

**THE EFFECTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT ON  
SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA SUB-REGION**

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**R50/69867/2011**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL  
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES TO THE INSTITUTE OF  
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
(IDIS), UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**



**AUGUST 2012**

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
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## DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree to any other University.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. I Farah for his scholarly insight, guidance and encouragement as I embarked on this project.

I wish to extend my appreciation to the Commandant and the Staff of the Kenya National Defence College for their support and encouragement during my entire stay at the college.

Special thanks to the University of Nairobi lecturers, under the leadership of Prof. Makumi Mwagiru, Director of IDIS, for their tireless efforts in providing me with valuable knowledge during my entire course at the NDC.

Last and not least, I wish to thank my husband, Nganatha and my children Wambui, Gicuku, Wabia and Wanjiru for their support and encouragement during my study period at the College. Their understanding during the period I was away from home, in order to accomplish my academic task was greatly appreciated.

## ABSTRACT

The genesis of the Somali conflict can be traced to the year 1991, when Siad Barre was ousted from power following a military coup d'état. Since then the country has not witnessed much peace despite various efforts by regional countries and the rest of the international community. The study provides analyses of the nature of the conflict with focus on the causes of the conflict and the actors and issues attributed to the conflict since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The study further analyses the past regional and international efforts employed to try to resolve the conflict in Somalia. The objective of the study is to analyse the effects of the Somali conflict on security in the Horn of Africa. More specifically, the study critically examines the causes of the Somali conflict and provides a policy analysis on the same. It explores the analytical linkage between the Somali conflict and security in the Horn of Africa region and further assesses regional and international efforts aimed at resolving the conflict. The Conceptual Framework adopted in the study is the internationalisation of conflicts and conflict systems. The study also refers to the realist theory, with a view to drawing a parallel between the protracted conflict in Somalia and its internationalisation nature. The methodology adopted in the study is mainly based in secondary sources of data obtained from books and journals. The research also uses other methods such as interviews and questionnaires. The causes of the Somali conflict is as a result of a number of factors which include the impact of the colonial legacy, Siad Barre's repressive regime and the political misuse of the clan system. Somalia is part of a larger conflict system, the Horn of Africa conflict system which includes all states in the Horn, in this case Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti. There are also other countries involved, which have interests in Somalia in various ways. These include the United States of America and Egypt and countries comprising the League of the Arab States. The conflict in Somalia has posed security challenges to the regional countries and the international community. This includes: the flow of small arms and light weapons into neighbouring countries; the influx of refugees from Somalia into these countries resulting to humanitarian crises due to the overcrowded nature of the refugee camps and the resultant economic burden posed to the host nations; piracy and terrorism resulting to the insecurity situation in Somalia which pose challenge to regional and international peace and security. The internalisation of the conflict is indicative of the fact that the success of realising a solution in Somalia lies in solving the root cause of the Somali Conflict and minimising the external interference in the country. These countries should aim to support Somalia rather than advocate for their own vested interests. The study concludes that for lasting peace to prevail in Somalia, the solution should emanate from the Somalis themselves with the concerted support of regional and international community.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project paper to my mother, Margery Gichangi and my late father, Elijah Gichangi.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
ARS	Alliance for Liberation of Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
EU	European Union
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
SNM	Somali National Movement
SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Party
TFC	Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFI	Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
UIC	Union of Islamic Council
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USC	United Somali Congress
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1: Introduction

The main purpose of this research paper is to study the Somali conflict with a view to establishing the root causes and recommend appropriate measures to resolve it. From the foregoing it is evident that the conflict is as a result of a multiple, historical, social and political processes that have shaped the structure of Somalia. The Somali conflict was initially triggered by the dictatorial tendencies of the Siad Barre regime prior to 1991. Since that period the conflict has fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of the actors involved as well as its dynamics. Currently the conflict is being waged between the transitional federal government (TFG) forces and their supporters on one side and the Al Shabaab and the other fundamental groups on the other side.<sup>1</sup>

Different scholars have different perceptions about the Somali conflict. Moller describes the current situation in Somalia with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a government without governance which is opposed to the anarchic situation of governance without a government.<sup>2</sup> Coleman describes that an intractable conflict is as destructive as it persists and resists every attempt to be resolved constructively and appears to take a life of its own. This explains the complexity of the Somali conflict.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A. Solomon Dersso, "The Somali Conflict: implication for Peace Keeping and peacemaking efforts," *Institute of Security Studies, ISS Paper* 198. (Sep 2009).

<sup>2</sup> B. Moller (2009), "The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors", *DIIS Report 2009:03 Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies.*

<sup>3</sup> M. Duetsch, P.T Coleman and EC Marcus, (edts) *Cooperation and Competition in the Hard Book of Conflict Resolution* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (2006).

Since the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, the twenty year civil war in Somalia has destroyed state institutions and created a territory in which lawlessness and impunity prevails. The country has been characterised by failure of a credible central government and lack of viable institutions to control law and order therefore classifying it as a failed state. Criminality, including the trafficking of people, drugs and arms has become entrenched into the Somali society. The conflict has become a disaster for the country and has mutated, affecting security in other regional countries. The persistent conflict and drought has contributed to influx of refugees into neighbouring countries causing a strain on these economies. More recently, piracy and kidnapping have been a menace to the international community by causing negative repercussions to the shipping industry and forcing a costly deployment of international navy forces.<sup>4</sup>

It has become a conflict in which Somalis, Somali's neighbours, the region, and the international community all have a stake, although their interests are not identical. Neighbours have legitimate interests in Somalia, but their role has been specific to their own national interests. The study will therefore aim to conceive how these divergent interests could be incorporated into a joint strategy with a view to resolving the Somali conflict in order to enhance peace and security in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

## **1.2: Statement of the Research Problem**

Somalia has been ravaged by war since the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991. The massive human suffering in Somali as a result of the conflict has had a profound impact on the country's peace, stability, security and development. The failure by various Somali

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<sup>4</sup> A. Solomon Dersso, " The Somali Conflict: implication for Peace Keeping and Peacemaking efforts, "*Institute of Security Studies, ISS Paper 198*. (Sep 2009).

factions to resolve the conflict has resulted to continued loss of life as a result of fighting, famine, displacement of persons and the resultant flow of refugees.

Recently terrorism and piracy which is occurring off the coast of Somali has posed serious challenges to regional and international security. The conflict has also continued to promote insecurity into the neighbouring countries mainly due to proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and contributed to other international crimes such as human trafficking and money laundering. The massive influx of refugees into the neighbouring countries has posed serious security concerns, since many of the refugees are ex-soldiers with criminal intents. This has increased banditry especially in North Eastern Kenya reducing economic activities and free movement of people. The refugee problem has also resulted to a strain on regional economies and further contributed to environmental degradation in the refugee camps and the neighbouring areas.

The conflict has become internationalised, attracting foreign fighters, radical political ideology and terrorism as well as regional forces and the Africa Union. It has been a conflict in which Somali, the neighbouring countries, the region and the international community have at times pursued diverge interests. This has further complicated the peace making process resulting to failure to take a coordinated approach in resolving the Somali conflict. Regional states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt as well as International and regional organizations such as the UN and IGAD have intervened with the aim of creating peace in the war torn country. The research therefore seeks to examine and analyse the effects of the Somali conflict on the state itself and its impact on the security in the Horn of Africa sub-region. It also seeks to come up with recommendations on the best approaches to ensuring sustainable peace and reconciliation in Somali. The question therefore arises as to

whether the Somali conflict has any effect on security in the Horn of Africa region and if so how the ongoing conflict can be resolved.

### **1.3: Objective of the Study**

#### **Broad Objective**

The overall objective of the study is to analyse the effects of the Somali conflict on security in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

#### **Specific Objectives**

More specifically, the study aims to:

- Provide an overview of the Somali conflict and its causes;
- Assess the regional and international efforts in resolving the conflict;
- Explore the linkage between the Somali conflict and security in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

### **1.4: Literature Review**

This section reviews what scholars have stated concerning the concepts of conflict and security with relevance to the situation in Somalia. These scholars' approach to the issue of conflict and security provides a useful overview of the genesis of the Somali conflict and its impact on security in the Horn of Africa sub-region. Their approaches to the resolution of Somali conflict is also driven by the desire to ensure that there is peace and stability in Somali.

The realists ascertain that nation states often have conflicting national objectives some of which lead to war.<sup>5</sup> The capabilities of states are crucial for the outcome of international conflicts and one state's ability to influence another's behaviour. They assume that certain luxury imitable factors such as geography and the nature of human behaviour shape international conduct. They further agree that a states location affect its national capabilities and its foreign policy orientation. Because of geography, certain states are more vulnerable than others in foreign conquest.<sup>6</sup> The strategic position of Somalia explains the regional and international interest in the country. This was demonstrated by the two super powers during the cold war era, in respect of Somalia and the Horn of Africa in general.

Based on the assertion that the study of international relations is primarily concerned with interstate relations, realists argue that states are the dominant actors. Although states are formally equal in mutual relations and fully sovereign in the disposition in the internal affairs, the realists denies that sovereign equality exists in practice. Power politics is seen as fundamental as expounded by Morgenthau. He posits that coercive devices are the chief modalities of the system which emerges from the external dialog between the status quo and the revisionist actors. This results frequently in a balance of power which can have the effect of creating a semblance of order and stability and of maintaining the independence of major actors.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> J. W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy* Manchester University Press pp.55-64.

<sup>6</sup> J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: Comprehensive Survey* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1981), by Harpers & Row Publishers pp.85-86.

<sup>7</sup> J. Burton and F. Dukes, *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, Published by The Macmillan Press Ltd (1990) p.74.

A number of scholars have laid a lot of emphasis to colonial history and its lingering effects on the Somali and other regional conflicts. Mazurui<sup>8</sup> attributes the causes of many conflicts in Africa to colonisation. He argues that European colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and tradition African political institutions. The colonial powers also failed to create effective substitutes in their place. Many states founded by the Europeans were therefore built on fragile ground. The Africans who inherited these states did not have much experience in governing themselves, nor the management of institutions inherited. He further observes that the worst out breaks of violence in Africa in 1990s occurred as a result of ethnic conflict.

Mwagiru<sup>9</sup> posits that a conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something. Incompatibility arises because the parties have different perceptions, goals and ideas about how to achieve them. Underlying this is a conflict of visions, inability or unwillingness to see the other person's point of view.<sup>10</sup> Conflicts are organic in nature and grow and change over time. Conflicts have complex and varied issues and interests. They have non-violent and violent stages and transform from a structural conflict to a violent conflict and acquire a life of their own in the course of time.<sup>11</sup>

Mwagiru<sup>12</sup> ascertains that conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term that implies that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. It also refers

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<sup>8</sup> A. Mazrui, 'Conflict in Africa: An overview' in *Africa armed Conflict in Africa* by Carolyn Pamphrey & Rye Schwartz-Barcott, (ed), Triangle Institute for Security Studies (2003).

<sup>9</sup> M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, processes and Institutions of Management*, Watermark Publications, Nairobi, (2000) p.3.

<sup>10</sup> M. Mwagiru (ed), *Conflict in Africa: theory, Processes and Institutions of management*, Centre for Conflict Research Publications, Nairobi, (2006), pp.2-4.

<sup>11</sup> M. Mwagiru. *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent electoral Conflict in Kenya*. IDIS Publications on International Studies, 1<sup>st</sup> edition. (2008) p.28.

<sup>12</sup> M. Mwagiru (2006), op.cit. p.43.



to the process of bringing about change. The aim of conflict resolution is to transform actual or potential violent conflicts into peaceful processes of social and political change. It is characterised by mutual satisfaction of needs and not by power relationships. It is based on the belief that at the bottom of every conflict are certain needs which are not negotiable. Conflict resolution is not power based and non-coercive. It aims at post-conflict relationship which endures because the parties or actors to a conflict find it legitimate.

Vayrynen<sup>13</sup> observes that a conflict is not static and that each conflict has a life and autonomy of its own. The life of a conflict is carried by the parties to the conflict because they experienced it and took part in the conflict. He further argues that because a conflict has a life it also has a memory. The memory of a conflict is carried by the parties to the conflict and passed on to other generations.

Markakis<sup>14</sup> states that although the union to form Somalia Republic was based on common consent, the sparsely populated predominantly pastoralist north was weary of being dominated in centralised state by the more populous and agriculturally developed south. This situation left the relations between the north and south rather volatile. He observes that despite its homogeneity and national consciousness, the Somali pastoral society did not provide a solid base for the state that came into existence at the time of independence in 1960.<sup>15</sup> The prevailing clan strife interlocked with the politics during the period of the civilian rule (1960-9) therefore weakening the nationalist regime and further perpetuating a vision of expansionism aimed at incorporating other lands inhabited by Somalis in the Horn

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<sup>13</sup> R. Vayrynen, "To Settle or to Transform? Perspective on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts" in R. Vayrynen, (ed.) *New Direction in Conflict Theory and Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution*, London Sage Publishers, 1991, p. 25.

<sup>14</sup> J. Marakakis, (1994). "Ethnic conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa" In Fukui, K; & Marakakis, J. (ed.) *Ethnicity & Conflicts in the Horn of Africa*. Athens: Ohio University press. P. 222.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. P. 223.

of Africa. This promoted an arms race resulting to further militarization which led to the control of the state by soldiers in 1969.<sup>16</sup>

Baker<sup>17</sup> posits that competition over resources is a major source of conflict. She also points out that demographic pressures and serious refugee problems exacerbate the problem in many regions of Africa. Complex humanitarian emergencies develop when the scale of humanitarian suffering reaches intolerable levels and the international community is often called upon to intervene. This has occurred so often that there is increasing resistance from members of the international community, since any form of assistance has in many cases backfired or proved to be of short-lived value. The experience of Somalia implants a permanent image of failure in the minds of sensitive publics, undermining political support for peacekeeping.

Abraham<sup>18</sup> traces the roots of the Somali conflict from the colonial history and the troubled state which obtained in the immediate post independent period. According to him, a major source of some of the early conflict was the surge for territorial identity in the early 1960s and the late 1970s based on claim of land allegedly occupied by Kenya and Ethiopia. The other source of conflict was the dictatorship delivered on the Somali traditional social fabric based on clan harmony. This was exercised by Siad Barre through his political centralisation based on 'scientific socialism.' The problem with that was that the process of socialisation to uplift the local population created rigid structures of control. The

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> P. H Baker, conflict Resolution: 'a Methodology for assessing Internal Collapse and recovery in Armed Conflict in Africa', in *Armed Conflict in Africa* by C. Pumphrey Rye Schwartz- barcott, Triangle Institute for security Studies.

<sup>18</sup> K. Abraham, *Somalia Calling, The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*, pp.27-30.

centralisation of the state was exercised through control measures that alienated the state from the society which was traditionally regulated by dialogue and consensus.

Abraham states that the collapse of Somali following the departure of Siad Barre in 1991 affected the security of the neighbouring states because of the refugees that it generated. Moreover, the lawlessness that prevailed in the collapsed state encouraged drug traffickers and rebels who continued to use the state as a base of operation. Somalia has also provided a safe haven for terrorism.<sup>19</sup> Abraham has provided an interesting examination of the challenges independent Somalia faced as it attempted to create a viable state. His work could have studied further the failure of Somalia to ensure that effective political and economic institutions were established for a more sustainable and integrated state to emerge; a more holistic approach to the study.

Clayton<sup>20</sup> advances the hypothesis that modern warfare in Africa echoes the warfare of pre-colonial days. He perceives most conflicts in the continent as struggles over inadequate economic resources. He argues that the Berlin conference negotiations which determined the procedure by which Europe nations were to acquire states in Africa did little to consider the needs of the region as a whole. This resulted in lasting conflict by placing a single ethnicity under the control of two or more political nations. Once in power colonial government demarcated administrative divisions to correspond with local ethnicities. By so doing, they sharpened existing rivalries and incited ethnic consciousness. Traditional African authorities were undermined. The new pressures demanded of individuals further detached Africans from their traditional role in the wider group. Another problem was the uneven development

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p.43

<sup>20</sup> A. Clayton, *Violence in Africa since 1950 (Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, UK) in Armed Conflict in Africa*, Edited by Caroline Pumphrey, P.48.

resulting in regional disparities. He posits that the end of the Cold War led to a 'new world disorder'. The withdrawal of Western support resulted to a number of African regimes becoming more vulnerable to attack and some became failed states.

Nyang'oro<sup>21</sup> argues that colonialism cannot be entirely blamed for conflicts in Africa. Behind the political problems lie economic problems resulting from underdevelopment and inequality. This has been perpetuated by the post colonial states. Huntington<sup>22</sup> is a strong proponent for the establishment of strong bureaucratic institutions that help enable the state to respond and accommodate social forces in an emerging state.

Azar and J. Burton<sup>23</sup> posit that protracted social conflicts have typical characteristics that account for their prolonged nature. They have enduring features such as economic and technological underdevelopment and integrated social and political systems. They also have features such as distributive injustice which require the elimination or substantial modification of economic, social and extreme disparities in levels of political privilege and opportunity. Any solutions that do not come to grips with these features are bound to cause an eruption of conflict. Balance is bound to erupt again as soon as there is any change in the balance of forces, in leadership or in some other eco-political conditions. A conflict is resolved by definitive acceptance of decision of all parties.

Azar and Burton further posits that each conflict may invite the intervention of great powers, complicating further the relationship of those powers and also complicating the

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<sup>21</sup> J. Nyang'oro, *The Economic Context of Conflict in Africa in armed conflict in Africa*, Edited by Carolyn Pamphrey & Rye Schwartz-Barcott, Published by Scarecrow Press (2003) pp.79-80.

<sup>22</sup> S.P. Huntington(1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies* Yale University press,pp.1-8.

<sup>23</sup> E. Azar and J. Burton, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice in conflict readings in management and resolution*, Edited by John Burton & Frank Dukes (1990), Published by Macmillan Press Ltd P.148.

already difficult relationship of each situation. These situations results in the protracted nature of conflicts resulting in exhaustion of resources of those directly and indirectly involved. This accentuates under development. The increase of states sponsored terrorism and the disruption of trade and commerce are by products of these conflicts, thereby making the resolution all the more important.<sup>24</sup> This observation is relevant to this study since the collapse of Siad Barre following the Ogaden war marked a shift of the Somali conflict from one of intrastate to interstate with regional and international security implications.

Buzan<sup>25</sup> posits that security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. In seeking security state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other or sometimes opposed. In the contemporary international system, the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial state. The ideal type is the nation state, where ethnic and cultural boundaries line up with the political ones. The security of human collectivises is affected by factors in the sectors of military, political, economic, societal and environmental. He states that military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states perceptions of each other's intentions.

Jervis<sup>26</sup> asserts that the serious impact of perception and misperception is that the dire for insecurity produces aggressive actions if the state either requires aggressive actions and requires a high sense of security or feels menaced by the presence of strong states. The circle of perceiving others' security as one's own insecurity tends to generate mutual insecurity.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid p154.

<sup>25</sup> B. Buzan(1991). *People States and Fear, an Agenda for international Studies in the Post-cold war era*, (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.) Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc.p.19.

<sup>26</sup> R. Jervis (1976). *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security state*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p.5&13.

Bull<sup>27</sup> argued against excessive self-interest in approaches to national security and for a broader view in which common interests and linkage among national securities receive greater attention.

Some aspects of the Somali conflict are accommodated by the explanations as espoused in this section. However, these scholars do not exhaustively address the causes of the Somali Conflict. They have also not dealt with the recent complexities of the conflict especially with regard to issues of piracy and terrorism. The challenge therefore is to come up with an adequate explanation to the Somali experience in order to address this issue in a more comprehensive manner. It is appreciated that Somali is one of the least researched country in the region and hence the need for more people to conduct research and make available data for analysis.

Mitchell<sup>28</sup> discusses the relationship between changes (dynamism). According to him an understanding of the dynamics of conflict formation and perpetuation should have implications for methods of resolving (or at least coping with) even the most intractable of conflict relationships. Martina Fischer's<sup>29</sup> research will be of primary importance to this study as she attempts to expound the role of civil society and regional bodies in conflict transformation and peace building including their strengths and limits. This will help in the diffusion of new information technologies and mass media, which benefits the transnational networking of non-state actors.

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<sup>27</sup> H. Bull, *the control of the arms race* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), pp. 28-9.

<sup>28</sup> Berghoff *Handbook for Conflict Transformation* in [www.gsdrc.org](http://www.gsdrc.org)

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

Ronald Fisher<sup>30</sup> provides an interesting discussion on the role of third party intervention in conflict transformation. Third-party intervention in situations of human conflict has a long history and a wide variety of forms and functions. Disputants in most, if not all, societies and at all levels of social interaction have had access to external actors to whom they can turn when they find they are unable to manage their differences by themselves. A common response to perceived incompatibilities in goals, methods or values between contesting parties is to enter into negotiation in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Negotiation appears to be a universal, human phenomenon, although it is of course expressed in variations that are appropriate to each cultural context. Mediation, which is intended to facilitate the negotiation process, also needs to be practised within the norms and assumptions of any given cultural or sub cultural milieu.

### **1.5: Hypotheses**

The hypotheses provided for in the study are as follows:

- The Somali conflict has no one single cause but a multiple of causes, issues and interests;
- Regional and international peace-making efforts in Somalia lacked the local recognition and appreciation of the Somalis;
- There is a direct linkage between the Somali conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa region.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid

## 1.6: Conceptual Framework

The study is based on the internationalisation of conflicts and conflict systems.<sup>31</sup> Further focus is made on the realist theory with a view to explaining the situation in Somalia. The division of the Somali state by international borders has greatly influenced the internal conflict and its internationalisation, through contagion hence affecting the whole of the Horn of Africa. The idea of internationalisation poses important questions on proper management of the conflict and gives ideas on how the conflict can be managed effectively. The Somalia conflict can be identified thematically, whereby it is interconnected with conflicts in the neighbouring countries to form the Horn of Africa conflict system. Since 1990 the conflict has been internationalised drawing in regional and international players.

A conflict in a country, often affects the sub-regional and regional international environment. Failure to adequately respond can escalate the crisis beyond the sub-region.<sup>32</sup> In the case of Somalia the collapse of Government has become a global concern. Countries of the region and beyond, have attempted to influence the outcome of the Somali crisis, by supporting Somali factions to advance their national interest.<sup>33</sup>

The study of Somalia and its relations to regional countries is perceived in the context of international relations. Realist theorists like Morgenthau<sup>34</sup> argue that international politics is a process in which national interests are adjusted. The concept of national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a

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<sup>31</sup> C. Anthony, *Key Development Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*, 183 *Mil. L. Rev.* 66(2005) Vol. 183 pp. 66.

<sup>32</sup> J.E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, jr. "Contending Theories of International relations (Second edition), P 327.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> H. J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National interest of United States," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (December 1952), pp.961-998.



consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous conflict and threat of war to be minimised through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interest. In a world where sovereign nations vie for power, all nations are compelled to protect their interests. Morgenthau's<sup>35</sup> concept of international order is closely related to his concept of national interest. He posits that the pursuit of national interests that are not essential to national survival contributes to international conflict.

In the case of Somalia it may be argued that the lack of a defined national interest has contributed to the internalisation of the conflict. In his arguments, Morgenthau<sup>36</sup> posits that like the balance of power, diplomacy plays a crucial role in preservation of peace. In fact, a precondition for the creation of peaceful world is the development of a new international consensus, in the formation of which diplomacy can contribute to "peace through accommodation." The regional countries and the rest of the international community have an important role to play in influencing consensus building in Somali. Diplomacy may not only contribute to 'peace through accommodation,' but also to the creation of an international consensus upon which more adequate world political institutions can be built.<sup>37</sup>

### **1.7: Justification of the Study**

The justification of this study is to gain insight on the Somalia conflict between 1990 and 2012. The study will aim to answer questions on the existing literature on the causes of the conflict and look into the impact of the conflict on security in the Horn of Africa. It will examine how this has adversely affected the Horn of Africa, primarily Kenya in terms of security, resettlement of refugees, proliferation of small arms to the most recent linkages with

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<sup>35</sup> J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, jr. Op. cit. Pp.98-101.

<sup>36</sup> H.J.Morgenthau, politics Among Nations,5<sup>th</sup> Ed. Rev.(New York:knopf,1978),p.529.

<sup>37</sup> J.E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, jr. Op.cit p.103.

the Somali terrorist group, the Al Shabaab. Kenya continues to bear the brunt of these effects and the settlement of the conflict is of utmost importance

The conflict in Somali has had adverse economic effects on the regional countries. In time the insecurity has affected the flow of goods along the coast of Somalia due to the activities of Somali pirates. Regional governments are incurring higher costs from delays and higher insurance premiums due to increased risk associated with the Somali pirates, off the Indian Ocean coast. Somalia has also become a source of goods being smuggled into the neighbouring countries, leading to revenue losses to neighbouring countries, in addition to negative impact on local industries. Somalia has a large Diaspora population which remits billions of dollars, largely from the Middle East, Europe and North America. Most of this currency is finding its way into Kenya, therefore negatively impacting on Nairobi's real estate and the financial markets. Somalia has also been a source of refugees into neighbouring countries

The inflow of small arms and light weapons has seen an increase in violent crime in Kenyan cities and those of other countries of the Horn of African region. The spill over of the Somali conflict especially as a result of the insurgency activities posed by the Al- shabbab terrorist group has in recent past affected tourism, which is a significant industry in Kenya. All of these developments can be argued to be taking place due to the absence of functioning institutions in Somalia. A Research study of the country is therefore necessary to ensure countries of the region arrive at enlightened policy decisions on the best way forward.

The study will further examine the preventative measures and peacekeeping strategies that can be applied in managing and containing the Somali conflict which has continued

being a matter of concern to the entire international community. Kenya in particular has continued to host the largest number of Somali refugees posing serious security, economic and environmental concerns.

This research will therefore be useful in the study of security strategies particularly in reference to the Somali conflict situation. It is hoped that the study will be used by government policy makers in the region to make informed decisions on how to resolve the Somali conflict. The study therefore may be a useful reference on these effects and the security strategies that can be applied to end the conflict and avoid future recurrences

### **1.8: Research Methodology**

The study was mainly based on secondary sources of data obtained from books and journals, by different authors that contained information relevant to the topic of study. To enhance the study, secondary data was sought from policy papers, official documents, reports magazines, credible newspapers, periodicals and published books. A limited field research such as interviews on government officials and other key personalities was used to enrich the study. The research methodology also included telephone and emails to those outside the country and also questionnaires.

This is a qualitative research that used the purposive (judgemental) sampling technique, which is a deliberate way with some purpose or focus based on the information the study is seeking to attain.<sup>38</sup> For interviews the research used semi structured interviews and also telephone calls. Semi structured interviews are not close ended and therefore allow for

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<sup>38</sup> K.F Punch, *Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (London. Sage Publication 2005) P. 187.

variation. The strength of this tool is that produces rich and valuable data since it is non-standardised, open ended in-depth interview.<sup>39</sup>

Descriptive data was used from both primary and secondary data for analysis. The study identified the themes, categories and patterns to determine the adequacy of information in relation to the hypothesis.<sup>40</sup>

## **1.9: Chapter Outline**

The study is presented in the following five chapters:

1. Chapter one constitutes the introduction, statement of the Research Problem, Objective of the Study, Literature Review, Hypotheses, Conceptual Framework, and Justification of the study and Research Methodology.
2. Chapter two will provide an overview of the Somali Conflict. It discusses the genesis and causes of the Somali Conflict and provides information on regional and international interventions in Somalia.
3. Chapter three will provide a detailed case study of the Somali Conflict and its regional impact. It will discuss the process of management and the lessons learnt.
4. Chapter four will constitute a critical analysis of the issues that have emerged in the previous chapters.
5. Chapter five is the last chapter of the study. It sums up the context of the study by giving summary and identifying issues that arose from the case study and finally providing recommendations.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> O.M Mugenda & A.G Mugenda, *Research Methods Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches* ( Acts Press, Nairobi, Kenya 1999) P. 117-118.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE SOMALI CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW

#### 2.1: Introduction

In the previous Chapter the study highlighted on the introductory basis of the Somali politics by giving a brief account of the genesis of the Somali conflict and informing on the current situation in the country. The chapter further deliberated on the different scholarly perspectives and identified the relevant theories that are applicable to the study. The chapter also elaborated on the methodologies or road map that the study will seek to use.

In this chapter, the study will start with a brief background of Somalia and proceed to provide a general overview of the Somali conflict including the past peace initiatives aimed at bringing peace and reconciliation in the country.

#### 2.2: Background

According to Lewis, Somalia covers an area of 637,657 square kilometres.<sup>41</sup> It has a long coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, forming the Horn of Africa. It is a long coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, forming the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by the Arabian peninsula to the north with which it has had centuries of commercial and cultural contact. To the north-west, it is bordered by the republic of Djibouti, while its western and southern neighbours are Ethiopia and Kenya. Lewis states that Somalia takes the its name from its population Somali, a Muslim Cushitic-speaking people who stretch far beyond its present frontiers in the neighbouring states<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> I Lewis, Somali: (2000) in 'Africa South of the Sahara 2000 '(29<sup>th</sup> ed) London: Europe Publication.

<sup>42</sup> P.Gilkes (ed), 1996, Somali, in 'Africa South of the Sahara', London: Europe publications p.867.

Somalia has a long history of migration, conquest and assimilation, a pattern that was accelerated by the 1991–92 civil wars<sup>43</sup>. Before Somali pastoralists migrated into the eastern Horn and the inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia from southern Ethiopia in the 10th century, the Somali interior was inhabited by Oromos, an agro-pastoral group in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as by other pastoral tribes and other hunter-gatherer groups. Predominately fishing peoples such as Brawanese and Swahili settled the southern coasts, including trading centre such as Kismayu. Agro-pastoralists settled in the inter-riverine regions. Most areas beyond the coast and inter-riverine areas were inhabited by interacting groups of nomadic pastoralists. The harsh environmental conditions prevailing throughout southern Somalia meant that pastoralists had to migrate in search of sufficient resources to support grazing livestock. Nomadic pastoralism remains the prevailing mode of production for most Somalis today<sup>44</sup>.

In the 19th century, clans from Somalia's central and northern regions crossed the Jubba River and migrated throughout south-western Somalia all the way to the Tana River in Kenya. At the same time, Somali pastoralists along the Benadir coast imported slaves from East Africa to provide labour for a rising slave-based grain export economy along the Lower Shabelle River<sup>45</sup>. The Bantu people known as *Jareer* in Somalia are the descendents of these imported slaves. Migration served to scatter clans across large areas of the physical environment. For example, the Ogaden clan is found throughout the present-day Ogaden region of Ethiopia, southern Somalia, and north-eastern province in Kenya. Migration also enabled Somalis to establish a dominant presence throughout the region, which has been

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<sup>43</sup> J Unruh, Post conflict recovery of African agriculture: The role of 'critical resource' tenure, *Journal of the Human Environment*, 1995.

<sup>44</sup> A Guido, *the Somali clan system: An introduction to Somali society and history*, UNHCR Publication, Jigjiga, 1994.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*

reinforced over time by the strong lineage identity of most Somalis. Pre-colonial Somalia was by and large a stateless society, although some parts of Somalia did at different points in history sustain Sultanates or quasi state polities<sup>46</sup>.

The civil war in Somalia that ousted Siad Barre from power left Somalia without a central government. Despite (seventeen) 17 attempts to resolve the Somali crisis, the political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic situation have created Africa's worst security and humanitarian crises. The collapse of the state and the threat of individuals to their clans and sub-clans for security led to the militarisation of the society. The Somalis are united by common descent and the Somali nation did not constitute a unitary state before or even after colonialism. This is because identity was mainly based on kinship. The people belong to one of the six kin-based 'clan families', namely the Dir, Isaaq, Darood, Hawiyee, Digil and Rahanwein which are again divided into smaller sub clans<sup>47</sup>. Somali's have developed a network of 'family relations' allowing individuals to have their own identity and to use this according to his needs and circumstances<sup>48</sup>. The conflict has pitted large lineage groups against one another, <sup>49</sup>each desiring to fill the leadership gap following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. It also created the conditions for a weapons market in the country.

It has been more than twenty years since the eruption of the Somali conflict following the demise of the government of Siad Barre. During this period, the conflict has fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of actors involved, as well as its dimensions and dynamics.

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<sup>46</sup> See L. Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society*, University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, 1982 and R Marchal, *A few provocative remarks on governance in Somali*, UNDOS Discussion Paper, UNDOS, Nairobi, 1997.

<sup>47</sup> J. L. Hirsch and R. B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*. (Washington D.C: US Institute of Peace, 1995), P.3.

<sup>48</sup> Mohammed-Abdi Mohamed, "Somalia: Kinship and Relationship Derived from it" in the *Mending Rips in the Sky*, Hussein M. Ada and Richard Ford (editors), (Canada: Red Sea Press, 1997)

<sup>49</sup> Ibid p.9

Currently, the conflict is raging between the militarily weak Transitional Federal government (TFG) forces and their supporters on one hand, and the Al Shabaab and other fundamentalist groups on the other. While the TFG enjoys international legitimacy and the support of intergovernmental Authority (IGAD), opposition forces particularly Al Shaabab reportedly receive support from some countries in the region and the Middle East.<sup>50</sup> The TFG with the support of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) controls only a small part of the capital Mogadishu. Parts of the south central Somalia are in the hands of the Al- Shabaab and other opposition forces.

The absence of border controls, with the collapse of the state, further aggravated the situation as arms dealers freely moved weapons into and out of the country. This situation has led to serious situation of arms proliferation, which has resulted to serious challenge to the security of regional countries.<sup>51</sup> The militarisation of the society and breakdown of the respect of the rule of law has posed challenges for any peacekeeping process. Since all faction leaders are armed it inevitably means that negotiators have to seek the support of all the significant factions. Similarly any initiative for deployment of peacekeepers needs to be deployed with the consent of the Somali actors. The major challenge currently faced by AMISOM is how it can avoid the perception from the Somali actors that it is providing protection to the Somali government. This has also undermined the credibility of the TFG.

The Somali conflict has protracted over the years resulting to a multiplicity of actors to the conflict.<sup>52</sup> The actors include the warlords, criminal gangs, clan leaders, religious

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<sup>50</sup> S. Dersso, "The Somali Conflict: Implications for Peace Keeping and Peacemaking efforts". ISS Paper 198, September 2009. P.1

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.p.10

<sup>52</sup> S. Grosse-Kettler, External Actors in Stateless Somalia- A War Economy and its Promoter. Bonn, BICC, 2004.



courts, local militia and civil society. Many of these actors have been internally divided and fragmented as they practice conflicting ideologies and interests. The multiplicity of actors and their fragmentation makes it difficult for the international community to pursue initiatives that will satisfy all the parties. The Somali conflict has been internationalised with regional and international actors playing various roles in the management on the conflict. This calls for new approaches in the peace process in order to ensure that there is a coordinated approach in resolving the protracted conflict in Somalia.

### 2.3: The Nature and Causes of the Somali Conflict

Colonialism in Somalia had significant political and administrative repercussions in the country. During the “scramble for Africa” in the late 19th Century, the Somali nation was divided among several colonial powers, each of which built up state-like administrative institutions. Britain took control of the northern part, i.e. the present Somaliland as well as all of the present Kenya, including those parts in the north which were almost exclusively populated by ethnic Somali. France established itself in the present Djibouti under the name of the *Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas* (TFAI).<sup>53</sup> Italy in turn took control over various territories along the eastern coast which in 1905 became a colony comprising most of the present Somalia minus Somaliland.<sup>54</sup> Abyssinia (the present Ethiopia) also expanded under the emperors Yoannis IV (1872-1889) and Menelik II (1889-1913) into territories with a Somali majority, mainly the present Somali Region of Ethiopia, formerly known as the

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<sup>53</sup> Marks, Thomas A.: “Djibouti: France’s Strategic Toehold in Africa,” *African Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 290 (1974), pp. 95-104

<sup>54</sup> R.L.Hess, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966). See also Novati, Giampaola Calchi: “Italy and Africa: How to Forget Colonialism,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1

Ogadeen province.<sup>55</sup> These territorial arrangements were negotiated among the external powers in a series of bilateral treaties without any consultation with the Somali themselves.

Due to the imposed partition, it was not surprising that the Somali state was born irredentist, with the ambition of unifying of all of the five Somali regions into one nation-state.<sup>56</sup> This nationalist project was symbolically represented in the new flag, featuring a five-pointed star. The five points represented the former British Somaliland, the former Italian Somali, which were united within a week of independence, plus Djibouti, the Ogaden province of Ethiopia and the north-eastern part of Kenya.

Somali conflict could be attributed to the troubled state that obtained in the immediate post-independent period. A major source of the early conflict was the search for territorial identity in the early 1960's and 1970's based on claim of the land allegedly occupied by Kenya and Ethiopia. The new state was established on a collision path with its neighbours. Whereas relations with Djibouti (which only received its independence in 1977, having rejected the French offer in 1958) have remained rather peaceful,<sup>57</sup> relations with both Kenya and Ethiopia were severely strained. First came the "Shifta war" with Kenya (1963-1968) in which the Somali government supported the NFDLA (Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army, known as the "Shifta") in their struggle for autonomy against the Kenya government. This was followed by the "Ogaden War" with Ethiopia (1977-78), which also began with

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<sup>55</sup>D. Levine, *Greater Ethiopia. The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 69-91.

<sup>56</sup>D. Laitin, "Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective," *Africa Today*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1976), pp. 29-38.

<sup>57</sup>S. Kassim & J. Searing, "Djibouti and the Question of Afar Nationalism," *African Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 315 (1980), pp. 209-226.

Somali support for indigenous secessionist rebel movements, the WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front), but which also saw extensive use of regular armed forces.<sup>58</sup>

The root cause of the Somali conflict could also be attributed to the colonial past especially as attributed to the type of administrative structures imposed by the colonial regime. The colonial rule institutionalised a centralised state system in the image of the European nation-state. This introduced political and social relations and structures which were unknown to the Somalis, religious and clan-based political tradition and social organisation.

The new structures therefore undermined and transformed the indigenous structures. As the state exercised dominant control over political power and economic resources within the whole territory,<sup>59</sup> its institutionalisation as the primary, if not the only, locus of political and economic power set the image for rivalry and antagonism as various groups vied for control of the state machinery or for political dominance. The political traditional social structures, consisting of the clan and sub-clan system therefore became the political instruments in this struggle in Somali. This therefore explains the place that clannism occupies in the current Somali conflict. The state has been perceived by many Somalis as an object of clan competition, a tool of political and socio-economic aggrandisement rather than a common framework for socio-economic and political development for all Somali irrespective of their political affiliation.

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<sup>58</sup> Tareke, Gebru: "The Ethiopia-Somalia War 1977 Revisited," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2000), pp. 635-667

<sup>59</sup> A. Osman, 'The Somali conflict and role of inequality, tribalism and clannism', in A. Osman and K. Square (eds), *Somalia at Crossroads: challenges and perspectives on reconstituting a failed state*, London: Adonis & Abbey publishers Ltd, 2007, p.95.

Colonialism also introduced agrarian and urban lifestyles to the Somali people that were substantially different from their traditional nomadic pastoral background.<sup>60</sup> The other significant change that colonialism brought to Somalia was the rapid growth of urban centres which catered for the interests of the ruling class and business people. The towns provided opportunities to generate and accumulate wealth. They altered the mandate of leadership from regulating kin relationships, and promoted entitlements to resources such as water, pasture and access to the political, economic and social benefits of the state.<sup>61</sup>

The Italians alienated large tracts of land from peasant farmers to establish foreign-owned banana plantations. After independence, a new class of Somali entrepreneurs began acquiring land for irrigation. The new class used their government connections and, if necessary, force, to claim land. They used provisions in the ostensibly progressive 1975 Land Reform Act to register land titles in their own names, while local smallholders were unable to navigate the complex bureaucracy or pay the bribes necessary to protect customary rights to land they inhabited and farmed.<sup>62</sup>

In the case of Somalia, the absence of land use policies has led to uncertainty and conflict over the use of land among various groups, including pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmers. Insecure rights to access and control land and natural resources hinder development and the fair sharing of benefits. Resolution of land disputes remains a prominent challenge for the Somali authorities' to date. Following the fall of Barre's government, the

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<sup>60</sup> M Lewis, *A modern history of Somalia: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa*, West view, Boulder, 1988.

<sup>61</sup> United Nation Development Program (UNDP), *UNDP Human Development Report*, Somalia, 1998.

<sup>62</sup> de Waal, *Famine crimes: Politics and the disaster relief industry*, Indiana University Press with Africa Rights and the International African Institute, Oxford and Bloomington, 1997.

civil war escalated competition to control land. In many areas, more powerful clans pushed their herds onto the farming and pasture lands of weaker groups and clans, and freely grazed livestock on their crops. Widespread alienation of land and resources from weaker clans and groups is ongoing.

During the time of independence, Somalia inherited the divergent colonial traditions of the colonial British and Italians. The difference in colonial administration and political traditions from the two colonial powers became a source of tension from the two territories. This division was further reinforced by clan differences of the people in the two territories. The strong-handed administration of the Italians involved the recruitment and elevation of members of the local clans, particularly the Mudgu and Majertina regions. The promotion of the clan members from the privileged regions enforced the exploitative and extractive practices of the colonial and post-colonial states.<sup>63</sup> Owing to the exposure to the administration of the colonial state and political mobilization, through the establishment of the Somali Youth league, the ruling political elite of post colonial Somalia was predominantly from these clans. The people from the North were not only marginalized but were also subjected to repeated violence by the state. This underlined the secessionist tendencies in and eventually the declaration of independence of Somaliland in 1981.

The politicization of the clan structure during and after the colonial rule led to its deployment in the struggle for control of the enormous political power and economic resources of the modern centralized state imposed by the colonial regime. During the reign of the Siad Barre, clan divisions were manipulated and further entrenched as some groups

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid p.94

dominated Somali politics and others were marginalized and subjected to harsh treatments.<sup>64</sup> This situation worsened when the opposition to Siad Barre's government escalated following the defeat of the Somali forces by Ethiopia and the 1978 attempted coup to overthrow the government. While on one hand Barre's government resorted to systematic use of clan system of political patronage in order to strengthen grip on power, on the other hand it marginalized certain clans particularly those blamed for the coup, and perceived to pose a serious threat to the regime.<sup>65</sup> He continued to rely on the three Darood sub-clans of Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante to which his closest relatives and friends belonged. The policy brought about disfranchisement from other clans.<sup>66</sup>

While Siad Barre's repressive regime incited widespread distrust of central government, his strategy of divide and rule left a legacy of deep inter-clan hostility and resulted in a number of clan-based insurgencies.<sup>67</sup> Although the clan system continues to provide indispensable social services, including justice, social security and physical protection, it has also become a source of division and conflict since Siad Barre's rule.<sup>68</sup> It is also one of the major factors that have continued to sustain the war. Various warring factions continue to use it in the quest for political dominance and monopoly of the state or for preventing the emergence of a strong state run by another clan.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> World Bank, *Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and dynamics*, 2005, pp.15-16.

<sup>65</sup> A. M. Abdulahi, 'Perspectives on the state collapse in Somali', in A. Osman & I. Souare (eds) *Somali at Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed state*, 2007, p.40, 44.

<sup>66</sup> A. Hussein, *Somalia: 'A terrible Beauty being born'*, in W. Zartman, *collapsed States: the Distegration & Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder W: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.78.

<sup>67</sup> E. Visman, *cooperation with politically fragile countries: lessons from EU support to Somali*, ECDPM Working paper 66 Maastricht: 'European centre for development policy management', 1993 p.3

<sup>68</sup> I.M Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The call of kinship in Somali Society*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press 1994.

<sup>69</sup> A. Osman, 'The Somali conflict and role of inequality, tribalism and clannism', in A. Osman and K. Souare (eds), *Somalia at Crossroads: challenges and perspectives on reconstituting a failed state*, London: Adonis & Abbey publishers Ltd, 2007 p. 108.

The other source of conflict in Somalia was the dictatorship employed on the Somalis by Siad Barre from 1969- 1991. This was based on political centralization known as “scientific socialism”. The problem with this was that the process of socialization to uplift the grassroots instituted rigid structure of control.<sup>70</sup> Through militarization, Siad Barre created a variable gap between the state and the society which had been traditionally regulated by dialogue and consensus. Barre’s astute exploitation of the Cold War mood of the East-West rivalry contributed to the recalcitrance with which the state conducted itself in its relations with various clans and dissenting organizations.<sup>71</sup> The end of the cold war however meant that Somalia lost its importance in the strategic geopolitical calculation of the superpowers. US aid was reduced drastically in the late 1980’s.<sup>72</sup>

Somalia’s large number of unemployed youth added fuel to the conflict. In the 1970’s the Somali population was estimated to be about 5 million. Although no credible census has been taken, Somalia now has an estimated population of about 9-10 million. In the 1980’s this increase created a young population with no employment opportunities. Somalia’s government could not provide employment or a meaningful education. The private sector was underdeveloped as well. As a result, many young men were in a hopeless situation their despair provided the greed-driven elites, who wanted to pursue their own interests with readily available human resources with grievances in a collapsed state context. Ultimately, the elites capitalised on this opportunity and organised the young men in a way that appealed them<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>70</sup> “One Dictator Less”, Africa Events (February 1991), P.27.

<sup>71</sup> “Barre’s Balancing Act”, Africa Events (February 1991), Pp. 29- 30.

<sup>72</sup> J. Hirscii & R. Oakley, *Somali & Operation Restore Hope*, Washington DC, US Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 139-143.

<sup>73</sup> *Somali History and Politics* retrieved from the Institute for Security Studies in [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)

Economics played a contributing factor to Barre's removal from power. The government's economic mismanagement resulted to unemployment, especially among the youth resulting to discontent by the Somali society. Dissatisfaction with the economic situation eventually led to anti- government riots in Mogadishu in July 1989. The riots were sparked off by the assassination of the catholic bishop of Mogadishu and the subsequent arrest of several prominent religious leaders. 450 people were killed in a day followed by the arrests and executions of civilians many of them Issaq.<sup>74</sup>

In 1970, Siad Barre decreed a socialist one party in Somalia by establishing the Somali Revolutionary Party (SRSP). His repressive politics were demonstrated in the aggressive behaviour towards his neighbours. In 1977 he backed the Western Somali Liberation front (WSLF) in the war against Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden region. Somali troops soon overran Ogaden region reaching Harar at which point the Soviet started supplying Ethiopia with weapons. This made Somali abrogate its treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and immediately expelled 6,000 Soviet advisors and experts.<sup>75</sup> Somalia found itself without super power support, and soon withdrew its troops from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Somalia defeated in the Ogaden and vulnerable soon sought the support of the USA. USA in return got the Berbera Naval base and provided Somalia with substantial amount of financial and military support. Barre's authoritarian and patrimonial rule and the loss of the 1977 war with Ethiopia, lead to the emergence of armed clan based movements. After the 1978 coup, the plotters who escaped, fled to neighbouring Ethiopia and established a guerrilla

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<sup>74</sup> M. Sahnoum, *Somalia: The missed Opportunities*, Washington DC institute of Peace 1994, pp.5-9.

<sup>75</sup> S. Makinda (1992) *Security in the Horn of Africa*, Adelphi paper . 269 of summer p.24.



movement known as Somali Salvation Democratic Front. In 1981, another opposition movement known as the Somali National Movement (SNM), was established by Isaaq exiles in England, which later became a guerrilla movement operating in Ethiopia. Subsequently many other clans based armed groups that cooperated with the SNM came into being. Among this were the Hawiye based United Somali Congress (USC). The armed conflict among a loosely united opposition groups on one end and the Barre regime escalated and by 1990, most parts of the country were in the hand of the rebel groups.<sup>76</sup>

The final push by USC of General Muhammad Farah Aideed, led to fierce fighting in Mogadishu. Siad Barre was forced to flee the country before any particular group or coalition of various forces was able to feel the power vacuum. The toppling of Barre by USC, and the state of anarchy in the country, led to the session of the northern region (Somaliland) in May 1991.<sup>77</sup> In the process Somalia descended into a state of anarchy and fighting, involving continuously multiplying numbers of clan based warlords and militias as well as Islamic fighters, which has led to the non functioning state structure and general insecurity.

Since the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, the twenty year civil war in Somalia has destroyed state institutions and created a territory in which lawlessness and impunity prevails. The country has been characterised by failure of a credible central government and lack of viable institutions to control law and order therefore classifying it as a failed state. Criminality, including the trafficking of people, drugs and arms has become entrenched into the Somali society.

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<sup>76</sup> R. Cornwell, *Somali: Fourteenth Time Lucky?* ISS Occasional Paper87, April 2004; Punier, Somalia: "Civil War", intervention and withdrawal.

<sup>77</sup> S. Makinda (1992) op. Cit, p 24.

The Transitional federal government was installed in Mogadishu in early 2007. The internal infighting between various factions of the TFG however weakened its legitimacy and in 2008, President Abdulahi Yusuf resigned from his post following pressure from various actors. As Yusuf was the major obstacle in the negotiations between TFG and ARS-Djibouti, his resignation created a new opportunity to move the Djibouti peace process forward. In January 2009, the Somali transitional Parliament was expanded to include 200 ARS-Djibouti members and Shiek Sharif was elected as President of Somali's unity government. Despite this positive development, militarily, the Government of Somali remains weak.<sup>78</sup> Since its inception, the TFG has struggled with internal division and the scale of the challenges it hoped to address. The constitutional process is central to the transition and the peace process as a whole, but the legitimacy of the process has been undermined by lack of consultation on the part of the TFG. Outreach by the TFG has remained a serious challenge especially in engaging the opposition groups.

There are two distinct realities on the ground today, south and central Somali is anarchic while there is relative calm in Mogadishu. Despite numerous mediation attempts, conflict has continued as the TFG has failed to foster any meaningful dialogue and political reconciliation with other Somali groups. By contrast, Puntland and Somaliland have managed to limit violence and re-establish basic public institutions. Political structures are in place, economic recovery is underway and there is relative stability in the two regions.

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<sup>78</sup> S. Dersso, *The Somali conflict, Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping efforts*, ISS Paper 198, September 2009.

The events of 9/11 changed the premise for international engagement in Somalia from a humanitarian imperative to the strategic objectives of the global war on terror as Somalia became regarded as a breeding ground or safe haven for transnational terrorism. Al Shaabab, the Al Qaeda- affiliated group operating in Somali has established itself in Somalia posing an increasing threat in East Africa. While the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has managed to push the Al Shabaab out of major parts of Mogadishu, the group has changed tack and is now recruiting non-Somalis to their cause.<sup>79</sup> So far, Kenya and Uganda have borne the brunt of Al Shabaab attacks.

During the past few years, the conflict has brought a serious humanitarian crisis. The conflict has been described as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. The number of Somalis who are in need of emergency food aid is about 3.2 million, constituting more than 40 percent of the population.<sup>80</sup> Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have crossed to neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya and Djibouti and live in highly populated refugee camps. Many more have been internally displaced.

The conflict in Somalia has become internationalised, attracting foreign fighters, radical political ideology and terrorism as well as regional forces, African union and IGAD. It has been a conflict in which Somalis, Somali neighbours, the region and the international community all have a stake. Their interests are however not identical hence further complicating the peace process. Neighbours have legitimate interests in Somali, but their role has at times been questionable.

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<sup>79</sup> The East Africa, published weekly by the National Media Group, 1-7 August 2011.

<sup>80</sup> Somali: *Political Progress, Humanitarian Stalemate, refugees International Field report*, report, April 2009.

Throughout history Somalis and Ethiopians have had unstable and poor relations. The two peoples have ethnic and religious differences. From the Somali people's perspective, Ethiopia is perceived to be one of the entities that participated in partitioning Somalia into five parts alongside the colonial powers. The European powers gave the Somali region of Ogaden to emperor Menelik to appease him and in 1954; Britain gave Somalia's Hawd and Reserve Area to Ethiopia. As a result, two major wars occurred in 1964 and 1977, in addition to several skirmishes that have taken place along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia has supported and armed opposition groups trying to overthrow Ethiopia's Government. Likewise Ethiopia has supported Somali opposition movements.<sup>81</sup> Ethiopia's interest lies in the strategic concern for security.<sup>82</sup>

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia although successful in dislodging the UIC forces, did not lead to the anticipated stabilisation of Somali and the consolidation of the TFG. Ethiopia's continued military presence in Somali radicalised many Somalis, pushing many of them into supporting the insurgency. Eventually it was evident that the continuing presence of the Ethiopian forces was unhelpful for negotiating peace in Somali. One of the terms of the Djibouti Peace Agreement was the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces followed by the deployment of the UN force.<sup>83</sup> The UN however failed to mandate such a force and Ethiopia decided to withdraw its forces without condition. The withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces however created fears that it might create a power vacuum.

Since January 2007, the AU mandated the deployment of a peacekeeping force to Somalia that would pave the way for the withdrawal of Ethiopia and support the

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> D.Lake and D. Rothchild eds., *The International Spread and management of ethnic conflict*, Princeton:Princeton university Press, 1997.

<sup>83</sup> CGI, *Somalia: To move beyond the failed State*, Africa Report no. 147, 23 December 2008, p.29.

consolidation the TFG. Currently AMISOM is comprised of forces from Uganda and Burundi. With less than half of its mandated strength AMISOM has been unable to implement many of the tasks assigned to it.<sup>84</sup> The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2036 (2012) in March 2012, allowing Kenya Defence Forces to integrate into AMISOM therefore increasing from 7000 to 17,731 troops.<sup>85</sup> This number is however still inadequate. The AMISOM and the TFG forces continue to encounter attacks by the Al Shabaab posing a great challenge to peace and stability in Somalia and the region. As the security situation remains volatile, no decision has yet been made to deploy a UN mission into Somalia. Moreover, there has not been much intent in supporting and strengthening the AMISOM forces.

## **2.4: Interventions to the Somali Conflict**

### **First United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)**

On 24<sup>th</sup> April 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751(1992), United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1), comprising 50 military observers and a 500-strong infantry unit to provide United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack and to fire in self-defence. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) set up to facilitate humanitarian aid to people trapped by civil war developed into a broad attempt to assist political settlements and reconstitute the basic institutions of a viable State.

UNOSOM I was originally mandated as a non-forceful mission to Somalia after the leaders of the two major fractions, Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, signed an Agreement

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<sup>84</sup> S. Dersso op. Cit, p.8.

<sup>85</sup> "Kenya troops may pull out of Somalia this October, Kenya Sunday Nation Newspaper." 4 March, 2012.

establishing mechanisms by which the international community could monitor the ceasefire and secure humanitarian assistance. It was supposed to provide protection and security for UN personnel, provide equipment and supplies at the air and seaports in Mogadishu, and to escort human supplies to distribution centres in and around the capital.<sup>86</sup>

In resolution 767(1992) of 27<sup>th</sup> July 1992, the Security Council approved the proposal to establish four operational zones - Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo - and strongly endorsed sending a technical team to Somalia. On 24<sup>th</sup> August 1992, the UN Secretary-General requested an increase in the authorized strength of UNOSOM to create the four operational zones. For each zone, UNOSOM would be provided with a military unit of 750, all ranks. On 28<sup>th</sup> August, the Security Council, by resolution 775 (1992), authorized the increase<sup>87</sup>.

UNOSOM I troops in Mogadishu were fired upon, vehicles and arms taken from them, relief ships were prevented from docking, air and sea ports came under fire, large sums of cash and aid were extorted from donor agencies, and the lives of personnel attempting to distribute supplies were put in severe danger.<sup>88</sup> By December 1992, it was obvious that UNOSOM I failed. The UN troops were unable to provide protection for the UN and NGO activities, and, thus failing to establish “humanitarian corridors” and “zones of peace”. The humanitarian situation got worse, and the US urged the Security Council to agree on the approval of a peace enforcement mission (UNITAF) to support UNOSOM I.

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<sup>86</sup> UNOPOS: UN Somalia, 2010.

<sup>87</sup> *Somali History and Politics* retrieved from the Institute for Security Studies in [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)

<sup>88</sup> UN: UNOSOM 11Mandate, UN Operation 1, Department of Public information (DPI) and Department of Peace operation, 2003.

### Unified Taskforce (UNITAF)

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) also dubbed “operation restore hope” was a United States led, United Nations sanctioned multinational force which operated in the Republic of Somalia from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. The formation of UNITAF was as a result of the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 794 of 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1992, which authorized the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia<sup>89</sup>.

UNITAF was initiated because there had been resistance to the humanitarian efforts already being made under UNOSOM I. The goal of UNITAF was to create a secure environment for these necessary humanitarian efforts to take place, but it did not replace UNOSOM I, it simply helped to aid its efforts.<sup>90</sup> UNITAF provided support to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994<sup>91</sup>.

UNITAF was only intended as a transitional body. Despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment could not be established and there was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force<sup>92</sup>. The UN Secretary-General concluded therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II; the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment

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<sup>91</sup> *Somali History and Politics* retrieved from the Institute for Security Studies in [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za).

throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State.<sup>93</sup>

The relationship between Somali and US troops got worse over the time, one reason for that is seen in the American insensitive cultural behaviour and soldiers were not briefed well enough on Somali peculiarities; by the time of UNOSOM II, the acceptance of international forces were extremely low.<sup>94</sup> For the first time in the international customary law a link was made between human rights and humanitarian military intervention when the Security Council cited the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by conflict in Somalia and the threat to international peace and security to justify intervention.

#### United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

UNOSOM II was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26th March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> F. Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascos in the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US interests*, 2002.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.



Further, in resolution 814 (1993), the Council also requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from all United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. The assistance included repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, and mine-clearance<sup>96</sup>.

It was the largest peacekeeping force in UN history so far with strength of 28,000 military and 2,800 civilian staff, and the first to be given legitimate authority to employ the use of force under Chapter VII. After UN troops had replaced the US-led multinational force, it soon became clear that UNOSOM II could not command universal obedience. Converting peacekeepers into fighters without clear command brought confusion about when and where and under which conditions the use of force was allowed. The UN was more and more seen as occupying the country and the US was playing a central part in UNOSOM II.<sup>97</sup>

The low acceptance of UNOSOM II troops in the local population and the hostile groups as well as the bad equipped UN troops caused more and more casualties on each side. The violence reached its climax in October 1993 with more than 500 Somalis and 18 Americans dead within 36 hours.<sup>98</sup> This fiasco forced the US government to announce a complete withdrawal by March 1994, leading to a decline in the mission capacity. On 30 September, the Security Council, by Resolution 946 (1994), extended the mandate of

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Y.Osinbajo, "Legality in a Collapsed State": The Somali Experience, *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 45, 1996, pp. 910-923.

<sup>98</sup> Fleitz, F. op. cit: p. 133.

UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994. With no progress in sight, UNSOM II withdrew on 31 March 1995 leaving Somalia in a maybe even worse state than before.<sup>99</sup>

## **2.5 The Somali Peace processes**

### The Arta peace process

There have been 17 attempts to restore law and order in Somalia. One of the most crucial peace processes was the thirteenth conference held at Arta from 1999-2000 which resorted into the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdikassin Salaad. This conference invited members of the civil society and other Somali stake holders. However other crucial groups of actors, those who are armed, did not attend.

The results of the Arta conference could not be implemented because the actors who were excluded, the armed functions, effectively blockaded and confined the activities of the new government to a section of Mogadishu. Arta was an attempt to move away from the earlier agreements which focused on the parties as entities and which led to the failure of other peace conferences.<sup>100</sup>

### The Eldoret and Mbagathi Peace Processes

The Eldoret and Mbagathi Peace Processes held in Kenya from 2002-2004 were initiated by IGAD member countries when it became apparent that the TNG had failed to secure peace in Somali. The peace processes applied on the four and a half formula of clan representation first adopted at the Arta Peace Process 2000. The only addition to the process was the half which represented the minority group. Significantly the Mbagathi Peace Process created a

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<sup>99</sup> Interpeace: A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, The Search for Peace: Somali Programme, 2009.

<sup>100</sup> M. Mwagiru (ed) *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*. Heinrich Boll Foundation 2004.

platform for the participation of the warlords in the negotiation process which was a departure from the previous processes.

The peace process established the first deemed effective central government since 1991 with a transitional parliament of 275 members inaugurated at the UN headquarters in August 29, 2004.<sup>101</sup> The selected delegates at the Mbagathi Peace Process created the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the TFC, a legislative branch TFP and an executive branch the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The election of the President of Somali took place on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2004 at Kasarani in Nairobi and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected President.

#### The Djibouti Peace process

The Djibouti Agreement was signed between the Transitional federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the Alliance for Liberation of Somalia (ARS) at a meeting from 31<sup>st</sup> May to 9<sup>th</sup> June 2008 in Djibouti, facilitated by the United Nations (UN). The primary aim of the Agreement was to ensure the cessation of all armed confrontation and political settlement for a durable peace; promote a peaceful environment; avoid a security vacuum; facilitate the protection of the population and the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance and call for the convening of a Reconstruction and Development Conference.

The parties agreed on the termination of all acts of armed confrontation by the ARS and its allies; they agreed to request the UN, consistent with the UN security Council Resolution 1814, and within a period of 120 days, to authorise and deploy an international stabilisation force from countries that are friends of Somalia excluding neighbouring states; the Ethiopian

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<sup>101</sup> "Somali Inch Closer to Deal," East Africa standard, Nairobi.30 August 2004.

government would withdraw its troops from Somalia after deployment of a sufficient number on UN forces; and the ARS would cease and condemn all acts of armed violence in Somalia and dissociate itself from any armed groups or individuals that did not adhere to the terms of the agreement.

## 2.6: Conclusion

The efforts for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Somalia have generally been informed by the current realities and dynamics of the conflict. The imperative of establishing peace in the country require that the root causes and contributing factors are made to have a bearing on efforts for making peace and undertaking effective peace operations in Somalia.<sup>102</sup> A good number of scholars have provided pragmatic solutions to the nature and cause of the Somali conflict in addition to the peace building initiatives that have been put in place. In that respect this research acknowledges Professor John Nyout Yoh's<sup>103</sup> conclusions that peace initiatives must address the main issue, in this case, the lack of strong institutions in Somali. Most of the peace initiatives carried out since 1991 failed to address the fact that the government institutions installed at independence were too weak to meet the needs of a vast country like Somalia

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<sup>102</sup> J.G. Nyout Yoh *Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution In the Horn of Africa* in [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)

<sup>103</sup> *Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution In the Horn of Africa* in [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE SOMALI CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECT

#### 3.1: Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the nature and causes of the Somali conflict by giving an overview of the same including a brief account of the attempted peace processes to date. The causes of the conflict have been attributed to a multiple of factors among them Somalia's colonial history. The chapter attempts to provide an overview of interventions by various international players in an effort to bring peace in the country.

This chapter will provide a detailed case study of the Somali conflict by focusing on the Somali conflict and its impact on regional countries particularly in the IGAD region. The role played by regional actors and other key international players will be highlighted upon with a view to showing the complexity of the conflict and hence its internationalisation nature. The chapter will conclude with the lessons learnt on the Somali conflict and the subsequent peace processes.

#### 3.2: Parties to the Somali conflict

##### The Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), of the Republic of Somalia is the current internationally recognized government of Somalia. TFG is not elected by the population but appointed and, therefore lacks legitimacy with its own population. It has remained overwhelmingly unpopular due to its composition of warlords and overrepresentation of the

Darod clan, of former leader Barre, at the exclusion of the powerful Hawiye who had controlled both the ICU and earlier USC. Most crucially was that the TFG was essentially a creation of Ethiopia. It has been unable to defeat the insurgents, but has had limited success in enticing some rebel leaders away. The government suffers from internal divisions and the loyalty of some of its security forces is also in question. <sup>104</sup>Currently the TFG is receiving support from AMISOM.

### Somaliland

In May 1991, after the breakdown of the Somali state structure, the Somali National Movement of Somalia declared its independence and established a de facto independent state of the Republic of Somaliland.<sup>105</sup> The area that is comprised of Somaliland is exactly the same as that of the former British protectorate. The main reason behind the formation of Somaliland was because the region felt marginalised by the government in the South. Since its establishment, the government of Somaliland has achieved some major goals such as relative peace in the area, the establishment of basic state institutions based on traditional clan structures and holding of free elections since 2001. Somaliland is also commonly accepted by its population.<sup>106</sup> However, Somaliland's government is yet to be recognized as an independent state by the international community. The TFG does not also accept Somaliland's independence.

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<sup>104</sup> H. Verhoeven, (2009): "The self-fulfilling prophecy of failed states: Somalia, state collapse and the Global War on Terror," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 3: 3, pp. 405-425.

<sup>105</sup> I. M Lewis, (2002): *A Modern History of the Somali. Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. 4. Edition, Oxford.

<sup>106</sup> Centre for peace and Conflict Mapping. B. Kirsty, E. Galloway, L. Parker, & B. Vogel, university of St. Andrews, 2010. p.25

## Galmudug

Galmudug is an official regional state in central Somalia. The State was established on August 14 2006, when Galgudud and Mudug, administrative regions, which existed during the time of Siad Barre, joined together to create their own state after years of neglect from Mogadishu-centric warlords, who ruled the country following the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. To solidify its base and influence, Galmudug solicited the support of a number of clans including the Shiikhali, Marehan, Madhiban, Suduble, Arab Salah, Saruur, Ayr and wagar-dhac clans. Unlike the secessionist Somaliland region in north-western Somalia, Galmudug, like the northern Somali region of Puntland is not trying to obtain international recognition as a separate nation.<sup>107</sup> Galmudug considers itself a federal division within the larger Federal Republic of Somalia, as defined by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter.

Galmadug is broken into a series of clan based mini-states. Despite the clan merges, there are for example rivalry between the Sa'ad and their big rival, the Salebaan. Though the Galmudug administration claims sovereignty over much of Mudug and Galgudud administrative regions, the government does not exercise effective control on the ground. In Galgudud, Galmudug, controls Gelinsoor and other villages. The Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ) also controls parts of Galgudud including Guri-El, Ceel-Bur, Dhusamareb and Abud-Wak. The mini-states of Himan and Heeb, created by the Sa'ad rival saleban clans control Adaabo and the surrounding areas.<sup>108</sup> Currently parts of the territory claimed by the Galmadug administration are under the de facto control of pirates, criminals and elements of Al-Shabaab, the hardline Islamic group battling for control of the country. Internationally, Galmadug is known as the location of hijacked ships, pirate groups and kidnap victims.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Report profiles: the regional state of Galmudug. Wadanka News. [www.Wadanka.com](http://www.Wadanka.com)

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

### Government of Puntland

The leaders of Somalia's northeast region declared Puntland an autonomous state in mid-1998 and referred to themselves as the Puntland State of Somalia. In contrast to Somaliland, Puntland does not seek for complete independence from Somalia, but to be "a cornerstone of a future federal Somalia," with its government aiming towards a unified Somalia.<sup>110</sup> The Security in Puntland is better than in Mogadishu area and other Southern parts. Non-state actors such as clan leaders or sheikhs who are an integral part of the fabric of Somali society play a key role in the region.<sup>111</sup>

### The Al-Shabaab

The Al-Shabaab is a radical Islamist group that dominates the current political arena in Somalia. The Al-Shabaab emerged as the militant wing of the defunct ICU. Al-Shabaab (meaning "youth" in Arabic) is not organised along clan lines and recruits young men from all clans.<sup>112</sup> During Ethiopia's intervention, when UIC's political leaders left Somalia, the Al-Shabaab decided to stay and wage a guerrilla war against Ethiopia, the TFG, and AMISOM troops. Accordingly, the Al-Shabaab garnered sufficient popular support in 2008 by projecting itself as a nationalist group.<sup>113</sup>

The Al-Shabaab has no specifically written or declared program, its principal objective is to "establish a strictly Wahhabi doctrine in Somalia and later expand it to the

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<sup>110</sup> T. Hagman & M Hoehne(2009), Failures of the State: evidence from the Somali territories, Journal of international Development 21 (1)p.24.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid p.25.

<sup>112</sup> Al-Shabaab (2009): Press Release regarding various NGOs & Foreign Agencies Operating in Somalia, <http://insidesomalia.org>

<sup>113</sup> International Crisis Group. 2008. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report No147. Brussels: ICG.



Horn and the rest of Africa through military intervention.”<sup>114</sup> The militant group partially shares the objective of its predecessor, Al-Itihad, whose main aim was to establish an Islamic state constituting all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa.<sup>115</sup> The leadership of the Al-Shabaab is decentralized and the group controls territories in the central and southern parts of Somalia, including the port of Kismayo. In 2006 al-Shabaab was placed to the United States’ list of foreign terror organizations. In February 2010 al-Shabaab confirmed it is aligned with Al Qaida, a global terror network.<sup>116</sup>

The Al-Shabaab receives financial support both from local and foreign sources. Locally, mosques, religious leaders, and local community networks provide long-term financial support for the Al-Shabaab’s logistical and operational needs. Al-Shabaab is also said to have businesses in the areas it controls.<sup>117</sup> Currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to have approximately 3,000 troops, but some put the number closer to 10,000. The Al-Shabaab established successful local and international recruiting mechanisms. Internally, they are able to attract thousands of uneducated and unemployed youngsters by providing them money, training, ideology, and arms.<sup>118</sup>

The Al-Shabaab’s strict interpretation of Islamic laws remains a source of popular dissatisfaction in Somalia. As a result, the Al-Shabaab is facing opposition from groups like Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, which is fighting to maintain traditional Islamic practices. The Al-Shabaab is further challenged by clan competition for resources and control over towns and

<sup>114</sup> A. Abdisaid. 2008. “The Al-Shabaab Al-Majaidinna—A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organization” paper presented on the joint Kenya-Uganda Border Security and Management Meeting held April 28–29, Uganda, organized by ICPAT.

<sup>115</sup> A. Adan. 2002. “The Scope Strength of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia.” pp. 7-10.

<sup>116</sup> BBC, 2010: Somali Islamists Al-Shabaab ‘joins al-Qaeda fight’. [www.bbc.co.uk/news](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news)

<sup>117</sup> International Crisis Group. 2008. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report No147. Brussels: ICG.

<sup>118</sup> K. Mulugeta. 2009. “Probable Scenarios for Somalia.” Paper presented at the 5th Cairo Expert Group Meeting, organized by FES from November 4–5, 2009.

ports, which makes it difficult for the group to provide effective administration. The Al-Shabaab however remains a relatively strong fighting force in Somalia and people are fearful of the group.<sup>119</sup>The group has been linked to terrorist activities in the region, notably in Kenya and Uganda. Many Western governments have interests in fighting al-Shabaab due to its linkage to terrorist activities.

### Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa (ASWJ)

ASWJ is a moderate Sufi Islamist group that was established in 1991 in the aftermath of the collapse of the Barre regime, with the support of General Mohamed Farah Aideed, in order to counter the growing influence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad Al-Islami.<sup>120</sup> Its emergence to prominence in the current Somali conflict is attributable to its opposition to Al Shabaab's attacks in 2008 against Somalia's traditional Sufi Islamic practices. The group operates in close cooperation with the TFG, having also signed a power-sharing agreement with the TFG in March 2010.<sup>121</sup> Although ASWJ is an alliance of various loosely connected clan militias and suffers from internal divisions, it is still capable of serving as a bulwark against Al Shabaab's radicalisation campaign and its offensive against the TFG.<sup>122</sup> The Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa is determined to oust the Al-Shabaab from the entire country.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> UN Monitoring Group, 'Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853(2008), 10 March 2011.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid p.12

<sup>122</sup> Rashid Abdi Ej hogendoor, 'It is not too late to rescue Somali islamists from the Jihadis who have hijacked them,' The East African 3 May 2010.

<sup>123</sup> Centre for peace and Conflict Mapping. B. Kirsty, E. Galloway, L. Parker, & B. Vogel, university of St. Andrews, 2010. p.28

## The Somali Diaspora

The conflict in Somalia has resulted to violence, insecurity, and severe hunger which have resulted to hundreds of thousands of Somalis fleeing from the country. Currently a large number of Somalis, over one million, live in the Diaspora.<sup>124</sup> Majority of these Somalis are in the neighbouring countries, but the most significant groups, in terms of their contribution, are those in Western Europe, North America, the Middle East and Australia.

These Diaspora communities retain close ties with the homeland and engage in a wide variety of transnational activities such as social and financial support (i.e. supporting their families/relatives and contributing to the humanitarian relief and development efforts), private investments and political engagements. For many Somali nationals the term 'Diaspora' indicates "expectations of economic support as well as continued loyalty towards Somalia and other Somalis abroad."<sup>125</sup> With regard to Somali politics, there are three main areas that Diaspora returnees are involved in. Some invest in the private and social sector; others engage in the civil services; while yet others directly compete for higher political positions.<sup>126</sup>

For a long time, members of the Diaspora have been returning to Somalia and taking part in the political leadership of the country. However, their involvement dramatically increased since 2000. One possible explanation is that The Arta peace conference held in

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<sup>124</sup> Nordic journal of African Studies 20(1): 28:47(2011), *Diaspora and Post-War Political Leadership in Somalia*. Abdirashid A. Ismail. P.30.

<sup>125</sup> N.Kleist (2008), *In the name of the Diaspora: Between Struggles for recognition and Political aspirations*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (34) 7:308.

<sup>126</sup> Nordic journal of African Studies 20(1): 28:47(2011), *Diaspora and Post-War Political Leadership in Somalia*. Abdirashid A. Ismail p.31.

Djibouti in 2000 provided real opportunity for the Diaspora to play a meaningful role in Somali national politics<sup>127</sup>.

The political role of the diasporas is however a controversial issue in both the academic debates and policy-making circles. In the literature<sup>128</sup> a substantial amount of studies consider the Diasporas as destructive force contributing to the conflict in their homeland. In this regard, the Diasporas are considered as a source of revenue and political support for the armed struggles within their home countries.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, some other studies perceive the role of the Diasporas as peace-makers and state-builders and emphasized the immense contributions in promoting post-war recovering and peace-building by the Diasporas.<sup>130</sup> The Diaspora involvement in Somali politics, with both positive and negative effects, has been focused on by the UNDP.<sup>131</sup>

#### The Somali Business Community (SBC)

The Somali Business Council presents an underused resource in addressing the current economic, political and social crisis. A Peace and Reconciliation Committee was created as an outcome with the aim of monitoring opportunities where the SBC can step in to support peace and reconciliation, and generate support among the population. The Somali Chamber of Commerce was created in 1970 but never became fully operational due to the subsequent war and collapse of central government. However, after the formation of the TFG, hopes were raised that the Chamber of Commerce could begin to play a prominent role in

<sup>127</sup> UNDP(2009). *Human Development Report: Somali's Missing Million. The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development*:26

<sup>128</sup> P. Pirkkalainen and M. Abdile (2009). *The Diaspora- Conflict- Peace Nexus: a Literature Review*. Diaspeace Working Paper 1.

<sup>129</sup> P. Collier and A. Hoeffler(2004), *Greed and Grievance in civil War*: Oxford Economic Paper 56: 563-95

<sup>130</sup> A. Zack- Williams and G. Mohan (2002), *Editorial: Africa, the African Diaspora and Development: Review of African Political Economy* 29(29): 205-210.

<sup>131</sup> Nordic journal of African Studies 20(1): 28:47(2011), *Diaspora and Post-War Political Leadership in Somalia*. Abdirashid A. Ismail.

development and trade, and maximize Somalia's strategic location on the horn of Africa. Such plans have yet to materialize but arguably the location presents great potential. Since March 2009, the SBC embarked on an initiative with the UNPOS to create an environment conducive to career development and job opportunities for youth and to assess the role to be played by the Somali business community's in the strategic development of Somalia. Its focus has been on short-term youth employment projects in an attempt to address the problem of youth unemployment as part of the peace and reconciliation process.<sup>132</sup>

### Clans

Tensions between Somali clans play out at different levels which have led to the persistent complexity of the Somali conflict. Somalia is made up of six major clans, the Dir, the Darood, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, the Digil and the Rahanweyn, and many minor clans.<sup>133</sup> These clans are additionally divided between sub-clans. One of the biggest challenges that clans and their leaders present is that clan leaders' power is based on their ability to protect their clan in times of warfare and tension. While in peaceful times clan leaders are sometimes considered unnecessary by their clan, they are respected as protectors of their people during times of trouble. Therefore, it is in their interest to continue conflict or create a "cold war," standoff based on mutual distrust. An example is during the late 1990s when General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan' was unpopular and not trusted within his own clan, the Mijerteen, but by fostering hatred between his own clan, he created a state of tension and was able to remain in power until 1999.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Centre for peace and Conflict Mapping. B. Kirsty, E. Galloway, L. Parker, & B. Vogel, university of St. Andrews, 2010. p.29

<sup>133</sup> J.L.Hirsch and R.B. Oakley(1995), op. cit P.5

<sup>134</sup> K. Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, vol. 364, *Adelphi Paper* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2004), 42-43.

Nearly all conflicts in Somalia have broken out along clan lines. Clan identities are used by leaders to gain control over resources and power. Clan identities are not in themselves the basis for conflict, but clan identities are manipulated to create and exacerbate conflict. Clans can serve as either constructive or destructive forces, and there is evidence that clan groups can serve as traditional conflict monitors. Clans have played a dominant role in Somaliland's peace building and reconciliation process.<sup>135</sup>

### 3.3: The Role of Actors

#### Ethiopia

The main regional actor is Ethiopia, a historic rival of Somalia. For centuries Ethio-Somali interactions have therefore been characterized by an unrelenting state of belligerence.<sup>136</sup> Both countries fought in the Ogaden war. They have supported rebel and secessionist groups in each other's country for decades to promote instability.<sup>137</sup> Ethiopia's foreign policy on Somalia is largely influenced by the irredentist policy of the latter. It was the policy of the Somali Republic since independence in 1960 to encourage the incorporation into Somalia of those parts of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia inhabited by the Somali people.

The two countries have been involved in supporting rebel groups fighting each other. Ethiopia provided military support and a base for Somali opposition movements, while Siad Barre's regime armed and deployed Somali armed groups from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia fighting against the latter.<sup>138</sup> Ethiopia has therefore been concerned about the security situation in Somalia due to reasons that are related to its national interests. A large

<sup>135</sup> I. Verhoeven, (2009), op. cit. P.405-425.

<sup>136</sup> S. Samatar, "the Islamic Courts and Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia: redemption or Adventurism", Chatham House, 25 April 2007, <http://www.ChathamHouse.org.uk>.

<sup>137</sup> M. I Lewis, (1989): The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism, *African Affairs*, 88: 353 pp. 573-579.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.P.3

population of Ethiopia's population in the Ogaden region are of Somali descent and therefore the latter considers the stability of Somalia critical to its own stability.

The most devastating aspect and one of the most defining moments in the struggle between the two countries was the 1977 war, in which Somalia was perceived to have been the aggressor. The likelihood of a future Somali attack on Ethiopia is not entirely inconceivable especially considering that the Somali claims to the Ogaden/Somali region have never really been abandoned. Not only might a real war again become conceivable, but even before that Somalia might foment unrest among the ethnic groups of Ethiopia, especially the Somali. This security threat has given Ethiopia a reason to be actively involved in Somali's politics.<sup>139</sup>

The flow of refugees from Somali to Ethiopia has also been a matter of great concern to the latter. Moreover, such refugees risk upsetting fragile ethnic balances within Ethiopia which has always been experiencing unrest in various parts of its immense territory, not only, but certainly not least, among the ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia has also been concerned about the very lawlessness of Somalia which does represent a major challenge to the law enforcement institutions of Ethiopia because of the long border between the two countries. Following the deteriorating security situation in Somalia, and upon request by TFG, Ethiopia sent significant number of troops into Somalia to defeat the Islamic Court militias that had seized power in 2006.

Although Ethiopia seemed to have planned a temporary campaign because of high cost operation and the fact that a long presence in Somalia would further incite Somali

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid p.6

nationalism against Ethiopia, their campaign lasted longer than expected. Ethiopia however eventually pulled out of the country in 2008, leaving the ICU a more radicalised group under its military wing, the Al Shabaab. It came as no surprise that one of the terms of the Djibouti agreement was the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces.<sup>140</sup> This led to the eventual deployment of AMISOM. The Ethiopian withdrawal created a further security problem for AMISOM as factions of Al Shabaab forces declared their intention to focus their attacks on AMISOM forces.<sup>141</sup> As the security situation has remained volatile, there is still no decision for deploying a UN mission and much of the focus has been on supporting and strengthening the AMISOM forces.

What compounds Ethiopia's involvement in Somali conflict is the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two countries that support opposing groups in the Somali conflict. Rather than resuming the direct war, the two countries seem to have been waging proxy wars against each other ever since 2000, one of the main battlefields being Somalia.<sup>142</sup> As Ethiopia is supporting the TFG, it was thus a foregone conclusion that Eritrea would support the UIC. This is certainly not due to ideological or religious affinity, as the government in Asmara is secular and Christian.

### Eritrea

Eritrea has been actively involved in Somalia after its border war with Ethiopia from 1998–2000. Eritrea supports various groups to counterbalance the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia. It can be said that Eritrea is in Somalia primarily to weaken the role of its arch

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<sup>140</sup> Article 7 of "the Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somali (ARS)" signed on 9 June 2008 in Djibouti.

<sup>141</sup> "Al-Shabaab insurgents attack AU Peacekeepers accessed" from <http://allafrica.com>.

<sup>142</sup> J. Abbink, "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2003), pp. 407-425



enemy, Ethiopia. Eritrea's involvement in Somalia over the past decade has been intermittent, driven almost entirely by desire to frustrate Ethiopian ambitions. During the 1998-2000 border war, Eritrea provided arms, training and transport for Ethiopian Oromo insurgents operating from Somalia, as well as their Somali allies, Hussein Aideed's militia. After the war, support diminished, although Asmara maintained relations with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and other Ethiopian rebel groups.<sup>143</sup>

Eritrea has also been perceived as a spoiler to the Somalia peace process. It is in view of this that the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 2023 (2011) sponsored by Gabon and Nigeria on behalf of IGAD and backed by the US, before the UNSC in October, 2011, seeking tighter sanctions against Eritrea. The resolution was passed by the Council on 5<sup>th</sup> December, 2011 condemning Eritrea's provision of political, financial, training and logistical support of armed opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab and subsequently demanding that Eritrea end such assistance. Accordingly, for any peace process to be successful and lasting, it is imperative that such a peace process addresses these regional dimensions of the war in Somalia.<sup>144</sup>

### Kenya

Kenya has ever since independence been an anchor of stability in the region. Despite the historical problems with Somali irredentism, Kenya has played a key role in the Somali peace process. For Kenya, peace in Somalia is pivotal to the country's own peace and stability. The serious security and economic consequences of the civil war are numerous. The collapse of Somalia in 1991 and the endemic conflict in the Horn of Africa region sparked off the

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<sup>143</sup> International Crisis Group. *Review of African political Economy* Vol 33, No. 110. Religion, ideology and Conflict in Africa ( September 2006, pp. 752-758).

<sup>144</sup> *CGI, Somalia: To move beyond the failed state*, Africa Report No. 147, 23 December 2008, pp.25-26.

proliferation of small arms that spilled over into Kenya. Some of these weapons can be traced to the Ogaden war. Somali received military aid from the Soviet Union worth between US dollars 300 million and 1 billion between 1964 and 1974.<sup>145</sup> Between 1979 and 1983 Italy assisted Somalia with military aid totalling US \$ 410 million.<sup>146</sup> Within the same period, Britain and France provided Somalia with military aid totalling US \$5 million each.<sup>147</sup>

The militarization of Somali society under the Siad Barre regime, through the massive acquisition of military weapons during the Cold War era made the acquisition of sophisticated and dangerous weapons available to Somalia. These weapons were later used by the Somali factions to oust Siad Barre from power. With the fall of Siad Barre and without a central authority, the illegally acquired weapons were distributed to the wrong people therefore causing further insecurity not only to Somalia but to the neighbouring countries. Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia, various groupings in the country manage to possess significant military capacity that they sustained through acquisition of arms and military equipment from outside the country.<sup>148</sup>

The illicit weapons that find their way into Kenya undermine the state security. Small arms have contributed to stalled development primarily through banditry, ethnic clashes and cattle rustling.<sup>149</sup> The small arms have also resulted to increased crime in the country particularly in Nairobi and other major towns. The consequences of Kenya as a conduit for

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<sup>145</sup> K.G Adar (1994). *Kenya Foreign Policy behaviour towards Somalia 1963-1983*. Maryland: University Press of America

<sup>146</sup> *US, World Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985* (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985).

<sup>147</sup> Ibid

<sup>148</sup> "UN Security Council Report of the Team of Experts Concerning Somalia". July 2, 2008

<sup>149</sup> "UNDP Supports Destruction of Small Arms". (2003, 15 March). Saturday Nation, (Nairobi). Pp.16-17

arms trafficking has led to spill over effects in that some of the weapons have found their way into neighbouring countries. This has inevitably led to heightened crime and violence.<sup>150</sup>

The Somali conflict has resulted to the influx of refugees which has put enormous pressure on the Kenyan government. Kenya has continued to host an average of about 150,000 Somali refugees each year. Due to the insecurity in Somalia some of the arms that flow into Kenya have been associated with the refugees. There is information that secret arms markets are operated in the refugee camps such as Dadaab. The effects of these illicit arms have adverse effects on Kenya's national security and its economical development. Kenya has suffered highly through the huge numbers of refugees who are a financial burden and a threat to the environment.<sup>151</sup> Due to the current famine situation in Somalia and other Horn of Africa regions, hundreds of thousands of Somalis have crossed into Dadaab Refugee camp in Kenya, further complicating the refugee situation at the camp. To this end, the Government of Kenya has opened an additional camp at IFO II to ease the pressure at the Dadaab camp.

The absence of a central authority in Somalia has made the country a fertile ground for terrorist organisations such as the Al Shabaab, an affiliation of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation. This terrorist organisation has launched attacks against Kenya and hence the protracted conflict in Somalia represents a legitimate security concern to the country.<sup>152</sup> This concern was evident following the bombing of the United States of America embassy on August 7, 1998 in which 214 Kenyans lost their lives.<sup>153</sup> Kenya also suffered another terrorist

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<sup>150</sup> The Big Issue: "Proliferation of Small Arms and Insecurity in Kenya", (2003, 3 February). East Africa Standard. (Nairobi) p 4

<sup>151</sup> M. Mwangi (ed.), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalisation*(2004), Heinrich Boll Foundation, p.118.

<sup>152</sup> M A. Gassim (2000), *Somalia Clan as Nation*. Sharjah UAE Printers p.113.

<sup>153</sup> "The British Do not Expect to be Grateful". (2003, 26 June) East Africa Standard (Nairobi) p.12.

attack on the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa on November 27, 2002.<sup>154</sup> Since then Kenya has suffered from hostile activities including attacks in tourist areas, kidnappings committed by Al Shabaab and other attacks at a refugee camp<sup>155</sup> forcing Kenya to militarily engage this group inside Somalia.

The latest attacks by the Al Shabaab have indicated that if Somalia is left to continue descending into chaos this instability will further engulf Kenya and the entire region. The issue of Somalia providing a lounging base for terrorists is therefore a matter of great concern especially due to threats to the country's economy particularly its tourism industry. Kenya's involvement in the conflict in this region basically stems from her concern for national security, a manifestation of her desire to protect her borders and retain her identity as a nation-state. Kenya has constantly maintained that she wants a policy of good neighbourliness with other neighbouring states including Somalia, which would result in mutual economic development. There is a possibility that in seeking political accommodation with Somalia, Kenya may be interested in increasing her trade with that country without necessarily losing the present markets in the region. The threat of terrorism emanating from religious hardliners such as the Al Shabaab is a cause of concern to Kenya and the region.

### The Kenya Defence Force

The Kenya government took the decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops into Somalia to wage war on Al-Shabaab after various attacks by the dissident groups into Kenya's territory. The decision by the government of Kenya to deploy the KDF or Operation Rinda Inchi was after a string of cross-border kidnapping attacks targeting Western tourists

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid

<sup>155</sup> "UN slaps extra sanctions on Eritrea over Shabaab," The Kenya Standard Newspaper, 7 December 2011, p.13

on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab. Tourism is a key industry, and Kenya, particularly Nairobi, is host to a large UN presence, including many international and local NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and other activities.<sup>156</sup> Following the kidnappings of the Europeans in the Lamu area in September and October 2011, the key tourism industry was hit hard. The last straw happened when two Spanish aid workers with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dadaab refugee camp, near the Kenya-Somalia border, on 13 October (the third incident in less than a month).<sup>157</sup> Several days later, Kenyan troops moved into Somalia. The main goal of the KDF is to destroy or weaken the Al-Shabaab.

Following the Mission in Somalia, Kenya wanted its troops to be incorporated into AMISOM, making it financially and legally easier for its allies to give it more assistance. In December 2011, the AU approved their participation in the mission. The UN Security Council has given formal assent for KDF to be incorporated into AMISOM. The Council further gave authorisation in March 2012 to increase the AMISOM troop level from 7,000 to 17,731.<sup>158</sup>

The most important recent military development is the direct, large-scale involvement of Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) and their proxies in Hiraaan (central Somalia) and Gedo. On 31 December 2011, ENDF, operating with the Shebelle Valley Administration and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a militias, captured the strategic town of Beledweyne from Al-

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<sup>156</sup> UNPOS recently announced it would relocate to Mogadishu. "UN Special Representative moves to Mogadishu – first time in 17 years", 24 January 2012, [unpos.unmissions.org](http://unpos.unmissions.org)

<sup>157</sup> International crisis Group. Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, Africa Report No. 184. 15 February 2012, p.3

<sup>158</sup> "Kenya troops may pull out of Somalia this October, Kenya Sunday Nation Newspaper." 4 March, 2012.

Shabaab. Ethiopian forces are also reportedly massing in Luuq (Gedo) and may be planning a push towards Baidoa (Bay), the major inland city in south and central Somalia.<sup>159</sup>

The offensive is both taking valuable territory and weakening Al-Shabaab by forcing it to fight on multiple fronts. Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximise its asymmetric advantage.<sup>160</sup> Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons.

The KDF is currently playing an effective humanitarian role with a view to succeeding in the critical task of winning hearts and minds in Somalia. The challenge is to provide a credible alternative political leadership in a region previously controlled by the Al-Shabaab. What is also conceivable is that the threat posed by the Al-Shabaab is increasingly a reality in the region, particularly in Kenya. The Dadaab refugee camps have become increasingly insecure. The surge of kidnappings, grenade attacks and violence within them has hampered aid efforts. Humanitarian agencies, UN officials and Somali refugees appear to be the key targets.<sup>161</sup>

### Other Actors

Djibouti is a neighbouring state to Somalia and has played a role as an honest broker and hosted conferences devoted to Somali state-building. This led to the reconciliation between the TFG and those factions of ARS which did not boycott the event, producing the Djibouti Agreement.

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<sup>159</sup> International crisis Group. Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, Africa Report No. 184. 15 February 2012 p.6

<sup>160</sup> Ibid p.7

<sup>161</sup> Ibid p.8

The role of Sudan also seems to have been quite minor and on the whole rather constructive. Sudan has remained neutral throughout the conflict, but played the role as honest broker, for example during the standoff between the TFG and the UIC when Sudan hosted reconciliation talks between the opposing sides.<sup>162</sup>

Egypt has been keen to safeguard its Nile designs through the conflict in Somalia. The Nile question affects all the riparian states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia and the Sudan. Through colonial agreements Britain granted exclusive rights to Egypt over the use of Nile waters at the expense of the others.<sup>163</sup> Egypt would like the protracted conflict in Somalia to continue to ensure Ethiopia's distraction from developments at home. In this case there would be no danger that Ethiopia or any other riparian states will divert the waters of the Nile for irrigation purposes.<sup>164</sup> It could be said that the history of the Horn of Africa, has been the story of a struggle between Egypt and Ethiopia for regional hegemony.<sup>165</sup>

The League of Arab States (LAS) has only played a minor role as mediator in the crisis, mostly acting in consort with the AU and occasionally the UN.<sup>166</sup> The same has been the case of the European Union which has generally supported the TFG, albeit apparently with a distinctly lukewarm attitude to President Yusuf.<sup>167</sup> An International Contact Group was established in 2006, comprising the EU, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the

<sup>162</sup> IRIN: "Somalia: Government, Islamic Leaders to Talk Peace in Sudan," IRIN News, 21 June 2006.

<sup>163</sup> C. Mbitiru, "Egypt May soon Lose Control Over the Nile waters." *Daily Nation* (Nairobi) 16<sup>th</sup> February 2004, p.17.

<sup>164</sup> M. Mwagiru (2004) op. Cit.p.120

<sup>165</sup> S. Samatar, "the Islamic Courts and Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia: redemption or Adventurism," Chatham House, 25 April 2007, <http://www.Chathamhouse.org.uk>

<sup>166</sup> "Somalia: Arab League Mediators Meet Govt and Islamic Delegations", IRIN News, 22 June 2006; "Somalia: Joint Mission to Consult Somali Leaders."

<sup>167</sup> EU Council Secretariat: *Factsheet: EU Engagement in Somalia* (Brussels: EU Commission, 2008)

UK, and the United States, with the AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, and the UN attending as observers. The interests of the partners has however been varied. Somalis have at times been uncomfortable with the approach taken by some members who are perceived to introduce western solutions to a problem that needed an African solution.<sup>168</sup>

The United States of America is one of the foreign states that have played a significant role in Somalia. The main difference between the USA intervention in Somalia in the early nineties and recent years seems to be that whereas the predominant motive then was altruistic and humanitarian, it is now focused on US growing concern on Islamic militancy in Somalia especially with regard to terrorism.

### **3.4: The process of Management**

#### United Nation's past efforts

The collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991 came after decades of dictatorial rule by Siad Barre and three years of civil war. The coalition that succeeded Barre became embroiled in its own internal strife, leading to fractionalization in the country. The UN intervened to address the insecurity in the country, deploying the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) in April 1992. It was supposed to provide protection and security for UN personnel, provide equipment and supplies at air and seaports in Mogadishu and escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in and around the capital.<sup>169</sup>

The feuding clans made it virtually impossible for UNOSOM 1 to be effective. The UN then drew on Chapter VII of its charter and deployed what was thought to be a more

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<sup>168</sup> M. Mwagiru (2004) op. Cit, p.120.

<sup>169</sup> R.Murphy, (2002): "The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon and the UNITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, pp. 26 – 56.



robust mission in the form of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF),<sup>170</sup> led by the United States and dubbed "Operation Restore Hope." The relationship between Somali and US troops got worse over time due to, among other factors, American insensitive cultural behaviour. By the time of UNOSOM 11, the acceptance of international forces by the Somalis was extremely low.<sup>171</sup>

There was a low acceptance of acceptance of UNOSOM 11 troops by the local population and the hostile groups. This resulted in violence, which reached its climax in October 1993 with more than 500 Somalis and 18 Americans dead within 36 hours. This fiasco forced the US government to announce a complete withdrawal of her troops by March 1994. With no progress in sight, UNOSOM 11 withdrew on 31 March 1995 leaving Somalia in a worse state than before.<sup>172</sup>

#### Regional efforts to resolve the Somali Conflict

Seventeen peace conferences have been held in various African cities as well as Yemen over the past 16 years to resolve the conflicts in Somalia. Such conferences are said to have failed because they focussed primarily on satisfying the needs of warlords and politicians, as opposed to the traditional clan leaders who wield the majority of popular power.<sup>173</sup> The civil war, together with state weakness and decades of economic decline has complicated foreign intervention leading to questions on whom to negotiate with in Somalia.<sup>174</sup>

Most notable amongst recent peace initiatives are the 2000 Arta Peace Conference and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led Somali National

<sup>170</sup> UN (2003) United Nations Operation 1, Department of Public Information (DPD) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions).

<sup>171</sup> F.Fleitz, (2002): *Peacekeeping Fiascos in the 1990s: causes, solutions, and US interests*.

<sup>172</sup> Interpeace (2009): "A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988," The Search for Peace: Somali Programme, (2009) online <http://www.interpeace.org>

<sup>173</sup> E.Sanders. 2007. "Somali reconciliation congress set to heal 16 years of civil war". *Sunday Independent*, 15 July 2007: p.17

<sup>174</sup> M.Schoeman. 2006. "Africa's International Relations in Power, Wealth and Global Equity. Landsdowne": UCT Press. P.245

Reconciliation Conference of 2002, held in Kenya. Although the Arta Peace Conference resulted in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), this body soon came to be seen as representing predominantly Hawiye interests, and it barely managed to extend its control and legitimacy beyond Mogadishu.

Despite the boycott of the Djibouti peace initiative by some leading warlords in Somalia, the initiative did succeed in instituting some vital interim institutions in the south, such as the transitional parliament and government, and it also brought a degree of peace. Arta conference was an attempt to move away from the earlier agreements which focused on the parties as corporate entities, and which led to the failure of earlier peace conferences.<sup>175</sup>

Attempts to bring peace in Somalia became even more complicated when the Somalis in the north opted to unilaterally declare that part of Somalia an independent entity on 18 May 1991. Not to be outdone, Puntland, once known as north-eastern Somalia, installed its own administration in that part of Somalia in August 1998. However, unlike Somaliland, the Puntland government does not advocate the breakup of Somalia and therefore supported the Djibouti peace process of 2000.<sup>176</sup> The Puntland leadership prefers a federal system, rather than the north-south advocated by the late president of Somaliland, Mohamed Egal.

IGAD subsequently convened a meeting in Kenya that forged an agreement, leading to the establishment of the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG drafted the Transitional Federal Charter

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<sup>175</sup> M. Mwagiru op. Cit, p.109.

<sup>176</sup> Auswärtiges Amt (2009): "Reise-und Sicherheitshinweise Somalia", <http://www.auswaertiges-amt>.

(TFC), which was adopted in February 2004.<sup>177</sup> On October 14, 2004 the IGAD initiative led to the election, of members of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was subsequently elected as head of the TFG. The TFI's were based on the transitional Federal Charter adopted in September 2003, which specified a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new constitution and the transition government following national elections.<sup>178</sup>

While a number of Western governments recognized the TFG, which governed from Baidoa, as legitimate, it did not receive universal support in Somalia. It is also worth noting that the TFG was established with the substantial involvement of Ethiopia, which fully backed the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as the President. One of the main reasons why the TFIs have not been considered legitimate by the wider Somali population is the tacit support that Yusuf received from Ethiopia. There was also a popular perception that Ethiopia was instrumental in undermining the Arta Process, on the one hand, by encouraging Abdullahi Yusuf, then President of Puntland, not to recognize it and, on the other hand, by establishing the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council, as a rival focal point of authority and legitimacy.

The representatives of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) participated in a peace conference in Djibouti between May 31 and June 9, 2008 under the auspices of the United Nations. The conference ended with the announcement on June 9, 2008 that they have signed an 11-point

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<sup>177</sup> K. Sabala, A Ahmad, and E Rutto (2008): "The Somali Peace Process from Arta to Eldoret to Mbagathi: Opportunities & Challenges," in: A. Nhema and P. Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.): *The Resolution of African Conflict: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Oxford: James Currey Ltd.

<sup>178</sup> W. C. Saaiak, C. Warsan and A.I Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim (2010): "Somali Peace Agreements: Fuelling Factionalism," in Bradbury, Mark and Sally Healy (eds.), *whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking*. ACCORD, 21, pp. 32-33.

peace agreement paving the way for "the cessation of all armed confrontation" across Somalia.

According to the agreement, the two sides agreed to terminate acts of armed confrontation and also request the United Nations to authorize and deploy an international stabilization force from countries that are friends of Somalia, excluding the neighboring countries.<sup>179</sup> The peace pact also called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops present in Somalia following the signing of the agreement. Both Somali Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein and ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad welcomed the peace agreement as a "historic opportunity" to end Somalia's long conflict. The agreement however lacked the goodwill and participation of other Somali clan leaders.

Somalia's current Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004 and backed by the United Nations, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, has limited capacity to enforce rule of law throughout the country. The Somali TFG government continues to battle Islamic militias, with the fighting concentrated in the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces supported the TFG until when they withdrew from Somalia on January 13, 2009 as required in accordance with the Djibouti Agreement.<sup>180</sup> After the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was launched in March 2007. The concept of logistic support for AMISOM is based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).<sup>181</sup> AMISOM mandate is to assist the TFG to stabilise Mogadishu.

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<sup>179</sup> See Agreement between the transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalis (ARS) Djibouti 2008.

<sup>180</sup> Shabelle Media Network, "Somalia: Scholars Sceptical About Recent Djibouti Agreement," June 13, 2008.

<sup>181</sup> See African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, January 19, 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, paragraph 9.

There continues to be an inability to restore order in Somalia because of existing power-struggles between the existing weak transitional government, the anti-Islamist warlords, the anti-government clan militias, and the Islamic courts, some of whom have housed Al-Qaeda linked elements, notably Al Shabaab. The TFG also has weak control over Puntland, which declared itself a semi-autonomous state in 1998. Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991 after the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime, is also not part of the TFG. The TFG remains a weak administration and has been regarded by various groups in Somalia as an imposed government not having been elected by the people of Somalia. More recently divisions within the party have been deepened by divisions within the TFG executive. The TFG continues to be perceived, especially by the Hawiye clan, as a means of satisfying the interests of the Darod clan, while the TFG itself sees the UIC as its primary foe, and remains unwilling to include the UIC in any political settlement.<sup>182</sup>

The conflict in Somalia has generated numerous inter-regional and intercontinental opinions, with various nations having taken sides in support of either the UIC or the TFG. Several role-players either in the continuation or management of the conflict include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Egypt within the regional realm, and the US, European Union (EU), China, Saudi Arabia and the International Contact Group on Somalia amongst the list of international stakeholders. It is generally believed that peace within the Horn of Africa will only come about should these actors be united in their goal of creating and maintaining stability.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> H.Morolong, Situation report (2007): Somalia, have all the options run out? *Institute for Security Studies*.

Available at: <http://www.iss.co.za>

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid* p.14

### The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)

When the TFG was established in October 2004, it could not be installed in Mogadishu because of the bad security situation. As a result, at the sidelines of the fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU meeting held at Abuja in January 2005, the IGAD Heads of State and Government (IHSG) reviewed the security situation in Somalia. In their meeting, IHSG took a decision 'to provide security to enable the newly established government of Somalia to relocate back home'. The contemplated IGAD mission to Somalia was named 'IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia' (IGASOM). Subsequently, the IGAD ministers of defence met in Entebbe, Uganda, and drew up a deployment plan of the mission. The mandate of the mission was spelled as: 'to provide support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security'.<sup>184</sup>

From the beginning, IGASOM encountered a number of difficulties. First, the fact that the agreement that establishes IGAD did not provide authority for the organisation to undertake a peace support mission in a member state. Secondly, the IGAD Secretariat lacked the capacity (both human and financial) to handle a peace support operation. Thirdly, and most importantly, IGAD member state Eritrea, in tense relations with co-member Ethiopia after their 1998-2000 border war, objected to the deployment. On 7 February 2005, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) at its 24th meeting and in its communique 'authorised the deployment of IGASOM to provide support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the re-

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<sup>184</sup> See Report of the 24th Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, held in Nairobi, Kenya (March 2005).

establishment of peace and security by helping in the formation of the Somalia police and army'.<sup>185</sup> However, due to the difficulties cited above, IGASOM could not deploy as envisaged. The UN Security Council finally concurred that the AU and IGAD could deploy a force in Somalia in December 2006.

In its ambitiously worded resolution, the council authorised IGAD and member states of the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia, to be reviewed after an initial period of six months by the Security Council with a briefing by IGAD, with the following mandate: to monitor progress by the TFIs and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue; to ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue process; to maintain and monitor security in Baidoa; to protect members of the TFIs and Government as well as their key infrastructure; and to train the TFIs security forces to enable them to provide their own security and to help facilitate the re-establishment of national security forces of Somalia.<sup>186</sup>

The council also partially lifted the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by its Resolution 733 of 1992 so that the authorised force would receive supplies of weapons and military equipment, and technical training and assistance.<sup>187</sup> Subsequent to receiving the authorisation of the Security Council, an AU technical evaluation mission visited Mogadishu in mid-January 2007 and consulted with the TFG on the planned deployment of a peace support mission. This was however made possible by the defeat of the UIC by the Ethiopian forces in December 2006-January 2007. The AU PSC formally authorised the deployment of

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<sup>185</sup> See Decision of the 24th Meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 7 February 2005.

<sup>186</sup> See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006), (para. 3)

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, para. 5.

the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) at its 69th meeting held on 19 January 2007.

AMISOM was therefore deployed in Somalia with a mandate; 'to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia'.<sup>188</sup> In 7 December 2011, the Kenya government took the decision that its troops deployed in southern Somalia would operate within the framework of AMISOM. Kenya had expressed willingness to bolster the African Union troops on condition that the forces' mandate was changed to reflect the security situation on the ground.<sup>189</sup> In March 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2036(2012), authorising Kenya to join AMISOM, and further that the strength of the forces would increase to 17,731.<sup>190</sup>

Currently, AMISOM's mandate restricts it to operate in Mogadishu as a peace-keeping force where it is providing security to the TFG led by President Sheikh Ahmed Sharif. In frank recognition of its inadequacy the AU has all along argued in favour of a UN mission in Somalia, or perhaps a "hybrid mission" such as that in Darfur, but this has not taken effect as desired. With less than half of its mandated strength, AMISOM has been unable to implement many of the tasks assigned to it. As the situation in Somalia further deteriorates, the role of AMISOM has been complicated. Due to its limited financial and

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<sup>188</sup> Peace and Security Council, Communique' of the 69th Meeting, PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX), 19 January 2007, para 8.

<sup>189</sup> "Kenyan troops join AU Somalia mission," The Kenya Daily Nation Newspaper, 8 December 2011, p.1.

<sup>190</sup> "Kenyan troops may pull out of Somalia this October," The Kenya Daily Nation Newspaper, 4 March 2012, p.2



military capability, AMISOM has been exposed to increasing attacks therefore dragging it into the complexity of the Somali conflict.

The lack of political progress is also another cause of concern for AMISOM. It may be argued that the deployment of any peacekeeping force should be preceded by an inclusive peace agreement and consensus among major parties to the conflict, which unfortunately is not the case for AMISOM. At the African Union Summit in late January 2007, several African countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda, and Malawi pledged to contribute troops for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. To date only troops from Burundi and Uganda have been deployed. The remaining states pledging troops have yet to convert their words into action.<sup>191</sup>

The security situation in Somalia has caused reluctance among states contributing troops, particularly Nigeria and Ghana.<sup>192</sup> In addition, they have delayed their contribution for reasons related to financial and logistical difficulties. Despite the criticism levelled against AMISOM and its drawbacks, the AMISOM troops have taken the risk where others, especially the West, avoided for a long time, which should be recognized. The peacekeeping forces are playing an effective role in trying to bring peace and security in Somalia despite the existing challenges.

### **3.5: The effects of the Conflict**

The fall of the military regime in early 1990 led to massive loss of lives and all kinds of human rights violations. There was mass displacement, large refugee influx into

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<sup>191</sup> Amnesty International. 2010. *Somalia: International Military and policing Assistance should be Reviewed*. London: Amnesty International publications.

<sup>192</sup> Hull, Cecilia and Svensson Emma. 2008. *African Union Mission in Somaliu-Exemplifying African Union PeaceKeeping Challenges*. Stockholm: FO1.p.28

neighbouring countries. The resultant insecurity led to a situation whereby government armaments fell into the hands of civilians. As a result of the lawless situation in the early 1990s and absence of effective government structures, private arms markets emerged to fill in the vacuum and operate in the insecure society. Some of the local arms (illegal) markets include the famous *Bakara* market in Mogadishu where small arms can easily be acquired by anyone who can afford.<sup>193</sup> After the fall of military regime, all the armaments of the military regime were shared out among various factions depending on who had access to the armoury. This happened throughout the country and it gave rise to armed violence throughout Somalia. The first Somali transitional government in 1991 did not have the capacity to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Instead, it engaged with clan warfare within itself, notably between Ali Mahdi and Gen. Aideed, and with other clans and sub-clans from other parts of the country.<sup>194</sup> The conflict in Somalia has recently taken a new dimension with the emergence of other global security threats such as piracy and terrorism.

### The piracy problem

Piracy around Somalia started in the 1980s but accelerated after the fall of Somalia's government in the early 1990s. During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia received aid from various governments to develop its fishing industry, with cooperatives fixing prices on the catches that were often exported due to the small demand for seafood in Somalia or the cooperatives issued fishing licenses. The aid money improved the ships and maintenance facilities were built.<sup>195</sup> After the Barre regime was overthrown, the income from fishing

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<sup>193</sup> I. Farah and S. Mohamed, *Civil Militarization in Somalia-Causes, factors and Issues*. Horn of Africa Bulletin, January – February 2012

<sup>194</sup> B. Finlay, et al, *Beyond Boundaries in East Africa: Bridging the Security/Development Divide with International Security Assistance*, (Washington, DC: Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation, 2011), p.16

<sup>195</sup> Report of NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, "Foreign Fishery Developments: Somali Fishing Industry has Potential for Growth," *Marine Fisheries Review* 44, no. 12 (December 1982)

decreased due to the civil war. Some pirates are former fishermen who argue that foreign ships are threatening their livelihoods by rampant illegal fishing in Somali waters. The pirates also claim that they are aiming to stop the dumping of toxic waste that continues to this day off the Somali coast. Piracy however started to flourish, especially when shipping companies started paying ransoms, initially in the tens of thousands of dollars, then to hundreds of thousands, and now amounting to millions of dollars.

The piracy problem has illustrated how an internal problem can result to external repercussions therefore drawing attention to the internalisation of the Somali conflict. It also offers a good case study of how the various regional and international state and non-state actors interact. Several factors contribute to the recent outbreak and continuance of piracy along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden.

The historical failure of governance that culminated in the collapse of the Somali state is the main factor responsible for the outbreak of piracy in the region. Since the ousting of President Siad Barre in 1991, the country has been in virtual anarchy without any functional central government to maintain security within its territory, including its maritime limit. This should be viewed in the context of the fact that Somalia does not have a strong national armed force or a police force that can enforce government authority. Since 1991, the Somali navy no longer exists.<sup>196</sup> The rising insecurity has led to the proliferation of warlords and armed militias and the consequent fragmentation of Somalia into a patchwork of rival fiefdoms.<sup>197</sup> The result is that Somalia's coastline has been divided among militia groups and

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<sup>196</sup> T.Potgieter, The lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa: Scope and effect. *Strategic Review for Southern*(2009) p.75.

<sup>197</sup> "Somali Militias Target Cemetery," BBC News, January 19, 2005, [http:// news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk)

warlords who engage in piracy or provide information, protection and support to criminal gangs involved in piracy.<sup>198</sup>

The lingering insurgency in turn has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Somalia in particular and the Horn of Africa in general. In turn, piracy exacerbates the volume of arms proliferation and circulation that undermines human security and sustainable development in some African states, especially those in the Horn of Africa region. These arms and weapons are circulating in and contributing to the environment of worsening poverty in Somalia.<sup>199</sup> Given the poverty situation in the country, the financial attraction of piracy especially to the Somali youth has become very high.

Prolonged years of neglect of environmental despoliation of the rich marine ecosystem of Somalia also contribute to the explosion of piracy. The absence of an effective central government capable of protecting Somalia's vast maritime resources has rendered it vulnerable to illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in its waters by foreign and local firms. Dumping of toxics on Somali waters has included radioactive uranium, lead, heavy metals like mercury and cadmium, and other chemical, industrial, and medical wastes. According to United Nations (UN) estimates, the cost of dumping these toxic materials off Somalia is only \$2.50 per ton, compared to \$1,000 per ton for disposing of them in Europe.<sup>200</sup> As a result, Somalia's fishing industry has collapsed in the past fifteen years and its waters are being heavily fished by European, Asian, and African ships.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> F. Onuoha, "Sea piracy and maritime security in the Horn of Africa": "The Somali coast and Gulf of Aden in perspective African Security Review", <http://www.tandfonline.com>

<sup>199</sup> L. Griffiths-Fulton, "Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa," *The Ploughshares Monitor* 23, no. 2 (2002)

<sup>200</sup> B. Van Auken, "Hijacking of U.S. Ship Raises Threat of Intervention in Somalia," <http://www.wsws.org>

<sup>201</sup> R. Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars," Chatham House Briefing Paper, October 2008

The piracy off the coast of Somalia grew significantly in 2008, with more than 100 attacks, including over 40 successful seizures and resulting to hundreds of persons being taken as hostage. The pirates have been demanding million-dollar ransoms for release of the hostages, ships and cargoes. Piracy disrupts critical humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia, increases shipping insurance premiums along one of the world's most travelled routes to near-prohibitive levels, damages littoral economies by forcing the diversion of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and raises the prospect of an environmental disaster as ships fall prey to hostile intent.<sup>202</sup>

Piracy is a symptom of a wider lack of security and rule of law in Somalia and continues to constitute a threat to regional and international stability. What however remains a challenge is the extent to which any response to piracy in the region can address the problem in a sustainable manner. There is need for the African union, regional organisations, national governments, civil society organisations and grass root communities to intensify collaborative networks and strengthen mechanisms to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Horn of Africa region. As such, piracy issues must be kept in mind when addressing the Somali peace process with a view to ensuring stability in the country.<sup>203</sup>

The juridical challenge of dealing with captured pirates has also been a challenge to regional countries particularly Kenya. In the period 2008-2010, Kenya signed memoranda of understanding with the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, the European Union, and the People's Republic of China to receive and prosecute suspected pirates. In

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<sup>202</sup> Report of the contact group on Somalia, New York. January 14 2009.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid

April 2010, Kenya suspended acceptance of new piracy cases and only eventually agreed to evaluate individually any future cases after receiving assurances of increased support from the international community.<sup>204</sup> The explanation for declining to accept new pirates was that the international community had not lived up to its promises to help Kenya with the 'burden' of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates.<sup>205</sup> Without the cooperation of the regional states and the international community it is difficult to sustain the anti-piracy campaign in the region.

### The Al-Shabaab

The Al-Shabaab allegedly founded as early as 2004 and an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisation, is considered the most militant, well-organised, well-financed and most active group in Somalia.<sup>206</sup> It is a radical Islamist group that dominates the current political arena in Somalia. It served as a military wing of the defunct Union of Islamic Council (UIC).<sup>207</sup> The Al-Shabaab has no specifically written or declared program, its principal objective is to "establish a strictly Wahhabi doctrine in Somalia and later expand it to the Horn and the rest of Africa through military intervention."<sup>208</sup> The militant group partially shares the objective of its predecessor, Al-Itihad, whose main aim was to establish an Islamic state constituting all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa.<sup>209</sup>

The Al-Shabaab receives financial support both from local and foreign sources. Locally, mosques, religious leaders, and local community networks provide long-term financial

<sup>204</sup> H. Agade, "Kenya to accept suspected pirates for prosecution." Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. 19 May 2010.

<sup>205</sup> "Kenya Ends Trials of Somali Pirates in its Courts," *BBC News*, April 1, 2010.

<sup>206</sup> Bergen Risk Solutions. (2009). *Gulf of Aden piracy: Background forecast, practical prevention strategies*. <http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com>.

<sup>207</sup> International Crisis Group. 2008. *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State*. Africa Report No147. Brussels: ICG.

<sup>208</sup> Ali, Abdisaid. 2008. "The Al-Shabaab Al-Majaidinna—A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organization" paper presented on the joint Kenya-Uganda Border Security and Management Meeting held April 28–29, Uganda, organized by ICPAT.

<sup>209</sup> Adar, Adan. 2002. "The Scope Strength of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia." pp.7-10.

support for the Al-Shabaab's logistical and operational needs. Al-Shabaab is also said to have businesses in the areas it controls.<sup>210</sup> Currently, the Al-Shabaab is said to have approximately 3,000 troops, but some put the number closer to 10,000. The Al-Shabaab established successful local and international recruiting mechanisms. Internally, they are able to attract thousands of uneducated and unemployed youngsters by providing them money, training, ideology, and arms.<sup>211</sup>

The Al-Shabaab's strict interpretation of Islamic laws remains a source of popular dissatisfaction in Somalia. As a result, the Al-Shabaab is facing opposition from groups like Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, which is fighting to maintain traditional Islamic practices. The Al-Shabaab is further challenged by clan competition for resources and control over towns and ports, which makes it difficult for the group to provide effective administration. The Al-Shabaab however remains a relatively strong fighting force in Somalia and people are fearful of the group.<sup>212</sup> It has conducted an extensive military, political and propaganda campaign aimed at recapturing the central and southern parts of the country.<sup>213</sup> Many of the most recent, violent and brutal attacks are attributed to the group.<sup>214</sup>

The radical Al-Shabaab insurgents are also believed to be directly linked with the pirates, as their activities have increased parallel with the piracy.<sup>215</sup> There is already concern that strategic sections of the Somali coastline may already be under the control of radical Islamists. The East African Seafarers' Assistance Programme has also highlighted that the

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<sup>210</sup> International Crisis Group. 2008. Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. Africa Report No147. Brussels: ICG.

<sup>211</sup> Kidist Mulugeta. 2009. "Probable Scenarios for Somalia." Paper presented at the 5th Cairo Expert Group Meeting, organized by FES from November 4–5, 2009.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid

<sup>213</sup> International Crisis Group. (2008). Somalia: To move beyond the failed state. *Africa Report* 147, 23 December. <http://www.crisisweb.org>.

<sup>214</sup> *Somalia: Implications of the Al-Qaeda-Al-* Available at <http://www.crisisweb.org>.

<sup>215</sup> Bergen Risk Solutions. (2009), op.cit.

rapid proliferation of piracy could also be instrumental in funding the growing Somali insurgency onshore as the hijackers could be funnelling hefty ransom payments to Islamist rebels.<sup>216</sup> It has been reported that money from piracy ransoms has helped pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab also allegedly have certain degree of control over several pirate groups, and are said to be providing operating funds and specialist weapons in return for a share of ransoms.

The increased insecurity in Somalia has led to increased Islamic fundamentalism which contributed to regional insecurity. On the 11th of July 2010, as fans watched the FIFA World Cup Finals two separate suicide bombings rocked Kampala, Uganda leading to the deaths of 79 people and injuring many others. The Al-Shabaab, the fundamentalist group in Somalia immediately claimed responsibility. The region also witnessed the dual bombings of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam Tanzania that claimed over 250 lives in 1998. The Al-Shabaab insurgents in August, 2011 vacated several bases in Mogadishu and moved their forces southwards towards Lower and Middle Shebelle regions in what they called tactical withdrawal. Subsequently, AMISOM and TFG forces have set up new bases in the liberated areas in Mogadishu and its environs that have enabled humanitarian agencies deliver food aid to starving populations in previously Al-Shabaab controlled areas.

#### Proliferation of Small Arms and light weapons

Somalia is said to have thousands of small arms and light weapons. Large numbers of weapons were amassed during the Cold War era while the post-1991 anarchy further created

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<sup>216</sup> D.Wallis, Piracy ransoms funding Somalia insurgency. *Reuters*, 24 August 2008. Available at <http://www.reuters.com>



an opportunity for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). There is an uncontrolled flow of arms from both state and non-state actors in Somalia. Accordingly, Somalia is one of the major sources of SALW in the Horn of Africa. The anarchy in Somalia, the porous boundary, and the presence of Somali refugees and nomadic groups in neighbouring states made it easier to smuggle weapons from Somalia.<sup>217</sup> The proliferation of SALW is one of the major sources of insecurity in the region. These arms have fuelled and sustained conflicts, and contributed to increasing criminal activities.

According to one ICG report, the terrorist attacks in Kenya in 1998 and the failed 2002 attempt on an Israeli charter aircraft were carried out with weapons smuggled from Somalia.<sup>218</sup> In general, the influx of refugees and the proliferation of arms, piracy, and terrorism are all problems emerging from Somalia and posing a threat to the region and international community.

### Refugees

The deepening insecurity in Somalia continues to create rising levels of refugee flows into neighbouring countries. The large number of people fleeing the country has accorded Somalia the distinction of having the third highest refugee flow in the world after Afghanistan and Iraq,<sup>219</sup> and of being the highest refugee-producing country in Africa. By July 2010, some 50, 065 Somalis had fled their country to seek refuge in neighbouring

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<sup>217</sup> International Crisis Group. 2005. *Somalia's Islamists*. Africa Report No 100.

<sup>218</sup> Farah, Ibrahim, Aisha Ahmad, and Daud Omar. 2006. "Small Arms and Border Controls in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; Mandera, Kenya; and Bula Hawa, Somalia." In *Africa Peace Forum, Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Supporting Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration*. Waterloo, Ontario: Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares.

<sup>219</sup> UNHCR Somalia Briefing Sheet, July 2010, <http://www.reliefweb.int>

countries.<sup>220</sup> The three largest host countries for Somali refugees are Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia.<sup>221</sup>

The increasing difficulty of undertaking humanitarian relief or conducting business in Somalia is another consequence of the deteriorating security situation in the country. Somalia ranks as one of the most dangerous places in the world for humanitarian workers. It has become increasingly difficult for aid agencies to operate in many parts of the country.

Various militant groups, particularly Al Shabaab, are continuing to target aid organisations, a practice that has increasingly made it unsafe to distribute aid supplies. In February 2010, Al Shabaab called for the suspension of all World Food programme (WFP) operations in Somalia and the group took control of WFP compounds in those territories under its control.<sup>222</sup>

### 3.6: Lessons learnt.

Clan affiliation has been the biggest obstacle to the attainment of peace in Somalia. Faction leaders have deliberately used 'clanism' as a political weapon and have, often brutally, insured that other forms of identity do not occupy political space<sup>223</sup> It should be recalled that the various clans coalesced to fight the dictatorship of Siad Barre. However, 'once the common enemy was deposed, the rebel forces led by Mohamed Aideed, Ali Mahdi and others, fragmented into clan-based groups that disagreed on everything'<sup>224</sup>. This underlined the failure of the previous 17 attempts since 1991 at forming an effective government. Over

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid

<sup>221</sup> United Nations News Service. 2009. "UN Rushing Relief Supplies for Somali Refugees in Ethiopia, February 6, 2009. <http://www.unhcr.org>. American Chronicle. 2009. "The Plight of Somali Refugees," July 8, 2009.

<sup>222</sup> ISS, Peace & Security council report, No. 10(May 2010),9

<sup>223</sup> P. Little, 2003. *Somalia: Economy without a state*. Oxford: James Currey.p.12

<sup>224</sup> O.Kamudhayi, 2004. 'The Somali peace process'. In *African regional security in the age of globalization*, ed. M. Mwagiru, p.108. Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

the years, Somalis have been divided between those who have alleged that their clan or sub-clan is under-represented in government, and those that believe that the previous governments maintained clan and regional balance.

An analysis of the past international sponsored initiative in Somalia indicates that there has mainly been focus on high and mid-level leaders in Somalia. These peace processes have failed to include a wide spectrum of traditional leaders in the negotiation process. There has been failure by the international community to fully comprehend the complexity of the Somali and hence lack of building on the positive aspects existing within the Somali society. The clan leaders have for example played a key role in ensuring that the values and norms of the Somalis are upheld and this should be recognised. Past Somali peace processes have also failed because there is failure to focus on the role that the grass roots and civil society can play in a genuinely driven local peoples' process. Recently there have been a number of consultative meetings held to address the Somali conflict. One of the latest initiatives has been the 21st meeting of the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia was held in Djibouti from 5-6 February 2012.

The 21st meeting of the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia was held under the auspicious of the United Nations and was attended by Speaker Shariif Hassan Sheikh Aden of the Transitional Federal Parliament of the Republic of Somalia, Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali of the Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia, President Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Farole) of the Puntland State of

Somalia, President Mohamed Ahmed Alin of the Galmudug State of Somalia, Abdilkader Moallim Noor of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a.<sup>225</sup>

The ICG agreed that the Transition must end on 20 August 2012 in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter, Djibouti Agreement, Kampala Accord, Roadmap and Garowe Principles. The minimum essential conditions include the finalisation of the draft constitution by 20 April 2012 as prescribed in the Roadmap and Garowe Principles leading to provisional adoption of a new Constitution (subject to a national referendum in due course), the establishment of a new, smaller and more representative Parliament and elections for the positions of Speaker, Deputies and President.<sup>226</sup>

This was with the view to address the persistent differences between the Somali parties in order to ensure that there is adoption of a new constitution and election of members of the constituent Assembly and Parliament. However, there is failure to recognise the need for an inclusive peace process in Somalia. The peace process must be seen to broaden its participation to include clan leaders and other opposing groups. The Somali Diaspora and members of the civil society should be incorporated to ensure the process enjoys widest possible support.

### **3.7: Conclusion**

This chapter has identified that the Somali conflict has been extensively internationalised for decades. In view of the threatening insecurity in Somalia, neighbouring countries have over the years interfered in Somali politics with the intension of securing their own national

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<sup>225</sup> Final communiqué of the International Contact Group meeting held in Djibouti from 5-6 February 2012.(UNPOS)

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

interests. The conflict has also been compounded through the interference of foreign powers in the country. The past peace interventions in Somalia have often been faced with a number of challenges especially due to the fact that various crucial Somalia actors have failed to participate during the entire peace process. One of the main lessons learnt is that for any lasting peace to be effective in Somalia, it is imperative that the solutions emerge from the Somalis themselves with the support of the international community.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT

#### 4.1: Introduction

The Previous chapter provided a detailed case study of the genesis of the Somali conflict. It focused on the impact of the conflict on regional countries particularly within the IGAD region. The role played by the regional actors and the other international countries in trying to resolve the conflict was highlighted upon.

In this chapter, a critical analysis will be provided on some of the key factors to the Somali conflict. This will include the role played by clans/clan systems, the regional and international players. The complex nature of the Somali conflict including its changing dynamics is focused on with a view to drawing lessons from past conflict issues. The chapter will also critically analyse regional and international security concerns. It will also provide an insight into recent peace initiatives.

#### 4.2: Emerging issues:

There is no single factor which can adequately explain the causes of the Somali conflict. Bradbury states that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali Kinship systems, contradictions between a centralised state and pastoral culture, cold war politics, militarisation, marginalisation and uneven development, ecological decline, lack of power sharing, corruption, oppression and cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict have all contributed to the conflict.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> M. Brudbury, *Somaliland Century Report*, Totton:Hobbes the Printer Ltd. 1997.p.1

Samatar<sup>228</sup> argued that the Somali Society was torn apart because their blood ties, without the Xeer,<sup>229</sup> was manipulated by the elite in order to gain or retain access to resources. He traced the conflict two major historical benchmarks in the evolution of Somalia: the commercialisation of subsistence economy, the imposition of a colonial structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic modes of power.

Samatar suggests that the Somali conflict can be resolved through the restructuring of Somalia by creating an economy in which productive resources are widely distributed and which in resources are channelled towards productive investments. There is hence need to craft political order which is accountable, representative and entrepreneurial, which does not allow for personal appropriation of public resources.<sup>230</sup> The government should also be inclusive and reach out to various Somali political groups.

#### **4.2.1: The nature of the Conflict**

The thorniest problem facing the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia is the unity of the Somali republic. The Republic of Somaliland (Northwest Somalia) declared its independence from the rest of the country in 1991. Although it has yet to earn recognition as a single member state in the United Nations, Somaliland through its relative peace and stability has earned the support and sympathy of a number of governments inside and outside Africa. The question of Somali unity is the most divisive and emotive dimension of the crisis. Any Somaliland government that moves towards dialogue with the south must be prepared to confront vigorously internal opposition, including allegations of a “sell-out”. Before committing themselves to such a political potent risk, Somaliland's leaders are likely to first

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<sup>228</sup> A.S Samatar. *Somalia: A nation of Turmoil*, minority Rights Groups. London 1991.

<sup>229</sup> Xeer is the Somali traditional or customary law, which serves important roles in managing social life and Somali politics in the new era of statelessness.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid

evaluate the credibility of their southern negotiating partners.<sup>231</sup> The stability of the TFG government, the quality of its leadership, and the degree to its commitments would all come under scrutiny.

Likewise the TFG will have to contend with domestic opposition to a dialogue with Somaliland. Some southern leaders may argue that bilateral dialogue with Somaliland is tantamount to recognition of the breakaway state. Others may feel that bilateral negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargesya might upset existing power sharing arrangements amongst southern groups, by awarding excessive importance and legitimacy to Somaliland and its administration. With sufficient good will on both sides, reinforced by support from the international community the initial reservations felt by the TFG and Somaliland about a bilateral dialogue could probably be overcome. A negotiated settlement between the government of Somali and Somaliland would not in itself result in a stable and durable union. Its implementation will require great care and sensitivity if the deal is to be successful.

The hasty process of integration following the 1960 union of Somalia was one of the root causes of the alienation between north and south, and the subsequent war in the north between the SNM and the Somali government.<sup>232</sup> Successful integration of the two territories is critical in preventing other regions in Somalia from engaging into secessionism and further conflict in the country. The chances of successful integration would be greatly improved by international diplomatic engagement, external economic support and most importantly the existence of mature, capable and committed political leadership on both sides. At the moment few Somaliland citizens are keen about the prospects for integration and few southerners

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<sup>231</sup> M. Bryden, "Somalia: Envisioning a Dialogue on the Question of Somalia Unity". Published in African Security Review Vol 13 No 2, (2004) p.1

<sup>232</sup> Ibid p.5



seem prepared to make the kind of concessions that might make unity more attractive to the north.

Many Somaliland citizens consider their independence to be non-negotiable and irreversible. They oppose any discussion on the topic of association and feel the prospect of dialogue with the south solely as an international requirement for obtaining international recognition as an independent state. However, negotiating a mutually acceptable formula for separation is likely to prove no less difficult than a workable formula for unity, partly because of reluctance in the south to accept the breakup of the Somali Republic.<sup>233</sup>

It is notable that Puntland and Galmadug have already declared semi-autonomous status in Somalia. Another problem in Somalia is the border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland. Currently, there is some limited fighting between the two over the regions of Sool and Sanaag. Somaliland claims the territory because the territory was part of British Somalia. Puntland claims ownership of the land because the inhabitants belong to the Puntland-based Harti clan. Both regions have disputed the area for many years. This conflict has the potential to spiral into a full-scale war if it stays unresolved.

#### **4.2.2: The role of the external actors**

Though the sources of the Somali conflict predate back to the colonial partitioning of the country in 1897, the modern day Somali conflict is a 'theatre' of many issues and it remains mostly intra Somalia in character. In the recent past, the conflict has assumed a regional dimension into neighbouring countries being drawn in due to fears and apprehension regarding the Pan- Somali ideology.

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<sup>233</sup> Ibid p.7

As far as the neighbouring countries are concerned, ever since its independence Somalia was viewed as a threat to the security of the sub-region. This is mainly due to the political ambition the Republic of Somalia pursued throughout its existence. Both the first civilian government and the Siad Barre regime constructed their basis of legitimacy on pan-Somali nationalism whose major political goal was to reunite the Somali people under a single state. In attempting to realize the unification, the Somali state had a series of direct diplomatic and military confrontations with its neighbours. The most common strategy was provision of military and logistical support to insurgencies and opposition groups fighting against ideologically and/or strategically hostile governments in the neighbouring countries. This was exacerbated by the involvement of the superpowers.<sup>234</sup>

After the ouster of Siad Barre, no significant change occurred in this respect. The phenomenon of collapsed state in Somalia, which is the result of the emerged power vacuum, became even more threatening to the stability and security of the neighbouring countries. The absence of a recognized power and/or the presence of multi-powers increased the unpredictability of political development in the country. This was a reason for concern for any party that had an interest to be maintained in Somalia. The neighbouring states were also concerned because of the geographic and ethnic proximity that makes them susceptible to a spill over effect from the conflict. Such a phenomenon is likely, in particular when there is a history of mutual intervention in each other's internal affairs. The existence of a strong minority group across the border that does not historically identify itself with the prevailing political entity constitutes an additional potential in this respect.

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<sup>234</sup> Habte Selasie, Berckel, 1980, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, (New York: Monthly Review Press). Lefebvre, A. Jeffrey, 1991, *Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991*, (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press).

The conflict has been compounded by the Ethiopia- Eritrea conflict, with Somalia becoming the incentive for a proxy war between the two countries. Ethiopia's interference in the affairs of Somalia dates back to the days of the Siad Barre regime. Ethiopia has always viewed Somalia with suspicion due to the irredentist policies portrayed by the latter to the country. During Siad Barre's reign Ethiopia served as a reliable rear base for groups engaged in the armed struggles against the regime.<sup>235</sup>

Ethiopia has several reasons to take whatever happens in Somalia very seriously. First of all, the two countries were at war with each other in 1978, with Somalia as the aggressor. A renewed Somali attack in the foreseeable future, as a long-term prospect is certainly not at all inconceivable especially considering that the Somali claims to the Ogaden/Somali Region have never really been abandoned. Ethiopia would like to make sure that no organized threat could come from Somalia. To this end it would attempt to influence the balance of power among the fighting factions, by supporting "friendly" Somali groups so they could gain the upper hand in the ongoing power struggle in reconstituting a Somali state.

Secondly, not only might a real war again become conceivable, but even before that Somalia might foment unrest among the ethnic groups of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has also maintained its concern regarding any support that may be given by Somali groups to the Oromo Liberation Front or any other group that may want to aspire to secede from Ethiopia. The two countries are neighbours, and an increased in flow of refugees from Somalia will also continue to have an impact on Ethiopia's economy and internal politics. Such refugees

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<sup>235</sup> J. Abbink, "Ethiopia- Eritrea: Proxy wars and prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa," *Journal of contemporary African studies*, vol.21, and no.3 (2003) pp.407-425.

risk upsetting fragile ethnic balances within multiethnic state such as Ethiopia, which has always been experiencing unrest in various parts of its immense territory notably among the ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia has also been concerned about the very lawlessness of Somalia which does represent a major challenge to the law enforcement institutions of Ethiopia because of the long border between the two countries.

Ethiopia was also perceived to have opposed the Arta peace process due to its perception that the process was dominated by Islamists with irredentist tendencies that threatened its government and national security. Ethiopia has further been perceived to eliminate any threat from Somalia by ensuring that the Somalia people remain divided and weak.<sup>236</sup> The 2006 military invasion by Ethiopia on Somalia was based on this definition of Ethiopia's national security interests. This policy however remained unsustainable due to the economic constraints and Ethiopia was forced to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Somalia in 2008.

In essence Ethiopia's position has been based on the understanding that there was need to weaken any regime in Somalia that has acted as a threat to its own national interest and survival. The marriage of convenience entered between Ethiopia and different Somali groups have become a permanent feature defining Somali's relations with different actors in Somalia. This has therefore further compounded the conflict and complicated the political dynamics in Somalia. Ethiopia also increasingly relied on Djibouti port and Berbera port, Somaliland for trade, because of the loss of the use of Assab port, Eritrea.

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<sup>236</sup> A.A Elmi and A. Barisse (2006). *the Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peace-building Strategies*, Africa Security Review 15.1: 32-5. Johannesburg: p.42

Through gaining political and also military influence, Ethiopia might be keen to realize its long-standing geo-strategic ambition, including access to sea. Possession of the two important Red Sea ports had been one of the major issues of the 30-year war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. After the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia remained without any direct access to the sea. Though an agreement was reached between Eritrea and Ethiopia that the Eritrean ports would serve as “free ports” for Ethiopia, the latter was eager to get another alternative route to the sea. This became a matter of urgency after the outbreak of war between the two neighbouring countries.

Ethiopia also has interests in Southern Somalia not related to trade. It has been concerned about the growing influence of fundamental Islamic movements on its borders and has made military incursions into southern Somalia to silence such groups.<sup>237</sup> Following September 11, Ethiopia has often been vocal in its claims to the US and its European allies that Somalia harbours radical Islamic and terrorist groups.

While until the tragic events of September 11 Somalia was of little interest to many wealthy industrialised countries, this was not the case for other states, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Some of these countries are of considerable interest to the global community, whether as adversaries or allies. Egypt for example is one of the US and Europe’s strongest allies in North Africa/ Middle East and has taken particular interest in the Somali peace process. Egypt has been a significant actor in reconciliation talks and hosted a major peace conference on Somalia in 1997. Egypt always had keen interests in Somali affairs dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>238</sup> Egypt’s long standing interests along the Somali

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<sup>237</sup> P.D. Little, African issues. “Somalia: Economy without State.” Heinemann Publishers (2003) p.172.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

coast has mainly been due to its concerns about developments involving Ethiopia, which is one of the main sources of the Nile waters reaching the Aswan dam.

Kenya hosted the Somali peace processes that were central in ensuring the Transitional Federal government was instituted in Somalia. Kenya unfortunately has had to bear the brunt of the Somali conflict due to the large influx of refugees and the rising insecurity arising out of the flow of small arms and light weapons through the porous border with Somalia. The insecurity and violence in Somalia threatens the security of Kenya. The continued lawlessness in Somalia has been an ideal haven for terrorist activities<sup>239</sup> and Kenya in October, 2010 deployed its armed forces inside Somalia to fight the Al Shabaab, a terrorist group that has conducted terrorist activities into the country.

The increasing refugee population from Somalia has been viewed with great concern by Kenya. The Somali refugees in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya have been responsible for the degradation of the environment around the camps as they cut down trees for fuel and building materials. As a result of the accumulated effect of the sedentary population of the refugees depending on the immediate environment for their livelihood over a long period of time, large areas of land under fragile natural vegetation cover around the camps has been extensively been damaged. The economic burden of hosting an increasing number of refugees is also a matter of concern to Kenya.

The conflict in Somalia has therefore generated numerous inter-regional and international opinions, with various nations having taken sides in support of the TFG or other

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<sup>239</sup> Tayler, Letta, and Chris Albin-Lackey (2009): "Somali Refugees to fight Islamists Back Home in Somalia". The Huffington Post. [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org).

opposing groups. Several role-players, playing a significant role in the conflict, include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Egypt within the regional realm, and the US, European Union (EU), China, Saudi Arabia and the International Contact Group on Somalia amongst the list of international stakeholders. It is generally believed that peace within the Horn of Africa will only come about should these actors be united in their goal of creating and maintaining stability.<sup>240</sup> The existing Somali government is in disarray due to lack of effective institutional structures and stabilization of the country depends on outside assistance. One of the most important groups with interests in Somalia is the African Union.

AMISOM was first deployed in 2007 to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and strategic infrastructures (the port and airport) in Mogadishu from the insurgents who had strengthened their position as Ethiopian forces withdrew, and to provide support for humanitarian assistance for the Somali population. Although AMISOM seems to have done a good job under difficult conditions, and with limited human and material resources or international political support, the operation has failed to fully realise the concept of operations and to make a serious impact upon the security and humanitarian situations in Mogadishu or Somalia as a whole. This however can be attributed to limited financial resources and limited deployment by troop contributing countries. The AU's assumption was that AMISOM was an interim mission, pending the arrival of a stronger international deployment with a UN mandate. The UN members and other African members have however been unwilling to commit anything more than moral and financial support. Under these circumstances the TFG's position remained parlous, and the plight of the population dire.

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<sup>240</sup> II. Morolong. 2007. Situation report: Somalia, have all the options run out? *Institute for Security Studies*. Available at: <http://www.iss.co.za>

With regard to IGAD's interventions, managing the interests and actions of regional actors has been a challenge. The member states of IGAD have not always been united in addressing the situations in Somalia.<sup>241</sup> Dating back to the Ogaden crises in 1977, Ethiopia and Kenya have had long-standing geostrategic interests in managing and containing the activities in Somalia. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006 compounded the perception that it seeks to manage Somalia's internal affairs. In response Eritrea, which has had a tense relationship with Ethiopia, has financed insurgents within Somalia.

While IGAD can be commended for maintaining a commitment to intervening and resolving the conflicts in Somalia, it is evident that there are significant infrastructural and logistical constraints that undermine its efforts to make peace in the country. IGAD is hampered by its inability to effectively work in the country because of the ongoing violent confrontation between the various factions.

The prevailing AMISOM mandate, besides being weak, is also facing constraints because of the lack of substantive political support from within the region and internationally. In the prevailing situation, the AMISOM operation seems to be attracting some foreign elements to the side of Al-Shabaab. It is therefore conceivable to establish an AU/UN hybrid operation in Somalia, by replicating the experiences in Sudan's Darfur and Western Sahara. Such an engagement is likely to improve the mission capabilities and is a way of neutralising radicalised armed groups in Somalia. Increasing AMISOM's strength will succeed if there is coherent political process, common regional approach and concerted collaboration within the international community.

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<sup>241</sup> R. Iyob, "The Foreign Policies of the Horn: The Clash between the Old and the New," in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001).



Historically, the UN is the most involved organization in Somalia. Direct participation in Somalia began with the adoption of Resolution 733 by the Security Council, which authorized the formation of the UNOSOM I in 1992. The UN has not taken any military action since UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II and continues to pursue strictly peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations. Over the past years, the United Nations has continued to call on the international community for monetary and humanitarian support, as well as emergency rehabilitation and economic development programs. The Secretary-General has continuously requested that the international community support the AU mission in Somalia "including its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration aspects."<sup>242</sup> Furthermore, the UN has argued that the developments made in the country must be "incremental and should be based on the outcome of discussions with the government."<sup>243</sup>

The United Nations strongly believes that international support for political reconciliation efforts would lead to "improved security and, thus, humanitarian access."<sup>244</sup> Following improved access, it is expected that more aid agencies will reach areas of need particularly in Southern Somalia. During the incremental reduction of troops involved in UNOSOM II, a number of non-governmental organizations pulled out of Somalia and very few have returned in recent years.<sup>245</sup> The UN continues to encourage the international community to help alleviate the humanitarian and political crisis in Somalia, but no dramatic steps have been taken towards a large UN intervention.

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<sup>242</sup> United Nations, "Press Release Sc/8225," in *Security Council, in Presidential Statement, Says Enhanced UN Role in Somalia Must be Incremental, Based on Discussions With New Government*, ed. Security Council (2004).

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> United Nations, "Sc/8662 " in *Security Council Reaffirms Commitment to Comprehensive Somalia Settlement; Welcomes 'Aden Declaration', First Session of Transitional Parliament*, ed. Security Council (2006).

<sup>245</sup> Jonathon Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu : Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia* (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 107.

The role that the United Nations has played in Somalia has however been criticised by some of the Somali groups. Up to date some Somali's argue that the UN in the past has been a party to the conflict. This has frustrated all endeavours by the UN to broker a peaceful settlement of the conflict. UNOSOM II military operations against Siad Barre were not perceived favourably by some Somali groups. These activities have become a source of Somalia resentment towards the UN to date.

One of the important mistakes of the UN effort in Somalia was to underestimate the diversity of local social groups. By focusing their efforts on the warlords and their militia and on clans and their leaders, they excluded many other elements of Somali society, including associations of *dilaal* (brokers), traders (male and female), women, religious leaders, and technicians. Nor did they recognise the dynamics of the clan identities and their complex relationship with militia, NGOs, and other groups. Instead, clans were treated as fixed entities, with rigid structure and rules of membership.<sup>246</sup>

The reality is that is that clans are 'indigenous,' a term that finds a receptive audience among community development practitioners and human rights groups. If it is indigenous, it is seen as 'truer' to local culture, and therefore more appropriate than other forms of social structures. The emphasis by outsiders on the clans did not go unnoticed by Somali communities, who utilised the term in local disputes about rights in the region. Without recognising their potential for fragmentation and /or aggregation, the UN and allied partners may have contributed to the proliferation of clan and sub-clan identities and the divisions they represent. They unknowingly elevated clans to a level of significance that was not in

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<sup>246</sup> P.D. Little, African issues. Somalia: Economy without State. Heinemann Publishers (2003) p. 155.

existence in the 1980s. Some of these groups, including clan-affiliated NGOs, disappeared as soon as external resources dissipated.<sup>247</sup>

The departure of UNSOM II troops in March 1995 was an indication that a military option had failed to resolve the Somali conflict, although it was not acknowledged by its proponents. The peace makers did not understand the intricacies of the Somali clan system and its impact of the conflict. The international intervention has often failed to recognise the nature of the conflict especially in regard to the clan dynamics and the intricacies of the Somali body politics as well as the system and its impact on the conflict resolution. Disputants used the presence of UNOSOM as a factor to the conflicts, yet the conflict continued unabated even after the departure of UNOSOM. Many of the Somalis are increasingly of the opinion that the United Nations has failed to maintain an effective presence in the country.

In 1992 the U.S became involved in UNOSOM I in which the United Nations attempted to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia trapped in civil war. The United Nations then requested the United States of America to intervention via Operation Restore Hope in order to contain the famine by securing food deliveries and distribution points. After the failure of Operation Restore Hope, the United States pulled out of Somalia and UNOSOM II took over. The United States is hesitant to become involved in Somalia because of its failure in 1993. Its interest in Somalia is however aimed at being at the forefront in fighting terrorism.

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

What often is forgotten is that the 'arms culture' in Somalia was initially fuelled by massive amounts of US military aid to the country in the 1980's which totalled more than US\$150 million, and by the former Soviet Union's assistance programs in the 1970s.<sup>248</sup> The visual effects of these cold war strategies are still found around the around Mogadishu and the rest of the country. The weapons have also penetrated neighbouring countries causing serious security concerns. The resultant conflict has also led to an influx of refugees into neighbouring countries and also resulting to an influx of asylum seekers to the west.

#### 4.2.3: Security concerns

Another dimension of the current conflict in Somalia is the proliferation of criminality. This started when the conflict degenerated into looting, banditry, and the occupation of valuable real estate by concurring *clan militias*.<sup>249</sup> Young gunmen employed by warlords and business people fought principally to secure war booty and for control of business opportunities and valuable real estates, which became important sources of income in their unregulated war economy of Somalia. They established roadblocks to extort money as well as other economic resources from ordinary Somalis and businesses and divert the distribution of food aid. Using easily accessible weapons not only as a commodity but also for re-enforcing their will, these criminal militias perpetrated various kinds of violence against the civilian population, including murder, robbery, rape and kidnapping.<sup>250</sup>

During recent years, the conflict has transformed and expanded its reach to the coastal waters of Somalia. Piracy has become a menace and the victims are not mainly Somalis. The

<sup>248</sup> Rawson, David 1994. Dealing with Disintegration: U.S. Assistance and Somali state. In *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal*. Ahmed I. Samatar, ed. Pp.147-187. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>249</sup> World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and dynamics. P.11

<sup>250</sup> S. A. Dersso. *The Somali Conflict: Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Efforts*, ISS Paper 198 September 2009. P. 10

main targets are the vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden and far south along the Indian Ocean coast. Piracy has now become a major source of concern for maritime security affecting all vessels passing through that region.<sup>251</sup> The several incidents of piracy in the Indian Ocean by Somali militias have become a serious security threat to trade. This security threat is not confined to Somalia; it is an international problem which has attracted both regional and international attention. The rise and relevance of piracy has revealed how the failure of the international community to do enough to resolve one of the most protracted and long drawn out conflict in the world creates multiple threats to international peace and security. There is therefore need and urgency of taking all necessary steps to end the Somali conflict, which is the root cause of piracy. International action should not be limited to trying to contain piracy, which is only the overt symptom of the crisis in Somalia.<sup>252</sup>

Islamic fundamentalism has given the conflict a new dimension. This is in particular as a result of the ascendance of the ICU to a position of dominance in Somalia politics and the military dominance and territorial control that the Al Shabaab has gained in the past few years. Some elements of the ICU and more specifically the Al Shabaab claim to seek to establish an Islamic Somalia state that will strictly enforce Sharia laws. Due to the rising levels of youth unemployment and the continuing insecurity in Somalia, there is a danger that the hardliner Islamists may continue to radicalise more Somalis. This creates a greater danger to the region and opens space for international terrorist groups to establish a strong foothold in Somalia.<sup>253</sup> There is therefore need for concerned external actors to engage in Somalia fully and to do everything possible to bring lasting peace in the country.

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<sup>251</sup> Roger Middleton, *Piracy in Somalia- Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars*, Chatham House Briefing Paper, October 2008

<sup>252</sup> ICG Report 147, 22. See Rubrick Beigon, *Somali Piracy and the International Response* FPIF Commentary 29 January 2009 available at <http://www.fpif.org>

<sup>253</sup> S. A. Dersso, *op. cit.* P.10

The humanitarian situation in Somalia has continued to remain dire with the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance increasing over the years. A great number of people remain internally displaced while the number of refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries is estimated at nearly 600,000 people.<sup>254</sup> The need for infrastructure, repair and strengthening basic service delivery such as food, shelter, water, sanitation and health is critical to save lives; to protect livelihoods from deteriorating further; and ensuring that populations are resilient to future shocks. It has recently been difficult to access Southern and Central Somalia regions with a view to providing humanitarian assistance. This is due to the insecurity in the area. Despite the challenges, the humanitarian community has been able to maintain some programmes through the Somali NGO partners.

The decline of humanitarian funding has further compounded the complex operating environment. Some traditional donors cut back their contribution in 2009 and 2010 while others introduced national legislation that placed the Al Shabaab on their terrorist list, affecting their ability to provide funds to Somalia. Meanwhile, NGOs are reporting increasing scrutiny of their activities and a reluctance by some donors to fund activities in Al-Shabaab controlled areas; these are precisely the areas where the majority populations in need reside. The dismal humanitarian situation in Somalia is now being complicated by the actions of the armed opposition groups including such acts that degrade the environment. Somalia is currently experiencing drought and the denial of humanitarian access by the Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups is exacerbating the already dire situation.

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<sup>254</sup> AMISON-IGAD UNPOS Strategy to Support the TFG in the Management of the Transition Period: Issues, Challenges and Recommendations.

The Somali conflict has resulted in asset depletion and transfer of natural resources. This has been debilitating to pastoral and farming communities as combats often stripped villages of their resources. The crumble of state institutions and security organs promoted the anarchy, looting and mutilation of the country's socio-economic resources. Since the collapse of the government there has been a massive increase in deforestation motivated by the growth in charcoal exports to the Middle East.<sup>255</sup> In north eastern Somalia alone it is estimated that charcoal production and trade result in deforestation rates as high as 35,000 ha/year.<sup>256</sup> Charcoal is commonly referred to as Somalia's 'Black Gold' and much of it is exported to Saudi Arabia. Conflicts between charcoal makers and camel herders who need trees for their herds and between the former and militia factions who control the trade have resulted in several armed skirmishes. Clan elders have attempted to control the trade and extraction of trees, but have only been minimally successful.

There is need for a government to defend and protect its natural resources including fisheries which have been overexploited by external parties.<sup>257</sup> This exploitation has resulted to displeasure by Somalis and has been attributed to the rising piracy in the region. It is claimed that the intention of the pirates is partly to discourage foreign ships from illegally fishing in the Somali waters. Some form of government and enforcement is therefore needed to protect external parties from exploiting Somalis rich coastal fisheries and to keep wealthy nations from dumping toxic waste along its coast.

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<sup>255</sup> A. Y. Farah (2000) *Opportunities for the Improvement of Essential Services: Primary Education, Health and Water*. WSP Somali Programme in Puntland, Nairobi, Kenya: UNDP p.26.

<sup>256</sup> Report of IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) 1997 *Somalia Natural Resources Management Programme*. Eastern African Programme. Nairobi, Kenya: UICN

<sup>257</sup> P.D. Little, *African issues. Somalia: Economy without State*. Heinemann Publishers (2003) p.173.

#### 4.2.4: Other Emerging issues

The Somali conflict was caused by multiple and complex issues ranging from political factors, economic factors, the colonial legacy, a repressive state regime and the availability of weapons. The clan factor however plays a prominent role in the genesis of the Somali conflict. Given the political turmoil which bedevilled the Somali society, the Somali homogeneity seems the source of its strength and weakness.<sup>258</sup>

The Somalia uniqueness as state in the sub region has to do with the fact that it is based on a single ethnic group. The Somali identity is defined by a common language, a pastoral economy, adherence to land and a patriarchal clan based political system. Clan is the most important element that has historically defined the identity and social relations of Somalis for centuries. Most Somalis identify themselves in terms of their lineage or clan. Historically, it was the basis that structured law and order and social activities within and between the various groups.<sup>259</sup>

The manipulation of the clan system has been used by regimes in Somalia to sustain and manipulate power clans that have fought each other throughout Somali history. As a result today, almost every group is split along clan lines. The colonial past forced the Somalis to be introspective and they derived their national inspiration from their clan origins for strength and identity. The flare up of factionalism is therefore not merely a freakish result of the civil war. The making of the clan dissension and discord were ever present from the colonial period to the post 1991 period.<sup>260</sup> While the clan system continues to provide

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<sup>258</sup> J.L.Hirsch and R.B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*. Washington DC: US institute of Peace, 1995. P.3.

<sup>259</sup> S.A. Dersso, "The Somalia Conflict: Implications for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping efforts." ISS Paper 198. September 2009. P.3.

<sup>260</sup> K. Abraham, *Somalia Calling: the crisis of statehood and the Quest for Peace (2002) p. 54.*



indispensable social services, including justice, social security and physical protection, as various political forces resort to it for political ends, it has also become a source of division and conflict.<sup>261</sup>

The Somali politics since the period before the ouster of Siad Barre were determined by clan politics. Importantly, the 1969 Coup of Siad Barre, who was a member of the Marehan sub-clan of Darod, and the 1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia were the turning points in the Somali Civil War. Barre's main rival was the Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was a Hawiye and who succeeded in gaining control of the capital of Mogadishu. The Union of Islamic Council (UIC) also came from this clan. Bradbury<sup>262</sup> alleges that the 1978 attempted coup by the Majerten sub-clan members of the Darod clan was indicative of the discontent of this clan with the manner in which Siad Barre had handled the Ogaden War. The Ogaden war created hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Darod clan who had surrendered their power to the Hawiye. These complexities of factors have contributed in creating condition conducive to the current intractable state of the Somali Conflict.

During the reign of Siad Barre, clan divisions were manipulated and further entrenched as some groups dominated Somali politics and others were marginalised and subjected to harsh and even violent treatments.<sup>263</sup> This situation worsened when the opposition to Barre's government escalated following the defeat of the Somalia forces by Ethiopia and the 1978 attempted coup to overthrow the government. While on one hand Barre's government

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<sup>261</sup> I.M Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994, 1994.

<sup>262</sup> M. Bradbury, (1994). "The Somali conflict, prospects for peace", An Oxfam Working Paper. Oxford: Oxfam. P. 11.

<sup>263</sup> A. A Osman, The Somali and the Role of Inequality, tribalism and Clanism, in Abdululahi A. Osman and Issaka Souare(eds) *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed state*, London: Adonis & Abbey publisher Ltd, 2007, p.92.

actively resorted to a systematic use of the clan system of political patronage in order to strengthen its grip on power,<sup>264</sup> on the other hand it marginalised certain clans, including major ones, and took violent actions against those clans that were blamed for the attempted coup and were feared to pose serious threat to the regime.<sup>265</sup> While Siad Barre's repressive regime incited widespread distrust of central government, his strategy of divide and rule left a legacy of deep inter-clan hostility and resulted in a number of clan-based insurgencies.<sup>266</sup>

After the fall of dictator Siad Barre in January 1991, clan warfare tore Somalia apart. What began as a united effort to overthrow Barre descended into fighting within and between Somali clans. The fall of the Siad Barre's regime created a political power vacuum resulting in anarchy. This led to a state of civil war between clans, warlords, Islamist, nomads and agriculturalists that are still ravaging Somalia. The conflict has developed into an intractable conflict. Coleman<sup>267</sup> describes an intractable conflict as destructive as it persists for a long period, resists every attempt to be resolved constructively and appears to take on a life of its own. The complexity of the Somali Conflict therefore explains why it is intractable conflict.

Siad Barre used the tensions of the cold war and superpower interests to solicit armaments for his government. Bradbury<sup>268</sup> argues that apart from the superpowers, other countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, East Germany, Apartheid South Africa, Iran Iraq, Italy and Libya were also arms contributors. The arsenals of weapons driving current conflict in

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<sup>264</sup> G. Prunier, *Somalia: Civil War, intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995*, Writenet Country papers, July 1995, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrisom.htm>.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> E. Visman, *Cooperation with Politically fragile countries: Lessons from EU support to Somalia*, ECDPM Working Paper Paper 66 Maastricht: European Centre for Centre for Development policy Management, 1998. P 3.

<sup>267</sup> C. Coleman, (2003). *The Challenge to the State in a Globalised World*, part one. In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, second edition, edited by M. Deutsch, P.T. Coleman and E.C Marcus. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass p.53.

<sup>268</sup> M Bradbury. M (1994), *Op. Cit* p.10.

Somalia are to a certain extent, leftovers of the Cold War proliferation, particularly the small arms that can be found in the country and neighbouring countries. Weapons that have found their way to civilians are readily available in Somalia and have been easily penetrated into neighbouring countries through the existing porous borders. These weapons have turned into means of survival and defence for various Somalia groups during desperate times.<sup>269</sup> The prevailing situation is a source of concern for the security and stability of countries in the Horn of Africa.

When the Somali state collapsed in 1991 there were no formidable political entities capable of filling the vacuum left by the weak government of Siad Barre. The country was fragmented in terms of clan lineage and patronage and the devastating drought and ensuing famine introduced food security as a source of conflict. A lack of political vision and the politics of exclusion became serious contributors of the current conflict in Somalia. The political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling, illicit commercial practices and competition over the control of humanitarian food supplies following the draught and famine of 1991 set the scene for the emergence of the warlords in Somalia. These warlords exploited the inter-clan animosities in order to continue gaining from the existing economic activities. These activities led to a war economy which further complicated the dynamics in Somalia and neighbouring countries. Cheap commodities have penetrated the regional markets posing challenges to the local economies. Goods from the Middle East and other countries have found their way into the neighbouring countries through the porous border.

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<sup>269</sup> A. Osman, (2007). Cultural Diversity and Somali Conflict, Myth or Reality? Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution, 7.2: p.99.

Tadesse<sup>270</sup> is critical of the Arta peace process and alleges that there was a gathering of the Al-Ittihad of Islamic parties. He argues that the outcome of the process was the election of the TNG and TNA leadership from the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye thought to be the backbone of the Union of Islamic courts, which emerged in 2006. The Mbagathi peace process has also been criticised for its failure to have a balance of power between the warlords and the clan leaders. Although it has been argued that the "four and a half formula included the Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Digle and Mirifile, and half of the Bantus, this formula of clan representation was however not translated into actual participation in the peace process. This led to dispute among some Somali groups. The challenge of implementing the peace process has been created by the fact that the dimensions of the conflict cannot be addressed adequately without due regard to the warlord and clan interests. The root causes of the Somali Conflict have to take into consideration the prevailing clan dynamics. It is through this that that state- building and peace building process can be achieved.

On the other hand, Clanism has been largely blamed on fuelling the war in Somalia due to supremacy wars and disrespect among other clans arising from the majority and minority clan's mentality. On the political side, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is the officially recognized structure but it is struggling to maintain local support. The other groups that have emerged in Somalia include the Al Shabaab and Ahlsunna Waljama which are all aspiring to influence the Somali politics although using different ideologies. These groups are not working alone, but also have those who believe in them and therefore have both financial and human resource support from other foreign countries that have vested

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<sup>270</sup> M.Tadesse (2002). *Ali Ittihad, Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*, Addis Ababa: Meag Printing

interest in the Somali conflict. The Al Shabaab is a terrorist group that has been associated with terrorist activities inside Somalia and neighbouring countries, notably Kenya and Uganda. The TFG being the accepted political structure enjoys support from African Union, United Nations and United States all with faith that their assistance will one day translate to peace and stability in Somalia.

The role played by clans in terms of helping the community should however be recognised. Clan elders have played a role in assisting and solving inter clan disputes through mediation on behalf of a member of a certain clan where there is an inter clan dispute. They have also actively been involved in mobilizing their members to participate in peace process locally. While noting this positive aspect it is however important to recognise that Clans have been used and manipulated by different ruling groups in Somalia for their own selfish interest. Clans are therefore major factors in this conflict, and without taking their influence into account, it will be very difficult to establish lasting peace in Somalia. While every Somali has an allegiance to his clan, very few have any allegiance to their government; it's critical that this perception is changed to ensure peace and stability in Somalia. Various warring factions continue to use clans in their quest for political dominance and monopoly of the state or for preventing the emergence of a strong state run by another clan.<sup>271</sup> This is the situation 'that both scholars and policy makers need to address in order to end the Somali conflict and create a viable state.'<sup>272</sup>

Following the collapse of the Barre regime, 17 Somalia National Reconciliation Conferences were internationally sponsored and hosted in a bid to solve Somali crisis. The

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<sup>271</sup> A. A Osman, The Somali and the Role of Inequality, tribalism and Clanism, in Abdululahi A. Osman and Issaka Souare(eds) *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed state*, London: Adonis & Abbey publisher Ltd, 2007. P.108.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

14<sup>th</sup> reconciliation conference, held in Kenya, established The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 2004. These negotiations were led by The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Transitional Federal Government was created to bring all the clans together into a cohesive working government but has failed in this endeavour. In order to bring peace to the region, negotiations must occur so that a clan based parliamentary government can be instituted that will fairly represent all groups in Somalia. The TFG needs to be all-inclusive, consisting of clan leaders and elders, militia leaders, current government officials and Islamists.<sup>273</sup> The TFG needs to take and hold onto a non-expansionist position. Somalia cannot afford to be pressed into a situation where it could be invaded and disorder returned to the country. Some of the reasons that Ethiopia invaded Somalia in the first place were a fear of being surrounded by a “sea of enemies,” and the threat of Islamic expansion at the hands of the UIC.<sup>274</sup>

The infighting between various factions of the TFG has further weakened its legitimacy. However, the signing on 9 June 2011 of the Kampala Accord by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), heralded a new phase in the peace process. The Accord ended a long-running stalemate between the Executive and the Legislature on the way forward by deferring the elections for one year and providing for the establishment of a roadmap with benchmarks, timelines and compliance mechanisms for the implementation of prioritized transitional tasks. The Kampala Accord has given new momentum to the peace process.

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<sup>273</sup> G. Alem, “The Horn of Africa at the Crossroads,” [www.uwate.com](http://www.uwate.com)

<sup>274</sup> Jeffery Gettleman, “Somalia’s Islamists, Cornered, Vow Never to Surrender,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2006.

The timely manner in which the Kampala Accord has been implemented thus far is encouraging. In accordance with the Accord, Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned from his post on 19 June 2011, twenty days ahead of the deadline provided for in the Accord. His successor, Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed, was overwhelmingly endorsed by Parliament on 28 June 2011, five days after his appointment by President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. On 11 July 2011, Parliament endorsed the Kampala Accord. And on 20 July 2011, the Prime Minister appointed a new Cabinet of 18 ministers. The Cabinet was approved by the Parliament on 23 July 2011 and sworn in five days later.

The management of the constitution making process however remains a delicate and urgent issue. The adoption of the constitution of The Transitional Federal Charter continues to pose challenges to the prevailing challenging security situation. While partners should continue to provide assistants to the TFG in implementing the transitional tasks, such as the process of deliberating on, and approving the new constitution, other areas of capacity weaknesses in the TFIs need to be identified and the requisite support provided. Leaders of the TFIs need to be regularly engaged by partners to ensure cohesion in the government. The ownership of the transition process must be maintained by the people of Somalia in close coordination with international community.

The London conference on Somalia held on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2012 drew representation from senior representatives from over 40 governments and multilateral organisations, and representatives from Somalia. The aim of the conference was to unify the position of the international community in order to determine how what efforts should be taken to tackle

both the root causes and effects of the problems in the country.<sup>275</sup> It is expected that the international community will continue addressing the Somali conflict in a unified manner in close collaboration with Somalis in order to ensure that there is sustainable peace in the country.

#### 4.3: Conclusion

The above exposition of the nature of the Somali conflict shows that the conflict is very dynamic and complicated. The ever changing nature of the belligerent forces, the regionalisation and internalisation of the conflict and the involvement of competing external actors further compounds this complex conflict. There is need for transformative approaches including nation building, control of movement of arms, grass root reconciliation and the deconstruction of divisive clan relations and discourses, and economic transformation and the reconfiguration of all economies. The complexity of the conflict also calls for well manned, well resourced and well equipped peace operations with robust and multidimensional peace keeping mandate. The current AU mission in Somalia although established has an important international presence in the country, lacks the qualities that a peace keeping operation should possess.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> British Foreign and commonwealth Office (FCO), [www. Fco.gov.uk](http://www.Fco.gov.uk)  
<sup>276</sup> Ibid p. 11



## CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1: Summary

Chapter one provided an introduction to the Somali case study. The introduction attributed the Somali conflict to a complexity of factors. It pointed out that the Somali conflict was triggered by the dictatorial tendencies of the Siad Barre regime prior to 1991. Since that period, the conflict has fluctuated in terms of its intensity and the diverse nature of actors involved.

The chapter further provided a highlight on the objective of the study, which is to establish the causes of the Somali conflict and analyse its effect on security in the Horn of African region. The chapter deliberated on different scholarly perspectives and identified the relevant theories that are applicable to the study. The gaps that have arisen in the literature review are pointed out. The study aims to focus on these gaps with the view to providing enlightened recommendations and decisions to scholars and policymakers on ways of resolving the Somali conflict.

Chapter two is an overview of the Somali conflict. The chapter provided an historical account of Somalia which predates from the migration of the Somali people in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. It is pointed out that the migration served to scatter Somali clans across a large geographical area in the Horn of African region. The chapter identified the various factors attributed to the Somali conflict which include colonialism, misuse of the existing clan systems, economy and marginalisation of Somalis, particularly the youth. The chapter provided an overview of various peace initiatives in Somalia dating back to 1992 when the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) was set up to facilitate humanitarian

assistance to the country. The role played by the African Union (AU) and the IGAD in trying to restore normalcy in Somalia is focused on.

Chapter three provided a detailed case study of the Somali conflict and pointed out at the role played by regional actors in trying to resolve the conflict. It was indicated that the conflict has taken an international dimension due to the involvement by different players. The various security concerns arising as result of the Somali conflict both to regional countries and the international community were reflected upon.

In Chapter four a critical analysis was provided on some of the key factors to the Somali conflict. This included the role played by clans/clan systems, the regional and international players. The complex nature of the Somali conflict including its changing dynamics was focused upon with a view to drawing lessons from past conflict issues. The chapter also critically analysed the regional and international security concerns. It further provided an insight into recent peace initiatives.

## **5.2: Key findings**

The conflict in Somalia has generated numerous inter-regional and international opinions, with various nations having taken sides in support of the TFG or other opposing groups. Several countries, playing a significant role in Somalia have included Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and Egypt within the regional realm, and the US, European Union (EU), China, Saudi Arabia and the International Contact Group on Somalia amongst the list of international stakeholders.<sup>277</sup> The issues of the conflict are multidimensional and the

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<sup>277</sup> Wilton Conference report. "Somalia: building stability, accepting reality". 9 February 2011 .www.wiltonpark.org.uk

approaches used to manage are full of not only competing but also contradictory interests harboured by both internal and external actors.<sup>278</sup> It is generally believed that peace within the Horn of Africa will only come about should these actors be united in their goal of creating and maintaining stability in Somalia.

Ethiopia's intervention in Somali politics has been viewed negatively amongst many groups in Somalia. Although throughout history Somalis and Ethiopians have had unstable and poor relations, more recently this meddling has given shelter and arms to spoilers (groups and individuals). Many Somali locals have suggested that Ethiopia, a powerful and well-positioned state, has systematically endeavoured to maintain a weak and divided Somalia. Eritrea has on the other hand extended support to the groups that have been opposed to Ethiopia's hegemonic interest in Somalia. The two countries are engaged into a border dispute and their presence in Somalia is viewed within the context of a proxy war.<sup>279</sup> Eritrea continues to provide militant groups in Somalia with political, financial and military support. More recently, this aid has come in the form of the provision of assistance to the Al Shabaab. Any successful peace process in Somalia will therefore have to take into consideration the complexity of relations between Ethiopian, Eritrea and other regional countries.

The political situation in Somalia still remains unresolved. Whereas the process of dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and different political groups are on-going,<sup>280</sup> the TFG is still being blamed for its failure to reach out to a broader spectrum of the Somali stakeholders. Besides, other armed opposition groups like Al Shabaab

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<sup>278</sup> I. Farah & S. Mohamed, *Civil Militarization in Somali-causes, factors and issues*. Horn of Africa Bulletin, January- February 2012.

<sup>279</sup> I. M Lewis, "The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somalia Segmentary Nationalism," *African Affairs*, 88: 1989 p.573-579.

<sup>280</sup> Report on AMISOM- IGAD- UNOPOS Strategy to support the TFG in the Management of the Transitional Period: Issues Challenges and Recommendations (23 February 2011).

operating within Somalia exist and they continue to pose serious security challenge to the TFG and the regional countries. Currently, government forces do not have the strength to challenge the Islamist insurgent threat and rely heavy on support from the Africans Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM) to maintain peace in Mogadishu and its environs. Further, due to increased incidents of piracy, the Somali coastline remains one of the most dangerous in the world. Piracy disrupts critical humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia, increases shipping insurance, and damages littoral economies by forcing the diversion of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope.<sup>281</sup>

The complex nature of the Somali conflict has resulted to the failure to reach an acceptable compromise between different parties who have brought diverging agendas to the negotiating table. Some of these agendas include commercial interests of external forces who use some Somali warlords as agents to achieve their own goals. This might explain why it has been extremely difficult to arrive at peaceful settlement to the Somali conflict despite meetings and agreements. Attempts to bring peace became even more complicated when the Somalis in the north opted to unilaterally declare that part of Somalia an independent entity on 18 May 1991.<sup>282</sup> Not to be outdone, Puntland, once called north-eastern Somalia, installed its own administration in that part of Somalia in August 1998. However, unlike Somaliland, the Puntland government does not advocate the breakup of Somalia. Other semi-autonomous states include Galmadug. To ensure peace in Somalia, the status of these states will have to be discussed to in order to avoid an escalation of further conflict in the country.

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<sup>281</sup> T. Portgieter. 2009. "The lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa: Scope and effect ". Strategic Review for Southern Africa xxxi (1) p.75.

<sup>282</sup> J.M Lewis (2002). *A modern History of the Somali: nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Oxford.

The humanitarian situation is another challenge that the TFG faces. The situation in Somalia continues to remain a disturbing challenge. Thousands have been affected by drought, flood and conflict. The rising number of internally displaced persons and refugees has caused security threats to Somalia and neighboring countries. The international aid agencies continue to face serious challenges in delivering humanitarian assistance to Somalia due to insecurity. If the TFG wants to build popular legitimacy then it will need to deal with these problems and put them on its list of priorities. The international community also has a role to play, by providing concerted support to Somalia despite the existing challenges. Some of the other outstanding issues facing the TFG include: advancing reconciliation, completing the Draft Federal Constitution, delivery of basic services, completion of the necessary parliamentary reforms, formation of all federal states and timing of elections.

### **5.3: Recommendations**

The first lesson to be learned is that the Somali peace initiatives must address the issue of lack of strong institutions in the country.<sup>283</sup> Most of the past peace initiatives have also failed to recognise the fact that the government institutions installed at independence in Somalia were too weak to meet the needs and complex nature of a vast country like Somalia. Part of the problem is also the lack of a clear formula for power sharing among the regions, in a society where the clan system plays a prominent role in communal life. In addition to the focus on reconciling or political settlement among factional leaders, attention should also be directed at institution building and the establishment of a national government, as part of the peace process. The solution to the conflict should therefore be found by the Somalis themselves.

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<sup>283</sup> "Violence in society is brought about by failure of institutions", The Kenya Daily Nation. 25 February 2012.

The clan dynamics are at the centre of the Somali conflict<sup>284</sup> and this has to be recognised as a key issue in peace efforts in Somalia. It is evident that the clan have been contesting to fill the vacuum in the political space created following the collapse of Siad Barre regime. Due to the prominence that the clan is playing in the Somali society, due recognition must be taken in the importance of this structure in any peace effort in the country. The international diplomacy in the resolution of the Somali conflict has at times downplayed the positive aspects of the clans in maintaining the Somalia society.

There is however need to acknowledge that the clan political unit can play a significant contribution to the peace making process.<sup>285</sup> The clan political unit structures can be effective if its implementation is effected from the smallest localised units upwards to ensure an effective bottom-up approach in governance. Failure to involve the clan structures in the broader conflict resolution strategies has led to a situation where the warlords have used them to recruit militias. They have often been used by the warlords for their own political survival.

For peace to be achieved, Somalis should appreciate their own support and leadership and include not only the clan elders but also religious leaders and other charismatic leaders in peace efforts. In addition, peace conference should be organized inside Somalia so that they can be owned locally. Outreach and reconciliation efforts aimed at key Somali regional, civil-society and other stakeholders need to be intensified by the Transitional Federal Institutions,

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<sup>284</sup>S. Grosse-Kettler. *External Actors in Stateless Somalia- A war Economy and its Promoters*. Bonn, BICC, 2004.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

with a view to broadening the support for the peace process.<sup>286</sup> Furthermore, the peace process should be able to look at the underlying causes of conflict.

The regional countries and the international community should maintain a united front in their approach in resolving the Somali conflict.<sup>287</sup> Africa and the international community ought to support the interim arrangements until some political and economic foundation has been put in place. This will allow a more inclusive Somali peace agreement to be brokered again with the possibility of including Somaliland and other semi-autonomous regions. Any future peace talks that plan to include the Somalilanders and other semi autonomous regions such as Puntland, must pay some attention to the higher level of the infrastructural development that Somaliland has already reached. The use of traditional discussion methods to deal with conflict in Somaliland and the encouragement of the Somali Diaspora to remain part of the country's development plan will definitely be useful when time comes for Somalis to rebuild their country

To further improve security, the outlawed groups and civilians should be disarmed and Somalis encouraged at embracing peace. The international community should maintain a united position on peace efforts and the 'spoilers' be cautioned on financing individual clans, militia and other interest groups involved directly in conflict. They should be engaged in dialogue with the warring parties without necessarily taking sides and support an outcome that would lead to sustainable peace. Due to the severe humanitarian problem and low economic development, the international community should also assist in providing good

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<sup>286</sup> Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda AMISOM big winners from London Somalia Conference,"The East African News. February- March, 2012.

<sup>287</sup> Report on AMISOM- IGAD- UNOPOS Strategy to support the TFG in the Management of the Transitional Period: Issues Challenges and Recommendations (23 February 2011).

infrastructure and initiate development to revive up the Somali economy.<sup>288</sup> Both the international community and Somalia should be fully dedicated to implementation of peace initiatives.

The nature of the roles played by the neighbouring countries in the Somali conflict resolution process has been an intendment and needs to be addressed by the regional bodies such as the AU and IGAD. The role of neighbouring countries should be limited to providing support to the peace process without taking an active part in determining or influencing the direction of the process or the state of governance in Somalia. Ethiopia's concern with Somalia's irredentism and the latter suspicion of Ethiopia's intention has complicated the peace process. There is therefore need to address this persistent problem in order to ensure there is mutual understanding between the two countries.

The Somalis must be supported in establishing a home-grown Somalia Army that will be respected by the nationals. The Government's military should have the mechanisms to protect its people from the persistent insecurity and create confidence in the citizens. A well-structured government with police, military, law and order is an asset in ending the conflict. The government should be assisted with manpower and finances to create functioning institutions ready to steer development in various sectors and ultimately improving the economy and creating employment for its citizens. A newly elected government once democratically constituted will give a sense of full representation by all clans. Such a government will acquire the support of the international community.

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid



Other challenges that the TFG is faced with include Piracy. This problem has been a serious challenge over the years.<sup>289</sup> The International community has a moral duty to find a lasting solution to this problem in Somalia. They should pour resources and expertise to restore the authority, credibility of the central government. The underlying cause of piracy should be identified and properly addressed. Piracy can only be effectively tackled through the concerted effort by the international community.<sup>290</sup>

Another challenge that the transition government faces is the proliferation of light weapons and small arms. Measures that can be taken to curb this problem is reforming of law enforcement agencies and military forces to ensure they are representative and provide security to all their citizens as well as adhere to international human rights laws. The TFG, AMISOM and the broader international community must agree on a common approach in countering the Al Shabaab. The questions to be addressed include whether the Al Shabaab should be defeated militarily, marginalized, or incorporated somehow into a political settlement. Achieving this approach will require a shared understanding of the structure, grievances, strengths, weaknesses and aims of the movement.

The nature of the conflict in Somalia requires a robust peacekeeping force. Currently, the size and military capability of AMISOM is immensely inadequate to implement its mandate.<sup>291</sup> It is also inadequate to support the peace process and deter armed actors from spoiling or impeding such a process. There are two causes of action that the international community should take to redress this problem. The first is to speed up the deployment of additional AU forces to Somalia to reach their mandated strength. Second, in addition to the

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<sup>289</sup> R. Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars," Chatham Briefing Paper, October 2008.

<sup>290</sup> "Leaders want Somali Constituent Assembly," The Kenya Standard Newspaper, 25 February 2012.

<sup>291</sup> "Kenyan troops join AU Somalia Mission," The Kenya Daily Nation Newspaper, 8 December 2011.

above, the UN should make the necessary arrangements for replacing AMISOM with a well-equipped, financed and adequately manned UN mission in Somalia. It appears quite logical for the international community to continue maintaining a strong naval force to fight piracy off the Somalia coast while failing to contribute towards such a mission. The mandate of UN mission should not be restricted to supporting the peace process by providing protection to the Somali government. It should also include the responsibility and capacity to respond to the security and humanitarian needs of civilians affected by the conflict and the drought affecting the region.

The setting up of viable Somali institutions is central in ensuring that there is the maintenance of law and order in the country. The international community should therefore assist Somalia to rebuild its country through the establishment of stable institutions. Future peace initiatives should emanate from the Somalis themselves with the support of regional countries and the international community. The Somali leadership should however ensure that they engage all stakeholders in future peace processes.

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