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9. ABSTRACT  
It has long been recognized that the study of peasant movements requires two basic methodological rules for its proper understanding: first, the focus of the study must be both on the interaction process which binds the peasantry to its overlord and the social forces that impinge upon both poles of interaction; second, such study must necessarily deal with the historical contexts within which the interaction process between lord and peasant develops.

The main purpose of this paper is to apply these two methodological rules to a case study of a) the transformation of a regional power structure and b) the origins and development of a peasant movement that swept an intermontane valley of Peruvian Central Sierra dominated by the hacienda system, transforming it into a region of Indian communities. A second purpose of the paper is to derive certain theoretical generalizations from the empirical case which can be relevant for the development of a theory of political peasant movements.

Finally, a third objective of the paper is to discuss in the light of the empirical information at hand the role of successful peasant movements in the development process of dependent, unequally developed societies, like Peru.

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The Breakdown of  
Provincial Urban Power Structure  
and the Rise of Peasant Movements

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## THE BREAKDOWN OF PROVINCIAL URBAN POWER STRUCTURE AND THE RISE OF PEASANT MOVEMENTS\*

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### INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that the study of peasant movements requires two basic methodological rules for its proper understanding: first, the focus of the study must be both on the interaction process which binds the peasantry to its overlord and the social forces that impinge upon both poles of interaction; second, such study must necessarily deal with the historical contexts within which the interaction process between lord and peasant develops (Moore, 1966, ch. IX).

The main purpose of this paper is to apply these two methodological rules to a case study of a) the transformation of a regional power structure and b) the origins and development of a peasant movement that swept an intermontane valley of Peruvian Central *Sierra* dominated by the *hacienda* system, transforming it into a region of indian communities. A second purpose of the paper is to derive certain theoretical generalizations from the empirical case which can be relevant for the development of a theory of political peasant movements.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, a third objective of the paper is to discuss in the light of the empirical information at hand the role of successful peasant

\* This paper grew out of a research project directed by the author, with the collaboration of Rodrigo Sánchez. His contribution is thankfully acknowledged.

movements in the development process of dependent, unequally developed societies, like Peru.

THE EMPIRICAL CASE: REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND  
PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN THE YANAMARCA VALLEY,  
PERUVIAN CENTRAL SIERRA

The historical development of Peru since the days of the Republic has been characterized by two interrelated social processes: foreign dependency (Quijano, 1968) and unequal regional development (Matos Mar, 1968). Their specific mode of interaction has produced a widening gap between the modernizing coast and the backward stagnant *sierra* (Quijano, 1967). Yet rather than moving along parallel and diverging lines, these two regions have been integrated by various mechanisms of internal domination (Cotler, 1968). This system of domination has operated at two levels: through the domination of the national power structure centered in the coast over the *sierra* and through the domination of the *sierra* urban elite over the local rural population. The typical expression of this system of domination has been the traditional *sierra hacienda*. The essential features of the system, in spite of the many and repeated attempts at rebellion on the part of the dominated peasantry, persisted to the early fifties. While changes in the structure of the economy and society had been intensifying since the turn of the century, the consequences of their impact on the rural population had been contained by tight control that the *hacendado* class maintained over its peasants. Starting with the fifties, the traditional system of internal domination entered a situation of crisis brought about by a process of societal differentiation produced by changes in the structure of dependency and the rapid development of the dependent capitalist sectors of the society (Quijano, 1968). As a consequence of the emergence of new social forces, such as new economic groups, political parties, etc., the decay of traditional elites, the opening of new occupational opportunities, the intensification of internal migration, the spread of education, and the diffusion of anti-oligarchical ideologies, just to name some of the most important agents of change, the peasant populations of the dominated *sierra* embarked on a process of political mobilization that would give the final blow to a crumbling social order. The specific form in which this process manifested itself varied from one *sierra* region to another; three were however its main manifestations: 1. union formation and struggle, 2. land invasions and 3. petition for the legal recognition of

the indigenous community on the part of groups of peons who were captive within the *hacienda* system.

The peasant movement that swept the Yanamarca valley belongs to this generalized process of rural political mobilization. It started in 1945, when a group of peons presented their first list of complaints to their *patron*; it developed through the formation of a union in the following years; it continued with various forms of conflict with the *hacendado*, and it ended with his bankruptcy and the taking over of the *hacienda* on the part of the peasants. The strain and tensions that gave rise to the peasant movement had their roots in the structural transformation that occurred in the Yanamarca and Mantaro valleys during the course of the last decades. Hence, a brief outline of this process of transformation is necessary.

*The Traditional Regional Social Structure of the Yanamarca Valley*

A good starting point to look at the social structure of the Yanamarca valley around the year of 1850 is to describe the political administrative division of the region, since this gives a clear and telling indication of the magnitude of the change process that has transformed the region.

At that time the Yanamarca valley was part of a much larger area known as the Jauja province, which extended over a territory of approximately a hundred square miles in the central highlands at an altitude of about twelve thousand feet. The capital of the entire region was Jauja, a city of about 3,000 people, residence of the regional power elite. At the next immediate level in the administrative hierarchy were four district capitals whose municipal authorities were appointed by, and were directly responsible to, provincial authorities. Each of the four districts controlled directly a number of indigenous communities which had the administrative status of *anexos*. While these communities had their traditional authorities, their respective district capitals appointed a number of representatives of the municipal administration, who in fact also controlled local government. In addition to these types of human settlements there were in the Yanamarca region six *haciendas* whose owners or renters resided most of their time in Jauja and were important members of its power elite.

Like other *sierra* regions in Peru, the Jauja province was controlled by a local *mestizo* elite, who maintained up to the beginning of this century a relative political autonomy. Within this context of relative regional autonomy the domination of the local elites over the in-

indigenous rural population was indeed all pervasive. This was the period in which the defenseless indian communities were subjected to the systematic assault of white and *mestizo* land owners who established a much harsher system of domination over the indigenous population than that which existed during colonial times (Pike, 1967, p. 67).

The specific forms in which the pattern of domination manifested itself in the Yanamarca valley varied according to the type of human settlements in which the indigenous population lived. In the *haciendas* of the area the domination of the *mestizo* elite reached its greatest intensity; indians lived under quasi-feudal conditions, as will be described later in the case. In the indigenous communities, the structure of domination took a different form. While the *hacienda's* peasants depended on the *patrón* for their means of subsistence, the indians of the communities owned communal lands for grazing and individual plots for agriculture. Thus, in a certain sense, they controlled their means of production. Yet, because of social and cultural colonial heritage, the indians of the communities were still required to pay a tribute. Furthermore, they were forced to perform various kinds of tasks in the urban center for the exclusive benefit of the dominant group. This included street cleaning, public work and road construction etc.; they were also forced to furnish building material for the city's public works.

In addition to these direct mechanisms of domination, the regional power elite had at its disposal the entire national institutional structure which clearly differentiated and discriminated against the indians. For example, indians were economically marginalized by *mestizo* intermediaries, who forced the indians to sell them their products at the prices established by the *mestizos*; were not allowed to vote because of literacy requirements; were practically excluded from educational facilities; and were culturally discriminated against. Thus, authority, prestige, power and economic resources rested exclusively in the hands of the regional elite resident in Jauja.

#### *Changes in the Political-Administrative and Economic Structure of the Region*

The monolithic control by Jauja over its region was first challenged in 1864, when Huancayo became the capital of a new province. This meant that the southern part of the Mantaro Valley was separated from Jauja province, and thereby removed from its control. Political, social, and economic factors brought about this situation. Politically,

Huancayo occupied a geographically strategic position which converted it into a natural frontier town that connected the central *sierra* to the southern departments of the country. This geographical location was utilized by the military *caudillos* of the early years of the Republic. For example, Gamarra<sup>2</sup> camped in Huancayo and there, after convoking a national assembly, promulgated the constitution of 1839. Some years later, perhaps the most important political figure of the XIX century, Ramon Castilla<sup>3</sup>, during his civil war against Echenique<sup>4</sup>, established his headquarters in Huancayo, because he needed the support of the indian masses of the area. Castilla rewarded their military contribution to his campaign against his enemy by abolishing the indian tribute and raising the administrative status of some of the villages of the southern part of the Mantaro valley, including Huancayo.

Economically, Huancayo was developing as an important commercial center, where the merchants who travelled south from Jauja found a natural place to stop overnight before continuing their trip. Furthermore, Huancayo enjoyed a strategic position as a hub of communication. At least six dirt roads converged there; among them, the road to the mines of Cercapuquio and Huancavelica was particularly important from an economic point of view. As mining activities and commerce were increasing in importance, a new group associated with them was emerging in the valley. By 1860, Huancayo's population had equalled Jauja's. With the establishment of a new province, the era of Jauja's elite domination in the valley was put to an end by the development of a new city, characterized by a more homogeneous and integrated social structure, and already prepared to take advantage of important changes coming to the valley. When the war of the Pacific broke out in 1879, the position of the land owning class of Jauja was further weakened. Apart from the material damage caused by the war and the disruption of normal agricultural activities, Bravo (1943) reports that most of the expenses for the defense and the preparation of Caceres's<sup>5</sup> army were met by the 'notables' of Jauja. The richest ladies of the city offered their jewelry to finance the campaigns against the Chileans. In the years following the war with Chile, Jauja however enjoyed a comeback due to the incursion of a group of foreign business men, who, taking advantage of the construction in 1893 of railways from Lima to La Oroya located at about 60 kilometers from Jauja, started to bring merchandise from Lima and Europe. The immigration of foreigners and the commercial exchanges with the coast intensified in the first decade

of this century when the railway reached the valley in 1908, rapidly transforming the social and economic profile of Jauja.

During the first years of this century, the commerce between Jauja and the coast was controlled by a small group of eight families, all of them foreigners or migrants from the coast. Its most important characteristic was that of operating in a situation of quasi-monopoly and of rapid expansion of their businesses. For example, one of the most important business men was an immigrant of Italian origin who controlled eight stores, a pharmacy and a hotel. The same people who imported from Europe, taking advantage of their personal contacts, very soon managed to monopolize as well what the valley exported, due to their superior buying capacity. For example, another immigrant of French origin monopolized the commerce of wool during the same period. These changes in the economic structure of Jauja had an important impact on the composition of its dominant group, and above all opened up the possibilities for new social forces to participate in the political control of the city. In fact, if before 1880 the '*principales*', those who controlled the city politically were the landowners, in this new stage, political power was shared between the old families from Jauja and the new group of business men. There were however no manifestations of conflict between this new emerging elite and the traditional land owning class. Alliances and agreements among them were established particularly through social and family interconnections.

Yet, while this process of differentiation and social recomposition within the dominant group of Jauja was taking place, not much was happening in the rural areas. Perhaps the single most important factor that had disequilibrating consequences for the total social organization of the valley was the massive penetration of modern capitalism. Cerro de Pasco Corporation, Peru's largest copper producer, established its operations for the exploitation of the rich mining zone of the Peruvian central *sierra* in 1902. The insertion of an 'enclave' economy meant the alteration of archaic forms of production and of the social relations associated with them; most of the working force was directly recruited from the surrounding peasant population through the mechanism of *enganche* (indentured labor). The concentration of a working population of peasant origins under a single economic regime, characterized by salary exchange relationships and depersonalization of the system of domination, brought about the appearance of various processes of politization and unionization of a peasant proletarian mass, that for the first time clashed in an organized



way with the capitalist class. These experiences were particularly important for their socialization effects, as they favored the development of new attitudes and organization abilities, which were later utilized by the peasant-miners in their communities of origin. At the same time, work in the mines permitted the increase in the acquisitive capacity of the peasant population that survived the hard conditions of such labor, which allowed them to modernize their agricultural activities or invest their savings in the modernization of their small industry.

As the introduction of Cerro de Pasco and its labor recruitment policy had a direct impact in the countryside, new forces of modernization were added to the already changing situation. Two large enterprises for cattle raising were formed: *La Sociedad Ganadera Junin* (1906) and *La Sociedad Ganadera del Centro* (1910). The former was particularly important because it meant the incursion of financial groups from Lima, which in combination with some large landowners from Jauja established more rationalized and technologically more advanced enterprises. The most immediate consequence of the formation of the *Sociedad Ganadera Junin*, from the point of view of the local power structure, was that the old owners of the *haciendas* incorporated in the new enterprise left Jauja and moved their residence to Lima, leaving the administration of the enterprise to employed professionals. This meant that the *hacendado* group lost some of its most powerful members. Simultaneously new anti-oligarchical ideologies originating in Lima began to spread to the areas affected by the first wave of the modernization process. Members of the urban working class in Jauja also participated in the change process and formed their first organization in 1913. It brought together mainly small artisans such as tailors, carpenters, small shopkeepers, etc. who attempted to follow anarcho-syndicalist ideology.

By the beginning of the twenties, the regional social structure had already undergone radical transformations. The rural areas saw the proliferation of new district capitals and legally recognized indigenous communities, which thereby acquired new channels of direct communication with the central government and weakened their dependency relationship with the urban centers. Jauja's old traditional elite had lost position both internally and valley-wide, where Huancaayo, capitalizing on the break-up of the previous monolithic structure of rural control, was emerging as the new dominant center of the valley, with an economy mainly based on commerce.

Two additional factors intervened to definitively close one histori-

cal period and open a new one in which the Mantaro Valley entered in its totality into a process of urban expansion and rural urbanization exemplified by the explosion of Huancayo.<sup>6</sup> First, in 1929, due to the international financial crisis, the commerce that the foreign immigrants had established between Jauja and both Lima and Europe collapsed. This meant the economic and social bankruptcy of one important faction of Jauja's power elite. Secondly, the election of Sanchez Cerro in 1931 brought about the overt political defeat of the landowning Jauja elite who had aligned themselves with the conservative forces which were defeated by the advent of the populist leader. The electoral process of 1931 also meant an effective expansion of the national political market: both *Sanchezceristas* and *Apristas*, members of the two largest competing parties, attempted to establish clientelist politics (Powell, 1970) in the more modernizing rural areas of Peru. In the Yanamarca and Mantaro Valley, electoral committees were established in rural districts for the first time. Jauja's decay was officially confirmed in the same year (1931) when the capital of the department of Junín, including both the provinces of Jauja and Huancayo, was moved from Cerro de Pasco to Huancayo. *All these converging processes produced an opening in the regional social structure setting the stage for the peasant movements of the Yanamarca valley which broke out in the following years.*

#### *Peasant Mobilization in the Yanamarca Valley*

While these structural transformations were taking place in the area that constituted the Jauja province of 1850, life in the *haciendas* of the Yanamarca Valley continued practically unchanged until the early 1930's. Of the six *haciendas* of the area, we will concentrate on one, *hacienda Yanamarca*, to describe the process of peasant mobilization. The *Hacienda* of Yanamarca is certainly the one that had maintained the closest contacts with the outside world due to the fact that it bordered on Acolla, an independent indigenous community, educational and commercial center of a small micro-region, and it was only a few miles away from Jauja. The *hacienda* belonged to a Spanish captain in the last years of the colonial period. With the establishment of the republic it passed to the control of the state which rented it to private individuals. The *hacienda* with its peons who constituted its labor force passed from one renter to another. Its extension was 3296 hectares of which only 540 were cultivable. Its main products were barley, potatoes, quinoa and more recently onions. The internal social

organization was fairly simple and social relationships were extremely hierarchical. The renter, commonly referred to as the *patrón*, was at the top of the organization, but as he resided in the city for most of the year, an administrator had the immediate responsibility for the functioning of the *hacienda*. He counted on the help of a *mayordomo* (general supervisor), one employee and two foremen. The labor force was made up of approximately 120 peons subdivided into two categories: full time and half time peons. In addition, there were a number of daily laborers that usually joined the *hacienda* work force during the period of highest labor demand such as harvest time. The arrangements governing the exchange relationships between the *hacendado* and his peons were like those prevalent in other parts of the *sierra*: the peon was given the right to cultivate a small plot of land for his own subsistence and that of his family; in exchange he had to work for the *hacendado* an average of three days a week. Furthermore the peon had to use his own tools, manure the lands with his animals and furnish the *hacienda* house with water and wood. Women were also subjected to a number of personal obligations in the *hacienda* house.

The system of social control was maintained through two different mechanisms. The *hacendado* or his administrator used a differential reward system in the attempt to ensure the peons' loyalty. First, those who behaved in the prescribed way received personal favors which could be withdrawn any time they ceased to obey their superiors' orders. Second, a complex system of sanctions was utilized to punish those who did not comply with their obligations. The most extreme of these sanctions was expulsion from the *hacienda* lands. The *hacienda* system of social organization rested on two additional features. First, as we noted earlier, the *hacendado* was a prominent member of the provincial power structure. He controlled the system of public administration, either by occupying important positions directly or by establishing close personal relationships with the holders of public office. The *hacendado* and his associates - the head of the local police, the judge, the priest and a few lawyers - constituted a closed power elite which safe-guarded their own interests. Second, the peons had no possibility of establishing effective links outside of the *hacienda*. Furthermore, the prevalent cultural orientation produced by the overall structural conditions favored intra-group hostility, which functioned as a displacement mechanism to compensate for the inherent frustration derived from the *patrón*-peon relationships.


This regime continued with insignificant changes up to the decade of 1930. Yet, by that time some of the peons had already gained ex-

periences in the mining centers. The first timid attempt to introduce changes in the *haciendas* was an effort on the part of the peons to establish a school. First, they invited a private teacher from the nearby community of Acolla to give classes to their children. Second, they established connections with the Ministry of Education in order to demand support for the activity of the local teacher. This was achieved at the beginning of 1940. Meanwhile, the children of the better-off peons received their first years of instruction in the *hacienda* and later continued their schooling in Acolla which was only 3 kilometers away.


Some of these young men, after receiving their first years of education, went on to work in the mines. They were in a privileged position with respect to their fathers, because they could take advantage of regional opportunities from which their fathers were excluded. In fact, they could choose between working in the *hacienda* as daily laborers or leaving it to look for work in the mines or the urban centers. They could always go back to the *hacienda* and take over their father's position, while if the latter left the *hacienda* he would lose his rights over the plot of land accorded to him by the *hacendado*. At the beginning of the forties, some of the sons of the peons were working in La Oroya and in Casapalca, both important mining centers of the Cerro de Pasco complex. There they learned about union activities and some of them were directly involved in the conflicts that characterized labor-management relationships during those years in the mines. At the same time they established contacts with political leaders and received the impact of anti-oligarchical ideologies. Some of them returned to the *hacienda* and were incorporated in the local labor force, some as peons and others as helpers. It was the year 1945. Important national events would help to speed up the process of change in Yanamarca. For the first time, Apra, a populist party, after many years of persecution and underground activities, was allowed to come out in the open and many of its adherents held seats in parliament and occupied public offices in some provincial public administrations.

These changes in the occupancy of authority positions, accompanied by political activities of parties representing emerging social forces, brought on immediate repercussion in many rural areas of the country (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969). With the direct participation of Apra members in positions of regional and national power, the process of unionization spread not only among the urban proletariat, but also in the rural areas of the coast, where for the first time groups of peons


formed their unions. The winds of change blew also over the lands of *hacienda* Yanamarca. Jauja's mayor at that time was a well known local *aprista* who participated in the early attempts of Apra penetration in the countryside during the election of 1931. It was during his term of office that a group of young ex-miners under the leadership of an *aprista* schoolteacher from Acolla, managed to mobilize a large segment of the peon population. After a series of general assembly meetings, held at night in order not to be discovered by the *hacendado* or the administrator, they decided to present their first series of complaints to the *hacendado*. Their aim was at first to achieve an improvement in their exchange rate with their *patrón*. In the presence of an official of the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs representatives of the peons and the *hacendado* reached an agreement signed by both parties, according to which the *patrón* agreed to abolish some of the peons' obligations and the peons promised to comply regularly with their tasks. However, very soon after the agreement had been signed, the peons filed a complaint with the Ministry of Justice, accusing the *patrón* of breaking the pact. Later on the peons also established contacts with the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs to which they sent a memorial about their case. It was the beginning of a long struggle in the national and also in the department capital. At one point, the prefect of Huancayo intervened, following a denunciation of the *patrón* who accused the leaders of the movement of being communists and social agitators. The peons immediately reacted with a written statement addressed to the Minister of the Interior, but in spite of their relentless efforts, the Ministry ordered the expulsion of the peasant leaders who had constituted the backbone of the movement. The order however was not carried out, because the leaders reached an agreement with the *hacendado* in which they committed themselves not to participate in any subversive activities, to obey their superiors' orders, and to drop all the demands they had previously presented. This fact might have meant the end of the movement, but the peasants, gathered in a general assembly, repudiated their leaders, and a new leadership emerged. This turnover in leadership positions is a clear evidence that the necessity for change and the willingness to move to action was felt throughout the peons' group and had reached almost the totality of its members. At this stage of the conflict, the peons decided to get in touch with the deputy for the province of Jauja. After many trips to Lima they achieved their purpose and obtained an interview with this important figure, to whom they revealed the details of their long conflict with the



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


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


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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For a typology of peasant movements, see Quijano (1967). He defines a political peasant movement in these terms: "The notion of politicalization is used here to describe the behavior of all social movements whose objectives, ideological models, organization forms, leadership and strategies of action, are mainly directed toward fundamental economic, social and political change in the society" (Quijano, *op. cit.*, 306). Here political is used in a much narrower sense. That is, a peasant movement is political when it attempts to alter the existing power structure, whether local, regional or national. I would argue that a peasant movement *per se* never attempts "to question the basic aspects of the dominant social order" unless by social order we mean the peasants' order and not the national one.

<sup>2</sup> General Agustín Gamarra was Peru's president from 1831-33 and from 1839-41.

<sup>3</sup> General Ramón Castilla was Peru's president from 1845-51 and from 1855-62.

<sup>4</sup> José Rufino Echenique was president from 1851-54.

<sup>5</sup> Andrés A. Cáceres, important national figure during the war against Chile (1879-83), was president from 1886-90.

<sup>6</sup> The following figures taken from the national censuses of 1876, 1940 and 1961, illustrate the differential development followed by Jauja and Huancayo.

	Jauja	Huancayo
1876	2,773	4,053
1940	12,280	26,729
1961	14,298	64,153

A pre-census estimation for this year (1972) indicates that Huancayo's population is around 120,000 while Jauja's is approximately 15,000.

<sup>7</sup> Other works that have dealt with the peasant movements of the Yanamarca valley are: Alberti (1970a, 1970b), Sánchez (1969), Tullis (1970) and Whyte (1969).

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of the peasantry *behaves* like a class should not make us jump to the deterministic conclusion that peasants form a class. That should remain an empirical question. Furthermore, from the point of view of the peasantry class formation, the 'class-like' behavior of segments of the peasantry, under conditions of national rural heterogeneity, can have counterproductive consequences. That is, it can lead, when successful, to more peasant fragmentation rather than to class solidarity.

On the basis of the empirical material at hand and the preceding theoretical considerations, we propose three general propositions about the origins of peasant movements and their role in developing countries:

- I. A peasant movement is the outcome of three interrelated social processes: 1) persistence of an exploitative relationship between landlord and peasant, 2) long range structural transformations that bring about loss of power of the *hacendado* class and 3) increased bargaining power on the part of the peasantry.
- II. While the conditions create a structural situation conducive to peasant movements, precipitating factors must be present to serve as detonators. The specification of the nature of these precipitating factors is an empirical question. Our material suggests a number of them: suddenly worsening exchange relationships experienced by the peasantry, population pressures due to natural causes and/or closing of alternative occupational opportunities, sudden decrease of peasant buying capacity as a consequence of national inflation, etc. *The important point to be made here is that the precipitating factors must not be taken as the cause of peasant movements.*
- III. A peasant movement, when successful in countries like Peru, serves to remove the vestiges of archaic systems of production and the social relations associated with them. That is, it brings a 'backward' social sector into line with the dominant mode of production and the social relations prevalent in a given region or country. In this sense, a successful peasant movement, from the point of view of deep national social change, can become a conservative force. This last observation suggests that the success of peasant movements must be analyzed in terms of both a local and a national perspective. Furthermore, within the national perspective, particular attention must be given to the conditions under which peasant movements can merge with urban-based protest movements and thus become an integral part of total national transformation.

continue their exploited existence *as if* nothing has happened around them. But things have changed. Some of these same peons have themselves been actors in the change process. For example, they have participated in union activities outside the *hacienda*, in the milling centers; have built up new client relationships with political figures; have gained other usable allies and, fundamental to their subsequent behavior, have acquired a new consciousness of their position. *Stage four* represents the total bankruptcy of the *hacendado* class. It has lost local political control: new forces, such as merchants, politicians, professionals (for example lawyers with anti-oligarchical ideologies or simply interested in making money, and willing to help the peons in their court cases), national bureaucrats, etc. now occupy local seats of power. At the same time, the *hacendado* class faces serious financial problems, due mainly to mismanagement, poor working relationships and lack of modernization in the technology of land exploitation. It commonly reacts by attempting to squeeze more work out of its peons. This move becomes a precipitating factor of the peasants' reaction. The important thing is, that at this stage the peons are no longer isolated. New, emerging social actors, such as politicians, union leaders, and national bureaucrats, are willing to listen to their demands. At this point, the direct confrontation between peasant and landlord is inevitable. The success of the movement leads to the elimination of quasi-feudal working relationships within a capitalist regional structure.

In the preceding analysis, we have implicitly used the concept of class and the analytical tools of the theory of class formation. These include such interrelated notions as: 1. the breaking down of social and cultural isolation, 2. the disruption of local loyalties (when they exist), 3. the perception that individual interests are not antagonistic with group interests, 4. the development of new intra-group systems of communication and organization, 5. a more realistic definition of the group's situation, its enemies and its potential allies, and 6. finally a clear understanding of the instrumental value, and usage, of strategies of action in order to attain new objectives (Quijano, 1967 p. 329). These notions are useful for heuristic purposes and in our case they point to *concrete* social processes. We have used them in trying to answer the question: What are the conditions under which a group of *peasants behave* like a class? Clearly, a political peasant movement is an example of class behavior; that is, it represents the change of the peasantry, which participates in it, from a situation of 'class in itself' to that of a 'class for itself'. However, the observation that a segment

elucidate the dynamics of change in collective peasant organizations. The approach selected for this study implicitly rejects the validity of a synchronic, correlational analysis, *unless* this is done as a complement to an historical analysis. A recent study of peasant mobilization in Peru (Handelman, 1971) clearly supports this contention. None of the correlations between peasant mobilization and various factors commonly hypothesized to be associated with it, such as urban contacts, mass media exposure, levels of social development, etc. is borne out by the data. This consideration brings us to the second methodological position taken in this paper. No single characteristic of the peasantry will do in the attempt to explain peasant movements. This is so for two reasons: first, the origins of peasant movements lie outside of the peasantry itself, and second, they have to be found in the interaction between the specific exchange relationship that binds peasant and lord and the social forces that operate at both levels. Thus methodologically, the unit of analysis of peasant movements must be the interaction process between city and countryside.

From a theoretical point of view, the empirical material presented suggests a four stage model of regional transformation and the origin of peasant movements. At *stage one*, the *hacendado* is at the heart of the regional power structure and has full control over the environment of the peons. The extremely unequal distribution of power is reinforced by cultural and ethnic differentiation in Peru between the subordinated indian and the dominant *mestizo*. At *stage two*, a regional power contender appears as the result of changes in the economic structure of the valley. The power domain of the *hacendado* is reduced, but his hold on his peons is still strong. At *stage three*, a new regional elite has displaced the old traditional *hacendado* class. By the time this shift in regional power relations manifests itself, the social structure of the region has already suffered important transformations. Not only has there been a regional revolution in the seat of power, but also the economic structure and the social relations associated with it have changed their quasi-feudal nature and taken on a more capitalist orientation. This stage is also characterized by the opening of new alternatives and the entrance of national politics into the rural areas. Yet at the local, provincial level, the *hacendado* class, because of personal connections and the weight of 'tradition' still manages to control the situation by sharing its power with new emerging groups. Given this set of conditions, while the autonomously organized indian communities can take advantage of changing regional opportunities, social relations within the *hacienda* tend to persist and the peons

again had a direct impact on the local situation at the hacienda Yanamarca. It was the year 1963 when Belaunde was elected president after a much disputed electoral process during which agrarian reform was promised by all parties. Upon taking office he announced a program of vast reforms and the constitution of a community development agency called Cooperación Popular, whose main task would be to assist peasants to improve their lot. Rural popular enthusiasm spread to many parts of the country including Yanamarca. The peons, now encouraged by presidential promises decided to radicalize their goals. They sent a memorial to the president, presenting their case and asking for the right to lease the *hacienda* directly, which would eliminate the *patrón*. The answer from the presidential office was long delayed, but finally it arrived in the form of a notification which stated that their request had been taken into consideration, but that they should wait for the promulgation of an agrarian reform law which was being prepared.

Meanwhile, during the two years of union struggle the party most affected was the *hacendado*. In fact, in a situation like that of *hacienda* Yanamarca where agricultural laborers kept the possession of a plot of land for their subsistence, the strike is a very effective conflict mechanism. It damages only one party, because while the *patrón* loses his labor force, the peons can continue working the plot of land assigned to them. Of course this is true only where the *hacendado* lacks the power to expel them from his land. The result of the years of conflict was a new financial crisis of the *hacendado*-renter who could not pay for the renewal of his lease. In these circumstances the peasants finally achieved success and obtained the renting of the hacienda under the condition of forming a cooperative.

Similar processes of mobilization? took place in some of the remaining five *haciendas* of the Yanamarca valley. The only one in which peasants did not organize and rebel against their *patrón* was run in a completely different fashion. The *hacendado* introduced many technological changes, he eliminated the 'feudal' obligations attached to the traditional role of peon, paid the peasants a salary and offered them his advice on marketing the crops produced in the plot of land assigned to them, thus facilitating their participation in the changing situation.

#### METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In this paper we have utilized an historical methodology in order to

While ferment was continuing among the peasants, the *patrón* carried out changes in the production process with the introduction of new machinery, insecticides and new crops such as onions. After a few years during which the operation of the *hacienda* produced good profits, the *hacendado* had to face a serious economic crisis due to the fact that bad weather during two consecutive harvests nearly destroyed the entire production. The first reaction of the *patrón* was to squeeze more work out of the peons. In order to do so, he depended on the collaboration of those who already occupied privileged positions, such as the *mayordomo* and the foremen, giving them more land and higher wages in the hope that they would be stricter in making the peons comply with their obligations. The rigid control of the helpers of the *hacendado* turned out to be counterproductive and forced the peons to react and defend their own positions. In the night of April 20, 1961 they all gathered in a general assembly meeting and decided to form a union in order to face the *patrón's* new demands in a united and organized way. In the following days they established connections with a lawyer from Huancayo in order to have the legal advice needed for recognition of their union. Their first effort failed. They were informed by labor officials that they could not form a union because their working conditions did not meet the legal requirements. This did not dishearten the peons who were finally supported by leaders of a leftist union, which itself was attempting to incorporate new organizations. Two years after the foundation of their union, the peons of Yanamarca succeeded in obtaining legal recognition, and registered their organization with the sub-regional office of the Ministry of Labor in Huancayo.

After achieving recognition, the union presented a list of complaints to the *patrón* which included all those presented in 1945. In addition they asked for money wages. Upon the refusal of the *hacendado* to satisfy the demands of the peasants, the union called a strike. The *hacendado* reacted by calling for the intervention of the prefect of Huancayo rather than appealing to labor officials. Higher level regional officials attempted to persuade the peons to stop the strike as a pre-condition to establish discussions between the two parties. However, agreements were not reached, because the peasants insisted on their right to money wages, while the *hacendado* claimed, that the remuneration for the peons' services was given in the form of the small plot of land which he let them exploit for their own subsistence.

While the situation had reached a standstill, national events once

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*hacendado*. When it seemed that they were going to receive his support, events of national importance brought about a temporary defeat of the peons. In 1948 with the change of government and the establishment of the Odría dictatorship and the closing of the national parliament, the connections with the deputy became irrelevant. As a result of this situation, Yanamarca temporarily returned to the same style of life and work prevalent during the days prior to the conflict.

In 1950 an important change occurred at the top of the *hacienda* social organization. The previous renter did not achieve the extension of the contract and was replaced by the ex-deputy who had previously established contacts with the peons. The new renter, who already knew about the conflictive relationships that had existed in the *hacienda*, wanted to introduce a more rational system, which would clearly specify, in the form of a written contract, the rights and obligations of both parties. He accorded the peons a few concessions, and in exchange he received a written statement in which they assumed full responsibility for their work obligations. For a few years there were no instances of overt conflict. Meanwhile the organizational activity of the peons, which had been centered around their conflict relationship with the previous renter, was now directed towards other endeavours. It was at that time that the parent-teachers association acquired importance. The functions of this organization went beyond educational matters and relationships between parents and teachers. Rather it was an organization which extended its activities to many aspects of life in the *hacienda*. For example, under its auspices a school building was constructed, after the leaders of the parent-teachers association persuaded the *hacendado* to provide the school with a small plot of land whose production would go toward the running costs of the school.

Meanwhile temporary migration to the mines of the central *sierra* continued and so did the education of young men in the nearby schools. One of the most prominent figures of a new conflict, which was about to break out, after completing primary education in the *hacienda* school, continued his education in a secondary school in Acolla. Afterwards he worked as a miner in La Oroya, where he participated very actively in the union movement of those years. When his father died, he went back to the *hacienda* and assumed the obligations which went along with the role of peon. As had already happened with others who had similar experiences, this young man was anxious to share what he learned in the mines with those who never left the *hacienda*. He encountered a very receptive audience.