

**FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
'OPERATION RUDI NYUMBANI' PROJECT IN NAKURU
DISTRICT, KENYA**

BY

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UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree or any award in any other university.

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my husband, James Kamau, with love for the sacrifices he made for me, to my late dad, Julius Kamungi, for his inspiration, and to my sister Prisca Mbura, with gratitude for her generous support throughout my studies.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAR	Central African Republic
DPCs	District Peace Committees
G.O.K	Government of Kenya
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Court of Rwanda
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
MoSSP	Ministry of State for Special Programmes
NAIC	National Accord Implementation Committee
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
P.E.V	Post Election Violence
PDA s	Pre – displacement Areas
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGPID	United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

ABSTRACT

The announcement of the disputed presidential election results in Kenya in 2007 sparked a wave of violence in many parts of the country resulting to displacement of over 500,000 people. The government, following the signing of a peace agreement between the Party of National Unity and the main opposition Orange Democratic Movement, embarked on a vigorous exercise of resettling the displaced, dubbed the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project. Through this 'operation, the government would seek to increase physical security, rehabilitate key services, provide the IDPs assistance for the first three months of return and engage in peace and reconciliation activities. The exercise was scheduled to be complete by end of June 2008 during which all displaced people were expected to have returned to their pre-displacement homes. Two years later, many internally displaced persons are still living in camps. Many others resulted to relocate permanently to new areas. The study sought to establish the factors that were influencing the implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru district. Data upon which this report is based was collected using a mix of methods including interviews with IDPs living in relocation camps within Nakuru district and Key Informants, and review of secondary information. By the end of the survey, a total of 286 respondents had been interviewed, presenting 78% response rate. The key informant interviews were equally successful. The study was conducted in the month of June 2010. Indeed the government has put considerable effort to assist the IDPs: 84% of the IDPs have benefited from the GK start-up funds for IDPs, physical security has been beefed up and structures to promote peace and reconciliation are in place. Despite these efforts, the implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project has been affected by a combination of political, socio-cultural, economic and logistical factors which stand in the way of return: The IDPs seem to have lost confidence in the government's commitment to protect them and safeguard their rights, Inter-tribal tensions and mistrust remain high, and most of the IDPs are yet to secure sustainable means of livelihood and therefore remain unable to re-establish their lives. The government interventions failed to address the diverse needs of the IDPs, address the root causes of their plight and did not guarantee non-repetition of the displacement and other human rights violations against them. In light of these findings, several recommendations are made: Security be guaranteed to those willing to go back home, the government to compile an accurate register of IDPs based on their diverse needs and incorporate the IDPs in making decisions affecting them, the government to safeguard the rights of the IDPs to own and access land, perpetrators of violence against the IDPs be held accountable, and efforts to promote nationhood and reconciliation among communities be scaled up. In summary, to find durable solutions to the problem of internal displacement, there's need to apply a multi-faceted approach that addresses the diverse needs and concerns of the IDPs. It is important for the government to take seriously its obligation to address the plight of internally displaced persons as required by the UNGPID and other regional instruments on internal displacement of which Kenya is a signatory.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Internal displacement is a global crisis affecting millions of people, literally in all regions of the world. Reports by IDMC indicate that, at the end of 2008, the number of people displaced by conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations across the world stood at approximately 26 million. In 2008 alone, some 4.6 Million people were forced to flee their homes as a result of new outbreaks of conflict in 24 of the 52 countries monitored, while 10 countries experienced new large-scale displacements of 200,000 people or more. Sudan, Columbia, Iraq, DRC and Somalia recorded the highest IDP population with approximately 4.9million, 4.3 Million, 2.8 Million, 1.4 Million and 1.3 million IDPs respectively (IDMC, 2008).

In 2008, Africa had the largest IDP population with about 11.6 million IDPs in 19 countries, the lowest internal displacement figure in Africa in a decade but which accounted for nearly half of the world's total IDP population (IDMC, 2008). The largest new displacements were recorded in Kenya with 500,000, DRC with 400,000, Sudan with 315,000 and Somalia with 300,000. Many other African countries including Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad had also situations of internal displacements. The causes of displacement in Africa, as in other parts of the world are manifold and complex, (IDMC, April 2007) ranging from natural disasters, armed conflict, poverty, effects of negative ethnicity, effects of climate change, scarcity of resources, political instability and weak governance and justice systems. These same factors often hamper the end of displacement and make the task of rebuilding lives and restoring livelihoods of people affected by displacement all the more difficult.

Internal displacement has been part of all transition moments in Kenya since the onset of multi-party politics in 1992 (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2009). Ethnic clashes and violence have been repeatedly used in the run-up to the general elections to frighten and suppress individuals, parties and communities associated with political opposition.

By May 2004, there were over 360,000 IDPs in Kenya (FIDH and KHRC, 2007) and by 2006 the figure had risen to 450,000 (IDMC 2007). At the end of 2007, there were still 380,000 IDPs from clashes that had been experienced in the 1990s (OCHA Kenya 2008).

Following the announcement of the disputed presidential election results in Kenya on 30th December 2007, a wave of violence rocked many parts of the country, resulting to massive displacement and loss of lives and livelihoods. An estimated 500,000 persons were internally displaced in various parts of the country (OCHA Kenya, 2008). About 1,300 others lost their lives in the violence (Commission of inquiry into the post-election violence, 2008), while another 2000 fled to Uganda as refugees (South Consulting, 2009). The political crisis and violent conflict threatened the very existence of Kenya as a national state (South Consulting 2009).

On 28th February 2008, the Orange Democratic Movement, led by Prime Minister Raila Odinga and the Party of National Unity of President Mwai Kibaki signed the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the coalition government and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was enacted bringing an end to violent conflict.

The National Accord outlined strategic actions that were to be taken by the coalition government to restore stability and normalcy. Resettlement of IDPs was a key priority of the National Accord. In this regard, on 5th May 2008, the government, through the Ministry of Special Programmes (MOSSP) launched the IDPs resettlement programme dubbed 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani'. Through this 'Operation' the government would seek to increase physical security in the areas from which people were displaced, rehabilitate key services, provide assistance for the first three months of return and promote and engage in reconciliation activities (Report of the National Accord Implementation Committee, March 2008). This government strategy for emergency social and economic reconstruction envisaged that all IDPs would return home and re-establish their lives and livelihoods by June 2008 (Kamungi and Klopp, 2009).

Despite these government efforts, return has remained limited. Many IDPs continue to live in deplorable 'transit camps' with no access to services (South Consulting, May 2009). Others who left the camp have relocated to areas they consider safe or to their "ancestral homes".

Most of these IDPs remain unwilling or unable to return to their pre-displacement home areas, a reflection that the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project was not effective in its mission of resettling the IDPs. According to Mars Group, a rights agency, 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' was a flop (Daily Nation, 29th October 2008).

This study therefore sought to investigate the factors that were influencing the effective implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Two years after the government officially launched the resettlement exercise of persons displaced by the post-election crisis of 2007, popularly referred to as 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project, there are people still living in IDPs camps. In Nakuru District alone, out of the over 20,000 IDP households registered in the official camps, there are still 954 registered IDP households living in relocation camps within the District.

Many others who left the official camps resulted to settle in other parts of the country in transit/relocation camps or as integrated IDPs rather than return to their pre-displacement areas, contrary to the expectation that through this 'operation' all displaced persons would be back to their pre-displacement homes by June 2008. This is a reflection that the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' Project was ineffective in its mission.

Previous studies on the post-poll violence victims of 2007 have mainly focused on the extent to which the agenda items of the National Accord of 2008, in which resettlement of the IDPs was a key priority, have been implemented. Little has been done to establish the reasons why people are reluctant or unable to return to their homes.

This study therefore sought to investigate the factors that were influencing the implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru district.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

This study intended to investigate the factors influencing implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This study was guided by the following objectives:

- a) To establish whether political factors were influencing implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.
- b) To investigate the social cultural factors influencing implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.
- c) To assess how economic factors influence implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.
- d) To identify the logistical factors influencing implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.

1.5 Research Questions

The research questions for this study were:

- a) Do political factors influence implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District?
- b) What socio-cultural factors influence implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District?
- c) How do economic factors influence implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District?
- d) What logistical factors influence implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study would guide the government on the response to the protection and assistance needs of the IDPs. Such informed response would in turn promote safe and dignified

return of the IDPs to their homes in accordance with the U.N. guiding principles on internal displacement.

In addition, the study would provide direction to the government, civil society, religious bodies and other stakeholders in developing programmes to address issues specific to IDPs.

The study would also enhance the work of District Peace committees in their effort to reconcile disputes and provide long-term solutions to issues of internal displacement in their respective areas.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The study was conducted only in Nakuru district. In addition, only IDPs living in IDP camps were involved in the study. The integrated IDPs were excluded from the study. The findings of the study therefore may not apply to IDPs in other parts of the country or to the integrated IDPs. There was language barrier where some respondents could not speak English or Kiswahili.

1.8 Delimitation of the Study

The study had a relatively large sample with over 30% of the IDP households covered. Since these IDPs came from different parts of the country, there may not be no significant bias in the findings of this study.

1.9 Basic assumptions of the study

The assumptions of the study were: that those living in IDP camps were actually genuine IDPs, displaced by the post election violence crisis of 2007, and that the sample population was actually representative of the entire IDP population.

1.10 Definition of Significant Terms used in the study

Significant terms in this study include:

Economic factors - all factors that relate to access to and control of resources and which provide the means of earning and sustaining a livelihood.

Effective implementation of ORN project – a situation in which all IDP camps are closed, the IDPs are willing and able to return to their PDAs.

Electoral violence – use of force on the electorate by security forces or eruption of armed hostilities between individuals or groups for reasons directly related to suffrage.

Ethnicity – the way in which people think of themselves in relation to others.

Integrated IDPs - people who were displaced during the clashes but who are now living with their friends or relatives in other areas but not in camps.

Internally displaced persons – persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or habitual residence, in particular as a result of in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural/man-made disasters and who have not crossed on international recognized state borders.

Logistical factors – factors which relate to operational aspects of the ORN project.

Operation Rudi Nyumbani project- it is the name popularly used to refer to the GoK initiative/project of resettling persons displaced by the post-poll violence of 2007.

Political factors – factors that relate to the affairs engaged in by a government and other political actors.

Political violence – commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious to obtain or maintain political power.

Resettlement – return of the persons displaced by the post poll chaos of 2001 to their pre-displacement settlements.

Returnees – people who were initially displaced during post election violence of 2007 but who have since gone back to their farms/pre-displacement areas.

Rudi Nyumbani - 'Rudi Nyumbani' are Swahili terms meaning 'return home'.

Socio - cultural factors - factors that are as a result of social constructions. They include gender and ethnic prejudices.

1.11 Organization of the study

The study is presented in five chapters:

Chapter one contains the introduction to the study. It covers background to the study, statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, limitations, delimitations and basic assumptions of the study. It also contains the definition of significant terms used in the study.

Chapter two contains the Literature review on past studies and arguments relating to internal displacement with specific focus on factors that have been found to cause and sustain population displacement across the world. These factors have been divided into four broad categories: Political factors, Socio-cultural factors, Economic Factors and Logistical factors.

Chapter three contains the Research Methodology. It describes the research design, target population, sampling procedures and sample size, the data collection instruments, the data collection procedure, Instrument Validity and reliability and the methods of data analysis employed in the study.

Chapter four presents the Data presentation, analysis and Interpretation. The results are presented in form of tables and percentages.

Finally, Chapter five contains the summary of key findings, discussions, conclusions made and recommendations. Suggestions for further research are also provided.

References and appendices including the interview guides and frequencies are also attached at the end of the report.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains a comprehensive literature review of past studies and arguments related to internal displacement with specific focus on factors that have been found to cause and sustain internal displacements of populations in other regions across the globe.

2.2 Internal displacement

Internally displaced persons are people who have been forced or obliged to flee and leave their homes or places of habitual residence but who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Article 1, UNGPIP). Internal displacement is a global crisis affecting 26 million people, literally in all regions of the world. Africa has the largest IDP population with about 11.6 million IDPs in 19 countries (IDMC, 2008). The number of internally displaced persons has risen considerably over the years across the globe. By early 1990s, the number of IDPs had outnumbered refugees (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2009). Displaced persons face a myriad of problems: Displacement deprives them of the basic necessities of life, they face discrimination and often find their family and communal ties shattered. Worst of all, they are often trapped within the zone of the very conflict which they seek to flee, forcing them to move again and again (Deng, 1998,)

Yet, unlike refugees who are governed by the 1951 convention on refugees, there's no international legal instrument for protecting and assisting the internally displaced. In international law, the problem of internal displacement by definition is internal and therefore the responsibility of the government concerned to provide assistance and protection for the IDPs in their country. This lack of a legal framework specifically mandated to address issues of IDPs, coupled with the obstacles of negative sovereignty including ineffective government authority, limited capacity and tensions between centralized and political and economic forces among

others presented serious challenges to dealing with the humanitarian and protection needs of IDPs for many years.

To fill this gap, in 1992, the U.N. secretary general, Boutros Ghali appointed Francis Deng as his representative for internally displaced persons. At the request of the commission on Human Rights, and General Assembly, Deng, together with a team of international legal experts set out to examine and compile all legal provisions relevant to internally displaced persons in one document with a view to restate the law and address the identified gaps and gray areas. The result of this work was the document, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*' (Deng, 2007). The guiding principles set forth the rights of internally displaced persons and the obligations of governments, insurgent groups and other actors towards the internally displaced persons in all phases of displacement. They also provide protection against arbitrary displacement, protection and assistance during displacement and protection during return or resettlement and re-integration (Malombe, 2009).

The UNGPID place the primary responsibility on the governments to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced within their jurisdiction (Principal 3). Similarly, the Great Lakes protocol on IDPs obligates the government to lead the coordination, protection and assistance of IDPs (Article 3). Kenya has ratified the IC/GLR Protocol and other international human rights and humanitarian instruments from which IDP protection standards are derived. It is in this respect that the government, through the Ministry of State for Special Programmes sought to resettle the over 500,000 persons displaced by the post-election chaos of 2007. After the signing of the National accord in February 2008, the government appointed the National Accord Implementation Committee (NAIC) which was mandated to develop policies for implementation so as to mitigate the effects of the PEV. NAIC developed actions that covered five key areas: security, peace building and reconciliation, resettlement of IDPs, revitalization of productive sectors and restoration of damaged infrastructure and positive engagement of the youth (Report of the National Accord Implementation Committee on National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy, 2008). In addition, a Mitigation and Settlement Committee was set up to work with other established national

committees to resettle IDPs. The 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project was launched in May 2008. The 'operation' aimed at facilitating the return of all IDPs to their pre-displacement areas by end of June 2008. To fast track this initiative, two other initiatives, the *Operation Ujirani Mwema* and the *Operation Tujenge Pamoja* were also implemented to promote reconciliation and rebuild destroyed homes respectively. It was expected that, these efforts would encourage people to leave the camps and return to their pre-displacement homes. Contrary to this expectation, to date, there are still people living in IDP camps. Others who left the camps opted to settle elsewhere, raising questions on the effectiveness of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project.

This study therefore sought to investigate the factors that were influencing implementation of the resettlement initiative.

The factors were addressed from the perspective of 4 major categories: Political, Social-cultural, Economic and Logistical factors.

2.3 Political Factors

Political factors addressed in this study were: response of the government, security and political violence.

2.3.1 Response of the government

The UNGPID set forth the rights of internally displaced persons and the obligations of the governments, insurgent groups and other actors towards the IDPs. Principle 28 (1) states: "Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions as well as provide means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity to their homes or places of habitual residence or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the re-integration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons".

In addition, since the release of UNGPID, the international community, in particular the Representative of the UN secretary General on the human rights of IDPs has worked to provide national authorities with the necessary guidance to fulfil their responsibility towards IDPs. An

example is the Framework for National Responsibility of 2005 which established 12 benchmarks that identified steps to be taken by governments to provide an effective response to internal displacement in line with their obligations under international law. In spite of these efforts, there has been increasing criticism of many governments on their failure to address issues of IDPs which have been responsible for sustaining massive displacements.

Deng, (2001) notes that, Internal conflicts, especially those connected with ethnic, religious or cultural contradictions are often associated with a crisis of national identity and may create severe cleavages between the victim population and the government of the controlling authorities so that, instead of being seen as the citizens who merit protection and humanitarian assistance, these persons are perceived as part of the problem, if not the problem itself. Therefore, they are neglected and perhaps even persecuted.

According to a report by IDMC, at the end of 2008, eight governments continued to deny situations of internal displacement in countries with over 4million IDPs. The report further notes that displacement in these countries is mainly caused by the national authorities themselves (IDMC, 2008).

By the end of 2008, 4.9 million people in Sudan remained displaced by the numerous conflicts that had afflicted the country for over two decades (IDMC, 2008). Jok (2001) states that the conflict in Sudan has revived the practice of slavery to the extent that blacks in the south have become objects of trade. According to him, what makes the situation more inconceivable is that 'this abominable and archaic practice seems to be occurring with the consent of the government', the main reason being that the Dinka tribe is accused of supporting the SPLA, the opposition army confronting the North, led by Khartoum government.

In Central Africa Republic, following the political conflict that broke out in 2005 between the government of President Francis Bozize and armed opposition groups demanding power sharing and which resulted to displacement of over 108,000 people, government forces are reported to

have committed atrocities against civilians until 2007 in retaliation for their support of opposition groups which, as the de facto authorities in some areas, punished civilians when their authority was not respected (IDMC, 2008).

The NARC Manifesto promises to implement the recommendations of the Akiwumi report, which includes recommendations to resettle and assist those displaced during clashes (NARC manifesto, 2003). So, following the election of President Mwai Kibaki as President of Kenya in 2002, the IDPs and their advocates had high hopes that displaced persons would be compensated or allowed to return to their homes (Refugee consortium of Kenya, 2005). Still, reports by the UNOCHA indicate that at the end of 2007, there were 380, 000 IDPs from clashes that had been experienced in the 1990s. Amnesty International (1998), concludes: since 1992, the Kenyan authorities have failed to provide sufficient security in the areas affected, or address human rights violations to an extent which implies complicity.

Clearly, lack of political will to address protection problems faced by IDPs as well as involvement of government officials in causing or tolerating circumstances that result in and sustain displacement could be a major factor in effective resettlement. This study sought to establish how the response of the government to IDP problems is influencing the implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru District.

2.3.2 Political violence

Political violence is a phenomenon that, in the century has been growing in alarming proportions across the world, Rios (2006). It is estimated that over 4,381 people had been killed in United States alone during the 20th century from political disputes of one form or another (Mathew, 1998). In 2008, of the 52 countries that were monitored, 24 countries were reported to have new or ongoing conflicts or violence which generated internal displacements (IDMC, 2008).

Political violence is one of the most common causes of displacement globally, dating back to the two world wars of the 20th century. Talking on politically instigated violence Mansch (1998)

notes, “so prevalent is violence in human history that a good part of the political and diplomatic efforts of mankind can be understood in terms of our attempts to deal with violence. Hobbes (1962) traces the origin of violence among men and women to their natural equality. He writes, “Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind...that, the difference between man and a woman is not as considerable as that one man thereupon claims to himself any benefit, to which the other may not pretend as he Leviathan (1962). Given this equality, they feel that they have the same hope of acquiring these benefits, competition arises and with this, enmity.

In Hobbes words, “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies, the result being that men endeavor to destroy or subdue one another” Ibid (1962). Each in fact fears the other that he attempts to subdue them in advance. Such is the nature of political violence. According to Moser and Clark (2001a), violence and power are intrinsically connected in a relation that involves “an uninvited but intentional act of physically violating the body of a person”.

Violence has, historically been expressed through different means such as physical attack, which involves a direct aggression against an individual or a group. This means it is used to weaken in a rapid manner the power of the other Rois (2006). According to her, political violence is about acquisition of power through violent acts. It is driven by desires for power that lead people to transgress other people’s private domains.

Apter (1997) believes that, political violence is a constant pattern that has been present through the history of man-kind. To him, the overthrow of tyrannical systems and regimes, the desire for a separate and independent state, the tendency to impose ones religious belief on others, to establish state religious and ideologies, to intrigue and gain access to power by devious as well as institutional means are all as old as the human group.

The destruction and chaos provoked by means used by perpetuation of political violence have their origins in diverse motivation, ranging from the desire to defeat a government to the desire to control a region. For example, Basque separatist terror group; ETA, driven exclusively by

political reasons, have used violence for about 30 years as a way to claim the separation of Basque region from Spain and establishment of an independent state Rois (2006)

Political violence is not a new phenomenon in Africa. Most of the displacements in Africa are as result of civil wars that have been breaking out across the continent. In Kenya, electoral violence has been traced to the onset of multi-party politics. Prior to the multi-party era, political violence was restricted to fights between supported of different candidates, as competition was for power and influence in only one party (Kamungi, 2001). In particular, violence largely stemmed from a determination of the then ruling political party KANU leaders to maintain a one-party political system (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1998).

Electoral violence and its resultant internal displacement continued in the NARC Government and in the run-up to the 2007 general election which has been responsible for displacement of over 500,000 Kenyans.

From the aforesaid, it is evident that political violence is a major source of internal displacement in many countries and consequently, a hindrance to resettlement. This study sought to establish its role in effective implementation of Operation Rudi Nyumbani project in Nakuru Town District.

2.3.3 Security

Security or lack of it is a major consideration for all displaced persons contemplating to return home. In a report by the IDMC, insecurity in 14 countries prevented IDPs from cultivating land or livestock in rural home areas or around their settlements. In Kosovo, security risks facing IDPs and other members of the Serbian minority prevented them from finding job opportunities outside their enclaves (IDMC, 2008).

The code of conduct for the law enforcement officers requires them to provide adequate security to all members of a society. It reads, "Law enforcement agents shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the community and protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession" (Article 1).

This requirement has been largely observed in breach in many African countries, the result, massive displacement of people, loss of lives and livelihoods. For example in Central African Republic, OCHA estimates that, a third of the people displaced in 2005 were displaced by bandits operating with impunity in the absence of government forces (IDMC 2008).

In Chad, widespread attacks by road bandits known as 'coupeurs de route' against civilians including IDPs and humanitarian workers between 2006/2007 have gone unpunished (IDMC 2007). A church leader, talking on post-election violence chaos in 1997 in Kenya noted, "in at-least three instances when suspected raiders were sighted, the police were informed in good time, but came many hours later and no arrests were made" (UN special reportuer on extra judicial; summary or arbitrary excursions, 1998).

When perpetrators go unpunished, they are emboldened to strike again, perpetuating and encouraging vicious cycles of attack and reprisal even when a country emerges from conflict. (Arbor, 2007)

Fear of repeated attacks means security remains a major concern and is in many instances could be a major factor influencing implementation of ORN project.

2.4 Socio – Cultural Factors

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Socio-cultural factors addressed in this study are ethnicity and gender.

2.4.1 Ethnicity

The concept of ethnicity refers to social identity formation that rests on three considerations: a culturally specific practice and a unique set of symbols and beliefs; a belief in common origin and a common history ("the past") that is broadly agreed upon, and provides an inheritance of origin, symbols, heroes, events, values, hierarchies, etc.; and a sense of belonging to a group that in some combination confirms social identities of people (members) in their interaction with both insiders and outsiders. Therefore, ethnicity constitutes the way in which people think of themselves in relation to others, the way in which they act upon the world around them, and the

messages addressed to ethnic subjects in their mobilization, and to their outlook and practices as members of a group with some identity (Mare, 1993).

The role of ethnicity in causing population displacements in Sub-Saharan Africa can be traced to the European colonialism. According to Oucho (1997), three critical phases of ethnic disturbances that triggered internal displacements may be identified:

First, the race towards independence in the 1950s and 1960s, during which various ethnic groups entered into alliances to suit their particular purposes, sparked off ethnic disturbances which in turn displaced previously well-settled groups, arousing fears, particularly among foreign groups, some of whom felt compelled to emigrate. The second phase is the first decade of independence when several countries, notably those in Western and Middle Africa as well as countries in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, witnessed episodes of military *coup d'etat* which caused internal displacements of population and even migration of nationals. Finally, as Sub-Saharan African countries pinned their hopes on a renaissance brought about by the renewed quest for multi-party democracy in the early 1990s against the background of political intolerance under the single-party rule and severe economic crisis, ethnic conflict again exploded, resulting in fresh episodes of internal displacements of population.

Bruce (2006), concurs with Oucho. To him, modern ethnicity is a social construction of the colonial period through reaction of the pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism. As an instrument of policy, ethnicity was adapted to enhance the divide and rule system of colonial administration in Africa and just as divide and rule' served colonialism, so does ethnicity serve neo-colonialism. (Tongken, 2009).

Ethnicity is a defining factor in modern African politics. But according to Tongken, (2009), ethnicity has been employed so negatively that the term is synonymous with chaos. Wiewiorka (2003) believes that most instances of political violence are inhuman expression of hatred, the destruction of the other, tending towards the barbarism of ethnic purification or extermination.

According to Rosenblum and Travis (2002), human beings have historically displayed a tendency of aggregating and dichotomizing the existence of other within a shared social universe. To them, “aggregation assumes that those who shared a master status are alike in “essential ways”. Conversely, dichotomization is viewed as a need for constructing a segregated universe where differences in race, sex, sexual orientation, social class or disability are promoted and reinforced. “The image of a mythical other who is not at all like us” seems to be the profound justification for engaging in acts in which the other is constantly stigmatized and essentialized (25). Such categories constructed by society have been exploited by perpetrators of political violence to achieve their political goals.

In Sudan for example, this notion of dichotomization by colour and ethnicity has left the country immersed in a savage conflict that lasted over 20 years between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLM) and the Sudanese government. This has left the country divided into 2 sections. The south, occupied by the Christian blacks and the North occupied by the Arab Muslims and with over 4.9 million people displaced.

In Kenya, during the run-up to the general election of 1992, the then ruling party KANU politicians stated their intention to push through a *majimbo* constitution, which would require all ‘outsiders’ in the Rift-valley to return to their “motherland”. By early 1993, ethnic clashes which were mainly between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, ended with over 1,500 people killed (Kenya Human Rights Commission 1998) and an estimated 300,000 displaced and dispossessed (Rogge, UNDP, 1994).

Social constructions such as race and religion are in many instances responsible for instilling distorted perceptions of groups and communities that lead to the emergence of violent manifestations against them.

Many countries around the world have experienced civil war and subsequent displacements as a result of ethnic and religious prejudices that often get out of control. For example in Sri-Lanka,

the emergence of violent acts of 1980 was the result of long-term religious conflicts between “the mostly Hindu Tamil and mostly Buddhist Sinhalese, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” .A parallel conflict occurred between “the governing parties and the extremist Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna which resulted to death of up to 60,000 between 1987 and 1990 (Kapterer 1997).

In Cote de Voire, politicization of ethnicity during the economic decline of the 1990s caused escalating tensions and eventual armed conflict which led to the split of the county into two: the government controlled south and the North held by rebels of the forces Nouvelles (IDMC, Global overview 2008). By 2008, over 500,000 people were still displaced, six years after the civil war erupted in 2002.

Many commentators have suggested that underlying ethnic cleavages in Africa are source of domestic instability and conflict. Citing the genocide in Rwanda of 1994, the ethnic chaos in Kenya in 2007and the butchery in Zimbabwe, Tongken (2009) concludes, “The realities in Africa show that ethnicity is still alive and strong”. That ethnicity will not die in Africa except urgent attention is paid to this problem at the national, regional, continental and global levels. Rebel groups and political parties are organized in clan, tribal or ethnic lines, and politicians and would be leaders often play upon ethnic differences to rise to power. According to Deng (1996), virtually all African conflict has some ethno-regional dimension to it; even those conflicts that appear to be free of ethnic concerns involve factions and alliances built around ethnic loyalties.

Premdas’ (1992) in his study of Guyana, identified two sets of factors that create an environment that is most conducive for ethnically based conflicts that trigger internal displacements: predisposing factors and triggering-igniting factors. The predisposing factors include cultural pluralism, lack of co-operation and overarching values and intercommunal beliefs of the separate sections. When these are exploited to advance their ethnic exclusiveness, they generate ethnic conflict and, in the process separate or displace groups that had co-existed previously. The triggering-igniting factors on the other hand encapsulate colonial manipulation,

introduction of mass democratic politics, rivalry over resource allocation and imported political institution adopted at independence (Premdas 1992:5).

This study focused on Kenya's PEV case of 2007 to analyse evidence of the ethnic factor in sustaining population displacement.

2.4.2 Gender factor

It has been estimated that between 70 and 80% of all IDPs are women and children (IDMC, April 2006). It is generally accepted that, because of gender power relations, it is women who pay the disproportionate cost of war. Women and girls suffer predominantly or exclusively from specific types of harm during conflict both because they are female (and) while entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status in society as well as sex (SIDA, 2006). In most instances of war, sexual violence against women is a common practice since they are naturally perceived as the most vulnerable and weakest members of a social group. Rape and sexual exploitation of women and children have remained a frequent characteristic of conflict and displaced women and children face an increase in abuses such as domestic violence and exploitation by people in positions of power, including those who control and distribute humanitarian assistance (Virginia, 2004).

During conflicts, women often assume positions that would have been unacceptable pre-conflict, either by joining one of the fighting parties, assuming the position of head of household or occupying positions that were previously the exclusive domain of men (Enloe, 2004).

After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 for example, when the violence receded, most men had either been killed, fled to nearby countries or were in prison leaving a national population of 70% women. Women assumed the position of household head, daily managing the impact of their own experiences whilst shouldering the responsibility to ensure the economic survival of those who remained and the reconstruction of communities and social relations (Rombouts, 2006).

These shifts in roles and identities in conflict present an enormous and devastating impact on women's lives and present major challenges for resettlement and rebuilding of livelihoods. This situation is compounded by pre-existing gender norms including cultural norms which force women to be dependent on men as a result of inability to inherit. In countries like Chad and Somalia, female headed households made up the majority of internally displaced families, and so women were the main breadwinners. In a report by the IDMC, displaced women faced particular obstacles to obtaining documentation in 14 countries. In at least half of them, this meant that displaced women could not receive assistance due to them as IDPs, take possession of or receive compensation for their land or property. Displaced women and widows in particular faced obstacles to owning or inheriting property or land. They were thus deprived of adequate housing and land, and denied the chance to return to their former homes (IDMC, 2008).

Research across post conflict societies reveals that violence does not cease simply with the signing of a peace accord. As conflict is brought to an end and peace agreements negotiated, societies are faced with the task of reconstructing not only their physical infrastructure but also their social infrastructure, including relationships to each other, but, for various reasons- including pervasive trauma, easy access to guns, militarized identities, normalization of conflict and the devastation of judicial systems- violence carries through and can even intensify during a transition period, playing out in ways which have continuity and a rooting in the causes and consequences of the conflict but which can also take new forms. Ongoing insecurity and violence intersect with gendered hierarchies and disproportionately impact on certain sectors of society, those historically in positions of less power such as women, foreigners, children and the elderly (Valji, 2007). So, without accountability for crimes against women, women continue to suffer.

In international law there has been considerable progress in recent years toward acknowledging and addressing women's experiences of sexual violence during conflict. For example, the Security Council Resolution 1325 deals specifically with justice for women's experiences during conflict. In the International criminal court or Rwanda (ICTR), rape has been confirmed as both

a crime against humanity as well as an act of genocide. Also, the 2004 Report of the Secretary General on *the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict societies* confirms the need for Women to be included in all initiatives which seek redress for past violations as well as assurances that these interventions will not re-victimize marginalized and at risk groups, including women who have been victims of sexual violence.

It is clear from the above that women's experiences of violence as well as shifts in their roles and identities during and after conflict could be a major hindrance to resettlement. This study would seek to establish whether the gender factor was influencing implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project.

2.5 Economic Factors

Economic factors addressed in this study are poverty and lack of access to economic resources.

2.5.1 Poverty

Poverty is both a cause and a consequence of internal displacement. In developing countries, economic and social violence are triggered by the extreme conditions of deprivation and oppression in which popular classes are forced to live due to unequal distribution of wealth and material goods. For example several countries of central and south America, including Peru and Nicaragua where class differences are high as a result of poverty and unequal distribution of wealth and power, many organized violent groups have emerged and have held their respective states in what appears, permanent state of war and terror e.g. the FARC of Columbia. This wide disparity in economic levels is used to the advantage of guerillas and paramilitaries as the means of recruiting new members to their revolutionary causes (Rois, 2006). The result, mass displacements of populations.

Population displacements tend to grind all forms of economic activity to a sudden halt. Displaced persons are impoverished as they are deprived of their established means of livelihood. A report by IDMC indicates that in almost half of the 52 countries monitored, IDPs were deprived of access to livelihoods and many remained dependent on assistance from host communities or

humanitarian organizations. This made them particularly vulnerable in situations of protracted displacement where humanitarian assistance was declining and development plans had not yet been implemented (IDMC, 2008).

Lack of access to livelihoods, inadequate housing, inability to enjoy their homes and land have been cited as major obstacles to durable solutions to IDPs in protracted internal displacement situations. Principle 18 of the UNGPID states that all internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living. In addition, the IC/GLR protocol places responsibility for provision of adequate and habitable sites on the government (Article 5).

Where IDPs have lost all their possessions upon displacement and when these IDPs consequently are unable to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, this could present a huge challenge to resettlement.

2.5.2 Land:

Pursuit of economic power, competition for access and control of economic resources have been major causes of numerous conflicts and internal displacements across the world. A good example is Colombia. The index of internal displacement in Colombia is third highest, only outnumbered by Sudan and Angola (Sweig, 2002). This has been the result of armed conflict that lasted, 55 years. According to Rois C (2006), political violence in Colombia is committed by a variety of groups which, in the name of social justice democracy, are intent in pursuing the same goal; the achievement of economic power. Consequently, many regions in Colombia have been affected by clashes between guerillas and paramilitaries that in many cases were over control of drug territories. As a result of these clashes between guerillas and paramilitaries, hundreds of civilians, mostly belonging to ethnic minority are displaced on a daily basis across the country.

Sudan, the country with the largest internally displaced population in the world, has been a scene of internal conflicts instigated by various rebel groups in response to unequal distribution of resources and concentration of power in Khartoum. The armed conflict, in Southern Sudan

which broke out shortly after Sudan got independence and continued until 1986 lay in a history of neglect by the central government and a failure to share resources and wealth. By the end of 2008, there were 49 million people displaced in Sudan by numerous conflicts (IDMC, 2008).

Displacement is often followed by the settlement of other groups in properties left behind. Principle 29(2) of the UNGPID obligates governments to assist the internally displaced re-establish their livelihoods. It states, “Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible their property and possessions which they left behind or were disposed upon their displacement. When recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of reparation” But, as IDMC found out, in 33 of 52 countries monitored, IDPs were deprived of their land and houses as a result of destruction and looting. Occupation of IDPs land and houses often by members of armed forces or their families was reported in 29 countries. In Iraq, one of the principle barriers to return was the secondary occupation of houses, often by families which had been displaced themselves. In Mexico, IDPs land was often given to other indigenous groups and peasants allied to the local government forces. In most of these situations IDPs had little hope of recovering their lost property and rebuilding their lives in their home areas (IDMC, 2008).

Access and rights to land is a key issue of contention in Kenya particularly in the Rift valley (Amnesty International 1998). During the colonial period, the British land policy favoured (white) settler agriculture, entailing the dispossession of many indigenous communities land (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2008).

This process was legalized with the implementation of an individual freehold title registration system at the expense of the customary mechanisms of land tenure (Kenya Land Alliance, 2004). Consequently, the customary rights of nomadic pastoralist communities were usurped. After independence, these rights were not addressed and have remained major sources of conflict among the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities, often resulting to internal displacements.

Resource based conflicts within pastoral communities continue to underlie conflict and displacement in Northern Kenya (IDMC / Norwegian Refugee Council 2006). Search for water and pasture during periods of drought has yielded numerous violent interclan and intercommunal conflicts.

It is evident from the above that conflicts over access to land and control of other economic resources remain a major cause of internal displacement as well as hindrance to resettlement. This study attempted to establish how economic factors affect implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project.

2.6 Logistical Factors

As stated earlier, there's no international humanitarian institution charged with the overall responsibility of protecting and assisting the internally displaced. Principle 25 of the UNGPID states that "The primary duty of providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities".

Consequently, majority of states, especially in developing countries face numerous challenges in discharging this responsibility, mainly due to lack of capacity or resources. However, Article 3 of the IC/GLR Protocol states that, where the government lacks the capacity to protect and assist IDPs, it will accept the collaboration of the international community. Governments are therefore at liberty to seek or welcome international assistance if they are unable to discharge their responsibilities to the IDPs. Besides inadequate resources, Poor design and implementation of the resettlement are possible challenges to the effectiveness of the exercise.

Logistical factors addressed in this study are IDP profiling and co-ordination:

2.6.1 Profiling of IDPs

A comprehensive profile of IDPs is a necessary pre-requisite for effective targeting of assistance and protection to the internally displaced. It is also an essential instrument for monitoring and

reporting on IDP populations. In new displacements, gathering baseline data ensures an appropriate first emergency response and enables further tracking of the population. In protracted displacement situations, an updated profile can help to ensure that affected people participate in recovery programmes according to their needs and on the basis of transparent selection criteria (IDMC, 2008).

The collection of core data on IDPs is generally considered the responsibility of national authorities. The IC/GLR protocol emphasizes that member states are responsible for assessing the needs of IDPs as well as their registration. In particular, the protocol states, member states are responsible for assessing the needs of IDPs, and shall, to the extent necessary assist the IDPs with registration and maintain a data base (Article 3). Since the launch of the UNGPID in 1998, significant steps have been taken to promote the systematic monitoring and profiling of IDPs. The Inter- Agency Standing Committee working group agreed in 2004 on the need to develop a framework for the collection of IDP- related information. The IDMC and OCHA's Displacement and Protection Support Section launched the Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced persons in 2008 to help obtain jointly agreed information on the number and location of IDPs. However, as IDMC observed, these core profiles of IDP populations were still generally missing in 2008. Only in 6 out of the 52 countries surveyed was there up-to-date information on IDPs (IDMC, 2008).

Poor profiling of IDPs means that genuine IDPs receive limited or no support from government agencies or local or international organizations. It has been estimated that some 5million IDPs in 11 countries are without any significant humanitarian assistance from their governments (IDMC, 2006). In the DRC for example, host families are believed to be assisting three quarters of the displaced population. This lack of proper records on IDPs and therefore poor targeting of IDPs for assistance means that most of these IDPs remain largely unable to re-establish their livelihoods and this could be a main hindrance to resettlement.

2.6.2 Co-ordination

Based on the magnitude of displacement, co-ordination of protection and assistance can be daunting task for any state.

The U.N.H.C.R was mandated by the General Assembly Resolution 428 (v) of 14th December 1950 to lead and coordinate international action for the world wide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems guided by the United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees and 1967 protocol (U.N.H.C.R, 2007). In 2005, the UNHCR signed an agreement with other humanitarian agencies under which the UNHCR would assume the lead responsibility for protection, emergency shelter and camp management for internally displaced people. (U.N.H.C.R, 2007).

The ICRC on the other hand has a mandate of ensuring application of International Humanitarian law. Its overall objective is to alleviate the suffering of people who are caught up in armed conflict and other situations of violence.

For a long time, the collaborative approach in which the responsibility of protecting and assisting IDP has been shared among the U.N agencies was used to coordinate humanitarian aid. But as Roberta (2006) reports, there was no real locus of responsibility in the field for assisting or protecting. There was also no predictability of action, as the different agencies were free to pick and choose situations in which they wished to be involved on the basis of their respective mandate, resources and interests. Therefore, in every new emergency, no one knew for sure which agency or combination thereof would become involved.

There was a realization that under the collaborative response, abnegation of responsibility was possible since there was no formal responsibility assigned to agencies and therefore no accountability when agencies reneged on their promises (Davies & Murray, 2005). This led to the conception of the cluster approach. This approach operates at two levels: the global and local. At the global level, the cluster approach is meant to build capacity by ensuring better surge

capacity, ensuring consistent access to appropriately trained technical expertise and enhanced material stock piles, and securing the increased engagement of all relevant humanitarian partners. At the field level, the cluster approach strengthens the coordination and response capacity by mobilizing clusters of humanitarian agencies to respond in particular sectors or areas of activity, each cluster having a clearly designated and accountable lead. National human rights institutions, civil society organizations, international agencies and donors play an indispensable role in supporting national responsibility for internal displacement. Coordination of these agencies is critical to the success of resettlement exercise. Poor coordination of the same could be disastrous to any resettlement efforts and may, be a hindrance to the effective implementation of ‘operation Rudi Nyumbani’ project. This study sought to identify the logistical factors that were influencing implementation of ORN project.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a detailed outline of how the study was carried out. It describes the research design, target population, sampling procedures, methods of data collection and the data analysis procedure. It also describes how validity and reliability of the research instruments were established.

3.2. Research Design

This was a cross-sectional research. Descriptive survey design was employed in the study. This method was found appropriate for the study since the study involved collecting data regarding values, behavior, experiences and attitudes of the population under study as well as answering questions on their current status. The research was both qualitative and quantitative. This was useful in generating both numerical and descriptive data that was used in measuring correlation between the variables.

3.3 Target Population

The survey targeted two categories of respondents: The IDPs still living in IDP camps and the Implementers of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project. There were 954 IDP households in camps within Nakuru District. The implementers comprised the Provincial administrators (the DC, D.Os, chiefs and assistant chiefs) and the Humanitarian Organizations directly involved in the resettlement programme. Information gathered from the IDPs gave insight into the IDPs perception of their own situation as well as provided first hand data on their reasons for remaining in camps.

The implementers were instrumental in providing information regarding the challenges they faced during the implementation of the 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project as well as gave insight into what, from their own experience was is hindering the IDPs from going back to their

homes. The implementers also provided valuable information on any assistance-humanitarian, protection, financial etc- that had been provided to the IDPs.

3.4 Sampling Procedure and sample size

A mix of both probability and non-probability sampling methods were employed in this study. The survey was designed to achieve a sample of 377 respondents drawn from the 3 categories i.e. the provincial administration (4), the IDPs (369) and the humanitarian organizations (4).

The sample was arrived at as follows:

a) Internally Displaced Persons.

Stage 1: The Population of IDPs living in IDP camps within Nakuru District was established. There were 954 households living in relocation camps in the district (DC's Office, Nakuru).

Stage 2: The appropriate sample size was established using the formula recommended for social science research by Mugenda & Mugenda (1999) below:

$$n = Z^2 pq/d^2 \quad \text{where,}$$

n = the desired sample size (if the target population is greater than 10 000).

Z = the standard normal deviation at the required confidence level

P = the proportion in the target population estimated to have characteristics being measured.

$q = 1 - p$

d = the level of statistical significance set.

Since there was no estimate available of the proportion of the target population with the characteristic of interest, 50 % was used as recommended by Fisher et al. (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). In this case,

$$Z = 1.96 \quad p = .50 \quad q = .50 \quad d = .05$$

Therefore, $n = (1.96) (.5) (.5) / (.05)$

$$n=384.$$

But, since the target population for this study was less than 10 000, the formula below was used to arrive at the sample size.

$N_f = n / (1 + N/n)$ where:

N_f = the desired sample size (when the population is less than 10 000)

n = the desired sample size (when the population is more than 10 000)

N = the estimate of the population size (Mugenda & Mugenda 1999).

Therefore, $N_f = 384 / (1 + 384/954)$

$$N_f = 384 / 1.04 = 369.$$

Therefore, the appropriate IDP sample was 369.

Stage 3: The first household to be interviewed was picked randomly by simple random sampling. Subsequent households to be interviewed were picked using systematic sampling. Systematic sampling is a random sample in which a researcher selects every k^{th} case in the sampling frame using a sampling interval (Lawrence, 2006).

The sampling interval was established using the formula:

$$k = N/n \text{ where,}$$

k = the sampling interval

N = the population size

n = sample size

Therefore the sampling interval (k) = $954/369 = 2.585$.

Since there's no 0.585 of a household, this was rounded to the nearest to arrive at the sampling interval of 3. Therefore, every third household was interviewed.

The first 18 and above year-old person who was traced from the selected household was interviewed.

b) Provincial administration

Stage 1: The total number of administrative units in the district was established. There were 57 administrative units which included the District, 3 divisions, 14 locations and 39 sub-locations. The number of administrative units should equal the number of administrative officers in the district.

Stage 2: The sample size was derived using stratified sampling. This method was found appropriate because not all administrative units in Nakuru district have IDPs living in camps. The administrative units were divided into two stratas i.e. those with IDP camps and those without IDP camps. Only administrative officers in charge of administrative units hosting IDPs in camps were included in the study. The two IDP camps in the district are in the same sub-location. The sample size for the provincial administration was therefore as here under:

Table 3.1: Distribution of Provincial administration officers within Nakuru District, their sample size.

Designation	Population	Sample size
D.Cs	1	1
D.Os	3	1
Chiefs	14	1
Assistant Chiefs	39	1
Total	57	4

c) Humanitarian Organisations.

This category of respondents was selected using purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a non random sample in which the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult to reach population or to select unique cases that are especially informative (Lawrence, 2006). In this case, all the humanitarian organizations involved in the resettlement exercise and which are based in Nakuru were identified and included in the study. This is because they were few (4) and could all be covered. Only officers in charge of these organizations were interviewed. Humanitarian bodies that were involved in the resettlement exercise but are not based in Nakuru town district were excluded from the study.

3.5. Data Collection Instruments

The data collection instrument used in this study was the interview guide. An interview guide containing pre-arranged questions was developed to guide the researcher and the research assistants gather relevant information. The interview guide contained both semi-structured and open-ended questions to allow for more in-depth responses. There were two sets of interview guides. The first set involved questions specific to IDPs with particular reference to what they perceived to be their main hindrance to going back to their pre-displacement areas. The second set involved questions for the implementers of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project who comprised Provincial administration officers and officers in charge of Humanitarian agencies involved in the resettlement exercise. Questions here focused on the challenges faced by the implementers of the programme during the exercise and any assistance given to the internally displaced.

3.6. Data Collection Procedure

In this study, both primary and secondary data was collected. Primary data was obtained through intensive face to face interviews and key informant interviews. The researcher and the research assistants used a pre-developed interview guide to conduct the interviews. Interviewers also used probes when necessary to clarify ambiguous answers, to complete incomplete answers or/and to obtain relevant responses.

Interviews were conducted in either English or Kiswahili depending on the language the respondent preferred. Secondary data was obtained by reviewing existing records from government sources as well as from the humanitarian agencies.

3.7. Instrument Validity

Validity is the degree to which results obtained from the analysis of data actually represent the phenomenon under study (Mugenda and Mugenda 1999). Validity addresses the question of how well the social reality being measured through research matches with the constructs researchers use to understand it (Neuman, 2006).

This study employed both content and face validity.

Content validity is the degree to which the contents of the test are related to the traits for which it was designed to test. It is a measurement validity that requires that a measure represents all the aspects of the conceptual definition of a construct (Neuman, 2006). To establish content validity, the interview guide was field tested on 5 randomly selected households prior to the actual data collection to allow for feedback from respondents on the ease of answering questions and to identify any ambiguities and problems on question wording and ordering that required refining. Necessary adjustments were then made on the interview guide so that it was able to capture all relevant aspects of the study.

Face validity is a judgment by the scientific community that the indicator really measures the construct (Neuman, 2006). In this study, face validity was achieved through expert evaluation- there were discussions between the researcher and the project examiner to review and critique the interview guide with a view to refining the guide so that it was able to generate data relevant for the study.

3.8 Instrument Reliability

Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), defines reliability as a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials. It suggests that the same thing recurs under similar or identical conditions. Reliability in this study was verified by use of test-retest method whereby the interview questions were re-administered to some respondents to check whether they yielded consistent results. Reliability was also improved by use of multiple indicators of the variables. Multiple indicators let a researcher take measurement from a wide range of the content of a conceptual definition (Neuman, 2006). In this case, a series of different questions relating to each factor was used to establish consistency and therefore reduce error.

3.9. Data Analysis Technique

Data collected was analyzed by content and descriptive analysis. After the close of the data collection exercise, the researcher checked the questionnaires for completeness and uniformity of information obtained. The unit of the data analysis was the themes. The data was coded using latent coding. Latent coding involves looking for the underlying, implicit meaning in the content of text (Newman, 2006). Data was then fed into the computer and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SSPS). Data was interpreted and presented descriptively in form of tables, percentages and statements.

3.11. Operational Definition of Variables

This section defines the variables in terms of measurable indicators. The independent and the dependent variables were operationalized as shown in the table below.

Table 3.2: Operational definition of variables.

Research questions	Variable	Indicators	Measure	Measure ment Scale	Type of data
What political factors are hindering the effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District?	Political Factors	Political violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political incitement • Reports of conflicts, threats, incitement by politicians, • Politicians/government sponsoring militias • Recurrent displacement during electioneering periods 	Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal	Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative

		Lack of Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical presence of security/ Level of Confidence with law enforcing officers. Presence of armed groups 	Nominal Nominal Nominal	Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative
		Response of the government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognition of IDPs by the government Number of Perpetrators of violence prosecuted Number of beneficiaries of G.O.K IDP support funds Peace and reconciliation efforts/ Peace committees operationalized 	Nominal Ordinal Ordinal Nominal	Qualitative Quantitative Quantitative Qualitative
	Socio-cultural factors				

What are the socio-cultural factors hindering the effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District?		Ethnicity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaceful co-existence among various communities • Mistrust /tension between communities / tribal animosity 	Nominal Nominal	Qualitative Qualitative
		Gender factor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratio of female headed to male headed households in camps 	Ratio	
	Economic factors				
How are economic factors hindering the effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District?		Level of Poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of access to basic needs • Number of beneficiaries of G.O.K IDP support funds • Number of houses re-built for IDPs • Source of income 	Nominal Ordinal Ordinal	Qualitative Quantitative Quantitative
		Landlessness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landlessness • Land disputes 	Nominal Nominal	Qualitative
		Employment status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature of employment 	Nominal Nominal	Qualitative Qualitative

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of income 		
	Logistical Factors				
What logistical factors are hindering the effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru district?		Profiling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of comprehensive profile of IDPs • Names of IDPs missing from the registers/ incorrect government records 	Ordinal Nominal	Quantitative Qualitative
		Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination between various agencies • Inadequate trained personnel • Delays in release of G.O.K support funds for IDPs 	Nominal Nominal Nominal	Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative
		Lack of transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate transport facilities 	Nominal	Qualitative

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of analysis of answers to the interview questions given by respondents targeted for the study. They included IDPs living in camps, government officials and officials of humanitarian organizations involved in the resettlement efforts within Nakuru district.

4.2 Results and interpretation

This section provides the results obtained and interpretation of the same.

4.2.1 Response rate

By the end of the data collection exercise, a total of 286 respondents had been interviewed representing 78% response rate. The key informant interviews were equally successful with 6 out of the possible 8 interviewed presenting 75 % response rate. The findings are presented in form of tables and percentages.

Table 4.1: Demographic Profile of the respondents

	Response	Frequency	Percentage
Gender of the household head	Male	132	46.5
	Female	152	53.5
	Total	284	100.0
Employment Status	Employed	32	11.3
	Unemployed	240	84.5
	self employed	12	4.2
	Total	284	100.0
Income bracket	Less than Ksh. 5000	273	96.1
	Between Ksh. 5,000 and Ksh. 10,000	9	3.2
	Between Ksh. 10,000 and Ksh. 20,000	1	.4
	Over Ksh. 20,000	1	.4
	Total	284	100.0

Table 4.1 above gives the demographic characteristic of the IDPs. 54% of the households are female headed. Most of the respondents not engaged in any gainful employment (84.5%) and a large proportion (96.1%) is living on an income of less than five thousand shillings.

4.2.2 Political factors

The IDPs were asked the main reason they were reluctant to go back to their PDAs. A majority 61% mentioned fear of fresh attacks as a reason they are unwilling to go back to their PDAs, ranking fear of fresh attacks as the single most important reason IDPs remain in camps (39%). This was followed by the concern that the perpetrators of the violence have not been held accountable for their actions (18%). Another 5% ranked security as the main reason they choose to remain in the camps representing 9% of total responses. Put together, a majority 57% ranked security concerns as a major factor influencing implementation of ORN project. A summary of the responses is in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: The main reason why IDPs have not returned to their pre-displacement areas

Reasons	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Fear of fresh attacks	174	39.1	61.3
Waiting for resettlement funds from the government	38	8.5	13.4
Perpetrators of the violence are still free	81	18.2	28.5
My land has been occupied by other people	24	5.4	8.5
Security	24	5.4	8.5
Government not serious on violence	1	.2	.4
Incitement and hate speeches	1	.2	.4
Total responses	343	77	121

It is often assumed that the IDPs still living in camps are those who have not received the IDP start-up funds from the government. To prove this, we asked whether the respondents had received the said funds. A majority of the respondents (84%) reported that they had received both the Ksh. 10,000 and the Ksh 25, 000 reconstruction funds. This result indicates that IPDs remain in the camps because of other reasons other than awaiting support funds from the government. Table 4.3 below provides a summary of the responses.

Table 4.3: Those benefitted from IDP resettlement funds from the government

		Frequency	Percent
Did you receive any IDP resettlement funds from the government	Yes	239	84.2
	No	44	15.5
	No response	1	.4
	Total	284	100.0
If yes, how much	10,000	30	12.6
	25,000	13	5.4
	Both	196	82.0
	Total	239	100.0
	No	32	11.3
	No response	25	8.8
	Total	284	100.0

To gauge the perception of IDPs on the security situation in their PDAs, respondents were asked whether there were locally organized armed groups in their PDAs and whether these have been disbanded. A majority of those interviewed (98%) said that there were locally organized armed groups who committed acts of post-election violence in pre- displacement areas with 60% reporting that they had not been disbanded. The results are presented in Table 4.4 below. The presence of armed groups is associated with insecurity and laxity on the part of the government to respond to protection needs of the IDPs. The IDPs are not guaranteed non repetition of the evictions due to the presence of these gangs and this is influencing the implementation of ORN project.

Table 4.4: Presence of local organized armed groups

		Frequency	Percent
Were there local organized armed groups who committed acts of post-election violence in your pre- displacement area	Yes	278	97.9
	No	6	2.1
	Total	284	100.0
If yes, have they been disbanded	Yes	8	2.9
	No	166	59.7
	Don't know	104	37.4
	Total	278	100.0

Asked why they thought the armed groups had not been disbanded, 67% of respondents mentioned that they enjoyed support from the politicians, and 39% lack of government commitment to deal with them. 87% of the respondents accused political actors (politicians & political parties) of financing the criminal groups. These findings point to a positive relationship between politics and violence. It is also clear from the results that the IDPs have no confidence in the government’s commitment to hold those responsible for their plight accountable. The IDPs believe that these gangs are therefore likely to strike again and this is influencing the implementation of ORN project. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 below provide a summary of the responses.

Table 4.5: Reasons armed groups have not been disbanded

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
No government commitment	88	31.0	38.6
Politicians support them	152	53.5	66.7
Police officers are few	3	1.1	1.3
Police are bribed	2	.7	.9
To be used in the next elections	2	.7	.9
Total responses	247	87	108.4

Table 4.6: Who finances armed groups?

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Politicians	245	70.6	93.9
Political parties	58	16.7	22.2
Community elders	38	11.0	14.6
Business people	3	.9	1.1
Community members	3	.9	1.1
Total responses	347	100.0	133.0

The IDPs were asked whether the 2007 evictions were the first they had experienced. 80% of the respondents indicated that it was not the first time they had been displaced from their homes. This recurrence of conflicts over the years has left the IDPs with no hope of ever rebuilding their livelihoods in those areas. A follow-up question was asked on why they thought the displacement had been recurring. Here, failure on the part of the government to stop the violence was ranked highest with a cumulative 48% Results are in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below.

Table 4.7: Whether this was the first time they were displaced from their home

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	56	19.9
No	226	80.1
Total	282	100.0

Table 4.8: Reasons for recurring displacement

	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Due to tribalism	19	12.9	13.6
land issues	28	20.0	21.2
Government is doing nothing to perpetrators	30	21.4	22.7
Political incitement and division	18	11.4	12.1
Kenyans don't listen to party policies	2	1.4	1.5
Government has no will to stop violence	28	20.0	21.2
Impunity has been allowed to continue	8	5.7	6.1
IDPs go back to their homes without reconciliation	6	4.3	4.5
Country's leadership struggle	2	1.4	1.5
Groups have not been disarmed	2	1.4	1.5

It was suspected that the expectation of another eviction in the next election would affect effective implementation of ORN project. To prove this, respondents were asked, do you think violence is likely to occur in your pre-displacement area in the next election? The results are presented in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9: Likelihood of violence in the next election

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	260	91.5
No	12	4.2
No response	12	4.2
Total	284	100.0

A majority (92%) think violence is likely to occur in their pre-displacement areas in the next election. They therefore do not see the need to go back only to be evicted in the next general election. This conviction is clearly a major factor influencing implementation of ORN project. The reasons given included political incitement (28%), tribalism (28%), perpetrators still being free (10%), land disputes (9%) insecurity (7%) among other reasons as presented in the table 4.9 below. The most likely persons to commit acts of violence were ranked as follows: supporters of politicians (33%), politicians (29%), militias (17%), members of other communities (15%)

among others as presented below. The results in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 below present the political-related reasons why violence is likely to occur in the next elections as well as the actors associated with the violence.

Table 4.10: Reasons to why violence may occur

	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Political incitement	146	27.8	54.5
Perpetrators of the violence are still free	54	10.3	20.1
There is no security	38	7.2	14.2
The government does nothing about it	49	9.3	18.3
It happens during every election	31	5.9	11.6
Total responses	318	60.5	118.7

Table 4.11: Who is likely to commit the act of violence?

	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Politicians	103	28.5	37.6
Supporters of politicians	119	33.0	43.4
Militias	64	17.7	23.4
Armed groups	2	.6	.7
Total responses	288	51.3	105.1

The researcher was interested in gauging the level of confidence in protecting the rights of Kenyans. The results are in the Table 4.12 below.

Table 4.12: Rating of the performance of police in protecting the rights of Kenyans

Response	Frequency	Percent
Excellent	9	3.2
Good	24	8.5
Fair	68	23.9
Not Good	56	19.7
Very Poor	124	43.7
No response	3	1.1
Total	284	100.0

A majority 63% gave a negative rating on the police performance, with 44% saying very poor and 19% not good. This implies that the IDPs have lost confidence in the government's ability to guarantee their security. Therefore, merely increasing physical security in the PEV areas is not an adequate measure to encourage the IDPs to return to their PDAs.

To check consistency of the findings on political factors, respondents were asked what they thought the government should do to enable them go back to their PDAs. Table 4.13 below gives a summary of the political- related responses.

Table 4.13: What government should do to enable respondent go back to PDAs

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Stop incitement by politicians	61	10.1	21.8
Provide security	102	16.9	36.4
Prosecute perpetrators of violence	53	8.8	19.0
Address past violence	2	.3	.7
Make use of reports given from the ground	1	.2	.4
Government to be firm on laws	9	1.5	3.2
Disarm the groups	1	.2	.4
Kenya should be a one party state	1	.2	.4
Total responses	230	38.2	82.3

Based on the results in Table 4.13 above, it is concluded that at least 38% of the respondents are willing to go back to their PDAs if the political issues associated with their displacement are addressed.

4.2.3. Social -Cultural factors

At least 95% of respondents indicated that they were optimistic violence would occur in the next general election. A follow-up question was asked on why they thought so. Table 4.14 below contains the results.

Table 4.14: Reasons why violence may occur

	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Political incitement	146	27.8	54.5
Tribalism	147	27.9	54.9
Perpetrators of the violence are still f	54	10.3	20.1
Land disputes	46	8.7	17.2
There is no security	38	7.2	14.2
The government does nothing about it	49	9.3	18.3
It happens during every election	31	5.9	11.6
Others	15	2.5	5.7
Total responses	526	100.0	196.3

From Table 4.14 above, it is clear that a large percentage (28%) of the respondents think that tribalism was the main reason conflict was bound to recur in future, with 55% of the respondents attributing the violence that's responsible for their displacement to tribalism. We sought the perceptions of the IDPs on how best violence would be prevented in Kenya in future. The responses were as in Table 4.15 below.

Table 4.15: The most important ways to prevent violence in Kenya in future

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Land reform	115	19.7	41.4
Fight unemployment	23	3.9	8.2
Fight tribalism	144	24.5	51.2
Fight poverty	113	19.2	40.2
Stop incitement by politicians or / and	76	13	27.1
Prosecute perpetrators	69	11.7	24.6
Adequate security	47	8.0	16.7
Total responses	588	100.0	209.3

Again, the issue of tribalism stood out. Majority 25% of those interviewed ranked fighting tribalism as the best way to prevent violence in Kenya with at least 51 % of the respondents mentioning that fighting tribalism would prevent violence in future. In addition, at least 12% of the respondents indicated that they were willing to go back to their PDAs if the problem of tribalism was addressed. This is a clear indication that ethnicity is a key factor in sustaining population displacement in Kenya. .

Interviews with the key informants reviewed that the ethnic factor presented a major challenge to peace and reconciliation efforts. They were asked ‘what is the biggest challenge to healing and reconciliation in your area?’ Table 4.16 below gives a summary of the results.

Table 4.16 Biggest challenge to healing & reconciliation

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Mistrust between communities	4	50
Statements by politicians	2	25
Perpetrators of violence still free	1	12.5
Awaiting government funds	1	12.5

These results indicate that inter-tribal tensions are still high and this is influencing implementation of ORN project.

4.2.4 Economic factors

The IDPs were asked what they perceived to be their most urgent concern at the moment. Table 4.17 below has a summary of the findings.

Table 4.17: Most important concerns right now

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Food	47	9.5	16.6
Shelter	171	34.5	60.4
Land	174	35.1	61.5
Security	68	13.7	24.0
Money	23	4.6	8.1
Education	12	2.4	4.2
Good governance	1	.2	.4
Total responses	496	100.0	175.3

The results indicate that the concerns of IDPs revolve around basic necessities. A total of 44% of the respondents cited shelter and food as their major concern with 34.5% and 9.5% respectively. This points to high poverty levels as this large number of IDPs is unable to afford these basic needs. Issues of land came second with 35%. At least 22% of the respondents do not own and therefore are unable to leave the camps (refer to appendix 5).

When asked if they thought prosecuting PEV perpetrators would prevent the recurrence of conflict in future, 34% of the respondents said that it would not. A follow-up question was asked on why they thought so. The responses are summarized in Table 4.18 below.

Table 4.18: Reasons why prosecuting the PEV perpetrators will not prevent the re-occurrence of conflict in the next election

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses
There is hatred within tribes	37	22.3
Root of the problem not addressed	15	9.0
Kenyans don't fear laws	16	9.6
Should look at land reforms first	119	71.6
Total responses	166	100.0

A majority 72 % of these believed that conflict would recur even if perpetrators were held accountable unless the land issues were addressed. This is a clear indication that the problem of displacement has a lot to do with land issues.

Respondents were asked what they felt the government should do to enable them go back to their PDAs. Table 4.19 below shows a range of economic issues raised.

Table 4.19: What government should do to enable respondent go back to PDAs.

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Give land	90	15.0	32.1
Give funds for resettlement	28	4.7	10.0
Land reform	72	12.0	25.7
Create employment	23	3.8	8.2
Fight poverty	56	9.3	20.0
Compensate IDPs	11	1.8	3.9
Providing shelter	18	3.0	6.4
Total responses	298	49.6	106.3

From Table 4.19 above, is clear that land issues dominated the responses, with 15% of the respondents saying they are willing to resettle if they are given land in the PDAs while 12% want land reforms to ensure conflict does not recur over this resource. In general, the results indicate that about 50% of the respondents are willing to go back to their PDAs if the mentioned economic issues are addressed.

The key informant interviews also appeared to agree with the results from the IDP interviews. The KI were asked what in their opinion was keeping the IDPs in the camps. The responses are presented in Table 4.20 below.

Table 4.20: Most important reason IDPs remain in camps (K.I).

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Lack land to go to	4	50
Fear of fresh attacks	3	37.5
IDPs are not genuine	1	12.5

Again, the issue of landlessness was identified as the main reason the IDPs have not left the camps, with 50% of the key informants citing landlessness as a main issue influencing implementation of ORN project.

4.2.5 Logistical factors

To identify any problems in disbursement of the IDP resettlement kit, the IDPs were asked whether there were any problems associated with the disbursements. Their responses were as in Table 4.21 below.

Table 4.21: Problems with disbursement of funds

Category label	Frequency	Percentage of Responses	Percentage of Cases
Delays in receiving funds	138	31.6	60.3
Names missing from the register	129	29.5	56.3
Incorrect government records	60	13.7	26.2
Money paid to non IDPs	66	15.1	28.8
IDPs not involved in identifying beneficiaries	35	8	15.3
Requirement for identification documents	6	1.4	2.6
Corrupt officials	3	7	1.3
Total responses	437	100	190.8

A majority (80%) reported that the disbursement of the funds was faced with several problems. They included delays in receiving the funds (60%), names missing from the register (56%), money being paid to the non-IDPs (29%), IDPs not involved in identifying the benefit among

others. These issues point to problems in the IDP profiling exercise as well as in the co-ordination of the exercise.

The key informants were also questioned on the challenges they faced while distributing relief supplies to the IDPs. The responses are in Table 4.22 below.

Table 4.22: Biggest challenge while distributing assistance to IDPs

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Lack of proper register of IDPs	6	46.2
Poor coordination of the exercise	2	15.4
Inadequate physical facilities	1	7.7
Delay in release of funds	1	7.7
Inadequate trained personnel	1	7.7
Inadequate stocks	1	7.7
People posing as IDPs while they are not	1	7.7

Again, the issue of the absence of a proper register of IDPs stood out at the main problem experienced during distribution of aid, with 100% of the key informants pointing at the problem. A total of 46% of the responses pointed at issues associated with the co-ordination of the exercise.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of findings, conclusions reached, recommendations given for facilitating return of IDPs and suggestions for further research.

5.2 Summary of findings and discussions.

The study sought to establish the factors that were influencing the implementation of 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani' project in Nakuru district. This section provides a summary of the findings and discussions

Table 5.1: Summary of findings

Objective	Findings	Remarks
To establish whether political factors affect implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District	<p>The IDPs have lost confidence in the government's ability to protect them: A large number has been displaced before and no durable solutions have been provided.</p> <p>The IDPs are very sensitive to their security: They have no confidence in the police guaranteeing their security. Armed groups who committed PEV acts are still free.</p>	Political factors including insecurity, political violence and poor response on the part of the government to concerns of IDPs is influencing the effective implementation of ORN project.

	<p>They are convinced violence will recur in the next general election.</p>	
<p>To investigate the socio-cultural factors affecting effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District</p>	<p>Inter-tribal tension is high.</p> <p>Displacements are highly associated with tribalism.</p> <p>There's no evidence of discrimination against women as far as compensation and property rights are concerned.</p>	<p>There's evidence that the ethnic factor is contributing to sustained displacement and therefore influencing effective implementation of ORN project.</p> <p>Gender factor is not a factor influencing effective implementation of ORN project.</p>
<p>To assess how economic factors affect the effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District</p>	<p>Poverty level is very high: Most cannot afford their basic necessities, are unemployed and live on less than ksh. 5,000 a month.</p> <p>Some IDPs were disposed of their land upon their displacement and have not been able to recover the same.</p> <p>A large number is landless Land disputes are high</p>	<p>Economic factors present a main challenge to effective implementation of ORN project: IDPs are unable to re-establish their livelihoods due to poverty.</p> <p>Landlessness and conflicts over land leave the IDPs with no choice but to remain in the camps.</p>

<p>To identify the logistical factors affecting effective implementation of ORN project in Nakuru District.</p>	<p>The IDP profiling exercise was poorly done: many people were not captured in the registers</p> <p>The diverse needs of the IDPs were not taken into account</p> <p>There was evidence of poor co-ordination among actors: IDPs not adequately involved in the exercise, delays in delivering assistance</p>	<p>Mismanagement of the profiling exercise has influenced implementation of ORN project mainly because assistance was not based on the diverse needs of IDPs.</p> <p>Poor co-ordination was largely responsible for delays in distributing assistance to IDPs, but it is not a main reason IDPs are still in camps.</p>
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The table above indicates that the ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani’ project has been influenced by a combination of political, socio- cultural, economic and logistical factors. A full report of the findings and discussions is here under.

The UNGPID places a responsibility on the government to guarantee IDPs return to their homes in safety and dignity (principle 28).

There is evidence that the government has put some effort to address the plight of the IDPs: The government, alongside other humanitarian organizations has been undertaking peace and reconciliation efforts. District peace committees are in place from the District to the sub-location levels and have been instrumental in promoting peaceful co-existence among communities through regular peace meetings. Security has also been beefed up. In addition 84% of the IDP respondents have received the start up funds from the government. Regardless of these

government efforts, the IDPs generally seem to have lost confidence in the government in protecting their rights. They accuse the government of lack of commitment to end the recurring violence: About 80% of respondents have been displaced before, some severally, but the government has not sought a durable solution to their plight. At least 70% of respondents believe violence cannot end unless the land problem is addressed but say the government is unwilling to address the problem. 31% of respondents say that the government is not committed to disbanding armed groups. Another 8.5 % claim that they cannot access their land because it was occupied by other people yet the government has not taken any action to help them repossess their land.

It is also clear from the findings that insecurity is a key issue influencing the implementation of ORN project. Fear of fresh attacks was ranked as the main reason hindering return of the IDPs to their PDAs (39%). The code of conduct for law enforcement officers obligates them to provide security to all persons at all times. It states, law enforcement officers shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the community and protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession. Shockingly, IDPs seem to have lost confidence in the police in guaranteeing their security; 64% of the respondents gave the police a negative rating on their performance with 44% rating their performance as very poor and the other 20% saying 'not good'. 98% of respondents confirmed the presence of armed groups in their PDAs who committed violence against them. However only approximately 3% believe the groups have been disbanded, with 60% confirming they have not been disbanded and the rest did not know. Arbor (2007) observed that when perpetrators go unpunished, they are emboldened to strike again, perpetuating and encouraging vicious cycles of attack. The IDPs seem to concur. They generally remain sensitive to their security which they feel is not guaranteed, with a majority 91% expressing optimism that violence will recur in the next general election. At least 36% of respondents are willing to go back to their farms if they are provided adequate security.

The majority of IDPs (95%) are convinced that violence is bound to recur in future, given that at least 80% of the respondents have been displaced before the 2007 PEV crisis. This is a

discouraging sign that those still in the camps are intending to go back to their PDAs any time soon. Majority of the respondents attribute the violence to political reasons including political incitement, politicians sponsoring/ supporting armed criminal groups who commit act of violence (81%). At least 21% of respondents expressed willingness to go back to their PDAs if incitement by politicians was stopped.

From the aforementioned, it is concluded that political factors including the failure of the government to address human rights issues of the IDPs, and to guarantee non repetition of violations as well as involvement of political actors in causing displacements is a key factor influencing implementation of ORN project.

Tongken (2009) observed that ethnicity in Africa is still alive and strong. He further observed that, ethnicity is employed so negatively that the term is synonymous with chaos. This study has revealed evidence of the ethnic factor in influencing implementation of ORN project in Nakuru district. 14% of respondents attribute recurrence of violence over the years to tribalism. Also, a large popularity (55%) believes that conflict will recur in future due to tribalism. The key informant interviews revealed that mistrust between communities is the biggest challenge to healing and reconciliation. 25 % of respondents are willing to go back to their PDAs if tribalism is eliminated while a majority 25% ranked fighting tribalism as the most important way of preventing violence in Kenya in future. This conviction that tribalism is alive in Kenya and is to a large extent responsible for internal displacements means that the ethnic factor will remain a key hindrance to implementation of ORN project unless, urgent attention is paid to this problem.

According to findings, 54% of the IDP households are female-headed households. Enloe(2004) observed that during times of conflict, women assume positions that were unacceptable pre-conflict like assuming head of household or occupying positions that were previously the exclusive domain of men. This shift in roles and identities was found to present enormous and devastating impact on women's lives and therefore presented enormous challenges to rebuilding lives. IDMC (2008) had also observed that half of displaced women in the situations they had monitored could not receive assistance due to them as IDPs, take possession of or receive compensation for their property as they faced obstacles in obtaining documentation. According

to findings of this study, there was no evidence of discrimination against women in distribution of relief assistance. There was also no significant difference in reasons given by men and women regarding their reasons for remaining in camps. The gender factor therefore was not found to be a factor influencing the implementation of ORN project.

IDMC (2008) observed that the obstacles to durable solutions which IDPs in protracted situations most frequently faced included lack of access to livelihoods, inadequate housing and the inability to enjoy their homes and land. The findings of this study have confirmed the same: The concerns of IDPs mainly revolve around basic necessities, with a total 44% of respondents citing food and shelter as their most important concern. In addition, majority of IDPs are yet to secure sustainable means of livelihood with 85% of respondents not involved in any gainful employment. 96% of the respondents are living on less than ksh. 5000 a month. This alarming level of poverty means that the IDPs remain largely unable to re-establish their lives. The majority therefore would rather remain in the camps where they can receive some assistance from various agencies and well wishers. Principle 18 (1) of the UNGPID states that all internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living. However, the majority of these IDPs are living under deplorable conditions, lacking most basic necessities. Clearly, poverty is a main issue influencing the implementation of ORN project.

The findings also revealed that land is a major cause of friction among communities that result in internal displacement. Land was ranked the second most important concern, only out done by basic necessities of food and shelter with 35% of respondents perceiving land as their main concern. This concern was also supported by the key informants who cited landlessness as the main reason IDPs remain in camps. According to IDMC (2008), a distinct consequence of displacement is the violation of IDPs property rights protected both under international human rights and humanitarian law.

The UNGPID obligates the government to assist IDPs recover the property they left behind upon their displacement. In particular, principle 29 states, 'competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned or resettled IDPs recover to the extent possible the property and possessions which they left behind or were disposed of upon their displacement. Where recovery

of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or other form of just reparation'. About 9% of respondents claim they are unable to go back to their farms after their farms were occupied by other people following their displacement reflecting laxity on the part of the government to fulfill its responsibility of protecting the property rights of the IDPs. 58% of respondents are willing to go back to their PEV areas if land issues including distributing land to the landless and land reform are addressed while 40% of respondents believe that conflict could only end if land reforms are enacted. Clearly, issues of land ownership and access remain a threat to security and peaceful co-existence in multi-ethnic areas and therefore a main factor influencing the implementation of ORN project.

The IC/GLR protocol places responsibility on the government for assessing the needs of IDPs and maintaining a national data base. A comprehensive profile of the IDPs ensures appropriate emergency response, participation of affected people in recovery Programmes according to their needs and provides the means for monitoring and reporting on IDP populations. Reports from the field indicated that the IDP registration exercise was mismanaged. 100% of the key informants cited lack of proper registers of IDPs as the biggest challenge faced while distributing relief to IDPs. At least 58% of respondents pointed to poor records as the main problem in disbursement of IDPs start-up funds. This has led to 16 % of respondents missing out on the funds. These IDP profiles are critical for the success of any resettlement exercise. Lack of a proper profile of IDPs meant that IDPs were given a blanket kind of assistance without any consideration of their differing needs. This explains the presence of the IDPs in the relocation camp despite the fact that 84% of them have benefited from the GK start up funds for IDPs.

The main actors involved the exercise included the government, international humanitarian organizations, religious groups, individuals and IDPs. The findings exposed poor co-ordination between the various actors supporting assistance efforts at the district level, especially in communication and administration of the 'operation'. It was revealed that the Ministry of Special Programmes did not work in a concerted manner with other key ministries especially the local provincial administration which could have increased efficiency. There were also reports of

disagreements between officials of the two ministries which led to delays in disbursing funds to the IDPs. The UNGPID requires that special efforts be made to ensure the full participation of internally persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and re-integration (Principle 28). The study revealed that IDPs were not adequately involved in the resettlement programme and were not consulted on their needs. There was also an acute shortage of reliable vehicles which delayed operations. Although poor co-ordination led to delays in carrying out the exercise, the same was not found to have been a main factor influencing the implementation of ORN project.

5.3 Conclusions

Based on the findings, it is concluded that the implementation of ORN project has been influenced by a combination of political, socio-cultural, economic and logistical factors:

The needs and concerns of IDPs are diverse and complex. The government intervention through the ORN project failed to address these diverse needs. According to NAIC's strategy, the resettlement and re-integration of IDPs was meant to enhance development, alleviate suffering, ensure security and enhance enjoyment of human rights. Clearly, this desirable situation is yet to be realized for the IDPs.

For the resettlement efforts to be effective, there's need to find lasting solutions to the problem of internal displacement by addressing the root causes of these displacements. There should also be a multi- faceted approach to the problem of displacement so as to address all the factors influencing the implementation of ORN project.

The government should fulfill its duties and responsibilities to internally displaced persons as enshrined in the UNGPID and other international instruments relating to IDPs. In this regard, the government must establish conditions and provide the IDPs the means to enable them return to their farms in safety and dignity.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and suggestions made, the following recommendations are given for improving the implementation of ORN project:

There's need for the government to compile an accurate register of IDPs in view of the various causes of their inability and/or unwillingness to return to their areas. Since the IDPs have different needs, concerns and interests, the IDPs should be incorporated in making decisions that affect them and their concerns about what the government should prioritize in their resettlement process taken into account.

The government must guarantee security to IDPs who are willing to go back to their farms. In this regard, the government should put in place measures to build confidence of the IDPs in their government and particularly in the police. Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to guarantee the IDPs non repetition of the displacement.

The government should safeguard the rights of IDPs to own and access their land. In view of this, the government should assist the IDPs whose farms have been occupied by others following their displacement repossess their land. The government should also address the issue of landless IDPs so as to find lasting solutions for them.

The government should take firm action on political actors who sponsor violence and/or incite communities against each other. Perpetrators of violence should be held accountable.

The government should put in place appropriate mechanisms to promote national hood and fight tribalism.

In general, the government must fulfil its obligations to the IDPs by putting in place appropriate measures to address the problem of internal displacement as per the regional and international instruments on internal displacement of which Kenya a signatory.

5.5 Suggestions for further research

The research was carried out in Nakuru District and covered only 2007 PEV IDPs living in the camps. It is important to research the situation in other parts of the country, to assess the needs and concerns of IDPs in those areas. Such research should also target the integrated IDPs as they have been excluded from this study. Another area recommended for research is the emergence of tribal armed groups and the effect this has had on inter-tribal conflict management. There is also need to study the effectiveness of the District Peace Committees in promoting peace and reconciliation among various communities.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO THE RESPONDENT.

Dear Respondent,

I am masters student at The University of Nairobi. As part of my studies, I am conducting a research on the factors hindering the effective implementation of *operation rudi Nyumbani* project in Nakuru district. You have been identified as a respondent because I believe you have useful information for my study. All data and information collected will be treated with confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this study. Your support in this study will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Glory Kagwiria Kamungi.

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE IDPS.

Please answer the following questions:

Section A: (Profile of the respondent)

1. Gender of household head Male [] Female []
2. Employment status:
 - Employed []
 - Unemployed []
3. Income bracket
 - a) Less than 5000 []
 - b) Between ksh. 5000 and ksh. 10,000 []
 - c) Between ksh. 10,000 and 20,000 []
 - d) Over ksh. 20,000. []

Section B: (Information on factors hindering return of IDPs to their pre-displacement areas).

1. What's the main reason you have not returned to your pre-displacement area?
 - Fear of fresh attacks
 - Don't own land in the pre-displacement area
 - Waiting for resettlement funds from the government
 - Perpetrators of the violence are still free
 - My land has been occupied by other people

- Can't afford basic facilities-food, housing etc
- Any other (specify).....

2. What's your most important concern right now?

- Food
- Shelter
- Land
- Security
- Any other (Specify).....

3. Did you receive any IDP resettlement funds from the government?

- Yes
- No

i) If yes, how much?

- 10,000
- 25,000
- both

ii) Were there any problems with the disbursement of these funds?

- Yes
- No

iii) If yes, what were the problems in the disbursement of the funds?

- Delays in receiving the funds
- Names missing from the register
- Incorrect government records/
- Money paid to non- IDPs
- IDPs not involved in identifying beneficiaries

- Any other (specify).....

(iii) How do you think disbursement can be improved in the future?

- Transparency through proper records
- Avoid corrupt officials
- Identify and give money fairly to genuine IDPs
- Government to release funds promptly
- Involve IDPs
- Any other (Specify).....

4. Were there local organised armed groups who committed acts of post-election violence in your pre- displacement area?

- Yes
- No

i) If yes, have they been disbanded?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

ii) If No, why do you think they have not been disbanded?

- No government commitment
- Politicians support them
- Police officers are few
- Police are bribed
- Other (Specify).....

iii) Who do you think finances armed groups?

- Politicians
- Political parties
- Government
- Community elders

- Other (Specify).....

5. Is this the first time you were displaced from your home? Yes/No

If yes, why do you think displacement has been recurring?

6. Do you think violence is likely to occur in your pre-displacement area in the next election?

○ Yes

○ No

i) If yes, why do you think violence will occur?

○ Political incitement

○ Tribalism

○ Perpetrators of the violence are still free.

○ Land disputes

○ There is no security

○ The government does nothing about it.

○ It happens during every election

○ Other (Specify).....

ii) Who do you think is likely to commit acts of violence?

○ Politicians

○ Supporters of politicians

○ Militias

○ Members of other communities

○ Police

○ Other (Specify).....

7. What in your opinion are the most important ways to prevent violence in Kenya in future?

○ Land reform

- Fight unemployment
- Fight tribalism
- Fight poverty
- Stop incitement by politicians or / and their supporters
- Prosecute perpetrators
- Adequate security

8. Do you think prosecuting PEV perpetrators will prevent re-occurrence of conflict in the next election?

○ Yes. Give reasons

.....

○ No. Give reasons

.....

iii) If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for initiating PEV, how do you think people in your community will react?

- Support it
- Demonstrate
- Violence against their communities
- Threaten other communities
- Other (Specify).....

8) How do you rate the performance of the police in protecting the rights of Kenyans?

- Excellent
- Good
- Fair
- Not Good
- Very poor

9) List three things the government should do to address land problems in the country.

- Enact laws to assist in settling disputes
- Distribute land to landless
- Allow both men and women to inherit land
- Issue title deeds
- Communities only to own land in their ancestral homes
- Other (Specify).....

iv) What do you think the government should do to enable you go back to your pre-displacement area?

- Give land
- Give funds for resettlement
- Land reform
- Stop incitement by politicians
- Create employment
- Fight tribalism
- Fight poverty
- Provide security
- Prosecute perpetrators of violence
- Other (Specify).....

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTERS OF OPERATION RUDI NYUMBANI PROJECT.

1. Are there people displaced by the Post-election violence of 2007 still living in camps within your area?

- Yes
- No.

If yes, what is the total number of IDPs still living in the camps?

.....

2. What in your opinion is the most important reason IDPs remain in camps?

- Fear of attacks if they go home
- They lack land to go to
- IDPs are not genuine
- They are awaiting government funds

Other (Specify).....

3. What is the nature of the relationship between IDPs and other people in your area?

- They get along well
- There's tension but no fighting
- There are threats made against IDPs
- Don't know.
- Other (Specify).....

4. Have there been any peace and reconciliation efforts in your area?

- Yes
- No

i) If yes, what type of activities have been pursued to promote healing and reconciliation?

- Peace meetings
- Sports and games
- Religious crusades
- Counselling services
- Other.

ii) How do you rate them?

- Very successful
- Somewhat successful
- Not successful

iii) What's the biggest challenge to healing and reconciliation efforts in your area?

- Tribalism
- Mistrust between communities
- Land disputes
- Statements by politicians
- Perpetrators of violence are still free
- Other (Specify).....

5. Were there local organised armed groups who committed acts of post-election violence in your area?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

i) If yes, have they been disbanded?

- Yes
- No

ii) If yes, how many members of these groups have so far been arrested?
.....

iii) If no, why have they not been disbanded?

- Security officers are few
- They change tactics
- Politicians finance them
- They are not enough facilities to deal with them
- Other (Specify).....

6. How many IDPs still living in the IDP camps have benefited from the GOK resettlement funds?

- 10,000.....
- 25 000.....
- Both.....
- None

7. What other initiatives have been undertaken by the government/ your organisation to facilitate the resettlement of IDPs?

- Constructed houses. (No.).....
- Beefed up security / Put up police posts (No.).....
- Set up and operationalized peace committees (No.).....
- Bought land for the IDPs. (No.).....
- Other (Specify).....

(For each of the above please indicate number)

8. What is the biggest challenge you face while distributing assistance to the IDPs?

- Lack of proper registers of IDPs
- Poor coordination of the exercise
- Inadequate physical facilities
- Delay in release of funds
- Inadequate trained personnel
- Other (Specify).....

END.



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23rd June 2010

Our Ref: UoN/C/EES/SCDE/DEMS/NKUEMC/001/Vol 2

To Whom It May Concern:

RE: KAMUNGI GLORY KAGWIRIA – L50/70841/2009


The above named is a student of the University of Nairobi at Nakuru Extra-Mural Centre Pursuing a masters degree in Project Planning and Management.

Part of the course requirement is that students must undertake a research project during their course of study. She has now been released to undertake the same and has identified your institution for the purpose of data collection on “Factors Hindering the Effective Implementation of Operation Rudi Nyumbani Project in Nakuru District, Kenya”.

The information obtained will strictly be used for the purpose of the study.

I am for that reason writing to request that you please assist her.

Yours Faithfully,


Joseph C. Mungai
Resident Lecturer, University of Nairobi
Nakuru Extra-Mural Centre

Frequency Table

SEC_A_1 Gender of the household head

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	132	46.5	46.5	46.5
	Female	152	53.5	53.5	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

SEC_A_2 Employment Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employed	32	11.3	11.3	11.3
	Unemployed	240	84.5	84.5	95.8
	self employed	12	4.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

SEC_A_2 Employment Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employed	32	11.3	11.3	11.3
	Unemployed	240	84.5	84.5	95.8
	self employed	12	4.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

SEC_A_3 Income bracket

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than Ksh. 5000	273	96.1	96.1	96.1
	Between Ksh. 5,000 and Ksh. 10,000	9	3.2	3.2	99.3
	Between Ksh. 10,000 and Ksh. 20,000	1	.4	.4	99.6
	Over Ksh. 20,000	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Q1. What's the main reason you have not returned to your pre-displacement area?

Group \$Q1 Reason for not returning to displaced ar

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Fear of fresh attacks	1	171	38.4	60.2
Don't own land in the pre-displacement a	2	63	14.2	22.2
Waiting for resettlement funds from the	3	38	8.5	13.4
Perpetrators of the violence are still f	4	81	18.2	28.5
My land has been occupied by other peopl	5	24	5.4	8.5
Can't afford basic facilities-food, hous	6	30	6.7	10.6
Security	7	24	5.4	8.5
Recurring violence	8	3	.7	1.1
Government not serious on violence	9	1	.2	.4
Provide shelter	10	9	2.0	3.2
Incitement and hate speeches	11	1	.2	.4
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		445	100.0	156.7

0 missing cases; 284 valid cases

Group \$Q2 Most important concern right now

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Food	1	47	9.5	16.6
Shelter	2	171	34.5	60.4
Land	3	174	35.1	61.5
Security	4	68	13.7	24.0
Money	5	23	4.6	8.1
Education	6	12	2.4	4.2
Good governance	7	1	.2	.4
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		496	100.0	175.3

1 missing cases; 283 valid cases

Q3 Did you receive any IDP resettlement funds from the government?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	239	84.2	84.5	84.5
	No	44	15.5	15.5	100.0
	Total	283	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Q3I If yes, how much?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	10,000	30	10.6	12.6	12.6
	25,000	13	4.6	5.4	18.0
	Both	196	69.0	82.0	100.0
	Total	239	84.2	100.0	
Missing	System	45	15.8		
Total		284	100.0		

Q3II Were there any problems with the disbursement of these funds?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	227	79.9	87.6	87.6
	No	32	11.3	12.4	100.0
	Total	259	91.2	100.0	
Missing	System	25	8.8		
Total		284	100.0		

Q3III. If yes, what were the problems in the disbursement of the funds?

Group \$Q3III problems in disbursement of funds

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Delays in receiving the funds	1	138	31.6	60.3
Names missing from the register	2	129	29.5	56.3
Incorrect government records	3	60	13.7	26.2
Money paid to non- IDPs	4	66	15.1	28.8
IDPs not involved in identifying benefic	5	35	8.0	15.3
produce and issue ID cards and passports	6	6	1.4	2.6
Government officials	8	3	.7	1.3
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	437	100.0	190.8

55 missing cases; 229 valid cases

Q31V. How do you think disbursement can be improved in the future?

Group \$Q31V How disbursement can be improved

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Transparency through proper records	1	161	33.6	64.9
Avoid corrupt officials	2	150	31.3	60.5
Identify and give money fairly to genuin	3	60	12.5	24.2
Government to release funds promptly	4	40	8.4	16.1
Involve IDPs	5	68	14.2	27.4
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	479	100.0	193.1

36 missing cases; 248 valid cases

Q4 Were there local organised armed groups who committed acts of post-election violence in your pre-displacement area?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	277	97.5	97.9	97.9
	No	6	2.1	2.1	100.0
	Total	283	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Q4I If yes, have they been disbanded?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	8	2.8	2.9	2.9
	No	166	58.5	59.7	62.6
	Don't know	104	36.6	37.4	100.0
	Total	278	97.9	100.0	
Missing	System	6	2.1		
Total		284	100.0		

Q4II. If No, why do you think they have not been disbanded?

Group \$Q4II Reasons for not disbursing the funds

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
No government commitment	1	88	31.0	38.6
Politicians support them	2	152	53.5	66.7
Police officers are few	3	3	1.1	1.3
Police are bribed	4	2	.7	.9
Culture of certain tribes	5	4	1.4	1.8
Don't know	6	20	7.0	8.8
Government is committed	7	1	.4	.4
To be used in the next elections	8	2	.7	.9
To protect community in future	9	4	1.4	1.8
Don't know if they are disbanded	10	6	2.1	2.6
Groups thought IDPs are planning to fight	11	2	.7	.9
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		284	100.0	124.6

56 missing cases; 228 valid cases

Q4.III. Who do you think finances armed groups?

Group \$Q4III Who finances the armed groups

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Politicians	1	245	70.6	93.9
Political parties	2	58	16.7	22.2
Community elders	4	38	11.0	14.6
Business people	5	3	.9	1.1
Community members	6	3	.9	1.1
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		347	100.0	133.0

23 missing cases; 261 valid cases

Q5 Is this the first time you were displaced from your home?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	56	19.7	19.9	19.9
	No	226	79.6	80.1	100.0
	Total	282	99.3	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.7		
Total		284	100.0		

Q5B. If yes, why do you think displacement has been recurring?

Group \$Q5B Reasons for recurring displacement

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Due to tribalism	1	9	12.9	13.6
land issues	2	14	20.0	21.2
Government is doing nothing to perpetrat	3	15	21.4	22.7
Political incitement and division	4	8	11.4	12.1
Kenyans don't listen to party policies	5	1	1.4	1.5
Govt has no will to stop violence	6	14	20.0	21.2
Impunity has been allowed to continue	7	4	5.7	6.1
IDPs go back to their homes without reco	8	3	4.3	4.5
Country's leadership struggle	9	1	1.4	1.5
Groups have not been disarmed	10	1	1.4	1.5
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		70	100.0	106.1

218 missing cases; 66 valid cases

Q6 Do you think violence is likely to occur in your pre-displacement area in the next election?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	260	91.5	95.6	95.6
No	12	4.2	4.4	100.0
Total	272	95.8	100.0	
Missing System	12	4.2		
Total	284	100.0		

Q6I. If yes, why do you think violence will occur?

Group \$Q6I Why do you think violence will occur

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Political incitement	1	146	27.8	54.5
Tribalism	2	147	27.9	54.9
Perpetrators of the violence are still f	3	54	10.3	20.1
Land disputes	4	46	8.7	17.2
There is no security	5	38	7.2	14.2
The government does nothing about it	6	49	9.3	18.3
It happens during every election	7	31	5.9	11.6
Through experience	8	2	.4	.7
Communities have not been disarmed yet	9	6	1.1	2.2
Healing and reconcilliation has not been	10	5	1.0	1.9
Habitats claim land is ancestral	11	1	.2	.4
Kenyan tradition	12	1	.2	.4
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		526	100.0	196.3

16 missing cases; 268 valid cases

Q6II. Who do you think is likely to commit acts of violence?

Group \$Q6II Who is likely to commit acts of violence

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Politicians	1	103	28.5	37.6
Supporters of politicians	2	119	33.0	43.4
Militias	3	64	17.7	23.4
Members of other communities	4	54	15.0	19.7
Armed groups	6	2	.6	.7
Majority tribe in that area	7	4	1.1	1.5
Members of the community	8	2	.6	.7
Street children	9	1	.3	.4
Party supporters	10	1	.3	.4
Looters	11	11	3.0	4.0
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	361	100.0	131.8

10 missing cases; 274 valid cases

Q7. What in your opinion are the most important ways to prevent violence in Kenya in future?

Group \$Q7 Most important ways to prevent violence

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Land reform	1	112	19.0	39.9
Fight unemployment	2	23	3.9	8.2
Fight tribalism	3	144	24.5	51.2
Fight poverty	4	113	19.2	40.2
Stop incitement by politicians or / and	5	75	12.8	26.7
Prosecute perpetrators	6	69	11.7	24.6
Adequate security	7	47	8.0	16.7
Resettling the IDPs	8	2	.3	.7
Provide land to landless	9	1	.2	.4
Change contitution and implement	10	1	.2	.4
Give majority community a chance to rule	11	1	.2	.4
		-----	-----	-----
	Total responses	588	100.0	209.3

3 missing cases; 281 valid cases

Q8I Do you think prosecuting PEV perpetrators will prevent re-occurrence of conflict in the next elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	182	64.1	65.7	65.7
	No	95	33.5	34.3	100.0
	Total	277	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	7	2.5		
Total		284	100.0		

Q8I.A Reasons why prosecuting the PEV perpetrators will prevent the re-occurrence of conflict in the next election

Group \$Q8I.A Why prosecuting PEV will prevent conflic

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Community fear their leaders will be pro	1	5	2.8	2.8
People will fear to commit violence	2	124	69.3	70.1
For the future of the country	3	3	1.7	1.7
Perpetrators will be jailed thus no chan	4	15	8.4	8.5
Govt to take serious measures on perpetr	5	6	3.4	3.4
They will be disfamed after they have be	6	3	1.7	1.7
This a problem to be solved by kenyans	7	1	.6	.6
No incitement from politicians any more	8	3	1.7	1.7
Impunity will end	9	8	4.5	4.5
They would serve as examples to others	10	10	5.6	5.6
Stop eviction	11	1	.6	.6
Total responses		179	100.0	101.1

107 missing cases; 177 valid cases

Q8I.B. Reasons why prosecuting the PEV perpetrators will not prevent the re-occurrence of conflict in the next electio

Group \$Q8I.B prosecuting PEV will not prevent conflic

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
If perpetrators are not arrested will st	1	3	3.1	3.1
There is hatred within tribes	2	8	8.3	8.3
This a problem to be solved by kenyans t	3	2	2.1	2.1
Root of the problem not addressed	4	5	5.2	5.2
Kenyans don't fear laws	5	6	6.3	6.3
Some tribes have government support	6	1	1.0	1.0
Government has done nothing to perpetr	7	2	2.1	2.1
Should look at land reforms first	8	68	70.8	70.8
Government to stop incitement	9	1	1.0	1.0
Total responses		96	100.0	100.0

188 missing cases; 96 valid cases

Q8III. How people would react if senior politician from the community is put on trial for initiating PEV

Group \$Q8III People's reaction on trying politicians

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Support it	1	181	61.8	65.6
Demonstrate	2	48	16.4	17.4
Violence against their communities	3	12	4.1	4.3
Threaten other communities	4	35	11.9	12.7
Community will do nothing	5	10	3.4	3.6
Fear to follow politicians who incite th	6	4	1.4	1.4
Ask justice to be done	7	1	.3	.4
They will be surprised	8	1	.3	.4
Develop hatred to attacking communities	9	1	.3	.4
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		293	100.0	106.2

8 missing cases; 276 valid cases

Q8 Rate of the performance of police in protecting the rights of kenyans

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Excellent	9	3.2	3.2	3.2
	good	24	8.5	8.5	11.7
	fair	68	23.9	24.2	35.9
	not good	56	19.7	19.9	55.9
	very poor	124	43.7	44.1	100.0
	Total	281	98.9	100.0	
Missing	System	3	1.1		
Total		284	100.0		

Q9. what governmnet should do to address land problems in the country

Group \$Q9 Ways of addressing land problems

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
enact laws to settling disputes	1	204	29.5	73.1
distribute land to landless	2	231	33.4	82.8
allow both men and women to inherit land	3	71	10.3	25.4
issue title deeds	4	165	23.8	59.1
communities to own land in ancestral hom	5	9	1.3	3.2
Change kenyan constitution and implement	6	1	.1	.4
Government to be harsh on law breakers	7	1	.1	.4
Govt to be serious on problems in the co	8	1	.1	.4
Land reforms	9	9	1.3	3.2
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		692	100.0	248.0

5 missing cases; 279 valid cases

IV. what governmnet should do to enable respondent go back to pre-displacement area

Group \$QIV Ways of enabling IDPs to go back

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
give land	1	90	15.0	32.1
give funds for resettlemnt	2	28	4.7	10.0
land reform	3	72	12.0	25.7
stop incitement by politicians	4	61	10.1	21.8
create employment	5	23	3.8	8.2
fight tribalism	6	70	11.6	25.0
fight poverty	7	56	9.3	20.0
provide security	8	102	16.9	36.4
prosecute perpetrators of violence	9	52	8.6	18.6
Compensate IDPs	10	11	1.8	3.9
Address past violences	11	2	.3	.7
Govt has done nothing about violence	12	1	.2	.4
Providing shelter	13	18	3.0	6.4
Make use of reports given from the groun	14	1	.2	.4
Govt to be firm on laws	15	9	1.5	3.2
Nothing can be done to make me go back	16	3	.5	1.1
Disarm the groups	17	1	.2	.4
Peace and reconcilliation to be done	18	1	.2	.4
Kenya should be a one party state	19	1	.2	.4
		-----	-----	-----
		602	100.0	215.0
Total responses				

4 missing cases; 280 valid cases

Group \$Q2 Most important reason IDPs remain in cam

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Fear of attacks if they go home	1	2	22.2	33.3
They lack land to go to	2	4	44.4	66.7
IDPs are not genuine	3	3	33.3	50.0
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		9	100.0	150.0

0 missing cases; 6 valid cases

Group \$Q4I Activities to promote healing & reconcil

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Peace meetings	1	6	54.5	100.0
Sports and games	2	2	18.2	33.3
Religious crusades	3	1	9.1	16.7
Counselling services	4	2	18.2	33.3
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		11	100.0	183.3

0 missing cases; 6 valid cases

Group \$Q4III Biggest challenge to healing & reconcilli

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Mistrust between communities	2	4	50.0	66.7
Statements by politicians	4	2	25.0	33.3
Perpetrators of violence are still free	5	1	12.5	16.7
Lack of compensation by government	6	1	12.5	16.7
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		8	100.0	133.3

0 missing cases; 6 valid cases

Group \$Q5III Why they have not been disbanded

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Security officers are few	1	1	25.0	33.3
They change tactics	2	1	25.0	33.3

There are not enough facilities to deal	4	1	25.0	33.3
Government not committed to disbanding t	5	1	25.0	33.3
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		4	100.0	133.3

3 missing cases; 3 valid cases

Group \$Q8 Biggest challenge while assisting IDPs

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Lack of proper register of IDPs	1	6	46.2	100.0
Poor coordination of the exercise	2	2	15.4	33.3
Inadequate physical facilities	3	1	7.7	16.7
Delay in release of funds	4	1	7.7	16.7
Inadequate trained personnel	5	1	7.7	16.7
Inadequate stocks	6	1	7.7	16.7
People posing as IDPs while they are not	7	1	7.7	16.7
		-----	-----	-----
Total responses		13	100.0	216.7

0 missing cases; 6 valid cases