



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**FACULTY OF ARTS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**FACTORS INFLUENCING YOUTH RECRUITMENT INTO *AL-SHABAAB*: A  
CASE STUDY OF *LAMU* COUNTY- KENYA  
(2011-2016)**

**REG NO: C50/83599/15**

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE IN STRATEGIC  
AND SECURITY STUDIES**

University of Nairobi Library Thesis



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### Declaration

I declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented for an award of a degree in the University of Nairobi or any other University. I further certify that all materials used in this project that are not mine have been identified.

  
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### Recommendation

This project has been submitted with my approval as the Supervisor of the student.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DATE

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this project to my dear wife, *Milkah Wanjiru* and my beloved children *Bravin, Petoline, Harris* and *Aidan* for the immense support they accorded me throughout this program.

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## Abstract

The aim of the study was to analyze the factors that influence the youth into joining *Al-Shabaab* in *Lamu* County from 2011 to 2016. This period was critical since it was characterized by more youth joining the *Al-Shabaab*. The group targeted *Lamu* County as a vulnerable area from where they could easily recruit and radicalize youth. The research sought to answer the following questions: Does unemployment influence recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*? What are factors influencing recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*? Does poverty influence youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab*. The study employed Relative Deprivation Theory to assess why youth within *Lamu* County join *Al-Shabaab* and the researcher came up with the following hypotheses; Unemployment and exclusivity has positive correlation with recruitment of youth in *Al-Shabaab*, while second hypothesis was poverty and illiteracy has direct relationship with recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*. The study employed evaluative research design which allowed use of questionnaires, participant observation and unstructured interviews which targeted population of 97 respondents and further used total population sampling. From the survey the youth recruitment from *Lamu* County is real with majority falling in the trap laid by *Al-Shabaab*. The *Al-Shabaab* thrive from existing problems affecting the youth by offering alternatives and they end up getting a number of youth in return. The study concludes that the counterterrorism response involving the military and other security agencies is necessary, but requires to be reinforced by quick impact projects to deal with economic and social well-being of the youth and communities who live in the county. The study further recommends that the government should initiate empowerment programs so that the *Al-Shabaab*'s ideologies do not attract the youth. The programs should include but not limited to *Kazi kwa vijana*<sup>1</sup> programs to be implemented in *Lamu* to empower the youth to afford basic needs and provide them with employment opportunities. The government should build adequate schools and employ enough teachers to ensure that children get the best education that prepares them for future. The study recommends identification and research further on theories that would explain why *Al-Shabaab* continues to radicalize and recruit youth not only from *Lamu* County but the whole country in joining *Al-Shabaab*. Also research on whether or not the proximity of *Lamu* County to Somalia and *Lacta Belt* motivates youth to join *Al-Shabaab*.

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<sup>1</sup> *Kazi kwa vijana* is a youth empowerment program run by national government to create employment to youths.

## **Acronyms & Abbreviations**

<b>AD</b>	Anno Domini
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Mission in Somalia
<b>AQ</b>	Al-Qaeda
<b>AS</b>	<i>Al-Shabaab</i>
<b>ATPU</b>	Anti-Terror Police Unit
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CVE</b>	Counter Violent Extremism
<b>DCI</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
<b>FLQ</b>	Front de libération du Québec
<b>ICU</b>	Islamic Court Union
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>ISG</b>	Islamic State Group
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>KDF</b>	Kenya Defense Forces
<b>KNBS</b>	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
<b>MDF</b>	Moorland Defense Forces
<b>MYC</b>	Muslim Youth Centre
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>NEMIS</b>	National Education Management Information System
<b>NIS</b>	National Intelligence Service
<b>RCMP</b>	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government

<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>VE</b>	<b>Violent extremism</b>
<b>VEG's</b>	<b>Violent Extremist Groups</b>

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Africa has emerged as a discrete theatre of the "war on terror" due to increased extremist and terrorist activities. In the East African region<sup>2</sup>, there existed Islamic extremism within the societies and regimes, but this was confirmed after the Bomb blasts that targeted American embassies in both Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998 killed scores of people (Medhane, 2011). This was due to a nation's inability for self defence and the absence of a legitimate government with good example being Somalia (Medhane, 2011). The Horn of Africa continues to be one of the most violent and unstable regions of the world. The instability in Somalia strategically made African countries through African Union (AU) to come together and form a mission in Somalia under the umbrella of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to neutralize *Al-Shabaab* and stabilize Somalia. This move is derived from the theory of collective security<sup>3</sup> whose tenets are on amalgamated power by AU members (Mwagambi, 2010).

According to this theory of collective security all members are equal to the task and sufficient to overpower the might of *Al-Shabaab* and are also committed to constraints in order to contain the aggression without looking where they originate. The deployment is sanctioned by the political class of various AU member countries through the political goodwill of respective countries who discuss the matters regarding funding of the operations and quantum of military power to be missioned. In Somalia, for instance, there are military forces deployed since 2007 with Kenya deploying in the year 2012, Uganda and Burundi from 2007 and Ethiopia from 2014 which constitute AMISOM forces.

A report by United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group in the year 2011 on Eritrea and Somalia showed that non-Somali Kenyan nationals established bigger quantum of force within rank and file of *Al-Shabaab*. This was as a result of an attribute of extremism and radicalization programs that made most of these youth to believe that the campaign against leftist-extremist Islamic factions

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<sup>2</sup> East African Region is a region on the eastern Africa bordering horn of Africa composing of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.

<sup>3</sup> Theory of collective security is a theory of international relations which indicate that members' states will not attack each other and they will rise in defense of a member state thus attacked.

elsewhere like Iraq and Afghanistan became part of the campaign against extremist Muslims in Somalia. Extremism demands a thorough analysis of both thematic and country-specific issues focused on regional conception and consistent effort.

Theories from different scholars have been used to unravel why youth are radicalized and made to commit atrocities. Both cognitive<sup>4</sup> and psychoanalytic theories<sup>5</sup> argue that there are different drives to this. For example, some youth think terrorism is an ideal option to achieve a certain goal like liberating themselves from western influence and exploitation. In religious identity crisis, a member of a small faction may seek recognition commit atrocities that are beyond reproach in order to influence others in believing to their faith. They get the excitement in killing what they call non-believers and gets satisfaction in suppressing them as they commit atrocities like suicide bombing (Jaffer, 2013).

Kenya has suffered the wrath of *Al-Shabaab* for a decade and also from other terror factions including Al-Qaeda for more than 20 years. A report on terror by a joint team from Kenyan government and United Nations Development Programme, 2015 indicated that *Al-Shabaab* leads the current terror attacks and killings like *Garissa* University attack on 2 April, 2015 in Kenya. The report further indicates that panic attacks on security agencies convoys and security posts and radicalization trends have taken root in the Coastal and North Eastern regions of Kenya. The study concluded that the rise in attacks in the different part of the country was as result of more recruitment of both informers and foot soldiers (Government of Kenya and United Nations Development, 2015).

With airstrikes in the year 2011 by Kenya Defence Forces and ground campaign from the same year against *Al-Shabaab* within Somalia, there were retaliatory attacks in Kenya with the *Al-Shabaab* faction being daring enough to attack even the Capital City of Kenya, Nairobi. There were more than 80 attacks<sup>6</sup> recorded in the year 2014, and this was an increase from 43 attacks in

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<sup>4</sup> Cognitive theory suggests that people perceive information incorrectly and make decisions that may cause violence at slightest provocation.

<sup>5</sup> Psychoanalytic theory by Freud suggests that human behaviours are product of unconscious forces operating within a person mind.

<sup>6</sup> Some of the attacks include 16 June 2014 attack on *Mpeketoni* town and the Hijack of *Mandera - Nairobi* bound bus killing 28 non-Muslims on board on 22 April 2014.

in the year 2013 (Pate, 2015). The threat posed by *Al-Shabaab* in Kenya is the hidden network, which facilitates radicalization and recruitment of the youth into *Al-Shabaab* and its local affiliate, *Al-Hijra*. Recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* and *Al-Hijra* has often been surprisingly carried out openly through social organizations like Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) which posed to advocate against marginalization of Muslims. From the year 2011 to 2014, an estimated 1,000 people from Kenya and Tanzania mainly Kenyans travelled to Somalia to receive training and battle experience with *Al-Shabaab* (Daniel Torbjörnsson, 2016). This trend was an upsurge of more radicalized youth joining *Al-Shabaab*.

## 1.2 Area of Study

The study was carried out within *Lamu* County. *Lamu* County is situated in Northern Kenya along the Coastline bordering Somalia. It has 7 administrative divisions namely: *Amu, Hindi, Faza, Kiunga, Kizingitini, Mpeketoni* and *Witu* (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The County has *Lamu, Manda, Pate* and *Kiwayu* Islands with *Lamu* town situated in *Lamu* Island which hosts the County administrative units and County Commission headquarters along the shore line. The County has an area of 6474.7km square that combines both the mainland and the islands with coastline line which is 130km long. The County is further divided in to ten wards which include *Mkomani, Shella, Faza, Kiunga, Basuba, Hindi, Hongwe, Bahari, Mkunumbi* and *Witu*. It has a population of 101,539 as per the 2009 population census (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

*Lamu* County has been the target area for *Al-Shabaab* recruitment due to its proximity to Somalia. According to Daily Nation (2014) United Nation's report accused *Al-Shabaab* of wooing youth from the Coastal Kenya with a Swahili video titled "*Mujahideen Moments 3*". The video was released in February 2014 by a male identified as *Abu Salim Muhajir* from *Mombasa*. He is heard warning the government not to forget *West Gate attack*.<sup>7</sup> This video targeted the Coastal Swahili people because in that video, the one speaking has a very strong command of the Swahili language, which qualifies him as a native speaker (Barasa, 2014). The map of the targeted area is further attached as appendix 1.

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<sup>7</sup> West Gate attack is an attack which was launched by *Al-Shabaab* at Westgate shopping mall on Saturday 21 September 2013. It was carried out by four masked gunmen killing scores of different nationalities.



### 1.3 Statement of the Problem

*Lamu* County has been a playing ground for *Al-Shabaab* for quite sometime since the defeat of Islamic Courts Union(ICU) which later gave birth to *Al-Shabaab* and retreat to *Boni Forest* in the year 2006.The *Al-Shabaab* has continued to recruit the youth from *Lamu* County and are committing atrocities within the region continually with *Mpeketoni* attacks and *Poromoko* attacks reflecting as examples. There are youth from the Coast within the rank and file of *Al-Shabaab* who speak fluent Swahili with an accent from the Coast as is evident from the video from *Al-Kataib* Foundation website released on 24 Jan 2017.

There are political problem arising from the recruitment of youth as *Lamu* community is subjected to live with security agencies in effort to avert the youth recruitment from the area. There are curfew imposed on the locals as a result. This further result in restraining economy of *Lamu* due to the fact that business are closed early as result and tourism industry is also affected impacting negatively to *Lamu* county. The recruitment of youth from the area denies locals working populations who could help in uplifting the lives of locals. The locals arc subjected to rigorous process when they want to secure crucial document like birth certificate and identity cards as a result. This further affect the local community since service providers like doctors and investors feel insecure operating within the county. This is due to the fact that the youth who are recruited from the area understand the area very well and can target them through kidnapping for ransom. This contradicts the perception that Kenyan-Somalis are the major cream of *Al-Shabaab* which can undermine the legitimacy and weaken the efforts of government to strategize and deal with terror groups.

This new development by terrorists to be able to successfully entice and recruit into their gang, youth from other ethnic groups presented a good field for research to analyze the overriding factors that influence the youth from *Lamu* County into joining the terror groups. The recruitment into extremist groups within *Lamu* County is high in comparison to other counties who share same poverty levels like *Meru* and *Siaya* or even poorer counties like *Turkana*, *Marsabit* and *West Pokot* as per the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) survey of 2017.

The killings in *Mpeketoni* attacks of the year 2014 in *Lamu* County were believed to be orchestrated by *Al-Shabaab* who operated within *Boni* forest due to the way attacks were carried

out and knowledge of the area. With a majority of them recruited from the Coast, they very well understood the region's terrain by virtue of being residents. Their participation was also evident from the video which was released later via *Al-Kataib* foundation on 03 March 2015 with the Swahili language and background music emanating from Coast region (*Al-Kataib* Foundation, 2015). Other reports published on Nation Newspaper on 30 January 2017 indicated that *Ramadhan Kungwa*, a *Lamu* County resident was involved in *Kolbiyow military attack*<sup>8</sup> in 29 January, 2017. He was allegedly spotted while sneaking back to Kenya from Somalia a day after the attack to seek medical attention immediately after the offensive (Ombati, 2017).

It is against this background that the study sought to investigate the factors that influenced the recruitment of youth from *Lamu* County into the *Al-Shabaab* terror group because several teenagers have joined the terror group. The study covers the period between the years 2011-2016. This period was critical because, more youth in *Lamu* were recruited into *Al-Shabaab* than any other time to replace the casualties which decreased to between 3000 to 8000 armed fighters with group mutation to terror group (Seth G. Jones, 2016) This period also saw increased terrorist attacks in the *Lamu* County like *Mpeketoni attacks* and the nation at large which includes *West-Gate attack* and *Garissa University attack* (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

#### 1.4 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the following questions.

1. What are factors influencing youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* within *Lamu* County of Kenya between the years 2011-2016?
2. Does unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and exclusivity influence youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab*?
3. What mechanisms are there in place to avert recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*?

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<sup>8</sup> *Kolbiyow* military attack is an offensive engagement that was conducted by *Al-Shabaab* on Kenya Defence Forces forward operating base using vehicle borne improvised explosive and claimed lives of some soldiers on 2017.

## **1.5 Objectives of the Study**

### **Overall Objective**

The overall aim was to critically analyze the factors influencing youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* groups in *Lamu* County of Kenya in the years between the years 2011-2016.

### **Specific Objectives**

1. To determine how unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and exclusivity influence recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab* group in *Lamu* County.
2. To determine the mechanisms in place to prevent recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*.
3. To analyze the challenges and way forward in dealing with recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*.

## **1.6 Justification of the Study**

### **1.6.1 Academic Justification**

Some authors have tried to unearth the factors that promote recruitment of youth into violent extremist groups. For instance, Kleinmann (2012) examined factors of radicalization and extremism in the United States of America (USA) among *Sunni* Muslims who are born and brought up there. It was evident that radicalization was not caused by perceived injustices against Muslims since they enjoy equal rights as everyone else.

On the other hand, a study by Otieno (2014) on youth radicalization in Kenya established that poverty, illiteracy and perceived discrimination of certain communities influence their young people into joining extremist groups. These two studies are contradicting in terms of injustices on Muslims as a factor. Otieno's study does not express precisely the level of illiteracy which motivates radicalization and whether it also includes religious education. The indicators of radicalized youth in Kenya is also lacking, more so in *Lamu* County.

In *Lamu* County of Kenya, the *Al-Shabaab* movement has a clandestine support network trying to radicalize and recruit youth ( International Crisis Group, 2012). Increased recruitment by terror groups in *Lamu* County might be attributed to governance failure by those in power, providing

terror groups with the environment that facilitates the recruitment under the guise of employing the youth and provision of essential services through non-governmental organizations linked to them. There is deficiency on the literature available on the factors that promote youth joining *Al-Shabaab* within *Lamu* County, hence the gap that this study seeks to fill.

### **1.6.2 Policy Justification**

The study illuminates ways for efficient management of youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* within *Lamu* County of Kenya. The second area of significant concerns is the period of recruitment. In Kenya currently, many youth are being radicalized, and Kenya is facing the challenge of dealing with this matter. Some progress made in determining reasons why youth are joining these groups is not conclusive. A critical analysis of why youth from different communities join is yet to be known. The researcher has tabulated some line of thinking that will provide information about what policies the policymakers can develop guided by the research, which when applied will reduce or prevent the recruitment of the youth into terror groups.

The attacks are proofs that without checks on terror groups, the country cannot progress and thus this requires to be investigated thoroughly. For Kenya to realize its vision 2030 there must be a comprehensive strategy on how to amicably deal with terror outfits. The fight against *Al-Shabaab* within *Boni Forest*<sup>9</sup> has now taken more than two years despite earlier plans by the government to fight it within three months (Muraya, 2015). This failure implies that the government policy in this campaign was not purely based on empirical evidence. The *Al-Shabaab* group thrived in *Lamu* County before deployment of security agencies in 2015 to deal with the situation and has continued to operate even after deployment.

The study informs on policies that if adopted to be used in preventing the recruitment of the youth into *Al-Shabaab* groups will yield a positive result. The allocation of resources to fight the recruitment to *Al-Shabaab* extremist group and terrorism will not be required if the motivators or grievances that drive youth to terror groups are addressed in advance.

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<sup>9</sup> *Boni forest* is an open canopy forest which covers Eastern part of *Lamu* County of Kenya and Western section of *Badaade* district of Somalia.

### **1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The study covers *Lamu* County of Kenya as the target area with a concentration of sectors where known suspects originate from, as per Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) records. Analysis is on political, economic and social factors as they exist in those regions. It covers the period from 2011 when KDF incursion to Somalia was launched through 2013 when devolution of power to Counties got actualized in the year 2016. Available time and distances covered limited the scope of the study. Linguistic barrier depending on the language used by the interviewees played a role in limiting the scope, but services of a language interpreter aided in overcoming this challenge.

## **1.8 Definition and Operationalization of Key Concepts**

### **Extremist Groups**

These are groups 'which support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals' (UNDOC, 2017). Another definition of an extremist group is a group of people which deviate from normal values, ideals, and beliefs of society (Kristen M. Klein, 2013). Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) defines the concept as individuals within a setting who condone and support the acts that have religious social and political motives (Federal Bureau Investigation, 2017) .

According to Melanie Norwood (2014), an extremist group is a group of individuals whose values, ideals, and beliefs fall far outside of what the society considers normal. It is often associated with violent tactics to convey their point to outsiders; thus, many definitions may refer to these groups as 'violent extremist groups' (Norwood, 2014). In this study, it will refer to all groups that use violence in pursuing their political and social ideologies in the society (Perl, 2004).

### **Radicalization**

Radicalization has different definitions from various scholars and authors. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) government domestic intelligence agency (2008), the Security Service defines radicalization as a process where individual supports terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with the mastermind terrorist. It is a systematic process where one becomes alienated from the basics of life and adopts the strange ideology that doesn't conform to what the society considers a virtue (Royal Canadian Mounted Police Report, 2009). According to English Oxford Living Dictionary online edition, radicalization is defined as the action or process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political or social issues. This study will adopt this latter definition in explaining radicalization.

### ***Al-Shabaab***

This is an Arabic phrase meaning "the youth" but in this paper, it will refer to a terrorist group affiliated to *Al-Qaeda* which adopted the said name. The group is active in Southern Somalia and

*Lamu* County of Kenya where they occupy a big part of *Lacta belt* which extends in both Kenya and Somalia (Abdisaid, 2008).

## **Youth**

According to the United Nations (UN) in 2001 for statistical purposes, the term youth is defined as "those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States." The Kenyan Constitution 2010 defines youth as a person between the ages of 18-35 years. In this study, 'youth' will refer to any person between 15-35 years to encompass United Nations lower limit and Kenyan definition upper limit.

## **Youth Recruitment**

Recruitment refers to the overall process to attract, shortlist, select and appoint suitable candidates for jobs which are either temporary or permanent within an organization (A.Sudhir, 2009). In this research youth recruitment will refer to the process of attracting and appointing youth between ages 15-35 years into *Al-Shabaab*.

## **Terrorism**

There are many definitions of the term 'terrorism' and different states have adopted various definitions. For example, the United States Department of justice 2005 describes terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce an authority, the civil populace, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of both political and social objectives."

According to Encyclopedia Britannica 11 edition, terrorism is defined as the systematic use of violence to create a general atmosphere of fear in a population thereby bringing about a particular political objective. In this study will adopt United States definition and modify the term to refer to all violent or non-violent activities directed at both combatants and non-combatants with an aim of inflicting fear and causing despondence within the populace in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives.

## **Exclusivity**

According to Cambridge dictionary 2019 edition, exclusivity is defined as the state of being the only person, group of people, or organization that is permitted to have or possess something. In this study exclusivity will apply to the failure to incorporate the people of *Lamu* wholly in the matters that are affecting their livelihood. This include failure to be appointed in national posts and denial of some services like birth certificates at every corner of the county.

## **Poverty**

According to United Nations, poverty is generally considered to be a measure of deprivation of the basic needs that a person, household or community requires to have a basic standard of living. The deprivation can be measured either in terms of lack of resources and capabilities. The internationally accepted measurement of poverty is those living in less than \$1.90 a day. In this research this is the definition that the study has adopted.

## **Unemployment**

According to Cambridge dictionary 2019 edition, unemployment is a term referring to individuals possessing skills and competence who are potentially employable and seeking job but are unable to secure a job. In this study the term will refer to the absence of opportunities among the youth to secure a job or self-employ themselves in order to earn a living.

## **Illiteracy**

There is no consensus on the definition of illiteracy and different scholars define it, ranging from simple ability to read and write one's own name to the collection of complex skills required in modern day society (US Senate, 1989). In this study the term will refer to inability of youth to comprehend and question the offers presented to them by *Al-Shabaab*. This will include inability to have a better understanding of religion as is the Koran for those, who converts to Islam.

## **1.9 Organization of the Study**

The research paper is organized in five chapters. Chapter one covers introduction, the background of the study, problem statement, research questions, objectives of the study, justification of the study, scope and limitation of the study and definition and operationalization of terms.



Chapter two covers literature review which includes the ways extremist groups recruit and factors leading the youth into joining extremist groups, the origin of *Al-Shabaab* and how they target recruitment from *Lamu* County in Kenya. The section analyzes different splinter groups of *Al-Shabaab* and their affiliations to other extremist groups in the World. It also covers theoretical framework, conceptual framework and hypotheses. Chapter three elaborates on the methodology used in collecting data and it looks at the relationship between non-governance and recruitment into *Al-Shabaab*.

Chapter four covers data presentation of findings and critical analysis of the data. It analyzes factors regarding political, socio-economic and environmental aspects which the government has failed to address. It covers the presentation of all the objectives and critical analysis of the same. Chapter five covers the discussions, conclusion and recommendations and way forward of the research. The references and appendices form the last part of the research project.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Terrorism

Throughout the history, terror has been applied by despotic societies to govern. In organized society it was a mean of punishing wrongdoing or dissuasion. The word terror originate from Latin word "*Terrere*" which means to "make tremble". However in modern era it has been used by different scholars and authors to mean violence in different context (Gerard Chaliand, 2007). Terrorism in this project refers to all violent or non-violent activities directed to both combatants and non-combatants with an aim of inflicting fear and causing despondence within the populace in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). Global terrorism is spreading to all corners of the World; this is supported by the fact that all continents have experienced cases of terror affecting normal lives. According to Institute for Economics and peace (2014), there was an upsurge of around the world in numbers between 2012 and 2013 which was equivalent to a 61% increase, with 66 % of these deaths caused by the *Taliban*<sup>10</sup>, *Boko Haram*, the *Islamic States* and *Al-Qaeda* (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). These four factions were seen to increase their lethality in 2014 and 2015 and a remarkable one by *Boko Haram* in January of 2015 when they killed about 2000 civilians (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

Terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s comprised mainly of radical left-wing<sup>11</sup> groups in Europe and South America with an outlined goal of resisting capitalism that contrary to the expectations was not achievable. The new breed of terrorist attacking the West had limited aims. They just wanted to kill and punish for what they trust is Western imperialism and the global oppression of Muslims in denying them religion rights. In their view, it is claimed "*you are guilty*" by association. The new terrorist organizations embraced a far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims and

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<sup>10</sup> *Taliban* is ultraconservative political and religious faction that emerged in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the collapse of Afghanistan's communist regime, and the subsequent breakdown in civil order.

<sup>11</sup> The term dates from the 1790s, when in the French revolutionary parliament the socialist representatives sat to the presiding officer's left. Leftists tend to be hostile to the interests of traditional elites, including the wealthy and members of the aristocracy, and to favour the interests of the working class.

wrap themselves in less cohesive organizational entities, with a more diffused structure and membership like *Al-Qaeda* to ensure a Muslim caliphates (Hoffman, 2006).

High profile attacks have continued particularly in Western Europe. The notable examples include; the attack by *Al-Qaeda* in Arabian Peninsula in January 2015. Here 11 staffs of satirical newspaper - Charlie Hebdo<sup>12</sup> were killed (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). Terrorist attacks increased in recent past in the west with the most attacks in France<sup>13</sup>, Belgium<sup>14</sup>, and the United States of America (USA)<sup>15</sup> in a period of six months (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016).

Terrorism today is now globalized by more networked, diverse and very lethal agendas like establishing a caliphate. The technological advancement in terms of internet, mobile and international banking, air transport and more opportunities that allow movement freely among states have advanced the concept of globalization in terrorism. Terrorist has a wide range of data of potential recruits due to the available profiles in social media just like the way marketing firms earmark their potential customers before they embark in promoting their products to them (Weinmann 2014).

### 2.1.1 Recruitment of Extremist Groups

The term extremist or radical was a common term even before 18<sup>th</sup> Century and was linked to the American and French revolution during the time. This concept became common during the 19<sup>th</sup> century in referring to political and social reforms. The word advocated for party extreme views (Akil et al., 2012).

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<sup>12</sup> It's a French satirical weekly magazine, featuring cartoons, reports, polemics, and jokes. Irreverent and stridently non-conformist in tone, the publication describes itself as above all secular, skeptic, and atheist, far-left-wing, and anti-racist, publishing articles about the extreme right especially the French nationalist National Front party, religion (Catholicism, Islam, Judaism), politics and culture.

<sup>13</sup> There was terror attacks in November 2015, Paris that killed 130 people and wounded 494. The attackers, armed with assault rifles and explosives where *ISIS* claimed responsibility.

<sup>14</sup> On the morning of 22 March 2016, three coordinated suicide bombings occurred in Belgium with two at Brussels Airport in *Zaventem*, and one at *Maalbeek* metro station in central Brussels where 32 civilians and three perpetrators were killed, and more than 300 scores injured.

<sup>15</sup> On 2 Dec 2015 at *San Bernadino*, *California*, two attackers killed 14 and injured 21 at a county employee meeting and Christmas party; both attackers were killed hours later in a shoot-out with police in which 2 police officers were injured.

The history of extremism which materializes in terrorism dates back to the pre-colonial period and is very complex as stated by Medhane (2011). From late 19<sup>th</sup> Century to-date, terrorism shares diverse political extremism and radicalization but have common terrorist action and structural features. They mostly thrive in an environment which is popularized by a sense of perceived or real fairness among the population and whole society. It also follows an aspect of exclusion and humiliation by the mighty in power and the drivers for change within a society (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008).

In the years before 1900 AD when success was unprecedented, most of the population was left out of the economically and political front. This triggered a mass movement to quell the inclusion of all in the agenda throughout Europe to become part of society. The movement used terror tactics in agitation for their cause in an archaic manner. These methods were condemned by trade unions and workers organization during this time (Coolsaet, 2011). Decades later, during inter-war period, especially after the 1929 *Great Crash*<sup>16</sup>, there were massive economic and social problems which resulted in prolonged mass unemployment that affected even the middle classes. This condition propagated racial intolerance, polarization and conflict in the society which saw a rise in radicalization benefiting the faction groups by increasing their membership. This was as a result of the fascist<sup>17</sup> offering a new set of life to those who had suffered disappointment and uncertainty in their existing social life. The groups employed terror tactics in discrediting the government of the day (Schmid, 2013).

Extremism was defined in 2009 as a systematic process where young individuals are acquainted with an ideological and belief system that deviates from the norms or status quo to views that do not respect the ideals of the society. However, extremism or radical thinking does not necessarily lead to violent or terrorist actions (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009).

A person with extremist views effectively agitates for changes on social, political and economic systems from the grassroots. However when the act of violence emanates from the extremist tendencies held, it becomes a problem to a state. The air bombing in India in the year 1984 and

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<sup>16</sup> A sharp decline in U.S. stock market values in 1929 that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Great Depression lasted approximately 10 years and affected both industrialized and non-industrialized countries in many parts of the world.

<sup>17</sup> A person who practices or believes in a system of government where a dictator has complete control.

Front de Liberation du Quebec (*FLQ*<sup>18</sup>) bombings in the 1960s to 1970s in Canada are a good example of violent extremism. There is a proof that some groups like *ISIS* and *Al-Shabaab* resort to use violent means in achieving or pushing their ideologies and this separates them from other radical groups (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009).

The European Union's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002) resulted in defining terrorism as any intentional act affecting how a country or an international organization runs. The main agenda is intimidating the population and compelling the government to stop or change its course of action. These acts, however, impacts negatively on economical, constitutional, political and social structures by attacking the integrity of people, seizure of ships and aircrafts or industries and the use of explosives to inflict very serious damages on both equipment and people.

### **2.1.2 Factors leading to Youth Recruitments into Terrorist Groups Globally**

Extremism can propel terrorism by considering the subversion aspect which it propagates when it attacks the rule of law and the democratic values. Through this act violence extremism is understood as radicalization due to socialization manifesting itself through terror acts. Waves from extremism within European liberal democracies are displayed through violent terror expressions (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008).

Al-Qaeda embraced social dynamics in the society in attracting individuals to the group which provides a common bonding structure. They also capitalize in political unrest in the countries ruled by authoritarian governments like Syria, Libya and Somalia. This behaviour has an impact on the terrorist jihads which appears to be a product of political action. They also embrace jihad which was rallied by *Osama Bin Laden*<sup>19</sup> in inspiring the masses into action. This trend was in tandem with Muslim religion which was a common denominator that united jihadists across the globe (Sparago, 2007).

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<sup>18</sup> It is a separatist and Marxist-Leninist terrorist and paramilitary group in Quebec. Founded in the early 1960s, it was a militant part of the Quebec sovereignty movement. It conducted a number of attacks between 1963 and 1970, which totaled over 160 violent incidents and killed eight people and injured many more.

<sup>19</sup> He served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011.

New media which form a social network platform like *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *Whatapp* for interaction offers terror groups an opportunity to strategize on how to get their potential recruits, a process known as narrowcasting. This process is very common with *ISIS*. This is a strategy which profiles groups of the public by segmenting them according to their preferences, demographic characteristics, attributes and all social aspects. The terror groups also use the sites in broadcasting materials which have stories or scenes which are so as to create an atmosphere that favours them in spreading fear and uncertainty which in turn create ripe conditions for propaganda and recruitment following any terrorist attack. *Al-Shabaab* have perfected the use of twitter account "*Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen (HSM)*" to win hearts and minds of potential recruits and also the case of *ISIS* in Syria (Bilgen, 2011). This space is what extremist groups capitalize to tap in the ungoverned cyberspaces.

Many public figures like Archbishop Desmond Tutu<sup>20</sup> and scholars like Marc-Olivier Cantin in his book titled " Re-examining the Terrorism-Poverty Nexus" underscores poverty at the top of list on sources of terrorism. This is further developed by believe that poverty alleviation is the answer to terror by USA president George W Bush in March 22, 2002 mentioned in his speech on the war on terror (Lee, 2011). This perception has seen an increase in foreign aid by the USA but still, this has not dealt with terror group to-date.

### **2.1.3 Factors leading to Youth Recruitments into Terrorist Groups Continentally**

Gurr (1970) in his book titled "*Why Men Rebel*", propagates that potentiality of political violence as a result of disparity among groups who believe they are entitled to the same treatment by government forces. When there are significant margins on expectations, the violence is also compensated in this respect. The actual occurrence is firstly dependent on political institutions and objects and secondly the intensity and extent of opposition toward the regime which is the striking balance on both opponents and supporters of the government (Gurr, 1970).

The movement of would be fighters in foreign land especially in Iraq and Syria have continued in recent years. There was a report of estimated 30,000 foreign fighters from about 99 different

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<sup>20</sup> The Archbishop in 2007 told CNN "The global "war on terror" can't be won if people are living in "desperate" conditions".

countries who arrived in Iraq and Syria since the year 2011 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). The flow has been high with evidence of estimated 7000 recruits in the first half of 2015 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). This is a clear indication that the recruitment agenda within the jihadist groups is still active.

A study on radicalization and extremism militants of Sunni origin within the USA realized that most of the fighters were recruited as a result of socialization from group set-up. In an analysis done on a sample of about 80 *Sunni* militants, in the USA in 2012 by terror experts it was evident that extremism is a result of the effort of recruitment by radicalized friends and some family members. It became somewhat a mystery since the perceived or real injustices which were leveled against Islam had a minor role in extremism and radicalization. This, however, cannot be substantiated due to lack of empirical research on psychological traits of terrorists (Kleinmann, 2013).

In this research project, the political factors and social-economic factors have been reviewed in respect to available literature work. Major General Jonathon P. Riley of the United Kingdom when researching on Sierra Leone conflict in 2006 realized that the *Revolutionary United Front (RUF)*<sup>21</sup> agenda were as a result of terror leveled against them by the government. The group under the leadership of Foday Sankoh<sup>22</sup> with assistance of Charles Taylor<sup>23</sup> of Liberia was able to stage resistance in Freetown. Economic deprivation of youth was the driver of the civil conflict which was witnessed in the country. Youth, however, joined *RUF* because of the political marginalization from the failure by the state and inadequate social amenities. However, their agenda was hijacked and *RUF* was quickly overtaken by criminals with no political or social objective. The government under leadership of Joseph Momoh<sup>24</sup> was reluctant in the provision of services to the populace resulting in the formation of a revolutionary group (Freeman, 2008).

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<sup>21</sup> RUF was a rebel army that fought a failed eleven-year war in Sierra Leone, starting in 1991 and ending in 2002. It later developed into a political party, which still exists today.

<sup>22</sup> He was the founder of the Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was supported by Charles Taylor-led *National patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)* in the 11-year-long Sierra Leone Civil War.

<sup>23</sup> Charles Taylor was the President of Liberia from August of 1997 until August of 2003, when he stepped down amid accusations of war crimes.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph Saidu Momoh, served as President of Sierra Leone from November 1985 to April 29, 1992. He was 2nd president of Sierra Leone and retired Major General from Army.

A study conducted in Somali by Anneli and Mahdi and published in 2014 on radicalization and *Al-Shabaab* recruitment in Somali discovered that about 39% of those interviewed cited financial reasons for joining *Al-Shabaab*. There are about 20% who claimed they did so due to the feeling that Muslims in both Palestine and Iraq were unfairly prosecuted and also the presence of 'Kuffars'<sup>25</sup> in Somali and the safeguarding of Islamic religion. There was about 10% who joined *Al-Shabaab* from fear or after being forced to do so (Institute for Security Studies, 2014).

#### 2.1.4 Factors leading to Youth Recruitments into Terrorist Groups in Kenya

*Sabaot Land Defense Forces* a guerilla group in Kenya, formed in 2005 was a result of corrupt security heads and the neglect of the area of Mt Elgon by the government as a matter of little importance (Ngulutu, 2010). In 2007, police activity against SLDF increased but remained largely unsuccessful. As a reaction to this absence of state protection, *Mosop*<sup>26</sup> began to organize security for the local people culminating in the establishment of the *Moorland Defense Forces* (MDF), named after the high region of the mountains from where the *Mosop* were resettled during the three *Chepyuk*<sup>27</sup> processes and to where many *Mosop* fled back to from SLDF violence (Ngulutu, 2010). However in this literature it fails to address the aspect of geographical and economic development as suggested by Fearon and Laitin in 2003. They argued, "States that are organizationally weak in both finance and political agenda are at the disposal of insurgencies since insurgents are aided by rough terrain, local knowledge, and large populations"(Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

The concept rough terrain versus distance from security agencies, therefore, suggests that terror group thrive in either mountainous or valleys that government forces cannot reach due to poor road networks connecting where terror groups. Their existence as well as increase in recruitment will not be realized early enough by government troops due to this challenge. This trend forms the basis of the research on the matter by getting distances between different public institutions and the places from where the terror groups operate and managed to recruit.

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<sup>25</sup> *Kuffar* is a highly derogatory Arabic term used to refer to non-Muslims, though it is usually directed less against "People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) and more against others (Hindus, Buddhists, Shintoists, etc).

<sup>26</sup> *Mosop* is one of ethnic group who lived in Mt Elgon forests before resettlement in *Chepyuk* scheme in 1970s to pave way for game reserve.

<sup>27</sup> *Chepyuk* Settlement Scheme was established in 1971 to settle the *Sabaot*, who had been pushed out of their lands by the British in colonial Kenya.



The large population of unemployed and uneducated youth in Kenya will therefore offers a large pool where the terror gang can recruit their members from. This means a large population will realize a robust terror group. This connotation formed a base of the researcher of this project to understand whether the number of *Al-Shabaab* fighters recruited in *Lamu County* has any reflection on population size. In alleviation of poverty *Lamu County* has many well-funded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), but this has not answered terror threats. Therefore, there is a need for this research to expose what is making recruitment to *Al-Shabaab* to thrive (Kenya Projects Organization, 2015).

According to some think tanks like International Republic Institute in 2017 which was evaluating local drivers to terrorism in Kosovo, corruption is seen as a prerequisite for youth joining extremist groups. Corruption is a complex phenomenon whose impacts have led to incubation and growth of youth radicalization. In his submission Marc R. Devore in 2014, an analyst on the Middle East issues describe that the rise of Hezbollah and its Secular *Shiite* rival *Amal* was facilitated by corruption. In other words, corruption is also attributed to creating environment for extremist group to recruit from when monies is embezzled by those who are entrusted in bringing development and deny youth opportunities which could reduce poverty and promote employment (M Lombardi, 2014).

The monies from natural resources could lead to infrastructural development and reduce the perceived deprivation among those living within a designated area as is the case of Niger delta (M Lombardi, 2014). In the latest era of globalization, corruption has been complex and it is now easier to remit monies scheduled for development agenda to fund terror activities at distant destinations which make it even harder to locate how transactions were made. For example Nigeria in 2013 and Philippines in 2014 managed to recover very little amount of monies stolen through corrupt means and used to support terror groups in the two countries (M Lombardi, 2014).

Youth are denied education, employment and therefore they only result to extremist groups that are willing to offer them jobs even without proper education and this promotes the chances of the groups having a pool to recruit from since the government has failed to offer them jobs. As Nobel peace laureate of 1986 argued "*What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate*

*terrorism*” (Sarah Brockhoff, 2015). Corruption inhibits the growth of a society in the economic dimension since policies are not implemented to create jobs for the youth and the result is joining terror groups. The legitimate jobs are made difficult to get and the wealthy clout in society controls who gets which job and this promotes illicit networks that promote recruitment to terror groups (M Lombardi, 2014).

In Nigeria those youth who fail to secure a bright future as a result of corruption have turned to be suicide bombers. The *Chibok* girls kidnapping and failure to rescue them has led to emergence of female suicide bombers and thus making the *Boko Haram* complex (Mesrvey, 2018). The desperation experienced by the youth due to corruption when seeking for some pre-requisite documents needed to secure jobs such as a certificate of good conduct and identity cards in case of *Boni* community of *Lamu* County in Kenya for example make youth opt to join extremist groups which do not require the documents required by government agencies when securing jobs. In Yemen corruption has resulted in the absence of public services and misappropriation of natural resources which are reserved only for a few who can be able to bribe their way out (M Lombardi, 2014). This has created a room for *Al-Qaeda of Arab Peninsula* to develop a narrative in their recruitment drive for jihad to fight the corruption (M Lombardi, 2014).

The terror groups target countries with poor rating in terms of *Corruption Perception Index (CPI)* by *Transparency International (TI)* in their recruitment efforts. For example in 2017 Syria and Somalia ranks position 178 and 180 respectively in corruption perception index of 2017 (Transparency International Org, 2017). Syria ranks fourth while Somalia ranks seventh according to global terrorism index of 2017 which is a positive correlation (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). This is made possible by mobilizing the populace in their fight against corruption which makes youth to be susceptible to the recruitment drive. The failure by political system to contain corruption provides an avenue to the terror group to plan a war waged against corruption. The narrative is easily bought about by the youth and they come in large numbers to join jihad against terror groups. Shara Chayes in the year 2016 in her literature titled “*Corruption and Terrorism: The casual link*”, confirms that corruption drove youth in Afghanistan to join the *Taliban* which is associated with religious extremism (M Lombardi, 2014).

A study on the rise of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria by Sarah Chayes in 2016 argues that the group arose as a result of class conflict between the dominant class and less privileged in the society. The failure by the state to perform critical roles in providing basic social services such as water, electricity and security prompted people enter into a contract with ethnic militia groups. Many people have joined groups based on religious fundamentalism which is coupled with competition between elite and non-elite classes.

The perception of elites manipulating non-elites have given rise to community and ethnic conflict in Nigeria which led to recruitment, arming and control of militant movements. This is further hijacked by political elites in furthering their own interests, through mobilization of youth belonging political parties. *Mohammed Yusuf*<sup>28</sup> in 2002 is believed to have been sponsored by the elite class because of the high end vehicles driven by the wealthy class like Governor Ali Modu Sheriff<sup>29</sup> seen at his compound in *Maiduguri*<sup>30</sup> whenever they visited him. This confirmed the argument that the group is a manifestation of opportunistic competition and struggle of the non-elite class for the scarce state owned economic resources (Uadiale, 2012).

According to Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder (2015), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria developed propaganda systems with its media section commonly referred as *Al-Hayat* dominating the cyberspaces using two different faces. The videos or images on one side would show the kind of life their members enjoy in day-to-day life especially showing Western-friendly videos and how conversant they are in embracing them. For example, posing with *Nutella jars*<sup>31</sup> while on other side they would display themselves as lethal even to the extent of showing children within their ranks holding heads of decapitated people. The majority of the videos are produced in such a manner that the actions on the videos resonate very well with Western music, or they have been translated into European languages to reach more, especially the youth within the society (Scott Gates et al, 2015).

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<sup>28</sup> Mohammed Yusuf was founder and leader of Boko Haram.

<sup>29</sup> He was governor of Borno state who used Boko Haram to attack political opponent before cutting link with after reelection in 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Maiduguri also called Yerwa or Yerwa-Maiduguri, capital and largest city of Borno state, northeastern Nigeria. It is located along the seasonal Ngadda (Alo) River, the waters of which disappear in the firki ("black cotton") swamps of Lake Chad, northeast of the city.

<sup>31</sup> Nutella jar is a full range of products to make the Holidays tasting good.

The rise of the internet and new media has created an atmosphere where extremist and criminal subcultures flourish. Individuals can connect in near-real time with anyone from around the world, making it possible to feel connected to others who share their interests, no matter how marginalized or unusual they may be. Individuals interested in these subcultures may back down to share their concerns with others in the real world, either because of embarrassment over their ideas, or a lack of common interests. In this way, technology enables social connections and subcultural participation over great distances. For individuals who identify and relate to a radical or extremist ideological movement, connecting online with others who share religious, racial or ethnic views provides a common point of entry into these extremist groups (Oxford Analytica, 2016).

The ability to connect socially on various online platforms like *Facebook* and *Twitter* enables personalities to become acculturated without the need for physical contact, as noted by the growth of subcultures related to computer hacking, digital piracy, and other behaviour. The perceived concealment afforded by connecting via a forum or social media site with others who have had a similar experience may allow individuals to prompt their views in ways they would not do with another person face-to-face. Having a safe place to express such ideas may not only upturn their willingness to write them, but also to accept more radical positions over time. This is perfected by using dark web where communication cannot be easily be detected unless by Information Technology (IT) experts (Oxford Analytica, 2016).

Other like-minded individuals who are susceptible to radicalization confirm pre-existing liberal views, and both push each other to become more extreme themselves. For example, abbreviations such as '14' in by white supremacists as a shorthand reference to the so-called "14 Words,"<sup>32</sup> which is the most famous white supremacist slogan in the world, "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." (Anti-Defamation League, 2016) Similarly, individuals may change their Twitter profile images to *ISG* flags to demonstrate their support for the movement. Since Twitter may delete accounts in an attempt to minimize the *ISG* online presence, individuals may use their account closure as a source of pride and validation of their support for the movement (Oxford Analytica, 2016). The radical groups ensure that they continue to lure more

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<sup>32</sup> It is a reference to the most popular white supremacist slogan in the world: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children."

in the fold by ensuring that by adopting the flag of the group they do support is a plus to their course.

Perceived deprivations on increasing inequality among different groups within the society which are catalyzed by changes that come with globalization bring a complicate balance within the society. Youth mobilize on social media like is the case of *Occupy Wall Street*<sup>33</sup> movement in the United States and also the results of *Arab Spring*<sup>34</sup> in Northern Africa. Therefore, it is important for any society to consider the similarities and differences that unite its citizens for the preservation of values that foster social integration in the fight against radicalization and promotion of peace in the country (M Lombardi, 2014).

The ultimate goal of the *Islam State of Iraq and Syria* factions is to discredit all the forces in the campaign against their deeds and show them in a different perspective as excellent people (Scott Gates, 2015). This might take the direction of rewarding or punishing those against the jihadist agenda that they advocate for to be followed by others. This happens through offline platforms where one is not conversant with his outside world or has lost touch especially by being in prison cells or mosques and also on online spaces which have boosted their recruitment when blending with the call for caliphate state. This makes the *ISIS* to be considered a viable and stronger organization (Scott Gates, 2015).

The violent radicalization in Syrian crisis in recent past is attributed to online recruitment but there is less empirical work due to methodological weakness since most of the results are from personal reflection by security practitioners on the subject. For example, in the literature by Samah Abdel-Sabour in 2018 on the uses of social media, he suggested that security agencies should review policies geared to the use of online platforms but fail to indicate real effects of online *ISIS* strategies among the youth (Seraphin Alava, 2017).

Researches from Arab countries on drivers to terrorism fail to categorically discuss Islam as a factor in radicalization and they focus on political and historical injustices to justify radicalization.

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<sup>33</sup> It is a left-wing protest movement that began on September 17, 2011, in *Zuccotti Park*, located in New York City's Wall Street financial district, against economic inequality.

<sup>34</sup> Arab spring was a series of pro-democracy uprisings that enveloped several largely Muslim countries, including *Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Bahrain*.

The research available on online radicalization in Sub-Saharan Africa has not nailed terrorism to date, despite the terror groups like *Al-Shabaab* and *Boko Haram* capitalizing on face book and twitter to conduct their recruitment. It is evident that the groups first use Arabic language before translating to English and French which is a clear indication that their greater goal is focused on the context of global jihad (Seraphin Alava, 2017).

A highlight on the existing literature to unearth recruitment to terror groups shows that there has been increased interest by researchers like Bruce Hoffman, scholars like Sarah Chayes, and governments like Government of Kenya on extremism and terrorism. This upsurge has been as a result of increased terrorist activities across the world, both in developed and developing countries. However, conclusive empirical evidence on the precise causes of violent extremism which is a prerequisite for terrorism is lacking (Seraphin Alava, 2017). Moreover, most of the existing literature on terrorism and studies radicalization concentrated on the global extremism and terrorism in European countries and America with little focus on Africa which in the recent past experienced increased terrorism due to violent extremism; Somalia and *Lamu County* of Kenya is example.

The existing literature on terrorism has failed to unearth the main factors that promote violent extremism and terrorism activities, and as such, there is little success in curbing violent extremism. This study seeks to fill this gap by first identifying the factors promoting the growth of violent extremism in *Lamu County* in Kenya as will be analyzed in subsequent chapters. It will also investigate the effectiveness of the strategies put in place to address this vice. Lastly, this study will establish ways in which the Kenyan government can curb violent extremism in the region.

### **2.1.5 Mechanisms to deal with Violent Extremism Globally**

Measures to counter-terrorism are sometimes counter-productive. This is possible when such measures go against human security and in a way negate the legitimacy of state machinery by eroding social cohesion and creating more radicals. In the fight against extremist groups the racial or religious profiling makes the community to withdraw its support for the government by ensuring that they share the information or intelligence of the terror group with the state. Tensions might arise among the community and invite conflict among them increasing radicalization and fear rather than preventing it (M Lombardi, 2014).

The profiling helps the extremist groups to rationalize their beliefs and pass the same to vulnerable communities which end up supporting the fight against government machinery. The reaction by any government within a state following an act of terror in a specific area for example, curfew in Kenyas *Lamu* and *Mandera* County which is normally effected with violation of certain human rights such as the right to movement which does not go well with vulnerable youth who confirm their worries as narrated by extremist groups. For example, in Canada where Muslim and Sikh communities have been targeted, Islam is equated with violence and terrorism (M Lombardi, 2014). In the fight against terrorism in a country like Unites state of America whose immigrants come from different backgrounds, such immigrants become targeted by the state security agencies and their discrimination is tied to their ethnic origins and religious affiliation especially after 9/11<sup>35</sup> (M Lombardi, 2014).

#### **2.1.6 Mechanisms dealing with Violent Extremism Continentally**

In Africa, different mechanisms have been developed to deal with extremism. This is through improving livelihood of youth at risk and other vulnerable populations through greater focus on areas prone to the recruitment and improving accessibility to jobs and education programmes. There is also improvement of the judicial system and rule of law so that it can be able to deal with radicalization ensuring effective investigation of cases. Good regional co-operations among different economic bloc within Africa which help to nail the offenders (United Nations Development Programme, 2016).

Another mechanism which has been developed is increasing levels of disengagement and improvement of reintegration processes through rehabilitation centers coupled with psychosocial support with increases community sensitization programmes. This also augment by lowering intra- and inter-religious tensions and heightened community resilience through dialogue and effectively governed madrassas, mosques with effective early warning mechanisms (United Nations Development Programme, 2016).

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<sup>35</sup> The September 11 attacks were a series of coordinated suicide attacks by *Al-Qaeda* upon the United States on September 11, 2001.

Scholars on terrorism studies observe that policy makers fail to understand the dangerous struggle they subject their countries with different minority groups when they turn against the people. Canada is one such example. The state believes that the minority group protects the criminal elements among them, a perception that makes it difficult for the community to cooperate with police. In Canada the leadership has continued to adopt a multicultural policy so that all Canadians enjoy rights equally and this helps in bridging the cultural gap between immigrants' parents and their Canadian born children in getting the freedom they yearn for (M Lombardi, 2014).

At educational level, mechanisms are in place to enhance equal opportunity to attend schools without adhering to cultural and religious backgrounds have helped in dealing with deprivation that would be perceived to arise. Curriculum is the same for equity within the society even to the extent of participating in inter-school events as well as cultural and religious ones. Therefore, for a country to enjoy social integration, the education system should enable learning and broadening of young minds as opposed to indoctrination.

#### **2.1.7 Mechanisms dealing with Violent Extremism in Kenya**

In Kenya different security mechanisms has been incorporated to deal with extremism. One of the strategies is building a wall along its border with Somalia which was initiated in April 2015 to keep out illegal immigrants and *Al-Shabaab* militants. However the construction was suspended in 2018 after Somalia accused Kenya of restarting construction without agreement. Kenya police has also increased their presence in vulnerable areas like college campuses. Kenya has also partnered with other countries in the fight against extremism which include the sharing of intelligence and establishing counter terrorism centers (Rift Valley Meeting Report, 2017).

Community based initiatives like *Kiunga Youth Initiative* in Kenya have also been achieving gains in the fight against terror, despite facing some economic and security challenges. However the leadership of these initiatives put up measures that would ensure they can respond, regroup and rejuvenate from the adverse situation to better their welfare. Through police-community relations, the fight against terror has born some fruits for a country like Canada that has capitalized on this initiative. The government recruits from the minority groups and deploy them back to the same areas which help in promoting confidence among the community that sees how the government trusts them (M Lombardi, 2014).



Corruption enables incubation and breeding of terror groups since without economic development the gap between the elites who stole for personal gain and the poor is widened. This in turn is crucial and makes terror groups to target the youth in their recruitment. Therefore the fight against terror groups should be accompanied by both hard and soft power since applying only one may not be effective. The measures to counter corruption should be given serious attention by government in fighting terror groups (M Lombardi, 2014).

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

### **2.2.1 Relative Deprivation Theory**

Relative deprivation theory is a view of social change and movements, according to which people take action for social change in order to acquire something that others possess and which they believe they should have, too. The theory was derived by Stouffer in 1940s. Stouffer devised the theory when he observed two phenomena. One of them is that with his wartime colleagues they found that military police were more satisfied with their slow promotion than the air corpsmen were with their rapid promotions. On the other hand African American soldiers in southern camp were more satisfied than those in northern camp despite the fact that racist south of the 1940s remained tightly segregated by race (Pettigrew, 2015).

This however was wrong referent comparison and Stouffer reasoned that military police compared themselves with fellow military police but not air corpsmen who they rarely encountered. Similarly, black soldiers in the South compared their lot with black civilians in the south not with black soldiers in the north who were out of view. Satisfaction is relative to the available comparisons we have according to his argument (Pettigrew, 2015).

This theory holds that an individual may feel and believe economically, politically or socially deprived in comparison to other members of specific group(s) (Gurr, 1970). The theory focuses on feelings and actions. Through this prism individuals, who are placed lowly in socio-economic and political strata are perceived to be susceptible to radicalization and violent extremism. Some of the critical variables would be; poverty, marginalization, low education level, poor health services and unemployment. The capacity of governance will determine whether those who feel deprived can resort to violence. However other factors might be at play to explain the phenomenon since there

are many groups that are racially, nationally and ethnically marginalized but do not necessarily become violent (Nasser-Eddine, M. et al. 2011).

Relative deprivation theory has a shortfall especially when micro-level phenomena are erroneously assumed from macro phenomena. This is due to the fact that macro units are too broad to determine individual data and individuals have unique properties that cannot be inferred from macro data (Pettigrew, 2015).

Economic deprivation is best suited to explain why the youth are joining *Al-Shabaab*. There are two different levels of analysis; individual and group levels. In individual level of analysis, the youth will be perceived to join the group due to their own personal justification to believe that they have been deprived for the benefit of other people and by joining the group they will be able to redeem their misfortune. Individual deprivation is derived either intra-personally or interpersonally.

Intrapersonal is arrived at when an individual compares his or her present situation with the past, feels deprived and this might justify his or her actions. Interpersonal is where an individual compares his life with that of others within the same locality and perceives that his predicaments are caused by the success of the others. In this context the person will tend to be swayed to believe that by joining a certain group which shares the same proposition will make him overcome his misfortune or improve his situation to a better one. This theory shows why such an individual joins the *Al-Shabaab* group (Asingo, 2018).

According to Asingo, (2018) the economic deprivation of a group explains the voting patterns in Kenya. This means that a group which is feeling deprived within a region will vote in large numbers against a particular government with a belief that they will succeed and be part of the government to make it favour them and satisfy their needs. Therefore, this theory will explain better the reasons why people join the *Al-Shabaab* within *Lamu* County since there is a belief that there are immigrants who came to occupy their native land and thus their misfortune is a result of such occupation and thus they have to do what it takes to reclaim their land.

This theory therefore, is associated with formation of social movements to advocate for collective group interests and needs. They are meant to redress injustices within the socio-political context.

Violent extremism is associated with grievances in the areas of the study and reflects upon the concerns of this theory. This approach can modify the Western models that may not be appropriate to the Kenyan context and predict the behaviour of the youth.


Violent Extremism (VE) erodes social cohesion while Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is meant to reduce or eliminate violent extremism thereby increasing social cohesion and national stability. The above analysis when applied to CVE offers a holistic and multi-dimensional prism that enables a more comprehensive analysis of socio-cultural, economic and political factors informing VE in *Mombasa* and *Kwale* and the corresponding design of effective CVE measures.

A government is obliged to provide for its citizen by ensuring that it guarantees security at all levels which includes the freedom to vote and elect their government, economic security, social security, environmental security and defend the country against external aggression from its enemy. Recruitment to extremist group arises as a result of failure by the government to adequately meet the demands of the people. This creates a vacuum that may be filled by groups that discredit the government and promise a better life when given mandate by citizens.

This theory however has fundamental problems since when Stouffer was devising the theory he did not measure relative deprivation directly but inferred it as a post hoc explanation for a series of surprising results. This failure to initiate a prototype measure has led to literary hundreds of diverse and often conflicting measures. The other problem is that Stouffer offered a concept, not a testable theory (Pettigrew, 2015). However, this theory weakness was mitigated by ensuring that individual deprivation was not transferred to group relative deprivation. Another mitigation measure was to ensure that absolute deprivation was not applied in the study. The factors in the study would be measurable to some extent especially when looking at number of schools available and also distances from the social amenities within *Lamu* County. For example factors like inadequate allocation of resources, government infrastructure and availability of leaders to address to local people problem will be independent variables which when absent or present will influence the radicalization and recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*.

## 2.3 Conceptual Framework

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Author (2019).

In this research, there are both dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable will be the recruited youth to *Al-Shabaab* derived from both official reports and unreported cases against independent variables which is the governance threshold regarding how close to people the government is and the government infrastructures within localities where youth have joined *Al-Shabaab* as well as political, social and economic marginalization.

## 2.4 Research Hypotheses

The study hypothesized the following;

1. Unemployment and exclusivity has positive correlation with recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*.
2. Poverty and illiteracy has positive correlation with recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter illustrates the research design and data collection methods used by studying the target population, and sampling. Based on the objectives, various methods were used in collecting, organizing, analyzing and presenting data.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

*Lamu* County is one of the 47 counties in Kenya. It is one of the six Coastal counties in Kenya which borders *Tana River* County in southwest, *Garissa* County to the north with Indian Ocean to the South and Republic of Somalia to the northeast. The county is dominated with coastal plains, island plains and sand dunes. The county physical infrastructure has remained underdeveloped for sometimes but there are efforts by national government to improve the road networks to bitumen standard.

#### **3.3 Study Area Selection**

The selection of *Lamu* County in the conduct of research was necessitated by the incidents of *Al-Shabaab* attacks. The complex attacks leveled against security agencies, properties and innocent civilians was a clear indicator that *Lamu* County harbored elements of the *Al-Shabaab*. The complexity and precision under which the attacks were planned and conducted proved that the perpetrators were locals. The way *Al-Shabaab* elements traversed the county was clear indicator that *Al-Shabaab* had recruited youth from the populace and were providing intelligence of security agent movements and formed part of the fighters. This therefore provided a study area which could unravel why the youth joins *Al-Shabaab* and what are the conditions available in luring youth to the group.

#### **3.4 Research Design**

The researcher used descriptive survey to minimize expenditure on effort, money and time. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), a descriptive survey design is a detailed and scientific process of answering research questions aimed at describing and gathering data about the current state of subjects or an event which is under investigation. It was explanatory in nature.

During the interviews, respondents fill questionnaires and the researcher observations which were critical in assessing the infrastructural development and how close the social amenities were to the people.

Officials from both county and national governments got reports about youth who join *Al-Shabaab* and gave critical data on the subject. Officials from Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) formed the basis of the better part of the interviews since most of its members are involved in fighting terrorism in the region. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the *Lamu* County involved in creating awareness against violent extremism which includes *Kiunga Youth Bunge*<sup>36</sup> shared a lot of data during interview. The unstructured interviews encouraged the population to talk freely about *Al-Shabaab*. This provided an opportunity to go deeper into the problems and give have insights and fresh ideas about *Al-Shabaab* in various areas within *Lamu* County

### **3.5 Target population and Interview Respondent Schedule**

The study targeted 700 security personnel who were known to be posted in the county by 2016 (Agnon, 2016). This would also include about 300 civilians who would include opinion leaders, religious and youth involved in the fight against *Al-Shabaab*. The total population targeted in this study amounted to 1000.

### **3.6 Interview Respondent Schedule**

The study earmarked 100 respondents from the security agencies and civil leaders. These are respondents who lived where *Al-Shabaab* has managed to recruit its new members and commit atrocities. This was further attributed to Kenyan constitution 2010 which advocated for affirmative action of one third, two third gender rule. The other consideration is the fact that according to report dated 2010 on affirmative action it reflection a 24.3 percent of female having joined ministry of internal security then by 2009 (Ministry of Gender, children and Social Development, 2010). This is clear indication during study the percentage would be considered to be have even surpassed 30 percent. The composition was also informed by the posted strength of security agencies that were deployed at the time to quell the *Al-Shabaab* menace. 20 respondents from National and

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<sup>36</sup> *Kiunga Youth Bunge* is an independent non-profit organization established in 2007. Its premised on the fact that youths form a critical group of Kenya's population that are most vulnerable to exploitation, misrepresentation and radicalization.

County leaders of *Lamu* County targeted due their critical role of leadership within the county. The target population also comprised of other government agencies which included 16 Anti-Terror Police and National Intelligence Service (NIS), 28 Administration Police and Directorate of Criminal Investigation representatives in the area, 18 opinion leaders and vulnerable youth who could have been enticed into joining *Al-Shabaab* were also among the targeted population.

The study also targeted 20 religious leaders that comprised of both the Council of Imams and Pastors. The targeted respondents were more informed about the activities of the deployed security agencies within the county in the multi-agency campaign against the militia elements. This was further dictated by the need for more accurate information concerning the factors influencing the recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* group. The population is as tabulated here below.

**Table 1: Study population**

Divisions Groups	<i>Amu</i>	<i>Hindi</i>	<i>Faz</i> <i>a</i>	<i>Kiunga</i>	<i>Kizingi</i> <i>tini</i>	<i>Mpeketoni</i>	<i>Witu</i>	<b>Total</b>
National/County Government	2	2	3	2	3	4	4	20
Anti-Terror Police/National Intelligence Service	3	2	0	3	0	4	4	16
Administration Police/ Directorate of Criminal Investigations	2	2	4	3	3	8	4	26
Religious Leaders	3	1	3	3	3	5	2	20
Opinion Leaders/Youth/Non-Governmental Organization's	1	2	2	2	4	5	2	18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author (2019).

### **3.7 Sampling Technique**

Sampling is the statistical process of selecting a subset of a population of interest for purposes of making observations and statistical inferences about that population. In social science research it is about inferring patterns of behaviours within the specific populations and thus it is extremely important to choose a sample that would answer the concerns of the researcher. However due to the nature of research the researcher adopted a qualitative approach in coming up with a sample.

The study adopted non-probability population sampling. Purposive sampling was used with the aim of having respondents from groups with different attributes of having collected intelligence in the area or assigned area of responsibility in the fight against *Al-Shabaab*. This purposive sampling relies on the judgments of the researcher when choosing who to ask to participate. It has the advantage of being time and cost-effective to perform although it is prone to errors of judgment. The sampling procedure included sampling all members in the target population since an informed decision was required on the recruitment of youth from *Lamu County* by *Al-Shabaab*. The sampling procedure was pegged on maximal variation sampling where the researcher selects the individuals by first identifying characteristics and then selecting individuals having the identified characteristics.

### **3.8 Data Collection**

#### **Primary Data**

Primary data came from respondents through the use of questionnaires, unstructured interviews and observations about how far the public infrastructures and social amenities are from public. The primary data was gathered from various stakeholders from government agencies which included the Ministry of Interior and coordination of national government, Anti-Terror Police Unit that fights terrorism in the region, vulnerable youth, NGO's workers and religious leaders of *Lamu County* that are involved in creating awareness against violent extremism. This collection of respondents formed a base of concrete information that enabled a sound analysis of data.

#### **Secondary Data**

Secondary data included reports from the governments or Non-Governmental Organizations, empirical studies from published and unpublished work, journals and articles. For example, the data contained in Socio-Economic and Demographic survey of *Lamu County* which was published



in September, 2017 by International Organization for Migration (IOM) was found very relevant since the group have an outreach program with the county government of *Lamu*. The data also included videos from an *Al-Shabaab* website known as *Al-Kataib* Foundation.

### **3.9 Data Validity and Reliability**

In order to attain a high level of validity and reliability in this study, the researcher drafted questionnaires and interview guides that answered the research questions and met objectives of the study. The research questions were assessed for a high level of content validity. In the same vein, the researcher employed a relevant theory to guide the study and to ensure that it achieved a high level of construct validity.

### **3.10 Ethical Considerations**

Research ethics is a branch of applied ethics with established rules and guidelines which governs research. Research ethics genesis is pegged on field of biomedical research which arose from the need to use human beings in research. The research ethics were taken seriously following prosecution of 23 German physicians and administrators who were charged with conducting medical experiments on thousands of prisoners without their consent. The prisoners were held captive in the concentration camps during World War II (Stephen Ifedha Akaranga, 2016). This however necessitated appropriate methodology, to employ relevant ways of collecting data, presentation of research findings and analysis.

Legal authority was sought from the statutory body which authorizes collection of data. In this line a research authorization letter was issued by National Commission for Science, Technology and innovation dated 26 January 2018. This formed a starting point towards collection of data from respondents within *Lamu* County which was the area of study. Thereafter *Lamu* County commissioners also wrote a letter to respective deputies of the sub-counties which helped the researcher to carry out the field work at ease.

Informed consent is a process by which a subject voluntarily confirms his or her willingness to participate in particular research. This was achieved by means of written consent which informed the respondents their right to participate, refuse or withdraw to participate at any time without reprisal (Camille Yip, 2016). Informed verbal consent was also sought to various respondent

before they be could engaged in the collection of data. The respondents were also at liberty to respond to issues raised on their own volition. The researcher also gave the purpose of research as one of the requirement in fulfillment to the award of master's degree in strategic and security studies and thus the interaction would be treated with utmost anonymity and confidentiality.

Plagiarism is the practice where researcher uses other people work without acknowledging where the information has been obtained from. This malpractice has been rampant with the advent of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in the contemporary world (Stephen Ifedha Akaranga, 2016). In this study the researcher endeavored to cite the original material appropriately. This was through American Psychological Association (APA) format. This was further tested through the University of Nairobi tools of testing plagiarism. The plagiarism was 9% which ensured it was below the recommended 15% by the University of Nairobi.

Privacy and anonymity refer to keeping the respondents names unknown by not divulging their ethnic or cultural background or referring them by their names (Stephen Ifedha Akaranga, 2016). In this research project the researcher ensured that the respondents' names on the questionnaire were optional and the respondents were also promised that the information given in confidence would be protected. This enhanced honesty toward the collection of data by protecting them from psychological harm or even physical which could result from disclosure of their identity.

Non-maleficence expresses the potential risks of participation which stems from physiological, emotional, social or even economic in nature. The main aim of non- maleficence is prevent any intentional harm or minimize any aspect of potential harm by refraining from injuring the respondent either physically or psychologically which could result from asking questions that could result to anxiety or fear among respondents (Stephen Ifedha Akaranga, 2016). In this study the researcher was very candid to explain the exact aim of study and why is important to disclose the information through a debrief on the subject. On the conflict of interest as security practitioner, the researcher was faced with challenge of filtering what pertains to academic and operations. However the researcher used his experience to divorce the two and was able to decipher what is relevant to academics.

### 3.11 Data Analysis and Presentation

The analysis was based on non-participant observation by interpreting opinions and perspectives of various subjects. It used both individual and group level analysis. The individual level analyzed the individual themselves on why they are recruited while group level has dwelt on what is offered by *Al-Shabaab* that triggers the youth into joining it or what they are provided with by the non-state actors. The data is analyzed using content analysis. Content analysis is the method of making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying unique characteristics of responses and then keenly identifying and using the same approach in relating trends. The analysis is both conceptual and relational. In the concept analysis, a concept will be examined according to its occurrences when coding manageable content categories. The concept analysis regards research questions as well as the positivity and negativity on respective arguments. The relational analysis will build on the conceptual analysis of examining concept relationships in a text. The analysis followed a series of steps with a goal of coming up with meaning from the data collected.

The first step included preparation of data which included transcribing all the data that was collected both through interview and in the questionnaires and also observations that the researcher observed. This saved time during analysis since everything was captured. This was followed by coming up with a table that was identifying meaning units and condensing the meaning units. The table below illustrates how condensing of units was done.

**Table 2: Meaning Condensing Unit**

<b>Meaning units (Condensation)</b>
“.....Well, when youth joins <i>Al-Shabaab</i> their way of living changes since they have a lot of money at the disposal and they become secretive.” <i>(lifestyle change when youth join Al-Shabaab)</i>
“When youth join the group they insult their former friends and sometimes they even bully them.”

*(Youth character changes and become bully)*

“.....The youth have no means to support their families. However when someone offers them good way of life including their families they are bound to join the group without thinking the repercussion.”

*(Poverty is reason behind youth joining Al-Shabaab)*

Source: Author (2019).

The next step from the condensing unit is the development of codes so that it can be easy to come up with codes that are descriptive labels for condensed meaning units. The codes made it easier to identify connections between the meaning units. However the researcher frequently referred back to original test and meaning units to check that meaning was not lost during condensation. The researcher also compared coding with other researchers work to reach to a consensus on most reasonable coding to help make sense of the data. The following table is illustration of how coding was done.

**Table 3: Formulation of Codes**

<b>Meaning units condensation</b>	<b>Codes</b>
<b>(a)</b>	<b>(b)</b>
<i>(Lifestyle change when youth join Al-Shabaab).</i>	Lifestyle change.
<i>(Youth character changes and become bully).</i>	Character change.
<i>(Poverty is reason behind youth joining Al-Shabaab).</i>	Poverty motivates youth.

Source: Author (2019).

Further to the coding process is categorization of different codes. The categorization answered the questions that the study wanted answered during research. This was done by comparing codes and appraising them to determine which codes seem to belong together. Through this process the researcher came up with the following table in finalizing the analysis process.

**Table 4: Formation of Categories**

Category	Definition	Codes	Coding Rules	Levels
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
<b>Cat 1:</b> Factors that influence youth joining <i>Al-Shabaab</i>	Push/Pull factors These are factors which influence youth to join <i>Al-Shabaab</i> .	“Poverty” “Illiteracy” “Religion” “Unemployment” “Education” “poor leadership” “Lack of decentralized social services”	. All these factors must pull factors to the group The aspects should be distinct.	Individual/ Group
<b>Cat 2</b> Signs of recruitment of youth	The signs must point out the indicators of recruitment  The signs of recruitment  Where it takes place	“Lifestyle change”  “Youth disappearance”  “ <i>Madrasa</i> ”	The three aspects of definition will throw weight on the indicators that <i>Al-Shabaab</i> is recruiting	Individual/ Group level
<b>Cat 3</b> Mechanisms in place	Mechanisms in place  Challenges	“Military operation”  “Lack of intelligence”	These two aspects should illustrate the effectiveness of mechanism	Individual/ Group/State

<b>Cat 4</b>	<b>Probable solutions</b>	<b>“Infrastructure development”</b>	<b>Any solution matters</b>	<b>Individual/ Group/State</b>
Way forward				

Source: Author (2019).

The results are presented through qualitative analysis, under identified themes according to the objectives and the hypotheses. This is ideal for all users who are interested in learning factors influencing recruitment into extremist groups in a more comprehensible manner especially policy makers and government officials in particular.

### **3.12 Limitation of the Study**

Budgetary constraints in the planning phase were eminent on how to undertake collection of data. This was on transport from *Nairobi* to *Lamu* County and subsequent crisscrossing the county. This was due the vast land and distance from one point to the other, and thus transport cost was envisaged to be high. The other aspect is in term of accommodation considering this was not the resident county of the researcher. However the budgetary constraint was mitigated by planning the research during routine flight from Nairobi to a Kenya Defence Force post within the county which made the cost of transport to reduce immensely. The accommodation cost was also lowered, after being hosted by a colleague who was within the county and was on leave at the time of the field work.

*Lamu* County had and still has security challenges emanating from *Al-Shabaab* militias and sympathizers. This posed a major setback on how the collection of data would be conducted. There had been cases of ambushes on civilian vehicles and security agencies operating within the county. Most of civilian vehicles were having armed escorts and were still a target to attack. However due to urgency of some nature there were private vehicles plying the route ferrying passengers from one town to the other. This became my means of transport during the collection of data. The security challenge faced was the fact that the researcher had his security service identification card and questionnaires which were on *Al-Shabaab* and this would form a good prey for militia if at any chance if they flagged the vehicle. The researcher could ensure that he hides everything under the seat or car boot where they could not be easily traced. The fear was that, if they frisk the vehicle thoroughly the researcher work would have been compromised or cut short.

Another challenge was the issue of suspicion on why researcher was conducting the research. The topic that researcher presented was in a way seen as an intelligence gathering forum and thus some respondents were not willing to share some bit of information. The researcher could however show the letter of authorization and research permit which proved to the respondents that the study was purely academic and they should not feel intimidated.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION, FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in depth data presentation, research findings and analysis of data as collected in the field. As mentioned earlier, the study aimed at establishing the factors influencing youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* in the case study of Kenyan *Lamu* County from the year 2011 to 2016. In addition, the research aimed at finding out the signs of youth recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. Furthermore, the study aimed at exploring the mechanisms and challenges faced when dealing with recruitment of the youth into *Al-Shabaab* and propose a way forward.

This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section provides information on the demographic characteristics of the participants and their knowledge about *Al-Shabaab*. The second section gives a comprehensive analysis of the responses of the participants in respect to the research objectives.

#### 4.2 Response Rate

From the study population of 100, there were 97 participants who took part in the study, and out of this number only 91 managed to participate in the interview or fill the questionnaires and returned them for editing and analysis. As per table 5 below, 19 out 20 of National/County officials which is 95% response, 16 respondents which is equal to 100% of Anti-terror Police/NIS, 20 out of 23 which is 86.9% of Administration Police/DCI's, 19 out of 20 which is 95% of religious leaders and 16 out of 17 which is 94.4% of Opinion leaders/Youth in *Lamu* County responded during data collection. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a sample response rate above 65% of study population is recommended for generalizing the findings of the study. In this case, the response rate was 93.8%, thus fulfilling the requirement of the study.



**Table 5: Response Rate**

Strata	Study Population Size	Response	Response Rate
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
National/County officials	20	19	95%
Anti-terror police/National Intelligence Service.	16	16	100%
Administration police/Directorate of Criminal Investigations'	23	20	86.9%
Religious leaders	20	19	95%
Opinion leaders/Youth	18	17	94.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93.8%</b>

Source: Author (2019).

The response is further tabulated to show how different divisions responded to the study as shown in the table below.

**Table 6: Response in Divisions**

Divisions	<i>Amu</i>	<i>Hindi</i>	<i>Faza</i>	<i>Kiung</i> <i>a</i>	<i>Kizingi</i> <i>tini</i>	<i>Mpeketoni</i>	<i>Witu</i>	<b>Total</b>
Groups								
National/County Government	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	19
Anti-Terror Police/National Intelligence Service	3	2	0	3	0	4	4	16
Administration Police/ Directorate of Criminal Investigations	2	2	1	3	3	5	4	20
Religious Leaders	3	1	2	3	3	5	2	19
Opinion Leaders/Youth/Non-Governmental Organization's	1	2	1	2	4	5	2	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>91</b>

Source: Author (2019).

#### 4.2.1 Demographic and Background Characteristics of the Respondents

This section provides a brief summary about the distribution of the participants in the following aspects: gender, age, education level, and other social-economic constructs.

**Table 7: Gender Distribution of the Respondents**

<b>Gender of the Respondents</b>			
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
<b>Male</b>	66	72	72
<b>Female</b>	25	28	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Author (2019).

In the above table the gender disparity arose due to the nature of the study. Women are not at ease in contributing to the topic despite being the victims of the *Al-Shabaab* menace. For example Diana Mueni<sup>37</sup> said; “our husbands and sons were killed by *Al-Shabaab* and they had audacity to tell us that they want to finish our men and convert us into Muslims before marrying us”. Therefore, this explain why were not comfortable in giving much of information as a result of the trauma they suffered and also due to cultural reason on talking about security. The study population targeted comprised of security officers and thus reduced number of female officers in the theatre and hence this explains why there is a big disparity in the gender in the area of study.

<sup>37</sup> Diana Mueni is religious leader in a personal communication on 8 March 2018 at *Hindi, Lamu County*.

**Table 8: Age of respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Above 18 years	42	46	46
Above 35 years	49	54	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Author (2019).

From the above table it is evident that 46% of respondents were youth in security agencies like Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) and Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) circles who are taking part in the war against *Al-Shabaab*. This provided more accurate data on what promotes youth in joining *Al-Shabaab*. They were free to share their concerns with the researcher which was also confirmed by their seniors who comprised of about 54% of the sample population. The seniors were able to articulate issues by virtue of some being residents in the County for a long time and having witnessed how the youth have been recruited to the *Al-Shabaab*.

**Table 9: Education Level of Respondents**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Primary	13	14	14
Secondary	28	31	45
Tertiary/University	50	55	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Author (2019).

The table above shows the education level of the respondents with 14% primary level of education, 31% attained secondary education while 55% having attained tertiary/university

education. This is explained by the fact that most of respondents were from security agencies and most of them had fulfilled the criteria required for one to join security forces which is secondary education.

**Table 10: Residents of Lamu County**

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Resident(2011-2016)	56	62	62
Not resident	35	38	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

Source: Author (2019).

The above table shows the respondents who were there in *Lamu* County between the periods the study targeted. There was a positive feedback with 62% having resided in the County between 2011 and 2016 and had a lot of information about what was happening. The 38% is explained by the new security personnel who were posted to the County to help in the fight against the *Al-Shabaab* menace.

### 4.3 Result Presentation

The overall aim was to critically analyze the motivating factors promoting youth into *Al-Shabaab* groups in the *Lamu* County of Kenya in the years between 2011 and 2016. The study was guided by the following specific objectives: first is to determine the indicators for recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* group. Second was to determine the challenges faced in dealing with youth recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* and propose a way forward.

#### 4.3.1 The Factors Influencing Youth Recruitment to *Al-Shabaab* in the *Lamu* County of Kenya

In this study, the factors were sub-divided into categories which are major influence of youth recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. The questionnaire which also doubled as interview guide was structured in a manner that various factors would fall under different categories from each the others. This is exactly what was realized in the responses and available secondary data.

## Exclusivity

Exclusivity was a major factor reported as an impediment or enhancer in the fight against any terror group. There was an overwhelming majority (99%) of respondents through interviews in questionnaire and personal communication who cited poor political leadership and exclusivity in the national government as a major factor that precipitated recruitment by *Al-Shabaab*. According to opinion leader<sup>38</sup> who confirmed that political leaderships would politicize exclusivity along tribal lines with perceived marginalized of small groups. He argued that political leaders were masterminds of the *Mpeketoni attack*. In his communication he said; “I lost my business for not supporting *XX*... The politician would tell the native *Swahili, Giriama* and *Kamba* communities that they are minorities and should not allow the *Kikuyu* people to dominate over them despite being the majority”. In shedding some light on *Mpeketoni* attacks he confirmed to have overheard some discussion when the attacks were underway; “we never agreed that you kill people but burning properties!! How do you do that? Immediately I heard a gunshot silencing the man.”

Peter Kai<sup>39</sup> (2018) also believed in his submission that exclusivity and political leaders are part of *Al-Shabaab* recruitment where they fundraise for the militia using government resources to lure vulnerable youth. This becomes a recipe for the aggrieved to join the *Al-Shabaab* in order to safeguard their interests. The political leadership in power further provided funds to the extremist groups in training the militia for their selfish and criminal goals. The opinion leader further commented; “The political competitors use youth who are desperate for jobs by giving them handouts to continue discrediting their competitors. They later become potential recruits to *Al-Shabaab* when the handouts dry up.”

On the social factors, the respondents who include youth leaders at *Kiunga Youth Bunge* office were given the option to confirm whether schools, dispensaries, recreation facilities and public areas form part of social factors that would contribute to the youth joining *Al-Shabaab* in the absence of such. There was an overwhelming affirmative response on these factors as triggers of

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<sup>38</sup> Opinion leader is a local businessman who sought anonymity in an interview on 10 March, 2018 at *Mpeketoni* town, *Lamu* County.

<sup>39</sup> Peter Kai is a Directorate of Criminal Investigation officer based at *Amu* in *Lamu* County interviewed on 11 March, 2018.

joining the *Al-Shabaab*. In an interview with Ann Mwangi<sup>40</sup> (2018) she narrated; “The services here are not decentralized. It takes one, for example, to travel from all parts of *Lamu* County to get a birth certificate from *Mokowe* where the registrar of persons is based, it is hectic affair.” She concluded.

This was confirmed by the researcher on his to tour through the *Mokowe*. Many parents were observed in a long queue waiting for the certificates to be processed. “The registration of pupils under *National Education Management Information System (NEMIS)*<sup>41</sup> is difficult since some mothers have no birth notifications and it lead to even some pupils being chased away from schools until they produce a copy of Birth certificate.” The leader insinuated. This was interpreted that, should a child who is chased away because of the birth certificate get a bad company or a mentor discrediting the education system during this period, he/she will be swayed to the bad group and he/she might be vulnerable to join the group in the future.

According to Anti-terror police officer<sup>42</sup>, exclusivity is further supported because of misplaced priorities by leaders who do not consult youth on the implementation of quick impact projects. There were other respondents who cited concentration of power in particular communities as a catalyst which made youth from other communities seek identity from the *Al-Shabaab* group. The *Al-Shabaab* group is believed to use the youth in carrying out atrocities in terms of providing intelligence to them since their loyalty is to the group.

There were also other respondents from Anti-Terror Police Unit who filled in the questionnaires, and considered political rallies and youth groups as avenues where youth could find themselves being lured in joining *Al-Shabaab* when they cite exclusivity. According to Abdulhakim Aboud<sup>43</sup> (2018), the number of roadblocks from *Lamu* to *Malindi* is very many totaling seven (7), which does not auger well for *Lamu* residents. He also cited the curtailing of fishermen not to fish at

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<sup>40</sup> Ann Mwangi is a local leader coordinating women affairs within *Mpeketoni* town, *Lamu* County interviewed on 12 March, 2018.

<sup>41</sup> NEMIS is an online web portal that automates the entire end-to-end management of education data and related administration functions.

<sup>42</sup> Anti-terror police officer who sought anonymity based in *Mpeketoni*, *Lamu* County on an interview on 7 March 2018.

<sup>43</sup> Abdulhakim Aboud is Deputy Governor of *Lamu* County while addressing Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism Seminar within *Lamu* town on 6 March 2018.

night, reduced job opportunities for youth and have opted out to go to Somali waters which in turn lure them to *Al-Shabaab*. The leader also brought to light the issue of land where he mentioned; “There are claims of historical injustices propagated on the issue of land. This motivates the youth into joining *Al-Shabaab* hoping that they would be trained to fight back those who acquired their land”.

Abdulhakim Aboud (2018), further elaborated that this narrative sounds very valid to the youth who do not understand the history of land allocation in *Lamu County* especially in the *Mpeketoni* areas. “...They blindly believe that they would own vast parcels of land when they get back from Somalia and fight the ‘foreigners’ who allegedly grabbed their parcels of land. This is further linked to *Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)* which rallies behind the calls for land allocation among the Swahili people” He concluded. From the above discussion and the researcher analysis, it is clear that politics play a critical role in influencing youth. Without inclusiveness in all matters of development and decision making youth are likely to fall prey to *Al-Shabaab*. The youth must be informed of their history and have forums where they can share their views.

### Poverty

Sarah Munyao<sup>44</sup> (2018) argued that youth join *Al-Shabaab* as a result of fishing activities. Fishing as major economic activities within the county make the youth venture in this business neglecting other economic activities. This in turn become an avenue for *Al-Shabaab* to recruit since the fishing is done at night when most security agencies are not on watch and thus the youth are lured to join the group with increased interaction with *Al-Shabaab* who have capitalized on this weakness. Other respondents cited lack of fishing equipment to the youth which would form a basis for self-employment. The motivating factors which carried more weight than others were mainly from the economic factors cluster. The underlying issues reflected in the questionnaire were poverty, unemployment and poor road network. 99% of respondents rallied behind these aspects as the ones which completely entice youth join *Al-Shabaab*.

The economic deprivation either perceived or real was evident among those interviewed as well as those who filled in the questionnaires. The low economic development within the county was

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<sup>44</sup> Sarah Munyao is a youth leader in a local organization interviewed on 11 March, 2018.

said to be the factor behind the recruitment. The poor road network was illustrated as a major contributor to the recruitment by the *Al-Shabaab*. The groups were able to access where the government machinery could not influence activities for lack of connectivity and this vacuum allowed the group to carry out their trainings and operations.

The respondents from all clusters were in unison in believing that there is poverty in the area and that is why youth join *Al-Shabaab*. They claimed that if the government came up with programs to eradicate poverty within the county, *Al-Shabaab* would not find anyone to recruit. They claimed the youth are lured to the group by good remuneration and end up joining the group to make ends meet in order to survive.

According to Wanyoike<sup>45</sup> (2018), the poor road network, hampers connectivity within *Lamu* especially when it rains. This was confirmed by the researcher observation and it was found that the roads were impassable especially on plain areas. The claim of joining *Al-Shabaab* would result since the County is close to Somalia and since there is no difference in road networks within *Lamu* and the *Lacta belt*<sup>46</sup> resulting youth in joining the group to look for better job opportunities. The respondents who were not sure of the above economic factors and they indicated other factors such as resource distributions. This was due to the fact that resources were not reaching the local citizens equally and some felt left out and marginalized.

## **Unemployment**

According to Caleb Gitari<sup>47</sup> (2018) whom the researcher interviewed acknowledged that; “Lack of jobs and employment opportunities have contributed to most young men and women lured in joining extremist groups with promises of jobs which turn out to be fake.” He further said that; “They are made to believe their salaries and wages will be adequate to cater for the welfare of their parents and siblings despite not having education that warrant such hefty pay.” This was a clear indicator that unemployment was the overriding factor that made the youth turn to *Al-Shabaab* to seek for opportunities. In conclusion he said; “It only dawns on them that they have been recruited once they cross the border and it becomes impossible to turn back or decline the offers”.

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<sup>45</sup> Wanyoike is a local opinion leader and based in *Mpeketoni, Lamu County*, interviewed on 10 March, 2018.

<sup>46</sup> It is vast Boni forest area, along the Kenya Somalia border which extends into Somalia.


<sup>47</sup> Caleb Gitari is religious leader among youths who was interviewed on 8 March, 2018 at *Mpeketoni Town, Lamu County*.



The issue of unemployment is also backed by a research which was published by IOM<sup>48</sup> in September 2017 on *Lamu County Socio-Economic and Demographic survey* which attributes unemployment to the vital tourism sector which suffered a major set-back in terms of terror attacks from extremist groups. In the data published by IOM on the employment status, 14% are employed while 37 % are self-employed which to totals to 51%. This translates to a total of 36% unemployed and 13 % who are student (Coast International Faith Council of Clerics Trust (CICC) volunteers and International Organization for migration(IOM)Staff, September, 2017).

This leaves 49% at the disposal of extremist groups who offer employment opportunities to these deserving cases. Figure 2 below illustrates the employment status according to the study.

**Figure 2: Employment Status**



Source: IOM (2017).

This is further supported by the report published in 2017 by IOM on psychosocial needs of former combatants and individuals at risk of radicalization in Kenya. The former combatants cited that joining the violent extremist groups was attributed to money which is reflected as 78% whereas 22% cited reasons such as oppression by the government and religion (Thomas Eliyahu et al, 2017).

<sup>48</sup> IOM is an inter-governmental body which acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold human dignity and well-being of migrants.

From secondary sources, the monopolization of agriculture and fisheries negatively affected the youth in looking for other avenues for employment opportunities which is evident from the research published by the IOM which shows that over 60% depend on these two avenues. From the research about 5% indicated that those who join *Al-Shabaab* are fishermen who during their work, end up joining *Al-Shabaab*. This happens as they are given fishing equipment such as fishing nets and they eventually fall prey since they have no other means of survival yet they are promised a better pay once they join the groups.

### Illiteracy

Abdulhakim Aboud (2018), further emphasized that education is key in averting radicalization and recruitment to *Al-Shabaab* and he dispelled his fears from the fact that schools continue to be closed in some areas within *Lamu* County which is likely to give more numbers of youth dropping out of schools. From the secondary data published by the IOM on *Lamu* County in terms of education and training, 48% are primary education graduates, 29% are secondary education graduates with only 8% being university education graduates while 14% lack any formal education. This supports Peter Kai (2018) who indicated that illiteracy among the youth was facilitating their recruitment into *Al-Shabaab*. The respondent lightly said; “The youth here are not able to question the offers given by *Al-Shabaab* they find themselves inside the group file and rank when it is too late to turn back and end up following the group agenda against the community”.

As National Intelligence Service officer<sup>49</sup> argued; “Once a potential recruit converts to Islam he/she blindly becomes a Muslim without proper Islamic teaching and gets radicalized to believe he is doing the right thing. The consequence is that he gets a perception that his former religion is evil and most of the times become lethal in attackers of the members of their former faith referring to them as *kaffirs*<sup>50</sup>. This is further supported by the researcher’s observation during data collection that some young men who should be school goers engaged in grazing cattle within areas of

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<sup>49</sup> The National Intelligence officer sought anonymity and was interviewed at *Magogoni* at *Manda Bay* on 12 March 2018.

<sup>50</sup> Kafir is an Arabic term alluding to a person who rejects or disbelieves in God.

*Milihoi*<sup>51</sup> on school days. This is a clear indication that their capacity to reason is low as compared to that of those who go to school.

5% of the respondents who filled the questionnaires cited illiteracy as a factor in youth joining *Al-Shabaab*. This mainly lures the youth to fake jobs since they could not question the job offers despite knowing very well their education level could not be remunerated with such amounts of money offered by the agents of *Al-Shabaab*. This failure to authenticate the offers to a greater extent helped the recruiters in further requesting non-Muslims to convert to Islam in order to be fully assimilated into the jobs.

A learned youth would ordinarily question, why he should change his religion if it is only his skills that qualify him to take up the offered job. Illiteracy has taken toll of the youth in just seeing the monies being promised without realizing that the cash is a trap to make them join the terror gang. On another interview at *Hindi*, a female respondent<sup>52</sup> confessed; “I witnessed *Al-Shabaab* hacking a male teacher at the area of *Bobo*. ... The *Al-Shabaab* confirmed to young lady in the homestead that their aim is to marry the ladies from other tribes once they are done with killing their men and converting them to Muslims”. This was a clear indicator that there was a likelihood of division along religious dominance in the county. 92% of the respondents who provided information through questionnaires and interview schedules believed that the motivating factors that drive the youth into joining *Al-Shabaab* are poverty and unemployment. This further explains why the 2% of the respondents thought that religion plays a role in motivating youth join the *Al-Shabaab*.

This is clear indication that religion should play a role in molding youth within society for them to uplift morals that can be emulated and passed through generations. When a youth who is radicalized and trained as *Al-Shabaab* he becomes a problem to the society. This becomes a shocker to many of their former friends since they could least expect any attack leveled against them by those whom they grew up with.

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<sup>51</sup> *Milihoi* is a hot spot area between *Mkanumbi* and *Hindi* prone from attacks from *Al-Shabaab*.

<sup>52</sup> Local leader is a woman within *Hindi* town, *Lamu* County who sought anonymity interviewed on 8 March, 2018.

According to Kosgey<sup>53</sup> (2018), brutal video shows in social places contribute to the youth joining *Al-Shabaab* to practice what they have watched in the movies. The social media influence was cited also as a major influence for youth joining the *Al-Shabaab* since there would be radical characters that would influence their line of thinking through *Facebook* groups and *WhatsApp* groups in the social media platforms. For example a personal communication with National Intelligence Service officer<sup>54</sup>, he confirmed that most youth join *Al-Shabaab* due to the fact that, they are exposed to internet that is not restricted on websites one can visit and thus it become easier to be recruited by the group.


From the interviews, questionnaires and secondary data published in regards to *Lamu* County there was a trend that was significant. The pattern that arose was that, unemployment is the major factor that makes youth join *Al-Shabaab* and also with poverty which is connected with lack of empowerment by both County and national government in developing the areas. The figure below therefore illustrates more specific factors that are cutting across, as the factors influencing youth joining *Al-Shabaab*.

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<sup>53</sup> Kosgey is *Anti-terror Police Unit (ATPU)* officer based in *Kiunga* through telephone interview on 10 March 2018.

<sup>54</sup> The National Intelligence Service officer sought anonymity and was interviewed on 13 March 2018 at *Mpeketoni*.

**Figure 3: Specific Factors influencing Joining *Al-Shabaab***



Source: Author (2019).

#### **4.3.2 The Signs of Recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* Group**

The respondents articulated that *Al-Shabaab* has a discrete way of recruitment. Sarah Munyao (2018) indicated that, when youth are recruited they abandon schooling once recruited by *Al-Shabaab* and join Islamic classes. According to Peter Kai (2018) another indicator of recruitment of *Al-Shabaab* is resilient attacks within regions where the militia elements have earlier been routed out. This is followed with change in mode of dressing on some youth and even change of names with some adopting Islamic names like Abu. According to Aboud (2018) youth change their lifestyles by becoming more aggressive, abusive and keep on travelling without permanent residence.

In a personal communication with Bett<sup>55</sup> (2018), he confirmed that *Al-Shabaab* use internet to interact through the social media where they recruit vulnerable youth who are desperate or using unsecure platforms. They also have agents who are commonly found within the areas they have earmarked to carry out atrocities in future. They also use recorded radical teachings which are in

<sup>55</sup> Bett is National Intelligence Service Officer in an interview at *Amu* Island, *Lamu* County on 6 March 2018.

soft copies and shared for free to youth. This was confirmed by 70% of respondents who confirmed that the recruitment is conducted in madrassa and mosques and enhanced during prayers where youth who are vulnerable are taken through radicalized teaching before they later join training in Somalia. For example one of opinion leader<sup>56</sup> was categorical in the interview by stating; “through use of recorded message which is shared in form of teachings, the message is shared to potential recruit freely in *mosques* and *madrassas* by radical sheikhs...intended to radicalize. There are also leaflets and advertisements on garter press... ”

According to John Karissa<sup>57</sup> (2018), the youth’s joins *Al-Shabaab* after being convinced to join Islamic faith which is tied to good job outside the country with influence of large sum of money in return. According to Hosea Nzuki<sup>58</sup> (2018), *Al-Shabaab* recruits in madrassa and mosques while also sending scouts to look for youth by promising them well-paying jobs. This is followed by youth missing from their homes. Another indicator is that most of the youth after joining the group become aloof and suddenly avoiding family and friends and become very religious all of a sudden. The recruitment is also manifested through increased preaching in mosques and in open places. This is fueled by propaganda in the teachings as indicated by respondents. Other respondents in the questionnaires indicated that, they witnessed that assistance from volunteer groups to local people through community projects which were funded by *Al-Shabaab* in order to get youth in return.

Sarah Munyao (2018) indicated that those youth who are recruited would start retreating from the family and other groups and live a secretive private life. They would leave school and migrate into areas away from their families and within a short period they would send back monies to relatives despite not disclosing any meaningful employment opportunities from where they could raise such hefty sums of money. This is further confirmed by John Karissa (2018) who said that the youth disappear from their homes and no one know their whereabouts which is an indicator of joining the group. He further said that they later isolate themselves to live in solitary while referring Christians as bad people. Another indicator was that of the Christian youth who would first convert

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<sup>56</sup> The opinion leader sought anonymity was interviewed in AMU Island on 6 March, 2018.

<sup>57</sup> John Karissa is Directorate of Criminal Investigation Officer interviewed at *Amu Island, Lamu County* on 7 March, 18.

<sup>58</sup> Hosea Nzuki is Anti-Terror Police Unit officer interviewed at *Mpeketoni, Lamu County* on 8 March, 2018.

to Islam before fully joining the group. This therefore would raise eyebrows when a youth suddenly change religion to Islam as some respondents indicated in the filled questionnaires. This would also see more increased attacks within the areas that these youth had been recruited from because they are well versed with the terrain and geography of those areas. Among the youth that were known by some of respondents as having joined the *Al-Shabaab* were ranging from 18 to 35 years of age. According to Kamau<sup>59</sup> (2018), he indicated that most of youth who are radicalized and nearing to join the group at Somalia their lifestyle changes. Many of them became more aggressive and abusive towards their colleagues and many seem to have lost their cool.

#### **4.3.3 The Mechanisms and Challenges Faced in Dealing with Youth Recruitment to *Al-Shabaab***

The respondents were not given any selection on what mechanisms they understood or available to deal with youth recruitment and they gave a number of responses. This was deliberately not given with options since majority of the target population was drawn from security agencies and NGO's within the County. They were giving a variety of answers on the mechanisms in place, the challenges and the probable solutions that would help mitigate recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*.

##### **Mechanisms of dealing with recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab* in Lamu County**

The mechanisms in place were outlined as seminars which were detailed in creating awareness to the youth on the effects of joining *Al-Shabaab*. For example Mathenge<sup>60</sup> (2018) was quick to say; "...through our initiative we have organized seminars that aim at raising awareness of youth and avenues that are favourable for the youth to air their grievances..." This was ideal for vulnerable youth so that they don't follow the extremist groups. The other one was creating employment through youth initiatives that would see provision of fishing nets and boats between *Mokowe Jetty*<sup>61</sup> and *Amu Island* which would see vulnerable youth absorbed into meaningful business.

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<sup>59</sup> Kamau is a youth leader from *Witu* who was interviewed at *Mpeketoni, Lamu County* on 12 March, 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Mathenge is leader of *Kiunga Youth Bunge* initiative based in *Amu Island, Lamu County* who was interviewed on 14 March, 2018.

<sup>61</sup> *Mokowe Jetty* is the launching point from *Mokowe town* where boats are boarded before sailing to *Amu Island*.

The sensitization of youth and capacity building and training was also given as another mechanism in place. According to Joseph Kanyiri<sup>62</sup> (2018) he insinuated that; there is strategy on how to integrate those who are returning from Somalia and also *nyumba kumi*<sup>63</sup> initiative where one has to know his or her neighbours well. There is also reopening of schools which were closed to enroll more youth in classes. There is use of counter narrative to discredit the *Al-Shabaab* in what they advocate for. This is tailor made to the youth who have no jobs and are vulnerable to be lured by the agenda pushed by the extremist groups. The narrative is supported by dialogue forums organized by NGO's in conjunction with government agencies to address pertinent issues that might be affecting communities like the issue of land and inadequate employment opportunities which are key issues within the *Lamu* populace.

Through researcher observation it was evident that the County government of *Lamu* has embarked on other mechanism in form of development projects within the County. The projects are like *cabro*<sup>64</sup> projects within the key towns which employed the youth during constructions and maintenance of the same. Further, through researcher observation and listening to presentation by various speakers in the seminar on countering and preventing violent extremism held at *Lamu* County on 6 March 2018 it was realized other mechanisms in place is like partnership between national government, county government, Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHCR), Civil Societies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics Trust (CICC). This is enhanced through community participation through formation of Technical Consultative Board (TCB) and formation of Community Management Team (CMT). There are also community revitalization projects that aim at empowering youth in form of youth polytechnics and community resource centres which is coupled with waste disposal and recycling programs.

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<sup>62</sup> Joseph Kanyiri is the *Lamu* County commissioner during his speech on Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism Seminar at *Amu* Island, *Lamu* County on 6 March, 2018.

<sup>63</sup> *Nyumba Kumi* Initiative is a program introduced in the Kenya community policing cycle by presidential order of the President of Republic of Kenya, gazetted in 2013 to anchor community policing at the household level with a definite physical address with the aim of achieving a safe and sustainable neighborhood.

<sup>64</sup> *Cabro* are interlocking blocks made of cements used to make outdoor floor.



### **Challenges faced while dealing with recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab***

However, in the implementation of these mechanisms, there exist challenges. According Hiribae Gwiyo<sup>65</sup> (2018); the communities hide information of known youth who are already recruited or vulnerable to be recruited to the *Al-Shabaab* terror gang. There is lack of trust between communities and security agents which curtails the war against *Al-Shabaab* difficult.

Sarah Munyao (2018) argument on challenges in dealing with recruitment is that there is no political will and government commitment to empower youth both nationally and county level. In another interview with Wanyoike (2018) he was quick to state that; "...the road network here is lacking ....especially when it rains some parts is impassable and the economic activities are affected. The wear and tear of our vehicles makes it difficult for even the NGO's to reach areas with vulnerable youth..."

The poor road network therefore is hindrance in reaching out to the areas where youth are vulnerable for recruitment with a view to creating awareness. Mathenge (2018) indicated that, the issue of lack of funds in the effort to curb youth recruitment as a set-back when empowering youth, they require assistance to start off employment opportunities like fishing and boat business. The other challenge cited by Wanyoike (2018) which could unlock the reintegration of *Al-Shabaab* returnees as he said it; "...The fear of the unknown for returnees from *Al-Shabaab* training camps since they feared surrendering to security agents. They were uncertain on whether they would rot in jail or get integrated back to the society as per the amnesty given by the government ..."

According to Aboud (2018), insufficient funding for counter violent extremism program as a major challenge coupled with lack of collaboration between county and national government. From the filled questionnaires, lack of political goodwill was cited to derail the efforts of fighting the recruitment of youth due to the earlier allegation that was leveled; that political leaders were misusing youth by giving them handouts in an effort to sell their agenda and once they fail to propagate it the youth were left empty handed with the only option available of joining extremist groups for fake jobs promised.

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<sup>65</sup> Hiribae Gwiyo is administration police officer based in *Mpeketoni, Lamu County*, interviewed on 9 March, 2018.

There were other respondents who cited lack of collaboration between County and national governments in the questionnaires as a challenge since they observed as if there was competition to discredit each other's efforts. This was connected with hypocrisy among leaders who were seen to pursue different personal interests. Another respondent<sup>66</sup> from the opinion leadership's cluster cited harassment from security agents. One of them was quick to say in *Swahili* dialect; "...*Ukisema unajua kijana ameingia hiyo kikundi ...shida inaanza hapo... wanasema hata wewe ni mmoja wao*" (If you say you know anyone who joined *Al-Shabaab* you are in hot soup, they conclude you are one of them). This therefore becomes a challenge in unmasking the recruitment cartel they opt to keep a low profile in sharing crucial information.

Hosea Nzuki (2018) indicated that the challenges they face is implementing measures of dealing with recruitment of *Al-Shabaab* is the lack of facilitations and funds especially when it comes to allowances. The seniors do not give their juniors their dues and thus no motivation to go on patrols in likely *Al-Shabaab* hot spots. In this context therefore the security agencies geared in fighting terrorist using kinetic force are curtailed to some extent and fight against *Al-Shabaab* is lost. However in the same vein there seems to be a concentration on hard power in fights against terrorism negating for soft power which should be given equal treatment if we aim at dismantling the recruitment network.

#### **4.3.4 The Way Forward in Dealing with Youth Recruitment to *Al-Shabaab***

##### **Possible Solutions**

The respondents outlined the following as some of the probable solutions that would help in mitigation of youth recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. This came from both security agents and locals who participated in filling questionnaires and interviews. They proposed the following:

The security agencies should work closely with locals to give them intelligence information about the youth who have crossed the border and should be stopped from harassing them. Mathenge (2018), indicated; "Police and military harassing local people has been making the fight against *Al-Shabaab* difficult because no one is ready to tell the police of the activities of *Al-Shabaab*."

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<sup>66</sup> The respondent is opinion leader, who sought anonymity and was interviewed at *Hindi, Lamu County* on 8 March, 2018.

Peter Kai (2018) proposed that the education syllabus within *Lamu* County schools and environs should incorporate the effects of the *Al-Shabaab* group so that the recruitment can be curbed from all areas. This was echoed by security agencies in their responses on the questionnaires. This amounts to soft power approach and not reliance on security agencies only in use of kinetic lethal force.

According to Bett (2018), family planning to sizeable family can also help in dealing with recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. He was quick to say that most of these youth within *Lamu* who have joined *Al-Shabaab* are as result of poor living conditions due to large families. He also indicated that the issue of school drop outs should be addressed in order to reduce the potentiality of recruitment. More schools and colleges should be put up for youth to realize their full potential and help them to start self-employment jobs.

According to Lawrence Mberia<sup>67</sup> (2018), the religious groups within the county should accommodate and tolerate each other's faith for a healthy and a symbiotic relationship. This would ensure that there is no radicalization and tendency to discredit other people faith. According to Wanyoike (2018), land related issues to be sorted out by both county and national governments to avert the hatred that is spread by greedy leaders. The land should be allocated to locals and title deed issued to legitimize land ownership of the populace. This also should be couple with clearance of forest close to the roads to a distance of 1 kilometer on either side to reduce the activities of *Al-Shabaab* who use the cover of bushes to conduct attacks on the area. Aboud (2018) proposed that there should be platforms geared towards youth dialogue at county level as part of solution in the recruitment of *Al-Shabaab*.

#### **4.3.5 Conclusion on Hypotheses**

##### **Hypothesis 1**

The first hypothesis was that unemployment and exclusivity has positive correlation with recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*. From the overall objective of the research which was to analyze the factors influencing youth to join the *Al-Shabaab* it is evident from interviews and

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<sup>67</sup> Lawrence Mberia is the chairman of Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics Trust (CICC) during his speech at Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism Seminar held at *Amu* Island on 6 March 2018.

questionnaire filled that the unemployment of youth plays a significant role in influencing their movement to the group. For example a Wanyoike (2018) claimed, “The political losers use youth who are desperate for jobs by giving them handouts to continue discrediting their competitors. They later become potential recruits to *Al-Shabaab* when the handouts dry up.”

This supports the findings from the research which brought to the light that the exclusivity which arise from what youth perceive as marginalization in terms of representation within county and national government. They feel they are not given opportunity to be part and parcel of national government in terms of top posts. This is fuelled by political class which goes an extra mile to make youth join the group in training and later fight for their rights like land ownership. Exclusivity arises from lack of similar opportunities with other counties. For example the media network which covers the region is only from paid network like Digital Satellite Television (DSTV)<sup>68</sup>. The television network does not cover the region and for the family who does not have cash to pay for their television packages are normally deprived right to information. This translates to denial of opportunities to youth through national media in informing them and also local content that could be aired for sensitization against the *Al-Shabaab*. *Al-Shabaab* scouts capitalizes on this unfortunate occurrence and offers to have video shows forums which air content that influence youth into joining the group. Lack of learning institutions within the county which can be able to impart skills among the youth is a major draw-back. Some youth lacks formal education to make rational decisions before they leave for greener pasture elsewhere. They cannot comprehend why the offers are so appealing before they find themselves deep in the group circles.

Exclusivity on the issue of how social services are delivered to the locals as is the case of identity cards and birth certificates is evident. Locals have to travel from far especially from Islands that form *Lamu* County and one has to pay for transport which sometimes is costly or not available to enjoy those services. This is tied to the feeling of the fact that a particular group has been sidelined in the sharing of national cake and other services as is the case of birth certificates. Ann Mwangi (2018), indicated that; “To get a birth certificate here is hectic, why does it take long time here in *Lamu* than *Nairobi* are we not like other Kenyans.” She concluded. The economic deprivation affects the poverty levels of the people of *Lamu* County. Lack of equal economic opportunities

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<sup>68</sup> DSTV is a Sub-Saharan Africa direct broadcast satellite service.

among locals threatens the youth joining the group. Those who perceive fishing as the only mean of business which they can survive on, feels they are marginalized. Fishing is restricted to daytime as is the case with agriculture; however on flipside fish harvesting is better achieved at night which makes youth who practice fishing deprived their economic security. They cannot feed their family as result. What follows is joining *Al-Shabaab* as the only option for them to be self-reliant.

Exclusivity among different groups leads youth to joining violent extremism groups. This happens when natives as group, believes that their land was taken by non-locals and have every right to reclaim it back. They opt to join *Al-Shabaab* group with intention of getting skills through arming and use of crude weapon to evict non-locals who took their land. This connotation applied through *Mpeketoni* attacks where kikuyu tribesmen were targeted. This mob psychology followed footsteps of what the local militia known as Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) were fronting the agenda that, Coast region is not part of Kenya and this was due to the feeling of being left out in the national development agenda.

Social deprivation which also influence youth in joining *Al-Shabaab* is religion. Youth who are from Islamic faith are radicalized to believe the religion is being targeted. For example before one is issued identity card or passport, he or she is subjected to scrutiny that they feel is not equal to other faiths. This is coupled with the believe that there is persecution of their religion elsewhere like *Iraq* and *Afghanistan* and they should join jihad to reclaim the freedom of their religion especially in Somalia where they perceive Kenya Defence Forces is part and parcel of fronting Christianity faith which they don't subscribe to.

## **Hypothesis 2**

Poverty and illiteracy has positive correlation with recruitment of youth into *Al-Shabaab*. Poverty among the community of *Lamu* has led to youth joining *Al-Shabaab* as an option to uplift their lives. This triggers them in effort to better their standard of living join the group for some money instead of dying in poverty. Illiteracy come handy due to the fact that the youth are promised jobs without even possessing any skills and they accept the offers blindly. This is due to the fact they cannot be able to comprehend and argue their case due to illiteracy.

The two hypotheses turned positive and all the factors outlined, proved in making youth join extremist groups. 52% of respondents believed unemployment while 40% of respondents believed, poverty lured youth into joining *Al-Shabaab* which is relative since not all youth who are experiencing unemployment and poverty have joined the group in the county. The hypotheses turned positive because the respondents were categorical in illustrating what they felt should be done to improve economic standards of the area. Either perceived or real, it played a big role in supporting the hypotheses. The theory which was used rhymed with the assumptions that were proved to be behind the youth joining *Al-Shabaab*. However the economic factors that include poverty and unemployment that were outlined by the respondents as contributing to the recruitment of the group cannot be the case elsewhere since there are other counties with similar deficiencies but *Al-Shabaab* have not managed to recruit youth from such areas.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides summary of findings and conclusions on the objectives. The chapter further highlights recommendations to be implemented and ends with a suggestion for further research on the gaps identified and considered important by the researcher during the study.

#### 5.2 Summary of Findings

From the study youth recruitment from *Lamu* County is real with majority falling in the trap laid by *Al-Shabaab* which thrives from existing problems affecting the youth by offering false alternatives and end up getting a number of youth as a result. The factors cut across the political, economic and social factors. Exclusivity through political sphere featured most in shaping the youth to join *Al-Shabaab* through shortcoming in failing to prioritize what is to be done for the society. Unemployment plays a significant role in influencing youth join *Al-Shabaab*, this is due to the fact that there is monopolization of some activities as the only meaningful way within the county. Fishing and agriculture continue to attract more people within *Lamu* County at expense of other business opportunities available. This therefore make the two ventures to be overcrowded and force youth to look for other opportunities elsewhere as is the case with *Al-Shabaab*. The social factors which emanates from lack of social services like birth certificate pose a risk to youth. When one applies for identity card he might be delayed or denied the chance especially when his nationality is at question since he comes from the border. This becomes a catalyst for youth to join *Al-Shabaab* who never require such for one to get a meaningful employment.

From the finding of the research, the signs that indicate there is recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab* are many. However, most respondents believed in the change of religions of potential recruits to Islam as an indicator. This is possible especially when one is promised job opportunities outside *Lamu* and has to blend with the customs and traditions of country he has been promised a placement. The job opportunities are mostly aligned to Arab states<sup>69</sup> and Somalia. From the

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<sup>69</sup> Arab states of the Persian Gulf are seven Arab states which borders the Persian gulf and they include Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

research it was evident that the government has engaged in use of hard power which includes use of military and other security agencies to quell and break links of *Al-Shabaab* recruitment network.

The study was able confirm that governance threshold has a major part to play in influencing youth joining *Al-Shabaab* in *Lamu* County. The poor leadership which cut across political arena influenced youth joins the group. This stemmed from lack of prioritization on quick impact projects that could keep the youth busy. Lack of budgetary allocation in terms of infrastructure including roads which could open the County in terms of business positively influencing youth to seek offers from *Al-Shabaab*. The inadequacy in resource distribution within the county contributed to youth joining *Al-Shabaab*. For example the land allocation has not been looked at, hence creating discrepancies among all tribes living within the County.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

This section will conclude on each objective and hypothesis as discussed earlier.

#### **5.3.1 The factors influencing recruitment of youth joining *Al-Shabaab* in *Lamu* County.**

Exclusivity play big role in influencing youth to join *Al-Shabaab*. The decision to deploy security forces in 2015 within *Lamu* County was made by political class without *Lamu* people participation at expense of what prevailed at the time. The step was welcomed but if it was not complimented by building infrastructure like road network which could open up the County in order to promote development within the county. When roads connecting the county with other counties are done, it will definitely reduce the cost of transport which now is not affordable to many youth. It will also reduce time in transport which is prerequisite for business opportunities. This means that the politicians who allocate budgets in infrastructure development have failed in their mandate and the political distance decay in failing to comply with what are priorities among residents of *Lamu* has contributed to youth joining *Al-Shabaab*.

Therefore the national government through political goodwill should monitor how the county spends her budget allocation in order to prioritize those quick impact projects which will see more youth benefiting hence reducing their vulnerability of joining *Al-Shabaab*. The factors that contribute to the hiring of youth should be addressed by the government in order to promote human security within the county. It was evident that the success of multi agencies in fighting *Al-Shabaab*



immediately after the 2015 degraded the group but the success was short-lived. They dealt with symptoms but not the root problems that are making the group continue to recruit from the County.

Unemployment also contribute to youth joining *Al-Shabaab*. The monopolizations of some preferred economic activities among residents of *Lamu* like fishing and agriculture have locked out some youth out of any meaningful job opportunities. Youth focus on fishing for livelihood and if they lack fishing nets they are easily lured by *Al-Shabaab* who offers to finance them or facilitate them with nets. Unemployment play a central role due the fact youth are promised jobs which to their understanding can alleviate poverty in their backyard. According Hassan (2012), some youth are enticed by money especially those who are impoverished in society. He confirmed out from his research, that five out of fifteen youth joined *Al-Shabaab* as a form of employment which came in form of carrying gun and patrolling the streets which is not tough as compared to construction. This makes youth to explore the other avenues from where they can get basic needs easily. The economic development of the county should be strategized in a manner that would lead to youth getting some form of livelihood.

Illiteracy featured most in discussions as a contributing factor for youth joining *Al-Shabaab* as a result of inability to make sound decision in life. According to Hassan (2012), lack of education in general without focusing in religious education proved a factor to joining *Al-Shabaab* since the youth claimed without education one could not venture in different avenues of life. There is no bright future ahead than joining the group, rather than languish in poverty with no chance to pursue something greater. From the research published by IOM in 2017, over 60% of the population highest qualification is primary level of education and 10% without any formal education (Thomas Eliyahu et al, 2017). The ability to articulate issues is therefore reduced for these youth to question the offers presented to them by *Al-Shabaab*. Such youth will automatically for not being well informed likely to join the groups since they believe they have nothing to lose but hope to gain something instead.

The influencing factors of youth joining *Al-Shabaab* are based on economic orientation where youth search for greener pasture to change their living conditions. The proximity of Boni forest and extensive *Lacta belt* create an added advantage to *Al-Shabaab* who are in dire need of youth who can front their agenda of creating despondency in *Lamu* County. This in line with existing

belief, that *Lamu* has over the years been a safe haven for *Al-Shabaab* militants. The *Boni forest* has been a hideout for the *Al-Shabaab* militants who are believed to have a hand in *Mpeketoni massacre* as well as *Hindi* areas of *Lamu* and *Gamba* areas of *Tana River*. The *Al-Shabaab* militant group seems to be exploiting the forested area for planning and executing the sporadic guerrilla attacks on the Kenyan locals, properties and security forces.

### **5.3.2 Signs of Youth Recruitment into *Al-Shabaab* Groups.**

The Islamic religion becomes a pre-requisite for one to get opportunity which is further supported by increased preaching in mosques and madrassas in the context of educating the youth about the religion and *Jihad* by extension. According to Hassan (2012) the youth are encouraged by radical Sheikhs who deliver's fiery sermons for them to join Jihad which make them end up in joining *Al-Shabaab*.

This translates to call for better understanding of religion and reasons behind, one to be forced to change own faith for job opportunities. On another note, since there is freedom of worship within Kenya it should be upon converted believers to understand their new religion deeply before are misinformed and radicalized to become *Al-Shabaab* as is the case of some youth today. The Islamic religion has been interpreted as part and parcel of terror links and this connotation should be reversed. Moderate Muslims especially sheikhs should preach and teach this religion to converted believers before confusion on the correct position by radical sheikhs.

### **5.3.3 Mechanisms dealing with *Al-Shabaab* and Way Forward**

Hard power mechanism has borne little fruit as *Al-Shabaab* continues to recruit youth within the *Lamu* County. Police junior ranks lacked motivation in their work, as allowances was not availed in time. This therefore worked against earlier gains achieved when police were deployed. This however calls for an insight of what can be done by the seniors in uplifting the morale. This should include the channeling the allowances through bank accounts without entrusting the funds to a single person. There should include the reopening of schools which will enhance dispensation of education to all members within the county. The way forward is through building capacity and governance within the county. Infrastructure development is critical in enhancing sustainable stability within the County. This will ensure that nothing is left to chance as far as employment is dealt with within the county by opening opportunities to youth.

The government agencies deployment within *Lamu* County require further review on what to be done. The study concludes that the counterterrorism response involving the military and other security agencies is necessary but requires to be supplemented with quick impact projects to deal with economic and social well-being of the youth and communities who live in the county. The quick impact projects for example should be include increase of radio and media network coverage within *Lamu*. Kenyan security forces undertook an operation to deny *Al-Shabaab* fighters *Boni Forest* codenamed '*Operation Linda Boni*.'<sup>70</sup> This operation has affected local communities with most of them bearing the brunt. The *Waboni* community lifestyle has been disrupted as the government ordered those living in the forest to vacate the area as the military intensified the raids to flush out the Islamic militant *Al-Shabaab*.

The operation has nevertheless been surrounded with controversy with human rights bodies claiming that the operation has resulted in displacements and civilian casualties. The government has however assured the residents the assistance they need. The government is moving residents affected by the attacks to safer areas. The flushing out of the *Al-Shabaab* militants within *Lamu* require amalgamation of efforts from all line ministries to provide services that locals need so that they don't feel deprived in comparison to other counties. Eventually youth will be kept at bay from joining the *Al-Shabaab* if there are opportunities available at their doorstep and recruitment to *Al-Shabaab* will be a thing of the past in *Lamu* County.

There are also non-governmental organizations who are taking part in the provision of humanitarian services to locals. This becomes an avenue for sympathizers who are aligned to *Al-Shabaab* in their recruitment agenda. It becomes difficult for government agencies to have control over them especially when they transcend across the borders. The locals shift their allegiance to the non-governmental organizations which in turn discredit government agencies in their effort to deal with recruitment of youth to *Al-Shabaab*.

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<sup>70</sup> *Operation Linda Boni* was launched in September 2015 to oust the *Al-Shabaab* fighters. The operation involves a variety of Kenyan security agencies including defence and police forces, intelligence agencies, and the Kenyan Forest Service, working together to secure the forest and surrounding area. The *Boni* Forest is a National Reserve located in northern, coastal Kenya along the border with Somalia. The forest is known for its rich biodiversity providing the surrounding communities with resources they depend on.

### 5.3.4 Conceptual Framework

The relative economic deprivation which was a trigger of youth joining *Al-Shabaab* was stemming from perceived marginalization. Youth from *Lamu* County join the *Al-Shabaab* from intrapersonal or interpersonal interactions to fulfill what they perceive as marginalization. They join the group due to the issue of land with aim of fighting to get their land back from non-natives. They also join *Al-Shabaab* from the interactions with others who joined the group earlier as they sought employment. Through group affiliation there is perceived persecution of religion in Somalia and Iraq which make youth to be lured to jihad in pretext of fighting those who want to destroy their religion.

### 5.4 Recommendations and Way Forward

The youth have been cited as vulnerable to *Al-Shabaab* recruitment and their plight has been ignored and as a result, they have been easily radicalized by the *Al-Shabaab* militants using the *Boni forest* for training and to plan attacks. They are exploited which in turn contribute to the growth of *Al-Shabaab* within Kenya. In this regard, the government should come up with empowerment programs so that the *Al-Shabaab* ideologies do not sway the youth. The following are the recommendations considering the issues and rationale:

- a. The national government should address unemployment through empowerment programs like *kazi kwa vijana*<sup>71</sup> (Jobs or work for youth) programs in *Lamu* county from short to long term to assist vulnerable youth. This should include recruitment of more youth to security agencies and deploying them back to the region.
- b. The national government should address poverty in the county through youth empowerment programs and rebates to the poor families. The government should also monitor closely the NGO's which offers services to locals within the County to ensure that they are not proxies in supporting *Al-Shabaab* agenda.

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<sup>71</sup> *Kazi kwa vijana* is an initiative by the National Government of Kenya launched in 2009 empowering youths to get job opportunities through public works projects tackling unemployment among majority young people. At County level the leadership earmarks vulnerable youths and enroll them in social services and their labour is paid in form of wages.

c. The county government in conjunction with national government of Kenya should build more schools and also increased television and radio media coverage signal within *Lamu* County to provide an avenue for community awareness about the effects of *Al-Shabaab* in conjunction with private media companies in short term. This will address illiteracy both as short and a long term strategy which will see reduction of youth who can easily be recruited to *Al-Shabaab*. The increase in the television and radio media coverage will provide an avenue to inform youth and general public on effects of *Al-Shabaab* in language they understand to even those without formal education.

### **5.5 Suggestion for further research**

From the research conducted, the following areas call for further research.

a. Identify and research further on theories that would explain why *Al-Shabaab* continues to radicalize and recruit youth not only from *Lamu* County but the whole country in joining *Al-Shabaab*.

b. Research on whether or not the proximity of *Lamu* County to Somalia and *Lacta Belt* motivates youth to join *Al-Shabaab*.

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


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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I MAP OF *LAMU* COUNTY<sup>72</sup>.



Source: Google maps 2019.

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<sup>72</sup> *Lamu* County is situated in the Kenyan Northern Coastline bordering Somalia with 7 administrative divisions namely *Amu, Hindi, Faza, Kiunga, Kizingitini, Mpeketoni* and *Witu*. The County has *Lamu, Manda, Pate* and *Kiwayu* islands with *Lamu* town on *Lamu* island which host the County administrative units and County Commissioner headquarters along the shore line. The County has an area of 6474.7km<sup>2</sup> that combine both mainland and islands with coastline line of 130km in length.

## APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE/INTERVIEW GUIDE



University of Nairobi

### QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDE ON FACTORS INFLUENCING YOUTH RECRUITMENT INTO *AL-SHABAAB*: A CASE STUDY OF KENYAN *LAMU* COUNTY (2011-2016)

#### Introduction and request for informed verbal consent

Good morning/ afternoon/ evening. My name is *Danson Ngunyi Mwangi*, a University of Nairobi student at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration. I am pursuing a Masters of Arts in Strategic and Security studies and is in that regard collecting information for my research topic

**“FACTORS INFLUENCING YOUTH RECRUITMENT INTO *AL-SHABAAB*: A CASE STUDY OF KENYAN *LAMU* COUNTY (2011-2016)”.**

You have been purposefully selected to participate in the interview/questionnaire and I am happy to invite you to share the information you have in this topic. Your knowledge, experience and suggestions will be appreciated as you assist in answering the research questions. The information you give will solely be used for academic purposes. The interview/questionnaire will take approximately 30minutes of your time.

#### Part I: QUESTIONNAIRE TIMELINE

Date of Questionnaire/Interview

Day:	Month:	Year:
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Time Interview Commenced:

Time interview ended:

**Part II: Bio data. Please tick the most suitable response.**

1. Sex:  male  female
2. Age:  above 18 years  above 35 years
3. Highest level of education attained:  
 primary education  secondary education  college/ university education  
 others \_\_\_\_\_
4. Nationality:  Kenyan  Non Kenyan
5. Religion  Christian  Muslim  Hindu  Others
6. Resident of *Lamu* County between 2011-2016:  Yes  No

**Part III. What are the indicators of recruitment into *Al-Shabaab***

1. How does *Al-Shabaab* recruit? -----  
-----  
-----  
-----
2. What are signs that *Al-Shabaab* are recruiting?-----  
-----  
-----  
-----
3. Do you know anyone who has been recruited to the *Al-Shabaab* (a) Yes  (b) No
4. If yes, explain what is the his/her age-----  
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-----

5. Does lifestyle of these people change ?-----

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**Part IV: Factors influencing recruitment of youth in the Lamu County of Kenya**

1. What are the probable reasons these people join *Al-Shabaab*? -----

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2. Which areas do these people come from *Lamu County* ?-----

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3. What activities do youth involve in showing they have joined or are joining *Al-Shabaab*?

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4. How do *Al-Shabaab* carry out recruitment?-----

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**Part V: What are the specific factors leading to youth recruitment into violent extremism in the Lamu County of Kenya?**

1. Do political factors lead to recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. Yes[ ] No[ ].

2. Does the following forms part of these political factors.

a. Poor leadership. Yes[ ] No[ ].

b. Inclusivity in the national government/County government. Yes[ ] No[ ].

c. Police post within a division. Yes[ ] No[ ].

3. Are there other political factors you think lead to recruitment of *Al-Shabaab*.

Yes[ ] No[ ]

4. If Yes/No explain.

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5. Does the following forms parts of the economic factors.

a. Poverty. Yes[ ] No[ ].

b. Unemployment. Yes[ ] No[ ]

c. Poor road network. Yes[ ] No[ ]

6. Are there other economic factors you think lead to recruitment of *Al-Shabaab*.

Yes[ ] No[ ]

7. If Yes/No explain

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8. Do Social factors lead to recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*. Yes[ ] No[ ]

9. Does the following forms parts of the social factors.

a. Schools. Yes [ ] No[ ].

b. Dispensaries. Yes[ ] No[ ]

c. Recreation facilities. Yes[ ] No[ ]

d. Public areas. Yes[ ] No[ ]

10. Are there other social factors you think lead to recruitment of *Al-Shabaab*.

Yes [ ] No[ ]

11. If Yes/No explain.

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**Part VI: What are the challenges faced in dealing with youth hiring to *Al-Shabaab* and propose a way forward?**

1. What mechanisms are there in dealing with youth recruitment -----

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-----  
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2. What are the challenges in implementing the measures of dealing with recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*.

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3. What are the probable solutions you can suggest in handling the challenge of recruitment to *Al-Shabaab*.

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**Part VII: What are grievances that make youth join *Al-Shabaab* ?**

1. What is the main bone of contention of youth joining *Al-Shabaab* \_\_\_\_\_

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2. Do you think the joining of *Al-Shabaab* is as a result of these grievances?

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3. In your own assessment how do you rate the altitudes, habits of thoughts and allegiances of youth who join *Al-Shabaab*.

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