnoses of Africa's most vexing problem, attempting to eliminate the less important ones so that attention can be focused on the real cause.

The analysis of the situation and the solutions suggested in the literature on Africa's agricultural problems vary widely. However, at the risk of broad generalization, the available diagnoses of the situation are classified into two broad perspectives in order to simplify the organization of the argument. The two categories are the orthodox and the radical perspectives.

It is important to note that not all the useful literature fits well into this categorization. There is also wide variation within each of the perspectives. The orthodox perspective, for example, includes studies that range from the free market advocates to proponents of policy intervention including serious land reform. The radical perspective also ranges from dependency school and African socialism to Maoist new democratic revolution and the theory of underdevelopment. All these variations cannot be treated effectively in such a short essay. This analysis will concentrate primarily on the wing of the orthodox perspective which advocates reform (henceforth referred to as liberal) and the theory of underdevelopment (the neo-Marxian segment of the radical perspective).[5]

The Liberal Perspective

According to the liberal perspective, the explanations of Africa's development problems and its agricultural crisis are to be found in, among others:

1. the lack of skill and entrepreneurship,
2. the lack of capital resources for productive investment,
3. the lack of technical and scientific improvements,
4. the lack of multi-disciplinary research relevant to the local conditions,
5. the lack of sufficient agricultural extension services such as marketing and credit facilities,
6. market failure (price controls and other imperfections in price-setting mechanisms),

5. Neo-Marxian is an adjective roughly used, as J. Schumpeter points out, to describe scholars who, while accepting Marx's fundamental attitudes and methods, eliminated some of his interpretations and replaced some of the interpretations put upon him by different interpretations. The adjective has been attached to different scholars in different generations. In the early 20th century, for example, it was used to describe scholars such as K. Kautsky and R. Luxemburg. In this study, it is used to describe the Marxist scholars who adhere to the theory of underdevelopment. Their difference with Marx is, while Marx envisioned international capitalism to bring about social development in the LDCs, they regard international capitalism as one cause for the underdevelopment of the LDCs.

7. the inappropriateness of development plans and failure to scrupulously implement set plans and policies,
8. the existence of some archaic social structures such as inequalities in land tenure patterns,
9. the environmental deterioration such as droughts and massive soil erosion,
10. the lack of developed transportation systems, and
11. the demographic problems, i.e., lack of control of population growth that neutralizes any growth in agricultural production.

The above list shows that the liberal diagnosis essentially relates the problem to the scarcity of certain factors of production. However, most of the factors listed above are producible. Scarcity of such factors reflects that their demand has exceeded their supply at a given time. Under such conditions, a successful reproduction system would shift resources and effort to the production of the scarce products and the development of necessary institutions. An unsuccessful system of reproduction, however, would fail to do so over time. Scarcity of products thus describes the state of certain factors at a given point in time but it does not, by itself, tell us why a reproduction system fails to produce the scarce products over time unless the scarcity is so general and severe that production cannot expand or even continue.

Scarcity of producible factors can certainly explain poor production over the period of time that is required to produce or acquire through trade and use such factors. The lack of a certain technical mix, for example, can explain low agricultural productivity but it does not explain the causes for the lack of the necessary technical mix. Thus as long as the necessary natural endowments for agricultural production are available, the lack of the producible factors of production does not provide a sufficient explanation. Failure of a reproduction system to achieve some level of growth over time, as is the case with the food production in Africa, therefore, imposes the question as to why a society fails to generate the necessary factors.

The scarcities of capital, skill and entrepreneurship do not take us very far in explaining the failure of a reproduction system. They do not tell us why a society fails to generate these producible goods and services. Furthermore, introduction of such factors, by itself, does not always alleviate the problem. The extension services provided by Ethiopia's Imperial Government in the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, began a process of reducing the scarcity of fertilizers, quality seeds, pesticides, marketing facilities, and other agricultural factors of production. The outcome of this was a rapid process of mechanization of the country's agriculture. The position of the peasantry and the food situation, however, continued to deteriorate due to land concentration, rent increases and an increased shift from the production of food to the production of cash crops.

Based on this diagnosis of the problem, liberal perspective advocates a development strategy which encourages trade and foreign investment to transfer skill, technology, capital, etc., and export promotion to provide the foreign exchange for the payment of the transferred products. This strategy, which essentially advocates commercialization of agriculture to transform the peasantry, has, in many LDCs, led to a relative expansion of the commercial sector. However, this expansion, which largely relies on the international market for its dynamism, especially in the case of the less diversified economies, has produced neither the development of the food sector nor the transformation of the peasantry.

World price fluctuations and restrictions of the market often constrain this strategy. The Republic of Sudan, for example, raised its cotton output 35% in 1981, and a further 10% in 1982. Falling world market prices, however, wiped out the expected foreign exchange earnings. Senegal and Kenya also experienced similar situations with groundnuts and beverage crops respectively.[6] There is also another problem that faces this strategy. Even when the international market conditions are favorable, the commercial sector's linkage effects on the food sector are highly questionable. We will return to this problem later.

The Neo-Marxian Perspective

The neo-Marxian perspective, like the liberal perspective, recognizes the scarcity of certain products such as capital, technology and skill in many developing countries. It also realizes that such scarcities impose productivity as well as market constraints on the producers. However, unlike the liberal perspective, it regards the scarcities as outcomes of the problem rather than the causes.

The causes of the problem, according to the neo-Marxian perspective, largely lie in the position that Africa occupies within the international division of labor, i.e., in Africa's dependency and in the production relations that predominate in Africa. The neo-Marxian perspective has not quite established a clear operational definition of the structures of dependency. Nevertheless, the general analysis of this perspective suggests that existing class relations which are closely related with Africa's position in the international division of labor prevent the coordination of available resources with social needs, for example, in terms of allocation of surplus. Implied in this analysis is that either the producers in the food sector are deprived of resources and thus are not capable of generating surplus or, if a surplus is generated, it is extracted from the producers through rent, taxation and pricing mechanisms, leaving little to be plowed back to this sector. The economic

6. Michael J. Schultheis, "The World Bank and Accelerated Development: The Internationalization of Supply Side Economics," **The African Studies Review**, 27, 4, December 1984, pp. 9-34.

classes that appropriate the surplus either invest it in other sectors or waste it in unproductive consumption, leaving the food sector to stagnate.

Based on such analysis, the neo-Marxian perspective points out that the solution of the food crisis requires fundamental restructuring of the existing socio-economic relations in the countries concerned. But if structural changes are prerequisites for the success of a reproduction system why is it that the backward societies have not succeeded in implementing such a change? And why is the neo-Marxian diagnosis claimed to be fundamentally different from the liberal diagnosis since structural changes which are largely subject to human activity can be treated like other producible factors of production? In other words, why is lack of structural changes of the neo-Marxian diagnosis any different from the liberal paradigm's scarcity of producible factors of production?

Inability of the masses to win the class struggle due to domestic and international class relations may explain the first question.[7] In other words, the lack of political consciousness and organization of the masses and the support that the international bourgeoisie lends to the domestic ruling elite may have prevented the success of social revolutions in many LDCs, and the consequent implementation of structural changes.

In regard to the second question, however, the neo-Marxian diagnosis goes, at least, one step deeper than the liberal diagnosis. This has very important policy implications. The neo-Marxian analysis considers that changes in the production relations and in the division of labor are prerequisites for dealing systematically with the scarcity of all producible factors of production by coordinating the use of available resources with social needs. It is implied in this analysis that without structural changes the appropriation that generates scarcity would persist.

There are some important empirical evidences about African agriculture that can help us in evaluating the diagnoses of the problem by the two perspectives. A careful observation of the situation reveals that in the 1950s, 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s the cash crop sector experienced a modest growth induced by the international market. (See Table 1.) Beginning in the second half of the 1970s, the cash crop sector also saw fluctuations partly caused by the instability of the international market. Yet, despite the environmental problems and the scarcity of many factors, the cash crop sector did not experience a general stagnation as the food sector did. (See Table 2.)

7. This implies that the primary cause for underdevelopment is failure to change the structures that prevent social development rather than merely the consequent exploitation by international capitalism as sometimes claimed. It should be understood, however, that incorporation to international capitalism modifies the class relations in the LDCs and often prevents the restructuring of their existing class relation.

Table 1
Africa's Per Capita Production of Major Cash Crop Products
(Kg per capita)

Year	Coffee	Tea	Cotton	Cocoa	Tobacco	Sugar Cane
1950	1.3	0.10	3.1	2.3	0.6	70
1955	1.6	0.10	2.9	2.1	0.6	70
1960	2.9	0.20	3.3	3.1	0.7	80
1965	3.7	0.23	3.4	2.8	0.8	80
1970	3.7	0.33	3.7	3.0	0.6	120
1973	3.6	0.40	3.2	2.5	0.6	130
1974	3.3	0.40	3.1	2.6	0.6	130
1975	2.8	0.37	2.8	2.5	0.6	130
1976	2.9	0.40	2.5	2.1	0.6	140
1977	3.0	0.45	2.9	2.1	0.7	140
1978	2.4	0.45	2.7	2.0	0.6	140
1979	2.6	0.40	2.5	2.2	0.7	130
1980	2.5	0.42	2.6	2.1	0.7	120
1981	2.7	0.41	2.4	2.2	0.5	140
1982	2.5	0.44	2.3	0.7	0.6	140

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, **FAO Production Yearbooks**, Rome.

Table 2
Africa's Per Capita Production of Major Food Products
(Kg per capita)

Years	Wheat	Maize	Millet & Sorghum	Rice Paddy	Cassava	Pulses
1961-65	21	54	64	19	102	13
1970	22	54	57	11	104	14
1973	22	45	45	18	108	13
1974	21	67	50	18	111	13
1975	21	62	51	19	109	13
1976	26	57	49	19	102	12
1977	20	64	45	19	105	12
1978	22	64	49	18	102	11
1979	20	52	42	19	99	11
1980	18	58	44	18	100	11

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications Limited.

The growth of the cash crop sector, which can be referred to as 'dependent development' has not been duplicated in the food sector.[8] It is also unlikely that food production will be stimulated by demand at the international market. This is essentially due to lack of overlapping demand between the domestic and international markets and due to cultural differences in food consumption patterns. The outward-oriented development strategy

8. For details on the concept of 'dependent development' see H.F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, **Dependency and Development in Latin America** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

which is advocated by the liberal perspective is thus inappropriate for the development of the food sector.

A related observation reveals that the growth of the cash crop is positively correlated with the favorable allocation of resources it has acquired. This implies that one major reason that the food sector has stagnated is that it has been discriminated against in terms of allocation of resources.

This is not the end of the liberal perspective, however. There is a viable argument in support of the export-oriented agricultural strategy. This argument is that the cash crop export sector would act as a leading sector and develop the rest of the agricultural activities through its linkages. There is nothing inherently wrong with the production or even specialization in the production of cash crops since, with the necessary political will, the surplus that this sector generates, if the international market allows capital to be generated, can be allocated to the food sector by policy. Cuba, which started a restructuring of its economy after its revolution, for example, continues to encourage its sugar industry while trying to use the surplus for the development of its masses. The bitter truth, however, is that such a political will does not exist in most of Africa. And left to the market, it is not very clear what mechanisms there are for linkages to take place. It is, for example, not clear how the peasantry is affected by the expected linkages especially when the production of cash crops is largely in the hands of commercial farmers. Furthermore, for the food sector to develop through the trickle-down effect of the cash crop sector, the domestic food market must expand sufficiently to attract investment resources. This means that the market for food has to be able to compete with the international market to make the production of food as attractive as the production of cash crops. However, the low standard of living of the masses in Africa does not allow this at the present.[9] The expansion of the cash crop sector thus continues. And, as we have already seen, its expansion, which requires appropriation of more resources and land, often leads to the food sector's deprivation of resources, peasant evictions, and rent increases, and consequently worsens the condition of a large segment of the peasantry and the food situation deteriorates.[10] Food production thus cannot be left to the highly questionable linkage effects of the cash crop sector. It needs to be stimulated directly through policy directives and favorable allocation of resources.

In sum, Africa's food production sector has failed to reproduce itself. Much of this failure is related to its deprivation of needed resources. The

9. There is no clear ground for expecting that this will happen even in the long run. In any case, food requirement is not a long run issue.

10. For a detailed analysis of the process of 'marginalization' of the peasantry see A.G. Frank, **Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil** (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

neo-Marxian paradigm relates this deprivation to the existing production relations while the liberal paradigm provides little explanation beyond the scarcity of resources. We now turn to the analysis of the predominant economic systems in Africa to examine if they are capable of overcoming the crisis by alleviating the food sector's deprivation of needed resources.

Existing Economic Systems

The existing predominant economic systems in Africa are the private enterprise and the state enterprise systems. The private enterprise system generates economic development through entrepreneurs who with their innovative economic activities generate employment, income, market, and new organization and techniques of production.[11] The operations of this system are essentially governed by the market, which among other things transmits information on social needs and satisfies the needs of individuals.[12] But, the market transmits information on social needs only when these are reflected by effective demand. It also satisfies the needs of individuals by making available what is demanded provided that the demands warrant a certain level of profits to the entrepreneurs.

It is clear from this that the information that the market transmits is biased in favor of the social classes with notable purchasing power. Needs not translated into effective demand are not clearly transmitted by the market. For instance, in the case of many African countries, a large part of the basic social needs such as education, health care and even food are often not translated into effective demand. The low standard of living of the masses depresses effective demand. Lack of effective demand in turn leads to undiversified economies that produce at low income levels. Hence, we have a vicious circle that the market, by itself, is unable to break. The market is thus not effective in coordinating available resources with social needs when the needs are not translated into effective demand through purchasing power. The neglect of the food sector in Africa exemplifies this weakness of the market.

Another important weakness of the private enterprise market system in the backward LDCs is that firms involved in these countries have not been able to perform the classical role of the firm in a capitalist system, the development of their own market. One important reason for this seems to be that the international market provides them with an alternative. Another reason might be the weakness of competition among firms. Competition could push some enterprises to rely on the domestic market and thereby expand it. But competition among firms is rather weak in the less diversified

11. For details on the role of the entrepreneur in generating economic development, see J. Schumpeter, **The Theory of Economic Development** (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 54-94.

12. David Levine, **Needs, Rights and the Market** (forthcoming) provides an interesting treatment of the market.

economies. There are several causes for this, among them protectionist policies, scarcity of resources, which limits new entries to the market, and collusion among the small number of firms that develop oligopolistic characteristics by price fixing or by following price leaders.

The most important firms involved in the less diversified LDCs' economies, and especially those engaged in the agricultural sector, may undertake innovative economic activities and may accumulate capital from their profits, but their employment creation effects are limited by mechanization.[13] From this it follows that their domestic market creation effect will also be limited due to their limited generation of new incomes for consumers. Their products, therefore, are largely oriented to the international market. This means that the role of private entrepreneurs to expand the domestic market by helping to translate social needs into effective demand is not very dynamic in the agricultural sectors of backward countries. The private enterprise market mechanism thus faces structural limitations in most African economies.[14]

The State Enterprise System

Another dominant economic system is the state enterprise system. This system, which Claude Ake calls statist economy, is characterized by state ownership of the principal means of production.[15] But what mechanisms are there in the statist economy for facilitating the translation of social needs into demand or for the development of society through the coordination of available resources with social needs? The state's direct ownership and control of the means of production and the control over the state apparatus gives its functionaries tremendous power. Control over the economy appears to enable the state to make long-term plans and investments which private entrepreneurs are largely incapable of doing. State investments may also be geared toward the improvement of the standard of living of the masses since they are guided by policy rather than by the market. An agricultural system based on small-holder operations with state assistance would seem to be consistent with the state enterprise system.

13. It is often argued that commercial farmers can be induced to become labor intensive but the nature of agriculture does not allow this. Even if they become labor intensive, the employment that they create is likely to be only seasonal.

14. The private enterprise system is not limited to the operations of big private entrepreneurs. We can have an agricultural system based on small-holders and still maintain the essential features of the private enterprise system. But the success of such small-holders' agricultural system would depend on the role of the state. That is, the viability of small-holders as successful productive units would depend on specific agricultural policies not only in terms of the provision of extension services but also in terms of state regulations to prevent concentration of holdings. It is conceivable that we can have such an agricultural system. However, it is likely that class interest would not allow policy makers to contain the market forces leading to concentration for long.

15. Claude Ake, "Exploratory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa," **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, 14, 2, 1976, pp. 1-23.

Neither of the two predominant economic systems thus seems to be capable of leading to the coordination of available resources with social needs. The private enterprise system is unable to do this because the poor masses cannot translate their needs into demand and they will remain unable to do so until their economic condition improves markedly. The state enterprise system is also not likely to produce any better results since it does not have a mechanism by which the general population can express its needs and influence policies.

In many African states we find that the private enterprise and state enterprise systems co-exist. This co-existence of the two is often referred to as a mixed economy. There is, however, nothing interesting about this type of mixed economy. A combination of two inappropriate systems can hardly produce one that works. A mixed economy that reflects a policy-guided market operation in which the policies represent social needs might work. But this is not the type of mixed economy prevailing in Africa.

Suggestions for Possible Solutions

The analysis of the predominant economic systems in Africa leads us to make two generalizations. One is that existing conditions in Africa demonstrate that the market, by itself, is unable to coordinate resources with social needs and thereby bring about a solution to the food crisis. So interventionist policy should play an important role. The second one is that when policy supersedes or complements the market it needs to represent social needs in order to achieve developmental objectives.

There are different implementational problems involved. Disposing of the supremacy of the market in favor of policy raises two questions. One is how policy makers acquire information on the constantly changing social needs. The second question deals with what mechanisms we need in order to base policy making on social needs.

The answer to the first question seems to be relatively easier than the answer to the second one. African economies are simple, the needs we are dealing with are essentially basic ones that policy makers can largely identify without relying on the market. One does not need the market to identify the needs of the African masses for food, shelter, health care, schools, etc. Furthermore, democratic rights that allow the masses to participate in decision making are mechanisms by which the masses could, to a certain extent, transmit information to policy makers on their changing needs, at least until the economy develops to become more complex.

This, however, does not mean that the market can easily be discarded. A functional prioritization of needed products and identification of their amounts are not easily determined without the market. Consequently, a policy guided economy may be less efficient than a market economy in terms

of achieving an equilibrium. In other words, due to lack of information, the imbalance between the supply of products and their demands at the end of each period of production may be greater under a policy guided economy than under a market economy.

Imbalances caused by lack of information reflect inefficiencies in resource allocation which lead to slower economic growth. However, despite the inefficiencies and the initial slower economic growth, in the case of the less diversified economies, the policy mechanism can be more effective than the market in improving the standard of living of the masses through income redistributive measures. Income redistribution raises the income of the poor. This higher income and the poor's higher marginal propensity to consume raise the effective demand of the overall economy. A higher level of effective demand, in turn, expands the domestic market and thereby establishes a sounder basis for a faster economic growth over time.

The more difficult question is to determine how to ensure the commitment of policy-makers to the satisfaction of social needs including the exercise of democratic rights. There are two possible suggestions on this. One is that African societies have to undergo social revolutions in which the masses occupy state power and ensure, through their representatives, that policies safeguard their interests. If implemented, this social change could achieve the goal of targeting resources to social needs. However, implementation of such social changes has been difficult in Africa. As Amilcar Cabral points out, the underdevelopment of the productive forces has also underdeveloped the potential agents (working class and peasantry) of such a social change.[16] An apparently insurmountable impasse faces the strategy of revolutionary change if a revolution cannot be undertaken effectively. Let us now examine how the neo-Marxian paradigm resolves this impasse.

Cabral developed a theory of social transformation in the backward developing countries, which has been further elaborated on by Samir Amin. They suggest that a radical segment of the petty bourgeoisie, which realizes that social development will not take place without fundamental social change, will lead a social revolution and bring about social development by coordinating available resources with social needs through careful investment policies.[17]

Even the Cabral-Amin strategy has been difficult to implement in Africa. This difficulty is evident from the experience of countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. One major difficulty emanates from the petty bourgeois leadership betraying the cause of the masses. The theory

16. For a detailed discussion of such an obstacle, see A. Cabral, **Revolution in Guinea** (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

17. For details on the mechanisms that enable the petty bourgeoisie to play such a radical role, see A. Cabral, *Op. Cit.*, and S. Amin, "Self-Reliance and the New International Economic Order," **Monthly Review**, 29, 3, 1977. pp. 1-21.

provides an implicit solution to this problem. If the cause is betrayed, the expected social development would not take place. In other words, the social problems that necessitated a social revolution would continue to exist and the segment of the petty bourgeoisie that is not in power would lead further struggles. But the continuous revolution could last over a long period of time. This leads to another problem.

The strategy of social revolutions entails disruptive social conflicts. It involves changes in existing production relations including confiscation of property and income redistribution. The beneficiaries of the existing system oppose such changes and they are likely to resist. The changes also may involve heavy sacrifices by the petty bourgeoisie and this breeds resistance by this class. The consequent social conflicts can be protracted and very disruptive. The economic situation in post-1975 Ethiopia seems to exemplify the agonizing impacts of such disruptions. Protracted conflicts can force a social change that started with the objective of coordinating resources with social needs to become so militaristic that it uses up resources which are badly needed for economic development.

The various resistances might be liquidated by force. This however, is hardly a solution. In the process of forcefully suppressing oppositions all other forms of diversity, including the creative and constructive ones, are also suppressed, since during such chaotic conditions it is difficult to distinguish between opposition to change and differences on how and what kind of changes should be implemented. Repression, in turn, generates among the masses lack of confidence and initiative which are very important aspects of social development.

Despite the elegance of its analysis there are thus many technical problems involved in implementing the strategy suggested by the neo-Marxian perspective. It is not always easy to overthrow existing regimes. It is even more difficult to implement the structural changes after taking political power. Nevertheless, with a committed and tactful leadership that uses persuasion and far-sighted compromises rather than force, it can be implemented. The outcome would then be a transitional social system in which the primary objective is the development of the productive forces through the coordination of available resources with social needs.

The other strategy is essentially suggested by adherents of the liberal perspective and it does not involve fundamental changes in the production relations. Rather it involves political as well as economic reforms to bring about some income distributive measures to improve the standard of living of the poor.[18] In the case of agriculture, the reforms would mean targeting resources towards the food-producing poor peasantry.

18. Reforms are not accepted by all schools of thought of the liberal paradigm. Poverty, maldistribution of income and development concerns are, for example, no justification for redistributive reforms according to the libertarian school. However, most other schools accept reforms although they do not have uniform mechanisms for determining their magnitude.

This strategy runs into two theoretical problems. The first one is that suggesting reforms seems to imply admission that the failure of a reproductive system is not simply due to scarcity of factors, as the liberal diagnosis suggests, but that there are some mechanisms in the economy that cause failure and that call for reforms. This problem, however, is not insurmountable. The liberal perspective is flexible enough to accommodate reforms. One justification for reforms is market imperfections. According to the liberal perspective, resources are scarce and they are allocated best through the market mechanism. But there are cases in which some resources are not allocated best by the market. Such market imperfections thus call for reforms without contradicting the general liberal diagnosis.[19] The food sector's deprivation of resources can thus be considered as one among many market imperfections that need to be corrected by policy.

Imperfections are inherent in the market mechanisms. Reforms are, however, exogeneous correcting devices. This raises the second problem which deals with who determines the need for reforms and their magnitude. If the negative impacts of market imperfections affect all economic classes, including the policy makers, then one can expect the policy makers to instigate reforms. But if it is only a segment of the population, for example, the subsistence farmers in particular or the poorest segment of the population in general that is directly affected, then why would policy makers initiate reforms? Of course, in some cases, we can have reforms implemented by benevolent policy makers who want to improve the conditions of the poor. We might also have far-sighted policy makers who envision the impact of the food sector's stagnation on the overall economy.[20] However, policy makers are not always benevolent or far-sighted. We thus face the problem as to who implements reforms.

One argument is that with democracy the poor are also represented in running the state. They can thus influence policies.[21] In fact, in the liberal tradition, the state is generally considered to be neutral to all economic classes. This implies that the state would initiate and implement reforms, when needed.

19. There are other possible arguments for reforms. One of these arguments is based on utility maximization. The 'necessities' of life that the poor need may render more utility than the 'additional' goods and services that the rich enjoy. Income redistributing reforms thus may increase the overall utility of a society. The problem with this argument is that according to the liberal tradition, individuals are utility maximizers and as such it is not clear why the rich would surrender individual utility to increase social utility. A moral argument of social justice is also made to justify reforms. But since the notion of justice is subjective income redistribution may not always be regarded as social justice. So society can very well view the competitive market mechanism as fair and just that needs no reform.

20. Needless to say, food like other necessities is not simply a consumption good. It is also a factor of production without which the production of other goods and services cannot continue.

21. Democracy in this case essentially refers to the Western type polyarchic form of government. It fails to realize that the influence of the poor masses on policy making can be minimal even under polyarchy.

However, the concept of the neutrality of the state is rather untenable. The conduct of the state, especially in the case of the LDCs, makes this obvious. The influence of the poor members of society, such as the subsistence farmers, on policy making is minimal. The issue as to who initiates reforms thus remains a nagging question since reforms generally conflict with private profit, at least in some sectors of the economy.

A more convincing argument for the solution of this problem is that social disparities endanger the viability of the capitalist system. The state, neutral or not neutral, realizes this and, in an attempt to save the system from social upheaval or a revolution, induces entrepreneurs and capitalists to share in carrying the burden of development. Under pressure from oppositions or due to fear of social upheavals the state can undertake some income redistribution measures.[22]

Even if implemented, due to its reformist nature, the impact of this strategy might be too little and sometimes too late for the situation in some African countries where social unrest is already endemic. Nevertheless, in many other countries, substantive reforms might overcome the food crisis and improve the economic condition of the poor. This means that despite implementational difficulties both strategies can overcome the food crisis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the magnitude of the crisis of the food sector in Africa is grave. The stagnation of production over the previous decades, the starvation of thousands of people in Ethiopia and other African states and the widespread malnutrition that ravages the continent are clear manifestations. The diagnosis of the problem is marred by ideological differences. But it is clear that the crisis is related to the neglect that has characterized the food sector. In any case, Africa now finds itself in a very difficult and shameful situation. And freeing it from such a tragedy would require nothing less than changing the existing orientation to development and allocating available resources in a way that would give top priority to the food sector.

The chronic conflicts that characterize Africa would certainly impose obstacles to such a change. Our analysis of the possible general strategies for dealing with the problem also shows that they are both difficult to implement. But then social development has never been easy. So there is no alternative for Africa but to manage its conflicts and to face the challenge.

22. This implies that, when policy makers fail to implement reforms when they are needed, popular revolts to overthrow them would be justified. This was the case, at least, according to the classical social analysts such as J. Locke and J. Rousseau.

Another implication is that the more organized the opposition is the more likely the state would implement reforms. And the more equally political and economic power is distributed among the different social groups of a society, the more neutral the state appears to be. When the distribution of power is skewed as it is in most LDCs, however, it becomes more obvious that the state is not neutral.

Another important point that our analysis hopefully has made clear is that neither of the identified strategies for social development can be proved to be unworkable for overcoming the food crisis. This implies that as long as the necessary changes that give top priority to solving the food crisis are accepted, then it is theoretically possible that tactical compromises can be reached even among the adherents of the different ideologically demarcated strategies of social development.[23] Of course, accepting tactical compromises when needed, managing conflicts without resorting to violence and cooperating to solve problems require a certain degree of political sophistication not only on the part of policy makers, but also on the part of political oppositions as well as on the part of all individual citizens. Overcoming the current crisis thus will require, among other things, the political maturity of Africans.

23. The idea of tactical compromises between different ideologies may seem to be equivalent to advocating class harmony to some people from the left. Class harmony, however, is not possible by definition. What is intended here is to point out that there are many occasions such as national defense and the food crisis that make compromises necessary in order to join forces against a common challenge. Even Cabral's theory of social development in the backward LDCs, which assigns the leadership role to the petty bourgeoisie, is itself a compromise strategy. This certainly needs a much deeper elaboration than can be provided here and I plan to treat it in a different paper.

Announcements

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FARM RADIO NETWORK (DCFRN), based in Toronto and Guelph, Ontario, is a network of about 700 individuals and organizations in roughly 100 countries; all of whom are somehow involved in the dissemination of agricultural and health-related information to rural people. The Toronto and Guelph offices produce the information in the form of manuscripts and cassettes, which are then sent out by mail to the 700 "participants" in the Network. The information produced is often gathered from the participants themselves and is always of a practical, very low-cost (if not no cost) nature. For further information write: Helen A. Atkin, Project Manager, Developing Countries Farm Radio Network, c/o University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada.

For the first time in its seven-year history the $3,000 NOMA award has been awarded for a volume of poetry. The 1986 NOMA AWARD FOR PUBLISHING IN AFRICA has been won by the Angolan poet, António Jacinto, for his collection **Sobreviver em Tarrafal de Santiago** (Surviving Santiago's Tarrafal), published by the Instituto Nacional do Livro e do Disco (INALD), Luanda, Angola, in 1985. Jacinto served eight years in Tarrafal prison, the Portuguese equivalent of South Africa's Robben Island, for his part in the struggle for the liberation of his country. Established in 1979, The Noma Award is open to African writers and scholars whose work is published in Africa, and is administered by the quarterly journal *The African Book Publishing Record*, published in Oxford, England.

Correspondent's Report

Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future

Maria E. Krenz

Why are people starving in Africa? Is the drought the cause of the famine? Or are national political structures also to blame? Similarly, what role does the international system play in making African societies more vulnerable to drought? While no simple answers emerged to these questions, at least they were thoughtfully scrutinized in a somewhat unusual setting in August, 1985, when the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR) and the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) sponsored a three-day colloquium on "Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future."

The colloquium gathered experts on Africa from a wide range of disciplines. It included meteorologists, geographers, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and economists, who were invited to go beyond what they have been doing to evaluate existing solutions and to search, perhaps, for new answers; to brainstorm about drought and hunger in Africa. "We have consciously tried to have several viewpoints represented in hopes that discussions across the boundaries of disciplines and experience will bear fruit," said Michael Glantz, Head of the NCAR's Environmental and Societal Impacts Group, who organized the colloquium. And judging from participants' comments, the sharing of insights across disciplines was indeed fruitful.

Eugene Rasmusson (Climate Analysis Center, NOAA) explained the meteorological aspects of African drought in a regional context, showing how large parts of the continent are affected by the large, global-scale pattern of climate variability in the tropics. Rainfall patterns in southeastern Africa seem to be quite strongly related to sea surface temperature (SST) variations in the equatorial Pacific Ocean, which could possibly be of predictive value for southeast African rainfall. Rainfall patterns in West Africa, on the other hand, show some relationship to SST variations over the Atlantic Ocean, albeit too weak to be of predictive value. West African rainfall indices show a downward trend in rainfall from the wet period of the 1950s

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to the present. Each wet episode since the '50s was less wet than the previous one, and each dry episode tended to be equal to or drier than the previous one. Whether this indicates an actual change in climate or is within the parameters of natural climate variability is currently being debated among climatologists. Workineh Degefu, director of Ethiopia's Meteorological Service Agency, corroborated Rasmusson's data, showing that of the 12 drought periods that Ethiopia had in 150 years, six occurred in the last 35 years.

Michael Glantz (NCAR) pointed out that while a great deal has been written about drought in Africa, somehow it does not get incorporated into the economic development literature. As soon as a drought episode is over, other crises command the attention of African policymakers. Yet drought affects not only that year's crop yields, but also has an effect on such long-term factors as land quality, acreage planted, labor supply, migration, urbanization, and others. Drought, or climate variability in general, is certainly not the only factor affecting economic development but any economic development planning for Africa that does not take it into account is bound to be unrealistic.

Bradford Morse, director of the UN Development Program and the UN Office of Emergency Operations in Africa, delivered the keynote speech, in which he defined the present crisis in Africa as one of development. There was a general agreement among participants that this crisis of development has both external and internal causes and that sometimes the two are difficult to separate.

Foreign development schemes have been generally unsuccessful. Michael Horowitz (Institute for Development Anthropology) pointed out that since 1973, around $600 million has been spent on livestock projects that have failed to achieve their objectives of increasing productivity, income, and the quality of life of pastoral herders. Nor did they produce a reasonable rate of return from the investment. Moreover, they resulted in the compaction of livestock into a constrained area, accelerating land degradation rather than retarding it. Large irrigation projects in northern Nigeria were cited by Michael Watts (University of California at Berkeley) as another example of tremendously expensive foreign development projects that have not only failed to deliver what was promised, but wrought tremendous social change and disruption of the cultural and moral basis of the communities where they operated. There was general agreement on the obvious but mostly ignored requirement that projects and programs which are aimed at having beneficial impacts must be predicated on better understanding of the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural realities of the targeted areas.

High interest rates, overvaluation of the exchange rates, and neoprotectionism in industrial countries were some of the external factors discussed.

Others included the fluctuations in price and availability of resources in the international market place that makes it difficult for African development planners to count on basic food staples being available cheaply and reliably. The enormous foreign debt of most African countries was seen as perhaps the major external contributor to the development crisis. Morse pointed out that according to estimates made by his office, the total unmet needs in Africa for 1985 are on the order of $1.6 billion. Yet, the sum that the African countries are paying in debt servicing this year is substantially greater.

Randall Baker (Indiana University) called for a systemic change in Africa's economic relations to the rest of the world and for the creation of an external environment in which internal policy changes can succeed. He pointed out that 15% of the African population falls below the conventional descriptions of poverty and are not reached by the International Monetary Fund programs or even the World Bank's poverty-oriented programs. He criticized the IMF and the World Bank for not taking a long enough perspective, for being constrained by having to gain a good economic rate of return on their investment and for concentrating on getting the balance of payments back on course. "We should consider the possibility of a moratorium, to give Africa a period of I would say no less than ten years, in which to have an environment conducive to the sort of internal policy changes that we are talking about here," concluded Baker, calling for a realistic forum where the external and internal policymakers can come together and have a clear discussion on the relationship between external and internal policy.

The discussion of internal factors that generate famine and contribute to the African development crisis showed the extreme complexity of these factors. High and increasing population growth rate along with insufficient development of human resources is, of course, a major problem. Another one is the essential fragility of the political systems which motivates leaders to pursue policies such as keeping agricultural prices artificially low to satisfy urban populations. Low agricultural prices, along with the overvaluation of exchange rates, act as a powerful disincentive for domestic food production. Yet, food availability is only part of the problem; in fact, there need not be a decline in absolute food availability for famine to occur. Serious transportation and distribution problems led to disastrous consequences. For example, John Harris (Boston University), noted that while southwest and west Tanzania produce surplus maize, it might actually be cheaper to import maize for the rest of the country due to the lack of transportation infrastructure. As another example, Sudan's railroad capacity has dropped from 3 million mt/yr to less than 1 million in the last twenty years. Entitlement problems have also exacerbated the famine. Changes in entitlements,

in people's access to food, are occurring because of growing commoditization, according to Watts. The growing market system is eroding the reciprocity and solidarity at the local level that used to have a very important role during food shortages. The theme of food entitlements, distribution and transportation as major hurdles to denying famine a future came up throughout the colloquium.

A predominance of monopolistic parastatals in the agricultural sector has become another major internal problem according to Michael Lofchie (University of California at Los Angeles). These parastatals are generally inefficient, mismanaged, have high operating margins, and do not pay producers on time. Yet drastic solutions could have calamitous consequences, warned Lofchie, calling for a gradualist solution of changing the role of parastatals from monopolistic buyers and sellers of various staple food crops to buyers and sellers of last resort, and of allowing exchange rates and producer prices to become slowly more realistic, perhaps using food aid to cushion the impact of rising prices.

Robert Cummings (Howard University) discussed the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, which is the first comprehensive continent-wide effort to formulate and articulate long-term development objectives for Africa. The Plan has identified food self-sufficiency as priority one. It calls for utilizing Africa's resources primarily for its own development, to expand its industrial base while orienting it primarily for home consumption, to rely primarily on their own technical skills, and to try to develop an industrial base and a consumption pattern more suitable to African priorities. The Lagos Plan seeks to encourage the formation of effective subregional groupings of African states, to cooperate in training, trade, and all the other kinds of policy matters crucial to economic development, with a possible ultimate goal of establishing an Economic Community of Africa. Cummings acknowledged several shortcomings of the Lagos Plan but was optimistic that it might enable Africans to initiate the kind of strategy that would help them answer the questions that they have posed for themselves: what kind of development does Africa need and what kind of future do they wish to mold for the African continent? On a less optimistic note, Timothy Shaw (Dalhousie University) commented that official strategies of self-reliance, including the Lagos Plan, tend to be very state-centric and ignore the real levels of self-reliance, that of farmers and producers, and that which is manifested in the "parallel" economies (i.e., trade outside of state control or accounting procedures).

Africa, of course, is not climatically homogeneous. Yet the impact of drought has been felt throughout the continent. Several case studies of

drought-coping mechanisms were discussed. James McCann (Boston University) found that local-level responses to the effects of drought in Ethiopia are not at all chaotic, but are ordered responses, conditioned by preexisting social institutions, the most important of which is the borrowing and exchanging of oxen, which is one of the scarcest factors of production. In the worst drought-afflicted areas it has been found that over 75% of households had either one ox or none. One-ox households cooperate with one another by sharing the use of the oxen. Households without oxen have to rent one ox in exchange for a considerable amount of grain, and then find a neighbor with one ox to share. The distribution of oxen implies that the effects of drought are not evenly distributed. Households that own oxen invariably are able to plant more crops than those who must borrow the draft animals. Those who borrow the oxen have less time and also less optimal time to use them, resulting in their planting grains that need less plowing but also have less value. Thus oxen are an essential form of capital in this system.

A strategy for diminishing the long-term effects of drought in causing famine is opening new areas for cultivation. Della McMillan (University of Florida) reported on such an effort in Burkina Faso. As a result of an international project to control major epidemic diseases, such as onchocerciasis (river-blindness), along river basins in order to open these areas for cultivation, the government of Burkina Faso, in 1974, launched a capital-intensive program of planned resettlement into the Volta Valley from the densely populated Mossi Plateau. The project was supervised by field agents and a survey was conducted of the results. The analysis of 313 households showed that the project had failed in its major objective, which was to introduce an intensive technological package. The project was more successful in increasing yields and income of settler households. The project costs, however, were three times higher than originally projected. Accurate appraisal of the success of these type of projects is difficult. The project might have been more effective than recognized, since the survey analysis did not include land cultivation that extended onto non-project lands or the branching out into livestock raising.

The impact of voluntary, self-managed, farmer organizations on production and consumption in Zimbabwe was examined by Michael Bratton (Michigan State University). In 1983, 44% of the small farmers in Zimbabwe said that they belonged to some form of voluntary agricultural organization for pooling information, pooling labor, buying farm inputs in bulk and selling in bulk. In the 1981-82 season, group farmers produced more maize than individual farmers. Bratton found that this held consistent regardless of measurement techniques used. Farmer organizations at the level of

distribution seemed to have had a greater impact on agricultural performance than at the level of production. Farmers in associations enjoyed higher levels of access than individuals to agricultural services, loans, and the marketing organization. Bratton also found that in the 1981-83 multi-year drought, the advantages of farmer associations were felt most significantly in the early years of drought. Farmer groups appeared to be buffered from food deficits for approximately one season longer than individual farmers. As the drought deepened, this advantage began to fall away and the role of the state became more prominent.

An example of a government successfully anticipating a grain shortfall, and thereby averting famine, was discussed by David Lewis (Cornell University). When the March to May rains failed in Kenya in 1984, President Moi declared that the necessary resources would be committed and there would be no famine. Even though Kenya lost nearly half of its principal food crop, it managed to come through the period of drought without major famine. According to Lewis, the effort was successful because of the strong political commitment and the use of existing government mechanisms. They made sure that sufficient supplies of grain continued to flow through normal channels and at normal prices. Both donors and the Kenyan people were kept informed. The government made good use of information management systems, such as microprocessors, to track the food situation, the timing of the grain imports, and the physical movement of grain from port to warehouses to consumers. In addition, there was also an outpouring of extra effort and cooperation by longshoremen, railroad-workers, truckers, and others. Whether such an effort could have been sustained in a multi-year drought, both in terms of government resources and of general cooperation, has yet to be tested. Another unanswered question is whether other African nations, in which drought is more frequent, have the resources and infrastructure that Kenya was able to mobilize.

The question of whether successes are transferable was further explored by looking at the case of increased agricultural output in Malawi and the successful management, in terms of averting famine, of a three-year drought in the Indian state of Maharashtra. J. Gus Liebenow (Indiana University) interpreted Malawi's achievement of food self-sufficiency as a result of a pragmatic, non-ideological strategy for development. Michelle McAlpin (Tufts University) explained Maharashtra's success as due to early governmental intervention, the presence of well informed local administrators who were in charge of coordinating the larger government and donor aid effort, relief programs in the form of income-generating employment, and the rebuilding of working capital for agricultural and pastoral populations once the drought has ended. She felt that these guidelines would serve Africa well if their implementation were based on local conditions.

In addition to the role of African and donor governments, non-governmental or private voluntary organizations (PVOs) also have a significant role in African development. Michael Scott (OXFAM) explained that, while PVOs provide only a small percentage of total foreign aid, they can provide it more rapidly and fill in existing gaps between the world food program and bilateral governmental assistance programs. They also can experiment with new development strategies on a smaller scale, but with more flexibility. Most importantly, PVOs play a role in their own countries by informing the public and mobilizing resources for financial support, acting as lobbyists for government support, not just for famine relief funds but for a sustained development effort. Scott saw a three-part role for PVOs in helping to deny famine a future: to make a case for humanitarian aid regardless of political considerations, so that relief assistance or development aid is based on needs and not on the basis of some political agenda or foreign policy; to provide relief and development assistance in ways that will systematize long-term food security; and to defend the dignity and the cultural integrity of the African people.

"Where do we go from here?" was the question posed at the end of the colloquium. A great deal of specific information was shared and gained by the participants in support of the general picture that emerged: in order to avert future famines in Africa, climatic factors must be integrated into development planning; there has to be widespread policy reform in Africa; and African leaders have to be afforded the opportunity to find a development path peculiar and unique to the social and cultural framework of their countries, a path that will fully realize Africa's human capacity. But this opportunity can come only with a radical, systemic change in the international environment, in the relationship of the developed world to Africa. In Bradford Morse's words, "There will be hope only when the affluent world understands that it is in their own selfish interest to help Africa and other parts of the developing world in their quest for economic and social progress."

A Look at Books

Solving the Agricultural Food Crisis

Thomas R. De Gregori

E.R. Terry, K.A. Oduro, and F. Caveness, editors, **TROPICAL ROOT CROPS: Research Strategies for the 1980s.** Proceedings of the First Triennial Root Crops Symposium of the International Society for Tropical Root Crops — Africa Branch, 8-12 September 1980, Ibadan, Nigeria. (Ottawa, Canada, International Development Research Centre, and New York, UNIPUB, 1981) 279 pp., $20 (hardcover), $15 (softcover).

James R. Simpson and Phylo Evangelou, editors, **LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: Constraints, Prospects, Policy.** (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) 407 pp., $18.95 paperback.

Sue Schofield, **DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEMS OF VILLAGE NUTRITION.** (Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld Osman & Co. in association with The Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1979) 174 pp., $22.95.

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. A study prepared by the Environmental Development Action (ENDA) for the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP Studies Volume 2. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981) 76 pp., paperback.

J. Roger Pitblade, **THE NORTH MKATA PLAIN, TANZANIA: A Study of Land Capability and Land Tenure.** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Department of Geography, University of Toronto, 1981) 178 pp., $8.50 paperback.

David W. Norman, Emmy B. Simmons, and Henry M. Hays, **FARMING SYSTEMS IN THE NIGERIAN SAVANA: Research and Strategies for Development.** (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) 275 pp., $22 paperback.

Barbara Dinham and Colin Hines, **AGRIBUSINESS IN AFRICA: A Study of the Impact of Big Business on Africa's Food and Agricultural Production.** (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1984) 224 pp., $29.95 hardcover, $9.95 paperback.

The food crisis in Africa is much in the news as this review is being written and undoubtedly will continue to be when this is published. There is concern that interest will wane while famine still stalks the land and before the rains return. Even with normal rains and a subsequent crop, the worst will be over, but the underlying problem will remain. Drought is a convenient explanation for

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everyone, because nobody is responsible for the failures that follow. Yet we have seen elsewhere, such as in Asia, that modern agronomy has a variety of weapons in its arsenal, that is, drought-resistant seeds, water-conserving methods of cultivation, and so on, that limit the deleterious impact of a shortfall in rain. Clearly, when the rains fail completely, nothing (except irrigation) can be done. Still, three stories on one page of the **New York Times** (December 2, 1984) tells it all. One was a picture of the tragedy of Ethiopia, another was a story of the continuing increase in per capita world food production, and the third was on the record crop produced by Zimbabwean peasants using drought-resistant seeds.

The fundamental question is to look beyond famine relief to the longer term reformation of African agriculture which throughout the continent, apart from the lack of rainfall, has been experiencing declining per capita production and increasing food import dependence. Each commentator has his or her explanation of *the* cause. To some, it is climatic change, whether this change is the result of long-term trends of population growth and/or the consequent mismanagement of the land. To others it is political instability that has created half of the world's homeless refugees. To still others, where some modicum of stability or continuity has been achieved, agricultural policies have been wrong. The wrongness of the policies vary across the spectrum by critics, from wrong pricing policies to favoritism for the better-off farmers. Most of all, policy critics seem to agree that government actions have tended to favor the urban population over the rural and that the net impact of policies has been for agricultural disincentives.

One need not be wed to one cause or explanation. One cause is nice, since if right, it would mean one solution, the return of the rains or getting prices right. Even if one accepts a complex array of causes, differently weighted in each individual case, there still is another ingredient that needs to be considered. With abundant rain and "right" policies, it is still questionable as to whether African agriculture is capable of accommodating the growth in population with increasing per capita output. Further, it is not due to lack of arable land. Africa's underdevelopment applies to its agricultural potential.

The Green Revolution that has been so instrumental in transforming world agriculture has been a grain revolution, that is, wheat, rice, and maize. These grains are called high-yielding varieties (HYV), though some suggest they should be called high-responsive varieties. These dwarfing varieties were not only bred for higher yields but also for the ability to increase yields further with fertilization and irrigation. Less than 10% of African agriculture uses these grains or has access to irrigation water. Further, all the problems noted above contribute to the low fertilizer utilization in Africa.

Africa desperately needs its own Green Revolution in the crops suited to its needs and environmental circumstances. Africa needs the research capability of modern science and agronomy focused on its agricultural condition. If one looks at the emergence of tropical crops research institutes in Africa since independence and throughout the third world, one cannot help but be impressed. There is even a consultative group of international agricultural research institutions. The work being done is outstanding and vital. However, compare this effort with the vastly greater research endeavor in the agriculturally developed countries, and the contrast is stark, and the research in African agriculture is pitifully small. In fact, in virtually all research endeavors involving Africa, be it health, education or agriculture, the strides and percentage growths have been enormous, but having started from near zero, there is still a long way to go.

The books under review reflect some of the efforts and results of research applied to African problems. Most of these will have an extremely limited audience. We hope that most find their way into university libraries. For it is the accumulation and compilation of such research results that will in time provide the baseline data necessary for advances in African agriculture. **Tropical Root Crops** is a truly fine collection of research papers that reflect both the state of our current knowledge and the necessary research agenda if we are to lay the foundation for increased production.

The papers deal with three major root crops: cassava, yams, and cocoyams. There is a strong emphasis on disease control and breeding disease-resistant varieties. There is also work done on hybridization and improving yields. There are a variety of other topics touched upon, from economics to food preservation. The papers are practical and can be applied by qualified workers in the field. Useful though the work may be, there are no miracles or spectacular gains to report. Thus, not only is there a need to set a research agenda, but there is also a definite need for greater international, regional, and national support for an expanded research effort.

Livestock Development in Subsaharan Africa is yet another book whose primary readership will be a limited, professional audience. That is unfortunate, because in many ways the organization and structure of the book should be a prototype of how this kind of problem should be attacked. It is not, like **Tropical Root Crops**, a series of papers resulting from organized research projects. Rather, it is the bringing together by scholars and professionals what is already known about specific livestock problems in Africa. The editors describe the approach of the book as assessing "in a systems context the environmental, biological, and social constraints on future African livestock development" and in so doing, they "consider prospects for improving productivity." There are twenty-one chapters with topics that vary widely but are linked together to give us a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved in livestock production. Topics range from ecology, livestock nutrition, marketing, government policies, donor assistance, and land use, to socio-economic variables, cultural history, and veterinary anthropology. The systems approach is an excellent way to organize our knowledge, and it allows us more clearly to define the research problems that demand high priority and attention. It also helps to define those areas where we need to apply the knowledge that we already have. This book is highly recommended even to those who would never have thought that they would want to read a book on livestock.

In most parts of the world, when we think of raising agricultural output, it is to increase farm income. In too many parts of Africa, our concerns are more fundamental, that of improving the nutrition of the farmers, their families, and their neighbors. Sue Schofield's fine study, **Development and the Problems of Village Nutrition**, attempts to get away from the exclusive study of extreme mass malnutrition, i.e., famine, and looks at the problems as they exist in villages throughout the globe. Her data is drawn from village studies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. What she has done is develop a framework for the identification and analysis of village nutrition problems. From this she derives recommendations on the implementation of village-focused nutrition problems. Since

villages and their nutrition problems vary, part of the implementation recommendations are in terms of types of issues to address, questions to ask and pitfalls to avoid. With limited resources she seeks to have us avoid "blanket" programs or trickle down effects of economic growth and isntead target the nutrition problem with "specific" programs. For, she argues, inadequate nutrition retards economic growth, as well as stunts people. Specifically focused nutrition programs can alleviate human suffering more quickly and effectively. This small book is also highly recommended.

Environment and Development in Africa is one of a series of small studies on Africa published by the United Nations Environmental Programme. Like the previous studies, it looks at constraints and challenges. The constraints are the physical limitations of the environment and the challenges are the current failures in meeting the health, food, and other basic needs of Africa. There is also the challenge of ongoing misuse of the environment that makes future problem-solving more difficult. They look at various "scenarios" for development, from dependent growth to greater economic autonomy. Their clear favorite is "environmental development," about which this reviewer does not want to seem to be cynical in calling it a catalog of good intentions. There is more than a whiff of small-is-beautiful, and one would like to know in more operational detail how such policies might be made to work.

On a macro level, we have referred to the detailed studies on African agricultural problems. **The North Mkata Plain, Tanzania** is a regionally-focused study. Pitblade's approach is basically that of a cultural geographer. The integrated look at soils, water, crops, land use, and land tenure has many similarities to the systems approach described above. Africa is in need of both macro level agricultural research that provides new crops and capabilities for agricultural advance, but also in need of fine, carefully done regional studies that provide a solid empirical base, allowing for improvements with current capabilities and for the application of advancements when and if they occur. In a word, we need many more studies, such as Pitblade's, of the environment of all parts of Africa.

Farming Systems in the Nigerian Savanna is another regionally-focused agricultural study. It is also very much more. The opening chapters explore the concept of Farming Systems Research as a method for integrated holistic analysis of agricultural problems. The presentation is lucid and useful as authors argue that the old style agricultural specialist is inadequate to the tasks of African agricultural development. Agricultural people still need their technical expertise, but they also need some knowledge of all other aspects of agriculture, so that they can participate effectively in integrated team research and development. They describe the systems approach as being "dynamic" and "iterative."

The authors of **Farming Systems in the Nigerian Savanna** practice in their research and writing what they preach. Their empirical studies are holistic, comprehensive, and multidisciplinary. Soils, temperature, water, growing seasons, agricultural practices, kinship, culture, marketing, credit, and local politics are brought together. They look at possibilities for improved technologies and ways of field-testing their validity. Then they close with some general observations on the potential for the Farming Systems Research approach for Nigeria. This book is sufficiently good that, were I to review it at greater length and seek to

pick a few nits, I would be hard put to identify relevant topics that were not covered and done well. The authors are exemplary of the process they advocate, and their book cannot be recommended too highly.

Agribusiness in Africa is a work of many strengths and weaknesses. Its greatest strength is on its carefully assembled and organized data on the major agribusiness firms operating in Africa. Even those who differ radically with Dinham and Hines' analysis will find these compendiums of information fascinating and informative. That many large-scale agricultural schemes have failed in Africa is well known. Many colonial schemes and those of independent Africa did likewise, and agribusiness schemes have not generally been a huge success. The authors raise some important questions that have been asked for Africa and for the rest of the Third World. Does favoring of export agriculture, be it small farmer, government, or agribusiness, crowd out food production to the detriment of the poorer population? Worldwide, as we have noted, per capita food production is rising, so that an aggregate deleterious impact would be difficult to defend through specific policies and cases. In Africa, however, with its falling per capita food production, any shift from food to production of coffee, sugar, or flour for export would likely hurt the poor. Of course, the case has to be made that one crowded out the other. On these issues, **Agribusiness in Africa** is one of the best documented and argued presentations I have seen.

Having given the authors the credit that is due, one still finds important questions that are not only unanswered, they are also in substance not asked. Do countries need foreign exchange to buy vital imports? If so, what else do they have to export? More important, if we want to refer to Africa's agricultural failure, we can add those attempts at self-reliant autonomous development. If three decades or more of development have shown anything, it is that peoples who open out to the rest of the world obtain the most rapid economic advancement and fastest reduction of poverty. Autarkic village development always seemed to this reviewer as a self-imposed form of apartheid. This assertion may seem strong, but many well-intentioned advocates of village-oriented development have described village educational and technological needs in language remarkably similar to the syrupy utterances of the early apostles of apartheid.

If the thesis of this review is correct, that Africa needs more of the very best in scientific research and technology focused on their unique agricultural problems, then calls for village development may be only one small part of what is necessary for agricultural transformation in Africa. For we can have radical or conservative critiques and charges of failures leveled at various schemes and policies, but we are still left with the fundamental need to find a way to make available to the villager better crops and agricultural and livestock practices, fertilizers and disease control for plants and animals, and a whole host of other goods and services that the economist calls agricultural inputs. Further, we need institutional structures to provide credit and extension assistance equitably. Dependency will not work, and neither will the isolation of village autonomy. Unfortunately, writing on Africa, it is easier to criticize someone else's approach than to devise a successful one. In defining the agricultural research agenda for Africa, it is important to add research in new effective means of making the fruits of research accessible to those most in need of them.

Class and State in Tanzanian Development

Colin Darch

Andrew Coulson, TANZANIA: A Political Economy. (New York: Oxford University Press; Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1982), 394 pp.; paperback $6.95.

Coulson's book is a major contribution to the already extensive literature on Tanzania, and should be welcomed as such. It is an important work of synthesis, and makes available in a single volume a coherently argued radical view of the political economy of modern Tanzania, which will serve as a counterbalance to such accounts as Pratt's.[1] As a possible text-book for use in university classes its many virtues include an extensive 21-page bibliography, 56 statistical tables by my count, and five maps. The work is clearly written and is organized on an essentially chronological schema in twenty-six shortish chapters with five sub-chapters (misleadingly called "appendices") inserted at appropriate points.

Andrew Coulson writes of his work that "for those who know little about the country, it will serve as an introduction, combining a historical outline, statistical information, and advice on where to read more" (p. 5). For such readers, certainly, the book can be counted a success, for it is informative, clearly written, and well documented, with several maps and with the extensive bibliography supplemented by a critical chapter on "Further Reading," organized around the themes dealt with in the preceding chapters. Thanks to a full index, the book can be used as a handy single-volume reference source on modern Tanzania.

Tanzania is among the most intensively studied countries in Africa, both by foreign scholars and by Tanzanians themselves. The results of this activity, whether in fully published format, or as mimeographed reports or papers, constitute a body of literature impressive in its quantity, if not, perhaps, always in its quality. For "Tanzanian studies" are African studies writ small: in general, a subject area as yet underdeveloped, unsophisticated, immature. The underdevelopment reveals itself in the way, for example, that African academic structures copy the institutional framework of metropolitan universities and colleges; the lack of sophistication in the shortage of creative inter-disciplinary and interregional contact; and the immaturity in the way in which debates around historical and social science questions often collapse into counter-assertion and ad hominem polemics.

In this context, the publication of major works of synthesis is warmly to be welcomed as a sign of growing confidence — and competence — in the social sciences in African countries. For Tanganyika we have John Iliffe's impressive history of the mainland up to independence,[2] and now Andrew Coulson has published a comprehensive political economy, following a volume of readings on contemporary politics.[3]

1. Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

2. John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

3. Andrew Coulson (ed.), African Socialism in Practice (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1979).

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The book is ostensibly organized around what Coulson calls a "convenient" periodization of five main epochs, borrowed from J. Forbes Munro.[4] In outline, this consists of the pre-capitalist period (pre-1500); mercantile capitalism (1500-1800); early industrial capitalism (1800-1870); maturing industrial capitalism (1870-1945); and a "gradually more integrated" world economy from 1945 onwards. In practice, of course, Coulson's chapters on the pre-colonial period constitute only a brief introductory section of some twenty-odd pages, before we arrive at the colonial conquest, in the period of "maturing industrial capitalism." The book then maintains a straightforward chronological schema, progressing from sections on the colonial system through the nationalist take-over and the fruits of independence to the final and gloomily titled chapter, "Harsh Realities." Each of these general parts is divided into several short chapters and appendices, the latter consisting of thematic treatments of such topics as the TAZARA Railway or the Rovuma Development Association. Much of this material will be familiar to readers of Coulson's earlier articles on the Tanzanian economy and on agriculture and industry.

What, then, of Coulson's problematization of all this information? In a key chapter on the Tanzanian state he writes that he has "avoided describig the country as socialist or non-socialist, or using the terms 'class' or 'the state' in any rigorous way" (p. 317). He follows this admission with a discussion of the class structure of contemporary Tanzania, in an attempt "to identify classes which do *not* control the state (emphasis in the original)" (p. 318). In this way he eliminates a capitalist bourgeoisie, the workers and peasants (including kulaks), and the petty bourgeoisie in the classic sense of the small traders, clerks and teachers. The petty bourgeoisie in the sense of the civil servants and party functionaries present, according to Coulson, a different kind of problem: that is, of its location in the process of production, its relationship to the means of production, and its means of reproducing itself. Coulson is clearly unhappy with Shivji's famous formulation of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie,"[5] and does not, in the end, take a defined position on this question. Yet we do not necessarily have to accept the idea of the bureaucratic ruling stratum as a fully fledged class to be able to use it as an analytical category. The process of the consolidation of power by such a stratum has been described in a powerful passage by Paul Sweezy, which is directly relevant to this problem. Sweezy identifies general political demobilization, increasing adherence to a centralized power structure, and greater reliance on market relations to solve economic problems as three of the main characteristics of this phase, but points out that "[t]he logical end of this process...has nowhere yet been reached (and of course may never be reached)..."[6] It seems to me that this intermediate position, focusing on the process, provides a much more useful starting point for concrete analysis than a debate around the actual position of such a bourgeoisie.

Coulson admits, in the middle of his discussion of this question, that "the concept of 'class' used so far has been sociological (or descriptive) and largely static: it has related classes to the existing economic structure but not to the accumulation of capital" (p. 324). this seems to imply that a new concept of class

4. J. Forbes Munro, Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960 (London: Dent, 1976).

5. Issa J. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1975).

6. Paul M. Sweezy, "A Reply," in: Paul M. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On the Transition to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 29-30.

will now be introduced, but when he then examines the accumulation process in Tanzania, Coulson simply asserts that

> "the Tanzanian ruling class ... was not a class of accumulators; it had little experience of industrial production and marketing; it had no experience of large-scale agriculture, and little faith in small-scale agriculture ... " (p. 326).

He characterizes the Tanzanian leadership as authoritarian and the ruling class as "almost uniquely unsuited to bring about economic transformation" (p. 327). He argues that its *unplanned* allocation of resources, often to unproductive projects, prevented the development of a strong local industry and agriculture which might have served to improve living standards generally. This is all true as far as it goes, but it seems to me that it remains an analysis firmly rooted in the same descriptive concept of class which Coulson has explicitly rejected in the brief autocritique quoted above.

Why did the ruling "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" accept and even support the Arusha Declaration, with the subsequent salary cuts, tax increases, and limitations on the right to own shares or houses, or to be involved in business activities? Coulson follows von Freyhold' in arguing that it was "because they were persuaded that it was in their broader class interest" (pp. 330) to do so.

The book is most convincing when dealing specifically with the effects of policy on the economy. Thus Coulson's chapter on agricultural policy from 1961 to 1967 (pp. 145-167) is a veritable chronicle of disaster. The chapters and appendices on the Rovuma Development Association, the State Trading Corporation, and on Ujamaa and villagization are succinct and useful. Coulson's brief and anecdotal treatment of the political role of the University of Dar es Salaam (pp. 224-230) is disappointing, however, and the ambiguity of its position as an elite institution also acting as a center for leftist critiques of government policy is never really confronted. Unfortunately, social services in general (health, education, housing, cultural questions) are only treated in a cursory fashion in a general chapter on social class and social services. This is a pity, since an analysis of the ideological role of culture and education in the reproduction of the ruling classes is of the first importance.

Coulson draws on nine years experience in Tanzania, both in the civil service and in the university, to enrich his account with specific examples. His basic line of argument is that the so-called "transformation approach" and other similar policies which were tried, were an effort doomed from the start: this pessimism permeates the whole book. His knowledge of the secondary literature is impressive, and he deploys statistics to good effect. The book is under-theorized; it is a narrative account of the Tanzanian economy, but as we have seen, it sidesteps some of the central problems of socialist transformation. Despite these criticisms, all students of contemporary Tanzania are certainly indebted to Coulson for this work, which must find a place on the shelves of anyone with more than a touristic interest in East African affairs, or in practical questions of development policy.

7. Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-colonial State and its Tanzanian Version," **Review of African Political Economy**, no. 8 (1977), pp. 75-89.

Africa Rights Monitor

African Refugees: Patterns and Policy

Trends

The last three decades have seen a staggering increase in the number of refugees in Africa. This trend is highlighted by the fact that the total number of African refugees, now estimated to be as high as five million,[1] is even greater than the population of many African nations, and Africa is the source of nearly half of the world's refugee population.[2]

The problem of African refugees is a problem of human rights development. Refugees are reflective of the denial of basic freedoms: physical safety of people; freedom from persecution; or economic security and emancipation. Invariably, as Ray notes, "Behind the flight of people is the spectre of injustice and strife, of racial persecution or civil war—all violations of human rights."[3] Refugees are symptomatic of a sorry state of affairs; so long as human rights violations persist, refugees are going to be more than merely a transitional category in international demographic statistics.

A number of distinct patterns characterize the refugee flow in Africa. Rogge shows that:

- the burden of refugees has usually fallen on a handful of countries.
- West Africa's role in both creating and receiving refugees has been relatively dormant, compared to most central, southern, and eastern Africa (Zaire, Tanzania, Sudan and Uganda have been significant asylum countries).
- the concentration of refugees in relatively few countries has put enormous strain on existing infrastructures.
- the major problems associated with the refugee influx include land scarcity, food shortages, and increased unemployment.
- the overwhelming majority of Africa's refugees are rural to rural migrants.[4]

1. Vanita Ray, "African Refugees: An Analysis," **India Quarterly** XL. 2 (April-June 1984): 185.

2. Gaim Kibreab, **African Refugees** (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1985): 5.

3. *Op. cit.* For an analysis of the causes of refugees in Africa, see Ray, *op. cit.* and Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa," **Africa Today** 29, 2 (1982): 5-30.

4. John R. Rogge, "Africa's Resettlement Strategies," **International Migration Review** 15, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1981): 195-212.

This ARM report was prepared by Mustapha K. Pasha and Joan O'Brien.
Acknowledgement: We are very grateful to the U.S. Committee for Refugees for providing us some vital information in the preparation of this report.

The map shows the principal source and asylum countries in Africa who are in need of international protection and/or assistance.[5] Ethiopia (1,286,500) heads the list of source countries, followed by Angola (358,000), and Uganda (282,100). On the other hand, the chief asylum countries are the Sudan (1,094,000), followed by Somalia (550,000), Zaire (328,000) and Tanzania (179,000).[6] Africans who have been "internally displaced" as a result of civil war, persecution or natural calamity are listed in Table 1.

African Refugees: Major Asylum and Source Countries

Figures for *Source Countries* in *italics* above country name.

Figures for Asylum Countries in light face below country name.

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees. **World Refugee Survey: 1985 in Review,** Virginia L. Hamilton, ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1986).

5. Unfortunately, these figures tend to understate the extent of the refugee dilemma. Large numbers of economic migrants escape the criteria adopted by international refugee relief agencies for classifying the refugee population. The real numbers are, therefore, likely to be much higher than reported here.

6. Sources for these figures vary significantly in numbers reported. For details, see U.S. Committee for Refugees, **World Refugee Survey: 1985 in Review.** Virginia L. Hamilton, ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1986).

Table 1. Internally Displaced

Angola	500,000
Chad	150,000-500,000
Ethiopia	700,000-1,500,000++
Mozambique	700,000-1,800,000
South Africa	3,500,000+
Uganda	500,000

++Includes approximately 600,000 moved in Ethiopian government resettlement program

+Blacks, "colored," and Asians forcibly relocated since 1961.

Note: People are displaced internally within their homelands as a result of civil strife, persecution, or drought and other natural disasters. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross international borders, they are generally not eligible for international refugee assistance (though, often, distribution of aid to the displaced uses the same or similar channels). No agency has the capacity or responsibility for keeping track of all displaced people. Therefore, Table 1 presents reported estimates or ranges. Because the figures are not comprehensive, no total is provided.

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, **World Refugee Survey: 1985 in Review.** Virginia L. Hamilton, ed. Washington, D.C.: 1986. p. 38.

International Protection

In theory, African refugees have enjoyed adequate international protection. In practice, however, protection is often inadequate. According to Nanda:

> The applicable legal instruments include the 1951 Statute of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR Statute), the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention), the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1967 Protocol), the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa, and the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.[7]

One of the basic rights of refugees is encapsulated in the principle of *non-refoulement*. This principle holds that a refugee will not be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to a country where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.[8] There is also general agreement in the international community that a refugee can return to his/her country only *voluntarily*, or if s/he no longer remains a refugee.[9]

The problem with the existing international legal framework is that it fails to address the scope of the refugee dilemma. Protection under international law often springs from a narrower conception of human rights.

7. Ved P. Nanda, "The African Refugee Dilemma: A Challenge for International Law and Policy." **Africa Today** (Special Double Issue—The State and Human Rights in Africa: Dialogue and Continuing Research), 32, 1 & 2 (1985): 64.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

Refugees become visible only if they meet the criteria laid out in mostly western-dominated norms and practices. These criteria are usually blind to either the causes or the situation of refugees. For instance, most refugees in Africa are products of an economic breakdown wrought by civil war, regional conflict or famine, not ideological preference. And a substantial refugee population on the continent is the result of the effects of unequal relations between Africa and the West. It is the political economy of Africa and its place in the world system that largely accounts for the continent's faltering economy which has contributed toward the refugee dilemma. Yet, international law deals with the refugee problem primarily in terms of its manifestations, not underlying causes.

Traditionally, refugee protection in Africa has enjoyed a more spirited existence. To date, 44 African states have acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Thirty-one African states have ratified the 1969 OAU Convention governing the treatment of refugees, although by January 1985, only 15 African countries had ratified the 1981 African Charter.[10] Only eight states out of 51 on the continent have so far not acceded to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol and more than half of the African states have acceded to the OAU Convention.

In the face of the refugee influx, African nations have shown flexibility and extended hospitality to the homeless. This attitude is well reflected in the enlarged definition of a "refugee," adopted at the 1969 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government:

> Every person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his (her) country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his (her) place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[11]

Additionally, the OAU Convention contains important provisions on asylum, *non-refoulement,* security, non-discrimination, voluntary repatriation and travel documents. Sentiment has also been voiced that African states should refrain from entering into mutual agreements that permit the forcible return of refugees to their home country.

Despite the acknowledgement of refugee rights and legal provisions for their protection, the gap between rhetoric and reality has been widening, especially in the 1980s. Refugees have not only faced expulsion, but threats

10. Olusola Ojo and Amadu Sessay, "The O.A.U. and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond." **Human Rights Quarterly,** 8, 1 (February 1986): 96.

11. Art. I (2) of the Convention.

to their physical safety. A number of recent examples illustrate this disturbing development:

- In 1982 Djibouti forcibly repatriated a number of refugees back to Ethiopia.
- Throughout 1983 and 1984 Zambia intermittently repatriated refugees from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Malawi with force.
- Nigeria expelled several thousand Ghanians in 1983 as well as in 1985.
- In 1982 Uganda sanctioned military attacks on Rwandan refugees who had been resettled over 20 years in Uganda.
- Despite Tanzania's otherwise exemplary treatment of refugees over two decades, in late 1983 Tanzanian and Kenyan officials arrested and exchanged "dissidents," including a number of documented refugees.
- In February 1984 Tanzania and Uganda agreed that 10,000 ethnic Rwandans expelled from Uganda in December 1983 would be repatriated even if force were necessary.[12]

Although, this development is somewhat mitigated by the existence of voluntary repatriations, the growing xenophobic attitude among many African states makes involuntary, forced expulsions a more likely future trend. Mounting economic pressures and political instability in countries with sizeable refugee populations are easily explicable through scapegoating these "alien" elements. Refugees can then become prey in a cynical political game.

US Policy

US refugee policy concerning the Third World, but particularly Africa, has been remarkably deficient, dictated more by ideological and political compulsions than consistent moral or legal standards. Refugees from Eastern bloc countries and those from "adversary" countries have been given much more favorable treatment by US authorities than those homeless from Third World nations.[13] Despite the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which established a non-ideological basis for evaluating refugee status, actual policy has been grossly insensitive to parts of the Third World, including Africa. Helton notes:

> Although the United States agreed to admit up to 70,000 refugees in 1985—above and beyond the normal immigration ceiling of 270,000—only 3,000 of these refugees could come from Latin America, 5,000 from the Middle East, and 3,000 from Africa. The remaining 59,000 were reserved for individuals from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Indochina.[14]

12. See Roger Winter, "Refugee Protection in Africa: Current Trends," (United States Committee for Refugees Issue Brief). A paper presented at The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy Conference on U.S. Policy Toward Africa, September 19, 1984.

13. Arthur C. Helton, "The Refugee Act's Unfulfilled Asylum Promise," in **World Refuge Survey,** op. cit., pp. 5-8. For a discussion of related issues, see **U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues.** Mary M. Kritz, ed. (Lexington, Mass.: 1983).

14. Helton, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

Peter Koehn sees three basic problems with US Immigration Law, which are also relevant to the African case:

- shortsighted foreign policy objectives are the principal considerations which govern the application of US immigration law.
- applicants for refugee status and political asylum with similar backgrounds and experience are treated differentially in terms of the standards of evidence needed to establish well-founded fear of political persecution.
- foreign involvement is directly and indirectly responsible for the creation of refugees and other migrants, and for the new immigration to the US. Nevertheless, foreign policy continues to be made and executed with virtually no regard for its migration and immigration ramifications.[15]

Table 2 shows that Africa as a whole does not rank high in terms of the number of refugee immigrants admitted to the US as Permanent Residents. Only South America ranks lower than Africa among the different continents.

Table 2 Immigrants Admitted as Permanent Residents Under Refugee Acts, By Continent of Birth: 1961 to 1984

Region of Birth	1961-1970, total	1971-1980, total	1981-1983, total	1984
Total	**212,843**	**539,447**	**372,361**	**102,685**
Europe	55,235	71,858	41,943	10,226
Asia	19,895	210,683	309,831	85,298
North America	132,068	252,629	13,902	4,547
South America	123	1,244	645	156
Africa	5,486	2,991	6,022	2,456
Other	36	42	18	2

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, **Statistical Yearbook**, annual; and releases

A number of measures can improve US refugee policy, making it more consistent with an equitable and humanitarian application of US immigration law. Koehn proposes three reform measures, which can have a profound effect on refugees from Africa as well:

- the enactment of a *liberal amnesty measure* which would serve to redress past discrimination against legitimate refugees who first sought asylum in this country—both those who had their application rejected due to foreign policy considerations or inability to document individualized persecution and those potential petitioners who elected to become illegal immigrants rather than make themselves vulnerable for deportation by applying for political asylum.
- the creation of (and granting of *additional* numbers to) a new category of "emergency admissions" to provide for persons who fit the sociological definition of a refugee, but have fled from a regime this country supports or does not wish to embarrass for foreign policy reasons, as well as for victims of generalized violence and insecure conditions.

15. Peter Koehn, "Selected Political Issues and Problems in U.S. Immigration Law." A paper presented at Refugees: Close the Door? Response to Global Challenge Conference, Denver University College of Law, 5 April, 1986.

- to remove political asylum decisions from State Department/INS jurisdiction and the *establishment of an independent Immigration Advisory Council* staffed by expert admissions officers, with responsibility for making initial asylum determinations.[16]

One area of U.S. immigration policy which shows potential for improvement is EVD (extended voluntary departure) status. This is an extraordinary administrative remedy and is typically applied to a group of people who have fled a particular event in a country. EVD works in the following manner: The State Department, in consultation with the attorney general, can designate individual countries that threaten to deny human rights or where human rights conflicts exist as places of origin for EVD status. Currently, refugees from four countries qualify—Poland, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. As a temporary form of relief, EVD does not permit any formal standards or formal means for petitioning.[17] This may be a defect in the EVD alternative to political asylum, but many Africans can at least be given protection under this informal scheme.

Needless to say, U.S. immigration policy toward the Third World needs major overhauling, since it is fraught with an outmoded Cold War bias. On humanitarian grounds, no distinction ought to exist among refugees from different parts of the world.

Solutions

No easy solutions are available to deal with the refugee problem in Africa. Usually, three major options have been available to the asylum country: (1) repatriation; (2) spontaneous settlement; and (3) rural settlement schemes. Each of these options has serious defects. Unless repatriation is *voluntary* its viability is questionable. Spontaneous settlement (which now covers approximately 60% of Africa's refugee population) is often the product of government ineffectiveness and takes place without rational planning. Rural settlement schemes require realistic planning, availability of suitable land, adequate water supplies, sufficient capital, organizational and administrative skills, and a sympathetic settler population which will cooperate in the settlement venture. Often, these conditions have been missing.

There are at least three levels at which the refugee problem must be tackled. International relief organizations recommend that:

- at a *national* level, there is a need to promote and coordinate policies and legislation to define and guarantee the rights of the individual and the community, of the refugees and displaced persons.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Peter Korn, "Hiding in the Pen," **Student Lawyer** 65 (January 1986): 25-31.

- at a *regional* level, there should be promotion of voluntary repatriation and establishment of an appropriate mechanism for the dissemination of humanitarian law.
- at the *international* level, persistent efforts are necessary to relieve the burden of large refugee flows on the economies of asylum countries. There should be concerted action for the identification, preparation and implementation of projects to benefit refugees and displaced persons.[18]

Clearly, the refugee problem cannot be addressed, let alone solved, in isolation from generalized human rights development in Africa as elsewhere. Built-in injustices in the international system and Africa's continued marginalization are deeper causes that have created the general conditions for the refugee influx. However, it is equally important not to see this problem solely at that level. African States, despite their weaker status relative to the international system, must find regional and national solutions. Human rights violations should not be condoned on any account. And in cases where they do occur, borders should not be closed to the unfortunate victims. For the economic refugees only a pan-African response can be durable and effective. The spirit of the African Charter should be sustained through less rhetorical appeal and more concrete measures. In the final analysis, African nations should see the refugee problem as their own.

The international community must recognize that assistance alone is not enough to address the refugee dilemma in Africa. Deeper causes, especially located in the workings of the world economy, must be tackled. As long as Africa's development possibilities remain restricted, the refugee problem will grow, not lessen. Nevertheless, emergency assistance to those in distress must be increased since their plight is both real and urgent. Only if the problem is dealt with at both long-and short-term levels, can refugees in Africa find themselves in more fortunate circumstances.

18. Based on UNHCR recommendations for Africa.

Publications

1. AFRICAN DEBT AND FINANCING, edited by Carol Lancaster and John Williamson (231 pp., $12), reports on a conference held in February 1986 that explored the African aspects of the global debt crisis. This publication is available from the Institute for International Economics, 11 Dupont Circle NW, Washington DC 20036.

2. A related publication on the debt crisis is FROM DEBT TO DEVELOPMENT: **Alternatives to the International Debt Crisis** by *The Debt Crisis Network*. This 69-page study uncovers the connections between bankers, government officials, and Third World elites, and proposes alternative policies and a plan of action for durable and just solutions to the twin crises of debt and development. To order write: Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street NW, Washington DC 20009 or call (20[illegible] 234-9382. Price: $3.95.

3. Written by Africans, expatriates and *World Vision International* executives who have had first-hand information on Africa's famine and drought problems, A SEASON FOR HOPE provides up-to-date, broad-based summaries and close-up vignettes of the situation on that continent. This 128-page book is available for $4.00 with prepaid orders ($5.95 list) from: MARC, 919 W. Huntington Drive, Monrovia, CA 91016. California residents add 6½% sales tax.

4. ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT by Jiri Texler is No. 120 in the *Studies on Developing Countries* series produced by the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This 48-page pamphlet can be purchased by order through Kultura, H-1389 Budapest, P.O. Box 149, Hungary.

5. Started in 1984, REFUGEE ISSUES, a quarterly series of working papers, is published by the British Refugee Council and the Refugee Studies Programme of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford. This series is an attempt to further the study of problems affecting refugees and the agencies which work with them. To subscribe, write: Refugee Issues, Information Section, British Refugee Council, Broadway House, 3/9 Bondway, London SW8 1SJ, UK. Cost £8.00.

6. MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA is the report of the *Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group* appointed under the Nassau Accord on Southern Africa to promote a process of dialogue for change, for ending apartheid and establishing a genuine, non-racial democracy in South Africa. The Group worked against a background of mounting turmoil within the country and increased calls for sanctions by the international community. The timescale for their mission was six months from 1 January 1986. This 176-page report is published by Penguin Books. Price $5.95.

7. A special issue on SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR has been published by *Labour, Capital and Society* as the journal's Volume 8, No. 2 (November 1985). Contributions by some eminent Africanists focus on various aspects of labor in the apartheid system, including articles on working class hegemony, Black trade unions, and migrant labor. To order write: Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 3715 Peel Street, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1X1.

8. SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A BIRTHRIGHT by Mary Benson is a classic account of the African National Congress from its beginnings in 1912 up until 1965. By blending the stories of the leading figures in the ANC the author has produced a unique document of social, historical and political significance, which in the light of the intensified struggle for South African liberation, is of as much interest and importance today as when it was first published. This 314-page reprint by IDAF, with a new preface by the author, takes the place of the original edition published by the Penguin African Library in 1966. Price: £4.00.

9. The *Africa Fund* (associated with the *American Committee on Africa)* announces the SUN CITY EDUCATION PROJECT, an innovative anti-apartheid curriculum package containing valuable and stimulating educational tools. The package includes the record, featuring over 50 internationally known artists from across the spectrum of popular music, the video, now on cassette with a documentary explaining the motivation of the artists involved in the project, and a paperback book, detailing the history of the project and providing a wealth of factual information about apartheid. A teaching guide shows how to use these materials in the classroom or for discussion. For details write: The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038 or call (212) 962-1210.

10. ZIMBABWE: REPORT ON THE 1985 GENERAL ELECTIONS is the title of a recent report on the first national elections in Zimbabwe based on a mission of the *Election Observer Project* of the *International Human Rights Law Group*. The report includes three separate perspectives on the Zimbabwean elections, written by each member of the observer delegation. The essays include: an analysis of the technical and legal aspects of the electoral process; consideration of the electoral condition from a human rights perspective; and an analysis of the elections in historical context.

The International Human Rights Law Group is a Washington-based public interest organization devoted to the promotion of human rights. Copies of the report are available for $7.00 from: International Human Rights Law Group, 733 Fifteenth Street, Suite 1000, Washington DC 20005.

Books Received

Starred (*) titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers

Political Science

CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM: **The Frontline States in The Liberation of Zimbabwe.** Carol B. Thompson. (Westview Press, 1986) 322 pp. Paper, $29.50.

THE MILITARIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS. Kenneth W. Grundy. (Indiana University Press, 1986) 133 pp. Paper, $18.95.

NAMIBIA: **The Violent Heritage.** David Soggot. (St. Martin's Press, 1986) 332 pp. Cloth, $39.95.

PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: **The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy.** Lawrence Farley. (Westview Press, 1986) 179 pp. Paper, $22.50.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: **Regional Security and Self-Interest.** Robert I. Rotberg, Henry Bienen, Robert Legvold and Garvin G. Maasdorp. (D.C. Heath & Co., 1986) 174 pp. Cloth, $20.00.

SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT APARTHEID: **Dismantling Racial Dominatin.** Heribert Adams and Kogila Moodley. (University of California Press, 1986) 315 pp. Paper, $18.50.

A STATE IN DISARRAY: **Conditions of Chad's Survival.** Michael P. Kelley. (Westview Press, 1986) 222 pp. Paper, $28.50.

History

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA. Robert Shenton. (University of Toronto Press, 1986) 169 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.50.

THE DIPLOMACY OF PREJUDICE: **Liberia In International Politics, 1945-70.** H. Boima Fahnbulleh. (Vantage Press, 1986) 234 pp. Cloth, $12.95.
A HISTORY OF AFRICA. Hosea Jaffe. (Zed Press Ltd., 1986) 172 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $9.95.

THE HISTORY OF EGYPT (Third Edition) P. J. Vatikiotis. (The John Hopkins University Press, 1986) 546 pp. Hardcover, $23.50; paper, $14.95.

Economics and Development

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. Allan Low. (Heinemann Education Books, Inc., 1986) 217 pp. Cloth, $35.00.

AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD MODELS: **Extension, Application and Policy.** Inderjit Singh, Lyn Squire and John Strauss. (John Hopkins University Press, 1986) 335 pp. Cloth, $34.50.

THE CHALLENGE FOR TANZANIA'S ECONOMY. George Kahama, C. Maliyamkono and S. Wells. (Heinemann Education Books, Inc., 1986) 384 pp. Cloth, $40.00.

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED. John P. Lewis and Valerian Kallab. (Transaction Books, 1986) 224 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $12.95.

LAW, STATE AND THE WORKING CLASS IN TANZANIA. Issa G. Shivji, (Heinemann Education Books, Inc., 1986) 286 pp. Paper, $27.50.

Literature/Miscellaneous

AFRICA INDEX TO CONTINENTAL PERIODICAL LITERATURE. Colin Darch and Nkhoma Wamunza, eds. (Hans Zell Publishers, 1986) 215 pp. Cloth, $40.00.

LETTERS FROM THE WHITE SOUTH. Sidney Trentbridge. (Ohio University Press, 1984) 189 pp. Paper, $12.95.

MGAMBIKA: STUDIES OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN LITERATURE. Carole Boyce Davies and Anne Adams Graves, eds. (Africa World Press, 1986) 298 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $11.95.

O EARTH, WAIT FOR ME. Frank Chipasula. (Ohio University Press, 1986) 84 pp. Paper, $9.96.

TO KILL A MAN'S PRIDE. And Other Stories From Southern Africa. Norman Hodge, ed. (Ohio University Press, 1986) 266 pp. Paper, $12.95.

TESTAMENTS OF THE BUSHMAN. Laurens Van Der Post and Jane Taylor. (Penguin Books 1986) 196 pp. Paper, $10.95.

A WEST AFRICAN TRADITION. An Analytical Study and Translation. John Williams Johnson (Indiana University Press, 1986) 242 pp. Cloth, $35.00.

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Coming Events

The *Ninth International Congress of [illegible] Studies* will be held in Moscow, USSR, August 26-29, 1986. Interest in participating must be communicated individually to: Prof. Andrei Gromyko, Director, Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, 30/1 Alexey Tolstoy Str., Moscow, K-1, 103001, USSR.

The International Symposium on Drought: Prediction, Detention, Impact Assessment, and Response will be held at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln on September 29-October 1, 1986. This symposium seeks to facilitate interchange of ideas between scientists and decision makers on the strengths and weaknesses of current drought prediction, monitoring, impact assessment, and response efforts; to identify the research needed for improvement in these areas; and to review the need for effective drought response plans in drought-prone nations of the world. For information write: Department of Conferences and Institutes, 205 Nebraska Center, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68583-0929.

A conference on "Hunger, Population and International Development" is to be held at California State University, Long Beach, October 15-17, 1986. The conference is being sponsored by the *Center for International Education* at CSU, Long Beach, the *Consortium for International Cooperation in Higher Education* (CICHE), the Southern California Consortium on International Studies (SOCCIS) and the Global Education Project for Southern California (GEPSCA). It will take place at the Ramada Renaissance Hotel in Long Beach, California. For more information, contact Denysia Watilo in the Center for International Education, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower, Long Beach, CA 90840. Phone (213) 494-8435.

The University of Nebraska at Omaha announces the *Ninth National Third World Studies Conference* to be held on October 16-18, 1986. The conference is concerned with: Western media and the Third World; Technology and Resources; Nationalism, Regionalism, and Internationalism; Violence, Terror and Human Rights; The World Economy, Nuclear Spread and the Third World; Food, Agriculture, and Appropriate Techology; Religion, Philosophy, and Ideology; Education and Teaching; and Third World Refugees. For more information write Third World Studies Conference, The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182.

This year, 1986, marks the 25th anniversary of the *University of Wisconsin African Studies Program*. The Anniversary events have been scheduled for Wednesday and Thursday, October 29 and 30, 1986, and have been planned to precede and coincide with the 1986 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, hosted in Madison. For more information write: The African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1454 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706 or call 608-262-2380.

The annual meeting of the *African Studies Association*, hosted, as indicated above, by the University of Wisconsin-Madison, will be held from Thursday, October 30 through Sunday, November 2, 1986 at the Concourse and Inn on the Park hotels (both located near the state capitol in downtown Madison). To preregister or to obtain additional information write: ASA, 255 Kinsey Hall, UCLA, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024 or call: (213) 206-8011.

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