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**TECHNOLOGY AS A CHALLENGE IN THE COUNTER TERRORISM AGENDA
IN KENYA**

BY

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**RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been presented for any degree in any other university.


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DEDICATION

To my entire family; my late mum Consolata, dad Remgeus, wife Maureen and lovely children, Roy and Connie.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I thank the almighty God for His grace and mercy throughout my academic journey thus far. I also thank my wife and children for having had to endure with my late-night studies at the expense of their comfort and happiness and the great support they extended to ensure the success of this project.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF:	Allied Democratic Forces
AI:	Artificial Intelligence
AMISOM:	African Mission in Somalia
ATPU:	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CA:	Communication Authority of Kenya
CBK:	Central Bank of Kenya
CCTV:	Closed Circuit Television
CHRPS:	Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies
CVE:	Counter Violent Extremism
DVD:	Digital Video Disk
ERRI:	Emergency Response & Research Institute
FATF:	Financial Action Task Force
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FRELIMO:	Mozambique Liberation Front
GoK:	Government of Kenya
ICT:	Information Communication Technology
ICTA:	ICT Authority
IED:	Improvised Explosive Device
IFMIS:	Integrated Financial Management Information System
IPOA:	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISS:	Institute of Security Studies
KDF:	Kenya Defense Forces
KNCHR:	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
LPO:	Palestine Liberation Organization
NACOSTI:	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NCTC:	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NIS:	National Intelligence Service
PDF:	Portable Document Format
PIRA:	Provisional Irish Republican Army
RAF:	Red Army Faction
RENAMO:	Mozambican National Resistance
SGI:	Security Governance Initiative
SMS:	Short Message Service
SIM:	Subscriber Identity Module
TV:	Television
US:	The United States of America
USB:	Universal Serial Bus
UK:	The United Kingdom
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
VPN:	Virtual Private Network
WWW:	World Wide Web
WMD:	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

Even though Kenyan government's counter terrorism efforts have worked to a great extent to foil planned attacks by terrorists in Nairobi and other parts of the country, the attacks have persisted and continue to claim many lives. Modern technologies, including ICT has given terrorists an unprecedented impetus to stay ahead of the Kenyan government's counter terrorism efforts. The aim of this research is to analyse and interrogate how technology has posed a challenge in the Kenya's counter terrorism efforts. Specific objectives were to examine: the forms of technologies that terrorists use to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact; the technological challenges that the Kenyan government faces in countering terrorism; and the counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms in place in Kenya and their impact. The study was guided by contagion theory, which postulates that contemporary or new terrorism takes advantage of available technological advances, including extensive use of mobile phones and the cyber space, making it more international in scope than it was previously. The study employed a cross-sectional design, which allowed the researcher to conduct the study in natural, real-life settings. The target population was the general population of Nairobi County and sample size of 50 residents was chosen through purposive sampling. Ten key informants were also interviewed. The findings of the study were that terrorists in Kenya – specifically Al-Shabaab – extensively use technology, including both traditional and new media (social media) for radicalization, recruitment, coordination of attacks and to mobilize for funds, and also to spread their propaganda in a bid to seek support and sympathy. The study also found out that the terrorist group is always ahead of the government's counter terrorism efforts and the counter terrorism authorities are always playing catch-up. It was also the finding of this study that Al-Shabaab has perfected its technology in making and using explosives against military operatives. The government operatives in the anti-terrorism fight, who were interviewed, however, insisted that they are making efforts, although not yet adequate, to counter terrorism in the technological front, for example by always ensuring the Al-Shabaab Twitter accounts are suspended every time they come up. This study recommends that more resources – funds, personnel and equipment – be dedicated to fighting the use of technological advances by terrorists. Social media cannot be ignored anymore as it provides the terrorists with a leverage to always beat government efforts. The counter terrorism institutions therefore need to overrun the technologies used by Al-Shabaab, and if possibly get a way into their social media space and beat them from the inside.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is not a new concept. There exist more than one hundred definitions of terrorism and, according to Jenkins, the word has no widely accepted definition and is often used pejoratively¹. The term has its roots in a Latin word 'terrere', which means 'to frighten'. For the purpose of this study, therefore, terrorism will be defined as the use of violence in a bid to frighten or cause fear among the masses, mostly innocent citizens, to either force them to do something or stop them from doing it. This use of violence is as old as mankind.²

Terrorism can either be carried out by the state against the people or by an organization that harms innocent population in order to force the hand of the state on the organisation's will. One of the notable examples of state terrorism are the Reign of Terror in France from 1793 to 1794, when the Roman Empire meted violence on the people to force them and their nations into submission. Such violence ranged from crucifixion of individuals to full-scale genocide. There was also the French Revolution during which over 20,000 people were beheaded over just a few months. The most recent examples of state terrorism include the Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany and communist China under Mao Zedong.

In the modern-day terrorism, clearly defined terrorist organizations have scaled up attacks and governments have declared a "war on terror". This war was marked by the 9/11 attack when the Twin Towers in New York City was bombed on September 11, 2001 by al-Qaeda, leading to the death of 2,996 people and over 6,000 others injured³. A few years before 9/11, in 1998, the al-Qaeda had orchestrated the death more than 200 people through the bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.⁴

¹ Jenkins, B.M. (1974)

² Mannik, E. (2007).

³ *Global Terrorism Database*, accessed from: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/GTDTeam.aspx>.

⁴ Ibid

Since then, there have been many cases of terror attacks across the world from the US to France and Africa. In Africa, the Boko Haram has been reigning terror on the people in Southeast Nigeria, killing innocent citizens almost every day, while Al-Shabaab has made Somalia ungovernable for over a decade now. Al-Shabaab has also extended its attacks to Kenya since the country sent its military troops to Somalia in 2011 to help fight the terrorists.

1.1 Background to the Study

Kenya experienced its first major terrorist attack in 1980 when the Norfolk Hotel in the capital city, Nairobi, was bombed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (LPO), killing 20 people⁵. And in 1998 al-Qaeda bombed the US embassy in Nairobi, killing over 200 people⁶. When Kenya sent its military troops to Somalia in 2011 to join the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in fighting Al-Shabaab, terror attacks rose significantly in Kenya, especially in the country's volatile border regions such as Mandera, Garissa, Mombasa and Nairobi. The two most serious attacks since then are the ones at Westgate Mall in 2013 in which 67 people were killed⁷ and Garissa University attack two years later where 147 people died⁸.

The Kenyan government has made efforts to fight terror threats and attacks in many ways. The major fight began when Kenya sent its military troops to Somalia in 2011 in a bid to uproot Al-Shabaab terror from its base. Up to now, the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) officers are still in the Horn of African country under AMISOM⁹ and the fight continues. Since then, the government has employed a number of strategies in the fight against terrorism, including an attempt to build a wall at the border between Kenya and Somalia to stop the terrorists from

⁵ Kiruga, M. (2013). "20 killed in bomb attack on Norfolk". *Daily Nation*. Retrieved December 12, 2018.

⁶ Supra 3

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Olsen, G.R. (2018)

crossing into Kenya; border surveillance; Operation Linda Boni¹⁰ in the Boni Forest at the Kenyan coast and the Nyumba Kumi initiative,¹¹ a community policing initiative. The Kenyan government also formed the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and a multi-urgency team on terrorism, which includes the Judiciary.¹²

But terrorist organizations are getting more creative, taking advantage of the advances in technology to upscale their attacks. Technology is a wide concept and it has been in use, albeit in various forms, since the medieval age. One of the definitions of technology that remains common among scholars today was given by American sociologist Read Bain in 1937 as “all tools, machines, utensils, weapons, instruments, housing, clothing, communicating and transporting devices and the skills by which we produce and use them.”¹³ Historically, extremist groups globally have used different media as vehicles of propaganda, and have over the years utilized new forms of communication to air their views¹⁴. In the 9/11 attack, for example, Al Qaeda used a passenger aircraft (sophisticated technology) as a weapon. Given that technology is this wide and its use goes back many ages, this study will define technology in terms of the modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT), including computers, phones and the Internet, used by terrorists as propaganda, financing, recruitment or radicalisation tools. This also encompasses the use of modern social media platforms, for instance, Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, Direct Message and platforms such as television and radio.

Some scholars believe that terrorists take advantage of the many developments in modern technology and heavily exploit them in furthering their agenda and conducting their operations. For example, the development of global communication networks such as the

¹⁰ Ndegwa, J. (2018).

¹¹ Ngigi, R. N. (2018)

¹² Magogo, S. (2017)

¹³ Bain, R. (1937)

¹⁴ Crilley, K. (2001).

Internet and television satellite links has made it easy for terrorists to almost instantaneously relay their “propaganda of the deed”¹⁵ around the world. This has increased the terrorist’s capability to overpower sophisticated and well-armed opponents and inflict serious threats to life and property. According to the contagion theory, the decision by terrorist groups to launch an attack is influenced by similar attacks elsewhere,¹⁶ and this influence has been attributed to coverage of terrorist activities by modern mass media platforms. The theorists further contend that the contagion effect implies “a growing loss of state control over more effective technologies of terrorism”.¹⁷

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Even though Kenyan government’s counter terrorism efforts have worked to a great extent to foil planned terrorist attacks in Nairobi and other areas in the country, the attacks have persisted and continue to claim many lives. Patrick Maluki posits that in the January 15, 2019 terrorist attack at Dusit D2 Hotel in Nairobi where at least 21 people were killed¹⁸, the rescue operation was successful and fewer people died, compared to previous attacks such as Westgate and Garissa University. However, it was still a reactionary response by the authorities, rather than an intelligence-led preemptive action¹⁹. In March 2019, there was a terrorist attack on Christchurch Mosque in New Zealand in which the lone gunman live-streamed himself on Facebook as he killed 51 people²⁰. Following this attack, an online extremism summit was held in Paris, France, on May 15, 2019, where United Kingdom (UK) outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May said that the live-streaming of terrorist attacks exposed gaps in authorities’ response strategies and the need to remain up-to date with the rapidly

¹⁵ Wilkinson, P. (Eds.) (2005)

¹⁶ Weimann, G. & Brosius, H. (1988)

¹⁷ Volgy, T., Imwalle, L.E. & Corntassel, J.J. (1997)

¹⁸ Supra 3

¹⁹ Maluki, P. (2019)

²⁰ AFP (2019). Christchurch attacker charged with terrorism: Police. *AFP*. Retrieved from <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/christchurch-attacker-charged-with-terrorism-police>

changing technological advancements²¹. This point is buttressed by Nzomo, et. al. (2017) who say that execution plans by terrorists and extremists demonstrate that they are usually a step ahead of policy makers and state security agencies.²²

Modern ICT has therefore seemingly given terrorists an unprecedented impetus to stay ahead of the Kenyan government's counter terrorism efforts. The aim of this research is to interrogate some of these modern technologies employed by terrorists, how terrorist organizations employ such technologies in their attacks in Kenya and the impact they have had on the success of the terrorists' agenda in the country. It is also important that the study gives workable recommendations that will enable the Kenyan government and policy makers reverse this trend and become proactive, rather than reactive, in the fight against terrorism.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What forms of technologies do terrorists use to advance their agenda in Kenya?
2. What are the technological challenges faced by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism?
3. What are the Kenyan government's counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms in place and what has been their impact?

1.4 Study Objectives

The study's general objective is to examine the role of technology as a challenge in countering terrorism in Kenya.

The specific objectives are as follows:

²¹ RNZ (2019)

²² Nzomo, M. et. al. (2017)

1. To examine the forms of technologies that terrorists use to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact.
2. To assess the technological challenges the Kenyan government faces in countering terrorism.
3. To evaluate the counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms in place in Kenya and their impact.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

The literature review for this study is generally categorized into theoretical and empirical literature. The theoretical debates explored include contagion theory, the instrumental approach to terrorism and the organizational approach to terrorism. The empirical literature is examined in the following broad areas: components of terrorism; technology as a tool for terrorism; countering terrorism in Kenya; challenges posed by technology in Kenya's counter terrorism efforts; and gaps in literature.

1.5.2 Theoretical Debates

a) Contagion theory

Redlick asserts the fact that terror attacks happens in a periodic manner.²³ Brosius & Weiman add that periodic attacks imply an intention to seize the attention of the globe through the media and that this proves that terror attacks are timed to elicit maximum attention.²⁴ Crenshaw goes ahead to state that modern mass media is responsible for encouraging these periodic attacks by highlighting them in their news articles.²⁵ The terrorist organisations therefore take advantage of modern mass media, including television, radio,

²³ Redlick, A. S. (1979)

²⁴ Supra 16

²⁵ Crenshaw, M. (1995)

digital or social media and use them not just as propaganda tools but in other more creative ways in their attempt to stay ahead of the government counter terrorism efforts.

b) Instrumental approach to terrorism

This theory postulates that a political actor uses terrorism as a deliberate choice to achieve a political end.²⁶ It was developed by Martha Crenshaw in 1987. She based her explanation on the assumption that the organization, as a unit, acts to achieve collective values involving radical changes in social and political conditions. Terrorists therefore work together to try force a government to their will by using force and coercion as a bargaining tool and process. In this approach, therefore, violence by terrorist organizations is intentional and is not employed for the sake of it. It is used by terrorists not as an end but to achieve a political end. Crenshaw suggests further that in deciding actions and how to take them, terrorist organizations do a cost-benefit analysis because they are more concerned about achieving their aim or hitting the target.²⁷

Using technology in terrorism is thus an option for terrorists if they determine that it would be cheaper and would achieve the goal faster than the traditional methods of engagement. The method of attack is calculated in terms of the probability of their success, which in this case lies in achieving the political end. However, it is always very difficult or impossible for terrorist organizations to achieve their ends fully²⁸, mostly because the rival organization, usually the state, is more powerful and has more successful ways of dealing with the terrorist groups.

c) Organizational approach to terrorism

²⁶ Crenshaw, M. (2008)

²⁷ Özdamar, O. (2008)

²⁸ Ibid

This approach was also developed by Crenshaw in 1987 and it postulates that the terrorist organization's main aim is survival. This means the terrorist organization does everything within its powers to survive in a competitive environment²⁹. In organizational theories, what defines actions by terrorist organizations is not purely political achievements, but survival. Leaders of the organizations therefore find ways of motivating and equipping members so that they can fight for organizational survival. This approach assumes that the terrorist organization is the victim of an offensive from an external force such as a state.

The survival of violent extremist and terrorist groups largely depends on their ability, especially in terms of resources, to recruit members, supporters and sympathizers. Violent extremists and terrorist groups therefore motivate individuals to join them by creating strong recruitment networks and motivating people to join them, focusing on removing obstacles that may impede one's intention to join them and participating in activities that ensure their survival³⁰.

1.5.3 Components of Terrorism

According to Shahira S. Fahmy, available literature offers no single agreeable definition of terrorism, but scholars agree that using violence with the main aim of creating fear among civilians, so as to force specific belief systems upon them³¹ constitutes what terrorism is. This implies that terrorists don't launch their attacks on their targets for the sake of it or for fun, but to achieve a particular aim, which in most cases is to force a government to perform a particular task. The 9/11 attack, for instance, was designed to incite the United States (US) into an armed retaliation in Afghanistan with the broader aim of causing smaller militant groups to join al Qaeda in the fight against invading Americans.³² In Kenya, Al-Shabaab has

²⁹ Supra 28

³⁰ Speckhard, A. & Shajkovci, A. (2019)

³¹ Fahmy, S.S. (2017)

³² Farrall, L. (2011)

told the government more than once that they will continue launching attacks in the country until the Kenyan troops in Somalia are withdrawn.

Cindy Comb writes that terrorism has five main characteristics; wanton violence, intimidation, a motive, weaker victims and an audience.³³ Terrorist organizations therefore use violence and intimidation against innocent civilians to make a point and seek publicity because their survival depends on that publicity. In the organizational approach to terrorism, Crenshaw says that the terrorist organization's main aim is to survive.³⁴ Therefore these five characteristics of terrorism are all geared towards the terrorists' survival.

Henry H. Willis, et. al. (2005) gives three major components of a terrorism risk, including the threat to a target, how vulnerable the target is to the threat, and the consequences of a successful attack.³⁵ This means that terrorists seek maximum damage to a target so as to achieve the greatest possible outcome. This explains why terrorist organizations mostly target crowded public spaces and attack in such a way that results in mass murders.

However, Morgan (2004) posits that terrorists appear to no longer want governments' attention over their issues of concern but to destroy the governments.³⁶ He believes that the 9/11 attack heralded what has now come to be known as new terrorism where terrorists are more interested in mass casualties and use such attacks not as a means to an end but as an end in themselves. To achieve this, terrorism organizations rely heavily on religious fanaticism as a motivation. The saturation of the media, and this includes new media, with images of terrorist atrocious attacks and their casualties not only helps to propel this fanaticism, but also raises the bar on level of destruction that most terrorists want to identify with and that attract headline attention.

³³ Comb, C.C. (2000)

³⁴ Supra 28

³⁵ Willis, H.H.et. al. (2005). *Estimating Terrorism Risk*. Rand Corporation.

³⁶ Morgan, M.J. (2004). *The Origins of the New Terrorism*. Parameters.

Terrorism takes various forms, and these forms have been changing over the years, since 1790s when French revolutionaries were termed as terrorists.³⁷ Today, terrorist attacks have morphed into more brutal and less humane forms. Terrorism can also take the form of the state launching attacks against the people to force them into submission. The most recent examples of state terrorism include the Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany and communist China under Mao Zedong.

Kefa M. Otiso gives four major types of terrorism movements, including religious or sacred, separatist or ethno-nationalist, leftist and rightist terrorism. However, sacred or religious terrorism dominates the global stage today and is what is practiced by Al-Shabaab in Kenya.³⁸ Mogire & Agade buttress this argument by asserting that contemporary or new terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism is a recent phenomenon in the country.³⁹

1.5.4 Technology as a Tool for Terrorism

Technology has evolved over time since the medieval age, and so have terrorists in exploiting these technological advances to make their attacks more sophisticated and lethal. According to Brian A. Jackson, modern society have become increasingly more vulnerable to terrorism due to the advances in technology and their resultant interconnectedness and interdependencies.⁴⁰ Technologies that have affected almost every aspect of human existence include military technology, product distribution systems that have dramatically improved trade, transportation systems that now make it possible to move around the world within short periods of time, power generation and water networks and, most recently, computers and the Internet through which anyone who can type now has an access to an international

³⁷ Burke, E. (1970). *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Penguin Books, London.

³⁸ Otiso, K.M. (2009)

³⁹ Mogire, E. & Agade, K.M. (2011)

⁴⁰ Jackson, B.A. (2001)

information distribution system.⁴¹ These technologies have seriously widened the scope of terrorist campaigns and made them more innovative in their methods.

Terrorist organizations have found a way of weaving through these technological advances to successfully further their agenda. In the 9/11 attack, for instance, the terrorists simplified highly sophisticated technology, which was passenger aircraft, and effectively converted them into brutal fuel-laden guided missiles to attack indefensible and vulnerable yet highly significant targets.⁴²

Some scholars discount the belief that terrorist organizations have the desire for innovation, and insist that many groups limit themselves to a small range of tactics⁴³ and prefer only to use firearms and explosives in their operations⁴⁴. However, Jackson posits that even in such cases, terrorist groups still use technological advancements to come up with innovative ways of using such tactics and weapons. For example, the German militant organization in the 1970s, Red Army Faction (RAF) developed a special ointment that eliminated fingerprints when applied to the fingers⁴⁵ in a bid to thwart police dragnets. Also, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) improved their detonator innovation to fuse first unrefined timers, then radio control, and lastly triggers using remote photographic flash units or radar indicators.⁴⁶

The use of modern ITs, for example, cell phones, texting, social media and the Internet has extended the worldwide reach of numerous terrorist groups.⁴⁷ As a result, terrorist groups have increasingly turned to attacks on the Internet in what have come to be known as hacktivism and cyber terrorism. Marie Wright writes that through the Internet, extremist groups scatter publicity and spread disinformation; request for finances from sympathizers;

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Cornish, P. (2010)

⁴³ Simon, J.D. (1994).

⁴⁴ Clutterbuck, R. (1993).

⁴⁵ Supra 41

⁴⁶ Hoffman, B. (1998)

⁴⁷ Cronin, A. (2002)

select and train volunteers; assemble and gather information from open sources; as well as plan and facilitate assaults.⁴⁸ The Internet also enables terrorist groups to maintain communications between terrorists belonging to a single terrorist group as well as between terrorist groups and their members; to provide tutorials and training sessions on how to build and plant explosive devices; and to publicize their acts of violence. One aspect of the Internet that has particularly been exploited by modern terrorists is social media. As Julius Kimutai puts it, terrorist organizations use social media as tools for ideological radicalization, recruitment, training and communication among their members. They also exploit social media to get in touch with cyber-crime groups and facilitate fundraising activities.⁴⁹

In the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in 2013, it is believed that some of the terrorists were American citizens, who were recruited by Al-Shabaab through the Internet, especially Facebook, Twitter and YouTube⁵⁰. It has also been reported that the Internet, especially Facebook and WhatsApp, are now major tools used to recruit and radicalise young people to join terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁵¹ Further reports suggest that since 2007, at least 22 American foreign fighters were recruited by friends who had joined Al-Shabaab ahead of them through Twitter, direct messages, and other social media communications and they travelled from the Minneapolis/St Paul to join the terrorist group.⁵²

1.5.5 Countering Terrorism in Kenya

At the dawn of Millennium, terrorism started manifesting itself more prominently in Kenya as armed rebel groups in Somalia, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the

⁴⁸ Marie, W. (2008)

⁴⁹ Kimutai, J.K. (2014)

⁵⁰ Ungerleider, N. (2013)

⁵¹ Jamah, A. (2015)

⁵² Supra 30

northeast⁵³, the Somali National Movement in the northwest⁵⁴, and the United Somali Congress in the south⁵⁵ overthrew the government and made the country ungovernable. This civil war spilt over into Kenya when pirates kidnapped a French tourist in Lamu at the Kenyan coast in October 2011.⁵⁶

According to the “Global Terrorism Database,” Al-Shabaab carried out a total of 409 attacks⁵⁷ in Kenya between 2005 and 2017. Many of these attacks were mainly carried out in Nairobi, the capital city, as well as the north-eastern cities of Garissa and Mandera, and beaches that are frequented by tourists. In 2016 alone, the terrorist group launched at least 48 attacks, and remained a major suspect in many others. The most notable attacks by Al-Shabaab inside Kenya include the 2019 Dusit D2 hotel attacks in Nairobi that led to 21 deaths; the massacre at Garissa University College near Kenya-Somali border in 2015 where 148 people died; the Mpeketoni attacks in 2014 in which at least 60 were killed; the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in which at least 67 deaths were recorded; the 2017 attack in the village of Jima in the south-coast Kenya, where the terrorists beheaded nine civilians; and killing of two teachers in Mandera.

To counter these attacks, the government of Kenya has been aided by the establishment of the NCTC⁵⁸. This is a coordination centre whose responsibility is to counter violent terrorist activities, support international anti-terrorist missions such as the offensive by Kenyan military troops in Somalia and operationalize the national strategy on countering violent extremism. Magogo gives other strategies that have been employed as community policing, increased security operations and risk reduction strategies such as automation of services, electronic detection systems and metal detectors in buildings, random security checks in

⁵³ Legum, Colin (1989)

⁵⁴ Menkhaus, K. (2007)

⁵⁵ Bongartz, M (1991)

⁵⁶ Pflanz, M. (2011).

⁵⁷ Supra 3

⁵⁸ Supra 12

public and closing of major/significant roads. New police squads and units were also formed just for the fight against terrorism, for example, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU).⁵⁹

1.5.6 Challenges Posed by Technology in Countering Terrorism in Kenya

Terrorists today exploit the cyber space created by modern technology such the Internet to advance their agenda in various ways, in what has come to known as cyber terrorism. Robert Popp, et. al. write that technology has enabled terrorist plots and activities to leave a information signature that is not easily detected, but even when terrorists have left detectable clues, they are generally not understood until after an attack.⁶⁰ Reports suggest that cyber terrorists deliberately target the Kenyan digital economy because counter-measures are critically weak. ESET East Africa Country manager Teddy Njoroge could not have put it better, “Essentially, in terms of cyber resilience, the Kenyan digital economy can be likened to a slow, plump gazelle stumbling through the “cyber-savannah” in the full view of agile, informed and hungry cyber-predators keen to sink their teeth into their sumptuous prize.”⁶¹ Njoroge espouses that despite more Kenyans now taking up the use of technology in their financial services, with about 75 per cent of the citizens now registered, Kenyans are doing very little to invest in cyber security and protect this important clientele. Cyber terrorists are not easy to detect because they are good at using the same space to cover their tracks, and this makes them even more dangerous. In December 2014, 77 foreigners – 76 Chinese and one Thai national – were arrested in Nairobi and were found with equipment capable of a massive cyber-attack.⁶² This cybercrime ring was only discovered by chance, because a fire broke out in a house some of the suspects were living in.

Terrorists now seem to have devised new ways of reaching out to young Kenyans, especially high school students, and convincing them to join their course. Before, the terrorist

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Popp, R. et. al. (2004)

⁶¹ Obura, F. (2017)

⁶² Gagliardone, I. & Sambuli, N. (2015)

organizations sent people to physically recruit more members through madrassas and youth in slums. But, according to Vincent Achuka and Justus Wanga, concern is now growing over the speed at which Al-Shabaab targets these school children for recruitment, taking advantage of the expanded social media and the Internet, coupled with the students' gullibility⁶³.

Robert Mugo, the acting Chief Executive Officer of ICT Authority (ICTA), has been quoted as saying that the "government is committed to developing comprehensive and offensive cyber-capabilities to protect citizens in the cyber space against threats and attacks."⁶⁴ However, Mr Mugo cites budget constraints, lack of trained staff and poor compatibility of systems as the biggest barriers to the state's attempts to counter cyber-attacks and cyber terrorism.

1.5.7 Gaps in Literature

After reviewing the available literature in this area, I conclude that there lacks sufficient evidence that addresses technology as a challenge in fighting terrorism, especially in Kenya. Most available data only focus on technology as a tool for terrorists and how the terrorist organizations use this tool, but there is nothing concrete on how exactly this technology poses a challenge to the government's counter terrorism efforts. Therefore, efforts of overcoming the technological challenges have not been given due attention. This research aims at linking the exacerbation of terrorist attacks in Kenya to these challenges and give policy makers a document to rely on.

1.6 Justification of the Study

Currently there is a scarcity of data that links the increase of terrorist attacks in Kenya to the challenges posed by technology. In fact, policies are increasingly being made based on unverifiable data, such as media reports which are prone to manipulation. This may slow

⁶³ Achuka, V. & Wanga, J. (2015)

⁶⁴ Supra 61

down the process of eradicating terrorism once and for all. This research intends to collect and collate verifiable data to be able to come up with accurate conclusions and actionable recommendations.

1.6.1 Academic Justification

This research seeks to add value to the existing academic work in the realm of how technology hinders counter terrorism efforts made by Kenya. This will be done by introducing new empirical data and highlighting how exactly technology hampers government operations in fighting terrorism and how best to overcome this challenge and successfully end terrorist attacks in Kenya. This research also intends to bring in new knowledge that will aid the academia in theory building and validation of the existing theories and ensure new hybrid theories are formulated.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

The literature reviewed has documented evidence that terrorists have found a way of exploiting technology to enable them stay ahead of the policy makers. This research will therefore be an important guide to policy makers to develop policies that will seal this technological loophole in the fight against terrorism because it will be evidence based. Secondly, this research will bring clarity to the policy makers on the significance of technology in the fight against terrorism and aid them to come up with better strategies of countering terrorism.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

In a world of rapid globalization, where advanced ICT makes it easy for individuals and groups to interact beyond territorial borders almost instantaneously⁶⁵, the contagion theory was the most appropriate and relevant to guide this study. Based on the contagion theory is

⁶⁵ Wojciechowski, S. (2017)

the argument that contemporary or new terrorism leverages on technological advances available today, including extensive use of mobile phones and the cyber space, making it more international in scope⁶⁶ than it was previously.

Contagion theorists contend that the drive by terrorist groups to attack a target is impacted by comparative assaults somewhere else, hence, the “concept of contagion”.⁶⁷ This influence has been attributed to coverage of terrorist activities by modern mass media platforms. Brynjar & Katja write that the late 1960s was characterised by a sudden increase of international terrorism following the development of new electronic mass media, particularly present day hand-held TV cameras.⁶⁸ With these technological innovations, which now includes modern ICT such as social media, terrorist groups suddenly found themselves with unprecedented opportunities for media attention and publicity, which they usually crave for. According to this theory, the last decades have seen international terrorism becoming more lethal due to the symbiotic relationship between modern mass media and terrorism.

The contagion effect also explains the imitation by terrorist groups, thus leading directly or indirectly to increased terrorist attacks either in the same country or in other countries. According to Volgy, Imwalle & Corntassel, this effect implies “a growing loss of state control over more effective technologies of terrorism”.⁶⁹ This loss of state control hampers its efforts to counter terrorism as terrorists creatively use technology within their disposal and what they borrow from their compatriots to multiply their attacks.

Today, thanks to globalization of technologies and movement, communication has been made much easier across the whole world, making it easy for terrorist organisations to be contagiously linked. This means that terrorist organisations and their members can easily work together to achieve their collective agenda. These linkages have led to what some

⁶⁶ Otenyo, E.E. (2004)

⁶⁷ Supra 16

⁶⁸ Brynjar, L. & Katja, S. (2000)

⁶⁹ Supra 17

theorists call a “globalization of terror”⁷⁰. Most terrorist recruitment today involves both online and face-to-face engagements, and therefore the importance of social media for Al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts cannot be overemphasised.

Because of the proliferation of highly advanced means of communication such as smart phones and extensive use of the cyber space by terrorists, the threat of terrorism seems to always persist and may never end, despite all the efforts made by the Kenyan government to counter terrorism.

1.8 Study Hypotheses

1. Terrorists use highly sophisticated technologies that are beyond the reach of Kenyan government’s counter terrorism efforts.
2. The Kenyan government lacks the capability to counter the use of modern mass media technologies by terrorist organizations as propaganda tools and for recruitment and training.
3. The counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms employed by the Kenyan government are not efficient and adequate to thwart terrorism.

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Introduction

This section outlines the research design used in the study. It also focuses on the site of the study, population, sampling techniques and the sample size and an explanation on why and how it was arrived at will be explained. The next section identifies the research instruments for this study, methods of data collection, data analysis and presentation. The section also distinguishes between qualitative and quantitative data. The last section is on ethical considerations. This section explains the procedures that the study will follow before data is collected.

⁷⁰ Supra 23

1.9.2 Research Design

The study deployed a cross-sectional design. One advantage of a cross-sectional design is that it allows the researcher to conduct the study in natural settings and real-life situations using probability samples, thus increasing the external validity of their studies. This design is the most appropriate here because this is a one-off study where relevant data will be collected from one city at one point in time. It is also the most appropriate because relevant data will be collected from respondents with different backgrounds, experiences and knowledge levels regarding cyber-terrorism and its impact on the whole society. Bryman⁷¹ and Robson⁷² say that with a cross-sectional design, the researcher is able to collect quantitative or quantifiable data at a single point on more than one case and in connection with two or more variables to detect patterns of association.

1.9.3 Study Site

The study was conducted in Nairobi because it is not just Kenya's capital city, but the most populous and one that has borne the greatest brunt of terrorism. The city hosts the headquarters of most of the institutions targeted for this study, including government offices, such as the National Police Service under which the ATPU operates and the NCTC, major religious institutions that formed part of the population of this study.

1.9.4 Population of the Study

The study population was the general population residing in Nairobi, religious leaders from two major religions – Christianity and Islam – and officials from the hotel industry. Senior government officials from the ATPU, NCTC, also formed part of the study population, and at least two lecturers from the University of Nairobi who have a background and interest in terrorism or have researched and published on the topic.

⁷¹ Bryman, A. L. (2012)

⁷² Robson, C. (2011)

1.9.5 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

The researcher used purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling is done to ensure representativeness of the sample⁷³. This study targeted senior government security officials from the institutions named in the previous section as they are actively involved in counter-terrorism strategies. Senior religious leaders who are more conversant with the issue of radicalization and extremism, and representatives of the hotel industry, which has borne the brunt of terror attacks were also selected through purposive sampling. Purposive sampling refers to non-probability type of sampling. The objective of purposive sampling is to sample participants or cases strategically so that those sampled are relevant to the questions being interrogated by the research.⁷⁴

The sample size comprised 50 Nairobi residents to which the questionnaire was sent. The purposive selection for this sample was guided by the demographic segmentation of the population based on age groups, religion, education and profession because each demographic unit has had their own experience with terrorism. The researcher also considered key informants for interviews. These key informants were purposively sampled, guided by interest groups and government agencies relevant for this study. They included two senior officials from the ATPU, two from the NCTC, two from the National Intelligence Service (NIS), two senior Muslim and two Christian religious leaders, two practitioners from the hotel industry and two lecturers from the University of Nairobi. The researcher unsuccessfully made attempts to reach one Al-Shabaab leader for an interview or to fill up the questionnaire. The representative number for the key informants was arrived at by looking at the organisational structures of these institutions and focusing on the senior management who have decision making roles and are experts in the research area. This gave a total sample size of 64. This sample size was adequate as it provided representative data for

⁷³ Mugenda, O.M., & A. G. Mugenda, (2003).

⁷⁴ Supra 71

the study, given the respondents will be selected based on their demographic segmentation and key interest groups. The researcher also settled on a relatively small sample size because of the limited time for the research and resource constraints that may not allow him to gather data from a larger size.

1.9.6 Research Instruments

This study used both quantitative and qualitative research instruments. A hybrid questionnaire with both closed-ended and open-ended questions was used because unstructured questions would give the respondents the freedom of response⁷⁵ while structured, suggestive questions were used in situations where the researcher expected to rank the responses to achieve a particular trend. According to Mugenda & Mugenda, reliability is the degree to which consistent results or data can be yielded by a research instrument after repeated trials.⁷⁶ The questionnaire was pre-tested to selected respondents, and the outcome was used to improve it. The questionnaires were then administered to the sample of 50 respondents selected from the general population in Nairobi. Use of a questionnaire has several advantages. First, with questionnaire-based surveys comes high amounts of standardization of data, they may be adapted to collect information that is generalizable from almost any human population, and they provide a relatively straightforward and simple approach to the study of attitudes, beliefs, values and motives.⁷⁷ Secondly, self-completion questionnaires are cheaper and quicker to administer.

The researcher also used an interview guide in interviewing key informants from ATPU, NIS, NCTC, hotel industry, religious leaders and academics. The advantage of an interview is that the researcher was able to ask follow-up questions arising from the respondent's responses.

⁷⁵ Supra 73

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Supra 72

1.9.7 Data Collection

The researcher collected both qualitative and quantitative data in this study. Quantitative research includes techniques, designs, and measures that produce discreet quantifiable or numerical data. Quantitative data was collected by sending self-completion questionnaires to the sample of 50 respondents selected from the general population in Nairobi. The questionnaire focused on the forms of technologies used by terrorists in their attacks on Kenya; the challenges these technologies present to the government's counter terrorism efforts and the socio-economic and political impact of terrorism in Kenya.

The study also collected qualitative data by interviewing the key informants from the institutions already mentioned. The interview focused on the technological challenges the Kenyan government has encountered in fighting terrorism and the future plans; the respondents' experiences with terrorism and radicalization and the infusion of technology in all these, how these have affected them and recommendations on how to beat technology in countering terrorism and the academic contribution to the counter-terrorism measures employed by the government.

Additional data was collected from secondary sources such as books, journals and media reports on terrorist activities in Kenya.

1.9.8 Data Analysis

Data collected from questionnaires was coded, and the coding scheme was designed inductively. It was designed based on a representative sample of responses to questions. The data was then analysed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics enabled the researcher to organize and summarize the data in a meaningful way.

Data collected from the interviews was analysed thematically and presented in narratives.

Data collected from secondary sources was analysed using content analysis.

1.9.9 Ethical Considerations

First, the researcher got a letter of introduction from the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies of the University of Nairobi and obtained a permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) as per the regulations permitting him to conduct the research and indicating that the data collected were only for the purposes of the research. Secondly, the researcher introduced himself and explained the purpose of this research to the population sampled. The researcher assured the respondents of confidentiality about themselves and their responses and that the data collected would be used only for purposes of the research, and this assurance was upheld.

1.10 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Terrorism is a broad subject that can be approached from many fronts, but this study will basically focus on the technological challenges that the Kenyan government faces in fighting terrorism. The scope of technology being studied in this research is as already defined in the background to the study.

The limitation of this study is that even though terrorist attacks have been witnessed in several parts of Kenya, including the capital city, Nairobi, the coast and north-eastern regions, the researcher was unable to collect data from the residents of all these regions due to the limited time for the research and resources at the researcher's disposal. The researcher therefore based the study in Nairobi and designed it in such a way that the data collected was representative of the entire country's population. The key informants were also based in Nairobi and they gave representative data.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1

This chapter is the research proposal, which lays the framework upon which the research was conducted, identifies literature gaps and shows the methodology that was used in the research.

Chapter 2

This chapter tackles the first objective of the study, which is to examine the forms of technologies that terrorists use to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact. This data was expected to come from the entire sample of the study, including members of the public and the key informants.

Chapter 3

This chapter investigated the technological challenges that the Kenyan government faces in countering terrorism. This data was collected mostly from the anti-terrorism institutions that have been sampled for the study. The respondents also gave solutions to the challenges already in place.

Chapter 4

In this chapter, the third study objective is analysed. The objective is; to evaluate the socio-economic and political impacts of terrorism in 21st Century Kenya. This data came from the entire study population as the researcher believed they have all been affected by terrorism in one way or another.

Chapter 5

This is the last chapter of the research and its main focus is the summary, conclusions and recommendations for each specific objective. This chapter summarises all the data collected in line with the study objectives, gives policy and academic recommendations, followed by the general conclusion of the entire study.

CHAPTER TWO

TECHNOLOGIES AND HOW TERRORISTS USE THEM

2.1 Introduction

Human existence in the modern world has been affected in one way or another by various forms of technology. With the increased growth of creativity and globalization, technology has advanced from the rudimentary tools to more sophisticated ones, so significantly that commercial organizations find it obligatory to embed these tools in their daily operations. These advances in technology have given today's terrorist groups greater operational possibilities and made possible the significant increases in their scale.⁷⁸ Today, for instance, without the services of a bomb expert, terrorists can make simple improvised explosive devices, which they use to destroy their targets. It is therefore important to note that today's terrorist is far more dangerous than their counterparts in earlier years, thanks to technological advancements. What has revolutionized terrorists operations even more significantly is the development of the computer technology, which brought with it the Internet and new media or social media. Social media tools, which include Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, text messaging, among others are so common today that it is possible that almost every

⁷⁸ Jackson, B.A. (2001)

terrorist organization uses them to further their agenda. YouTube, a product of the Internet, is available for anyone to exploit and provides a great opportunity for the creative terrorists of today to expand their operations to unimaginable levels.

2.2 Historical Background and Traditional Media

Technology is nothing new, so is their use by terrorist organizations. Crenshaw writes that the ambition of “old” terrorists, who existed sometime in the second half of the twentieth century, were local rather than global and their aims were tangible, realistic and understandable. Consequently, true mass murder was alien to the tradition of this crop of terrorists.⁷⁹ However, there was still a fear of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to the insecurity that followed the collapse. This means the old terrorists had within their disposal the technology of acquiring and deploying chemical, nuclear, radiological and biological weapons. For example, Al Qaeda is reported to have tested nerve gas in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda-linked groups have used chlorine opportunistically in Iraq. In 2003, Al Qaeda likewise wanted to utilize chemical weapons in an assault on New York metro transport system.⁸⁰

The use of technology by terrorists can also be seen in the kind of media they relied on and how they exploited them in their operations. Every commercial entity – even non-commercial – needs publicity. The terrorists’ exploitation of mass media to their advantage is therefore as old as the invention of such media as radio, television, newspapers and news magazines. Contemporary mass media crave specific peculiar ingredients of human-interest stories, including drama, tragedy, shock and grief, and this is exactly what every act of terrorism, regardless of the scale, results in. This only means that every terrorist attack inevitably gets news coverage, enabling the terrorist organizations to easily spread their “propaganda of the

⁷⁹ Crenshaw, M. (2007)

⁸⁰ Salama, S. (2006)

deed”⁸¹, as anarchists explained their violence in the 19th century. They believed that the surest way to publicise their causes and existence was through violent deeds. These gave the terrorists exactly what they need: free massive publicity, which they exploit to prove to the world that they have the capability to strike against even the strongest nation states. And the media get their reward in return; their competition for audience size and circulation is elevated, which improves their chance of increasing the all-important advertising revenues. In this regard, the two sides enjoy a symbiotic relationship, that is, they feed off each other.⁸²

Long before the printing press was invented by Gutenberg, terrorists majorly relied on the word of mouth to spread their propaganda. And therefore to achieve the greatest publicity and ensure the word reaches as many people as possible, they would strike in largely populated or crowded places so that eyewitnesses would spread the news among their friends, families and acquaintances. This was also easily possible because, as Crenshaw posits, “old” terrorism was more local and the aims of terrorists were typically related to issues of territorial autonomy and nationalism.⁸³ This is unlike new terrorism, which is more religious and is driven by the desire to inflict catastrophic damage and leave behind mass casualties of their attacks. So when traditional media – the printing press – was invented and with it came the expanded news industry, it increased the terrorists’ ability to exploit this invention for their purposes. They now started using these media to expand their outreach with their propaganda. But this still provided a bit of a challenge to the terrorists because the traditional media (radio, television, newspapers and newsmagazines) have gatekeepers and are guided by ethics in their operations. This therefore meant that the information that was published from terrorists was subjected to scrutiny, hence limiting the effect that terrorists may have desired to achieve. This pushed the terrorists to circumvent⁸⁴ these media. For example,

⁸¹ de Mesquita, E.B. & Dickson, E.S

⁸² Nacos, B.L. (2006)

⁸³ Crenshaw, M. (2007)

⁸⁴ Supra 5

Carlos Marighela the Brazilian revolutionary, wrote in the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla that even though the contemporary mass media were significant instruments of propaganda that could not be ignored, his comrades could also effectively utilize their own copying machines and printing presses. More recently, in addition to these copying machines and printing presses, terrorists have used their own television channels, off-shore and on-shore radio transmitters and satellite telephones. The Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, expanded its local Beirut TV-station – Al Manar – into a regional player first, and eventually into a powerful global satellite TV-network. Today, millions of Muslims globally prefer Al Manar to any other TV-network. The network is especially more popular among the Muslim diaspora in the West. In Palestine, the Hamas also added to its radio station “Voice of Al Aksa” a television station, Al Aksa TV, in early 2006. Both are in secret locations in the Gaza strip. In East Africa, Al-Shabaab has its own radio station (Radio Andalus).⁸⁵

It is important to note that this interest in the media by terrorists is not just for spreading the propaganda of the deed. Nacos gives four media-dependent objectives in every terrorist attack or threat to violence, including to create awareness on their operations and intimidate their targets; to ensure their causes are recognised by all and sundry; to attract the sympathy and respect of the people whose interest they think they serve; and to legitimise their status by commanding the same media coverage as is received by legitimate political actors.⁸⁶

So to attract world attention and be more successful, terrorists usually strike when and where they believe they would get the greatest media coverage and cause extensive fear among the masses. For example, in the 1972 brutal attack at the Munich Olympic Games targeting Israeli athletes, the Palestinian “Black September” terrorists determined effectively that they would get the world’s attention by attacking the premier sporting event because it had brought together major international media outlets that would not ignore such an attack. The

⁸⁵ Cox, K. et. al.

⁸⁶ Supra 5

suicide attackers of the London transit system on July 7, 2005, on the other hand, picked the same date as that of the important G-8 summit in Scotland. The 7/7 attack made page one on the New York Times, but the G-8 summit did not. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram in 2014 correctly calculated that kidnapping the Chibok schoolgirls would draw an international outrage and therefore attention. The abduction took place on the same day during which a bomb attack happened in Abuja killing at least 88 people, but it is the kidnap of the girls, some of whom have not been found, is what people remember to date. In Kenya, Al-Shabaab terrorists have always targeted popular shopping malls such as Westgate (2013) and Dusit D2 (2019) and other well-established institutions such as Garissa University College (2015). In other instances – such as the 2014 Mpeketoni attacks where over 60 people were killed across several villages – they have aimed for mass casualties, and the media have given the attacks such extensive coverage that the world is incapable of ignoring. The result is just what the terrorists desire – fear among the people and world governments. Andrew Kohut writes that in the days and weeks after 9/11, many Americans were traumatized as was revealed by public opinion polls: they felt depressed, could not sleep peacefully, and had the fear that they or their loved ones could be potential victims of future terrorism. Consequently, many people retained a great deal of anxieties, especially in New York, Washington and other places considered to be likely targets. Heavy news consumers evidently feared terrorism more than those who did not closely pay much attention to the news.⁸⁷

In reference to traditional media, it is newspapers, radio, television and magazines that mostly come to mind. But aside from these well-known mass media, there are other forms of traditional media that terrorists have exploited immensely in their operations, such as video tapes, audio cassettes and Digital Video Disks (DVDs). Al Qaeda, for example, and like-minded groups in Europe and the Middle East used these forms of media to spread

⁸⁷ Kohut, A. (2002)

propaganda and recruit teens and young adults. When he was arrested in Rome for participating in the unsuccessful bombing attacks in London on July 21, 2005, Hamdi Issac revealed to Italian interrogators that he was amongst those who had been enlisted into Al Qaeda by Said Ibrahim, another would-be bomber. Issac told the interrogators that he met Ibrahim at a muscle-building class in Notting Hill and Ibrahim showed them DVDs with pictures of the war in Iraq, especially children and women murdered by British and American troops. During the gatherings, Issac said, they examined the political situation and analysed the fact that in every part of the West, Muslims are humiliated and that they needed to respond.⁸⁸ DVDs, audio cassettes and video tapes have the advantage of providing anonymity to the person using them as a medium of communication, thereby concealing their identity and protecting them from anti-terrorism authorities.

There are also video games, which terrorists have used over time to target potential and also to draw support and sympathy. Some of these video games are advertised and sold on the Internet, including Ummah Defense I and Ummah Defense II. In Ummah Defense I, for example, the description of the scenario begins with the sentence, "It is the year 2114 and the Earth is finally united under the Banner of Islam."⁸⁹ Research has shown that the terrorists make some of these video games in the US then distribute them to customers abroad. According to Ahmed Al-Rawi, the ISIS uses video games as part of its media strategies. The ISIS's has a video game called "Salil al-Sawareem" (The Clanging of the Swords) whose main goal is to gain publicity so as to attract attention, especially of the young people, to the group. Al-Rawi reports that although a majority of comments on the video game are against ISIS and its game, there are those that were favourable towards the group.⁹⁰ Miron Lakomy also posits that computer games have increasingly turned into a noteworthy means of advanced

⁸⁸ AFP (2005)

⁸⁹ Supra 5

⁹⁰ Al-Rawi, A. (2018)

digital propaganda for the jihadists,⁹¹ and that the increased interest of other violent extremist groups on video games follows in the footsteps of how the Caliphates exploit the electronic entertainment software.

The music industry has also not been ignored by violent extremists in furthering their agenda. White supremacists, for instance, find it lucrative to produce and distribute songs advocating hate and violence against people of colour and non-Christians. Whereas Muslim fundamentalists castigate Western pop culture as decadent, radical Islamic groups have harnessed the impact of Hip Hop in Western and American culture by producing their own (Hip Hop) groups that try to indoctrinate youthful audiences.⁹² Madeleine Gruen writes that, “The most extreme militant Islamic Hip Hop is known as ‘Terror Rap.’ The video ‘Dirty Kuffar’ by the British Hip Hop group Soul Salah Crew features a masked ‘Sheik Terra’ dancing in front of the camera with the Quran in one hand and a gun in the other.”⁹³ On the flipside, Black Americans also used songs extensively to condemn racism against them. For example, reggae artiste Manley Augustus Buchanan (Big Youth) produced a song, ‘KKK’ in 1986, while Steel Pulse, also a reggae artiste, produced Ku Klux Klan the following year. Both songs condemn the actions of the Ku Klux Klan, which meted out violence on African Americans at the height of racism in the 1970s.

Finally, books—which is among the earliest inventions even before the printing press—have served as powerful propaganda tools. Over time, perfect and workable guides on how to commit terrorism have been published by terrorists in books. For example, the late William Pierce who founded the National Alliance (neo-Nazi/White supremacy organization) published two books, *The Turner Diaries* and *Hunter*⁹⁴ under a pseudonym, Andrew MacDonald. These books provided blueprints for big style terrorism. As he planned how to

⁹¹ Miron Lakomy (2019)

⁹² Madeleine, G. (2005)

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Supra 5

bomb Oklahoma City in 1995, Timothy McVeigh used *The Turner Diaries* as a manual guide and followed the prescriptions provided there. McVeigh's accomplice, Terry Nichols, was also found with a copy of *Hunter*. Today, there are still followers of Pierce and his National Alliance in North America and abroad with their headquarters in the United States. The greatest challenge in the use of books, especially as propaganda tools, by terrorists is their slow distribution, especially before the age of the Internet. This means therefore that they could not reach a wider audience as would have been desired by the terrorists distributing them. However, the situation could be much different now with the advent of a new and more revolutionized media technology.

2.3 New Media and Terrorist Revolution

The Internet has brought with it new media that have undoubtedly revolutionized how terrorists leverage media and technology to their advantage. For the sake of this study, "new media" refers to the use of social media networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, Short Message Service (SMS) Texts, YouTube and Instagram and the Internet. According to Robert Mackey, the earlier forms of large-scale information sharing differ sharply with these new forms of media networks.⁹⁵ In fact, most traditional media – radio, television and newspapers – provide platforms on the Internet, ostensibly for interaction with and to get feedback from their audiences or for citizen reporting, an indication of how powerful this new media have become. Today, you can read an electronic newspaper or live stream a radio or TV show on the Internet. This is because the new media provide the terrorists with what traditional media could not; ownership. In the past when terrorists relied on traditional media and use of word of mouth to spread their propaganda, they depended entirely on the owners of such news channels and had no control on how the news was framed. This had the result of the spread of the information, but not as would have been intended by the source – the

⁹⁵ Mackey, R. (2009)

terrorist. The power of information framing and control of an agenda even pushed some terrorist organizations to open their own radio and TV stations and printing presses as has been discussed in the above section. This power of control of the media and ownership is what new media and the Internet offer terrorists. Thanks to social media, violent extremists now have the power to send out to their audiences whatever information they deem appropriate for its purpose and frame it as they wish. No censorship as is the practice among traditional media owners and operators. Recently in May 2019, a lone gunman filmed himself and streamed live on Facebook as he attacked and killed 51 people in Christchurch Mosque in New Zealand⁹⁶, a demonstration of how terrorists take advantage of the power of social media to spread the news about their operations. However, social media have presented its share of challenges to the terrorists. Though all news is influenced by the media houses that publish or present it, the volume of information sources now available on the Internet is so high that controlling their access and usage from a central point is quite daunting if not impossible. Oppressive regimes, such as in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, and terrorist groups have tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to suppress citizen reporting by ordering Internet blackouts. In worse scenarios, they have kidnapped, arrested, tortured, and or even killed those who post critical comments via social media.⁹⁷ The Internet and social media is therefore a double-edged sword.

Through modern ICT, terrorist groups are now capable of connecting with the world outside of their boundaries in three major ways; recruitment, radicalization and theater. Craig Espeseth, et. al. insist that there is little or no proof that people are all the more effectively radicalised through the Internet and other propaganda materials⁹⁸ such as jihadist magazines and radio programmes, but there is no doubt that these materials exist, and terrorist groups

⁹⁶ RNZ (2019)

⁹⁷ Supra 18

⁹⁸ Espeseth, C., J. Gibson, A. Jones & S. Goodman, (2013)

reach all corners of the world with their message of violence using the Internet. This propaganda is not just about violence, however, as terrorists also portray a more charitable view of their actions more often.

Outside of the Internet, there is a broad range of communication technologies such as mobile phones, radios and videos, which terrorists utilize. The mobile phone has now made one-one-one conversations much easier and terrorists use this technology to coordinate attacks and to reach out to potential recruits who have already been identified. But currently the most useful and common tools for terrorists to communicate externally are the Internet and social media. Jason Burke argued in 2011 that grassroots activism could never be replaced by social media; that it may help terrorists to gain additional funding or a few recruits, but would never play a role in on-the-ground operations.¹⁰³ But in 2016, his tune changed and he wrote that ongoing fast technological change that enables terrorists to contact an enormous group of spectators rapidly and legitimately has empowered them to accomplish their messaging objectives without conducting huge scale attacks that demand important physical infrastructure.¹⁰⁴ This implies that terrorist groups that will be able to adapt to the changing media scene and utilize web-based social networking to directly focus on the individuals they want to influence will be considered the most successful and long-lasting groups.

Marc Sageman asserts that online radicalization has replaced face-to-face radicalization.¹⁰⁵ He thinks that the ideological battle for “young Muslims’ hearts and minds” is being fought in chatrooms and online forums.¹⁰⁶ The Internet also gives terrorist groups the opportunity to promote the political goals of certain groups of people, with the hope of influencing them and gaining their support. Anne Speckhard agrees, and argues that multi-media and extreme

¹⁰³ Burke, J. (2011)

¹⁰⁴ Burke, J. (2016)

¹⁰⁵ Sageman, M. (2008)

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

imagery frequently cause a secondary trauma in viewers and this spurs them into action.¹⁰⁷

Figure 2.1 below summarizes the impact social media has on security and development.




Figure 2. 1: Impacts of social media on security and development

Source: RAND analysis, 2018

2.4 Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan Situation

Whereas some scholars argue that Al-Shabaab does not rely heavily on technology in its operations in Kenya and the East African region where its attacks are concentrated, others posit that it has not been able to avoid technological developments entirely. In fact, according to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, Al-Shabaab adopted the Internet early as a strategic tool for furthering its political and operational objectives, thereby

¹⁰⁷ Speckhard, A. (2011)

establishing itself in 2007 as one of the most technologically advanced jihadist groups world over.¹⁰⁸ But even before the advent of the Internet, Al-Shabaab relied on traditional media, including radio, television and newspapers, to spread their political propaganda and create fear among the masses. It is not uncommon even today to hear over the radio or see newspaper headlines after terrorist attacks in Nairobi that Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for such attacks. This only means that the terrorist organization has contacts with local journalists who they can call up at will and inform that they carried out the attack. While the journalists and media houses may see the terrorists as a rich source of news, knowingly or unknowingly they help the jihadist group in furthering its agenda. Today, perhaps in an effort to control the kind of information they send out and depending on their agenda, Al-Shabaab has its own radio station, Radio Andalus.¹⁰⁹ Cox, et. al. argue that the terrorist group uses radio programming frequently to engage with local communities in areas with limited Internet access.

With the advent of the Internet and its dependents in the name of social media, Al-Shabaab has significantly improved its online presence and leveraged the advantages offered by social media as a linchpin to its operations beyond its bases in Somalia. According to Menkhaus, since 2007 when the terrorist group established itself as one of the more technologically advanced jihadist groups worldwide, Al-Shabaab has improved the production quality of its online activities and its online communications have aimed at appealing to local Somalis, the Somali diaspora, and the international media.¹¹⁰ Overall, Al-Shabaab has used social media in four major ways; to disseminate propaganda, secure access to funding, coordinate activities and recruit followers. As for recruitment, social media can provide a level of interaction between terrorists and their potential recruits that cannot be achieved through traditional

¹⁰⁸ Cox, K. et. al.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Menkhaus, K. (2014)

media.¹¹¹ Social media may be more useful for the terrorist group because of its voluntary recruitment strategy. Cox, et. al. suggest that Al-Shabaab has never been a powerful military organisation¹¹² and therefore rarely practises forced recruitment. Forced recruitment has only been practised by Al-Shabaab commanders in rare and dire situations, for example when they lose too many fighters and are in need of immediately refurbishing the front lines as they look for better trained supporting troops or because they have a planned pending offensive that they want to launch and need cannon fodder. Even in such rare cases, the group goes to great lengths to train the newcomers before they get to the frontline so as to avoid insubordination or a backlash.

While the group maintains a presence on a number of social media platforms, it has reportedly been particularly active on YouTube, Twitter and its own al-Kata'ib news channel, which is part of its dedicated media branch.¹¹³ Of course there is WhatsApp, which enables encrypted communication between members of the group, and identified potential recruits. However, Al-Shabaab's Twitter handle and Facebook accounts have always been brought down every time they try to use these media. Because of this, some experts believe that the terrorist group has been rendered almost impotent on social media and they heavily rely on physical interactions among members and potential recruits or rudimentary recruitment methods, where "an imam walks into a mosque and preaches a radicalized message, and after the sermon he walks away with two or three boys..."¹¹⁴ Other scholars nonetheless insist that the Internet has been a rich fodder for Al-Shabaab, with the only the mode of use shifting from written media communiqués and reports in 2006 and 2007 to video communications. For example, between 2007 and 2009, the terrorist organization produced videos focusing on recruiting youth, Western foreign fighters and the Somali diaspora. One such recruitment

¹¹¹ Supra 31

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Anzalone, C. (2010)

¹¹⁴ Interview with anonymous media expert on September 3, 2017.

video focused on Omar Hammami, a US citizen who subsequently became the international face of the group until his fall from leader Ahmed Abdi Godane's favour in 2013.¹¹⁵ And in 2009, Al-Shabaab released its first high-definition (HD) video titled 'We are at your service, O' Osama' in which Godane was pledging the group's allegiance to Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has continued to produce videos in subsequent years, which are more inclined towards battlefield tactics and recruitment.¹¹⁶ In July 2010, the group rebranded its media wing from a 'media department' to the 'al-Kataib media foundation' in an attempt to position itself as a legitimate news agency, "targeting not only fighters and sympathisers but also citizens of countries involved militarily in Somalia such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, the US and Uganda with its tailored messaging."¹¹⁷ This shows that Al-Shabaab places a lot of emphasis on international publicity and attracting a wider network of recruits¹¹⁸ because they consider it important. Under the rebranded media wing, the group from 2010 produced videos targeting specifically the Ugandan and Burundian audiences, urging their governments to withdraw their military troops from AMISOM in Somalia.

From around 2011, Al-Shabaab turned much of its attention to Twitter, and used the service to report its 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in real time.¹¹⁹ This emphasises the interest and a concerted effort by the group to control how the news of the attack is told and divert the public's attention from the Kenyan government's official reporting, and attract international media attention. This effort is demonstrated by the fact that 541 of the 556 tweets from Al-Shabaab's Twitter account (97.3 per cent) on the attack were in English.¹²⁰ Al-Shabaab repeated this Twitter activity twice in 2015 when it attacked Lido Beach, Mogadishu, in January, and the Maka al-Mukarama hotel attack in March. To

¹¹⁵ Supra 31

¹¹⁶ Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. et al (2012)

¹¹⁷ Cox, et. al.

¹¹⁸ Anzalone (2010).

¹¹⁹ Mair, D. (2016). Al-Shabaab Returns to Twitter.' VOX-Pol, 3 February. Accessed August 28, 2018 from <http://www.voxpol.eu/Al-Shabaab-returns-to-twitter>

¹²⁰ Mair, D. (2017)

enable these online efforts, and even though their Twitter handles keep being deactivated, the group has maintained a series of official Twitter accounts since 2011. In 2011, the group established @HSMPress ('Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen Press Office'), using the al-Qaeda black flag as its Twitter avatar. By December that year, the group had tweeted 56 times and attracted 2,489 followers, with separate English and Arabic accounts. In January 2013, Twitter shut down the English language account. Al-Shabaab, in order to stay afloat and maintain its online presence, then established another account, @HSMPress1, which was active for eight months before being closed down by Twitter in September 2013. The group again established a new account later that month, @HSM_Press, which it used to live tweet the Westgate Mall attack, before this was suspended in September 2013.¹²¹ Several accounts have been suspended by Twitter every time the group tries to open them, including an account established in December 2013 named 'HSM_INFO',¹²² and the two short-lived accounts used in the coverage of the 2015 Lido Beach and Maka al-Mukarama attacks. Today, a search on Twitter for Al-Shabaab returns a Twitter account, @ ShabaabWatch with 6,239 followers, which mostly retweets pro-Al-Shabaab messages. There is also @HSMpress__1 whose last tweet was on January 19, 2016 about the death of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, praying to Allah to accept him as a martyr; and @ al_shabaab whose online tweet was a now-inactive link in 2011, and has 7,737 followers.

Al-Shabaab also relies heavily on websites to spread its propaganda and recruit, and according to Roland Marchal, the group's websites have evolved quite dramatically as a way to attest its growing strength.¹²³ At the beginning, the group had the website (www.heegan.net) in 2007¹²⁴, which offered very little: life stories of leaders murdered in the Jihad, images of "shahiid" and news update on the operations of Al-Shabaab. Somali was the

¹²¹ Alexander, H. (2013)

¹²² Mohamed, H. (2013); Mair (2016)

¹²³ Marchal, R. (2011)

¹²⁴ Ibid

only language used in the website. Videos were marked by an anti-Ethiopian fury and limited in numbers. This was then technically improved and gave birth to the second generation of websites (www.almujaahid.com and www.kataaib.net or www.kataaib.info and www.kataaib.org, which looked more professional and featured more videos. The materials posted on the websites included more references to al-Qaeda and its leaders. Marchal posits that the group's maturity age came in 2011 with websites that used Arabic and English languages and the quality of the videos improved dramatically.¹²⁵ The websites are <http://amiirnuur.com>, <http://SomaliMidnimo.com>, <http://Somaliunited.com> and <http://somalimemo.net/>. The improvement in the websites could be linked to the group's association with Global Islamic Media, a virtual organisation. These Al-Shabaab's websites can be distinguished from other Somali websites by looking at the videos presented by them. The former use fresh information on events on the frontline or in the areas they control with frequent updates. The videos show the location and timing of events and are presented in a way that proves that the group tells the truth. They even strive to come out forthright and provide rational explanations whenever they lose a position. Besides, the websites contain many speeches related to da'wa and muhadara that comment on the news. Those points are repeated by other Shabaab Sheikhs in their own mosques or other places. The information may not entirely be true, but they are presented in a way that make lay people believe what the terrorists are saying and give their audiences the impression that their videos have no filters. This only proves that Al-Shabaab has highly skilled webmasters with high academic qualifications in the field of IT.

Beyond websites and propaganda videos, Al-Shabaab also uses online propaganda magazines to spread its message; for example, the Swahili publication, 'Gaidi Mtaani' ('Terrorist on the

¹²⁵ Ibid

Street'), which is released in PDF form¹²⁶ and targets a younger audience.¹²⁷ The first issue was published in April 2012 and a total of nine issues have been published so far. The latest issue available is Issue 9, whose cover is shown in Figure 2.2 below, published in September 2017. According to Andrea Madrazo, Al-Shabaab has used this online magazine to attract a certain number of Western Muslims.¹²⁸ The magazine features articles in both English and Kiswahili, but most of its articles are written in Kiswahili, even though the language is not widely spoken in Somalia. Some scholars thus argue that the choice of language was to

¹²⁶ Anderson, D.M. & McKnight, J. (2015)

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Madrazo, A. (2018)

ensure the magazine reaches wider audiences in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.¹²⁹ Other sources claim that the magazine is written by Kenyan supporters of Al-Shabaab, and the second issue published in August 2012 was actively promoted by the Muslim Youth Center, a Kenyan organization that supports Al-Shabaab, via its Twitter account and blog¹³⁰ before the posts were taken down shortly after. The Muslim Youth Center later transformed into Al-Hijra and merged with Ansar al-Mujahideen to found Al-Muhajiroun as an affiliate of Al-Shabaab. Al-Muhajiroun (Emigrants of East Africa) then introduced an online magazine,

¹²⁹ Bunker, R.J. & Bunker, P.L. (2018)

¹³⁰ Kenyan Al Qaeda Supporters' Magazine Takes On Jews And Obama. ADL. Accessed on September 8, 2019, at <https://www.adl.org/blog/kenyan-al-qaeda-supporters-magazine-takes-on-jews-and-obama>

“Amka” and produced its first publication in February 2015.¹³¹ The magazine however folded




Figure 2.2: Cover of “Gaidi Mtaani” Issue 9 (September 2017)

after its second issue in July 2015 as it was unsustainable. Its editor, Abu Salim Al-Kenyi, was identified as Ahmed Iman Ali, a Kenyan.

A combination of the Internet and developed mobile technology have also given Al-Shabaab an easier way to source for funds and move large sums of money across borders undetected. Kenyan detectives, for instance, are investigating reports that the Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi in which 21 people died on January 15, 2019 was likely funded by money moved from South

¹³¹ Bunker & Bunker (2018)

Africa to Kenya by a Kenyan living in Cape Town. The money was reportedly wired through a Kenyan. Kenya's Standard newspaper reported that an employee of the bank was arrested in connection to the case, as detectives from Nairobi visited Cape Town to probe an "intricate money laundering network used by the terror group to move money across borders".¹³²

Overall, the Internet strategy of Al-Shabaab has three goals.¹³³ First, it is a product meant to serve the distrust Al-Shabaab had for other media. Al-Shabaab did not and still does not trust journalism at all, not even al-Jazeera, contrary to what is mostly assumed in the West. It has more than once emphatically responded against some Arab media that they blamed for misinterpreting their activities. Secondly, it proves that Al-Shabaab employs modern technology in its activities since it is the only group that is able to maintain websites, whose servers are more often closed down by the US, and produce such professional video clips.¹³⁴ Lastly, the website allows the group to directly communicate with the global Jihadi movement and Somali Diaspora.¹³⁵

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is one technology that Al-Shabaab has used extensively to attack security operators in the East African region. In Kenya, there are frequent attacks by IEDs planted on roads and targeting security personnel and their armoured cars, especially at the coast and northern part of the country. On June 14, 2019, for instance, twelve Kenyan police officers were killed by an IED planted on the road by Al-Shabaab in the country's northern county of Wajir.¹³⁶ On October 14, 2017, two truck bombs exploded in Somalia capital, Mogadishu, making it the largest terrorist attack in the country in decades¹³⁷ and killing at least 350 people and wounding hundreds more.¹³⁸ The attack was unclaimed but it

¹³² Maina, K. & Wesangula, D. (2019). Revealed: Sh2.3 billion from S Africa aided Dusit attacks. *Sunday Standard*.

¹³³ Marchal, R. (2011).

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ Capital News (2019).

¹³⁷ Mohamed, H., Schmitt, E. & Ibrahim, M. (2017)

¹³⁸ Osman, A.O. (2017).

was likely the work of A-Shabaab, and that was the 33rd car bombing attack in Mogadishu in 2017 alone.¹³⁹ Al-Shabaab's technology upgrade that enables the rise of its IED attacks is often as a result of the terrorist organization's growing international connections, with the belief that the group imports this technology from its international partners. However, as Muibu & Nickels argue, this assumption is inaccurate as it overlooks the fact that Al-Shabaab has in recent years been determined to reduce and limit foreign influence.¹⁴⁰ Research has shown that the terrorist group has its own bomb experts recruited locally from the region, who have the capability of using readily available materials, some acquired from wreckages of attacked vehicles while others are from guns and ammunition gained from attacked military and police bases in Somalia and Kenya. In an interview with a media expert, this study established that one of Al-Shabaab's bomb experts is a graduate engineer from a Kenyan university who was likely radicalized and recruited locally.¹⁴¹ Kenya's Daily Nation newspaper reported in September 2019 that some Al-Shabaab operatives work in cahoots with mechanics, garage operators and car thieves to steal a special type of metal from car exhaust pipes that they use to make explosives.¹⁴²

2.5 Future of Technology and Terrorism

With increased inventions and innovations, it can be predicted, almost accurately, that the technology will get more advanced. With the terrorists' determination to always stay ahead of nation states' counter terrorism efforts, terrorist groups will most certainly also get advanced in their acquisition and use of technology. As has been discussed in the earlier chapter, terrorists have proved that they are capable of converting sophisticated technology into simple but very lethal weapons, just like Al Qaeda did in the 9/11 attack. Already, terrorists are using drone attacks, a clear pointer to the kind of future technology holds for terrorism.

¹³⁹ Roggio, B. & Weiss, C. (2017).

¹⁴⁰ Muibu, D. & Nickels, B.P. (2017)

¹⁴¹ Interview with anonymous media expert, September 3, 2019.

¹⁴² Wabala, D. (2019)

The BBC reported recently that Saudi Arabia, which produces about 10 per cent of the world's crude oil, had to cut their oil and gas production after the Yemeni Houthi rebels launched drone attacks on the country's two major oil facilities. Saudi Energy Minister said the drone strikes reduced their crude oil production by almost half. The rebels' spokesman said they had deployed at least 10 drones in the attacks.¹⁴³

The UK and US have developed policies for the use of drones for targeted killings as one way to fight terrorism. Even though the US justification for its use of drone strikes on suspected terrorists have been extremely disputed, the technology and its use have generally been accepted by Western policy elites.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, the western nations have widely used drone strikes against suspected terrorists, especially in fighting the ISIS in Syria and Libya. For instance, in 2015 an RAF drone strike was used to kill 21-year-old Reyad Khan, a British citizen, in Libya. Then British Prime Minister David Cameron before the House of Commons justified this killing as an act of self-defence to "protect the British people from a direct threat of terrorist attacks being plotted and directed by Khan."¹⁴⁵ Some scholars believe that US drone strikes have immensely contributed towards reduction in the incidents and lethality of terrorist attacks, especially in Pakistan where the US mounted drone strike campaigns against terrorists between 2007 and 2011.¹⁴⁶ On the flipside, however, other scholars posit that the use of drone strikes by the US to counter terrorism has angered Muslim populations and instead of aiding in fighting terrorism has led to more recruitment into terrorism organizations and consequently fuelled terrorism further. Johnston and Sarbahi however insist that there is no available data that can be used to assess if the drone strikes have led to increased recruitment by terrorist groups.¹⁴⁷ But Anouk S. Rigterink writes that there

¹⁴³ Saudi Arabia oil and gas production reduced by drone strikes. BBC, September 14, 2019.

¹⁴⁴ Von Bernstorff, J. (2016).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Johnston, P.B. & Sarbahi, A.K. (2013)

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

is evidence that terrorist organizations in Pakistan increase the number of their attacks after a drone 'hits' on their leader, compared to after a 'miss'. The increase is up to 43 percent (about 29 terrorist attacks) globally per group in the six months following a drone strike.¹⁴⁸ It can also be argued that in the interest of retaliatory attacks, terrorists have smarted and learnt from their attackers and are also now using drones in their attacks, making them more lethal than they have ever been. Although the use of drone strikes by terrorists are so far not widespread, the availability of the technology points to a future that makes the terrorists more dangerous than they are currently. In East Africa and Kenya in particular, for example, there have been no drone strikes either by Al-Shabaab in their attacks or by the Kenyan government in countering terrorist strikes. There is also no evidence as to whether Al-Shabaab has this technology at its disposal yet, but this by no means implies that they cannot acquire it and use it to launch attacks in future with more serious ramifications and casualties. It is in the interest of Al-Shabaab to always stay ahead of the Kenyan government in its operations and this means they may not hesitate to acquire this technology if it promises them more success in their attacks; success here being more casualties in their attacks and forcing the government to their will. The government agencies charged with counter terrorism responsibility must therefore be on the lookout at all times to stem either the acquisition on these new technologies by terrorists or their use in launching attacks against innocent citizens. They should make efforts to at least be at par with the terrorists in terms of technology use if not ahead of them.

2.6 Conclusion

The digital world gives people real power to speak beyond their own geographical and biological constraints.¹⁴⁹ Singers and performers who are barely known can become famous overnight with a well-placed YouTube video. Haters can also press the wrong button at the

¹⁴⁸ Rigterink, A.S. (2018)

¹⁴⁹ Supra 26

most vulnerable time, which results in a catastrophic impact on international relations. With the Internet's capability to make the world a global village, that which is on the opposite end of the world can seem very local. Yet this can either amplify or distort reality. For example, while the 2012 "Innocence of Muslims" video successfully catalysed the dissatisfaction the Arab world feels toward the lack of Western support towards them, the protests and riots were made possible by YouTube and Facebook and would not have occurred without them. Newer and older media have been brought together in ways that can change what counts as truth in today's world by turning slander into reality. And this plays in the terrorist's hand with the potential of a disaster. Although evidence points to the fact that Al-Shabaab so far does not rely heavily on technology in its operations, it is clear that the terrorist organisation has tried its hand on technology, albeit not so successfully, and that only means that they might never stop trying. Technology provides a great leverage for both the terrorists and counter terrorism efforts and no side would want to surrender to the other. It is therefore important that the counter terrorism agencies develop mechanisms, using technology or otherwise, to effectively counter the use of these technologies by the offenders. This study therefore argues that winning the war against terrorism and the terrorists' success in their operations largely depend on how side will employ the available technologies – both traditional and modern – going forward. Above all the technologies that have been mentioned in this chapter, technology keeps developing, with new innovations emerging, and this makes it difficult to predict what the future holds for terrorist organizations and counter terrorism efforts.

CHAPTER THREE

TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

Arguably, modern technology has afforded terrorism a scene to thrive by providing a global audience and perfect localities. Terrorist organizations have embraced technology, making it a formidable tool in realizing their goals of instigating fear through violence. Terrorism has heavily started relying on mass messaging to create fear among sizeable populations. Social media, cyberspace and emerging technologies have facilitated terrorism in an unforeseen scale. Communication of large groups of people in real time has been enabled through the presence of smart mobile phones with high processing power, smaller than expected video and camera gadgets, fast information systems and encryption. Modern virtual communication platforms provide intended large impact at little cost. It is technological loophole that terrorist elements have leveraged with unceasing impunity and agility. Terrorist organizations can remotely in a quick and direct manner message their goals¹⁵⁰, eliminating the need of investing in physical infrastructure to carry out large-scale attacks. Simple technological operations and immense communicative capacity have made terrorism accessible to the masses. Terrorist organizations leverage on open, innovative, easy to use, free and popular technology platforms for communication. Organized terror groups such as the ISIS have some of its commanders tasked with educating members and sympathizers on how to use encrypted and new communications¹⁵¹. Today, ISIS can remotely inspire and command attacks with less training and little tactical planning grounded on technology driven landscape. Technological proficiency among terrorist groups such as Boko Haram through consumer technology products and social media as channels of communication, broadcast

¹⁵⁰ Burke, J. (2016)

¹⁵¹ <https://www.csis.org/nfp/evolving-tech-evolving-terror>

and tools of propaganda has led to their swift rise. Ghost Security Group identified SureSpot, Wickr, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Askfm, Threema and Kik with Twitter as most preferred social media platforms among the Islamic State¹⁵². Mainstream platforms, chatrooms, betting sites, pornography websites and online gaming hubs are all culpable. Terrorists use the Internet and the social media for radicalization, incitement, recruitment, planning attacks, training, communications, collection of information, preparations and financing. Access to the Internet has not only changed the way persons get radicalized and plan their attacks, but has also offered more opportunities for radicalizing and accelerated the speed of mobilizing radicalized individuals. Curtis Culwell Center attacks, for instance, were directed through Twitter by an ISIS actor, Mohammad Abdullahi Hassan¹⁵³.

In the propaganda campaign, organizations such as ISIS have created appealing messages that touch on the basic life dynamics. The content promises career opportunities on having a chance to lead a family life with the inclusion of a sense of community. Extremists' messages are not only aimed at radicalization. It is visible to every day Internet users and those who receive social media push notifications. Past evidence indicates that most of the people drawn to the ISIS are those seeking a sense of belonging. Terrorist groups are also advocating for lone offender attacks in target countries. Also, recent extremist content advocates for attacks against specific persons in the population such as the soldiers, law enforcement, and intelligence community officers.

Additionally, virtual interaction platforms are ideal grounds for both accidental and purposeful modes of propagating extremists' narratives and luring new recruits. They are easy to gain access to, explore content and use to impart information both publicly and

¹⁵² <https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-was-key-to-islamic-states-attacks-on-paris-50743>

¹⁵³ https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/180322_evolving_tech_terror_harrison.pdf?GpUN2x6.58_hlq86bS0INpCOAq4efJ7Y

secretly. ISIS is reported to have developed a new model of cyber technology, with Boko Haram following the way. Terrorist groups continue to use the Internet in a sophisticated manner and have clearly demonstrated to understand the use of off-the-shelf technology. As a result, terrorist organizations have been able to surpass geographical tyranny in raising funds, recruitment and radicalization from individuals far from their locations. In acclaiming the vitality of technology enhanced terrorism, ISIS in 2016 granted media actors among the group equal rank as those fighting on the ground¹⁵⁴. Nonetheless, radical groups of age have more access to money than in earlier days, as a result of hawala networks that have embraced modern financial technology in their service operations. Terrorist organizations are reported to raise, launder and finance their operations through earlier existing services such as crowd funding arenas, e-wallets, crypto-currencies and digital currencies. Haroon Ullah, author of Digital War, termed the advancement of digital technology and the spread of social media as having created an equal intellectual battlefield by enabling the tech-savvy groups to wage ‘guerrilla warfare’.

3.2 Technological Challenges in Global Counter Terrorism Efforts

Globally, social media platforms host billions of users. Internet providers find it exceptionally hard to fulfill their obligations to the common digital users and align their interests to investors and regulators. States struggle to balance national security concerns with the freedoms of cyberspace in response to the fight of the convergence between technology and terrorism. There exist complex drivers of terrorism and trade-offs involved in regulatory technologies. Counter terrorism agencies continue to search for ways to end the misuse of social media by terrorist groups and at the same time protect the interests of the general population. Internet service providers have shut online accounts associated with radical groups in the attempt to undermine their recruiting tools. However, Internet features such as

¹⁵⁴ Burke, J. (2016)

end-to-end encryption and virtual private network have eased terrorists' online activities such as finding recruits, managing outreach and organizing. For instance, proponents of ISIS propaganda moved from Facebook and Twitter to Telegram largely due to encryption of platform users. In efforts to combat global terrorism, social media platforms are confronted by the headwinds that relate to political interference, complexity in policies and fake news.

Network and Internet user anonymity continues to be a global technological challenge. Internet platforms such as public Internet terminals, network address translation devices, mobile phones services that do not require device registration, homepage data storage abilities that are provided and one is not required to register, unidentified communication devices and unspecified remailers do not reveal the user's identity¹⁵⁵. In Virtual Private Networks (VPN) the user's Internet Protocol (IP) address is replaced with that from the VPN provider,¹⁵⁶ creating anonymity among the Internet users. VPN use varies from free to hidden web browsing. Anonymous communication is offered, either as a by-product of a service or with the aim of providing privacy for service consumers. However, terrorist elements have exploited VPN for sinister motives. Network is available in distributed nature and the accessibility of some online applications such as VPN conceals the source of the content, hence hindering identification of delinquents. Terrorists can use fake e-mail addresses or register e-mails without revealing their identities. Establishing the source of communication is always a key factor of investigation in cybercrime. Anonymity hinders law enforcement from tracking terrorists' trails and plans. Terrorists might utilize insecure personal connections that are cordless or have accesses to sim cards from states without mandatory requirements for registration. However, legal authorities and other stakeholders are not

¹⁵⁵ Mohochi, S. M. (2011)

¹⁵⁶ Cornish, P. (2010)

certain on the censorship of unidentified access to the Internet and hidden communications to approaches targeted at countering terrorism.

Technology improves the effectiveness of terrorism operations by helping radicals to better hide their contacts, coordination and plans. In reference are applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram, which use end-to-end encrypted messages. Encryption guarantees a user's privacy by scrambling the data that is sent. In terrorist syndicates, encrypted messaging services cripple law enforcement as they cannot disrupt or view the communication. End-to-end encryption creates protected messages that are substantially harder for law enforcement specialists to reveal. Smartphones, computers and other sensitive technology devices can be locked through full encryption to make them almost fully inaccessible. Simultaneously, anonymization of Internet traffic via services such as The Online Router (TOR) allows individuals to access and/or download online content without leaving digital fingerprints. Technologies such as burner phones or "live" flash drives, provide terror suspects with more autonomy to communicate and access data without leaving forensic fingerprints for law enforcers to follow. Technological sophistication of these capabilities is growing, becoming a challenge for authorities and intelligence services. They render terrorism very effective and make their indictment difficult.

Widespread Internet access allows extremism content to be uploaded on multiple platforms to have a maximum reach. Further, the Internet is on a continuous development, notably with the development of online games and voice over IP (VoIP) communication¹⁵⁷. The techniques and routines for intercepting earlier cellular calls are obsolete when it comes to communications made through VoIP channels. Telecom service providers were used in the conventional voice call interception. Using similar approaches with VoIP, authorities'

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

agencies must use ISPs in collaboration with VoIP service providers. In peer to peer technology, data is relayed directly between the sender and the receiver, making it impossible to intercept communications. Therefore, new interception techniques are needed by the law enforcers. There is the urgency of grasping the context of online based crimes, occurrences and setbacks to mount appropriate court injunctions. Development of a more user-friendly graphical user interface as opposed to the earlier command based triggered massive expansion. Development of the World Wide Web (WWW) created a platform for new applications – the shift from traditional voice calls to Internet enabled telephone calls. Law-enforcement agencies are struggling to keep up as well as enabling new crimes. However, it remains uncertain on the ability of the authorities to progressively analyse and implicate crimes done on the online channels.

There is a rapid development of new hardware devices in the new wave of technological improvements. Home appliances such as smart TVs have access to the Internet, smartphones have the capacity to hoard electronic data and have wireless network access of data. Modern flash disks – USB storage equipment – have been incorporated into watches, pens, pocketknives and bottle openers. It is a challenge for the authorities to keep track of these developments that need to be considered in their counterterrorism activities. In such scenarios, it is crucial for the legal officers to be informed on a continuous basis, on the updates on the latest technology. With this information they will be able to identify vital devices and any equipment that call for further scrutiny to piece up evidence and terrorist trail. The modern access to cordless Internet points presents a major challenge. Current clamour for cordless access to the Internet in the developing world is a chance for development but also a setback in efforts to counter online extremism. In cases where criminals have perfected the use of cordless points to access Internet and that registration is

optional, it becomes a daunting task for law enforcement agencies to trace terrorists. Trails in such investigations hit a dead end on access points.

Modern computers being introduced in the digital world are powerful and have recently been used to extend criminal activities. Technology based techniques such as ransomware¹⁵⁸ have been developed by extremist actors to gain the ability to considerably impact the day-to-day operations of vital social sectors, ranging from health care, telecommunications, to transportation with significant disastrous effects. Unfortunately, it is not only the advancement of performance abilities of one user computers that present formidable challenges for inquiries. There are rapidly growing abilities of the network among several computers. For instance, analysis in the attacks against government websites in Estonia suggested that it was executed by multiple processors. Through a botnet, a cluster of Internet-connected devices such as computers run programmes under external control that mostly are unknown to the user. In such incidents, processors are festered with malevolent applications that initiate programmes that let offenders to take over the PC. Such interconnectedness gathers essential information about selected targets usually on valuable persons/individuals. Recently, botnets have increasingly been used in posing, making them a serious challenge in counterterrorism. The number of computers in a botnet connection may range – tens of them connected to a PC. Reports on the susceptibility of computers to malicious programmes suggest that about a quarter of all computers with Internet access are exposed to software that can allow botnet. Botnets have been used for illegal denial of service, sending out spam, executing hacking attacks and allowing unauthorised swap of data and access device connection. Botnets increase the computer access and network capacity for criminal activities. By making use of several connected computers, terrorists have the ability to assault

¹⁵⁸ <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/technology-making-terrorists-more-effective%E2%80%94and-harder-thwart-45452>

PCs that would have been inaccessible with the use of countable processors. With several computers involved, it is arduous to identify the root criminal in an elaborate system, as the digital trail end up to a computer user in a number of them. More terrorists are accessing and making use of high-performance device processors and the network, and the emerging competitive edge with legal enforcement is getting wider.

Recent developments in information and communication technology has enabled automation of certain processes. Automation has several key advantages, first, it increases the speed of processes. Secondly, it scales up the impact of automated processes and thirdly, it reduces the need to involve humans. Through automation, the need for many experts who are expensive to maintain is averted, facilitating lenders of telecommunication services to decrease their prices. Consequently, terrorists make use of computerisation to carry out far-reaching operations. Automation can facilitate the sending of millions of unsolicited bulk spams that contain offending content. Hacking can also be automated by using malicious applications that can assault multiple computers in a short duration.

The global society lacks a universal instrument to addresses online terrorist activities. Most prevalent in developing countries is the limited training on legal and practical prosecution of terrorism incidents in the Internet. Investigation and prosecution of cybercrime need Internet tailored approaches and procedures that lead to meaningful inquiries. These are instruments to detect a crime, trail and identify the offender. More so, there is the need to understand the cybercrime, to collect evidence and build up a legal response necessary for implications. Mostly, these instruments are the same as those utilised in conventional terrorist investigations cases which are irrelevant to computer technology. The growing number of terrorist activities through online platforms render traditional investigation instruments insufficient to carry out successful investigations. Traditionally, wiretapping was used to intercept landline and mobile phone communications that is not possible with peer to peer-

based technology services that need collaboration with the service providers. Service providers are also confined to privacy agreements and the authorities need legal documentations for such operations, further complicating the investigations.

Complex and transnational nature of financing and planning terrorist acts mostly involving cross-border activities hinder quick investigations due to difference in jurisdictions, especially lack of cooperation and low capacity among the states. For instance, Kenyan Dusit D2 attackers were financed from South Africa and money withdrawn from several mobile money transfer agents in Kenya on different dates. This revelation comes after several months of investigations that require robust cooperation in a well-structured institutional mechanism that is not always the case. Lastly, lone actor phenomenon that emphasizes on the system and not the organizations has created what American President George Bush termed as the “enemy within”. Abu Musab al-Suri dubbed it as individual terrorism and analysts refer it to as leaderless jihad. The lone actor approach views the Internet as a platform to relay advice and orientation without raising concerns to the authorities, only for the extremist to strike without potential indications.

Rapid pace of advances in modern technology such as the cellular phone and other existing technologies of communication has evolved to be a substantial challenge; for instance, in carrying out court orders based on electronic surveillance of terrorists. As a result, there is a gaping hole amid lawful means to get electronic information that is usually private and the technical ability to do so. Analysis by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) point out that communications and terrorist groups’ contacts with potential recruits are usually private messages that are sent in channels that allow for content encryption. Continued use of coded messages constitute a technical setback to authorities’ capabilities of identifying, investigating, and disrupting threats that are not just limited to counterterrorism but also touch on child exploitation, gangs and drug traffickers. Authorities uphold the right to

people's privacy to engross in secured telecommunications, irrespective of the type of technology in use. Inclusively, the general population has the autonomy to relay information among each other in private, exclusive of unsanctioned tapping by the authorities either as messages, texts, or old-fashioned letters. Government surveillance is intended to retrieve vital electronic information that promotes citizens' safety.

Societies are continuously reliant on modern technology devices to pass information and store electronic data. Information that was usually stored in filing cabinets, letters, and photo albums is now stored in USB drives, memory cards, hard drives and in clouds. Technological dynamics prevent authorities from investigations and following crucial leads. Such modifications deter strengths to ascertain and halt terrorism that is using media platforms to recruit, plan, and terrorize the populations.

In the terrorism context, electronic devices – a phone, a tablet, or a laptop – are believed to contain significant pieces of evidence or information that substantiate a charge against a terrorist suspect and lead to their sentencing or exoneration. Failure of relevant authorities to access such devices with evidence have continuing negative influences on the capacity to isolate, impede, and implicate criminals. In the first ten months of 2017, the FBI reported that it was unable to access the content of more than six thousand cellular devices using suitable and obtainable technical instruments, even though there was lawful permission. The figure represented slightly more than half of all the cellular devices the bureau tried to impound within the same time frame.

Mostly, security agents are compelled to improvise investigative techniques based on individual cases. This approach is inclusive of utilizing material techniques and probing non-content sources of electronic information like metadata analysis. Some organized investigative institutions such as the FBI adopt optional techniques of permissible concocted

access. However effective, such efforts suffer severe limits. Metadata is a non-content source of information that is not usually adequate in meeting the high standards provided by the constitutional provisions of convections to deter wrongful confinement. Creating different approaches to employ in investigations usually consumes a lot of time, goes at high costs and the results are not certain. On situations where these methods unravel the required evidence, it is difficult for global adoption due to their short time applicability or disclosure during legal trials.

Experts allude these challenges to the balance between privacy and security. The requirements to obtain the legal permission to access personal data by applying for a court subpoena that can facilitate wiretapping are both a privacy and security concern. Authorities need to be actively engaged with relevant stakeholders, including service providers, to create awareness on the corrosive effects of hiding crucial evidence presenting public safety concerns and undermining the rule of law.

Terrorists use modern technological platforms to delude their communications, enlist followers, plot and inspire espionage, carry out cyber-attacks, and attack states. Terrorist threats continue to evolve, necessitating the global society to adapt in order to confront these challenges, relying heavily on global collaborations. Lastly, new technological approaches combined with revised legal approaches are important to combat fast evolving terrorism.

3.3 Kenya's Technological Preparedness in Fighting Terrorism

Sometime not so long ago the customary way of thinking was that the Al-Shabaab brutality would in some way stay constrained to the perpetually unstable and violent Somalia and that the main risk toward the West was arbitrary, disengaged assaults by solitary attackers striking freely of any organisational mandate or influence. It was wishful thinking that was dramatically swept aside in 2011 when the terrorist group started abducting tourists along the

Kenyan coast. The preceding activities happened with no pre-emptive warning and in disobedience of the predominant assumption that Al-Shabaab was not by any means keen on mounting external assaults and additionally did not have the capacity to further such ambitions. The fact that the militants were able to travel undetected from Somalia to Kenya and then back, despite border patrols should make people more mindful about any conception we may have of completely understanding Al-Shabaab abilities and expectations—considerably less the risk that it will keep on presenting in the region. In this context, it is worth to note that terrorists have targeted Kenya many times in the past. High-end Dusit D2 complex located in Nairobi was recently attacked in January 2019¹⁵⁹. The siege took nineteen hours, leaving fifty casualties, among them Kenyans and foreigners, with at least twenty people killed. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack. Terrorists associated with Al-Qaeda attacked the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 that resulted to the death of two hundred people. Al-Shabaab has successfully carried out two notable far-reaching assaults in Kenya. One was a siege on the high-end Westgate Mall that took place in September 2013 where sixty seven people died. The second was the April 2015 Garissa University attack that resulted in 148 deaths¹⁶⁰. Mombasa Republican Council has also been accused of propagating violent extremism in Kenya. Kenyan police have documented cases of Kenyan citizens travelling to join the Islamic State.

From a terrorist perspective, Kenya is concerned with three specific areas: first are the individuals inspired by terrorist propaganda and act out in support of the indoctrination. Secondly are people who act based on the inspiration as a result of extremist propaganda and in primary contact, conveying information to members of foreign terrorist groups who offer advice on set planning or targets. Thirdly are those individuals who are guided by members

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/kenya>

¹⁶⁰ <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/kenya>

of terrorist organizations in foreign countries to attack specific targets that are usually directed in support of terrorists' ideology. Potential terrorists are classified in any one of these three categories.

As a retaliation to the increased terrorist threats, the Kenyan government has taken aggressive approaches to counter extremism. The government initiated the installation of CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) cameras on all major highways and cities, including Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi. This follows a national CCTV policy that requires public institutions and businesses to install the secret cameras. The intentions of the policy are to standardize the installation, operation and management of the digital security platform in Kenya. In the policy, the owners and persons in charge of these premises need to ensure reasonable access, connection, linkage, integration mechanism and registration. In the event of formal investigation, CCTV footage should be disclosed for analysis and prosecution. The policy requires the owner to be held accountable for the footage in an impartial and fair manner. Additionally, there should be a signage to inform any person accessing the building of the secret surveillance. Among the objectives of the policy is to deter, detect and prevent terrorism that constitute a major security threat in Kenya. Initially, when CCTV footage was presented as evidence in Kenyan courts, it presented a policy challenge to the law enforcement. The National Police Service officers were trained to build deeper capacity with a prospect of having a robust security response. In return, CCTV surveillance played a big role in aiding the immediate response to the Dusit attack. The CCTV footage was valuable in piecing together evidence to track down all persons that were involved.

Communications Authority of Kenya pushed for sim card registration in the country with the aim of taming misuse of mobile phones. Fines on non-registered sim cards or buying sim cards from hawkers and failure to report lost cards were also identified as crimes liable for

penalties. The move was intended to boost national security. Mobile service providers were to ensure identification aligns to the integrated population registration systems.

However, Kenya lags in technology developments in counter terrorism. For instance, one of the attackers in the Dusit D2 attack visited the premises on several occasions before the assault, probably as a reconnaissance mission. If the surveillance system had incorporated video analytics technology (VA), it could have been possible to have facial recognition. Such a system is linked with an international criminal database that would have raised concerns on matching the person of interest. Video Analytics is a software that uses complex algorithms to automatically identify specific things and their behaviour or attitudes in a video footage. The software can profile people in different occasions and situations and help authorities to build a database for subsequent monitoring, intelligence sharing or interrogation. These are the best technological approaches towards terrorism incidents that provide early warnings to averting property damage, death or injury. Moreover, Kenya lacks Internet technologies such as crowdsourcing that are effective in gathering intelligence.

3.4 Place of Terrorism in Future Advancement of Technology

Online recruitment and indoctrination have allowed terrorist organizations to operate within their localities without the need for finding ways to travel into target countries to carry out any attack. Online terrorism thrive in uncontrolled platforms to propagate puffery and provide coaching materials that are readily disseminated with an aim of attracting easily influenced individuals across the globe. Recruited individuals are the ones who travel or are motivated to act in their home countries. This presents a significant transformation from the conventional terrorism that resembled foreign invasion into home-grown (domestic) terrorism.

Terrorism has evolved from top down to peer to peer that includes citizen journalism. The focus shifted from getting attention by carrying out large-scale attacks into developing

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the past, terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab used homemade grenades and landmines to terrorize target areas. Now, there are attempts by terrorists to create homemade biological weapons. Easier access to the Internet enables terrorists to have unlimited access to information, both scientific and technical. WMDs are nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that are meant for military use with restricted use. One is the possibility to develop massively destructive weapons such as clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and WMD drugs. By using synthetic biology techniques, terrorists can develop new infectious viruses and bacteria that can be disseminated to the general population. Such biological modifications will be difficult to detect. The international community has reported the urgency in reducing the number and acquisition of WMD, control of the material that can be used to fabricate WMD and sequestering the remaining ones. Biological attacks on agriculture and farm animals is also a future threat of terrorism. The concern lacks equivalent, epidemiological response, necessitating protective measures and decontamination strategies. Despite the fact that weapons of mass destruction are the most lethal, they are hard to get for the terrorist organizations unless with the aid of states sponsoring terrorism.

Terrorist groups such as the Hamas have in the past used drones and kites to launch attacks in Israel. Authorities fear that in future terrorists will have the capacity to use drones in propagating chemical, biological or radiological attacks. Unfortunately, drone technology among the terrorist groups might in the future make use of artificial intelligence (AI). AI may be used to improve the control of unmanned systems and effectively discriminate targets through applications like social media mapping. There is a likelihood of AI improving the efficacy of terrorist financing and surveillance via automation.

Islamic groups have enhanced their cyber-attack capabilities against infrastructure mostly in western countries. In future, they can have offensive capabilities on the Internet by hiring

hackers and receive more support from terrorist sponsoring states.¹⁶¹ Sympathizers of Islamic State have expressed the desire to develop such offensive capabilities.

3.5 How Kenya Responds to Technology Use by Terrorists

Kenya introduced mandatory security checks in public and private institutions as a security measure in response to sporadic terrorist attacks. Handheld and walk through metal detectors were installed even at the entrance of major buildings to detect heavy metals that may be used as explosive devices. Commuter service providers are required to frisk passengers boarding their vehicles, with some installing CCTV cameras. To curb anonymous voice calls, text messages, financial activities and to enhance detection of digital fingerprints, Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) deactivated unregistered sim cards. In efforts to obtain meaningful trail of offenders, the government installed CCTV cameras in major towns and highways. Later a national policy was passed requiring public and private entities to install a surveillance system. Recently, in the attempts to develop a national biodata, the Kenyan government rolled out an audacious Huduma Namba initiative. Details such as physical addresses, facial impression and fingerprints were fed in electric form to enhance quick retrieval in times of need. The modernization of radicalisation should be tackled as a whole, there is a need for more emphasis on critical sectors such as transport, and information communication and technology (ICT). Both of these sectors anchor a country's economy, directly affecting businesses. Consequently, fast progress has been reported in the ICT sector, mostly electronic devices and services (Internet, cellular phones, computers) as compared to the conventional mediums of television, radio and print media. It is evident in the high

¹⁶¹ <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/technology-making-terrorists-more-effective%E2%80%94and-harder-to-thwart-45452>

Internet use, increased penetration and calling traffic. Kenya is reported to have an Internet penetration way above that of Africa (21.3% as by the statistics in December 2013).¹⁶²

In major cities and towns there is Internet accessibility. Facebook, one of the most popular social media platforms, recorded a 4.8% number of users against the total population. The use and spread-penetration of mobile phones was recorded at 80% as of June in 2014.¹⁶³ With the assumption that most of the mobile phones are Internet enabled, their penetration can be a rough measure of the penetration of Internet across the country. In reference to civilization, this is a good gesture as a majority of the population is in access of information that works to the advantage of the country's economic and social development.¹⁶⁴

It is also an indication that more youths are adopting modern means of communication in an aggressive manner. Mostly, young people use these platforms for social activities of entertainment (games music), learning (publications) and interacting (Facebook).¹⁶⁵ Njonjo, concluded that 57% of the population access information through the Internet while the use of email and social media comes second at 39% and entertainment purposes take 2%. The observations are good indicators of progress, however, they present a vast playground for cyber related crimes such as the spread of radicalization of the young population into terror groups. Widespread interconnectivity through online platforms render police surveillance and control of information very difficult, leaving the users, especially young people, exposed to uncensored form of information.¹⁶⁶

3.6 Conclusion

In the realization that digital war is a strong method of promoting terrorist objectives, terrorist organizations have allocated significant resources to its effect. ISIS is reported to have

¹⁶² CAK. op. cit., pp 15

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011)

¹⁶⁵ Njonjo op. cit., 41

¹⁶⁶ Botha, op. cit pp.160

developed a media package that has enabled the organization to appeal to potential recruits. Through aggressive media campaigns, ISIS has undermined the authenticity and authority of western countries. At one notable incident at the ISIS activities in 2014, it had fifty thousand pro-ISIS accounts on Twitter against two hundred Twitter accounts to counter the messaging in the US. There is a growing attention by the world states for the compelling need for a common strategy in order to defeat extremism. However, the strategy remains fragmented and underfunded on differing ideas and informational response. Meanwhile, the digital scope continues to advance in dimensions that advantage extremist activities.

Today, hazardous excess outside volunteers are battling in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Mali just as in Iraq and Syria. In fact, the three columns whereupon this system is based—authority whittling down, preparing of neighbourhood powers and countering brutal radicalism—have up to this point neglected to convey a devastating hit to these fear monger gatherings.

Until the ongoing increases against the Islamic State, specifically in Iraq, Syria and Libya, a discouraging example built up itself where the United States slaughtered psychological militant pioneers while they in any case held onto more domain. Where we scaled back our military, while the progression of enlisted people into their positions proceeded. Where our insight gathering capacities decreased while they all the more adequately encoded their correspondences to plan and actualize assaults and abused advanced and Internet-based life for purposeful publicity and enlistment. Given this reiteration of rising and growing difficulties, the most basic inquiry today is whether the United States can keep a structure on these most recent increases to guarantee supported, long haul progress.

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opined that exposure is the oxygen of fear mongering. Today, in any case, it is access to asylum and place of refuge that supports and feeds psychological warfare. Appropriately, just executing a few pioneers in psychological

militant gatherings, whose positions in any occasion are consistently recharged, will not be part of the bargain by the ISIS and al-Qaeda to oust the radicals from their operating hideouts in places like Levant in Iraq, parts of Northern Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. Moderate approaches by state security agencies to use local governments is not intended to work. There are inadequacies in preparation strategies that are aimed at unrestricted acceleration of psychological oppressor exercises in every one of those spots. Regardless of whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, or Somalia, our endeavours to construct accomplice limit have all foundered. In every Islamist fear monger numbers became quicker than we had the option to prepare indigenous security powers adequately; psychological militant command over an area and the making of new asylums and places of refuge extended while administrative sway contracted; and the psychological militants' operational viability obviously outmatched those of their administration rivals. There has been progress on the ongoing advancement in countries within North Africa, Middle East, it is not evident that the previous issues that derailed the introduction of local soldiers have been defeated and incapacitated. It is the approach that Iraqi authorities' powers stay ill armed for reclaiming Mosul void of backing of civilian armies, for example, the Kurdish Peshmerga and Shi'a Popular Mobilization armies. The Afghanistan government relies on air support provided by the American military superiority that has been successful in incapacitating the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State brutality in that nation. Also, American tactical support has been helpful in containing the resurgence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This is not in consideration of AMISOM's preparation into engaging the terrorist group and training the local government security forces. With an example of Mali, it was a project of the American accomplice preparing between 2002 and 2012. At one time, President Obama explicitly referred to the preparation of Yemen's security powers as confirmation of the achievement of these efforts to counter terrorism.

As of a report by GSM association, 52% of Kenyans used mobile Internet in quarter four of 2016. Kenya has a wide access to the Internet, coupled with popular encrypted messaging services, increased use of virtual private networks and cohorts of veteran domestic fighters returning from Somalia terrorist hideouts. According to reports, 14 million people in Kenya have access to the Internet. Despite that, mass accessible terrorist operations are limited to the West, in presence of conventional terrorist networks, the geography of terrorism is set to expand. It is witty for the policy makers to incorporate sound technological approaches in their projections of emerging Internet terrorism, extensive investment in technology, capacity building and intelligence sharing.

Religious leaders can and should indeed promote the prevention of violent extremism. The religious leaders have a unique position in relation to the fight against terrorism, given the power bestowed upon them, credibility, resources and close ties with the community. It is important to note that not all violence can be explained in terms of religion and not every extremism is violent. However, media coverage and reporting always ignore the positive contribution of religion in efforts to counter terrorism. The media discussions have continually stressed the important role of religion in countering terrorism in Kenya.¹⁶⁷ It is important to recognize and appreciate the role of religion and its leaders/stakeholders in actualizing the war on violent extremism as well as involving different stakeholders in discussions which are aimed at winning the war. This further enhances the role of religious leaders in preventing violent extremism along with the significance of community and faith leaders to mentor vulnerable adherents to empower them to dismiss violent belief systems and promote tolerance, comprehension and compromise among communities.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Nozell op. Cit., pp. 113

¹⁶⁸ Baku, A. (2016)

The United Nations plan action plan on preventing violent extremism indicates that the persons employed by terrorists, and retire are radicalized and then recruited in major prisons across the country. It is therefore imperative that there must be safeguard measures put in place to prevent these persons from spreading terrorist ideologies among other prisoners, along with ensuring that religious leaders are not tricked to support such extremist acts. As much as religion has been used to instigate violence, it can also be used as a means to peace building. The fact that religious leaders can communicate with each other much faster than before due to the improved methods of communication can be one way of building peace among people of different religions. International religious organizations like Catholic Relief Services have peace building as one of its missions. Buddhism encourages Buddhists to better the life on earth through, among other things, peace building.¹⁶⁹ Many religions promote values like selflessness, discipline, compassion, empathy and forgiveness. The belief in these values implies that a religious person will be motivated to work towards peace.¹⁷⁰

Many religions have similar traditions, values and practices. The adaptability of many of the religious traditions, beliefs and values can be used by religious leaders positively to choose myths and symbols and create interpretations which encourage reconciliation.¹⁷¹ Through these, they can encourage peace building. Religious leaders usually know the myths, symbols and traditions of the religion they profess, as well as a linkage with other religious leaders in the same or different religions. They can use these linkages and knowledge of the prevailing myths and traditions to create bridges between warring parties. Religious leaders are usually trusted by their followers, who comprise members of the local community. Because of this trust, their advice and standpoint is easier to follow compared to the views of ordinary

¹⁶⁹ Appleby Op cit., pp. 196

¹⁷⁰ Silberman, I. E., Tory H. and Dweck, C. S. (2005)

¹⁷¹ Bercovitch, op cit., pp. 177

members of the community. This trust can be exploited to create harmony between discordant communities.

Their position as religious leaders gives them moral legitimacy and leverage to bring about an agreement between parties involved in a conflict, thereby acting like intermediaries.¹⁷² The authors further point out that religious peace building is more effective when religion still plays an important role in that society, when the disputants respect the religious authority of the peace builders and when religion plays some part in the conflict.

According to Mohammed,¹⁷³ each religion can cultivate either violence or peace. It is the duty of the individuals who pursue a faith to separate these resources for peace from their religious scriptures. He extracts these resources and in the case of Islam, comes up with a list of virtues or attributes, valued within Islam, which can contribute towards peace. These include human dignity and equality, all as creations of God; fairness and pardon, showing sympathy regarded more highly than pursuing vengeance; calling for peace; avoiding confrontation; and resolution with warring parties. There are other attributes that are not directly linked to peace but can be useful in the peace building process.¹⁷⁴ These include patience, valorisation of collaborative processes above authoritarian ones, and the concept of the Ummah or Muslim community which emphasises collective action that can be utilised for peaceful goals, despite the reputation that Islam has in the west for being inherently violent. Denny¹⁷⁵ asserts that overwhelming majority of Muslims genuinely need peaceful domestic and international political and religious relations and the institutions and understandings that can make them secure and stable.

¹⁷² Ibid pp. 187

¹⁷³ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

¹⁷⁵ Denny, F. M. (2004)

The Bible explicitly discusses peace, as embodied by Jesus who sought peaceful conflict resolution and mercy among the followers. A majority of Christian believers value love and compassion, elements that propagate peace. In a similar fashion, Gandhi (2004) explains that Hindu religious texts tend to emphasise war, especially the epics, but that peace and reconciliation are also represented as worthwhile goals. The Ramayana also emphasises the importance of treating the enemy honourably, and Rama's chariot is described as having "self-restraint as one of its horses, and cords of forgiveness and compassion to harness it. The Quakers and the Mennonites have been devoting their time and money towards conflict resolution and peace building.¹⁷⁶

Most research studies suggest that Christianity has taken the greater initiative when it comes to peace building, especially when compared to Islam and Hinduism. A case in point is the Henry Martyr School of Islamic Studies (HMI) in Hyderabad, which was started with the goal of studying Islam in order to facilitate missionary efforts among Muslims and enable them to "commend Christ acceptably to Muslims".¹⁷⁷ This role was changed to include that of encouraging interreligious dialogue, reconciliation and in building peace between communities.¹⁷⁸ The institute has lately established three community development projects in the Old City of Hyderabad where Muslims and Hindus are brought together to learn skills to support their livelihood, to be schooled, to receive health care etc. the aim of this is to bring members of the different communities together to solve common problems, thereby developing strong links that cannot be easily separated. This would also increase the participants' awareness of the commonalities between the two communities, thereby encouraging them to actively work towards preventing violence in times of tension.

¹⁷⁶ Bartoli, A. (2004)

¹⁷⁷ Diane d'Souza (1998)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

There have been many debates and dialogues surrounding the important role played by religion which is an important factor in enhancing understanding and ironing out differences in terms of inter-country relations and national security.¹⁷⁹ The religious approach explicitly emphasises use of religious individuality, spiritual material, resources and other forms of faith-based indulgences in third party roles of peace building. The religious interventions are very much reliable on religious actions who are perceived as being legitimate stakeholders in solving conflicts among nations. Conflict resolution has been emphasized in the religious context where beliefs of sharing common destiny and a sense of reception of a divine calling as far as peace and reconciliation is concerned has been seen as an antecedent of fighting terrorism in Kenya. In such understanding, involving the religious bodies will play an important role as far as solving the problem of terrorist attacks is concerned.

There has been increased importance of religious leader involvement in peace-building among many nations in the world. The religious leaders contribute positively in the stages of conflict resolution such as mediation, arbitration, reconciliation, advocating for a political change, as well as establishing that peace exists even after reconciliation process. A body known as Appleby has been advocating for the understanding of the great role played by religious leaders in resolving conflicts and prevention of terror attacks. It also advocates for societal holistic efforts to addressing terrorism and maintain conflicts, in a way that respects the human rights, along with increased government involvement in these efforts.

There are several benefits accrued from involvement of the religious leaders in peace building initiatives and conflict resolutions. This is mostly due to their ability to use religious teachings in advocating for peace.¹⁸⁰ Religious leaders are perceived to maintain high moral norms that are valuable to the followers in terms of respect and influence. Religions have far

¹⁷⁹ , D. and Cox, B. (2003)

¹⁸⁰ Smock, op cit., pp.27

reaching connections that allow for local, national, and global linkages helpful in providing resources for conflict resolution.¹⁸¹ The civil structure of any society always augurs well with religious leaders, who offer leadership in societies and democracies that are undergoing reconciliation having undergone stigmatisation through attacks and conflicts.¹⁸² Religious actors can make use of various measures in responding to violent extremism: educating; advocating; intermediating; mediating; positive influence the change of behaviours; facilitate peace related studies, provide health and relief services; publicise ideas on human rights, human freedom and rights or encourage disarmament.¹⁸³

Sterland and Beauclerk¹⁸⁴ concluded that the relevance of religious institutions is based on the extent that these institutions promote religion in a community without themselves being part of the religious community. The sense of belonging to the religious part of the community makes them trusted by the people. However, by not being part of the community itself, it creates autonomy that works for them in the peace building processes. Communities can be mobilized by their religious leaders based upon their accessibility of the masses.¹⁸⁵ Religious leaders reach out to the people through sermons in large numbers that is achieved with relative ease.¹⁸⁶ More so faith-based leaders have access to both the grassroots people and the top leaders. Fortunately, due to the spread of common spiritual beliefs, religious leaders are in a position to mobilize resources and people through elaborate local and international linkages.¹⁸⁷

In most case, religious leaders are seen to be trustworthy in both moral and spiritual dimensions which is usually a motivation for peace building initiatives with lesser ulterior

¹⁸¹ Ibid pp. 23

¹⁸² Shore, M. (2009)

¹⁸³ Bercovitch, J., & Kadayifci-Orellana, A. S. (2009)

¹⁸⁴ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003)

¹⁸⁵ Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 179

¹⁸⁶ Ibid pp. 178

¹⁸⁷ Ibid pp. 182

intentions. Some literature suggests that Muslim based communities mostly tend to portray as individuals other than organized non-governmental organizations.¹⁸⁸ Christian communities are often formed into organizations that have the ability to link up with Christians based in other communities.¹⁸⁹

Religious organizations have widespread networks that helps in reaching out to the wide public. Spiritual networks are in constant interactions that are based on cooperation and dialogue among different identities in the overall group¹⁹⁰. At times, these networks are across different regions and even country borders. Such established networks may be critical to promote dialogue during conflicts among warring parties. Further, the belief of “being religious” is an element that can be used to advocate for reconciliation during conflicts¹⁹¹. In Angola, the Catholic Church put into practice various approaches to pressure the warring parties not to resume violence. The church used direct contact through its interactions with the grassroots level followership and international networks. Further, the church employed public protest and had support from traditional local leaders (sobas), non-governmental organizations, and donor governments.¹⁹²

Religious leaders have the ability to gravitate for peace from the government through collective activism and lobbying. In Sri Lanka, the Budhi founded Sarvodaya movement is a strong player in advocating for social and economic reforms.¹⁹³ In Kano, Nigeria, the radical Islamic movement Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’ah Wa’ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) continuously lobbied the state for equal distribution of relief services and justice for the community.¹⁹⁴ In Kenya, the Wajir based faith-based community, successfully convinced the government to

¹⁸⁸ Abu-Nimer, M., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2008)

¹⁸⁹ Owen, M. & King, A. (2013)

¹⁹⁰ Johnston, D. (2003)

¹⁹¹ Johnston, D. (2003)

¹⁹² Cain, A. (2001)

¹⁹³ Ibid pp. 580

¹⁹⁴ Best, S. G., & Rakodi, C. (2011)

start peace education programs in schools. Another case study is in Nepal. Where mixed faith institutions have pushed for the youth grievances, disarmament, including spaces for faith-based cemeteries.¹⁹⁵

Faith based leaders can lead to peaceful transformation in their communities through education of the masses. They hold positions highly regarded in the society that allow them to educate call for tolerance, understanding and on other religions beliefs.¹⁹⁶ The success of faith-based organisations in peacebuilding efforts is associated with religious teachings. Alluding to doctrines specific to a religious group in promoting development agenda can lead to intrinsic value within that society.¹⁹⁷

In the city of Mindanao, Philippines, soldiers have been actively involved by the faith-based communities in peace building workshops.¹⁹⁸ Catholic Relief Services has facilitated peace building trainings that have been essential for the military in understanding conflicts in different set ups. The relief service has helped the attitude towards the military change into being seen as colleagues other than a powerful force.¹⁹⁹ The relief service has gone beyond into creating bridges among communities. The result is a change in the reputation of the soldiers promoting their relationships with the society.

Damietta Peace Intuitive is a Franscian Christian Organization in South Africa that empowers people as a means of building peace. The initiative focuses on educating the society on non-violent ways of conflict resolution. In a non-violent way, teaching peace and tolerance. The

¹⁹⁵ Owen op. cit., pp. 225

¹⁹⁶ Hayward, S. (2012)

¹⁹⁷ Clark, J. N. (2011)

¹⁹⁸ Berkley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs. (2011)

¹⁹⁹ Ibid pp. 37

organization targets the poor black majority population in rising their self-esteem that lead to reconciliation thorough the empowerment program.²⁰⁰

Schools and educational institutions are seen as conduits of values are therefore used in promoting peace by instilling behavioural and attitude change.²⁰¹ Through child education, values taught can help tolerate tolerance that is essential in long term peace.²⁰² Spiritual teachings can aid in creating mental resilience, providing hope and constructing a form of unique social structure.²⁰³ ICCO and KIRK both of which are Dutch Christian organizations are fundamental in promoting the ideals of peace, tolerance, peaceful coexistence, inclusivity and non-violence that is achieved in partnership with faith based societies.

One accomplice association is ZOA in Sub-Saharan Africa, which advances strife change in its school programs through interreligious and interethnic collaboration, equivalent access to administrations, and responsible administration, among others. Caritas Southern Africa is doing peacebuilding in schools all through South Africa. Its program plans to enable youngsters to manage sentiments of resentment and dissatisfaction in a valuable way, to help forestall going to savagery. World Vision in Nepal has offered comparative workshops to kids, expecting to help fabricate inspirational frames of mind.

Governments and associations have grasped interfaith discourse as a key device for encouraging peacebuilding in circumstances where struggle has some between religious components. In some scholastic work, cultivating relations between various networks is likewise alluded to as structure social capital. There are many instances of this sort of work, which is a key focal point of numerous FBOs.

²⁰⁰ Clark op cit., pp. 347

²⁰¹ Van Ommering, E. (2009)

²⁰² Ibid pp. 453

²⁰³ Van Ommering op. cit., pp450

Caritas Nepal helped between confidence compromise through network ventures, including giving the structure materials to Hindus and Muslims to build houses together. In Jos, Nigeria, after savagery in 2001, numerous associations partook in or built-up classes for peacebuilding and exchange. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) sorted out gatherings among Christians and Muslims, took an interest in between confidence courses and fabricated discourse with Muslim partners. The Islamic association Jamatul Nasril Islam drove Christian-Muslim exchange and partook in all the harmony boards of trustees sorted out by government. Religiously blended workshops seemed to have helped construct trust between members. Different procedures included blended confidence sports matches, workshops on peacefulness, focusing on various divisions, for example, understudies and indigenous people groups, and radio messages of harmony.

Gopin²⁰⁴ suggests that exercises such as interfaith discourse ought to be combined with various approaches to accomplish considerable outcomes. Moreover, what many concur on is that so as to empower and reinforce the impact of religious leaders and other actors, co-operation among religious and mainstream secular actors, and between local religious leaders and political specialists, is essential.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Gopin, M. (2000)

²⁰⁵ Appleby op. cit., 212

CHAPTER FOUR

COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

Kenya, as a third world country, has employed various strategies to combat terrorism and, in their implementation, the country confronts several limitations. In this chapter, these strategies, limitations and their impacts are discussed. In addition, there is a brief look into the Kenya antiterrorism laws and the chapter sums up with data analysis and presentation.

4.2 Specific Counter Terrorism Measures and their Impact

The National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism was launched in September 2016. The strategy was to ensure pooling of assets from the government, the private sector and civil society to advance counterterrorism endeavours. Kenya has initiated rehabilitation programmes and initiatives aimed at de-radicalization processes. In attempts to counter migration of Kenyans into Somalia, the Ministry of Interior accorded amnesty to all radicalized youths returning from Al-Shabaab. It targeted those who wished to denounce their criminal activities and were willing to rejoin the society. These efforts were termed to be cross-cutting, multi-agency and a national campaign that offer prevention, mitigation, and rehabilitative measures. Counter terrorism efforts have employed new approaches, including unprecedented multi-agency security operations, with investments in skills, technology and innovation. As a result, there has been increased coordination and use of equipment aimed at detecting, disrupting and deterring terrorist activities. They are complimentary to other existing counterterrorism efforts. Kenya has greatly contributed to peace building, security and stabilization of Somalia through the joint forces of African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM).²⁰⁶ The military action, first initiated by the Kenya Defense Forces' "Operation Linda Nchi", has significantly disabled Al-Shabaab and reclaimed vast territories that were previously under the terrorist organization²⁰⁷. In 2018, experts on Kenyan security affirmed that Kenya's military strategy had led to considerable decrease in Al-Shabaab's violent activities.

Based on past sporadic attacks in Kenya, it is clear the country is susceptible to domestic and international terrorist acts. The trend has elicited concerns from not only the state but also the regulatory bodies to come up with a mechanism to minimize the risks of terrorist operations. In response to the growing terrorist threats, Kenya National Strategy was established in 2016 as a 'Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy'. Also constituted were the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force and National Task Force aimed at enhancing national security.²⁰⁸ The approaches were essential in ensuring their adoption among all relevant government ministries prevent and counter terrorism.

The Kenya Police Service was introduced in 1887 and has since been faced by great pressure to ensure effective and efficient service delivery to the citizens, hence the introduction of the Kenya Police Strategic Plan (2003-2008), whose main objective was to cater for both internal development of the police force and promoting the welfare of the citizens. This was further boosted by the 2013-2017 strategic plan. All these are aimed at providing guidelines onto how the police organ conducts their operations. This has been upheld by the campaigns for public awareness that have enabled the building of good rapport with the public. Additionally, the creation of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) has greatly aided in the efforts to counter terrorist threats and resulting attacks. The service is a coordination centre tasked with

²⁰⁶ https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2018/01/kenya-instituted-measures-fight-terror-president-kenyatta-savs/?doing_wp_cron=1568037521.0983378887176513671875

²⁰⁷ Hoffman, B. (2016).

²⁰⁸ "United Nations-Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force". Accessed August 10 from <https://umv.un.org/counterterrorism/ctif/en/un-counter-ty/>

countering extremists' activities that include operationalization of the national strategy on countering radical based violence and in the strategic tactical support of the AMISOM's war against terrorism. In its approach, Kenya uses two information communication and technology mechanisms that include the militant and intelligence frameworks. These efforts have incorporated NSAs as seen in the de-radicalization efforts of the GOR and NSAs like CNDP, USAID and other Community Based Organizations.²⁰⁹

According to the Global Terrorism Index 2014, Kenya is ranked twelfth, one of the highest-ranking countries that are affected by terrorism. The study found out that the government's response has been to tackle the underlying problems, which are mainly the increased Somali refugee inflow, who have migrated and settled as urban refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi. Since the 1990s, Eastleigh has transformed from predominantly a residential area to a profit-making business centre with a wide range of retailers and wholesalers. This has led to increased competition to the Asians who had predominantly occupied the region. The area was established and referred to as the 'Little Mogadishu' owing to the large population of refugees in the region who are mainly of Somali origin. Currently, Eastleigh has over 350,000 inhabitants²¹⁰ who include mostly Somali Kenyans as well as registered Somali refugees. However, Eastleigh, which is the new hub of trade networks both locally and internationally, is frequently targeted by the state securities to arrest and identify illegal migrants. The area has experienced numerous terrorist attacks, which worsened in November 2012. This was followed by five more attacks in the following months, thus making the area a primary concern with regards to curbing terrorism attempts in Kenya. In response to the rise in terrorist attacks, the respondents indicated that there has been implementation and beefing up of new police squads and units with more equipment and utilities to prevent terrorism from

²⁰⁹ GOK, Kenya National Strategy, Nairobi, Government Printer (2017)

²¹⁰ Lochery, E. (2012)

happening and punishing the culprits. The agencies that have been set up include Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the National Counter Terrorism Center, National Security Intelligence Service and the National Security Advisory Committee. Eastleigh region constitutes one of the most vulnerable areas to terrorism, having been the target of most attacks done in Kenya. This has seen numerous counter terrorism strategies being put in place by the security agencies. The strategies that the study found out to be in place to curb terrorist activities in Eastleigh include the following;

Intelligence Services

Following the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi, the National Security Intelligence Service was formed to collect, analyse and advice on terrorist threats. Through its operations, the service gained global recognition and was incorporated into the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in the US.²¹¹ The NIS has a daunting responsibility of deterring and preventing terrorist attacks before they happen through detailed evidence analysis that is reliable. Either political, economic or social, the intelligence services are to protect the country's interests and ensure that due security measures are in place. Intelligence services that involve diplomatic relations in cases of cross-border inquiries have been promoted, changing the scope of counter terrorism measures throughout history. Pashley and Cools note that the NIS is required to provide crucial values that guide the investigations undertaken in operations as well as measure the resulting effectiveness. Under such basis, the intelligence services at Eastleigh region play a great role in determining the course of the current security positions among different security organs.²¹² However, as opposed to developed countries, Kenya and generally third world countries lack training utilities, equipment and financial muscle necessary to invest in intelligence infrastructure. Authorities rely on conventional means of

²¹¹ (2006). "NSIS Historical Background", Security Intelligence Service. Archived from the original in October 2017.

²¹² V. Pashley, and M. Cools

gathering and analysing intelligence information that mostly does not rely on modern software integrations and IT capabilities. As a result, Kenyan intelligence is heavily reliant on technical help from well-established spy organizations such as the US and the UK and other states willing to collaborate to promote regional safety. The counter terrorism strategy will be highly dependent on Kenya for implementation to enhance mapping of radical activities in the country.

Risk Reduction Strategies

Risk reduction strategy has been reported to be gaining wide acceptance in terrorist attacks, prevention and deterrence. In the risk reduction strategy, players need to identify, assess and mitigate the threats of an attack. The approach aims at reducing the population exposure to the adverse effects of attacks. In areas like Eastleigh, the strategy involves services automation, metal detectors in buildings, frequent security checks that are both private and public. Moreover, better management of transport through road block checks is essential. The approach has eliminated major terrorist threats. Murty identified several risk factors associated with terrorism as detonations, arsons, armed assault, biological and nuclear assaults, inclusive of others like cybercrime, and espionage. Any of the identified factors results in colossal damage when carried out, necessitating early detection and aversion.²¹³ In the US embassy attacks, there was loss of lives, property destruction, physiological trauma and loss to businesses. The reduction strategy as an approach to counter terrorism has worked to the advantage of the government, however, it has been confronted by several challenges that need immediate resolution. Major concerns associated with the strategy is the lack of policy and legal frameworks that impair the implementation process. Also, there are challenges of ill preparedness, fragile coordination and integration among government departments during terrorist incidences in the country. Hence, risk reduction teams are

²¹³ Mogire, E. and K. M Agade

incapacitated to fully address all terrorist assaults in the country. Thus, the risk management teams are not fully ready to respond to any impending terrorist attacks in the regions. This is supported by Odhiambo, Maito and Onkware, who argue that putting danger measures could be as basic as confining passage and it plays a significant role in limiting terrorist assaults in a specific region.²¹⁴ Through screening, the risks of terrorist activities happening are highly minimized and the citizens are given a sense of security amongst themselves. Hence, the government should station law enforcement officers at critical sites to check the movement of the public entering and leaving buildings.

Security Operations

To ensure tight security across the country, the government has adopted security operations with more frequencies in dangerous areas. One of these operations in Eastleigh area is the “Operation Usalama Watch” that began in April 2014, involving about 6,000 security officers, some drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces. The operation was justified as a means of extraditing illegal foreign nationals some of whom were indicted to have links with terrorist groups. Operation Usalama Watch led to the deportation of illegal immigrants found within Eastleigh area and Nairobi town. The unauthorized immigrants engaging in illegal activities were detained while others were relocated to designated refugee camps. These security operations were not without sharp criticisms from several Muslim clerics, political leaders from the opposition and human rights activists who complained against excessive force and said the operation was biased against the Somali ethnicity. On record is the statement of Michelle Kigali, Deputy Regional Director for Eastern Africa at Amnesty International that “Operation Usalama Watch is being used as a pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali community in Kenya. They have become scapegoats with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcibly relocated and hundreds unlawfully expelled to a

²¹⁴ Odhiambo, M.D. Maito, P. and Onkware, K. (2013)

war-torn country."²¹⁵ It is therefore in the interest of the law enforcers to observe due diligence during security operations to avoid discrimination in the household searches.

Community Policing

Abdulrahamah describes community policing as a form of paradigm shift with which the recipients of police services – the community – participate in maintaining law and order through a collaboration with the authorities. Community policing was earlier established in parts of Eastleigh and Mombasa to enhance the quality of police services through human intelligence. Modern community policing requires police to delegate some of their mandate to the members of the public and fall into some form of formal hierarchy. Coquilhat posits that there are three principle elements that need to be adopted for a community-based counter terrorism strategy to be effective. The first strategy is change management followed by community partnership and lastly collective problem solving.²¹⁶

Fielding observes that community-based terrorism mitigation approach arose from the inadequacy of earlier policing methods due to the fast dynamics in modern terrorism world. Further, continued use of force weathered out the public trust for police, creating the need for community involvement in combating terrorism.²¹⁷ One of the greatest benefits realized through community policing is having a localised response to terrorist threats that has considerably improved the police efficiency and accountability. Through the existence of community-based approaches, challenges and possible loopholes within implemented strategies are identified and provided with solutions progressively. To strengthen the security initiatives, citizens need to be involved through rallies and public seminars with an aim of awareness creation and increased support. In countries like China, community-based policing

²¹⁵ O'Kefa. O. (2009)

²¹⁶ Coquilhat, J. (2008)

²¹⁷ Davis, R.C., N.J. Henderson and C. Memck

is hugely based on community cooperation and public consent. Both local and political structures need to be aware of the counter terrorism strategies for collective public safety. However, there are several setbacks associated with community policing through its implementation and application. Baker deduced that from a terrorism perspective the community is seen as a tool to enhance terrorism rather than an approach to reduce attacks. In the approach, the community provides authentic and essentially reliable information, contrary to the police who do not share privy intelligence.

As a counter terrorism strategy, Kenya began the implementation of community policing in 2003. The Kenya Police Annual Report entails community policing as a way of involving and joining together the resources and efforts at the government agencies' disposal together with a number of community members. The aim is to bridge the gap between the police and the community in mutually benefiting ways. As a recent result, the strategy has led to the launch of the "Nyumba Kumi Initiative" in the wake of home-grown terrorism. The initiative is in attempts to counter terrorism right at the grassroots with the help of the public members who are well positioned to witness suspicious activities within their neighbourhoods. Nyumba Kumi initiative has gained popularity in rural settings but continue to struggle in the most vital urban areas.

Random Searches

Patrol police carry random searches in areas like Eastleigh as a counter terrorism measure. Police search premises of terrorism suspects, detainees, documentations, financial transactions, photographs and electronic devices that mostly are seized for further analysis. Mostly, these security operations are aimed at nabbing illegal immigrants largely present in these terrorism hotspots. According to a study by Chumba, these surprise searches are

effective community policing strategies to counter terrorism in Kenya.²¹⁸ The Eastleigh part of Nairobi is mostly inhabited by the Somali tribe. These people are usually deemed to be engaged in illegal business activities, hence they are perceived to be wealthy. The perception has attracted periodical security screenings in the area ostensibly to beef up security. However, the police have taken such screenings as an opportunity to arrest and extort residents. Additionally, in spite of the stipulation by the Kenyan laws that such screenings must always be accompanied by search warrants, that is rarely the case. Consequently, these unwarranted searches have received much criticism from the residents, especially with regard to their validity. These concerns have compelled the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) to launch investigations into cases where the police were accused of violating the human rights in the process of carrying out the searches. Examples of the findings include harassment, gross assault to the residents as well as cases of bribery. Despite this, there was also support from the public due to negative perception attributed to Somalis that they are terrorists and criminals. On the other hand, these operations also cause short term economic consequences. According to Lederach, peacebuilding depends on the contributions of leadership from three major levels which include the top level, the middle range and the grassroots levels.²¹⁹ First, the top level includes the key military and political leaders in the conflict. Due to their low numbers, they are to some degree expelled from their constituencies. Profoundly obvious, they are bound to be more impacted than other actors by media pressure and individual professional aspiration, especially as the latter is affected by the prosecution and outcome of the conflict. The public's perception that these are the key players with genuine power and influence ups the stakes for them, and the resoluteness because of a paranoid fear of being seen as losing ground to a more grounded rival can be the outcome. At the post-conflict level in which structural transformation ought to take place, the

²¹⁸ Chumba, C. (2012)

²¹⁹ Lederach, J. P. (2010)

leaders often are concerned with consolidating power and preserving stability by whatever means possible; they allow real structural reform, if at all, with these considerations primarily in mind. Secondly is the middle range level which are the top-level national officials such as patriarchs, bishops, chief rabbis and ayatollahs.

Numerous scholars²²⁰ have deliberated the various roles that the religious leaders play regarding peacebuilding and peace making. Other scholars have also highlighted the high potential of religious leaders in encouraging peace within their communities.²²¹²²²²²³

Reconciliation comes out as a unique area in which the religious leaders make the highest contribution. Johnston and Cox²²⁴ note that religious leaders, owing to their proven respectable values, have the capability to serve as political actors. In this regard, they are able to mobilise both international and local support to assist in the success of the peace-making initiatives. Lederach²²⁵ proposes a paradigm shift by focusing more on the rebuilding of relationships as opposed to making resolutions. According to Sampson²²⁶, there has been an increase in the activeness towards peacebuilding by networks, interreligious councils as well as other organizations. These councils, NGOs, and religious bodies formed by religious leaders have the ability to contribute more in terms of preventing conflicts through religious approaches.^{227 228} Botha²²⁹ finds that FBOs have been able to positively contribute to conflict resolution, mediation together with peacebuilding in various ways in the communities affected by war.

²²⁰ Appleby, R.S. (2000).

²²¹ Barnett, Michael, and Janice Gross Stein. (2012)

²²² James, op. cit., pp.19

²²³ Omer, A. (2015)

²²⁴ Johnston op. cit. pp. 14

²²⁵ Lederach op. cit., 24

²²⁶ Sampson op. cit., pp. 273-326.

²²⁷ Johnston, D. (2003)

²²⁸ Johnston, D. (2003)

²²⁹ Botha, A. (2013)

For Lederach²³⁰ the midrange leaders are best positioned to lead long-term peacebuilding efforts. This is because, they have more prominent adaptability of movement and are more in number compared to top level leaders. Additionally, they are associated with a wide scope of people in the conflict settings through their systems and expert affiliations. Within the religious community the midlevel leaders are the exceptionally regarded priests, clerics, clergymen, rabbis and other people who fill in as leaders of the regional religious bodies such as dioceses' representatives to ecumenical, civic or inter-religious bodies, or as pastors of prominent local congregations.²³¹

Creation of the NCTC, a multi-agency institution put in place has ensured Kenya's counter-terrorism policies are implemented. Kenya adopted anti-terrorism county action plans to reduce threats to the counties by bringing together all the 47 counties. The plan incorporates enforcement agencies, administrators, civil society and the general public. The NCTC is in collaboration with Kenya's Ministry of Education on a curriculum-based programme aimed at countering violent extremism.

Al-Shabaab fighters have been reportedly crossing into Kenya through neighbouring Somalia's Bula Hawa border region. In April 2015, the Kenyan government began the construction of a wall along the Somalia border to cut off Al-Shabaab militants and illegal immigrants that may be coming in with extremism motives. It is a 440-mile planned wall, which stretches from the Indian Ocean to Mandera, an intersection of Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia borders. The wall incorporates concrete barriers, fences, ditches, and observation posts. Kenya and Somalia agreed to share a common exit and entry points along for better policing. North-eastern Regional Commissioner Mohamud Saleh, said that the construction of the wall had considerably lowered the border attacks to almost zero levels. However,

²³⁰Lederach, J. P. (2010)

²³¹ Lederach op. cit., 42-43

political differences between the Kenyan and Somali governments have slowed the construction process.

To counter online extremism (radicalization) the Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) and the Institute of Development Studies formed Countering Violent Extremism Research Hub. It is an online library to support counter violent extremism (CVE) research. CVE committee is funded by the government to track extremist incidents in Kenya and entails active CVE programming. The committee was created under the country's CVE strategy that was adopted in September 2016.

Kenya is a participant in the United States' Security Governance Initiative (SGI) that focuses on oversight, management and accountability of security services. Among the Kenya's SGI priorities are administration of justice, border security and police human resource management. Each of the priorities has an aspect of countering violent extremism.

Diplomatic relations between Kenya and US has injected \$1 billion to empower the country economically and help in military combat of extremism activities. Funding from the US has partially been used to purchase equipment, training, and improve intelligence and improving logistics capabilities.

Collaboration between Kenyan government and the British army has led to the training of 1,000 Kenyan police and military officers in the disposal of IEDs from 2015. On her visit to Kenya in 2018, British Prime Minister Theresa May agreed to expand cooperation between the two countries in counter terrorism measures. In the agreements, was the expansion of a joint Kenyan-United Kingdom counterterrorism installation to a regional facility for IED disposal. Aimed to be fully operational by the end of 2020. United Kingdom pledged to provide funding and material resources for Kenya to enhance its border and aviation security activities.

A religion can serve an essential role in rebuilding trust and restoring social fabric in communities. To foster that, religious groups can outwardly encourage some crucial values, for instance, empathy, forgiveness, mercifulness, compassion and repentance.²³² While Johnston and Cox²³³ highlight the capability of religious leaders in bringing together opposing parties, Kadayifci-Orellana²³⁴ notes the abilities of religious leaders in facilitating the healing of trauma, for instance through ceremonies and rituals as important aspects of peacebuilding. Many often agree that religious leaders are able to foster peace among conflicting parties due to the respect, trust and legitimacy they receive from their communities.²³⁵ Additionally, the religious leaders also need to comprehensively understand the needs of their communities so that they can effectively facilitate the process of peacebuilding. Amongst all levels of religious leaders, engaging the moderate leaders is an essential of curbing extremist religious groups as well as general violence.²³⁶ Sampson²³⁷ emphasizes that modern approaches to reconciliation, mediation, and reconstruction of communities are particularly essential in intrastate conflicts in which the conflicting parties live close to one another which affects their routine activities. For these and other reasons, the peaceful potential of religion is increasingly employed by various religious actors from faith-based NGOs to individuals in their peace efforts.²³⁸ They are now increasingly play peacebuilding roles in numerous conflicts which are not limited to those perceived to be religious.²³⁹ Appleby²⁴⁰ underscores that religious actors add to the processes of structural reform that is vital for the restoration of conflict and human rights abuses. For him, countering recovering from abusive regimes and civil wars, as in South Africa and

²³² Johnston op. cit., pp.14-15

²³³ Johnston op. cit., pp.14

²³⁴ Kadayifci op. cit., pp. 274

²³⁵ Bercovitch op 29

²³⁶ Zartman, I. W, and Maha K.. (2011)

²³⁷ Sampson, C. (2007)

²³⁸ Ibid pp. 277

²³⁹ Smock op. cit., pp 21-28

²⁴⁰ Appleby op. cit., pp.228

Nicaragua, urged religious leaders to determine and implement appropriate instruments of transitional justice.²⁴¹ For him, religious actors were set up to accept authority of key components of social recreation after a dangerous clash since they had been personally associated with the attempt to end the violence from the beginning whether as prophetic voice, social critic, advocate for the poor and defenceless or humanitarian relief agency.²⁴² For example in the 1960's and 1970's when the military grabbed power in most Latin American countries, with only Colombia and Venezuela left with democratic politics, the Catholic Church – the dominant religious body on the continent at the time – increased its public condemnation of the abuses of power. The bishops of Brazil, Chile and Argentina denounced state-sponsored torture, murder and denial of fair trial.²⁴³

The external religious mediators have played the critical role in getting talks off the ground or in overcoming an impasse. For example, conflict resolution efforts of *Sant' Egidio* in Mozambique, Algeria, Uganda and Kosovo; and Mennonite consultation in the negotiations between the Sandinista government and the Miskito Indians on the east coast of Nicaragua in 1988. Also, the United Nations and its agencies, humanitarian and secular NGOs, local actors and interested states have often taken the leading part.²⁴⁴ For example the United Nations peacekeeping to avoid wars in Democratic Republic of Congo, south and north Sudan, Somalia and so on. Also in March 2003, the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Nigeria and the United States Institute of Peace jointly promoted a five-day dialogue workshop in Kaduna which is one of the most conflict-ridden states in Nigeria.

Lederach ²⁴⁵ demonstrate how negotiation and humanitarian aid improved the harsh economic conditions that civil war Mozambique was ravaged with. The mayhem between the

²⁴¹ Ibid pp.220

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Bouta op. cit., pp. 172.

²⁴⁴ Appleby op. cit., pp.239

²⁴⁵ Lederach, J. P. (2010)

independence movements named FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance).²⁴⁶ The larger Mozambican religious community was divided with Muslims hostile towards FRELIMO. Evangelical and Pentecostal organizations supported RENAMO. The Protestant ecumenical association and United Methodist Church supported FRELIMO.²⁴⁷ The Catholic bishops issued personal letters to condemn carnages stanced by the two sides and the negotiations were called. The government had no chance to deny the fundamental societal services, for instance provision of food, clothes, health care and education facilities offered to the civilians during the RENAMO war.

Folberg and Taylor²⁴⁸ define mediation as the process by which the members, together with the help of an impartial individual or people; efficiently segregate disputed issues so as to create options, consider choices and arrive at a consensual settlement that will suit their needs. Mediation is a procedure that stressed the member's very own obligation regarding settling on choices that influence their lives. It is, along these lines, a self-enabling procedure. It is a goal-directed and problem-solving intervention.²⁴⁹ The objectives of mediation, they argue, are production of a plan (agreement) for the future that the participants can acknowledge and consent to; introduction of the participants to acknowledge the outcomes of their own decisions; and decrease of the tension and other negative impacts of the conflict by helping the participants reach a consensual resolution.²⁵⁰

The identity of a mediator plays a crucial role in the success of intervention procedures of mediation processes.²⁵¹ In several conflicts religious leaders have been involved as mediators. Often, conflict mediations are presided over by spiritual leaders unlike secular oriented. Faith

²⁴⁶ Lederach op. cit., pp. 57.

²⁴⁷ Ibid

²⁴⁸ Flanigan, S.T. (2013)

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Flanigan op. cit., pp.257.

²⁵¹ Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 186

based actors have demonstrated long term commitment on community affairs and with their social and cultural background they present authority and credibility of the process.²⁵² Mediation processes always regard neutrality and impartially in their affairs, a religious represented falls at the extreme end of fairness. Religious leaders are well privy to the conflicts between the disputing factions and are locally based within the area. In that, there cultural background gives an upper hand in reaching peaceful resolutions aimed at long lasting peace.²⁵³ Their role encourages the warring community parties to work towards peace. Mediators from faith-based communities win the trust of the fighting factions regardless of the difference in faith. Naturally, they are seen to be working on the commitment of God's will void of vested personal interests that are clear in the reconciliation process.²⁵⁴ For instance, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone was composed of leaders from different faiths that allowed a representative outlook with each of the warring parties feeling represented. Also, mediators form outside the community acting as negotiators have been successful in fostering peace.²⁵⁵ Religious leaders help through the mediation processes in reaching amicable agreements. They make use of divine intervention prayers, meditation, religious rituals, religious vocabulary, values and myths.²⁵⁶ In an Islamic set up, religious leaders have been used for traditional conflict resolution (Suluhl) who are perceived to be familiar.²⁵⁷

According to Scott, the most direct and decisive involvement in conflict resolution came when religious actors provided good offices and served effectively as mediators.²⁵⁸ For example, the Catholic Church was deeply involved in this area in the beginning of 1968 in Bolivia, helping to resolve every major conflict between the miners and the national

²⁵² Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 193

²⁵³ Clark op. cit., pp. 465

²⁵⁴ Ibid

²⁵⁵ Flanigan op. cit., pp. 254

²⁵⁶ Bercovitch, op. cit. pp.175-204.

²⁵⁷ James, R., with CABUNGO. (2009)

²⁵⁸ Ibid

government and the numerous stalemates that were created by the elections for the presidency. In Northern Ireland, para-church organizations such as Corry Meela provided peace and expertise for discussion among government officials and ordinary citizens from the Protestant and Catholic communities, and off camera arbiters prepared the way for meetings between leaders of the opposing militias. Also, in India, the Gandhi Peace Foundation from its headquarters in Delhi and in 33 field centres across India, conducted research and training programmes in nonviolent conflict resolution.²⁵⁹

Commitment

Religions usually rely on normative systems. On the same note, religions also depend upon its followers experiencing a certain level of dependence on the specified normative systems. Specifically, the various religions normally expect its adherents to experience a feeling showing an appropriate degree of commitment. As a result, there is a direct relationship that arises between the willingness of adherents in contributing towards maintenance of a religion and the implied dependence upon it. The main reason for having the implied relationship is because lack of faith in normative systems by the followers creates a high and unavoidable risk of extinction of a certain religion.²⁶⁰ Peace-making efforts require similar mechanisms. As such, the involved parties must substantial willingness to resolve any conflicts. In the event of lack of a certain level of commitment and dependence by the parties aiming at achieving peace, it places a significant probability that the peace-making efforts will not be successful. The normative system which is extensively applied in religions suffers some challenges. The system is fundamentally ambiguous, having both destructive and constructive potential. On the same note, the potentials and possibilities for engagement in the peace-making process are highly related to the normative systems.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Appleby, R.S. (2000)

²⁶⁰ Repstad op. cit., pp. 17

²⁶¹ Stålsett, Sturla J., Oddbjørn Leirvik, and Peter Beyer (Eds.). 2004

Further, peace-brokering based on the principles of honest normative commitment may improve the peace-making leaders' credibility and capacity to facilitate the process. For instance, sant Egidio, a Catholic community based in Mozambique, played a significant role in mediating the mid 1970's conflicts. The success of the peace negotiations was attributed to the neutrality of the faith-based community in the conflict. More so, during the mediations, saint Egidio, offered ethos that embraced shared religious normative among the warring parties²⁶². The case study offers good examples of the ability of the religious inclined groups to broker peace in instances of conflict by setting a common ground for either parties.

Faith based organizations have the advantage of being in touch with the grass root individuals actively engaged in the conflict and with the top and general public that hold an opinion on the differences. They can lead to transformative peace talks by invoking religious doctrines and dogmas that they can alter to fit in the real-world situation. In instances where religious leaders do not share similar beliefs to either of the warring parties, their social credibility coupled with their freedom of action may allow them to intervene²⁶³. Partiality of religious leaders in a conflict puts them in danger and risks the disintegration of a community. In addition, people may at times resort to religious networks in times of weakening state governance, creating the need for involvement of spiritual leaders in conflict resolution. This clearly indicates the pivotal role that religious leaders hold in shaping the mind-set and conflict approach of a society.

4.3 Limitations of the Counter Terrorism Measures

Kenya's capacity to handle terrorism is in-adequate in terms of resources. There is massive underfunding of the critical institutions directly responsible with countering terrorism. Immigration department and Police service ministries have not embraced modern technology in their operations that are key in national security measures. Lack of suitable tools and

²⁶² Repstad op. cit., pp. 17

²⁶³ Gopin, M. (2000)

equipment within the security agencies hinder tracking and enough investigation necessary to mount enough evidence needed for court prosecution. Security personnel tasked with busting terror activities have inadequate training, receive poor pay and have poor housing resulting to low morale.²⁶⁴ Kenyan youth face economic, religious, and social coercion and this convinces them that they have no alternative to joining extremist organizations. High levels of unemployment among Kenyan youths is a pull factor to join radical groups²⁶⁵. Despite massive efforts in installation of CCTV cameras in Kenyan cities and highways, footages into sensitive inquiries has in the past been deleted. The counter-extremism agenda has also suffered from government corruption. Security operatives have been accused of gross abuse of human rights and torture in the conduct of their operations and detainment policies. The ATPU has allegedly been responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and mistreatment of individuals arrested on terrorism charges²⁶⁶. Kenyan boundaries remain porous allowing offenders into the country and allowing easy escape of terror culprits.

Another great challenge to Kenya's counter terrorism efforts is the high levels of youth unemployment, (about 40% as at December 2012).²⁶⁷ At the coast region alone, unemployment stands at 70% of the total youth population. This is because the minimal activities the youth carry out are not sufficient for utilization of their full potential or to afford them a decent life.²⁶⁸ In addition to that, the influx of migrant communities (*wabara*) into the coastal regions have led to rising animosity among the citizens. The migrant communities moved to the coast mostly in the 1960s and 70s to capitalise on the available economic opportunities, especially land resettlement schemes.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁴ Kiprono, B. J. (2013)

²⁶⁵ Mohochi, S. M. (2011)

²⁶⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/kenvas-anti-terrorism-strategy-should-prioritize-human-rights-rule-law>

²⁶⁷ World Bank (2012)

²⁶⁸ Njonjo op cit., pp 23

²⁶⁹ Ngunyi, M. and Katumanga, M. (2012)

4.4 Kenya's Anti-terrorism Laws

Kenya has the Prevention of Terrorism Act that was amended in 2018. Also, Kenyan lawmakers passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014, that sought to empower security forces and inhibit the freedom of the media and sources of independent enquiry. According to the law Kenyan police can hold terrorist suspects for longer periods pending investigations, and it gives the power to monitor and tap phone communication. The Kenya Information Communication Act and the Penal Code and its regulations criminalise several cybercrimes. However, Computer and Cybercrime Bill 2016 was adopted. The Bill provides for the arrests and prosecution of offenders and advocates for nation-wide sensitization program on cyber security. The law is aimed at enabling the law enforcers, prosecutors and judicial officers to deal with cyber security in a proactive approach. Kenya is confronting expanding global strain to sanction the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2012, during calls by an area of the neighbourhood Muslim people group to have it revised, in case police use it to encroach on the common freedoms of Kenyans. The Bill, which has just experienced a second perusing in Parliament is being pushed by the Executive after a risk by the global alliance battling fear-based oppression to boycott Kenya in the event that it isn't authorized into law by October 1. In August, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the worldwide standard setting body for hostile to illegal tax avoidance and battling the financing of psychological warfare, cautioned that Kenya could be boycotted by October for lacking laws to control tax evasion and fear-based oppression financing. James Manyonge, the legitimate guide at the Financial Reporting Center said the danger is not kidding as it would imply that exchanges with Kenya will be investigated, particularly between bank exchanges, which would bring about additional postponements and make the nation hazardous to work with. Kenya has been encountering fear monger assaults since 1998 yet has been delayed establishing against psychological warfare laws regardless of weight from the US. The

nation's entrance into Somalia last October and resulting explosive assaults by Al-Shabaab have increased the requirement for hostile to fear-based oppression laws. On her ongoing visit to Kenya, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton put weight on the administration to establish the law on fear, contending that it had been racked for a long time. Yet, those pushing for changes to the Bill contend that whenever ordered in its present state, it will remove the common freedoms Kenyans have increased in the course of recent years. Abdikadir Mohamed, the director of the Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee in Parliament, who has been pushing for revisions, said the antagonistic issue is whether it will maintain established protections contained in the Bill of Rights. He brought up that the meaning of fear-based oppressor act in Article 2 of the Bill is equivocal and leaves the onus to the police of figuring out who a psychological oppressor is. Muslims have explicitly disapproved of Article 2 (b) that somewhat characterizes a psychological oppressor as an activity "which is completed with the point of propelling a political, religious, ethnic, ideological or other reason."²⁷⁰ They state this could be utilized to reduce opportunity of love or propelling religious confidence. Abdulkadir referred to Article 3, which he says gives the Inspector General of Police enormous powers and which conflicts with the established appropriate to remain silent. The area enables the Inspector-General to capture in the event that the individual in question has sensible grounds to accept that a substance has submitted or is planning to submit a fear monger act, endeavoured to submit; or partook in or encouraged the commission of a psychological militant act. In the area, Uganda was the first to sanction an enemy of fear-based oppression law in 2002. In any case, similarly as in Kenya, Muslims in Uganda have been ready to fight illegal, especially after the 2010 Kampala besieging in which 98 percent of the suspects captured were Muslims. Counter fear-based oppression police explicitly brushed rural areas where Muslims are concentrated.

²⁷⁰ Bill of Rights

4.5 Data Analysis and Presentation

The section presents findings on the contribution of technology as a challenge in countering terrorism on a Kenyan perspective. The findings are analysed according to the study's specific objectives; examining the forms of technologies that terrorists used to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact, assessment of the technological challenges faced by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism and evaluation of counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms in place in Kenya and their impact. The results are depicted in figures and tables in the sections that follows.

4.5.1 Response Rate

From the data collection exercise, 44 questionnaires were duly completed from the possible 50 questionnaires issued.

Table 4. 1: Questionnaire Response Rate

Questionnaires Issued	Questionnaires Returned	Response rate (%)
50	44	88.00

This indicated response rate of 88% which was above the recommended threshold of 50%²⁷¹.

Therefore, the data collected was viable for analysis and forecasting purposes.

4.5.2 Respondent's Demographics

The study aimed to capture the gender and the age group of the respondents under the background information. The age and the gender of the respondents were chosen since the researcher hypothesized that they played a key role in counter terrorism. The youth were

²⁷¹ Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. (2003)

believed to play a critical role in embracing technology and averting the terrorism activities in the country.




Figure 4. 1: The Gender of the Respondent

The research findings indicate that 68.18% of the survey respondents were males and 31.82% were females as depicted by figure 4.1 above. The results imply that the males were highly involved in the counter terrorism as served various dockets targeted by the study.

Table 4. 2: The Age Range of the Respondent

Age group	Frequency	Percent
18 – 35	23	52.3
36 – 50	12	27.3
Above 50	9	20.5
Total	44	100.0

Regarding the age group of the respondents, it was established that majority of the respondents were between 18 – 35 years represented by 52.3%, followed by 36 – 50 years

represented by 27.3% as shown in the table 4.2 above. The results signify that the youth are the key players in the embracing technology to counter terrorism in the country. This attributed to their ability to grasp and adapt to changing technological techniques in the world.

4.5.3 Forms of Technology

Based on the first objective of the study, to examine the forms of technologies used by terrorists to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact, the responses collected were aggregated and analysed as shown below.




Figure 4. 2: Opinion on the forms of technology embraced

A proportion of 47.73% of the respondents indicated that social media was the key technological form through which terrorists advanced their agenda in Kenya. Additionally, the three forms; TV, Radio and social media were rated second at 29.55%. Further, 13.64% and 9.09% of the respondents identified TV and Radio respectively as the forms of technology used as depicted in the figure 4.2 above.

For those that selected social media, they argued that it was used for propaganda and radicalization, creation of social media groups for recruitment of youths and other vulnerable groups, it was easier to target susceptible individuals, terrorists had access to social media platforms, there was less monitoring compared to TV and Radio and finally to take advantage of social media frenzy when attacks occur.

Table 4. 3: Perception on the use of sophisticated Technologies

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	9	20.5
Disagree	13	29.5
Neutral	8	18.2
Agree	7	15.9
Strongly Agree	7	15.9
Total	44	100.0

Further, paying attention to objective one, the researcher sought to establish whether the terrorist organizations used highly sophisticated technologies that were beyond the reach of the Kenyan government's counter terrorism efforts. The findings indicated that 29.5% of the respondents disagreed followed 20.5% of those who strongly disagreed. Contrary, a similar percentage of 15.9% of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed as shown in the table 4.3 above.

For the respondents who disagreed, they argued that the government had all the machinery to check the social media platforms, a key technology form used by terrorists for communication and attacks. Further, respondents faulted the government to take up intelligence reports and laxity in curbing terrorist attacks. Moreover, they argued that the

government had resources and facilities to invest in more sophisticated technologies that the terrorists groups. Finally, corruption, favouritism, complacency and failure to recruitment experts in countering the terrorism undermines the government efforts.

4.5.4 Technological Challenges

Regarding the second objective of the study, to assess the technological challenges faced by the Kenyan government in countering terrorism, the responses were aggregated, graphed and tabulated below.




Figure 4. 3: Opinion on Kenyan Government Strategies

From the figure 4.3 above, the 31.82% of the respondents expressed their opinion showing that the government had adopted strategies to address the counter terrorism in the moderately adequate way. However, a similar proportion of 20.45% of the respondents faulted the government strategies and believed it had done inadequately and very inadequately.

For those who were dissatisfied with the government efforts towards counter terrorism, they advocated for involvement of the local communities in the fight against terrorism.

Additionally, they called for the end of the extra judicial killings in the fight against terrorism. Further, they called for closer scrutiny and monitoring of the extremists propagandas through speech and personalized communication. Moreover, the respondents called for adoption of people friendly approaches in addressing the terrorism and abolishment of military driven approaches in the war against terrorism.

For those who supported the government efforts, believed a lot must be done pertaining to the preparedness to terrorism, investment in intelligence, border controls to curb illegal immigrants and enforcement of disarmament of SALW by cracking down on the illicit trade of small arms.




Figure 4. 4: Perception on the lack of Capability on mass media technologies

From the figure 4.4 above, when asked if the government lacked the capability to counter the use of modern mass media technologies by terrorists, 34.09% of the respondents disapproved. Further, 25% of the respondents strongly disagreed argued that had the technical know-how superior to the terror groups. However, 18.18% of the respondents agreed. Government being endowed with adequate resources and expertise was hypothesized by the respondents to have an upper hand in the use of modern mass media compared to terrorists groups.

Table 4. 4: Modern ICT have greatly fueled terrorism in Kenya

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	3	6.8
Disagree	8	18.2
Neutral	7	15.9
Agree	16	36.4
Strongly Agree	10	22.7
Total	44	100.0

For the statement ‘Modern ICT have greatly fueled terrorism in Kenya’ 36.4% of the respondents agreed while 22.7% strongly agreed as shown in the table 4.4 above. Modern technology poised as a challenge in the war against terrorism. The rate of adoption of technology by the terrorists was deemed to be higher since the government proved to be reluctant to embrace modern technology in its services. Further, development of modern warfare equipment worked to the advantage of the militia groups as the government entangled in the embezzlement and misappropriations of funds meant to boost its counter terrorism activities.

Table 4. 5: Terrorists embrace superior technology to that of Kenyan government

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	4	9.1
Disagree	20	45.5
Neutral	5	11.4
Agree	9	20.5

Strongly Agree	6	13.6
Total	44	100.0

For the statement ‘Terrorists use technology in a way that makes it difficult for the Kenyan government to fight back’ 45.5% of the respondents disagreed while 9.1% strongly disagreed as depicted in the table 4.5 above. The respondents believed that the government had superior technology to the terrorists, and above the enough manpower and expertise to quash the terrorists’ activities. Further, the respondents believed that the government should recruit youths who are skillful and full of energy to surpass the terrorists and curb the radicalization of the fresh graduates.

Table 4. 6: Terrorists still prefer old tactics and rarely use modern technology

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	11	25.0
Disagree	15	34.1
Neutral	10	22.7
Agree	6	13.6
Strongly Agree	2	4.5
Total	44	100.0

For the statement ‘Terrorists still prefer old tactics and rarely use modern technology in their operations’ 34.1% of the respondents disagreed while 25% strongly disagreed as shown in the table 4.6 above. The respondents perceived that the terrorists were on watch out for the latest modern technology to destruct the government’s efforts towards counter terrorism. They believed the terrorists are use highly specialized weapons and gadgets to run their operations.

This was further evidenced by the type weapons recovered when the terrorists are cornered by the government forces.

4.5.5 Kenya's Counter Terrorism Strategies

In accordance with third objective of the study, to evaluate counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms put in place in Kenya and their impacts, the respondents were required to give their opinions as analysed below.




Figure 4. 5: Opinion on Anti-terrorism law in Kenya

When asked about their opinion on the efficiency of anti-terrorism law in Kenya in preventing the terrorists' attacks and radicalization of the youth, 34.09% of the respondents believed it was efficient. However, 25% of the respondents believed it was inefficient in the curbing terrorism and radicalisation of the Kenyan youth as depicted in the figure 4.5 above.

For the opposers argued that there were loopholes in the relevant departments such as security and immigration that advantage the terrorists, not implemented fully to insufficient resources to curb youth radicalization, tends to radicalise the youths more than effectively

fighting terrorism. Further, respondents felt that the anti-terrorism law was reactionary thus failed to detect and avert terrorism.




Figure 4. 6: Opinion on Security Checks at Public and Private Institutions

When asked whether the security checks at public and private institutions are effective in preventing a terrorist attack in Kenya, 36.36% and 34.09% of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively as shown in the figure 4.6 above.

The opposers argued that the security officers lack appropriate detective equipment and the poorly trained to detect terrorism attack. Also, the checks are casual and inconsistent to curb terrorism. Most public and private institutions have porous fences and the equipment are too basic to detect harmful devices such as IEDs and bombs.

Table 4. 7: Opinion on the military operations both in Kenya and Somalia

	Frequency	Percent
Not at all	1	2.3
Low extent	13	29.5
Moderately	8	18.2
To a great extent	17	38.6

To a very great extent	5	11.4
Total	44	100.0

From the table 4.7 above, the research findings established that military operations both in Kenya and Somalia have deterred terrorists from attacking Kenya to a great extent represented by 38.6% of the respondents. The respondents reported that the attacks have reduced tremendously, the disruptions by the military kept terrorists busy in their homeland and the terror groups have been weakened and rarely launch deadly attacks unlike before when they were frequent. Further, the respondents enumerated that the military has created a buffer between Kenya and Somalia which in turn has reduced frequency of attacks.

4.5.6 The Interview Report

The interviewees' highlighted several strategies embraced the by terrorists' groups;

Social media

It was noted as the measure strategy spearheading the terrorism activities in Kenya. It was used for communication by the terrorists. They conducted recruitment and radicalization activities through the social media. Notably, WhatsApp groups were used in sharing of the terrorist's doctrines and chants. Further, the media spearheaded fear amongst the citizens when terrorists attacked places. Moreover, the media was not censored by the government, thus, facilitating exchange of any form of information. The terrorists used the media to air grievances and spread their influence in the country.

The view of the government strategies

Local communities' involvement in enhancing security is limited by unmet promises and uncoordinated government operations that create mistrust with the authorities. Findings show that lack of employment, corruption technology also a contribution to violent extremism across the country. Potential recruits to terror organizations are further argued to be more inspired by extremists' ideologies than economic coercion. The respondents argued that the

brutality levelled against the innocent Kenyans with respond to terrorists' attacks fuelled the terrorism agenda.

4.6 Conclusion

Chapter four analysed the third goal of the study which evaluated the social, economic and political effects of terrorism in 21st Century Kenya. It explored on the specific counter terrorism measures embraced by the Kenyan government such as installation of CCTVs in the city centre and their impacts on the efforts towards terrorism. Further, the chapter expounded limitations related to strategies put in place such as corruption, poor intelligence services. Finally, data analysis and presentation concluded the chapter. The analysis found out that the government of Kenya is doing well in the fight against terrorism. However, a lot desired to be implemented so that it can the win the war against terrorism. The findings revealed that the government needed to embrace technology and human friendly techniques in the quest to end terrorism. The respondents noted that the involvement of the local communities in the fight against terrorism would be major milestone. Further, it was concluded that the government should utilise its massive resources and expertise to censor the social media and ensure the terrorists do not infiltrate it. Moreover, radicalization of the youths was rated highly due to the unfavourable environment and susceptibility to religious doctrines. Nevertheless, the need to close the loopholes in the anti- terrorism law to make it rigid to bypass by the terrorists. In general, the Kenyan citizen have a role in counter terrorism efforts to complement government measures.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study aimed at examining the role of technology in countering violent extremisms in Kenya. The following study objectives were used to guide as a guide to explore the use of technology by terrorists to further extremism; to examine the forms of technologies that terrorists use to advance their agenda in Kenya and their impact, to assess the technological setbacks that Kenyan authorities undergo in countering extremism, to evaluate the counter terrorism strategies and mechanisms in place in Kenya and their impact.

5.2 Summary of Findings

Social media platforms in Kenya are the most preferred tools of communication by the terrorist groups due to their wide reach and convenience. Mostly, they are used for propagating extremist content and carrying out radicalization. By using the social media, terrorist actors can single out specific audiences. Government loose regulation on social media has made it convenient for terror organizations to advance their objectives unlike TV and radio platforms that are always under scrutiny. These online channels are used to propagate fear and solicit for sympathy. To note, is the use of TV to monitor authority response during an attack and cause panic among the general population by giving false attack notices.

Terror groups in Kenya are confined to off-the -shelf technology for communication. However, they are in possession of powerful ammunition and can advance their technology through their educated peers joining from foreign groups and educated members. Kenyan government has demonstrated some form of laxity in acting on intelligence and need to adopt new technologies to tap into encrypted messages. Strategies to counter terrorism in Kenya

are adequate though more involvement of local communities is necessary. Emphasizing more on laws to counter extremism is not as effective as community driven approaches. Extrajudicial killings associated with police are not working to complement government efforts. To adequately counter terrorism the government need to invest more in intelligence gathering, tighten border controls by preventing illegal immigrants and enforcing disarmament by cracking down illegal trade of small arms. Kenyan governments need to employ human intelligence inside terrorism cells and pay more attention on information disseminated on personalized communication. In the study responses, the government is yet to leverage on its capacity on mass media technologies to thwart terror activities. Persistence and consistence use of law to avert terror attacks and promote youth deradicalization is not efficient. A reason attributed to lose ends in immigration and internal security departments allowing movements of terrorists within and outside the country. In addressing radicalization, the government need to integrate youth unemployment, historical injustices and religious animosity. National Counter-terrorism policy need more publicity from the government and should be inclusive of the media, individuals, community groups and civil society organizations. Currently, it is viewed as an obstacle. Security checks at public and private institutions are regarded as too basic to avert possible terror attacks. The security officers have showed not to understand terrorism related equipment's and are ill-trained. The equipment used are not advanced enough to really detect elusive techniques are at times broken down. Security checks are termed as both casual and done at an entrance in an institution with porous fences. Kenya military approach to counter Al-Shabaab aggression has substantially decreased terror attacks in the country. The operation led to the loss of operation basis for the organization crippling their attacks. However, porous Kenya-Somali border facilitates sporadic attacks within the country. Security personnel in Somali need better motivation in terms of remuneration by the government to hinder possibilities of

bribery by terror. Online activities by terror organizations have led to home-grown terror that need alternative approaches which need to confront the philosophy jihad “holy war”.

5.3 Conclusion

The nature of terrorism is dynamic and as evolved over time due to a number of factors. These factors are intertwined as well as interrelated by the actors, space and enabling environment. Terror attacks nowadays are unpredictable and affects many nations, along with spreading far and wide due to technological forces. Internet is one of the key sources of extremists to spread propagandas, fake news, and as well to carry out activities aimed at mobilizing and recruiting people to terror activities. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that social media platforms and channels are being used by terrorists to inspire, attract and even recruit youths to terrorism activities, given the numerous interactions and high impact videos found in such sites. There is also increased online messaging with has been propagated through content dissemination using online communication such as email, mobile devices as well as media, such as Aljazeera. There is also another worry that terrorists have an increasingly growing presence online, for example Al-Shabaab which poses security threats to Kenya. Through the advancement of technology, the rise in terrorism is alarming situation necessitating the need for informed response in Internet security including efficient law enforcement. This study also advocates for an examination into the role of information technology in terrorism in Kenya.

From the findings of this chapter, the counter terrorism strategies and level of preparation in Kenya from 2002 and 2011 were not sufficiently enough. This is evidenced by small- and large-scale attacks which took place four years before 2015, for example the Westgate and Garrisa University attacks. Further, it is asserted that formation of NCTC which was aimed at formulating and implementing counter terrorism in 2004 failed to do much in order to reduce the number of attacks in the country. This research study also establishes the the

capacity of Kenya's capital to fight terrorism using its law enforcement agencies has been affected by a number of factors such as rampant corruption, inefficiency of law enforcement agencies, poor coordination, too much politicking on terrorism attacks, lack of enough training, just to mention a few.

This chapter also compares the counter terrorism strategies of Kenya's capital and that of HOA in the preceding chapter, finding several similarities. From this perspective, and reference to the second hypothesis of this research study, it is clearly shown that the focus on Kenya's capital in fighting terrorism is focused on state centric and military centric approaches of fighting corruption. In this light, the Kenya Defence Forces has in the recent past launched war on terrorism, with a focus on countering the Somalia militant group. It is therefore imperative that establishing the factors that promote terrorism in Kenya, will help a greater deal in addressing this issue of terrorist attacks.

The findings of this research study, and in this chapter, conform to the research objective two of this study, that is, exploring the effectiveness of Kenyan measures to counter terrorism. As such, these findings establish that the sole militaristic approach of counter terrorism has done very little in addressing the problem and has instead catalysed more terrorist attacks. It is asserted that the key cause of inefficiency in the militaristic approach is the fact that the key causes of terror attacks have not been established, along with inadequate counter-terrorism measures.

It is beyond any reasonable doubt that Kenya as a nation has witnessed terrorist attacks in the recent past, for example the Dusit attack that left 20 people dead. Terrorism has adverse effects in the economy in the pillars such as infrastructure, the human capital formation, productivity, and economic growth. There is decreased foreign investment in the country following the recent terrorist attacks, along with decreased household spending and

livelihood, scare of foreign direct investment and diversification of resources from economic growth pillars such as the Big Four Agenda to spending aimed at increasing the national security. The policy brief under consideration in this paper has outlined the effects of terrorism and violent extremism on important sectors of the Kenyan economy such as tourism, foreign direct investment, the Nairobi stock exchange market, as well as effect on allocation of resources both at the national and county levels. There is always also an increased cost of doing business as businesses investment in safeguarding security. It does not just end there: there has been installation of security devices such as CCTV cameras, metal detectors and so forth in the urban areas, a move which is aimed at enhancing security. From the existing literature, and reference to the policy brief, it is clear that drivers of terrorism in Kenya are high levels of unemployment especially among the youths, high levels of extreme poverty, as well as behaviour change among youths. As such, the policy brief proposes that Kenya enacts the following measures to actualize the war on terrorism: increase job opportunities, enhancing access to finance, ensuring equity in access to education and health, among others. This however must be coupled with development of labour-intensive model which is capable of generating a rapid growth with equitable growth and generation of employment opportunities for the youthful population. This is one of the effective measures of reducing idleness which drives young people to engage in terrorism activities.

From the findings, lack of employment contributed significantly to youth radicalization and involvement in violent extremism. This has been propagated by the historical injustices in the country which seem to favour the productive areas such as the rift valley and the central regions. Political as well as economic factors do not favour these regions compared to other counties and it was only after devolution that developments are being experienced. The

regions are also highly populated by Muslims against the larger populations of the country which are christens.²⁷²

This section explores the Kenyan measures of countering terrorism by carrying out a study on effectiveness of the already existing strategies and then recommends a better approach which is inclusive of all stakeholders. Using the contagion theory of international relations, this paper explains the international terrorism and the suitable strategies of countering terror. This paper appreciates that Kenya has been focusing on militaristic strategies of fighting terror, whose consequences are increased terror activities, and recommends that the country considers the non-militaristic strategies if the war on terrorism is to be actualized. The key findings of this paper is that counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya have failed to addresses preventive terrorism measures, for example collaboration between the central government and National safety agencies to counter terrorism; it is asserted that the strategy still lags behind hence ineffective and there is limited effort in seeking the solutions to terrorism using the diplomatic means such as collaboration with other external bodies, for example FBI. This analysis finds out that the government of Kenya has been focusing on militaristic approach to counter terrorism and very little has been done as far as countering terrorism is concerned. In the same light, use of militaristic and state centric approaches in the fight against terrorism such as crack down of militants, prosecution of terror suspects, illegal detention as well as death sentence for terror suspects has done much in catalysing terror attacks other than reducing it. Some measures which could play a role in fighting corruption include involving the non-state actors, good governance, among others. This study recommends a national counter terrorism and counter violent extremism plan which involves the state and no-state actors. Further, a number of counter terrorism measures exists such as border management, diplomatic arrangements, addressing the marginalization that exists among Muslims,

²⁷² Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. (2014)

ensuring that national security agents are well equipped, as well as a counter terrorism grand strategy. The grand counter terrorism strategy is one that will involve strengthening national and international actors, a serious war against graft in Kenya which has been a catalyst of terror attacks, pursuing the national interest in peace and security over the extra- territorial coalitions with war-torn Somalia. Over and above these, the following can be pursued: prioritizing information sharing and coordination of regional intelligence, support economic development of the war-torn Somalia and enacting strong security measures on the border

5.4 Recommendations

The following section discusses the postulated recommendations that are according to the study results. Based on the research findings, this study recommends the following;

- i. The government needs to develop technology-based instruments to counter the spread of extremism through social media platforms. This is by investing in mass media technology capabilities such as video analytics and anti-terror media accounts.
- ii. Law enforcement officers should be equipped with the technical knowledge and skills on how common technology devices and platforms are used to stage terrorist attacks.
- iii. There is a need for hiring highly qualified counter terrorism actors to keep up with technological advancements in an evolving world of terrorism. Cracking encrypted messages, hacking into offenders' communication terminals and developing new counter terrorism approaches will need persons with better education.
- iv. The government should invest in intelligence technology and act on crucial information related to terrorist activities. With modern technology applications and devices, Kenya could have averted major terrorist attacks. Kenya needs to

embrace new forms of technology such as video analytics to have a competitive edge.

- v. The Kenyan government needs to actively involve local community in its efforts to fight terrorism. Use of brutal force in carrying out terrorist related cases result in lack of cooperation from the public and create mistrust with the authorities. The public needs to be informed on the policies on anti-terrorism while the government needs to use a multi-dimensional approach other than law enforcement in the fight against terrorism.
- vi. Security officers at various security checks across the country need proper equipment and continuous training. This will help them in identifying potent devices and suspicious persons. Religious leaders ought to cleanse their name against being involved with any terrorist groups and violent extremism by being in the forefront in condemning the same. This should be done openly as opposed to conducting meetings in undisclosed locations to regain the trust from the community.
- vii. The government should assure religious leaders of protection as they carry out their peace building messages from place to place. Past deaths and threats to religious leaders from both the government and the terrorist groups have victimized the leaders, hence reducing their willingness to be proactive on the issue of violent extremism in Mombasa County.
- viii. Both the central and county governments should offer necessary funds to the religious leaders in preaching and training on violent extremism. More funds should particularly be given to the sheiks since the majority of coastal people are Muslims and attend mosques.

- ix. The county governments should look for ways of creating job opportunities to the youths, especially in the coast region. The research has found out that more youths are likely to engage in violent extremism due to idleness, which makes them prone to being lured to terrorist groups. When the youths are made busy they will have no time to engage in such activities.
- x. Non-governmental organizations should join hands with the religious leaders in carrying out campaigns on the dangers of being involved in violent activities. By teaching the community, the information is likely to trickle down to the youths who will be warned against involving themselves with terrorist groups.
- xi. The government should work with religious organizations which are involved in campaigns to try to address the push and pull factors of violent extremism. These organizations lobby and advocate for policy change in different levels of the government because there are also genuine grievances. These are very appealing to communities where there are practical issues that require attention.
- xii. The government should maintain Kenyan Defense Forces presence along the Kenya Somalia border or inside Somalia to keep terrorism attacks at their lowest. Military action was reported to be an efficient response against terrorism.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Questionnaire

Introduction and request for informed consent

Good morning/afternoon/evening. My name is Godfrey Ombogo, a masters' student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, the University of Nairobi. I am collecting data on my research project titled *Technology as a challenge in counter terrorism agenda in Kenya*.

You have been purposefully chosen to participate in the interview as part of the study. I would appreciate your cooperation in answering some questions relating to your knowledge and experience on the topic. The interview will take approximately 20 minutes.

Section A: Respondent's Demographics

1. Indicate your gender

Male [] Female []

2. What is your age group?

18-35 [] 36-50 [] Above 50 []

Section B: Forms of technologies terrorists use

3. What forms of technologies do you think terrorists use to advance their agenda in

Kenya?

TV [] Radio [] Social media [] All of them []

Other (Specify).....

4. Kindly explain how you think terrorists use the technologies you have chosen in question four above to advance their agenda in Kenya.

.....
.....

5. Do you think terrorist organizations use highly sophisticated technologies that are beyond the reach of Kenyan government's counter terrorism efforts?

Strongly agree []

Agree []

Neutral []

Disagree []

Strongly disagree []

Kindly explain

.....

Section C: Technological challenges in countering terrorism

6. In your opinion, are the Kenyan government strategies in place adequate to counter terrorism?

Very adequate []

Adequate []

Moderately adequate []

Inadequate []

Very inadequate []

If you think they are inadequate, kindly recommend better alternatives in your opinion.

.....

7. Do you think the Kenyan government lacks the capability to counter the use of modern mass media technologies by terrorist organizations?

Strong agree []

Agree []

Neutral []

Disagree []

Strongly disagree []

8. Kindly indicate your level of agreement on the listed statements on the role of technology in terrorism.

Statement	Strongly	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
a) Modern ICT have greatly fuelled terrorism in Kenya.					
b) Terrorists use technology in a way that makes it difficult for the Kenyan government to fight back.					
c) Terrorists still prefer old tactics and rarely use modern technology in their operations.					

Section D: Kenya's counter terrorism strategies

9. In your opinion, is the anti-terrorism law in Kenya efficient in preventing terrorist attacks and radicalization of the youth?

Very efficient []

- Efficient []
- Neutral []
- Inefficient []
- Very inefficient []

If you think the law is inefficient, what in your opinion is the reason?

.....

10. Do you think security checks at public and private institutions are effective in preventing a terrorist attack in Kenya?

- Strongly agree []
- Agree []
- Neutral []
- Disagree []
- Strongly disagree []

If you disagree, why do you think so?

.....

11. Do you think the military operations both in Kenya and Somalia have deterred terrorists from attacking Kenya?


- To a very great extent []
- To a great extent []
- Moderately []
- Low extent []
- Not at all []

Kindly explain

.....

Appendix II: Interview guide

1. What are some of the strategies and mechanisms the Kenyan government has put in place to counter terrorism?
2. Do you think these strategies are adequate in countering terrorism in Kenya? If not, what more needs to be done?
3. Are the counter terrorism agencies aware of the technologies used by terrorist organizations to advance their agenda in Kenya?
4. What are some of these technologies and how do you terrorist groups use them to advance their agenda in Kenya?
5. Do you think the counter terrorism agencies have the capability to counter the use of these technologies by terrorists?
6. In your opinion, do terrorists use highly sophisticated technologies that are beyond the reach of Kenyan government counter terrorism efforts?



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NAIROBI-KENYA

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Date: **18th June 2019**

Godfrey Otieno Ombogo
University of Nairobi
P.O Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Technology as a challenge in counter terrorism agenda in Kenya.*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **17th June, 2020.**


You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner, and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.


**DR MOSES RUGUT., PhD, OGW
DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

**The County Commissioner
Nairobi County.**


**COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAIROBI COUNTY
P. O. BOX 30124-00100, NAI
TEL: 341066**

**The County Director of Education
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