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**South Africa, Namibia and
Human Rights
The Case for Strengthened Sanctions**

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
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Letter to the Editors

The Editors, Africa Today:

George Shepherd in an eloquent editorial in Africa Today 33/1 makes the case for "An Affirmative United States' African Policy" to be based in part on a series of papers prepared by academics. This outburst of good intentions is likely to founder because it ignores two key factors.

One, where is the organizing and lobbying to produce an effective national constituency in support of a change in U.S. policy? What is needed are not more academics writing policy papers but a sustained effort to network local, regional and national constituencies. There simply are not enough Americans who care about U.S.-African relations to support a major change in policy.

Second, any analysis of U.S.-African relations needs to be firmly anchored in U.S. national interests. It is not enough to propose what the U.S. should do for Africa. Good old-fashioned mutual self-interest needs to be clearly identified and explained to millions of people who are not specialists on Africa. Start with American interests in Africa and build a policy which can be sold to a broad and diverse American constituency. This is what happened during the debate on South African sanctions and it is the only way to bring about significant changes in U.S.-African relations.

Aaron Segal
2511 The Meadows
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Editor's Response

Our thanks to Aaron Segal for beginning the dialogue we hoped our initiation of a series of articles on U.S. policy toward Africa would provoke, despite his skepticism about its effectiveness. As this issue makes clear, we do not regard the sanctions debate as over, as his last sentence seems to imply, but only well underway.

The article by Richard Payne in this issue speaks to his first point concerning constituency-building, and points the way toward the expansion of that base. The other articles, especially Sanford Wright's, speak to the question of true U.S. self-interest in relation to this facet of U.S. Africa policy. We believe U.S. national interest has usually been defined much too narrowly, and our stake in the well-being of the rest of the world badly underestimated. It is our hope that this series will effectively join U.S. and African interests in developing a fully rounded policy for the many issues facing the continent.

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

Comprehensive International Sanctions Against South Africa: An Evaluation of Costs and Effectiveness

Sanford Wright

The purpose of this article is to establish the case for mandatory comprehensive sanctions against the present government of South Africa, and to demonstrate the importance of withdrawing international support for a system that both oppresses and disenfranchises the majority of its own people, systematically places children as well as adults in detention, and seeks to destabilize neighboring governments. Universally enforced mandatory sanctions are one very important means in the world campaign to eliminate apartheid. It is now clear that persuasion has failed. By vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling for limited but mandatory sanctions (February 1987) the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have again shown how bankrupt their moral exhortations for change have become.

A sanctions campaign against South Africa to be successful must be a part of a total strategy to achieve regime change. It should not be viewed merely as moral censure or economic pressure. Its objective must be a new alignment of political forces inside South Africa that brings to power a majority democratic government able to initiate social justice. This was the objective of the use of sanctions to end the white majority regime in Rhodesia, and to overthrow Idi Amin in Uganda. In their twisted ideas of liberation the right wing of the Reagan Administration accepts this approach towards Nicaragua and Afghanistan but not South Africa.

The South African regime's actions are an escalating breach of world peace. Military incursions against neighboring countries, continued colonization of Namibia and the rape of its wealth, the occupation of Angolan territory and support for UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique have internationalized apartheid. South Africa's destabilization efforts, though aimed at the Front Line States, affect Malawi and Zaire as well.

By destroying railways in Mozambique, RENAMO has cut Malawi's primary links with the sea. Since trains stopped running in the early 1980s, the growth of Malawi's economy, which was 6% a year in the 1970s, no longer is keeping pace with the population growth rate, which at 3.1

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percent a year is among the highest in the world.¹ Malawi's export-dependent economy cannot survive unless transportation links are restored.

Zaire, both because of its own ideologies and because of encouragement from the U.S. and possibly South Africa, must now be seen as an affected state. Angolans have long accused that country of providing a supply route for UNITA. With American aid, including Stinger missiles, UNITA is accused of setting up a second front in the north of Angola on the Zairian border. MPLA Director of information Paulino Pinto João has stated, "We feel that some local officials across the border have closed their eyes to UNITA activity."²

The call for sanctions is not new, but it has become intensified and expanded. It is heard in almost every international forum as well as in the national deliberations of many countries. Almost all of the Front Line States have given it support, although they are aware that they will bear some of the costs. The call is supported by black South African union leaders and black political leaders such as Winnie and Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Alan Boesak. That the majority of black South Africans support this call was confirmed in August 1985 when 77% of the respondents answered "right" to the question, "Do you think that other countries are right or wrong to impose economic sanctions on South Africa unless South Africa agrees to get rid of the apartheid system?" in a poll conducted by the Gallup-affiliated Marcinor agency.³

Those opposed to sanctions, including President Pieter Botha, President Ronald Reagan, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, are becoming increasingly isolated in the world. Members of their own constituencies in the West are abandoning them. For example, a state department panel has recently concluded that President Reagan should make it a high priority to persuade America's allies to impose sanctions comparable to those implemented last year by the United States.⁴

Apartheid is now broadly recognized as a flagrant violation of international law; consequently, the legal basis for sanctions has become well established.⁵ International legal experts have concluded that the Charter of the United Nations and the various resolutions and decisions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the

opinions and judgments of the International Court of Justice were of a higher order than trade treaties such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the BENELUX treaty.⁶ Members of the international community not only have the legal right but the moral duty to assist in the abolition of apartheid.

In recognition of the obligation the world community has begun to take action. The embargo on arms sales, though never airtight, has been enforced in one form or another by most countries since the '60s, and became mandatory in 1977. The OPEC embargo on oil sales, imposed in the '70s and accepted, at least nominally, by most western nations, has substantially increased South Africa's energy costs. Bans on nuclear collaboration, although often evaded, have also been observed by the U.S., The EEC and the Commonwealth countries since the '70s. More recently imposed bans by individual countries or groups of countries on the import of gold coins, iron and steel, coal, uranium and agricultural products are also in effect. Restrictions on sensitive equipment for the police and military have been in effect in some cases since the late '60s. Various restrictions on credit, including the United Kingdom ban on government to government bank loans and the recent U.S. prohibition of bank loans except for those that facilitate black upliftment, have also recently been imposed. Bans, comprehensive or voluntary, have also been imposed by the UK, Commonwealth, EEC, and the U.S. on new investment.⁷ Stronger measures have been taken by many other countries, especially in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, some of whom have total embargoes. Although these sanctions have definitely affected South Africa, their impact has been limited for the following major reasons:

- the sanctions have been piecemeal, limited in nature, and full of deliberate loopholes;
- the sanctions have not been enforced; and
- they have not been universally applied by the major countries that trade with South Africa.

In order to achieve a minimum degree of effectiveness, sanctions would need to be expanded within terms of coverage and universal participation, would have to be combined with additional international measures, including both economic and military assistance to the front line states, in order to discourage reprisals and destabilization measures by South Africa.

1. Elaine Harden, "Malawi Reconsiders Its Pact With the Devil," *Washington Post*, Dec. 29, 1985, p. A14.

2. Andrew Meldrum, "At War With South Africa," *Africa Report*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1987), p. 29.

3. *London Sunday Times*, 25 August 1985.

4. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, United States Department of State, January, 1987, p. 14.

5. See "Apartheid, South Africa and International Law," *Notes and Documents 13/85*; New York: United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 1985.

6. See "Legal Aspects of Unilateral Sanctions Against South Africa," *Notes and Documents 16/84*; New York, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 1984.

7. John D. Battersby, "Sanctions: A War of Attrition," *Africa Report*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1987), p. 5.

Apartheid is the basis of the structure of the South African economy. Therefore, its elimination will be a long, difficult, and confrontational process. For example, the legalized rural ghettos called Bantustans have taken decades to construct, and their dismantling and positive integration into a restructured South African economy is not even contemplated by the Botha regime. In addition, the near monopoly of asset ownership, skills, and education by white South Africans will ensure their privileged position in the foreseeable future, even if the government changes to a democratic system. Under the best circumstances, scenarios of income redistribution will not quickly alter the economic position of blacks as their population is large, growing very fast, and lags far behind the whites in its living standards.

The costs of sanctions can only be compared to a future under the status quo. This would include widening civil war, indefinite Bantustanization, and regional war against governments that are refusing to act as tributary states for South Africa. The human cost of domestic neo-slavery that is maintained by measures of managed fratricide is far greater than the loss of jobs in certain industries by blacks that the opponents of sanctions regard as central.

Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions

No one definition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions (CMS) is accepted by everyone; but there are several necessary characteristics. To be mandatory they must be established by the UN Security Council; to be comprehensive they must include embargoes on trade in all major commodities imported or exported by South Africa, the banning of loans and other forms of financial exchange, and restrictions on cultural and political contacts. As international enforcement mechanisms are precarious at best, and vetoes must be avoided to obtain Security Council action, it is probable that a flexible timetable for compliance will be adopted, making implementation gradual. As the noose is tightened around the target economy, the internal changes take place, and ultimately a new regime negotiates a settlement.

An analysis of comprehensive sanctions must examine the effects such sanctions will have upon the major components of the southern African system, which include South Africa, neighboring countries, and major Western countries with ties to South Africa. At best, such an analysis can only produce broad estimates. Moreover, as South Africa is in an escalating state of regional and civil war, the assumptions upon which any analysis is based are very tenuous.

Sanford Wright

The Effect on the South African Economy

Much of the world community has already severed its contact with the Republic, and a combination of economic conditions and political pressures have already imposed severe restrictions on South Africa's capital flow. In fact, the Investor Responsibility Research Center has reported that the capital net flow of American companies, as measured by loans to South African subsidiaries and increased investment, has declined from an inflow of \$71 million in 1981 to a net outflow of \$17 million in 1985.⁸ This trend will escalate significantly as additional sanctions are employed and the deteriorating South African economy and anti-apartheid pressures force additional multinational corporations to withdraw from the South African market.

The profitability of doing business in South Africa has become precarious, and the current mild economic upturn is totally misleading. Some of the rise in consumer spending can be attributed to \$20-35 million withheld in rent boycotts every month. High prices on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are due in part to the lack of alternative legal investments under new foreign exchange rules. In addition, the upturn in some economic indicators may reflect stockpiling in anticipation of additional sanctions. Assets being accumulated in the Reserve Bank are at the expense of foreign creditors.

The partial economic sanctions that have been applied to date by several countries have already made an impact on the nation's economy. For example, revenues derived from coal exports have been second only to gold, as coal exports earned \$1.5 billion in 1985.⁹ Coal was viewed as one of the best growth industries as production soared from 57 million tons in 1971 to 173 million tons in 1985; furthermore, coal was expected to surpass gold as the major export earner by 1990. However, embargoes on South African coal imposed last year by Denmark and France have cut projected exports for 1986 by 7.5 million metric tons or 17 percent.¹⁰ The United States has now banned these imports, and as the coal embargo becomes universal this industry will probably become one of the most depressed in the South African economy.

Already the counter measures that South Africa has taken against sanctions have severely distorted the economy; these measures include

8. Neil A. Lewis, "Circling the Wagons: South Africa and Sanctions," *New York Times*, July 21, 1986, p. 4.

9. Allister Sparks, "Limited Sanctions Take Their Toll on South African Economy," *Washington Post*, July 25, 1986, p. A27.

10. Allister Sparks, "Homeland Official Killed in South Africa," *Washington Post*, July 31, 1986, p. A27.

oil-stockpiling, the promotion of import substitution industries, a forced pace of development for strategic capital goods sectors, trade diversification, and military sector expansion. For example, in trying to reduce its dependence on imported oil, South Africa is spending \$1.3 billion on three plants that convert coal into liquid fuel. However, this fuel is five times more expensive than refining gasoline from petroleum at current oil prices.¹¹

Comprehensive trade sanctions would induce a very serious short-term crisis in the economy. Upper limits to import product substitutions would eventually come into play in the form of higher unit costs, inferior quality, excessive protection rates, and an increased degree of monopoly. For example, Anglo-American Corporation, the South African mining concern that is the nation's richest private company, has further expanded its economic dominance by purchasing a 22.5 percent share in the newly organized local bank that will replace Barclays. Two other firms in which Anglo has interest purchased another 32.5 percent.¹² This would happen precisely when dynamic long-term costs were mounting steadily and seriously. Import substitution and capital goods development tend to make intensive demands on available skills and imports. Both are likely to be in short supply under comprehensive sanctions; the former may be potentially jeopardized by rising emigration while the latter may be constrained by both reduced export earnings and difficulties in establishing supplier sources.

South Africa is most vulnerable in its agriculture and food sectors. It exports 85 percent of its agricultural resources, much of it to Europe. Last year ten European countries imported more than \$434 million in fruits and vegetables from South Africa, nearly half of which went to Britain.¹³ This sector is predominantly Afrikaner owned and managed and a ban on these imports will hit at the center of the Nationalist Party.

The Impact on South African Blacks

"The Blacks will pay," Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha stated in response to the Commonwealth's threat of sanctions.¹⁴ He was referring to blacks in neighboring countries as well as the black population of South Africa. This statement was intended to intimidate the governments of neighboring countries and internal black leaders. It was also intended to

reassure whites that their standards of living would be protected, primarily by passing the costs of sanctions on to the black community.

Certainly sanctions will have an effect on the unemployment rates. However, 4.5 million are already unemployed. John Battersby, apparently relying on figures from the Federated Chamber of Industries in South Africa, estimates that this figure will reach 7.8 million by the turn of the century even without sanctions, and could reach 9.8 million if sanctions are effectively imposed.¹⁵ Such projections are clearly highly contingent, and can be affected by many factors. The figures must be seen against the continuing population increase, and other mitigating factors may serve to modify the effect on black employment. They should also be read in relation to white unemployment and their impact on white-owned businesses.

In fact, white South Africa's ability to pass the cost of its distorted economy on to the blacks, may be approaching its peak, as further attempts to impoverish blacks will be met with increased rebellions in various forms. For example, in many areas the government can no longer compel blacks to pay rent, and tax collectors are no longer sent into the townships.¹⁶ Rather than being weakened, the black unions, only recently fully recognized, have in fact strengthened their position in gaining recognition for the voice of black workers. These unions are becoming more militant and combative, and are extending their grievances beyond the workplace to general attacks upon the system. Also, the vast majority of rural blacks are already living on the margin.

Furthermore, sanctions could be beneficial for many blacks. The government's likely response to curtailed imports will be to encourage substitute industries which could provide new jobs. Wishing to maintain a profit, employers could substitute black labor for more expensive white labor which would also serve as a hedge against the future.

Foreign investment has primarily been capital intensive, and foreign funds have been utilized by capital intensive industries. Withdrawal of investments will inevitably result in a shift to labor intensive import substitution, increasing the number of jobs for black labor, but raising the price to whites. This was the experience in Rhodesia, as Elizabeth Schmidt has noted.¹⁷

11. Steve Lohr, "South Africa's World Oil Pipeline Starts to Dry Up," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1986, p. 28.

12. Ned Temko, "South Africa Fears More Pullouts and Lost Jobs After Barclays Retreat," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 28, 1986, p. 19.

13. "Excerpts from Communique of Seven Commonwealth Chiefs," *New York Times*, August 6, 1986, p. 6.

14. Neil A. Lewis, "West Finds Some Common Ground on Sanctions," *New York Times*, August 6, 1986, p. A9.

15. Battersby, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

16. Pauline Baker, "Facing Up To Apartheid," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1986, No. 64, p. 45.

17. Elizabeth Schmidt, "Sanctions Worked in Rhodesia, White Businessmen Say," *ACAS Newsletter*, Michigan State University, East Lansing, No. 19, Fall 1986. See also Douglas Anglin, "UN Economic Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia," in David Leyton Brown, ed., *The Utility of International Sanctions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

Already white South Africans are feeling the effects of current sanctions and the counter-measures that have been taken against these sanctions. As additional measures are employed, whites will be affected more and more. For example, South African passengers to New York now must go by way of western Europe, and the cheapest round-trip ticket has risen 48 percent to 2,509 rand (\$1,129).¹⁸

Sanctions have contributed to the currency crisis, resulting in an inflation rate of more than 17 percent. This increase is having the most direct impact on high income whites who are finding it increasingly difficult to purchase imported luxury items. Moreover, the costs of these goods will rise much higher as foreign exchange is tightly rationed, import taxes are raised, sources of supply are diverted, and "sanctions busters" begin to charge what the market will bear.

Many whites have accepted this already and have begun to emigrate. In the first five months of 1986, 2,157 whites left South Africa; most were skilled professionals.¹⁹ Historically, South Africa has utilized immigration to bolster its system; however, immigrants can become emigrants. As a consequence of past high levels of immigration about 8 percent of South Africa's white population has a citizenship other than South African, and many more have automatic right to another citizenship by virtue of the fact that they or their parents were born abroad, or that they are married to a non-citizen.²⁰

The impact of comprehensive sanctions will fall most heavily on owners and managers in the agricultural and mining sectors, as Haider Kahn's analysis elsewhere in this issue demonstrates, and will also affect the demand for consumer goods used by the whites. While blacks will lose some skilled jobs the major impact will be on the groups and classes who have benefited in the past from the racial system. As William Minter concluded, "White business leaders are more willing than Pretoria's political leaders to admit the need for African political rights and to plan for survival in a post-apartheid era." But he also notes that they presently "... continue to support the arming of the South African State."²¹

The political result of these disruptions is anger, resentment, and resistance, resulting in the growth of a "laager" mentality in the short term. However, as the costs increase and counter measures prove ineffective, as

in Rhodesia, an increasingly powerful group of the whites will look for a means of settlement to save something rather than lose everything. This is what ruling groups have done after defeat in warfare, as the case of the Germans and Japanese after World War II demonstrated. They recognized their interest lay in restoring the growth and productivity patterns of the pre-warfare period by cooperating with the international capitalist system. The hard core Boer mentality in South Africa may resist such settlement for a time but the ruling financial and industrial class will increasingly seek a compromise with African nationalists.²²

The Cost to Neighboring Countries

Accurate estimates of South Africa's economic relations with neighboring countries are impossible to obtain. South Africa ceased to publish data regarding trade with individual countries in 1964, and other African countries are reluctant to publicize their links with the Republic. In addition, South Africa tends to manipulate statistics from the "independent" Bantustans when this is deemed politically advantageous. Foreign trade figures published by the Directorate of Customs and Excise are for the whole South African Customs Union Area; included with South Africa are Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and all of the "independent" Bantustans. National accounts data usually also include Namibia. Population data, on the other hand, usually include only "white" South Africa and the "non-independent" Bantustans.

Current Dependencies

Geography, history, and deliberate South African policies have made surrounding countries dependent upon South Africa for transportation, energy, food, trade, employment, and revenues.

Most neighboring countries depend upon South Africa for port facilities and road and rail links to them. Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa and, consequently, is 100 percent dependent upon the Republic for all road and rail links. An estimated 90 percent of Zimbabwe's trade and more than 50 percent of Zambia's trade depend upon South African trade routes and services.²³ Swaziland and Botswana, both of which are landlocked, also ship most of their goods through South Africa.

18. James Smith, "Screws Tighten on South Africa," *Tribune-Star* (Terre Haute, Ind.), November 20, 1986, p. 1.

19. Karen DeWitt, "Unrest Sends Whites on the Chicken Run," *USA Today*, August 15, 1986, p. 5A.

20. Pamela Freer, *South Africa to 1990: Growing To Survive*, Report No. 239, London: Economist Unit, 1986, p. 47.

21. William Minter, "Straight Talk on Sanctions," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1986-87, No. 65, pp. 43-63.

22. George W. Shepard, Jr., *The Trampled Grass: Tributary States and Self-Reliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood/Prager, 1967), p. 41.

23. Ned Temko, "Pretoria's Main Worry: Capital Flight," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 8, 1986, p. 9.

In addition, a number of citizens from neighboring countries work in South Africa, mostly in the mines. Estimates range from a low of 250,000 to the South African government's estimate of 1,500,000.²⁴ The figures provided by the South African government, however, would include workers from the "independent" homelands. The most reliable estimates center around 400,000.²⁵ The remittances from these workers still provide significant foreign exchange and income for some of South Africa's neighbors.

South Africa is a primary trading partner of several front line states. The South African controlled Southern African Customs Union allows free trade with South Africa for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, for whom it is the major trading partner. Agriculture and consumer goods are the major component of this trade. South Africa collects tariffs on goods imported by these countries and distributes a share to the members. According to South Africa, disbursements from the Customs Union made up 32 percent of Botswana's total revenues, 37 percent of Lesotho's, and 61 percent of Swaziland's.²⁶

Two independent neighbors, Lesotho and Swaziland, use South African currency, as a part of the Rand Monetary Area. The South African Reserve Bank acts as a central bank for all three countries. Both Lesotho and Swaziland hold most of their foreign reserves in the form of Rand balances invested in the South African money market.

Several neighboring countries are also highly dependent upon South Africa for their supply of electricity. The South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) has reported that it provides 100 percent of Lesotho's needs, 79 percent of Swaziland's, 50 percent of Botswana's, and 60 percent in Maputo, Mozambique.²⁷

Impact of Sanctions

South Africa has emphasized the above dependencies in its attempt to prevent additional international sanctions, and it has demonstrated its willingness to exploit these vulnerabilities. For example, in the early weeks of 1986 South Africa stopped the flow of commerce with Lesotho, consequently forcing a coup in that country in which the new leaders were much

more acquiescent to the Republic.²⁸ For several weeks in August 1986, the Republic delayed shipment of commerce to Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana at border posts.²⁹

A more in-depth analysis reveals that there are real limitations to South Africa's ability to exploit the Front Line States' vulnerabilities and that international sanctions could have positive as well as a negative impact on regional countries. For example, if neighboring states denied airspace to flights bound for South Africa, this could prove not only very difficult for the Republic but beneficial to their own airlines.

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has outlined several measures in cooperation with Commonwealth actions cited earlier that could counter South Africa's actions. These measures include seizing South Africa's assets and stopping payment on pensions to 40,000 white emigrants from Zimbabwe who now live in South Africa.³⁰

Furthermore, an international boycott of South African products would increase the demand for the same items produced in other parts of the region, most of which are competitors or potential competitors of South Africa. This would not only be true of mineral exports (e.g., diamonds, chromium, and coal) but agricultural exports as well. The markets for mineral and agricultural exports are oversupplied, which makes South Africa's exports particularly vulnerable. Canada has already set an example by announcing a boycott of South African sugar and simultaneously increasing its sugar imports from Swaziland.³¹ It would only be necessary for a small amount of South Africa's trade to be diverted to have a large impact on regional economies. A denial of landing rights to South African Airways, for instance, would increase passenger and cargo services in neighboring countries, increasing the business of, for example, the Royal Swazi Airline. Anticipated sanctions have already persuaded many factories to relocate in Swaziland. These industries would primarily be interested in a Swaziland "Certificate of Origin," which, under most international agreements, only requires that 25 to 30 percent of a manufactured product be completed in the certifying country. Such transfers would need to be watched closely to see that they did not become sanctions-busting. In addition, severance of trade with South Africa could stimulate

24. Robert Shury and Theodore Galdi, *Possible Impact on Neighboring States of Sanctions Against South Africa*, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, February 1986, p. 7.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

26. Department of Foreign Affairs, *South Africa: Malaise in Southern Africa*, Pretoria, 1985, p. 15.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

28. Patrick Laurence, "Water Helps Lesotho—Pretoria Ties Bud," *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 24, 1986, p. 10.

29. Tony Hawkins, "Pretoria Fires Warning Shots at Neighbors Over Sanctions," *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 8, 1986, p. 9.

30. Robert Mugabe, "Zimbabwe May Counter-Punch South Africa," *Tribune-Star* (Terre-Haute, Ind.), August 30, 1986, p. C2.

31. Andrea L. Woolard, "Funds With Social Themes: Investing Principal in Your Principles," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 14, 1986, p. 19.

many import substitution industries, including food production. Zimbabwe fairly easily and Zambia under optimum conditions could become food exporters.

Comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South Africa would force the regional states to reduce their transportation links with the Republic. The Beira corridor can provide part of the transportation access to the sea. Plans exist for restoration of the Tazara railroad that runs northeast from Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam and the opening of the Benguela rail line through Zaire and Angola. Given this development, with western aid, the front line states, with the exception of Lesotho, would be far less dependent upon South Africa. The latter development, of course, depends on the end of South African supported insurgency in Angola, which in turn implies turning Western support for the insurgency into active support of Angola's government.

The tourist industry is a major revenue earner for South Africa. As the ban on tourist travel becomes widespread, many tourists may decide to travel to some of the surrounding countries, providing them with the revenue and foreign exchange that would otherwise have gone to South Africa.

Comprehensive international sanctions would result in the dissolution of the South African Customs Union. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland would probably experience a short term loss of customs revenues, but this would be offset by the long term gains that would come from their development of import replacement industries. Dissolution of the Rand Monetary Area could have long range benefits for both Lesotho and Swaziland, as the continuing depreciation of the rand has made their imports more expensive and has eroded the value of their foreign reserves held in rand.

A summary of these ideas has been presented by Ann Seidman: In imposing economic sanctions, the international community could, moreover, simultaneously contribute to the conditions necessary to enable the new states of Southern Africa to create a new balanced and integrated regional economy, capable of achieving an industrial and agricultural transformation which would provide productive employment opportunities and rising living standards for all. Over time, this transformation would permit the peoples of the region to participate as full partners in a growing, mutually beneficial pattern of international trade with all the industrial nations of the world.³³

Estimates of the effects that sanctions would have on neighboring countries vary widely. A contingency planning team set up by the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) is now estimating that SADCC states stand to lose up to \$6.5 billion over a three-

year period if and when international sanctions are imposed. However, the study suggests that SADCC may be able to avert more than half of the estimated loss by increasing trade among its members and reducing the costs of transporting goods. Also, it forecasts that at the end of three years, South Africa's closest neighbors might achieve a net gain of up to \$1.5 billion by diverting trade and transport routes away from South Africa.³⁴

In addition, the \$6.5 billion loss needs to be put into perspective. Consultants to SADCC estimate that from 1975 to 1985, SADCC members closest to South Africa lost some \$25 billion and are now losing at least \$5 billion a year. The losses stem from SADCC-claimed trade losses, damage from South African military attacks, loss of tourism, and the need to increase military budgets.³⁵ Many industries have refused to locate in war-torn Angola and Mozambique, and these lost opportunities should be added to the totals.

The Cost to Western Countries

Estimates of the economic cost of sanctions to Western countries also vary widely; their impact would depend upon many unpredictable variables. The pattern of trade and investment means that a few key countries would experience the major impact, notably Britain and the United States.

It is reported that in 1985 Britain earned \$5.9 billion in trade, investment, and services in South Africa.³⁶ The value of direct British investment in South Africa, which stood at about \$8.5 billion until the recent collapse of the rand, according to the U.K.-South African Trade Association, is estimated now at about \$2.13 billion to \$2.83 billion.³⁷ The United Kingdom probably holds one-third of all foreign investment in South Africa, and this represents ten percent of the United Kingdom's direct foreign investment.

Estimates of the effects that sanctions would have on the British economy vary widely. A ban on British exports to South Africa would only represent a loss if alternate markets could not be found. South Africa's key exports to Western countries, especially Britain, are its minerals. Recent

33. Colin Legum, "Debate on South African Sanctions Broadens," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 15, 1986, p. 7.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

35. Alan Covell, "Pretoria Imposing Area Trade Limits on Black Nations," *New York Times*, August 5, 1986, p. 1.

36. Peter Truell and Roger Throwing, "Barclays Exit From South Africa Is Most Significant Disinvestment," *Wall Street Journal*, Midwestern Edition, November 25, 1986, p. 33.

32. Ann Seidman, *Sanctions As A Best Choice In Southern Africa*, (London: The African Bureau), 1981, p. 29.

research has demonstrated that a combination of substitution, alternate sources of supply, and the elimination of non-essential usage are alternatives to the import of most South African minerals.³⁷

After an extensive analysis of the effects that these sanctions would have on Britain, Charles Elliot concludes as follows: "The industrial adjustments required by the loss of the South African market was small, certainly less than those enforced by other exogenous variables such as changes in technology. The likely United Kingdom balance of payments loss on visible exports was thought unlikely to exceed £50 million and on invisibles, perhaps £450 million. The employment loss was thought to be 26,000 under extreme assumptions and 2,500 under more realistic assumptions."³⁸

Sanctions against South Africa would directly benefit many of the Western countries. Last year, the United States imported \$117 million in steel, \$99.6 million in iron, and \$43 million in coal, all from South Africa.³⁹ Britain imported these same products from South Africa. An import ban could help increase domestic production of these products in both Britain and the United States. A worldwide ban on these South African exports could boost U.S. and U.K. exports of these products, particularly coal. Canada has already benefited significantly from the ban on Krugerrands. The Canadian Maple Leaf won 65 percent of the world market for investment gold coins in 1985, compared to 28 percent in 1984, and their sales are rapidly increasing.⁴⁰ Australia will also benefit from its sale of gold coins to obtain a share of the lost Krugerrand market.

Canada's boycott of South African apples has resulted in increased imports of apples from the United States, and this trend could be extended to other agricultural products and countries. A boycott of South Africa's mineral exports would stimulate U.S. domestic production of platinum and other minerals as well as create alternate usage businesses and recycling industries. In addition, sanctions would stimulate a mining of the seabed which has an abundance of these minerals. The United States and other Western countries would directly benefit from corporate activities in this area they have begun to take under the U.S.-sponsored mini-treaty arrangements.

37. See Sanford Wright, "The Political Economy of South Africa: An Analysis of Selected Economic Factors on U.S. Leverages," in George W. Shepherd, Jr. and Ved P. Nanda (eds.) *Human Rights and Third World Development*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985).

38. Charles Elliot, *The International Impact and Adjustment To Economic Sanctions On South Africa*, (London: The African Bureau, 1981), p. 31.

39. Neil A. Lewis, "West Finds Some Common Ground on Sanctions," *New York Times*, August 6, 1986, p. A9.

40. R. David Francis, "Gold Coin Output Boosts Canada's Coffers, But Sales Race Heats," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 11, 1986, p. 21.

The above, long-range benefits to Western countries are likely to far outweigh the short-term gains from South African trade. In addition, the benefits from trade with other African countries must be considered. Ann Seidman has stated:

Viewed in a dynamic perspective, the possibilities arising from an integrated development of independent Southern African states would be enormous. The larger regional population, participating fully in the development process and taking advantage of their far more extensive natural resources, would constitute far more valuable trading partners than could South Africa if it continued to dominate the region in increasing isolation and under the strains of a widening regional conflict.⁴¹

This, of course, would be only after South African military and economic regional hegemony has been pushed back by comprehensive international sanctions. And once a settlement is reached, the re-integration of the region with a democratic South Africa would be on a more equitable basis for the less productive countries.

Developing an Effective U.S. Sanctions Policy

The Current Stance

In an overwhelming bi-partisan vote of 308-77, on September 12, 1986 the House of Representatives passed the Senate-approved version of a bill containing selective sanctions against South Africa. President Reagan's veto of this bill was overridden by Congress, and Senate Bill 2701 became the major policy tool for the United States to express dissatisfaction over apartheid.

The anti-apartheid movement much preferred the stronger provisions introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Ronald Dellums and overwhelmingly approved by that body; however, the movement supported the Senate version for several reasons.

1. Approval of even a limited sanctions bill at this time would place the United States Congress in line with actions of state and local governments, particularly the California divestiture measure.
2. A sanctions bill would place the U.S. in line with other international bodies, including the Commonwealth of Nations, the Non-Aligned Nations, and the European Community. It would also add to the pressure upon Japan and other countries that follow the lead of the United States and Europe.

41. Ann Seidman, op. cit., p. 25.

3. Most importantly, additional delays would have resulted in no bill being passed during this congressional session, as time was rapidly running out before adjournment.

Under its major provisions, Senate Bill 2701:⁴²

- prohibits the importation of South African coal, steel, textiles, uranium, agricultural products and products produced by South African parastatals;
- applies these sanctions to Namibia;
- prohibits the landing of South African airlines in the United States and U.S. airlines in South Africa;
- prevents U.S. corporations from deducting South African taxes from their income;
- Prohibits new corporate investment in South Africa; and
- Prohibits U.S. bank deposits from South African governmental agencies.

Additional provisions in the bill are designed to assist victims of apartheid by providing blacks with scholarships, establishing a human rights fund, and expanding black participation in the South African economy. The bill permits the ending of sanctions if the President of the United States determines that the South African government has released Nelson Mandela from prison, and has made substantial progress toward dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy, and by taking three of the following four steps: repeal of the state of emergency and release of detainees held under the state of emergency; unbanning democratic political parties; repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts; public commitment to good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions.

This bill is a significant step forward in terms of diminishing U.S. support for the South African government. In 1985, the South Africans sold to customers in the U.S. \$713.5 million worth of now-banned items (steel and iron, \$293.6 million; uranium, \$140 million; coal, \$43.4 million; textiles, \$55.1 million; and agricultural products, \$181.4 million).⁴³ Approximately \$329 million in South African funds is affected by the bank deposit prohibition. At least 95,000 passengers a year will be affected by the bans on landing rights.

However, the bill fails to include several key provisions of the House bill. The import bans represent only \$713 million of the \$2 billion total annual U.S. imports from South Africa. The conditions specified for the lifting of sanctions are too lenient: Nelson Mandela's release and the

unbanning of political parties, while commendable, need to be accompanied by systemic changes that will create an effective arena for action for such leaders and parties; the end of the state of emergency may well be merely a prelude to the institution of some other oppressive structure; the acts mentioned for repeal while important to the apartheid structure, are not its only underpinning, and could be replaced without a change in the overall structure. There is also a large loophole for strategic minerals, and the negative references to the African National Congress (ANC) and Communist influences were totally unnecessary. Legislation now must be adopted that will accept the total ban on trade and investment and moreover will institute U.S. leadership in support of international mandatory sanctions.⁴⁴

Divestment Activities

The divestment campaign has had a major impact upon U.S. companies' decisions to quit South Africa, and with Britain's Barclays Bank also leaving, other European companies are bound to follow. More than 55 American companies either closed or sold their South African operations between 1984 and mid-1986, and additional companies are continually following suit. Decisions to divest have been based upon a combination of factors, including the low level of profits from South African subsidiaries, the deteriorating economic climate in South Africa, stockholders' pressures, and the divestment actions of cities, states, universities, and various stockholding plans. The most far-reaching action was California's divestment of \$11.3 billion invested in companies doing business in South Africa.

David Hauck, Director of the South Africa Review Service of the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, D.C., has stated that "it is interesting to note that at least 15 of the 54 U.S. companies that have pulled out since the beginning of 1985 signed licensing agreements with the companies that purchased their South African assets."⁴⁵ In addition to licensing agreements, companies maintain connections and profits through technology agreements and distribution agreements. As Keith Hammonds has stated, "for the American companies involved, disinvestment can be a godsend; in one stroke, they escape anti-apartheid pressure in the U.S., cut the risk of operating in an unstable economy, and improve

42. For a full description of this bill see S. 2701, Calendar No. 775, 99th Congress, 2nd Session.

43. *New York Times*, August 16, 1986, p. 4.

44. *Review* by V. DeBums, "The Need for Comprehensive Sanctions," *Washington Notes on Africa*, Summer 1986.

45. David Hauck, *Testimony*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 24, 1986.

profit margins by selling through low-overhead distribution and licensing agreements.⁴⁶

General Motors, IBM, Coca-Cola, and Honeywell, who recently "quit" South Africa, will maintain their ties through distribution agreements, licensing, and other arrangements. They will be following the Japanese model, which forbids direct investment in South Africa but maintains strong business ties through these methods. The impact of divestiture can only be felt when these companies totally leave the South African market. For example, Coca-Cola has 75 percent of the South African soft-drink market. If South Africans were no longer able to buy Coca-Cola they would begin to feel the impact of international isolation. South African movie houses are heavily dependent on American made films, and the withdrawal of these films would exert a cultural influence like the sports boycott.

If these companies sell a percentage of the interest in their companies to black South Africans, which Coca-Cola recently did, they can gain additional public relations points in the United States, and blunt any additional pressures for them to completely sever their ties.

Eastman Kodak Co. has said that it is not only shutting down operations, but it has also banned its products from being sold in South Africa. Bell and Howell, Ashland Oil Inc., and Sara Lee Corporation have also moved to sever all business ties. As the anti-apartheid and disinvestment campaigns attack the GM and IBM withdrawals as "corporate shell games" these companies will also feel pressures to sever their ties.

South Africans are not yet aware of the economic impact of divestment, as they have obtained short-term gains by being able to buy subsidiary companies at fire-sale prices. For example, Bell and Howell was so anxious to get out of South Africa that it sold its entire subsidiary, with an estimated book value of \$5 million, to a local conglomerate for \$1.⁴⁷

Both General Motors and IBM injected money into South Africa under local employee-buyout arrangements. GM paid off local debts prior to turning its operations over to the new owners, and IBM will lend its employees the money to buy the local company.

These gains are one-time windfalls, and are very short lived. For example, General Motors South African operations have been losing money for several years, and this was also true of many of the other multinational corporations. As the general economic and political climate deteriorates it is difficult to see how the new owners will be able to operate profitably. Between 1982 and 1984, Europe's banks had a hand in \$9 billion of loans

46. Keith Hammonds, "Out of Africa? Well, Not Really," *New York Times*, August 17, 1986, section 3, p. 4.

47. Michael Isikoff, "Threat To Profits Spurs U.S. Exodus From South Africa," *Washington Post*, November 17, 1986, p. 1.

to South Africa. The departure of Barclays Bank will certainly affect their willingness to provide any additional capital.

Looking Ahead

By supporting the South African government, the Reagan Administration has acted against the political and economic interests of the United States, as well as the interests and concerns of the world community. Sending Edward J. Perkins, a black American diplomat, as the ambassador to South Africa to carry out present policies is simply tokenism. The current U.S. administration has become identified with one of the most hated regimes in history, an identification that makes a mockery of stated foreign policy objectives which include human rights, democracy, regional stability, and economic development.

Supporting comprehensive sanctions does not mean that the United States will "cut and run" from South Africa; it would mean the opposite. The U.S. helped strengthen the present system, and it has a moral responsibility to directly assist in its dismantlement and transformation until the majority population has control of a democratic system. To leave blacks in South Africa and neighboring states to fend for themselves would be cowardly and irresponsible.

The United States must be prepared to lead the Western nations in taking a comprehensive long-haul approach. "Finely tuned" approaches with linkages to "performance criteria" are totally misdirected, and only result in reforming the terms of white supremacy.

Apartheid is merely a manifestation of the real problem, that of a racist, minority-controlled, white settler state that refuses to relinquish its power and control to the black majority.

The "sanctions won't work" lobby has not become the "sanctions have backfired" lobby, even though these measures have yet to be effectively employed or enforced.⁴⁸ These critics are accepting President Botha's utilization of sanctions as a scapegoat for South Africa's retrenchment into a siege mentality and a siege economy. "South Africa will not be dictated to by foreign powers" has become the rationalization for refusing any concessions to blacks, employing additional clampdowns on the media, totally suppressing all sectors of opposition to the Government, and an explanation of the continuing economic difficulties. A more realistic assessment would reveal that the "retrenchment to the laager" has been a

48. See, for example, Doug Bandow, "Break Relations With South Africa," *New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1987.

continuous process that has recently escalated in response to the black rebellion, and the reforms that Botha claims were made in response to international pressure have only modified the system of apartheid, while making its essential structures easier to maintain and defend.

The United States should provide world leadership in establishing and enforcing mandatory comprehensive sanctions; however, it must first demonstrate that it no longer supports the South African government. Beginning steps in this direction would include stopping support of UNITA in Angola, providing adequate military and economic support to the front line states, supporting the liberation movements, and stopping all trade and economic relations with South Africa. It should simultaneously begin coordination with its allies, third world states and international corporate and financial interests to assist towards these ends.

These measures would seriously raise the cost of apartheid and the laager. The South African war machine, which depends upon imported oil and technology, would be seriously impaired and it could no longer afford to wage war on so many fronts. As argued here, the economy would seriously deteriorate, and whites would bear the brunt. The combination of a deteriorating economy, weakened war machine, stronger opponents, and increased international isolation should force the white community to begin serious negotiating towards majority rule. Results will take time. We have begun a course of action which we now must vigorously pursue by a high order of statecraft to its intended conclusion: regime change and freedom for South Africa's people.

A New Namibian Policy for the United States: Why It's Needed; What It Can Do

Patricia Schroeder

The adoption of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 by the United States Congress, in October, 1986, achieved by overriding a Presidential veto, marked a major milestone in the freedom movement. United States policy is at last moving toward eliminating racial preference for whites in South Africa. This is both morally correct and entirely reasonable in terms of U.S. policy interests. But as always, a formidable lobby of conservatives, military and business interests continue to oppose what common sense demands — a new policy for the United States on Namibia and South Africa.

A Brief History

In 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established its small station at the Cape, the land now known as Namibia was inhabited by the agricultural and pastoral communities of Ovambo, Damara, Herero, Nama and San people. The arrival of missionaries, traders and business people during the nineteenth century caused a colonial scramble between Britain and Germany for the coast of Southwest Africa. Through an agreement in 1890 an area of 318,000 square miles was annexed by Germany, but Walvis Bay, the region's principal deep water port, remained in British hands, controlled from Cape Colony.¹

American economic and political involvement in Namibia began in the latter part of the eighteenth century, through extensive trading with the Namibian people and whaling in Namibia's waters. An influx of American missionaries and traders from the 1840s through the 1860s increased American involvement. American commercial interest continued to grow even after Germany formally colonized the territory near the end of the nineteenth century.

The second phase of colonial occupation occurred when Union of

1. Allan J. Cooper, *U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 13.

Since 1972, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder has represented the First Congressional District in Colorado. She currently serves on four Committees, Armed Services, Post Office and Civil Service, Judiciary and the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families. She also serves as co-chair of the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues. Her interest in Namibia goes back to 1961 while she was a student at the University of Minnesota.

South Africa troops marched into Windhoek in May of 1915, as part of allied action against Germany in World War I. On December 17, 1920, South Africa, at that time a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet, was given the mandate of trusteeship for the adjoining German colony of South West Africa, as it was then known,² by the League of Nations, to be administered for the benefit of its inhabitants.³

With the territory under South African control, American investments expanded. However, when South Africa attempted to annex Namibia by gaining the agreement of the allied powers, it was the United States who refused because it violated one of President Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, which called for peace without annexations:

People are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; people may not be dominated, and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.⁴

In 1946, when the League was dissolved, the United States joined a majority of the United Nations General Assembly in rejecting South Africa's request to incorporate Namibia as a fifth Province. The Assembly advised Pretoria to place the Territory under the United Nation's Trusteeship System.⁵ Pretoria dismissed this advice and denied that the General Assembly had succeeded to the status of the League with the authority to supervise South African administration of Namibia. The United States backed the Assembly and criticized the imposition of South African apartheid upon the Territory⁶ and the unilateral steps taken in 1949 and subsequently to incorporate the Territory into the Union.⁷ But when the Assembly tried to assert its authority, the United States generally demurred at any forceful measures and urged conciliation or placation to bring South Africa around. This forerunner of "Constructive Engagement" was as unsuccessful then as it is now.

2. The name was changed to Namibia by General Assembly resolution 2372 (XXII) (1968).

3. The Mandate is reprinted in John Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, (University of California Press, Berkeley 1973), pp. 72-74. The book contains invaluable source material and comments for the period 1919-1972.

4. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress, February 11, 1918.

5. A. W. Singham and Shirley Hune, *Namibian Independence: A Global Responsibility* (Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1986), pp. 3-4.

6. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-1963 R.P. 12 of 1964 (The "O'Donnell Report"); Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa, No. 54 of 1968 (The "Native Nations Act").

7. Viz., granting representation in the South African Parliament to white Namibians (South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act No. 23 of 1959), sections 27-31; imposing involuntary South African citizenship on most Africans born in Namibia (South Africa's Citizenship Act, No. 44 of 1949, sections 2, 3, 5, (i); and transferring control of Namibian "Native reserves" and related funds to the South African Native (now Bantu) Trust, of which the South African State President is the sole Trustee (South-West Africa Native (now Bantu) Affairs Administration Act, No. 56 of 1954 sections 2, 4, 5).

After World War II new American investment grew in the mining sector. This was extremely profitable due to the vast mineral resources of the land and the cheap labor pool created by South African exploitation of the populace through the contract labor system. Today 75 American corporations are operating in Namibia. More than 70% of these companies⁸ entered Namibia through contracts with South Africa after the United Nations General Assembly, with United States support, officially revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory in 1966. This wholly unprecedented action taken after two decades of conflict, was effected by the adoption of Resolution 2145 (XXI) (1966). Under its provisions, Namibia was placed under the Assembly's administration until independence. But for almost a decade after that date, American concern about the Territory was largely sporadic and uninformed as it had been for the fifty preceding years.

The United States soon showed that it considered adoption of United Nations Resolution 2145 a symbolic act rather than one designed to effect serious changes. It opposed establishment of the Council for Namibia to act on behalf of the Assembly and refused to be a member of the Council.⁹ American representatives warned that the Council would be powerless, a fact that was assured by the refusal of all the Western powers to participate in it. The South Africans tightened their hold on the Territory, unconcerned that under international law they were illegal occupiers in Namibia, just as the Nazis were in Norway or the Netherlands.

During 1972, in a gesture apparently intended to deflect calls for stronger action against South Africa, the United States backed Security Council Resolution 300, which instructed the Secretary General to negotiate with South Africa for Namibian independence. The resulting Waldheim-Escher mission ended unhappily with Pretoria scoring propaganda points at the expense of the United Nations.

It was only with the collapse of the Portuguese African Empire in the mid-'70s that then Secretary of State Kissinger "discovered" Africa and the United States started to take an active, and frequently destructive, role vis-a-vis Namibia.¹⁰

Cuban troops entered Angola in October 1975, at the invitation of President Augustinho Neto, after South African troops and mercenaries

8. Edward Knight, "American Firms Operating in Namibia that Would Likely be Affected by Passage of HR 2589," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 13, 1985.

9. Singham and Hune, op. cit., p. 3. The Council for Namibia was established by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) (1967).

10. Mohamed A. El-Khawass and Barry Cohen (eds.), *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Memorandum 39* (Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1976), p. 28.

invaded Angola, with the collaboration of the CIA. This is confirmed by the former CIA agent directing the covert operation, John Stockwell.¹¹ The Cubans have remained to provide security assistance to the Angolan government against the frequent South African invasions of Angola since that time. There have been several efforts to reduce their numbers but the process has never been completed due to continued South African invasions.

The U.S. Role in Namibian Independence Discussions

This article considers three aspects of the American role in the negotiations for Namibian independence: (i) the major proposals made, or orchestrated, by the United States in the course of negotiations since 1976, or orchestrated, by the United States in the course of negotiations since 1976, (ii) the pressures, direct and indirect, that the United States has brought to bear on the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and its supporters to undercut their bargaining positions and to try to force them to settle for terms proposed by the United States. And (iii) a proposed alternative affirmative policy for the U.S. based on Security Council Resolution 435 and United Nations comprehensive sanctions.

Early in 1976 the United States supported adoption of Security Council Resolution 385. The resolution called for South African withdrawal from Namibia and for elections under United Nations "supervision and control" so that the Namibian people could freely determine their own future. The resolution set a summer deadline for compliance by Pretoria.¹²

South Africa cannily called a conference of docile ethnic representatives to consider "the future" of the Territory. Members of the "Turnhalle Conference" managed at the last moment to present a statement to the effect that they were working on a constitution and hoped Namibia would be independent within three years. Insulted by this travesty, a majority of the Security Council voted to impose sanctions for non-compliance. But the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly vetoed the proposed sanctions.¹³

At this point Secretary of State Kissinger set up and coordinated a "Contact Group" composed of the five Western members then sitting on the Security Council: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (permanent members) and Canada and West Germany (elected members). The "Contact Group" neither asked the United Nations for,

nor received from it, any authority to act, but it immediately took over control of the "Namibian question." "The Group" continued without break under the Carter administration, negotiating at length with South Africa and consulting occasionally with SWAPO and the United Nations Secretary General.

United States Negotiating Proposals

Early in 1978 the Group unveiled a proposal,¹⁴ later incorporated in Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, to bring about an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian conflict and Namibia's independence. Resolution 435 calls for a ceasefire, democratic elections under UN sponsorship and supervision and then a new constitution. The Contact Group claimed that this was in accordance with resolution 385 but it left South African authorities in place in Namibia and provided that they would run the election subject only to UN monitoring. It also weakened various human rights provisions in 385 and, by omission, seemed to accept South Africa's illegal seizure of Walvis Bay in 1977.¹⁵

Since 1978, when South Africa first appeared to agree to implement Resolution 435 and then reneged, the Contact Group has tried to find a formula that would modify the resolution so that Pretoria would agree to elections monitored by the United Nations. To that end it has, without asking or receiving authorization from the Security Council, repeatedly offered concessions at the expense of Namibia and of the principles enunciated by the United Nations.

As a result Resolution 435 has been extensively reinterpreted, supplemented, and otherwise changed by a series of understandings and largely unpublished agreements. The changes are so numerous and have been made in so many different forms that it is necessary now to redefine 435 as the basis for a new United States policy. It is doubtful if anyone could produce an authoritative text, assuming that the Security Council would accept the unauthorized changes.

Draft Constitution for Namibia

The second major United States proposal, the first to be offered by the Reagan administration, was that SWAPO accept an American draft con-

11. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1978).

12. *Official Records of Security Council Thirty-Third Year* (1976), UN Document S/12636.

13. *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-Fifth Year* (1978), UN Documents S/144 59, S/14460/Rev. 1.

14. *Official Records of the Security Council Thirty-Third Year, Supp. for April, May, & June 1978*, UN Document S/12636.

15. South African Proclamation R202 of 1977.

stitution for the future Namibian state.¹⁶ The administration was reported to have insisted that there be no implementation of 435 unless the draft constitution was accepted even though the election to be held under the resolution was to choose delegates to a "constituent assembly" where a constitution would be drafted in accordance with the wishes of their electorate.

Apparently the draft constitution was designed to meet several objectives. First, it would respond to Pretoria's insistence on "minority rights" (a code term for the protection of whites and their property, particularly by preventing future land redistribution). The draft contained other provisions such as a rudimentary and poorly drawn bill of rights, possibly drafted by South African lawyers, and certainly not intended to be taken very seriously.

In addition, the draft incorporated provisions which improved the electoral odds for parties opposed to SWAPO, effectively preventing the latter from dominating the constituent assembly or any future government, even if it should be chosen by an overwhelming majority of Namibian voters. SWAPO is an outgrowth of the Ovamboland People's Organization formed in Capetown in 1958 in opposition to the migrant labor system. In April, 1960, the movement reorganized as the South West Africa People's Organization with the goal of winning complete liberation of Namibia. The organization has observer status at the United Nations as the representative of the Namibian people. The draft included a complicated provision for voting, involving "one-person-two-votes." SWAPO and the front line nations, those countries surrounding South Africa, rejected the proposal as too complicated. The choice of voting systems (for election of the constituent assembly under Resolution 435) was therefore left to South Africa, which has informed the United Nations that it has opted for proportional representation.

Non-aggression treaty

The third major proposal was a draft non-aggression treaty presented to SWAPO in a deniable "non-paper."

The treaty was drafted ostensibly to govern the relations between an independent Namibia and all its neighbors, perhaps to reinforce the repeated United States calls for a regional settlement in Southern Africa. A cursory reading of the draft makes it clear that in fact it was a thinly disguised South African-Namibian non-aggression treaty, perhaps much like those South Africa has tried to force on neighboring Botswana and Lesotho. Its terms seemed designed to give Pretoria justification for invading an "independent" Namibia whenever it disapproved of political

developments in its former mandate.¹⁷

"Linkage"

Linkage is the fourth and latest proposal made by the United States. It suggested that a Namibian settlement was dependent on a prior or parallel Cuban withdrawal from Angola.¹⁸ This approach was opposed by all of our western partners in the old Contact Group and was a factor leading to the disintegration of the Group. It is not part of any internationally accepted settlement plan. South Africa embraced this United States position as the most convenient obstacle to prevent their withdrawal from Namibia.

In its original form, "linkage" called for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and presumably for the implementation of Resolution 435 to bring about Namibian independence.

In contrast to this proposal, the best way to get the Cubans out is to first address the immediate problem of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, to force a South African withdrawal, and the implementation of the internationally agreed to independence plan. This would certainly help relieve the Angolans of their major, and very real, security concern. Since the Cuban forces will probably stay in Angola as long as is necessary to protect it against South African aggression, Pretoria can be assured that the American demand will never be met by continuing its attacks on the Luanda government, directly or through UNITA, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola, the resistance movement in Angola.

We should also note that, while the United States has full diplomatic relations with racist South Africa, it has refused diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, despite the fact that all of our allies have, and that the United States is Angola's number one trading partner and Cuban troops provide the security for Chevron/Gulf Oil in Cabinda.

Recently the United States has added to its "linkage" proposal the demand that Angola's government must also agree to share power with Jonas Savimbi, the President of UNITA.

Pressures Exerted by the United States Government

To understand the role that the United States plays in the negotiations

16. *Windhoek Advertiser*, 31 October 1981: "No Principles, No Independence."

17. Elizabeth S. Landis, "The U.S. Role in Negotiations for Namibia's Future" (an unpublished paper), 29 March 1986, p. 9.

18. Security Council Resolution 539 (1983). See also UN Document S/PV 2481, and George W. Shephard, Jr., "The United States' South Africa Policy: The Failure of 'Constructive Engagement' and the Emergence of New Options" *Africa Today*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1984), p. 20.

on Namibia's future, it is necessary to go beyond the terms which our government has imposed, or attempted to impose, on SWAPO. We must also examine the pressures that we have exerted and continue to exert, directly and indirectly, on SWAPO and its supporters in the Front-line states and in the United Nations, designed to cause SWAPO to accept a settlement that ensures United States/Western interests.

Economic pressure

The most obvious pressures exerted by the United States, often in concert with its Western Allies, are financial. The Front-line nations and many of SWAPO's other supporters are developing nations with heavy debt burdens and pressing needs for their people; they are particularly vulnerable to threats to deny or withhold loans, aid, or services. We have seen this pressure exercised recently against Zimbabwe, with the withdrawal of financial assistance by the United States following public Zimbabwe criticism of U.S. policy.¹⁹

The United States uses its financial power in other ways as well to weaken the Namibian resistance and undermine United Nations activity aimed at loosening South Africa's hold on the Territory. Thus the State Department relies on unnecessarily restrictive interpretations of law to reduce, each year, the sum appropriated by Congress for the support of the United Nation's Namibian activities.

Our government has cut its general contribution to the United Nations, allegedly because United Nations members are not sympathetic enough to United States positions.²⁰ Do officials in Washington ever ask themselves whether they, rather than the rest of the world, are wrong? One effect of the cut has been to enable persons opposed to Namibian interests, quoting a leaked United Nations document, to suggest that for economic reasons the United Nations may have to drop its precedent-setting judicial proceeding to implement the decree protecting Namibian natural resources.

Military pressure

On occasion military pressures are also applied. The Reagan administration is supplying covert assistance to UNITA, in order to force Angola to send home its Cuban soldiers, or so administration spokesmen

19. Elizabeth S. Lando, "Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics." (Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, New York 1982) p. 12.

20. Readers Digest, October, 1983, p. 121-122. Statement made by Jeanne J. Kitpatrick, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the 39th Session of the General Assembly of the U.N.

inform the press.²¹ This pressure must be evaluated in light of the United States abstention veto of a proposed Security Council resolution to condemn a South African military invasion of Angola.²²

While it now seems unlikely that the United States will supply rebel groups fighting to overthrow the other front line neighbors, South Africa appears to be continuing such activity in Mozambique, and all those states are subject to raids at will by South African forces. All are aware that the United States could easily exert indirect military pressure by vetoing condemnation of such military aggression, as it did in the case of Angola.

Petty diplomatic pressure

SWAPO has been subjected to various petty tactics designed to make its diplomatic and political work more difficult. SWAPO members, even its Observer to the United Nations, who is a permanent resident in New York, are repeatedly subjected to unwarranted delays and difficulties in obtaining visas. Other times overseas members are subjected to travel restrictions in the United States. The SWAPO United Nations Observer Mission was threatened with federal inspection, as a result of clearly spurious allegations as to its activities as a foreign agent.²³ The Mission was forced to seek legal advice, distracted from other activities, and given a not-too-gentle reminder of the power of the United States Government, but the mission was finally cleared. Other pressures are less obvious or may work in a more oblique fashion.

Pressure on United Nations personnel and programs

The United States is very effective in using the United Nations bureaucratic structure to hold out rewards and effect punishments for persons dealing with matters in which American officials are interested. It is also able to insinuate saboteurs into United Nations programs it dislikes.

The case of the former United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Sean MacBride, illustrates pressure the United States can bring to bear in the United Nations. It is generally believed that MacBride was driven from

21. Africa News, August 29, 1983, p. 12.

22. Security Council Resolution 545 (1983)

23. Committee for a Free Namibia vs. SWAPO. US District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action no. 82-1241). 1982 Committee for a Free Namibia, which was connected with a registered lobbyist for the Administrator-General in Namibia, filed a harassment suit raising spurious issues concerning SWAPO's status under the Foreign Agents Act. The suit has been dismissed.

his post at the end of 1976 by Henry Kissinger. His problem was that he was deeply committed to Namibian independence and without personal ambition. When MacBride's successor was being selected, the United States backed a rival Scandinavian candidate against the choice of the African bloc, despite the latter's special concern for Namibia and the superior paper qualifications he possessed.²⁴

By this course of conduct the United States not only rid itself of a formidable opponent; it also discouraged independent and courageous conduct by future Commissioners, placed pressure on them to moderate their advice to their United Nations superiors, and strained their relations with SWAPO.

Non-recognition of Council for Namibia

The United States also has refused to recognize the authority of the Council for Namibia to act on behalf of the Territory. Our government insists the Council has failed to implement its primary function as set out in the resolution creating the Council. The function of the Council is to administer the Territory pending independence. Consequently, the United States feels no obligation to recognize Council actions or to deal with it as the lawful administration of the Territory. This weakens SWAPO's bargaining position directly and decreases the effectiveness of substantive measures adopted by the Council for the benefit of Namibia.

During the 1971-72 general strike in Namibia, the Council invited major American employers in the Territory to meet with it and discuss labor conditions. When the employers refused, the Council sought the assistance of the United States mission. By dismissing the Council's request, the mission denied the right of the Council to take such action.²⁵

The State Department has made it clear that it does not recognize Council Decree No. 1 protecting Namibian natural resources. This non-recognition was carried to its ultimate absurdity when Assistant Secretary Crocker cited it in opposing a bill introduced by me in October 1985, designed to help protect Namibian resources by enacting substantive provisions of the Decree into American law, applicable to Americans.²⁶

The United States has also seen to it that the Council has been excluded from all participation in Namibian negotiations. The Council has not been allowed to represent Namibian (or United Nations) interests or even

24. Statement by Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO of Namibia, to a meeting of the European Economic Community Parliamentary Group, at Brussels, 28 September 1982. (Reproduced and issued by Episcopal Churchman for South Africa, New York 1982).

25. Personal report by Elizabeth S. Landis who was legal advisor for the Council for Namibia.

26. *Wall Street Journal*, June 11, 1986, p. 33.

to keep itself informed of proposals and decisions affecting the Territory for which it is responsible.

Backdoor recognition of MPC government

In June 1985 Pretoria installed a new, non-elected "transitional government," dominated by the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) in Windhoek.²⁷ Its purposes were to test whether the international community was sufficiently tired of the unresolved Namibian situation to accept, at least halfway, a new local puppet group with carefully manufactured "popular" credentials, and to prepare to negotiate with that "government" in the future to grant Namibia a carefully circumscribed "independence" under its leadership.

Immediately thereafter the Security Council adopted Resolution 566, which condemned the new MPC "government" as "illegal, null and void" and declared that neither the United Nations nor its member states should recognize the government. The United States abstained on the vote.²⁸ However, press reports indicated that United States officials negotiating on Namibia have consulted with representatives of the MPC "government." Thus the United States has brought pressure on SWAPO by ignoring a Security Council Resolution and negotiating with a government the Frontline nations don't recognize as well as defying the World Court ruling forbidding any action recognizing South Africa's regime in Namibia.²⁹

This internal administration is designed to block independence for Namibia. It has no authority over defense, internal security, or foreign affairs. All domestic decisions are subject to the veto of South African President P.W. Botha. It was not freely elected and whatever laws it drafts cannot be said to be independent or democratic. When South Africa announced the formation of this internal settlement scheme our State Department rejected it saying that any such proposed transfer of power would be null and void. Yet Washington's unwillingness to match its rhetoric with actions suggest not only an unconscionable tolerance of continuing South African crimes in Namibia but also a silent recognition that this latest development is a direct consequence of past United States policy.

27. *Namibian Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 2, August, 1985.

28. Security Council Resolution 566, June 1985, Official record of the Security Council 39th Year (1985).

29. Security Council Resolution 276, (1970). Advisory Opinion I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, paragraph 33.

Perceived American Interests

The third factor to consider in analyzing the United States role in negotiating for Namibian independence concerns our national interests as perceived by our government, i.e., by the administration of the day and, when relevant, by earlier administrations. For practical purposes these interests may be summed up as the four R's.

Resources

Every recent United States administration has been concerned about the availability to the West of Namibia's many resources after independence, assuming that there are any left by then. It is a strange obsession that worries about the hypothetical denial of resources after independence for political/ideological reasons but is totally unconcerned about current illegal mining practices that will make it impossible to obtain any more minerals after the richest parts of the deposits are exhausted, as they will be within a decade in the case of both copper and diamonds in Namibia.

Experience shows that the states of southern Africa, whether or not allegedly Marxist, have proved reliable sources of raw materials after independence. None of them has refused for ideological reasons to sell their resources to any Western state prepared to pay in hard currency.

Regional Stability

This is a codeword for fear of rapid and fundamental change. In Namibia almost every aspect of life calls out for drastic change. That raises the specter of new, possibly less advantageous personal, racial, and economic relationships; of the end to comfortable arrangements and privileges; of uncertainty and possible internal chaos; of the spread of new ideas and concepts to neighboring countries or even further afield; in short, a situation which may not be under anyone's control. It should never be forgotten that if there is one thing that the major countries of the world on both sides of the "Iron Curtain" dislike, it is fundamental change over which they have no control.

Racism

This is the factor that all officials will deny. Yet there can be no denying that, consciously or subconsciously, it affects all official calculations of interest and concern.

Thus, there is more concern about potential uncompensated loss of

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land by white Namibian farmers, whose ancestors got it by force or theft, than there is about the present economic well-being of the descendants of Africans, whose land was wrongfully taken. There is public disapproval of black SWAPO soldiers who attack in Namibia to free their homeland from illegal occupation. But there is no public outcry about the detention and torture of thousands of Namibians by the white South Africa-controlled forces that maintain the illegal occupation.³⁰

Russophobia

Pretoria for years has been equating all opposition to its regime, at home and abroad, as "communist terrorism." It has finally found a true believer in the President of the United States, who identifies any dissent as being communist inspired.

The South African army has made it clear that it does not intend to let SWAPO "communist terrorists" reach the seat of power in Windhoek. The present United States administration has never made such a statement, but many of its members silently take the same position.³¹

Toward a New, Constructive U.S. Policy

American values and national interest require a new foreign policy toward all of southern Africa, but particularly Namibia. We need a foreign policy which has as its immediate and primary objective the self-determination of the Namibian people and the preservation of the country's natural resources for their benefit, to be realized under their own independent government. Current policy must change as South African actions have made "Constructive Engagement" null and void. We must begin to treat Pretoria like the international outlaw it is.

Return to the United Nations Plan

The United Nations has provided a solid alternative plan for the settlement of Namibia's claim to independence. Since 1978, and especially under "Constructive Engagement," there has been an unfortunate retreat by the United States from the plan, as outlined and adopted in Security Council Resolution 435, which, as was pointed out earlier, the U.S.

30. *Social Conditions in Namibia: Report of the Standing Committee of the UN Council for Namibia, 1984.*

31. Elizabeth S. Lardis, "The U.S. Role..." op. cit. p. 9.

helped to draft. The plan broke down not only because South Africa failed to honor its earlier commitments by Prime Minister Vorster when he was replaced by P.W. Botha in 1978, but also because both the U.S. and the U.K. had begun a conservative reaction against previous strong commitments to the principle of self-determination.

This was shown especially in the reluctance of the U.S. to undertake sanctions against South Africa for its violation of obligations under the UN Charter and its original acceptance of a free and fair election under UNTAG, the United Nations Transitional Administrative Government. The Reagan Administration, under "Constructive Engagement," has particularly sabotaged attempts at a peaceful settlement. The linkage policy of tying a UN settlement to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola endorsed the refusal of South Africa to comply with a clear-cut edict of the United Nations Security Council.³³

The difference between that period and today is the growing American and world acceptance of the necessity for the use of sanctions against South Africa. Moreover, these sanctions can only be successful if they are comprehensive and universal. And only the United Nations provides the machinery and the international legal process for imposing a settlement with black nationalists on a reluctant South Africa.

South Africa has attempted to repudiate the UN claim to jurisdiction on this issue, despite the clear establishment of that authority under international law. The failure of U.S. policy has been directly due to the support of that anti-United Nations bias by the Reagan Administration which has, throughout its term of office, shown contempt for international law.

While the UN is not without fault and some of the resolutions lack practical application, it remains the central institution which should be the means we use to settle the Namibian and South African issues. It must once again become a crucial force in the world-wide determination to end once and for all the apartheid system in South Africa. This does not mean that other international agencies such as the Commonwealth of Nations or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would not also be centrally involved. But the UN alone has the authority necessary to mobilize the pressures needed to bring about a South African alternative governmental structure that can lead to a peaceful settlement in Namibia. The U.S. moral outrage against South Africa which has led to the passage of major sanctions legislation in the U.S. Congress should now be channeled through the UN Security Council and the Council for Namibia.

South Africa's fear that the UN may be a surrogate of Soviet interests

simply has no foundation in fact in this case. The Council for Namibia is supported and led by Third World countries. The USSR is not taking the initiative; but there is strong reason to believe that the USSR will support a revival of the 435 approach without attempting to control the result. Certainly Angola has given every indication that it will cooperate with the UN and OAU in a revival of UNTAG. The attempt by South Africa to play on the anti-Communist issue simply should not be permitted to become a major determinant of U.S. policy. This is not an issue of Communism, as the Reagan Administration has tried to make it, but an issue of racial discrimination and international law. As Congressman Ronald Dellums has stated it:

To continue our current policy is un-American. I believe that opposition to apartheid is as American as apple pie. We, in this country, believe in individual freedoms. Black people in South Africa do not have them.³⁴

Further, the Reagan administration policy of support of UNITA's insurrection against the government of Angola, which is recognized by the OAU and every other major power of the world as the legitimate authority, is wrong. One does not need to endorse all the policies of a government to recognize it and in this case the alternative offered by Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, is both tribal and corrupt.³⁵ It offers South Africa a means of continuing its attacks against a people who should be allowed to determine their own form of government. To allow this intervention to prolong the agony of Namibia and the destruction of the economy of Angola is a travesty of justice which further demonstrates the way in which U.S. policy must be changed to curb unjustified intervention.

A Free and Fair Election

A return to the United Nations plan would be possible only if the U.S. and other nations are prepared to force South Africa to accept it. The original plan of UNTAG could be readily adapted to the needs of a settlement. This entails a cease-fire, withdrawal of forces on both sides to restricted areas, a demilitarized zone, and a free election to create a new government. A constituent assembly is to be elected first and then an election to the new representative offices can be held.³⁶ This was similar to the procedure in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1980. There is no reason to modify

32. "Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries," Congressional Study Mission, Howard Wolfe, Chm., Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 1982, pp. 44-45.

33. Rep. Ronald Dellums, "The Need for Comprehensive Sanctions," *Washington Notes on Africa*, Summer 1986, p. 2.

34. Gerald Bender, "American Policy Toward Angola: A History of Linkage," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1985), pp. 110-129, eds. Gerald Bender, James Coleman, Richard Sklar.

35. "Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation," *Objective Justice*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1978.

the outline of this plan simply because it was unacceptable to the "aggressor" state. The UN in Namibia would perform in the same manner as the United Kingdom did as the supervising agent in Zimbabwe, administering the election and assuring that results were fair. The UNTAG plan called for a UN administration with temporary governing powers that included international policing. All of this was agreed to by South Africa in 1978 but what was lacking was fundamental confidence by South Africa in the impartiality of the UN and the agreement broke down allegedly over differences on the Demilitarized Zone with accusations from South Africa against the UN Secretary General of bias in favor of SWAPO.³⁴ There is nothing in the record of these deliberations which would sustain this South African charge. Most independent observers concluded that it was fear of a SWAPO victory in the elections that led to the South African breaking of earlier agreements.

It will be essential for the UN to supervise cease-fire lines and the Demilitarized Zone if intimidation is to be eliminated from any election result. The existing police, especially the Koevoel, cannot be trusted. The problem of electoral manipulation can only be surmounted by direct UN supervision of the voting and the computation of the results. The "transitional government" of Namibia is generally considered to be unrepresentative by a large number of groups as demonstrated by the recent Ai-Gams (Windhoek Conference of some 16 varied church, civic and political groups. Participants rejected the so-called "transitional government," objected to the continuing South African military presence, and opposed by the apartheid regime.³⁷

As always, the cost of undertaking such a UN peace-keeping operation must be specially financed and the U.S. should take the lead in securing world-wide support as well as contributing to the budget itself. The cost of these operations is much less than the ultimate cost of a military conflict in southern Africa. Even now, the U.S. is expending resources foolishly, supplying UNITA in Angola with arms, using funds which might well be diverted to this peaceful settlement plan.

The particular virtue of the United Nations Plan is that it by-passes the issue often raised: who is the real representative of the Namibian people? It allows that issue to be settled in an electoral process. Representatives of different political views and interests obviously will stand for election.³⁸ The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, along with the right-wing nationalists and

various branches of SWAPO can participate. SWAPO has always been supportive of universal participation although they have opposed special ethnic and racial representation. Whatever permanent formula for representation of the different groups is best for Namibia will ultimately be determined by the constitutional convention and new government. Such issues are best left to the representative system itself under the truly transitional government that would be established by the UNTAG. This can assure a stable and democratic alternative to the war that is now raging in the country and neighboring Angola.

International Sanctions

Sanctions of major proportions under international law can only be applied through universal action under the United Nations, for they are a form of warfare. Moreover they can only be effective if they have universal support. The U.S. must now return to the UN Security Council and use it as a major forum and strategy group as was done during the Congo crisis of 1960-61. The fear of the Soviet Union's influence in the U.N. is quite unjustified as it is dominated by Western and friendly interests and the Secretary General's office would play a key role in the coordination. Other international agencies, such as the Commonwealth of Nations and the OAU, as well as the non-aligned movement, already have begun their programs of international sanctions against South Africa. Simply the necessity of making these sanctions effective should dictate the utilization of the UN as a central coordinating agency.

It is not true that sanctions have never been important in the settlement of disputes, or that South Africa is not vulnerable to a well-coordinated international sanctions action. Elizabeth Schmidt and others have recently demonstrated how the South African economy is technologically dependent on the Western and Japanese suppliers.³⁹ Others have shown how an energy embargo would have costly consequences.⁴⁰

The objectives of this campaign are much wider than simply the freedom of Namibia. South African apartheid is now the central issue. This system should now be dismantled and, of course, Namibia should gain its freedom without further delay. These objectives need central definition

36. Text of reply by the South African Prime Minister, 15 Mar. 1979, to the Sec. General (A/13172). This document contained "The Military Employment Plan for UNTAG," drafted between UN military advisers and South Africa. There is no reservation regarding SWAPO bases later demanded by South Africa.

37. *National Namibian Concerns*. Denver, Colorado, June, 1986.

38. This view was supported by the Parliamentary visiting team from the U.K.: Robert Rhodes, MP (Cons.), Donald Anderson, MP (Lab.), and Lord Kennet, MP (SDP).

39. Elizabeth Schmidt, "South Africa, Sanctions Fact Sheet: Lessons from Rhodesia," New York, Episcopal Church People for a Free Southern Africa, July, 1986.

40. Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, "Oil Sanctions Against South Africa," Notes and Documents, Centre Against Apartheid, UN, New York, June 1978.

and agreement. The UN Security Council with other agencies like the Council for Namibia should again become the central authority of policy for major powers.

The fact that South Africa is suspicious of the United Nations and opposed to the Council for Namibia should not be allowed to influence the decision of Western powers to use the UN. No sanctions campaign can be successful unless it is universal and in compliance with international law. Moreover, it must be remembered that the view of the African majority and, in particular the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO, who have been fighting liberation wars, must also be reflected in the conflict resolution process. If a negotiated settlement is to be achieved, the central machinery will have to be sufficiently diversified to reflect all major interests, and flexible enough to effect a compromise between parties that at this stage are prepared to wage all-out war, rather than forego any major principles or interests.

The UN Security Council might well appoint certain states to act as mediators. These could be chosen from the Contact and Front-line nations. But the initial stage of universal sanctions can no longer be bypassed, and these need to be adopted and implemented by the world body under the direction of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General.

There are three cardinal principles necessary for a successful sanctions action. They are economic dependence, universality and negotiating flexibility.

The first principle, "economic dependence," points to the need to recognize that the South African economy is highly dependent and that certain kinds of sanctions can be very effective in forcing compliance, with the objectives of penalizing aggression, including the illegal occupation of Namibia, and ending apartheid.

Under "universality" our first concerns must be for compliance, verification and enforcement. This means that the policies of all states need to be brought into conformity with the objectives of the sanctions action. If this is not done, not only could certain transnational corporations defy the embargo but also certain states could engage in a profitable supply of essential commodities such as oil or computer technology. A system of international surveillance of shipping and financial transfers can be established today with modern technology. Satellites can detect the nature of shipping while banking centers in London, Geneva, and New York are subject to strict surveillance techniques that were non-existent a decade ago.

It should be noted that certain states such as Israel and Iran have, in the past, supplied South Africa with military and energy supplies despite

world-wide bans.⁴¹ Such practices can only be stopped when major powers who use these states as indirect agents of intervention are persuaded to end these violations and comply with international sanctions. Enforcement under international law is the prerogative of national policy. But the principle of universality is vital because of the history of violations by powers who have officially accepted sanctions but in fact have violated them through surreptitious policies. The role of the U.K. in oil sanctions against Rhodesia is a prime example. Each state, including the U.S., will be requested to provide for enforcement penalties against individuals and corporations that violate the terms of the embargo. Such information about violations will be transmitted to national authorities who will oversee the enforcement of the penalties. This is standard treaty procedure. We in the U.S. need to bring our law and enforcement agencies into compliance in order to gain greater benefits for our foreign policy objectives. I had, in proposed legislation in the 99th Congress (House Bill 2589), attempted to bring our domestic law into compliance with UN decisions regarding the exploitation of Namibian resources under Decree No. 1 of the Council for Namibia.⁴² This is one of the important ways in which U.S. and other international business activity can be brought into compliance with international sanctions against South Africa. Those corporations that continue to do business in Namibia despite UN bans cannot be permitted to gain either profit or tax incentives for such violations. This legislation, along with the recent sanctions adopted by the Congress, could make it possible, if enforced, to eliminate any gains derived by these corporations presently continuing to operate in South Africa or Namibia.

The key to South African vulnerability is the standard of living enjoyed by the white population; but more importantly, it is a trade-based economy.⁴³ The high income of whites is directly linked to the sale of mineral and agricultural goods abroad and the importation of the technology which services most of the multinational corporations involved in processing and manufacturing. For example, while automobiles and aircraft are produced in South Africa, most of their essential technological components are imported. This is also true of their much-vaunted military technology. In addition, South Africa is energy dependent. There is no oil in South Africa. Their coal-based oil processing industry is growing; however, it is not cost-efficient in a world market that is currently one-third of the price per barrel at the height of the world oil crisis.

42. Rep. Mervyn M. Dymally (CA) will be the prime sponsor in the 100th Congress of legislation on Namibia.

43. This point is made by Elizabeth Schmidt, op. cit. p. 2.

41. "Strangers and Brothers," *Sunday Times*, 15 April, 1984.

Therefore, comprehensive sanctions, covering most trade, if universally adopted, would have a highly depressing effect on white living standards. It would, as suggested by conservatives, create unemployment among the presently employed black workers. However, most blacks have indicated they are willing to absorb the effects of a trade embargo because they are currently living at a minimal subsistence level. Many whites would try to leave the cities and return to the farms but the hardships this would impose would be similar to war-time conditions. Blacks would be less affected because of their communal traditions of mutual assistance, as opposed to the individualism of white materialistic morality. Estimates of a 50% unemployment rate among blacks, including the Bantustans, are not far off. Whites are affected more by inflation and shortages of luxury goods. Loss of domestic services will be powerful and few Africans can afford to employ servants.

A sanctions policy will be much more effective if it is comprehensive and universal rather than selective and partial. The current tendency in the U.S. and the Western world is toward selective and partial. As Senator Lugar put it in the U.S. Senate debate, "we do not want a burn and destroy policy." The assumption or hope is that the South African Government will come around as soon as they realize the U.S. is serious about sanctions. Unfortunately, this is not likely to be the case. They can ride out selective and partial sanctions with the help of their friends abroad who will supply their basic energy and technology needs for a price. This will in turn give them time for greater preparation.

The effect of an inadequate sanctions action will be tragic because it will prolong the conflict and intensify the polarization between sides that need to come to the negotiating table immediately.

Therefore, the U.S. and its partners in the Contact Group need to agree on a comprehensive trade and energy embargo policy which takes advantage of the current vulnerability of the dependent South African economy and standard of living of the white population. Such a policy could create within a few weeks a massive sell-out of transnational corporations, a collapse of the stock market and the rand. Any remaining export market would disappear because of the high prices imposed by the depletion of energy reserves.

Rather than block neighboring economies, South Africa would try to utilize them for import and export. This might permit a trickle of trade but the cost and limits are beyond the capabilities of even the most ingenious multinationals.

The Contact states would need to work with the Front-line nations

and SADCC, the Southern Africa Development and Coordinating Council, in the opening up of rail routes to the sea, which are currently blocked by the Reagan policy of support for insurgent anti-Marxist groups of UNITA and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).⁴⁴ South Africa's support for the counter-revolutionary groups might also change as they would like to use the ports of Beira and Maputo themselves to attempt to by-pass the embargo. Thus, the effect of a comprehensive embargo against the Front-line nations in the longer term may be to strengthen the regional economies against and lessen their dependence on South Africa.

The third principle for success is negotiating flexibility. This means a clear understanding of what the goals of the comprehensive sanctions action must be and the means necessary to achieve that end. These are: 1) The negotiation process must begin between the contending groups, with the major liberation groups, such as the ANC and SWAPO included; 2) a flexible format will require some international mediating agency under the over-all direction of the United Nations. The nations of the world cannot be expected to take part in a comprehensive sanctions action unless they have a role in the settlement. In practice, this means an appointed group such as the Front-line nations or the Western negotiating states would need to act. The Council for Namibia should not try to be bypassed and must be brought into the process as well.⁴⁵

Rather than define the basis of the settlement themselves the mediating groups should seek to create the conditions for free and fair elections in Namibia and South Africa, and allow the nationals of the different states to establish new representative agencies to proceed to settle among themselves the basic form of government and policy. If there are any criteria to be applied to the minimal terms of the settlement, these should only be self-determination and racial equality, meaning the independence of Namibia and the democratic participation of blacks along with minorities in the new South African society. Other principles of justice and re-distribution of the wealth and control of basic industries should be left to the contending parties themselves.

SWAPO and the ANC have shown themselves to be open to this negotiation process. The obstruction has come from South Africa and the United States under Reagan, together with the U.K., under Thatcher.

Conclusions

The questions regarding the impact of sanctions on United States cor-

44. Africa News, April 18, 1986.

45. See the "Arusha Declaration and Programme of Action on Namibia," UN Council for Namibia at Arusha, Tanzania, 14 May 1982.

porations operating in Namibia, and the possibility of others moving in and assuming the profits from United States corporations who withdraw, are further stalls on the part of investors, made possible by the lack of understanding on the part of so many of our citizens. First, it could be that other multinationals will move in, but if international sanctions are in place to whom will they sell their product? Other companies are as interested in profits as United States companies and will not take over the enterprise if there is no market. Secondly, if we stop exploiting the Namibians and the resources the impact on Americans in general will be positive. The territorial U.S. has the potential to produce many of the minerals in question. Developing this potential would create thousands of jobs for American workers and enhance the American economy. The argument about the loss of jobs by Namibians is utterly ridiculous since few Namibians are employed by United States corporations, and the few who are employed receive very little compensation for their efforts.

Therefore the whole issue hinges on United States and worldwide support for a United Nations sponsored trade embargo of South Africa. The focus is not the fairness to American corporations or questioning who will step in next. The issues are compliance with International Law, Human Rights, Justice and Peace.

Measuring and Analyzing The Economic Effects of Trade Sanctions Against South Africa: A New Approach

Haider Ali Khan with the assistance of Oscar Plaza

The subject of economic sanctions against apartheid in South Africa has already attracted widespread attention. The discussions range from the political economy of sanctions¹ to the modelling of the South African economy in order to examine their impact.²

The existing political economy approaches, however astute, suffer from a lack of empirical analysis at any but the most descriptive level. The linkages between external sanctions and the generation of internal effects via a causal linkage of aggregate demand, output, employment and distribution, are often not made explicit. The causal models, on the other hand, are impoverished in two ways. First of all, they often abstract from the national and international political factors and thus the analysis becomes purely economic. Secondly, this economic analysis is set in a framework of a simple two or three sector model.

The present study starts from the premise that if the economic analyses are to serve as a basis for more useful political economic analysis, then they must not leave out the detail necessary for examining the transmission of the ultimate effects of economic sanctions. In this author's view, this necessitates the use of models which are 'realistic', i.e., with enough sectors (certainly more than three) to capture the production, employment and distribution of output among economic classes and socio-economic groups, as well as the external linkages in the economy.

The present paper proposes a new economy-wide framework for examining the impact of trade sanctions by using the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework. It is argued that using the multi-sectoral presentation of economic data on production, employment, distribution, and external relations, the SAM framework allows one to avoid the pitfalls of narrow economic modelling. At the same time, the inclusion of different classes and socio-economic groups opens the possibility of a detailed and sophisticated political economic analysis grounded in empirical reality. Some preliminary results are

1. Sanford Wright, "The Political Economy of South Africa: An Analysis of Selected Economic Factors on US Leverages", in George W. Shepherd Jr. and Ved Nanda (eds.) *Human Rights and Third World Development* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985) pp. 231-48; William Isomptier, James A. Lehman and Anton D. Lowenberg, *The Economics of the Call for Anti-Apartheid Investment Sanctions* (Palo Alto: Claremont Center for Economic Policy Studies, 1986).

2. Mats Lundahl, "Economic Effects of a Trade Investment Boycott Against South Africa," *South African Journal of Economics*, Vol. 86, No.1, 1984, pp. 68-83.

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presented to illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach for assessing how sanctions might affect different socio-economic groups and classes.³

There are four sections, starting with a discussion of the background conditions showing the *prima facie* vulnerability of the South African economy to a boycott. Sections II and III describe the general methodology and the more specific one based on the South African SAM. The last section presents some preliminary results on effects of sanctions on distribution in South Africa and discusses the possible political and economic significance of these results.

I. The Vulnerability of the South African Economy

Even though the conventional wisdom in economics looks askance at sanctions as effective tools for changing the behavior of a recalcitrant party, the South African economy in the '80s appears to be in a highly vulnerable position. It is an economy historically characterized by the inflow of large amounts of foreign capital. This was especially true of mining but also good for manufacturing in recent years as well.⁴ In 1973, the latter sector attracted 40% of the total foreign investment while mining received 15%.

The dependence of South Africa on its ability to export gold is well known. Historically, gold has accounted for more than half of South Africa's exports. Less well known are South Africa's other exports, e.g., other minerals, sugar, wool, processed fruits and manufactured goods.

On the import side, the country is dependent on both foreign technology and oil. In 1984, the total import bill was 23,530 million rands against an export volume of 25,355 million rands.⁵

Given the openness and trade dependence of the South African economy, sanctions should have some palpable effects. But what will these effects be? Is it possible to arrive at reliable quantitative estimates of these effects? In particular, what will be the precise effect of a trade boycott on the classes and socio-economic groups within South Africa? In view of the decidedly empirical nature of the question of effectiveness of sanctions, it is surprising that the arguments, pro and contra, have been couched in terms of abstract principles and often unverifiable theoretical considerations. While not disparaging the value of such a debate, the need for concrete answers to the questions posed by the issue of sanctions can only be fulfilled by a

3. The present study is a report on a larger project based on the social accounting matrix for South Africa.

4. See, for example, Barbara Rogan, *White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investment in South Africa* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976); Ann and Neva Seidman, *US Multinationals in South Africa* (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing, 1977); and Jill Natross, *The South African Economy: Its Growth and Change* (Capetown: Oxford University Press, 1981).

5. I.M.F., *International Financial Statistics*, Vol. 38, 1985. Import values are given in c.i.f. Since the worsening of the political conditions in South Africa, the balance of trade has also deteriorated.

structural model of the South African economy with sufficient detail. This paper describes such a model based upon the SAM for South Africa for the year 1978.

II. A New Approach Based on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)

In this section the Social Accounting Matrix is presented as a data-gathering framework as well as an analytical tool. The origins of social accounting can be traced as far back as Gregory King's efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems from the attempts by Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorbecke and others. A useful summary of the state of the art can be found in a recent work by Stone.⁶ The following discussion has been left as non-technical as possible for the sake of communicability across disciplines. A technical appendix is attached for the interested reader.

The best way to understand a SAM is perhaps to visualize it as a snapshot of the entire economy at a point in time. As such the SAM summarizes the interrelations between the productive activities, value added going to the factors of production (land, labor, capital, etc.), household income, saving, government expenditures and revenue and balance of payments. All of these are organized in a matrix format as a single entry bookkeeping system where the columns and rows designate expenditures and receipts respectively. Table one shows the basic format of the SAM.

The advantage of a data system in a SAM framework is considerable. First of all the amounts of data gathered in a large SAM is enormous. A 50 x 50 (average size for most SAMs) SAM gives 2500 data points summarizing the economic activities and their outcomes for the given time period. More importantly the constraint expenditures = receipts (which translates into each column sum = corresponding row sums) means that the SAM data set is consistent. Having an appropriate SAM thus ensures consistency in later empirical analysis.

In order to carry out such analysis the SAM accounts are divided into endogenous and exogenous categories. Typically (see fig. 1) the production activities, households and factors can be taken as endogenous (i.e. to be determined by the economic activities in the other, *exogenous* accounts) and everything else as exogenous. Accounting and fixed price multipliers can be computed so that the effects of any change in an exogenous account on an endogenous one translates into a multiple of the initial change. Thus an


6. Richard Stone, "Social Accounting: The State of Play," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 88, No.3 (1986) pp. 453-472. G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, *Planning Techniques for a Better Future* (Geneva:ILO, 1976).

TABLE 1
A Basic Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)

		Expenditures							Totals		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
		Factors of production	Institutions				Combined capital account	Production activities		Rest of the world combined account	
			Current accounts								
Households	Companies		Government								
Receipts	1	Factors of production						Value added payments to factors	Net factor income received from abroad	Incomes of the domestic factors of production	
	2	Institutions	Current accounts	Households	Allocation of labour income to households	Current transfers between households	Profits distributed to domestic households	Current transfers to domestic households		Net non-factor incomes received from abroad	Incomes of the domestic institutions after transfers
				Companies	Allocation of operating surplus to companies			Current transfers to domestic companies			
				Government		Direct taxes on income and indirect taxes on current expenditure	Direct taxes on companies plus operating surplus of state enterprise		Indirect taxes on capital goods		
	5		Combined capital account		Household savings	Undistributed profits after tax	Government current account surplus			Net capital received from abroad	Aggregate savings
	6		Production activities		Household consumption expenditure on domestic goods		Government current expenditure	Investment expenditure on domestic goods	Raw material purchase of domestic goods	Exports	Aggregate demand - gross outputs
	7		Rest of the world combined account		Household consumption expenditure on imported goods			Imports of capital goods	Imports of raw materials		Imports
		Totals	Incomes of the domestic factors of production	Total outlay of households	Total outlay of companies	Total outlay of government	Aggregate investment	Total costs	Total foreign exchange receipts		

Source: G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, *Planning Techniques for a Better Future* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1976), p. 27.

FIGURE 1
Simplified Interrelationship Among Principal SAM Accounts
(Production Activities, Factors, and Institutions)*



*T stands for the corresponding matrix in the simplified SAM which appears on Table 1. Thus for example, T_{1,6} refers to the matrix which appears at the intersection of row 1 (account 1), i.e., "factors" and column 6 (account 6), i.e., "production activities."

T_{1,6}: Income flow to the factors.

T_{2,1}: Value added going to the household.

T_{2,2}: Transfers between households.

T_{6,2}: Consumption.

T_{6,6}: Inputs to production.

Source: Haider Ali Khan & E. Thorbecke, "Macroeconomic Effect and Diffusion of Alternative Technologies within a Social Accounting Matrix Framework: the Case of Indonesia," (Geneva: ILO, 1986).

increase in government expenditure may lead to 3 times that amount in terms of change in output.⁷

7. It is also possible to decompose these multipliers and trace the network of influences in the economy through the structural path analysis. See G. Pyatt and J.I. Round, "Accounting and Fixed Price Multipliers in Social Accounting Matrix Framework," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 89, December, 1979, pp. 852-875, and Haider Ali Khan and E. Thorbecke, *Macroeconomic Effect and Diffusion of Alternative Technologies within a Social Accounting Matrix Framework: the Case of Indonesia* (Geneva: ILO 1986).

The interesting aspect of SAM is that the incorporation of households in terms of socioeconomic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, region, gender, occupation, and income allows the researcher to observe the effects of any exogenous change on these different categories of households. This is illustrated in a study of Indonesia where the SAM includes 44 categories of households divided according to gender, occupation, region (rural vs. urban), ownership of assets and income.⁸

III. The South African Social Accounting Matrix and Analysis of Sanctions

It is indeed fortunate that Central Economic Advisory Service (SEASentrale Ekonomiese Adviesdiens) of the Office of the President of the Republic of South Africa just recently completed the first SAM ever prepared for South Africa.⁹ The data base corresponds to the year 1978, which is recent enough to yield meaningful answers to policy questions. The CEAS has published both an income and a regional SAM. The following is a brief description of the income SAM.

Essentially, the income SAM describes the circular process in which production activities generate household incomes (via the aggregation of factorial incomes per household category) and household expenditures which generate the demand for output. Other related variables such as government spending, imports and exports, transfers, etc. are linked to this core process where necessary.

The 1978 income SAM contains 28 separate productive activities. There is clearly enough detail here on the production side. The value added generated in these productive activities is distributed among landowners, capitalists and forty occupation-by-race groupings. Though unintended, the realism of the classification captures the nature of the apartheid regime by indicating the determination of many occupational categories by racial factors. Finally, there are seven groups of households within each of the four racial groups. These are stratified by income. Therefore, both racial and economic stratifications are embodied here.

The starting point for an analysis of sanctions based on this SAM is the recognition of the exogenous or external nature of these policies. Trade sanctions are typically boycotting of exportables and embargo on importables. These measures deny either certain inputs to the producers or final products to the consumers in South Africa along with barring its commodities from the

world market. A refusal to buy South African products translates very simply into a decrease in expenditures along certain columns of the SAM. It is important to note that the SAM multipliers capture not only the direct reductions of expenditures and its effects on the specific sector under discussion but also the indirect effects as well. For example a boycott of South African gold will result not only in a decline of output and employment in that particular sector, but also in many others (e.g. trade and finance) as well. One important reason for this is that households and companies who receive their incomes from this sector will have less to spend on goods from other sectors, depressing the demand for these goods and services and so on.

IV. Some Empirical Results and Tentative Conclusions.

Table 2 gives the fixed price multipliers¹⁰ for the income received by the various categories of labor and capital in the four significantly export-oriented sectors in South African economy. These are: agriculture, gold, mining, and food.¹¹ What happens to the incomes of capitalists and workers as sanctions are imposed?

Clearly, sanctions would impose hardships on everyone, but will every group suffer equally? The answer suggested by preliminary analysis is quite provocative. In all four sectors capitalists will lose unambiguously more than all the workers combined. Among the workers, however, the high differentiations of skills and the presence of apartheid results in a variegated distributional impact as well. Let us consider concretely the effect of a sanction leading to total income loss of a million dollars.

Considering each sector separately, the capitalists will lose \$676,670 in agriculture, \$665,030 in gold, \$608,150 in mining and \$555,360 in food sector. Among the workers the whites lose relatively more than the other groups, but in absolute terms these losses are minuscule compared to the mainly white capitalists. To illustrate, let us consider the white professionals and laborers in two key sectors, agriculture and gold. In our thought-experiment, these two groups in the agricultural sector will lose \$24,658 and \$25,591 respectively. If we look at the same two groups in the gold sector the collective losses in these two categories are \$29,587 and \$72,167.

10. The multipliers in this section are based on the technical assumptions that income elasticity of demand equals unity for these sectors. While not strictly true in all cases, it is quite acceptable as a first approximation. Future work will address the issue of using different income elasticities for greater realism.

11. Later work will report on the situation in the manufacturing sector.

8. See Khan and Thorbecke, *ibid.*, chapter I.

9. The research for this was conducted by two separate teams, in collaboration with CEAS. See CEAS, *Social Accounting Matrix for South Africa*, Pretoria, 1986.

TABLE 2

Impact of sanctions on capital and various racial-ethnic-occupational categories of labor (Fixed Price Multipliers); showing the change in factor incomes for unit changes in demand.

Category	Agriculture	Gold	Other Mining	Food
Capital	.676673	.665033	.608149	.555363
White				
Professional	.024658	.029587	.034502	.035627
White collar	.065618	.048139	.076849	.107489
Farm worker	.015164	.000848	.000769	.007953
Laborers	.025591	.072167	.069096	.049727
NC	.000872	.000951	.001748	.001295
White total	.130721	.151692	.152964	.202091
Coloured				
Professional	.000872	.000608	.001534	.001286
White collar	.044780	.020291	.005461	.007663
Farm worker	.021092	.000809	.000767	.011679
Laborers	.009226	.006319	.013872	.021107
NC	.000235	.000226	.000584	.000545
Coloured total	.036205	.010853	.022218	.033331
Asian				
Professional	.000481	.000372	.000799	.000955
White collar	.007202	.002391	.004195	.007500
Farm worker	.000657	.000028	.000026	.000383
Laborers	.002655	.001582	.002714	.006410
NC	.000054	.000051	.000098	.000098
Asian total	.011049	.004424	.007832	.015354
Black				
Professional	.001682	.003085	.003787	.002291
White collar	.013339	.014758	.019495	.020675
Farm worker	.080979	.003337	.003100	.041712
Laborers	.029859	.155582	.109870	.066839
NC	.001514	.001616	.003323	.003322
Black total	.127570	.178350	.139575	.134839

Note: The CEAS data has ten categories of employment for each of the four racial groups. We have simplified the presentation of that data by reducing these to five categories. The CEAS categories Professional, Technical, and Other Professional are combined in the single category Professional, and the CEAS categories Administrative, Clerical, Sales and Services are condensed under the heading White collar. Their other three categories, Farm worker, Laborers, and Not Classified Elsewhere (NC) are uncombined.

The position of the black workers is obviously an important issue. Paradoxically, their very low economic status will make the impact of sanctions much less pronounced. This is true not only for the large pool of unemployed but also for the economically active workers. In the latter case the multipliers are apparently higher for some black groups. However, one must consider the fact that black workers outnumber whites by a ratio of more than five to one. Thus, in the previous example black agricultural laborers are shown to suffer a loss of \$29,860 exceeding that suffered by the white workers by some \$4000. Adjusting for the number of workers in each group leads to the result that in per capita terms a black loses only 23.3% of what each white worker loses. When we turn to the gold sector we find that black miners as a group lose \$155,582, or more than twice the collective loss of the white miners. However, in per capita terms given the greater numbers, the black laborer loses at most 50% of what the white laborer must sacrifice.¹² In absolute terms this will still lead to a decline in the living standards, but relative to white workers and capitalists, blacks may not rate their loss too preciously. Furthermore, the historically higher level of white consumption may contribute to a feeling of greater deprivation, as they are forced to curtail their current and future consumption, especially of consumer durables such as houses and automobiles.

Conclusions

A political economy analysis of the internal support for or opposition to sanctions must begin with the kind of data presented above. It is clear that for economic reasons alone, the white capitalists in these four sectors are going to oppose the sanctions. Given the well-known political entrenchment of these interests and their ideological positions, such opposition is readily explicable.

The case of the black worker is also clear. Here a heightened sense of injustice and demand for political equality and partnership seem to have overridden the relatively minor economic losses. The situation with regards to the white workers and professionals is less clear. Their response, therefore, should be of great interest. They certainly have more to lose from the sanctions than their black counterparts. However, the study points out that this difference is less than the difference between either one of these groups and the capital

12. There is, however, a wage differential between the average white and black worker in the same occupation favoring the former. The larger this differential, it might be argued, the more would be the loss of a black worker relative to his own wages. Assuming that the black and white workers are employed the same number of hours, the precise extent of this loss to a black worker relative to his/her own income depends on the absolute sectoral wage rate for the blacks. This information is currently not available to the present author.

owners. Will arguments about the apartheid regime being morally repugnant sway substantial numbers of these groups? Or, will they consider only their own narrow economic interest and the small short-term losses from the sanctions? This question should receive much more critical attention than it has so far.

This paper has not addressed the issue of the so-called Coloured and Asian groups. In the future, it will be interesting to compare their situation and political responses with those of the black and white workers. This is part of ongoing research. The point of this exercise has been merely to illustrate the usefulness of the approach based on the social accounting matrix for understanding the impact of sanctions.

Appendix

The Derivation of Accounting and Fixed Price Multipliers in a SAM Framework¹³

This appendix will discuss some of the technical details for the use of SAM as a basis for economic modelling. As is elaborated further in Khan and Thorbecke,¹⁴ the SAM framework can be used to depict a set of linear relationships in a fixed coefficient model. For deciding the question of determination, the accounts need to be divided into exogenous and endogenous ones. For instance, in the South African SAM, there are three endogenous accounts. These are the factors, households and production activities, leaving the government, capital and the rest of the world accounts as exogenous. Table 3 shows these endogenous accounts plus a consolidated exogenous account.

Looking at Table 4, which represents a SAM, we can see immediately that:

$$Y = n + x \quad (1)$$

$$Y = 1 + t \quad (2)$$

Now if we divide the entries in the matrix T_{nn} by the corresponding total income (i.e. Y_n), we can define a corresponding matrix of average expenditure propensities. Let us call this matrix A_n . We now have:

$$Y = n + x = A Y + x \quad (2.1)$$

$$Y = (I - A)^{-1} x = M x \quad (2.2)$$

M has been called the matrix of the accounting multipliers by Thorbecke,¹⁵ for these multipliers, when computed, can account for the

results (e.g., income, consumption, etc.) obtained in the SAM without explaining the process that led to them. Let us now partition the matrix A_n in the following way.

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & A_{1,3} \\ A_{2,1} & A_{2,2} & 0 \\ 0 & A_{3,2} & A_{3,3} \end{bmatrix}$$

Given the accounts factors, household and the production activities, now we see that the income levels of these accounts (call them Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 , respectively) are determined as functions of the exogenous demand of all other accounts. In this respect, what we have is a reduced-form model which can be consistent with a number of structural forms. This is quite satisfactory as far as tracing the effects of a certain injection in the economy is concerned or for prediction purposes when the structural coefficients are more or less unchanged.

One limitation of the accounting multiplier matrix M_n as derived in equation (2.2) is that it implies unitary expenditure elasticities (the prevailing average expenditure propensities in A are assumed to apply to any incremental injection). A more realistic alternative is to specify a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities (C_n below) corresponding to the observed income and expenditure elasticities of the different agents, under the assumption that prices remain fixed. Expressing the changes in incomes (dy_n) resulting from changes in injections (dx),¹⁶ one obtains,

$$\begin{aligned} dy_n &= C_n dy_n + dx \\ &= (I - C_n)^{-1} dx = M_c dx \end{aligned}$$

M_c has been coined a fixed price multiplier matrix and its advantage is that it allows any non-negative income and expenditure elasticities to be reflected in M_c . In particular, in exploring the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in the output of different product-cum-technologies on other macroeconomic variables, it would be very unrealistic to assume that consumers reacted to any given proportional change in their incomes by increasing expenditures on the different commodities by exactly that same proportion (i.e. assuming that the income elasticities of demand of the various socio-economic household groups for the various commodities were all unitary). Since the expenditure (income) elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal expenditure propensity (MEP) to the average expenditure propensity (AEP) for any given good i , it follows that the marginal expenditure propensity can be readily obtained once the expenditure elasticity and the average expenditure propensities are known; i.e.:

13. Khan and Thorbecke, op cit. Khan, Haider Ali. *Technology, Energy, Employment and Basic Needs: A Study of the Korean Manufacturing Sector*. Report submitted to the World Employment Programme, (Geneva: ILO 1982).

14. See Khan and Thorbecke, op cit., Chapter III.

15. *Ibid.*

16. See Pyatt and Round, op cit., p. 861.

$$\epsilon y_i = \frac{MEP_i}{AEP_i}$$

$$MEP_i = \epsilon y_i \cdot AEP_i$$

and

$$\sum MEP_i = 1$$

Thus, given the matrix A_{32} of average expenditure propensities, and the corresponding expenditure elasticities of demand ϵy_i , the corresponding marginal expenditure propensities matrix C_{32} could easily be derived.

Table 3
Simplified schematic Social Accounting Matrix

		Expenditures					
		Endogenous accounts			Exog.	Totals	
		Factors	Households	Technology production activities	Sum of other accounts		
		1	2	3	4	5	
	Factors	1	0	0	$T_{1,3}$	x_1	y_1
	Households	2	$T_{2,1}$	$T_{2,2}$	0	x_2	y_2
	Production activities	3	0	$T_{3,2}$	$T_{3,3}$	x_3	y_3
	Sum of other accounts	4	1_1	1_2	1_3	t	y_x
	Totals	5	y_1	y_2	y_3	y_x	

TABLE 4
Schematic representation of endogenous and exogenous accounts in a SAM

		Expenditures				Total
		Endogenous	Sum	Exogenous	Sum	
Receipts	Endogenous	T_{nn}	n	Injections T_{nx}	x	y_n
	Exogenous	Leakages T_{xn}	1	Residual balances T_{xx}	t	y_x
Totals			y_n		y_x	

T_{nn} : endogenous flows.

Source: E. Thorbecke, NSF Report.

The Comoro Islands in South African Regional Strategy

W. Andrew Terrill

In 1978 a mercenary coup in the Comoro Islands ended the rule of the revolutionary leader Ali Soilih. Soilih's initially valiant plans to reform his backward nation had by this time degenerated into an abyss of destruction and chaos. Since the 1978 coup numerous countries hostile to the former regime have sought to improve their relations with the Comoros and extend their influence with the government of that country. One nation clearly engaged in this type of behavior is South Africa.

The purpose of this paper is to examine South Africa's links with the Comoros. This will be done to understand both the strength of current ties and the possible uses that South Africa may have for establishing these links. Finally an assessment will be made of countervailing forces opposing South Africa and the possible future directions of South African-Comoran links. A fundamental premise of this work is that many of the South African policies applied to the Comoros represent basic South African principles for regional interaction with African states and the domination of Southern Africa. In the Comoros, however, such principles have progressed further toward their intended result due to special circumstances examined in the course of this work.

Background to South African Penetration of the Comoros

Three of the four islands of the Comoro island chain became an independent nation on July 6, 1975. As such they represented a small state with a land area of 863.3 square miles and a current population of over 400,000. The fourth island in the Comoran chain, Mayotte, remained under French control in response to both French intrigue and popular agitation by its residents against their incorporation into the new national entity.¹ The islands are located in the northern Mozambique Channel, approximately 180 miles east of the coast of Africa.

1. The residents of Mayotte have voted overwhelmingly to remain French on repeated occasions, probably due to a desire to maintain French welfare benefits. See Jacques de Barrin, "Remaining French to Remain Free?" *Le Monde*, May 8, 1984, p. 7 (in French).

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The first president of the Comoros in the post-independence era was former French parliamentarian, Abderramane Ahmed Abdallah. Abdallah's initial tenure lasted less than a month, however, due to a coup by white mercenaries employed by rival leader, Ali Soilih. Soilih made himself President and installed a leftist dictatorship, which placed the country's internal security in the hands of capricious and undisciplined teenage militia members. While many of Soilih's initial ideas reflected a serious attempt to deal with the problems of overpopulation and a collapsing economy, his regime nonetheless became arbitrary and destructive.² Without a strong base of support, this regime also yielded to an attack by mercenaries. This time these troops were employed by Abdallah, and Soilih was killed. Furthermore, after the coup had taken place few of the mercenaries showed any interest in leaving the islands for more strenuous activity elsewhere.

When Abdallah again assumed power he seemed interested in phasing out the mercenary presence in the islands due to the unfavorable reaction to the coup coming from African quarters. His opinion changed however as he realized the key role these individuals played in insuring his own security and that of his regime. From 1981 to 1986 there were at least four serious coup attempts which were put down only with the help of the mercenaries.³ A March 1985 coup attempt was particularly instructive as it pitted insurgent native Comoran members of Abdallah's presidential guard against Europeans within that same force. The native Comorans were defeated by the mercenary troops and it was only this victory that allowed the Abdallah regime to survive.⁴

The failure of President Abdallah to rid himself of the mercenaries or reduce his dependence on this force therefore provoked other African leaders into taking action against his regime. A number of African states severed their diplomatic relations with the Comoros while the Organization of African Unity (OAU) expelled this nation from its ranks.⁵ This push away from mainstream Africa was combined with a pull toward South Africa influenced by the mercenaries. This group was composed of individuals who generally sympathized with South African goals and who occasionally fought beside white South African nationals. As such, they tended to favor friendly relations with South Africa.

The establishment of good Comoran relations with South Africa

2. See Melvin Nevitt, *The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984).

3. "Situation in the Comoro Islands in 1985," *Afrique Contemporaine*, July-August-September 1985, pp. 59-61 (in French), and "Comoros: Riddle of the Coup Announcement," *Africa News*, May 1985, p. 27.

4. Update Comoros: Mercenaries Foil Coup Attempt," *Africa Report*, May-June 1985, p. 39.

5. Cited in Michael Griffin, "Nation's Economic, Political State Examined," *New African*, August 1984, pp. 27-28.

appears to have become a special project of mercenary leader, Bob Denard (the alias for Gilbert Bourgeoud) around the early 1980s. Denard is close to the President and until 1985 was the clear leader of the mercenaries supporting Abdallah (his role was then apparently overshadowed by that of Belgian mercenary, Roger Gie).⁶ Utilizing his previous connections Denard sought commercial ties with South Africa and also chose to coordinate with military and intelligence officials from the South African government.⁷ One particularly telling form of cooperation can be seen with regard to the import-export company, *Establishments Abdallah & Gie*. As the name implies, Abdallah is part owner of this firm, as is Denard. Not surprisingly, this is the largest import-export firm in the Comoros, and its extensive ties to South Africa underscore the personal interest of the Comoran leadership in such ties. While all of the firm's links to South Africa are not known, one particularly high profile interaction is the continuing bulk purchase of South African sugar.⁸

The South African government for its part reciprocated Denard's friendship. South African army officers made frequent trips to the Comoros, and in April 1983 Denard arranged an unofficial visit by Abdallah to Pretoria.⁹ In Pretoria, Abdallah met with a number of South African leaders including Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha. Botha later returned the compliment by covertly visiting the Comoran capital of Moroni on at least one occasion in 1984 when economic cooperation, and possibly secret South African financial assistance, were discussed.¹⁰

Nature of the South African-Comoran Relationship

South Africa's relationship with the Comoros therefore began as an outgrowth of the regime's dependence on foreign mercenaries. These mercenaries and especially Denard have helped to establish and consolidate good relations which the South Africans were soon able to exploit for their own purposes. In particular, the Comoros were integrated into

6. "Comoro Islands: Coup Attempt a Fails, Claims Opposition," *Africa Research Bulletin*, August 15, 1985, p. 7708, and "New Mercenary Threat," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, December 14, 1985, p. 5.

7. "Relations with South Africa," *Africa News*, September 1983, p. 13.

8. "Strategic Position is New Boom Commodity," *Africa Business*, July 1984, p. 33.

9. "No Change in Status for Mayotte Island Foreseen," *Liberation Afrique-Caribe-Pacifique*, March-April-May 1985, pp. 8; 27.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

South African regional strategy through coordination on a variety of levels including:

- The use of "Air Comoros" as a cover for South African commercial air flights and the integration of Comoran ground facilities into South African flight routes;
- The use of the Comoros as a forward base for South African intelligence gathering;
- The use of the Comoros as a staging area to arm the insurgent Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO);
- The use of the Comoros as a model for other Indian Ocean states in their relations with South Africa.

The first South African use for its new relationship with the Comoros involved the sensitive matter of South African civil air flights. Since all OAU states are expected to participate in a civil aviation boycott of South Africa, Pretoria has a variety of problems refueling aircraft for flights to Europe, Asia and the Middle East. South African Airways (SAA) also has to contend with a very large amount of airspace in Africa which it is restricted from overflying. The South African government has attempted to address these problems through non-public understandings with strategically located African and Indian Ocean states, including the Comoros.

South Africa has at times integrated the Comoros into its civil aviation program in two known ways. These are (1) a previous and possibly ongoing use of Air Comoros as a cover for SAA flights and (2) the integration of Comoran ground facilities and air space into South African flight schedules.

The use of Air Comoros as a cover for South African air flights came to light in the aftermath of Pik Botha's 1984 visit to the Comoros. Part of the purpose of this visit is believed to have been to negotiate matters involving civil aviation. The specific flight that was detected was an "Air Comoros" flight from South Africa to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with a stopover in Somalia.¹¹ Such covers for South African flights make it less embarrassing for countries such as Somalia to make their airspace and even landing rights available to disguised South African aircraft. The inability of those involved to keep the matter a secret or even prevent widespread discussion of the links, however, eventually caused the flight to become a public embarrassment. This led to this specific flight being cancelled although similar actions involving an Air Comoros cover may continue to occur and cannot be ruled out for the future.¹²

11. "Update Somalia: Landing Rights Negotiated," Africa Report, March-April 1985, p. 42.

12. See "An Act of Betrayal," The Ethiopian Herald (December 11, 1985) p. 2, for an example of Somalia's chief enemy exploiting the issue of South Africa ties.

The South African use of Comoran ground facilities has been a more enduring facet of Comoran cooperation with Pretoria. The exact point at which this began is not clear, but it appears in general that the Comoran decision to make these facilities available came at a useful time for South Africa. This is because a 1977 coup in the Seychelles replaced the collaborationist regime of James Mancham with a new government hostile to South Africa. As a consequence of this change, South Africa lost a variety of privileges including the use of Mahe airport. This loss placed a gap in South African flight planning which was only partially overcome by rerouting aircraft to Mauritius.¹³

The second use that Pretoria found for the Comoros was as a friendly outpost for the large and powerful South African intelligence establishment. The extent of this involvement is unclear, but credible reports suggest that an underground South African radio monitoring station exists near Isandra on Grande Comoro. Such activity would fit in well with one of the principal interests of South African intelligence. This is the monitoring and recording of a variety of intelligence data on ship movements around the Cape. Such data could complement a South African nautical data gathering and recording system known as Silvermine (Project Advokaat).¹⁴

The enhancement of the Silvermine data base is also an important South African goal, in which the Comoros can play an important role. This is because the strategic position of Comoros, between northern Mozambique and northern Madagascar, makes their position useful for monitoring ships sailing to or past these countries. Comoran data could therefore fill out and enhance the quality of Silvermine data. It could also help South Africa in its unceasing efforts to portray itself as an anti-Communist bastion that is willing and able to cooperate with Western countries on a military level. This cooperation would be predicated on being mutual and would include the South African hope that opposition to apartheid could be correspondingly softened.

The Comoro Islands have also been of use to South African intelligence officials seeking to gather intelligence on Mozambique and to influence events there through covert operations. Prior to the South African imposed non-aggression pact known as the Nkomati Accord, this clearly

13. Arthur Gavron, "The Seychelles: A Tit to the West?" Africa Report, November-December 1983, p. 57, and "Update Mauritius: Trading with Pretoria," Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 28.

14. On the Silvermine system see Richard E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States: Erosion of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 52.

involved supplying the anti-government Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) which was also supplied through Malawi and the northern South African province of Transvaal.¹⁵

Since the conclusion of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 it is more difficult to tell if the Comoros are still being used as a base to support the insurgents. Following the agreement South Africa only admitted that it once supplied RENAMO from its own territory. It also claimed that individuals involved in such activity were transferred away from the border with Mozambique.¹⁶ Later, the South Africans were forced to admit that violations had occurred, although they minimized their scope and claimed that they were the result of a South African effort to bring RENAMO to terms with the Mozambican government.¹⁷

Conceivably the Comoros (and Malawi) could still be used as officially sanctioned weapons conduits for RENAMO under a variety of conditions. The first of these would be if South Africa decided to continue cheating on the Nkomati Accord which the Mozambicans charge has been done. These charges are backed by RENAMO documents seized by the Mozambican and Zimbabwean armies at Gorongosa, Mozambique in September 1985.¹⁸

A second possibility is that the Comoros are being used by South African intelligence officials who are circumventing the Nkomati Accord with only the tacit approval of their government. Such individuals would find willing collaborators among the Comoran mercenaries. These people are reportedly opposed to the Nkomati Accord or at least involved with that faction of South African intelligence opposed to the accord.¹⁹ Additionally, South African officials would find, in the Comoros, a geographically useful staging area from which to mount their operations.

The status of the Comoros as an independent state is also useful to South Africans interested in supporting RENAMO. This is because use of such a staging area circumvents the need for supplies transferred directly from South African territory. This enhances the image of RENAMO as an independent national force and downplays the significance of South African aid. Furthermore, in the Comoros South African officials can coordinate with other ultra-conservative elements seeking to support RENAMO. Such elements are known to include a variety of Portuguese,

Saudi and other individuals ready to supply these forces with weapons and funding.²⁰

The final and perhaps one of the most important functions the Comoros hold in South African strategy is an example of how smaller states might benefit from cooperation with Pretoria. As such the Comoros can be placed in the same category as Mauritius, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. It can be contrasted with a Seychelles which has paid a clear price for its independence of South Africa.

The contrast between the Seychelles and the Comoros is indeed striking. While the Comoros have received economic support and cooperation from South Africa, the Seychelles since 1977 have had to deal with acts of sabotage, subversion and an attempted coup. All of these acts occurred at that point in time when South Africa was especially aggravated with Seychellois foreign policy.²¹

The most serious South African threat against the Seychelles was a 1981 coup attempt. This occurred when South African mercenary leader Michael ("Mad Mike") Hoare attempted to seize control of the government in an action similar to the 1978 Comoran episode. Unfortunately for Hoare, some of his weapons were discovered in Mahe airport, and a shootout with Seychellois authorities ensued. Faced with such difficulties at an early stage, Hoare aborted the mission and returned to South Africa in a hijacked airplane.²² In a subsequent trial for airplane hijacking, Hoare claimed he had the collaboration of South African authorities.²³ He at least had South African acquiescence since his mission had been rehearsed there, and his troops were supplied with South African weapons.²⁴ His recruitment of the mercenaries in South Africa and his subsequent flight to Durban also suggested South African involvement.

The mercenary attempt to overthrow the Seychellois government was followed by a six month long series of bombings and arson attacks directed against government targets. Then in August 1982 portions of the Army revolted, and the René regime was preserved only with the help of Tanzanian troops.²⁵ The extent to which South Africa supported the anti-government violence is unclear but the earlier mercenary coup attempt suggests that involvement is at least possible.

15. "Update Mozambique: MNR Incursions on Upswing," *Africa Report*, March-April 1985, p. 49.

16. "Update Mozambique: MNR Tightens Grip," *Africa Report*, July-August 1985, p. 51.

17. "South Africa and RENAMO," *Die Burger*, September 20, 1985, as reprinted in *South Africa Digest* September 27, 1985, p. 892, on "technical" violations. Also see Allen Isaacman, "After the Nkomati Accord," *Africa Report*, January-February 1985, p. 11.

18. Mota Lopes, "The MNR: Opponents or Bandits?" *Africa Report*, January-February 1986, pp. 68-69.

19. "Feud Splits Mercenary Leaders," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, April 6, 1985, p. 4.

20. See Lopes, *op. cit.*, p. 72, and Sam Levy, "U.S.-Mozambique: Broken Promises," *Africa Report*, January-February 1986, p. 80.

21. Gavshon, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

22. "The day the Seychelles routed the Mercenaries," *Africa*, Number 125, January 1981, pp. 36-38.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.* and "The Hand Behind Hoare," *The Economist*, July 31, 1982, p. 47.

25. Gavshon, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

Limitations on South African Influence

The integration of the Comoro Islands into South African regional strategy has been seen to be both extensive and significant. Despite this situation, there is some potential for a weakening of South African influence due to several key factors. These include (1) the role of France as a former colonial power and current mentor of the Comoros, (2) the re-integration of the Comoros into good standing with black Africa, and (3) the potential of Comoran opposition groups to replace the Abdallah regime or to cause it to moderate its pro-South African policies.

France is currently the most important state maintaining an interest in the Comoros, and French influence is unquestionably more extensive than that of South Africa. The French presently provide the Comoros with large amounts of foreign aid and are linked to the islands by a formal defense agreement.²⁶ Some observers also suggest that France may have been responsible for the 1978 coup.²⁷ The territorial issue of Mayotte is a central problem in French-Comoran relations but it also binds the two nations together through the need to find a common solution to the problem. The French response to South African inroads is therefore extremely important.

The basic policy of the French to date seems to be a limited coexistence with South African interests provided that they do not assume a level that could threaten France's role as the dominant power influencing the Comoros. Some sources have even suggested that France basically approves of the South African influence in the Comoros because this reduces the need for French foreign aid and supports strategic objectives that are not offensive to France.²⁸ Clashes however have occurred.

The most visible clash between France and South Africa over the Comoros centered on an attempt by South Africa to expand its influence within the Comoran tourist industry during the early 1980s. This involved a South African plan to finance hotels in the islands and thereby increase the tourist capacity of the Comoros by 1,500 beds.²⁹ The French responded to this attempt to penetrate a key island growth industry by successfully pressuring the Comoros into cancelling their agreement with South Africa. As part of this effort, France provided grants to bring the French hotel

26. See "Meeting of the French-Comoran Joint Commission; Increased French Financial Aid and Cooperation," *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, November 1990, December 30, 1983, p. 3193.

27. See for example John Stockwell, in *Search of Enemies* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1978) p. 220; also see Daniel Bon and Karen Mingst, "French Intervention in Africa," *Africa Today*, August 1980, pp. 11-12.

28. "No Change in Status for Mayotte Island Foreseen," op. cit., pp. 8; 27.

29. Colin Legum, et al., *Africa Contemporary Record* Volume XV (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984) p. B130.

chain *Nouvotel* into the islands.³⁰ These efforts temporarily denied the South Africans influence within this economic sector. The hotel issue, however, reemerged in the summer of 1986 for reasons to be examined below.

Another less visible but possibly more important clash between France and South Africa occurred in 1985 over the issue of weapons transfers from the Comoros to RENAMO rebels in Mozambique.³¹ While South Africa is unwilling to completely disengage itself from these rebels, France has continually sought good relations with the present government of Mozambique. The use of the Comoros as a weapons conduit has therefore been embarrassing for France and has reportedly provoked considerable tension between Paris and the Abdallah regime. This tension boiled into the open in March 1985 when Radio France International made a broadcast stating that arms shipments originating in the Comoros had reached the RENAMO rebels through Malawian channels. Comoran authorities shot back that the charges were, "grave, fallacious and baseless."³²

The continuing tension between France and the Comoros over the issue of arms transfers may have been a factor contributing to the reemergence of the hotel issue. On July 1, 1986 the South African newspaper *Die Vaderland* announced that the South African Guarantee Insurance Corporation had underwritten a 23 million Rand contract (approximately U.S. \$9 million) for hotel development in the Comoros. This involved the construction of one large beach hotel on the main island of Grande Comoro and two smaller hotels on the lesser islands of Anjouan and Moheli. The South Africans also agreed to upgrade an existing hotel and provide an infrastructure to service the new hotels.³³ A clear implication of this activity is that the Comoran economy could become permanently dependent upon South African tourist largesse. Such a situation will inevitably increase the influence of South Africa although this alone could not end French influence and could provoke a French response to the South African challenge.

A second factor that may have some potential for limiting South African inroads to the Comoros involves the renewed willingness of black Africa to deal with the Comoran government. This willingness has provided the Comoros with an incentive to avoid such close involvement with

30. "Strategic Position' is New Boom Commodity," op. cit., p. 33.

31. Francois Maser, "New Strain in Relations with France," *New African*, December 1985, p. 29.

32. "Who's Behind the MNR?" *Africa News*, April 22, 1985, p. 14.

33. Cited in "South African Firm to Build in Comoros," *South Africa Digest*, July 16, 1986, p. 655.

South Africa that ostracism of the Abdallah regime again becomes a possibility. In this regard the Comoros were readmitted to the OAU in February 1979 following a lowering of the mercenaries' profile in the islands. Since that time a gradual improvement of relations with a variety of African states has taken place.³⁴

Perhaps the most important country to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Comoros is Mozambique. This occurred on June 20, 1985 with potentially significant implications for the arming of RENAMO. The establishment of normal relations between Mozambique and the Comoros suggests that the Abdallah regime might eventually have cause to resist South African plans for destabilizing Mozambique, should Mozambican-Comoran cooperation become more established and institutionalized.

A third factor that may have some potential for limiting South African influence involves the activities of anti-regime opposition groups. Since 1982 these groups have been outlawed and suppressed by the government with increasing degrees of intensity. They are however significant among the Comoran exiles in France and are correspondingly able to disseminate hostile information and propaganda about the Abdallah regime. A central focus of these comments has been the South African links with the Comoros.³⁵ The Comoran opposition therefore is using the South Africa issue in an attempt to discredit Abdallah. The extent to which they are successful in this effort with both Comoran and international audiences may correspondingly have some input on future regime decisions regarding the relationship with South Africa.

A final factor suggesting change involves the mercenaries themselves. As a bloc they are not monolithically pro-South African and a power struggle between Bob Denard and his former assistant Roger Gis (known as "Commander Charles") seems to have worked itself out in the latter's favor.³⁶ While Denard's leadership may still be important, to prevent actual armed conflict between mercenary factions, it is no longer decisive. Gis, moreover, is known to be less pro-South African precisely because these people are so friendly with Denard. While mercenary authority in any country is unpalatable the pro-South African side effects of this situation in the Comoros may begin to fade as Gis consolidates his power and Denard spends more time in semi-retirement in Pretoria.

34. See "Comoro Islands: Diplomatic and Economic Activities," *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, April 20, 1984, p. 1041 (in French).

35. See for example "Arrests Follow Coup Attempt," *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 5, 1985, p. 7610.

36. "Feud Splits Mercenary Leaders," *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Conclusion

The Comoro Islands represent a state which without becoming a satellite has nevertheless been integrated into South African military and political strategy at a variety of levels. This has been done despite South Africa's status as a regional pariah state and because previous ostracism of the Comoros by mainstream Africa proved counterproductive and actually encouraged Comoran-South African ties. Internal changes in the mercenary leadership could limit South Africa's ability to exploit the situation but this development remains problematic.

Attempts to reintegrate the Comoros into respectable African company have shown some potential for reducing Pretoria's influence but can only expect limited success so long as the Comoran regime remains dependent on white mercenaries who view ties to South Africa as both natural and profitable. This dependence is not diminishing with time and even appears to be on the upswing since the 1985 coup attempt.

In considering Comoran-South African relations one is presented with a clear picture of how Pretoria can expand upon fairly small regional victories. While a close relationship with the Comoros would seem superficially unimportant, it nevertheless has allowed the South Africans to advance key economic and political goals. This includes threatening Mozambique and pressuring the United States for cooperation (through Silvermine-related efforts).

The Comoran situation also illustrates that in this unstable and economically backward region South Africa has found complete satellites to be unnecessary. Rather than compete with France for exclusive influence over the Comoros, South Africa has instead pressured the Comoros into concessions on a limited range of issues which, when noticed, have usually served as an irritant rather than a threat to the French. Additionally, the South Africans have been able to exercise their influence in such a way that South African regional leverage has increased while the practical value of other African states remaining loyal to the anti-apartheid boycott has been correspondingly demeaned. Finally, the Comoros may still become a South African satellite, since Pretoria's influence there has the potential for continued growth.

The situation in the Comoros is therefore not promising for the forces opposed to apartheid. Rather it clarifies the nature of South African strength and resourcefulness in exploiting disunity and weakness among the nations of southern Africa. These factors cannot be minimized and will not be easily overcome. While many African and non-African nations alike

devote erratic and limited attention to containing South African influence, the South Africans are deadly serious about breaking out of this isolation. Under these circumstances, weak links such as the Comoros assume a disproportionate importance within South African strategy.

Black Americans and the Demise of Constructive Engagement

Richard J. Payne

Escalating violence in South Africa prior to and after President Botha's declaration of a national state of emergency on June 12, 1986, which placed the entire country under martial law¹, poses serious challenges to President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement and highlights the continuing attempts by black Americans in particular and civil rights and student organizations in general to influence the administration to adopt a more pragmatic approach to a country where violent conflict is intensifying. The effectiveness of this challenge was clearly demonstrated when, in September 1986, Congress overwhelmingly overrode the President's veto of Senate Bill 2701 firmly establishing a limited U.S. sanctions policy. Although the impact of black Americans on foreign policy has been given relatively little attention by scholars of international affairs, those responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. policy toward South Africa cannot ignore the ethnic consciousness of blacks, widespread public opposition to apartheid, and possible domestic political ramifications of perceived official support for the white minority regime.

Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy

American foreign policy, as an extension of domestic political realities, is inevitably influenced by ethnic considerations. As Glazer and Moynihan observed, foreign policy responds to other things as well, but probably first of all to the primal fact of ethnicity.² Unlike most ethnic groups, however, blacks were not politically powerful enough until recently to have a significant impact on their country's relations with South Africa. Their preoccupation with obtaining basic civil rights and achieving economic progress at home prevented them from being as effective as

1. Under the state of emergency security forces may arrest anyone who is considered a threat to public order, and detain them as long as the state of emergency continues. Members of the security forces are exempt from criminal or civil liability in connection with enforcement of the emergency. It is illegal to report "subversive statements" and to publish pictures or recordings of unrest without police permission. The probability of widespread demonstrations to mark the 10th Anniversary of the Soweto uprising triggered the state of emergency.

2. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 23-24.

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Jews, Greeks, Italians, and other ethnic groups which had acquired power abroad. Furthermore, the vast majority of black Americans, having lost direct links with Africa, felt little affinity for or loyalty toward any country other than America.³ Nevertheless, once their position was more secure, Africa became increasingly important to them. Senator Charles Mathias, an astute observer and practitioner of U.S. foreign policy, states that one of the ironies of American ethnic politics is that, as immigrant groups acquire influence in their adopted country, they also often acquire an affection for the old country they probably had not felt when they lived there.⁴ Since black Americans' ties with Africa are essentially symbolic, their interest in South Africa is more closely related to issues of U.S. domestic policy than affection for the old continent.

South Africa's system of apartheid has a tremendous psychological impact on black Americans because its very existence threatens their self-concept and creates self doubts which are accompanied by latent feelings of inferiority. Because of the historical memories of slavery and harsh discrimination against blacks, it is not at all surprising that the black community remains the only population group for which South Africa is steadily a salient issue.⁵ Apartheid represents for American blacks the worst aspects of racism as experienced here throughout the 19th century and for more than half of the 20th century, and the current struggle by black South Africans for basic human rights is reminiscent of the American civil rights movement. Consequently, black Americans are keenly interested in developments in South Africa and U.S. policy toward the minority regime. Black American leaders clearly identify with and support black South Africans, and have succeeded in mobilizing both blacks and whites in support of their goal of eliminating apartheid. So closely are U.S. relations with South Africa connected with domestic politics that any major policy initiative toward South Africa is likely to be construed as symbolic of the degree of an administration's commitment to racial equality in America.⁶ Few policy-makers are unaware of this crucial reality or want to be perceived as representing segregationist attitudes of the past. The fact that South Africa's system of racial discrimination is inextricably intertwined with perceptions of America's own racial attitudes and democratic values

3. Kenneth Longmyer, "Black American Demands," *Foreign Policy*, no. 60 (Fall 1985), p. 7. Many middle-class blacks and intellectuals were interested in African affairs.

4. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, no. 5 (Summer, 1981), p. 980.

5. William J. Foltz, "U.S. Policy Toward Africa," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard Sider, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 41; and George H. Quester, *American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 118.

6. Foltz, *op. cit.*, p. 42; and James Baker, J.D. O'Flaherty, and John de St. Jorre, "The American Consensus on South Africa," *Worldview*, Vol. 22, no. 10 (October 1979), pp. 12-16.

provides black Americans with political leverage similar to that exercised by Jews in relation to Israel.

Determining the extent to which ethnic groups influence foreign affairs is difficult. Nevertheless, there are imprecise measures of a group's ability to shape decisions. Influence can be demonstrated by the group's success in making official statements and actions conform to or be consistent with its objectives and policy preferences. In other words, the administration's behavior becomes more harmonious with positions openly articulated by a segment of the population. A group's influence may take one or more of the following forms: serving as a significant direct source of information into the foreign policy bureaucracy by initiating communication or articulating its interest in the problem; having its interests and goals transformed into official interests and goals; and facilitating or obstructing the implementation of a decision.⁷ Particular conditions must exist for any ethnic group to succeed in altering American commitments abroad, the most crucial of these being that the issue must be viewed as being consistent with the public perception of morality.

Perhaps the most important reason for the black community's greatest foreign policy success (and during the most conservative administration in recent decades) is that the American people do not support Reagan's policy toward South Africa because, in their view, it ignores basic American values and the deeper moral foundations upon which our society is built. As Cyrus Vance observed, one can sense a rising desire among Americans to see a return to the fundamental beliefs on which their country's human rights policy must rest and from which it draws its strength.⁸ South Africa's system of apartheid is anathema to democratic principles of justice, repugnant to a country that has made tremendous progress away from racial discrimination toward a truly egalitarian society, and too painful a reminder of our own past.⁹ Like Jews, blacks have articulated the issue in humanitarian terms and, consequently, appealed to symbols of American nationhood. By so doing, they put their opponents in the uncomfortable position of appearing to support "un-American" values, and have thus eliminated significant opposition to their position. Developments in South Africa only further reinforced American support for the abolition of apartheid and facilitated black influence on U.S. policy. Just as the issue must

7. F. Chidote Ogene, *Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 9.

8. Cyrus R. Vance, "The Human Right's Imperative," *Foreign Policy*, no. 63 (Summer 1986), p. 3.

9. See William J. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Chapter seven addresses more contemporary issues.

be viewed as being consistent with the public perception of morality, an ideological connection between the would-be influencer and policymakers is also essential.¹⁰

Members of Congress, especially those who were directly involved in the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam war protests, may see a link between their efforts to be more assertive in foreign policy-making and humanitarian legislation suggested by ethnic organizations. But such legislation must be regarded as a pragmatic way of securing national objectives and economic interests, and should provide some political advantages or, at least, not be politically detrimental. For most members of Congress the specific context of a policy issue can be decisive. If South Africa is seen primarily as an East-West, communism v. anti-communism issue, Congress is likely to support the white minority. However, when the issue is articulated in terms of racial justice members of Congress take an anti-apartheid position.¹¹ While ethnic factors do not necessarily take precedence over anti-communist tendencies, they play a role in altering and reducing American commitment to ideology.¹² Growing black political sophistication and the rise of black members of Congress to powerful committee assignments contributed to blacks' ability to redefine the issue of apartheid as one of injustice rather than communism, thereby depriving Reagan of the ideological basis for his policy of constructive engagement with the white minority regime.

Another factor facilitating a group's influence is the degree of specificity of the issue. Unlike previous attempts to influence American policy toward the vast extremely diverse African continent, the current focus on apartheid is far more specific and tangible. By concentrating on abolishing apartheid, black organizations make it easy for members of Congress to support their position even if they disagree with their strategies. Furthermore, coalition-building becomes more feasible when any interest group has a well-defined objective that is also consistent with American values. Many different organizations' combined resources may comprise a formidable political instrument beneficial to all involved. In addition to the acquisition of essential political skills and resources and access to decision makers, an ethnic group's influence on foreign policy is dependent on its ability to mobilize those who belong to it. The various leaders must be able to galvanize for specific political objectives the strong emotional bonds of the group's members to their ancestral home or country to which they

10. Bernard C. Cohen, *Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 8.

11. Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 52; and Foltz, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

12. Quetzer, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

have a symbolic attachment.¹³ In order to achieve this substantial group support and cohesion, the issues must arouse a certain amount of indignation against a perceived enemy or threat and must be highly charged with moralistic and humanitarian concerns.

Finally, the ethnic group must have a lobbying apparatus as well as being capable of posing an electoral threat. Various organizations and individuals have lobbied on behalf of black Americans in their effort to shape foreign affairs, W.E.B. DuBois, A. Phillip Randolph, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, James Farmer, Robert Browne, Martin Luther King, Jr., and James Foreman were among the early leaders who advocated close U.S.-African ties. The lobbying resources of the entire liberal-labor-black political coalition were available to blacks. Liberal leaders such as Hubert Humphrey and Donald Fraser advocated a U.S. Southern African policy similar to that desired by black Americans, and the AFL-CIO has usually supported positions strongly advocated by blacks.

Despite the existence of these and other civil rights organizations that worked to influence policy, the creation of TransAfrica by the Congressional Black Caucus in September 1977 established the first institutional vehicle whose sole objective is to aggregate and articulate black interests in U.S. relations with Africa and the Caribbean.¹⁴ Under the leadership of Randall Robinson, a graduate of Harvard Law School, TransAfrica enjoys considerable support among black academics, members of Congress, the black community and a broad coalition of civil rights, church, and student organizations.

Passage of voting rights legislation, massive voter registration drives, increased educational and economic opportunities, tremendous progress in integrating blacks in the mainstream of American life, and a growing awareness of their political power, especially during the election of 1976 in which they provided President Carter with his margin of victory, have all contributed to the ability of blacks to pose an electoral threat. And although Reagan was elected and reelected without significant black support, individual Republican members of Congress cannot completely ignore the black vote. Unlike 1976, the electoral threat is not as important in 1987 to mobilize American support against apartheid and constructive engagement. Reagan's policy towards South Africa, his general disregard for civil rights issues at home, opposition to affirmative action, his deep

13. Mathis, *op. cit.*, p. 996.

14. Watanabe, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

15. Herschelle S. Chalfont, "The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa," in *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Abdul Said, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 143.

cuts in programs affecting the poor, many of whom are black, attempts to weaken the voting rights act and his nomination of racially-biased judges such as William Steele Sessions to federal office combined to inspire greater black and white concern about South Africa. Blacks are so estranged from the Reagan administration that they feel they have nothing to lose domestically by opposing the president on foreign policy.¹⁶

Constructive Engagement

Reagan's election in 1980 was a welcome relief to leaders of the white minority regime after Carter's emphasis on human rights and his administration's vocal opposition to apartheid. Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Vice President Walter Mondale were all involved in applying pressure on South Africa in international forums and called for political equality while on official business in South Africa. Carter also reiterated American support for the arms embargo against South Africa following that government's decision to prevent publication of black newspapers, and warned Prime Minister John Vorster that the United States would not continue the policy of paying only lip service to majority rule and equality.¹⁷ Rather than agreeing with white South Africans that communism was the major problem, Carter deemphasized the Soviet threat, focusing instead on racial injustice. Furthermore, unlike previous American U.N. Ambassadors, Young did not hesitate to focus on black South Africans as being ultimately responsible for the transition to a multiracial egalitarian society.

President Reagan clearly signaled a shift away from support of the black majority and pressuring the apartheid regime toward dialogue with the white minority. His policy of constructive engagement largely ignored more than 72% of the South African population and relied almost entirely on white-led change, as defined by a regime determined to modernize apartheid in the face of rising violence. Stopping Soviet/Cuban expansionism in southern Africa and elsewhere became the preoccupation of the Reagan administration, a worldview which coincided with South Africa's. Seemingly unaware of widespread Afrikaner sympathy with the Nazis and resistance to South Africa's entry in WWII against Hitler, Reagan hailed the apartheid regime as a strong ally and advocated greater acceptance of that country in the global framework of Western security. Furthermore, South Africa's strategic value was seen as outweighing human rights concerns.

16. Longmyer, op. cit., p. 11.

17. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Talking Tough to South Africa," *The Washington Post*, March 18, 1977, p. A27; and Willem E. Scherfelle, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "U.S. Relations with Southern Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 26, no. 1976 (May 9, 1977), p. 467.

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Apart from the administration's contention that the Cape route's security was crucial for the continued flow of Western oil supplies from the Middle East, South Africa's vast mineral wealth and its strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies were main considerations underlying constructive engagement.

Reagan's ideological affinity with South Africa (in relation to communism) and his perception that closer ties with the white minority would better safeguard America's security interests influenced him to protect South Africa from international pressures and to reverse previous U.S. policies designed to demonstrate opposition to minority domination and put distance between the two governments.

Evidence of this departure was first seen in March 1981 when U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick received a visiting South African delegation that included South Africa's chief military intelligence officer, Lieutenant General van der Westhuizen.¹⁸ By June the White House had issued a series of measures which permitted the sale of American products (including medical equipment and supplies) to South Africa's police, military, and nuclear agencies. In February 1982 the administration added computers, helicopter, and airplanes to the list of goods sold to South Africa.¹⁹ The most controversial action however, was the Commerce Department's decision to allow the sale of approximately 2,500 shock batons for use of the South African police which is in violation of the Human Rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.²⁰ These measures were taken amid growing violence in South Africa, developments which would enhance blacks' influence on U.S. policy and ultimately contribute to the demise of constructive engagement.

Developments in South Africa

Situational factors are generally regarded as key determinants of a group's ability to have an impact on foreign affairs.²¹ The state of emergency declared in June 1985 vividly demonstrated the white government's loss of control as well as its ruthlessness, and created a new sense of urgency in Washington and for apartheid activists throughout the country. Black

18. Andrew Cockburn, "An Uneasy South African Tie," *The New York Times*, December 26, 1984, p. 15.

19. Kevin Danaher, *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 194.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

21. Lester W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, James N. Rosenau, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 248-56.

South Africans, growing increasingly defiant, violent and confident that apartheid would eventually be defeated, buried their dead not in mourning but in protest. In scenes reminiscent of the American civil rights struggle, blacks were indiscriminately beaten and over 1,750 killed by white policemen and soldiers, many in full view of television cameras. And the violence continued after the government banned television coverage, lifted the state of emergency on March 7, 1986, but reimposed it, this time on a nationwide basis, on June 12, 1986.

Confronted by the reality that change was inevitable South Africa's President Pieter Botha vacillated between utilizing brute force and making limited concessions to blacks. These reforms included an acknowledgement of permanence of about 10 million blacks in so-called "white" South Africa, relaxation of regulations governing nonwhite access to areas designated as white, repeal of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Act that prohibited interracial sex and marriage, suspension of forced resettlement of blacks into the unrecognized Bantustans or Homelands, and abolition of pass laws or 'influx control.' Despite these changes, which would have been earlier regarded as major compromises, blacks demanded total dismantling of apartheid. Conservative Afrikaners, viewing the reforms as threats to their privileged status, directly confronted the government to force a return to the status quo. Their Nazi-like banners reminded the world of the philosophical foundations of apartheid and its repugnance to western values.

As the government proved incapable of leading South Africa out of the cycle of violence, various individuals and organizations in that country became more assertive. Many blacks and whites called for peaceful change and formed alliances such as the United Democratic Front. Black and white university students protested government repression and experienced police brutality and official indifference to their fate. But perhaps the most important development was action by business leaders.

South Africa's reputation for stability and high profits attracted investors who appeared oblivious to the dehumanizing effects of apartheid on blacks. By 1984, however, business confidence was badly shaken as profits declined, black trade unions grew more politically active, and the value of the rand, until recently worth U.S. \$1.20, plummeted to forty cents by September 1984. Business leaders, especially South Africans, severely criticized the government, and Gavin Relly, chairman of Anglo-American mining corporation, led a group of businessmen to Zambia to discuss South Africa's future with the outlawed African National Congress. For Relly and others apartheid is now seen as a threat to free enterprise.²²

22. Gavin Relly, "The Costs of Disinvestment," *Foreign Policy*, No. 63 (Summer 1986), p. 132; "The Rand: A Fraction of Its Former Self," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 1985, p. 13; and David Sanger, "South African Prospects Leave I.B.M. Chief Glum," *The New York Times*, April 23, 1986, p. 25.

More than 900 South African white businessmen, faced with an effective black boycott, called for ending racial segregation of neighborhoods, authorization of all races to own property, and the inclusion of blacks in the central government. In addition to endorsing the Sullivan Principles which call for equality in the work place and beyond, American firms also openly condemned apartheid. G.M., for example, directly challenged the minority regime by offering financial and legal support to employees who defy the law segregating beaches.²³ By June 1986 about 80 American companies placed full-page newspaper advertisements throughout South Africa advocating the elimination of apartheid and the legalization of outlawed political organizations.²⁴ As political violence continues, and the recession deepens, American companies are reluctant to pay the high cost of operating under apartheid. Many are leaving South Africa, while others are reducing the number of employees and transferring part of their operations to South African firms.²⁵

A crucial catalyst in the changing situation in South Africa was the decision to award Bishop Desmond Tutu the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent campaign to end apartheid, and his subsequent appointment as the first black Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg. These developments drew world attention to apartheid and elevated Bishop Tutu with greater moral authority within South Africa as well as internationally. He was able to gain access to Presidents Reagan and Botha (for the first time in six years), members of Congress, the media, churches, and universities, and was now in a position to contribute, directly and indirectly, to black American efforts to influence U.S. policy toward South Africa. The election of the Reverend Alan Boesak to the Presidency of the World Reformed Alliance and that body's expulsion of the white Dutch Reformed Churches of South Africa because of their unwillingness to join the other churches in declaring apartheid a sin, was also of great significance.

Mobilizing Public Support Against Apartheid

The current struggle for racial dignity and equality in South Africa is intimately connected to the American civil rights movement. President

23. Alan Cowell, "G.M. Unit Challenges Apartheid," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1986, p. 46.

24. "Eighty U.S. Companies Urge Protest to Change," *The New York Times*, June 3, 1986, p. 4. Companies involved included I.B.M., Citibank, Union-Carbide, and Coca-Cola.

25. See Jonathan Kaptein, "The High Cost of Keeping Blacks on the Bottom," *Business Week*, September 25, 1985, pp. 106-112; and Barbara Bradley, "U.S. Companies Edging out of South Africa," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 2, 1986, p. 25.

Carter's election marked the emergence of a new constituency for U.S.-African relations in the United States. This coalition, composed of civil rights organizations, young black professionals, church groups, labor unions, college students, and opponents to the Vietnam war, played a pivotal role in helping Carter support a peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe. According to Andrew Young, a driving force for them was the determination that America not provide a bulwark for white suppression of blacks in southern Africa.²⁶ Young's appointment as U.N. Ambassador marked the beginning of black influence at higher echelons of the foreign policy establishment. His experiences in the civil rights movement strongly shaped his perception of and involvement in African affairs, and, for the first time, black Americans felt capable of having a major impact on U.S. policy toward South Africa in particular and Africa in general. Young's strong commitment to Africa and his standing in the black community influenced prominent black Americans to use their leverage on behalf of human rights for South Africa's black majority. It was at Young's suggestion that Rev. Leon Sullivan formulated the Sullivan principles, the backbone of America's South African policy.²⁷

In addition to Young, there was a growing black professional foreign policy elite accustomed to engaging in systematic tradeoffs with other groups interested in foreign affairs. Their integration in the foreign policy establishment and experience in powerful circles facilitated their attempts at coalition-building. The erosion of racial barriers and widespread support among the American people for equal opportunity for all facilitated the emergence of black experts affiliated with prestigious foundations, universities and multinational firms. Among this new elite are Clyde Ferguson, professor at Harvard Law School, Willard Johnson, professor at MIT, Wilbert LeMelle, president of Mercy College; Elliott Skinner, author of *Beyond Constructive Engagement*, Franklin Thomas, the first black president of the Ford Foundation, and Franklin Williams, President of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. All but Johnson and Williams have served as ambassadors in Africa, and Franklin Thomas chaired the first private national commission on American policy toward South Africa which conducted investigations in South Africa in 1979-1980. Its report, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, became a standard reference for scholars and policymakers interested in apartheid.²⁸

26. Andrew Young, "The United States and Africa: Victory for Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1981), pp. 661-662.

27. Martin Kilson, "What is Africa to me? Dilemmas of Transnational Ethnicity," *Dissent* (Fall 1984), p. 437.

28. *Ibid.*; and *South Africa: Time Running Out* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

The rise of this professional elite is symbolic of America's progress toward racial integration and desire to move away from a painful past. As Alan Pifer states,

the trauma and bloodshed that marked the American road to equal justice for all are too deeply etched into the soul of the nation for the vast majority of Americans ever to be willing to abandon their commitment to equality.²⁹ Apartheid is anathema to a society committed to non-discrimination both at home and abroad. By focusing on racial injustice, black Americans appealed to the essence of American nationhood, and focusing on this specific issue made it easier for Americans, conservative and liberal, to support their foreign policy objectives. In open-ended surveys racial issues are accorded priority over all other considerations in the images and attitudes most Americans hold regarding South Africa.³⁰ Strategic interest, communism and trade, for example, are of secondary importance. As millions of Americans watched the violence and brutality of the apartheid regime, their opposition to apartheid was reinforced. A 1985 Gallup Poll showed strong American support for black South Africans. Asked if their sympathies were more with the black population or with the South African government, 63% of the respondents favored blacks while 13% supported the government. Twelve percent said they favored both equally, 5% said neither, 1% identified with the white population, and 6% were undecided.³¹ Whites were less supportive (59%) than black Americans (85%) were of black South Africans. Republicans (52%) were less likely than Democrats (73%) to support the black majority.³² Almost half (47%) of those surveyed called for more U.S. pressure while only 15% advocated less pressure on Pretoria. About 42% of white Americans favored more pressure compared to 74% of black Americans. Thirty-nine percent of the Republicans compared to 57% of the Democrats regarded more pressure as a necessary step.³³ It is important to note that less than 18% of any of the groups favored less pressure on South Africa. In addition to having popular support and "oppositionless" issues, blacks have a lobbying apparatus that is comprised of coalitions representing a broad cross section of Americans.

Organizations such as the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leader-

29. Alan Pifer, "Dimensions of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," *Obss*, Vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1982), p. 865.

30. Alfred O. Hero, "The American Public and South Africa," in *The American People and South Africa*, Alfred O. Hero and John Barratt, eds. (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1981), p. 9.

31. John Gallup, Jr., *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1985* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1986), p. 244.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

ship Conference, Operation PUSH, the AFL-CIO, the American Committee on Africa, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the Urban League, the Washington Office on Africa, the American Friends Service Committee, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Lawyers for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Association of Concerned African Scholars have persistently lobbied on behalf of black Americans to shape U.S. policy toward South Africa. Black organizations early on adopted specific policy objectives for Washington to pursue in relation to South Africa. The Coalition of Black Trade Unionists in 1980 called for withdrawal of bank accounts and union funds from banks doing business with South Africa. In 1966 the NAACP advocated a ban on new American investments in minority-controlled governments and in 1980 it called for U.S. divestment as well as economic sanctions against Pretoria. The national Black Caucus of State Legislators urged its members to introduce divestment bills nationwide. The Summit Conference of Black Religious Leaders on Apartheid in 1979 proposed total U.S. economic withdrawal from South Africa, and as early as 1962 Martin Luther King, Jr. advocated sanctions against South Africa.

Despite previous black lobbying, it was not until the creation of TransAfrica in 1977 that blacks gained an effective ongoing lobby. Under Randall Robinson's leadership, TransAfrica now has over 10,000 members, an annual budget of half a million dollars, and is widely regarded as the legitimate representative of blacks' foreign policy aspirations. TransAfrica has consistently called for the initiation of comprehensive economic sanctions, trade embargo, a ban on new investments, a prohibition on transferring funds to and from South Africa, the elimination of air travel between the two countries, and termination of diplomatic, consular, cultural, and athletic relations.³⁵ Its objective is to mobilize American public opinion against constructive engagement and to put the issue of apartheid in the middle of the American political agenda. To accomplish this, TransAfrica publishes the *TransAfrica Forum* to provide information on South Africa, and has organized the Free South Africa movement and a steering committee to oversee nationwide anti-apartheid protests. The Free South Africa Movement is a broadly-based coalition of church groups, students, civil rights activists, labor union representatives, and various black organizations. It organized daily protests, at the South African Embassy during which many prominent Americans were among 3,046 people arrested. Among those arrested was Lowell Weicker, who thereby became the first U.S. Senator in history to be arrested for civil disobedience while in

office. The names of some other well-known citizens can be found in Table 1, clear evidence of the widespread support for black foreign policy objectives, and general repudiation of constructive engagement.

As a direct result of these daily arrests of prominent Americans, demonstrations were organized in numerous cities and on university campuses nation-wide. Thirty-five conservative Republican House members, led by Newt Gingrich of Georgia, threatened to seek economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa unless it showed progress in ending racial separation, and President Reagan, in a significant departure from previous practice, strongly condemned apartheid following a meeting with Bishop Tutu.

Under the leadership of TransAfrica and The American Committee on Africa, demands for divestment and banning the sale of krugerrands grew, and apartheid became the popular issue for college students in 1985 and 1986. At Harvard, Brown, Columbia, the University of Illinois, and the University of California at Berkeley, among others, students par-

Table 1. A Selected List of Americans Arrested for Demonstrating Outside the South African Embassy and Consulate

Name	Position
Lowell Weicker	U.S. Senator from Connecticut (Republican)
Randall Robinson	TransAfrica
Walker E. Fournier	Delegates to Congress from District of Columbia
Mary Frances Berry	U.S. Commission on Human Rights
Caroline Collins	U.S. Representative from Illinois (Democrat)
William Clay	U.S. Representative from Missouri (Democrat)
Charles Hayes	U.S. Representative from Illinois (Democrat)
Patricia Schroeder	U.S. Representative from Colorado (Democrat)
Thomas R. Donahue	Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO
Leon Lynch	Vice President for Human Affairs of the United Steelworkers
Charles A. Patrick	President of the Newspaper Guild
Former Judge William Booth	President of the National Coalition of the 100 Black Men
Rev. Herbert Daugherty	Chairman of the National Black Front
Ronald Dellums	U.S. Representative from California (Democrat)
John Conyers	U.S. Representative from Michigan (Democrat)
Gerald McInnes	President of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
Mark Stepp	Vice President of the United Auto Workers
Douglas Kennedy and Rory Kennedy	Children of Robert Kennedy
Theodore R. Mann	President of the American Jewish Congress
Henry Seligman	Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress
Rosa Puzis	Leader of the Montgomery Bus Boycott
Sister Mary O'Keefe	National Director of the Association of American Nuns
Roger Wilkins	Institute for Policy Studies
Famecy Clark	Former Attorney General of the United States

Sources: The New York Times, December 5, 1984, p. 10; The New York Times, December 6, 1984, p. 27; The New York Times, December 10, 1984, p. 17; The New York Times, December 11, 1984, p. 4; The New York Times, January, 1985, p. 13; The New York Times, May 10, 1985, p. 8.

35. Mifred Pierce, "Black and White American Opinions Towards South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 26, no. 4 (1982), p. 680; and Barbara Gamarekian, "Lobbyist with a Target: South Africa," *The New York Times*, December 5, 1984, p. 9.

participated in anti-apartheid protests against universities with stock in companies engaged in business in South Africa. Partly in response to student pressure, 16 college and university presidents, including those of Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Yale, Bryn Mawr, Dartmouth and Swarthmore, urged the American Chamber of Commerce to be more actively involved in ending apartheid.³⁷ Elsewhere, emphasis shifted to Capitol Hill, the headquarters of corporations doing business in South Africa, and to consumer boycotts against some of these firms.³⁸ The National Council of Churches, the General Convention of the Episcopal Church, the General Synod of the United Church of Christ and the United Methodist Church have been leaders in divestment campaigns, not only divesting their holdings in companies in South Africa but exerting pressure on the government and corporations to work forcefully for dismantling apartheid.³⁹

TransAfrica also initiated a divestment campaign aimed at cities, states, and organizations that have money invested in companies operating in South Africa. Massachusetts, the first state to totally disinvest in 1983, has been followed, to date, by 15 other states, including New Jersey, Connecticut, Minnesota, and New Mexico. Together, they withdrew \$6 billion from the companies. Virtually all states are considering divestment and other anti-apartheid measures. Major cities such as Boston, Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and Jersey City have ordered total divestment, while another 55 cities imposed bans on new investments, and restricted banks from extending credit to South Africa.⁴⁰ Mayor Ed Koch of New York, who formerly opposed withdrawing New York City's pension funds from companies involved in South Africa, endorsed the recommendations of a report urging the city to express solidarity with black South Africans because of his belief that "the city has a moral responsibility to lead the fight against discrimination here and abroad."⁴¹ Organizations such as the Teachers' Insurances and Annuity Association, America's largest private fund with \$44 billion, influenced 26 companies to sign the Sullivan Principles. The Bank of America, the nation's second largest bank, joined approximately 24 smaller, regional banks, in refusing to lend money to borrowers in South Africa until apartheid is abolished.⁴²

37. Wolfgang Iwan, "Churches and Colleges Bid Ban on Apartheid," *The New York Times*, January 9, 1985, p. 13.

38. "New Tactics on South Africa," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1986, p. 8.

39. *Ibid.*; and Joseph Berger, "Protestants Seek More Divestment," *The New York Times*, June 10, 1986, p. 9.

40. American Committee on Africa, "Divestment Pace Snowballs," *ACOA Action News*, no. 20 (Fall 1986), pp. 1-4; and "Sanctions on South Africa," *The Economist*, April 12, 1986, p. 32. When Denver, Colorado passed a divestment ordinance in December, 1986, 19 of the 20 largest cities in the U.S. had taken such action.

41. Michael Goodwin, "City Urged to Remove Funds to Protest Apartheid," *The New York Times*, July 14, 1984, p. 10.

42. *The Economist*, op. cit., p. 33; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "Bank of America Loan Curb," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1986, p. 23.

These developments, martial law in South Africa and TransAfrica's access to several members of the Congressional Black Caucus, brought apartheid to the center of the American political process.

Congressional Opposition to Apartheid

Reagan's reelection in 1984 effectively prevented black Americans from regaining direct influence inside the Executive branch. In sharp contrast to the Carter administration, black Americans have been largely ignored by Reagan. According to Congressman Mervyn Dymally, the President consistently refuses to meet with the 20 members of the Congressional Black Caucus to establish a dialogue over foreign or domestic policy issues.⁴³ Having no members in the Republican-controlled Senate, the Black Congressional Caucus focused its attention on the Democratically controlled House of Representatives where they comprise only 4.5% of the membership. The House emerged as the leading body on anti-apartheid legislation.

The Congressional Black Caucus, founded in 1971, made U.S. policy toward Africa one of its major concerns. For more than 16 years, the CBC has provided leadership on apartheid, provided information to members of Congress, and kept the issue in the news. Many of the actions now enacted against Pretoria were advocated for two decades by the CBC. As is currently the case, they articulated the issue of apartheid in terms of justice versus injustice, not black versus white. Their persistence, political sophistication, positions on powerful committees, the emotional nature of the issue, the repugnancy of apartheid to Congressional members and the American public, and the apartheid regime's widespread brutality contributed to their ability to influence U.S. policy, despite White House opposition. In fact, the lack of presidential leadership forced Congress to take the lead in putting America on record against apartheid. Many Republicans, viewing constructive engagement as collaboration with discrimination against blacks, distanced themselves from and openly criticized the President's policy. Under these circumstances, the CBC played a crucial role in shaping American policy.

Many black legislators have gained seniority and positions on powerful committees which deal with foreign policy. Ronald Dellums, one of the first members of Congress arrested outside the South African Embassy for protesting against constructive engagement, became the chairman of the

43. Letter from Congressman Dymally, February 20, 1986.

Armed Services subcommittee on Military Construction after serving for 12 years in the House. Cardiss Collins chairs the Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities; William Gray was selected by House Democrats as chairman of the powerful Budget committee; and George Crockett is the second ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Crockett, who exercises significant influence over subcommittee positions, also conducts yearly seminars on American policy in Africa. These seminars assemble scholars and specialists on Africa and serve as a resource for the Congress.⁴⁴ Like other legislators, CBC members are coalition-builders. Charles Rangel, for example, stressed the possibilities for legislative trading and compromise during his tenure as chair of the CBC in the 99th Congress. A close friend of then Speaker Tip O'Neill, Rangel is regarded as the CBC's most effective lobbyist. Mickey Leland has also demonstrated skill in building coalitions, and works closely with Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, and Ted Weiss.

William Gray has consistently introduced legislation calling for tougher measures against apartheid. In 1981 Gray sponsored a bill (HR 3697) aimed at prohibiting new U.S. investments in South Africa. Two sessions later, in 1985, his Anti-Apartheid Act (HR 1460) passed with an overwhelming majority in the House,⁴⁵ triggering a series of significant events. Gray's argument that the choice was between "standing with the victims or standing with the oppressors" effectively put opponents of the measure in a position of appearing to favor apartheid. Not surprisingly, 35 conservative congressmen openly declared their commitment to freedom, opportunity, and individual liberty, and warned Pretoria that it could not count on conservatives to look the other way.⁴⁶ Conservatives were aware of the political and social implications of voting against what could be considered an extension of the domestic civil rights struggle. As Adam Meyerson observed "there is a river . . . that separates the majority of black Americans from the conservative movement, and until it is crossed conservatives cannot make a full claim to national leadership."⁴⁷ Many conservatives supported the Anti-Apartheid Act.

Gray's views were strongly supported in the Senate, a development which placed a surprised White House in a very awkward political position.

As in the House, apartheid was seen as a moral issue and repugnant to basic American values. Arguments about South Africa's strategic importance, because of its location and mineral resources, and its opposition to communism were largely ignored by the overwhelming majority of Senators who wanted to register their support for basic human rights at home and in South Africa. Bipartisan leadership on apartheid was demonstrated by the fact that early in December 1984 Richard Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, and Nancy Kassebaum, Chairman of the Senate Africa Committee, wrote Reagan a letter expressing concern about his ambiguous policy and urging him to speak out more forcefully against Pretoria's racial policies and repression. Senators Lowell Weicker (Republican), Charles Mathias (Republican) and Ted Kennedy (Democrat) strongly condemned apartheid, with Senator Weicker noting that the legal foundations of apartheid were similar to Nazism. Mathias sponsored the Anti-Apartheid bill in the Senate and Kennedy reported the increasing South African hostility toward America and capitalism that he encountered during his visit to South Africa.

Moynihan seemed frustrated by what John Heinz (Republican) called "negotiable" results of constructive engagement and the failure of the white minority regime to make more than token gestures. Many Republicans and Democrats asked the president to support a foreign policy consistent with the views of the first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln.⁴⁸ It was clear that apartheid had emerged as a political issue. In a stunning defeat for Reagan, the Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 16-1 for the sanctions approved by the House, Senator Helms being the lone dissenter, and the full Senate approved the legislation by a vote of 80 to 12.⁴⁹ Senate-House conferees agreed on a compromise version of the bill which was approved by the House, but delayed in the Senate. Fearing a presidential veto, Lugar, the 35 conservative House Republicans and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole urged Reagan to implement provisions of the bill without waiting for the final vote.⁵⁰ Assured of the bill's passage, Reagan signed an Executive Order containing milder sanctions, thereby avoiding another defeat. But Pretoria's raids on Swaziland, Zambia and Botswana, its imposition of

44. *Ibid.*; Congressman Julian Dixon, "The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa," *Africa Report*, Vol. 29, no. 3 (May-June 1978), p. 12; and Alan Ehrenhalt, ed., *Politics in America: Members of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985), pp. 179, 780, and 1313.

45. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. House of Representatives, May 9, 1985.

46. Robert S. Walker, "A Conservative Viewpoint Against Apartheid," *Africa Report*, Vol. 30, no. 3, (May-June 1985), p. 55.

47. Adam Meyerson, "Conservatives and Black Americans: Overcoming the Barriers," *Policy Review*, no. 30 (Fall 1984), p. 40.

48. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Hearings before the Committee on Banking, and Urban Affairs, and the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. April 16, May 24, June 13, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), pp. 6, 33, 55, and 57.

49. See "Senate Approves Bill to Punish South Africa for Racial Policies," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 43, no. 28 (July 13, 1985), p. 1364.

50. "Lugar Warns Against Veto of South Africa Sanctions," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 43, no. 32 (August 10, 1985), p. 1615.

martial law, and severe restriction on the foreign and domestic press exacerbated Reagan's problems with Congress and highlighted the failure of constructive engagement.

When the new session of Congress opened in 1986, the Congressional Black Caucus immediately resumed its efforts to go beyond the President's executive order and impose stringent economic sanctions against South Africa by legislation. As a result the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, approved by the full House on June 18, 1986, called for all American companies to withdraw from South Africa within 180 days, a total embargo on imports of South African raw materials and finished products into the United States as well as a ban on all U.S. exports to South Africa. The Senate's initial reaction was to pressure the President to move more aggressively against apartheid in order to avoid harsh sanctions. Senator Kassebaum urged Reagan to personally intervene and push for immediate negotiations between Pretoria and black South African nationalists. Senator Lugar, wanting to avoid another confrontation between Congress and the White House over foreign policy, and pointing out that stronger U.S. action was inevitable, stated that "The President and the Secretary of State ought to be responding on behalf of the country."⁵¹ Disappointed with Reagan's speech on South Africa, the Senate voted 84-14 in favor of its own somewhat milder bill on August 15, 1986, despite strong protests against such a move by the White House. The House leadership voted to support this version in order to get the legislation on the books and the administration's only remaining recourse, a presidential veto, was resoundingly overridden in September 1986.

The Demise of Constructive Engagement

Overwhelming Republican support for stronger actions against South Africa's white minority regime reflected Congress' view that constructive engagement was dead. Reagan's own imposition of relatively mild sanctions against Pretoria, after being admonished to do so by the Senate Republican leaders, had already provided conclusive evidence that his policy had failed. White South Africans who warmly embraced Reagan as their "virtual Savior" regarded his sanctions as a betrayal, despite his attempts to deny his defeat by calling his policy by a new name, "active con-

Richard J. Payne

structive engagement."⁵² Reagan's first executive order, issued on September 9, 1985,⁵³ failed to ban the sale of Krugerrands. Senator Lugar then threatened to revive the House-Senate conference bill, which the administration opposed. On October 1, 1985 Reagan issued another executive order banning importation of Krugerrands "in recognition of the fact that the Krugerrand is perceived in Congress as an important symbol of apartheid. This view is widely shared by the U.S. public. I am directing this prohibition in recognition of these public and congressional sentiments."⁵⁴

The President's admission of public and congressional influence was evidence of the fact it is extremely difficult for any president to ignore basic American values, the nation's deep commitment to racial equality, and the ability of ethnic groups to shape foreign policy. By appealing to the moral values upon which America is built; recasting the issue of apartheid in terms of justice versus injustice; mobilizing broad support from church groups, labor unions, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association, Jewish groups, and civil rights organizations; building grassroots support in the black community; having TransAfrica as an effective lobby; focusing on specific issues; and by building coalitions in Congress, black Americans have a significant influence on U.S. policy toward South Africa. Their ability to transform goals and interests they have had for over two decades into official goals and interests was due not only to their persistence and growing political power but also to the fact that America does not want to rekindle racial hostility after having made tremendous progress toward a non-racial egalitarian society. South Africa's system of apartheid is too painful a reminder of our past, and is anathema to a country deeply committed to human rights and a foreign policy reflective of the symbols of American nationhood.

53. "What Reagan Has Decided to Do," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 43, no. 37 (September 14, 1985), p. 1803.

54. Message from the President of the United States, "Prohibition of the Import of Krugerrands" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, October 1, 1985), p. 1; and "Reagan Bans Krugerrand Imports," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 43, no. 40, (October 5, 1985), p. 2021.

51. Jonathan Fuesbringer, "Key Senator Cool to South Africa Sanctions," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1986, p. 6; and Gerald Boyd, "U.S. Says Both Spurned Appeal From Reagan to Repeal Decree," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1986, p. 7.

52. See Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, "South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 2, (Winter 1985/86), pp. 234-235.



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Africa Rights Monitor

Uganda: Breaking Out of the Mold?

John D. Rusk

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John D. Rusk is a Ph.D. candidate at the
ARM since its inception.

2nd/3rd Quarters, 1986

rights monitoring groups suggest that the number of those killed by Amin's troops ranged from at least 50,000 to more than 300,000.¹ Killings of this magnitude are unprecedented in contemporary African history.

When Amin was ejected through Tanzanian military intervention in January 1979, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief. What is not generally recognized is that the human rights horror continued over the next seven years. With Amin gone, the old political, regional, and ethnic factionalism re-emerged. Squabbling in the political arena and disarray within the armed forces hastened the collapse of law and order throughout the country. Wide-scale killing, looting, and corruption were characteristic of this period. Retaliation descended upon those areas of the country that had most strongly supported former President Amin. In one well-known incident, Ugandan troops completely destroyed the West Nile capital of Arua, leaving more than 250,000 homeless there and in other parts of the province.² The nation's miseries were further exacerbated by famines in 1980 and 1981 which left as many as 30,000 dead of starvation in the Karamoja region of the northeast.³

Milton Obote re-entered the political scene in December 1980 when he was elected President in elections that were noted for widespread fraud. He tried to consolidate his rule through intimidation and terror at the hands of the armed forces, at which time many opponents fled the country. Insecurity reigned supreme throughout the country as Obote's undisciplined troops engaged in acts of atrocities and banditry.⁴ Torture and death awaited many opponents of the regime. The Makindye and Kireka military barracks as well as the Milton Obote Foundation Building in Kampala became institutionalized centers of death.⁵ Anti-Obote sentiment soon coalesced into the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Army (NRA); former President Yusufu Lule headed up the political wing of the organization while Yoweri Museveni took control as commander of the guerrilla force. The resulting civil war introduced a new round in the history of human rights abuse in Uganda. Obote swiftly visited his wrath on ethnic groups and areas of the country thought to be linked to the NRM/NRA. In the Lower Triangle north of Kampala, thousands were detained, tortured, or killed at the hands of government troops.⁶ Such abuses unfortunately continued during the brief rule of General Tito Okello in 1985-86 until he was routed by the NRA in January 1986.

1. *Africa: South of the Sahara 1983-83* (London: Europa Publication, Ltd., 1982), p. 1098.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 1100.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1099.

4. See "Uganda: Opposition in Trouble," *Africa Confidential*, November 11, 1981, p. 8 and "Uganda: On Stopping UNLA," *Africa Confidential*, October 15, 1981, p. 8.

5. "Uganda: On Stopping UNLA," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

6. See *Amnesty International Annual Report 1986* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1986), pp. 106-110.

Violent solutions to the delicate problem of nation-building have beset Uganda since independence. These responses have contributed to a political culture accepting of the use of force as an indispensable element of rule to a degree most would regard as excessive. This political culture frustrates reform efforts and distinguishes the human rights problems of Uganda from those of other African states. The ethos of this culture is best summed up in a recent interview with a taxi driver in Kampala: "They (the northerners) killed our people for many years and they even invited Anyenyas from the Sudan to come and help them kill us. I can never forgive them; they should also be killed. Now we have defeated them and they will never rule us again."⁷ Such is the legacy the present government must grapple with in its effort to construct a new human rights order.

Consolidation of Power

Ever since the forces of the NRA assumed power in 1986, the new government has been attempting to transform the guerrilla movement into a government charged with the day-to-day responsibility of administration in accordance with accepted international human rights standards. To promote this goal, the new regime has established a human rights commission and promised to return Uganda to the rule of law, but for these efforts to have any chance of success, the government must extend its administrative control throughout the country. In the initial phase of the consolidation process needed to guarantee the short-term survival of the regime, the NRM mandated the establishment of National Resistance Councils at the local, regional, and national levels. These councils are designed to facilitate the mass mobilization of the population needed to rebuild the Ugandan economy and to create new political structures that bridge historical cleavages of class, region, and ethnicity. This task, however, is not likely to be easy, given the general suspicion of post-colonial political institutions and traditions. Given the legacy of the past, public confidence in all political institutions is low, since people no longer believe what they used to believe.⁸

One of the primary roles of the Resistance Councils is the inculcation of new political and social values. Numerous political education and military training seminars are taking place throughout the countryside, but this effort

7. "Solving the North-South Conflict," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 7 March 1986, p. 15.

8. A.M. Babu, "Uganda's Lesson in Democracy," *South* (London), October 1986, p. 93.

cuts in programs affecting the poor, many of whom are black, attempts to weaken the voting rights act and his nomination of racially-biased judges such as William Steele Sessions to federal office combined to inspire greater black and white concern about South Africa. Blacks are so estranged from the Reagan administration that they feel they have nothing to lose domestically by opposing the president on foreign policy.¹⁶

Constructive Engagement

Reagan's election in 1980 was a welcome relief to leaders of the white minority regime after Carter's emphasis on human rights and his administration's vocal opposition to apartheid. Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Vice President Walter Mondale were all involved in applying pressure on South Africa in international forums and called for political equality while on official business in South Africa. Carter also reiterated American support for the arms embargo against South Africa following that government's decision to prevent publication of black newspapers, and warned Prime Minister John Vorster that the United States would not continue the policy of paying only lip service to majority rule and equality.¹⁷ Rather than agreeing with white South Africans that communism was the major problem, Carter deemphasized the Soviet threat, focusing instead on racial injustice. Furthermore, unlike previous American U.N. Ambassadors, Young did not hesitate to focus on black South Africans as being ultimately responsible for the transition to a multiracial egalitarian society.

President Reagan clearly signaled a shift away from support of the black majority and pressuring the apartheid regime toward dialogue with the white minority. His policy of constructive engagement largely ignored more than 72% of the South African population and relied almost entirely on white-led change, as defined by a regime determined to modernize apartheid in the face of rising violence. Stopping Soviet/Cuban expansionism in southern Africa and elsewhere became the preoccupation of the Reagan administration, a worldview which coincided with South Africa's. Seemingly unaware of widespread Afrikaner sympathy with the Nazis and resistance to South Africa's entry in WWII against Hitler, Reagan hailed the apartheid regime as a strong ally and advocated greater acceptance of that country in the global framework of Western security. Furthermore, South Africa's strategic value was seen as outweighing human rights concerns.

Apart from the administration's contention that the Cape route's security was crucial for the continued flow of Western oil supplies from the Middle East, South Africa's vast mineral wealth and its strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies were main considerations underlying constructive engagement.

Reagan's ideological affinity with South Africa (in relation to communism) and his perception that closer ties with the white minority would better safeguard America's security interests influenced him to protect South Africa from international pressures and to reverse previous U.S. policies designed to demonstrate opposition to minority domination and put distance between the two governments.

Evidence of this departure was first seen in March 1981 when U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick received a visiting South African delegation that included South Africa's chief military intelligence officer, Lieutenant General van der Westhuizen.¹⁸ By June the White House had issued a series of measures which permitted the sale of American products (including medical equipment and supplies) to South Africa's police, military, and nuclear agencies. In February 1982 the administration added computers, helicopters, and airplanes to the list of goods sold to South Africa.¹⁹ The most controversial action however, was the Commerce Department's decision to allow the sale of approximately 2,500 shock batons for use of the South African police which is in violation of the Human Rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.²⁰ These measures were taken amid growing violence in South Africa, developments which would enhance blacks' influence on U.S. policy and ultimately contribute to the demise of constructive engagement.

Developments in South Africa

Situational factors are generally regarded as key determinants of a group's ability to have an impact on foreign affairs.²¹ The state of emergency declared in June 1985 vividly demonstrated the white government's loss of control as well as its ruthlessness, and created a new sense of urgency in Washington and for apartheid activists throughout the country. Black

16. Longmyer, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

17. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Talking Tough to South Africa," *The Washington Post*, March 18, 1977, p. A27; and William E. Schanfield, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "U.S. Relations with Southern Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 26, no. 1976 (May 9, 1977), p. 467.

18. Andrew Cockburn, "An Unsound South African Tie," *The New York Times*, December 26, 1984, p. 15.

19. Kevin Danaher, *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 194.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

21. Lester W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, James N. Rosenau, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 248-56.

is being hampered by the lack of NRM/NRA personnel with the experience and education necessary to take on this demanding work. Many of the most experienced members of the NRM/NRA are still occupied with security-related tasks in the north as remnants of armies loyal to past presidents Amin, Obote, and Okello sporadically harass government officials and troops.⁹ Moreover, critics of the Resistance Councils have recently charged that emphasis on military training has begun to eclipse the original role of political education envisioned for these bodies.¹⁰ Charges have also surfaced that link the Resistance Councils to acts of intimidation by the NRM against its opponents. The Ugandan People's Democratic Movement (UPDM), for instance, has compared the victimization and harassment at the hands of these councils to the situation that obtained under former presidents Amin and Obote.¹¹

Clearly, in the face of such chronic problems, the Museveni regime needs an experienced bureaucracy to carry out the urgent day-to-day administrative chores related to national reconstruction; that it unfortunately does not have. Years of misrule have left the civil service in shambles, with many of the most able and educated officials now expatriates.¹² Forced to rely on pieces of the old administrative apparatus, Museveni may find many of his programs and reforms difficult, if not impossible, to carry through.

Economic Realities

More than fifteen years of civil strife, genocide, and misrule have taken their toll on the economy of Uganda. Basic human needs have gone unfulfilled for nearly two decades. Economic and social development is needed to secure for the population its important second-generation human rights. Political realities at home and abroad impede the implementation of a new economic agenda.

The most immediate task facing Uganda is the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid to outlying regions of the country, and the rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure. Lack of trucks, poor road conditions, and an overall shortage of manpower only add to the logistical nightmare of this project. In the north, the government's dubious security situation further hinders these efforts. Compounding these logistical problems is the need to secure financial and humanitarian aid from Western donor nations, whose hoped-for generosity has been slow to materialize.

9. Cathy Watson, "Uganda, What Next?: NRM's Plan for Uganda," *New Africa*, November 1986, p. 10.

10. "Museveni Courts the Support of the West," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 21 November 1986, p. 15. *Ibid.*

12. "Uganda: Reconstruction," *Africa Confidential* 23 April 1986, p. 6.

The new government must also deal with the demands of the international community during negotiations with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Uganda's current foreign debt stands at \$1.8 billion according to government sources. As a result, the IMF has been pressing hard for the devaluation of the Ugandan shilling by as much as 72%.¹³ Despite such pressure, the NRM has shown few signs of crumpling under. This stance, along with other economic realities such as an inflation rate of 175%, brought about by the suspension late last year of a \$42 million credit for industrial rehabilitation by the World Bank's Industrial Development Association.¹⁴

If Uganda is to carry out any meaningful reconstruction and rehabilitation it will have to be financed largely through the foreign exchange earnings of its primary export crops. Principal among these crops is coffee which, it is estimated, represents approximately 95% of its export earnings.¹⁵ The world market price for coffee has been favorable of late, but Uganda must diversify its export mix if it is not to be held hostage to the vicissitudes of the world market. In this regard, the government must revive the ailing cotton and tobacco industries that thrived in the early days of Ugandan independence. However, while the government attempts to revitalize these important segments of the agricultural sector, it must also ameliorate the glaring economic disparities among the various ethnic groups and geographical regions of the country.

Decades of British colonial rule helped solidify the dominant economic position of the Baganda in national life. By virtue of its geographical position which included the national capital and the railhead, the Buganda region developed at a much faster rate than other areas of the country. British administrative policy further advanced the dominance of this region in the Ugandan economy. Post-colonial governments that have tried to reduce economic disparities through the promotion of economic interests and schemes in other districts, particularly in the north, have met the stiff and unwavering resistance of the Baganda elite. Such resistance can precipitate the kinds of political crises that destabilize national politics. Such a situation plagued Obote in the late 1960s when he promoted his own brand of African Socialism with his famous "move to the left." The potential power of the southerners and the Baganda in the economy today has not changed markedly from what it was at

13. "Special Report: Africa's Economies in 1987," *Africa News*, 22 December, 1986, pp. 12-13.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

Major Ethnic Groupings: **Gisu**
 Cities & Towns Mentioned
 in Text: •**KAMPALA**



independence. Museveni's brand of socialism may be no more palatable to this elite than any of the other programs of the past.

Rounding out the complex array of economic problems facing the new regime is the ever-present question of national security. The continuing insurgency in the north as well as the historical propensity for regional instability and foreign intervention mean that increasing military demands are placed on a meager national budget whose resources are so desperately required in other areas of national life. Currently, upwards of 30% of the \$352 million national budget is earmarked for defense.¹⁶

National Security

From a human rights perspective, national security is a double-edged sword. Security, both internal and external, is essential for the protection of the individual person and for the stability and smooth operation of the political and administrative apparatus. At the same time, security concerns can degenerate to the point where the maintenance of civil and political liberties is sacrificed at the altar of national security. Uganda in 1987 faces this dilemma.

As Uganda wrestles with the problem of internal stability, several issues loom large: national security, integration and restructuring of the armed forces, and military discipline. The manner in which the Museveni regime deals with these issues will largely determine the future status of human rights protection in Uganda.

When the Uganda National Liberation Army fled Kampala in January 1986 as the NRA seized power, there were widespread reports of killing and looting as troops of the former regime sought revenge on their enemies.¹⁷ These actions follow a pattern of military abuse that goes back as far as the late 1960s and early 1970s. The government and the central command of the armed forces have been unable and unwilling to instill even a modicum of discipline within the ranks. Moreover, the Ugandan military itself does not reflect the great diversity of the Ugandan population; the military ranks have been largely made up of recruits from the economically backward northern regions of the country, particularly among those of Acholi and Langi ethnic background. Since the 1960s, each succeeding Ugandan regime has been forced to rely on the military as its power base due to the lack of national cohesion within other segments of the polity. Factionalism, typically following ethnic lines, has been cultivated within the ranks of the armed forces as each suc-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "Uganda: Götterdämmerung in Gulu," *Africa Confidential*, 12 February 1986, p. 1.

cessive regime has sought to build support for its political program among certain segments of the officer corps. The divisions that this promotes generate the personal and ethnic animosities that help to propel the cycle of violence which has victimized the Ugandan people for nearly two decades.

President Museveni's most urgent task over the next several years is to rebuild a military establishment that reflects the geographical and ethnic diversity of Uganda, as well as to enforce a code of conduct on the armed forces that will bring down the curtain on the military lawlessness and vigilantism that has plagued Uganda. Museveni's task will not be easy. When the NRA fought its way to power, it was a guerrilla force of not more than 6,000 soldiers.¹⁸ It may now have to integrate upwards of 30,000 troops from the ancien regime.¹⁹ Given the southern dominance in the NRA, the government will have to go out of its way to allay deep-rooted suspicions. Moreover, most of these ex-northern troops have never been subjected to the rigid code of discipline the NRA guerrillas knew from their five years in the bush. (This was always one of the strengths of the NRA, as it was the only army that enjoyed a large degree of civilian support due to its respect for human rights.) Museveni must also find a way to deal with the hundreds of young people, some as young as 10 years old, who joined his guerrilla army during the civil war after their parents were massacred by Obote's troops.²⁰ After nearly a year of active duty that permitted them to carry out law and order functions throughout the country, Museveni officially dismissed them from the army January, 1987.²¹ Government officials are hesitant to integrate these youngsters into the traditional education system for fear that their military experience and perspective might infect the social and political values of other students.²²

Unfortunately, after more than a year of NRM/NRA rule, the resolution of these difficulties appears as problematical as ever. NRA troops in the north have been implicated in several instances of killing and harassment. In one case, eyewitnesses reported the summary killings of 23 men by NRA soldiers along a roadside near the northern villages of Pajoro and Lamugi.²³ The Teso in the northeast have also alleged that government soldiers while searching for rebels often torture local villagers.²⁴ People of Bagishu ethnic background are also said to be frequent victims of government abuse. Kenyan President Arap Moi revealed last November that more than 1600 Bagishu

fled to Kenya reportedly to avoid army atrocities; the Ugandan press apparently kept this information under wraps for some time.²⁵ According to reports, the refugees passed a memorandum to Kenyan authorities which claimed that NRM officials instigated members of the Sebei ethnic community to attack the Bagishu because of their resistance to NRM political indoctrination.²⁶ The UPDM claims that military sweeps by NRA detachments often result in the extortion of money and property from the local villagers.²⁷ While the NRM denies responsibility and insists that abuses that may have occurred are the fault of other military groups that have been integrated into the NRA, Museveni has appointed his former secretary Serwanga Luwanga as northern brigade commander to improve discipline in the ranks.²⁸ Despite the change of command, it is still extremely difficult to get junior officers to report problems to their superiors.²⁹

Guerrilla warfare by former UNLA troops appears to be a growing problem in the north especially since last August. Although the NRA has a large battalion of troops garrisoned at the former Acholi stronghold of Gulu, government control of the countryside remains tenuous at best. Gulu itself has been attacked at least six times since last summer and the guerrillas appear to be extending their area of operations to the east of the country.³⁰ Over the last year, three Catholic missions have been forced to close their doors due to the security situation in the north.³¹ Despite an amnesty offer by Museveni to ex-UNLA troops, the latest reports place rebel troop strength at 4-5,000 armed soldiers.³² As recently as January 18 of 1987, rebels launched an attack against the town of Corner Kilak in the Acholi district.³³ Although NRA troops dealt the rebels an impressive defeat at Corner Kilak, this battle points to the fact that the government still faces a difficult security situation that cannot be contained effectively by the security functions of the Resistance Councils. Access to weapons and ammunition is readily available since the government has not been entirely successful in effecting a surrender of arms from members of the former army. The free flow of weapons in the countryside has also exacerbated the recurring problem of cattle raiding in the northeastern district of Karamoja. During the past year, cattle raids in this part of the country have

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. "Coup Plot Compounds Museveni's Problems," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 5 September 1986, p. 15.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. "Muwanga Among Eight Losing Treason Charge," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 27 February 1987, p. 13.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

18. George Abigish, "Uganda: A Nation on the Mend," *Searchlight* (London) October 1986, p. 45.

19. *Ibid.*

20. "Back to School," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 23 January 1987, p. 21.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Uganda: False Messiah," *African Confidential*, 4 February 1987, p. 1.

24. "Museveni Courts the Support of the West," *op. cit.*

left a high number of casualties, leading some observers to believe that the district has been infiltrated by ex-Okeko soldiers.³⁴ Moreover, with thousands of refugees waiting in camps in the southern Sudan, the Ugandan government has to worry about the potential of rebel recruitment among disaffected Acholi.

Political Institution Building

The institutionalization of political rights has proven elusive in post-independence Uganda. Presidents and politicians have been unable to build lasting national power bases through party structures. Instead, as with many other Third World regimes, they have been forced to rely on the power of the gun represented by the military. This has resulted in the tradition of the politics of violence that has beset Uganda for years.

The coalition government that Museveni heads as leader of the NRM/NRA has pledged to hold parliamentary elections within four years time. At present, all partisan political activities are proscribed. But Museveni is under increasing pressure from many different sides as traditional political cleavages begin to reassert themselves. The way in which Museveni is able to balance these conflicting demands against the need for national unity will largely determine whether Uganda is offered a new political lease on life or is consigned to the old political pathology.

In September of 1986, the Buganda problem reared its head once again. With the return of Prince Ronald Mutebi, the heir to the Buganda throne, from years of exile in London, Baganda voices were raised in support of the restoration of the Buganda monarchy. Within two weeks of Mutebi's return, the government arrested twenty-five people on charges of attempting to overthrow the government and to establish a monarchy.³⁵ Whether these charges can be substantiated or not, the government will have a difficult time in tempering the demands that the Baganda make on the system. As the ethnic group with the most economic and political power in Uganda—due in no small part to the colonial legacy—the Baganda can be expected to continue to press their narrow agenda on a government that is attempting to get a grip on the centrifugal forces that destroy national unity.

Ugandan politics has historically been a free-for-all among a plethora of parties, each with a narrow base of power and an agenda of parochial interests. Attempts at coalition building have rarely yielded more than an

ephemeral unity. Obote learned this hard lesson in the mid-1960s, as he was unable to sustain a parliamentary majority and gradually had to rely on the military in order to rule the country. Museveni has attempted to address this problem by naming members of some of the old political parties to the National Reconstruction Council (NRC) and to his cabinet. The initial results of these efforts have not borne fruit. In October of last year, a former vice president, three other cabinet ministers, and six army officers were among those alleged to be involved in planning a coup.³⁶ The government formally charged four cabinet ministers in the plot: former Vice President Paulo Muwanga, leader of the Ugandan People's Congress (UPC); Commerce Minister Evaristo Myonzi, Democratic Party (DP); Environment Minister David Luwangwa, Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO); and Energy Minister Andrew Kayiira, Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).³⁷ The government suggests that the plotters may have had links to the rebels operating in the north, even though most of those involved are said to be Baganda. Although treason charges against Kayiira were dismissed for lack of evidence, the prospects for political unity have been dealt a severe blow.³⁸ Two weeks after his release from detention on February 24, Kayiira was murdered at the home of a local journalist.³⁹ Government efforts to disassociate itself from the knowledge of or involvement in the murder have failed to allay widespread suspicions. Of immediate importance to the stability of Uganda has been the political fallout from this incident. Reports from Kampala confirm that the UFM has withdrawn from Museveni's coalition and fled to the bush to take up arms against the government.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Uganda is illustrative of the problem facing many African countries in the 1980s: the tension between reconstruction and human rights fulfillment. The dilemma simply stated is that governments must be able to survive if they are to fulfill the human rights expectations of their people, but when survival becomes the main preoccupation of the government, human rights development suffers. Uganda in 1987 is confronted with real and potential threats to the survival of the regime. The government will require a degree of coercive power to overcome some of these obstacles. Whether it is able to carry out these urgent economic and political tasks while at the same time inculcating respect for the rule of law and new political values is the most important question for the future of human rights in Uganda.

36. "Museveni Thwarts Coup Plotters, Rebels," *Africa Report*, November-December 1986, pp. 39-40.

37. *Ibid.*

38. "Muwanga Among Eight Losing Treason Charge," *op. cit.* Although treason charges were dropped against Kayiira, Muwanga, and Luwangwa, both Muwanga and Luwangwa remain in detention, the former facing further charges of kidnapping with intent to murder and armed robbery while the latter faces charges of terrorism.

39. "Murder of Kayiira Embarrasses Museveni," *The Weekly Review* (Nairobi) 13 March 1987, pp. 12, 13.

40. VOA broadcast of April 21, 1987.

34. Alegh, *op. cit.*

35. *Africa News*, September 15, 1986, pp. 5-6.

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Edward A. Hawley, Executive Editor



A Look at Books

Namibia, The United Nations and the West

Elizabeth S. Landis

Geisa Maria Rocha, **IN SEARCH OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE: The Limitations of the United Nations.** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 192 pp. \$26.50

How often have government officials or commentators—all of whom know, or should know, better—complained that the world's underdeveloped, incompetent, corrupt ministas have ganged up and wrested control of the United Nations from the United States and other decent, dignified, and democratic Western countries? Even aside from the question why the West believes itself entitled to run the world organization, this charge is utter nonsense: In fact, the United States still dominates important issues at the UN although it may sometimes yield on matters of marginal significance.

To those who are still bemused by the crocodile tears shed on behalf of the poor little rich (Western) states, Ms. Rocha's book should prove a convincing corrective. It demonstrates how those very states—the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada, allied as the "Contact Group"—hijacked the UN's attempt to

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end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia; how they transformed it into an instrument to promote their own policy; and how they used it to protect Pretoria's (and their own) interests in the area.

In a period of only a couple years the Contact Group effectively ousted the UN from jurisdiction over Namibia and took over themselves. Then the United States managed to convert the accepted Namibian settlement formula (Security Council resolution 435 of 1978) into a tool to promote its anti-Cuban crusade: by effectively inserting its "linkage" provision into the formula it made Namibian independence hostage to events outside the former mandate and created a condition that actually works to discourage South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory.

Though she limits her facts to the case of Namibia, Ms. Rocha's conclusion applies to all issues of importance before the international organization: The UN "cannot take significant action without the support of those members who supply it with resources and have the capacity to act [i.e., primarily the United States]."

The real value of Ms. Rocha's book is not, however, in her restatement of the realities of the international power game. It is in her history of Namibia in the UN from the establishment of the world body through the end of 1981.

Everyone interested in Namibia will want to have the book as a handy reference manual. It provides a substantial chronology of events from 1946—starting with the South African proposal, made to the first session of the General Assembly, to incorporate "South West Africa" as a fifth province—through 1981—ending with the constitutional proposals for a future Namibian state made by the Contact Group toward the end of the year. (It contains a short postscript summarizing very briefly events up to 1984, but only the Lusaka Conference of May 1984 is discussed in any detail.)

Ms. Rocha makes it possible to track all the missions to South Africa or Namibia that have been made by UN officials from the early Good Offices Committee and the so-called "Carpio Commission" through the disastrous Waldheim/Escher missions of 1972-73 to the commuting between New York and Pretoria engaged in by the Secretary-General's Special Representative after 1978.

Similarly, she enables readers to trace step by step the modifications made by the Contact Group in their own proposal for an "internationally acceptable" solution of the "Namibian problem," as incorporated in Security Council resolution 435. This chronology is particularly valuable, since much of the material to which she refers is not part of the official published record.

In the course of setting out her history Ms. Rocha summarizes each major proposal, initiative, or action and cites the appropriate UN document or secondary source. Unsurprisingly, in Chapter 4, which details negotiations since formation of the Contact Group a decade ago, the ratio of official to non-official sources tips noticeably toward the latter; certain statements appear to reflect insider information, which she shared as a Secretariat member.

In this reviewer's opinion, Ms. Rocha's summaries are accurate and eminently fair. Sometimes, however, they are a bit too condensed, probably reflecting the book's origin as a master's thesis, with its limitations on length. Some relevant information is omitted, and occasionally a hasty reader may be confused by ellipses when several subjects are being treated together.

In general, her conclusions as to motives of, and consequences of actions by, the various organizations, governments, and others involved in the ongoing Namibian ordeal follow more or less accepted UN positions. However, some evaluations, as of the General Assembly's decision to seek an Advisory Opinion in 1950, break with traditional wisdom. A number of her more forcefully stated assessments, which this reviewer

considers sound, may appear harsh to the uninitiated or downright insolent to some of the actors.

Thus, referring to Reagan administration policy, she states flatly that "Pretoria and ... Washington share the goal of preventing a SWAPO victory in Namibia and preventing the South African liberation movements from gaining more influence..." If this flies in the face of official protestations, it is nevertheless the only conceivable explanation for the Administration's dogged attempts to stand by "constructive engagement" despite overwhelming evidence that it has failed to prevent or even mitigate the increasing official brutality and repression in both the Republic and the Territory.

Her conclusion, that the Security Council's credibility has been undermined by its failure to follow through on its repeated threats to take appropriate measures under the Charter—impliedly sanctions—if South Africa did not comply with Council demands, is amply justified by the facts, indeed, it is widely discussed by UN staff and observers. They are likely, however, to ascribe the blame to the Western permanent members for hamstringing action by vetoes and threats of vetoes.

Ms. Rocha also refers to the vetoes—indeed, her chronology enables the reader to trace them over the years. But she accurately points out that the Western states may use other techniques when they wish to avoid the naked exercise of power involved in the veto. Thus, for years they have opposed any Security Council action on the ground that it would interfere with current "delicate negotiations," a claim that has mesmerized the credulous and dared the others to challenge Western veracity. As she states it, "whenever there is pressure by the majority of the members of the United Nations on the West, progress in the negotiations [for Namibian independence] is always reported..."

Ms. Rocha also criticizes the General Assembly for its unrealistic approach to Namibia. While the issue is far more complicated than her criticism suggests, there is no question that the Assembly has acted over the years as if the illegal occupation of Namibia could be solved by adopting one more resolution even though it was clear that Pretoria would respond only to force that the Assembly did not—and could not—command. On a somewhat less elevated plane, she also criticizes the "enormous" waste of funds on unnecessary "missions of consultation" by the Council for Namibia. Her prescription for alternative expenditures are, in this reviewer's opinion, however, far from the most productive use of the funds.

One additional criticism which the reviewer feels relevant is that the UN personnel system did not find some way to assist Ms. Rocha so that she could pursue her valuable graduate studies while continuing her work at the Organization; and with the reasonable hope that she could make it across the terrible chasm—always wider for women than for men—from the untouchable clerical caste into a professional post after she won her degree. As a result the UN has lost a loyal, hard-working international civil servant, whose knowledge and training should have made her a valuable member of the small staff working for the liberation of Namibia.

Namibian History Through a Participant's Eyes

Elizabeth S. Landis

David Soggot, **NAMIBIA: The Violent Heritage** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 333 pp. + xvi, \$39.95

For far too long the Africanist's basic library on Namibia consisted of a mere handful of books—a number that reflected neither the international significance of the issues involved nor the intensity of the struggle by a whole people to rid itself of a brutal and illegal occupation regime.

Recent years have, however, brought forth a relative spate of important works. Of these, three deal with essentially the same subject: the current political situation in Namibia and how it came to be.¹

It is a measure of the true complexity of the Namibian situation that there is little overlap among these three books. Each tells the Namibian story from a different perspective, bringing an insider's special expertise to the particular facets of Namibian history within his or her own knowledge and experience. Thus the SWAPO authors emphasize organized resistance and economic exploitation of their country's precious resources; Ms. Rocha concentrates on the role of the United Nations; and David Soggot focuses on the system of "justice" in the occupied Territory.

Mr. Soggot, a South African advocate (i.e., barrister) now living in England, has represented Namibians in the Territory's courts for many years, now commuting from London to Windhoek for that purpose. His book grows out of his experience. He discusses the trials in which he participated in order to expose the quality of justice in occupied Namibia. But beyond this, he sets them in the broader context of Namibian political history, of, as he says in his introduction, "Namibia's wider implications and its complicity in an awesome trinity of scourges which has fascinated the twentieth century—genocide, totalitarianism and war."

To this end, the book is organized roughly chronologically, in 46 short, colorfully titled chapters, starting with "Pax Germanica" and ending with a postscript that goes as far as the installation of the MPC "transitional government" in 1985.

Considered as political history, the book is vivid, compelling and idiosyncratic. It is descriptive rather than analytical. Soggot is a moralist, not a theorist or an ideologue. His concern is the Namibian people and how they are affected by events.

In connection Soggot devotes considerable attention to the role of the Namibian churches, which are now so deeply involved in the struggle for Namibian liberation. As he points out, they have undergone a dramatic metamorphosis from instigators of German conquest in the nineteenth century and passive acquiescers in South African authority throughout much of the twentieth. He pays tribute to the series of foreign born ministers who, over the last decade and a half, have been deported for their tireless labor to help Namibians achieve their aspirations; and also to Namibian-born black clergy who have summoned the courage publicly to reprove South African officials and even to hale them into court.

The first trial discussed in the book is the proceeding brought by Anglican and

Lutheran bishops in late 1973 to prevent Ovambo tribal authorities from publicly flogging SWAPO supporters for their political beliefs. (A decision against them by the local court was ultimately reversed on appeal to Bloemfontein.)

The last is a trial *manque*, a potential attack on army brutality and torture in "interrogation." Accumulated affidavits and medical evidence established that torture was indeed a routine practice and that its purpose appeared to be mass punishment. Detainees who finally confessed to anything to escape further torment were freed, not tried, leading to the conclusion that the entire process was intended "as an inquisitorial procedure designed, through widespread and indiscriminate use, to produce re-education through fear."

After all the evidence had been collected—and it was damning—the churches faced harsh reality: legal action would be long and bitter and unlikely to succeed in the then prevailing judicial climate; and they simply did not have the money to pursue a prolonged legal battle. Regrettably they told their lawyers not to proceed.

The role of the churches is inextricably intertwined with that of SWAPO. While even the most apolitical Namibians may be caught in the toils of army or secret police, Soggot makes it clear that those forces are aiming at SWAPO or the idea of national liberation that SWAPO represents. By clear implication Soggot accuses the UN designation of SWAPO as the "authentic representative" of the Namibian people. But he does not hesitate to criticize SWAPO actions of strategy when he disagrees. His chapter on "The Young Prophets" (SWAPO Youth League leaders in the early 70s) illustrates his cool appraisal: admiration for their idealism mixed with concern about the retribution in store for many as a result of their unrealistic conduct.

It is apparent that Mr. Soggot has consulted widely to supplement his personal files. His tracking of the course of events is detailed and pulls together disparate bits of evidence into clear patterns. Persons who have followed Namibia over the years will find that his accounts of events arouse memories of long forgotten persons and incidents.

More important than mere factual completeness or accuracy, however, are the authenticity and urgency of his experience, which is presented without obvious personal glorification or commentary. Thus his low key description of the generic Security Branch "style of arrangements" brings home the ugly reality, which it is clear he has observed at first hand:

In buildings occupied by them a particular floor is singled out for isolation behind an iron grille protected by an armed guard. The windows are barred, equipped with blinds throughout, including the southern flank unshaded by the sun. Interrogation designed to extract information from detainees requires no special installation;... an ordinary office, and for those who prefer to apply "third degree" treatment, immunity against unwelcome visitors. (p. 102)

Similarly, one cannot doubt his unsparring accounts of the experience of detainees he represented: the "homicidal eyes" of an interrogator; extinguishing cigarettes in detainees' flesh; electric shocks on nipples, ears, and in the arx; beating of detainees suspended from iron bars...

It is unfortunate that the main text is cut off in March 1982, with only a 20 page postscript to cover the period from completion of the manuscript until publication. A number of landmark cases were decided during that gap of over four years.² They

1. *To Be Born a Nation* (London: SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity, 1981); Getta Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); and the book under review.

2. A number of these cases, including Soggot's first case (to enjoin flogging of SWAPO supporters) are discussed in a memorandum submitted by the Namibian Bar Council (similar to the ABA) to a commission of inquiry on Namibian "security legislation" in 1984. For an annotated copy of the memorandum, see Landis, "Security Legislation in Namibia: Memorandum of the South West Africa (Namibian) Bar Council" 11 *Wils J. Int'l L.* 48 (1985).

include a habeas corpus-type proceeding for the release of Namibian refugees held in Mariental after their capture by South African troops at Kassinga in Angola and an action to end imposition of nighttime curfew in northern Namibia. Both were brought by the churches, which are once again seeking judicial relief for their parishioners and other Namibians.

Other shortcomings apparently attributable to the publisher include the failure to provide more maps—there is only one—and the absence of any photographs, copies of affidavits, or other pertinent graphic materials. And there are too many typos—not serious ones, to be sure—for a serious and expensive book.

Finally, there is the matter of price. Everyone should read the book, but many will find its \$40 price too steep to consider purchasing it for themselves. In that case they should urge their institutional libraries to buy multiple copies.

Bibliographical Works on Namibia

Jean-Paul Prentice

Stanley Schoeman and Elna Schoeman, **NAMIBIA**, World Bibliographical Series, Volume 53. (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Information Services, 1985) 186 pp. \$32.00.

Tore Linne Eriksen with Richard Moorsom. **THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NAMIBIA: An Annotated, Critical Bibliography**. Published as Norwegian Policy Studies, No. 50. (Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in cooperation with United Nations Institute for Namibia and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1985.) 423 pp., \$32.50.

Stanley and Elna Schozman have included in their compilation a broad range of published works regarding Namibia. Geography, archeology, history, anthropology, economics, religion and politics are but a few of the areas covered. All of the works presented are annotated, but the tenor of the work itself is in no wise critical. For persons who desire knowledge of early Namibian history or the physical Namibia, **Namibia** is a good place to begin.

Many of the works listed in the areas of education, journals and newspapers, cultural life, politics, law and economics are non-critical of the reality in Namibia. Most of the works listed in the "Politics and the International Status Issue" section are by authors who are 'amicable or not critical' of South Africa's military occupation of Namibia. The few works which do provide a critical analysis of the Namibia situation are critically annotated by the authors. Several major books published by American or third world authors are not listed and works published by the United Nations are not presented. Whether or not the brevity of **Namibia** is a matter of the compiler's choice of relevant works, or whether the purpose of the text is to provide a concise bibliography is a relevant question. Nevertheless, the works presented are notable and current.

Eriksen and Moorsom made a gallant effort to include all major works, published or not, about Namibia. **The Political Economy of Namibia** is truly impressive in content and arrangement. Works published or prepared by individual authors, governments, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations from every continent are presented. The authors have also provided multiple categorization of many works by language, topic area, country and time period, which are excellent tools for the researcher or serious student. This flexibility of use extends to persons desiring information in the areas of corporate business, politics, economics, international law and the role of women.

Several works included in the work have been of primary importance to this writer, namely; the lists of conference papers, theses, addresses, periodical publications and the list of alternative sources of information which is quite extensive. The "Current bibliographies" section is well annotated. Several "in progress" works are also included. Addresses are provided by country and organization subtitle, and an author index is included. Finally, an addenda was incorporated containing notable works which were not available when the text was sent off to print.

Jean-Paul Prentice is a student at the Graduate School of Business, University of Denver, Denver, CO. He co-authored an article on The Enforcement of the Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1 in U.S. Courts in *Africa Today*, Vol. 30, Nos. 1 & 2.

Comparatively, Schoeman's *Namibia* is too brief to be of great biographical value. On the other hand, Eriksen and Moorsom's *Political Economy of Namibia* includes conference papers, addresses of organizations whose focus is the Namibia subject, and alternative sources of information. *The Political Economy of Namibia's* arrangement provides ease of use and reference, something that is truly lacking in Schoeman's *Namibia*. Lastly, the annotations in *Namibia* appear to be written from the South African perception rather than an objective one. The annotations of works not critical of South Africa have a mild tenor in comparison to the annotations of works which are critical of the South African position. Conversely, Eriksen and Moorsom's annotations in the *Political Economy of Namibia* do not attempt to influence the reader's choice of works to review. Thus, this writer's choice is the very thorough bibliography of Eriksen and Moorsom. *The Political Economy of Namibia* is certainly one of the best, if not the best, annotated bibliography of Namibia presently available.

That Troublesome Enclave: Namibia's Walvis Bay

Jean-Paul Prentice

Richard Moorsom. **WALVIS BAY: Namibia's Port.** (London: International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa in cooperation with the United Nations Council for Namibia, 1984.) 93 pp. \$1.50.

Walvis Bay is a well written documentary about Namibia's only major port. A concise introduction includes a brief historical account and geographical description of the bay city and its attendant fish resources. From this point on, the writing becomes an in depth analysis. Moorsom discusses the legal status of the territory with regard to South Africa and the international community, and the political and economic consequences of continued South African domination. The role of the port in interstate commerce and external trade is shown to be the crux of South Africa's motivation for continued dominance. Several tables portraying the economic impact of the fishing industry to South Africa are provided.

An extensive bibliography is included at the end of the text. The author's conclusions are well supported by this documentation, which includes the operative paragraphs of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/9 of 4 November 1977 and the full text of Security Council Resolution 432 (1978). Security Council Resolution 432 was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. In addition, Moorsom also references South African commission reports and periodicals (*Financial Mail*, *Windhoek Observer*, etc.), as well as other international periodicals and organization reports.

Although the issues surrounding *Walvis Bay* are covered in several other works, the issue receives well deserved individual attention by Moorsom, lest it be forgotten in the flood of other issues regarding Southern Africa.

Southern Africa: Taking the Region Seriously

William Minter

Carol B. Thompson, **CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 322 pp. \$29.50. (Originally published in Harare by Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985).

Carol B. Thompson, **REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)** (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986: Current African Issues, No. 6). 34 pp.

Appearing on a number of radio talk shows in recent months, I have found host after host who has difficulty saying "Southern Africa," unconsciously substituting "South Africa" even when discussing a book with "Southern Africa" in the subtitle. With last year's media focus on South Africa, much of the U.S. public has advanced beyond the idea that all of Africa is one country to understand that South Africa, with its apartheid system, is distinct. But the troublesome concept of the "southern" African region, indispensable for understanding, for example, why the conflicts in Angola and South Africa are interrelated, is still largely unknown.

Even if the distinction between country and region is grasped, many—including the press—still refer to the "frontline states" as "the independent countries bordering South Africa" or some similar phrase. Thompson's book makes clear, however, that "Frontline States" is not a loose geographical expression, and that it is neither petty nor pedantic to insist on a more precise understanding.

The term specifically denotes a political alliance, with an organizational structure and regular meetings, and a significant impact on the conflicts in the region. Some countries in the region (not all on South Africa's borders) are members. Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, together with Angola and Mozambique, formed the alliance, later joined by Zimbabwe. Other states, which do not share the Frontline commitment to coordinating their policies on southern Africa, are not. Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi are not members of the Frontline States alliance, although they were recruited to membership of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), a parallel economic organization. Zaire and Kenya, plausible as related to the region by geography and history as Tanzania, are members of neither organization.

The development projects of SADCC have attracted new journalistic and academic attention in recent years, as has South Africa's regional war against Angola, Mozambique and other countries. Two of the more useful anthologies covering these regional issues are Thomas M. Callaghy, ed., *South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence* (New York: Praeger, 1983) and Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986; distributed in the U.S. by Africa

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World Press, P.O. Box 1892, Trenton, NJ 08608). Ann Seidman's impact audit for Oxfam America, **The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa**, (Africa World Press, 1985) touches on the crucial issues of economic underdevelopment and the U.S. role. Joseph Hanlon's **Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) is an invaluable source of data on South Africa's regional war and the diversity of its targets and methods. **Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against Its Neighbors** (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), by the same author, reviews the same material more briefly for a wider audience.

But there have been few book-length studies dealing with the specifically regional dimension, and even fewer that go beyond description to analysis. That is the distinctive contribution of Carol Thompson's **Challenge to Imperialism**. Thompson's book analyzes the significance of the Frontline States as a political alliance, a regional African initiative which has played a critical role in increasing the leverage of its member states far beyond what one would predict from their economic dependence and relative military weakness. Thompson approaches this issue, of decisive importance for the future of the struggles to free Namibia and South Africa, by a careful examination of the role of the Frontline States (then five in number) in supporting the campaign for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

The starting points for Thompson's analysis lie in the fact that the Frontline States as a group provided decisive support for majority-rule independence in Zimbabwe, both through the role of some of them as rear-bases for guerrilla action and through their collective participation in the diplomatic arena. From a strictly racial perspective one might assume that of course African states with a history of colonialism would support the liberation of their fellow Africans from white-minority rule; the role of the Frontline would then be unsurprising theoretically. But that begs the question of why these particular states are involved, and not others in the region, such as Malawi, Kenya or Zaire.

On the other hand, if one were to go simply by the political economies of the Frontline States, which encompass states highly dependent on South Africa and ruling parties with different class bases and ideologies, the question becomes why the support for liberation was as great as it was. Thompson, making use of concepts of economic dependence, foreign capital and relative state autonomy, explores the reasons for cooperation among the Frontline States, as well as the bases of the differences and disagreements among them.

None of the Frontline States, she makes clear, had managed to transform the basic colonial condition of dependence on foreign capital, and, in many cases, even on South African capital. The ideologies of the ruling parties ranged from the revolutionary, in Angola and Mozambique, to varieties of populism, in Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania. The particular situation of each country set limits to its autonomy from Western and South African pressure. But the common political commitment of the Frontline rulers to majority rule—leaving open the question of the extent of revolutionary transformation afterwards—created a space for action not totally constrained by the inherited dependence. And the institution of the Frontline itself provided a mechanism to counter the other side's classic techniques of "divide and rule."

One outstanding virtue of Thompson's work is that she treats autonomy—the space left open for movement towards liberation—not as a theoretical constant, but as a variable: variable in terms of the different histories, political economies and class struggles in each country, but also variable by time, and subject to change through the creation of new institutions. These new institutions—such as the Frontline States,

and such as SADCC, discussed in Thompson's final chapter and in the monograph cited above—do not function in a vacuum. The issues of external dependence, and of internal class struggle, do not disappear. But in the context of the ongoing war in southern Africa, such regional institutions create new opportunities. They constitute one kind of mechanism to equalize the odds over against South Africa and its allies.

Regional studies, which take a comparative and synthetic bird's eye view, are risky, for one may miss the finer detail of studies focused more precisely on one country. But studies such as **Challenge to Imperialism** make it clear that the risks are worth it for the additional insight. Understanding the region requires more than summing up the results of separate studies on separate countries. Thompson shows convincingly that without regional cooperation, despite all its difficulties, the struggle for Zimbabwe would probably have been even more prolonged. In the escalating conflict in southern Africa, the regional initiatives of the Frontline States and of SADCC confront a host of obstacles. Their successes or failures will weigh heavily for each country, as well as for those ruled by the apartheid regime in Namibia and South Africa. Activists as well as scholars need to read Thompson's **Challenge to Imperialism**. And hopefully others will follow her lead in exploring the potential and analyzing the difficulties of such efforts to build strength through regional unity.

Sullivan Principles Weaknesses Exposed

Jean-Paul Prentice

Elizabeth Schmidt. **One Step in the Wrong Direction**. (New York: Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa, 1985.) 42 pp., \$2.00.

Elizabeth Schmidt provides a thorough and well documented critique of the Sullivan Principles as a strategy for opposing apartheid. The roles of several U.S. firms are presented in view of Sullivan Principle goals of equal employment and compensation. In light of South African law, the author profoundly establishes the conclusion that the Sullivan Principles cannot operate to effect change in the apartheid system. Schmidt also dispels the "constructive engagement" notion that continued investment is the best alternative since it avoids hurting the black majority. There can be little loss, when there has in fact, been no change in apartheid. The work is well footnoted and several citations of corporate managers as well as black leaders are included.

In view of congressional approval of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which contains a provision similar to the Sullivan Principles, **One Step in the Wrong Direction** provides a strong opposing argument. Elizabeth Schmidt presents a convincing statement that the Sullivan Principles have not, do not and can not work in South Africa as long as apartheid is in place.

The History of the Exploitation of Southern Africa's Resources and Labor by Western and Settler Capital

James H. Mittelman

William Minter, **KING SOLOMON'S MINES REVISITED: Western Interests and the Burdens of History** (New York: Basic Books, 1986) pp. 401, \$21.95 cloth.

The title of William Minter's history of southern Africa ironically recalls H. Rider Haggard's *King Solomon's Mines*, an 1885 romantic account of the quest for precious metals by English adventurers in the subcontinent. Debunking persistent myths about the region south of the Zambezi, Minter provides a rich analysis that weaves structural elements into a complex tapestry of events. This overview is a skillful presentation, eminently readable, carefully researched and theoretically informed.

Minter's main concerns are the dynamics of southern Africa over the past 100 years and Western involvement in the region. He begins with a helpful discussion of the origins of apartheid, including the importance of such strategic factors as the route to India and competition among fractions of capital (agriculture, mining, and industry) for the labor supply. According to Minter, the bedrock of the South African political economy is "the joint exploitation by foreign and local capital of politically powerless, cheap black labor." The state has designed a variety of mechanisms, a panoply of racial legislation, to control labor.

Minter focuses on central problems facing the apartheid regime. He subtly addresses white nations and classes as well as resistance to apartheid. In the conclusion, Minter emphasizes that the West does not have the power, and should not attempt, to impose a solution. Nonetheless, the policies adopted by the West will be a major factor in determining how long apartheid survives.

A former teacher in Mozambique, Minter is at his best in examining liberation politics. For example, he cogently explains the perceptions of the African National Congress, Mozambique and the other Front Line States in regard to the Nkomati Accord. Also useful is the attention given to broad patterns and the continuity of U.S. objectives in the region. Minter argues that in the period after the Sharpeville massacre, Washington favored disengagement from white Africa for only two brief periods, interludes at the outset of the Kennedy and Carter administrations. Here it is not clear what, apart from government rhetoric, Minter has in mind. Kennedy's green light to multinational corporations? Carter's encouragement for International Monetary Fund credits to South Africa?

Minter also offers incisive commentary on the "sanctions don't work" thesis and counters the oft-heard argument that South Africa under majority rule will inevitably dissolve into "tribal" chaos, dictatorship, and blood-letting. His book is committed and non-polemical scholarship, a superb treatment of the promise and problems of southern Africa.

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Myths That Sustain Apartheid

J. Alton Tomplin

Leonard Thompson, **The Political Mythology of Apartheid**. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) 293 pp. \$22.50.

Leonard Thompson of Yale University, who previously taught at the University of Cape Town and the University of California at Los Angeles, presents us with a thoughtful book, which he is eminently qualified to write, about the interpretation, the reinterpretation, embellishments and specific emphases within South African history which he labels "mythology." Thompson thinks of myth as "a tale which is told to justify some aspect of social order or of human life" (p. 8). Modern, as well as primitive societies develop myths. Myth fulfills a specific function in society, although it may change from one era to another. Thompson elaborates: "Myths originate in specific circumstances as a product of specific interests, and they change with the changing interests of successive generations and successive regimes. They vary in intensity; they may be dormant, they may flourish, they may decline, they may die out" (p. 8).

This book concerns three major myths in Afrikaner nationalist culture, with several subsidiary myths noted as well. As the Afrikaner culture developed, two major challenges appeared: the challenge of British imperialism and the challenge of the African majority. Myths developed to help the Afrikaners interpret their plight in these situations, with the British challenge seeming to be greater until well into the 20th Century.

Thompson devotes a chapter to the myth of "unassimilable races." He surveys many serious writers both past and present, who argue that the black people should not be treated as equals with whites because they are lazy, not capable of development, are cursed as "children of Ham" or of Ishmael, and are to remain "drawers of water and heavers of wood," or are otherwise inferior to "civilized" Europeans. Most important, the whites have a God-given mandate to keep the races separate. During the first part of the present century certain anthropological understandings gradually became known in parts of South Africa, and certain less Negro-phobic statements appeared in their books. With the Nationalist victory in 1948, however, the unassimilability of the races was written into law as the system of "Apartheid." Thompson calls the present South African society a "pigmentocratic industrialized state" (p. 191).

Another chapter is devoted to the myth of the *Slagternek skermish* (1815-1816). This was an exertion of British legal and police action on the eastern frontier in face of several unruly Boers who had decided to take the law into their own hands. Some ringleaders were shot on the spot while others were executed after trial. The South African mythology which developed a half century later suggested that these were "freedom fighters" against "British imperialism" or "oppression." The story was written into the first history in the Afrikaans language (1877). It was later incorporated into textbooks, and became one of the bulwarks of Afrikaner self-consciousness against

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British political control. About this skirmish the mythological history included these words: "Weep Afrikaners!—Here lies your flesh and blood!—Martyred in the most brutal fashion. . . . They were guilty, says the earthly judge; but what will the Heavenly Judge have to say?" (p. 127). The author surveys the career of this myth and shows that before the middle of the 20th century the anti-British function ceased to be needed, and even Afrikaner historians in more recent decades have admitted that facts were remembered wrongly, and that the victims were not heroes so much as outlaws of the frontier. This myth has thus disappeared from many history books in the public schools.

A third myth is summarized in the chapter concerning the Covenant at Blood River in Natal, December 15, 1838. As in the myth of Slagtersnek, this was virtually forgotten for almost a half century, and then was remembered and elaborated. Its function was not so much anti-British as it was anti-African, to show how God was on the side of the Afrikaner Boers—if they only would continue to be faithful. In the growth of the Nationalist self-consciousness from the 1870s onward, this covenant of 1838 became the center of growing nationalist spirit, and the date was even set aside as a national holiday, which continues to the present time. This date became a symbol of the Great Trek of the 1830s, and a symbolic, or mythological, center of all of South African history. The largest rally of nationalist and mythological sympathies was on the centenary, December 16, 1938, when the Voortrekker monument was unveiled and dedicated just outside Pretoria. The day remains significant, although it has been increasingly nationalized, though the religious connection continues to be emphasized especially among the most conservative political factions.

Other myths are mentioned briefly, but not developed. For instance, the myth that the Afrikaners are chosen by God has a loose connection to Calvinist thought in the Dutch Reformed churches. The way it is elaborated in the South African context, however, is theological only in a very general way, but it is a myth which pervades all phases of the society. The present reviewer analyzed this doctrine and many related myths in his *Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundations of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1652-1910* (1984). Whereas the word "ideology" is used, it can be related closely to mythology as Thompson has analyzed it.

Another myth which is central in the South African society, but not analyzed thoroughly by Thompson, is that of "vacant land." As the myth goes, the white population has as much or more right to the land than the Africans because they came at about the same time. Scientific studies, however, including carbon-14 tests on artifacts, show that there were countless African settlements in South Africa as early as 300 A.D. The myth persists, however, in spite of scientific evidence to the contrary, and it continues to fulfill a function in the thought of the dominant political group.

In South Africa there are other ideologies with mythic components being developed: 1. Black African unity; 2. the oneness of all society; and 3. a Marxist ideology. The Afrikaner mythology is significantly out of step with the rest of the world, and is in danger of being overthrown by one of these other mythologies.

Thompson has presented us with an interesting overview of myth using the Afrikaner model. One needs a good knowledge of the history of South Africa, however, to be able to fit all the pieces together. This is a very insightful book, nevertheless, and recommended for an understanding of contemporary intellectual problems in South Africa. It is based on wide research, including extensive reference to developments of the last half century.

Daily Life in South Africa: Two Perspectives

Alicia Fields

Njabulo Ndebele, **FOOLS and Other Stories** (New York and London: Readers International, 1986) pp. 280, \$14.95 cloth. Judy Boppell Peace, **THE BOY CHILD IS DYING: A South African Experience** (San Francisco: Harper & Row) pp. 88, \$9.95 cloth. Published simultaneously in Canada by Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Limited, Toronto.

In "Fools," the title story of Njabulo Ndebele's fine collection of short fiction about life in a black South African township, a disillusioned womanizer awkwardly attempts to mend his marriage. But it appears that he has nearly worn his wife's love, if not her forbearance, to shreds. At home, the husband observes that they read constantly "to fill the unbearable silence between us." He becomes "conscious of the fact that the habit of reading" has "become the habit of avoidance."

Ndebele's insight rings true; reading can provide respite from problems. In contrast, the act of writing offers the opportunity to confront reality. In their recent and vastly different books, Judy Boppell Peace, a white American, and black South African Njabulo Ndebele eloquently confront the troubles of life in the land of apartheid.

Ndebele, who received Africa's highest literary honor—the NOMA award—for these stories, grew up in Western Native Township, Johannesburg and in Charterston Location, Nigel. He has taught African, Afro-American and English literature at the University of Lesotho and at Yale University. Peace lived in South Africa for eight years, teaching English in a private girls' school while her husband worked for an international support organization for churches.

While fiction is the vehicle Ndebele uses to explore his homeland, Peace recalls her South African stay through a series of brief, powerful, non-fiction vignettes. Both focus on domestic settings and everyday life. Whites exist only on the fringes of Ndebele's tales, whereas blacks and Indians are central figures in Peace's stories.

When Peace arrived in South Africa at 25, she seems to have felt as free to make friends with her housekeeper (not that it didn't take considerable effort to win Mrs. Ntosen's trust) and other blacks as with white acquaintances. The title of Peace's book, **The Boy Child is Dying**, is based on a painful reminiscence about the death of Mrs. Ntosen's grandson. Although critically ill, the toddler could not be taken to the closest hospital because it was for whites only. Instead of five minutes, it took thirty to reach an emergency room.

Many of the examples of racism Peace describes are reminiscent of the American South's former Jim Crow laws. For example, South African blacks are not allowed to swim at the same beaches or to eat in the same restaurants as whites.

Peace discovered that blacks weren't even safe from degradation at drive-in

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restaurants. She recalls an incident in which a fast food worker called the 50-year-old Mrs. Ntosheni "git" and refused to take the Peace family's order unless the housekeeper could provide her own utensils. (In *Fools*, a boy protests the arrest of fellow blacks by throwing his tin cup at the departing police car.)

When Peace became enraged by the drive-in incident, Mrs. Ntosheni told her not to get so upset. "If I allowed myself to feel anger every time I was treated that way, I would be a sick woman by now," she said.

Like the icon of the tin cup, the idea of being destroyed by obsession with injustice also emerges in Ndebele's book. In the story *Fools*, Zani, a black college student describes how his political activism became so demanding that it robbed him of time for the studies he loved. Says Zani:

[T]oo much obsession with removing oppression in the political dimension, soon becomes in itself a form of oppression....Somewhere along the line, I feel, the varied richness of life is lost sight of and so is the fact that every aspect of life, if it can be creatively indulged in, is the weapon of life itself against the greatest tyranny.

What Mrs. Ntosheni and Zani show us is that obsession with injustice leaves no time to sort out the rest of life's problems such as the struggle to free oneself from an oppressive family. This is the difficulty encountered by Vukani, a sensitive and tormented boy in Ndebele's story "The Music of the Violin."

In this emotionally evocative story, Vukani's tyrannical, social climbing parents are derisive of the black culture in which they live but are barred from the white society whose values they mimic. They discourage their son's attempts at friendship with a barber's son because "he should have friends of his own station in life." But Vukani is uncertain of his station and is lonely.

Vukani's parents seem to love him for what they can make of him, not for what he is. When they give him a beautiful violin, it is an act of self-interest. His mother shows no compassion when Vukani complains that bullies harass him about the instrument. In fact, each time company visits Vukani's parents compound his embarrassment by coercing their "Mozart" into performing.

Vukani's parents cannot nurture their child's emotional and intellectual growth, because they do not acknowledge his emerging personality. Nor can they grant liberty. It must be wrested from them just as Black South Africa must struggle for its right to freedom.

Looked at on a larger scale, the stifling of personality is one of the great crimes of apartheid because the vast majority of South Africa's population is not allowed to develop its abilities. Judy Peace recalls a black friend named Samuel, who worked as a gardener but wanted to learn how to write down the music he heard "in my head all the time." There was no place either could think of where Samuel could study the subject.

Peace could only tell Samuel that it was "a terrible thing to consider the artistic talent among your people that has been lost to the world because of the false limitations placed on your lives."

The Boy Child Is Dying and **Fools** are thoughtful, well written books and extraordinary accomplishments. South Africa and the world are lucky, in particular, that Ndebele's talent flourished despite the odds.

A Satirical Attack on Apartheid: A Film Review

Aaron Segal

WOZA ALBERT! Producer: David Thompson. BBC, 1982: 55 minutes. 16mm: rental \$85, sale \$850; video rental \$65, sale \$490. Available from the Southern Africa Media Center, 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103. Tel. (415) 621-6196.

Woza Albert! is the BBC film version of a highly successful play that has been performed throughout South Africa. It showcases the talents of two versatile black South African actors, Percy Mtwa and Mbozeni Ngema, whose comic characters and skits probe the inequities and ironies of daily South African life. The film version intersperses actual footage of daily life such as miners' compounds or overcrowded commuter trains with comic and pathetic sketches. The effect is one of thought-provoking entertainment.

The theme is the rumor that Christ has risen and is returning to South Africa, the quintessential Christian nation according to the rhetoric of its rulers. The sketches depict the reactions of black and white South Africans to the reports that Christ is returning. The Prime Minister first seeks to co-opt Christ and when that fails has him arrested as a subversive. A helicopter crew becomes so excited at the demonstrating crowds that they destroy Capetown by dropping a nuclear device. An elderly black woman scavenging in the trash for food hopes that Christ will have all the whites turn over their table scraps. A white shopkeeper increases the wages of one of his black employees to induce him to become an informer and play Judas. These and other sketches are performed with a minimum of props on a nearly bare stage but with a maximum of gestures, parodies, and general irreverence. Mtwa and Ngema effectively transform themselves into the white characters with the simple addition of a white nose.

Woza Albert! is sardonic, witty, bitter, and effective. The climax comes with Christ rising in a black South African cemetery and calling forth the spirits of the heroes of the South African resistance struggle, beginning with the late Chief Albert Luthuli, leader of the African National Congress. (*Woza* is Zulu for "arise"). The film is eminently suitable for classroom viewing. It is a remarkable witness to the ironies and injustices of South Africa as well as to the ability of black South Africans to laugh at themselves and their oppressors.

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A "Talking Heads" Critique of Apartheid in Video

Edward A. Hawley

Mongane Wally Serote: South African Poet (York, U.K.: Meridian Productions, 1987) 20 minutes, color (VHS or U-matic), \$70.*

Meridian Productions of the York Film Workshop with this video-taped interview launches an ambitious new series on South Africa. The forthcoming titles are intriguing: *The Church at the Crossroads: South Africa's New Radical Theology*; *Apartheid Underground: An Eyewitness Account of the Conditions in the Mines*; and *Community Politics: The New Grassroots Politics and the United Democratic Front*. One hopes that they will be presented with the vigor implied in the titles, a vigor that only flickers in this interview with Mongane Wally Serote, the head of the Cultural Department of the African National Congress. The interview was conducted by Ralph Nzomo, also a South African exile and a former political prisoner in that country.

The "first effort" nature of this tape is glaringly apparent. Certainly in this country and probably in the U.K. as well, Serote's poetry is not widely known, yet no effort is made to familiarize the viewer with his work. Instead Nzomo starts off with a comparative question about black African and European poetry that elicits a "that's a very difficult question"—long pause—reply, hardly the optimal approach to involve the viewer! Fortunately, since adequate background on the poetry has not been provided, the discussion soon moves on to South African politics. Here most viewers will be on more familiar ground, and Serote's comments are more succinct and effective. The viewer is also given some fleeting relief from the three basic camera angles: focus on the interviewer, focus on the interviewee, and a mid-distance shot showing both participants. In these sections several too brief illustrative film clips—both moving and still—are inserted over the dialogue.

Our audience, mostly University students with some knowledge of Africa, watched with increasing interest as the tape progressed, and the reaction was generally favorable. It is a film that could be effective with a captive audience, e.g., in a classroom or public seminar. Both in length and content it is ideal as a discussion starter about South African politics. (The literature professor should beware though—despite the title, little of Serote as poet is effectively revealed.) I doubt that much interest can be aroused for a showing on television unless the opening minutes are dramatically improved; the temptation to turn the dial will be too great. Nonetheless, as a first effort by a new group its shows promise, and future releases should be anticipated by all who are concerned to tell the South African story.

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*Meridian Productions, York Film Workshop, 8 The Crescent, Blossom St., York, England. Tel. 0904-641394 or 0904-23571. U.S. inquirer: 711 Crestwood Drive, Blacksburg, VA 24060. Tel. (703) 552-8248.

Samora Machel's Legacy for Mozambique and Africa

Solomon Nkhwane

Barry Munslow, ed., **SAMORA MACHEL: An African Revolutionary; Selected Speeches and Writings** (London: Zed Books Limited, 1985), pp. xxvii, 210, \$26.65 cloth, \$9.95 paper.

The tragic and untimely death of Samora Machel, first President of Mozambique, on October 19, 1986, gives the above publication an importance and relevance which it would not otherwise be accorded. Who was Samora Machel? What did he stand for in life? What legacy has he left behind for Mozambique; for southern Africa; for Africa?

Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary is pregnant with many answers to the above questions. In his careful selections Munslow manages to capture for the reader the multiplicity of the late leader's talents. Samora Machel's origins were unpretentious, even humble. Indeed, he was a man from the people, and of the people. But at the same time he was head and shoulders above the ordinary man in Mozambique, particularly in his sensitivity to the day-to-day problems of the people and to his vision of a future Mozambique, southern Africa and Africa.

After a short introduction (18 pages), the reader quickly comes face-to-face with Samora Machel the liberator and the teacher. The true liberator is realistic and down to earth. He does not inflame the people unnecessarily by giving them false hopes. Even as late as 1974, one year before independence, he says "we are all aware that victory will not come tomorrow and that there is still a long way to go" (p. 1). The true teacher and successful organizer of men is spontaneous and verbalizes his thoughts in a natural and casual flow unencumbered by doubts and without fear or favour.

"We shall be ruthless with the undisciplined, the incompetent, the lazy, the negligent, the careless, those who go in for red-tape, for inertia, those who fall into the trap of routine, those who despite the people, misappropriate state property or squander the property of the people." (p. 95)

The selected speeches and writings have been grouped into two major categories. The first category, constituting Part I, reveal the thinking of Samora Machel regarding the close relationship between the liberation struggle on the one hand, and the state and the party apparatus on the other. In other words, this part deals with the institutional framework for the Mozambiquean revolution. To Samora Machel, the real revolution that comes after the attainment of legal independence is unlikely to take off unless and until there has been created an ideological, constitutional and political framework. Essentially, "Liberation, state and party" (Part I) is meant to capture the essence of Samora Machel's thinking on this constitutional framework.

In my view, however, the particular selections do not succeed in demonstrating one crucial aspect of Samora Machel's strengths: the maintaining of the inter-relationship and unity of the state (the people) and the party (Frelimo), born out of the liberation struggle, as the prerequisite for a successful revolution. The fault may be the particular selections themselves. Somehow, after reading Part I, one does not get the sense of a coherent framework except in the form of the discrete categories.

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And yet, there is no doubt that Samora Machel's whole revolutionary approach seemed to revolve around his clear grasp of the relationship between the complex constitutional framework and the prosecution of a grass roots revolution that would bring about real development and equity.

Part II of the book focuses on "national reconstruction" in its various aspects: economy, education, health, women, youth and defense security. These are the real problems facing the government and people of Mozambique. Samora Machel's sensitivity to, and understanding of, these problems stem from a combination of his own humble origins and the long and tried apprenticeship in the fire of the liberation struggle itself.

I see two major flaws in this important publication. First, it seems that the combined effect of the selected speeches is unable to bridge the gap between Part I and Part II, i.e., how to prosecute the post-independence revolution (the substance of Part II) within the framework of a legal, constitutional and political apparatus (Part I) with contradictions. Second, I am uncomfortable about a situation in which the selections were done randomly (in terms of dates), without some chronological considerations.

Surely, the development of Samora Machel's revolutionary ideas must have been shaped, developed in some chronological fashion and logic. The selections do not suggest this. Also, it would have been illuminating if some selections had been included from the liberation period to show the extent to which his post-1974 ideas were a direct growth from his earlier experiences.

All in all, however, **Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary** is an important contribution to scholarship on an important political personality in southern Africa. Having read it, you cannot help but recognize and admire the down-to-earth sincerity and courage of the man. How many leaders in southern Africa, if not in the whole of Africa, could have the courage and "guts" to stand beside Pieter Botha (President of Apartheid-ruled South Africa) and sign a security accord, without looking over his shoulder?

In short, this book is worth reading, not only because it will enable one to have an insight into Samora Machel's revolutionary thought, but because his wide-ranging ideas encompassed the yearnings and the concerns of southern Africa as a whole.

Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Limits and Possibilities of Energy Development in the SADCC

David S. Cowie

J.T.C. Simoes (ed). **SADCC: ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE YEAR 2000**. (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), pp. viii + 184 (Energy, Environment and Development in Africa, No. 2); SEK 75 hardback.

Phil O'Keefe and Barry Munslow (eds.). **ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: SADCC COUNTRY STUDIES, PART 1**. (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), pp. viii + 193 (Energy, Environment and Development in Africa, No. 3); SEK 75 hardback.

Phil O'Keefe and Barry Munslow (eds.). **ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SADCC COUNTRY STUDIES, PART 2**. (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), pp. xi + 227 (Energy, Environment and Development in Africa, No. 4); SEK 75 hardback.

Richard Peet. **MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SADCC COUNTRIES**. (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), pp. xi + 119 (Energy, Environment and Development in Africa, No. 5); SEK 75 hardback.

The history of regional cooperative ventures throughout the Third World has not been one of success, and in this respect the African experience is no exception. In East Africa, for example, the East African Community collapsed due to political differences and problems regarding the distribution of benefits. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States has been damaged by the Nigerian expulsions of undocumented immigrants. Small regional schemes such as the Mano River Union between Liberia and Sierra Leone have been plagued by similar problems. All three of these schemes and others like them are beset with problems relating to the unequal distribution of costs and benefits, conflicts between neighboring states, bloated and inefficient bureaucracies, and unrealistically high expectations. Others, such as the recent agreement between Morocco and Libya, only survive because they serve the politically expedient goals of political elites. Still others, such as the Southern African Customs Union between Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa exist only because of regional underdevelopment patterns and inequality between neighboring nation-states.

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This pervasiveness of failure has led to changes in the concerns and perceptions of regional integration theorists. Scholarly works have evolved from the early neo-classical preoccupation with the possible economic benefits of trade expansion, creation and diversion in regional integration, to the political and economic problems which quickly surfaced, and finally to a general disillusionment with regional integration schemes and a widespread abandonment of the study of regional integration. This has paralleled a growing disenchantment among Third World policymakers with regional integration; these corresponding trends challenged both academics and policymakers to develop new approaches to the problems of regional cooperation. It was within this environment of failure, cynicism, and introspection that a new breed of regional integration was born. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, or SADCC, is perhaps the best example of this emerging brand of integration. Both pragmatic and adaptive, the organization is aided by a focus on low-level integrative goals, a small bureaucracy, the setting of obtainable goals, and the existence of a common threat, South Africa, in the region. With the issuance of the *Lusaka Declaration* in 1980, the major goals of the SADCC were stated:

- 1) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- 2) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- 3) the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; and
- 4) concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.¹

To operationalize these goals, the SADCC member-states devised a plan of action which relied on a decentralized decisionmaking structure and the use of existing facilities and bureaucracies for implementation. Sectoral responsibilities were divided based on member-state wishes, with Angola assuming the responsibility for energy development, Botswana for crop research and animal disease control, Lesotho for soil conservation and land utilization, Malawi for fisheries and wildlife management, Mozambique for transport and communications, Swaziland for manpower development, training, and health, Tanzania for industry, Zambia for the establishment of a Southern African Development Fund and mining, and Zimbabwe for food security and land utilization. In the first few years of operation emphasis was placed on the transport and communications sector, due in part to the linkage effects of this sector with all others. With the maturation of the organization, however, the focus has grown to include other sectors, of which energy is an important component. In each of these sectors a series of studies were commissioned by the SADCC to determine the needs of the organization and the best strategies to be employed. In the transport and communications sector, for example, the Danish firm of Hoff and Overgaard carried out studies on regional trade and commodity flows to the year 2000. In the energy sector, a series of studies were carried out by members of The Beijer Institute between June and October 1982 for presentation at the Regional Energy Planning Seminar coordinated by Angola, and hosted by Zimbabwe in December 1982. The four volumes under review were the result of these energy studies. All the volumes display a quality of workmanship which is quite rare, and represent consultancy work at its very best.

1. A.J. Nzelaka (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*, (Rex Collings, London, 1981), p.3.

A number of the findings of the studies are startling: that Angolan crude oil production is at present twice the requirements of all the SADCC member-states combined, that the region has a tremendous surplus of electricity and coal, and that the potential for hydro-electric production is enormous. Yet the colonial heritage of the region and existing neo-colonial ties lead to even more startling statistics: that Mozambique exports 91% of its electricity production to South Africa, that virtually all of the coal Zimbabwe exports goes to South Africa, and that almost all Angolan oil is exported to the West. Summing up the frustration, yet the hopes, of The Beijer Institute researchers, Simoes notes that "if ways could be found of redistributing energy in the region, there would be no need to buy any from outside supplies."²

The study is divided into four volumes. Using the same methodology developed in its earlier study of energy development in Kenya³, the Institute uses a demand approach to examine the energy future of the SADCC region, assessing patterns common to all countries in the region as well as inter- and intra-country differences.

In the volume edited by J.T.C. Simoes entitled *Energy and Development to the Year 2000*, an eloquent and lucid summarization of the findings of the researchers is given. Two major themes emerge from the Simoes volume. *First*, the most severe and potentially most threatening energy crisis in southern Africa comes not from member-state vulnerability to oil shortages, although this is a problem. Rather, a much more immediate problem exists in the so-called 'traditional' sector, that is, the acute shortage of woodfuels for cooking and cleaning. In Lesotho the shortage is virtually nation-wide, with wood being imported. In Swaziland, huge tracts of land in the middle-veid are completely deforested. In other SADCC countries women must walk for hours to find wood. In labor-short societies such as Botswana, this has reduced time spent working in the fields, reducing final output. In the chapter on Swaziland the author notes that the growing scarcity of wood affects the type of food prepared, reducing nutritional intake, and also affects whether baby bottles will be sterilized, with ensuing problems for health. *Second*, while the region produces more energy than it consumes, it suffers from neo-colonial structures which limit the intra-regional linkages between electricity grids, forces dependence on certain markets, makes the need for foreign exchange predominant, and entails severe infrastructural problems.

These two themes are developed further in the next two volumes which examine the energy demand situation in each country. Chapters in these books are of fairly even quality, each detailing the problems with both woodfuel shortages and modern sector fuel provision. At the same time, however, each provides a plethora of information regarding the special energy situation facing each country. In Swaziland, for example, huge tracts of land are devoted to timber plantations for wood exports while areas alongside suffer acute fuelwood shortages. In Mozambique, electricity imports from South Africa have increased 57% over the past twelve years. In Botswana, five industrial enterprises consume 95% of all industrial energy. In Zambia, the drop-off in energy demand is due to the poor performance of the economy, particularly the mining sector. Although none of the studies can equal the detail of the earlier Kenyan study performed by The Beijer Institute, each provides a clear picture of the existing energy situation in the SADCC member-states and develop future scenarios.

2. J.T.S. Simoes (ed.), *SADCC: Energy and Development to the Year 2000*, (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), p. 51.

3. Phil O'Keefe, Paul Rabin and Steve Barrow (eds.), *Energy and Development in Kenya: Opportunities and Constraints*, (Uppsala, Sweden: The Beijer Institute and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984).

The final volume by Richard Peet offers a concise yet adequate account of the manufacturing sector in the SADC member-states. Peet reviews a variety of plans for the development of industry in southern Africa, ranging from the World Bank's conservative approach to Ann Seidman's 'commanding heights' strategy. What emerges is a series of predictions based on the assumption that the SADC countries will adopt elements of both strategies.

Two final issues emerge from the reading of these four volumes. First is the effect the imposition of sanctions on South Africa would have on the energy situation in the SADC countries. While such countries as Angola or Tanzania would be largely unaffected, countries such as Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho would be devastated. In all three countries, the authors warn, effective oil sanctions against South Africa would have dire consequences for the energy situation. South Africa has attempted to ensure that this will remain the case in an effort to prevent the imposition of sanctions. In the case of Lesotho, for example, South Africa denied transport facilities to OPEC oil Lesotho purchased and had refined in Mozambique. Lesotho was subsequently forced to sell the refined oil on the open market while continuing to import refined crude from South Africa. Yet this example makes the second issue even more important: what are the prospects of energy development within the context of the SADC? In trying to answer this question the authors discuss how electricity grids might be integrated, how coal produced in Zimbabwe could be exported to other SADC member-states, how refineries could be used at greater capacity for internal oil supplies, and how Angolan oil could be used in the region. All of the recommendations are well thought out, and suggestions as to how they might be implemented are given.

Yet all these recommendations are useful only to the extent to which member-states are working toward the destruction of neo-colonial linkages, an assumption which is in many respects dubious. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the SADC's concern with the transport and communications sector, which increases SADC nation-state ties with the outside world, particularly the West, rather than the sectors of, say, manpower development or fisheries, which have the potential for greater regional integration. In Botswana, for example, attention has been focused on the building of the Trans-Kalahari railway from Francistown in Botswana to the existing railway network in Namibia (following independence). The major purpose of the railway, however, will not be to increase regional trade ties, but rather to transport Botswana coal and cattle to Walvis Bay for export overseas.

This example, and others like it, serve only to question the implementation of SADC policies. They do not challenge the overall goals of the SADC or the findings and recommendations of the consultancy groups. On the contrary, the work performed under the leadership of The Beijer Institute illustrates a level of dedication and competence which will serve the SADC well. The quality of the studies makes the reading of the four volumes a must for scholars interested in energy development in Africa in particular or the SADC in general. They represent the best work which can be done.

Zambia's Development Predicament

James R. Scarritt

Klaas Woldring, editor, **BEYOND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: Zambia's Development in the 1980s** (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1984), pp. 252 +ix, no price.

This volume consists of twelve substantive chapters plus a brief introduction and an even briefer conclusion by the editor, all of which are focused on some aspect of Zambia's development predicament in the 1970s and very early 1980s, and some of which make predictions and/or recommendations about the course of development throughout the latter decade. No more specific substantive or theoretical focus ties the chapters together, and none appears to have been intended by the editor. A few of the chapters are outstanding, and a substantial majority contain useful descriptive material, but a few are too short to develop their presentations adequately. Given this extent of diversity among chapters, a review of the book can most usefully concentrate on a critical analysis of the most interesting chapters.

By far the longest chapter, and in some ways the best, is "Were the Copper Nationalizations Worthwhile?" by Marcia Burdette. The author examines the outcomes of the two phase (1969-70 and 1973-75) nationalization process in terms of its relation to the formation of the Zambian political class and to the place of copper in the world economy. She demonstrates the ways in which conflicts within the political class both stimulated nationalization and made it more awkward and costly. The most skilled Zambians were not always utilized in negotiating the second phase of nationalization, which was aimed at converting majority ownership into effective control, because they were out of political favor. Burdette also describes the many ways in which the place of Zambian copper in the world economy since the nationalizations has been unfavorable: prices have declined; costs have risen; production has declined; severe transportation problems have not been solved, contrary to expectations; technological innovations have made the Zambian mines outmoded; and all of these developments have worked together to put the Zambian Government, as owner of the mines, in a severe financial squeeze.

The question of whether the nationalizations were worthwhile, Burdette argues, needs to be analyzed in terms of worthwhile for whom. She believes that the international mining companies were the prime gainers because of the favorable financial settlement that they received, and that the lower and middle income groups in Zambia were the prime losers because they have been subjected to an income squeeze in the absence of significant governmental revenue from copper. To change this distribution of benefits, Burdette suggests that Zambia redirect a growing portion of its copper production, and production of other metals, to domestic and regional use. In the opinion of this reviewer, such a policy would be useful, but would provide only a small increment in the income that Zambia receives from metal mining given the protectionism of other southern African states and the limited size of the Zambian market.

The second longest chapter, which is also one of the best, is "The Process of Class Formation in Contemporary Zambia" by Gilbert Mudenda. The author is widely regarded as one of Zambia's most promising social scientists. In this chapter he presents

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the most detailed scheme that can be found in the literature for describing the Zambian class structure. The most general units in this scheme are three classes: the bourgeoisie, the working class, and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie has five sections: imperial, comprador, national, bureaucratic, and petty. The last of these, which is the largest, is divided into old and new (business and salaried) fractions, each composed of several elements. Three sections of the working class are differentiated in terms of the sector of the economy in which they are employed: modern, agricultural, and informal. The first section has five fractions: mining, manufacturing, construction, power and transport, and services, all but the relatively homogeneous mining group containing a number of diverse elements. Plantation and seasonal workers are the two fractions of the agricultural section of the working class, and the seasonal fraction can be divided into migrant, seasonal, and itinerant elements. The informal section of the working class has two fractions: highly marginalized (domestic servants, market vendors, and self-employed craftsmen) and wholly marginalized (criminals). Finally, the peasantry is divided into rich, middle, and poor sections.

This reviewer is in the process of attempting to utilize Mudenda's scheme in a study of the relationships among class formation, economic decline, and political change in Zambia. As a part of this research, experts on Zambia are asked to examine Mudenda's list of classes and sections, with organized groups classified under one or more of these categories based on the class backgrounds of their members, and to examine a number of events in which these groups are either actors or targets. Mudenda's scheme was selected because of its precision and completeness, but some scholars have difficulty in perceiving the reality of some of his distinctions. Mudenda's conceptualization is significant because it will be the starting point and possibly the foil for much future research.

The role of the press in Zambia is a complex and controversial topic. The Western tradition of a free, critical, and occasionally sensationalist press remains strong, yet comes up against both Party/Government ownership and the desire to play a developmentalist role. This delicate balance is effectively portrayed in Francis Kasoma's chapter on the press, as would be expected given Kasoma's important role in journalism education in Zambia. It can be hypothesized, although Kasoma does not do so, that the relatively rapid turnover of newspaper editors has helped to maintain relative press autonomy; outgoing editors take the political heat without being banished from government employment, and incoming editors are thus more able to express independent viewpoints.

Another significant chapter, although one that could have been improved by elaborating its arguments, is the one by Fred Roos on the role of external aid agencies. The lack of coordination among these agencies is a very serious problem, and a team of experts sponsored by UNDP is in Zambia at the time this is being written developing recommendations for solving this problem. Roos presents a brief but cogent analysis of the reasons for and consequences of this lack of coordination. He correctly points out that it must ultimately be supplied by the Zambian Government's planning system, but also that, until this system can be adequately staffed and financed, the external agencies themselves can and should do much more to coordinate their efforts.

When the information and analysis contained in other chapters is added to that presented in the chapters discussed above, the conclusion is easily reached that this book, if not the copper nationalizations discussed in it, is worth-while and should be read by everyone who is interested in developing a detailed knowledge of Zambia.

Publications

1. SOUTH AFRICA AND SELECTIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A *Canadian Perspective* by Robert D.A. Anderson, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Western Ontario, is an Occasional Paper commissioned to provide a background and analysis of the Canadian decision on sanctions policy. It was published May 1986 by the *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Jan Smuts House, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa.
2. A FREE NAMIBIA PACKET is available from the *Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund*. It provides a basic understanding of the Namibian situation, its exploitation by South Africa, and its struggle for freedom. The packet can be used to teach others about Namibia, and shows them what they can do. Also available is the SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMATION PACKET, which addresses the apartheid issue and the audio-visual AMANDLA!, a 35 min. visual presentation of the struggle for freedom, on video, filmstrip or slides. The prices for packets are Namibia \$3, South Africa \$2.50. AMANDLA! can be purchased (film \$55, slide show \$85 and videotape, \$125) or can be rented at the rate of \$30 a showing (filmstrip and slideshow only). Write Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, DC. 20006 USA. Add 35% of the item price for postage and handling.
3. The *Centre for Applied Legal Studies* at the University of Witwatersrand in conjunction with *Lawyers for Human Rights* are in their third year of compiling the SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS. This journal is dedicated to play some part, however modest, in stimulating sensitivity in South Africa to human rights infringement and to the process of reform of the legal order. On of its articulated goals is to persuade the apartheid system to remove racism and repression from its statute book. Back issues are available. The price per issue is R10, US\$9.95, or £5.95. Subscriptions: South African Journal on Human Rights, Ravan Press, P.O. Box 31134, Braamfontein 2017, RSA. The US distributor for Ravan Press is Ohio University Press, Scott Quadrangle, Athens, Ohio 45701
4. SOUTH AFRICA: A *Different Kind of War* by Julie Frederikse (192 pp., \$12.95) is a paperback which combines interviews with a wealth of photographs and documents, including clippings from state controlled and opposition newspapers, protest pamphlets, and lyrics from protest songs. The author and the publisher, Beacon Press, 25 Beacon St., Boston, MA 02108, will be donating a portion of their income from sales of this book to the *Africa Fund of the American Committee on Africa*.
5. An interesting title has been published by the *Africa World Press*: STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY: A *Curriculum Guide on South Africa*, 92 pp., \$14.95 (paper). This book introduces students and teachers to the lives and struggles of the people of South Africa. Designed as a manual for high school teachers, this book incorporates short stories, poems, role plays, simulations, news articles and historical readings to reveal the drama unfolding in Southern Africa. Africa World Press, Africa Research and Publications Project, P.O. Box 1892, Trenton, NJ 08608.
6. New titles and updates are available in the NOTES AND DOCUMENTS Series of the *United Nations Center Against Apartheid*. No.14/86 is "Implementation of United Nations Resolution

on Africa Against Apartheid by Member States;" No. 16/86 is "Analytical Compendium of Actions Taken by Governments with Respect to Sanctions on South Africa," by Paul Conlon; No. 20/86 is "Education for Blacks in South Africa: Deconstructing the Myths" by Mobubung Nhomu; No. 22 is a "Consolidated List of Sportsmen and Sportswomen who Participated in Sports Events from 1 September 1980 to 31 December 1985," and No.23/86 is "The 'Treason' Trials of Pietermaritzburg and Decams" by Patrick MacEntree, Chairman of the General Council of the Bar of Ireland. The address of the Centre Against Apartheid is simply United Nations, New York, NY 10017.

7. The *National Committee Against Removals*, a group comprising four different groups working in South Africa (the Association for Rural Advancement, Natal; Grahamstown Rural Committee; the Surplus People Project, Western Cape; and the Transvaal Rural Action Committee), is publishing a NEWSLETTER on the situation of evictions in the townships and the South African government's attempts at 'relocation' of blacks. Close up reports of events at different settlements, reports on farm removals, and a detailed view of the legislative process involved in removing blacks or declaring different language groups as 'aliens' to make it easier their relocation, makes the Newsletter a very important resource. Write National Committee Against Removals, 61 Station Road, Observatory 7925, P.O. Box 187, Cape Town 8000, South Africa.

8. The *Association for Rural Advancement* has published WAAIHOEK: *A Picture of a Natal Relocation Camp*, by Patricia Henderson, with photos by David Smylie and Cedric Nunn, R2 plus postage. (The information we received put the postage cost at SA30c but we assume this only applies within the country.) The Association also publishes a newsheet, AFRA. Report 29 (February 1987) which they sent to us is entitled "Focus on Farm Evictions." We do not know the subscription price. The address is P.O. Box 2517, 3200 Pietermaritzburg, Natal, South Africa.

9. THE CHILD IS NOT DEAD, published jointly by the *International Defence and Aid Fund* and the *Inner London Education Authority* (64 pp.) focuses on the youth of South Africa and their part in the struggle for freedom. Included in this publication are newspaper clippings, photos and accounts by young South Africans that tell the story of the violence and pain that has become part of their daily life. Copies can be ordered at the US address by sending \$6.70 to IDAF-US Committee, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138 or in England & Europe by sending £2.95 to IDAF publishers, Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR England.

10. SOUTH AFRICA: *Hunger in a Land of Plenty* is a 4 page *Food First Action Alert* published in August 1986, summarizing the causes of black starvation in South Africa, a nation rich in agricultural resources. The paper chronicles the state-sanctioned "relocation" of blacks into arid and hostile lands, where food is scarce. Prices are \$2 for 5 copies, \$3 for 10, \$6 for 25, with proportionally reduced rates for larger quantities. Order from Food First, 1885 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94103-3584 USA.

11. Brian Bunting's THE RISE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REICH (552 pp.), first published in 1964 and revised in 1969, has now been reissued by *International Defence and Aid Fund*. It analyzes the period in which the political foundations of the apartheid

regime were laid. It traces the mobilization of Nationalist Party power in the 1930s and 40s around an ideology which had close affinities with that of Nazism. The price from IDAF is £6.00. For copies contact: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Canon Collins, 64 Essex Road, London, N18LR, England. It is distributed in the US at \$12.50 by Humanities Press International, 171 First Ave., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716.

12. The *Institute for Contemporary Studies* has published two books related to South Africa. A WAY OUT: *Federalist Options for South Africa*, edited by ICS editor Michael K. Briand, features two sections. The first offers four federalist proposals for South Africa: "Toward a Self-Enforcing Constitution for South Africa" by Mwangi S. Kimenyi; "A Consensual Basis for Ending Apartheid" by J.A. Lombard and J.S. du Pisanie; "Justice is Possible in South Africa" by Daniel Elazar; "A Swiss-style Canton System for South Africa" by Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, plus "South Africa After Apartheid" by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley. The second part examines "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: The Question of Sanctions" by Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, who argue that "constructive engagement" has failed. In response, Richard Bissell argues that it is still the best policy toward South Africa. The second title is SOUTH AFRICA: *The Solution* by Leon Louw and Frances Kendall. What that proposed solution is can be deduced from the title of the chapter by these authors listed above. ICS did not include prices when announcing these books in "the Letter" (Winter 1987). For more information write Institute for Contemporary Studies, 243 Kearney St., San Francisco, CA 94108.

13. BLACK LABOR UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, edited by Anthony G. Freeman and Diane B. Bendahmane (72 pp. plus bibliography, \$4.50) from the *Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs* of the U.S. Dept. of State's Foreign Service Institute, examines the influence the labor movement has in the volatile uncertainty of South Africa. Included is the history of the trade union movement from 1919 to the present. The Center offers a wide variety of publications as part of their Study of Foreign Affairs Series. To order the above, or for more information write U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1400 Key Blvd., Arlington, VA 22209.

14. *Project South Africa*, an activity of the *A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund* has provided us with useful information on how to order South African publications that can assist in keeping abreast of events in that country. They enclosed a copy of WORK IN PROGRESS, 16 (February 1987), a publication of the Southern Africa Research Service, P.O. Box 32716, Bramfontein, Johannesburg 2017 RSA. This 44 page issue contains a hard-hitting pro-labor article on the O'K Bazaars strike, an article critical of Inkatha's 'regional option' for Natal, one documenting human rights violations in Venda, and one on forced removals, among others, plus a four page listing of strikes in the Transvaal. Subscription rates (for six issues) vary by destination and subscriber classification, but the six issue rates for individuals are R15 in southern Africa, R60 for US, Canada & Oceania and R33 for Europe (The latter two by air mail). There are other rates for students, institutions and donors. They also provided addresses and North American air mail subscription rates for South Africa's two major liberal weeklies, THE WEEKLY MAIL, P.O.B. 260425, Excom 2023, Johannesburg, RSA, \$95, and NEW NATION, P.O.B. 10674, Johannesburg 2000 RSA, \$90.

15. **SOMEHOW WE SURVIVE: An Anthology of South African Writing**, edited by Sterling Plumpp (\$7.95 including postage and handling) is available through *Thunder's Mouth Press*. Among the poets whose works are included are Dennis Brutus, Mongane Serote, and Arthur Notze. Write *Thunder's Mouth Press*, 93-99 Green St., #2A, New York, NY 10012 USA.

16. **CRITICAL ARTS: A Journal for Media Studies** is a unique South African journal which takes a radical look at Third World media. It offers a perspective on relations between media and society at large. Both formal and informal channels are its interests, and it challenges the existing social structure. Information on subscriptions and back copies may be obtained from the editor, c/o Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit, University of Natal, King George V Ave., Durban, South Africa. For information about forthcoming issues see *Announcements*, this issue, p. 137.

17. The forthcoming issue of **TRIQUARTERLY**, a literary journal published at Northwestern University, will feature 500 pages of new fiction, memoirs, essays, interviews, poetry, and many kinds of art work by 50 South African authors and artists. To be published on July 1st, **TRIQUARTERLY 69: From South Africa** is available at \$13.50, or as the first issue on a one year (3 issue) subscription for \$16.00. Order from Triquarterly, 1735 Benson Avenue, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60201, USA.

18. The *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies* has announced four new titles: **MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: Dependence on South Africa: A Study of Lesotho** (170 pp., SEK 80; SEK 40 in Third World countries) by Gabriele Winal Ström, studies the migrant labor system in Basotho society, the wage employment system of South Africa, and the changes of this system via conscious actions undertaken by the Lesotho government. This book gives crucial insights into the South African conflict, and shows the potential for change in the situation. **NAMIBIA, THE BROKEN SHIELD: Anatomy of Imperialism and Revolution** (213 pp., SEK 80) by Kaire Mbuende, attempts to explain the nature of German and South African colonialism by examining how these forces affected and transformed Namibian society. The book shows how the German colonization set in motion the transfer of black-owned capital and changed the Africans from independent producers into wage-earners. **INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: Some Critical Issues** by Samuel M. Wangwe and Rune Skarstein (291 pp., SEK 80; SEK 40 in Third World countries), deals with the last two decades in Tanzania, and includes an historical analysis of industrial development since independence. Also included is a critical assessment of the basic industrial strategy, adopted officially by Tanzania in 1975. **RITUAL AND SYMBOL IN TRANSITIONAL ZARAMO SOCIETY** (452 pp., SEK 200; SEK 75 in Third World countries) by Marja-Liisa Swantz is an exploration into the life of the Zaramo and in unmistakable terms spells out "that development can be conceived as a cultural process." The book is written with a solid foundation of historical research. In addition to addressing development issues, the book also analyzes the changes in the women's position as the culture changes. To order these titles, or to receive a catalog, write: *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies*, Box 1703, S-751, 47 Uppsala, Sweden.

19. **AFRICA ANALYSIS** is the fortnightly bulletin on financial and political trends in

Africa. In each fortnightly issue of this bulletin, readers can expect coverage of subjects such as developments in Southern Africa, exchange rates, trade finance, corruption watch, commodity reports, and developments plans. Subscription rate is US \$290/£185) For issues write *Africa Analysis*, 20 Essex, Strand, London WC2, England.

20. **AFRICA COMMENTARY** a new quarterly journal that describes itself as a "quarterly review of international and Interstate Affairs for decision-makers in government and industry and for the scholarly community worldwide," is making its debut. Edited by Daniel G. Matthews, it has on its distinguished international advisory board an Africa Today Associate, Robert S. Browne. Subscription are by volume only (4 issues) at \$85 per year plus \$3 postage U.S. and Canada; \$7 elsewhere. Write *Africa Commentary*, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc., 120 Marine St., Box D, Farmingdale, NY 11735.

21. Volume 489 (January 1987) of **THE ANNALS of The American Academy of Political Science** is devoted to "International Affairs in Africa" with Gerald J. Bender as Special Editor. The issue includes two articles on North African States; five on Sub-Saharan States; and two each on Southern Africa Crises and African States and International Forums. Paperbound copies of the 204 page issue may be obtained at \$6.95 for members, \$7.95 for non-members, or \$10 for institutions. Clothbound copies are \$10 and \$15 respectively. Order from *The Annals*, Sage Publications, Inc., 2111 West Hillcrest Drive, Newbury Park, CA 91320.

22. **AGAINST RACISM** is a Newsletter of the *Anti-Racism Literature Project* published five times a year by Brooklynites Against Apartheid. It is closely related to SAMRAF, an organization which supports South African conscientious objectors. For copies contact *Anti-Racism Literature Project*, P.O. Box 2902 Brooklyn, N.Y. 11202.

23. **STRATEGIES FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT**, edited by Robert Berg and Jennifer Whitaker (585 pp., \$15.95) reports on Africa's development crisis—rising population, declining productivity and foreign debt. This volume was jointly sponsored by the *Council on Foreign Relations* and the *Overseas Development Council*. It can be obtained from the *Overseas Development Council*, 7717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

24. The *Centre for Developing-Area Studies* has released another of its Bibliography series. No. 12 (1986) is entitled **COPING WITH RAPID URBAN GROWTH IN AFRICA: An Annotated Bibliography in English and French on Policy and Management of Urban Affairs in the 1980s** by Richard Ström and Claire Letemendia (230 pp., Developing countries \$10.50; Others \$15.00), translated by Claude Ström, covers "major sources in the most important countries." Write: *Centre for Developing-Area Studies*, McGill University, 3715 Peel St., Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1X1.

25. **THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS 1987** (534 pp.) is now available from the *Third World Foundation*. Prices are UK £20; Europe & US \$35; rest of the world US \$39. This is a thorough overview of key issues facing the Third World written by Third World political analysts, containing 45 articles broken down into 12 sections, including

Refugees, Economic Sanctions, Conflict in Cities, etc. To order write Circulation Dept., Third World Foundation, New Zealand House, 13th Floor, 80 Haymarket, London SW1Y 4TS England.

26. *The International Monetary Fund's WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK*, APRIL 1987 is now ready. It provides a comprehensive picture of the international economic situation and prospects and contains up-to-date information on the outlook for industrial countries (including an analysis of exchange markets and labor markets), and for developing countries in 1987 and 1988, and offers medium-term scenarios through 1991 under differing assumptions. It is available to university libraries, faculty and students for \$11 (\$15 to all others). Another volume of revised projections will be ready in October, and the two volumes can be ordered for \$16 or \$25. Five supplementary economic and financial surveys can be included in the order for a total cost of \$44 or \$65. In addition IMF continues to publish *Occasional Papers* and the eight scheduled for 1987 (52 through 59) can be ordered for \$44 or \$65, or included with all the above for a total cost of \$59 or \$89, academic or regular rate. For more information, or to order write: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 20431 USA.

27. DEUTSCHLAND IM URTEIL AFRIKANISCHER LEHRER is the title of a study by Marianne Nuss and Volker Welter which has been published as No. 115 in Verlag Breitenbach Publishers' series, *Social Science Studies on International Problems*. This 245 page study, which includes a 10-page summary in English, presents the results of a survey of 40 teachers from Lesotho who had come to West Germany to study technical subjects. The questionnaire focused, as the title implies, on the students' impressions of Germany and the effectiveness of the programs they were offered. The price is 28.-DM. The Verlag Breitenbach address is Memeler Str. 50, 6600 Saarbrücken 3, Federal Republic of Germany. The U.S. distributor is Breitenbach Publishers, P.O. Box 16243, Planta Fort Lauderdale, FL 33318.

28. PRESENCE AND PRESTIGE: *Africans in Europe* by H.W. Debrunner is a recent book length title published by Mitteilungen der Basler Afrika Bibliographien. This book is the "phénomène total" of the African in Europe from the Middle Ages to 1918. Price per copy is 153 Swiss Francs. For orders write: Basel Africa Bibliography, P.O. Box 2037, CH-4001, Basel, Switzerland.

29. *Lone Star Distributors* have released five new titles on Liberia: *LIBERIA: A Promise Betrayed* (\$10) is the report of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights on the deterioration of the human rights situation in Liberia, and the role the U.S. plays in the current state of affairs; *HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA: A Preliminary Report* (\$6) gives the findings of two 1986 on-site inspections performed by the International Human Rights Law Group on the status and trials of political detainees; *BEST FRIENDS: Violations of Human Rights in Liberia, America's Closest Ally in Africa* (\$5) is the *Fund for Free Expressions'* report on the return to constitutional rule and the U.S.'s role in the human rights situation in Liberia; *THE LOVE OF LIBERTY: The Rule of President W.V.S. Tubman* (\$12) by Tuan Wreh puts into historical context the struggle for human rights in Liberia; *NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR: October 1985 Election Report* (\$2.50) prepared by the US-based *Liberian Research and Information Project* chronicles the events of the elections and the role of the major players in it. Write Lone Star Distributors, P.O. Box 708, Glasboro, NJ 08028 USA.

30. THE CAMEROON MONITOR, the *Bulletin of the Committee for Human Rights in Cameroon*, is a new quarterly publication. Vol. 1, No. 4, which we received, is on "Israel, the Middle East and Africa: The Cameroon Connection." In the June/August issue the Monitor will present short articles on human rights by internationally recognized individuals. The first in the series will be written by Mongo Beti, a Cameroonian author and political activist. Subscriptions are £2 for individuals and £3 for institutions. To subscribe write Committee for Human Rights in Cameroon, BM Box 551, London WC1 3XX, England.

31. A HANDBOOK FOR AFRICAN WRITERS, James Gibbs, compiler (226 pp., US \$30, £19.50) gathers together practical information and advice for African authors. Advice on presenting a manuscript, dealing with literary agents, and finding a publisher are dealt with in a clear, concise manner. A listing of publishers in Africa, Europe and the North American continent is included, as is an annotated listing of several journals, magazines and literary periodicals. The experiences of several African authors help the reader understand what others have gone through to get published. To order write Hans Zell Publishers, 52 St. Giles, P.O. Box 56, Oxford OX1 3EL England.

32. AFRICAN ART: *A Bibliographic Guide* (55 pp.) by Janet L. Stanley is a Smithsonian Institution Libraries research guide published by Africana Publishing Co. It is a critical "Best Books" list of the literature on African Arts, addressed both to the newcomer and the specialist. The Smithsonian Institution Libraries established this research guide series in order to bring to public attention the substantive collections of this major research library and also to serve as *aide-memoire* to some of the standard books in the field. Your bookseller should be able to obtain a copy for you. If not, write Africana Publishing Co., A division of Holmes & Meter Publishing, Inc., 30 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003. In Europe: Hillview House, One Hallswell Parade, London, NW 11 0DL, England.

33. TOWARD FREEDOM, which previously described itself as *A Newsletter on the Developing Nations*, has a new modernized look and expanded format, designating itself as *Report on Non-Alignment and the Developing Countries*. Each edition will now have between 8 and 16 pages, and will include more room for coverage of non-aligned nations and the developing countries. Eight issues will be distributed each year, including a special "Future of Nonalignment" edition in July-August. To subscribe, write: Toward Freedom, c/o Maverick Books, 64 North Street, Burlington, VT 05401.

Films/Visuals

1. *Icarus Films* has two relatively new (1985) releases dealing with South Africa. THE TWO RIVERS (color, 60 min.) utilizes the narrator's journey from his rural village across the country to Johannesburg to highlight South Africa's political, economic and cultural tensions. It has won awards at six international film festivals. STUBBORN HOPE focuses on a few months in the life of Dennis Brutus to help us understand this South African exile, poet, teacher and activist, and the situation in his homeland. Another 1985 release is ZIMBABWE: *The New Struggle*, a videotape focussing on Zimbabwe's current problems and possibilities. THE TWO RIVERS rents for \$125 and sells for \$895 in 16mm, \$560 in video. STUBBORN HOPE rents for \$55 and sells for \$500 in 16mm or \$280 in video. The ZIMBABWE video prices are rental \$75, sale \$400. Icarus also has older films on these and other African countries, and a variety of other topics. A complete catalog is available from Icarus Films, 200 Park Avenue South, Suite 1319, New York, NY 10003, USA. Tel. (212) 674-3375.

2. *Third World Newsreel* presents films on South Africa and Namibia. Titles such as THE ANVIL AND THE HAMMER, with much of its footage shot clandestinely in South Africa, and SONG OF THE SPEAR, featuring performances of the Amanda Group, a troupe of cultural workers from the ANC, bring into focus the human side of the freedom struggle. Titles are available for non-commercial screenings on film and video, \$75 a title from Third World Newsreel, 335 W.38th St., 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA.

3. The *International Film Bureau, Inc.* has recently released two Africa-oriented film strips to be used in the teaching of beginning or intermediate French. LA FAMILLE: *Aspects Traditionnels et Modernes* \$70, is in two parts, I-Trois Familles 58 frames, 10 min., and II-L'Education et la Sante Publique, 33 frames, 6 minutes. UN CONTE AFRI-CAIN: *Le Taureau de Bouki*, 40 frames, 8½ minutes, \$37, presents a folktale as told by Birago Diop with drawings by Chandra D. Cox. The price includes the filmstrip, audio-cassette, a text of the narration and a copy of an AFCELL Student Module of the same title. Order from International Film Bureau, Inc., 322 South Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60604-4382. IFB also offers a number of similar programs on the French Antilles. They also have a three part program for courses in Intermediate Spanish entitled LA PRESENCIA AFRICANA EN HISPANAMERICA, which sells for \$140.

4. *Impact Visuals* is a cooperative of progressive photographers and graphic artists who provide illustrations on Southern Africa and a multitude of other subjects—all from a progressive perspective. You can also rent high quality photos and graphics for reproduction. The IMPACT VISUALS RED PAGES is a monthly listing of new releases which is offered at \$10 for one year. Contact: Impact Visuals, P.O. Box 404830, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11240-4830, tel. (718) 855-2140. The January 1987 copy we received listed 33 photographs from South Africa, all rather fully described and many reproduced, and indicated that many others had recently been received. One U.S. apartheid picture and two from Mozambique are also listed. All the graphic arts are cartoons, but none in this issue deal with South Africa.

5. AMANDLA! another audio-visual on South Africa, is described, together with other items from the Washington Office on Africa, in *Publications*, Item 2, p. 129.

Announcements

The *African Studies Center* at Michigan State University has established a graduate fellowship program for South African and Namibian refugees. The fellowship is designed to help South African and Namibian students who are attending colleges in the U.S. continue their graduate studies. Students who want more information should call William Derman at (517) 353-1700 or write: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1044, Attn.: William Derman.

The *Institute of International Education* is offering 24 scholarships for academic year 1988-89 through its Fulbright Program for study in Africa. Scholarships cover academic costs, round trip travel, and health and accident insurance for one year, and are available for 36 African countries. Campuses set their own deadlines but the 'at large' deadline is October 31, 1987. Interested people can contact the Fulbright Program Adviser on their campus or write: Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

The journal *CRITICAL ARTS* calls for papers for a forthcoming issue entitled *The South African Intellectual and the Struggle*. Articles questioning the ideological assumptions underlying established modes of interpretation and focussing on the sets of conditions and relations which produce performances and texts, rather than textual analysis, are preferred. Among the questions to be addressed will be: 'white' intellectuals and the 'black' struggle; the epistemological challenge in the quest for a new society; the production and reproduction of the intellectual in South Africa; academic research and the 'popularization' of knowledge. Contributions (3 copies) should be submitted by October 1, 1987 to: Dr. Njabulo Ndebele, Guest Editor, *Critical Arts*, Dept. of English, University of Lesotho, P.O. Roma 180, Lesotho. Enquiries and contributions are also requested to Vol. 5, No. 1 of *Critical Arts*, "Education, Capital and Discourse in South Africa" scheduled for January 1988 are requested. This issue will deal with the crisis in education. Contact Richard Aitken, Dept. of English, Academy, 13 Storch Street, Private Bag 13301, Windhoek 9000, Namibia. The deadline is September 1, 1987. For more information on *Critical Arts* see *Publications*, this issue, Item 16, p. 132.

The *International Rural Projects Data Base* (IRPDB) of the Settlement Study Centre is offering computerized search services of its files on Rural Projects around the globe. Information is available on current projects, their scope and implementation and other formats. Searches can be made by geographical region, descriptive and bibliographic criteria, etc. For more information write: Projects Collection, Settlement Study Centre, P.O. Box 2355, Rehovot 76120 Israel.

PIG IRON magazine wants poetry, fiction, essays, photographs, and graphics about or derived from Third World experience. Submissions might emphasize tradition, history, culture, conflicts, family, society, the individual, politics or intercultural relations. Translations accepted—include original text. Open to all writers and artists. Deadline 31 December 1987. For details write Pig Iron Press, P.O. Box 237, Youngstown, OH 44501.

TRANSATLANTIC LINK is a Business/Trade/Professional Pen Pal program and Mentoring Exchange Network, designed to provide helpful support relationships between black business communities of the U.S. and South Africa. This program was founded by Patricia Roper, a black publisher and lecturer, who recently returned from South Africa. For membership in *Transatlantic Link*, send \$4.00 plus a self-addressed stamped envelope. Members will receive a membership package, which includes a listing of participating South Africans, a sample *Transatlantic Link* Newsletter, and a data profile sheet. Mail all correspondence to: Fountainhead Associates, Transatlantic Link, 2550 Hawthorne Blvd., STE 201, Torrance, CA 90505, USA or phone (213) 377-0647 or (213) 378-9317.

Coming Events

The 4TH ZIMBABWE INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR will be held in Harare, 24-29 August, 1987. The last book fair, held in 1985, attracted over 10,000 visitors, and this year publishers, booksellers and distributors from around the world will gather again. This year's theme is "Writing and Publishing for Children in Africa and the Third World." For more information on exhibition facilities available for booking, or for information on advertisement listing in the Official Zimbabwe International Book Fair Guide (to be produced after the Fair), or to find out about attending the Fair those outside Zimbabwe should write: Zimbabwe International Book Fair, c/o Hans Zell Associates, 11 Richmond Rd., P.O. Box 56, Oxford OX1 3EL, England. For those inside Zimbabwe, the address is: Zimbabwe International Book Fair, c/o Zimbabwe Publishing House, P.O. Box BW-350, Borrowdale, Harare, Zimbabwe.

"INTO AFRICA" is a Study-Travel adventure being organized by the *University of Redlands*, September 12-27, 1987. This package will feature two weeks exploration of the game parks in Kenya, guided by Professor James Malcolm. For participants who want to deepen their exploration, a Tanzanian wildlife option and a Killimanjaro option are offered. The cost for the trip, depending on options, will range from approximately \$4,000 to about \$5,000. For reservations write: University of Redlands, Alumni House, Redlands, CA, 92373-0999, USA.

The *International Development Foundation* is holding a colloquium entitled INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM to coincide with the September 1987 meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank and other world monetary institutions. The dates for the colloquium are 25-26 September 1987. More information can be obtained by writing: Mekke Mtewa, Ph.D., International Development Foundation, P.O. Box 70257, Washington, D.C. 20024-1534, USA.

The TENTH NATIONAL THIRD WORLD STUDIES CONFERENCE is scheduled for October 1-3, 1987 at Peter Kiewit Conference Center, The University of Nebraska, Omaha. The format of this conference will be interdisciplinary in nature and it will cover areas such as Technology, World Economy, Nuclear Spread, Agriculture, Education, Refugees, etc. One page abstracts of paper and curriculum vitae are requested of panelists. All correspondence should be directed to the Third World Studies Conference, The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska 68182, USA. Tel. (402) 554-2376.

Coming Events

The 1987 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION will convene at the Radisson Hotel, Denver, Colorado, November 19-23, 1987. The Meeting will be hosted by the University of Denver. The Program Chair for the 30th Annual Meeting is George W. Shepherd, Jr. of the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. Papers and panels will focus on all aspects of African Studies and from every discipline in the arts, humanities and social sciences. Pre-registration fees are as follows: Regular Members-\$25.00; Student/Retired/Unemployed Members-\$12.50; Non-member Professionals-\$30.00; Student/Retired/Unemployed Non-Members-\$15.00. On site registration fees will be significantly higher. Send advance registrations to: 1987 Annual Meeting, African Studies Association, 255 Kinsey Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024. Program inquiries should be directed to: George W. Shepherd, Jr., 1987 Program Chairman, GSIS, University of Denver, Denver, CO 80208, USA. Tel. (303) 871-2551.

The *Association for the Advancement of Policy Research and Development in the Third World* will hold a conference on INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION AND POLITICS on November 19-21, 1987 in Bermuda. For inquiries about the conference write: Professor Shah Mehrabi, Dept. of Economics, Mary Washington College, 1301 College Avenue, Fredericksburg, VA 22407 or call (703) 899-4092/4715.

The MISSOURI VALLEY HISTORY CONFERENCE is being held in Omaha, Nebraska on March 10-12, 1988. Paper and panel proposals are being accepted through November 15, 1987 and are open to all fields of history and interdisciplinary and methodological studies. For more information write: Prof. Michael L. Tate, Program Coordinator, 1988 MVHC, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182, USA. People wishing to participate as moderators and commentators are also encouraged to write.

The *Washington Office on Africa* is holding its Second Annual MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SYMPOSIUM ON SOUTHERN AFRICA on April 7-9, 1988 in Washington, D.C. Information on the discussion topics, panels and registration will be available this summer. Those interested in participating should write to: Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund, Suite 112, 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20002.

Books Received

Starred (*) titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

Political Science

AFRICAN POLITICS: *Crises and Challenges*. J. Gus Liebenow (Indiana University Press, 1986) 305 pp. Cloth \$32.50, paper \$12.50.

APARTHEID'S SECOND FRONT: *South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours*. Joseph Hanlon. (Penguin Books, 1986) 129 pp. \$4.95.

ARMS AND THE AFRICAN: *Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*. William Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds. (Yale University Press, 1987) 221 pp. Paperback \$9.95.

CONFRONTATION AND LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: *Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord*. Ibrahim Msabaha and Timothy Shaw. (Westview Press, 1987) 315 pp. \$29.95.

DECOLONIZATION AND DEPENDENCE: *The Development of Nigerian-U.S. Relations, 1960-1984*. Bassey E. Ate. (Westview Press, 1985). 300 pp. \$26.50.

FUELING THE FIRE: *U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict*. Leo Karmie. (The Red Sea Press, 1987) 104 pp. Cloth, \$12.95; paper, \$4.95.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: *South Africa as Regional Superpower*. Kent Butts and Paul Thomas. (Westview Press, 1986) 193 pp. \$22.50.

GUINEA-BISSAU: *Politics, Economics and Society*. Rosemary E. Galli and Jocelyn Jones. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987) 217 pp. Cloth, \$30.00.

INSIDE THE O.A.U.: *Pan-Africanism in Practice*. C.O.C. Amate. (St. Martin's Press, 1987) 603 pp. Cloth, \$45.00.

LIBERIA: *The Quest for Democracy*. J. Gus Liebenow. (Indiana University Press, 1987) 336 pp. Cloth, \$35.00; paper, \$12.95.

MILITARY POWER AND POLITICS IN BLACK AFRICA. Simon Baynham, ed. (Croom Helm Ltd., Publishers, 1986) 333 pp. £19.95.

POLITICAL DOMINATION IN AFRICA: *Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Patrick Chabal, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1986) 211 pp. Cloth, \$39.50; paper, \$12.95.

*SOMALIA: *Nation in Search of a State*. David Laitin and Said Samatar. (Westview Press, 1987) 198 pp. Hardcover, \$28.00.

Books Received

SOUTH AFRICA: *A Different Kind of War*. Julie Frederikse. (Beacon Press, 1987) 192 pp. Paperback, \$12.00.

*SOUTH AFRICAN DISPATCHES: *Letters to my Countrymen*. Donald Woods. (Henry Holt & Co., 1987) 190 pp. Hardcover, \$16.95.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY: *Realities and Future Prospects*. Human Sciences Research Council Staff. (Greenwood Press, 1987) 240 pp. \$29.95.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CRISIS: *An Analysis and Bibliography*. Timothy Shaw. (Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1986), 48+vi pp., n.p.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. Kurt Campbell. (St. Martin's Press, 1987) 223 pp. Hardcover, \$32.50.

*STUDIES IN POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA. Irving Markovitz. (Oxford University Press, 1987) 400 pp. Cloth, \$32.00; Paper, \$14.95.

SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. Samuel Makinda. (St. Martin's Press, 1987) 241 pp. Hardcover, \$45.00.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA: *Andrew Young and Beyond*. H. Newsum and O. Abegunrin. (St. Martin's Press, 1986) 256 pp., \$29.95.

Economics and Development

AN AFRICAN WINTER. Preston King. (Penguin Books, 1986) 249 pp. \$5.95.

AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD MODELS: *Extensions, Applications and Policy*.INDERJIT Singh, Lyn Squire and John Strauss, eds. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) 335 pp. Hardcover, \$35.50.

AGRICULTURAL MECHANIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF FARMING SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Prabhu Pingali, Yves Bigot and Han S. Binswanger. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 216 pp. \$22.50.

BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. Roy Smollan, ed. (St. Martin's Press, 1987) 256 pp. Hardcover, \$35.00.

DROUGHT AND HUNGER IN AFRICA: *Denying Famine a Future*. Michael Glantz, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 457 pp. \$49.95.

THE DYNAMICS OF PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP: *African Share Contracts in Comparative Perspective*. A. Robertson. (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 321 pp. Hardcover, \$44.50.

GOLD FIELDS: *A Centenary Portrait*. Paul Johnson. (St. Martin's Press, 1987) 256 pp. Hardcover, \$29.95.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: *Some Critical Issues*. Rune Skarstein and Samuel Wangwe. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986) 291 pp. Paperback, SEK 80.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: *The New Reality*. Kwamena Acquah. (Praeger, 1986) 213 pp. Hardcover, \$37.95.

PETROLEUM AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: *The Case of Nigeria*. Peter Olayiwola. (Praeger, 1987) 206 pp. Hardcover, \$39.95.

POST-CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION: *Planning Economic Independence in Tanzania*. William Luttrell. (Praeger, 1986) 186 pp. \$42.95.

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: *United Nations Public Hearings. Vol. 1: Reports of the Panel of Eminent Persons and of the Secretary-General*. (United Nations, 1986) 242 pp. n.p.

*THE UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. David Leyton-Brown, ed. St. Martin's Press, 1987) 320 pp. \$32.50.

History/Geography

ALEXANDER CRUMMELL: *Pioneer in Nineteenth-Century Pan-African Thought*. Gregory U. Rigsby. (Greenwood Press, 1987) 231 pp. \$32.95.

DICTIONARY OF AFRICAN HISTORICAL BIOGRAPHY (Expanded and updated). Mark Lipschutz and Kent Rasmussen. (University of California Press, 1986) 328 pp. \$40.00.

EMPIRE ON THE NILE: *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934*. M.W. Daly. (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 542 pp. \$65.00.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THIRD WORLD CITIES. Stella Lowder. (Barnes and Noble, 1986) 292 pp. Hardcover, \$34.95.

HAILE SELASSIE I: *The Formative Years, 1892-1936*. Harold Marcus. (University of California Press, 1987) 242 pp. Hardcover, \$25.00.

HIDDEN STRUGGLES IN RURAL SOUTH AFRICA: *Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape 1890-1930*. William Beinart and Colin Bundy. (University of California Press, 1987) 326 pp. Paperback, \$11.95.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE PYRAMIDS: *Egypt During the Old Kingdom*. Jaromir Malek and Werner Forman. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1986) 128 pp. \$22.50.

Books Received

THE MAKING OF A PARIASH STATE: *The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi*. Martin Sicker. (Praeger, 1987) 147 pp. \$32.95.

THE MAN CALLED DENG MAJOK: *A Biography of Power, Polygyny and Change*. Francis Mading Deng. (Yale University Press, 1986) 294 pp., \$26.00.

THE OTHER DESERT WAR: *British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-43*. John W. Gordon. (Greenwood Press, 1987) 241 pp. Hardcover, \$39.95.

SOUTH AFRICA: *A Modern History*, 3rd edition. T.R.H. Davenport. (University of Toronto Press, 1987) 692 pp. Cloth, \$45.00; paper, \$19.95.

THE SOUTHERN MARCHES OF IMPERIAL ETHIOPIA: *Essays in History and Social Anthropology*. Donald Donham & Wendy James, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1986) 308 pp. Hardcover, n.p.

SOWETO: *The Fruit of Fear*. Peter Magubane. (Africa World Press, 1987) 48 pp. Cloth, \$29.95; paper, \$14.95.

TOPICS IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY. Second edition. Adu Boahen, Ade Ajayi and Michael Tidy. (Longman, 1986), 200 pp. \$12.95.

Sociology/Education/Religion

AFRICAN RELIGION MEETS ISLAM: *Religious Change in Northern Nigeria*. Dean Gilliland. (University Press of America, 1986) 250 pp. \$12.75.

A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF SEVEN ADULT FUNCTIONAL LITERACY PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Edwin Richmond. (University Press of America, 1986) 107 pp. \$8.75.

IN RESISTANCE: *Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-American History*. Gary Okhiro. (The University of Massachusetts Press, 1986) 238 pp. Hardcover, \$30.00; paper, \$12.95.

REVEAL AND CONCEAL: *Dress in Contemporary Egypt*. Andrea Rugh. (Syracuse University Press, 1986) 192 pp. \$29.95.

UNDER AFRICAN SUN. Marianne Alverson. (The University of Chicago Press, 1987) 233 pp. Cloth, \$19.95.

WOMEN IN THE THIRD WORLD: *A Directory of Resources*. Thomas Fenton and Mary Heffron, eds. (Orbis Books, 1987) 141 pp. Paperback, \$9.95.

Literature

COME TO LAUGH: *African Traditional Theatre in Ghana*. Kwabena N. Bame. (Lilian Barber Press, Inc., 1985) 190 pp. n.p.

THE PENGUIN BOOK OF SOUTH AFRICAN STORIES. Stephen Gray, ed. (Penguin Books, 1986) 328 pp. \$5.95.

POPPIE NONGENA: *One Woman's Struggle Against Apartheid*. Elsa Joubert. (Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1987) 359 pp. \$8.95.

Reference/Miscellaneous

THE HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL POPULATION CENSUSES: *Africa and Asia*. Eliane Domschke and Doreen Goyer. (Greenwood Press, 1986) 1032 pp. Hardcover, \$125.00.

MAKING BROADCASTING USEFUL: THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: *The Development of Radio and Television in Africa in the 1980s*. George Wedell, ed. (Manchester University Press, 1986) 306 pp. Hardcover, £35.00.

*NEWS OUT OF AFRICA: *Biafra to Band Aid*. Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer. (Hilary Shipman; Longwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1987) 152 pp. Cloth, \$19.50; paper, \$9.50.

OUR NAMIBIA: *A Social Studies Textbook*. Compiled by Henning Melber. (Zed Books, 1986) 167 pp. n.p.

THE ROUGH GUIDE TO KENYA. Richard Trillo. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987) 375 pp. Paperback, \$12.95.

SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: Vol. 11, 1985-86. D.H. Van Wyk, ed. 301 pp. U.S. \$20.00; South Africa, R25.00.

THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS 1987. Altaf Gauhar and Raana Gauhar, eds. (Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, London, 1986) 534 pp. U.K. £20; U.S./Europe \$35.00; Rest of the world \$39.00.

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