

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

**LINKAGES BETWEEN STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND RESOURCES-BASED
CONFLICT: THE CASE STUDY OF SOUTHERN SUDAN**

(1954-2005)

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in another university.

Signature: 

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This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family, friends and colleagues at work for their invaluable support and for believing in me.

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The period during which I was undertaking my master's degree at the University of Nairobi was enlightening. I have encountered many people from whom I have learnt a lot, besides exchanging ideas that have widened my perception about the world I have made established new bonds of friendship.

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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to investigate the linkages between structural violence and resources' based conflict in Southern Sudan (1954-2005). The importance of this study lies in exposing the relevance of considering resources and structural violence in causing a conflict. The purpose of this study is to investigate causes of the Southern Sudan conflict. In particular the study seeks to link structural violence and natural resources in fueling the already delicate relation between North and Southern Sudan.

This study endeavours to analyse the Sudan conflict between the North and the South with an emphasis on the role played by natural resources and its linkage to the structural violence experienced by the people of the Sudan. This is because the Sudan conflict has raged for a long time hence presents a wide perspective for study. A comprehensive study of this conflict will give clear understanding of all the parameters surrounding the conflict. An examination of the variables surrounding the conflict, including the role of the colonial administration will explain why the conflict has lasted this long, and why previous efforts to resolve it have been so unsuccessful. Such an insight will form an important basis when approaching similar conflicts in the continent

The African continent has experienced many conflicts, ranging from struggle for independence from the colonialists to intra state conflicts for example the Sudan conflict. A common feature in these conflicts has been the coming up by the oppressed in society to challenge the unjust structures. The structuralisms' approach has given an angle at which the conflict can be analyzed and possibly managed. Its suggestion of

revolutionizing the structures every time there is a conflict may not be practical, this practicability is challenged by the fact that human nature and needs are ever changing and as such it may be possible to ever come up with structures that will keep up these changes.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS	Africa Union Mission in Sudan
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	Africa Union
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
GNPOC	The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MOFA	Ministry of foreign Affairs
NIF	National Islamic Front
OAU	Organization of Africa Union
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed District National Union
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SF	Southern Front
SPLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
UN	United Nation

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the topic of the research study. It sets the broad context of the study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and methodology of the study.

The word conflict is derived from the Latin word which means strike together. A conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something¹. The unwillingness of one party to see the other party's point of view aggravates the already tense situation. This situation may escalate into a full scale conflict which may turn violent². Structural violence is that condition in which human beings are unable to realize their full potential. Their somatic and mental realization is below their potential realization³. Structural conflict is nested in structural violence⁴. Structural violence is within the structures that govern relationships in a given society⁵. The society in which structural violence exist is in un-peaceful state where that society is neither in a war nor peace condition⁶. Peace lacks because relations in that society are organized in such a way that there is a big gap between the actual and potential development.

Physical violence on the other hand is the most manifested form of conflict where physical harm is inflicted to those affected by it⁷. Physical violence is demonstrated in everyday situations in form of wife battering in family conflict, to the use of missiles in international

¹ C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 15-25.

² P. Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, (London: Sage, 2002), p. 17.

³ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3 (1969) pp. 167-191.

⁴ M. Mwangi, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Process and Institution of Management*, (Nairobi, CCR 2006) p. 26.

⁵ J. Galtung, *Op. Cit.*

⁶ A. Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock publication, 1971).

⁷ M. Mwangi, *Op Cit* p 14.

conflict⁸. At some point structural violence and physical violence converge since the idea of violence is central. At some point if structural violence is not attended to and the conflict generation structure continues, life in that structure becomes unbearable that violence is the only reasonable way out⁹.

Human needs theorists argue that many conflicts are caused by the lack of provision of fundamental human needs¹⁰. These include basic needs for food, water and shelter as well as more complex needs for safety, security, self esteem and personal fulfillment. These more complex needs centre on the capacity to exercise choice in all aspects of one's life and to have one's identity and cultural values accepted as legitimate. All these needs are fundamental requirements for human development thus while interests can be negotiated when they come into conflict, needs cannot.¹¹

Conflicts that develop around issues of identity, ethnicity, religion or culture are often grounded in unmet human needs¹². Identity is integral to one's self-esteem and how one interprets the rest of the world, any threat to this is likely to produce some response. Typically this response is both aggressive and defensive. Individuals will fight indefinitely to achieve essential needs and will not give up until their goals are attained¹³.

Desire of justice is one that people are unwilling to compromise. An individual's sense of justice is connected to the norms, rights and entitlement that are thought to underlie decent human treatment. If there is a discrepancy between what a person obtains, what she wants and what she believes she is entitled to; she may come to believe she is being deprived of the

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ J. Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² J. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

¹³ G. Sorensen, 'Utopianism in Peace Research: The Gandhian Heritage,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2, (May, 1992), pp. 135-144.

benefits she deserves. When people believe that they have been treated unfairly, they may challenge or get even with those who have treated them unjustly. A sense of injustice motivates aggression or retaliation. Individuals may use violent or non violent means to address the injustice they have suffered and ensure that their fundamental needs are met. This is especially likely if no procedures are in place to correct the oppressive structures or bring about retributive justice¹⁴.

The conflict in Sudan had been one of the longest running conflicts in Africa. Its genesis goes back to the historic relations between the North and the South. The armed conflict itself however flared up towards independence in 1956 with the mutiny by Southern soldiers in 1954. The main contentious issue was the marginalisation of the South by the North. This situation did not change with independence as successive Sudanese governments pursued policies which fell short of the Southerners' aspirations, prompting them to take up arms¹⁵.

Egyptian administration, slave trade flourished¹⁶. This was started by the Turks and Egyptians as a means of financing but was heightened by the Madhist regime after the Mahdiyya uprising of 1881.

A significant factor that continues to haunt the relationship between the South and the North was the colonial concentration on the economic, political and administrative development of the North at the expense of the South, thereby creating socio-economic and political disparities between the two regions. In this evolution of uneven development, education was a major factor in that the Northerners, being closer to Egypt, found easy access to educational

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ J. A. Allan, *Africa South of the Sahara*, 2003, p. 1006

¹⁶ F.M. Deng, "Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood," in R.R. Laremont (ed.) *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 16.

facilities in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. The education dispensed to the Southerners retarded the evolution of their national consciousness and political awareness¹⁷.

With the end of the Second World War, Europe's pre-war colonial arrangements came under review, with pressure especially from the United States for colonised countries to be granted full independence. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium had, therefore to make a decision about the future of Sudan. The tide of Sudanese Nationalism was rising in the North, and the cause of self-determination for Sudan was being taken up by Egypt which indicated its desire to end the Condominium.

For almost two decades, the Condominium government had been unable to decide what to do with the South. It had the option of either linking the South with the North in an independent Sudan or to extract the South from an independent Sudan and link it politically with East Africa. In the meantime the South remained closed. When the Southern policy was repealed, a conference was convened in Juba in 1947 with the aim of exploring the Southern Sudan question and to determine whether it was advisable for the South to send representatives to the Legislative assembly or have their own Advisory Council similar to the one established in the North in 1944. Its participants from the South comprised of fifteen Southerners chosen by Governors of the Southern Provinces, who included a police sergeant major, a few chiefs and very junior administrators. Not all were educated to the same standard. Coming from different provinces, they lacked a common experience to draw them together.¹⁸ The other participants included six British officials and six Northerners.

The conference was, from the view of the Southerners unsatisfactory. The Northern representatives, led by Judge Mohammed Saleh Shingiti, were highly educated and had a

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ D.H. Johnson, *African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Oxford: James Currey, 2004) p. 25.

definitive view of Sudan's political future as a single state. The Southerners had differing opinions both from the Northerners and amongst themselves. Clearly, they could not visualise at that time what the political developments would be in future. It created fear in the minds of the Southerners that the aim of the conference was simply to inform them of a decision that had already been reached between the Northerners and the British, that the South would be handed over to the North. This meant a new form of colonialism; this time from the North, although it had been agreed to have thirteen Southerners participate in the Legislative assembly¹⁹.

In February 1954, a committee comprising of two British Officers and three Northern members was set up with the remit of replacing the British Officials with Sudanese in government posts. The South was not represented. When the names of the new Sudanese were announced, out of eight hundred posts, only six were assigned to Southerners. The highest of the posts was that of Assistant District Commissioner. This act heightened tensions between the North and the South. These events made the Southerners more politically conscious than they ever were before. Accelerated Sudanisation was met by growing political awareness and dissent by educated Southerners who gave voice to their opposition to the political arrangements that were being put in place for Sudanese independence.

Through the 1970's and 1980's, the Sudan government introduced changes which were a precursor to the dissent in South Sudan. The abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement through the introduction of the Regional Government Bill that sought to redraw borders of South Sudan marked this period.²⁰ In 1993, IGADD under retired president Moi sought to mediate in order to end the conflict in Sudan. The conflict in Sudan was having a spill over

¹⁹ G. G. Riam, *Christian Muslim Relations in Sudan*, (Scotland: Non Western World College, 2005) p. 37.

²⁰ A. Alier, *Too many Agreements Dishonoured*; South Sudan, (Lebanon, Ithac press, 2003) p.257

effect on its neighbours. This effort did not bear fruits as the Sudan Government rejected the proposed right to self determination.²¹

Egypt and Libya peace proposals fell short of South Sudan aspirations and such in the wake of repeated failures the United States of America became actively involved in the peace process. This involvement by the US was occasioned by its need to protect its interest against terrorists. This is the process that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.²²

Immediately after independence and the subsequent years, it became clear that the new government intended to follow a policy that was based on one language; Arabic, one religion; Islam and one nation²³. A common cause of all the rebellions in the Sudan irrespective of the region and time is that in terms of development, representation and justice, successive northern civilians (mainly Arabs) and military oligarchies in Khartoum have conducted the business of government with little or no regard to the wishes and aspirations of the majority of non Arab citizens especially those in the west and south.²⁴

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

According to the theory of structural violence, conflict is deeply rooted in structures of international system. Peace can only be attained by revolutionizing completely or partially structures which are unjust and because of the unjustness cause conflict. Structural conflict gives rise to structural violence which is no less harmful than violent conflict²⁵. The conflict arises when opportunities and goods which some parts of the system feel they are entitled to,

²¹ D. H. Johnson, *Op Cit*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ M.N. Arou, *Post Independence Sudan*, (Scotland: University of Edinburgh, 1980) p. 17.

²⁴ B. Raftopoulos and K. Alexander, *Peace in the Balance: The crisis in the Sudan*, (Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town 2006) p. 20

²⁵ J. Galtung, 'Violence Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace Research* Volume 3 (1969)

have not been forthcoming²⁶. The conflict may also be fueled by resources either due to demand induced scarcity, supply induced scarcity or structural scarcity.²⁷

The African continent has experienced many conflicts, ranging from struggle for independence from the colonialists to intra state conflicts for example the Sudan conflict. Resources extracted from South Sudan have been used to sustain a perfect war;²⁸ tens of thousands of indigenous South Sudanese have been killed while hundreds of thousands have been displaced.²⁹ A common feature in these conflicts has been the coming up by the oppressed in society to challenge the unjust structures. The structural violence approach has given an angle at which the conflict can be investigated and possibly managed.

Notably is the natural resources endowment in many African countries for example Sudan which has vast oil deposits in its southern part. Does the manner in which these resources are utilized as a result of the structures have a bearing of the stability in Sudan? If such just structures are developed according to the peace research theory, then conflict will be managed. This paper seeks to investigate the linkages between structural violence and resources-based conflict in Southern Sudan.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Overall Objective

The overall objective of this study is to link structural violence and resource based conflict in the Sudan conflict context.

²⁶ M. Mwangiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Process and institution of Management*, (Nairobi, CCR 2006). p 28

²⁷ N.P. Gleditsch, 'Environmental Change, Security and Conflict,' in Crocker, C.A. *et al*, (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 53-68

²⁸ R. Martin, 'Sudan's Perfect war,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81 No. 2 (Mar. – Apr., 2002), 111-127.

²⁹ J. Rone, 'Sudan: Oil and War,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 3 No. 97, The Horn Conflict (Sept., 2003), pp. 478+504+510.

Sub-Objectives

The study will specifically seek to investigate:

- i. If the distribution and utilization of resources has generated conflict between North and South Sudan
- ii. If structures in the Sudan system (political, economic and social) have generated conflict between North and South Sudan.
- iii. The transformation of the causes of conflict between North and Southern Sudan.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study endeavors to examine the role played by natural resources and structural violence in causing a conflict. The case study is the North-South Sudan conflict. As such, the study will be looking for literature in the following sub themes: Literature on structural violence, literature on the link between structural violence and resource based conflict, literature on North-South Sudan conflict and literature on the management efforts of the North-South Sudan conflict.

Literature on Structural Violence

Conflict is broadly associated with tensions surrounding decisions on various choices, sometimes being manifested in confrontations between social forces³⁰. According to Galtung, structural violence is within the structures that govern relationships in a given society³¹. He argues that it is deep rooted structural anomalies are responsible for the conflict rather than

³⁰ H.W. Jeong, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis*, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008). p. 6.

³¹ J. Galtung: 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3 pp 167 - 191

the subjective elements in the nature of the relationship, structural violence is present whether perceived or not.³²

Curle, posits that structural violence is partly responsible for the stunted growth and undermining of justice.³³ Structural violence is embedded in the structures that govern relationships and interactions, it is experienced through unequal power distribution and unequal life chances.³⁴ In the long run this kind of relation breeds conditions of violence where the weaker parties suffer. Curle further explains that structural violence laced in social political order is evidenced in society by institutions that impose conditions which are at risk of negative consequences.³⁵

Boulding differs with this line of thought and posits that the world is characterized by high levels of dynamism. Circumstances in the world are never static and as they change, the culture and structures around them also transform. This transformation can be for the best or the worst³⁶. Galtung is also accused of being too normative in his analysis of structural violence to the extent that description of reality suffers. Notwithstanding that norms act as a filter that leads to a perversion of our image of reality, circumstances sometimes lead people to perceive the objective reality. With increase in literacy levels and education, science is also reaching the masses in higher levels with its arguments that norms should be separated from affect as far as possible.³⁷

Galtung has also been criticized because of his passion for equality, his hatred for hierarchy and top dogs. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of structure

³² Ibid.

³³ A. Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock publication, 1971).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ K. Boulding, 'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung' *Journal of Peace Research*, No.1 Vol. 14, (1977), pp 77-86.

³⁷ Ibid.

itself. This means the costs of inequality are underestimated, especially the lack of quality and liberty. Quality is a peak achievement, not average achievement, and an egalitarian society cannot produce the peaks. Equality involves the loss of liberty. Liberty involves property, since property is that within which we have liberty, and property always involves a dynamic that destroys equality because some people use it well and some badly, some accumulate and some decumulates.³⁸

Hierarchy, which Galtung opposes, is a fundamental feature of social organization, which would render societies chaotic in its absence. Hierarchy is a principle of social organization and a device for economising communication, which is absolutely necessary in organizations beyond a handful of people. Ills of hierarchy like corruption of information and domination must be dealt with within the structure of hierarchy itself and cannot be dealt with by abolishing it.³⁹

Galtung doesn't take into account that the world is a mixture of both the model of Marxism where the poor/working class produce everything as the rich take it all away and the model of differential development where a group can get rich because their culture encouraged innovation and thrift while another group got poor because their culture did not cultivate behavior which would lead to riches⁴⁰

To Boulding, liberationism, which operates primarily in the dialectical mode and looks to the solution of human problems by getting rid of top dogs simply produces another set of top dogs, often worse than the last, and does little to promote the real evolutionary and developmental processes which are the only way of getting rid of poverty and diminishing the sum of human misery.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Galtung, and the general structural thinking, has been accused of overemphasizing on redistribution rather than production. Too much focus on redistribution of existing resource means that innovation of new resources is neglected. Redistributions therefore only destroy production, a fact that can easily make the poor worse off than they were before. The overall productivity of a society is much more a function of its knowledge and know-how structure, including organizational know-how, than it is of natural resources or of the labour force. Thus the poverty of the poor historically has been relieved very little by redistribution. The poor have gotten richer mainly by getting into the evolutionary mainstream of increasing know-how and so increasing their productivity⁴¹.

Joseph argues that structural violence factors show themselves in systemic political exclusion, uneven economic inequalities, lack of adequate and responsible institutions, presence of ethnic minorities, resource exhaustion and over dependence on international trade.⁴² The absence of justice is frequently the principle reason for the absence of peace; this is at the most basic level.⁴³ According to Cheru, denial of basic rights, extreme economic inequalities, ethnic discrimination are manifestation of injustices and forms of structural violence which plants the seed of physical violence.

According to Kriesberg,⁴⁴ conflict exists when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible goals. A conflict arises when members of one or more of the adversaries minimally combine four qualities: a sense of collective identity, a grievance,

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² T. Joseph, *Early Warning Methods: Background Report and Methodology Notes, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy* found at www.carleton.ca/citp/docs/EW

⁴³ F. Cheru, *African Renaissance; Road Map to The Challenges of Globalisation* (London: Zed books,2002) p.

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⁴⁴ L. Kriesberg, 'Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes (May, 2001), pp. 373-

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the belief that the other side is responsible for their grievance, and the conviction that they can affect the other side so as to lessen their grievance.

According to Joseph, Cheru and Kriesberg, social conflicts always involve one or more groups who see themselves as distinct and therefore have different collective identities. The content of each group's identity varies greatly, affecting the emergence and course of a conflict. Insofar as one group's sense of identity seems to deny the reality or legitimacy of the other group's identity, an 'identity-based conflict' is sometimes said to exist. It is useful to regard such denials as grievances if they are experienced that way by one or more parties. Similarly, values and ways of living that one group tries to impose on another are likely to be regarded as grievances by one or both sides. These are matters of dissensus between the adversaries.⁴⁵

The grievance may also refer to matters of consensus, for example land, wealth, political control, or other matters desired by the contending groups. Conflicts about such consensual matters are often considered to be 'interest'-based. Grievances exist in all conflicts, generally involving both dissensual and consensual matters, but in varying degrees.

The concept of identity-based conflicts has additional connotations. It generally refers to collective identities based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other communal characteristics. Furthermore, these tend to be ascribed status characteristics, regarded as determined by parentage and hence immutable. These identities are often viewed, by members and non-members alike, as shared by every member of the community. Such qualities tend to perpetuate the differences between communal groups and to make combatants regard

⁴⁵ V. Aubert, 'Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (1963), pp. 26-42.

everyone in each group as engaged in the conflict. Consequently, such collective identities may lead to particularly destructive conflicts involving genocide⁴⁶.

Literature on Resources-Based Conflict

Natural resources have been known to lead to conflicts since the days of Robert Malthus who formulated the Malthusian principle that pointed out that high population growth will ultimately put pressure on the available resources and end up in a crisis.⁴⁷ Natural resources are those resources found in natural form like crude oil, diamonds, arable land, pasture, watering points, and so on. Deteriorating resource bases coupled with a rapidly growing population can lead to a conflict or exacerbate the existing tension. There is undisputed relationship between natural resources and conflict. Conflicts can arise from competition for limited or inequitably distributed resources as it is the case in land conflicts in Kenya, conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and so on.

One of the most important champions of the view that resources play an important role in generating and exacerbating armed conflicts, Thomas Homer-Dixon, distinguishes between three forms of resource scarcity that lead to a conflict situation. Demand-induced scarcity is the kind of resource scarcity that results from population growth. Supply-induced scarcity is the type of resource scarcity resulting from the depletion or degradation of a resource. Structural scarcity, which is a central theme of this study, is the type of scarcity that results from inequitable/unfair distribution of the resource.⁴⁸

A fundamental academic debate concerning resources as a cause of conflicts is whether the conflict over a given resource is due to greed or due to genuine and pressing grievance.

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ T.R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

⁴⁸ N.P. Gleditsch, 'Environmental Change, Security and Conflict,' in C. A. Crocker, et al, (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 53-68.

Collier⁴⁹ relates the risk of conflict due to resources to three factors. These are over dependence on primary commodity exports leading to extreme competition over these commodities; low average income meaning basic needs are not met; and slow growth/stagnation of the economy.

According to Collier and Hoeffler,⁵⁰ states that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states. Azzam⁵¹ *et al* concur with them, and he posit that the onset of violent conflict is triggered by the interaction of the economic motives with long standing grievances over the mismanagement of the resources and wealth. Fearon and Laitin,⁵² and de Soysa,⁵³ each using unique data sets, find that oil-exporting states are more likely to suffer from civil wars. Fearon also shows that the presence of certain types of resources (gemstones and narcotics) tends to make wars last longer; similarly, Doyle and Sambanis⁵⁴ demonstrate that civil wars are harder to end when they occur in countries that depend on primary commodity exports. Buhaug and Gates⁵⁵ show that the presence of mineral resources in a conflict zone tends to increase a conflict's geographical scope.

Ross⁵⁶ extensively explored the correlation between civil wars and resources. A civil war is an important concept in this study since Sudan has been embroiled in this kind of conflict for

⁴⁹ P. Collier, 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their applications for Policy,' in C. A. Crocker, *et al*, (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 143-162.

⁵⁰ P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil War,' *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 50, No. 4, (1988), pp. 563-573.

⁵¹ J. P. Azzam and A. Mensard. Civil War and The Social Contract'paper presented at the Royal Economic annual Conference, Durnam 9-11th April 2001.

⁵² J.D. Fearon, and D.D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,' *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No. 1, (2003), pp. 75-90.

⁵³ I. de Soysa, 'Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 4, (2002), pp. 395-416.

⁵⁴ M. Doyle, and N. Sambanis. 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,'

American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, (2000), pp. 779-801

⁵⁵ H. Buhaug, and S. Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.39, No. 4(2002), pp. 417-33.

⁵⁶ M.L. Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (2004), pp. 35-67.

long period. To become classified as a civil war, a conflict must pass a certain threshold, producing at least one thousand combat-related deaths over some period of time. The correlation between resources and civil war can be explained in three dimensions: resources and onset of a civil war; resources and intensity of a civil war; and resources and duration of a civil war.

The onset of a civil war due to existence of resources can be explained from four perspectives. Looting of the resources by potential rebels avail start up costs for the war, ⁵⁷that is, the looting of resources by rebels avail the funding of the war. Resource extraction can lead to grievances among the locals and a war erupts as the locals resist or address these grievances. Resource extraction is an excellent incentive for separatism where the resource rich region seeks to be autonomous to avoid sharing the treasures with a large population. Over dependence on resource revenues by states leads to state weakness and ultimately a civil war breaks.⁵⁸

The duration of a civil war due to presence of resources can be understood from four perspectives. Looting by weaker (or stronger) party leads to more arms and the war is either prolonged or shortened. War in resource-rich countries appears financially profitable leading to less (more) incentive for peace and ultimately the war gets prolonged or shortened. Resource wealth in separatist region leads to commitment problem and the war gets prolonged.⁵⁹ The intensity of a civil war due to the presence of resources can be understood from two perspectives. When two sides engage in resource battles, more casualties are produced. But if two sides engage in cooperative plunder, fewer casualties are produced.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

The greed versus grievance model is critiqued by Ballentine⁶¹ who rejects the correlation between conflicts and resources. Governance failure seems and is the mediating variable presence of resources and conflict.⁶² This argument does bring the debate of structural violence linked to resources to full circle since it supports the idea that governance which form part of the structures is linked to how resources are utilized and ultimately to the stability of a society

Natural resources based conflict and structural violence are linked by the phenomenon of unequal distribution of resources where in most cases only a very small proportion of the population possesses all the resources at the expense of the poor majority. It is well established that natural resources lead to conflict when the society is in situation of structural conflict or negative peace.

Literature on Sudan Conflict

A lot of literature has been written about the Sudan conflict by several scholars and writers. They have presented their analyses from varying perspectives, each emphasising on different sets of variables as being the predominant ones upon the conflict.

Holt and Daly use the historical perspective to explain Southern Sudan current predicament. They capture the history of Sudan from the period before the Turco-Egyptian conquest. They explore the historical interactions between the Arabs and Africans with a view of explaining the current Sudanese nationality, religion and culture. They give detailed accounts of the different peoples of Sudan, the regions they lived in and the interactions between them⁶³. It goes on to explore the development of Sudanese nationalism during the Anglo-Egyptian

⁶¹ K. Ballentine, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering The Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflicts' in Ballentine K and Sherman J (eds). *The Political Economy of Conflict: beyond Greed and Grievance*. Boulder: Lynner Reiner. Pp 259-283.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ P M Holt and M W Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, (Longman, New York, 1988) p 152.

condominium administration of separateness between the North and the South.⁶⁴ The authors give detailed accounts from the Sudanese governments after independence and the politics involved and ends with the fall of Numeiri's regime.

Deng also uses Sudan's history to explain the causes of conflict. He traces Sudan's fragile path into nationhood. He begins by giving an overview of the situation from the historical evolution of the conflict, pointing out key issues, culminating in the contemporary challenges faced by the country. He further elaborates on various themes and perspectives, with a focus on identity conflicts and the roadmap to peace. He then dwells on the key issue of statehood and the evolution of a national consciousness, ending with an assessment of the prospects for peace, unity, and national integration. In his conclusion, he captures the words of former SPLA leader; "Sudan's major problem is that it has been looking and it still looking for its soul; its true identity".⁶⁵ Holt, Daly and Deng all relate Southern Sudan turbulent path to its history and its quest to find its own identity.

Policies adopted by various rulers before and after independence have are also been cited as another cause of the Sudanese conflict. Kwaje⁶⁶ gives an account of the Sudan Conflict by analysing the policies that have been pursued by successive Sudan governments which have led to the division of the country into North and South. He compares the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period to the situation which existed in Rhodesia, which after separate colonial administrations as Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, led to the emergence of three separate states after independence. He then goes on to discuss the search for peace in the Sudan. In the ensuing account, he traces the search for peace to the early 1930s and incrementally follows it up to the present day situation. He deliberately deals with

⁶⁴ibid.

⁶⁵ F M Deng, "Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood" p 80

⁶⁶ S. L. Kwaje, "The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha" in M. Mwagiru (ed.) *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004)

the major contentious issues as regards the comprehensive peace settlement, while at the same time highlighting the crucial role played by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Beshir⁶⁷ just as Kwaje alludes to policy issues as the cause of conflict. He analyses the political developments in the Sudan with a critical look at Sudan's relations with Egypt and the impact Egypt has had on Sudan's politics. He particularly considers the role that Egypt has played in the Arabisation of the Sudan. Infact, Arabisation of the South has been one of the contentious issues which led to the conflict. As regards the escalation of the conflict after independence, he considers the government policy of suppression of opposition in the south and implementation of policies which did not consider the special conditions of the South as the major cause.⁶⁸ He particularly faults the steps taken to create a presidential system governed by an Islamic constitution. He argues that this made it impossible for solution to the Southern problem to be found.

Clayton⁶⁹ also eludes to policies adopted as the cause the conflict and states that the underlying cause of the conflict between the North and the south as the disastrous linkage of the Northern Muslims, who saw themselves as Arabs, with the various Christian and non Muslim Africans of the South together in one Polity. He blames the unification on Britain's desire not to undermine her strategic position in Egypt, whose monarchs claimed the whole region. He considers the formation of the Anya-Nya movement in 1963 as the beginning of the civil war. He examines the successive governments which followed and faults the policies of reprisals they took as being the cause of the escalation of the conflict. He brings in the outside interference factor as a contributor to the conflict.

⁶⁷ M. O. Beshir, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan*, (London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1974) p. 213

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 214.

⁶⁹ A. Clayton, *Frontiers, Men and Warfare in Africa Since 1950* (UK: University College of London Press, 1999)

Nyaba and Johnson approach the Southern Sudan conflict from a wider perspective, apart from using Sudan's history include other perspectives. Nyaba examines the conflict from the political perspective of the Southern liberation movements.⁷⁰ He starts by giving a summarised but detailed background to the conflict between the North and the South. There after, he traces the struggle for liberation of southern Sudan from 1955 to the formation of Southern liberation movements and their struggles through the mid-1990s. He gives vivid accounts of the goings on in these movements, analysing the struggles, aspirations and inclinations of the leadership, exposing internal wrangles which often flared up into serious violent conflicts which nearly compromised the Southerners' liberation struggle. He particularly focuses on problems of regionalism, ethnicity, politics of collaboration with the National Islamic Front (NIF) and finally on the resurgence of the SPLM/A as the dominant force in the liberation of Southern Sudan. Towards the end of his book, he analyses the Nasir coup, in which there was an internal attempt to oust the leadership of SPLM/A, and goes on to highlight the lessons drawn from this debacle.

Johnson⁷¹ as concerns the conflict between the North and the South, not only considers the root causes as being the commonly held view of the conflict; one between North and South, Arab against African, and Christian against Muslim, but notes that the conflict has spread to theatres outside the Southern Sudan and even outside Sudan's borders. He gives a detailed account of all events right from the pre-Egyptian colonisation to the peace protocols signed in Kenya in 2004. He explains the nature of this recurring conflict as being a product of ten factors; among them being pre-colonial patterns of governance, Islamic militancy, Narrowly-based nationalist movement among the Northern elite in Sudan which attempted to confront issues of Sudan's diversity by attempting to build a national identity based on Arab culture

⁷⁰P A Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View*, (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 2000) p. 14.

⁷¹D. H. Johnson, *African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. p. 27

and Islam, and the interest of foreign governments and foreign investors in Sudan's natural resources, especially water and oil. The present peace in Sudan is critically examined with the author questioning whether this is a situation of bad peace⁷², which is a case of peace imposed; not permanent as key issues are still unresolved. On the future, Johnson⁷³ argues that issues pertaining to unequal and underdevelopment will have to be addressed if lasting peace is to be achieved.

Sudan's civil wars have been argued to be as a result of complex religious and ethnic subdivisions that existed within Sudanese society. This argument can be disputed because two of the main political parties, Umma (Nation), led by Sadiq Al -Mahadi, the great grandson of Al-Mahadi, and Federal Democratic Party led by Mohammed Osman Al-Margani (both of them are religious leaders as well as former prime minister for Sadiq Al-Mahadi) supported and fought in the side of SPLA. During the war a considerable number of southern citizens migrated to the north, these numbers estimated by 3 to 4 millions. It should also be noted that there are numerous churches in the North in most of the main cities especially Khartoum the capital itself prove that the North is not against Christian South.⁷⁴

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Academic Justification

The importance of this study lies in exposing the relevance of considering structural violence coupled with resources in causing a conflict. The purpose of this study is to investigate causes of the Southern Sudan conflict. In particular the study seeks to link structural violence and natural resources in fueling the already delicate relation between North and Southern Sudan.

⁷² J. Galtung, 'Violence Peace and Peace Research'. Op Cit

⁷³ D. H. Johnson, African Issues: Op Cit

⁷⁴ Ibid.

The study focuses on the Sudan as a case study because the Sudan conflict has influenced the conflict system in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes conflict system. This study endeavours to investigate the Sudan conflict between the North and the South with an emphasis on the role played by natural resources and its linkage to the structural violence experienced by the people of the Sudan. This is because the Sudan conflict has raged for a long time hence presents a wide perspective for study. A comprehensive study of this conflict will give clear understanding of all the parameters surrounding the conflict. An examination of the variables surrounding the conflict, including the role of the colonial administration will explain why the conflict has lasted this long, and why previous efforts to resolve it have been so unsuccessful. Such an insight will form an important basis when approaching similar conflicts in the continent.

Many scholars and researchers have not adequately addressed the area of linking structural violence and resource-based conflicts. Some of the main scholars who have worked on the general notion of resource based conflicts and structural violence include Collier,⁷⁵ Gleditsch,⁷⁶ Galtung⁷⁷ and Hommer-Dixon. The main contribution of these scholars has concentrated on the general dynamics of structural violence and distribution of natural resources. This has led to creation of a lacuna where the full effects of presence of structural violence coupled with skewed resource distribution on the effectiveness of conflict management has not been properly established in the literature of conflict management, especially in an inter-religious conflict, This gap is more profound when the effect of resource distribution is applied to the Sudan conflict. This study endeavors to fill this gap.

⁷⁵ Collier, Op. Cit.

⁷⁶ Gleditsch, Op. Cit.

⁷⁷ Galtung, Op. Cit.

Policy Justification

The Southern Sudan conflict has been a very costly one. It has led to loss of many lives, destruction of property and has hampered development in the regions concerned, not to mention the never-ending problem of small arms and refugees. This study will go a long way in generating insights to conflict managers on ways of managing the conflict more effectively. The study will influence policy formulation of various stake holders such as the countries that are mining oil in South Sudan. Such countries should be implored upon to have policies that will demand from the Sudan government accountability on issues of human rights violation in South Sudan.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study applies the theoretical framework of Structural violence. This exists in conditions in which human beings are unable to realize their full potential.⁷⁸ Violence is caused by the difference between the potential and the actual levels of realization. Potential levels of realization are those which are possible with given levels of insight and resources. Violence and by extension conflict occurs when the insight and resources are monopolized by a group or are used for other purpose causing the actual level to fall below potential level.⁷⁹

The primary motivation of peace research is to improve the human conditions with the aim of a better life in a safer world.⁸⁰ For a conflict to be dealt with, it advocates the overhaul of the underlying structures, even if force must be used. It is therefore revolutionary in nature.

The Sudan conflict was a lengthy conflict with dormant and active phases. The country is currently in the transition stage in accordance with the peace protocols agreed upon in Kenya. In the past, there have been periods of calm but the conflict flared into violence once again.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6 No. 3, (1969).

According to the theory of relative deprivation, Gurr⁸¹ argues that with rising expectations and lack of results, the discrepancy between the value expectations and the value capabilities, creates a likelihood of unrest which will manifest itself in a direct conflict, where there is infliction of physical injury and pain.⁸² This paper seeks to analyse in particular the role played by natural resources in Southern Sudan in fueling the already delicate relation between North and Southern Sudan.

HYPOTHESES

This study will be guided by the following hypotheses:

There is a link between structural violence and disproportionate allocation of resources between South and North Sudan

1. Resources found in the Southern Sudan have generated conflict with the North.
2. Structures in the Sudan system (Political, economic and social) are unjust and inequitable hence presence of structural violence in South Sudan.
3. Resolution rather than settlement will end the North South Sudan conflict.

METHODOLOGY

The study relied on primary data from structured interviews and secondary data from journal and books. The research design provided a framework for the collection and analysis of data.⁸³ The study employed case study type of research design. This is because the study sought to apply the concepts of structural conflict and natural resources on the causes of a particular conflict, the Sudan conflict.

⁸¹ T. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 24.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ A. Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 27.

A case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.⁸⁴ Case study research investigates the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. A case is commonly associated with a location, such as a community or organization. The emphasis in a case study tends to be upon the intensive examination of the setting.⁸⁵

The Sudan conflict has been selected as a critical case because it allowed a better understanding to the circumstances in which the clearly specified study hypothesis held true. This particular conflict is also an exemplifying case because it provided a suitable context for research questions to be answered.

A case study allowed for an intensive examination of a single case in relation to which a theoretical analysis is done, how well the data collected supports the theoretical arguments that were generated. A case study also allows for longitudinal research that compares phenomena over a period of time. As such it illuminates social change and improves the understanding of causal influences over time. Analysis of archival information and retrospective interviewing increases elements of longitudinal research into case study research.

However, a standard criticism labeled against case study research design is that findings derived from it cannot be generalized. External validity or generalizability of case study research is highly debatable. It is highly doubted that a single case can be representative so that it might yield findings that can be applied more generally to other cases.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 48.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 49.

Sampling Design

In the collection of primary data, this study employed purposive sampling/deliberate sampling. This kind of non-probability sampling involved purposive or deliberate selection of particular units of the universe for constituting a sample that represents the universe.⁸⁶ Specifically the study used convenience sampling because population elements were selected for inclusion in the sample based on the ease of access.

Since the population/universe of this study was the Horn of Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Sudanese embassy, the United Nations (UN) offices in Nairobi and any other organizations or persons with considerable information about the Sudan conflict, convenience sampling was advantageous because it allowed for selection of those respondents who were available. Individuals in the MOFA, embassies and such other places as mentioned above have busy schedules outside the country making their accessibility difficult. Some respondents due to security reasons and fear of their feedback to questions asked during data collection as being taken to be the official position of their government declined to participate and sought anonymity. As such, only the available or easily accessible officials were selected for inclusion in the sample. This helped in saving resources for doing the research as time and money.

Despite these advantages, convenience sampling suffers a drawback where it may give biased results particularly when the population is not homogenous.⁸⁷ As such there is need to have a wider population in the sampling to cater for the biasness, this was dictated by availability of time and resources.

⁸⁶ C.R. Kothari, *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*, 2nd ed., (New Delhi: New Age International Publishers, 2004), p. 15.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Methods of data collection

For collection of the primary data, this study employed structured interviews. Since the respondents were professionals in their areas of specialization, the open ended questions provided high levels of flexibility as the interview allowed for extraction of more information without limitations. With little direction from the interviewer, the respondents were encouraged to relate their experiences, to describe whatever events seem significant to them, to provide their own definitions of their situations, and reveal their opinions and attitudes as they see fit. This allowed respondents from both sides of the conflict to give their own views without limitations or obstructions by the interviewer. This kind of data collection method also allowed the interviewer a great deal of freedom to control the interview situation and to probe various areas and to raise specific queries during the course of the interview.⁸⁸

Some of the criticisms labeled against personal interviews include high costs in terms of the time to be spent during interviews and the traveling expenses to be incurred in reaching the respondents. The very flexibility that is the main advantage of interviews leaves room for interviewer's personal influence and bias. Interviews also lack anonymity as compared to other methods like mail questionnaires.⁸⁹

Data collection in this study also included analysis of secondary data that had already been collected and analyzed by someone else then stored in libraries or archives. As such, data collection involved analysis of various publications of governments or of international organizations and their subsidiaries like the MOFA and UN; journals including online journals; books; newspapers; and reports and projects prepared by research scholars.

⁸⁸ C. Frankfort-Nachmias, and Nachmias, D., *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 5th ed., (London: Arnold, 1996), p. 235.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 238.

Secondary data analysis has the advantage of saving the researcher from being confronted with the problems that are associated with collection of original/primary data like extensive traveling and field risks. Moreover, secondary data is readily and cheaply accessible in the libraries and archives.

Some of the drawbacks associated with secondary data include inadequacy and inaccuracy of the data especially because of the changes in the field after completion of such sources as books or project papers.⁹⁰ Some secondary sources especially government publications might be barred from the public for sometime leading to delays in the research. Moreover, such government publications might have been doctored to suit government policies or to please the public leading to inaccuracy. As such it was necessary to critically analyze the secondary data before including it in the research findings.

Data processing and analysis

The raw data collected was first be edited. The process of editing involved examination of the collected raw data to detect errors and omissions and to make corrections where possible. Editing assured that the data are accurate, consistent with other facts gathered, uniformly entered, as complete as possible and well arranged to facilitate analysis.⁹¹

All the information gathered was examined in relation to the hypothesis of the study to see if the hypothesis were confirmed or not.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter one: Research Proposal

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 238.

⁹¹ C.R. Kothari. Op. Cit. p. 122.

Chapter two: Debates on Structural violence and resources-based conflict

Chapter three: The Southern Sudan case study

Chapter four: Critical analysis

Chapter five: Conclusion.

CHAPTER 2: DEBATES ON STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND RESOURCES-BASED CONFLICT.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the various debates on structural violence and resources-based conflict. It looks at forms of structural violence where the subjectivity and objectivity of conflict is discussed; cultural violence, hierarchy and equality are also discussed in this chapter. Human security as opposed to state security is examined in human needs theory and development and the link between resources and conflict.

Forms of Structural Violence

Physical/direct violent conflicts are known in many cases to evolve from the very day-to-day norms, rules, constitutions that guide and organize social relationships. Conflicts are not static, and as such, they get transformed following a cycle from latent/covert conflict to overt/manifest conflict. In its latent stage, the conflict remains dormant for sometime because incompatibilities are unarticulated or built into unjust social structures.¹ Structural violence therefore results from unbalanced structures (skewed distribution of resources like political, power, knowledge, wealth and so on). Incompatibilities are embedded in social structures/structure of relationships and hence the actors might not immediately recognize it.² Whenever persons are harmed, maimed, or killed by poverty and unjust social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or structures, we speak of structural violence. Structural violence, like armed violence, can have two effects: it either kills its victims this is the case in Sudan where in pursuit of a relentless policy of scorched-earth warfare to create 'security' for the foreign oil companies, tens of thousands of indigenous people in South Sudan have been

¹ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.3 (1969), pp. 167-191

² Ibid.

killed, more than 200,000 displaced.³ It can also harm them in various ways short of killing,⁴ tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of residents in South Sudan have been displaced in order to provide a 'cordon sanitaire' for international oil companies.⁵

Violent and structural conflict raises the question as to whether conflict must be perceived for it to exist;⁶ this is the debate between subjectivists and the objectivists.⁷ According to the subjectivists' view, parties to a conflict must experience the conflict and its effects for the conflict to exist⁸ whilst, the objectivists posit that it is possible for parties to a conflict not to immediately experience the conflict because the conflict exists independent of the parties perception.⁹ Objectivists and subjectivists concur on the need to manage conflict in society, though there is a difference in opinion as to the conflict management methodology. While the latter advocates for management through negotiations and problem solving, the fore prefers management through eradication of structures responsible for the conflict through any means. Some of the means used may be violent; this contradicts the objectivists' commitment to eradicate violence as they see violence as a solution to conflict.¹⁰

Structuralists see conflict as an objective phenomenon, which emerges from a real clash of real interests rather than a perceived clash of interests, although actors may not perceive who their real enemies are. Victims of such unbalanced structures may not be unhappy with their masters, in that they are happy slaves, since they exist in a legitimized relationship.¹¹ In the condition of a happy slave, the slave works hard daily for the master and the master grows

³ J. Rone, 'Sudan: Oil & War,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict (Sep., 2003), pp. 478+504-510.

⁴ G. Köhler and N. Alcock, 'An Empirical Table of Structural Violence,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1976), pp. 343-356.

⁵ J. Rone, 'Sudan: Oil & War,' *Review of African Political Economy* Op cit

⁶ M. Mwagiru, *Conflict in Africa: Theory, Process and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi, CCR 2006) p. 15

⁷ K. Webb, *Conflict: Inherent and Contingent Theories*, *World Encyclopaedia of Peace* Vol. 1 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986) pp 169-174

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ M. Mwagiru, Op Cit

¹¹ Ibid.

rich from the sweat and labour of the slave. Since the slaves may not realize the inherent injustices in the structure of the relationship, the master does everything within his reach to maintain that structure and even to rationalise and make it legitimate to the slave.

The idea of unpeaceful societies¹² which do not conform to the traditional dichotomy of war and peace raises the question why actors involved in a conflict do not immediately recognize it. Why would societies not feel the inherent structural violence in which their lives are imbedded?¹³ They believe in partisanship or taking sides to defend your interests. Objectivists are sometimes seen as revolutionary and activist although such revolution need not be violent where the people undergoing structural violence can address the causes of the structural conflict through negotiation.¹⁴ Objectivists have been accused of being exporters of revolution and violence to other states¹⁵ they also lack an objective perspective because of the partisanship approach to conflict management.

Galtung,¹⁶ a key proponent of peace research, has helped shape the philosophical basis of peace research. Peace research challenges the basic tenets of the conventional analysis of violence and offers critical alternatives because conventionally, conflict is seen as physical and violent. The basic assumption of peace research is to improve the human condition and aim for a better life in a safer world for all. Proponents of peace research emphasize the need to promote values like justice, humanity, equality and so on, within society.

Structural violence is one of the principle conditions of aggression.¹⁷ A society festering in structural violence has numerous options (some peaceful others violent) to address the

¹² A. Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Publication, 1971)

¹³ M. Mwangiri, *Op cit* p. 27

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.3 (1969), pp. 167-191.

¹⁷ J. Galtung, 'A Structural theory of Aggression' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1 No.2 (1964), pp 95-119.

incompatibilities and aggression is just one of them. Aggression is important in this study since our case study (Sudan) has mostly opted to use aggression in addressing its grievances. Aggression is defined as the drive towards change even against the will of others. The extreme forms of this phenomenon of aggression are crimes, including homicide, between individuals; revolutions, including elimination, between groups; and wars, including genocide, between nations. These forms make aggression negative and problematic, a cause of concern and prevention.

Aggression mainly comes from the top dogs (individuals or groups or entities benefiting more from and by virtue of the social configuration) or the underdog (individuals or groups or entities losing by virtue of the social configuration).¹⁸ The underdog will always pressure the top dog to alter the social structure by any means available,¹⁹ for example violence as in our Sudan case, while the top dog will always try to thwart the underdog's efforts mostly by similar means, that is, if the underdog uses violence, the top dog will most likely counter via violent means.

The complete top dog has already obtained what the system has to offer in terms of rewards, but this by itself will not prevent 'much from wanting more'. Colonial wars and slavery were typical examples of aggression from the top, although closer analysis perhaps may reveal that they were also efforts made by nations and individuals close to the top, but short on one or two dimensions, to achieve the configuration of the complete topdog. Then it may be argued that the complete top dog is always in a state of aggression relative to, for instance, the complete underdog. The reward structure of society is a built-in transfer of value from underdog to topdog where the latter inevitably gets more than his due through a process of

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ D.J.D. Sandole, 'Paradigm, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or Confusion?' in D.J.D. Sandole and H.V. der Merive (eds.) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). pp. 3-24.

accumulation. Where there is stratification there will also be exploitation. But however important this may be, it is not aggression in our sense. Aggression involves a desire for change, and as long as the topdogs are only soaking from the structure what is their institutional 'right' this cannot be defined as aggression (but possibly as exploitation). They may encounter aggression from positions lower down in the structure with more aggression, but that is reactive aggression, which only worsens the conflict.²⁰

To what extent are the values of justice and equality championed at the expense of order? Hierarchy is a fundamental feature of social organization, which would render societies chaotic in its absence. Hierarchy is a principle of social organization and a device for economising communication, which is absolutely necessary in organizations beyond a handful of people. Galtung has been criticised because of his passion for equality, his hatred for hierarchy and top dogs. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of structure itself. This means the costs of inequality are underestimated, especially the lack of quality and liberty. Quality is a peak achievement, not average achievement, and an egalitarian society cannot produce the peaks. Equality involves the loss of liberty. Liberty involves property, since property is that within which we have liberty, and property always involves a dynamic that destroys equality because some people use it well and some badly, some accumulate and some decumulate.²¹ Ills of hierarchy like corruption of information and domination must be dealt with within the structure of hierarchy itself and cannot be dealt with by abolishing it.²²

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ K. Boulding, 'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung' *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 1 Vol. 14, (1977), pp. 75-86.

²² Ibid.

Structural violence exists in those conditions in which human beings are unable to realise their full potential:²³ where their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. Violence is responsible for the gap between potential and reality and as such, violence is defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. When the potential is higher than the actual is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is present.²⁴

When the actual is unavoidable, then violence is not present even if the actual is at a very low level. For example, low life expectancy in the old days when technological and medical advances were low was not an expression of violence, but the same low life expectancy in the contemporary world society of super technological and medical advances would be seen as violence. The potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level of insight and resources. If insight and resources are monopolised by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual level fall below the potential level and violence is present in the system. Structural violence/indirect violence exist in so far as insights or resources are channeled away from constructive efforts to bring the actual closer to the potential.

Structural violence connotes a situation in which overt violence is absent but in which structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behavior as the overt threat or use of force. In a society experiencing structural violence an actor or group is prevented, by structural constraints, from developing its talents or interests in a normal manner, or even from realising that such developments are possible. A good example in the contemporary

²³ . J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.3 (1969), pp. 167-191.

²⁴ J. Galtung, Op Cit.

world society is the role of women or class, race and religious discrimination.²⁵ Emphasis is put on the structure that gives rise to relationships within society and leads to conflict in the society.

Direct violence exists when there is an actor who commits violence (like in a war where killing or hurting a person certainly puts his actual somatic and mental realisation below his potential somatic and mental realisation) whereas in the case of indirect/structural violence there may be no actor who directly harms another person in the structure.²⁶ Structural violence is built into the structure of social relationships and is often manifested by the existence of social injustice, unequal power and unequal life chances. Galtung²⁷ brings out a vital distinction between positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace is characterised by the absence of physical violence despite presence of unjust social structures whereas positive peace entails overcoming structural violence as well. Peace researchers believe that conflict can only be resolved by changing the underlying structure and specifically by taking sides in a conflict against the forces of oppression.

Inequalities also invite aggression by way of relative deprivation which is perceived as discrepancy between value expectation and value capability.²⁸ The greater the average degree of perceived discrepancy between the two, the greater the relative deprivation, thus the greater the potential of collective violence.²⁹ Indeed Mitchell³⁰ and Brown³¹ posit that

²⁵ A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher,' in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 71-98.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ T.R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 360-367.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ C.R. Mitchell, 'Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 518, Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives (Nov., 1991), pp. 23-38.

³¹ M.E. Brown, 'Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications,' in C. A. Crocker, et al, (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 209-226.

aggression occurs in those relationships where one party has more decision making powers at the expense of the other. Thus the need for just and equal structures in the society.

These views are structural-static,³² in that in a world characterised by high levels of dynamism circumstances in the world are never static and as they change. The culture and structures around them change too. In as much as this change can be for the worse, it can also be for the better. The analysis of structural violence is too normative to the extent that description of reality suffers.³³ Notwithstanding that norms act as filter that leads to a perversion of our image of reality, circumstances sometimes lead people to perceive the objective reality. With increase in literacy levels and education, science is also reaching the masses in higher levels with its arguments that norms should be separated from affect as far as possible.³⁴ Liberationism, which operates primarily in the dialectical mode and looks to the solution of human problems by getting rid of top dogs simply produces another set of top dogs, often worse than the last, and does little to promote the real evolutionary and developmental processes which are the only way of getting rid of poverty and diminishing the sum of human misery.

Culture has also been seen to engender structural violence. Such kind of structural violence is referred to as cultural violence.³⁵ Culture can be defined as the total way of doing things by a people. Culture includes a people's language, art, literature, music, food, economic activities, mode of dress, religion, education, norms, laws (both written and unwritten), and so on. People tend to hold their culture dearly with many of them being loathe altering it. Consequently, such people will not be able to perceive injustices in their culture.

³² K. Boulding, 'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung' *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 1 Vol. 14, (1977), pp. 75-86.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ J. Galtung, 'Cultural Violence' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.27 (1991), pp. 291-305.

Cultural violence is any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural form.³⁶ Symbolic violence built into a culture does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure. However it is used to legitimise either structural or direct violence or both. Cultural violence means those aspects of culture, (the symbolic sphere of human existence exemplified by religion, ideology, language, art, economic activities and so on), that can be used to justify or legitimise structural violence. Cultural peace on the other hand means aspects of a culture that serve to justify and legitimise direct peace and structural peace. Because people are born and socialised in their cultural dictates, cultural violence make direct and structural violence look or even feel right, or at least not wrong. Societies are experiencing cultural violence if the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimised and thus rendered acceptable in those societies.³⁷

Culture can legitimise structural violence through religions like Christianity or Islam, which bestow the male gender with leadership roles in the society at the expense of the female gender. This has seen the males dominate the females in many spheres of the culture ranging from property ownership to decision-making and leadership. Aspects of culture like language also propagate cultural violence where some words like man mean both the male and female gender despite the same word being predominantly taken to mean the male gender. Cultural aspects like religion teach values of being meek and questioning authorities or status quos.

This view doesn't take into account that the world is a mixture of both the model of Marxism where the poor working class produce everything as the rich take it all away³⁸ and the model of differential development where a group can get rich because their culture encouraged innovation and thrift while another group got poor because their culture did not cultivate

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸K. Boulding, Op Cit.

behaviour which would lead to riches³⁹ there is overemphasizing on redistribution rather than production.

Too much focus on redistribution of existing resource means that innovation of new resources is neglected. Redistributions therefore only destroy production, a fact that can easily make the poor worse off than they were before. The overall productivity of a society is much more a function of its knowledge and know-how structure, including organizational know-how, than it is of natural resources or of the labour force. Thus the poverty of the poor historically has been relieved very little by redistribution. The poor have gotten richer mainly by getting into the evolutionary mainstream of increasing know-how and so increasing their productivity.⁴⁰

Tefft⁴¹ explained an important distinction between structural violence and direct/manifest violence where he points out that structural violence leads to enduring/persistent conflicts as opposed to direct violence without any structural underpinnings. In this distinction, structural violence is named restrictive war while direct violence is named unrestrictive war. Unrestrictive war seems to entrap polities in repeated cycles of continued violence. Of course restrictive war in which the victor gained many benefits while the victims suffered few losses and sustained an excellent chance of being a victor in turn could be considered 'adaptive', at least if the long term benefits were gained by all polities in a given region. Unrestrictive war could prove beneficial to a particular polity that was the constant victor over its enemies, assuming that such warfare did not have long-term hidden costs.

Numerous accounts of unrestrictive tribal warfare suggest that the long-term results of war prove destructive to both victor and victim. Some political communities never achieve

³⁹ K. Boulding, 'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung Op. Cit.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ S.K. Tefft, 'Structural Contradictions, War Traps and Peace,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 149-163.

military success as some are even totally destroyed. Other polities achieve military victories but later become victims to other polities that have acquired more military power, usually through new alliances. Over the long run polities engaged in unrestrictive warfare suffer the loss of territory, destruction of their mode of production, disruption of the economic and social ties with other groups and, often, the destruction of the framework for community life itself. Benefits of victory may be short-lived because military success may later trigger events that sap the military strength of the community, making it vulnerable to future defeat by its enemies.⁴²

Warfare is a surface manifestation of problems generated by structural contradictions within the social system. War, thus, constitutes a collective attempt by a polity to take violent action to resolve systemic problems generated by contradictions within the total system. But war, in turn, usually accentuates the prevailing structural contradictions, making further war more likely. Social systems are composed of patterned relationships between actors or collectivities across time and space. Such structures are both a medium and an outcome of social practices. As a medium, social structures can be consciously utilized and/or manipulated by knowledgeable social agents to attain particular ends. Such manipulation may produce unintended consequences that thwart the social agents efforts and subvert their ability to attain goals. Some unanticipated events are the result of composition effects, the aggregate of individual or collective acts, which occur more or less in distant time and space.⁴³ This view is true for the North South Sudan relationship from the pre-colonial period and still haunts them up to today.⁴⁴

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ See P.M. Holt and M W Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, F.M. Deng, "Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood", in R R Laremont (ed) and S.L Kwanje "The Sudan Peace Process.

Contradictions refer to oppositions that are inherent within the total system at a particular state in its history and yet destructive of particular structures or entities. Such contradictions are irresolvable within existing rules or conditions. Structural contradictions occur when interrelated structures become functionally incompatible. That is when conditions necessary for the perpetuation of one set of social actions put such patterned activity in conflict with other sets. Thus, certain structures place limits on the development of social relationships and thus come into contradiction with them. These primary contradictions are not necessarily between the means of production and the relations of production.⁴⁵

Different structures place limits on the development of various relationships and thus come into contradiction with them. Contradictions that generate social problems are not confined to the boundaries of the political community, highlighting the need to understand both the internal dialectics and the dialectics of articulation between the local units and the 'encompassing context' to understand the range of systemic contradictions. Thus a study of the 'total system' must include structural relationships that operate at the local, regional and inter-regional (or intertribal) levels. Autonomous, self-governing polities, whether closely situated or widely separated, which are in interaction with one another constitute a 'peer polity' interaction system. Contradictions within the 'peer polity' interaction system (or total system) affect the individual polities in various ways.⁴⁶

Social conflicts are surface manifestations of structural contradictions. Social agents come into confrontation when they take sides on issues generated by such contradictions. Thus, confrontations produce the 'fault lines' around which conflicts are generated. Conflict is the active realization of contradiction and warfare is just one type of conflict manifest at the 'fault lines'. The 'fault lines' create the conditions of conflict but they don't determine its form.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Warfare is only one option. How the divisive issues are played out is not completely determined by circumstance but by the choices of individuals.⁴⁷

However, there are other scholars who have dissenting views concerning structural violence. Wang⁴⁸ and Levy⁴⁹ argue that inequalities of any kind whether economic, power and social do not necessarily invite aggression. Wang asserts that maldistribution of resources in general does have direct connection with initiation or escalation of violence of any kind.⁵⁰ Explicating the concept of power preponderance, Levy,⁵¹ argues that war is least likely when one party has preponderance of power over another and most likely when there is equality of power.

Structural Violence, Human Needs and Development

Human security is seen as more comprehensive compared to state security as it furthers human development and enhances the protection of human rights, which are a major proclamation of democracy. Democratic principles go in tandem with structural peace in attaining human security and development. People are enabled to participate in the process of governance; decision-making; and their voices are heard and respected. This kind of society calls for establishment of strong institutions/structures, which establish the rule of law and empower the people. Human security provides the people with economic security by addressing extreme poverty and resource distribution; it provides adequate healthcare,

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ T.Y. Wang, *et al*, 'Inequality and Political Violence Revisited,' *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 4 (December, 1993), pp. 977-994

⁴⁹ J.S. Levy, 'Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels of Analysis Approach,' in C. A. Crocker, *et al*, (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 3-27.

⁵⁰ T.Y. Wang, *Op. Cit.*

⁵¹ J.S. Levy, *Op. Cit.*

knowledge, skills among other resources that close the gap between the actual and potential.⁵²

This becomes a step towards eliminating structural violence to attain structural peace.

Structural violence is present in societies where the fundamental human needs of their populations are not met. Development, basic human needs and structural violence have been found by scholars to be interrelated. Galtung⁵³ sees violence to be rooted in the concept of basic human needs. Peace (seen as the absence of violence) is a situation where needs for survival (security), freedom, welfare and identity are met. Any threats to these needs are seen to be violence, repression, misery and alienation. This leads to the conclusion that peace and development are synonymous.⁵⁴ Many conflicts are caused by the lack of provision of fundamental human needs.⁵⁵ Indeed, Mudida⁵⁶ argues that the security-development nexus is increasingly vital because of the realisation that there can be no long-term security without development and vice versa. The evolution of the concept of human security to encompass fundamental rights and basic needs led to the linkage of security and development.

Because of the evolution of the concepts of security and development to encompass more broad meaning of human security and human development, structural violence is increasingly seen to be present in societies lacking the conditions required by the evolutionary concepts of human security and development. Traditionally, the concept of security meant the use of force if necessary to preserve vital interests, as based on realism or power politics. Consequently, power was taken to mean the ability to get another actor do what it would not

⁵²R. Mudida, 'The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach', (2007) pp. 11-22.

⁵³J. Galtung, 'Twenty-five years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and some Responses,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 141-158.

⁵⁴G. Sorensen, 'Utopianism in Peace Research: The Gandhian Heritage,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2, (May, 1992), pp. 135-144.

⁵⁵J. Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1990)

⁵⁶R. Mudida, 'Op Cit.

otherwise have done. It was also seen as the capacity to impose one's will on others by reliance on effective sanctions in case of non-compliance.⁵⁷

More comprehensive notions of security, highlighting prominence of structural violence, have come up recognising the importance of human security and environmental issues. Human security implies protecting vital freedoms, protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations while enhancing their strength and aspirations. Human security entails creating social systems/structures that incapacitate people for survival, dignity and livelihood, hence the interrelationship with development. Human security includes the various fundamental freedoms including the freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf.

The concept of development was traditionally viewed in narrow economic terms where high per capita income was equated to development. Any measure that would lead to economic development was interpreted as development. These include the 1960s and 1970s thinking where the government controlled prices/markets and the 1980s and 1990s thinking of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and market liberalization. These ideals however did not bear the desired fruit of development.

At the end of the twentieth century, economic thinking was directed towards the role of structures/institutions in development. This kind of thinking coincided with greater emphasis on the wider notions of human security and attempted to consider which institutions/structural changes were required to achieve improvements in the quality of life. This was tantamount to the calls made by peace researchers to review institutions so as to achieve structural peace. Development increasingly came to be viewed as a process of

⁵⁷ N.D. Palmer, *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, 3rd ed., (New Delhi: CBS Publishers and Distributors, 1985)

expanding real freedoms that people enjoyed, including political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency, protective security, and so on hence helping to advance the capability of a person and therefore improve the quality of life as the fundamental goal of development and of structural peace as defined by the icon peace researcher Galtung.⁵⁸

Resources and Conflict

Resources have been known to lead to conflicts since the days of Robert Malthus who formulated the Malthusian principle that pointed that high population growth will ultimately put pressure on the available resources and end up in a crisis.⁵⁹ Natural resources are those resources found in natural form like crude oil, diamonds, arable land, pasture, watering points and so on. Deteriorating resource bases coupled with a rapidly growing population can lead to a conflict or exacerbate the existing tension.

Conflicts can arise from competition for limited or inequitably distributed resources, as it was the case in land conflicts in Kenya, conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, copper, gold and diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo, oil in Sudan and Nigeria and so on. Recent studies have found that natural resources and civil war are highly correlated. According to Collier and Hoeffler,⁶⁰ states that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states. Fearon and Laitin,⁶¹ and de Soysa,⁶² each using unique data sets, find that oil-exporting states are more likely to suffer from civil wars. Fearon also shows that the presence of certain types of

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ T.R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁶⁰ P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil War,' *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 50, No. 4, (1988), pp. 563-573.

⁶¹ J.D. Fearon, and D.D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,' *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No. 1, (2003), pp. 75-90.

⁶² I. de Soysa, 'Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 4, (2002), pp. 395-416.

resources (gemstones and narcotics) tends to make wars last longer; similarly, Doyle and Sambanis⁶³ demonstrate that civil wars are harder to end when they occur in countries that depend on primary commodity exports. Buhaug and Gates⁶⁴ show that the presence of mineral resources in a conflict zone tends to increase a conflict's geographical scope.

Ross⁶⁵ extensively explored the correlation between civil wars and resources. A civil war is an important concept in this study since Sudan has been embroiled in this kind of conflict for a long period. To become classified as a civil war, a conflict must pass a certain threshold, producing at least one thousand combat-related deaths over some period of time. The correlation between resources and civil war can be explained in three dimensions: resources and onset of a civil war; resources and intensity of a civil war; and resources and duration of a civil war.

The onset of a civil war due to existence of resources can be explained from four perspectives. Looting of the resources by potential rebels avail start up costs for the war, that is, the looting of resources by rebels avail the funding of the war. Resource extraction can lead to grievances among the locals and a war erupts as the locals resist or address these grievances. Resource extraction is an excellent incentive for separatism where the resource rich region seeks to be autonomous to avoid sharing the treasures with a large population. Over dependence on resource revenues by states leads to state weakness and ultimately a civil war breaks.⁶⁶

⁶³ M. Doyle, and N. Sambanis. 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, (2000), pp. 779-801

⁶⁴ H. Buhaug, and S. Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.39, No. 4(2002), pp. 417-33.

⁶⁵ M.L. Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,' *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (2004), pp. 35-67.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

The duration of a civil war due to presence of resources can be understood from four perspectives. Looting by weaker (or stronger) party leads to more arms and the war is either prolonged or shortened. War in resource-rich countries appears financially profitable leading to less (more) incentive for peace and ultimately the war gets prolonged or shortened. Resource wealth in separatist region leads to commitment problem and the war gets prolonged.⁶⁷ The intensity of a civil war due to the presence of resources can be understood from two perspectives. When two sides engage in resource battles, more casualties are produced. But if two sides engage in cooperative plunder, fewer casualties are produced.⁶⁸

One of the most important champions of the view that resources play an important role in generating and exacerbating armed conflict, Thomas Homer-Dixon, distinguishes between three forms of resource scarcity that lead to conflictual situation. Demand-induced scarcity is the kind of resource scarcity that results from population growth. Supply-induced scarcity is the type of resource scarcity resulting from the depletion or degradation of a resource. Structural scarcity, which is the central theme in this study, is the type of scarcity that results from inequitable/unfair distribution of the resource.⁶⁹

One of the most important academic debates concerning resources as a source of conflicts is whether the conflict over a given resource is due to agreed or due to grievance. Collier⁷⁰ relates the risk of conflict due to resources to three factors. These are over dependence on primary commodity exports leading to extreme competition over these commodities; low

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ N.P. Gleditsch, 'Environmental Change, Security and Conflict,' in Crocker, C.A. *et al.* (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 53-68.

⁷⁰ P. Collier, 'Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy' in Crocker, C.A. *et al.* (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 143-162.

average income meaning basic needs are not met; and slow growth/stagnation of the economy.

Ballentine⁷¹ rejects the correlation between conflicts and resources. Governance failure seems and is the mediating variable presence of resources and conflict.⁷² This argument compared to Galtung, Burton, Homer Dixon and the other scholars differ but in principle they do agree that unjust structures coupled with inequitable resource distribution is more often than not a tasty recipe to conflict.

Natural resources based conflict and structural violence are linked by the phenomenon of inequitable/unfair distribution of resources where, in most cases, only the very small proportion of the population possess all the resource at the expense of the majority. It is well established that natural resources lead to conflict when the society is in situation of structural conflict or negative peace. That explains why Botswana is rich in resources and peaceful at the same time while DRC, Angola, Sudan, Liberia and so on are in conflictual situation due to their rich resource bases.

Evidently, structural violence and cultural violence impedes and sometimes prevents realization of full potential.⁷³ Though situations vary when circumstances culture and structures changes because of for example literacy levels, this change can be for the better or worse.⁷⁴ Positive peace is necessary in order to achieve welfare, freedom, security and identity. Lack of just structures leads to power governance of people and resources. This in

⁷¹ K. Ballentine, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering The Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflicts' in Ballentine K and Sherman J (eds). *The Political Economy of Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Boulder: Lynner Reiner. Pp 259-283.

⁷² P. Collier, Op Cit

⁷³ J. Galtung, Op cit

⁷⁴ K. Boulding, Op cit

turn brings about structural scarcity⁷⁵ which in turn causes conflict when the people start to fight over the diminutive resources available.

Numerous debates have been put forth for and against structural violence is so far as its role in conflict. The existence of resources and its role in conflict has also been debated widely in this chapter. Some scholars have openly disputed the role of resources in conflict and blame structures for the misuse resources leading to conflict. There are no set rules when studying variables to a conflict, different interpretations will determine the conflict management methodology adopted to resolve the conflict.

⁷⁵ N.P Gelditsch Op cit K. Boulding.

CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND RESOURCE BASED CONFLICT AND THE NORTH-SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the North-South Sudan conflict in terms of structural and resource based conflict. The chapter is divided into two main themes: Structural causes of the North-South Sudan conflict; and the North-South Sudan conflict as a resource based conflict and linkages between structural violence and resources-based conflict. The chapter concludes with an overview of the themes covered.

Structural Causes of the North-South Sudan Conflict

From its initial stages and throughout its history, the North-South Sudan conflict has been characterised by political, social and economic inequalities between the Arab Muslim dominated North Sudan and the African Christian dominated South Sudan. It is because of these disparities in which the South feels the North is developing at its expense, that have caused conflict between the two groups. Indeed, Brown¹ argues that an ethnic group will always rebel once it perceives of itself as being exploited or threatened in any way by another group. This is because of nationalist group's preoccupation with preserving its identity and survival.² In addition, the South's perception that it is being exploited by North Sudan meant that the conflict was shifting from structural to behavioural conflict where physical damage of war is experienced.³ The history of the conflict clearly shows how inequalities and exploitation of the South by the North have fuelled the conflict. The North has used its

¹ M.E. Brown, 'Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications,' in C. A. Crocker, *et al.* (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 209-226.

² *Ibid.*

³ A. Curle, *Making Peace*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971).

topdog position to maintain the status quo so that they can continue at all cost to exploit the natural resources found in South Sudan.

The conflict in Sudan had been one of the longest running conflicts in Africa. Its genesis goes back to the historic relations between the North and the South. The armed conflict itself however flared up towards independence in 1956 with a mutiny by Southern soldiers in 1954. The main contentious issue was the marginalisation of the South by the North⁴. In fact neglect of the South in the country's development policies had been institutionalised and legitimised as evidenced by external financial, political and educational assistance which was only directed to the North. In addition, the neighbouring Arab countries only assisted Arab inhabitants of the North. This is in line with Galtung⁵ and Groom's⁶ demonstration that institutionalization and legitimization of inequalities is key starting point of structural violence. This situation did not change with independence as successive Sudanese governments pursued policies which fell short of the Southerners' aspirations, prompting them to take up arms.

At around 1800 AD, very little was known of the Sudan except for brief descriptions made by Arab travellers who passed through it and called it "bilad el Sudan", meaning land of the black people⁷. This area which the dark skinned Africans controlled covered the vast Sahel belt including what is now known as Southern Sudan. The Arabs, in their migration across the river Nile from east to west and vice versa, used to seek permission and guidance of these people. The situation changed with Turco-Egyptian invasion in 1820, led by Mohammed Ali, which was followed by the establishment of an Islamic Turco-Egyptian regime in what is now Northern Sudan. It is seen that under the Turco-Egyptian administration, slave trade

⁴ P.A. Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's view*, (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1997) p 14.

⁵ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' Op. Cit.

⁶ A.J.R. Groom, Op. Cit.

⁷ P.A. Nyaba, Op. Cit. p 14.

flourished⁸. This was started by the Turks and Egyptians as a means of financing but was heightened by the Madhist regime after the Mahdiya uprising of 1881. The Mahdists collaborated with the Turks in the plunder, pillage and enslavement of the people in South Sudan, the Nuba mountains and Funj; marring the relationship between the North and the South.⁹ The Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan between 1896 and 1898, which lasted until 1946, brought new factors into play. It adopted different policies for the administration of the North and South respectively.

The situation was exacerbated by the rebellion of 1924 against the British led by Ali Abdel Latif, a young Dinka officer of slave background.¹⁰ After this rebellion, the South, the Nuba mountains and the Ingessina hills were sealed off from the rest of Sudan under the Closed Districts Ordinance. This policy consolidated the separate socio-economic, administrative and political evolution of the two regions. From that time until 1947, when the policy was reversed, South and North Sudan were administered as separate entities, with formal travel and consular arrangements between them. A significant factor that continues to haunt the relationship between the South and the North was the colonial concentration on the economic, political and administrative development of the North at the expense of the South, thereby creating socio-economic and political disparities between the two regions. In this evolution of uneven development, education was a major factor in that the Northerners, being closer to Egypt, found easy access to educational facilities in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. The education dispensed to the Southerners retarded the evolution of their national consciousness and political awareness¹¹. These developments aligned with Köhler and

⁸ F M Deng, "Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood", in R R Laremont (ed) *Borders, Nationalism and the African state*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2005), p 16.

⁹ *Ibid* p 15.

¹⁰ *Ibid* p 37.

¹¹ *Ibid* p 16

Alcock's¹² demonstration that structural violence therefore results from unbalanced structures (skewed distribution of resources like political, power, knowledge and wealth). Incompatibilities are embedded in social structures/structure of relationships and hence the actors might not immediately recognise it. Unequal distribution of resources in Sudan confirms Hommer-Dixon's explanation of the concept of structural scarcity, which is the type of scarcity that results from inequitable/unfair distribution of the resource.¹³

With the end of the Second World War, Europe's pre-war colonial arrangements came under review, with pressure especially from the United States for colonised countries to be granted full independence. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium had, therefore to make a decision about the future of Sudan. The tide of Sudanese Nationalism was rising in the North, and the cause of self-determination for Sudan was being taken up by Egypt which indicated its desire to end the Condominium. For almost two decades, the Condominium government had been unable to decide what to do with the South. It had the option of either linking the South with the North in an independent Sudan or to extract the South from an independent Sudan and link it politically with East Africa. In the meantime the South remained closed. When the Southern policy was repealed, a conference was convened in Juba in 1947 with the aim of exploring the Southern Sudan question and to determine whether it was advisable for the South to send representatives to the Legislative assembly or have their own Advisory Council similar to the one established in the North in 1944. Its participants from the South comprised of fifteen Southerners chosen by Governors of the Southern Provinces, who included a police sergeant major, a few chiefs and very junior administrators. Not all were educated to the same standard. Coming from different provinces, they lacked a common experience to draw

¹² G. Köhler and N. Alcock, *Op. Cit.*

¹³ N.P. Gleditsch, *Op. Cit.*

them together.¹⁴ The other participants included six British officials and six Northerners. The fact that the South was to be represented by few uneducated individuals compared to the North's many educated representatives shows how the system of governance legitimised South's underdog position. Galtung¹⁵ argues that the underdog's position is legitimised/normalised with help of social structures like governance systems, institutions and constitutions.

In April 1952, the Legislative Assembly, enacted with the agreement of both the British and Egyptians, tabled a draft Self-Government Statute that established a Council of Ministers from Northern Sudan who were to exercise authority in a transitional period leading to Independence. This contained safeguards for the South, vesting these in the authority of the Governor General. This was however opposed by the Northern political parties who after a series of meetings, merged to form the National Unionist Party (NUP) which nominated Ismail al Azari as the presidential candidate for an independent united Sudan. On 5th December 1952 an agreement was reached between the NUP and the Egyptian Government which was now led by General Neguib, after having ousted the Khedivate in July, to reject the draft Self-Government Statute as a satisfactory basis for Sudanese independence, and issued a statement declaring the Sudan as an indivisible entity. The Northern parties presented a unified front and prevailed upon Egypt to omit specific powers that were reserved for the Governor General for the protection of the interests of the South. The British had no alternative but to revise the draft Self-Government Statute.¹⁶

On 12 February 1953, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed which reiterated the unity of Sudan as a fundamental principle of policy leading to the full independence, while specific

¹⁴ D H Johnson, *African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2004) p 25.

¹⁵ J. Galtung, Op. Cit.

¹⁶ D H Johnson Op Cit p 35.

concerns of the South were only acknowledged in general terms to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all inhabitants of the provinces of Sudan.¹⁷ The period leading to the signing of this agreement was marked by intense "Sudanisation" of the South. Various economic, educational and administrative reforms were introduced which while advancing the development of the South, were intended to affirm the principle of national unity, this structural contradiction within the social system constitutes a collective attempt by a polity to take violent action to resolve a systemic problem generated by contradictions within the total system.¹⁸ A united system of education that included the teaching of Arabic was introduced, local government was established in all districts, trade opened up to all Sudanese and restrictions on movement between the North and South relaxed.

In February 1954, a committee comprising of two British Officers and three Northern members was set up with the remit of replacing the British Officials with Sudanese in government posts. The South was not represented. When the names of the new Sudanese were announced, out of eight hundred posts, only six were assigned to Southerners. The highest of the posts was that of Assistant District Commissioner. This act heightened tensions between the North and the South. These events made the Southerners more politically conscious than they ever were before. Accelerated "Sudanisation" was met by growing political awareness and dissent by educated Southerners who gave voice to their opposition to the political arrangements that were being put in place for Sudanese independence. By early 1954, tensions were so high that it only required an issue to precipitate a revolt by the South. Some Southerners began to see that a union with Egypt was the only chance they had to curb the power of the North, now that the British had been removed from all positions of influence and authority in the country. The Egyptian Government which still hoped for union with

¹⁷ P M Holt and M W Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, (Longman, New York, 1988) p 160.

¹⁸ Tefft, *Structural Contradictions, War Traps and Peace*. Op Cit

Sudan, encouraged Southerners in this belief.¹⁹ This kind of unequal representation in leadership positions demonstrates how the underdog will not close the gap between the actual and the potential due to monopolisation of decision making and national resources by a group of people.²⁰

Indeed the conflict in Sudan has been a long and protracted one, various issues have come together to complicate the whole situation. Religion has played a part, where the Northern part of Sudan is mainly inhabited by people who practice the Islamic faith, the South mainly comprises of African Traditionalists and Christians. The conflict is not so much on the difference in faiths but the attempt by the successive rulers at imposing Islam on the minority in the South²¹. The clash of culture between the North and the South has contributed towards fuelling the conflict. The situation was worsened by attempt to "arabize" the South whose people are mainly black skinned Africans and whose culture is different from the Northerners who have been greatly influenced by the Arab culture²². The attempt to hide South's marginalization through Arabization can be explained using Galtung's²³ argument that structural violence is also perpetuated through cultural elements like religion and language.

The mutiny in the South began on 18th August 1955 in Torit when the Equatorial Corps, whose British officers had been replaced by Northern Sudanese officers, refused to relocate to Khartoum without ammunition²⁴. Just before the orders were issued, the British officers were evacuated from the South and their Northern counterparts took charge of the Southern Military Corps. All the platoons comprising of only Southerners were ordered to move to

¹⁹ D.H. Johnson, African Issues: *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, p. 27.

²⁰ G. Sørensen, 'Utopianism in Peace Research: The Gandhian Heritage,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 135-144.

²¹ Interview of the researcher with G. G. Diing, Deputy Principal Liaison Officer, Ministry of Regional Cooperation GOSS, on 19/Aug/2009

²² Ibid.

²³ J. Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' *Op. Cit.*

²⁴ G.G. Riam, "Christian Muslim Relations in Sudan" (Non Western World College, Scotland, 2005), p 40.

Khartoum, allegedly to take part in a parade marking the evacuation of foreign troops from Sudan. As the Torit Garrison paraded for departure, they requested that their relocation only be temporary. Their request was not granted, and fearing retribution, the Garrison broke into the armoury taking guns and other ammunition. This marked the beginning of a general revolt throughout Southern Sudan. For two weeks, it was all chaos. On 20th August, a state of emergency was declared in the Southern Provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria and the Upper Nile. The insurrection was suppressed with the help of the Royal Air Force but the anger it had unleashed could not be suppressed. This marked the beginning of the civil war in South against the North for political rights and self-determination.

On 19 December 1955, the elected parliament promised that the request of the Southern members of parliament for a federal system of governance for the South would be given due consideration by the Constituent Assembly. However, immediately after independence in 1956, it became clear that the new government intended to follow a policy that was based on one language; Arabic, one religion; Islam and one nation.²⁵

On 19 December 1955, after the Torit uprising, the parliament promised that the request for a federal system of government for the South will be given due consideration by the Constituent Assembly²⁶. This request had been put forward during the Juba conference of 1947 where the Southerners had argued the people of such different racial, religious and cultural characteristics as Africans and Arabs could only co-exist in the same state if constitutional recognition was given their respective identities and political needs.

During the first two years of independence, the question of the political status of the South dominated parliamentary politics. Based on past promises, the Southerners demanded it but

²⁵ M N Arou, *Past Independence Sudan*, (University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1980) p17.

²⁶ G G Riam, "Christian Muslim Relations in Sudan", (Non Western World College, Scotland, 2005) p 4

the Northerners objected. They instead took over the South supported by a police force and an army. On 17th November 1958, General Ibrahim Aboud took over power in a bloodless coup.²⁷ He immediately embarked on an intensive Islamisation and Arabisation of the South, backed by the military. The army's operations against the southerners killed thousands and caused a large number to flee into the neighbouring states. The rebel war in the South spread, and with it, economic hardships which were felt throughout the country. General Aboud was finally forced to transfer power to a transitional civilian government led by Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa in 1964. In the meantime, between 1960 to 1963, the first Southern political party emerged in exile. It was initially called Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU), but was renamed Sudan African National Union (SANU) in 1963. On 10th December 1964, the new Prime Minister Mr Al Khalifa responded positively to a SANU memorandum by declaring an amnesty to all Sudanese who had fled the country since 1955. He further consented to SANU's request for a conference which was decided to be held in Khartoum.

Various groups that included representatives of the government, the main Northern political parties, two main Southern political parties, SANU and the Southern Front (SF) and foreign observers attended the Round Table Conference of 1965. Several constitutional options for the South were to be addressed including separation, federalism, and local government. The South presented two options; SANU opted for federalism while SF pressed for full independence.²⁸ The Northerners on the other hand accepted only the local government option and were not willing to discuss either separation or federation. The Southern demand for a referendum was refused and the conference ended without an agreement. This conference was followed by elections a few weeks later which saw a coalition of the Umma

²⁷ P M Holt and M W Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 171.

²⁸ D H Johnson, *African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. (The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2004) p 41.

party and Democratic Unionist Party under the leadership of Mohammad Ahmad Majoub, followed in 1966 by that of al-Mahdi. These were representatives of the same old parties that had failed to resolve the conflict and as such, they pursued a military solution with al-Mahdi aiming at "crushing the rebellion" while at the same time seeking dialogue to find a political solution within a united Sudan under an Islamic constitution. The civil war went on unabated until General Ja'far Numeiri came to power in a military coup in 1969.

When General Numeiri came to power in the coup of 25 May 1969²⁹, it was announced that the main aim of the coup was to achieve national reconciliation and terminate the long civil war. In its policy statement, the government recognised the ethnic and cultural differences between the North and the South, and declared it was ready to grant regional autonomy to the Southern provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. This regime promised to solve the imbalances between the two regions by implementing programmes in favour of the South. Despite this promise, the government did not halt its military action and this convinced the Southern Sudanese that the government was not serious in ending the violence. In their efforts to defend the civilians, the Anya-Nya became a more cohesive fighting force and openly attacked army garrisons in the South drawing the wrath of the government forces.³⁰ The civil war therefore continued.

Despite the ongoing civil war, President Numeiri made several concessions that encouraged the church organisations. The public holiday which had been changed from Sunday to Friday, was reinstated back to Sunday, while in the North, it remained Friday. The churches therefore stepped up their efforts in laying a foundation for negotiations. The churches efforts culminated in the Addis Ababa peace accord of 1972. The talks took place in Addis Ababa on 15th February 1972. The Government of Sudan delegation was led by the Vice President Abel

²⁹ P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, p 197.

³⁰ Ibid.

Alier while the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was led by Mr Ezboni Mondiri. Reverend Cannon Burgess Carr presided over the meeting after the Emperor Haile Sellasie decided not to chair the meeting personally.

The talks proceeded quite cordially and an agreement was reached which was ratified on 27th February 1972.³¹ The agreement established a basis for settlement by introducing regional autonomy for the Southern Provinces. A Regional People's Assembly was to be established in Juba with representatives in the National People's Assembly and a higher executive council of its own. This agreement was followed by a new constitution for Sudan in 1973. This constitution established Sudan as a secular state and it recognised the existence of Islam and Christianity as legitimate religions in Sudan. It further granted freedom of worship and exempted the Southerners and other Non-Muslims from Sharia law.³²

The Northern political parties however saw this accord as a serious obstacle to the Islamisation of the country. They saw this as an imposition by the military government, done without the consent of the Northern parties. In the following years, three attempts were made to overthrow Numeiri; in January 1973, September 1975 and in July 1976. These made Numeiri realise he could not rely on Southern support alone and reached out to the Northern parties. Soon, the Umma party and the National Islamic front gained popularity and by 1978, the Islamisation process had began, albeit with more vigour. By 1981, there was no Southerner in the cabinet and thus the Southerners lost their voice to argue out their case against the Islamic state. The Islamisation process reached its threshold in 1983 when President Numeiri declared Sharia law as the sole guiding principle of Sudan's law. These led to the resumption of the civil war. In 1985, the Numeiri regime collapsed and General Swar

³¹ G G Riam, "Christian Muslim Relations in Sudan", (Non Western World College, Scotland, 2005) pp 72-73

³² A Sikianga and M W Daly (eds) *Civil War in Sudan*, (British Academic Press, London, 1960) p 84.

al-Dahab took over for a transitional period of one year after which he handed over power to a civilian regime under Sadiq al-Mahdi.³³

The Mahdi regime lasted from 1986 to 1989. During this period, the conflict between the North and the South intensified and took a distinctly religious dimension as al-Mahdi was unable to prevail upon the Northern parties for the establishment of a secular state. As a result, the issue of Sharia became the dominating contentious issue. Sadiq al-Mahdi's military intervention in the South did not bear fruit and did not bring the SPLM to the negotiating table. This made him unpopular with the Army, leading to a coup under General Omar al-Bashir in 1989.³⁴

General al-Bashir's regime embarked on Islamisation from the onset. The regime also intensified military action against the Southerners. General al-Bashir's policies were mainly guided by the National Islamic Front. In May 1991, while marking eight years since the start of the civil war, former SPLA leader, the late Col Garang, called on the government to come to the negotiating table. The government responded by stating that it was willing to take part in peace negotiations but reiterated that it had already made considerable compromise. During this period, most of Southern Sudan was under rebel control. A short while later, Col Mengitsu of Ethiopia was overthrown and with him, went the Ethiopian support for SPLA.

In July 1993, al-Bashir made a cabinet reshuffle which was seen to have strengthened the position of the National Islamic Front in the Government, and as a step towards a civilian administration. This was an example of Galtung's³⁵ argument that government structures are used by the topdog to enhance their position at the expense of the underdog. On 19th October 1993, General al-Bashir announced political reforms in preparation for presidential and

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' Op. Cit.

legislative elections to be held in 1994 and 1995 respectively. By the beginning of 1994, the civil war remained in a stalemate. In June 1994, Government forces captured Kajo Kaji and opened a land route between Renk in the Sabat and the Upper Nile capital of Malakal for the first time in ten years³⁶.

In the wake of repeated failures in the talks, and considering the events of 11th September 2001, the United States became actively involved in the peace process in 2002. The US was already exerting hostile political and economic action on the Sudan government. The involvement of Sudan with Osama bin Laden and other terrorist activities prompted the US to consider Sudan as one of the states sponsoring terrorism. The US sent a special envoy to Sudan who initiated a series of consultative meetings that led to the resumption of the IGAD Peace Process in Machakos; Kenya. This is the process that finally led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The North-South Sudan Conflict as a Resource Based Conflict

Most of the economic activity in Sudan is concentrated along the river Nile and its tributaries. These activities are mainly subsistence agricultural production. The country however has vast reserves of oil in the South whose exploitation was hampered by the civil war between the Muslim North and the Christian South. However, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9th January 2005, production has increased and oil production is set to become the leading contributor to the Sudanese economy. Due to climatic change over the years the waters of the river Nile have decrease especially down steam in North Sudan, this has had an effect on irrigation which is highly depended on in Northern Sudan³⁷. Also land for grazing has decreased, as such the pastoralists in the North have ventured to the South in search of

³⁶ T. Ofcansky, *Africa South of the Sahara*, 2003, p. 1015.

³⁷ Interview of the researcher with Maj K. Kirui, Staff officer, United Nation Mission in Sudan 2007-2008, on 25/Aug/2009.

pasture and as such this has generated conflict with the people living in the South Sudan³⁸. This phenomenon confirms Malthus³⁹ argument that increase in human population with increase in destruction of the natural environment will eventually lead to conflict.

Sudan is one of the few countries in Africa bestowed with vast reserves of crude oil and extensive fertile agricultural fields along the Nile River. Due to its ready market and few competitors, oil has gained prominence as one of the most important resources in the country. Since most of the oil reserves are located in the South, conflict proved inevitable as the relatively powerful and more developed North endeavoured to exploit the resource with little or no benefit being felt by the South. This confirms Rose's⁴⁰ argument that conflict can arise from competition for limited or inequitably distributed resources. In addition, Collier and Hoeffler,⁴¹ state that countries that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states.

Consequently, oil development in Sudan now sustains and exacerbates the longest and most destructive civil conflict in the world. More than two million human beings have perished in the most recent phase of the conflict, which re-ignited in 1983 at least in part because of Chevron's discovery of commercially significant oil reserves in the late 1970s. Because the discoveries occurred in areas near the 1956 division between northern and southern Sudan, then President Numieri attempted to redraw the boundaries in order to place oil reserves in the North.⁴² The Sudanese President Gaafar Numieri took a series of measures that upset the delicate balance between the predominantly Muslim North and the heavily Christian and Animist South; among these measures was his decision to place newly discovered oil in the

³⁸ Interview of the researcher with Maj Kisilu, Staff officer, United Nation Mission in Sudan 2007-2008, on 25/Aug/2009.

³⁹ T.R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁴⁰ M.L. Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases, Op. Cit.

⁴¹ P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Op. Cit.

⁴² E. Reeves, 'Oil Development in Sudan,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 29, No. 91, Sovereignty, Democracy & Zimbabwe's Tragedy (Mar., 2002), pp. 167-169.

country's south under the jurisdiction of the North, and to build an oil refinery in the North instead of the South. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) subsequently complained that the North was stealing the resources of the South, including oil; demanded that work cease on a pipeline to take oil from the South to the refinery in the North; and in February 1984, attacked an oil exploration base, killing three foreign workers and bringing the project to a halt. This instance gave good evidence that natural resources helped initiate the North-South Sudan separatist conflict. Numeri further renegeing on the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, and his attempt to impose Islamic law on the south, also helped trigger the renewal of fighting.⁴³ These steps were the final insult to the predominantly non-Muslim, non-Arab population of southern Sudan, which had long been cut off from the distribution of national resources and otherwise marginalized.

Majority of South Sudan is rich in oil except the Equatorial region which instead has deposits of uranium, gold and some copper. North Sudan is mainly desert land with fewer minerals compared to South. If roles were reversed and the South was in the current geographical location of the North and attempts to separate from the larger Sudan were made, little or no force would have used to prevent them⁴⁴. Due various negotiations resulting from the conflict, various attempts have been made to resolve the conflict. One such attempt which recognised that the structures that were in place were flawed were review of the constitution in 1973 and The Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Despite this there still areas which are potentially areas that may cause disagreements. Tax revenues mainly from oil and other minerals collected from Southern Sudan by the government of Sudan is shared on a fifty

⁴³ E. Reeves, Op. Cit.

⁴⁴ Interview of the researcher with G. G. Ding, Deputy Principal Liaison Officer, Ministry of Regional Cooperation GOSS, on 19/Aug/2009

percent ratio between the North and South Sudan, where else taxes collected from North is not shared at all⁴⁵.

In the government's eyes, the centuries-long residents of the southern oilfields pose a security threat to the oilfields: owner-ship of the south's natural resources is contested by southern rebels led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The government has helped to create this 'security' situation by forging ahead with oil development in southern territory under circumstances in which its Nuer and Dinka residents have no right to participate in their own governance and in which the government has historically ridden roughshod over their rights, even before oil was discovered. The abuse most connected to oil development in southern Sudan has been forcible displacement, by military means, of tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of residents in order to provide a 'cordon sanitaire' for international oil companies.⁴⁶

Chevron withdrew from Sudan in 1984 when the southern opposition killed several of its workers, and this essentially ended their role in oil development. It was not until the late 1990s that commercial activities again resumed in serious fashion, with the entry of Canadian, Chinese, and Malaysian oil companies. Over the last five years the consequences of oil development have been devastating, sustaining and exacerbating the conflict in a number of ways. Since the most promising oil reserves lie in the South, the North felt disadvantaged by the geographic fact. In the eyes of the presently ruling National Islamic Front (which came to power by military coup in 1989, deposing an elected government), this unfortunate fact of geography has dictated that they pursue a relentless policy of scorched-

⁴⁵ *ibid*

⁴⁶ J. Rone, 'Sudan: Oil & War,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict (Sep., 2003), pp. 478+504-510.

earth warfare to create 'security' for the foreign oil companies. Tens of thousands of indigenous people have been killed, more than 200,000 displaced.⁴⁷

Moreover, oil revenues presently stand as the greatest obstacle to a resolution of the conflict. All Sudanese revenues, from all oil projects and concession sales, go directly to the National Islamic Front, unencumbered by any credible mechanism for equitable or productive distribution. Indeed, the regime has boasted openly of its willingness to use revenues for military purposes, and has made good on these boasts. Acknowledged military spending, according to IMF documents, reveals that over the last three years military spending has doubled (oil began to be exported in August 1999, though the regime had clearly been using anticipated oil revenues to fund military purchases, especially from China). Moreover, several dual use facilities (military/commercial) have recently been completed near the capital of Khartoum. These have allowed for a very significant increase in domestic military production, and the regime is now militarily self-sufficient in several categories. Oil from the major producing consortium in southern Sudan (the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company [GNPOC]) also goes directly to a 10,000 barrel a day refinery in the town of El Obeid, which lies (not coincidentally) adjacent to the forward-most military air base of the regime. From the El Obeid air base, Antonov bombers (actually retrofitted Russian cargo planes) have conducted an ongoing campaign of bombing against civilian and humanitarian targets throughout southern Sudan and other marginalized areas, most notably the Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan province.⁴⁸

These attacks, numbering in the many hundreds over the last few years, are nothing less than state-sponsored, state-conducted terrorism, in that they serve no military purpose other than to terrorize civil society and create further internal displacement (Sudan's internally displaced

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

population of 4.5 million is the greatest in the world). The deliberate targeting of UN-sponsored humanitarian relief has also been a hallmark of Khartoum's conduct of the 'oil war.' So intense was the bombing of humanitarian relief in the summer of 2000 that all efforts to reach the extremely vulnerable populations of southern Sudan were suspended. Attacks on humanitarian targets are presently continuing. The airstrips built by the foreign oil companies in their concessions are also used for military purposes by the Khartoum regime. The Canadian assessment mission⁴⁹ established this as 'totally incontrovertible' and issued a highly authoritative report confirming that helicopter gunships continue to use the oil company airstrips for attacks against civilians in the south and other areas in and bordering the oil concessions. The companies making up GNPOC, the only significant producing consortium in Sudan, include Talisman Energy of Canada (25%), Petronas (the state-owned oil company of Malaysia) (30%), and China National Petroleum Corporation (40%). Sudapet, the Sudanese state oil company, has a nominal 5% stake, but the royalty contracts dictate that at present production levels, Khartoum receives approximately 40% of profits after the scheduled capital recovery.

Other companies operating or controlling concessions in southern Sudan include: Lundin Petroleum (a small, recently restructured Swedish company, that operates with Petronas and OMV of Austria in the most southerly of the concessions); Gulf Oil (Qatar), which operates in the most easterly concession along with China National Petroleum Corporation; and Total Fina Elf (the French oil giant, which controls the largest concession areas in the south). Agip of Italy has signed an agreement with Petronas. The Russian Slavneft has also signed an oil exploration and production agreement with Khartoum.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Canadian Assessment Mission, 'Report on the Sudan War' (January, 2000)

⁵⁰ E. Reeves, Op. Cit.

With the construction of a pipeline to carry oil from the South to the North, oil extracted from the South is now earning Sudan's government (the North) well over a million dollars a day—enough to pay for the military campaign, support militias drawn from SPLM's rival southern tribes, and buy new friends abroad. From the North's perspective, therefore, the battle against the south has become self sustaining, both politically and economically. It has become, according to Martin's⁵¹ argument, a perfect war. The Khartoum government for example uses oil revenues to support a group of armed kinsmen called murahaleen. The murahaleen are Arab tribesmen who harbor a historic enmity against the neighboring southern Dinka tribe, a feud based on ancient competition over grazing land, cattle raiding, and the abduction of slaves. Khartoum has exploited this rivalry by employing the murahaleen to harass the Dinka in Bahr al Ghazal and to run interference for the army's resupply trains to its garrison in the provincial capital, Wau. These trains run through contested territory a few times each year, moving at little more than walking speed and stopping frequently for repairs to the tracks. The murahaleen fan out on horseback and camelback, ranging up to 20 kilometers from the tracks. They burn villages, rustle cattle, kill the elderly, and abduct women and children, and then load their booty onto the trains for transport back to points north.⁵²

In the period before 1983, Sudan's oil reserves represented no more than untapped potential and intensity of the North-South conflict was low with high chances for resolution. Short on cash, Khartoum had to go begging to places such as Baghdad, Damascus, Tehran, and Tripoli for the resources to continue fighting, and this dependence on outcast nations contributed to Sudan's diplomatic isolation and economic decay. With the opening in 1999 of a 1600-mile pipeline connecting its oil fields to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, however, Sudan finally got the chance to translate its petroleum reserves into economic and political capital. The payoff was

⁵¹ R. Martin, 'Sudan's Perfect War,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 111-127.

⁵² *Ibid.*

impressive: in the year 2001, Sudan's oil income was estimated to be in the neighborhood of \$500 million, and many experts believed that production could double or more in the next few years. Sudan, therefore, now had an internal source of financing for its million-dollar-a-day war. Khartoum used the windfall not only to buy and import more sophisticated weapons but also to start building them itself.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees estimates that Sudan's military expenditures have doubled since 1998, and government sources in Khartoum proudly claim that Sudan can now produce its own light arms and munitions, and will soon manufacture artillery and even tanks. These new industrial interests have increased the constituency for war in the North. The ability to produce its own weapons has also left Sudan far less beholden to fundamentalist regimes and international rogues.⁵³

Indeed, data collected demonstrates the role of structures which have propagated structural violence⁵⁴ and have contributed to abet the plunder of resources found in South Sudan. Further investigations reveal that resources have also caused and sustained the Sudan conflict. There is a linkage between structural violence exercised by North Sudan on South Sudan and the vast deposits of resources in South Sudan. This structural violence can be linked directly to natural resources⁵⁵ found in South Sudan.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ For further details on the discussion on structural violence, see chapter 2 p 33.

⁵⁵ For further details on the discussion on resources and conflict, see chapter 2 p 45 and chapter 3 p 63.

CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LINKAGES BETWEEN STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND RESOURCES-BASED CONFLICT IN SOUTH ERN SUDAN 1954-2005

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a critical analysis of the three themes of the study, which are structures as a source and sustainer of the North-South Sudan conflict; and resources as a source and sustainer of the North-South Sudan conflict in terms of what they contribute to the theories of structural violence and economic sources of violence, their assumptions and the various debates emanating from these theories. The chapter concludes with a discussion on conflict management implications and an overview of the themes covered linking the two variables.

Structures as a Source and Sustainer of the North-South Sudan Conflict

The conflict in Sudan has been one of the longest running conflicts. From its initial stages and throughout history, the conflict has been characterized by political, social and economic inequalities between Arab Muslims dominated North Sudan and the African dark skinned people dominantly found in South Sudan.¹ This situation has not changed with independence as successive Sudanese governments pursued policies which fall short of the Southerners' aspirations.² These incompatibilities are unarticulated and built into unjust social structures, and have resulted into socioeconomic inequalities between the North and South Sudan. The incompatibilities are embedded in social structures like the constitution, system of governance, education system, and so on, and therefore it took the actors' long time to recognize and react to them. Just like physical violence,

¹ For further details on the discussion on the background of the Sudan Conflict see chapter 3 p 49

² B. Raytopoulso and K. Alexander, *Peace in the Balance*, Op. Cit., p. 20.

structural violence³ due to unjust social structures in the form of unequal in the form of unequal distribution of political power, knowledge, wealth, and so on, have harmed, maimed or even killed persons in the conflict between the North and South Sudan.⁴ The main contentious issues have been marginalization of the South by the North.⁵ This is seen during the Turko-Egyptian administration when slave trade flourished.⁶ The Mandists collaborated with the Turks on the plunder, pillage and enslavement of the people in South Sudan.

The different administration policies of the North and the South further marginalized the latter. The Nuba Mountains and the South were sealed off from the rest of Sudan under the closed districts ordinance.⁷ This policy consolidated the separate socioeconomic administrative and political development of the two regions. This led to unfair socioeconomic, political and administrative development of the North at the expense of the South thereby creating socioeconomic and political disparities between the two regions.⁸

Education is one of the areas where unequal opportunities of its access between the North and the South have engendered the Sudan conflict. The Northerners had access to better education facilities from Egypt and the rest of the world especially the Arab states whilst education dispensed to the Southerners was scanty and consequently retarded even the development of their national consciousness and political awareness.⁹ It can therefore be interpreted that structural violence experienced in Southern Sudan has

³ For further details on the discussion on structural violence see chapter 2 p.29

⁴ G. Köhler and N. Alcock, *An Empirical table of structural violence*, Op. Cit., pp. 343-350.

⁵ P. A. Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's view*, Op. Cit., p. 14.

⁶ FM. Deng, "Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood", in R.R. Laremont (ed.) *Borders, Nationalism and the African state*, Op. Cit., p. 16.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. p. 37.

⁹ Ibid. p. 16.

brought about structural constraints and has hampered development of talents and interests in a normal version.¹⁰

In the current situation, the relations between the South and the North Sudan cannot fall in the traditional dichotomy of war and peace¹¹ since the South Sudan, after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is neither in a condition of peace nor of war.¹² Indeed, Sudan is in an unpeaceful state, and hence there is need for promotion of values such as justice, humanity and equality within the Sudan society.¹³

At independence, the structures that were put in place greatly favored the Northerners. For instance, a conference convened in Juba in 1947 with the aim of exploring the Southern Sudan question and its participation in the legislative assembly is a case in point. The Northerners sent a highly educated delegation that had a definitive view of Sudan's political future as a single state as opposed to the southerners whose delegation was in the first place small in number, uneducated and without the deft touch to bargain for their interests. The committee formed to replace the British officials at independence only gave six posts out of eight hundred posts to the Southerners. This demonstrated the imbalance of structures which did not favor South Sudan. The question of political status dominated parliamentary politics based on past promises. Instead of using dialogue/peaceful means, the army and police machinery were used to subdue these demands. The army operations against the Southerners have continued to kill thousands and to displace many others. These conditions have made the people living in and those of Southern Sudan descent unable to realize their full potential. Their actual somatic and

¹⁰ A. J. R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict,' *Op. Cit.*, pp. 71-98.

¹¹ For further details on the discussion on unpeaceful societies see chapter 2 p 31.

¹² A. Curle, *Op. Cit.*

¹³ J. Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' *Op. Cit.*, pp. 167-191.

mental realizations are below their potential realizations bearing in mind that South Sudan is endowed with vast deposits of natural resources.¹⁴

Religion has also contributed to the North-South Sudan conflict.¹⁵ The conflict is not so much on the difference in faiths but an attempt but successive rulers from the North to impose Islam on the people living in the South.¹⁶ The clash of culture between the Sudan Northerners and the Southerners has immensely contributed to the conflicts. Culture¹⁷ in this case has been used to legitimize violence unleashed on the Southerners. Groom¹⁸ suggests that religion as a social structure can be used to in the contemporary world society to discriminate; such is the case in Sudan where religion has been used as the basis to segregate the people of South Sudan. This has equally prevented the Southerners from realizing their actual potential and developing interests and talents.

Despite the ongoing civil war, several attempts were made to resolve/settle the conflict. These included concessions given to the churches.¹⁹ The churches therefore stepped up their efforts in laying a foundation for negotiations. The attempts can be viewed as a way of rectifying the unjust structures. The consideration and adoption of a separate constitution for the South is a giant step in the process towards positive peace. Though it should be noted that superficial attempts to end the conflict by trying to settle rather than resolve the underlying issues to the conflict will lead to flaring up of the conflict every

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ F.M. Deng, Op. Cit., p. 16.

¹⁶ Interview of the researcher with Mr. G.G. Diing, Deputy Principal Liaison Officer, Ministry of Regional Cooperation, Government of Southern Sudan, held on 19th August, 2009.

¹⁷ Galtung, Cultural Violence Op cit pp 291 – 305.

¹⁸ A.J. Groom "Paradigms in Conflict Op cit pp 71-98.

¹⁹ G.G. Riam, *Christian Muslim Relations in Sudan*, (Scotland: Non Western World College, 2005), p. 72.

time the unresolved issues come to the surface. Resolution is important so as to bring both parties and especially the stronger party (North Sudan) to the negotiating table²⁰.

The North- South Sudan conflict has shifted from being a predominantly about religion to issues of marginalization and the current borne of the contention is the control of resources with are largely in South Sudan.²¹ The underdogs (South Sudanese) continue to pressure the topdogs (North Sudan) to alter the social structure²².

The North-South Sudan Conflict as a Resource Based Conflict

Most of the economic activities in Sudan are concentrated along the River Nile and its tributaries. These activities are mainly subsistence agricultural production. The country however has vast reserves of oil in the South whose exploitation was hampered by the civil war between the North and the South.

Due to environmental degradation and global warming over the years, the waters of the River Nile have decreased especially downstream in North of Sudan. This has had a negative effect on irrigation which is highly depended on in Northern Sudan.²³ Land for grazing has also decreased²⁴, and as such, the pastoralists in the North have ventured to the South in search for pastures. Deteriorating resource bases and rapid population growth²⁵ in North Sudan has generated conflicts with the inhabitants of the South who are using the same land to grow their food crop.²⁶

²⁰ A. Curle, *Making Peace*, Op cit

²¹ For further details on the discussion on resources-based conflict see chapter 2 p 45

²² Galtung, *A Structural Theory of Aggression*, Op cit pp. 95-119

²³ Interview of the researcher with Major J. Kirui, Staff Officer, UN Mission in Sudan 2007-2008 held on

²⁴ August, 2009.

²⁵ For further details on the discussion on forms of resource scarcity see chapter 2 p 45.

²⁶ T.R. Malthus *An Essay on the Principle of population* Op cit

²⁷ Interview of the researcher with Major Kisilu, Op cit

Decreasing productivity of the land under agriculture, ready market for the abundant oil and few competitors, oil has gained prominence as one of the most important resources in the country.²⁷ Since most of the oil reserves are located in the South, conflict over the exploitation and control of this important resource was inevitable as the relatively powerful and more developed North endeavored to exploit the resource at all costs with little or no benefit being felt in the South. Oil development in Sudan now sustains and exacerbates the longest and most destructive civil conflict in the world²⁸. The presence of oil deposits in South Sudan among other issues have contributed to the conflict²⁹.

Structural scarcity³⁰ can be said to exist in South Sudan and it is induced by North Sudan. Furthermore dependency on the exports of oil has led to competition; low average income thus basic needs of South Sudanese are not met and slow growth of the economy especially in South Sudan³¹. Sudan endowment with resources is vast, with deposits of uranium, gold and some copper in the equatorial region. North Sudan is mainly a desert and with fewer minerals compared to the South.³² If roles were reversed and the South was in the current geographical location of the North, the kind of conflict over the control of resources being experienced between the two regions would not exist³³.

Resources were present at the onset of the conflict, the same resources have intensified the conflict and have sustained one of the world's longest running conflict³⁴. But again probably the current inhabitants of the South would want to use the resource which

²⁷ For further details on the discussion on how oil has sustained the Sudan conflict see chapter 3 p 63

²⁸ E. Reeves, *Oil Development in Sudan*, Op. Cit., pp. 167-169.

²⁹ J.D. Ferron, and D.D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,' Op cit pp. 53-68

³⁰ N.P. Gelditsch, *Environmental Change, Security and Conflict* Op cit pp. 143-162.

³¹ P. Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implication on Policy* Op ct pp. 143-162.

³² Interview of the researcher with Mr. G.G. Ding, Op. Cit.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ M.L. Ross, *How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War* Op Cit pp. 35-67.

would be lying with the current inhabitants of the North and thus would have done everything in their power to get the resource being needed for development. The current conflict would still exist since the underlying and main cause, resources and unjust structures would still play an important role. The difference would be the protagonists and their rôles.

Revenue collected from the oil mined in the South is shared equally between the South and the North Sudan; where else the taxes collected from the North are retained by the Sudan government for use in the North only. This disparity in the distribution of the revenue poses a potential risk in exacerbating the already delicate relation between the North and the South Sudan and dims any chances of reconciling the two sides to form a united Sudan nation.

Linkages Between Structural Violence and Resources-Based Conflict

Resources in Sudan have been used to sustain the conflict between North and South Sudan. The Khartoum government cannot afford the loss of control of exploitation of resources which are abundantly found in South Sudan. It can be interpreted that it is beneficial for the North if the conflict continues that way they (the Northerners) continue to benefit from the resources.³⁵ To achieve this goal it is paramount that South Sudan does not come together, the Northerners have propagated unjust structures which ensure that South Sudan can be managed. Residents of Southern Sudan oilfields have been perceived as a threat by the Northerners, the people of South Sudan have over the years been denied the right to participate in their own governance.³⁶

³⁵ For further details of the discussion on the link between resources and conflict, see chapter 2, p. 45 and chapter 3, p. 63.

³⁶ J. Rone, Op cit

All Sudanese revenue from exploitation of resources which are dominantly found in the South have gone directly to funding project such as military purchases which have been directly used to continue harming inhabitants of South Sudan through physical violence as well as structural violence.³⁷ The ability of North Sudan to be able to produce its own weapons has not only provided the means to propagate the current state of affairs but the resources also give a means to sustain the conflict.

Conflict Management Implications

Classical modes by which states strive to resolve internal conflict include policies such as extermination, population expulsion, coercion-domination, assimilation, institutionalized discrimination, democratic majority rule and individual human rights, minority protection, autonomy, federal system of government and territorial separation.³⁸ The above policy options can be distinguished into policies of denial in which case there is direct or indirect denial of existence of the other party to a conflict.³⁹ Acceptance policy admits the existence of the other side and recognizes the other side has a meaningful say regarding its position vis à vis the state.⁴⁰ The denial strategy which the government of Sudan has over the years adopted can lead a struggle for effectiveness and self determination.⁴¹ This coupled with structural violence⁴² incites discontent and

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defence: A General Theory* (New York, Harper and Row 1962)

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ For further details on the discussion on the Southern Sudan struggle for self determination see Chapter 3 p 48

⁴² For further details on the discussion on structural violence see chapter 2 p 33

civil strife⁴³ and social revolution.⁴⁴ Indeed, in most cases communities prefer to be governed poorly by their in-group rather than however wisely by an alien.⁴⁵

When division of labor is cultural⁴⁶ and there is inequality between the core (the Khartoum government) of a polity and the periphery (South Sudan), this is viewed as internal colonization and the periphery is likely to strive to correct the imbalance.⁴⁷ Once the process of assertiveness which imbues and legitimization ensues, it tends to be relentless and cannot be arrested by secondary cosmetic changes. Only far reaching structural changes that are based on respect and participation of South Sudan in determining their destiny and resource utilization can placate them, should the proposed changes not meet their expectations South Sudan has opted to secede after the 2011 referendum⁴⁸ taking the separatism option.⁴⁹

It is therefore necessary to employ genuine acceptable negotiable policies which may lend themselves to a conflict resolution process. Only then can the real merits of a case for justice, power sharing or self determination be deduced so as to comprehensively address issues to a conflict.⁵⁰ Peaceful management of conflicts is enshrined in article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. It specifies methods of peaceful settlement of disputes in article 33(1).⁵¹ This notion contradicts structural violence theory which advocates for revolutionizing the structures so to overhaul it in order to tilt the scales of

⁴³ C Geerts, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New York States in Jr., Welch ed, *Political Modernization* (Belmont, Wadsworth 1967) p 170

⁴⁴ J. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, (New York, Colombia University Press 1981) pp 14-15

⁴⁵ E. Krippendorf, 'Minorities, Violence and Peace Research,' *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 16 (1979) Pp 27-

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⁴⁶ For further details on the discussion on culture and cultural violence see chapter 2 p 36

⁴⁷ A. Heraclides, *The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London, Frank Cass). Also See CPA between North and South Sudan signed in Nairobi in 2005

⁴⁸ For further details on the discussion on Sudan Peace Process see chapter 3 p 60

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ C. Kaufman, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,' *International Security* Vol. 20 (1996) Pp 136-175.

⁵¹ U.N, *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

balance of power. The oppressed who have been suffering due to the skewed structures may get a reprieve and social, economic and political situation improves substantially.

It is critical to match methodology and conflict at hand. Conflict managers should beforehand have an idea as to whether the management process is aimed at settlement or resolution of the conflict.⁵² It is also important for the conflict managers to understand the type of conflict at hand.⁵³ The Sudan conflict has over time transformed but the underlying issues have always been brushed under the rug and quick fix solutions sought. The danger of this approach has been that the conflict keeps recurring and each time it recurred it did so with greater momentum. Sudan has been and is still looking for its soul⁵⁴ especially South Sudan will not settle because of the importance of the values they are fighting for which are non-negotiable.⁵⁵ Rather it will forge on in order to correct historical injustice and secure a future that promises positive peace, equitable distribution of resources and allows them to develop to their full potential with the resources they own. It is important to explore all angles to a conflict for example the linkage between structural violence and resources based conflict so as to employ conflict management methodology that will bear long lasting results.

⁵² M. Mwangi Op Cit p118

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ F. M. Deng Op Cit

⁵⁵ M. Mwangi Op Cit p 119

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The chapter shows the extent to which the study's objectives were reached, it states the final findings namely whether or not the hypotheses have been confirmed and the conclusions reached. The chapter presents the summaries of the chapters that make up this study.

Chapter one introduces the topic of the research study. It sets the broad context of the study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and methodology of the study.¹ The debate on the objectivity or subjectivity of conflict has been put forth by many scholars. Whilst there is a conceptual difference between behavioral and structural conflict, they are eventually tied together by existence of violent conflict, at some level the distinction is arguable. The contention is about the stage at which violent conflict becomes an issue. Chapter two examines the various debates on structural violence and resources-based conflict.²

Chapter three explores the North-South Sudan conflict in terms of structural and resource based conflict. The chapter is divided into two main themes: Structural causes of the North-South Sudan conflict; and the North-South Sudan conflict as a resource based conflict.³ Chapter four presents a critical analysis of the two themes of the study, which are structures as a source and sustainer of the North-South Sudan conflict; and resources as a source and sustainer of the North-South Sudan conflict in terms of what they

¹ For further details of problem statement, justification of the study, objectives, literature review, hypotheses, theoretical framework and methodology of the research, see chapter 1, pp. 1-28.

² For further details on discussion involving debates on structural violence and resource-based conflict, see chapter 2, pp.29-44.

³ For further details on the South Sudan case study, see chapter 3, pp.49-61.

contribute to the theories of structural violence and economic sources of violence, their assumptions and the various debates emanating from these theories. The chapter concludes with an overview of the themes covered and links structures and resources in the South Sudan conflict case study.⁴ Chapter five summarizes the previous chapters, it indicates the findings of the research based on the hypothesis and gives a conclusion of the research.⁵

The overall objective of this study was to link structural violence and resource-based conflict in the Sudan conflict context. The Sub-objectives of the study were to specifically investigate if the distribution and utilization of resources generated conflict between North and South Sudan, if structures in the Sudan system (political, economic and social) have generated conflict between North and South Sudan and the transformation of the causes of conflict between North and Southern Sudan.

With respect to the first sub-objective, that is, to investigate if distribution and utilization of resources generated conflict between North and South Sudan, the study found out that South Sudan has vast deposits of natural resources among them oil which has become a very important resource to Sudan in general. These resources have been used to sustain the perfect war.⁶ North Sudan exploits the resources in South Sudan with no regard for the Southerner's well being and development.⁷

⁴ For further details of critical analysis of the data collected in this study, see chapter 4, pp. 69-76.

⁵ For further details of summary and conclusions of this study, see chapter 5, p 79

⁶ For further details of the discussion on how the resources are linked to the Sudan conflict, see Chapter 3 p 61-67.

⁷Ibid.

With respect to the second sub-objective, that is, if structures in the Sudan system (political, economic and social) have generated conflict between North and South Sudan, the study established that, since 1954 and throughout its history the North-South conflict has been characterized by political, social and economic inequalities between the Arab Muslim dominated North Sudan and the African Christian dominated South. South Sudan feels that the North has developed and is still developing at its expense.⁸

In relation to the third sub-objective, the transformation of the causes of conflict between North and Southern Sudan, the study found that the conflict has transformed from being a conflict based on religion to one based on resources and structural violence.⁹ Since transformation of a conflict affects the management process of the conflict either positively or negatively, conflict managers must carefully study how the conflict they are managing is getting transformed and seek resolutions having in mind the effect of such transformations on both the progress of the conflict and the management efforts.

These findings confirm the hypotheses that guided this study. The first hypothesis was that, resources found in South Sudan have generated conflict with North Sudan in the period 1954 to 2005. Increase in human population with the increase in destruction of the environment will eventually lead to conflict.¹⁰ North Sudan requires the vast deposits of oil found in South Sudan for its economic development, the Khartoum government continues to use these resources at the expense of the Southerners.¹¹ The endowment of

⁸ For further details on the discussion on evidence of structural violence in the North-South Sudan conflict, see chapter 3 pp 50-61.

⁹ For further details on the discussion on the transformation of the Sudan conflict, see chapter 3 p 55.

¹⁰ T. Malthus Op Cit.

¹¹ For further details on the discussion on North-South Sudan conflict as a resource based conflict, see chapter 3 p 61.

Natural resources has turned out to be a curse rather than a blessing. The resources have been used to intensify and sustain the conflict between North and South Sudan.

The second hypothesis was that, structures in the Sudan system are unjust and inequitable hence there is structural violence experienced by South Sudan. This study demonstrated the presence of structural violence in South Sudan propagated through various means by North Sudan. Skewed structures have favour North Sudan and propagated structural violence against South Sudan.¹²

This study has elucidated the link between the well being of the people of South Sudan and the development of Sudan as a whole, one cannot do without the other or perhaps South Sudan can do without North Sudan, whilst North Sudan faces circuitous future without South Sudan. There is lack of human security and development, thus South Sudan has experienced extreme poverty, disproportionate resource distribution, inadequate healthcare, knowledge and skills. This is evidenced by the gap between the actual and potential in South Sudan considering its natural resources endowment.¹³

The third hypothesis was that, resolution rather than settlement will end the North-South Sudan conflict.¹⁴ The conflict management implication these findings have are that, it is critical to match methodology and conflict at hand. Conflict managers should beforehand have an idea as to whether the management process is aimed at

¹² For further details on the discussion structural violence in the Sudan conflict case study, see chapter 3, p 49.

¹³ For further details on the discussion on the linkages between structural violence and resource-based conflict, see chapter 3, pp. 49-68

¹⁴ For further details on the discussion on conflict management implication of the North-South Sudan conflict, see chapter 4 p 76.

settlement or resolution of the conflict.¹⁵ It is also important for the conflict managers to understand the type of conflict at hand¹⁶ and adopt the acceptance policy which admits the existence of the other side and recognizes the other side has a meaningful say regarding its position vis à vis the state.¹⁷ Only then will there be far reaching structural changes that are based on respect and participation of South Sudan in determining their destiny and resource utilization, should the proposed changes not meet their expectations South Sudan has opted to secede after the 2011 referendum¹⁸ taking the separatism option.¹⁹

Linkages between variables (structures and resources) affect the way a conflict is managed. It is therefore important to understand the effects the various variables and their interconnection and seek more practical and long term solutions to the Southern Sudan conflict either by settlement or resolution bearing in mind how these variables play out in the bigger picture of the conflict.

¹⁵ M. Mwagiru Op Cit p118

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ For further details on the discussion on Sudan Peace Process see chapter 3 p 60

¹⁹ Ibid.

APPENDIX

Structured Questionnaire

- Who are the main actors involved in the Sudan conflict from 1954 to 2005?
- What was the cause of the Sudan conflict from 1954 to 2005?
- What are the main motives of the actors involved in the conflict?
- What are the current issues dominating the Sudan conflict?
- What efforts if any, are being made bring about positive peace in Sudan?
- To what extent do you think structure have contributed to the Sudan conflict?
- To what extent have resources which are mainly found in South Sudan contributed to the Sudan conflict?
- Is there a link between equitable distribution of resources and the structures in the Sudan?

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