

MANAGING CIVIL CONFLICT

**A Critical Appraisal of External Intervention in
the Somali Conflict from 1991-2003**

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION**

BY JULIETTE PAGE

*Thesis submitted in partial completion of requirement for a
Master of Arts Degree in International Studies from the
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi*

MANAGING CIVIL CONFLICT ;

A Critical Appraisal of External Intervention in the Somali Conflict from 1991-2003

by PAGE T. Juliette

R/50/P/8177/2002

University of NAIROBI Library



0479021 8

August 2009

Bd 356824

AFR

JX

1961

·S6P3

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has never been submitted by anybody for examination at any university



JULIETTE PAGE

20 August 2009

DATE

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the candidate's supervisor



PROF. MAKUMI MWAGIRU

20 August 2009

DATE

For my little 'UN Secretary-General'

– Nat Dafydd –

Whom Momma loves and cherishes ever so much

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
AFRICANA COLLECTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis would have been unfinished without constant nagging from my darling husband, Neil, and my Dad-in-Law, David, that kept me soldiering on with this project even when it seemed infinite. I am particularly grateful to my husband for all the support he gave me while I abandoned the family and became a recluse in the family study; for the numerous trips to the animal orphanage to give me the free space I required from my *UN Secretary-General*, Nat, I'm enormously appreciative. Appreciation goes to my Dad and Ma for all their prayers and fasting to seek divine intervention for the completion and acceptance of this project, and to my sisters: Carole, Lyn, Jan, Jo, and Marni for their taunts, without which I would have sunk to their label of drop-out. Thank you all for your motivation – both positive and negative.

I am immensely grateful to Prof. Makumi Mwagiru for his guidance and support, without which this thesis would have been uninspired, unfocused and unfinished. For the good ideas and the constant picking at the initial drafts for quality control, and for the support in the completion of this project, I am especially appreciative. Thanks also to Kizito Sabala, the Political Officer at the IGAD Liaison office, who selflessly provided me with written material and the necessary contacts to conduct the much-needed research and interviews with key people in the Somali mediation. For all those who may have played an important role in this project and are not mentioned herein, I am truly grateful for your assistance.

ABSTRACT

This study provides a background of the Somali conflict, examining the immediate triggers and the internal and external factors that precipitated the civil war that has lasted more than a decade. It reviews the nature and evolution of the internal rebellion, paying special attention to the effects of the end of the Cold War – on the Somali situation – and the subsequent emergence of a new breed of international politics that rejected absolute sovereignty in favor of interventionism, where third-party interventions became common in cases of human rights abuses and humanitarian disasters. The complexity of the Somali conflict in terms of perceptions of *clanic*⁸ marginalization and the quest for governance is examined to reveal the issues that have continually obstructed the possibility of a peaceful, sustainable and diplomatic resolution of this conflict. The role of the warlords in the internal division of Somalia and other contributory factors to the failure of the Somali state are critically analyzed to illuminate the factors at play in the conflict and deliberate the future of a *national reconciliation*.

Indeed the primary concern of this study is to explore the various attempts undertaken by the international community to manage and ultimately resolve the Somali conflict that has afflicted Somalia for more than a decade. It examines the involvement of international, intergovernmental organizations and the world's governments in this conflict, paying special attention to implementation arrangements employed by intervening parties and lessons learnt in each of the interventions. In essence, this study seeks to answer the question: how has external intervention affected the Somali civil conflict and the prospects of its resolution? Where governments have been involved in this civil war, the study considers the role of these governments in managing it, and/or in frustrating peace initiatives set out to resolve this conflict. Whilst not discounting the importance of external intervention, this project examines the reasons for failures – and where accurate, the successes – of past interventions, analyzing the impact and implications of their approaches, with the aim of building on present initiatives, and constructing a way forward in the realization of sustainable peace.

⁸ Adjective referring to the **clan** system

ABBREVIATIONS

AIAI	<i>al-Ittibad al-Islamiya</i>
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EACTI	East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative
ECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
LAS	League of Arab States
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
NEC	National Executive Committee
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
NSC	Salvation Committee
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
QRF	Quick reaction force
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army
SAMO	Somali African Muki Organisation
SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNDU	Somali National Democratic Union
SNF	Somali National Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNPC	Somali National Peace Conference
SNRC	Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
SNU	Somali National Union
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council

SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNC	Transitional National Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITAF	UN-Approved US-Backed Unified Task Force
UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress
USF	United Somali Front
USP	United Somali Party
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.....	3
OBJECTIVES.....	3
JUSTIFICATION	4
Connectors.....	4
Conflict Trap	5
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	5
Foreign Intervention in Intrastate Conflict.....	6
Causes of Violent Conflict	10
Early Warnings: Symptoms of Imminent State Collapse?	12
Lessons Learnt: Prospects for Reconciliation and Reconstruction.....	14
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	14
HYPOTHESES	15
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	15
CHAPTER OUTLINE	17
CHAPTER 2: CIVIL CONFLICT IN SOMALIA	19
BACKGROUND	19
POLITICIZED ETHNICITY.....	20
STATE FAILURE.....	21
SOMALIA’S COLLAPSE	24
CHAPTER 3: MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA.....	29
THE RATIONALE FOR INACTION	29
THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM I)	34
THE UN-APPROVED US-BACKED UNIFIED TASK FORCE (UNITAF)	39
THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM II).....	43
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU).....	48
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)	50
The High-level Consultative Meeting of Somali Political Movements.....	52
Somali National Peace Conference	53
The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference.....	57
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.....	62
CHAPTER 4: STATE-LED RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT	61
AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS.....	61
Ethiopia.....	61
Kenya.....	66
Djibouti	68
Egypt.....	69
WESTERN AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS.....	71
Italy	71
United States of America.....	73
Saudi Arabia.....	74

Yemen.....	76
CHAPTER 5: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF INTERVENTION.....	77
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	87
RECAPITULATION.....	87
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	89
Conflict Management and Resolution.....	89
A Case for Islamism.....	91
State-Building?.....	93
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	96

CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Conflict management is a process which entails identifying causes and potential sources of conflict in an attempt to establish regularized, constructive interactions in a society under severe strain through the employment of peaceful methods including preventive diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, bargaining, arbitration and adjudication. The object of conflict management is to “defuse the conflict, prevent it from escalating further, terminate it, and limit effects that may complicate peacebuilding.”¹ Accordingly, effective conflict management entails the identification of significant obstacles to conflict resolution, which essentially vary from one conflict to another, but include the nature of the conflict, fears, mistrust. It is important to note this early in the study that the conceptual understanding of the causes of the conflicts contributes immensely to the management and resolution of conflict, given as it provides conflict policymakers with the necessary tools to conduct mediations and negotiations effectively and significantly reduce disputes.

In this study, conflict management is considered in the context of the international interventions to resolve the civil war that has affected the peoples of Somalia since 1991 following the deposition of President Siad Barre. Seeing as the state was embroiled in the conflict and therefore lacked the capacity to impartially manage the conflicting clan relations, the international community was compelled to step in to alleviate the suffering of millions of Somalis. The main challenge in managing the conflict in Somalia was establishing and applying an effective system of conflict prevention, management, and resolution nationally when the people’s of Somalia were intolerably divided along clan lines. In view of the fact that the international community had already missed the opportunity of attempting to manage the conflict during the last leg of Barre’s tenure, the institutional weaknesses were not addressed, leading to further tears in the unraveling conflict system and finally to warlordism. The focus

¹ Sriram, Chandra L., and Wermester, Karin (eds.), *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention*

now had to be conflict management through predominantly negative incentives which included sanctions, arms embargoes, the establishment of demilitarized zones, and even the justified use of force. In the case of the Somali conflict, the phase dealing with post-conflict peacebuilding has sadly never been reached as the conflict rages on without an end in sight.

In this study, the main focus will be on peace-enforcement and mediation as the third-party interventions in the Somali conflict, specifically to reveal which of the two methods had better success and the reasons for both the success and failure of the initiatives. Literature by Bercovitch indicates that even though mediation processes like those initiated in Somalia that are nonbinding and noncoercive have been popularly practiced for centuries, there is very little scholarly knowledge available on this form of conflict management due to a lack of systematic analyses.² Peace enforcement is a relatively new tool of conflict management that was initiated in the post Cold War era to revamp the United Nations (UN), whose authority had been curtailed by the superpower rivalry that caused years of stalemate in the security body. The term 'peace enforcement' was drawn from the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's recommendation for peace enforcement units in his book entitled *An Agenda for Peace*.³ In this project, the peace enforcement will be used to mean the "authorization of the use of force by the Security Council in situations that fall into the grey area between full-scale enforcement measures and traditional peacekeeping situations."⁴ Unlike in mediations and peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the parties to the conflict; this was exemplified in the peace enforcement responses of the UN in the Iraq-Kuwait and Somali conflicts.

of Violent Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. p28

² Bercovitch, Jacob and Houston, Allison, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in Bercovitch, Jacob (eds.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. p11

³ Ghali, Boutros B., *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations, 1992

⁴ Boulden, Jane, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. p2

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Somalia has experienced armed conflict since the initial failed attempts to overthrow the state's despot in 1988, and continues to do so to date. The nature of the Somali conflict has changed considerably over the years, but humanitarian crises continue to plague the stateless territory, with armed conflict remaining widespread in areas of Somalia especially in the south. Despite the best efforts by the international community to manage the conflict, there are areas where violence still prevails, including the "Middle Shabelle region, south Mudug region, north Mogadishu, Medina District in Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle, Bay region, Gedo region, Buaale (Middle Juba) and Kismayo."⁵ This study considers the international community's responses, which even with their good intentions, have neither succeeded in quelling the civil war nor restoring order in Somalia, but have in fact made things worse. It explores the implications of the premature termination of the largest UN humanitarian intervention before its conclusion and the inutility of the subsequent uninspiring involvement of the international community in the management of this conflict. In addition, it seeks to identify solutions for a protracted conflict paralleled to the Lebanese conflict where the populace was similarly compelled to reconnect with family and community for security and shelter,⁶ and thenceforward nothing could be done to reverse the deeply embedded clan antipathy.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this study are to:

- examine the interventions by external parties into the Somali conflict to expose the long-term implications of the errors committed including the blatant disregard of emerging opposition groups, delayed intervention despite early warnings, poor planning and coordination, and subsequently the missed opportunities

⁵ Menkhaus, Kenneth, *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Protection Information Section (PIS/DIP), 2003

⁶ Khalaf, Samir, "The Case of Nineteenth-Century Lebanon" in Esman, Milton J. and Telhami, Shibley (eds.) *International*

- provide policy makers, academia, students and other interested parties with a one-stop source of information that has not been collated by other authors in any one book
- articulate practical policy lessons for future emergencies of similar complexity through the critical appraisal of the conflict

JUSTIFICATION

The units of observation are the state and system levels of analysis, with its dependent variables as sustainable peace while its independent variables consist of competent and transparent external intervention, national reconciliation, good governance, universal representation of locals. The study is therefore justified on the basis of these arguments:

Connectors

The Somali community is one that is invariably homogenous, with the entire population sharing a common ethnic, religious and linguistic identity, only distinguished from each other by lineage, history and custom. The community is composed of five major clans, namely the *Hawiye*, *Darood*, *Isaaq*, *Dir* and *Rahanwein*, that lived peacefully together in relative peace until the defeat in the Ogaden war that made Barre initiate a divide-and-rule campaign to manipulate Somalis through *clanic* and *sub-clanic* affiliations. The dictator ruthlessly exploited this and politicized clan relations by encouraging conflict among clans in order to suit his legacy, with his régime openly oppressing clans that had led insurgencies against him. With a divided Somalia and opponents murdered, exiled or imprisoned, the dictator short-sightedly believed his rule would face no opposition from the Somali people but this was not to be as his very deeds led to his deposition. Therefore, this study aims at identifying and exploring how the common connectors can be employed to reunite the Somali people given that the divisions caused by clan apathy are

irreparable. Not only does the author build on the academic works of respectable authors and the pre-Barre sentiments expressed by the peoples of Somalia, but she also brings to fore unexplored solutions that may present an opportunity for the management and ultimate resolution of the Somali conflict.

Conflict Trap

The situation only degenerated with the civil war, as Somalis withdrew to the only form of dependable security they could find, **the clan system**. The Somali peoples had been divided and the future of reconciliation had been killed by the *clanic* mistrust fuelled by the Barre clan-manipulation campaign that still haunts Somalia to date. Indeed this seemingly irresolvable situation has trapped Somalia into an ongoing and protracted conflict that makes the prospects of national reconciliation seem bleak as different clan-based regions seek to secede. It does not help that neighboring Ethiopia allegedly continues to provide illicit support to clan-based factions in Somalia, this going a long way in undermining genuine peace initiatives. Appreciating the failures of past interventions, this study is an attempt to *think outside the box* and appropriately identify workable ideas to liberate the Somalis from this conflict trap that has overwhelmed many regional and international policymakers and leaders of interim governments of the failed state of Somalia. It therefore seeks to provide a basis for further critical thinking among scholars and policymakers committed to facilitating the resolution of the civil conflict by sampling novel and practicable solutions that are in line with the Somali consciousness.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study considers and analyzes the works of various authors, seeking to fill gaps in their analyses in order to contribute to the body of knowledge on the Somali and other armed conflicts. The author acknowledges that the subject of armed conflict in Somalia is immense and thus this literature review does not attempt to exhaust this subject but to serve as a sample of a

variety of materials on the important issues, giving an overview of some of the major crises and opportunities being discussed. The sources cited in this study are varied and include materials by prominent scholars in the field of conflict, as well as the ordinary Somali peoples and interim governments. As is, this review is a work in progress and does not therefore provide an in-depth exploration of all the topics and relevant materials that are available.

Foreign Intervention in Intrastate Conflict

Somalia has known many foreign interventions involving all manner of actors that ranged from single states, coalitions of states through intergovernmental instruments, international organizations and the civil society. The rationales for these interventions are as diverse as the actors that sought involvement in the internal conflict, and according to the works of various international authors, the primary justifications for intervention in the Somali conflict were regional security, national interest, moral and hegemonic considerations. Authors invoking moral considerations for intervention maintain that external actors were motivated by a sense of international responsibility to promote peace, end humanitarian crises and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms – what UN Secretary General Kofi Annan terms ‘individual sovereignty’⁷ – of the Somali people.

Drysdale⁸ ventures that another rationale for intervention in Somalia was individualistic considerations of various actors, including then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and US President, George Bush. Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah put it best: “[p]rospective mediators are motivated by their own self-interests in either initiating entry or accepting an invitation to mediate and parties to a conflict are equally motivated by self-interests in accepting mediation and entry of a particular mediator.”⁹ Cooper and Berdal¹⁰ consider ethnic

⁷ Annan, Kofi A., *Balance State Sovereignty With Individual Sovereignty!* Speech delivered on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly.

⁸ Drysdale, John, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* London: Ipswich Book Company, 1994

⁹ Maundi, Mohammed O., Zartman, I. William, Khadiagala, Gilbert M. and Nuamah, Kwaku, *Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. p175

sympathy for oppressed groups, a sense of international responsibility and humanitarian concerns among the rationales for intervention, usually with mixed motives. The ethnic sympathy rationale may have been one of the appeal factors for Ethiopia and Djibouti's intervention given the ethnic similarities of communities that straddle their borders with Somalia.

It is evident from the interventions of the states bordering Somalia, that they were motivated by national interests, specifically self-preservation, national security, regional hegemony and national image, ethnic harmony among others. International and regional intergovernmental bodies are similarly motivated by institutional objectives, organizational missions and visions as was evident in the UN, AU and IGAD interventions. Scholars have argued that external intervention generally escalates domestic conflict, seeing as it introduces new parameters while increasing the number of parties involved in the local conflict.¹¹ Indeed Walker¹² notes that successful external intervention in domestic conflicts is scarce, Gurr and Harff¹³ support intervention arguing that championing the rights of states essentially disregards the rights to life and security of persons as provided for in the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Anderson¹⁴ joins other authors in arguing that external assistance more often than not exacerbates the conflicts that it was intended to mitigate, by unwittingly feeding inter-group tensions or weakening inter-group connections. She argues that many scholars often focus on the 'dividers' that led to or aggravate the conflict rather than the impact of 'connectors' within society and how they can be strengthened. Woodward adds his voice by arguing that although the Horn conflicts have arisen from domestic issues of ethnicity, history and traditions, they have been magnified by international involvement.¹⁵ The lack of altruism and objectivity by

¹⁰ Cooper, Robert and Berdal, Mats, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic conflicts," in Brown, Michael E., (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. p197

¹¹ Ryan, Stephen, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Vermont: Dartmouth, 1990.

¹² Walker, Jenonne, "International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts", in Brown, Michael E., (eds.) op. cit., p165

¹³ Gurr, T. R. and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994. p149

¹⁴ Anderson, Mary B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999

¹⁵ Woodward, Peter, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, London: Tauris Publishers, 1996

interveners is reproached by Adam¹⁶, Menkhaus¹⁷, Drysdale¹⁸, Clarke and Herbst¹⁹, Hirsch and Oakley²⁰, who examine defective intervention by states offering support to régimes that represent their interests regardless of their internal illegitimacy or behavior. These authors argue that the international community missed an opportunity to facilitate a transition in Somalia along the lines of the successful examples in Africa, by overtly favoring particular factions.

Accordingly, this study evaluates the effectiveness of past interventions in the context of these bases for intervention, paying special attention to the opportunities missed and the tragic mistakes made by various actors in the quest to manage this conflict. In particular, it considers the defective mandates and strategies of the UNOSOM I deployed to Mogadishu in July 1992, the US-led UNITAF intervention⁸ under the UN, and UNOSOM II, which assumed responsibility for military operations in Somalia on 04 May 1993. The effects of partiality, authorizing the use of force and executing missions without the consent of the local authorities, are considered to demonstrate the part they played in escalating the conflict and hindering its resolution.

Regan²¹, Chopra and Nordbo²², and Thürer²³ discuss the new 'peacekeeping' improvisations that were developed for situations, like Somalia's, where party cooperation was problematic and the need to use force beyond that for self-defence in fulfillment of mission

¹⁶ Adam, Hussein M., "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?" in Zartman, I. William (eds.) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. p85

¹⁷ Menkhaus, K. and Lyons, Terrence, "What Are the Lessons to Be Learned From Somalia?" CSIS Africa Notes, Washington, D.C., No. 144, January 1993. See also Menkhaus, Kenneth. *International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia*. International Peacekeeping Vol. 3 No. 1, 1996. See also Menkhaus, Kenneth., *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. op. cit

¹⁸ Drysdale, op. cit., p165

¹⁹ Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (eds.), *Learning From Somalia: The Lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997

²⁰ Hirsch, John L. and Oakley, Robert B., *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1995

⁸ The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), deployed to Somalia in advance of UNOSOM II

²¹ Regan, Patrick M., *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Michigan, University of Michigan, 2000

²² Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralv, "Fighting for Hope in Somalia" in The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations No 6, 1995 online at <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a007.htm>

²³ Thürer, Daniel, *Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: der 'Failed State'*, published in *Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht*, Vol. 34, Heidelberg, 1995

objectives inevitable. The Ghali²⁴ proposal for a middle ground between peacekeeping and peace enforcement – termed as ‘aggravated peacekeeping’ by Mays²⁵ and Connaughton,²⁶ and as ‘muscular peacekeeping’ by James²⁷ – that was implemented in Somalia is examined in this paper to reveal what went wrong. Works by Menkhaus²⁸, Drysdale²⁹, Clarke and Herbst³⁰, Hirsch and Oakley³¹, show the misguided ambiguity of Article 42⁸ of Chapter VII of the UN Charter invoked during this operation, whose objective of establishing a secure environment did not offer guidance on the rules of engagement. The unfortunate interpretation of this objective therefore was the “arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, no right to *habeas corpus*; death injury without an official enquiry; the seizure and destruction of property without compensation”³² which was indeed a violation of human rights. These works show how peacekeeping missions set out to prevent human rights abuses instead caused more harm than good and callously worsened the wrongs they had set out to right.

Also examined are UN Resolutions to the Somali conflict with particular reference to the landmark development of Resolution 794 (1992) of 03 December 1992, in which the Security Council held that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict” was sufficient in itself to constitute a threat to peace thus authorizing humanitarian intervention. This study analyzes the fallibility of multilateral intervention by considering the provisions as Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, which authorized a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, after 24 Pakistani soldiers of the UN Force were killed in Mogadishu in an ambush. The Security Council

²⁴ Ghali, Boutros B., op. cit.

²⁵ Mays, Terry M., *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*. International Organizations Series, No. 9. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1996

²⁶ Connaughton, Richard M., “*Command, Control and Coalition Operations*” in Lewis, William H. (eds.), *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993. p13

²⁷ James, Alan, “*Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*”, *International Journal*, Spring 1995. p250

²⁸ Menkhaus, K. and Lyons, Terrence, op. cit.. See also Menkhaus, Kenneth. *International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia*. op. cit.. See also Menkhaus, Kenneth., *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. op. cit

²⁹ Drysdale, op. cit., p165

³⁰ Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (eds.), op. cit.

³¹ Hirsch, John L. and Oakley, Robert B., op. cit.

⁸ Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore

in Resolution 837 of 06 June 1993 confirmed “that the Secretary-General is authorized under Resolution 814 to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” effectively establishing the authority of UNOSOM II to arrest and detain them for prosecution, trial and punishment.

Causes of Violent Conflict

Many scholars today agree that the causes of violent conflict are complex and are frequently so thoroughly intertwined with a range of social, economic, and political factors that isolating individual variables can be extremely difficult. In general, there is some agreement that the root causes of violent conflict include poverty, economic dependence, weak states, ethnic discrimination, international rivalries, and foreign military interventions.³³ Many contemporary researchers – including Zartman, Reno, Ake, Baker and Weller – are reconsidering the question of causes and effects, and are now pointing to issues of governance as the underlying causes of conflict in Africa. The Carnegie Commission emphasizes that unevenly distributed economic growth may contribute to conflict, especially when poverty is concentrated among certain ethnic groups.³⁴ According to the Commission, “peace is most commonly found where economic growth and opportunities to share in that growth are broadly distributed across the population.” In agreement, Baker and Weller³⁵ identify uneven economic development along group lines and sharp economic decline as two of the top twelve indicators of internal conflict and state collapse.

The works of authors on protracted conflicts are analyzed to demonstrate how the Somali conflict has greatly metamorphosed and acquired anomalous features thus making it

international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

³² Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p165

³³ Schmeidl, Susanne and Jenkins, Craig J., *The Early Warning of Humanitarian Disasters: Problems in Building an Early Warning System*. International Migration Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 1998. pp471-486; See also Brown, Michael E., in Brown, Michael E., (eds.) *op. cit.*, pp6-12

³⁴ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. Washington DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997

³⁵ Baker, Pauline H. and Weller, Angeli E., *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners*. Washington DC: The Fund for Peace, 1998

resistant to resolution. According to Conteh-Morgan identity conflicts “originate from socioeconomic crises of the state and patterns of ethnopolitical domination”³⁶ and because the parties to the conflict are in the same territory, the conflict easily becomes protracted. This happens particularly as the conflict widens in scope and the antagonists rigidly view the conflict in zero-sum terms hence making violence their main instruments of communication. In Patten’s view, achieving win-win solutions in resource-related protracted conflicts is impossible given the difficulty in converting distributive bargaining into integrative bargaining.³⁷ Most importantly, Azar delineates four preconditions as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict viz. communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance and the state’s role, and international linkages, asserting that the complex entanglement of issues in protracted conflicts reduces the efficacy of third party intervention.³⁸

In addition, this study considers the detrimental effects of politicized ethnicity on the past and present conflict relations in Somalia, as the defunct government of Siad Barre exploited this aspect to divide and rule the Somali peoples leading to a situation that has tended towards irreversible. According to Adam, Ford et al³⁹ it is important for any party intervening in the Somali conflict to understand the dynamics of the war such as these strong clan affiliations in order to resolve the conflict in a sustainable manner. The putting forward of solutions that are centralized are therefore unlikely to work as this is not the Somali way of doing things, given that their historical background is based mainly on decentralization according to ethnicity [READ clans.]

³⁶ Conteh-Morgan, Earl, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts*. New York: Routledge, 2004. p196

³⁷ Patten Thomas H., Jr., *Organizational Development through Teambuilding*. New York: Wiley, 1981. p115

³⁸ Azar, Edward E., *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990

³⁹ Adam, Hussein M., Ford, Richard B., et al, *Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation*. United States Institute of Peace, 1998

Early Warnings: Symptoms of Imminent State Collapse?

With the end of the Cold War, failed states became more common especially as a result of the fragmentation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) into various states, and the subsequent demise of Soviet support to its allies. The concepts of failed and collapsed states were hence born, and theories formulated to explain the degeneration of states as they lost legitimacy, failed to perform public functions or maintain functioning state institutions or maintain social cohesion. Zartman defines state collapse as “a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power) law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.”⁴⁰ Even as it is not easy to theorize state collapse and failure, scholars have identified some of these reasons for this degeneration. Duffield identifies the need for rulers to survive globalization as one of the reasons for state failure, arguing that these leaders create war and engage brutal but ‘innovative’ non-state political formations, deliberately dismantling state structure and superseding it in order to guarantee themselves the power of a state.

Despite disagreements on the cause of state collapse or violent conflict, many scholars seem to agree with the old adage “*a stitch in time saves nine*,” when referring to early warnings to conflict. Walker posits that “the earlier the efforts to mediate ethnic quarrels begin, the better are their chances for success.”⁴¹ In agreement, Mwaura and Schmeidl⁴², Ryan⁴³ and Richardson and Wang⁴⁴ argue that successful interventions occur before the breakout of violent conflict, when parties to a conflict are more willing to exercise their tolerance of each other whereas after escalation into violence, prospects of resolution make it more difficult. However, it is important to note this early in the study that forecasting conflicts is a complicated process that is shrouded

⁴⁰ Zartman, I. William, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse”, in Zartman, I. William, (eds.), 1995. op. cit.

⁴¹ Walker, J., op. cit., p168

⁴² Mwaura, Ciru and Schmeidl, Susanne (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2002

⁴³ Ryan, Stephen, “Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Prevention and Ethnic Conflict”, in Carment, D. and James P. (eds.), *Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995: p77

in controversy just as the interpretations of a brewing conflict differ from individual and from culture.

Whether violent conflict is caused by or is indeed the cause of state collapse is a question posed by Zartman who posits that “poor performances of [state’s] functions – representation, interest articulation, output efficiency – are broad causes of state collapse.”⁴⁵ He contends that state tyranny and incapacity both contribute to illegitimacy and the ultimate destruction of state infrastructure, thence begetting violence as soon as a power vacuum is created. In agreement with Zartman, Khadiagala⁴⁶ portrays state institutions as the central element in state collapse, using the example of Uganda to demonstrate that the militarization of politics is the root cause of the erosion and ultimate disintegration of the state. Reno⁴⁷ argues that it is indeed the attempts by weak states⁴⁸ rulers to manage external challenges and reconfigure politics by relying on repression, force and a narrow political base of trusted allies in order to maintain their positions, that results in warlordism. According to Dearth, state collapse is a three-step progression in which the institutions firstly fail to provide adequate services to the population, then their effectiveness is further eroded by ethnic, social and ideological competition, and finally poverty, overpopulation, rapid urbanization and environmental degradation overwhelm the weak state to the point of collapse.⁴⁸

In his study of Somalia under Siad Barre, Adam⁴⁹ delineates eight factors behind the collapse of the state namely, personal rule, military rule, ‘clan-katura’⁵⁰, clan rule, poisoning clan relations, urban state terror, neofascist campaigns against the north, and external military,

⁴⁴ Richardson, John and Wang, Jianxin, “Peace Accords: Seeking Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies” in Kingsley M. de Silva and S.W.R. deA. Samarasinghe, *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict*. London: Francis Pinter, 1993: p191

⁴⁵ Zartman, I. William, “Posing the Problem of State Collapse” in Zartman, I. William (eds.), 1995. op. cit. p6

⁴⁶ Khadiagala, Gilbert M., “State Collapse and Reconstruction in Uganda” in Zartman (eds.), 1995. op. cit. p33

⁴⁷ Reno, William, *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998

⁴⁸ The terms ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ states are references to the state’s capacities to perform the functions of governance, including internal and external security, provision of public goods, control over state agents, etc. and strong or weak states should not be confused with strong or weak rulers: <http://www.info.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb>

⁴⁸ Dearth, Douglas H., ‘Failed States: An International Conundrum’, *Defense Intelligence Journal*, 5, 1996, pp119-130

⁴⁹ Adam, Hussein M., *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?* in Zartman, (eds.), 1995. op. cit. pp72-75

⁵⁰ Placing trusted clansmen and other loyalists in positions of power, wealth, control/espionage

technical, and financial foreign assistance. Drysdale⁵¹ and Menkhaus⁵², in agreement, contend that the divisive politics employed by Siad in Somalia as well as personal rule and external support are the key factors behind state collapse in Somalia. Many contributors to the study of the African conflicts substitute 'ethnicity' for 'clan' in the description of the civil conflict in Somalia, arguing that ethnic conflict is a symptom, rather than a cause of state failure. This is in consideration of the fact that Somalia is one of the most homogenous states on the continent in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, and religion, yet it too has been devastated by inter-group warfare revolving around competing clans.

Lessons Learnt: Prospects for Reconciliation and Reconstruction

This study discusses the agreements reached between the Somali political leaders at various consultations held in Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya both individually and under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and their achievements and failures in assisting the Somali reconciliation process. The failure of the ill-fated UN (UNOSOM I & II) and US (UNITAF) humanitarian missions to Somalia that resulted in lack of political will by America and her western allies to intervene in Somalia are analyzed to come up with a way forward that builds on past mistakes. These mistakes are analyzed in detail and recommendations made on how to stimulate the participation of Western and Arab states in the Somali crisis despite the low expectation of success and their obvious lack of strategic interest in the failed state of Somalia, while exploring novel approaches for successfully dealing with the conflict.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In examining the Somali conflict, this study exploits the main conflict theories that have been employed in interpreting this ongoing conflict, evident from the policies and practices implemented by the UN, the world's governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

⁵¹ Drysdale, John, op. cit.

in response to it. The study considers the effects of the end of the Cold War and the new theories to explain contemporary wars that were no longer motivated by East-West ideological affiliations. Accordingly, this study shall employ in its arguments, different main and supporting theories including those offering explanations to protracted and intrastate wars, ethnocentrism, state failure and collapse, internationalization of internal conflict, the realism and idealism behind the increasing recourse to armed humanitarianism and the effects on international responses to the Somali situation.

HYPOTHESES

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
EAST AFRICANA COLLECTION

This study presents three hypotheses relevant to the management of the Somali conflict, including a null hypothesis that entails the exclusion of the Somali people in the management of the civil conflict:

1. *The management and ultimate resolution of the Somali conflict depends solely upon the popular participation of the Somali people with minimal but vital involvement of the international community.*
2. *The realization of a durable solution to the Somali conflict is hinged on the sole involvement of the Somali people without any interference or involvement whatsoever from the international community.*
3. *The exclusive participation of the international community without any involvement whatsoever of the Somali people is likely to beget peace in Somalia, as it will provide a new outlook to the conflict and provide innovative solutions.*

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This is an exploratory study whose scope considers international responses to the Somali conflict after the deposition of Barre to the expiry of the 3-year mandate of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in August 2003. The methods and instruments of research

⁵² Menkhaus, Kenneth., *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. op. cit

employed in the study will include qualitative and quantitative research to obtain primary data, while literature review will provide the much-needed secondary data.

Qualitative research through interviews, conducted by telephone or in face-to-face meetings, with Somali, national and international resource persons both individually and in focus-group sessions. The semi-structured interviews will be conducted with the help of an interview guide prepared beforehand, which will list a pre-determined set of questions or issues that are to be explored, not without the appropriate digressions. Both open-ended and closed questions will be employed so as not to limit the expression of the respondents' opinions and to facilitate an analysis of the popularity of certain responses. Generally, secondary sources, such as books, journals, newspapers, periodicals and magazines will be utilized in information gathering and these will essentially be works of knowledgeable persons, and staff from the UN, USAID, local and international universities and others not mentioned herein.

Quantitative research where questionnaires will solely be administered in obtaining supplementary information and opinions from various sources such as Somali refugees in Kenya, participants of the Somali national reconciliation conference as well as Somali and national scholars. The questionnaires will comprise both closed and open-ended questions requiring brief responses on various issues and aspects of the conflict as well as possible solutions to the protracted civil war. Given the time-consuming nature and prohibitive costs that are likely to be incurred in administering questionnaires and conducting interviews of representative samples of the Somali population, this study will keep the sample size to a minimum. Discussions will be through a focus group of at least five participants, and to supplement the data collected from these, a further five questionnaires will be administered to respondents who did not participate in the discussion groups. Approximately five respondents, drawn where possible from the general Somali populace resident in Kenya, the leadership of Somali interim governments, regional and international intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, mediators in the conflict among other resource persons, will be interviewed for their expert opinions.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study shall be laid out in six chapters thus:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter is generally an introduction containing the rationale for conducting to the study, the reading material examined in its compilation, the theories pursued and the sources of information in support of these.

Chapter 2: Civil War in Somalia

This chapter examines the background to the conflict, especially the triggers and the nature of this civil conflict that threatens to remain unresolved due to the continued discord among the key players in the conflict.

Chapter 3: Multilateral Intervention in Somalia

This chapter considers the UN-led missions and other regional processes attempting to resolve the Somali civil conflict through peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, incursions, various mediation conferences and negotiations. Essentially, it examines the efforts undertaken by the UN through the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), and the US-backed Unified Task Force (UNITAF), efforts by regional bodies including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – in pursuit of peace in the conflict-ridden Somalia. It considers the progress and achievements of each intervention, while critically examining the reasons for the failure or success of these multilateral and state-led interventions to manage the conflict. Despite the remarkable successes achieved through the involvement of nongovernmental and civil society

organizations, this project does not deal with this aspect of conflict management as it surpasses its scope.

Chapter 4: International Governments' Responses

This chapter examines the efforts undertaken by various international governments both in and outside Africa including Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, the United States of America, in pursuit of peace in the conflict-ridden Somalia.

Chapter 5: A Critical Appraisal of Intervention

This chapter examines successes and failures of external intervention and the reasons for their failure to bring factions together in reaching sustainable peaceful agreements to a ceasefire, disarmament and reconciliation, and ultimately reconstruction of the collapsed state. It scrutinizes the peace agreements reached at conferences facilitated by various international states and bodies and the action taken to sustain peace in Somalia. In addition, it explores how differently these international responses could have been carried out to achieve success in managing the protracted conflict, observing the lessons learnt that can be replicated or avoided in future interventions should these ever be necessary.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter attempts to give insights why the civil conflict has surpassed numerous efforts to resolve it peacefully, thus provoking international fatigue, and preventing the establishment of an effective government. It concludes the study with recommendations that can be made in future interventions into the Somali conflict, building on lessons learnt and past successes of interventions in Somalia and other states where such actions have yielded sustainable peace.

CHAPTER 2: CIVIL CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

BACKGROUND

The Somalis are a nation of peoples that share a common ethnic identity, language and religion but without a common Somali consciousness.⁵³ The Somalis belong to various clans and sub-clans with the largest clan confederations being the *Hawiye* in the central regions and parts of the Benadir farther south, the *Darod* in the eastern parts of the north and the central regions, the *Isaaq* who predominate in the northern regions, and the *Dir* in the extreme north and the south.⁵⁴ It is important to note this early in the study that the main protagonists in the Somali civil conflict were from the *Hawiye* clan whose sub-clans included *Habr Gedir*, *Abgal* and *Murusade*, and the *Darod* clan which is made up of the *Ogaden*, *Herti*, *Mareban*, *Majerteen*, *Dhulbahante* and *Warsangeli* subclans.⁵⁵

Somalia gained its independence in 1960, after a century of Italian and British colonization, and a democratically elected President Aden Abdullah Osman Daar assumed control of the United Republic of Somalia. In the 1967 elections for president, former premier Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beat Daar to become Somalia's second democratically elected president. Somalia's experience with democracy was short-lived as Somali strongman, Mohammad Siad Barre – widely held responsible for the failure of the Somali state – assumed presidency after the ouster and assassination of President Shermarke in a coup in October 1969. Barre established himself as a dictator and remained so for more than 20 years, a period during which he declared Somalia a socialist state and nationalized most of the country's modern resources.

⁵³ Africa Watch, *A Government at War with its Own People: Somalia Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North*. New York: Africa Watch, 1990. p20

⁵⁴ Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. p8

⁵⁵ Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia. New York: Routledge, 2004. p38

POLITICIZED ETHNICITY

“Clanism is the Somali version of the generic problem of ethnicity or tribalism: it represents primordial cleavages and cultural fragmentation within Somali society.”⁵⁶ President Siad Barre successfully exploited clan identity to divide and rule the Somali peoples and established his clan as the ethnic power in control of the state resources, in order to ensure his political survival. Indeed the Barre régime is blamed for fuelling the destructive clanism that has continually afflicted Somalia and continues to make the Somali conflict unpredictable and renders national reconciliation virtually unattainable. The Somali dictator also exploited the Cold War struggle for Africa to provoke border conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya in the pursuit of Pan-Somalism⁵⁷ as he tried to unify ethnic Kenyan and Ethiopian Somalis with their Somali compatriots in a ‘Greater Somalia.’ This pursuit culminated in a showdown with Ethiopia in 1978 over the Ogaden region that left Barre reeling from the effects for years to come. With continued support from the Soviet Union, Barre took advantage of political problems in Ethiopia after the ouster of Emperor Haile Selassie by a communist revolution, and thinking it a strategic moment waged war with the Ethiopians over the region in Ethiopia. Barre realized his miscalculation when the Soviets withheld their support and instead teamed up with the Cubans to rout Barre and his forces from Ethiopia, which at the time had just embraced Marxism.

Following the Ogaden humiliation, Barre ordered for the summary execution of his own military officers and soldiers, in Hargeisa after the army’s retreat, accusing them of having disobeyed orders.⁵⁸ As a result of the defeat, and an attempted coup-d’état by Colonel Mohamud Sheekh Osman and Colonel Abdillahi Yousuf Ahmed, followed by several attempted assassinations, Barre became suspicious of all others but his own people⁵⁹, whom he appointed

⁵⁶ Adam, Hussein M., “*Somalia: Problems and Prospects for Democratization*,” in Mengisteab, Kidane and Daddieh, Cyril (eds.) *State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999. p262

⁵⁷ Lewis, I. M., *Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism*. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1963), pp147-161

⁵⁸ Drysdale, op. cit., p135

⁵⁹ Barre relied mainly on three sub-clans of *Darod* clan viz. the *Marehan* (his father’s sub-clan), the *Ogadeen* (his mother’s sub-clan), and the *Dhulbahante*(his son-in-law’s sub-clan); this clan patronage was referred to as MOD

in key posts in the military and civil service.⁶⁰ Such was his paranoia that “by 1987, half the senior officer corps in the army were *Marehan* or related clans,”⁶¹ not realizing that it would be this exclusion and inequality that would cause the collapse of the Somali government.⁶²

STATE FAILURE

The Ogaden “defeat was so total that Barre feared Ethiopian units would cross into Somalia. Arms were anxiously distributed to civilians and refugees in the north. Those weapons in angry public hands would haunt Barre until his fall.”⁶³ This must have put Barre at great unease, and unsurprisingly “fearing loss of power, anticipating rebellious factions within Somalia, and with few options to strengthen his weakening political base, Siad began a protracted and savage war against his own people.”⁶⁴ In the May 1988 confrontation in Hargeisa and Burao between the Somali National Movement (SNM) and Barre’s army, Barre unleashed a brutal aerial assault and indiscriminately massacred civilians in the north⁶⁵ in punitive retribution. “The entire northern city of Hargeisa was leveled in a fruitless effort to rid the régime of an *Isaaq* clan-based rebel group. Somali Air Force jet fighters took off from the Hargeisa airport and then turned around to make repeated bombing runs on the city.”⁶⁶

With the face of Barre’s rule associated with his clan, and opposition to his power organized along clan lines,⁶⁷ it was now impossible to extricate clan from politics, and Barre’s actions in northern Somalia only resulted in an exponential increase in clan-based opposition movements dedicated to removing him from power. The most prominent was the *Manifesto Group*, a group of Mogadishu-based former politicians and civil servants – formed in 1981 in

⁶⁰ Drysdale, op. cit., p136

⁶¹ Lewis, I. M., *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. p256

⁶² Cullen, Michelle L., *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2000. p91

⁶³ Peterson, Scott, *Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa*. New York: Routledge, 2000. p13

⁶⁴ Adam, Hussein, Ford, Richard et al., *Removing Barricades in Somalia Options for Peace and Rehabilitation*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. p4

⁶⁵ Hirsch, John and Oakley, Robert., op. cit., p11

⁶⁶ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p14

London – that would later openly challenge the Barre régime. January 1989 saw the formation of the United Somali Congress (USC), a group primarily made up of *Hawiyes* who had left the armed forces to join the military wing led by General Mohamed Farah *'Aideed'*⁶⁸ who would later lead them to depose Barre. Later in the year, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an *Ogaden* armed guerrilla force under Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was constituted mainly of ex-soldiers.

Initially Barre had succeeded in playing off as a Soviet⁶⁷, then US ally acting as a bulwark against the pro-Soviet régime in Ethiopia but with the end of the Cold War when Somalia became less strategically important, US support dried up and the Barre régime grappled unaided with famine, thousands of refugees, illegitimacy and underdevelopment. Now that the “US [had been] granted new bases in the Persian Gulf countries, Somalia fell off the radar screen of US foreign policy,”⁶⁹ meaning that the limitless resources that she had enjoyed during the Cold War struggle for Africa were no more. With the freezing of aid by Western donors, Barre’s government was left to fend for itself, and this engendered the rapid withering of a central government, which had now been left virtually devoid of resources.⁷⁰ With a bloated bureaucracy and military, one of the largest in Africa, that he could no longer sustain, and the real value of civil service salaries having sunk due to runaway inflation, Barre encouraged his soldiers to loot and sell freely what they could steal.⁷¹ “Declining revenues, dismal real wages, low morale of civil servants, massive corruption, political violence, and poor management styles seriously eroded the capacity of public institutions. Government economic and social services collapsed.”⁷² With most ministries and government agencies deserted, the government failed as it could no longer provide for its constituents, who were now compelled to fall back on informal and clan systems for

⁶⁷ Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralv, *op. cit.*

⁶⁸ Bakonyi, Jutta and Stuvøy, Kirsti, “*Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola*” in *Review of African Political Economy* Nos.104/5, 2005, ROAPE Publications, p365

⁶⁹ From 1970 to 1978, the Barre régime received external military support from the East Bloc and from 1980 to 1989, the West Bloc provided this support

⁷⁰ Zunes, Stephen, *Somalia as a Military Target*. Foreign Policy in Focus, January 11, 2002 online at www.fpif.org

⁷¹ Menkhaus, K., “*Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping*” in *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07). p80

⁷² Englehart, Neil A., *op. cit.*, p139

⁷² Mubarak, Jamil Abdalla, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. p1

support and basic services including security. Fearing that the population's recourse to clan spelt doom for his tenure, Barre played the clan card yet again to encourage further divisions amongst clans and their sub-clans. He frustrated the formation of opposition coalitions by alternating his support in such a way that he armed one side inciting it to attack the other only for him to arm the victims and encourage them to retaliate.

By 1990, most parts of Somalia were experiencing civil war, the state had disintegrated and the economy had failed. "Almost all Somali army units disintegrated, and members joined their respective clan militia. The government's effective territorial control shrank to only the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu."⁷³ At that particular time it had been long apparent that the Barre government had lost its legitimacy, was incapable of maintaining law and political order or meeting its obligations to its constituents – all the basic ingredients of state failure and collapse. A desperate Barre became conciliatory and dismissed his government in January 1990, offering the posts to prominent opposition leaders who – hell-bent on ousting the despot – refused to be part of the proposed successor administration.⁷⁴ Barre determinedly persisted in his quest to appease the opposition, and in February 1990, a new government headed by Mohamed Ali Samater took office only to be replaced in September by Mohamed Hawadle Madar, a member of the *Isaaq* clan. Madar subsequently formed a new Council of Ministers and announced that a constitutional referendum and multi-party elections would take place within a year.⁷⁵

On 15 May 1990, the *Manifesto Group*, consisting of more than 100 prominent Somalis based in Mogadishu, issued a manifesto "seeking political reconciliation, a return to democracy, the restoration of *habeas corpus*, and the demobilization of Barre's terrorizing military police and its intelligence branch."⁷⁶ For their criticism of the Barre régime, 45 signatories of the manifesto were detained only to be released to quell riots that had broken out upon the commencement of

⁷³ Mubarak, Jamil Abdalla, op. cit., p15

⁷⁴ Taylor and Francis Group, *Europa World Year Book 2*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004 pp3822-3

⁷⁵ Lea, David, (eds.), *A Political Chronology of Africa*. London: Europa Publications, 2001. p404

⁷⁶ Drysdale, op. cit., p23

their trial, and after the intervention of the Italian Ambassador, Mario Sica. This did not dampen the determination of the opposition groups. The challenge to Barre's authority intensified, with increasing support for the USC in the south of Somalia, the SNM's and SPM's decision to form a united front against Barre,⁷⁷ and the emergence of Mohamed Farah Abdullah's Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) in the north. The odds were now highly stacked against the unrelenting despot.

In a last ditch attempt at pacifying the opposition, Barre resigned from his position as Secretary-General of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in accordance with provisions of a new constitution adopted in October 1990, which forbade the President from holding any other responsibilities other than those of the presidency.⁷⁸ Sadly, all his appeasements did not persuade the principal insurgent groups to relent. The fighting intensified in spite of the 25 December legislation that sanctioned the establishment of opposition parties.

SOMALIA'S COLLAPSE

In January 1991, a USC-led national rebellion forcibly ousted Barre, forcing him to flee *Villa Somalia* – the presidential mansion – and retreat to his home country in the Gedo region of Somalia from where he would plan his comeback. The USC forces took over whatever was left of the administrative apparatus, but instead of jubilation, the conflict intensified with the Aideed and Mahdi factions jostling for control of the state, consequently ensuring complete state collapse.⁷⁹ The deeply rooted *clanic* division and hatred drove on individualism and ad hoc leadership that was based on kinship, and this exacerbated the power struggle. Political power over most of Somalia therefore fell into the hands of feuding warlords who deployed their private armies in pursuit of power and recognition, even as hundreds of thousands of Somalis died of starvation in the famine. Somalia was now a state in turmoil! “A nation without a

⁷⁷ Lea, David, (eds.), op. cit., p404

⁷⁸ Donald F. Busky, *Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. p123

⁷⁹ Adam, Hussein M., “*Somalia: Problems and Prospects for Democratization*,” in Mengisteab, Kidane and Daddieh, Cyril

government or central security force, where a collection of armed clan militias fought over spoils, [] ravaged the land and systematically killed and displaced the civilian population.”⁸⁰

As a remedy to the precarious power vacuum created by Barre’s deposition, the *Manifesto Group* concurred with the arbitrary installation of prominent businessman Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim president by his clan. This had a long-term significance as it greatly incensed Somali strongman Aideed, the army commander behind the national rebellion that saw the ouster of Siad Barre. Aideed, having spent the late 1960s and early 1970s in prison for planning to overthrow Barre – who eventually freed him and made him ambassador to India, Sri Lanka and Singapore – and being the force behind the USC militia that ultimately deposed the dictator, saw himself as the suitable successor of the former dictator. The uncompromising stance taken by both leaders against relinquishing power or perceived control to their opponent created a volatile situation that imminently degenerated into a civil war. Mahdi’s self-declaration as interim president made worse the already precarious situation, unsurprisingly provoking the secession of the north in May 1991 to establish the Republic of Somaliland, under the presidency of Abd ar-Rahman Ali Tur.

The downward spiral was inevitable when the perpetrators of the civil war employed the *clanic-struggle* trump card so often pulled by Barre during his reign, begetting the failure and inevitable collapse of the state of Somalia, as various clan-based military factions battled for control and failed to install a functional central government. The warring parties made every effort to divide and rule the peoples of Somalia under different clan groupings, and with protracted fighting in the administrative capital, Mogadishu, and the promotion of secessionist agendas, it became increasingly difficult to install a national government. Indeed, Somalia has been without a central government since 1991 when the civil war broke out and she continues to be plagued by a war that has been escalated by various circumstances discussed further in this

(eds.) *State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999. p267

⁸⁰ Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Somalia: Overview*, 2007. UNHCR Refworld, online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ce42c.html>

study. In particular, the lack of interest and slow response by the international community to several early warning signs of the deterioration of the Somali situation, the failure to address the political dimension of the Somali crisis and effectively prevent state failure and collapse are examined in detail to unearth what really happened in Somalia.

Since the collapse of the state of Somalia, a lot has happened. The international community through the UN intervened in Somalia in three operations namely the United Nations Operations in Somalia I and II and the Unified Task Force executed from 1992 to 1995. The numerous peace conferences held by the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and other states to reconcile the warring factions and attempt to install an interim government, shall be discussed further in the proceeding chapters. The successes and failures of these interventions, conducted from 1991 to 2003, together with the reasons behind these outcomes shall be examined in subsequent chapters. With the withdrawal of the second UN operation in 1995, the warlords jostled for control of the countries remaining infrastructure, and the situation further deteriorated as looting, banditry and clan clashes intensified. Sadly, the Somalis had squandered “every opportunity and assistance to resolve their difference and start rebuilding their country [and] instead turned the other way, back toward violent struggle for personal, political and factional advantage.”⁸¹ In June 1995, Aideed proclaimed himself president of Somalia, and established a government even when he only controlled a fraction of the Mogadishu capital. Badly in need of international recognition, Aideed, who had fallen out with one of his former financial backer, Osman Atto, was forced to occupy Baidoa and later the Bay and Bakool regions.⁸²

In May 1996, Aideed was fatally wounded in a shootout with rival clansmen⁸³ and died later in August to be succeeded by his son, Hussein Mohamed ‘Aideed’, as the interim President of the Somali National Alliance (SNA.) In July 1998, Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former

⁸¹ Hirsch, John and Oakley, Robert., op. cit., p146

⁸² Marchal, Roland, “*Somalia: a Difficult Reconstruction*,” in *Action Against Hunger, The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001: Hunger and Power*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. p45

⁸³ Casper, Lawrence E., op. cit., p140

leader of the SSDF, announced the creation of Puntland, an autonomous entity in north-eastern Somalia, whose Charter precluded its secession from Somalia but instead supported the creation of a federal system based on similar units.⁸⁴ The region, inhabited mainly by the *Majerteens*, has remained relatively peaceful given the culture of its people who have retained their traditional structures, which have been instrumental in establishing the government based on the consent of the leaders of the clan and its subclans.⁸⁵

After many attempts at peace, most that had ended in failure, Abdulqassim Salad Hassan was inaugurated as President of Somalia on 28 August 2000, and returned to Mogadishu to discharge his mandate of rebuilding Somalia. President Hassan's election had been the product of the three-month 2,000-delegates peace summit organized and hosted by President Ismael Omar Guelleh of Djibouti in the town of Arta. However, it would not be smooth sailing for the newly-inaugurated President. With the support of Ethiopia, a group of southern factions going by the name Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), challenged the interim President's leadership, and announced its intention to form a rival national government within six months. The opposition that President Hassan experienced intensified particularly after his appointment of Ali Khalif Galaydh, the former Minister of Industry in Barre's government, to the post of Prime Minister.⁸⁶ There were attempts on the lives of President Hassan's government officials, and even the murder of Hasan Ahmed Elmi a member of the Transitional National Assembly.

In 2002, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) set up an autonomous regional administration, the State of Southwestern Somalia, over the Bay and Bakool regions along the lines of the Puntland.⁸⁷ Further ceasefire agreements were signed but as is expected of every protracted conflict, peace accords reached on the cessation of protracted violence are very fragile

⁸⁴ Lea, David, (eds.), *op. cit.*, p406

⁸⁵ Minahan, James, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World*. vol. 3. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. p1146

⁸⁶ Lea, David, (eds.), *op. cit.*, p406

and subject to breakdowns, as was evident in the Rabin-Arafat peace accord and those reached in Sri Lanka and the Philippines.⁸⁸ Further consultations were initiated including the Eldoret-Mbagathi peace process which culminated in the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as Somalia's fourteenth president on 01 October 2004 by the newly-established 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament. Even then, the Somalis were no farther than they had started with their first peace conference, and peace did not prevail.

⁸⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Nairobi, “*RRA Sets Up Autonomous Region*”, 1 April 2002, online at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=30936>

⁸⁸ Tiryakian, Edward A., “*Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts?*” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* Vol. 45 2004

CHAPTER 3: MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

Firstly, this chapter delves into reasons for the initial hesitance of the UN and the international community to intervene in the Somali conflict despite early warning signs. This lack of interest and slow response to the deterioration of the Somali situation, and the disregard of the political dimension of the Somali crisis – effectively resulting in state failure and collapse – are examined in detail to reveal the missed opportunities in Somalia. It considers this in the context of the complex post-Cold War era which “removed the moderating role of the superpowers, both as third parties and mutually neutralizing allies”⁸⁹ in intrastate conflicts.

Secondly, it considers the UN missions in Somalia after the outbreak of a civil war, carefully examining these missions under different leadership and the outcomes of each, the opportunities gained or lost and their influence on the course of the Somali conflict. It analyzes the initial attempts at resolving the conflict through conferences, the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the US-backed Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the second UN Operation (UNOSOM II.) It considers the progress and achievements of each intervention, while critically examining the reasons for the failure of these UN-led interventions to manage the conflict.

Thirdly, it examines the responses of different regional intergovernmental bodies, laying particular emphasis on the intervention of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to reveal the progress made by Somalia’s neighbors in managing the conflict in the failed state. It scrutinizes the peace agreements reached during conferences facilitated by different regional bodies and the actions taken to realize peace [or a degree of order] in Somalia.

THE RATIONALE FOR INACTION

The writing was on the wall! Somali was falling apart but the UN and the international community chose to ignore the early warning signs of the deterioration of the Somali situation.

⁸⁹ Deng, Francis M., et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings

Was it due from the assessment the international community shared with Samatar and other authors that for Somalis, fighting is their very nature?⁹⁰ Did the international community write off Somalia before giving her a chance?

During the Cold War era, there was a general aloofness to the internal Somali situation even as the disintegration of the state gradually escalated and reached its peak at the end of the 1980s when the state could no longer sustain itself. International governments and even the UN turned a blind eye to the human rights violations that had been ongoing for more than a decade since 1978 when Somalia lost the war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region following the Soviet Union's opportunistic decision to shift support to Ethiopia in November 1977.

In the genocide of 1988 in which the *Isaaq* clan was nearly obliterated, following the SNM's military offensive in the northwest region, the Barre régime got away with no international reproach. It was only upon US Ambassador Frank Crigler's June 1988 recommendation to freeze shipments of lethal weapons to Somalia, that Robert Gersony, a consultant and refugee expert, was hired by the US Department of State to tour the region and document the extent of the violence. Gersony reported on the disproportional response by the Somali Armed Forces⁹¹ during which "as many as 50,000 people lost their lives in this fighting, and an estimated 500,000 were driven from their homes."⁹²

This was the opportune moment for the international community, particularly the US and some Arab governments, to condemn the massacre, suspend its financial and military support, and call for a cessation of hostilities and reconciliation. But as it happened, the US had competing interests in Berbera, which made it ignore the unraveling situation. According to the Human Rights Watch, the Reagan and Bush administrations shored up the faltering Barre régime

Institution, 1996. p21

⁹⁰ Samatar, Said S., *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*. London: Minority Rights Group Report, 1991, p26

⁹¹ Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995. p27

⁹² United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, New York: UNDP, 1996 p11

through provision of military aid and direct budgetary assistance worth millions of US dollars.⁹³ It didn't help that other international governments continued to support Barre's régime through "foreign funding [that] allowed the government to be extremely opaque, promoting corruption and secretive policymaking."⁹⁴ Most certainly the international community failed to appreciate that the "massive amounts of small arms and weapons on hand as a legacy of Cold War politics in the region [would facilitate] the eruption of violent hostilities."⁹⁵

That Somalia had lost its strategic importance with the impending end of the Cold War period remains the primary rationale for the lack of international response to the happenings in Somalia in the late 1980s. Without support from the Cold War rivals, the government's effective territorial control shrank to only the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu.⁹⁶ By then there had been no doubt that the Barre government was on its knees, having lost its legitimacy and its capacity to maintain law and political order or meet its obligations to its constituents, and its collapse was an imminent reality. Yet "most of the rest of the world watched the violent endgame and the unraveling of Siad Barre's régime without forming even the beginnings of a coordinated strategy to promote a peaceful transition."⁹⁷

With the imprisonment of the *Manifesto group*, riots broke out in Mogadishu, compelling Barre to quickly reverse his decision and free the members of the group. Sadly, even as "Siad chose not to imprison them, neither did he enter into dialogue, and the last opportunity for peaceful transition passed."⁹⁸ The UN and the rest of the international community remained tight-lipped, with the US choosing instead to maintain its support for the Barre régime when it might have been more prudent to push for mediation. And the civil war raged in earnest. Following large-scale violence in Mogadishu and the declaration of a state of emergency by Barre

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1989 – Somalia, 1 January 1990*. online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467bb499c.html>

⁹⁴ Englehart, Neil A., *Governments against States: The Logic of Self-Destructive Despotism* in *International Political Science Review* 2007. California: Sage Publications p141

⁹⁵ Cullen, Michelle L., *op. cit.*, p91

⁹⁶ Mubarak, Jamil Abdalla, *op. cit.*, p15

⁹⁷ Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., *op. cit.*, p26

⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch, *The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. p111

in December 1990, the UN along with diplomatic missions and international organizations evacuated their international personnel leaving the remnants of the Somali state to its own fate! Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a handful of NGOs remained to provide emergency food relief and medical care.⁹⁹

Barre's ouster created a power vacuum that generated intense power struggles between the two USC factions headed by Aideed and Mahdi over the control of Somalia, hence provoking the intensification of the civil war in Somalia. While this happened, "no attempt was made by the United Nations to assist the parties to reconcile their differences"¹⁰⁰ and through its inaction, the international community missed yet another opportunity. It seemed that the early warning signs were insufficient to warrant any action by the UN, which declined to intervene without the consent of the warring parties arguing that to do so would be to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Somali state, all international principles that it was mandated to uphold. Never mind that UN had been mandated under its Charter to uphold the human rights of the Somali peoples! However, in its defence it can be argued that the international community had not anticipated that its failure to address the political dimension of the Somali crisis would effectively lead to the failure and eventual collapse of the Somali state.

It was finally on 27 December 1991 that Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary General, informed the Security Council that he agreed with the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) view that the Council's involvement would facilitate a peaceful settlement of the conflict.¹⁰¹ By then, the UN had had a quick turn-around as was obvious in their press release: "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."¹⁰² This together with de Cuellar's pro-intervention declaration that "the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be

⁹⁹ Menkhaus, Ken "U.S. Foreign Assistance Somalia: Phoenix from the Ashes?" Middle East Policy 5.1, 1997. pp138-139

¹⁰⁰ Drysdale, op. cit., p30

¹⁰¹ United Nations, op. cit., p113-4

¹⁰² United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991

regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity”¹⁰³ motioned the UN into action. However this “belated decision was made in the last days of de Cuellar’s reign and was seen as an attempt to add a final feather to his cap.”¹⁰⁴ Secretary General de Cuellar sent James Jonah, a Sierra Leonean diplomat who was then UN Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, to visit Somalia to explore ways of dealing with the crisis. Jonah’s mission to Somalia was however ridden with problems that have been associated with his incompetence in conflict management so much so that the action taken by the UN compounded the Somali situation in the end.¹⁰⁵ His recognition of Mahdi as the interim-President when the presidency was in question was certainly a big blunder that would have ripples throughout the UN’s future missions as it provoked implacable resistance from the chief protagonist, Aideed.

The UN continued to drag its feet when it came to dealing with the political aspects of the crisis and pressing for a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, on 01 January 1992, after a unanimous decision of the General Assembly, Boutros-Ghali took office as the new Secretary General, and things started to look up for Somalia. Through his influence, the UN finally intervened on 23 January 1992 to try to end the civil war and famine in Somalia, firstly adopting Resolution 733 (1992) imposing an arms embargo on Somalia.¹⁰⁶ In February 1992, the UN brokered a ceasefire between Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aideed, and on 03 March 1992 the ceasefire agreement was reached between the two factional leaders in a meeting with the OAU, the OIC and the LAS. However, the faction leaders failed to abide by their commitment to implement the ceasefire occasioning the adoption of Resolution 746 (1992) on 17 March, through which the Security Council gave Boutros-Ghali carte-blanche to intervene in Somalia using all the resources at his disposal to address the critical humanitarian needs of the Somali populace. In addition, the Security Council strongly supported the Secretary General’s decision

¹⁰³ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*. New York: United Nations, 1991. p12

¹⁰⁴ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p33

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p34

to dispatch a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the effective implementation of an arms embargo, and convene a national reconciliation conference of all Somali parties, movements and factions, in collaboration with the OAU, LAS and OIC.¹⁰⁷

THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM I)

On 24 April 1992, upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). By now, it had taken the UN more than a year after Barre's ouster "before the Security Council established the [] UNOSOM I to monitor the ceasefire and provide emergency humanitarian assistance."¹⁰⁸ Still nothing happened.

International governments were financially reluctant to commit resources to support the management of the Somali conflict, and it was not going to get easier when the Bush administration, on 24 April 1992, opposed the idea of sending 500 armed UN troops to Somalia at a cost of US\$ 20 million to the American public in an election year.¹⁰⁹ The donor fatigue compounded by the international community's distraction – the Balkan war – led to the abandonment of Somalia while a great famine intensified due to escalated fighting. Indeed it took Boutros-Ghali's public rebuke of the Security Council for its inaction in Somalia charging that "the Security Council was devoting too many resources to what he termed 'the rich man's war' in the remnants of Yugoslavia^δ and ignoring less visible conflicts in Africa such as in Somalia"¹¹⁰ for any notice to be taken. And it was only after the suffering brought about by the 1991 and 1992

¹⁰⁶ Lea, David, (eds.), op. cit., p405

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992*. New York: United Nations

¹⁰⁸ Laitin, David D., "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention" in Walter, Barbara and Snyder, Jack (eds.), *Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 p160

¹⁰⁹ Abdullahi, Mohamed D., *Culture and Customs of Somalia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. p43

^δ More than 15,000 UN peacekeepers were at the time deployed in Yugoslavia

¹¹⁰ Moeller, Susan D., *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease Famine War and Death*. New York: Routledge, 1999. p134

famine was televised on the international media, that the international community was shamed to action.¹¹¹

The Council asked the Secretary General to consult with all Somali parties with a view to convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity, in collaboration with the OAU, the LAS and the OIC. The Council also appealed to the international community to provide financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which was still far less than was required. On 28 April 1992, Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative to provide overall direction of UN's activities in Somalia, and on 01 May he left for the Somalia. After studying the situation on the ground, "Sahnoun indicated [] that the possession of large amounts of weapons by many varied factions posed the most serious threat to the security of food aid. He recommended a comprehensive UN response throughout the country, where problems varied by region."¹¹² This informed Boutros-Ghali's July Report to the Security Council in which he noted that "many of the most destitute are located in the interior of the country, not easily accessible from major ports. The mounting of an urgent airlift operation may be the only way to reach those areas and should be undertaken as soon as possible." In response to this, the Council passed Resolution 767, authorizing airlifting of food and relief supplies into the most urgently affected areas in Somalia. Using the precedent of Resolution 688, the Bush administration sent an observer force in July 1992 to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, which was hard-hit by drought, starvation, civil war and anarchy.¹¹³

From the outset, Sahnoun and his team pursued a strategy of attempting to make the clan system work for Somalia, based on the important role played by elders in pre-colonial society as advisors. He reckoned that the elders would be instrumental in identifying and promoting new leadership that could credibly substitute the faction leaders, and address the

¹¹¹ Ghalib, Mohammed Jama, *The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience*. New York: Lillian Barber Press, 1995

¹¹² Gorman, Robert F., *Great Debates at the United Nations: An Encyclopedia of Fifty Key Issues 1945-2000*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001. p340

anarchical situation that prevailed in Somalia.¹¹⁴ Another of Sahnoun's first tasks was to convince Aideed to support Resolution 751 (1992) which "authorized UNOSOM to immediately deploy 50 unarmed observers to monitor the ceasefire and allowed for the possibility of deploying up to 500 peacekeepers in future."¹¹⁵ Aideed had been incensed by the resolution, which seemed to favor Mahdi, seeing as it was Mahdi that had requested envoy Jonah for the presence of foreign troops in Mogadishu in his letter dated 25 March 1992, specifying that such forces should be from NATO-EEC countries, League of Arab States, OAU and OIC.¹¹⁶ Sadly, Aideed was to confirm his suspicion when a Russian plane with UN markings was used to deliver currency and military equipment to troops supporting Mahdi.¹¹⁷ This *faux pas* not only enraged Sahnoun but it also flew in the face of the UN's core principle of impartiality which it undermined absolutely thereby complicating its own mission goals.

Special Representative Sahnoun intensified his efforts to secure approval for the deployment of the five hundred peacekeepers that had been authorized,¹¹⁸ and managed to convince warring factions to reach an agreement with the UN mid-October 1992 to allow armed troops to guard the port and airport of Mogadishu and escort food convoys. At around the same time, he also convinced the factional and community elders to participate in a conference on national reconciliation. Recognizing the limitation of focusing too much on Mogadishu, the Special Representative pursued a decentralization strategy that would free the UN from being held hostage in the Mahdi-Aideed struggle. His proposal to have Somalia divided into four zones viz. Bossaso, Berbera, Kismayu, and Mogadishu, would have reduced dependency on the prevailing conditions in Mogadishu and promoted new regional leadership. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali disagreed, insisting that pockets of peace like Somaliland be treated as part of

¹¹³ Fleitz, Frederick H., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. p97

¹¹⁴ Sahnoun, Mohammed M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, pp25-40

¹¹⁵ Art, Robert J. and Cronin, Patrick M., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. US Institute of Peace Press, 2003. p25

¹¹⁶ United Nations, op. cit., pp144-5

¹¹⁷ Clarke, Walter, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia" in Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (eds.) op. cit., p7

Somalia, thereby single-handedly succeeding in undercutting an incremental, regional-based approach to conflict settlement.¹¹⁹

Sahnoun, a seasoned diplomat, preferred a gradual process to managing the Somali conflict, in harmony with traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, and believing that the civil society needed strengthening before the imposition of state structures.¹²⁰ Indeed, his patient approach was paying off as was evident when he persuaded Aideed to agree to the deployment of a 500-strong force to monitor food supply and distribution in Mogadishu and for similar forces in other parts of the country.¹²¹ Even though Aideed's agreement had come with a proviso that the security personnel would not have any peacekeeping responsibility, and that their number not be increased without his consent and that of his Alliance,¹²² there was some measure of success. Sadly, these successes were undermined every step of the way by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali whose approach was the antithesis of Sahnoun's, as he was playing to an audience that sought a quick fix to the Somali situation. This became apparent when the UN announced its decision to deploy a further 3,500 troops to Somalia without informing UNOSOM, leaders of neighboring countries and the Somali faction and community leaders, at a time when Sahnoun was still in delicate negotiations concerning the first 500.¹²³ Sahnoun's tenure continued to be ridden with hiccups instigated by the UN Secretariat.

On 28 October, Aideed declared that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion was no longer welcome in Mogadishu, when the Pakistani Commanding Officer Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen took over control of the Mogadishu International Airport from under Aideed's nose in a private arrangement with the *Hawadle* members of Aideed's USC faction. Aideed further

¹¹⁸ Art, Robert J. and Cronin, Patrick M., op. cit., p26

¹¹⁹ Bush, Kenneth D., "Somalia: When Two Anarchies Meet", Wirick, Gregory and Miller, Robert (eds.), *Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia and Somalia*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998. p96

¹²⁰ Adam, Hussein M., *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?* in Zartman, (eds.), 1995. op. cit. p83

¹²¹ Gorman, Robert F., op. cit., p340

¹²² Drysdale, op. cit., p52

⁶ The Alliance constituted the SNM, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)

¹²³ Hashi, Abdinur, *Weapons and Clan Politics in Somalia*. Mogadishu: Horn of Africa Printing Press, 1996 p68

“ordered the immediate expulsion of David Bassiouni, UNOSOM’s Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, on the grounds that his activities were counter to the interests of the Somali people and his security could no longer be guaranteed.”¹²⁴ Through such actions, the UN seemed determined to frustrate Sahnoun’s efforts, provoking his open criticism of the organization citing its inability to articulate and sustain any policy,¹²⁵ and his subsequent resignation in October 1992. According to Peterson, “his untimely departure was the final blow to UN credibility in Somalia,”¹²⁶ seeing as his astuteness in conflict management had allowed him to make significant headway and had earned him the confidence of the warlords.

On 08 November 1992, Ismat Kittani of Iraq replaced Sahnoun as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, at a time when calls to strengthen UNOSOM, which could no longer meet its mandate, had intensified. From the outset, “it was plain to all that Kittani was going to pursue a forceful policy, diametrically opposite to that of Sahnoun,”¹²⁷ whom he held in such contempt. Still reeling from the embarrassment of losing control of the airport to UNOSOM I troops, Aideed demanded renegotiation with the UN, only to be rebuffed by Kittani. Acting upon his threats, Aideed’s forces shelled and shot at UNOSOM I forces controlling the airport but finally relented after persuasion from the India’s Foreign Minister who was visiting Mogadishu. However, in an attention-seeking tantrum, Mahdi later threatened to shell any ships that would attempt to dock at the port. After coming under machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire, the Pakistani troops controlling the airport returned fire on 13 November, an act that sealed the mission’s demise. There ensued a spate of carjacking, looting of relief organizations’ convoys and warehouses, and detention of expatriate staff. With UNOSOM unable to protect humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, a catastrophic level of starvation

¹²⁴ United Nations, op. cit., p28

¹²⁵ Sahnoun, Mohammed M., *Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia in Mending Rips in the Sky*. p 306

¹²⁶ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p48

¹²⁷ Drysdale, op. cit., p74

loomed.¹²⁸ Though it was obvious that Kittani lacked diplomatic decorum and capabilities, it can also be argued in his defense that he was in the unenviable position of being caught between President Bush's desire to leave behind a legacy in conflict resolution, and Boutros-Ghali's desire to sample his novel concept of peace enforcement.¹²⁹

THE UN-APPROVED US-BACKED UNIFIED TASK FORCE (UNITAF)

On 20 November 1992, despite having previously declined to assist Somalia, the Bush administration announced its plans to send 30,000 US troops Somalia, under an American commander on a mission dubbed *Operation Restore Hope*. This change of heart provoked suspicions over the US' motive in intervening in the Somali crisis, with this sudden 'altruism' being construed as a ploy to gain political mileage back home rather than genuinely assist the Somali. However, this gesture was welcome at a time when it was obvious that UNOSOM I had failed, as spelt out in Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's letter dated 29 November 1992¹³⁰ in which he presented five options to be considered by the Security Council to address the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. His fourth option was a countrywide enforcement operation undertaken by UN Member states, with the US taking the lead in organizing and commanding it for a specific period during which it reported to the Security Council.¹³¹ Adopting Resolution 794, the Security Council agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendation to resort to the use of force under Chapter VII to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Through this resolution, the UN empowered its member states "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somali" after having demanded that all factions immediately cease hostilities.

¹²⁸ Steinbruner, John and Forrester, Jason, "Perspectives on Civil Violence: A Review of Current Thinking" in Lahneman, William J. (eds.), *Military Intervention Cases in Context for the Twenty-first Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. p13

¹²⁹ Patman, Robert G., *Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during UN Intervention in Africa Affairs*. 1997 pp509-511

¹³⁰ United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/24868. New York: United Nations

¹³¹ United Nations, op. cit., pp209-212

In December 1992, the United States won Security Council approval for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a large US-led peace enforcement operation whose mandate was to establish a secure environment to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid. “Led by former US Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley, the UN-approved [] UNITAF operation was designed to suppress the armed factions and to provide security for international aid agencies.”¹³² The role of Ambassador Oakley as the Special Envoy to President Bush was to coordinate the mission and manage the associated diplomacy, with the President clarifying that the operation be perceived strictly as a less-than-six-months humanitarian mission to save civilians from starvation.¹³³ This was definitely at odds with the Secretary General’s proposition in a press release dated 08 December 1992 in which he stated that UNITAF would “feed the starving, protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction.”¹³⁴ UNITAF – alias *Operation Restore Hope* – was essentially a military intervention that unlike UNOSOM I did not require the consent of local parties to carry out its mission. UNITAF was therefore authorized to disarm rogue clans that were perceived as a threat to security, although it was reluctant to disarm civilians on the streets only choosing to do so when they openly carried their weapons. Given that UNITAF was a heavily armed and well organized force that did not threaten the political balance in the country and was only deployed for a fixed period of time before it handed over to another force of the UN, the Somali warlords tolerated it.¹³⁵ Aideed welcomed UNITAF which he felt would forestall any idea by Boutros-Ghali to impose a UN trusteeship,¹³⁶ while Mahdi welcomed a counterweight to Aideed.¹³⁷ Whatever the reason, this was a good sign for the Americans, who had decided to proceed despite a confidential cable

¹³² Bazerman, Max H. and Watkins, Michael, *Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them*. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2004. p115

¹³³ Laitin, David D., “Intervention in Internal Conflict” in Lahneman, William J. (eds.), *Military Intervention Cases in Context for the Twenty-first Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. op. cit., p32

¹³⁴ United Nations, UN Press Release SG/SM/4874, 08 December 1992

¹³⁵ Fletz, Frederick H., op. cit., p131

¹³⁶ Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., op. cit., p39

¹³⁷ Durch, William J., “Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and ‘State-Building’ in Somalia” in Durch, William J. (eds.) *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. p320

from Ambassador Smith Hempstone to his State Department superiors warning them to think deeply before they got involved in Somalia.¹³⁸

With vast resources at his disposition, Oakley arranged for the deployment of UNITAF only six days after the authorizing resolution,¹³⁹ with the first units of UNITAF arriving in Somalia on 09 December under the command of Marine Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. They were later joined by the French Foreign Legion from Djibouti, and it was expected that large components from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would too. Indeed, during the course of the operation, it had “thirty eight thousand [38,000] soldiers from twenty one [21] nations, including twenty-eight thousand [28,000] Americans.”¹⁴⁰ With the arrival of the foreign troops under the direction of the US,

The respected US diplomat Robert Oakley soon recognized the importance of securing the consent of the warlords for the success of the mission,¹⁴¹ and laid the diplomatic groundwork for the US troops to arrive with no Somali resistance. His diplomatic competence contributed to the progress he made in the first few months, reconciling the warring USC factions in Mogadishu and as a consequence facilitating the erasure of the ‘green line’ dividing the city.¹⁴² However, his consultation with the two main protagonists – Aideed and Mahdi – led to criticism being leveled against him for giving too much legitimacy to the two at the expense of the other parties to the conflict.¹⁴³ Even with this notch on his belt, and weapons off the streets, things did not turn out as rosy as had been anticipated. Implementing agencies that had for long

¹³⁸ Hempstone, Smith, *Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir*. Sewanee, Tenn.: University of the South Press, 1997. pp214-231

¹³⁹ Steinbruner, John and Forrester, Jason, “*Perspectives on Civil Violence: A Review of Current Thinking*” in Lahneman, William J. (eds.), op. cit., p14

¹⁴⁰ Laitin, David D., “*Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention*” in Walter, Barbara and Snyder, Jack (eds.), op. cit., p161

¹⁴¹ Wheeler, Nicholas J., *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p189

¹⁴² Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, op. cit., p44

¹⁴³ As reported in *The Guardian*, 12 December 1992

operated safely in Somalia with security from heavily armed 'technical'¹⁴⁴ were now subjected to hijackings, extortion, theft and other crimes seeing as they were unarmed.¹⁴⁵

In February 1993, the Belgian UNITAF contingent in Kismayu did not react when forces of General Mohamed Sayed Hersi Morgan battled with those of Colonel Omar Jess¹⁴⁶ for three weeks ending up with Jess fleeing town; its refusal to intervene led to accusation of complicity with Morgan from Aideed's supporters in Mogadishu.¹⁴⁷ Prior to this attack, when it was apparent what Morgan had been planning, Aideed had implored Oakley to instruct UNITAF to repulse Morgan's forces to which Oakley had agreed only to withdraw from his commitment.¹⁴⁸ Given the outcome of the battle, this act did not endear Oakley. Matters were made worse when it was broadcast on the British Broadcasting (BBC) in Somali language that Morgan had taken the town with UNITAF's consent, and allegation that destroyed UNITAF's reputation as a neutral force.¹⁴⁹ The final nail on the coffin came when Oakley – who even though he had promoted the December 1992 pact that preserved all warlords' heavy weapons – likened his strategy to "plucking the bird. You take one feather at a time and the bird doesn't think there's anything terrible going on. Then one day he finds he can't fly. We did that from the beginning."¹⁵⁰ "Sadly when his remark was broadcast by BBC to the country in Somali language, it became increasingly difficult for Oakley, a respected diplomat, to mediate in the conflict.¹⁵¹ Thenceforward, the odds were stacked heavily against UNITAF, which no longer had the trust of an inconsolable Aideed.

As the situation deteriorated, the UN continued putting pressure on Washington to extend its responsibilities to disarming the warlords and laying the groundwork for a police

¹⁴⁴ Technicals were vehicles on which an automatic weapon had been mounted

¹⁴⁵ Drysdale, op. cit., p90

¹⁴⁶ Colonel Jess was a close ally of Aideed's and he held the town of Kismayo

¹⁴⁷ Sitkowski, Andrzej and Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. pp102-3

¹⁴⁸ Drysdale, op. cit., p108

¹⁴⁹ Hirsch, John and Oakley, Robert., op. cit., pp76-7

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Tom Cohen, "US 'Plucking the Bird' of Violence to Reduce Warlords' Power," Associated Press, 19 February 1993

¹⁵¹ Drysdale, op. cit., pp13 and 110; Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., op. cit., p47

force.¹⁵² This finally seemed to have paid off when the Clinton administration, having come into power on 20 January 1993, announced its plans to expand the mission into state building. President Clinton administration was even more idealist than President Bush's, and Clinton was eager to implement his foreign policy of 'assertive multilateralism' built on Bush's idealism and the New World Order.¹⁵³ Accordingly, on 17 February 1993, Clinton's Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Robert Houdek, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa of their plans to move "from the job of reestablishing a secure environment to get relief to the most needy to the challenge of consolidating security gains and promoting political reconciliation and rehabilitation."¹⁵⁴

THE UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM II)

With the Security Council having passed Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, the Clinton administration commenced its formal transition to a nation-building operation in Somalia. Although the resolution was ostensibly designed to shift responsibility for Somalia from the United States back to the United Nations – as President Bush had originally urged – the wording of the resolution was actually written by US political and military officials in Washington.¹⁵⁵ With an expanded peace enforcement mandate under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNOSOM II was to secure a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and assist in the reconstruction of economic, social and political life. Accordingly, its responsibilities included enforcement of "cease-fire and reconciliation, disarmament and creation

¹⁵² Lewis, Ioan and Mayall, James, "Somalia" in James Mayall (eds.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p112

¹⁵³ Burgess, Stephen F., *Operation Restore Hope: Somalia and the Frontiers of the New World Order* in Bose, Meena and Perotti, Rosanna (eds.), *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. p268

¹⁵⁴ Houdek, Robert, "Update on Progress in Somalia," Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., February 17, 1993, US Department of State, *Dispatch* 4, no. 8, February 22, 1993, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/F:RC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no08.html>

¹⁵⁵ Dempsey, Gary T. and Fontaine, Roger W., *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building*. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001. p32

of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue,”¹⁵⁶ in a Somalia-wide operation that would culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government.¹⁵⁷ The insistence that the Operation’s mandate cover the whole of Somalia was important seeing as the previous operation was only deployed in 40 percent of the Somali territory.¹⁵⁸

This second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was under the authority of Special Representative of Jonathan Howe (an American), while Turkish Lieutenant General Çevik Bir commanded the military contingent. General Bir’s deputy, Major General Thomas Montgomery, also an American, commanded a separate US quick reaction force (QRF) that was not under UN command.¹⁵⁹ Even though 23 nations contributed to UNOSOM II, the Operation’s decision makers were primarily from the US, or handpicked for their association with the US in organizations such as NATO, as was the case with Bir. For this reason, Boutros-Ghali’s first appointment of a Guinean as his new envoy was nullified as the Clinton administration insisted that an American hold the post.¹⁶⁰ To the Americans, it didn’t matter that Admiral Howe, a US retired navy general, had practically no experience in Somali politics or any civilian diplomacy at all,¹⁶¹ and it therefore seemed from the outset that the US was setting itself up for failure.

On 03 May, Kittani handed over an open *Pandora’s Box* to Howe who did not have at his disposal the quantity and quality of resources that Oakley had had, as dwindling financial, material and human resources from member states continued to fall short of what was required. To make matters worse, when Oakley had packed up, he took with him all the intelligence and experience gathered during his operation, and therefore “there was essentially no overlap with the incoming leadership and no effort to document and share lessons learned.”¹⁶² The Americans had abandoned their own operation, leading Oakley to chide the Administration for not actively

¹⁵⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992) (3 March 1993)*, S/25354 and Add.1 and 2. New York: United Nations

¹⁵⁷ SCR 897 (1994) 4 Feb 1994

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, *op. cit.*, pp252

¹⁵⁹ Dobbins, James, et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003. p59

¹⁶⁰ Peterson, Scott, *op. cit.*, p75

¹⁶¹ Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, *op. cit.*, p44

¹⁶² Bazerman, Max H. and Watkins, Michael, *op. cit.*, p116

participating in the Operation to ensure its success yet it was aware of the weaknesses of the UN. This lack of support together with UNOSOM II's expanded enforcement mandate contributed to the erosion of cooperation between UN forces and the Somali warlords¹⁶³ hence the ensuing deterioration of the Somali situation as the UN and US were continually perceived as the enemy.

On 05 June 1993, a contingent of Pakistani soldiers attempting to carry out an inspection of a weapons storage facility located on the premises of Radio Mogadishu controlled by militia loyal to Aideed, was ambushed and twenty-four soldiers were brutally massacred and fifty-six wounded.¹⁶⁴ The contingent, it was suspected, was under instruction to act upon a letter dated 31 May in which Mahdi and eleven faction leaders proposed that UNOSOM II take over Radio Mogadishu,¹⁶⁵ which had been vocal in its denouncement of UN operations in Somalia. The inspection had been given the go-ahead despite warnings to Montgomery and other senior officers by the Brigadier commanding the Pakistani contingent that the planned inspection of weapons at the site of Radio Mogadishu was politically sensitive and dangerous.¹⁶⁶ And he was right. These killings provoked the hasty, uninformed and uninvestigated reaction of the Security Council based solely on a draft resolution from the Pakistani envoy and Madeleine Albright, the US Ambassador to the UN, which named Aideed as responsible for the attacks and demanded his arrest.¹⁶⁷ On 06 June, the UN Security Council promptly passed Resolution 837 authorizing the "arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment" of "all those responsible for the armed attacks [READ Aideed]."¹⁶⁸ Admiral Howe, wasting no time, issued an arrest order for Aideed with a US\$ 25,000 bounty for his capture, thus unwittingly bestowing upon Aideed the reverence of a national hero who could take on the modern mantle of the *Mad Mullah*, the martyr who left a political legacy that still inspires Somalis.¹⁶⁹ Aideed's popularity grew. The US and UN

¹⁶³ Baum, Matthew A., "How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34.2 (2004)

¹⁶⁴ Casper, Lawrence E., *Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. p31

¹⁶⁵ Drysdale, op. cit., p178

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p179

¹⁶⁷ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p76

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, op. cit., pp267-8

¹⁶⁹ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p94

troops were now perceived not as peacekeepers but rather a warring party in an already complex conflict.

By counting on Aideed's clan and countrymen to turn him in, Howe had made the biggest miscalculation in the history of the UN/US interventions! Indeed this "revealed a gross misunderstanding of the clan support that kept Aideed safe everywhere in his south Mogadishu fiefdom."¹⁷⁰ Worse still, Howe persisted in true military style, shifting the mandate to a manhunt that saw the deaths of many innocent civilians caught in the spate of air bombings on Aideed's strongholds. On 12 July, armed with intelligence of Aideed's location, Howe ordered the bombing of a building belonging to one of Aideed's senior aides, where a political meeting was taking place at the time. Sadly, 54 people including the participants of the meeting, and innocent women and children were killed in the bombing, provoking the wrath of local residents who in turn killed 4 journalists covering the incident. "The initial welcome that had greeted the arrival of the international troops in Somalia the previous December had rapidly turned to disappointment and bitterness [and finally into an] explosive rage."¹⁷¹ The UN operation was now on a steep and slippery spiral slope.

Unsurprisingly, these increasing human rights violations by UN peacekeepers that resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians provoked the civilian population to turn against the UN.¹⁷² This reality was revealed on 03 October 1993 when US Rangers having received "information that two of Aideed's top lieutenants, Abdi Hassan Awale and Omar Salad Elmi, would be attending a gathering later that afternoon near the Olympic Hotel"¹⁷³ set out to hunt for them. The Rangers were engaged in a firefight when one of Aideed's commanders ordered his men to cordon all possible escape routes from the hotel, and a Blackhawk helicopter that was

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p94

¹⁷¹ Omaar, Rakiya and de Waal, Alex, "Somalia: Human Rights Abuse by the UN Forces" in Salih, M. A. Mohamed and Wohlgemuth, Lennart (eds.), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum*, 17-19 January 1994. Nordic Africa Institute, 1994. p124

¹⁷² Adebajo, Adekeye, "From Congo to Congo: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War" in Taylor, Ian and Williams, Paul (eds.), *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. p201

¹⁷³ Casper, Lawrence E., op. cit., p32

carrying three Special Forces snipers providing fire support was brought down by rocket-propelled grenade fire and another hit.¹⁷⁴ What followed was an orgy of violence over the next 36 hours which left over 500 Somalis and 18 American soldiers dead.¹⁷⁵

Following this humiliating incident, President Clinton announced on 07 October 1993 that the US troops would be withdrawn on 31 March 1994.¹⁷⁶ In order to minimize the casualties that UNOSOM II suffered, the arrest warrant that had been issued for Aideed was promptly reversed but the damage had already been done. With his tail between his legs, Ghali was quoted saying, “[t]here is no political will there to solve the problem. It is like an addict who does not want to be cured. How can we impose our will on them? We are there to keep the peace, we are there to help them but if they do not want to be helped...”¹⁷⁷ To state that the operations had been a failure would be an understatement, for the international community had suffered great losses and shame when it withdrew from Somalia unrewarded after its \$3-million-a-day long-drawn-out stint in the stateless nation.

Indeed on 31 March 1994, all US and other Western military contingents met the deadline for withdrawal from Somalia¹⁷⁸ and the country was once again left to its own devices. The warlords took advantage of this withdrawal and started competing to secure strategic resources like ports and the airport, leading to further deterioration of the situation in the country. With the expiry of the four-month extension of UNOSOM II’s mandate, the UN Security Council voted on 04 November 1994 to terminate its operations with effect from 31 March 1995, and on 02 March 1995, its remaining personnel departed.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ DeLong, Kent and Tuckey, Steven, *Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. pp6-18

¹⁷⁵ Fleitz, Frederick H., op. cit., p133

¹⁷⁶ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia*. New York: Routledge, 2004. p50

¹⁷⁷ Overseas Development Institute, *ODI Newsletter: Relief and Rehabilitation Network* (Number 2 September 1994) p5 online at <http://www.odihpn.org/documents/newsletter02.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ Lea, David, (eds.), op. cit., p404

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p405

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 in Ethiopia primarily to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States and act as a collective voice for the continent. The preamble to the OAU Charter of 1963 outlined a commitment by member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa but in the same breath contained a contradictory provision to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states.”¹⁸⁰ This inscription highly limited the organization’s effectiveness in the management and resolution of intrastate conflict hence its initial absence in Somalia. It was therefore befitting for it to be derided as a bureaucratic outfit with little power. For its reluctance to intervene in internal conflicts, the OAU was accused of being “more concerned to buttress the external authority of governments than to protect the rights of African peoples.”¹⁸¹ The fact that it struggled to enforce its decisions, and lacked armed forces only made intervention exceedingly difficult, resulting in its lack of response to the civil wars in Nigeria and Angola that continued unabated for years. The situation in Somalia was not any different as the OAU firstly lacked the will to intervene in a situation that it deemed went contrary to the aims of its establishment namely reducing the vulnerability of African states to external intervention.

Despite all these handicaps, the OAU played an instrumental role in convincing then UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to support its view that the Security Council’s involvement in seeking a solution to the Somali conflict would facilitate its peaceful settlement.¹⁸² Having noted the grave situation that was unraveling in Somalia, the OAU decided to proffer advice given that financial constraints hindered its first-hand intervention in the conflict. Fortunately, its view was shared by the UN Security Council, which set out to formulate plans to respond to the crisis, which had quickly escalated following the ouster of Barre’s régime.

¹⁸⁰ Organization of African Unity, *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*. Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963. p2

¹⁸¹ Welsh, Jennifer M., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p123

¹⁸² United Nations, *op. cit.*, p113-4

With the election of Salim Ahmed Salim, a respected statesman from Tanzania, the OAU experienced a revival in the early 1990s, partly due from his election as its Secretary General from 1989 to 2001. Indeed, it was under Salim's leadership that in 1992 the OAU established a new mechanism for conflict resolution and a peace fund to deal with a growing number of conflicts in Africa. This was done during its 1993 Session in Cairo, during which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the **Cairo Declaration** that gave "the organization the legal competence and legitimacy to intervene in internal conflicts falling within the jurisdiction of member states."¹⁸³ Accordingly, under article XIX of its Charter, the OAU thereafter established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution that would enable it to fulfill its peacemaking role,¹⁸⁴ and Ethiopia was nominated as the Chair of the Central Organ.

At its meeting in July 2001, the OAU announced its decision to transform to the African Union (AU) in 2002, a fete that came to pass during its launch from 08 to 10 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The newly revitalized regional body that was formally established in September 2001 at an Extraordinary Summit Meeting in Sirte, Libya, set out to adopt a new charter that would facilitate its work. Indeed, two new principles were added to the Charter of the African Union revised from the OAU Charter, namely Article 4(h) which allows the Union to intervene "in respect of grave crises namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" and Article 4(j) which gives the member states "the right to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and stability."¹⁸⁵

With its new resolve to intervene in intrastate conflicts and facilitate peace, the OAU together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) gave Ethiopia the mandate to pursue Somali reconciliation in 1997.¹⁸⁶ In addition, it teamed up with the Arab League to provide US\$ 200,000 for the Arta Process, and declared its support to Djibouti, which

¹⁸³ Draman, Rasheed, "Conflict Prevention in Africa: Establishing Conditions and Institutions Conducive to Durable Peace," in Carment, David and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.) *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* New York: United Nations University Press, 2003. p242

¹⁸⁴ Welsh, Jennifer M., op. cit., p129

¹⁸⁵ Welsh, Jennifer M., op. cit., p128

was mandated to lead the conference.¹⁸⁷ Further, the AU supported several initiatives through its representation at the peace talks, including Mbagathi in March 2003, where it signed a collaborative memorandum of understanding (MoU) with IGAD. Given IGAD's limited capacity, the MoU mandated the AU to monitor ceasefire agreements in Somalia, provided the monitors deployed to this mission were strictly from West and Southern Africa countries, which were remote to the conflict. In April 2003, the AU Commission met with a delegation of the Committee Monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities in Addis Ababa to draft a plan to monitor the ceasefire agreement signed during the Somali National Reconciliation Conference.¹⁸⁸ Thereafter, a Joint Technical Fact-finding Mission to Somalia was undertaken from 22 May to 02 June 2003, and this made its recommendations to the 92nd Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which essentially entailed the deployment of an AU Military Observer Mission in Somalia. In addition, the AU dispatched a Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia at the end of July, which established the need by the majority of Somali people for the deployment of an International Force.¹⁸⁹

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

The states bordering Somalia had no other option but to intervene in the civil conflict, which compromised peace and security in the sub-region, entire region and internationally through the refugee crisis, proliferation of small arms, establishment of terrorist havens, piracy on the Somali coastline, banditry, among other human rights and security breaches. The intervention action was undertaken under the auspices of the revitalized and expanded Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional membership body constituted of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Before the expansion of its

¹⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead* in the Africa Briefing N°45 Nairobi/Brussels, 26 January 2007

¹⁸⁷ Gamal Nkrumah, "Out of Arta" in the Al-Ahram Weekly Issue No. 496 (24 – 30 August 2000), Cairo: Al-Ahram online at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/496/in3.htm>

¹⁸⁸ Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Reconciliation Process in Somalia

mandate, IGAD existed as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) established in 1986 to coordinate member states' efforts in managing the region's drought-related problems. "Within this framework, security was viewed as the prerogative of individual states and therefore as falling outside the arena of collective action," leaving the Authority with no mechanism for common security.¹⁹⁰

This changed in the late 1990s following a consensus among member states to establish a regional mechanism for collective security. Accordingly, on 21 March 1996 at an extraordinary summit in Nairobi, IGADD was reconstituted as IGAD. With its newly-amended charter, IGAD began planning its intervention in regional conflicts in line with its newly expanded mandate that aimed to "promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue."¹⁹¹ The decision had been reached after the realization that following Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the international community was reluctant to get involved in Somalia for obvious reasons. IGAD quickly recognized its limits in terms of resources and expertise without the military might of the US or the capacity of the UN, and accordingly limited its intervention in the Somali conflict to mediation. In 1998, with support from the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), IGAD member states created the Standing Committee on Somalia under the chairmanship of Ethiopia to facilitate reconciliation and restoration of a national government in Somalia.¹⁹² This replication of the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda that had been set up to negotiate a peace settlement in Sudan, mandated Ethiopia to take the lead in facilitating peace in Somalia.

¹⁸⁹ Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstruction, Monday 1 December 2003 online at <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/CReports/IGADDec03/IGAD.htm>

¹⁹⁰ Juma, Monica Kathina, "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community" in Baregu, Mwesiga and Landsberg, Christopher (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. pp229-230

¹⁹¹ IGAD, *Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996

¹⁹² United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/1999/882 (16 August 1999)*. New York: United Nations. p2

The High-level Consultative Meeting of Somali Political Movements

IGAD's decision to intervene had come after numerous unsuccessful attempts – some of which are presented in the subsequent chapter – by various actors to peacefully resolve the Somali crisis. The Ethiopia-led IGAD-mandated *High-level Consultative Meeting of Somali Political Movements*, dubbed the **Sodere Initiative**, took place in the resort town of Sodere from 22 November 1996,¹⁹³ and brought together 26 Somali political factions following an earlier meeting in Addis Ababa.¹⁹⁴ Two key personalities, Hussein Aideed and Mohamed Egal, snubbed the meeting, with Aideed claiming that Ethiopia favored Mahdi's faction,¹⁹⁵ and with Egal offended by the reference to him as a Somali faction leader in disregard of his position as Somaliland's Head of State. The meeting sought to establish a transitional structure of governance, reopen the main seaport and airport, consolidate the two currencies in Mogadishu, as well as the joint administration of Mogadishu.¹⁹⁶

The Sodere Initiative saw the factions agree to the formation of a 41-member National Salvation Committee (NSC) which included an 11-member National Executive Committee (NEC), and a 5-member rotating Co-Chairmanship⁸ to act on the Council's behalf.¹⁹⁷ The NSC was mandated with drafting the transitional charter and organizing an all-inclusive National Reconciliation Conference that was scheduled to take place in Bosasso in early 1998 to approve the charter of a *Transitional Central Authority* or a *Provisional Central Government*.¹⁹⁸ The choice of Bosasso was based on the stability of the northeastern port city that was inhabited by the Darod clan, and this deliberate shift from Mogadishu and its warring Hawiye sub-clans evidently

¹⁹³ Ghebremeskel, Adane, "Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience" in the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution Vol. 4 #2: p25 (2002) online at www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_2gheb.pdf

¹⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia (17 February 1997)*, S/1997/135. New York: United Nations

¹⁹⁵ Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. p133

¹⁹⁶ Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, op. cit., p133

⁸ The 5-member joint chairmanship committee comprised Ali Mahdi (USC/SSA), Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (SSDF), Abdulkadir Mohamed Adan (Rahanwein-based SDM/SSA), Ali Ato (anti-Aideed USC/SNA faction) and General Adan Abdullahi Nur Gabeeyow (SNF-allied faction of the SPM.)

¹⁹⁷ United Nations Security Council, S/1997/135 op. cit., p6

emphasized the inclusion and input of all factions.¹⁹⁹ To ensure its success, the OAU provided the Initiative with financial, political and diplomatic support to implement the Sodere Agreement. Sadly, prior to the implementation of the Sodere accords, “Egypt invited many of the same faction leaders to Cairo, ostensibly to reconcile them with Aideed,”²⁰⁰ hence defeating the purposes and negating the achievements of this initiative. IGAD governments, particularly Ethiopia, criticized Egypt for its deliberate undermining of the Sodere Initiative with the intention of strengthening its position in the Horn of Africa nation. Several attempts to hold the National Reconciliation Conference in 1998 were unsuccessful despite continued statements of support and commitment by the warlords and the IGAD governments, with Mahdi attributing the delay to their resolve to allow Aideed’s participation in the process²⁰¹

Somali National Peace Conference

When Djibouti took over the chair of IGAD in 1999, President Ismail Omar Guelleh declared⁸ his intention to initiate the thirteenth attempt at reconciling the warring parties in a key National Peace Conference at Arta.²⁰² The initiative was endorsed by IGAD at their Summit in Djibouti on 26 November 1999, and from May to August 2000, Djibouti hosted the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) which came to be known as the Arta Process. The Arta Process was a departure from previous peace efforts in that it insisted upon the participation of representatives from the Somali civil society, not exclusively warlords as had become the norm. In addition, the main object of the Process was specifically to establish a national framework of

¹⁹⁸ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), *Somalia Bi-Monthly Information Report* (01 Dec 1996–15 Jan 1997) online at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64C63Z?OpenDocument&query=sodere>

¹⁹⁹ Dagne, Theodros and Smith, Amanda, “*Somalia: Prospects for Peace and US Involvement*” in Fitzgerald, Nina J., *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography*. Nova Publishers, 2002. p5

²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead* op. cit., p2

²⁰¹ Dagne, Theodros and Smith, Amanda, op. cit., p5

⁸ Djibouti made this declaration in 22 September 1999 during the fifty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly

²⁰² Feldman, Stacy and Slattery, Brian, *Living without a Government in Somalia: An Interview with Mark Bradbury: Development Processes in Somalia Exist not as a Result of Official Development Assistance, but in Spite of it*. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, 2003

governance, in contrast with previous process that had essentially focused their attention on power sharing arrangements among faction leaders according to clan hegemony.

During the conference, more than 2,500 participants including elders, traditional and religious leaders, politicians, warlords, peace activists, professionals, business people, scholars, women, minorities and youths met to facilitate the reestablishment of “the sovereign state of Somalia and initiate [] steps necessary to realize a democratic government and administration, under a framework which fairly with liberty and justice for all.”²⁰³ The success of the conference was of particular importance to Djibouti whose economy had been plunged into recession following the Horn of Africa crisis, hence President Guelleh’s personal involvement and Djibouti’s financial commitment running into millions of dollars to broker peace in Somalia. The Government of Djibouti went a step further to ensure that the invited participants would attend the reconciliation process by sending the President’s top advisor Osman Ahmed “to Mogadishu and some of the provincial capitals in Somalia to win over the warlords who initially refused to cooperate and send representatives to Djibouti.”²⁰⁴

President Guelleh pulled all stops through extensive consultations before the commencement of the conference, firstly with “state actors, including IGAD member states, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the UN.”²⁰⁵ Thereafter, he consulted with Somalis in a series of meetings, the first being with a group of 60 Somali intellectuals, professionals and seasoned former politicians, the second with elders, and finally with more than 200 traditional leaders and 100 women delegates.²⁰⁶ During the Seventh Summit of IGAD Assembly Heads of State and Government, he influenced the Assembly to adopt “the building block and the bottom-up approach in which the role of warlords is contained and that of Civil Society is enhanced” and reproach “the political tourism” carried out by Somali

²⁰³ Djibouti-Led IGAD Peace Process for Somalia: Peace Plan Somalia National Peace Conference. Djibouti, 20 April-5 May 2000 online at <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000406601.htm>

²⁰⁴ Gamal Nkrumah op. cit.

²⁰⁵ Juma, Monica Kathina, op. cit., p236

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p236

warlords.²⁰⁷ Sadly, the “vast majority of Somalia’s militia-factions [] refused to participate in the peace conference since they were denied any special status in the negotiations by comparison with clan elders, businessmen and civil society representatives,”²⁰⁸ and therefore stood to gain little if anything from the talks in terms of government positions.

The conference considered four main areas viz. arms control, disarmament of militia, looted property, and the status of Mogadishu, forming special committees to critically examine each issue. President Guelleh’s personal intervention was instrumental in the continuity of dialogue between the participants, and this earned him acclaim for his remarkable skills in mediation and diplomacy. In the end his efforts paid off with the formation on 13 August 2000 of a 245-member Transitional National Assembly that also included representatives of minority and women’s groups, and the election of Abdallah Deerow Isaak as speaker of the National Assembly.²⁰⁹ On 26 August 2000 the Transitional National Assembly elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, a member of the *Habar Gedir* sub-clan of the *Hawiye* clan and a former minister in Barre’s regime, as interim President of Somalia.²¹⁰ The Transitional National Government (TNG), formed with a three-year mandate that would expire in August 2003, moved to Mogadishu in August the same year and established a new Legislative Assembly and Cabinet. Unlike the Somaliland administration, the TNG gained international recognition in “the UN General Assembly, the Arab League and the African Union, thus giving Somalia formal representation in these bodies for the first time in a decade.”²¹¹

Initially, the TNG achieved some success in establishing government institutions in Mogadishu and even managed to restore some semblance of security to parts of the city but the worst was yet to come. Seeing as the newly-elected Hassan was a ‘Southerner’, it was expected

²⁰⁷ IGAD, *The Proceedings of the 7th Summit of IGAD Assembly Heads of State and Government*, Republic of Djibouti, 26 November 1999

²⁰⁸ Le Sage, Andre, *Stateless Justice in Somalia Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005. p25

²⁰⁹ Juma, Monica Kathina, op. cit., p237

²¹⁰ Bahcheli, Tozun, Bartmann, Barry and Srebrnik, Henry (eds.), *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty*. London: Routledge, 2004. p220

²¹¹ Feldman, Stacy and Slattery, Brian, op. cit.

that he would be well placed to mediate the *Habr Gedir*-dominated politics of Mogadishu but this was not to be. The TNG faced resistance both from the self-declared state of Somaliland and the regional administration in Puntland in the north and from faction leaders in the south, essentially all the parties that had refused to participate in or rejected the outcome of the Arta Process. Such was the extent of Somaliland's resistance to the outcome of the Arta Process, that Egal threatened to go to war if the self-declared State was forcefully subjected to the anarchy and chaos that characterized the rest of Somalia.²¹²

With little authority in Mogadishu let alone nationally,⁶ the TNG had no control over public order nor could it regulate illegal economic activities,²¹³ and the fact that ex-ministers of the Barre regime had been appointed in the interim government only succeeded in aggravating a number of groups. In particular, the President's appointment of Ali Khalif Galaydh, the former Minister of Industry in Barre's government, to the post of Prime Minister only succeeded in intensifying the opposition that the TNG faced.²¹⁴ Ethiopia took advantage of the situation and in 2001 established the SRRC, a coalition of faction leaders opposed to the TNG,²¹⁵ which she accused of having links with Islamist and terrorist groups. Seizing the opportunity in January 2002, the Kenyan Government attempted to bring together the TNG and the opposition factions but sadly this failed. The TNG continued undaunted, and even attempted to discharge its mandate by issuing a proclamation in January 2002 that prohibited Mogadishu residents from carrying weapons in the streets of the capital. This it further sought to enforce by authorizing the two-thousand strong police that it had deployed in Mogadishu to confiscate weapons in its quest to tackle rampant banditry and extortion.²¹⁶

²¹² Bahcheli, Tozun, Bartmann, Barry and Srebrnik, Henry (eds.), *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty*. London: Routledge, 2004. p220

⁶ An AU-IGAD fact-finding mission to Somalia in June 2003 found that the TNG had control over only four buildings in Mogadishu, while Hussein Aideed controlled less than 200 square metres of the capital city

²¹³ Abbink, Jon, De Bruijn, Mirjam and Van Walraven, Klaas (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Boston: Brill, 2003. p360

²¹⁴ Lea, David, (eds.), op. cit., p406

²¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, ICG Africa Report N°79, Nairobi/Brussels 4 May 2004. p2

²¹⁶ Cukier, Wendy and Sidel, Victor W., *The Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to AK-47s*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. p145

It became increasingly clear that the TNG had failed to achieve the objectives for which it had been established as it crumbled in its attempts to disarm the militia, enhance security in the Somali territory, facilitate reconciliation within Somalia or even attract significant international funding for reconstruction. In fact, if anything the existence of the TNG seemed to have aggravated the fragile Somali situation as fighting and insecurity intensified in Puntland, Mogadishu, and the Bay and Bakool region. To cap it all, there were several attempts on the lives of TNG officials, in one instance ending in the murder of Hassan Ahmed Elmi a member of the Transitional National Assembly. Worse still, it is during the TNG's term of office that the Bay and Bakool regions 'seceded', setting up the State of Southwestern Somalia, an autonomous regional administration along the lines of Puntland.²¹⁷ With all the mayhem, it is therefore unsurprising that the TNG sought the backing of the local Islamic movement whose armed militias used force similar to the warlords in attempts to restore a semblance of order in Mogadishu.²¹⁸ Two days before the term of the TNG's mandate expired on 13 August 2003, the interim President Hassan refused to relinquish power and instead chose to announce that his government would stay in power until free and fair national elections took place.²¹⁹

The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference

The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) was hosted by Kenya, which as then current chair of IGAD was responsible for leading the negotiations under Kenya's Special Envoy for Somalia Elijah Mwangale, with support from the Technical Committee comprised of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. The talks, which commenced in Eldoret on 15 October 2002⁶ raised hopes of resolving the conflict based on the fact that they included the participation of all militia leaders – therefore earning recognition as the most inclusive forum – and given the strong

²¹⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *op. cit.*

²¹⁸ Abbink, Jon, De Bruijn, Mirjam, and Walraven, Klaas Van (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Boston: Brill, 2003. p359

²¹⁹ Menkhaus, Kenneth., *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. *op. cit.*, p11

⁶ The talks were initially due to start in April 2002 but were repeatedly postponed

support from the international community for the peace process. So popular was the conference that even though only 350 Somali delegates had been originally invited, more than 800 turned up²²⁰ to participate in the initiative; sadly this would be a major source of the numerous challenges that the initiative would face. Indeed, the first few months were spent sifting through the delegates' list to determine the identity of the invited and the multitude of personalities that had simply shown up to represent their interested factions.²²¹ The divisions between Djibouti and Ethiopia only made the situation worse as both parties intently fronted their respective Somali proxies. Djibouti and the Arab League supported the TNG while Ethiopia supported the SRRC and opposed the TNG by virtue of the fact that they had support from Islamist groups.²²²

The object of the peace talks was to reconcile the TNG with its opponents, employing a three-phase framework that essentially entailed firstly recognizing key issues and signing of a cease-fire agreement, secondly resolving technical issues including constitutional structure, economic recovery and transitional justice, and thirdly power sharing. The easiest of the three phases was the first, which culminated in the signing of the *Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process* – aka **Eldoret Declaration** – on 27 October 2002 by all delegates who included the TNG, faction leaders and representatives of civil society. Despite the assurances made, the Declaration failed to guarantee the security of humanitarian and development personnel, and ceasefire violations were commonplace.

The second phase, which was to provide the “framework for the finalization of all the tasks related to the drafting of the Transitional Federal Charter for Somalia and the preparatory work for the launching of Phase III,”²²³ would prove immensely difficult. To facilitate dialogue, Ambassador Bethwel Kiplagat, a senior Kenyan diplomat was appointed Chair of the Conference in January, replacing Mwangale whom the Somali delegates had accused of being

²²⁰ IRIN, *Somalia: New Mediator Promises More Transparency at Peace Talks*, 23 January 2003 online at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=40981>

²²¹ African Union, 55th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(LV), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (17 June 2006)

²²² Taylor & Francis Group, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. London: Routledge, 2003. p997

dictatorial.²²⁴ Further allegations of corruption and mismanagement of funds had prompted the incoming Government to replace the chair and relocate the SNRC to Mbagathi, which being closer to Nairobi, cut the escalating costs^δ by approximately 50 percent.²²⁵ In order to resolve the problem of uninvited delegates, an approved list of delegates was prepared prior to the commencement of the second round of talks on 15 February 2003 employing the 4.5 clan formula to admit delegates.²²⁶

The work of the second phase was organized in six committees on Federalism and the Provisional Charter; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); Land and Property Rights; Economic Recovery, Institution Building and Resource Mobilization; Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation; and Regional and International Relations.²²⁷ The key committee on Federalism and the Provisional Charter was responsible for developing a draft national transitional Charter for the federal structure and therefore faced the most difficulties. In July 2003 when the plenary had accepted the resolutions of all the other 5 committees, Committee one was still at it. The issues in contention related to the autonomy of regions like Puntland and Somaliland, the size of the Parliament, the duration of the transitional period, the designation of the new Transitional Government, the role of clan and sub-clan leaders in the election of the Transitional Parliament, reference to federalism and the status of the three languages spoken in Somalia.²²⁸ With a lack of consensus on the controversial issues raised during its sitting, the committee produced two divergent drafts, one advocating for federalism and the other for centralism.

²²³ African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, Sixth Session (29 April 2004), Addis Ababa: Peace and Security Council. p1

²²⁴ News from Africa, *Horn of Africa Briefs*, January 15-February 14 2003 online at http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_546.html

^δ It is approximated that the daily costs of holding the conference had exceeded US\$ 80,000

²²⁵ International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p4

²²⁶ Terlinden, Ulf, *IGAD – Paper Tiger facing Gigantic Tasks*. Berlin, February 2004. p9

²²⁷ Schiee, Guenter, *Consultancy Report to the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Support of Committee 3 – Land and Property Rights* (IGAD). Halle/Germany: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 15 November 2003. pp3-4

²²⁸ African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, op. cit., p1

The IGAD Technical Committee, having consulted with Somali leaders, scheduled the formal adoption of the draft Federal Charter for mid-September 2003, a fait that was not to be when disagreements emerged among the Somali delegates despite previous perceived consensus. It was only in August that discussions on the merger of the two divergent drafts commenced, and by then it was too late given that quite a number of faction leaders had either withdrawn from the process or suspended their participation. Heightening tensions at the meeting was the resistance by the G-8 – a coalition of 8 southern Somalia faction leaders⁵ from the Hawiye clan that had strongly opposed the TNG – to proposals for political decentralization. Further suspicions emerged when it increasingly became apparent that Addis Ababa was particularly intent on forming an SRRC-dominated government that catered for *Darod* interests, especially those of the SRRC's most influential figure, Abdullahi Yusuf's *Majerteen* sub-clan.²²⁹

Given that many contentious issues were set aside rather than resolved, the process continued to tear at its seams. The President of the TNG, among other delegates, objected to the Charter and withdrew from the talks,⁶ leaving the process hanging in the balance. IGAD stepped up efforts to win over those who had rejected the Charter, and finally this paid off with the approval of the draft transitional charter on 15 September 2003.²³⁰ The decision was reached to name the Charter, the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, and the government that was to be formed would be referred to as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).²³¹ Despite repeated revisions of the Charter, some leaders particularly those who had withdrawn from the talks only to return, perhaps as spoilers, opposed the Plenary's approval by acclamation of a revised Charter on 15 September. With this, the process stalled due hence necessitating its amendment.

⁵ The G-8 leaders include Mohammed Qanyare Afrah (*Hawiye/Murasade*), Musa Sude (*Hawiye/Abgal*), Omar Finnish (*Hawiye/Abgal*), Osman Atto (*Hawiye/Haber Gedir*)

²²⁹ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead*, op. cit., p3

⁶ In August 2003, Djibouti withdrew after the TNG abandoned the process

²³⁰ International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p2

²³¹ United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), Political Developments in Somalia online at http://www.un-somalia.org/Political_Developments/index.asp

After a lot of behind-the-scenes bargaining, it was agreed that a select number of delegates would meet in-camera from 09 January 2004 to remedy this. The Somali Consultative Meetings took place from 09 to 29 January at the Safari Park Hotel on the outskirts of Nairobi, with 38 Somali leaders invited to harmonize various issues raised by the delegates. On 29 January 2004, eight⁸ of the 38 leaders present endorsed a revised transitional charter and signed the **Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates** – referred to as the **Safari Park Declaration**. In all, the TFG would have a five year term, while the 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament would be made up of a majority of men and 12 percent women. Some of the delegates returned to Somalia, threatening to convene a rival peace, while nearly half the leaders at the Mbagathi talks announced their intention to withdraw on 19 March 2004.²³² Preempting the impending failure of the peace process, IGAD threatened that all future absentees and dissenters would not to be considered ‘Somali Leaders’,²³³ but this was merely a slap on the wrist.

The third phase, which involved the formation of a new government only commenced on 05 March 2004 due to delays and postponements. This phase involved the formation of the transitional parliament and government, and successfully ended with the election of Abdullahi Yusuf, 01 October 2004, as Somalia’s fourteenth president by the newly-established 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament. However, this decision that attracted outrage from the outset, given Yusuf’s previous history as the president of Puntland. During his presidency, he had eliminated his political opposition, and at the end of his term refused to relinquish presidential powers, instead denouncing the selection of his successor, Jama Ali Jama, by the Congress of Elders in 2001.²³⁴ A year later, with support from Ethiopia, he ousted Jama from power. To further complicate the situation, the legitimacy of Yusuf’s election was called into question

⁸ Five of these leaders would later disown it or express their strong reservations to it. See ICG, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p1

²³² International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p2

²³³ Terlinden, Ulf, op. cit., p10

²³⁴ Rigol, Natalia, “*Clash of Clans: Challenges to Somali Government*,” in *Harvard International Review* 27.2 (2005): p7

Horn of Africa Standing Committee

The Horn of Africa Standing Committee, and Ethiopian-Eritrean initiative was among the first regional efforts that attempted to bring together all parties to the Somali conflict to workshop on their issues in mid-1991. However, due to a lack of support by the international community, the initiative of the Horn Committee failed.²³⁹ It did not help that the two initiators of the process were governments that had ascended to power through uncivil means, and therefore lend the process no credence. Undeterred by the lack of support, the initiative continued at sub-regional level, and from 31 May to 03 June 1992 it organized the first all-party meeting among Somali warring factions in the town of Bahir-Dar, Ethiopia. During this meeting, discussions centered on the humanitarian and political aspects of the Somali conflict, with the outcome being the signing by faction leaders of the *Bahir Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspect of the Problem in Somalia*, an agreement to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance and opening of all ports, airports, and roads.²⁴⁰ With the initiation of parallel initiatives by the UN and the US in preparation for the arrival of UNITAF, the effort of the Horn Committee was abandoned.

Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation

In preparation for the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia an Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation was held in Addis Ababa from 04 to 15 January 1993. The meeting was organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as an attempt to settle differences between the warring factions, who attended in two groupings namely the SNA Coalition, which consisted of Aideed's USC faction, SPM and SSNM, together with the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) which consisted of SSDF, Mahdi's USC faction, SDA, SAMO, SNDU, SNF, SPM, SNU, USF, USP and SDM. During the course of this meeting, the

²³⁹ Sahnoun, Mohamed, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, op. cit., pp9-10

²⁴⁰ Horn of Africa Standing Committee, "*The Bahr Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspect of the Problem in Somalia*," 1992, unpublished document quoted from Ghebremeskel, Adane, *Regional Approach to Conflict*

factions signed three agreements viz. the *General Agreement* reached on 08 January 1993, the *Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament* reached on 15 January, and the *Agreement on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee* reached on 15 January.

These ceasefire agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and disarmament, with the faction leaders agreeing to hand over all heavy weaponry to a ceasefire monitoring group until a legitimate Somali Government could take over.²⁴¹ In addition, it scheduled for the immediate commencement of the disarmament process that would last till March 1993, proposing the encampment outside major towns of all militias, whose upkeep it requested from the international community. The Ad Hoc Committee was set up to organize a conference on national reconciliation on 15 March, and continue discussions to resolve the question of criteria for participation and the agenda for the conference. Due to sporadic fighting the Committee could not meet in Addis Ababa on 22 January, and when it finally met on 23 February in Mogadishu, its sitting was interrupted by three days of rioting and fighting.²⁴² During this sitting, the Committee agreed on an agenda for the national conference and on disarmament as faction leaders furnished it with information on where they had stored weapons.

Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia

The Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was held from 15 to 27 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, with fifteen faction leaders participating to discuss the cessation of armed hostilities, economic reconstruction and the creation of a new political order.²⁴³ The faction leaders agreed on national reconciliation, security and disarmament, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes and on the creation of a

Management Revisited: The Somali Experience in the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Issue 4.2 Spring 2002, p24

²⁴¹ Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993) online at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/somalia/somalia_01081993_sun.html

²⁴² United Nations, "Somalia: 30,000-Strong UN Force Steps in to 'Restore Hope'," UN Chronicle June 1993

²⁴³ Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, op. cit., p133

Transitional National Council²⁴⁴ (TNC) to administer Somalia until elections could take place. On 27 March they signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on the same, and agreed to hold elections in Somalia in 1994²⁴⁵ but the Agreement could not have been more ill timed. On 26 March 1993, the Security Council reached the decision to transform UNITAF into UNOSOM II, an operation authorized under Chapter VII to use force to establish a secure environment in all of Somalia.²⁴⁶ Facing strong opposition from some of the warring factions, the Agreement collapsed and the UN packed up and left not too long afterward, following the attack on its personnel.²⁴⁷

Incursions and Military Support

It must be noted that the justifications for Ethiopia's interventions in Somalia have not always been as unambiguous as safeguarding international principles. Ethiopia is known to have supported the ouster of Barre by allowing Aideed into the country to train an armed rebel movement that would overthrow the despot, according to the wishes of Aideed's *Habr Gedir* clan. After Barre's ouster, the statelessness in Somalia, whose anarchy was a breeding ground for insecurity, now became a twisting barb in Ethiopia's flesh, prompting military intervention after the failure of various peace-seeking initiatives. In August 1996, following the death of Aideed, Ethiopia intervened militarily in the Gedo region bordering Kenya and Ethiopia when she felt compelled to counter the growth of *al-Ittihad al-Islamiya* (AIAT)⁸ and its terrorist activities by attacking its rear bases near Lugh.²⁴⁸ However, Ethiopia modified its engagement to a political one with the signing of the Sodere Accords in January 1997²⁴⁹ but later to a more overt military one after the Process was undermined by an Egyptian-mediated agreement between Aideed and other southern factions for the establishment of the Benadir Administration in December

²⁴⁴ Malanczuk, Peter, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*. London: Routledge, 1997. p404

²⁴⁵ The Addis Ababa Agreement on the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993

²⁴⁶ Malanczuk, Peter, op. cit., p404

²⁴⁷ Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, op. cit., p133

⁸ *al-Ittihad al-Islamiya* is an organization that is dedicated to creating a radical Islamic State in Somalia

²⁴⁸ WRITENET, *Somalia: Update to End August 1996*, 1 September 1996 online at

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6bf4.html>

²⁴⁹ Marchal, Roland, op. cit., p46

1997.²⁵⁰

In early 1999, following the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, Ethiopia's military engagement in Somalia intensified as the two warring states sought to gain military mileage through Somali proxies. In June, Ethiopia succeeded in routing out Aideed's SNA forces from Baidoa when the Eritrean-supported OLF moved to support the younger Aideed in his struggle against the RRA which was supported by the Ethiopian government.²⁵¹ Aware that their involvement clearly contravened international principles and the arms embargo on Somalia established by Resolution 733 (1992), both governments denied any involvement, and somehow managed to keep their forces hidden from international scrutiny, essentially the UN Security Council, the European Union, the OAU and the LAS.²⁵²

All through the Arta Process, Ethiopia silently resented the outcomes of the peace conference particularly the establishment of the TNG, which she openly opposed on the grounds that it had links with Islamists. At the time, she was engrossed in her war with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, and opted not to meddle in stateless Somalia until her own problems had been managed. However, this changed when the TNG President appointed former ministers in Barre's government to various posts including that of Prime Minister. Ethiopia's role became obvious in 2001 when she established the SRRC to oppose the TNG,²⁵³ and further provided military support to Puntland's ex-President Yusuf to expel his TNG-favored rival Jama Ali Jama from the region²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ Bradbury, Mark, *Somalia (November 1999)*, in the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Humanitarian Practice Network, ODI online at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1563>

²⁵¹ Schlee, Guenther, "Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference", in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Volume 73, Number 3, 2003

²⁵² Mark, Bradbury, *Somalia (November 1999)* in the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI online at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1563>

²⁵³ International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p2

Kenya

Kenya also had stakes in Somalia's peace, as her Government was anxious to resolve the burdensome problem of refugees from Somalia and to curb the inflow of illegal firearms, which were exacerbated by the state's porous border with Somalia.²⁵⁵ It had become imperative for Kenya and other African states to be involved in the peaceful resolution of the Somali conflict following the withdrawal of the UN and US from Somalia, and the international community's subsequent adoption of the policy seeking 'African solutions to African problems.' Kenya therefore took the lead both in her capacity as the Chair of IGAD, and as a concerned neighbor of Somalia, a territory that shared parentage with the Somali community in Kenya.

Under the leadership of President Daniel arap Moi, Kenya facilitated the negotiation of a ceasefire with the three main Somali warlords, Aideed, Mahdi and Atto, leading to the signing of an agreement,²⁵⁶ dubbed the **Nairobi Declaration**. The Declaration, signed on 24 March 1994, was the outcome of a meeting to get the Somali warlord to agree to the indefinite cessation of hostilities and long-term solution to the problems of Lower Juba.²⁵⁷ In addition, it called for a national reconciliation conference to be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister but sadly this was not to be as the Declaration collapsed shortly after. That the Declaration recommended that two meetings be held in Somalia to reconcile the warring parties, was used by Aideed as an excuse to stay away from the Sodere meeting.²⁵⁸ On 15 October 1996, Kenya again brought together the 3 main Somali warlords, Mahdi, Aideed and Atto, and successfully brokered the **Nairobi Understanding** aka the **Nairobi Peace Accord** in which all 3 combatants pledged to continue the dialogue towards peace. Despite the best efforts of General Mohamed Nur Galal, the mediator who had been

²⁵⁴ Terlinden, Ulf, op. cit., p9

²⁵⁵ Okumu, F. Wafula, "Human Rights in Transition Societies: The Cases of Somalia and South Africa" in Horowitz, Shale and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.), *Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses*. New York: United Nations University Press, 2004. p301

²⁵⁶ Schoiswohl, Michael, *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized de Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland': The Resurrection of Somaliland against All International 'Odds': State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition, and Human Rights*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004. p109

²⁵⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia submitted In Pursuance of Paragraph 14 of Resolution 897 (1994) S/1994/614*. New York: United Nations p2

identified to facilitate the implementation of the accord, Aideed refused to enter into dialogue with Atto or to accept his nominees.²⁵⁹

In January 2002, the IGAD's Ninth Summit in Khartoum mandated then Kenyan Government, to team up with the frontline states to hold a reconciliation conference on Somalia in Nairobi within two months.²⁶⁰ The Kenyan government pulled out no stops for this process, endeavoring to improve on previous processes that had been unsuccessful in getting the warring parties to reconcile and organize themselves politically. The Mbagathi and Eldoret peace conferences were the most inclusive of all the peace processes that had been held previously, given that they managed to attract all parties to conflict.⁸ Through seasoned Kenyan mediator, Ambassador Kiplagat, many strides were made towards peace despite the damage that had been done by the previous mediator who had been unsuccessful in winning the trust of the parties to the conflict.

However, without the commitment of the warring faction leaders, even a well thought-out process is likely to fail, and this was the case with the Kenyan-led process as the warlord repeatedly flouted the ceasefire agreement and hijacked the peace process – from the civil groups and traditional elders – through their Political Leaders' Committee. It didn't help that TNG President Abdiqassim, who remained in office term even after his term expired and ignored the expiration of the TNG's mandate, continually opposed outputs of the meeting and declared the agreements null and void. Egoism won the day as the warlords whose interests were not fully served refused to compromise, with several abandoning the Process and returning to Somalia all the while threatening to organize their own peace conference in Somalia.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia* op. cit., p6

²⁵⁹ United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), *Somalia Bi-Monthly Information Report* op. cit.

²⁶⁰ IGAD, *Proceedings of the 9th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, 10-11 January 2002, Khartoum

⁸ Even though the Republic of Somaliland did not participate in the peace conference, it cannot be termed as a party to the conflict given the relative peace that has dwelt in the self-declared territory since its secession.

Djibouti

The Government of Djibouti was among the first to react to the Somali crisis as the international community continued to turn a blind eye to the unraveling events in Somalia. In June 1991, with support from regional governments in the Horn of Africa but without any assistance from the UN or the OAU, President Hassan Gulaid Abtidoon of Djibouti convened a national reconciliation conference²⁶² for warring Somali factions (SSDF, SPM, USC and SDM) but Aideed declined to attend unless Mahdi retracted his claim to presidency. An invitation extended to the UN was snubbed by the multilateral organization, which at the time did not see a need to interfere in the affairs of the Horn state. This preparatory conference that was later dubbed **Djibouti I** took place from 15 to 21 July, with all factions – USC, SPM, SSDF, SDA, SDM and USF – bar SNM in attendance. It sought to find solutions to the lawlessness in Mogadishu, recognize Mahdi as interim president, and identify acceptable ways of removing Barre from Somalia.²⁶³ There were no agreements and the conference failed, and a further meeting had to be held if reconciliation was to be achieved.

The **Djibouti II** conference attracted the participation of Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany Italy, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Uganda, USA, USSR, Yemen, the Arab League, EC, IGADD, OAU and OIC. During this meeting, the faction leaders agreed on a ceasefire, and made five other important recommendations namely respecting the unity of Somalia, resurrecting the 1960 constitution, involving opposition groups in the formation of a government, establishing a 123-member legislature, and enacting regional autonomy.²⁶⁴ The discussions on other presidency and the premiership saw the USC suggest an *Issaq*, while SSDF and SPM strongly preferred a *Darod*,²⁶⁵ and following pressure from then Italian Ambassador,

²⁶¹ Terlinden, Ulf, *op. cit.*, p10

²⁶² Menkhous, Kenneth and Ortmayer, Lou, *Somalia: Misread Crises and Missed Opportunities* in Jentleson, Bruce (eds.) *Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, and Lessons to be Learned*. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1999. p229

²⁶³ Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p32

²⁶⁴ Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M., *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*. London: Haan Associates, 1994. p86

²⁶⁵ *Somalia: Still Fighting*, in *Africa Confidential* vol 32, N° 16 (9 August 1991), pp 6-7

Mario Sica who also preferred a *Darod*, Mahdi, as elected interim President of Somalia.²⁶⁶ Rightly so, this led many Somalis to perceive Djibouti II as an attempt by Italy to front its new allies in the Manifesto Group including Ali Mahdi.²⁶⁷

Further, as discussed previously, Djibouti hosted the **Arta Process** – discussed in *Chapter 3* – which culminated in the formation of the TNG and its associated National Assembly, and has been instrumental in seeking ways of achieving peace in Somalia.

Egypt

In September 1990, Egypt with the support of Italy called a national reconciliation roundtable in Cairo between Barre's regime, the SNM and USC. Despite calls from Egypt's Foreign Minister Boutros-Ghali, the factions refused to negotiate with the Barre regime perhaps out of their intransigent belief that the power was theirs to take, while Barre declined the invitation unless the USC met the conditions he had set.²⁶⁸ The talks did not take place and instead the SNM, Aideed's USC faction, and the SPM held a series of informal talks that concluded in September 1990 in Ethiopia with the signing of an agreement to form a military alliance.²⁶⁹ Through Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, Egypt was also indirectly involved in the quest to resolve the Somali conflict in the early 1990s with the initiation of the UN operations in Somalia.

Egypt had another go in May 1997, with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak facilitating the signing of yet another ceasefire agreement by Aideed and Mahdi on 29 May, following a similar meeting in Kenya.²⁷⁰ Pursuant to this meeting, the Egyptian government convened talks in November 1997 to reconcile Aideed with the faction leaders who had attended the Sodere

²⁶⁶ United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), op. cit.

²⁶⁷ Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., op. cit., p29

²⁶⁸ US Department of the Army, *Somalia: a Country Study (Area Handbook)*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress 1993 online at [http://kweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/querf/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+so0096\)](http://kweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/querf/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0096))

²⁶⁹ US Department of the Army, op. cit.,

²⁷⁰ Casper, Lawrence E., op. cit., p142

Process, despite the fact that the Sodere Process had not been concluded.²⁷¹ Aideed, who had declined his invitation to the Sodere Process, participated in the peace conference in Cairo together with representatives of 25 clans, boosting the confidence of the organizers on the likelihood of success. The meeting took place from 12 November to 22 December 1997, and was convened by Egypt with support from Libya and Yemen. For its efforts, Egypt was castigated for scuttling the Sodere Process based on the old Ethiopian-Egyptian rivalries. These rivalries have existed over the use of the headwaters of the River Nile²⁷² and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's support for the unification of all Somali peoples under a single flag,²⁷³ an ambition that Egypt is partial to given that a strong and unified Somalia unity would serve as a counterweight to Ethiopia.

As far as success could be claimed, the factions signed the **Cairo Accord** agreeing to establish a federal democratic system of governance and convene a National Reconciliation Conference in Baidoa to elect a Presidential Council, a Prime Minister and to adopt a Transitional Charter.²⁷⁴ However, it failed to establish a process for the identification of a national leader or to compel the Somali factions to disarm. Additionally, with the abstention of the Somaliland leadership coupled with the withdrawal of *Darod* leaders, Yusuf and Adan Abdullahi Nur Gabeeyow (SPM/SSA) in protest of the selection of Aideed-controlled Baidoa as the venue for the reconciliation conference and the inequitable^δ distribution of seats,²⁷⁵ the prospect of success was doubtful. The two warlords rejected the **Somali Declaration of Principles**, signed by the other warlords on 15 February 1998, for being biased in favor of the *Hawiye* clan affair given that the two major *Hawiye* warlords, Aideed and Mahdi, were the dominant players. The National Reconciliation Conference initially scheduled to take place in

²⁷¹ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead* op. cit., p2

²⁷² Dagne, Theodros and Smith, Amanda, op. cit., p6

²⁷³ International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead* op. cit., p2

²⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Cairo Declaration on Somalia, Annex to the Letter Dated 22 December 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/1000* at <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1997-1000.pdf>

^δ Out of the proposed 465 delegates to participate at the reconciliation conference, Aideed and Mahdi would get 80 seats each while the remainder would be subdivided among the remaining clans and sub-clans

February 1998 was postponed several times due to delegates' fear for their security in Baidoa, leading to the collapse of the peace process. In July of the same year, following the collapse of the Cairo Accord, the SSDF, announced the secession of northeastern Somalia, and the establishment of the *Majerteen-Darod* dominated Republic of Puntland.²⁷⁶

WESTERN AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS

Italy

Italy was the only European countries to stay by Somalia's side when all international organizations and diplomatic missions evacuated their international staff and suspended operations with the breakout of the civil war. The fact that Somalia had been under Italian Trusteeship, just before her independence, gave Italy the impetus to stay on in Somalia when all others evacuated their international staff and abandoned the Somalis at their greatest hour of need. Dating back to the days of the Colony and the Trusteeship, Italy had had a long standing relationship with and the biggest ally of the *Abgal* clan to which Mahdi, the prominent Somali businessman belonged, and this relationship would influence some important decisions by the European state.

When Barre arrested members of the *Manifesto Group*, Italy intervened as a conciliator, quietly negotiating on behalf of the 45 signatories of the manifesto for their release and quashing of their trial. Unlike the rest of the international community that had not understood the severity of the crisis, Italy had realized that the only way to save Somalia was to mediation between Barre and the emerging opposition, and called for a national reconciliation roundtable in Cairo. Sadly, the opposition, which was determined to oust Barre, declined Italy's offer for reconciliation, choosing to continue with their campaign. After Barre's deposition, Italy intervened again to restore formal rule and order in Somalia, following the escalation of the civil war as a result of

²⁷⁵ UK Immigration & Nationality Directorate (Home Office), *Somalia Assessment October 2001*. Country Information & Policy Unit online at <http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ppage.asp?section=193>

²⁷⁶ Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, op. cit., p133

the power struggles between senior Aideed and Mahdi. With no peaceful outcome in sight, Italy fell back on the *Abgal* clan that she had learned to trust over the years, and upon Ambassador Sica's urging Ali Mahdi arbitrarily declared himself President. This was regrettably the miscalculation of the century! Through this ill-advised action, Sica had single-handedly managed to encourage the failing state down a slippery slope of conflict from which it would never recover!

The Italian government continued its involvement in the Somali conflict, mainly providing troops to UN and US-led operations, funding and mediators for various peace processes including the IGAD-led Processes, the botched Cairo meeting among others discussed previously. In the UN and US-led operations, the Italians proved to be a thorn in the flesh of the operations' commanders as they refused to respect the UN command chain, preferring instead to seek guidance from their government seat in Rome. Even when the mission was to attack, the Italians defied UN orders and initiate negotiations with factional leaders, an approach that they felt had achieved results in the Italian sector,²⁷⁷ even though it went contrary to the mission objectives. This disregard for UN command can be argued to have emanated from the Italians disapproval of US dominance in these operations, yet it was Italy that deserved a more prominent role given its past colonial connections with Somalia.²⁷⁸

Subsequent to the **Nairobi Understanding** of October 1996, the Italian government facilitated mediation efforts between Mahdi and Aideed resulting in the **Mogadishu Agreement** in January 1997.²⁷⁹ In February and March 1997, the Italian Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Gusepe Cassini managed to organize two meetings to facilitate dialogue between Mahdi and Aideed on the reunification of Mogadishu and the reopening of the Mogadishu airport and port of the capital.²⁸⁰ From 19 to 20 January 1998, the Italian Government organized a meeting of the IGAD and its donor partners in Rome to garner support for peace in Somalia

²⁷⁷ Wheeler, Nicholas J., op. cit., 197

²⁷⁸ Bush, Kenneth D., op. cit., p100

²⁷⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Assistance for Humanitarian Relief and the Economic and Social Rehabilitation of Somalia*

Fifty-Second Session 27 October 1997 A/52/532 p9

and the development of a common policy framework on Somalia and Sudan. At the meeting were representatives from donor countries, the UN and the European Union but with no Somali representation.²⁸¹

United States of America

The US was the key player in the external interventions in the Somali conflict, arguably for non-altruistic reasons but definitely in response to pressure from her own constituents who had been moved by the media coverage on the dire humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa state. It has also been argued that the US-led intervention in Somalia lacked the humanitarian element for which it is perceived to have been fashioned for and instead was a preemptive strike to prevent the growth or ascendance to power of Islamist extremist groups in stateless Somalia.²⁸² Whatever the reason, the US involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s topped the support from other states and institutions, both militarily and financially, despite the individual at the helm of the presidency – Bush and Clinton. And in its rush to prove a point to the international community, the US government mounted operations in Somalia without recognizing the complexities of the crisis, which was not a humanitarian one but a political one engendered by the collapse of the state.²⁸³

The US involvement in the Somali crisis has been discussed in detail in *Chapter 3* under the UN and US-led operations, and further in *Chapter 5* which examines the successes and failures and the reasons behind these outcomes. After the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia on 31 March 1994, the US shied away from any direct intervention in Somalia and instead left the task of reconciliation to Somalia's neighbors. The most significant financial support has been the Clinton Administration's provision of US\$ 3.3 million to OAU peacekeeping operations and

²⁸⁰ United Nations Security Council, 3770th Meeting S/PV.3770 23 April 1997 New York: United Nations p2

²⁸¹ United Nations Coordination Unit: UNCT Somalia Monitor 17-25 Jan 1998 online at

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/dh900sid/ACOS-64D7G1?OpenDocument>

²⁸² Lefebvre, Jeffrey A., "The U.S. Military Intervention in Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?" Middle East Policy 2.1 (1993) p59

²⁸³ Lyons, Terrence, "The Political Lessons of Somalia," Brookings Review Spring, Vol. 12, 1994. p46

the signing of the African Conflict Resolution Act in 1994.²⁸⁴ Indeed, compared to the Sudanese process, American representation at the Somali talks was insignificant and prospects of enhanced engagement are negligible.²⁸⁵ Washington, reeling with humiliation from the Somalia debacle introduced into Congress legislation that unilaterally limited American financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in February 1995, this despite the fact that the US was in arrears and singly owed over 40 percent of the UN dues.²⁸⁶ When the US government finally decided to directly intervene in Somalia, it was to seek military redress for the deaths that had been suffered during the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The outcome was the defeat of the US and her ally Ethiopia in their war against the Islamists, leading to the US' heightened involvement in anti-terrorism activities in 2003 when she launched the \$100 million East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) that included training for border patrol, coastal security and police activity.²⁸⁷

Saudi Arabia

The Saudi government is said to have provided financial and other support for Manifesto Group and also played a key role in the enthronement of Mahdi after the ouster of Barre, with the intention of barring Aideed from ascending or staking a claim to the presidency. The reason behind this support was the friendly relations that the Saudi government had had with Barre, subsequently leading to frosty relations with Aideed by virtue of his opposition to Barre. For its ill-advised bias in favor of one warlord over another, its provision of support for convening the reconciliation conferences in Djibouti in June and July 1992 was one of the factors that led to the failure of these peace initiatives.

It is accepted that Saudi Arabia, being the religious seat of Islam, has immense authority on Muslims and Islamic nations world worldwide, and with no disrespect meant, the King Abdullah is considered the equivalent of the Pope in Islam. Being a religious heavyweight even

²⁸⁴ Ghebremeskel, Adane, op. cit., p12

²⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, op. cit., p13

²⁸⁶ Nossal, Kim Richard, "Without Regard to the Interests of Others: Canada and American Unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era", in *American Review of Canadian Studies* 27.2 (1997)

within Somalia, Saudi Arabia as the capital of the Muslim world, would have played a key role in the management and resolution of the Somali conflict but squandered this opportunity for reasons that cannot be established by the author. However, this was to change when the Saudi government was alleged to be funding Islamic groups in Somalia including the *al-ittihad*, who even though being of the *Wahabi* sect from Saudi Arabia differed from *Sufism*, which was Somalia's traditional sect of Islam.²⁸⁸

The Saudi government through its 18-month ban on livestock import from Somaliland and Puntland, which were both pockets of relative peace in Somalia, disrupted the progress that the two regions were making in strengthening the security situation and the demobilization of ex-combatants.²⁸⁹ The author speculates that the imposition of the ban, for which it was confirmed that no official document existed,²⁹⁰ was a political statement by the Saudis in support of a unified Somalia and a rejection of these existing pockets of peace. It was therefore crystal clear to the Somalis that with their own race [READ Muslims] against them, the odds were stacked heavily against the stateless polity.

According to a US State Department report prepared by David Shinn, Saudi Arabia was among the twelve countries that bankrolled the TNG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)²⁹¹ during the period following the expiry of the TNG's term. This was essentially in opposition of Ethiopia which at the time was supporting the SRRC, whose candidate at the time of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference was the 'heir apparent' and therefore the candidate most likely to form the new Somali government. In addition, the Saudi government is accused of allowing frequent visits by the head of the Somali Islamist opposition movement, Sheikh Hassan

²⁸⁷ Shinn, David, *Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn*. Foreign Service Journal, September 2004, p41

²⁸⁸ United States Senate, *Somalia: US Policy Options: Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session (6 February 2002). Washington: US Government Printing Office. p43

²⁸⁹ Partnership Africa Canada, *Peace and Development in Northern Somalia Opportunities and Challenges* online at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64CEDF?OpenDocument>

²⁹⁰ Food Security Analysis Unit – Somalia, *Focus on the Situation of Livestock in Somalia December 98* online at <http://www.fsasomali.org/fileadmin/uploads/ndf/606.pdf>

²⁹¹ Shinn, David, "Somalia: Regional Involvement and Implications for US Policy" Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 4 October

Dahir Aweys despite his appearance on the list²⁹² released pursuant of UN Security Council's Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999.²⁹³

Yemen

The Arab governments have been faulted for not taking a keen interest in the Somali conflict despite the fact that Somalia identified herself with the Arab nations through her affiliation with the Arab League. Yemen is one of the few that took any direct action to try and resolve the situation in Somalia. In May 1997, the Yemeni government brokered talks between Aideed and Atto, leading to their signing of an agreement in Sana'a, agreeing to work together to restore security and stability in Somalia. Later, Yemen stepped in to try to resolve the standoff between the President and his Premier on one side and the Speaker of the Parliament and his supporters on the other, over the location of the Seat of government in Jowhar or Mogadishu.

²⁹² United Nations, Press Release AFG/169 SC/7222, 26 November 2001, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Afghanistan Issues a New Consolidated List online at <http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/afg169.doc.htm>

²⁹³ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) on the Situation in Afghanistan*. New York: United Nations

CHAPTER 5: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF INTERVENTION

As early as 1990, NGOs were warning of a looming catastrophe in Somalia considering the violent manifestation of the conflict that had been festering during Barre's iron rule and disproportionate reaction to the opposition. However, the principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of sovereign states remained the primary deterrent of intervention in the Somali civil conflict that had afflicted many long before the ouster of Barre. It is undeniable that the delay in the UN's intervention "forfeited the opportunity to support the failing administrative structures and those Somalis trying to prevent the disintegration of the governmental system."²⁹⁴ Had the UN and the international community employed diplomatic means when it was clear that Somalia had begun to fail, Barre's departure would have been facilitated and the transition for succession smoothed to a new interim government. When Barre clearly tried to mend fences with the rising opposition, it was glaring that there lacked "a hegemonic bourgeoisie, capable of addressing issues on a national level and of cutting across clan lines"²⁹⁵ that could take over from Barre hence a vacuum was created. Without the much-needed support of the international community, Barre's frantic efforts to extend olive branches to the opposition were met with suspicion and therefore came to naught allowing the precarious situation to fester and escalate into a conflict.

It did not help that the UN was sluggish – or made no effort – to respond to the crises that the conflict presented particularly the power vacuum that appeared after Barre's ouster, possibly distracted by other events in the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia. Certainly, with Mahdi's self-declaration as the interim president of Somalia, it was obvious to all that the situation was critical, what with Aideed's refusal to recognize Mahdi as the new president. Even after Osman Hashim, the representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "alerted the UN Secretariat in New York to the gravity of the political situation he

²⁹⁴ Zacarias, Agostinho, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996. pp67-8
²⁹⁵ Hashim, Alice Bertis, *The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1997. p7

received no considered response.”²⁹⁶ Throughout the intervention, the UN, established to take “effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” through peaceful means viz. negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,²⁹⁷ had failed in its diplomacy which was best characterized as mediocre, inconsistent, and shortsighted.

Despite the longstanding activities of development agencies in Somalia, broader UN involvement did not begin until the appointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in January 1992.²⁹⁸ This appointment would however complicate the UN’s intervention in the Somali conflict as Aideed perceived the newly-appointed Secretary-General as an ally of Siad Barre²⁹⁹ whose aim it was to reinstate the ousted despot after establishing Somalia under UN trusteeship.³⁰⁰ The issue of trust meant that under no circumstances would Aideed readily comply with the UN under Boutros-Ghali, his perceived nemesis. Despite the realization that compliance could only be secured diplomatically from Aideed, Boutros-Ghali did nothing to remedy the situation but frustrated the efforts of those who did not ascribe to his accepted wisdom, as was the case with Sahnoun. These emotional responses to the unraveling Somali conflict by the top UN official were a deterrent to the success of the UN operations and were a contributing factor to clouding their mandates and rules of engagement. One such fatal and erroneous response by the UN and US was the singling out and going after Aideed as an enemy of the UN, an act that led to the subsequently glorification of the warlord as a heroic figure.³⁰¹ At this point, the mission goal was muddled as the UN and US pursued one warlord at the expense of discharging the operation’s mandate of facilitating political dialogue and rebuilding Somali institutions including establishing a civilian police force. This led to states (Italy) and non-state actors alike (OAU) to express their misgivings concerning

²⁹⁶ Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p36

²⁹⁷ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945

²⁹⁸ Bush, Kenneth D., *op. cit.*, p90

²⁹⁹ Adebajo, Adekeye, *op. cit.*, p264

³⁰⁰ Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralf, *op. cit.*

³⁰¹ Welsh, Jennifer M., *op. cit.*, pp133-4

UN military command, in particular the tactics and interpretation of the peacekeeping mandate.³⁰²

With Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's rush to intervene without understanding the conflict in Somalia, with the wrong motives, it was abundantly clear that the UN's ill-prepared missions were unlikely to succeed. In his ambition to outdo his predecessors and rejuvenate the UN in the post Cold War era to play a key role in the enforcement of internal peace and security,³⁰³ the UN bureaucracy erred by viewing Somalia as an anarchy driven by banditry rather than by clan struggle for political supremacy. The complex situation that existed in Somalia meant that the interventions would be conducted in a power vacuum, and this called for expert knowledge and profound understanding of Somalia, her people, politics, culture and traditions, justice structures, the necessary in-country intelligence. Therefore, the interveners should have possessed excellent knowledge on the real causes of the conflict, the parties to the conflict, and solid estimations of what the interventions entailed in terms of resources and time. Most importantly, the executors needed possess the necessary skills and competence to act appropriately, and speculate knowledgeably and intelligibly on what strategies were likely to work and which ones would exacerbate the already-delicate situation.

Numerous were the scenarios that the UN and the international community failed to interpret effectively. For starters, it was apparent that international policymakers did not understand the magnitude of self-destruction in Somalia, nor appreciate the importance of the clan system in the conflict. By disregarding the long-enduring traditional systems and structures and opting to deal directly with the warlords, they failed to appreciate warlordism as an economic system that supported leaders and their factions in sustained conflict. The influx of foreign humanitarian aid provided the militia with currency to hijack Somalia's future and enabled them

³⁰² Bush, Kenneth D., op. cit., p101

³⁰³ Thakur, Ramesh and Schnabel, Albrecht, "Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor" in Thakur, Ramesh, and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*. New York: United Nations University Press, 2001. p4

cling on to aspirations for power.³⁰⁴ The spoils of the conflict went towards recruiting new soldiers, enlisting the support of clan elders, gaining influence and recognition amongst the locals. That the warlords benefited from the continuation of conflict was not in question, and was precisely the reason for the warlords' scramble to secure positions and strategic infrastructural facilities such as ports and airports that would their increase prestige. Inevitably, these operations had succeeded in irreparably exaggerating the supremacy of the very warlords they had hoped to tame!³⁰⁵

The champions of intervention in the Somali conflict failed to appreciate the enormity of the task of assisting Somalis in the reconstruction of their country, and instead presumed that dealing with the humanitarian aspect of the conflict was the only imperative. The intervention was conducted in an anarchical environment that called for political solutions that intelligently mixed force and diplomacy, if the collapsed state was to be rebuilt. The cloudy rules of engagement stemmed from the lack of prior planning for the expanded operations that required expertise in Somali relations, coordination, neutrality, commitment of vast resources, patience if they were to succeed. These flaws were highlighted by UN officials including Sahnoun and Trevor Page³⁰⁶ who publicly censured the international body for delaying its responses to critical cues.³⁰⁷ The dismissal of Sahnoun and the appointments of Kittani who lacked the necessary skills to facilitate peace building, and Howe who had no experience in Somalia, showed a lack of commitment on the part of the UN and the US to the outcomes of their operations. In the end, the US quickly abandoned its nation-building experiment as soon as 18 US soldiers were killed and 76 wounded in Mogadishu, with Clinton announcing that it was not America's responsibility to rebuild Somalia.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁴ Bernhard, Helander, "Somalia: Aid Fuels the Conflict", in News from Nordic Africa Institute, No. 3, 1995

³⁰⁵ Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralv, op. cit.

³⁰⁶ Trevor was a World Food Program (WFP) official who during his interview with The New York Times expressed his dismay at the incompetence of the UN staff who failed to raise the alarm at the unraveling situation in Somalia

³⁰⁷ Peterson, Scott, op. cit., p45

³⁰⁸ Dempsey, Gary T., and Fontaine, Roger W., *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building*, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001. p7

These incapacities were also evident in the absence of provisions to follow through the operations' mandates. For instance, the operations failed to attend fully to disarmament by allowing the combatants to relocate their weapons instead to the countryside, and the ever-so-important demobilization aspect was not taken into account therefore making reintegration combatants impossible.³⁰⁹ In its pursuit of a quick fix, the UN had failed to strengthen the existing traditional support systems and structures that were widely respected by the Somalis and were therefore better equipped to manage the conflict through peace building after the UN's departure than were the warlords. The obvious implication of these failures was recourse to violence and degeneration into warlordism once the UN, US and international states had wound up their operations in Somalia. The setbacks the UN experienced in Somalia also emanated from a lack of coordination within its agencies, as well as between the policymakers in New York and their representatives in the field. The UN failed to realize that it was not an implementing agency and therefore needed to outsource its responsibilities to NGOs present in Somalia and the civil society, involving its agencies for coordination.

Another miscalculation was the expansion of the ambitious UNOSOM II without securing or appealing to UN member states to increase the number of troops or provide a higher quality of personnel for the force. How ill advised that UNOSOM II tried to restore order to Somalia, disarm Somalis, and rebuild the country's economy and political institutions without sufficient tools! How ill advised to allow the operation, which had much less military capability than UNITAF to attempt to subdue Aideed when it was abundantly clear that such a combat mission would have been better performed by US forces and at great risk!³¹⁰ The UN and the US were certainly not prepared to pay the price of nation building, and "within months the UN's first experiment in rebuilding failed states lay in ruins"³¹¹ due to what Weiss refers to as "no stomach for nation-building."³¹² In addition, the UN's assumption that Somalis would not attack

³⁰⁹ Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey, (eds.) *op. cit.*, pp242-4

³¹⁰ Wolfowitz, Paul D., "*Clinton's First Year*" *Foreign Affairs*, 73(1), 1994. January/February pp28-43

³¹¹ Wheeler, Nicholas J., *op. cit.*, p207

³¹² *ibid.*, p207

international troops deployed under the UN flag hence the decision to arm them lightly without the much-required tanks, armored cars and personnel carriers was a fatal miscalculation that made the mission suffer high casualties.³¹³

A serious shortcoming during the intervention was the failure to recognize that “force may be a useful adjunct to diplomacy but it cannot substitute for it”³¹⁴ hence the dreadful results from UNOSOM II’s constant resort to force. When peace enforcement replaced traditional peacekeeping, the right balance had to be maintained or the mission risked failure particularly if it abandoned the core elements of traditional peacekeeping missions namely “the peacekeepers’ neutral role in the conflict, non-use of force, and consent of the belligerent parties to outside involvement.”³¹⁵ For ignoring the importance of firstly exhausting diplomatic means before resorting to force, the UN and its allies suppressed conflict management wisdom on the ineffectiveness of force as an inducement on adversaries to yield the outcomes sought³¹⁶ and by so doing, they unwittingly assumed the role of an active party to the civil conflict. By conducting raids against Somali clans and attempting to arrest Aideed, the operation deeply antagonized the local population.³¹⁷ Thenceforward, it became deeply embroiled in the violence and ultimately proved ineffective in disarming the combatants and restoring regularized rules of relations among the militia leaders.³¹⁸ The UN downplayed the requirement that peacekeepers obtain and maintain the consent of local warring parties in Somalia, and as a result the warlords refused to cooperate and prevented UNOSOM I troops from leaving the vicinity of the Mogadishu Airport. This therefore meant that the operation could not discharge its mandate of delivering humanitarian aid and therefore relieving mass starvation in a country plagued by anarchy. In

³¹³ Fleitz, Frederick H., op. cit., p131

³¹⁴ Blechman, Barry M., Kaplan, Stephen S., Hall, David K., Quandt, William B., Slater, Jerome N., and Slusser, Robert M., *Force without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978. p225

³¹⁵ Thakur, Ramesh and Schnabel, Albrecht, “From an Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report: Towards a New Era of UN Peace Operations?” in Ramesh Thakur, and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds.), op. cit. p241

³¹⁶ Kriesberg, Louis, *Noncoercive Inducements in US-Soviet Conflicts: Ending the Occupation of Austria and Nuclear Weapons Tests*, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 9 Spring 1981, p. 13

³¹⁷ Fleitz, Frederick H., op. cit., p131

³¹⁸ Rothchild, Donald, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997. p271

addition, when the UN flouted the core element of impartiality and was perceived to be taking sides, it lost its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party and thereby succeeded in prejudicing its own security to which it now was compelled to divert its resources.³¹⁹

To say that UNOSOM II was management poorly would be understatement of the Century! The forces contributed by member nations worked at cross-purposes, and the commander faced considerable challenges trying to control the contingents, particularly the Italian contingent, which insisted on checking with their nation's capitals before accepting orders from the UN commanders, and sometimes implemented orders from their capitals in total disregard of the rules of engagement. One instance was the Italian contingent's decision to engage with Aideed and his forces when UNOSOM II was in hot pursuit of the warlord, who was held responsible for the deaths of tens of its personnel. It didn't help that there was considerable waste and corruption in UNOSOM II,³²⁰ a factor that provoked the US Ambassador Daniel Simpson to nickname it the "world cash cow."³²¹ The final blow came with the premature exit by international organizations and donors, which spelt irreparable doom for Somalia's reconstruction plans.³²² The international community had now abandoned Somalia to her own antics.

With the exit of the UN and its international partners, the regional bodies, whose houses were in disorder, were left to carry the burden of seeking reconciliation in Somalia, yet they lacked the financial capacity to undertake any sustained peace process. These institutions, including the OAU and IGAD were left at the mercy of international organizations and governments that, having suffered humiliation in Somalia, were unwilling or unable to convince their constituents to contribute further funding to this lost cause. Even when IGAD could institute some modicum of activity towards peace, it lacked peacekeeping force and was compelled to rely on the OAU and later the AU which had a world of problems of their own.

³¹⁹ Berdal, Mats. "Fateful Encounter: The US and UN Peacekeeping" *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994, p44

³²⁰ Fleitz, Frederick H., op. cit., p133

³²¹ Preston, Julia, "Waste in Somalia Typifies Failings of UN Management" *Washington Post*, January 3, 1995, pA11

Even with the best intentions, IGAD and the OAU could not obtain approval to intervene in Somalia given that their one of their core principles forbade interference in the internal affairs of member countries. That these institutions could only concentrate their efforts on conflict prevention was farcical, given that that window of opportunity had already been squandered and what was required in Somalia was conflict management responses.

Fortunately, both institutions recognized the structural weaknesses that had prevented them from intervening in civil conflicts in Africa and underwent reforms that would enable them peacefully resolve these intrastate conflicts that had increased with the end of the Cold War. Following the adoption of the Cairo Declaration in June 1993, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution to address issues of peace, security and stability and such other related subjects as governance and democracy.³²³ IGADD also underwent its transformation and was reconstituted as IGAD, with a newly-amended charter that mandated it to “promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-State conflicts through dialogue.”³²⁴ In addition, IGAD developed a sub-regional Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN’s functions included “collection, processing, and analyzing information; establishing networks of cooperation including memoranda of understanding with various other actors; and creating, managing, and disseminating databases of information on early warning.”³²⁵ Empowered by these new mandates, the two bodies were now authorized to intervene in the Somali and other African conflicts.

Even with the establishment of the necessary mechanisms and instruments, the AU and IGAD faltered in their interventions given that aside lacking funds, their biggest challenge was

³²² Rotberg, Robert I., “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in Rotberg, Robert (eds.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. p34

³²³ Makinda, Samuel M. and Okumu, F. Wafula, *The African Union Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance*. London: Routledge, 2008. p29

³²⁴ IGAD, *Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996

³²⁵ Juma, Monica Kathina, op. cit., p241

the fact that all IGAD member states but Kenya were either at war or at odds with each other as was the case with Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Sudan and Uganda. The situation was further complicated by the lack of coordination between the OAU and IGAD, leading to the proliferation of parallel and contradictory initiatives that undermined the central objective of accelerating the peace process in Somalia. In outright competition with each other, the regional states initiated talks with warring parties when it was clear that other initiatives were ongoing or their outputs were in the process of being implemented. Understanding the reasons behind these unilateral attempts gives a good outlook on regional prerequisites to the resolution of the Somali conflict. The competitive Ethiopian-Egyptian relationship over regional hegemony is worth mentioning as it has played a key role in the sabotage of otherwise good reconciliation processes, which given a chance would have yielded better results. The competitive nature of their relations has ensured that cooperation was lacking when it came to the implementation of the outputs of successfully concluded peace processes, as was the case with Ethiopia's opposition to the TNG, and most often than not it has resulted in the proposal of new reconciliation conferences by the competing party.³²⁶

Currently, Somali society can be said to be at the bottom of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs and this explains the current motivation for widespread non-conventional behavior such as banditry, warlordism, extortion, piracy among others. It is high time that the international community recognized that the next rang in this hierarchy will only be accessed after the Somalis meet this most basic need. Therefore any expectations for Somali commitment to a state structure, which essentially embodies the third rang of belongingness, are farcical to say the least! For this reason, the transitional authorities that have been developed in the IGAD and other state-led peace processes have been powerless and succeeded at none of the goals that they set out to achieve. Of all the peace conferences, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia held in March 1993 in Addis Ababa had the best chance of success, given that instead of imposing a transitional government structure that the Somalis were not prepared for, it created a

³²⁶ Marchal, Roland, *op. cit.*, p46

Council to administer Somalia until such a time as the Somalis were prepared to hold elections. Had the UN supported the follow-through of the agreements reached at this conference instead of rushing off to enforce peace through UNOSOM II, we can only speculate that the situation in Somalia might have been different today.

The quality of the mediation was at times questionable, as was the case with Kenya's Special Envoy Mwangale who had no experience in conflict management, and this was the reason for the failure of the process. Regrettably, due to this ineptitude, the Kenyan mediators were overwhelmed when the discussions on identified technical issues turned into arguments, and instead of facilitating discussion resignedly directed delegates to reach consensus on their own. By the time of the entry of career diplomat, Ambassador Kiplagat, the damage had already been done and the Somalis had lost confidence in the process, which they had termed as rigid under Mwangale. Further, what didn't help was the fact that the delegates had only felt compelled to attend the talks as a face-saving attention-grabbing tactic to hoodwink the international community of their charlatantry.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The civil conflict in Somalia has surpassed numerous efforts to resolve it peacefully, thus provoking international fatigue, and preventing the establishment of an effective government, and leaving the territory open to exploitation. Policymakers now need to refresh their philosophies and adopt novel approaches of managing this complex conflict whose protracted nature has ensured that its peaceful resolution is highly unlikely in our lifetime. From the past initiatives, we need to learn from the failures and accept some painful truths that are indeed inconvenient to the international community, particularly the issue of statehood and the role of Islam as a connector of the Somali peoples.

RECAPITULATION

The reason for the failure of the numerous accords and agreements reached has been firstly for their dependence on the cooperation of the numerous warlords, even when it was not for the warlords to accord such cooperation given that they only controlled small fractions of territory, particularly for those based in the Mogadishu area. Secondly, by disregarding all parties to the conflict and instead concentrating their efforts in the Mogadishu area, they had succeeded in rubbishing a regional approach to conflict management, and unwittingly led to the secession of neglected parcels of Somalia. Thirdly, by missing and misreading opportunities presented by the Somali crisis, international mediators have inappropriately proposed solutions that were ineffectual within the context of the protracted conflict and the historical complexities of stateless territory. Fourthly, the international community's commitment to the conclusive resolution of the Somali conflict has been wanting, with its preference for quick fixes that required minimal resources.

Fifthly, the use of conflict management and resolution tools has been ineffective, leading to a disregard of discreet and tactful diplomatic pressure by the international community on the different warring factions and the warlords. Sixthly, the fact that the differentiation between

peacekeeping, which seeks to build barriers between the warriors, and peacebuilding whose primary goal is to build bridges between the ordinary people,³²⁷ and peace enforcement and peacemaking were terribly blurred only ensured the failure of the missions. Seventhly, the operations mounted by the UN and the US lacked rules of engagement and therefore failed to clarify the responsibilities of the international 'peacekeepers' in Somalia or indicate the chain of command and the role of individual states,³²⁸ leading to incidences where the different contingents based their actions on their national perception of the aim of the mission.

Eighthly, the existing competition among the interveners meant that the party not initiating a reconciliation process snubbed the outcomes reached by the competition and instead of cooperating to build peace in Somalia, commenced a succeeding process that they believed would earn them international glory. Ninthly, the lack of coordination among different actors spelt doom for the success of the mounted operations, particularly the UN, which not being an implementing agency, should have delegated to the existing NGOs and the civil society the implementation of necessary state building activities that fell within its mandate. Tenthly, the international community failed to condemn the intervention of warring states, in this case Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Somali conflict yet the only accomplishment of their involvement was the fronting of proxies to fuel the civil war. Further, the Somali conflict is one in which the stakes are high given that officials of transitional governments will always be fearful of power-sharing; Ethiopia will be unwilling to cooperate with any government that doesn't serve her interests; while the warlords and businesspeople will always be fearful that a unified government will marginalize, regulate, prosecute and deny them of their war livelihood.³²⁹ Brutally put, peace is not in the interests of the parties in the Somali conflict and any imposition from the international community is unlikely to be successful unless the Somali people's popularly and desperately appeal for any such initiative. The international community's lack of understanding of the dynamic nature of the Somali conflict has been to blame for these failures and scholars

³²⁷ Ryan, Stephen, (1990) op. cit., p61

³²⁸ Hill, Christopher, *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. New York: Routledge, 1996. p99

need to pan out their viewing lenses in order to capture some of the things that they have missed in their diagnoses and prognoses.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Conflict Management and Resolution

The Somali reconciliation initiatives have not been successful for various reasons including the fact that they have been instituted at a time when the Somali peoples were not prepared for reconciliation. Situations where the conflict has been judged to have achieved a hurting stalemate have more often than not been misread, hence leading to the employment of inappropriate conflict management and resolution tools at the wrong time. It must be recognized that attaining a hurting stalemate is inconceivable, given the fact that despite Somalia's homogeneity there has never existed a collective Somali consciousness in the history of the nation. This has stemmed from the individualism of the Somali nomadic pastoralist whose lifestyle is one of survival, and is best described in the traditional Somali aphorism, "me and my clan against the others, me and my family against the clan, me and my brother against the family and me against my brother."³³⁰

In addition, the Somali conflict has been by nature, a protracted conflict which has involved hostile interactions over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of unpredictable violence, and as defined by Azar, the conflict is not comprised of specific events but is indeed a process.³³¹ Given that protracted conflict "keeps creating derivative issues, factionalizes opponents, destroys trust, invites outside intervention, and brings to power hard-liners and extremists,"³³² the direct consequence is that the chances of resolution diminish with the duration of the conflict. For such a conflict as the Somali one that is deeply rooted and whose

³²⁹ Menkhaus, Ken, "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts" op. cit., p389

³³⁰ Fogarassy, Helen, *Mission Impossible: the World Community on a UN Compound in Somalia*. Lanhan, MD: Lexington Books, 1999. p52

³³¹ Azar, Edward E., Jureidini, Paul and McLaurin, Ronald, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8, no. 1, 1978. p50

propagation is ensured through the accentuation of ethnic differences, by warlords who have profited from the conflict, the description irresolvable comes to mind. It must therefore be accepted that the protracted nature of this ethnic conflict does not allow for the universal unification of the Somali peoples given that the conflict has become integrated into the life of the groups, and indeed been elevated to the level of religion.³³³ Therefore, for any reconciliation to be realized, identity-focused models that enhance harmony among sub-clans and clans must be employed, only attempting to heal the nation after this has been achieved.

External intervention has aggravated than supported the resolution of the Somali conflict by unwittingly facilitating the creation of mafia-style economies, warlordism and continued entrapment of Somalia in protracted internal warfare.³³⁴ Indeed, these have failed to adequately attend to the power relations between the groups in conflict, and unwittingly sided with the goals of the high-power group [READ warlords]³³⁵ hence rubbishing effective systems that Somalia had traditionally relied upon to assure order. It is important to note that in pre-colonial times the Somalis were governed successfully by *Xeer*, a socially constructed code of conduct to uphold security and social justice within and among Somali communities³³⁶ and *Sharia*, the Islamic law that complemented the former for more than a millennium.³³⁷ In the absence of centralized authority, *Xeer* effectively regulated conflicts through the population's compliance with a form of justice that encouraged self-reliance rather exploitation or domination of others. Traditional Somali society is not one of disorder; there is a clear hierarchy of traditional roles, all retaining an emphasis on negotiation, mediation and facilitation that is consistent with that of the informal

³³² Oberschall, Anthony, *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995. p104

³³³ Conteh-Morgan, Earl, op. cit., p196

³³⁴ Jung, Dietrich, "Towards Global Civil War?" in Jung, Dietrich (eds.), *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*. London: Routledge, 2003. p2

³³⁵ Rouhana, Nadim N., and Korper, Susan H., "Power Asymmetry and Goals of Unofficial Third Party Intervention in Protracted Intergroup Conflict," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 3(1), 1997. p1

³³⁶ Samatar, Abdi Ismail, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1992. p630

³³⁷ Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, op. cit., p142

leaders referred to as *aaqil*.³³⁸ What is required in the Somali situation is recourse to these tried and tested methods of conflict management that may be the only redemption for the Somalis.

The author therefore recommends the replication of the successful reconciliation processes in the north, including the Borama and Sanaag elders' conferences, and other successful internal reconciliation processes, which relied on internal solutions for the region's internal problems with only minimal financial intervention from the international community. Capitalizing on internal successes within Somalia is the only way that peace or a modicum of peace will be achieved, with the leaders of traditional structures being at the fore of such processes. This will be a long-drawn-out process that will come only at great financial commitment and patience from the international community as the Somali community is allowed to gradually – sub-clan-by-sub-clan then clan-by-clan – rebuild peace in the stateless territory. The author proposes comprehensive and all-inclusive peace and reconciliation processes at the sub-clan level that will build into a conclusive national peace initiative of the senior representatives of these sub-clans to share their experiences and work out ways of achieving territorial peace and security. Such a process, it must be noted would likely take years if not decades even if it were undertaken simultaneously among all the sub-clans then the clans of the Somali peoples. Only after the success of such a process, would the Somalis be allowed funding for the next step that would entail, disarming and effectively demobilizing militias, recreation of Somali-specific governing institutions, and rebuilding of infrastructure such as airports, ports controlled by these, and provision of the necessary services to the populace.

A Case for Islamism

One of the aspects required to address the identity factor in conflict and enhance the prospects for its resolution in the African context is focusing on identity as a source of conflict,

³³⁸ Walls, Michael, *State Formation in Somaliland: Building Peace from Civil War*. Paper presented at 2008 International Peace Research Conference 14-19 July 2008. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium online at <http://www.progressio.org.uk/files/06497/FileName/StateFormation.pdf>

and with this it becomes easier to identify ways of managing the conflict.³³⁹ The Somali conflict is one in which the clan plays an important role in motivating and escalating violence when certain sub-clans or clans perceive they are being shortchanged. In agreement with Anderson,³⁴⁰ reinforcing connectors rather than dividers can be of extreme importance in resolving certain conflicts, and the fact that the international community has not explored some of these connectors means that not all options have been exhausted in seeking peace in stateless Somalia.

Clan contestations notwithstanding, most Somalis are universally united in their belief in *Allah* and their practice of Islam. Reconciliation processes should therefore capitalize on this connection, and seek to enhance or create structures based on religion that are incontestable to the vast majority of the Somalis. This is a role that the OIC would play an important in, facilitating and guiding the establishment of governing structures based on moderate Islamic ideologies as opposed to secularist approaches that have so far been unsuccessful in yielding peace and reconciliation for the Somali peoples. Indeed, what may be needed in Somalia is organization according to the tenets of Islam and furthered by Islamic states particularly those with clout such as Saudi Arabia that can sustainably commit the necessary resources required to achieve peace in Somalia. The international community is likely to undermine or reject an Islamic leader in Somalia but it is imperative that serious consideration be given to the installation of an Islamic republic in which public policy and social conduct is guided and determined by *Sharia*, particularly if Islamic political leadership is the only way to inspire peace among the Somalis. The international community will be required to display a lot of maturity in supporting moderate Islamic states seeking to assist the Somali nation reinvent itself, and recognizing Islam as an important connector that can be employed by the Somalis in organizing themselves politically.

³³⁹ Deng, Francis M., et al., *op. cit.*, p61

³⁴⁰ Anderson, Mary B., *op. cit.*, pp23-31

State-Building?

The international community has been faulted for conducting peace and reconciliation processes and employing negotiation procedures in accordance with standard international diplomacy rather than Somali custom,³⁴¹ and also of tackling the symptoms and not the underlying causes of the conflict.³⁴² This has led to propositions to resurrect the state of Somalia at a time when a consensus did not exist amongst most Somalis about its desirability and shape, thus leading to internal division and disaster that counteracted any prospects.³⁴³ The employment of conflict resolution models founded on western cultures has often been as a result of ignorance about the existence of local socio-cultural apparatus for conflict management.³⁴⁴

Traditional Somali society was not one of disorder, and good lessons can be extracted from it in the quest to resolve the Somali conflict. According to Chopra, the ideal of nomadic independence amongst the Somali majority was one that rejected hierarchy, centralized authority and governmental organization,³⁴⁵ and to the Somalis therefore state structures are an artificial imposition and unsustainable structure.³⁴⁶ This emanates from the fact that even before colonization, "political organization was based on what anthropologists call a 'segmentary lineage system' in which political identity and loyalty were determined by genealogical proximity or remoteness."³⁴⁷ Therefore, the international attempts to reanimate state structures display the ignorance of the international community to the history and culture of the Somali,³⁴⁸ in which the state was a financially unsustainable imposition on a previously pastoral society by the

³⁴¹ Menkhaus, Ken, "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia," in Zartman, I. William (eds.), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine'*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. p192

³⁴² Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., *African Yearbook of International Law, 1997: Annuaire Africain de Droit International*. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998. p30

³⁴³ Abbink, Jon, De Bruijn, Mirjam, and Walraven, Klaas Van (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Boston: Brill, 2003. p363

³⁴⁴ Duffey, Tamara "Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping", in Woodhouse, Tom and Ramsbotham, Oliver, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London: Frank Cass, 2000. pp160-2

³⁴⁵ Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralv, op. cit.

³⁴⁶ Menkhaus, Ken, "U.S. Foreign Assistance Somalia: Phoenix from the Ashes?" op. cit., pp126-7

³⁴⁷ Lewis, I. M. *Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society (Discussion Paper No. 6)* London: London School of Economics, 1993. p12

³⁴⁸ J. Peter Pham, "Do Not Resuscitate" *The National Interest* March-April 2008

colonial masters.³⁴⁹ What the international community fails to recognize is that the mere resurrection of the Somali state will guarantee neither stability nor self-determination, as these structures will require the commitment of the leadership of the Somali people,³⁵⁰ who are opposed to them.

We must recognize the precedence set by Somalia and accept the fact that even though Somalia has neither government nor anything akin to a structure of government, this does not discount her capacity to exist as a quasi-state in the international community. This is evident on the strength of her financial market which has improved under statelessness, with numerous remittance firms, *xawaalaad*, remitting, what is said to be a conservative estimate of, nearly US\$ 500 million annually from Somalis in the diaspora to relatives and friends in Somalia.³⁵¹ Even with what the international community perceives as disorder in stateless Somalia, the economy of the nation has evidently been thriving and is therefore not dependent on state institutions. After all, none of the transitional governments possessed the monopoly to violence as they mostly had negligible territorial control, a fact established by the AU-IGAD fact-finding mission of June 2003. In existence in certain clan-based territories that have shunned violence, are traditional councils that effectively govern their constituents

The author feels that it is about time the international community recognized successful break-away states in Somalia such as Somaliland, which exist as a model to the larger peace-deprived southern Somalia. After all, international recognition has been conferred upon East Timor, Eritrea, Western Sahara and the break-away territories that made up Yugoslavia, and what's more, Somaliland's existence as a state before its unification with Somalia soon after its independence from the British allows for its recognition as it's not in breach of the AU's principle of respecting borders existing on achievement of independence. Given that the resurrection of the Somali state is a phantom concept, such recognition would provide the much-needed impetus towards peace and facilitate the establishment of further clan-based quasi-

³⁴⁹ Menkhaus, Ken, "Somalia: *Political Order in a Stateless Society*," *Current History* Vol. 97, No. 619, May 1998. p220

³⁵⁰ Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., *op. cit.*, p44

states of relative peace.

The insistence on clan-based state-like structures is deliberate given that it is easier to manage conflicts in societies with territorially divided ethnic groups such as in Cyprus as opposed to those that are ethnically mixed such as in Bosnia.³⁵² As is the case in Somaliland, a council of elders would be the ultimate political authority, with responsibilities including the appointment of parliaments through the equitable selection of candidates from the various sub-clans, the resolution of conflicts among leaders or their constituents. This model has worked rather effectively, and the international community needs to commit resources to replicating it in southern Somalia in order to restore peace and rebuild quasi-state institutions that would provide the necessary public services to the suffering Somali peoples. It must be reiterated here that the involvement of the international community would be exclusively one of a financial and logistical sponsor, in order to provide the necessary environment for the Somali peoples to have recourse to their traditional institutions that have served them well in their history.

³⁵¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report: Somalia 2001*. New York: UNDP. p120

³⁵² Carment, David and James, Patrick, *International Ethnopolitics: Theory, Peacekeeping, and Policy* in Stack, John F. and Hebron, Lui (eds.), *The Ethnic Entanglement Conflict and Intervention in World Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. p22

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abbink, Jon, De Bruijn, Mirjam and Van Walraven, Klaas (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Boston: Brill, 2003
2. Abdullahi, Mohamed D., *Culture and Customs of Somalia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001
3. Adam, Hussein M., "Somalia: Problems and Prospects for Democratization," in Mengisteab, Kidane and Daddieh, Cyril (eds.) *State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999
4. Adam, Hussein M., Ford, Richard B., et al, *Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation*. United States Institute of Peace, 1998
5. Addis Ababa Agreement, Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the UN, 28 December
6. Adebajo, Adekeye, "From Congo to Congo: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War" in Taylor, Ian and Williams, Paul (eds.), *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2004
7. Africa Watch, *A Government at War with its Own People: Somalia Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North*. New York: Africa Watch, 1990
8. African Union, 55th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(LV), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (17 June 2006)
9. African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia*, Sixth Session (29 April 2004), Addis Ababa: Peace and Security Council
10. Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993) online at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/somalia/somalia_01081993_sup.html
11. Anderson, Mary B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999
12. Annan, Kofi A., *Balance State Sovereignty With Individual Sovereignty!* Speech delivered on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly.
13. Art, Robert J. and Cronin, Patrick M., *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. US Institute of Peace Press, 2003
14. Avruch, K., Black, P. and Scimecca, J. A., *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. London: Greenwood Press, 1991
15. Azar, Edward E., Jureidini, Paul and McLaurin, Ronald, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8, no. 1, 1978. p50
16. Bahcheli, Tozun, Bartmann, Barry and Srebrnik, Henry (eds.), *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty*. London: Routledge, 2004
17. Baker, Pauline H. and Weller, Angeli E., *An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners*. Washington DC: The Fund for Peace, 1998

18. Bakonyi, Jutta and Stuvøy, Kirsti, "*Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola*" in Review of African Political Economy Nos.104/5, 2005, ROAPE Publications
19. Baum, Matthew A., "*How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope,*" Presidential Studies Quarterly 34.2 (2004)
20. Bazerman, Max H. and Watkins, Michael, *Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them.* Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2004
21. Berdal, Mats. "*Fateful Encounter: The US and UN Peacekeeping*" Survival, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994
22. Bernhard, Helander, "*Somalia: Aid Fuels the Conflict*", in News from Nordic Africa Institute, No. 3, 1995
23. Blechman, Barry M., Kaplan, Stephen S., Hall, David K., Quandt, William B., Slater, Jerome N., and Slusser, Robert M., *Force without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument.* Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978
24. Bradbury, Mark, *Somalia (November 1999)*, in the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Humanitarian Practice Network, ODI online at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1563>
25. Brown, Michael (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993
26. Burgess, Stephen F., *Operation Restore Hope: Somalia and the Frontiers of the New World Order* in Bose, Meena and Perotti, Rosanna (eds.), *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002
27. Cairo Declaration on Somalia
28. Carment, D. and James P. (eds.), *Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995
29. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.* Washington DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997
30. Casper, Lawrence E., *Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001
31. Chopra, Jarat, "*The Space of Peace Maintenance*" in *Political Geography*, vol. 15, no. 3/4, 1996
32. Chopra, Jarat, Eknes, Åge and Nordbø, Toralv, "*Fighting for Hope in Somalia*" in The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations No 6, 1995 online at <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a007.htm>
33. Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (eds.), *Learning From Somalia: The Lesson of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1997
34. Clarke, Walter, "*Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia*" in Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (eds.) op. cit.
35. Cohen, Tom "*US Plucking the Bird' of Violence to Reduce Warlords' Power,*" Associated Press, 19 February 1993

36. Cooper, Robert and Berdal, Mats, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic conflicts," in Brown (1993) op cit
37. Cukier, Wendy and Sidel, Victor W., *The Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to AK-47s*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006
38. Cullen, Michelle L., *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2000
39. Dagne, Theodros and Smith, Amanda, "Somalia: Prospects for Peace and US Involvement" in Fitzgerald, Nina J., *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography*. Nova Publishers, 2002
40. de Cuellar, J. Perez, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*. New York: United Nations, 1991
41. Dearth, Douglas H., 'Failed States: An International Conundrum', *Defense Intelligence Journal*, 5, 1996
42. Delong, Kent and Tuckey, Steven, *Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994
43. Dempsey, Gary T. and Fontaine, Roger W., *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building*. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001
44. Deng, Francis M., et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996
45. Djibouti-Led IGAD Peace Process for Somalia: Peace Plan Somalia National Peace Conference. Djibouti, 20 April-5 May 2000 online at <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000406601.htm>
46. Dobbins, James, et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003
47. Donald F. Busky, *Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002
48. Draman, Rasheed, "Conflict Prevention in Africa: Establishing Conditions and Institutions Conducive to Durable Peace," in Carment, David and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.) *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* New York: United Nations University Press, 2003
49. Drysdale, John, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?*. London: Ipswich Book Company, 1994
50. Duffey, Tamara "Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping", in Woodhouse, Tom and Ramsbotham, Oliver, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London: Frank Cass, 2000
51. Durch, William J., "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-Building' in Somalia" in Durch, William J. (eds.) *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996
52. Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia*. New York: Routledge, 2004
53. Englehart, Neil A., *Governments against States: The Logic of Self-Destructive Despotism in* *International Political Science Review* 2007. California: Sage Publications

54. Feldman, Stacy and Slattery, Brian, *Living without a Government in Somalia: An Interview with Mark Bradbury: Development Processes in Somalia Exist not as a Result of Official Development Assistance, but in Spite of it*. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, 2003
55. Fleitz, Frederick H., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002
56. Gamal Nkrumah, "Out of Arta" in the Al-Ahram Weekly Issue No. 496 (24 – 30 August 2000), Cairo: Al-Ahram online at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/496/in3.htm>
57. Ghali, Boutros B., *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations, 1992
58. Ghalib, Mohammed Jama, *The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience*. New York: Lillian Barber Press, 1995
59. Ghebremeskel, Adane, *Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience* in the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 4.2 (2002) online at www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_2gheb.pdf
60. Gorman, Robert F., *Great Debates at the United Nations: An Encyclopedia of Fifty Key Issues 1945-2000*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001
61. Gurr, T. R. and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994
62. Hashi, Abdinur, *Weapons and Clan Politics in Somalia*. Mogadishu: Horn of Africa Printing Press, 1996
63. Hashim, Alice Bettis, *The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1997
64. Hempstone, Smith, *Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir*. Sewanee, Tenn.: University of the South Press, 1997
65. Hill, Christopher, *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. New York: Routledge, 1996
66. Hirsch, John L. and Oakley, Robert B., *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1995
67. Horowitz, Shale and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.), *Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses*. New York: United Nations University Press, 2004
68. Houdek, Robert, "Update on Progress in Somalia," Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., February 17, 1993, US Department of State, *Dispatch* 4, no. 8, February 22, 1993, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no08.html>
69. Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1989 – Somalia, 1 January 1990*. online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467bb499c.html>
70. Human Rights Watch, *The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations*, USA: Human Rights Watch, 1993
71. IGAD, *Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996

72. IGAD, *Proceedings of the 9th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, 10-11 January 2002, Khartoum
73. IGAD, *The Proceedings of the 7th Summit of IGAD Assembly Heads of State and Government*, Republic of Djibouti, 26 November 1999
74. International Crisis Group, *Biting the Somali Bullet*, ICG Africa Report N°79, Nairobi/Brussels 4 May 2004
75. International Crisis Group, *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead* in the Africa Briefing N°45 Nairobi/Brussels, 26 January 2007
76. IRIN, *Somalia: New Mediator Promises More Transparency at Peace Talks*, 23 January 2003 online at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=40981>
77. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia*. New York: Routledge, 2004
78. Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M., *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*. London: Haan Associates, 1994
79. J. Peter Pham, "Do Not Resuscitate" *The National Interest* March-April 2008
80. James Mayall (eds.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996
81. Jentleson, Bruce (eds.) *Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, and Lessons to be Learned*. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1999
82. Jeong, Ho-Won, "Research on Conflict Resolution", in Jeong, Ho-Won (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Processes and Structure*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999
83. Juma, Monica Kathina, "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community" in Baregu, Mwesiga and Landsberg, Christopher (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003
84. Jung, Dietrich (eds.), *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*. London: Routledge, 2003. p2
85. Kieh Jr., George Klay and Mukenge, Ida Rousseau, *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002
86. Kriesberg, Louis, *Noncoercive Inducements in US-Soviet Conflicts: Ending the Occupation of Austria and Nuclear Weapons Tests*, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 9 Spring 1981
87. Lahneman, William J. (eds.), *Military Intervention Cases in Context for the Twenty-first Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004
88. Le Sage, Andre, *Stateless Justice in Somalia Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005
89. Lea, David, (eds.), *A Political Chronology of Africa*. London: Europa Publications, 2001
90. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A., "The U.S. Military Intervention in Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?," *Middle East Policy* 2.1 (1993)

91. Lewis, I. M., *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002
92. Lewis, I. M., *Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism*. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1963)
93. Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I., *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995
94. Lyons, Terrence, "Internal Vulnerability and Inter-State Conflict: Ethiopia's Regional Foreign Policy," in Ottaway, Marina (eds.) *The Political Economy of Ethiopia*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990
95. Lyons, Terrence, "The Political Lessons of Somalia," *Brookings Review*, Vol. 12, Spring 1994
96. Makinda, Samuel M. and Okumu, F. Wafula, *The African Union Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance*. London: Routledge, 2008
97. Malanczuk, Peter, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*. London: Routledge, 1997
98. Marchal, Roland, "Somalia: a Difficult Reconstruction," in *Action Against Hunger, The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000-2001: Hunger and Power*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001
99. Mark, Bradbury, *Somalia (November 1999)* in the Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI online at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1563>
100. Maundi, Mohammed O., Zartman, I. William, Khadiagala, Gilbert M. and Nuamah, Kwaku, *Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006
101. Mays, Terry M., *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*. International Organizations Series, No. 9. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1996
102. Menkhaus, K. and Lyons, Terrence, *What Are the Lessons to Be Learned From Somalia?* CSIS Africa Notes, Washington, D.C., No. 144, January 1993.
103. Menkhaus, K., "Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping" in *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07)
104. Menkhaus, Ken "U.S. Foreign Assistance Somalia: Phoenix from the Ashes?" *Middle East Policy* 5.1, 1997
105. Menkhaus, Ken, "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts". *African Affairs*, 106/204 2007
106. Menkhaus, Kenneth, *Somalia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Protection Information Section (PIS/DIP), 2003
107. Menkhaus, Kenneth. *International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia*. *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 3 No. 1, 1996.
108. Minahan, James, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World*, vol. 3. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002

109. Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Somalia: Overview, 2007*. UNHCR Refworld, online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ce42c.html>
110. Moeller, Susan D., *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease Famine War and Death* 1999
111. Mubarak, Jamil Abdalla, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996
112. Mwaura, Ciru and Schmeidl, Susanne (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*. Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2002
113. News from Africa, *Horn of Africa Briefs*, January 15-February 14 2003 online at http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_546.html
114. Nkrumah, Gamal, “*Out of Airtel*” in the Al-Ahram Weekly Issue No. 496 (24 – 30 August 2000), Cairo: Al-Ahram online at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/496/in3.htm>
115. Nossal, Kim Richard, “*Without Regard to the Interests of Others: Canada and American Unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era*”, in *American Review of Canadian Studies* 27.2 (1997)
116. Oberschall, Anthony, *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995. p104
117. Organization of African Unity, *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*. Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963
118. Overseas Development Institute, *ODI Newsletter: Relief and Rehabilitation Network* (Number 2 September 1994) online at <http://www.odihpn.org/documents/newsletter02.pdf>
119. Patman, Robert G., *Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers during UN Intervention in Africa Affairs*. 1997
120. Peterson, Scott, *Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa*. New York: Routledge, 2000
121. Preston, Julia “*Waste in Somalia Typifies Failings of UN Management*” *Washington Post*, January 3, 1995
122. Regan, Patrick M., *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Michigan, University of Michigan, 2000
123. Reno, William, *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998
124. Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Reconciliation Process in Somalia
125. Richardson, John and Wang, Jianxin, “*Peace Accords: Seeking Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies*” in Kingsley M. de Silva and S.W.R. deA. Samarasinghe, *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict*. London: Francis Pinter, 1993
126. Richmond, Oliver P., *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. New York: Palgrave, 2002
127. Rigol, Natalia, “*Clash of Clans: Challenges to Somali Government*,” in *Harvard International Review* 27.2 (2005)

128. Rotberg, Robert I., (eds.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003
129. Rothchild, Donald, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997
130. Ryan, Stephen, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Vermont: Dartmouth, 1990
131. Sahnoun, Mohammed M., *Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia in Mending Rips in the Sky*
132. Sahnoun, Mohammed M., *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994
133. Salih, M. A. Mohamed and Wohlgemuth, Lennart (eds.), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*. Nordic Africa Institute, 1994
134. Samatar, Said S., *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil. London: Minority Rights Group Report, 1991*
135. Schlee, Guenter, *Consultancy Report to the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Support of Committee 3 – Land and Property Rights (IGAD)*. Halle/Germany: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 15 November 2003
136. Schlee, Guenther, "Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference", in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Volume 73, Number 3, 2003
137. Schmeidl, Susanne and Jenkins, Craig J., *The Early Warning of Humanitarian Disasters: Problems in Building an Early Warning System*. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 1998
138. Schoiswohl, Michael, *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized de Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland': The Resurrection of Somaliland against All International 'Odds': State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition, and Human Rights*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004
139. SCR 897 (1994) 4 Feb 1994
140. Sitkowski, Andrzej and Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006
141. *Somalia: Still Fighting*, in *Africa Confidential* vol 32, N 16 (9 August 1991)
142. Sriram, Chandra L., and Wermester, Karin (eds.), *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003
143. Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstruction, Monday 1 December 2003 online at <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/CReports/IGADDec03/IGAD.htm>
144. Taylor & Francis Group, *Africa South of the Sahara 2004*. London: Routledge, 2003
145. Taylor and Francis Group, *Europa World Year Book 2*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2004
146. Terlinden, Ulf, *IGAD – Paper Tiger facing Gigantic Tasks*. Berlin, February 2004
147. Thakur, Ramesh, and Schnabel, Albrecht (eds.), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad*

- Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*. New York: United Nations University Press, 2001
148. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993
 149. The Guardian, 12 December 1992
 150. Thürer, Daniel, *Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: der 'Failed State'*, published in *Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht*, Vol. 34, Heidelberg, 1995
 151. Tiryakian, Edward A., "Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts" *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* Vol. 45 2004
 152. UK Immigration & Nationality Directorate (Home Office), *Somalia Assessment Version 4 September 1999*. Country Information & Policy Unit online at <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/HO/421/2/ind/som4.htm>
 153. UK Immigration & Nationality Directorate (Home Office), *Somalia Assessment October 2001*. Country Information & Policy Unit online at <http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ppage.asp?section=193>
 154. UN Press Release SG/SM/4560, April 24, 1991
 155. United Nations Coordination Unit: *UNCT Somalia Monitor 17-25 Jan 1998* online at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64D7GL?OpenDocument>
 156. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), *Somalia Bi-Monthly Information Report* (01 Dec 1996–15 Jan 1997) online at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ACOS-64C63Z?OpenDocument&query=sodere>
 157. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), *RR4 Sets Up Autonomous Region*, Nairobi, 1 April 2002, online at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=30936>
 158. United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), *Political Developments in Somalia* online at http://www.un-somalia.org/Political_Developments/index.asp
 159. United Nations Security Council, *3770th Meeting S/PV.3770* 23 April 1997 New York: United Nations
 160. United Nations Security Council, *Assistance for Humanitarian Relief and the Economic and Social Rehabilitation of Somalia Fifty-Second Session* 27 October 1997 A/52/532
 161. United Nations Security Council, *Cairo Declaration on Somalia, Annex to the Letter Dated 22 December 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/1000* at <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1997-1000.pdf>
 162. United Nations Security Council, *Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia submitted In Pursuance of Paragraph 14 of Resolution 897 (1994) S/1994/614*. New York: United Nations
 163. United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/24868*. New York: United Nations

164. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992) (3 March 1993)*, S/25354 and Add.1 and 2. New York: United Nations
165. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia (17 February 1997)*, S/1997/135. New York: United Nations
166. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/1999/882 (16 August 1999)*. New York: United Nations
167. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
168. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
169. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
170. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 767 (1992) of 24 July 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
171. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
172. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm>
173. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
174. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
175. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
176. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 878 (1993) of 29 October 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
177. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) of 16 November 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
178. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>
179. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm>
180. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 923 (1994) of 31 May 1994*. New

- York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm>
181. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm>
 182. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 953 (1994) of 31 October 1994*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm>
 183. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm>
 184. United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999*. New York: United Nations online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>
 185. United Nations, "Somalia: 30,000-Strong UN Force Steps in to 'Restore Hope,'" in UN Chronicle June 1993. New York: United Nations
 186. United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945
 187. United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, New York: UNDPI, 1996
 188. United Nations, *UN Press Release SG/SM/4874, 08 December 1992*. New York: United Nations
 189. US Department of the Army, *Somalia: a Country Study (Area Handbook)*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress 1993 online at [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+so0096\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0096))
 190. Walker, J., "International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts", in Michael E. Brown (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993
 191. Walls, Michael, *State Formation in Somaliland: Building Peace from Civil War*. Paper presented at 2008 International Peace Research Conference 14-19 July 2008. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium online at <http://www.progressio.org.uk/files/96497/FileName/StateFormation.pdf>
 192. Walter, Barbara and Snyder, Jack (eds.), *Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999
 193. Welsh, Jennifer M., *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004
 194. Wheeler, Nicholas J., *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002
 195. Wirick, Gregory and Miller, Robert (eds.), *Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia and Somalia*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998
 196. Wolfowitz, Paul D., "Clinton's First Year" *Foreign Affairs*, 73(1), 1994. January/February
 197. Woodward, Peter, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, London: Tauris Publishers, 1996
 198. WRITENET, *Somalia: Update to End August 1996*, 1 September 1996 online at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6bf4.html>

199. Yusuf, Abdulqawi A., *African Yearbook of International Law, 1997: Annuaire Africain de Droit International*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998
200. Zacarias, Agostinho, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996
201. Zartman, I. William (eds.) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995
202. Zartman, I. William (eds.), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine'*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000
203. Zunes, Stephen, *Somalia as a Military Target*. Foreign Policy in Focus, January 11, 2002 online at www.fpif.org