


**AN ANALYSIS OF THE CROSS-
BORDER EFFECT OF RWANDESE
REFUGEES ON POLITICAL
CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT
LAKES REGION (1959-2000)**

PATRICK LEO KAMAU MAGERO

PROJECT PAPER SUBMITTED AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF NAIROBI, INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF A MASTERS DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.



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PROF. MAKUMI MWAGIRU

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEDICATION

To all survivors of the Rwandan Genocide and other political conflicts in Africa.

Jesus Christ was once a refugee in Egypt but made a significant revolutionary effect on socio-political relationship among the Israelites and Gentiles.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my gratitude to all those who in one way or another assisted me in the course of preparing this work.

This scholarly work was inspired and encouraged by my supervisor and director of Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Prof. Makumi Mwangi. My sincere appreciation goes to him for his tireless inspiration with intellectual and technical assistance without which, this work could have appeared differently from what it is now.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my lecturers in IDIS. Your intellectual insights were very helpful in the development of this work. Diplomatic missions of Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda in Kenya were very helpful in offering information. My Sincere thanks goes to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and that of Home affairs in Kenya for their generosity in offering information. I also thank government officials from different governments especially those of Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, Burundi for offering information to my study. Special thanks goes to all those Interviewees during this research period who offered me with information. Your in-depth and practical information offered me critical insights to develop this work. I regret having not mentioned your names here because of your convenience, but I am sincerely grateful for your support and honesty. Kindly accept my gratitude.

I also acknowledge with gratitude the authors and scholars of the data utilized in this study. Your books and articles provided me with insights and wealth of information. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha offered me deep insights into the gravity of the Rwandan conflict especially the genocide.

My classmate were very instrumental in the development and criticism of ideas in this project paper. Your critical insights enhanced my capacity to analyze issues in this study. I also thank the general staff of IDIS for the cordial interaction we have had. All of you have enriched me in one way or another.

My family stood by me during the period of writing this work. I acknowledge that the work kept me away from my responsibilities, but I am encouraged that you understood and stood by me. Thanks for your patience and understanding during the time of my absence.

I can not forget to thank the Camillian Fathers in Kenya who funded my undergraduate studies laying a foundation for this study. Special thanks also goes to Fr. Prof. Raphael Wanjohi of the Catholic Diocese of Nyeri and Fr. Johnmary Mosoti, MI. Your material and moral support kept me burning for the entire period of my studies.

Patrick Leo Kamau Magero

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies-UoN.

October, 2006.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

AU	African Unity
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	Force Armee Rwandaise
GLR	Great Lakes Region
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organizations
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IO	International organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	Parti du mouvement et d'emancipation Hutu
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

ABSTRACT

Conflicts in Africa have resulted to mass flow of refugees. Refugees have been viewed as victims of conflicts who should be protected and assisted. However, while protection of refugees has been important, refugees have protracted, internationalized and generated conflicts. They get involved in the politics of the host country to protect their interest. Regimes in host countries have utilized refugees for their political ends. Refugees have involved themselves in subversive activities across the border to their home government. At times refugees form movements and organizations that contend power in their home country. Such activities have resulted to cross-border political conflicts.

While refugee protection has been an attempt to protect human lives and minimize refugee generated conflicts, refugees have turned out to be a significant contributor to cross-border political conflicts. This has been possible by the fact that refugees get involved in the politics of the host country, carrying out subversive activities to their home government or even yet to another third country. Refugees have also made governments and regimes perceive each other as enemies, hence adopting competitive foreign policies. Refugees protract and internationalize internal conflicts making management efforts complex. Therefore, conflict management efforts should not only concentrate in refugee protection and assistance but should attempt to address the causes of refugee flow if at all they seek to achieve success in conflict management. Therefore, the presence of refugee precipitates to cross-border political conflicts. As long as the Great Lakes region will continue to have high refugee population cross-border political conflicts will persist or even escalate with the diminishing environmental resources.

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

The presence of refugees in Africa is high, that is, more than half of the refugee population of the world is in Africa.¹ Refugees flee independent African countries because of instability, fear for secession, opposition, criticism, and political rivalry and frequent violation of human rights.² Political instability and dissatisfaction makes many people to move out of their country and becoming refugees.³ Refugee crisis in Africa seems to have become permanent.⁴

The cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region have roots at least partly, in the displacement of Rwandese refugees. The study stems from the assumption that the presence of massive refugees is a reality in Africa.⁵ The focus of this study will be various linkages between large Rwandese refugee flows and the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. It deals with how massive refugee flows and massive presence of refugees can help create contribute or precipitate to cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The focus of this study is on Rwandan refugees before, during and after the 1994 genocide and their cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region with specific emphasis on Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

¹ S. A. Khasiani, Refugee Research in Africa: Problem and Possibilities, (Geneva: International Organization for Immigration, 1990), p. 368.

² P. Nobel, "Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa" in Transnational Legal Problems Of Refugees, (New York: Clark Boardman Company Ltd, 1982), pp. 255-272.

³ Z Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 1977).

⁴ S. A. Khasiani, Refugee Research in Africa: Problem and Possibilities, op. cit., p. 368.

⁵ Ibid.

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The refugee flow in Africa has been high. To address this problem, the OAU realized and came up with the OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa.⁶ The aim of this Convention was to complement 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The OAU recognizing the unique situation in Africa, expanded its scope and suppressed the subjective element of refugee determination. These large numbers of refugees within a short period constitute a mixture of those fleeing out of well founded fear and those individuals and groups committed to carrying out hostile activities across the border.

Cross-border political conflicts have been witnessed in Africa, for example Uganda and Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda, Rwanda and Burundi, and Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This has increased during the period in which there have occurred massive refugee flows especially 1959-1962, 1973 and 1994. At the same time, the cross-border political conflicts have been prevalent in areas where there have occurred massive refugee flows like in the Great Lakes region. The Great Lakes region has been identified as the greatest origin and settlement of refugees. The states where refugees came from have not been politically stable, the states in which refugees are have not been stable, and the relationship between the host and origin states and other states that have interest in the peace and stability of region has not been smooth.⁷ Other actors like International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) come in to assist refugees. In contemporary

⁶ OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa Adopted in September 10, 1969 by Heads of States and Governments of the OAU at the Sixth Ordinary Session. The Convention Entered to Force on June 20, 1974.

⁷ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), pp. 39-44.

discourses on state collapse in Africa, it is most patently traceable to armed refugee movements organized outside their homeland with active support of external actors.⁸

While the OAU stressed that, receiving refugees and granting them asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state⁹ and looking at the situation of cross-border political conflicts in Africa especially in the Great Lakes region that relate to refugees, leave the question: What effect the refugees have on the cross-border political conflict in the Great Lakes region? Therefore, what effects refugees have to the cross-border political conflicts and conflict management? It leaves one to wonder why refugee prone areas like the Great Lakes region are prone to cross-border political conflicts. Therefore, this study seeks to investigate the contribution of refugees to conflict generation and escalation. It also investigates the place of refugees in conflict management.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The focus of this study is on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The broad objective of the study is to examine the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region that are as a result of the presence of large numbers of Rwandese refugees. The focus is on the effect of Rwandese refugees on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

The study explores refugees as agents of internationalization of internal political conflicts. It examines the effectiveness of refugee law in addressing and resolving cross-border political conflict resulting from refugees. It also seeks to investigate why refugee prone areas are prone to cross-border political conflicts.

⁸ M. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhood: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flow" in International Security, Vol. 21 No. 1, summer, 1996.

⁹ OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa Art II (2).

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section seeks to review some literature on conflict and conflict management, refugees and cross-border political conflicts, and Rwandese refugees and cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. This section of the study aims at examining issues and debates in conflict, conflict management, refugees and across-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. This review offers the background on which this study stands on.

Literature on conflict and conflict management

According to Mwagiru¹⁰ conflict is a consequence of the incompatibility of goals of different parties about a particular thing. Conflict transcend time and space. Therefore, it is inevitable in all social systems. Conflict have both destructive and constructive consequences.¹¹ Management efforts should be directed towards maximizing its potential benefits and minimizing its distractive consequences.¹²

Conflict is a vehicle via which personal and societal values of security, welfares, justice and development opportunities can be realized.¹³ Burton¹⁴ is against suppression of conflict as such may render society static. He encourages conflicts to be accepted as a reality than be feared or avoided. The acceptance of conflicts as an inevitable reality calls for willingness to manage conflicts. Suppression leads to settlement of conflicts instead of resolution. Settlement is dangerous to the society in that, as long as a conflict is settled

¹⁰M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000), p. 3.

¹¹ J. B. Hill, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem Solving Workshop to Theory" in Journal Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, March 1982 p., 113.

¹² J. Bercovitch and A. Houston "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence" in J. Bercovitch (ed), Resolving International Conflict: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. (London: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1996), pp., 11-35.

¹³ K. Dieke, "Conflicts and Conflict Resolution" in R. Wolfrum and C. Philip (eds) United Nations: Law Policies and Practices. Vol. 1 (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 1995), pp., 189-199.

¹⁴ J. W. Burton, World Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.,137-138.

it continues to exist underneath and once the balance of forces leading to settlement of such a conflict are altered the conflict is likely to erupt. Burton seems to advocate for the resolution of the conflicts than settlement. Mwangiru¹⁵ notes that conflict is about non negotiable needs like recognition participation and dignity.¹⁶ He further notes that conflicts are inherently non negotiable and can only be resolved. This is because conflicts involves values and needs that cannot be traded, compromised or repressed. Here Mwangiru points out that conflicts need resolution more than settlement. Unless resolution is reached, any settled conflict will always erupt whenever a trigger occurs or conditions leading to settlement are altered.

Sidole¹⁷ notes that peace is not only absence of violence but also the correction of structural sources that give rise to conflict. Intended management of conflicts is more complex than just the introduction of external factors into the conflict. This means that while other parties to a conflict should be involved, the management efforts should deeply involve those parties directly involved in the conflict. Unless all the parties get involved any solution reached would remain at the level of settlement and may not carry on for long.

Wallenstein¹⁸ notes that construction of social and political system that gives reasonable social and political space to all groups in a society is crucial in the resolution of internal conflicts. Such construction is essential as internal conflicts concerns power distribution within the state. Here there is recognition on the involvement of diverse

¹⁵ M. Mwangiru, The International Management of Internal Conflicts in Africa: the Uganda Mediation, 1985, (PhD Dissertation. University of Kent, 1994).

¹⁶ M. Mwangiru, Conflicts: Theory: Processes and Institutions of Management op. cit., pp. 38-48.

¹⁷ J. D. Sindole, "Conflict Resolution: A Unique US Role For the 21st Century" in Electronic Journal, US Foreign Policy Agenda, Preventive Diplomacy, Vol. 1 No. 19 Dec. 1996, pp. 12-24.

¹⁸ P. Wallenstein, Understanding Conflict Resolution, (London: Sage Publishers, 2002), p. 133.

actors in a conflict and conflict management. This challenges the realist perception of politics that states are the only dominant actors with all the coercive powers to make other actors within their jurisdiction to comply to its dictates. It is not force that can make peace, but the correction of social and political structures.

The literature reviewed in this section reveals that conflicts are inalienable in human society. Since they are inevitable, they need to be managed effectively to avoid their dysfunctional effects. There is need for the resolution of conflicts more than settlement. Resolution requires that all relevant actors in a conflict be involved in the management of such a conflict. Unless all the actors are involved the conflict will continue to exist underneath and will eventually erupt when the forces holding the balance are altered.

Literature on refugee and cross-border political conflicts

A refugee is a person who is outside his home country for fear of being persecuted and is unable or unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country.¹⁹ The UN Convention further requires a refugee to conform to the laws and requirements of the host country to ensure public order.²⁰ The OAU Convention taking into account UN Convention on Refugees, considers people outside their home country owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination and events seriously disturbing public order as refugees. The two Conventions give the host states an upper hand in controlling and regulating refugees. It assumes that, the states have sufficient machinery to control the activities of refugees. The two Conventions seem to protect refugees and make them not to become a source of interstate conflicts. Based on the realist domination

¹⁹ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, art. 1.

²⁰ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, art. 2.

on international relations, the Conventions assumed that states are the only dominant actors in the international system²¹ and any other actor found within the jurisdiction of a particular state can be controlled by that particular state. Non-state actors such as refugees have no place in the international system apart from being protected and controlled by the host country. The two Conventions assumed that once a person becomes a refugee he or she ceases to be under the Jurisdiction of the origin country and remains under the jurisdiction of the host country.

Nobel²² highlights that refugees flee independent African countries because of political instability, fear for secession, opposition, criticism, political rivalry and frequent violation of human rights. Nobel only considers that refugees are victims who seek protection of another state. He does not consider any possible attempt by refugees to become actors in the international system.

Cuenod²³ notes that rural communities in Africa are usually small, that they cannot absorb large numbers of newcomers. Governments of asylum have been drawn in to make decrees to regulate settlement of refugees. According to Ogata²⁴ the subject of refugees and displaced persons is high in the list of international concerns, not only because of humanitarian significance, but also, because of their impact on peace, security and instability. This challenges the OAU Refugee Convention on receiving refugees and granting them asylum as a peaceful and humanitarian act, which should not be regarded

²¹ O. R. Holsti, "Theories Of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers" in Kegley C. W. J (ed), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. (New York: Palgrave, 1995), pp. 35-65:37.

²² P. Nobel, "Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa" in Transnational Legal Problems Of Refugees. op. cit. pp. 255-272.

²³ J. Cuenod, "The Problem of Rwandese and Sudanese Refugees" in S. Hamrell (ed.), Refugees Problem in Africa. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967), p. 48.

²⁴ S. Ogata, "Forward" in UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: Challenges of Protection. (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. iii.

as an unfriendly act by any member state.²⁵ According to Eriksson et al²⁶ giving refuge to refugees has not always been taken to be a friendly act by states involved. This means that, refugees and their reception has been a source of political conflicts among states. Erikson and his colleagues do not consider refugees to be a source of internal conflict. Perhaps his position was based on the assumption that states are the dominant actors and have coercive power to control refugees.

According to Orwa²⁷ the influx of refugees has become a major feature in Africa and produces political consequences of its own. One such consequence is political tension between the countries concerned, especially when refugees attempt to use the territory of the host country as an operational base against their home government. Orwa does not consider refugees as a source of internal conflicts. He also does not see them as agents of internationalization of internal conflicts. He seems to consider refugees in a realist perspective that they can only influence interstate relationship but not internal conflicts.

As Smyser²⁸ notes, the governments that offer refuge to refugees have to suffer political and possibly military consequence especially if the refugees' country of origin believes that their refugees are engaged in hostile activities. He further notes that, durable solution to refugees problem by repatriation, settlement and resettlement yet to another country have shown tendencies to create conflict within and among nations. This

²⁵ OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa Art II (2).

²⁶ L. G. Eriksson, G. Melander and P. Nobel, An Analyzing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee Problem Arusha, May 1979, (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1981), p. 15.

²⁷ D. K. Orwa, "Causes of Conflicts in the Relation of African States" in O. J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, African International Relations, (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 133-134.

²⁸ W. R. Smyser, Refugees: Extended Exile, (New York: Praeger Publ., 1987), pp. 49 & 32.

observation shows the discrepancy between the Conventions and the practice of international relations.

The literature reviewed in this section present refugees as not being considered as significant actors in the international system. Most literature here are characterized by the realist perception of the international system. They present a situation in which multiple actors are not appreciated in conflict generation and conflict management. Refugees particularly are put under the ambit of the state. Their place in generation, internationalization and escalation of conflicts is not significantly recognized. This exclusion and suppression of other actors like refugees from the international system do not effectively address conflict.

Literature on Rwandese refugees and cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region

Payne²⁹ observes that, the Ugandan government has always had generous policies on the acceptance of refugees. However, at a certain point the government of the time determined how refugees were treated. There were those regimes that favored refugees like Museveni's. This was based on the perceived benefit and support the regime got from refugees. At the same time, the regimes used refugees as scapegoats to achieve an internal cohesion of the state. For example, President Obote attributed the source of bad things that were taking place in Uganda during his reign to refugees especially those from Rwanda. This was a strategy that Obote used to create an internal socio-political cohesion in Uganda. Although Obote seemed to advocate for entry of Rwandese refugees to Uganda during colonial period and subsequently allowed them to enter Uganda when he

²⁹ L. Payne, Rebuilding Communities in Refugee Settlement: A Casebook from Uganda, (London: Oxfam, 1998), p. 1.

became head of state, later he seemed to be uncomfortable with the presence of Rwandese refugees in his country.

Otunnu³⁰ observes that, regimes in Uganda made use of Rwandese refugees for political ends (to come to power or maintain their power). Rwandese refugees were active members of Ugandan army till the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. The Ugandan population developed anti-refugees sentiments against Rwandese refugees. The Ugandan government in a number of occasions accused Rwandan refugees of violating its hospitality by engaging in unacceptable activities³¹ and threatened to expel them from Uganda. There was a problem of repatriation of refugees. For political reasons, most of the refugees who repatriated to Rwanda were rejected by the Hutu dominated government as not being Rwandese. Rwandese refugees being repatriated also claimed to be Ugandans to avoid the repatriation for fear of their security guarantee in Rwanda. The border of Uganda and Rwanda was at a certain time closed. Although there was an attempt by the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to address refugee problem the government of Rwanda seemed not committed. The Rwandese refugees in Uganda seemed not to be willing to repatriate. The government of Uganda also pressurized refugees to repatriate and it also exerted pressure on the government of Rwanda to accept them. The whole exercise of repatriation was not voluntary and done in good faith. The result was the mistreatment of returnees in Rwanda.

President Habyarimana's regime did not see much need to address the plight of Rwandan refugees in Uganda even though the Ugandan government considered it to be to the advantage of the Rwandan government. Attempts by the Ugandan government to

³⁰ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke Eds., The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 3-29

³¹ African Research Bulletin, March 1964: 37A.

persuade Habyarimana's regime to address refugee issue did not yield much. It is during the 1992 Arusha Peace Process that the Rwandan government under international pressure decided to negotiate with refugees who had forced their way back to Rwanda by armed struggle. This acceptance to negotiate gave the RPF formal recognition³² and legitimacy³³. This was not acceptable to the inner core of Habyarimana's regime. Strategically the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda had kept Rwandese citizens out of their country as a means to avoid Tutsi uprising and domination. With the end of Cold War, the forces that ensured that Rwandese refugees be out of the country had weakened. Therefore, the Rwandese refugees got a chance to challenge their home government and demand their return unconditionally. One of the ways the Rwandese refugees used was armed struggle, While conflict generate refugees, it is equally true that refugees generate conflict.³⁴

Otunnu³⁵ further notes that, in 1989 a group of RPA refugees carried out an abortive armed invasion of Rwanda. After being defeated by the Rwandan Army, this group of RPA hastily returned to its military base in Uganda. In October 1990 an estimated 10,000 well armed refugees of the RPA carried out another invasion of Rwanda. Most of these invaders were at least until the invasion active members of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda. This indicates Uganda's involvement in the invasion of Rwanda by RPF.

³² IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op cit. pp. 55-60.

³³ F. Deng and I. W. Zartman "Introduction" in F. Deng and I. W. Zartman (Eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 1-15.

³⁴ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op. cit., p.39.

³⁵ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)" in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke Eds., The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire. op. cit., pp. 31-49.

Newbury³⁶ notes that, the October 1990 invasion of Rwanda by some elements of armed Rwandan exiles made Habyarimana's regime to accelerate the process of internal political reforms. To respond to criticism from RPF and other exile groups, Habyarimana announced that ethnic rebels would no longer be recorded on identity cards. This was a threat aiming at scaring RPF from challenging his regime. On the other hand, Habyarimana perceived the uprising of RPF as the uprising of Tutsis who may ultimately takeover power in Rwanda.

Halvorsen³⁷ on the Rwandese refugees in Zaire notes that, within four days from 14th July 1994, 1.2 million Rwandans crossed the border to Zaire to become refugees. He highlights that, the OAU Convention on Refugees considers all people in mass influxes resulting from war or natural catastrophe as prima facie refugees. Only then can exclusion clause³⁸ be applied if there is a reason to believe that someone was responsible for war crime or crime against humanity to separate such people from refugees. Although it was known that large numbers of people should be excluded from Rwandese refugee population in Zaire, the problem was how to identify them, collect evidence against them and separate them from bona fide refugees. He further notes that, the refugee included civilians, former government civil administration, militias and defeated government forces (ex-FAR). Some refugees prevented other refugees from voluntary repatriation either by propaganda or intimidation.

³⁶ C. Newbury "Rwanda: Recent Debate over Governance and Rural Development" in G. Hyden and M. Barraton (Eds.), Governance and politics, (London: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1992), p. 215.

³⁷ K. Halvorsen, "Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in Refugee Camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security" in Adelman & A Suhrke (eds), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., pp. 307-320.

³⁸ UN Convention on Refugees, 1951 art. I (c) and OAU Convention on Refugees, 1969 art. I (4 and 5)

Gnamo³⁹ highlights, the Mobutu's regime in Zaire was hostile to the new government in Kigali after the 1994 genocide. Mobutu's regime had been friendly with Habyarimana's regime before its collapse. This explains why many former Rwandan officials got refuge and protection in Zaire. The new Rwandan government was irritated by the presence of massive Hutu refugees among them *Interahamwe* and ex-FAR, in the refugee camps near its border with Zaire, who continued to destabilize Rwanda through repeated incursions. He further notes that, the former Rwandan soldiers (ex-FAR and militia) in Zaire had made no secret about their intention to invade Rwanda. Rwandan government thought that the only solution was to flash the Hutu refugees back from Zaire. Rwanda together with Uganda trained the *Banyamulenge* (Zairian Tutsi) and used them to flash Hutu refugees from Zaire, destroy refugee camps and later to remove Mobutu's regime from power and this led to the emergence of Kabila's regime.

Salim Ahmed Salim⁴⁰ made a proposal that, preemptive intervention be made when a conflict occurs or it is likely to occur. This proposal of Salim does not take into account the effect of such an initiative especially when refugee camps are invaded in the name of preemptive intervention. Such preemptive intervention can lead to an escalation of a conflict, an outbreak of another conflict and violation of human rights.

Mwagiru⁴¹ highlights the importance of knowing the causes, actors and their stake in the conflict. It is after a clear understanding of the conflict situation that an appropriate management initiative can be implemented. When conflicts occur they tend to generate refugees, who run away from their homeland in search of safety. Refugees cross borders

³⁹ A. H. Gnamo, "The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kelptocracy" in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke (eds.), *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire*, op. cit., pp. 321-349.

⁴⁰ CM/1710(LVI) Rev 1, Report of the Secretary General on Conflicts in Africa: Prospects for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and resolution (Addis Ababa, June, 1992).

⁴¹ M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management* (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000).

and this internationalizes internal conflict. Other actors come into a conflict that was earlier internal. The Great Lakes conflict system is based on a pattern of interconnecting relationship and concerns in the region. These include historical linkage of migration of the people of the region from one country to another. These for example led to the *Banyamulenge* uprising that triggered off the original conflict in Zaire. He further notes that, introduction of external actors to a conflict further internationalizes an internal conflict and introduces new complexities to the challenges of conflict management. He further notes that, memory of a conflict by those who participated or experienced it is not far from the surface. It only needs very little trigger to create a new conflict. Memory of conflict makes conflicts to be protracted and any effort on conflict management should take into account memory and its role in conflict.

Burton⁴² links frustration and basic needs for identity, security, recognition, autonomy, dignity and bonding. If such basic needs are not compatible with the socialization processes, it will lead to frustrations, disturbed and anti-social personal and group behavior. Individuals and groups cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other needs and goals. Therefore, actors will react against such a socialization process. Behaviors that are as a result of responding to frustration of such human needs will often seem aggressive and counterproductive.

The literature in this section reveals that refugees are significant actors in the international system. Although the realist perception does not recognize refugees as a significant actor, it is noticeable that they have made a significant effect on cross-border political conflict in the Great Lakes region. One could wonder why realism does not

⁴² J. W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 33-34.

recognize refugees as significant actors in the international system owing to their cross-border effect.

Although there is a sizeable literature on refugees and conflict, there has not been an in-depth and comprehensive link between refugees and their real effect on the Cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A theory is a body of internally consistent empirical generalization of descriptive, predictive and explanatory power.⁴³ A theory explains, describes and predicts phenomena. Since a theory provides a framework within which to operate, it is hard to think without a theory.⁴⁴ This study utilizes the Conflict Research paradigm to conflict and conflict management.

The Conflict Research paradigm is rooted on the world society paradigm of international relations. World society paradigm is championed by scholars like John Burton. According to the world society paradigm, states are not the only sole actor in the international system.⁴⁵ There are many actors in the international system where the state is one of the many actors. These actors include the state, international organizations and non governmental organizations and individuals. Therefore, the state is a penetrated society.⁴⁶ The emphasis of this paradigm is on the transactions of actors that make patterned interactions (system). Interactions in the international system are not state-

⁴³ T. Columbis and J. Holfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, (New Delhi: Practice Hall of India, 1986), p. 29.

⁴⁴ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradgms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 74-79: 71.

⁴⁵ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradgms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

centric only, but also include other actors as well. The state in a Westphalian sense once considered impermeable can now be accessed through multiple channels.⁴⁷ The relationship among the diverse actors in the international system form a 'cobweb' of interactions across boundaries. Non-state actors are recognized as important actors in the international system although they do not supersede state sovereignty.⁴⁸ The multiplicity of actors in the international system presupposes tolerance among diverse actors. The resting point of the world society paradigm is on the individuals hence giving primacy to individuals in the transactions.⁴⁹

Based on world society paradigm of International relations, the conflict research paradigm recognizes the role of diverse actors in conflict management. Conflict is subjective, meaning that conflict occur because of parties perception on each other. Conflict is not inherent in human nature, but results from the environment in which the actors interact. Conflict research is non-partisan and aims at engaging interested parties to manage a conflict by constructing legitimized relationship which is self-sustaining. Unlike the strategic paradigm, conflict is not out of instinct in man but conflictual behavior is a response to an actor's perception of on each other and the environment. Conflictual behavior is subjective, learned behavior and triggered by circumstances and to the extent that environment can be manipulated.

Conflict research paradigm tends to resolve conflict and not settle as the strategic and peace research paradigms do. The researcher is non partisan and tends to involve all

⁴⁷ G. Stern, The Structure of International Society. (London: Pinter Publishers, 2000), p. 25.

⁴⁸ B. Michael, "The Inter Paradigm Debate" in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom, International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1985), pp. 7-26.

⁴⁹ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradgms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution, op cit. p. 76.

interested parties. This paradigm seeks to create relationships that are legitimized and self-sustaining, hence acceptable by all parties involved as beneficial and rightly fulfilling well profound needs.⁵⁰ Here goals and interests can always be re-assessed and perceptions can change through analysis and negotiations. Therefore, the actors' needs and interests, can be satisfied within the same society and no actor benefits at the expense of the other(s).⁵¹ Conflict research tries to create a situation of conflict management of win-win to all parties since it believes that proper manipulation of the environment can satisfy the needs of each party. The researcher tends to create a problem solving workshop as the mechanism under which all parties can achieve satisfaction. This paradigm does not appeal to the use of force in the process of conflict management. Conflict can be managed without the use of force.

Therefore, Conflict Research paradigm stands a better chance or is relevant in this study in that, it seeks to build post conflict relationship. Conflict Research paradigm also seeks to resolve conflicts than settlement. Since the refugee problem has been associated with the cross-border political conflicts, the conflict research paradigm stands a better chance as a lens of analysis and management of cross-border political conflicts as it recognizes refugees as actors in the international system and requires tolerance among diverse actors⁵².

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

There have been a number of assessments on the conflict situation in the Great Lakes region. Most of the literature that relates refugees to conflict concentrates on

⁵⁰ M. Light, "Problem Solving Workshop: The Role Of Scholarship In conflict Resolution" in Conflict in World Society: A Perspective of on International Relations, M. Banks (Ed.) (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books 1984), 146-160.

⁵¹ D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 31.

⁵² S. D. Tansey, Politics: The Basics, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 129.

conflicts as generators of refugees, refugees as victims of conflicts and refugees assistance. The refugees effect on cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region has only been looked at in passing. To be more specific, the issue of refugees and their effect on the cross-border political conflicts has been looked at in shallowly to show its real magnitude. This study is a contribution to fill the gap left by a number of authors, conflict managers and government policy makers in the assessment of the effect of refugees on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Most studies are on conflict as a generator of refugees and refugee assistance, but this study examines a situation where refugees generate or escalate conflicts. It seeks to explain why and how refugees are prone to conflict generation and escalation.

The study seeks to explore the effect of refugees on the cross-border political conflicts and eventually peace. It is hoped that the study will provide policy makers, conflict managers and by extension African governments especially those of the Great Lakes region with vital information on cross-border political effect of refugees.

The study is expected to contribute to the study and understanding of cross-border political conflicts as they relate to refugees in Africa. In other words, it should be able to offer factual and critical analysis of cross-border political conflicts that are associated with refugees in Africa and to be more specific the Great Lakes region.

The study through its multi-disciplinary approach seeks to make comprehensive study on the relationship of refugees to cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The study is expected to open up new areas of study in order to develop a comprehensive programme that can lead to the understanding and subsequently the management of cross-border political conflicts that are associated with refugees.

HYPOTHESES

The whole study investigates the following hypotheses:

1. Massive presence of refugees contributes to generation and escalation of cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.
2. Refugees are major agents of internationalizing internal conflict in the Great Lakes region.
3. Refugees have not been effectively incorporated in conflict management in the Great Lakes region.

METHODOLOGY

The study will make use of both primary and secondary data. The primary data will be collected from the field by interviews. The questions will be open ended. The study sample shall be drawn from personnel from relevant ministries like Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, Diplomatic missions of countries from the Great Lakes region; personnel from UNHCR; NGOs working with refugees and conflict management in Rwanda, Uganda and Congo DRC and Burundi; African Rights; ICRC; scholars and researchers in relevant fields of study like refugees, population study, politics and conflict and peace studies; and where possible Rwandan Refugees and returnees will also offer information.

Primary data collection will be important as the researcher goes out to the field to test hypothesis for himself. It also puts the researcher in touch with the reality under study. This method of study as a source of data will complement the limited literature that exist on the subject matter in the period under study.

This study will make use of secondary data. It will explore and critically analyze works that have been published in books, journals, articles, newspapers, relevant papers presented at different fora, print and electronic media that have a relation to this area of study. International instruments such as Conventions and Charters on refugees, conflicts, war and human rights will offer information.

The study will also employ critical reflection on the data collected from the field. This is important as it incorporates the researcher's critical contribution to the study. This will allow critical appreciation of prior studies that have been done on the areas related to the subject under study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

CHAPTER ONE: THE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This section deals with what the study endeavors to achieve and how to go about to achieve it.

CHAPTER TWO: AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RWANDESE REFUGEE PROBLEM

This section will present the Rwandese refugee problem from an historical perspective.

CHAPTER THREE: EFFECT OF RWANDESE REFUGEES ON CROSS-BORDER POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

This section of the study presents the cross-border effects of Rwandese refugees on political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF RWANDESE REFUGEES ON POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

This section presents critical issues in the study and critically analyses them.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study a conclusion will be made.

CHAPTER TWO

AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RWANDESE REFUGEE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The Rwandan conflicts goes back to time immemorial. During the pre-colonial Rwanda, the conflict was not overt. Although the conflict was not overt in the pre-colonial Rwanda, it gradually got polarized with the colonial rule. The colonial regime together with missionaries in Rwanda made ethnic differentiation manifest and used Tutsis for their advantage to administer Rwanda. In turn, the Tutsis used this chance to exploit the Hutus. This generated overt antagonism between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The abrupt withdrawal of support on Tutsis by the Belgians as independence dawned ignited the already polarized conflict in Rwanda. The Hutus took that chance to revenge on the perceived injustices that the Tutsis had done to them during pre-colonial and colonial period.

Although there was a weakening of Tutsi power against that of Hutus who were politically uprising, the Tutsis did not want to distribute the power. The Hutus on the other hand wanted to revenge on the Tutsis. This caused the Hutu revolution of 1959. The revolution was characterized with fierce conflicts that followed to independent Rwanda setting many Rwandese mostly Tutsis to become refugees. The Tutsi refugees went to the neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region.

The Rwandese refugees especially those in Uganda organized themselves to a political movement (RPF/RPA) and invaded Rwanda. This protracted the Rwandan conflict which culminated to the 1994 genocide. The end of the genocide also resulted to

massive flow of refugees to the countries in the Great Lakes region. These refugees have in turn set the Great Lakes region politically volatile.

This section briefly explores the Rwandan conflict. It moves further to examine historically the Rwandese refugees problem.

THE RWANDAN CONFLICT

Rwanda occupies a position in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Generally, Rwanda is composed of three ethnic groups (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa). The Tutsi and Hutu form averagely 15 and 84 percent population of the country respectively while Twa form 1 percent. Tutsis and Hutus are the most significant ethnic groups in the politics of Rwanda.

Although the three ethnic groups in Rwanda use the same language,¹ there emerged clear distinction during pre-colonial era based on the occupation and wealth. Tutsis kept animals and occupied senior positions in the community. Hutus on their side did farming and held lower position to that of Tutsis in the community. The Twa were involved in hunting and pottery. In terms of wealth and occupation, the three ethnic communities in Rwanda considered themselves in that descending order (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa respectively). Although there was such differentiations, there was peaceful coexistence among the three ethnic groups in Rwanda. Such coexistence was made possible by the acceptance of each group's role and position in the society. Such ethnic differentiation were not evidently exposed to people of Rwanda based on flexibility and social mobility among the groups. The groups intermarried, had same religious beliefs and lived side by side.

¹ L. Mbanda, 'Committed to Conflict' – The Destruction of the Church in Rwanda. (Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), p. 3.

Although there was no violence between the Tutsis and Hutus during pre-colonial era, the explicit domination of Tutsis and subordination of the Hutus could hardly have failed to create antagonism between the two.² The people of Rwanda during pre-colonial era considered themselves to belong to one of the ethnic groups. Therefore, during pre-colonial era the Rwanda conflict was structurally present but not overtly expressed.

Rwanda was colonized by Germans until 1916 and the Belgians until 1962, when Rwanda attained its independence. Both colonialists used ethnic fractures that were already in Rwanda to solidify their rule in the country. Therefore, they cemented ethnic identities and distinction. The colonialists together with missionaries solidified ethnic distinction and introduced physical feature as a distinguishing quality between the Tutsis and Hutus. The Tutsis were described as Taller and thinner a quality they presented as superior to that of most Hutus (shorter and fatter).³ The Tutsis were used by colonialists as the local elite, holding power and favors over the Hutus who were many.⁴ It is during this time that the identity differentiation solidified. The Tutsis serving the interest of colonial masters mistreated the Hutus. In turn the Hutus considered the Tutsis as an enemy group. Although Tutsis served the interest of the Belgians, it gradually seemed that continued support of the Tutsi minority could not continue serving the interest of the Belgians. Therefore, there was need to shift their support from Tutsi minority to Hutu majority.

As independence dawned, the Belgians shifted their support from Tutsi minority to Hutu majority. This shift of support of colonialists from Tutsis to Hutus left the Tutsis on their own against the Hutus who were uprising politically. On the other hand, the

² IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ F. Keane, Seasons of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. (New York: Viking, 1995), p. 16.

colonialists empowered Hutus to take political power in Rwanda. This resulted to the Hutu revolution of 1959 which eventually saw fierce conflict resulting to mass flow of Rwandese refugees mostly Tutsis to other countries in the Great Lakes as refugees. Subsequent years after independence there were conflicts in Rwanda between Tutsis and Hutus which were also characterized with the flow of Tutsi refugees.

While Tutsi refugees went to different countries, it is notable that those that went to Uganda were instruments in the armed struggle of Rwandese refugees to Rwanda in the 1989 onwards. These refugees were actively involved in the politics of Uganda.⁵ Under the unfolding political situation in Uganda during Museveni's reign refugees became more determined to return to Rwanda. The Museveni's regime too had to ensure that Rwandese refugees returned to Rwanda. Therefore, the Tutsi refugees drew a lot of support from the Ugandan government to invade Rwanda.⁶

The Invasion of RPF/RPA in Rwanda protracted and escalated the already existing conflict. The attempts to manage the conflict by the Arusha Peace Process in 1992 did not yield much to resolve the conflict. Instead it acted as a catalyst to the genocide.

Generally, it can be commented that during pre-colonial Rwanda there existed a structural conflict among the ethnic groups. During the colonial Rwanda, the structural conflict got polarized by the solidification of ethnic identities. This was made possible by the colonialists perception of the ethnic groups as distinct.⁷ The shift of colonialists support for Tutsis in Rwanda reflects this distinct perception on the part of the indigenous

⁵ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁶ J. F Miskel and R. J. Norton, "Going to Goma: The Rwanda Deployment" in National Security Studies Volume II: Case Studies in US Contingency Operations. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1996), 222-223.

⁷ M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), p. 99.

people of Rwanda. The shift of support on Tutsi ignited the conflict in Rwanda. This conflict and subsequent conflicts during the independent Rwanda generated a vast number of refugees to neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region. The invasion of RPF and subsequently taking of power in 1994 marked another movement of mass refugees to countries in the Great Lakes region.

PRE INDEPENDENCE RWANDESE REFUGEES

As the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsi to Hutus, the Tutsi were left without support, favors and protection of the Belgians. This weakened the power of Tutsis against the Hutus who were uprising. This set a stage for Hutu revolt against the Tutsi whom Hutus considered oppressors. Political tension between Hutus and Tutsi increased which led to 1959 Hutu revolution. This revolution was supported by the Belgian administration.⁸ Because Tutsi traditional chiefs refused to share power and their persistent use of authoritarian rule, there were Hutu and Tutsi clashes and most Tutsi fled to the neighboring countries as refugees especially Uganda.

With the elections of 1961, in which Hutus won, shows a period of the rise of Hutu to power and decline of Tutsi power. 1959-1961 also marked the beginning of violent ethnic clashes directed towards Tutsi minority. With the granting of independence by Belgians to Hutu majority, the Hutus got an opportunity to redress injustice done to them in the past by Tutsi leadership in colonial and pre-colonial era.

The violent political changes of 1959 to 1961 had significant effects on refugee flow. Many people, most of them Tutsi fled violent encounters in Rwanda and went to Uganda and other countries in the Great Lakes region and even beyond. This period marked the origin of major refugee flow from Rwanda.

⁸ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide. (Kampala: Fountain, 1995), pp. 1-10.

POST INDEPENDENCE TO 1989 RWANDESE REFUGEES

During this period, the Tutsi refugees in Zaire (now Congo DRC) and Uganda organized themselves into armed groups and externally opposed the Hutu government between 1962 and 1973.⁹ However, any attack from refugees to the Rwandan Hutu dominated government was met with an elimination of Tutsis who had remained in Rwanda. For example, the Hutu government killed 5000 Tutsis to revenge 1963 Tutsi refugees' attack in Bugesera area. Most of those Tutsi leaders who remained in Rwanda after independence were eliminated between 1962-1963.¹⁰ In post independent Rwanda, most of the Tutsi who remained in Rwanda after the 1959 Hutu revolt were either forced out of Rwanda or killed.¹¹

During President Habyarimana's regime from 1973-1993, refugee problem became complex. The regime tried to totally block peaceful return of Tutsi refugees. Rwandan government claimed that Rwanda was overpopulated to accommodate Tutsi refugees. This blockade led to Tutsi refugees to organize themselves across the world. One of the organizations was the Tutsi refugee conference at Washington in 1988 to discuss their plight. In this conference, Tutsi refugees reaffirmed the right to return to Rwanda and rejected Habyarimana regime's blockade and claims of over population.

The period of post independence Rwanda to 1989 was marked by a significant refugee movement. Although there was refugee flow during this time, what caught the attention of Rwandan refugees was the treatment by their home government on their desire to repatriate.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 50-53.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 1-10.

¹¹ D. Kamukama, Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implication (Kampala, Fountain Publishers Ltd 1997), pp. 20-25.

POST COLD WAR TO 1994 RWANDESE REFUGEES

With the collapse of Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War, Rwanda like any other African state, was affected with the abrupt withdrawals of the superpowers. This withdrawal of superpowers from African politics weakened the governments in Africa. The support governments used to get from the superpowers on the basis of ideological affiliation vanished. The withdrawal of superpowers led to the challenges to the government especially from opposing actors such as movements formed by refugees.

With the rise of anti Rwandese refugee sentiments in Uganda, the Rwandan refugees saw it better to invade Rwanda while they accessed the Uganda resources.¹² Aliens including Rwandese refugees were denied a chance to own properties in Uganda. This aggravated their plight and so acted as a catalyst to return home.

RPA was splitting apart with disagreements on military strategy and so in 1989 one of group of RPA invaded Rwanda.¹³ As the rivalry within RPA/RPF increased, each faction contemplated invasion into Rwanda before the RPA strength weakened or its strategy realized by the Rwandan Hutu dominated government. The Rwanda refugees organized a number of conferences to raise funds for the foreseen armed struggle

Attempts of Museveni to demobilize some of his soldiers who at the sometimes were members of RPA set signals that the RPA would be demobilized before it invaded Rwanda. There was pressure to invade before the soldiers lost their unlimited access to NRA military hardware.¹⁴

¹² C. Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion. (Washington: US Committee for Refugee, 1991), p. 3.

¹³ K. Essack, Civil War in Rwanda. (Dar es Salaam: Forem Litho Printer, 1993), pp. 34-35.

¹⁴ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., p. 37.

After 1989, life had increasingly become difficult for Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Promises of naturalization were not honored, army promotions were blocked and Rwandese under new code were denied a chance to own land and property. With deteriorating life situation, returning 'home' seemed the most desirable choice for the refugees and their leadership.¹⁵

Refugees have been at the centre of the crisis in the Great Lakes region since 1990s. The Rwanda refugees in Uganda during this period included children of refugees. These children had not stepped foot in Rwanda. However, the rising of anti-Rwandese sentiments led to these refugees thinking of going to Rwanda at whatever cost. Although large number of Tutsi were born in Uganda and had not set a foot in Rwanda, they were still seen or considered as foreigners in Uganda. While there has been sympathy of refugees' cause in Rwanda, it is acknowledged that the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF triggered a series of pivotal consequences that ultimately led step by step to the 1994 Rwanda genocide¹⁶

Continuing to stay in Uganda offered little hope, if any, to the Rwandan refugees. There was an increasing perception based on past experiences and future prediction that going east or west 'home' is the best. This increasing perception was triggered more by the Ugandan government's decisions to control activities of refugees like rank-rising in military and ownership of property. Urgent invasion was significant to Rwandese in Uganda while they accessed and utilized Uganda military equipments and bases.

The invasion was also rooted, among many other reasons the perception RPF had about Hutu regime in Rwanda. The regime suffered internal conflicts among its top

¹⁵ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), p. 40.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

members. Together with the catastrophes that in the near recent past had hit Rwanda like famine, this sent a signal that the regime was resting on a troubled sea and any attempt of military invasion is likely to yield better fruits. On 1st October 1990, RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda most of the invaders were well trained and armed by the Museveni regime since its struggle to power in Uganda.¹⁷

Due to reluctance of Habyarimana to address refugees problem, Rwandan refugees especially those in Uganda and together with the pressures from Uganda led Rwandan refugees to contemplate their return to Rwanda. Due to the reluctance of Habyarimana's regime, the refugees had no choice but to use force to return. Refugees had to become refugee warriors to make their cause in Rwanda. This use of force was the only option even though it was inevitably to escalate old conflicts or cause new conflicts and perhaps new refugees.¹⁸ Therefore, on 1st October 1990 RPF through its armed wing RPA invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Most of RPA members had received training and weapons since Museveni's days of struggle for power in Uganda.¹⁹

The invasion was done when Presidents Habyarimana and Museveni were in New York for UN summit on children. This attack led to a protracted civil war in Rwanda. This invasion of 1990 was preceded by three and half years of anti-Tutsi incidents which step by step grew culminating to the shooting of the plane carrying president Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart on April 6th 1994 and subsequently the unleashing of the genocide.

Shortly before the 1990 Rwanda invasion some refugees had disappeared from refugee settlement and by August it was reported that RPA /NRA had confiscated a

¹⁷ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁸ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁹ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, op. cit., p. 43.

number of cattle, which were reported to have been slaughtered, smoked and preserved to feed refugee warriors during the invasion.

With the 1990 invasion of Rwanda, several efforts to resolve the conflict were undertaken. Habyarimana's regime under pressure agreed formally to negotiate with RPF. This negotiation was to be done in Arusha, Tanzania.²⁰ The RPF was headed by its head while the government's side was seen to be leaderless.²¹

The post Cold War era is marked by many actors in national and international political systems. The weakening of the state and rising of the other actors especially individuals led to the successful attempt by Rwandan refugees to get the attention of Hutu dominated government in Rwanda by officially accepting to negotiation in the Arusha Peace Process. This step taken by the Hutu dominated government gave RPF an international standing as the power contender in Rwandan politics.

RWANDESE REFUGEES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

The post genocide period in Rwanda is marked by among other effects massive refugee displacement and psychological scars that are likely to last for a longer period. The report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities²² noted that "an entire nation was both brutalized and traumatized. They were, in their own phrase 'the walking dead'". The genocide wrecked Rwanda leaving it as a waste land. Out of 7 million people before the genocide, two millions became refugees.²³ The former Rwanda political leaders fled with the money. The *genocidaires* ran off with whatever cash reserves that

²⁰ F. Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands lacs Crise Paris*, (Paris: Karthala, 1994), pp. 248-256.

²¹ IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

²² Ibid., p. xvi.

²³ F. Reyntjens, "Estimation Dumombre de Personnes Tuees au Rwanda en 1994" in S. Marysse and F. Reyntjens (eds) *L'Afrique des Grand lacs Annuaire 1996-1997*, (Paris: Harmattan, 1997), pp. 179-186.

existed.²⁴ Most of the educated, skilled and the professional were dead or in exile and most of those in exile had supported the genocide.²⁵

With RPF's victory, exiles began returning in massive numbers. These exiles returning were mostly Tutsi who were English-speaking. The returning population was made up of survivors who were depressed and bitter. They were soon demanding justice and compensation.²⁶ The Tutsi in the diaspora streamed into Rwanda, mostly from neighboring Uganda, Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. The returning population included those who had left Rwanda 35 years earlier and those born in exile who were setting their foot in the Rwandan soil for the first time. In short, it was almost an entire new Tutsi people that emerged after the genocide.²⁷ The returnees brought with them much-needed capacity like skills, talents and leadership needed for construction.

As Tutsi returned to Rwanda, the remaining Hutus regarded them as outsiders and could not accept that they, the majority and "natural" inhabitants of Rwanda were again to be ruled by "foreign" people. This perception of Hutus stems from the BAHUTU Manifesto and PARMEHUTU propaganda that Tutsi were not the original inhabitants of Rwanda but outsiders. The second perspective was based on the fact that, most of the Tutsi were returnees from Uganda and other countries. A good percentage of the population in Rwanda had grown to know the Hutu regime. Some of the refugee returnees had set their foot in Rwanda for the first time, others had like president Kagame left Rwanda at the age of three years. These two aspects contributed to the belief that the

²⁴ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op .cit., p. 180.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 180.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 180.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

new regime in Rwanda was of foreigners and outsiders and to some Hutus, those returnees were intruders and not real Rwandese.

As the Hutu dominated government lost ground in Rwanda during the genocide, they set out of Rwanda. Most of them (1.2 million) went to Congo DRC (by then Zaire) and stayed there in refugees camps and others outside refugee camps along Eastern Zaire. The other half a million went to Tanzania, and a quarter million to Burundi.²⁸ Although there may be controversies over the real figure and distribution of Rwandan refugees after the genocide, the figure and distribution above gives a good idea of the general order of magnitude in each location.²⁹

The former Rwandan government was in good terms with Mobutu's regime in Zaire and this explains among other reasons why most of the refugees went to Zaire. Most of the leaders, many of the troops and militia of the genocide had escaped from Rwanda to Eastern Zairian refugee camp, where they had unlimited access to weapons,³⁰ which was a sure formula for more conflict across border. Immediately the Hutu leadership settled in Eastern Zaire, it started launching attacks on the new Kigali government. These attacks called for urgency of address by the Kigali government. In response the Kigali government secretly trained former local Tutsi of Rwandan origin (*Banyamulenge*) in the Eastern Zaire in the name of alliance of anti-Mobutu Zairians, whom they used to flash Hutu refugees from refugee camps. Many of the refugees returned to Rwanda while others went deeper into Zaire. This alliance of anti Mobutu

²⁸ G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, op. cit., p. 312.

²⁹ UNHCR Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, *Rwanda and Burundi Information Meeting*. Geneva (16 November 1994).

³⁰ IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, op .cit., p. XVII.

Zairians proceeded to contend power from Mobutu by force which set Mobutu to flee Zaire and subsequently his government fell.³¹

RWANDESE REFUGEES IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE

Not all refugees live in refugee camps. The fact that African governments were advocating for refugee acceptance, they assumed that refugees would be integrated in the societies where they entered. Such attempts were made in Uganda. Most of the refugees, since either they were from rural setting or opted to live in rural setting, they were settled in different settlement schemes. Therefore, refugees lived “freely” among the other ethnic communities in Uganda.

Contrary to the Ugandan case, refugees in eastern Zaire were settled in refugee camps and their movement was regulated. Very few of the refugees especially Rwandese former political leaders lived outside refugee camps with links to the camps.³² Humanitarian organization streamed in for assistance with the publicization by the media.³³ The former Rwandan government leaders took control of the refugee camps. The refugee camps became recruiting centers for people to attack the new Rwandan government.³⁴ The camps also were used as hiding places for those people who committed crimes against humanity from facing justice. The camp leaders prevented Rwandese who wanted to repatriate freely not to do so through physical intimidation, violence or propaganda on the political situation in Rwanda.

³¹ A. H. Gnamo, “Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu’s Kleptocracy” in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Op. cit., pp. 330–349.

³² K. Halvorsen, “Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security” in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire op cit., p. 312.

³³ ³³ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide op .cit., p. XVIII.

³⁴ K. Halvorsen, “Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security” in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire op cit., p. 312.

The life of the refugees in the camp created an opportunity for cohesion among the Hutus to address their plight by making attacks on the new Kigali government.³⁵ Refugee camps were situated close to the border of Zaire and Rwanda. This made it possible to launch attacks across the border. At one time in November 1994, the UN Secretary General warned that there were indications of preparations for an armed invasion of Rwanda.³⁶

There was an international concern that disarmament of refugee camps seemed a better solution to conflict in the camps, outside the camps and across the border, but little if any was done. The attempt to separate and resettle Rwandan ex-forces from the camps was not undertaken due to lack of resources among many reasons.³⁷ Ordinary refugees suffered in the hands of their leaders. The aid workers had to serve camp leaders first before serving the other refugees.

In general the presence of refugee camps right from their creation in the Eastern Zaire was a sure fire formula for disaster. Unlike Rwandese settlement in Uganda, which only showed gradual development of anti-Rwandese sentiments, in Zairian refugee camps, ex-FAR and ex-Rwandan government leaders were immediately committed to return to Rwanda militarily. In Uganda the return 'home' was gradually growing with the unfolding events while in Eastern Zaire refugee camps, the leaders were determined to launch attacks once their force was strong. The camps became havens of manipulation, terrorism and death.³⁸

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

³⁶ UN Secretary General, "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for Rwanda" 1994.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 314 – 315.

³⁸ UN, United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, (New York: United Nations, 1996), p.14.

CHAPTER THREE

EFFECT OF RWANDESE REFUGEES ON CROSS-BORDER POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

INTRODUCTION

It is clear that the refugee problem is trans-boundary and so the refugees political conflicts will be trans-border. This is deeply rooted in the definition of a refugee under international law.¹ This section is on the political effects of refugees in Great Lakes region. The term cross-border is preferable to interstate in this study. This is because refugees may engage in activities that may not directly involve official interstate relations or direct involvement of governments. Since refugees cross the border, their activities and effects are cross-border.

The conflict in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region in general, which reached its peak in the genocide of 1994 has its roots, at least partly, in the displacement of many Rwandan refugees. A similar displacement of refugees is also a critical component in understanding the repercussion of the genocide. The consequences, among others created the conditions for the eventual overthrow of the Zairian president Mobutu and the protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes region and even beyond.

Since the 1950s, Rwandan Tutsi refugees displaced and living in exile in Uganda contributed to an increasingly unstable situation in Rwanda. Some took up arms and invaded Rwanda. These armed refugees made up the bulk of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which initiated military actions against the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda. The Tutsi refugees remaining in Uganda streamed back into Rwanda once the

¹ UN Convention Governing the Status of Refugees (1959), Article 1.

civil war was renewed and the genocide started, and the RPF began achieving battlefield victories. These factors led, in turn, to a massive outflow of Hutu refugees to all the countries of the Great Lakes region. Some of these new refugees in their turn took up arms and returned to Rwanda to carry out attacks. This further destabilized the region and led to counterattacks by the new Tutsi-dominated government. The result has been protracted conflict that today spans the whole of the Great Lakes region and beyond. It has contributed to the conditions which resulted in the overthrow of Mobutu, the assassination of Laurent Kabila, of the Democratic Republic of Congo, thousands of deaths, and the scramble for resources as neighboring countries drawn into the conflict.

This chapter evaluates the various effects that the large refugee flows have had on cross border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. In particular, it will detail how extremely large refugee flows can sometimes lead to, or at least help to create conditions for protracted cross-border political conflicts. It looks at the effects of refugees on cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

THE GREAT LAKES CONFLICT SYSTEM

The conflict system perspective of conflict analysis and conflict management acknowledges that every conflict is interconnected with other conflicts in the region.² Any conflict management efforts should take into account the other conflicts in the region, which are all interconnected. Therefore, it must trace the larger regional pattern of a conflict.

The conflict system perspective of conflict analysis and management recognizes the relationship of a conflict within a state with other conflicts in a geographical region.

² M. Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000), pp. 73-74.

This approach to conflict analysis and management poses challenge to *ideographism*.³ *Ideographism* is a belief that a particular conflict is peculiar having nothing to share with other conflicts.⁴ The conflict system approach into conflict analysis and management takes into account migratory patterns, historical and ethnic distribution of the regional, political and interdependent relationships, which enable an analysis of a conflict to extend beyond internal causes. This approach broadens the possible causes and relationship of internal and external conflicts. There is no clear cut distinction between internal and international conflicts.⁵

The Great Lakes region is one of the conflict systems in Africa. The Great Lakes conflict system comprises of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and DRC (formally Zaire). These countries share one geographical region. Events in one state have a significant effect on the other states. Rwanda and Burundi mirror each other in terms of ethnic composition and colonial history. The countries in the region of the Great Lakes also are related by their history of migration. The aspect of refugees in the region of the Great Lakes gives room for one to discern the linkages among the countries

The Great Lakes conflict system also interacts with other conflict systems. The Great Lakes conflict system interact with South Africa conflict system in that countries like Angola and Namibia in one way or other are involved in the Congo DRC conflict. The Great Lakes conflict system also interacts with the horn of Africa conflict system in that Uganda is involved deeply in the Great Lakes conflict system and the Horn of Africa

³ Ibid., p. 72.

⁴ Ibid., p. 72

⁵ F. Deng and I. W. Zartman, "Introduction" in F. Deng and I. W. Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa, (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1991), pp. 4-5. see also H. Solomon, "Analyzing Conflicts" in M. Mekenkamp et al (eds), Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, (Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999), pp. 34-35.

conflict system. The Great Lakes conflict system interacts with the East African conflict system in that Uganda links the two. Uganda is deeply involved in both the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Therefore, the conflict systems in Africa interact by the fact that there is involvement of common actors in the systems.⁶

The Great Lakes conflict system has over the years had Rwanda as its epicentre. The epicentre of the conflict system is the area around which the conflict revolves. This suggests that systemic conflict management efforts should concentrate on the epicentre as it influences the trends and prospects of the conflict of the region.⁷

RWANDA, RWANDESE REFUGEES AND THE GREAT LAKES CONFLICT SYSTEM

Rwanda occupies a portion of the Africa Great Lakes region. It is comprised of three ethnic groups Twa, Tutsi and Hutus. Tutsi and Hutus are major population and most significant actors especially in Rwanda ethnic conflict and politics. Between these two major actors, Tutsis are the minority.

Rwanda was colonized by Germans until 1914 and later by Belgium until 1962 when it gained independence. The colonial masters manipulated old tribal rivalries and used Tutsi minority over Hutu majority to solidify their rule and profit. The two colonial masters' transition meant a shift from bad to worse in terms of ethnic manipulation.⁸

Rwanda has an ethnic relationship with other ethnic groups in the countries of the Great Lakes region. Rwanda in the 16th and 19th century extended its political influence to portions of Ankole in Uganda based on the two states and inter marriage between the two

⁶ Ibid., p. 83.

⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

⁸ F. Keane, Seasons of Blood: A Rwanda Journey, (New York: Viking, 1995), p. 16.

politically relevant ethnic groups in Rwanda and Ankole that is, Tutsi and Hima respectively.⁹

The colonial boundaries complicated matters of national identity, citizenship and national allegiance even with the porous frontiers.¹⁰ These frontiers shifted from time to time depending on available topographical information, administrative, political and economic necessity of the regimes in power.

With the end of World War I, Rwanda was put under the trusteeship of Belgians. The Belgians economic policy favoring cash crop production resulted to a loss of fertile land from Rwandese population and hence deteriorating welfare for many of them. Between 1920s and 1950s, there was mass Rwandese migration to Uganda due to deterioration welfare.¹¹

As independence dawned there was Hutu armed revolt in 1959, which set many Tutsi to escape ethnic persecutions and violence. Ethnic and political conflicts in Rwanda have had a significant impact on the entire Great Lakes conflict system since 1959 Hutu revolution. The 1963 and 1973 violence together with 1959 Hutu revolution produced a wave of refugees to Uganda, Burundi and Zaire (now DRC)

Rwanda and Burundi have similar ethnic composition, however, in Burundi Tutsi have continued to dominate the Hutu majority through political concession with Hutu elites, intimidation, elimination and force. The Burundi Tutsis in power have sympathized with the plight of Rwandan Tutsi while Rwanda Hutus have sympathized with Burundi Hutus. The Hutus-Tutsi tension in Rwanda and Burundi has had a

⁹ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 3-29: 4.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 5.

significant effect to the two countries. The 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda sent a signal to Burundi's Tutsi dominated government that the same revolt was likely to occur in Burundi. Burundi's Tutsi dominated government made radical changes to avoid Hutu revolt in Burundi. These changes included giving political, economical and social concessions to Hutu elites to preempt Hutu uprising. Such concessions ensured Tutsi dominance in Burundi as the Hutu elites did not challenge the Tutsi leadership. Although there was shift in Belgian policy from supporting Tutsi as it was in Rwanda this shift became insignificant or was neutralized by the concessions granted to Hutus elites by Tutsi leadership in Burundi.

The violence of 1973 directed at the Tutsi in Rwanda was among other things, triggered by Hutu massacre in Burundi of 1972 to 1973.¹² It was justified as a revenge for Hutu Kinsmen in Burundi. This was rooted on the ethnic relationship between Rwanda and Burundi.

Refugees produced by Rwandan conflicts and violence have produced destabilizing effects in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda was attacked by its refugees who had acquired arms in neighboring countries especially from Ugandan and Congo DRC. The effort by Rwanda to deal with the refugees' attacks from Uganda was curtailed by the fact of non violability principle of state and territorial integrity, which were treasured by OAU member states.¹³

Rwandan refugees in Uganda influenced the Uganda politics a great deal. They participated actively to overthrow of Obote I and Obote II governments. Rwandan

¹² W. Waren and P Schrire, Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi. (Foreign and comparative studies / East Africa XXIII, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse university, 1976), pp. 17-30

¹³ OAU Charter, Art. III (2).

refugees were instrumental in determining legitimacy of the government in power. Rwandan refugees held senior and significant positions in the Ugandan government.¹⁴ The Tutsi refugees who had migrated to Uganda during 1959 Hutu revolution and subsequent violence of 1963 and 1973 were deeply affected by Ugandan political shifts and developments. But the ascent of Museveni through the National Resistance Army (NRA) to power had significant effects on Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Museveni and his NRA were sympathetic towards the Rwanda refugees' cause in Rwanda. This was made possible by allowing Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) to operate from Uganda creating political crisis in Rwanda which spilled over to the 1994 genocide. Rwanda refugees included those who came from Rwanda and those born outside Rwanda and have grown without setting foot in Rwanda.

Therefore, over the years since 1959, Rwanda has remained the hub or the epicentre of the Great Lakes conflict system. The Great Lakes conflict system revolved around Rwanda. Since proper identification of an epicentre has profound significance on responses to conflict within the conflict system, Rwanda has been at the centre of Great Lakes conflict system. Focus on Rwanda in the process of Great Lakes conflict management initiative is necessary since Rwanda as the epicentre influences the trends and prospects of conflicts¹⁵ in the Great Lakes region.

RWANDA-BURUNDI REFUGEE CRISIS

Before World War I Rwanda and Burundi were governed by the Germans as Ruanda-Urundi territory. In terms of population, the two countries share Hutu, Tutsi and Twa ethnic groups. Both were characterized by Tutsi domination and distinction

¹⁴ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., p. 31-49.

¹⁵ M. Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

economically, socially and politically. Since Rwanda was more centralized under Mwami Rwabugiru¹⁶, the Germans preferred to use this system of social-political arrangement to advance its indirect rule in Ruanda-Urundi territory.

After World War II, Ruanda–Urundi became a mandated territory to Belgium and in 1946 a trusteeship under the United Nations.¹⁷ The Belgian regime in Ruanda-Urundi continued indirect rule that had been started by Germans in Ruanda-Urundi territory. The colonial masters together with missionaries distorted the traditional way of life and created the awareness of social differentiation among ethnic groups in Ruanda-Urundi and more significantly among the dominant Hutu and Tutsi groups.

Burundi is a mirror-reflection of Rwanda in terms of ethnic composition. The attempts by Tutsi-dominated government in Burundi to incorporate the Hutu elites in government after 1959 and 1960 Hutu revolution in Rwanda quelled the conflict relatively. Despite the many years of relative calm, little was required to ignite the flames of discord. In a number of occasions, the Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi attacked each other. Therefore, the two ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) engaged in clashes.¹⁸

Burundi provides an opposite of the power equation in Rwanda. The Tutsi minority have continued to dominate the Hutu majority through political concessions to Hutu elites, use of force, intimidation and elimination. The Hutu–Tutsi tension in Rwanda and Burundi had demonstrated effects in the two countries. Tutsi refugees from Rwanda got a welcome in Burundi and Hutu refugees from Burundi were welcomed in Rwanda. Political sympathy between the two countries follows the same ethnic trend.

¹⁶ W. R. Lovis, Ruanda - Urundi 1884-1919, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), pp. 15-20.

¹⁷ UN, United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, op. cit. pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op .cit., p. 52.

The Hutu and Tutsi conflict and massacres in Burundi generated large number of refugees most of them Hutus to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. The massive massacre of Hutus in 1972 resulted in revenge in Rwanda by Hutu dominated government on the Tutsi minority.¹⁹ The killing of Hutu president in Burundi by Tutsi dominated army in October 1993 sent signal to Rwandan Hutu dominated government that power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi was forever doomed.²⁰ To the Hutu government, the Tutsis could never be trusted. To curtail Tutsi aspirations for leadership and killing many Hutus in the future, the Hutu radicals saw it necessary to act first by eliminating the Tutsis. Therefore the plan of genocide was justified as nothing more than self defense on the part of intended Hutu victims.²¹

The 1972 Massacre of majority Hutus in Burundi set refugees to Rwanda. They came to Rwanda because their ethnic kinsmen were in power and sympathized with them. As the Burundi refugee came to Rwanda, they inflamed ethnic tension and joined anti-Tutsi attackers. While few Tutsis in Rwanda were killed, most of them fled to join their kinsmen in exile.²²

CROSS-BORDER POLITICAL EFFECTS OF RWANDSE REFUGEES IN UGANDA

The 1950s and 1960s entry of refugees in Uganda created division among African members of legislative council. Some like Obote advocated for free entry of Rwandese refugees to Uganda while others refused. The colonial government on its part gave a number of excuses for denying Rwandese refugees asylum. Among the reasons given by

¹⁹ G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

²⁰ IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, op .cit., p. 53.

²¹ Ibid., p. 53.

²² Ibid., p. X.

colonial government included, lack of the resources to support Rwandese with their cattle, another one was that, Rwandese Immigrants were misinformed of political situation in Rwanda or were political criminals.²³ Obote motion of 29th Feb 1960 to allow Rwandese refugees free entry to Uganda was defeated but with Uganda independence in 1961 and subsequent ascent of Obote to power, many Rwandese refugees flowed to Uganda.

Following the invasion of Rwandese refugees from Uganda to Rwanda in 1961 and 1962, the western part of Uganda became politically unstable. The government of Uganda was forced to regulate the activities of Rwandese refugees and even expel some 24 Tutsi refugees for involvement in the armed attack on Rwanda.²⁴

Although Obote had supported free entry of Rwandese refugees to Uganda in pre-independence era and subsequently allowed their free entry when he became Uganda's head of State, he sacrificed refugees as source of every bad thing in Uganda in his desperate attempts to seek social cohesion among Ugandans. Rwandese refugees in turn saw Obote and his regime as enemies.²⁵ When a chance of anti-Obote opposition under Idi Amin emerged, Rwandese freely embraced Amin and actively participated to overthrow the Obote I regime in 1971.

Since Rwandese refugees welcomed Amin's regime and the regime needed refugees to join the forces, Amin was friendly to refugees. However, due to the terror unleashed by refugees in the forces, there increased anti-refugee sentiments. This forced

²³ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., 6.

²⁴ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire op. cit., p. 7.

²⁵ E. Nabuguzi, "Refugees and Politics in Uganda" Paper Presented at the Makerere Institute Of Social Research, Makerere University, 20 December 1993, p. 25. see also, International Commission of Jurists, Uganda Human Rights, (Geneva: ICJ, 1977), p. 5.

Amin's regime to turn against refugees to provide a popular and vulnerable scapegoat that would be blamed for political crisis among other crises in Uganda.²⁶ With the overthrow of Amin in 1979, anti-refugee sentiment escalated under Obote II regime.²⁷

Refugees were involved in many terror activities in Uganda since the time they started joining the forces in Uganda. Refugees actively participated to bring regimes to power while removing others from of power. This was the case of Amin against Obote I regime, and Museveni regime against Obote II and Okello's regimes.

The sharing of scarce resources together with the terror caused by refugees escalated anti-refugee sentiments. The anti-refugee sentiment questioned legitimacy of Museveni's regime, which was perceived to be refugees' regime. Seeking legitimacy on Museveni's regime there was needed to seek a political solution. Since the anti-refugee sentiments were increasing, the possible solution lay in the attempt to return refugees to Rwanda and Museveni's regime had to participate in refugees struggle to Rwanda. Museveni's regime did this by providing military hardware and bases to RPF.

CROSS-BORDER POLITICAL EFFECTS OF RWANDESE REFUGEES TO RWANDA

While refugees were flowing from Rwanda to Uganda, a group of Tutsi refugees, the *Inyenzi* (cockroaches) invaded Rwanda in July 1961 and May 1962 generating political instability in western Uganda. In May 1962, the Ugandan government warned

²⁶ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire op cit., p. 15.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

refugees against using Ugandan territory as military base against Rwanda.²⁸ The Ugandan government even expelled 24 Tutsi refugees for their involvement in the invasions.

The Tutsi refugees in Uganda exerted pressure for their unconditional return to Rwanda. This demand was met on condition that the returnees were able to support themselves in Rwanda and not claim ancestral land from the present owners.²⁹ Such conditions upon Tutsi refugees were unbearable. The Hutu dominated government was slow to allow Tutsi refugees to return. The few who returned were put in concentrated camps where human rights violations were taking place. Therefore, the RPF resolved to use force against the Hutu regime in Rwanda to secure refugees' safe return.

The RPF invaded Rwanda on 1st October 1990 from Uganda a country with which Rwanda had by that time a formal diplomatic relations. This invasion got military setback especially with the death of the soldiers leader Fred Rwigyema who was killed on 2nd day of the combat. Although there was some success in capturing 60 kilometer a cross the border, the RPF had to retreat to its base in Uganda due to its weakening force against that of the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda.

With the return of Major Paul Kagame from US where he had gone for studies, RPF reorganized, rearmed and invaded Rwanda in January 1991. This invasion was successful, forcing Hutu regime in Rwanda to yield to international pressures to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.³⁰ The capture and control of Ruhengeri by RPF after January 1991 made the shift of the conflict from a cross the border into Rwanda.

²⁸ R. Lamarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 208.

²⁹ R. Van Der Meeren, "Three Decades in Exile Rwanda Refugees 1960-1990" in Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, pp. 252,-267:258.

³⁰ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, op. cit., pp.93-94.

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³⁰ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, op. cit., pp.93-94.

Rwandese refugees internationalized their plight through conferences in Washington DC, Makerere University and other places in Kampala, to fundraise for their cause in Rwanda. The formation of the RPF was first aimed at settlement of the refugee crisis in Rwanda.³¹ Rwandan Hutu dominated government delayed attempts by OAU and UNHCR in 1988 to resettle its refugees for 30 months making RPF impatient and decided to invade Rwanda in 1990. The RPF considered the government as not being serious to address their plight. The actions of Rwandese refugees to Rwanda in post 1989 escalated already polarized ethnic conflict in Rwanda. For example from 1991, the Hutu regime targeted Tutsi and moderate Hutus who were sympathetic to Tutsi minority in Rwanda for elimination. The invasion of 1990 by RPF was a very significant factor in exalting the political polarization in Rwanda.³² Although such consequences were unintended and unpredictable, their impacts affected the politics of Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a whole³³

The legitimacy of the new Kigali government became suspect as it questions the right of invaders in 1989 and 1990 to invade a sovereign country with an aim of taking power by force. It is argued that nationality of the invaders of 1990 in Rwanda is suspect and such an organization of invaders did not enjoy the support of many Rwandese. Another issue that was clear is that, Uganda supported the RPF in the invasion when the two countries had formal diplomatic relations. This attempt by Uganda violated the core pillar of OAU of non interference. The problem of trust emerged as the RPF claimed to represent all Rwandese, yet in its leadership and majority of them were Tutsi. The new

³¹ R. Van der Meeren, "Three Decades in Exile Rwanda Refugees 1960-1990" in Journal of Refugee Studies. op cit., pp. 258-265.

³² Africa Right 1062

³³ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. op. cit., p. 40.

government in Kigali did not trust its citizens most of them Hutu. The citizen most of them Hutu did not trust their new government. Again, Rwanda remained polarized along ethnic lines.

The politics surrounding the RPF and their cause in Rwanda propelled mobilization of the majority of Rwandese mostly Hutu against the outsiders (Tutsis refugees). The claim here was that, the RPF was foreigners and did not have links in Rwanda as most of them were born in Uganda and had not known Rwanda for 30 or so years.

CROSS-BORDER POLITICAL EFFECTS OF RWANDESE REFUGEES IN ZAIRE (DRC)

Refugees in Congo after the genocide constituted mostly Hutus, former government leaders, ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* militia who had participated in the genocide. They had entered the camps with their arms.³⁴ Some time after the establishment of the camps, the leaders exerted their authority in the camps. Their desire was to prepare to invade Rwanda.³⁵ The arrival of anti-Tutsi refugees, combined with local anti-Tutsi sentiments in Zaire contributed significantly to the escalation of the conflict.³⁶

Mobutu's regime in Zaire was friendly to the refugees as it had been to the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda before the genocide. This explains mostly why the Hutu refugees got asylum in Zaire. Most refugee camps were put near the border between

³⁴ Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity-International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandese Genocide" May, 1995, p. 4

³⁵ A. H. Gnamo, "Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu's Kleptocracy" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Op. cit., pp. 325, 330-331.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

Zaire and Rwanda.³⁷ This violated the requirement that refugee camps be put away from borders to prevent their cross border attacks and the origin government's attack on them. The proximity of the refugee camps to Rwanda resulted in two things: One, the refugees who were in the camps (especially ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*) resorted to invade Rwanda in a number of occasions with an aim to remove the new Kigali government from power. The other thing, the new government in Kigali had made it clear that due to the activities of refugees in Eastern Zaire, it would not tolerate refugees being out there destabilizing Rwanda. The new Rwandan government was determined to have its refugees back to avoid cross-border attack and to make those who committed atrocities during genocide to face justice.

Since such effort by Kigali government did not yield much (as even those who wanted to repatriate were prevented to do so by refugee camp leaders), the new Kigali government had to act with the support of Uganda. The Kigali government trained Zairians of Tutsi origin (*Banyamulenge*) in Eastern Zaire in the name of anti Mobutu alliance who first attacked the refugee camps flashing Rwandan refugees to Rwanda and then went for Mobutu's regime. Some Rwandese refugees went deeper into Zaire.³⁸ In the process, Human Rights and the Rights of refugees were violated. The new Kigali government accused humanitarian workers for harboring refugees. If it was not for the assistance that refugees were getting from humanitarian workers and UNHCR they could have repatriated to Rwanda. The new Kigali government wanted humanitarian assistance to be withdrawn from refugees in Eastern Zaire.

³⁷ IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, op. cit., Annex G p. 325.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

The anti-Mobutu alliance after flashing Rwandese refugees to Rwanda and destroying refugee camps, headed for Mobutu's regime. The Mobutu regime was brought down and L. Kabila came to power. L. Kabila having been assisted by Rwanda and Uganda to come to power, decided to throw them out of DRC. In turn, these two countries came back as opposing forces to L. Kabila's regime. This return of Rwanda and Uganda as enemies of L. Kabila led to his assassination and the escalation of the Congo DRC conflict to almost becoming First African War.

In the refugee camps, life was complicated and in conflict.³⁹ The leaders of the camps made life hard for humanitarian's workers. The leaders demanded to be served first before the refugees were served. These refugee camp leaders continued to recruit militiamen in the refugee camps. They sold relief food. At times relief workers had to pay confilicants to access people in need of relief.⁴⁰ Refugees were prevented from repatriating freely by camp leaders.

EVALUATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

The Tutsi refugees accused their home government of not addressing their plight and not democratizing. They demanded their return to Rwanda unconditionally. On the side, the government decided to ignore its refugees. At certain time, it referred to its refugees as immigrants. The government also claimed that, Rwanda was packed by population and was unable to accommodate the returnees. In this thinking, Habyarimana's regime was committed to continue having its nationals as refugees. This

³⁹ K. Halvorsen, "Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in the Refugee camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.) The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire op cit., pp. 312-313

⁴⁰ F. Jean, Population in Danger, (London: A Medicines sans Frontier Report, 1995)

can be attributed to the commitment by the Hutu dominated government of Rwanda to revenge on the Tutsis by destroying their pre-independence power. Such was also consistent with the claim that Tutsis were not original nationals of Rwanda but foreigners.

The effort by refugees to return home was inhibited by government's attempts to keep its refugees out of Rwanda. The effort of the government to keep out its refugees was also countered by increased demand for return and demand for democratization. In this case, the value expected by both refugees and the government were inhibited by each other's demand and efforts. Therefore, the two experienced discrepancy between actual situation and the preferred. For refugees, the actual situation was that, it seemed hard to return home which was their preferred state of affairs. For the government, the actual situation was that the pressure was mounting high to address its refugees problem and democratize against its preferred state of wanting to ignore and have its refugees outside the country and to continue with single party state to continue with Hutu policies.

This state of affairs in which the government and the refugees got themselves frustrated by the effort of both parties in the opposite direction to each other. Since there was significant importance attached to the goals by the refugees and the government, this resulted to aggression. This aggression was a factor in the complex interplay between strength of instigation to aggression and the inhibition of acts of aggression from either party.⁴¹ This interference with instigation to aggression set up further frustrations, which build up to aggressive behavior until it reached its climax during the genocide.

⁴¹ J. Dollard, et. al., Frustration and Aggression. (London: Yale University press, 1939), p. 15.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF RWANDESE REFUGEES ON POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

INTRODUCTION

The Rwandese refugee effects on the cross-border political conflicts stems from the Rwandan conflict and spreads to the whole of the Great Lakes region. As noted in chapter two, the Rwandan conflict resulted to mass flow of refugees to countries in the Great Lakes region. The flow of refugees served the Hutu dominated regimes in Rwanda to settle the Rwandan conflict. To the new government in the post genocide Rwanda, the presence of Rwandese refugees posed a security dilemma in Rwanda.

In chapter three, it has been noted that Rwandese refugees played a significant role in generation, escalation, protraction and internationalization of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Rwandese refugees made the entire Great Lakes region experience the effects of the Rwandan conflict. Therefore, the Rwandese refugees has a significant impact on the political conflicts in the entire Great Lakes region and even beyond.

This section of the study critically examines the critical issues in the Rwandese refugees' effects on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. It starts by presenting the critical issues that arise in the study and moves a head to critically analyze them. It is by doing a critical analysis that the study presents its contribution. The data will be analyzed in the light of Conflict Research paradigm and relevant literature.

CRITICAL ISSUES

The study reveals some critical issues about the Rwandan conflict, the refugee crisis and the political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. First, the conflict in Rwanda was generated by the environment of interactions among the actors. The actors especially the missionaries and the colonialists manipulated the environment in such a way that it solidifies ethnic differentiations and eventually generated the conflict. This is contrary to the claim that conflicts are inherently in human nature.¹

Secondly, conflict management should endeavor to resolve the conflicts and not merely settle them. The management attempts made to the Rwandan conflict and the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region was at the level of settlement. Such attempts did not go deeper to resolve the conflicts. Power struggle and bargaining was evident in the process of addressing the Rwandan conflict. This resulted to the protraction and escalation of the conflict in Rwanda. There were no attempts to resolve the original Rwandan conflict, the Rwandese refugee crisis and the other conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

Thirdly, the Rwandese refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region was affected by the UN and OAU Conventions on Refugees. The Conventions gave primacy to state actors in addressing the refugee crisis. For along time, this denied a chance to non-state actors especially refugees to be actively involved in the search for the solution to the Rwandese refugee crisis, the Rwandan conflict and the other cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Although there was OAU Convention on refugees in place, there was a discrepancy between the Convention and the actual practice in

¹ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution. (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 72-74 and 83-85.

protection of refugees. In Zaire, refugee camps were placed near to the border. The host states were unable or unwilling to control the political and military activities of refugees as required by the two Conventions. This resulted to cross-border political conflict. Refugees also involved themselves in subversive activities across the border. The new government in the post genocide Rwanda invaded refugee camps in Zaire forcibly repatriating its refugees and committed atrocities to refugees. In this case, international law was ignored or seemed impractical in the conduct of affairs in the international system.

Fourthly, empowerment and disempowerment was used as a strategy to manage the Rwandan conflict and the Rwandese refugee crisis. The Tutsis were empowered by the Germans and Belgians to be used in administration. The Hutus also got empowered by the Belgians while the Tutsis were disempowered as independence dawned. Museveni's regime too empowered the Rwandese refugees to struggle back home against their home government. The problem with this empowerment and disempowerment is that it is power based. The end result was the re-alignment of power relations which eventually saw violent conflicts in Rwanda and the other parts in the Great Lakes region. Although empowerment and disempowerment is advocated by the Peace Research paradigm in conflict management,² it resulted to conflicts as the empowered parties revenged on the other actors protracting the conflict.

Fifthly, the actors in the Rwandan conflict and refugee crisis were not effectively involved in the search for the solution. The UN and OAU convention together with the Cold War rivalry ensured that Rwandese refugee problem was a matter of state actors. Non-state actors did not seem significant in addressing the Rwandan refugee crisis and

² Ibid., pp. 91-95.

the management of the conflict. The issues of morality like democracy and legitimacy did not seem important in the international system. The end result was the Rwandan conflict, the Rwandese refugee crisis and the other conflicts in the Great Lakes region were not resolved but settled.

Finally, as not all actors were involved in the management of the Rwandan conflict, Rwandese refugee crisis and other conflicts in the Great Lakes regions, the interests of such actors were not taken care of. The interest of the actors in the Rwandan conflict, Rwandese refugee crisis and the other conflicts in the Great Lakes region were not addressed. This further prevented the resolution of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. As will be elaborated in this chapter, actors have certain interests in the conflict, its management and outcome that makes them involved. Unless their interests are taken care of, the actors are likely to sabotage the process or the outcome of the management process

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Having exposed critical issues in the Rwandese refugees effects on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region, it is important now to subject the critical issues to a critical analysis.

Conflict

The study reveals some critical issues in conflict and conflict management. First, it reveals that conflict is not innate in human nature.³ Conflict is learned behavior. It results from the environment in which the actors find themselves. Therefore, conflict is not inherently inevitable. The Rwandan conflict did not inherently exist among the

³ M. Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000), pp. 16-18.

people of Rwanda. As observed, the conflict resulted from the unfolding circumstances.⁴ As the environment was manipulated, ethnic identities started becoming manifest. The asymmetrical relationship gradually became rigid. While the three ethnic groups lived in harmony during pre-colonial Rwanda, the coming of the missionaries and colonial rule corrupted their way of life.⁵ The new parties (missionaries and colonialist) corrupted the structure of relationship by significantly introducing hierarchy among the ethnic groups. The introduction of physical features in ethnic differentiation reduced flexibility and social mobility among the groups. The use of Tutsis by the colonial regimes to solidify their rule in Rwanda⁶ created an environment in which the Tutsis elites got a chance to exploit Hutus. In turn, the Hutus gradually started seeing the Tutsis as an enemy group.

The Rwandan conflict was internationalized by among the many refugees. The conflict in Rwanda became the concern of diverse actors in the Great Lakes region and even beyond. The actors in turn introduced their interests in the conflict, hence complicated the initial conflict.

Resolution of the Conflicts in the Great Lakes region

Conflict should be resolved than settled. Resolution of conflicts rejects the power basis in conflict management and strives to create legitimized relationship among the actors by satisfying the needs of all the parties.⁷ Resolution holds that conflict is not innate in human nature and therefore, conflicts can be resolved by manipulation of the environment that generate conflict. Unlike resolution, settlement holds that conflict is

⁴ See chapter one.

⁵ See chapter one.

⁶ F. Keane, *Seasons of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, (New York: Viking, 1995), pp. 15-17.

⁷ M. Mwagiru, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, op. cit. pp. 41-42.

innate in human nature and the best possible way to manage it is by use of force.⁸ The problem of this approach to conflict management is that it suppresses the conflict. Therefore, the conflict continues to exist underneath as long as there is that balance of power. However, when that balance of power is altered the conflict erupts again. This is because such management does not address perceptual aspects of the conflict and therefore cannot endure.⁹ The gradual development of the Rwandan conflict during colonial era was managed by the colonialists support for the Tutsis. Under this support, the Hutus found it hard to challenge the Tutsi Hegemony in Rwanda.¹⁰ However, when the balance of power was altered by the colonialists abrupt shift of support from the Tutsis to Hutus the conflict erupted.¹¹ Use of force by the Hutus against the Tutsis as Rwandan independence dawned, saw the elimination of many Tutsis and mass flow of refugees to the neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region. This mass flow assured the Hutus that their power was above that of Tutsis. The Hutus used this as a strategy to avoid challenges from the Tutsis. They seemed to believe that such dominance managed the conflict. Under the state-centric international system accompanied with the Cold War,¹² the Tutsi refugees found themselves helpless against their home government. The Hutu dominated government could not allow them back to Rwanda for fear of the alteration of the balance of power. This relatively settled the conflict until the Tutsi refugees got empowered by Uganda to invade Rwanda. The Rwandan conflict was not

⁸ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution, op. cit. pp. 72-74 and 83-85.

⁹ M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, op. cit. pp. 39-41.

¹⁰ H. M. Hintjens, "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, (1999), pp. 241-286: 253.

¹¹ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, Kampala: Fountain, 1995), pp. 1-10.

¹² R. Lemarchand, "Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa in Comparative Perspective" in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, (1994), pp. 581-604.

for a long time resolved since resolution meant going deeper to address the root causes of the conflict.

Conventions on Refugees

The UN and OAU Conventions on Refugees were negotiated among states. They are characterized by the realist perception of the international system. They present the state as the only dominant actor in the international system. Relations in the international system are state centred. Refugees are not recognized as significant actors in the international system. They are only reduced to compliance with the dictates of the host country.¹³ The aim of the two Conventions was to control refugees so that they may not be the source of interstate conflicts. This was based on the assumption that when refugees are controlled by the host countries they may not become the source of interstate conflict. On the other side, it was considered that states have full monopoly of coercive power to regulate the activities of refugees. The conventions did not care to address the root cause of refugee flow. They only sort to protect them and regulate their activities. The critical issue here is that the conflict that generated refugees continued to exist as long as there were refugees. Refugee protection and regulation is merely a settlement of a conflict since it does not dig deeper to the root causes of the conflict. Therefore, the Conventions took care of the states' interest more than the interest of individual. It also assumes that conflict occurs when there is war it does not recognize structural conflicts.

UNHCR also seemed to send the same message on the actors. UNHCR exerted pressure on the countries hosting Tutsi refugees to control the political and military activities of the Tutsi refugees. UNHCR assumed that by governments doing so, it would

¹³ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Art. 2. see also, OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969, Art. III.

prevent the Tutsi refugees from provoking violence in Rwanda.¹⁴ Although this attempt by UNHCR was aimed at reducing Tutsi refugee flows hence making it possible for UNHCR and the host countries to protect and assist refugees, it sent a message of elevating the role of the state in conflict management. This message down played the role of refugees as actors. Such attempts would only yield to a temporal settlement of the conflicts in the region as the root causes of the conflicts are not addressed..

Based on the realist perception of the international system the Conventions only settles the conflict. Raising the supremacy of states as actors in the Conventions, required that the host states control refugees and their activities. In turn, refugees should comply with the demands of the host country. By doing this, interstate conflicts would be addressed. This leads to the settlement and protraction of the conflicts. The Rwandan conflict was characterized by the flow of refugees. The flow of refugees sent a signal to the Hutus that the power of the Tutsis was declining in Rwanda. As a result, the Hutu regimes in Rwanda did not care to address its refugee crisis. Although there were signs that the Tutsis were declining with the outflow of Tutsi refugees, the initial ethnic conflict continued to exist. The Hutu regimes in Rwanda suppressed the conflict in Rwanda by ensuring that the Tutsi refugees remained outside the country. It also sought to dominate the politics of Rwanda.

The outflow of Tutsi refugees was a strategy employed by the Hutu dominated government to manage the conflict. This approach to conflict management was power based and only managed to settle the conflict and not resolve it.

There was a discrepancy between refugee law and the practice of refugee protection. Although the OAU Convention on refugees prohibit the situation of refugee

¹⁴ K. Essack, Civil War in Rwanda, (Dar es Salaam: Forem Litho Printer, 1993), pp. 12-13.

camps close to the border,¹⁵ the Convention was ignored in Zaire after the Rwandan genocide. Refugee camps were situated near the border to Rwanda. This resulted to the invasion to Rwanda by the former Rwandan leaders and the ex-FAR. The New government in Rwanda also found it easy to invade the refugee camps in Zaire in 1996. The international law seemed inadequate to address refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region. This set a discrepancy between the provisions of international law and the real conduct of the affairs in the international system.

Empowerment of the Parties

During colonial Rwanda, the colonialists empowered the Tutsis elites in order to use them for administration and economic gain. This made the Tutsis to acquire more power in relation to the Hutus. This state of power relations caused discomfort between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The Tutsi elite had an upper hand in accumulating resources and mistreating the Hutus.¹⁶ Although some authors feel that the Tutsis who were not elites suffered together with the Hutus, the Hutus perceived the oppressor not as a class of Tutsi elites but as an ethnic group. The Tutsis who were not among the elites cemented this interpretation by flaunting the superior status conferred upon them by reason of ethnic identification.¹⁷ However, as the independence dawned, the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsis to the Hutus. This empowered the Hutus and disempowered the Tutsis. This made the Tutsis helpless in the Hands of Hutus who were committed to revenge on the perceived injustices done to them by the Tutsis during colonial time.

The Ugandan government empowered the refugees to reduce the power asymmetry. The empowerment of refugees and Tutsis in general was also possible by the

¹⁵ OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969, Art. II.

¹⁶ G. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*, op. cit. pp. 23-35.

¹⁷ IPEP, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), p. 15.

disempowerment of the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda by economic destabilization of the government and the Structural Adjustment Programme of the IMF and World Bank of the late 1985.¹⁸ The empowerment of the Tutsis refugees by the Ugandan government together with the disempowerment of the Hutu dominated government by economic destabilization and IMF and World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme of the late 1985 caused the re-alignment of the power relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The empowered Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda and challenged the Hutu dominated government. It was not clear to Uganda and RPF that such an invasion could lead to genocide. The problem of empowerment and disempowerment is that the end result of the process is not determined.¹⁹ For example, the empowerment of Tutsis by colonialists in colonial Rwanda, Hutus by colonialist as independence dawned, refugee by Ugandan government in the late 1980s and disempowerment of the Tutsis as independence dawned, the government by economic destabilization and Structural Adjustment Programme eventually saw violent conflicts in Rwanda. Therefore, the empowerment and disempowerment of the actors in the Rwandan conflict exacerbated the conflict.²⁰ It also saw the re-alignment of power relations hence settling the conflict instead of resolving it.

Actors

The states and UNHCR were the major actors in the Rwandan refugee crisis before the end of the Cold War. The rivalry of the superpowers meant that, in their struggle for ideological and strategic dominance, the two superpowers supported whichever regimes were in power without taking into account issues like democracy and

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 31-34.

¹⁹ M. Mwangiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management op. cit. pp. 30-31.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 31.

accountability.²¹ The UN and OAU convention gave the prime role to states and state actors in addressing the refugee problems. Refugees were not given a place except that they are required to respect and comply with the dictates of the host country.²² The two Conventions ultimately sought to address interstate relationships and not internal relationships.

The end of Cold War and subsequent withdrawal of the superpowers from Africa had a significant impact to the Rwandan conflict and the refugee crisis. Governments lost the support that they were getting from the superpower. Post-Cold War era was characterized with the multiplication of actors in the international system. It meant that the state lost its power to stand the opposition of other emerging actors. The new international system required that the governments democratize and draw its legitimacy from its citizens. The power that helped Hutu regimes in Rwanda to suppress Tutsi refugees was altered. This alteration of the power led to the uprising of the RPF. Refugees also got a chance to challenge the legitimacy of their home government which did not address their plight.²³

Based on the realist perception of international relations, the Hutu regime did not see the need to involve refugees in seeking a solution to refugees crisis and the original conflict in Rwanda. It seemed that the Rwandan refugees problem was an issue between the Rwandan government and the Ugandan government. Refugees did not seem to be

²¹ M. Mwangi, Conflict and Peace Management in the Horn of Africa: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives, Paper presented at the International Resource Group Conference Mombasa, Kenya Nov. 6-9, 1996 (Revised 1998).

²² UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Preamble.

²³ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 46.

significant actors. This made Habyarimana's regime indignant to give RPF a formal recognition for along time.²⁴

The Rwandan refugee crisis attracted many actors to the Rwandan conflict. The countries of asylum got involved and humanitarian organizations came in to offer assistance. Although many actors got involved in the Rwandan refugee crisis, the search for the solution to Rwandese refugee crisis remained at the level of state actors. It did not involve non-state actors, the position of the Rwandan government was that it would address the issue with Ugandan government. Most of the negotiations on the repatriation of refugees was done between the governments of Rwanda and Uganda. The Rwandan government did not address the refugee crisis for fear that repatriation would alter the power relations in Rwanda. The Ugandan government in turn wanted the Rwandese refugees repatriate in order that Museveni's regime could secure legitimacy in Uganda.

Rwandese refugees became significant actors in the politics of asylum countries. In Uganda, Rwandese refugees got involved in the politics of the country. They were used by rebel groups to challenge the power of the existing governments. The regimes also came to power with the active support from refugees. Regimes in Uganda also used refugees to maintain their power. Refugees involvement in the Ugandan politics led to the generation and escalation of anti-refugee sentiments among the Ugandans. This implied that the integration process of Rwandese refugees was resting on a hot base.

The persistent persecution of the Tutsi refugees in the Great Lakes region since the late 1950s paved way for the formation of RPF as a political movement of refugees

²⁴ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. op. cit., p. 55.

and its armed wing the RPA.²⁵ The end of Cold War and the subsequent need for the new international order made it possible for the RPF to demand that the plight of refugees be addressed by the Rwandan government if it had to retain legitimacy.²⁶ The RPF became a power contender in Rwanda.

Rwandese refugees internationalized the Rwandan conflicts. Through the Refugees, the Rwandan conflict together with its effects has been felt throughout the Great Lakes region and even beyond. Rwandese refugees drew the countries in the Great Lakes region to the Rwandan conflicts. Humanitarian organizations also were drawn into the conflict. The role of humanitarian organizations was to assist refugees. Humanitarian organizations also served to internationalize the Rwandan conflict and refugee crisis.²⁷ Humanitarian assistance to refugees protracted and transformed the original Rwandan conflict. Humanitarian organizations became actors in the Rwandese refugee crisis and subsequently to the Rwandan conflict.²⁸ The new government in Kigali saw that the humanitarian organization participated in the Hutu refugees' invasion to Rwanda by offering humanitarian assistance.²⁹

The Rwandese refugee crisis attracted diverse actors who ranged from state to non-state. As these actors came in, they complicated the initial Rwandan conflict and Rwandese refugee crisis. The management efforts of refugees and the conflicts in the Great Lakes region became complex. Refugees protracted the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The sidelining of Rwandese refugees as actors in the management of conflicts in

²⁵ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit. p. 48.

²⁶ See chapter two

²⁷ K. Halvorsen, "Protection and Humanitarian Assistance in Refugee Camps in Zaire: The Problem of Security" in Adelman & A Suhrke (eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., pp. 307-320.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 315.

²⁹ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), pp. 216-217.

the Great Lakes region served to escalate and protract the conflicts. Therefore, as long as other actors like refugees are not involved effectively in the search for the solution to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region and refugee crisis the conflicts will persist and even escalate.

Interests of the Actors

Actors have certain interests in the conflict that make them involved in the first place.³⁰ Although external actors are not directly involved in the conflict, they are part of the conflict. Parties enter into a conflict because of an interest they have in the conflict, its management and the outcome of the management.

The Hutu regimes in Rwanda did not take into account the interests of the refugees. They simply ignored refugees and their interest. They considered the refugee crisis to be a matter between the governments. The interest of the refugees was their claim to legitimate and conscionable need to return home with dignity.³¹ The Hutu regimes suppressed the interests of the refugees. Hutu regimes in Rwanda used violence and force to suppress the interest of refugees. The suppression of the interest of the refugees protracted the Rwandan conflict. It also escalated the Rwandese refugee crisis. Since the Refugees' interest was not effectively addressed by the Hutu regimes in Rwanda it led to the commitment of RPF to armed struggle to Rwanda at all costs.

On the other hand, Habyarimana's regime did not take the interest of Museveni's regime in Ugandan to repatriate the Tutsi refugees. Museveni was seeking internal legitimacy in Uganda which seemed impossible with the presence of Rwandese refugees.

³⁰ M. Mwangiru, Community Based Approaches to Conflict in Kenya: Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management (Nairobi: GTZ. Kenya, 20001).

³¹ O. Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)" in Adelman H. & A. Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire. op. cit p. 46.

Repatriation was the immediate solution. Although Museveni denied taking an active role in the invasion of Rwanda by RPF/RPA, he admitted having involved himself in seeking a peaceful resolution of the dispute between RPF/RPA and the Rwandan government.³² Since Museveni's involvement in seeking the repatriation of the Rwandese refugees with Habyarimana's regime was yielding too little and taking too long, armed struggle seemed an attractive alternative.

In Zaire, humanitarian organizations did a lot of work to assist Refugees. Although the organizations did this excellent work, they also introduced their interest in the Rwandan conflicts. Some of the humanitarian organizations were seeking fame, funding and seeking legitimacy.³³ Such interests complicated the Rwandese refugee crisis, the Rwandan conflict and the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The management process of the Rwandese refugee crisis became complex as humanitarian organizations introduced their interest in the conflict.

The management efforts on the Rwandan conflict and refugee crisis did not take into account the interest of the actors that were involved in the Rwandan conflict. Not taking into account the interests of the expanded actors in the Rwandan conflict and refugee crisis served to complicate and protract the conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

³² Ibid. p. 45.

³³ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op cit. pp. 215-217.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The Great Lakes region is one of the regions in African continents where conflicts have had significant dysfunctional impact. While conflicts have been considered not absolutely negative in human relations,¹ their dysfunctional effects especially in the Great Lakes region has questioned the positive effects that have been attached to conflicts. Conflicts in the Great Lakes region have claimed human lives, degraded the environment, spoiled relationships, and stagnated or reversed economic and human development.² If conflicts will continue to afflict the Great Lakes region as they have been in the past, then the Great Lakes region will continue to suffer and the suffering may be aggravated by the fact that resources are becoming less and less as the population is increasing day by day.

This study as presented in chapter one set out to investigate the effects of Rwandese refugees on the cross-border political conflict in the Great Lakes region. The study was triggered by the fact that, in the Great Lakes region there are many and protracted conflicts which need to be resolved. The Great Lakes region has been the source and destination of the highest refugee population.³ While reception of refugees has been considered to be a friendly and humanitarian act by the OAU Convention on refugees,⁴ the act has not always been considered to be so by states and other actors that are involved in refugee crisis. This study appreciates refugees as victims of conflicts and natural calamities, but moves ahead to look at their effect on cross-border political

¹ M. Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management. (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000), pp. 6-7.

² Agreement Establishing IGAD (1996) Article 7 and 18.

³ See map in United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Guidelines on the Methods of Evaluating the Social Economic and Demographic Consequences of Refugees in Africa, op cit., p. 4.

⁴ OAU Convention on Refugees, Art., II (2).

conflict. The concern of this study was to investigate the place of refugees in influencing cross-border political conflict generation and escalation in the Great Lakes region.

In examining the politics of exile and their cross-border effects on conflicts, the study endeavored to test three hypotheses. The first hypothesis was to test the role of refugees in generation and escalation of cross-border political conflicts. The second hypothesis was to test the place of refugees in internationalizing internal conflicts. The last hypothesis was to test how far refugees have been incorporated in management of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. It is on the investigation of these hypotheses that this study was conceptualized.

The second chapter of this study reveals that the Rwandese refugee crisis and its cross-border political effects in the Great Lakes region stems from the Rwandan conflict. The Rwandan conflict started to manifest itself as the missionaries and colonialists manipulated ethnic differentiation among the ethnic groups in Rwanda. Although there were ethnic differentiation in Rwanda based on the role and activities people engaged themselves in, this did not result into confrontation.⁵ There was flexibility and social mobility among hierarchy of the ethnic groups making ethnic distinctions not evidently exposed among the indigenous people of Rwanda. However, the coming of missionaries and colonialists in Rwanda cemented ethnic differentiation and hierarchy making them rigid among the ethnic groups in Rwanda. This made the indigenous people of Rwanda especially Tutsis and Hutus to start seeing themselves as ethnically different and enemies.

The empowerment of Tutsis by the colonialists in order to serve in administration in Rwanda to the advantage of the colonialists, served to polarize ethnic hatred between the Tutsis and Hutus. The Rwandan conflict became fierce when the Belgians abruptly

⁵ See Chapter Two.

empowered Hutus and disempowered Tutsis as independence dawned. This together with the violence occurring in the post independent Rwanda resulted to the mass flow of Rwandese Tutsi refugees to the neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region.

Rwandese refugee who left Rwanda did not intend to return soon. However, the circumstances that they found themselves especially in Uganda made them contemplate to return to Uganda at all costs. Their attempt to repatriate violently re-ignited the Rwandan ethnic hatred and subsequently violent conflict, which slow by slow build up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. After the genocide, the Rwandese refugees mostly Hutus found themselves in the refugee camps in Zaire where they became determined to return to Rwanda by armed struggle posing a security threat to the security of Rwanda and Uganda.

Chapter three reveals that Rwandese Refugees have been part of the building block of the Great Lakes conflict system. The Rwandese refugees especially after the Hutu revolution of late 1950s have had significant impact on the cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The Hutu revolution and the violence that followed the Hutu revolution in Rwanda to the period of the genocide generated a large wave of refugees in the Great Lakes region.⁶ Refugee problem in the Great Lakes region has overtime been complicated by ethnicity which extends across-border. Territorial boundaries were constructed cutting across ethnic groups separating related ethnic groups and uniting unrelated groups. The spread of related ethnic groups across territorial boundaries has been of great consequence to refugee flow and cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. When ethnic kin suffer in a neighboring country an

⁶ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), pp. 11-30 and p. 179, see also, F. Reyntjens, "Estimation Du Nombre de Personnes Tuees au Rwanda en 1994" in S. Marysee and F. Reyntjens (eds), L'Africa des Grands Lacs Annuaire 1996-1997, op. cit. pp. 179-186.

ethnic kin in another country sympathize with them and may be inclined to give them a welcome a cross the border without following legal procedures.

Where refugees have settled have been characterized by conflicts that involve refugees and local resident. Refugees have been active politically in their country of asylum. Local political elites have also used refugees for political ends.⁷ Refugees on the other hand, have continued to destabilize their home country. Refugee organizations and movements over the years have become power contenders in their home country. They have at times also sought to return home by use of force. A case that is at hand here is the Rwandan refugees in Uganda before the genocide and the former Rwandan government leaders and ex-FAR in Zaire after the Genocide who sought to use force to return to Rwanda. Refugees have also internationalized internal conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Therefore, the conflicts that were initially of one country like for our case here Rwanda became a concern of other countries in the Great Lakes region and even beyond. Foreign policies of countries in the Great Lakes region have been adjusted to cope with refugee crisis. Such foreign policy adjustments have had cross-border political impact in the Great Lakes region. Countries like Rwanda and Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire, Uganda and Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi have at different times either viewed each other as enemies or with suspicion because of offering asylum to refugees of the involved country. In this way, offering refugees refuge has not been considered to be a friendly undertaking, instead it has had political consequences a cross the border.⁸

⁷ O. Otunnu, "Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda" in Adelman H. & A Suhrke (Eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., pp. 14-24.

⁸ L. G. Eriksson, G. Melander and P. Nobel, An Analyzing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee Problem Arusha, May 1979, op. cit. p. 15. See also, D. K. Orwa, "Causes of Conflicts in the Relation of African States" in O. J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, African International Relations, op cit. pp. 133-134.

Refugee law that has been in existence since 1951 and has been supplemented by other laws has not been effective in prevention of cross-border political conflicts. In the Great Lakes region, refugees either have been the source of cross-border political conflicts or have escalated such conflicts. Refugees have over time continued to be source of conflicts both to the country of asylum and country of origin. Refugees have also been of effect to other third countries. Here, the challenge Refugee law has can be of two types: One is that, refugee law has not been effective in preventing cross-border political conflicts that results from refugee flow. The other is that, refugees have not been effectively protected by refugee law. These two challenges to refugee law have generated or escalated cross-border consequences that are political in nature. On the other hand, refugee law has not been effective because member countries especially those of the Great Lakes region have not been willing to implement refugee law effectively or they lack resources and face technical obstacles to do so.⁹ This implementation problem of refugee law has degenerated to cross-border political conflicts. Unless refugee law is applied effectively and in good faith, refugee problem will continue to be the source of cross-border political conflicts or will continue to escalate the already existing conflicts.

Over time, refugees have been considered to be victims of conflicts and natural catastrophes. Some refugees have left their countries with a desire to return soon while others have left their home country with no desire to return soon or even in the near future. Although this later group of refugees as can be characterized by Rwandan refugees in Uganda can be considered to be less violent in generation or escalation of conflicts, they have often found themselves in difficult situation, which has forced or

⁹ P. Nobel, "Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa" in Transnational Legal Problems Of Refugees, op.cit., p. 262.

induced them to conflict generation or escalation as a survival technique. “Many Tutsis Chose not to be helpless victims, joined Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) against their common foe.”¹⁰ Although Rwandan refugees in Uganda did not contemplate returning to Rwanda for a long time due to memory of suffering, the political situation that unfolded over years in their country of asylum (Uganda) made the memory recede.¹¹ With receding memory and suffering faced by Rwandese refugees in Uganda, Rwanda that had been perceived with pessimism gradually started being perceived as a land of “milk and honey” after thirty years of exile.¹² Persistent attempt by Hutu dominated government in Rwanda to prevent peaceful repatriation of its refugees forced Rwandese refugees especially those in Uganda to use violence as a means of return home.¹³ On the other hand, the former Hutu leaders of former Rwandan government who went to Zaire during and after the genocide were determined to return to Rwanda violently.¹⁴

Refugees precipitate to cross-border political conflicts. They do so by creating conflict situation in the local communities where they settle, they also influence the politics of the host country, they destabilized and contend legitimacy of their home government, and they draw other actors like UNHCR, NGO and Humanitarian urgencies to the conflict. Therefore, as long as there are refugees in a region, cross-border political conflict will continue to be generated and those already existing ones will escalate and protract.

¹⁰ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op. cit. p. 40.

¹¹ G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide, op. cit. p. 66.

¹² Ibid., p. 66. see also IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op. cit. P. 40.

¹³ O. Otunnu, “An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)” in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke Eds., The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., pp. 31-49.

¹⁴ A. H. Gnamo, “The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu’s Kelptocracy” in H. Adelman & A. Suhrke (eds.), The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda to Zaire, op. cit., pp. 330-331.

Although refugee protection is important, offering refugees asylum is not a solution to cross-border political conflicts. The data explored and presented in this study illustrates refugees and their movements as precipitating to cross-border political conflicts. Refugees generate conflicts, those already existing protract while others escalate with refugee crisis.

As observed in this study, the presence of mass refugees precipitates to cross-border political conflicts in a region. This means that conflicts and their dysfunctional effects will continue to inflict regions that have mass refugees. Therefore, the solution to cross-border political conflicts does not entirely rest on offering refuge to refugees, but goes deeper to address the root causes of refugee flows. A conflict continue to exist as long as long as refugees exist.

The study generally reveals that Rwandese refugees have had significant contribution to the generation, escalation and promotion of cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Management of Rwandese refugee crisis and its cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region did not incorporate all significant actors. The management process of both the Rwandese refugee crisis and conflicts in the Great Lakes region suffered methodological deficient. The management methodology followed either strategy or peace research. The problem with these two methodologies is that, they are power based and can not lead to legitimized relationship among actors in the conflict hence resolution of the conflicts.¹⁵ They only settle conflicts for a while and such conflict will erupt when the existing balance of power is re-aligned. This led to the settlement of refugee crisis and conflict in the region. Settlement of

¹⁵ A. J. R. Groom, "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher" in J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds) Conflict Readings in Management and Resolution, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 85-89.

refugee crisis leaves the crisis and the conflicts to persist even though they may not be overt.¹⁶

Rwandese refugee crisis internationalized the initial Rwandan conflict. Rwandese refugees drew diverse actors to the Rwandan conflict. In turn, the diverse actors introduced their interests into the Rwandan conflict. This complicated the management of the initial Rwandan conflict and the other conflicts in the Great Lakes region. When the interests of the parties in the conflict, the conflict management process and the outcome of the process are not taken care of, such parties will sabotage the process and the outcome of the process. Therefore, the management initiatives did not seek to resolve refugee crisis and its effects on cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region. This led to the generation, protraction and escalation of conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

The management of the Rwandese refugee crisis and its effects on cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region did not seek to construct of legitimized relationship among diverse actors involved. The management efforts were based on power and its manipulation. This resulted to the protraction, escalation and generation of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. There were no attempts to building a conflict resolving framework. Therefore, Rwandese refugees precipitated to cross-border political conflicts in the Great Lakes region.¹⁷

It is recommendable that conflict management efforts should not only address the conflicts directly, but also address causes and factors that lead to generation and protraction of conflict. Since conflicts generate refugees, refugees equally generate

¹⁶ M. Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management op. cit. p. 40.

¹⁷ IPEP, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, op. cit. pp. 39 and 132.

conflicts. Therefore, conflict management efforts should endeavor to address refugee problem. Conflict management initiative should not only focus on offering refugees asylum, but should go deeper to address the causes of refugee flow. Conflict management initiative should endeavor to incorporate all significant actors in the search for the solution to conflicts. Such attempt should reject the power basis of conflict management owing to the fact that power creates friction that may protract the conflict.

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