



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN UNION'S PEACE & SECURITY  
COUNCIL ON INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 2016 TO 2022**

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**R50/40696/2021**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY  
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE  
OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**2023**

## DECLARATION

I Claire Njoki Njoroge do declare that that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of Degree of Masters of Arts International Studies in any other University.

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Date: 08/11/2023

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor:

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Date: .....08/11/2023.....

Dr George O. Katete

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this research project to my family who have been my source of inspiration and most especially to Almighty God for His abundant blessing and grace. I most especially dedicate this research project to the People of the Democratic Republic of Congo who inspired this research project with an aim to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in their country. I hope that this research will be importance and will contribute insights to mechanisms to be used by relevant peaceful ambassadors in solving the DRC conflict. I also dedicate this work to all who will find time to read and appreciate this research project, especially all those who were involved in its development.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I acknowledge with gratitude Dr George O. Katete for his guidance in helping prepare for my research project through his commitment to make me understand the concepts related in this work and the paper to conform to university standards. I wish to thank my family for the inspiration, peace of mind and encouragement to complete my studies and my classmates for their willingness to assist me during consultations.

To you all, I say Thank You.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AU – African Union

EAC – East African Community

FP – Foreign Policy

UN – United Nations

US – United States

DRC– Democratic Republic of Congo

UNOSM– United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission

AMISOM– African Union Mission

AUPSC – African Union Peace and Security Council

EUFOR Althea – European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina

EU – European Union

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of Congo

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RECs - Regional economic communities

SFOR – Stabilization Force

## ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of the African Union Peace & Security interventions in addressing the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the conflict resolution mechanisms employed to deal with the DRC conflict, has not been adequately investigated. Several studies revealed that various the AU mechanisms in joint effort with international organizations namely the United Nations. With the study period of 2016 to 2022, the following were the objectives of the study; examines, in part, the genesis and root causes of the DRC Conflict, before setting out to analyze the AU's approach to conflict resolution through its peace & security apparatus in the Congo between the period, including its peacekeeping missions and political interventions. Furthermore, the study assessed the efficacy of AU's various initiatives in addressing the conflict and promoting sustainable peace in the region. This study was carried out in the offices of the African Union in Nairobi, Kenya, The Embassy of DRC in Nairobi, ministry of foreign affairs in Kenya who were involved in the pivotal Nairobi peace agreement. The study revealed that AU has initiated systems and architecture to deal with the crisis in the DRC, however implementation and ground efficacy brightly lacks from the organization more notably the African Union Peace and Security Council. It found that the profound limitations of AU's interventions in the DRC is both historical and structural. More notable, is that diplomatic conferences are at the core of DRC conflict mitigation but no political good will from DRC government and politicians. AUPSC Africa Standby Force deployment of peacekeeping and peacebuilding military security strategies whose deployment only began in 2015 despite its ratification in 2001. The study recommended AU structural change of systems, increased support and allocation of resources to enable the AU to effectively address the conflict and promote sustainable peace and development in the region improve the AU's capacity to address conflicts within the African continent. In addition, the study drew lessons from best practices of similar regional organizations namely the European Union being that the African Union, with a particular focus on the conflict of Bosnia & Herzegovina on organizational role and mobilization of resources and implementation of comprehensive approach strategies. By so doing, it identified key factors contributing to the effectiveness or limitations of the African Union's efforts in comparison to other regional models like the dynamics of regional bloc conflict resolution mechanisms compounded with the internal governance structures of countries like the DRC.



## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the study

It is a cardinal practice in the field of medicine, that when a doctor is confronted by an unknown condition in a patient, s(he) must first thoroughly examine how the symptoms present themselves and carefully consider the patient's previous medical history. This process allows the doctor to make an accurate diagnosis and develop an effective treatment plan.

Similarly, so as to appreciate the efficacy of the African Union's peace & security interventions, one must, as of necessity, examine even if only briefly, the history of the conflict in the DRC and the multitude of challenges it has faced both in the past and present, which have significantly shaped the complexity of the conflict and the difficulties encountered in its resolution, which make up the basis of this study.

These historical events, though condensed in time, have had far-reaching consequences. Trouble begins with the attainment of independence on 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1960. The mood was cheery, and the excitement palpable. But not for long. Soon after, and for the next 50 years, the DRC begun experiencing a spate of gloom, war & pain, which for the purposes of this study, is attributable in part, to its second to fourth leaders.<sup>1</sup>

First came Patrice Lumumba, who assumed office at the 1960 DRC independence from Belgium. However, Lumumba's term was short-lived. He faced political turmoil and opposition from various factions, including secessionist movements in Katanga and Kasai. Lumumba was ultimately arrested and assassinated in 1961 under controversial circumstances. In came Joseph Mobutu in 1965 through a coup, who would later rule the country for three decades.

The two were followed by Laurent Kabila, who rose to power through a coalition of rebel groups in 1997, until his assassination in 2001, following which he would be succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who ruled the country until 2019, when he stepped down in favor of Democratically elected President Felix Tshikedi.<sup>2</sup>

The common thread among the last three presidents of DRC - Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila, and Felix Tshisekedi - has been a backdrop of violence, humanitarian crises, and

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<sup>1</sup> Young, M. C. (1966). Post-Independence Politics in the Congo a Transition 26, Pg 34 - 38.

<sup>2</sup> Radowicz, J. (2022) Congo from Leopold II to Félix Tshisekedi pp 34.90

insecurity. These persistent challenges have necessitated the intervention of the AU to address the conflict and promote stability in the country.<sup>3</sup>

However, to maintain brevity and focus, this paper will concentrate on the more recent period between 2016 and 2022. During this timeframe, the DRC has continued to grapple with the consequences of political instability, armed conflicts, displacement of populations, and the erosion of security.

The nation, particularly the eastern region, remains home to more than 70 operational armed factions, including the infamous M23, which challenge the legitimacy of the central government. These factions primarily engage in localized pursuits such as mining and resource exploitation. As a consequence, AU's peace and security interventions during this period become particularly significant.

Arguably, the formation of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) marked a pivotal moment in the AU's commitment to addressing conflicts in Africa. The Council was tasked with the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, was modelled to embody the AU's determination to establish robust security mechanisms. Thankfully, the creation of the PSC signaled a shift from the non-interference policy of the former Organization of African Unity, OAU to a more proactive stance on intervention in member states under certain conditions.<sup>4</sup>

AUPSC constitutes of fifteen members, ten of them holding a term of two years, and five holding a term of three years, on rotational- basis. to ensure regional balance, members are elected from all five spheres of the African Continent.<sup>5</sup>

As with similar regional security outfits, election of the AUPSC members follows specific criteria that includes the capacity and commitment and responsibility of the AU states to the rule of law, good governance, respect democratic principles of human rights. Other factors include commitment of states to pay their regular monetary contributions to AU and the ability and want to manage and resolve conflicts within their respective regions.

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<sup>3</sup> Schatzberg, G. Michael (2012) The Structural Roots of the DRC's Current Disasters - Deep Dilemmas African Studies Review, pg 117 - 118

<sup>4</sup> Franke, Benedict (2008) Africa Evolving Security in Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities within Cooperation and Conflict, pg 310 - 330

<sup>5</sup> Art 5 (1), (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

Notably, the AU has not independently conducted peacekeeping missions in the DRC. Instead, it has frequently collaborated and provided support together with the United Nations, through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), as a jointly by UN and AU to address conflict challenge and maintain stability in DRC.

The AU's involvement in these joint missions has been crucial in contributing to the coordination and implementation of peacekeeping efforts, including providing troops, logistical support, and expertise. Tremendous gains have been achieved by this collaborative approach as it has allowed for a unified and coordinated response in addressing the complex challenges faced by the DRC, by leveraging the strengths and resources of both the AU and the UN, which would have been otherwise challenging.

One of the critical roles done by the AU, peripherally is the intervention in the through the Forward Intervention Brigade (FIB), which though domiciled under the MONUSCO, was and remains overwhelmingly supported by the AU.

One of the most significant achievements of the FIB was its role in defeating the M23 rebels. The FIB, in cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), launched offensive and defensive operations to quell M23, leading to the defeat and subsequent disarmament of the rebel group in November 2013.<sup>6</sup>

The FIB's success against M23 served as a deterrent to regionally existing armed groups. For instance, in 2014, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) that were reported to have halted some of their operations in the face of the FIB's robust mandate.<sup>7</sup>

Subsequently, FIB made tremendous commitments to civilian protection by conducting targeted operations against armed groups known for committing atrocities against civilian populations. Its presence and actions have often been crucial in preventing massacres and

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<sup>6</sup> Day Christopher (2013) Fates of African Rebels - Democratic Republic of Congo: Defeat for M23 Rebels pg 30 - 50

<sup>7</sup> Autesserre, Séverine (2014) Going on Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research in International Peacekeeping pg 490 - 498

providing safety to vulnerable communities<sup>8</sup>, as well as facilitating the delivery and transportation of humanitarian aid to conflict-stricken areas by improving security conditions.<sup>9</sup>

The African Union went and had a critical part in the negotiations more commonly known as the Luanda Process. While the initiative was primarily facilitated by the government of Angola and supported by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the AU also actively supported and participated in the process.

Through the Luanda Process, the AU was able to facilitate dialogue amongst the DRC Government and the M23 rebels, which ultimately eased the conflict, eventually leading to the signing of the Nairobi Declarations, which effectively ended the M23 crisis in 2013. Simultaneously, the AU mediated between Rwanda and the DRC, by providing support and guidance to the two countries, both of whom had accused each other of supporting rebel movements against their respective governments.<sup>10</sup>

The AU displayed an even more critical role during DRC's protracted and contentious electoral process that culminated in the 2018 presidential election, originally scheduled for 2016, but which former President Kabila had post-poned. Throughout the electoral process, the AU, alongside other international entities, actively engaged in diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring a peaceful and credible electoral process. It continually pushed for dialogue between political parties and called for the respect of constitutional norms.

The AU's immediate former Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and then appointed Special Envoy to the DRC, Edem Kodjo, facilitated discussions that prompted the signing of the December 31, 2016, agreement. It was this agreement, brokered under the auspices of National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO), which averted a large-scale political crisis by setting a new election date and establishing guidelines for a peaceful political transition. The December elections results raised questions where the AU expressed serious doubts about the provisional

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<sup>8</sup> Tull, D. (2017) *The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo* International Peacekeeping pg 45 – 48

<sup>9</sup> Karlsrud, J. (2015) *The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali*. Third World Quarterly pg 40 - 48

<sup>10</sup> Wolters, S. (2023) *The M23 Crisis – An Opportunity to Bring Sustainable Peace to the Great Lakes Region?* South African Institute of International Affairs Journal Article.

outcomes and required the suspension of the eventual results due to those concerns in a show of its commitment to ensuring electoral credibility.<sup>11</sup>

In conclusion, it is evident from the foregoing events and intervention strategies employed by AU that it has demonstrated its concerted collaboration to restore peace and security in the DRC.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Despite the interventions by the AU towards resolving the crises in the DRC, there is a clear growing concern regarding the effectiveness of the AU's peace and security measures in bringing about a sustainable resolution to the conflict.

Previous studies on peacekeeping missions have mostly focused on UN interventions, while there is limited research specifically examining the AU's role and effectiveness in conflict resolution within the DRC. Furthermore, the impact of AU's interventions on the ground, especially in areas such as civilians' protection, conflict de-escalation, and supporting political processes, has not been critically analysed for the specified period between 2016 and 2022.

To that end, this study seeks to analyse the effectiveness of AU's peace and security interventions in the conflict in DRC between 2016 to 2022, with a view of investigating the potential discrepancies in objectives of the AU's peace and security interventions and actual outcomes on ground, in order to inform policy and practice, both for the AU and other stakeholders engaged in peace and security efforts in DRC and other conflict-stricken regions in Africa present & future.

## **1.3 Research Questions**

This study seeks to identify answers to the following salient questions:

- a) What has been the role and effectiveness of the African Union Peace and Security Council in the resolution of the crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo?
- b) What are the lessons that can be drawn from the AU's experience in the Congo crisis, and how can they be applied to future conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Africa?

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<sup>11</sup> Carter Center (2019) Report on Democratic Republic of Congo 2018 Election Report Retrieved from [https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\\_publications/election\\_reports/drc-2018-election-report-final-en.pdf](https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/drc-2018-election-report-final-en.pdf)

- c) What are some best practices from other notable regional organizations, more specifically, the European Union?

#### **1.4 Hypothesis**

- a) The AU Peace and Security Council peacekeeping missions and political interventions have not been entirely effective in addressing the factors fueling the conflict and promoting lasting peace within the DRC.
- b) The study hypothesizes that the AU has been impeded in achieving peace in the DRC by various factors, ranging from the peculiar nuances of the conflict, the lack of resources and capacity of the AU, and the competing interests of regional and international actors.
- c) The AU Peace and Security Council could and should draw lessons from the other similar regional organizations such as the European Union in conflict resolution.

#### **1.5 Research Objectives**

The following three goals are the focus of this study:

- a) Analyzing the role and effectiveness of the African Union Peace and Security Council in the resolution of the crisis Democratic Republic of Congo.
- a) To Highlight the lessons learned from the AU's experience in the Congo crisis, and their application to future conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Africa
- b) Carrying out a comparative analysis of best practices from other notable regional organizations, more specifically, the European Union

#### **1.6 Justification of the study**

There is no doubt in anyone's mind to the fact that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for a long time has been engaged in a protracted conflict that has largely characterized by political instability, humanitarian crises, and security challenges. There is equally no doubt or conviction, that the African Union (AU), being the relevant regional institution, has endeavored to put interventions in various ways to promote peace and security in the DRC.

One then wonders, what is so important about the period between 2016 to 2022? The answer is simple: this period is particularly significant as it represents a period of intensified conflict and security challenges in what for all intents and purposes can be described as **modern DRC**. Within this period, the DRC has experienced contested presidential elections, security challenges

characterized by widespread violence, re-emergence & emasculation of outlawed militia outfits, and overall humanitarian crises.

The same period has equally seen the proliferation of armed groups who illegally exploit the country's natural resources, and cross-border conflicts. AU's role in addressing these security challenges is of paramount importance in identifying the constraints and opportunities in regional security collaboration. This analysis will provide evidence-based assessments that can be used to improve security policy and intervention strategies.

At the same time, we have witnessed an evolution of the African Union's approach towards peace and security interventions, including new partnerships with other international actors as well as local initiatives. And so, by paying particular attention to this period, this project study will shed additional light on the changing dynamics of the AU's strategies and how they have been applied in the DRC, and in turn, provide insights that could be applicable in other hot conflict situations across the continent presently and in days to come.

But more importantly, gaining understanding into the effectiveness of the AU's interventions in DRC will undoubtedly serve as an important reference for policy-makers and stakeholders in the development of more effective strategies for peace and security in the region. As the project study looks at past and on-going interventions, it will inform policy recommendations that address some of the root causes and advancement of the conflict and how best to control and prevent future occurrence of such- like conflicts.

Finally, given the regional implications of the crises in the DRC, looking at the efficacy of AU'S interventions will provide an opportunity to examine the regional dynamics and international cooperation role in conflict resolution within the region. The study will certainly prove useful in contributing to the understanding of how regional organizations can effectively collaborate with international partners in addressing conflicts.

## **1.7 Literature Review**

This study would not come to life without the material works of various notable authors.

Nagar et al. (2019) in "The African Union: Regional & Global Challenges", the authors provide an analysis on the African Union (AU) and its challenges in its efforts and commitment to promote regional based integration, peace, security, and economic development across Africa.

The authors identify a lack of Pan- Africanism as a main challenge facing the AU. They posit that despite a large population of Africans in the diaspora, there is little role in mobilizing and lobbying conducted by those Africans in advancing African interests, save from foreign remittances back to their countries. They opine that leveraging the over 169 million Africans in the diaspora could be a potential game changer for Africa as a whole.

The second biggest challenge the authors identify is greed for power by African heads of states, militaries and politicians alike. They observe that despite most African states having obtained their independence from as early as the 1950s, the greed for power by a select few people has often undone all progress made. They decry the numerous wars and crisis that have been occasioned by these individuals' gluttony, and propose that the self- monitoring process must be implemented with some seriousness to enable the AU and other players to continuously assess the state of democracy and to step in early enough to offer the needed assistance to prevent full blown crisis that we now see in countries like the DRC.

The authors go on to identify funding as another big challenge hampering the effective discharge of the mandate of the AU. They posit that without proper and sustainable funding, very little can be achieved by the AU. As an example, they cite an audit report of the AU's achievements during the reign of its first Chairperson, which identified only half of the AU's goals achieved during the period between 2004- 2007. This is attributable to a lack of proper funding.

In their conclusion, the authors propose a raft of recommendations to address these challenges: first, the authors recommend that the AU establishes better working relationships with civil society groups and private entities and persons in order to scour for alternative funding to meet its needs as opposed to relying on member contributions.

Secondly, the authors recommend an overhaul of the commission's Human Resource policy particularly in its Peace and Security Department, by making the hiring and contract renewal of commission staff merit- based, to weed out lazy and ineffective staff that are only a burden to the commission.

The authors further propose that decisions affecting the interests of any member state be considered, and where applicable, compensation be paid in order to spur economic growth.



Additionally, they recommend that the AU and the UN re-look their working relationship, with a view of ensuring that each play their part, but as a team and not competitors, towards achieving their set goals.<sup>12</sup>

Ebere (2019) on the other hand, in his work “The African Union, R2P and the Challenges of Capability” examines the “Right to Protect Principle” colloquially referred to as the R2P and challenges of implementing it by the African Union. The author aptly appreciates the provision of non-consensual interference in AU member state sovereigns’ internal conflicts.

Ebere argues that while the AU recognizes the importance of protecting populations from mass atrocities, it is too cautious about the potential for non-consensual internal interference of business of AU states. The author emphasizes that AU strongly upholds the non-interference and sovereignty of the state, which often times complicates the implementation of R2P.

The author decries the AU’s preference for preventive diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms, such as mediation and negotiation, to address internal conflicts and protect populations at risk, which he argues that while not entirely pointless, it doesn’t often work, as perpetrators of atrocities within the African continent respond best to force.

The author also addresses the AU’s engagement with external actors, particularly the United Nations, in implementing R2P. Ebere emphasizes the need for strategic cooperation and coordination of AU and international organizations to enhance the effectiveness of R2P implementation in Africa.

He argues that we can learn from past mistakes, such as the genocide in Albania and Rwanda, and the civil wars in the DRC, and make a conscious undertaking to intervene to protect people as a matter of moral responsibility.

He proposes an urgent move to amend the AU charter’s conflicting clauses, which on the one hand prohibits forceful ways and any form or way of interference in any affairs and activities of other states while on the other it maintains a right of interference where grave violations of human rights have occurred.

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<sup>12</sup> Nagar, D. & Nganje, F. (2016) *The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges* pp 56 – 60 on Centre for Conflict Resolution

Applying Ebere's concerns to the DRC situation, it is discernible that the country has experienced protracted conflicts and humanitarian crises, making it a relevant case study for examining R2P within the AU. Ebere's analysis suggests that the AU's overall approach to R2P in the Congo crisis is influenced by its commitment to "the principle of non-interference" and one of preservation of sovereignty of state.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, AU is being generally cautious about endorsing external military interventions or non-consensual interference in member states' internal or any affairs, including the DRC.<sup>14</sup>

Adegboyega, et.al (2016) in "Missions with Hindrance" analyze challenges faced by African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions, specifically focusing on their experiences in DRC.

The authors examine the complex political dynamics within the DRC and how they impact the AU's peacekeeping efforts. They point fingers at the presence of multiple armed groups, each of which have their own political agendas, as a major obstacle to achieving sustainable peace.

The authors decry a lack of proper coordination and cooperation among the various actors involved in the peacekeeping efforts. They argue that only through genuine and honest collaboration between the AU itself, the United Nations, regional organizations, general stakeholders can give us a shot at achieving successful outcomes. To them, the lack of coordination and overlapping mandates have only led to confusion and inefficiency on the ground, leading to little success.

Additionally, the authors raise issue with limited public support and skepticism towards peacekeeping missions in the DRC. They argue that gaining the trust and cooperation of local communities is most critical as their support is essential for successful peacekeeping operations. However, negative perceptions of peacekeepers, instances of misconduct, and a lack of tangible improvements in the lives of Congolese citizens have eroded public confidence and hindered the AU's ability to gain local support, resulting in very a lack of tangible progress in- country.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Jamnejad, M (2009) The Principle of Non-intervention. *Leiden Journal of International Law* pp. 345 - 351

<sup>14</sup> Adigbo, E. R. (2019) The African Union, R2P and the Challenges of Capability. *Journal of African Union Studies* pp 115 - 128

<sup>15</sup> Ola, A. A. & Ehiane, S. O. (2016) Missions with Hindrance: African Union (AU) and Peacekeeping Operations. *Journal of African Union Studies*, pp 113–133

Juma, et.al (2002) in their “The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa” explore the complex nature of conflicts in Africa, including their causes, dynamics, and implications. They plough deep into understanding the specific context of conflict in the African continent, shedding light on the factors that contribute to the perpetuation of violence and instability, in a place like DRC.

The authors argue that conflicts in Africa are multifaceted, driven by a combination of political, social, economic, and historical factors. They finger governance failures, ethnic tensions, economic inequalities, and external influences by foreign actors as the primary factors that shape the dynamics of conflicts in different African countries. For Congo however, the authors contend that the primary driver of the conflicts is the incessant scramble for its minerals.

Additionally, the authors examine the relationship between local and regional dynamics, as well as the responsibilities of organizations like the AU in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. They posit that peace restoration efforts within countries like DRC can only be achieved by collective effort, and not by parties playing politics.

According to the authors, the politicization of peace efforts hinders the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding initiatives by organizations like the AU, thereby undermining the legitimacy of peace agreements, and perpetuating the same cycles of violence.

The authors argue that to curb the politicization of peace efforts requires a commitment to impartiality, inclusivity, and genuine dialogue among the various actors in the conflict, but most importantly, the respect for the sovereignty of the DRC. They propose, that as far as is practically possible, countries must be allowed to take charge of their own solutions.

To that end, the authors argue that regional and international actors must strive to align their efforts, coordinate their approaches, and demonstrate support for the neighborhood responsibility for harmony to guarantee peace process and to ensure that activities of peacebuilding and related initiatives in the DRC are driven and orchestrated by the needs and aspirations of the Congolese people rather than political interests.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Juma, M. & Mengistu, A. (2002) The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa. In *The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions* pp 9 - 18 International Peace Institute

## **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

### **1.8.1 Regional Integration Theory**

The theory of regional integration seeks to explain the processes and outcomes associated with different countries coming together to form a cohesive economic, political, or social unit within a geographic area. Propounded in chief by economist Béla Balassa, it posits that economic integration can be seen as a series of stages, ranging from a free trade area to complete economic integration.

It advances the idea that governments employ regional integration as a means to optimize their national security and economic objectives within the framework of regional interconnection. The consequences of integration stem from negotiations between governments and basically mirror the prevailing regional preferences and power dynamics. Governments entrust regional organizations like the AU with authority to safeguard their negotiated outcomes while retaining some control over these organizations and the overall integration process.

Beyond economic integration however, the scope of regional integration theory has been expanded to also cover political, social, and security dimensions. According to author Joseph Nye, regional integration is characterized by the formulation and implementation of shared rules and norms among neighbouring states which foster cooperation. It essentially entails the voluntary merging of separate nation-states into a larger whole, such that they retain their traditions but pool their sovereignty for mutual gain.

One of the critical aspects of integration of regions is the development of collective security measures. The theory seems to be grounded on the very proximate relationship between security and integration. It asserts that a group of states may create a “security community” wherein there is an established expectation that disputes will be resolved through peaceful means and that there is a mutual trust.

Experts argue that regional organizations serve as platforms for member states to negotiate and coordinate security policies, allowing for the pooling of resources and sharing of information. By delegating certain security functions to regional organizations, states are able to enhance their security while maintaining a degree of influence over the integration process.

In the case of the AU and its interventions in conflict situations such as in the case of the DRC, regional integration theory surely holds particular relevance. We are aware that the AU was established as a continental body of 55 member states, whose creation was motivated by the need for African countries to integrate and work together on common challenges, including peace initiatives.

In the DRC conflict, the efficacy of the AU's efforts can therefore be examined through the lens of regional integration. The AUPSC has, as I have stated in the preceding sections of this study, been actively engaged in deploying peacekeeping forces and facilitating dialogues in conflict-affected regions within the DRC. Evidently, this is an approach that incorporates elements of regional integration, which has been undoubtedly critical in enhancing AU's capacity in resolution of conflict in DRC.

### **1.8.2 Normative Power Theory**

Normative Power Theory, in principle, refers to the ability of a political entity, such as any international organization or state, to shape the norms and values of other entities through non-coercive means. Developed by Prof. Ian Manners, who, whilst analyzing the European Union's ability to influence global norms, argued that the EU has a unique capacity to shape the norms of the international system due to its historical context, legal framework, and political structures, which are characterized by an emphasis on globalism and intergovernmentalism within.<sup>17</sup>

The theory posits that political entities can affect the behavior and beliefs of others through diffusion rather than imposition. This diffusion can occur through various processes such as contagion, informational exchanges, procedural exchanges, transference, and overt diffusion such as persuasion and attraction. Differently put, normative powers do not impose but rather foster their internal values and norms as exemplary, persuading others to adopt these norms willingly. The objective is to reach a somewhat normative middle-ground between what the normative power believes internally and what it seeks to promote externally.<sup>18</sup>

Looking at it in the context of the AU and its intervention in the DRC, the theory can be applied to grasp the degree to which the AU has been successful in diffusing its own norms and

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<sup>17</sup> Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, pp. 235 - 250.

<sup>18</sup> Diez, T. (2013) Normative power as hegemony: Cooperation and Conflict pp 194 - 208.

values in conflict resolution and governance. We see that the AU, since its inception, has adopted several normative frameworks, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), whose aim at promoting peace, tranquility, maximum security, and good governance in Africa.<sup>19</sup>

In the DRC conflict itself, the AU's efforts have been characterized by diplomatic engagements for the most part, which have been supplemented by peacekeeping deployments and mediation efforts. These efforts can be seen as an attempt to diffuse norms such as respect for any and all related human rights, democratic governance and peaceful conflict resolution. More particularly, the AU has been influential in pushing for peaceful electoral processes and dialogue.

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

This section will describe the research design that the study will adopt, the study area, target population, sampling technique, data collection methods and data analysis.

### **Research Design**

This study will primarily involve descriptive research design which will include desk-based research qualitative and qualitative review. The research will involve a systematic review of available and relevant literature to wit; books, journal articles, government publications, policies and international treaties on the subject matter.

Additionally, the study will employ a questionnaire-based survey to gather primary data from a number of experts in the field. The questionnaire will be designed to elicit opinions and perspectives on the primary factors contributing to the DRC crisis and the effectiveness of the various AU interventions.

### **Research Site**

This study was conducted in by issuing questionnaires at the African Union offices in Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DRC embassy to Kenya in Nairobi.

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<sup>19</sup> Obi, Cyril & Akuffo, Edward & Butera, Jean-Bosco & Bah, Abu-Bakarr & Tiekou, Thomas. (2013). African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) pp 56 The Theory - The Practice Gap.

## **Study Population**

The Study Population will comprise of department officials at the African Union offices in Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DRC embassy to Kenya in Nairobi and include various scholars knowledgeable in the matter.

## **Sampling Technique and Sample Size**

Mugenda and Mugenda explains that populace is the entire gathering of people, occasions or items with a natural noticeable traits <sup>20</sup>. The total number population of this project study will be 50 of representatives in various institutions. The sample selection determination for this project study will be as per the divisions and departments of the AU offices in Kenya and the ministry of foreign affairs.

## **Data Collection Methods**

There are two types of data that is primary and secondary data. Primary data in the study is straightforward while secondary data is composed of various interpretations of the primary data mainly received from publications, reports and libraries. The study employed a questionnaire-based survey to gather primary data from a number of experts in the field. The questionnaire was used and designed to elicit opinions and perspectives on the primary factors contributing to the DRC conflict and the effectiveness of the various AU interventions.

## **Data Analysis**

The study used both qualitative and quantitative data. The responses collected through the questionnaire will be analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative approaches to identify key patterns and designs that should be employed to effectively deal with the conflict in the DRC as well as provide valuable data on areas of improvement for the African Unions' peace & security mission.

## **Chapter Outline**

The study will comprise of four chapters taking the following form:

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<sup>20</sup> Mugenda, O.M. and Mugenda, A.G. (1999) Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. pp 67 - 78 Acts Press, Nairobi

## **Chapter 1: Introduction and Background**

1.1 Background of the Study

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 Research Questions

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.5 Significance of the Study

1.6 Theoretical Framework

1.7 Literature Review

## **Chapter 2: The Role and Effectiveness of the African Union Peace and Security Council in the Resolution of the Crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The Mandate and Structure of the AU Peace and Security Council

2.3 The AU's Interventions in the DRC: A Historical Overview

2.4 Analysis of the AU's Effectiveness in the DRC

2.4.1 Successes of the AU's Interventions

2.4.2 Challenges and Constraints

2.5 Conclusion

## **Chapter 3: Lessons from the AU's Experience in the Congo Crisis and their Application to Future Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Efforts in Africa**

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Identifying and Analyzing Key Lessons from the AU's Experience in the DRC

3.3 Application of These Lessons to Future Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Efforts in Africa

3.4 Recommendations for Improving AU's Future Interventions

3.5 Conclusion



## **Chapter 4: Best Practices from Other Notable Regional Organizations: The Case of the European Union**

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Understanding the EU's Approach to Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

4.3 Best Practices and Successful Interventions by the EU

4.4 Lessons the AU Can Learn from the EU's Approach and Experience and Application in African Context.

4.5 Conclusion

## **Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations**

## **CHAPTER 2. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN UNION'S INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC**

### **2.1 Introduction**

As conceded in the preliminary section of this study, scant research has delved into the efficacy of the AUPSC involvement in solving the conflict within Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The current landscape reveals a divergence of opinions concerning the extent and even the very existence of the AU's actions and success in this context.

In any event, there is no denying that the persistent violence and turmoil across the African continent as is the case with DRC remain significant obstacles to both social and political advancement, constraining economic growth as well. Such conflicts continue to present substantial challenges in terms of achieving peace and maintaining it.

As a consequence, these challenges in turn also strain regional institutions like the AU that really for the most part is still in the process of development, and therefore their resolution is contingent upon establishment of effective peace and security mechanisms.

This chapter, thus, undertakes a comprehensive analysis to shed light on these matters.

### **2.2 The Mandate and Structure of the AU Peace and Security Council**

One cannot surely discuss the effectiveness of AU without looking at its basic architecture. Unlike many other regional organizations that whose creation came either after resolving emerging conflicts, the inception of the AU was primarily driven by the imperative of peace and security. This imperative, with emphasis on human security, was deemed an essential prerequisite for effectively handling the developmental challenges and difficulties faced by the African continent.<sup>21</sup>

The OAU Charter of 1963 core focus was on decolonization, and in this regard the AU religiously adhered to the standing and principle and rule that member-state sovereignty while refraining from interfering in their domestic matters. However, this was problematic as it ultimately diminished the organization's capacity to promptly engage in preventing and effectively

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<sup>21</sup> Moolakkattu, J. (2010) The Role of the African Union in Continental Peace and Security Governance. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* pp 151-168

handling member states conflicts. In fact, the OAU's track record in security interventions was so terribly bad and uninspiring, as the organization was more focused on establishing norms and standards that it lacked even the capability to enforce.<sup>22</sup>

Fortunately, scholars and experts caught on to this problematic approach, thanks in general to the shift in Africa's political and security landscape, set against the backdrop of broader transformations world-wide. A pivotal element of these transformations, which notably influenced the normative and structural standings of the AU, was the transition in the perception of security. The world was changing from the traditional state-focused perspective to a more expansive and inclusive outlook of security that places humanity at the core. Closer home however, the tragedy of the Rwandan genocide and the Libyan crisis had prompted the AU to reassess its stance on non-interference.<sup>23</sup>

Indeed, the commencement of the African Union on July 9, 2002, signified a fresh chapter in the endeavors of African leaders to construct an adaptable framework for peace and security within the continent.

It was out of this that the AUPSA Architecture was borne, encompassing a dynamic framework consisting of one Peace and Security Council (PSC) for decisive policymaking, the African Standby Force (ASF) for swift operational response, Mechanisms for regional organizations for localized management of all conflicts, and synergistic components like the Peace Fund and with Continental Early Warning System, all aimed at collectively preserving peace, preventing conflicts, and ensuring stability across the Africa.<sup>24</sup>

### **2.2.1 The Peace & Security Council**

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created to serve as the permanent decision-making body responsible for preventing, handling, and settling conflicts. Its core mandate involves

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<sup>22</sup> Moolakkattu, J. (2010) The Role of the African Union in Continental Peace and Security Governance. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* pp 156-168.

<sup>23</sup> Williams, P. D. (2009) The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* pp 600-620.

<sup>24</sup> The Constitutive Act of the African Union

forecasting and averting conflicts, fostering peace, stability and security suggesting intervention to the Assembly in critical situations.<sup>25</sup>

Notably, the PSC was initially not accommodated in the AU Constitutive Act (ratified in Lomé, Togo, in July 2001). Instead, its inception emerged from an improvised reform process concerning the Instruments for Prevention of Conflict, Resolution of Conflict and Management of conflict. This mechanism had initially been endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as unit previously of the Organization of African Unity in June 1993, with its principal aim centered on foreseeing and deterring conflicts.<sup>26</sup>

The PSC constitutes of fifteen members, ten of them holding a term of two years, and five holding a term of three years, on rotational- basis to maintain regional balance, and the members are elected from all five spheres of the African Continent, that is to say, North, East, South, West & Central Africa.<sup>27</sup>

As with similar regional security outfits, the selection process for PSC members adheres to well-defined criteria, encompassing considerations such as the member states' capabilities and dedication to upholding democratic values, human rights, sticking and observing the rule of law, and effective governance. Additionally, factors like the commitment of AU states to meet various financial and economic obligations to AU and their proficiency in addressing and resolving conflicts within their respective regions was also addressed.<sup>28</sup>

Currently, the membership of the PSC comprises of Djibouti, Cameroon, Nigeria, Morocco, and Namibia, elected for a term of 3 years from February 2022, and Congo, Tunisia, Burundi, Senegal, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe elected for a term of 2 years.

### **2.2.2 The Panel of the Wise**

Established under Article 11 of the Protocol to the Establishment of the Peace & Security Council, the one named Panel of the Wise comprises of five distinguished African figures drawn

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<sup>25</sup> Rwengabo, S. (2016) Institutional Design and the Implementation of the African Peace Security Architecture in Eastern Africa: Africa Development pp 107–130.

<sup>26</sup>Williams, P. D. (2009) The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* pp 600–620

<sup>27</sup> Art 5 (1), (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

<sup>28</sup> Art 5 (2), (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

and got from the five spheres of the African continent and representing diverse sectors of society, re-known for their remarkable efforts to the advancement of security, development and peace across Africa. It is entrusted with responsibility of bolstering the endeavors of the Chairperson of the Commission and the overall PSC, with a specific focus on activities related to the prevention of conflicts.<sup>29</sup>

The basic function is fairly straight-forward: by relying on shared intelligence and data from member states, regional organizations and other stakeholder, the panel monitors and analyzes situations of potential conflict across Africa to identify emerging conflicts or situations that could escalate into violence; upon which it assesses the situation(s) and gathers information to understand the underlying causes and dynamics. Based on this analysis, the Panel formulates recommendations aimed at preventing or mitigating the conflict to the Chairman of the PSC.<sup>30</sup>

But at the core of its functioning model is an emphasis of preventative diplomacy. To a great extent, the panel is seen as the central mediative wing of the PSC, and for obvious reason.

In 2017, Panel of the Wise made a milestone recommendation to formulate the African Network of Women in Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation (FemWise–Africa). Its key aims is to contribute inclusivity for women leadership and advocacy in peace processes in the African Continent. The four action points for FemWise includes the establishment of a women’s permanent Office in the AU Commission, formulation of an AU Gender Peace and Security Programme (GPSP), establishment of a permanent Open Session of the Council on Women on Peace and Security and the launch of FemWise–Africa

### **2.2.3 The African Standby Force [ASF]**

The first Assembly of the AU held in Durban, South Africa from July 9 to 10, 2002 saw the adoption of the Protocol of the PSC. Among the key provisions in the protocol were those concerning the establishment and formation of the ASF along with a Military Staff Committee.<sup>31</sup> The African Standby Force, was by design to comprise prepared multidisciplinary units inclusive

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<sup>29</sup> Article 11 (2002) of the Protocol to the Establishment of the Peace & Security Council

<sup>30</sup> Porto, J. G. & Ngandu, K. Y. (2014) The African Union, Preventive Diplomacy, Mediation, and the Panel of the Wise: Review and Reflection on the Panel’s First Six Years on African Security pp 181 - 200.

<sup>31</sup> Report of APSA Assessment Study conducted: July - October 2010 Available at <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-apsa-assessment-study-conducted-july-october-2010>

of both civilian and military components situated within their respective originating countries. This force would be poised for swift deployment upon receiving appropriate notice.

Regrettably, the ASF wasn't actually made operational until 2015, with the AU having spent years formulating its operational rules for deployment of the Standby Force. As a result, in 2013, looking to fill the shoes of the yet operationalized ASF, the idea of establishing the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was conceived. ACIRC was conceived as a temporary measure, and would rely on member states voluntarily providing troops for intervention missions.<sup>32</sup>

The primary objective of ACIRC would encompass enforcing peace, intervening in crises, countering terrorist organizations and cross-border criminal operations, quelling armed group rebellions, and providing urgent aid to all African states, all aligned with the principle of non-indifference towards safeguarding civilians.

During the 821<sup>st</sup> meeting of the PSC, a decision was made for the merger of the ACIRC into the ASF operational framework. This was informed by a growing concern that the ACIRC essentially replicated ASF and that excessive attention on it could sidetrack ongoing endeavors to ensure the complete operational capability of the ASF.

#### **2.2.4 The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)**

Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, establishes the CEWS which is intended to anticipate and prevent conflict by the use of open- source intelligence as well intelligence gathered by the AU itself.<sup>33</sup>

The fundamental operational framework of the CEWS revolves around the systematic collection of data, followed by rigorous analysis and assessment to identify potential conflicts and

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<sup>32</sup> Institute for Global Dialogue. (2015). Africa's Peace and Security Architecture: Summary of the Policy Forum on South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect. A Journal Article pp 14 - 26

<sup>33</sup> Masara, W. B. (2021) Biting the Bullet: Interrelating Early Warning to Early Action in the Continental Early Warning System of the African Union. Journal of African Union Studies pp 5–15.

crises, enabling proactive measures to anticipate, prevent, and efficiently respond to emerging threats stability and peace on the African continent.<sup>34</sup>

This data includes political, economic, social, and security-related information, and is collected from a plethora of sources including governments, regional organizations, civil society, and international partners. The analysts attached to the CEWS are then able to study the various indicators presented by the data to identify potential conflicts and crises. These indicators may include political tensions, ethnic or religious disputes, economic instability, natural resource disputes, and other factors that could lead to conflict.

The recommendations and conclusions drawn from this analysis are then shared with the relevant stakeholders within the African Union, beginning with the PSC itself, the Commission, and member states.<sup>35</sup> The effectiveness or lack thereof of CEWS is a discussion of varying outcomes and will be discussed later in this study.

### **2.2.5 The Peace Fund**

As the term suggests, the Peace Fund kitty has the biggest objective to fund peace and security interventions of AU. The fund also supports conflict prevention and mediation efforts by providing resources for diplomatic initiatives, negotiations, and financial support for peace talks to prevent conflicts from escalating. An ancillary Crises Fund is established under the Peace Fund to support emergency situations without awaiting the allocation of formal budget.

The kitty's funds are in part, sourced from the AU's budget and composed of voluntary member making contributions and external funding from the various partners and friends of the AU. While records are not properly current, available data shows that the AU has struggled with member commitment to monetary contribute, with many of the member countries being in arrears for consecutive years.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Bamidele, 'Seun. (2016). Re-Assessment of African Union Security Architecture and Emerging Security Challenges in Africa. *Journal of African Union Studies* pp 137–163.


<sup>35</sup> Wulf, H. & Debiel, T. (2010) Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms. *Global Governance* pp 525–540

<sup>36</sup> Jentzsch, C. (2014) Opportunities and Challenges to Financing African Union Peace Operations. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, pp 86–105.

Bearing this mind, the AU adopted the Kigali Decision in 2016, resolving to implement a levy the equivalent of 0.2 percent of all imports coming into the African Continent with a view of maintaining its budget funding. However, only half of the members have implemented this levy and remitted funds to the Commission.<sup>37</sup>

Despite the ambitious provisions and indicated rules of Article 21 (4) of the Protocol to the Establishment of the PSC, the Crises Reserve Facility intended for timely and unencumbered intervention in emergency situations is yet to be established to this day.<sup>38</sup>

The components of the African Union Peace and Security Council are elaborated in the diagram below:



### 2. 3 The AU’s Interventions in the DRC Between 2016-2022

As noted earlier in this project study, traditionally, the AU has typically pursued security interventions in the DRC through collaborative efforts, rather than independently, often working in collaboration with the United Nations (UN) and various sub-regional economic communities

<sup>37</sup> African Union Finance Policies (2021). Financing The Union: Towards the financial autonomy of the African Union. Journal Article pp 1 - 5

<sup>38</sup> Bamidele, 'Seun. (2016). Re-Assessment of African Union Security Architecture and Emerging Security Challenges in Africa. Journal of African Union Studies, 137–160.



(RECS) particularly the EAC and SADC in this particular period of study, as a majority of the very members of the AU are equally members of other sub-regional organizations.<sup>39</sup>

Up until 2016, the DRC had been in a fairly peaceful state having crushed the M12 rebel group in 2012 which had been a major cause of the instability in the country. However, this begun to change in 2016 as the rebel group begun to re-emerge.

For the purposes of this study, the interventions in DRC have been threefold, namely The Deployment of the East African Community (EAC) regional force, the Nairobi Process and the Luanda Agreement.

### **2.3.1 The East African Community Regional Force**

In 2016, The East African Community (EAC) established a regional force to participate and provide solutions for peace and security in the DRC. DRC's conflict is highly complex, involving both domestic and international actors. Various armed groups, often backed by neighboring countries, have contributed to the violence and instability. This has not only cost the lives of countless Congolese but has also had regional repercussions, with conflicts spilling over into neighboring states. The EAC in 2016, comprised of Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Sudan and Uganda, recognized the purpose for a coordinated and planned regional approach to address the ongoing crisis in the DRC.

In 2016, the EAC declared its intention to form a regional force supporting the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in maintaining peace in DRC. The decision to establish a force was motivated by several factors: First, Regional Responsibility where the EAC recognized that regional peace and security were interlinked, and addressing DRC's conflict was crucial to promoting stability throughout East Africa. Second, Complementing MONUSCO where the EAC Regional Force was designed to work in coordination with MONUSCO, leveraging its strengths and resources to enhance the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts. Third EAC regional force was premised on a Neutral Stance engagement where the force aimed to be neutral and impartial in its operations, ensuring that it could relate with all parties involved in conflict and work towards a peaceful resolution.

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<sup>39</sup> Lisakafu, J. (2018) State Multiple Regional Membership as a threat to Peace and Security in Eastern and Southern Africa. *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs* pp 45–68.

Among the primary objectives of the EAC regional force was first and foremost security and stability in eastern DRC. By conducting joint military operations with MONUSCO, the force aimed to neutralize armed groups and reduce the violence that had plagued the region for years. It also aimed to conduct conflict prevention where it conducted a preventive role by deterring armed groups from engaging in hostilities and promoting dialogue and reconciliation among different factions. Another main objective was supporting humanitarian efforts where the force provided a more secure environment for humanitarian agencies to operate in, enabling them to deliver much-needed assistance to vulnerable populations. The EAC a regional bloc promoted regional cooperation where the force's operations encouraged regional cooperation among EAC member states, demonstrating their commitment to peace and security in the Great Lakes region.

### **2.3.2 The Nairobi Process**

The Nairobi Process a precursor of the Luanda Process was initiated in 2014, as a diplomatic effort to bring stability and peace to the DRC. It was facilitated by the United Nations and the African Union and sought to provide a platform for dialogue coupled with reconciliation among DRC stakeholders. The process aimed to address the reasons of conflict, promote inclusivity, and foster a sense of ownership among the various parties involved. The key components and achievements of the Nairobi process includes Commitment to Inclusive Dialogue where it brought together government officials, opposition figures, civil society representatives, and regional actors. This inclusivity ensured that diverse perspectives were considered in the peace process. Secondly, it engaged key political figures in Political Agreements. It significantly achieved the facilitation of political agreements of DRC government and opposition groups. These agreements addressed issues related to governance, electoral processes, and power-sharing arrangements. They provided a roadmap for political stability and democratic governance. Thirdly, it addressed the humanitarian issues being experienced by the DRC people where the key component was Humanitarian Assistance where the process called for increased humanitarian assistance and aid to address the population wants and needs that were affected by the conflict. This focus on humanitarian concerns underscored the commitment to alleviating the suffering of the Congolese people.

Fourth, the process considered Security Sector Reform where efforts were made to reform and professionalize the Congolese armed forces, with the goal of improving security and minimizing human rights abuses. Fifth, it promoted regional involvement where regional actors, including neighboring countries like Rwanda and Uganda, was a key feature of the Nairobi Process. Regional stability is vital for lasting peace in the DRC, as many armed groups operate across borders. The process facilitated cooperation among regional states to address shared security concerns.

### **2.3.3 The Luanda Process**

The Luanda Process, also known as the Inga Dialogue, was started as a diplomatic initiative aimed at addressing the complex issues plaguing the DRC. It was launched in 2019 by Angola and the Republic of Congo, supported by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The Luanda Process has had significant impact AU effectiveness in conflict prevention in the DRC even in the years focused on the study.

This was peace initiative to disarm rebel groups and promote non-aggression between various countries neighboring the DRC particularly in the Eastern region. The Eastern region of DRC is the area plagued with armed conflict and in hindsight propelled by exercising organized crime, for example, illegal gold and jewel exports, dealing with bhang, guns, unlawful timber and elephant ivory, child trafficking and double-dealing of its tremendous amounts of natural resources. These vast array of activities continue to undermine and lead to deterioration of security which has led to the highly volatile Eastern DRC and constant outbreak of violence.

The Luanda Process sought to create a platform for dialogue and reconciliation among the various Congolese stakeholders, including political leaders, armed groups, and civil society organizations. The five key components and achievements of the Process includes Inclusive Dialogue where it brought together a wide range of actors, ensuring that all voices were heard. This inclusivity helped create an environment where different parties could express their grievances, negotiate, and work towards common solutions. Secondly, the Security Sector Reform where the process recognized the importance of reforming security sector in DRC and a commitment was made, including efforts to integrate former rebel fighters into the national army. This was a significant step towards stabilizing the country's security. Thirdly, the formulation of Peace Agreements between the DRC government and various armed groups. These agreements aimed at ending hostilities, demobilizing

combatants, and addressing the heart of the conflict. The peace deals contributed to a reduction in violence and displacement.

Fourth component brought about by the process was Regional Cooperation where it facilitated the involvement of neighboring countries including Angola and the Republic of Congo, in the Luanda Process helped foster regional cooperation. Regional stability in the Central region of Africa is essential for lasting peace in the DRC, as many armed groups operate across borders. Fifth and final component was the Civil Society Engagement where these organizations had a crucial role in the Luanda Process. They outlined and formed a platform for citizens participation in peacebuilding efforts and hold their leaders accountable. This civic engagement was instrumental in building trust and promoting transparency.

## **2.4 Successes of the AU's Interventions**

While the implementation strategies of these three AU interventions were slow the dialogue processes made major strides in addressing the DRC's conflicts. To achieve lasting peace in the DRC, it is crucial for the international community, the United Nations, the EAC, and other regional actors to continue their collaborative efforts. Military solutions alone will not suffice; political dialogue, governance reforms, and socioeconomic development are equally vital components of the peacebuilding process.

The formation of the East African Community Regional Force in the DRC represented a promising step towards addressing the ongoing conflict and instability in the region. Its objectives of enhancing security, preventing conflict, and supporting humanitarian efforts are commendable.

The EAC Regional Force serves as a testament to the commitment of regional actors to handle the complex challenges and difficulties facing the DRC, and its success will depend on sustained support and a comprehensive approach to stability in the Great Lakes region.

The Nairobi Process represented a significant step toward achieving peace and stability in the DRC. Its emphasis on inclusive dialogue, political agreements, and regional cooperation has contributed to positive developments in the country.

The Nairobi Process offered hope in a region that has suffered for too long, and it underscores the importance of diplomacy and collaboration in addressing complex conflicts. While the road to

peace in the DRC may be long and arduous, initiatives like the Nairobi Process demonstrated the potential for positive change and a brighter future for the Congolese people.

The Luanda Process also in the works represents a promising step towards achieving lasting peace and stability in the DRC. Its inclusive approach, emphasis on dialogue, and commitment to addressing the various origin of conflict have contributed to positive developments in the country. The Luanda Process offers a glimmer of hope in a region that has suffered for far too long, and it serves as a testament to the power of diplomacy and dialogue in resolving complex conflicts.

#### **2.4.1 Challenges and Constraints**

The main challenge faced by the AU in all these interventions has been the shortage of resource human and material, poor staffing and poor representation of African states which affect the AUPSC to effectively carry out its mandate. While the EAC Regional Force represents a significant step towards regional stability in the DRC, it faces several challenges. The force faced and faces challenges related to resources, coordination, and the long-term sustainability of peace efforts. Resource Constraints by the force has encountered resource limitations, including funding and equipment shortages, which have hindered its ability to carry out operations effectively.

Multifaceted and bureaucratic Coordination has been strenuous to ensure seamless coordination between the EAC Regional Force and MONUSCO, as well as other international actors, has been a complex task. One bureaucratic body namely, The Panel of the Wise has also faced criticism for its poor performance or reluctance to monitor ongoing and upcoming conflicts within the continent. The Panel lacks the initiative to deliver its mandate of outlining strategies to solve ongoing conflicts namely the DRC.

The Peace and Security Council African Standby Force has been impeded in its delivery of its mandate due to prolonged legislation processes that on its commissioning in 2013 it didn't resume any mitigations of conflict in the African continent. To begin the work of ASF, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was instituted for members states voluntary contribution to peace keeping efforts.

Sustainability of security and achieving lasting peace in the DRC requires a multifaceted approach that extends beyond military operations. It necessitates political and socioeconomic reforms, which the EAC Regional Force and other organizations cannot implement alone.

Despite its notable achievements, the Nairobi Process faced several challenges namely political tensions and mistrust persist in the DRC, and there is a need for continued efforts to implement the agreed-upon political reforms. The process promotion of Security sector reform remains a complex and ongoing endeavor. Additionally, the equitable distribution of the DRC's vast mineral wealth remains a contentious issue.

The Luanda Process AU intervention has made significant strides in promoting stability in the DRC, numerous challenges remain. The country's political landscape remains polarized, and there is a need for continued efforts to build trust among political actors. Security sector reform is an ongoing process, and it must be pursued diligently to prevent a resurgence of violence.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

The AU Peace and Security Council has invented and laid firm the structures under which it pools efforts to solve conflicts in the African Continent. This, however has had achievements and some instances proven futile. The futility of strategies has led to AUPSC convening conferences and agreements each after another to fix loopholes left. But one key factor cuts short the strides made the AUPSC and that the lack of good will from the Congolese stakeholders who inadvertently change systems to suit their political ambitions or even finance rebels to avert peace building mechanisms. The road to enduring and lasting peace in African conflict ridden countries like the DRC is long and challenging, and continued international support, political will, and engagement from all Congolese stakeholders are essential for the success of this important initiative.

## **CHAPTER 3: LESSONS FROM THE AU’S EXPERIENCE IN THE CONGO CRISIS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO FUTURE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN AFRICA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This section essentially connects the two previous chapters examined before on and seeks to answers the hypotheses of this project. The theoretical literature review and framework will be the of analytical tool that creates the basis and importance of the hypothesis with an effort to answer these project objectives while presenting and outlining the findings from accounts in the past sections, the review has been prepared to consolidate organized assessment of various events and notwithstanding modify reality by concluding the parts of various records that are striking and meriting thought.

The DRC has experienced numerous conflicts over the years, and there are several important lessons that the AU can learn from these conflicts. The DRC's conflicts have been complex and multifaceted, involving internal strife, regional involvement, and resource-driven dynamics. Some valuable lessons for the AU in the DRC conflict majorly lie along conflict resolution, regional cooperation, resource management, humanitarian assistance and governance, all that are important in addressing both the symptoms and reasons of conflicts.

The DRC has experienced a substantial number of conflicts between 2016 and 2022. These conflicts have been complex and multifaceted, with a variety of factors contributing to their outbreak and continuation.

**The 2016/2017 Kasai conflict also known as the Kamwina Nsapu rebellion.** This conflict was sparked by the killing of a local chieftain by government forces. The conflict quickly escalated, with widespread violence and displacement. 2016 Kasai conflict was a violent conflict that took place in the Kasai region DRC between August 2016 and August 2017. The conflict was initially sparked by Kamuina Nsapu traditional chiefdom and the DRC government. Nsapu's followers, known as the Kamwina Nsapu militia, launched an armed rebellion against the government. The government responded with a brutal crackdown, which led to widespread violence and displacement. Government forces committed abuse of human rights such as political extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape. The government also imposed a blockade on the Kasai region, which

made it difficult for humanitarian aid to reach the people who needed it most. The rebellion was sparked by the killing of Kamwina Nsapu by government forces in August 2016. Nsapu was a popular figure in the Kasai region, and his killing sparked outrage among his followers. The Kamwina Nsapu militia quickly grew in size and strength, and it began to attack government forces and symbols of state authority.

However, it quickly escalated into a wider conflict involving security forces, militias and armed groups. The conflict was mainly characterized and depicted by violence and abuse of human rights, including killings, rapes, and torture. Over 3,000 people were killed and over 1.4 million people were displaced from their homes. The conflict has also had a significant impact on children. Thousands of children have been killed, maimed, or recruited by armed groups. Many children have also been separated from their families and have lost access to education and other basic services. The conflict ended in August 2017 with the death of Kamwina Nsapu. However, the region remains unstable and there is a risk of renewed conflict.

The origin of the 2016 Kasai conflict is complex which include disputes over land and resources where the Kasai region is endowed in natural resources, such as diamonds and gold. However, the distribution of these resources is uneven, and this has led to disputes between different groups. Political marginalization of the Kasai region which has long felt marginalized by the DRC government. This feeling of marginalization has been exacerbated by the government's failure to address the region's economic and social problems. A number of external actors, including Rwanda and Angola, as parties in the Kasai conflict and this involvement exacerbated the conflict and made it more difficult to resolve. The international community response namely the African Union was criticized as being inadequate in responding to the 2016 Kasai conflict. Some critics have argued that the international community has failed to do enough to protect the maximum number civilians and to address causes of the conflict.

**The 2018 Beni massacres:** These massacres were done by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group known to operate in eastern DRC. The ADF has killed thousands of civilians in the Beni region since 2014. The 2018 Beni massacres were a series of attacks conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group operating in eastern DRC. The attacks took place in the Beni region of North Kivu province between October and December 2018, and caused deaths of



over 1,000 civilians. The ADF is a Ugandan rebel group that has been operating in the DRC since the 1990s. The group is known for its brutal tactics, and it has been accused of carrying out numerous massacres of civilians. The 2018 Beni massacres were some of the deadliest and unfortunate attacks ever carried out by the ADF. The attackers used machetes and guns to kill their victims, and they often targeted women and children. The attacks caused widespread terror and displacement in the Beni region. The DRC government has been unable to stop the ADF's attacks in Beni. The government has deployed troops to the region, but the ADF has been able to continue its attacks with impunity.

**The 2019 Ituri conflict:** This conflict is between two ethnic groups, the Lendu and the Hema. The conflict resulted in unfortunate deaths of thousands of ethnic people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. The 2019 Ituri conflict is still continuing conflict with agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups within the Ituri region of the north-eastern DRC where the groups have fought since 1972. The conflict was influenced by the Second Congo War, which caused increased sale and use of illegal and small arms, ethnic differences and the proliferation of various armed groups. Armed conflict in this region still continues today.

The conflict began in December 2017 with a series of attacks on villages in the Djugu territory of Ituri. The attacks were blamed on Lendu militias, and they led to a cycle of violence of the Lendu and Hema. The conflict has since escalated, with both sides carrying out massacres and displacing hundreds of thousands of people. They continued in June 2019, when suspected Lendu militiamen attacked villages inhabited by the Hema ethnic group. The attacks were in response to the killing of four Lendu traders who were travelling within a Hema occupied area. The attacks on Hema villages led to a cycle of violence and revenge by two groups. The conflict has had an unfortunate and devastating effect and impact on Ituri region. Millions of people being periodically and fully displaced from their ancestral homes, and thousands have been killed. The conflict has also disrupted economic activity and made it difficult for people to access essential services.

**The 2020 Kivu conflict:** This conflict is between the armed forces of the DRC and a number of rebel armed groups in eastern DRC. The conflict has resulted people dying and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. The 2020 Kivu conflict is an ongoing conflict of armed forces DRC and rebel groups operating in eastern DRC. The conflict is a long history of instability and

violence in the region, and it has been exacerbated by competition for natural country's resources and for acquiring political influence and power. The conflict began in January 2020 with several attacks on government forces by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Ugandan rebel group. The ADF has been operating in eastern DRC since the 1990s, and it is known for its brutality and its use of machetes and axes in its attacks. In addition to the ADF, and several other armed groups also operate in eastern DRC. These groups include the March 23 Movement (M23), the National Forces of Liberation (NFL), and the Nyatura militia. These groups have different objectives and agendas, but they all threaten the region stability.

The 2020 Kivu conflict negatively impacted the people of eastern DRC where millions of people have been sent away and displaced from their homes, and thousands have been killed. The conflict has also disrupted economic activity and made it difficult for people to access essential services.

**The 2021 Masisi conflict:** This conflict is between two ethnic groups, the Hunde and the Nande. The conflict has resulted in the death of people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. The 2021 Masisi conflict was an armed conflict amongst DRC armed forces and a number of rebel groups operating in the Masisi territory of North Kivu province. The conflict began in early 2021, and it is still ongoing. The conflict is a long and tedious history of violence and instability in the Masisi territory. The territory is rich in natural resources, such as gold, coltan, and cobalt, and these resources have been a source of conflict for many years. The territory is also home to many ethnic groups, and there have been tensions among groups for many years.

The 2021 Masisi conflict was sparked by several factors, including: The withdrawal of MONUSCO peacekeeping forces: In December 2020, the United Nations Security Council voted to withdraw the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission from the DRC. The mission had been in place since 1999, and it had played a critical and substantial role of both maintaining stability and peace in DRC. The withdrawal of MONUSCO left a security vacuum in the Masisi territory, and this vacuum was exploited by rebel groups. Recently, there has been a rise in the number of rebel groups that operate in the Masisi territory. These groups include the Nyatura Defense League (NDL), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). These groups are competing for control of the territory's natural resources, and they are also using violence to achieve their political goals. A number of foreign actors have been unfortunately involved in the Masisi conflict, either directly or indirectly. These actors include

Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. These actors are supporting different rebel groups in the conflict, and they are also vying for control of the territory's natural resources. The 2021 Masisi conflict has had a bad impact on the people of the Masisi territory with thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands significantly displaced from their homes. The conflict has also disrupted economic activity and made it difficult for people to access essential services.

**The 2022 Tanganyika conflict:** This conflict is between two ethnic groups, the Twa and the Bantu. The conflict has regrettably resulted and culminated in the death of people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. The 2022 Tanganyika conflict is a continued conflict between two ethnic groups, the Twa and the Bantu, in the Tanganyika province of the DRC. The conflict is a long history of tensions amongst the two groups over land and resources. The conflict began in January 2022 with a series of attacks on villages in the Tanganyika province. The attacks were blamed on Twa militias, and they led to a cycle of violence of Twa and Bantu. The conflict has since escalated, with both sides carrying out massacres and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

The 2022 Tanganyika conflict is a complex conflict with a number of contributing factors. Some of the key factors include: The Second Congo War of 1998 to 2003 was one of the worst conflicts in modern history. The war left a legacy of violence and instability in the DRC, including in Tanganyika. The DRC's institutions are weak and ineffective. This makes it difficult for the government to tackle the original causes of conflict and to resolve disputes peacefully. The DRC is a poor country with a high level of economic inequality. This inequality can lead to frustration and resentment, which can be exploited by those who seek to sow discord and division. The Tanganyika province is rich in natural resources, such as gold and coltan. These resources can be a source of conflict, as different groups compete for their control.

These conflicts have had a devastating and horrifying impact on the DRC and millions of ethnic people being regrettably displaced from their ancestral homes, and thousands have been killed. The conflicts have also disrupted economic activity and made it difficult for people to access essential services. The causes of these conflicts are complex and multifaceted. However, some of the key factors include: The legacy of the Second Congo War was one of the shocking conflicts in modern history. The war left a legacy of violence and instability in the DRC. The DRC's

institutions are weak and ineffective. This makes it difficult and tasking for the government to have strategies to deal and handle the causes of conflict and to resolve disputes peacefully. The DRC is a poor country with a high level of economic inequality. This inequality can lead to frustration and resentment, which can be exploited by those who seek to sow discord and division. The DRC is rich in natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, and cobalt. These resources can be a source of conflict as different groups compete for their control. A number of foreign government and individual actors have interfered and are involved in the DRC's conflicts, either directly or indirectly. This involvement has often exacerbated the conflicts and made them more difficult to resolve.

The international community namely the AUPSC in this context has tried to play a role in trying to resolve the DRC's conflicts and to provide peace and stability in the country. However, its efforts have had limited success. The main challenges is that the international community is often divided on how to address the situation in the DRC. The DRC's conflicts are a complex and challenging issue. There is no easy solution.

### **3.2 Identifying and Analyzing Key Lessons from the AU's Experience in the DRC**

#### **Better working relationship with sub-regional organization**

The African Union and regional alliances should develop and need a transparent mechanism for exchanging information and conveying their respective intervention plans in specific regions. This will enhance the operational efficiency of these organizations. Regional Cooperation in the DRC conflict involved neighboring countries, with various regional actors supporting different armed groups. The AU should promote regional cooperation and coordination to address cross-border conflicts and prevent external interference. It must, as of necessity establish an improved operational framework for collaborating with said regional economic communities, which frequently play a leading role in crisis mitigation before the AU steps in.<sup>40</sup>

#### **Security Sector Reform**

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<sup>40</sup> International Crisis Group. (2023). *Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2023*. International Crisis Group. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47400>

The AUPSC through its organ the African Stand By Force ASF, frequently engage the DRC security forces and through these interactions realized how the forces have been plagued by corruption, human rights abuses, and a lack of accountability. This was a key setback for the ASF to sufficiently deliver on their mandate to provide peace and stability to the DRC people. Therefore, the AU should emphasize the importance of security sector reform to establish professional and accountable armed forces and by these sufficiently engage these countries to help reform their security forces.

### **Political Inclusivity**

The DRC's conflicts have often been linked to political exclusion and contestation by political leaders. The AU as a neutral party should promote inclusive governance and support democratic processes to address the political causes of conflict. The AU in an effort to promote a more inclusive and stable political environment in the DRC it should engage in conflict resolution among political elites, participate in election observation, engage opposing leaders in capacity building, conflict prevention, human rights advocacy, support for national dialogues, and economic development. These efforts contribute to the broader goal of establishing a more inclusive and stable political environment in the DRC.

### **Promote Mediation and Conflict Resolution**

The DRC conflict highlighted the need for effective mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms within the AU. The AU should develop and strengthen its capacity to mediate conflicts and engage in peacemaking efforts. The AU played and exercised a vital role in mediating and ways of resolving conflicts in the DRC. It has been involved in numerous peace initiatives, including facilitating peace talks and ceasefire agreements between various armed groups and the DRC government. By promoting dialogue and negotiation, the AU helps bring different political and social actors to the table.

### **Sustainable Natural Resource Management Mechanisms**

The exploitation of the DRC's rich natural resources, particularly minerals, played a significant role in fueling conflict. The AU recognizes that for national and regional stability management of these resources is essential to ensure long-term economic development, environmental conservation, and peace. It should come up with strategies to advocate for transparent, accountable,

and equitable natural resource governance in the DRC. It has a role to encourage the government to establish effective regulatory mechanisms and laws that promote the sustainable management of resources such as minerals, timber, and water. The AU should prioritize sustainable resource management and transparent revenue-sharing mechanisms to prevent resource-driven conflicts in other African countries.

### **Promote and invest in Humanitarian Assistance**

The DRC conflict has led to widespread displacement and humanitarian and health crises and as reported by International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in December 2022 about 6.1 million people were displaced in DRC. The AU should be prepared to provide effective humanitarian assistance to affected populations and ensure their safety and well-being. AU member states African troops are within and working in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) whose aim in the DRC is to stabilize conflict areas, protect civilians, and create conditions for humanitarian access for delivery of aid to those in need.

The AU and its peacekeeping missions prioritize the protection of civilians from violence, abuse, and displacement. This includes the establishment of safe zones and the prevention of gender-based violence. The AU provides assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, including food, shelter, healthcare, and psychosocial support. It also works on durable solutions for displacement, including safe returns and reintegration. Another key to the AU has been involved in responding to health crises in the DRC, such as outbreaks of diseases like Ebola where it supports healthcare infrastructure, prevention, and containment efforts. The AU supports food security and nutrition programs to address the chronic issue of malnutrition in the DRC. This includes providing food aid, agricultural support, and nutrition education. Where it ensures access and availability of clean water and sanitation facilities is a critical humanitarian need in the DRC. The AU assists in providing clean water sources and sanitation infrastructure to affected populations. The AU promotes access to education for children affected by conflict and displacement. It also works to protect children from recruitment into armed groups and other forms of exploitation.

### **Strengthening Local Institutions**

In DRC conflict civil society groups including churches have been at the forefront to conflict resolution and promote peace efforts. The strengthening of local institutions is crucial for enhancing the capacity of local governments, civil society, and communities to provide essential services, promote development, and maintain stability. The AU supports local government institutions and civil society organizations to enhance their capacity in responding to humanitarian needs. The AU through the AUPSC in DRC has worked in coordination with the national government to ensure a harmonious approach to strengthening local institutions. The AU assists local institutions in improving public service delivery, including education, healthcare, sanitation, and infrastructure development. This support enhances the ability and strength of local governments to meet the basic needs of their constituents. The AU assists local institutions in strengthening their governance structures and promoting the rules and regulations of the law. The AU recognizes the need to support the development of effective legal and judicial systems at the local level, which are essential for maintaining stability and ensuring the protection of citizens' rights.

### **Coordination with International Partners**

The AU collaborates with international organizations, NGOs, and donor agencies to ensure a coordinated and effective humanitarian response in the DRC. The coordination between the AU and international partners in DRC is essential for addressing the country's multifaceted challenges and ensuring that efforts are harmonized, resources are effectively utilized, and the needs of the Congolese population are met. It reflects a collective commitment to peace, stability, and development of projects regionally. The AU was and still collaborates with international partners, including the United Nations (UN), to support peacekeeping of various missions in the DRC. The most prominent example is the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The AU and international partners work together to ensure the safety and region stability, especially in conflict-affected areas like the Eastern DRC.

### **Promote Advocacy and Awareness**

The AU is charged to often represents the collective voice of African nations in international forums and diplomatic efforts related to the DRC. This advocacy helps raise awareness of the DRC's challenges and secure international support for its peace and development. The AU

advocates for the rights of affected populations and raises awareness about the humanitarian situation in the DRC on the international stage. The AU and the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC have collaborated reports since 2016 through to 2022 condemning the conflicts being propagated by armed groups namely the March 23 Movement M23 in Eastern DRC, Allied Democratic Forces ADF in DRC and Uganda, Cooperative for the Development of the Congo URDPC/CODECO in Eastern DRC, joint Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda/Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi FDLR/FOCA and Popular Self-defense Movement of Ituri also Zaïre/MAPI. These armed groups had signed an MOU in 2016 and agreed on a ceasefire an MOU facilitated with two partners, the Government and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Over the years MONUSCO has used the ceasefire and allowed for the resumption of collaboration between MONUSCO and FARDC. These foreign armed groups from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have revoked the MOU and continued to operate in Eastern DRC and seriously affected illegal operations carried out by FARDC and Mai Mai groups in 2015. The international community continue to raise awareness and condemn the interference by these armed groups from various countries,

### **Strengthening Peacekeeping**

The AU's peacekeeping mission in the DRC, known as MONUSCO, is one of the largest and the most complex in operation in the world. The AU should evaluate the effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions and continually work on improving their performance and coordination. The AU's involvement in peacekeeping efforts in the DRC is part of its commitment to maintaining regional stability and promoting peace in Africa. By contributing troops, diplomatic efforts, and capacity-building support, the AU strengthens the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and plays a substantially crucial responsibility and role in addressing the complex security challenges in the DRC. The AU should enhance contribution to military and police personnel to peacekeeping operations in the DRC. These peacekeepers help maintain security, protect civilians, and support the implementation of peace agreements.

### **Early Warning and Prevention**

The AU's commitment to early warning and prevention in the DRC is instrumental in addressing potential conflicts and crises before they escalate. This proactive approach is essential for maintaining peace and stability in the region and reducing the human and economic costs



associated with conflicts. An early warning on possible attacks by armed groups namely M23, ADF, URDPC/CODECO, FDLR/FOCA, and Zaïre/MAPI. The AU should invest in early warning systems to detect and address potential conflicts before they escalate. Timely intervention can help prevent the outbreak of violence. Additionally, the AU should conduct risk assessments to evaluate the severity and potential impact of emerging issues. It assesses the likelihood of conflicts erupting, the actors involved, and the potential consequences for the region. The AU PSC early warning system has failed in this aspect and collaboration to revive the system is essential in detecting possible conflicts. The AU therefore should closely monitor the political, social, and security situations in the DRC through various mechanisms, including intelligence gathering, research, and analysis. It should keep a watchful eye on potential triggers for conflict, such as ethnic tensions, political disputes, and resource disputes.

### **AU PSC Consistent Engagement**

The DRC conflict has been ongoing for many years, and consistent engagement and support from the AU are essential. The AU should remain committed to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the region over the long term. The AU's consistent engagement in the DRC is essential for addressing the complex and evolving challenges in the country. It reflects the AU's long-term commitment to peace, security, and development of a region and its dedication to handle the origin and causes of conflicts and crises. The AU with this to provide long term conflict prevention should provide ongoing capacity-building support to the DRC's institutions, security forces, and civil society organizations. This long-term engagement helps strengthen governance structures and promote sustainable development.

### **Efforts in Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

After periods of conflict, the DRC faced significant challenges in both reconstruction and development. The AU plays a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC to help the country recover and rebuild after protracted conflicts. Post-conflict activities and reconstruction aims to restore stability, promote development, and address the root causes of conflict. In post-conflict settings, the AU should continue to provide humanitarian assistance to populations affected by past conflicts. This assistance includes food, shelter, healthcare, and psychosocial support. The AU supports reintegration of former military and militia members into civilian life. This includes providing education, vocational training and psychosocial support to

help former fighters become productive members of society. The AU assists in rebuilding communities affected by conflict. This includes repairing infrastructure, providing housing, and restoring essential services like healthcare and education. The AU additionally, should encourage political reconciliation and inclusivity, aiming to bring various political actors together to work for a common future. This can involve supporting national dialogue processes. The AU should prioritize post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts to help stabilize conflict-affected regions.

### **3.3 Application of These Lessons to Future Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Efforts in Africa**

The African Union's (AU) role in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, early warning and prevention, strengthening local institutions, and post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC can be applied to future conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts across Africa. The application of these lessons should be guided on several principles that will guide AUs application to resolve conflict ridden zones. Among the principles to guide the application include Early Intervention and Prevention, Coordination and Information Sharing, Conflict Analysis, Comprehensive Approach, Conflict Resolution Mechanisms, Inclusivity and Political Reconciliation, Continued Engagement, Collaboration and Multilateralism, Fostering economic opportunities and development and Humanitarian Assistance and Protection of Civilians.

#### **Early Intervention and Prevention**

Proactive early intervention and prevention are essential in addressing the causes of conflicts, monitoring emerging threats before they escalate, and engaging in early diplomatic efforts can help prevent conflicts from escalating. The AU's commitment to detect potential conflicts will help avert conflicts as close monitoring will provide timely intervention. Additionally, intelligence agencies across the African countries should come together and engage in intelligence sharing of possible conflicts that may erupt in any country in the continent. The AUPSC has the Conflict Management Task Force CMTF has the mandate to initiate mission plans for the potential deployment of a peace mission. This information when analyzed by the Continental Early Warning Signs CEWS will provide sufficient information to address any impending conflict.

## **Conflict Analysis**

A thorough and knowledgeable understanding and being introspective of the local situation and context of conflict signs and dynamics is essential. Conflict analysis is an organized investigation of the origins and probable course of a dispute. It aims to spot possibilities for handling or resolving conflicts without resorting to force. Conflict analysis helps tailor peacebuilding strategies to the specific needs and challenges of each situation. The AU should sufficiently explore and invest in organs in the AUPSC to facilitate analysis of certain conflicts to provide a framework and plan of execution.

## **Regional Coordination and Information Sharing**

The AU should promote regional cooperation and coordination as effective coordination and information sharing among various actors, including peacekeepers, humanitarian organizations, and local governments, are vital for a unified response. Collaborating with regional organizations will help to address cross-border conflicts and prevent external interference. Regional organizations should share information gathered, share implementation strategies to avoid overlap on functions in the conflict ridden areas.

## **Inclusivity and Political Reconciliation**

Political inclusivity and reconciliation among conflicting parties are essential for lasting peace. Efforts to bring all stakeholders to the negotiation table can promote stability. The AU should guide leaders to promote a stable political environment in any conflict ridden country. The AU is supporting the implementation of the DRC's Constitution through its constitutional support program. This program is providing technical assistance to the DRC government in implementing the Constitution and in reforming its constitutional institutions. The AU is promoting dialogue and consensus building among the DRC's political stakeholders through its mediation efforts. The AU has had a vital role in mediating political disputes in the DRC, such as the dispute over the 2018 presidential election.

## **Continued Engagement**

Continued engagement after Consistent and long-term engagement is essential. Addressing the the causes of conflict and achieving sustainable peace often requires patience and persistence. Support

and advance the implementation of the DRC's National Strategic Development Plan. The National Strategic Development Plan is the DRC's roadmap for development. The AU can support the implementation of this plan by providing financial and technical assistance. Promote regional integration as DRC membership of several regional economic communities, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The AU can promote regional integration by supporting the implementation of trade agreements and by facilitating across-border investment and trade.

### **Collaboration and Multilateralism**

The AU has been involved in numerous peace initiatives, including facilitating peace talks and ceasefire agreements. Collaboration with international partners, regional organizations, and relevant stakeholders is crucial as multilateral efforts can bring together diverse resources, expertise, and diplomatic influence to address complex conflicts effectively.

### **Fostering economic opportunities Development**

Support the development of infrastructure. The DRC has a vast territory, but its infrastructure is underdeveloped. This makes it difficult to transport goods and services, and it hinders economic development. The AU can support the DRC in developing its infrastructure by providing financial and technical assistance. Continue fostering initiatives like the AU's Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) which is supporting the development of infrastructure projects in the DRC, such as the Inga hydropower dam and the Kinshasa-Brazzaville bridge.

### **Humanitarian Assistance and Protection of Civilians.**

The AU and its peacekeeping missions prioritize the civilian protection from violence, abuse, and displacement. This includes the assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to provide and uphold their human rights. The AU's humanitarian assistance efforts are coordinated by the African Union Humanitarian Agency (AU-HA). The AU-HA works with several partners, including UN agencies, international NGOs, and local organizations, to provide humanitarian assistance to people affected by conflict, displacement, and natural disasters in the DRC.

### **3.4 Recommendations for Improving AU's Future Interventions**

Improving the AU's interventions will require a sustained commitment to building capacity, learning from experiences, and maintaining strong partnerships with international, regional, and local actors. It is essential for the AU to continually evolve and adapt its strategies to effectively respond to changing dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding in Africa.

The AU has made considerable and significant actionable progress in recent years in improving its peace interventions, but there is still room for improvement. Here are some recommendations for how the AU can further strengthen its peace interventions in the future:

**Improve coordination and cooperation.** The AU needs to improve coordination and cooperation with its member states who are in RECs, and other international partners. This is essential for ensuring that AU peace interventions are effective and sustainable. Strengthen partnerships with regional organizations and economic communities to promote joint efforts and resource sharing in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Encourage and support the active participation of civil society organizations in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.

**Develop a culture of prevention within the AU,** with an emphasis on mediation and diplomacy as early responses to potential conflicts. Promote preventative diplomacy by engaging in early, quiet diplomacy to address conflicts before they escalate.

**Invest in prevention and early warning.** The AU should invest more in prevention and early warning mechanisms. This will help to identify and address potential conflicts before they escalate into violence. Strengthen early warning mechanisms to identify and respond to emerging conflicts and crises more proactively.

**Ensure adequate and predictable funding for the AU's peace and security activities.** Reliance on external funding can be problematic, so efforts to secure more sustainable funding should be prioritized.

**Strengthen the African Standby Force (ASF).** The ASF is the AU's rapid deployment force. It purposefully needs to be strengthened in terms of its capabilities, capacity, and funding. This will enable the AU to respond more effectively to emerging crises.

Ensure adequate provision and funding to most peace operations. The AU needs to ensure that its peace operations are adequately funded. This will help to ensure that they have the resources they need to be successful.

Increase the participation of women and youth in peace interventions. Women and youth are disproportionately affected by conflict, and they can play a vital role in peacebuilding. The AU should increase their participation in peace interventions at all levels. Promote gender mainstreaming in all peace and security activities. This includes ensuring the meaningful women participation in conflict resolution processes.

Prioritize capacity building for AU personnel and member state institutions involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Develop a skilled and knowledgeable workforce capable of deploying to conflict areas. Develop and maintain a pool of skilled mediators, negotiators, and diplomats who can facilitate dialogue and reconciliation processes effectively. Invest in community-based peacebuilding efforts that empower local actors to resolve conflicts and maintain peace.

Continually review and reform AU structures and mechanisms to adapt to evolving conflict dynamics and operational needs. Conduct regular evaluations of intervention efforts to learn from both successes and failures. Apply lessons learned to improve future interventions and strategies.

Invest in comprehensive conflict analysis and research to better understand the causes and dynamics of conflicts. Use data-driven approaches to inform policies and strategies. Advocate for accountability for abuse of human rights and international law violations and holding those responsible for crimes face justice.

Facilitate dialogue amongst various stakeholders including governments and contributing civil society stakeholders. Improve coordination with humanitarian agencies and organizations to ensure a more efficient and effective humanitarian response to crises and emergencies.

Enhance communication and information-sharing mechanisms within the AU and with external partners to ensure a coordinated and coherent approach. Develop and support conflict-prevention initiatives at the community and regional levels, including addressing issues such as resource disputes and ethnic tensions.

Provide support for electoral processes, ensuring they are free, fair, and credible, and that they contribute to long-term political stability. Encourage local ownership and leadership in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Local actors should have a say in designing and implementing interventions.

Develop more comprehensive and integrated peacebuilding strategies. AU peace interventions should not just focus on military peacekeeping and security. They should also address the causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and governance challenges.

Strengthen the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The AU should ensure that its peacekeeping interventions are linked to peacebuilding efforts. This will help to create a sustainable peace after the conflict has ended.

Prioritize capacity building and training. The AU should invest in capacity building and training for its personnel involved in peace interventions. This will help to ensure that they have the skills and knowledge they need to be effective.

Improve the monitoring and evaluation of peace interventions. The AU should improve its monitoring and evaluation of peace interventions. This will help to identify lessons learned and improve future interventions.

By implementing these recommendations, the AU can further strengthen its peace interventions and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous Africa. Take a more holistic approach to peace interventions. This means addressing all the causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and governance challenges, in addition to providing security.

Build partnerships with local communities. The AU should work closely with communities to design, structure and implement peace interventions that are tailored to their specific needs.

Invest in sustainable peacebuilding. The AU should not just focus on the immediate needs of peace interventions, but also invest in long-term peacebuilding efforts, such as education, job creation, and social reconciliation.

Promote gender equality and youth empowerment. Women and youth are disproportionately affected by conflict, and they can play a vital role in peacebuilding. The AU should promote gender equality and youth empowerment in all aspects of its peace interventions.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

The AU has created a distinctively African method for resolving issues across the continent, but it has also put the method to the test to make sure it can someday be implemented. No strategy or plan is known to survive the first contact with the enemy, but what matters is that the AU has a plan and it will only get better with time. By implementing these recommendations, the AU can make its peace interventions more effective and sustainable, and contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous Africa. These lessons can inform the AU's strategies in addressing conflicts and promoting peace and stability across the continent. The importance of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding that is long term. The AU has learned that peacebuilding in the DRC is not just about military peacekeeping and security. It is also about addressing the causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and governance challenges. The AU needs to take a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding in the DRC, involving various identified stakeholders, including the civil societies and the international community. There is also need for strong partnerships as the AU cannot solve the Congo crisis alone. It needs to work closely with its member states, RECs, and other international partners. The AU should also strengthen its partnerships with local communities, as they are essential to the success of any peacebuilding effort.



## **CHAPTER 4: BEST PRACTICES FROM OTHER NOTABLE REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The European Union (EU) has a long history of involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding around the world. It has seen successes and failures in its accomplishments in peacebuilding interventions. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one successful case that the EU contributed to peace restoration and dialogue in this nation. This section will seek to analyze the EU approach to conflict resolution in BiH and what the African Union can draw and apply in the African Context.

### **4.2 Understanding the EU's Approach to Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding**

The EU's approach to resolution of conflict and peacebuilding is based on significantly outlined key principles, including: Comprehensive approach where the EU takes a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution activities and peacebuilding including causes of conflict, such as inequality, poverty and governance challenges. The EU holds the principle of Strong partnerships work with its member states, regional organizations, and other international partners to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and committed to long-term engagement. Finally, the EU takes a human rights-based approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, ensuring the rights of all people are observed and protected.

#### **EU Comprehensive Approach Principle**

The EU Comprehensive Approach principle is a complex and ambitious approach to foreign policy. The EU Comprehensive Approach Principle is a foreign policy framework that aims to coordinate and integrate all of the organs external policy instruments in order to achieve its objectives more effectively. The approach is based on the belief that the EU's external challenges are complex and interconnected, and that no single instrument or policy area is sufficient to address them effectively. The Comprehensive Approach Principle was first articulated in the 2013 European Council Conclusions on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to addressing External Conflict and Crises. It has since been applied to a wide range of EU external policy issues, including development, security, trade, and climate change.

The EU takes a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution activities and adopting peacebuilding approaches into addressing the causes of conflict and instability, as well as the short, additional medium, and further long-term needs of conflict-affected countries. This means that the EU uses a wide range of instruments, including political dialogue, development aid, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance.

The Comprehensive Approach is based on three pillars which include stronger policy coherence, focus on prevention and multilateralism. The approach on policy coherence it asserts that any EU's external action should be coherent and aligned with the EU's overall strategic interests and objectives and all policies should be used in a coordinated and complement each other. On prevention pillar the EU should focus on preventing conflicts and crises rather than reacting to them after they have occurred. This means dealing with causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and weak governance. The final pillar includes a commitment to multilateralism EU should work with its partners, including the UN, regional organizations, and civil society, to take responsibility and address common challenges and build a more peaceful and prosperous world.

Using this approach, the EU ability to apply it in a number of different EU external policy priorities, including: In conflict prevention and crisis management the organization has used has used the Comprehensive Approach to guide its response to conflicts and crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and some parts of the African Sahel. The EU has used the Comprehensive Approach to develop its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to promote mechanisms of security and defense and to address global security and policy challenges, such as terrorism and organized crime.

The EU Bosnia and Herzegovina used the principle by unearthing the root causes of the BiH conflict whose main drivers were the ethnic and religious tensions which contributed to the outbreak of the Bosnian War. After the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s it created a power vacuum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This power vacuum was exploited by nationalist leaders, who sought to create ethnically homogenous states. EU used the cause of the conflict which was spread by nationalist leaders to engage the leadership of BiH dialogue and observe that there exist the dangers of nationalism and the importance of tolerance and respect for diversity.

## **EU Principle of Strong Partnerships**

The EU Principle of Strong Partnerships is a key part of the EU's foreign policy. It allows the EU to leverage its resources and influence to address global challenges and to promote its values and interests. The EU Principle of Strong Partnerships is applied with among issues, including trade, development, security, and climate change. The EU has partnerships with countries all over the world, as well as with regional and international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the African Union.

One such example includes the EU partnership itself and another includes the EU-Africa Partnership is based on a joint commitment to sustainable good governance, development and security. The EU provides development assistance to support and develop African countries in achieving their development goals, and also works with African countries to address security challenges such as terrorism and organized crime. These Partnerships have allowed for EU itself to organize more than 20 nations to take part in peacebuilding the BiH.

The EU Principle of Strong Partnerships is based on the following four pillars including first is Equality and mutual respect in this means that the EU should treat its partners with dignity and respect, regardless of their size or power. Secondly partnerships should have Shared interests the EU should work with its partners on issues that are important to both parties. Thirdly is Differentiation where the EU should differentiate its partnerships according to the specific needs and interests of each partner. This means that the EU should tailor its partnerships to the unique circumstances of each country or region. And the fourth is Conditionality to value commitment where the EU should use the Principle of Strong Partnerships to promote human rights, and continued sustainable development. This means that EU should provide support and commitment to its partners only if they are committed to these values.

## **EU Principle of Long-term Engagement in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding**

The EU Principle of Long-term Engagement in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding is a commitment to supporting countries and societies in conflict and post-conflict situations over the long term. It is based on the recognition that conflict resolution and peacebuilding are complex and challenging processes, and that there is no quick fix. The EU Principle of Long-term Engagement is applied to all aspects of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, from prevention and

early warning to mediation and post-conflict reconstruction. The EU provides financial assistance, technical expertise, and political support to its partners in conflict-affected countries.

The EU's long-term engagement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is based on the following pillars including Prevention and Early Engagement in a Conflict where EU is committed to preventing conflict from breaking out in the first place. This includes deeply seeing causes of conflict, such as inequality, poverty and discrimination. Additionally, the EU strives to engage early in conflict resolution and peacebuilding even before a conflict escalates. This allows the EU to have a greater impact and to prevent the conflict from becoming more protracted and costly. The EU works in partnership with other countries and international organizations to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding where it recognizes that no single actor can achieve sustainable peace alone.

The EU believes that local ownership is essential for sustainable peacebuilding where it works with local partners to develop and implement conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. The EU is flexible and adaptable in its approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The EU tailors its support to the specific and priority needs and circumstances of each conflict-affected country. Finally, the EU coordinates its efforts with other international actors, such as the United Nations and the African Union, to ensure that conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts are coherent and effective.

The EU's long-term engagement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has had a number of successes. For example, in the Sahel region, the EU is supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts through a comprehensive approach that includes development assistance, security assistance, and political support. The EU is working with partners in the Sahel region to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, unemployment, and climate change. The EU has also supported peacebuilding efforts in other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU has continuously been engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the Balkans for over 20 years. The EU has supported the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, and has also provided development assistance to help these countries rebuild after conflict. However, the EU's long-term engagement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has also faced some challenges. For example, the EU's efforts in Syria have been hampered by the ongoing conflict and by the lack of political will on the part of the warring parties.

## **EU Principle of Human Rights-based Approach to Conflict Resolution**

The EU Principle of Human Rights-based Approach to Conflict Resolution (HRBA) is a major and key part of the EU's foreign policy. EU Principle of HRBA is a commitment to putting peoples' rights at the center of conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. It is based on the recognition and realization that human rights abuse and violations are often the cause of conflict, and that sustainability peace is difficult to be achieved without respect for human rights. It allows the EU to make a meaningful contribution to conflict resolution efforts around the world, and to help build sustainable peace and security. The EU works to promote respect all rights and to protect the rights of all people such as the vulnerable groups of women, children, and minorities, in conflict-affected countries.

EU Principle of HRBA is based on the following four pillars including universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights, participation and inclusion, accountability and rule of law and non-discrimination and equality. The EU recognizes that all human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent. This means that all rights are equally important and cannot be ranked. It also means that violations of one human right can often lead to violations of other human rights. Secondly, all people, including those affected by conflict, have the right to participate in making impactful decisions that affects their lives as it is essential in building sustainable peace. Thirdly, there must be accountability for violations of human rights and the rule of law must be upheld in conflict-affected countries as this prevents future violence and building a just and lasting peace. Finally, all people have the right to be free and protected from discrimination on any grounds for building a peaceful and inclusive society and are equal before the law.

### **4.3 Best Practices and Successful Interventions by the EU**

EUFOR Althea was a European Union (EU) military peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It was launched in December 2004 as a successor to the NATO-led SFOR mission, and concluded in December 2014. EUFOR Althea played a significant function in maintaining peace and stability in BiH during its ten-year deployment. The mission helped to prevent and stop the outbreak and break of violence, supported the implementation and follow up

of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and assisted in the development and support of BiH's defense capabilities.

EUFOR Althea's main tasks were to, deter threats to peace and stability in BiH, support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, provide a safe and secure environment for reconstruction and development, assist in the development of BiH's defense capabilities. The mission was made up of troops from around 20 EU standing member states, as well as from several non-EU countries. At its peak, EUFOR Althea had over 6,000 troops deployed in BiH. The 20 nations, including Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Republic of North Macedonia, Chile, France, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Switzerland, Portugal Turkey, and the United Kingdom, are present within EUFOR.

A brief history of the BiH conflict, in 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six republics that made up the former Yugoslavia. In this period after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the region underwent a period of bloody conflict that resulted in the deaths of nearly 100,000 people there alone.<sup>41</sup> In 1995, through the intervention and control of the International Community and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, The Dayton Accords were finally signed in Paris ending the war with. The long journey toward bringing wealth and peace back to this war-torn country had already started when EU joined the journey nine years when the war had ended.

The European Union (EU) began the military Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina on December, 2004, nine years after the war's end. This came after NATO made the decision to hand over its own peacekeeping operation, which had been in charge of preserving security in the area ever since the end of the conflict. In order to maintain adherence to the Dayton/Paris Agreement and contribute to the creation of a Safe And Secure Environment (SASE) in BiH, the EU sent out a sizeable military force (EUFOR). **A comprehensive and coordinated EU commitment to BiH is represented by Operation ALTHEA.**

In the years 2004 to 2014 the EU led mission in BiH dealt with ethnic city based conflicts caused through city council decisions. The City Councils across various cities in BiH would make ethnically inclined decisions that would often be rejected by various factions. The Comprehensive

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<sup>41</sup> EUFOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Military Operation ALTHEA [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eufor-althea/eufor-bosnia-herzegovina-military-operation-althea\\_und\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eufor-althea/eufor-bosnia-herzegovina-military-operation-althea_und_en)

Approach had identified three factors that caused conflicts for the 10 tens they took up peace missions this include ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, economic hardship and political instability. BiH is a country with a complex history of ethnic conflict the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 was particularly devastating, and it left deep scars on the country's social fabric. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a poor country, and many people are struggling to make ends meet which led to frustration and resentment, which can be exploited by national leaders. Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a weak central government, and there is often political instability which created a climate of uncertainty and insecurity, which led to violence.

Citing one of EU's involvement in the 2004 Mostar riots in BiH was important in helping to restore calm to the city and to start the process of rebuilding. The riots were triggered by the arrest of a Bosnian Croat teenager for assaulting a Bosnian Muslim woman. The teenager's arrest sparked protests by Bosnian Croats, which quickly turned violent. The EUFOR peacekeeping force was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. EUFOR played a key role in helping to restore calm to Mostar after the riots. EUFOR troops helped to protect civilians and to prevent further violence. The EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina played a key and significant role in mediating between the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim communities after the riots. The EU Special Representative helped to build trust amongst the two communities and to promote dialogue and reconciliation. The EU provided financial assistance to help Bosnia and Herzegovina to rebuild after the riots. The EU assistance was used to repair damaged property and to support businesses that had been affected by the violence.

The EUFOR quickly learnt that the ethnic and religious differences between the Bosniaks Muslims, Bosnian Croats who are Catholics, and Bosnian Serbs who are Orthodox Christians were deeply rooted and had to be handled with sensitivity and caution. The subsequent conflicts from 2008 to 2014 were a reminder of the deep ethnic divisions that still exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The cities of Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Banja Luka often experienced conflicts between ethnic opposing groups. The EU was proactive in providing early intelligence to prevent civilian deaths. The conflicts would often last a few days and would be quelled by the EUFOR supported by the BiH military and police.

The EU employed its comprehensive approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding where it dealt with occurrences and reason of conflict in the BiH cities as ethnically incited coupled with

poverty and inequality. The EUFOR sufficiently provided leaders with tactics including participation in city elections which helped solve governance challenges. The EU held the principle of Strong partnerships works closely with BiH security forces including police and partnered to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. The EUFOR over 20-year long-term engagement in BiH helped promote conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Finally, the EU promotion of dialogue and reconciliation between the warring groups in BiH ensured that the needs and rights of all people were protected.

EUFOR currently in BiH gives the currently ongoing police and monitoring missions, humanitarian programs, and political participation a new dimension. The mission fixates on keeping a SASE inside BiH by coordinating completely with the Military, Policing and Regular and local authority of the country. EUFOR upholds the Military of Bosnia-Herzegovina (AF BiH) with standard consolidated preparing serials and enormous scope yearly activities to accomplish the mission objectives.

In December 2014, EUFOR Althea was succeeded by a smaller EU military mission, EUFOR Althea Follow-On. EUFOR Althea Follow-On remains deployed in BiH today, and its main task is to provide support to the BiH authorities in giving a secure environment. After going through various reorganization processes, EUFOR force levels were lowered to around 600, and the Force is now primarily concentrating on joint and integrated training with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AF BiH).

EUFOR has a Worldwide Brigade which empowers it to answer as expected to help BiH experts in the support of a SASE is quite limited. EUFOR has a little impression with regards to staff, however can rapidly get save powers from Europe countries to enhance its capacities. EUFOR has different resources which empower its work inside BiH, including transport facilities such as helicopters and other security equipment.



#### **4.4 Lessons the AU Can Learn from the EU's Approach and Experience and Application in African Context**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are two countries that have experienced horrifying conflicts in recent history. While the specific circumstances of each conflict were different, there are some striking similarities between the two. Both conflicts have been fueled by ethnic and religious tensions, weak central governments, foreign interference, economic hardship, and humanitarian crises which have had a devastating impact on the people of these countries.

Complex history of ethnic and religious conflict where both countries where in DRC, there are over 200 ethnic groups where the main ethnic groups are the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa and the country has been plagued by conflict between different ethnic groups for decades. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country is divided into three ethnic groups such as Bosnian Serbs who are Orthodox Christians, Bosniaks who are Muslims, and the Bosnian Croats who are Catholics, where the 1992-1995 Bosnian War was fought amongst the three ethnic groups. These tensions are often exploited by politicians and other actors for their own gain.

Weak central government: Both countries have weak central governments. In the DRC, the central government has little control over the vast territory of the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the central government is weak and divided three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult to maintenance of law and order and to provide basic services to all population. Weak central governments in both countries have also made it easier for armed groups to operate and to exploit ethnic and religious tensions. The economic hardship in both countries are poor and underdeveloped. In the DRC with majority of the population lives in poverty. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the economy is still recovering from the Bosnian War. Economic hardship has made it difficult for people to meet their basic needs and has created a breeding ground for resentment and violence. Both the DRC and BiH have experienced humanitarian crises and millions of people displaced and have been in need of food, water, and shelter.

Foreign interference in both the DRC and BiH have been the subject of foreign interference. In the DRC, foreign powers have supported different armed groups in the conflict. Additionally, in the DRC, there have been multiple interventions by foreign countries, including Rwanda, Uganda, and the United States. In BiH, there was a NATO intervention in 1995 where opposition to foreign powers played a role in exacerbating the conflict which eventually led to mediating the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war. However, foreign interference has also exacerbated the conflict in both countries. The legacy of the Bosnian War and the Congo War left deep scars on BiH and DRC societies respectively, and these scars continue to manifest themselves in conflict and violence.

Both conflicts have also been characterized by widespread gender based violence with victims being women and girls living in both countries. Both conflicts caused millions to be displaced. In the DRC, over 5 million displaced people. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 1 million people were displaced during the Bosnian War. Both conflicts have seen widespread impunity for perpetrators of violence. This has made it difficult to achieve justice and reconciliation.

The similarities and differences between the conflicts in the DRC and Bosnia and Herzegovina highlight the challenges of building peace in countries that have experienced a history of ethnic and religious conflict. It is important and significant to learn depending on the experiences of both countries in order to develop more effective strategies for peacebuilding.

The AU strategies in the DRC have shown to slow in addressing the complete resolution of the DRC conflict. Despite that the conflict in the DRC has been much more violent of the First War in 1997 and the Second Congo War of 2003-1997 than the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the DRC has been plagued by a civil war that has lasted for over two decades and has resulted in millions of deaths. The Bosnian War was also a very violent conflict, but it was much shorter in duration and resulted in fewer deaths. Additionally, the AU can allude that the conflict in the DRC has been more complex and multifaceted than the conflict in BiH. The DRC conflict has involved a number of different armed groups, including rebels, militias, and foreign troops. The BiH conflict was primarily a conflict between three ethnic groups.

Despite these the AU has to sufficiently employ the strategies that the EU employed to come to a resolution of peace of the BiH conflict. The AU has a membership of 55 countries as compared to the EU that has 20 countries. This shows that the AU only has 20 African Countries contributing

to either military or general police personnel. This shows the need for AU to begin building some stronger partnerships among the nations, the Six main Africa regional organizations and other international partners to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts and to ensure compounded efforts of both human and capital resources to help DRC restore its peace and stability.

The AU should develop a comprehensive conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies just like the EU Comprehensive Approach principle as the AU's through the AUPSC Africa Standby Force deployment of peacekeeping and peacebuilding military security strategies whose deployment was only in 2015 that are not sufficient in resolving the conflict in DRC. The AU should develop strategies that should address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and governance challenges.

The AU has been in DRC since Making a long-term commitment to conflict resolution and peacebuilding: The AU should be prepared to provide long-term support to conflict-affected countries. The AU should take a human rights-based approach to equally both conflict resolution and peacebuilding and that the needs and rights of all people are protected in its conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

The international community should know they have a responsibility to help the people of the DRC and BiH to rebuild their countries and to create a more prosperous and peaceful future. Consequently, successful strategies employed by various Continental Organizations can be modified to apply within other continents. This has seen that it can be done by bringing the strategies home to fit the various contexts. The AU mission in DRC should independently should employ strategies used by the EU in BiH and ensure situational changes to fit the African Context.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The field of International Community interventions in various countries and actions taken to influence policies is highly controversial and there is no consensus on whether or not they are effective. This study has attempted to analyze the AU Peace and Security peacekeeping mission in DRC and determine whether the AU interventions in conflict resolution are effective in DRC. The study also collated debates on regional organizations effectiveness in conflict resolution activities with more focus on the African and international scholarly debates. The in depth study was conducted through review of scholarly work, academic papers, journals, to support and influence my findings from the study, arguments derived and analysis. The research was informed by Béla Balassa regional integration theory which seeks to explain the processes and outcomes associated with different countries coming together to form a cohesive influenced effort such as the AU entrusted role to safeguard integration of African countries. The analysis and findings sought to achieve the following research objectives a). Analyzing the role and effectiveness of the African Union Peace and Security Council in the resolution of the crisis Democratic Republic of Congo. b) To Highlight the lessons outlined and learned from the AU's experience in the DRC Conflict, and their application to future conflict resolution activities and peacebuilding efforts in Africa. c) To carry out a comparative analysis of best practices from other notable regional organizations, more specifically, the European Union.

### **Main Findings**

The Challenges of Peacebuilding and Effectiveness of AU PSC interventions and strategies do not fail due to the absence of law and regulations to guide the interventions. They fail due to poor mobilization. Mobilization is compounded in context of resources, influence, expertise and implementation strategies. Continental organizations as intergovernmental organizations that are composed of member states are tasked with mobilizing resources and coordinating efforts to address common challenges facing their member states.

From the study African Union has broad collection of policy frameworks that underpin implementation of peace building resolution in warring and conflict ridden countries. Despite the launch and subsequent promulgation, it has little to show for in bringing a stop to over ten unstable

states in the continent DRC being one such country ridden in unending conflict. Additionally, AU in DRC has engaged in peace talks, declarations, agreements, decisions, recommendations and conflict resolutions mechanisms which were all aimed at influencing and bringing to a stop the violence in the DRC but all these instruments are not necessarily legally binding to any African country to adhere and observe.

The study also has underscored that the international community has played a crucial and important function in trying to resolve these conflicts and to promote peace and stability in DRC. However, its efforts have had limited success. A key main challenge is that the international community is often divided on how to address the situation in DRC. One key difference between the two countries comparable between the AU and EU context is that through EU Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a significant international response that led to resolution of the conflict. The international community significantly more involved and a participant in the BiH conflict than in the DRC conflict. The international community stepped up in mediating the Dayton Peace Agreement, that eventually ended the war in BiH. The international community provision of significant financial, political and technical assistance to BiH to help rebuild the country. The project study shows clearly the international community less involvement in the DRC conflict.

## **Conclusion**

The effectiveness of African Union strategies in peacebuilding are underwhelming as many countries continue to be ridden in conflict. Many of the conflicts in Africa are complex and intractable, which makes them difficult to resolve even for the AU which has a continental reach but unfortunately is often under-resourced, which can limit its ability to deploy and sustain peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. The AU despite having 55 member states do not always have the political will to intervene in conflicts, especially when those conflicts involve their own neighbors. The good news is the AU has the potential to be a leading role in promoting peace and security in Africa by increasing its resources, improving its capacity, enhancing coordination, and addressing the root causes of various conflict and through this the AU can become even more effective in resolving any emerging conflicts and building sustainable peace.

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