MULTIAGENCY APPROACH IN PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF OPERATION AMANI BONI IN LAMU COUNTY

By

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
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A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of Requirements for the Award of Post Graduate Diploma in Strategic Studies of Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi

June 2022

DECLARATION

This research project report is my original work and has not been presented for award of a post graduate degree in any University.

Signed.......

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R47/41714/2022

Date... 15 September 2022

This research project is submitted for examination with his approval as University Supervisor.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to extend special gratitude to my supervisor Hilary K Kipkurui for his guidance, encouragement and selfless dedication. Special thanks to my lecturers who have taught me various units in this Post Graduate Degree program. I also wish to thank University of Nairobi for according me the opportunity to study at the university. To my fellow classmates and colleagues; thanks for your encouragement. To my friends; thank you for being there for me and for the support. I also thank my immediate family for all their encouragement and support during this course.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family for the sacrifice they made towards the successful conclusion

of this research project in time. Their support and encouragement inspired me to complete this

project.

ABSTRACT

Despite joint efforts by government and non-governmental entities, as well as several researches on various aspects of terrorism in Kenya there are limited studies done to examine the effectiveness of the multiagency security approach to enhancing security and an analytical look at the existing multiagency team's legal and institutional framework and its effect on enhancement of security. This paper therefore explores Multiagency approach in promoting national security. It analyses global, regional and Kenya Multiagency approach to combating security threat and its application in counter terrorism efforts in operation Amani Boni. The study examines institutional and legal framework of multiagency approach to security in Kenya and analyses the effectiveness of multiagency approach in the case of Lamu County. This is because, multiagency security approach has been viewed as means of organizing and implementing complex and comprehensive interventions where independent security organ efforts to address security challenges have failed or have been unsatisfactory. The paper utilizes the system Theory as a tool of analysis pioneered by Emile Durkheim, who was a sociologist looking at establishing how societies establish and maintain stability. It adopts a descriptive research design, specifically a case study case research method, to examine multiagency approach in promoting national security in Kenya. This study targeted security personnel tasked with coordinating and managing operation Amani Boni, in Lamu County, Kenya. The paper concludes by proving that multiagency approach has been beneficial in identifying and preventing security threats in Kenya demonstrated by a decrease in incidences, number of fatalities, greater public awareness and cooperation between multiagency. The paper further concludes that resource constraint, doctrinal disagreements among security actors due to lack of a unified institutional and legal framework at tactical level and training disparities have limited effectiveness of the multiagency approach in the fight against security threats.

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ACSRT - African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism.

AP - Administration Police.

ATPU - Anti-Terror Police Unit.

CIMIC – Civil Military Cooperation.

CISC - Criminal Intelligence Service Canada.

CSIC - County Intelligence and Security Committee.

DHS - Department of Homeland Security.

EAC - East African Community.

FATF - Financial Action Task Force.

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations.

FRC - Financial Reporting Centre.

FTX - Field Training Exercise.

GSU - General Service Unit.

ICK - Inter-Religious Council of Kenya.

JOC - Joint Operation Centre.

JSIS - Joint Security Intelligence Secretariat.

JSOC - Joint Security Operations Centre.

KCG - Kenya Coast Guard.

KDF - Kenya Defence Forces.

KFS - Kenya Forest Service.

KWS - Kenya Wildlife Service.

LAPSSET - Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport.

MAC - Multiagency cooperation.

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NCCK - National Council of Churches in Kenya.

NCTC-National Counter Terrorism Centre.

NGOs - Non-Governmental Organizations.

NIS - National Intelligence Service.

NPS - National Police Service.

NSAC - National Security Advisory Committee.

NSC - National Security Council.

NSCVE - National Strategy to Countering Violent Extremism.

PISCES - Personnel Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System.

POCAMLA - Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009.

POCA - Proceeds against Organized Crime Act.

POTA - Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012.

PSO - Peace Support Operations.

RBPU - Rural Border Patrol Unit.

RDU - Rapid Deployment Unit.

RSIC - Regional Security and Intelligence Committee.

SCPS - Sub-committee on Protective Security.

SCSIC - Sub-County Security and Intelligence Committee.

SLAA - Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014.

SPSS - Statistical Package for Social Scientists.

SUPKEM - Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.

USA – United States of America.

WSIC - Ward Security and Intelligence Committee.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Security of the people and protection of national interests are of paramount importance to every state as a secure nation enables its citizens to enjoy their fundamental freedoms and rights. Those rights and freedoms are enshrined in the constitution of the states.

> "National security is the protection against internal and external threats to a nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests".[1]

Globally, nations have faced several challenges caused by insecurity mainly through terrorism that has threatened their survival. Following the increase in threats and changing dynamics of insecurity, different countries all over the world are continuously expanding their security apparatus capability. This includes changes of the security personnel composition, equipment, training and any other possible strategy that may help in combating the spread of insecurity. This has seen many nations establish highly trained and adequately equipped independent security organs that deal with emerging threats.[2] Nonetheless, presently, many countries have shifted from the single security units to development of synergy among the security organs in order to leverage on the strengths of each. This in return has helped in the attainment of the capability required to enhance security. Decisively, countries have come up with the concept of multiagency security organ approach to respond to insecurity. Multiagency approach includes

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[1]Government of Kenya, The *Constitution of Kenya,* (Nairobi: Government Printers 2010); p 125.

[2] Speckhard A, *The Handbook of Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Oxford: Routledge printers, 2015); pp. 781-782.

coordinated and integrated collaboration between different key security organs and supporting institutions for improved information sharing and effective response to security threat. The organs within the multiagency share a common goal of not only enhancing the security of a nation but also avoiding being reactive to security threats by proactively preventing and responding in an event of attack.

As opposed to the single security organ operation, multiagency approach to security has continued to receive more attention globally. Some of the successful operations include the 2005 London train bombing, which led to the establishment of command-and-control center. The established system assisted in relaying the right information to the restless public thus rallying the entire population and partners behind the government effort thereby defeating the publicity that the terrorists desired. This in return helped reduce the adverse impact of the attack an indication that when agencies work together in a collaborative manner rather than individually it results in a more secure nation. Additionally, the US, on the other hand, having enhanced collaboration between various intelligence organizations has successfully managed to counter terrorisms activities organized by armed groups such as Al Qaeda. In Africa, Nigeria adopted the use of "carrot and stick" approach to spearhead the country's counter-terrorism agenda. It draws from the various multiagency security approaches used by different countries combating terrorism by being both proactive and reactive. Further, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which reflects the notion of a multiagency security approach and is primarily responsible for coordinating anti- and counter-terrorism actions, was founded in response to the escalation of terrorism threats in Kenya.

The dominance of the multiagency approach to security could be attributed to its ability to accurately identify and define specific security threats and problems. This accuracy is as a result

of the incorporation of multidirectional strategies and viewpoints generated by relevant security agencies compared to the single security agent approach.[3] Additionally, scholars have also argued that different security agencies have different professional cultures that highly inform the adoption of multiagency approach to security matters. Working practices, priorities, and terms of reference inform agencies' perception of professional culture, which may vary significantly amongst agencies in some cases.[4] Thus, the use of a multiagency approach allows diverse security actors to pool their resources and bring together the necessary skill sets.[5] For example, the Intelligence Unit is responsible to gathering crucial information for successful operations, whereas the Anti-Terrorism Unit has its own distinct characteristics. As a result, bringing together a collection of all of these varied, unique, and possibly very different traits is critical to increasing synergy among the many participants.[6] Similarly, relying on the capacities of different specialized security agencies in the multiagency approach to security plays an important part in reducing risks thereby securing lives and reducing losses associated with emergency situation. Another factor contributing to the adoption of the multiagency approach is that decisions to addressing security threats are highly dependent on the availability of resources.[7] Individualized security operations are thought to be more expensive, especially when all security agencies' organs are needed to contribute, as compared to a multiagency strategy.

Therefore, from the above insights, it is clear that there is need for states to innovatively review their approaches to security threats. This includes the adoption of frameworks that not only

[3]Rosenbaum D, *Evaluating Multi-Agency Anti-Crime Partnerships: Theory, Design, and Measurement Issues,* (Chicago: University of Illinois, 2002); pp 171-225.

[4] Hazel K and Maguire M, *Public Protection, Partnership and Risk Penalty: the Multi-Agency Risk Management of Sexual and Violent Offenders*, (England: Cardiff University Printers, 2001); pp 237-264.

[5] Hoffman F, *Shifts in Global Security Landscape Demand Changes in Force*, (Washington DC: National Defence University Printers, 2010); p 100.

[6] Magara E M, *Coordination by Security Agencies in Securing Africa: a Case Study of Kenya* (Nairobi; University of Nairobi, 2019); p 67.

[7] Pratt J, *Professional Identity in a Multi-agency Team,* (Durham: Durham University, 2012); p 13.

enhances coordination among security agencies but also facilitates maximization of resources and capabilities inherent in each agency. Arising from the aforementioned, this research project is informed by the preposition that, combined force approach may be effective as opposed to independent act by the state security agencies to provide security for its citizens. Therefore, the need for proper institutional and legal structures that facilitates collaborative proficient and reliable partnership among security agencies is of paramount importance. The multiagency security framework must function as a whole rather than as a collection of individual components. As a result, building and operating a multiagency organization necessitates consideration of a variety of aspects at all levels of operations.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Having secure environment in all aspects of human security where the citizens live peacefully as they contribute to the growth of the country is what every Nation's desire and strive for. Kenya is not exempted as various security ministries have put up mechanisms that ensure citizens lives are secured. Various policies, operational and administrative efforts have been put in place by the government to ensure that there is security countrywide. However, there are challenges to the desired peace arising from international criminal organizations, acts of terror and other related crime. In the last two decades, the emergence and spread of international terrorism has prompted countries to put in place mechanisms to prevent and respond to such actions wherever they occur.[8] Following a series of terrorist attacks in Kenya, particularly between 2010 and 2014, the security organs implemented a multiagency security approach to combat the crime. Prior to the Security Amendment Laws (2014) underpinning the multiagency security approach, the Kenya suffered enormous losses due to acts of terror, as well as being shamefully referred to as a

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[8] Sarma K, *Multi-agency Working and Preventing Violent Extremism,* (Ireland: University of Ireland, 2018); pp25-26.

"hotbed of terrorism" in worldwide media. Reports of significant youth involvement in terrorism exacerbated the situation threatening the future of the next generation and stability of the country.[9]

Because the world has become more interconnected as a result of globalization, every form of instability anywhere becomes a security hazard everywhere. The hunt for an effective grand plan to combat insecurity incidents such as terrorism in the region continues, necessitating a broadening of analysis and investigation of all important players. Furthermore, while the institutional and legal foundations of a country's civil-military interactions are critical in achieving successful multiagency operations, they are frequently disregarded. Clear differences between their individual realms of responsibility are critical to increasing the odds of success in the management of security emergencies by various security bodies. Despite joint efforts by government and non-governmental entities, as well as several researches on various aspects of terrorism in Kenya,[10] there are limited studies done to examine the effectiveness of the multiagency security approach to enhancing security by the security organs. Another area that appears to have been given a wide berth by researchers of Kenya's security sector is aspects of the existing multiagency team's legal and institutional framework, as well as the effect it has had in the overall enhancement of security. Will understanding the country's structure and approach towards providing security help in improving national security? How effective are approaches and strategies applied enhance the national security of Kenya as a whole? This paper therefore seeks to examine the structure of multiagency operations and to understand the effectiveness of this approach. The case study of Boni which is one of a multiagency operation will be used.

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[9] Mogire E & Agade K, *Counter-Terrorism in Kenya, Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* (Nairobi: University Printers, 2011); pp 473-491.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study will be to examine multiagency approach in promoting national security. The specific objectives of the study are:

i.   To examine the institutional and legal frameworks of multiagency approach of security in Kenya.

ii. To analyze the effectiveness of multiagency approach in the case of Lamu County.

1.4 Literature Review

This chapter reviews empirical material on the multiagency approach to security's institutional and legislative frameworks, as well as its effectiveness in boosting national security. The reviewed literature is then outlined as per the research objectives. A summary is presented in a manner that identifies knowledge gaps in reviewed literature which this study intends to fill.

1.4.1 The Institutional and Legal Frameworks of Multiagency Approach of Security.

A multiagency security approach, like any other organization, is made up of different agency cultures and services, with partners bringing a variety of resources and ideas to the problem-solving table. As a result, a correct and functional structure is required to improve the partnership's efficiency and effectiveness. This means that planning and implementing a multiagency security operation necessitates consideration of a number of elements at both the strategic and operational levels. These include clarifying roles when assembling the various organs, ensuring dedication of the security organs and their subordinate teams at strategic, operational and tactical levels and ensuring that multi agency structures are designed in a manner that fosters cooperation, respect and trust among the various agencies thereby ensuring that the

multiagency approach fosters mutual understanding.[11] These factors smoothens inter relations between the various security agencies hence maximizing on the intrinsic advantages of each security organ.

A good multiagency approach to security structure should ensure that there is parity among organs while valuing diversity. Once every organ understands the importance of their contribution towards the operation, they become fully committed to the mission. Sharing of skills and equal distribution of resources help in building trust and mutual respect among the security organs. Further, to foster understanding between the different security organs, there should be considerations of having joint exercises, training and appreciation of expertise that enhances success in mission planning and execution. More so, the success of a multiagency operation is hinged on four elements which include; "having a structure that enhances communication which is fully multilateral information disclosure, designing the organs structure to enhance cooperation among actors thereby encouraging teamwork through joint action, ensuring that the design of the structure facilitates coordination of efforts and ensuring that the structures promotes integration such that the different actors leverages on their individual capability under a unified command and control structure when working on a commonly defined problem".[12] Every effort therefore must be geared towards establishing structures that enhances team work through cooperation and mutual respect.

Because partnerships bring together a varied set of people representing a wide collection of security organs with distinct intervention philosophies, they are anticipated to provide focused interventions. As a result, a structure must be developed that assigns duties to different players in

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[11] Atkinson M, Jones M & Lamont E, *Multiagency working and its implications for practice: A review of the literature,* (Berkshire: National Foundation for research, 2007); pp 100-102.
[12] Canton R, *Inter-Agency Cooperation: How Can It Best Enhance Compliance with the Law?* (Leister: De Montfort University printers, 2011); p 6.

the multiagency security system in clearly defined roles, ensuring that the actors' efforts are not duplicated when working toward the achievement of the common goals.[13] Emphasis is also laid on the need of having a clear strategic plan describing and specifying a clear division of tasks and responsibilities from the start.[14] Furthermore, given the diverse range of actors and interests, the team's leadership is critical in overseeing the multiagency security operations and steering them in the appropriate direction. The leadership must reflect the multi agencies partners as is the case with multinational forces such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Following increasing terror attacks globally, several governments have implemented a number of legal measures to improve security. The September 11 terrorist attacks, for example, brought to light a number of legislative instruments to combat terrorism in the United States. They include among others the Transport Security Act, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act and the Transportation and Aviation Security Act, to name but a few. All of these legal frameworks are designed to strengthen border security hence contributing towards national security. The European Commission, on the other hand, endorsed the Framework Decision on Counter-Terrorism (2001) which defines terrorism and establishes the legal framework for combatting it. This is critical in ensuring that all actors involved in the response have a shared knowledge of the situation. The framework also specifies the kind of punishments and sanctions that will be applied to different groups or people. Further, it also describes the extradition procedures and techniques of information exchange that European Union member states must follow.

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[13] Abbott D, Townsley R & Watson D, *Multiagency working in services for disabled children: what impact does it have on professionals?" Health and Social Care in the Community*. (Maryland: National Library of Medicine, 2005); pp 155–163.

[14] Sloper P, *Facilitators and barriers for coordinated multiagency services: Child Care, Health and Development,* (Heslington: University of York, 2004); pp 571–580.

The United State takes lead in adopting multi agency approach commonly referred to as the multiagency cooperation (MAC) to address its national security issues. One such initiative is the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This resulted in the relocation of more than 22 agencies from their previous departmental locations to actively participate in the construction of cabinet level security section with the primary mission of ensuring the United States' national security is achieved. Currently, it has been reported that a number of federal agencies are cooperating on a variety of national and international security-related tasks.[15] Comparably, in 2008, the Australian government replaced their traditional Department of Defence centric system with the multiagency approach to security. The Border Security Legislation Amendment Act of 2002 and the Security Legislation Amendment Terrorism Act of 2002 were among the adjustments made by the Australian government to its already existing security and anti-terrorism laws (2002). This decision was made to ensure that Australia's border and entry ports were secured by a multiagency border control task force commanded by the Australian Border and Customs Protection Service.[16] Kenya faces similar security challenges especially with the long and porous border that leaves the state vulnerable to terror attacks. Cooperation therefore between the various security organs can be enhanced by establishing structures that are well anchored in law.

Further, the Multiagency approach has been implemented in the Canadian's structure of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). As a result, all Canadian law enforcement organizations may easily exchange information on organized crime within the established structure. CISC member agencies contribute to the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information

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[15] Koenig Kristi L, *Homeland Security and Public Health: Role of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the US Department of Homeland Security, and Implications for the Public Health Community,* (New York: Prehospital and disaster medicine, 2003): p.330.
[16] Customs Australia, *Border Protection Service. Annual Report 2013–14,* (Canberra: ACBPS, 2014): p16.

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C1 - Public

System through planning, intelligence collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, among other legal frameworks, prescribes steps to be followed in profiling terror organization modus operandi, their activities, investigation and method of prosecution, electronic surveillance, and apprehension and detention criteria. Drawing from the Canadian experience Kenya Multi agency structure should establish a shared Automated Intelligence Information System, which enhances collaboration in collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, and distribution of intelligence.

In South Africa, after the realization that lack of cooperation and coordination among various state departments was the main hindrance to effective border security, the government instructed the establishment of a Joint Border Management Agency that incorporates multiple government agencies such as immigration, intelligence services, home affairs, trade and industry, police and customs. The Joint Border Management Agency brings together individual agencies resources towards accomplishment of border control and management.[17] The agency responsibility is to supervise the country's points of entry and exit including border security tasks thereby dealing with illegal migrants.

In West Africa, the Nigeria's Constitution establishes a functioning and productive interagency cooperation between security, law enforcement, and intelligence services, which is overseen by National Security Council of the country. The partnership between agencies brings together a variety of security agencies to address national security concerns, with each agency having its own set of operational responsibilities.[18] Enshrining multiagency security organization in a country's constitution ensures moderation of the security organs conduct as well as enabling the

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[17] Steinberg J, *An Overview of South African Border Control: 1994-2004*,(Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2005): p. 1.
[18] Oladimeji et al. *Nigeria Custom Service Inter-Agency Cooperation and National Security,* (Abuja: International Journal of Advanced Research Vol 6, No 12, 2018); p. 1187

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state to support, direct, and resource their operation in addition to maintaining the legitimacy of multi-agency cooperation. It also guarantees that partner agencies are treated equally and fairly in order to avoid supremacy battles, which stifle the performance of effective security services.

Kenya's security structure has also been transformed in the recent decade as a result of efforts to adopt a multiagency approach to security concerns. Some of the primary legal frameworks that guide Kenya's multi-agency counter-international terrorist operations include: the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009 (POCAMLA); the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010 (POCA); the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 (POTA), and Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014 (SLAA). Prevention of Terrorism Act establishes the National Counter Terrorism Center which is a multiagency institution mandated to coordinate the country counter terrorism efforts to thwart, dissuade and disrupt terrorism activities. The legal framework also established the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) and the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center among other multi-agency institutions. Furthermore, in order to combat terrorism, the government has secured and solicited the help of regional and international organizations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels through cooperation partnerships. Kenya is collaborating with the United States since April 2018 in developing automated technologies that permit the sharing of intelligence on air land and sea commuters through the platforms such as Personnel Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). Simultaneously, multiagency Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) were established at specific points of entry such as airports and border points to enhance information exchange and facilitate security agencies collaboration.[19] These multiagency initiatives need to be clearly anchored in law with well-established structures indicating each agencies operational responsibility directly supported by a

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[19] United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017–Kenya*. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f9c11. Html.

common budget something which the current laws don't provide for. This will guarantee equal and fair treatment of each partner agencies in order to avoid supremacy battles.

1.4.2 The Effectiveness of Multiagency Approach of Security

The most basic question is whether the multiagency security operations have achieved its objectives. This is because, multiagency security approach has been viewed as means of organizing and implementing complex and comprehensive interventions where independent security organ efforts to address security challenges have failed or have been unsatisfactory. The complexities of delivering effective multiagency security operations entails appointing appropriate leaders of integrity who are committed to the mission with a clear responsibility to achieve set goals/objectives and organizational aims. The appointed team must work towards developing strategies and evaluating security measures in place. All these actions must be well planned to avoid conflicts among the organs due to ignorance of other organs professional perspectives, resources, and priorities resulting to non-effectiveness of the multiagency security approach. [20]Studies have deduced that multiagency security approach has helped in addressing contemporary security challenges due to its effectiveness and collaborative nature of incorporating community needs through people centered approaches to security while others indicate that the approach does not meet its objectives as intended. [21] For example, research has shown that the multiagency approach to cyber-crime in United State of America and United Kingdom yielded varied degree of success.[22] This is because research and practice have shown that different agencies have varying degree of competence when it comes to Information,

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[20] Rumgay J, Partnerships *in probation in Loraine Gelsthorpe and Rod Morgan (eds.) Handbook of Probation*, (Clopton: Willman Publishing, 2007); p16.

[21] Rosenbaum D, Evaluating multiagency anti-crime partnerships: Theory, design, and measurement issues, (Washington DC: Government Publications, 2002); P 14.

[22] Levi M & Williams M, *Multiagency partnerships in cybercrime reduction: Mapping the UK information assurance network cooperation space. Information Management & Computer Security,* (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2013); pp 420-443.

Communication and Technological capability. This gap has been significantly reduced through a multiagency approach to cybercrime hence defeating potential adversary efforts.

Further, information sharing is key for both individual organs and the multiagency security organ although it can be limited by factors attributable to the community trust of security agencies, agency competence and individual level idiosyncrasy.[23] Governments in the world are constantly fighting insecurities especially that have changing dynamics. As a result, they must use all tools of state power such as the diplomatic, information, economic and military lines of efforts to combat them. A good example is the coordination between the Dutch military and other security organs that took place in Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan South during the period 2006–2010 to address the ongoing war. It was learnt that it played an integral role in restoring peace and development in that part of Afghanistan indicating a positive impact of multiagency security operations.[24] For multiagency security approach to be effective, it must therefore incorporate the various lines of operations such as diplomatic, economic, law enforcement and military.

In the complicated expeditionary missions, British integrate both civilian and military components to facilitate interagency coordination of tasks further fostering the intended cooperation.[25] The cooperation and integration of civilian and military components improves the military's ability to plan and implement campaign plans including troops' understandin of teir social cultural and political operational environment, allowing them to be more successful during operations. Similarly, it has been observed that responses to new wars (modern world wars) have resulted in unparalleled levels of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) within European Union

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[23] Bharosa N, Lee J & Janssen M, *Challenges and Obstacles in Sharing and Coordinating Information During Multiagency Disaster Response: Propositions from Field Exercises,* (New York: Information Systems Frontiers, 2010); pp 49–65.
[24] Rietjens S, Soeters J & Van Fenema P, Learning *from Afghanistan: Towards a Compass for Civil–military Coordination. Small Wars and Insurgencie s* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Defence University, 2013); pp 257-277.
[25] Egnell R, *Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension Journal of Strategic Studies.* (London: Taylor & Francil 2006); pp1041-1075.

states and other external partners with intent of achieving synergy and meet the European Union's security challenges.[26] The United Nations presents an ideal platform to study the effectiveness of multi-agency operation. Previously United Nations used traditional method of peacekeeping. The adoption of multidimensional peace keeping operations that synergizes civilian, military and police components have proved effective in stabilizing conflicts and leading to sustainable peace.

Currently, security issues around the world have necessitated interagency collaboration, which has clearly risen over time. As a result, achieving coherence during operations should be one of the primary goals of a multiagency operation with intention to enhance security and promote peace in countries plagued by civil and military wars.[27] The complex nature and multipronged nature of conflict around the world has made it problematic and unmanageable for any individual security organization to work independently and successfully. The police cannot succeed in restoring calm and security on their own. The same can be stated about the military while operating individually in any operation. In view of this, multiagency joint operations are crucial in attaining unity as opposed to difference of opinion and lack of synergy among the security organs which may minimize chances of success during operations.

1.4.3 Gaps in the Literature

According to the literature, many countries have moved away from single security units and are working towards establishing synergy across security organs to capitalize on the assets of each in order to achieve the competence required to strengthen security. Regardless of the diverse ways taken in the development of multiagency corporations in various countries' security sectors, what

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[26] Zartsdahl P, *Civil–military Synergies in EU Crisis Response and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Analysis. Global Affairs* (Brussels: European Union External Action Services, 2018); pp 197-213.
[27] Rietjens S & Ruffa C, *Understanding Coherence in UN Peacekeeping: A Conceptual Framework. International Peacekeeping,* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Defence University,2019); pp 383-407.

remains consistent is the determined push toward cooperation in the execution and delivery of security services. However, despite the global attention given to multiagency approach to security and notwithstanding the fact that a multiagency approach has also been adopted in Kenya, substantial studies are yet to be conducted to evaluate its effectiveness including institutional and legal frameworks that are applicable in the Kenyan context in meeting its mandate. Therefore, it is against this background that this research project will fill gaps in multiagency security approach in promoting national security in Kenya.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This section looks at how the system theory relates and contribute to multiagency security approach role in enhancing security in Kenya. This study utilized the system Theory by Emile Durkheim which explains how societies are organized to shape and maintain stability as a tool of analysis. The central argument of systems theory is that each component of a society works to ensure the overall stability.[28] This means that there must be agreement or harmony among the various elements of a whole system in order for it to meet the expectations placed by its creators. The notion compares a society to a living thing made up of various pieces, each with a duty to perform in ensuring that the total living thing functions properly.[29]Just like a human body, each organ plays an important role towards the wellbeing of a person. No part of the body is more important than the other and therefore they function interdependently.

Taking the realists' view that state is the main actor in international relations, proponents of systems theorists correctly claim that a state operates as a system or living organism comprising of institutions that serve various functions in order to ensure its survival. Different security

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[28] Banathy B H, *Guided Evolution of Society. A Systems View,* (New York: Kluwer, 2000); pp 23-33.
[29] Bertalanffy L V, *General System Theory. Foundations, development, applications,* (New York: Braziller, 1972); p 121.

organs form an organizational system with constituent elements, each with a specific function(s). When a component fails to perform as intended, the entire security sector is said to have failed. The multiagency security approach to this study is akin to the concept of a system or society. The multiple security organs must work in synergy under the multiagency security strategy to harness each other's strengths and repair the gaps that will always exist. Every effort must therefore be geared towards building mutual trust and cooperation to achieve the overall strategic end state.

In Kenya, the National Police Service (NPS), National Intelligence Service (NIS), Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), a delegate from the National Security Council, and other security agencies chosen by the National Security Council make up the National Counter Terrorism Command Centre (NCTC). Each of these units within a country brings a unique set of skills to bear on improving security, particularly in the battle against acts of terror. The NPS primary responsibility is internal security matters within territorial borders of Kenya. The KDF on the other hand is charged with the responsibility of defending the nation against external aggression. The NIS gathers actionable intelligence from within and outside the country and passing it on to the other forces responsible for action. The security actors form a component parts within the system with specific function.

1.6 Hypothesis

The study seeks to test the following research hypothesis;

> **H $_1$** There is unclear institutional and legal frameworks of multiagency approach of security in Kenya.
>
> **H$_2$** Multiagency approach to security has been effective in enhancing security in Lamu County.

1.7 Research Methodology

The study's research methodology is presented in this chapter. It outlines the steps that must be taken in order to complete the research. This section covers the research design, study population, sample methods and processes, data collection procedures and instruments, data processing and reporting, as well as ethical issues.

1.7.1 Research Design

A research design is a broad outline that explains how, when, and where data will be collected, as well as how the data will be evaluated to produce usable information. This study will adopt a descriptive research design, specifically a case study case research method, to examine the role of multiagency security organs in promoting national security in Kenya. A combination of mixed research approaches, both secondary data and primary data collected using a questionnaire was used to conduct this study.

1.7.2 Target Population

This study targeted personnel tasked with coordinating and managing the security organs involved in operation Amani Boni, in Lamu County, Kenya. The security organs include KDF, National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Service (NPS), Administration Police (AP) and General Service Unit (GSU). The aforementioned are the particular key security organs that take part in the implementation of policy and operationalization of the multiagency security approach specifically in the war against terror who were targeted by the research.

1.7.3 Sampling Technique

Due to the minimal number of respondents envisaged within the population size, the study adopted the purposive sampling technique. This approach was preferred because it is easy to administer since all the participants have an equal opportunity to participate.

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1.7.4 Data Collection Procedure and Instruments

This study utilized primary data that was gathered using questionnaire and secondary data from official documents which formed the secondary sources. The tool was drafted with questions addressing the objectives of the study and included both open-ended and close-ended questions. The closed ended questions gave the respondents an opportunity to express their opinion that best described their thoughts on questions proposed while the open-ended questions intention was to give the respondents an opportunity to express their thoughts on the questions posed.

1.7.5 Validity of the Research Instruments

To ensure that the data collection techniques regularly generated valid data, a pilot test with a small group that is representative and matches the profile of the target demographic was carried out. These procedures' input were then integrated and incorporated into data collecting tools, following which the final data collection instruments was polished and administered.

1.7.6 Data Analysis and Reporting

Data was entered and cleaned to affirm completeness and consistency. Descriptive statistics in form of frequencies and percentages were obtained using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 24 while the open headed questions were analyzed using NVIVO. Results were interpreted and presented in the form of tables, graphs and charts according to the study objectives for ease of interpretation and understanding.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of Study

The purpose of a study's scope is to define the parameters within which it is carried out. The study was primarily conducted in Kenya in terms of geographical coverage. The NCTC, Amani Boni multiagency command center and other multiagency command arrangement were the focus

of data collection. While acknowledging the wide range of factors that go into defining national security strategies, this research focused on the multiagency approach to countering terrorism taking a keen interest on existing security actors with responsibility for coordinating and overseeing national counter terrorism efforts that identify, prevent, and defeat terrorism in Kenya. The existing theory on multiagency and actual practice of coordinating the operations of multiagency task force, as well as the elements that pushed for a multiagency strategy to fighting terrorism and the success of the practice, were all thoroughly examined.

The study anticipated difficulty in obtaining candid data from the respondents due to fear of being associated with leaking classified information; this was mitigated by reassuring the respondents that the study was to be used for educational purpose and informing future multiagency operations to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. Further to this, the respondents were assured of uttermost confidentiality of information given by the security officers. The study also anticipated that there might be a limitation of resources like time and money.

1.9 Chapter Outline

Chapter one covered introduction and background information on insecurity highlighting the need for multiagency approach of security in Kenya and explained the methodology of the study. Chapter two dwells with understanding the institutional and legal frameworks of multiagency approach of security in Kenya. Further, Chapter three focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of multiagency approach in the case of Lamu County, Chapter four gives the study findings, discussion and analysis while chapter five concludes the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF MULTIAGENCY APPROACH TO SECURITY IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one covered introduction and background information on insecurity highlighting the need for a multiagency approach of security in Kenya and further explained the methodology of the study. Chapter two will discuss the legal and institutional frameworks being employed by the Government of Kenya in the fight against insecurity in Kenya.

2.2 Overview of the East African Community (EAC) Legal Frameworks

First and foremost, provision of security to its citizens is any government's primary duty, and Kenya is not an exception. In this respect, security agencies role is crucial in securing a country against internal and external threats. Coordination and management of security within a state is important towards the realization of this objective in a contemporary ever metamorphosing security environment. Any functioning entity; a nation, state, government agency, or association of entities requires an enunciation of mutual essentials in order to remain sustainable. Therefore, to better understand the role of multi-agency in promoting national security in Kenya, one has to look at the structure of its security system, its evolution, how it was established and finally, where it is anchored.

The East African Community (EAC) has developed a Peace and Security Protocol whose main objective is to provide a road map on how to ensure peace and security within its geographical region. The community member states include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and the republic of South Sudan. The Protocol addresses the areas of conflict management

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and resolution, genocide, crises response, terrorism, suppression of piracy, peace support operations, disaster management, refugees, illicit small arms and light weapons, transnational and border crimes. The other areas addressed by the protocol include combating cattle rustling, exchange, detention, custody and rehabilitation of prisoners and offenders and relationship with regional and international organizations.

This institutional framework is dependent on endorsement of the EAC Protocol on defence and the EAC Protocol on Peace and security. Article 2 of the Protocol requires member states to; Co-operate on peace and security together with international and regional organizations to promote peace and security in the region. Article 3 (1) of the Protocol gives objectives of the community as: advancement of peace and security in the East African region. This is attainable through coordinating in security and peace issues in the Community; peacefully address conflicts and disputes amongst partner states; implementing the United Nation's, Africa Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament; developing peace keeping capacities, participation of partner states in regional and international peace support missions (PSO); enhancing disaster management capabilities and international humanitarian assistance; addressing the issue of refugees; and combating terrorism and piracy. Further Article 4 of the protocol states that "the Partner States of the EAC undertake to develop a conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism whose main aim will be to peacefully resolve disputes and conflicts within and between member states or with foreign countries."[30] Kenya as a member state of the East Africa Community is therefore required to adhere to the stipulated requirements of the Community's protocol and other international treaties it has signed to fight insecurity. It achieves this by establishing legal frameworks and structures that contribute

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[30] EAC heads of state, East African Community Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs, (Arusha: Government Printers, 2012); pp 5-25

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to regional peace and stability cognizant of the fact that instability in Kenya poses a security threat regionally.

2.3 Overview of the Kenya Legal Frameworks

Between 1998 and 2002, Kenya government considered itself a victim of transnational terrorism that targeted foreign interests in the country. It viewed terrorist operatives as foreigners targeting Israeli and Western interests in Kenya. It considered its primary responsibility to be maximum cooperation with America's FBI and Israel's Mossad plus other western intelligence networks in hunting down suspected terrorists. For example, after US Embassy in Nairobi terror attack in 1998, the GoK established capacity for intelligence sharing and investigation to facilitate mutual cooperation further giving the US government access to any scene of terror attack. The government also assisted in the apprehending and handing over of the individuals to US authorities for trial in the US. In addition to the USA, the GoK requested the Israeli government for assistance in rescue operations. Following that, rescue teams and intelligence agencies were dispatched to assist in the search for individuals responsible for the attacks.[31]This set the foundation blocks for developing Kenya Anti-Terrorism architecture to address the rising cases of terrorism in the country.

During this period, Kenya's intelligence network led by the National Intelligence Service was ill-equipped to detect and track down terrorist suspects. There were also major weaknesses in the immigration department that allowed foreign nationals of questionable character to enter the country on fake documents and even acquire citizenship. Such individuals assimilated themselves into the local communities at the coast of Kenya due to common religious affiliations, and in the process promote their terrorist activities. Additionally, a person can

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[31] Aden H, *Combating transnational Terrorism in Kenya' Unpublished Master's Thesis*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Faculty of the US Army command General Staff College, 2005); p 11.

readily obtain Kenyan passports, national identity cards, or other certificates through illegal markets due to institutional corruption that has persisted in the country. Terrorists can make use of such gaps to enter the country as immigrants, tourists, or businesspeople. The National Intelligence Service Act of 2012 the mentioned loopholes by providing for the functions, organization and administration of the National Intelligence Service pursuant to Article 239(6) of the constitution of Kenya.

The first post-terrorist attack phase was hampered by a lack of relevant and effective domestic legislation on terrorism-related concerns. A semblance of suggested legislation did not exist until parliament passed the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003. The bill was analogous to the Patriot Act in the United States. Individuals, human-rights organizations, Muslim organizations, and some politicians were outspoken in their opposition, fearing that it would violate basic human rights and target certain communities, particularly Muslims.[32] The lengthy process of drafting legislation has hampered the country's ability to wage a full-fledged battle on terrorism. Foreign-born terrorist suspects who were apprehended tended to be extradited to other jurisdictions for prosecution. Kenyan citizenship suspects were prosecuted under normal criminal law. The Kenyan government did not enact the Prevention of Terrorism Act until 2012. It's also astonishing that, since 1998, the country has taken fourteen years to develop a legal framework to combat terrorism. Kenya's neighbors in the region passed anti-terrorism legislation in 2002. Tanzania's Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed in 2002, while Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act was passed in 2002.[33] The governments' unwillingness to handle the threat of terrorism quickly is reflected in the delay in putting in place legal architecture. The act of parliament was passed after terror networks had established themselves not only in the country but also in the area of

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[32] Ibid.
[33] Kagwanja P, *Ruling on anti-terrorism law a triumph for Kenya's Judiciary,* (Nairobi: Daily Nation, Saturday February 28th 2015); p 19.

research in Lamu. It's worth mentioning that counterterrorism legislation is a vital component of a successful counterterrorism plan, and any country facing a terrorist threat should enact it as quickly as possible.

Since 2001, there has been global formulation of international policies that have created a platform for counterterrorism effort with an aim of enhancing security. By Resolution 1373 of 2001, the United Nations Security Council correctly resolved that all states must "prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts" and "find ways to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information, particularly regarding terrorist persons or networks' actions or movements." It also expressed worry about the "tight relationship between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, and illegal arms trafficking," and proposed a counter-terrorism plan. The Resolution called for the establishment of a National Security Council Committee to oversee the resolution's implementation according to provisional procedural rules stipulated in Rule 28 of the Security Council's, and for all states to report to the Committee on their efforts to implement the resolution[34]. Kenya as a member state of United Nation is obliged to develop legislations that curtails terror financing and prevents establishment of terror networks that poses threat to international peace.

Further regionally, the African Union endorsed the African Union Plan of Action on Terrorism Prevention in September 2002. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 to be a platform for information coordination, studies, and analyses on terror organizations, as well as developing counter-terrorism capacity-building programmes and collaborations with regional and international partners[35]. The intelligence community, armies, and law enforcement agencies have all evolved techniques geared at

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[34] UN Secretary General, *Resolution 1373 of the United Nation* (New York: Secretariat, 2001); p 1-4.
[35] The Secretariat ACSRT, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, (Al Mohammadia: 2004); p 1-16.

detecting and combating terrorist threats. They've also put in place a variety of procedures to improve on coordination with different actors in other nations involved in the war on terror. Over the last decades, Kenya has proven to be extremely prone to insecurity, as indicated by the numerous terror incidents that have occurred in the country since the 1990s. This has prompted the government, as well as regulatory authorities, to devise ways to mitigate the dangers associated with such incidents of insecurity. As a result, the Kenyan government has adopted and altered a number of operations that make up its counter-terrorism policy in order to protect the country's security.

The step towards enhancement of security involves the formulation of the legal frameworks, which enables the Kenya courts to prosecute terrorism acts. The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), which was enacted by parliament in 2009 and was in conformity with the worldwide Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (UNSCR 1373), is one such framework. The goal of POCAMLA was to facilitate the adoption of legislation and the development of organizations, such as the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC), to combat money laundering and other connected crimes, such as terrorist funding.[36] POCAMLA was included to the FATF's 'Grey List' of countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regimes in February 2010 following government's failure to address criminal financial activities. Kenya later enacted the Proceeds against Organized Crime Act (POCA) in August 2010, which aimed to deter and punish organized crime as well as recover the proceeds of organized criminal gang activities.

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[36] Attorney General, *Proceeds of Crime and Anti-money Laundering Act,* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2013); pp 9-12.

Following improvements in counterterrorism measures, such as enactment of POCA and POTA, Kenya was removed off the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) Grey List in June 2014. The Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA), enacted in December 2014, seeks to reinforce 20 laws, including the POTA. For example, a change to POTA Section 33(10) allowed for the detention of a terror suspect for up to 360 days in order to conduct further investigations.[37] The SLAA further expanded the definition of terrorism to encompass radicalization, the dissemination of offensive content, terrorist training or instruction, the presumption of travel to a country for terrorist training, and assisting and abetting such actions. By establishing the National Counter-Terrorist Centre (NCTC) to be "responsible for the coordination of national counter-terrorism activities in order to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorism actions," the SLAA aimed to improve "aspects of the country's institutional structures for security coordination." Fundamentally, the law mandated that workers for the center come from the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Service (NIS), and Attorney General's office, the Directorate of Immigration and Registration, and the National Police Service to combat terrorism (NPS).

Since then, the National Counter Terrorism Centre interlinks state and non-state actors on counter terrorism efforts, de-radicalization efforts. Kenya's decision to establish a security structure and culture that includes a multi-agency strategy is similar to the British government's tactical shift in security approach in the 1990s, which highlighted the importance of cross-agency and multiagency collaboration. The strategy focuses on collaboration and synchronization of the various government and security agencies such as lawyers, national security services agencies, and other significant national agencies, to meet the challenges of international organized crime within the country's borders, demonstrating the importance of a multiagency approach in addressing security concerns.

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[37] Attorney General, *the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014* (Nairobi: government Printers, 2014); pp 33-45.

In 2017, an amended POCAMLA was ratified by Parliament. The amendment expanded the law's scope to encompass money laundering in nightclubs, real estate businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and valuable metals and gemstone commerce. In addition, the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) was given the authority to penalize those who did not follow the law, including giving recommendations on revocation or suspension of institution's license[38]. Hundreds of suspected terrorists have been apprehended, and NGOs accused of sponsoring terror operations have been deregistered, thanks to the implementation of an anti-terrorism regime, which includes POCAMLA, POCA, and POTA. However, due to a lack of adequate evidence to warrant conviction in terrorism cases, conviction rates have been low, owing to a variety of factors such as corruption, limited budgetary allocation and shoddy investigations/lack of evidence to prosecute terror suspects.

Beside the above discussed legislations, the foundation and systems of National Security are anchored in The Constitution of Kenya 2010. Chapter fourteen expounds on establishment of various state security organs, its objectives and functions. For instance Article 238 identifies the country's main security organs, defines the national security principles on defence against threats to the country's territorial integrity, sovereignty and her people as well as individual rights and freedoms, protection of property, national peace, stability and prosperity including other national interests.[39] Additionally, Article 241 establishes KDF, Article 242 establishes the NIS charged with security intelligence and counter-intelligence and Article 243 establishes the NPS which is led by the Inspector-General of Police. Two services form up the National Police Service that is; the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service153 which were initially two separate entities each with its independent command. Further, apart from the establishment of a

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[38] Ibid.
[39] Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya,* (Nairobi: Government Press, 2012); p 200.

clear architecture on National Security as set out in the constitution, the provisions of the law have been actuated through operationalization of several legislation such as the National Intelligence Service of Act (2011), National Police Service Act (2011), the National Police Service Commission Act (2011) and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (2011) just to mention a few. Later, in 2016 Kenya National Strategy was formulated to ensure that all the pertinent ministries and agencies embraced the applicable instruments in both stopping and counteracting insecurities.[40] Other Key policies included the introduction of the Kenya Police Strategic Plan of 2003-2008, and 2013-2017, that provided guidelines on how police organs conduct their operations while promoting the welfare of the citizens.

2.4 Overview of Kenya's Institutional frameworks

Before enactment of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya's internal state security services were provided by a two-tiered police system: the Kenya Police Force and the Administration Police Force (as they were then referred to). Both of these police agencies were run independently and provided different security services. The Kenya Police Force was responsible for crime identification, investigation and prosecution, while Administration Police Force was given the responsibility for the protection of government buildings and installations and was affiliated to the then province administration.[41] The Kenya Police Force (KPF) had been inherited since independence and therefore, it was perceived to be repressive as it was during the colonial era. This called for the need to reform this security organ to be in tandem with the changing times. Just as the KPF then, the Administration Police Force (APF) which was paramilitary in nature was also perceived to be repressive against the citizenry and was mostly used by the establishment to silence dissent. It is also due to this tag of repression that also led to reforming

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[40] Government of Kenya, *Kenya National Strategy*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 2017); P77.
[41] Republic of Kenya, *The Repealed Constitution of Kenya 1969,* (Nairobi: Government Press, 2007); p 120.

of this arm of the police to a new looking title which for now is christened the Administration Police Service (APS).

After the endorsement of the new constitution of Kenya 2010, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and all police units undertook a restructuring process that resulted in new designations for both. The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) was renamed to National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the two police forces were merged. The NIS was formally known as special branch, created in 1952 by the British government as a department within the national police. The overall force created was known as the National Police Service (NPS), and it was commanded by the Inspector-General. The Kenya Police Force was renamed to Kenya Police Service (KPS) and the Administration Police Force was renamed to Administration Police Service (APS).[42] With these reforms, it was envisaged that when delivering security services to the public, these two primary internal security organizations would focus on human security.

The new National Police Service Under the 2010 constitution's command structure drove into immediate headwinds, as there emerged wrangles between the two arms when it came to performance of their duties. With the new national governance structure in the country, each unit was still represented at command level at all levels of the national government without clearly spelling out the duties and functions for each resulting into unnecessary vagueness. The constant wrangling and tension between the two services resulted in a failure by the police to effectively offer services to the citizenry, thus hampering its core mandate of providing security.[43] More often than not, response by the police to crime situations was luck-lustre and haphazard to say the least. This situation led the government to re-organize the clogged structure with a view of

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Douglas K, *The Achilles Heel of Police Reforms in Kenya*, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2013); p6.

making it easier for the police to offer services more efficiently and effectively. The re-organization was meant to eliminate overlaps and duplication of duties, commands and structures and to accord with the National Police Service Act of 2011.

In face of the command and control structures created at regional level where the two police arms each had representation, this created duplication and overlaps that caused confusion when it came to executing orders. This led to unnecessary rivalries as the units performed the same functions, thus at times clashing and not knowing which order or orders to follow. To cure this, the government abolished the parallel command structures of the KPS and APS which were initially at Regional, County, Sub-county and police station or APS camp and collapsed them into four. The new police command has been aligned with the national regional and county boundaries. The new structure merges the command structure into one at Regional level, cascaded downwards up to police station level, which is now also called a ward. The new structure provides for only one regional police commander, one county police commander and one sub-county police commander. The Officer In-charge of police Station (OCS) is now the ward commander. The hitherto administration police camps, posts and patrol bases were placed under the command of the OCS of the local ward area. The abolished positions were the regional KPS and APS, the county KPS and APS, the sub-county KPS and APS commanders and replaced with a single National Police Service commander at each level and it does not matter to which arm he or she originally belonged to be it KPS or APS.[44] The idea behind this is that the police structure and command at this operational level has to be under one command for ease of operations.

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[44] Douglas K, *The Achilles Heel of Police Reforms in Kenya*, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2013); p7.

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was established in 2004 by a Cabinet resolution in response to the growing threat of terrorist attacks in Kenya. This project was created and launched under the framework of multi-agency operations allowing it to supervise and synchronize counter terrorism efforts and act as a national counter terrorism point of contact for Kenya and overseas partners partnership.[45] The Kenya Defence Forces, Kenya Police Services, Provincial Administration, National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), Immigration Department, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Kenya Revenue Authority(KRA), Kenya Airports Authority(KAA), Kenya Ports Authority(KPA) and the Office of the Attorney General are all members of the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), which is part of the President's Office. NCTC was given a legal mandate for coordinating counterterrorism efforts, planning and coordinating national de-radicalization strategies, involving the civilian population on counter terrorism matters, capacity building of counter terrorism units through training and aviation security responsibilities by the Security Laws Amendment Act of 2014. The Security Laws Amendment Act (2014) further states that the Centre will be made up of the National Security Council's Director, Kenya Defence Forces, National Intelligence Service, National Police Service and any other additional agencies involved in security related matters that the National Security Council(NSC) deems necessary.

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) enabled the government to develop and operationalize a comprehensive National Strategy to Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE). The NSCVE strategy is geared to ensure that a holistic approach is put in place to support and supplement military and security operations. The strategy is meant to add the critical dimensions of preventing, countering and reversing radicalization, and engaging the public so that every

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[45] Joseph O, *Roles of Security Sector and Civil Society in Responding to and Preventing Violent Extremism*, (Accra; Security governance initiative partners seminar, 2017); pp1-11

Kenyan, and every community, resists violent extremism. Further, it is intended to coordinate the government and the broad spectrum of stakeholders in the design and implementation of Counter Terrorism Centre (CVE) initiatives.[46] This strategy was created reflecting a public perspective through an inclusive, collaborative process that involves among others scholars in research, commercial sector, clergy, government departments, civil society, regional and international partners and county governments.

One significant gain in the development of the strategy was the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, whose views and suggestions have been taken on board. The national government and county government, including local community based organizations ensures that countering terrorism is not exclusively a military affair. Similarly, since the new constitution was promulgated, and following the coming to force of the two levels of government structure, county governments tended to keep off matters of security as a preserve of the national government. This scenario has proved injurious to national security. Local communities, particularly in opposition led counties, which happened to include the terrorism prone counties, tended to withhold cooperation and support to the security sector. The NSCVE therefore is a panacea to the problem since it requires each county to develop a customized implementation strategy of the action points of the NSCVE.

In terms of operations of security agencies in countering terrorism, there was lack of coordinated command of the security organs until 2015. The Kenya Police including the paramilitary General Service Unit, the Administration Police, Anti-Terror Police Unit, the Rural Border Patrol Unit (RBPU), Criminal Investigations Directorate, Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit and the Bomb Disposal Unit were in charge of counterterrorism. Other agencies outside the traditional police

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[46] National Counter Terrorism Centre, *European Union Partnership for the implementation of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in Kenya*, (Nairobi: government printers, 2020); pp 1-17.

agencies such as the National Intelligence Service were also involved. In May 2015, the National Security Council, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) were all moved to the President's Office.[47] Interagency coordination improved as a result, particularly in terms of information sharing; but, operational effectiveness was hampered by resources and training constraint and corruption among some employees and an unclear command and control arrangement. Lessons learnt during the Garissa University College attack on 2015 where al-Shabaab fighters attacked and killed 147 students prompted the decision to construct some type of crisis response command center. The siege and killing lasted several hours, from early morning until late afternoon, when a specialized police team from Nairobi arrived to neutralize the extremists. The delay in response was appalling given that security agencies in Garissa, including the KDF, were unable to neutralize and rescue the students.

Additionally, specific mandates to Anti-Terrorism Police Unit supported by the National Security Advisory Committee and other police units were aligned to give them powers to undertake essential roles in identifying, dissuading, and disrupting terrorist operations, policing operations and deployments. The National Police Service Act (2011) under the provisions in Section 96 to 100 mandates the Police Service to establish community policing platforms and committees to meet the goals provided in Article 244 of the Constitution, particularly in terms of adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms constitutional standards.[48] The Service shall build and sustain partnerships with the community through these community-policing programs, as well as promote cordial relations between the civil population and the police Service. The intention of this is to encourage collaboration between the society and the Service

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[47] Ibid .p 20
[48] Attorney General, *National Police Service Act,* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2011); pp 46.

further strengthening the Service's transparency and accountability in dealings with the community and encourage the Service and the community to identify and solve problems.

The Government of Kenya has further set up several institutions at national, regional, county, sub-county and ward levels to respond to security concerns in an efficient and effective manner and involves all stakeholders whenever these jointly exist in an administrative area. These institutions include the; "National Security Council (NSC), Sub-committee on Protective Security (SCPS), Joint Security Intelligence Secretariat (JSIS), Joint Security Operations Centre (JSOC), Regional Security and Intelligence Committee (RSIC), County Intelligence and Security Committee (CSIC), Sub-County Security and Intelligence Committee (SCSIC), and Ward Security and Intelligence Committee (WSIC)" Among these institutions, The National Security Council is the highest ranked institution in Kenya. The National Security Council (NSC) is established under Article 240 of Kenya's 2010 Constitution and is operationalized by the National Security Council Act (No.12) of 2010. The President, Deputy President, cabinet secretaries in the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and internal security, as well as the leaders of the defense forces, national intelligence services, and national police service, make up the council.[49] The council's principal responsibilities include overseeing other national security organs, formulating policies and establishing guidelines on all national security issues, and integrating security-related domestic, international, and military policies for national security organs.

The National Security Advisory Council (NSAC) is next in the hierarchy. Its membership comprises the; The Head of Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet, Attorney-General, the Principal Secretary in foreign affairs, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National

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[49] Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya, (*Nairobi: Government Press, 2012); Chap 14.

Government, finance and defence, the Permanent secretary, information and communication, State Department for Immigration and national registration of persons, the Chief of Defence Forces, Inspector-General of Police, Director, National Counter-terrorism Centre, The Director-General NIS, and Co-optee/s from other government departments depending on the issue in question.[50] The NSAC is however not established under article 240 which establishes the National Security Council. The membership differs with that of NSC except for the Chief of Defence Forces, Inspector-General of Police and Director-General NIS who are in both. There is need to de-conflict this through amendment to the law and have Vice Chief of Defence forces, Deputy Inspector General of police and Deputy Director General of NIS sit at NSAC to formulate policies and advise NSC. Some of the responsibilities the NSAC is charged with include; Monitoring and giving advance warning on threats to national security to the Cabinet and President as required by law, preparing the agenda and coordinates affairs of the NSC, constantly reviewing threats to national security and addressing security issues that are referred to it from the NSC and the The Joint Security and Intelligence Secretariat (JSIS), preparing national security contingency plans, and strengthening national efforts against terrorism and other forms of organized crime in the state.

The Sub-Committee on protective Security (SCPS) assists NSAC in the performance of its duties in as far as matters of protective security are concerned. The main duties of the sub-committee include; Constantly reviewing and recommending necessary protective security measures for security of government buildings and other critical infrastructure, providing advice to the minister in-charge of international security on the security and safety of public strategic key installations and other critical infrastructure, making recommendations on breaches of security in

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[50] Attorney General, *National Security Council Act,* (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2014); pp 5-9.

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government offices and other government establishments, and making sure that government security rules and regulations are strictly adhered to in order to avoid breaches of security.[51]

The Joint Security and Intelligence Secretariat (JSIS) is another institution that is multiagency in nature and composition and comprises of membership from all the national security organs as well as co-opted government departments on need basis.[52] The JSIS duty is to prepare reports and the agenda for the National Security Advisory Committee, Collating and deliberating on operational reports from security agencies and communication centres , Preparing material on evolving socio-economic issues and disasters facing the country and coordinate with the National Disaster Management Centre on the same, taking part in joint border security meetings with neighbouring countries and closely follow up the implementation of decisions deliberated upon by NSAC.

The Joint Security Operations Centre helps the JSIS perform its functions and its membership comprises representatives from the; National Police Service, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, National Intelligence Service, and Kenya Defence Forces.[53] The Centre's functions are; to receive and collate urgent information of operational nature as well as emergency reports that have a bearing on national security and after having analysed the information, to inform the relevant agencies on what kind of action to undertake, the kind coordination mechanism or mechanisms necessary.

The change in new structure of government due to devolution, the old provincial administration structure was replaced by a regional administration structure where the provincial governors were replaced by regional coordinators. The regional   Security Intelligence Committee

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[51] Attorney General, *National Security Council Act*, (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2014); pp 10-11.
[52] Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya*, (Nairobi: Government Press, 2012); Act No 23.
[53] Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya*, (Nairobi: Government Press, 2012); Act No 23.

coordinate and direct security, intelligence and disaster management plans in the County and develop security contingency plans as well as review security situations in the County; the County Security and Intelligence committee is tasked with the function of reviewing and managing the security situation within the County as well as designing the County's security contingency plans, and liaising with relevant government departments in the County on issues of intelligence and security among others; the Sub-county security and intelligence manages the security situation within the Sub-county and the Ward security and Intelligence committee is in-charge of policing the security of the wards. Whenever a serious threat to national security is identified, a multi-agency task force is constituted by authority of National Security Council to meet the threat. It is at this level that this research paper is addressing since there is no clear structural and legal framework that underpins it.

Due to lack of clear structures for the setup of a multiagency task force at tactical level, security organs command relationship is marred with poor or lack of coordination, collaboration and cooperation resulting in conflict between agencies. A case at point that clearly demonstrates this weakness is the Westgate mall terror attack that brought to the fore weaknesses in multiagency operations by the security forces who took part. Pursuit of self-serving personal interests and single force objectives so as to retain structural control over counterterrorism efforts jeopardized the security forces ability to defeat Al-Shabaab who conducted the attack.

2.5 Conclusion

In summary, we, Kenya, as a country, clearly do not lack a legislative and institutional framework on matters concerning the safety and security of the country at strategic level. However, one could then be tempted to ask, "With such a seemingly solid constitutional and legislative framework intended at fostering safety and security, why has the country's insecurity

continued to rise at such an exponential rate?" The structure described above represents the true picture of Kenya's internal security formation and how the security agencies coordinate at national and regional levels to make the country safe. This multi-agency approach is adopted to help harness the government's strengths at grand strategic level while addressing the weaknesses and gaps identified at operational and tactical level with the ultimate objective being a secure and safe environment for social and economic development of the country. However, despite the existence of the hierarchical chain of the Kenya's security the same has not been actualized at tactical level where the rubber meets the road due to mistrust, unhealthy competition and lack of clear legislation and structures for formation of multi-agency task force. Therefore there is need to actualize it as it forms the basis of multiagency approach to security at the grass root level.

<center>**CHAPTER THREE**</center>

<center>**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTIAGENCY APPROACH IN THE CASE OF LAMU**</center>

<center>**COUNTY**</center>

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two discussed the legal and institutional frameworks being employed by the Government of Kenya in the fight against insecurity in Kenya. It found out that although Kenya doesn't lack adequate legislative and institutional framework on matters concerning the safety and security of the country at strategic level, the same has not been actualized at tactical level where the rubber meets the road due to mistrust, unhealthy competition and lack of clear structures. This chapter will now highlight the frequency of insecurities within Lamu and discuss the strategies adopted by the multiagency security force and whether they have been effective in meeting security challenges in Kenya.

3.2 Security Situation in Lamu County

The various terror attacks against Kenya by the al-Shabaab clearly exhibited that terrorist activities are among the major threats to peace and security in Kenya, regionally and the rest of the world. This has resulted to the institutionalization of a counter terrorism agency to help in the coordination and planning of ways to eliminate the threats and actions of terror. With the deteriorating security situation in the country, His Excellence, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya's president asked the country's security forces to drop the "silo mentality" where security forces operates single-handedly independent of other units if the security of the country has to be assured[54]. Observing that the silo mentality approach had failed mainly when faced by threats

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[54] https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017-05-03-drop-silo-mentality-in-war-against-crime-uhuru-tells-security-agencies/. Updated on 03 May 2017

<center>39</center>

brought about by extremism and terrorism around the world, the president further called for adoption of a multi-agency approach to security.

Lamu is one of the counties in Kenya that has experienced numerous cases of insecurity forcing the government to deploy more security officials in the region to respond to such insecurities. The main sources of these security threats included terror attacks, marginalization and exclusion, negative ethnicity, regional conflicts, conflicts due to religion, unhealthy political competition, and land disputes among others. Terror attacks in the County have led to massive deaths of security personnel, civilians and destruction of properties and infrastructures. These include the attacks on 15 June 2014 at Mpeketoni Police Station and APS Divisional Headquarters where over twenty six buildings were burnt down, vehicles torched and civilians were killed. The aftermath was deaths of 49 people.[55] There were also other ethnic based attacks that were perpetuated at night where several people of Kikuyu tribe lost their lives in the villages of Hindi, Gamba and Pandanguo. For instance on 5th July 2017 suspected Al-Shabaab fighters attacked poorly policed villages in Lamu County around Pandanguo area where they killed civilians further destroying their property. This was preceded by a previous attack where four students and four policemen were killed in an IED attack targeting police officer on a convoy from Kiunga enroute to Lamu[56]. The increasing cases of terror attacks in Lamu county was a pointer that the security approach adopted previously was not working.

Additionally, there were also attacks on several buses ferrying people within Lamu County. Terrorists claimed to be responsible for these attacks that culminated in killing of several passengers. For instance on 19 July 2014, Gunmen suspected to be Al-Shabaab militia attacked a

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[55] Daily Nation,*"Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48",* (Nation Media Group: AFP, 16 June 2014); Retrieved 16 June 2014.
[56]The Standard, *Al-Shabaab attack Pandanguo police post in Lamu*,(Nairobi: The Standard, 2017); pp 1.

bus and a truck carrying mangos in the general area of Witu killing five people and injuring eight others. To combat these threats and with approximately 100 people killed, the government established mechanism to improve on coordination and collaboration among security forces within the region[57]. The attacks further prompted the government to institute operations such "Operation Amani Boni". Despite the presence of big number of security personnel, the county has continued to experience some attacks although with decreased frequency due to multiagency operations.

3.3 Strategies adopted in the Multiagency Approach

Effectiveness in the adoption and implementation of any security strategy is determined by how well the strategies are created and implemented to meet the stated goals. This includes communicating, interpreting, adopting, and implementing the intended methods. Each of these may or may not follow the others, but they cannot be separated. In Lamu County, the Kenyan government has initiated numerous strategies to counteract insecurities especially those related to terrorism. After every attack experience in the County, the government has always heightened the number of security personnel in the area. On 12 March 2016 security in Lamu was enhanced with deployment of additional seven hundred security personnel to booster the multiagency command center operations. The security forces included regular police officer, Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), General Service Unit (GSU) and Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)[58]. The additional forces came in handy in sealing off identified gaps in security which Al-Shabaab was exploiting.

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[57] Feisal O, Joseph A, *Somalia's al Shabaab claim responsibility for Kenya bus attack*, (Nairobi: The Thomson Reuters); pp 2.
[58] Shmuel Y, *Over 700 Security Personnel Deployed in Lamu* ,(Winchester: Strategic Intelligence, 2016);pp 3.

Additionally, there have also been efforts geared towards training of security agencies, provision of sophisticated equipment to fight terrorism, employment of the police personnel and development of special agencies such as anti-terrorism police. On 21st Jul 2021 the president of republic of Kenya HE Uhuru Kenyatta paid a visit to Lamu multi-agency Field Training Exercise (FTX) comprising of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Kenya Coast Guard (KCG), Kenya Police Service (NPS), Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), National Youth Service (NYS) and Kenya Forest Service (KFS). The aim of the exercise was to increase the level of operational proficiency by testing the interoperability of Kenya's security forces[59]. These exercises are part of Multiagency strategy to build the capacity of security forces to operate in synergy hence enhancing interoperability.

In a research conducted in Kenya to analyze the success and challenges of counterterrorism methods, the effectiveness of the multiagency strategy was evaluated. According to the research multiagency approach to operations was analyzed as a tool for defeating and preventing terror acts in a country.[60] The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK), Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (ICK), the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and other religious organizations in Kenya have been engaged in advocating for anti-terrorism and security through common conversation.[61] Furthermore, the inability to prevent the terrorist strikes of 2002 and subsequent terrorist acts in the country has been attributed to a lack of competent intelligence and law enforcement. However, through the intelligence service provided by the NIS and coordination with other agencies, has seen successful in both detection of threats to security

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[59] PSCU, *President Kenyatta visits multi-agency security team in Boni Forest*, (Nairobi: The Standard, 2021); pp 4.
[60] Kivunzi J & Nzau M *An Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Challenges of Counterterrorism Strategies in Kenya,* (Nairobi: International Journal of Social and Development Concerns, 2018); pp 16-28.
[61] IPOA, *Operation Sanitization Eastleigh Report, Usalama Watch, July, Nairob*i, (Nairobi: Independent Policing Oversight Authority, 2014); pp 19.

and further the stopping of attacks before they happen.[62] In problematic areas like Lamu County, the government has increased security measures, including extra security officers. Emergency drills are also held to provide residents with the necessary skills and knowledge to combat insecurity. Scholars both locally and globally have endorsed the usefulness of drills.

Further, the Government of Kenya has been persistent in making efforts to counter terrorism which is among the top most causes of insecurity in Lamu County. The efforts made include capacity building and training the law enforcers, formation of security special agencies mandated with countering terrorism such as ATPU and NCTC. Additionally, the public has also been sensitized on countering terror attacks and reporting suspected cases that threaten the national security of Kenya. This is also known as community policing through 'nyumba kumi initiative' where the public alerts the police and security agencies on any threat to security hence ensuring maintenance of law and order.

Community policing was formulated in 2003 and it has been an effective strategy of enhancing the country security.[63] According to the Annual Report by Kenya Police community policing entails integrating government agencies and the public efforts and resources with the goal of enhancing cooperation by linking the police to the public. This principle has been found to be effective only when these three key factors are implemented simultaneously; community partnership, change management and problem solving. Nyumba kumi initiative is one of those measures which enables the public to know their neighbors and also enhances reporting of suspicious persons or activities within the neighborhood. This measure has been successful in combating incidences of insecurity mainly terror attacks in Lamu County.

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[62] Anderson D & McKnight, *Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and Its Enemies in Eastern Africa, African Affairs,* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2014); p 24.
[63] Mwakimako N & Willis J, *Trends in Kenyan Islam,* (Nairobi: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014); pp 15-17.

Kenya's president praised the government's multiagency approach for paying dividends for the country's security during a speech he gave during a military function. According to the president, cooperation between agencies has resulted in the country's government putting an end to a variety of crimes, including terrorism.[64] Further, the president stated that the multiagency approach brought together various response units of the security agencies such as the army and police to facilitate information sharing, resourcing and harmonizing security responses with an aim of ensuring an integrated response to insecurity. Consequently, it was established in a research conducted on neo-elitism, counterterrorism and anti-terrorism operations in Kenya that un-cooperation among security forces, failure to collaborate and coordinate efforts had hampered counterterrorism operations in country.[65] Failure or lack of coordination, collaboration and cooperation among the Kenya's counterterrorism security forces resulted in conflict between agencies according to the study. The Westgate terror attack clearly demonstrated weaknesses in multiagency operations by the security forces who took part. Pursuit of self-serving personal interests and single force objectives so as to retain structural control over counterterrorism efforts jeopardizes the security forces ability to combat national security threats.

The Multiagency has also initiated community based projects within Boni aimed at winning the hearts and mind of local populace to support government efforts. This has been carried out through Civil Affairs office manned by Military Engineers personnel. The personnel carry out operations within the greater military mission space as part of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) rebuilding efforts or as an independent task force that works towards countering radical

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[64] Presidential Strategic Communications Unit, *Multi-agency Approach Has Paid Dividends for Kenya's Security, President Kenyatta Says,* (Nairobi: Retrieved April 10, 2020).
[40] Mwangi O, *Neo-elitism and Counterterrorism Operations in Kenya: African Security Review*, (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2017); pp 12-25.

extremism and changing the perceptions of local population towards the military forces.[66] These efforts include practices such us drilling of boreholes, offering medical services, airlifting students to marginalized areas as well as provision of relief aid. These projects have had a positive response from the local community through sharing of intelligence on Al-Shabaab whereabouts. At the same time, the recipient's initial skepticism directed towards the military's aid interventions has improvements after infrastructure projects were initiated by the government. The government has also been at the fore front in funding schools, health centres and posting teachers and medical staff.

3.4 Indicators of Effectiveness of Multi-Agency Security Approach

The completion of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project is a crucial indicator of the efficiency of Lamu County's multiagency approach to security. The Government of Kenya has launched and developed the single most largest and first comprehensive, innovative and transformative infrastructural development project under the Vision 2030 Strategy Framework without external support. Lamu, like Kenya's other five coastal counties, has low development indices, a characteristic that has been linked to the region's high insecurity rate. It follows the northern Kenya eastern region, bordering Somalia and has suffered exclusion from development efforts since independence. This Kenya's coastline region has experienced the greatest poverty rates in the country. With the construction of the LAPSSET Corridor, however, the economics and broader socio-economic growth of this region is undergoing a significant upheaval. The LAPSSET initiative will create opportunities for pastoral communities in Kenya, notably in the north, as the next growth frontier for the overall economy,

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[66] Jan B, *Militarization going places?, Critical Military Studies*, (Gothenburg: School of Global Studies University of Gothenburg, 2018); P 7.

facilitating socioeconomic development[67]. This will further lead to increased electricity production through various energy options such as cleaner energy and green energy to build the capacity of electric power supply and enhance its dependability. This will in turn boost industrial growth rate and create conditions for regional electricity exportation especially between Kenya and Ethiopia as per electric energy exportation agreement currently being negotiated.

For Kenya to boost its status as an entry point and hub for logistics and transportation matters serving the East African region and the Greater Lakes region, the LAPSSET corridor project is aimed at facilitating commerce and promoting regional economic integration and interconnectivity among African countries. The plan is to link coastal counties, country interior and neighboring countries by airports, roads, railways, telecommunications and ports thereby generating a unified regional connectivity. The project will also boost Kenya's position as a regional hub in Eastern and central Africa as the pioneer of special economic zones, free trade zones and transboundary transportation projects.[68] This will assist the region in developing financial, human, technological and consumer capacity in the infrastructure business. Furthermore, the country's strong potential for increasing private sector investment in infrastructure development and administration cannot be overstated. Currently, the private sector is involved in a number of sub-sectors, including energy, water, and railways. Improved roads, railways, ports, and water services are all attracting more private sector investment. The multiagency task force in Boni has been very instrumental in setting the conditions for implementation of the projects. Currently, the security forces are providing security at Lamu

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[67] LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, *Building Transformative and Game Changer Infrastructure for a Seamless Connected Africa*, (Nairobi: government printers, July, 2016); pp 10.
[68] LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, *Building Transformative and Game Changer Infrastructure for a Seamless Connected Africa*, (Nairobi: government printers, July, 2016); pp 15-17.

port, power generating stations as well as picketing vulnerable points along Lamu – Malindi road.

As a result, when such a project the size of LAPSSET is undertaken, spanning hundreds of kilometers of oil pipeline, road, railway line and electricity power lines including their supporting infrastructure it necessitates significant expenditures in security architecture to secure them. With the cooperation between security agencies deployed in Lamu County under operation Linda Boni, there has been efficient security intelligence which has provided the key ingredient of the total security architecture required for the implementation of such a huge project.

The team's intelligence processing and sharing is significantly superior to what was before the multiagency formation. Timely information sharing has facilitated allocation of missions on a need to know basis to certain elements within the team, while the rest of the team are kept in the loop to provide support and backup if needed. Thanks to the multiagency collaboration, prevention efforts have greatly aided in keeping the homeland safe and secure. For instance, the regularity with which terrorists carried out assaults in the country, almost at will, has drastically decreased. The ability of terror groups such as Al-Shabaab to invade the nation has been considerably reduced. The rare attacks that occur from time to time are primarily limited to the Kenya –Somalia border areas with the preferred choice of attack being mainly through IEDs attacks.

Lamu has several key facilities that are vital to the national economy and their destruction can impose huge losses and cost on the government and the public. They include road, railways, seaports, security gargets among others that require to be guarded throughout.[69] Security alerts have caused governments of various nations to issue restriction on travel advisories to their

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[69] Wycoff K, *Fighting Terrorism in Africa: Testimony to Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations*, (Washington DC : University Press, 2004); pp32.

citizens in countries prone to terror attacks. Whenever countries like the UK and USA questioned the safety of their citizens in the country due to incessant terror attacks and issue travel bans and security alerts, the economy of Kenya gets negatively affected, especially tourism. Kenyan air and land transport have been affected greatly by those alerts. This has pushed Kenya to establish a number of milestones in the security of the aviation sector. These security measures include improving surveillance done jointly with security patrols of the airports and through perimeter wall construction around Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. Further the government of Kenya introduced measures such as 72hrs advance clearance of commercial private flights landing in the country and stationing of security gargets at the airport such as CCTV cameras and screening machines. These measures have helped to curb terror attacks at the airports.

The multiagency operation in Lamu has led to the reduction of terror attacks both in Kenya and her neighbors in general. The purpose is normally to defeat or deter a threat. This creates the circumstances in which the initiative can be regained by offensive action. Defensive operation makes the enemies more vulnerable as they are forced to concentrate their troops, wearing down his offensive capability and also fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations elsewhere[70]. The Kenya Defence Forces through the multiagency operation in Lamu has been so instrumental in conducting defensive operations by seeking out the enemy forces and striking them thus weakening them. They leverage on their mobility by destroying the attacking forces and thus permit the enemy to move to a position that exposes them to counter attacks. Indeed the Kenya Defense Forces was able to defeat the Al-Shabaab attacks as a result of good defensive operation characterized by buying time, utilizing military force, making proper calculation/organized movements and making sure that the condition they were in was

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[70] Kenya Army, *Battle Group Tactics*,(Nairobi: Military printers, 2014); Chapter 7.

favourable for offensive operations hence giving the KDF the energy to regain the initiative. These actions have been essential in promoting security as it has been employed by the Kenyan Defence Forces in operation Linda Nchi and Operation Linda Boni as a tactic in response to disprove the attack of the Al- Shabaab. The Counter attacks launched by the Kenyan military have been aimed at destroying the Al-Shabaab and reclaiming their lost ground.

In 2018, KDF provided free medical camps to over 3,000 locals within the operation area. The soldiers have also been distributing water to the locals and have dug several boreholes. Their efforts have thus won the hearts and minds of the locals, who are key in the fight against the Al-Shabaab militants. Locals, most of them from Boni community, have little access to appropriate medical care, schools and other key amenities. Additionally, radicalization of the youths has highly been attributed to high rates of unemployment among the young people. Multi-agency efforts to protect Lamu County by establishing a substantial military post in the county have prevented criminal groups, making the region safer and allowing tourism and other economic activities to thrive. Many individuals have found work as a result of the construction of Lamu port and the LAPSSET corridor. These long-term initiatives are required to combat and prevent the growth of violent extremism, with a focus on the economic and social elements that fuel radicalization among vulnerable communities and groups, such as the youth.

3.5 Conclusion

Kenya continues to face a variety of security and safety challenges, the most serious of which is radicalization of youths and acts of terrorism. Other than threats emanating from terrorism which remains top priority for the Kenyan government, other criminal activities of great concern for the security forces include human trafficking, corruption, cybercrime, cattle rustling, drug smuggling, proliferation of light weapons and organized crime. Kenya has made significant

progress as a country in detecting, preventing, protecting against, and mitigating the hazards that these insecurities represent. At the same time, security agencies confront dangers from within the country, such as attacks on educational institutions, schools, workplaces, festivals, and retail outlets. As a result, the government has worked hard to establish and maintain a multiagency approach to operations in Counter terrorism, aviation and border security management. The Nation is safer on all fronts by having the ability to spot attackers ahead of time and enhanced collaboration among relevant stakeholders and international partners in the fight against terrorism. Kenya's key infrastructure in Lamu has been protected and local communities have been empowered.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STUDY FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three highlighted the frequency of insecurities within Lamu and discussed the strategies adopted by the multiagency security force and whether they had been effective in meeting security challenges in Kenya. To accomplish rapid and efficient action during crises, it is critical for entities taking part in provision of security to have centralized control and decentralized execution always ensuring that operations synchronized. As a result, the survey's findings and interpretation are presented in this chapter. The first section gives a profile of the participants by examining the demographic information provided by the respondents. The major data is then analyzed and conclusions drawn based mostly on the study's two specified objectives and the specific questions from both questionnaires. This research used pie charts, graphs, and tables to make the findings more reader-friendly. To facilitate discussion of the findings, the studied data has been shown in a comprehensible fashion.

4.2 Response Rate and Demographic Profile

Different stakeholders, security personnel, policy makers and scholars have for a long time explored root causes of individuals engaging in violence and crime activities in order to formulate solutions suitable for heightening security. From the discussion in the previous section, it is clear that the process of mitigating insecurity incidences in the country, involves both long and short term strategies which involve building trust between the population and the government as well as adopting offensive and defensive measures. Acts of terrorism, according to this study, create huge obstacles and crisis circumstances that, if not properly handled, might undermine state security and foster citizen skepticism of the government's ability to defend and

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secure their interests. Despite the fact that most residents are aware that terrorism is a form of irregular warfare, this continues to be the case.

4.2.1 Response Rate

A total of twenty one (21) questionnaires out of the thirty five (35) initially issued to participants taking part in the survey were returned duly completed for analysis. Therefore, the overall response rate was 60 per cent, an indication of an excellent response rate, thus warranting the analysis study results and generalization of the study findings.

4.2.2 Age of the Respondents

As indicated in Figure 1. A majority of the respondents were aged between 31 and 50 years. This distribution could be attributed to the fact that the target population was individuals tasked with coordinating and managing the security organs. Therefore, respondents aged 41 to 50 years formed the largest proportion of 48 per cent mainly because they have requisite experience in command and control and are most likely involved in decision making. This group is likely to be involved in formulation of multiagency policy, goals and objectives which are crucial in securing the Kenya. Further, the second largest group of the respondent were individuals aged between 31 to 40 years, whom constituted 29 percent of the respondents. This group is considered to be at middle level of leadership due to their tactical experience, quick responsiveness and active involvement in deployment of forces to secure Kenya. Majority of the individuals with the highest age bracket of 51 years and above and who constitute 19 percent of the proportion of the respondents, were assessed to be senior commanders and policy makers a position they were holding on merit and based on their level of expertise in order to provide direction to field commanders. Their relatively lower number was attributed to the law of diminishing returns,

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since majority of the officers within that age bracket were not considered to be extremely active or capable in terms of physical maneuver.

**Figure 4.1 Age Brackets of Respondents**

Source: Author, 2021

4.2.3 Highest Level of Education

The study results in Figure 2. Indicate that none of the respondents within the coordination and management of the security organs team have only primary or secondary level of education as the highest education level attained. The respondents with the lowest level of education, comprising of 29 percent had attained at least college diploma while majority had a university degree with the undergraduate forming 48 percent, master's degree forming 19 percent while those with doctorate degree formed 5 percent of those interviewed. Multiagency operations call for the highest level of education to be able to comprehend the nature of operations to be undertaken and to develop strategies to address them. The study results clearly indicated that the multiagency team was well balanced in terms of personnel with requisite knowledge and professional skills to understand the nature of problem facing a multiagency team and to develop

policies and strategies to respond to them. A degree of interpersonal cooperation, synergy, mutual respect and collaboration is required for personnel working with a multiagency security environment since the team will be required to plan and implement frequent joint training exercises and other joint activities such as operations. In addition to this, a person's education level is an indicator of their Leadership, Command and Management abilities as training inculcates these qualities in an individual.

Figure 4.2 Highest Education Level Attained

Source: Author, 2021

4.2.4 Attachment/ deployment of security agency in a multiagency command center

Multiagency team distribution of personnel as attached from the different security agencies is as indicated in Table 4.1 below. The results indicated that 14 per cent of the respondents were from NIS, 24 per cent were from KDF, 19 per cent were from NPS, 14 were from AP, 19 per cent were from GSU and the rest 10 per cent represented the Long Range Surveillance team.

Table 4.1. Security Agency in Which Respondents are Attached

| Security Agency	Frequency	Valid Percentage
NIS	3	14
KDF	5	24
NPS	4	19
AP	3	14
GSU	4	19
LRS	2	10
OTHERS	0	0
Total	**21**	**100**

Source: Author, 2021

In general, the study found that the all security organs in Lamu multiagency team were distributed proportionately. This signifies that members of the multiagency team were drawn evenly from various units during its formation and establishment in order to improve equity in each agency's involvement and to ensure that vital input is not missed due to lack of personnel from one or more agencies.

4.2.5 Length of time served in a Multiagency Team

Figure 3 indicates that only 10 per cent of the respondents had served in the multiagency team for less than one year. The study established that the remainder had more than one year in service with the multiagency team. Majority of the respondents comprising of 48 per cent have worked with the multiagency team for 6 to 10 years. Further, 29 per cent have been with the team for between 1 to 5 years while 19 per cent of the multiagency team has worked for more than 10 years. The analysis of this results indicates that majority of the respondents have the requisite

experience having worked for a period of time that was within the study's time frame. This is indicative of their ability to effectively opine on and contribute a wealth of helpful and well thought out information beneficial to this research paper.

Figure 4.3 Length of time served by respondents in a Multiagency Team

Source: Author, 2021

The study also revealed that majority of the respondents who had served with the multiagency team for over 10 years were mostly senior leaders having been promoted over the years served.

4.3 Research Analysis and Findings

4.3.1 Structure of the Multiagency Approach

Respondents were queried whether each security organ should send a representative to the multiagency coordination team. As shown in Table 2, a large majority of respondents (90 per cent) agreed with the question statement, 5 per cent were neutral, and 5 per cent disagreed that each security agency should send a representative to the multiagency coordinating committee. These findings are indicative that the coordinating team is made up of individuals from all teams,

not just a few security officials. This is necessary to improve teamwork, cohesion and to achieve synergy drawing from different experiences by each party within multiagency team. Moreover, operational challenges brought about by conflict of interest and suspicion of domination by a team member was reduced because each team was informed by their own officer, which increased ownership and engagement among the constituent teams.

Table 4.2 Structures of the multiagency security approach in Kenya

Statement	Extent of Concurrence (%)		
	Agree	**Neutral**	**Disagree**
Every security organ is represented by a member at the multiagency coordinating cell	90	5	5
Each member within the multiagency coordinating cell later briefs their respective commanders in their chain of command on daily programme routine	86	10	5
The shared responsibilities consider individual members capabilities at the multiagency coordinating cell	67	24	10
Regular meetings are held to assess the conduct and progress of allocated responsibility and to address developing situations threats	71	10	19
Leadership, Command and Management responsibilities are undertaken by the leadership of each agencies after tasks are given	48	33	19

Source: Author, 2021

In the second row of Table 4.2, the findings on if each member within the multiagency coordinating cell later briefs their respective commanders in their chain of command on daily programme routine are also shown. According to the findings, 86% of respondents did agree that their superior officers representing them on the multiagency coordination team later briefed their respective members on the program of activities, 10% of respondents were unsure whether or not such briefings take place, and the remaining 5% disagreed on the occurrence of such briefings. The analysis of this is indicative that representatives from the various agencies recognize the need of keeping their team members up to date on the agency's overall program of activity. In view of this, training is more relevant, and team members' commitment is increased as they have a perception of feeling acknowledged and valued. Those respondents who expressed that they don't make or haven't received such briefings sighted it was due to the confidentiality of the information that is not meant to be passed to all the members.

In relation to the multiagency team structure given the responsibility to combat terrorism in Lamu, respondents were queried if the shared responsibilities consider individual members capabilities at the multiagency coordinating cell. The study found out that 67 per cent of respondents did agree that individual member's capabilities are considered when responsibilities are shared. 10 per cent of the respondents disagreed while 24 per cent remained neutral on whether when responsibilities are shared individual members capabilities at the multiagency coordinating cell are considered. The result of this parameter of study is indicative of the varying degree of capability each security agencies possesses, their unique roles and the need to enhance collaboration and cooperation aimed at enhancement of national security. The results also indicate that individual capability is taken into consideration during deployment. The neutral respondents can be attributed to personnel gaining more capability through individual training while already deployed or failure to effectively communicate their area of expertise. The

multiagency headquarters should have a mechanism for publication of individuals' qualification for efficient and effective placement.

Further, the respondents were queried if regular meetings are held to assess the conduct and progress of allocated responsibility and to address developing situations threats. Although a majority of those queried, 71 per cent agreed that such meetings were usually held, 19 per cent disagreed on holding of regular meetings by the multiagency team to address developing situations while the remaining 10 per cent of the respondents were neutral as shown in row 4 of Table 4.2. An analysis of this is indicative that there exist deficiencies in the frequency of meetings, which is critical for attainment of operational objectives and the desired end state. The above finding was attributed to a variety of factors, including lack of standard operating procedures that gives mandates to the specific units within the multiagency team. Varying levels of factors that contribute to motivation of a force such as remuneration differences and individual security organs responsibility for the welfare of their men could also be a contributory factor. According to this study, harmonization of the standard operating procedures and conditions of service for the various agencies will promote unity of effort and facilitate cooperation within the multiagency team.

The survey findings suggest that 48 per cent of respondents believed that Leadership, Command and Management responsibilities are undertaken by the leadership of each agencies after tasks are given, as shown in row 5 of Table 4.2. More than a third of the respondents were undecided, with 33 per cent saying they were unsure if respective agency leadership was responsible after tasks are given and 19 per cent disagreed that Leadership, Command and Management responsibilities are undertaken by the leadership of each agencies after tasks are given. From these findings we can deduce that while those with responsibility for Leadership, Command and

Management of the respective agencies have the authority to influence their activities, considerable command and control comes from the centralized command center at the multiagency cell then subsequently cascaded to the lowest level of command organized along the administrative security committees.

Finally, in analyzing the establishment of the structures of a multiagency in Kenya, the study sought to establish the possibility of conducting a multiagency security organ cell meeting bearing in mind the different background and levels of competence of cell members and variation in standing operating procedures of each force. Majority of the respondents explained that every member is seconded by his respective agency to be attached to a specific cell within the multiagency Centre that is controlled by the Overall Commander/ Chairman/ Director. The overall Commander/ Chairman/ Director has the responsibility of convening multiagency meetings. Additionally, others stated that the willingness and overall goodwill of all actors in the multiagency cell considering the threats facing the country was a contributing factor. When further asked about the major weaknesses of the institutional and legal structure of multiagency security organ being employed currently to combat insecurity in Lamu, respondents highlighted differences in training with majority of members having basic security training, lack of trust resulting in poor sharing of intelligence, limitation in resources such as incompatible communication equipment, limited airlift capability especially the helicopters, varying morale incentives, lack of follow-up by respective strategic headquarters and ego wars as major weaknesses of the multiagency. In addition to this, the desire to outshine others makes teams to conceal information for their respective security organs to appear more informed and competent in addressing the threat. Furthermore, the ambition to outshine others brings about breakages in communication resulting in delays in response and sharing of operational matters or intelligence information to those who don't need to know outside of the chain of command. In addition, the

lack of a unified doctrinal template and the lack of SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) were noted as roadblocks to an organized multiagency approach to improving security.

4.3.2 Effectiveness of the Multiagency Approach to operations in the war against insecurities in Lamu County

To establish whether the multiagency approach has been effective in enhancing security, the respondents were asked whether they were familiar with any operations by the security organs that have been successfully undertaken by the multiagency security cell deployed in the fight against any insecurity in Lamu. The study indicated that a significant majority of the respondents, 95 per cent confirmed their awareness of a successfully executed multiagency team operation conducted with an aim of enhancing national security as illustrated in Figure 4. Therefore, an analysis of this indicated that multiagency team had in overall assessment been effective in promoting security in Kenya.

Figure 4.4 Awareness of operations that have been successfully executed

Source: Author, 2021

Further, when the respondents were asked to highlight some of the successes the Multiagency approach to security operation team has had in the securing Lamu county through operation

Amani Boni, respondents unanimously agreed that the multiagency approach to security had been successful in combatting terrorism giving the following examples; securing of Mpeketoni town that was subject to Alshabaab attacks back in 2014 and 2015, reduction in levels of violent extremism and radicalization, completion of LAPSSET programme, civil military cooperation such as drilling of boreholes and building of schools, and through the support of the multiagency team, the National Census was conducted successfully in the region as some of the indicators of success of the multiagency team. Additionally, in relation to changes in the management of the war on insecurities in Lamu since the incorporation of the multiagency approach to security, the research found out that changes in intelligence sharing, improvement in resourcing and better planning and implementation of security programmes had occurred. Additional changes communicated were synergy of efforts between all security agencies that are working towards the attainment of the objectives and end state.

Finally, to conclude on the effectiveness of the establishment of the multiagency approach, respondent were queried to rate their sentiments on a three point Likert scale to the seven items that were provided. According to the presentation in Table 3, 79 per cent forming the majority of the respondents agreed that the Multiagency Security approach had resulted in a decline of the frequency of insecurities occurring in Lamu County, 17 per cent disagreed while the remainder of the respondents represented by 4 per cent were unsure if the multiagency security approach had resulted in a decline of the frequency of insecurities occurring in Lamu County. The analysis of this high percentage of those in agreement implies that the multiagency approach to operation was to a greater extent more effective in promoting security in Lamu compared before the multiagency team was established.

Table 4.3 Effectiveness of the Multiagency Approach

Statement	Extent of Concurrence (%)		
	Agree	**Neutral**	**Disagree**
The Multiagency Security approach has resulted in a decline of the frequency of insecurities occurring in Lamu County	79	4	17
The rate of casualties and deaths reported especially in relations to terrorism acts are much less after multiagency security approach was introduced in Lamu County	66	14	20
The security organs are better synchronized in their planning and response to acts of terror and other forms of insecurities	67	13	20
Multiagency security approach has inculcated a synergized robust communication strategy during incidences of insecurity like acts of terror	75	6	19
Multiagency security approach has facilitated joint training of security organs to react in a more professional manner to security threats.	60	9	31
There is warm and cordial popular support for the Multiagency security approach to promote security	81	13	6

Further, as indicated in the row 2 of Table 4.3, 66 per cent of the respondent agreed that the rate of casualties and deaths reported especially in relations to terrorism acts are much lesser after multiagency security approach was introduced in Lamu County compared to before. Secondly,

63

20 per cent of the respondents disagreed that the rate of casualties and deaths reported especially in relations to terrorism acts are much less after multiagency security approach was introduced in Lamu County. The rest of the respondents 14 per cent were neutral and therefore unsure whether the rate of casualties and deaths were much less after multiagency security approach was introduced in Lamu County as compared to before its establishment. An analysis of the study results established that the security organs are better synchronized in their planning and response to acts of terror and other forms of insecurities in Lamu County as majority of the respondent, 67 per cent agreed to it. However, 20 per cent of the respondents felt that the security organs were not well synchronized in their planning and response to acts of terror and other forms of insecurities since the establishment of a multiagency operation centre while 13 per cent of the respondents were unsure. Based on these finding, the study was of the view that security organs in the multiagency team had better synchronized their planning and response to acts of terror and other forms of insecurities despite their inherent differences, thus reducing the number of cases of insecurity in the region.

In terms of the multiagency approach's communication plan, the majority of respondents (75 per cent) agreed that Multiagency security approach has inculcated a synergized robust communication strategy during incidences of insecurity like acts of terror. Consequently, 19 per cent of the participants disagreed with the viewpoint, while the remaining 6 per cent were undecided. These findings suggest that the various agencies that make up the multiagency team understand and value the importance of continuous communication in promoting security when responding to terror attacks and other incidents of insecurity as a way of achieving operational objectives.

More specifically, the study wanted to see if there was any appropriate training available for the multiagency team to improve their capabilities. Further, from the study results, 60 per cent of the respondents agreed that the Multiagency security approach has facilitated joint training of security organs to react in a more professional manner to security threats. However, over quarter of the respondents 31 per cent were in disagreement that multiagency security approach had facilitated joint training of security organs to react in a more professional manner to security threats while 9 per cent of the respondents were neutral. The majority of the respondent agreement was due to improved new equipment brought to the theater of operations requiring refresher training and the need for continuous training necessitated by the need to keep at pace with the mutating nature of terror attacks. For those in disagreement, the study identified the probable reason to be internally driven needs of respective security organs to conduct individualized training to meet their requirements while still remaining open to joint trainings for specialized teams.

Further, the study sought to find out what the respondent sentiments were on popular support for the Multiagency security approach to promote security. Although a majority 81 per cent unanimously agreed that the approach enjoys much approval by the population in promotion of security, 13 per cent were neutral in their response while 6 per cent of the respondents disagreed that there was open support for the multiagency approach to promotion of security. Therefore, based on the results, the study was of the opinion that the multiagency approach to operations was highly acceptable because of the high approval rating it received across the board from the population.

4.4 Conclusion

From the study findings, we can deduce that multiagency approach has been beneficial in identifying and preventing security threats such as acts of terror and radicalization. This has been demonstrated by a decrease in the rate of insecurities, decrease in fatalities, as well as greater public awareness and cooperation with multiagency teams in implementing a concerted effort to promote security. Each of the constituent agencies' skillsets, equipment, and coordination have all contributed to a more robust response to security threats. The strongest evidence and signal that the state security agencies have what they need to defend Kenya is coordinated teamwork.

The multiagency team's record of success exemplifies the genuine meaning of unity in diversity meaning that different security actors can work together to secure the nation. Kenya possesses human and material capital as well as qualified security leaders to improve security. Resource limits, doctrinal disagreements among security actors due to lack of a unified standard operating procedure and training disparities have limited effectiveness of the multiagency approach in the fight against security threats.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four presented the survey's findings and interpretation deducing that multiagency approach has been beneficial in identifying and preventing security threats such as acts of terror and radicalization. This chapter seeks to understand the security issues faced and approaches used by the past and current regimes in Kenya to achieve security and recommends on measures the government can adapt in future to secure the country better.

5.2. Past Approaches in tackling security issues in Kenya

Security is a distinguishing aspect of any nation's politics, economy, social structure, religion, national cohesion, and stability. The security environment has been overstretched by pervasive and unprecedented domestic and transnational insecurity, posing substantial challenges to stability. Actors at the local, national and global levels have influenced security dynamics. This ranges from traditional local livestock rustling to the emergence of ethnic and religious radicalism exhibited in terrorism.

After the attainment of independence in Kenya In 1963, the government focused on growing the economy of the state. The new government, however, was confronted with the harsh reality of divide and rule leadership style inherited from the colonial government which had major ramifications for internal national cohesion, integration, security, and stability. The government also faced the problem of "shifta activities that were driven in part by local grievances, and were a reflection of the unsettled borders and frontiers in the Horn of Africa resulting from political instability". The complaints stemmed from individual discrimination, marginalization, and underdevelopment as a result of laws, government policies, and other administrative activities.

The government's reaction to security concerns was varied, but was essentially influenced by the necessity to maintain the state's survival.

The government kept the national security apparatus, players, institutions, and processes centralized and reinforced it. The intelligence security system was increased, and the provincial government was strengthened. During this era, national security policies were highly individualized and aimed to show raw authority in order to quell any form of protest; the only concern was survival of the regime and its sustainment.

The post-election crisis prompted a re-examination of security sector role in quelling internal conflict. The 2010 Constitution was therefore purposefully written to decentralize the country's national security policy environment, which had been largely concentrated since independence. Structures, functions, and powers of national security organs (Kenya Defence Forces, National Police Service, and National Intelligence Service) as well as supervision mechanisms were reviewed to meet the current threat. The military increasing role in internal security in support of national police services emerged due to emergent none traditional conventional type of threat that a military force was established to counter.

5.3. Current Approaches in tackling security issues in Kenya

The present administration has been functioning in a context dominated by local and global security challenges, most of which were passed down from previous administrations. Terrorism, clan/tribal wars, poaching and livestock rustling are among the current security issues. The government adopted a number of steps in response to security threats. It tightened immigration loopholes by implementing steps to strengthen the management of the country's immigration operations and establishing a national digital register to offer a complete and accurate record of people and property. Security agencies' service delivery has also been targeted through legal

measures, as well as the strengthening of punitive penalties for acts of insecurity. The Security Laws (Amendment) of 2014 was passed by the National Assembly. In addition, initiatives were taken to improve the role of the national administration (formerly the province administration) in administration and security, including the introduction of the "Nyumba Kumi'' a localized micro-security system and a multiagency approach to combating security threat.

To combat the rising terror threats, the Kenyan government enhanced intelligence collection, monitoring, and police visibility in cities through multiagency collaboration. When operationalized, the multiagency approach, aimed to construct a Central Command-and-Control Centre to enable security agencies and the general public to freely share more information on security. Another endeavor to combat insecurity in the country has been to equip security forces. The government has expanded the number of recruits, provided more surveillance equipment and increased force multipliers to combat insecurity.

5.4 Emerging Approaches in tackling security issues in Kenya

In order for Kenya's government to be able to protect its citizens in a continuously changing security environment, it must adopt holistic, cohesive remedial measures to the country's flawed legislative and institutional changes especially at tactical level as this study has found out. The battle against corruption should be viewed as an integral part of a comprehensive multiagency approach to insecurity. This will not only help to build state institutions over time, but it will also help to close gaps in state responses, particularly in border control.

Despite the existence of a legal framework for dealing with the country's present forms of insecurity, the usage of key laws such as the Defence Act and the 2012 Organised Crime Act will be limited in many circumstances. Having common unifying laws shared by all security agencies

and respect for the same will be critical to avoid the type of misunderstanding that occurred during the Westgate Mall attack owing to a lack of coordination during a multiagency operation.

5.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is clear that multiagency approach to security has been effective in combatting insecurity in Kenya. Although there is adequate constitutional and legislative framework at grand strategic level establishing joint effort between security organs in combatting insecurity, the same has not been cascaded down to tactical level. Multi-agency task force such as AMANI BONI is characterized by mistrust, unhealthy competition, lack of clear legislation and structures. Standard Operating Procedures anchored on common legislative framework will therefore need to be operationalized at tactical level to further enhance multiagency effectiveness.

A thorough understanding of local security tactics and priorities will be critical because it will help make informed multiagency policies. Having a firm awareness of the emerging security issues will give security forces an upper hand in making informed policy, operational and administrative decisions to combat the threat. Kenya's government should continue working towards security sector reforms while collaborating with the public to ensure a safe and secure society. In this twenty-first century, the government should a multiagency task force directly in order to develop their ability to meet emerging threats in the cyber space, unmanned aerial vehicles and terrorism. The ability of Kenya's security agencies to rise to the situation will be based on common security agencies doctrine, tenacity, dedication and commitment to a common goal within a multiagency setup.

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Appendix A: Sample Questionnaire for the Research

This questionnaire has been prepared to facilitate gathering of data on multiagency approach in promoting national security in operation Amani Boni in Lamu County. The data gathered will specifically be utilized only in this research study. You are requested to mark your submission in the spaces provided with an (√) and include your response in the lines provided.

Section A: Biodata
Kindly tick (√) the one suitable for you.
a) Gender:
Male ( )   Female ( )
b) Age:
21-30years ( )
31-40 years ( )
41-50 years ( )
Over 51 years ( )
c) Highest Education Level:
Primary ( )
Secondary ( )
College ( )
University – undergraduate ( )
University – masters ( )
University – doctoral ( )
d) Which of the following security organs do you work with?
KDF ( )
NIS ( )
NPS ( )
AP ()
GSU ()
LRS ()
OTHERS ( )
e) Length of time you have worked in a multiagency setup?
Less than 1 year ( )
1 to 5 years ( )
6 to 10 years ( )
Over 10 years ( )

Section B: The institutional and legal frameworks of multiagency approach to security in kenya
a.   To what degree do you concur with the following statements about the institutional and legal frameworks of multiagency approach to security in kenya? (Kindly tick only one area per statement; 1 – Agree, 2 – Neutral, 3 – Disagree)
> 1. Every security organ is represented by a member at the multiagency coordinating cell.
> 2. Each member within the multiagency coordinating cell later briefs their respective commanders in their chain of command on daily programme routine.
> 3. The shared responsibilities consider individual members capabilities at the multiagency coordinating cell.

4. Regular meetings are held to assess the conduct and progress of allocated responsibility and to address developing situations threats.
5. Leadership, Command and Management responsibilities are undertaken by the leadership of each agencies after tasks are given.

b.   Is it possible to conduct a multiagency security organ cell meeting bearing in mind the different background and levels of competence of cell members and variation in standing operating procedures of each force?

_____

_____

c.   What in your own view are the major weaknesses of the institutional and legal structure of multiagency security organ being employed currently to combat insecurity in Lamu?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………

Section C: Effectiveness of the Multiagency Approach to operations in the war against insecurities in Lamu County

a.   Could you be familiar with any operations by the security organs that have been successfully undertaken by the multiagency security cell deployed in the fight against any insecurity in Lamu?
Yes ( ) No ( )

b.   If your response to the question (a) above is yes, please enumerate some of the successes the Multiagency approach to security operation team has had in the securing Lamu county through operation Amani Boni.

_____

_____

_____

c.   Is there anything that has changed in the management of the war on insecurities in Lamu since the incorporation of the multiagency approach to security?

_____

_____

_____

d.   To what degree do you agree or disagree with the under listed statements? (Kindly tick only one choice against each statement; 1 - Agree, 2 – Neutral, 3-Disagree)
  i.The Multiagency Security approach has resulted in a decline of the frequency of insecurities occurring in Lamu County.
 ii.The rate of casualties and deaths reported especially in relations to terrorism acts are much less after multiagency security approach was introduced in Lamu County.
iii.The security organs are better synchronized in their planning and response to acts of terror and other forms of insecurities.
 iv.Multiagency security approach has inculcated a synergized robust communication strategy during incidences of insecurity like acts of terror.
  v.Multiagency security approach has facilitated joint training of security organs to react in a more professional manner to security threats.
 vi.There is warm and cordial popular support for the Multiagency security approach to promote security.

MULTIAGENCY APPROACH IN PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE OF OPERATION AMANI BONI IN LAMU COUNTY

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