

V THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
RWANDA ETHNIC CONFLICT, 1990 – 1998 6

BY

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.



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DEDICATION

To all Eritrean patriots who gave
their lives in defence of the country.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the roots of the Rwanda conflict (1990-1998) and its external dimension. Specifically, it investigates the interaction between the internal and external factors in the escalation and management of the conflict.

The study relied on both primary source of information and secondary sources. Secondary sources involved library research on published and unpublished, but authoritative materials. Primary information was sourced through interviews with individual experts on the region and political attaches in both the DRC and Rwanda embassies.

The study reaches a number of conclusions. The Rwanda conflict had multiple and complex causes. These are structural, economic, social, political, colonial and institutional (state structure, discriminatory political and economic, social, political institutions, elite politics). Security problems were also causes of the conflict (intra-state security concerns, refugee problems). Others were psychological or psycho-cultural (irrational myth, mistrust, fear and hatred). It was the interplay between the structural and psychological factors that triggered the tragic events of 1994.

At any time either before or during the genocide, the deployment of a well-equipped international peace keeping force with a strong mandate could at least have forced the *genocidaires* to modify their plans thereby saving many lives. Only the international community could have done that, but it chose to reject that choice.

The Rwanda conflict has not been contained within the frontiers of the country. Its neighbours experienced the effects of this crisis. Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda had been flooded with refugees. Former Zaire (now DRC) has been destabilized. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) conquered Kigali in July 1994, the deposed leadership and the *genocidaires* escaped into eastern Zairean refugee camps. With the tacit support of the Kinshasa government, the ex-FAR and Interhamwe used these camps as bases to launch attacks against the new Kigali regime. The presence of massive Hutu refugee camps that housed hostile armed elements close to the border constitute a major security threat. In order to eliminate this threat, Kigali intervened militarily in the former Zaire in support of the anti-government forces. Thus the Rwanda internal conflict internationalized and shifted the epicenter of the conflict from Rwanda to the former Zaire.

Political rivalries and ethnic distinctions are becoming intertwined, with the result an ugly new ethnic polarization threatens to engulf central and eastern Africa. It is the notion of a pan-Tutsi conspiracy to conquer the Bantu people of eastern and central Africa. Some members of the Congolese elite subscribe to this notion. There is growing anti-Tutsi feelings in the DRC, which is reinforced by the fear of extension into the Kivu region of the Rwanda political-military presence.

The conflicts in Rwanda and the DRC are best and most effectively managed regionally. If the international community wants to solve the Congolese conflict it should also take into account the Rwanda conflict because these are interconnected.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces – Ugandan Armed Group that opposes the Museveni government.
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire – Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire The rebel forces led by Laurent-Desiré Kabila that overthrew the Mobutu regime in 1996-97.
ALIR	Armée de Libération Rwandaise – Liberation Army of Rwanda
BBTG	Broad Based Transitional Government
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République. Committee for the Defence of the Republic.
CNDD	Conceil national pour la défense de la démocratie, National Council for the Defence of Democracy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAC	Forces Armées Conglaises - Congolese Armed Forces
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises - Rwandan Armed Forces under the Habyarimana regime.
FDD	Forces for the Defence of Democracy, The Burundi Hutu guerilla group and militant arm of CNDD
FNL	Front National de Libération – National Forces of Liberation
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain – Democratic Republican Movement
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement - National Revolutionary Movement for Developemnt, President Habyarimana's party, founded in 1975, which became the MRNDD IN 1991.
MRNDD	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PALIR	Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda
PARMEHUTU	Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation de Bahutu – The Party of Grégoire Kayibanda, the first president of independent Rwanda
PL	Parti Libéral - Liberal Party
PDC	Parti Democrate Chretien - Christian Democratic Party
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate – Social Democratic Party
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie Congolese Rally for Democracy
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This study examines the root causes of the Rwanda conflict (1990-1998) and its external dimension. Specifically, it seeks to understand the interaction between the internal and external factors in the escalation and management of the conflict.

A study of political development across the multi-ethnic nations of Africa in the recent past reveals an emerging and disturbing political trend towards ethnic conscientisation and a resurgence of ethnic nationalism. States with diverse ethnic communities or even clans have witnessed political restlessness among their nationals who unrelentingly demand for either secession or federalism. In some states, for example, Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia, it has boiled down to increased ethnic animosities and armed conflicts between ethnically motivated guerillas and state soldiers.¹

The Rwanda conflict can only be described as the worst politically motivated blood lust case in recent history. The defenceless and armless people were killed en-masse, thousand others were seriously wounded and left for dead. Survivors were maimed for life. The frustrated, demoralized and traumatized humanity flee their homelands, trekking for unknown distances to seek refuge in neighbouring countries often characterized by ethnic tensions.²

¹ P.K. Kurgat, 'Ethnicity and Political Pluralism in Africa', in B.A. Ogot (ed.) Ethnicity, nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies, Maseno University College, 1996, p. 145.

² Ibid.

The conflicts in the Great Lakes region have not been contained within the frontiers of the countries of the region. Their neighbours experience the effects of these crises. Tanzania and Uganda have been flooded with refugees while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been destabilized. Rwanda and Burundi, chronic victims of civil conflicts, destabilize their neighbours and weaken one another. A crisis in Rwanda sends tens of thousands of refugees to Burundi and vice versa. For the past forty years or so Rwanda and Burundi have been sending back in turns bloody conflicts.³

In order to enhance the conflict resolution capacity in Africa, there is a need to study and understand the internal dynamics and external dimensions of these conflicts. This study, using the Rwanda conflict during the period between 1990 – 1998, examines the factors which gave rise to the conflict. It further examines the regional impact of this conflict.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The conflict in Rwanda can be interpreted as a power struggle along predominantly ethnic lines between the Hutu majority, consisting of 85 percent of the population, and the Tutsi minority which comprise 14 percent of the total population.⁴

Some scholars blame the colonial regimes (especially the Belgian) and the post-colonial leadership in Rwanda for having been the architects of a scheme that disrupted

³ A. Ould-Abdallah, 'La diplomatie africaine face aux conflits de la région des Grands Lacs', *Politiques Africaine*. No. 68, 1997, p. 23.

⁴ J. Havermans, 'Rwanda Crisis Lingers On', in M. Mekenkamp, P. van Tongeren and H. van de Veen (eds) *Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*. Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999, p. 248.

the supposedly peaceful co-existence of the ethnic groups in that country. The civil war in Rwanda began in 1990 with an invasion by Tutsi rebels from Uganda. The armed Tutsi, who had organized themselves into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), were the sons and daughters of Tutsi exiles who had been chased from Rwanda in 1959.⁵

In August 1993, the civil war into which the offensive had developed appeared to come to an end. Under international pressure, the government of president Habyarimana and the RPF rebel movement had opened negotiations in the Tanzanian town of Arusha and reached a political agreement. The accords provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government, the repatriation of refugees, the integration of all military forces into one national army and the holding of democratic elections. The implementation of the peace accord was to be supervised by a UN force, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).⁶

However, extremists in the Hutu camp refused to accept the formulated power sharing and prepared a genocidal plan to eliminate all of the RPF's potential supporters. The plan started to unfold on April 6, 1994 after the shooting down of the presidential aircraft which killed president Habyarimana. A major role in the genocide was assigned to the Interhamwe militias, consisting of young Hutu men armed with machetes and clubs. Within a short period of time, over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu had been killed.⁷

⁵ J.P. Chrétien, Le Défi de l'Ethnisme: Rwanda et Burundi: 1990-1996. Paris: Edition Karthala, 1997, pp. 307-308.

⁶ J. Havermans, 'Rwanda Crisis Lingers On', in Mekenkamp et al., Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, pp. 247-248.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

The RPF succeeded in quickly conquering the country and seized control of the state in July 1994. Fearing retribution for the genocide, two million Hutu fled Rwanda, with 1.2 million settling in refugee camps in neighbouring Zaire (DRC). Others fled to Tanzania and Burundi. These camps soon came under the control of the Interhamwe militia who used them as bases from which to launch assaults against the Tutsi-led Kigali government.⁸ The presence of massive Hutu refugee camps that housed hostile armed elements close to the border constituted a major threat. The elimination of this threat was the main rationale for the decision of Kigali to intervene militarily in former Zaire. In late 1996, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo – Zaire (AFDL)* led by Laurent Kabila broke up Zaire's Rwandan refugee camps. Refugees initially scattered from the Rwandan border, but 1.2 million returned voluntarily or were driven back between November 1996 and January 1997. The Tanzanian government also expelled 500,000 Rwandan refugees in January 1997.⁹

Laurent Kabila took power in Zaire (which he renamed Democratic Republic of Congo) in May 1997, the RPA played a key role in his rise to power. Rwandans initially dominated the Congolese government and the Armed Forces command, but in 1998 President Kabila drastically curtailed their influence and later ordered the RPA out of Congo. The events that followed have plunged Rwanda and Congo into what is Africa's largest war involving nine guerilla armies. A further four countries Angola, Zimbabwe

⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *EIU Country Profile Rwanda 2000*, 2000, p. 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

and Namibia backing the government and Uganda supporting different rebel movements have armed cross-border military operations.

In response to security concerns over the sanctuary for hostile rebel groups in the DRC, Rwanda launched a major offensive against President Kabila's government in August 1998. The RPA was joined by Congolese Tutsi – known as Banyamulenge – members of the Congolese armed forces (*Forces Armées Congolaises, FAC*) who formed a political organization called *Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD)*. Following initial successes, the RCD and its allies' bid to capture Kinshasa was thwarted by the intervention of troops from Zimbabwe and Angola in late 1998. Fighting shifted to the eastern Congo where Rwanda and its ally the RCD, have secured control over most territory.

In Rwanda, the violent conflict between the now Tutsi-led national army and Hutu militias continues. In the second half of 1997, Hutu rebels from Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern part of the DRC entered into an alliance and began infiltrating Rwanda from across the border with the aim of attacking the national army and civilians. A harsh repression of Hutu civilians, perceived to be potential allies of the new rebellion, was imposed by the Rwandan Army, particularly in the northwest. There are strong indications that the DRC government now supports the defeated army (the former Rwandan Armed Forces – FAR) and the Interhamwe and helps them stage incursions into Rwanda.

The internationalization of the conflict has coincided with increased support for both camps, enhancing their ability to keep up their fight for a longer period of time.

Additionally, the linkage between the domestic Rwandan conflict and other conflicts in the Great Lakes region makes it more difficult to reach a peaceful political solution.

The internationalization of the Rwandan conflict has economic, social, environmental and security impact on the DRC. There is an interconnection between the Rwandese and Congolese conflicts. These are pressing problems of the region whose across-system causes need to be identified and studied.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The broad objective of the study is to examine the interaction between internal and external factors.

The specific objectives are:

- (a) To examine the factors that led to the conflict.
- (b) To investigate the impact of the conflict on the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic relationship in the region.
- (c) To explore the roles the international community played in minimizing or aggravating the conflict.
- (d) To examine the impact of the Rwanda conflict on the Great Lakes region.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been home to inordinate deadly conflicts, most notably in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville and Sierra Leone. These conflicts have caused untold loss of life, famine, poverty, the destruction and altering of traditional institutions

and general economic stagnation. The characteristic of these conflicts is their internal orientation and ethnic motivations, with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda resulting in a great loss of human life within just three months.¹⁰

In the face of such a situation in Rwanda, a study that seeks to analyze the problems with a view to identifying solutions or recommendations for action is justified. Effective and successful management of a conflict needs a thorough study of its root causes. Thus the study has the potential to influence policy and decision-making among leaders, conflict managers and all other stakeholders in conflict management in the Great Lakes region. The Rwanda conflict is one of the epicentres of the conflict in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa conflict systems and its resolution would enhance and broaden the peace making in the region.

Internal and international affairs are intertwined. The domestic conflict that started in Rwanda has serious international effect. The Rwanda conflict is interconnected with the conflict in the DRC. Both belong to the Great Lakes conflict systems. Mwangiri¹¹ has indicated that conflict management should not concentrate only on one dimension of the conflict; it must take into account the other conflicts in a region with which it is intertwined.

The international community is trying to manage the conflict in the DRC. The conflict management process must trace the larger regional pattern. It should identify and trace the root causes of both the Congolese and Rwandese conflicts. Unless the concerns

¹⁰ J. Levit, 'The African Response Initiative', Africa Insight, No. 3 / 4 Vol. 28, 1998, p. 100.

¹¹ M. Mwangiri, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. Nairobi: Watermark Printers Limited, 2000, p. 72.

and interests of Rwanda and its constituents are addressed. peace in the DRC is unlikely to be attained.

A number of scholars have written on the war and the genocide in Rwanda. However, there has been little research on the interconnection between the Rwanda conflict and the conflict in the DRC and its impact on the Great Lakes area. This study hopes to fill the gap in the literature on the Great Lakes conflict systems.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

The relevant literature of this study can be classified in two sets: those that deal with ethnic conflict and those that deal with Rwanda crisis. Scholars have studied the causes of conflict in Africa. Many identify ethnicity as a one of the main factors.¹² However, as Mwangi observes, there is a prominent group of analysts in Africa who reject the centrality of ethnicity in the analysis of conflicts in the African continent. Subscribers to this school of thought argue that the ethnic problem is no longer central to an understanding of conflicts in modern Africa. Instead, this school of thought prefers and vigorously champions a class analysis of these conflicts. It contends that the competition between classes is the analytical centerpiece around which conflicts in Africa should be studied. This study does not share that outright rejection of ethnicity as a central explanatory factor of the conflicts in modern Africa. Indeed, empirical evidence of the vast number of ethnic conflicts in Africa should not be dismissed on the basis of preference for only one theoretical framework over others.¹³

¹² For instance, see D. Kamukana, Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1993, pp. 5-8.

¹³ M. Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflict in Africa. The Uganda Mediation, 1985 Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, pp. 105-106.

Amate¹⁴ argues that in partitioning the African continent among themselves, the European governments hardly took into consideration the interests of the African people living in the areas concerned. Almost all the boundaries they drew up in this way cut across existing states, some of them across homogeneous ethnic groups or even families, separating them into two or more territories.

This design is explicit in the Eastern African region where the Luo inhabits three states: Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The Somali live in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. This dispersion of ethnic groups into various states has been a threat to national integration. In some instances, these groups owe allegiance to more than one state. They indeed, may carry two identification cards, passports from two states for convenience. They support their assumed state when the conditions are favourable but rebel when there is hostility.¹⁵ While this is true of the Horn of Africa, the same does not apply in the Great Lakes region where the Hutu and Tutsi who share the same language and culture, are at each other's throats for ethnic and economic reasons.

According to John M. Mwaruvie¹⁶, in pre-colonial period, African ethnic groups lived in independent states who related with other groups as different states. Sometimes they would fight to expand their territory or to get livestock. After the war they would enter into contact to retain their relationship. Colonialism brought in a new concept of relationship which placed Africans in one territory and therefore created new areas of conflict.

¹⁴ C.O.C., Amate, Inside the OAU. London: Macmillan Publishers, 1986, p. 403.

¹⁵ J.M., Mwaruvie, 'Ethnic Imbalance in African States: A Challenge to Ideas of Nationalism and Democracy', in B.A. Ogot (ed.), Ethnicity, nationalism and Democracy in Africa, Maseno: Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies, Maseno University College, 1996, p. 169.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 168.

European powers devised various methods to administer their colonies. They realized that the colonies (or the protectorates) had heterogeneous ethnic groups who were in constant rivalry. In order to have easy control, they used "divide and rule" policy through which they played one community against the other. This created mistrust and fear among the population. Mwaruvie argues that this policy perpetuated ethnicity in Africa.¹⁷

Since these colonialists were not familiar with African inter-ethnic relations, they put traditional enemies together under one roof. In Uganda the Baganda and the Banyoro who had been rivals for many years were put together in one territory. In Nigeria, the Yoruba were used to spread British influence to other regions. In Sierra Leone, the Creoles were used to administer the Mende and the Temne. This system tended to intensify ethnic hatred, especially where certain Africans were used to suppress other African groups. In Rwanda and Burundi, the colonialists utilized the Tutsi who were minority and aristocrats to rule the majority Hutu. Instead of emancipating the Hutu, the Belgians perpetuated Tutsi domination and exploitation. The conflict between the two ethnic groups has been a major concern for their neighbours and the international community since 1960. After independence, many Tutsi fled the country to escape genocide from the Hutu.¹⁸

Mwaruvie pointed out that missionaries also played a role in dividing the African people. Their recruiting methods created fanatical hatred among the believers in certain denominations against other sects. In Kenya, denominations appropriated for themselves spheres of influence leading to certain ethnic groups being associated with certain

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 169.

denominations. For instance, Anglican was for Kikuyu, Luhyia and the Luo, Methodist for Meru, African Inland for the Kamba and Kalenjin, Presbyterian for Kikuyu and the Chuka, Seventh Day Adventist for Gusii and Luo of South Nyanza and Muslims for the Coast and North Eastern Kenya.¹⁹

According to Amutabi²⁰, ethnicity presupposes a very interesting dichotomy: First, those within the ethnic group identify as one and establish a solidarity in articulating their interests in the nation-state. Here, they compete for national resources openly and fairly although with or without the ethnic group in mind. In other words, they partly owe their loyalty to the ideals of the ethnic group. This, Amutabi argues, is the positive part of ethnicity. At the second level, ethnicity is related to xenophobia, serious fear and hatred of other ethnic groups seen as enemies that should be eliminated at the slightest provocation. This is the negative part of ethnicity. He observes that it is this type of ethnicity that has been highlighted by many scholars at the expense of positive ethnicity.

Amutabi argues that in many countries in Africa, ethnicity has encouraged competition, innovation and discovery, which are some of the attributes of development dynamism. Some of the most serious innovations and discoveries in human history have been borne out of competition. Dividing countries into states along ethnic lines will intensify competition hence innovation.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ M.N. Amutabi, 'Federalism as a Cure for Tribalism', in B.A. Ogot (ed.), Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies, Maseno University College, 1996, p. 180.

²¹ Ibid., p. 181.

Amutabi opines that in Africa, ethnicity has been blamed for the many civil wars rendering other factors insignificant. According to him, this is an inversion of the truth. Colonial legacy is to blame for most of the problems, but for how long should we cry over this, he asks. He argues that religion, especially Islamic fundamentalism, is also responsible for part of the problems. Leadership in Africa is another serious problem as leaders create tribes and even cause secessions where a tribe has become so big for their interests to be realized. Leaders sponsor wars.²²

His argument is that federalism should be introduced in all of Africa's nations which suffer from acute ethnic rivalries. The regional state boundaries in these nations should be based on tribal or ethnic consideration. The ethnicities should only meet at the national level when considering national interests. This will reduce rivalry so often witnessed in the jostling for national power and control of other structures by the various ethnic groups.²³

Many scholars have written on the causes of conflict in post-colonial states. J. Pronk and P. Sciarone²⁴ argue that the process of state formation is not complete in many developing countries. The means of violence are not fully centralized in the hands of leaders and the central government leaves a lot to be desired. The official institutions are weak. The result is a fragmentation of power along the lines of loyalties of the population. Governments in such weak states, with the little legitimacy and weak institutional capacities, can only partially manage social development. In reaction to this,

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., p. 180

²⁴ J. Pronk and P. Sciarone, 'A Dutch Policy Perspective', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe & Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction, An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp 354-371.

the interests of the state are often equated with those of the government. They can barely hold their own through the use of violence. This has consequence for security. The weak state is not only a threat to internal security, but is also far more vulnerable to external threats than strong states. The authors cite Afghanistan, Angola, Lebanon, Liberia and Somalia as examples of this.

According to Pronk and Sciarone, leaders see ethnicity as a means, an instrument to form groups in order to achieve political ends. They argue that whichever meaning it has, ethnicity is in itself not a sufficient condition for conflict. Differences of race and culture must be made socially relevant and ultimately politicized in order to result in conflict. According to the authors, ethnicity is not a cause of conflict. The opposite may be the case: war strengthens ethnicity.²⁵

Pronk and Sciarone indicate that there are economic causes of conflict. Sudden reductions in income, unemployment and a continued reduction of living circumstances can lead to insurrection and opposition. According to the authors, economic inequality is a necessary precondition to armed conflicts. When one ethnic group, for example the Tutsi in Rwanda, allow another (Hutu) less room for economic maneuver, there is reason for conflict. On the other hand, this implies that the removal of economic opposition between groups could help to prevent the escalation of conflict. Pronk and Sciarone not only identify the causes of conflict in developing countries but they also provide ideas how conflicts should be prevented. Their article has many insights that are useful to this study.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

Kingsley de Silva²⁷ stresses the importance of ethnicity in the outbreak of conflicts, on the condition that it is manipulated for political purposes in the context of a multi-ethnic society. Omari Kokole regards ethnic pluralism as a major element in the vulnerability of African societies to violent conflict, especially given the colonial heritage of state-formation in the African continent.²⁸

Is there a direct relationship between the availability of weapons and the outbreak of armed conflict? According to Keith Krause, such a direct relationship does not exist although armaments can, however, act as catalysts of armed conflict. Beyond armament, he sees the often intrusive role of military establishments in developing countries as more important especially in the context of state formation in these countries.²⁹ S.D. Muni³⁰ also sees a catalytic role of weapons in violent conflict, especially at the intra-state level. He argues that post-Cold War security is challenged by the massive availability and proliferation of small arms and weapons of mass destruction.

Francis Deng³¹ stresses the effects of the colonial heritage on post-colonial African states. As a result of the way in which African states were created and peoples

²⁷ Kingsley M. de Silva, 'Conflict Resolution in South Asia', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996, pp. 298-320.

²⁸ Omari, H. Kokole, 'Ethnic Conflicts Versus Development in Africa: Causes and Remedies', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 126-139.

²⁹ Keith Krause, 'Armaments and Conflict: The Causes and Consequences of 'Military Development'', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 173-192.

³⁰ S.D. Muni, 'Arms and Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Developing World', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds) Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 197-212.

³¹ F. M. Deng, 'Anatomy of Conflicts in Africa', in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 219-234.

were separated, the states are now confronted with a crisis of nation building. The ethnically highly heterogeneous states are now challenged by competition for state power and national resources, often escalating to crisis and armed conflicts in which the legitimacy of the state and the controlling authorities fall onto the question. However, he does not explain the impact of the internal conflicts on neighboring states.

According to Orwa³², ideology, personality, internal power struggle and marginalisation of ethnic minorities are causes of conflict related to the internal affairs of a country. He argues that civil war is one of the most explosive of intra-state conflicts and often transcends national boundaries. He observes that although the 1967 Nigerian civil war started as internal conflict, power struggle among the military leaders, religious rivalry, manipulation of ethnic differences and regional grievances were among the main causes of the conflict. The civil war between the Biafrans and the Federal Government did not remain internal for long. When both parties sought external assistance it developed into an international issue. The Soviet Union supported the Federal Government and some groups in France rallied behind Biafra.

Orwa's article is of particular interest to this study. Many of the factors that led to the civil war in Nigeria, especially power struggle and manipulation of ethnic differences, are similar to the sources of the Rwanda conflict. Both conflicts developed into international issues and had impact on neighbouring countries.

Dixon Kamukama³³ views ethnicity as the central problem in the conflict in Rwanda. He argues that in pre-colonial times, the Tutsi played the role of the lords over

³² D.K. Orwa, 'The Causes of Conflicts in the Relations of African States', in C.J. Ojo et al., African International Relations. London: Longman, 1990, pp. 129-141.

³³ D. Kamukama, Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1993, pp. 5-8.

the Hutu as their serfs. He noted that these pre-colonial inequalities were carried onto the colonial period, which compounded them, and today the conflict is an attempt to redress or resist the imbalance created by the past. He also observes that the roots of the conflict lie for a large part in the colonial era when Belgian authorities exacerbated ethnic divisions. These authorities identified themselves with the Tutsi, thus causing the social, political and economic position of the Hutu to be accentuated and undermined. This phenomenon eventually accentuated the already existing mistrust between the Hutu and Tutsi. Post-colonial leadership is also blamed for having failed to address the relevant developmental issues, instead relapsing into the sectarian politics of the colonial era.³⁴

The regime of President Habyarimana for example is blamed for ignoring numerous appeals from the Banyarwanda who wanted to return home from Uganda and continued to bar Banyarwanda (the people of Rwanda) from arguing that Rwanda was too small. He is also blamed for fanning ethnicity rather than trying to correct the distortions of the colonial era. Kamukama further observes that the Rwanda conflict is of two dimensions, internal and external. The internal dimension was both political and socio-economic. This internal problem caused a new wave of refugees mostly Tutsi who were accused of supporting the R.P.F. ethnic struggle to re-impose Tutsi hegemony. Overwhelmed by the internal demands for democratization and multipartism, Habyarimana's government was significantly weakened. Kamukama identifies the main causes of the Rwanda conflict to be ethnicity, colonialism and bad governance. Although his study has relevance for this study, it does not cover the period when the conflict had

³⁴ D. Kamukama, 'Pride and Prejudice in Ethnic Relations: Rwanda', in Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.) Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflict. Nairobi: Africa Academy of Science, 1993 pp. 133-160.

degenerated into genocide. It also does not address the regional and Internationalization of the conflict throughout the Great Lakes region.

Prunier's study presents a detailed historical and chronological account of the Rwanda conflict from the colonial era to 1994, the year of the genocide.³⁵ Prunier examines the development of Hutu-Tutsi rivalry and the problems that have been experienced in Rwanda since the 1959 massacre and the transformation of ethnic relations to prejudice and hatred. The period between 1959 – 1990 is described by Prunier as that of the Hutu Republic. He argues that the advent of the first republic, which lasted from-1962 – 1973, did not put an end to the bloodshed. This republic kept up the discrimination policy begun under Belgian colonization. The government eliminated practically all the former Tutsi politicians. Tutsi were driven out of schools and public offices. Some were killed but many more went into exile. The Habyarimana government (1973-1994) also pursued a policy of discrimination against Tutsi. They were all but excluded from the army, the diplomatic service and parliament. This condition created a great problem of refugees and the Tutsi Diaspora, who later formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Prunier's work is historical and helps us to understand the causes of the Rwanda genocide.

Phamphile Sebahara looks at the way in which an ethnic vision has become an issue for the Rwandans and the way in which ethnicity has become a dividing factor – not necessarily a source of conflict – in their social life.³⁶ He notes the role played by the

³⁵ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995.

³⁶ P. Sebahara, 'The Creation of Ethnic Division in Rwanda', in A. Cruz (ed.). Voices from Africa: Conflict, Peacekeeping and Reconstruction. Issue No. 8. Geneva: United Nations Non-Governmental Service, 1998, pp. 93-100.

colonial regime in establishing a system of strict ethnic classification, backed by compulsory identity cards specifying the holder's ethnic group. He observes that these cards stating ethnic origin still existed as late as 1994: long after colonial authorities have left. They were to play an important part in identifying victims of the genocide. He argues that the post-colonial regimes have fanned sectarian conflicts, using them as escape routes from pressing political and economic challenges. Instead of correcting the distortions of the colonial era post-colonial leaders have fanned ethnicity. Sebahara does not, however, consider ethnicity as one of the main causes of the Rwanda conflict. He rightly mentions the policies of Belgian colonial authorities and post-independence regimes as the root causes of the conflict. This study agrees with such views. His article is thus helpful in understanding the Rwandan crisis.

Harowitz³⁷ examines the underlying causes of ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic societies. According to him, politics is central in many ethnic conflicts because it determines each group's socio-political and economic status in post-colonial societies. He explores important frameworks and themes in ethnic relations in multi-ethnic societies. Harowitz's study is an important source of information in studying ethnic conflicts. However, he does not explore the impact of internal ethnic conflicts on neighbouring states.

Brown indicates that conflict arises over economic, political, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic groups.³⁸ He points out that ethnic conflicts commence as internal disputes but get internationalized when outside powers intervene.

³⁷ D. Harowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkely: University of California, 1985, pp. 216-224.

³⁸ M.E. Brown, Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflicts, in Brown M.E. (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 4-26:5.

In some instances, trouble spills over into neighbouring states. In other cases, neighbouring communities or powers become involved in internal disputes for humanitarian reasons or to protect the interest of their ethnic brethren.

H. Adelman and A. Sutarke³⁹ study provides an elaborate chronological event of the Rwanda genocide. In August 1993, the war between the Habyarimana regime and the RPF seemed to be ending. Under international pressure, the warring parties had opened negotiations at Arusha and reached a political settlement. However, Hutu extremists refused to accept the formula for power sharing and prepared a genocidal plan. The plan started to unfold on April 6, 1994 after the shooting down of the presidential aircraft that killed president Habyarimana. The killing of Habyarimana unleashed the wave of killing that saw thousands massacred within hours of the downing of the plane. The killers went after not only Tutsi, but also any other person they thought was against them, be they Hutu or Tutsi. Top members of opposition parties were especially targeted. The massacres did not stop until after the RPF had taken over the government. By then the death toll numbered about one million people. Another 1.5 million had fled to neighbouring countries. The study examines the role of the international community in the Rwanda genocide.

Adelman and Sutarke⁴⁰ argue that because of international indifference there was little international response to advance warning of genocide. According to their study, France logistically supported the extremist army of the Habyarimana regime, directly trained

³⁹ A. Adelman and A. Sutarke (eds), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

extremists, and in some instances French troops were accused of being directly involved in mistreatment and killing of the citizens of Rwanda. France failed to denounce loudly and unequivocally the crime against humanity in Rwanda. The US government was reluctant to intervene during the first week of the genocide fearing another Somalia.⁴¹ The study provides invaluable information on the causes of the genocide, diplomatic attempts taken to resolve the conflict and the role played by regional and international powers in minimizing or aggravating the crisis.

Hellen Hintjens⁴² identifies some of the causes of the Rwanda genocide as: (a) the colonial ideology of racial divisions; (b) the economic and political crises of the 1980s and early 1990s; and (c) the fragile regional and class base of political faction determined to hold on to state power at any cost. She attempts to compare the genocide in Rwanda with other situations of mass state murder. She argues that an overwhelming agrarian society such as Rwanda cannot easily be compared with the heavily industrialized Germany of the 1930, but there are nonetheless parallels to be drawn between these two experiences. The similarities lie mainly in the extent of ideological and military preparations prior to genocides, and in the systematic use of conspiracy theories and myths to justify covert plans for slaughter. She also notes the indifference of the international community to the genocide in spite of extensive media exposure. Although Hintjens has made an informative study on the Rwanda genocide, she makes no attempt to analyze how the fleeing Rwandans across the border spread the conflict and how this crisis affected the neighbouring states.

⁴¹ In October 1993, the US lost 18 soldiers in Somalia. That made it politically awkward for the US to immediately become involved again in another peacemaking mission.

⁴² H. Hintjens, 'Exploring the 1994 Rwanda Genocide', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1999, pp. 137-163.

J. Havermans⁴³ argues that the division between Hutu and Tutsi is still perceived as a reality, but is not the only clue to understand the conflict. He identifies other affiliations and rivalries, mostly within the Hutu majority. Under the Habyarimana regime, a Hutu opposition had developed with the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) as its major force. This Hutu movement opposed Habyarimana's Hutu-led National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). According to Havermans, divisions also developed between, on the one hand, radical elements who were against democratization, power sharing and the Arusha Peace Accords, and on the other, moderate forces who supported a peaceful solution to the conflict and were open to power sharing with the RPF. These divisions partly crossed the ethnic lines. Havermans notes that behind the ethnic strife between Hutu and Tutsi lay a conflict between elites over access to the country's scarce resources. Since the scarce resources are most easily accessible for those Rwandans who control state power, the struggle has developed into a violent political conflict about government control in which the radical parties adopt an 'all-or-nothing' approach. According to Havermans, the political affiliations of the rival groups are closely intertwined with their business relations and interests and also with their ethnic identity. He observes that the Rwandan conflict is also, to a large extent, about access to land, housing and jobs. He further argues that the Rwandan conflict should not be interpreted as being triggered by demographic pressure, as some analysts and media have suggested. Haverman's article is one of the few studies that provides means and ways of how the Rwandan conflict can be resolved. His study has important information and recommendations, which will be useful to this study.

⁴³ J. Havermans, 'Rwandan Crisis Lingers On', *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.

Since the RPF takeover in Kigali in 1994, the movement is still the principal political force in Rwanda. It controls a government of national unity with both Hutu and Tutsi in its ranks. However, despite the presence of Hutu officials in the government many Hutu still consider the RPF leaders as foreign occupiers. The current government has demonstrated a lack of interest in establishing a broad political power base and in processes leading to power sharing. Instead, gradual exclusion of Hutu and Tutsi, opponents from the top political levels, as well as in the administration and in the judiciary, in addition to the continued mono ethnic nature of the national armed forces.⁴⁴

One of the main threats to stability in Rwanda is the Hutu insurgency in the northwest of the country. The attackers are members of the defeated army (the former Rwandan Armed Forces, ex FAR) and Interhamwe militias. The insurgents operate under the name of the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR). Their political wing, formed in June 1996, is known as the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR). Together they have tried to create a power base in the northwest, the cradle of hard-line Hutu extremism. The insurgents claim to be fighting on behalf of the political will of the majority of the Rwandese people. They present themselves as an army engaged in a liberation struggle. When the insurgency began in earnest in May/June 1997, their intention appeared to be to force the government to share power with them, if they could not defeat it outright. However, a few months later, the genocidal aspect of their programme began to take precedence. By killing and threatening Tutsi, they intend to

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 249.

drive them out of the northwest altogether and to pit Hutu and Tutsi – not just in Rwanda, but all over the Great Lakes region – against each other in an all-out war.⁴⁵

The ability of the insurgents to gain access to arms, ammunition and the fake travel documents, which facilitate freedom of movement, has depended upon their contracts in foreign countries and their connections to other rebel movements in the region. The insurgents in Rwanda share many characteristics and objectives – political and military – with Hutu rebel groups in Burundi at war with the Burundian army. The two main Burundian groups with whom the ex-FAR have enjoyed formal and informal link since their period of exile are PALIPEHUTU (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People) and its armed wing, the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CDDN) and its armed branch, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD). The rebels sought support from local people of several different ethnic groups who reacted with hostility towards what they perceived as the increasing influence of Tutsi in the government, army and business in Kivu.⁴⁶

Rwandese rebels are also getting support from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an umbrella for various groups opposed to President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Congo Brazzaville has become an important base for support with arms and training. The Central African Republic and Congo Brazzaville became the two most common destinations for senior FAR commanders who left Zaire in late 1996. In Congo - Brazzaville they helped Denis Sassou – Nguesso and his Cobra militia wrest power from President Pascal Lissouba.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ African Rights, Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest. London: African Rights, 1998, p. 26.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 61-77.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

In early 1998, relations between the Kabila regime and his former supporters – the Rwandan and Ugandan governments – started to deteriorate. In July 1998, Kabila ordered Rwandan and other foreign troops out of the DRC. Uganda and Rwanda started to support different Congolese groups that opposed the DRC regime. It is widely believed that the Kinshasa regime was retaliating by backing Hutu insurgents in their fight against the RPF government.⁴⁸

The Rwandese insurgents are getting military, financial, strategic and political support from other rebel movements bound together by defeat and anti-Tutsi sentiments. The conviction among the fighters that war is their only option has already destabilized Rwanda and has contributed to a war, which involves the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

A critical analysis of the literature shows that there is adequate literature on the Rwanda conflict. However, the bulk of the literature concentrates on the genocide and does not indicate the impact of the conflict on the region. The few that attempt to explain its regional implications do not cover the period when the conflict degenerated into genocide or the period after July 1998, when Rwanda and Uganda changed alliance and intervened militarily in the DRC in support of anti-Kabila forces. The conflict that started in Rwanda is affecting the whole region. This phenomenon calls for more research. This study intends to fill the gap in literature by concentrating on the regional impact of the Rwanda conflict between 1990-1998.

⁴⁸ J. Havermans, 'Rwanda Crisis Lingers On', *op.cit.*, p. 249.

1.6 HYPOTHESES

- (a) Manipulation of ethnic differences by ruling elites contributes to wider inter-ethnic violence.
- (b) Acute socio-economic deprivation and inequality lead to conflict and social disintegration.
- (c) Intra-state conflicts influence regional and international peace and security whose management must necessarily involve the international community.

1.7 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

This section defines some key concepts that are relevant to an understanding of this study. These concepts include ethnic group or ethny, ethnicity, conflict and ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Group or Ethny

Van den Berghe⁴⁹ points out that an ethnic group, or ethny, is a group of people who claim common descent and share a common language and culture. Where the ethny develops political consciousness and asserts statehood rights based on the common ethnicity, there are sufficient ingredients for the existence of a nation. The definition of ethnic group has been honed further in later theorizing to include the psychological requirement that members of the group believe that they share a common descent and

⁴⁹ Quoted in M. Mwangi, The International Management of Internal Conflict: Uganda Mediation. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1994, p. 124.

cultural heritage and are recognized as such by others. Thus ethnic conflict involves as its source this psychological divergence in identity. It manifests itself in primary loyalty to the nation rather than to the state.

Shibutani T and K.M. Kwan have defined ethnic group as a group of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with very few exceptions, they speak the same language and they have a common cultural heritage.⁵⁰ For the purpose of this study ethnic group will be defined as a group of people with common characteristics that distinguish them from other people of the same society. Members of such a group may have ties of ancestry, culture, language, et cetera.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity defines a sense of collective identity in which a people (the ethnic group) perceives itself as sharing a common historical past and a variety of social norms and customs, including the roles of elders and other age groups within society, relationships between males and females, rites and practices of marriage and divorce legitimate forms of governance and the proper means of resolving conflict.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Quoted in P.K. Kurgat, 'Ethnicity and Political Pluralism in Africa', in B.A. Ogot (ed.) Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies, Maseno University College, 1996, p. 146.

⁵¹ P.J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society, A Mosaic in Transformation. Boston: Boston/St. Martin's 2000, p. 138.

In this study, ethnicity is defined as a group identification based on common name descent and culture, common language and common territory.

Conflict

Holsti⁵² observes that conflict leading to organized violence emerges from a particular combination of parties incompatible positions over an issue, hostile attitudes and certain types of diplomatic and military actions. Parties seek to achieve certain objectives such as additional or more secure territory, security, access to markets, prestige, alliance, world revolution, the overthrow of unfriendly government and many other things. In effort to achieve or defend these objectives, their demands, actions, or both will run counter to interests and objectives of other parties.

Kegley and Wittkopf argue that conflict regularly occurs when actors interact and disputes over incompatible interests arise. In and of itself, conflict is not necessarily threatening and may be seen as inevitable. However, its costs become threatening when the partners turn to arms to settle their perceived irreconcilable differences.⁵³

Mwagiru agrees with both definitions and indicates that conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something. The incompatibility arises because they may both have different perceptions, goals and ideas about how to achieve them.⁵⁴ Zartman observes that conflicts in most cases used to refer to the underlying issue in dispute between parties.⁵⁵ For the purpose of this study conflict is defined as a

⁵² K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International Inc., 1998, p. 396.

⁵³ C.W. Kegley, Jr. and E.R. Wittkopf (eds), World Politics Trends and Transformation: New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997, p. 347.

⁵⁴ M. Mwagiru, Conflict Theory. Processes and Institutions of Management, p. 3.

⁵⁵ I.W. Zartman, Ripe for Resoluition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 8.

situation of interaction involving two or more parties in which actions in pursuit of incompatible objectives and interest result in varying degrees.

Ethnic Conflict

According to Zeric Kay Smith, ethnic conflict is a range of events from articulation of discontent, protest, mobilization, confrontation, sporadic or sustained violence and civil war or insurrection, in which ethnicity plays a significant role. Ethnic conflict may arise between ethnic groups and the state. Ethnicity need not play a primary role in order for an event to be considered an example of ethnic conflict, but must be significant enough to be mentioned as a contributing factor in the standard academic reference to construct the ethnic scale. Further ethnic conflict may occur over access to material goods as well as intangible goods such as power, respect or social status.⁵⁶ Ethnic conflict has manifested itself in the form of an identity conflict. An ethnic conflict is essentially caused by ethnic consciousness.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Hoffman has defined theory as “ a systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principal variables, to explain behaviour, and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national units”.⁵⁷ Theory helps us explain phenomena and make predictions, and in research, to organise knowledge, formulate

⁵⁶ Z.K. Smith, 'The Impact of Political Liberalization and Democratization on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2000, 38, 1, pp. 21-39.

⁵⁷ Hoffman, 'Theory and International Relations', in R.N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 30-40: 30.

priorities and select methods of carrying out research.⁵⁸ Two theoretical approaches will be integrated into one theoretical framework.

Peace Research

Peace research paradigm is derived from the structuralist view of international relations.⁵⁹ Peace research is interested in structures that give rise to relationships and conflict in society. The peace research approach looks at not just criticism about society but also at constructing an architecture of peace in society. The paradigm has the notion of structural violence or structures that promote conflicts. In other words, it identifies the primary source of conflict in the social, economic and political organization of society and the nature and strength of ties within and between communities.⁶⁰ For instance, if economic and political discrimination and weak ties of kinship exist in a society, the chance of conflict between groups will be higher.

In peace research conflict is an objective phenomenon. It emerges from real clash of interest rather than perceived interest, although actors may not perceive who their real enemies are.⁶¹ Peace researchers view conflict as a situation in which incompatible interests are built into the structure of the society – based on competition for scarce resources of relationship. They believe that conflicts can be resolved only by structural change. It is in this sense that the peace researcher is said to be revolutionary. Peace researchers take sides in a conflict.

⁵⁸ T. Colombis and J.H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987, p. 6.

⁵⁹ L. Richard, 'Structuralism and Neo-Realism', in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds) International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. London: Printer Publishers, 1989, pp. 74-89.

⁶⁰ S. Utterwulghe, "Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies", Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. 1999, p. 4.

⁶¹ A.J. Groom, Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict: Reading in Management. London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 93.

Once the old structure is removed, then it is the duty of peace researchers to establish a new one. The notion of “revolutionary peace” attained by force. Thus the peace researcher relies on power to maintain peace, as do structuralists.

Peace research is relevant to this study it informs our understanding of the nature of the Rwanda conflict.

Realism

The realist approach is based on the assertion that the study of international relations is primarily concerned with inter-state relations. States are the dominant actors and they are conceived to be well integrated internationally and act externally as a clearly defined unit. Although states are formally equal in mutual relations and fully sovereign in the disposition of their internal affairs, the realist denies that sovereign equality exist in practice. Both sovereignty and equality are severely circumscribed by an amalgam of pressure known as power. Indeed, there is a hierarchy of states with the great powers collectively, through the medium of the balance of power acting as guardians of world order. Lesser powers are obliged to act within those constraints or suffer the consequences. Those at the top of the hierarchy are assumed to have the power and the responsibility to impose their will, whereas minor powers and non-state actors are more likely to be the objects of power politics than independent actors within the system.⁶²

⁶² A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigm in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher; in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds), Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution. p. 73.

Morgenthau, who is regarded as the father of modern Realism argues that each state strives for dominance in the international system as a means of achieving and attaining security and national interest.⁶³

The realist paradigm is the conceptual framework of the strategist. Strategy insists on the primacy of states and is based on power politics. Strategy is concerned with the manipulation and application of threats either to preserve or to change the *status quo*. There is an acceptance of the realist paradigm since states are seen as the principal actors and their relationships are predominantly, perhaps exclusively coercive either actively or in latent fashion. The realist paradigm hold that states are the major actors since they have a plentitude of means of coercion available to them and the right to go to war and defend their interest. However, the manipulation of threats is pursued not only to secure domination for one state, it is also the currency for seeking a period of order based on a stable and recognized balance of forces.⁶⁴ Strategists are inherently activists in orientation; their policy prescriptions are partisans to and are geared towards promoting or protecting the interests of one against the other conflictant.⁶⁵

Strategists see states as having sovereign equality but this is differentiated by the power available to various states. Powerful states are the ones that define relations in the international system.

⁶³ H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1995, pp. 2-16.

⁶⁴ A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', op. cit., p. 83.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 84.

Strategists argue that states especially the weaker ones accept the *status quo* because they have nothing to do. Peace is a result of the power configuration ceasing when this changes. Strategists see aggression and aggressive relations as being central. With realists strategists see a drive to dominate which is instinctive can only be managed through threats and sanctions. They argue that states contain potential for conflict nationally and internationally.

The realist framework will serve as a useful guide in examining the root causes of the Rwanda conflict and its impact on the Great Lakes region.

1.9 METHODOLOGY

The study relied on both primary sources of information and secondary sources. Secondary sources involved library research on published and unpublished, but authoritative literature materials in the form of textbooks, encyclopaedias, periodicals, newspapers, journals, magazines and other literature that was also relevant to the study.

Primary information was sourced through extensive interviews with individual experts on the region, and political attachés in both the DRC and Rwanda embassies. The questions asked were open ended; respondents were able to give their views on the nature and management of the conflict. Discussions were also conducted with DRC embassy staff. Through these discussions the impact of the Rwanda conflict on the DRC was clarified. Documents especially constitutions of the current and previous Rwandan regimes and various international agencies were examined.

1.10 CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is comprised of five chapters. This part forms chapter one, in which the introduction, statement of the problem, literature review, theoretical framework and study methodology has been put forward. This chapter has also put forward the justification of the study, hypotheses and objectives of the study. Chapter Two follows with the examination of the physical features of Rwanda, its extreme population density, landlessness, pre-colonial history and pre-colonial political system, ethnic relations and social stratification. In addition, the colonial legacy and the Kayibanda years, 1961-1973 are looked at.

Chapter Three examines the multiple and complex underlying causes of the Rwanda conflict. These causes are structural and economic, social, political and institutional. Others are psychological or psycho-cultural (irrational myth, mistrust, fear and hatred). This chapter explores the role of the church and external actors especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council during the genocide. Furthermore, the study looks at the pre-negotiation, negotiation and implementation stages of the peace process and presents an analysis of the Arusha Accord.

Chapter Four focuses on the impact of the Rwanda conflict on the Great Lakes region. It explores the motives behind the involvement of Rwanda in the DRC conflict and DRC's effects on Rwanda.

Chapter Five is an assessment of the magnitude of the current conflicts in both Rwanda and the DRC, the lessons to have been learned and suggests a way forward.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO THE RWANDA CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the physical features of the country, its extreme population density, landlessness, pre-colonial history and pre-colonial political system, ethnic relations and social stratification. Furthermore, the colonial legacy and the Kayibanda era, 1961-1973 is looked at.

Rwanda is a land-locked country, the nearest seaport, Mombassa, is about 1,700 kilometres away. This has adverse effects on the economy and security of the country. Rwanda is a very small country, with the highest population density in Africa. Farm sizes are small. Each square kilometre of agricultural land has to support an average of four hundred farmers. The Rwandan conflict might not be triggered by demographic pressure but there is an indirect relationship between overpopulation and the genocide. Increasing poverty, high population density and landlessness in rural areas indirectly contributed to the heightening of tension within the Rwandan society and the ignition of ethnic hatred by Hutu extremists.

Disagreement exists among scholars on the nature and distinction between “Hutu” and “Tutsi”, the nature of the pre-colonial political system and the relations between the social groups during that period. This chapter presents the different contending views with the aim of identifying the root of the conflict.

2.2 Physical and Social Geography

The Republic of Rwanda is located centrally in the African continent, to the east of African graben and south of Lake Victoria, between 1° 04' and 2° 51' south latitude, and 28° 53' east longitude. The longest north-south span is almost the same as the longest north-east span: 220 km and 230 km.¹

Rwanda has common frontiers with Uganda in the north, Tanzania in the east, Burundi in the south, and with the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. It has no ocean frontiers. The distance from the Indian Ocean in the east is about 1200 Kilometres, from the Atlantic in the west is about 2200 Kilometres.²

Rwanda is distinctive both for the small size of its territory and for the density of its population. Covering an area of 26,338 Kilometres, it had an enumerated population of 7,142,755 at the census of 15 August 1991, with a density of 271 inhabitants per square kilometre. However, political and ethnic violence during 1994 was estimated to have resulted in the death or external displacement of 35% - 40% of the total population. Prior to these events, the population had been composed of Hutu (about 85%), Tutsi (about 14%) and Twa (1%). The official languages are French, English (widely spoken by the Tutsi minority) and Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language with close affinity to Kirundi, the main vernacular language of Burundi.³

Most of Rwanda lies at an elevation of more than 1,500 metres above sea level. The Congo-Nile drainage divide runs from north to south along its rugged western

¹ F.H. Beinroth, H. Neel and H. Eswaran, Proceedings of the Fourth International Soil Classification Workshop Part Two: Field Trip and Background Soil Data, Brussels: Agricultural Editions, 1983, p. 3.

² Ibid.

³ Africa South of the Sahara 1998, 27th Edition, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1997, p. 830.

mountains. At the extreme western edge of the country is lake Kivu, with an area of 2,700 square kilometres. The Ruzizi river draining Lake Kivu to the south forms part of Rwanda's western boundary with the Democratic Republic of Congo. To the east, a high plateau declines gently to the low marshy plains of the Kagera River near the eastern boundary with Tanzania. In the southeast, numerous lakes are scattered through a great bowl-shaped depression, while the northern reaches are dominated by the lofty volcanic peaks of the Virunga Mountains, reaching 4,507 metres at Karisimbi, the country's highest peak.⁴ The succeeding erosion cycles induced by climatic changes and the tectonic movements have transformed Rwanda into actual typical landscape of the 'thousand hills'.

Two-fifth of the land is arable; another one-fifth is pasture, supporting substantial herds of goats, cattle and sheep. About one-fifth of the country is forested mostly in the western mountains. In the volcanic northwest, at the higher elevations, bamboo forests can be found. Much of the remainder of the country is wooded (northeast) or grassy savannah. The country's rich and varied wildlife includes the elephant, lion, gorilla, chimpanzee, buffalo, various antelopes and zebra. The Kagera National and Mutura Hunting Reserve in the northeast protect these and other species.⁵

The climate is tropical, although tempered by altitude, with a daily temperature range of as much as 14°C. Kigali, the capital, has an average temperature of 19°C and 1,000 mm of rain. Altitude is a factor, which modifies the temperature, but such a factor is debatable value for agriculture. Average annual rainfall (785 mm) is only sufficient for

⁴ The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 10, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1993, p. 267.

⁵ Ibid.

agricultural purposes, but two wet and two relatively dry seasons are experienced, making two harvests possible.⁶

For administrative purposes, Rwanda is divided into ten prefectures (regions) each headed by a *préfet* (prefect) appointed by the President of the Republic. The *préfectures* are divided into 143 *communes*, governed by a *bourgemestre* (mayor). The president also appoints the mayors.⁷

2.3 The Socio-economic Basis of Tension

Until the recent civil war, Rwanda's population was growing at a rate of 3.7 percent per year.⁸ This is one of the highest in tropical Africa. Nearly one-half of the population is under 15 years of age. Despite the high population density, Rwanda's dominant settlement pattern is one of extreme dispersal.⁹ In Rwanda the land is small, the population density is high – as is clear from the following table.

Year	Population	Gross Density	Practical Density
1934	1,595,00	61	85
1950	1,954,00	73	102
1970	3,756,00	143	200
1980	5,257,00	200	281
1989	7,128,00	270	380

Source: G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 4. Gross density means population density in relationship to the total surface of the country, i.e. 26,338 sq. km., while the practical density reflects the population density related to the arable land surface, that only 18,740 km.

⁶ Africa South of the Sahara 1998, 27th Edition, p. 830.

⁷ T. Sellstrom et al., The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1996, Study 1, p. 15.

⁸ T. Mitchell, 'Rwanda and Conflict', International Conflict and the Environment Case Studies, Case Number 23, 1997, p. 2.

⁹ The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia, Vol. 15, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. 1997, p. 640.

Jean-Damascène Nduwayezu indicated that with a 50 percent increase every ten years the population of the country could be 50,000.00 by 2040.¹⁰ The reasons behind Rwanda's historically high population density are many. The climate is agreeable for human habitation. In addition, the mountainous area has been protective. The natural fortress formed by the highlands served as a shield against hostile intruders, such as the nineteenth century Swahili slave traders from the Indian Ocean coast. Coupled with effective military structures, the Rwandese society was thus one of the very few in Africa that were saved from the ravages of the Arab and European slave traders. As a result, the population was not reduced by this trade but actually increased as other people sought refuge in the country. Further settlement was encouraged by the local chiefs, because, under the 'clientage' system, the more clients a patron had the more powerful he became.¹¹ In addition, the strong influence of the Catholic Church against population control measures, as well as the traditional position of women, are important explanatory factors for the high population growth.¹²

Rwanda is a country of peasant farmers. Many observers link the tragedy that occurred in 1994 to high population pressure and increased competition for means of survival. Prunier argues that the decision to kill was made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasants in their family plots was the feeling that there were too

¹⁰ Quoted in G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995, p. 2.

¹¹ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994 History of a Genocide. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995, p. 2; D. Waller, Rwanda Which Way Now? Oxford: Oxford Publications, 1993, pp. 18-19.

¹² T. Sellstrom et al., The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, p. 16.

many people on too little land and that with a reduction in their numbers, there would be more for the survivors.¹³

Rwanda is a rural country, where most of the people live and farm on hills, which form the basis of the society. This has determined a very precise and peculiar form of human settlement. The Rwandese peasant – Hutu or Tutsi – is part of a *rugó*, which broadly translates into enclosure, compound or household. (In a polygamous household, each wife occupies her own *rugó*). Every hill consists of several *ingo* (plural of *rugó*), where Hutu and Tutsi traditionally live side by side in the same slope, for better or for worse; for intermarriage or for massacre.¹⁴

The degradation of Rwanda's resources base is closely tied to pressure exerted on a limited arable land area by a large and rapidly growing population, 90 percent of whom are engaged in agriculture. In many areas of the country, intensive crop cultivation is practiced on land that cannot sustain such practices or on land that should remain fallow. This trend is most evident in hilly areas, where every slope is intensively cultivated, even very steep slopes, which are greater than a 50 degree gradient. Experts suggest that in the northwestern territory, where the potential for agricultural productivity is high, the expansion of agriculture onto marginal land is resulting in serious slope failures. Soil erosion is further exacerbated by a majority of Rwanda's population farming and living at high elevations.¹⁵ There was plant disease, an erratic climate and primitive farming methods.

The overwhelming majority of peasant farmers are self-employed, and neither the government nor the small industrial sector can absorb the annual physical increase of the

¹³ G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994 History of a Genocide*, p. 4.

¹⁴ T. Sellstrom et al., *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁵ T. Mitchell, 'Rwanda and Conflict' *International Conflict and the Environment Case Studies*, p. 2.

working population. Thus, the agricultural sector has had to support the rapid demographic growth, which, however, in many regions has outstripped the rise in agricultural yields.

As stated above, Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa: each square kilometre of arable land has to support an average of four hundred people. As the majority of local people live in rural areas, land pressure and landlessness are acute. By 1990, over one quarter of the entire rural population was entirely landless. In some districts, the figure reached 50 percent¹⁶. Land had been subdivided repeatedly with each passing generation. Those who were landless had no future. The traditional social fabric began to disintegrate. Young people migrated towards big towns where they were largely unwelcome. They became easy prey for unscrupulous political leaders to channel their energies for their own objectives. Violence and murder increased.¹⁷

During the early 1990's, the big issue was land. The grievances of the rural Hutu — population were redirected to the Tutsi minority. Hutu extremists told the farmers that the RPF was coming to take their land, and promised people that if they killed their Tutsi neighbours, their land would be available.¹⁸

Platteau argues Rwanda was caught in the “Malthusian trap”. He also stresses the connection between the problem of extreme land pressure and the break of violence.¹⁹

¹⁶ A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 45.

¹⁷ T. Tschuy, Ethnic Conflict and Religion a Challenge to the Church, Geneva: WWC Publication, 1997, p. 48.

¹⁸ African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, London: African Rights, 1994, p. 24.

¹⁹ Quoted in S. Utterwulge, 'Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies', Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1999, p. 15.

However, Jos Havermans contends that the Rwandan conflict should probably not be interpreted as being triggered by demographic pressure. He observes that the relationship between demographic pressure and genocide is more indirect than direct.²⁰

Rwanda's other physical handicap to economic development is its distance from the sea. As stated earlier, the nearest seaport, Mombassa, is about 1,700 kilometres away. Most imports and exports are transported by lorry to and from Mombassa via Uganda, making goods highly expensive. When the RPF cut this overland route to the outside world, Rwanda was forced to use a longer route via Tanzania. This had devastating effects on the economy and security of the country. The economic hardship of Rwandan people was manipulated by Hutu supremacists. They exploited the misery of the people and incited ethnic violence to achieve their ends.

2.4 Pre-colonial History

2.4.1 Race and Ethnicity in Pre-Colonial Rwanda

There exists little agreement among historians on the development of pre-colonial Rwanda. Some scholars indicate the existence of an "ethnic" diversity based partly on occupational status, partly on a patron/client relationship, and on Hutu/Tutsi ancestry. Others argue that before the advent of colonialism, people identified themselves according to clan rather than to ethnic affiliation, and that the description of so-called ethnic groups was laid by colonialists.

Most historians believe that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers and forest dwellers whose modern day descendants are the Twa, today's small minority

²⁰ J. Havermans, 'Rwandan Crisis Lingers On', *op. cit.*, p. 249.

who inhabited the country from as early as 2,000 BC.²¹ Although no written records are available it seems that during the 11th century or earlier, the Hutu, an African Bantu people of sedentary farmers, came from the Cameroonian savannahs to what is today Rwanda and Burundi, displacing the original population of Twa hunters and food gatherers. By the 15th century, many Hutu were organized in large families, clans and small kingdoms ruled by *Mwamis* (chieftains and ritual leaders). They cleared the forests and settled in villages.²²

Peter Uvin²³ argues that, the cattle rearing Tutsi had arrived in successive waves from the north during the 15th and 16th centuries fleeing famine and drought. The integration of the Tutsi and Hutu had gone very far: they spoke the same language, believed in the same god (*Imana*), shared the same culture and lived side by side throughout the country. This had led many to challenge the notion of existence of ethnic groups in Rwanda.

Prunier²⁴ has observed that the Hutu had standard Bantu physical aspects, resembling the populations of the neighbouring Uganda and Tanganyika. But the Tutsi were different. They were extremely tall and thin, and often displayed sharp, angular facial features. Prunier points out that these cattle-herders were of different racial stock from the local peasants. According to him, the Tutsi came from outside the Great Lakes area and that it is possible they were initially of distinct racial stock. Their distinct physical features probably point to a Cushitic origin, probably from somewhere in the

²¹ J. Sparrow, World Disaster Report. Special Focus. Under the Volcanoes: Rwanda Refugees Crisis. Geneva: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994, p.5; T. Sellstrom et al., op cit., p.21.

²² T. Tschuy, Ethnic Conflict and Religion. Challenge to the Church, p. 4.

²³ P. Uvin, 'Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda'. African Studies Review, Volume 40, Number 2, 1997, p. 92.

²⁴ G. Prunier. op. cit., pp. 13-16.

Horn, especially southern Ethiopia where the Oromo have proved to be both mobile and adventurous.

J.D. Fage, on the other hand, contends that, serologically, the Tutsi are black, ruling out the possibility that they are of a Cushitic origin.²⁵ There are some who would explain their physical differentiation from the bulk of the Bantu-speaking population simply as the consequence of a superior, high protein diet.

Jean Pierre Chretien argues that the physical differences between Hutu and Tutsi have been greatly exaggerated by both European colonialists and missionaries and later by some Rwandan politicians and the Western media. European colonizers were keen to exaggerate likeness to themselves to justify their decision to rule through the Tutsi. In reality, there are people who fit the stereotypical "Hutu" and "Tutsi" physical types. However, for many Rwandans, it is not possible to determine ethnicity based on physical appearance alone.²⁶

Present day Rwanda, seen as a geopolitical entity of many statelets, emerged, according to different historians, sometime between the 11th and 15th centuries, largely through the pastoralist immigration and settlement of the Tutsi. Whether the immigration into Rwanda was gradual or sudden has been contested. According to Lemarchand, Kagame and Reyntjens the Tutsi settlement was achieved through both conquest and peaceful assimilation.²⁷

Lemarchand distinguishes two different phases of interaction between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Tutsi immigration into Hutu areas is said to have begun with a gradual and peaceful infiltration. Cattle products were exchanged for agricultural products,

²⁵ J.D. Fage, *A History of Africa*. London: Routledge, 1995, p. 20.

²⁶ Quoted in African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1995, p. 5.

²⁷ T.Sellstrom et al., *op. cit.*, p.21.

farming being the basis of social interaction. Peaceful co-existence, however, was usually followed by Tutsi conquests, resulting in the establishment of direct Tutsi military rule and administration.²⁸ As C. Newbury and Vidal²⁹ have pointed out, this phase was followed by a process directed towards the control of the factors of production, involving gradual restrictions of access to land, cattle and labour. Thus, over a period of 400 years, a number of independent Hutu political units were reduced to administrative entities, and the Hutu transformed into what was to be described as an “ethnic” category.

B.A. Ogot, however, argues that, historians have rejected the claim made by an earlier generation of writers that the Tutsi “invaded” and “conquered” Rwanda, imposing a centralized monarchy. He points out that, the “migration conquest hypothesis” is more in the nature of a bad habit, left over from the now-discredited racial theories of ethnicity in Africa and is not a fact established by rigorous inquiry.³⁰

The Economic Intelligence Unit has different views about the origin of the Tutsi population. Between the fourth and seventh centuries A.D., Bantu clans settled in the region, clearing much of the forest to make for cultivation. The region’s Tutsi are believed by some to have emerged from this group as a cattle-owning class. Cattle ownership enabled many Tutsi to act as patrons in a network of complex relationships with Hutu.³¹

Catherine Watson³² argues that although the ruling class was Tutsi, only a minority of Tutsi were nobles and rulers. Most were poor and benefited little materially

²⁸ Ibid., p.22.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Quoted in African Rights Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, London: African Rights, 1995, p. 2.

³¹ Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Profile Rwanda 2000, p. 51.

³² C. Watson, ‘Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion’, Refugee Survey. Washington: US Committee of Refugees, 1991 pp. 1-5.

from the caste system. However, social mobility and intermarriage blurred caste distinctions. The system was more of class based than ethnic group-based. A rich Hutu or a Hutu who was made a chief could become a Tutsi through “kwihutura”(shedding “Hutuness”). Over one or two generations, a Tutsi family could lose its cows, turn to cultivation, marry into Hutu families and eventually become Hutu itself. Subsequently Deborah Kabak³³ points out that the distinction between the Hutu and the Tutsi was more economic than ethnic. The two groups spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda, but essentially represented different classes of the same society.

Some scholars have argued that, given the fact that the Hutu and the Tutsi have lived peacefully side by side for centuries, sharing the same Bantu language, culture, and offering the same lifestyle, it is inappropriate to describe Hutu and Tutsi as being ethnically different from each other. This view attributes the creation of the ethnic Hutu/Tutsi categories and ethnic consciousness to colonialism.

It is recognized that even if ethnic consciousness is a false, artificially imposed consciousness, ethnicity as such remains. As Filip Reyntjens argues, different “ethnies” did exist in pre-colonial Rwanda,...*Chacun sait qu'il est Hutu, Tutsi ou Twa*³⁴ (each person knows whether he is Hutu, Tutsi or Twa). An African author and political scientist, Mahmood Mamdani, writes that, ‘the Batutsi (the prefix ba – refers to a group of people) and the Bahutu spoke the same language, had the same culture and lived on

³³ D. Kobak, ‘Rwanda: Never Again?’ In R.K. Lipsey (ed.) *Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Prevention*, London: Macmillan Publication Ltd., 1997, p. 151.

³⁴ Quoted in S. Utterwulghe, ‘Rwanda’s Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies’, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

from the caste system. However, social mobility and intermarriage blurred caste distinctions. The system was more of class based than ethnic group-based. A rich Hutu or a Hutu who was made a chief could become a Tutsi through “kwihutura”(shedding “Hutuness”). Over one or two generations, a Tutsi family could lose its cows, turn to cultivation, marry into Hutu families and eventually become Hutu itself. Subsequently Deborah Kabak³³ points out that the distinction between the Hutu and the Tutsi was more economic than ethnic. The two groups spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda, but essentially represented different classes of the same society.

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³³ D. Kobak, ‘Rwanda: Never Again?’ In R.K. Lipsey (ed.) Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Prevention, London: Macmillan Publication Ltd., 1997, p. 151.

³⁴ Quoted in S. Utterwulghe, ‘Rwanda’s Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies’, op. cit., p. 11.

the same hills. However, they had yet to become one people.³⁵

According to Obi Igwara an ethnic group is a historical entity comprising individuals who identify with each other on the basis of shared symbolic socio-cultural attributes that have the power of influencing the outcome of social interaction with other groups.³⁶ From this perspective, Hutu and Tutsi are different ethnic groups. As Alex de Waal observes:

Specialists on Rwanda protest in vain that Hutu and Tutsi are not separate ethnic groups. But sixty years of colonial and Tutsi rule and thirty five years of Hutu supremacy following the 1959 revolution, which consigned half the Tutsi population to exile, have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between them. Political conflict, punctuated by inter-communal violence has created distinct and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which for all the hesitations of social scientists, are identifiably “ethnic”.³⁷

2.4.2 The Nature of the Pre-Colonial Political System

Another important issue that divides the specialists concerns the nature of the pre-colonial political system. It seems incontestable that, by the end of the 19th century when the colonizer arrived, Rwanda was a kingdom with a Tutsi King and a predominantly Tutsi court. Yet, an intense debate exists as to the exact nature of that system. Was the Kingdom highly centralized and inegalitarian, or was the power of the King and the Tutsi surrounding him more theoretical than real outside of the central region? What were the levels of mutual control, exchange and obligation between Tutsi and Hutu? What possibilities for upward mobility, if any, were open to Hutu?

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Obi Igwara (ed.) Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN Publications, 1995, p.2.

³⁷ Quoted in Ibid.

Guy Vassal-Adams³⁸ argues that four hundred years ago, the Tutsi established feudal kingdoms in the lands now called Rwanda and Burundi. They formed a land-owning and cattle-owning aristocracy, ruling over the Hutu. In return for their labours, Hutu were granted the use of land and cattle and the protection of their overlords. Guy Vassal-Adams also argues that the Tutsi controlled the three main sources of powers: the cattle economy, the monarchy, and religious life. Their reign was reinforced by an oral mythology, which taught that Tutsi were inherently superior and that their dominance was ordained by God. The Tutsi *mwami* (King) stood at the apex of this complex social order, which encompassed three different sets of chieftaincies over land, cattle, and the military.³⁹

During the nineteenth century, the Tutsi kings reinforced their dominion. A Tutsi clan, the Nyiginya, achieved political dominance in central Rwanda. The Nyiginya formed the core of a state that expanded to cover most of the modern-day territory.⁴⁰

According to African Rights, the central ruling institution, *the abiru* (ritual specialists) appears to have been a compromise between the traditions of the pre-existing Hutu Kingdoms and the expanding dominance of the Nyiginya Tutsi lineage. Along with their traditions, many Hutu chiefs, through wealth acquisition and intermarriage, could become honorary Tutsi.⁴¹

Though there is no doubt that the Nyiginya Tutsi were dominant, a range of institutions mediated social relations. Notably, the clan system spanned the entirety of

³⁸ G. Vassal-Adams, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action. Oxford Oxfam UK and Ireland, 1994, p. 7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ J. Casoliva and J. Carrero, The African Great Lakes, Barcelona: Cristianisme i Justícia, 2000, p. 4.

⁴¹ African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despairs and Defiance, p. 3.

Rwandan society. The nineteen major and numerous minor clans encompassed members of all three groups. Some argue that up to about the middle of the nineteenth century, these clan identities in fact overrode the Tutsi-Hutu-Twa categorization.⁴²

In the mid-and late nineteenth century, the Rwandan state became more centralized and authoritarian, especially under king Rwabugiri (1860-1895). The King preferred to rely solely on the Tutsi, helping to cement their dominance, and thereby making the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic boundary more rigid. Rwabugiri's administration imposed a harsh regime on the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an "ethnic" differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European colonialism.⁴³

Under Rwabugiri, the *mwami* was the source and symbol of all authority in the politically centralized state. Some smaller states, however, stayed autonomous. In the Northwest (currently the provinces of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi), until the end of the 19th century, there existed a set of small Hutu Kingdoms, in which fewer Tutsi lived and were devoid of political power. These Kingdoms were fighting aggression from the Tutsi Kingdom in central Rwanda and were only incorporated into what is now Rwanda at the beginning of colonization, with German military help. These two regions, Northwest on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other, differ in levels of historical Tutsi

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ L. Wohlgenuth and T. Sellstrom, 'Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors', Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 1996, p.1.

influence, as well as their traditional system of land tenure, the importance of cattle rearing and agricultural et cetera.⁴⁴

2.4.3 Ethnic Relations

2.4.3.1 Patron/Client Relationships

In central Rwanda, what appears to have kept the people together is the institution of the *ubuhake*, a highly personalized relationship between two individuals of unequal social status. This patron/client relationship involved reciprocal bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services. The patron was mostly Tutsi, but the client could be Hutu or Tutsi of inferior social status. Under this system, a patron gave a cow to his client. Thereafter, the client performed various services for the patron, in turn for protection. According to Joan Casoliva and Joan Carrero,⁴⁵ the client peasants had to hand over half of their crop to the *mwami* (king). This contributed to the impoverishment of the population and accentuated the division between the patron and the client who, in most cases, were Hutu.

Another form of patron/client relationship was the *uburetwa* in which labour was provided in return to access of land. Overdule⁴⁶ observes that the immense majority of the Hutu people were subject to the *Uburetwa*. Each man was obliged to work for two days a week (the traditional week comprised five days) in the service of the Tutsi chief without any form of payment. Generally, the Tutsi were exempt from the *Uburetwa*, even if they were not members of the nobility. In this way, they procured a privileged status with regard to the great majority of Hutu. This kind of relationship was an

⁴⁴ P. Uvin, 'Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda', *op.cit.*, p. 94.

⁴⁵ J. Casoliva and J. Carrero, *The African Great Lakes*, p.5.

⁴⁶ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 5..

enormous obstacle for the men, preventing them from working sufficiently and regularly on their own land. Hutu women could also be called to carry out tasks in the home of a Tutsi chief.

As Lemarchand⁴⁷ has observed, the *ubuhake* and other forms of patrons/client relationship such as the *uburetwa* did have some important effects. They institutionalized the economic differences between the mainly cultivating Hutu and the cattle – breeding Tutsi. They were instruments of control, and turned Hutu into socio-economic and political clients and Tutsi into patrons. They also led to a process of “ethnic” amalgamation, particularly among Hutu. The result was an “ethnic” Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy.

However, some historians like Catherine Newbury and David Newbury question the assumption that the patron/client relationship was an important cornerstone of the Hutu-Tutsi social formation. According to them, the Rwandan clans were both multi-class and multi-ethnic. Hutu and Tutsi, they argue shared membership in all the nineteen main clans of Rwanda.⁴⁸ In this view, the system rather resulted in an economic differentiation and stratification between various occupations.

2.4.3.2 Social Stratification

The feudal nature of pre-colonial Rwandan society indicates that it was akin to a caste system. A caste system is usually sub-divided into graded endogamous groups, which have hereditary occupations, and membership is inherited mainly through birth. The feudal characteristics are realized in the association of a socially weak person with a

⁴⁷ Quoted in T. Sellstrom et al., The International Response to Conflict and Genocide, Study 1, pp. 23-24.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

socially powerful one so that the weak person may get protection against other powerful persons. Hutu and Twa were given protection on the strength of their pastoral contact with Tutsi cattle owners. They in turn provided cultivation skill and produce to their patrons.⁴⁹

The *mwami* and all army chiefs were Tutsi, and so, almost without exception were the cattle chiefs. As regards the army, although it had a multi-‘ethnic’ composition, it was clearly stratified in the way that all higher military offices were held by Tutsi followed by Hutu and, finally, Twa in the lowest ranks. There was thus no power sharing in the military. The military, like most other institutions of the state, was Tutsi dominated.⁵⁰

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Rwandan state had developed into a Tutsi-dominated structure, built to consolidate political power. Hutu participated only in the middle and lower levels of the administration. They were receivers of orders and norms, not norm makers. Consequently, there was only very limited scope for “ethnic” integration in the upper echelons of the state apparatus.⁵¹

Scholars have different views about the nature of pre-colonial Rwanda. Obi Igwara⁵² argues that the exercise of power in Rwanda has historically been oppressive and monopolistic. Leaders of one ethnic group have systematically dehumanized members of the other groups. In pre-colonial times, he observes, the majority Hutu peasantry suffered institutionalized discrimination and disadvantage due to the system of stratification established by their Tutsi overlords.

⁴⁹ O. Igwara (ed.) Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, p. 25.

⁵⁰ T. Sellstrom et al., op.cit., p.24

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² O. Igwara, ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism and Genocide in Rwanda’, in Obi Igwara (ed.) Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN Publications, 1995, p. 4.

Johan Pottier⁵³ has also pointed out that despite uncertainty about the precise use of the ethnic labels in the 19th century, it is certainly clear that the European colonizers were not the first to build an empire on Rwandan soil along divisive ethnic lines. He argues that overt ethnic friction may have been non-existent at the turn of the century but the ethnic division and 'obvious hatred' toward the Tutsi overlords were well entrenched by 1898, when the Germans arrived to colonize Rwanda.

However, David Newbury has argued that the Hutu and the Tutsi have lived much of their time together as participants in a shared culture. The conflicts that occurred were associated with the process of state formation, not within ethnic interaction per se. When conflict did occur it was more often within ethnic groups (for instance, as the Ngiginya dynasty fought with other Tutsi dynasties) than between them. Thus, wars among competing Tutsi dynasties were more frequent than warfare between Tutsi and Hutu. The cliché of "ancient tribal animosities" and "centuries of inter-ethnic conflict" simply are not justified when judged against the historical record.⁵⁴

Prunier⁵⁵ states that even if Rwanda was not a land of peace and bucolic harmony before the arrival of the Europeans, there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu as such. In this respect, the theory of 'ancient hatred' cannot really account for the modern day Rwanda's ethnic conflict.

⁵³ J. Pottier, 'Representation of Ethnicity on Post Genocide Writing on Rwanda', in Obi Igwara (ed.) *Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda*, London: ASEN Publications, 1995, pp. 38-39.

⁵⁴ D. Newbury, 'Crisis in Central Africa Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa', *Africa Today*, Volume 44, Number 2, 1997, p. 213.

⁵⁵ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

2.5 The Colonial Legacy

In many territories in Africa, European colonizers sought to use existing chiefs as agents of their rule. This system, known as “indirect rule” or “native administration” was seen by the colonialists as preserving existing structures. This was particularly the case in Rwanda. Although the Germans were present in Rwanda from 1890, only in 1899 did the *Mwami* accept the protection of the German Imperial Government. This was followed by a formal setting up of a German colonial administration. Rwanda (with Burundi) was the only district within German East Africa to have indirect rule. Indirect rule was granted to Rwanda on the basis of there already being an efficient local administration in place, which could perform administrative duties such as tax collection and maintenance of law and order. The effect of this decision was to formalize Tutsi supremacy and to draw upon resources of a powerful European nation to support it.⁵⁶

The system of royal dictatorship did not change even after the Germans established a protectorate over Rwanda. As in Europe, “pleasing” physical features and tall bodies were taken as a sign of mental superiority, which justified entrusting the protectorate to the Tutsi. In accordance with European racial theories then in vogue, the missionaries considered the Tutsi to be Hamites, a Caucasian race descended from Noah’s Son Ham. Because of Noah’s curse, their skin had turned dark, but they were basically European and therefore “superior” to the Bantu race like the Hutu, who were at the bottom of a divinely ordered world racial scale.⁵⁷ As a consequence the Hutu were

⁵⁶ B. Davidson, The Black Mans Burden Africa and the curse of the Nation State. Kampala: 1992, Fountain Publishers, 1992, pp.249-250; J. Mullen, ‘From colony to Nation. The Implosion of Ethnic Tolerance: Genocide in Rwanda, in O. Igwara (ed.), Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda. London: ASEN, Publications, 1995, pp 28-29.

⁵⁷ T. Tschuy, op.cit., p.42.

made to feel inferior. The Hutu resented the disenfranchisement and dispossession that ensued. Their animosity against the Tutsi and the colonists – sometimes underground, sometimes overt-runs throughout the colonial and postcolonial era like a continuous thread and would become a powerful contributing factor to the crisis of the 1990s. Hutu resistance to Tutsi rule was strongest in the north, where Ruhengeri and Gisenyi had managed to retain certain autonomy.⁵⁸

The *mwami*, Musinga, who ruled from 1897 to 1931, skilfully used a small but well-armed German military force to submit the region to his absolutist rule. The monarchy was reinforced to the detriment of small Hutu principalities. The expedition was accompanied by both Tutsi and Hutu warriors from the south. That Hutu fought against Hutu raised considerable bitterness in the north and contributed to the estrangement between the northern and the southern Hutu.⁵⁹

2.5.1 The Belgian Era: A Deepening Antagonism

The advent of the Belgian colonial rule in 1916 followed the forced departure of the German administration. Rwanda was placed under the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in 1924. From 1946 until independence in 1962, Rwanda was given the status of a U.N. Trusteeship Territory administered by Belgium.⁶⁰

The Belgians continued the German policy of attributing legitimacy to Tutsi leaders. In the 1920s, the triple office of land, cattle and army were combined into a

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ UN Department of Information, The United Nations and Rwanda, New York. UN Department of Information, 1996,p.8.

single position, which became confined to Tutsi alone.⁶¹ This exacerbated the position of the Hutu and marginalised them from the modernization process. Tutsi notables were quick to take advantage of the authority given to them by the colonialists claiming as “traditional” many onerous duties from the Hutu that were in fact not traditional at all.⁶²

Thus in colonial Rwanda, Hutu come to be classified as second-class citizens. This was starkly illustrated in the allocation of new colonial social and economic resources. For example, the Hutu had dramatically fewer opportunities to attend school and achieve post primary education than the Tutsi. They came to be excluded almost entirely from high-level administrative positions. Twa were discriminated against even more intensely, and very few had opportunities to attend school. The introduction of identity cards in 1933 created problems since it was impossible to know for sure who belonged to which ‘racial’ group. According to one account, Belgian colonial administrators so despaired of being able to distinguish Tutsi from Hutu that they introduced a means –tested system of ethnic identification. Any man with more than ten heads of cattle was to be permanently classified as Tutsi, and any man with fewer than ten cattle as Hutu or Twa, depending on their profession.⁶³ Whichever way ethnic identity was assigned, it became the basis for determining the allocation of many of the prizes the country had to offer, especially school places, civil service jobs and the like. This card system as Hintjens⁶⁴ has indicated, was maintained for over 60 years. In a tragic irony, it eventually became key to enabling Hutu killers to identify their Tutsi victims during the genocide.

⁶¹ G. Prunier, *op.cit.*, pp 45-46.

⁶² African Rights, Rwanda, *op.cit.*, pp 5-6.

⁶³ H.M. Hintjens, ‘Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, *op.cit.* p. 253; C. Newbury, ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda’, *Africa Today*, Vol. 45, No. 1., 1998, p. 11.

⁶⁴ H.M. Hintjens, ‘Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, *op.cit.*, p. 253.

The ramification of the Belgian system could have hardly been clearer. Between 1932 and 1957, for example, more than three quarters of the students in the only secondary school in the small city of Butare were Tutsi. Ninety-five percent of the country's civil service came to be Tutsi. Forty-three out of forty-five chiefs and all but ten of 559 sub-chiefs were Tutsi.⁶⁵

2.5.2 The Role of Religion

Since the arrival of the Belgians, the Catholic Church had functioned virtually as the country's state church. Much of the Hamitic ideology was invented by the Catholic White Fathers, missionaries who wrote what later became the established version of Rwandan history to conform to their essentially racist views. Because they controlled all schooling in the colony, the White Fathers were able, with the full endorsement of Belgian colonial authorities, to indoctrinate generations of school children, both Hutu and Tutsi, with the pernicious Hamitic notions. Whatever else they learned, no student could have failed to absorb the lessons of ethnic cleavage and racial ranking.⁶⁶

According to African Rights, the church adjusted its educational policies and openly favoured the Tutsi and discriminated against the Hutu. The Tutsi were given sufficient education to become administrators. With some exceptions, the Hutu received only education required for working in mines and industry.

When some Belgian officials began to express misgivings about this one – sided preference for Tutsi, Archbishops Leon – Paul classé, the apostolic Vicar of Rwanda, issued a stern warning.

⁶⁵ A. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, p.37.

⁶⁶ International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, 2000 p.12; African Rights, *op. cit.*, pp 9-10.

The greatest harm the government could possibly inflict on itself and on the country would be to do away with the Matutsi caste. Such a revolution would lead the country straight into anarchy and towards a viciously anti-European Communism --- As a rule, we cannot possibly have chiefs who would be better, more intelligent, more active, more capable of understanding the idea of progress and even more likely to be accepted by the population than the Batutsi.⁶⁷ Thus, Msr. Classe told missionaries that they should give their support to the Tutsi chiefs and teach the Hutu submission as a Christian virtue.

As the Report of International Panel of Eminent Personalities indicates, together, the Belgians and the Catholic Church were guilty of what some call “ethnogenesis” – the institutionalization of rigid ethnic identities for political purposes. The proposition that it was legitimate to politicize and polarize society through ethnic cleavages – to play the ethnic card for political advantage – became integral to Rwandan public life. Ethnogenesis was by no means unknown in other African colonies but as destructive as it has been everywhere, no other genocide has occurred. In Rwanda, however, it was a force of great potential consequence and it combined with other factors with ultimately devastating consequences.⁶⁸

2.5.3 Ethnic Polarization

Two Tutsi clans among many were privileged by colonial rule. Below the small indigenous Tutsi elite were not only virtually all of Rwanda’s Hutu population but the

⁶⁷ Quoted in T. Tschuy, Ethnic conflict and Religion. Challenge to the Church, p.43.

⁶⁸ International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, op. cit., p.12.

large majority of their fellow Tutsi, as well. According to Lemarchand,⁶⁹ not all Tutsi were more privileged in social or economic terms than the Hutu. Although they were considered superior to the Hutu in theory, in practice, most Tutsi were relegated to the status of serfs. Both the Hutu and the Tutsi had more than enough reason to resent the Tutsi chief who regularly imposed onerous obligation on the majority of the population, including taxes and the surrender of cash crops and unpaid labour. These compulsory activities could eat up half of an adult working time and failure to co-operate was dealt with brutality, regardless of ethnic background.

As Prunier⁷⁰ indicated most Tutsi shared the hardships of Hutu both were exploited by a privileged class. But to the Hutu, the oppressor was viewed not as a class but as an ethnic group. Many Tutsi who were not among the elite contributed to this interpretation by flaunting the superior status conferred upon them by reasons of ethnic identification. Many Tutsi looked upon the Hutu with open scorn, treated them with contempt in a variety of ways, and humiliated them in social contracts. Whatever the objective similarities between the Hutu and the Tutsi, the cleavage between them had become commonplace in most aspects of Rwandan life by the end of colonial era.

Since the gap of mistrust began to widen between Hutu and Tutsi and the fear of Tutsi domination began to rise, the Hutu took the opportunity presented through political mobilization to reaffirm themselves as a group.

⁶⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁰ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp 38-39.

2.6. THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1959-1973

As stated earlier, after the Second World War, Rwanda – Urundi became a Trustee Territory of the United Nations. During the 1950s, the United Nations put pressure on the Belgian authorities to grant the country independence and introduce elected advisory structures⁷¹

From mid – 1950s, Tutsi politicians began agitating for independence. They suspected that the longer independence was delayed, the more likely the Belgians would hand down a system of government, which would entail Hutu majority rule. Tutsi leaders sought to emphasize a history of a harmonious, integrated pre-colonial Rwanda, and argued that the designation “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were foreign impositions.⁷²

As the prospect of independence from Belgium loomed on the horizon, a new class of educated Hutu started to demand majority rule and “racial” self-determination. The emerging Hutu leaders were few in number and all were mission educated. They had been encouraged to get education by a new generation of Belgian officials, clergy and soldiers. The Hutu – Tutsi relations became a vehicle for intra-Belgian rivalries.⁷³ Helen M. Hintjens⁷⁴ argues that after the Second World War, many more Flemish officials and priests were appointed to the colonial administration. Posted to Rwanda, they tended to identify more strongly with the Hutu cause, possibly because of the projection of Flemish feeling of resentment at Walloon domination onto the situation of polarization in what was then Ruanda – Urundi. A radical change of mind occurred within the Catholic Church. In 1959, Archbishop Andre Perraudin adopted a pro – Hutu attitude by stating

⁷¹ G. Vassal-Adams, *Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action*, p.8.

⁷² African Rights, *op.cit.*, p.10.

⁷³ P. Uvin, 'Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda', *op.cit.*, p.96.

⁷⁴ H.M. Hintjens, 'Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda', *op. cit.*, 254.

that social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandese society.⁷⁵

However, Guy Vassal-Adams⁷⁶ contends that the Belgians started to support Hutu aspirations for a greater role in their country's affairs because they believed that minority rule was unsustainable and feared the Pan-Africanist tendencies of the Tutsi ruling class. According to Lemarchand, the Belgians also assumed that the Hutu would be less radical and nationalist than the Tutsi.⁷⁷

When political parties were set up in the late 1950s, political structures had already been established along ethnic lines. Grégoire Kayibanda, a former Secretary to Archbishop Perraudin, created the *Movement Social Muhutu – MSM*. The Tutsi had concentrated their major political effort on the royalist Party, the National Rwandese Union (*Union National Rwandaise – UNAR*). UNAR was a pro-monarchist, anti-Belgian party that emerged in 1959 largely supported by the Tutsi to push for independence.⁷⁸

By this time, the Belgians were deeply concerned at the assertiveness of UNAR. They persuaded Grégoire Kayibanda to convert his Hutu movement, MSM, into the *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation de Bahutu (PARMEHUTU)*. PARMEHU as its name indicates, was a movement, which aimed at emancipating the Hutu from the alleged perpetual feudal oppression of the Tutsi. As Kakwenzire⁷⁹ points out, with the creation of the PARMEHUTU, the independence struggle in Rwanda took a new turn and became a Hutu-Tutsi struggle. Other political parties formed during that period had ethnic

⁷⁵ J. Cousoliva and J. Carrero, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁷⁶ G. Vassal-Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Quoted in, Obi Igwara (ed.), *Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda*. London: ASEN Publications, 1995, p. 29.

⁷⁸ J. Kakwenzire, et al. 'The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994', in H. Adelman and A. Suhrke (eds). *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 61-62.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

inclinations. However, two movements tried to rise above ethnicity: the *Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse* (APPROSOMA) – Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses– a Hutu political party and *Le Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais* – RADER – Rwandese Democratic Union which had the support of moderate Tutsi.

The Hutu elite came to regard itself as the only authentic indigenous leadership of Rwanda and the Hutu as the only true ‘sons of the soil’. Hutu activists issued a Hutu manifesto in March 1957. They demanded Hutu emancipation as well as democratization. This document attacked the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict between the Hutu and the hamitic (that is foreign Tutsi).⁸⁰ As Nkundabagenzi⁸¹ states, though its demands were moderate, equality of opportunity and improved access to education, employment and social services for all Rwandans regardless of ethnic background or social rank - the Hutu manifesto used racist terminology, mirroring the ideologies of the time.

Such calls for change provoked a backlash among prominent members of the Tutsi power structure. Their intransigent behaviour served to polarize further the political divisions. In 1958, a group of conservatives at the royal court responded to the Hutu manifesto in an arrogant language. In a public statement, these notables wrote that there was no basis for brotherhood and cooperation between Hutu and Tutsi since many years ago Tutsi had subjugated Hutu by force.⁸²

⁸⁰ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

⁸¹ Quoted in C. Newbury, ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda’, *Africa Today*, Volume 45, No. 1, p. 12.

⁸² *Ibid.*

The first violence occurred in late 1959. The political climate was already tense, with the death of *mwami* Rudhigwa in mid-year in sudden and mysterious circumstances. When Tutsi youth beat up a Permehtu activist, some Hutu rushed to exploit the moment.⁸³ Houses were burned, and people were clubbed or speared to death. In this first outbreak of anti-Tutsi violence, several hundred people were killed. Huge numbers of Tutsi fled the areas of the most fierce fighting. Some 10,000 took refuge in neighbouring states.⁸⁴ The Belgian government responded by sending troops to the country. However, the Belgian military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt. Towards the end of the 1950s, the Belgian authorities suddenly started to pay marked attention to the situation of the Hutu peasantry majority. They adopted a pro-Hutu policy through the installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace those Tutsi incumbents who had been deposed, killed or had fled during the initial stages of the uprising.⁸⁵

The Hutu peasants' revolt and the revolution of 1959-1961 occurred, in large part, because of widespread rural grievances. The strong dissatisfaction with the regime was articulated by Hutu counter-elite who had been pushed into more radical action by the intransigence of a conservative political and administrative elite that flatly refused any democratization. Powerful external institutions (the Belgian administration, the Catholic Church and, at certain times, the United Nations) were also involved. Though their support helped the revolution succeed, the event in Rwanda was not engineered from outside. As Catherine Newbury has observed, many rural people had a stake in the new

⁸³ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 48; C. Newbury: The Cohesion of Oppression Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960. New York: Columbia, University Press, 1988.

⁸⁴ International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁸⁵ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

political order and shared a strong commitment not to return to the "old order" in later years.⁸⁶

The PARMEHUTU leaders, whose power base was in central and southern Rwanda, were the beneficiaries of the revolution. Local elections held in 1960 resulted in an overwhelming Hutu victory; Tutsi-dominated political parties got 16 percent of the votes. Belgian authorities strengthen the process further through the granting of internal autonomy under a temporary government led by the founder of PARMEHUTU, Gregoire Kayibanda.⁸⁷

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through the parliamentary elections of September 1961. In this election the rise of a Hutu elite became definitive. PARMEHUTU gained 78 percent of the votes and 35 seats out of 44. UNAR, the Tutsi dominated party was badly defeated obtaining only 17 percent of the vote and seven seats. At a simultaneous referendum, 80 percent of the electorate rejected the monarchy and voted in favour of a Republic. Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President by the new parliament in October 1961 and formed a government that included all Rwanda political parties. On July 1962, Rwanda finally obtained its independence.⁸⁸

The political and social system introduced by PARMEHUTU was republican. However, in most other aspects, it substituted one set of hierarchical, Tutsi-dominated institutions with another set of Hutu dominated ones. Though *ubuhake* cattle client ship had been abolished, *ubukonde* land client ship – which benefited Hutu chiefs – remained. In many respects, the ethnic hierarchy was simply reversed. Identity cards were retained

⁸⁶ C. Newbury, 'Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda', *op. cit.* p. 68; J.H. Marrow (ed.), Nation – Building in Africa Problems and Prospects. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969, p. 190.

⁸⁷ T. Sellstrom et al., *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

and used as the basis of systematic discrimination against Tutsi in education, the armed forces and the civil service. Hutu leaders continued to propagate the old racial theories, employing them against the Tutsi in exactly the manner the Tutsi had feared.⁸⁹

Throughout the 1960s, Rwanda remained tense. Not all refugees remained passive victims; some turned into warriors. Between 1962 and 1966 Tutsi armed groups launched dozen of raids from former Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania hoping to regain power by force. The impact was devastating for other Tutsi. After each incursion, reprisals were carried out by government troops against the Tutsi in the country. The most serious of these incidences occurred in December 1963, when an unsuccessful and ill-planned raid from Burundi led to a Hutu backlash that claimed more than 10,000 Tutsi lives. All prominent Tutsi politicians living in Rwanda were executed during this period.⁹⁰ Before these incursions cased, 20,000 Tutsi had been killed and another 300,000 had fled to the Congo, Burundi, Uganda and what was then called Tanganyika.⁹¹

Following their repeated failure and the tragic repercussions, the strategy of returning for restoration purpose was finally brought to an end. This strategy resulted above all in consolidating the power of the most radical Hutu elements and helped to suppress the deep divisions within the regime in power, which was increasingly marked by the personal and authoritarian style of government of President Gregoire Kayibanda. The Kayibanda regime's annihilation policy against the Tutsi political elites and the opposition political parties aggravated the situation. Parties like UNAR, APROSOMA and RADER were banned, resulting in one party dictatorship.

⁸⁹ African Rights, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁹⁰ C. Watson, 'Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion', *op.cit.*, p. 5.

⁹¹ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Kayibanda surrounded himself with Hutu supporters mainly from his home base in Gitarama as well as the Butare areas. This alienated him from the northern Hutu who felt that they had been isolated from the system. In response to this political isolation and using the massacres of Hutu by the Tutsi leaders in Burundi in 1972 as an excuse, Kayibanda began persecuting the Tutsi anew, rigidly enforcing the nine percent quota for Tutsi in higher education, government, or even private employment. The general atmosphere of intimidation and terror led to yet another exodus of thousands of Tutsi from their homeland.⁹²

The terror failed, however, to save Kayibanda's regime. In July 1973, General Habyarimana, a northern Hutu, seized power in a bloodless coup and promised to restore national unity and order. At that particular moment, the atmosphere in the country was so oppressive that the coup was received largely with satisfaction by the population.⁹³

⁹² Ibid., p. 64.

⁹³ International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, op. cit. p. 19.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE RWANDA CONFLICT, 1990 - 1998

3.1 Introduction

Fanatical determination to maintain state power and their privileges prompted Hutu extremists to kill over 800,00 people. The victims were not only Tutsi, but included moderate Hutu like the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the Minister for Agriculture who did not espouse the exclusivist tendency of the Hutu ruling elite. This would suggest that the ethnic explanation alone is insufficient; other factors must have contributed to the genocide.

This chapter will examine the multiple and complex underlying causes of the Rwanda conflict. These are structural, economic, social, political, and institutional (state structure, discriminatory political institutions, elite politics). Security problems (intra-state security concerns, refugees problems) are also cause of the conflict. Others are psychological or psycho-cultural (irrational myth, mistrust, fear and hatred). As Steve Utterwulghé¹ has observed, structural factors often transform latent conflict into-overt or manifest conflict while psychological causes explain the escalation, duration and intensity of the conflict. It is the interplay between structural and psychological factors that triggered the 1994 genocide.

This chapter looks at the role of the Roman Catholic and Anglican hierarchies during the genocide, the role of external actors especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council before and during the genocide. It will further examine the pre-

¹ S. Utterwulghé, "Rwanda's protracted social conflict. Considering the subjective perspective in conflict resolution Strategies", *op. cit.*, p.5.

negotiation, negotiation and implementation stages of the peace process and presents an analysis of the Arusha Accord.

The tragic events that occurred in Rwanda in the 1990's are the results of policies pursued by the Habyarimana regime. In order to understand these phenomena in depth, this chapter begins with the accession to power of President Habyrimana, 1973.

3.2 THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE GENOCIDE, 1973 – 1994.

With the advent of "Second Republic" in 1973, the bases for a relative civil peace were gradually restored in Rwanda. However, the ethnic question remained unresolved. Each ethnic group guarded the memory of members who were killed in the massacres.

The Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes had sought to assert their legitimacy through the use of two separate discourses: One was the ethnic, "social revolution" argument, tailored for local consumption; the other was a "development" legitimization, aimed at both the international community and the domestic audience.²

3.2.1 The Ideology of the Social Revolution

The ideology of the social revolution rested on the notion that Rwanda belonged to the Hutu who were its true inhabitants but had been brutally subjugated for centuries by the foreign Tutsi. In this view, the majority Hutu had wrested power away from their minority former exploiters in 1959 and installed a true democracy representative of the vast majority of the population. In other words, since the "ancien" regime was "feudal" and unrepresentative, the new one must be democratic and progressive. The argument

² P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1998. p.6.

that the Hutu- dominated government was the true representative of the majority Hutu population. and their sole defence against Tutsi's subjugation formed the powerful core of the legitimization of the ruling group's hold on power. This ideology was, and still is, powerful in its appeal, both inside and outside of the country. It was supported by the Catholic Church, as well as many aliens who were attracted by its claims of democracy and progressiveness.³

This ethnic ideology, however, concealed inequality and suppression under the cover of common belonging to the "Hutu community". The Habyarimana clique employed ethnic politics to divert attention from pressing problems of the country and intra-Hutu political cleavages.⁴

The Institutionalized Structure of Discrimination

In line with its ideology of the "social revolution", the new Hutu establishment adopted a policy of systematic discrimination against Tutsi especially in areas of political power – the government, the army, the single party – and in state jobs, education and foreign training.⁵ Throughout the Habyarimana years, according to Gerard Prunier, "there would be not a single Tutsi *bourgmestre* or *préfet*, there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, there were two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy and there was only one Tutsi minister out of a cabinet of between twenty-five and thirty members.⁶ Under the pretext of easing tension between Tutsi and Hutu communities and distributing resources equitably between regions and groups the Habyarimana government enforced the policy of "ethnic" quota system according to the population of each ethnic group.

³ P. Uvin, "Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda", *op.cit.*, p.98.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ P. Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, p. 34.

⁶ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

Based on fictitious statistics, the regime allocated 90 percent of educational and employment opportunities to Hutu. Tutsi and Twa got only nine percent and one percent respectively.⁷ According to African Rights⁸, this policy was used to exclude Tutsi as much as possible from important positions. Discrimination also extended to Hutu from east, central and southern Rwanda. The policy of “ethnic balance” or *equilibre ethnique* was a ploy to reward Habyarimana’s home region, the northwest, at the expense of the rest of the country. The policy created much more ethnic animosity than had ever been known in the country.

But even this policy of “ethnic balance” did not apply in all walks of life. In the armed forces, for instance, only Hutu were allowed to join. To keep the “purity” of the Rwandan armed forces, no army officer was permitted to marry a Tutsi woman.⁹

To facilitate the operation of its policy of political discrimination, the ruling clique kept intact the system of ethnic identity cards introduced by the Belgian colonial masters. This practice helped to identify quickly the ethnic origin of an individual by merely glancing at his/her identity papers. Hutu extremists exploited this system in identifying and liquidating thousands of Tutsi during the tragic events of 1994.¹⁰

⁷ A. Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the 20th Century*. London: Pluto Press, 1995, p. 44.

⁸ African Rights: *Rwanda Death, Despair and Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1994, p.14.

⁹ J. Kakwenzire et al., “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994”, in H. Adelman and A. Suhrke (eds). *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 73.

¹⁰ T. Longman, “Rwanda: Chaos from Above”, in L.A. Trillo and P.A. Huxtable (eds), *The African States at a Critical Juncture. Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 81.

As Lemarchand has argued, by reinforcing, structuring and exacerbating ethnic identities, colonialism had planted the seeds of two radically different and incompatible nationalist myths.¹¹ These myths and realities made the relationship between the two ethnic groups toward each other more rigid. Mistrust and fear intensified. Thus when Habyarimana dissolved the PARMEHUTU and organized a single party, *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (MRND) in 1975, the Tutsi were not allowed to join the party.¹² He controlled the party with an iron fist and it became, next to the army, the second pillar of his power.

Tutsi refugees whose number grew to more than half million by the early 1990s were denied the right of return. The justification of the Habyarimana government was that Rwanda was already “over populated” and could not absorb any more people. Habyarimana was fond of saying: “the glass is full and I have nowhere to put the rest of the water”.¹³

During the Habyarimana years, a small faction of insiders known as *Akazu*, “little house”, controlled the top position in the government, the army and the parastatal sector. The power base and composition of this ruling elite were ethnic and regionalistic. They were northerners and Hutu.¹⁴

The ideology of the “social revolution” had genocidal components. President Kayabanda in a 1964 speech warned Tutsi refugees that if they attempted to regain political power, the “whole Tutsi race will be wiped out”¹⁵. During the early years of

¹¹ Quoted in S. Utterwulge, “Rwanda’s Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies”, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹² T. Tschuy, *Ethnic*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹³ African Rights, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁵ P. Uvin, “Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda”, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

Habyarimana rule this ideology was dormant. However, in 1990s, it became radicalized quickly and attained a genocidal stage by 1994.

3.2.2 Development as Legitimization

The Development ideology was based on the argument that the state's sole aim was the quest for economic growth for the underdeveloped Hutu population, as a result, all the "living forces" in Rwanda, and foreign institutions that are interested in advancing development, should co-operate with the state to achieve that objective.¹⁶

The Habyarimana government was skilful at playing the development card. The name of the single party was changed to *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour Le Developpement* (MRND- National Revolutionary Development Movement). Parliament was renamed the National Development Council.¹⁷ Under the banner of "Peace, Unity and Development", Habyarimana initiated aggressive agenda to address Rwanda's social and economic problems. His party organized public participation in development in an effort to improve the infrastructure throughout the country. The most important programme was the *Umuganda* (Community Development Work). Rwandans at all levels of society were required to join together once every week to perform public projects such as planting forests, building bridges and roads, and constructing terraces to fight erosion. With increased internal support, the government was able to attract considerable international donor aid. This assistance, which rose from US \$79 million in 1976 to over US \$ 150 million annually in the 1980s, enabled the regime to launch major development programmes.¹⁸

¹⁶ P. Uvin, . *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁸ F. Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Economy", *Africa South of the Sahara: 1993*. London: Europa Publications, 1993, pp. 680-682.

Compared with other four Great lake region Nations – Burundi, Former Zaire (DRC), Tanzania and Uganda – Rwanda saw a significant increase in GNP per capita during the first decade of the Habyarimana regime. (Rwanda had the lowest GNP per capita among the five when Habyarimana came to power in 1973). At independence, only two countries in the world had a lower per capita income than Rwanda; it was 19th from the bottom two decades later.¹⁹

The World Bank indicated that from 1970 to 1979 Rwanda's GDP increased by an annual average of 4.7%. However, as the next table indicates the GDP slow down to 2.2% in 1980 – 88. In 1989, the GDP fell significantly due to sharp fall in coffee earnings. The decline continued in 1991 and in 1992.²⁰

¹⁹ T. Sellstrom et al., *op.cit.*, p.34

²⁰ N. Middleton and P. O'Keele, *Disaster and Development: The Politics of Humanitarian Rights*. London: Pluto Press, 1998, pp. 104-105.

Rwanda: Gross Domestic Product 1980-1992

YEAR	GDP Rw.fr.bn	Percentage Growth (Minimal terms)	Percentage Growth (Real terms)
1980	108.0	-	-
1981	122.6	13.5	2.8
1982	130.9	6.8	4.1
1983	142.1	8.6	6.2
1984	159.1	12.0	-5.0
1985	173.3	9.1	4.6
1986	168.9	-2.7	5.1
1987	171.9	1.8	-0.6
1988	177.9	3.5	0.5
1989	174.2	-2.1	-6.0
1990	176.5	1.3	-0.1
1991	193.8	9.8	-3.3
1992	207.2	6.9	-1.3

Source: International Financial statistics Year Book, quoted in N. Middleton et al., *Disaster and Development: The Politics of Humanitarian Rights*, 1998.

3.2.3 Political and Economic Crisis After 1985

As stated above, after 1985, things started going wrong again for Rwanda. The economy started to decline. Nearly all segments of the population were affected. The economic problem was first agricultural (affecting both food-crops and export-crops) but gradually became financial. Economic difficulties were succeeded by a series of political problems as dissatisfaction and unrest among the population escalated. A civil war broke out in October 1990, inviting international pressure for democratization and peaceful resolution of the ethnic conflict. These problems threatened the privileges and power of the Hutu elite. Instead of trying to solve the crisis in a more inclusive and constructive manner, the ruling clique chose a course that would soon cause the entire economic, political and social fabric of the nation to collapse. Through a series of human rights violations, racist propaganda, and militarization of the society, Rwanda population moved towards disaster.

3.2.3.1 Economic Crisis

The economic situation deteriorated in the 1980s. During the second half of the 1980s, the price of coffee, Rwanda's major export, began to decline in the international market. In 1989, Rwanda, like other small coffee growing countries was severely hit by the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement. Coffee export receipts fell from US \$ 144 million in 1985 to US \$ 30 million in 1993.²¹ This greatly reduced the earnings of the Rwandan state whose export earnings were still far more than 80 percent dependent on coffee and tea. The purchasing power of most Rwandese farmers was also eroded. In

²¹ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

1985. the last tin mine which had provided 15 percent of the country's foreign currency earnings stopped functioning due to increasing costs. Rwanda's debt-servicing charges increased four-fold. The available data demonstrate that aggregate GDP per capita decreased from US \$ 355 in 1983 to US \$ 260 in 1990²². According to a 1994 World Bank report, the incidence of poverty in Rwanda increased, from 40 percent in 1985 to 53 percent in 1992.²³ This situation caused widespread discontent. Growing inequality between most rural and some urban dwellers exacerbated the frustration of peasant farmers.

A severe agricultural/food crisis hit Rwanda. FAO data document that food production per capita increased greatly between 1960 and the middle of 1980s, but fell significantly after that. This decline was the result of the combination of factors: droughts in the middle and late 1980s, excessive rain in 1987, plant disease in 1988, the effects of land degradation (over-utilization), soil erosion and poverty.²⁴

From 1990 onwards, the civil war instigated by the RPF further aggravated the economic crisis. First, it displaced hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers in northern Rwanda (13% of the country's total population) with dramatic impact on both coffee and food production (15% decline in agricultural marketed production in one year). Second, it cut off the road to the Kenyan port of Mombasa, Rwanda's main overland route to the outside world. Third, it destroyed the country's tourist industry, which had become the third largest foreign currency earner. Finally, it prompted the government to enlarge its armed forces dramatically, thereby reducing national resources available for other purposes. All these created ground for extremism and ethnic tension.²⁵

²² P. Uvin, *op. cit.*, p.54.

²³ P. Uvin, "Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda," *op. cit.*, p. 106.

²⁴ P. Uvin, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁵ African Rights, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Structural Adjustment Programme

As stated earlier, after 1985, government earnings from coffee exports declined. Because of the continued threat from the RPF, the government increased defence spending. GDP per capita fell by some 40 percent over the four-year period, 1989-1993.²⁶ To address the economic crisis the Habyarimana administration reluctantly accepted a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in return for a loan conditional on the rigid and harsh policies of both international institutions. Devaluation, the reduction of guaranteed prices for the small coffee growers, the relaxation of price controls prior to their ultimate abolition and the privatization of parastatal enterprises were the main conditionalities of the programme.²⁷

Devaluation was introduced to boost coffee exports, reduce imports, increase consumption levels, encourage investment and improve the balance of trade. The Rwandan franc was devalued twice: by 40 percent in 1989 and by an additional 40 percent in 1993. However, devaluation achieved exactly the opposite. Prices increased immediately for Rwandans who were indirectly linked to the commercial economy. The implementation of the SAP had a dramatic and immediate impact. Expansion of public sector jobs ceased and civil servants salaries were frozen. The government was obliged to reduce its social programmes. As a result, there was dramatic decline in the standard of health care and education. While costs of health care, school fees increased, almost every family suffered a substantial reduction in income. At the same time, increased shares of the remaining government budget were taken up by debt reimbursement, and

²⁶ J. Erikson, The International Responses to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Synthesis Report. Copenhagen: Strandberg Grafisk, 1996, p. 15.

²⁷ N. Middleton and P. O'Keefe, Disaster and Development: The Politics of Humanitarian Rights, p. 106.

after 1990, by the war effort. There was growing anxiety and uncertainty among the population.²⁸

The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme seemed to fuel dissent within a general population already unhappy with the authoritarian, one-party rule of President Habyarimana. The terms of the SAP also stipulated that the government introduces greater transparency in government, public accountability, representative democracy and multiparty political system. These externally inspired changes unleashed fear among ruling Hutu elite and resulted in resistance to change, and use of suppression and incitement to ethnic violence to preserve their authority and privileges.

3.2.4 Political Crisis

At the beginning of the 1990s, political problems resurfaced, compounding the economic crisis. The survival of the Hutu establishment was directly threatened. In 1990, the Habyarimana regime faced growing mass discontent. Habyarimana and his clique were under continuous attack from all corners. To maintain their privileges and state power, they resorted to systematic preaching of the social ideology to keep alive ethnic hatred.

3.2.4.1 Political Discontent

The Habyarimana regime had enjoyed considerable public support in the first decade of rule. The government seemed to have brought peace and prosperity to the country. In the mid 1980s, however, a variety of problems emerged to undermine support for the regime. The population was becoming increasingly disenchanted. The

²⁸ V. Jefremovas, "Treacherous Waters: The Politics of History and the Politics of Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi", Review Article, *Africa*, 70 (2) 2000, p. 301.

benefits of economic growth were heavily concentrated in the hands of Habyarimana and his supporters, particularly those from his family and home region. According to Newbury, most public investment took place in Habyarimana's home region, northern Rwanda. In 1982-84, 90 percent of all investments were in the four provinces of Kigali, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Cyangugu (the first is the capital, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi are provinces of the North, the President's region), while Gitarama, the most populous province after Kigali, received 0.16 percent, and Kibuye 0.84 percent.²⁹

After a decade in office, government officials at all levels had become detached from the masses. The growing perception of a social and economic gulf between government officials and the majority of the population exacerbated frustrations with the government over the deteriorating economic situation. Even as the poverty of most Rwandans increased, government officials and their allies were able to accumulate substantial wealth. The opportunities for politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel to gain personal benefits from their offices through both licit and illicit means gradually expanded during Habyarimana's term. *Umuganda* (Communal labour) originally a means of bringing the population together to address communal needs became a form of forced labour. The impoverished rural masses already overburdened with numerous taxes, were obliged to perform 'voluntary' *umuganda* on land owned by supporters of the regime. These developments caused widespread resentment among the population at large³⁰

The one-party state was seen more and more as the obstacle rather than the road to development. There was growing discontent within the country, mainly among the

²⁹ Quoted in P. Uvin, "Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda", *op. cit.*, p. 108.

³⁰ T. Longman, "Rwanda: Democratization and Disorder: Political Transformation and Social Deterioration", in J.F. Clark et al., (eds) *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p. 290; T. Longman, "Rwanda: Chaos from Above", *op. cit.*, p. 79.

disgruntled Hutu in the south who felt excluded from the spoils of power. Geographical exclusion and disappointment with the slow pace of development (especially after the implementation of SAPs) all combined to challenge the regime from within. The rivalry between southern and northern Hutu served to increase political tension in the period up to and the RPF guerilla attack in 1990.³¹

The Habyarimana regime was an autocratic military dictatorship. It had killed many of the members of the Kayibanda government. Opposition parties were not allowed to function for more than a decade. The legal system was not independent. Regular elections were a farce in which Habyarimana was re-elected with more than 95 percent of the vote.

As stated earlier, a small clique of people from Habyarimana's region and family known as the presidential *akazu* increasingly dominated Rwanda's government and economy. For the *akazu*, the movement toward power sharing was simply a challenge to its authority and was fanatically determined to preserve its privileges. Soon it started using the ethnic card to divert attention away from difference among the Hutu.

An expansion of press freedom that began in 1988 had helped give concrete expression to the growing public dissatisfaction by bringing to light examples of official corruption and by openly discussing Rwanda's economic problems, such as famine in the south of the country in 1989. In December 1990, contrary to its usual mutism, even the Catholic Church spoke out against the regime. The church felt obligated to express publicly its dissatisfaction with government economic and political policies. The discontent, however, was expressed mainly by the lower echelons of the church.³² Open

³¹ T. Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda", in R. Joseph (ed.) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1999, p. 343.

³² T. Sellstrom, op.cit., pp. 39-40.

discussions of Rwanda's economic and political troubles thus reinforced public alienation from the Habyarimana regime.

The declining legitimacy of the regime, continuing pressure of war of October 1990, increasing criticism of state officials and practices, growing formal and informal protest, placed pressure on the Habyarimana administration to consider the possibility of political reform. Shortly after returning from Franco-African Summit at La Baule (France) where French President Francois Mitterand had urged his African clients to embrace democracy and multi-party politics, Habyarimana reluctantly initiated a process of democratic reform in 1990.³³ He promised to appoint a commission to chart the country's political future, reform *Umuganda* and other unpopular government programmes, allow free expression of ideas, and move the country towards multi-party elections. While Habyarimana allowed some political changes, he maintained ability to control and direct the process of reform. In September 1990, a National Expert Commission was set up with the task of working out a national charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties. The commission presented its proposals in early 1991, and in June of the same year, a new constitution was adopted that created a post of Prime Minister.³⁴

Following the adoption of the new constitution and a new party law, a number of political parties emerged. Some parties were anti-Tutsi in nature, such as the Mouvement Démocratique Republicain (MDR), which drew much of its support from the Hutu of the

³³ P. Douma, *The Netherlands and Rwanda: A Case Study on Dutch Foreign Policies and Interventions in the Contemporary Conflict History of Rwanda*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of IR, 2000, p. 19; G. Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front", in C. Clapham (ed.) *African Guerillas*. Oxford, James Currey, 1998, p. 128.

³⁴ G. Prunier *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90; T. Longman, "State Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda", *op.cit.*, p. 344.

Giterama prefecture, or even outright radical and racist such as the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). Others mildly pro-Hutu, such as the Parti Social – Démocrate (PSD Butare base). The Parti Libéral (PL) appealed to Tutsi throughout the country. The Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) drew its support from the Hutu in the north, Habyarimana's home region. Except for the desire to oppose the Habyarimana government, there were few ideological differences in the programme of the different parties. In March 1992, in negotiations sponsored by Christian church leaders Habyarimana accepted the formation of a new "government of transition" with an opposition Prime Minister and ministries divided between the MRND and opposition parties. In April 1992, a new transitional government was established. It included all the major opposition parties and led by President Habyarimana and Prime Minister from the opposition. However, relations between the MRND and the opposition parties remained tense throughout the conflict with RPF 1990 - 1994.³⁵ The new political parties were accused of collaborating with the Tutsi and the RPF, who were considered as ethnic enemies.

3.2.4.2. Rwandan Patriotic Front Invasion

The second political challenge was the October 1990 invasion by the RPF composed mainly of the descendants of Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda in the wake of 1959-67 killing and expulsion. Many Rwandan refugees in Uganda became integrated into Ugandan society. However, as non-citizens they faced persistent discrimination. This experience convinced many that their future did not lie in Uganda. Their bitter

³⁵ P. Douma, The Netherlands and Rwanda, p.20.; T. Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda", op.cit., p.344.

experience in Uganda, the fear of extermination and the right to return to their homeland precipitated the 1990 RPF military invasion of northern Rwanda.

At the time of invasion, the RPF had about 2000 men. Most of them had fought with Museveni in Uganda. From this they had obtained arms and experience. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), with the timely support of the French and former Zaire managed to push back the rebel forces. The RPF, however, gained control of a small part of the territory in the northeast of the country and continued to threaten the government. In the fighting of 1990, about three hundred and fifty thousand people had been, temporarily displaced.³⁶

In January 1991, the RPF's surprise attack on the northern prefecture caused a major upheaval. The front quickly pulled back after its success and began operating in the Byumba region. The fighting was of a small scale, but the combatants were able to cut off the highway to Uganda, forcing all the imports and exports of land-locked Rwanda to pass through the longer Tanzanian route.³⁷

The fighting was interrupted from time to time by occasional attempts of cease fires and negotiations, but it was only after the MDR, the PL and the PSD joined the government in April 1992 that they were able to oblige Habyarimana to enter into meaningful negotiations with the RPF. At the same time, the RPF launched a major offensive in the northeast, apparently to assure a strong negotiating position at the commencement of peace talks. They drove Rwandan government troops from several communes in Byumba prefecture. The RPF and the Habyaimana government signed a ceasefire at Arusha in July 1992. The following month they signed the first of a series of

³⁶ G. Prunier, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front", *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

agreements that would be known as the Arusha Accords.³⁸ The ceasefire was, however, violated in February 1993 when the RPF launched an attack following the slaughter of some 300 Tutsi a few weeks before. Hundreds of civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands of others pushed into camps in and around the capital.³⁹

The civil war that began in 1990 greatly affected the Rwanda economic and political environment. Soon after the outbreak of the war the government started to portray the front fighters as quasi-monsters. The propaganda was so obsessive and effective that even the Tutsi fled from the advancing RPF and a large segment of the population rallied around the regime. There were reports of arbitrary killings of civilians by the RPF. They exploited the incident to discredit the Front. People who left their home region because of the fighting and those residing in the areas that the displaced had moved to were hostile to the RPF and open to ethnic manipulation.⁴⁰

3.2.5 Psychological Factors

Together with the political and socio-economic difficulties seen in Rwanda, psychological factors also played a role in creating the possibility for violence. According to Jermy Sarkin, situational stresses such as poverty, political conflict, decline in power, and threats to prestige combined with an explosive emotional brew intentionally stirred by political manipulation, often lead to the tendency in individuals with particular disposition to scapegoat and punish those perceived as "others".⁴¹

³⁸ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, P.60.

³⁹ P. Uvin *op.cit.* p. 61.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁴¹ J. Sarkin, "The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda," *Human Rights Quarterly*, volume 21, 1999, p. 776.

The mass killing of the Tutsi could be seen as an extreme form of scapegoating, by which the powerful group supports its threatened self-concept by hurting the subgroup.⁴² When public resentment of official corruption and profiteering grew in the late 1980s, some Hutu officials perceived that rekindling ethnic tension could serve to deflect public attention and directed popular dissatisfaction and anger towards the Tutsi.

Although the objective of RPF's offensive of October 1, 1990 seemed to be limited to presenting an alternative to the Habyarimana regime, the invasion was seen as a threat to the Hutu ideology and an attempt to return the Tutsi to power. The government used the technique of scapegoating. It aggravated ethnic tension and united many Hutu around the President. The regime then incited a series of pogroms against the Tutsi. It justified the pogroms on the grounds of self-defense of the Hutu majority against the threat from the feudal Tutsi. This reawakened the latent mistrust between the two groups.⁴³

3.2.6 The Path to Genocide

Different identities, ethnic or otherwise, do not in themselves cause division or conflict. It is the behaviour of unscrupulous leaders that transforms differences into divisions. As one scholar has observed, those who choose to manipulate such differences for their self-interests, even at the risk of creating major conflicts, are "bad leaders". Fatefully, Rwanda's bad leaders chose the path of division and hate instead of national unity.⁴⁴

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide on the 20th Century*, p.45; H.M. Hintjens. "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," *op.cit.*, p.263.

⁴⁴ International Panel of Prominent Personalities, *op.cit.*, p.42.

Economic and political crises threatened to deprive Habyarimana and his clique of their control of power. After the adoption of the multiparty system, the regime was under attack from all corners. The *akazu* was, however, determined to preserve its power and privileges at any cost and reverted to ethnic hatred as a remedy to its problems. The RPF invasion had made the renewed vilification of the Tutsi easier. The war killed hundreds of people and displaced hundreds of thousands. The *akazu* exploited the death and misery of the people and portrayed the RPF and the Tutsi as aggressive and dangerous.

All Tutsi, whether linked to RPF or not, were considered a threat. The government used the RPF invasion as an excuse to arrest 8,000 to 10,000 Tutsi throughout the country. The arrest began after bombs were heard in Kigali on the night of 4 October 1990. It has since been shown that this particular incident was a staged attack by the Rwandan army itself to justify a crackdown on "the enemy within". Most of those who were imprisoned were released only after months of international pressure. Many were tortured, some killed and their property looted. Thus a direct link was created between the RPF and all Tutsi in the country. However, as Alison Des Forges has observed, it appears that even many Tutsi were initially unsympathetic to the RPF invasion.⁴⁵

Habyarimana's supporters continued to re-ignite ethnic conflict. They used political rallies and speeches, as well as extremist local language newspapers. The government-controlled Radio Rwanda and the infamous *Radio Libre des Mises Collines*, and "Kangura" a radical newspaper were also used. Tutsi were the subject of hateful

⁴⁵ A. Des Forges. *op.cit.*, p.50, G. Prunier, *op.cit.* p.102., T. Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda," pp. 347-348. *op.cit.*, pp. 347-348.

propaganda. Unsubstantiated reports of RPF atrocities against civilians were disseminated, and government officials claimed that the RPF wanted to re-impose the monarchy.⁴⁶

Hutu extremists, most of them members or supporters of the ruling party, produced a set of ten commandments that dictated how Hutu should treat their Tutsi neighbours. Among other things, it described as 'traitors' any Hutu who married, or employed Tutsi. To the extremists, all Tutsi were dishonest and were to be excluded from business and from positions of influence and education. The commandments urged Hutu to have no mercy on the Tutsi. The hate campaign was aimed at marginalizing the Tutsi and creating an environment in which their mass slaughter would be acceptable.⁴⁷ This extremist and genocidal propaganda was tolerated and financially and morally backed at the highest echelons of the administration.⁴⁸

Increased ethnic tensions and the war with the RPF helped the regime to take on the cloak of nationalism and characterize its opponents as traitors to the Rwandan nation. After peace negotiations between the RPF and the government began in Arusha in mid 1992, the President and his supporters regularly rejected proposals worked out by the representatives at the peace negotiations, claiming they were defending the interests of the Hutu majority. The killings of Tutsi in Rwanda inspired the RPF to become more brutal in its own attacks, and as the extent of destruction in the country spread, support for the rebels among the Hutu population almost entirely vanished.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-42.; J. Kakwenzire et al., "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda" 1990-1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

⁴⁷ F. Keane, *Season of Blood. A Rwandan Journey*. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁸ P. Uvin, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴⁹ T. Longman, "Rwanda: Democratization and Disorder: Political Transformation and Social Deterioration," *op. cit.*, pp. 298-299.

Habyarimana and his supporters employed ethnic arguments to divide the opposition. As Peter Uvin⁵⁰ contends, most opposition groups were little more than vehicles of individual politicians, with little agenda beyond the pursuit of their own power and privileges. By 1993, under the pressure of an increasingly polarized society, each of the major opposition parties split into moderate factions that supported a negotiated settlement with the RPF and another that sought to protect Hutu interests and thus, were close to the CDR. During the genocide, most of the leaders who supported a negotiated settlement with the RPF were massacred many of the radical so-called opposition politicians participated, often occupying high posts.

During this period, the Rwandan population became increasingly militarized. At the time the RPF launched their attack in October 1990, Rwanda had an army of only 5000 men. By 1994, the army had expanded to between 40,000 and 50,000 men strong. Large amounts of arms were imported from France, Egypt and South Africa. The Rwandan army which was being trained and equipped by the French in turn armed and trained the militia and youth wingers of the MRND and CDR in extremist killer tactics.⁵¹ The Habyarimana regime distributed arms to regions closest to the fighting zone, to allow for "popular defense" of the nation. At the end of 1993, a major campaign was conducted to distribute arms to "self defense forces" in all 146 districts.⁵²

With all this strength, the non-liability of the army and other armed groups to commit crime increased. Frequent killings of the Tutsi were perpetuated by the Presidential Guards, the Rwandan army and armed militias, the *Interhamwe* and the

⁵⁰ P. Uvin, *op.cit.* p.65.

⁵¹ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 132.; C. Kakwenzire et al., "The Rwandan Patriotic Front Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994," *op. cit.*, p. 78; H.M. Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 Genocides in Rwanda", *op.cit.* p. 257.

⁵² C. Braeckman, Rwanda: *Histoire d'un Genocide*, Paris: Fayard, 1994, p. 154.

impazamugambi. Between 1990-1993, thousands of Tutsi were massacred often by mobs organized by local officials, the police and national politicians.⁵³

On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down. The exact details of the plane crash will probably never be known. The RPF might have launched the missiles either because they believed that Habyarimana would never permit the Agreements to be implemented or, because they thought he was about to do so and they preferred a clear military victory to sharing power as part of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.⁵⁴ A Canadian newspaper, *the National Post*⁵⁵ revealed, the existence of a UN document, which indicated that the Rwandan Patriotic Army had shot down the aircraft carrying President Habyarimana, an incident that precipitated the genocide. The Kagame government rejected the report, and other pro-RPF elements questioned its authenticity.⁵⁶

According to various reports, including a study by the Belgian government, Habyarimana's own circle had devised a plan in late 1993 or early 1994 to kill off anyone who challenged their authority. The CDR and even MRND leaders had criticized Habyarimana for talking with the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, in March 1994 and some feared that he would return from Dar-es-Salaam ready to implement the Accords.⁵⁷ Fergal Keane had also observed that the army and the extremists felt they had to remove the president in order to preserve their own power, and thus his plane was shot

⁵³ T. Longman, "Democratization and Disorder Politically Transformation and Social Deterioration":

op. cit., p. 298;

⁵⁴ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, 182.

⁵⁵ *The National Post*, a Canadian newspaper in its March 2000 issue criticized the role of the UN in Rwanda and revealed the existence of UN documents, which indicated that, the RPA had brought down the aeroplane carrying President Habyarimana.

⁵⁶ Africa South of the Sahara 2001, 30th Edition, p. 923.

⁵⁷ C. Braeckman, *Rwanda Histoire d'un Genocide*, pp. 174-180; "T. Longman, Rwanda Chaos from Above," *op. cit.*, p. 84; A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

and used this as a pretext for implementing the final solution of the Tutsi problem, as well as for the destruction of moderate Hutu opposition politicians.⁵⁸

Lists of people to be targeted by the violence were already in existence at the time of the president's death. Within hours of the accident, a group of soldiers and the Presidential Guard went through Kigali systematically killing all those perceived as potential enemies. When it became clear that the international community was not going to intervene, the killings spread outside the capital. In addition to the Tutsi, leaders of opposition parties, leading southern Hutu, human rights activists, journalists, development workers, university professors and others whom they perceived to be capable of challenging them or of inciting the population to resist had been massacred.⁵⁹

As soon as the killings began, the RPF renewed its attacks and swept through the east and north of the country and laid siege of the capital. The Front seized control of the state in July 1994. The government, the army and 1.2 million ordinary people fled into exile in former Zaire. Another one million fled to Burundi and Tanzania.⁶⁰

In conclusion, what occurred in Rwanda shows a situation where the coexistence of different social groups transformed into an ethnic problem having a racist dimension. The physical differences between Tutsi and Hutu have been greatly exaggerated by some Rwandan politicians and were manipulated to give proof of the racial superiority of one group over the other. Political differences were gradually metamorphosed into racial ideologies. The ruling cliques that had administered Rwanda since independence

⁵⁸ F. Keane, *Seasons of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ A. Guichaoua (ed.) *Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)*, Paris: Karthala, 1995, pp. 675-693; J. Havermans, 'Rwandan Crisis Lingers On', *op. cit.*, p. 248; "T. Longman, "Rwanda": democratization and Disorder," *op. cit.*, p. 300.

⁶⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *EIU Country Profile Rwanda*, 2000, p. 8.

demonstrated that they needed ethnic cleavages in order to strengthen and justify their authority. However, it was the ethnic categorization registered on identity papers initiated by Belgian colonial masters that served as the main tool for the slaughter of the Tutsi. As Alain Destexhe observes, the Tutsi people were “guilty” on three charges: they were a minority, they were a reminder of a feudal order, and they were considered as colonizers in their own country.⁶¹

3.3 The Role of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Hierarchies During the Genocide

Rwanda is a religious country; about 90 percent of the population are Christians; of which more than 60 percent adhere to Catholicism. However, some church leaders – nuns, priests and bishops – were among those who were implicated in the 1994 genocide.⁶²

As stated in Chapter Two, the Roman Catholic Church involvement in Rwandese politics goes back to colonial era, when church hierarchies became part and parcel of divisive colonial politics. Like German and Belgian colonial authorities, the Catholic Church backed the ruling Tutsi without critical distance. During that period, the Catholic Church was identified as a “Tutsi” church. In the late 1950s, the Tutsi elite started to demand an end to colonial rule. This was taken as a sign of ingratitude by both the colonial administration and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchies. The hierarchy decided in 1959 to switch its support from the Tutsi to the Hutu and started to accuse the

⁶¹ A. Destexhe, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁶² J. Kakwenzire et al., “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994”, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

Tutsi of being oppressors.⁶³ The church remained a trusted ally of the Habyarimana regime. Its leaders rarely challenged the ethnic bases of Habyarimana's one-party military dictatorship. The leadership of the church and state remained tightly bound throughout the Habyarimana era, earning the former the nickname of "the church of silence".⁶⁴

Church leaders were invited to participate in regional and national party committees. The Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Vincent Nsengiyumva, the church's first Rwandan primate, became a member of the central committee of the MRND until 1990 when the Pope ordered him to resign.⁶⁵

The church plays a major role in uniting its followers. It socializes them and cares for them in times of need. The church, therefore, becomes a haven for peace and protection. When the mass killings started, the only place people thought they could be safe were church buildings. Thousands of people took refuge in churches. Unfortunately churches were not treated as sanctuaries. On the contrary, they became primary killing sites; many churches became graveyards.⁶⁶

Despite the massacres at churches and other places of worship, the Hutu leadership of the Catholic and Anglican Churches continued to give unquestioned support to the Hutu ruling clique. These church leaders did not attempt to discourage the bloodletting. They failed to use their unique moral position among the overwhelming Christian population to denounce ethnic hatred and mass killings. They betrayed their people in the hours of need. Even in the last hours when the extremists were slaughtering

⁶³ T. Tschuy, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁶⁴ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁶⁵ P. Reyntjens, quoted in Timothy Longman, "State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda", in R. Joseph (ed.) *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 342; T.

Tschuy, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁶⁶ J. Kakwenzire et al., "The Development of Extremist Forces in Rwanda", *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

people, they never let the people know that the situation was so bad that the walls of the churches could provide little protection. Their silence was easily interpreted by ordinary Christians as an implicit approval of the massacres.⁶⁷ As late as June, two months into the genocide, the Anglican archbishop refused to condemn the *genocidaire* interim government of Rwanda.⁶⁸ When the interim government fled to a provisional new capital, the Catholic archbishop fled with the group.⁶⁹

However, some church leaders heroically risked their lives to protect their people and died in the process. Many nuns, pastors and priests hid the hunted and the vulnerable and tended the wounded. These people knew the penalty, for their deeds, and most paid dearly.⁷⁰

As stated above, both the Roman Catholic and Anglican Archbishops remained loyal allies to the Hutu establishment throughout the genocide. The latter fled to exile. His successor and the Archbishop of Canterbury have publicly apologized on behalf of the Anglican Church for its action during the tragic events of 1994.⁷¹

The leadership of the Catholic Church in Rwanda did not follow similar line. The Rwandan National Radio and the press openly accused the Catholic Church of having participated in the genocide.⁷² The Government of Rwanda has demanded a formal apology from the Vatican. The Pope has called for the clergy who are guilty to have the

⁶⁷ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 126; J. Kakwenzire et al., "The Development of Extremist Forces in Rwanda", *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁶⁸ African Rights, *Rwanda. Death, Despair and Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1995, p. 901.

⁶⁹ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁷⁰ African Rights, Rwanda, p. 922; International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP), *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁷¹ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 768.

⁷² The President of the Episcopal Conference of Rwanda, *Rwanda Concerns about the Attitude of the Catholic Church with Regard to Social and Political Development of the Country after the Genocide, Memorandum to His Holiness Pope John Paul II*. Kigali: 1996, p. 8.

courage to face the consequences of their crimes. But the church refuses to admit any wrongdoing as an institution nor will it agree to conduct any inquiry.⁷³

3.4 The Role of External Actors Before and During the Genocide.

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the international community has played a major role in Rwanda's society. It contributed in shaping its external relations and its economic activities. However, when it came to preventing the tragic events, the international community failed to fulfill its obligation. It failed totally to avert the mass slaughter.

Several external actors carry a heavy responsibility for events that occurred in Rwanda. The main actors were the members of the UN Security Council, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), France, Belgium and the United States. The role of each will be examined briefly.

3.4.1. Belgium

During the early 1990s, the Belgian government attempted to play a role in resolving the Rwandan conflict peacefully. When the civil war began in October 1990, the government sent troops to protect the large Belgian expatriate community in Rwanda. However, one month later, when it became clear that the Belgian community was not threatened, Brussels withdrew its troops.⁷⁴

When the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in 1993, the Belgian government contributed by sending 440 best trained and best equipped soldiers. Responding to news of imminent crisis in Rwanda, the Belgians

⁷³ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 768.

⁷⁴ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Alain Destexhe, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

lobbied for a strengthened UNAMIR and for an expanded mandate. However, major powers, the US, the UK and France refused to consider the Belgian proposal.⁷⁵

The murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers by Rwandan soldiers on 7 April 1994 led to a popular outcry in Belgium.⁷⁶ As the Hutu extremists had anticipated, the Belgian government panicked and made the decision to end Belgian participation in UNAMIR and pull out its troops. The Belgian government argued that it was pointless continuing the operations and that there was high possibility of further losses among the Belgian soldiers.⁷⁷

UNAMIR's commander, General Romeo Dallaire, was never ordered by headquarters to take care of the people at risk but he did so. He permitted his subordinates to grant refuge. Ninety Belgian troops had been posted at a school in Kigali called *Ecole Technique Officielle* (Official Technical School – ETO). The Tutsi, frightened by rumours of impending violence, had been gathering at this school. By April 10, 1994, the number had grown to 2,000, at least 400 of them children. Rwandan soldiers and extremist militia waited outside the school compound. The panic-stricken crowd begged the Belgian peacekeepers not to leave them behind, but the Belgian commander, acting on direct orders from his government to leave the country, ordered his men to evacuate.⁷⁸

As the soldiers drove out of the school ground, the crowd was attacked, many instantly murdered. Those who fled were rounded up by government soldiers and militia and attacked with machetes, hand grenades and guns. Most of the two thousand people

⁷⁵ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 600.

⁷⁶ T. Sellstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁷⁷ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 619.

⁷⁸ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

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⁷⁸ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

were slaughtered that day, within hours of the departure of Belgian peacekeepers from the school.⁷⁹

Belgium, apparently disconcerted by its hasty pullout and eager to save face, sought the withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops. The Belgians launched a vigorous campaign to persuade Security Council members to support their proposal. This maneuver was meant to disguise and lessen Belgian responsibility for deserting Rwanda.⁸⁰

Belgium, a country that had devoted its effort since 1990 to end the Rwandan civil war and then to strengthen UNAMIR's mandate, now argued that Rwanda was unsafe for UNAMIR peacekeepers. As one UN official observed, "because Belgium had ten men dead, it does not give a damn about thousands of blacks who are going to be killed."⁸¹ Belgian government officials decided that sacrificing Rwandans to assuage angry voters was a price worth paying. Belgium must accept a degree of responsibility for this genocide. It is responsible for having largely created the political antagonism between Tutsi and Hutu and then transforming it into an ethnic problem, which sowed the seeds of the present tragedy.⁸²

On 7 April 2000, on the sixth anniversary of the genocide, the Belgian Prime Minister visited Rwanda and apologized for his country's refusal to intervene to prevent the mass-killings.⁸³

⁷⁹ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 618.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 620-621.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 622.

⁸² International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.* p. 142; A. Destexhe, *op. cit.* p. 71.

⁸³ Africa South of the Sahara 2001, 30th Edition, 2000 p. 923.

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⁸³ Africa South of the Sahara 2001, 30th Edition, 2000 p. 923.

3.4.2 The United States of America

The United States had for a long time only held marginal interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War it counted on its European allies to handle the situation. With the end of the Cold War, the inherent American tendency to regard African issues strictly as non-relevant unless proven to the contrary was reinforced.⁸⁴ As Peter J. Schraeder argue, a policy of 'cynical disengagement' during the Bush government revealed the continuity of this historical neglect.⁸⁵ Essentially, the policy consisted of keeping costs at a minimum and trying to avoid commitments that could cause internal political upheaval.

In October 1993, when Rwanda appeared on the agenda of the Security Council, the United States had lost 18 soldiers in Somalia. The murder of its soldiers in Somalia profoundly shocked the Clinton administration. As a result of its bitter experience in Somalia, the US government was reluctant to participate in any further peacekeeping tasks.⁸⁶ It immediately started to set out strict conditions for future UN peacekeeping missions. Presidential Decree Directive 25 ruled out any major peace enforcement whatsoever by the US for the foreseeable future.⁸⁷

Like many western powers, the US knew in advance that a terrible calamity was looming in Rwanda. It was fully aware of the massacre that was taking place but its

⁸⁴ P. Douma, *The Netherlands and Rwanda: A Case Study on Dutch Foreign Policies and Interventions in Contemporary Conflict History of Rwanda*, p. 38; A.C. Huliaras, "The Anglosaxon Conspiracy: French Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1998, p. 597.

⁸⁵ Quoted in P. Douma, *The Netherlands and Rwanda*, p. 38.

⁸⁶ J. Havermans, "Rwandan Crisis Lingers On". *op. cit.*, p. 252.

⁸⁷ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

analysis was rather superficial.⁸⁸ James Wood, a former Pentagon African Specialist, believes that the principal problem at the time was a failure of leadership, and it was deliberate and calculated because whether in Europe or in New York or in Washington, the senior policy-making bodies did not want to face up to this African problem. They did not want to admit what was going on or that they knew what was going on because they did not want to bear the burden of mounting a humanitarian intervention against the genocide.... I think much of this (pretence about whether or not it was genocide) was simply a smokescreen for the policy determination in advance: 'we are not going to intervene in this mess, let the Africans sort themselves out.'⁸⁹

As stated above, the problem was not that the US government was ignorant about the Rwandan crisis. The problem was that nothing was at stake for the Americans in Rwanda. There was no interest to preserve. The Clinton administration, fearing domestic political backlash, wanted to avoid meddling in a murky ethnic quagmire. There were no powerful lobbies on behalf of the Rwandan Tutsi. Clinton confronted with the Rwandan problem, demanded to know whether the African American community, that had a considerable voting power bloc, had expressed a strong commitment. Unfortunately, the answer was in the negative. The President had no domestic pressure to intervene.⁹⁰

The US government played a significant role in preventing action being taken to stop or mitigate the genocide. When the full impact of the genocidal events were reported to US officials they initially blocked the deployment of 5,500 peace keepers to

⁸⁸ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁸⁹ Quoted in international Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP), Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, p. 134

⁹⁰ P. Douma, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

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p.134
⁹⁰ P. Douma, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

Rwanda and ordered their subordinates to refrain from using the word “genocide” to sidestep the international obligation to intervene. The Americans withheld support for the UNAMIR II mission at a crucial point of time.⁹¹

In 1998, President Clinton formally apologized for not having responded to Rwandan cries for help. He admitted that the United States and others had not done enough to try to halt the genocide.⁹² The United States and the rest of the international community had moral obligation and under the UN Charter, a legal one – to try to stop the genocide.⁹³

3.4.3 France

France has been regarding its former African colonies as its indivisible sphere of influence and part of its backyard, *le pré carré*. Many French policy makers believed that France must continue to have strong links with African allies if it were to have any stature in the international arena. Such allies were French-speaking countries, Rwanda included. Rwanda had not been a French colony, but an ally that had been won away from its former colonial master, Belgium.⁹⁴

French support for the Habyarimana regime dated back to the 1970s, when the two countries signed their first military assistance agreement. But following the RPF invasion in October 1990, France sent its own soldiers and military advisors to Rwanda

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² R.M. Press, *The New Africa: Dispatches from a Challenging Continent*. Tallahassee: The University Press of Florida, 1999, p. 227.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

in order to help the Habyarimana regime halt the invasion of the 'anglophone' Tutsi of the Rwandan Patriotic Front from neighbouring Uganda.⁹⁵

Paris had always justified its opposition to the RPF with the argument that the organization was a stooge of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni and, through him, of the United States and the wider 'Anglo-Saxon world.' "In the eyes of the Mitterand government", argued Christopher Clapham, "Ugandan support assumed the dimensions of an anglophone conspiracy to take over part of francophone Africa, and the defence of Habyarimana become part of the more general defence of francophonie and Francafrica."⁹⁶

The leaders of the RPF were largely English speaking. The long years of exile in Uganda had forced the Tutsi refugees to abandon the French language. The RPF's senior military leadership had fought with Museveni's National Resistance Army during Uganda's civil war. However, the RPF emphasized its independence from Ugandan subordination. According to Asteris C. Huliaras, the French perception of total dependence on Uganda by the RPF was rather exaggerated.⁹⁷

French officials argued that their intervention in Rwanda had the humanitarian objective: to protect the 600 French expatriates and other foreigners residing in that country.⁹⁸ However, French troops did much more than just protect their nationals; they took active role in field combat. According to several sources, French intervention was the determining role in halting the RPF advances in 1992 and February 1993. With each

⁹⁵ F. Keane, *Seasons of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, pp 25-26.

⁹⁶ Quoted in IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide* p.88.

⁹⁷ A.C. Huliaras, "The Anglo-Saxon conspiracy", French perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis, *op.cit.* p 594.

⁹⁸ J.P. Chretien, *Le Defi de l'Ethnisme: Rwanda et Burundi: 1990 - 1996*, p. 123.

new RPF offensive. The French government raised the number of its troops until they totaled 700 soldiers of the elite Rapid Action Force.⁹⁹

Throughout the early 1990s, French officers worked closely with their Rwandan counterparts. The French army was in complete control of anti-guerilla operation and advised Rwanda senior officers in preparing battle plans.¹⁰⁰ French army officers provided military intelligence, trained the Presidential Guard and other soldiers who later became *genocidaires*. Furthermore, militias were being secretly trained by French instructors, under the guise of training FAR soldiers. This militia, Interhamwe (MRND) and Impuzamugambi (CDR) later played a vital role in the genocide.¹⁰¹ In addition, French troops took rather more sinister duties such as supervising Rwandan military security operations, including questioning RPF prisoners and detained suspects. French troops were deployed to man checkpoints north of Kigali, at which they demanded identification cards from civilians.¹⁰²

France also increased arms deliveries out of all proportion to actual military situation and the defence needs of the country.¹⁰³ These weapons and equipment were supplied during 1992 and 1993 when the Rwandan government was already committing human right abuses.¹⁰⁴ French soldiers and officers were aware of wide spread intimidation, repeated massacres and murders committed by extremist Hutu during this period.¹⁰⁵ As Lemarchand has observed, by turning a blind eye and deaf ear to the

⁹⁹ A. Callamard, "French Policy in Rwanda," in H. Adelman et al (eds) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick. Transaction Publishers, 1999. pp. 159-16; A. Destexhe op. cit., pp 51-52.

¹⁰⁰ G. Prunier, op.cit., p.149.

¹⁰¹ P. Douma, op.cit., p.20; A. Callamard, "French Policy in Rwanda", pp 166-167.

¹⁰² T. Sellstrom, op.cit., study I. p.90; Prunier, op.cit., pp.110-111.

¹⁰³ C. Braeckman, op. cit., p.149; A Destexhe, op.cit., pp51-52.

¹⁰⁴ G. Vassal Adams, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action, p.27.

¹⁰⁵ A. Callamard, "French Policy in Rwanda", op.cit., p.168.

multiple signs of human rights violations and a coming genocide emerging from the Habyarimana clique. French officials substantially strengthened the military capabilities of the regime as a matter of deliberate policy¹⁰⁶. France failed to use its military might and influence to end human rights abuses. On the contrary, the French government supported the Habyarimana regime in international fora, demanding support for an innocent government under siege by foreign troops and dismissing the increasing stories of human rights abuses committed by that regime.¹⁰⁷

On 8 April 1994, two days after the mysterious death of Habyarimana, the French authorities had finally decided that France's military presence in Rwanda had to end. French citizens as well as Rwandans linked to the Habyarimana family and *Akazu* members who for years had propagated ethnic hatred were flown out of Rwanda. Neither Tutsi nor any Hutu targeted by the *genocidaires* were allowed to go on board the French planes.¹⁰⁸

French officials pressed by public opinion at home and francophone leaders in Africa, and South Africa's threat to intervene unilaterally, announced a plan to send 2,500 troops to Southwestern Rwanda for "humanitarian reasons". In mid- June 1994, the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, wrote in a French major newspaper:

We have a real duty to intervene in Rwanda. The time to passively watch the massacre is over, we must take the initiative-
France is ready with its main European and African partners to prepare an intervention on the ground to put an end to the

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in A. Callamard "French Policy in Rwanda", *op.cit.*, pp.173-174

¹⁰⁷ A. Des Forges *op.cit.*, p.121; G. Prunier, *op.cit.*, p176.

¹⁰⁸ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

multiple signs of human rights violations and a coming genocide emerging from the Habyarimana clique. French officials substantially strengthened the military capabilities of the regime as a matter of deliberate policy¹⁰⁶. France failed to use its military might and influence to end human rights abuses. On the contrary, the French government supported the Habyarimana regime in international fora, demanding support for an innocent government under siege by foreign troops and dismissing the increasing stories of human rights abuses committed by that regime.¹⁰⁷

On 8 April 1994, two days after the mysterious death of Habyarimana, the French authorities had finally decided that France's military presence in Rwanda had to end. French citizens as well as Rwandans linked to the Habyarimana family and *Akazu* members who for years had propagated ethnic hatred were flown out of Rwanda. Neither Tutsi nor any Hutu targeted by the *genocidaires* were allowed to go on board the French planes.¹⁰⁸

French officials pressed by public opinion at home and francophone leaders in Africa, and South Africa's threat to intervene unilaterally, announced a plan to send 2,500 troops to Southwestern Rwanda for "humanitarian reasons". In mid-June 1994, the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, wrote in a French major newspaper:

We have a real duty to intervene in Rwanda. The time to passively watch the massacre is over, we must take the initiative-
- France is ready with its main European and African partners to prepare an intervention on the ground to put an end to the

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in A. Callamard "French Policy in Rwanda", *op.cit.*, pp.173-174

¹⁰⁷ A. Des Forges *op.cit.* p.121; G. Prunier *op.cit.* p176.

¹⁰⁸ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

massacre and to protect the population threatened with
extremation--. France will live up to its responsibilities.¹⁰⁹

As Prunier has pointed out, from a moral point of view, it was a strange statement. Having spent the last nine weeks silently watching its former allies and protégés commit a massive genocide, the French government discovered it had a conscience when public opinion became irresistible and when South Africa threatened to intervene unilaterally¹¹⁰

The French lobbied hard at the UN to get support for their mission dubbed “Operation Turquoise”. Even the former UN Secretary – General, Boutros – Ghali, known to have intimate ties with France, admitted that, “France had long been deeply involved with the Hutu and therefore was far from ideal for this role”. However, he personally intervened in support of an authorization of the French mission, arguing for urgent decision. On June 22, 1994, the UN Security Council authorized Operation Turquoise with Ten members in favour and five abstaining¹¹¹

It appeared the French intervened to protect the falling regime they had backed. Once France carved out the “secure humanitarian zone,” the majority of the former Rwandan forces, thousands of heavily equipped Interhamwe militia, as well as high ranking military officers managed to retreat to this “safe zone”. It is believed that French authorities willingly allowed the flow of arms into the area thus enabling the Hutu forces to counter attack later.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ G. Prunier, “Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End,” in H. Adelman et al., (eds), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis, from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1999.p.285.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 284-285.

¹¹¹ IPEP, op.cit., p. 144

¹¹² African Peace Forum, Background Report African Great Lakes, 1998, pp. 30-31; J. Havermans, “Rwanda Crisis Lingers On”, op.cit.,p. 252.

Radio Mille Collines run by Hutu extremists¹¹³ continued to broadcast from the “safe area”. No attempt was made by French officers to locate and destroy the transmitter. France failed to arrest the perpetrators of genocide who were taking refuge in its ‘safe zone’. Yet this was exactly what France should have done to show a desire for justice and to restore French credibility.

The French government continued to back its former Hutu allies. French officers allowed the defeated Rwandan army to move freely between the “safe area” and eastern Zaire. French soldiers drove ex-FAR soldiers around in official vehicles and provided them with food at Goma. According to UN authorities, the French army flew an aeroplane of *genocidaires* out of eastern former Zaire to an unknown destination.¹¹⁴

A French non-governmental organization, *Medicins Sans Frontieres*, describes the French government’s role in the genocide as “shameful” and argues that, “France backed the Habyarimana regime even though racism was the pillar of all its policies”¹¹⁵

A French parliamentary inquiry into the Rwandan tragedy clarified that France helped the Rwandan regime that perpetrated the genocide. A telegram from the French Ambassador in Kigali to his government clearly demonstrates that France was well informed at an early stage about the preparation for the mass killing.¹¹⁶ France had the military might and influence to stop the massacre, but it did not have any will to halt it.¹¹⁷ However, France remained totally unrepentant and, in its own eyes, totally blameless for any aspect of the Rwandan tragedy. In January 2000, Charles Josselin, the French minister for overseas co-operation, visited Rwanda. Josselin refused to apologize for

¹¹³ A. Destexhe, *op.cit.*, p.54; A. Des Forges, *op.cit.*, p.687.

¹¹⁴ IPEP, *op.cit.*, pp. 146-147.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.91.

¹¹⁶ J. Havermans, “Rwanda Crisis Lingers On”, *op.cit.*, p.252.

¹¹⁷ IPEP, *op.cit.*, p.142.

France's role in the 1994 genocide. instead he urged Rwanda to focus on present and future co-operation rather than the past.¹¹⁸

3.4.4. The Role of the United Nations

As stated in chapter one, in 1993, under international pressure, the Habyarimana government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front started negotiations in the Tanzania town of Arusha and reached a political agreement. The agreement called for the merger of all military forces into one national army, the repatriation of refugees, the establishment of a broad-based transitional government and the holding of democratic elections. The implementation of the peace agreement was to be supervised by a United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Because of the desire not to repeat the mistakes made in Somalia, diplomats at the UN produced a mandate for UNAMIR that was far short of what would have been required to guarantee implementation of the agreement. The Arusha Accords had asked for a force to "guarantee overall security" in Rwanda. The Security Council provided, instead, a force to "contribute to" security, not throughout the country, but only in the capital city, Kigali. In Arusha, the warring parties had agreed that UNAMIR would "assist in the tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout Rwanda" and would assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to, or illegally obtained by, civilians. However, UN diplomats, because of their experience in the disarmament attempts in Somalia, rejected these conditions. In the agreements, UNAMIR was to have been charged with providing security for civilians. However, this

¹¹⁸Africa South of the Sahara 2001, 30th Edition, p.923.

part of the mandate was changed to “investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities” of the police.¹¹⁹

The United Nations knew beforehand that the genocide might be in the offing but took no steps to avert it. UNAMIR’s commander, Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent a memo in January 11, 1994 to the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations explaining what a former member of Habyarimana’s security staff had told him that arms were being distributed among the Hutu population and lists of targeted Tutsi and moderate Hutu were being prepared¹²⁰. The informant offered to help the UN raid Hutu arms caches, which Dallaire notified the United Nations he intended to do.

Dallaire was unequivocally informed that from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that under the UN mandate in Rwanda, such offensive actions were not permitted. Instead of challenging the mandate to allow offensive operations, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations instructed Dallaire to take no action.¹²¹ When Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6 1994, Dallaire pleaded with New York to be given the means in order to do more. His superiors in the peacekeeping office replied, “that nobody in New York was interested in that”.¹²²

On April 7 1994, knowing she was targeted by the Hutu extremists, the then Prime Minister of the country Agathe Uwilingiyimana took refuge at a UN compound. Dallaire immediately sent a message to UN headquarters informing them that force might be needed to save the Prime Minister. “The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations confirmed the rules of engagement: that peacekeepers should not fire until fired upon.” Government soldiers knew well that so long as they did not directly attack UNAMIR

¹¹⁹ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹²⁰ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 –108.

¹²¹ R. M. Press, *The New Africa Dispatches from a Challenging Continent*, pp. 622-623.

¹²² A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

soldiers, they could execute their mission. Rwandan soldiers rushed to the UN premises and shot the Prime Minister and her husband to death. Few days after Habyarimana's death, virtually all the major political leaders who needed protection were killed or in flight because their UNAMIR guards had refused to take the risk to protect them.¹²³ On April 10, Dallaire again asked for 5000 soldiers and a clear mandate to stop the killings. Again no support was forthcoming from New York.¹²⁴

Although there were UN soldiers in Rwanda, they did not get appropriate mandate and sufficient equipment and transport that might have saved lives. When the genocide started, the UN failed to call genocide by its rightful name. A condemnation of the killing might have given moral support to the few who tried to stop the genocide and a moral leadership role to the UN.

At the time of the outbreak of the killings UNAMIR had 2548 troops. Shortly after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by the government soldiers, the UN ordered the withdrawal of all but 270 troops, leaving the UN forces incapable of doing anything significant.¹²⁵ Discussions continued in the Security Council through the genocide especially after Belgian politicians announced the withdrawal of their contingent, without tangible results. The special representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Bouh, his successor, Shaharyar Khan and other UN representatives failed to criticize the provisional government even though its senior cadres were inciting the genocide. Instead, they were interested in getting a cease-fire between the government army and the RPF. As the rebel movement had made it known that it would not discuss a

¹²³ H.K. Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali: The Rwandese Civil War 1994 (A Personal Account)*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, Ltd., 1998, pp. 23-24; IPEP, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

¹²⁴ A. Des Forges, *op.cit.*, p. 598.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 632.

cease-fire unless the mass slaughter stopped, the insistence by UN officials to get a cease-fire without mentioning the genocide was of no use.¹²⁶

As Ian Linden argues, the withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to re-inforce them and acknowledge that genocide was taking place, cost hundreds of thousands of lives and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on intervention.¹²⁷

A decision to strengthen and enlarge the UN mission to 5,500 troops was taken by the Security Council on 17 May 1994. However, decisions on the financing of UNAMIR II forces and on operational issues took until the end of July of that year. By then, most of the genocide was over and over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu had been exterminated.¹²⁸

UN Secretary-General, Koffi Anan, who at the time of the genocide was in charge of the UN's peacekeeping operations travelled to Kigali in May 1998 and made a formal apology. In hindsight, he said, "we see the signs which then were not recognized. Now we know what we did was not nearly enough, not enough to save Rwanda from itself, not enough to honour the ideals for which the United Nations exists. We will not deny that in their greatest hour of need the world failed the people of Rwanda". He also said, "the world must deeply repent its failure to stop the genocide."¹²⁹

As Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari stated.¹³⁰ The Security Council, especially its most powerful members, and the

¹²⁶ Africa Rights, Rwanda: *op. cit.*, p. 1120; T. Sellstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹²⁷ T. Sellstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹²⁸ R.M. Press, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

¹³⁰ IPEP, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

international community as a whole failed the people of Rwanda in their greatest hour of need. The world had let genocide tell its toll again.

3.4.5. The Role of the Organisation of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had promoted the Arusha negotiations and provided military observers before the UN became involved. After the death of President Habyarimana, the Central Organ of the OAU called for the speedy institution of “an independent and impartial investigation into the circumstances leading to the plane crash”¹³¹. The OAU condemned the carnage bloodletting, called for immediate end of massacres, wanton killings and senseless violence in the country. However, no party was condemned by name, implying that both warring sides were equally guilty. The OAU Secretary-General, Salim Salim urged the RPF and the interim government to end hostilities and the massacres. It is intriguing that until July 1994, the OAU had not been willing to call genocide by its rightful name.¹³²

While mass killings were taking place in an African country, the OAU and a large majority of African leaders failed to denounce the *genocidaires*. Their silence constituted a moral failure. It was bad enough that the genocide was never condemned openly. Such attitude might have encouraged Hutu extremists to perpetrate their heinous act.

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council decided, against the advice and strong objection from the African Group at the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the OAU Secretary General to reduce UNAMIR strength from 2548 men to 270¹³³.

¹³¹ A. Teclé, “The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, in H. Adelman et al (eds), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 124-125; A. Des Forges, op.cit., p. 643.

¹³² A. Teclé, “The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, op.cit., pp. 124 – 125.

¹³³ Ibid.

In May 1994, during the inauguration ceremony of South Africa's new President Nelson Mandela, Salim met with the heads of State from Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Namibia. All were willing to send troops to strengthen UNAMIR II. Salim told Boutros-Ghali he had collected commitment pledges from African countries to send 5000 troops to Rwanda. The UN's role would be to equip and transport the soldiers and provide logistical support they once arrived. Many African soldiers took part in the second UN mission. However, the first African contingent with UNAMIR II arrived in October 1994, three months after the genocide had ended.¹³⁴

Fourteen heads of African states finally condemned "genocide" by name in early June 1994. However, at the OAU summit in Tunis in mid June of the same year, the delegation of the *genocidaire* government headed by interim President Sindikubwabo was allowed to attend as an equal and full member of the OAU, apparently representing and speaking for the people of Rwanda. Many found this unacceptable. The Tunis meeting, which described the massacres as "crimes against humanity" provided the occasion for discussion that produced a cease-fire that was never put into effect.¹³⁵

A large number of foreign agencies must take certain responsibility for the tragic events in Rwanda. Foreign aid agencies and international financial institutions accepted the continuation of the ethnic Identity Cards and did not pressurize the regime to abandon such practice – not even in 1992, when it became evident that they were being utilized to target Tutsi for harassment and extermination. Their money helped to strengthen the coercive approaches of the regime. Right from 1990, there were many indications that preparations were being made by the Habyarimana clique to exterminate a section of the Rwandan population. The international community turned a blind eye to such signs, and in a way, condoned crime in Rwanda.¹³⁶ In the bitter words of

¹³⁴ R.M. Press, *op. cit.*, p. 268; IPEP, *op.cit.*, p.146.

¹³⁵ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, pp. 643-644; IPEP, *op.cit.*, p. 150.

¹³⁶ P. Uvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38; J. Kakwenzire et al., "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda, 1990-1994", *op.cit.*, p. 88.

General Dallaire, the “international community has blood on its hands”.¹³⁷

3.5 Conflict Management Initiatives

Following the end of the Cold War, the international community re-discovered a strong attachment to democracy and put pressure on the Habyarimana regime to democratize and to negotiate power sharing with the RPF and domestic opposition as a first step to free elections. This pressure is generally credited with providing the impetus for the Arusha negotiations.¹³⁸

After November 1990 there was a stalemate in the military conflict between the Rwandan army and the RPF. A military solution was thus not in sight. As French officials rightly concluded, the RPF might win militarily but could not win politically. The government could not win militarily, though it might command the numbers to win politically.¹³⁹ A negotiated settlement seemed the best option to resolve the Rwandan crisis.

Because of the growing international pressure, increasing military gains of the RPF (especially after May 1992), Habyarimana reluctantly agreed to negotiate with it.

3.5.1 Pre-Negotiation: Regional Peace Efforts

Efforts to resolve the Rwandan civil war began soon after the 1990 RPF's invasion. On 17 October 1990, under the mediation of Belgian and Tanzanian authorities, President Habyarimana and President Museveni agreed in Mwanza

¹³⁷ IPEP, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹³⁸ P. Uvin, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹³⁹ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

(Tanzania) on an OAU supervised regional summit on the refugee problem and to resume the dialogue their countries had had since 1988.¹⁴⁰

At this conference, Habyarimana and Museveni agreed on direct negotiation with the RPF. Consequently, the RPF was recognized by Habyarimana as a negotiation partner. This regional conference, in itself ineffective in halting the war, could nevertheless be considered as having laid the foundation for the Arusha peace process.

The regional peace process was composed of two tracks. The first track was a series of conferences between the Presidents of the member states of the *Communauté Economique de Pays des Grands Lacs* (CEPGL); the members were the former Zaire (now DRC), Burundi and Rwanda. The second track was made up of broader meetings of CEPGL members and Tanzanian, Ugandan, OAU and UN authorities.

In a meeting conducted in late October 1990 in Gbadolite, former Zairean President, Mobutu Sese Seko, was chosen OAU mediator for the peace process, despite his active pro-Habyarimana involvement in the Rwandan conflict. The CEPGL states and Uganda also proposed the formation of a 55-man OAU observer force, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under the observation of the OAU's Liberation Committee.¹⁴¹

In 1991 an interesting development happened. At the pre-conference talks between Museveni, Mwinzi and Habyarimana, the Ugandan and Tanzanian presidents persuaded the Rwandan president to sign the Zanzibar Communiqué. The communiqué restated a commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict through achieving a cease-fire agreement, through conducting a dialogue with the internal and external

¹⁴⁰ A. Suhrke, "UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda", in G.M. Sarbo, et al., (eds), *Out of Conflict: War to Peace in Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Africa Institute, 1997, p. 100.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

opposition, and through the regional conference on refugees. The meeting had done little to contain the fighting between the Rwandan army and the RPF. Nevertheless, the process moved from general principles towards negotiating a real cease-fire.¹⁴²

The first of these was signed in March 1991 in N'Sele, DRC. The N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement between the two Rwandan warring parties was the first formal cease-fire of the civil war. The N'Sele text established the conditions of the cease-fire, set part of the agenda for continuing talks and formalized the creation of Neutral Military Observer Group.

The mandate of the NMOG was to oversee the implementation of the cease-fire and report to the OAU on violations. However, NMOG had the opportunity to deploy, government forces broke the cease-fire agreement by bombing RPF areas in Byumba *préfecture*. Fighting resumed for some months with heavy losses to the government side.¹⁴³

After the collapse of the N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement, the RPF was invited to attend the Gbadolite, (ex-Zaire) talks held in September 1991. The Gbadolite meeting re-issued the N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement in an amended form and re-confirmed the protagonists' commitment to peaceful end of the conflict. At this meeting, all parties recognized Mobutu's incompetence as a mediator. Thus Gbadolite ceasefire marked the end of Mobutu's mediation role. However, he retained the title of "mediator".¹⁴⁴

In May 1992, preliminary talks took place in Paris and Brussels between the PL, PSD and the MDR on the one hand, and the RPF on the other. The parties agreed to

¹⁴² B.D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process", in H. Adelman et al., (eds.) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1999, pp. 133-134

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p. 135.

restore the N'Sele cease-fire and to start serious negotiations.¹⁴⁵

Independent of each other, American and French officials advanced the course of negotiation. Throughout the conflict, the French were the Habyarimana government's closest ally militarily, politically and diplomatically.¹⁴⁶ However, as it became clear that the government forces could not win militarily, France came to support the peace process. A negotiated settlement was the best option for France to salvage its interests in Rwanda.¹⁴⁷ The most important meeting before the Arusha talks was one conducted at the French Foreign Ministry. The then US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen was present. At this meeting, on June 6-8, 1992, the Government of Rwanda and the RPF finally agreed to resume comprehensive political negotiations under Tanzanian mediation and to meet in July of the same year to launch the peace process.

3.5.2 Negotiation: The Arusha Peace Process

Peace negotiations between the two warring parties began on 10 August 1992 and lasted thirteen months. The agenda for discussion was set and the process facilitated by Tanzania, although the OAU and western countries were involved as well. Observers from neighbouring countries of Uganda, former Zaire and Burundi and from France, Belgium, the United States, Senegal and the OAU attended the consecutive Arusha negotiations.

¹⁴⁵ T. Sellstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁶ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁴⁷ G. Prunier, "Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End", in H. Adelman et al., (eds.), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, p. 284.

The agenda covered the establishment of rule of law and a culture of human rights, power-sharing in all public institutions, the transitional arrangements that would obtain until elections were held, the repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the integration of the two opposing armies. A cease-fire agreement, as an amended version of a twice amended cease-fire, which originated in N'Sele, was quickly reached. The first round of Arusha talks also called for the establishment of a joint political military commission. Its mandate was to ensure the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the peace agreement to be signed at the conclusion of the political negotiation.¹⁴⁸

Between September, 1992 and January, 1993, the discussions had dealt initially with power-sharing arrangements. In October 1992 delegates reached agreements on the issue of the nature of presidential power under a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). It was agreed that the BBTG would last for no more than twenty-two months and would be followed by free elections to determine the government of the country. The Parliamentary system was preferred to the presidential one. The RPF insisted that power reside in a council of ministers rather than with the president and presidential advisors. The Transitional National Assembly was given the unusual power to elect the president and vice president.¹⁴⁹

There was doubt about the sincerity of President Habyarimana concerning the negotiations. The president would agree to proposals made under pressure at the negotiating table, but would retract them later when his own hard-liners applied countervailing pressures.¹⁵⁰ For example, a cease-fire agreement was reached and went

¹⁴⁸ A. Guichaoua (ed.), *Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)*, Paris: Karthala, 1995, p. 632.

¹⁴⁹ B.D.Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process." *op.cit.*, p. 138.

¹⁵⁰ T. Sellstrom, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

into effect in August 1992, but within two months Habyarimana was publicly repudiating it as "a piece of trash ... which the government is not obliged to respect".¹⁵¹

In November 1992, the agenda focused on the difficult topic of the precise composition of the transitional institutions that would constitute the BBTG. Habyarimana was determined to have the *coalition pour la défense de la république* (CDR) seated in the assembly because it could provide him the final vote necessary to block any effort to impeach him. The French, American and Tanzanian delegates insisted that it was better to have the CDR in the government where they could be controlled than on the outside where they could wreak havoc. They urged the RPF to accept this arrangement in order to make the agreement work. However, the Front refused to accept inclusions of the CDR on the grounds that the radical Hutu party was not only responsible for the physical and rhetorical attacks against the Tutsi of Rwanda, but that it had refused to sign the ethical code included in the Arusha Accords that prohibited the creation of political parties based on ethnicity. The CDR at this stage was excluded from power sharing. Long after the genocide, this issue is still controversial. Many observers argued that it was wiser to include the extremists than to attempt to shut them out of power.

A protocol signed on 22 December 1992 contained agreements about seats in the transitional government. The party of the president, MRND, got five portfolios including Defence, Public Works and the Presidency. The RPF was allocated five portfolios

¹⁵¹ A. Des Forges, *op.cit.*, p.61.

including those of Vice-prime Minister and Minister for Interior. Four other smaller parties were given three portfolios each. Seats in the assembly were divided among the major parties. The MRND, RPF, MDR, PSD and PL, each had eleven seats, the PDC had four, and a number of small parties obtained one seat each.¹⁵²

President Habyarimana would remain head of state. However, he would have to cede certain powers to the Prime Minister and the government. Parliamentary and Presidential elections would be organised at the end of the transition period. A commission would be given the task to draft a new constitution, which would be the object of a referendum.

The final round of negotiations dealt with two sets of issues: refugees and security. The refugee issue was settled quickly as a framework for agreement had already been laid by the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on the Rwandese refugee problem. The far more difficult negotiation in this phase concerned the critical issue of integrating the two armies into one national army (*Armée Nationale*). After heavy intercession by the Tanzanian, French and American delegates, an eventual agreement was brokered wherein command level 50 percent be allocated to the government and 50 percent to the RPF, and the forces were to be drawn 60 percent from the government and 40 percent from the RPF.¹⁵³

Agreement was further reached on an army of 13,000 soldiers and *gendarmérie* of 6,000 men. As regards the army, this would imply a considerable reduction compared to the number of troops at that moment: about 35,000 in the FAR and 20,000 in the RPA.

¹⁵² H.K. Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali: The Rwandese Civil War*, p.14; G. Prunier, *op.cit.*, p.192.

¹⁵³ G. Vassal-Adams, *op.cit.*, p.28; A Guichaoua (ed.), *Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)* p. 641.

The RPF would be given the head of the *gendarmerie*; the national army would be headed by a FAR commander.¹⁵⁴

It was also agreed that 600 RPA soldiers would be permitted to see to the protection of the RPF authorities taking part in the transitional government in the capital. A neutral international force under the supervision of the UN would be in charge of security in Rwanda and would provide security for the transitional government.¹⁵⁵

The Arusha peace process was impressively managed with respect to the civil war. However, the massacres against Tutsi civilians were not directly addressed during the long months of negotiations. Fearing that the peace process might succeed and provide genuine power sharing and likely loss of power, Hutu extremists intensified the killings of Tutsi.¹⁵⁶

Many observers argued that on the question of military strength, the Accords signified a complete surrender by the government side to the rebel movement. Given the size of the two armies, more than two-thirds of the government soldiers had to be demobilized. Little attention was paid to the questions of severance pay, job re-training or integration in civilian life. As a result, many young Hutu men with poor educational background, with little land and few opportunities, trained only to be soldiers, were suddenly to join the unemployed youth.¹⁵⁷

By the time serious talks between the two warring sides started, many government soldiers opposed the negotiations: they were afraid of demobilization. The thousands of

¹⁵⁴ A. Guichaoua (ed.), *op.cit.*, (1993-1994) pp. 641-642; H.M, Hintjens, "Explaining the Genocide in Rwanda," *op.cit.*, p.261.

¹⁵⁵ H.K. Anyidodo, *op.cit.*, p.4.

¹⁵⁶ P. Uvin, *op.cit.*, p.63; S Utterwulghe, "Rwanda's protracted social conflict", *op.cit.*, p.16.

¹⁵⁷ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op.cit.*, p.53.

soldiers who had been enlisted since the beginning of the armed conflict had become accustomed to the benefits of military life.

MRND and CDR cadres exploited the situation and spread rumours that soldiers would be thrown out onto a deteriorating economy without prospect of getting jobs. In May and June 1992, soldiers mutinied in the northern towns of Byumba, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi killing many civilians and damaging hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property. In November 1992, responding to such pressure, Habyarimana indicated that he had no intention to implement the accord that he had signed earlier.¹⁵⁸

A knowledgeable observer indicated that confusion and lack of consensus prompted government negotiators to make such a concession. He argued that it was imprudent for the RPF to have insisted on such terms.¹⁵⁹

For senior officers in the military, the Presidential Guard, the CDR and extremist elements of the MRND, the Accords' requirement that the RPA be incorporated within the Rwandan Armed Forces and be allocated 50 percent of all officers posts was seen as the last straw.¹⁶⁰ They would lose their authority in a democratic regime and possibly face trials for crimes against humanity.¹⁶¹ This condition was interpreted as hostile to the already beleaguered Rwandan regime. An association of senior military officers, known as AMASASU (bullets) violently rejected the proposal for military integration.

3.5.3 The implementation Phase

The Arusha peace agreement called for the establishment of the BBTG within thirty-seven days of the signing of the accord, and the deployment of a UN force within

¹⁵⁸ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁵⁹ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p.53.

¹⁶⁰ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp 159-190.

¹⁶¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU. Country profile 2000, Rwanda, p.8.

the same period. However, after signing of the Accords, a number of inter-linked factors would contribute to non-implementation of the agreements by 6 April 1994: the delayed arrival of UNAMIR peacekeepers, unwillingness by Habyarimana and his clique to abide by the terms of the peace agreement and internal friction within the different new parties of the country. As the UNAMIR mandate was not yet approved by the UN Security Council, the caretaker Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her government had to continue administering the country.¹⁶²

UNAMIR's commander, General Romeo Dallaire, and an advanced team of twenty-one soldiers eventually arrived in Kigali on the 21 October 1993. Efforts to form the transitional bodies in Kigali started with the appointment of the MDR's Faustin Twagiramungu to the Prime Ministership, as agreed in the final texts. However, he lacked the support of his party. The MDR, the PSP, and the PL split politically, between those ready for power sharing (moderate group) and those who wanted to preserve Hutu power at any cost (the so-called "power" group). Each side accused the other of complicity either with the party of the President, the MRND or with the RPF. To make matters worse, Felicien Gatabazi, the leader of the PSP, was assassinated in Kigali. The event was immediately followed by the killing of Martin Bucyana of the CDR.¹⁶³

The assassination of Gatabazi was part of a plan to disrupt the installation of the BBTG. After his assassination, attempts were made to rescue the Arusha peace Accords. Jacques Booh-Booh, the representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda met with the RPF in March 1994 to try to find means to put the peace process back on track. Tanzania also stepped up its efforts to convince the protagonists to implement the

¹⁶² T. Sellstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 45

¹⁶³ International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

protocol. However, the Habyarimana clique and other Hutu "Power Group" together with the new parties were reluctant to accept the terms of the Arusha Accords. The enlarged transitional government, the cornerstone of the Arusha agreement on which most other activities depended, never came into existence.

Tanzania invited Habyarimana to attend a conference in Arusha on the Burundi crisis, with the intention of persuading him to re-affirm his commitment to the enlarged transitional government. Habyarimana attended the summit and issued a statement re-affirming the Arusha Accords. It was on his flight back from this meeting, on 6 April 1994, that the aircraft carrying him was mysteriously brought down, killing him instantly.

Events deteriorated rapidly in Kigali. Tanzanian officials attempted to salvage the Arusha deal in order to restore order in the country. After the death of President Habyarimana, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, called for a return to Arusha for 23 April 1994. On 23rd April, an RPF delegation arrived in Arusha ready to announce a unilateral cease-fire. However, the government team failed to attend the meeting.¹⁶⁴ Former Zaire's President Mobutu had chosen this date to re-assert his mediation role. He had invited the Rwandan government to a parallel summit in Zaire on the same day – 23 April 1994. The government delegation had gone to Zaire, and had had itself supposedly been ready to announce the cease-fire. As Bruce D. Jones observes, Mobutu's interference denied the Arusha peace process a possible last chance. April 23 thus marks the effective end of the Arusha peace process.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ B.D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process", *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

3.5.4 Analysis of the Arusha Peace Process

Many diplomats argued that the Arusha Peace Accord was the best peace agreement, which could possibly have been reached. The nature of the process had many positive aspects: appropriate mix of regional and international actors, neutral bodies in the negotiating room; the participation of the new political parties of the country, tackling the root causes of the crisis. However, it ended in failure. One of the main reasons is that it pushed well beyond what was acceptable to senior military officers concerning the distribution of officer posts and the exclusion of radical Hutu from the spoils of power.

The two warring parties seemed to be in a military stalemate at the beginning of the Arusha peace process. Nevertheless, after its decisive 1993 offensive, the RPF asserted its military superiority on the battlefield and was poised to continue military gains should the peace talks collapse. This military strength enabled the front to have a superior negotiating position in the peace process.¹⁶⁶

Moreover, in the 1993 fighting, about one million Rwandans were displaced. These internal refugees came from northern Rwanda, the most fertile area of the country.¹⁶⁷ This phenomenon further worsened the already deteriorating economic situation in the country. Militarily stronger and free from administering a country at war in full-scale economic decline, the rebel movement was in an advantaged position to influence and dictate the outcome of the negotiation.

The RPF, in defiance of advice and pressure from regional and international mediators, used its bargaining strength to marginalize the Habyarimana regime within the negotiated structure and erode major elements of its power base. In both the political and

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

¹⁶⁷ African Rights, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

military spheres, the RPF insisted on arrangements which deprived hard-liners surrounding Habyarimana. Bruce D. Jones¹⁶⁸ concluded that the final version of the Arusha agreement read like a "victor's deal", rather than a general settlement between relatively equal sides.

Some observers have argued that a more balanced power-sharing arrangement between the two warring parties could have provided an incentive structure for members of the government to play active roles in securing the installation and survival of the institutions of the enlarged transitional government. A more prudent handling of distribution of command posts may have significantly reduced feeling of insecurity among those in the Habyarimana regime who would lose total control of a military base and an effective political base.

However, others have argued that giving greater control of the military and meaningful political role to Habyarimana and his officials would have posed many problems for the RPF. From the perspective of the RPF, this would not only have been morally unacceptable, but infeasible.

While the international community was concentrating on the documents to be signed at Arusha, the *Akazu*, racist radicals and MRND cadres prepared to use violence to reverse the externally initiated changes. The deployment of a well armed international peace keeping force could have forced the *genocidaires* to change their plans, and possibly saving many innocent Rwandans. Only the permanent members of the Security Council could have done that but they willfully chose to reject that option.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ B.D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process", *op. cit.*, p. 149.

¹⁶⁹ N. Dabelstein, "Reaction or Prevention? The Lessons of Rwanda." *New Routes*, 1996, Volume 3, p. 12; P. Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, p.63

3.5.5 Postscript

As noted in chapter one, since the RPF takeover in Kigali in 1994, the organization is still the principal force in the country. According to Jos Havermans¹⁷⁰, the current government has shown lack of interest in forming a broad political base and in processes leading to power sharing. Instead, gradual exclusion of Hutu and Tutsi opponents from top political echelons, as well as in the judiciary and in the administration, in addition to the continued mono-ethnic nature of the national army, adds to the present conflict potential.

To dispel the increasing popular criticism that the ruling elite administers the country as a closed shop and excludes others, especially the Hutu, the current President, Paul Kagame, has appointed politicians previously regarded by many observers as having fallen out of favour with the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

It is clear that the President wants to dispel the anxiety caused by the resignation of high-ranking dignitaries last year – including the President Pasteur Bizimungu and the former prime minister, Celestin Rwigema (both of Hutu origin), the parliamentary speaker and several cabinet ministers - and several alleged political assassinations. These developments had worsened the tense political climate of the country. The above mentioned former prime minister, with whom the government had hoped for reconciliation, sought political asylum in the US and argued that the government must do more if its claims of inclusiveness are to be credible.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ J. Havermans, "Rwanda Crisis Lingers On". *op.cit.* p. 249.

¹⁷¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report 2000, Rwanda, p. 8.

One of the means to get over the traumatic past and create conditions for reconciliation is the trial of suspects in the genocide. In November 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up by the UN Security Council resolution 955 (1994).¹⁷² Although it faced a number of obstacles at the beginning, the ICTR is now up and functioning. The ICTR located in Arusha is credited with carrying the fight against impunity beyond Rwanda's borders. The Tribunal has convicted a small number of high – ranking suspects. It abstains from capital punishment.¹⁷³

Rwandan courts also try genocide suspects. The judicial system is overwhelmed with more than 125,000 genocide suspects, detained in overcrowded jails. Several suspects have been sentenced to death and executed. However, almost seven years after the genocide many observers note that the process is too slow, lacks proper controls and seems unable to fulfill its expected role as a driving force for justice and reconciliation.¹⁷⁴

The government plans to empower community courts, *gacaca*, to try genocide cases. The plan is designed to deal with the backlog of genocide cases, which the overloaded formal justice system is unable to handle. Even though aimed at resolving the lingering issues of justice and reconciliation, the plans may reopen old wounds. Many Hutu fear that the process will result in their crimes being unmasked.

The church in Rwanda is now fighting to improve its image. The Rwandan Anglican Church established departments of reconciliation in all dioceses in the course of 1997. They are

¹⁷² S. Vanderginste, Human Rights Accountability: Issues of Justice, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation. The Case of Rwanda, 1998. pp 1-2

¹⁷³ International Crisis Group, Five Years After the Genocide in Rwanda: Justice in Question, ICG Report No. 1, April 1999, p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

conducting seminars, inviting people from all corners of the globe to speak on the necessity of forgiveness and peaceful co-existence.

During the conflict, the local mass media played a negative role in disseminating hatred and inciting ethnic violence. The BBC has designed reconciliatory initiatives in Rwanda. It has broadcast programmes in Kinyarwanda (the local language) aimed at promoting mutual understanding and re-uniting those who survived. Other radio stations also propagate messages intended to encourage peace and harmony.

One of the main threats to the present government is the Hutu insurgency in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. The rebels are members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces and Interhamwe militias. They target Tutsi survivors of the genocide, local Hutu politicians sympathetic to the government and international aid workers and human rights monitors. The rebels operate under the name of Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR). Their political wing, formed in 1996 is called the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR). Their aim is to overthrow the existing government or to force it to start negotiations. The RPA has been accused of using excessive force in its attempt to crush the rebellion. Indiscriminate killings of Hutu of the northwest seem to be intended to compel them to choose sides.¹⁷⁵

From mid-1998, the government of Rwanda gradually adopted a more reconciliatory attitude towards the population, recruiting a large number of ex-FAR soldiers into the RPA as well as making an effort to protect civilians.¹⁷⁶

The legitimacy of the present government is still fragile. It is undermined by the continuing defection of its Hutu members. If these incidents continue, the RPF will find it even more difficult to broaden its political base. Any outcome of the conflict will depend on eradicating the hate propaganda disseminated by Hutu rebels. As one observer has noted Rwanda may start to resemble its neighbour, Burundi, where a civil war has been going on since 1993.

¹⁷⁵ J. Havermans, "Rwanda Crisis Lingers On", *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁷⁶ P. Douma, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE RWANDA CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

To adopt an old metaphor, “when Rwanda sneezes, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi catch a cold”.¹ The continuing conflict in Rwanda is inter-connected with other conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The Rwandese and Congolese conflicts are based on a pattern of interconnecting relations and concerns. These include historical linkages of migration of people from Rwanda to the DRC, cross-border insurgencies, cross-border flow of refugees, arms and ideas. Many specialists on this region argue that a resolution to political crisis of Rwanda must be founded on a regional context. In order to arrive at such resolution, it is important to understand ethnicity and ethnic relations in eastern DRC and the impact of the Rwanda conflict on neighbouring countries especially DRC and vice versa. This chapter addresses these issues.

4.2. Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Eastern DRC

The Central African Great Lakes region shares a common history based on co-existence between agriculturists and pastoralists prior to the major state formations. In this area the arbitrary delineation of colonial boundaries placed the Banyaruchuru,

¹ J. Prendergast and D. Smock, Postgenocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi, Special Report, 1999, p. 3.

community formerly part of the Rwanda Kingdom, within the boundaries of Belgian Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC). The Banyarwanda, literally people of Rwanda, in Kivu are divided into three distinct groups: the Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasasi in North Kivu and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu. Of these, the Banyaruchuru have been considered indigenous to Congo, but the Banyamasasi and Banyamulenge are not considered to be traditionally Congolese.²

The Banyaruchuru community consists of both Hutu and Tutsi. The community had a native authority of its own in colonial times. The Banyamasasi came as migrants in the colonial times. These were mostly Hutu, who had been brought by the Belgians in the 1920 and 1930 to supply manpower for the under-populated Congo.³ For a while, from the late 1930s to 1959, the Banyamasasi were given their own Native Authority called *Collectivité Gishari*. When that collectivité was abolished at independence, and the Banyamasasi were put under the control of what were indigenous chiefs, there followed a popular revolt against these chiefs called *La Guerre du Banyarwanda*. Since then, the Banyamasasi have been struggling for their own Native Authority. Without being recognized as indigenous, an individual lacks significant rights, particularly the right to customary land.⁴

The Banyamulenge⁵ are of Tutsi origin who migrated to South Kivu in the early nineteenth century after losing intra-Tutsi feudal wars in Rwanda. The few Hutu clients

² M. Mamdani, "The Politics of Identity, How Uganda Exported its Crisis to Rwanda and Rwanda Exported it to Congo", *Sunday Vision*, August 27th, 2000 p. 27.

³ G. Prunier, "The Great Lakes Crisis", *Current History*, Vol. 96, No. 610, 1997, p. 195.

⁴ M. Mamdani, "The Politics of Identity, How Uganda Exported its Crisis to Rwanda and Rwanda Exported it to Congo", *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵ The term *Banyamulenge* emerged in 1967 to distinguish the pastoral ethnic groups living in the Mulenge area in South Kivu from the Rwanda refugees, especially the Tutsi who started migrating in 1959. (K.N.F. Emizet, 2000).

who had come with their Tutsi patrons had been “Tutsified” over the years and the group was homogenous. They were separated from Rwanda in 1910 when boundaries in the Great Lakes region were redrawn by the colonial masters.

The Banyamulenge, like the Banyamasisi have also been struggling to be recognized as indigenous so that they can have their own customary land and customary authority.⁶ These layers of Banyarwanda were joined by more recent immigrants, exclusively Tutsi, who fled the 1959 and 1963 massacres and the imposition of Hutu ethnic state at the time of Rwanda’s independence in 1962. The Banyarwanda of North Kivu formed a tightly knit, mutually supportive community, without distinction between Tutsi and Hutu.⁷

Even though land rights and traditional authority are major causes of ethnic conflict in the Kivu, the economic success of the Banyarwanda frustrated the autochthons (local groups) and created a sense of loss that led to hatred. With the appointment of Binsengimana Rwena, a Kinyarwanda speaking Tutsi from Kivu, to the position of Chief of Staff, the Banyarwanda gained some political visibility in the office of President Mobutu. The result was the law of 1972, which gave clear rights of citizenship to the Banyarwanda especially the natives of Rwanda and Burundi.⁸ This political advantage made the “native” population of Kivu more xenophobic about them.

After the death of Rwema, Kivu politicians lobbied in parliament to pass a new citizenship law. In 1981, the government revoked the citizenship of the people of Rwandan extraction, the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda in Kivu (except the native

⁶ K.N.F. Emizet, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 38, NO. 2, 2000, p. 166.

⁷ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁸ G. Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst and Company Publications, 1997, pp. 379-380.

Banyaruchuru) and officially branded them as “foreigners” who could not hold public office.⁹ During the following years, tension remained, but did not explode until the *Conference Nationale* of 1991. At this conference the “native” groups – Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo – tried to dominate representation in the Parliament with the aim of eliminating the Banyarwanda economically and physically.¹⁰

By early 1993, militia groups were killing hundreds of Banyarwanda in Masisi region of North Kivu. The killings were reportedly connected to a struggle for control over land and other economic resources in the region. The Rwandan conflict had transformed the situation in the Banyarwanda communities of Kivu. Many Tutsi had joined the RPF, while the Habyarimana government succeeded in influencing the Banyarwanda Hutu of North Kivu through a politicized “agricultural cooperative”.¹¹ Thus the divided Banyarwanda communities were not able to fight back. Between November 1995 and February 1996 about 37,000 Tutsi left for Rwanda, half of them Zairian Tutsi of North Kivu and the other half refugees from earlier 1959 exile.¹² By mid 1996, when the Banyamulenge began to be harassed by the local “Zairian” authorities, they knew that the time to act had come.

4.3 The Internationalization of the Rwanda Conflict

When the RPF conquered Kigali in July 1994, over two million Hutu fled across

⁹ K.N.F. Emizet. “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo”, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁰ A. H. Gnamo, “The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu’s Kleptocracy”, in H. Adelman, *The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis, from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 320.

¹¹ G. Prunier, “The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis”, *WRITENET Country Papers*, 1997, p. 2.

¹² UNHCR, *The State of the World’s refugees Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000, p. 246.

the border to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and former Zaire. The massive influx of refugees in the Kivu area of former Zaire was estimated at 1.2 million people, with a greater number staying in Goma (850,000) and Bukavu (332,000) and additional concentration in Tanzania (600,000) Burundi (270,000) and Uganda (10,000).¹³ At the same time, the deposed leadership and the *genocidaires* escaped into eastern Zairean refugee camps.

4.3.1 Ex-FAR, Interhamwe: Agents of Internationalization of Conflict.

The Zairian central government's authority in eastern Zaire was weak. The Rwandan *genocidaires* had allies in the local administration in Kivu. The ex-FAR officers had also established effective control of the camps. There seem to have been between 50 and 230 political leaders and probably as many as 70,000 soldiers and militia.¹⁴ As the camps became organized, MRND politicians, the interim government, FAR military and militias reorganized. Under France's "*Opération Turquoise*", a significant portion of the Hutu Power¹⁵ forces escaped across the border from the French safe zone, in southwest Rwanda, some of them fully armed. The ex-FAR received arms shipments in the camps mainly from France.¹⁶ They conducted military training exercises, recruited combatants and planned a "final victory" and definitive solution to Hutu-Tutsi antagonism. The Zairian authorities had failed to totally disarm the Interhamwe militias and the ex-FAR troops, collect all arms and military equipment and

¹³ G. Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

¹⁴ K. Halverson, "Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee Camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security", in H. Adelman et al., *The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 312.

¹⁵ Hutu leaders close to extremist *Coalition pour la défense de la république* (CDR) and its discourse and who were ready to go to the utmost extremities to retain power belong to the so called Hutu power wing.

¹⁶ A. Des Forges, *op. cit.*, p. 660.

gather them in a secure place far from the border. The presence of such a force posed a significant military threat to the new Rwandan government.

Rwanda's new government was extremely critical of the situation in the camps and repeatedly asked for the immediate repatriation of the refugees or their removal away from the border areas deep into Zaire. However, Hutu Power leaders opposed the repatriation of refugees because they were a source of funds for Hutu Power in the form of humanitarian aid. They were also used as buffers to prevent the arrest of the *genocidaires*.

In order to set up their Hutuland, the ex-FAR and the Interhamwe began launching attacks on Tutsi Congolese with the help of "native" groups, who used the opportunity to settle old scores with the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge. In 1995, Hutu forces started to attack the Banyarwanda of North Kivu. They then turned against the "native" population and drove hundreds of thousands of local people and Tutsi out of their land in order to establish a "Hutuland" from which to conduct attacks on Rwanda.¹⁷

From early 1995, Rwandan military groups in eastern Zaire launched a series of cross-border attacks into Rwanda. President Mobutu supported the re-armament and re-training of the ex-FAR. Light weapons from the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe also contributed to the re-armament of the *genocidaires*.¹⁸

The RPF government was irritated by repeated incursions and violence at the border in eastern Zaire. The Rwandan government warned the international community that if nothing was done it would clean up the camps.¹⁹

¹⁷ K.N.F. Emizet, "The Massacres of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping failure and International Law", *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁸ P. Douma, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁹ A.H. Gnamo, "The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy", *op. cit.*, p. 329.

To compound the problem, in October 1996, the Deputy Governor of the South Kivu Province claimed that the 300,000 strong Banyamulenge community was destabilizing the region and had to leave Zaire within a week or be hunted down as rebels. The Banyamulenge refused to leave and approached the government in Kigali for help. The request proved timely, as the political leadership in Rwanda was looking for means to deal with its own internal conflicts and repeated incursions of the ex-FAR into northwestern Rwanda. The only way to solve this dual security problem was for the RPF to attack the refugee camps in eastern Zaire.²⁰

In September 1996, the RPA and armed elements of Banyamulenge attacked Mobutu's army and the ex-FAR in the South Kivu region. By early October, the first group of Hutu refugees began to flee into Uvira refugee camps. At this stage several Congolese anti-Mobutu groups joined the Banyamulenge led uprising in order to oust Mobutu. Then the Banyamulenge switched targets and attacked the Burundian refugee camps between Bukavu and Uvira. The attack was ruthless. Burundian refugees scattered. Uvira, Bukavu and Goma were all captured in the month of October. According to Prunier²¹, those who attacked North Kivu were not the Banyamulenge forces, but a mixture of Masasi Tutsi of North Kivu and militia from the Hunde and Nyanya ethnic groups who had been fighting the Rwandan Hutu refugees encroaching on their land.

The defeat of the ex-FAR and the Interhamwe and the shortage of humanitarian aid prompted the refugees to return to Rwanda, and it was estimated that roughly 300,000 Hutu, civilians and militias fled westwards. These refugees suffered from lack of food,

²⁰ F. Reyntgens, "Briefing: The Second Congo War: More than a Remake", *African Affairs*, 1999 Vol. 98, p.242; G. Prunier, "The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis", *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3; H. Solomon, "From Zaire to the DRC: Towards post-Mobutism", *Africa Insight*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1997, p. 92.

²¹ G. Prunier, "The Great Lakes Crisis", *op.cit.*, p.197.

medical aid and persecution from RPA/ADLF (*L'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération, du Congo-Zaire*) combatants. Human rights groups and the UN accused the RPA and the anti-Mobutu forces of systematically killing more than 200,000 Hutu from Rwanda, Burundi and former Zaire. However, the rebels and Rwandan government officials denied these accusations.²²

After gaining partial control of its border areas and repatriating hundreds of thousands of refugees, the RPF government planned to give the Banyamulenge rebellion a national character in order to oust Mobutu. The Banyamulenge, though technically Zairians (Congolese), were bound to be perceived first as Banyarwanda. This would be a hindrance for a mass movement in the Kivu. Using Kabila as a form of "local cover" could solve the problem. Thus almost as soon as the Banyamulenge uprising began in September 1996 the Kigali government agreed to let Laurent Desire Kabila a Mulaba from Shaba (former Katanga) province be the spokesman of the rebel movement ADFL. He was helped in recruiting a number of Congolese autochthons. Kabila formed an alliance with other anti-Mobutu opposition movements. Within a period of seven months, the AFDL/RPA had conquered the former Zaire, and in May 1997, Kabila declared himself President and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

4.3.2 The Second Congo War

4.3.2.1 Unresolved Problems in the East

Contrary to the expectations of Kabila's sponsors the new regime installed in Kinshasa seemed unable or unwilling to solve the two problems at the initial origin of the 1996-1997 war: the security of the Eastern neighbours and the status of the Congolese

²² P. Douma, *op.cit.*, p.27; International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op.cit.*, pp 228-229. Interview conducted with a Rwandan Embassy Staff in Nairobi in September 2001.

Tutsi. Even though security arrangements were signed by Laurent Kabila government and Rwanda, the DRC remained a source of insecurity and launching ground of attacks against Rwanda. Ex-FAR and Interhamwe militias remained in Kivu and conducted raids inside Rwanda, killing genocide survivors, planting landmines and destroying the infrastructure. Frustrated by what was perceived as Tutsi hegemony in the region, local militias, such as the mai-mai, the Bembe and ex-*Forces Armées Zairoises (EX-FAZ)* joined the ex-FAR and Interhamwe in attacking civilian targets²³

In the second half of 1997, Hutu rebels from Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern part of the DRC entered into an alliance and started infiltrating Rwanda from across the Congolese-Rwandan border with the aim of attacking the national army and civilians. By late 1997, this had become a major concern to the Rwandan government. The Rwanda government urged Kabila to send more troops into Eastern DRC or to allow them to do the job.²⁴

4.3.2.2 Deterioration in the Relationship Between Rwanda and the Kabila Regime

As soon as he had taken power, Kabila had been confronted with many problems. During the armed struggle, his political and military base had been weak. It was external forces mainly Rwanda, Uganda and Angola that had helped him to power. Initially he was well accepted by the population because he ousted Mobutu and stopped the excesses committed by his army. However, the continued presence of external forces, especially of the Rwandese army, gave the impression that Kabila was a mere 'stooge' of the Rwandans.²⁵

²³ Africa Confidential, 20 February 1998, pp 4-6; Filip Reyntjens, Briefing: "The Second Congo War. More than a Remake", *op.cit.*, p. 243.

²⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Congo at War. A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict*, 1988, p.11; J. Havermans, *op.cit.*, p.248

²⁵ F. Ryntjens, Briefing. "The Second Congo War. More than a Remake", *op.cit.* p.245.

Relations between the former allies became increasingly strained from time to time. Rwanda and Uganda did not hide their displeasure with Kabila. They believed that he was incapable of formulating and conducting a coherent policy concerning commerce, thus preventing the economy from stabilizing. They argued that he was unable to form a government of national unity, because of his exclusionist policies. Both countries believed that he was unwilling to control extremist Hutu and Ugandan rebels from launching raids on Rwanda and Uganda from the DRC.²⁶ In early 1988, the relationship between Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan allies started to turn sour. In July 1988, he announced that military co-operation agreement between Rwanda and the DRC had served its purpose and would end. He ordered Rwandan and other foreign troops out of the country.²⁷

Kabila unleashed a hate campaign against Tutsi resulting in a witch-hunt against any one tall or with angular Tutsi features and began to recruit Hutu soldiers. This move angered the Rwandans who had backed him and done most of the fighting. Combined with the repeated incursions by ex-FAR and Interhamwe militias in the north west of Rwanda, Kabila's policy threatened the security of the new Rwandan Government. As a result, Rwanda started to support the Congolese Rally for Democracy RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*).²⁸

The broad alliance of countries that had backed Kabila to topple Mobutu split into two. This time the conflict developed into a major international war as Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebels whereas Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia backed the Kabila

²⁶ International Crisis Group, Congo at War: A Briefing on the International and External Players in the Central African Conflict, pp.10-11.

²⁷ Africa South of the Sahara., 30th Edition, 2001, p.396.

²⁸ D. Gough, "Kabila Fights for Survival", Africa Today, October, 1998, p.31; P. Douma, op.cit., p.28.

government. Burundi was the third supporter of the RCD. The EX-FAR, Interhamwe militias, the Allied Democratic Forces and various Burundian Hutu Groups backed the Kabila government.

The RCD swiftly captured eastern border towns of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira and gradually occupied the whole central – eastern section of the DRC. However, due to the massive intervention of Angola and Zimbabwe they could not occupy the capital (Kinshasa) and topple Kabila. The RCD quickly split into two factions: the Uganda - backed Wamba dia Wamba faction and the Rwanda-sponsored Emile Ilunga faction. The Wamba dia Wamba front operated in the northeastern part of the country. The stronger Ilunga faction, with Rwandan support, controlled the whole central-eastern section of the DRC. The local population resented the actions of the RCD and its Rwandan sponsors and formed armed resistance to confront them. Because of the proliferation of armed militias it is becoming difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement between all actors involved.²⁹

In July 1999, an agreement was signed in Lusaka between the warring states – DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda. The main provisions of the agreement include, *inter alia*, the immediate cessation of hostilities, the establishment of Joint Military Commission and the deployment of an appropriate peacekeeping and peace enforcement UN mission to disarm armed groups. The three anti-Kabila rebel forces signed later.

The various rebel groups threatening their respective governments: Ex-FAR and Interhamwe for Rwanda, FDD for Burundi, UNITA for Angola, and several that have

²⁹ P. Douma, *op.cit.*, p.27.

used the DRC as a rear base against Uganda were not part of the agreement. None have signed it. These non state actors have interest in the continuation of the conflict. Rwanda has made clear that unless the ex-FAR and the Interhamwe are disarmed, it has no intention of abandoning its military campaign in the DRC.

The external pressure is increasing on Rwanda to withdraw its support for the RCD and abide by the conditions set out in the Lusaka peace accords. Apparently, the United States has been pressuring Rwanda to accept the deal in return for high-tech equipment to secure its borders³⁰

4.4 The Regional Consequences

4.4.1 The Rwanda Conflict and Its Impact on the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Internalization of Rwanda conflict has socio-economic and environmental impact on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.4.1. Socio-economic Impact

As mentioned earlier, both Hutu and Tutsi communities in Kivu joined to resist local pressure against them. However, with the escalation of the civil war in Rwanda and the massive influx of Hutu refugees, members of the defeated Rwandan army and Interhamwe militia into the Kivu, the two groups of Banyarwanda – Hutu and Tutsi turned against each other.

The imported Rwandan conflict intermingled with an internal conflict that was already simmering in the former Zaire. This conflict further intensified in 1996, when Zairian Tutsi militia and other dissidents intent on ousting Mobutu Sese Seko formed an alliance and set up the AFDL. As the war escalated, all actors in the conflict started to

³⁰ Africa Confidential, July 1999. Quoted in P. Douma. The Netherlands and Rwanda, p.30.

violate basic human rights principles. According to Amnesty International,³¹ the killing by AFDL/RPA forces which started in the Kivu region in 1996 were part of concerted and deliberate attack on members of the Hutu ethnic group in particular – on Rwandese, Burundians and Congolese – either by shooting the victims or beating them to death.

It is not only members of the Hutu ethnic group who have been targeted by the AFDL/RPA troops. Congolese nationals who belong to different ethnic groups suspected of being sympathetic to the Hutu or hostile to the AFDL/RPA have been attacked and murdered. Serious human rights violations, including torture, mutilation, abduction, arbitrary arrest, extra-judicial execution burnt villages were carried out by AFDL/RPA soldiers.³² The UN special reporter for human rights in the DRC, Roberto Garreton, estimated that 200,000 Hutu from Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC had been massacred by the AFDL and its RPA ally during the 1996-97 war.³³

The humanitarian situation in the DRC continued to deteriorate and civilians continued to pay high price for the conflict. Up to two million Congolese had been displaced internally, including an estimated half million in the first six months of 2000 alone. In Kivu alone, this number has increased more than four fold, from a quarter million in December 1999 to current estimate of nearly 1.1 million. A quarter of a million fled to neighbouring countries as refugees.³⁴

The influx of arms and general militarization of society as various groups and

³¹ Amnesty International, Open Letter to Governments Hosting Refugees From Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC a call for the Safety and Dignity of Refugees, London Report (AFR 02/24/97 October 1997, p.5.

³² Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo, Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests, London: International Secretariat December 1997, AFR 62/33/97, pp. 8-14.

³³ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democratic Republic of Congo Country Report, 4th Quarter 1999, p.30.

³⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region, December 2000, p.10.

communities are armed and counter – armed, is contributing to the general lack of security. The population is increasingly becoming poor; this phenomenon further exacerbates the humanitarian situation and the lack of security. Conditions of insecurity simultaneously empowered those with weapons, permitting them to seize the goods of the weak. A new, predatory system of violence has emerged, in which groups seek wealth and political power through the gun.³⁵

The crisis in the DRC has created a human tragedy. The International Rescue Committee, an American NGO, estimated that the conflict had caused 1.7 million deaths by either direct or indirect means, of these some 200,000 were killed in fighting, the rest died as a result of malnutrition and disease.³⁶

The status of Congolese Tutsi is still unresolved. The anti-Rwandan sentiments, which existed prior to the war, increased. Many Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi, military and civilians behaved as if they were working in an occupied zone. They harassed, insulted and humiliated the local population. The dispatch to Kigali of goods confiscated from the houses of fleeing Mobutists contributed to the growing unpopularity of the Rwandans and Congolese Tutsi. A number of organizations and movements began to surface and vowed to fight what they called Tutsi hegemonism. The crisis is becoming more dangerous because an increasing number of Congolese see it in racial terms, with Bantu pitted against the 'Hima' or 'Hamites'.

Uninterrupted conflicts, high incidents of violence, plunder, pillage, unemployment, disease and prolonged displacement have caused a situation of extreme

³⁵ International Crisis Group, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, ICG Report No. 26, Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000, pp. 26-27.

³⁶ Ibid.

poverty for large segments of the Congolese population. It is estimated that out of a population of 50 million, 18 million people need food and medical care. The situation is worse in Kivu, people are living in extreme distress. Disease, starvation and war are killing children: four out of ten children die at infancy.³⁷

Economic conditions have deteriorated even for populations that have not been displaced. Trade routes have been cut or disrupted by battle lines. Two examples are barge traffic on the rivers, or roads to Banyamulenge inhabited areas of South Kivu. As a result markets have collapsed for food surplus regions while food prices increased in food deficit areas. In provinces such as the Kasais, the collapse of food markets and insecurity have forced inhabitants to switch from farming to other activities.

Some observers argue that Rwanda intervened in the DRC not only for security concerns but to gain access to the mineral riches of that country. Illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest resources of the DRC is taking place at an alarming rate. This is conducted by mass-scale looting and the systematic exploitation of natural resources.

Between September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zones of the DRC were drained of existing stockpiles, including minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and money. Rwandan and or RCD soldiers, commanded by an officer, visited storage facilities, farms banks and factories, and requested that managers open the doors. Commanders ordered their soldiers to take away the necessary products and load them into vehicles. The products were then either transferred to Rwanda or exported to international markets.³⁸

Rwanda is systematically exploiting the natural resources of the DRC. Key

³⁷ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), August 07,2001.

³⁸ UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo , (S/2001/357),2001. p.8.

individual actors are government structures on the one hand, and high-ranking army commanders and businessmen on the other. The consequence of illegal exploitation are massive availability of financial resources for the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the emergence of illegal networks headed either by businessmen or high-ranking military officers.³⁹

The RPA, through Rwandan companies – *Rwanda metals* and *Gands Lacs Metals* – has big stakes in Coltan business. Most of the Coltan extracted by civilians and Hutu prisoners is sold to civilian or military intermediaries. Almost all of this Coltan is sent to Kigali, and generally stored in facilities owned by the regime. The mineral is exported to Europe and the USA through the above mentioned companies.⁴⁰

The DRC possesses 65 per cent of the World's reserve of Coltan. According to Kinshasa, the systematic pillage of this mineral by Rwanda has deprived the DRC of three billion US Dollars annually.⁴¹

Rwandans have also extracted timber or have been associated with Congolese loggers. Rwanda has no known deposit of diamond and gold, yet, the country has been exporting diamond and gold.

As the Report of the Panel of Experts indicates Rwanda's military appears to be benefiting from the conflict. There is an integration between the military establishment the civil bureaucracy and the business community. RPA finances its war in the DRC in the following ways:

³⁹ Ibid., p.2.

⁴⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 15 September 2001.

⁴¹ C, Braeckman, "Guerre sans Vainquer en République Democratique du Congo" Le Monde Diplomatique, Avril 2001, pp. 16-17.

- (i) Direct commercial activities;
- (ii) Profit from shares it holds in some enterprises;
- (iii) Direct payments from RCD-Goma;
- (iv) Taxes collected by the "Congo desk" and other payments made by individuals for the protection RPA provides for their business; and
- (v) Direct uptake by the soldiers from the land.⁴² Some RPA commanders enrolled teams of local Congolese to dig coltan; these Congolese worked under the heavy guards of Rwandan soldiers.⁴³

The official defence budget of Rwanda cannot alone cover the cost of its war and presence in the DRC. As President Paul Kagame stated the conflict in the DRC is a self-financing war.⁴⁴

4.4.1.2 Environmental and Ecological Impact

A sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of people or the establishment of long-term camps can have a serious impact on the environment and ecology, as well as on the welfare of nearby communities. The impact of refugees on renewable natural resources is of particular concern as this can have lasting effects on human welfare. Forest destruction and degradation is one of the most serious environmental problems.

When hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees flooded into the former Zaire in 1994, an environmental and ecological disaster of grand proportions appeared imminent. Refugees were removing some 800 tonnes of timber and grass each day from the Virunga

⁴² UN Security Council, Report of Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, pp. 31-32.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.13. See also section 4.4.1.2. on Environmental and Ecological Impact.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

- (i) Direct commercial activities:
- (ii) Profit from shares it holds in some enterprises:
- (iii) Direct payments from RCD-Goma:
- (iv) Taxes collected by the "Congo desk" and other payments made by individuals for the protection RPA provides for their business: and
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⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.13. See also section 4.4.1.2. on Environmental and Ecological Impact.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

National Park to heat their cooking pots and to build huts. This amount was far in excess of a possible sustainable yield. Within two years they have cut down millions of trees covering more than 113 square kilometres of virgin forest of which 71 square kilometres have been completely deforested. At another site in South Kivu, almost 38 square kilometres of forest were lost within three weeks of the arrival of refugees.⁴⁵

Between 1998-2000, in the RCD-ML controlled area of Orientale Province, logging activity was carried without consideration of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber harvesting for sustainable forest management. As a result 100,000 hectares of forest area has been badly affected.⁴⁶

Wildlife has also suffered a great deal from the conflict. Endangered species come under threat from local gunmen, poachers and refugees. Numerous accounts and statistics from regional conservation organizations indicate that, in the Garama Park in northeastern DRC, nearly 4,000 out of 12,000 elephants had been killed between 1995 and 1999. The situation in other parks and reserves is equally worrying, including Kahuri-Biega Park, the Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park. The number of okapis, gorillas and elephants has decreased at an alarming rate. In the Kahuzi Biega Park, only 2 out 350 elephant families remained in 2000. There is serious concern among conservationist that the rest fled the area or had been killed, as two tons of elephant tusks were traced in Bukavu area late in 2000.⁴⁷

According to the report of the Panel of Experts in most instances, poaching of elephants in violation of international law (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was well organized. Either soldier hunted

⁴⁵ UNHCR, Refugees and the Environment, Caring for the Future, Geneva: Public Information Section, 1996, p. 12.

⁴⁶ UN Security Council, Report of Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, pp. 10-12.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

directly with the permission of the commander or they gave equipment and protection to locals and carry out the task with the aim of collecting elephant tusks. Rwandan soldiers were involved in the trading of elephant and buffalo meat. In the Bukavu and Goma area, there seems to be a pattern: high-ranking commanders take the tusks, soldiers negotiate the wholesale price with some locals, and locals sell the meat in the market place as retailers.⁴⁸

4.4.2 The Impact of the Rwanda Conflict on Other Neighbouring Countries

Through the refugee problem, the politics of post-genocide Rwanda were progressively a matter of concern for the whole Great Lakes region.⁴⁹ As noted earlier, when the RPF seized control of the Rwandan state in July 1994 around 600,00 Rwandan refugees crossed the Rwanda – Tanzania border and entered western Tanzania. In the Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania, the ex-FAR and the Interhamwe did not have the same military presence as in eastern Zaire. As a result the situation in the refugee camps had been less tense than in the camps in the Kivu. In 1995, a Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation had been signed between Tanzania, Rwanda and UNHCR. However, in 1995 and 1996, less than 10,000 refugees voluntarily returned to Rwanda.⁵⁰

The massive influx of refugees in western Tanzania brought environmental destruction, population pressures, instability, insecurity and widespread damage in infrastructure. The massive forced repatriation that happened in Kivu in November 1996 was therefore taken by the Tanzanian government as a clear indication. Tanzanian authorities argued that following the mass repatriation from eastern Zaire, the Rwandan

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁹ G. Prunier, *op.cit.*, p.376.

⁵⁰ UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000, p. 264.

Refugees in Tanzania had no longer any legitimate reason to refuse to return to Rwanda.⁵¹ Tanzanian government set a policy of forced repatriation of all Rwandan refugees except those who could prove their lives were threatened if repatriated. By the end of 1996, an estimated 475,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda.⁵² Human rights organizations criticized the Tanzanian decision which, however, it was supported by the UNHCR.

The civil war in Burundi had become another arena of operation for the Rwandan Hutu Power group. Hutu extremists backed the *Front de Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)*, an antigovernment rebel movement conducting raids in Burundi alongside the ex-FAR and Interhamwe militias, while Rwandan government, forces supported the Burundian army in northern Burundi.

As mentioned earlier, in 1996, AFDL and Banyamulenge troops attacked Burundian refugee camps and FDD support bases in South Kivu. Many Hutu civilians had been killed. About 40,000 Burundi Hutu eventually returned to Burundi while over 100,000 moved deeper into Zaire. The Burundian army started killing Hutu returnees. The FDD reentered northern Burundi and the intensity of fighting increased in that area. The aim of the front was to reach the eastern border with Tanzania and establish new rear bases there. The government army attempted to encircle the rebels, and there was heavy loss of life among the local population caught in the crossfire. The result of this renewed violence in northern Burundi was an increase in the number of refugees fleeing to

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² International Panel of Eminent Personalities, *op.cit.*, p.209.

Tanzania. About 156,000 refugees fled Burundi during November and December 1996 and during January 1997.⁵³

The Rwandan crisis has also had its impact on Uganda, though to a much lesser extent than in Burundi. In November 1996, as hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees returned to Rwanda, armed groups based in eastern Zaire attacked Uganda from the west. The Ugandan army retaliated and pushed back the rebels deep into Zaire.⁵⁴

The rebel organization, which launched the attack on Uganda, was a new entity named Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The ADF was composed of three groups. These were Rwandan Hutu extremists who were former members of the ex-FAR and Interhamwe and had fled the attack against the refugee camps in North Kivu. The second group was the *Tabligh* Islamic sect who had the support of the Sudanese army stationed in Juba. The third group consisted of members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda who had enjoyed the backing of both Zaire and Sudan.⁵⁵

Together, the former Hutu extremists, Islamists and disgruntled tribesmen had set up a guerrilla organization. Its initial attack on Uganda was successful because the Ugandans did not anticipate attacks from the west. The subsequent Ugandan retaliatory measures and hot pursuit deep into Zairian territory caused diplomatic problems.⁵⁶ The repeated attacks from Zaire and the unwillingness of the Mobutu regime to put pressure on the rebels to stop their incursion into Ugandan territory prompted Uganda to intervene militarily in Zaire on the side of anti-Mobutu forces.

⁵³ G. Prunier, "The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis", op.cit., pp.7-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ G. Prunier, "The Great Lakes Crisis", op.cit., p.190.

In the context of an extra-territorial extension of the Rwanda conflict, the Great Lakes region has entered a phase of profound dualization⁵⁷. As a result of instant ethnogenesis, 'Bantu' oppose themselves against "Hima" or Hamites", just as the Hutu are opposed to Tutsi in Rwanda. Therefore, the bipolar ethnic set-up, the instrumentalization of which has claimed so many lives in Rwanda, now infects the whole Great Lakes area.

⁵⁷ F. Reyntjens, "Briefing : The Second Congo War : More than a Remake", op.cit., p.244.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

This study has made a long journey from pre-colonial Rwanda all the way to present-day Rwandan politics to trace the root causes of the conflict. Even though the present government, which replaced an old dictatorial regime made some changes, the underlying causes of the Rwanda conflict remain and therefore the conflict is unresolved.

As noted on chapter three, the causes of the conflict are not only structural but also psychological or psycho-cultural (for example, irrational myths, mistrust, hatred and fear). It is the result of the interplay of structural causes with psychological factors that escalated the conflict and triggered the tragic events of 1994.

Static economy, severe demographic pressures, high levels of poverty and unemployment and shrinking land holding per family all add serious strains to conflict management and reconstruction. If the economy is not structurally reformed to allow greater opportunity, the potential for violence will continue to exist.

In today's Rwanda, there is no declared theory of ethnic exclusivity as was the case during the Kayibanda and Habyarimana years of the Hutu, "the majority people" ideology.¹ A majority of the ministers are Hutu. The government led by the RPF presents itself as 'democratic', because it 'shares power' with the former opposition parties. However, the regime has been heavily criticized for the narrowness of the ruling clique, and its silencing of certain voices of dissent. The government has two channels of authority: one is the official administrative structure of the cabinet and the ministries; the

¹ See Chapter Three.

other is the RPF network, both civilian and military, which runs parallel to the administration controlling the reality of the decision-making process. According to the same pattern, 14 of the 18 chiefs of ministerial staff; 16 out of 19 general-secretaries (the equivalent of Permanent Secretaries) and 80 percent of the local *bourgmestres* are RPF Tutsi. Of the 12 district prefects, nine were Tutsi, two Hutu, one position was vacant. Among the 14 officers comprising the army and *gendarmerie* high command, only one is Hutu. 95 percent of the academic staff at the re-opened campus of the *Université du Rwanda* in Butare are Tutsi and so are 80 percent of their students. The "Tutsization" of the judicial system is also clear: the Supreme Council of the Judiciary is mainly Tutsi; three of the four presidents of the Courts of Appeal and 90 percent of the new judges now being trained for the Justice Department are Tutsi.²

RPA officers are present at all levels of the government and head several of the big parastatals such as the *Office National des Transport en Commun* and Rwanda Metals. Most companies with important activities related to the natural resource of the DRC are owned by the Government or by individuals very close to the inner circle of President Kagame.³ Power is concentrated in the hands of a small RPF elite; opposition parties have been weakened. Rwandans who do not agree with the policies of the government are considered as negative elements and threat to national security. Among those who dared to oppose government policies one Tutsi leader was killed; other fearing for their lives fled the country. An effective security apparatus is being developed. Rwanda is increasingly becoming an army with a state rather than a state with an army.

² G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, 1997, p. 369.

³ See Chapter Four.

During the course of 1997 and 1998, the defeated ex-FAR and Interhamwe militia attacked civilian and army positions in the northwest of the country, the traditional headquarter of Hutu extremism. Combining wave after wave of anti-Tutsi propaganda, the rebels continued to use the politics of hatred as their mobilizing message, which they target at the northwest. Thousands of people residing in that area appeared to have participated in the attack or at least providing information. Counter attacks were unleashed by the RPA in which military and civilian targets were indiscriminately attached and killed. Entire villages were systematically bombed and civilians slaughtered.⁴ The use of excessive force by the government army had by and large reinforced the position of Hutu extremists because part of the predominantly Hutu population in that area gave supplies and logistical support to the rebels.

The government cannot win the hearts and minds of the Hutu population in the northwest using excessive force. It could not deal with the insurgency solely from Kigali as the rebels were mostly the sons of families living in that area. The government should discourage acts of reprisals against the civilian population, step up efforts to reintegrate ex-FAR into the RPA and use some of these officers and soldiers to convince other insurgents to return. It must deploy to the troubled northwest ex-FAR Hutu high-ranking officers who had been reintegrated in the RPA.

One of the most important strategies for ending the insurgency that is fueling the war on Congolese soil and heightening divisions within Rwanda would be to adopt a multifaceted approach of luring refugees and combatants back to Rwanda or - in the case

⁴ See Chapter Three.

of those accused of genocide – to face justice⁵. Such a strategy would require political, judicial, economic, social and military elements, including:-

- movement toward more democratic economic and political participation;
- allowing local population to decide whether any accusation will be lodged against returnees to Rwanda, thus determining whether the individual will reintegrate or face justice;
- due process and a presumption of innocence until proven guilty;
- returnees not accused of genocide should take back their old houses reintegrate into economic life and run for local office if they so choose;
- major demobilization and reintegration programme to provide training and employment to demobilized militia and;
- economic support for reintegration and restoring livelihoods;

The belief in collective Hutu responsibility for the genocide may account for the big number of death of Hutu at the hands of the RPA in the DRC, as well as the massacres in Rwanda. The government should know that the perpetrators of genocide are few and the majority of Hutu are innocent. Although there have been few instances of vengeance against returning Tutsi refugees in the past years, many Hutu remain alienated and fearful of the present government.

The Rwandan people and government know that destructive nature of divisive ethnicity. Rwandans should acknowledge the ethnic realities that shape their society. Pretending that ethnic division do not exist and will not be recognized is a response that

⁵ J. Prendergast, Post genocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi.. Special Report, pp.10-11.

satisfies nobody. These divisions exist and everybody knows they exist. Many of the government's actions exacerbate the division: the war reinforces them. The destructive and divisive ethnicity of the past should be replaced with an inclusive ethnicity. The government should increase meaningful Hutu participation while maintaining security for Tutsi populations. It should consider affirmative action policy in favour of Hutu students for scholarships and admission into universities, and disadvantaged Hutu owned businesses for government contracting. Government employment should be on the basis of merit.

This study is set out to explore the roles the international community played in minimizing or aggravating the Rwanda conflict. It is established that the UN Security Council, especially its most powerful members and the international community as a whole failed the people of Rwanda in their greatest hour of need. They failed to condemn the perpetrators of the genocide and to stop the genocide. The world had let genocide happen again. The international community had also failed to disarm the Hutu Power in the Kivu refugee camps.⁶

In the name of both justice and accountability, reparations are owed to Rwanda by actors in the international community for their roles before, during and after the genocide. The funds paid, as reparation should be devoted to urgently needed infrastructure developments and social service improvements on behalf of all Rwandans.

As noted in Chapter Three, Hutu Power mass media played negative roles in the Hutu – Tutsi ethnic relationship. Hutu rebels continued to disseminate hate-filled inflammatory statements. Any outcome of the conflict will depend on eradicating the hate

⁶ See Chapter Three.

propaganda propagated by these rebels. The Rwandese Parliament should introduced legislation that prohibits hate propaganda and incitement to violence.

There is lack of theory on rules regarding insurgents. Further research on insurgents is needed, especially when they are nationals enjoying refugee status in another country. In recent years refugees are becoming agents of internalization of conflicts. Their involvement in politics threatens regional stability. Further studies are also required on this phenomenon.

The Rwanda conflict has not been contained within the frontiers of that country. Its neighbours experience the effects of the crisis. Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda have been flooded with refugees, the DRC has been destabilized. Rwanda's occupation of the Kivu region of eastern DRC in a pursuit to deal with the insecurity posed by the ex-FAR and Interhamwe militia resulted in serious violations of human rights and the displacement of the local population. Thus the Rwanda internal conflict internationalized and shifted the epicentre of the conflict from Rwanda to the DRC. The DRC has charged Rwanda with aggression; however, it is also obliged by the stipulation of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention to prevent subversion by refugees. The conflict in Rwanda and the DRC are best and most effectively managed regionally. If the international community wants to solve the Congolese conflict it should take into account the Rwanda conflict which both are interconnected.

Rwanda has been criticized for having no non-military strategy of dealing with the regional war. This study understands the government's determination to root out its ex-FAR and Interhamwe enemies throughout central Africa so long as no other force undertakes the task. However, this strategy exacerbates ethnic tensions both within

Rwanda and the region. In the Kivu region of eastern DRC, animosity to Tutsi thrives on rumours of Rwandan ambitions to annex the territory. Bands of anti-Tutsi fighter find willing recruits to join the battle against so-called "Rwandan imperialism"⁷. The Kigali government has made little efforts to form broad-based political coalition at a local level that might sustain the RCD, its Congolese ally, once the RPA pulls out. In order to break the alliance between Congolese groups and their Rwandan *genocidaire* allies, the Rwandan government should convince the local groups that Rwanda is committed to political pluralism for the Kivu once the conflict ends.

One of the reasons that worsened the relations between the DRC and Rwanda is the issue of the Banyamulenge community. As noted in chapter five, the Banyamulenge and other Kivu Banyarwanda (people of Rwandan origin, both Tutsi and Hutu) were given Congolese (Zairean) citizenship in January 1972. In 1981, a new law was passed that redefined the requirements for Zairean nationality. The new text had been carefully tailored to exclude the Banyamulenge and other Banyarwanda since it required proof of long-standing residence in Zairean soil. Thus in 1981 the Mobutu government revoked the citizenship of the Banyamulenge. They are officially branded as strangers who could not hold public office.⁸ One of the conditions for Rwanda supporting Kabila to topple Mobutu 1996 was that once he came to power he would solve the status of the Congolese Tutsi. However, Kabila proved unable or unwilling to solve this problem. The Banyamulenge issue continues to cause problems for both countries. The measures taken by the Mobutu regime to revoke the nationality rights of the Banyamulenge was a flagrant human rights violation; it is also politically ridiculous. In effect, how was it that

⁷ See Chapter Four.

⁸ Ibid.

the country, established some thirty years previously, could deny the nationality rights of a community who had resided in the Kivu for 200 years? If Congolese political leaders wish to solve the present crisis and want to live in peace and harmony, they should better re-examine carefully their exclusionist policy.

Peace will not come to the Great Lakes region until the territorial integrity of the DRC and the citizenship rights of the Banyamulenge is fully restored, and participation is widened in the political and economic life of the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Instead of focusing on the ethnic identity the states of the Great Lakes area should encourage a national identity. In order to minimize conflict and take advantage of their individual economic strength, they should implement policies for economic integration as proposed by the UN Economic Commission for Africa and other OAU conventions.

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