

“  
THE DIPLOMACY OF STATE RECOGNITION: A CASE OF ‘SOMALILAND’,  
1991-2010 ”

JOHN RABUOGI AHERE  
R50/75472/2009

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL  
STUDIES TO THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL  
STUDIES (IDIS), UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

OCTOBER 2011

University of NAIROBI Library



0532759 8

Bd-35924

AV

JX

4044

•A43

C.2

## DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other University.



John Rabuogi Ahere

10/11/2011

Date

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor



Dr. Ibrahim Farah

16/11/2011

Date

## **DEDICATION**

**To my mother Mrs. Clarice Martha Otieno, who toiled tirelessly and saw to it that not only did I obtain a solid foundation in education but that I also appreciated its worth.**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Many thanks go to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) for granting me the opportunity to pursue this degree. In particular I would wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Ibrahim Farah for his patience and unwavering guidance while I engaged in this study.


I would wish to extend my thanks to the MA IS class of 2011 for providing an environment that allowed incisive debates that led to the development of the idea of this study.

Most of all, I would wish to thank the respondents who agreed and took their time to participate in this study.

To my family and friends, I shall always be thankful for your patience, encouragement and moral support during the entire time that I pursued this course.

My ultimate thanks go to God for providing me with the resources, good health, perseverance and understanding that led me to working on this study.

Figure 1: Overview of post-1991 Somalia<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> P. Hoyle, 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2000), pp.80-91:81. Note should be taken that the boundary between Somalia and Ethiopia has never been demarcated or agreed on by the two countries.

## ABSTRACT

This study examines the diplomatic intrigues that take place in the international recognition of states. It seeks to contribute to the analysis of the probable dynamics that have led to some territories in the International System not to be recognised as states by other states and international entities. A specific focus was on Somaliland which has failed to obtain international recognition since May 1991 when the 'Republic of Somaliland' was proclaimed after the breakdown of the central government of the Somali Republic. This study had certain objectives. It delved into the examination of the criteria that is used for the recognition of states in the international system. It also analyses the role of intergovernmental organizations in the non-recognition of Somaliland. The objective of this study is also to make an assessment of the nature of interactions between Somaliland and other actors in the international system. The conceptual framework that was used in this research was majorly based on realism. Specific reliance was on structural realism but with some reference to the tenets of institutional liberalism. The methodology that was used in this study is the research design known as formulative research studies. Specifically survey of concerning literature was done and the researcher reviewed and built upon the work already done by others. This study came to the conclusion that from a juridical perspective, Somaliland meets the threshold for statehood. However, in the International System, politics takes precedence over law when it comes to state recognition. Another key finding is that Somaliland's failure to participate in the Somalia peace process or its lack of engagement with the semblances of governments in Somalia has served to isolate it from the international community even as it seeks international recognition. A key recommendation is that in as much as there is global interest for peace in Somalia, for the efforts of the international society to work, the efforts need to compliment the efforts of the Somalis who must be left to devise their own mechanisms of handling their own problems. Ultimately, with peace in Somalia, and with a stable government in Baidoa or Mogadishu, the question of Somaliland's independence can then be exhaustively discussed by all actors concerned.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AU</b>	<b>African Union</b>
<b>BMA</b>	<b>British Military Administration</b>
<b>CPA</b>	<b>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union</b>
<b>HoA</b>	<b>Horn of Africa</b>
<b>IGAD</b>	<b>Inter-governmental Authority on Development</b>
<b>IGO</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Organisation</b>
<b>INGO</b>	<b>International Non-governmental Organisation</b>
<b>IS</b>	<b>International System</b>
<b>KAR</b>	<b>Kings African Rifles</b>
<b>MINURSO</b>	<b>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</b>
<b>MNC</b>	<b>Multinational Corporation</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</b>
<b>NFD</b>	<b>Northern Frontier District</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-governmental Organisation</b>
<b>NK</b>	<b>Nagorno-Karabakh</b>
<b>OAU</b>	<b>Organisation for African Unity</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>
<b>RBC</b>	<b>Resource Based Conflicts</b>
<b>SNC</b>	<b>Somali National Congress</b>
<b>SNL</b>	<b>Somali National League</b>
<b>SNM</b>	<b>Somali National Movement</b>
<b>SPLA</b>	<b>Sudan People's Liberation Army</b>
<b>SPLM</b>	<b>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</b>
<b>SSDF</b>	<b>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</b>
<b>SSLM</b>	<b>South Sudanese Liberation Movement</b>
<b>SYL</b>	<b>Somali Youth League</b>
<b>TFG</b>	<b>Transitional Federal Government</b>
<b>TNA</b>	<b>Transitional National Assembly</b>
<b>TNG</b>	<b>Transitional National Government</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNEP</b>	<b>United Nations Environment Programme</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States</b>
<b>USC</b>	<b>United Somali Congress</b>
<b>USSR</b>	<b>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</b>
<b>WSLF</b>	<b>Western Somali Liberation Front</b>



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....	ii
Dedication.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Abstract.....	vi
List of abbreviations.....	vii
<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background to the study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the research problem.....	2
1.4 Objectives of the study.....	4
1.5 Literature review.....	4
1.6 Study justification.....	16
1.7 Conceptual framework.....	18
1.8 Hypotheses.....	19
1.9 Research Methodology.....	20
1.10 Chapter outline.....	20
<b>CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 'SOMALILAND'.....</b>	<b>22</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	22
2.2 Pre-colonial and colonial period.....	22
2.3 Post-colonial Somalia.....	30
2.4 Somaliland since 1991.....	42
2.5 Conclusions.....	46
<b>CHAPTER THREE: THE DIPLOMACY OF STATE RECOGNITION, A CASE OF 'SOMALILAND'.....</b>	<b>48</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	48
3.2 Secessionist cases in Africa: An overview.....	48
3.3 Somaliland's justification for recognition.....	56
3.4 Positions of regional and sub-regional institutions.....	60
3.5 Perspectives of the Somalis.....	64
3.6 Conclusions.....	70
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: 'SOMALILAND' – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>71</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	71
4.2 Somaliland in post-1991 war-torn Somalia and the peace process.....	71
4.3 Role of politics in the recognition of states.....	77
4.4 International legal perspectives.....	82
4.5 Other issues.....	86
4.6 Conclusions.....	90

<b>CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS</b> .....	91
5.1 Summary .....	91
5.2 Key findings.....	92
5.3 Recommendations.....	95
Bibliography .....	100

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Somaliland is an autonomous region located in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. Most countries in the world regard it as being part of Somalia. The contested boundaries of Somaliland are bordered by Ethiopia in the south and west, Djibouti in the northwest, the Gulf of Aden in the north, and, internally, by Puntland in the east.

Historically it has been referred to as the British Somaliland, which was a British protectorate in the northern part of present-day Somalia. The protectorate incorporated much of what now constitutes the Puntland (Maakhir) and Somaliland macro-regions of Somalia. For much of its existence, British Somaliland was bordered by French Somaliland, the Ogaden, and Italian Somaliland. From 1940 to 1941, it was occupied by the Italians and was part of Italian East Africa.<sup>2</sup> In August 1940, during the East African Campaign in World War II, the British protectorate was briefly occupied by Italy. In March 1941, British Somaliland was recaptured by British and Commonwealth forces. The final remnants of Italian guerrilla movement discontinued all resistance in British Somaliland by the summer of 1942.

The protectorate gained independence on 26 June 1960. As a referendum indicated support for unification with the Italian-administered Trust Territory of Somalia

---

<sup>2</sup> M. E. Page, and P. Sonnenburg, *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural and Political Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p.544.

(formerly Italian Somaliland), days later on 1 July 1960, the northern State of Somaliland joined with the southern trust territory to form the Somali Republic.<sup>3</sup>

In 1991, after the breakdown of the central government of the Somali Republic, parts of the area which formerly encompassed British Somaliland declared independence. In May 1991, the formation of the "Republic of Somaliland" was proclaimed, with the local government regarding it as the successor to the former British Somaliland. However, the Somaliland region's self-declared independence remains unrecognized by any country or international organization.<sup>4</sup>

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

The aforementioned background establishes that Somaliland has a somewhat defined territory with distinct population. The territory also has a system of governance that brings forth leadership through periodic elections. Somaliland also interacts in various ways with other entities and actors that are external to its territory. Basically it would seem that Somaliland is a state. However this is not the case since other states and international organisations have not formally recognised it as a state.

For a territory to be given state recognition in the IS, there are certain standards that are used by international actors and these standards are a reference point when it comes to the question of whether or not a territory is a state. The fulfilments of these standards by a territory would highly likely lead to state recognition by international actors most notably states.

---

<sup>3</sup> Federal Research Division, *Somalia a Country Study*, (Washington: Library of Congress, 2004), p. 72.

<sup>4</sup> M. Lacey, "The Signs Say Somaliland but the World Says Somalia" in *Hargeysa Journal*. Retrieved January 16th, 2010 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/africa/05somaliland.html>

Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are influential bodies that play a big role on the question of recognition of states. Such bodies are primarily composed of sovereign states and are established by treaty. When a territory seeks to be recognised as a state, IGOs normally make known their stand on the matter and such is important to the territory seeking state recognition. When an IGO expressly recognises a territory as being sovereign; then that territory is considered to be a state as far as that IGO is concerned.

The recognition of a territory as a state often happens after a struggle that is laden with many challenges. Such challenges have to be surmounted by the territory as it puts to the IS, its case for state recognition. The more successful a territory is in surmounting these challenges the more likely it will be recognised as a state in the IS. It follows that since Somaliland has sought to be recognised as a state for long there are a myriad of challenges that it continues to face.

Territories interact with each other and it is through such interactions that relations are established. Through such relations, legitimacy is derived for those territories that seek to be recognised as states by other states and international organisations. For example, if Kenya was to allow Somaliland to open an embassy in Nairobi then it would mean Kenya recognises her as a state. There are also other modes of interactions that can contribute to legitimising a territory as a state. As it seeks recognition, the more a territory engages in interactions with other actors in the IS, especially states, the more likely it is to be recognised as a state.

Against this background, this study will seek to contribute to the understanding of the diplomatic intrigues behind recognition of new states. The main question is: why does Somaliland still remain unrecognised in the IS?

## **1.4 Objectives of the study**

The study aims to analyse the diplomacy of state recognition with the specific objectives being to:

- i. Examine the criteria that are used for recognition of states in the international system.
- ii. Analyse the role of intergovernmental organisations in the non-recognition of Somaliland.
- iii. Assess the nature of interactions between Somaliland and other actors in the international system.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

### **Introduction**

The literature that was reviewed was that which analysed the probable reasons why some territories remain unrecognised as a state in the IS. A specific focus was on Somaliland. The literature also included those that explain some of the criteria used in the IS to recognise territories as states. When examining such criteria, note was made of the examples of territories that have fulfilled such criteria and whether or not they were recognised as states. The researcher was also interested in literature that relates to Somaliland's interactions in the IS as well as the how IGOs have influenced its non-recognition status in comparison to other states or territories. The aforementioned literature was obtained from books, journals, newspapers, credible websites, and speeches among other sources that can stand the test of credibility.

## Criteria for recognition of states in the IS

Malanczuk and Akehurst postulate that when a new state comes into existence, other states are confronted with the problem of deciding whether or not to recognise the new state.<sup>5</sup> They add that recognition means willingness to deal with the new state as a new member of the international community. The rise of a new state means that the IS does not stay the same. The *status quo* is revised and each time states and other international actors want to transact on a global issue then a provision is made of the new state's reaction to global issues; the fact that such reaction could be ignored notwithstanding.

Brunnée et al identify two theories that have been advanced for recognition: the constitutive theory and the declaratory or evidentiary theory.<sup>6</sup> They assert that the constitutive theory postulates that recognition has a constitutive effect to the extent that it is through the act of recognition that international personality is conferred. In essence, states are only established as subjects of international law by the will of the international community through recognition. According to Brunnée et al, the declaratory or evidentiary theory adopts an opposing approach and is more inclined to reality in so far as state practise is concerned. The theory propounds that statehood does exist prior to recognition. That recognition is only a formal acceptance of an already existing situation. Thus, it is the factual situation that produces the legal constitution of the entities and recognition does not have to be awaited for this purpose.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> P. Malanczuk, and M. B., Akehurst, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.80-85:83.

<sup>6</sup> J. Brunnée, et al, *International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted in Canada*, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publication, 2006), pp.19-23:20.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Brunnée, p.20.

Erades and Instituut delved into the legal dynamics of recognition of a state by other states.<sup>8</sup> The act of recognition is a precondition of the existence of legal rights: full international personality as a subject of international law derives from the decision of other states to recognise statehood. To this has been coupled the view that there is a legal duty on states to accord recognition where the criteria for statehood under international law are satisfied.

Kaplan has discussed the principles that guided the recognition of states by the United States (US) during the time of Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State.<sup>9</sup> These principles involved effective governance, discharge of national obligations, and general acceptance by the people. These requirements were comfortable for a nation that won its independence through revolution.

Bringing in an interesting aspect of premature recognition of states, Shaw says that there is often a difficult and unclear dividing line between the acceptable recognition of a new state, particularly one that is emerging as a result of secession, and intervention in the domestic affairs of another state by way of premature or precipitate recognition.<sup>10</sup> For each individual case, “the state seeking to recognise will need to consider carefully the factual situation and the degree to which the criteria of statehood...have been fulfilled. It is therefore a process founded upon a perception of fact.”<sup>11</sup> Croatia for example was recognised as a state by the European Community member states on 15<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> L. Erades, and Instituut, T. M. C. A., *Essays on International & Comparative Law in Honor of Judge Erades*, (The Hague: Brill Archive, 1983), pp.235-238:237.

<sup>9</sup> L. S. Kaplan, *Entangling Alliances With None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson*, (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987), p.33.

<sup>10</sup> M. N. Shaw, *International Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.383.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.383.



January 1992. Its recognition was premature to the extent that at the time and for much longer after that it didn't effectively control one third of its territory.

Evans posits that recognition of statehood has also been based on the willingness of the territory seeking state recognition to respect the rights of its population.<sup>12</sup> For example, the long-denied recognition of an independent Southern Rhodesia was based, at least in part, upon the regime's denial of majority representation and South Africa's apartheid policy was denied recognition in the Bantustan and Namibia. More recently, the guidelines formulated by the European Community (EC) for the recognition of new states formed out of the break-up of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Yugoslavia made recognition dependent upon a commitment to the rule of law, democracy and a guarantee of minority rights.<sup>13</sup>

Cross pointed toward the possibility that international law had been violated in the manner in which some states were recognised in the Balkans.<sup>14</sup> Under German pressure, a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the European Union member countries was held in Brussels on 17 December 1991, which passed a Declaration on the Criteria of Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and also a Declaration on Yugoslavia. They stated that the European Union (EU) was prepared to extend recognition to the Yugoslav republics and confirmed their support for the obligations stated in the document on the criteria of recognition of new states. Cross' analysis is that from the viewpoint of international law, the EU declarations represented a

---

<sup>12</sup> T. Evans, *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p.107.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p.107.

<sup>14</sup> S. Cross, *Global Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p.197.

gross violation of the 1975 Helsinki Act stipulating respect for the territorial integrity of each state signatory.<sup>15</sup> The declarations in question withdrew Yugoslavia (and also partially the USSR) from the sphere of the international jurisdiction of the Act. Further, the EU countries assumed the functions for which no one had authorised them, wilfully misappropriating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN decision-making prerogatives concerning the destiny of a sovereign and independent state.

There have been efforts in the IS to bring the recognition of states under some legal framework. The classic statement of the elements of statehood under international law can be found in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. As Bederman notes, "...article I of this treaty declared 'the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states'...this remains the customary international law standard of statehood."<sup>16</sup> Bederman adds that "...the political reality is that entities that can effectively act like states are treated as states. With breakaway or separatist entities...when the new entities achieve some measure of independence and are safely and permanently established, recognition should follow. This occurred for the revolutionary government in the United States, the former Spanish colonies in Latin America, and so forth in the history of the past two centuries."<sup>17</sup>

The Estrada Doctrine brought an interesting dimension. As Jessup observes, the Mexican government made an announcement that it would no longer give any expression

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp.197-198.

<sup>16</sup> D. J. Bederman, *The Spirit of International Law*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p.82.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.83.

regarding the recognition of new governments which come to power by *coups d'état* or revolution. This policy therefore recognises states rather than governments.<sup>18</sup>

Scattered around the world are a number of states and statelets that have declared independence but are not recognized by other states. These political entities are what Kolstø referred to by various names: 'de facto states', 'unrecognized states', 'para-states', 'pseudostates', and 'quasi-states'.<sup>19</sup> This denial of recognition is not based on any assessment of their internal sovereignty, which may or may not be deficient. The reason, instead, is that the would-be state has seceded from a recognized state that does not accept this loss of territory. Such secessionist states can be said to lack external sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> Examples include Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), Transnistria, also known as Trans-Dniester or Transdnistria; Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Taiwan and Chechen republic of Ichkeria. Others are Kosovo, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Tamil Eelam.

Since decolonisation, Africa has had at least four quasi-states one (Eritrea) of which has achieved international recognition whereas South Sudan only recently gained independence from Sudan after an internationally observed plebiscite. From 1960-1963 Katanga sought to secede from Congo whereas Biafra (1967-1970) wanted to be independent from Nigeria. Both were unsuccessful in their quests. Kolstø notes that when the Spanish colonial power withdrew from West Sahara in 1976, the Polisario liberation

---

<sup>18</sup> P. C. Jessup, 'The Estrada Doctrine', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25, NO. 4, (1931), pp.719-723:720.

<sup>19</sup> P. Kolstø, 'The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized and Quasi-states', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 6, (2006), pp.723-740: 723.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.724.

movement established the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, but controls today less than one-third of the territory of West Sahara. The rest is under the control of Morocco.<sup>21</sup>

### **The role of intergovernmental organisations in the recognition of states**

Before any further steps are taken, it would be apt to understand what IGOs are. Peters contends that finding an all-embracing, clear and unambiguous definition for IGO remains to be formulated. He alludes to the Union of International Associations' definition of an IGO as being based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation states; including three or more nation states as parties to the agreement and possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks.<sup>22</sup>

According to the Public Inquiries Unit located in the Department of Public Information of the UN, "the recognition of a new State or Government is an act that only States and Governments may grant or withhold. The United Nations is neither and, therefore, does not possess any authority to recognize a State or a Government."<sup>23</sup> Rothwell et al argue on their part that if a UN Member State votes in favour of the admission of a new member, that vote will necessarily imply recognition of the applicant as a state.<sup>24</sup> That having been said, they caution that not all states in the IS may be a member of the UN. Switzerland, a European State with a long standing interest in international affairs and which hosts a number of UN bodies in Geneva, refrained from becoming a member of the UN until 2002.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p.726.

<sup>22</sup> B. A. Peters, *Managing Diversity in Intergovernmental Organisations*, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), p.26.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Department of Public Information, *Can a new State or Government be recognized by the UN?*, Retrieved March 14th, 2011 from <http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/memberstate.pdf>.

<sup>24</sup> D. Rothwell, et al, *International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives*, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.240.

Verma postulates that an international institution can provide a medium through which collective recognition by states can be granted to a territory seeking state recognition.<sup>25</sup> The Berlin Conference of 1878 granted recognition to Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro. In the UN membership case, the International Court of Justice clearly stated that admission of a new entity to the UN is merely an acknowledgement by the organisation that the new member is a state. In essence, it clearly rejected the inference that admission to the UN amounts to recognition. The recognition therefore, Verma adds, is an evidence of statehood of the new entity as a State in the sense that the UN purposes to treat the new entity as a State for its purposes.<sup>26</sup>

Milton-Edwards affirms that economic assistance for less developed economies in the latter half of the twentieth century, from international lenders and financial institutions as the World Bank and the IMF, has often been tied to statehood, and statelessness has made it all the more difficult to obtain the important benefits associated with such international legitimacy and recognition<sup>27</sup>

Warbrick promulgates that NATO has been used as a podium from which the recognition of statehood has been influenced.<sup>28</sup> This can be seen in the statement by the NATO Heads of State and Government on 7<sup>th</sup> – 8<sup>th</sup> November 1991 when they said that they would not recognise any changes of borders, external or internal, brought about by the use of force. Weitz points out NATO's influence in state recognition going by its

---

<sup>25</sup> S. K. Verma, *An Introduction to Public International Law*, (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 2004), p.98.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.98.

<sup>27</sup> B. Milton-Edwards, *Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World*, (Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd., 2004), p.34.

<sup>28</sup> C. Warbrick, 'Recognition of States', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (1992), pp.473-482:476.

condemnation of Moscow's recognition of the formal independence of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>29</sup> Indeed after the war, NATO leaders visited Georgia to reaffirm their support for the government's pro-Western policies.

Kamanu provides some insight about the African context. He notes that the struggle for African independence was waged under the banner of the right of self-determination. African states as well as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) gave financial and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.<sup>30</sup> The paradox he notes is that the same African states and the OAU denounced Biafra's attempted withdrawal from Nigeria and similar struggles in Southern Sudan, Chad and Eritrea, without reference to the possible merits their peoples' claims to the right to self-determination.

Pavković identifies the fact that the contending norms of self-determination and non-interference brought the OAU to a standstill in the 1980s, when the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco became the most contentious issue ever to confront the organisation.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, he affirms that Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 (and until recently South Sudan) is the only such case in Africa that has succeeded. The OAU treated the case of Eritrea as an exception and did not alter its stance on territorial boundaries in general. It should be noted that it was only after Ethiopia recognised

---

<sup>29</sup> R. Weitz, *Global Security Watch-Russia: A Reference Handbook*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010), p.154.

<sup>30</sup> O. S. Kamanu, 'Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U Dilemma', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1974), pp.355-376:355.

<sup>31</sup> K. Sturman, 'New Norms, Old Boundaries: The African Union's Approach to Secession and State Sovereignty', in A. Pavković & P. Radan (ed), *On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008), pp.67-84:75.

Eritrea's independence that the OAU followed suit.<sup>32</sup> Mazrui speculated that recognition of Eritrea would pave way for Somaliland and other disputed territories to resolve their claims.<sup>33</sup>

Dehéz argues that given that Somaliland is also seeking independence and is far more advanced in its consolidation of statehood it will prove to be problematic to offer international recognition to Southern Sudan and not to Somaliland, especially keeping in mind that Somaliland had been a single British protectorate in the colonial period and its case is hence a quest for the restoration of colonial borders, something that cannot be said about Southern Sudan.<sup>34</sup>

#### **Somaliland's quest for recognition and interactions with other actors**

Despite the many challenges, Somaliland has been making some progress in her quest for international recognition. Minahan notes that in November 1997 the government of neighbouring Djibouti reportedly officially recognised Somaliland.<sup>35</sup> The Isaaks of Somaliland then opened their first diplomatic mission abroad, in Djibouti's capital. In 1998, Egal (the president of Somaliland) toured Ethiopia, France, and Italy, reinforcing the trend toward "semi-diplomatic" recognition, which would allow the country access to bilateral and multilateral financial assistance. Minahan adds that Eritrea and Ethiopia exchanged ambassadors with Somaliland and the UN agreed to give Somaliland observer

---

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp.67-84:75.

<sup>33</sup> A. A. Mazrui, 'The Bondage of Boundaries', *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1994), pp.60-63:60.

<sup>34</sup> D. Dehéz, 'Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict', in B. Gebrewold-Tochalo (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007), pp.21-36:30.

<sup>35</sup> J. Minahan, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World*, Volume 4 S-Z, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), p.809.

status.<sup>36</sup> Be that as it may, in February 2006 the Ethiopian foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin said that despite its trade relations with Somaliland, it does not support her (Somaliland's) sovereignty. Mesfin however said that Somaliland deserves to be rewarded for creating peace out of anarchy, but that no one should confuse Ethiopia's trade links there as recognition of Somaliland's bid for recognition.<sup>37</sup>

Woodward contends that in Somaliland itself, the UN is seen as hostile to its independence, a position which is viewed critically in the light of the latter's acceptance of Eritrea, though there is growing informal recognition, especially by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).<sup>38</sup> Schlee supposes that the international recognition of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia continues to prevent official recognition of Somaliland, which in 2005 held a peaceful parliamentary election and progresses steadily in providing order and justice in a democratic framework.<sup>39</sup>

According to Human Rights Watch, Western Nations have in the meantime largely insisted that the AU must take the lead on the recognition issue one way or the other.<sup>40</sup> As it stands, many AU states are reluctant to sanction what some see as a precedent that could embolden secessionist movements across the continent. Gebrewold and Gebrewold-Tochalo hold that the non-recognition of Somaliland by global powers has more global systemic aspects. They surmise that global players such as Russia and

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.810.

<sup>37</sup> Icon Group International, *Ethiopia: Webster's Quotations, Facts and Phrases*, (San Diego: ICON Group International, Inc., 2008), p.120.

<sup>38</sup> P. Woodward, *Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations*, (London: British Academic Press, 1996), p.86.

<sup>39</sup> G. Schlee, *How Enemies are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), p.165.

<sup>40</sup> Human Rights Watch, & C. Albin-Lackey, *"Hostages to Peace": Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), p.51.



China have got their own separatists. They further note that whereas the West supported the independence of Kosovo, Russia was against it, not only because Kosovo became independent from its closest ally, Serbia, but the issue of Chechnya is still there.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, the non-recognition of Somaliland has to be seen in the global context.

Kaplan affirms that Somaliland can make a strong case for recognition on a wide variety of grounds: legal, historical, political and practical. Its legal and historical case rests on its separate status during the colonial period and its existence, albeit brief, as an independent country in 1960.<sup>42</sup> Except for a short period during World War II, Somaliland was a British territory for over seven decades, unconnected to the rest of what became Somalia. It had clearly demarcated borders that were recognised by the international community – and that could easily be used today. During the five days in 1960 that Somaliland existed as an independent country, it gained the recognition of thirty-five states and indeed signed a number of bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom, and received a congratulatory message from the U.S. Secretary of State. The Somaliland authorities argue today that they are dissolving an unsuccessful marriage rather than seeking secession, and that their case is therefore analogous to the breakup of Senégambia (Senegal and Gambia) and the United Arab Republic (Syria and Egypt). They also draw parallels with Eritrea. In May 2001 a constitutional referendum was held. Kaplan explains that this was actually a referendum on independence and ninety-seven percent of those who voted approved the document in a ballot deemed to have been

---

<sup>41</sup> B. Gebrewold, & B. Gebrewold-Tochalo, *Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009), p.43.

<sup>42</sup> S. D. Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008), p.125.

“...conducted fairly, freely, and openly...and in accordance with internationally accepted standards.”<sup>43</sup>

### **Literature gap**

Having reviewed what other writers have propounded in areas that are similar or related to this study, the researcher came to the conclusion that the various writers seemed to agree that for a territory to become a state that is recognised in the IS, there are certain criteria that it must fulfil. The researcher also came to the conclusion that the recognition comes faster if one or more of the major powers in the IS expresses recognition. Most importantly, the literature reviewed pointed to the fact that in recognition of a territory's statehood, a state normally assesses the consequences of such action to its national interests.

There were, however, certain gaps in the literature reviewed. The reasons which prompted the government and peoples of Somaliland to decide to secede are inadequately addressed. Another area that had some gaps pertained to the interests that various actors in the IS have with respect to Somaliland and how their recognition of Somaliland will impact on those interests. It is these gaps that this study aimed at contributing to filling.

### **1.6 Justification of the study**

This research seeks to contribute to the intellectual understanding of the diplomacy that takes place in order for a territory to be recognised as a state by other states. The study provides an analysis of the criteria that a territory must fulfil before it is recognised as a state by other state and actors in the IS. The study also analyses the role of IGOs in the

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.125.

recognition of territories seeking statehood in the IS. Students and researchers examining the foreign interactions of Somaliland will find an additional reference point in the form of this research, which they will find useful in their studies as it will focus on why territories like Somaliland still remain unrecognised as states in the IS in spite of their autonomy. The aforementioned analyses are backed up by in-depth historical overview of Somaliland which will be useful to a researcher or student attempting to obtain background information on Somaliland.

This research makes attempts to fill the vacuum provided by the situation where some states have gained recognition in the IS after fulfilment of some criteria while others like Somaliland have found it difficult to gain recognition. There is need for more analysis on why a state might fulfil some criteria for statehood and yet remain unrecognised in the IS. The focus on Somaliland in this research provides this opportunity. This research is potentially important to diplomats<sup>44</sup> who are currently or might in the future find themselves handling policy decisions on the prospects and implications of territories like Somaliland gaining state recognition in the IS. If or when that recognition comes to reality, it is highly likely that the diplomat with adequate context analysis and background information of a territory's (like Somaliland) quest for recognition will be well equipped to function effectively.

IGOs and influential International NGOs (INGOs) conduct their some of their activities in territories like Somaliland which continue to seek state recognition in the IS. These organisations prepare policy briefs, strategy documents among other communiqués

---

<sup>44</sup> These also includes policy makers in respective foreign affairs ministries of respective governments.

which serve as formidable advocacy documents. As Somaliland continues to lobby for recognition, IGOs and INGOs need to proactively prepare for and understand the dynamics that are at play in this process. IGOs, being an element of this study, and INGOs, which work closely with IGOs, will find this study useful in understanding how their policies influence the process of recognising a new state.

## **1.7 Conceptual framework**

The conceptual framework that was used in this research was mainly based on the theory of realism. Realism is a school of thought in international relations that gives priority to national interest and security as opposed to ideals, social reconstruction and ethics. Ofuho observes that realism views the relations between sovereign states in terms of 'a balance of power', in which states pursue their individual national interests in an anarchic international system.<sup>45</sup> In this research, the national interests of states were looked into vis-à-vis recognising other territories as states.

This research was also guided by the tenets of structural realism to the extent of the IS as a structure is seen acting on the state. Wagner observes that the claim that propositions about the behaviour of states can be deduced from properties of the state system is the most basic idea in structural realism or neorealism.<sup>46</sup> In this case, the IS appears to be defining the requirements which the territory of Somaliland must fulfil in order to be granted state recognition.

---

<sup>45</sup> C. H. Ofuho, 'Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa,' in M. Mwangi (ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*, (Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004), p.8.

<sup>46</sup> R. H. Wagner, *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2007), p.17.

Institutional liberalism as a theory was most definitely applicable in this research to the extent of analysing the role of IGOs in the non-recognition of Somaliland. Institutional liberalism is a modern theory of international relations. Jackson and Sørensen summarise institutional liberalism by affirming that “...international institutions help promote cooperation between states and thereby help alleviate the lack of trust between states and states’ fear of each other which are considered to be the traditional problems associated with international anarchy...”<sup>47</sup> Jackson and Sørensen add that institutions provide a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate, enhance the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments-hence their ability to make credible commitments; and strengthen prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements.<sup>48</sup>

Realism and institutionalism are not competing theories in this research but rather complimentary because they analyse the activities of states in the IS.

## **1.8 Hypotheses**

This research was based on the following hypotheses:

- a) When a territory fulfils certain set standards for statehood, other actors in the international system are more likely to recognise the territory as a state.
- b) Intergovernmental organisations influence the recognition of territories as states in the international system.

---

<sup>47</sup> R. H. Jackson, & G. Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.110.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p.111.

- c) The more a territory as an entity interacts with other actors in the international system, the more likely it is to be recognised as a state.

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

This study used the research design in case of exploratory research studies otherwise also known as formulative research studies. Specifically, the method used was the survey of concerning literature. This research used non-probability sampling; specifically purposive sampling.

This research mostly relied on secondary sources of data. Where possible, the researcher also endeavoured to use primary data in the form of interviews with experts in the field of this research. Specifically, this research shall use the case study method and interviews.

This research had a focus on Somaliland. The researcher was not able to visit Somaliland in order to collect data. This is due to the high costs of transportation as well as living costs and also against the backdrop of the researcher being limited as far as pecuniary resources are concerned. The researcher de-limited this by making attempts to conduct telephone interviews with his contacts already in Somaliland as well as extensively reviewing available material on the research topic.

## **1.10 Chapter Outline**

### **Chapter One: Introduction**

This introduces the topic of this research by delving into the background of the problem, stating the problem, identifying the objectives and reviewing of literature. Thereafter

there is a justification of the research problem, hypotheses, methodology and the scope of the study.

### **Chapter Two: Historical Overview of Somaliland**

This is laden with an analysis of Somaliland's history and the background to its quest for statehood.

### **Chapter Three: Somaliland's Case for Recognition**

This focuses on the justification that Somaliland has put forward even as it tries to convince other states and actors in the IS to recognise it as a state. It also reviews that justification against international developments in so far as state recognition is concerned as well as arguments that oppose that quest for recognition.

### **Chapter Four: Critique of Key Issues**

This is dedicated to analysis of the key issues that emerged from the examination and analysis done in chapter three.

### **Chapter Five: Conclusions**

This provides the conclusions of this study as well as giving recommendations. Suggestions on areas that need further study will also be made in this chapter.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 'SOMALILAND'

#### 2.1 Introduction

In chapter one, a brief background of the study was delved into and this gave a pointer to the research problem which was raised. The study seeks to analyse the diplomacy that is involved in the recognition of states in the IS. It was ascertained that Somaliland has all the qualities of a state in the current day and age but it has failed in its attempts to obtain international recognition. This state of affairs attracts pertinent questions that this study will seek to contribute in answering.

This chapter aims to provide an in-depth overview of the history of Somalia and by extension Somaliland. This will help in providing an understanding of the journey that Somalia has taken in the course of time up until Somaliland began to seek international recognition. The historical overview will be classified into three viz. pre-colonial and colonial period; the post-colonial era, and the period after secession from Somalia.

#### 2.2 Pre-colonial and colonial period

Because of its clan system, it would be a *faux pas* to try to understand the history of Somaliland without going into that of Somalia or that of the Somali as a people. Mohamoud provides an important analysis of the Somali people. He suggests that the social structure of the Somali pastoral nomads has some key characteristics. First, the Somalis are highly egalitarian because of the absence of exploitation and domination in their power relations. Second, the Somali society is stateless, lacking centralised



institutions and formalised authority. Third, the primary social networks of the Somali people are regulated by a web of lineage segmentation, which provides the fundamental basis for identity formation.<sup>49</sup> Accordingly, it must be the persistence of this primordial kinship segmentation that prevented Somali society from developing a single political unit during pre-colonial period. Mohamoud's analysis is that in the contemporary post-colonial era, the tenacity of this lineage segmentation is what perpetuates social divisiveness and political fragmentation among the Somali population.<sup>50</sup>

Kieh argues that European colonialists formalised the incorporation of Somali societies into the global capitalist system and completed the process of the commodification of social relations by shifting from clan-based to class-based interests.<sup>51</sup> Under the new relations of production, the upper class consisted of the colonial agents, the middle stratum consisted of Somali compradors and the lowest tier comprised the subaltern classes consisting primarily of pastoralists and farmers. Characteristically, the colonial state was used as a vehicle for legitimising and maintaining the mode of production and its associated relations of production and system of unequal exchange and lopsided power arrangements.<sup>52</sup>

Fitzgerald affirms that Somalia is steeped in thousands of years of history and that the ancient Egyptians spoke of it as "God's Land" (the land of Punt).<sup>53</sup> Chinese merchants

---

<sup>49</sup> A. A. Mohamoud, *State Collapse and Post-conflict Development in Africa: the Case of Somalia*, (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006), p.38.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p.38

<sup>51</sup> G. K. Kieh, 'The Somali Civil War', in G. K. Kieh, & I. R. Mukenge, (ed), *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*, (London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), pp.123-138:125.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p.125.

<sup>53</sup> N. J. Fitzgerald, *Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002), p.30.

frequented the Somali coast in the tenth and fourteenth centuries and, according to tradition, returned home with giraffes, leopards, and tortoises to add colour and variety to imperial menagerie. According to Fitzgerald, Greek merchant ships and medieval Arab dhows plied the Somali coast. The Arabs referred to the Somalis, along with the related peoples, as the Berberi.<sup>54</sup>

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased European involvement and interests in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, by the eighteenth century, the Somalis essentially had developed their present way of life, which is based on pastoral nomadism and the Islamic faith. As colonialists divided up the Somalis, Ethiopia emerged as the master of the hinterland, especially after defeating Italy in the 1896 battle of Adowa and thereafter assuming control of the Ogaden region.<sup>55</sup> From 1897 and during the colonial period, the Somalis were separated into five mini-Somalilands: British Somaliland (north central), French Somaliland (east and southeast); Italian Somaliland (south); Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden); and what came to be called the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.<sup>56</sup>

Easton observes that in the 1880's Britain, France, and Italy were disputing their spheres of influence in Africa with one another, and with the then Abyssinia. Easton adds that in the circumstances then prevailing, it was necessary for the Somalis who lived in the Horn of Africa to obtain some protection. The Somali chiefs of the protectorate sought British protection and signed treaties with Great Britain, who Easton affirms that

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>55</sup> A. McKenna, *The History of Central and Eastern Africa*, (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2011), p.159.

<sup>56</sup> N. J. Fitzgerald, *Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography*, op cit, p.30.

for a long time administered the territory through Aden which was itself a dependency of the government of India.<sup>57</sup>

As Page notes, European colonialism first arrived in Somalia in 1887 when the British, attempting to safeguard their trade interests in the Indian Ocean, proclaimed the British Somaliland Protectorate.<sup>58</sup> Juang however offers different dates. He posits that in 1884, the first British political agent was appointed to the country and that the British protectorate called British Somaliland was established in 1885 but was initially governed from India.<sup>59</sup> Shortly thereafter in 1889, the Italians established their own protectorates over the Obbia and Mijertein sultanates and continued expanding southward toward the Juba River such that by 1892, Italy had laid claim to all of Somalia outside of British Somaliland. Even though both the British and the Italians made efforts between 1892 and 1899 to consolidate their control over their spheres of influence, it is the Italians who managed to institute any semblance of formal administration.<sup>60</sup> In 1899 there arose formidable resistance movements which challenged the British and the Italians. One notable rebellion was led by Muhammad Abdullah Hassan (also known to the British as 'Mad Mullah'), a religious leader from the north who attracted a huge following among like-minded Somali.

---

<sup>57</sup> S. C. Easton, *The Twilight of European Colonialism: A Political Analysis*, (London: Bradford and Dickens, 1961), p.288.

<sup>58</sup> M. E. Page, *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003), p.544.

<sup>59</sup> R. M. Juang & N. Morrisette, *Africa and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2008), p.1016.

<sup>60</sup> M. E. Page, *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, op cit, p.544.

Juang indicates that the revolt was gradually put down by the British use of the Camel Corps led by Richard Corfield.<sup>61</sup> It would be interesting to understand the events that led to the overcoming of 'Mad Mullah.' The latter had a band of about 3,000 dervishes whose attacks made the British to deploy to Berbera, the Central Africa Rifles, 2d Battalion, which included 16 British officers, 1 British warrant officer, 30 Sikh, and 862 African troops.<sup>62</sup> This was to prevent 'Mad Mullah' from crossing into British Somaliland from his base in eastern Ethiopia. Between 1900 and 1904, the British launched four unsuccessful campaigns against 'Mad Mullah.' After 1904 'Mad Mullah' moved to Italian Somaliland and by the time he returned to British Somaliland in 1909, the colonial administration had reinforced the 6<sup>th</sup> Kings African Rifles (KAR) with Indian battalion. This however failed to beat 'Mad Mullah' in 1910 resulting in the withdrawal of the British to the coast and disbanding the 6<sup>th</sup> KAR and the standing militia<sup>63</sup>. For the next two years, British administrators in Somaliland argued for a more assertive policy. This led to the June 1912 approval by the British government for the formation of the 150-man Camel Corps, which operated within an eighty-kilometre radius of Berbera. This was to counter 'Mad Mullah's' hit-and-run tactics. There were also 320 Aden troops and 200 Indians from a disbanded contingent of the 6<sup>th</sup> KAR to support the Camel Corps which was later to be reorganised into the Somaliland Camel Corps. In 1920 a combined British land and air offensive – which included the Somaliland Camel Corps, Somaliland Police and elements from the 2d and the 6<sup>th</sup> KAR and an Indian battalion – finally

---

<sup>61</sup> R. M. Juang & N. Morrisette, *Africa and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, op cit, p.1016.

<sup>62</sup> Federal Research Division, *Somalia a Country Study*, (Washington: Library of Congress, 1993), p.230.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.230.

defeated 'Mad Mullah's' army. Despite this defeat, many Somalis continued to hail 'Mad Mullah' as a warrior hero and the source of modern Somali nationalism.<sup>64</sup>

Stokes' analysis is that before 'Mad Mullah' came into the scene; Britain took little interest in its Somaliland protectorate, instead regarding it as a supply point for its Aden colony.<sup>65</sup> He adds that Britain invested very little in infrastructure during the two decades it tried to suppress 'Mad Mullah' whereas the Italians in Southern Somalia made considerable investments as they sought to establish an agriculturally productive colony over the same period. It is this imbalance that would later lead to the dominance of the south in the post-independence period and can be seen as one of the causes of the later Somali civil war.<sup>66</sup> Lulat agrees with this notion going by the fact that in British Somaliland of the post-World War II era, there was practically no higher education comparable to that being developed by the Italians, other than a teacher training institute and one or two vocational schools. Lulat concludes that the principal determinant of this parsimony in education provision appears to have been the decision by the British to govern British Somaliland as cheaply as possible.<sup>67</sup> In fact, Dumper and Stanley argue that British Somaliland was a poor excuse for a colony and should have been abandoned. They add that Winston Churchill made this point when he visited Berbera in 1907 where, as undersecretary of state, he recommended that the protectorate be abandoned, since it

---

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p.232.

<sup>65</sup> J. Stokes, *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, Volume 1*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, Inc., 2009), p.640.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p.640.

<sup>67</sup> Y. G-M. Lulat, *A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present: A Critical Synthesis*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), p.366.

was unproductive, inhospitable, the people were hostile to the occupation, and that the governor's residence "was unfit for a decent English dog."<sup>68</sup>

British Somaliland was a very small part of a far larger empire, and it attracted minimal attention or investment. Roberts and Oliver affirm that most of the population (350,000 in the mid-1930's) were herdsmen, though by 1920 some clans of the *Ise* and *Gadabursi* had adopted plough cultivation from *Sufi* communities at Hargeisa. They add that the imposition of peace from 1920 enabled both human and animal populations to recover, and many herdsmen migrated to Ethiopia in order to escape interference by the British.<sup>69</sup> In 1921 there was the introduction of direct taxation and this met such resistance in the camel corps and among officially backed clan elders that troops had to be called in from Kenya and Nyasaland.<sup>70</sup>

According to the Europa World Year Book, during the World War II British Somaliland was conquered temporarily by Italian troops, but in 1941 it was recaptured by a British counter-offensive, which also forced the Italians to withdraw from Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.<sup>71</sup> A British military administration was then established in British and Italian Somaliland. Under the provisions of the post-war treaty of February 1947, Italy renounced all rights to Italian Somaliland. In December 1950 however, the

---

<sup>68</sup> M. Dumper & B.E. Stanley, *Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007), p.92.

<sup>69</sup> A. D. Roberts, & R.A. Oliver, *The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.727.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p.727.

<sup>71</sup> Europa Publications, *The Europa World Year Book 2004*, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), p.3822.

pre-war colony became the UN Trust Territory of Somalia with Italy returning as the administering power for a ten-year transitional period prior to independence.<sup>72</sup>

Contini posits that until 1957, the Governor in British Somaliland exercised full executive and legislative powers, and the only participation of the local inhabitants in the administration of the Territory on the national level was through an Advisory Council of appointed members representing all sections of the Somali community.<sup>73</sup> In 1957, as a result of increased demands for self-government, a Legislative Council was established, consisting of eight official and *ex officio* (British) and six unofficial (Somali) members.<sup>74</sup> The latter were appointed by the Governor from a panel of candidates prepared by the Advisory Council. In March 1959, for the first time the unofficial members were elected rather than appointed and their numbers were increased to thirteen and that of the official and *ex officio* members to seventeen.<sup>75</sup>

Rao notes that a nationalist party in the British Somaliland desired merger with the Italian Somaliland<sup>76</sup> and in the ensuing election aftermath the British agreed for the union of the two Somalilands to form Somalia.<sup>77</sup> Prior to this, Seddon and Seddon-Daines point out that the Trust Territory's first general election held in March 1959 saw the Somali Youth League (SYL) win 83 out of 90 seats in the Legislative Assembly.<sup>78</sup> McEwan and Sutcliffe affirm having opposed Pan-Somali tendencies, the British

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.3822.

<sup>73</sup> P. Contini, *The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration*, (London: Frank Cass, 1969), p.5.

<sup>74</sup> The Legislative Council had been established by the Somaliland (Constitutional) Order in Council, 1955, which was made on February 10, 1955 but came into force more than two years later, on April 15, 1957.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>76</sup> The Italian Somaliland became independent on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960.

<sup>77</sup> B. V. Rao, *World History from Early Times to AD 2000*, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 2007), p.359.

<sup>78</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p.475.

surprised everyone, including the Somalis, by timing British Somaliland's independence to coincide with that of Somalia.<sup>79</sup> A movement in French Somaliland in favour of accession to Somalia had been circumvented two years earlier when that territory's assembly voted in favour of remaining a French Overseas Territory. Hatch posits that after the passage of the *loi cadre*, elections were held in French Somaliland and they were won by Mahmoud Habri, who was unable to secure more than a quarter of the votes for his proposed rejection of membership of the Community.<sup>80</sup> Shortly afterwards, Habri fled to Cairo and was deposed by the French, who organised new elections in which the Assembly was returned which voted for continuing status as an Overseas Territory. The latter was eventually to become Djibouti. When the independent Somali Republic was declared in June 1960, the president of the southern Legislative Assembly was proclaimed Head of State and the two legislatures merged to form a single National Assembly.<sup>81</sup>

### 2.3 Post-colonial Somalia

On 26<sup>th</sup> June 1960 the Somali National League (SNL), the majority party headed by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal led British Somaliland to independence. But the resulting State of Somaliland was short-lived as on 1<sup>st</sup> July, four days later, it combined with Somalia on the same day the Italian-administered UN Trust Territory gained its independence. Abdullahi contends that Somaliland was hence referred to in the British newspapers as

---

<sup>79</sup> P. J. M. McEwan, & R. B. Sutcliffe, *The Study of Africa*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1965), p.223.

<sup>80</sup> J. Hatch, *A History of Post-War Africa*, (Worcester: André Deutsch Ltd., 1965), p.350.

<sup>81</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p.475.



“the colony that rejected freedom.”<sup>82</sup> Despite an initial period of political stability, inter-clan tensions threatened the coalition government under the SYL. Seddon and Seddon-Daines allude to the fact that at the Lancaster House conference on Kenya in 1962, a request by the Somalis for a plebiscite in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and its union with Somalia was denied.<sup>83</sup>

Schraeder contends that one of the most remarkable aspects of Somalia’s heady nationalist experience was the degree of agreement and clarity among nationalist elites concerning the nature and ultimate justice of their pan-Somali nationalist agenda. Simply put, Schraeder adds, the elites of the new Republic of Somalia were in agreement as to who theoretically formed the Somali nation (all ethnic Somalis) and which territories theoretically formed part of a larger, natural, pan-Somali nation-state (all neighbouring, Somali-inhabited territories).<sup>84</sup> Schraeder further postulates that in reality, a true, populist-based Somali nationalism was never born due to the fact that Somali elites, “...regardless of whether democratically elected or illegally taking power through a military coup..., ultimately employed the rhetoric of nation-building and Somali irredentism to guarantee their hold over power – not to promote a pan-Somali nationalism truly capable of overcoming clan-based differences.”<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> M. D. Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2001), p.26.

<sup>83</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p. 475.

<sup>84</sup> P. J. Schraeder, ‘From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali,’ in L.W. Barrington (ed), *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp.107-140:116.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Bariagaber notes that the union of British Somaliland and the Trust Territory in the south is rare in the annals of the decolonisation process because of its voluntary nature and was a manifestation of Somali solidarity, which colonialism failed to erase.<sup>86</sup>

Abdullahi argues that the amalgamation of the north and the south was the result of a nationalist fever in the north; the southerners were not much interested in a union especially since the southern leadership were afraid to lose their prominence.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, when the northerners flew to Mogadishu, the southern capital, they were housed in a hotel as the southerners deliberated alone for a day about what their conditions would be for the union with the north. Finally they summoned the northerners in the middle of the night and presented them with a set of options stating that “the president is one, and it is going to be ours; the prime minister is one, and it is going to be ours; the capital is one, and it is going to be ours; the currency is one, and it is going to be ours; the flag is one, and it is going to be ours.”<sup>88</sup> The southerners thought they had raised the stakes so unpalatably that the northerners would not be able to swallow their conditions but knowing the nationalist fervour in the north, the northerners duly accepted the southern proposition. It is no wonder, Abdullahi notes, that despite the union, the new country was functioning in all reality as two countries under one flag: there were two administrative systems, two monetary systems, two customs and taxation systems, two official languages and two educational systems.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> A. Bariagaber, *Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), p.30.

<sup>87</sup> M. D. Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*, op cit, p.26.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p.27.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p.28.

Abdullahi's position is one shared by von Bogdandy et al. The latter contend that although unified in one single state, the former British part and the former Italian Trust Territory were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate countries given that Italy and the United Kingdom had left them with separate administrative, legal and educational systems where different procedures were used and different languages spoken by the elites.<sup>90</sup> The orientation of their elites was divergent because of their different backgrounds to the extent that economic contact between the two regions was virtually nonexistent. Northern political, administrative and commercial elites were reluctant to accept that they had to orient themselves towards Mogadishu.<sup>91</sup>

Hironaka postulates that although the Somali people were delighted to be united, integration created serious challenges and inequities in the new state. Neither colony had been prepared economically or politically for independence.<sup>92</sup> The northern British half of Somalia had been less economically developed than the southern Italian half. On the political front, nearly all of the work on the preparation of the constitution had been completed by Italian Somalia before Britain decided to allow the independence of its half of Somalia. Thus the northern British half of Somalia had little say in the new political structure and resented the dominance of the southern Italian half in setting the political agenda.

Abdullahi confirms this through how, just before the union, the police officers of the south, themselves products of the semi-illiterate colonial force, gave themselves (with

---

<sup>90</sup> von Bogdandy, et al, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), p.521.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p.521.

<sup>92</sup> A. Hironaka, *Never Ending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), p.65.

the full knowledge of their political bosses) generous promotions in rank with the express aim of outranking the northerners. In the north, the British had a territorial army of about 2,000 men whose junior officers were graduates of distinguished British military academies such as Sandhurst and Mons. These young officers now fell under the command of the old *carabinieri* (police) officers such as Siad Barre.<sup>93</sup>

Later on in 1962 there was discussion of an East African federation, which would embrace not only Somalia and the British East African territories, but also Ethiopia. Kenya was however adamant that it would retain the NFD. In 1963 hostilities erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia – the Somalis did not accept the 1897 treaty by which Britain ceded part of British Somaliland to Ethiopia, and the fact that the border between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was not established. Fighting continued until 1967 when mediations resulted in restoration of diplomatic relations in 1968.<sup>94</sup> Thackrah affirms that by rejecting the 1897 Treaty, Somalia proceeded to break off relations with Britain in 1965.<sup>95</sup>

On the home front, the democratically elected President Aadan Abdallah Usmaan and Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke oversaw the creation of a clan-based elite compact that ensured proportional representation for individual clans. Schraeder notes that the regime's first cabinet included four Daaroods (two Dulbahantes, one Majeerteen and one Mareehaan), two Isaaqs (one Habar Awal and one Habar Yoonis), three Hawiyes

---

<sup>93</sup> M. D. Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*, op cit, p.28.

<sup>94</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p.475.

<sup>95</sup> J. R. Thackrah, *The Routledge Companion to Military Conflict Since 1945*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.228.

(one Habar Gidir and two Abgaals), and three Digil and Rahanwayn.<sup>96</sup> In so doing, perhaps the Usmaan/Shermaarke administration was presumably attempting to prevent clan suspicions and competition from subsuming the energies of the new administration by making the equitable distribution of political spoils the bedrock of all future initiatives.

Contini suggests that among the many achievements of the new administration were the drafting and adoption of a new constitution, the formulation of a new judicial system that blended important components of the British and Italian (not to mention Sharia) legal traditions, and the merging of the northern and southern civil services and security forces.<sup>97</sup> Be that as it may, Hastedt observes that the early years of independence witnessed the emergence of a number of conflicts; one pitted the north (formerly British Somaliland) against the south (formerly Italian Somaliland).<sup>98</sup> A second dispute centred on priorities. Modernists sought to undertake a program of economic and social development. Others wanted to create a Greater Somalia along the lines that Schraeder already alluded to earlier in this chapter.<sup>99</sup> Doornbos and Markakis propound that the root causes of the imminent disintegration of Somalia is the ruling class made up of the intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie who exploited clannishness to promote their own interests.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> P. J. Schraeder, 'From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali,' in L.W. Barrington (ed), *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, op cit, p.117.

<sup>97</sup> P. Contini, *The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration*, op cit, p.23.

<sup>98</sup> G. P. Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004), p.442.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p.442.

<sup>100</sup> M. Doornbos & J. Markakis, 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?', in M. A. R. M. Salih & L. Wohlgemuth (ed), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia*:

In May 1962, Egal, the man who took the north into the union despite his personal misgivings, allied himself with some southern opposition leaders in a new political formation, the Somali National Congress (SNC). When the first national post-independence elections were held in 1964, the SNC coalition of northerners and southerners did not win the election (it got 22 seats) but it narrowed the SYL seats to 54 out of 123. Egal later joined SYL and was instrumental in getting Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke elected as the second president of the Republic by corralling the northern deputies against the incumbent Aadan Abdallah Usmaan, the man who had presented the five conditions of the union to the northerners. As a result, Egal, now in the SYL, was invited by President Shermaarke to form the next government. The presidency had thus its first northern premier.<sup>101</sup> Gradually, the integration of the two regions improved and northerners felt less alienated in the union for three reasons: the crossed political alliances such as the SNC or Egal's entry into the SYL inner circle, the increasing use of English in the south as a result of the internationalisation of that language; and the increased commerce between north and south and investment in the south by northern business people who built the highest buildings in Mogadishu.<sup>102</sup>

Mubarak elucidates that soon after the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964, the Somali government's preoccupation with security increased, in terms of both

---

*Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*, (Uppsala, Reprocentralen HSC, 1994), pp.12-18:13.

<sup>101</sup> M. D. Abdullahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia*, op cit, p.28.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.

human and financial resources.<sup>103</sup> The Soviet Union agreed to provide Somalia with military assistance – to build a 5,000 strong army which later expanded to 17,000 troops. Recurrent spending on defence was around 35% to 38% of the government budget.<sup>104</sup> To confront the threat of Pan-Somalism, the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments agreed to mutual defence agreement in 1964 in the event of war.<sup>105</sup> Premier Egal, seeing the economic stagnation and the political stalemate over the issue of pan-Somalism, tried to ease the tensions by diplomatic means. In 1967, he initiated an understanding with President Kenyatta of Kenya that Somalia intended to solve the issue over NFD through peaceful means. He attempted a similar approach with Ethiopia. But Ethiopia was a traditional enemy of Somalia since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and the move made many Somalis furious, including the army. Mubarak argues that Premier Egal's reconciliation effort toward Ethiopia was one of the principal factors that provoked the military officers to stage a coup in October 1969.<sup>106</sup>

Seddon and Seddon-Daines point out that following the unsuccessful war with Ethiopia, and a presidential assassination, the army under General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in October 1969 and began ruling Somalia as a "scientific socialist" state.<sup>107</sup> Mubarak declares that the military regime started reorganising all economic activities

---

<sup>103</sup> J. A. Mubarak, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p.10.

<sup>104</sup> D. D. Laitin, 'The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, (1976), pp.449-468.

<sup>105</sup> D. K. Orwa, 'Change & Continuity in Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi', in W.O. Oyugi, (ed), *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), pp.297-330:305.

<sup>106</sup> J. A. Mubarak, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*, op cit, p.11.

<sup>107</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, op cit, p.475.

along socialist lines.<sup>108</sup> It announced that the objective of its development policy was to create a society based on justice, equality and development. It also aimed to create an atmosphere for greater self reliance. The regime sought these goals through nationalisation of major private enterprises (foreign and national), banks, insurance companies, and wholesale businesses.<sup>109</sup>

Nolan observes that when Barre took over, he opened port facilities to the Soviet Union.<sup>110</sup> In 1974 an even more radical group took over power in Ethiopia and the Soviets shifted to support this new client state to the west in the war with ethnic Somali guerrillas fighting for secession of the Ogaden region. This led to the Ethiopia-Somalia war in 1977 whose result was the annihilation of Somalia by largely Cuban troops who intervened on the side of Ethiopia.<sup>111</sup> In reaction to the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship, probably with Saudi Arabian and Sudanese encouragement, President Barre was left with no recourse but to abrogate, in November 1977, its 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. He ordered all his Soviet bloc advisers (estimated at 6,000) as well as Cubans to leave the country.<sup>112</sup> Though he did not cut diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he moved to the right and asked the US for aid. The resultant co-operation led to Washington providing aid to Barre and in return the US took over the Soviet-built naval facilities at Berbera in the north.

---

<sup>108</sup> J. A. Mubarak, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*, op cit, p.13.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>110</sup> C. J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: S-Z*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), p.1548.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1548.

<sup>112</sup> R. Lapidoth-Eschelbacher, *International Straits of the World: The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden*, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p.88.



Lapidoth-Eschelbacher claims that thereafter, relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan were strengthened and that with Iran were developed. She adds that some rapprochement with the West was detected in the granting of permission to West German soldiers to free a hijacked Lufthansa plane in Mogadishu in October 1977.<sup>113</sup> President Carter promised Somalia defensive arms in April 1977 but Washington reneged on this pledge when Somalia encouraged and supported the opening of hostilities in Ogaden. The 1978 defeat in Ogaden and the breakdown of the Somali-Soviet relationship led to an unsuccessful coup against President Barre in April 1978.

Colletta and Cullen suggest that soon after shifting alliances from East to West, the Barre regime concurrently sought the support of some clans and targeted certain other clans for collective punishment, striking out against the Majeerteen clan of the north-east (some of whose members were implicated in the unsuccessful military coup of 1978).<sup>114</sup> A scorched-earth campaign targeting both people and their means of livelihood was begun in this area.

Throughout the 1980s border skirmishes continued with Ethiopia, producing a mass of refugees and contributing to endemic famine and disease. A peace agreement was reached in 1988, propelled mainly by the exhaustion of both countries.

Seddon and Seddon-Daines note that during the 1970s Barre established a regime that became increasingly militaristic and dictatorial such that by the early 1980s opposition groups had begun to form in the north-west and in north-eastern regions. One such group in north-west Somalia (formerly British Somaliland), the Somali National

---

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p.88.

<sup>114</sup> N. J. Colletta, & M. L. Cullen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia*, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), p.59.

Movement (SNM), launched an unsuccessful offensive in 1988 against the forces of Siad Barre based in the north-west. Barre's forces countered with great violence, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and almost total destruction of Hargeisa (the region's capital).<sup>115</sup> The city was obliterated. Indeed, by October 1990 other rebel groups were in active opposition to the Barre regime, including the United Somali Congress (USC), whose military wing was led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed. With the Cold War imperatives no longer at stake in 1990, US aid was cut and the base at Berbera was closed.<sup>116</sup> In 1991 the USC gained control of Mogadishu and this resulted in Barre fleeing to his south-western homeland before later on taking refuge in Nigeria in 1992. The ensuing power vacuum triggered an intense struggle between the self-appointed President, Ali Mahdi, and General Aideed resulting into a full-blown civil war over Mogadishu.

The demise of pan-Somali solidarity, Lewis declares, was signalled in April 1988 when President Barre and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam finally signed a peace accord, normalising their relations and undertaking to stop supporting each other's dissidents.<sup>117</sup> With this, President Barre withdrew support from the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) – which was by then opposed by an anti-Barre organisation, the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Mengistu for his part withdrew support to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), to which he had previously assigned Ethiopian equipment and troops, and similarly stopped backing the SNM. It is the knowledge of this

---

<sup>115</sup> D. Seddon, & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p.475.

<sup>116</sup> C. J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: S-Z*, op cit, p.1548.

<sup>117</sup> I. M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: a Guide to Cultural History and Social Institutions*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p.71.

détente, and fear of its consequences that triggered the SNM's audacious onslaught on military installations in northern Somalia, which quickly led to the already alluded to all-out civil war in 1988 between the regime and northern Somalia's Isaaq clansmen.<sup>118</sup> Adam notes that it is during this time that male Ogadeni refugees in northern Somalia, who had long been subject to illegal conscription into President Barre's armed forces, were forced to join a paramilitary militia to fight the SNM and to man checkpoints on the roads. Thus, those who had been earlier received as refugee guests in northern Somalia had supplanted their Isaaqi hosts, and in this bitterly ironic turn of fate, had become refugees in the Ogaden.<sup>119</sup>

Lewis makes an incisive clan analysis around the civil war. He says that if the Ogadenis were once the tail that wagged the dog, drawing Somalia into their fight for liberation from Ethiopian rule, the situation in 1989-90 was very different in that those still in the Ogaden were to all intents and purposes deserted by President Barre, while those inside Somalia were co-opted into fighting to maintain the regime.<sup>120</sup> Here the appeal, also addressed to the disunited Majeerteen, was for Daarood solidarity against Isaaq. Thus other northern Daarood clans were armed by the regime and urged to join the fight. Other northern groups (such as the Esa and the Gadabursi) who were neither Isaaq nor Daarood were also armed and exhorted to turn against the Isaaq. The regime's appeal for Daarood solidarity evoked a corresponding attempt by the Isaaq to invoke a wider-

---

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p.71.

<sup>119</sup> H. M. Adam, 'Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?' in I.W. Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp.69-90:74.

<sup>120</sup> I. M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: a Guide to Cultural History and Social Institutions*, op cit, p.72.

based, higher level 'Irrir' solidarity to include the important Hawiye clans in whose territory Mogadishu is located.<sup>121</sup> At the end of it all, President Barre's family and clansmen sought to exploit to the full segmentary lineage rivalry within the Somali nation. Be that as it may, the SNM effectively overcame President Barre's forces in the north and by end of January 1991, was consolidating its position throughout the region while many Ogadeni refugees had returned to Ethiopia.

Colletta and Cullen surmise that the state-sponsored violence and the systematic destruction of social capital during President Barre's military dictatorship not only planted the seeds of disintegration of the state but also nurtured intergroup enmities. They concur that no social glue was left to hold the nation together once the formal structures collapsed and that the disintegration of the state resulted in a different kind of violence – decentralised, clan-based and driven by the desire to settle old scores or the struggle over resources.<sup>122</sup> The earlier experience during the military campaign against Hargeisa and other cities, when many members of the armed forces engaged in looting at considerable gain and without being held accountable, may have demonstrated the potential benefits and low risks of looting.

#### **2.4 Somalia since 1991**

With the collapse of Barre's regime in 1991, Woodward portends, the SNM declared the independence of the new state of Somaliland headed by President Abdel Rahman Ali

---

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p.74.

<sup>122</sup> N. J. Colletta, & M. L. Cullen, *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia*, op cit, p.60.

Tour.<sup>123</sup> The claim for independence was based in part on the argument that since Somaliland has been a separate territory until Somalia's independence in 1960, and had subsequently been treated badly by central government, it should have the right to secede. Abokor et al affirm that the leaders of the SNM and northern Somali clans meeting at the 'Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples' in Burao bowed to public pressure and revoked the 1960 Act of Union, which had joined British Somaliland and erstwhile Italian Somaliland into the Somali Republic.<sup>124</sup> Leaders of the former territory of British Somaliland pointed to the international recognition of Eritrea's right of self determination in 1991 nearly forty years after it had joined with Ethiopia: an argument that was all the stronger when Eritrea did indeed vote overwhelmingly for independence two years later.

The territory of Somaliland lies between the 08°00' - 11°30' parallel north of the equator and between 42°30' - 49°00' meridian east of Greenwich. The 'Somaliland region' is bordered by Djibouti to the west, Ethiopia to the south, and the Puntland region of Somalia to the east. Somaliland has a 460 miles (740 km) coastline with the majority lying along the Gulf of Aden. According to Kariye, the region has an area of 137 600 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>125</sup>

Forrest alludes to the determination of the SNM leadership to pursue an inclusivistic strategy which was made especially clear at an SNM congress that was held in Burao in May 1991 where Somaliland's independence was announced. He writes that

---

<sup>123</sup> P. Woodward, *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p.135.

<sup>124</sup> A. Y. Abokor, et al, *Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, September 2005*, (London: Progressio, 2006), p.2004.

<sup>125</sup> B. Kariye, *The Kaleidoscopic Lover: The Civil War in the Horn of Africa & My Itinerary for a Peaceful Lover*, (Indiana: Authorhouse, 2010), p.121.

by that point the central committee was made up of representatives of all eight Isaaq sub-clans – the Toljaclo, Ayub, Arab, Habar Awal, Habar Yunis, Idagale, Muse and Habar Jeclo (including Sanbul and Imran lineages) – as well as the Daarood-Dulbahante, Dir-Gadabursi and Daarood-Warsangeli clans.<sup>126</sup>

Albin-Lackey portends that a May 2001 popular referendum overwhelmingly approved a provisional constitution that reaffirmed Somaliland's independence and that indeed, in the eighteen years since declaring its independence, Somaliland's government has been focused on two things above all else – winning international recognition and maintaining fragile peace.<sup>127</sup>

That Somaliland has failed to secure the crucial international recognition of its contested status as a sovereign state is a fact. Doyle points out that an OAU mission that visited Somaliland in 2006 raised the hope of recognition of Somaliland but the favourable report of that mission was not followed through on by the OAU's governing heads of states who "refused to recognise Somaliland's independence citing the maxim that there would be chaos if colonial boundaries were not observed."<sup>128</sup> Be that as it may, Menelik observes that Somaliland maintains excellent relations with Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Middle East.<sup>129</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup> J. B. Forrest, *Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances and Politics*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), p.143.

<sup>127</sup> C. Albin-Lackey, *"Hostages to Peace": Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), p.10.

<sup>128</sup> D. H. Doyle, *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements*, (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p.350.

<sup>129</sup> G. Y. I. Menelik, *The Emergence and Impacts of Islamic Radicalists*, (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2009), p.38.

Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio observe that shortly after Somaliland's declaration of independence, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the leader of Somaliland, had not ruled out the possibility of a reunification but which Egal said could never be imposed on the Somaliland region and that Somalia and Somaliland must interact as equals.<sup>130</sup> It is worth noting that compared with the rest of Somalia, the territory of Somaliland has enjoyed relative peace and its government includes a bicameral parliament with elders exercising a traditional role under the 1997 constitution. In fact von Bogdandy et al, writing soon after Somaliland obtained its independence, say that "Somalia currently has no recognised central government authority, no national currency, or anything that one associates with an established nation state."<sup>131</sup>

Weller and Nobbs posit that since its declaration of independence, Somaliland has consistently boycotted the factional reconciliation efforts organised by the international community for Somalia. The international community has, in turn, shunned the breakaway republic, refusing to recognise it.<sup>132</sup> Page postulates that within Somalia, Somaliland represents the strongest local economy and has undergone something of a boom since it declared independence.<sup>133</sup> In a situation of relative peace and without the tyranny of the central Somalian state, the autonomous region has undergone a modest transformation with infrastructural improvements and an emergent business elite. However without international recognition, Somaliland cannot access funds from the

---

<sup>130</sup> E. Doxtader & C. Villa-Vicencio, *Through Fire With Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa*, (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2003), p.161.

<sup>131</sup> von Bogdandy, et al, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, op cit, p.518.

<sup>132</sup> M. Weller & K. Nobbs, *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p.285.

<sup>133</sup> K. Page, *Middle East Review*, (London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2004), p.188.

IMF or World Bank let alone develop trade relations. The May 2001 referendum, which voted in favour of full independence from Somalia, could pave the way towards full statehood.<sup>134</sup>

## **2.5 Conclusions**

This chapter has traced the history of Somalia (and by extension the territory of erstwhile British Somaliland) and its people since the pre-colonial period up to the time that Somaliland seceded and declared independence. It went ahead and provided a synopsis of the local and international repercussions of its declaration of independence. Basically, it is clear that the Somali as a people are homogenous as far as language is concerned. However they are heterogeneous in so far as clans are concerned. A useful characteristic that has been pointed out is the fact that the Somali as a people have throughout their history never had a system of governance that has been centralised to all of them. Colonialism therefore distorted their clan-specific autonomous systems. Colonialism also introduced to the Somalis different boundaries, culture as well as politics. In as much as they were one people, they became divided by up to five international boundaries under different imperial powers. At the end of colonialism, it is British Somaliland and the Trust Territory under Italy that united to form Somalia. This union was plagued with many challenges; key among them the marginalisation of former British Somaliland people to the extent that they began to have fervour of self-determination. The collapse of the Siad Barre military dictatorship in 1991 provided the window of opportunity for

---

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p.189.



Somaliland to extricate itself from the union its people had been uncomfortable with for decades.

**CHAPTER THREE**  
**THE DIPLOMACY OF STATE RECOGNITION, A CASE OF**  
**‘SOMALILAND’**

**3.1 Introduction**

In chapter two, this study traced the history of Somaliland and its people since the pre-colonial period up to the time that Somaliland seceded and declared independence. The chapter also provided an inkling of the local and international repercussions of Somaliland's declaration of independence. An issue that cut across the entire chapter is the fact that colonialism made a divide between the northern and southern parts of Somalia. This division seemed to have prevailed throughout the entire period that the union of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland lasted.

The aim of this chapter is to examine some secessionist cases in Africa while at the same time analysing Somaliland's justification for recognition. This chapter will also look into the positions of regional and sub-regional institutions as well as the perspectives of Somalis from northern and southern Somalia. Ultimately a baseline for potential ways forward will be established and these shall be based on in-depth analysis of the issues identified in the entire chapter.

**3.2 Secessionist cases in Africa: an overview**

Since decolonisation, there have been territories in Africa that have sought self-determination. This study shall examine some of these cases in order to provide an opportunity to draw a parallel or linkage to the case of Somaliland. These territories include: Western Sahara in Morocco, Ogaden Reserve Area and the Haud in Ethiopia; Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in the former Zaire, Eritrea and South Sudan.

### 3.2.1 Western Sahara

Fischer and McDonald estimate that the territory of Western Sahara has an area of about 280,000 square kilometres and approximately 250,000 inhabitants known as Sahrawis.<sup>135</sup> It is situated in the north-west of the African continent, where the Sahara Desert meets the Atlantic Ocean, and has a coastline of more than 1,000 kilometres. In the north, Western Sahara has a common border of 443 kilometres with Morocco, and in the south and west it shares a 1,561 kilometre border with Mauritania. It also has a short common border of 42 kilometres with Algeria.<sup>136</sup>

Ham et al contend that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Spain claimed Western Sahara and renamed it Rio de Oro (River of Gold).<sup>137</sup> When the region was abandoned by Spain in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania both raised claims to it but the latter withdrew her claim in 1979. When Morocco invaded and occupied the entire territory, a guerrilla war ensued between the Moroccan Armed Forces and Polisario-led Sahrawi fighters. Fischer and McDonald affirm that in 1980 the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and invited Morocco to participate in the search for a viable solution to the problem.<sup>138</sup> During the 18<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the King of Morocco accepted the idea of a referendum in Western Sahara. In April 1991, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).<sup>139</sup> The referendum was scheduled to take place in

---

<sup>135</sup> H. Fischer & A. McDonald, *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005), p.375.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p.375.

<sup>137</sup> A. Ham, *Africa*, (London: Lonely Planet, 2010), p.168.

<sup>138</sup> A/RES/35/19, 11 November 1980: Question of Western Sahara.

<sup>139</sup> Security Council Resolution 690 of 29<sup>th</sup> April 1991.

January 1992 but never materialised over the question of who has the right to participate in the vote on self-determination. MINURSO is still deployed in Western Sahara and the UN Special Representative is still trying to find an accommodation on the contentious issues.

### **3.2.2 Ogaden Reserve Area and the Haud**

The Haud is a strip of prime grazing land along the Ethiopia-Somaliland border. Shinn et al argue that the Haud together with the Ogaden region in Ethiopia has been central to Somalia's post-independence irredentist claims against Ethiopia.<sup>140</sup> The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 delimited the frontier between British Somaliland and Ethiopia. The Haud was the most important area, from a Somali perspective, to come under Ethiopian administration as a result of the treaty. The grazing grounds to the northwest of the Haud and adjacent to the boundary of British Somaliland and French Somaliland became known as the Reserved Areas. Jacqz observes that in 1942 Britain retained the administration of the Ogaden, recognising that the "area was a distinct entity separate from Ethiopia."<sup>141</sup>

On 24<sup>th</sup> July 1948 Britain and Ethiopia concluded a protocol where Britain agreed to evacuate the greater part of the Ogaden that was restored to Ethiopian jurisdiction but preserved the British Military Administration (BMA) in the Haud and Reserved Areas. The final act in the alienation of Somali territory took place in 1954 when the Reserved Areas was handed over to Ethiopia by the British. Continued disagreement between

---

<sup>140</sup> D. H. Shinn, et al, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, (Maryland: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2004), p.201.

<sup>141</sup> J. W. Jacqz, *Africa Policy Update: Conference Report, 1977 African-American Conference*, (Washington, D.C.: Transaction Publishers, 1978), p.8.

Ethiopia and Somalia over the aforementioned areas led to the Ogaden War in 1964 and 1977 among other numerous clashes.<sup>142</sup>

Jacqz notes that since the founding of the OAU Somalia had consistently filed reservations concerning the provisions of the OAU Charter that refer to the inviolability of the boundaries between African states as they were left by the colonial powers, maintaining that the boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia has never been defined and that it results from colonial domination by Ethiopia.<sup>143</sup> In 1974 the OAU appointed a mediation committee composed of eight heads of state. This committee tried several times to work out a solution but failed.

### 3.2.3 Biafra

Juang confirms that the Republic of Biafra came into existence on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1967, having been proclaimed by General Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, then military governor of Nigeria's South Eastern Region and this followed an edict of the Eastern Region Constituent Assembly.<sup>144</sup> Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria's second military head of state refused to recognise the sovereignty of Biafra even though it had obtained varying recognitions from France, Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Israel, Portugal, South Africa and Tanzania.<sup>145</sup>

DeRounen and Heo suggest that Nigeria's oil reserves are concentrated in Biafra and that had the secession been successful, these resources would have been primarily in the hands of the new republic.<sup>146</sup> Gordon posits that in response to General Ojukwu's

---

<sup>142</sup> D. H. Shinn, et al, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, op cit, p.201.

<sup>143</sup> J. W. Jacqz, *Africa Policy Update: Conference Report, 1977 African-American Conference*, op cit, p.9.

<sup>144</sup> R. M. Juang & N. Morrissette, *Africa and the Americas: Culture, Politics and History*, op cit, p.161.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p.162.

<sup>146</sup> K. R. DeRouen & U. Heo, *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007), p.571.

proclamation, the Nigerian government initiated a civil war that lasted till 15<sup>th</sup> January 1970 with the defeat of Biafra. He adds that the causes of the civil war were complex and its effects on Nigeria have been profound and long-lasting.<sup>147</sup>

Falola and Heaton propound that the OAU refused to recognise Biafra and treated the war as an internal Nigerian conflict even as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) chose to sit on the fence, preferring to withhold support for either side until it was evident who was going to win.<sup>148</sup> Adiele claims that Africans cheered, praising Biafra as the first African nation based on self-determination rather than a legacy of colonial boundaries, the first nation where Africans were completely independent, both politically and psychologically.<sup>149</sup>

#### **3.2.4 Katanga**

According to Nzongola-Ntalaja, Moise Tshombe made a declaration on 11<sup>th</sup> July 1960 to the effect that Katanga had seceded from the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville).<sup>150</sup> On the previous day, having lost control of the situation in the Congo, Belgium had intervened militarily ostensibly to protect European lives and property. Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that the sequence of events on the two dates was not a pure coincidence. A true indication of the true intentions of the Belgians was revealed when the latter disarmed all

---

<sup>147</sup> A. A. Gordon, *Nigeria's Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2003), p.125.

<sup>148</sup> T. Falola & M. M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.178.

<sup>149</sup> F. Adiele, 'Locating Biafra: The Words We Wouldn't Say', in B. W. Thompson & S. Tyagi, (ed), *Names We Call Home: Autobiography on Racial Identity*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.75-86:79.

<sup>150</sup> G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, (London: Zed Books, 2002), p.99.

non-Katangese soldiers and expelled them from the province, while retaining those who were native to the province for service in the Katanga Gendarmerie.<sup>151</sup>

Ironically, Falola and Oyebade note, within six months Katanga had to grapple with a secessionist attempt when Baluba of its northern region declared their own independence.<sup>152</sup> Katanga was, in fact, unable to wholly control the Baluba throughout its existence as an independent state.

Kamalu declares that the secession of Katanga was illegal as Patrice Lumumba was the head of a democratically elected government.<sup>153</sup> When Lumumba pleaded with the UN to send troops to prevent the secession, the latter did so but did not immediately counter the secession as expected. The UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld appeared to do all in his power to support Belgian and America policy in the region, interpreting international law in a way that suited the consolidation of the Katanga secession.<sup>154</sup>

Tshombe's resistance to UN pressures to end secession, and the state's use of military power to bring this about, made the Katangan secession a devastating brutal civil war. In the end, however, the state of Katanga proved to be short lived. UN military operations in December 1962 led to the capture of its capital Élisabethville (later renamed Lubumbashi). Falola and Oyebade note that the secessionist regime collapsed on 15<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p.99.

<sup>152</sup> T. Falola & A. O. Oyebade, *Hot Spot: Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2010), p.19.

<sup>153</sup> C. Kamalu, *The Little African History Book – Black Africa from the Origins of Humanity to the Assassination of Lumumba and the Turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, (London: Orisa Press, 2007), p.119.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p.119.

January 1963 when Tshombe surrendered, and the region was subsequently reintegrated back into the Congolese state.<sup>155</sup>

### 3.2.5 Eritrea

Doyle confirms that in May 1991, Eritrea proclaimed its independence after a plebiscite was held whose result showed that Eritreans favoured secession from Ethiopia.<sup>156</sup> In 1992, the UN validated the result of the plebiscite as a means of punishing Ethiopia for its former alliance with the Communist Bloc. The formal declaration of Eritrea's independence was signed in 1993.<sup>157</sup>

Feyter confirms that Eritrea had been a separate Italian colony from 1890 whereas Ethiopia was colonised by Italy in 1936.<sup>158</sup> As a consequence of World War II, the coloniser lost both territories. After prolonged negotiations, the UN created an Ethiopian-Eritrean federation (1952-1962) which was gradually eroded by the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie, resulting into the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia. Ultimately, the Eritrea case may be somewhat atypical, in that Eritrea was a separate entity under colonialism and this gave Eritrean nationalists the opportunity to portray the Eritrean question as a case of arrested decolonisation, properly belonging to the decolonisation period.<sup>159</sup> Indeed Sturman affirms that the OAU treated the case of Eritrea as an exception

---

<sup>155</sup> T. Falola & A. O. Oyebade, *Hot Spot: Sub-Saharan Africa*, op cit, p.19.

<sup>156</sup> D. H. Doyle, *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements*, (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p.348.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>158</sup> K. Feyter, *World Development Law: Sharing Responsibility for Development*, (Oxford: Intersentia, 2001), p.65.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p.65.



and did not alter its stance on territorial boundaries in general. It should be noted that it was only after Ethiopia recognised Eritrea's independence that the OAU followed suit.<sup>160</sup>

### 3.2.6 South Sudan

On 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011, South Sudan became Africa's newest independent state following the January 2011 referendum that saw nearly 99% of the Southern Sudanese people vote for secession from Sudan.<sup>161</sup> This referendum was part of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was reached by the warring parties on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2005 under the watchful eye of the international communities and backed by UN Security Council Resolutions.<sup>162</sup> Dehéz underscores the role that Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) played in the Sudan Peace process, particularly in making sure that an independence referendum was envisaged even though there lacked a clear road-map on how to deal with statehood in the region.<sup>163</sup>

Hassan confirms that the protracted war in the South began in 1955 at the dawn of Sudan's independence from British colonialism; the war being a logical outcome of the inequalities and imbalance in power sharing that characterised the colonial period.<sup>164</sup> He adds that the war was also a consequence of the failure, typical of postcolonial regimes

---

<sup>160</sup> K. Sturman, 'New Norms, Old Boundaries: The African Union's Approach to Secession and State Sovereignty', in A. Pavković & P. Radan (ed), *On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008), pp.67-84:75.

<sup>161</sup> Reported by BBC News Africa. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12379431>.

<sup>162</sup> One of the notable ones include Resolution 1574(2004) reached during the UN Security Council's historic meeting in Nairobi on 19<sup>th</sup> November 2004. For more see <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/616/89/PDF/N0461689.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>163</sup> D. Dehéz, 'Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict', in B. Gebrewold-Tochalo, (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007), pp.21-36:30.

<sup>164</sup> S. M. Hassan, 'Naming the Conflict: Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan', in S.M. Hassan & C. E. Ray, (ed), *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: a Critical Reader*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp.154-169:160.

since 1956, to seriously address these inequalities. Lancaster's analysis is that the northern Arabs in Sudan have long dominated Sudan's politics and economy whereas the southerners were historically slaves or low paid workers of the northerners.<sup>165</sup>

After independence, a southern insurgency led by the South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) and its military wing, the Any-anya, continued until 1972, when a settlement between SSLM and the government in Khartoum was signed in Addis Ababa. The agreement provided a considerable autonomy for the south, including control over all matters affecting the region except defence, foreign affairs, and overall social and economic planning policies. Peace prevailed between the north and the south until 1983 when President Nimeiri imposed Sharia law throughout the country thereby alienating the southerners, most of whom were not Muslims.<sup>166</sup> The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) represented the face of the 1983 struggle that lasted till the IGAD facilitated Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in October 2002 which culminated in the CPA.

### **3.3 Somaliland's justification for recognition**

#### **3.3.1 Colonial history, international law and the criteria for recognition**

Hoyle affirms that under the generally regarded international law definition of state, an entity seeking statehood must be prepared to demonstrate that it possesses: (i) a permanent population, (ii) a defined territory, (iii) government in effective control, and

---

<sup>165</sup> C. J. Lancaster, 'The Horn of Africa', in A. Lake, (ed), *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa*, (Washington, DC: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp.169-190:173.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p.174.

(iv) capacity to enter into international relations with other states.<sup>167</sup> Somaliland has an area of about 137,000 km<sup>2</sup> and its population is 3.5 million.<sup>168</sup> Hansen and Bradbury portend that Somaliland has a democratic system matched by few other countries in Africa and the Middle East.<sup>169</sup> With regard to capacity to enter into international relations, Brownlie maintains that the international relations criterion is best understood as a proxy for the criterion of independence.<sup>170</sup> The independence being referred to here is the fact that no other sovereign with legitimate title to or control over the territorial entity exists.

Murison observes that in late May 2001, a referendum was held in which 91.7% of the voters in Somaliland approved a new constitution for the territory, which contained a clause confirming the self-declared state's independence.<sup>171</sup> Bradbury et al posit that the Somaliland authorities have developed their legal arguments in support of their independence claim. They elucidate that these arguments are twofold: the existence of Somaliland as a geopolitical entity from 1897 when the British Protectorate was established; and the recognition of its independent sovereignty between 26<sup>th</sup> June 1960 when Somaliland was granted independence from Britain and 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960 when it united with Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.<sup>172</sup> Indeed, Somaliland had already acquired many tangible features of statehood: government ministers and a

---

<sup>167</sup> P. Hoyle, 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, op cit, p.82.

<sup>168</sup> S. Omar & M. Yonis, 'Community Empowerment: The Experience of the Northwestern Integrated Community Development Program in Somaliland', in F. W. T. P. Vries, (ed), *Bright Spots Demonstrate Community Successes in African Agriculture*, (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 2005), pp.49-70:67.

<sup>169</sup> S. J. Hansen & M. Bradbury, 'Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa?', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 34, No. 113, (2007), pp.461-476:461.

<sup>170</sup> I. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law, Fourth Edition*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.73.

<sup>171</sup> K. Murison, *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, (London: Europa Publications, 2002), p.946.

<sup>172</sup> M. Bradbury, et al, 'Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97, (2003), pp.455-478:457.

president, a flag, an army, its own currency, vehicle licence plates and, perhaps most important, a sense of self.<sup>173</sup> Somaliland had achieved a considerable degree of internal stability and a firm control over much of its territory.<sup>174</sup>

According to Adam, Somaliland's claims to self-determination are grounded on a historic consciousness of oppression, surviving military annihilation perpetuated by indigenous systems of oppression.<sup>175</sup> Prunier professes that Somaliland's claim to independence is in line with the OAU Charter and the Cairo Declaration of 1964, which reaffirm the respect for Africa's boundaries as they stood at the moment of Independence from colonial rule.<sup>176</sup> Stock argues that ethnicity did not influence the decision of Somaliland to attempt secession from Somalia, but colonial history was a factor.<sup>177</sup> Somaliland is governed by a republican constitution, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature including a Chamber of Elders and a House of Representatives. Pham postulates that the judiciary is functioning independent, and various parties exist and compete in multiparty elections.<sup>178</sup> The country even maintains an official website.<sup>179</sup> Somaliland is for all intents and purposes, a functional state.<sup>180</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> I. S. Spears, 'Reflections on Somaliland & Africa's Territorial Order', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 95, (2003), pp.89-98:89.

<sup>174</sup> G. Prunier, 'Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2002), pp.247-272:247.

<sup>175</sup> H. M. Adam, 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 21, No. 59, (1994), pp.21-38:35.

<sup>176</sup> G. Prunier, 'Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, op cit, p.263.

<sup>177</sup> R. F. Stock, *Africa South of the Sahara: a Geographical Interpretation*, (New York: Gullford Press, 2004), p.19.

<sup>178</sup> J-P. Pham, *Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: the Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy*, (New York: Nova Publishers, Inc., 2005), p.185

<sup>179</sup> See [www.somalilandgov.com](http://www.somalilandgov.com)

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p.185.

### 3.3.2 The nature of interactions with the world

Adam notes that Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was received in Addis Ababa with state honours; he occupied the presidential suite at the Sheraton, met with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and concluded (undisclosed) agreements on transport and cooperation. A regular air connection to Hargeisa, serviced by the national Ethiopian Airlines, was opened in early 2001. Somaliland citizens travel easily to and from Ethiopia.<sup>181</sup>

Murison reminds us that in December 1997 the minister of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland, Mahmoud Salah Fagadeh Nour, visited several countries in the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, where he persuaded President Issaias Afewerki to act as a mediator between Somaliland and Ethiopia.<sup>182</sup> During his visit to Ethiopia he informed government officials that the Ethiopian authorities had alienated the Egal regime by providing weapons to some of the republic's Dolbuhunta sub-clans on the pretext of dissuading al-Ittihad from launching cross-border raids into Ethiopia. The Ethiopian authorities subsequently agreed to deal only with the Somaliland Government, and not with clans and sub-clans. Several months later, President Egal visited France and Italy.<sup>183</sup> In January 2002 President Egal accepted the credentials of Ethiopia's first ambassador to Somaliland.

---

<sup>181</sup> G. Prunier, 'Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, op cit, p.256.

<sup>182</sup> K. Murison, *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, op cit, p.947.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p.947.

Somaliland has also maintained cordial relations with Libya, as reflected by President Egal's visit to Tripoli in October 1999, which resulted in signing of an investment and trade agreement.

Karatnycky posits that though there were initial disputes that resulted in border closures, in October 2001 Djibouti and Somaliland said they had resolved their differences and guaranteed the free movement of people, goods and livestock across their common border.<sup>184</sup>

Relations between Somaliland and Egypt remained tense especially during 1998 because of the latter's decision to hold a peace conference for Somalia's warring factions in late 1997, which President Egal refused to attend. President Egal claimed that Egypt had secured the agreement by promising to help southern Somalia's clans to regain Somaliland by force.<sup>185</sup> Indeed, Weller and Nobbs concede that Somaliland has had recent successes<sup>186</sup> in attracting foreign donors and increasing its activity in international relations coupled with its considerable success in terms of consolidation and prosperity.

### **3.4 Positions of regional and sub-regional institutions**

#### **3.4.1 The United Nations (UN)**

Minahan reports that in 1998 the UN agreed to give Somaliland observer status.<sup>187</sup> In late 1999, the UN, US and the European Union (EU) officials discussed the possibility of a special status for Somaliland, perhaps informal recognition similar to that of the

---

<sup>184</sup> A. Karatnycky, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, (New York: Freedom House, 2002), p.201.

<sup>185</sup> K. Murison, *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, op cit, p.947.

<sup>186</sup> M. Weller & K. Nobbs, *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p.292.

<sup>187</sup> J. Minahan, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World, Volume II D-K*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), p.810.

Palestinians or Kosovars, which would allow the Isaacs access to international loans and aid.<sup>188</sup>

Kaplan observes that the UN and many international aid agencies operate programs throughout Somaliland's territory and deal with its government. To them, all of this suggests a creeping informal and pragmatic acceptance of Somaliland as a political reality.<sup>189</sup>

Interestingly, Moore and Pubantz contend that in February 2000, the UN facilitated a peace conference in Djibouti.<sup>190</sup> The quest by the UN to see one peaceful and united Somalia raises a paradox of convenience. In fact, Lalande asserts that the UN denied recognition to Somaliland, leaving to the political process, the decision on the constitutional arrangements with Somaliland and in the same way refused to withdraw UN troops from their territory at the Somaliland President's request.<sup>191</sup>

Ultimately, in Somaliland, the UN is seen as hostile to its independence, a position which is viewed critically in light of the latter's acceptance of Eritrea.<sup>192</sup>

### **3.4.2 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU)**

Lyons affirms that the OAU vigorously opposed the Republic of Somaliland's declaration of independence and passed a resolution at its June 1991 meeting that

---

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p.811.

<sup>189</sup> S. Kaplan, 'The Remarkable Story of Somaliland', in L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner, (ed), *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp.248-264:258.

<sup>190</sup> J. A. Moore & J. Pubantz, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2002), p.381.

<sup>191</sup> S. Lalande, 'Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping', in D. Warner, (ed), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhorff Publishers, 1995), pp.69-99:81.

<sup>192</sup> P. Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p.86.

affirmed the indivisibility and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic.<sup>193</sup> The African Union's opposition to Somaliland's independence is founded on the belief that the unity and territorial integrity of its member states is sacrosanct, in accordance with the 1963 Charter of the Organization for African Unity and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.<sup>194</sup>

Arieff informs us that Somaliland submitted an application for membership to the AU in December 2005, basing its claim on its separate status during the colonial era and its brief existence as a sovereign state following independence in 1960.<sup>195</sup> The application followed an AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland, conducted earlier the same year, which concluded that Somaliland's situation was sufficiently unique and self-justified in African political history that the case should not be linked to the notion of opening a Pandora's box. To Arieff, the AU's acknowledgment that Somaliland's membership claim deserves any attention whatsoever is a stunning reversal.<sup>196</sup>

However, individual African Union members have interpreted Somaliland's claim to independence as a unilateral secession from an internationally recognized state (the Somali Republic), and have retained a solid commitment to the concept that Somalia constitutes a single sovereign state whose territorial integrity must be maintained. Indeed, the AU has, with little—if any—internal debate, accorded Somalia's AU seat to two

---

<sup>193</sup> T. Lyons, 'Can Neighbours Help? Regional Actors and Conflict Management', in F. M. Deng & T. Lyons, (ed), *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998), pp.67-99:74.

<sup>194</sup> J. Wells, *Cabinda & Somaliland – A Comparative Study for Statehood & Independence*, <http://www.mbali.info/doc31.htm>, Retrieved 30<sup>th</sup> May 2011

<sup>195</sup> A. Arieff, 'De Facto Statehood? The Strange Case of Somaliland', *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2008), pp.60-79:67.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p.67.



successive coalition governments in Mogadishu which have held little demonstrable local authority or sustainable power.<sup>197</sup>

### **3.4.3 Inter-governmental authority on Development (IGAD) and East African Community (EAC)**

Dehez points out the fact that IGAD has failed in giving a clear indication in which way it wanted to deal with defacto independent Somaliland; a failure that created the impression among some southern Somali faction leaders that national unification was still in reach.<sup>198</sup> De Blij writes that Somaliland's president Dahir Riyale Kahin toured five East African capitals in 2006.<sup>199</sup> The dual membership of Kenya and Uganda in IGAD and EAC is bound to make positions of the two organisations similar as far as the international recognition of Somaliland is concerned.

As a matter of fact, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula wrote to Kenya Parliament's Defence and Foreign Relations Committee to investigate Deputy Speaker Farah Maalim's activities on a tour of Somaliland between 22<sup>nd</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> December 2009. According to Hon. Wetangula, Hon. Maalim had made speeches that promoted separatism in Somalia.<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., p.68.

<sup>198</sup> D. Dehez, 'Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict', in B. Gebrewold-Tochalo, (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, op cit, p.28.

<sup>199</sup> H. J. De Blij, *The Power of Place: Geography, Destiny, and Globalization's Rough Landscape*, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2009), p.33.

<sup>200</sup> See D. Ochami, *Wetangula Wants Maalim's Conduct Investigated*, <http://www.buhodle.net/index.php/feature/505-wetangula-wants-maalims-conduct-investigated.html>, Retrieved 26<sup>th</sup> June 2011.

### **3.5 Perspectives of the Somalis**

#### **3.5.1 The Somalia government standpoint**

The Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu rejected the secessionist claim of Somaliland as had the neighbouring Puntland.<sup>201</sup> Indeed, critics tend to dismiss Somaliland's momentary encounter with statehood in June 1960 as a pit stop on to Somali unity, saying that "northerners can in no way claim that the 1960 merger with the south was a shotgun wedding – by all accounts unification was popular."<sup>202</sup>

Opponents of Somaliland secession hotly dispute the extent of the political accomplishments made by the unrecognized separatist state, claim that only a national referendum would give Somaliland the legal right to secede, and argue that external recognition of secession there would have far-reaching and negative consequences across much of Africa.<sup>203</sup>

Bryden notes that Somaliland's aspirations to independent statehood are anathema to a significant minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast majority of southern Somalis as well.<sup>204</sup> It may be no exaggeration to state that the question of Somali unity is the most divisive and emotive dimension of the crisis. A transitional Somali government will undoubtedly claim sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland, which might bring matters to a head. Ideally, some solution of the

---

<sup>201</sup> A. B. Hashim, 'Globalisation and Africa: Reconstructing the Failed Somali State and Reviving National Identity', in A. Jalata, (ed), *State Crises, Globalisation, and National Movements in North-East Africa*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.182-201:195.

<sup>202</sup> M. Bryden, 'The "Banana Test": is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?', *Annales d'Ethiopie*, Vol. 19, (2003), pp.341-364:342.

<sup>203</sup> K. Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping', *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3, (2007), pp.74-106:92.

<sup>204</sup> M. Bryden, 'Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *African Security Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004), pp.23-33:23.

dispute will be found through dialogue. Unresolved, it could lead to violent conflict between Somali Unitarians and the proponents of an independent Somaliland.<sup>205</sup>

### 3.5.2 Other Opinions

Jirreh, a northern Somali from the Isaaq clan who lives in the US is categorical that “...northern Somalis are not asking for international charity, nor are we asking foreigners to assume responsibility for what we ourselves are capable of accomplishing. We simply seek international recognition of our sovereign right to withdraw from a union we once voluntarily joined.”<sup>206</sup> To buttress their case, functionaries in the Somaliland government argue that no single Act of Union was ever signed between the two states, rendering the *de facto* union legally invalid. Instead, two separate acts of union were approved by the northern and southern assemblies, neither of which was ratified by the other. They add that from a legal perspective, the unity of the Somali Republic was an illusion.<sup>207</sup>

As far as Shuria is concerned, Somaliland was independent state before it joined Somalia. There was huge conflict that arose between the main Somalia and Somaliland people over period of time before the collapse of Somali government in 1991, in which some argued that the developmental process of the this regions was sidelined. After the collapse of Somalia, the people of Somaliland showed the world that they can independently govern themselves while no other single regions was unable to accomplish

---

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p.23.

<sup>206</sup> P. J. Schraeder, 'From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali Nationalism', in L. W. Barrington, (ed), *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp.107-140:133.

<sup>207</sup> M. Bryden, 'Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *African Security Review*, op cit, p.343.

that. The shows the will of the Somaliland people to withdraw from the Somali government. They also showed the democratic process of governance.<sup>208</sup>

Khalif also contends that “Somaliland has a set of history different from main Somalia as they were colonised by different colonial powers and Somaliland was the first colony to get independence from British in 26<sup>th</sup> June 1960 but decided to join their brothers in the south Somalia who attained independence on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1960 due to various reasons.”<sup>209</sup>

Tsuma affirms that “everyone has a right to claim self determination and that includes Somaliland.”<sup>210</sup> He however cautions that the boundaries in Africa are politically driven and therefore it is going to be a difficult journey for Somaliland to get their state recognition because as a continent, Africa did not have a say on how the respective borders would look like.<sup>211</sup> He asks: “for how many years has region five in Ethiopia tried to obtain autonomy from Ethiopia? In my opinion Somaliland is justified in its quest to seek recognition but its secession was driven by political and economic marginalisation in a highly centralised system. Siad Barre concentrated everything in Mogadishu.”

Somaliland has established elaborate security systems that maintain law and order in the country and ensuring the sovereignty of Somaliland is upheld and respect. In addition, Somaliland government has established a number of operating ministries that spearhead development activities and taking government services to the local people in rural areas within the country and the same units also act as bridge between the local

---

<sup>208</sup> Hashim Shuria, interviewed on 30<sup>th</sup> May 2011 in Nairobi.

<sup>209</sup> Abjata Khalif, interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 in Wajir.

<sup>210</sup> William Tsuma, telephonically interviewed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2011 from Bonn.

<sup>211</sup> William Tsuma, telephonically interviewed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2011 from Bonn.

people and the government. Somaliland has also joined other nations in fighting terrorism. "The country has a running Central Bank with Somaliland currency that is accepted in neighbouring Ethiopia and the currency is popularly used in border trading areas like Tog-Wochale and others points."<sup>212</sup> Somaliland engages in international trade with Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Ethiopia among others and because of all these, Khalif observes that it deserves the recognition it is seeking.

Shuria wonders what power or influence Somaliland can have in the region, Africa and the world. "Will it be a country that will require constant aid from the international community once recognised or will it have resources that attract the interest of the international players whether physical resources, airspace and ground of strategic interest like security and terrorism?"<sup>213</sup> Shuria contends that recognition of Somaliland will have negative effects on Somalia because other regions in Somalia can want to secede. For Africa, he adds that some countries like landlocked Ethiopia will have direct link in terms of imports and export of goods and services. He is of the strong opinion that peace in Somalia is the biggest priority in the eyes of the international community and as long as Somalia remains in conflict, Somaliland's quest for international recognition will remain elusive. He recommends that Somaliland leaders should involve themselves in the Somalia peace process as this will win over crucial allies and supporters that would be useful in its lobby for recognition.

It has been opined that Somaliland should wait for Somalia to have a stable government which it should engage on its quest of seceding and obtaining international

---

<sup>212</sup> Abjata Khalif, interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 in Wajir.

<sup>213</sup> Hashim Shuria, interviewed on 30<sup>th</sup> May 2011 in Nairobi.

recognition.<sup>214</sup> Again they can approach and convince other African nations on importance of Somaliland seceding and win their support in AU which will set stage for other bodies to recognise them. Khalif suggests that the other way is for Somaliland leaders to bring warring clans from southern Somalia to a negotiating table wherein a constitution amendment would be proposed (in the current constitution that governs the Transitional Federal Government) for Somalia. In this amendment, the option of self determination would be mentioned under a framework of a nationally recognised referendum. This, Khalif notes, is an important lesson that can be learnt from the Sudan peace process.

Abukar shares Khalif's opinion. According to the former, whereas Somaliland displays all the characteristics of a state, the politics within and outside Somalia will connive to pose a major hurdle to Somaliland's efforts of gaining international recognition. To Abukar, the world right now is interested in seeing a peaceful Somalia and therefore so long as Somalia remains in turmoil, Somaliland's quests will take a back seat.<sup>215</sup> Abukar sees the probable way forward laden in an accord between Somaliland and Somalia leaders stipulating a framework for achieving sustainable peace as well as a roadmap for Somaliland separation via a referendum organised under the watch of organisations like IGAD. The moment Somalia leaders acknowledge the right of Somaliland to secede, the path to international recognition will be easier for Somaliland.<sup>216</sup>

---

<sup>214</sup> Abjata Khalif, interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 in Wajir.

<sup>215</sup> Mohamed Abukar, Telephonic Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2010 from Gaalkacyo.

<sup>216</sup> Mohamed Abukar, Telephonic Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2010 from Gaalkacyo.

Tsuma portends that the instability in Somalia poses a formidable challenge to Somaliland's hopes of international recognition because the majority of actors in the international system recognise one Somalia.<sup>217</sup> On the question of international recognition, Tsuma's analysis is that politics plays a bigger role than any legal framework like the Montevideo criteria. Somaliland's leaders therefore need to lobby hard in the global level and play a lot of politics if it is to obtain the recognition its leaders and people so desire. One of the ways to go about this, Tsuma adds, is for the Somaliland leaders to get involved in the Somalia peace process. He reckons that their persistent and consistent absence from the process does not make them look favourable to the international community whose interest is peace and stability in Mogadishu. The success of the secession of Sudan is hinged on the fact that Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), agreed to engage with the Khartoum government under Omar el Bashir.<sup>218</sup> This engagement lent credence and legitimacy to the successful process of secession of South Sudan.

Ahmed's advice to the Somaliland government is that they should adopt an incremental recognition. She advises Somaliland leaders to engage a lot in confidence-building measures, such as pursuing the possibility of greater engagement with regional bodies such as the IGAD.<sup>219</sup> She also advises that the leaders of Somaliland must make efforts at solving the contestation of the Sool and Sanaag region with Puntland. This contested region will add up to the hurdles in the way of Somaliland's ambitions to obtain international recognition.

---

<sup>217</sup> William Tsuma, telephonically interviewed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2011 from Bonn.

<sup>218</sup> William Tsuma, telephonically interviewed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2011 from Bonn.

<sup>219</sup> Sadia Musse Ahmed, Telephonic interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 from Hargeisa.

### **3.6 Conclusions**

This chapter has indeed confirmed that from a juridical position, Somaliland qualifies to be considered as a state. It has also confirmed that, in spite of that qualification, Somaliland has found it hard to obtain international recognition. Essentially Somaliland was, for four days since 26<sup>th</sup> June 1960, a state that was recognised internationally until she united with Italian Somaliland to form Somalia. Throughout the time that the Union lasted, the relations between erstwhile British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were frosty due to governance issues bordering on marginalisation. The climax was in 1991 when Somaliland declared its independence, grabbing an opportunity that presented itself with the fall of President Siad Barre.

A key point that has come out in the chapter is that in as much as Somaliland declared independence, the respective semblances of successive central governments in Somalia have not provided blessing to Somaliland's decision to break the 1960 Union. It is the failure to obtain this blessing that has proved to be the major challenge to Somaliland's ambitions. It has also come out that the international community's priority at the moment is and has been the peace and stability of Somalia. For it is peace and stability of Somalia that is most likely to open the door to a process of negotiation between the leaders of Somaliland and those in Somalia. It is highly likely that the moment a meeting of minds is reached between the aforementioned leaders, and an agreement on how the separation of Somaliland can be handled is arrived at, IGAD, EAC, AU and the UN will be more receptive to the internationally recognising Somaliland. But for this to happen, the process will need to be led and managed by the Somalis themselves.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE CASE OF 'SOMALILAND' – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

In chapter three, an overview of secessionist cases in Africa was delved into. These included Western Sahara, Ogaden Reserve Area and the Haud; Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea and South Sudan. In looking at the justification for Somaliland's recognition, colonial history and international law were examined. The positions of the UN and other sub-regional institutions were analysed with regard to Somaliland's quest for international recognition. An important aspect in the chapter pertained to the perspectives of Somalis as well as knowledgeable personalities who are familiar with Somali issues and the attempts by Somaliland to obtain recognition.

In this chapter, this study will provide an analysis of issues that were distilled from chapter three. These issues featured prominently and therefore warrant further critical analysis with the aim of ultimately obtaining formidable conclusions to this study. Somaliland's quest for international recognition will be evaluated against the background of the war in Somalia since 1991, the peace efforts and the parallels in processes that led to chaos in Somalia and relative stability in Somaliland. Politics and the role it plays in the recognition of states will be examined while at the same time referring to legal perspectives based on international conventions that pertain to state recognition.

#### **4.2 Somaliland in post-1991 war-torn Somalia and the peace process**

The fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre was one of the main reasons for an abundant supply of weapons in Somalia since the beginning of the 1990s. Somalia is the best case to question the nature and value of the state and the meaning of

state boundaries. As Woodward, opines, “Almost everyone got hold of guns....armours are empty. Police have no weapons. There is no army as such. The elders of the clans do not seem to be able to control many of their armed youth and there are conflicting inter-clan interests, who prevent their elders from acting jointly to improve security”<sup>220</sup>

According to Weller and Nobbs, during the 1990’s Somalia became notorious for what had become an increasingly common phenomenon of the post-Cold War international order: the prolonged and seemingly permanent absence of an effective government or state failure.<sup>221</sup> A UN peace-building mission and countless internationally sponsored peace conferences failed to pacify the country. At about the same time that the south descended into chaos in 1991, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland evolved from a crippled, anarchic and impoverished province into a relatively peaceful democracy showing signs of economic recovery.<sup>222</sup> Indeed, Notholt posits that Somaliland’s political and economic stability is in stark contrast to the rest of Somalia.<sup>223</sup>

In chapter three a key issue arose to the extent that Somaliland’s international recognition might actually hinge on its cooperation with Somalia in a bid to find a way out of the current internal strife. That being the case, it would be interesting to explore and analyse the practicability and the dynamics of such cooperation vis-a-vis the issues that led to the attempted secession of Somaliland.

---

<sup>220</sup> D. J. Francis, *Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005), p.203.

<sup>221</sup> M. Weller & K. Nobbs, *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p.278.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, p.278.

<sup>223</sup> S. Notholt, *Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict*, (London: Troubar Publishing Ltd., 2008), p.2.21.

In 2000 President Gelleh of Djibouti sponsored an IGAD peace and reconciliation conference that began on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2000 in Arta, Djibouti. Seddon and Seddon-Daines affirm that the conference was attended by more than 2,000 Somalis, either as delegates or as observers.<sup>224</sup> Somaliland, Puntland and some prominent warlords in the Mogadishu area did not participate and were not represented in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) that was formed.

Somaliland's declaration of independence resulted in border conflicts as it was faced with the challenge of protecting its territory. According to Minahan, the Somaliland government threatened to fight to protect the borders of their breakaway state to the extent that in late 1999, Somalia and Somaliland troops clashed in Sool.<sup>225</sup> Feyissa and Hoehne point out that in contrast to Somaliland, Puntland does not pursue secession but aims at rebuilding a unitary Somali state within its pre-civil war borders and therefore leaders in Puntland do not support Somaliland's self-declared independence.<sup>226</sup> A serious contestation of borders<sup>227</sup> between Somaliland and Puntland has also occurred since Somaliland declared independence.

As Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio argue, "Somaliland and Puntland contain over a third of Somalia's overall population but have not played a substantial role in the Djibouti peace process"<sup>228</sup> Even as the Djibouti peace process was being mooted, the Somaliland

---

<sup>224</sup> D. Seddon & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p.477.

<sup>225</sup> J. Minahan, *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), p.1149.

<sup>226</sup> M. V. Hoehne, 'People & Politics Along & Across the Somaliland-Puntland Border', in D. Feyissa & M. V. Hoehne, (ed), *Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, (New York: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 2010), pp.97-121:97.

<sup>227</sup> Sool and Sanaag are contested frontier regions between Somaliland and Puntland

<sup>228</sup> S. Streleau & S. Ngesi, 'Somalia: Beginning the Journey from Anarchy to Order', in E. Doxtader & C. Villa-Vicencio, (ed), *Through Fire with Water: the Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa*, (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2003), pp.155-186:161.

Forum, an organisation that unites Somaliland intellectuals in the Diaspora opposed it.<sup>229</sup> The opposition was due to the Forum's perception of "Djibouti's insistence that a central transitional government be appointed for the whole of the Somali territories...and in particular...Somaliland."<sup>230</sup> In fact, Dagne notes, in late December 2008, President Yusuf resigned from office, having opposed the Djibouti peace process and repeatedly clashing with his prime minister.<sup>231</sup>

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) propounds that in 2002, a group of warlords declared autonomy of six districts in south-western Somalia.<sup>232</sup> In the same year, Somaliland refused to participate in a reconciliation conference held in Kenya where participating parties signed a declaration on cessation of hostilities and the structures and principles of the Somali national reconciliation process.

Dagne and Smith postulate that at the end of the IGAD summit in March 1998, the member governments issued a statement noting that "the proliferation of parallel initiatives can only undermine the central objective of accelerating the peace process in Somalia" and urging "all concerned parties to bolster the IGAD peace process on Somalia and ensure that all assistance provided to Somalia be geared to enhance the peace process and that it be channelled through the IGAD mechanism."<sup>233</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> International Business Publications, *Djibouti Foreign Policy and Government Guide*, (Washington DC: International Business Publications, 2010), p.98.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid, p.98.

<sup>231</sup> T. Dagne, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, (Washington, DC: Congress Research Service, 2010), p.4.

<sup>232</sup> United Nations Environment Programme, *The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study*, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2005), p.65.

<sup>233</sup> T. Dagne & A. Smith, 'Somalia: Prospects for Peace and US Involvement', in N. J. Fitzgerald, *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), pp.4-14:6.

Indeed, Somaliland seemed to have some sort of representation in the peace process, more specifically during the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia that resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1993. Lyons et al point out that Mohammed Egal, the president of Somaliland, addressed the conference but only to bring a message of peace.<sup>234</sup> Egal reiterated the SNM's determination to await reconciliation in the south before any talks with Somaliland officials could take place. Furthermore, the fact that three movements representing smaller clans in the north (who opposed the Isaaq-dominated SNM's rule) signed the Agreement made the SNM officials more suspicious about the process. The Addis Ababa formula was seen as that which "intends the northern independent republic to be ruled by the muddled set up of committees presided over by the southern former warlords."<sup>235</sup>

Weller and Nobbs have an incisive perspective. They argue that in reality Somaliland's declaration of independence had no significant impact on the peace process in the south and that if Somaliland were to be internationally recognised, the only effect would probably be that Somalia would lose between a fourth and a third of its population and one-fifth of its territory on the official world map.<sup>236</sup>

Perhaps a more analytical foray into the Somalia peace process comes from Farah and Lewis. They promulgate that the reason why stability has been realised in Somaliland comes from the fact that genuine clan leaders of the hostile clans used a 'bottom-up'

---

<sup>234</sup> T. Lyons, & A. I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p.52.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, p.52.

<sup>236</sup> M. Weller & K. Nobbs, *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, op cit, p.292.

approach to restoration of peace and stability.<sup>237</sup> This comprehensive peace movement was first initiated at the local level by traditional political leaders, using conventional mechanisms of arbitration between disputing adjacent and affmally related clans. Starting at the grassroots level, the elders' peace endeavour progressed to district and regional levels and reached its height at the Boorama conference, where a hundred and fifty delegates (known as *Guurti*), comprised of clan councillors representing all the groups in Somaliland, managed to produce separate national and peace charters. Farah and Lewis add that clan reconciliation conferences in Somaliland were financed through community self-help in contrast to the inordinate costs that were externally funded for the process in the south.<sup>238</sup> Muriithi strikes the nail on the head. He points out that the situation in Somaliland is much more stable than the experiment taking place in southern Somali, which has opted to reconstruct a Westminster style of Government from Nairobi.<sup>239</sup> He also attributes the stability to the use of indigenous Somali structures of governance in the peace process in Somaliland.

At some point, Sicurelli echoed the comments of Abdullahi Mohamed Dualeh, the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, that attempts by the EU to build peace “were bound to fail because EU support of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, which appears unwilling to reconcile the country’s many ethnic groups.”<sup>240</sup>

---

<sup>237</sup> A. H. Farah & I. M. Lewis, 'Making Peace in Somaliland', *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, Vol. 37, No. 146, (1997), pp.349-377:350.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, p.350.

<sup>239</sup> T. Muriithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p.148.

<sup>240</sup> D. Sicurelli, 'Regional Partners: Perceptions and Criticisms at the Africa Union', in S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti, (ed), *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp.180-193:189.

That there needs to be peace and stability in Somalia is not in question. The question is how? Lewis argues that local peacemaking in Somalia needs to be encouraged, with external assistance supplementing rather than overwhelming the local grassroots initiatives that existed in Somalia.<sup>241</sup>

Somaliland's aspirations to independent statehood are anathema to a significant minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast majority of southern Somalis as well. Bryden contends that it may be no exaggeration to state that the question of Somali unity is the most divisive and emotive dimension of the crisis and that a transitional Somali government will undoubtedly claim sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland, which might bring matters to a head.<sup>242</sup>

#### **4.3 Role of politics in the recognition of states**

According to Müllerson, the emergence of new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has raised issues relating to the recognition of states and has once more engendered discussions on whether such recognition is a political or legal phenomenon.<sup>243</sup>

As events in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have confirmed, recognition is certainly an act of high political importance and its grant or refusal are basically dictated by political considerations.<sup>244</sup>

The international community is likely to be a dimension of future relations of Somaliland with the rest of Somalia. Woodward affirms that decisions of the

---

<sup>241</sup> N. Lewis, 'The Tasks of Political Recovery', in G. T. Harris, (ed), *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp.65-94:72.

<sup>242</sup> M. Bryden, 'Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004), pp.23-33:24.

<sup>243</sup> R. A. Müllerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.117.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, p.117.

international community regarding the recognition of Somaliland will remain a dimension of the reconstruction of Somalia as a whole, whether as one or two states.<sup>245</sup>

The international community remains focused on state reconstruction in the south and according to Weller and Nobbs, is largely oblivious to the success of Somaliland.<sup>246</sup> Order is supposed to be the defining characteristic of a state, but instead the world insists on clinging to the fiction that Somalia has a government that rules over a united territory. Sturman argues that understanding why the world pretends that Somaliland does not exist tells us much about the foibles of the international politics of recognition.<sup>247</sup> As Seddon and Seddon-Daines note, soon after the formation of the TNA already alluded to in the preceding section, a declaration by the EU of 8<sup>th</sup> September 2000 stated that the EU was, among others, willing to support the new Somali authorities' efforts to rebuild the country once it had established its authority.<sup>248</sup> The EU also urged the new authorities to establish a constructive dialogue with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland.

Western nations have largely insisted that the AU must take the lead in the recognition issue one way or the other. The Human Rights Watch and Albin-Lackey note that Many AU states are reluctant to sanction what some see as a precedent that could embolden secessionist movements across the continent.<sup>249</sup> Egypt and some Arab states are reluctant to empower Somaliland with recognition because they see it as an Ethiopian

---

<sup>245</sup> P. Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), p.86.

<sup>246</sup> M. Bryden, 'Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *Africa Security Review*, op cit, p.278.

<sup>247</sup> K. Sturman, 'New Norms, Old Boundaries: The African Union's Approach to Secession and State Sovereignty', in A. Pavkovic & P. Radan, (ed) *On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), pp.67-84:77.

<sup>248</sup> D. Seddon & D. Seddon-Daines, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, op cit, p.477.

<sup>249</sup> Human Rights Watch & C. Albin-Lackey, "*Hostages to Peace*": *Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), p.51.



ally and do not wish to strengthen Ethiopia's regional position. In addition, the authorities in Somalia have consistently and implacably opposed any formal dismantling of the larger Somali state.

Huliaras posits that certain Arab governments fear that an independent Somaliland may facilitate Israel's influence in an area considered as the 'soft underbelly' of the Arab world. Thus, according to some observers, the Arab League aiming to undermine Somaliland's economic viability is actually what prompted Saudi Arabia to include the country in the ban on cattle exports from the Horn of Africa.<sup>250</sup> Moreover, the United Arab Emirates have imposed new and expensive visa regulations to Somaliland merchants. Interestingly, Hargeisa has tried to answer these pressures by turning to Israel.<sup>251</sup> To this end, the reconstruction of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) makes it unlikely that major external powers will shift their position on Somaliland recognition in the immediate term as they focus on attempting to shore up the power of the TFG against continued threats to its existence.<sup>252</sup> Kaplan also agrees that Arab countries, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular, have vehemently opposed independence of Somaliland to the extent that the latter has sought to sabotage Somaliland's economy by refusing to import any of its livestock since 1997.<sup>253</sup>

Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia and several other African states supported Somaliland's independence, yet the AU has been paralysed because of opposition from

---

<sup>250</sup> A. Huliaras, 'The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 20. No. 2, (2002), pp.157-182:170.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid, p.170.

<sup>252</sup> Human Rights Watch & C. Albin-Lackey, "Hostages to Peace": Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland, op cit, p.52.

<sup>253</sup> S. D. Kaplan, *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), p.127.

Somaliland's neighbours, each of which has a vested interest in the country not gaining recognition.<sup>254</sup> Ethiopia, for example, concerned about the irredentist claims of its own Somali population, has tried to divide and weaken Somalia since the Ogaden War three decades ago, and considers any attempt to strengthen Somaliland as inimical to Ethiopian interests.<sup>255</sup>

Somalia's crisis appeared on the draft agenda of the 1999 Algiers Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is however not clear whether Somalia was represented especially since Somalia's seat in the OAU has allegedly been vacant from 1995-2000. Likewise existence of any Somalia representation at the Conference of Islamic states and the Arab league is shrouded in obscurity from early 1990s to 2000. Kreijen observes that Somalia seemed to have been totally incapable of protecting its people's interests at International level whereas Somaliland and Puntland on the other hand had "representatives" in various capitals around the World and with several International Organizations.<sup>256</sup> However, none of them could have enjoyed official status owing to lack of International recognition.

The non-recognition of Somaliland by global powers has more global systemic aspects. Gebrewold opines that global powers such as Russia and China have got their own separatists such that whereas the West supported the independence of Kosovo,

---

<sup>254</sup> S. Kaplan, 'The Remarkable Story of Somaliland', in L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner, (ed), *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp.248-264:259.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid, p.259.

<sup>256</sup> G. Kreijen, *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), p.72.

Russia was against it, not only because Kosovo became independent from its closest ally Serbia, but the issue of Chechnya is still there.<sup>257</sup>

There have been cases where international recognitions were granted under circumstances that are bound to be puzzling to a follower of Somaliland's quest for international recognition. In 1992, in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Croatia was recognised by the European Community (EC) and its member states and was admitted as a state to the UN in conditions of civil war when it was not yet in control of a considerable part of its territory and did not meet the additional criteria (107) articulated in the EC guidelines of 1991.<sup>258</sup> The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its admission to the UN was even more premature in view of the continued civil war, with the Bosnia-Herzegovina government controlling less than a half of the state's territory as defined by the pre-civil war borders of the republics.<sup>259</sup> Curiously, the application for international recognition by Krajina, a part of Croatia with mostly Serbian population was declined by the EU.

Kreijen cautions that cooperation with the international community is complicated by Somaliland's insistence on the non-negotiability of its independence though President Egal did not rule out the possibility of Somaliland being part of a future federal Somalia.<sup>260</sup>

---

<sup>257</sup> B. Gebrewold, *Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), p.43.

<sup>258</sup> B. A. Boczek, *International Law: A Dictionary*, (Oxford:Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2005), p.109.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*, p.109.

<sup>260</sup> G. Kreijen, *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness*, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), p.69.

Ham propounds that the main reason why the world is reluctant to accept Somaliland's independence is that the UN still hopes for a peace agreement covering all of Somalia, and its other neighbours are wary of an independent Somaliland, fearing a 'Balkanisation' of the Horn.<sup>261</sup>

Coggins notes that there is a wide variation in domestic capacity at the point of recognition; many secessionist regimes with *de facto* independence remain unrecognized while regimes with shaky claims to sovereignty are sometimes embraced as States. Ironically, he laments, there is no longer even a functioning national government of Somalia for Somaliland to secede from, yet Somalia is still regarded as a State by nearly every system member.<sup>262</sup>

On the face of it, there appear to be firm grounds for Somaliland's international recognition. Bryden however argues that in the world of politics and statecraft, things are not always what they seem; as far as the international community is concerned, Somaliland is not – at least legally speaking – a state.<sup>263</sup>

#### **4.4 International legal perspectives**

A question has been floated in many forums, blogs, among others on whether Somaliland has defined territory. Somewhere between the towns of Laascaanood and Garoowe, the only tarmac road running through the semi-desert of Northern Somalia passes a dusty old bush. There are thousands of others along the road. This bush is called Yocada and in

---

<sup>261</sup> A. Ham, *Africa*, (London: Lonely Planet, 2010), p.759.

<sup>262</sup> B. L. Coggins, *Secession, Recognition & the International Politics of Statehood*, PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2006, p.8.

<sup>263</sup> M. Bryden, 'The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?' *Annales d'Éthiopie*, Vol. XIX, No. 19, (2003), pp.341-364:341.

the colonial times, Hoehne notes that it indicated the border between British and Italian Somaliland.<sup>264</sup>

In June 1897 Britain and Ethiopia formalised the border between Ethiopia and British Somaliland. Notholt notes that it is Ethiopia's border with the former Italian Somaliland (Southern Somalia) that remains undefined to date.<sup>265</sup> That having been said, what is meant by a defined territory? Hoyle argues that even though Israel's boundaries have yet to be decisively delineated, Israel unquestionably exists as a state.<sup>266</sup> Likewise, to what extent (both territorial and political) must the requisite government be able to govern?<sup>267</sup> That having been said, Adam contends that Somaliland has a territory of 67,000 square miles.<sup>268</sup>

Another criteria for statehood enshrined in the Montevideo Convention is the ability to enter into international relations. Debates have ensued over whether this criterion requires not just the capacity, but the corresponding ability to conduct international relations. International legal scholars maintain that the international relations criterion is best understood as a proxy for the criterion of independence. By independence, what is referred to is the fact that no other sovereign with legitimate title to or control over the territorial entity in question exists.<sup>269</sup> In the case of East Timor, for example, competing sovereigns, Portugal and Indonesia, formally relinquished any claims to title over the

---

<sup>264</sup> M. V. Hoehne, 'People & Politics Along & Across the Somaliland-Puntland Border', op cit, p.97.

<sup>265</sup> S. Notholt, *Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict - Extended Edition*, (London: Stuart Notholt Communication Ltd., 2008), p.2-22.

<sup>266</sup> P. Hoyle, 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2000), pp.80-91:82.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid, p.82.

<sup>268</sup> H. M. Adam, 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 21, No. 59, (1994), pp.21-38:22.

<sup>269</sup> P. Hoyle, 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, op cit, p.82.

country allowing East Timorese independence. Thus, the actual ability to carry out an effective international relations regime is secondary to the absence of a competing sovereign with the right to maintain international relations on behalf of the prospective state.

Roble however differs with Hoyle. He propounds that although it is plausible to argue that Somaliland has established a somewhat permanent but fragile government, it is not a government that can enter into any meaningful relationship with either bilateral governments or international bodies. Moreover, he adds, neither the population nor the territory claimed by Somaliland is defined.<sup>270</sup> Besides, international law presupposes that a secessionist part must do so within the framework of the parent state. Mogadishu's say in this case is all the more pivotal.

According to Abokor et al, there has been no census in Somaliland for almost 20 years and that war, displacement, urban migration and the nomadic nature of the population make it difficult to determine the population with any accuracy.<sup>271</sup> Akol however places the population of Somaliland at an estimated 3.5 million.<sup>272</sup>

Indeed, Spears postulates, Somaliland had already acquired many tangible features of statehood: government ministers and a president, a flag, an army, its own currency, vehicle licence plates and, perhaps most important, a sense of self.<sup>273</sup>

---

<sup>270</sup> F. Roble, 'Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somaliland's Unilateral Secession', *Horn of Africa*, Vol. XXV, (2007), pp.165-196:183.

<sup>271</sup> A. Y. Abokor, et al, *Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections September 2005*, (London: Progressio, 2006) p. 2004

<sup>272</sup> J. J. Akol, *Burden of Nationality: Memoirs of an African Aidworker/Journalist 1970's-1990's*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2006), p.272.

<sup>273</sup> I. S. Spears, 'Reflections on Somaliland & Africa's Territorial Order', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 95, (2003), pp.89-98:89.

The series of democratic elections since 2002, Hansen and Bradbury affirm, have brought significant changes to the political system in Somaliland.<sup>274</sup> They have served to consolidate Somaliland as territorially-defined political entity, with all the regions within its borders (with the exception of Sool and eastern Sanaag) having elected councils and elected representatives in government. The introduction of universal suffrage and the creation of political parties that are not based on clan mark a significant attempt to change the system of kinship-based politics. The achievements in Somaliland are in many ways remarkable in a region more often associated with authoritarian regimes and conflict.<sup>275</sup>

Elden opines that Somaliland has a strong government and projects security. He adds that it has a legal framework, collects taxes and provides services that approximate reasonable levels of good governance.<sup>276</sup>

Hoyle surmises that from a purely international legal standpoint, Somaliland could indeed pass the statehood test – it has a permanent population, largely Somali Issaqs; a defined territory, based on British colonial boundaries; and a government, that, on the relative scale, has achieved order and stability.<sup>277</sup> She suggests that if it is acknowledged that Somalia, as we knew it, is no longer, the international community would further have to acknowledge Somaliland's capacity to enter into international relations (in the sense that no competing sovereign exists). Yet to date, Hoyle elucidates,

---

<sup>274</sup> S. J. Hansen & M. Bradbury, 'Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa?', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 34, No. 113, (2007), pp.461-476:473.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid, p.473.

<sup>276</sup> S. Elden, *Terror and Territory: The Spatial extent of Sovereignty*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), p.101.

<sup>277</sup> P. Hoyle, 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, op cit, p.88.

Somaliland has not been recognised as a state by the international community. It is this political factor – the largesse of the doctrine of recognition – that holds Somaliland back.<sup>278</sup>

A careful reading of the Declaration on Friendly Relations reveals that it contains no absolute bias toward territorial integrity, but restates well-known rules, namely, “(1) that states shall not dismember other states (i.e. use force unlawfully) under the pretext of aiding self- determination; and (2) the international law and its system is neutral as to secessionist movements (i.e., does not ‘authorize or encourage’ those) that seek the break-up of established sovereign states.”<sup>279</sup> This argument, perfectly applicable to the case of Somaliland, boils down to the stark reality that while international law neither prohibits nor encourages secession outside the particular colonial experience, it will recognize secession when it is successful. And so while international law does not recognize a right of secession outside such a context, this alone does not mean that international law prohibits secession.<sup>280</sup>

#### 4.5 Other issues

There are those who have called for Somaliland’s recognition based on historical and legal perspectives among others. Jhazbhay posits that there is need for official recognition of Somaliland, emphasising that official recognition of Somaliland would

---

<sup>278</sup> Ibid, p.88.

<sup>279</sup> A. K. Eggers, ‘When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland’, *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2007), pp. 211-222:216.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid, p.216.



send a clear message to all Somalis that peaceful transitions from stability are possible without the need to use overpowering military force, and will be rewarded.<sup>281</sup>

Jibril observes that the question of Somaliland, which is the most controversial problem in the process of reconciliation, needs a new approach based on democratic principles and recognition of the right of the people of Somaliland to decide their own destiny.<sup>282</sup>

Gebrewold argues that IGAD has failed in giving a clear indication in which way it wanted to deal with de facto independent Somaliland; a failure that created the impression among some southern Somali faction leaders that national unification was still in reach.<sup>283</sup>

International terrorism has played a part in Somaliland's push for international recognition. Roble notes that at first, especially before the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 terrorist bombings of the twin towers in New York, the strategy to convince the outside world on the merits of Somaliland's recognition hung on what some viewed as democracy dividends.<sup>284</sup> This strategy intended to woo the West and other regional governments to reward Somaliland in kind with recognition for its commitment to multi-party liberal democracy. After the incidents of September 11<sup>th</sup> rearranged the West's priorities,

---

<sup>281</sup> I. Jhazbhay, 'Political Islam, Africa and the War on Terror', in M. Smith, (ed), *Securing Africa: Post-911 Discourses on Terrorism*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), pp.67-79:72.

<sup>282</sup> A. M. Jibril, 'The Somali Crisis: Prospects and Options', in M. A. R. M. Salih & L. Wohlgemuth, (ed), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), pp.47-52:51.

<sup>283</sup> D. Dehéz, 'Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The International Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict', in B. Gebrewold, (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), pp.21-36:28.

<sup>284</sup> F. Roble, 'Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somaliland's Unilateral Secession', *Horn of Africa*, op cit, p.181.

advocates for secession quickly shifted strategy to now emphasize the geopolitical role an independent Somaliland can offer the West in the war on terrorism.<sup>285</sup>

Roble asserts that it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify and explain secession on the basis of social inequality which the Isaaq clan has suffered at the hands of southern clans.<sup>286</sup> There are about four major clans (Daarood, Isaaq, Hawiye and the Maay groupings). Most of all, the Isaaq community has never been oppressed in a particular way, and did not suffer any visible discrimination or domination based on race, cultural or ethnic differences. Nor were they the victims of linguistic oppression as may be the cause with the Somali Bantu minorities in the south.

Bryden portends that many Somalilanders consider their independence to be non-negotiable and irreversible and that they oppose any discussion on the topic of association and view the prospect of dialogue with the south solely as an international requirement for obtaining international recognition as an independent state.<sup>287</sup> He adds that the dominance of the separatist platform in Somaliland politics, enshrined in constitution and reinforced through the electoral process, means that no Somaliland government will be able to hazard dialogue with the south unless independence remains an option. In order to justify such a risk, Somaliland's leaders would also probably seek reasonable assurances of international recognition if unity proves unworkable. However, negotiating a mutually acceptable formula for separation is likely to prove no less difficult than a workable formula for unity, partly because of reluctance in the south to

---

<sup>285</sup> Ibid, p.182.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid, p.183.

<sup>287</sup> M. Bryden, 'Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *African Security Review*, op cit, p.25.

accept the break-up of the Somali Republic. Another reason is Somaliland's assertion that its exercise of self-determination should be independent of southern influence or control.<sup>288</sup>

Somaliland is presented by its government as an independent state that seceded from the rest of Somalia and claims international recognition. This claim however, does not have the full support of those in Somaliland. According to Hamilton, those over 40, in particular, remember Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s, with a strong national army and healthy international relations. Many older Somalis see the people in the south as their brothers and sisters, even if split by civil war. Hamilton reckons that they prefer a future reunion with the south and adhere to the vision of a united Somalia over one of the independence of Somaliland.<sup>289</sup>

In Puntland, to the east, the government shares similar sentiments and is, according to the constitution, working towards rebuilding the Somali government. By sabotaging the full integration of Somaliland in its colonial borders, Puntland politicians hope to prevent its definitive split from Somalia. Höhne sees Puntland as a representation of the vision of a re-united Somalia. "This fits well," he says, "with the political attitude of many ... who take pride in being the ones holding secessionist Somaliland and war-torn Somalia together".<sup>290</sup>

---

<sup>288</sup> Ibid, p.26.

<sup>289</sup> E. Hamilton, *Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia*, <http://globaltides.pepperdine.edu/rethinking-somalia.pdf>. Retrieved on 6th August 2011.

<sup>290</sup> M. V. Höhne, 'Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2006), pp.397-414:401.

## **4.6 Conclusions**

A critical point that has emanated in this chapter pertains to Somaliland's lack of participation in the Somalia peace process. Somaliland's refusal to participate in the process has been pegged its assertion that its independence is not negotiable whereas various leaders in Southern Somalia still perceive Somaliland to be a part of Somalia.

The countries bordering Somalia and indeed the international community have prioritised the issue of peace and stability high on the agenda. The question however remains how sustainable peace can be attained. It was noted that it is imperative that external efforts should only serve to complement the efforts by Somalis to resolve their problems through their acceptable mechanisms.

This chapter also noted that international politics plays a bigger role in the international recognition of states in the IS as compared to international law. From a legal perspective however, various scholars observed that Somaliland meets the threshold for recognition as far as the Montevideo criteria is concerned. This threshold is based on comparison with other countries that have been recognised in recent times.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

This study has examined why Somaliland has not been successful in obtaining international recognition since 1991 when it seceded from Somalia. A number of formidable conclusions can be drawn from this study.

Abdi, an International Crisis Group analyst is passionate that “there is no way Somaliland will rejoin Somalia, not in my lifetime.” He adds that “they are dead-set on independence. If we don’t reward Somaliland with some form of recognition, they risk sliding back. I think they are the most democratic administration in the Horn of Africa.”<sup>291</sup> Somaliland has, without a doubt been appreciated to have a government that is in effective control. Indeed, while ‘Republic of Somaliland’ has failed to achieve any international recognition, it has attained a measure of stability and embarked upon a process of political reconciliation.<sup>292</sup>

Gebrewold posits that the AU is opposed to any talk of altering the borders of countries while Western governments have indicated that they will take their cue from the AU.<sup>293</sup>

Although de jure recognition remains elusive, Somaliland has achieved de facto recognition in a number of ways. Diamond and Plattner note that in January 2008,

---

<sup>291</sup> CQ Researcher, *Global Issues: Selections from CQ Researcher*, (Newbury Park: Pine Forge Press, 2009), p.236.

<sup>292</sup> R. G. Patman, *Strategic Shortfall: the Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010), p.13.

<sup>293</sup> B. Gebrewold, ‘Civil Militias and Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa’, in D. J. Francis, (ed), *Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), pp.187-212:192.

Somaliland's president led a delegation to Washington and London and met with officials from both capitals.<sup>294</sup> Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, Italy and Yemen have also welcomed official visitors from Somaliland while Ethiopia has a quasi-embassy in Hargeisa. The UN and many international aid agencies operate programs throughout Somaliland's territory and deal with its government.<sup>295</sup>

The reconstitution of the TFG in Mogadishu and later in Baidoa makes it unlikely that major external powers will shift their position on Somaliland recognition in the immediate term, as they focus on attempting to shore up the power of the TFG against continued threats to its existence.<sup>296</sup>

## 5.2 Key Findings

This study has confirmed that from a juridical perspective, Somaliland has fulfilled the threshold required for a territory to be internationally recognised as a state.

Tsuma however opines that in the international system and more on the question of international recognition of states, politics takes precedence over law.<sup>297</sup> Forsythe agrees with Tsuma. The former affirms that recognition of states, which is based on recognised self-determination, is a subject considerably muddied by the troubled waters of world politics.<sup>298</sup> He adds that recognition and self-determination have no transcendent meaning. Malone considers recognition to be a confusing mixture of international law,

---

<sup>294</sup> S. Kaplan, 'The Remarkable Story of Somaliland', in L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner, (ed), *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp.248-264:258.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, p.258.

<sup>296</sup> Human Rights Watch & C. Albin-Lackey, *"Hostages to Peace": Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, op cit, p.51.

<sup>297</sup> William Tsuma, telephonically interviewed on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2011 from Bonn

<sup>298</sup> D. P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics*, (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p.33.

domestic law and politics. She posits that it is important to distinguish political considerations from legal considerations, and to isolate legal issues that arise under international law.<sup>299</sup> Orfield notes that there is no duty to recognise a state although the state has fulfilled the criteria for statehood.<sup>300</sup> Perhaps to infer why power politics would be seen to be superior to legal frameworks in so far as state recognition is concerned, Orfield states an interesting perspective. He postulates that power plays an all-important role in the development of international law and that this is evident as the nations make treaties.<sup>301</sup> Political power is very important in the creation and extinction of states.

In the short run, states can exist without sovereignty as long as they do not lose international recognition. Barrington et al state that it is important to note that this recognition can be granted before sovereignty has been achieved, and it can continue after has, in reality, been lost.<sup>302</sup> The European and American governments, for instance, recognised the independence of several republics of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia and eventually Bosnian before the governments of these republics had complete control over their territory from the Yugoslav military.

Somaliland's business sector is reported to be thriving exponentially in spite of its lack of recognition. The role of MNCs, whether from the East or West, must be examined. With financial resources at their disposal that dwarf those of many states, the largest MNCs wield enormous power. Perlez and Bonner argue that indeed, recognition

---

<sup>299</sup> L. A. Malone, *International Law*, (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2008), p.42.

<sup>300</sup> L. B. Orfield, 'Books for Lawyers', *American Bar Association Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 1, (1958), pp.55-62:61.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, p.61.

<sup>302</sup> L. Barrington, et al, *Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices*, (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2010), p.46.

by MNCs may at times be even more important than recognition by the UN in conveying legitimacy and power to a new state or government in the sense that agreements reached between MNCs and particular governments may provide those governments with the revenues required to defeat domestic rivals or to stand up to neighbouring states.<sup>303</sup> This should be looked at from this perspective: MNCs' countries of origin are very powerful actors in international politics.

The failure of the Somaliland governments to participate in the Somalia peace process backed by its reluctance to engage with the recent semblances of governments in Somalia have also worked against the image of Somaliland internationally even as it seeks recognition.<sup>304</sup> Indeed thousands of people protested against the outcome of the Arta process<sup>305</sup> in the streets of Hargeisa and Berbera, denouncing President Abudqassim as a relic of the past, burning Somali flags and holding placards reading: "*No More Unity*". President Egal claimed that future relations "can only proceed with prior unconditional acceptance by the Transitional National Government of the Republic of Somaliland".<sup>306</sup>

Woodward posits that as long as there is no recognised indigenous authority in Mogadishu, Somaliland is unable to receive an agreed farewell of the sort that was so helpful to Eritrea.<sup>307</sup> The semblances of governments in Mogadishu formed after 1991 have never really been in control of Somalia. According to Abukar, Somaliland will

---

<sup>303</sup> J. Perlez & R. Bonner, *Global Politics in a Changing World*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009), p.224.

<sup>304</sup> Sadia Musse Ahmed, Telephonic interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2011 from Hargeisa.

<sup>305</sup> In August 2000, under UN auspices, a lengthy conference of Somali elders and civil society groups in Arta, Djibouti where Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was elected as Somalia's new President.

<sup>306</sup> A. Huliaras, 'The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, op cit, p.168.

<sup>307</sup> P. Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, op cit, p.195.



most certainly obtain international recognition in the near future if its leaders negotiate with the TFG leading to an agreeable process that is clear on the terms of Somaliland's secession or otherwise. As it stands, the two sides have not directly engaged on this issue.<sup>308</sup>

The international community (especially the West) on the other hand perceives the question of Somaliland as potentially divisive to its objectives of seeing peace and stability to Somalia, given its geo-strategic positioning. Most nations will therefore not want to grant Somaliland recognition when Somalia remains in civil war. According to Bruton, Somalilanders crave international recognition of the territory as an independent nation but it appears that a substantial majority of southern Somalis desire reunification, or at least the perpetuation of a confederal system. The Somalilanders' commitment to independence is a stumbling block to international efforts to establish a central government for Somalia.<sup>309</sup>

### **5.3 Recommendations**

#### **5.3.1 Resolving Somali problems with Somali solutions**

Ayittey opines that a long-term solution to Africa's problems can come only from Africans themselves, not from well-meaning occupying powers or grandiose nation-building schemes of the United Nations.<sup>310</sup> He adds that the United Nations and the United States must allow Africans to work out their own destiny.

---

<sup>308</sup> Mohamed Abukar, Telephonic Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2010 from Gaalkacyo.

<sup>309</sup> B. E. Bruton, *Somalia: A New Approach*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010), p.17.

<sup>310</sup> G. B. N. Ayittey, *The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution*, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-205.html>, Retrieved 26<sup>th</sup> June 2011.

Bryden observes that many Somalilanders consider their independence to be non-negotiable and irreversible.<sup>311</sup> They oppose any discussion on the topic of association and view the prospect of dialogue with the south solely as an international requirement for obtaining international recognition as an independent state. In diplomatic circles, the question of Somalia unity is routinely described a matter best left for Somalis to decide. Bryden cautions that this is a disingenuous and deceptive argument to the extent that it refers only to the recognition of Somaliland; most foreign governments stand ready to recognise a new Somali government when one finally emerges, implicitly accepting its claims to sovereignty over Somaliland as well.<sup>312</sup>

Indeed Huliaras reminds us that the majority of the people of Somaliland have developed a sense of identity distinct from the rest of Somalis; a sense of identity mainly based on kinship and shared historical experiences.<sup>313</sup>

Acknowledging the reality that the international community craves for a stable Somalia and while also appreciating the reality that Somaliland is less likely to reunite with Somalia, Schraeder recommends that the cornerstone of any viable proposal designed to solve ongoing ethnic conflict and state collapse must be the recognition of the death of pan-Somali nationalism and thus international recognition of the sovereignty of

---

<sup>311</sup> M. Bryden, 'Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *African Security Review*, op cit, p.26.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., p.26.

<sup>313</sup> A. Huliaras, 'The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (2002), pp.157-176:157.

the Somaliland Republic.<sup>314</sup> Schraeder laments that unfortunately, the vast majority of proposals fail to recognise that northern Somali elites have reached a point of no return.

That Somaliland has looked at the example of Eritrea to justify her own quest for recognition is not in question. Perhaps a difference is that unlike Eritrea, Somaliland re-emerged from a state that had crumbled and with no central government with which to negotiate with so as to amend the Act that led to the union in 1960. Menkhaus surmises that Somaliland, just like Eritrea has however moved “away from colonially designed juridical statehood to fashion empirical formulas that respond to the messiness of their current realities. Only time will reveal whether these new, flexible structures prove an effective response to . . . state weakness”<sup>315</sup>

Battera posits that successful local reconciliations are easier than national or regional reconciliation efforts in that when local reconciliation processes are difficult, local agreements are more likely to be respected than national agreements.<sup>316</sup> The number of actors and interests are reduced and their composition is easier. Battera recommends that state-building operations sponsored by the international community must start with and respect local experiences.<sup>317</sup> This will lead to a stable Somalia and perhaps pave the way for a process that will lead to the international recognition of Somaliland

---

<sup>314</sup> P. J. Schraeder, 'From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali Nationalism', in L. W. Barrington, (ed), *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, op cit, p.133.

<sup>315</sup> K. Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping', *International Security*, op cit, p.106.

<sup>316</sup> F. Battera, 'State - & Democracy - Building in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of Somaliland - A Comparative Perspective', *Global Jurist Frontiers*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2004), pp.1-21:18.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

### 5.3.2 The Role of UN, AU and Sub-regional organisations

Mohamoud portends that the UN administration attempted to resolve the political conflict in Somalia by focusing too much on quickly imposed outcomes and too little on the process. In fact, it was disregard for the process - which painstakingly builds up towards a possible negotiated outcome that has made the resolution of Somalia's conflict so problematic.<sup>318</sup> By focussing too much on track I diplomacy (as opposed to track II), the UN diplomats sought out the warlords who presided over the collapse of the state as interlocutors in the political reconciliation. The result was that the UN diplomats dangerously promoted the political interests of the capricious warlords at the expense of informal civic groups.<sup>319</sup>

Møller opines that no matter how popular the phrase 'African Solutions to African Problems' may be, it is neither obvious that 'Africa' could nor should solve all the continent's problems.<sup>320</sup> He adds that the ambitions of the African Union, the various sub-regional organisations on the continent and the national leaders are obvious and the determination to strive for their realisation seems sincere, at least in most cases. However, that there is a wide gap between these ambitions and the actual accomplishments should come as no great surprise. It is notable that both the AU and the sub-regional organisations have actually succeeded in bringing at least relative peace to countries such as Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan (with the significant exception of Darfur) in situations where the rest of the 'global community'

---

<sup>318</sup> A. A. Mohamoud, *State Collapse and Post-conflict Development in Africa: the Case of Somalia (1960-2001)*, (Indiana:Purdue University Press, 2006), p.150.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

<sup>320</sup> B. Møller, *The African Union as Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems?* (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2009), p.16.

procrastinated.<sup>321</sup> It is this motivation that should be applied to the Somalia conflict and by extension the question of Somaliland's quest for international recognition.

The researcher discovered late into the study that the opinions of important actors in Sool, Saanag and Cayn (SSC) needed to have been factored. He therefore proposes that more study needs to be done with the focus on the implications of Somaliland's recognition to SSC. Review of various websites, blogs and online newspapers revealed that the leaders of SSC could indeed not be supportive of neither Somaliland's recognition nor Somalia's government. This is worth exploring in further studies.

---

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., p.16.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullahi, M. D., *Culture and Customs of Somalia*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2001)
- Adam, H.M., 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 21, No. 59, (1994), pp.21-38.
- Abokor, A. Y., et al, *Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, September 2005*, (London: Progressio, 2006).
- Adam, H. M., 'Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 21, No. 59, (1994), pp.21-38.
- Adam, H. M., 'Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?' in I. W. Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp.69-90.
- Adiele, F., 'Locating Biafra: The Words We Wouldn't Say', in B. W. Thompson & S. Tyagi, (ed), *Names We Call Home: Autobiography on Racial Identity*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.75-86.
- Akol, J. J., *Burden of Nationality: Memoirs of an African Aidworker/Journalist 1970's-1990's*, (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2006).
- Albin-Lackey, C., "*Hostages to Peace*": *Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
- Arieff, A., 'De Facto Statehood? The Strange Case of Somaliland', *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2008), pp.60-79.
- Ayittey, G. B. N., *The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution*, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-205.html>, Retrieved 26<sup>th</sup> June 2011.
- Bariagaber, A., *Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006).
- Barrington, L., et al, *Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices*, (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2010).
- Battera, F., 'State - & Democracy - Building in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of Somaliland - A Comparative Perspective', *Global Jurist Frontiers*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2004), pp.1-21.
- Bederman, D. J., *The Spirit of International Law*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002).
- Boczek, B. A., *International Law: A Dictionary*, (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2005).
- Bradbury, M., et al, 'Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97, (2003), pp.455-478.
- Brownlie, I., *Principles of Public International Law, Fourth Edition*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
- Brunnée, J., et al, *International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted in Canada*, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publication, 2006).
- Bruton, B. E., *Somalia: A New Approach*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).
- Bryden, M., 'Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somali Unity', *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004), pp.23-33.

- Bryden, M., 'The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition?' *Annales d'Éthiopie*, Vol. XIX, No. 19, (2003), pp.341-364.
- Coggins, B. L., *Secession, Recognition & the International Politics of Statehood*, PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2006.
- Colletta, N. J. & Cullen, M. L., *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia*, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000).
- Contini, P., *The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration*, (London: Frank Cass, 1969).
- CQ Researcher, *Global Issues: Selections from CQ Researcher*, (Newbury Park: Pine Forge Press, 2009).
- Cross, S., *Global Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
- Dagne, T., *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, (Washington, DC: Congress Research Service, 2010).
- Dagne T., & Smith, A., 'Somalia: Prospects for Peace and US Involvement', in N. J. Fitzgerald, *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), pp.4-14.
- Dehéz, D., 'Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The International Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict', in B. Gebrewold, (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) pp.21-36.
- DeRouen, K. R. & Heo, U., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007).
- Doyle, D. H., *Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America's Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements*, (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010).
- Doornbos, M. & Markakis, J., 'Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?', in M. A. R. M. Salih & L. Wohlgemuth (ed), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*, (Uppsala, Reprocentralen HSC, 1994), pp.12-18.
- Doxtader, E. & Villa-Vicencio, C., *Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa*, (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2003).
- Dumper, M. & Stanley, B. E., *Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007).
- Easton, S. C., *The Twilight of European Colonialism: A Political Analysis*, (London: Bradford and Dickens, 1961).
- Eggers, A. K., 'When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland', *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2007), pp.211-222.
- Elden, S., *Terror and Territory: The Spatial extent of Sovereignty*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
- Erades, L., and Instituut, T. M. C. A., *Essays on International & Comparative Law in Honor of Judge Erades*, (The Hague: Brill Archive, 1983).

- Europa Publications, *The Europa World Year Book 2004*, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004).
- Evans, T., *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).
- Falola T. & Heaton, M. M., *A History of Nigeria*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- Falola T. & Oyebade, A. O., *Hot Spot: Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2010).
- Farah A. H., & Lewis, I. M., 'Making Peace in Somaliland', *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, Vol. 37, No. 146, (1997), pp.349-377.
- Federal Research Division, *Somalia a Country Study*, (Washington: Library of Congress, 1993).
- Federal Research Division, *Somalia a Country Study*, (Washington: Library of Congress, 2004).
- Feyter, K., *World Development Law: Sharing Responsibility for Development*, (Oxford: Intersentia, 2001).
- Fischer, H., & McDonald, A., *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005).
- Fitzgerald, N. J., *Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002).
- Forrest, J. B., *Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances and Politics*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004).
- Forsythe, D. P., *Human Rights and World Politics*, (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).
- Francis, D. J., *Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005).
- Gebrewold, B., *Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009).
- Gebrewold, B., 'Civil Militias and Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa', in D. J. Francis, (ed), *Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), pp.187-212.
- Gordon, A. A., *Nigeria's Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2003).
- Ham, A., *Africa*, (London: Lonely Planet, 2010).
- Hamilton, E., *Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia*, <http://globaltides.pepperdine.edu/rethinking-somalia.pdf>. Retrieved on 6th August 2011.
- Hansen, S. J. & Bradbury, M., 'Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa?', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 34, No. 113, (2007), pp.461-476.
- Hashim, A. B., 'Globalisation and Africa: Reconstructing the Failed Somali State and Reviving National Identity', in A. Jalata, (ed), *State Crises, Globalisation, and National Movements in North-East Africa*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.182-201.



- Hassan, S. M., 'Naming the Conflict: Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan', in S. M. Hassan & C. E. Ray, (ed), *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: a Critical Reader*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp.154-169:160.
- Hastedt, G. P., *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004).
- Hatch, J., *A History of Post-War Africa*, (Worcester: André Deutsch Ltd., 1965).
- Hironaka, A., *Never Ending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005).
- Höhne, M. V. 'People & Politics Along & Across the Somaliland-Puntland Border', in D. Feyissa & M. V. Hoehne, (ed), *Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, (New York: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 2010), pp.97-121.
- Höhne, M. V., 'Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2006), pp.397-414.
- Hoyle, P., 'Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?', *IBRU Boundary & Security Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2000), pp.80-91.
- Hughes, J. & Sasse, G., *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002).
- Huliaras, A., 'The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 20. No. 2, (2002), pp.157-182.
- Human Rights Watch, and Albin-Lackey, C., *"Hostages to Peace": Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland*, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
- Icon Group International, *Ethiopia: Webster's Quotations, Facts and Phrases*, (San Diego: ICON Group International, Inc., 2008).
- International Business Publications, *Djibouti Foreign Policy and Government Guide*, (Washington DC: International Business Publications, 2010).
- Jackson, R. H. & Sørensen, G., *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- Jacqz, J.W., *Africa Policy Update: Conference Report, 1977 African-American Conference*, (Washington, D.C.: Transaction Publishers, 1978).
- Jessup, P. C., 'The Estrada Doctrine', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25, No. 4, (1931), pp.719-723.
- Jhazbhay, I., 'Political Islam, Africa and the War on Terror', in M. Smith, (ed), *Securing Africa: Post-911 Discourses on Terrorism*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), pp.67-79.
- Jibril, A. M., 'The Somali Crisis: Prospects and Options', in M. A. R. M. Salih & L. Wohlgemuth, (ed), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), pp.47-52.
- Juang, R. M. & Morrissette, N., *Africa and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2008).
- Kamalu, C., *The Little African History Book – Black Africa from the Origins of Humanity to the Assassination of Lumumba and the Turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, (London: Orisa Press, 2007).

- Kamanu, O. S., 'Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U Dilemma', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1974), pp.355-376.
- Kaplan, L. S., *Entangling Alliances With None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson*, (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987).
- Kaplan, S., 'The Remarkable Story of Somaliland', in L. J. Diamond & M. F. Plattner, (ed), *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp.248-264.
- Kaplan, S. D., *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008).
- Karatnycky, A., *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, (New York: Freedom House, 2002).
- Kariye, B., *The Kaleidoscopic Lover: The Civil War in the Horn of Africa & My Itinerary for a Peaceful Lover*, (Indiana: Authorhouse, 2010).
- Kieh, G. K., 'The Somali Civil War', in G.K. Kieh, & I.R. Mukenge, (ed), *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*, (London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), pp.123-138.
- Kolstø, P., 'The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized and Quasi-states', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 6, (2006), pp.723-740.
- Kreijen. G., *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness*, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).
- Lacey, M., "The Signs Say Somaliland but the World Says Somalia" in *Hargeysa Journal*. Retrieved January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2010 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/africa/05somaliland.html>.
- Laitin, D. D., 'The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, (1976), pp.449-468.
- Lalande, S., 'Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping', in D. Warner, (ed), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp.69-99.
- Lancaster, C. J., 'The Horn of Africa', in A. Lake, (ed), *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa*, (Washington, DC: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp.169-190.
- Lewis, I. M., *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: a Guide to Cultural History and Social Institutions*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
- Lewis, N., 'The Tasks of Political Recovery', in G. T. Harris, (ed), *Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries*, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp.65-94.
- Lyons, T., 'Can Neighbours Help? Regional Actors and Conflict Management', in F. M. Deng & T. Lyons, (ed), *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998), pp.67-99.
- Lyons, T., & Samatar, A. I., *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
- Lulat, Y. G-M., *A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present: A Critical Synthesis*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005).
- Malanczuk, P., and Akehurst, M. B., *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, (London: Routledge, 1997).

- Malone, L. A., *International Law*, (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2008).
- Mazrui, A. A., 'The Bondage of Boundaries', *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1994), pp.60-63.
- McEwan, P. J. M. & Sutcliffe, R. B., *The Study of Africa*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1965).
- McKenna, A. (ed), *The History of Central and Eastern Africa*, (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2011).
- Menelik, G. Y. I., *The Emergence and Impacts of Islamic Radicalists*, (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2009).
- Menkhaus, K., 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping', *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3, (2007), pp.74-106.
- Milton-Edwards, B., *Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World*, (Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd., 2004).
- Minahan, J., *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
- Mohamoud, A.A., *State Collapse and Post-conflict Development in Africa: the Case of Somalia (1960-2001)*, (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006).
- Møller, B., *The African Union as Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems?* (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2009).
- Moore, J.A. & Pubantz, J., *Encyclopedia of the United Nations*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2002).
- Mubarak, J. A., *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996).
- Müllerson, R. A., *International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS*, (New York: Routledge, 1994).
- Muriithi, T., *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005).
- Murison, K., *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*, (London: Europa Publications, 2002).
- Nolan, C. J., *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations: S-Z*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
- Notholt, S., *Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict*, (London: Troubar Publishing Ltd., 2008).
- Notholt, S., *Fields of Fire: An Atlas of Ethnic Conflict - Extended Edition*, (London: Stuart Notholt Communication Ltd., 2008).
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, G., *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, (London: Zed Books, 2002).
- Ofuho, C. H., 'Security Concerns in the Horn of Africa,' in M. Mwagiru (ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*, (Nairobi: Henrich Böll Foundation, 2004).
- Omar S. & Yonis, M., 'Community Empowerment: The Experience of the Northwestern Integrated Community Development Program in Somaliland', in F. W. T. P. Vries, (ed), *Bright Spots Demonstrate Community Successes in African Agriculture*, (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 2005), pp.49-70.

- Orfield, L. B., 'Books for Lawyers', *American Bar Association Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 1, (1958), pp.55-62.
- Orwa, D. K., 'Change & Continuity in Kenya's Foreign Policy from Kenyatta to Moi', in W. O. Oyugi, (ed), *Politics and Administration in East Africa*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994), pp.297-330.
- Page, M. E. and Sonnenburg, P., *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural and Political Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003).
- Page, K., *Middle East Review*, (London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2004).
- Patman, R. G., *Strategic Shortfall: the Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010).
- Pertez, J. & Bonner, R., *Global Politics in a Changing World*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009).
- Peters, B. A., *Managing Diversity in Intergovernmental Organisations*, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008).
- Prunier, G., 'Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2002), pp.247-272.
- Roberts, A. D. & Oliver R. A., *The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- Roble, F., 'Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somaliland's Unilateral Secession', *Horn of Africa*, Vol. XXV, (2007), pp.165-196.
- Rothwell, D. et al, *International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives*, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- Schlee, G., *How Enemies are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).
- Schraeder, P. J., 'From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of Pan-Somali Nationalism', in L. W. Barrington, (ed), *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp.107-140.
- Seddon, D. & Seddon-Daines, D., *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa*, (London: Routledge, 2005).
- Shaw, M. N., *International Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Shinn, D. H., et al, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, (Maryland: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2004).
- Siourelli, D., 'Regional Partners: Perceptions and Criticisms at the Africa Union', in S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti, (ed), *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp.180-193.
- Spears, I. S., 'Reflections on Somaliland & Africa's Territorial Order', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 95, (2003), pp. 89-98.
- Stock, R. F., *Africa South of the Sahara: a Geographical Interpretation*, (New York: Guilford Press, 2004).
- Stokes, J., *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, Volume 1*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, Inc., 2009).
- Streleau S. & Ngesi, S., 'Somalia: Beginning the Journey from Anarchy to Order', in E. Doxtader & C. Villa-Vicencio, (ed), *Through Fire with Water: the Roots of*

- Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa*, (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2003), pp.155-186.
- Sturman, K., 'New Norms, Old Boundaries: The African Union's Approach to Secession and State Sovereignty', in A. Pavković & P. Radan (ed), *On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008), pp.67-84.
- Thackrah, J. R., *The Routledge Companion to Military Conflict Since 1945*, (New York: Routledge, 2009).
- United Nations Department of Public Information, *Can a new State or Government be recognized by the UN?*, Retrieved March 14th, 2011 from <http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/memberstate.pdf>.
- United Nations Environment Programme, *The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study*, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2005).
- Verma, S. K., *An Introduction to Public International Law*, (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 2004).
- von Bogdandy, et al, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005).
- Wagner, R. H., *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2007).
- Warbrick, C., 'Recognition of States', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (1992), pp.473-482.
- Weitz, R., *Global Security Watch-Russia: A Reference Handbook*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010).
- Weller M., & Nobbs, K., *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
- Wells, J., *Cabinda & Somaliland – A Comparative Study for Statehood & Independence*, <http://www.mballi.info/doc31.htm>, Retrieved 30<sup>th</sup> May 2011.
- Woodward, P., *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003).
- Woodward P., *Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations*, (London: British Academic Press, 1996).
- Woodward, P., *US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006).
- Weller, M. & Nobbs, K., *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

#### Interviews

- Abjata Khalif, Programme Coordinator, Wagalla Centre for Peace and Human Rights.
- Hashim Shuria, Finance Manager, Somalia Transitional Initiative for Stabilization (TIS), DAI Inc.
- Mohamed Abukar, Chief Executive Officer, Humanitarian Action for Relief and Development Organisation.
- Sadia Musse Ahmed, Somalia Country Representative, Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa.

**William Tsuma (PhD), Regional Coordinator, Resource Based Conflicts Management  
Network for the Horn and East Africa**