

AFRICAN SOCIALISM AS A DETERMINANT OF GUINEA'S
FOREIGN POLICY

by

JOHN K. WAMUGI

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"Our policy is defined essentially by the interests of Africa; not her momentary, but her historic interest, encompassing all present and future interests of the African populations since our country's destiny is conditioned by those interests."

AHMED SEKOU TOURE.

"Guinea's foreign policy, which is simply the true prolongation of her home policy, is in the same manner defined by the will and interest of the peoples, not by the quality of our relations with their governments"

AHMED SEKOU TOURE.

"Our militant struggle should give a substance to the Unity we are striving for: we should not regard it as an end in itself, but as a means; we do not want unity in confusion but unity in the action inspired by the nature of popular expectations"

(On African Unity).

AHMED SEKOU TOURE.

"The quality of the Revolution is essentially in function of the degree of political consciousness and militant engagement of the people, who are at the same time its instrument and its object."

AHMED SEKOU TOURE:

"Peace, Democratic Progress, Universal solidarity will be imposed upon the forces of war, repression, and contempt by the joint action of peoples conscious of being the only creative force of the happiness of man"

AHMED SEKOU TOURE:

"The essential quality of the revolution is to be measured by the degree of political consciousness and militant commitment of the people, who are at one and the same time its instrument and its subject matter"

AHMED SEKOU TOURE:

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JOHN K. WAMUGI

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INTRODUCTION.

This paper seeks to discuss African Socialism (Guinea's style) as one of the key determinants of Guinea's foreign policy. The analysis covers the period 1959 to 1973. Implicit in my discussion is the notion that other variables may equally be important in shaping Guinea's external policy. However, this paper does not in any way attempt to analyze these other variables, except in so far as they influence Guinea's ideological commitment to African Socialism. The concept of 'African Socialism-Guinea style' in this paper must therefore, be taken and understood to be one of the many such policy determining variables in Guinea's foreign relations.

The paper is divided into four main chapters and conclusion. The first chapter has dealt with the purpose of the thesis and the contribution of my research into the field of foreign policy studies. It also tackles the Nature and Research Problems and also the leading Idea in the discussion. The chapter takes up the Definition of concepts (the leading concepts in the discussion) and finally the Methodology and Limitations within the scope of this thesis.

Chapter two is mainly concerned with the evolution of Guinea's Foreign Policy (1958-1973) and mainly gives a historical and analytic account of the Guinean policy process. It does not, however discuss Guinea's foreign policy structure.

Literature review; Guinea's continental (African) policy; Guinea's policy towards the Rest of the continent; Guinea's Extra-continental policy; and finally Guinea's policy in issue-areas.

Chapter three focuses attention on the dichotomous relationship that exist between Guinea's African Socialism and her non-alignment. In other words it is an examination of both the ideology of the domestic system (socialism) and the Guinean ideology in her international relations (foreign policy ideology of Non-alignment). In essence the chapter, which is divided into two sections attempt to give a critical appraisal of the changing thoughts on Guinea's socialism; and also the implications of the domestic ideology in the regime's international policy.

✓ The final Chapter is a rather theoretical peace building its analysis on the Hanrieder/Rosenau "debate" on Linkage politics. It also attempts to lay out a policy deterministic theory based on "crucial policy variables" and sub-crucial variables. The chapter does not engage in a lengthy discussion but it attempts to highlight the main issues. Finally the conclusion attempts to synthesize the thesis. In other words it is the critique of the entire discussion and suggests in the end possible fields of research in the area the paper has naively attempted to break the ice.

It must be realized that a paper of this size cannot treat the subject of Guinea's foreign policy, or Guinea's

political ideology in great detail and neither can it cover to any depth any issue-areas that have been discussed under chapter II. Each of these issues-areas could very well be used as the basis of research in future. But, all that said we cannot lose sight of the main theme of the present discussion - which, in short, is the basic linkage between Guinea's ideology and Guinea's foreign policy. The nexus of the two issues (ideology and policy) should be viewed as the basic theme of this paper.

CHAPTER I

This discussion attempts to do two things. On the one hand it attempts to examine Guinea's Foreign policy from a purely theoretical point of view, and secondly, it analyzes the role African Socialism, as an ideology plays in determining the foreign policy. An exposition of the methodology used is given further below in this introductory chapter.

The author of this paper hypothesizes that Guinea's ideological commitment toward African Socialism, significantly influences her international policy to the extent that the Guinean policy makers use this ideology as a frame of reference. The use of the phrase "used as a frame of reference" is here intended to mean that the doctrine of African Socialism is used as a guide for mapping out Guinea's stand in various international issues. Further elaboration of this point will be given in the next chapter while discussing Guinea's foreign policy in specific issue-areas (e.g. Apartheid; Rhodesia's U.D.I. Dialogue with South Africa; or interstate disputes; African Unity; the cold war conflicts etc.) An inevitable corollary of this hypothesis is that the Guinean domestic policy draws heavily from this ideological framework. i.e. African Socialism is also Guinea's national (domestic) as well as her economic declared ideology. The search for a linkage between this ideology and Guinea's foreign policy becomes an imperative task of this discussion.

Efforts are made to appraise Guinea's socialism on a comparative basis with doctrinaire socialism. The author does not however, intend to present an attitudinal analysis of Guinea's socialist. This point is elaborated further below under methodological limitations. The paper also pays particular attention to the linkage model of national (domestic) and international politics, the objective of this effort being to explicate other variables that may be crucially significant in determining the character, direction, and purpose of Guinea'sforeign policy. There is increasing pressure among both students of comparative politics (national systems) and students of International politics to erase the illusory boundaries separating national and international systems. Philip E. Mosley for instance remarks that "the difference between 'national and 'international' now exists only in the minds of those who use the words."¹ Similarly, Chadwick F. Alger contends that there is widespread recognition that the boundaries separating national and international systems are becoming increasingly ambiguous.² Thus it is hardly surprising that recent years have experienced a widening search for conceptual equipment with which to handle the convergence of national and international systems. In

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1. Philip E. Mosley; "Research on Foreign Policy," in *Brookings Dedication Lectures; Research for Public Policy* (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1961) pp. 43-72
 2. See Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of International and International Politics," in part five of this volume; George F. Kennan.

Hanrieder's view, the problem posing itself to both national and international analysis is their inability to build upon existing theory. This dilemma is further aggravated by the conviction among those analysts that the separation of the two types of systems no longer serves a useful analytic purpose. Consequently, a number of analysts have felt compelled "to re-examine old concepts, invent appropriate terminology, and construct new models." In this search for new models an inevitable diversion in system analysis has occurred between those who believe that the notion of national international 'linkages' seems to offer hope as a solution of the problem. For others, the concept of "system transformation" appears promising. For still others, the idea of a "penetrated" political system is distinguishable from both a national and an international system opens up the possibility of accommodating the changing structures of macropolitics. And for a fourth group the texts of 'field' theory in physics and social psychology appear to offer a fruitful approach to the problem. For Hanrieder himself "compatibility" and "concensus" loom large as central organizing concepts.³ In the wake of those conceptual diversions, Rosenau's recent thesis advocating the rearming

American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1951), p. 99; and Otto Klineberg, "Intergroup Relations and International Relations," in Muzafer Sherif, ed., Intergroup Relations and Leadership: Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural and Political Areas (New York, Wiley, 1962), pp. 174-76.

3. Wolfram F. Hanrieder: "Compatibility and Concensus: A proposal for conceptual linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy." The American Political Science Review. (Vol. LXI, 4 Dec. 1967).

of yet another new field of "adaptive politics" is still another attempt adding more weight to the contemporary debates in favour of "linkages" in the national-international systems.⁴

In light of the current debate on linkage theory in national and international systems any analysis of a country's foreign policy must of necessity examine the linkage variables from both the internal and external perspectives. It is no longer satisfactory, or even convincing to assume that a nation's foreign policy is the preonict of the decision makers in that particular state. An attempted coup in Guinea may on the surface appear to be a Guineasn domestic problems but at a deeper level the impact of these domestic problems is almost always extended beyond the national boundaries and thus involving the external systems. It is hoped that the material presented in this paper will not only take us through the various dimensions of linkage theory, as seen by Hanried, Rosenau, Mosley and others, but that it will also explore the application of this theory in a developing policy, an area which has largely been neglected in "linkage-phenomena" studies. In saying this I do not, of course, intend to minimize the contributions related to "linkage" studies made by other

4. James N. Rosenau; "Compatibility, Concensus and an Emerging Science of Adaptation"; The American Political Science Review (Vol. LXI, 4 Dec. 1967).

students of comparative and international politics, though it is permissible to quibble that a basic short coming in these studies has been the lack of systematic analysis of the resourceful findings and deep insights shown by these studies,⁶ but that specific linkage studies on areas such as foreign policy and national ideology, party politics and foreign policy etc., have surprisingly been overlooked. The present study is a naive attempt to fill this gap.

Apart from some major works of the American Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics which include: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.); Lucian W. Pye (eds.), Communication and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1963); Joseph LaPalombara (ed) Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1963); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A, Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1967); James S. Coleman (ed.) Education and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1965); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.); Political Culture and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1965) and Joseph La Malombara and Myron Weiner (eds.); Political Parties and

5. Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics," World Politics. (Vol. XVI: 1, Oct. 1963)

6. See James N. Rosenau: "Political Science in a Shinking World" in James N. Rosenau; Linkage Politics; The Free Press, New York Collier-Macmillan Ltd Lonon (New York 1969) pp 1-17

Political Development (Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1966); very little has been done in Developing countries particularly in the new discipline of "Adaptive Politics"* However important, these linkage - phenomena studies have been confined to fairly general and broad areas. In this connection Rosenau asserts that "...virtually all the findings and insights bearing on linkage phenomena are derivatives of other concerns, and thus their common content has never been probed and compared."⁷ A more erroneous assumption in most of these studies is that the political unit is simply one environment to which it responds and with which it interacts. This assumption leads students of foreign policy to examine the responses and students of international relations to investigate the interactions, but neither group considers how the functioning of the unit itself is conditioned and affected by these responses."⁸ The consequent problem created by these distinct and separated analyses is to evaluate all these studies in separate continua, and hence commofraging the actual problems.

7. James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, op. cit; p. 4

8. Ibid; p. 5

* The concept 'Adaptive Politics' is used in Rosenau's sense; that is, 'The distructive subject matter of this field is in the interaction between a political actor and its environment. The Distructive theory consists of propositions in which the functioning of the actor is linked either to its external behaviour or to veriations in its environment at the level of the national actor, the political science of adaptation, according to its proponent - Rosenau embraces foreign policy phenomena and also those in which the internal functioning of the policy is linked to environment through processes' Other than the purposeful governmental actions known as foreign policy.

In analyzing any state's foreign policy, it is important to realize the two major alternatives that lie within our purviend. On the one hand, we could easily reduce the pursuit of foreign policy goals to a contest between stateman and environment that is already settled by the insurmountable r restrictions of the international "system."⁹ Taking this view, nations are muplicitly delegated to play out the roles that the international system has "assigned" to its actors to maintain system stability or equilibrium. In this view domestic variables one largely neglected and Foreign policy aspirations are assessed primarily in terms of whether a nation has adequately adjusted to the contingencies of the international system (which seems to move toward a preardained historical or analytical telos).

A second analytical alternative is for viewing foreign policy that focuses on the internal political process of the nation state.¹⁰ This perspective stresses the motivational elements that shape a nation's foreign policy goals, and as Hanrieder argues, it highlights the sociacultural predisposition's and institutional processes that lead to the formulation of goals and to the choice among methods of implementation. This latter view assumes that the international conduct of nations tends to be regarded as either irreversibly determined by their historical experience and "political culture" or decisively shaped by the personal idiosyncrasies of their decision-makers.

9. Walfram F. Hanrieder; op. cit. p. 971

10. Ibid. p. 971

Here analytical emphasis rests on the domestic political system as a "subsystem" of the enveloping international system; the strictures and opportunities of the international environment are relegated to the secondary analytical role of serving as "in-puts" from the international systems into the domestic system.¹¹ To borrow from Harrieder's analysis the two perceptions are infortunately loaded with disadvantages and short comings particularly when viewed in the light of the questions that are raised in connection with the distinction and choice between "systemic" and "substenic" levels of operation; Although this paper does not intend to interject in the systemic/subsystemic debate, it is never the less fitting to note that full consideration of a nations foreign policy should focus both on the opportunities and strictures presented by the nation's external, operational environment, and on the internal, psychological environment prevailing in the national system. Viewed in this perspective then, a primary analytical interest in the outcome of foreign policy will necessarily focus on the operational environment that the nation-state focus in the historical circumstances of the

11. See also Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey, : Princeton University Press, 1954), and the early essay by Snyder "The Nature of Foreign Policy," *Social Science*, 27 (April 1952) pp. 61-69

international system. Secondly, analytical pre-occupation with motivational aspects of foreign policy making will necessarily turn to internal political processes and to the perception of external conditions that is the basis of choosing among alternatives of ends and means.¹² No analysis of a nation's foreign policy can conceivably be considered rational if it obviates from those two perceptions. Our present analysis tries to fit within this framework.

All this said, and to avoid obscuring the analytic pursuit of this paper, it is pertinent that we break away for a moment from the discussion on linkage - phenomena¹³ and briefly survey the dichotomous relationship of Guinea's foreign policy (non-alignment) and her ideological commitment to African Socialism.¹⁴ Before delving into a discussion of this relationship it is fitting that we make a brief review of the political setting any student of African foreign policies.

Apart from the analytical problems, lack of systematic linkage studies, the absence of fully fledged policy-making institutions, the time dimension is probably the most crucial factor. History has not as yet given Africa time long enough

12. W.F. Hanrieder: op. cit., p. 972

13. The discussion on linkage-politics is resumed in chapters Three and Four of this dissertation.

14. See Chapter III; for a more exhaustive treatment of this dichotomous relationship.

for the various states to develop and consolidate their foreign policies, since the majority of the African states have hardly gone through their first decade of sovereign statehood. Further, the few states that have been politically independent for over a decade have not enjoyed their independence without going through various domestic as well as international political problems. In the majority of cases domestic civil strife has erupted almost immediately after the acquisition of independence. The preoccupation of the nationalist leaders with these domestic problems leaves them very little time to concentrate with international politics and hence doing the moulding of national foreign policies substantial harm. One can, therefore safely argue that in the initial years of independence, the newly independent African states are primarily concerned with safeguarding their new status, accelerating and strengthening the process of nation-building (integrating the various socio-political and economic facets of the new state) and that the process of formulating a distinct and deterministic foreign policy is very much incidental. This partly explains why most African foreign policies are made in a haphazard manner, a country's stand on international issues being made out of convenience than experience.

In those formative years, the new African states, are indecisively torn between identifying what would be regarded purely as national interest and what is otherwise international. The crisis of this juxtaposition renders the victim state helpless and consequently vulnerable to external influence. In

formulating her foreign policy such a policy ends up as an amalgam of divergent policies and hardly reflective of the national consciousness. For the more astute African leaders, the solution to this dilemma has had to be sought in welding the new society through the use of new ideologies. Basically the new ideology is supposed to serve two important functions. On the one hand the new ideology is supposed to rally all the nationals of the new state behind the task of nation building. The citizenry's loyalty is in this case subscribed to the nationalist leaders together with their philosophically conceived nation building cliches. This role is more or less functional. On the other hand the new ideology is supposed to identify the new state as a member of the independent sovereign world community. This role could be seen to play an identitive function. For the new state to fulfil the two ideological functional roles effectively it necessarily must project its domestic and foreign policies in two dimensions. First the domestic policies must be such that the population recognizes and identifies the indigenous government, of the new regime as their own sovereign government. In other words the populations must necessarily identify itself with the functions of the new government. For this to be done, the new government must also satisfy the aspirations of the masses or else the new regime becomes alienated from the masses. This is usually the cause of civil disorder in the new states. Secondly the new regimes' international policies must be such that the new states can easily find accommodation and acceptance in the international community. That is, the new

regimes' international policies must not appear to be international heresy. It must not alienate the new state from the other members of the international community. Thus decision-making foreign policy institutions are between the domestic (national) and the external (international) environments. Striking a compromise between these two forces is not an easy task particularly to countries which are merely beginning to exert themselves in an impervious international environment shredded between bloc politics. For most new states of Africa the shield of non-alignment offers the best cover in the bloc power-pull game. Confronted with the two ideological and foreign policy problems, the policy-makers in the new states of Africa have had to find a compromising convergence of two basic issues: That is, what is domestically acceptable and feasible; and secondly what is internationally acceptable and practicable. To enmesh out of this dichotomous dilemma, most African policy-makers have resolved into adopting African Socialism as a functional and identitive ideology suitably embeded in the African traditions (the family life); and non-alignment also called positive neutralism as an internationally recognized policy. The definitional implications of these two concepts is dealt with in greater detail below. The Republic of Guinea, hereafter referred as Guinea, is one of these countries which have adopted this co-social relationship of African Socialism and non-alignment.

A more pre-ponderant feature of foreign policy-making in the new African states is that the shaping of these foreign policies is largely in the hands of a few leaders while most of

the ordinary citizen has little knowledge or interest in it. In the majority of cases, expatriate personnel is used in advisory capacities in key domestic policy issues which may have any implications on the international scene. If not carefully censored expatriate policy advice in either domestic or foreign policy can at times have negative repercussions on the domestic scene, the alienation of the adopted political ideology being a further possible consequence. Such policy flaws are not infrequent in African politics. One important area which is not dealt with in this paper is the conceptually alienative function expatriate or foreign advice in foreign plays to the political ideology to which the new states subscribe. I have deliberately neglected the analysis of this conceptual conflict between the local political ideology and the foreign policy for the reason that it is not possible to give the subject a fair treatment in as a limited discussion as the present one.

It is certainly not belittling the ability of the new African states to argue that the majority of them have had little experience in the science of foreign diplomacy. As a result of this, they often rely on the diplomatic practice and precedents of the more nations. Since most of the new African states have been at one time colonies of the metropolitan powers, it becomes less strange to find that their foreign policies are analytically speaking (if not literally), made in Washington, London, Moscow or Peking. If the concept of sovereignty is supposed to imply the ability to make independent

decisions particularly in foreign policy, one wonders whether these African states are indeed politically independent. The status of sovereignty becomes even more dubious when is remmaided of the African states' dependancy on the metropole in culture, and economics. In this connection, therefore, the influence of the departed colonial powers in the farmulation of the new African regimes' foreign policies is considerably significant. The foreign office ministries, staffed with large armies of influential expatriate advisors are hardly capable of formulating policies reflective of the domestic setting in the final analysis. The not-policy outputs of the domestic policy institutions emulative of the advisors' home government policies, easily yields to pressure exerted by the external environment. The African leaders who have attempted to detach themselves from such foreign influence like Sekou Toure, Julius Nyerere and others are considered nothing short of international rebels. However, the economic links between the African states and the metropole powers reinforces the vulmerability of these small states to the big power cold war politics. As wukk ve duscysed katerm tge non-alignment policy adopted by most of the African states, and certainly the Republic of Guinea, is a reaction to the cold war politics.

Another short coming of the African leadership in the newly independent African state system, besides reaching to foreign policy questions on a day-to-day basis, is its extreme sensitivity to the foreign pressure, and as Vernan Mekay remarks:

"....They are inclined with their eyes on local reaction, to make public pronouncements which would not always reflect their personal convictions."¹⁵

Beside the handicap of experience in foreign policy, the new states of Africa are further handicapped by weak and vulnerable economies. While the economic vulnerable has been more so a creation of the departed colonial powers, the majority of the independent states have aggravated the situation's by allowing subtle neo-colonial inroads. Thus, although it may still be necessary to depend on the metropole powers for further development assistance, the same developmental assistant has been used as a bait to effectively control the domestic and foreign policies of these newly independent African states. This dependancy is well exemplified by Albert Tevoedjre's "sugar cube" policy.¹⁶ In his sugar cube theory, Tevoedjre comments:

"The economic dependence carried over from the colonial period puts an African in the position of an Alpinist who is thrown a rope that enables him to cling to a cliff exhausted. The rope saves him from immediate death, but as long as he remains hanging in the air he is at the mercy of the person holding the rope."¹⁷

15 Vernon McKay; African in World Politics; Harper and Row Publishers (New York, 1963) pp. 398-407

16. Vernon McKay; African Diplomacy (Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy); Fredrick A. Praeger (New York, 1966) p183

17. Ibid; p. 183

Tevoedjre gives the dependency of Dahomey on French assistance as an illustrative case. According to him Dahomey purchases 75% ad Valorem of its merchandise within the franc zone, and exports about 80% of its products to France. When the world market price for raw materials is at its worst point, France sustains Dahomey by purchasing Dahomey's palm oil at price higher than the world market-price. But France does this only on condition that Dahomey buys its imports from French Industry. For example in 1961, Dahomey sold 68, 131 tons of products to France for 2,581,809,000 francs C.F.A. The Dahomean deficit became a "daily specter relying further on French assistance to finance Dahomey's Administrative budget. Grants totalling over 3 millions francs C.F.A. were devoted to this deficit financing mess between 1961 and 1963. It is not difficult to imagine what could have happened if France withdrew this economic aid from Dahomey over-night. It is also not difficult to imagine who determines Dahomey's domestic as well as her international policy. This type of policy of chaining the client state to the protector's market is what Tevoedjre refers to as the sugar cube policy. The client state becomes hypnotized by the lure of aid from the metropole; just as Partov's dogs were hypnotized by the sugar cube. According to Tevoedjre, the client state is only given sufficient time to nibble a corner off the sugar cube so that its hunger is not satisfied. More aid is extended over a short term and it is always insufficient to cover the needs of the particular period. In a neat comment Tevoedjre comments:

"The beggar is thus always perpetually uncertain. Pulled into an almost scientifically refined combination, he is unceasingly obliged to solicit new credit and to be careful of any 'impudence' likely to annoy the protector."¹⁸

This client/protector policy attitude helps to explain why the majority of the French-speaking African states were reluctant to adopt a pro-Algerian position during the French/Algerian conflict. In a raurification of his 'sugar cube thesis' Tevoedjre criticizes the Dahomeyans for importing French potatoes and eggs while they could use their own domestically produced yarms and eggs and for importing luxury products which even the wealthy French may not at times afford. In a contronary and concluding comment, Tevoedjre remarkds that until Dahomey restrains her nationals from excessive conepicusus consumption and learn to use their own resources, "...they will have no independence, no non-alignment and no foreign policy."¹⁹ The most unhappy scene is that the Dahomeyan story told above accurately portrays the situation of almost all the independent states of Africa. Guinea, the state being discussed in this paper, is not in any way exceptional. This assertion will be elaborated further below. What need to be said at this juncture is that the spirit of self-reliance is still very new to most newly independent African states. This illustrates the reasons why there contunues to be a high dependency of foreign resources particularly those associates with the economic development of

18. Vernon McKay; African Diplomacy op. cit. p 183

19. V. McKay: African Diplomacy; op. cit., p. 184

the new states a situation which aggravates the vulnerability of the small foreign policies of these African states.

In the preceding analysis, my major concern has been to expound on the theory of the vulnerability of the newly emergent African states and the consequent coercive influence of the metropolitan powers. Through somewhat limited, the analysis can nevertheless help us to answer in general the question whether any "independent" African state is viable in the world of contemporary international politics. The analysis so far has not yet attempted to answer to what degree and under what circumstances the small African states can withstand external influence of the big powers. It is not within the scope of this discussion to deal with these two inter-related policy divisions.

Any study of foreign policy determinants is essentially a motivational study requiring the analyst to be more concerned with "the reasons for acting" and the "decision-making process." Such a study is neither a study of acts nor a study of policy.²⁰ The present study, does not therefore present a chronological study of Guinea's foreign policy, but rather it merely attempts to confirm or disapprove our original hypothesis that Guinea's African socialism is one of the key determinants of her

20. I. William Zartman: "National Interest and Ideology." Cited from Vernon McKay; African Diplomacy: op. cit, p. 25 (Carl Rosberg and Ruth Schachler Morgenthau were the main discussants of this paper. see pp. 177-182.

nonalignment policy. This motivational role of African Socialism in Guinea's foreign policy will be the key leading idea in the entire discussion. Having now discussed the political setting (domestic environment) upon/from which decision-making in African foreign policies is based it is now fitting that we define our two basic terms (concepts) of reference: African Socialism and nonalignment.

African Socialism:

The first all Africa conference to attempt a definition of African Socialism was convened in Dakar in December 1962, by Leopold Sedar Senghar, the President of Senegal. Before the conference began its theme was changed from "African Roads to Socialism" to "African Economic Development and Roads to Socialism" A significant change - suggesting that perhaps not all the countries represented at the Dakar Conference were committed to socialism. The Dakar Conference did not succeed in identifying homogeneous natural laws underlying the political and economic policies of all the countries of Black Africa. It did not find a precise definition of African Socialism. But something can exist even if no one can find a definition for it, and socialist may agree on broad objectives without agreeing on the "roads" to be followed to achieve those objectives.²¹ This is understandable in the light of the fact that no two countries have the same social or economic problems, the same history and the same leaders. Furthermore the failure to come

21. Thomas Muhisa and John Fox; What is Socialism? East African Literature Bureau; (Kampala 1972) pp. 33-34

out with a consensus definition on African Socialism at the Dakar conference does not mean that it was a failure in other respects. The assembled African leaders were encouraged to re-examine their traditions, to explore what aspects of those traditions could be maintained and related to a socialist ideology, so that the modern political systems at African would not appear wholly new or imported. Mulusa and Fox contend that the failure to produce a single acceptable definition demonstrates that the leaders were realistically concerned with specific economic problems and that they "were not simply searching for high-sounding but empty slogans."²² Seen in these terms the change of theme for the conference was justified. This conceptual difficulty of defining "African Socialism" is not peculiar to the African socialists alone. In the article "Socialism Revised", M.M. Sankhdher points out that different connotations has been attached to the concept "socialism" The definition of socialism as "a theory of policy that aims at or advocates the ownership or control of the means of production (capital, land, labour, property etc.) by the community as a whole and their administration in the interest of all" is no longer regarded as a standard definition. It is not only formal and ambiguous, but that it also gives a misleading picture by Lidwig the various complex mances in the term in practice.²³

22. Ibid; p. 34

23. M.M. Sankhdher: "Socialism Revised;" Quest (Vol. 51 Autumn, 1966). p. 37

Used first in Italy in 1803, by Robert Owen in 1827, by Saint Simon in 1832, and by Karl Marx in 1867, the concept has meant different and sometimes contradictory things. Thus even today, due to the incoherence or lack of unity of the doctrine the task of giving it a precise definition becomes all the more difficult. Some socialist theoreticians reject its Arvenite parentage as utopian while others denounce its Marxian legacy as "new utopianism". The division into Orthodox and revisionists creates further complications in comprehending this body of beliefs.²⁴ A metamorphosis thus seems to have overtaken socialist thinkers, and most of them now regard themselves as liberal empiricists. The issue of liberty and the feasibility of ideals have become their major concerns, for they have discovered that no claim for any uniform social or economic organization can express socialist ideals in the context of social change. Sankhdher observes that under the new caption of socialism is envisaged economic security to the workers, full employment within a mixed type of economy, extension of social services and increase in the living standards of the masses. A wide departure from rigid positions has therefore become an accepted phenomenon in the current theories of socialism.²⁵

It is thus less surprising that the African Dakar Colloquium on African Socialism in December 1962, should have found it difficult to reach a definitional concensus

24. Ibid; p. 37

25. Ibid; p. 37

on what should be unanimously accepted as "African Socialism." President Sanghor's definition at the Dakar Colloquium that,

"Socialism is for us is nothing but the rational organisation of human society considered in its totality, according to the most scientific, the most modern, and the most efficient methods,"²⁶ might easily be said to be indistinguishable from fascist approach to development had he not latter added,

"...More than the use of the most efficient techniques, it is the sense of community which is the return to African-ness"²⁷ It is arguable if Sanghor's Colloquium

definition, in spite of its later modification, is in any way significantly different from his perception of "negritude,"²⁸ but one thing which was evident in all the deliberations of the Dakar Colloquium was that it was clearly the developmental aspect of socialism that struck the common chord.²⁹ The Colloquium revealed a deep concern with the goals and instruments of economic change.

What is socialism then? And what should we identify as African Socialism? Socialism refers to a form of society

26. Margaret Roberts; "A Socialist Looks at African Socialism;" Cited from, William H. Friendland and Carl G. Rosberg Jr. African Socialism; Stanford University Press (Stanford California, 1964), p. 83

27. Ibid.; p. 83

28. See Senghor's Speech on "Negritude" at University of Oxford, December 1961.

29. Friendland and Carl Rosberg; op. cit; see Chapter 7 for a deeper exposition of the Dakar Colloquium deliberations.

in which natural resources and economic activities are consciously controlled and organised for the benefit of the Community as a whole. In a typical socialist society, the basic means of production are owned by the community and economic activities are usually planned and co-ordinated by a central authority responsible to the community. This aspect distinguishes socialism from capitalism since in the latter, the means of production are owned by private individuals and are utilised for their personal use.³⁰

The late Professor of Social and Political theory at Oxford University Professor G.D.H. Cole, defines socialism thus:-

"...A form of society in which men and women are not divided into opposing economic classes, but line together under conditions of approximate social and economic equality, using in common the means that lie to their hands of promoting social welfare... a social system in which no one is so much richer or poorer than his neighbours as to be unable to mix with them on equal terms, the common ownership and use of all the vital instruments of production, and an obligation upon all citizens to serve one another according to their capacities in promoting the common well-being..."³¹

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30. Ahmed Mohiddiu: Socialism and Class concept in African Development; African Quarterly (Vol. 19)
31. G.D.H. Cole, The Simple Case for Socialism. Victor Gollancz Ltd, (London 1953) ✓

It is because of the community-orientation and emphasis on human equality that socialism has that African Socialists have claimed their societies were basically socialist before the entrenchment of colonialism. That is, the African socialists maintain that the basic principles enshrined in Coles definition of socialism were also an inherent part of the traditional African society. What the African socialists imply by this assertion is that there is no need for the African to go through capitalisms and industrialism in order to arrive at socialism. What is needed is to adapt these basically traditional system to serve modern needs.³² This Africa could if necessary steps are taken, avoid the social and economic compulsions experienced by Europeans in their transfer to socialism. In Mohiddin's view, "... The objective is the same - socialism: but the means must of necessity differ in Africa simply because Africa is not Europe, Asia or America."³³

Just as much as African Roads to socialism must be expected to differ from the European or Asian, the various African socialist states similarly accept this difference. The difference in theoretical approaches to socialism (definition) results in diametrically opposed socialistic practices among the African-confessed socialist states, some of them pursuing capitalist paths of economic development while at the same time proclaiming the doctrine of socialism. This calls for

32. Ahmed Mohiddin: "Socialism and Class concept In African Development" op. cit., p. 85

33. Ibid; p. 85

a brief survey of the various definitional perceptions by Africa's leading proponents of African Socialism. For Leopold Sedar Senghor, African Socialism must not be a carbon copy of European scientific socialism. He asserts that "...Everything in "Scientific Socialisms" is not to be accepted especially its atheistic materialism."³⁴ According to Senghor, Socialism is a method that must be tested with African realities. Thus his versions of the African Road to Socialism includes the integration of the contributions of European socialism with the African traditional values, and in definitional terms he defines African Socialism as "... essentially the transformation of the economic relation between men, and the transformation of economic structures themselves."³⁵ By rejecting European socialism, atheistic communism and democratic socialism of the second International as the basic origin of African (Senegalese) socialism, Senghor pinpoints to lead his Senegalese society toward a Negro-African mode of socialisms (which he alternatively calls African Mode of Socialism), an original mode, and one which stresses an the attainment of economic democracy and spiritual freedom. He further argues that in the efforts of trying to build up the Negro-African mode of socialism the basic problem would not be to put an end to the exploitations of man by his fellow man, but rather to prevent it from happening, by bringing political and economic democracy back to life.³⁶

34. Leopold Sedar Senghor: The African Road to Socialism (p. 83)

35. Leopold Sedar Senghor: The African Road to Socialism; op. cit. p. 101

Mamadou Dia, the former Senegalese Prime Minister, Like Senghor maintains an African Socialism being the synthesis of between socialistic and individualistic values. "... a true humanism, which will rest on African reality and African values while not rejecting the enviching contributions of other cuñtures, will be genuinely African but will at the same time have universal character." What is distinct about Dia's perception of African Socialism is his subtle attempt to link up African Socialism with nonCalignment. In this regard he remarks.

"...it is within our vision of a hammonious world that we shall seek to build African Socialism, in order that it may satisfy man's present needs and his future aspirations. To be more specific, we believe that since Africa is not going to be committed to any bloc, a synthesis will be possible between individualistic and socialistic values, hammony between them being achieved in the complete human personality."³⁷

More important in Dia's definition of African socialism is his rejection that the new synthesis should infuse within itself the categories of idealism which includes:

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36. W.H. Friendland; African Socialism; "African Style Socialism," By Leopold Sedar Senghor pp. 264-266. Also Senghor's Lecture delivered in 26th Oct. 1961 at Oxford; Also West Africa November 11, 1961.
37. Mamadou Dia: "African Socialism;" cited from Wikliam H. Fiendland; African Socialism op. cit p. 248

Marxism, materialism, and liberation.³⁸ Thus a basic commonality in the perception of African style socialism by Senghor, Mamadou Dia, both regarded as some of the leaders of the African socialist movement of the cultural - humanistic school is that the political platform of the ideology is to improve the regime in the spirit of both European democracy and local traditions . As Marian Mushkat puts it:

"There are co-operative cells remaining from the past; yet the platform includes planks on private enterprise and foreign capital as well as production systems supervised by the state for the common benefit."³⁹

Several points from this platform have also found their way into the theories of the Ivory Coast leader F.C. Houphouët-Boigny, who is now regarded as the most prominent representative of the liberal-capitalist school in the African continent.⁴⁰

Nkurumah's expression of his thoughts on African Socialism are recalled in his concern for raising 'an equitable' and "progressive" social order in the newly independent nations of Africa. In more concrete terms this meant providing full employment in the Ghanaian economy, good housing, equal opportunity for educational and cultural advancement up to

38. See Mamadou Dia's speech made on April 4, 1961 at Dakar at the National Assembly on the occasion of the Anniversary of Independence Day.
Also see: (Socialist international Information (London, XI No. 18 (May 6, 1961) pp. 276-277

39. Marion Mushkat: "African Socialism Reappraised and Reconsidered" (AFRICA (Vol. XXXVII No. 2 August 1972). pp. 168-169.

40. Ibid; p. 169

the highest level possible for all the people (Ghanaians) In real facts all this meant "that real income of all types of workers, farmers, and peasants must rise; that prices of goods must not overleap wages; that house rentals must be within the means of all groups; that educational and cultural amenities must be available to all the people."⁴¹ Distinct ~~*~~ in Nkurumah's socialism was his orientation to the Marxist aim of state ownership of productive property. Like all modern marxists, Nkurumah' could not conceive of a socialist state or society which is not also an industrial society. Though proper education, rapid industrialization and state ownership, Nkurumah thought that the existing classes could be abolished, the formation of new social classes prevented and the stage of capitalist development by-passed.⁴² Thus "Ghanaian socialism" is the concept of "consciencism" which stresses the fight against backwardness and the strengthening of political and economic independence. For Nkurumah, the process of rapid industrialization meant building roads, ports power plants, dams and other projects, widening the co-operative movement and mechanized agriculture. These achievements, however, were made through harsh dictates which corrupted the ruling elite and which consed a queat waste of

41. Kwame Nkurumah; Some Aspects of Socialism in Africa. An article by the President of Ghana in Pan-Africa (Nairobi) April 19, 1963, pp. 13-14.

42. Colin Legum: "Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretatio Cited from W.H. Frienland: African Socialism; op. cit pp. 131-133. Also see Mushkat. op. cit. p. 170

resources. Mushkat comments that the country's financial condition was weakened by these activities; by Nkurumah's expenditures on pan-African Conferences and by subversive movements against conservative governments and by the decline of it in the prices of cocoa and other raw materials in the world market. The tribal, political and intellectual opposition subverted Nkurumah's program, harming the interests of the rich while not helping the poor. The gap between platforms and reality caused Nkurumah's growing bitterness and loneliness and since his form of socialism was, little more than personality act these factors made his downfall easier.⁴³ Like Trotsky, in different circumstances, Nkurumah rejected the notion that socialism can be built in a single country in Africa. For him, the building of socialism in Ghana must be accompanied by the building of socialism, throughout the continent. This belief, according to Colin Legum, rests on the premise that independence in Africa is indivisible and that there can be no real independence without economic independence, which in turn depends upon socialist development. Hence his advocacy of a continent-wide, single mass, political party.⁴⁴

43. Mushkat: op. cit. pp. 170-171

44. Kwame Nkurumah; Africa Must Unite (New York: Praeger, 1963) p. 119

In relation to African tradition society, the Osagyefo sees socialism as historically revolutionary but genetically evolutionary. He thus includes in his Manifesto five major prescriptions of attaining African socialism. Firstly, he argues that socialist in Africa should seek a connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the people before their social evolution was "ravaged by colonialism"; Secondly, African Socialists should seek from colonialism those elements like new methods of industrial production and economic organization which can be adapted to serve the interests of the people; thirdly to seek ways and means of crushing the growth of class inequalities, and antagonism created by the "capitalist habit of colonialism; fourthly to reclaim the psychology of the people by erasing "colonial mentality;" and finally to defend the independence and country of the people⁴⁵ Consciencism also seeks to describe the principles, strategy and methods by which "liberated territories" can achieve their transition socialism. It is clear in his 'consciencism' that the Osagyefo had launched and signed himself in his new role as the "Lion of Africa." While basing himself on 'scientific socialism' he continuously avoided aligning himself with the communist world by revising Marxism to give it particular application to Africa.

45. Colin Legum: Op. cit. p. 156

Thus what had evolved as Ghanaian Socialism between 1957 and 1960 emerged as a new and full-fledged ideology - NKRUMAISM in 1961. This new doctrine was defined by Nkrumah's devoted Defence Minister, Mr. Kofi Baako "...as a nonatheistic socialist philosophy which seeks to apply the current socialist ideas to the solution of our problems... by adapting these ideas to the realities of our everyday life. It is basically socialism adapted to suit the conditions and circumstances of Africa... The African traditional social system is basically commonalistic. i.e., Socialistic - a society in which the welfare of the individual is bound up with the welfare with all the people in the community. For this reason Nkrumaism is a social idea and a way life that is important that I stress that Nkrumaism does not aim at the abolition of personal ownership of your own personal property... provided that you do not use what you have to foster an exploitation of man by man."⁴⁶

Dr. Nkrumah's own definition of Nkrumaism is blandly
fragmatic: ⁴⁷

"In Ghana, we have embarked on the socialist path to progress, but it is socialism with a difference.

Some have called it "Nkrumaism." It is not socialism

46. Mr. Kofi Baako; "Nkrumaism" The Ghanaian Times (Accra) January 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 1961.

47. Colin Legum: op. cit. p. 141 (article in *Friendland African Socialism.*)

for the sake of socialism, but a practical solution of the country's problems. We want to see full employment good housing and an equal opportunity for education and cultural advancement for all the people up to the highest level possible."⁴⁸

These definitions were highly enticized and By 1964, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, "in consultation with Osagyefo the President," announced the following definition:

"Nkrumaism is the ideology for the New Africa, independent and absolutely free from imperialism, organized on a continental scale founded upon the conception of One and United Africa, drawing its strength from modern science and technology and from the traditional African belief that the free development of each is conditioned by the free development of all."⁴⁹

From the latter definition, Colin Legum notes that 'Nkrumaism' (the new Ghanaian proclaimed mode of development) placed its major emphasis on Pan-Africanism rather than socialism.⁵⁰

There is nothing substantially different in the latter definition as compared to the original definition of Ghanaian socialism except the Nkrumaistic personality cult.

48. Kwame Nkrumah Africa Must Unite. op. cit; p. 119

49. The Spark (Accra), April 3, 1964

50. Colin Legum; Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation op. cit. 141.

The system, not goals, differentiates the socialism of Nkrumah, Senghor, Dia and others from that of Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and the late Tom Mboya. The Kenyan leaders attribute a socialist character to traditional African Society. They emphasize the importance of principles over changes in the economy. Kenya's sessional Paper No. 10., which is the principle document explaining socialism in Kenya states that the regime must be: rooted in the best African traditions; able to adapt to new and rapidly changing circumstances; and non-dependant on any other state or group of states. Foremost among the positive African traditions outlined in the document are: democracy, equality and mutual responsibility. The document states that the ability to adapt is closely connected to the realization of these basic principles through effective solutions to pressing problems.⁵¹ Marxism is rejected as inaplicable to the Kenya situation and political independence is seen as an expression of "African Socialism." aid is acceptable only when it entails no political or economic obligation. Further state planning and state control of industry and agriculture - a system adapted to the traditional African use of land for the general benefit are all practical issues envisaged in the document. In rejecting Marxist class separation and class conflict as totally foreign to the African scene the paper recommends state control of foreign investment, local acumulation of capital and development

51. Marion Mushkat; op cit. p. 173

of ownership.⁵² In an attempt to define African Socialism Joseph Tom Mboya writes:

"When I talk of 'African Socialism' I refer to those proved codes of conduct in the African Societies which have over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity which characterized our society and I refer to the African's thought processes and cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means but as an entity in the society."⁵³

In Mboya's view socialism is a mental conditioning or an attitude of mind established in order to achieve rational relationship and harmony in society. The concept stands for equality of opportunity, security of income and employment, equality before the law, individual freedom, universal franchise, state regulation of economic life, state control of vital means of production and distribution etc.⁵⁴ In spite of the universality of these basic elements prescribing a socialist state, Mboya notes that these principles must be interpreted and modified to fit the needs of the African states. He contends that "...Each state has its own history; its own culture; its own inheritance of economic

52. Ibid, p. 174

53. W.H. Friendland and Carl Rosberg; African Socialism op. cit. p. 251.

54. Ibid., p. 252 (It is interesting to note Mboya's reference to the mental construct - the attitude of mind as the basis of African Socialism. This notion is identical to Nyerere's emphasis on Socialism being very much an attitude of mind. It's probable that Nyerere had an influence on Mboya's writing.)

institutions and resources, and its own problems.

"...to impose on a people a rigid system that takes no account of their needs, desires, aspirations, and customs is to court disaster and failure."⁵⁵ A more desirous understanding of the Kenya African Socialism should be counted with the literature that characterised the dialogue that ensued from the document between the intellectuals and some politicians, particularly between Ahmed Mohiddin,⁵⁶ and Tom Mboya.⁵⁷ Mohiddin maintains that the Kenyan Road to Socialism is a Road toward capitalism. He refutes that the doctrine processed by the document is neither African nor is it socialism. It is outright capitalism. (Mohiddin p. 15) Mohiddin further asserts that "...the basis of Kenya African Socialism is not traditional African values. It is through the judicious manipulation of the profit motive that Kenya expects to bring about economic growth and with it development generally" (p. 15) It is also noted that the document put maximum emphasis on the economic aspect of socialism, to the exclusion of others, and that social and political implications of economic development are not attended to seriously (p. 12) It is not of course, the intension of this discussion to resume the Mohiddin/Mboya debate but suffice it to say that

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55. Tom Mboya: The Challenge of Nationhood; Heinemann Educational Books; (Ibadan, 1970), p. 76
56. Ahmed Mohiddin: "Socialism or Capitalism? Sessional Paper No. 10. Revisited" East African Journal; March, 1969); pp. 7-15
57. Tom Mboya: "Sessional Paper No. 10. It is African and it is socialism" East African Journal; (May 1969) pp. 15-22.

stipulations on such documents are more often than not statements of intension than reality. Mohiddin's analysis of Kenya's repudiated socialism is very revealing of what one finds in most self-confessed socialist states in Africa. Learning Kenya's own brand of Africanised capitalism ephemistically entitled 'African Socialism' it is fitting that he examine Nyerere's notion of African Socialism.

Nyerere's version of socialism, also called 'Ujamaaism',⁵⁸ is primarily based on the individual's mental construct. Reducing it to an attitude of mind, President J.K. Nyerere argues that the basis of this socialism is essentially the belief in the oneness of man, the common historical destiny of mankind. In short it is the belief in human equality. The choice of the concept Ujamaaism as expressive of Tanzania-style socialism is based on two premises. Firstly, the concept is African and thus emphasizes the policies Tanzania intends to follow. Secondly, the literal meaning of term is "family-hood and thus "brings to the mind of the people the idea of mutual involvement, in the family as we know it today"⁵⁹

Like the other socialists, Nyerere believes in the universality of socialism. "socialism is international;

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58. Ujamaaism is Tanzania - style socialism and should not be confused with Nyerere's general definition of Socialism
59. Julius K. Nyerere: Freedom and Socialism; Oxford University Press; (Dar es Salaam, 1968); p. 2

its ideas and beliefs relate man to man in society, not just to Tanzanian man in Tanzania, or African man in Africa;"⁶⁰ Nonetheless, Nyerere stresses that by using the term "Ujamaa" it is implied that Tanzania wishes to build socialism on the foundations of the African past, renovating the past with modernity; but at the same time renouncing the importation into Tanzania of a foreign ideology.

More central in Tanzania's "Ujamaaism" is the attempt to eradicate exploitation of man by man; democratization of institutions that is facilitating every person to participate in the affairs of his own government; institutionalization of individual freedom; equitable distribution of national resources% accompanied by state control and public ownership of the major means of production.

In his analysis of European Socialism, Nyerere contends that the later emerged as a result of social warfare (class conflict). He argues that the European Agrarian Revolution created the 'landed' and the 'landless' classes in society; and that the Industrial Revolution produced the modern capitalist and the industrial proletariat. These two revolutions planted the seeds of conflict within society and that not only was European socialism born of that conflict, but that its apostles sanctified the conflict itself into a philosophy- The Marxian philosophy of class conflict. By rejecting scientific, socialism - the new religion or theology of socialism as the holy writ importable and implantable to Africa Nyerere refutes the applicability of Marxian analysis of class

conflict in the African context. He thus remarks:

"Brought up in tribal socialism, I must say that I find this contradiction (class conflict or class war which he also calls Civil war) quite intolerable. It gives capitalism philosophical status which capitalism neither claims nor deserves. For it virtually says, 'without capitalism, and the conflict which capitalism creates within society, there can be no socialism.' This glorification of capitalism by the doctrinaire European socialists, I repeat I find intolerable."⁶¹

Nyerere even doubts the word 'class' ever existed in the African traditional setting or even in any indigenous African language. Synically noting that African Socialism did not have the "benefit" of the Agrarian and/or the Industrial Revolution(s), it could not have started from the existence of conflicting classes in society. 'The Foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is the extended family. The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the 'brethren' for the extermination of the "non brethren". He rather regards all men as his brethren and members of his ever extending family."⁶² from this analysis of

61. W.H. Friendland and Carl & Rosberg: 'African Socialism' op. cit., pp. 245-6

62. Friendland and Roseberg: op. cit. p. 246

African socialism it becomes evident why Nyerere has always been reluctant to admit the presence of social divisions, least of all antagonistic classes, even though he implies that they may have been spanned by non-African forces during the colonial years.

Nyerere's basic contention, therefore is that the traditional African society does provide the basis for socialism, certainly in Tanzania. What is needed is the adaptation of this essentially traditional base to a modern nation state. Thus the stress is always on the essence of socialism and not on its outward forms or on particular means of achieving it; and what is asserted by Nyerere and his socialist colleagues is not so much an Africanization of socialism, as an African approach to Socialism. As Nyerere put it to his Egyptian academic audience in Cairo in 1967:

"It is not possible for a country which moves to socialism from a highly developed capitalist economy to follow the same path as one which starts from a backward peasant economy. Nor is it likely ...that two backward countries moving towards socialism will follow exactly the same path if one starts from a fental base and another from traditional communalism. East state must move in a direction which is appropriate to its starting point."⁶³

63. Julius Nyerere: Mwalimu In Cairo, April 1967, Tanzania Information service p. 21. Also for a detailed discussion on the Cairo speech see: Julius Nyerere: "The Varied Paths to Socialism," J.K. Nyerere "Freedom and Socialism" op. cit. pp. 301-210

In conclusion, it should be noted that by reducing socialism - and democracy - to the function of an attitude of mind, what Nyerere is claiming is that, as a social system, socialism is not to be attributed to any geographical area or to a particular breed of people. What is important is the attitude the individuals in that system have towards one another and towards property. In other words Nyerere reconfirms his belief in the universality of African socialism.

Guinean socialism founded by the pragmatist socialist, President Sekou Toure is fairly different in approach compared to the rest of the African Roads to socialism already discussed above. Sekou Toure opposes tribal separatism, and views the "African Personality" as something in need of further development - not merely as an expression of values. Guinean socialism stresses social justice, perhaps as a result of Toure's activities in trade Unions and also because of his reactive sensibility to the conditions of workers. He emphasizes the need the masses to organize centralization of the government advancement of pan-African goals and fermiriation of dependence on foreigners/Mushkat Marion, p. 16a).

Sekou Toure reflects the same attitude towards the centrality of class in the evolution of socialism as Nyerere and Senghor. He argues that we must examine the totality of African Society as it is now, and should not be deluded by the development in other parts of society which might be different because of their contact with outside corrupting influences. He puts it thus:

"Africa is essentially 'communocratic.' Collective life and social solidarity give her habits a humanistic foundation which many people may envy. It is also because of those human qualities that an African cannot imagine organizing his life outside that of his group - family, village or clan. The voice of African people is not individualistic. On the contrary in spheres contaminated by the mentality of the colonised, who has not observed the progress of personal egoism? Who has not heard the exponents of the theory of art for the sake of art, poetry for the sake of poetry, the theory of each for himself?"⁶⁴

Thus, according to Sekou Toure, African society has in its traditions those principles which are generally associated with socialism like Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure rejects the emphasis and existence on class struggle as the basis of African socialism. He not only refutes the notion of the African class struggle but he also denies the possibility of the emergence of such a phenomenon. He therefore notes: "The class struggle here is impossible, for there are no classes, but only social strata. The fundamental basis of our society is the family and the village community."⁶⁵ We need not

64. Ahmed Sekou Toure, "African Elites and the People's Struggle," Spearhead, Dar es Salaam, July/August 1962.

65. Kenneth W. Grundy; "The Class Struggle in Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories" Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, 3 (1964) pp. 379-393.

detain ourselves in discussing Guinean socialism in this chapter since the issue is raised again in better chapters, but it is noteworthy to mention here that Sekou Toure conceptualizes of realistic class division as being torn between the trans-national and international perspectives. By internationalizing class warfare he for convenience groups all Europeans as comprising a class of exploitative 'haves', and the Africans as a collective class of the oppressed 'have-nots). He emphatically refutes the vertical trans-national division of social classes in Guinea and attempts in his national policies to suppress any potential upsurge of such social classes. In this purely analytic class concept, President Sekou Toure states that "The Anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle represents in reality in the framework of a group of nations, the national form of the class struggle between nations which oppress and exploit other peoples and the peoples of the exploited nations." (Kenneth W. Grundy p, 384).

Having dealt with the various 'varied Paths to socialism' it should be assumed that all Africa has turned socialist. Not all African leaders regard themselves as socialists and just as the ideology of socialism is popular with some leaders, it is equally 'abhorred and avoided by others.' As important as this distinction between the African socialists and the non-socialist african leaders is also the differences that exist among the disciples of African socialism particularly in their methodological approach to socialism. This distinction

has already been dealt with above.

Despite the fact that African socialism is a heterogeneous concept, at least three basic themes are discernible: The problem of continental identity; the crisis of economic development; and finally, the dilemma of control and African class formation. The last two themes are brought out later in the analysis of Guinea's socialism. At this juncture we shall only attempt to analyze the first theme - i.e. The problem of continental identity.

The concept African Socialism is both differentiative and identitive. It identifies itself with its practitioners and isolates itself from other kinds of socialism. It comotes the Africanness of socialism as an ideology. The ideology thus embodies a cluster of ideas through which African leaders are searching for some common identity and therefore, they give African socialism a unique African identity - a continental identity. As Friendland and Rosberg have argued (Friendland and Rosberg, p. 4), African Socialism therefore culminated in becoming both a reaction against Europe and a search for a unifying doctrine, Movements such as Leopold Senghor's negritude and Kwame Nkrumah's African Personality were nothing more than a search for this continental identity. Though differently conceived the objective goals were the same. It was in these circumstances that an African form of socialism began to emerge and bult on the foundation of traditional values and beliefs @ the African communalistic way of life. Friendland and Rosberg note that the mythos of an African socialism

developed as political leaders sought a doctrine to replace the ontrouded unifying influence of anticolonialism. Thus while anticolonialism was the unifying force during the pre-independence era, African Socialism was conceived as its alternative in the post-independence period.⁶⁶

After attempts to continentalize nationalism and neo-colonialism as identitive concepts had failed. The institutionalization of African socialism by its proponents has advoitly meant the creation of an African unifying mythology similar to the concept of non alignment in its identitive and functional roles. The implications of African socialism in the national and international systems has not had effect especially in the politics of foreign policies.

Non-alignment: Non-alignment or positive neutralism as it is sometimes called, is a recent concept, and a response to those too conspicuous landmarkd os the post-1945 world war, the atomic bomb and the cold war. It is necessary to distinguish non-alignment from neutrality since while the latter is a "pos@ive" policy, the former is an active policy. Whereas neutrals are primarily concerned with keeping out of war when it comes, non-alignment is an active policy primarily aimed at averting a major war, and settling minor ones between

66. Friendland and Rosberg, op. cit. pp. 4-5

* Iam highly indebted to Dr. A.T. Mugomba for his stimulation Lectures on non-alignment. This section heavily borrows from his anlytical lecture notes on non-alignment and from his MSc Thesis. However, the interpretation of these combined works plus any other supplementing elaborations on the subject (non-alignment) remains entirely the responsibility of the author of this paper.

two contesting sides. In other words non-alignment is a specific kind of neutrality in a war that has not yet began. Mugamba has argued (see notation below), a non-aligned state, unlike a neutral state, can fight its own wars and still remain neutral, as India has done with Pakistan (1965 and 1971) and Portugal (1962 over Goa). The non-alignment policy of such a state is comperilled only when it is drawn into a conflict with one side in the cold war and has to rely on help from the others, e.g. during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. India was extremely anxious to secure some-even if only token - help from the Soviet Union against China, in order to avoid relying wholly on Western support.⁶⁷ Though used synonymously with positive neutrality, neutralism or non-commitment, non-alignment as a concept is deficient of any operational definition and this lack of a satisfactory practical definition explains why it is possible for virtually every Third World nation to claim that it accepts and practises (or tries to) such a policy in its international relations.⁶⁸ For instance, "all independent African States" claim to be officially non-aligned and have, in fact, institutionalized 'a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs' in Article 111, Section 7 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.⁶⁹ By " all independent African

67. Dr. A.T. Mugomba, "The concept of Neutrality in International Politics' (Lecture Notes pp. 20-21)

68. Ibid; 'Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Politics' Lexture xi p. 25)

69. Patrick J. McGovan: Africa and Non-alignment: A Comparative Study of foreign Policy." International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1968)

states" is meant all other sovereign states excluding the white-ruled countries in the South-Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. Malawi is in this case treated as a setellite of the white - dominated south. It is nonetheless important to distinguish between neutralism and non-alignment since proponents of neutralist and nonaligned policies mistakenly use the two concepts interchangeably and synonymously. Neutralism refers to perceptual characteristics, or a set of attitudes, underlying non-alignment. Dr. Mugomba indentifies two basic aspects of neutralism: negative (or passive) neutralism, whereby a state is recognised in international law and practice as neutral and obligates itself to permanently refrain from commitment to any side in a conflict situation or in time of open warfare, and positive (or active) neutralism, whereby a state chooses to undertake a 'balancing act' in its policy towards states in conflict, not a balance of power but a balance of trust.⁷⁰ On the other hand non-alignment refers to the official policy of the Afro-Asian states of non-belligerence in the Cold War. The implication of this policy choice is that the state does not automatically align itself with one side against another on some particular issue, but rather, it implies the states expressed desire to take independent decisions on foreign policy issues related to Cold War politics. As Mugomba has contended, judgement is not predetermined by commitment to

70. A.T. Mugomba; African Foreign Policy: The Dichotomy Between Pan-African Ideology and National Interest. MSc Thesis (University of Southampton, 1970). p. 56

or taken as a given by one side. Such independent decision - making is based on the individual state's perception, evaluation, and interpretation of events in its external environment according to its own interests, be they ideological, economic, short - or long-term, parochial or national interests.⁷¹ Hence non-alignment is not a policy of withdrawal, self-abnegation, or indifference in the field of international politics and foreign policy but a configuration of conscious, calculated decisions and policies, or undertakings designed to reflect and maintain the appearance of an independent line in the international environment.⁷²

Varied reasons have been given by foreign policy analysts explaining what motivates the African states to adopt non-aligned policies, but it is important to realize that no such a policy is taken collectively. Each state is motivated to be either aligned or non-aligned depending on the domestic political setting and its bearing in the international system. No one could convince Malawi's Banda that he should stick to non-alignment when his land-locked state would in the course of de-aligning itself with the white south lose all the opportunities of exploiting its relations with Vosters regime. To this extent non-alignment is a policy to be adopted for convenience and not for expedience. It is a policy that has to be taken on rational grounds and not for the sake of

71. Ibid. pp. 56-57

72. A.T. Mugomba (MSc Thesis) op. cit. p 57

conformity. Nonetheless the explanations given in support of African non-alignment are that: Firstly such a policy insulates the newly independent non-aligned African states, from a return of Western imperialism in its new and more civilized form - neocolonialism. The new states of Africa fear that their historical connections with the metropole powers would regain their lost colonizing status this adulterating the newly gained sovereignty. Thus the non-aligned policy is taken as a protectionist policy to guard the new African states from a second round of post-independence neo-colonial domination. The experience of the small newly independent African states with colonial rule makes them abhor the very thought of being 're-colonized.' Hence the justification of non-alignment. This theory de-emphasizes non-alignment as a response to the Cold War politics. Thus African countries are non-aligned not because they fear Communist domination, the evidence of which fails to support many of the allegations⁷³, but because they fear implications of a second round of neo-colonial balkanization. Thus a Nigerian lawyer participating at an international colloquium on Africa speak for themselves commented: "It is true," he said, "that we do not know the Russians, but we know the West, and our long life under foreign rule unfortunately taught us that we cannot trust the West. Our distrust of our former rulers is the basic cause of our non-alignment. If we commit

73. Mugomba, (MSc Thesis) op. cit, p. 58

ourselves", he concluded, "it will be to ideas - meaning the ideas of human freedom and dignity - not to the West."⁷⁴

Nazli Moustafa Choucri suggests in his theoretical model of non-alignment that the non-aligned states perceive the configuration of the international system as threatening to their existence, to their desire for recognition, and to their aspiration for better domestic conditions. As a result these states fear the external political environment and generally oppose prevailing cleavages and decisions. In this respect the variables of threat and fear may be instrumental in the development of non-alignment;" and that the "perceptual orientation of the national leadership may well be the most significant determinant of a states alignment or non-alignment."⁷⁵ Thus non-alignment or "positive neutralism" for the African nations is a response to the threat they perceive from the international environment in which they single out the Western powers as the source of their fear and distrust. Analytically, therefore, the inherent implications in non-alignment that there be a 'balance' in the state's attitude towards the cold war protagonists, many of the African states seem much more concerned about the Western states. This attitudinal conduct shifts the operational focus of non-alignment from the Cold War proper to the attention of the impact of Western bloc

74. Vernon McKay, African Diplomacy, "International Conflict Patterns; op. cit., p. 19

75. Nazli Moustafa Chouri, "The Perceptual Base of Non-alignment" (PhD. Thesis, Stanford University, 1968) pp. 58-63

imperial influence.

Thirdly, the African states adopt non-alignment as their foreign policies purely on the basis of the doctrine of national interest. In his comparison of the founding fathers of the United States with those of African leaders today, a Sierra Leone professor teaching at the University of Nigeria at Nsukka showed, in the same colloquium cited above, how both wanted (1) no entangling alliances, (2) fewer trade restrictions (3) rapid economic development and industrialisation, (4) the full and free exercise of the right of sovereignty, (5) the withdrawal of foreign governments from their continent, and (6) a hemispheric association of states. Tested against this criteria the African states are induced to adopt non-alignment for national interest more than any other reason.⁷⁶

Protagonists of Cold War sometimes contend that the basic cause of non-alignment lies in its potentialities for "black - mailing" both the Western and Soviet powers for economic aid although as McKay points out, these powers never think of themselves as guilty of "briberly" when they try to buy friends with aid. McKay destroys this thesis by arguing that while the Africans are quite praqutic in stating that they want aid from both sides in order to achieve their major objective of rapid economic development, this should not be taken as the original course of non-alignment, since Nehru set the tone of

76. C.F. Vernon McKay, op. cit. p. 18

non-alignment in 1947 before the cold war competition to aid Asia and Africa began. The Soviet Union began its assistance program to Asia in 1953, and to Africa in 1958 (apart from military aid to Egypt in 1955). It is the fear of neo-colonialism, reinforced by national interest that fortify the pursuit of non-alignment by most African states. Nkrumah pinpointed the relationship of neo-colonialism to non-alignment when he attacked the European common Market as neo-colonialist form of "collective colonialism" in a speech on June 4, 1962, to a group of freedom fighters being trained in Ghana. He argued that African states entering the Common Market, would lose their option of non-alignment and "find themselves dragged into the diplomacy of imperialist cold war politics....."⁷⁷ In Nkrumah's view non-alignment not only fenced the African states from the intrusion of neo-colonialism but also from the cold war conflicts.

Besides these basic motivating factors, bifolarization in the international system after World War II has been another national for non-alignment. This intrusive dimension gives the non-aligned states the lee way to actively penetrate the cold war or Super-Power subsystem in order to encourage positive changes in the attitudes of the major powers. Connected to this factor has been the introvertive perception of the third world states wishing to make independent decisions

77. McKay, African Diplomacy, "International Conflict Patterns, op. cit. p. 19

on international issues according to the merits of the individual cases and an evaluation of national interests, rather than decisions being predetermined by alignment.

On ideological bases, it is possible to argue that non-alignment has emerged as a result of the belief that Third World states, particularly the Afro-Asian ones, do not and cannot share with either of the blocs in their political, economic, and social systems. In this respect, non-alignment emerges as a rejection of the ideological premises upon which the great power confrontations are based. It is also a refusal to emulate or imitate the systems developed and perfected by both capitalist and socialist nations, even though most of the non-aligned states are creatures of the Western world and also some admire the socialist achievements of the Eastern powers and are attracted to Marxist - Leninist ideology.

The emergence of non-alignment was/is fortified by the desire for freedom of opinion without subjection to constraints which cut across national aspirations or values in international politics, e.g. freedom to criticise certain actions of some major powers, such as America over Indo-China or Russia over Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Finally, non-alignment psychologically satisfies its profounders. In other words the psychological or emotional value attached to political independence and its protection, even though such independence is only nominal for many states,

as well as the "psychic" feeling of satisfaction associated with the belief that there is some type of security or immunity afforded by staying out of great power conflicts also serves as a good basis, if not a goal, of the policy of non-alignment and thus inducing the weak, small, poor, developing states to adopt such a policy both in the international politics and in their foreign policy.

Before we conclude this section it is needful that we examine the basic principles underlying the policy of non-alignment. In the main this effort will help us to establish a crude criteria of evaluating or differentiating the aligned states from those that profess to follow or those that actually pursue a policy of non-alignment. The essence of the policy of non-alignment is a deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the great powers or permanent military bases on one's territory. In more elaborate terms, those are a number of criteria adopted at the June 1961 Preparatory Meeting in Cairo for the Belgrade Summit Conference held in September 1961, which have served as the criteria to distinguish a non-aligned country. Primarily these criteria were (and have continued to be) that a non-aligned country should

- (a) Follow an independent policy of non-alignment (this was never defined) or non-commitment in great power conflicts, and the principles of co-existence at 'different' states,

- (b) Support national liberation movements in colonial territories (and perhaps illegitimate ones in other places, such as the Palestinian movement);
- (c) Not be a member of a multilateral military pact in the context of the East - West struggle,
- (d) Not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a big Power in the East - West struggle, and finally
- (e) Not grant military bases to foreign powers (receiving military assistance was excluded somehow, perhaps because the three dominant non-aligned states all relied on foreign military aid i.e. India, Egypt and Yugoslavia).

Tested against this list of criteria, and despite their claim to be non-aligned, the African states are not entirely unaligned. Scholars such as Vernon McKay have shown that they are aligned in three respects: (1) Their own regional and intra-African groupings; (2) bilateral and multilateral military arrangements between African states and external powers, thirteen African states having such agreements with members of the NATO system in 1965, and finally (3) economic, technical and cultural agreements with non-African powers.⁷⁸

78. Vernon McKay, "International Conflict Patterns" in V. McKay, ed., African Diplomacy. op. cit. p. 16

There are certainly some good reasons for the alignment of Africa's officially non-alignment as it is conceived in Africa does not preclude close cooperation with non African states. Non-alignment is not neutrality. While in power, Nkrumah wrote, "Ghana does not intend to follow a neutralist policy in its foreign relations, but does intend to preserve its independence to act as it sees best at any time."⁷⁹ One authority of non-alignment has also written that above all neutralism or non-alignment implies diplomatic freedom of action and choice with respect to Cold War contestants."⁸⁰ As McGowan argues and as I have already noted earlier, the consequence of this position is that "the African states must necessarily take part in every international problem or conflict. What is essential is not systematically to support one or the other blocs,⁸¹ but as McGowan has noted, for some African states, the avoidance of systematic support has proved extremely difficult to achieve. This paper will attempt to show that even the Republic of Guine has been trapped up in this bloc systematic support.

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79. C.f. Kwame Nkrumah, I speak of Freedom (New York: Praeger, 1961). pp. 97-98
80. Cecil V. Grabb, The Elephant and the Grass: A study of Non-alignment (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 11
81. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories of Foreign Policies," in R.B. Farrell (ed.) Approaches To Comparative and International Politics; Northwestern University Press; (Evanston, 1966), p. 31

Methodology and Limitations:


One of the common declared objectives of the new states is to maintain on independent hand in the conduct of their foreign relations. Unfortunately for the small new states, the right to exercise the freedom of such independent decision-making is not within the domain of their foreign policy processes. Somebody somewhere (unidentified) makes the decision. Policy analysts express it only in terms of dependency - vulnerability relationships. A general theory or a methodological approach applicable to the already known interactive variables or linkage relationships in these states is more often than not implicit and intractable. Little is even known on the actual influence of the internal/external stimuli on the foreign policies being pursued. It certainly is not enough to merely recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors since such knowledge does not sufficiently help us to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates the other. And in these respects very little progress has been shown to ward off the growing deficiency of such seriously needed analytic tools.⁸² If this complaint can be assumed to indicate the general problem one still add that little attention has been given to the new states particularly the African states. Very little systematic analysis has been done on the linkage theory of the African

states and whatever appears is either on case-study basis or general foreign policy commentaries. In short very scanty information exists on such relationships as: The impact of foreign aid on Country X's foreign policy; the role of American aid and support in country Y's foreign policy; or The influence of British 'hidden' diplomacy in country Z. To lament over these micro problems in foreign policy analyses into merely hint about the falsehoods taken as truths as a result of having enough premises to reach the conclusions one often finds in commentaries on International issues and foreign policies of the African states. Having taken this detour, it is enough to frankly and yet not unfairly say that the field of African states' foreign policies is not yet usefully exploited by students of foreign policy or comparative politics.

This study has however, used Yash Tandon's Input - Process - Output model of foreign policy analysis, a model which is partly suitable for our present analysis.⁸³ Like most theories, Tandon's inquiry model is deficient in its theory particularly in its treatment of ideology - in fact the model is hardly prepared to handle motivational studies, though it provides useful analytic tools for most case studies of foreign policies. Its basic advantage is that its purposely conceptualized

83. Yash Tandon: "The foreign Policy of Uganda: A Methodological Inquiry;" Social Science Conference, (Makerere 1966) Vol. 2 pp. 3-4

for use by students of foreign policies in the new states and even increasingly so by students of comparative politics.



Demands, in terms of which the foreign policy, and other goals of the system are formulated may arise from the international environment. It may be useful to distinguish two kinds of demands from the international environment: Firstly demands presented by international events requiring the state to take up certain positions on them e.g. The declaration of the U.D.I., or the American-Belgium rescue operation in the Congo. Secondly there are those demands which are presented in the form of expectations of responses from the political system. These expectations of responses from allies (in our case from other members of say the non-aligned camp of African states, or from our socialist African states etc.), e.g. to show willingness to fight a war over the Rhodesian issue if this becomes necessary from co-members of a concussing bloc (e.g. to vote in the U.N. on one side or the other on a particular issue); from co-members of international or regional organisation (The U.N., O.A.U., the commonwealth etc.); from minority residing in other countries or from donor country's opponent, or to support the donor country's

position on a certain particular issue.

Demands may also arise from the domestic environment e.g. from interest groups which, to use Tandon's words 'might feel the punch' of say, 'the American reprimand to the persistent anti-American stance taken by the government! Finally demands may arise from within the political system as well, e.g. by certain sectors of the policy-making elite, or by the higher echelon of the civil service that say a pro-Western or pro-Chinese approach is called for.⁸⁴

Tandon's model further a perceptual analysis which is applicable in our own study of Guinea's foreign policy. The two basic strategies of analyzing foreign policies of the new states according to Tandon's scheme is by using two methods: These include; on the one hand an 'Objective factors Analysis approach; and on the other 'phenomenological approach. In the former, one use either the legalistic - institutional model, or functionalist (input-output) model. In the latter scheme (phenomenological approach) a policy analyst may either use a single or multiple case study of a country's foreign policy, or alternatively use a historical sequence model relating case studies. As one may notice, there is very little linkage theory in Tandon's model and this is one of the major weaknesses of Tandon's analytic framework. They could be very useful if it were developed further to overcome this shortcoming. The weakness of the model is nonetheless attributed

84. Yash Tandon op. cit. p. 4 For a more detailed analysis of supports; the Process of Political conversion; and Foreign Policy Decisions see the article p. 5

to Tandon and not to the model itself.

When embarking on this study the initial fundamental obstacle was to adopt an efficient model of content analysis, since this my key methodological approach to the study of the published material related to the subject. I had for some time hoped that it would be possible to get in touch with Guinea's foreign ministry's officials for the purpose of conducting some interviews with them or administering some questions, but this hope was watered down by the fact that Guinea does not have its own Embassy in Kenya and hence it was not possible to carry out this task. Confronted with this problem, the only remaining alternative was to use any published material dealing with Guinea's foreign policy African Socialism (or Guinea's Socialism) or such related material. Guinea having been a French Colony, most of the material is published in French, and this was another set back in my study, since interpreting some information from the French studies on Guinea politics required arduous long hours of tedious work. However I was able in the long last to find enough material published in English, but the problem of selecting would be critically useful from what is not, was not an easier job either.

Apart from literature and language problems and apart from the physical inability to interview Guineas, the next most serious limitation was the absence of well developed operational definitions particularly of the basic concepts being used in my study. Lack of definitional concensus on African socialism on the part of the proponents of this ideology and the absence

of well developed operational definition of non-alignment are problems that have already been alluded to and thus they need not detain us here.

Another limitation was the perceptual distinction between national interest and ideology. Most writers on the two concepts have confusedly mixed them up and it has not been easy to distinguish the distinctive roles each of them in influencing Guinea's foreign policy. Finally and most important of all is the absence of any academic piece of work on Guinea's foreign policy - in analytical terms. While such literature may be existing elsewhere the author was not able to trace any in the local libraries. This shortcoming stresses the need for more research in this area. What all these limitations leave us with is the conclusion that this study is probably the first of its kind in the area chosen and consequently is bound to have a lot of short falls. The author, however bears all the responsibility of interpretation of any published material used in this discussion a few of which are dealt with in our literature review - in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER 11

THE EVOLUTION OF GUINEA'S FOREIGN POLICY (1958-1973)

No claim can be made that a miniature study such as the present one would exhaustively cover all the processes in the evolution of Guinea's foreign policy over the last fifteen years (1958-1973). In the first place the period under consideration is too short for all the policy processes to have stabilized and hence projecting Guinea's image in to on the international scene. That is to say, Guinea's foreign policy is still evolving and trying to find accommodation in the international environment. Secondly, the complexities of nation-building in the new states requires the development and usage (application) of a more sophisticated linkage model (ideology and foreign policy): but it has to be recognized that the outcome of any foreign policy is heavily dependent on the interaction of more than two variables. Any assertive statements on the foreign policies of the new states requires a close examination of each of the various critical variables that operate within the system, and also any other exogenous factors, such as external political pressure that may have some implications in the state's perception of international relations. This does not imply that similar problems are not encountered in any analysis of the policies of the more developed states. In some cases, the problem of policy analysis in the case of the latter (the more developed states is even more complex. The basic assumption here of course is that policy variables increase relatively with respect to the level

of development of any given state.

For the new states, it is hardly necessary to use complex analytic linkage models; if the essence is to study the behaviour of any given variable. In our study, the isolation of Guinea's political ideology as the determinant of the regime's foreign policy is taken as operational only within the confines of the present study. Thus, by not holding the ideology constant, it is possible to identify other variables such as institutional support, to which the original independent variables now becomes dependent. However our analysis operates within the original model comprising of a dependent (foreign policy) and an independent variable (political ideology). Expressed differently, Guinea's political ideology will for the purpose of this discussion be regarded as an input of the model whereas her foreign policy is the output.

The evolution of Guinea's foreign policy cannot be well understood without reflecting on its background of independence. By virtue of an overwhelming negative vote on General Charles de Gaulles constitution, Guinea became an independent nation on September 28, 1958, thus separating herself from the other territories of French West Africa. Previously one of eight territories in French West Africa, Guinea was the only one of the French holdings in Africa to reject the de Gaulles offer. On October 2, 1958 Guinea became an independent republic by a constituent assembly. Ahmed Sekon Toure,

Prime Minister in the territorial assembly assumed office as head of the new Government. A provisional constitution adopted on November 12, 1958 declared Guinea "a democratic, secular, and social republic," the powers of Government being exercised by a President assisted by the Cabinet. In November 1958, Guinea entered into confederation with Ghana, a union which was later dissolved.⁸⁵

General de Gaulle's reaction to Guinea's refusal to accede to the Fifth Republic's constitutional referendum was an immediate withdrawal of all French technical and financial Assistance which the French government had hitherto committed to Guinea's economic development. This sanction led to the initial rupture of Guinea's diplomatic relations with mother France and consequently to the total withdrawal of Guinea from the French Community. Threatened by an economic crisis Guinea's appeal for technical and financial aid from the West met with dismal failure and Guinea was left only with the option of wooing the East for similar assistance, a chance which the communist bloc was not going to let go. It should be observed that de Gaulle's threat to break off from the N.A.T.O. alliance if the members of the alliance recognized

85. W. Scott. Thomson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New States. Princeton University Press (Princeton New Jersey 1969). See pp. 67-73 for the Ghana - Guinea Union, declared on 24th Nov., 1958; and pp. 73-76 for the Ghana - Guinea - Liberia Union; and pp 150-152 for the Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union declared in Dec. 1960

or aided Guinea contributed to the West's reluctance to replerush the aid that had been withdrawn from Guinea by de Gaulle's regime. Guinea thus entered her first years of independence with a crumbling economy. Months even passed before de Gaulle's government accorded Guinea diplomatic recognition.

Within a few months after independence, the Guinean posture in foreign policy had been made clear to the world. In interviews with foreign journalists, exchanges with v visiting Heads of state, and speeches derivered abroad, Ahmed Sekou Toure had emphatically made it clear that Guinea would in future pursue a foreign policy based on two things: positive neutrality or non-alighment and African Unity. But what factors motivated Guinea to adopt a non-aligned posture at a time when alliance particularly with the Eastern bloc seemed the most rational policy to undertake? Should Guinea have become more particular about African unity instead of being introvertive in her own national integration? These are some of the questions that must be answered if one is to fully grasp the problems that emerges over time in the execution Guinea's foreign policy. It should also be observed here that in addition to non-alignment and African Unity the two other basic principles which guide Guinea's foreign policy are: African liberation (African emancipation from both colonialism and non-colonialism), and African Economic independence.

Any analysis of Guinea's historical development of her foreign policy must pay attention to each of the four basic principles.

To be able to answer the two questions posed above, it is necessary that one understands the problems that confronted Guinea immediately she severed colonial links with France. The impact of the French withdrawal of financial and economic aid is very central to this policy stance. Sekou Toure's pronouncements and his stress on neutrality corresponds to the immediate post independence needs of Guinea. Help of all kinds, both economic and technical was required to build the new republic and by adopting a stance of neutrality the President sought to indicate to the outside world that Guinea was prepared to accept all offers of aid, provided they did not imply a permanent liaison with either major power bloc. Toure insisted however, on accenting the positive aspects of his neutralism. That is, it was not to be assumed that Guinean neutrality meant isolation from the main currents of international politics.⁸⁶ Thus President Sekou Toure defined non-alignment policy in the following terms:

"We mean by 'positive neutralism, that our neutralism, far from being an isolated principle or a negative stand, serves the highest interest of humanity. It is essentially neutralism in the service of all peoples, which favours the right of self-determinationat the international

86. L. Gray Gowan: 'Guinea' in Gwendolen M. Carter's (ed.) Africa One-Party States; Cornell University Press; Ithaca; New York, 1962, Cornell University) pp. 230-232

level we seek to be an element of peace. We ask help and support from all the world, but at the same time full respect for our sovereignty."⁸⁷

Thus positive neutralism for Toure had two sides: One, a sincere wish to avoid involving Guinea in the cold war, and the other a desire to prove to other states that Guinea was genuinely independent and had "thrown off the shackles which bound it to a Western colonial system. Gowan, however doubts any assertion that Guinea has succeeded in the application of this neutrality principle in her day-to-day relations with the outside world. He contends that, if anything, Guinea's international policy, particularly in the United Nations, has reflected "extreme neutrality" towards the West.⁸⁸ In effect, this has meant voting in the majority of issues on the side of the East. As an explanation for Guinea's pro-East bias, Cowan further submits that Guinea's support for the Soviet position in the U.N. must necessarily be seen in the light not only of Sekou Toure's own Marxist predilections, but also of the immediate postindependence attitudes of the Western powers, particularly development assistance. Guinean pride was deeply hurt by the failure of France to sponsor Guinean membership to the U.N., by the reluctance of General de Gaulle's to recognize Guinean sovereignty and by the hesitation of France's allies to disregard the French position. The Eastern bloc, on the other hand, supported the new state quietly and fully,

87. Ibid; p. 231

88. Ibid.; p. 231

granting her not only immediate recognition, but also large scale economic aid. In the light of these circumstances, a Guinean bias towards the East was obvious and justifiable. Secondly, the openly carried anticolonial attitude of Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the U.N. was clearly in consonance with the avowed Guinean aim of independence for all African countries.⁸⁹ Thus Guinea looked on the Soviet Union as her ally in the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism, while she viewed the West with distrust and suspicion that she (the West) might seek to reassert the former colonial control in the guise of economic aid. Thirdly, the similarity in ideological orientation between Guinea and soviet Union could be considered as yet another reason that initially influenced Sekou Toure's pro-East bias in his foreign policy. Guinea's pro-eastern orientation in her foreign policy did however take a different turn towards the end of 1961.

The three remaining elements of Guinea's foreign policy; African Liberation, African Unity and Economic independence have equally exerted a preponderant influence on Guinea's posture in the international scene. Although it may not be rational to compartmentalize these elements in terms of their motivational influence in Guinea's overall policy (continental and extra-continental), it is important to emphasize that African Liberation

89. The Eastern bloc's support for African decolonization corresponds to Guinea's struggle for the Liberation of the Colonized peoples of Africa.

and African Unity have preponderantly influenced and even determined Guinea's stand in certain continental or contineutral - Extra - continental issue areas. These issue-areas⁹⁰ are discussed later in the chapter and include: The 1965 Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.). The 1960-64 Congo crisis; The Algerian Crisis; The Middle East Crisis; The Biafra secessionism; Boigny's Dialogue with South Africa (1971); The Tanzania/Uganda conflict (1972) and Liberation Movements.

The four principles of Guinea's foreign policy are all inter connected and need not be treated as separate identities. Nevertheless, the degree of influence of each element in the regimes policy stance has varied from time to time over the last fifteen years. For instance, national interest predominates Guinea's policy stance when she is experiencing some domestic political problems, or when there is an eminent external threat. Such was the case in Nov. 1970 during the invasion of Guinea by Portuguese mercenaries. Secondly, any of the four elements may operate as a necessary condition for the other to be fulfilled. For instance, the Liberation of African continent presupposes that there be at least some form of "African Unity" among the

90. An issue-area is formally defined as (1) A chester of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (2) lends to the affected, or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations would be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behaviour designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values. See James N. Rosenau; Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Barny Farrell; ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics; (Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1966) p. 81.

states which have already acquired political independence to act as a pressure group on the colonial powers for the Liberation of the colonized. Similarly, African Unity implies sense form of collective effort in economic planning and development (i.e. resource utilization); a common continental policy; the development of a common ideology; a continental defence force and all other aspects of statecraft. It means surrendering most of the state power to the continental government - i.e. if African Unity as a concept culminates in the formation of a continental structure. These are some of the implications of Guinea's commitment to African Unity, Liberation and economic independence. But since most states are hesitant to lose either part or total sovereignty to a Union Government, African Unity as a concept has to be left to imply a loose confederation of independent and autonomous governments and states, which meet at will and which co-operate in solving ansuing continental, interstate or even single states problems, without necessarily infringing on the sovereignty of the individual states. In the event of the various problems challenging the realization of African Unity, African (Liberation has over the last fifteen years become the leading theme of Guinea's continental policy.

Guinea's evolving extra-continental policy should be viewed in light of the shifting pattern of global politics from the classical post world War ll bipolarism to an international environment which is presently characterized by the interplay of three ideological forces namely; the ideological East;

the Capitalist West and the emergence of a more recent factor - non-alignment. This is not the place to discuss the influence of each of these forces on Guinea's foreign policy, but suffice it to say that both her continental and extra-continental policies are deeply emerged in the new polarism of nonalignment. However, it should also be mentioned that like other Third World states with a similar foreign policy, Guinea's non-alignment is not completely isolated from the influence of the cold War politics especially because of her links (economic, cultural and social) with members of the two blocs. Consequently, Guinea's response to issues originating from the international environment depicts a deliberate and desperate attempt to take no sides with either bloc but at the same time to exhibit an independent stand which identifies her to her affiliate bloc of the non-aligned states.

Thus whereas it may be possible to talk about a country's definite stand with respect to certain international issues, one must remember that basically, such stands are more or less visionary reflections of global ideological tensions. In addition to the triplicate ideological forces, the emergence of international subordinate state systems have crept in new cleavages, such that a country's foreign policy can no longer be explained only in terms of the three ideological bloc systems. That is, a country's stand in international politics, say for instance Guinea's radical stand towards the declaration of U.D.I. in Rhodesia in 1965, could in no way be explained by the

facts of her belonging to the non-aligned camp. Such a stand was primarily motivated by her pro-African interest and especially her commitment to the African Liberation. Similarly, her various stands at the U.N. on any given issue reflects her bloc system support as well as her support for the African subordinate state system. For instance, in relation to the African subordinate state system relations between all O.A.U. members and between African and non-African states is guided by specified principles which are laid down in the 1963 "Addis Ababa Charter." Thus Guinea's behaviour on the international scene is first and foremost guided by those same principles.

With respect to her relations with other African states, and unless Guinea wished to defy the O.A.U. Charter - a thing she has not so far explicitly done, Guinea's foreign policy is guided by four principles posited in Article 111 of the Charter. These principles include:

- (a) The sovereignty of all member states;
- (b) Non-interference in the internal affairs of the other states and condemnation of subversive activities;
- (c) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and finally peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus although the Charter does not go as far as to state explicitly its "non-acceptance of any leadership," it does in effect debar any single African state from playing the role of leader by stressing the principle of absolute equality.⁹¹

91. Winslow A.; "The Addis Ababa Charter: A Commentary." pp 27-30

Similarly, Guinea's extra-continental policy is based on three fundamental purposes and principles of the Addis Ababa Charter which govern relations between African and non-African states. These include:

- (i) the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa;
- (ii) The promotion of international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the U.N. and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

and

- (iii) the affirmation of a policy of non-alignment. The Guinean former support of post - 1963 events relating to issues on colonialism with its aftermath, neo-colonialism and decolonization is explicitly related to the stipulation of paragraph 4, of Article 11 of the 'Addis Charter' which calls for eradication of "all forms of colonialism from Africa." The Guinean support of this portion of the clause is an affirmation of the regime's adherence to the 1963 Addis Resolutions passed unanimously by all heads of state. The resolution sets forth a complete program of action, with emphasis on "the urgency of accelerating accession to complete national independence of all African states still subject to foreign domination and on the obligation of free African states to assist those African peoples who have (had not in 1963) not yet achieved it".⁹²

Although the implementation of Guinea's foreign policy dates back a little earlier than when the O.A.U. was formed, her non-aligned policy is in total consonance with paragraph

92. Winslaw A.; *The Addis Ababa Charter: A Commentary.* op. cit. pp. 34-38

7 of Article 111 of the O.A.U. Charter. This Article puts as one of the principles of O.A.U. the "Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs." In Sekou Toure's definition of his country's pursuit of non-alignment, he makes it clear that the implementation of such a policy would involve the non-aligned country in (a) refusing to provide either the Soviet or the Western bloc to establish military bases on the soil of the non-aligned country (b) Abrogation of all military treaties, and non-participation in all such treaties in future (c) the liquidation of imperialism, colonialism, and their by-product, neo-colonialism; (d) the liquidation of all sequels of World War II and the solution of all ensuing problems (e) the peaceful coexistence of all states on the basis of the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (f) Respect for the independence of all the peoples and the regimes of all states; (g) economic non-discrimination and abolishment of prevailing restrictions; and (h) free circulation for persons and goods.⁹³ Articles 11 and 111 of the O.A.U. charter cover the eight elements that Sekou Toure includes in his view of what non-alignment means to Guinea.

In reference to military bases and treaties, it should be emphasized that the Charter does not in any way imply the

93. Sekou Toure; Guinean Revolution and Social Progress S.O.P Press Cairo (Societe Orientale de Publicite). 1964; p. 19
 Also see: Zdenek Cervenka; The Organization of African Unity and its Charter: London C. Hurst and Company, 1969. pp. 232-233 (Articles 11 and 111 of O.A.U. Charter).

renunciation of the right to self-defence. The neutralists do not waive the right to maintain an army nor to use it when their interests are directly involved. Moreover, Article 11 of the Addis Ababa Charter provides specifically that "member states shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies in fields of defence and security. Thus when African states form military alliances among themselves, or give other African states the right to use military bases on their territory, they are not violating the principle of non-alignment in the Addis Charter. On these grounds then, the Guinean military expeditions to Congo during the 1960-1964 lybrinth; and to Sierra Leone in 1968 were justified. But if an African state enters into an alliance with European power associated with a bloc, this not only implies its automatic adherence to one of the two blocs and raises the possibility of introducing the Cold War into Africa, but also the wish of fostering neo-colonialism. On the other hand if the same African state concludes a military alliance with another African state; it may risk compromising the balance of power in Africa, but it is less likely to introduce cold war issues.

It should have become clear at this level of an analysis that the implementation of foreign policies in the Third World, and Guinea is no exception, has not only to reckon with the influence exerted by the three ideological forces, but also the preponderance of the implicit force characterized by the penetrative cleavages of the subordinate state system. The penetration of the Guinean political system by the politics

of the African subordinate state system clearly elaborates this theory. One should also mention here the fact that single state influence, particularly the super powers, could even at times operate as a fifth factor. In the Guinean situation, such patronage by the any of the super powers has so far not been witnessed. In pursuing her non-aligned policy, the republic of Guinea manipulates the super powers in a see-saw fashion with a view to getting the most out of them especially development aid.

It would be erroneous therefore, to assume that in the making and in the implementation of Guinea's foreign policy, any one given factor will determine the course of action. As has been argued earlier, any action that Guinea takes in international politics should always be viewed as the resultant compromise of many interacting forces. Most literature on Guinea's foreign policy has tended to exaggerate the predominance in Guinea's foreign policy of either the cleavages of the African subordinate state systems, non-alignment or both. To some even, the execution of Guinea's foreign policy is viewed as a muddling-through process which operates on no specific principles. Obviously these two types of perceptions are wrong and unrealistic. The fact that most African states operate their foreign policies on a haphazard day-to-day fashion, and Guinea may have been included in McKay's category of such countries, does not at all mean these policies are based on no principles. The unpredictability of international politics, or domestic politics for that matter, imposes a limitation to hard-line rules in predetermining how any given state will behave when an unpredicted crisis ensues.

An examination of three volumes of Sekou Toure's most expository literature on the Guinean political system and particularly the republic's foreign policy helps to elaborate some of these misconceptions.

Any critical analysis of Guinea's foreign policy should bring up two of the most dominant features of the regimes overall policy. On the one hand it should become clear that the evolution of Guinea's foreign policy has been a rather erratic process varying with the currents of domestic politics. This behaviour may be viewed as partially confirming McKay's thesis on the haphazardness of the African Diplomacy; that is, that African leaders make their foreign policies on a day-to-day basis. This point has been raised before. Secondly, such an analysis should impress on the fact there is a tendency of the Guinean leadership to try to conceal the penetrative nature of the external system into the domestic system (the internal system). At the same time the regime attempts to insulate, at least superficially, the domestic system from the international environment. For instance the Guinean leadership shows remarkable sensitivity over issues that are external and infringing upon the domestic politics.⁹⁴ In other words, the syndrome of Guinea's foreign policy depicts a defensive mechanism over any possibility of the external system to penetrate the domestic system. This is remarkably true especially where the politics of the internal power distribution and

94. This point should become clear after we have discussed the 1960/61 Guinean/Soviet Union tension which culminated in the expulsion of Mr. Solodov, the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea.

institutional organization is affected by the politics of the international system. Under this latter feature of Guinea's foreign policy, the Guinean leadership is given a covering of trading in domestic problems into the more fluid international system. These two features contribute the basic components of the dilemma of Guinea's foreign policy thus making the manipulation of the policy appear rather contradictory.

It is worth mentioning that it is as a result of this dilemma, that the regime has failed to establish a fully-fledged machinery for running the foreign policy in a predictable fashion. Consequently most of the literature written on the subject (Guinea's foreign policy) or on the country's domestic ideology (african Socialism) is disproportionately unanalytic largely because the sources of such information is extremely scanty and scattered. This problem has been raised in the preceding Chapter. The lack of critical appraisals of the Guinean system (policy and ideology) or any such related policy documents leaves us exclusively dependent on President Sekou Toure's three volumes. This if of course, not to discount the contribution made by M. Hippolyte⁹⁵ in his short essay on Guinea's Foreign Policy (March 1972). Hippolyte's unfinished essay⁹⁶ is, as far as the author of this paper is

95. M. Hippolyte; Guinea's Foreign Policy; African Quarterly; Jan - March 1972; Vol. XI, No. 4

96. The article used in this paper was the first of a series which Hippolyte proposed to write on Guinea's foreign policy. As far as the author of this paper is aware Hippolytes second article has not yet been published.

is aware, one of the foremost elucidating critics of the Guinean scene. In his attempt to avoid falling prey to the usual exigencies of journalistic topicality, Hippolyte adopts one Yashpal Tandon's analytic framework (Historical sequence)⁹⁷ in explaining the linkage theory of Guinea's domestic politics and the wider international environment. For instance he argues that the concession and firmness, the manoeuvrability between the theory and practice of Guinea's foreign policy, and the sharing and reciprocity of certain advantages enter into the strategical framework of the Government's action particularly in soliciting development aid from outside (i.e. from external sources).⁹⁸ From her ideological stances also flows, partly the strategy for the preservation of independence, "which appears to some as a skilful sea-saw game between the two blocs....."⁹⁹ The lucidity of Hippolyte's essay is, unfortunately not matched similar analytic sophistications. The scope of the essay is rather small and ignores discussing some of the most crucial issues of Guinea's foreign policy. The paper is also lacking in specificity. Nonetheless, ...Hippolyte's little contribution is outstanding in its logicity particularly in his normative correlation of Guinea's external policy with internal development, that is, with the evolution of the allegiance of the regime on the one hand, and the economic situation on the other. In his attempt to explain how foreign policy sustains internal policy Hippolyte argues that each

97. See Yashpal Tandon; *The Foreign Policy of Uganda: A Methodological Inquiry* op. cit.

98. Hippolyte; op. cit p. 303

99. *Ibid.*; p. 303

discovery of conspiracy, caused by an aggravation of economic crisis and social malady is accompanied by the condemnation of severance of relations with, an imperialist power which is considered as an instigator of the conspiracy. This the so-called conspiracy serves as a means of diversion, as an outlet for economic and political difficulties, and reveals itself as an instrument above all to justify government's adventurist policies in inventing a scapegoat.¹⁰⁰

In a similar trend of thought Hippolyte develops the linkage thesis between the major economic determinants which link internal and external policies. The only major shortening of Hippolyte's essay is, again, its scope. Moreover he does not substantially cover in his exposition the linkage between Guinea's domestic ideology (African Socialism) and the external policy ideology - non-alignment. In the absence of these shortcomings, Hippolyte's thesis is a steering and elucidating contribution in an area that has hardly been touched in terms of systematised research. Like Yashpal's models of linkages (see Chapter 1) Hippolyte does not fully develop the linkage between domestic and the international environments.

President Sekou Toure's three volumes, unlike Hippolyte's and Yashpal papers, are far more comprehensive. Sekou Toure's first volume, The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea Vol. vii; published 1962, is a collection of President Sekou Toure's speeches at International Conferences and deliveries

100. M. Hippolyte; op. cit; pp. 304-305.

to the Guinean masses. The book gives a composite and voluminous discussion of Guinea's stand on some specific issue-areas all of which divide the material presented into ten main sections: (1) The international Policy and Diplomatic Action of the Democratic Party of Guinea; these are extracts from the Report on doctrine and orientation submitted to the 3rd National Conference of the P.D.G.; (2) at the United Nations Organization; - speeches and remarks by President Sekou Toure at the fourteenth and twenty-fifth sessions of the General assembly of the U.N.; (3) Colonialism and Imperialism, - speeches at the twenty five session of the U.N. (4) For the Freedom of all peoples, - Intervention made on October 13, 1960, by President Sekou Toure, after that disagreements arose in the U.N. debate about the draft resolution for the Liberation of all colonized peoples; (5) African Unity - speech by President Sekou Toure at the opening meeting of the steering committee of the African People Conference; (6) Afro-Asian Fraternity; - speech by President Sekou ⁱ Toure at the 2nd Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference held at Conakry from April 11 to 15, 1960; (7) The Guinean position on the War in Algeria; - Extracts from the speech by President Sekou Toure at the Algerian - Guinean solidarity demonstration, on November 1st, 1961; (8) The Ghana-Guinea - Mali Union - welcome address by President Sekou Toure to President Nkrumah and Modibo Keita at the meeting of the three heads of state at Conakry on December 23, 1960; (a) For the Reinforcement of the conditions of maintenance of World Peace - speech delivered by President Sekou Toure on August 13, 1961,

at the ceremony for the Nation - delivered by President Sekou Toure on the Occasion of the New Year, and published on Jan. 10, 1962. This text is disappointing to any foreign policy analyst who is interested in the kind of detailed work one finds in Thompson's Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966. Sekou Toure's volume lacks Thompson's statistical wealth. As a composition of various independent speeches made at different occasion it fails in sequential coherence that one finds in Thompson's work. Since most of these speeches were made at the beginning of Africa's decolonization decade (1960's), Sekou Toure, seems to have devoted most of his attention to this major theme. Consequently the text is far removed from the reality of Guinea's contemporary policy stance. This is not to say that the theme of decolonization is no longer a dominant element of Guinea's foreign policy. If anything it constitutes part of the strands that link the three factors of Guinea's policy i.e. the domestic (internal) system; the African subordinate state system, and the international environment (external system). It is important, however, to note that Guinea's pre-occupation with her domestic problems in the late sixties and in the early seventies has created a partial shift in Guinea's preoccupation with decolonization; This shift has been characterized by Guinea's isolationism - a stance which provokes criticism from the observers of the Guinean situation. For analytical purposes, it is possible to divide the evolution of Guinea's foreign policy into three phases:

- (1) 1958-1965:- Guineas post-colonia national integration-dorminant theme in her international or extra-continental policy was decolonization.
- (2) 1966-1970:- Guinea's Isolationist period; a period of intense interstate conflicts (Guinea Vs her neighbouring African States; Nkrumah overthrown and appointed co-President of the Guinean Republic. - this culminated in the 1966. Ghana-Guinea conflict. Various invasion attempts of Guinea by Portuguese mercineries - culminated in the Portugues invasion of Nov. 1970, an act which solicited international condemnation.
- (3) 1970 and After: A shift from isolationism, characterized by various attempts to advance rapproachment with former unfriendly states.

These three phases of Guinea's post-colonial history should not be viewed as distinct periods. The impact of each phase are carried over into and beyond the following phase. This analytic scheme of Guinea's political history merely helps us to logically organize the various policy stances that the Guinean regime has taken in international and continental issues over the last fifteen years. Each phase is characterized by a definite policy stance. For the reader who is interested in a logical and systematic analysis of Guinea's foreign policy, President

Sekou Toure's first volume is a great disappointment. The volume treats the evolution of the policy in a fairly state model. Moreover the material presented in this text appear as a package of speeches and addresses given from a rostrum. There is nothing concise and indicative of a well thought out policy development. That is, the volume gives very little attention to the dynamic processes of an evolving policy stemming from a fairly complex environment.

Apart from these shortcomings this volume nonetheless provides the most thorough expository speeches and deliberations by the Guinean head of state. The text treats Guinea's foreign policy together with her emerging ideology (democratic African Socialism) in a most cohesive fashion. For our analytic purposes this form of fusion between the foreign policy and the national ideology presents itself as a constant. It makes it difficult to identify which variable determines the other - i.e. foreign policy or the national ideology.¹⁰¹ This problem becomes crucial in our attempt to develop the linkage thesis of domestic and international systems.

Sekou Toure's second volume, Guinean Revolution and Social Progress devotes a very small portion to Guinea's foreign policy analysis. However, this text introduces concepts such as positive neutralism and non-alignment much more vividly than

101. It should be noted here that national ideology is treated synonymously with domestic ideology. Secondly non-alignment should conceptually be understood as representing a policy ideology affliating Guinea to one of the ideological systems - the non-aligned bloc.

the first volume which leaves such notions implicit. Like his first volume, the second volume, which is more or less the program of what the Guinean society hoped to achieve, is not very informative in terms of data. The material is written in undefined futuristic terms; for instance the anticipation to create a united continent and a united world where peace, justice and democracy are dormant in all human institutions. The author does not provide or identify the means for achieving these goals. Nevertheless, the volume tackles Guinea's foreign policy themes such as: African Unity; The African reality; African Liberation (political independence); Economic independence and non-alignment with more ingenuity and precision.

Finally, in his third volume, and the most recent one, The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, Sekou Toure deals with Guinea's foreign policy more systematically. The chapter on foreign policy is divided into eight sections namely: (1) The Way of Peace; (2) Analysis of the International context; (3) Political Regimes in Africa and Asia; (4) Revolutionary Ethic and the Teaching Function; (5) Conditions for the Reinforcement of Guinea's Political influence; (6) The situation Today (7) Diplomatic Action; (8) Objectives of the International Policy of the P.D.G., and (9) the Conclusion.

A characteristic which this volume shares with the previous two volumes is the lack of empirical details. More so than in the second volume, Toure presents his material in this later volume with logical clarity, but like in his second volume,

Guinea's Revolution and Social Progress, the third volume impresses on the intractable difficulty that one is bound to confront in any analysis that attempts to isolate Guinea's domestic policies from the corresponding international stance. In view of this dilemma, President Toure argues that Guinea's foreign policy (whether continental or extra-continental) is a prolongation of the domestic policy. In the simplicity of this linkage argument one may be tempted to conclude at this juncture that if the domestic ideology is thus closely linked to the foreign policy ideology (non-alignment), and if the "african interests"¹⁰² determine Guinea's domestic and consequently the external policy, then obviously Guinea's domestic (national) ideology which is african socialism, determines Guinea's foreign policy. This is not the place to confirm the statement of our thesis, especially from simplistic syllogisms, but it ought to be noted that Sekou Toure's impressions on the fusion of domestic and external policies, implies his conceptual agreement of Rosenau's¹⁰³ thesis the penetration of the domestic system by the international system and consequently the difficulty of separating domestic politics from international politics. In other words, if "African interests" determine Guinea's response to specific stimuli originating from the international - environment, then obviously Guinea's external policy is not determined from and by the domestic system, but rather the external system. This

102. The concept "African Interests" is used to refer to the African interests (Liberations, African Unity, Economic Independence etc.) viewed from a continental stand point, and excluding the interests of minority regimes in Southern Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese Colonial interest in

argument is closely linked to our analysis earlier in the Chapter of the encroachment of the Guinean domestic system by the African subordinate system.

President Sekou Toure's Third Volume, the Doctrine and Method of the Democratic Party of Guinea, (1970) has obviously not developed the analysis this far, but the scope of his foreign policy analysis in his third volume is an invaluable supplement to the theoretical analyses presented by Rosenau¹⁰⁴, Hanrieder,¹⁰⁵ Tandon,¹⁰⁶ McGowan,¹⁰⁷ and Hippolyte.¹⁰⁸

Toure's contribution in his three volumes does not certainly command the scholarly sophistication of these four policy analysts, but no-one can bargain Toure's explicitness for his simplicity in policy analysis. To obtain a systematic analysis of Guinea's foreign policy one would probably need to use the

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103. James N. Rosenau; "Towards the study of National - International Linkages" in James N. Rosenau (ed.) Linkage Politics; The Free Press, New York Collier - MacMillan Ltd; (London 1969) pp. 44-67.
104. Wolfram F. Hanrieder: "Compatibility and Concensus. A Proposal for the conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign policy;" The American Political Science Review: Vol. LXI, 4 Dec. 1970; pp. 971-988.
105. Yashpal Tandon: The Foreign Policy of Uganda: A Methodological Inquiry op. cit.
106. Patrick J. McGowan: "Africa and Non-alignment: A comparative Study of Foreign Policy;" International Studies Quarterly: Vol. 12; No. 3, Sept. 1968, pp 262-295.
107. M. Hippolyte: Guinea's Foreign Policy; African Quarterly Jan. - March 1972; Vol. XI; no. 4

models of the four policy analysts, but to analyze the Guinean situation, these models would be inadequate in the absence of such material as Sekou Toure covers in his three volumes. On this account alone Sekou Toure's contribution to the study of Guinea's foreign policy is extremely invaluable.

1. GUINEA'S CONTINENTAL POLICY:*

For the purpose of this discussion, it is possible to divide Guinea's continental policy into two sections; namely: (i) Regional policy, and (ii) Guinea's policy towards the rest of the continent. This classification is not based on any rigid criteria except that the author of this paper considers the intensity of inter-state relations as an index of determining the two broad clusters of African states. Secondly, the concepts intensity and index are not used here with any imperical connotations. Our basic assumption in subdividing Guinea's continental policy into two categories is that because of both geographical proximity and also historical association states considered under regional Policy, have had more intense relations with Guinea than countries from the rest of the continent. "The rest of the

nonrinnr" here refers to all other African states excluding the white minority regimes in Southern Africa Rhodesia and Portuguese colonial Africa. Guinea has had no diplomatic relations with any of the racist white minority regimes and any stance that she may have adopted towards these regimes ..is discussed below under issue-areas.

(i) REGIONAL POLICY: The concept "regional policy" is here intended to refer to Guinea's political, economic and cultural policy relations towards her West African neighbours. Countries considered under this category include: Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria. The list does not include all countries which comprise region geographically referred to as West Africa. The list merely considers only those states which have had intense diplomatic (or hostile) relations with the Republic of Guinea. Furthermore from their colonial history these states could also be classified into what we may refer to as the Anglo-phonie Africa, and the Francophone Africa. This sub-classification is important in the sense that whereas we would expect countries that were formerly under the same colonial regime to have more close cooperation in the post-colonial period as is the case in the East African states (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) the Guinean situation Visa-Visa her former co-French dependencies in the region and the Anglo-phonie West Africa opposes this theory. Thus one finds that Guinea has been more friendly with the Anglo-phone West Africa than with Franco-phonie West Africa. This distinction

becomes evidently clear when one compares relations between say Guinea and Ivory Coast and Guinea and Ghana or Guinea and Nigeria. Again this is not to imply that relations between Guinea and Ghana have been cordial since 1958. One finds for instance that after the overthrow of Nkrumah of Ghana from power 1966, Guinea severed her diplomatic relations with Ghana in March 1966. Following this diplomatic rupture Guinea granted political asylum to the late President Kwame Nkrumah, appointed him as the Co-President of Guinea, and allowed him to broadcast hostile propaganda against the National Liberation Council regime that had removed Nkrumah from power.

Relations between the two states further deteriorated in late October, 1966, when Ghanaian authorities forcibly detained the Guinean Foreign Minister and his encourage on their way to the O.A.U. meeting in Addis Ababa. Intense diplomatic intervention of Addis Ababa led to the release of the Guinean delegation later that month. General Ankrahs and Kofi Busia's regimes did little to restore the pre-1966 Guinea-Ghana friendly relations. It was not until after the death of Kwame Nkrumah in 1972, that Col. Acheampong begun to cultivate the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two states. Ghana and Guinea started talking to each other in April 1972 after the Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubū Gowon, used his good offices to persuade Guinean authorities to release the corpse of the late ex-President Nkrumah for burial in Ghana. By November 1973, Ghana had established diplomatic relations with Guinea, with the Ghanaian ambassador

residing in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and the Guinean Ambassador to Ghana residing in Lagos, Nigeria. 108

The resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries was viewed by observers as long overdue. It should be remembered that Ghana was the first African country to come to the help of Guinea when she was left practically stranded at birth and outlawed by France. Nkrumah's government offered Guinea an immediate assistance worth £ 10 million. Later Ghana and Guinea formed the nucleus of the Organization of African Unity known as the Ghana-Guinea Union. This union was later joined by Mali and it became the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. (also see bottom of p. in this chapter).

Relations between Guinea and Franco-phonetic West Africa have perpetually been hostile ever since Sekou Toure led his country out of the French Community by voting non against the membership offered the French colonies by the late President Charles de Gaulle. To understand the crisis between Guinea and her French-speaking neighbours of Senegal and Ivory Coast; and to appreciate Sekou Toure's constant cries of 'plots' during the last 15 years, it is necessary to go back to October 2, 1958. Sekou Toure, Sedar Senghor and Reassemblement Democratique Africain (the RDA party) but Houphouet Boigny was the acknowledged boss. Sekou Toure's defiance to the de Gaulle referendum initiated what was going to be permanent hostility between the three French-speaking West African personalities but purely based on suspicion all successive French Governments

108. Daily Nation, Friday November, 2 1973 p. 6

would attempt to regain the lost dependency by using of Boigny or Senghor. Thus since 1958, Toure has lived in perpetual fear especially because of De Gaulle's spiteful treatment of Guinea and subsequent attempts of every French Government to effectively astracise the small republic economically, politically, socially and internationally. The economic privations of, the trade restrictions on Guinean exports, the isolation of the Guinean frame, which was rendered almost worthless in international trade with active manipulation of the French Government have contributed to colour Toure's views with his neighbours. His (Toure's) suspicions were given credence with the teachers' plot of 1961, and the subsequent plots of 1965, 1966, the army plot of 1969, the abortive invasion of 1970, the alleged invasion attempt of July, 1971, in which West Germany and France were jointly implicated.¹⁰⁹ There are rummours of an impeding coup virtually every year.

Hostility among the three personalities is purely a colonial legacy which originated from the expulsion of Toure with his RDA branch by Houphouet Boigny's main party - the RDA, in 1958. A crisis of leadership competition for French Africa which ensued from this expulsion, with Sekou Toure and Houphouet Boigny acting as the main contenders, and Sedar Senghor operating peripherally as the reknowned philosopher king, planted the seeds of political tensions which has

109. African Confidential: No. 24, Dec. 10, 1965, pp 7-8 and Vol. 12; No. 14, July 9, 1971, p. 8
 Also Daily Nation: Friday, October 19, 1973, p. 6

characterized relations between the two states over the last fifteen years. Various attempts have been made to reconstitute diplomatic relations, either on bilateral basis or by mediation from another African state, but any conciliation success has always been broken down as a result of accusation and counteraccusations that the neighbouring states are plotting or helping Guinean exiles living in these states to topple Toure's regime. Such accusations are almost always followed by a rupture in diplomatic relations between Guinea and the implicated state.

The Guinean Head of state speech¹¹⁰ addressed to the Ivory Coast Democratic Party (P.D.C.I.) Congress on 29th October, 1970, exemplifies the wish for the two leaders to patch up the Guinea - Ivory Coast rift. Similar mediation efforts were made in October 1973 to restore diplomatic relations between Senegal and Guinea by the current O.A.U. Chairman, General Gowan.¹¹¹ Senegal had severed diplomatic relations with Guinea in Sept, 1973, after President Sekou Toure had accused the Senegalese and Ivorian Governments of financing exiled Guinean elements in another plot to overthrow Toure's regime. This was not, of course, the first time that Senegal and Ivory Coast had been accused of helping in such anti-Toure plots, but the September, 1973, accusations took a different with Toure

110. Africa Contemporary Record (ACR); 1970/71; c 14-c 16.

111. See Daily Nation. Friday, Oct. 19, 1973; op cit. p. 6 and also West Africa. No. 2940, Oct. 15, 1973, p. 1474.

inciting the peoples of Senegal and the Ivory Coast "to overthrow the "traitor Senghor" and the "puppet Houphovet - Boigny"¹¹² It has been argued that Senghor's invitation to General Gowan as the Chairman of O.A.U., and to use his good offices for mediation among the three West African states, was a last-ditch and a desperate action on the part of President Senghor.¹¹³ President Senghor appealed to General Gowan to investigate the Guinean allegation and see if the Guineans had any proof of their coup-implications. President Toure on the other hand counter-claimed that he had ample proof.

In response to Senghor's appeal, General Gowan sent a four-man delegation to Conakry to help mediate in the existing rift. The delegation headed by the Nigerian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nelson Soro carried a special message for President Sekou Toure. Observers have sniffed at the composition, leadership and success of the mediation delegation, and doubt that the delegations would ever make a permanent reconciliation among the three neighbours. In their confessions, the observers argue that an experienced politician would have been more likely on the same wave length with President Toure, and would have been a better choice for leading the Nigerian mediation

112. See Daily Nation; Friday Oct. 19; 1973; p. 6

113. West Africa op. cit. p. 1494

delegation. However the choice of a military men could have been offset by the fact that Toure has great respect for the Nigerian leader and has in recent months done everything possible to forge closer links between his country and Nigeria - especially in the cultural and economic fields.

President Senghor, however, at the request of General Gowan had earlier withdrawn his demand for the O.A.U. Senegal - Guinea commission to meet to examine Guinea's complaint that Senegal was supporting Guinea apposition elements. The withdrawal initiative had been by President Gaddafi of Libya who after having met President Senghor and President Houphovet Boigny at the non-aligned meeting in Algiers stated that he had found them both to be "sober and possessed of great experience."¹¹³ Gaddafi had, therefore, expressed surprise that Senegal and Ivory Coast "could be involved in any disgraceful action against a sisterly African state whose only fault is that it is fighting against colonialism and holding aloft the banner of freedom in the Western part of our African continent".¹¹⁴ Gaddafi further stated that he anxiously awaited the measures the two leaders would take to prove our good faith you.....and by which you will remove cause of the accusations continued in President Sekou Toure's

114. Ibid; p. 1494

message to me."¹¹⁵ Senegalese attitude to Guinea's hostility was contained in Senghor's message of reply to Gaddafi's in which he stated that President Toure had been prevented from going to Algiers because of his internal situation, and was trying to turn himself (Senghor) and Houphovet - Boigny into scapegoats. According to Senghor the reasons for breaking relations with Guinea was the stream of injurious accusations, lies and incitement to assassination which Sekou Toure had been uttering since that time. While accepting a dialogue between the two sister states with a view to promoting reconciliation Senghor stated that "Senegal cannot have diplomatic relations with a state which considers it as a public enemy."¹¹⁶ It was on the basis of these communications that Gowan appointed and despatched to Canakny the four-man delegation, mentioned earlier, and headed by the Chief of Naval staff, with hope of mediating between Guinea and Senegal.

Relations between Guinea and the Republic of Mali and between Guinea and Sierra Leone has been less erratic and also less hostile in comparison to the Guinea-Senegal-Ivory Coast diplomacy. Relations between these three states could be described as peripheral but still important in Guinea's

115. West Africa op. cit. No. 2940, 15th Oct. 1973, p. 1474

116. Ibid; p. 1474

attempt to consolidate her power base in West Africa by patronising the two states. Between 1960 and 1968 the Republic of Mali pursued a socialist policy very similar to, though less radical, Guinea's socialist ideology. The regime during this period, and under President Modibo Keita, enjoyed fairly cordial relations with Guinea. On December 23, 1960, Mali entered into a union with Ghana and Guinea forming the Guinea-Ghana-Mali union. The coalition of the three heads of states into a union raises much inquiry as to why it should have happened at a time when Ghana and Guinea (Nkrumah and Sekou Toure) were behaving like strange bad fellows, but as one Western diplomat has remarked, the moment the union was declared was a time when Ghana-Guinea-Mali relations had reached the high-point and opportune for the three leaders to take opportunity for building a realistic union. It was the Malian's first international meeting, to which they went as "babes in the woods"¹¹⁷ Nkrumah was the outside force necessary to keep the other two together, and Toure was simply shamed into going along with Nkrumah because of the overriding importance of African Unity. "The meeting brought together the strands of several moments; it was a psychological coming-together at a critical time. President Modibo Keita of Mali later commented in Bamako that he had accepted the declaration for exactly what it said. That is, in Africa, "la parole est Creatrice"¹¹⁸

117. W. Scott. Thompson: Ghana's Foreign Policy (1957-1966); Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1969; p.150

118. Ibid: p. 151. The citation in French is in Germaine Dieterlén, "Essai sur la Religion Bambara."

Relations between Mali and Guinea became temporarily strained after the overthrow of President Keita on November 19, 1968, and during which time Lt. Moussa Traore became President. Relations have since then restored to the pre-coup era with economic and cultural ties having been strengthened. Restoration of diplomatic relations between Guinea and Mali were encouraged with a view to revitalizing the operation of the organization of Senegal River States (OERS). This regional organization experienced a series of crises of institutional integration throughout 1971.

Sierra Leone, having been a British colony and Protectorate shares little colonial experience with Guinea unlike Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mali. But on achieving independence on April 27, 1961 this small West African state entered into diplomatic relations with Guinea. Like the other West African states already discussed Sierra Leone relations with Guinea has fructuated with political events both at home and inside Guinea itself. Thus, subsequent to the two coups that took place in Sierra Leone on March 23, 197 , under Col. A.T. Juxon-Smith who headed the ruling council, and the coup d'etat of April, 8 1968, led by non-commissioned officers, relations between the two countries were fairly uncertain until the April 1968 military junta returned the government to civilian rule under Prime Minister Siaka Stevens.¹¹⁹ It should be noted here that Siaka-Stevens was appointed Prime-

119. Stevens, head of the All Peoples Congress party had been Prime Minister for two hours at the time of the 1967 coup. Sierra Leone became a republic April 19, 1971 and Stevens was named President.

Minister-elect at the time of the 1968 coup while he was still in exile in Guinea.

Relations between the two states have been extremely close since Siaka Stevens took over in April 1968 to the extent that some observers argue that Sekou Toure now runs (governs) Sierra Leone foreign policy and even the state machinery. This quibble is only true in the sense that Toure today contributes a lot, in terms of security, to sustain Siaka Stevens regime, and also to contain the rift which exists in the Sierra Leone armed forces. (see ACR. 1971/72 c. 60) For instance, a mutual defence agreement providing for co-ordination between the armed forces to ensure collective defence, peace and security as well as far pulling of their means of defence to face aggression was signed in March, 1971. In accordance with this treaty Guinea armed forces entered Sierra Leone on March 28th, 1971 at the request of Prime Minister Siaka Stevens after an attempted coup.¹²⁰ While there is such a close alliance between the two states, it is not correct, however, to assume that Sekou Toure controls Sierra Leone policy. In many ways the two countries are usually far apart, even for African neighbours. For instance, while Sekou Toure constantly denounces the alleged responsibility of West Germany for planning invasions, as recently as July 7, 1971, Solomon Pratt, Sierra Leone's Minister of External Affairs was speaking in

120. Africa contemporary Record (ACR); 1971/72; p. B 575
Also see Dowments Section pp. C59-61.

Bonn of the long cultural links between Germany and Sierra Leone, and extolling to newsmen the "impressive record of economic and technical assistance." West Germany had given to his country. On the other hand, while Guinea and the United States are enjoying a honeymoon, Mr. Stevens accused the Americans of encouraging opposition to his government. During the same time, the Soviet Embassy in Freetown appeared to be benused by events and certainly played no part in them. Furthermore, Sierra Leone still recognises, and has an ambassador from, Taiwan, while it is believed that the Ghana High Commissioner in Freetown acted as Accra's listening post for the activities of Dr. Nkrumah (until his death) and other exiles in Guinea. Inside Sierra Leone itself, in July 1971, some hundreds of Guineans were rounded up and taken to the frontier on the grounds that they had no valid documents; Guinea on the other hand refused to accept them. From the Guinean side the firing by Guineas troops on a Sierra Leone government tug, even if it was accidental was still another of the many incidences which take place between the two countries and which cannot be taken lightly.¹²¹ From these fairly different policy perspectives adopted by the two states it is very doubtful to accept the thesis that Sekour Toure currently runs or even significantly influences Sierra Leone's foreign policy. The policies and attitudes of the two countries towards many international issues

121. Africa Confidential Vol. 12, July 1971; pp. 5-6

are in the majority cases at variance. Nonetheless variation in policy stances does not in any way minimize the impact of Guinea's (more so Sekou Toure's) commitment to defend Siaka Stevens from internal insurgency. This link is significant in the bilateral relations between the two states but still more important in Sierra Leone's domestic politics.

From the foregoing discussion a few points should be emphasized. Firstly, it is evident that Guinea's relations with the Angtophone countries (Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria) have been more cordial than with the Francophone group (Mali, Senegal, and Ivory Coast) although with the exception that for the period that the late Kwame Nkrumah stayed in exile in Guinea until the time of his death (1966-1971) relations between the two states was rather strained. The 1966 detention of the Guinean Foreign Minister by the Ghanaian authorities marked the height of tensions between the two states which were hitherto friendly. Nevertheless there appears to be a positive policy of rapproachment between the two countries at the present moment with Col. Acheampong sworn to reinstate diplomatic revels between Ghana and Guinea to where it was before the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Secondly, relations with Mali, the better party among Guinea's Francophone colleagues, have been less certain with the present military junta under President Traore. Four factors help to explain this position. Firstly, as of 1972, and equally so in 1973, there was very little talk of return to civilian rule; Secondly,

the Malian Government seems to be fairly content in maintaining its isolationist policy; while at the same time its low-profile political approach continues; the regime still puts its main emphasis on economics rather than on politics; and finally the military committee for National Liberation (CMLN) felt confident enough to stage a public trial of Captain Yoro Diakite and his colleagues who had emerged in 1971 as a rival group within its ranks; an act which the Guinean leadership did not approve of: with this general background to Mali's domestic politics, the Guinean regime has shown some amount of reluctance in establishing full diplomatic amity though one could argue that the two states were fairly friendly by the end of 1973.

It will have become obvious that the discussion has so far not dealt with Guinea-Nigeria relations. In the absence of intense diplomatic relations between the two countries as compared to bilateral relations of the other five countries already discussed. Thus omission is carefully dealt with in our discussion of Guinea's policy in issue-areas later on in this chapter.

(iii) Regional Organizations:

Whereas she has been a staunch protagonist of African Unity, Guinea, and in particular Sekou Toure, has from 1958 been in favour of regional organization at least, if for nothing else, for economic advantages. Conscious of the vulnerability and unviability of the economies of individual

African states, the Guinean regime began participating in West African regional organization in 1958 when she entered into a union with Ghana to form what was then called, the Ghana-Guinea union. The Ghana-Guinea union operated for two years and was replaced by the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union which was created in 1960. The latter was soon to become the nucleus of the O.A.U. Like the Casablanca and Monrovia group which had been abandoned having failed in their primary objectives, the union of African states (the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union) was likewise discarded at Addis Ababa with Sekou Toure announcing unilaterally its dissolution. There was even no zest for sacrifice displayed, as the group was long since dead. Besides most of leaders who met at Addis Ababa were agreed at least in principle that regional organization had to be dispensed with if only for the success of African Unity. Thus the dissolution of the Union of African states was a bi-product of the founding of O.A.U. It should be noted here, however, that Toure had spent virtually a whole year (1962) directing his efforts towards bringing the O.A.U. into being; and having succeeded in this strenuous task, there was no comparable challenge to absorb his energy. Thus, when the French-linked states that he had so recently worked with did not dissolve regional/political organization, despite the formation of the O.A.U., he appeared in his former radical guise. In their commitment to enhance the principles and objectives of the Addis Charter which had founded the O.A.U. in 1963, Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah once more joined hands to fight against the regionalists' conspiracy which in their

view had made them "greatly concerned about the possible use of delaying tactics to interfere with the objectives which we laid down at Addis Ababa."¹²² What is important to here is Sekou Toure's anti-regionalism radicalism a policy which he seems to have given up as he drifted his country, into isolation from the mind sixties.

Guinea's policy realignment in favour of regional economic grouping was clearly shown by her enthusiasm in the founding of the Organization of Senegal Rivers States (OERS) Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal were to be the signatories of the O.E.R.S. Constitution which was ratified in February 1968. This organization replaced the Senegal River States Committee which had been formed earlier. The preamble of the constitution specified that the objectives of the organization were to foster understanding and mutual co-operation between the four states to promote economic, social and cultural development and solidify the formation of a Union of West African states.¹²³ The fact that President Sekou Toure accepted to be appointed as the first president of the OERS and also the fact that Guinea was one of the signatories of the very constitutions which sought to ultimately create a "Union of West African states" shows a radical change in Toure's policy towards regional organization. Toure's 1968 posture was very identical to his 1958-1961 policy towards the creation of

122. W. Scott Thompson: Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966; op. cit. pp. 329-331

123. ACR 1968/1969; pp.; 780-782

regional organization but very different from his anti-regionalism attitudes of 1962-1964.

In April 1968, the Liberian President Tubman opened the first West African Summit conference in Monrovia. The conference aim was to create the conditions for such integration, following a preliminary ministerial meeting held in Monrovia from 17th to 21st April. Ahmed Sekou Toure again participated in this summit conference. The Economist¹²⁴ noted that the summit conference failed for both cultural and economic reasons. Besides eight of the nine summit attendants of the French-speaking states among the 14 are associated with the European common market (Guinea is the only exception). Among the English-speaking, only Nigeria is. Another problem is that there are rules made in Paris, which inhibit commerce between france-zone states and sterling or dollar neighbours. But the greatest barrier is the absence of cohesion among the English-speaking states of West Africa.¹²⁵

Guinea's commitment to the OERS and to any other West African regional grouping looked dubious by early 1971 mainly because of her domestic political problems. In a conference of all heads of state of OERS states held in Bamako, Mali, on 18th Jan., 1971 the Guinean head of state failed to attend and appointed his Minister of State Mr. Lansana Beavogui. Although Mr. Beavogui stated that President

124. The Economist 11th May, 1968

125. ACR 1968/1969; pp.; 778-779

Toure could not attend because Guinea "was still in a state of War," Guinea's posture in the subsequent conference raised much doubt in her future membership to the OERS. It was becoming quite apparent that the increasing tension between Guinea and Senegal was the prime cause of Guinea's gradual withdrawal. As a result of Guinea's allegations of "duplicity" by Senegal in the November 22, 1970, invasion a special Ministerial council meeting was held in February 1971 (Novak chott) and even though the differences between the two countries are said to have been smoothed over the meeting, President Toure's refusal to attend the Heads of State conference scheduled to take place on 20 April, 1971, in Novakchott, Mauritania, to study the dispute between Senegal and Guinea was a clear indication that the February Ministerial council meeting had not sorted out the real issues of contention. In his 10th April 1971 Conakry broadcast President Toure stated that because the Senegalese Government had deliberately violated Charters of the O.A.U. and the OERS by refusing to implement their resolutions stipulating that all African states should send residents in their territories who had been implicated in the invasion of November 1970 back to Guinea, he did not consider it "useful" to hold a further summit meeting of the Organization of Senegal River States (OERS)¹²⁶ In a reply to President Toure's statement President

126. ACR 1971/72; p. C. 334, also Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) Political Series, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1971.

Senghor argued that it was contrary to international law and to the Senegal constitution to hand over to the Guinea Government, the Guineans who had already been condemned because of their alleged participation in the November invasion. President Senghor further argued that 'it would have been more worthy of President Sekou Toure to say that he could not go in person to Novakchott any more than he can accept invitations to Brazzaville, Addis Ababa, or Cairo. He cannot go anywhere, but since he prefers not to say so, he has to "create a situation," avoiding going to the Summit of Novakchott by attacking Senegal."¹²⁷ Senghor's opinion seems to agree with the observation made by Afrique Nouvelle that "it is almost certain' that President Toure would not have attended the meeting and never meant to do so. Had he meant to attend, he would probably not have agreed to the location of Novakchott, since he never leaves Guinea."¹²⁸ It is evident that Guinea's participation in the OERS conferences and in its general operations was being constrained by her own domestic political crisis and hence her complete refusal to attend the Ministerial meeting scheduled for July 1971 on Novakchott, Mauritania, was still another indication that she had more or less pulled out of the OERS.¹²⁹

Although regional co-operation seems to have gained favour and momentum as a first step towards African Unity

127. Ibid.

128. Afrique Nouvelle; April, 1971

129. ACR; 1971/72 p C 335; also Africa Research Bulletin Economic Series. Vol. 8. No. 6 1971

among the African leaders and government by the middle of 1971, Guinea's role in regional co-operation seemed to have dwindled tremendously. Increasingly, the regime seems to have been more concerned with consolidating the socialist structure¹³⁰ of her domestic politics, and to have began shipping back into isolation. The regime also seems to have opted not to participate in the formation of a West African Economic Community (CEAO) whose Treaty was signed on 2nd June 1972. Members signatory to the Treaty included: Ivory Coast, Dahomey; Upper Volta, Mouritania; Niger and Senegal; whose heads of state with the exception of Dahomey were in Bamako for the occasion. Togo, who did not join the organization sent an observer.

While the future membership of the organization remained opened to any West African State wishing to join it, as was indicated by President Traore's (Mali) and President Ould Daddah's (Mauritania) addresses to the conference, Guinea's uncommitted views towards the CEAO were expressed in her June 7 broadcast which stated:

"...that the ruling P.D.G. remained convinced that all West African states should make a concerted effort to build up the West African Regional Group (WARG)¹³¹ formed by a Heads of state conference in Liberia in 1968.

130. ACR; 1972/73 p. B. 615

131. For more details on the West African Regional Group see ACR 1968/69 op. cit. pp. 778-779

Guinea approved, however, of the references to enlarge the new economic community to include English-speaking neighbours. It was patently to West Africa's advantage that its countries should emerge from their colonialist structures and take account of Geographical realities as well as their peoples interests."¹³²

Thus in principle, the Guinean Government supported the formation of a wider West African Economic union embracing the Francophone and Anglophone states, but she tactfully evaded committing herself. In the event of deteriorating relations with her two neighbours, Senegal and Ivory Coast, Guinea was excluded from the new organization created for the Senegal River States - Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) established in Novakchott on 11th March 1972. The founder members were Mali, Mouritania and Senegal, but like the CEAO, the organization remains open to all states through which the river flows" "provided they accept the spirit and letter of the convention." The OMVS was created after discussion in Novakchott by the Heads of state of the three countries: Leopold Senghor (Senegal), Mokhtar Ould Daddah (Mouritania), and Col. Moussa Traore (Mali). The three heads were all members of the

132. ACR 1972/73 pp. C 238 - C 240. Also see Africa Research Bulletin; Economic Series May - June 1973

former Organization of Senegal River States (OERS) which they had formed with Guinea, but the organization (OERS) broke up in November 1971, following a dispute between Senegal and Guinea. Thus by the end of 1973, Guinea's tensions and bad neighbourliness with her neighbours, seems to have eclipsed any chances of her participating formally and practically in any West African regional organization.

(b) GUINEA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE REST OF THE CONTINENT:

Broadly speaking, the rest of the continent, for the purpose of this discussion, envisages: Northern Africa; Eastern Africa, Central and Southern Africa. It is not as easy to identify Guinea's regionalized policies towards the various regions grouped together under this broad heading in the same way as we have dealt with Guinea's West African regional policy. First, the classification is too broad and general for any meaningful discussion on Guinea's policy stance towards all the above regions grouped together. Secondly the politics lumped together under this grouping encompass a huge variety of ideological orientations (economic, political and cultural), and hence making any generalizations on policy stance between Guinea and the group of regions concerned, either meaningless or incorrectly articulated. As an alternative any meaningful discussion in this regard would have to narrow itself down to Guinea's policy towards the rest of the continent on issue-areas, as this is dealt with later on in the chapter.

Consequently any remarks made in this section in connection with Guinea's policy on this broad perspective, must be taken evaluatively with these analytic problems in mind.

In spite of these analytic problems, it is still possible to make a few general observations with regard to Guinea's general policy towards each region. The thesis advanced earlier on the importance of geographical proximity and similarity in the colonial historical experience as fundamental determinants of inter-state relations is not only relevant to Guinea's regional policy, but also in its relations with any other state in the continent. Whereas this relationship seemed not to be very significant in Guinea's regional policy (in fact the converse of the thesis seemed to be more operational Guinea had a more consistent policy towards the Anglophone states than towards the Francophone states) The relationships of these two variables seem to be undeterministic in the case of Guinea's relations with the rest of the continent.

Rather, similarity in ideological orientations in post-colonial period appear to be the dominant factor that determines a country's relations with Guinea. In the case of Guinea's relations with Southern Africa, the question of race relations and regime typology are the two preponderant issues. That is, Guinea's hostile attitude towards the South African Governments is based on the sheer facts that the Southern Governments pursue racist policies of apartheid and secondly because the government itself is founded on undemocratic

principles of minority rule. Guinea's strong stand against the bi-products of the racist minority government such as suppression; exploitation and all practices of injustices is completely compatible with her dominant theme in her foreign policy - i.e. African Liberation. In Guinea's view, the restitution of African political independence could be manipulated to solve the weils of socio-political and economic injustice in south Africa. Thus Guinea's anti-Apartheid policy rests on the notion of African Liberation. One could advance similar views for the rest of minority governments in southern Africa (i.e. Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola).

Principally, the Guinean policy towards the rest of the continent, with the exclusion of South Africa, fourses its attention on African Unity. The Guinean regime conceptualizes African Unity as the sysnthesizing factor of continental problems including African Liberation; and neo-colonialism. That is, the Guinean regime prescribes continental Unity, in economics, politics and culture, as the basic solution to the multifarious problems that confront the continent presently. It is also seen as a way of promoting continental identity - thus impressing the Africanness of continental issues in the internation environemnt.

With most states in black Africa professing to be advocates of both African Socialism and non-alighment, however unrealistic their confessions of these ideologies may be, similarity in ideological orientations between Guinea and

states from the rest of the continent, may not be a very accurate index of evaluating inter-state interaction and for that matter interaction between Guinea and other states. Neither would the concepts "revolutionary or radical leaders" be a sufficient condition for Guinea to adopt a pro-stance towards such as state. Hence, while Tanzania may have enjoyed the closest links with Guinea among all the three East African partner states, such closeness should under no circumstances be attributed entirely to the similarity in the ideological orientations of the two states. President Nyerere and President have even taken very different stands on some continental issues, for instance the 1967 Biafra crisis.¹³³ In this instance President Toure refused to recognize Biafra on the principle that recognition of secessionism was inconsistent with the African theme of African unity while at the same time, President Nyerere recognised Biafra's secession on the grounds that unity can only be based on the general consent of the people involved and that since the people had ceased to feel that the Federal state and government was theirs, then the Federal state and Government had for practical purposes ceased to become a viable unit, at least from the Biafrans' viewpoint. The Government as such could no longer be conceptualized as an organ for the people - i.e. for all

133. For a detailed discussion on Nyerere's stand see ACR. 1968/69, p. 651; "Why we Recognised Biafra."

the Nigerians. This incidence exemplifies the latitude with which African leaders can pursue their own foreign policies independently, at least from the continental viewpoint, while at the same time maintaining fairly close bilateral relations. In the Biafran issue, inspite of the variant stands taken by President Toure and President Nyerere, the two leaders nevertheless maintained very cordial relations. Before concluding our remarks on Guinea's relations with Eastern Africa, it is important to impress on the fact that the Guinean regime views Tanzania not only as a radical socialist state but also as the strategic base for the operation of the freedom movements in southern Africa. Thus when President Nyerere paid a state visit to Guinea in February 1968; the Guinean national radio referred to President Nyerere as

"an African revolutionary, a brother, a friend, a comrade in arms and a convinced partisan of the defence for peace throughout the world."¹⁴⁴

With the death of President Nasser on September 28, 1970, Guinea's relations with the Arab world appear to have relapsed until July 1972 when Anwal el Sadat began to take a sharp turn towards the Russians. In July 1972, Sadat ordered most of the 20,000 Soviet Military advisers and personnel to leave Egypt. From the time Sadat was sworn in as President on October 4, 1970, until the expulsion of the

Russian personnel relations between Guinea and the UAR seemed to have been at very low ebb. The Russian expulsion was interpreted by the Guinean leadership as a radical change in UAR's foreign policy and although President Toure did not openly support Sadat's action, his implicit attack on "imperialist intrigues in Africa" at the time of the Soviet Union. Guinea's invasion in the following month (November 1970) effectively Guinea from any active participation in external issues, both continental and extra-continental.¹³⁵ Guinea's introverted and isolationist policy and the UAR's involvement in the Middle East crisis have meant that the two countries have not been able to restore bilateral co-operation to the pre-1967 level. It should be emphasized that Guinea's has from 1967 stood for the Arab course in the Middle East War and has on all U.N. and O.A.U. resolutions on the issue voted on the pro-Arab side. For instance in the 1967 U.N. General Assembly resolution tabled by Yugoslavia on behalf of the non-aligned countries, and requesting that "Israel should immediately withdraw to its pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers;" Guinea adamantly led the support for this resolution. Unfortunately the resolution was rejected on the basis that it lacked a two-third majority support.¹³⁶ Similarly Guinea was among the first African countries to break diplomatic relations with Israel during the October 1973 war with the Arab world (U.A.R. and Syria).

135. Radio Conakry, October 17, 1970 Also; West Africa October 1970

136. Africa Diary, August 1967, Vol. VII, p. 3517

Whereas isolation was the dominant feature of Guinea's foreign policy in the late sixties, and at the beginning of the seventies, 1972 was for Guinea a year of intense diplomatic reconciliation with old enemies (though little was achieved in this direction) and a year to strengthen the loose ties that existed between Guinea and some of the African states. The year was thus characterized by a sequel of state visits by: General Yakub Gowon of Nigeria (March, 1972), General Mobutu of Zaire (June 1972); President Alidjo of Cameroon (May, 1972), and Algeria's President Boumedienne (June, 1972). Relations with the east African states became rather mixed and even hostile especially towards Tanzania when Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda on September 17th, 1972. Guinea's attitude towards the Nyerere - Amin conflict is discussed under issue - areas later in the chapter.

Having briefly surveyed Guinea's continental policy, it is now fitting that we draw our attention to Guinea's extra-continental policy. Like in our analysis of continental policy it must be appreciated that a discussion of this size is necessarily limited in its exposition of Guinea's policy stance in extra-continental issues. As usual, the most serious limitations that besets our analysis in this section is the lack of substantive and systematic data on Guinea's relations with nations and states outside the continent.

(c) GUINEA'S EXTRA-CONTINENTAL POLICY.

The dominant theme in Guinea's extra-continental policy has been the pursuit of a positive neutralist policy. In pursuance of this policy, the Guinean regime seeks to participate actively in international issues, while at the same time taking no sides on ideological basis with any bloc or system. Although the regime has been accused constantly from Western quarters as being very much aligned to -, or simply as being pro-East, her participation on continental issues at the O.A.U, and on international issues at the U.N. have depicted an independent stand taken without pressure from any system or bloc of countries.

In the main, the Guinean regime has persistently pursued three of the four principal international goals of non-alignment, namely:

1. Active opposition to colonialism neo-colonialism, imperialism, and racial discrimination, as well as verbal and material diplomatic support for liberation efforts of the various peoples of the Third World;
2. Active support of the U.N. in its efforts to promote peace and security among states. One should qualify this point by stating that the U.N. has been a major forum for small power diplomacy and the principal medium through which small nations, particularly the non-aligned group, have continuously expressed their

dissatisfaction with the structure of the existing order; and¹³⁷

3. Urging for peace and disarmament. This of course is both a role and a goal in the sense that the non-aligned states, along with other small states fully realize that they cannot pursue their own domestic and international objectives in a world where security is not assured for states. That is, and Dr. Mugomba has argued elsewhere, a system marked by instability because no state enjoys unconditional viability irrespective of the fate of states or what they might do.¹³⁸ that whereas Guinea has persistently pursued the three goals.

Since 1958, she has devoted more attention to the first one than the rest. This may be explained by the fact the basic elements of this goal (colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination) are more rife in the African continent than anywhere else in the globe;

Secondly, it should also be noted that Guinea has severally participate or helped other members of the non-aligned group to participate in the principle organs of the U.N. which control the means to fulfil these goals. Where verbal means has been the required principal means of

137. Ahmed Sekou Toure; The Doctrines and Methods of P.D.G. p. 544 of Non-alignment

138. For an exposition of International goals and their achievement, see Mugomba 1974, Lecture xiv p. 31

realizing these goals, the regime has not been hesitant to apply it.

Another important feature of Guinea's extra-continental policy, is the internationalization of class conflict. Guinea's perception of global inequality is systematically divided into the poor underdeveloped states of the Third World, and the rich, industrialized nations of the world. The notion of exploitation between individuals or among social groups, is thus transcended into the exploitation of the Third World by the industrialized nations. This in Sekou Toure's views, it is meaningless to conceptualize on the possibility of establishing international peace and security while the world is still divided into the two categories of nations.¹³⁹ The regime therefore, professes to "assume the historic responsibility of eradicating every kind of discrimination, all forms of exploitation, and gradually all conditions of social alienation."¹⁴⁰ To eradicate the internationalized class conflict based primarily on the inequality of states, the policy of positive neutralism must be operationalized to benefit the Third World. That is, the Third World, and especially the non-aligned Group of countries must take advantage of technical scientific or cultural contributions of the highly developed nations. This thesis refutes the assumption that positive neutralism implies

139. A.S. Toure: The Doctrines and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea (P.D.G.) pp 586-589.

140. Ibid; p. 542

rerunciation and emphasizes the fundamental principles, upon which the policy is based. In Sekou Toure's opinion these principles should include (a) honest co-operation with all countries; (b) respect for the sovereignty of all peoples; (c) non-interference in the internal affairs of the states (d) refusal of any form of domination of one nation over another nation, a state over another state, a people over another people, (e) continuous reinforcement of the people's freedom of action and expression. And do to the freedom of establishing relations with all countries and states, Sekou Toure argues that Guinea's positive neutralism, or non-alignment in general, should lead to the consolidation of the right for every country to choose its relations freely.¹⁴¹ It is on these premises that the Guinean regime encourages technical and economic co-operations with the ideological East (Soviet Union: China and Cuba), with the ideological West (U.S.A.; Britain, West Germany and France) and also with the rest of the world. Thus for instance in 1969 Guinea signed agreements with the U.S.A. Government to exploit the bauxite deposits at Boke; with Soviet Union to exploit bauxite at Kindia. Similar agreements had been made earlier in 1968 between the Guinean government and a consortium to develop the iron ore in Nimba hills. In February 1971, the British steel corporation associated itself with the United States steel corporation and those

141. Ahmed Sekou Toure: The Doctrines and Methods of the PDG. op. cit. p. 593

of Holland, Austria, Japan and Sweden to exploit bauxite deposits. In March 1971 another bauxite agreement was made between a Yugoslav enterprise and the Guinean Government to extend the aluminium factory at Kimbo-Fria to increase its annual production from 700,000 tons to 100000 tons. This was followed by yet another agreement with another Yugoslav firm with Guinea owning 51% of the capital and 95% of profits. The latter agreement was signed in April 1971¹⁴² Similar economic and cultural cooperation links were established between Guinea and Cuba when the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro visited Guinea in May 1971. An agreement was signed between the two governments with the Cuban Government committing itself to build two airports in Guinea at Babe and Boke and aircraft Hangars at Conakry International airport. In addition 100 Guinean students were awarded scholarships to Cuba.

Although Guinea has freely encouraged the participation of foreign countries in her economic development, it is noteworthy to mention that capitalist ascendancy in Guinea has been subjected to a rigorous and cautious scrutiny evaluating the contribution of each bilateral/multilateral agreement to the Guinean national economy. The regime also establishes a close surveillance on the participation of foreigners (or their implied participation) with a view to checking foreign influence from perpetrating into the Guinea's

142. Africa Quarterly; Jan-March 1972, Vol XI, No. 4; p. 305

domestic politics but more especially in her foreign policy. This explains why the Guinean Government acted so sharply in 1961, against the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Solod, after his alleged implication in the teachers/students uprising against President Sekou Toure's regime. Mr. Solod's expulsion by the Guinean authorities was meant to serve as a lesson to all the foreign diplomats accredited to Guinea, to desist from interfering with Guinea's domestic politics.¹⁴³ The regime wished to make it clear in the eyes of the international community that her, (the regime's) non-aligned policy stance was not going to be exchanged with soviet aid, and that neither was the regime prepared to allow any foreign ideologies adulterate Guinea's socialism.

Thus comparing Guinea's continental policy with her extra-continental policy stance, the dominant implicit feature of the two policy dimensions is the regime's rigorous defence of its national interest from intrusion by the external systems. This should not be interpreted as implying that the Guinean political system is in no way penetrated by the external dimension (if variables such as aid are used as an index of penetration), and neither does it contradict the thesis advanced earlier with regard to the significant roles the continental subordinate system and the international system (environment) play in influencing Guinea's foreign

143. See Robert Legvold; Soviet Policy in West Africa: Harvard University Press; Cambridge Massachusetts; (1970) pp 115-129; for a more detailed discussion on the Soviet view of the expulsion of Mr. Solod from Guinea.

policy. Rather, Guinea's actions in defence of her national interests are concomitant with the pursuit of positive neutralism both in its principles and its objectives. The action Guinea took in expelling the Soviet Ambassador must be viewed as an attempt on Guinea's part to defend her own sovereignty and also to preserve her non-alignment.

A second interesting feature of the two policy dimensions is the inclusion of Liberation and especially African Liberation as the most explicit theme of Guinea's policy stance. President Toure explicitly holds colonialism with its aftermath, neo-colonialism as the two evils that have promoted the internationalized feature of inequality of states. As we have argued elsewhere, President Toure's commitment to African Liberation is primarily based on the view that total decolonization is a necessary condition in eradicating the internationalized class conflict between the rich states and the poor nations.

Thirdly, a careful analysis of Guinea's foreign policy reveals the fact that it is both erratic and therefore unpredictable, and that it is derived from two broad themes - African Liberation, and non-alignment. By erratic we mean that the regime has not developed a consistent policy approach that may be used to predict the policy outcomes in any given situation. It is more or less a policy that exhibits a "muddling through" approach.

(d) GUINEA'S POLICY IN ISSUE-AREAS:

A proper synthesis of Guinea's continental and extra-continental policies is clearly revealed by an analysis of Guinea's response to specific "issue-areas". The concept issue-area is defined as:

- (i) A cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations would be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behaviour designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.¹⁴⁴

According to Rosenau, if a cluster of values does not lead to differences among those affected by it, then the issue-area is not considered to exist for that group of actors and their relationship with respect to the values are not considered to form a vertical system. If a cluster of values does divide the actors affected by it but if their differences are not so great as to induce support building behaviour, then the issue-area, and its vertical systems, is considered to be dormant until such a time as one of the actors activities it pressing for a reallocation of the value clusters. Similarly if a cluster of values induces support-building on the part

144. James. N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy."

of the affected actors, but if their behaviour is not distinctive from that induced by another cluster of values, then the issue-area is considered to encompass both clusters, and both are also regarded as being processed by the same system¹⁴⁵

In his analysis of external and internal systems Rosenau asserts that a typology of issue areas ought to be something more than a mere cataloguing of the matters over which men are divided at any moment in time, and that for vertical systems to be of analytic utility, they must persist beyond the life of particular actors. Functionally, a model that equates on "issue" with any and every concrete historical conflict that ensues between identifiable groups can hardly be able to accomplish much of analytic value. However, in the absence of systematic and extensive data on the distinctive nature of certain issue-areas, the lines dividing them cannot be drawn with much certainty, and consequently we resolve into using the simplistic typology in which an issue-area is defined on the basis of matters over which a group of people or countries are divided either temporarily or permanently. This approach avoids using models in which the levels of abstraction is too high to be of any operational use, but at the same time, a typology of issue-areas must be cast in sufficiently abstract terms (to use Rosenau's terms), to encompass past and future clusters of values, as well as the present ones.¹⁴⁶

145. In Barny Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*; (Northwestern V. Press, 1966) p. 81
Ibid; p. 81

146. R. Barry Farrell (Ed.) op. cit. pp. 81-82

Any analysis of this sort must essentially address itself to three basic questions: (1) How are values over which men differ to be clustered together into issue areas? (2) At what level of abstraction should they be clustered? and (3) what characteristics render the behaviour evoked by one clusters? This is certainly not the place to attempt to answer the three questions and neither is it the place to venture into structuring Guinea's foreign policy using complex typologies especially when we are heavily constrained by the lack of systematic and extensive data. Consequently, our analysis of Guinea's policy in issue-areas will entail nothing more than a catalogue of some of the continental and extra-continental issues over which international opinion is (has been) divided, and over which Guinea has taken definite stands. It should be emphasized that each of the issue-areas chosen for this discussion warrants an extensive analysis, but the scope of the present discussion militates against such a venture. For the sake of this discussion, the following list consists of what could be regarded as the issue-areas in Guinea's foreign policy: (1) The Middle East Conflict; (2) The Congo crisis (1960-1964); (3) The Biafran secession (1967); (4) The Algerian issue - (1952-1962); (5) The Tanzania-Uganda conflict (Sept., 1972) (6) Rhodesia's U.D.I. (1965); (7) South Africa's Apartheid policy; (8) Houphovet Boigny's proposed Dialogue with South Africa (1971); (9) Liberation Movements in Africa; (10) The Vietnam Issue, and (11) Arms Limitation and Disarmament.

These issue-areas could analytically be divided into the following classifications:

1. Continental/Extra-Continental Issue-areas: These include:

- (i) The Middle East Conflict.
- (ii) The Rhodesian Issue.
- (iii) The Algerian War
- (iv) The Congo Crisis (1)

2. Continental Issue-areas:

(a) Military engagements (Inter- or Intra-state)

- (i) The Congo Crisis (11)
- (ii) Biafra Seccesionism
- (iii) Tanzania-Uganda Encounter
- (iv) Liberation Movements.

(b) Continental Cold-War Issue-Areas:

- (i) The South African Issues
- (ii) Felu Houphovet's Buigny's proposed Dialogue with South Africa.

3. Extra - Continental Issue-Area:

- (i) The Vietnam War
- (ii) Arms Limitation and Disarmament.

The Middle East Crisis (1967-1973); - This is both a continental and at the same time an extra - continental problem. It is continental in the sense that it is the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and in particular Egypt who is a member of O.A.U. It is extra-continental in the sense that it involves other members of the West Asian Community (Soudi Arabis, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Quwait) but more important because the conflict has induced the intervention of the super powers - the United States and Soviet Union. With regard to the voting on the issue at the O.A.U, during the non-aligned conferences and at the United Nations on various resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict Guinea has since 1967 adopted a pro-Arab stance on the issue. For instance on the "non-aligned resolution" presented by Yugoslavia in August 1967 asking among other things, that Israel should immediately withdraw to its pre-June 5, 1967 frontiers, Guinea stood for the Arab course and voted for the motion together with twenty other African states. Unfortunately the Yugoslav resolution was rejected on the grounds that it did not obtain a two thirds majority.

Similarly, the republic of Guinea in favour of the Soviet draft resolution which followed the Yugoslav resolution. The Soviet draft resolution condemned the Israel aggression against the Arabs. On the Latin-American resolution, which also mentioned free navigation and the refugee question (considered

anti-Arab), 17 African countries were among the 57 who voted for it - Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Kinshasa, Dahomey, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar (Malagasy) Chad, Togo and Upper Volta. What is important to note is that Guinea voted against the resolution together with sixteen African countries: Algeria, Burundi, Congo - Brazzaville, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Uganda, U.A.R., Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia. Gabon, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria and Rwanda abstained.¹⁴⁷ In the recent Arab-Israeli hostilities (October 1973) Guinea was among the first African countries to break diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Rhodesian U.D.I. of 1965 is another continental/extra-continental issue which sparked off a major controversy between the African states and Britain. Following the U.D.I., the Guinean President, Sekou Toure, expressed the Guinean stand on the issue in the following remarks:

"We regard all African states as being in a state of war with Rhodesia. Guinea is already preparing an expeditionary force... we shall shoulder our responsibilities, although certain countries may not implement the decision taken at Accra on Rhodesia."¹⁴⁸ The President added in his remark

147. Africa Diary; August (6-12) 1967, Vol. VII, No. 32 pp. 3515-3516.

148. Africa Research Bulletin (A.R.B.); Nov. 1965; Vol. 2; No. 11 p. 4098. also see ARB Dec. 1965 Vol. 2 No. 12 p. 423C; p. 435A. (President Sekou Toure's statement was made on Nov. 12, in Novakchott)

that the Guinea was prepared to go to any lengths to oppose the decision of the Smith Government and in particular to resort to military intervention. He further argued that Britain was responsible for the situation as she had not abrogated the 1961 constitution as had been demanded by the African states in Accra in 1961.

Following the Guinean pronouncement and similar responses from the other individual African states (i.e. from Black Africa), an emergency O.A.U. ministerial meeting was convened in Addis Ababa on Dec. 3, 1965. The meeting recommended among many other things that if Britain did not crush the Rhodesian rebellion by Dec. 15, all the O.A.U. member states would break off diplomatic relations with her (U.K.). The recommendations also called upon African states to sever economic ties with solisbury and refuse overflying and landing rights to any aircraft bound for Rhodesia.¹⁴⁹

The republic of Guinea again took lead in being the first African country to announce the implementation of the O.A.U. threat by severing diplomatic relations with Britain, and ordering the closure of the British Embassy in Conakry as from Dec. 15¹⁵⁰ Diplomatic relations were, however, resumed in February 1968 It is also interesting to note that the initiative to resume relations between the two countries came from President Sekou

149. Africa Diary Jan (3-6), 1966; Vol. VI; No. 2 pp 2678-2679

150. Ibid.; p. 2678

Toure after his letter to Prime Minister Harold Wilson in November 1967. Whereas the resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain may imply that Guinea has by 1967 re-ordered her priorities in foreign policy and that the Rhodesian issue was now no longer as crucial as it was in 1965, it is also important to realize continental politics had now taken a different turn especially with the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria, and the six days war between Egypt and Israel in June 1967. Each of these three events had challenged the credibility of the O.A.U. as an effective and operative organization capable of solving the African problems. The O.A.U. seemed to be undergoing a serious crisis of trying to integrate a continent which seemed to sheared off most of its leading Pan Africanists. Thus by 1967 the Rhodesian issue was no longer the paramount issue in the O.A.U. forums. Nevertheless Guinea's attempt to resume diplomatic relations with Britain in 1967 raises the question of the leaderships consistency in the pursuit of the country's radicalized foreign policy. It is worth noting that in his reply to Toure's November letter, British Premier was now more concerned not with whether Guinea had changed her stance in the Rhodesian question, but rather he was concerned with the status of the former Ghanaian President, Dr. Nkrumah, when President Toure had made "Co-President" of Guinea following Dr. Nkrumah's overthrow in February of 1966. London had no desire to recognize Dr. Nkrumah's status as "Co-President" of Guinea.¹⁵¹

151. Africa Research Bulletin, March 1968, (covering February 1-29) Vol. 5 No. 2 p. 987

During the Algerian nationalist struggle against the French colonialism, (1954-1962) most of the African states were still under colonial regimes. As most of them acquired independence in the late fifties and early sixties, the Algerian issue started to become an African concern with most states supporting the course of the Algerian Liberation front (F.L.N.) Civil strife in Algeria after she became independent in 1962 created confusion on the country's leadership until Ahmed Ben Bella with army support, assumed control in August 1962. Ben Bella was elected President for a five year term on Sept. 15 1963. His five-year term was cut short after the bloodless army take-over of June 17, 1965 led by Col. Houari Boumedienne, who assumed the Presidency on July.11, 1965. The Guinean pro-Algerian stand during the nationalist struggle, and particularly between 1958 - 1962 is clearly elaborated by President Sekou Toure's speech at the Algerian-Guinean solidarity demonstration staged on November 1st, 1961.¹⁵² Like in his statement on the Rhodesian issue, President Toure asserted that the Guinean regime considered "the war imposed on the Algerian peoples as a war waged against the rights of the African peoples as a whole."¹⁵³ He thus called for independence as a precondition for Franco-Algerian friendship."¹⁵⁴ It should be noted that Guinea's

152. Ahmed Sekou Toure; The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea (P.D.G.) Vol. VII. pp 127-136; pp 137-140.

153. Ahmed Sekou Toure; The International Policy of P.D.G., op. cit. p. 127

154. Ibid., p. 126

policy towards France was very much determined by the French attitude towards the Algerian Revolution especially between 1960 and 1962. According to President Toure, the Algerian issue had ceased to be a conflict exclusively concerned with two countries only (France and Algeria), but that it had now become a continental issue. In his speech he thus stated that the Algerian War had become an issue of Guinea's foreign policy, "...Because Algerian is an African land," and also, "because the unjust war waged against her people affects all African peoples." ¹ On these two grounds, President Toure reaffirmed the Guinean, "unreserved solidarity for the Algerian people and its authentic representatives." In his assurance of Guinea's commitment to the Algerian's course President Toure thus stated:

"Fully aware that the Algerian independence is one of the decisive factors of African independence, and an indispensable prerequisite for the free determination of African peoples as a whole, we are determined to give the Algerian people our unconditional support for the establishment of peace in Algeria under the conditions under the conditions and with quarantees defined by the provisional Government of the Algerian Republic."¹⁵⁶

The Guinean regime also recognized the members of the *G.P.R.A as the authentic representatives of the true interests of the

155. Ibid. p. 134

156. Ahmed Sekou Toure: The International Policy of the P.D.G. op. cit. 134

* GPRA Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

people of Algeria, "indissociable from the permanent interests of African peoples as a whole."¹⁵⁷ The Guinean stand on the Algerian was was concomitant with her revolutionary views with respect to any issues that apertained to African liberation - the main theme of Guinea's foreign policy in the later fifties and early sixties. From the time Guinea broke off from de Gaulle's France in 1958, her first priority in the foreign policy was/became total decolonization. Thus the regime refused to consider the Algerian problem exclusively in terms of relationship between the Algerian people and the French Government; on the contrary, the Guinean leadership viewed this problem as linked directly and concretely to the current de-colonization of Africa, which the regime further considers as an imprescriptible principle and the fundamental condition for establishing peaceful international relations. The regime also argued that by letting the French continue to commit their Leinous athocities on the Algerians, this would equally justify the attempts to dismember the Congolese state, the genocide committed by Portugal in Angola and the growing impudence of the dictatorship in South Africa. The Guinean regime was certainly prepared to present a similar situation from being repeated in Algeria. Hence the Guinean stand on the Algerian war.

157. Ibid. p. 134

On the Congo crisis (1960-1964), the Guinean Government besides despatching troops to join the U.N. Action Force, later condemned the equivocal attitude of the representatives of the U.N. on the conviction that the U.N. had deliberately and illegally disowned the central Government of the Congo led by Lumumba, and had instead encouraged the movements of the secession and the chaos sought by the Belgium aggressors. Guinea's dissatisfaction with the U.N. action in the Congo culminated in the recall of the Guinean troops in 1961. In the Guinean view, the only one responsible for the conduct of the fate of the Congolese people, in "accordance with the Congolese legality" was the Government of Mr. Lumumba, "which was duly elected by the Parliament and which was expected to keep the confidence of that Parliament. The Guinean leadership thus asserted that the intervention of the U.N. in the Congo drama could not be justified unless it was recognized that it was requested by a responsible government - that of Patrice Lumumba.

Similarly, Guinea was critical about the power involvement in the Congo issue, but more in particular about the perpetrating cold war. The incursion of the cold war between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union over the Congo crisis was viewed from Guinean circles as a subtle imperialist way of implanting neo-colonialism in the Congolese Republic while using the crisis as an excuse. Though the crisis warrants a more analytical and detailed treatment than is done in this paper, it should suffice to conclude discussing Guinea's involvement in this issue-area

by voting that the Guinean regime did not sanction the actions of the Super Powers involvement in the crisis. Secondly, Guinea openly attacked the U.N.'s strategy of solving the whole crisis. According to the Guinean authorities, the U.N. was seen as yielding too easily to the pressure exerted by the Super powers, particularly the United States, at the expense of the Congolese interest, but more important at the risk of allowing the crisis to escalate into a total global confrontation.¹⁵⁸ The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were already engaged in a lot conflict at the U.N. over the administration of the U.N. Action Force to the Congo was a clear evidence that the Cold War between Washington and Moscow was being shifted now into the African continent. This factor alone created a lot of resentment from the Guinean Government on U.N. operation in the Congo. Thus in his speech at the U.N., President Sekou Toure called on U.N. "to first recognize only the Congolese Government and to deal only with that Government."¹⁵⁹ Further he asserted that the seat of the Republic of Congo in the U.N. be occupied by the representatives "accredited by the Central Government which had been invested and supported by the Congolese Government."¹⁶⁰

Sekou Toure's suspicions on the imperialists intrigues in the African continent were clearly expressed in his official

158. Ahmed Sekou Toure; op. cit. pp. 60-71

159. Ibid.; p. 69

160. Ibid; p. 70

communiqué with respect to the U.N. action in the Congo. The Communiqué expressed: "The indignation felt by the Guinean people, at the announcement of the new intervention by Belgium military forces against the Congolese people.

Scorning the U.N. recommendations, defying the verdict of all the African peoples and trying to ruin the authority of the O.A.U., the Belgian Government with the support of all the partisans of political and economic domination in Africa, is citing humanitarian exigencies as a motive, exigencies which have never motivated it through its sixty years of colonial domination and exploitation imposed on the brotherly Congolese people."¹⁶¹

It is pertinent to note here that the Guinean action of sending an expeditionary force to work in conjunction with the other African forces was essentially motivated by two factors: (a) Guinea's commitment to speed up the decolonization of the African continent and also to eradicate neo-colonialism (which was beginning to take root in the Congo - this does not mean that this evil does not exist presently in the Congolese political system); and (b) Guinea's consciousness of African Unity in the defence of African interests. The latter is one of the main purposes of the O.A.U.¹⁶²

Guinea's attitude towards the (1960-1964) Congolese crisis is typical of her policy towards intra-African military

¹⁶¹. Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) Nov. 1964; p. 184 A

¹⁶². See Zdenek Cervenka: The Organization of African Unity and its Charter; London C. Hurst & Company, 1968 p. 232 (O.A.U. Charter: Articles (1) One, and (2) f)

engagements, secessionism and military insurgency. This point is clearly elaborated by analyzing Guinea's attitude towards the Biafran secessionism (intra-state military engagement) and the recent (Sept. 1972) invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops (inter-state military engagement). Our exposition of these two issues is merely confined to Guinea's policy stand with respect to the conflicts. No attempt is made to elucidate on the real issues that precipitated the confrontation.

With regard to the Nigeria-Biafran conflict (1967) the Guinean regime refused to recognize Ojukwu's secession purely on the grounds and principles of African Unity. In a message to General Gowon, President Sekou ^Toure said that he was not changing his original position of solidly backing the Federal Military Government, and that he would find it difficult to reconcile secession with the policy of African Unity, and respect for Nigerian sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁶³ Sekou Toure's policy stance in connection with the Biafran issue markedly differs from President Nyerere's viewpoint. In his paper "Why we recognized Biafra,"¹⁶⁴ President Nyerere argues that the Tanzanian stand was based on the principle that national unity is primarily based on the general consent of the people involved, and that the people must feel that "their

163. Africa Research Bulletin; April, 1968 p. 1044 B

164. African Contemporary Record; 1968/69 pp. 651-652

state or this union is theirs,"¹⁶⁵ and they must be willing to solve their quarrels in that context. In his opinion, once a large number of people of any such political unit steps believing that the state is theirs, and that the government is their instrument, then the unit is no longer viable. "it will not continue to receive the loyalty of its citizens"¹⁶⁶ it was on this principle alone that President Nyerere, "while very much conscious about the need for African Unity recognized Biafra.

These two apparently contradictory interpretations of domestic politics of the African states are a major setback in African Unity. Recognition of military Juntas has been another conflicting area in the opinions of various African leaders, especially when every leaders, virtually, stands a chance of being the next victim of coup d'etat. It is interesting to note the recognition of non-recognition of a regime may even cause any two friendly African states to sever their diplomatic relations. The recognition of General Amin's military government after the September 1972 Tanzania-Uganda hostilities, at least for sometime ensured cold relations between the two leaders Nyerere and Sekou Toure after their long period of close friendship. However the recognition of Biafra by President Nyerere and the solid backing offered to General Gowon's Federal

165. Ibid; p. 651

166. Ibid:

Government against Col. Ojukwu's Biafran secessionism did not cause a rift between Sekou Toure and President Nyerere, as did the 1972 Tanzania-Uganda, crisis.

Despite Guinea's previous backing for Tanzania in its dispute with General Amin, the latter's expulsion of Israelis, Asians and Britons was seen in Conakry as distinctively revolutionary.¹⁶⁷ Following the Uganda invasion, it is reported that President Sekou Toure backed Amin against Nyerere, "sending the latter a deeply hurtful message while at the same time supporting Amin with glowing praise."¹⁶⁸ Toure also defended the Libyan action of intervention during the crisis. It is interesting to compare President Toure's changed attitude towards the Amin regime following the overthrow of Milton Obote on January 25, 1971, and the backing Sekou Toure gave to General Amin when the Uganda - Tanzania crisis ensued.¹⁶⁹ When the Amin coup took place President Toure in his message to all African heads of state remarked:

"The Guinean Government refuses categorically to recognize the military junta and strongly and indignantly denounces the usurpers of the Ugandan people's power who are meekly carrying out the directives of imperialism,

167. Africa Contemporary Record (ACR); 1972/1973; B. 620-B621

168. Ibid; p. B 621

169. See (ACR) 1971/1972 pp. c 62-63; President Sekou Toure's Message To General Amin; Radio Conakry, 1 Feb., 1971, and President Sekou Toure's Appeal to African Leaders; ACR 1972/1973; p. C 80; Amin-Toure Exchanges.

the sworn enemy of all the African peoples."¹⁷⁰

In the same statement President Toure appealed to all the other African Heads of State to unite their efforts, "to restore legality in the republic of Uganda by replacing President Milton Obote at the head of the Nation."¹⁷¹ In Toure's view, silencing over the issue would encourage imperialist enterprise against the African States. In an earlier despatch to General Amin, President Toure had accused the General as being "guilty of national treason by means of brutal force."¹⁷²

Basically, the Guinean stance towards the Ugandan scene, Jan, 25, 1971 up to Sept., 1972 (coup to invasion) can be interpreted as a reflection of Guinea's national interest. That is, if the Guinean leader had recognized the Ugandan military take-over, he would have by the same token encouraged the same thing back home. The various plots made against his regime and the assassination attempt on his life are a clear indication of disaffection from within and outside the system. Thus apart from Toure's concern to sustain constitutional or legal leadership in the African Governments, Toure was also using the Ugandan coup to condemn the would-be suboteurs of his own regime. His recognition of the coup in Sierra Leone which put Prime Minister Siaka Stevens back in power in 1968, can also

170. AGR; 1971/1972 p. C. 62

171. Ibid; p. C. 62

172. Ibid; p c. 63

be viewed in the same light. Sekou Toure is said to have recognized Siaka Steven's regime principally on the grounds that he was not on very terms with the deposed leadership. By supporting Siaka Steven's regime,¹⁷³ Toure was in essence trying to eliminate the circuit of regimes hostile towards Guinea.

Secondly, by condemning Tanzania's action in invading Uganda, Sekou Toure was also disclaiming the legitimacy of inter-state military engagement. The Ugandan invasion and the claim by the Amin junta that mercenaries were being used in the attack reminded Toure of the Guinean invasion by the Portuguese mercenaries in Nov., 1970. Thus Guinea's support of the Tanzanian action would have been inconsistent and contradictory to the repulsive measures the Portuguese invaders received from Guinea herself and from the international community. Thus, whereas one would have expected President Toure to support Tanzania in the Uganda invasion in the hope of reinstating ex-President Milton Obote, President Toure reacted otherwise by condemning Tanzania. The Guinean reaction in this issue raise the question of credibility in Guinea's foreign policy. It should be remembered that following the overthrow of the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President Toure had sworn that he would help Nkrumah to get back into power even

173. Siaka Stevens was appointed Prime-Minister-elect by the new military junta while he was still in exile in Conakry. This partly explains why Sekou Toure recognized the Sierra Leone Coup.

if this required the use of force. For a whole year (1966-1967) there were constant rumors of the Guinean army being trained for the preparation of launching an attack on Ghana. Toure's hopes of reinstating Nkrumah as the Ghanaian head of state were shattered when the other African leaders became increasingly less concerned about the return of Nkrumah back to Ghana.

What is so far not clear is the reason that motivated Sekou Toure Appeal to all Heads of State to help reinstate Milton Obote back to power (see above) and at the same time condemn President Nyerere two years later when the latter attempted to implement the very appeal that Sekou Toure had called on the African Heads of state to implement. Sekou Toure's approaches to the two issues are inconsistently irreconcilable. The spate of revolutionary policies that General Amin initiated in Uganda in the early days of the military regime is not in itself enough reason for Toure's drastic change in his drastic change in his East African policy. Neither is it easy to reconcile the Amin-Toure exchanges easily in 1971 with Toure's pro-Uganda stand during the Tanzania-Uganda hostilities. With the normalization of relations between the two states, Uganda and Tanzania, Guinea has now resumed the pre-1971 diplomatic accord with the two east African states.

No discussion of Guinea's foreign policy in issue-areas can be considered complete without commenting on the regimes towards the African Liberation movements. It has already been pointed out that African Liberation is the most predominant theme of Guinea's foreign policy, and for Guinea, Liberation movements are the principle organs of executing the African Revolution in areas that are still colonized. Guinea's contributes significantly to maintenance of those movements either through the O.A.U. or directly. The closest Liberation movement to which Sekou Toure's Government has given assistance is the African independence Party of Guinea and Cape verde Islands (PAIGC) of Portuguese Guinea (Now called Guinea Bissau) Toure's regime has since 1961 offered training ground for PAIGC's guerrillas as well as providing a hiding for the PAIGC leaders. Although the Guinean regime had its early reservations in helping the PAIGC particularly on the touchy subject of clandestine arms imports, these reservations were later cleared out by 1963 and Toure's regime accepted full responsibility to train the guerrillas or to help in arranging for their training in Europe or in Asia, equipping them and helping them to combat the Portuguese bases in Guinea Bissau. This was of course the major cause of Portuguese invasion of Guinea in November 1970.¹⁷⁴

174. Amilear Cabral: Revolution in Guinea; Love and Malcomson Ltd. Brighton Road Red Hill Surrey, 1966. pp; 18, 32, 33, 114-119, 127

Also Basil Davidson: The Liberation of Guinea Penguin Books: p. 86

Guinea's militant diplomacy particularly with respect to the racist regimes in Southern Africa (Rhodesia, Vosters union and south Africa, the Portuguese Mozambique and Angola) has throughout been compromising. This hostility has been manifested at the O.A.U. and U.N. debates. Sekou Toure's Guinea has been a staunch supporter of anti-apartheid policies at the U.N. since 1958. In quantitative terms, Guinea's substantive contributions towards the liberation struggle exhibit the regimes commitment to the course of African Liberation. The success of Sekou Toure in fostering the Liberation course, however very much depends on the co-operation she receives from all other independent African states. If the continent continues to be riddled with the inter-state conflicts and hostilities, the future of the African Liberation movements lies in jeorpady.

The South African issue remains the main stigma of African politics and especially in the intra-African relations among states. Whereas the majority of African leaders are staunch supporters of the use of force as the only instrument of liberating the Africans (black Africans) in this part of the continent, there are those other leaders like Malawi's Banda, and Houphonet Boigny of Ivory Coast who believe that the solution in South Africa lies not in the use of force, but rather through peaceful negotiations. The division and variations in the perceptions of the various African leaders towards such issue-areas as the south African question is the basic factor

that undermines African unity. A recent vivid example of African "disunity" was the 1971 Great debate on Dialogue with South Africa. The question of "a dialogue" between the Republic of South Africa and the rest of the African states dominated intra-African foreign relations in the whole of 1971. It not only divided white South Africa from the great majority of African states but also produced sharp divisions within the O.A.U. Thus by the end of 1971, it was hard to predict with any real confidence, the likely outcome of efforts to get a dialogue started with the backing of a convincing number of African Governments.

In July 1971, the O.A.U. had seemed to succeed at its summit conference to bloc the attempt (announced in November 1970) by the Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny, to carry on the initiative for a dialogue started by Malawi's P President Dr. Kamuzu Banda. In October, a group of countries - the so-called 'dialogue club' - met on the occasion of Lesotho's independence celebrations in Maseru to plan their future strategy. President Boigny's advocacy for a dialogue with south African is based on what he referred to as the orthodox O.A.U. stand towards the South African regime. These illusions are included in his address to the O.A.U. Heads of state summit which stated: "It is to be feared that the O.A.U. may become an supine organization. It is an illusion to think that South Africa can be compelled to abandon apartheid through force. It's another illusion to believe that the whole world will stop economic relations with

south Africa because of Apartheid. It is yet another illusion to believe that all those who talk of war will take up arms and go to the South African border.

Finally, it is an illusion to believe that the two blocks struggling for world leadership will remain indifferent in the event of conflict with South African and the African states.....Because we are advocates of one indivisible peace, war cannot solve the problem of apartheid. We can and we must resort to a dialogue in the interest of peace"¹⁷⁵ What may still be more

interesting is that not only was there two divisions on the dialogue issue, between the white south Africa and the African states; and also between African supporters of Dialogue "the Dialogue club" and their opponents, but there also existed opposition within the "dialogue club." First, the Governments themselves were often internally divided over the question; thus included the Ivory Coast itself where several senior ministers were known to be opposed to the President's idea - a situation shared in countries like Ghana, and Madagascar (present Malagasy). Second, there was a difference of approach between those who favoured the direct initiative advocated Malawi and Ivory Coast and the others - prominently Lesotho - who favoured the heavily conditioned approach of the Lusaka manifesto. Thirdly, there were those - like the majority of

the Entete countries (Niger, Upper Volta, Togo and Dahomey) who were in favour of an initiative over dialogue provided it had the backing of the O.A.U.

Our principal concern on the dialogue issue is, however Guinea's stand on the issue. On May 16th, 1971, President Sekou Toure announced that his Government would never undertake a dialogue with the "executioners of South Africa." Such a dialogue, he said, would be a "betrayal not only to the peoples of Southern Africa but also of all peoples in the continent."¹⁷⁶ The Guinean stand was made more clear at the Foreign Ministers meeting held on June 17th to debate on the issue: The Guinean Foreign Minister stated:

"In our language dialogue is between two people willing to understand and to be understood, and meeting on equal terms. Is this what is envisaged by dialogue with South Africa? Our delegation formally accuses 'The dialoguers' of betraying Africa; of putting a dagger into the back of the fighters for freedom; of conniving with our enemies, of tramping on our dignity.... Any dialogue must be initiated first between the Africans and the whites in South Africa; and this presupposes the release of all political prisoners. Meanwhile we should increase our

176. Africa Research Bulletin (ARB); Vol. 8, No. 5, June 15, 1971; p. 2099

contributions to the Liberation movements, so that by the end of this year the liberation movements may reach independence."¹⁷⁷ Thus, the question of solving the South African problem through peaceful negotiations is, as far as the Guinea leaders are concerned, ruled out. In the Guineans view, the solution has in strengthening the militant liberation movements in South Africa. Towards the close of the dialogue debate, Houphovet Boigny's proposal was more or less a lost issue. Its impacts on the intra-African politics, however created negative ramifications. That is, not only did the issue create dissensions among the African leaders on the issue itself, but that also it created a new rift among the African leaders in their future co-operation in financing and organizing liberation movements in South Africa. Guinea's call to increase the contributions to the Liberation movements was an echo of helplessness in this division. Furthermore, the failure of Houphovet- Boigny's proposal has left deep scars not only on the President, but also on most of the pro-dialogue proponents. The dialogue was more or less a motivator of African disunity than Unity. To the South African's minority, racist regimes, and especially to Voster's regime, the African division on the issue was a clear indication that has some sympathizers, though a minority, among the leaders of Black Africa. This view was expressed by the South African

177. ACR; 1971/1972 p. A78

representative during the great debate.¹⁷⁸

Thus, from this analysis it is possible to identify two basic continental cold war issues which have emerged from Pretoria's policies and to which the African states have responded. On one hand, the African Governments from Black Africa have shown or expressed solidly their repugance over Pretoria's apartheid or racial totalitarianism. Here the Cold war issues involves the Pretoria regime and the rest of the continent or what may be called the O.A.U. affiliates.

On the other hand the other hand, Boigny's proposal on dialogue with Pretoria Government extended the ramifications of the cold war issues, this time to cause a rift on the African (Black Africans) solidarity against the minority regimes in Southern Africa. The most significant aspect of the dialogue issue is that both the initiative and the opposition of the debate was purely an African matter exhibiting the divergence in the perceptions of African leadership with respect to continental problems, and implying an unnoticed crack on the walls of African Unity.

178. For a more detailed discussion on the Dialogue; see Colin Legum; "Dialogue: The Great Debate" in ACR 1971/1972 pp. A 66 - A 83; Also Africa Diary; June (11-17). 1971, Vol. XI, No. 24, pp. 5502-5504

July, (16-22), 1971, Vol XI, No. 29. pp. 5553-5554

August (6-12), 1971, Vol XI, No. 32 p. 5576

(E) EXTRA CONTINENTAL ISSUE-EREAS

The small states, like Guinea, cannot be expected to influence the politics of the super powers significantly if they acted independently. Thus their power to influence the international environment lies in their forming coalitions or blocs with specific objectives. For Guinea, and most other small states, the non-aligned-group coalition has been used to voice the views of such states. The O.A.U. and the U.N. have also been used with the same objective. But this does not mean that the small states are shut up from expressing their views independently and without using these international organs. For instance the small states find it fashionable to make their foreign policy statements when the heads of states are making state visits. The republic of Guinea has severally used these two strategies to express her views on specific extra-continental issues. Thus during his state visit to Yugoslavia in 1965 President Toure used the occasion to attack the American policy in Vietnam. In a joint communique with President Tito, the two Presidents expressed their deep concern over "the situation created by foreign intervention in Vietnam." The two statesmen felt that American bombing of North Vietnam must end before any progress could be made, and that "the Geneva Convention Agreement prohibiting foreign interference in Indo-China must be respected." They also felt (and expressed their feelings) that the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (Vietcong) must take part in

any talks aimed at a political solution of the crisis.¹⁷⁹

Another area of Guinea's involvement in extra-continental issues has been talks on Disarmament. On Disarmament President Toure asserts: "We do not struggle for disarmament: we struggle for the happiness of the people, which demands security in the world, and disarmament is only a means to this end."¹⁸⁰ Sekou Toure stresses more on 'the liquidation of all domination and the real freedom of every country and every people' as the supreme conditions for peace. He argues that peace is dependent on political freedom. That is, the effective sovereignty of the people both at the level of individual nations and of the world community.¹⁸¹ Apart from Guinea's perceptual attitude towards disarmament, the regime has actively participated in international forums where the issue is discussed the most significant of which was the Belgrade Conference (Yugoslavia) of the Non-aligned Countries in 1961. The main issues discussed included: Big Power rivalry; stabilization of peace; the need for consultative talks particularly between the super powers; End of colonialism; Apartheid condemnation and any acts of racial totalitarianism; Vacation of foreign military bases from the non-aligned countries; The Disarmament problem

179. Africa Diary August 28 - Sept. 3, 1965

180. A.S. Toure; Doctrine and Methods of the P.D.G. op cit. p. 589

181. Ibid; p. 589

and finally Nuclear Test prohibitions. An disarmament, the non-aligned countries unanimously agreed that:

(i) that solution could be found by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament; (ii) that the Great powers should sign without delay a treaty on (i) in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armament for peaceful economic and social development of mankind; (iii) the non-aligned should in future be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament (iv) all discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the U.N. (v) that general and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control the terms of which should include members of non-aligned nations.¹⁸² The Guinean support for all the above resolutions is an indication of the country's stand on disarmament.

In conclusion it should be realized that Guinea's dependence on foreign aid from the metropole powers has in no way been a barrier in the execution of her foreign policy. From the preceding discussion it is evident that in taking certain stands on international issues the regime has generally withstood the risk of facing economic sanctions. But the true dilemma of her foreign policy is hinged on compromising between the strands

182. For a more detailed discussion on the proceedings of the Belgrade conference see: Africa Diary; Sept (16-22) 1961 pp. 142-144

of domestic politics and the pressure exerted from outside - from the international environment. Nevertheless the Guinean leadership still lavishes in the dream of African Unity while and after the continent is completely decolonized.

CHAPTER IIITHE DICHOTOMY OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENTS:THE GUINEAN CASE:

An examination of Guinea's foreign policy must necessarily focus its attention on the state's domestic ideology - African Socialism, before making any attempts to grapple with the factors that motivate the regime to pose as a non-aligned state in her international relations. Put differently, it must be accepted that the image that any state creates on the international scene is both a reflection of the domestic political milieu as well as the actions of that state in its various attempts to find accommodation as a sovereign unit in the international system.

Thus, in any country's foreign policy, there must be an internal struggle within the state system in the attempts of that state to mould the various strands (economic, political and socio-cultural) that constitute the life of that state. A domestic ideology serves to fulfil this basic function in the foreign policy. Secondly, there must be an external struggle of that state in its attempts to operate as an autonomous unit in the community of nation. That is, the single state must by all means establish the premises upon which its capability to compete equally with other states on any international matters can be assessed. The ability of the state to compete effectively with other states very much depends on the power of the individual

state. Since state power is not a homogeneous factor among all states, the states with more power are naturally bound to exert more influence on international issues than the small and less powerful states. Moreover, the powerful states also have the capability to determine the domestic politics of the small states in the various inter-state (bilateral or multilateral) relations. This point would become more clear if we analyzed the properties of what James Rosenau calls "penetrated political systems"¹⁸³ This is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of the concept, but it suffices to emphasize the fact that the phenomenon of political penetration is overtly common in most small states particularly in the Third World. Furthermore, the political processes of a penetrated system are concerned to be structurally different from both those of an international political system, and those of a national political system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and non authoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than through joint action. In the latter, nonmembers of a society do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its values or the attainment of its goals.¹⁸⁴ It is important to note, before

183. R. Barny Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics; Northwestern University Press (Evanston 1966) p. 65. (In his article, "External and Internal Relationships," (ibid;) James N. Rosenau defines a penetrated political system as one in which nonmembers of a national society participates directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals (p. 65); Also see Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System," *World Politics* XIV; October 1961: pp. 144-181

we leave our observation on penetrated political systems, that through we have not enumerated the characteristics of a penetrated political systems, for a penetrated system to function, there must be intensive face-to-face interaction between members and non members of a society., values cannot be authoritatively allocated, or goal-attaining activities authoritatively mobilized from afar. Non-members of a society must come in order to acquire sufficient information about the society's needs and wants to participate in its value-allocation processes in ways that are sufficiently acceptable to be authoritative. What we need to say at this juncture is that there is mounting evidence, as Rosenau also points out, (R. Barny Farrell; p. 70; 1966), that all national societies in the modern world are "susceptible of swift transformation into penetrated systems."¹⁸⁵ There are no societies exceptional to this rule, though it must be realized that there does exist some degree of difference in the ease which some state political systems are penetrable. Besides, and as we have already mentioned, the small poor states are more prone to penetration than the more developed states.

Linking this thesis to our original proposition of the internal and external struggle in the processes of

184. Ibid.; p. 65

185. Ibid; p. 70

any foreign policy, one readily sees the causative factors that enhance the evolution of national or state system ideologies. It may be argued here that Guinea's pursuit of a non-aligned posture and has adoption of African Socialism as the national ideology may be viewed in this light. In her non-aligned policy the Guinean state seeks to benefit from the international system, but at the same time the acceptance of African Socialism is an attempt to (1) grapple with the internal (domestic) struggle of the foreign policy process (see above), and (2) sieve-off the impact of excessive political penetration. Here, the ideology (African socialism) operates as the cohesive force in the internal (domestic) system - since its origins is the indigenous African traditions. Secondly the ideology functions as a repulsive force shielding the domestic system from excessive penetration, by the external system. This presupposes that the ideology is capable of infusing into the system value-allocation roles, and hence by so doing excludes external participation in the allocation of values and goals to the domestic system. This is one of the intricate threads that links the domestic ideology to the states foreign policy. This now leads us to examine the functional roles of Guinea's African Socialism.

(a) GUINEA'S STYLE OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM:

To understand the perceptual framework of Guinea's socialism one must necessary examine President Sekou Toure's constructs

on the subject. After all, Sekou Toure is the architect of Guinea's socialism.

Of all African heads of state, Sekou Toure has been most strongly influenced by Marxian socialism and Leninist principles of organization. The political thought of Toure, however, does not slavishly copy Marxist-Leninist theories, rather it posits the need to combine Marxism with uniquely "Communaucratic" socialism indigenous to Africa. Like Marx, Toure seeks to unify thought and action.¹⁸⁶ In his view, for instance the action and thought of the party. R.D.G., should become unified: "We are engaged in a revolution which has no historical precedent and which must result in a radical transformation of our conditions of life. But if the revolution is directed by thought, it is by acts that it operates. The putting into practice of ideas assures its development."¹⁸⁷ Hence, rather than become immersed in sterile polemics, African Marxists must constantly adapt their thought and actions to the real social context. In the opinion of Toure Africans should apply the "science" of Marxism to society instead of imposing pure Marxist theory on inappropriate conditions. He thus remarks:

186. David E. Apter. (ed.) Ideology and Discontent; The free Press of Glencoe: Collier MacMillan Ltd; (London 1964) see Charles F. Andrain; "Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders" pp. 153-205. see especially p. 173. According to Marx, theoretical philosophy and concrete human activities are closely related.

187. Ibid; p. 173

"Society is not made for principles, for philosophy, for a doctrine, for a given science. But on the contrary science, philosophy, and principles of action must be determined for the people and as a function of the realities of the people. Instead of applying society to science, we must apply science to society. Thus, Marxism, which has served to mobilize the African peoples and particularly the working class and to lead the working class toward success, has been shown of those characteristics which do not correspond to African reality."¹⁸⁸

It is important to note, however that Toure's concentration on the general political interest, rather than on a more particular class of economic interest, marks his main departure from Marxian theory. For Toure, as for Lenin, "Socialism" means a form of political economy; the economic domain constitutes one aspect of the political realm, and as he argues, "Political economy is not the adaptation of political action to economic action; on the contrary, it is the use of economic activities for political ends."¹⁸⁹ That is, the given economic conditions are not purely independent variables, but must be manipulated by political organization.

Thus in stressing the general interest, Toure denies the relevance of the class struggle concept in the African

188. Op cit. p. 173

189. Charles F. Andrain; op. cit p. 175 (in D.Apter's Ideology and Discontent.

situation. According to him, since the instruments of production belonged to society, African experienced no class antagonisms until the coming of the foreign occupation. Within African Society, Toure argues that there exists only one class - that of the dispossessed united by their common misery. Among the social strata, the women and peasants rather than the workers have been the most exploited. Marx too had shown contempt for the peasantry. In contrast, Toure believes that Guinean socialism must be primarily concerned with the peasants who comprise more than 90% of the population. Essentially an agricultural region, Africa should place maximum emphasis on agricultural production and should consider industry as a complementary factor, of economic development.189

In his attempt to articulate an ideology to the African milieu, Sekou Toure attempts to blend Marxism with the "communitarian" values of pre-colonial African society. And hence since Guineans are a proletarian people, Marxism is conceptualized to offer more useful possibilities to Africans than does bourgeois ^{social} capitalism. Yet Africans live under conditions transcending the class struggle.

In attempting to erase any possible misconceptions on what the concept African socialism engrosses, Sekou Toure told a reporter:

"Your question implies that we have defined what you call 'African Socialism' and that we are making our political orientations and our principles of action dependent on that definition. That is not true... We use the expression "communaucratic" precisely in order to avoid all equivocation and all force analogiesOur solidarity, better known under its aspects of social fraternity, the pre-eminence of group interest over the personal interest, the sense of common responsibilities, the practice of a formal democracy, which rules and governs village life - all of which constitute the base of our society - that is what forms what we call our communaucratic realities¹⁹⁰

This stress on communaucracy reflects Toure's concern to achieve an economic policy independent of both European capitalism and communism. Since Africa has neither a bourgeoisie nor a large accumulation of capital, capitalism is not appropriate to the present stage of Guinean development. Toure further attacks capitalism for the individualism, egotism and anarchy which it multiplies. Similar to his opposition of a multiparty regime because of its disorder, he also criticizes liberal capitalism for a similar anarchy of economic forms.

190. Toure, Texte des interviews, pp. 149-151; interpreted by Charles F. Andrain; in David E. Apter's Ideology and Discontent op. cit. p. 175

Toure also rejects the East European and Russian brands of socialism, for he feels that communism resembles a collective form of national capitalism. In a capitalist regime, the workers surplus value goes to the capitalists. In communist countries, the state recovers all or part of the workers' profits. Since both Russian and Western Europe and the U.S.A are highly industrialized both systems use similar technical means. Neither communism, nor capitalism is therefore applicable to Africa because the Soviet Union, as well as Europe and America, is far too highly developed than African states. "Thus when people ask us if we are for capitalism or for socialism, for the East or for the West, we invariably answer that what we consider first and above all is Africa we intend to liberate from foreign domination, sickness, misery, and ignorance."¹⁹¹ Thus, the desire for independence is reflected not only in foreign relations but also in economic policy. For Toure, Africa constitutes a third force, an undeveloped area between the communist and capitalist camp.¹⁹²

In sharp contradistinction with other African leaders who conceive independence as the fruit of a completed struggle, Toure insists that independence was a purely instrumental acquisition. So too were democracy and national unity, to make them ends in themselves was as barren as a doctrine as

191. A.S. Toure; *La planification economique*, pp. 292, 293-3

192. David E. Apter (ed.) *op. cit.* p. 176

"art for arts' sake." Toure contends that these instruments were merely means towards social progress, towards the destruction of the old colonial 'structures of domination' and above all towards the decolonization of the minds, habits and attitudes of the people, "without which other forms of progress were impossible or illusory"¹⁹³

To integrate the Guinean internal structures, a prerequisite of the Guinean 'social revolution' the regime launches a massive campaign of political education. This great effort, summarily referred to as "social progress" has its bearing on civil, moral and ideological perceptions all of which project at creating "a Guinean national consciousness."

In historical terms, this process (campaign) took place during the period 1958 to 1964. The aim of socialism is entirely absent at this stage.¹⁹⁴

As may have already been implied from the preceding discussion, Toure's perception of class struggle in the African ⁵⁶⁻¹ seen exposes a shift from his earlier stronghold on Marxist philosophy. It should be noted that this is an important indicator of radicalism in Africa in the early sixties, and one may use it to place all African ideologists within a four-point scale.¹⁹⁵ Using Johnson's four-point scale for the measurement and evaluation of radicalism in Africa in the early 1960's and Guinea's radicalism for that matter it is possible to conceive of the scale as comprising the following stages:¹⁹⁶

193. R.W. Johnson: "Sekou Toure and the Guinean Revolution" African Affairs Vol. 69: No. 277, October 1970 p. 355

194. R.W. Johnson; African Affairs: op. cit. pp. 355, 359

(i) the know-Nothing stage involving an attempt to deny the existence of significant social differentiation in African societies. Attempted by some political leaders in the early 1960's, Johnson contends that this stage is not tenable for too long:

(ii) A second stage in which it is acknowledged that a process of social differentiation and stratification has begun but in which it is insisted that the social conflicts thus occasioned are a second order pressure group variety which may, indeed must, be reconciled in the national interests of national Unity or some other long-term goal:

(iii) A third stage in which it is frankly acknowledged that social classes proper with fundamentally opposed interests exist, but in which it is asserted that such conflicts, however bitter, may be due to the merely temporary strains of a particular historical period of say, intensive "modernization." Here Johnson supports a contemporary thesis which upholds the view that there is both the tactical possibility and the strategic necessity of a pragmatic alliance of classes. It should be noted, however, that in most cases, it has been the trade unions that have been asked or compelled to subordinate

195. Ibid; For a more detailed discussion on this subject see p. 355

196. Ibid p. 355

their class interests," but Johnson argues that these unions may be asked to do this under either right or left wing Regimes, "for technocratic, developmentalist" reasons, or in the name of "scientific socialism."

(iv) A fourth stage in which it is acknowledged that social conflicts between different strata are of a fundamental nature, incapable of resolution. In Johnson's view, this necessitates the implicit or explicit taking of sides - "theoretically, at least - for some groups against others (Johnson, 1970)

If this four-point scale thesis holds; it is then possible to conceive of the Guinean society, as may also be seen from Toure's thoughts, as having moved from at least stage (ii) through (iii) to (iv). Johnson remarks that Toure's thinking has moved a great deal faster than its political implementation (Johnson 1970, p. 356). It may be noted, therefore, that when in 1959-1960 Toure talked of the "internal contradictions" within Guinean society, the contradictions with which he was concerned were idealistic rather than social sins of individual behaviour - 'egoism' , 'individualism' and 'opportunism.' As the position is put more explicitly in Toure's works (Tome 1-2, p. 554 and Tome 3, pp. 161-168) it becomes rather less surprising that these sins should be committed by de'racine intellectuals with a superiority complex. It is also important to note that Toure admits that social conflict is possible between different 'couches sociales.' between, for example, peasants and traders

on the question of free trade in rice; he warns fonctionnaires that resources are scarce, and he speaks of the dangers that the fruits of independence will be confiscated by the few. Thus, for him, greed and selfishness, not class interests, are the true villains of the piece, and cultural and intellectual defolonization is the remedy (Johnson 1970, p. 356)

In view of class struggle and with particular reference to trade unionism Toure remarks:

'In Africa, where class antagonism does not exist, where identity of interest dominates merely occupational - functional diversity ...the labouring masses must accordingly quickly comprehend the peculiarities of their situation as against that of the European working class. For them trade unionism must be an instrument of class struggle but an instrument for harmonious evolution and rapid emancipation"¹⁹⁷

Elsewhere he also states:

"...while marxism is applied in its doctrinal integrity by the international working class insofar as the class struggle is concerned, so we have amputated that element of it so that all the African couches sociales may work together in the general anti-colonialist struggle."¹⁹⁸

197. R.W. Johnson, African Affairs, op. cit. p. 356; cited from Tome 1-2, pp. 419-420)

198. Tome 1-2 pp. 420. See R.W. Johnson. op. cit. p. 356

What is interestingly definite in Sekou Toure's analysis of class conflict is that while he emphasizes on the fact that class struggle is absent in the African context he at the same justifies the inevitable social differentiation. In his view the latter is incompatible with societal development. With regard to this he says:

"Certainly, as our society develops, so it has a tendency to fragment itself into a more and more differentiated hierarchy. The scale runs from the pleberian elements to the elite and the result is the dissociation of each element from that which precedes it and that which follows it, on the basis of the more or less accentuated contradictions between their interests. In the face of this hierarchical deployment there is a great temptation for each distinct couche sociale to act in a collolar manner - pursuing its own narrow interests rather than the narrow interests. Already (1959) one must observe - and one must deplore that a very clear tendency towards crystallisation is manifesting itself among the various layers of society. This egocentric phenomenon will of necessity continue, accentuating itself so that at least the most urgent of these (particularist) demands may be met, for it is undeniable that the man who is himself deprived is deaf and blind to the misery of others. There is in this tendency a social aspect

which threatens to condition the political situation.¹⁹⁹

Further, he notes: "thus one may fear with justification, that this social mutation will have its corollary the formation of a bourgeoisie, of a sort of aristocratic feudalism, the danger of which is unnecessary to underline. As we have said earlier, we reject the principle of class struggle, less though philosophical conviction than through the desire to save African solidarity at any price. For this (African solidarity) alone can lead us along our destined path, this alone is capable of preserving our originality and of imposing on the world a respect for African Man."²⁰⁰ (Tome 1-2 pp 411-412)

Johnson and others have argued that the "teachers' plot" and subsequent strikes of 1961 are enough evidence to confirm Toure's ideas on these ideas even to the point of claiming that:

"Should the class struggle appear in the Republic of Guinea - if we give leeway to egotistic interest groups, even trade union ones, they would form a reactionary class of bourgeois sort." Toure even goes further to suggest that it was only counter-revolutionaries and the anti-party group' who tried to substitute the notion of social classes for that social differentiation endemic in all societies; (Ibid. p. 309)

199. R.W. Johnson; op. cit. p. 357

200. Ibid. p. 357

and that only anarcho-sindicalists could believe that the principle contradictions facing Guinea were internal rather than those of the external struggle against imperialism. (Ibid. pp. 318-319) Thus for a fact, it has to be accepted, at least in Toure's view, that colonialism has prevented the growth of a national capitalism or a national bourgeoisie in Guinea and accordingly there could then be no class struggle.²⁰¹ Johnson contends that from this point on, Toure seems to be moving to the Right and that we have already cited could very well be said of Mboya and Senghor.

One dilemma which still remains unsettled in Toure's thesis on Guinea's African Socialism is the functional value of international monopoly capital. This does not imply that Toure has in no way stated Guinea's position with respect the role of foreign capital in Guinea but that rather his radicalism (anti-capitalist) is backed by little else in terms of policy implementation particularly in areas where foreign capital is of crucial use. He however, explicitly asserts that foreign capital is still needed in Guinea. With regard to this he states:

"The financial support of capitalism for which we appeal does not in any way compromise the mastery of the situation

201. op. cit. p. 357

which we have acquired politically.....We haunch this appeal to Capital so that those who possess it may also, with complete solidarity, enter into full collaboration with us."²⁰² To strike a valance between the Eastefn type state capitalism and the Western capitalism the regime launched a scheme of massive nationalization between 1959 and 1960. Before examining the implications of this program in Guinea's foreign policy, it is important to note a few more solient points of Guinea's view on Socialism.

It should be observed that Toure prefers to call Guinea's socialism the "non-capitalist way." According to him, the non-capitalist way is the expression of a socialist will. A most expository comment on why he feels reluctant to sway with the concept African socialism is constained in the following remark:

"There is much talk of "African Socialism," and this seems to infer that there also exists a Chinese socialism, an American Socialism, a Yugoslavian or Bulgarian Socialism.... Why would people, tomorrow, not speak of the Nigerian or Togolese path of African socialism, or Senegalese Chemistry or Moroccan Mathematics?"²⁰³ He contends that what is important is not the label that one attaches to socialism but rather whether the path followed is explaitative or non-exploitative."

202. Ibid. p. 356

203. Ahmed Sekou Toure: Guinean Revolution and Social Progress op. cit. p. 362

Engaging in 'socialism for the sake of socialism' is trying to mow with the sickle's handle."²⁰⁴ He therefore poses the question whether socialism is a means or an end in itself. The P.D.G. on its part thinks that socialism is a means, and that it is with this end in view that the regime chooses the social structure, the economic as well as the cultural patterns. In Sekou Toure's view, socialism, capitalism or Christian democracy are roads of access to some desired condition, so that if a capitalist system is chosen, it is with view to creating the conditions for a capitalist development, not with a view to freezing capitalist privileges. If socialism creates conditions for a social development which will fully satisfy the needs and aspirations of the human person and of the people of large, Toure contends that the social quality of conditions created is less important than the moulding of the social body (the society) to fit into the doctrine. As a Party principle, "The P.D.G., refuses to mould the people into any doctrine, it believes on the contrary, that the practical implementation of the contents of any doctrine should be conducted in furtherance of the interests of the people, present and future."²⁰⁵ President Toure notes that it is quite pointless to speak of the end while avoiding the problem of the means and especially for most

204. Ibid p. 367

205. A.S. Toure; Guinean Revolution and social progress; op. cit. p. 363

African peoples, this problem is still linked "to their factual condition of dependence."²⁰⁶ For him the problem of the means will only be solved when these peoples are liberated. It is important to note that this is the key thread that interconnects Guinea's domestic ideology ('African Socialism') and her foreign policy. We have in this regard elaborated, further above, (in the dominant themes (or objective) of Guinea's foreign policy. Thus Toure notes elsewhere that "socialism is the first stage towards abolishing exploitation and oppression, and communism is a second stage, theoretically more radical."²⁰⁷ He argues further that both of these stages are of exactly the same nature, "that of being founded on the interest of the people." They consequently, presume the abolition of all forms of exploitation and alienation, the establishment of a social justice which guarantees "the security and blossoming of man and of society in absolute harmony." In the Guinean situation then, the 'non-capitalist way' is conceived of as the way of establishing concrete and integral democracy. It is also a way of establishing popular and progressive structures.²⁰⁸ Toure posits this as the basic distinction between Guinean brand of African Socialism and the other African states which though they support to be socialist they nonetheless favour capitalism. Their money is colonial,

206. Ibid:

207. A.S. Toure; Doctrines and Methods of the P.D.G. op. cit p. 321

208. Ibid.; p. 322

therefore capitalistic so he argues, their banks are capitalistic and the means of production are still in the hands of the capitalists.²⁰⁹ Toure also rejects the thesis that "socialism" should only concern industrialized countries while the non-capitalist" way concerns the "underdeveloped" countries. He argues that this distinction is besides the point since socialism is not determined by the level of technical development, but rather "by the nature of the regime, by the manner in which the economy and society are organized, by the preeminent role of the people, who are both the designers and beneficiaries of harmonious and stable development, by the instinsic nature of the political, economic and cultural relationship, and finally by a socialist mentality."²¹⁰ The final characteristic resembles Nyerere's "state of mind" notion in his definition of socialism.

From the Sekou Toure's view-point, the non-capitalistic way is expressed in the following terms." ...It is our decision never again to tolerate any system in which man exploits man; any system in which man oppresses man; any supremacy of one or a group or a group of men over the labouring masses, and the latter must be granted and are granted as far as Guinea is concerned - the right and the power to define the means and

209. Ibid.

210. A.S. Toure; Doctrine and Methods of P.D.G.; op.cit. p. 323

the methods of work as well as the right and the power to share the fruits of this work.²¹¹ In other words, this is the essence of Guinea's "African Socialism."

It is noteworthy to mention that Sekou Toure's perception of Guinea's socialism especially with regard to the notion of class struggle took a different turn from the historic moment of the loi-cadre of November 8, 1964.²¹¹ It should be noted that the period 1961 to 1963 saw internal disaffection reach its height particularly among the intellectuals. Many French progressistes^{ves} and foreign Africans who had come to Guinea after independence full of enthusiasm for the new state and its regime, left in this period, disgruntled and despairing. Many Guineans left as well, not only intellectuals but many thousands of peasants too, flooding into Abidjan and Dakar. In the meantime Guinea's isolation within Africa and internationally deepened at the same time that the economy, labouring under an over-valued currency, hasty nationalization, inefficiency, corruption, and smuggling on a massive scale, plunged into ever more desperate straits. From the face of it all it appeared as if Sekou Toure was building a regime of iron - 'an inefficient dictatorship in which austerity and corruption combined to

211. Suitable Comparisons of the Nov. 8th 1964 loi-cadre include: Nkrumah's Dawn Broadcast, 'The Arusha and Mulungushi Declarations and also Milton Obote's move to the left.

provide the worst of both sides. In the face of the first real signs of political disaffection and mounting apathy, Toure's position hardened noticeably. He had always insisted, from independence on, that "bourgeois democracy" was not applicable in Guinea, which was a people's Republic (republique populaire), a democratic dictatorship.

Thus the loi-cadre of November 8, 1964 was essentially an attempt by Toure to halt this political and economic slide. New measures were introduced to curb corruption and to regulate commerce; in Conakry for instance, licences to deal in commerce were to be cut by 80%; all state Party officials were to be submitted to examination of the source of their income and possessions; all private import and export trade was outlawed; the P.D.G. was entirely re-organized with work-place organization and a slimmed-down membership. Excluded from all Party responsibilities were all merchants and all those convicted since 1958 of theft, corruption, fraud, subversion or racism. As Johnson puts it, "there are series of further decrees aimed at corruption among civil servants. Henceforth even the most senior Minister would have to prove his revolutionary militancy and vigilance in word and deed under pain of the most severe sanctions."²¹² President Toure, using the same analytic base that he had earlier (1961) employed in his attack on the 'teachers' plot,' claimed that the measures

212. R.W. Johnson, African Affairs op. cit. p. 358

were necessary to prevent Guinean comprador~~4~~ bourgeoisie from becoming a full-blown national bourgeoisie. He thus remarked:

In Africa colonial intervention occurred during a feudal period which was still profoundly marked by a 'communocratic' spirit. The organization of the modes of production was still neither of the slave-based type, nor assimilable to the so-called 'Asiatic' mode. The despotism which characterizes feudalism only appeared after the colonial intervention and at its behest. A fortion there was no bourgeoisie at all. In the absence of national bourgeoisie one could not have a capitalist society. Moreover, colonialism, by its take-over of both land and men as means of production, hindered the formation of a bourgeoisie class. While a privileged social category (feudal chiefs, civil servants and merchants) did appear under this omnipotent reign, it did so only very late and still possessed none of the means necessary for primitive capital accumulation, for these means were in the hands of colonialism or, at least, under its direct control. It is quite evident that this privileged national category was using our independence as a cover for transforming itself into a national bourgeoisie. (Tome 13, pp. 110-111)"²¹³

213. Tome 13, pp. 110-111

Guinea had moved from the stage of People's Democracy to that of National Democracy, by which was meant a regime intent upon preventing the emergence of antagonistic social classes by crushing the national bourgeoisie at the moment of its emergence. Thus for the first time Guinea's socialist option was affirmed, Toure made it clear that he had doubts of the applicability of the term. Irrespective of Toure's conclusion of his of (Tome 13) with an academic discussion of dialectic materialism, Toure's conception of socialism remained essentially idealistic.

What interests us here, however, is the impact of the loi-cadre to the Guinean political life. The major swing to the Left of 1964 has been followed in succeeding years less by important original ideological departures than by a process of continuous expansion, elucidation and intensification of the 1964 theses. 1964 also marks a landmark, however in the use of ideology as a form of social control. Hitherto, the dominant position of Toure's ideology has been used to disadvantage members of certain social groups in their public and political activities. Since 1964 ideology has increasingly become an instrument of control over individuals rather than groups. It has been pointed from some quarters²¹⁴ that the loi cadre reforms of 1964 have never been fully or properly carried out

214. R.W. Johnson, op. cit. p. 360

and that since then the disjuncture between what Toure says and what actually happens in Guinea has now grown increasingly radical and severe to the extent of giving the impression that Toure 'has' long ago run up against the outside limits of all that organization and exploitation to mass mobilization can achieve. John argues that also Guinea's isolation within Africa, has increased enormously with the fall of the friendly Sierra Leonean, Malian, Ghanaian and Algerian regimes²¹⁵ and also the weakened position of the U.A.R. since the 1967 war with Israel. The partial success of the UAR against Israel in October 1973 may probably rectify this weakness. But Johnson points out that this isolation has, in turn, predictably intensified the domestic climate of tension and suspicion in Guinea. This climate and the fact that Toure's ideology has far outrun both popular understanding and concrete every-day Guineans realities produce a situation in which hardly anyone in any position can feel safe from denunciation for ideological crimes such as the humbering of counter-revolutionary sentiments.²¹⁶ The Guinean leader has now more than ever before intensified his campaign against real or imagined subversion (which he claims is literally everywhere).

"...subversion is not a material fact that one can show people. It is not an objective thing; it only has objective results' Subversive is part of one and it is in all of us, beginning from the secretary General of the

215. The impact of the Ghanaian and Malian coups was particularly great

PDG down to the last militant who joins the Party as he strolls out of a meeting. Subversion inhabits every heart.²¹⁷

Naturally Toure's ideological control of the entire Guinean political system makes it difficult from any deviationists to operate freely. Under this fear, the official perception of the major domestic as well as international issues is left to the political ideologies led by Toure himself. Intrinsicly then, the frames of the nation's foreign plicy is built on the states ideological foundation which is itself 'Guineas' socialism.

It could never be proper to conclude this section without pointing out Sekou Toure's views towards class struggle in the Guinean political system. Implicitly, though not explicitly, the 1964 tournant revoked all Toure's earlier denials of the existence of social classes and of class struggle in Guinea. The Party was in absolute terms surmoned to revolutionary struggle against the emerging bourgeoisie class. Since 1964 the principle of class struggle has been clearly emphasized, particularly since the 8th PDG Congress in 1967. Moreover, Toure has made it clear that he views the problem of class struggle in both a national and an international context. On the domestic scene, the lines of division has been somewhat clarified:

216. Johnson op. cit. p. 361

217. Johnson op. cit. p. 361

"The interest of the labouring masses ...demands that the working class, the peasantry and sinceply progressive elements effectively direct and control all the vital sectors of the national life and that the reactionary elements of the bourgeoisie; of the bureacracy and of capitalism, even national capitalism be thrown from all positions of influence, decision and control..... The class struggle hereby becomes the political form of practical explanationThe class struggle is a universal reality, and a historic necessityPolitical organization, political and ideological education of the people, are the principle weapons in the struggle against class enemy."²¹⁸ (Compare this with page 1 above).

Thus, in his view, Sekou Toure conceptraizes the bourgeoisie as the domestic enemy of the revolution, and as Johnson has cacitly put it, 'the enemy has to naturally to hide. In reference to the Guinean bourgeoisie, Toure remarks:

"Embourgeoisement continues to make progress. Of course, a cadre will never say that he has become a bourgeoisie. But it is easy to delect in his manner of speaking, in the way he discusses future possibilities, in the way he interprets facts, in the way he takes on a job; in the way he behaves himself in regard to the people of course all this denounces him without his realizing."²¹⁹

218. R.W. Johnson; African Affairs; op. cit. p. 362

219. Ibid.

All these remarks help to exemplify Sekou Toure's drastic shift from the non-Marxian analysis of class struggle in Africa in general but Guinea in particular, to a Marxian conception of the emerging class conflict, particularly in Guinea.

Toure also characterizes the class enemy in various ways. For instance, referring to the growing bourgeoisie in Guinea he states:

"Undoubtedly in the last few years a bureaucratic bourgeoisie has installed itself within the Party and in public administration and the state enterprises. It has spawned about itself a 'chentete' of merchants, transporters, and rural land proprietors - an embryonic national bourgeoisie - all as its dependents" (Tome 13, p. 115)

But the real problem is a cultural one, of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois aspirations. In connection this cultural problem Toure remarks:

"There are some whom, victims of colonial petit-bourgeois ideology, owing to their training as servants of colonialism, have never been able to regain their self-possession but have retained their old expectations, waiting for new masters able to provide them with the neo-colonialist crumbs to which they aspired during the colonial period and of which they have since been deprived.....It is a petit-bourgeoisie with an aberrant mentality, incapable

of any creative or serious effort, while the European bourgeoisie for example, was and still is tough-minded and ready for work. It is a petit-bourgeoisie which has resigned itself, which is slothful, which is ready to sell the nation to any imperialist power that presents itself, which is hypocritical and teacherous.....it is a corrupted petit-bourgeoisie.....in fact a lumpen-bourgeoisie"²²⁰

Having analyzed Guinea's socialism this far, what verdict would one give to the success or failure of the Guinean political ideology? Writing about the same question, Ladipo Adamolekun of the Institute of Administration of Ife University, Nigeria makes the following observations concerning Sekou Toure with his brand of African Socialism:²²¹

First, that struggle for survival in power has led to considerable changes in Sekou Toure's values especially between 1964 and 1967. His early realism and total devotion to seeking ways and means of improving the lot of Guineans (that is their standard of living) gradually gave way to: (a) a subordination of practical objectives to theoretical, doctrinaire pre-occupations, culminating in obsession with Scientific socialism,

220. A.S. Toure 'Rapport politique et de doctrine' 8^{eme} Congre National du PDG, Conakry 25 Septembre - 2 Octobre 1967; p. 85. Also cited by Johnson; African Affairs op. cit. p. 362.

221. Ladipo Adamolekun; "Some Reflections on Sekou Toure's Guinea: 4"; West Africa; 9th April, pp. 464-466.

world revolution - both of which have so far contributed very little to the improvement of Guinea's standard of living; (b) a recourse to harsh treatment of opponents. Although this is a natural reaction, it is doubtful if the new level of violence reached within the system will not become permanent. In other words, a vicious circle of violence has now become installed with the "Ins" resolved to maintain themselves in power at all costs including the use of violence against opponents while the "Outs" are also resolved to oust their opponents by violence. This makes the future of the country very precarious.

Secondly, it is questionable how much development can take place within this kind of system. So far the achievements of the regime since independence rates very low (39% in Adamolekun's view - West Africa 9th April, 1973, p. 465). The uncontestable achievement of the regime is the political consciousness of all Guineans (Adamolekun ranks it the highest in all of Africa p. 465); followed by unquestionable social success especially in education.

Thirdly, the regime now virtually depends for its survival on: the emotional support generated by political mobilization nourished and sustained by imperialist attacks; the commitment of those who have never had it so good (those who have benefited from the regime, the "People's Elite" riding Mercedes and other costly cars); the devotion of the "chorus boys" (the militia leaders, the party managers, and the leaders of the women's youth and workers organizations); and above all on Toure's continued popularity with the masses. It should be noted

however, that the future of the regime is now, more than ever before, tied to its success in delivering the goods - economic and material benefits for the masses.

Fourthly, the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in Guinea is effectively PDG - controlled such that one can only now talk of a single bourgeoisie - the PDG bourgeoisie which is subdivided into two major categories: Party and Government bureaucracies with a considerable area of overlapping. For example a Party Federal Secretary who is named Regional Governor becomes a bourgeois of the Government bureaucracy. The almost total absence of transporters and builders who constitute the bulk of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in other African countries is notably most striking.

Finally, the PDG - controlled national bourgeoisie is not as large as in other African countries of similar size. There is some element of internal competition among those who are effectively 'out' either in mind or in practice or are open enemies of the regime while those 'out in mind' only are camouflaged within the ranks of the same bourgeoisie; it claims to be popular. i.e. relies for its support on the masses; it is a kind of elite compared to the "outs" who can be described as bourgeoisie elite, its greatest problem is how to limit the gap that separates it from the masses especially in regard to conditions of living. A dangerous - temptation would be for them to use their control of the masses as a means

of securing passive audience to them.²²² From the previous discussion it is now fitting that we ask ourselves: What is the basic linkage between Guinea's ideology and her foreign policy? The next section attempts to answer this question.

(b) Implications of Guinea's Socialism in her Foreign Policy:

Any analysis that seeks to establish the linkage between Guinea's ideology and her foreign policy must also focus its attention on her national interest. Since we have so far delved into an analytical discussion of Guinea's ideology (Guinea's brand of African Socialism/and also her non-alignment policy) it is now that we attempt to define and identify Guinea's national interest. It is only after we are clear about the three concepts that we can attempt to trace their inter-relationships.

A more fundamental question that needs to be answered is: Is there a conception of the national interest in the foreign policy of a developing country, such as Guinea, that has only recently assumed independent statehood? In his prolific analysis of national interest and in an attempt to answer the same question, Mugomba argues that there is some conception

222. The five points raised in the preceding discussion have been extracted from a series of articles, published by Ladipo Adamolekun in West Africa: See; West Africa; "Some Reflections on Sekou Toure's Guinea (1-4); (1) 19th March 1973; pp. 371-372; 26th March, pp 403-404 2nd April, 1973; pp 434 -435; 9th March, 1973; pp. 464-466

of national interest or 'national value', in the foreign policies of the new states, whether they (national interest) are articulate or perceptual. He also further suggests that these interests 'whatever is their real nature,' are relevant in that they have some influence on the conduct of foreign policy on the general international behaviour of the state.²²³ Apart from the perceptual value of the concept national interest in foreign policy analysis, it is important to bear in mind Mahan's cautious remarks on the definitional problems that one must be prepared to confront. He thus remarks:

"The familiar difficulties of defining the 'national interest' in a complete manner are, in the case of a new state, further confounded, as there is no indigenous tradition of foreign policy or diplomacy that might be consulted for reference or guidance, and as, moreover, the common purposes and solidarities summoned into existence during the anticolonial struggle are, after independence, substantially reduced, if not dissolved altogether. The national interest of a new state at independence are neither given, nor yet fixed; they are waiting to be defined, indeed to be shaped by the country's leadership out of the admittedly slender resources and

223. Dr. A.T. Mugomba; "African Foreign Policy: The Dichotomy Between Pan-African Ideology and National Interest." MSC Thesis; University of Southampton, 1970

choices available to it. The process of definition affecting both domestic and foreign policies can only be understood in the context of the country's total situation, internally and externally, and its over-all orientation and line of development with regard to the severe constraints both of its colonial inheritance and of international order created and still largely dominated by world capitalism.²²⁴

Various definitions and debates of the nation of national interest have been advanced by many students of international relations and foreign policy. Of particular interest to this discussion in the category of debates is Niebuhr's "Debate" with Morgenthau and Kennan (Robert C. Good)²²⁵ Here, though we shall be no means enjoin our analysis to this debate Robert C. Good posits that debates on the national interest proceeds from two perspectives: (a) One tends to be policy oriented and (b) the other ethically oriented. The national interest as it bears on policy, at least in Good's view, represents a rough guide to, and a negative restraint on, decisions and action. It defines the outermost limits of choice, beyond which responsible statesmanship must not trespass because to do so risks the

224. Jitendra Mahan in his review of Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State (Princeton University Press 1969) by W. Scott Thompson in the Journal of modern African Studies (JMAS), Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1970; pp 156-157; also cited in Mugomba's MSc Thesis op. cit. pp 7-8

225. Robert C. Good; "The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's "Debate" with Morgenthau and Kennan; The Journal of Modern Politics (Gainsville, Florida); Vo. 22, No. 4, Nov. 1960, pp. 597-619

security and perhaps the survival of the nation. Exactly where this boundary line runs, and precisely what programs are to be pursued within its limits, are matters of constant debate among the surveyors of the nation's interests. This is so because "security" and "survival" (or "vital interests," or "way of life" or "national welfare") are not fixed points on the political terrain; rather their precise location, their size, and importance to one another, depend in great part "on the lens settings in the instruments by which they are surveyed." Thus for example the American chamber of Commerce, defines the boundary circumscribing legitimate choice differently from say, the Pentagon. The Pentagon defines it differently from state department, and also the state department differently from the atomic Energy Commission. The behaviour could be cited as being almost similar even in the new states.

The second perspective is the national interest as a problem in political ethics. It is the problem of reconciling necessity and principle: the necessity is that of protecting the interests of the group for which one serves as trustee and the principle is that of undifferentiated loyalty to values such as justice and equality. It is the problem of adjusting the moral claims laid upon one by his allegiance to the national community with the claims that derive from his loyalty to communities transcending the national community. As Good argues, it is the problem of dealing both realistically and creatively with self-interest, and nowhere is self-interest more stubbornly institutionalized, yet capable by great

concealment than in the "national interest" of the sovereign state.²²⁶

James N. Rosenau on the other hand distinguishes between national interest as an analytical tool that could be used to describe, explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy, and national instrument as an instrument of political action serving as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies.²²⁷ Mugamba, however, points out that while there is common ground between the use of the concept for the purpose of political analysis and for political action, in the sense that both concern the perceived or articulated interest of a national society beyond this stage they have practically nothing in common.²²⁸

A more concise analytic framework of national interest is that submitted by Professor Joseph Frankel who proposes a tri-dimensional approach of national interest. In his construct he postulates the thesis that national interest can be classified into: the operational, aspirational and declaratory political levels.²²⁹ As Mugamba has pointed out there is an inextricable perceptual overlap among the three levels of approach in

226. Robert C. Goodman op. cit. p. 1

227. James N. Rosenau, "National interest" International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 1968, cited in Joseph Frankel, National Interest (Pall Mall Press 1970) pp. 15-16

228. Dr. A.T. Mugamba, MSc. Thesis op. cit. p. 9

229. Joseph Frankel, National Interest (Pall Mall Press 1970) op. cit., p. 31

Frankels postulate i.e. the declaratory overlaps with the aspirational and operational levels. Apart from this heuristic problems, Frankel's model is otherwise useful for any systematic analysis of any state's national interest. One must also not forget the fact that there are no established criteria for identifying these varied interests at any given time since all three levels may exist in a single policy undertaking.²³⁰

From these theoretical premises the following observations could be made with respect to national interests in Guinea's foreign policy. Firstly, Guinea's national interests are dominated by the nation's attempt to consolidate and safeguard the consciousness of natural sovereignty; that the regime's obsession with creating a cohesive socialistic domestic ideology renders it to perceive all domestic and external issues through the spectacles of this ideology; that there is an apparent problem in clearly distinguishing between the micronationalistic and macronationalistic aspects of the Guinean foreign policy or the overlapping of the two which creating a macro-micronationalistic dimension and finally that it is difficult to divorce Guinea's ideology from her national interests. That is to say, it is proper to argue that at a certain level of analysis the distinction between the two-Guinea's national interests and her ideology may cease

230. Mugomba op. cit.1 pp. 9-10

to exist. More complex still is the fact that the Guinean ideology also to a certain extent pre-determines or defines the limits and scope of some aspects of Guinea's national interest.

More explicitly, one would argue that Guinea's national interests are defined by and within the basic principles that guide her foreign policy. These principles include: African Socialism, and the actual form of political system at the domestic level, pan-Africanism and national interest at the subsystemic level, and non-alignment at the systemic level. These concepts also constitute the web of the various dichotomous aspects in the international relations of the African states. A discussion of the various inter-relationships that can be developed from these concepts with regard to Guinea's foreign policy could be most revealing. However, such a discussion may shift out focus outside the scope of this discussion. It is possible, however, to establish the dichotomous relationship that exist in Guinea's foreign policy between national interests, Guinea's political ideology and non-alignment.

Zartman, in his discussion of ideology and national interest maintains a distinction between the two concepts but Mugomba emphasizes that national interest concept is inextricably linked to ideology in operative foreign policy. Like Zartman Mugomba also recommends that on analytic separation of the

two concepts should be maintained.²³¹

In his discussion of the role of ideology in foreign policy, Mugomba argues that ideology can be used as a medium or filter through which external events pass and their meanings explained. This is the perceptual and explanatory function of ideology which is played by the Guinean ideology. Mugomba asserts that the main benefit here is that the ideology tells one what not to see rather than what to see or look for i.e. a negative function in foreign policy action.²³² Ideologies can also be used to identify allies and foes as a basis for policy. In such circumstances, friends are supported in policies that conform to or encompass the interests of the state, and as Mugomba points out, enemies are sought out and donned for their alleged responsibility in creating problems for the nation and sustaining them for the sole purpose of frustrating its aspirations. One could argue, as has been pointed out earlier that this is one of the dominant roles of the Guinean ideology. Any signs of domestic embourgeoisement is linked up with such evils as neo-colonialism and imperialism and the Guinean masses are all mobilized to fight against such evils. The ideology is here used to arrest potential opposition of the regime either from within or from outside.

231. Mugomba, op. cit. p. 16

232. Ibid.

It is through the same ideology Toure has successfully managed to augment domestic patriotism. This makes the masses believe that for every domestic problem that exists, there must be some imperialist power involved. The justification of decisions and policies has been given as yet another function of ideology. Mugomba contents that this is similar to the role of the declaratory and potemical level of national interest. In his view, the state justifies in ideological terms its actions, which are regarded as the true, legitimate, interest of all and those in disagreement are criticized. This may help to explain the anti-bourgeoisie attitude the Guinean ideology i inculcates among the so-called masses. Functionally, this is the role that the Guinean ideology purpots to play. Another role which the Toure's ideology may be argued to play is that of demarcating the areas of operation. i.e. it helps to identify the areas in which the state should have an interest. This applies both to the domestic as well as to the foreign policies. As an extension of this role, the Guinean ideology defines the boundaries of policy action, which natural interest, because of its extreme ambignity could not do without controversy.²³³

Still more important, is the influence of ideology on other states' policies. The impact of the Guinean ideology

on the other former French Colonies after Sekou Toure voted non to De Gaulle's 1958 French Referendum is a case in point. That is, the influence of ideological principles on the Guinean decision had the net effect of encouraging other less committed leaders to demand freedom and as Mugomba has pointed out, Guinea could be said to have scored a major success in policy not long after her dissenting vote had been cast.²³⁴ Finally, an ideology is useful in indicating course and direction of change in foreign policy according to the interpretation of international affairs. For instance one could draw a line between the kind of policies that the regime pursued before the loi-cadre of 1964 and the policies followed since 1964. That is, it is possible to identify the stringent domestic as well as foreign policy measures that were adopted, after the introduction of the loi-cadre, to curb the upsurge of the national bourgeoisie. Before 1964 the ideology was less radicalized with the result that embourgeoisement had begun to take root in the Guinean society. Similarly in foreign relations the post -loi-cadre period has witnessed the development of a nations attitude toward foreign participation in the Guinean economy.

In discussing both national interests and the ideology of a state it is important to realize that a distinction between the two must be maintained. Zartman, in discussing these two

234. Mugomba op. cit. p. 18

concepts as determinants of foreign policy in Africa, has explained that "the state has a broader task than simply defending interests; it must not only change in relation to other states or its place in the state system, but also change the system itself.....To the ideologue, the external environment must be revised in order to secure domestic goals and support the internal system. The visionary and revisionist aspect also makes plan the total nature of ideology. The new order is not only internal, it is above all external, indivisible, and universal.....Herein lies the greatest difference between national interest and ideological policies. The foreign policy based on (national) interest seeks to achieve within the state system; it accepts the environment and seeks to fit within it. The ideological policy works to create a new environment because it can find no secure place for itself within the extant state system.²³⁵ It should be emphasized however, that this is an extreme interpretation of reality in contemporary foreign policy in Guinea. Zartman argues that "ideology and national interest are two extremes of a range of foreign policy criteria. Between these two extremes are three more but less clear situations, the state that speak ideologically and act according to interest, those states that mix their

235. Zartman, National interest and Ideology," pp 46-47
 Professor Zartman characterizes the outward-looking ideologies as the 'problem solvers' and the inward looking 'prognatists' the "solidarity - makers"
 Also cited in Mugemba's MSc Thesis; p. 18

motives for the same end, and those states that contribute to a sort of situational dialectic in which their ideological policies, confronted by the pressure of reality, produce of new environment that is different from the status quo ante but falls short of the idealA particular state's policy may fit one category at one time and another later on. No complete listing and categorization of all African foreign policy actions can be made but characteristic examples can be given."²³⁶ Zartman as true for Guinea's foreign policy analysis.

The most important aspect of Guinea's foreign policy that needs emphasizing is that dichotomous features are present in the theory and practice of non-alignment, pan-Africanism and African socialism. Mugomba has also our attention to these dichotomous relationships in the analysis of the foreign policy of each environment. This is the basis of the two concepts of unity and diversity which characterize the polarization of African international relations. Mugomba, however, offers a cautionary note in the treatment of these dichotomies - he contends that these dichotomies only represent the extremes and that in operative policy the majority of states are noted between these ranges, where they tend to shift according to the prevailing internal and external situations. This behaviour is characteristic of the Guinean policy process which as we have pointed earlier has exhibited a notoriously

236. Mugomba op. cit.; p. 19

high frequency of shifts between the two extremes. This may probably justify our depicting the Guinean policy as erratic inconsistent.

But what has been the actual (tangible?) implications of Guinean's socialism in her foreign policy. Firstly, the regimes dramatic shift to the Left after the 1964 loi cadre, was interpreted from Western circles as a confirmation that Guinea has for practical purposes entered into the communist orbit. This feeling, irrespective of Toure's persistence in pursuing a non-aligned course has been closely associated with Guinean's pro-Eastern stand in the majority of U.N. resolutions. It should be noted, however, that Guinea's pro-Eastern bloc bias must also be viewed in light of her commitment to the Afro-Asian solidarity.

A more significant influence of Guinea's socialism in her foreign policy can only be explained in terms of the effective ideological control of all political and government institutions in the country. Thus control has been effected by purging the up-surgng national bourgeoisie a susceptible element to neo-colonial control. By rooting out from the Guians society colonial and neo-colonial petit-bourgeoisie ideology and replacing it with a truly indigenous communaucratic ideology, Sekou Toure's Guinea has managed to avoid falling prey to the problem that has riddled the majority of African states. - i.e. The implicit neo-colonial manipulation (and therefore foreign control) in the formulation and execution of their foreign policies. This problem is more rampant in countries

where the growth of a national bourgeoisie is not only checked but also encouraged. In such politics, the elite, who constitute the national bourgeoisie, and who are also a debtor class continue to maintain relations of economic dependence on the former colonial powers. As such they have developed insufficient control of their resources and suffer from a general inability to serve reference groups or settlers in their own societies. The problem of the elites in the new states has been more articulately expressed by John Okumu when he writes:

The old lines of superordination and subordination which governed the relationship between the colonial powers and the indigenous populations continue to manifest their essential essence in ever all hegemonic terms and are manifested in practically all spheres of human activity especially in sociocultural and economic terms. This hegemony exhibits strong moral and intellectual leadership which the old mother countries still exert upon the new elites. It is the imposition of a total world view and social authority whose ultimate sanction is a profound cultural supremacy. This cultural supremacy not only limits the freedom of the new elites, it also shapes their orientation to matters of government and external relations, - Anglo-phone Africa and England; Francophone Africa and France and so on. It is this relation which conditions Africa's relations with the world, a fact

that establishes a further point that Africa is a power vacuum as she relates to the distribution of power. in international politics."²³⁷ In a way this cultural -economic supremacy is superimposed by the mother countries to the client neo-colonial state only if the elites in the new states, particularly the ruling elites are inculcated with bourgeoisie mentality and have developed capital-plobia with its co-operant practices. Such ruling elites are an easy prey to neo-colonial intrusion. Again to quote Okumu,

"...African states are governed by weak elites which have not yet developed sufficient control of their own economies, and which continue to be dominated by foreign firms. This is a basic source of insecurity for the elites as they cannot direct fully the future of industrial development and modernization. Their insecurity also derives from the lack of established social and political authority, a factor which makes the ruling regimes less tolerant of dissent and political disagreement."²³⁸ Until developed certain broadly accepted internal norms and rules of the political process, foreign policy, which is largely

237. John J. Okumu, "The Place of African states in International Relations." in August Schou and Arne Olaf Brundfland (ed.) Small states in International Relations; Wiley Interscience Division; (Almquist 1971)

238. Okumu, op. cit. p. 149

dependent on possession of effective power may not amount to very much given the essential weakness of African states. Any elite whose power and authority does not come from its effective control of the resources of the country is bound to trive as external economic and military support. Okumu asserts that the foreign relations of African states are profoundly influenced by this basic insecurity which has consistently forced them to adopt a definite stand that emphasizes certain - universal human conditions e.g. human equality. Okumu further proposes that the foreign relations of African states could be better described as reactive rather than positive and active @ they react to events and issues emanating from the present bi-polarity sharpened by the cold war"²⁴⁰

Thus, this paper is suggesting that one of the basic impacts of Guinea's domestic political ideology has been to eradicate any neo-colonial influence in the division making processes. Toure has successfully managed, at least for the moment, to institutionalize fear in all the operative organs of Guinea's political system; this is helped by the fact that Guinea's PDG as we have pointed above, (pp)has virtually controlled the neo-colonial bourgeoisie which is firly small compared to other African countries. The bourgeoisie purge

is effected by Toure's constantly comed watch-wards. Johnson notes that the political climate in Guinea and the fact that Toure's ideology has for outrun both popular understanding and concrete every-day Guinean realities produce a sition in which hardly anyone in any position can feel safe from denuaciation for ideological crimes such as the labouring of counter-revolutionary sentiments. As may have become implicit this ideological parge suppresses any form of alliance between Guinea's tiny national bourgeoisie with its external conterparts. Of course this is not to say that there are virtually no dissident elements living outside the country, but such contact is vigilantly kept to the minimal.

Finally, and internationally, Toure has moved towards a more 'Cuban' position. In several diplomatically explosive passages of his Rapport Politique to the 8th PDG. Congress, Toure declared that tiers monde countries were now in the forefront of the struggle against imperialism. He argued that not only could one no longer believe that capitalism and imperialism would fall of themselves, but one could not rely either upon the socialist great powers. He also argued that it was for example., not true that 'the British worker can wait upon the USSR or China to see the end of the exploitation to which he is submitted.'²⁴¹ Moreover according to him, the

²⁴¹. A.S. Toure, Rapport politique et de doctrine, 8 eme Congres National du PDG, Conakng 25 September 2nd Oct. 1971, p. 44

Socialist powers were guilty of helping to uphold an international primary products price - system which merely institutionalized tiers mode exploitation.²⁴² On the doctrine of peaceful co-existence Toure argued that it was 'a reactionary and unacceptable compromise for it helped to freeze a world situation in which imperialism was still rampant.'²⁴³ He further noted that fruitful relationships between tiers monde countries and capitalist imperialist ones were simply impossible - and that the regime would be restrictive of foreign aid receipts. All in all Toure's main concern since 1967 has been the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie which is still depicted as "armchair intellectuals with superiority complexes:" Returning to these intellectuals, Toure remarked: The counter-revolution has installed itself in armchairs. It no longer lies in the (Chiefs') huts from which it fled Now it lives in villas and civil services apartments.²⁴⁴

It should be noted in conclusion that Sekou Toure also denounces the Sino-Soviet split as 'a rear-criminal irrelevance." Guinea sides with the Vietnamese against the U.S.A. and the N.L.F. is normally cited by the Guinean authorities as a paradigm model for anti-imperialist struggle. It should also be noted that, characteristically and in company with China and Cuba, Guinea refused to sign the Test-ban treaty.

242. Ibid p. 57

243. Ibid pp. 45-48

244. African Affairs Johnson's Article op. cit. p. 363

Having examined Guinea's domestic ideology, the national interest and the tenets of her foreign policy, is it possible to extract any linkage phenomena in Guinea's domestic and international relations? Can we test the validity of Rosenau's linkage thesis with the Guinean experience or is Rosenau's contribution to the theory of Linkage politics and others who have responded to his thesis merely excelling in an academic exercise? These are the basic questions that the next brief chapter attempts to answer in light of the Guinean experience in her foreign policy. We must warn those who may be looking for an extension of Rosenau's work that our exposition in the next chapter is merely a naive attempt to introduce a micro-analytic problem into Rosenau/Hanriender debate - i.e. an attempt to isolate one domestic variable (ideology) and to try to examine whether it could help us to understand why a state behaves the way it does in international politics. The previous discussion has touched on the impact of Guinea's ideology in both domestic and foreign policies but in no way have we explicitly linked our analysis to Rosenau/Hanriender theses. The next chapter attempts to fill up this gap.

CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF LINKAGE POLITICS IN GUINEAS FOREIGN POLICY:(a) Synopsis: (Introduction)

In the traditional conception, international relations are conducted by political units treated almost as personalities. The domestic structure is taken as given; the foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.

But this approach is appropriate only to stable periods because then the various components of the international system generally have similar conceptions of the "rules of the game." If the domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. If domestic structures are reasonably stable, temptations to use an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are at minimum. For the new states the question of political stability is a fairly sensitive issue, because few can boast of being stable at any given moment. The African states, and more so the Republic of Guinea, confront this situation. However, where conditions are stable, leaders will generally apply the same criteria and hold similar views about what constitutes a "reasonable" demand. And as Kissinger would prefer to put it, this state of stability does not guarantee agreement, but it provides the condition for a meaningful dialogue,

that is, it sets the stage for traditional diplomacy.²⁴⁵

But this condition of stability in international politics no longer obtains, and neither is it realistic any longer to conceptualize that the foreign policy of a state begins where domestic policy ends. This is the core of Rosenau,²⁴⁶ Hanrieder,²⁴⁷ Karl W. Deutsch,²⁴⁸ Pablo Gunzalez Casanova,²⁴⁹ and Michael O'Leary²⁵⁰ theses.

At a minimum the domestic structure determines the amount of the total social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy. Apart from the allocation of resources, the domestic structure crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted. We have already raised this point above in connection with the role of Guinea's ideology in her foreign policy. To some extent, of course, every society finds itself in an environment not of its own making and has some of the main lines of its foreign policy imposed on it. To be more exact, it is doubtful if Guinea and any other member of

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245. Henry A. Kissinger; *American Foreign Policy*: Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London, 1969) p. 11
246. James N. Rosenau "Towards the Study of National-International Linkages" in Linkage Politics by James N. Rosenau(ed.) The Free Press, New York, 1969;
247. Wolfram F. Hanrieder; *Compatibility and Concensus: A proposal for the conceptual linkage and internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy;* The American Political Science Review Vol. LXI, 4 Dec. 1967
248. Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States" in R. Barny Farrell (ed). Approaches to Comparative International Politics; Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1966)

the non-aligned camp, could have adopted a non-aligned posture
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 if the super powers were not engaged in an ideological competition. Similarly, Guinea's partisanship in African Liberation is policy line taken with a view to change colonial creations and co-operant colonial legacies in the continent. No doubt Guinea would have taken a different view towards African Liberation if she were never a colony of a foreign power.

From the domestic point of view, no matter what the system of government, many of the African leaders (and the majority of leaders in the new states) use foreign policy as a means to escape intractable internal difficulties and as a device to achieve domestic cohesion. The international arena provides the opportunity for the dramatic measures which are impossible at home. Kissinger argues that those are often cast in an anti-Western mold because this is the easiest way to re-create the struggle against imperial rule which is the principal unifying element for many new nations.²⁵¹ The incentive is particularly strong because the mictry of the unclear powers eliminate many of the risks which previously associated with an adventurous foreign policy - especially if that foreign policy is directed against the West which lacks any effective sanctions.²⁵² Thus Sekou Toure's regime can

249. Pablo Gazalez Casanova. "Internal and External Politics of Developing Countries" in R. Barny Farrel;

250. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics; op. cit. Michael O'Leary: "Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped countries;"

afford to use the rampant plotomania as a factor of unifying the Guineans against a common enemy - the culprit country.

Further the regime freely implicates whichever power it may have recently fallen out of favour with, without necessarily fearing possible reprisals which may be applied through economic sanctions. Extending this point further, the new nations are susceptible to externally initiated dissidence or the fermenting of domestic upheavals which may change the pattern of domestic power distribution. As Kissinger points out, many of the leaders of the new countries will be prepared to ignore the classical panoply of power; but they will be very sensitive to the threat of domestic upheaval.²⁵² The leaders of the new states know it all too well that the major powers have a high capacity of exploiting domestic instability which they can use as a tool of foreign policy. From the foregoing analysis it should have become clear that the separation of Guinea's domestic politics from her international policies is both unrealistic and untenable.

Among the various on-going debates on Linkage theses, I find the Rosenau - Hanrieder most revealing and relevant

251. Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*; op. cit. p. 42

252. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barny Farrell (Ed.) "Approaches to Comparative and International Politics"; Northwestern University Press Evanston 1966)p. 56

to any linkage deductions on Guinea's foreign policy. The debate between the two personalities is not very much centred on whether or not linkages exist between the domestic and external structures, but rather it revolves around the operational principles. That is, while Rosenau contends that "the difference between 'national' and 'international' now exists only in the minds of those who use the words"²⁵² Wolfram F. Hanriender also makes similar ascertainment. He thus notes:

"...the analyst of foreign policy is on the safe ground' in arguing that a full consideration of nation's foreign policy should focus on the opportunities and structures presented by the nation's external, operational environment and on the internal, psychological environment prevailing in the national system.

...Almost by definition, foreign policy goals are circumscribed both by internal-motivational - psychological phenomena and by external-operational contingencies. It is literally impossible to speak of foreign policy goals without thinking at ones of a psychological-motivational "unit" and the contextual operational environment in which the unit realizes its goals."²⁵³

253. See Wolfram F. Hanriender, "Actors Objectives and International systems," Journal of Politics, 27(February 1965), pp. 100-132

Also Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 3-24

In other words, both Hanrieder and James N. Rosenau are agreed that the 'Linkage system' theses between the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects or in general terms between international systems and national systems is a realistic and national conception. One may even emphasize here that the consensus on this thesis is not only shared by Rosenau and Hanrieder, but that also there is widespread recognition that the boundaries separating national and international systems are becoming increasingly ambiguous. This feeling has been expressed strongly by men like Chadwick F. Alger.²⁵⁴ Also, Harold and Margaret Sprout for example concede that rigorous adherence "to the distinction between intranational (domestic) and extranational (external) factors leaves highly important factors out of the picture." The sprouts, nevertheless, are prepared to accept these omissions on the grounds that "the distinction has value for certain purposes."²⁵⁵

Whereas the theory of linkage politics between the domestic and external system has won acceptance among the students of

254. Chadwick F. Alger "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," in Part Five of this volume: George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 99; and Otto Klineberg, "Intergroup Relations and International Relations, in Muzaffer Sharif (ed.) Intergroup Relations and Leadership: Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic Cultural and Political Areas (New York, Wiley 1962) pp. 174-176

255. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1962) p. 183.

foreign policy a more current debate has ensued between Rosenau's - Hanrieder's perception of penetrated political systems. That is, the debate between the two originates from the variations in their perception in the application of Linkage thesis in the penetrated political system, the Republic of Guinea falling closely within what the two personalities may describe as a penetrated polity. First the disagreement between Rosenau and Hanrieder storms up from the fact that the latter thinks Rosenau's definition of a penetrated political system, is too narrow and restrictive. Rosenau's definition of a penetrated political system has already been given elsewhere in this discussion.* Hanrieder expresses the following reservations about Rosenau's definition: (1) that Rosenau's formal definition of a penetrated system focuses entirely on the direct and authoritative participation of non-members of a national system in its value allocation - this definition seems unnecessarily restrictive and (2) that its stress on authoritative participation of non-members renders its strongly institutional, and (3) that it cannot, therefore, accommodate the penetration of national systems by external

* Repeating Rosenau's definition of a penetrated system, Rosenau says that "a penetrated political system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals." He further argues that the political process of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international political system and those of a political system (for more details, see our earlier discussions on penetrated political systems.)

events and trends that take place without the direct authoritative participation of non-members - For example, the 'penmeability' of the modern nation-state as a consequence of developments in weapons technology - a most important case of penetration by external events and trends - cannot be accommodated by Rosenau's definition, although the recognition of this type of penetration by national decision - makers could plousibly lead to a shift in the allocation of values. In other words Hanrieder's view is that penetrative processes may take place without the direct, personal, or authoritative participation of non-members of the national system.²⁵⁶

To remedy Rosenau's shortcomings in his definition, Hanrieder proposes that a penetrated political system should be regarded as such (1) if its decission making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events, and (2) if it can command wide concensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events.²⁵⁷ Hanrieder claims that this definition not only covers a wider range of types of penetration, but also makes possible the correlation of patterns of compatibility with patterns of concensus.²⁵⁸

The two concepts compatibility and concensus, have been used by Hanrieder in his attempt to synthesize the correlation

256. Wolfram F. Hanrieder; "Compatibility and Concensus: A Proposal for the conceptual linkage of external and internal dimensions of Foreign policy; The American Political Science Review (Vol. LXI, 4 Dec. 1971) p. 979

of important external and international dimensions of any country's foreign policy aims.

The first concept, compatibility, is, according to him, used to assess the degrees of deasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the structures and opportunities of the international system or the systemic level. Consensus on the other hand assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and means of fofeign policy on the domestic political scene i.e. at the subsystemic level.²⁵⁹

In definitional terms, eompatibility between the conditions of the internation system and foreign policy goals implies that a particular objective has a reasonable chance of realization if implemented by a policy that an outsider would deem appropriate. Thus Hanrieder contends that the degree of complementality among goals can be established by aggregating their respective individual compatibilities vis-a-vis the international system. i.e. if one goal is judged to be compatible with the conditions prevailing in the international system, and if the pursuit of this goal is seen to have a negative effect on another goals chances of attainment, these two goals can be regarded as incompatible.

257. Ibid.

258. Ibid

259. Hanrieder op cit. p. 977

Hanrieder therefore posits that the respective degree of compatibility between individual goals and the international system serve as the basis for evaluating the degree of complementarity among goals.²⁶⁰ Thus for example in realizing African Unity in 1963, as a goal of her foreign policy was seen as being compatible with killing the West African regional Grouping. This point has already been raised elsewhere

Consensus on the other hand is defined as the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a rational system's decision-making processes, it necessarily impresses boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation. In that sense, consensus is in fact a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system; it determines what foreign policy goals a government without using popular support and office.²⁶¹

Although, to quote Hanrieder again, compatibility is a concept of feasibility by definition, and consensus a standard of feasibility it should become apparent from this perceptual approach that consensus, unlike compatibility lacks "operational" background. Hanrieder posits that no standard of feasibility on

260. Ibid

261 Wolfram F. Hanrieder; op. cit; p. 977

the domestic scene corresponds precisely to that which the operational contingencies of the international system provide for the external dimensions of foreign policy goals. Secondly the motivational - psychological determinants of foreign policy projects may be checked by ethical restraints, inadequate perception of opportunities, realistic perception of external strictures e.t.c. but the range of political goals that the members of a political system can advocate and agree on is, as Hanrieder puts it, 'at least hypothetically without limit.'²⁶²

Lest it appears like we are merely concerned with reviewing Hanrieder's paper, we must now address ourselves to the utility of Hanrieder's concepts - compatibility and consensus - in the linkage system of Guinea's foreign policy. i.e. what is the intrinsic analytic utility of applying compatibility and consensus as concepts of linkage particularly in our analysis of Guinea's foreign policy?

First it is important to emphasize that many of the national actors in the contemporary international system find it increasingly difficult or meaningless, to distinguish between foreign policy and domestic policy. This holds true

262. Ibid

not only for the industrialized nations of the northern Hemisphere, whose allocations of resources and values are strongly affected by international contingencies, but also for the developing nations such as Guinea. Thus, not only are domestic allocations of values strongly affected by the international environment, but also national decision-makers, i.e. the Guinean policy makers, have become very conscious of the fact that many external events have more or less direct impact on the allocation of values that traditionally has taken place largely within national institutional structures.

In analytic terms, the concept of compatibility is a standard of feasibility by definition because it serves to assess the chances of success of foreign projects given the structures and opportunities of the operational environment of the international system. As Hanriender has put it, it falls squarely in a framework of analysis that stress capability analysis and the importance of external stimuli for explaining the conduct of actors in the international system.²⁶³ The analysis of Guinea's foreign policy for the last fifteen years has already been discussed. Viewing Guinea from a unitary (individual) point of view; her contributions to the international environment may not have created significant impacts on the domestic structures of other states or even in the international

263. Hanrieder, op. cit. p. 979

environment itself. This does not however imply that events originating from the domestic structure have not at all permeated any rubble into the external environment. However, it is important to note that in pursuit of the basic goals of her foreign policy (African Liberation, African Economic Independence and most important African Unity) the regime has solicited complementary support from the external systems. The pursuit of these goals in Guinea's foreign policy have coincided with a period when the issues of self-determination; economic development in the underdeveloped world and also the search for international peace and security have taken priority within the walls of the international organization. More explicitly the pursuit of Guinea's extra-continental (and event continental) goals have been compatible with the pursuit of similar goals by the international system.

This has made it easy for Guinea to even use the facilities of the international organization (the U.N. General Assembly) to campaign for the realization of these goals. One may argue here that the acceptance of such goals by the international system has given Guinea the coverage to articulate these goals as the prime objectives of her foreign policy. This too has been the basis of international support for the pursuit of such goals. Hanrieder would have probably liked to argue that Guinea's pursuit of such goals is judged to be compatible with the conditions prevailing in the international system. Thus the idea of compatibility could be used to analyze the variables of the international system that may either directly

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or indirectly influence Guinea's foreign policy, i.e. it helps to focus on the external determinants of Guinea's foreign policy and/or to assess the response a foreign policy may have as conditions change in the international system. Thus with the decline of the Cold War between the two super powers, Guinea has equally adjusted her non-aligned posture focusing its attention more on the economic aspects of the policy and relinquishing the firm grip based on ideological conflicts. In other words Guinea is now no longer overly concerned with the bipolar politics as she is with the economic development of the Third world.

Implicitly the idea of compatibility could be used to analyze the variables of the international system that may influence the foreign policy of Guinea - i.e. it helps to focus on the external determinants of Guinea's foreign policy. Since the present discussion does not purport to delve into the analysis of external determinants or more broadly on Guinea's systemic global approach to international politics, it should suffice to say that the concept of compatibility offers a rational model which may be used to analyse the impact of the external (systemic) dimension in Guinea's foreign policy process.

It should also be noted that the external system may restrain or induce the domestic system to take a course of action that may lead into divergent policy perceptions. In the extreme form this course of action may cause the country

concerned to adopt an isolationist policy. The Guinean experience in her foreign policy operation has characteristically resulted in to adopting this isolationist stand. Although isolationism has never been a policy goal in the Guinean foreign policy, the regime has nonetheless constantly resolved into this policy in response to the events originating from the external system. This point has been discussed elsewhere - (see Guineas plotomania above). Whereas it is not necessary to renew the discussion on political instability associated with Guinea's long history of plots and invasion attempts, the implications of such external intrusion into Guinea's domestic structure and also on the external system cannot be overlooked. In terms of Guinea's response to other 'civil demands' of the international system it is suggested in this paper that the regime has developed an insular attitude in its foreign relations with other states.

The concept of consensus, on the other hands, is subsystemically oriented and serves as an organizing principle for domestic political phenomena, but as we have already pointed out, it may similarly be regarded as a standard of feasibility.²⁶⁴ It should be emphasized that the concept embraces a much larger (and different) dimension than that of feasibility. Hanrieder

264. Hanrieder op. cit. pp. 977-978

posits that the concept reflects the aggregate of the motivational and psychological preferences prevailing in the body politic. Thus its aspect of being a standard of feasibility is merely an operational consequence of psychological phenomena. Hanrieder's claim on the rationality of using this concept in the analysis of the domestic structure is based on the dual nature of the concept i.e. consensus.

Thus, unlike compatibility which focuses its attention on the variables of the external system, Hanrieder's concept of consensus may be use to explain the degree of agreement on policy choices among the relavant elements of a national systems decision-making process. In the case of Guinea where the decision making process is dominated by one man, Sekou Toure, and where the datum of policy choices is the political ideology, the concept may not be able to reveal much in terms os the other suppressed views of the members who constitute the body politic. We have argued elsewhere that the Guinean system is clauded with suspicion and fear of expressing any variant views. The application of Hanrieder's concept of consensus in the Guinean situation, therefore, in this case not be able to properly assess the motivational and psychological preferences of the policy institutions in Guinea. Rather it would assess the ideological emotive views of a single individual - the President of the Republic who is also the institutional head and executive Secretary General of the dorminant goal and policy setting institution the P.D.G.

Before concluding this section it would be pertinent to ask ourself the question: And so what have we achieved in terms establishing the percepts of linkage thesis in Guinea's foreign policy through the use of Hanrieder's concepts of compatibility and consensus? First and foremost, when compatibility and consensus are used together, it is possible to establish an analytic framework which recognizes that two different analytical environments (the domestic structure and the international system) are involved.

Secondly, although the regime has crubbed down any form of official opposition, we still could still could assess the aggregation of the motivational and psychological prevailing in the PDG - dominated politic - thanks to the strong ideology that have pervaded the entire society and thanks to the skillful political organization. i.e. In spite of the suppression of any form of opposition when the frenzy of instability ceases in Guinea one could dafely talk about real political consensus based on the democratically organized bōdy politic. (Note that from Teure's perception, Guinea's democratic centralism is deemed the most suitable form of political organization - though dictatorship by one man has replaced the proletarian dictatorship that one would have expected to find wider a socialist régime.

In terms of conceptualizing compatibility as a concept for judging the feasibility of demands made by the national system on the external operational environment (it assesses

the structures and opportunities of that environment - the Guinean environment - with respect to a range of goals) it is possible to argue that in so far as the Guinean national interests, which are exerted into the international system as policy inputs, the Guinean extra-continental policy goals have to a significant extent been compatible within the prevailing international environment.

The Guinean ideology has however insulated the system from excessive political penetration but even though, one can still talk of the system being heavily penetrated by (1) pro-socialist political organization format (2) French culture - particularly because of the dominant role played by the French language and (3) An amalgam of western values transmitted through the use of foreign personnel (though those are still very few comparing Guinea with some of the other African countries); and finally, (4) the dominant role being placed by the multi-national corporations which are getting deeply entrenched in the extractive fields especially in the bauxite mines. The use of foreign capital in the Guinean economy (which is another form of penetration) has meant that the regime has had to adjust its domestic policies since, by implications, the relationships between the Government of Guinea and the source of capital must be such that the policies of the external system (the aggregation of the capital owning countries) find accommodation within the domestic structure. Essentially this also means an interaction between policy actors or policy implementers between the countries

concerned (This of course presupposes that penetration need not necessarily result from face-to-face interaction as Rosenau suggests. Hanrieder has qualified this by arguing that penetration can occur without physical contact - see discussion above). Policy readjustment in the Guinean situation could be cited on what happened soon after Guinea became independent. That is, the nationalization of foreign owned firms in Guinea during (1959-1960/61) period created some ramifications of policy readjustment in the external system. The countries whose firms had been nationalized had to respond to the Guinean action. Similarly, after 1961, a reverse process of denationalization of state-controlled firms had similar implications. i.e. The denationalization program coupled with a cautiously programmed development policy did create some impacts on the pro systems - the external and internal dimensions.

One important analytic consequence which must not be forgotten is that as a result of the Guinean society being ideology-permeated the perception and implementation of foreign policy goals is left to a small section of the decision-making institutions, but as we have noted earlier there is an overwhelming dominance of one man - Sekou Toure. A further consequence of ideology permeation in the Guinean society is that all foreign policy goals are perceived through the same sieving instrument - ideology. This determines the action to be taken in the domestic structure and at the same time assesses

the implications of domestic policies in the international system. It is also used to interpret the implications of external events and trends in the domestic structure. To this extent then, one could argue that Guinea's foreign and domestic policies are determined by overall national ideological orientation. In other words, Guinea's socialism or communaucracy, (a unique brand of the so-called 'African Socialism') determines Guinea's foreign policy.

But, having implied that Guinea's domestic and international systems are interrelated or, interpenetrated, the distinction between Guinea's foreign policy and domestic policy diminishes substantially. This is even further affirmed by Sekou Toure's assertions when he declares for instance that "Guinea's foreign policy, which is simply the true prolongation of her home policy....."²⁶⁵ As Hanrieder puts it, this is part of the definition of a penetrated system: as external events affect a wide range of value allocations, it follows that few allocations can remain isolated from external contingencies. Moreover as a result of the traditionally sharp analytic distinction between the two systems (domestic and international) Hanrieder posits that a question whether policy is made in response to domestic impulses or to international restraints has necessarily to be raised in one of three ways: policy is made (a) primarily

265. Sekou Toure; The International policy of the P.D.G. op. cit., p. 9

in response to domestic impulses;)b) primarily in response to international restraints; and (c) in response to both. Having argued that the Guinean political system depicts some form of penetration by the external system (and especially through her regorous participation at the U.N. which Rosenau suggests is the best or servers as one of the best sites for penetrated systems)²⁶⁶ alternative (c) seems the most plausible for our analytical purposes. It also seems closest, in general terms, to the line of analysis that Hanrieder suggests as commenturate with the political processes of a penetrated systems. Hanrieder quolifies the phrase "in response to both," and suggests that this phrase should not imply a fusion of the pro systemic levels. Rather, argues that it actually underlines their distinctiveness.²⁶⁷ A most composite way of looking at the whole analysis is to use Hanrieder's three-frames of goal's perception model in which the decision-makers are seen to respond to definite value references.²⁶⁸ These include the following: First, that policy objectives may derive from internal referents. Hanrieder argues that such objectives do not directly depend for their formulation and realization on forces outside the state. Examples of goals

266. James N. Rosenau; Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy; op. cit., p. 69

267. Hanrieder. op. cit., p. 980

268. Ibid.

with internal value referents include - the advocacy of a certain sociopolitical and economic order, or devotion to high living standards, natural law and peaceful change. Secondly goals may be viewed to be drawn from external referents when and if their realization depends on the behaviour of one member of the international system. As Hanrieder argues, these goals cannot be formulated or achieved without making specific reference to or demands on other states. Examples of these goals may be cited as including: territorial revisionism, a crusading foreign policy, colonial emancipation, the advocacy of regional economic integration or of a fundamental change in the world economic system - all such goals emerge as externally focused value referents because their formulation and achievements require the specific identification of other nations as "targets." And finally, objectives may stem systemic referents. Hanrieder posits that these goals are highly instrumental because, as he argues, "they are not based on tenaciously held values-systems, but are formulated in response to what national decision-makers perceive to be the existing patterns of power and purpose in the international system."²⁶⁹ Hanrieder further notes that goals and policies derived from systemic referents often reflect survival values of the nation. Hence they are flexible "because they change with shifting perceptions of environmental threats," and that also they

269. Hanrieder op. cit., p. 980

are frequently implemented by defensive armaments programs, alliances e.t.c. In other words, systemic focused goals are imposed by the contingencies of the international system and represent the nation's "acculturation" to its environment.²⁷⁰

Penetrated political systems, however, exhibit a considerable overlap of the three goal types of goal referents. i.e. the internal referent, the external referent and finally the systemic referent. All this implies (in fact confirms our original postulation) that it is both erroneous and misleading to isolate one variable as the only determinant of a country's foreign policy.

But before concluding this chapter, it would be necessary to elaborate on the functional role of an ideology in determining a country's foreign policy. The republic of Guinea is of course our main target.

(b) Towards a Deterministic Model in Foreign Policy.

To be able to determine the outcomes of the purposeful governmental actions known as the national foreign policy it would be imperative that one analyses the associations between variations in the national actor(s) (decision-makers) and variations in the domestic structure. This task would further require that we identify variables that may be classified as crucial determinants and others that may be referred simply as complementary factors which the decision-makers may or may not pay much heed in the policy-making process. Among the

category of crucial determinants, Vernon McKay includes: Economic determinants; External political pressure; Ideological and Cultural determinants; national interest and psychological determinants. This list is by no means exhaustive and as may be seen it ignores such crucial variables as the psychic factors that may be prevailing in the external system - elsewhere referred to as the international environment. Thus to be able to make realistic predictions on the outcome of a foreign policy, the student of foreign policy will necessarily have to be able to identify the functional roles of each of these variables.

The present study is mainly geared to analyzing only one of such crucial determinants of Guinea's foreign policy - That is Guinea's foreign policy. We cannot pretend to engage ourselves in a more thorough exposition of the role of Guinea's socialism (the national ideology) as a determinant (note, not the determinant) of Guinea's foreign policy than is really possible within the scope of this paper. Moreover a lot on this has already been discussed earlier under the implications of Guinea's socialism in her foreign policy' - see Chapter III

The role of ideology in the foreign policy is much more ostensibly significant in the communist countries, particularly Eastern Europe, USSR, China and Cuba than in the free world. In the new states the concept of national interest is inextricably linked to ideology in operative foreign policy to the extent that one may not be able to determine easily which of the two

factors exert more influence in any policy dimension. For most of the new African "true" socialist states, the concept of "African Socialism" has overtly assumed an economic interpretation implying more often than not; nationalization, self-reliance; sometimes economic integration; equitable distribution in incomes and other resources etc. Whereas these may be considered as some of the implications of socialism in the domestic structure one must not forget that the ideology of socialism has specific functional roles (deterministic) in the relations of that state with the international system. Some of these roles will be examined below but it should be emphasized here that a more rational theory on the deterministic functional roles of African socialism (or any other ideology for that matter) cannot be built on only one variable. Hence this is the basic limitation of the discussion in this section in the sense that ideology alone cannot determine the policy outcome in any environment. It can only influence the policy outcome. This assertion should not be taken as contradicting what may have been said about the dominant role of Guinea's ideology (socialism-Guinea's style) in her foreign policy. The dichotomous relationships that exist between national interest; ideology, economic determinants, external factors and also the political ecology of the international environment must all be examined before one can say for sure that variable(X) determines Country A's foreign policy. Again these factors should under no circumstances be treated on a cumulative basis, but that rather

the given policy outcome is the product of the interactive processes of the various variables. It should be noted that each variable is also dependent on other sub-variables. This point was discussed early in this paper. Thus any appraisal of a given foreign policy must take into consideration not only crucial and less significant variables but also their sub-dependent variables. In essence this points to the need for shifting foreign policy normative analysis to assume some form of scientific empiricism. What we are suggesting here is that the thesis of policy determinism should be treated basically as a scientific theory and not merely as normative and unquantifiable theory. One may even suggest that there are also fundamental linkages between the determinants of foreign policy. This is, however, not the place to engage on a deep analysis of determinants linkages.

Before concluding this chapter, and taking the risk of sounding repetitive, it is crucially important that we try to enumerate some of the explicit functions of ideology. Mugomba posits that any ideology (political ideology) that has some bearing in the national policy of a country may assume all or some of the following functions: (a) Ideology may be conceived as medium or filter through which external events pass and their meanings get explained (b) Ideology can also be used as a justification of decisions and policies. i.e. The state justifies in ideological terms its actions which are regarded as the true legitimate interests of all. Here

any policy deviants are criticized or condemned. (d) Fourthly ideology can also be used to indicate policies for action. In other words it helps to identify the area in which the state should have an interest, and finally (e) Ideology can be used to define the boundaries of policy action which national interest because of its ambiguity cannot do without provoking controversy.²⁷¹ These are some of the basic functions an ideology performs in a foreign policy that Mugomba enumerates and which may be identified in the Guinean linkage phenomenon between the political ideology (subsystemic: ideology) and the national phenomenon of foreign policy. We should from this analysis conclude that most ideologies have direct influence on the national foreign policy.

Taking the republic of Guinea as a case in point no one doubts that ideology is not the dominant link factor in both the domestic and extra-territorial policies. In more explicit terms, Sekou Toure's thesis for political organization is based on democratic centralism. This organizational tenet has fossilized the consensus of the masses on any given policy issue. Of course, we are not here implying the measurability of the concept of mass consensus, but the notion is rather important.

271. Mugomba op. cit.; pp. 16-19

Finally it could be argued or hypothesized that ideological and institutional compatibility are important linkage factors. This it could also be hypothesized further that a state will be most heavily influenced by those states with whom it shares similar ideological orientations. Hence, other things being equal, a state will be more influenced by other members with an organization with which it identifies than by outsiders. We should be cautious here not to exaggerate Guinea's ideological support with her non-alignment. That is, the above hypothesis implies that, Guinea for instance would more readily ally herself with member states of say the socialist world - those states with similar ideological inclinations. This would of course be in contradiction with the basic principles of the principles of non-alignment. Nonetheless, the historical evolution of Guinea's foreign policy exhibits a truly impartial participation on international issues and in spite of the Western accusations that she has been more pro-East there are hardly any political alliance with any bloc as such.

Thus all in all, the nexus of linkage thesis and Deterministic theory, constitute complementarity in any analysis of foreign policy studies. But is African socialism really a determinant of Guinea's chapter? In the synthesis of this thesis (the conclusion) an attempt has been made to answer this question.

CONCLUSION:

There is a general consensus on the universality of the concept of socialism among the 'African Socialist,' practitioners and theoreticians alike but virtually all of them disagree in the method of approach. African leaders who advocate the doctrine of socialism are also agreed on the traditionality of the thesis of Socialism in the African continent but nearly each of them attaches a label on what he believes was embraced by the traditional African ethics i.e. socialism. For Nyerere the idea of communality which he refers to as 'familyhood,' was the dominant social norm that tied the individual to his society making the individual feel committed to collective unit - the family, the clan or the society. Likewise, the collective unit also took the responsibility of treating the individual as a human being, giving him protection and providing him with the essentials of life. Work was viewed as the individual's contribution for his own self-sustenance and for the common good of the society.

For Sekou Toure the notion of communaucracy appeals more as the precise expression of the African pre-colonial cultural traits which impressed more an social fraternity, the pre-eminence of group interests over the personal interests, the sense of common responsibilities, the practice of a formal democracy which ruled and governed village life - all these aspects constituted the base of the African society.

Toure's hesitation to use the concept African Socialism is hidged on the ground that the use of the term might mislead outside observers to think that the Guinean ideology is foreign. Hence he prefers to use the term communaucratic" precisely in order to avoid all equivocation and all force analogies. Noticeably Toure avoids being over-emphatic on the traditional culture; unlike most of the other African socialists - Nyerere, Senghor etc.

Moreover, for Sekou Toure socialism is defined by its concept of social life, of economic practices based on a harmonious nature, balanced by the economic, social and cultural development of society. He thus views the concept as representing a body of postulates, a body of fundamental principles that must be rigorously respected by those who claim to be socialists. He strongly refutes the notion that socialism could have any national characteristics, ".....it belongs to no nation, to no race, to no colour, to no continent." Like science it is impersonal and inalienable."²⁷² Its principles and practices are applied to men who have, indeed, certain values in common: their creative spirit, their will for progress, their aspirations for liberty, independence, and social progress. More important still Toure accepts the thesis that socialism is adaptive to historical and geographical conditions, that is, what may be realized in one place under

272. A.S. Toure, Method and Doctrines of P.D.G. op. cit p. 329

specific conditions 'may be in other places a factor for social regression. But above all the universality, in spite of the variations in historical and geographical conditions, binds together all socialists such that in essence one cannot expect to find a common way or path of socialism; there is a common will; common options; and common objectives. It must be re-emphasized that Sekou Toure impresses on the fact that "the steps to be taken in each country are necessarily still contingent on specific conditions."

Thus the history and practice of socialism (Socialism African style) differ among all the African doctrinaire socialist leaders and although we have only analysed in this chapter Toure and Nyerere it should be noted that all the other "African Socialists exhibit these divergences in their conceptual approach and equally so when putting the doctrine into practice.

The second aspect of "Toure's" socialism that should be considered before linking the Guinean ideology to her foreign policy is Toure's perceptual approach to decision-making which of course has definite implications on the regime's foreign policy. The analysis of decision-making in Guinea is relevant and important in the sense that not only does it help us to identify who is invested with the power to make decisions that affect both the domestic and external structures, but that it also us to comprehend the potency of institutional

and individual (personality) dominance Vis-a-vis the people (masses) in the decision making process. With regard to decision-making, it is important to take note of the fusion of the dominant Guinean Party the Democratic Party of Guinea (P.D.G.), and Sekou Toure- the man and architect of both the party and the foreign policy. Thus, to understand the theory and practice of decision-making in Guinea one has to grasp the philosophy behind what we may call "Guinea's" institutionalization and personalization of the decision-making process."

Consequently, this emerges in the dominance of the PDG and the personality cult of Sekou Toure the man. The outcome of this party-man fusion is that Sekou Toure literally makes the decision, and the party legitimizes and implements these decisions. In terms of foreign policy, the party sieves and interpretes policy inputs (or events) from the external environment and at the same time gives its proximations (which in essence are the policy syntheses from both the systemic (domestic) and subsystemic (international system) levels.

Hence, the party ideology, which is a reflection of Toure's thoughts and views on internal (domestic) and external (international) politics determines the Guinean stand in international relations. Having argued that the African Socialism Guinea's style is the dominant party ideology, we may therefore conclude that this same ideology influences Guinea's stance in international relations.

The justification of the one-party system in Guinea is based primarily on the view that the P.D.G. fosters 'National Democracy' where no class struggle and mal factions exist. Theoretically, under 'National Democracy' unitary action of the people is promoted by reviving the old indigenous democratic traditions. Thus in Toure's view, it is only in single party regimes that two democracy can thrive; Otherwise, so he argues, in states which allow a multi-party system, class struggle between opposing groups of interest, the people have an inactive role, are an anonymous force by reference to which the munevous parties merely justify their choice without ever allowing the people to exercise any choice themselves.²⁷³

On the contrary, in one-party states, founded on the principles of man's priority and the pre-eriminence of the people's interest, Toure contends that there is no room for ideas of inequality between man or the sexes, nor for racial or colour discrimination, nor for exploitation, nor for religious or cultural mystification..... "...and still less for the demagogic methods of those democracies based on parliamentary representation". All forms of arbitrariness, power politics, superiority complexes, paternalism and with them in justice and corruption are no longer the rule in social behaviour.²⁷⁴

273. A.S. Toure Method and Doctrines of P.D.G.; op. cit. p. 30

274. Ibid 29

He further argues that once one understands that democracy signifies, liberty, equality, common responsibility for the realization of collective objections, one cannot define the democratic character of a party by its ability to oppose another party without, also recognizing within the latter characteristics of opposition and discussion, which one in any case negative effects of the democratic function. Hence if we accept that the citizens of a nation are equal, "one could not protect the life and interests of some, to the detriment of that of others without giving an unjust and anti-social and to one's actions".²⁷⁵ From these philosophical precepts it follows that Guinea's one-party monopoly is in contradistinction with the multi-party system. As Toure puts it, "one should not seek opposition for opposition's sake; but to make one's acts legitimate and moral, in keeping with the rights and aspirations of human society."²⁷⁶

In the absence of any opposition party the P.D.G. is operated as the only policy-organ in the Guinean regime. Another interesting feature, which has some bearing on policy formulation, is the fusion of party and government, to the extent that it is almost impossible to demarcate party operations from bureaucratic action. Thus Sekou Toure's control of the party (he is the secretary General of the P.D.G.) and his role as

275. A.S. Toure op. cit. p. 32

276. Ibid.

the Executive head of the government places him on a strategic position to control policy formulation and policy execution. In operative terms it means that the same party ideology pervades the governmental structure such that the national foreign policy viewed as governmental action in response to either the domestic or external system is sieved through the regimes political ideology.

This analysis establishes a neat linkage, in operational terms, between foreign policy and the domestic ideology. Hence by analyzing the role of ideology in national decision-making, we are able to determine the significant influence of Guinea's ideology in the regime's policy outcomes.

Another way of looking at the linkage between Guinea's political ideology and the country's foreign policy would be to draw parallelisms between the various themes of Guinea's foreign policy and "African Socialism." Friendland stipulates that African socialism comprises of the following themes: (a) Continental identity ; (b) Economic independence (Economic development); and (c) the dilemmas of control and class formation.²⁷⁷ These themes have been discussed before, but it is interesting to note that the Guinean foreign policy stresses or is built on the some themes; only that it lays more emphasis on African Liberation. We have again dealt earlier on with the dominant themes or guiding principles of Guinea's foreign policy, and hence it not necessary to repeat them here.

Yet another dichotomous relationship that confirms the linkage thesis of socialism Guinea's style and her foreign policy could be arrived at by comparing the tenets of Guinea's non-align and her political ideology. Finally a similar dichotomous relationship also prevails between Guinea's national interest, Guinea's 'non-capitalist way' and non-alignment.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Sekou Toure's Marxian predilections have perturbed his perceptions to always view politics both at the systemic and subsystemic levels in terms of class conflict and class structure. Nevertheless, it is important to note Sekou Toure's shift in his belief in the non-existence of class conflict in Africa (and in Guinea for that matter) in 1958-1964, to his contemporary Marxian predispositions, the shift may be traced from his 1964 loi-cadre.²⁷⁸ We have discussed elsewhere this radical change in Toure's ideological orientation and we need not delve in the same discussion again. What must be noted here, however, is the fact that Toure's policies both domestic and external, in post-1964 period depict a similar ideological twist in his beliefs. It is therefore suggested in this paper that the shift in Toure's belief on class conflict notions in the African context and particularly in Guinea itself, coupled with

278. See R.W. Johnson op. cit.; p. 354

various other changes in the external system (particularly hostility with Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Ghana) is partly responsible for Guinea's isolationist policy. That is, Sekou Toure has withdrawn his enthusiasm in attacking class conflict on the international plane (between the poor and rich nations) and has systematically concerned himself with purging the surging Guinean national bourgeoisie.

Having accepted the thesis that domestic and international politics of any state are inextricably linked, it may be rational to hypothesize that Toure's ideological adjustments in the domestic system have inevitably extended similar ramifications in the international system.

But one question which cannot be ignored is how much of the present Guinea will survive Toure. The Party organization is largely his brain-child. The Politico-administrative set up is a wonderful piece of improvisation which may not survive Toure; its author and chief operator. The will to carry through certain programs, for example cultural revival; in the face of limited resources bears his mark. But if Adamolekun's predictions are anything to go by, the Guinean Experience may well survive Toure, but it seems doubtful if it will be the same Guinea.²⁷⁹ After 13 years in power, it is not yet clear what legacy the President will leave. If the present system survives him, then no doubt the Guinean

279. Ladipo Adamolekun; "Some Reflections on Sekou Toure's Guinea: 2." West Africa; March 26, 1973; p. 404

political ideology will continue to exert a dominant influence in the regime's foreign policy. As of now the Guinean ideology and the Guinean national interests are two inextricably linked variables that heavily determine the nation's foreign policy.

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