

**THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN NATURAL RESOURCE BASED  
CONFLICTS:**

**THE CASE OF DRC (1990-2005) "**

**BY RUGA REMI CAROLINE**

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
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
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
## DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

Ruga Remi W. Caroline, Signature:  Date: 14 November 2006

This dissertation has been submitted for external examination with our approval as University Supervisors:

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## DEDICATION

To my family: you guys are the best that one can have. Be blessed especially mum for giving so much of your self for me and to *guka* and *cucu* who have blessed me with so much love. To my siblings with whom I have shared endless love and aunties, uncles and cousins especially Nyambura who gave all to me including advice that I may excel. There are people who come in to our lives and just radiate love and that's what my family you are: love to me. God bless you so much

## **ABSTRACT**

This study seeks to investigate the role of the external actors in conflicts that have become influenced by the availability and lootability of natural resources like the DRC between 1990 and 2005. The analysis seeks to understand natural resource based conflicts and the external actors involved in the illegal exploitation and plundering of the natural resources like the DRC conflict. The study sets out three objectives: To make a contribution to the literature on natural resources based conflicts, to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the external actors in the conflict and their role in the conflict especially the peace spoilers and widening the scope of internalization of the conflicts and to offer recommendation on policy mainstreaming in the area of conflict and natural resources. The study utilizes the greed theoretical frameworks as the analytical tools.

The study reaches a number of conclusions. The DRC conflict is different from all conflicts and as such should be analyzed on its own in order to reach to a comprehensive analysis and influence sound peace agreements. Secondly weak institutions, infrastructures and poor decisions making by those in power have created space for the external actors to be able to venture and exploit the natural resources available in the DRC. The illegal exploitation of the DRC natural resources by external actors has been a problem that has never been resolved. The peace process has been treating the symptoms and not the root causes of the conflict and has been narrow in facing the conflict issues hence the management process has been settlement oriented. The analysis of the external actors also brought about different levels of internationalization: at the regional and international level as a result of the war economy.

The study concludes that the DRC conflict needs to be analyzed at all levels and the state needs to be strengthened so it can shelve off external interference.

## LISTS OF ACRONYMS

ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo
AFDL	Alliance Des Forces Démocratiques Pour La Liberation Du Congo-Zaire
ALIR	Armee de Liberation du Rwanda (Rwanda's liberation Army)
CIA	Criminal Investigation Agency
CONAKAT	Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga
CNL	Conseil National De Liberation
CPP	Commities du Pouvoir Populaire (Committees for Peoples Power)
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
Ex-FAR	Former Rwanda Armed Forces
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFRA	Institut de Français Recherché en Afrique
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
Interahamwe	Extremist Hutu Militia Groups (those who kill together)
KPDCS	The Kimberley Process Diamond Certification Scheme
MNC	Congolese National Movement

MNC	Multinational Corporations
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
PNP	Parti Nationale du Progress
PSC	Private Security Companies
SADC	South African Development Community
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNC	Union Nationale Congolaise
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for the Total liberation of Angola)
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Social Republics
OAU	Organization of African Union
AU	African Union
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
TSC	Transnational Security Corporations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme

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## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

#### INTRODUCTION

Frantz Fanon famously remarked that Africa has the shape of a pistol with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resembling the trigger housing.<sup>1</sup> The violence inherent in this analogy suitably captures the chaotic and disorderly events afflicting a significant part of Africa since the 1990's, the DRC being seen as a trigger.<sup>2</sup> The vast natural resources of the DRC such diamond, cassiterite, tin, uranium, oil, gold, coltan, cobalt, copper, water and timber, have contributed to a history of colonization, exploitation and violence, resulting in one of the most disastrous conflicts in the history of modern Africa. The availability of strategic natural resources has contributed to the presence of the conflict and external actors. DRC is a country which has the potential to be one of the wealthiest in Africa yet is one of the poorest, ranking 167<sup>th</sup> on the Human Development Index in 2003 out of 167 countries<sup>3</sup> and 205<sup>th</sup> in the World Development Report in 2001.<sup>4</sup>

The DRC has an area of 2,345,410 square kilometers and is the third largest State in Africa after Sudan and Algeria respectively. It joins the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region to Western Africa and Southern Africa nevertheless strictly speaking it is in the Great Lakes Regional conflict system.<sup>5</sup> This system includes countries like Rwanda,

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Y Crawford: *Contextualizing Congo Conflicts: Order And Disorder In Post-Colonial Africa* found in J.F. Clark: *The African Stakes Of Congo War* (Kampala: Kampala Fountain Publishers ,1997) p13

<sup>2</sup> ibid

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Development Programme: *Human Development Report 2003*. (New York: United Nations Development Programme 2003) available at: [http://undp.org/statistics/dat/country\\_fact\\_sheets/ctv ts\\_COD.html](http://undp.org/statistics/dat/country_fact_sheets/ctv ts_COD.html).

<sup>4</sup> World Bank; *World Development Report* ( Washington: World Bank 2001)

<sup>5</sup> From Mr. Mudida on September 12, 2006

Burundi, DRC, Uganda, Tanzania, Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville. The lakes around this region are Lake Tanganyika, Lake Victoria, Lake Albert, Lake Edward and Lake Kivu. The Great Lakes Region refers to the region around these lakes as it includes the entirety of the nations of Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Uganda as well as portions of CAR, Tanzania, and Kenya.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shares borders with nine states: The Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. The population has been estimated at approximately 58.3 million with Bakongo, Lingala, Swahili and Kilumba as the main African languages and French as the official language. However, there are over 200 ethnic groups in DRC. The four largest groups -- Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu) and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) -- constitute nearly half of the population.

The DRC conflict has attracted a number of countries that are directly involved in the conflict or indirectly involved.<sup>6</sup> Congo has thus become the epicenter of conflict in Great Lakes Conflict System with the involvement of six neighboring states: Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Burundi; has four major internal fragments involved in the conflict and other small groups who have interests in plundering and looting the DRC natural resources. Other non-African foreign states, MNCs, NGOs and civil societies and individuals have also been involved in the conflict to loot and plunder the Congolese natural resources. The external actors focus on the DRC natural resources have been because of the availability and lootability of these natural resources coupled by the DRC weak states institution and structural anomalies.

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<sup>6</sup> D Kamukana: "Recent Conflicts In The Great Lakes" ; Presented To The African Studies Association Of The United Kingdom, Benial Conference, SOAS,( London: University of London, 1998) p18

Since the outbreak of the war in August 1998 at least four million people mostly women, children and the elderly are estimated to have died because of the conflict the vast majority not from bullets but from malnutrition.<sup>7</sup> More than 2.25 million others have been driven out of their homes, many of them beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies.<sup>8</sup>

## **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The exploitation of natural resources by external actors in the DRC has been a recurrent problem since historical times. From the Slave Trade era, to King Leopold II time, to Mobutu's regime and currently, external actor's involvement in exploitation of Congolese natural resources has been a menace though by no means can the external actors act on their own and therefore they liaise with the internal actors in order to accomplish their goals and objectives of plundering and exploiting the natural resources in the DRC. The external actors cannot penetrate and would not have been able to gain entry into the DRC without the loopholes in the DRC structures as shown by countries like Botswana who are rich in minerals yet stable.

The anomalous structures and weak state institutions akin to lack of a stable army led to slight opposition of the AFDL the DRC 1998 conflict. Lack of governmental concern for its own citizens, lack of proper education, health systems and poor infrastructure led to the people in the periphery to garner support from outsiders to oust

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations Development Programme: The Human Development Report 2006, (New York: United Nations Development Programme 2003) available at [Http:// undp.org/statistics/dat/country fact sheets./cty ts COD.html](http://undp.org/statistics/dat/country_fact_sheets/cty_ts_COD.html)

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Panel Of Experts: *Report Of The Panel Of Experts On The Illegal Exploitation Of Natural Resources And Other Forms Of Wealth Of The Democratic Republic Of Congo* (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001) pp1

Mobutu. Economic decline, mismanagement and corruption and poor infrastructure also led to the peripheral towns and citizens to do business with the neighboring States surrounding them. These anomalous structures have not yet been adequately addressed. Galtung posits structural violence is embedded on social and political hierarchies that are enacted by societies and their institutions that impose conditions, which stunt development and undermine justice.<sup>9</sup> The DRC's structural anomalies have made the DRC vulnerable for attack by outsiders and the garnering of support by the internal actors. The structural anomalies have made the State of DRC not able to handle external shocks like the fall of communism and the lack of external support by the western powers, the structural adjustment programmes and the disintegration of the Mobutu regime.

DRC has vast economically essential and strategic natural resources that are important for high-tech industries for instance coltan, diamond, copper and cobalt. The quandary in the DRC has been because of the availability and lootability of these natural resources as external actors covet a share of the natural resources and the availability of immense natural resources in DRC has attracted external actors who are enriching themselves and involved in raping the country.<sup>10</sup> To achieve their egocentric objectives of self-enrichment they have initiated, fueled, aggravated, sustained and prolonged the conflict in the State. The country has become a play ground for self enrichment and has statutory and non- statutory forces fighting over the 'spoils of war' which are likely to

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<sup>9</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3 (1969) pp167-191  
<sup>10</sup> C. Paul and H. Anke: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, The Economics of Crime and Violence Project, (Washington DC: World Bank, January 1998 and Oxford Economic Papers, 1998) pp 563-573

sustain the conflict for sometime.<sup>11</sup> The trading of these natural resources by those involved in the looting is economically beneficial to them and to their economies.

The external actors are diverse in that some may be pro Kinshasa government but are involved in the conflict for their economic gains; they may fund different rebel groups or be on Congolese soil on their own so long as they are involved in the conflict and looting of the natural resources. The external actors may as well be indirectly or directly involved in the DRC as the DRC war economy is complex and multifaceted.<sup>12</sup> For the purpose of this study the focus is on external actors: that is States, MNC's, civil groups, NGO's and individuals involved in the conflict for their self enrichment and economic gains. The conflict has become internationalized and affected the Great Lakes System as a result of external actors' interference and exploitation of the DRC natural resources.<sup>13</sup> This has complicated any attempts towards finding a lasting conflict resolution. The peace agreements have failed since the external actors have insisted on their interests prevailing and also the mechanism applied have been more of settlement rather than resolution oriented.

The analysis will evoke us to understand their role in the conflict in order to draw or initiate peace processes that are comprehensive and resolution oriented and which involve all the actors. This research attempts to highlight the role external actor(s) play in natural resource based conflicts. It will attempt to answer questions like: is there a connection between the natural resources and the DRC conflict? Who are the external

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<sup>11</sup> D Kadima and C. Kabemba: *Whither Regional Peace and Security? Democratic Of Congo After The War* (Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, Colortec Designs, 2000) p3

<sup>12</sup> United Nations: *United Nations Panel Of Experts On Illegal Exploitation Of Natural Resources And Other Forms Of Wealth Of The Democratic Republic Of Congo* (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)



actors involved in the exploitation of the Congo? Who controls the means of violence? Who are the key actors that participate in this war economy? What is their role in the conflict between 1990 and 2005? What motives do they have for their participation in this war economy? What incentives do they have to seek peace? What can be done to provide a situation where all the actors are involved in the peace process?

## **OBJECTIVES**

The general objective of the study is to provide an insight on the role of external actors in fueling, aggravating, sustaining and prolonging the DRC conflict as a result of the availability and lootability of natural resources since 1990 to 2005. Specifically the study will seek to:

- To identify the relationship between the availability and lootability of natural resources and the conflict in DRC.
- To examine the relationship between the conflict and exploitative external actors.
- Analyze the role that rebels funding and government aiding exploitative external actors play in the DRC conflict.
- To highlight the complex issues that have come up as a result of the internationalization of the conflict especially in the Great Lakes Conflict System and the international system.

## **JUSTIFICATION**

### **Academic Justification**

Natural resource exploitation by external actors has been continuing for long in many States and DRC is just but an example. External actors from time immemorial have been major players in internal conflicts especially their quest to access natural resources thus making a conflict internationalized. However, this debate is recent as internal conflicts were earlier seen as purely a State affair. In the UN Charter, States are prohibited from interfering with internal affairs of other States but that is not the case in the DRC as foreign states are the main actors who are involved in illegal gaining of the natural resources through the government and in funding the various rebel groups coupled with non state actors like MNC's, foreign rebel groups and individuals.<sup>14</sup> DRC is endowed with vast natural resources thus the role of external actors in acquiring these natural resources needs to be understood.

The 1990 to 2005 period under review was a period that the external actors were keen and the behavioral violence was intense, the State collapsed and the Mobutu regime was overthrown. It was a period in the DRC when various external actors took an active role in the conflict and new actors joined in like foreign rebel groups like the *Interahamwe*, MNC's and individuals. The conflict was explosive compared to any other conflict and involved many States especially the neighbors and new interests joined in.

The jostle for natural resources in the DRC was so strong that it was waged by African States with or without the help of other States, non African States though mostly indirect, MNC's, NGO's, civil societies, and individuals for self enrichment. It was a

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<sup>14</sup> United Nations: *Charter of the United Nations* Article 2 paragraph 4 available at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm>

period that saw the fall of communism and therefore no superpower rivalry. The superpowers stopped funding friendly states and corrupt regimes that supported their ideology. The International Financial Institutions such as IMF and World Bank made States to enforce structural adjustment plans that further undermined the State capability especially for a State to be able provide for its population and the States institutions forced to be liberalized when the state wasn't ready. The need for strategic resources like coltan further heightened as technology advanced and human needs became diverse and this led to a rush for coltan like in the DRC.

The facet of availability and lootability of natural resources as a cause of war and that it facilitates the ongoing of an existing conflict is an upcoming debate that need to be looked into and delved into as it explains to some degree why some conflicts like the DRC have been protracted. This is because the looting of natural resources is embedded in existing structures. The structures in the DRC allow for the looting of the natural resources in the DRC. This is as a result of the structures that have been implanted since the Slave Trade, King Leopold II time, the Belgian Colonial period, and Mobutu period and at present though structures are dynamic. Though the conflict has some ethnic aspects, the elites or actors play on the ethnic line game to justify their actions while looting as none can explicitly say they are in the conflict so as to loot the natural resources. The external actors have been involved in playing the ethnic line game for example Rwanda has been using the Rwandese eighteenth century immigrants and other Rwandese immigrants to escalate the conflict.

The study focuses on the DRC as a case study since it has influenced the Great Lakes region conflict system and is seen as an epicenter of the mentioned conflict system.

External actors have been keen in the conflict and exploitation of the resources in DRC for long.

Few studies have focused on all the external actors: that is those who fund the rebels and those that support the Kinshasa based government be they statutory or non statutory external actors. Statutory actors are State actors whereas non statutory actors are non-state actors like MNC's and individuals. Some studies only focus on the African external actors yet there are other actors influencing these African actors to take the actions and position that they have taken. Few studies have indicated that these external actors have complicated the conflict because when it comes to the peace process and conflict management mechanisms then the interests of all these actors will have to be addressed. Most studies do not relate the conflict escalation to the indirectly involved external actors like those countries used as transit zones as they are involved in the DRC conflict. Consequently, there is need for a comprehensive study on all the external actors and their role in the conflict as a result of availability and lootability of these natural resources. This study embarks on filling out the gaps left out by academic writers on all exploitative external actors, all external looters of the natural resources and their role in natural resource based conflict like the DRC. This study also seeks to fill the gap that structural loopholes have allowed the greed of external actors to be manifest and to allow for their exploitative behavior to be patent and ongoing. The study will add up to the discussion on natural resource based conflict and the internationalization of conflict and conflict system and the DRC conflict.

## **Policy Justification**

The study will prove useful to internationalized conflict managers and policy makers not only in the DRC but also in any part of the world where there are conflicts because of availability and lootability of natural resources. It will influence policy formulation in that it will help policy makers reevaluate their policies on conflict management by considering the external actors' interests in the conflict in order to adequately come up with strategies of managing the conflict. In addition, conflict managers and policy makers of natural resource based conflict will also benefit from the study as it will contribute substantially to policy reform of mutual natural resources distribution and control as a prerequisite for a sustainable conflict prevention and resolution in Africa and many parts of the world. Policies that will be formulated in the DRC conflict may need to involve all the external actors including the ones who are regarded as inconsequential in the previous peace process yet have subsequently proved otherwise and those that are the directly involved and indirectly involved actors in the looting of the natural resources in the DRC. The study may also generate and interest further research in this specific and related areas.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Introduction**

In recent academic and policy research, the conflict in the DRC has often been presented as a prominent example of how violent struggles over natural resources have shaped contemporary internal and internationalized warfare. The study examines literature on natural resource based conflict and literature on DRC conflict. The literature review will be categorized into six sections.

The first subsection is on conflict especially what different actors have to say about the conflict, its causes and definition. There are different definitions of conflict as a concept and there is also structural and behavioral conflict hence it is important to look at how different authors define conflict, what they say about conflict and various causes of conflict. The paradigms of conflict adopted influence the way conflict is viewed and managed especially the settlement and resolution of conflicts.<sup>15</sup>

The second subsection is on literature on historical background of DRC conflict that will provide room for a better understanding of the DRC conflict. Third section is literature on relationship between natural resources and conflict. This section will help in enlightening what different studies have to say on the connection between the availability and lootability of natural resources and conflict. It will also show the debate that has arisen on whether availability of strategic natural resources causes conflict or conflict is caused by scarcity.

The fourth section is on the external actors and their gains in the DRC conflict. This will focus on the DRC natural resource based conflict. This subdivision will demonstrate what different scholars say about the different actors, their motives and an

analysis of the gaps they have not filled. The fifth section is on other case studies like Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola as they too have natural resource based conflicts and on the other hand South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and Botswana who have natural resources yet they have managed to stay in relatively peaceful conditions. These case studies will allow for comparative and analytical purposes.

The last subsection is on literature review on conflict systems and internationalization of conflict that will help us understand the internationalization of the DRC at the international and regional level.

### **Literature Review on Conflict**

Wallenstein and Sollenberg define conflict as a battle between incompatible interests over government and / or territory where armed force is being used and where at least one of the parties involved represents the national government.<sup>16</sup> To them conflict in the DRC should be seen as a battle between governments and rebels over territory. However the DRC conflict is more complex than this and involves a myriad of external and internal actors and is multifaceted.

According to Mwagiru conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals. Conflict refers to the underlying issues, proximate and triggers in disputes between or among parties. According to him, the conflict in the DRC is about different sets of incompatible goals. One of this is the difference in perception of how the

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<sup>15</sup> Statement by Mr. Mudida on September 12 2006

<sup>16</sup> P. Wallenstein and S. Margareta : "Armed Conflict", *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol 37(5) (2000) pp 635-649

Congolese natural resources should be distributed and how the inter-Congolese dialogue would be handled.<sup>17</sup>

Conflict may be defined as a difference in preferred outcomes in a bargaining situation according to Joshua Goldstein. The bargains may be in terms of economic resources or in a political situation.

Galtung posits that conflict is caused by structural violence. When the underlying structure is unjust it breeds structural conflict. Structural violence is embedded on social and political hierarchies that are enacted most by societies and their institutions that impose conditions which stunt development and undermine justice. To him it is not the subjective elements in the nature of relationships but deep rooted structures which give rise to conflictual relations. When the underlying structure of relationships and interactions is unjust and inequitable it breeds conditions of structural violence. This type of conflict may be overt or not. The anomalous structures can be legal, economic structures, political structures or social structures<sup>18</sup>. Conflict can either be manifest through actions or behavior, or latent in which case it remains dormant for sometime as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations or even civil society.<sup>19</sup> From Galtung point of view the DRC conflict has been as a result of the anomalous structures that are in place despite the structural dynamism that has taken place since Slave Trade era , King Leopold's era , Belgium colonialism era, Mobutu's era , Laurent Kabila's era and Joseph Kabila's era. This is important because these structural anomalies have also led to the

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<sup>17</sup> M. Mwagiru: *Conflict , Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management* ( Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) pp 3-4

<sup>18</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3 (1969) pp167-191

<sup>19</sup> C.E. Miller: *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies* (Geneva: University for



external actors using the structural loopholes and the weaknesses in the DRC institutions to enter the DRC and loot and plunder the State's natural resources leading to raving of the country.

According Bercovitch and Allison conflict is one of the most pervasive and inevitable features of all social systems however simple or complex that it may be and irrespective of their location in time of peace and space. Wherever it occurs conflict is significant, newsworthy and challenging.<sup>20</sup> They bring out a good analysis that conflict is challenging helping us to understand that managing peace is more important than conflict management even in the DRC.

McNeil posits that conflict can sometimes be beneficial. It can liberate oppressed people; it can enforce governments to reform and rationalize their behavior and it can drive industrials and technological progress.<sup>21</sup>

Jeffrey Herbst states that conflict can be beneficial if it succeeds in ousting a repressive, unrepresentative or corrupt government and bring a better one to power. War can be a trial by fire that hardens and unifies a country forcing elites to streamline and rationalize a government in order to survive while building a sense of nationalism and duty among the people.<sup>22</sup> For Herbst and McNeil conflict was important as it led to ousting dictators like Mobutu however the way the DRC conflict has been transformed has led to the question over who is or was the best replacement after such an ordeal.

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Peace, 2005) p 25.

<sup>20</sup>J. Bercovitch and A Houston: *The Study of International Mediation; Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence* in J. Bercovitch (ed): *Resolving International Conflicts, The theory and practice of International Mediation* ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996) p15

<sup>21</sup> W.H Mcneil: *The Pursuit Of Power; Technology, Armed Force And Society Since AD 1000* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1982)

<sup>22</sup> J. Herbst: "War and The State of Africa", *Journal of International Security* Vol.14 (Spring 1990) pp 117-139

Dennis Jett voices that much of what plagues Africa today can be attributed to the failure to resolve conflict by any other means except through the use of force or arms. To him democracy is the only way to resolve conflict. According to him, democracy by its very nature provides the means of conflict resolution by ensuring that all points of views are aired and reflected hence the only way to resolve the DRC conflict has been is by enforcing democratic procedures and instruments in the State.<sup>23</sup>

However the strategist paradigm belief that man and states are inherently aggressive, hence their approach to management of conflict is by issuing threat and sanction and conflict can only be managed through settlement and not through resolution. To the strategists peace is temporary.<sup>24</sup> The peace research paradigm shaped by Galtung and other scholars like Adam Curl views conflict as a result of the underlying structural anomalies in society. To them it is not the subjective elements in the nature of relationships but deep rooted structures which give rise to conflictual relations in the first place and peace is not the lack or absence of conflict. Structural conflict is embedded in the structural relationships and interaction. When the underlying structure of relationships is unjust and inequitable it breeds condition of structural violence where the weaker party suffers and this conflict may be overt or not. These structures can lead to individuals who may not realize that they are in the conflict like “happy slaves” who does are happy with the situation as it.<sup>25</sup> The peace researcher advocates for violence to overhaul the anomalous structure but the problem is usually which or what other structure do we

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<sup>23</sup> D. Jett: *Networking With A View To Promote Peace*; Towards Sustainable Peace Civil Society Dialogue Forum For The Horn Of Africa, 10<sup>th</sup> To 13<sup>th</sup> December 2001, Second Conference Documentation, (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation 2001)

<sup>24</sup> A.J.R Groom: *Paradigms in Conflict; The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher*: in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds): *Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution* (London : Macmillan, 1990) pp 71-98

<sup>25</sup> J. Galtung: “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3 (1969) pp167-191:

replace with? The first DRC conflict of 1998 was meant to expel Mobutu from power and to change the DRC states to be a peaceful state not only for the Congolese but also for the neighboring states however this was not to be as Laurent Kabila senior turned out to have a different agenda other than the one the Congolese and the neighbors had resulting to another conflict shortly. He did not overhaul the anomalous structures. The conflict researcher views conflict as learnt behavior and is acquired from the environment. Conflict arises due to diverse levels of decision making centers and decision made from all the decision making centers may be incompatible. The conflict researcher maintains that conflict behavior can be unlearned and conflict management need not to be based on use of power mechanisms but through change of perceptions whereby everyone is a winner in a win-win situation.<sup>26</sup>

This illustrates that many scholars confer different definitions to the term conflict and this will greatly influence the way the conflict is managed as this will result to resolution or settlement. How a conflict is perceived greatly influences the outcome of the peace process as shown by the literature review on conflict.

### **Literature on Historical Background of the DRC Conflict**

Literature on the DRC conflict looks at different eras in Congolese history: the Slave trade era, King Leopold era, Belgium Colonialism Era, Mobutu Era, Laurent Kabila's Era and Joseph Kabila's era. All this era's have shaped the DRC state and the conflict, transformed the actors and shaped the conflict management mechanism and the peace process.

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and A. Curle , *Making peace* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971)

<sup>26</sup> A.J.R Groom: *Paradigms in Conflict; The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher*: in J. Burton

Peter Calvocoress looks at the DRC's conflict as starting from the Slave Trade era, Colonial Period to Mobutu's Regime. The Belgium colonial period was a period that did not build up the indigenous Congolese nor did it prepare them for the independence period. The trade routes were channeled to benefit the Belgians and not the Congolese as the Congo State was meant to provide raw materials for the Belgium and the Congo state was seen as periphery from which the Belgium was to get natural resources. He asserts that the Cold War was a period that saw the Congo State turn into a fighting ground for both Super Powers especially the USA. During Mobutu's period, the State (then Zaire) became disentangled for the population and the population lost faith in the State.<sup>27</sup>

Young Crawford and Thomas Turner give a historical background of the country and how the colonial legacy prepared the DRC (then Zaire) inadequately for independence. They also examine the Mobutu's regime period and the external forces that maintained him in power. Mobutu's regime was a kleptocratic regime that was involved with the plunder of DRC natural resources by the few elites in power and their western counterparts. The decay of the State was enhanced by the political direction that Mobutu chose and the changes and politics in the international arena at that time.<sup>28</sup>

Paul Kagame traces the conflict back to pre-colonial period. He cites the false start at independence and chronic bad governance as the greatest causes of the Great Lakes conflicts and not pre-colonial as earlier mentioned.<sup>29</sup>

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and F. Dukes(eds): *Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution* (London : Macmillan, 1990) pp 71-98

<sup>27</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics Since 1945*, (London: Longman Group Limited, 1991)

<sup>28</sup> Y. Crawford and T. Thomas: *The Rise And Decline Of The Zairian State* (London: University of Wisconsin Press Limited, 1985)

<sup>29</sup> P. Kagame: *The Great Lakes Conflict, Factors, Actors And Challenges*; an inaugural lecture delivered by his Excellence Paul Kagame President of the Republic Of Rwanda at the Nigeria War College, Abuja 16 September 2002

Rosenau posits that the Congolese conflict between 1960 and 1965 was sponsored by other states like USA, Belgium. Direct support for the *Conseil National De Liberation* was facilitated by the existence of friendly states bordering the rebellious region. The governments of Congo, Sudan, Burundi and Uganda encouraged the activities of CNL arms and ammunition came from Algeria, Ghana and United Arab Emirates.<sup>30</sup> He adds that the independent African states could not function effectively in the UN to try and combat the civil war as a result of the division between the radical and more conservative states. There are some states that thought that the UN should take a more radical decision in the then Congo while others opted for silence. The Brazzaville and the Monrovia Groups could not agree how the Congo civil crisis should be handled. As the above illustrates the African states were quite unsure how the Congolese crisis should be handled<sup>31</sup>

Sean Kelly posits that USA put Mobutu in power, protected him from his enemies, helped him become one of the richest men in the world, maintained him to power for three decades and lived to regret it. To her the USA was responsible for the bad regimes in Africa like Mobutu's in Africa as the Western countries wanted leaders that would protect their interests in the countries even if they were dictators or autocratic like in Zaire. The Cold War was played right in the soil of DRC by the Capitalist and the Communist block. USSR and Cuba sponsored some of the conflicts and the Western States provided for the Mobutu regime aid, arms and ammunition as DRC is a strategic and endowed with strategic and valuable natural resources.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> J. Rosenau: *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) p467

<sup>31</sup> *ibid*

<sup>32</sup> S. Kelly: *America's Tyrant ; The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire* (Washington D.C: The American University Press, 1993)

The Humanitarian Update group views as the DRC conflict as a product of colonial tyranny, Cold War and postcolonial state failure. According to them the current situation has much to do with the legacy of colonialism and hence the root cause of the DRC conflict can be traced in colonial history of the area, the competition of the two superpowers during the Cold War and the failure on the post – colonial to address the forces of contradiction brought about by colonialism.<sup>33</sup>

According to Clark, Zaire State become predatory and extractive under Mobutu to the detriment of the citizens. Those who gained were only those close to Mobutu and his personalized tyrannical rule and the elites. As such the structures broke down and had long been corroded when Mobutu was in power. The State under Mobutu regime became a parasite that existed on the nutrients of mineral revenues<sup>34</sup>

According to Jean Boyne, Kabila had no trouble finding anti Mobutu's allies. Rwanda and Angola gave him troops and Uganda weapons. This is because Mobutu had become a troublemaker for all the States around him and his neighbors and the western powers that had long protected him were by then no longer supporting him.<sup>35</sup>

Jermaine McCalpin looks at the historical background of the conflict as a result of a lot of *raison d'être*s. To him the Belgian imposition of alien rule, the nature of the road to independence and the grant of independence weakened the state and provide for the structures that allowed the collapse of the state. He also asserts that the Cold War rivalry over the then Congo further weakened the state. The Mobutu regime further brought chaos and Mobutu brought on himself his demise. To him Mobutu had his demise

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<sup>33</sup> Humanitarian Update: Congo: *A Glimmer of Hope or Despair*, Volume III, Issue II (Brussels and Nairobi, February 2001) p 1

<sup>34</sup> J.F. Clark: *Zaire the Bankruptcy of the Extractive State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998)

<sup>35</sup> J. Boyne: "The White Legion: Mercenaries In Zaire", *Jane's Intelligence Review* Vol.9: (6 June 1997)

coming. The Zairian state had long collapsed even as the ADFL forces with the support of foreign actors.<sup>36</sup>

Kevin Dunn looks at DRC under Kabila, the death of Laurent Kabila and the installation of Joseph Kabila and their survival strategies at the global level and internal level. Laurent Kabila was put in power by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola however fearing the Congolese were not happy with the involvement of the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* in the leadership of the country as they were considered outsiders and his being shoved to power by external actors like Uganda and Rwanda, he chose to oust the foreign powers that put him in power.<sup>37</sup> Joseph Kabila has chosen a different approach involving the internal as well as the neighboring states in the peace process though he has failed in the transitional government.

Kisangani Emizet looks at the 1998 conflict as a conflict that is motivated by the greed of the external actors and especially Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.<sup>38</sup> All these literature fails to give the link between the state and natural resources in DRC. This an important link because the State decay and structural anomalies have led to the intervention of DRC State by external actors.

Most of the Literature on DRC conflict traces the history of the conflict to Slave Trade period, King Leopold II era, Belgian colonial imposition, Cold War rivalry between the Communist block and the Capitalist block, Mobutu's kleptocratic and predatory regime and the external actors' greed on Congolese natural resources. The

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pp 278-281

<sup>36</sup> J. McCalpin: *Historicity Of A Crisis*, In J.F. Clark, *The African Stakes of The Congo War* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002)

<sup>37</sup> D.C Kevin: *A Survival Guide To Kinshasa; Lessons of the Father , Passed Down to the Son*, in John Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002)

<sup>38</sup> F.E. Kisangani : "Conflict in the DRC: A Mosaic of Insurgent Groups", *International Journal of World Peace* Vol XX (3) (September 2003) pp51-80

historical background gives insights to the structures that developed, the actors involved in the DRC conflict and the State's weaknesses. It gives the paths chosen by the leaders and for any conflict mechanism to be sound or to resolve the conflict it needs to take into account the history of the conflict. They also reflect the dynamism of the conflict, the state, structures and time period.

### **Review of Literature on Relationship between Natural Resources and Conflict**

Studies of conflict duration typically find a stronger relationship between natural resources and conflict, as these studies allow coding whether the natural resources exist within the conflict-affect regions. Several studies suggest that the presence of precious minerals becomes significant during the conflict as a source of income. For example, Fearon notes that the role of smuggled goods in lengthening conflicts is sufficient.<sup>39</sup> Buhaug notes that diamond within the conflict zone increases the duration of the conflict.<sup>40</sup> Le Billon Philippe posits that the role of resources in encouraging conflict is determined by the physical concentration of the resources and the 'loot ability' of particular resources. He also makes two distinctions among resources between those that are proximate to a national capital and are easier to capture and those that are distant and it is easier for rebels to hold. The other distinction is point source resources, which are concentrated in a small area and are easily controlled by a single group and diffuse resources, which are scattered over a larger area and thus harder for any single group to

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<sup>39</sup> J. Fearon and D. James: 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer Than Others?', *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 41(3) pp 275–301

<sup>40</sup> G. Buhaug and B. Lujala: *Exit, Voice and Violence. Determinants of Territorial and Governmental Conflict, 1946–99*. Paper presented at the 13th National Conference in Political Science. Hurdalsjøen, 5–7 January 2005.



capture.<sup>41</sup> According to Paul Collier, the big brute fact is that civil war is heavily concentrated in countries with low income in economic decline and dependent upon natural resources. These natural resources produce rents, which lengthen conflict period.<sup>42</sup>

Several studies have found a strong statistical correlation between a state's reliance on the export of natural resources and the likelihood that it will suffer from civil war for example De Sosya.<sup>43</sup> Elbadawi and Sambanis also arrive at the same conclusion<sup>44</sup>.

According to Bethwel Ogot, literature on conflict affirms that throughout the world the common elements of conflicts are a zero-sum situation of desired items among competing drivers for their possession or attainment. Thus conflict of principles when accompanied by a threat to vital national interest can produce war.<sup>45</sup>

Nazli Choucri and Robert North have argued that increases in corresponding demand for resources to sustain further economic growth against a background of advances in technology can lead to lateral pressures for societies to move beyond their borders to get what they want.<sup>46</sup> A good deal of conflict potential adheres to tangential pressures especially if as in the portrait of imperialism painted by Hobson, potential sources of the desired resource are less and less available. This means that more and

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<sup>41</sup> P. Le Billon: 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts', *Journal of Political Geography* Vol 20(5): (2001) pp561-584

<sup>42</sup> Paul Collier in [www.crimesofwar.org](http://www.crimesofwar.org)

<sup>43</sup> De Sosya: *Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?* paper presented at the International Studies Association March 2000, Los Angeles

<sup>44</sup> I. Elbadawi and N. Sambanis: "How Much War Will We See? Estimating The Prevalence Of Civil War In 161 Countries 1960-1999," *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* Vol 46(3) (2002) pp307-334

<sup>45</sup> B. Ogot: *African Conflicts In A Global Context; A Research Agenda* in Godfrey P. and Ogot B.A: *Conflict In Contemporary Africa* (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000) p10

<sup>46</sup> N. Choucri and R. North: *Nations In Conflict , National Growth And International Violence* in D.J.D Sandole and H.V Der Merwe (eds): *Conflict Resolution, Theory And Practice Integration And*

more states might attempt to get what they want by force. Choucri and North did find relationships between domestic growth, national expansion, military expenditures alliances and international violence.

Economic competition becomes a security issue when it concerns trade in strategic natural resources needed for military purposes such as special minerals and uranium for atomic weapons considering that such natural resources are found in a few States where the structures are weak to ward off other states from venturing into them. As few states are self sufficient in these resources, economic competition as a source of conflict has important implication as States run to capture regions with these natural resources according to Goldstein.<sup>47</sup>

Ross using thirteen different case studies finds concludes that natural resources can influence the occurrence, duration and intensity of war and that lootable resource have different characteristics than unlootable resources. He lists the resources most linked to civil conflicts as diamonds and other gemstones, oil, natural gas, copper, gold, timber and coltan. He posits that distant natural resources will lead to a longer duration of conflict than point resource.<sup>48</sup> Auty Richard shows that natural resource wealth is problematic for society as it tends to give rise to bad economic and social politics.<sup>49</sup>

Hommer Dixon has a different view and says that scarcity of resources contributes significantly to the civil violence such as insurgencies and clashes.<sup>50</sup> However

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*Application* ( Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993)

<sup>47</sup> J. Goldstein: *International Relations*, (USA: Longman, 2003) p 196

<sup>48</sup> M.L Ross: 'Oil ,Drugs And Diamonds; How Do Natural Resources Vary In Their Impact On Civil War' , *Journal of Conflict Research* (June 5 2002) pp 1-13

<sup>49</sup> R.M Auty: "How Natural Resources Affect Economic Development", *Development Policy Review* Volume 18 (Oxford,2001) pp347-364

<sup>50</sup>D.T Hommer: *Environment, Scarcity And Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)

the conflict in the DRC is because of availability and lootability of scarce natural resources.

Fearon and Laitin dismiss resource dependence explanations on civil war.<sup>51</sup> Ibrahim and Elbadawi find enough inconclusive results to support an argument against resource dependence.<sup>52</sup> The presence of diamond and other precious stones is not found to significantly contribute to civil war onset in studies by Ross and Humphrey<sup>53</sup>. Elizabeth Gilmore finds that the role of primary diamond is to lessen the risk of conflict inception, while secondary deposits increase the risk of ethnic civil wars, particularly in the post cold war era.<sup>54</sup> These studies suffer greatly from giving the role of external actors pertinently. The role of external actor in the DRC conflict is crucial as for peace to be achieved the external actors have to be considered. On the other hand they give important pointers on relationship between availability and lootability of natural resources and the conflict in the DRC.

### **Literature on External Actors, Their Gains and Their Role in the DRC Conflict**

Studies on Congo's conflict tend to focus on how the quest for individual profit has prolonged the conflict and present economic exploitation of natural resources as the dominant military strategy. Financial and economic gain is often put forward as the sole driving force of warring parties. It is argued that, as with many wars in Africa, the seemingly permanent cycle of violence in Congo is the product of a long history of

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<sup>51</sup> J. D. Fearon and D. Laitin: 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War' *Journal of American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97 (2003) pp75-90

<sup>52</sup> A. Ibrahim and N. Sambanis: 'How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol 46(3), (2002) pp307-334

<sup>53</sup> M.L. Ross: 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?', *Journal of Peace Research* 4, (2004b) pp337-356

<sup>54</sup> N.P. Gleditsch and E. Gilmore: "A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource", *Journal of*

political and economic involvement by regional and international interest groups. The invasion of external actor in the DRC has its roots in the colonial legacy.

According to Eduardo Bustin, one of the first preoccupations of the Belgian colonial administration was to redirect into its own circuits the flow of the ancient commercial net works; those along the old caravan routes, channeled exportable commodities, ivory, native rubber, wax, copper ingots or slave in to Portuguese, Swahili or Sudanese trading posts in exchange for consumer goods.<sup>55</sup>

Baregu Mwesiga refers to the DRC conflict as Africa's First World War because it involves seven foreign armies and a multitude of rebel actors. He identifies the external actors as peacemakers, peace spoilers and peace opportunists. To him most of the actors in the DRC have a role to play in the conflict especially the peace spoilers and peace opportunists and the peace spoilers who have been involved in the Great Lakes region conflict system. However, he does not give a detailed exposition on all external actors.<sup>56</sup>

In his thesis, Douma argues that the underlying rationale of Congo's war is the exploitation of the country's rich natural resources to the advantage of local warlords, neighboring governments and MNCs. He however misses out in the individuals and the foreign rebels involved in the DRC conflict as crucial to the war economy.<sup>57</sup>

Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers in their article argue that the outbreak of violence in Ituri in the DRC has been as a result of exploitation by local and regional actors of a deeply rooted political conflict for access to land, economic opportunity and political

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<sup>55</sup> E. Bustin: "The collapse of Congo/Zaire and its regional impact" in Bach C Daniel (ed): *Regionalization in Africa, Integration and Disintegration* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999)

<sup>56</sup> B. Mwesiga: *Resources, Interests And Conflicts In The Great Lakes Region*, A Paper Presented for CODESRIA 10<sup>th</sup> General Assembly on Africa in the New Millennium Uganda, Kampala, 12<sup>th</sup> December 2002

<sup>57</sup> N. Douma: *White Noise, the Issues Surrounding the Coverage of African Conflicts on Dutch Television*, MA

confrontations. However, they do not focus on the whole of DRC only in one region- Ituri.<sup>58</sup>

The United Nations Panel of Expert Report concluded that widespread operations spearheaded by the Uganda and Rwandan occupiers and Kinshasa government with its Zimbabwean ally. The Panel Report divides the DRC in three areas: the government controlled area, Rwanda controlled area and Uganda controlled areas.<sup>59</sup> The Report also gives other actors involved in the DRC like the MNCs from foreigners states both African and non African states. The Report also provides information on the individuals and rebels that are involved in the DRC conflict for war economic. However the Addendum and Final Report was interfered with by the great powers especially the United Nations Security Council Permanent Five like the USA, UK, Germany and France that did not want their governments for being embarrassed hence had companies linked to the government in place then and / or their families deleted.

Rothchild talks of the conflict, as about ethnic groups and patterns of distributing scarce resources as important to conflict management process. However, he does not address the issue of external actors on the resources and that the availability of resources in the DRC is a trigger and a proximate cause of the conflict.

Alex de Waal says that in Congo, resource scarcity has led to armed conflict among certain groups over resources essential for survival, combined with arguments about environmental decline and alleged overpopulation. To him African people historically, have had few options other than violence. He also posits that it is simplistic

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dissertation (Sage Publications Inc. September 2005)

<sup>58</sup> K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers: "The Politic Of Rebellion And Intervention In Ituri ; The Emergence Of A New Perspective Complex", *Journal Of African Affairs*,103/412 (2001) pp385-412

<sup>59</sup> United Nations: *The Report on The Panel Of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and*

and mechanistic to look at internal conflicts as conflicts that began in one state and spread to the neighboring states. This is because, while neighboring states can be passive victims of turmoil in their regions, they are often contributors to military escalation and regional instability; whereby opportunistic interventions are common. Neighbors take several motivations in a conflict situation that is a) humanitarian intervention b) defensive interventions c) protective interventions e) opportunistic meddling designed to further political, economic and military interests f) opportunistic invasions. However, he doesn't give a detailed account of the opportunistic meddling and invasion in the DRC<sup>60</sup>. He does not analyze the situation in the DRC especially the role of external actors adequately. He doesn't indicate that external actors come into a state's as a result of structural anomalies and structural dysfunctions and malfunctions.

Nitzschke Heiko sees the Congolese war as a self-financing nature of contemporary civil wars. To him, this self-financing nature of contemporary civil wars has led not only to a mutation in the character of the conflict but also to a systemic criminalization of warfare as rebel movements and shadow states increasingly engage in illegal economic activities through the links with transnational criminal networks.<sup>61</sup> Neil Cooper believes that economic interests are the main causes for the continuation of the conflict and the fragmentation and fractionalization of combatant groups.<sup>62</sup> Douma and Heiko do not address how and the extent to which the external actors are involved.

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*Other Forms of Wealth of The DRC S/2001/357* ( New York: United Nations, 2001)

<sup>60</sup> A. de Waal (ed): *Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa*, (Justice for African and Inter Africa Group: Africa World Press Inc, 2000).

<sup>61</sup> N. Heiko: *Transforming War Economies Challenges For Peacemaking And Peace Building*, Report On Wilton Park Conference ( New York: International Peace Academy, 2003)

<sup>62</sup> N. Cooper et al: *War Economies In A Regional Context; The Challenge Of Transformation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005)

Montague Dena argues international competition for scarce resources such as gold, coltan, oil and timber is one of the causes of the lack of state stability and the prolongation of war in the eastern parts of the DRC. As the natural resources are being looted by the government and the rebels and their external actors who liaise with these internal actors.<sup>63</sup> He gives a list of MNCs involved in the DRC conflict including the ones deleted from the United Nations Panel of experts Final Report.

To Ken Menkhaus wars in Africa like in the DRC overtime have mutated partially or principally into wars waged not to win but rather to create conditions of durable disorder from which key actors benefit economically or politically. Economic interests feature prominently in these conflicts and can transform war into an instrument of enterprise. Using his words, fortunes made by warlords in the case of the DRC-several neighboring states –in these noxious cocktail of commerce and violence are generated by leaders' capacity to monopolize both illegal and legal trade of natural resources colluding with international firms.<sup>64</sup> However he does not give a detailed account of all external actors as countries involved as not all neighboring countries are involved directly in the conflict. Other states are also involved in the conflict too. There are external actors from other states and non-state actors not just neighboring countries. These actors may be influencing the neighbors to be involved in the war or involved in aiding the government in the conflict or as actors on their own. Furthermore he doesn't show that these external actors come in the name of peace makers then develop interests as time goes by or even come in with their interests.

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<sup>63</sup> D. Montague: "Stolen Goods; Coltan And Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo," *SAIS, Review Papers* Vol.22 (2002) pp103-118

<sup>64</sup>K. Menkhaus: "A Sudden Outbreak Of Tranquility Assessing The New Peace In Africa", 28 *Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs* Vol 73 (2004) pp120-122

The war in the DRC cannot be understood without taking into account the role played by neighboring states –both those that back the government like Zimbabwe and Angola and those that back the rebels for example Uganda and Rwanda. Zimbabwe and Angola fight alongside the Kinshasa based government and Uganda and Rwanda have their own rebels whom they fund. The war in the DRC is economic where external actors as well as internal actors are trying to share what is available otherwise known as ‘war economies’.<sup>65</sup> The ICRC document tends to place the countries in the same category but they are not, as one side supports the government and the other funds the rebels.

Perrot tries to explain the role of the external actors but her work is based on Uganda. Perrot states that in Kisangani which has been a diamond center for decades, the Ugandan army started granting lucrative diamond concessions to friendly traders while others were forced to pay penalties for non-payment of taxes or were simply driven out. She posits that there is a relationship between the conflict in the DRC and Uganda.<sup>66</sup> Congolese conflict is an example of how natural resources shape the power struggles and strategies pursued by different belligerents. According to Le Billon these strategies are based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resources areas and trading networks.<sup>67</sup>

Michael Ross states that the government in the DRC has continuously controlled the lootable resources while the rebels have periodically controlled the lootable resources. To him the resources appeared to create an economic incentive that undermined peace

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<sup>65</sup> International Committee Of The Red Cross Forum: *War, Money And Survival* (London: Open Agency, 2000)

<sup>66</sup> P. Sandrine: ‘Entrepreneurs De L’insecurite: La Face Cache De L’armee Ougandaise’, *Politique Africaine* Vol 75 October (1999) pp 60-71

<sup>67</sup> P. Le Billon: “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts”, *Political Geography* Vol. 20(5): (2001) pp561–584



treaties. The DRC natural resources have been used to fuel the ongoing conflict especially in the Eastern part of the DRC.<sup>68</sup>

Ingrid explores how the exploitation of key natural resources, diamonds in particular, has contributed to prolonging the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It affirms that the motivation and feasibility of resource exploitation largely explain why external military contingents have remained active in the country since August 1998. Driving forces of war can be identified among elites of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, for whom DRC resources have proven decisive to sustain positions of power. Although most exploitation has been carried out at gunpoint, the use of existing networks suggests that withdrawal of forces will not necessarily stop the massive resource diversion. While a lasting resolution to the crisis needs to ensure due benefits to the local population from their resources, it also requires that stakeholders see peace as a more attractive option than continued war. However Ingrid looks at the African states only and not all the actors and also looks at only diamonds rather than all the natural resources available in the DRC as DRC is a state endowed with various natural resources.<sup>69</sup>

### **Other Case Studies for Comparative Analysis**

According to Ballentine and Nitzschke the civil wars in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Angola are often cited as examples of how rebels with the help of external actors are motivated by greed and looting of the resources. In Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de

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<sup>68</sup> M.L Ross: *Oil, Drugs And Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary In Their Impact On Civil War*, June 5 2002, pp

<sup>69</sup> I. Samset: "Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC" *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 93/94, (2002) pp 463-480

Angola, (UNITA) financed its war largely through the taxation and encouragement of the illicit trade in diamonds from the mid-1990s until the war ended in 2002.<sup>70</sup> Successive U.N. investigative panels monitoring UNITA's sanctions busting in Angola reported that UNITA earned approximately 300 million U.S.A dollars a year from illicit diamond sales between 1999 and 2002.<sup>71</sup> The government of Angola, largely dependent on oil during the latter years of its war with UNITA, is one example of such an unaccountable, predatory state. UNITA was aided by several MNC's that traded with it and other states such as Zaire, Togo and Burkina Faso.<sup>72</sup>

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone also financed itself by trading in illicit diamonds just like the Liberian government under Charles Taylor, as explained below, is a case in point. Relying on off-budget accounts, the Taylor government funded both illegal arms purchases and illegal supplies of arms to rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone, who at the time were subject to a U.N. arms embargo. It took stringent international enforcement of the embargo to put an end to the Liberian government's illegal activities. The involvement of Charles Taylor's forces in Sierra Leone's conflict and in western Côte d'Ivoire from September 2002 to mid-2003 was also driven in part by a desire to obtain control of such resources. The incursion into Côte d'Ivoire also fostered individual greed: Taylor's forces resorted to looting in *lieu* of pay.<sup>73</sup>

Importantly there is the need to consider both the political economy of rebellion as well as of state failure in explaining conflict onset and duration. As such, the question

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<sup>70</sup> K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke: *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation* Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation found in [http://www.berghof-handbook.net\(2002\)](http://www.berghof-handbook.net(2002)) pp 1-24

<sup>71</sup> *ibid*

<sup>72</sup> United Nation: *United Nations Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions*. UN Document S/2000/1225 (New York: United Nations, December 21, 2000)

<sup>73</sup> A. Ganesan and A. Vines: *Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State* pdf available

is why diamonds, which are a type of natural resources also found in DRC and Sierra Leone and Liberia, are a source of wealth in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa but a source of instability in the fore mentioned States. The answer to this question may be three-fold. First, the alluvial diamonds found in riverbeds in West Africa and some parts of DRC provide easy loot for would-be rebels, while the deep-shaft, kimberlitic diamonds in Botswana require heavy equipment and substantive capital in order to be mined. Diamonds have two forms alluvial (secondary) and kimberlitic (primary) form. Alluvial mining takes place in rather wide riverine areas and can easily be done by artisanal miners. Kimberlitic mining involves drilling through diamondiferous rock at the specific location of the kimberlitic pipe. Alluvial mining is found in DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Kimberlitic mining is found in some parts of DRC which are controlled by the government, Namibia and South Africa. However some form of Kimberlitic mining is found in DRC and Angola and the mining areas are under the government<sup>74</sup>.

Secondly, the diamond sector in Sierra Leone, Angola and DRC was highly unregulated and corrupted since the 1950s and 1960's. Few of the remaining official revenues were spent by the various kleptocratic regimes for development purposes. Hence the various groups have been fighting for what they have or feel they have been denied for so long. Thirdly Botswana had strong institutions before diamond deposits were found in 1970's. British colonialists had no particular interest in the Kalahari Desert areas of Bechuanaland except as a strategic barrier to German rule in Namibia. Hence they let the Tswana have certain autonomy even though the Tswana are believed to have similar parliamentary system like that of the European countries. In 1966 the country was

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<sup>74</sup> at <http://hrw.org/wr2k4/download/14.pdf#search=%22Arvind%20And%20Alex%20vines%20%22.html>  
ibid

poor with reasonably good institutions of private property. In 1967 the mines and mineral act gave the state all rights to potential mineral wealth at the expense of individual tribes. In DRC and Angola natural resources have been ruthlessly extracted since colonial period when rich natural resources deposits like copper were found.

In Botswana and South Africa by contrast, the government's physical control over the mines and its wise macroeconomic and fiscal management of the revenues, reinforced by a generally transparent and corruption-free state apparatus, ensured that diamonds became a blessing rather than a curse.<sup>75</sup> Even so South Africa economy is run by a few and its structures have been implanted because it has been through colonialism for long by whites born in South Africa. South Africa got independence recently though it had been accused of sending the mercenaries to DRC and selling arms to both the DRC government and the rebels and their external governments backing them<sup>76</sup> In short the South Africa have institutions that are sound to be able to control the intervention of other states but cannot be a good comparative study case because South Africa has not been independent for long and its historical path is different from that of the DRC and many other African states. Structural violence is also still evident in South Africa as there is still so much racism and hatred between the blacks and the whites.<sup>77</sup>

The Kimberley Process Diamond Certification Scheme (KPDCS) was created in response to the role of "conflict diamonds" in financing armed conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC. However NGOs have raised concerns about the continuing weaknesses in monitoring and verification. Yet, the Kimberley regime has the potential to

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<sup>75</sup> K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke: *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation* Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation* found in <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>(2002) pp 1-24

<sup>76</sup> Researchers own opinion

not only regulate the flow of “conflict diamonds” but also the much larger trade in illegally mined rough diamonds that have played an important role in violent state collapse in diamond dependent countries, such as Sierra Leone, Angola and DRC.<sup>78</sup> Despite the launching of the KPDCS, other natural resources are financing civil war like coltan and oil and they have not had such processes and schemes put in place for them. The other reason is that De beers has near monopoly on diamond mining in South Africa and a joint venture monopolies in Namibia and Botswana. De Beers formed a joint venture with the Botswana state called Debswana with a split of fifty percent to each. Namibia’s Namdeb is also a joint venture between De Beers, which holds a monopoly and controls the world prices.<sup>79</sup>

According to Emizet Kisangani, in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the civil wars were dominated by strong men or warlords who controlled vast economic bases and large constituencies before the onset of civil war. In Sierra Leone some warlords were diamond mining entrepreneurs. In Liberia incumbent American Liberian elites held 3,000 rubber estates comprising of fifteen percent Liberian territory.<sup>80</sup> Jonas Savimbi controlled the diamond, its illegal trade and a large ethnic constituency. The warlords who emerged from these conflicts controlled resources so large to challenge the states authority and players. Centrally state players controlled the political landscape in DRC leaving no room for warlords who can wholly challenge states authority to prevail. Mobutu frequent reshuffles of government enabled him to destroy any challenge to his rule. When he was

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<sup>77</sup> I am grateful to my friend Rosemary Anyona for this insight on 15 June 2006

<sup>78</sup> K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke: *The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation* op cit pp 1-24

<sup>79</sup> *ibid*

<sup>80</sup> A. Sawyer: *The Emergence Of Autocracy In Liberia* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992)

ousted in May 1997, no members of his ruling coalition had a sound regional constituency base or an economic resource base such as diamond mining sites similar to warlords in other African conflicts. This partly explains the dominance of state players in DRC conflict. This also complicated their relations making any lasting peace in the DRC problematic.<sup>81</sup>

In summary we deduce that the availability and lootability of the resources found in the DRC, Sierra Leone and Angola and Liberia has provided for room for rebels and foreigners to extract natural resources especially those that have high value per unit of weight, and the structures, the Cold War rivalry was extended in some countries like DRC and Angola and the structures in those countries have also allowed for predation as compared to Namibia and Botswana. The structural anomalies in all the eras of Congolese history have allowed for the predation of the Congolese natural resources even though the structures have been dynamic unlike those of the states like Botswana and Namibia.

A comprehensive study on the role of external actors is needed as for any comprehensive agreement to be reached all actors and their interests have to be considered especially those who are termed as inconsequential yet end up instigating new wars and conflicts. During the previous peace talks and agreements one of the concurring parameter is that the left out actors always instigate violence again. This shows that all the external actors have to be studied so that their role in the conflict may be well understood. This will enable resolution to be reached at instead of settlement of the conflict as resolution is long lasting that a settlement conflict management. The study

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<sup>81</sup> E. Kisangani: "Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo; A Mosaic Of Insurgent Groups", *International Journal On World Peace* Vol XX(IX) (September 2003) pp51-78

will try and fill the gap for the stated problem. Conflict in the DRC has also greatly influenced the Great Lakes Conflict System and a study on that conflict system would help analysts understand the complexity. The study will fill the gaps left by the literature review also consolidate some of the ideas in the literature as one document for easier access by analyst.

### **Literature Review on Conflict Systems and Internationalization of Conflict**

According to Mwangiri the idea of conflict systems means that a conflict is “interconnected with other conflicts in a region” and conflict management should take into account the region form which the conflict belongs to. In every conflict there are relationship between the conflict and the wider region in terms of issues, actors, causes and strategies and from these arise complex systemic relationships that the analysts and manager of conflict needs to appreciate in order to understand the conflict system properly and hence design proper management tools and strategies. The idea of conflict systems brought about the idea of epicenters. Epicenter is the center of the conflict from where the conflict system revolves around and this epicenter may shift from time to time. Epicenter is the focal point of the conflict.<sup>82</sup> The DRC is currently the epicenter of the Great Lakes Conflict Center but at one point Rwanda was the epicenter but this later changed to DRC. This shows that the epicenter is not static. This is very important to the DRC conflict which has attracted a number of regional states and also been affected by conflicts from other states and also affected other states in terms of refugees, trade and arms proliferation.

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<sup>82</sup>M. Mwangiri: Conflict: theory , processed and institutions of management (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) pp71-95

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The study will use the greed and grievance theory for its critical analysis. The greed versus grievance theory will be important as it explains why the external actors are involved in the DRC conflict. The greed and grievance theory was brought to the forefront by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. According to this theory internal conflict will be highly likely in states that rely on primary commodities like agricultural products and natural resources whose terms of trade are declining and which provide rents that can be used to sustain violence for the private gains of the actors involved.<sup>83</sup> The greed and grievance theory posits that the use and control of ecological resources as causes of conflicts has been motivated by greed rather than grievance. Grievance is related to the unjust and inequitable distribution of land and natural resources in many regions of Africa. Greed by actors in the conflict has in many instances been the one of the underlying causes of armed conflicts according to this theory. The theory posits that human greed is the root cause of war and the profit motive a catalyst of war.<sup>84</sup>

According greed and grievance proposition, groups engaged in violent conflict are not motivated by grievance but essentially by economic agendas and therefore greed. Other issues like self determination are dismissed in favor of a focus on the role that resources by and of themselves play as the main objective of groups engaged in war.<sup>85</sup>

Conflicts are more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievances however this depends on the extent of grievances. Civil violence is mainly driven by greed or self serving behavior rather than by grievance based, justice seeking

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<sup>83</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank , January 1998) pp 563-573

<sup>84</sup> *ibid*

<sup>85</sup> J. Lindsay and K. Storman (eds): *Scarcity And Surfeit; The Ecology Of Africa's Conflicts*, ( Pretoria:



behavior and that abundance of resources is likely to spur conflict because it offers lootable income over which to fight for making strategies of violence viable where a few can do well out of war. According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the discourse on conflict tends to be dominated by group grievances beneath which inter-group hatred lurks, often traced back through history. To them economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars are protracted.<sup>86</sup>

Where natural resources are there is likelihood that there will be an increase in the duration of the conflict and the risk of war but then it reduces. To Paul Collier rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the cost of rebellion.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless the rebels do not conduct this kind of cost –benefit analysis in practice. They do not do it intentionally or overtly but one of the ways of collecting data is by observation and this seems to hold true for most rebels. The evidence on the causes of conflicts, points to economic factors as the main drivers of conflict. Greed seems more important than grievance although civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low income countries like the DRC.

In loot seeking movements individuals join the rebel movement depending on the expected utility of their action which is a function of opportunities forgone by engaging in violence and the pay off. The higher per capita wealth and human capital the less likely individuals will engage in risky behavior but this is dependent on the pay off which they proxy as the availability of natural resources. Justice seeking groups form on the basis of ousting a grievance causing government and ending injustice. Justice seeking groups

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Institute For African Studies, 2002) p8

<sup>86</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *Doing well out of war, Paper prepared for Economic Agenda's in civil war*, London 26-27 April 1999.(Washington: World Bank, 1999) pp1-10

<sup>87</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime

have to be large to oust the state whereas loot-seeking groups remain small and fragmented and fractionalized as evidenced in the DRC whereby MLC and RCD fragmented into many different groups like RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani. Greed proxied by the availability of natural resources has been one of the strongest effects on the incidence of conflict holding the other factors constant. Greed rather than grievance is the more potent driver of conflict because grievance should be the highest at the point of repression but so are the opportunity costs of rebellion. According to Collier a country with large amounts of natural resources would likely suffer more.<sup>88</sup>

As warfare is expensive, rebellion has been privatized. Markets in natural resources and armaments have developed to the extent rebel groups can be self sufficient and be accommodated to the global markets for example the financial sectors. This has been evident in the DRC for example the rebel groups have sought to gain access to natural resource rents by running protecting rackets against companies or people who are exporters, directly operating extractive operative businesses or selling concessions to minerals rights in anticipation of subsequent control of territory.

## **HYPOTHESES**

In order to achieve the goals of this research the hypotheses below will guide the investigation:

- (i) The conflict in the DRC is brought about by the availability and lootability of natural resources.

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and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank , January 1998) pp 563-573  
<sup>88</sup> P. Collier: *Doing Well Out Of War* in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds) *Greed And Grievance; Economic Agendas In Civil War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000)

- (ii) The DRC conflict has led to a wide array of external actors that are involved in the war economy for their own benefits.
- (iii) The DRC structural anomalies and weak institutions have allowed the external actors to plunder and exploit the natural resources of the DRC.

## **METHODOLOGY**

Vital information is crucial to make this study a success and both primary and secondary sources of data will be used. The study will be based on field work and library research.

### **Secondary Data**

In utilizing secondary data, books, journals, articles publications and documents will be used. Credible articles and documents will be sourced from the United Nations, World Bank, intergovernmental organizations like EU, Non-governmental organizations like IFRA; their articles, publications and documents will be used. Electronic journals from online journal database like JSTOR, Blackwell Synergy, Eprint and Universities like Oxford, Cambridge will also be used. Publications like African Action, ICG, IRIN, Human Update and Documents from international meetings like all African Churches and civil societies will also be used in order to make this study credible.

### **Primary Data**

To acquire primary data, purposive sampling will be used. Nachmias and Nachmias states that “purposive sampling is whereby the researcher selects sampling

units subjectively in an attempt to obtain a sample that appears to be representative of the population. The chance that a particular sampling unit will be selected for the sample depends on the subjective judgment of the researcher.”<sup>89</sup> The DRC is in conflict and it is hard to venture into the conflict ridden areas. The elements in the sample will be chosen on the basis that they have met the required criteria and possess the relevant information for example practitioners in the field of conflict in the DRC and any other natural resources based conflict in the World. The researcher’s own judgment about the respondents will be used for example ICG staff, some Congolese, Rwandans and Ugandans who have knowledge of the conflict. The researcher will go to the embassy of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to try and verify this information on their role in the DRC conflict. Unstructured questionnaires as well as face to face interviews will be used to collect data from the chosen respondents. Unstructured questionnaires will be used to allow for probing, and to provide room for in-depth information as the respondent is left free to answer what is important. The researcher will not use research assistants because she wants the information from the respondents to be first hand and precise so as to analyze it from her point of view and using the scholars who are gurus in this topic.

Traveling to the DRC to collect data will be quite cumbersome because of the ongoing conflict hence the researcher may not get all the respondents she wants to. Sensitive information may be collected thus the researcher may have to withhold some information. This is because the role of external actors especially their economic gains is quite a sensitive area as it involves powerful individuals, MNC’s, NGOs and states. Also marrying different information will be hard. For instance the DRC might agree that the external actors are involved in the looting of the resources and the other states like

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<sup>89</sup> Nachmias and Nachmias : Research Methods in Social Sciences (London: St. Martins Press, 1996) p 184

Uganda might repudiate and declare that they are not involved at all in the conflict. Marrying the two types of data will be quite hard hence secondary data will be relied on heavily in the study. This sensitivity of the matter may also mean the researcher may not get all the information required. The researcher will also face the problem of getting all the information she needs especially because of funds and getting enough respondents.

## **DEFINITION OF TERMS**

### **Conflict**

Conflict refers to the underlying issues, proximate and triggers in disputes between or among parties.<sup>90</sup> Conflict can be either manifest through actions or behavior, or latent in which case it remains dormant for sometime as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations or even civil society.<sup>91</sup>

### **Conflict Systems**

A conflict system is a system which the conflict centers and this is usually a group of states in one region or sub region. It entails a shift in levels of analysis from a particularistic to a system basis. Conflict system take into account the diversity of actors, factors and transactions in a conflict. It is a holistic in its approach to and appreciation of conflict as it recognizes and acknowledges that conflicts are indivisible from the whole. The conflict system appreciates interlink ages of conflicts in a region.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Makumi Mwangi: *Conflict , Theory, Practices And Institutions Of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) pp 3-4

<sup>91</sup> C.E Miller: *A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies* (Geneva: University for Peace, 2005) p 25.

## **Epicenter**

In conflict this refers to the area around which the whole conflict system turns.

## **External Actors**

External actors refers to those actors who are involved in the DRC conflict and are not nationals of the country be they individuals, foreign countries, civil societies, non governmental organizations, multinational corporations (MNC's) and intergovernmental organizations (IGO's).

## **Internal or Civil War**

Internal war or Civil war refers to war between different antagonistic groups in a state.

## **Internationalized Conflicts**

Internationalized conflicts are those conflicts that have transcended national boundaries and spilled into other states. This occurs when Internal conflict cross borders of countries and involve neighboring countries. When internal conflicts cross borders they develop some elements of internalization of the conflict the conflict has changed. Internalization of DRC conflict is because the external actors involved are fighting on DRC soil.

## **Natural Resources**

Natural resources are naturally occurring materials such as land, diamond, gold, coltan and others that can be used by man. It is those resources existing in or produced by nature.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> M. Mwangiru: *Conflict , Theory, Practices And Institutions Of Management* opcit pp 73-74

## **Role**

This is the involvements of the actors in the DRC conflict with a view to influence the outcome or with a motive of having a say in the conflict.

## **CHAPTER OUTLINE**

- **Chapter One: Proposal**
- **Chapter Two: Overview of the DRC Conflict**
- **Chapter Three: The Natural Resources Found in DRC and the External Actors in the DRC Conflict**
- **Chapter Four: A Critical Analysis of the Role of External Actors and DRC Conflict**
- **Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation.**

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<sup>93</sup> C. Williams: *English Dictionary, Complete And Unabridged*, (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers 2003) p1086

## CHAPTER TWO

### OVERVIEW OF THE DRC CONFLICT

#### INTRODUCTION

Violence cannot be allowed to speak for itself for violence is not its own meaning. To be made thinkable it needs to be historicized.<sup>94</sup> Historicizing violence means seeing it in its social setting and appreciating its roots in social conflict.<sup>95</sup> As with most conflicts in Africa, the current situation has much to do with the legacy of colonialism and hence the root cause of the DRC conflict can be traced in colonial history of the area, the competition of the two superpowers during the Cold War and the failure on the post – colonial to address the forces of contradiction brought about by colonialism.<sup>96</sup> However this is not to say that the external actors are the only ones that have caused the conflict, the state of DRC has not only allowed the external actors gain entry to the DRC but also caused internal strife whereby the population have been disgruntled by the \_\_\_\_\_

The conflicts affecting the DRC are older than the present war though there are recent development in the DRC like election for the first time in the countries history.. The plundering of Congolese resources has formed a recurrent parameter throughout the history of the DRC and its successive violent conflicts and remains one of the constant parameters in the analysis of the various violent episodes that have molded the DRC state throughout history from the slave trade to the Mobutu predatory regime, from King Leopold II exploitation of natural rubber for the Belgian colonial system to copper shortly after independence to coltan, diamond, water, timber, animals and other natural

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<sup>94</sup> M. Mamdani: *When Victims Become Killers; Colonialism, Nativism And The Genocide In Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) p 364

<sup>95</sup> D. Crumney: *Introduction*, in D. Crumney (ed.): *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa* (London : James Currey, 1996),p3.



resources in recent years. Thus the invasion of external actors in the DRC has its roots in the colonial legacy. To explicitly state it, war and conflict have their deep roots in the colonial policy of divide and rule.

The chapter gives the structural causes, the proximate and the triggers of the conflict. The chapter gives a chronology of events in different eras of the Congolese history: pre-colonial and colonial era, Mobutu kleptocratic regime era, Kabila era and Joseph Kabila's recent time\_\_

## **CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT**

### **Structural Causes of the Conflict**

According to Galtung, structural conflict is embedded in social structures. To him it is the structural anomalies that cause conflict and this conflict can be overt or not and it can either be subjective or objective. Galtung posits it is not the subjective elements in the nature of relationship but deep rooted structures which gives rise to conflictual relations in the first place. You can have structural violence whether perceived or not.<sup>97</sup> The peace research paradigm which has been shaped by Galtung's and other scholars like Adam Curl philosophies conjectures that structural violence plays a role in stunting development and undermining justice. Structural conflict is a conflict which is embedded in the structure of relationships and interactions. When the underlying structure of relationships is unjust and inequitable it breeds conditions of structural violence where

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<sup>96</sup> Humanitarian Update: *Congo: A Glimmer of Hope or Despair*, Volume III, issue II (Brussels and Nairobi: February 2001) p 1

<sup>97</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.3 pp 167-191

the weaker party suffered. Violence is built into structures and shows up as unequal power and as unequal life chances.<sup>98</sup>

Structural violence is embedded in social political hierarchies enacted most often by societies and their institutions that impose conditions which place people at high risk for negative consequences. Cheru wrote that at the most fundamental level the absence of justice is frequently the principal reason for the absence of peace. Ethnic discrimination, denial of basic rights, extremely economic inequality and other manifestations of injustice are forms of structural violence which plants the seeds of physical violence and in many cases deadly conflict.<sup>99</sup> According to Joseph structural factors are found in systemic political exclusion, inherent economic inequalities, lack of adequate and responsible institutions, presence of ethnic minorities, resource exhaustion and over dependence on international trade.<sup>100</sup>

The structures in the DRC have been unjust for long time. The slave trade and King Leopold's era and Belgian colonial era laid foundations for structural anomalies. Historical inequality between the slave traders and the Congolese people, the Belgian colonizers and the Africans who were treated as cannibals and children put in place structures that opened up Congolese people vulnerable exploitation. The slave traders and the colonialists distorted the structures that had worked for the African for centuries and laid down structures that allowed exploitation and plundering of the natural resources and the raping of the country. Even as time has gone by these structural anomalies have not been analyzed as such Congo has not had peace.

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<sup>98</sup> *ibid*

<sup>99</sup> F. Cheru: *Africa Renaissance ; Road Maps To The Challenge Of Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 2002) p204

<sup>100</sup> Joseph T: *Early Warning Methods: Background Report And Methodological Notes*, Country indicators

After independence because these inequitable structures were never put into consideration external actors continued to use the loopholes to get into Congo. The way, manner and time in Congolese history that independence was granted without educated human resource other than Lumumba (whose schooling consisted of four years of elementary school and one year of technical school for postal clerks) and Kasavubu (who studied catholic priest hood) left many gaps to be filled.<sup>101</sup> The Africans in Congo were left with a state mechanism and an administrative system that was new to them. This is so because, African ideologies were different from any ideology be it from communism or capitalistic or socialist.

The structures were further undermined by the weak state and the weakness of the army. The army was not yet established and this is what Joseph states as the lack of adequate and responsible institutions that can be able to absorb the shocks and externalities. For any State to be safe a sound and working army is important. This is also evident during Mobutu's and Laurent Kabila's time. The alliance of AFDL, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were able to easily penetrate into the DRC because the army was weak. The Mobutu Regime had left the army to fend for itself, it was unpaid, indiscipline and had no morale to fight much as they also wanted change. Kabila also had no strong army. This shows that the defense institutions after independence, Mobutu's time and Kabila's time were lacking and / or weak.

The conflict after independence started when the State was relatively new with no clear path which the new leaders could follow or any systems to be put in place which would have worked. It is like a baby let to feed on itself by the mother. As such as there

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for Foreign Policy found at [www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/EW\\_Hotsnots.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/EW_Hotsnots.pdf)  
<sup>101</sup> For A Detailed Analysis of exploitation of Africa by Europe Colonialists see Walter Rodney: *How*

was no time for weaning of the young state all institutions and systems came tumbling down just after independence. The external actors' interference in the young state and with no sincere help further undermined the state. This is in reference to the Cold War game that went on till the fall of communism and the USSR. Congo became an area for cold war proxy confrontations.

Due to all the above the states institutions were stalled, and were stunted and could not work adequately. The social cohesion that is needed for any state to develop especially one that is endowed with natural resources and strategic like the DRC did not materialize. For example the Belgians were involved in the Katangan secession that engulfed the newly independent state which can be equated to a new born baby left to fend for itself. Thus just structures could not be formed as there was no time to form them.

The Mobutu regime further heightened the structural inequalities and anomalies. Vayrynen talks about structural transformation because structures just like conflict are not static but are dynamic, for the structures built during Mobutu's time were different from those of colonial period and from those of both the Kabila's.<sup>102</sup> He managed Congo as one giant mining concern for the benefit of foreign interests and his Ngbandi clan under the guise of preserving the tropical rain forest he kept different provinces isolated from each other without road or telephone communications which led to such ethnic groups feeling marginalized and hatred amongst themselves progressed.

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*Europe Underdeveloped Africa* ( Washington D.C; Howard University Press 1974)

<sup>102</sup> R. Vayrynen (ed): *New Directions In Conflict Theory ; Conflict Resolution And Conflict Transformation* (London ; Sage Publication , 1991) cited in M. Mwangi: *Conflict , Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management* ( Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p28

He did not make any serious attempts to develop economic infrastructure, health and education facilities leaving large sections of the population without livelihoods.<sup>103</sup> This is similar to what Joseph calls lack of adequate and responsible institutions and lack of adequate and responsible institutions.<sup>104</sup> Civil society experienced extremely stunted growth and lacked the unity of purpose required to confront dictatorship making it vulnerable to repression and manipulation. Struggles for power was left in the hands of narrow political elite and expressed through the will of rival warlords and the military. Zaire was characterized by security rackets, predation and mercenary activity in an unending cycle of violence.<sup>105</sup>

Ethnic confrontations further undermined the structural equality in the Zaire state. The elites used the ethnic diversity to further their political ambitions and greed. Mobutu played the ethnic games to maintain his regime. He decided to revoke the *Banyarwanda* and *Banyamulenge* citizenship which has no basis as these are people who had been in Zaire even before Zaire attained independence. There existed ethnic minorities that felt disadvantaged by the conduct of Mobutu and to some extent the Kabila regime like the *Banyarwanda* and *banyamulenge*. Joseph states that structural violence is found in the presence of ethnic minorities whereby they are discriminated by the regime in power therefore laying a foundation and a basis for them to feel disgruntled by the whole system.<sup>106</sup> He built up structural economic inequalities in that only the people at the top gained. He used ethnicity to build up his political prowess such that different ethnic tribes

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<sup>103</sup> C. Tilly: *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime* in Evan P.B et, al (eds): *Bringing the State Back* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp 169-191

<sup>104</sup> T. Joseph: *Early Warning Methods: Background Report And Methodological Notes*, Country indicators for Foreign Policy found at [www.carleton.ca/cifo/docs/EW\\_Hotspots.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/cifo/docs/EW_Hotspots.pdf)

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>106</sup> ibid

fought amongst themselves for favor. Systemic political exclusion was also evident as Mobutu played the ethnic game to his political advantage by making different tribes fight against each other especially those with political opponents of his regime.<sup>107</sup>

In short the Mobutu regime was kleptocratic, illegitimate as he had been catapulted to presidency by CIA directive and maintained by the Western countries and the State become predatory. The legal structures would only benefit the elites. A good case in mind was when the FAZ soldiers decided to torture the Zairian Tutsis and despite the demonstrations nothing was done as Mobutu was pro the *Hunde –Nyanga* tribes and elites. The lack of institutions for the population at the peripheral to trade with the government in Kinshasa was a cause of the conflict. This is because the economic structures were not adequate to support the trading system and the people felt the government and the State had nothing to offer as they had what they needed.<sup>108</sup>

From above it is clear to say that the economic structures, political structures and social structures in the DRC since time immemorial have inequalities and are anomalous. The conflict can be seen as a result of people being marginalized. Thus these marginalized people needed to change.

### **Proximate and Triggers of the DRC Conflict**

The proximate causes and triggers can be said to go hand by hand as they are interrelated. Proximate causes are those aspects that make the underlying causes worse and worsen the root or underlying causes whereas triggers are incidents and events that directly ignite a violent conflict.

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<sup>107</sup> *ibid*  
<sup>108</sup> see a detailed analysis of the Zaire State W. Reno: *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne

According to Joseph proximate causes are feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions but also signify system breakdown or basic changes in political casualty.<sup>109</sup> There are many proximate causes but one of the causes is new discriminatory policies by a regime.<sup>110</sup> When Kabila got in power he had been aided by Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi he decided to discriminate the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda*, this caused ethnic rivalry in the eastern DRC and his ousting of the armies that put him to power as they viewed this as discriminatory. Kabila was afraid the Congolese did not like the integration of the external actors into government as DRC was their country and wanted the indigenous Congolese into his government but he made a mistake as these actors saw it as a unjust considering their efforts and as a threat to their interests.

Increased external support for politically active groups as was the case of Zaire (now DRC) is also a proximate cause of the conflict.<sup>111</sup> Mobutu was being kept to power by the external actors like the USA, France and Belgium and this further heightened not only the structural causes but also made him arrogant as he did not need the internal actors creating room for a disgruntled population which further heightened his demise. Kabila also received external backing from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi for the 'First War'. The 'Second Congolese War' Laurent Kabila was aided by the SADC members Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Currently the external actors are also backing the internal actors like RCD-Goma is

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Rienner Publishers, 1998)

<sup>109</sup> T. Joseph: *Early Warning Methods: Background Report And Methodological Notes*, Country indicators for Foreign Policy found at [www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/EW\\_Hotspots.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/EW_Hotspots.pdf)

<sup>110</sup> *ibid*

<sup>111</sup> *ibid*

backed by Rwanda just like Bemba's MLC, RCD-Kisangani, UPC and IFL are backed by Uganda.

Increase in size and cohesion of opposition group is also a proximate cause.<sup>112</sup>

The increase in numbers of opposition groups to the Mobutu regime that consolidated and had backing of the external actors like neighboring states and the MNCs. Kabila's time there arose a number of disgruntled groups that increased not only in size as time went by but also became fractionalized and fragmented into many small groups. From time to time these groups have merged and split to suit their won interests. The MLC merged with RCD-Kisangani at one time to form the RCD-ML that split after a short time. In terms of cohesion this was evident when different groups against Mobutu merged to oppose his regime. They formed the AFDL and were able to oust the dictator.

Violent opposition by kindred groups and aggressive posturing and affectation by opposition groups are proximate causes in the DRC conflict.<sup>113</sup> The *Banyarwanda* and *banyamulenge* changed to rebel against the Mobutu regime and the Kabila regime in the eastern DRC. The Hendu and Nyanga ethnic groups have also been known to fight for their land against the outsiders: the *banyamulenge* and the *Banyarwanda* and were backed by the Mobutu regime as well as the Kabila regime. The rebels in the DRC have used their ethnicity to wage war in the DRC even after the peace process. This is a result of ethnic fragmentation and fractionalization in the DRC. The rebels have arrogantly refused to adhere to the peace process recommendations especially in the east. There were many rebels in the peripheral areas of eastern DRC such that forming the AFDL was not difficult as the rebels merged in order to oust the dictator. Mobutu regime

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<sup>112</sup> *ibid*

<sup>113</sup> *ibid*



refused to negotiate with the AFDL as they advanced until it was evident that the rebels would win the war.

Increase in life integrity violations known as violations of human rights and corruption and lack of integrity in the DRC.<sup>114</sup> DRC had a legacy of being ruled by dictator whose regime abused human rights and defied all calls by the population for reforms. The regime was known for its brutality especially on the population or ethnic groups that were opposed to its dictatorship. Human rights are inalienable to the person and are fundamental to every human being. The concept of a loyal opposition was odd in the state in that the Mobutu regime pitted each opposition against each other plus the political will among the elites was not evident or strong as it should have been. DRC also lacked a strong middle class that is necessary for democracy to work and that advocates for observation of human rights. This is because the middle class may act as a cohesive factor between the very rich and the poor, they are the ones who pay taxes so they may ask for a regime to be accountable and also to vote wisely, have a lot to loose in case of a conflict so they will be against it. The middle class are also educated and have information about their rights and values which they will fight for. The very rich (upper class) have nothing much to loose because most of their monies and investments are outside the country hence in case of an outbreak of the conflict this group usually leaves the country, and they are socially detached form their country. The poor have little voice and may be ignorant or negligent about their right as the may be illiterate and incase of conflict outbreak they are the most vulnerable groups. Hence a strong middle class is important for peace building and peace management.

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<sup>114</sup>M. Leitenberg : 'Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation', *Asian Perspective*, vol. 21 (3) winter 1997) p.3-7

The availability and lootability of natural resources can be said to have been a cause of the second Congolese war of 1998. But the first war was as result of Mobutu's foreign policy towards his neighbors and the availability of same or related ethnic groups across borders such as Katanga's and Angola, Zaire and Rwanda and Burundi. The availability of pro Mobutists like Jean Pierre Bemba and people like Wamba dia Wamba was also a cause of the second war as they were used to fight against Kabila. The presence of Rwandan and Burundian *genocidaires* of 1994 as refugees was a trigger to the first war and Mobutu being away in France for treatment provided room of attack. Kabila was also used to zaireanize the conflict.

The triggers to the DRC conflict can be said to be sudden events that act as catalysts igniting a crisis or conflict.<sup>115</sup> In the DRC Mobutu being away to France for treatment of prostate cancer was a trigger as the state had no one to govern it. The presence of refugees and foreign rebel groups in DRC in terms of Hutu extremists and from Rwanda and Burundi, ADF from Uganda and UNITA from Angola was a catalyst and a proximate trigger. This made the neighboring states to secure their borders from the DRC side at whatever cost plus having a regime that was sympathetic to their security interests.

## **THE STATE, CONFLICT AND THE ERAS**

### **King Leopold's era and the Belgian Colonial Era**

Congo was a colony of Belgium from 1884 to 1960, when it was granted independence. In 1805 the Belgium imposed its colonial rule by King Leopold II who

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<sup>115</sup> *ibid*

regarded it as his personal fiefdom and called it the Congo Free State. Before then he had hired the British-American explorer Henry Morton Stanley, to carve out a huge empire in the heart of Africa, the Congo Free State who *“was instrumental in portraying the Congo as a resource-rich space waiting for European cultivation and exploitation [mise-en-valeur].”*<sup>116</sup> The Congo was presented as an *“empty space, unpeopled (except for the “savages”), undeveloped, and thus at the disposal of the European.”*<sup>117</sup> King Leopold then established his own fiefdom in Congo and by mid 1880s the colonial infrastructure was well in place. Rubber, ivory and mineral resources became major commodities. By the end of the century, the Belgians expelled all of the major competition in the region and ended the slave trade. The Belgian colonial administration redirected into its own circuits the flow of the ancient commercial networks, commodities, ivory, native rubber, wax, copper ingots or slaves into Portuguese, Swahili or Sudanese trading posts in exchange for other consumer goods.

In 1908, Belgium annexed the Congo Free State and named it Belgian Congo. Suffice it to say that the Belgian colonialism imposed on Congo was one of the sorriest chapters in the history of colonialists plunder and exploitation in Africa. This created gateways of exploitation of the area by the external actors as the institutions were weakened. The Africans were subjected to severe human rights violation and exploitation of their environment. In the first 23 years of King Léopold fiefdom until 1908, the country's population of over 20 million was progressively decimated to about 8 million as a result of slave like exactions imposed.<sup>118</sup> King Léopold's ruthless system of forced

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<sup>116</sup> C.K Dunn: *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) P38

<sup>117</sup> *ibid*

<sup>118</sup> E.D Morel : *The Black Mans Burden*, (New York,: Monthly Review Press, 1920) chapter ix

labor for the collection of ivory and natural rubber exacted a horrendous human toll on the Congolese people, resulting in the death of at least ten million Congolese between 1891 and 1911.

As Dunn rightly observes, "*A central aspect of the colonial project involved the silencing of African identity discourses, or the closing off of discursive spaces for indigenous voices*".<sup>119</sup> Galtung calls it cultural violence which "*entails those aspects of culture the symbolic sphere of our existence –exemplified by religion and ideology, language and arts, empirical science that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.*"<sup>120</sup>

They argued that the white race is more superior to the black one and the black people should even be grateful that at least civilization has been brought to them. To Galtung violence "*is avoidable insults to basic human needs which include survival needs, well being needs, identity and meaning needs and freedom needs.*" Lack of fulfillment of these needs leads to repression alienation misery and death.<sup>121</sup> The existence of cultural violence breeds structural violence which can be through religion, ideology, language and science. The African religion, traditional practices and belief system were regarded as unworthy, cruel, uncivilized and unfathomable.<sup>122</sup> The "colonial trinity" of the Belgian state, the Church, and commercial / industrial firms continued to employ the tropes of the Congolese as cannibals, savages, or children. Even after independence the 'children' were seen as not to have mastered the art of the colonialists

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<sup>119</sup> C.K Dunn: *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (.New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). p38

<sup>120</sup> J. Galtung: "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 27 (3) (1990) pp 291-30305

<sup>121</sup> *ibid*

<sup>122</sup> C.K Dunn: *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (.New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). P38-39

and so needed the aid of the Belgians so that they would not fall easily into colonialism.<sup>123</sup>

The quest for labor required to gather rubber and ivory led to the emergence of ferocious and genocidal regime in Congo. The substitution of direct Belgian colonial rule in 1908 only changed in the form but not essentially the character of the system to which Congolese people were subjected. When large reserves of minerals like copper, diamond and later uranium and cobalt were discovered, this resulted to further exploitation of Congolese labor and resources in the service of foreign interests. Companies such as *Union Miniere du Haut Katanga* (which aided in financing the Katanga secession), Tanganyika Concessions and *Societe Generale de Belgique* operated with scarcely any restrictions from a colonial regime whose *raison d'etre* was economic exploitation.

The structures built in the DRC since the Belgian invasion marginalized Africans, thus exemplifying what Galtung calls structural violence which is embedded in structures and that inhibit people from achieving their potential and developing.<sup>124</sup> The Belgians built more hospitals than schools for the reason that they needed people to work in the mines. The maternity services were good and cheap so that Africans can deliver healthy babies who in turn would provide mining services for the Belgians. Families with more than four children were exempted from some taxes. As Nancy Hunt puts it the Belgian colonial power was concentrated on Congolese fertility, child bearing and mothering nothing much on education or learning institutions.<sup>125</sup> The strong emphasis not only on

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid p 49

<sup>124</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.3 (1969) pp 167-191

<sup>125</sup> N.R Hunt: *A colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, medicalization and mobility in the Congo* (London: Duke University Press, 1999) p10 and pp 237 – 280.

colonial government but on production which dates from ivory and rubber days of the Free State culminated in an ambitious paysannal scheme.<sup>126</sup>

Accordingly the Belgians failure to take up any serious steps towards opening access to positions of administrative responsibility to Congolese natives remains one of the weakest points and brought about weak anomalous structures that lead to some extent the collapse of the State. Contrary the British who even though they applied the divide and rule system and the French who applied the assimilation method or ruling the Africans managed to empower many African that they left to govern when they were gone and the some of their systems are still working like in Kenya, Nigeria.<sup>127</sup> For example the constitution that Kenya got when she was gaining independence was better than the current one as it had room for democracy like multipartism. However it was manipulated during KANU's rule to suit the Kenyatta and Moi regimes.

This shows that it is some of the elites who have changed the political, economic and social structures to some extent and their lack of checking on the contradictions with an interest of the greater population. In short what the British and the French had for the Africans in terms of education, institutions, law and rule was far much better than what the Belgium left for Congo. their interest lay in exploitation and gaining from Congo and as much as the other colonialist wanted from other African states the Belgian was exploitative and predatory with no real interest to lay any structural and systemic foundation for independence for the 'children and the cannibals'. The structural anomalies are also evident in other states like Rwanda and Burundi whose colonialists were the Belgians where ethnic groups have been pitted against each other (Tutsis and the

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<sup>126</sup> C. Young: *Politics in the Congo, Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p 573.

Hutus) and have had conflict some so grotesque like the Rwanda genocide. <sup>128</sup>These shows the Belgian rule left voids, vacuums, institutions and structures that were never replaced and their way of governing was also faulty as well as the manner in which they left things in these countries.

Nationalism grew in the 1920's with the formation of Kimbanguist church by Simon Kimbangu and the beginning of the Kitawala religious movement. As Africans moved to the urban centers in the 1920s, nationalism grew. <sup>129</sup>Their forthrightness amidst suppression led to Minimal reforms which were implemented and in turn enabled Africans to own land, access public establishments and participate in politics to very small degree. In 1956, the Alliance of Kongo people (ABAKO) called for immediate independence. Soon thereafter, they were joined by the Confederation of Katanga Associations. In 1957, urban Africans were granted the right to elect local communal councils. ABAKO won a majority in the urban elections. The Congolese National Movement (MNC) was formed in 1958, and in mid 1959 the MNC split into two groups, Patrice Lumumba headed the radical faction; Joseph Ileo, Cyrille Adoula and Albert Kalonji led the moderate faction. <sup>130</sup>

Critically speaking political parties and nationalist movements emerged in the Congo shortly before independence. These parties were largely tribally based, the nearest to an authentic national group being Patrice Lumumba's Congolese National Movement (MNC). The major parties opposed to MNC were Abako led by Joseph Kasavubu the Katanga based Lunda CONAKAT led by Moïshe Tshombe and the Kasai movement of

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<sup>127</sup> I am grateful to my class mate Emmanuel for this insights on September 20, 2006

<sup>128</sup> *ibid*

<sup>129</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics since 1945* (London: Longman, 1995) pp 518-532

<sup>130</sup> *ibid*

the self styled King Albert Kalonji of the then South Kasai Province. This means that the structures and institutions were not adequate for such a young State.

### **Independent Congo (1960-1965)**

The African State is a historical phenomenon that varies from one nation to another hence there is need to assess the paths traveled since independence for us to also understand the current conflict. The details of Congo's independence were worked out at the Round Table conference in Brussels in January 1960. The frontiers of the new state were to be the same as those of the colony. The internal structure of the new State whether it should be military or federal was however left undecided, while the distribution of top posts was also unsettled pending elections which were held in May 10 1960.<sup>131</sup> This created structural anomalies that impede development as structural as the structure of the State was important for the independence to go smoothly.<sup>132</sup> It further undermined the process of growth of the State.

In 1960, the first legislative elections were held and Lumumba led MNC emerged with the largest number of votes. Belgian authorities appointed Lumumba as Prime Minister and promulgated the fundamental law to serve as the constitution and to guide the country to independence. In June Kasavubu was elected president and the First Republic of Congo was established on June 30, 1960. After 75 years of colonial rule, the Belgians left abruptly relinquishing the political rights to the people of Congo in 1960 but the economic rights were not there to flourish. Many of the Congolese were not educated and the institutions to govern a State were not there as the Belgian colonial rule had done

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<sup>131</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics Since 1945*, (London : Longman,1995) p 520



nothing significant to prepare the Congolese to govern a modern state. The nature of the grant of independence itself and the ensuing scramble for the influence among the U.S.A, the U.S.S.R and Belgium during the Cold War demonstrated the severe weaknesses of the post colonial state and further undermined its limited prospects for success. The Cold War and super power rivalry had catastrophic consequences for some countries in Africa and Congo was one of them.<sup>133</sup>

In July, the head of confederation of Katanga Associations Moïshe Tshombe, declared Katanga to be an independent state. Union Miniere one of the mining companies became the chief prop behind the Katanga secessionist movement headed by Moïshe Tshombe. According to Le Billon, secessionist movements are found where there are point distant natural resources. Katanga is endowed with copper as a natural resource that require deep shaft mining and in one area. The Katangan secession can be seen as an attempt by the Belgians to capture and have a say in the exploitation of the natural resources. The Katangan secession was partly influenced by the availability of copper and the aiding of external actors like Belgium and Union Miniere.<sup>134</sup> By September 1960, Kasavubu and Lumumba were at odds with one another. The conflict was based on both ideological basis and personal power Lumumba a nominal follower of Marxism, sought help from the Soviet Union. The ideology was based on socialism in that Lumumba was a strong anti-capitalist. Thus despite coherence of Lumumba's vision for

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<sup>132</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.3 (1969) pp 167-191

<sup>133</sup> *ibid*

<sup>134</sup> P. Le Billon: "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts" *Political Geography* Volume 20 (5) (2001) pp561-584.

his country and its relations with other states, he was unable to translate that vision into reality because of collapsed state machinery.<sup>135</sup>

In July 1, the In 1960, the U.S.A together with Belgium sent paratroopers against nationalist forces in Stanleyville and helped organize mercenaries in Congo in order to maintain a government popular uprising.<sup>136</sup> In order to control the separate and the Belgian forces, the new government requested assistance from the United Nations (U.N). the Security Council passed its first resolutions concerning Congo on 14 July 1960, other such resolutions were adopted in 9 August 1960 , 21 February 1961 and 24 November 1961, these resolution provided for the dispatch of a UN peace keeping force to the Congo that is the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC); for all round UN assistance to the Congolese government in the military, technical, economic and administrative spheres and for the withdrawal from the territory of Belgian and other non-UN forces. It called upon all states to desist from interfering in Congo's internal affairs.

The inception of the Congo crisis concurred with a shift in the UN and particularly the Secretary General Dan Hammarskjöld notion of the role of the organization in a predicament situation. This new approach was encompassed under the notion of preventative diplomacy and was seen as a feasible option to enforcement action or collective military action under the Security Council patronage. Preventative diplomacy was seen as stratagem of crisis management which aimed at interposing UN military and political personnel between disputants with a view to preventing both the swelling of conflict and probable intercession by the superpowers.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> J.C Olatunde et al: *African International Relations* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1985) p45

<sup>136</sup> *ibid* p 100

<sup>137</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics since 1945* op cit pp 518-532

The purpose of UN peacekeeping force in Congo was intended to cut off the Congo from outside interference. This inline with traditional peacekeeping whereby peacekeeping was a means to resolve conflicts between states by deploying military personnel from various countries under the UN command to keep off the armed forces from each other to give time for diplomatic efforts. The interposition would allow for a cooling period and ensuing peaceful resolution of conflict. The central shove of preventive diplomacy was to quarantine local conflict situations and to insulate them from superpower meddling.<sup>138</sup> Hammarskjöld under article 99 of the UN Charter, which states that the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of the international peace and security, deployed ONUC to Congo.<sup>139</sup>

However from the onset of its involvement ONUC was bedeviled by controversy. To start with, there was disagreement as to the scope of its mission and even the nature and scope of its mandate. The Congolese government with the support of radical African socialist states demanded that ONUC should not only expel the Belgian troops from Katanga but also that the secession of Katanga provinces be terminated by force if need be.<sup>140</sup> The UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld on the other hand insisted that the role of ONUC was non political and confined to police actions. He was supported by western powers especially U.S.A.

It was only under U Thant as Secretary General that Katanga secession was forcibly ended in December 1962. The UN peacekeeping forces were biased against

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<sup>138</sup> Africa Journal: *Africa and the U.N African International Relations op cit* p.25

<sup>139</sup> United Nations: *The United Nations charter* (New York: United Nations, 1945) Article 99

<sup>140</sup> M.G. Schwartzberg : "Military Intervention And The Myth Of Collective Security, The Case Of Zaire" , *The Journal Of Modern African Studies*, Volume 27 (.2) (1989) p.316

Congolese factions thought to be close to the Soviet Union especially Practice Lumumba. As Schwartzberg observes the UN intervention was probably designed more to curb the expansionism of USSR than to respond to the security needs of the Congolese people.<sup>141</sup> Congo thus became one of the first victims of the Cold War in Africa which was immediately plunged into a political crisis to last for five years 1960 –1965 which made Congo become a virtual camping ground for external Cold War interests and a captive of external forces.<sup>142</sup> The Cold War was between the communist block and the capitalist block. The capitalist block saw Congo as a strategic nation in terms of geographic size and location in that Congo was placed at a strategic place in Africa and also had valuable and strategic natural resources like copper, diamond and uranium which the West feared would be exploited by the communists and give them an edge over the West. The West also viewed Congo to be important for their goods in terms of trade and also in terms of the voting in the UN General Assembly. The West wanted their capitalistic ideologies to be promoted in Congo. The Communists wanted to exploit this opportunities and hence tried their luck in the Congo. The capability to have more state followers in terms of ideologies was seen as prestige.

Hammarskjöld representative in Leopoldville Andrew Cordier closed airports and radio, thereby giving an advantage to Kasavubu by denying to the more popular Lumumba the opportunity to state his case in different parts of the country or make his voice heard on air. In 1961 the Mobutu – Kasavubu team failed and a new government was appointed under Iléo it lasted six months when Iléo was succeeded by Adoula who

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<sup>141</sup> M.G Schwartzberg: *"Military Intervention And The Myth Of Collective Security, The Case Of Zaire"*  
ibid p316

<sup>142</sup> D.K Orwa: *The Congo Betrayal: The UN – US and Lumumba* (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1985)  
p82

became Prime Minister until 1964. During this period the Lumumbist led by Antoine Gizenga and Laurent Kabila in Stanleyville and the Katangans led by Tshombe and Godefroid Munogo in Elizabethville were separate and often separatist factors in the situation. Various attempts were made to bring all three sections together but hopeful moves in both directions did not yield good results. The Stanleyville secession was never formalized in the same way as the Katanga one.<sup>143</sup>

In Africa, there was infighting about the Congo crisis between the two groups. The Brazzaville Monrovia Group which became the Lagos Group had its origin in the 1960 Brazzaville conference of twelve conservative former French colonies opposed to the support of African states for Patrice Lumumba. The other group was the Casablanca Group arose in response to the Brazzaville twelve. To Modeibo Keita and Kwame Nkrumah the group offered a forum for projecting a collective African view on the Congo crisis.<sup>144</sup> Casablanca Group preferred to see a Congolese state that would be freed from any form of external control. The Monrovia group fully supported the UN effort and did not criticize the UN, policy and operation ONUC. Unlike the Casablanca group which viewed western powers as having subverted ONUC for their own economic and strategic reasons the Monrovia group harbored no such fear. The Congolese case made Kwame Nkrumah change his attitude and policy towards the west and the USA in particular. Hence divisions among African states further weakened Africa's capacity to influence the course of events in the UN and Congo.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics since 1945*, (London : Longman,1995) pp516-549

<sup>144</sup> D.K. Orwa : *The Congo Betrayal*, op cit p 124

<sup>145</sup> C.M.B. Utete : *Africa And The United Nations* in Olatunde J.C.O et al, *African international relation* op cit p 82

The USA was determined to ensure that Patrice Lumumba did not hand over the strategically placed and natural resources endowed country into the hands of the Soviet Union. The security situation in the Congo worsened and the conflict was prolonged. The crisis was turned into a Cold War competition as the USA supported the Tshombe faction while the USSR supplied arms to Lumumba's rebels.<sup>146</sup> President Eisenhower agreed, during a National Security Council meeting of August 1960 that Lumumba should be eliminated, whereupon CIA Director Allen Dulles, who referred to Lumumba as a "mad dog," dispatched several agents to Central Africa especially after Lumumba refused USA firms to replace Belgians firms in Zaire the operation to destabilize Lumumba was undertaken with the official approval of the Belgian government, while the Parliament voted the secret funding.<sup>147</sup>

Under cover of the Kasai-based Belgian diamond corporation *Forminière*, a Belgian agent was sent to Congo to contact Mobutu, Iléo, Bolikango, and Kasavubu in order to "sensitize them to the communist threat, personified by Lumumba."<sup>148</sup> The operation started with placing Lumumba in a constitutional straightjacket: conceived on the Belgian model, the *Loi Fondamentale* created a deliberate ambiguity with regard to the respective powers of the president and the prime minister, to the detriment of the latter. As the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs revealed, the Belgian government deliberately sought to engineer a federal or confederal restructuring of the Congo as Congo was seen as important not only on the basis of ideology but also strategic geographically and economically.

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<sup>146</sup> C. Braeckman: *Lumumba, Un Crime d'État*. (Bruxelles: Les Éditions Aden, 2002.) p.27

<sup>147</sup> *ibid*

<sup>148</sup> *ibid* 31–32

As Braeckman posits, "*These rebellions [in Katanga and Kasai] were not designed to create autonomous or independent entities, but were rather meant to undermine the political and economic bases of Lumumba's power.*"<sup>149</sup> Through a series of maneuvers the West was able to ensure that Soviet Union out of Congo. Lumumba was killed in the process and the chief of staff of the army then, (the commander in chief Luanda was not in the capital) Joseph Mobutu was catapulted into presidency having been spotted by CIA operative.<sup>150</sup> This gives evidence the western powers were willing to go to avoid having an African state turn to the USSR for help.

### **Mobutu's Regime**

The way Mobutu came to power also provoked the crisis at the time to some extent. He came into power illegitimately, thus the population did not feel they owed him any form allegiance to him and his government and more so those at the peripheries. The Lumumbists were pushed to the periphery whereby they continued to instigate and instigate attacks to his government. He immediately implemented the second post independence constitution and changed the name from Congo to Zaire after his election in November 1971. He acquired an iron fist and used totalitarian control over all aspects of life thus leading to bloody uprisings. In Zaire many political institutions created during the colonial period become the natural order of things.

The West sought to protect their interests in Zaire through the provision of extensive military aid. The superpowers maintained unpopular government in power especially where their interests lay and Mobutu was one of them. In 1977 and 1978 the

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<sup>149</sup> *ibid* p 61

<sup>150</sup> *ibid*

U.S., Belgium and France intervened in Zaire to protect the Mobutu regime in pursuit of their own interests. The three western powers maintained Mobutu in power not because he was the most able figure but because he was a dependable anti communist and pro-west leader and could be counted on as a protector of western investments and military interests in Zaire.<sup>151</sup>

The Soviet Union also did fund the uprising and rebellions in Zaire. USSR was alleged to have been involved in coup attempts in Zaire in 1970, 1977 and 1978 however despite Mobutu's claim that the crises were engineered by external communist forces it would appear that his tyranny and dictatorship were the root causes of the conflict. Mobutu was moreover able to play the cold card by crying communism in order to receive external support, negotiable in the corn of anti-communism for an internal political legitimacy which had long vanished because of his tyranny. He was able to extend his tyranny which created insecurity for Zairians. Hence current turmoil can partly be traced back to the Cold War period. The Cold War rivalry also hampered the effectiveness of the OAU in international fora especially the U.N. Twice the superpowers frustrated its efforts in having the international community take certain decisive actions on the security related issue of Congo crisis.<sup>152</sup>

### **Ethnic Conflict and Influx of Refugees**

Competition between local communities ethnically embedded centers of political power and economic control increased during Mobutu's regime.<sup>153</sup> As informal sectors

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid p101

<sup>152</sup> M.G. Schwartzberg: *Military Intervention And The Myth Of Collective Security* op cit p335

<sup>153</sup> J. Macgaffey: *The Real Economy Of Zaire: The Contribution Of Smuggling And unofficial Activities To National Wealth* (London: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991) pp 225-262



came up Zaire entire provinces fell into the hands of warlords who contented themselves with paying tribute to the great chief (that is Mobutu) as the only form of allegiance and were divided along ethnic lines and this cultivated ethnic hatred and conflict overtly and covertly.<sup>154</sup>

Brown terms an “*ethnic group as a human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with historical territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity.*”<sup>155</sup> Ethnic conflict is a dispute about political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities. Ethnic conflicts are is inherent in multiethnic societies as they will disagree about issues and in multiethnic countries the fault lines will often be defined in ethnic terms even tough ethnic conflicts are not necessarily violent conflicts.<sup>156</sup>

There many causes of ethnic conflicts like weak states like Zaire as they are constructs of colonialism and lack ethnically sensitive borders. The presence of ethnic minorities as they feel marginalized and maligned by the state and thus may edge towards secession especially if the are geographically lined to the borders or ask for help from their kin in neighboring countries. The political unfairness that Mobutu deployed to the members of other ethnic groups also catalyzed ethnic conflict as interests of his Ngbaka origins. Elite politics by Mobutu and his cronies provoked ethnic conflict especially between the autochthones and the indigenous groups like the Hendu-Nyanga and the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* to secure their interests.<sup>157</sup> Unequal economic

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<sup>154</sup> D.C Bach: *Regionalization in Africa, Integration And Disintegration* (Oxford: James Currey limited, 1999) pp 64-66

<sup>155</sup> M.E Brown: *Ethnic And Internal Conflicts; Causes And Implications* pp209-226

<sup>156</sup> *ibid*

<sup>157</sup> M.E Brown: *Ethnic And Internal Conflicts; Causes And Implications* pp209-226

opportunities, unequal access to resources such as land and capital and vast differences in standards of living made the ethnic marginalized groups see as unfair and illegitimate.

Mobutu's cynical yet unwise manipulating of the ethnic conflicts spilling over from the Great Lakes Region paved way for his demise at the hands of rebel movement activated from Kampala and Kigali. Mobutu's rule as a patron declined questions such as who was an original inhabitant acquired new importance as local strongmen and their followers jockeyed to control local resources.<sup>158</sup>

Debates on Eastern Zaire over who was an authentic Zairian provoked attacks on descendants of eighteenth century immigrants from Rwanda. Relations between the native people of Kivu and immigrants mainly from Rwanda have always been conflictual. The natives are farmers and immigrants are shepherds hence conflict over resources has always been there. The conflict between these two groups originated in the difficulty of finding a peaceful cohabitation strategy and none has been found up to date.<sup>159</sup> In the pre-colonial Africa the notion of borders did not exist. Like all African states, Zaire's borders are artificial in the sense that they were traced by European colonizers without any respect to ethnic compositions and definition of local social universe, language and culture. Borders in Africa are inherited from colonial times and were the product of negotiations and treaties between the colonial powers, decided in Europe with the aid of poor maps and with scant attention to African people.<sup>160</sup> Neither the colonial state nor the sovereign state could strictly control the population movement from one country to other where relatives, kinsmen, affinities or potential opportunities.

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<sup>158</sup> C. Young: *Zaire, The Unending Crisis* op cit p117

<sup>159</sup> W. Reno: *Warlord Politics And African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) p23

<sup>160</sup> O. Furley: *Conflict in the Africa* ( London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995) p2

At independence the new African governments shied away from making adjustments and in any case this was difficult.

In Zaire the confusion during independence over the leaders, secessionist attempts and coup d'état that came immediately after independence and during Mobutu's rule hindered the new leaders to put into consideration the issue of borders. This was also difficult to address because not all African states attained independence at the same time.<sup>161</sup> Mobutu's attitude towards conflict between the indigenous population and immigrants were dictated by the political advantage he would obtain from the conflict. He did not adopt a responsible position that would end the never ending conflict always shifting his alliance to the side that fitted him most.

This was however highlighted when debates emerged on who was the authentic Zairian and Mobutu's lack of successfully controlling it. The Zairian *Banyarwandans* (who are people of Rwandan origin) were at the centre of this controversy. This people had migrated to Zaire in the eighteenth century and colonial period. In 1981 law requiring proof of ancestry, the judicial condition of the citizenship rights of the *Banyamulenge* was in doubt. The citizenship of *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* was revoked and they were branded as strangers and foreigners.<sup>162</sup> This was an absurd move as the two groups had migrated to Zaire in the eighteenth century in search of pastures, during the colonial period as they had come to provide the Belgian colonizers with cheap labor and others just migrated on their own and others had migrated as the African borders are porous. The question over who was indigenous and who was not was as just a matter of playing ethnic rivalry did not have a base.

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<sup>161</sup> O. Furley: *Conflict in Africa* op cit p2

<sup>162</sup> W. Reno: *Warlord Politics And African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 1998) p23

As Howard Adelman and Arti Suhuke say:

*The Banyarwanda had done well economically in commerce but envy by the autochthones was evident. The Hutu –Tutsi influence in political and economic life of northern Kivu was resented by other ethnic groups as was the domination of the émigrés. The Hunde-Nyanga elites played the ethnic rivalry game and accused the Banyarwanda of putting in place a secret and hierarchical structure exclusively composed of the immigrants to promote their economic power and political power at their expense. The elites of Hunde – Nyanga who were close to the mouvance présidentielle (president's supporters) claimed that their land ownership rights were jeopardized by the Hutu and Tutsis. Mobutu also played in the inter-ethnic conflicts according to circumstances and opportunity. He supported Banyarwanda against the autochthones that contested his authority but later encouraged the anti -Banyarwanda sentiment of the local ethnic groups during the national conference after the Rwandan genocide.*<sup>163</sup>

He further employed divide and rule tactics by inciting ethnic violence so that he can consolidate his position in the government thus employing what colonialists did the “*divide and rule tactic*” which include having the different ethnic groups fight and at war with each other then bring them under the leaders submission. Unified ethnic groups can make the leader be ousted hence the divide and rule tactic works as the ethnic groups may not have any time to reason with each other the way forward. In North Kivu, *Hunde, Nyanga* and other local people attacked the immigrants from Rwanda. In Katanga a mineral rich province local people attacked Kasaians as a result of Mobutu’s directive. The Kasaians have a kinship tie with the Angolans and as such Angolans also felt they have to intervene. Huntington calls it the Kin Country Syndrome where ethnic fault lines cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to spill over from one arena to the next,

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<sup>163</sup>H. Adelman and A. Suhuke (eds): *The Path Of A Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda To Zaire* ( New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999) pp

transforming kin solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational violence.<sup>164</sup> This kinship tie led to asking for help from Banyarwanda, Banyamulenge and the Kasai people from their kinship ties.

In 1992, Mobutu assigned soldiers in provinces different from their ethnic communities. This was wrong move considering the antagonism between the different ethnic communities was ripe in the sense that it moved from objective conflict to direct escalation violence.<sup>165</sup> The soldiers mistreated the civilian population of his ethnic enemy for example torture of the Hutus and Tutsis by *Forces Armees Zairoises* (FAZ) under the orders from *Hunde- Nyanga* elites. Strong protests arose, however the case was never investigated.<sup>166</sup> The Hutu's during the first Congo war in turn were used to attack the Tutsis. These two communities had opposed the 'enemies' for long but after the Rwanda genocide the two turned enemies as the ex-FAR, *Interahamwe* and armed militias from Rwanda and Burundi went into Congo Then Zaire. The Tutsis decide to take up arms and defend themselves. They counted on regimes in Kigali, Bujumbura, Luanda and Kampala for help.<sup>167</sup> Thus it was easy to find allies from Rwanda and Uganda. Angola's involvement on the side of Kabila in 1997 was motivated by Mobutu's record for the support for UNITA, a support, increasingly rewarded in the tangible form of diamond, Uganda's rebels and Rwanda rebels. .

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<sup>164</sup> S. Huntington : *The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order* Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Vol. 72(3) (Summer 1993) P22-28; Also S. Huntington : *The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order* (New York: Simon And Schuster, 1996)

<sup>165</sup> J. Galtung: "Violence Peace and Peace Research" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.3 (1969) pp 167-191

<sup>166</sup> Adelman H. and Suhuke A. (eds): *The Path Of A Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda To Zaire* ( New Jersey ;Transaction Publishers, 1999) p 327

<sup>167</sup> H. Adelman and A.Suhuke (eds): *The Path Of A Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda To Zaire*(

## Economic structures as part of structural anomalies

Mobutu shifted his center of rule from the capital to his hometown of Gbadolite where he presided over a commercial empire with the help of foreign firms.<sup>168</sup> Zaire under Mobutu became an extractive predatory state though the first ten years of his rule were relatively prosperous, whereby the state served primarily as an instrument of extracting minerals and other natural resources for the benefit of those who control it.<sup>169</sup> His regime was so imeldific and the finances got from the natural resources did benefit the Congolese people but himself and his cronies and paying of his opposition. The regime came up with ruling strategies based on market manipulation which brought new non state economic actors into the decision making process along with the stimulation of competition among autonomized factions which prevented the formation of a counterforce as non state actors emerged that were increasingly reliant on the growing local informal economy.

His rule was no longer meaningfully tied to a fate of a realm of public interest. He controlled logging and mining areas in Zaire, Angola and Mozambique. The bureaucrats in Zaire extracted social wealth from the population and exploited the country's mineral endowment for the benefit of a few.<sup>170</sup> In Mobutu's system of rule the powerful used political or administrative to create economic wealth. This means the officials utilized their power to exploit what they could from those in contextually inferior positions in their social hierarchy and in so doing created scarcity.<sup>171</sup> Citizens

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New Jersey ;Transaction Publishers, 1999)

<sup>168</sup> J.F Clark: *Zaire: the Bankruptcy of the Extractive State*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998) p 106.

<sup>169</sup> Olatude et al: *African International Relations* op cit p 72

<sup>170</sup> J.F Clark: *Zaire the Bankruptcy of the Extractive State*, in A.L Villalon and A.P Huxtable (ed): *Africa State at a Critical Juncture, Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) p 109.

<sup>171</sup> M.G Schwartzberg: *The Dialects Of Oppression In Zaire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

were thus caught in the grip of ever increasing insecurity never knowing when their rulers would appropriate the few resources they had accumulated.<sup>172</sup> It is adequate to say that the state under Mobutu regime” became a parasite that existed on the nutrients of mineral revenues.”<sup>173</sup> Zaire contending strongmen benefited from the concentration of portable valuable natural resources which also regarded formal State institutions as threatening because they feared bureaucracies would stop them from acquiring their own interests and power. In this way Mobutu not only created economic structures that were predatory but also that maligned and marginalized the population.

Vigorous organizing by citizens was insufficient to force exploitation away from reliance of exploitation of resources in alliance with foreigners of blusters Mobutu’s authority. Mobutu was able to dominate the country’s abundant natural resources and call on a wide array of outsiders to help him do so. Military and technical and financial foreign assistance played a key role in prolonging the life of Mobutu’ regime. The west gave Mobutu aid and trained his army as well as provision of mercenaries called the terrible ones who intimidated the population. This means that the economics of resource exploitation has all along played a prime role in insulating rulers from societal demands. Mobutu also sought to protect the economic interests his supporters by portraying certain kinds of political oppositions as manifestation of rebel activity. In addition, Mobutu would repeatedly commit efforts at economic reforms in order to manipulate state regulated industries so that he can generate privileges for himself and his followers and to reward those whose support he needed to remain in power<sup>174</sup>

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1988) p135

<sup>172</sup> J.F Clark: *Zaire: The Bankruptcy Of The Extractive State* op cit p113

<sup>173</sup> *ibid*

<sup>174</sup> Z. Aristide: *The Party State in Perspective from Creating Political Order*, in T. Young(Ed): *Readings in*

The economic crisis of the 1980's severely undermined public state financed health care and many other sectors of the economy. Hyper inflation sky rocketed the cost of living; salaries were paid late or not at all and after of the uproars of 1991 and by 1993 most of the salaried employment in Kinshasa had been lost.<sup>175</sup> Concurrently Zaire state resources become thoroughly concentrated in Mobutu hands in the 1990's. The long term shift of government expenditure to president's office reflected Mobutu personal control of state resources. It is estimated that Mobutu and his close associates pillaged between four billion dollars and ten billion dollars of the country's wealth siphoning thirty percent of countries earnings from natural resources exports and minerals export revenues.<sup>176</sup> This shows that the Mobutu regime had become not only a parasite and kleptocratic but also imeldific in that they became extremely extravagant. Some section of the economy prospered but the State piled up huge debts and was shoved up by Western countries which valued its minerals and superficial stability. The average life of a Zairian became worse when Mobutu ruled and their life ended at forty while Mobutu and his followers became prodigiously rich and ostentatiously rich.<sup>177</sup>

In 1992, the World Bank reported that 64.7% of Zaire's budget was reserved for Mobutu. In 1991, IMF announced that Zaire was behind in 81.7 million dollars in payment and Zaire was expelled from Financial Institutions.<sup>178</sup> However he survived diplomatic and aid sanctions imposed in 1991 by Belgium, France and the U.S.A. Meanwhile, the regime dexterously traded on the premise that its creditors could not

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*African politics* (London: International African institute, 2003) p10

<sup>175</sup> G. Jan – Lodewijk (ed): *Mort Et Maladies Au Zaire* Afrika studien /cahier Africain, Zaire annees 90 vol 8 No 31-32, tervuren CEDAF ASDOC (Paris: Harmattan, 1998) p523

<sup>176</sup> C. Collins: "The Congo Is Back!" *Review Of African Political Economy* No. 72 (1997) pp 277-278

<sup>177</sup> P. Calvocoress: *World Politics since 1945*, (London: Longman, 1995) p531

<sup>178</sup> M. Ledeen: *Africa Sceneries; The Future Of Zambia, Zimbabwe And Zaire*, paper presented at COBOLT on *Opportunities Problems And Survival Strategies* 2 November 1994.



afford either to see it fall or see Mobutu fall. Bankruptcy would be as inconvenient for the Banks as for Zaire thus at each negotiating brink a new formula was found, the debt was rolled over one more time while all awaited the millennium of higher copper prices.<sup>179</sup> Thus Mobutu's regime further benefited from significant financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF and as long as resources did not dry up Mobutu was able to hold on to power. there was no one to replace him as the president and the West had abetted him commit the crimes against the Zairian population including catapulting him to power plus their MNCS were still benefiting from the natural states and they did not want this to end.

As privatization increased in the 1990's the appearance of soldiers fighting other people's war for money became common. These mercenaries were paid by the Zairian government with access to natural resources rights. More common was the new actor the transnational security corporation (TSC) or private military company.<sup>180</sup> Mercenaries were employed in Congo's civil wars and earned a reputation of brutality thus the name the "terrible ones". Mercenaries are still employed by companies interested to keep their mines operational during conflicts in Africa.<sup>181</sup>

In relation to all the above civil disorder in Zaire resulted in the breakdown of the national, political, economic and social structures. The domestic decay was revealed starkly in the 1990s when the international forces that had maintained juridical statehood for three decades evaporated or at least came to provide fewer sustaining resources. That is at the end of the Cold War, the abandonment of previous client states by the West, the

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<sup>179</sup> A. Mockler: *The New Mercenaries* (London: Sedgwick and Jackson Inc, 1985) p 38

<sup>180</sup> *ibid*

<sup>181</sup> L. Chweya: *Emerging Dimensions Of Security In The IGAD Region*, in M. Mwangi (ed): *African Regional Security In The Age Of Globalization* (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004) pp 44 -45

pressure from international institutions especially IFIs for economic liberalization, removal of important sources of state power and both domestic and international pressure for democratization made the violent structures become visible.<sup>182</sup> As Cold War came to an end, the West did not need the client states that they used to provide aid with hence they were abandoned especially the non strategic ones. The fall of communism meant that capitalism prevailed hence the IFIs wanted the third world states to liberalize their economies as this would allow the non effective industries to exit the market and global system and this would allow the MNCs, goods and services to capture the markets that they had once been denied. Liberalism was seen as away of the Third world countries to be industrialized. The IFIs forced the third world states to undertake structural adjustment programmes that further undermined the states. This is because these states were forced to cut off their work force, their budget and this made the state not provide the basic necessities as they should have done. For the Congo case structural adjustments were made but as the state did not provide for the population, they did not miss a lot but this made the state loose value.

Mobutu found himself confronted with frank criticism from civic groups about his ill gotten personal fortune amassed in Swiss bank accounts.<sup>183</sup> The civil war was seen by many Congolese people as the last resort for necessary political change. Enough civilians accepted however reluctantly that violence was the only means to reform a political order with which they were dissatisfied.<sup>184</sup> That's why Kabila's assault on the central state was viewed as legitimate by so many Zairians though not all by. The involvement of Laurent

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<sup>182</sup> M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle: *Democratic Experiments In Africa, Regime Transitions In Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p105

<sup>183</sup> *ibid* p 105

<sup>184</sup> P. Chabal and J. P. Paloz: *Africa Works, Disorder As Political Instrument* ( Indianapolis: Indiana

Desire Kabila provided national dimension. Kabila was little known but he had a reputation of being a foe to Mobutu regime.<sup>185</sup> Kabila was a Mluluba and the coalition he formed included Muluba ethnic group (South Kivu), *Banyamulenge* (Zairian Tutsi in Kivu (Masisi) and South Kivu regions and Mukungo of Shaba region.

Mobutu was out of the country and invented a clever but manipulative formula known as *avant moi; le chaos, après moi; le deluge*. He thought that his absence would mean that he was needed back in the country especially after what was happening and as such his return would restore his legitimacy. Many Zairians gave him a sound welcome upon his arrival from France where he was being treated prostate cancer in the hope that he would restore calm. Mobutu vowed to wipe away the enemy and recover the occupied areas. He named new military commanders, mobilized his famous Republican Guard and even employed mercenaries from France, Belgium and Serbia. However the Guards lost one battle after the other. According to Colette Braeckman “ Mobutu’s army which had not been paid salary for so long did not win but this was not because it was simply not because of cowardice or lack of motivation but because majority of the soldiers wanted change as well and were no longer worried about defending a discredited regime that had forgotten to pay them. Herbst states that conflict can be beneficial if it succeeds in ousting a repressive, unrepresentative or corrupt government and bring a better one to power. War can be a trial by fire that hardens and unifies a country forcing elites to streamline and rationalize a government in order to survive while building a sense of nationalism and duty among the people.<sup>186</sup> For Herbst conflict was important as it led to

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University Press, 1999) p83

<sup>185</sup> African Confidential 28<sup>th</sup> March 1997 volume 38(7) and 38;10

<sup>186</sup> J. Herbst: “War and The State of Africa”, *Journal of International Security* Vol.14 (Spring 1990) pp 117-139

ousting dictators like Mobutu however the way the DRC conflict has been transformed has led to the question over who is the best replacement after such an ordeal happening to a country.

Those who fiercely resisted the AFDL were the Hutu militias, ex FAR and UNITA fighters who had everything to loose with the ousting of Mobutu.”<sup>187</sup> Mobutu tried to change his cabinet and give it a new look to his counter offensive. He reappointed Kengo wa Dondo as head of government as he was seen by France as the favorite to succeed him. However Kengo resigned and Etienne Tishesekedi in the hope of sharing power with the alliance but Kabila declined as it was evident they would win. Kabila had also been pro-Lumumba during the first Congolese state hence his desire for vengeance could have influenced his decision. Mobutu replaced Tishesekedi with General Likilia Bolongo three days after his nomination.<sup>188</sup>

Mobutu’s regime collapsed in the wake of the death of Mobutu himself leaving behind a state that had long collapsed and an economy that had long been reduced to shambles, a State that had deteriorated and a population that was disillusioned.<sup>189</sup> The USA refusal to help Mobutu was critical in the success of the rebellion and was held as a victory of USA over France.<sup>190</sup> Some French politicians even saw this refusal as evidence of a conspiracy. Till the wake of his death Mobutu only had France as his only ally.<sup>191</sup> The USA and France were allies against communism but with the end of Cold War they

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<sup>187</sup> C. Braeckman: *L'Enjeu Congolais; L'Afrique Centrale Après Mobutu* (Paris, Fayard 1999) pp12-13

<sup>188</sup> H. Adelman and A. Suhuke: *The Path Of A Genocide; The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda To Zaire* op cit p336

<sup>189</sup> P.A Nyong'o : *The study of African politics, A critical Appreciation of a heritage* ( Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2002) p85

<sup>190</sup> A.C Huliaras: “The Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy , French Perception Of The Great Lakes Crisis”, *The Journal Of Modern Studies* vol 36(1998) pp 593-609

<sup>191</sup> F. Nolet: “African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire”, *Africa Today* Vol 47(2000) pp 65-85

became rivals.<sup>192</sup> The French saw the down fall of Mobutu as an Anglo Saxon conspiracy to take over French influence in Africa. The fall of Mobutu and the country's economic potential aroused a unique interest in the affairs of the country. Although the socio economic and physical infrastructure in the DRC were almost non existent and the country was faced with huge challenges for construction and national cohesion, the country was seen as having enormous potential for future economic and political stability.<sup>193</sup> Nevertheless, as later seen this was not to be.

### **The Toppling of Mobutu's Regime and Installation of Laurent Kabila's Government**

Kabila had no trouble finding anti Mobutu's allies. Rwanda and Angola gave him troops and Uganda weapons.<sup>194</sup> Kabila received direct and indirect support from Uganda, Burundi, Angola Eritrea, Zambia and Tanzania, while Rwandan military forces prominently provided aid and direction to the rebellion that included Tutsis and other disconnected groups. Angola, Uganda and Burundi wanted a friendly regime in Kinshasa capable of securing their borders with the DRC.<sup>195</sup> This created a conflict system with Zaire (now DRC) as the epicenter. The Great Lakes conflict system was affected by the politics the regional leader decided to play and the influx of refugees like the Hutu Extremists and the UNITA rebels. As the conflict escalated to direct violence it embroiled the States of the region and even some extra systemic states with interests in

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<sup>192</sup> Adelman H. and Suhuke A. (eds): *The Path Of A Genocide ; The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda And Zaire* p 322

<sup>193</sup> D. Kadima and C. Kabemba (eds): *Whither Regional Peace And Security*, op cit p21

<sup>194</sup> J. Boyne: "The White Legion: Mercenaries In Zaire" *Jane's Intelligence Review* Vol 9 (6) (June 1997) pp 278-281

<sup>195</sup> M. McNulty: "The Collapse Of Zaire: Implosion , Revolution Or External Aggression" *The Journal Of Modern Studies* Vol.37(1999) pp 53-82

the outcomes of the conflict as later seen by the joining of some SADC countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa. This conflict system is based on the historic movement of the people from one State to another like the *Banyamulenge*.<sup>196</sup>

Mobutu's interference in his neighbors' domestic politics was resented and left them ready to settle scores. In the east he played a limited but somewhat dubious role in the Ugandan civil war. In January 1985 his forces accompanied a party of pro Idi Amin soldiers, who had been allowed to operate in Congolese soil. Mobutu also entered into an agreement with the Sudanese government to destabilize Uganda. Consequently, when Museveni became president in 1986 he refused to cooperate with Mobutu.<sup>197</sup> Thus Uganda went into the Congolese war to secure its borders. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was carrying raids on governmental installations in western Uganda with the aid of Sudan and Zaire. The ADF emerged from a combination of a preexisting Sudanese supported movement against The Ugandan National Resistance Movement.<sup>198</sup> Mobutu backed the ADF in retaliation for Museveni backing the AFDL and the Banyamulenge.

Mobutu encountered some major problems with Angolan leaders. His subversive behavior toward Angola started when the popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) took control of Luanda and installed a pro-soviet regime in June 1975. Mobutu had funded UNITA rebels for long and UNITA was an offensive to the MPLA government in Luanda. The National Front for the Liberalization of Angola (NFLA) and UNITA which were backed by the USA through Mobutu and South African leadership continued a guerilla against the Angolan government. Mobutu continued interference in

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<sup>196</sup> M. Mwagiru: *Conflict , Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management* ( Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) pp 82-84

<sup>197</sup> E. Kisangani: *Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo: A Mosaic Of Insurgent Groups* opcit pp51-79

the Angolan civil war was the main reason Angola leaders decided to help topple him and bring Kabila to power in May 1997. Hence, Angola readily agreed to be involved in the ousting of the dictator.<sup>199</sup> Luanda's main objective was not to put Kabila to power but to cut off aid to, base and trade route for UNITA.

Angola's strategy for the prevailing war was to pursue Savimbi especially by interdicting his supplies, to protect the oil installations that finance its own war effort and to maintain a favorable or compliant regime in Kinshasa.<sup>200</sup> Savimbi had built a secret army and numerous arms depots in Zaire in Mobutu's presidential domain at Gbadolite, then transferred to Gabon on the eve of the AFDL victory. Thus Angola intervened in the first Congo war (1996-1997) to destroy UNITA's secret army and to break up the networks by which he disposed of diamonds.<sup>201</sup> As part of the ongoing struggle against Savimbi, Angola decided to join Rwanda, Uganda and AFDL effort to overthrow Mobutu. However when the rebellion started in October 1996 relations between Zaire and Angola appeared normal. The Angolan leader's decided not to decide but entered full front in the war when it was clear who would win the war.<sup>202</sup>

Burundi was also against the FDD elements in Zaire who had also moved into the DRC in refugee camps. The FDD was cooperating with the ALIR in training together procuring arms and carrying out joint military operations. FDD used refugee camps to rearm themselves and also utilized international aid given to refugee camps to rebuild their strength and to conduct guerilla raids against Burundi and Rwanda. In 1996 the

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<sup>198</sup> International Crisis Group: *The Scramble Of Congo* (Brussels and Nairobi: ICG, 2000) p34

<sup>199</sup> *ibid*

<sup>200</sup> T. Thomas: *Angola's Role In Congo War* in Clark J.F, *The Africa Stakes In The DRC War* op cit pp75

<sup>201</sup> C. Braeckman: *L'Enjeu Congolais; L'Afrique Centrale Après Mobutu* (Paris: Fayard 1999) p264

<sup>202</sup> F. Reyntjens: *la Guerre des Grand Lacs* ( Paris: L'Harmattan , 1999) p 70

FDD forces were weakened by the disruption of their bases in the DRC following attacks by the Rwandan backed AFDL rebels against Mobutu's army.<sup>203</sup>

The exodus of some 1.2 million Hutu refugees across the border from Rwanda to Eastern part of following the capture of Kigali by Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front in July 1994 led to the disruption of the Congo. The Rwanda genocide was an atrocity committed against Tutsis and Hutu moderates by the *interahamwe* and Hutu extremists who killed over 800,000 people and maimed others as an ethnic cleansing ritual.<sup>204</sup> It was meant to rid of all 'cockroaches' that were in the Rwanda. Among the refugees that fled into Zaire were members of the defeated Rwandan army *ex-FAR* and *Hutu militia* and the *interahamwe* who posed a threat to the security of Rwanda. Rwanda's primary rationale for its support to the rebellion was to press into eastern Zaire in order to rid the area off all *interahamwe* and *Ex-FAR* forces that had left Rwanda after the genocide but continued to create and pose instability in their home country. Existence of such people has the effect of prolonging guerrilla conflicts also as guerillas can easily across into friendly territory and hide among people either the same or related to themselves for example Zaire and Angola, Zaire and Rwanda. The ease with which dissidents are harbored in neighboring countries and guerillas armed and trained there is a cause of both internal and interstates conflict.<sup>205</sup>

Foreign companies liaised with the AFDL forces to acquire the areas in Zaire that were rich in natural resources. Many Anglo-American firms that were interested in the

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<sup>203</sup> International Crisis Group: *Burundi Breaking The Deadlock* Africa Report No. 29 (Brussels and Nairobi: ICG, 2000)

<sup>204</sup> R. Lemarchand: "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes" *African Studies Quarterly* (2005) pp1-17

<sup>205</sup> R. Lemarchand: "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes" *African Studies Quarterly* (2005) pp1-17



DRC liaised with the rebel forces and acquired state owned corporations even before the war began. Several mining companies from Canada, America, South Africa and Britain financed the first Congolese war. Foreign mining companies were trying to get a share of the fields and the Kabila rebel group was busy already selling concession and indicating that they intended to privatize most of the state owned and held mines in Zaire as soon as they assumed power in Kinshasa. Examples of these foreign companies are AMF, Banro, Barrick Gold Mines, Anglo American Corporation, Consolidated Eurocan, Iskor And Gencor, De Beers, Cluff Mining Company and most of these companies were part of the Club of Isles which is an organization to protect the interests of British, American and some European Monarchies.<sup>206</sup>

South Africa sold arms to the belligerents until Mandela decided to mediate between Kabila and Mobutu as well providing mercenaries. However Mobutu was not willing to relinquish power and refused to cooperate, until the last minute when he saw he would lose. The fall of Mobutu seemed to pave way toward reshaping and even resizing the DRC. Each of the DRC neighboring leaders had reasons to support Kabila and to reshape the DRC. It was 'pay back' and 'get even' time.<sup>207</sup>

Angola had a chance to 'pay back' of years of Mobutu interference and to squeeze UNITA by closing off its pipeline to the outside world. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi supported Kabila to create a buffer zone against their own insurgent groups that were

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<sup>206</sup> D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region*; In Heinrich Boll Foundation; *Networking With A View To Promoting Peace, Towards Sustainable Peace –Civil Society Dialogue Forum For The Horn Of Africa*, Second Conference Documentation Nairobi 10-13 December 2000 (Nairobi; Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2000) pp 183-213

<sup>207</sup> E. Kisangani: *Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo: A Mosaic Of Insurgent Groups* opcit pp51-79

roaming in the DRC.<sup>208</sup> The war which ousted Mobutu's government started in eastern Zaire that is North Kivu and South Kivu though they were ethno national in character. The first North Kivu conflict was between autochthones and *Banyarwanda* who are people of Rwandan origin. The second involved Hutu refugees including the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* and autochthones on the one hand with *Banyamulenge* Tutsis on the other hand. Conflict escalated *Banyamulenge*. Conflict escalated when the Hutu refugees perpetrated ethnic cleansing against Zairian Tutsis with the understanding and encouragement of Zairian authorities and soldiers<sup>209</sup>.

Kabila's led AFDL forces took over Kinshasa and Kabila declared himself president of the country which he renamed the DRC. He formed a transitional government comprised of the main political parties and scheduled elections 4 April 1999. He also appointed a constitutional by March 1998. Kabila, after assuming power, tried to transform the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo), a motley assemblage of various anti-Mobutu groups, into a broad-based, people-centered political structure, the Committees for People's Power (Comités du Pouvoir Populaire / CPP). The attempt failed, because the provisional CPPs were quickly infiltrated by the better-organized Mobutu loyalists, but also because, as in the case of Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolaise (MNC), Kabila did not have sufficient time to put the structure in place.

At a donors conference in Brussels in December 1997, Kabila and his team presented a minimal three-year development and reconstruction plan designed to establish a "social market economy" (*économie sociale de marché*). The plan was an

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<sup>208</sup> *ibid*

<sup>209</sup> *ibid*

uneasy mixture of populism and liberalism, which required a capital outlay of USA three billion dollars, was rejected by the “*Friends of Congo.*”<sup>210</sup> But as Martens rightly notes, “The Plan had great political significance: it was the first time in Congo that the government had conceived a plan on its own, based on the most urgent needs of the rural and urban masses”<sup>211</sup> Having learned from experience that he should rely essentially on his own capabilities, Kabila then initiated a state-based policy of economic independence, including the successful launching of the Congolese Franc in June 1998, and he proceeded to take a series of measures designed to tighten the state’s control over the economy, which included the exclusion of foreigners from the diamond sector. Other populist measures for example, the creation of “popular stores” (*magasins du peuple*) designed to provide the ordinary people with affordable goods—were adopted but also failed. However, the Kabila regime did achieve a measure of economic success in 1997; the price of basic foodstuffs stabilized, inflation was reduced, and state customs and excise revenues increased.<sup>212</sup>

Kabila’s regime did not change the structures and institutions that had maligned and discriminated against the population as this structural violence was hard to be removed as it involved a lot of resources in terms of funds, time and personnel which the new regime did not have. The peace research paradigm advocates for anomalous structures to be removed from a state so that peace can prevail, however the question is usually, which is the replacement? Mobutu was ousted but the structures were still there

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<sup>210</sup> M. Ludo: *Kabila Et La Révolution Congolaise: Panafricanisme Ou Néocolonialisme.* (Antwerp: Éditions EPO 2002) p245

<sup>211</sup> *ibid*

<sup>212</sup> *ibid*

and the replacement was hard to come by even as DRC sunk into deeper anarchy each moment.

Of greater concern to Western economic interests were Kabila's attempts to achieve economic independence and to delink the Congo from the dominant developed countries and developing trading networks which he viewed as exploitative. In particular, Kabila's policies were seen as going against the West's efforts to better integrate Africa into the world economy and as providing a "bad example" to other African countries. The United States was especially upset by Kabila's renegeing on previously concluded agreements with minor mining companies, on his insistence that foreign firms pay taxes (tax evasion used to be the norm), and on the decidedly socialist-populist and pan-Africanist orientation of his regime.<sup>213</sup> U.S initially backed Kabila so that it can secure its interest in the natural resources, to contain Islamic fundamentalism in Eastern and Central Africa and to extend its influence in Central Africa against France.<sup>214</sup> Despite all these the USA was wary of Kabila who happened to be a pro Lumumba who had been driven out by the Zairian government Mobutu after the fall of Lumumba and a socialist.

On July 1998 as Kabila was battling internal pressures he ordered all foreign troops to leave. Military cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda ended abruptly and the two former allies initiated an anti -Kabila revolt which began on august 1998. Kabila filed a case in ICJ against Rwanda and Uganda. Uganda and Rwanda relations also soured because of regional rivalry. In August, Laurent-Désiré Kabila's former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, who had helped him overthrow Mobutu and seize power in May 1997, turned against him especially after he announced that all foreign armies should

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<sup>213</sup> *ibid* p250-256

<sup>214</sup> J.C William : "The Friends Of Congo And The Kabila System", *A Journal Of Opinion* Vol. 26 (1)

leave the DRC as they saw this as a betrayal and started the Second Congo War, which still goes on in spite of two main Peace Accords. This time the war involved at least three rebel groups, five major intervening or invading states, a handful of other states drawn in to a fray and a wide array of international actors most of whom attempted to reap the financial benefits of the ongoing conflict. When Kabila could no longer satisfy his former backers they turned against him and backed others rebel groups. Relation between DRC, Uganda and Rwanda soured leading to the expulsion of Rwandese and Ugandan soldiers from the DRC. This not only changed the issues, and characters but also the nature of the conflict as Vayrynen calls it conflict transformation and dynamism.<sup>215</sup> The conflict became a full blown continental war and vital for the relative stability of the region as the whole region was encompassed in this War.

Thus Africa's first continental- scale war and the Second DRC War was fought on the territory of the DRC, raged on throughout 2000 with renewed military offensives by all sides. At one level a Congolese civil war, the conflict drew opposing regional blocks; a Great Lakes Regional alliance of Rwanda , Uganda and Burundi in support of Congolese rebel groups which later shifted and broke to Uganda and Rwanda fighting against each other on DRC soil versus Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia backing the government in Kinshasa. A number of unfinished civil wars from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola are also being battled out in the DRC. One of the reasons given was that Kabila never quelled Rwanda and Ugandan insurgents and rebellious activities against his eastern allies continued from the eastern borders.

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(1998) pp 645-667

<sup>215</sup> R. Vayrynen (ed): *New Directions In Conflict Theory ; Conflict Resolution And Conflict Transformation* (London ; Sage Publication , 1991) cited in M. Mwangi: *Conflict , Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management* ( Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p28

The 'Second War' was a manifestation of the desire of former Kabila allies to substitute him for a new leadership team much more competent and better able to secure the interests of the Rwandese and Ugandan interests like natural resources exploitation and border interests vis-à-vis the armed group fighting them from Congo.<sup>216</sup> Angola broke ties with the former allies and supported Kabila because UNITA's President Antonia Dembo had just been received in Kigali and Savimbi had visited Uganda. Uganda and Rwanda sent their troops to the Bas-Congo Angola's backyard without consulting Angola.<sup>217</sup>

Fighting broke out simultaneously in the East and West in 1998 and Rwanda's attempt to blow Kabila's government with an airborne assault in the West was thwarted by Angola's intervention.<sup>218</sup> The anti Kabila revolt started on August 1998 as a cohesive group called the RCD. Anti government forces and their foreign backers gained ground in the East within the month it had developed into a full scale war with the anti government forces penetrating hundreds of kilometers deep into the DRC territory and several countries joining the fray on both sides. The RCD and its foreign backers stated four objectives when they started the second DRC war: the restoration of a federal state, the establishment of a liberal political system, the development of an open economy to lay the foundation of sustainable economic development and regional security. Wamba dia Wamba was the leader but as war progressed he realized that the objectives were not to

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<sup>216</sup>G. Nzongola-Ntalaja: *Position Du Professeurs Georges Nzongola Ntalaja Sur La Crise En Republique Democratiques de Congo*(Washington Association of Concerned Scholars , special bulletin October 1998) pp12-25

<sup>217</sup>T. Thomas: *Angola's Role In Congo War* in J.F Clark: *The Africa Stakes In The DRC War* op cit p75-92

<sup>218</sup> *ibid*

be. The RCD broke into two camps: 'doves' supporting Wamba and the 'hawks' supporting Emile Hunga and Deogracias Bugera. Ten months later Wamba was ousted.<sup>219</sup>

Though President Kagame claimed that the war was to save the Tutsi *Banyamulenge* people the actions of the army officers contradicted the claim. Kigali not only manipulated the RCD's leadership but also suppressed the people it claimed to protect by using them to do the mining some forcibly and violation of human rights by killing and maiming any opposition or any who traded with other groups.<sup>220</sup> As time went by, the people resentment of the RCD- Goma after the RCD split became clear in 2000 with a wave of church led civil demonstrations in town controlled by the RCD- Goma. The RCD –Goma retaliated by "massacring defenseless civilians with machetes, knives and guns causing thousands of victims."<sup>221</sup>

The outbreak of the second war in the DRC induced the involvement of new actors with interests and new agendas, making the DRC an arena for competing regional interests. Foreign interests vying for influence and access to the country's vast mineral and natural resources wealth are exacerbating the conflict. Under the guise of SADC solidarity there was an intervention led by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola though each state was motivated by its own interest. DRC had just joined SADC and the SADC Charter views attack on one of their members is an attack of all them. South Africa was against the intervention but Zimbabwe insisted on aiding the DRC. Kabila's regional dependence became increasingly characterized by resource extraction by his erstwhile allies. He became an active participant in the emerging spoils of war system. This

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<sup>219</sup> E. Kisangani: *Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo: A Mosaic Of Insurgent Groups* op cit pp51-79

<sup>220</sup> *ibid*

<sup>221</sup> S. Jackson: "Making A Killing ; Criminality And Coping In The Kivu Economy" , *Review Of African*

creation of a conflict political economy ensured Kabila's immediate survival while simultaneously transforming the DRC into an economic colony of the intervening states Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe and the instigators of the conflict Rwanda, Uganda.<sup>222</sup> In 1999 the rivalry over the control of the diamond rich Kisangani precipitated divisions between Rwanda and Uganda. Two other confrontations occurred in March and May 2000. This led to a split in the RCD to RCD – Goma controlled by Rwanda and RCD-Kisangani controlled by Uganda. The RCD Kisangani also formed a coalition with Jean Pierre' MLC.<sup>223</sup>

The UN Security Council (UNSC) response did not match the huge escalation of the hostilities although the government lodged a number of complaints. After a month the Council called for a cease fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces. This became the Council's characteristic way of dealing with the DRC conflict whereby it would express its concern call for an end to the violence, the withdrawal of foreign forces and respect for territorial integrity of the DRC without taking any further action when its calls were ignored by parties concerned. The UN and Western powers were concerned with conflicts in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. However it is important The UNSC had had a nasty experience in their intervention 1991 in Somalia whereby the United Nation humanitarian intervention (UNOSOM I and II and UNITAF) failed as they humiliated by the Somalis and thus failed.<sup>224</sup> In Rwanda in 1994 their not taking action led to their criticism as they

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*Political Economy* Vol.93/94 (September /December 2002) p159

<sup>222</sup> M. Berdal and D.M Malone (eds): *Greed And Grievance; Economic Agendas In Civil Wars* ( Boulder: Lynne Renner 2000) p65-67

<sup>223</sup> *ibid*

<sup>224</sup> E.W Clark and J. Herbst: *Somalia and the future of Humanitarian Intervention* in E.W Clark and J. Herbst: *The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Colorado : West View Press, 1997) p71



watched people die yet no intervention took place. Hence the Security Council was torn between acting and not acting.

It was until 1999, more than eight months after the DRC war begun that Council adopted its first resolution on the matter. The operational paragraphs of the Resolution contained no concrete measures for any particular action. In August 1999 the Council adopted its Second Resolution on the DRC and authorized the deployment of 90 military liaison personnel for three months. In July 1999 the Lusaka accord was signed and it aimed at stopping violence against civilians, facilitating assistance through opening the corridor doors, halting the war, calling for Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), stopping any attempt to overthrow the regime and coordinating efforts through the creation of a Joint Military Commission. Five hundred military observers were deployed in 2000 but half million lives had already been lost, the Lusaka Peace Agreement was dead and the Council had little to show for its deliberation.

The Sirte Agreement of 18 April 1999 a Libyan brokered peace agreement between Museveni and Kabila which was also signed by Chadian and Eritrean presidents. It called for armies withdraw from DRC and Chad withdrew and Libya sent forty military personnel to Ugandan to prepare for deployment of a proposed neutral African peace keeping provided for under the Sirte agreement.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> International Regional Integration: *DRC: IRIN Background report on peace efforts* (Nairobi: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999)pp 1-5

Lusaka Peace Accord is signed by six warring nations (Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe) and rebel groups in an attempt to stop the civil war. It called for a ceasefire, deployment of UN peace keepers and the disarmament and repatriation of foreign groups. It also called for the creation of inter Congolese dialogue and the formation of a transitional government prior to the 2005 elections. The U.N asked a panel to investigate the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC and its finding was that external actors are engaged in illegal extraction of natural resources.<sup>226</sup> The document, nonetheless, only mentions a few external actors and leaves out a whole range of external actors involved in the conflict.<sup>227</sup> The Experts found out that there is illegal exploitation of natural resources by a myriad of external actors as well as internal actors but the major states were Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Burundi, MNCS and individuals. They concluded that the DRC conflict is a war economy and involves regional and international actors.<sup>228</sup>

### **Joseph Kabila's Era**

Laurent Kabila was assassinated on January 16 2001 by a member of his own presidential body guard and his son Joseph Kabila was catapulted in as the new president of the DRC. This is because the moment Kabila started to exhibit signs of independence and attempted to initiate a populist development project based on self-sufficiency (including a greater control of the Congo's natural resources), he, like Lumumba before him, became a marked man. Almost forty years to the day after Lumumba's death, Kabila

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<sup>226</sup> United Nations Panel Of Experts: *Report Of The Panel Of Experts On The Illegal Exploitation Of Natural Resources And Other Forms Of Wealth Of The Democratic Republic Of Congo* (New York: United Nations, April 2001)

<sup>227</sup> *ibid*

was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph, who proved to be much more amenable to Western interest than his father had been. He also hadn't brought about peace as structural violence and ethnic favoritism was still in place centrally to his commitment when he was coming to power. Hence during his regime the Congolese still felt they needed change and they were disillusioned by the violence that was still imposed on them whether direct or indirect. Kabila never changed the structures or institutions but left things as they were however this could be because he did not have the time to change the situation as he had a war to fight and the instability on the country.

It seems that as early as the summer of 2000, the United States had decided to "get rid" of him and that the operation, executed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through selected Congolese agents, had to be concluded before George W. Bush's assumption of office on January 18, 2001.<sup>229</sup> The United States was especially upset by Kabila's reneging on previously concluded agreements with minor mining companies, on his insistence that foreign firms pay taxes (tax evasion used to be the norm), and on the decidedly socialist-populist and pan-Africanist orientation of his regime.<sup>230</sup> Laurent Kabila eventually met his tragic fate at the hands of one of his bodyguards on January 16, 2001 but his son took over.

Joseph Kabila reconvened the LPA and warring factions met in Sun City although smaller groups like mayi-mayi felt marginalized and intermittently resumed fighting. The conflict theory tenets argue that goals and values can always be reassessed in the light of changing circumstance that each actor can reassess these values and the values of others

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<sup>228</sup> *ibid*

<sup>229</sup> C. Braeckman: *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs: Politique des puissances en Afrique centrale* (Paris: Fayard, 2003).pp170-176

<sup>230</sup> M. Ludo: *Kabila et la Révolution Congolaise: Panafricanisme ou néocolonialisme*. (Antwerp: Éditions

whereby this can lead to a win-win situation whereby all parties agree to resolve the conflict other than having a settlement kind of conflict management. This was not to be seen in DRC as most of the 'small actors' were left out and did not feel part of the peace process hence they resumed fighting.<sup>231</sup>

The ICD ended in the Sun City talk South Africa, in April 2002, with an agreement between the DRC government under Joseph Kabila and the MLC of Jean Pierre Bemba.<sup>232</sup> Uganda and Zimbabwe also backed the Agreement. Kagame called the agreement a non starter by contending that the deal was an act of defiance against the signatories of the Lusaka Accord and Bemba sold his erstwhile allies down to the drain. His main position was that the accord did not address the key issues related to *disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR)* of armed groups<sup>233</sup>. On July 2002 president Kagame<sup>233</sup> and Kabila signed a memorandum of understanding in order to end the conflict between Rwanda and DRC. The agreement committed the DRC to locating and disarming the *Interahamwe*, Hutu militias and ALIR, to dismantle them in collaboration with the United Nations in the DRC and repatriate Rwanda combatants to Kigali. 90 day implementation programme of the agreement was outlined and agreed upon by both parties. Under the agreement Kabila would remain interim president and have two vice presidents however the deal never materialized.<sup>234</sup>

July 30, 2002 President Kagame of Rwanda and Joseph Kabila signed a memorandum of understanding in order to end the conflict between the DRC and

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EPO, 2002) p692.

<sup>231</sup> A.J.R Groom: *Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher*: in J. Burton and F. Dukes(eds): *Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution* (London : Macmillan, 1990) pp 71-98

<sup>232</sup> International regional information network (IRIN): *DRC Focus On The Results Of The ICD*; found at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp> (25 April 2002) pp1-5

<sup>233</sup> *ibid*

<sup>234</sup> *ibid*

Rwanda. DRC was committed to locating and disarming the interahamwe and Hutu militias and ALiR and dismantle them in collaboration with the UN and DRC and Repatriate all ex- Rwandan combatants to Kigali. A ninety day program of implementation of the agreement was outlined and agreed upon by both parties. Kabila would remain the interim president and have two vice presidents one from RCD – Goma and the other from Bemba's MLC. The deal however did not materialize<sup>235</sup>.

Then on April 2 2003 another peace deal was signed among the belligerents in Sun City talks that sought to restore democracy and stability in the DRC. The peace accord resulted in a transitional government headed by Joseph Kabila and consisting of four vice presidents, thirty cabinet ministers, and twenty five deputy ministers, five hundred members of the National Assembly and 12 senators who were sworn in September 2003.<sup>236</sup> Kabila signed a draft constitution in March 2003. Fighting continues and in March 2004 there was an attempted coup against the Kinshasa government thus one can conclude that the rebel factions are not mainly interested in peace but in how the natural resources are distributed.<sup>237</sup> The longer the stay of the foreign troops and their non commitment to the various peace accords and agreements shows that the external actors are interested only in the natural resources of the DRC.

The Pretoria and Luanda agreements prompted the recent troop withdrawals from eastern DRC but just as the United Nations Panel of Experts Final Report showed that the departure of forces would do little to stop the economic control or the means of achieving it since the use of national armies is just only one among many means of excising it. The

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<sup>235</sup> African Affairs , *Congo 's transitional Government* African Research Bulletin (July 2003) pp 15370-12371

<sup>236</sup> *ibid*

<sup>237</sup> *ibid*

various actors especially the state actors are far from not gaining illegally from the DRC conflict. This is because the government of Rwanda and the army have adopted other strategies for maintaining the mechanisms for revenue generation many of which involve criminal activity. Rwandan troops have withdrawn but they have left behind mechanisms that do not rely on an explicit presence of the RPA.<sup>238</sup> The violence is still ongoing despite the peace agreements and effort of the international community to mediate in the conflict. This shows that until all the actors that are involved in the DRC are involved in the peace process and the provision for their wants are seen to be handled; peace is not going to be achieved anytime soon just as the conflict theory posits in that each actor in the conflict can achieve satisfaction through problem solving workshop as all relationships will be legitimized and therefore lead to a resolution of conflict whereby all actors are important in their input in the peace process as well as their allies and links who can assess their interests and values and negotiate them with other actors thus this leads to a win-win situation.<sup>239</sup> If this took place in the DRC conflict the smaller actors that are also detrimental for the maintenance of peace in the DRC would be involved in the peace process leading to resolution rather than settlement.

A transitional government headed by Joseph Kabila and consisting of four vice presidents, thirty cabinet ministers, twenty five deputy ministers, five hundred members of the National Assembly and 12 senators were sworn in September 2003.<sup>240</sup> the transitional government was involved in confrontation which hindered it working effectively as every fraction had its own interests that they wanted to prevail as well as

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<sup>238</sup> *ibid*

<sup>239</sup> A.J.R Groom: *Paradigms in Conflict; The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher*: in J. Burton and F. Dukes(eds): *Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution* (London : Macmillan, 1990) pp 71-98

<sup>240</sup> S. Naidoo: The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict: *Global*

their allies and backers interests. Bemba MLC and RCD – Kisangani wanted the Uganda interests to prevail as well as RCD-Goma interests were combined with those of Rwanda

The current conflict about access to, plunder and exploitation of, DRC's mineral resources by a score of Western companies and governments, other states, their governments, MNC'S and individuals though to a much lesser scale from states like Iran, Israel, China, Lebanon and by the African states involved, specifically Rwanda, Angola, Namibia Uganda, and Zimbabwe, South Africa and heir governments, MNC'S and individuals. The Kivu region alone (including Ituri and Maniema) is a treasure nest of rare strategic minerals essential to Western advanced-technology industries: cadmium, cassiterite, cobalt, columbo-tantalite (coltan), niobium, tin, uranium, and wolfram. In addition, huge oil deposits have recently been identified in Lake Albert, a few miles from Bunia (Ituri).<sup>241</sup> However the State collapse in DRC, the elitist politics, the structural anomalies have allowed the conflict and this is because the external actors need reasons to violate the territorial integrity of DRC. The State of DRC is also important to consider as part of the conflict as shown by the historical background whereby the State of DRC has changed with each era but structural anomalies are still evident even though structures are dynamic.

In summary the historical background shows that the external actors have been in involved with meddling of the Congolese wars for long. The war that ousted Mobutu did not bring much change as had been desired by the Congolese population and the international population. It is evident that the external actors have found loopholes in the structures that allow for their coming in to the DRC to meddle in the Congolese affairs

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*Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105

<sup>241</sup> US Geological Survey Mineral Yearbook available at

and exploit and plunder the natural resources. Even the peace agreement that have been decided have failed because some of the external actors have been left out or they feel that their issues have not been addressed but the bottom line is they do not want to loose their gains in the DRC as such they create excuses to enter the Congo. The external actors will be dealt with in the next chapter but the historical background has given a basis for understanding the DRC conflict better. The structural, proximate and trigger causes of the conflict are also analyzed.

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[www.minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodityaccessed\(2006\)](http://www.minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodityaccessed(2006))



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE DRC CONFLICT AND THE NATURAL RESOURCES FOUND IN DRC

#### INTRODUCTION

DRC conflict is a complex conflict involving a myriad of internal and external conflict. According to Mwangi, “a complex conflict like the one in the DRC is one in which there are more than two parties in conflict and hence multiplicity of actors, interests and values.”<sup>242</sup> This shows that the complex DRC conflict has diverse external actors, interests and values which need to be analyzed for one to understand the DRC conflict satisfactorily and for the conflict to be resolved sufficiently. The involvement of diverse actors means that there are many issues that need to be dealt with since each party brings its own interests and values to the conflict. “These interests are diverse and the interplay between them makes the conflict even more complex” like the DRC conflict.<sup>243</sup>

The actors, issues and interests framework posits that conflict becomes complex as the actors increase, as these actors come with their own interests, issues and values that should not be taken for granted during the peace process and for the conflict to be resolved. This is because if their interests are not considered then the peace process will be not be as effective as the conflict will start again or be cyclic until their interests and issues are delved into. This is evident in the DRC peace process and the way the conflict has been transformed whereby the involvement of different types of actors has made the conflict dynamic from time to time whereby there has been shifting of allies and patrons

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<sup>242</sup> M. Mwangi: *Conflict : Theory Processes and Institutional Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p49

<sup>243</sup> *ibid* p50

to the internal actors by the external actors and to the external actors by other external actors. It is therefore important to have a study of the external actors in the DRC their issues and their interests.

This chapter deals with the external actors in the DRC conflict who influence the DRC conflict impeccably and need to be involved in the peace process at all levels (local, national, sub regional, regional and international). This section is divided into various parts because the external actors are different. There are State actors as well as non-state actors. the State actors are diverse as there are those who are directly involved in the conflict besides those who are indirectly involved in the conflict which means they could be involved in supporting the rebels or supporting the states that are backing the rebels and the government.

Indirectly involved States are those that may be transit zones for the natural resources as well as sending mercenaries or their MNCs business men and may be involved. These States can aid the DRC in achieving peace only if they help in abetting the illegal goods, controlling their MNCs and individuals involved in the conflict or in combating the illegal trade in their boundaries. A case in point is Kenya, which has been a transit zone for the DRC natural resources and may aid the peace process in the DRC by cutting off the much needed outlet for the natural resources.

There are African states and the non-African states. State actors are those actors that have according to international law have a territory, population and government and an international capacity to act on their own. Non-state actors are those actors that are under or can be under State jurisdiction this are MNCs, individuals, and foreign rebel

groups as well as PSCs. The section also deals with the different natural resources found in the DRC.

## **STATES**

Strategist paradigm posits that conflict is inherent in man and in States in general and the aggressive natural or instinct of States can never be eliminated, it can only be managed. This is in line with the nature debate that man is inherently aggressive unlike the nurture debate that states that man learns aggression from society. Strategists borrow their ideas from realism political science theory in international relations that posits that States are the main actors in the international arena. To them peace is temporary and the use of force or threats of use of force and sanctions is considered part of conflict management. To some extent this is true of DRC whereby the States especially the neighboring States who have contributed to the escalation of the conflict and penetrated the DRC and fought on DRC soil and abetted the internal actors contrary to the UN Charter whereby forcible intervention in another state is prohibited in international law under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which states:

*“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”<sup>244</sup>*

This general prohibition on the use of force has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the *Corfu Channel Case (1949)* and the *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua* and is considered to be a rule of *jus cogens* that is, a peremptory norm of international law from which no subject

of international law may derogate.<sup>245</sup> The two main exceptions to this general prohibition are: the right of a State to use force in self defense or collective self defense under Article 51 of the Charter; and the right of the Security Council under Article 42 to authorize the use of force "to maintain or restore international peace and security." International law is based on universal consent, rather than majority rule. So nations can essentially "opt out" of rules they don't like, hence the rebellion by the States in the DRC can be explained from this point of view especially in the light that they have 'sponsors' or 'mentors' from the permanent five. Even when the rules are clear, nations have guarded enough of their sovereign privileges to fulfill their own selfish demands.

Nonetheless according to international law Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi were justified in attacking Zaire on humanitarian grounds as the Dutch Hugo Grotius in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* "*where government should inflict upon its subjects such treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting*" other states may exercise a right of humanitarian intervention.<sup>246</sup> This means that according to the naturalist theory humanitarian intervention of the Uganda, Rwandan, Angolan, AFDL and Burundian alliance forces for the 'first DRC war' was warranted as Mobutu regime was inhumane in its treatment to the population and the Tutsis threat of undergoing a second genocide. There are those who are against humanitarian intervention as they argue that respect for sovereignty should be upheld at all costs hence non intervention for them is the key thing.

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<sup>244</sup> United Nation: United Nations Charter (New York: United Nations, 1945)

<sup>245</sup> M.E O'Connell: "The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo," *Human Rights Quarterly* Vol. 22 (2000) pp 57-89

<sup>246</sup> J.L Holzgrefe: *Humanitarian Intervention Debate* ; in J.L Holzgrefe and R. O Keohane (eds): *Humanitarian Intervention; Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Journals, 2003) pp15-52

There also others who argue that there should not be intervention unless there are interests that the State will gain as risking lives can lead to over commitment.

They were justified on pre-emptive ground in that if a state because rebels were attacking them and according to international law if a State perceive another will attack it can preempt. The rebels were being armed by the Zairian government under Mobutu and this can also be seen as pre-emptive as Uganda, Angola, Burundi and Rwanda to preempt an imminent attack from the rebels being funded by Mobutu's regime. This argument came in light of USA against terrorism as it attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. However as time went by this did not justify their continued military intervention in the DRC hence more complex reasons like economic gains were observed even as these states continued to gain illegally.

## **THE AFRICAN STATES**

The African states were drawn into DRC first war in 1998 to oust Mobutu and this were mainly States that were pro Kabila and those that were pro Mobutu. These are States like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi whose governments were tired of having rebels opposed to them and using the DRC as their base and as their hideout and having Mobutu to back them up. The other group was States like Sudan that were pro-Mobutu. Sudan was pro-Mobutu because of Uganda aiding Kabila as if to fulfill the saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Sudan was constantly aiding Mobutu because Uganda was constantly aiding the SPLA/M and Uganda was opposed to Mobutu as he was constantly funding rebels from Uganda that were a threat to Museveni's government.

The other group was under SADC that came to help out the Kabila's government from the opposing forces of alliance of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi during the 'second DRC war'. DRC had just joined SADC and therefore sought for help from the SADC group as the group viewed a threat on one of them is a threat to all of them. The other group have been involved indirectly because they are neighbors and internal actor have used their territory to channel natural resources through them or they are used as transit routes like the Kenya, CAR and Congo Brazzaville. There is one more group like South Africa and Libya that have come to mediate yet are into the DRC because of their vested interest although mediators do not mediate for purely altruistic reasons as Mwangi states it clearly that "the notion that third parties engage in conflict management or altruistic reasons is completely misplaced".<sup>247</sup>

## Rwanda

Rwanda was drawn to the DRC war with a sound reason in that *Interahamwe* and *Hutu* extremist who had gone to DRC (then Zaire) posed a security threat to Rwanda and were continually being aggressive to western Rwanda from eastern DRC.<sup>248</sup> Paul Kagame justified the Rwandan attack on DRC by arguing that ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* militias (*genocidaires*) that committed the Rwandan genocide ran into Zaire. He added that the presence of these *genocidaires* posed a threat to Rwanda's security.<sup>249</sup> Rwanda in

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<sup>247</sup> M. Mwangi: *Conflict; Theory, Processes And Institutions Of Management*, op cit p57

<sup>248</sup> A.H Gnamo: *The Rwandan Genocide And The Collapse Of Mobutu's Kleptocracy*, In H. Adelman and A. Suhuke(eds) : *The Path Of A Genocide; The Rwandan Genocide* Op Cit Pp 321-348

<sup>249</sup> P. Kagame: *The Great Lakes Conflicts; Factors ,Actors And Challenges* Op Cit

addition stated humanitarian concerns over the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* Tutsis in Zaire who faced a similar genocidal threat.<sup>250</sup>

Furthermore Rwanda wanted a government in DRC that was complacent with not only the security issues of the Kigali regime but also a friendly government that would enable Kigali achieve its national objectives of having new young leaders in the Great Lakes Region with an ambition of new generation of leader in Africa that would remove Africa from the *wazee*'s mentality.<sup>251</sup> However as time went this did not adequately explain Rwanda's continued engagement in DRC and it mutated to plundering of the DRC natural resources.<sup>252</sup> Rwanda continued to use the opportunity for both national and personal enrichment.

The exact extent to which Rwanda is profiting from its intervention in DRC is hard to determine but the evidence of the economic benefits taken from DRC are clearly visible in the current level of prosperity in Kigali. Extraction of resources and goods from DRC seems to benefit not only the Rwandan government and the army but also individuals related and close to the Kigali government engaged in smuggling and other forms of trade.<sup>253</sup>

Rwandan president Paul Kagame unapologetically described the war as 'self financing' meaning that the Rwandan government used the finance got from exploiting the DRC natural resources to finance Rwanda's involvement in the DRC war. Rwanda is

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<sup>250</sup> Amnesty international: *Democratic Republic Of Congo: Time To End Threats Against Human Rights Defenders*; Public Statement Of 22 February 2006 p136-137

<sup>251</sup> Remark by one of the Congolese respondents on 16 August 2006

<sup>252</sup> Amnesty International: *Democratic Republic Of Congo; Time To End Threats Against Human Rights Defenders*; Public Statements Of 22 February 2006 Pp 136-137

<sup>253</sup> T. Longman: *The Complex Reasons For Rwanda's Engagement In Congo*; found in J.F Clark : *The African Stakes Of The Congo War* ( Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001) Pp 129-144

not known for diamond production yet it has five diamond marketing agencies.<sup>254</sup> According to the Panel of Experts Reports ( First Report, Addendum and Final Report) Rwanda has a Congo Desk, a unit of Department of External Relations in the Rwandan Ministry of Defense which controls the economic activity between the rebel zones and Rwanda. The Congo Desk is a link between the commercial and military activities of RPA and RPA commercial wing.<sup>255</sup> The UN panel of experts said that the Desk realized about three hundred and twenty million US dollars for Rwanda.<sup>256</sup>

Individuals with links to international criminal networks worked closely with the Congo Desk in transporting minerals from DRC to Congo and from Kigali to other states.<sup>257</sup> To add to that Rwanda companies with links to members of Rwanda governing elites brokered deals with international trading posts.<sup>258</sup>

It became evident that Rwanda was gaining from the exploitation of natural resources in DRC when they were involved in a fight over Congo with Uganda which led to a split in RCD; RCD- Goma which was supported by Rwanda under Ileo and RCD Kisangani. This is because they were fighting over the natural resources rich areas like Kisangani and the East of DRC. The UN Final Panel of Experts Report said that the diamond market was the prize Rwanda fought Uganda to have for its own.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> P. Chabal and J.D Pascal: *Africa Works; Disorders As Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999) P 799

<sup>255</sup> M.J. Weinstein: *Africa's Scramble For Africa; Lessons Of A Continental War; World Policy Journal* (2000) pp 11-20

<sup>256</sup> United Nations: *United Nation Panel Of Experts Report On The Illegal Exploitation Of The DRC of Natural Resources And Other Forms Of Wealth.* (New York: United Nations,2001)

<sup>257</sup> T. Raeymaekers: *Network War; An introduction to Congo's privatized War Economy* (Brussels: International Peace information Service (IPIS), 2002) pp 21-22

<sup>258</sup> *ibid*

<sup>259</sup> United Nations: *United Nations Panel Of Experts On Illegal Exploitation Of Natural Resources And Other Forms Of Wealth Of The Democratic Republic Of Congo* (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)



After the last clash in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the RCD-Goma administration to funnel all the diamonds in Kisangani through the Congo Desk Control. The technique was to oblige all local diamond traders to sell to one principle *comptoir* holding exclusive exports rights that is SOMIGL. The controversial conflict diamonds from Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks. This way of laundering the revenues from diamond sales has had the effect of undermining and ruining local manufacturing, driving previously flourishing enterprises out of business and bringing the local Kisangani economy under Rwanda's control.<sup>260</sup> RPA obtained eventually a near monopoly on some economic activities within Eastern DRC as senior RCD Goma officials set up partnership with Rwandan colleagues. These private joint ventures become junior players in the economy of the RCD Rwandan zone although the RPA's commercial operations have remained economically dominant.<sup>261</sup>

RPA raised funds by extorting protection money from businesses from a five percent tax on diamonds and coltan *comptoirs* and from profits it received as a shareholder in several companies; coltan exports are estimated to have earned the Rwandan government approximately forty million USA dollars in net profits between 1999 and 2000.<sup>262</sup> When RCD took power in 1998, nineteen companies were engaged in Coltan mining most of which were owned and managed by Rwandans. RCD established SOMIGL which had monopoly on all exports till April 2001.<sup>263</sup>

Rwandan army was given the responsibility for mining activities by the Rwandan government and used Hutu prisoners or Congolese laborers (some forced) and they were

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<sup>260</sup> *ibid*

<sup>261</sup> T. Aloys et al: *The Coltan Phenomenon; How A Rare Metal Has Changed The Life Of The Population Of War Torn North Kivu Province In The East Of DRC*( Goma: Pole Institute, 2002) P 47

<sup>262</sup> M. Nest et al: *DRC Economic Dimensions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006) pp 53-60

involved in terrorizing the villager as Dena states that “in the territory of Bunyakiri some villagers were completely destroyed to enable coltan and gold production flights troop’s equipments were arriving from Rwanda.”<sup>264</sup> This explains some of the terrors that the Rwanda army employed to get land to exploit the natural resources and the natural resource themselves. The villagers were forced to work in the fields and if they refused they were subjected to torture, imprisonment, rape and looting of the villager and being forced to see their relatives dying.

Rwanda has utilized UPC by providing and training in turn they are rewarded by resources. UPC is one of the fragmented rebel movements in DRC that is in the eastern DRC. It was involved in exploiting coltan and then trades it with the Rwandese army or Rwandese traders. The UPC elements reported directly to Kigali. The UPC elements are used in protection of the Rwandese interests while the Rwandan army withdrew from the territory.<sup>265</sup> Rwanda become a major exporter of *prunus Africana* a tree used in medicine for prostate cancer treatment and found neither in Rwanda.

Pretoria and Luanda promoted the recent RPA troop withdrawal however their departure will do little to reduce economic control or the means of achieving it since the use of national armies is only one among many means of exercising it. The government of Rwanda and the army has adopted other strategies for maintaining the mechanisms for revenue generation and many of which involve criminal activities.<sup>266</sup> These strategies include hiring UPC, RCD-Goma, the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* to not only

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid

<sup>264</sup> D. Montague: “Stolen Goods; Coltan And Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo,” *SAIS, Review Papers* Vol.22 (2002) pp103-118

<sup>265</sup> United Nations Panel of Experts Final Report Op Cit

<sup>266</sup> ibid

protect Rwandese interests but also channel the trade routes and trade commodities towards DRC. Other strategies include having the RCD-Goma in the transitional government whereby Rwanda was able to influence the decisions made by the government to their advantage or creating a kind of impasse in the peace process and the transitional government until the Rwandese interests are taken care of. Thus Rwanda prepared for withdrawal by putting in place economic control mechanisms that do not essentially rely on an explicit presence of the RPA.

## **Uganda**

Uganda got involved in the DRC war for the same reasons as Rwanda as the Uganda rebels forces the ADF who were being funded by the Sudanese and the Zairian governments and using Zaire as their base of operation. Museveni wanted a friendly regime that would not fund rebels like the Mobutu regime and that would help him end the menace. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni is known to have used Pan-Africanist arguments in getting involved in the Congolese war that opening Zaire would create a large market for African development and modernization.<sup>267</sup> However the UPDF soldiers and officers started getting involved in the exploitation of the natural resources in the DRC. President Museveni aided Kabila's AFDL forces in the first Congolese war but after Kabila ordered the same troops that had aided him to get into power out, relations between Kabila and Museveni soured.

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<sup>267</sup>D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region*; In Heinrich Boll Foundation; *Networking With A View To Promoting Peace, Towards Sustainable Peace –Civil Society Dialogue Forum For The Horn Of Africa*, Second Conference Documentation Nairobi 10-13 December 2000 (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2000) pp 183-213

The relations started souring when senior Congolese officials accused Rwanda and Uganda officials of profit seeking in Eastern DRC. In 2000 Rwanda and Uganda were involved in feuds over who should control Kisangani an area rich in diamonds and natural resources.<sup>268</sup> Uganda has been known to support various rebels groups in areas in DRC where their interests' lies like the FNI because of gold that they exploit through the FNI. They protect their interests around the natural resources through the FNI by arming them, training them and offering to trade with them. RCD-Kisangani, MLC and UPC are funded by Uganda and been employed to protect the Ugandan interests and also to trade with them as the Ugandan troops pulled off from the country. At one time RCD-Kisangani and MLC merged to form RCD-ML under Jean Pierre Bemba a former Mobutists as they were liaising with the same external actor: Uganda. However, they later split to back to their original groups because of power struggles.

UPDF collaborated with RCD-ML to pursue its economic interests. However unlike the Rwandan RPA, UPDF held a looser vein on its Congolese allies.<sup>269</sup> The RCD-ML and UPDF economic activities involved some coltan, diamond and taxing of trade in its areas of influence. Their control, of Bunia for example was located on a major trade route stretching from Eastern DRC through Uganda to Kenya and the Gulf States or any other location.<sup>270</sup>

Victoria Group headquartered in Kampala and working closely with senior Ugandan military officials was an important single source and was an MLC affiliate. Victoria Group had gold, diamond and coffee trading operations throughout northern

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<sup>268</sup> J.F Clark: Explaining Uganda's Intervention In Congo : Evidence And Interpretation, *Journal Of Modern African Studies* Vol 39(2) (2001) pp 261-267

<sup>269</sup> J. Weinstein: *Africa's Scramble For Africa; Lessons Learnt Of A Continental War* op cit pp 11-20

<sup>270</sup> Human Rights Watch: *Fuelling Political And Ethnic Strife*; Human Right Watch Report Vol 13(2A)

DRC. Its diamond production was confined to the northeast Ituri region, which was under UPDF. UPDF formed several companies to conduct their commercial activities in liaison with their Congolese counterparts. Uganda also had companies like DARA Great Lakes Industries and a sister company of Nyota Wood Industries located in Uganda that cleared Congolese forests to export some 48,000 meters cubes of rare timber per year.<sup>271</sup>

Lebanese expatriates figured prominently in Uganda's network brokering the transport and sale of many of the commodities produced and traded through the network as well as having high profile positions in some companies formed by military officials.

In 1997 and 1998, Uganda's exports increased seven fold. Diamond exports peaked at 1.8 million USA Dollars in 1999 and dropped to 1.3 million USA Dollars in 2000.<sup>272</sup> Coltan exports in 2000 were twenty seven times larger than those of 1999 and cobalt exports were for times greater than those of 1999.<sup>273</sup>

**Table 1**

**The Figure below Shows Official Ugandan Gold Import, Export and Production in Figures in US Dollars**

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Gold Exports	18,600,000	38,360,000	55,730,000	50,350,000	59,900,000	45,760,000	45,590,000
Gold Imports	-	2,000	3,076,000	890,000	0	2,000	N/A

(2001) p 23

<sup>271</sup> United Nations: United Nations Panel Of Experts Report op cit

<sup>272</sup> M. Nest et al: *The Democratic Republic Of Congo; The Economic Dimensions Of War And Peace* op cit pp53-54

<sup>273</sup> ibid

Local Gold production	N/A	40,307	477,000	1,412	24,817	23,000	2,000
Discrepancy	18,600,000	38,317,693	52,177,000	49,458,588	59,875,183	45,735,000	45,569,000

Source; **The Curse Of Gold Human Rights Watch Paper** <sup>274</sup>

The table above shows that there is discrepancy between the exports and the imports and local gold production. For example in 2003 the gold exports were valued at 45,760,000 USA dollars, the import of gold was valued at 2,000 USA dollars and the local gold production was 23,000 USA dollars. The difference is valued at 45,735,000 USA dollars signifying that Uganda doesn't produce nor legally import the gold it exports. The same can be said of 1999 whereby Uganda domestic production was valued at 40,307 USA dollars and gold imports were valued at 2,000 and the total discrepancy was 38,317,693 USA dollars. One can deduce that the gold is got from neighboring DRC whereby it is through illegal traders that it is exported. However in Uganda gold is not exported illegally, it is recorded and shipped formally from Uganda to its destination.

Uganda Commercial Impex limited officials admitted to Human Rights Watch (HRW) interview that their gold was from Ituri in the DRC. This gold was later sold to Dr. Kisoni Kambale from Butwembo who has a refinery and later shipped it to Switzerland and later South Africa, illustrating a complex interdependence of the external actors to trade routes, international markets and manufacturing firms. Machanga Limited agreed to importing gold from the DRC and selling it to Mr. Omar Aria. They exported their gold to Metalor Technologies in Switzerland.<sup>275</sup> What's more The HRW found that

<sup>274</sup> Human Rights Watch Paper: *The Curse Gold* (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2 2005 ) p102

<sup>275</sup> ibid p 103

some companies exporting gold that is from DRC were rewarded for their efforts to promote trade. In 2002 Uganda Commercial Impex limited received the President's Export Award for the best performance in gold sector and Machanga came second.<sup>276</sup> This irony considering the fact that the government has never admitted to being in the DRC to exploit natural resource. Uganda is recently reported to be interested in the oil exploration in the DRC State.

High-ranking UPDF officials have been mentioned in the UN panel of experts' reports and other subsequent reports like Salim Swaleh, Major Sonko and Lieutenant David Okumu. The latter two were involve in ordering the Gorumbwa mines that collapsed to be used.<sup>277</sup> Salim Swaleh is the brother in law to Museveni and the other two are linked closely to Museveni's government.

According to the UN Panel of Experts Reports Uganda has been involved in looting the DRC and financing rebels; however Uganda denied reports and argued that Uganda is transit country and rebel forces have de facto legitimacy to produce trade. Due to pressure Uganda formed a Commission of Inquiry headed by David porter which gave evidence that General Kazini and other officials were actually involved in the DRC looting of the natural resource. However no action was taken and no mentioned official was reprimanded.

## **Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe got involved in the DRC war when Laurent Kabila government asked for helped from SADC from the oncoming Uganda, Rwandan and Burundi armies. DRC

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<sup>276</sup> *ibid* p104

<sup>277</sup> *Global Witness: Rush And Ruin; The Devastating Mineral Trade In Southern Katanga DRC*

had just joined SADC and when one member is attacked it is like all members are attacked. Zimbabwe answered the DRC call as it was the head Defense Department of SADC at that time. Economic ventures of Zimbabwe and DRC have been rooted in senior government and military officials from ZANU-PF and these ventures involved copper, cobalt and diamond.<sup>278</sup> Most ventures have yielded low profits and have experienced many difficulties as Zimbabwean investors were hampered by the inefficient DRC banking sector which made payments difficult and the weak and corrupt legal system made it almost impossible for Zimbabweans to ensure their contracts with the Congolese were reinforced.<sup>279</sup> Mugabe had seen DRC as a source of natural resources that would help pull out Zimbabwe from the financial crisis it is in. However this was not to be as the joint ventures did not yield much. Zimbabwe army was engaged more for commercial than security reasons and that is to exploit natural resources such as timber, copper, cobalt and diamond<sup>280</sup>.

Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG) was on Zimbabwean company whose directors are General Vitalis, Onesime Moyo, and Isaiah Rusingwe. It had a joint venture with DRC Company to form COSLEG a joint venture between Zimbabwe and DRC. In its agreement it states that OSLEG has resources to protect, defend and support logistically in the development of commercial ventures, to explore research, exploit market, timber and other resources held by the DRC state. Other ventures include SOCEBO (Societe Congolaise d'exploitation du bois) which has links with OSLEG, Comiex and Oryx Zimcom. Zimcom is a joint venture between ZDF and Oryx Natural

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(UK: Global Witness, September 2005 p16

<sup>278</sup> Africa Confidential: *Rhodes To The Rescue*; Issue 40, No. 22 November 5 (1999) p 6

<sup>279</sup> African Confidential: *Soldiers Of Misfortune* Issue 41 No 18 ( September 15, 2000)

<sup>280</sup> C. Dietrich: *Hard Currency; The Criminalized Diamond Economy by its neighbor international peace*



resources<sup>281</sup>. Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) signed a deal to double its import of electricity from Inga Dam BAS Congo. Zimbabwe was also given 500,000 hectares of Katanga farmland to Zimbabwe largest state owned farms. Ridgepointe was to take over the management of Gecamines with the help of Rautenbach.<sup>282</sup>

## **Angola**

Angola was drawn into the 'first DRC war' to eject UNITA rebels who were using DRC territory as a safety haven where they could attack the MPLA government in Luanda aided and funded by Mobutu. Their main aim was to cut off Savimbi and UNITA's base and source of wealth. Economic involvement by Angolan individuals and organization is of a much smaller scope than the Rwandans, Ugandans or Zimbabweans. Angolan government demanded compensation in the form of diamond concessions for military expenses it incurred assisting the DRC government.<sup>283</sup> Angola interests are oil near the Cabinda enclave which has rich deposits of oil. National Angolan Fuel Company (Sonango) and Comiex had a joint venture to explore oil off the DRC – Angola coast. Sonango is controlled by Jose Do Santos and Comiex Joseph Kabila<sup>284</sup>

## **Namibia**

Namibia was involved into the conflict as a result of SADC intervention and President Sam Nujoma has been a friend of Kabila for a long time. Namibia is in a

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Academy Occasional paper Series ( boulder ; Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006)

<sup>281</sup> International Crisis Group: *Scramble for Congo; Anatomy of an ugly War*, ICG report Brussels No 26(20<sup>th</sup> December 2002) pp1-120

<sup>282</sup> M. Nest: *Ambition, Profits And Loss; Zimbabwe And Economic Involvement In The DRC* (2002) pp 469-490

<sup>283</sup> I. Samset: *Conflict of Interests or Interests of Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC*, Review Of The African Political Economy No 93/93 (200) p 475.

situation comparable to that of Zimbabwe. If Sam Nujoma and Kabila maintain good relations, Namibia has no national interests to defend in Congo. The first deaths of Namibian soldiers were particularly badly received by the population, who are also indignant that troops were sent without any discussion in parliament. According to the Namibian press, parliament recouped when, at the end of September, the opposition DTA questioned the government about the Congolese mining interests of Aaron Mushimba, Sam Nujoma's brother-in-law. The DTA inquired the interests in the Congolese war of Quando Holdings, a company linked to the party in power, SWAPO.

It gained its share of DRC resources as it was awarded a stake in the Miba Diamond Mining Company. Sam Nujoma brother-in-law Aaron Musimba was awarded a stake in the diamond mining company.<sup>285</sup> When Laurent Kabila needed time to finance military recruitment, his diplomatic campaign and political programmes, He signed a decree transferring all the activities of Gécamines, a major state mining company, to two private companies: Ridgepoint Overseas Development Ltd and Central Mining Group Corporation. Kabila was a shareholder in the first and a relative of Mugabe owns shares in the second. A Greek company, closely linked to Nujoma was associated with the consortium. Together these companies forged an alliance to exploit all the mineral assets of the central sector of Congo.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> T. Turner; *Angola's role in the DRC conflict* in J.F Clark: *African Stakes In The DRC War* op cit p 87

<sup>285</sup> International Crisis Group: *Scramble for Congo; Anatomy of an ugly war* op cit

<sup>286</sup> International Crisis Group: *Africa's Seven Nation War Democratic Republic of Congo Report N° 4* (Brussels and Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 21 May 1999) pp 1-37

## Burundi

Burundi was drawn into the DRC conflict the first time because of the Hutu extremists that were in the DRC and using DRC as a safety haven and as a base to attack the new transitional government. The rebels were using the refugees to extort the humanitarian workers off aid and relief. Burundi had started gaining from the DRC natural resources illegally however its civil war has impeded its entire involvement. Nevertheless, Burundi has been known to export diamonds and coltan and *prumus Africana* a tree known to treat prostrate cancer.<sup>287</sup> There are some elitist from Burundi who have been known to exploit the DRC natural resources like Shenila Mwanza and her brother who are the children of business mogul Aziza Kulsum a Burundian popularly known as Gulimali.

## Zambia

Economic interests and poor relations between Zaire and Zambia prompted its peripheral involvement in the DRC war. The attack of AFDL from the south was enabled by using Zambian territory. Zambian forces supported AFDL in capturing Lumumbashi; Kolwenzi and Kasenga.<sup>288</sup> Zambians were invited to invest in DRC in joint mining ventures. Cobalt and other natural resources are smuggled out of DRC into Zambia where they are exported straight to China or to South Africa. According to Global witness who visited Kasomalesa in the DRC-Zambian border, forty trucks of cobalt were waiting to

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<sup>287</sup> D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region*; In Heinrich Boll Foundation; *Networking With A View To Promoting Peace, Towards Sustainable Peace –Civil Society Dialogue Forum For The Horn Of Africa*, Second Conference Documentation Nairobi 10-13 December 2000 (Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2000) pp 183-213

<sup>288</sup> International Crisis Group: *Scramble for Congo; Anatomy Of An Ugly War* op cit p101

close the border and one company SABOT had five large trucks of raw ores which they were taking to sell to Kitwe Zambia.<sup>289</sup>

## **South Africa**

South Africa under Mandela refused to heed to Mugabe's order to be involved in the DRC conflict. However after some time he tried mediation between Kabila and Mobutu. Recently it has been fusing political diplomatic interests with economic ambitions. When Kabila's victory seemed eminent a South Africa mining Conglomerates led by De Beers were the first to seek lucrative mining contracts with Kabila. However America companies were also interested and hence the spoils had to be shared.<sup>290</sup> South Africa government has however been coy about admitting that its pursuit was driven by the interests of its business community, but President Thabo Mbeki stated that one of the reasons that South Africa was involved in the peace process in Sun City was because their companies lay waiting for the conflict to be resolved so that they can invest.<sup>291</sup>

To add to that South Africa has been one country whose mercenaries have been involved in the DRC conflict, the most visible is when mercenaries from South Africa were caught in the DRC.<sup>292</sup> South Africa has been known to lease out PSCs to war torn countries, yet the recent debate has been the thin line between PSCs and the mercenaries who also extort and subject civilians to harsh treatment and are also involved to some degree in looting.

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<sup>289</sup> Global Witness: *Rush And Ruin; The Devastating Mineral Trade In Southern Katanga DRC* September 2005 pp 1-30

<sup>290</sup> R. A. Griggs: *Wild Cards In The Great Lakes Conflict* (Center For World Indigenous Studies, 1997) p 4

<sup>291</sup> F. Grignon: *Economic Agendas In The Congolese Peace Process* in M. Nest et al; *DRC Economic Dimensions* International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006) p92

## Central African Republic

The CAR is used by certain warlords from DRC to loot the DRC natural resources like Bemba who used their tribal relations and also as a transit route for the stolen natural resources by the rebels to enrich themselves. Bemba uses CAR to export his goods. CAR used to export its good through the Port of Pointe Noire until 1997. Congo River was disrupted by Jean Pierre Bemba in 1999 and his aim was to control over Northern Equator in mid 1999. <sup>293</sup>Ange Felix Patasse had little choice but to do business with him. CAR traders were thus able to extract profit from the coffee and other goods that Bemba smuggled from 1999-2002. Jean Pierre Bemba has capitalized on his Ngbaka origins to attract mutineers form Central African countries mostly of Yakoma origins a group closely related to Ngbaka. From CAR he sells his looted natural resources like coffee and diamonds. <sup>294</sup>

## Congo-Brazzaville

Although it has retained a discreet distance up to now, Congo-Brazzaville could not avoid being drawn in if there is an eventual extension to the war being fought in its eastern neighbor. This is because it has Bakongo populations that have been experiencing a renewed sense of identity over recent years. <sup>295</sup>The Bankongo, who were organized in a powerful kingdom before colonization, have had contact with Europeans since the 15th

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<sup>292</sup> International Crisis Group: *Congo At War A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict* (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group: 17 November 1998) pp 1-31

<sup>293</sup> International Crisis Group: *Scramble for Congo; Anatomy of an ugly War*, ICG report Brussels No 26(20<sup>th</sup> December 2002) pp 1-120: check also International Crisis Group: *Congo At War A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict* (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group: 17 November 1998) pp 1-31

<sup>294</sup> *ibid*

<sup>295</sup> International Crisis Group: *Congo At War A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict* (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group: 17 November 1998) pp 1-31

century and are increasingly resentful that nowhere do they have access to power. Bernard Kolelas (former mayor of Brazzaville), their leader in Congo- Brazzaville, was overthrown along with former President Lissouba by General Sassou Nguesso, with the aid of Angola. In Angola itself, the Bakongo were the victim of systematic massacres in Luanda in 1992.<sup>296</sup>

The members of the Cabinda independence movement fighting against Luanda are also Bakongo. As for the Bakongo in the Democratic Republic of Congo, if not hostile to Kabila, they remain resolutely federalist although the Congolese President seeks a centralized government from Kinshasa. In addition, the Angolan counter-offensive against the rebels in Congo has resulted in many victims in Bas Congo province.<sup>297</sup>

However due to its political instability the Republic of Congo has not had much to gain from the DRC conflict.

## **Chad**

During September, in his search for allies, President Kabila approached the countries of French-speaking Africa, which he had previously discounted. Under the watchful eye of France, which saw this as an occasion to set foot again in a region in which it has not been welcome since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a summit meeting in Libreville (Gabon) on 24 September supported Kinshasa. A few days later, as N'Djamena acknowledged at the beginning of October, Chad sent a thousand soldiers to Congo.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> *ibid*

<sup>297</sup> *ibid*

## **Libya**

Libya organized the transport of the Chad troops to Congo. The solidarity that might exist between Ghaddafi and Kabila is not enough to explain the sudden interest of the Libyan leader in Congo. It is more likely that he sees a chance to profit from the crisis and escape from the international isolation into which the United States has forced him.<sup>299</sup>

On 30 September, he organised a mini summit meeting on the Congo situation. His involvement in Congo could perhaps serve as a bargaining chip while Tripoli and Washington negotiate the normalization of relations. Libya mediated and provided good offices between Uganda and DRC which resulted to the signing of the Sirte Accord.<sup>300</sup> Finally, it should not be forgotten that Colonel Ghaddafi is an ally of Burundian Colonel Bagaza, former president of Burundi and the main political rival of Major Buyoya. This could be significant in the hypothetical case of Burundi entering the war.

## **Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia**

Kenya got involved in the DRC when she tried to mediate through President Moi though they were not successful.<sup>301</sup> However it is a transit zone especially goods from Uganda which is landlocked and needs the Mombassa port to transport heavy cargo like logs, coltan. According to the ministry of foreign affairs Kenya's foreign policy regarding DRC is non interference but it is evident from the actions that Kenya feels sidelined in

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<sup>298</sup> *ibid*

<sup>299</sup> *ibid*

<sup>300</sup> S. Naidoo: *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict: Global Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105

<sup>301</sup> M. Mwangi: *Conflict, Theory, Practices and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark Publications, 2000) p98

the peace process in DRC by South Africa as she has economic and trade interests.<sup>302</sup> Libya was also involved in the DRC conflict after South Africa took the role of the mediator as it was afraid of South Africa rising influence in the region. It initiated the Sirte Accord between Uganda and DRC.<sup>303</sup>

Sudan became an indirect participant in the war in Congo in two ways: firstly, by financing the three Ugandan anti-Museveni guerrilla movements (ADF, West Nile Bank Front, and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)) and trying, during recent months, to bring them into a federation; secondly, by agreeing to support Kabila's government in his war against the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition. Sudan itself accuses Uganda of supporting the guerrilla movement in the south of the country, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), composed of Christians and animists who reject the Islamic law imposed by Khartoum.<sup>304</sup> The SPLA is ethnically close to the inhabitants of North Uganda and recruits from among the 350,000 refugees from South Sudan living in the north of Uganda. In September 1998 President Museveni indicated that his troops were holding the main airports in the east of Congo in order to prevent the Sudanese from using them against Uganda. He added that he had information indicating the presence of Sudanese soldiers in Isiro (Orientale province, formerly Haut Zaire, bordering Sudan and Uganda). This has also been reported by a source among the humanitarian organizations working in the area. On 1 September the Sudanese pro-government paper *Rai Al Aam* stated that President Kabila had secretly visited Khartoum on 28 August to look for aid. On 2 September a demonstration of some 300 "mujaheddin" claiming to be Congolese took

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<sup>302</sup> From Judy Njau who works at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 August 2006 by the researcher

<sup>303</sup> S. Naidoo: *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict: Global Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105

<sup>304</sup> International Crisis Group: *Congo At War A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the*



place in Khartoum. They were demanding to be taken to Congo to fight at the side of President Kabila against the Ugandan enemy and presented the Congo Embassy in Khartoum with a note calling for the nomination of Muslims to government posts in Kinshasa.<sup>305</sup>

The entry of Sudan into the war in Congo, if true, would obviously put another face on the conflict. Sudan is a sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa, which has made considerable progress in the past ten years, particularly in the south among countries such as Mozambique that are considered Christian. Sudanese charitable organizations of a fundamentalist nature – the spearhead of this Islamist conquest – have been present in Congo for several years and are easily able to recruit new “believers” in exchange for food aid to the most impoverished. Congo, devastated by the economic crisis, has for several years been experiencing a period of religious pietism and fanaticism.<sup>306</sup> Dozens of evangelical sects, linked with or modeled on American sects, are openly recruiting among the population. Islam’s success has been less spectacular than that of the evangelical and Pentecostal sects, but is very evident in the large cities. Congolese Muslims claim to have eight million adherents out of a total population of some 45 million.<sup>307</sup>

Eritrea was also involved in giving Kabila the army just like Ethiopia. The two countries were antagonistic as they were fighting their boarder so Ethiopia joined in the ant- Kabila alliance as Eritrea was pro-Kabila

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Central African Conflict (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 17 November 1998) pp 1-31

<sup>305</sup> ibid

<sup>306</sup> ibid

<sup>307</sup> ibid

## WESTERN STATES

Most of the stolen and looted natural resources are shipped to western states. Some of the western states involved are USA, Greece, German, United Kingdom and Belgium.<sup>308</sup> According to Montague Dena USA showed it had received Coltan from Rwanda yet Rwanda does not have coltan reserves. He adds that USA relies primarily on Africa for coltan.<sup>309</sup> This shows that indirectly the western states are funding the natural resources based conflict in the DRC. The interests of the western states began with the first Congolese war. The USA interests led by the former president George Bush convinced the Ugandan that it was in their joint interests to work together to regain the DRC (then Zaire) natural resources.<sup>310</sup>

Gold from Uganda is exported to Switzerland, which acts as a warehouse from where goods are dispatched. Over seventy percent of Uganda's gold went to Switzerland. However gold from DRC via Uganda also gets into the Swiss free port zones; "areas normally based around airports which effectively operate outside of Swiss government control"<sup>311</sup> "Gold entering such zones is not registered in Swiss import statistics as and are sent to other locations without export duties. In such areas criminal activities usually thrive and thus may influence Uganda's and individuals not to give in to peace as it offers lucrative deals."<sup>312</sup> There are three main western states involved in the DRC conflict like Germany, USA and UK.<sup>313</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> Congolese respondent

<sup>309</sup> D. Montague: "Stolen Goods; Coltan And Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo," *SAIS, Review Papers* 22,(2002) pp103-118

<sup>310</sup> D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region* op cit pp 183-213

<sup>311</sup> Human Rights Watch Paper: *The Curse Gold* p106

<sup>312</sup> *ibid*

<sup>313</sup> A Congolese respondent interviewed on 28 August 2006

The western nation's corporations for example American Mineral Fields, Metalor Technologies are also involved and thus it can be said to an indirect support of the war. Such MNC's may thrive in conditions of conflict since it is cheaper because there are no taxes. European Union especially companies like Heineken and Canada are also interested economically in the DRC. Heritage Oil Corporation of Canada negotiated an agreement with the DRC government to operate in Ituri and Butembo provinces. The area is controlled by *Union des Patriots Congolais* and RCD- K-ML which are both backed by Uganda. When the United Nations Panel of Experts was established Washington was uncomfortable that U.S.A officials and companies had been incriminated. The economic section of the USA embassy in Kigali had been extremely active at the beginning of the war in helping to establish joint ventures to exploit coltan, but the initial draft of the report was edited to remove any mention of the role of the USA government or firms in the conflict in order to avoid embarrassing the US government.<sup>314</sup>

As a result the names and activities of western companies and individuals responsible for much of the exploitation, marketing, processing and consumption of raw natural resources were largely omitted. All references to US interests were withdrawn and only a few British and German companies were mentioned as importers of natural resources. A good example is a French multinational Bollore was heavily involved in transport of the resources from Kenyan port of Mombassa to Europe was not highlighted as a result of power politics in the Security Council<sup>315</sup>. USA, UK and France have

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<sup>314</sup> F. Grignon; *Economic Agendas In The Congolese Peace Process* in M. Nest et al: *DRC Economic Dimensions* international peace Academy Occasional paper Series ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006) 87

<sup>315</sup> F. Grignon; *Economic Agendas In The Congolese Peace Process* in M. Nest et al: *DRC Economic Dimensions* international peace Academy Occasional paper Series ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006) 87

simultaneously attempted to disguise their deep involvement of their own countries in the exploitation of natural resources as revealed by their attempts to determine the focus of the three United Nation Panel of Experts Reports.<sup>316</sup>

### **ASIAN AND MIDDLE EAST STATES INVOLVED IN THE DRC CONFLICT**

There are other states involved indirectly in the DRC conflict such as China, Libya, Turkey Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Cuba, Iran Sudan, Israel, Lebanon and North Korea. North Korea has shown an interest in DRC's Shunkolobwe uranium mines that Iraqi had an interest in. North Korea and China are happy to get access DRC' cobalt a key mineral for their aeronautical industries and also uranium from DRC. Most of the Cobalt is smuggled fro DRC through Zambia reroute to South Africa then shipped to other countries like China.

### **MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND SMALL FIRMS**

The MNC's and small firms involved in the DRC can be either involved in joint venture with DRC, Rwanda or Congo or rebels; have green field ventures or joint ventures. The MNC's are important as actors in the conflict as they can decide to liaise with rebels or the government in the war thus adding up the number of external actors in the conflict and transforming the conflict. The companies can also be involved directly or indirectly in the conflict as it is complex network of financial institutions, transport companies, mining companies, and arms proliferation companies and services industry.

According to Vernon MNCs maximize the well-being of its stakeholders without necessarily accepting any direct responsibility for the consequences of its actions in

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<sup>316</sup> *ibid*

individual national jurisdictions.<sup>317</sup> John Dunning posits that MNCs try to maximize their interests by investing abroad seeking access to natural resources, strategic assets, larger markets, or increased efficiency. The OLI paradigm of international production discusses three determinants of MNC activity – ownership specific advantages, location specific advantages and internalization advantages.<sup>318</sup>

The main objectives of the MNCs are to earn profits and lower the cost of production, so they invest in areas where the cost of doing business is low and in case of the extractive industries they have to be located in the places whereby the natural resources. Extractive industries have to do be located in the places whereby the natural resources are even if it means doing businesses with the regime in power as they are out to make profit. According to the Economist “the primary incentive for MNCs is to invest or remain invested in conflict prone states has been the existence of natural resources based assets for extractive purposes.”<sup>319</sup>

The cost of goods and services in conflict zones may be comparatively cheap, capital assets may be undervalued due to the risk involved in operating in a conflict zone and there may be less market competition since fewer companies will have an interest in investing. MNCs in conflict prone states may also be motivated by the higher potential returns on investments that can be made in comparison to investments in more stable countries.<sup>320</sup> Privatization of state owned companies has been accompanied the recent wave of economic liberalization throughout the developing world including conflict prone

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<sup>317</sup> R. Vernon: *In the Hurricane's Eye: The troubled prospects of multinational enterprises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) p28

<sup>318</sup> J. Dunning: (1993) *Multinational Enterprises, The Global Economy*. (Massachusetts: Addison – Wesley, 1993)p. 79

<sup>319</sup> The Economist: *Risk Returns*, Business In Difficult Places, The Economist 355(8171) (May 20, 2000) pp 85-88

states has proven to be a big draw for the foreign direct investors. Other types of MNCs that may be attracted to conflict prone zones are involved in the arms industry, financials services, private security companies and expert consultants who specialize in goods and services directly related to conflict.<sup>321</sup>

Extractive companies, such as those in the oil or minerals sector are especially vulnerable to security risks because of the capital intensive nature of their investments. Internal instability has made it necessary for extractive companies to use their own armed guards, or by enter arrangements with private security firms or with state security forces in order to protect their property. These arrangements have had interesting ramification in terms of contributing to human rights violations, exacerbating local conflict and thus have resulted in harming the reputation of several MNCs. There are several examples of MNCs seeking military protection in conflict prone areas. Once a company decides to invest in a conflict prone area, the decision-making must include how their operations will affect and be affected by the associated political, social and economic instability.

This decision is detailed by a MNCs resolution to work *in, on or around* a conflict zone. Potential risks that face corporations operating in conflict zones include threats to their investment, property, resources and personnel. Such threats ultimately affect the firm's ability to maximize profits. However, the 'reverse flow of risk', that is, the ability of a corporation to exacerbate or worsen violence in a country has received an increased amount of attention in recent years.<sup>322</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> J. Nelson: *The Business Of Peace : The Private Sector As A Partner In Conflict Prevention And Resolution* ( London: The Prince of Wales Leaders Forum , 2000) p58-59

<sup>321</sup> *ibid*

<sup>322</sup> R. Vernon : *In The Hurricane's Eye: The Troubled Prospects Of Multinational Enterprises*( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) p65-69

In line with the discussion above the international corporations were the ones whose influence was critical in reshaping the political landscape of the country. By securing mining deals with the AFDL during the early stages of the war MNC's were able to establish legitimate mining operation in rebel occupied territories and provided revenues to AFDL. As major cities located in natural resources rich areas fell under control mining corporations swarmed into rebel held AFDL territory prompting or scramble for Congolese wealth.<sup>323</sup> These MNCs and small firms were all eager to earn their profits and maximize on the conflict. Some of the MNCs that were there during Mobutu's period were handed over to other MNCs that the Kabila's regime deemed fit.

American Mineral Fields and Bechtel landed lucrative deals during the AFDL invasion. Barrick Gold Corporation, Rusell resources, Krall and Banro American Resources have been accused of funding military operations in exchange for lucrative contracts in the east of the DRC.<sup>324</sup> Jean Ramon Boule co-founder of AMF landed a one billion USA dollars deal with AFDL in April 1997 whereas Bechtel Corporation assisted Kabila with NASA satellite studies on DRC as well as four infrared maps of its mineral potential free of charge.<sup>325</sup> This reshaped DRC mining sector as business interests continued to be the most prominent players reshaping the political development of the country. The close collaboration between MNC's and AFDL meant that the creation of a

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<sup>323</sup> D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region*; In Heinrich Boll Foundation's: *Networking With A View To Promoting Peace, Towards Sustainable Peace –Civil Society Dialogue Forum For The Horn Of Africa, Second Conference Documentation Nairobi 10-13 December 2000* (Nairobi; Heinrich Boll Foundation,2000) pp 183-213

<sup>324</sup> K.C Dunn: *A Survival Guide to Kinshasa ; Lessons of the Father passed down to the son*; in J.F Clark: *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (Kampala: Fountain Publisher : 2000) pp52-73

<sup>325</sup> Human Right Watch: *The Curse of Gold; Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington D.C: Human Rights Watch , 2002 ) p2

new government was influenced from the outset by the willingness of the AFDL to secure and sustain beneficial mining agreements.

Before the outbreak of the *banyamulenge* rebellion that stirred up the war, Barrick Gold Corporation was formed precise to move and take over several mineral concessions as the war progressed and control the territory in which they ere located. The Board of directors included George Bush senior and former Canadian Prime Ministers Mulroney. Toronto based mining Banro obtained concessions to mine gold in north – Eastern Province of Zaire. Banro acquired thirty percent of Sominki a Zairian state controlled mining company. The real actor behind Banro has the British controlled Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa controlled by De Beers.<sup>326</sup> A Belgian based company Mines D’or du Zaire (MDDZ) bought the other shares of Sominki. Cluff Mining Company of London owned sixty percent of MDDZ. Anglo- American Corporation owns Cluff’s sixty percent shares the world largest mining company and a component of the Club of Isles, which is an organization that protects the interests of British and some European monarchies.<sup>327</sup>

In 1996, Banro and MDDZ announced their merger sold all its shares to MDDZ and thus became owners of the state owned enterprise. As the war progressed Banro acquired all Sominki shares and the state owned mining Firm became an Anglo-American affair. Gecamines was also acquired by the AMF. It acquired the copper –Zinc mine at Kapushi and according to Jean Raymond Boule, “the company director the company’s strategy was to go for the highest grades and the largest deposits.”<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> D. Nabudere: *Uganda's Role In The War In The Democratic Republic Of Congo And It Implications For Peace And Security In The Great Lakes Region* , op cit pp 183-213

<sup>327</sup> *ibid* pp 183-213

<sup>328</sup> *ibid*



According to professor Nabudere, “this represented fifty percent equity stake in the new venture and acquisition as the Anglo-American was weaving a web of interests around Zaire for the Club of Isles through this intricate acquisitions”.<sup>329</sup> American Diamond buyers owned by Boule paid US\$25,000 to Kabila forces to procure the diamond trading licenses from the rebel forces even before they took over Zaire.<sup>330</sup> Consolidated Eurocan of Vancouver Canada finalized a deal which enabled them to purchase a fifty five percent in Gecamines Tenke- Fungurume copper –cobalt deposits located in Shaba province. Tenke-Fungurume represented the largest operating cobalt reserves in the world. Eurocan sold its acquisition to Isor and Gencor, which are both South African companies, which are part of the British raw material cartel.<sup>331</sup> Societe Miniere des Grands Lacs was created with the Belgians, South Africa and Rwanda partners to exploit Coltan and gold in the south and north Kivus.

Several other mining companies were trying to get a share of the fields and the Kabila rebel group was busy already trying selling concession and indicating that they were intending to privatize most of the State held mines in Zaire as soon as they assumed power in Kinshasa.<sup>332</sup> The privatization involved selling off old state enterprises at throw away price especially as the Kabila troops advanced to the capital city Kinshasa. Barrick Gold mines in 1996 went ahead and registered itself as mining firm in Uganda just a month before the rebellion began. It also had offices in eastern DRC and the posh places of Kampala, Uganda.<sup>333</sup> The situation is not changed as corporations are still players in DRC importing natural resources from Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda and CAR and

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<sup>329</sup> *ibid*

<sup>330</sup> *ibid*

<sup>331</sup> *ibid*

<sup>332</sup> *ibid*

mining from these areas controlled by the DRC Government or the rebel controlled areas and providing the rebel forces with arms and / or paying the rebels for the protection of their interests .<sup>334</sup>

Indirectly involved states are those who buy goods from DRC that are exploited illegally thus continuing the cyclic process of aiding the rebels indirectly. International corporations such as Banro-Resources, Corporation, Geologists Hannover, Rwasibo – Butera, Eagles Wings , Veen, Soger , Afrimex, Cogecom Ventrostar, Raremet, Finmining Limited. Union Transport Specialty Metal and Fincocord have Imported Coltan via Rwanda.<sup>335</sup>

In 1990's De Beers Consolidated mines limited. Anglo American Corporation, Sominki, Tenke Mining Corporation (a subsidiary of EuroCan Consolidate Ventures) and Anvil Mining all negotiated deals with AFDL contrary to Zairian constitution which states that the soil and subsoil belongs to the state and prospecting, exploration and exploitation requires permits from ministry of mines and energy<sup>336</sup>

United Nations Panel of Experts gathered evidence that linkages between different actors and stakeholders are very structured to the point that governments and large reputable companies operate in confidence. It identified thirty four foreign companies importing natural resources from Rwanda.<sup>337</sup>

The importing companies and their facilitators are still aware of the origin of these natural resources. This means that whether directly or indirectly involved in DRC

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<sup>333</sup> *ibid*

<sup>334</sup> Human Right Watch: *The Curse of gold; Democratic Republic of Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch , 2002 ) p2

<sup>335</sup> United Nations: *United Nations Panel Of Experts Final Report Op Cit*

<sup>336</sup> D. Montague: "Stolen Goods; Coltan And Conflict In The Democratic Republic Of Congo", *SAIS Review Papers* Vol 22,(2002) pp103-118

<sup>337</sup> United Nations :*United Nations Final Repot Of The Panel Of Experts Op Cit*

conflict and/or exploitation of natural resources, corporations have a role to play in the conflict. The Sabena Cargo carried Congolese Coltan from Rwanda's Kigali: airport back to Europe, Citibank was involved with controversial transactions with Rwanda's and their allied rebels.<sup>338</sup>

The African states have formed corporations with their Congolese counterparts to loot the resources. Zimbabwe has had OSLEG, and Ridgepointe, Uganda has had the Victoria group as Rwanda has had companies like SOMIGL.

In 2003 after the peace talks MNC's sought to sign new deals, revitalize old ones to start gold mining and exploration operations in the rich gold concessions in the north east. AngloGold Ashanti one of the largest gold producers started explorations in Mongbwalu. Anglo fold Ashanti established relations with FNI in return for FNI assurances of security for its operations and staff. Anglo American has also been linked to FNI.<sup>339</sup> In 2003 Metalor technologies a leading Swiss refinery bought gold from Uganda yet this gold was from DRC companies like Heineken from USA have been involved in the DRC war.<sup>340</sup>

Companies like SOMIGL have been established to gain in the trade. Masingiro GmbH it a German corporation exports coltan to H.C Starck in German Cobalt Inc in the USA and Ningxid in China. Masingiro imports fifty tonnes of coltan a month which comes from DRC Rwanda Zimbabwe or Zambia. When SOMIGL export monopoly ended Masingiro entered into a partnership with Gemicom. SOMIGL was backed by 4

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<sup>338</sup> United Nations Final Report of the Panel of experts Report op cit

<sup>339</sup> Human Rights Watch ; *The Curse of Gold* op cit p22

<sup>340</sup> ibid

foreign partners African, Premeco, Cogecom and Coger the identity of Premeco and Africom is unknown<sup>341</sup>.

Gemicom (Groupe des Entreprises Minieries Congolaise) was established by Wamegabe Mudekereza and Byabushi Muyeye. According to IPIS Gemicom and Masingiro made business comprising of forty tonnes coltan and landed at Ostend Airport Belgium in July 2001 and August 20 2001. *Transports et Messageries* au Kivus (TMK) is a company based in Goma which transports and ships coltan to Antwerp via Mombassa Kenya. TMK transports timber to Greece and Belgium. Trafca contracts ABAC a Belgian company to fly coltan from Goma to Ostend Airport in Belgium. ABA subcontracted Air Memphis which leased an airplane belonging to Heliopolis Egypt.<sup>342</sup> Cogecom was established on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1992 as an import export business to and fro Zaire and was a head company to control a number of buying point in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. It is now engaged in import from DRC of coffee, papaya, quinine, tin and coltan. Their coltan supplier is Shenimed a comptoir based in Bukavu led by Shenila Mwanza<sup>343</sup>. SCIBE Company is involved in buying coffee in Equateur province, Amex – bois is involved in logging<sup>344</sup>

The UN panel of experts stated that the Indian Kotecha family heads a group of trading companies in east DRC and has been a leader in the coltan trade for long.<sup>345</sup> This implies that even family ties have been established within companies for trade.

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<sup>341</sup> J. Cuvelier and T. Raeymackers: *Supporting The War Economy In The DRC European Companies And Coltan Trade*; International Peace Information Service (IPIS) report (January 2002 ) pp 21-32

<sup>342</sup> *ibid*

<sup>343</sup> *ibid*

<sup>344</sup> S. Perrot: " Entrepreneurs De L'insecurite; La Face Cachee De L' Armee Ougandaise", *Le Journal De La Politique Africaine* (1999) pp 1-24

<sup>345</sup> *ibid*

Rwanda metals and Grand Lac Metals are from RPA. Rwanda metals have traded with Euromet, Raremet and Northington Trading Company and Finmining limited. Fincocord SA was also involved in coltan trade which is sold to ULBA plant in Kazakhstan. However its addresses were fictitious Air Cess is managed by Victor Vasilerich Butt who has many aliases. His network includes airlines companies, cargo charter companies and freight involved in shipping illegal cargo. He organized flights pass CAR Kisangani and Kigali carrying timber and precious stones when coltan prices increased he started transporting coltan.

From the above it is clear that corporations are involved. The corporations can be involved in mining, transport or shipping or bank. As such one can deduce that the corporations involved whether indirectly or directly have financed the war be it explicitly or not. Thus involving them in the peace process will lead to progress. The companies created by the Rwandese, Zimbabwean and Ugandan States are example of what Dietrich calls “military commercialism” whereby military personnel create corporate military business in order to generate income for themselves and their state apparatus.<sup>346</sup> Trinitech manager Robert Raun said “it is capitalism in its purest form.....let me put it in a positive way; A good civics lesson on how you pay for governance would be useful in this region”<sup>347</sup> This statement gives understanding that for MNCs to cooperate good governance is needed as most extractive industries will thrive in chaos also and the price for that is bad governance. MNCs are geared towards profit and will do anything and work with any *de jure* or *de facto* regime irrespective of the human rights abuses

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<sup>346</sup> C. Dietrich : “The Commercialization Of Military Deployment In Africa” *Africa Security Review* Vol 9 (2000) pp

<sup>347</sup> V. Karl ‘ *Waging Wars in Congo ; Vital Role Ore plays*; found in J. Cuvelier And T. Raeymaekers; *Supporting The War Economy In The DRC European Companies And Coltan Trade*; International Peace

committed. It also shows how arrogant the MNCs managers and stakeholders are in regard to being at the conflict prone zones.

## FOREIGN REBEL MOVEMENTS

Foreign rebel movements have also to some degree influenced the Congolese wars such as *Interahamwe*, Hutu militias from Rwanda and FDD from Burundi, ADF from Uganda and UNITA from Angola. They may not mine a lot of minerals but if their plight is not addressed they might hinder progressive peace results as they can be used to spark internal violence. Some like UNITA have been used to exploit the DRC resources for example as stated in chapter two the president of UNITA visited Uganda and the mining minister to Rwanda. This shows that rebels groups can be in foreign country and rely on foreign states that are friendly to them and want to do business with them from the exploitation of natural resources. UNITA supported the second rebellion because of strategic and economic interests; only through the export of Angola' diamonds a large portion of which is marketer in Kigali, Kisangani and Kampala can UNITA find the foreign exchange needed for the purchase and servicing of its huge military arsenal as well as for the salaries of foreign mercenaries.<sup>348</sup> There are other rebel groups like Uganda's *Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)*, *Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie (CNDD)* who are elements of all Hutu militant wing of Burundi's CNDD. The *mai-mai* militias developed links with the *Interahamwe* and FDD based in DRC to produce gold and smuggle contraband. This shows that if these rebels groups are not

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Information Service (IPIS) report (January 2002 ) pp 21-32  
<sup>348</sup> J. Cuvelier and T. Raeymaekers: *Supporting The War Economy In The DRC European Companies And Coltan Trade*; International Peace Information Service (IPIS) report (January 2002 ) pp 21-32

considered in the peace process, they are likely to hinder the peace process and escalate the conflict.

## **INDIVIDUALS**

It is worth noting that individual work with the backing of another actor like the State, foreign armies or the MNC and even so they are still under the home country jurisdiction. The prospect theory posits that people evaluate choices with respect to a reference, overweight losses relative to comparable gains, engage in risk-averse behavior in choices among gains but risk acceptant behavior in choices among loses and respond to probability in a non linear manner.<sup>349</sup> In conflict this theory is important in that it explains why individuals chose to be involved in conflict to as they make choices to be involved in risky behavior or rather in conflict especially for personal gains. Individuals are said to be rational and can make decisions whether to engage in conflict but it is because they weigh the costs of being involved in the conflict and not involved. This is where the prospects come in what is it that they are seeking to gain from the conflict in short what are the prospects in that conflict. The external individuals are mostly in the conflict because of the economic gains and profits just like the MNCs.

Individuals involved in the DRC conflict have adversely contributed to the illegal trade in the rebel and conflict prone areas for their own benefits, their government's and companies. One of them is Salim Swaleh the half brother of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni and his wife. Alex Bazano of the group Bazano has also been mentioned in consequent reports in 1999 South African mining tycoon Billy Rautenbach

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<sup>349</sup>D. Kahneman and A. Tversky: "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk." *Econometrica* Vol. 47 (1979) pp263-291

was bankrolling the Kabila's government side in the DRC. South Africa accused him of siphoning profits from exploitation of Congolese cobalt and copper mining to reimburse the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe involvement in the DRC war.<sup>350</sup>

Mr. Albers the director of SOMIKIVU which operates a niobium mine near Rutshuru in South Kivu is been involved in exploiting the natural resources in the DRC and is alleged to have received 500,000 Deutsch Mark loan from Germany to expand SOMIKIVU activities. He denied these allegations and the Germany government denied them too by saying he was receiving compensation for the losses he had incurred in the DRC in his investments.<sup>351</sup>

Mr. Ramnik Kotecha of the Kotecha family has been a leader of coltan trade for decades in eastern DRC and introduces himself as honorary consul of the USA in Bukavu.<sup>352</sup>

Mr. Jacques Van dee Abeel is a coltan supplier who has a comptoir based in Bukavu led by Shenila Mwanza and her brother who are the children of business mogul Aziza Kulsum a Burundian known as Gulmali.

There are other individuals who are majors and high-ranking officials of RPA, UPDF, and ZDF. There are also mercenaries who are involved in the DRC illicit conflict trade form South Africa, Armenia, Lebanon, USA and Britain. These are in for the war to exploit the resources. For instance early this year some South African mercenaries were caught in the DRC and apprehended. This shows that without consider such in the peace talks it will, be futile as they will not want to loose what they are gaining unless their

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<sup>350</sup> J. Switzer: *Armed Conflict And Natural Resources ; The Cases Of The Mineral Sectors; Discussion Paper For Experts Workshop July 11 2002 pp 1-12*

<sup>351</sup> J. Cuvelier and T. Raeymaekers: *Supporting The War Economy In The DRC European Companies And Coltan Trade* op cit



desires are met or a win-win situation is found. Expatriate entrepreneurs carrying Greek, Belgian, Indian, Lebanese or Pakistani passports were established players in the natural resources sector and in retail and wholesale commerce in DRC<sup>353</sup>.

## THE NATURAL RESOURCES FOUND IN DRC

For one to understand the role of external actors in the 'war economy' it is important to understand the natural resources available as this will give a clear understanding of why the exploitative external actors are interested in the DRC. This is because the external actors covet a share of the natural resources available in the DRC. The DRC is endowed with vast natural resources and some are strategic. Most of them are needed in high-tech industries and as population increase the need for these resources is increasing. The DRC also has animals that are valuable to poachers like African elephants which has ivory that is valuable, gorillas, chimpanzees and other animals like gazelles and antelopes for game meat. This has led to exploitation of DRC natural resources from all corners and all sources like the animals, minerals, farm produce, water, fish, forests and land.

The DRC has gold, coltan, cassiterite, tin, copper, timber, uranium, cobalt, niobium, wolfram, cadmium, oil tantalum, petroleum, industrial and gem diamond, silver, zinc, manganese, coal, hydropower, coffee and other and wildlife.<sup>354</sup> The ore, columbite-tantalite, or coltan for short, isn't perhaps as well known as some of the other resources and minerals. However, the demand for the highly prized tantalum that comes from the

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<sup>352</sup> ibid

<sup>353</sup> M. Nest: *The Evolution Of A Fragmented State; The Case Of The DRC* (New York: New York University, 2000) P295

<sup>354</sup> US Geological Survey Mineral Yearbook available at:

refined coltan has enormous impacts, as highlighted by a recent U.N. Security Council report where an expert panel was established on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>355</sup> Coltan has been exploited extensively in Orientale Province by various armed groups.

Diamond is either found in volcanic rock known as kimberlite, which requires mining and is an expensive, capital-intensive operation or in alluvial deposits when kimberlite disintegrates and the diamond is carried by river systems and deposited over wide areas including sea-beds. About seventy four percent of diamonds are mined from kimberlite formations where it is easy to control production under tight security. However alluvial diamond deposits are spread over wide, frequently remote areas, often exploited by small-scale artisanal diggers using rudimentary technologies. Such production conditions are extremely such as the ones found in the DRC.

The Congo Basin hosts at least 30 species of primates. Africa has three of the world's four great ape species: bonobos, gorillas, and chimpanzees. The Congo has all three. Majority of primates are restricted to the high-rainfall forested tropics with a few species inhabiting woodland savannas and mountain regions that is the Mountain gorillas (*Gorilla gorilla beringei*), A second species of chimpanzee the bonobos (*Pan Paniscus*), western lowland gorilla, (*Gorilla gorilla gorilla*), which lives in the forests. Although western lowland gorillas are far more numerous than the other subspecies, they are frequently killed for food and medicine and this has been part of what Rwanda and Burundi have been exporting to pharmaceutical companies. There are approximately

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[www.minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodityaccessed\(2006\)](http://www.minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodityaccessed(2006))

<sup>355</sup> United Nations; *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. United Nations Security Council, April 12, 2001.

96,000 remaining Eastern Chimpanzees (*Pan Troglodytes schweinfurthii*), which occupy the savannas and rainforests Congo. Habitat loss due to clearing of forest for cultivation is the main cause of decline, but the poaching of these gorillas for food, medicine and for parts sold as souvenirs is also a big problem. These animals are poached by the poachers and sold to the international markets even though they are endangered.

Other animals are in danger of being poached like the elephants. A large area of the State is under the rebels and the parks are not secure from poachers who poach the animals and sell them. The roads made in the forests provide deep forest access to hunters seeking bush meat. They are avenues of invasion for exotic species, some of which may out-compete already beleaguered endangered organisms. Logging towns may act as magnets to other Africans seeking protection from civil war (as in the Northern Congo) or seeking an income base. As the forests are cut into smaller islands of habitat, they become still more vulnerable to hunters entering from their edges and the fragmentation cycle accelerates.<sup>356</sup>

These animals are important to the Congolese tourism and trade and their exploitation is a threat especially to the endangered species. The external actors rush for these natural resources is injurious not only to the economy of the DRC but also to the social cohesion, environment, politics and stability.

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<sup>356</sup> Anna Stabrawa; *Environmental Endowment and Conflict: The Case of Diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)* Division of Early Warning & Assessment, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), while at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA 9 February 2003

## **THE ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE DRC CONFLICT**

The external actors have been identified but it is also important to note their role in the DRC conflict. This is important as it shows the extent to which the external actors have been involved in the DRC conflict, their interests in the conflict and the implication of this to the peace process, to them and to the DRC community. This will open a way for the critical analysis chapter as their role will be understood better.

The external actors in the DRC are interested in the natural resources especially as the natural resources are of value and are lootable. Those areas with the unlootable natural resources are under the government controlled areas and the areas controlled by the pro-government forces. According to Bethwel Ogot, "literature on conflict affirms that throughout the world the common elements of conflicts are a zero-sum situation of desired items among competing drivers for their possession or attainment. Thus conflict of principles when accompanied by a threat to vital national interest can produce war."<sup>357</sup>

This means that in the DRC war most of the competing forces are interested in the DRC because of its mineral potential despite the war raging on. With the advancement in technology and rising population the need for these natural resources is increasing day by day, therefore more and more actors want to share in the 'spoils of war'. This has contributed to the war escalating or the DRC having negative peace as shown by the conflict cycle whereby there is peace then tensions as the underlying issues are not addressed and then crisis and then violence which when managed leads to post conflict peace building. DRC cannot be said to be in a situation of peace as some places are still

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<sup>357</sup> B. Ogot: *African Conflicts In A Global Context; A Research Agenda* in Godfrey P. and Ogot B.A: *Conflict In Contemporary Africa* op cit p10

violent and other are still negative peace which if not managed can lead to escalation of violence.

In summary there is myriad of actors and private networks based on links with the political and military elites involving airline companies, trading agents, mining companies trading agents, mining companies and gun runners. Individuals and companies have vested interests in continuing their involvement in resources exploitation. Links between military commercial system, criminal networks and legitimate business is of great concern and may no longer need presence of troops to sustain them. Ethnic based military exploitations of Congolese actors will continue to be used by the external actors and the internal elites. As shown form the above chapter the external actors are diverse and need to be put into consideration in the peace process at the local, national, regional and international levels.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL ACTORS IN DRC CONFLICT AND DRC CONFLICT**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter introduces the various debates in the DRC conflict. It will look at the role of natural resources in the DRC conflict, role of third parties in the mediation, challenges to the peace process, the greed and grievance theory and how and to what extent it captures and addresses the DRC situation, internationalization of the conflict, role of the non state and state actors in the DRC conflict, the DRC as an actor and lastly the feasibility of the democratic model in conflict zones such as the DRC.

#### **THE STATE OF DRC**

The analysis of the DRC conflict cannot be complete without understanding the State of DRC. As seen in Chapter Two the State of DRC had structural anomalies that allowed the external actors to gain entry into the DRC and plunder the resources since historical times. The lack of a stable army (practically the lack of an army) in DRC allowed the rebels to advance to Kinshasa without much opposition.

The regional politics that Mobutu used in Zaire paved way for the external actors to gain entry into the DRC. For example his funding and aiding of the rebels for neighboring states made the state leaders from neighboring states attack the integrity of the DRC State as they were concerned with their territorial security.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> International Crisis Group: Africa's Seven Nation War Democratic Republic of Congo Report N° 4 (Brussels and Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 21 May 1999) pp 1-37

Divisions along ethnic lines along ethnic fault lines allowed the elites to use the ethnic reason to allow for predation in the State as they have continued liaising with the external actors for their gains. For example the *banyamulenge* and *banyarwanda* used their contacts with Rwanda. Bemba has used his Yakoma origins to liaise with CAR and both Kabilas have used their tribal origins to liaise with Angola. UPC and IFN have used their Ugandan links to exploit the natural resources.<sup>359</sup>

The weak institutions of DRC that were created and that were transformed since independence time did not allow the State to absorb shock of the change in the international arena and the state itself. The lack of a strong civil society for example did not allow the State to absorb the changes into democracy. The fall of communism meant that Mobutu was no longer needed by the West hence his demise did not result into change of the leadership into younger prudent leaders aware of the changing times. The strength of the State was important as change was inevitable bearing in mind that the DRC state had lost the trust of its population and neighboring states.

The structure, law and order has fallen apart that DRC is considered as one of the fallen or collapsed states. A state is collapsed when it fails to exhibit the fundamental characteristics of statehood. That is a functioning security national and political apparatus, and social and economic cohesion and order. Blaming the external actors entirely means that the DRC leaders do not have to be accountable for any wrong doing. Mobutu and his cronies lack of democracy and mismanagement of the State and its institutions meant that the DRC State weakened further and was exploitative and exhibited political violence, towards even its population, yet some of the cronies like

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<sup>359</sup> International Crisis Group: Congo At War A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 17 November 1998) pp 1-31

Bemba are still vying for leadership. The fact that the country is rich in natural resources doesn't mean that it has no structural anomalies or is not dysfunctional. The lack of democracy and good governance currently and historically means that the State is dysfunctional and needs attention. The past characteristics of DRC State from Mobutu's period continue to prevail: corruption, personalization of power, self cannibalization whereby the State feeds on itself to live for another day, and ethnicity continue to prevail even in this era and any peace process needs to consider this aspect.

No strong leader seems to have emerged from the conflict in the DRC. The Congolese feel both Kabila and Bemba are not leaders. Bemba will bring back the memories of Mobutu period and Kabila is a dictator. Only one thing is clear: the mistakes made in 1996-1997 must not be repeated, but it is not apparent how a repetition can be avoided even as the two edge towards elections.<sup>360</sup> Congolese feel that the two cannot make adequate leader because Bemba was former Mobutist and Kabila is a dictator.

For the peace agreement to work they have to focus not only on the external actors and their allies but also the State of DRC.

## **THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE THEORY**

The greed and grievance theory as stipulated by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler posits that rebels in today's conflicts especially in natural resource rich states are more likely to be motivated by greed other than grievances. This is because they will be after capturing the rents from these resources or from taxing the natural resources along the

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<sup>360</sup> International Crisis Group: Africa's Seven Nation War Democratic Republic of Congo Report N° 4 (Brussels and Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 21 May 1999) pp 1-37



transport routes. Greed over access, control and trade of these natural resources is what motivates the rebels to be engaged in the conflict.<sup>361</sup>

Economic agendas in such conflicts are always theorized around grievances, like ethnic discrimination and division, justice seeking and overthrow of the dictator and his regime, actual political differences with government authorities against the governments as there is no dissident group that would accept that they are looting the natural resources. Furthermore looting rebellions unlike those that seek justice need not to defeat the government because their aim is met as long as they can keep stealing from the local population and exploiting natural resources that have been captured.<sup>362</sup> Lichbach calls it the 'preference falsification' where by "dissidents do not signal their true preference for collective action, because demands are made efficaciously with an eye to their consequences.....dissidents will support a side in which they do not believe, remain neutral, support both sides, switch sides among opposition groups and take sides only after the conflict is over *which is not easy to come by*".<sup>363</sup> For Lichbach ideological commitment is not needed to sustain a dissident movement. Tullock also support this idea and states that "*profit seeking individuals will ignore the public goods nature of a revolution but even the ideology of the opposing sides when deciding whether to participate or not.*"<sup>364</sup>

The main reasons that external actors are involved in the DRC are because of greed and not grievance as stipulated by authors like Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler,

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<sup>361</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank, January 1998) pp 563-573

<sup>362</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank, January 1998) pp 563-573

<sup>363</sup> M.I Lichbach: *The Rebels Dilemma* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995) p 284

<sup>364</sup> Herbst J: *Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and conflict in Africa: Journal of African Economies* Vol 9(3) (2000) pp 270-294

Lichbach and Tullock. Economic agendas by all external actors are led by greed and not grievance as stipulated earlier by States like Rwanda, Uganda and Angola though they had a profound concern for their borders. These actors have been involved in pillaging the natural resources in the DRC through the funding of governmental forces to access non-lootable resources and the rebels to access lootable natural resources. Greed by external actors was seen when AFDL began to advance to capture Kinshasa as MNCs and individuals rushed in to be given a portion of the 'spoils of war'. Even though grievance was the first thing in the strategy and reasoning of States like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and Burundi over time this mutated to greed for the valuable natural resources. This has even influenced the relations between Uganda and Rwanda especially regarding Eastern DRC as they fought over natural resources in Kisangani and the Kivus.

The other actors like Western States like German, USA and UK are also involved in the DRC conflict so that their interest may prevail and this is purely led by greed. However states that are pro government like Zimbabwe are also interested in the DRC natural resources that they wish will enrich them and build up their economies. According to Dietrich "*extraction of the resources of a country such as the DRC can provide rich pickings for those who through the deployment of their armed forces can control and exploit mining ventures that they would otherwise not be able to access. Economic benefits reaped from the war far outweigh those that might have been harvested from a political settlement.*"<sup>365</sup> For example because time was required to exploit the DRC's resources in order to finance the war and allow individuals to accumulate personal wealth , a foreign troop withdrawal did not materials after signing

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<sup>365</sup> C. Dietrich: the Commercialization of Military Deployment in Africa ( Pretoria : ISS. 2001 available at <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9.1/Commercialisation/sic.html>.

the Lusaka Agreement. This has largely been motivated by greed for quick riches especially when it is not from your own country. The non state actors are also driven largely by greed for a quick buck. As Keen puts it money is the sinew of war and DRC is the continuation of commerce by any other means.<sup>366</sup> War needs resources and as conflict in the DRC has shifted to control of natural resources, this has made external actors like Rwanda and Uganda finance their war through the natural resources they have plundered from the DRC as well as MNCs paying the government and the rebels to protect their interest while the later finance their war efforts. To Paul the only solution to conflict like the DRC is by curbing rebel financing, jump starting economic growth in these States and provide a robust military presence in nations emerging from conflict.<sup>367</sup>

As compelling and provocative the greed versus the grievance theory is to a point there are weaknesses. The greed versus grievance theory doesn't address states actors and is a little simplified in that it does not address the government sides as a predator for the natural resources from the country. The greed theory also has no entry point external rebels, individuals and MNCs involved in predatory behavior in natural resource based conflict like the DRC one. It does not also include the indirectly involved states like the transit states and the consumers as the world has turned into consumerism with globalization and capitalism. This is because these actors are important as they mine

It is imperative to note that the State of DRC has also structural and institutional anomalies that have led to the external actors being able to access the resources and plunder and rape the country. For example the State's army was in disarray such that

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<sup>366</sup> D. Keen: *Incentives And Disincentives For Violence* in Berdal M and D.M Malone (eds): *Greed And Grievance : Economic Agenda In Civil Wars*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner , 200) pp 12-35

<sup>367</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank , January 1998) pp 563-573

when the AFDL externally backed rebel attacked there was no much resistance from the army. The greed theory does not cover this aspect and needs to put into consideration the structures and institutions that are needed by the state for it to effectively run. for instance the economic structures such that there is equitable distribution of resources, social structures such that ethnic discrimination is resolved, legal structures, the distribution of power such that the government is held accountable, the strengthening of the civil society such that the civil groups can advocate for rights and freedoms to be enhanced. The external actors have also used the fragmentation along ethnic lines to woo the internal actors to their side and to abet them in their looting of the natural resources. The lootable natural resources are under the rebels especially those at the peripheries and distant lines. The non lootable natural resources are under the government which liaises with some external actors to exploit these natural resources

As Ganesan and Vines posit the greed and grievance theory doesn't address the role that governments of natural resource rich States play. Government control of important resources and the revenues that flow from those resources goes hand in hand with endemic corruption , a culture of impunity , weak rule of law and inequitable of public resources. This creates structural anomalies and weak institutions. That has led to the entrance of external actors and states that have been involved in the DRC conflict. These factors often lead to governments with unaccountable power that routinely commit human rights abuses and can also make prolonged armed conflict likely.<sup>368</sup> This is because the availability of natural resources gives such a government a strong incentive to maintain power even at the expense of public welfare and the rights of the population.

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<sup>368</sup> A. Ganesan A. and A. Vines: "Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State" in Human Rights Watch World Report: Human Rights and Armed Conflict, (Washington, D.C. Humans Rights

Thus the government becomes predatory committing abuses to maintain power and controlling resources of the state for the benefit of a few. These governments are called predatory autocracies where state power faces fewer constraints and the exploitation of public and private resources for the gain elite interests is embedded in institutionalized practices with greater continuity of individual leaders. Such regimes are non transparent and corrupt.<sup>369</sup> This is evident during Mobutu's regime and to some extent Laurent Kabila's regime whereby the leaders became predatory and did not care about the population which in turn created opportunities for the external actors to act. Mobutu's plunder of the natural resources helped create condition that led to the country's civil war and the cycle continues today. Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, MNCs and other individual have benefited from the DRC's natural resources.

Since the departure of the foreign armies, the State actors have provided political, material, financial or military support to rebels groups and governments in furtherance of their won economic interests. The MNCs and individuals still remain and also provide for rebels groups and the government support militarily and politically.

The presence of natural resources especially the strategic ones may color the way foreign actors deal with the internal actors like rebels and governments. They may down play human rights abuses or poor governance in order to maintain cordial relations with a commodity provider or may engage in the conflict directly or through proxies in order to secure their the areas with the resources and they are mainly driven by greed as evident in the DRC.<sup>370</sup> When Mobutu was in power the USA, Belgium and France supported Him

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Watch, 2004), pp. 301-323 Available at: [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)

<sup>369</sup> *ibid*

<sup>370</sup> I am grateful for Didier a Congolese on September 12, 2006 in Karen Seminary who gave me this insight

even though the State was in shambles economically and socially and there was human rights abuses and predation and plunder of the economy. The Kabila's regime was also supported by Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia even though he did nothing to change the structures as they also coveted a share of the natural resources. Uganda, Rwanda and MNCS have also supported directly the rebels and the government in order to get a share of their areas of interest. They have been also engaged directly in the conflict. However, in as much as these external actors have been in the Congolese territory because of greed one should not ignore their grievances such as to secure their borders especially Rwanda, Angola, Burundi and Uganda contrary to what the greed and grievance theory posits as this provides room for the external actors to venture into the DRC.

### **ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE CONFLICT**

DRC has valuable and strategic natural resources that can improve the standards of living of the population, yet this has not been the case. Even as terms of trade for primary commodities have been decreasing some of the natural resources are still valuable and have enriched the minority elites and external actors not the population.<sup>371</sup>

If DRC was relatively stable, it would be able to adequately use its human and natural resource potential. However the DRC is marked by violence and injustice to the DRC people and this creates a favorable environment for the people exploiting and plundering the natural resources. With the attraction that has been turned to natural resources and conflict is one of important to note that DRC conflict is one of such conflicts which have received increasingly good attention to the analysis of armed

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<sup>371</sup> R. Barlowe: *Land Resource Economic* 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice – Hall Inc, 1978) pp 228 – 229

conflict.<sup>372</sup> Natural resources can either be renewable or non – renewable but include mineral resources, water resources and forest resources. Natural resources can be classified into fund resources (stock) that include metals, mineral fuel, coal, stone. The second category is the flow resources which continue to flow whether they are natural resources in short are productive assets which support economic development and sustain human population.<sup>373</sup>

Natural resources may susceptible to looting or extortion because of their fixed location or remote areas and minimal infrastructures needed to tax or trade them. Lootability of natural resources is related to the ability of rebels to secure it from existing threats, as the terrain in which resources are located is important in determining their lootability. Physical characteristics and geography of natural resources influence their lootability. Required investment, technological demand for exploitation and price weight ratio determine the opportunities available for rebels' forces and their packers.<sup>374</sup>

DRC natural resources can be classified into proximate and distant natural resources.<sup>375</sup> Proximate natural resources are those close to the center of power in the capital city. Distant resource are those located along porous borders or within marginalized groups territory or opposition territory and can be exploited DRC by artisanal diggers.<sup>376</sup> DRC natural resources can also be classified into point resources and diffuse natural resource. Diffuse natural resources are widely spread, need less capital intensive mining and are easily lootable. These resources include gems and minerals,

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<sup>372</sup> M. Nest et al: *The Democratic Republic Of Congo: Economic Dimensions Of War And Peace* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006) p1

<sup>373</sup> R. Barlowe: *Land Resource Economic* 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, op cit pp 228 – 229.

<sup>374</sup> P. Le Billion : *Fueling War: Natural Resources And Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 357 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp1-92

<sup>375</sup> *ibid*

timber from forests. Point resources are natural resources that are concentrated in small areas, exploited by capital-intensive extractive industries and employ a small workforce point resources bring about rent-seeking, are not easily lootable, and have low price volume ratio.<sup>377</sup>

These characteristics of natural resources determine the type of armed conflict that will be there and its duration. For example distant diffuse natural resources produce warlordism and violent conflict in DRC like alluvial diamonds, gold, coltan and timber and the point proximate natural resources are under state control like diamond. Oil and gas which are point distant resources in the DRC have not yet been tapped. The DRC natural resources are not the underlying causes of the cause of the conflict however their availability and weakness of structures and institutions to avoid conflict have caused conflict to be manifested. This is because they are important to development of technology and are coveted by nations-states, MNCs that deal with them. The natural resources aggravate conflict because the rents found can be used to buy arms, they provide for rents for both governments and rebels which they can use to further their ambitions. However today's rebellions like the DRC shows that rebels may be interested in natural resources so they are able to serve their own's need and may not be interested in peace unless their interests may be achieved in the conflict and that is control of resource areas.

These resources allow for room for inequitable distribution of natural resources which provide for grievances and later this leads to greed, this resources may also lead directly to greed as actors want to access this resources that are strategic and also allows

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<sup>376</sup> *ibid*

<sup>377</sup> R.M Auty : *Resource Abundance And Economic Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)



entry point of external actors as structures are weak and anomalous as seen in chapter two. Greed may not be the underlying cause but it also leads to conflict transformation and structural transformation. The DRC conflict was transformed to an all regional crisis that led to other conflicts to be involved like Zimbabwe and Namibia, Kenya, Tanzania Libya and Chad.<sup>378</sup>

Resources not only financed but also motivated and shaped strategies of power based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around the valuable natural resource areas and trading networks.<sup>379</sup> Resources in the DRC have intensified confrontations over areas of economic significance as belligerents focus on military activities on areas of economic significance. The rebels have sought to establish permanent strongholds or areas of insecurity wherever resources and transport routes are located. They have established de facto sovereignty which is characterized by crime, commercial opportunities such as mining, logging or smuggling networks. Exploitation of DRC timber rests on highly porous borders and a degree of collusion between rebels, governments and business as logs are bulky and need good infrastructure. Diamonds are easy to jet of the country as they have a high price to volume to ratio just like gold.

The DRC war economy has largely depended on the porous borders, and shadow economies characteristic of DRC. Shadow economies refer to those trade routes that are illegal and that do not follow the legal channels of trade in a country and war economies

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pp 12-14  
<sup>378</sup> International Crisis Group: *Congo At War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central*

African Conflict (Brussels, Nairobi: International Crisis Group: 17 November 1998) pp 1-31  
<sup>379</sup> P. Le Billon : "The Political Ecology of Armed Conflict", *Political Geography* Vol 20 (2001) Pp561-584

refer to the actions of various protagonists of civil wars in DRC. When Mobutu was in power, he built a Kleptocratic predatory regime that did not provide for its population. Areas around the periphery thus turned to doing business and commerce with the neighboring countries which acted as their markets and their transit routes. Even though opportunity for rebellion is not a function of existence of natural resources in a given country, the DRC conflict has been aggravated and prolonged by natural resources available in the DRC.<sup>380</sup> That is even though the war did not start as a race for the natural resources this has mutated and turned into a race for the resources and commercialization by any other means. The DRC conflict started in 1996 as a political rebellion and mutated over time as economic considerations became equally or even more important political aspirations.<sup>381</sup> The rebels' nature of self financing through natural resources in DRC conflict has become criminalized especially access to natural resources. However it is important to note that economic considerations have historically played a role in DRC State affairs and also with the relations with the external actors since King Léopold's time to now.

The government and the rebels have engaged in illegal economic activities either directly or through international criminal networks engaged in trafficking of arms, smuggling valuable natural resources contraband and money laundering. The conflict environment has opened up business opportunities for rogue companies usually operating

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<sup>380</sup> K. Ballentine: *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict*. In K. Ballentine and J. Sherman eds: *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003) pp. 259–283.

<sup>381</sup> A. Alao and O. Funmi: *Economic Fragility and Political Fluidity: Explaining Natural Resources and Conflicts* *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7(4) (Winter 2000) pp 23–36.

that have used the conflict and anarchy as a cover for their operations and in some cases actively supply combatants.<sup>382</sup>

The war economy in the DRC has allowed belligerents to generate income and secure livelihoods through the exploitation of trade in lucrative resources and combatant remuneration in the form of licenses to loot and pillage. This may be an important factor that has contributed to the increased fragmentation and fractionalization of both militaries and rebel groups.<sup>383</sup> The number of rebel groups in the DRC increased steadily throughout conflict and its ongoing violent. For example, RCD fragmented to RCD – ML and RCD – Goma. RCD – Kisangani merged with MLC to become RCD – K-ML that later fractionalized to RCD-Kisangani and MLC.<sup>384</sup> There have been other small internal groups like UPC, IFN and mayi-mayi groups in the DRC. Natural resources war economy has also caused problem among combatant groups in terms of command and control rebels can go on their own to exploit these natural resources making it harder for leaders to impose peace agreements on their rank and file followers.<sup>385</sup>

The war economy is as a result of natural resources predation and shadow economies that were formed during Mobutu's regime. Those who have benefited during conflict and anarchy may not necessarily be interested in peace if peace will reduce their benefits.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> M. Taylor: *Emerging Conclusions*, March 2002 Fafo Project On The Economies Of Conflict: Private Sector Activity In Armed Conflict (Oslo: Fafo Institute, 2002)

<sup>383</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, World Bank. The Economics of Crime and Violence Project (Washington DC: World Bank, January 1998) pp 563-573

<sup>384</sup> P. Le Billion: *Fueling War: Natural Resources And Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 357 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2003)

<sup>385</sup> International Community of the Red Cross: *War Money And Survival* (London : Open Agency, 2001) p

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<sup>386</sup> S. Steadman: "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes" *Journal of International Security* Vol 22 (2) (1997)

There are plenty of opportunities for evil in wartime as profiteering flourishes and soldiers of fortune abound. There are many examples of guerilla or rebel groups which have successively built up war economies enabling them not only to survive but also to effectively challenge the government. Especially where chains of commands are weak, 'war may be continuants of economics by other means.'<sup>387</sup> The business economy in DRC gives more autonomy to local actors and this explains why armed movements are facing a period of rapid fragmentation and internal sedition.

These war economies create a profound link between two factors that are classically considered separately that is internal security and international security. This is due to the fact that criminalized armed movements have to sell their products on the major markets. The war economy is the instrument that rebels have used avoid marginalization and join in towards global markets, thus conflicts in DRC has frighteningly remained there for all to see.<sup>388</sup> The war economy in DRC has been developed by the set of powerful individuals from western States like George Bush senior and directors of prominent MNCs like and networks that transcend state actors as more and more actors have an interest in the continuation of war.<sup>389</sup> It is important to note that resource on predation in DRC benefits both governments and rebels. Thus bringing the state back into the equation has highlighted issues of transparent equitable and accountable resource managements as part of governance agenda. <sup>390</sup>

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PP 45-53

<sup>387</sup> D. Keen: *War and Peace: What's the Difference?*; In A. Adekeye and L.S Chandra (eds): *Managing Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2001) pp. 1-22.

<sup>388</sup> International Community of the Red Cross: *War Money And Survival* (London : Open Agency , 2001 ) p 33

<sup>389</sup> International Crisis Group : *The Agreement on a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace* (Brussels / Nairobi :ICG Report Number 5 20<sup>th</sup> August 1999)

<sup>390</sup> K. Ballentine: *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed*

However there is a fine line between criminal organizations and the combatant groups. As Karen states, "*whereas criminal organizations employ violence in pursuit of profit, combatant groups engage in illicit trade and economic predation goal.*"<sup>391</sup> In the DRC most combatants are not even sure what ideology they are fighting anymore and have become soldiers of fortune thus making the DRC conflict complex war economy. For example a Congolese stated that "I have not experienced war in my place as there are no natural resources but in Eastern Congo-these people don't know what peace is. It is not our war. There are many foreign states that are interested in our riches and they are not interested in allowing us to have peace for example Uganda, Rwanda Japan, USA, Belgium, Germany and UK."<sup>392</sup> Twenty of the Congolese interviewed did not think the current war is theirs or it will be won any time soon unless the external actors dimension is solved once and for all.<sup>393</sup> This explains why for many Congolese people and for other external actors this war has become a conflict over their natural resources. However they thought that the State has made progress as there were elections held.

There are different functions for war economy such as the DRC as some engage in the war economy to finance the war effort and other for personal enrichment. Kagame called the DRC war a self financing war whereas General Kazini and other UPDF soldiers of Uganda engaged in the war for personal enrichment.<sup>394</sup>

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Conflict. In Ballentine K and Sherman, J eds: *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003) pp. 259–283.

<sup>391</sup> *ibid*

<sup>392</sup> A Congolese respondent as interviewed on August 12 2006 by the researcher at PCEA St. Andrews Church at University Way Nairobi

<sup>393</sup> Congolese Respondents interviewed by the researcher between 12 -20 August 2006 in Nairobi at PCEA

<sup>394</sup> St. Andrews Church at university way in Nairobi and various seminaries in Karen  
<sup>394</sup> United Nations: *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo* (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)

The war economy has benefited civilians who participate in the war economy to secure their survival. The war economy in DRC has benefited civilians especially where the informal economy is widespread and where traditional livelihoods have been destroyed during the conflict. Artisanal miners in DRC earn their livelihoods from mining and small scale trading. Even when under predatory control of rebel forces civilian incomes from these activities can sustain livelihoods and compensate for the states failure or incapacity to provide basic services.<sup>395</sup> There are also those who join the rebel groups in order to earn money to sustain themselves.<sup>396</sup> These special groups are in the conflict as a result of the circumstances not because they want to or are forced to be there. However knowing who is in the conflict to earn a living is difficult as the heart of man is hidden and the ethical issues is to what extent the means justifies the end because many civilians are dying because of the war but that is not to say these groups should be ignored.

The war economy in the DRC is a connection between trade in natural resources global financial centers and major trade markets in Western States, African States, and the Asian Countries and armed conflict. From the very beginning neighboring governments and militants from neighboring countries were involved in the DRC war which drew more countries, involved wide spread predatory to criminal behavior by all combatants and was directly and indirectly responsible for three million deaths. This brought about internationalization of the conflict. War economies thrive with certain corporations, arms brokers, transnational criminal networks and corrupt governments

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<sup>395</sup> Le Billion Philippe: *Fueling War: Natural Resources And Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 357 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp 1-92

<sup>396</sup> A Congolese respondent interviewed by the researcher in Nairobi on August 20 2006 in PCEA St. Andrews.

reaching well beyond war zones to the world's commodity markets and major financial centers. This in turn gives the conflict a regional and international dimension.<sup>397</sup> The war economies are also known as resource wars.<sup>398</sup> In such wars there is much to war than winning; those benefiting from violence may often have vested interests in the conflict perpetuation there by challenging international peace efforts.<sup>399</sup>

This shows that the natural resources have played a role in the DRC conflict which has generated to some extent to a war economy where the best man wins and also involves a myriad of external actors and internal actors who are benefiting in this resource war which has affected the whole of Great Lakes Region and conflict system.

### **INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DRC CONFLICT**

Before Kabila's toppling of the Mobutu government in 1997, the DRC was a safety haven for rebels and militant from various neighboring countries like Uganda, Angola, later Rwanda and Burundi. This made him have enemies and most of the neighboring leaders wanted him out hence Kabila garnered support from this states notably Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.<sup>400</sup>

In the 'second Congolese war' other countries were involved in the DRC conflict both on the government side and rebel side. Rebels also fought each other as they

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<sup>397</sup> M. Duffield: *Globalization And War Economies ; Promoting Order or Return of History ; The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs* Vol 23(2) (1999) pp 21-38

<sup>398</sup> J. Cilliers: *Resource Wars , A New Type of Insurgency* in J. Cilliers and D. Christian (eds) *Angola's War Economy : Role Of Oil And diamonds* ( Pretoria , Pretoria Institute o f Strategic Studies , 2000) pp1-15

<sup>399</sup> P. Collier: *Demobilization and insecurity : A Study in the Economics of transition From War to Peace: Journal of international development* Vol 6 (3) (1994) pp 343-351

<sup>400</sup> International Crisis Group: *Rwandan Hutu Rebels In The Congo: A New Approach To Disarmament and Reintegration* ICG Africa Report N°63 ( Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 23 May 2003) pp 1-33

disintegrated and had their own external backers. The country was divided into two sets of foreign occupation.<sup>401</sup> Those that are pro the rebels and those that are pro-government thus The Great lakes Regional system became more vivid. However it is important to note that DRC is under different sets of regions. It is in Central Africa, Southern Africa and Great Lakes Region and therefore a concrete analysis should analyze it from all these regions as they converge around the DRC and overlap however strictly speaking the DRC conflict is in the Great Lakes Regional System.

Escalation of the DRC conflict has resulted in part from involvement of neighboring states. Even though at the onset the neighboring states did not have the natural resources incentives it is important to note that as time went by this evolved into war economy where foreign states like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi plundered the neighbors natural resources without having to hide. No wonder the Congolese view this as not their war but a war that is fostered by external actors.<sup>402</sup>

Foreign actors have had indirect and direct control over strategic resources and the protection of major commercial and strategic interests. The external actors' involvement in the DRC conflict can reflect vested commercial interests in a regional context as with Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwandan and Burundi presence in DRC as well as a means of self financing transborder security involvement. The DRC neighbors have benefited from the war economy associated with the conflict through routing of natural resources through the zone and by acting as a market for them.

Regionalization of the conflict plays an important role in the conflict as regional dimension of conflict resolution and regional factors are crucial to the onset and character

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<sup>401</sup>R. Lemarchand: "Patterns Of State Collapse And Reconstruction In Central Africa : Reflections On The Crisis In The Great Lakes" *African Studies Quarterly* (2005) pp 1-17



of warfare and conflict resolution. Regional dynamics such as spill over effects or contagious effects affect a region.<sup>403</sup>

According to Rubin regional conflict transformations are a “*set of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region making for conflicts.*”<sup>404</sup> The war economy sustaining DRC conflict thrives on deeply embedded political, military, economic and social linkages with neighboring state elites, informal trading networks, regional kinship and ethnic groups, arm traffickers, mercenaries and commercial entities each of which may have a vested economic interest in the prolongation of conflict and instability.<sup>405</sup>

As the DRC occupies a strategic geographical position any instability in DRC has the potential to destabilize its neighbors and its natural resources can play an important role in the development of the wider region and continent if exploited and utilized efficiently as well as DRC population of sixty million could be an important market for African products if they are empowered.<sup>406</sup>

The external actors have been involved in illegal exploitation of the DRC conflict, thus the notion of what is illegal and illegal has become fluid. What Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been doing to plunder the natural resources in the DRC has been wrong as the law in the DRC stipulates that. Edict –law No 81 – 013 of April 12 1981 states that “in virtue of article 10 of the constitution, the Zairian under soil and the soil are and

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<sup>402</sup> A Congolese respondent interviewed on 18 the August 2006 at PCEA St Andrews University Way

<sup>403</sup> P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg: Armed conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 35 (5) (1998) pp 621 – 634

<sup>404</sup> B. R Rubin, A. Armstrong And G.R Ntegeye (Eds): *Regional Conflict Formation In The Great Lakes Region Of Africa: Structure Dynamics And Challenges For Policy* (New YORK: Center On International Cooperation, 2000) p1

<sup>405</sup> T.M. Shaw : Regional Dimensions Of Conflict And Peace Building In Africa” *Journal Of International Development* Vol 15 (4) (2003) pp 487 – 498

remain the property of the nation and comprise among other mines, carriers, water mineral sources and hydrocarbons.<sup>407</sup> Edict No 67 – 410 of 23 Sep 1967 art 8 adds that the State is the guarantor and the protector of general interest of the people.” It can take special dispositions against the exploiter in case his/her exploitation is threatening the general interest of the people.”<sup>408</sup> However in DRC it is turned out to be the law of the jungle as nobody respects the law not even the law enforcers and even territorial rights are not respected by the neighboring states according to Lindsay.<sup>409</sup>

The external dimension in DRC conflict in producing an interstate battle with the direct involvement of eight African states increased the enormity and complexity of the conflict. This was evident in the peace process as the main states wanted their interests to prevail especially after the Lusaka Accord conflict continued despite the authorization and commitment to cessation of hostilities. DRC regionalization of the conflict came because of two reasons. DRC was a battle ground for the internal disputes of six neighboring countries. That is: the MPLA government of Angola and UNITA, minority Tutsi government in Burundi and the pro-Hutu rebels of the forces for the FDD and FNL; Sassou Nguesso government of Congo-Brazzaville and militias backing the ousted president Pascal Lissouba and his ally the former prime minister Bernard Kulelas; The Rwandese government and Ex-FAR and *interahamwe* (*genocidaires*); Museveni government and LRA and AFF and lastly Sudanese government and SPLA.

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<sup>406</sup> Kabemba Claude: South Africa And The DRC: Is A Stable And Developmental State Possible In The Congo? Found at [www. Hsrcpress.ac.za](http://www.Hsrcpress.ac.za) (2006) pp 151 – 172.

<sup>407</sup> C. Morroud and J. Katunga: Coltan; Exploitation in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC) on J. Lind and K. Storman: Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts. (South Africa: Pretoria; Institute for African Studies, 2002) pp56-184

<sup>408</sup> *ibid*

<sup>409</sup> *ibid*

The second reason is that DRC produced an opportunity for interstate hostilities produced by domestic disputes to be unleashed. The conflict between Sudan and Uganda illustrates these as Sudan supported Kabila as Uganda was at war with DRC. Sudan supported LRA and ADF rebels whereas Uganda supported SPLA. Rwanda and Uganda assisted UNITA rebels sell their diamond and transport of military hardware as Angola backed Kinshasa and so fulfilling the saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."<sup>410</sup>

Another aspect that is new to regionalization and internationalization is the entry of the non states actor and trade and commerce in Great Lakes Region Conflict system. This includes Individuals, MNCs and Rebel groups who have also been involved in the DRC conflict. The non the State actors has a lot of influence on the war economy and thus should not be ignored especially the direction and path the conflict has take in the sub regional, regional and international level and also influenced state to take the position and to behave the way they have. For Rwanda and Uganda and Zimbabwe to be able to exploit the MNCs in the transport industry, financial industry and trade sector have led to their deep involvement. This includes Citibank, Sabena who are not mining companies but involved in financial flow of money and money laundering and transporting respectively like the Mining companies for example Anglo-Ashanti who are involved in direct mining. There is informal and illegal trade across borders and the networking of these systems.

This turned the whole region of Great Lakes into a conflict system. The regional conflict system was different from others in that it involved an alliance pro- rebels against an alliance pro-government that is a Great Lakes regional alliance of Uganda, Rwanda

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<sup>410</sup> S. Naidoo: "The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict", *Global Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105

and Burundi and Congo against an alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudanese that was pro government.<sup>411</sup>

Economic incentives play a great role in the war and even though they were not in the war for economic gains from the beginning this became obvious. This is because external actors became involved in the trade of commodities which they did not produce locally and even fought over them in DRC soil like Rwanda and Uganda. MNCs also became involved and changed their position and support for a certain actor who would protect their interests. AngloAshanti Gold Company hired the FNI to protect its interests and before hand had liased with Kabila when he was leading the AFDL to oust Mobutu's regime. This change of position by MNCs shows that they are interested in what will allow them to make profits to the detriment of the population. When control over resources became military objective it is strong disincentive for troops withdrawal simply because the expeditionary corps and those they support whether rebels or governments need each other. In the DRC case, this is evident that a ruler of a stronger state deploys the national military in a neighboring country supporting the sovereign power for example Zimbabwe and Angola or the rebels for example Rwanda, in exchange for access to natural resources.<sup>412</sup> In as much as the external actors from the region denied that they were looting the DRC natural resources, it was evident in their actions and behavior.<sup>413</sup> For example Museveni used the Pan Africanist argument that opening up

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<sup>411</sup> African Peace forum (APF) and International Resource Group: *Situation Analysis of the Great Lakes Region* (Nairobi, African Peace Forum, 2000) vol. 1 (3) pp 119-127

<sup>412</sup> F. Reyntjents : "Briefing; The Democratic Republic of Congo from Kabila To Kabila" *African Affairs* Vol. 100 (2001) pp 311-317

<sup>413</sup> A Congolese Respondent interviewed on 20 August by the researcher at Karen on 13 August 2006

Zaire would create a large market for African development and modernization and Rwandan president Kagame called it a self – financing.<sup>414</sup>

Centuries earlier Kautilya the fourteenth century Indian philosopher had stated that geographical neighbors are always political enemies while neighbors' neighbors are friends.<sup>415</sup> DRC's natural resources have become a State coveted by neighbors but the neighbors' neighbors have also helped it militarily as they want to settle their scores with other states. Sudan helped the DRRC militarily because it wanted to settle the score with Uganda as Uganda was said to fund and aid SPLA/M. Even with withdrawal of troops, these states have left systems that are conducive to them seeping the profits from natural resources or trading routes and destinations of the natural resources.<sup>416</sup>

The regionalization of the conflict has left the DRC relationship with its neighbors sour even amongst the Congolese elites and their Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian counterparts. This is sour relationship will still be evident for years to come as Congolese feel that these actors have stolen from them what rightfully belongs to them.<sup>417</sup> A good example is when the delegates from these four countries met for a workshop in Uganda, and there was exchange of words and the Congolese walked out saying that the Ugandans have stolen from them and raped their country and do not care what the Congolese fate is.<sup>418</sup> Some of those who were involved in the plundering and raping their countries have

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<sup>414</sup> United Nations; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)

<sup>415</sup> J.C Olatunde et al: *African International Relations* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1985) P 21

<sup>416</sup> United Nations; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)

<sup>417</sup> A Congolese respondent interviewed by the researcher on August 20 2006 at the PCEA St. Andrews At University Way in Nairobi

<sup>418</sup> Kenyan respondent who attended a workshop which ended in a first fight in Uganda between Ugandans

had to come back to their communities and ask for help and elders.<sup>419</sup> This shows that the Congolese community is tired of being denied of what is rightfully theirs.

The situation became complex and intricate due to the fact that the conflict in the DRC assumed a regional character and was dubbed 'Africa's First World War'. The war in the DRC and its borderlands is a catastrophe in the heart of Africa. For example Clapham has stated "Africa states are weak as they were founded on the artificial borders as they were merely arbitrary colonial partition lacking internal cohesion and *raison d'être*, failing, dysfunctional and even collapsed hence any external shock such as the one in the DRC would affect other states stability In terms of refugees and allies."<sup>420</sup> The refugees in the DRC who were the Rwanda genocidaires were a threat to Rwanda just like the ADF which was using DRC as a safety haven were a threat to Uganda and UNITA was threat to the MPLA regime of Angola.

The internationalization of DRC conflict has raised several questions. For example is it necessary to develop new mechanisms for the management of internationalized conflict which has both internal and international characteristics? It has also raised challenges about the mediator identities and whether traditional concepts of third parties are useful in the management of internationalized conflict

Internationalization has also been brought to what we have resolved to call regionalism. Regionalization of the conflict is actually giving a conflict an internationalized character but in order to distinguish the regional level and international level, we have chosen to give them such a dichotomy. Internationalization has been

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and Congolese as Congolese felt they had been robbed.

<sup>419</sup> A Congolese Respondent interviewed by the researcher on August 20 2006 at the PCEA St. Andrews At University Way in Nairobi

<sup>420</sup> C. Clapham: "Rethinking African States" *African Security Review* Vol 10 (3) (2001) pp 1-8

brought about by ethnic groups. Ethnic relations between Ngbaka and yakoma in Zaire and CAR. This is what Bemba has used to export looted natural resources to CAR and to the outside world especially coffee. Ethnic ties too have been between the Tutsis in Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi. Lastly Angolans who fled to Zaire during Angola's civil war still have ties with the Angolans in Angola. Migration of ethnic communities from the other countries may alter the ethnic demography of the two segments and this may generate new conflicts for example the *Banyamulenge* and *Banyarwanda* migrants from Rwanda to DRC around whom the Great Lakes conflict centers. This has led to these kinship ties (known as the kinship syndrome) being used to exploit natural resources.<sup>421</sup>

War is considered a threat because of the human misery it causes on a catastrophic scale however war is not always catastrophic as Hegel believed that war preserved the ethical health of nations.<sup>422</sup> Treitschke said that war is one of the conditions of progress the cut of the whip that prevents a country from going to sleep, forcing satisfied mediocrity to leave it apathy.<sup>423</sup> Carr regarded war "as a midwife of change, as war ..... Breaks up and sweep away the half rotted structures of an old social and political order."<sup>424</sup> Haas stated that "conflict is norm oriented behavior that seeks to preserve or change the structures of a system through direct representation of demands by adversaries. Conflict may pave way for constructive change when it has been resolved in a manner that leads to an improvement in the harmony in a manner that leads to an

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<sup>422</sup> L. Dickey and H. B. Nisbet: *Political Writings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Avineri, Shlomo, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

<sup>423</sup> Heinrich von Treitschke, *History of Germany in the 19th Century* (1879) found at <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/HIStreitsche.html>.

<sup>424</sup> Carr, E.H. 1966 *International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) and Carr E.H., *The Twenty Years Crisis*, (London,

improvement in the harmony or capabilities of a system.”<sup>425</sup> From this dimension the DRC conflict can be seen as a functional thing for example to oust Mobutu and to show the anomalous structure like ethnic divisions and underlying causes of the war and replace them. However the problem comes with the replacement as seen up to now there has not been any comprehensive replacement of Mobutu and all the DRC anomalous structures.

The regional networking, very often clandestine and illegal has helped forge a regionalization that may not be recognizable at first glance, but is surely as real in the DRC as any formal regionalism. The type of regionalism emerging links up well placed individuals and groups within Africa to outside interests creating a milieu where a wide variety of shadow businessmen and assorted state elites from both within and outside Africa has developed.<sup>426</sup>

Informal regionalization links well placed individuals and groups within Africa to outside interests creating networks involving states , mafias , private armies , mercenaries and PSCs , MNCs , businessmen and assorted state elites from both within and outside Africa..<sup>427</sup>

For sure without extensive international activities and connections the types of scenarios currently playing themselves out in DRC would not be possible. Internationals business has through its contacts, deal and provision of all manner of mean served to sustain those actors involved in the conflict be they the government or rebels. The form

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Macmillan, 1939) pp 103, 140, 287-307.

<sup>425</sup> M. Haas : Sources Of International Conflict In N. Rosenau Et Al (Eds) The Analysis Of International Conflict (New York: the Free Press, 1972)

<sup>426</sup> I. Taylor : Conflict In Central Africa; Clandestine Networks And Regional Configuration , *Review Of African Political Economy* Vol 2(95) (2003) pp 45-55

<sup>427</sup> International Crisis Group: *Scramble for Congo ; Anatomy of an ugly War* Africa Report Number 26 (Nairobi: international Crisis Group, 2000) pp 1-124



of regional networking, based essentially in the form of kleptocratic political economy undermines coherent developmental projects and prospects for peace and stability. They constitute a war economy that can only be managed by looking at regional dimension.<sup>428</sup> Powerful international interests have stimulated a new forum of regionalism in Great Lakes system and Central Africa as well as Southern Africa if we are to attempt to understand the conflicting processes currently reconfiguring the region.<sup>429</sup> What is interesting is that international business has traded with regional states or directly with the rebels involved in the DRC conflict. International trade not only involves the international and internal actors rather it is a convergence between internal, international and “extra external” actors. For example DRC internal actors trade with external actors who also trade with international actors. This makes regionalization and internationalization complex as it is a myriad of actors who if they made a lasting commitment to end the war in DRC it would be so.

Shadow networks in the Great Lakes Region are a combination of political economic and socio cultural forces linked to the International sphere and transactional in sphere.<sup>430</sup> Shadow net works are links between groups - the things that make them a network - are generally hidden from view, recessed in the shadows. Informal shadow networks describe the informal networks that work against the formal set rules and they may not necessarily be bad but they can come with a lot corruption, illegal trade and all manners of crimes as they are based on private interests between groups of people from

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<sup>428</sup>T. Shaw : “Regionalism In Africa In The New Millennium; Comparative Perspectives On Renaissance, Realism Or Regressions”: *New Political Economy* Vol 5 (3) (2000) pp 25-56

<sup>429</sup> C. Nordstrom: *Out Of the Shadows*, in Latham R, Kassimir R. and Callaghy (eds): *International and Transnationalism in Africa: Global and local networks of power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) P 218.

<sup>430</sup> *ibid*

different areas or States.<sup>431</sup> The risk that private interests may affect the performance of public roles as Lowndes postulates,<sup>432</sup> seems in many formal contexts to engender a social frame that silences any meaningful reference to shadow networks.<sup>433</sup> So, while it is true many illegal and illicit networks operate in the shadows in antagonism to public and social interests Networks arise in social life across boundaries of difference.<sup>434</sup>

What is intriguing about the type of shadow networks present in the Great Lakes Region System is that it is escaping state, regional or continental boundaries: the continents boundaries are now truly transactional in scope “reflecting the intensification of the extra version of the DRC State.”<sup>435</sup> International and local networks of illicit trade in conflict and post colonial environments support markets for natural resources in the DRC. Illicit trade systems exists in DRC during the conflict and will do so even in the uncertain post- conflict period as shadow networks due to the complex set of cross state economic and political linkages that move outside formally recognized states based channels and shadow networks are not easily dismantled.<sup>436</sup>

There are other transactions in the DRC conflict at the global levels that have included financial markets, transport companies; individuals arm traders and transit routes up to the consumer.<sup>437</sup> This is as a result of globalization whereby the international

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<sup>431</sup> J. Raab and H.B Milward: “Dark Networks As Problems” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* Vol. 13(4) (2003) pp413-439.

<sup>432</sup> V. Lowndes: “Varieties of New Institutionalism” *A critical appraisal in Public Administration* Vol. 74 (1996) pp181-197.

<sup>433</sup> D. Goleman: *Vital Lies, Simple Truths* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing , 1998) pp195-234

<sup>434</sup> J.S McIlwain: “Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach” *Journal Of Crime, Law And Social Change* Vol. 32(4) (1999) pp301-323.

<sup>435</sup> C. Nordstrom: *Shadows Of War ; Violence, Power And International Profiteering In The Twenty First Century* (Berkeley C.A: University Of California Press, 2004) p 293

<sup>436</sup> *ibid*

<sup>437</sup> United Nations: *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo* (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 2001)

system under capitalism has been reduced to a global village with transactions taking place anywhere in the world. These global networks have assisted conflict trade. Conflict trade is the trade in non military goods such as diamonds, timber and natural resource. Such trade includes export and import of goods to a war zone. <sup>438</sup> To Neil “when the structural violence created by legitimate trading networks is combined with the impact of neo liberal globalization, structural adjustment and aid dependence the effect is to produce a particularly acute version of the crisis of the State which creates the conditions for if not the inheritability of collapse. What is surprising is not the extent to which collapse occurs but the extent to which it does not do.”<sup>439</sup>

The violence in DRC has been multidimensional comprising government violence against rebels; rebels against government; rebel violence against corporations; corporate financial support for government violence against rebels; corporate financial support for rebels against government; rebels against rebels and foreign rebel against the government or internal rebels.

### **MNCs AS NON-STATE ACTORS**

Despite a growing emphasis on corporate accountability, there is much debate over the role and responsibilities of MNCs in conflict-prone areas. MNCs are focused on returns and what they gain from the investment. The MNCs in extractive sectors like mining have to seek the places that have these resources and this leads them to go towards areas that do not necessarily have good governance. Over the last few decades, there has been widespread concern about the potential for economic, political,

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<sup>438</sup> N. Cooper : “State Collapse as Business: The Role of Conflict Trade and emerging control Agenda” *Journal of Development and Change* Vol 33(3) (2002) pp 935 – 955

environmental, and social impacts of MNCs' activities to exacerbate violent conflict in risky states and regions. Foreign direct investment by MNCs, particularly in high impact sectors such as extractive industries and infrastructure, has been associated with worsening levels of violent conflict in such countries as Colombia, Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria and many others. While much research has been devoted to the analysis of economic factors that contribute to violence, the linkages between MNC activities and conflict have not been thoroughly studied.<sup>440</sup> The primary incentive for an MNC to invest or remain invested in a conflict-prone state has traditionally been the existence of natural resource-based assets for extractive purposes.<sup>441</sup> This is precisely the same sector that Paul Collier identifies as a major risk indicator for civil conflicts in developing countries.<sup>442</sup>

Corporations in conflict-prone states may be motivated by the higher potential returns on investment that can be made in comparison to investments in more stable countries. In several different cases, the failure of corporate decision-makers to manage conflict risks and to adhere to best practice policies has resulted in worsening violence and negative publicity for the company involved. Public outrage over specific allegations of corporate complicity with repressive governments, such as the Harker Report, which condemned Talisman for its oil operations in Sudan, has led to increased pressure on MNCs to put in place concrete measures to ensure that their activities do not exacerbate

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<sup>439</sup> *ibid*

<sup>440</sup> A. Campbell: "The Private Sector And Conflict Prevention Mainstreaming: Risk Analysis And Conflict Impact Assessment Tools For Multinational Corporations", *Country indicators of foreign policy* pp 1-30

<sup>441</sup> Economist: Risky returns: business in difficult places. *The Economist*, 355(8171) (2000, May 20)pp 85-88.

<sup>442</sup> P. Collier: Conflict and development. The World Bank Development Research Group Retrieved January 15, 2002, from [www.worldbank.org/research/conflict](http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict) p3

conflict.<sup>443</sup> Significant media attention has also been focused on the actions of other major MNCs in the oil and gas sector, including Shell in Nigeria.<sup>444</sup> Non-governmental organizations and reporters are increasingly focusing on the economic dynamics underlying today's armed conflicts. The media report daily on the role of natural resources in war-torn countries such as gold and coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo, oil in Chechnya, Colombia or Sudan, GILLES CARBONNIER is Economic Adviser and Coordinator for Private Sector Relations with the International Committee of the Red Cross or diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone. Controversies over the so called "blood diamonds" brought over thirty governments, NGOs and the diamond industry around the negotiating table to regulate trade so that diamonds do not fuel conflicts and conflicts do not tarnish the image of diamonds as a symbol of love.<sup>445</sup> As a result, the role of private companies in conflict-prone areas has come under tighter public scrutiny.

MNC's role in the DRC conflict has been there since independence as Union Miniere financed the Katangan secession. The mining industry is faced with two challenges stemming from the growing incidence of conflict in connection with its operations successively managing the links between conflict and mining at the level of individual and social operations and enhancing the collective reputation of the industry and its contribution to society.<sup>446</sup> This is because investment in mineral sector and the resulting economic development can diminish the likelihood of conflict yet the expected

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<sup>443</sup> Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ottawa, January 2000 found at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/cansudan2.pdf#search=%22harker%20report%22>

<sup>444</sup> *ibid*

<sup>445</sup> G. Carbonnier: Corporate responsibility and humanitarian action: What relations between the business and humanitarian worlds? IRRC Vol. 83 ( 844) (December 2001) pp 947-968

<sup>446</sup> J. Sherman: Private sector actors in zones of conflict: Research challenges and policy responses. IPA Workshop Report. (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001)

development gains from large scale development projects often fail to materialize for the affected communities thus exacerbating instead of reducing conflict.<sup>447</sup>

Mining or resource extractive MNC's cannot relocate elsewhere as natural resources are geographically predetermined. This means that MNC's have to deal with who is in power at that time so they can effectively mine. However the debate has been on who should be controlling the MNC's involved in conflict situations and what standards should the standards be of the home country or of host country that is inline with practice of ethics by international business. It is important to note countries where NGO's such as Global Witness have a powerful voice can influence MNC's from their countries like USA, UK and Canada and MNCs from such countries will be disadvantaged unlike China, Malaysia and India where such mechanism do not apply. Hence both sides of the argument should be heard when making policies.<sup>448</sup>

MNC's can support and participate in conflict management activities and correctly managing the side effects however they also exacerbate inequalities, greed and grievance by aggravating inequalities or increasing rents amenable to functional control and by hindering peace processes by voluntarily or involuntarily bankrolling belligerent and governments thereby reducing the leverage of local population and international institutions as well as influencing the foreign policy of home the countries through commercial interests according to Billon.<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>447</sup> J. Switzer: *Armed Conflict and Natural Resources; the Case of the Mineral Sector*, A Discussion Paper For The July 2002 Experts Workshop. *International Institute For Sustainable Development* (2002) pp1-20

<sup>448</sup> *ibid*

<sup>449</sup> P. Le Billion: *Fueling War: Natural Resources And Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper 357 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp 1-92

This is as seen by The MNC's liaise with belligerents who require armed rebels to protect their property like Anglo Ashanti Gold utilized FNI in order to secure mining sites around Mongabwalo in DRC.<sup>450</sup> Relationship between Africa's governments and MNCs have been perceived as exploitative because of the governments limited abilities maximize their individuals potential producer power as owners of the World Richest mines. Many of the markets for the semi processed and the processed materials are dominated by oligopolistic MNCs and this has also brought about conflicts. The simple presence of foreign operators does not indicate the degree of foreign influence however in the DRC context MNCs have influenced from the start of the war as MNCs wanted to invest through Kabila even before he had taken over Kinshasa.<sup>451</sup>

MNCs further complicate the conflict as part of internationalization of the DRC conflict by non-state actors. Firms invest in DRC in rebel factions with an eye to access resource areas in the short term while paying the government to keep. MNC's supported options open or vice versa. MNC's supported AFDL as it gained control of eastern and southern DRC (then Zaire). MNC's have assisted both the government of DRC and rebels in looting of natural resources for the pursuit of war and financial self interest. MNC's have also worked with Private Security Companies (PSCs) just like the rebels have used PSC's to bolster capacity through training and assistance in the use of high technology weapons.<sup>452</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> Human Rights Watch: *The Curse of Gold. The Democratic Republic Of Congo* (New York: Human Watch Report, 2 July 2005) pp

<sup>451</sup> B.B. Kaberuka: "The Significance Of Mineral Processing Activities And Their Potential Impact On African Economic Development": *African Development Bank report* (1999) p 233

<sup>452</sup> P.W Singer: "Corporate warriors: The Rise And Ramifications Of The Privatized Military Industry" *International Security* Vol 26 (2) (2002) P 32

NGO's have also used PSC's in order to have safe corridors in rebel or militia controlled areas in order to be able to reach the civilians. "NGO's and humanitarian workers in order to be able to talk to rebels they also have talk directly to armed groups. Catering for the needs of displaced populations and protecting camps for refugees or internally Displaced peoples requires them to so. This illustrates that interaction and attempts to influence the behaviors of armed groups also involves sharing operational space with external actors.<sup>453</sup> Use of PSC's by external actors be they MNC's, NGO'S or humanitarian actors in the DRC risks creation of safe enclaves established in a secure environment. This may fuel grievances amongst populations who observe an increased militarization of society while they are unsure. The coupling of MNC's with PSCS is particularly compromising in contexts where an inequitable distribution of resource revenues may have triggered rebellions.<sup>454</sup>

Western and other external states have been indirectly involved in the DRC conflict through their MNCs presence in the DRC. In the peace process what has been seen is an Anglo – American versus French rivalry as they all want their interests to prevail but they are largely driven by their MNCs interests.

The bottom line is MNCs invest in conflict areas and will continue doing so for they are in for profits. The recent debates have been the ethical question that what are guidelines of ethics at their areas of investment? Is it that of the home country or the host country? The answer is not straightforward but partly lies with the host government willingness to work out their conditions of MNCs who bribe their way out.

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<sup>453</sup> C. Holmqvist: Engaging Armed Non State Actors In Post Conflict Settings op cit

<sup>454</sup> Ibid



## **INDIVIDUAL IN DRC CONFLICT**

Individuals have been involved in the DRC conflict but they act with the assistance of other actors like State actors, MNCs or rebels backing. The involvement of individuals in the regional and international level should also be considered in the peace process because they find ways and form small groups that can inhibit peace once their interests are not looked into or once they feel their interests are threatened. Individuals have been involved at all levels: the national, sub regional, regional and international levels.

## **ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE DRC CONFLICT**

Internationalization by the DRC conflict has had several effects on the conflict for example its duration, magnitude and structure of its management. It broadened the conflict and brought external perspectives. It gave the conflict a multi dimensional perspective by incorporating various relationships between state actors and non state actors in the conflict. Conflict management which do not engage other interested actors are unlikely to succeed and endure. For mediation, the internalization has seen mediators come out and this has led to a number of successful agreements in signing but in implementing not yet.

Mediation is a form of third party intervention and its purpose is bring the conflict to an end through resolution that is acceptable to both sides and consistent with the third party's interest in its outcome otherwise they would not mediate.<sup>455</sup> Angola has

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<sup>455</sup> S. Touval and W.I Zartman: International Mediation: in The Post Cold War in W.I Zartman, S. Touval: "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era." in *Managing Global Chaos*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996)

mediated Several times in the DRC conflict that led to Luanda agreement. However, Angola is also one of the States involved in the DRC conflict because of UNITA. Similarly, South Africa has mediated in the DRC conflict which led to Pretoria agreements and Sun City talks. South Africa has also been a transits location for cobalt and other national resources from DRC to China. She has also sold arms and ammunitions to DRC government, Rwanda and Uganda and other rebel movements involved in the DRC conflict. To add to that, South Africans mercenaries are also in DRC. South African based Executive Outcome is not known whether it is a PMC or mercenary Company. However there is no mediator who mediate for purely altruistic reasons and when that is considered South Africa with her interests may be seen as a good mediator considering the resources and good offices she is able to provide for mediation.

In 2002 during Sun City talks President Mbeki clearly stated that South Africa's motivation for financing a major portion of ICD was that South Africa's investors stood ready to stream into the county as soon as the Congolese agreed on their political future. Yet South Africa seems threatened by DRC'S potential to become an economic super power in the region due to its economic capabilities in terms of human resources and natural resources. South Africa's involvement is as seen as preparing the way for deeper penetration of DRC by South African extractive companies and other corporations. However, it can also be viewed as a wider vision of African Renaissance by Thabo

Mbeki as expressed by NEPAD's which view the resolution of conflict and wars in Africa as a fundamental basis for good governance, democracy and economic growth<sup>456</sup>.

Mediation by South Africa has yielded much but not full as still the transition period was filled with the parties still striking and small scale hostilities hence it is partly successful but the eastern part of the DRC still needs to be checked into. Bercovitch stated that mediation is fully successful when it is able to craft an immense difference to or to settling of the conflict. It is somewhat successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the parties. Its success is limited when it only attains a ceasefire or breaking in hostilities and it is unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the conflict.<sup>457</sup> This has been progressive as during mediation the first times did not yield much especially when former Botswana president was to engage the ICD but could not as the parties did not even manage to meet. Kabila refused to even be engaged citing that the president was biased.

The poor performance of Ketumile Masire led the UN Secretary-General to grant Mustapha Niasse (his Special Envoy for the DRC, who had chaired the Political and Legal Commission of the ICD) a six month mandate, later extended to March 2003, to broker an all-inclusive agreement. Between June and October 2002, Mustapha Niasse conducted three missions in the region. During these he discussed with all the parties concerned their views on power sharing during the transition period. At the end of his third mission, the Special Envoy expressed optimism about the prospects for reaching an agreement.

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<sup>456</sup> C. Kabemba: South Africa and the DRC: Is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo? Found at [www.hspressrac.2a](http://www.hspressrac.2a) pp 152-172

<sup>457</sup> J. Bercovitch, J. T. Anagnoson and D.L. Wille: "Some Conceptual Issues And Empirical Trends In The Study Of Mediation In International Relations" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 28 (1991) pp 7-17

This is as seen by the Pretoria agreement, though the current state in the country is from violence to a “negative peace”.<sup>458</sup> South Africa has sought terms in the mediation that would increase the prospects of stability, deny her rivals opportunities for intervention earn them gratitude of one or both parties or enable her to have a role in future relations in the region. South Africa wants to be a regional hegemon and oust potential leaders like Kenya, Zimbabwe and would otherwise be the regional leaders or was leaders and it has the resources. Zimbabwe sees South Africa economic penetration to the DRC as danger.

Mugabe has often stressed that his military partnership with Congolese government is a long term investment for Zimbabwe which sees DRC as the new frontier where it can find resources to build its economy. The role of South Africa is however not clear as it is both an external actor and a mediator in the DRC. However Mwangi states that success of the mediation depends on the paradigm within which the analyst is working with this is because “Kreisberg views a successful outcome to moves from escalation to de escalation, or negotiations have moved towards an agreed upon settlement or a settlement contributes towards an enduring solution where by a conflict is resolved.”<sup>459</sup> From this, one can deduce that the DRC conflict is far from being successful as peace process has been geared towards settlement of conflict other than resolution.

“South Africa is scared that once DRC achieves peace it will overtake it as a regional hegemon and thus they want DRC to achieve peace at their own discretion and direction. DRC is endowed with numerous natural resources and has a large population that can be a good market. This makes South Africa wary of what will happen if DRC

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<sup>458</sup> J. Galtung: “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 3 (1969) pp167-191  
<sup>459</sup> M. Mwangi: *Conflict, Theory, Practices And Institutions Of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark

achieves peace, so it is involved in the peace process so it can gain and loot".<sup>460</sup> The statement shows that South Africa is not trusted as a mediator by the Congolese as they view the process with speculation. This may be one of the reasons the peace agreements are working as they are viewed with suspicion.

## **PEACE PROCESS IN THE DRC**

Peace initiatives have nevertheless been discreetly and persistently mounted throughout the duration of the conflict by African or United Nations (UN) mediators, whose perseverance may finally have been rewarded by the signing of the Final Act in Sun City on 1–2 April 2003. Ironically, the number of regional organizations involved, mediators appointed and agreements signed over time have made these peace efforts almost as difficult for the layman to track as the conflict itself.

The Lusaka agreement stipulated that all air, land and sea attacks were to cease within twenty hours of the signing, and that immediately afterwards, all forces would disengage and redeploy. Inter-Congolese negotiations involving the DRC's government, the armed opposition (the RCD and MLC) and the political (unarmed) opposition would then be held. These would lead, within 90 days of the signing of the agreement, to "a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC". In the meantime, the UN would have deployed a peacekeeping mission mandated, among other tasks, to assist with the disarming of foreign armed groups in the DRC. In fact, an annex to the agreement listed nine rebel movements from Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, and Burundi said to be using DRC territory as a rear base from which to harass their respective governments. The

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Publications, 2000) p104

<sup>460</sup> A Congolese respondent at PCEA St. Andrews 16 August 2006

dispersal of these 'negative forces', some of which had been involved in the perpetration of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, was intended to pave the way for three desirable outcomes. These were the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces, the re-establishment of state administration throughout the Congolese territory, and the implementation of measures to normalize the security situation along the country's borders. The conflict in the DRC, and the resolution of each of the thorny issues which had caused it, was thus expected to be resolved within 360 days. However the implementation of this agreement was different as the forces did not withdraw and new hostilities started.

The UN's cautious approach was also justified by the adverse conditions within which the peacekeepers would have to operate. As the UN Secretary-General emphasized, "the huge size of the country, the degradation of its infrastructure, the intensity of its climate, the intractable nature of some aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion, the large population displacements, the ready availability of small arms, the general climate of impunity and the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory combine to make the Democratic Republic of the Congo a highly complex environment for peacekeeping".<sup>461</sup>

Kabila's obstructiveness was not the only difficulty the UN mission faced. MONUC's operations were hampered by serious logistical constraints, which led the Secretary-General to request a considerable expansion of the mission, raising the numbers involved to 5,537 military observers and peacekeepers.

Other peace agreements include The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement (December 2002), The Luanda Agreement between the DRC and Uganda (September 2002), The Pretoria Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda (July 2002) When an

agreement was reached on 30 July 2002 by the Heads of State of the DRC and Rwanda on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disbandment of the 'negative forces', very few expected it ever to become reality. Signed by the President of South Africa and the UN Secretary-General as witnesses, this four-page protocol added nothing new to the agreement concluded three years earlier in Lusaka, or even closed any of its loopholes.

The peace process faces some challenges in terms of participants and their constituents and their allies these as these also had vested interests which hindered the progress. For Lusaka ceasefire was repeatedly violated by all parties in 2000, these confrontations did not alter the military balance significantly.<sup>462</sup>

## **THE ROLE OF DUAL DIPLOMACY IN THE DRC**

In the DRC peace process various actors have been involved in the mediation in DRC. There is track two diplomacy that has been used as a forum for discussion organized by many NGO's and subs state actors. However, for a conflict like DRC Track One Diplomacy was required especially because of the intensity of the conflict and some of the actors involved were states. The higher the required mode of mediation the lower the felt need the more structural interests involving a third party, the more the conflict involves states rather than non state actors the less likely sub state actors or non state actors will be effective as mediators in that conflict<sup>463</sup>

As non state actors mediated in DRC the state actors were needed because of guarantees that only the state could give. At the height of DRC conflict in late 1990 and

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<sup>461</sup> United Nations: United Nations Security Council Report on DRC Report number S/1999/790, par. 15.

<sup>462</sup> E. Rogier: "The Labyrinthine Path To Peace In The Democratic Republic Of Congo; The DRC Peace Process" *African Security Analysis Programme* (2006) pp 1-243

<sup>463</sup> S. Naidoo: The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict: *Global*

early 1997, there were no less than your separate conflict management efforts in progress ADFL attempted to open bilateral negotiations with Mobutu Sese Seko's senior officials but they were rejected until May 1997 when it was certain Kabila's forces would take over Kinshasa. Heads of states from neighboring countries tried to mediate like president Moi of Kenya and Southern Africa's President Nelson Mandela. Statesmen are not necessarily better mediator's but they can provide interest and need related serviced that informal mediators cannot handle another hindrance was that parties whose participation was crucial to the talks filled to arrive and little was achieved.

Mediation was done by United Nations and OAU when they sent Mohammed Sahnoun. The OAU in chapter III of the OAU charter stipulates non-interference in the affairs of member sates as such the OAU could not do much in the conflict. OAU mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution and OAU central organ in 1998 asked both Kabila and Uganda plus Rwanda to seek peaceful solution to the problem condemned all external involvement in the conflict and encouraged efforts of regional states especially SADC to seek a solution to the crisis. An OAU meeting with regional states of Great Lakes region was convinced and a ceasefire agreement was conducted and the mechanism for setting up an OAU observer mission of UN peace keeping operation.<sup>464</sup> However, this was not enforceable as rebels nor involved.

It is important to note that efforts to manage the conflict had always been ad hoc if not, uncoordinated, poorly planed and ineffective. Regional organizations are unsuccessful in resolving Africa's conflict as regional organizations involve states who want their interests to prevail. Secondly regional organization in Africa lack skilled

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*Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105  
<sup>464</sup> *ibid*



workers and funds for them to adequately undertake such a task and some of the countries like DRC belong to so many such regional organizations that overlap<sup>465</sup> regional organizations also overlap for example is the DRC in Great Lakes region, Central African Region or Southern African Region and conflict systems because at one stage it was the epicenter of all this conflict systems and was also influenced by other conflicts like the Rwanda conflict, Congo- Brazzaville conflict and Angola conflict.

Negotiations should be attempted first negotiations also lay a good foundation for mediation as the DRC needed mediation due to the intricacy of the conflict. Negotiations allow the parties to lay down these interests and work even as the mediator is involved.<sup>466</sup> Research has shown that complex conflicts such as the DRC conflict require high ranking individuals with the ability to wield considerable resources and political muscle. As Zartman posits getting the right mediator is only part of the puzzle, mediation is a contingent social behavior and what the mediator actually does during the conflict management is important. Large states that wish to establish themselves as important regional powers will have to invest a lot in pursuit like South Africa.<sup>467</sup>

The external actors dimension was looked into during the peace process and talks. However, this has only focused on the directly involved actors and mostly avoided non state actors like the MNC's, foreign rebel armies and individuals. The conflict management process has also downplayed others states that have a stake and the indirect dimensions. Even though after the UN panel of experts revealed a systematic and systematic illegal exploitation of states is important to note that the panel of experts final

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<sup>465</sup> R. Jackson : "Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts", *Journal of Peace and change* vol 25 (2) April 2000 pp. 200-224

<sup>466</sup> *ibid*

<sup>467</sup> *ibid*

report had been doctored as MNC's the UN with lawsuits and US, UK and French companies were removed from the list so that it would not shame or bring embarrassment to the governments of these states.<sup>468</sup>

## **MONUC AND MOUNTING CHALLENGES**

When UN Security Council approves Peace keeping Operations, they make a truce in regions where there is conflict and sends agents from other member countries to arbitrate and stabilize the situation and prevent the recurrence of conflict.

Peacekeeping operations include:

- Observing elections
- Acting as civil police
- Watching human rights violations
- Assisting repatriation of refugees
- Advising administrative matters on transitory governments
- Minimize the damage to civilian life and promote national reconstruction

MONUC was dispatched to DRC to undertake the mandate of helping to implement the Lusaka Peace agreements, to ensure that the foreign armies left and to protect civilians as well as to end hostilities between the armed parties and to disarm the foreign rebel groups from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola. MONUC was also involved in the monitoring of the election process, and capacity and institutional building.

In setting forth MONUC's mandate, the Security Council, which is the sole body empowered to create and mandate United Nations peacekeeping operations, adhered

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<sup>468</sup> F. Grignon: *Economic Agendas In The Congolese Peace Process* in M. Nest et al: *DRC Economic*

closely to many aspects of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The military mandate of MONUC generally conformed to the Lusaka provisions on the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, while responsibility for the civilian political aspects of Lusaka – the inter-Congolese dialogue – were entrusted to neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and not to MONUC. However, MONUC's mandate in respect of DDRRR differed significantly from the approach adopted by the Lusaka signatories, as reflected above. The main difference in approach was that Lusaka envisaged forcible disarmament, whereas the Secretary-General and the Security Council stated from the outset that any DDRRR programme undertaken by MONUC must be voluntary. MONUC has always adhered to the voluntary principle, and will continue to do so.

MONUC has however not lived up to much of its mandate in that while it has the clear task of protecting civilians, monitoring the arms embargo and supporting the new army it is yet to devise a coherent strategy. A month after UNSC Africa's Session 5 537 peacekeepers were deployed as phase two of the MONUC. However the need to capture more territory and controls strategic sites led to renewed clashes which brought an instant halt to the deployment of the peacekeepers. Kinshasa announced that MONUC would not be allowed under their territory. Peace keeper cannot operate in a country without the government or State's consent hence this is a factor that needed to be considered and Laurent Kabila used this ground to refuse them to operate.<sup>469</sup> It is important to note that MONUC has been bedeviled by controversy as some of its soldiers were allegedly involved in smuggling of the some natural resources such as diamonds and in sexual

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*Dimensions international peace Academy Occasional paper Series ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers , 2006) pp43-52*  
<sup>469</sup> S. Naidoo: "The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict": *Global Dialogue* (2004) pp 85 -105

abuses of the women in DRC. The UN's internal watchdog, the Office of Internal and Oversight Services (OIOS), opened an investigation into up to 68 allegations of sexual misconduct by peacekeeping of MONUC. The allegations range from trading food for sex, to cases of child rape and the organization child prostitution ring out of an airport by UN troops in Bunia.<sup>470</sup> South African and other peacekeeping troops have allegedly committed a string of rapes and other sexual offences against children in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The United Nations sent a special team to the DRC to investigate.

In one case, a South African colonel in Goma was allegedly found during a UN investigation to have sexually molested his young male interpreter. It emerged he had requested young male interpreters under the age of 18 since the start of his mission. The cable detailed the sexual abuses against minors carried out by MONUC troops in Bunia, a town in the northeast of the DRC, over the past year. They numbered a staggering fifty.

A second cable was sent, recording a further four allegations and adding that special attention must be paid to the behavior of South African. MONUC troops in Kivu, Moroccan MONUC troops in Kisangani and MONUC troops from Uruguay, Pakistan and Nepal.<sup>471</sup>

An independent UN investigation team from the Office of Internal and Oversight Services (OIOS) was sent to investigate allegations of widespread sexual Anna, who lives in a shelter for women and girls and who has been raped, said in Nairobi: "A few weeks ago I was walking past a UN vehicle. There were South Africa soldiers standing around with guns. They asked me if I wanted a biscuit. I went up to where they were holding a

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<sup>470</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: *Great Lakes: Focus On Sexual Misconduct By UN Personnel* 2004 NAIROBI, 23 July 2004 (IRIN) pp1-2

<sup>471</sup> K. Holt and S. Hughes: *South Africa Troops 'Raped Kids In DRC'* On 24<sup>th</sup> September 2004  
Peace Women Project (New York; United Nations Office, 2004) pp 1-3

packet out for me." "One of them grabbed me, took me inside the vehicle and shut the door. Then he ripped off my dress and made me do it with him. I was really scared and tried to get away but he wouldn't let me. He told me if I said anything he would find me and hurt me." "He let me go and I ran away but I'm really scared now that he'll find me."<sup>472</sup>

This made the UN peace keeping lose its face in the advent of mounting criticism. However it is important to note that peace keepers are sent by their state and are only under the jurisdiction of their home Country. Weaknesses of the procedure to punish UN staff guilty is evident The UN cannot take sanctions; it's up to the member states to discipline their personnel. The UN does not prosecute criminal charges. If the military is involved in cases of sexual misconduct, it's up to the contingent to take disciplinary action. The UN could not proceed to punish criminal acts by its peacekeepers; only the individual's national authorities were empowered to do so.<sup>473</sup> This is an inherent weakness of the UN but the UN is made up member states and thus they cannot agree to turn up their members to ICC. <sup>474</sup> The eruption of the "sex scandal" surrounding MONUC staff coincided with a point in time when, on a global scale, the UN's image, and in particular that of its peace operations was already plummeting. Not there are debates that Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse be established.<sup>475</sup> The question is if those sent to protect the civilians don't, who will and who will pay up the damages caused to the DRC women and their families and how can the UN redeem itself.

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<sup>472</sup> Found at K Holt and S. Hughes: *South Africa Troops 'Raped Kids In DRC' On 24<sup>th</sup> September 2004* Peace Women Project (New York; United Nations Office, 2004) pp 1-3

<sup>473</sup> *ibid*

<sup>474</sup> N. Dahrendorf : *Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study* (New York: United Nations, March 2006) pp 1-24

<sup>475</sup> *ibid*

MONUC faced criticism that some of its soldier are involved in the looting of the DRC natural resources and / or aiding the rebels to do the same. Nigerian and Indian peacekeepers have been mentioned to do the same. This raises the question of how effective peace keeping is in DRC.

## THE INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS

There are various mechanisms in place to curb conflicts over natural resources like the DRC conflict in the international system like the Kimberly Certification Scheme that was put in place when the De Beers and other MNCs agreed to it. The KDSC is an international monitoring system that is geared to check where diamonds are from: if they are from conflict zones. However this come after the World Trade Center attack of Eleventh September terrorist attack which was put into place after the European and American countries realised that the Diamonds from Sierra Leone and Liberia were funding the Hisbollah through the Lebanese traders and other terrorist.<sup>476</sup> This shows that for any mechanism to be put in place there has to be a connection with the interests of the Western States, the Permanent Five or any other rich State.<sup>477</sup> There has been some difficulty in monitoring the KDSC and as such it is important to strengthen the verification mechanism of this scheme however this scheme has been valuable to states like DRC as they can monitor the diamonds that are traded by the rebels.<sup>478</sup> Nevertheless

<sup>476</sup> Global Witness: The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls. Seven Case Studies (London: Global Witness, 2004) Available at:  
<http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/index.php?section=diamonds>

<sup>477</sup> Grant J. A and Taylor I: Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems: Round Table 93, no. 375(2004) pp 385–401

<sup>478</sup> Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada: Implementing The Kimberley Process Five Years On: How Effective is Kimberley and What More Needs to be Done? (Ottawa and London: Global Witness, June 2005) pp. 1-8. Available at:  
<http://pacweb.org/e/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=65>

the DRC conflict involves States that rare also involved in the conflict and that trade in the Diamonds, thus it is cyclic as the rebels trade with these countries that act as middlemen. There are other conventions that aim in preventing arms and trafficking of persons like the Ottawa Convention that's prohibit stockpiling and selling of small arms but this its not heeded to by rich nations as most like the USA are not Signatory according to Olson and Grant.<sup>479</sup> The international community need to be adamant in its fight for pace and justice as they try and aid the DRC to achieve peace they must ensure that the mechanisms that are there need to be followed so that poor counties can be aided in their goal to achieve peace.<sup>480</sup>

## THE DEMOCRATIC MODEL IN THE DRC

Democratic reconstruction model consists of two major aspects. One of them is the military side which includes demobilization of former combatants, some provisions for their resettlement into civilian life and formation of a new national army. This was to be done in the DRC under DDDRR which was to be undertaken by the DRC government and MONUC. However this process has been long and tenuous as the Secretary General Koffi Annan said because of the vast regions of the DRC and the unwillingness of the combatants according to Ottaway.<sup>481</sup> The problem regarding democratization and the construction of a solid State is that the DRC has never had a legitimate government,

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<sup>479</sup> Olsson O: Diamonds Are A Rebels Best Friend. *The World Economy* (2006) Pp 1-17 and also: Hartung W. D: The New Business of War: Small arms and the Proliferation of Conflict. *Journal of Ethics and International Affairs*, Volume 15 (1) (2001) pp

<sup>480</sup> Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada: Implementing The Kimberley Process Five Years On: How Effective is Kimberley and What More Needs to be Done? (Ottawa and London: Global Witness, June 2005) pp. 1-8. Available at: <http://nacweb.org/e/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=65>

<sup>481</sup> M. Ottaway: Promoting Democracy After Conflict: the Difficult Choices" *Journal of International Studies Perspectives* Vol. 14 (2003) pp314-322

although the Congolese have been talking about implementing a classic democratic system since the National Conference in 1991. The Museveni-Kagame formula conflicts with that democratic model aimed to ensure legitimacy for a regime installed by a guerrilla movement with a strong leader, which will put regional security and stability at the head of its priorities. They tried to impose this vision of power and governance through the course of two wars, but the rebel movement had a very narrow political base. If the rebels did come to power, this 'war solution' will induce them to build up their military capacity with a view to future defense needs, which would have served only to worsen a constantly deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation.<sup>482</sup>

The political sides include the structuring of a democratic system including the drafting and approval of a constitution enactment of the necessary laws on political parties and elections, registration of voters and holding of multi party elections. For the DRC the process had to start as there had never ever been such since independence and two years was a very short time as formal structures of democratic systems did not exist.

These were simply too many prescriptions, too many simultaneous demands made of the extremely weak governments of DRC a war torn society. The democratic model is a good idea in such a state like DRC but it needs time and lots of finances and does need take into consideration the external actors in the conflict. It is a long process, includes a lot of education for the local population at the grass root levels and information dissemination and trained personnel. It becomes a vicious circle because it demands that countries need to implement all these reforms because their problems are too great but the problems are so great to implement all reforms even if they wanted to which is not

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<sup>482</sup> International Crisis Group: Africa's Seven Nation War Democratic Republic of Congo Report N° 4 (Brussels and Nairobi: International Crisis Group, 21 May 1999) pp 1-37



always the case.<sup>483</sup> The international community also needs to make a commitment to work with the DRC in these reforms especially finances which they are not willing to do.

This does not mean that elections are bad but the duration and the planning matters and also other issues like external actors and the structural issues that are likely to make the systems not to work adds Ottaway.<sup>484</sup> The Congolese people went to the polls for the first time in June 2006 and it was a relatively peaceful, safe and well conducted after being postponed so many times because the elections council was not ready for elections. The elections had been scheduled for 2001 and postponed to June 4 2005 and held on June 2006.

This was one of the successful moments in DRC but elections are just but one part of the democratic process. Other aspects include enhancements of rights and freedoms Kabila's party, strengthening of civil society, and accountability of the government *Partie du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Democratie* PPRD (Peoples Party for the Reconstruction of Democracy) controlled the state apparatus in sixty percent of the national territory. Bemba was in control of MLC lacks funds but is army is small and used his position as vice president to sway people. Etienne Tshisekedi leader of Union pour la Democratie et le progress Social UDPS(Union For The Democratic Social Progress) led the political opposition against Mobutu had votes in Kinshasa and his province of Kasai Oriental but had little support in other provinces. Bemba and Kabila are to battle it out in the next round. Any peace process initiative has to consider the rebels from foreign countries even though they are weakened and do not pose a threat to Kigali they are still able to conduct raids into Rwanda and are a serious threat to

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<sup>483</sup> ibid

<sup>484</sup> ibid

Congolese civilians. It also has to consider all the actors in the DRC like MNCs, Individuals and civil groups. The civil groups need to be educated as they can mobilize peace building at the grass roots levels.

From the above we note that the DRC conflict is not just about the natural resources although they have heightened and aggravated the war. The ease with which the natural resources can be looted has made the war economy easier. It is also important to note that no external actors who act alone and have liaise with the internal actors. The external actors have taken advantage of the structural anomalies such as the ethnic disintegration to loot the DRC natural resources

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter consists of chapter summaries and conclusion, Policy recommendations and issues of further research that could have emerged from the study. The chapter states the study's final findings namely whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or not.

#### **CHAPTER SUMMARIES**

Chapter one set to find out the complex nature of relationships between external actors and the natural resource and conflict in the DRC. The study explored the research problem intending to show the role of external actors in the DRC as a result of the availability and lootability of nature resource in the DRC. It attempts to analyze the situation between external actors and natural resources. The study hypothesized that conflict in the DRC has been as a result of natural resource and external actors' influence in the DRC has led to the conflict and this conflict has affected the region as a result of internationalization of the conflict.

On reaching such a conclusion the measure used to determine External actors' role in conflict has been a qualitative representation of them as instigators, aggravators and continuants of the DRC conflict as they are greedy for natural resources especially strategic ones which have led to plunder predation, raping and exploitation of the country.

Chapter two gave an overview of the DRC conflict tracing the origin and causes of the first Congo war to pre colonial eras the nature and grant for independence by the

Belgian colonialists and the Cold War politics played on DRC soil that led to the first disintegration of the country. It went further and found that the preconditions for the current conflict lies in Mobutu's regime era as structures were transformed to be predatory even through the first ten years of his rule were successful. The chapter delves into structural analysis of DRC conflict. It confirmed that structural root causes of conflict in DRC have been dynamic but they have been there since time immemorial. The chapter confirmed that DRC natural resources have been a factor in historical exploitation, plunder and a determinant in the conflict. However the State's structure weaknesses and lack of proper institutions have allowed external actors to plunder, root and exploit the country.

Chapter three looked at the external actors involved in the DRC conflicts the chapter found that the external actors were directly and indirectly involved in the conflict. A wide range of external actors came up as states were from Africa, Europe, America, Asia and Middle East the most notable ones from Africa and the West. Non-state actors were MNCs, PSCs, foreign rebel movements and individuals. The chapter analyzed the DRC natural resources that external actors have pillaged and looted and found out that DRC has vast resources that include minerals, forests, trees, animals, water, and fish. These natural resources are found in the DRC and none has been spared.

Chapter four presented the critical analysis of the DRC natural resources based conflict , internationalization , of the conflict , the peace process , external actors and their role in the conflict. The observation of this chapter is that natural resources have played a role in the conflict whether lootable or unlootable which has resulted in to a war economy or natural resource war but this has been ongoing for long. External actors

motivated by greed, liaise with internal actors either govern the government or rebel movements to achieve their goals but the most vivid picture is that the structural anomalies and institutional weaknesses have allowed external actors to have a reason to enter that DRC and exploit it. The chapter agreed that DRC conflict has been to some extent aggravated, continued by external actors but this does not mean the State is not to blame too therefore building a multi causal framework. The study attempted to analyze the role of external actors in the natural resources based conflicts focusing on the DRC conflicts which has led to loss of lives and unfathomable sufferings to the DRC people and also has affected other nations. It has emerged that scramble for the natural resources in DRC has been a historical phenomena but has been vivid in recent times after the ousting of Mobutu. Even though States like Rwanda and Uganda had security reasons to venture in the DRC their stay has proved that they are interested in looting natural resources. External actors have played a role in exploiting, marketing, selling and consuming the DRC natural resources that have turned the country into a conflict zone and anarchy.

DRC conflict is a complex conflict and involves a multitude of actors who have been involved indirectly or directly but can assist in bringing much needed peace and stability in the country for it to flourish. One peculiar issue that has emerged is that DRC conflict is one of a kind and a comprehensive analysis of the conflict should be done at the international level, regional level, national level and local levels.

This way all levels will be adequately analyzed and policy recommendations will have solid ground. These will lead to comprehensive all inclusive peace accords and lead

to resolution of conflicts which will involve even the grassroots level and non state actors rather than settlement.

The study has come to conclusion that the external actors do not always act on their own but mostly rely on international internal actors and other external actors to achieve their objectives. Most external actors raise with other internal actors to have access to natural resource be they individuals, States, mercenaries PSCs and MNCs. Another aspect that comes up is the civilians who are forced into the war economy by circumstances because they have to work to cater for themselves and their families. This vulnerable group is current situation and if the environment was different they would be different in terms of earning a living.

The greed verses grievances theory used to analyze the role of external actors has been motivated by greed to the extent that Rwanda and Uganda fought to capture source rich areas. The external actors have been involved in funding the rebels or government or PSC's or mercenaries to protect their vested interests in the natural resources. Even though the greed and grievances closes not fully reflect all the complexities of the conflict adequately it helps to understand what the actors want from DRC that is natural resources and will go any length including investigating direct violence to achieve their objectives .

The DRC experience has proven that no State is secure from its neighbors and other States that have interests despite their UN charter prohibiting violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states it also demonstrated that the level of complexity in natural resources based conflicts are high and one dimension is not enough to give a peaceful solution. It has shown that the local population can torn from their state and

liaise with external actors to exploit and plunder their natural resources and leave out their fellow tribes men or ethnics population in search of riches which is purely motivated by greed.

The availability of natural resources countries like Libya, Botswana, Tanzania, and Namibia has not led to conflict like the one of the DRC. However the structural anomalies like ethnic fragmentation, lack of strong institutions like the army can allow predation by external actors. Structure in DRC caused by a weak State created by colonialists "elite politics" inequitable distribution of ethnic fractionalization and fragmentation can lead to opening the state to exploitation. The DRC natural resource based conflict has been aggravated by the presence of informal economies in the peripheral area and looting of natural resources.

However there has been progress as the population has awakened to reality and even staged counter attacks to the external actors and general towards peace. The international community has helped in curbing the conflict issue but more commitment is needed and mechanisms need to be strengthened like the Kimberly Diamond Certification scheme which deals with checking the authenticity of diamond to avoid "blood diamond".

The objectives of the study were to identify the relationship between the availability and lootability of natural resources and the conflict in DRC. To examine the relationship between the conflict and exploitative external actors: Analyze the role that rebels funding and government aiding exploitative external actors play in the DRC conflict: To highlight the complex issues that have come up as a result of the internationalization of the conflict especially in the Great Lakes Conflict System and the

international system. The flow of chapter two, three, and four has been able to handle all the objectives that were intended to be realized. Role of external actors in the natural resource based conflict has been enumerated and critically analyzed with the intention of finding out the external role in the DRC conflict.

It was found out that external actors are involved directly and indirectly involved in the DRC conflict at all levels. This has led to internationalization of the conflict at the regional level and international level bringing out a complex war economy.

The dependent variables in this study external actors which may change according to the availability and lootability of the natural resources and conflict and the independent variable is the natural resources. The type physical attributes and geographical proximity of natural resource will determine the nature of the conflict and external actors involved in the conflict. DRC has many natural resources available and their lootability and geographical proximity has not only influenced the conflict as evident in the study but also allowed the external actors to choose whom to liaise with the DRC Government or rebels or alone. It is imperative to note that the DRC conflict involving external actors relied on this factors that the study has unearthed! The State of DRC: Physical attributes of DRC natural resources and internal actors who liaise with external actors to plunder and rape the country by using the ongoing conflict as their hideout.

This means DRC State is important if one tries to understand the conflict and the natural resources attributes, as they will determine the type of conflict.



## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

There is need to develop a clear strategic map of the actors and their interest for any conflict that has natural resources aspect. These external actors dimension helps policy makers understand the complexity of the conflict and the duration of the conflict as well as management of internationalized conflict. External actors influence conflict significantly and their interests need to be checked out to avoid drifting back to conflict.<sup>485</sup>

MNCs participation should be integrated into broader policy framework that makes prudent use of foreign goods and factors of production to fill gaps in domestic capacity. This is because MNCs can also be effective in peace building.<sup>486</sup>

Policy issues need to focus on different issues like those of artisanal diggers, forced soldiers, and civilians who are involved in the war economy for different reasons.<sup>487</sup>

Labeling all natural resources like diamonds as conflict goods from conflict zones will make natural resources from other countries like Canada, Brazil, Australia more marketable leading the economies of such conflict-ridden zones to further economic shambles which will lead to deeper levels of anarchy.<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>485</sup>P. Le Billon: The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, *Political Geography* Volume 20 (5) (2001) pp561-584. also P. Le Billon : The Geopolitical Economy of Resource Wars, in P. Le Billon (ed.), *Geopolitics of Resource Wars: Resource Dependency, Governance and Violence*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002) pp. 1-28

<sup>486</sup>S. Pegg : Globalization and Natural Resource Conflicts, *Naval War College Review*, 56:4 (autumn 2003): pp82-95.

<sup>487</sup> A. Kacowicz: 'Negative' International Peace And Domestic Conflicts, West Africa 1957-1996, *Journal of Modern African Studies* Volume 35 (1999) pp 367-385

<sup>488</sup> Global Witness: Conflict Diamond; Possibilities For The Identification Certification And Control Of Diamonds And A Rough Trade The Role Of Companies And Governments In Angolan Conflict. Available at [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness) also P. Le Billon: The Geopolitical

As accountability by governments is important for transition to democracy and for the growth of relative stability there needs to be creation and strengthening of institutions and structures like civil society groups, opening up for public scrutiny the business of the government counter check of corruption, which can provide checks on government's officials and businesses.<sup>489</sup>

Education and information dissemination is important in peace building and needs to be utilized in the DRC case. This can be done through public speaking fora at the local level to enable local groups know their rights and plight. The information is powerful as it involves empowering people's minds to change their beliefs and values for the good of society.<sup>490</sup> This can be done to the people of DRC by frosted public speakers as it will also enhance ethnic cooperation.

DRC can opt for decentralization but it may not be as effective because it may lead to shift of power from capital to periphery hence loss of national cohesion, heightened local corruption and weaker management that will lead to cyclic conflict cycle especially for states like DRC. Hence federalization should be viewed with caution which is a type of decentralization as evidenced by Nigeria whose federation system has not worked yet in other countries like USA it has worked.<sup>491</sup>

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Economy of Resource Wars, in P. Le Billon (ed.), *Geopolitics of Resource Wars: Resource Dependency, Governance and Violence*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002) pp. 1-28 J.A Grant and I. Taylor: *Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems: Round Table* 93, no. 375(2004) pp 385-401

<sup>489</sup> A. Ibrahim and N. Sambanis: *How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 46(3), (2002)

<sup>490</sup> M.L. Ross: *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse*, *World Politics Journal*: pp 297-332, and M.L. Ross: *What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?* *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 4, (2004b) and J. Richard: *Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts* *Journal of Peace and Change* Vol. 25 (2) (April 2000) pp 208-224

<sup>491</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler: *Doing Well Out Of War*, Paper prepared for Economic Agenda's in civil war, London 26-27 April 1999 (Washington; World Bank, 1999) and also P. Collier and A. Hoeffler : *Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict*, *Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 49 (4) (2005), pp625-633, available at: <http://jcr.sagepub.com/current.dtl>

DRC needs to diversify its economy such that it does not rely on natural resources only, however it can opt to process some of the resources further to increase their value. This is as seen in countries like USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa that have resorted to processing the natural resource to increase their competitive edge globally and thus leads to economic growth.

DRC can have co-ownership and management for example long term concessions and production sharing agreements between the State and private sector and community based programmes which will increase the private sector share of production and output and also pull the state away from the effective industries and dealing with too many issues at the same time hence government will focus on other issues. It will bring about competitive products both locally and internationally. It will make the community and individuals invest in their country more thus bringing about an effective middle class.

Efforts need to be directed at reinstating a states monopoly on the use of force effective role of law and individual accountability for crimes committed. This is by strengthening the security apparatus and the legal structures so that the role of law can prevail.<sup>492</sup>

At the international and regional levels important levels importing countries should set legality requirement on procurement rules exporting countries in order to combat illegal or conflict trade.<sup>493</sup>

Transit countries can set out rules on point of origin of the natural resources for example are they from conflict zone areas. This is shown by KDCS which traces origin of

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<sup>492</sup> J. Richard : "Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts" *Journal of Peace and Change* Vol. 25 (2) (April 2000) pp 208-224

diamonds hence the same can be done for other goods like gold, cotton, wild animals, and forest products.<sup>494</sup>

The international community needs to realize that its sanctions towards external actors will be effective to DRC only if there is commitment from the international community especially the permanent five (P5) in the UN Security Council and IFIs. This is because the permanent five seem to be indirectly aiding the conflict by not imposing sanctions to countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and others who have been involved in the DRC conflict. Their MNCS have been involved in the conflict thus the doctoring of the UN panel of Experts report was meant not to expose them. Individuals like Victor Bout from Russia are also involved and yet Russia is apprehensive about the issue and USA has sought to protect him from ICC as he sold her arms during the invasion in Iraq. The IFIs and donor countries have continued funding knowing aid is tangible like Uganda which have been involved in the conflict. The P5 and IFL's commitment to conflict war economy can provide a necessary tool for ending the conflict.

Regional organizations need to receive greater technical and financial support to improve cooperation on custom controls and border policing. Efforts need to be complemented with regional cooperation on key economic and trade policies as a means to make informal cross-border trade less profitable to generate income for the governments. Regimes are needed for managing resource flows from and to conflict zones. Regimes should be strengthened and more to potential unintended consequence.

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<sup>493</sup> Global Witness: Conflict Diamond; Possibilities For The Identification Certification And Control Of Diamonds And A Rough Trade The Role Of Companies And Governments In Angolan Conflict. Available at [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness)

<sup>494</sup> Global Witness: Conflict Diamond; Possibilities For The Identification Certification And Control Of Diamonds And A Rough Trade The Role Of Companies And Governments In Angolan Conflict. Available at [www.oneworld.org/globalwitness](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness)

## **AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

The DRC conflict involves both internal actors and external actors working together and it is important that internal actors are also studied especially on the line that they are also involved in rent seeking and loot seeking behavior in natural resource based conflicts. It would be interesting to attempt an investigation into the underlying factors of this kind of behavior.

Similarly MNCS as peace builders especially in community driven approach has not been studied and thus this element would be useful to academic and policy studies as this would move the debate away from MNCS as external actors involved in escalation, and prolonging of the conflict. The individuals role in conflict has not been addressed and this needs attention as most liaise with other actors to achieve their goals in conflict.

## **LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY:**

The researcher encountered problems like lack of anyone to question at embassies like Uganda and Rwanda as this area of study is a sensitive area hence not able to fully analyze the role of external actors though she got a few pointers from Rwandese and Ugandans who are aware of the situation.

Lack of financial resources to travel to the DRC curtailed the researcher's intentions to do field surveys within the DRC which would have made the study weightier however the information got from the various sources made the work thoroughly done.

All in all, the study got done and it is an attempt to note the role of external actors in the war economy in the DRC even though it is a sensitive area. Further research can be done from where we stopped: *Alluta- continua*

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## APPENDIX

### Unstructured Questionnaire

- What are the root causes of the DRC conflict from 1990-2005?
- Who are the external actors involved in the DRC conflict between 1990-2005?
- Are there motives or reasons for being involved in the DRC conflict? If so which ones?
- What is your foreign policy in regard to the DRC? (For foreign states other than the DRC )
- What is the implication and impact of the DRC conflict in Great Lakes Region, Africa and International System?
- What are the efforts being made to restore peace in the DRC?
- Are these efforts effective? if no go to question 8
- What can be done to bring about lasting peace in the DRC?
- What are the current issues in DRC?